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P H I L E B U S,

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D I A L O G U E

CONCERNING

THE CHIEF GOOD OF MAN.

THE FIRST PART.

L O N D O N :

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P H I L E B U S,

A

D I A L O G U E

CONCERNING

THE CHIEF GOOD OF MAN.

T O

THE HONOURABLE

Mr. *T O W N S H E N D,*

AND TO HIS SONS, (WORTHY OF

THEIR FATHER AND THEIR NOBLE ANCESTRY,)

The Right Hon. Mr. THOMAS TOWNSHEND,

A N D

CHARLES TOWNSHEND, Esq;

T H I S T R A N S L A T I O N O F

T H E P H I L E B U S O F P L A T O

I S

MOST RESPECTFULLY OFFERED

B Y

their much obliged,

and most obedient Servant,

FLOYER SYDENHAM.

At neque nos agere hæc, patriæ tempore iniquo,
Possumus æquo animo; neque Memmî clara propago,
Talibus in rebus, communi d'esse salutis.

T H E

A R G U M E N T.

*T*H E proper Subject of this Dialogue is The Chief Good of Man: the Design of it is to shew, that Man's chief Good is Moral Virtue.—The Subject is introduced, by stating the different Opinions of Socrates and Philebus, concerning the Nature of That Good, wherein the Happiness of Man is to be found;—Opinions, which, it seems, they had just before severally avowed.—Philebus, a Man strongly prepossessed with the Doctrine of Aristippus, had asserted, that this Good was Pleasure,—meaning Pleasurable Sensation, or Pleasure felt thro the outward Senses. On the other hand, Socrates had supposed the Sovereign Good of Man to be placed in Mind, and in the Energys of Mind on Mental Subjects.—Philebus, in support of his own Assertion, had been haranguing, for a long Time together, after the Manner of the Sophists; until he found his Spirits and Imagination, or perhaps his Stock of plausible Arguments, quite exhausted. He had therefore de-
sired

fred his friend Protarchus, a young Gentleman, who appears to have been a Follower of Gorgias, to take up the Controversy, and carry it on in His Stead and Behalf. Protarchus had consented, and had engaged himself so to do. Immediately on this Engagement, at this very point of time, the present Dialogue commences: accordingly, it is carried on, chiefly between Socrates and Protarchus. But, as Philebus is the Principal Person, whose Opinion combats against That of Socrates,—and as no higher a Character is given to Protarchus, than That of Accessary, or Second to Philebus, in this argumentative Combat, the Dialogue, now before us, very properly, and consistently with the Rule¹, which Plato seems to have laid down to himself in naming his Dialogues, hath the Name given it of Philebus.—In all the printed Editions it is intitled A Dialogue concerning PLEASURE. The general Account of it, just now given, shows, that with equal reason it might be intitled A Dialogue concerning MIND. But, in truth, neither Pleasure, nor Mind, (considered as intelligent,) is the principal Subject, herein treated of. Inquiry indeed is made into the nature of Pleasure, and the nature of Mind; but this is done with no other apparent or professed View, than to make it evident, that Neither of them, singly, and separately from the Other, can ever constitute the Happiness of such a Compound-Being as Man. Not, that the

¹ See the Synopsis, or General View, page 22.

Drift of these Inquirys is meerly Negative, or tends only to show, *What is not the Chief Good of Man.* For the Insufficiency of either Mind alone, or Pleasure alone, to Human Happiness, being in the course of the Dialogue acknowledged by Both Partys, naturally leads them to inquire into the essential nature of that Chief Good ;—and *What it is, which either constitutes or produces the Happiness of Man.*—If then this Inquiry appears to be made in the Philebus, and if the Dialogue is found to end with the Result of such Inquiry, we presume, that the Title, given to it in this Translation, is the fittest, and the most worthy of it, as being expressive of the principal Subject, therein treated of. Ficinus, however, intitles it *de Summo Bono*, concerning the Sovereign Good, (absolutely and universally,) without specifying its particular reference to the Human Nature. And it must be admitted, that he is very excusable in so doing. For the Principle of That which will appear to be the Chief Good of Man, will appear also to be the Essence of Good, Good Universal, and the Good of Every Being in Nature.—Be it observed, however, that, if the proper Title of this Dialogue be That, which is given it by Ficinus, it will follow, that the peculiar Design of it is to investigate the Divine Nature; and to point out to us, in *What* the Essence of the Supreme Being consists. But This is the great Design of Plato in all his Writings : every One of them hath This End ultimately

mately *in View*; and All of them conspire together to accomplish it. Perhaps indeed The Philebus contributes more to it than any One other Dialogue. For in *What Part of Nature, in What Rank of Things, thro What Medium, doth the Divine Being appear so conspicuous, as he does in the Mind, Heart, and Life of a wise and good Man? No other Being, (with whom We are acquainted here on Earth,) besides Man, appears to partake of those pure Forms, the Objects of the Divine Mind: no other Being, than Man, appears to be endued with Conscience, —that is, with a Feeling of God within him, or in his own Heart: and the Life of no other Particular Being, besides an honest and good Man, is a visible Display of thorow Integrity and universal Benevolence. By purifying our Ideas, we are, in some measure, united to the Divine Mind; by purifying our Hearts, we are united to the Divine Will; and by the Purity of our Lives, led in the constant Practise of Universal Justice, we partake of the Divine Goodness, and enjoy the Happiness of that Participation. Thro Wisdom and thro Virtue, thus it is, that a Man knows and feels within himself Truth and Good, never ceasing to spring up; and thus he not only draws from, but continually drinks at their pure Fountain. — Now 'tis well known, that the rational and usual way of discovering the Virtue of some particular River-waters, and how far they are corrupted by any extraneous Filth,*

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gathered

gathered in their Course, is to take out some of the Water, and to let it settle; then to draw or pour it off from the Sediment it has deposed; and then to strain or filter it. When all this is done, but not before, just Experiments may be made, to prove What are its inherent Qualitys. And these Qualitys being thus fairly ascertained, if afterwards we can trace the River upward to its Source, we may then discover, how much of its original and native Spirit the derived Stream has lost; and we may then reasonably conclude, that some subtle Particles of Earth and Air were so intimately mingled with it in its downward Flow, as not to be separable from it by the known Methods of Purification. In like manner we are first to become acquainted with the Virtue of our own peculiar Nature, its proper End, and true Good,—by separating in our Minds and viewing it apart from those foul Dregs of Evil which are mixed with it,—before we can, in the ordinary way of Reason, find the Fountain, from which our own Virtue, Good, and End, are derived; and before we can discover the nature of its everliving, pure, and undefiled Water.—Hence it appears, that, however the remote and ultimate Design of this Dialogue may be, (and most willingly we acknowledge that it is,) to lead us to a discovery of That which is absolutely and universally The Sovereign Good, yet the proximate and immediate Design ought to be, and is, to make us acquainted with the Nature and Essence of That which is

the Chief Good to Us.—It remains farther to be observed, on the Subject of this Dialogue, that the Investigation of the Chief Good of Man rightly sets out with the consideration of Pleasure,—a Good, which presents itself to our View the very First; as it is the most obvious of any, common to all Sentient Beings, and the only Good felt, even by Such of them as are Rational, before the Dawn of Reason.—Our Searches are then naturally led thro every Order of Good, which hath any Pretensions to be of the Final Kind, or Good for its own sake. We meet with All of these in this Dialogue; and find their Values, relative to Man, severally ascertained. Viewing the Philebus in this light, we may intitle it, not improperly, a Dialogue concerning Good,—that is, Good in general. Mr. J. Petvin has accordingly given it that Title, in his Letters on Mind, page 17. And in our Synopsis, page 18, we have followed his Example.—Thus much may suffice concerning the Name, the Title, the Subject, and the Design of this Dialogue: and if the Account, thus given, of these Articles of it be true, the wonderful Propriety of the Introductory Part,—as relative, not only to the Subject and Design, but also to the larger and argumentative Parts, the Body of it, and to the conclusive or finishing Part, the ἐντελέχεια and the Soul of it,—will justly be admired.—But no man can form a right Judgment of any Work, before the Work is finished; unless he has seen

THE ARGUMENT. II

the Plan or Model of it; or unless he has been otherways informed of the Purposes, to which all the Parts of it are meant to serve. 'Tis necessary therefore to a just Discernment of the Excellence of this Dialogue, in the masterly Composition of it, that a Reader, to whom it may be quite new, should be made acquainted, beforehand, with so much of the Conclusion, as will show the Connection of the larger Parts, and also of their Sub-divisions, and the Reference which they all have to the principal Design.—In the Conclusive Part then of the Dialogue, all the Kinds of Good, which are pursuable as Ends, (and one or other of which is actually pursued, as Such, by Every man, in the general Course of his Life,) are enumerated in Order, according to the relative Value of Each of them to Man;—an Order, settled by Socrates, in consequence of his whole preceding Argumentation.—First in Rank, and alone, stands Measure, —the Effence of all Good, and the Principle of all Moral Virtue;—running thro every Kind and Species of it; and guarding every Moral Action from those Excesses on the one side, and those Defects on the other, which it is ever in danger of.—In the Second Rank of Goods appear Symmetry and Beauty,—the Symmetry of a Man's whole Conduct as ruled by Measure, and the Beauty thence resulting;—together with Sufficiency and Fulness,—a sufficient and full Possession of all things requisite to Practic Virtue. —The Third Place is held by Mind, (considered as Intelligent,)

gent,) and Wisdom (considered as Speculative).—The Fourth Place is filled by Sciences, and Arts, and Right Opinions. — In the Fifth Rank we find the Pleasures, which we feel from Things Corporeal, thro the outward Senses of Sight, Hearing, and Smelling;—Pleasures, which are neither preceded, accompanied, nor followed by any Pain, either of the Soul, or of the Body. — In the Sixth and last Place, far behind all the other Goods, we discover, in a tumultuary Group, the Pleasures enjoyed by Animals of all Kinds,—the Pleasures of the Taste and of the Touch;—Pleasures, attended all of them, with Pain, either past, present, or to come.—Now these Six Kinds of Good, valued often for their own Sakes, without regard had to any farther Benefits, expected to accrue from them, are reducible to those Three, the Examining of which constitutes the Body of this Dialogue, — Virtue, Knowledge, and Pleasure. — This threefold Examination is set on foot, by supposing a Contest to have happened between Socrates and Philebus, concerning Pleasure and Knowledge, — Whether of these Two was the Chief Good of Man.—For neither Sophists nor Philosophers, in that age, seem to have thought of Virtue, as a fit Competitor with Either of the Two for so high a Character, until the Superiority of Virtue to Both the Others was shown by Socrates.—The Contest is supposed to have continued for some time, and to remain at last undecided; as every contested Point for ever must, — if

it

it be controverted in a declamatory way; unless the contending Partys are bound to abide by the Decision of some Authoritative Judge; or unless they will submit, by Agreement, to some Referee or Umpire. — The Mode therefore of Disputation is here changed,—from the Dogmatical, positively asserting, and flatly contradicting,—to the Dialectic, questioning and answering: for in this Socratic way of arguing, the Respondent, if in the wrong, may be confuted out of his own mouth.—To effect this Change, it was necessary to change the Person also of the Advocate for Pleasure,—from Philebus, a peremptory and fierce Dogmatist,—to Protarchus, who was candid, and gentle, and could hearken coolly to the Reasoning of an Adversary. This Change of Person gives occasion for a fresh Stating of the Controversy. And such an Occasion was necessary to be contrived; because it was necessary for the Readers of the Dialogue, to be informed, what Points were to be debated on. The like necessity occasioned most of the ancient Dramatic Pieces to be introduced by Prologues; in which the Audience were made acquainted with the Foundation of the Fable, then to be represented. But in this Dialogue, to state the Controversy, after it had been long on foot,—to propose the Points distinctly and at large, as at the first Opening,—to make this Repetition appear natural and proper, required much more Address, than to make a Prologue, giving only a simple Narrative

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of

of what had passed previous to the Drama. From these observations, a judicious Lover of Dialogue-Compositions will have pleasure in perceiving, with what Art Plato, the greatest Master in this Kind of Writing, has introduced his Dialectic Inquiry into the nature of Pleasure and the nature of intelligent Mind, Two of the Three Things to be examined.---With no less Art has he opened a Way for inquiring into the nature of the remaining Third, Moral Virtue; and for manifesting the superior Value of This, compared with Knowledge and with Pleasure. For, however the clear Reasoning of Socrates might be alone sufficient to make that Superiority appear evident to Persons attentive to his Reasoning,---yet no little Skill or Address were requisite to raise a proper Degree of Attention to an Hypothesis so paradoxical,---as it must seem to the Company, then around Socrates,---the Frequenters of the Lyceum; None of whom, 'tis probable, had ever considered any of the Moral Virtues, otherwise than as Means, subservient to the acquisition of Knowledge, or the enjoyment of Pleasure. But the Introduction to the Dialogue procures their Attention, and consequently prepares the Way to the Reasoning of Socrates on this additional Third Subject, by suggesting a Possibility, that the Chief Good of Man might consist neither in Knowledge nor in Pleasure, but in some Other Thing
(not

(not naming it,) hitherto perhaps unthought of. The Possibility of This, being tacitly admitted, raises their Expectation of some new plausible Hypothesis, and serves for a sufficient Ground to an Inquiry, at that time, new to the World.---On comparing the particular Account, now given, of the Introduction to this Dialogue, with the Extract, given just before, of the Conclusion,---every good Critick will admire the singular Art of our Author, in the Construction of the Whole. For he will perceive, that the Beginning regards the End, and is connected with it, by those intermediate Links, that form all the Middle Part, the Argumentative. And now indeed 'tis high time to give the Reader a Foretaste of the copious Entertainment, he may expect in this rich Repast. ---The Argumentation is divided into Three Parts, like Three plentiful Courses at a bounteous Table; Each being composed of a well-consorting Variety. For tho' the nature of Pleasure, and the nature of Mind, are severally considered in the First Part, as well as in the Second; yet in the Second Part only is Pleasure accurately and thorowly examined: the principal Subject of the First Part is Mind; which great Subject is there treated of in such a manner, as to insinuate, unperceived and secretly, what in the short Conclusive Part of the Dialogue will appear openly,---that "MIND is both the Cause and the Principle of that Best of human things, Moral Virtue. ---The

---The First of the Argumentative Parts of the Dialogue layeth the Foundation of these Inquiries in the Samenesses and Differences of Things. For Sameness and Difference are found together in all things;---Difference of Species, where a Sameness is of the Kind,---Accidental Difference, (or perhaps, sometimes, only Numerical,) where a Sameness is of the Species. The Philosopher's Design, in laying this Foundation, seems to be none other, than to confute the Opinion of Philebus; who made no difference between any one Pleasure of Sense and any other, except what arose from their differing in Degree; that is, from the More and the Less of Pleasure: as tho Things, agreeing in some Genus, differed only in Magnitude or Quantity, One of the Accidental Differences, belonging to Individuals of the same Species. But a much greater Difference than This, being shown by Socrates, between Things differing in their essential Qualities, (as being of different Genera, tho perhaps agreeing in some higher Genus,) prepares the way for that clear Distinction, made afterwards, between the Fifth and the Sixth Rank of Goods, --- between the pure and harmless Pleasures, and Those to which is annexed always Pain, and frequently Destruction.---The principal Design, however, of beginning the Argumentation in this way, is to unfold the nature of Intelligence (or intelligent Mind) and Science, (or real Knowledge,) by revealing at once their

their Principles: from which it will appear at the same time, how much the Sources of Pleasure differ from those of Mind.---Now the Principles of Mind are by the Pythagoreans termed Unity and Number. Plato in this Dialogue, by the words One and Many, means the same Principles: he means One divisible into Many, Each of which Many is One; just as every Number is divisible into Unites: and he means Many united, or combined in One; just as a certain Quantity of Unites combined together makes some One certain Number. But neither Infinite Number, nor Indefinite Multitudes, are Objects of the Mind; they are but obscure Objects of Imagination which is boundless, or of Sensation blind and undistinguishing.---Sense perceives, clearly and distinctly, One Thing or Being at a time, and no more;---a One, which is not divisible into Many Ones, Each of them, by its self, a whole intire Thing or Being;---but a One, divisible only into Parts, not One of which Parts is any Thing or Being, independantly, or subsisting by its self.---But 'tis the nature of Mind, to perceive, at one and the same time, Many Things or Beings comprised, all of them, in One.---Individual Beings therefore, of whatever Species and Kind they are, --- being infinite, and divisible only into Parts, and those again into Parts smaller, ad infinitum,---fall under the Perception of Sense only, and not under the Cognizance of the Understanding. The Objects of Mind are those Universals which run thro all things; and, besides these, the Genera and the

Species of things; a Genus, together with all its Species, numbered by the Mind;---a Species, common to all the Individuals of it, Many Ones without Number; to which numberless Many no Mind descends: for Mind dwells for ever in the Region of Numbers definite and certain. It is only by knowing these Principles of Mind, One and Many, or Unity and Number, that we can distinguish between Mind and Sense, or between Science and Sensation: and 'tis necessary² to the right understanding of this Dialogue, accurately to settle the Bounds between them. What these Bounds are, appears from the Account above given. It appears, that in Man Mind and Intellection begin from, and end with, the least One and Many,---the lowest Species,---That, which borders on Infinity: and it appears, that Sensation, and the Use of the Organs of Sense, begin with the Infinity of Things individual, and never end, but with the Extinction of all outward Sense.---Mind, says Aristotle, is the Beginning or Principle of Science³. It must be so, if the very Essence of Mind, considered as intelligent, is

² For the sake therefore of Readers unacquainted with Plato, we have gone a little out of our way; by inserting, in this summary Account of the *Matters*, contained in The *Philebus*, and of their *Order*, an *Elucidation* of Plato's Doctrine concerning the difference between αἰσθητὰ *Things Sensible*, and νοητὰ *Things intelligible*; whereas the proper place of it would be among the Explanatory Notes to the Second Part of this Dialogue.

³ Λέγω νῦν, ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης. *Analyt: Poster: L. 1, C. 23.* and again, Νῦν δὲ εἰς ἐπιστήμης ἀρχὴν. *L. 2, C. 19.*

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One and Many united.----*But the consideration of Mind, as One and Many, reaches not to the whole nature of Mind; not showing it to be the Cause and Principle of Virtue. After This therefore, the great Philosopher takes a wider Scope, for the Ground, on which to build his Inquiries; so as that all the Kinds of Good, enjoyed by Man, may be therein included. He proceeds to consider next, the nature of the whole Universe, as divisible into Four Sorts of Things.---Of the FIRST SORT are all Such, as are Objects of any of the Five Senses, or which any way affect the Sensitive Soul;---the Qualitys, and Quantitys, and all other Attributes of Corporeal Substances, considered as they are in themselves, apart from those Substances, of which they are the Attributes. And because the Nature of all these Attributes of Body is indefinite and general, Each admitting an infinite Number of Degrees, (as may appear from the instances of Hot and Cold, Soft and Hard, Great and Little, High and Low,) this First Sort of Things is termed INFINITE. To this Sort belong all the Materials, employed by Plastic Nature, in the Generation, Growth, and Maintenance of all Natural Beings;—not only Such of those Materials, as are Particles of the Four Elements of all Compound-Bodys, but Such also, as are minute Mixtures of those Elementary Particles. Among the Infinites are also to be ranked all the Materials, made use of by Man, in any of the Works of Art; whether the*

Materials are taken from Natural or from Artificial Forms, from Such of either Kind as are destroyed, whether by Violence or by Time.—Things of the SECOND SORT are those Bounds, which are set by Plastic Nature, and Those also by Artist-Man, to the infinite Materials above-mentioned;—by Nature, in the creating of Her Beings,—by Man, in the framing of His Works:—Bounds, set to those Primary Qualitys of Body, Hot and Cold, Moist and Dry, by mixing Part of Each of the Four Elements with its Contrary, in a degree proportioned to the nature of That Form, which is intended to be made:—Bounds, set to those other Qualitys of Body, termed Secondary, by means of Compound-Mixtures, in such Proportions to each other, as accord to the nature of the whole Compound-Body:—Bounds, set to Quantitys, by definite Numbers:—Bounds to the Activity, Passiveness, and other relative Attributes of Corporeal Substances, by intermingling these Substances in certain Quantitys, adapted to the Natures, Uses, or Ends of the intended Corporeal Forms.—To this Second Sort of Things is given the general Term BOUND, because Bound is common to them all: and to This Sort belong the Genera, or Generic Powers, of all corporeal Beings; and their Species, or Specific Forms;—those Powers and those Forms, by which the Nature of each of those Beings is determined,—by which it is essentially distinguished from all others of different Kinds or of different

ferent Species,——and from which the Being receives its true Definition and proper Denomination.——But these Genera and Species, these Numbers and Proportions, which every where, in the Sensible World of Nature, bound the Infinitude of Things, we are, on the one hand, not to confound with those Intelligible Forms, the eternal Ideas of the Divine Mind; and on the other hand, we are to separate them λόγῳ (or consider them apart) from the Individual Beings, which are endued with any of these General Powers, and invested with any of these Specific Forms. For the Archetypal Forms, the Divine Ideas, belong to the Fourth Sort of Things; as we hope to make appear in Note 167: and the Individual Beings of Nature, copied from those original and eternal Forms, belong to the Sort of Things, to be mentioned next.—For the THIRD SORT comprehends all Forms Corporeal; the Substratum or Substance of which Forms is the First or Common Matter, —That Infinite, which is the Ground of Infinity in All of the First Sort of Things; the Bounds to which Infinite are every where set by the great Mind of Nature:—it comprehends all the Beings of Outward Nature, produced into Existence successively in Time, flourishing for a while, and then perishing; and all the Beauty, spread over these temporary Beings, varying and changing, as the Forms of these Beings are changed or vary:—it comprehends all the Performances, Operations, and Works of Human Artists,

Artists, *making use of Such of those infinite Materials above-mentioned, as are within their Power; to form or fashion irregular Figures according to their own Minds; to give Measure to Motions, Harmony to Sounds, and Meaning to Voices articulate; or to amend the decayed but mendable, and recover the hurt but recoverable, Works of Art or Nature. And rightly are all Things of this Third Sort, placed by Plato after those of the First and Second Sorts; for, in the Order of Nature, they actually come after: Infinitude and Bound must be presupposed in Nature, before any temporary or transient Form, where Infinitude receives a Bound, can be generated, produced, or made.*

—Beings of the FOURTH SORT are Such, as give Existence to Those of the Third Sort; to the external, changeable, and temporary Forms;—namely, the Mind of Nature, to Nature's Works;—and the Minds of Men, to the Productions of Human Art.—To this Fourth Sort of Being Plato gives the general Denomination of CAUSE: concerning which it may at present suffice to say, that the Final, the Formal, and the Efficient Causes of all Things existing are comprehended therein: for a more explicit and particular account of it, we refer the Reader to Note 167; in which Note some Reasons also are assigned, to show, why Cause is spoken of the Last of the Four Sorts of Beings, or Things, in the Universe; altho in the Order of Nature it is evidently the First. — Our Philosopher's Design, in
making

making this Division of Things, is to lay before us the nature of Pleasure, the nature of Intelligent Mind, and the nature of Moral Virtue:—it is to show, that all the Pleasures of Sense belong to the First Sort of Things, the Infinite;—all the Energys of Mind, to the Fourth Sort, Cause;—and all the Virtues peculiarly Human, the Moral Virtues, belong to the Second Sort, Bound;—and that Man, the Subject at once of Moral Virtue, Knowledge, and Pleasure, belongs to the Third Sort; as Man is One of the Beings of Nature, in Every one of whose Beings the Infinity of Matter is bounded by Form; but of these Beings Man is the Only one, capable of enjoying all the Three Kinds of Good, Pleasure, Knowledge, and Moral Virtue.—Here it must be observed, that, if the First of the Argumentative Parts of this Dialogue has been now represented rightly, and the Drift of the Argumentation been well explained, no Conclusions, regarding Pleasure, can be drawn from it, beside these;—first, that Pleasure is infinite in its own nature;—and secondly, that 'tis divisible into Many;—but whether these Many are many different Kinds and Sorts of Pleasure, as Socrates had intimated before; or whether they are an infinite number of particular and distinct Pleasures, differing only in Quantity, or Degree of Pleasure, but alike in This,—that All of them are good, and conducive to the Happiness of Man, as Philebus had asserted, — hath not as yet appeared.

appeared.—The Second Argumentative Part of the Dialogue, in making a particular and minute Inquiry into the nature of Pleasure, distinguishes all those agreeable Sensations, called by the general name of Pleasure, into certain Sorts, very different, one from another. But, previously to the making of any Distinction into Sorts, in order to show, that such a Distinction is founded in Nature, Three Points are proposed to be considered. —The First is,—of what Kind the Beings are, which are susceptible of Pain, as well as of Pleasure. Now on this Head, 'tis evident, that all such Beings are Animals; that is, Beings Corporeal, animated by Sentient Souls; but whose Bodys are generated, gradually grow to their mature State, last for a time by means of Nourishment, and at length decay and are dissolved;—Bodys, which, all the time they last, undergo continual Changes of their State, thro the alternate Emptiness and Repletion of their inward Receptacles or Vessels, which contain the Matter of their Nourishment; — Bodys, which require frequent Supplies of Food, to fill the place of what passes away from them, in natural Excretions, by various Outlets.—The Second Consideration is,—at what Times such Animals feel Pleasure, and at what Times they feel Pain. And on this Head, 'tis evident from our own Experience, (for Man is an Animal of this Kind,) that a Retention of whatever ought to be excreted and thrown off, (as
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for instance, internal Air and other perspirable Fluids, after they have been duly circulated thro the Body,) is always followed by Pain or Uneasiness; and that every due Excretion, and every natural Evacuation, is attended by a total Cessation of Pain, or by a Relief and Ease, so agreeable to nature, as to be often termed a Pleasure. Again; from the Emptiness, consequent to these Excretions and Evacuations, we feel Uneasiness and Pains arising in the Body; and on the other hand, we feel, that Pleasure accompanys the timely taking of nutrimental Food, by which all the empty Vessels are replenished.—Thirdly,—since every Animal consists of a Body and of a Soul,—and since the Soul in Animals of the more perfect Kinds, chiefly in Man, is the Seat of Imagination, Memory, Passions, and Affections, as well as of Sensation,—it is considered, in what Part of its Composition such an Animal feels Pain and Pleasure. And on this Head, 'tis found also from Experience, that the Body, animated throughout with Sentient Soul, may feel either Pain or Pleasure, and yet, the Memory and Imagination, the Passions and Affections of the Soul, may all the while lye dormant and unmoved;—that, on the other hand, the Soul may feel either Pain or Pleasure, when the Body is sensible of neither, and even when the Organs of Sensation are totally untouched:—that sometimes the Soul and the Body are pained or

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delighted,

delighted, Both of them together ;—and that again, at other times, opposite Feelings at once prevail, Pleasure in the One, while Pain is in the Other.—These Considerations are made the Ground of many Distinctions, laid down by Socrates, between the several Pleasures, which we receive from external Things, by means of our outward Senses.—The First Distinction is between the Pleasures, which are perfectly pure, unmixed with any Pain, either subsequent or precedent,—and the Pleasures on the other hand, whose Presence is preceded by Pain, in proportion to their Magnitude, or which at their Departure leave a Sting behind them, a Regret of their Absence and a Longing for their Return. — After this, other Differences, equally wide, are shown by Socrates, and admitted by Protarchus to be real, between the harmless Pleasures and the hurtfull ; between the gentle, and the fierce ; the true Pleasures and the false ; the right Pleasures and the wrong ; Those which are consistent with Rational Delights, and Those on the other hand, which exclude for a time, and at length banish for ever, all Mental Objects, and all Self-Enjoyment.—When the Pleasures of Sense have been thus sifted ; and a Separation has been made of the pure from the impure ; Distinctions are laid down between the different Arts, exercised by Man, as they are more or less built on Science ; and as they have more or less of Certainty in
their

their Performances : some Arts depending chiefly on Sagacity and Experience ; while others proceed with the assurance of Truth in all their Operations. A Distinction is also taken between some Sciences, and others bearing the same Name ;—a Distinction, with respect to the difference of the Subjects, in which they are conversant ;—as, for instance, between the Arithmetick of Mathematicians, the Subject-Matters of which Science are invariable Numbers, Each consisting of Monads, all of them, equal,—and, on the other hand, the Arithmetick, which is used in Common Speech, and applied to Things Corporeal, Each of them One, but variable, and of unequal Value.—By these Distinctions the Philosopher leads Protarchus to recognise the superior Excellence of the Science of Mind above all others,—a Science, conversant in those Subjects only, which are the same for ever. And thus also are we led to a discovery of the nature of pure Mind, as it is the Seat of eternal Truth, and the Fountain of all real Science, of all true Art, and of all Right Opinions.—In the Third and last Argumentative Part of this Dialogue, those Moral Truths are shown, which it is the whole Intent of it to show, in the following Order :—the First is, that neither Pleasure alone, nor Theoretical Wisdom or Knowledge alone, is sufficient for the Happiness of any Man.—The Second is, that the best and happiest of all human Lives is That Life, in which the best and highest Science, the

D 2

Knowledge

Knowlege of True Good, *produceth into habitual and constant Praëfise the Moral Virtues; Each of them, attended by a peculiar Satisfaction; and All of them, embracing fuch purer Pleasures of Sense, as Outward Nature presents to them on every Quarter, and for which They alone have a true unadulterated Taste: — a Life, in which the Prime Science, just now mentioned, rightly estimating the Value and the Use of every other Science and of every Human Art, entertains them all, together with their concomitant Delights; assigning to Each his proper Place, and Time of Exhibition;—receiving also frequent but fhort Visits from the groflier Pleasures of Sense,—from Such, as are necessary to the support of Life and Health and Strength;—but constantly refusing ever to admit Such, as interrupt and hinder the Arts in their Exercifes; Such, as drive the Sciences into Oblivion; Such, as impair the Health of the Body, and diminish every Faculty of the Soul; Such, as profess Enmity with sober Reason, and are utterly incompatible with the Science of True Good.—*

The Third Moral Truth is this, that in a Life, where Pleasure and Knowlege are thus amicably joined, and operate together for the Good of the whole Man,—a Life, where all the Parts of it are exactly proportioned and fitted to each other,—Symmetry, Harmony and Beauty appear throughout.—The last and higheft Truth, no lefs Theological than Moral, is This, that the Cause of

the

the Happiness found in such a Life, is the Same with the Cause of Harmony, Symmetry, and Beauty thro the Universe; and the Same with the Principle and Effence of Moral Virtue;—namely, MEASURE its Self, and TRUTH its Self,——the IDEA OF GOOD, the great Object of the Divine Mind;—in which Universal Idea the True Measures of All things are contained.——Thus have we endeavoured to point out the Method of this Capital Dialogue, the Philebus; and the Series, Order, and Connection of its Argumentative Parts.——As to the Epilogus or Conclusion of it, where the Particular Matters, reasoned in it, are summed up and recapitulated, enough has been said before, for the Purpose of this Argument.—The apparent Form of the Dialogue is Dramatic; the Genius of it, Didactic; and the Reasoning, for the most part, Analytical⁴.

⁴ See the *Synopsis*, page 7.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,

S O C R A T E S,
P R O T A R C H U S,
P H I L E B U S¹.

S C E N E,

T H E L Y C E U M².

¹ For the Characters of *Protarchus* and *Philebus*, see the *Argument* of this Dialogue, pages 5, 6, and 13.

² See Note on the *Scene of the Greater Hippias*.

P H I L E B U S.

SOCRATES.

CONSIDER¹ now, Protarchus! What the Doctrine of Philebus is, which you are taking upon yourself to second and support; and What things, said by Me, you are going to controvert, if they should be found Such as are not agreeable to your Mind². Will you permit me to state, in a summary way, the difference between My Positions and those of Philebus?

PROTARCHUS.

By all means.

¹ The Beginning of this Dialogue supposes, that much Conversation had passed, immediately before, between *Socrates* and *Philebus*: concerning which Conversation, or rather Controversy, the Reader is referred to the *Argument*, page 5.

² The restrictive Clause, which concludes this Sentence, is perhaps *intended* to suggest a Thought, that *Protarchus*, when he undertook to controvert the Position of *Socrates*, had not examined it sufficiently; nor had considered, whether he was, or was not, of the same Opinion Himself. The Possibility of such an Intention may appear from the Two next Notes.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Philebus then says, that The Good of all Animals is Joy, and Pleasure, and Delight³, and whatever else
is

³ This Part of the Sentence, to give it a literal translation, runs thus,—*that 'tis good for all Animals to rejoice, and (to feel) Pleasure and Delight, &c.*—But in translating it, we chose to give it That Meaning, which is rightly presumed by *Socrates* to be agreeable to the Sentiments of *Philebus*: for otherwise, there would be no *opposition* between the Opinion of *Philebus* and his own. *Pleasure* might be a good thing; and yet *Knowledge* might be a better.—But from what follows in this Dialogue it appears, that, in the Opinion of *Philebus*, *Pleasure* and *Good* are Terms *synonymous*, and signify the same Thing: the Consequences of which Opinion are these;—that *all Pleasure* is good; and that *no other* thing is good, *beside* Pleasure. See Note 35.—Now *Socrates* knew, that the Term *Pleasure* had a *vague Meaning*: that often it meant some agreeable Sensation, felt by the Soul from Things Corporeal, thro the medium of her own *Body* and its *Organs* of Sensation,—whenever any such Organ, either of the *Sight, Hearing, Smell, Taste, or Feeling*, meets with an Object suitable to it;—whether the Sensation *refreshes, or exhilarates, or soothes* the *Animal-Spirits*; and whether it *irritates, or convulses, or softens* the Whole or any Part of the *Nervous Frame*; he knew that every one of these different Sensations in the Soul, by means of the *Body*, was termed *Pleasure*:—that the same Term often signified an agreeable *Passion*, felt by the Soul *immediately*, and arising in her thro her own Facultys of *Memory* and *Imagination*, whenever these Facultys exhibit to her, as if *present*, any *future* Object, suited to those Bodily Organs of Sense, thro which she has heretofore received any *Pleasure*, of the Kind *before-mentioned*.—

He

is congenial to them, and harmonises with all other Things of the same Kind. And what I contend for is, that

He had heard the Term *Pleasure* sometimes used, to express a delightful Sensation, felt by the Human Soul, when some Object, suited to her higher Facultys of *Reason* and *Understanding*, presents itself to her View;—any *Truth* of *Science*, whether Speculative or Practic;—any *Regularity* or *Order* in the Works of *Art*, or in those of *Nature*.—He had heard the same word, *Pleasure*, made use of at other times, to express the heart-felt *Satisfaction*, enjoyed by All of Human Kind, and by Many of the Brutal, in *gratifying* their natural and social *Affections*:—and not infrequently, to express a Kind of *Exultation*, felt by Virtuous Souls, on reading or hearing the recital of *noble* and *generous Actions*, performed by Any of their own Species:—or to express certain *Feelings* of the *same Kind*, but sinking deeper, and diffused thro the whole Soul, from a *Consciousness* of her own *Right Conduct*, in acting bravely and honestly, or in benefiting Those with whom she is connected.—He had heard the Term, *Pleasure*, applied by Some to That *Cheerfulness*, — That sober and innocent *Gaiety* of Spirit, — naturally flowing from a social and benevolent Disposition of Mind:—and by Others perhaps in His time, as afterwards it was applied by *Epicurus*, to the constant *Serenity* and *Tranquillity* within every Soul, conscious of no Injustice,—freed from all permanent Passions,—unmolested by her own Body, as well as by Things which concern that Body,—and at liberty to enjoy her Self.—Nay, 'tis probable, that in That philosophic Age and Country, as well as elsewhere since, Those *rapturous* and *elevated* Sentiments were sometimes termed *Pleasures*,—Those, which the Soul feels but rarely, and only for a few precious Moments of time,—when, insensible of her

Body, and of the *World without*, she is retired to that secret and sacred Place within her Self,—where, with her Eye clear, and brightened by the Light of Universal Mind, there present, she beholds and converses with those fair and perfect Ideas, which That Light enables her to see,—and where she finds her Self, for the time, in so godlike a State, as to *want Nothing* to compleat her Happiness. — Now it may be reasonably supposed, that *Aristippus*, the First celebrated Teacher of the Doctrine espoused by *Philebus*, did, at different times, use the Term *Pleasure* homonymously, to mean these different Enjoyments,—viz. *Sensual, Rational, Moral, Social, Intellectual*, and That also which approaches to *Divine Happiness*;—by such a fallacious and sophistical Variation, endeavouring to support his favourite Doctrine,—“that *Pleasure* was the *only Good* of Man, *eligible for its own sake*, and therefore to be proposed as his *only End*.” — This Supposition seems probable, because the *Epicureans* afterwards, who adopted for their own That Doctrine of *Aristippus* and his Followers, (from the Country of their Founder termed *Cyrenaicks*,) were so unsettled in their use of the word *Pleasure*, as to attribute to it, on different occasions, those several Meanings above-mentioned.—To be convinced that the *Epicureans* were thus unsettled, we have only to compare the *Epistle of Epicurus to Menæceus*, with some other *Sentences* of that Founder of the *Epicurean Sect*, recorded by *Laertius*, but more fully by *Cicero* in *Disputat: Tusculan: L. 3, §. 18*. See also *Seneca* in his *Treatise de Vitâ Beatâ*, Cap: 6, 12, 15, and 19. and his *Epistles* 66 and 78.—But, whatever Expressions were used by the *Cyrenaicks*, we see, that *Socrates*, in the Sentence now before us, to prevent all Ambiguity and all Prevarication, uses other Terms, beside *Pleasure*; he couples with it *Joy* and *Delight*; and by the Words, “*whatever else is congenial*,” we presume he means *Cheerfulness, Ease, Tranquillity, Complacency, and Self-Satisfaction*. Thus he allows the utmost Latitude of

Meaning

Meaning to That Hypothesis, which *Protarchus* undertook to vindicate; and gives all possible Advantage to his Adversary's Cause. For, though it might fairly be supposed, (what afterward appears, more than once, in the course of this Dialogue,) that *Philebus* had principally in his view *Sensual Pleasures*, of the *grosser* Kinds,—the word *Delight* is added by *Socrates*; because it is a Term, generally applied to the *Pleasures* we receive thro our *Eyes* and *Ears*: and the word *Joy* is put *first*, because of its more extensive Meaning; as it includes every Feeling attendant on the Soul's Perception of Objects agreeable to her *Nature*: and if we understand the words,—“*whatever else is congenial*,”—to mean such Feelings as *Mental Tranquillity*, and *Self-Satisfaction*, we have then all those several Meanings, in which we said the Term *Pleasure* was homonymously used.—Farther; that *Plato*, in the latter, the *et cætera*-Part of the Sentence now before us, had a View to those Sentiments or Feelings last mentioned, those of a truly philosophic Soul, is probable from a passage in his *Cratylus*,—a Dialogue, in which is taught the Nature of Things, as well the permanent as the transient, by a supposed *Etymology* of Names and Words;—in that Dialogue, (pag: 419 of *Stephens's* Edition,) he briefly recites and explains all the agreeable Sensations or Affections of the Soul. The Three first, there enumerated, are the very same which are here specified,—ἡδονή, χαρά, τέρψις,—*Pleasure, Joy, Delight*: the Fourth he there terms εὐφροσύνη, *Cheerfulness*,—a Word, which, according to the Genius of that Dialogue, he supposes a contraction of εὐφροσύνη, and derived ἀπὸ τοῦ εὖ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν συμφέρεσθαι, from the easy Flow of the Soul, when she is amiably carried along with the natural course of things.—Now in this εὐφροσύνη, this *Cheerfulness*, all the remaining good Affections or Feelings of the Soul, before mentioned, we presume to be included; not only, because *Cheerfulness* arises naturally in the Soul from a *Consciousness* of her having and enjoying the natural, rational, and social,

that those Things are not the Best; but that to discern, and to understand ⁴, and to remember ⁵, and
 whatever

Affections,—but also, because a *constant* Cheerfulness can never be maintained without *frequently* enjoying some or other of those godlike Feelings.

⁴ The Hypothesis, here set up by *Socrates*, in opposition to the Sentiments of *Philebus*, seems to be the same with the Doctrine, said to have been taught, an age or two afterwards, by *Herillus* of *Carthage*. For this *Herillus*, who had been a Disciple of *Zeno* the *Citeæan*, Founder of the *Stoic* Sect, is reported by *Cicero*, (whether justly or not, may well be questioned,) to have held, that *Science* or Knowledge was the *Chief Good of Man*. But whatever was the Meaning of *Herillus*, when he set so high a Value on *Science*, it will soon appear, that *Socrates* himself entertained no such *Notions* on this Subject. It will appear afterwards, that this Hypothesis, which he here gives out, as if it were his own, is introduced by him for the sole purpose of explaining rightly that ancient Doctrine, —“ *that Mind is the Highest and the Best of Things*,”—by suggesting to our thoughts the Distinction, mentioned in our Argument and Notes to *the First Alcibiades*, between *Mind Intelligent* and *Mind Intelligible*. And lastly it will appear, that *MIND*, in this latter Sense, is *GOOD ITS SELF*, and *BEAUTY ITS SELF*; the *Cause*, (*Final* as well as *Formal*) of *Beauty*, *Harmony*, and *Good*, throughout the *Universe*; and in *Man*, who partakes of it, the *Principle* and *Cause* of *his* Chief Good, which is *Moral Virtue*. — The Terms made use of in this place by *Plato*, are very remarkable: they are—not *φρόνις καὶ νόσ*,—the *former* of which frequently means *Moral Wisdom*, or *Prudence*, the *Habit of discerning what is Good* in all *Moral Actions*, That *Habit*, which is the *Leading* or *Prime Virtue*,—and by the *latter* frequently is meant *Mind Intelligible*,

gible, That which is the *Fountain of Good*, the *Cause of Beauty*, the *Measure of all things*, and the sole *Principle of Virtue*: now, here he can neither mean *Virtue*, nor the *Principle of Virtue*; because we shall find, in the Conclusion of this Dialogue, that he rates These above all other Goods:—his words in this passage are—τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν,—that is,—the *actual Discernment* or *Knowledge* of what is the *best way of acting* in any *Affair* under immediate deliberation,—and the *actual Perception* of any *Truth*, then presented to the *Mind*.—Nor does it invalidate the *Justness* of this Remark, that in repeating the Hypothesis proposed by *Socrates*, the terms φρόνσις and νῆς are sometimes used by *Socrates* himself, as well as by *Protarchus*. For, the Hypothesis being once stated in precise and unambiguous *Terms*, and its *Meaning* consequently settled, and equally well understood by Both the *Partys*, they might thenceforward safely indulge themselves in a *Liberty* of changing the *Terms* for *Variety's* sake, and of using such others, as often conveyed the same *Meaning*.—It is well known by the learned in the Writings of ancient Greek Philosophers, that by the term νῆς they mean the *Intellect*, the *intelligent* or *percipient Principle* in the *Soul*, more frequently than they mean *Mind Intelligible* and *Eternal*.—And as to the other term φρόνσις, omitting many Passages in *Plato's Phædo*, where it signifies the *Energy* of the *Mind* in *discerning* what is *Good*, we need only refer to Two Passages in his *First Alcibiades*; in the former of which, the term, used by *Plato*, is τὸ φρονεῖν, which we have translated by the word *Intelligence*, page 320 of that *Dialogue*: in the latter, *Plato's* term is φρόνσις, Ours is *Wisdom*, page 321; which word we have there chosen, because the *Intelligence*, there spoken of, is That of the *Divine Mind*.

⁵ *To remember* does not here mean a retaining of the Impressions made by *Sensible Objects* in the *Imagination*; as it may seem to do from what is said of the *Memory* hereafter in this Dialogue. For
the

whatever is of Kin to them ⁶, Right Opinions ⁷, and True Reasonings ⁸, are better things than Pleasure, and
 more

the Souls of *Brute Animals* have this retentive Faculty, as well as those of *Men*. The Passage now before us hath relation only to the *Human Mind*. Here therefore is to be understood the *Mind's* retaining those *Mental Objects* only, which she had before conceived, by learning from Others, or thro her own Force and Virtue, as *Minerva* was said to have been born of *Jupiter* alone. This account is agreeable to the Definition, given us by the anonymous Writer of the *Life of Pythagoras* in *Photius*. Μνήμη μὲν ἐν ἐστὶ τήρησις ὧν ἔμαθ' ἐ τις. Now *Memory*, says he, is a *Keeping of those Things which a Man has learnt*: And still more does it agree with that of *Porphry*, in his *Ἀφορμαί*, §. 16. Ἡ μνήμη οὐκ ἐστὶ φαντασιῶν σωτηρία, ἀλλὰ μελετηθέντων. *The Memory is not a Preservation of Fancys*, or the Traces of Sensible Objects left in the Imagination, but of Things which have been studied, or to which the Mind has before applied her self. *Aristotle* includes both *Sensible* and *Mental Objects* in the account which he gives of *Memory*: and his account of it we shall endeavour to explain and justify, in a Note to that Passage of the present Dialogue, above referred to: for we think it a Subject of the last Importance to a Knowledge of the *Soul of Man*.

⁶ That is, of Kin to a *Discernment* of what is just and right in *Morals*, founded on what *Mr. Hutcheson* terms the *Moral Sense*;—of Kin to a *Perception* of what is true in *Metaphysics*, founded on the *Principles of Knowledge*; and of Kin also to a *Memory* of what the Mind has either of her Self discerned thro her own natural Feelings,—or has of her Self perceived thro her own Principles, the *Principles of Knowledge*,—or has learnt from Others, who, for the Rectitude

and the Truth of what they taught, must have secretly appealed to those *natural Feelings* and to those *untaught Principles*.

⁷ What the *Kindred* is between real *Knowledge* and *Right Opinion*,—in What they are *alike*, and in What they *differ*,—is shown by *Plato* himself, near the conclusion of his *Meno*.

⁸ That *true Reasonings* are of Kin to *Knowledge*, no Man needs to have it proved to him. They are the *ordinary Means*, by which every *Art* receives *Improvement*; altho the first *Invention* of it may be owing to *Sagacity*, or *Chance*: and they are the *only Means* of advancing in any *Science*, after the first Principles or *Axioms* of it are established.—Having explained, sufficiently, (it is hoped,) for the present, the Hypothesis, proposed by *Socrates*, in which he enumerates the principal *Affections* of the Human Mind; (for we know not by what other common name to call the *Impressions*, made on the *Mind* by Mental Objects,—the *Depth* and *Duration* of those Impressions,—and her own *Energys*, or the Motions within her Self, to which those Impressions give Rise;) we presume, that our philosophical Readers will not be displeas'd at stopping here a while, to observe the just Order of the Parts in this Passage.—In the first place are ranked the *discerning* of what is *right*, and the *perceiving* of what is *true*: and these are the Mind's primary and *chief Affections*; whether they spring up spontaneously therein from Natural Feelings and First Principles, thro Mental Introversion, Self-Reflection, and untaught Reason, — or whether they are rais'd by due Culture of the Mind, good Discipline, and wise Instruction.—In the next place stands, what cannot be in the Mind till after the two former, the *retaining* or *remembering* of what we have so *discerned* and felt, so *perceived* and understood.—After this, come *Right Opinions*: for these are founded on *remembering* what we have heretofore discerned and perceived, of Good and Truth, when this remembrance is applied rightly to Actions, or Things, of which we have no *certain Knowledge*.—Lastly are placed

more eligible to all Beings univerſally, that is, to Such as are capable of receiving the participation of them⁹; and that to all Beings, which have that capacity, the actual Partaking¹⁰ of them is of all things the moſt advan-

placed *True Reasonings*: and rightly are they placed the laſt in this Liſt of Mental Affections. For tho' the *Juſtneſs* of all Reaſoning depends immediately on the ſelf-evident *Principles of Mind* and of all Science, yet the *Truth* of what we *reaſon*, or prove by reaſoning, depends on the *Truth* of the *Premiſſes* laid down. For be our *Concluſions* ever ſo juſtly drawn, yet the *Premiſſes* being always *Propoſitions*, — and theſe *Propoſitions* being always, except in Geometrical Reaſoning, nothing more than *Opinions* expreſſed in Words, the *Truth* of which is not yet proved, and only taken for granted,—the *Truth* of the *Reaſoning* depends on the *Reſtitute* of thoſe *Opinions*.—As to the two Mental Affections, here firſt mentioned, the *Diſcernment* of what is *juſt*, and the *Perception* of what is *true*, Whether of theſe Two is, in the Order of Things, of ſuperior dignity to the Other, will appear in the concluding Part of this Dialogue.

⁹ Or, *of receiving a Share in them*; for the words of *Plato* in this place are,—*αὐτῶν δυνατὰ μεταλαβεῖν*.

¹⁰ Or, *the actual holding of a Share*; for the word, uſed here by *Plato*, is,—*μεταχεῖν*.—*Ficinus* is the only one of the *Translators* from the Greek, who has interpreted this Paſſage rightly. *Cornarius*, it ſeems, diſcerned no difference between the meaning of *μεταλαβεῖν*, and that of *μεταχεῖν*. So that His tranſlation repreſents *Plato* as guilty of a moſt inſipid *Tautology* in this Sentence. Which Error of his ſeems to have been the conſequence of another, committed by him, in his referring the word *μεταχεῖν* to the preceding

advantageous¹¹,—not only to those Beings which are¹², but to Those also which are to come.—Do we not, O Philebus!

preceding word *δυνατοῖς*. It is true, that the *Verbal Adjective* *δυνατοῖς* governs, as the Grammarians speak, a *Verb* of the *Infinitive Mood*: but the Verb, governed by it here, is *μεταλαβῆν*, a word to be understood from the preceding Part of the Sentence. The *Infinitive* *μεταχῆν*, in this latter Part of the Sentence, hath the Office of a *Noun Substantive* in the *Nominative Case*; just as *sapere* has in this Verse of *Horace*.

Scribendi rectè, sapere est & principium & fons.

and the mark of a *comma* should, in like manner, be printed immediately before it in the next Edition of *Plato*.

¹¹ Whatever is *good*, is certainly *advantageous* to the Being which *enjoys* that *Good*. But no *Good* can yield any *Enjoyment*, or be of any *Advantage*, to the Being to which it reaches, unless such *Good* be *agreeable* to the *Nature* of that Being. — Farther; Whatever is *agreeable* to the *Nature* of any Being *intelligent* and *sentient*, — that is, to any of its Powers of *Perception* or *Sensation*, — is an *Object* of *instinctive Love* or *Desire* to the Being possessed of such Powers. If then the *Ways*, thro which such an *Object* reaches to such a *Being*, are free and unobstructed, — that is, if the *Mediums* of *Perception* or *Sensation* are in a State of *agreeableness* and *fitness* to That Being, which is the *Subject* of this *Love* or *Desire*, as well as to That which is the *Object*, — thro these *Ways*, and by these *Means*, the *Desire* and the *Object* of it meet together, suited to each other, — the One, disposed to be gratified and to enjoy, — the Other, to gratify and to be enjoyed. — If the *Object* also of the *Desire* be either *intelligent* or *sentient*, as well as the Being which is the *Subject* of that *Desire*, in this case Both

the Beings feel that natural Delight or Pleasure, which arises, thro' all Nature, from the Congress of congenial and corresponding Beings, if they are either *intelligent* or *sentient*.—What we principally aim at, in making this last General Observation, will easily be seen in our Notes to the finishing Part of this Dialogue. Our immediate Drift at present is only an Appeal to the *Experience* of intelligent Readers, for the proof of *Joys* or *Delights* purely *Mental*; such as have no relation or reference to the *Body*; and in which no *Corporeal Feeling*, present, past, or future, has any Share. We have the assurance also of *Reason*, that it must be so, and cannot be otherwise. For, as every Animal, or *Sentient Soul*, naturally desires, pursues, and catches at *Sensible Good*, so the *Rational Soul* of Man, when disentangled from Sense, and freed from Passion, naturally loves, follows after, and embraces when found, every *Truth*, every *Intelligible* or *Mental Good*: because *Truth* is no less agreeable to the *Rational Nature*, than *Sensible Good* is to the *Animal*.—If then *Protarchus*, when he took upon himself to be an Advocate for *Pleasure*, had included, in his Meaning of that word, all such Pleasures as are purely *Mental*, his Opinion fairly and rightly understood, could not have been different, in the main, from This which *Socrates* here professes,—that, in every particular case, to discern what is *Best* in *Action*, and to perceive what is *True* in Speculation, is the *Chief Good of Man*; unless, indeed, it should afterwards come into question, whether of the Two Kinds of Pleasure, the *Sensual*, or the *Mental*, was to be preferred. For if it should appear, that in This Point they were Both of the same Mind, the Controversy between them would be found a meer Logomachy, or *Contention about Words*; such a one, as the *Epicureans* pretended, (and perhaps with reason,) was between Them and the *Stoicks*, when They (the *Epicureans*) maintained, that the *true Happiness* of Man was placed in that *Joy* or *Pleasure*, (for they make use of Both these words,) which arises from the habitual Practice of
Virtue,

Virtue, and inseparably attends it; while the *Stoicks* insisted, that it lay in *Virtue* only, abstracted from all its natural Issue and all its constant Retinue. See *Seneca*, in *Epist.*: 6, and 13.—A contention This, of the same Kind, as That would be between *Two Persons*, One of whom asserted, that to a Musical Ear the proper and true *Good* was *Harmony*; while the Other contended, that the *Good* lay not in the *Harmony* its self, but in the *Pleasure* which the Musical Ear *felt* from *bearing* it:—And, to add another Simile, which, as well as the former, tends to illustrate the concluding Part of this Dialogue, such a Contention is like a Controversy amongst *Three Persons*, One of whom having asserted, that to all Animals, living under the Northern Frigid Zone, the *Sun in Cancer* was the greatest Blessing,—and Another of them having asserted, that not *the Sun* was that chief Blessing to those Northern Animals, but *the Warmth* which he afforded them,—the Third should imagine, that he corrected or amended the two former Assertions, by saying, that those Animals were thus highly blest, neither by *the Sun*, nor by *the Warmth* which his Rays afforded them, but by the *Joy* or *Pleasure* which they *felt* from the Return of the *Sun* and *Warmth*. For

Wits, just like Fools, at War about a Name,

Have full as oft no Meaning, or the same.

See Sir *William Temple*, on the *Gardens of Epicurus*, in his *Miscellanys*, Part 2^d.

¹² All *intelligent* and *rational* Beings are here plainly meant. By Those *who are*, we suppose are meant Such as are *immortal*, and *always are*, Such as in Pagan Language are called *Gods*: and by Those *who shall be*, we understand *Men*, Such rational Beings only, as are born *Mortal*. See the Sixth of Mr. *Petvin's Letters concerning Mind*. What occurs hereafter in this Dialogue confirms the truth of our Supposition.—If then we are not mistaken in the Sense of the Passage now before us, it means, that those

Philebus! You and I, severally lay down some such Hypotheses as These?

PHILEBUS.

Exactly such, O Socrates!

SOCRATES.

And will You, Protarchus! take up the Controversy, as I have just now stated it?

PROTARCHUS.

Of necessity I must. For Philebus, the Champion of Our Side, is tired and gives out.

SOCRATES.

Now it is right and proper for us to discover, by all means possible, the full Force and Meaning of Both those Hypotheses; and not to give over, till we have determined the Controversy between them.

PROTARCHUS.

Affections of the Mind, before mentioned, are, above all other things, *good and advantageous*,—not only to *the Gods*, who, being invested with Bodys uncompounded, and subject to no Change or internal Motion, feel neither Pain nor Pleasure, in which the Body hath any Share,—but likewise to *Men*, susceptible of Pain and Pleasure corporeal.—The first Part of this Proposition, That

PROTARCHUS.

I agree with you, it is ¹³.

SOCRATES.

Let us agree in This too, besides.

PROTARCHUS.

In What?

SOCRATES.

That we should, Each of us ¹⁴, endeavour to set forth, what State and what Affection ¹⁵ of the Soul is able,

concerning *the Gods*, we shall find agreeable enough to the Sentiments of *Socrates*, on the supposition of any such Beings as are above described: but the latter Part, That concerning *Man*, will soon appear to be expressive, not of his real Opinion, but of an Hypothesis, introduced by Him into the Field of Debate, to combat against the opposite one of *Philebus*; that Both of those Hypotheses being defeated, each by the other, a Third might, without any Opposition, assert a juster Claim to the Matter in Dispute, the Character of being the *Chief Good of Man*.

¹³ Use is made of this First Preliminary Article, afterwards in the Course of the Dialogue, both by *Socrates* and by *Protarchus*. The Foundation of it we shall find anon to be a prior Engagement, entered into by *Socrates* himself, during his Dispute with *Philebus*.

¹⁴ The *Greek* of this Sentence, in all the Editions of *Plato*, is *αὐτῶν ἐκάτερος*. But all the Translators interpret, as if they read in the M.SS. *ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος*; a Reading, which is clearly agreeable

to

to the Sense of the Passage, and makes it easier to be understood. In the printed Reading the word αὐτῶν must refer to λόγων, which is more remote, and has been rather implied than expressed; αὐτῶν ἐκάτερος will then mean *the Argument of Each*: but to say, *the Argument should endeavour*, is in a Stile too figurative and bold, to be used by any Prosaic Writer.

¹⁵ In the Greek,—ἐξω καὶ διάθεσιν.—All the differences between ἐξίς and διάθεσις are accurately shown by *Aristotle*, in his *Categorys*, Cap. 8. and in his *Metaphysics*, Lib: 4. §. 19. In the Sentence now before us, the difference between them is this;—διάθεσις ψυχῆς, an *Affection of the Soul*, is the Soul's present but *transient State*;—ἐξίς ψυχῆς, a *State of the Soul*, is the Soul's *permanent Affection*.—Thus we say of a Man, that he is in a *joyous State of Mind*, when the Joy, with which he is *affected*, is of some *standing*, and is likely to *continue*: but, of a Man, in whose Soul Joy is *just now arisen*, we say, that he is *seized* (that is, *affected suddenly*) with Joy. And thus again we say, that the Mind is in a *thoughtful State*, when it has been for *some time* actually *thinking*, and is not easy to be diverted from *thinking on*: but when a Thought arises suddenly within us, in an *unthinking State of Mind*, and amidst the wandrings of Fancy, we say, that a Thought *strikes us*, that is, *suddenly affects* our Mind.—It must not, however, be concealed, that ἐξίς and διάθεσις, which we have here translated by the words *State* and *Affection*, usually mean *Habit* and *Disposition*. But the affinity between This their usual Meaning, and That which they have in the Passage now before us, will appear, from considering,—that, as the Soul acquires certain *Habits of acting*, thro frequent repeated *Acts* of the same Kind,—so she is *fixed* in some certain *State*, thro frequent *Impressions* made on her where she is *passive*, or thro frequent *Energys* of her own where she is *active*, — a State, to which those *Impressions* from without, and those *Energys*

able, according to our different Hypotheses, to procure for every Man a Happy Life. Is it not our Business so to do?

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly it is ¹⁶.

SOCRATES.

within, gradually lead her;—and also that, in like manner as some certain previous *Disposition* of the Soul is necessary to every single *Act* which is *voluntary*, so is it also necessary to the receiving of every *Impression* from without, and to the performing of every *Energy* within.—These Observations will perhaps be of Use to us, in the conclusive Part of this Dialogue.

¹⁶ This other Preliminary Article sets the Two Hypotheses in such a Light, as to make it easy to compare them together; and contracts the Controversy between them to this single Point,—What is the *Best State* of a Man's *Soul*, and in What Manner it is *Best* for him to be *affected*;—in other words, with What *Habit* and *Disposition* of *Soul* a Man is *happiest*;—whether with That *Habit* and That *Disposition*, which the Enjoyments, so highly extolled by *Philebus*, create and form within him; or whether with Those, which he acquires and possesses through the Mental Exercises, recommended by *Socrates*. That this is the true Light, in which alone the Subject can be rightly viewed, will be found, by considering,—that *Happiness* can only consist in a certain *State* or *Habit*, and in a certain *Affection* or *Disposition*, of the *Soul*; and that Whatever placeth the Soul in this *State*, or produces in the Soul this *Habit*,—Whatever *affects* the Soul in such a manner, as contributes to bring it into this *State*, or to maintain it therein,—Whatever
disposeth

disposeth the Soul to acquire easily this *Habit*, or advanceth the Progress of the Soul towards it,—Every such Thing is to be ranked in the number of a Man's *Greatest Goods*. Whether Happiness be to be found in *Speculative Wisdom*, or in *Pleasure*, or in some other *Possession* or *Enjoyment*, it can be seated no where but in the *Soul*. For Happiness has no Existence any where, but where it is *felt* and *known*. Now 'tis no less certain, that only the *Soul* is sensible of *Pain* and *Pleasure*, than it is, that only the *Soul* is capable of *Knowledge*, and of *thinking* either *foolishly* or *wisely*. To determine therefore the Controversy, whether *Speculative Wisdom* or *Pleasure*, constitutes Human Happiness, or is a Man's Chief Good, it must be thorowly considered and known, How, or in What manner, the Soul is affected by speculating or *thinking wisely*,—and How, by *enjoying Pleasure*;—to What *Habits* these different Affections severally *dispose* and lead the Soul;—and also, into What *State* the Soul is brought by a Life of *meer Speculation*; and into What, by a Life of *meer Pleasure*. Unless these Points are examined and settled, the Controversy concerning a Man's Chief Good, can never be determined: which, it was agreed in the First Preliminary, was right and proper to be done. For, without the settling of these Points, every Man's *Opinion of Good* will be governed by *his own Sentiments*, or by what *He himself* takes a *Fancy* to, and not by the Sentiments or Fancys of any Other Man. Difference of Opinion indeed on every Moral Subject must be endless, without some Standard of Moral Truth be fixed: and on this Subject, of Human Happiness, there can be no true Standard, which agrees not with the Common Sense of all Men, and with Universal Experience. To Common Sense therefore and the Experience of all Mankind an Appeal is to be understood, and tacitly is made, in the whole following Inquiry.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Well then ; You say, that 'tis That of rejoicing ;
We, that 'tis That of understanding and thinking
rightly.

PROTARCHUS.

True.

SOCRATES.

But what if there should appear some Other ¹⁷,
preferable to Both of these, but more nearly of Kin
to Pleasure ? should we not, in this case, be, Both
of us, confuted, and obliged to yield the Preference
to a Life, which gives the stable Possession of those
very Things ¹⁸, wherein you place Human Happiness ?

¹⁷ That is,—some other *Life*, or some other *State* of the Soul
throughout Life, preferable to That of *Speculation*, as well as to
That of Pleasure ; — some other *Affection* also of the Soul, pre-
ferable to any of her *Energys*, exercised in meer *Thinking*, as
well as to any *Sensation*, which she feels, of meer *Pleasure*.

¹⁸ The last Five words in our *Translation* of this Interrogatory
Sentence, we acknowlege to be not authorized by any words
in the *Greek*. We have added them, by way of explaining,
what, in our apprehension, *Plato* means by ταῦτα, *these things*,
For we suppose them to be the very same things, mentioned
by him before, in representing the Opinion of *Philebus*. And
our supposition is founded on this reasoning : — Since Pleasure
is generally *transient* and of *short duration*, a Life the most
nearly of Kin to a *Life of Pleasure*, but preferable to it, must
in all probability be Such a Life, as will *fix* the *Instability* of
Pleasure, and *secure* its *Continuance*.

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However, at the same time it must be agreed, that a Life of Pleasure would be found more eligible than a Life of Knowledge or Intellection.

PROTARCHUS.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

But if that Better State of the Soul ¹⁹ should appear to be more nearly allied to Knowledge, in that case, Knowledge would be found to have the advantage over Pleasure, and Pleasure must give place. Do ye not agree with Me, that these things are so? or how otherwise say ye that they are?

¹⁹ The Reader will be curious to know, what this Third Kind of Life, or State of the Soul, is, which *Socrates* here supposes may be found preferable to the other Two Lives, to a Life of *Speculation*, and to a Life of *Pleasure*. And since our Author, after he has raised this Curiosity, delays to gratify it, till he proves the *Truth* of this Third Hypothesis; which is not done, till we arrive at the last Part of the Dialogue; we are willing to prevent the Reader's Impatience, that he may not gallop over all that is between; by letting him know thus long beforehand, that 'tis a Life of *Practic Virtue*, but yet preceded by *Speculative Wisdom*; and that, in such a Life, the *State*, which the Soul is in, is the *Habit*, (or *having*) of Virtue, and a *constant Disposition* to act with Honesty and Goodness; and constantly attended by *Joy*, *Delight*, or *Pleasure*, of such a Kind, as is stable and durable, as being *rational* and *virtuous*.

PROTARCHUS..

PROTARCHUS.

To Me, I must confess, they seem to be, as you represent them.

SOCRATES.

But to Philebus how seem they? What say You, Philebus?

PHILEBUS.

To Me Pleasure seems, and will always seem to be the Superiour, whatever it be compared with. And You, Protarchus, will be at length convinced of it, your self.

PROTARCHUS.

After having resigned to Me the Management of the Debate, You can no longer be the Master of What should be yielded to Socrates, and What should not.

PHILEBUS.

You are in the right. But, however, I have discharged my Duty²⁰; and I here call the Goddess her Self to witness it.

²⁰ In defending, to the utmost of his Power, That Cause, the Defence of which he had undertaken,—the Cause of *Pleasure*; which he here dignifies with the name of the Goddess, whom he supposed to preside over it, that is, *Venus*. From hence it is evident, what *Kind* of Pleasure *Philebus* meant.

PROTARCHUS.

We too are Witnesses of the same; and can testify your making of the Assertion, which you have just made²¹. But now, as to that Examination, O Socrates! which is to follow after what You and I have agreed in, whether Philebus be willing to consent, or however he may be disposed, let us try to go thro with, and bring to a Conclusion²².

SOCRATES.

By all means, let us; beginning with²³ that very Goddess, who according to Him is called Venus, but whose true name is Pleasure²⁴.

PROTARCHUS.

Perfectly right.

SOCRATES..

²¹ A stroke of Raillery, this, on the solemn manner, in which *Philebus* had invoked *Pleasure* as a Goddess.

²² That is,—to go thro with an examination of the Three Hypotheses, proposed before; and thence to draw our Conclusions, and demonstrate — Which of the Three Lives is, in the order of things good and desirable as Ends, the *First*,—and Which of them is the *Second*.

²³ That is,—examining in the first place the Hypothesis of *Philebus*, by inquiring into the nature of *Pleasure*.

²⁴ The ancient *Greek Poets* had great authority with all the *People of Greece*, but with None a greater than with the *Sophists*: for it was no small part of the business of these Men, to please
and.

and flatter the *People*, by supporting their Prejudices or preconceived Opinions.—Intelligent Readers of *Homer* need not be told, that *Venus*, in his *Iliad*, the Deity who presides over the *Mysteries of Love*, is that Power in Nature, which attracts the Two Sexes to each other, couples them together, and produces mutual Pleasure from their mutual Embraces.—Some of the Poets, who came after *Homer*, mean by *Venus* the same attractive Power; as, for instance, *Sappho* in her elegant *Ode* to that Goddess, and *Euripides* in his *Hippolytus*.—Others of them personify, by the name of *Venus*, the *σοῦσσία*, the Veneral Congress its self, or the meer Pleasure felt therein; as, for instance, *Mimnermus* in these celebrated Verses of his,——

Τὶς δὲ χάρις, τίδ' ἔτερπνόν, ἄτερ χρυσαῖης Ἀφροδίτης;
 Τεθναίνω, ὅτε μοι μηκέτι ταῦτα μέλει.

In citing which lines, some ancient Authors give us the word *βίος*, instead of *χάρις*. To include the Meaning of Both these words, we have thus paraphrased the Distick;—

Where grows a Pleasure, not in Venus' Reign?
 Where smiles a Grace, not One of Venus' Train?
 In Venus' Blessings, when I lose my Share,
 Let me not live;—Life is not worth my Care;
 It is not Life, to live unblest by Her.

This latter *Venus*, this Goddess of *Philebus*, was by the Roman People worshipped under the name of *Venus Voluptas*: and accordingly *Lucretius*, in the beginning of his fine Poem, where he imitates the first Lines in *Homer's* longer *Hymn to Venus*, invokes that Goddess, as *hominum divumque VOLUPTAS*; and in Lib. 2, v. 172, hails her *dux vitæ*, *DIA VOLUPTAS*.—And indeed, thus to deify *Sensual Pleasure*, is not disagreeable to the *Orphic System* of Theology; one Part of which attributed *Divinity* to every *Virtue, Force, or Power*, whether active or passive, in every Being throughout

throughout nature, whether *rational, animal, or merely vital*; calling them all ἐγνόσμιον θεοί, *Mundane Deitys*, tho of different Ranks and Orders, according to the natural Dignity of the *Being, possessed* of such Forces, Powers, or Virtues. The *other Part* of this ancient *Theological System* of the Universe (for the best way to understand thorowly *all Parts* of it, is to divide it first into *Two*,) considered, as more eminently and in a higher sense *Divine*, those things only which are divine by *nature*, inasmuch as they are *eternal*, and the *Causes* of those several Virtues, Powers, and Forces, which are possessed by all the *Individuals* of every *Sort and Kind*, in their natural and sound *State*. These *divine Causes* were called by the *Orphic Theologers* ὑπεργνόσμιον θεοί, *Supra-Mundane Deitys*, ranked according to the Dignity of those *Virtues, Powers, or Forces*, of which they are the Causes. And considering farther, that all those Causes, whether *Formal* or *Efficient*, whether *Intelligible* or *Intellective*, meet together and centre in The One universal and divine MIND, they held the *Unity* of this *Supreme Cause* of All things.—But, as they supposed or pretended, that the Bulk of Mankind or the Multitude, being under a necessity of living a Life wholly outward and sensual, without leisure to look into Themselves, were little capable of apprehending the nature of those *Divine Causes*, —and still less so, the nature of that *Cause of Causes*, the μέτρον μετῶν, καὶ ἐν ἑνὲν πάντα τὰ ὄντα, *Mind its Self*,—they declined troubling the Vulgar with these *Mysteries of Nature*; and framed a Religion, suited to Vulgar Apprehensions; exhibiting to them, for Objects of their Worship, *Images* and other Representations (Some, proper and naturally expressive, Others, figurative, symbolical, or allegorical) not only of those external things which they saw, heard, and felt, and of whose Powers and Virtues they had experience, — but even of those truly *Divine Causes*, the *eternal Ideas* of the Supreme Mind, inconceivable (as perhaps

They might imagine) by the Sensual Populace, who seem to have no communication with them, and know of no Ideas superior to their own.—In evidence of this, it will be sufficient to cite the Testimony of *Varro*, the most learned of all the Romans: his words are these;—*Apud Samothraces, multis indicibus collegi, in simulacbris aliud significare cælum, aliud terram, aliud exempla rerum, quas (l. quæ) Plato appellat ideas. cælum enim Jupiter, terra Juno, Idææ Minerva intelligitur: cælum, quo fiat aliquid; terra, de quâ fiat; exemplum, secundum quod fiat.* Thus *Varro* apud *Augustinum de Civ. Dei*, L. 7. Cap. 28. — 'Tis indeed highly probable, that the Chief Priests of the *Orphic Religion*, thro whose Hands in succession were transmitted the *Secrets* of it, communicated those *Secrets* to a few Others; chiefly to the *Governors* amongst the People, Such as they deemed worthy of being *τελεταί*, *perfected in the Mysteries of Nature*, and instructed in the *deep Meaning* of the *ιεροὶ λόγοι*, and the other *Orphic Verses*. But the rest of the People, the *Governed*, were all the while kept in the most brutish ignorance of the Divine Nature by their Priests and Statesmen, whose Political Maxims in point of Religion are expressed by *Varro* in these words, as they are delivered to us by the old Bishop of *Hippo* in his work above cited;—*Multa sunt vera, quæ non modò vulgo scire non est utile, sed etiam, tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expedit. Et ideò Græci teletas, ac mysteria, taciturnitate parietibusque clausurunt.*—“ Many things are true (in nature) which it is not only of no use to the Vulgar to have the Knowledge of, but even tho they (i. e. the common Opinions concerning them) should be false, it is expedient that the People should believe them true. And for this reason have the Greeks concealed their secret doctrines in silence, and inclosed with walls their religious mysteries.” — To the *Orphic Divines* succeeded the *Pythagorean Philosophers*; who, as they

they followed the former in their Tenets, pursued a like Method of handing down those Tenets to Posterity; in delivering them to *all* their Disciples at first thro *Symbols* and *Ænigmas*, and in revealing afterwards the *naked Truth* to a *chosen Few*, Such as they deemed fit to be entrusted with it.—But *Socrates* used a Method of teaching, quite different, a Method, suitable to his Mind,—simple, yet comprehensive, like *the Mind of Nature*,—plain and clear, tho sublime and deep, like those *φανερώτατα πάντων*, *the First Principles of Things*. He neither concurred with the *Political Priests* and the *Statesmen*, in keeping the People ignorant of those truly Divine Things, which of All things it most concerns All men to be acquainted with; nor did he follow the example of the *Orphic Theologers* and the *Pythagoreans*, in delivering his Doctrine, explicitly indeed to Some, but figuratively and obscurely to a much greater Number. His Disquisitions were carried on openly, in Places the most frequented by the Publick, to be heard by every Man who chose to hear; and the Subjects of them were always either Such, as related immediately to Morals and Politicks, or else Such, as laid the only solid Foundation of those Sciences in the Science of Mind, that is, in the Science of Things eternal and divine. Laying aside all Inquiries into *Nature*, considered meerly as *Corporeal*,—or into the *Mechanical Forces*, by which some *Bodys* attract or repel, move forward, retard or turn aside, generate, nourish or destroy, change, vary, or in any way affect Other Bodys, — as being, if rightly considered, *all* of them only *passive*, meer *instruments* in the hands of *active, intelligent, and designing Nature*, whose secret ways, after all our Searches, are past finding out,—and *many* of them being also *instruments* in the hands of *Human Artists*,—he did not acknowlege true *Divinity* in any of these Bodys or Natural Things themselves, nor in any of those blind Powers or Forces, with which they are invested by the *Laws of Nature*.

Now

SOCRATES.

The Fear²⁵, which I have always in me, concerning the proper Names of the Gods²⁶, is no ordinary Kind

Now seeing that One of these Powers in Things corporeal, the Objects of Sense, is That of producing Sensual Pleasure in Sentient Beings, on the occasions mentioned in Note 11, *Socrates* could not, consistently with himself, admit such a *Pleasure*, or the *Power* which immediately produced it, to be, either of them, truly *Divine*.

²⁵ Meaning possibly That Kind of Fear, which always attends on *Reverential Awe*,—the Fear of doing or saying any thing wrong, in the opinion of Those whom we honour.—But we rather think, it means That rational or *prudential Fear*, which is necessary to guard us against Evils in our own Power to prevent, by using due Care and Precaution. See the next Note.

²⁶ That is, *Names*, significant of their *Natures*.—It is indeed possible, that *Socrates* might here allude to that vulgar Superstition, Instances of which occur often in the ancient Poets,—a *Fear of displeasing the Gods*, in giving them Names or Titles offensive to them. But the Philosopher's own Mind was far superior to such religious Fancys: and yet he appears to be very serious in this Sentence. We presume therefore, that he means a *Fear of mistaking the Divine Nature*: for to have right Notions of This, is of the utmost importance to Private as well as Public Virtue: to entertain any *Error* concerning it, *diminishes* the Happiness of Human Life: and if the Error be *Capital*, as it is, if what is *opposite* to the Divine Nature be taken *for it*, such an Error is utterly *destructive* of all Virtue and all Happiness.

of Fear ²⁷; it surpasseth the greatest Dread ²⁸, to which the Soul in any other case is subject. Hence in the present

²⁷ That is, — not *usual* or *common* amongst Mankind, — not incident to *ordinary* Men. — See Dr. *Forster's* 1st *Index* to his Edition of *Five Dialogues of Plato*, where he cites this very Passage.

²⁸ For the Objects of Fear to ordinary Men, such as are of meaner Rank, and governed by their Passions and ignorant of their *true Selves*, are only things, which threaten Evil to their *Bodys*, chiefly *Death*, *extreme Poverty*, and *great Corporeal Pain*. To Those of higher Rank, the great Vulgar, governed mostly by a Sense of Honour, but as ignorant of Themselves as the meaner Sort, the Objects of Fear are not only Such, as are just now mentioned, but also, and principally, the *Loss* of that *Honour* which is given to them by Others; because on this *Honour* depend all the Advantages, which they have beyond the Vulgar, in Outward Life. But as all these *Advantages*, together with *the Life itself* in which they are found, appeared in the eyes of *Socrates* but *Trifles*, when compared with *Mental* or with *Moral Good*, so he considered the *Loss* of them as comparatively but a trifling Loss. He knew, that all Mental and all Moral Good depended on the *Stability* of *Knowlege* and of *Virtue*; — that the *Stability* of *Virtue* depended on the *Knowlege* of *Good and Evil*; — and that the *Stability* of *all Knowlege* depended on the *Principles of Mind*, the Cause of all *Truth* and of all *Good*; — that these *Principles* therefore were of all things the *most Divine*; — that consequently to err concerning These, was to err concerning the *Divine Nature*; and that an Error of this Kind must be fatal to the *Mind* of any *Man*, to all his Knowlege and

and to all his *Virtue*. Such Errors were the sole Objects of Fear to the Mind of *Socrates*.—Farther; as the *Vebemence* of any Man's *Fear* must always be *in proportion* to his *Sensè* of the *Importance* of its Object;—and as no Object of the Multitude's Fear can, even to Them, appear of Importance equal to That of the Object of the Philosopher's Fear, as it appeared to Him, —*Plato* uses no Exaggeration or Hyperbole in the Sentence now before us.—The Accuracy of the *principal Terms*, or Nouns, in this Sentence, is also very remarkable. The former, which we have translated *Fear*, in the original is *δέος*: the latter, which in our translation is *Dread*, in the original is *φόβος*. Now *φόβος* always means an *irrational Passion*, seizing the *inferior Soul*, without being authorized by *Reason* so to do. And accordingly, the *Stoicks* number it amongst the *Passions* or *Perturbations* of the Soul, and define it by *ἄλογος ἐκκλισις* *irrational* or blind *Aversion*. See Mr. *Harris's* Note 48. to the Third of his *Three Treatises*. *Δέος* is by some old Grammarians distinguished from *φόβος* in this point only,—that the latter means a *Fear* which *suddenly seizes* the Soul, on the Opinion of *Evil imminent* or *at hand*; and the former, a *constant* or *settled Fear* of *Evil* remote. This we believe a true, but not the only true, distinction between *φόβος* and *δέος*. For, besides their difference with respect to their length of *time*, and to the apparent *distance* of their Objects, they seem to differ in the *nature* of their Objects, and in the *nature* also of the *Beings*, *subject* to those Passions.—The Objects of *φόβος* are whatever things we imagine to be *evil*, or from which we may *receive Evil*, whether they be animate, as *Sharks* and *Tygers*, *Banditti* and *Tyrants*, or inanimate, as *Fires* and *Earthquakes*, *Famine* and *Pestilence*. The Objects of *δέος* are *Beings* whom we deem *superior* to our selves, either in *Wisdom*, or in *Knowledge*, or in *Authority*. In proof of this, see the Passages, cited out of *Homer* by *Plutarch* in *Vitâ Cleomenis*,

pag: 1482, Edit: H. Steph: So, in *Plato's Theætetus*, pag: 189, δεδιώς is opposed to καταφρονῶν. — The *Subjects* of φόβος are all *Brute Animals*, and *Man* also, in as much as he partakes of *Soul irrational*. The *Subjects* of δέος are *Human Beings* only; unless there be in some *Brute Animals* an *Instinct* equivalent to *Reason*, so far as to inspire them with a *Reverence* for *Man*, as a *Being* by nature *Superior* to them in *Sagacity* and *Counsel*. This *Kind* of *Fear*, or *reverential Awe*, we see in *Children* toward their *Parents*, in the *Younger* toward the *Advanced in Age*, in *Disciples* toward their *Masters*, in *Subjects* toward their *Magistrates* and *Princes*, and in the *People* of all *Countrys* toward the *Objects* of their *religious Worship*. Of this *rational Kind* was the *Fear*, which *Socrates* says he had in him continually: but of all the *rational Kind*, This of *Socrates* was the *most rational*, — as not only deriving its *first Origin* from *Reason*, or the *Rational Principle* within him, which he had cultivated more rightly perhaps than any other *Man*,—but as having also the *Sanction* of that cultivated *Reason* to approve it, — and indeed taking its *immediate Rise* from a just *Sentiment* of what is *really evil* to the *Soul* of *Man*, together with a *Sense* of the great *Danger* of a *Man's* falling into it,—a *Sense*, productive of that *Caution*, which effectually secures a *Man* against it; because *Real Evil* is always in a *Man's* own *Power* to avoid. This *Kind* of *Fear* the *Stoicks* defined by εὐλογος ἔκκλισις *Rational Aversion*; but to avoid using the word *Fear*, they termed it *Caution*; thus confounding the *Cause* with the *Effect*, or the *Sentiment* with the *Energy* which it produces.—What confirms the *Account*, given in this *Note*, of the δέος of *Socrates*, is the *Definition*, given us by *Andronicus* of *Rhodes* in his *Treatise* περὶ παθῶν, of One of the *Two Species*, into which he divides εὐλάβεια *Caution*; from which it appears to be the very same with the δέος, here professed by *Socrates*: for it is this,—εὐλάβεια τῶν περὶ θεὸν ἀμαρτημάτων,
Caution

present case with regard to Venus²⁹, whatever Name be agreeable to the Goddess, by That would I chuse
to

Caution to avoid Errors about God. If it be objected, that by ἀμαρτημάτων in this definition, *Speculative Errors* concerning the Nature of the Divine Being are not meant, but *Practical* or *Moral Offences* against God;—we reply, First, that the very Distinction, made in this Objection, is founded on One of the most Capital Errors concerning the *Divine Nature*. For that, on this Subject, there is no *Opinion*, which is *meerly Speculative*, or which has not a *necessary Influence* on *Practise*; as we hope to make apparent in our Notes to the latter Part of this Dialogue. — And farther we reply, that this continual *Fear*, this constant Apprehension of *Danger*, in the Mind of *Socrates*, had a View to nothing but the Integrity of his own Life and Manners. For if ever any Man was, *Socrates* was One of the *peccare timentes*,—*Those who fear to do amiss*,—spoken of by *Horace*, in *Epist: ad Pisones*, v. 197. Indeed, 'tis evident, that he feared nothing else: and he knew, that τὸ δίκαιον, *the nature of Universal Justice*, was materially the same thing with τὸ ὅσιον, *the nature of Sanctity*; or, as *Andronicus* terms it, ἀγνεα, *Purity*; agreeably to This of *Sophocles*,—εὔσεπτον ἀγνεαν λόγων, Ἔργων τε πάντων — *Religious Purity of all my Words, and Actions.* *Soph. in Oedip: Tyr:* v. 884.—Those of our Readers, who are conversant with *Plato*, well know, that he frequently puts ὅσιον καὶ δίκαιον together in the Mouth of *Socrates*. See likewise Notes 287, and 301, to the *First Alcibiades*.

²⁹ What the *Orphic Theologers* meant by the allegorical Deity of *Venus*, is explained towards the End of Note 94 to the *Banquet*. And how highly *Socrates* Himself thought of this *Venus*,

the

to call her. But as to Pleasure, how vague and various a thing it is, I well know. And with This, as I just now said, ought we to begin; by considering and inquiring into the nature of Pleasure, first. For we hear it called indeed by One single Name, as if it were One simple Thing: it assumes, however, all sorts of Forms, even Such as are the most unlike, one to another³⁰. For observe; we say, that the Intemperate Man has Pleasure; and that the Temperate Man has Pleasure also,—Pleasure in being what he is, that is, Temperate. Again; we say, that Pleasure attends on Folly, and on the Man who is full of foolish Opinions and foolish Hopes; that Pleasure attends also on the Man who thinks wisely,—Pleasure in that very Mental Energy, his thinking wisely. Now any Person, who would affirm these Pleasures to be of similar Kind, would be justly deemed to want Understanding.

PROTARCHUS.

The Pleasures, which You mention, O Socrates! are indeed produced by Contrary Causes; but in the

the *Beauty of Nature*, in its perfect *Original* at least, — in That MIND, of which *Outward Nature* is (as it were) the *Image*,—appears from what he says in the Person of *Diotima*, page 160 of that Dialogue.

³⁰ See general Proofs of This, near the beginning of Note 3.

Pleasures themselves there is no Contrariety. For how should Pleasure not be similar to Pleasure, its Self to its Self, the most similar of all things ³¹ ?

SOCRATES.

Just so, Colour too, my Friend, differs not from Colour, in this respect, that 'tis Colour, All ³². And yet we, All of us, know, that Black, besides being different from White, happens to be also its direct Contrary. So Figure too is all One with Figure,
after

³¹ This was the very Language, or manner of expression, used by a Sect of Philosophers, called *Cyrenaicks*, from *Cyrene*, the native City of *Aristippus*, their Master. For the *Cyrenaicks* held, says *Laertius*, *μὴ διαφέρειν ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς*, that Pleasure differs not from Pleasure. Whence it appears probable, that *Philebus* derived his Notions and Expressions on this Point from Some of the Disciples of *Aristippus*, if not from *Aristippus* himself. For this Philosopher, after he had for some time conversed with *Socrates*, for the sake of whose Conversation he came to *Athens*, departed thence, and went to *Ægina*; where he professed the Teaching of Philosophy, and where he resided till after the Death of *Socrates*.

³² That is,—as the Translations of *Ficinus* and *Cornarius* rightly explain it,—every Colour is [a] Colour. For Colour is a General Thing, a Quality of all Bodys visible, the Nature of which Quality All the Species of Colour, and the infinite Degrees and Mixtures of them All, partake of. See Notes 14 and 26 to the *Meno*.

after the same manner, in the General. But as to the Parts of that One General Thing, Some are directly Contrary to Others³³; and between the rest there happens to be a Kind of infinite Diversity. And many other things we shall find to be of this Nature. Believe not then this Position, that Things the most Contrary are all of them One³⁴. And I suspect, that we shall also find Some Pleasures quite contrary to Other Pleasures.

PROTARCHUS.

It may be so. But how will That hurt My Side of the Question?

SOCRATES.

³³ See Note 31 to *the Meno*.

³⁴ *Socrates* had here, probably, a View in general to the Doctrine of the old *Physiologers*, All of whom, says *Aristotle*, held that the World was composed from *Contrary Principles*; — not such Principles, as *Form* and *Matter*: for, to speak properly, *Matter* is not *contrary* to *Form*, but is quite otherwise, easily *recipient* of all *Forms*, and gives not the least *opposition* to any *Form* whatever. That, which is often called the *Stubbornness* or *Untractableness* of a *Subject-Matter* is in fact the *Stubbornness* of some *adhesive Form*, which then invests it, and is not easily made to quit its Hold, and give way to Another, a new Comer: — not such Principles neither, as those of *Democritus*, *Solid Body* and *Empty Space*; which are no otherwise opposed to each other, than as *Something* is opposed to *Nothing*, or *Being* in general to
Non-

Non-Being: as may appear on comparing what *Aristotle* says of them in his *Physicks*, Lib. 1, Cap. 6, where he is pleased to call them *Contrary*s, with his own account of *Contrary*s in his Treatise on the *Category*s, Cap. 11.—Nor yet by *Contrary Principles* did the more ancient Physiologers mean *Identity* and *Diversity*: for These are so far from *contending* with each other, as *Contrary Things* do when they meet, that they exist amicably together always in every *Form of Nature*, and *together* constitute the very *Essence of Mind*: inasmuch as without Both of them united, no Particular *Forms* ever could *exist*; nor could *Mind*, or *Form* universal, whether considered as *Intelligent*, or as *Intelligible*, ever have a *Being*. — By *Contrary Principles* they plainly meant *Contrary Powers* in the Nature of Things;—Powers, perpetually at *Variance*, but *controlling* Each of them its *Contrary*, and Each of them by its *Contrary controlled*: thro which mutual *Contest*, and *Equality of Strength* in the contesting Powers, every *Part* was kept in *Equilibrium*, and the *Whole* preserved firm and *intire*. Now this *Whole*, consisting thus of *Contrary Parts*, they call'd *One Thing*; how justly we shall see anon, when we are led by *Plato* more deeply into the Subject. — But the present Passage seems to have an *especial* reference to certain Positions of *Heraclitus* in *particular*. For, if *Aristotle* has given a just representation of them, they were such as these; — that the *Same Definition* suited *Contrary Things*; and that *Contradictory Propositions* were *Both* of them *true*: — that therefore *Contrary Things* had *one* and the *same Essence*; and *Contrarietys*, or *Contrary Qualities*, belonged to *one and the same Thing*:—whence it followed, that *one* and the *same Thing* might be both *Good* and *Evil*; and farther, that *Good* and *Evil* were the *Same Thing*. See *Aristot: Physic: L. 1. C. 3. Topic: L. 8. C. 5. & Simplic: Comment: in Physic: fol: 18. a.*——And that *Plato* and *Aristotle* may not be thought to have mis-represented any Sentences or Words of

Heraclitus, expressive of Notions so absurd, if understood strictly and literally, it is certain, that those absurd Notions were attributed to *Heraclitus* by Many Persons; as we learn from *Sextus Empiricus*, pag: 53. Edit. *Lips*: For this able Advocate for the Doctrine of *Pyrrho* mentions it as a main Objection, made against that Doctrine, that it led the way to the Doctrine of *Heraclitus*; as if, from perceiving in the same Thing those Contrary Appearances, which render the real *Essence* of it and the *Truth* concerning it *uncertain*, it was an easy Transition to pronounce *dogmatically*, that in the same Thing Contrarietys *really met*, and Contradictory Positions were Both of them *indubitably true*. Now it seems strange, how any man, not wholly unacquainted with the Character of *Heraclitus*, which sufficiently appears from his *Epistles* extant, could ever imagine him to have held Tenets, so inconsistent with the Principles of *Wisdom* and *Goodness*: much less can we think it possible, that *Plato* and *Aristotle* so greatly mistook the true Meaning of his obscure Writings. However, we think it probable, that the Authority of these Two great Philosophers led into this Mistake many Persons, who understood not Their Manner of teaching, from a want (perhaps) of such a Greatness of Soul, as begat and formed in Them that Manner. Both of them appear inspired with the *Love of Truth* alone; superior, on the one hand, to a *blind Reverence* for Those who preceded them in the Study of *Wisdom*,—superior also, on the other hand, to that *Spirit of Detraction*, (however often they have been accused of it,) thro which, Men of Little Souls aim at establishing their own Reputation on the Ruin of that of Others. Accordingly they, Both of them, speak with great Respect of all the prior Philosophers; assuming, and transplanting into their own Systems, the Doctrines which originally sprang from Them; at the same time, that they treat their inaccurate Expressions and crude Conceptions with great Freedom, to guard their own
Disciples

Disciples from being mis-led by the authority of Great Names. Happy had it been for the philosophizing Part of mankind, had their Successors followed them in this their Manner.—For Proof of this in the Case now before us, we refer to a *Dissertation on the Doctrine of Heraclitus*, lately published.—But however probable it is, that *Plato* in this Passage alludes to the common Doctrine of all the ancient Physiologers, or to the supposed Notions of *Heraclitus* in particular, yet there is reason to think, from what follows in the introductory Part of the Dialogue, that he had more immediately in his View certain *Logical Sophisms*, introduced among the Athenian Youth by some of the Scholars of *Zeno the Eleatic*, Such as *Pythodorus* and *Callias*. For *Parmenides of Elea*, having discovered the Principles of all Reasoning to be *Unity and Multitude, Sameness and Difference*; and having thus raised the Theory of Reason into a *Science*; imparted his Discovery to *Zeno* his Countryman. And *Zeno*, being a Man of a most acute and subtle Wit, on That *Science* built the *Art* of Logick or *Dialectick*. He contrived Rules, according to which all Rational Argumentation ought to proceed;—Rules, to regulate Logical Debates,—to restrain a wandering from the Subject,—to keep close to the very Point in Question, by distinguishing the nature of it from other things, which in some respects resemble it, and may be easily mistaken for it,—to guard against the being deceived by Fallacys and all erroneous Argumentation, whether wilful or undesigned, on the Part of the *Questioner*,—and on the Part of the *Respondent*, to make his Answers with Simplicity, and Strictness, and without Prevarication. These Rules were afterwards augmented and improved by *Socrates*, in his daily Exercise of *conversing* on philosophical Subjects, either with *Sophists* or with his own *Disciples*. *Plato* has, in his Dialogues, exemplified these Rules, and appears to have *practically* brought them to Perfection: and *Aristotle* has, in his Logical Treatises, *methodically*

SOCRATES.

In that *You* call them, dissimilar^a as they are, by another ³⁵ Name; (shall we say?) for all *pleasant* things *You* call *good*. Now that all pleasant things are pleasant, admits of no Dispute. But tho many of them

and *scientifically* committed them to Writing, with the utmost Subtilty, Acuteness and Precision, yet at the same time with the most compleat Comprehensiveness, and all the Perspicuity which so abstracted a Subject will admit of.

³⁵ In the *Greek*,—ἐτέρω φησομεν ὀνόματι. That is,—by another Name, common to them all, beside That of *Pleasure*.—The word φησομεν, — shall we say?—is, without reason, as it seems to Us, suspected by *H. Stephens* and many Others not to be genuine. We suppose it used here *interrogatively*, and implying a Doubt in the Mind of *Socrates*, whether *Protarchus* would call the Term *Good* a Name or Noun Substantive, (that is to say,—a Noun, denoting a Substance,) as well as the Term *Pleasure*; or whether he used the Term *good* as an *Epithet* or *Attributive* only, denoting an *Attribute* of some *Substance*. In order to understand the Difference, on which this seeming Doubtfulness is founded, it may be useful to observe, in the first place, that *Attributes* of *Substances*, or, in other words, the *Propertys*, *Accidents*, *Conditions*, and *Circumstances* of *Beings*, are found in Every one of the *Nine Categorys*, into which is divided (as *Mr. Harris* very justly says, in his *Philosophical Arrangements*, B. 1. Ch. 2.) *Attribute in general*.—For instance; the *Attributes*, *pleased*, *delighted*, *joyous*, denote certain *Feelings*, *Sensations*, or *Sentiments*, attributed, Some of them, to *Beings* meerly *Sentient*, Others, to *Beings* which are also *Rational*; and the *Attributes*, denoted by those Terms,

rank

rank under the Category of *Passion*; for they are *Attributes* of a *Soul*, moved or affected in a particular manner. But the Attributes, *pleasant*, *delightful*, and others of like Kind, denote certain Facultys or *Powers*, belonging to Things not within our Selves, often to Things *Inanimate* and meerly *Corporeal*, as Colours, Sounds, and Odours,—such Powers in Them, as are able to excite delightful or pleasing Sensations in all Sentient Beings: now these *Powers*, which we rightly *attribute* to those External Things, rank under the Category of *Quality*.—Let it be observed, in the next place, that every *Attribute* of Substance, under whatever Category it ranks, every Property, Accident, Condition, or Circumstance of Being, by *abstracting* it in our Minds from the *Subject* to which it is attributed, (to borrow the elegant expreffion of Mr. *Harris* in his *Hermes*, B. 1. Ch. 4.) *we convert even into a Substance*. Thus from every pleasing Sensation, Sentiment, Feeling, or Affection, by a Creation as it were of our own, arises in our Minds the *abstract Form* of *some particular Pleasure*. And from many particular Pleasures, of whatever Kind or Kinds they may be, as many as we have conceived the *Notions* of, assembled together and united in our Minds, we form a *general Idea* of *ἡδονή*, *Pleasure*. And thus again, we abstract the *Powers* of exciting Delight, or Pleasure, from the Things invested with such Powers, and comprehend them in One *General Idea*, to which we give the Name of *τὸ ἡδύ*, or *τὸ τερπνόν*, *The Pleasant*, or *The Delightfull*.—In applying the *observations* above made, and the *Instance* just now produced, to the *Attributive Term good*, we are to remark, that this Term has a double signification. For it is often used to denote some *Quality* in the *Substances* or Things themselves, to which it is attributed, whether they be *natural* or *artificial*,—a *Quality*, respecting the *End* for which they were designed by *Nature* or by *Man*. In *natural* Substances, *good Corn* is Corn good for *Food*; a *good Horse* is a Horse good to *carry*, or to *draw*; and

and a *good Man* is a Man endued with *Qualities*, fitting him for the *Ends* of his Being: in Things *artificial*, *good Bricks* are Bricks good for *building*; and a *good House* is a House fit for the *habitation* of Those, for whose habitation it was built. The same *Attributive Term* often also denotes a *Quality* or *Power*, in *Outward Things*, by which, when they are possessed, used, or enjoyed by Us, they contribute to our *Well-Being*,—a *Power*, with which they are invested, thro a *Fitness* of Their Nature to some Part of our own. Now such *Qualities*, *Powers*, and *Fitnesses* in Them, are by Us called *good*, with respect only to our Selves; as They are the *Means*, the *Mediate* or *Instrumental Causes*, of something desirable to Us.—Taking the *Attributive Term good* in the former of these Two Significations, and *abstracting* the *Quality*, denoted by it, from the *Subject* in which the *Quality inheres*, such *Quality*, thus abstracted, we term *Goodness*, — the *Goodness* of That Being, to which we ascribe it:—And if the *Subject* be a *Living* or *Active Substance*, such *Abstract Quality* is also termed *Virtue*. — Note, that in all these cases, by the Terms *Goodness* and *Virtue* is meant the *natural* or *right* and proper *State*, *Habit*, or constant *Disposition* of some *Particular Being*. And because the *natural* and *right* *State* of a *Man's Soul* is a constant *Disposition* to embrace *Truth*, to act *honestly*, and to do *Good* to All, *Evil* to None, such a *Disposition* is the *Virtue* or *Goodness* of a *Man*. — From the *Goodness*, by which *Individual good Beings* are good, — a *Goodness relative* only to the *Design* and *End* of each *Particular Nature*,—a *Goodness confined* and *partial*,—we attain, thro *Induction*, to some *Idea* of *Goodness absolute*, *extensive* as *Being* its *Self*, and *universal*. — But if we take the *Attributive Term good*, in its other *Sense*,—in That, which it evidently presents to us in the *Passage* now before us, namely, for a *Quality* or *Power*, not in *our Selves*, but in *Other Beings* or *Substances*, whether they be *natural*, *artificial*, or *abstract*, (of the latter
of

of which three Kinds is *Pleasure*,) — a Quality or Power, by which they are conducive to our Well-Being,—this Quality of *Theirs*, considered in its *First Abstract*, or as *immediately separated* by the Mind from the Being or Substance to which it is attributed, is not our *Good in the general*; neither is it our *Greatest* or *Chief Good*; but simply a *Good*, that is, some Particular Thing, conducive to our Well-Being.—It is from Many of these Particular Things, which are *Good for Us*, collected together and united in our Minds, that we acquire the Idea of *our own Good in general*;—an Idea, in which are comprehended all the Kinds of Good relative to our Selves: It is from comparing together these different Goods relative to our Selves, that we form a *Judgment*, Which of them all is our *Greatest Good*, or the *Best* for Us, according to the *Experience* we have of those several Goods, joined to the *Knowledge* we have of our own Nature.—*Good* therefore, in the *Abstract*, considered as *relative* only to our Selves, signifies either some one *Particular Species* of what is *good* for us,—or the *Whole* of our *Good*, comprehending *all* its *Species*,—or *That*, amongst the several *Species* of our *Good*, which is the *Chief* and *Greatest*.—Now the *First* or immediate *Abstract* of any *Quality* or other *Attribute*, being only the *Attribute*, considered (*λόγῳ*) *apart from its Subject*, has the very same Meaning with the *Attribute*, considered, as actually it is, *in its Subject*.—Admitting therefore, that the *Quality* or *Attribute* *good* belongs to *Pleasure* in general, (and This is acknowledged by *Socrates* himself before the End of the Dialogue,) if we consider this *Attribute* of *Pleasure* in the *Abstract*, we find, that 'tis only *one Particular Good*, namely, *Pleasure*;—a *Good*, relative only to the *Sensitive Soul*, which is only a *Part* of the *Human Nature*. Since there is then no real Difference of Meaning between *good* the *Attributive Term*, and *Good* the *Substantive*, when used in this Sense, *Socrates* could have no Objection to the

Use of either indifferently on this occasion. But if by the *Noun* or *Substantive* Term *Good* in this place we understand either the *Chief Good* of Man, or his *Good* in the *general*, the Whole Genus of Human Good, it makes a great Difference, whether, in calling Pleasure *Good*, we use the *Attributive* Term, or the *Substantive*. For if by the *Substantive Good* the *Whole* of Human Good is meant, if *Socrates* here doubts whether *Protarchus* meant it so, and if *Protarchus* should avow This to be his Meaning, it follows, that in His Opinion, the Terms *Pleasure* and *Good* might be used *reciprocally*, and that Either might be affirmed of the Other; for that, to Man *Pleasure is Good*, and *Good is Pleasure*. But whether the *Whole*, or the *Chief and Greatest*, Good of Man be meant by *Protarchus*, the Article τὸ, *The*, should here, as well as before in stating the Matter in Dispute, to state it rightly, have been prefixed to the *Substantive* Term *Good*. This is a just Remark, made by *Aristotle*: for he seems to have had this Dialogue in view, in his *Prior Analyticks*, L. 1. C. 40, where he observes, that the Terms ἀγαθόν and τὸ ἀγαθόν, *Good* and *The Good*, in syllogising, ought not to be used indifferently; but that, Which soever of the Two conveys the Speaker's Meaning, That alone should be made use of and adhered to. See Part of this Passage in *Aristotle*, to which we refer, cited by Mr. *Harris* in his *Hermes*, B. 2. Ch. 1. We do not, in seconding this Remark, mean to charge *Plato* with a want of Precision or Accuracy in this respect; neither do we think that *Aristotle*, in making the Remark, had any such Intention. We apprehend, on the contrary, that *Aristotle* was indebted, for so just a Criticism, to his thorow Acquaintance with *Plato's* manner of Dialogue-writing. He well knew, that this Great Master in that Species of Composition, always attributed to every Person in his Dialogues whatever was proper and peculiar to the Character,—

*Reddere personæ scit convenientia cuique,
Skill'd to assign the Suitable to Each,*

not only in the *Sentiments*, but even in the *Diſtion*. He muſt have perceived, that, in the preſent caſe, 'twas the intention of *Plato* to charge *Philebus*, and Others of the ſame Sect, with a looſe and ſophiſtical way of reaſoning on the Subject of *Good*. For they appear to have uſed the Fallacy of *changing* a *Particular* Term for a Term which is *Universal*, or *vice verſâ*, by the *ſly* *inſertion* or *omiffion* of the definite Article *The* before the word *Good*. With this View has *Plato* in the Beginning of this Dialogue, where *Socrates* ſtates the Opinion of *Philebus* concerning the *Chief Good of Man*, omitted the Article τὸ, *The*, before the word *Good*; as appears from a literal tranſlation of that Paſſage, to be ſeen in Note 3. That 'twas omitted *purpoſely*, to imitate *Philebus*, and to repreſent him as having, in his Panegyricks on Pleaſure, made the ſame omiffion *fallaciouſly*, appears, we think, from the very word, which has given occaſion for this long Note. The Interrogative φησομεν; *ſhall we ſay?* ſhows, that *Socrates*, diſcovering the Fallacy of *Protarchus*, tried to bring him to declare openly his ſecret Meaning, and to avow, that *Pleaſure* was, in his Opinion, τὸ ἀγαθὸν *The Good of Man*, that is, either *the Whole* of his *Good*, or his *Chief Good*. For the Article, τὸ, *The*, prefixed to an *Attributive* Term, is always equivalent to the *Abstract Subſtantive*, in its General Idea; it means the *Ideal Perfection* of the *Attribute*, or the *Excellence* of it in its own Kind. Thus, *The White* means either *Whiteness* its Self, or *purely white*: *The Round* means either *Roundness* its Self, or *perfectly round*: *The Beautiful* means either *Beauty* its Self, or *absolutely and completely beautiful*: and τὸ ἀγαθὸν, *The Good*, without a particular reference to Man, either means *Good* its Self, comprehending all the *Kinds* of *Good*, or elſe it means *perfectly* and *purely* good,

them are evil ³⁶, and many indeed good ³⁶, as I readily acknowledge, yet All of them You call Good; and at the same time, you confess them to be dissimilar
in

without deficiency, and without the least mixture of any Evil. (In how sublime a Sense the *Platonicks* use the word *τὰγαθόν*, and indeed *Plato* himself in his *Republic* and elsewhere, we shall have occasion to observe in the Notes to the latter Part of the present Dialogue.) By Analogy therefore, in this Dialogue, (where, as *Proclus*, in his *Commentarys on Plato's Republick*, pag: 426, rightly observes, it is obvious for Every one to discern, that the Subject of Inquiry is not—*τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν*, *What is simply or absolutely The Good*; but *τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἀγαθόν*, *What is the Good of Man*,—*τὸ μεθεκτόν ἀγαθόν*, *The Good, which Man partakes of*;) the Substantive Noun *Good*, tho' spoken absolutely, means either the *Whole of Human Good*, or, at least, That which so greatly excels the rest of Human Goods, as to be justly stiled, by way of eminence, *The Good*, i. e. relative to *Man*. — It will appear, however, in the last Part of this Dialogue, that The simply and absolutely Good, *Good its Self*, is the *Cause of Good* to every Being,—is the *Good of the whole Universe*,—and is the *Sovereign Good of Man* in particular. It will appear likewise, that this *Good its Self*, this *Cause of all Good*, this *Good Universal*, co-incides with *The Good* in the first-mentioned Meaning of the word *Good*; for that 'tis *Goodness absolute and perfect*, GOODNESS ITS SELF; that 'tis the *Cause of whatever Goodness or Virtue* any Particular Being is endued with; in fine, that 'tis GOODNESS UNIVERSAL, as extensive and comprehensive as UNIVERSAL BEING.

³⁶ *Socrates* here, by the words *evil* and *good*, evidently means *evil* and *good* to the *Whole Man*. For, that *Pleasure* is the only *Good*, and *Pain* the only *Evil* of all Animals, considered merely

in their natures ³⁷, when a man forces you to this confession. What then is That, the Same in every Pleasure, in the evil Pleasures equally with the good, from which you give to all Pleasures the denomination of Good ³⁸ ?

P R O T A R C H U S.

What is That, O Socrates! which You say? Do You imagine, that any person, after having asserted, that Pleasure is the Good ³⁹ of Man, will admit your Supposition? or will suffer it to pass uncontradicted, that only Some Pleasures are good, but that Other Pleasures are evil?

S O C R A T E S.

as *Sensitive* Beings, cannot be questioned. And thus is detected another Fallacy of *Philebus*, in this Position of his, — that *the Good of all Animals is Pleasure*, &c. in which he confounded the Nature of *Man* with That of *Brute-Animals*; These being, in all appearance, capable of no higher nor happier a Life, than the *Life of Sense*; whereas the Point in controversy between *Socrates* and *Philebus* regards *Human Life* only, or *Man*, considered in the *Whole* of his Nature.

³⁷ In the Greek it is—*λόγῳ*—that is, according to the *Definition* or *Account* of them, before given. For *Protarchus*, in his Answer to the Sentence, wherein *Socrates* gave an *Account* of their different Natures, did in effect admit That to be a true Account: see Page 44.

³⁸ See *Plato de Republicâ* Lib: 6. pag: 505, Edit: *Steph:*

³⁹ In the Greek,—*ἡδονὴν εἶναι τἀγαθόν*,—literally—that *Pleasure is the Good*.—At length *Protarchus*, finding that his Fallacy, taken

SOCRATES.

However, you will acknowledge, that Pleasures are unlike, one to another, and some even contrary to others.

PROTARCHUS.

Notice of in Note 35, was detected by *Socrates*, here explicitly avows his Meaning to be,—that *Pleasure is the sole Good of Man, valuable for its own Sake*, by using in this Sentence the Substantive Noun τὰγαθόν.—A learned Reader must have perceived, that, in translating this Sentence into English, we have made no scruple to add the two words—*of Man*. This addition is authorised by what was observed near the End of Note 35, agreeably to the observation of *Proclus*, there cited.—'Tis worth remarking, on this occasion, that *Eudoxus*, a celebrated Astronomer, about ten Years Junior to *Plato*, tho he entertained the same Opinion with *Aristippus* on this Point, yet appears not to have prevaricated, like the *Cyrenaicks*; but to have expressed his Meaning in plain Terms, when he asserted ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὰγαθὸν ἐλλόγων καὶ ἀλόγων, that *Pleasure was the Chief or Supreme Good* of all Animals whether *Rational* or *Irrational*. For, that by the word τὰγαθὸν he meant the *Chief Good*, is evident from the other Attributes which he assigned to Pleasure; those of μάλιστα αἰρετόν, and κρετίστον, of all good things *the most eligible*, and *the most excellent*. See *Aristotle*, in *Ethic: Nicom:* L. 10, C. 2. The same Author, in the same accurate Treatise, L. 1, C. 12, says of him, that he pleaded handsomely, καλῶς συνηγόρησε περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ ἡδονῇ, for giving Pleasure the Preference to all other Good Things. This singular Ingenuoufness of *Eudoxus* was very laudable, but is easy to be accounted for: since we learn from *Aristotle*, that he was a Good Man, and a Lover of Truth; and *Diogenes Laertius* reports

PROTARCHUS.

By no means; so far as they are Pleasures, every One of them.

SOCRATES.

We are now brought back again to the same Position, O Protarchus! There is no Difference between Pleasure and Pleasure; all Pleasures are alike, we must say: and the similar Instances, just now produced ⁴⁰, in Colours and in Figures, have had, it seems, no Effect upon us. But we shall try, and talk after the manner of the meanest Arguers, and meer Novices in Dialectick.

PROTARCHUS.

How do you mean?

of him, that after he had been a Scholar of *Archytas* the Pythagorean, he became an Auditor of *Plato's* Lectures. It is probable therefore, that he had been favoured with the reading of *Plato's Philebus*; or, if not, yet that he had heard the Divine Philosopher explain the Force of the Article τὸ prefixed to ἀγαθόν, by which, this Word, of its Self a meer *Attributive*, becomes an *Abstract Noun*; and it is distinguished as Such, in the Dialogue now before us, where the Sophistry of the *Cyrenaicks* is thus detected.

⁴⁰ See above in Page 63.—In the Greek of this Sentence, we are inclined to read δῆτα, (one word,) instead of δὴ τὰ, in *Stephens's* Edition and the *Basil*, or, (what is much worse) δὲ τὰ in *Aldus's*.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

I mean, that if I, to imitate you, and dispute with you in your own way, should dare to assert, that Two things, the most unlike, are of all things the most like to each other, I should say nothing more than what You say : so that Both of us would appear to be rarer Disputants than we ought to be ; and the Subject of our Dispute would thus slip out of our hands, and get away. Let us resume it therefore once more : and perhaps by returning to Similitudes⁴¹, we may be induced

⁴¹ The Sense and the Reasoning require a small alteration to be here made in the Greek Copys of *Plato*, by reading, instead of τὰς ὁμοίας,—τὰς ὁμοιότητας, *Similitudes*, or rather τὰ ὅμοια, *Similes*.—*Similes*, of the Kind here meant, are by *Aristotle*, in his *Art of Rhetorick*, L. 2, C. 20, Edit: *Du Vall*, justly stiled τὰ Σωκρατικά, *Socratic*, because frequently employed by *Socrates*. They are not such as Those, for which the *Imagination* of a *Poet* skims over all *Nature*, to illustrate some *Things* by *superficial Resemblances* to them in *Other Things*: neither are they Such, as the *Memory* of an *Orator* ransacks all *History* for, to prove the certainty of some doubtful *Fact* by *Examples* on Record, which agree with it in a few *Circumstances*: but they are Such, as the *Reason* of an accomplished *Master of Dialectick* chooses out from Subjects *near at hand*, to prove the *Truth* of some uncertain or controverted *Position*, by the *Analogy* it bears to some other *Truth* which is obvious, and clear, and will be readily *admitted*. Such a *Simile*, bearing the plainest and most striking *Analogy* with what is to be

induced to make some Concessions, Each of us to the Other ⁴².

PROTARCHUS.

Say how.

SOCRATES.

Suppose Me to be the Party questioned; and suppose Yourself, Protarchus, to interrogate Me.

PROTARCHUS.

Concerning what?

SOCRATES.

Concerning Prudence, and Science, and Intelligence, and all the rest of those Things, which in the begin-

be proved, is actually produced, immediately after this preface to it, by *Socrates*. But not a Word is there, in what follows, concerning *Similar Pleasures*; and τὰς ὁμοίας, *alike* or *similar*, cannot be joined with, or belong to, any preceding Noun, beside ἡδονάς.—As to the word *returning* in the present sentence, it refers to those *Similes*, produced before, of *Colour* and of *Figure*.

⁴² For, by the following Simile, *Protarchus* might be rationally brought to concede to *Socrates*, that *Some Pleasures* were *evil*; and that, consequently, not all Pleasure was *good*; and *Socrates* himself, on the other hand, would be obliged to own, that *Some Kinds of Knowledge* also were *evil*; and consequently, that he must yield up the Hypothesis for which he had hitherto pleaded, and confess, that Knowledge was not That Sovereign Good they were in search of.

ning

ning of our Conversation I said were good, when I was asked what Sort of a Thing Good was⁴³; must I not acknowledge These to be attended with the same Circumstance, which attends those Other things, celebrated by You?

PROTARCHUS.

What Circumstance?

⁴³ From this Passage it appears, that the unwritten Altercation between *Socrates* and *Philebus*, immediately previous to this Dialogue, began with some such Question as This,—“What is the Chief Good of Man?”—a Question, proposed to *Socrates* by *Philebus* as bluntly and as pertly, as That, proposed to him by *Meno*, which opens the Dialogue, called after *Meno*'s Name. Hence we infer, that the Scene of *the Philebus*, as well as That of *the Meno*, is laid in the *Lyceum*. See Note 1. to *the Meno*. A Critical Reader of *Plato*'s Dialogues, who knows that, in conversation between Man and Man, to put a philosophical Question suddenly and abruptly, with a view of exhibiting the Knowledge of the Questioner, is a distinguishing Mark of Sophists, and of Pedants in Philosophy,—a Reader, who knows and considers This, will observe, that *Plato*, tho in the *Meno* he has thrown a strong Light upon this ungracious Characteristick, by placing it in the Front of that Dialogue, yet in *the Philebus*, one of his Capital Performances, he has judiciously withdrawn it from full View into the Back-Ground; by which Conduct and Disposition, the Commencement of this Dialogue is more polite and elegant than That of *the Meno*, where the Subject is intruded on us without any Kind of Introduction.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

The Sciences, viewed all of them together, will seem to Both of us not only Many and of Diverse Kinds, but Dissimilar too, Some to Others. Now if, besides, there should appear ⁴⁴ a Contrariety in any way, between Some of them and Others, should I deserve to be disputed with any longer, if, fearful of admitting Contrariety between the Sciences, I were to assert, that no one Science was Dissimilar to any other Science? For then the Matter in Debate between us, as if it were a meer Fable which has no Foundation, would come to No-

⁴⁴ The Sciences differ, according to the difference of their Subjects. So that Two *Sciences*, whose respective *Subjects* are *contrary*, each to the other, are *Themselves* also Two *Contrarys*. If then *Mind* and *Body*, the Subjects of Two different Sciences, commonly called *Metaphysicks* and *Physicks*, are, in any way, *contrary* to each other, those *Sciences*, of which they are respectively the Subjects, must be *contrary* to each other, in the same way. 'Tis certain, that no Contrariety happens between *Mind* and *Body*, considered as Two different $\epsilon\sigma\iota\alpha$, *Beings*, or *Substances*; because no $\epsilon\sigma\iota\alpha$, no *Substance*, or *Being*, is contrary to any other $\epsilon\sigma\iota\alpha$. But, on account of the contrary *Qualities* of *Mind* and *Body*,—as the one is eternal and invariable, the other variable and perishable,—*Mind* and *Body*, considered in this way, are Two *Contrarys*: and therefore the *Sciences*, of which they are the Subjects, are *contrary* also, each to the other.

L

thing

thing and be loft; while We faved our Selves ⁴⁵ by an Illogical Retreat. But fuch an Event ought not to happen, except this Part of it, — the Saving of our Selves ⁴⁶. And now the Equality, which appears thus far between Your Hypothefis and Mine, I am well enough pleased with. The Pleafures happen to be

⁴⁵ That is, — faved our felves *from being openly defeated*, by running away from the Argument, and retiring into the impregnable Fort of a Truth not to be contradicted: and Such a Truth is This,—that Science differs not from Science, confidered in *the general*, or fimplly as *Science*.—For when Things, of any Kind whatever, are contemplated in their *Genus*, where they are *united*, they lofe all their *Specific Differences*, and appear to the Mind as *One* Thing. Now of *Science in general* the Subject is *Being in general*, that is, all Kinds of Being, taken together, *united* in the Mind, and contemplated as *One*. The Division of *Science* attends the Division of *Being*; the feveral Kinds and Sorts of *Being*, when Being is divided naturally and rightly, diftinguifh the feveral Kinds and Sorts of *Science*; and our diftinguifhing juftly one Kind or Sort of *Science* from another, depends on the Diftinctions, made by Nature, between the feveral Kinds and Sorts of *Being*.

⁴⁶ This Phrafe,—“ *the Saving of our felves*,”—feems here, with an elegant facetiousnefs, turned to another Meaning, than it bore in the preceding Sentence: for it here fignifies *the Saving of our felves from Falshood*,—not by flying to Paralogifms and Sophifms, —nor by ftriving to ftand our Ground longer than it is tenable thro found Logick,—but by yielding up Both our Hypothefes to Right Reafon and Truth, if Thefe fhould happen to be againft us.

found

found Many and Dissimilar; Many also and Diverse are the Sciences. The Difference, however, between Your Good and Mine, O Protarchus! let us not conceal⁴⁷; but let us dare to lay it fairly and openly before us Both; that we may discover⁴⁸, (if Those who are closely examined will make any Discovery,) whether Pleasure or Wisdom ought to be pronounced the Chief Good of Man, or whether any Third Thing, different from Either: since it is not, as I presume, with This view that we contend⁴⁸, that My Hypothesis, or that Yours, may prevail over its Antagonist; but That, which hath the Truth on its Side, we are Both of us to contend for and support.

PROTARCHUS.

This is certainly our Duty.

SOCRATES.

But this Point farther we should, Both of us together, settle on the surest Ground.

PROTARCHUS.

⁴⁷ That is—let us not have recourse to Subterfuges and Evasions, as *Protarchus* had hitherto sophistically done.

⁴⁸ Or, — *let us be bold, in not concealing, but laying it down fairly between us Both.* — In the Greek, — μή ἀποκρυπτόμενοι, κατατιθέντες δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον τολμῶμεν, ἂν πη ἐλεγχόμενοι μινύσωσι, πότερον κ. τ. λ. *Cornarius* and *Stephens* were of opinion, that

PROTARCHUS.

What Point do you mean?

SOCRATES.

That which puzzles and perplexes all Persons, who choose to make it the Subject of their Conversation; —nay sometimes some Others, who have no such intention, are led to it unawares, in Conversation upon other Subjects ⁴⁹.

PROTARCHUS.

this Passage wanted Emendation, to make it intelligible. But if we suppose the two former *Participles* used instead of *Gerunds*, or instead of the *Infinitive* Verbs to which they are paronymous, there is no necessity for any alteration. And to justify our supposition, we need only cite a similar Enallage, in the Oration of *Lysias* περὶ τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας, — ἐκ αἰσχύνεται [says he of his Prosecutor] τραῦμά γε ὀνομάζων τὰ ὑπώπια, *he is not ashamed to call [or, he is not ashamed of calling] a few black and blue spots under the eye a Wound.* — Granting, however, that those two Participles have no other Place or Power in the construction of this Sentence, than Such as Participles usually have, yet the printed Text is still found, if we suppose an Ellipsis of the word *μηνύειν*, (governed of *τολμῶμεν*,) immediately after the word *μηνύσωσι*, from which the word *μηνύειν* is to be supplied. — Concerning words, not expressed, but tacitly understood from the word immediately preceding, see *Leisner* in *Præfat: ad Bos in Ellipsis Græcas*.

⁴⁹ By these last Persons *Plato* means Men of good natural Abilities of Mind, tho not readily disposed to philosophise.

For

PROTARCHUS.

Exprefs what you mean in plainer Terms.

SOCRATES.

I mean That, which fell in our way, but juſt now ⁵⁰, the Nature of which is ſo full of Wonders. For that Many are One, and that One is Many, is

For when ſuch Men are debating calmly and rationally on any Point whatever, in weighing the Force of each other's Arguments, they cannot help now and then recurring, by way of Appeal, to thoſe *Principles of Reaſon*, from which all juſt Argumentation depends, and to which it owes all the Force it has. Now the *nature* of theſe *Principles of Reaſon* is the very *Point*, coming on to be conſidered.

⁵⁰ The *Analogy*, juſt before ſhown, between *Science* and *Pleaſure*, in the *Diviſibility* of Each of them into *Many Species*, and alſo in the *Diſſimilarity* between the ſeveral *Species* of Each, muſt *there* ſeem pointed out by *Socrates*, meerly to *illustrate* what he had ſaid of different and diſſimilar Pleaſures. He *there* indeed profeſſed nothing more. But we *here* find, that the principal *Deſign* of that Simile, or Comparison, was to lead the way to the Diſquiſition, we are now entering into, concerning the nature of *One*, *comprehending many*, and of *Many*, *comprehended* all of them *in One*;—a Diſquiſition, neceſſary to the Knowledge of *Mind*. For the nature of *Mind* cannot be known without the Knowledge of ſuch a *Comprehenſive One*: and until the *nature of Mind* be known, it cannot be determined, whether the *Chief Good* of Man is placed in the *Energys of Mind*, or whether we are to look for it ſomewhere elſe.

wonderful.

wonderful to have it said; and Either of those Positions is easy to be controverted ⁵¹.

PROTARCHUS.

⁵¹ The following Disquisition concerning *One and Many* seems to have been first set on foot by *Pythagoras*, and to have arisen in His Mind from His Speculations on That Part of *Nature* which is *stable* and *invariable*. His Disciples transmitted what he taught them on this Head, together with all his other Doctrines, to Their Successors in teaching, under the Seal of Secrecy, as They had themselves received it. In this manner the Philosophy of *Pythagoras*, or his Way of considering the Nature of Things, was for a considerable time kept, as if it were sacred, amongst his Followers, intirely hidden from all other Men. During the time of this very reserved Conduct of the *Pythagoreans*, it appears that *Diocetas*, a Philosopher of That Sect, made no Secret of their Doctrine to *Parmenides*, a Man of an illustrious Family and ample Fortune at *Elea* in *Lucania*. *Parmenides* had been before instituted in the Knowledge of Nature by *Xenophanes*, who then lived at *Zancle* in *Sicily*: and he is said to have attended the Lectures of that Philosopher there, (as it was but a short Voyage from *Elea* to *Zancle*;) until he became acquainted with *Diocetas* above-mentioned; whom he took into his own House at *Elea*, together with *Aminias*, who in all probability was a *Pythagorean* also; especially, if what is reported of him be true, that His Advice and Arguments determined *Parmenides* never to engage in Public Affairs. From thenceforward these Three Philosophers led the *Pythagorean Life* together, in a Community of Studys, and of all external Commoditys. This Circumstance in the Life of *Parmenides* corresponds to what is by Some reported of *Xenophanes*, that he was a *Pythagorean* himself at first, and lived in Community with *Parmeniscus* and *Orestades*; but that he afterwards quitted their Society, and proceeded to speculate

on Nature by Himself in his own Way. And this Report concerning *Xenophanes* is confirmed, and made highly probable, by the Agreement of His Philosophy with That of the *Pythagoreans*, in the General Representation which it gave of Nature: for in Both was taught the *Unity of all things*;—in Both, the *Principle* of this *Unity*, ΤΟ 'ΕΝ, THE ONE;—in Both, the *Essence* of this ONE, λόγος, νῦς καὶ φρόνησις, *Reason, Mind, and Wisdom*. That this was the Doctrine of *Pythagoras*, is clear from *Porphyry's* Life of that Philosopher: and that it was no less the Doctrine of *Xenophanes*, may be fairly gathered out of *Cicero, Laertius, and Sextus Empiricus*.—But whoever was the immediate Master of *Parmenides*, in the *Pythagorean* Doctrine of Nature, this great Philosopher of *Elea* seems to have strengthened the Foundation of it, by considering the *Mind of Nature* as the only *True Being*, — The *One immovable*,—the sole *Principle and Cause* of everlasting *Stability and Sameness* to all the *Kinds and Species* of Things; and the sole Fountain to all *Particular Minds*, of their *Ideas*. For these *Ideas* of Theirs are no other than their *mental Perception, Intelligence, or Apprehension*, of the *Kinds and Species* of Things which are in *Nature*. As therefore the *Kinds and Species* of Things are ever the same in *Nature*, the same also are the *Ideas* of them in *Human Minds*, thro all successive Ages. On good Grounds therefore *Parmenides* seems to have imagined, or rather we may say to have divined, that, Whatever was the *Immediate Cause* of our *Ideas*, and whatever was their *Nature*, they owed their *Immutability*, and their *Sameness* in all *Particular Minds*, to the same *Principle and Primary Cause*, to which were owing the *Constancy* and everlasting *Sameness* of *Nature* in all her ordinary Productions. It must be confessed however, that the more ancient *Pythagoreans* appear to have philosophised, no less than the *Eleaticks*, concerning the *Species* and the *Kinds* of natural Things: which *Kinds and Species*, or rather our *Ideas* of them, they termed *Monads*. They considered them as leading to the Knowledge of *Universal Nature*; — seeing, that in This all those

Kinds

Kinds and Species of Things are comprehended;—and to the Knowledge also of *Nature's Cause*; which they justly presumed to be *One* all-forming *Mind*, — *One* Great *Idea*, in which the *σπερματικοὶ λόγοι*, or *Embryo Forms* of All things were included,— *One* all-efficient *Soul*, pregnant with the *Powers* and *Virtues* of every *Kind* of Being, to which it imparts *Soul* or only *Life*.— But, as some very important Points, relative to these *Pythagorean Monads*, are, soon after the Passage now before us, brought into Question, — Points, which have been litigated ever since, and remain unsettled to this day,—it may not be improper to assign the *reason* of those *Names*, by which they are now commonly called, *Genus* and *Species*; and at the same time to give some account of their *Natures*, so far as all Partys are agreed concerning them.—It cannot be doubted, but that Men always have observed, of the Beings around them,—as well of Those which move freely from Place to Place, as of Those which are fixed by Nature to one Spot of Ground,—that they live and flourish only for a time; and that, whilst Some of these Beings are perishing, or decaying, Others of them are rising into Form, or growing. They must also always have observed, that these New Beings *resembled* the Old ones, from the Seeds of which they were generated or sprang, in the *outward* Structure of their Frame, in the *visible* Disposition of the Parts of that Frame, and in the *apparent* Powers and Uses of those Parts. They must have always *known* and *distinguished* these Beings, Some from Others, by certain *characteristic Features*, which are continued *the same* from Generation to Generation. For different Features, Figures, and Appearances, continued on thus for ever with the *same Differences*, evidently denote *different Sorts* of Being. Now these different *Sorts of Being*, thus easy to be distinguished by the Eye, the *Pythagoreans* termed, in a peculiar and eminent Sense, *ἄσν, Forms*, (a Word, derived from *ἄσεν, to see*;) because their *visible Form*, or Aspect, shows *at first sight*,

to all Persons who have before seen any Others of *similar Form*, to What *Sort* of Beings they belong, and from What *Race* they are descended.—An *Oak-Tree*, for instance, sprung from an *Acorn*, resembles not only *The Oak*, that produced *The Acorn* from which it sprang, but also *all Other Oaks*, so greatly, as to be known *at first Sight* to be an *Oak*, by every Person who has observed the constant Differences between Oaks and Other Trees, in their external and superficial Form. The Difference between *One Oak* and *Another*, in the Height or Largeness of the Tree, or in the Size, Intervals and Number of its Branches or of its Leaves, never occasioned any Person to mistake an Oak-Tree for a Tree of some Other Sort. The *Form* therefore, *peculiarly* belonging to an *Oak*, being constantly and invariably the *Same* in *All Oaks*, was called by those Philosophers the εἶδος of an *Oak*.—In a few Ages after That of *Pythagoras*, the Grecian Philosophy travelled to *Rome*, assumed a *Roman* Garb, and spake the *Latin* Language. In this Language, every such εἶδος or *Form*, as we have just now endeavoured to delineate, — every Form, common to Many Individual Beings, to All of the *same Sort*, and of a *similar Appearance*,—took the Name of *Species*; a Name given to it with the same Propriety, with which in *Greece* it bore the Name of εἶδος; the Word *Species* being derived from the old *Latin* Word *specere*, to behold.—Thus much for the Term *Species*; and thus much, at present, as to the *Nature* of those everlasting *Forms* or *Beings*, to which That Name is now generally given.—As to the Other Name, given by the *Pythagoreans* to their *larger Monads*, That of γένος, or *Kind*, we premise, after the same manner in which we began our account of *Species*, that Men in all Ages,—such Men as made Observations, ever so slight, on those Productions of Nature, which occurred daily to their Eyes,—must have observed farther, of those εἶδη, those *Species* or *Forms* of Natural Things, (Each of them *common*

to many Individual or distinct Beings,) that, tho they differed outwardly, or to the *Eye of Sense*, One Species from Another, yet *Several* of them were *alike* accompanied by some *unseen Power within* them,—a *Power*, which enabled such Individual Beings, as were invested with certain Specific Forms, to *perceive* Sensible Objects around them, and to *move* of Themselves from Place to Place, Some on *Earth*, Others in *Water*, and Others in the *Air*. Appearing therefore to *operate alike* within them all, so as to beget in them a Capacity of *perceiving* external Objects, and a Capacity of *Self-Motion*, (tho, in Beings of different Species, with different Degrees of Motion and Perception,) it could not but appear to be *One* and the *Same* invisible *Power*,—an inward Principle of *Sense* and *Local Motion*,—a Principle, every where called *Anima*, that is, *Soul*. And thence the Beings, which partook of it, were called *Animals*, as having Each of them an *Anima*, or *Soul*.—Men, who were disposed to make such Observations, must have also taken notice of several Other Beings, produced by Nature, differing in their *ἔδη*, *Species*, or outward Forms, and all of them apparently *void of Soul*, but all of them agreeing with all the Species of *Animals*, in having a *Power* within them, as *invisible as Soul*;—a *Power*, which enables them to receive *Nourishment*, and thence to *grow*, or encrease in *Size*, and in the *Virtues* respectively belonging to their several *Species*; (unless their Growth be obstructed by some Accidental Cause;) but which *Power* gives them not those Capacities of *Perception* and *Self-Motion*, with which *Animal-Forms* only are endued.—This *Power* in them, this Principle of their Growth, was commonly called *Life*; and all those Species of Being, which were observed to partake of this *Power* only, and not of *Soul* also, were called simply *φυτὰ*, *Vegetables*, or Sprouts of *Nature*.—Thus it was discovered by ordinary Observation, that all the *ζῶα*, or *Living Things*, with which Man is acquainted, are divisible into Two
Sorts,

Sorts, ἔμψυχα and ἄψυχα, that is, into Such as, *besides Life*, partake of *Soul*, and Such as partake of *Life only*, and *not* of *Soul*; each *Sort* being *One*, comprehending *Many* distinct *Species*; in the same manner, as each *Species* is *One*, comprehending *Many* distinct *Individuals*.—We mention these *Two comprehensive Sorts of Being*, the *Animal* and the *Vegetable*, as an undisputed Instance of *different* Beings, the *Essential Difference* between which, tho obvious to be marked, lyes deeper than the *Difference* between their *Outward Forms*.—In Each of them there appears to be a Series of regular Gradations,—in the *Animal* Sort, rising to *Souls Rational*,—in the *Vegetable*, or meerly *Vital*, descending to *Minerals* or *Fossils*; for These also (in their native Beds) seem to partake of *Life*.—But to settle the Bounds of *Soul*, or those of *Life*, in the several Species of Being, is foreign to the present Subject. Thus much, however, we may say with Propriety, as well as with Certainty,—that different *Degrees* of *Life*, *Self-Motion*, and *Perception*, distinguish different *Sorts of Being*;—that *Each* of these Sorts is *One*, apart by its Self, and distinct from Others;—and that in Each of these *Ones*, *Many Species* or different *Outward Forms* are comprehended.—Now to these larger and more comprehensive *Ones* or *Monads*, which are distinguished, each from others, by a different *Degree* of some *internal Power*, apparent only from its Effects,—(a Power, which it communicates, thro each of its *Species*, to the multitude of *Individuals* in those several Species,—) to these *Monads* the *Pythagorean* Philosophers gave the Name of γένη, *Kinds*; and the *Romans* after them, accordingly, the Name of *Genera*;—Names, which, in a *proper* Sense, signify distinct *Familys*, descended from *One* common *Ancestor*, like so many *Branches*, sprouted forth from *One* common *Stock*;—*Tribes* also, in *Each* of which are comprehended *Many* such out-spread *Familys*;—and *Nations* also or *People*, Each comprehending *Many* such *Tribes*. The Names therefore of γένη

and *Genera* were, in a *figurative* Sense, applied to those comprehensive Sorts of Being; because *every One* of them, like a large and widely-extended *Family, Tribe, or Nation*, is distinguished from *Others*, not thro any external Marks, visible to *Sense*,—but by being known, thro *Reason* and *Experience*, to contain *Many* subordinate *Ones*, of *Kin* to each other, thro such a *Community of Kind*, as it were a Rise from One Root in Nature, common to them All.—Such seems to have been the Origin, and such the Meaning, of the Terms *Genus* and *Species*, when they are used in a philosophical Sense, or applied to the Forms produced by Nature. Only a little more remains necessary to be said on this Subject; and we shall resume it in the same way, in which we began and proceeded.—After that Men in all Ages, such Men especially as were given to make Observations, had once begun to speculate concerning the *Species* and the *Kinds* of Natural Things; (for now that we have explained the philosophical Meaning of these Terms, we shall not scruple to use them in that Sense;)—when they had observed of *many Individual Beings*,—of Such as were distinguished, one from another, not by any *essential* and *constant Marks*, and only by *Differences* afterwards termed *accidental*,—that they wore One and the Same *Specific Form*, in viewing which *Form* all those little Distinctions were disregarded, sunk and lost;—when also they had observed, that *many different Species* were of One and the Same *Kind*, in considering which *Kind* all Difference between them disappeared;—they were naturally led to carry their Speculations farther on Both those Points. In making nicer Observations on the various Productions of Nature, and on the more minute, yet constant and everlasting, Differences of Form in those Productions, they increased the Number of *Forms Specific*: what they at first looked on as a peculiar *Species*, which admitted no *essential Difference* between the *Individuals* that partook of it, they perceived:

ceived to have the nature of a *Genus*, or general Kind,—in this respect, that 'twas *common to many* different *Species*: and afterwards, on nearer and nicer inspection, discovering every one of these *different Species* to be divided into *many Subordinate Species*, or to contain different *Forms*, the *Same* always from generation to generation, and always with the *same Specific Difference* from each other, they called these *Forms* *more Special*; and to Those, which *comprehended* these, they gave the Name of *Genera*, or *Kinds*, with regard to the *Species* contained in them, and the Name of *Species* still, with regard to the *Kinds*, in which they were themselves contained. As *Children* first distinguish *Birds* from other *Animals*, by their *Flight*, their *Wings* and *Feathers*: afterwards, by degrees, they acquire the Knowledge of the several *Species* of *Birds*; they learn to distinguish *Hawks* from *Doves*, &c. while only *Men*, from Study or Experience, know the different *Species* of *Hawks*, and those of *Doves*, &c. — But the amusing work of distributing the *Forms* of Nature into proper *Classes*, according to *Genus* and *Species*, the *Pythagoreans* and *Eleaticks* seem to have left to the curious *Spectators of outward Forms*. To Such Objects (however *beautiful* be their *Aspect*, of however *wise* contrivance be their *Frame*, and however *good* the *Ends*, to which their *Frames* are fitted,) those Philosophers preferred the Study and Contemplation of an Object by far the fairest, noblest, and most divine, *Nature's Self*; deeming lesser Objects unworthy of their View or Attention, farther than as useful and perhaps necessary for the Direction or Guidance of Men's Minds to the Knowledge of the *Universe*, or *Whole of Things*. For they contemplated *The All*, τὸ πᾶν, as *One Thing*, or *Being*, εἷς ὄν, involved in whose *Principles* lye all the *Kinds* and *Species* of Things; which from those *Principles*, as from their *Root*, arise, shoot forth, and are expanded. They viewed it also as the *Great Whole*, εἷς ὅλον, whose *Parts*, taken together, contain

PROTARCHUS.

Do you mean such Positions, as This,—that I Protarchus, who am by nature One Person, am also

the numberless *Individuals* of all those *Kinds* and *Species*. They considered, that from the *Substance* of the *Universe*, all those *Individuals* derived the *Substance* of their *Particular* Beings; — that into That *Substance Universal*, when they fell to pieces, all their *Parts* returned and were *resolved*; and that out of these *Fragments* of Being, *new Beings* continually were composed, framed and formed, by an all-efficient all-forming *Cause in Nature*,—*new Beings*,—yet still *the same* in their *Kinds* and *Species*, endued with the same *Degrees of Life*, the same *Kinds of Soul*, the same *Limits of Reason*, and the same over-clouded *Minds*, with the Beings which preceded them. — Hence they argued, that from this *Great Cause*, thus full of ever-active *Virtue*, and thus for ever energising in the same way, all Beings received, not only their outward *Forms*, and inward *Frame* of *Parts*, but also whatever *Kind of Soul*, or *Degree of Life* was in them; in a word, all the *Powers* and *Capacitys*, whether *active* or *passive*, with which they were severally endued: and hence they argued farther, that this *Cause* of all things was, Himself, *Universal Life*, *Universal Soul*, and *Universal Mind*; imparting Himself, and his own eternal *Forms*, together with the *Powers* which attend them, *vital*, *active*, *sentient*, and *intelligent*, in various *Degrees*, to all the *Parts* of *Nature*. So that, according to those great *Philosophers*, the right *Theory of Nature*, and of *Nature's Forms*, is, at the bottom, a *Theory of Mind*, a *Theory of One and Many*, *Same and Different*: and these *Principles of Mind*, and of *Mental Forms eternal*, are also the *Principles of Nature*, and of Her *ever-lasting Forms*, the *Species* and the *Kinds of Things*.

Many?

Many? and such as these Others,—that my Self, and other Persons the reverse of Me,—the Great also and the Little, the Heavy and the Light, are One and the Same? with a thousand Positions more, which might be made, of like Kind?

SOCRATES.

The Wonders, O Protarchus! which You have now spoken of, relating to the One and Many, have been hackneyed in the Mouths of the Vulgar; but by the common agreement, as it were, of all men, they are now laid aside, and are never to be mentioned ⁵²:
for

⁵² It was observed in Note 50, that the Disquisition, now upon the carpet, concerning *One and Many*, is introduced for the sake of unfolding the *nature of Mind*. And this Purpose it naturally effects; because *Mind*, considered as unmixed with *Body*, and consequently as unconnected with *Sense*, is pure *Intelligence*; and the only *Objects* of pure *Intelligence* are those Intelligible Beings, *Genus* and *Species*, or every *One and Many*. And hence it is, that *Mind*, being the *Highest Genus*, or the *First One and Many*, is, in its Self, its own *primary* and proper *Object*, in which all other Intelligibles are comprehended. For *Mind its Self*, considered as *Intelligent*, is the *intelligent Comprehension* of those *higher Genera*, in which are included all the *subordinate*, quite down to the *lowest*; and in which lowest are virtually contained all εἶδη, or *Forms*, as well the *more* as the *less Specific*. Rightly therefore does *Plato* begin this Inquiry, by throwing

for they are considered as childish and easy Objections, and great Impediments also to Dialectic Reasoning on the Subject. — 'Tis now also agreed, never to introduce into Discourse, as an Instance of One and Many, the Members or Parts, into which any single Thing may be considered as divisible. Because, when a Respondent has once admitted and avowed, that all these [*Members or Parts*] are That *One* Thing, which is thus at the same time *Many*, he is refuted and laughed at by his Questioner, for having been driven to assert such monstrous Absurdities as these,—that a Single One is an Infinite Multitude, — and an Infinite Multitude, only One ⁵³.

PROTARCHUS.

out of the way, as foreign to the Subject, all those Things, which are not Objects of the *Mind*, but meerly of the *Senses* or *Imagination*; — in the first place, all *Individual Persons*, whether considered singly, or compared, Each with Other; — in the next place, all those Attributes, which belong only to Things *Corporeal*, such as their *Magnitude*, and their *Sensible Quality*s, compared with Those of other Things of the *same Species*; and lastly, all *Wholes*, consisting of *Parts*, none of which are, themselves, distinct Beings, — Parts, infinite in Number; — and such a Whole is every *Individual*, or distinct *ἑσία*, whether *Animate* or *Inanimate*, the *Substance* of which, or the *Substratum* of whose *Form* is *Matter*; because *Matter*, if not actually, yet in thought or imagination at least, is *infinitely divisible*.

⁵³ The Absurdity of representing the *Body* of any Animal, and *its Members*, as an instance of *One and Many*, is heightened by
 considering

PROTARCHUS.

What other Things then, not hackneyed among the Vulgar, nor as yet universally agreed on, do you mean, O Socrates! relating to this Point?

SOCRATES.

I mean, young Man! when a Thing is proposed to be considered, which is One, but is not of the Number or Nature of Things generated and perishable ⁵⁴. For as to the Ones of this latter Sort, 'tis agreed, as I just now said, to reject them, as unworthy of a serious confutation ⁵⁵. The Ones, which I mean, are

considering the Members themselves, not as *Members*, but as *Parts* only, of the *Body* to which they belong: because as *intire Members* or *Limbs*, they are *not*, what they are as *Corporeal Parts*, — that is, *infinite in Number*. Accordingly, *Plato's* own words, in the first part of this Paragraph, are,—μέλη καὶ ἅμα μέρη —*Members, which at the same time are Parts, &c.*—But we have translated the words μέλη and μέρη *disjunctively*; so as to comprehend, not only all *Animals*, whose *Members* are *dissimilar* and *heterogeneous*, but also all other Things Individual and *Corporeal*, whose *Parts* are *similar* and *homogeneous*; following herein, as we apprehend, the *Intention* of our Author, rather than his *Words*; as indeed we generally do, when a literal translation would not fully and clearly express his Meaning.

⁵⁴ This excludes all *Individuals* of every *Kind* and *Species*.

⁵⁵ That is, when they are proposed in conversation, as *Instances* of Things which are, *Each* of them, *One and Many*;

are such as Man, Ox, Beauty, Good ⁵⁶. When These, or Such as these ⁵⁷, are proposed for Subjects of Debate, much

whether they are proposed as *Objections* to the *Truth* of the Doctrine, or as *Exceptions* to the *Universality* of it;—and whether they are meant to try the Ingenuity of the Respondent, in distinguishing rightly between these *false* Instances and the *true*;—or, as the *Sophists* meant them, to show the Proposer's own Knowledge and Skill in making the right Distinction, and to expose the Ignorance of Such as wanted that Skill;—or whether with a view of guarding the Doctrine against Error, Fallacy, and Misapprehension; and indeed this last seems to have been the laudable Design of *Zeno* the *Eleatic*, who first taught the Art of detecting all Sorts of Sophisms.

⁵⁶ Of the Four Instances, here brought, the *first* Two are taken from among such *Species*, as admit of no *Division* into any *subordinate* Species, and are divisible only into *Individuals*: and and the *latter* Two, (in the Greek, τὸ καλὸν, and τὰγαθὸν,) are the Chief among such *Universals*, as are most properly so termed, Such as extend to *All things*, and of which *All* the *Works* of *Nature* participate, whatever be their *Kind* or *Species*. For the Charm of *Beauty* is spread over all the Face of *Nature*, thro the *Order* and *Harmony* of all its Parts; and the Power of *Good* is infused into all *Beings*, by means of their *mutual Fitness*, for the Supply of each other's Wants.

⁵⁷ In the Meaning of these Words are included all those *Species* and *Kinds* of Things, which, in the Order of *Universality*, lye between *Forms* the most *Specific*, such as *Man*, and *Ox*, (for, with relation to their several *Individuals*, these *Forms* are also *Universals*), and those *absolute* *Universals*, such as *Beauty* and *Good*, which accompany

much serious Attention is given them ; and when they come to be divided, any One of them into Many, much Doubt and Controversy arise.

PROTARCHUS.

Upon what Points ?

SOCRATES.

In the first place, Whether such Unitys ⁵⁸ should be deemed to have true Being ⁵⁹. In the next place,
How

accompany the Principles of the Universe, penetrate the inward Effences of all Beings, and pervade all outward Nature.

⁵⁸ These *Monads*, so termed by the *Pythagoreans* (as appears from *Plutarch: de Placit: Philos: L. 1. C. 3*, and from the Anonymous *Life of Pythagoras* in *Photius*,) are here by *Plato* termed *ἐνάδες*, because in Each of them *Many* meet and are *united*. In the next Sentence, however, the *Pythagorean Term* is made use of.—They were named *Μονάδες*, either because they lye in the (Human) Mind, *καταμόνας*, separately and *singly*; or because Each of them always *μένει* *remains That One* which it is.

⁵⁹ *Democritus* held, that the *only* Things which were *true*, (or had True Being,) were *Atoms* and *Vacuum*. This we are told by *Sextus Empiricus*, pag: 399, Edit: *Fabricii*. And to confirm it, he cites the following words from that great Philosopher's own Writings,—ἐστὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν τὰ ἄτομα μόνον, καὶ τὸ κενόν. What *Democritus* meant by *True Being*, will be inquired into on a fitter occasion. But his manner of expressing himself in That, and

such other Sentences of his, seems to have given the first occasion of questioning the *Reality* of Things *Universal*. For then began the Controversy, stated by *Porphyry* in these words, — *περὶ γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν, εἴτε ὑφέστηκεν, εἴτε ἐν μόναις ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις κεῖται.* *Whether they have real Subsistence, or whether they have their place in meer Notions only.* *Porphyr. Isagog. Cap. 1.* This Controversy lasted, until Religious Faith put an End to all Philosophical Doubts and Inquiries. New Controversys of a different Kind then succeeded; and the only Subject of these was the Meaning of several Articles of that Faith. And when these Controversys were silenced by the prevailing Party, armed with Power to suppress all Opposition to its own Decisions, the *Ghost of Philosophy* arose; and in his Train appeared the *Shadows* of old philosophic Controversys; for the ruling Powers permitted no free or fair Inquiry into the *Foundation of Truth*, or the *Principles of Things*, — Inquiries, which are the *Life and Soul of Philosophy*, rightly so called. Accordingly, in those days, the Followers of *Dr. John Duntze*, of *Merton College in Oxford*, (commonly called *Duns Scotus*,) and the Followers of *William of Okebam*, were divided on this very Subject, — whether *Universals* were *Real Beings*, or whether they were only *Names*, and denoted nothing but what was merely notional, *Creatures of the (Human) Mind*. — A Dispute somewhat similar to This, happened, toward the Close of the last Century, between *Mr. Locke* and *Bp. Stillingfleet*. — And Disputes of this Kind never will have an End, till it be settled and agreed, What is *True Being*, and What is the *Essence of Mind and Reason*: for till then it cannot be ascertained, whether *any* and *what* Share of *True Being* is to be allowed to *Entia Rationis*; or whether the *Truth of Being* belongs not, rather, to *Them* only, — to *Such* of them, we mean, as are the *Same in Every Mind*.

How

How it is, that these Monads, every One of them being always the Same, and never generated, nor ever to be destroyed, have, notwithstanding, One and the Same Stability, common to them all⁶⁰. And lastly,
Whether

⁶⁰ This *Second* Question supposes the *First* Question decided, in favour of the *True Being* of the *Monads*. For, if *Universals* are held to be only *Names*, invented to denote unreal *Fancys*, or factitious *Notions*, it is trifling and idle to inquire, whence they derive *Stability*; This being an *Affection*, or *Property*, of *Real Beings* only,—unless it be as merely *nominal*, *notional*, or *fantastic*, as those Things are, to which it is attributed.—The Sentence, now before us, in the Greek is printed thus; — πῶς αὖ ταύτας, μίαν ἐκάστην ἔσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτήν, καὶ μήτε γένεσιν μήτε ὄλεθρον προσδεχομένην, ὅμως εἶναι βεβαιότητα μίαν ταύτην. The Greek Text must here be faulty; and to make good Sense of it, 'tis necessary to make a small alteration or two,—by reading ἔχειν instead of εἶναι, and καὶ αὐτήν instead of ταύτην. In translating this Passage, we have presumed, it ought to be so read; and the Meaning, intended to be conveyed by it, we suppose to be This;—“ it must
“ needs seem strange, that *distinct Beings*, not generated, Some
“ of them by Others, but All equally eternal, without Inter-
“ community or Interchange between them, should, nevertheless,
“ have *one and the same Nature*, That of *Monad* or *Unity*, and
“ *one and the same Property* of their Being, That of *Stability*.”—
In this place, the Question is only stated, and the Reason of
Doubting shown: but the Doubt is easily solved, and the
Question answered, on the Principles of that Philosophy, which
we are endeavouring to illustrate, because it seems to illustrate
all Nature. For it follows from the Principles of it, laid down

Whether we should suppose every such Monad to be dispersed, and spread abroad, amongst an Infinity of Things generated or produced, and thus, from being One, to become Many;—or whether we should suppose it to remain intire, its Self by its Self ⁶¹, separate and apart from that Multitude. But of all Suppositions, This might appear the most impossible, that One and the Same Thing should be in a single One and in Many, at the same time ⁶². These Points, O Protarchus!

in this Dialogue, that all the several *Monads* of different Orders, that is, all the *Kinds* and *Species* of Things, whether more or less general or special, derive their Beings from *One its Self*, the great *Mind of Nature*, by the *Pythagoreans* called emphatically THE MONAD;—and that in this Mind, being Universal, They, being all of them Universals also, tho of different Extent and Comprehensiveness, lye as it were inveloped; and consequently are exempt from all Motion, Alteration, and Destruction.

⁶¹ In the *Greek* we here read, — αὐτὴν αὐτῆς χωρὶς. But 'tis presumed, that we ought to read, — αὐτὴν ἐφ' αὐτῆς χωρὶς.

⁶² If the *Monads*, so much spoken of in the time of *Socrates*, should have been admitted to have both a *true* and a *stable* Being, by any Disputants who were unacquainted with the *Ground* of their Reality and Stability, for the sake only of a thorow Inquiry into their Nature, in that Age of philosophical Inquiries, — a *Third* Question is then asked, the right Answer to which must put an End to all Doubts concerning the Nature of the *Monads*, — Where is their Place of Residence? or, Where are they to be found?—And the first Doubt, which, in considering
this

this Question, naturally occurs to all Minds uninformed in the *Principles of Things*, is This, — Whether the Monads exist *only* in *Outward Nature*, that is, in the respective *Individuals* of each Kind and Species,—either by being *divided* amongst them, (as it must be supposed, if every Individual is only *participant* of some Species and of some Genus,) or by being *multiplied* into *Many*, (which must be the Case, if in *Each* Individual be found the *whole* *intire* Species and Kind, to which it belongs,)—or whether they are seated *only* in the *Human Mind*, being placed there by her Self, thro a Power which she has of collecting the *Images* of those scattered Individuals into *separate Assemblages*, according to their *Agreements* and *Disagreements*;—or else, whether each Monad exists in a Multitude of *Individuals*, *at the same time* that the *Whole* of it hath its Seat, *apart* from those Individuals, and *alone* by its Self, in the *Human Mind*. — That there is, in *Nature*, some *invariable Cause* of That *invariable Agreement* between all the Individuals of their respective Kinds and Species, cannot be doubted by any Person, who knows that no Thing exists without an *adequate Cause* of its being What it is. Neither can any such Person doubt of there being, in all *Human Minds*, some One *uniform Cause* of That *constant Uniformity* in them All, thro which, All of them in the same Manner, and with equal Facility, tho not perhaps with equal Quickness, assemble together and unite *Many* Individuals *in One* Species, and *Many* Species *in One* Genus.—Now it is most certain, that the *Human Mind* is not the *Cause* of any Similitudes, or *Agreements*, between the Individuals. Nor is it less certain, that the *Individuals* themselves are not the *Cause* of their own *Union*, or even of their *Assemblage*, in the *Human Mind*.—The *Platonic Philosophy* professes to obviate this Doubt, by teaching, that the *Cause* of all the Similitudes and Agreements between Individuals, in *Outward Nature*, is the *Cause* also of their *Assemblage* and of their *Union*, in *Human Minds*:—that this Com-

mon Cause of Both is The One *Mind* and *Soul* of the Universe, framing *All Things* together, fitted to each *Other*; framing the *Organs of Sense*, in All Animals, fitted to *Outward Things*, so as to transmit all *necessary Notice* of them to the Seat of *Sensation*; framing the fairy Grounds of *Imagination*, fitted to receive, hold, and retain their *Images*; framing the deep Cells of *Memory*, fitted for Her Office, which is to rouse those *Images* from their dark Dormitorys, and call them up to be reviewed when Occasion offers; endowing also Some Beings, over and above Others, with Powers to segregate, congregate, and unite those *Images*, that is, with *Minds* fitted to the *Monads*: — by teaching farther, that these *Monads* have their true, their stable, and eternal, Being, in pure *Mind alone*, The *Mind* of Universal Nature, whose *Ideas* they are, and in whom they are pure, and unmixed with *Body*: — that the Resemblances of these *Ideas* are formed in *Matter* by the Presence of That Great *Mind* throughout *Matter*, investing every *Portion* of it with such a *Form*, that is, with the Resemblance of such an *Idea*, as That *Portion* of *Matter* is pre-disposed to receive: (for pre-disposed it is, in some certain way, by its being the Relicks or the Corruption of some preceding *Form*, which is departed; or by its being the Flower and Farina of some elder *Form*, which is still living, and arrived at its Maturity:) — that the *Images* of those *Outward Forms*, with which *Matter* is invested, entering into *Human Imaginations*, are there assembled in separate *Parcels*, according to their *Similarity*s and *Dissimilarity*s; assembled thus distinctly by the *Human Mind*, thro her Power of seeing the *Sameness*s and the *Differences* of *Things*; (a Power, This, essential to her Nature; because *Sameness* and *Difference* are the Principles of all her *Intelligence* and *Knowledge*, whatever be the *Objects* of it;) — and that the same *Mind*, afterwards, combines together and unites the *Similar Images*, thro that unifying Power, which also is essential to her Nature, for that She her
Self

Self is a *Monad*.—Thro these her *native Powers* it is, (according to this ancient Doctrine,) that, in beholding Each of those *distinct Assemblages*, she sees, arising in her Self, the *Idea* of a *Species*, from which all *Accidental Differences* are excluded; — and that, whilst she beholds together all *congenial Species*, there is at once presented to her the *Idea* of a *Genus*, in which all *Specific Differences* disappear; tho they are, All of them, in that *Genus* virtually contained. — Thro the same *comprehending* and *unifying Powers* it is, that, by degrees, she comes to view within her Self the larger *Monads*, the *more general Ideas*; to contemplate even *her Self*, and her own *Being*, in which *all her general Ideas* are *united*: the *Human Mind* may therefore properly be called her own *most general Idea*, or the *Idea* of all her *Other Ideas*; these being seen, *All* of them, *in One*, seen in *her Self*, thus found to be a *Monad*. — Hence it may appear, that, tho the *Human Mind* seems to *form* or *create* her own *Ideas* *Special* and *General*, by comparing together *Things* more or less similar, and by overlooking or not attending to their *Diffimilarities*, yet She no more creates them, than she creates *her Self*; and that her seeming *Powers* of *creating* are only, in reality, her *Powers* of *energising*, dormant in her, till awakened and roused by *Outward Objects*.—The *original* and *eternal Seat* therefore of all *Ideas* can only be That *Universal Mind*, which is never dormant, but for ever is and must be *in Energy*. For, considered in his own *simple Essence*, *abstracted λόγῳ* from the *Universe* which he fills, and from the *Matter* of it which he forms, *He himself* is *Wisdom*, the *actual Intellection* of Himself, that is, of the fair *Ideas*, involved in the *prolific Unity* of his *Essence*; and *actual Intellection* is the *Energy of Intellect*:—considered, as he is the *Efficient Cause* of all *Outward Forms*, creating them after those his own fair *Ideas*, it is evident, that he *never ceases operating*, from the never-ending *Effects* of his *Operation*:

tion: — and considered again, as being *within* every Particle of *Matter*, and intimately *present* to every *Living Form*, supporting it in Being for a convenient time, and healing the Breaches made in it by Mischance, he is the *Energy*, the *Life* and the *Soul* of the *Whole World*; the Fountain of all *Particular Souls* and *Lives*, with their blind or unconscious *Energys*; the Fountain also of all *Particular Minds*, with their *Ideas*, and all their Energetic Powers,—namely, the Power of *perceiving* those Ideas, and their Relations to each other, — the Power of *comparing*, *joining*, and *dividing* them,—the Power of *raising* up, or discovering, *Some* by the means of *Others*,—and the Power of *comprehending* and *uniting* all of them in her Self. — Thus is to be solved the Doubt, or Question, proposed in the Sentence now before us; and the seeming Absurdity, mentioned in the latter Part of it, is thus to be reconciled to Truth and Nature. For every *Genus*, and every *Species* of Things, is, in the Divine Mind, each of them, a *Monad*, its Self by its Self, separate and apart from the Multitude of its *Resemblances* or *Copys* in Outward Nature, to all of which it is the sole *Original*.—By these Copys the *Monad*, the *Ideal Form*, is as it were *multiplied*: but, as it is multiplied in *Matter*, — a Subject, not only in its Self *incapable* of *perfect Form*, but also, in many Particles of its Mass, (the Dregs and Drofs of some prior Forms,) *repugnant* often to the Admission of any new Form, or *refusing* to assimilate and unite with any Neighbour-Form to which it is conveyed,—it becomes like a fine Picture, copied upon a rough Ground, and with coarse Colours; the Daubing satisfies only vulgar Spectators, who never saw better Painting.—In the *Human Mind*, the Idea returns again to its *Monad-Nature*; tho still falling short of Perfection; because it is there *mixed* with *some* (at least) of those Corporeal *Images from without*, by which it was first excited in that Mind. Notwithstanding which impure Mixture, it proves so *fair a Copy*,

as to have been mistaken for an *Original* by Some Persons who pass for *Connoisseurs*. Indeed, the more that a Human Mind is conversant with *abstract Science*, which rejects those *Images*, the nearer Approaches do her *Ideas* make toward Purity and Perfection,—toward an *exact Likeness* of their *true Originals*. For every *Particular Mind* partakes of the *Whole Essence* of *Universal Mind*, from whom she is *derived*: but, being derived into *Body*, the Activity of her Powers is suppressed; and she is, at first, only in *Capacity*, what the *Fountain-Mind* is in *Energy*, that is, *contemplative* of her own Ideas, and *operative* outwardly according to those Ideas; these being the only *Patterns* she has, to copy after in her *Works*, and the only *Rules* she has, to direct her *Operations*.—In fine, to conclude our summary Comment on this Passage, regarding the *Seat* of these Monads, the *Kinds* and *Species* of Things, — it appears, that the *original Monads*, and the *Two* several Sets of *Forms*, copied from them, the *Corporeal* and the *Mental*, must have *Three* different *Seats*, where they severally *reside*, suitable to their different Natures: — that the *Seat* of the *Originals* is *Inward Nature*, or the *True Intelligible World*, *Universal Mind*; in whose *Unity* all these Monads are *eternally united*:— that the *Seat* of their *Corporeal Copies* is *Outward Nature*, or the *Sensible World*, the *Image* of the Mind within, impressed on Matter; thro the *emanant Virtue* of which Mind, this Visible World is a *Whole*, and all the *Parts* of it, thro incessantly interchanged in their *Forms*, are *everlastingly held together*:—and that the *Seat* of the *Mental Copies* of the original Monads is the *World* of each *Particular Mind*, opening to Each of us gradually, as our *Reason* travels on, by the *Light of Intellect*: but that the *Seat* of what are now commonly called *Our Ideas*, (which ought to be, and by nature are, *true Copies* of the Original and true Monads) is the *World of Imagination* and *Opinion*; a *Private World*, to every Man *his own*; a World, whose *Parts* are all *unconnected*, without

Protarchus! which regard Such Instances as I have mentioned, and not Such as were mentioned by You, they are These, which, for want of being rightly settled, create all the Difficultys and Doubts we meet with in Dialectic Inquirys, but when once they are settled rightly, they clear the Way with Ease.

PROTARCHUS.

Then, it seems, we are to labour these Points first.

SOCRATES.

I should think, we ought.

PROTARCHUS.

And that We consent to it, you may take for granted,—all of Us here. Philebus indeed 'tis best perhaps, at present, not to discompose, by asking him Questions, now that he is quiet.

any fixed *Bounds*, and without any *Principle of Unity* or Stability,—until our Minds *rectify* their *wrong* Opinions, and *establish* on a firm Foundation such as are *right*, by frequently withdrawing from the Objects of Sense that *croud* the *Fancy*, and from the Din of Rumours that *stun* the *Understanding*, to visit the Regions of *Science*; where all is still and quiet; and where every Idea is for ever settled, distinct and clear; being inlightened by That, which throws Light on all intelligible Things, That intellectual Sun, in whom the Fountains of Being, of Identity, and of Diversity are all united.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Very well: but in What way shall we begin the Discussion of these Points, in so wide a Field of Controversy? Shall we begin thus?

PROTARCHUS.

How?

SOCRATES.

We say, in speaking of these Monads, (Each of which is One, but on a Logical Examination of it, appears to be divisible into Many,) that they run throughout every Sentence in our Discourse, every where and always⁶³: and that, as their Being shall never have an
End,

⁶³ On this Passage we can give no better Comment, than what Mr. *Harris* has written in his *Hermes*, B. 3, Ch. 3. concerning *Words, the Symbols of general Ideas*: to which therefore we refer every Reader, who is inquisitive into the Truth of *Things*, represented by *Words* in every Language; and shall only add This Observation, — that, altho *Particulars* are often the Subjects of our Discourse, yet, in every thing we *say of them*, we use *General Terms*; appealing to those *General Ideas*, which are the same in the Minds of All men, of the Speakers and of Those to whom they speak: for 'tis only thro *general Ideas*, that the Hearers can understand What *Relations, Qualities, Actions, Passions, or extrinsic Circumstances*, are attributed to the *Particular Person or Thing*, spoken of.—The Reader is here desired to take notice,—that in this Note, and elsewhere, by *General Ideas* we mean all Ideas commonly called

End, so neither does it first begin in the present age ⁶⁴. Now this perpetual Attendant upon all Speech proceeds, as it seems to Me, from Something immortal and undecaying within our Selves ⁶⁵. And hence it is, that the Youth every where, when they have thus had a Taste of it, are overjoyed at their having thus found a Treasure of Wisdom. Transported therefore with the Delight it gives them, they apply it to every Subject of Discourse: sometimes they collect Particulars from all Quarters, and roll them into One; then they unroll

called *Universal*; comprehending Ideas *Special*, as well as Those which are *General*, and Those also, which, not being limited to any One Species or Genus of Things, deserve to be alone stiled *Universal*: to one or other of which Three Orders belongs every *Idea* in our *Minds*: for of *Individuals* we have only *Images* in our *Imaginations*.

⁶⁴ This perhaps is added, to prevent any Person from surmising it to be a new *Creation*, or even a new *Discovery* of *Zeno's*.

⁶⁵ Meaning *the Mind*. For Speech is, for the most part, an *Exhibition*, or outward *Display*, not of *Images* in the *Fancy*, but of *Ideas* in the *Mind*, which are *Copies* of *Things eternal*. And even these *Originals* of our Ideas may very properly be said to be *within us*; inasmuch as they are the Ideas of That *great Mind*, whose intimate Presence to *Our Minds* continues their *Being*; preserves to them their *Principles* of Sameness and Difference *united*; and supports their *Powers* of seeing *Many in One*, and *One in Many*.

them

them again, and part them afunder ⁶⁶. After having, in this way, puzzled Themselves in the first place, they question and puzzle the Person next at hand, whether he be their Equal in Age, or Younger than themselves, or Older, sparing neither Father nor Mother, nor Any one else who will attend to them, scarcely other Animals, more than Man; it is certain, they would not exempt Any who speak a Foreign Language only, could they but find somewhere an Interpreter ⁶⁷.

PROTARCHUS.

⁶⁶ See Note 62, not far from the beginning.

⁶⁷ This Passage, on a slight reading of it, seems to mean nothing more than This, — to rally the Athenian Youth on That contentious Manner of discoursing, and that immoderate Love of arguing and disputing, with which the *Logick* of *Zeno*, then newly introduced into Athens, had inspired them; — a Manner and Disposition, of like Kind with those which have been often observed of Young Logicians in Modern Universities.—But on a little carefull examination, the Whole Passage will be found to have, beside this jocosè Raillery, a serious and philosophic Meaning. It will be found to convey these Truths, — that *General Ideas* are not peculiar to Persons who philosophise, nor to Nations which are civilised or enlightened; and that no less do they attend the *unlettered Vulgar* and the *Savage*:—that they neither first come into the Human Mind, when her Facultys arrive at their Maturity; nor depart, when those Facultys decay; but that, as they are *essential* to all *Mind*, (for What is *Mind* without *Ideas*?) they spring up naturally in every *Mind*, as soon as the Rational Soul

PROTARCHUS.

Do you not see, O Socrates ! how numerous we are, and that All of us are Young ? and are you not afraid, that, if you rail at us, we shall All join Philebus, and attack you jointly ? However, (for We apprehend your Meaning,) if you can, by any Means or Contrivance ⁶³, easily rid us of these Perplexitys, which hinder the Progress of our Inquiry, and can devise some better way of managing the Argument, do You but give your Mind to the prosecution of it, and We shall do our utmost to follow and attend you. For the present Debate is of no trifling Concern, Socrates !

Soul begins to energise ; at latest, a little sooner than *Speech* is formed and issues from the Mouth. For *General Ideas* may be said, in a metaphorical Sense, to be the *Souls* of all *Human Speech* : from Them, much more than from Sensible Images, it is, that Articulate Sounds, the *Subject-Matter* of Speech, receive their *Form* or Meaning : and thro Them it is, that the Meaning passes from One Mind into Another.—A Hint also is given, in a Part of the Passage now before us, that Novices in Philosophy are apt to imagine Some *Brute Animals* not totally void of General Ideas.—The Satyric Humour which appears in this Passage, and the grave Meaning, couched under that Appearance, were, we find from what *Protarchus* says next, Both of them discerned by the young Gentlemen of the *Lyceum*, Auditors of the Conversation.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Indeed it is not, Children! as Philebus called you. No better Way then is there, nor can there be, than That, which I am always a great Lover of⁶⁹; but often before now, it has slipt away from my Sight, and has left me, as it were, in a Desert, at a Loss whither to turn me.

PROTARCHUS.

Let us but know, What Way you mean.

⁶⁸ In the *Greek*,—*μηχανή*,—perhaps alluding to a Device, sometimes used by the best *Tragic Poets* of Greece. For, when their Ingenuity was at a Loss, how to disentangle the Perplexitys of their Plot or Fable, by any ordinary and Human Means, they introduced the Person of some *Deity*, appearing in the Scene *ἐκ μηχανῆς*, (that is, by some such Piece of *Machinery*, as hath been exhibited on our modern Stage in many of our *Pantomimes*;) either to unfold those Intricacys of the Drama, occasioned by the Misapprehensions and Errors of the principal Persons therein,—or to bring about a Catastrophe, not to be accomplished without some Divine Interposition,—or to pacify and silence all Partys, by announcing the Will of Heaven. — In this Theatrical Sense the Word *μηχανή* is used by *Plato* in his *Cratylus*, pag: 425. But our chief Reason for thinking, that he meant an Allusion to it in the place now before us, is This,—that he is here actually preparing to introduce *True Divinity*, as the only Means of clearing away the present Difficultys about the *Monads*.

⁶⁹ The Way, which the Philosopher means, is the *ascending* to the *Principles* of All things.

P

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

To point out the Way, is not very difficult ; but to travel in it, is the most difficult of all things. For all such human Inventions, as depend on Art, are, in this Way ⁷⁰, discovered and laid open. Consider then the Way, which I am speaking of ⁷¹.

PROTARCHUS.

Do but tell it us then.

SOCRATES.

A Gift of the Gods to Human Kind ⁷², (as appears plain to Me,) it was of old brought from Heaven, by some Prometheus ⁷³, along with a Fire the most luminous.

⁷⁰ For the only Way of *explaining* any *Works of Art* fully and clearly, is to show the *Principles* of their *Construction*. And the only right Way of *teaching* any Art, is to begin from the *Principles* on which the Art is *founded*.

⁷¹ These re-iterated Delays in *Socrates* are evidently intended to augment the Curiosity of his Audience, and to heighten their Expectations of something very important.

⁷² What is said, in *Plato's Timæus*, pag: 47, of Philosophy in general, that 'twas a *Present from the Gods to Human Kind*, seems to be here said *particularly* of that *Basis* of Philosophy, the Doctrine of the *Principles of the Universe*, which are the same with those of *Mind*.

⁷³ The *fabled Prometheus* is said to have brought down fire from *Heaven*, to animate the *Man*, whom he had made of *Mud* or *Clay* ;

minous ⁷⁴. From the Men of ancient Times, Men, better than We are, and dwelling nigher to the Gods,

Clay; that is the *Human Body*, composed (as *Clay* and *Mud* are) from the Elements of *Earth* and *Water*.—Concerning the *allegorical Prometheus*, see the next Note.

⁷⁴ We presume, that the *Luminous Fire*, here spoken of, means the Fire truly *Ætberial*, the immediate Seat of Mind; — That Fire, which is termed by the *Stoicks* νοερόν, *Intellective*; and by *Heracitus*, θεῖον, *Divine*, φρενῆδες, the *Vehicle of Wisdom*, and λογικόν, *pregnant with the λόγοι, the essential Forms* (or *Ideas*) of all things. — In the Passage now before us, it is evidently implied, that the *original, principal, and proper Place* of this *Luminous Fire* is *Heaven*, or the *Upper Sky*;—an Opinion, which has in all ages every where prevailed. For *All men, Barbarians as well as Grecians*, says *Aristotle*, in his *Treatise de Cælo*, L. 1, C. 3, τὸν ἀνωτάτω τῷ θεῷ τόπον ἀποδιδάσι, *assign the highest Place* [in the *Universe*] *to That which is Divine*.—Agreeable to this universally received Opinion, concerning *Heaven*, is an Account of the allegorical Person of *Prometheus*, given us by *Cornutus*, the Stoic Philosopher, in his *Treatise de Naturâ Deorum*, C. 18, apud *Opuscula Mythologica*, pag: 179; and by *Julian*, the Platonising Emperor, in the *Sixth* of his *Orations*, where he explains the present Passage of *Plato*. For according to Their Interpretation of this Fable, *Prometheus* is an Allegorical Person, representing That divine προμήθεια, or πρόνοια, which *forms and orders* the lower Parts of the *Universe*, the mutable and mortal; continually *creating* the various *Forms* of Bodies; and dispensing to the Bodies, newly created, *Life, Soul, and Mind*, in different Portions, suited to the Capacity of each Form. The more ancient

Theologers, however, the *Orphic*, seem not to have made any Distinction between *εἶς*, or *μῆτις*, and *πρόνοια*, or *προμήθεια*. And we must confess that these *different* Names are very properly given to *One* and the Same *Supreme Being*; but they are *proper* in *different respects*. When he is considered *abstractedly* from Outward Nature, and as conversant only with *Things Eternal*, (the sole Objects of *pure Mind*;) *πρόνοια* *Providence*, or *προμήθεια* *Forethought*, is not to be attributed to Him; because as no *Eternal* Things are *past*, so none of them are *yet to come*; and in pure Mind there is neither a *before* nor an *after*, but all Ideas are *ἀεὶ ἅμα καὶ ὁμῶς*, *together always present*. On the other hand, when he is considered as the *Creator* of *Temporary* Things, His Being is *prior* to Their Existence; His Ideas, considered as the *Originals* and *Models* of Their Forms, are *before* the Copies; and his Creative Mind is, with respect to these his Creatures, *Fore-Thought*, *Providence*, *Contrivance*, and *Design*.—Now this Divine *Prometheus*, being the *Soul of the Universe*, and *inspiring into* [lower] *Nature*, says *Julian*, πνεῦμα ἐνδεσμὸν *a Spirit full of Warmth*, or warm Life, imparts to *Animals*, *Vegetables*, and *Fossils*, so much of *Soul*, or of meer *Life*, as their several Frames are fitted to receive. But since, in lower Nature, only the organisation of the *Human* Frame admits of *Mind*, only to *Human* Beings is *Mind* communicated, in a Particle of that *Ætherial Substance*, which, according to *Plato* and *Aristotle*, is the *first* and *finest*, the only *pure* and *simple*, *Body*, or *Corporeal Form*; and is therefore the fittest of all *Bodys* to be the immediate Vehicle or *Seat of Mind*; filling those *boundless* Tracts of *Æther*, which, if the old *Ægyptian* or *Eastern* Doctrine be true, are peopled with *Immortal Beings*, whose *Bodys* consist of that *Ætherial Substance*, and whose *Minds* approach nearest to the *Supreme*.

Gods,

Gods ⁷⁵, this Tradition of it hath descended to Us,
 —that those Beings, said to be for ever ⁷⁶, derive their
 Effence

⁷⁵ We apprehend, that, by these *Better Men*, these ancient Inhabitants of the *mountainous Parts* of the Earth, (many of which rise above the Clouds,) our Author here means the same Persons, of whom he writes in the Beginning of his *Third Book of Laws*, — Those, who escaped the last *General Deluge*, which had laid all the *low Lands* under Water, and had drowned all their Inhabitants. For those few Survivors were, as *Plato* with great probability there supposes, Such as led the Pastoral Life on the *highest Downs*, and with the natural Produce of their own Flocks fed and cloathed their own Familys; — “ People, says He, of more *Simplicity* and *Candour*, more *Sobriety* and *Manliness*, and more *Universal Justice*, than the present Race of Men.” — Such People were likely to preserve, and to deliver down to their posterity those accounts of Beings, either Divine, or at least superior to Human, which the Philosophy of Ages, prior to the Deluge, had discovered and taught the World.—But who else may possibly here be meant, see in the latter Part of Note 78.

⁷⁶ By these *Immortal Beings*, may be meant either those *invisible Ætherial* Beings, mentioned in Note 74, or else those *visible Celestial* Bodys, (as they are commonly called,) the *Sun*, together with the *Planets*, primary and secondary, and also the *Fixt Stars*; all of which in Greece at that time, and indeed all along from the time of *Orpheus*, were vulgarly deemed to have, Each of them, a *distinct Intelligence* or *Mind*. Whichever of these Two is *Plato's* Meaning in this Sentence, it may well seem strange, that he should derive the Nature of the *Monads* or *Ideas*,

Effence from One and Many ⁷⁷; and therefore have, in Themselves, Bound and Infinity, connatural to them :

of which he is now discoursing, (Beings not *intelligent*, but *intelligible*;) from the same *Principles*, from which the ancient Tradition, here perhaps referred to, derived the Nature of those *intelligent* Beings immortal and undecaying.—But we shall cease to wonder at this, if we consider, that an exact *Analogy* must always subsist between all *intelligent* Beings, (of whatever Order,) and their *Ideas*. The same degree of Purity or Perfection, which they have, *Themselves*, the same will be in their *Ideas*: for in proportion to the Grossness or Fineness of the Bodys, with which they are invested, will their *Ideas* be more or less accompanied or mixed with *corporeal Images*, and consequently will be more or less *imperfect*; because *Matter*, one of the Principles of *Body*, admits not of *perfect Form*; and because no *Particular Minds*, (Minds, invested with *Bodys*;) can have any *Knowledge* of any Thing *out of Themselves*, but thro *corporeal Images*. To this argument it may be added, that Being *Intelligent* and Being *Intelligible* are not only *Correlatives*, but are so in their very *Essences*; *Neither* of them can *be* at all, without the *Being* of the *Other*.

⁷⁷ That all *particular Minds*, even those of the Highest Order, derive the Nature of their Beings from *One and Many*, is most certain. For whatever *Particulars* stand together in the same *Rank of Being*, they partake of One and the Same *Universal*; and all *Universality* supposes Unity, or *Oneness*, as a *Principle* of Things. On the other hand, if *Multitude* were not originally in Nature, as another *Principle of Things*, there could be no *Particulars* of any *Universal*; because every *Particularity* infers an *indefinite* and a possible *infinite*, *Multitude* of the *Kind*. — This

them ⁷⁸:—that, being in the midst of Things so constituted as they are, we ought to suppose and to search for some One Idea in every Thing around us; for that, since it is there, we shall on searching be sure to find it:

Argumentation not only relates to those *Æthereal Beings* before mentioned, (Such, as are termed by *Proclus* νοεροὶ θεοὶ *Intellective Deitys*,) and to Such also, as are their *Objects*, (those eternal and divine *Ideas*, termed by the same *Proclus* νοητοὶ θεοὶ *Intelligible Divinitys*),—but 'tis applicable no less to the *Heavenly Bodys*, visible to the Eye of Sense, — to all Such of them, at least, as seem to be of the same Nature, — the *Sun* and the *Fixt Stars*. For These have, according to the *Orphic* and *Pythagorean* Doctrine, as it is reported by *Iamblichus de Vitâ Pythag:* C. 28, N°. 151, τῶ παντὶ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν μορφήν ὁμοίαν *a Nature and a Shape, like to That of the Universe*; that is, they are *Ætherial* in their *Essence* or Nature, and *Round* in their *external Form* or Shape; as the same Doctrine supposed *the Universe* to be, which may therefore be considered as *That Universal One*, of which They are the *Particular Many*.

⁷⁸ This, as well as the preceding Part of the Description, here given us, of certain *Beings*, said to continue for ever, equally agrees to the nature of those *intelligent Beings* *Ætherial*, above mentioned, and to the nature of the *Celestial Orbs*. For all *Individual Beings* are *Corporeal*; and *Corporeal Beings*, be their Bodys ever so fine, consist of *Matter* and of *Form*. Now *Matter*, considered (νόδιφ τιμ λόγιφ) by its Self, is *infinite*; tho 'tis every where *bounded*, because it is every where *formed*: for the *Form* of every Portion of *Matter* is its *Bound*.—By the *Form* of it we mean, not the *Figure*,

Figure, but the *essential Nature*, That *Genus* and *Species*, of which it is an *Individual*.—For neither doth the *Nature* of any Corporeal Being, nor do any of its *Essential Qualitys*, arise from the *Figure*, *Position*, or *Scituation* of its *Parts*, as the ancient *Atomists* strangely imagined; but, on the contrary, from the *Nature*, the *Essential Form*, of every such Being, ariseth the *Figure*, which is *proper* to that *Essential Form*.—To this Interpretation of the Passage now before us, which attributes *Bound* and *Infinity*, Both of them, to Such Beings only as *endure for ever*, it may reasonably be objected—that *Infinity* and *Bound* are, Both of them together, *essential* to the *Nature* of *all Body* or formed *Matter*, and *connatural* therefore to every *Corporeal Form*. But to this Objection it may be answered, — that *Form* is no where *stable*, and consequently that *Bound* is no where *fixt*, in any *Corporeal Beings*, Other than in Such as are *permanent* and endure for ever; and None can be Such, excepting these Two Kinds; — One of which is the *purely Æthereal*:—for Beings of This Kind, being *uncompounded* and *uniform*, have *within* them no *Principle of Dissolution*; (especially if their *Parts*, all of which are *similar* and *homogeneous*, are held together by an *unifying Principle* within Themselves, a *Particular Mind*, or *Intelligence of their own*;) nor from *without* can there come to them Any Substance, finer than their own, (for None can be finer than the *purely Æthereal*;) so as to penetrate, divide, and separate their *Parts*:—The *other* Kind of *Corporeal Beings*, *permanent* thro all ages, comprehends all Such as are indeed, like *temporary* Beings, composed of *Parts dissimilar* and *heterogeneous*; and in the *Frame* of whose *Bodys*, just as in the *Frame* of *Theirs*, *different Elements* are mixed together, and are continually changing, Each into Other;—yet, because they are *Spherical* in their *Figure*, and are pressed every where *from without* by the *Circumambience* of an *equal* and *unvarying Æther*,—and because all their *Parts* gravitate *within* to

One

One Central Point, — and also, because they are incessantly in rapid Motion, turning, Each of them, around its own Axis, and wheeling their Course, in unresisting *Æther*, All of them, around one Common Center,—all these Causes operate together, so as to prevent their Frame from ever falling to Pieces.—Of this *latter Kind* is our own *Terraqueous Globe*, with its surrounding *Atmosphere*; and, reasoning from Analogy, we may, with great probability, refer to the *same Kind* all the celestial *Planetary Bodys*, whether of *primary* or of *secondary* Order; as appears from the most ingenious Theory of *Huygens* in his *Cosmotheoros*. — Of the *former Kind* is generally deemed *the Sun*, That common Center, to the Earth and to all the visible Planets, of their circularly *progressive Motion*. To the *same Kind* are referable, according to the most probable and received Opinion, those Celestial Bodys, called the *Fixt Stars*: and the Quality of being *Fixt* is attributed to them, because, tho it be reasonable to conclude from Analogy, that they *move* around their several Axes, yet they still maintain the *same Places* in the Heavens; that is, the same Situation, Each of them, relatively to all the Others. To this *Æthereal* Kind of corporeal Forms belong also whatever *Intelligent Beings* there may be throughout infinite *Æther*, invisible to Us on Earth, on account of the *Fineness* and *Minuteness* of their Spheres, or the Immensity of their Distance.—But, as to these Diviner Beings, last mentioned, tho *Plato* himself, during his Abode in *Egypt* might have been well informed of the Eastern Notions concerning them, yet, since it appears, that *Socrates* never intermeddled in such Speculations, we deem our Author too strict an Observer of Propriety, to give the least Hint of them, as coming from the Mouth of his great Master. It seems more probable therefore, that the Beings, spoken of in the Passage now before us, are Those, usually stiled by Astronomers the *Celestial Bodys*. And what encreases the Probability of it, is

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This,

This, — that, according to the *Orphic Doctrine*, these Celestial Bodys are *infinite* in Number;—that *Some* of them are *fixed* immovably, Each in the Center of some *Planetary System*; — and that the Motions of such *Others*, as *move* around them, are confined within *Bounds impassable*. Now we cannot suppose, that *Socrates*, so well acquainted as he was with all the Mathematical and Philosophical Learning of *Greece*, could have been a Stranger to the *Beginning* of it all, the *Philosophy of Orpheus*. For the *Orphic Doctrine*, descending from the *Mountains of Thrace*, where the Musick of it had softened in some measure the savage Manners of the *Thracians*, soon spread itself over all *Greece*, by means of the First Followers of it, *Museus, Linus, Thamyris, Eumolpus*, and many Others; carrying with it, not only a *Social Spirit* and the Rudiments of *Legislation*, but also a *Knowledge* in the *Nature* of the *Universe*, veiled under the Rites of *Religious Mysterys*: and These, so long as they remained uncorrupted, were found to be the firmest Support to Legal and Just Government, and the strongest Barrier against the lawless and boundless Spirit of Injustice.—But now, after all the Pains we have taken to interpret this whole Passage in *Plato*, as if it respected *Individual Beings*, Such of them as *endure for ever*,—yet, if we may suppose, that either the *Philosophy of Orpheus*, or the *Traditional Doctrine* of the more ancient *Mountaineers*, reached so far in the *Knowledge* of *Universal Nature*, as to see, that all the *Kinds* and *Species* of Being are comprehended in *Being its Self*, — in *One* eternal and universal *Mind*, — in *One* inward or *intelligible World*, — in like manner, as the *Individuals* of all those *Kinds* and *Species* are comprehended in *One sensible and outward World*,—on such a Supposition, we should be apt to think, that *Plato*, in speaking of *Beings*, *said to endure for ever*, meant those very *Kinds* and *Species* of *Being*. For 'tis evident, that in this Part of the Dialogue, he hath These principally in his View; and that the Mention

it⁷⁹:—that, after we have found it⁸⁰, we are next, in this One to look for Two, if Two only are next⁸¹; otherwise


of any *Individual* or *Particular* Beings, which *endure for ever*, could be introduced for no other Purpose, than to illustrate, in the way of *Analogy*, the *permanent* Nature of those *Kinds* and *Species*.—In this case, however, they are not to be considered as pure *Ideas*, or as having their *eternal Essences* only in the *Mind of Nature*: for *Infinity* enters not into the Composition of Any thing *there*, where the Bounds of All things are invariably *fixt*, and where the Nature of every *One* [that is, of every *Monad*] is *always the Same*: but to the Beings, here spoken of, *Plato* says that *Infinity* is *connatural*.—If then, by these Beings, we are to understand the *Kinds* and *Species* of Things to be meant, they are here to be looked on in no other Light, than as having an *everlasting Existence* in *Outward Nature*, thro an ever-lasting Succession of *Individuals* and *Particulars*, their *Copys* or *Pictures*, the *Ground* of which is the *Infinity of Matter*. See Note 164, in which is confirmed this Interpretation of the Passage now before us.


⁷⁹ “ *All Nature* (says *Plato* in his *Epinomis*, near the End) *beareth the Stamp of Genus and Species*.”—Every Form in *Outward Nature* is an *Individual* of some *One Species*, amongst *Many*; to which *Many*, *One Kind* of Being is *common*.—Nor is This true only of the *Essential Form* of every thing, from which *Form* the Thing receives its *Denomination*; no less true it is of every *accidental* and variable *Quality*, *Condition*, or *Circumstance*, which the Form admits *within* its Self; or which may *invest*, or *encompass*, or *attend*, or any way *affect* its Being. See Notes 26 and 28 to *the Meno*.

⁸⁰ In the two First Editions of *Plato*, *Aldus's* and *Walker's*, we here read *μεταλάβωμεν*, a Word, which the Sense of this Passage absolutely condemns. We therefore hope, that future Editors of *Plato* will here follow *Stephens's* Edition, where we read *καταλάβωμεν*.

⁸¹ That is,—if the *Highest Genus* (or most General Nature) of the *Subject* of our Inquiry be, in its First Division, divisible only into *Two Kinds*, immediately subordinate to That Highest.—We shall exemplify the Division of Things, recommended to us here by *Plato*, in the following *Table*: it is adapted to Each of those Three Meanings, in which that ancient Tradition, concerning Immortal Beings, may be understood; as appears in Note 77 and the Two which follow it.—The Division of *Animals*, *Vegetables*, and *Fossils*, into their several *Kinds*,—and the Division of Each of these *Kinds* into the *Species*, peculiar to it, — are the entertaining Studys of the curious *Naturalist*, or *minute* Observer of the lower Works of Nature.—But, in this *Table*, we are far from pretending or designing to make a just or complete Division of *Being*: we mean nothing more, than to give an *Example*, or *Specimen*, of the *Method of dividing λόγῳ*, or *logically*, Things (with regard to their *Essences*) into their several *Kinds* and *Species*, — a Method, which is perhaps the only Way of *proving* any such Subject to have been justly *analysed*.—For when we are *analysing* any individual *Complex-Form* of Nature, — that is, when we are investigating its *Principles*,—(from which Principles only we can discover, *What it is*, or in *What the Essence* of it consists,) we tread unshurely in every Step we take; because we tread all along in the Way of *Induction* from *similar* Forms; until we arrive at our *End*, the *Principles* we are in search of.—But when we are once arrived at this *End*, we are able with *Certainty* and *Ease* to return, thro every Step of the Road,—that is, thro every Degree in the *Derivation* (or *Process* in the *Composition*)

REAL.





[To be placed facing page 124.]

otherwise Three, or some other Number : again, that Every One of this Number we are to examine in like manner ⁸² : until at length a man not only perceives, that the One, with which he began ⁸³, is One and Many and Infinite ⁸⁴, but discovers also how many it contains ⁸⁵ : —for, that a Man never should proceed to the Idea of Infinite, and apply it immediately to any Number,

of that *particular Complex-Form*, whose *Essence* we desire to know ; —in descending from *Principles* to *Kinds*, from *Kinds* the *least General* to *Sorts* or *Species*, and among These to that very *Specific Form*, which had before been the Subject of our *Analysis*. —Accordingly *Plato*, in his *Dialogues*, employs *Analysis* and *Induction* for the *inquiring* after and the *discovering* of any Truth,—*Synthesis* and *Division*, for the *proving* and the *teaching* of it.

⁸² In the above drawn Table it appears, that BEING *its Self* is ONE, comprehending immediately the *most General* Kinds of Being ; and thro These, the *less General* and subordinate, in their several *Gradations* ; — and more remotely, the numerous *Species* of all the *least General* Kinds : it appears at the same time, that *Each* of these Kinds and Species is also *One*, comprehending *Many*.

⁸³ That is, — the *Highest Genus* of the *Subject*, which he is examining.

⁸⁴ The *Many*, comprehended in every lowest *Species of Being* ; are Beings *Individual* and *Corporeal* : and These are *infinite* in Number ; because *Matter* is One of the *Principles* of their Existence ; and *Matter* is *infinite*, in *Extension*, *Divisibility*, and *Duration* thro all Ages of Time.

⁸⁵ The *Kinds* and *Species* of Things must be of a *definite* and *certain* Number : for otherwise there would be no *Science* of them.

before

before he has fully discovered all the definite Number, which lyes between the Infinite and the One⁸⁶: but that, having compleated this Discovery, we should then finish our Search; and dismissing into Infinity Every One of all those Numbers, we should bid Farewell to them⁸⁷. The Gods, as I before said, have given us to consider Things in this way, and in this way to learn them, and teach them one to another⁸⁸.

But

⁸⁶ That is,—that, after some *General Subject* of our Speculation has been considered by us, and divided into its several *Kinds*, we should not descend to the consideration of the *Particulars* or *Individuals* of those *Kinds*, untill we have considered, and are able to enumerate, *all* the *subordinate* *Kinds*, *Species*, or *Sorts*, *intermediate*;—if we would attain to true *Science*, or to full and perfect *Knowledge*, in the *Subject*.

⁸⁷ Individual Beings are the Objects only of the *Outward Senses*, or of the *Imagination*: but where *Sense* or *Imagination* begins, there *Science* ends. *Sense* reaches to *Individuals*, the *Multitude* of which is *infinite*, and the *Diversity* *unbounded*: for *Sense* is in its Self *infinite*; and in *Animals*, or *Sensible Beings*, is *bounded* only by *Defects* in the *Organs* of their *Sensation*: but *Science* descends no lower than to *Species*.

⁸⁸ For this mythological Tradition, see Note 72. But in its *Mystic* or *Philosophic Meaning*, it imports,—that every *Particular Mind*, having a Faculty of perceiving *Every one* of her *Ideas*, (every *Kind* and every *Species* of *Things*) to be both *One* and *Many*, derives that *Faculty* from the same *Fountain*, from which she derives her *Being*,—namely, from *The Mind Universal* and *Divine*.

For

But the Wise Men of these days take any Monad whatever, and divide it into Many with more Conciseness

For *Unity* and [definite] *Multitude* are the very *Principles* of all *Mind*.—Of *Mind*, considered as the *Seat of Intelligibles*, or as the *Subject of Intelligence*, *Unity* is the Principle: and of *Mind*, considered as the *Object of its own Intelligence*, [definite] *Multitude* is the Principle.—On *Unity* and *Multitude*, joined together, depend all *Order* and *Proportion*, all *Harmony* and *Beauty*. Without *Number* pre-supposed, there could be no Place for *Agreement*, no Place for *Measure*: neither would it be possible without *Number*, for any *Truth*, or any *Good* to have a *Being*. — But these two Principles, *Unity* and *Multitude*, or *One* and *Many*, may be considered, (λόγῳ,) not only as they are *together in Mind* and in every *Idea*, but as Principles *distinct* from each other: and thus considered, they are severally the First or most General Objects of the Two higher Facultys of the *Mind*, *Intellect* and *Reason*. By her *Reason*, the *Mind* comprehends *Many*, and defines them, all and every of them; which *Every* of those *Many*, by her highest Faculty, That of *Intellect*, she sees to be *One*,—and *All* of them *together*, to be united, and to be *One*, in *her Self*.—And as *One* and *Many* are *together* the Principles of every *Mind*, so *Same* and *Different* are *together* the Principles of all the *Mind's Intelligence* and *Knowledge*; and may, in like manner, be considered λόγῳ as Two *distinct* Principles, and severally the Objects of those Two distinct Facultys, *Intellect* and *Reason*. By her *Reason*, the *Mind* compares *one Idea* with *another*, and discerns the *Difference* between them;—a *Difference*, which by her *Intellect* she annulls,—that is, sees an *Agreement* between *different Species* in the *Sameness of their Kind*, and between *different Kinds* in some *higher Sameness*.

than,

than they ought, and with more Prolivity too, ſince they never come to an End ⁸⁹: for immediately after the Monad, they introduce Infinity, overlooking all the intermediate Numbers; the exprefs Mention of which, or the Omiſſion of them, diſtinguiſhes ſuch dialectical and fair Debates, as Ours, from ſuch as are contentious and ſophiſtical.

PROTARCHUS.

Part of what you ſay, Socrates, I ſeem to apprehend tolerably well: but the Meaning of Some Things, which you have now ſaid, I ſhould be glad to hear you exprefs in plainer Terms.

SOCRATES.

The Whole of what I have ſaid, Protarchus, is evident in Letters. In Theſe therefore, which have

⁸⁹ For inſtance, let the General Idea of *Science* be the *Monad* propoſed; and let the *Nature* of this Monad be made the Subject of Inquiry; as it is in *Plato's Theætetus*: if a Man, preſuming that he knew its Nature, ſhould begin to give an account of it, (as *Theætetus* does in pag: 146, *Edit: Steph:*) by enumerating ſeveral *Objects of Knowledge*, the account never would be finiſhed; becauſe particular *Objects of Knowledge* are *infinite*. — In like manner, if the Nature of *Pleaſure in general* be inquired into, as it is in the preſent Dialogue, it would be *endleſs* to enumerate the various Things, *in particular*, from the application of which to ſome Part or other of us we *feel Pleaſure*.

been

been taught you from your Childhood, you may easily apprehend my Meaning.

PROTARCHUS.

How in Letters?

SOCRATES.

Voice, that issues out of the Human Mouth, may be considered as One General Thing, admitting of an infinite Number of Articulations, not only in all Men taken together, but also in every Individual Man.

PROTARCHUS.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

Now we are not made knowing in Speech, or Sound Articulate, thro the Knowledge either of the Infinity or of the Oneness of its nature: but to know how Many, and What, are the Parts, into which it is naturally divided, This it is, which makes any of us a Grammarian, or skilled in Grammar.

PROTARCHUS.

Most certainly.

SOCRATES.

And farther, That by which a Man comes to be skilled in Music, is This very Thing.

R

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

How so?

SOCRATES.

Musical Sound ⁹⁰, which is the Subject-Matter of this Art, may be considered in its Self as One general Thing.

PROTARCHUS.

⁹⁰ In the *Greek*, the Term, used here, as well as just before, (where this Translation hath the word, *Voice*,) is φωνή. It there signified *Articulated Vocal Sound*, or *Speech*: — It here signifies *Musical Sound of the Voice*, or *Vocal Musick*.—We see then, that φωνή *Human Voice* is by *Plato* supposed to be a *Common Genus*, dividible into those *Two Sorts* or *Species*. It is expressly so laid down by *Nicomachus*, (*Harmonic: Enchiridion*: pag: 3. Edit: *Amst.*) in these words;—Τῆς ἀνθρώπινης φωνῆς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Πυθαγορικῆς διδασκαλείας δύο ἔφασκον, ὡς ἐνὸς γένους, εἶδη ὑπάρχειν. καὶ τὸ μὲν συνεχές ἰδίως ὠνόμαζον· τὸ δὲ διαστηματικόν. Such [Writers concerning Musick,] as came out of the *Pythagorean School*, say, that of *Human Voice* [in general], as of *One Genus*, there are *Two Species*. One of these *Two* they properly named *Continuous*; the *Other*, *Discrete*.—These two *Technical Terms* he afterward explains, by showing us, that the *Continuous* is That *Voice*, which we utter in *Discoursing* and in *Reading*; (and therefore by *Aristoxenus* and by *Euclid* termed φωνή λογική) and that the *Discrete* is the *Voice*, issued out of our *Mouths* in *Singing*; (and thence termed φωνή μελωδική) for, in this latter case, every single *Sound* is distinguished by a *certain* or *measured Tone* of the *Voice*. The same *Division* of φωνή is laid down, and a similar *Account* of it is given, by *Aristoxenus*, in *Harmonic: Element*: pag: 8 & 9. Edit: *Amst.*

PROTARCHUS.

Without dispute.

SOCRATES.

And let us suppose Two Kinds of it, the Grave and the Acute, and a Third Kind between those Two, the Homotonous, or how otherwise⁹¹?

PROTARCHUS.

Musical Sound in general is so to be distinguished.

SOCRATES.

Ans: — The Doctrine, implied in the Passage now before us, will assist in the explaining of a Difficulty in the latter Part of this Dialogue.

⁹¹ *Homotony* of Sound is made, when a *String* of some stringed Instrument of Musick, having the *same* degree of *Tension* with a similar *String* of some Other, yields, in *conjunction* with it, the *same Musical Tone*;—or when Two different *Voices* utter, at the same time, Musical Sounds, Neither of which is more *Acute*, or more *Grave*, than the Other.—In Both cases, the Sameness of the Sound is also termed *ὁμοφωνία*: for *φωνή* *Voice* is (metaphorically) attributed to all *Musical Instruments*; (see *Nicomachus*, pag: 5 and 6.) as on the other hand, *Tone* is (by an easy Metaphor) attributed to the *Human Voice*, modulated by the Will in the *Trachea*, or *Aspera Arteria*: for this natural *Wind-Instrument*, in English aptly named the *Wind-Pipe*, while it transmits the Air breathed out from the Lungs, receives any degree of *Tension* it is capable of, at the pleasure of the Mind. — In like

manner, a Repetition of the *same Tone* from a single *Human Voice*, as well as from a single *Monochord*, is termed a *Monotony*. — In the Passage of *Plato*, now before us, we may observe farther,—that, tho Musical Sounds *Homotonous*, considered by themselves, *may* be either of an *Acute Tone*, or of a *Grave*, indifferently; in like manner as Persons, who read or speak in a *Monotony*, (where the *same Tension* is continued in the Organs of the Voice,) *may*, in Expiration, draw their Breath either from *low down*, or from *higher up*; (indeed all Musical Sounds *must* be either *Acute* or *Grave* on every Scale of Musick;) yet we here find *Homotonous* Sounds *separated* from both the *Acute* and the *Grave*, and supposed to form a *Third* distinct *Kind*. — To set them thus apart by Themselves, is agreeable to that Account of *Grave* and of *Acute* Sounds, in Composition, which is given us by the old Greek Writers on *Musick*. For, according to Them, every Musical Sound, called either *Acute* or *Grave*, is so called *relatively*,—either respecting the Sound which immediately *precedes* it, if issued from the *same Voice* or Instrument, — or respecting a Sound, issued at the *same time* from *another Voice* or Instrument. — And this perhaps may be one Reason among others, why *Grave* and *Acute* Sounds, in Musick, are by those Writers said to *differ κατά τόπον* with regard to *Place*. From a *Grave* Sound to an *Acute*, and from an *Acute* Sound to a *Grave*, a *Step* or a *Transition* is made; (a *Step* to either of the *nearest* Musical Sounds, a *Transition* to any one that is *remote*;) ὁδός, says *Nicomachus*, pag: 8, ἀπὸ βαρύτητος εἰς ὀξύτητα, ἢ ἀνάπαλιον. But *Homotonous* Sounds, even tho successive, *remain* (as it were) All in one and the *same Place*, to the Hearing of the *Ear*; as the successive Waters of a running Stream do, in their Appearance to the *Eye*.—’Tis from that *Neutrality* or *Indifference* of Musical Sounds *Homotonous*, with respect to both the *Grave* and the *Acute*, and not from their *partaking* of Both These, that *Bacchius* and

Aristides Quintil: say, they are μέσαι Middle Sounds, between Both the Others. See the former, in his *Introduct: Music:* pag: 11; the latter, in his elegant Treatise *περὶ μουσικῆς concerning Musick,* pag: 23; of the *Amsterdam Edition,* Both.—Very different from these *Homotonous* Sounds are Others, to which is given the same Epithet of μέσαι;—the φωνή, or *Vocal Sound,* in *Cathedral Chaunting*; — That of the ancient *Rhapsodists* in *reciting Poems*; — and the *Recitativo* in modern *Operas*; — a φωνή, Each of them, between the *Continuous* and the *Discrete,* (that is,) between *Reading* (or *Speaking*) and *Singing,*—a *Composition* or *Mixture* of them Both, and thence denominated μέση. See *Aristides,* pag: 7, and *Martianus Capella,* Lib: 9. To speak or to read in some such manner, *Nicomachus,* pag: 4, terms μελεάζειν.—No less different from the *Homotonous* is That φθόγγος, or *Musical Sound,* which, lying in the *Mid-Way* between the ὑπάτη and the νήτη, the Two Extreams on the most ancient and simple Scale, is accordingly there marked as the μέση, or *Middle.* See *Nicomachus,* pag: 9. — There is a Passage in *Theon's Mathematica,* (pag: 76, Edit. Paris:) where μέσαι φθόγγοι *Middle Sounds* are to be understood in a Sense, similar to That last-mentioned. It begins thus, — τῶν φθόγγων οἱ μὲν ὀξεῖς, οἱ δὲ βαρεῖς, οἱ δὲ μέσαι. *Of Musical Sounds, some are Acute, some are Grave, and others are Middle:*—Now this Division, being in almost the *same Terms* with *Plato's* Division now before us, may easily be supposed to have the *same Meaning*; especially since this Work of *Theon's* is professedly a *Comment* on the *Mathematical Passages* in *Plato,* But, as *Theon* proceeds to explain his own Meaning, in these words, — ὀξεῖς μὲν οἱ τῶν νητῶν, βαρεῖς δὲ οἱ τῶν ὑπατῶν, μέσαι δὲ οἱ μεταξὺ — he is so far, we find, from meaning, by his *Middle Sounds,* Sounds *Homotonous,* (the Epithet given by *Plato* to His *Third Kind* of Sounds,) that he must be understood to mean *different Musical Sounds* from the *same Voice* or *Instrument,*—all those, which, on the most enlarged Scale of
Musick,

SOCRATES.

But with the knowlege of This Distinction only, you would not yet be skilled in Musick; tho without knowing it, you would be, as to Musick, quite worthless.

PROTARCHUS.

Undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

But, my Friend, when you have learnt the Intervals⁹² between all Musical Sounds, from the more Acute
to

Musick, lye between the several *μήται* and *υπάται*, in those several Systems, the *Conjoined*, the *Disjoined*, and the *Excessive*;—for which, see the *Diagrams*, drawn by *Meibomius*, in his Edition of *Alypius*. In a Sense, somewhat of Kin to this of *Theon's*, a *Tenor-toned* Voice or stringed Instrument is sometimes called *μέση*, as being the *Mean*, or Middle, between a *Treble* and a *Bass*, when all the Three are joined in Concert. Were the word *Homotonous* capable of such a Sense, we should not scruple to assign this Sense to it in the Passage of *Plato* now before us.

⁹² An *Interval* is the *Distance* [or *Difference κατά τόπον* with regard to *Place*, mentioned in Note 91,] between any Two Musical Sounds, (between That which is *Acute* relatively to the Other, and That Other which is relatively a *Grave*,) however *near* together they may be, or however *remote* from each other, on any Scale of Musick. In proportion to the *Nearness* or *Remoteness* of these Two Sounds, the *Interval* between them is, in Mathematical Language, said to be *small* or *great*; that is, it is *short* or *long*. So that different Musical Intervals, like all other
different

to the more Grave, how Many they are in Number ⁹³, and into What Sorts they are distinguished ⁹⁴; when you have

different Distances from Place to Place, *essentially differ*, one from another, in *Magnitude* or *Length*. And on this essential Difference are founded all the other Diversities of the Intervals; as will be seen in Note 94.

⁹³ The *Number of Intervals*, between such Sounds as are definite and certain, must depend on the *Number* of those *Sounds*; in like manner as the *Number of Distances* between Cities, or other certain Places in any Country, depends on the *Number* of those *Places*. No other Things, than such as are definite and certain, is it possible to number: and no *Sounds* are Such, except the *Musical*.—For *Sound in general*, considered, not as a *Sensation*, but as a Thing *External*, is nothing else than a *Percussion of the Air*; and Air, being an *Elementary Body*, is *indefinite* in *Extent*, and *infinitely divisible*. Sound in general therefore must have the like Nature, and admits of *no Limit*,—none to its Extensiveness, Depth, or Greatness,—none to its Subtlety, Shrillness, or Minuteness.—But the *Organs of the Human Voice* are *limited* in their Power of *striking the Air*; so as that they cannot *produce* Sounds, either *above* or *below* a certain Pitch.—*Limited* also are the *Organs of the Human Ear*, in their Power of *transmitting* Sounds to the Seat of Sensation. But Nature has given to these *Auditory Organs* a Power *more extensive* than she has given to the *Vocal*; because, tho the *Equality* of their *Extent* would be sufficient for mutual Converse, and for the other Ends of Social Life, yet 'tis necessary for Man, who is, by means of his Body, connected with all lower Nature, to hear many Sounds, very different from the Voices of his own Species.—The *Compass*, however, of the *Voice* in uttering *Articulate Sounds*, or *Speaking*,

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tho' it be narrower than That of the *Ear* in *Hearing*, yet can never be *ascertained*: the extreme Boundaries of it, Either way, in *Height* or in *Depth*, cannot be *settled*; neither can it be divided into any *fixt* or *measurable* Parts. The Voice of *Grown Persons* is *stronger*, and consequently of *larger Extent*, than That of *Children*. It is *deeper* in the *Male Sex*, than in the *Female*: in the *Female*, on the other hand, it rises *higher*, than in the *Male*. In *warm Climates*, the Organs of Speech are capable of greater degrees of *Tension*, nor less of *Relaxation*, than they are in *colder Climates*, where they are, like the Air, *rigid* as well as *contracted*.—But, in *Singing*, the Human Voice hath no such *Latitude*.—For *Musical Sounds*, uttered by Persons of either Sex, at any Time of Life, and in any Climate, have the *same Effect* on a *Musical Ear*, — on that inward Ear, which perceives Harmony; — uttered by Voices the most different, they hold the *same Proportion*, each of them to the rest; and in uttering them, all Voices have the *same Degree of Tension*, relative to the Powers of their respective Organs.—The *Cause* of all these *Samenesses* lyes in the *Nature of Things*, — in That Part of Nature, which immediately *corresponds with Mind* Eternal and ever *the Same*.—To this Part of Nature belong all *Particular Minds*, all *Beings intelligent and rational*. With the Nature of all such *Beings* the Nature of *Harmony* is *congenial*. For *Harmony* and *Mind* are *con-natural*: whatever *Beings* therefore partake of Either, partake, at the same time, of Both.—Hence it is, that *Musical Sounds*, uttered by *Human Voices*, or issued from any *Musical Instrument* of *Man's Contrivance*, proceed from what is of *Divine Origin* within him; and the Force of them is felt only by what is of the same Origin in Others, namely, *Harmony and Mind*. — *Sound* is nothing more than the $\psi\lambda\eta$ or *Subjeēt-Matter* of *Musick*, in the partial and modern Meaning of the word *Musick*: it is *Harmony*, which gives *Form* to this *Matter*, and
 makes

makes *Sounds* to be *Musical*.—Now it is the Nature of *Form* in general, to set *certain Limits* to every Portion of *Matter*, which it invests. The *Compass* or *Extent* therefore of Musical Sound in general must of necessity be *limited*; and every Musical Sound within that *Compass* must be *fixed* to a *certain Point*. If their *Extent* be *limited*, there must be then a *Highest* and a *Lowest*, their extreme *Boundarys*: and if every one of them be *fixt*, the several *Distances*, or *Intervals*, between Each and every Other, must be *limited* also, and *certain*. Of these *Intervals*, there must also then be a *Greatest* and a *Least*. The *Greatest* or *Longest* Interval, between any Two of these Sounds, is evidently That between the *Highest* and the *Lowest*: and 'tis agreed on by all the Ancient Writers on this Subject, that the *Least* or *Shortest* Interval is the *διεσις έναρμόνιος*, or *Quarter-Tone* in the *Enharmonic Melody*. Now the Knowledge of a *Quarter-Tone*, or of any larger *Part* of a *Tone*, implies the Knowledge of a *Whole Tone*; and the Knowledge of This infers a Knowledge of all the Other Intervals, in respect of their *Magnitude* or *Length*; for they are all measured by *Tones*, or *definite Parts* of *Tones*: tho' some indeed fail of so exact a Measure, some Space remaining over, which is called a *λείμμα*. If then *all the Intervals* of Musical Sounds are *knowable*, no less *knowable* is the *Number* of them: For Things of any Kind, when they are all known, are easy to be *numbered*. None indeed, but Such as are *definite*, *fixed*, and *certain*, are ever to be *known*; and Such only are Those, which (to use our Author's own expression) *lye between the Infinite and the One*. In the present Subject, *Musical Sound in general* is That *One*; and Those *Infinite* are the Musical Sounds from *innumerable Voices and Instruments* of Musick.

⁹⁴ The ancient Writers on this Subject enumerate *Five Sorts* of Diversities, in which the Intervals *differ*, Some of them from Others. The *First* Sort has been mentioned in the preceding

Note,—namely, That, relative to their *Magnitude*.—This *primary Difference* between them is (as it were) the *natural Ground*, out of which, when it was *cultivated* by the close Attention of Good Ears, *Another Sort* of Difference was perceived arising between the Intervals;—a Difference, from which anciently were framed *Three different γένε τῆς μελωδίας Kinds of Melody*, (as they are called by *Aristides*, pag: 19,) the *Diatonic*, the *Chromatic*, and the *Enharmonic*. — The *smallest* Interval in the *Diatonic* Melody was a *Half-Tone*: the *Enharmonic* descended to a *Quarter-Tone*: the *Two smallest* in the *Chromatic* were *between* the *Half-Tone* and the *Quarter-Tone*;—namely, a *Third Part of a Tone*, in *one Species* of the *Chromatic*; in another *Species* of it, a *Quarter and Half-Quarter Tone*, as *One* simple Interval. — Those *Three Kinds* of Melody had also *Seven Other* simple Intervals, severally peculiar to each Kind. The *Diatonic* had an Interval of a *Whole Tone*; another Interval of a *Three-Quarter Tone*; another, of a *Tone and a Quarter*: in the *Enharmonic*, there was an Interval of *Two Tones*: and in the *Chromatic*, was an Interval of a *Tone and Half-Tone* and the *Third of a Tone*; another, of a *Tone and Three Quarters*; another, of a *Tone and Half a Tone*. These *Eleven* peculiar Intervals, the *Four smaller* and the *Seven greater*, were called by the Names of those *Three different Kinds* of Melody, to which they respectively belonged,—the *Diatonic* Intervals, the *Chromatic*, and the *Enharmonic*;—and thus arose a *Distinction* of the Intervals κατὰ γένος, in respect of Kind. — The Speculation of these *Two Sorts* of Difference between the Intervals,—their Difference in *Magnitude*, and their Difference in *Kind*,—easily produced a *Third Sort*; according to which, they were distinguished by the opposite Attributes, *Compounded* and *Uncompounded*.—The *uncompounded* Intervals are those, which are *not divisible* by any intervening φθόγγος, or *Musical Sound*, on the same *Scale*, or in the same *Kind of Melody*: the *compounded* are Such, as over-leap some intermediate

mediate Musical Sound or Sounds, by which they may be *divided*, and into which, as into their Elements, they are *resolvable*. Thus we find, this *Third Sort* of Difference between the Intervals to be grounded in the *First Sort*,—That, which regards their several *Magnitudes*,—but not discernible, until the Ear had nicely *distinguished* all the *peculiar* Intervals in the *Three Kinds* of Melody.—Farther; when the *Ground* had received an *additional Cultivation* from *Mathematical Science*, — when the *Greater Intervals* in each Kind of Melody came to be *measured*,—a *Fourth Sort* of Difference was discerned between them: for Some were found to be *completely measured* by some *Smaller Interval* in the *same Kind* of Melody: Others were found to *exceed*, or to *fall short* of, any such *certain Measure* multiplied: Those were distinguished by the Epithet *ῤητὰ*; while These were called *ἄλογα*;—Mathematical Terms, both of them;—the *former* was applied to those *Quantitys*, which had a *certain Name*, because they were divisible into Parts of *known Proportion*; the *latter Term* was applied to *Quantitys*, the Parts of which were *not* in any *certain Proportion* to each other, and were therefore, as well as the Wholes which they composed, *undefinable* and *nameless*: the Epithet, now given to *Quantitys* of this latter Sort, is the Term *Surd*. — Of the *Four Sorts* of Difference between the Intervals, hitherto mentioned, the *First Sort* we called metaphorically the *Ground* of the other Three; and These, the *Products* of that *Ground*, arising from learned and heedfull *Culture*. — The *Fifth Sort* of Difference is That, by which the *σύμφωνα* *Consonant* Intervals differ from *διάφωνα* the *Dissonant*. Now this last Distinction (to continue the Metaphor) springs up *spontaneously* from the *same Ground*; having been sown therein by UNIVERSAL MIND, the *Cause of Harmony*: the *Discernment* or *Sense* of this Distinction needs only the Warmth of *Genius*, to raise it higher and higher towards Perfection. For a *Particular Mind*, or *Genius*, disposed to Harmony and Musick,

have also learnt the Bounds ⁹⁵ of these Intervals, and how many Systems ⁹⁶ of Sounds are composed out of them ;

is (as it were) the *Air within*, warmed by the *Rays* of the *Intellectual Sun* ;—*Rays*, which refine the Mental Facultys ; quicken the Discernment of *Sameness* and *Difference* in all Things ; sharpen the Sense of *Order*, *Harmony*, and *Proportion*, in the *Works of Nature* ; and form a fine as well as a just Taste of whatever, in the Works or Operations of Art, is agreeable to those *Outward Copies* of the *Mind of Nature*. — Thro this *innate Sense* of Harmony, liveliest in the finest Genius, it was discovered, that the *smallest Interval of Consonance* was the *Diateffaron* ; for that *every Interval, smaller than This*, was *dissonant*. Thro the same Sense, a farther Discovery was also made, of *Seven* more Intervals of *Consonance*, Each greater than the preceding, when placed in the Order now to be exhibited ;—the *Diapente* ; the *Diapafon* ; the *Diateffaron added to Diapafon*, as *One Interval* ; the *Diapente added to Diapafon*, in like manner ; the *Disdiapafon* ; the *Diateffaron added to Disdiapafon*, as *One Interval* ; and the *Diapente added to Disdiapafon*, in like manner : Every Interval *between any Two* of these *Eight* was perceived to be an Interval of *Dissonance*.

⁹⁵ The *Bounds* of each Interval are those *Two Musical Sounds*, from Either of which there is made an *immediate Step* or *Transition* to the Other. Of all Musical Sounds the *Three principal* were ὑπάτη the most *Grave*, ῥήτη the most *Acute*, and μέση the *Middle* between those other *Two*, on the most ancient *Scale of Musick* ; which consisted of only *Seven Sounds*, produced by striking on the same number of Strings, all of different Lengths. We account those *Three*, just now mentioned, the *principal*, because the first and easiest Division of any *Quantity*,

ity, whether it be *continuous* or *discrete*, is into *Two* equal Parts, or *Halves*; the most *distinguishable Points* or *Bounds* of it therefore, however it be afterwards *subdivided*, are the *Two Extreams* and the *Middle*. Accordingly *Plato*, in his 4th Book *de Republicâ*, Edit: Cantab: pag: 314, speaking of the *νεάτη*, the *ὑπάτη*, and the *μέση*, the *Highest*, the *Lowest*, and the *Middle Sound* in Musick, calls them *οἅς τρεῖς ἀρμονίας*, *the Three Bounds of Harmony*; and likens to them the Three most *evidently distinguished* Parts of the Soul,—the *Rational Part*, the *Highest*, — the *Concupiscible*, the *Lowest*,—and the *Iracible*, between them Both.

⁹⁶ A *System* is a *Composition* of *Three* or *more Musical Sounds*; or (what amounts to the same thing) it is an *Extent*, *comprehending Two* or *more Intervals*.—Of these *Systems* the general *Diversities* are laid down by *Aristides*, pag: 15, & seq. But in His *Definition* of a *System*, (as it is printed,) an important Error deserves Notice. For we there read — *πλειόνων ἢ δυῶν*, — *more than Two*:—instead of which, we ought to read—*δυῶν ἢ πλειόνων*, *Two* or *more*; or else—*πλειόνων ἢ ἐνός*, *more than One*: which last are the very words, used by *Aristoxenus*, *Euclid*, and *Gaudentius*, in Their *Definitions* of a *System*. The Error probably arose from some Manuscript Copy of *Aristides*, happening to be not easily legible in this place. The Transcriber of it therefore, we suppose, consulted *Baccheius*; who in His *Definition* of a *System*, useth the words — *πλειόνων ἢ δυῶν* — these words are *right* indeed in *Baccheius*, because they are by Him applied to *φθόγγων Musical Sounds*, agreeably to Our *First Definition*; but they would be *wrong* in *Aristides*, where he is speaking, not of *φθόγγων*, but of *διαστημάτων* the *Intervals* of those *Sounds*, agreeably to our *Second Definition*.—On the many *Diversities* and *Variations*, to be made in so large a Field of *Systems*, are founded those many different *Forms*, *Figures*, or *Modes* of *Harmony*, or *Sorts* of *Tunes*, (the
Greek

them; (which our Predecessors having discovered, delivered down to Us, who come after them, by the name of Harmonys⁹⁷; and having discovered other such

Greek Writers call them ἄδη, μόρφαι, γήματα, τρόποι, and τίνες εἰρμορίας) the general *Kinds* of which, according to *Aristides*, pag: 25, are These — the *Dorick*, the *Phrygian*, and the *Lydian*: if this be true, *all the other Modes* are to be considered as *subordinate* to these Three; and indeed they seem, Some of them, to be *Intensions*, Others to be *Remissions*, and Others to be *Mixtures*, of Those the more *moderate* and *simple*.

⁹⁷ The word εἰρμορία, *Harmony*, was used in different Senses by the old Grecian Writers. We learn from *Nicomachus*, that the most ancient Writers on *Musick* gave the name of *Harmony* to that most perfect *Consonance*, the *Diapason*.—*Aristoxenus* and *Euclid* mean, by the Term *Harmony*, That *Kind of Melody*, which is called *Enharmonic*.—*Plato* and *Aristotle*, when they speak of *Harmony* in the *singular number*, without the addition of an Epithet, denoting the *Sort*, mean, by that Term, the *Idea*, which is commonly nowadays expressed by the Term *Musick*;—probably, because it was the *First discovered* of those *Sciences*, as well as the *First invented* of those *Arts*, which were anciently comprehended together in *One general Idea*, expressed in *One Word*, and termed *Musick*. What *Sciences* and *Arts* were included in the Meaning of that general Term, it will be more opportune to specify in the next Note.—But when the same great Philosophers speak of *Harmonys* in the *plural number*, they mean those different *Forms* or *Modes* of *Harmony*, whose Specific Differences depend on the *different Systems*, or on the *different Order* of those *Systems*, of which they are severally composed.—To the Term
Harmony

such Affections ⁹⁸ in the Motions of the Body, and in Words ⁹⁹, meafuring thefe by Numbers, they have taught

Harmony in this latter Senfe only, (as it fignifys a *Mode* of Harmony,) agrees the following Definition of it, given us by *Theo*, and, long after him, by *Pfellus*; — Ἀρμονία ἐστὶ συστηματικῶν σύνταξις. *A Harmony* (not, Harmony in general) *is a Composition* (or an *Ordering together*) of *Systems*.—On this Definition *Bouillaud* in his *Notes to Theo*, pag: 250, judiciously thus obferves, — *Vocat hic Harmoniam, quos alii appellant τρόπος seu τόνος*. — On this Subject we fhall only obferve farther, that the *Synthesis* of Harmony, prefented to us by *Plato* in the whole Paffage now before us, beginning from fimple φθόγῳι or *Mufical Sounds*, (which are the *Elements* or *primary* constituent *Parts* of Harmony,) is exactly the fame, and proceeds in the fame Order, with That *Synthesis*, which is taught by all the ancient Greek Writers on *Mufick*: One Proof among Many, This, of *Plato's* Knowledge in the *Theory of Mufick*. Agreeably to which obferuation, *Plutarch*, in his Treatife περὶ μουσικῆς, informs us, that *Plato* applied his Mind clofely to the *Science of Mufick*; having attended the Lectures of *Draco the Athenian*, and thofe of *Mettellus of Agrigentum*. Or if we fuppofe, that *Plato*, in this Part of the prefent Dialogue, did no more than faithfully record the Doctrine of *Socrates*, our fuppofition is very juftifiable; for *Socrates*, in his Old Age, ftudied *Mufick* under *Connus*.

⁹⁸ That is, — fuch *Relations* and *Proportions*, (or to make ufe of *Mufical Terms*) fuch *Steps* and *Transitions*, *Intervals* and *Bounds*, *Systems* and *Compositions*, in the *Motions of the Body*, and in *Words*, as are *analogous* to the *Affections of Mufical Sounds*, called by thofe very Names. — The *Greek* word, which we have rendered.

dered into English by the word *Affections*, in the Passage of *Plato* now before us, is *πάθη*, and translated literally, signifies *Passions*. For, whatever Situation, Condition, or Circumstance, any Being or Thing is placed in by some Other,—or by its Relation to some Other, — in whatever way it is acted on, or affected by that Other, — such *Situation*, &c, of the Being or Thing so placed, so acted on, or so affected, was by the Greek Philosophers termed a *πάθος*, a *Passion* of such Being; because, in that respect, the Being is *passive*.

99 In the printed *Greek* of this Passage we read only, — *ἔντε ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὐτῶ σώματος* — immediately after which, — *ἔντε ἡμίμασιν*, — ought to follow, but is omitted. This will be rendered probable, at the least, by the two next Notes; to which we shall here prefix the following Observations. — The ancient Grecians, in their Idea of *Musick*, comprehended the Sciences of *Harmony*, *Rythm*, and *Metre*; — that is, — a perfect Theory of *Sounds*, *Musical* and *Harmonic*, — of *Motions* of the Body, *regular and well-proportioned*, — and of *Words*, the *Meaning* of which (and perhaps the *Sound* also, when those Words are properly pronounced,) agrees with those *Musical Sounds*, and those *Rythmic Motions*; all Three joining to produce One great Effect on the Souls of the Hearers and Spectators. — On the *Principles* of those three Branches of *Musical Science* were of old founded the *Arts of Vocal and Instrumental Harmony*, *Dancing*, and *Poetry*; — Arts, which advanced nearer and nearer to Perfection, as the Minds of Men became more and more refined and polished, thro the Study of *Musick*. — We are furnished indeed by *Nature* with sufficient Powers to produce the several *Materials* for those Arts, or their *Subject-Matter*; namely, — *inarticulate Sounds*, — *voluntary Motions* of our Bodys, or of its Limbs, — and *Speech in general*, or *Voice articulated*. — *Nature* has also taught us to express, by those several Signs, the *Passions*, *Affections*, and *Sentiments* of

our Souls. But she has left to Us the *harmonising* of those *Sounds*, the *regulating* of those *Motions*, and the *modulating* of our *Speech*,—not only, so as to attract and charm the attention of Those who see and hear us,—but farther, so as to raise in them such Sentiments, Passions, and Affections, as we feel, or feign to feel, our Selves, and think it good to impart to Others. To accomplish this End, were the Musical Arts *invented*; and Rules, and Systems of Rules, were *composed* and *framed*, for the teaching and learning of these Arts. But the *Sciences*, on whose *Principles* these Arts are founded, have their foundation, Themselves, in *universal Nature*, — in That Part of it, which is everlastingly the Same,—in the *Harmony* and *Symmetry* of Things, which are the outward *Expressions* of Those harmonious and justly-measured Forms, the *Ideas* of *Universal Mind*; whose all-comprehensive *Intelligence*, or *Wisdom*, is MEASURE ITS SELF, — The *Measure of All things*. — For these *Ideas* are the *Originals* of that *Symmetry* and that *Harmony*, which appear exemplified in the Forms of Outward Nature: and These their Exemplifications, the copied Forms, imperfect as they are, serve Us for the Foundations of our Science; which Science, in all its Compartments, we begin to build, as soon as our Minds are excited by those external Forms, so as to look within Themselves, and to contemplate there the more exact, tho faint, Copys of the same divine Originals.—Now the Internal Forms of *Symmetry* and *Harmony*, (*obscured* by those Corporeal Images which excite them, yet still *bright*, in proportion to the Brightness of the Mind where they arise to View,) are, as we conceive, meant by the *Muses*, those superior Beings in the old Mythology, from whom the whole Science and Art of *Musick* took its Name. For they were supposed to inspire Men, Such as they favoured, with a *just Sense* or Taste of *Harmony*, *Rythm*, and *Metre*; and with a *Genius* for those *Arts*,

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which

taught us to call them Rythms ¹⁰⁰ and Metres ¹⁰¹; bidding us to infer from hence, that Every *One-and-Many* ought to be searched into and examined in the same way;)

which are founded on that natural *Sense*, improved by *Science*. — The same allegorical Persons, the *Muses*, are also fabled to be the Daughters of *Μνημοσύνη* *Memory*, begotten by *Jupiter*. And, if the *Platonic* Philosophy be true, our conception of What were meant by those *Muses*, rightly explains the Allegorical Fable of their Parentage. For, if all *Particular* Minds are derived from *Universal* Mind, the *Mind of Nature*, then must *Their* Ideas be derived from the *Divine* Ideas, as having been *implanted* or *sown* in them by their proper and true *Sire*: and when these Embryon-Ideas are *born*, or *spring up* in any *Particular* Mind, they are so *natural* to her, that she is apt to take them for *her own Productions*, her own long-lost and long-unthought-of *Offspring*; and to *recognise* them for Such, as if thro her own actual *Reminiscence*.

¹⁰⁰ *Rythm*, in general, is an *Order of homogeneous Motions, measured by Time*. Motions *homogeneous* we call all such Motions, as are made in the *same way and manner*; whether they are made by one and the *same Thing*, as for instance, by the Foot or Hand in beating Time to a Tune; or whether by *different Things*, as for instance, by all the Four Feet of a Horse, one after another, in walking or in galloping. — Now all *Order* infers *Distinction*, — a Distinction of the *Parts* of some *Whole*. And where the *Whole* consists in *Motion*, as doth a *Dance* for instance, all the *Parts* of it are so many *distinct Motions*, and all these Motions are *homogeneous*. Every distinct Motion hath its *Bounds*, — a Beginning and an Ending; — *Bounds*, which are separated by *Intervals* of both
Space

Space and Time. For some *Part* of *Space* must be between the Place *from* which the Thing in motion began to move, and the Place *to* which it moves, and where That Motion of it *ends*: some *Portion* of *Time* also must elapse during such Motion, if no Motion can be quite instantaneous, or without a Lapse of Time. *Two distinct Motions* of one and the same Thing, as of the Human Body for instance, require, at the least, a *Point* of *Time*, for an *Interval* between them. *Three or more* such Motions, having *Intervals of Time* both within and between them,—Intervals unequal, but well-proportioned,—make a *System* or Composition of Motions,—an *Integral Part* of some *Dance*: and *Many* of these *Systems* (Each of them being, in the Times of its Intervals taken together, equal to every one of the rest,) compose a whole *Dance*; all the Parts of which *συντάσσεται* are ordered together, and are proportioned, Each to Other and to the Whole.

¹⁰¹ In the Greek, — μέτρα. — The term μέτρον, in common acceptation, signifies *Measure* in general. But the manner, in which that word is introduced by Plato in the Sentence now before us, shows, that 'tis here used in That peculiar Sense, given it by the ancient Greek Grammarians, in teaching the Art of Versification. Accordingly, the Romans, who derived all their Skill in that Art from the Grecians, retained the word μέτρον, in Latin Characters *metrum*, as a *Technical Term*, appropriated to *Poetical Measure* solely, the Measure of *Syllables* in a *Versè*. — Our old *English* Poets indeed sometimes, by the word *Measure*, mean a *Dance*; (probably because our *British* Ancestors used to dance to the *Verses* of their *Bards*;) but we venture to assert, that the old *Grecians*, by the word μέτρα *Measures*, never meant Measures in the *Motions of the Body*; for Such they express only by the term ῥυθμοὶ *Rhythms*. This Consideration first led us to suspect the present Passage to be, in some Part or other of it, wrong printed: and the Translations

of it, made by *Ficinus*, *Grynæus*, and *Serranus*, confirmed us in this Suspicion. For they translate, as if in the MSS, made use of by Them, next to the words — ἐν τε ταῖς κινήσειν αὐ τῆ σώματος,—they found written,—ἐν τε σχήμασιν—tho indeed erroneously so written, instead of—ἐν τε ῥήμασιν,—as in this English Translation we have not scrupled to take for granted. The Mistake is only of the Letter ρ, to which the erroneous Character has a very near resemblance: it was committed the more easily, because σχήματα, in *Plato's* own Writings, frequently signifys any *Figures*, described by the *Motions* of the *Body* in *Dancing*. So in *Aristotle's Poeticks*, Cap: 1, σχηματιζόμενοι ῥυθμοὶ signify the *measured Motions* of *Dancers*, imitating, by the various *Figures* which they describe, the various *Manners*, *Affections*, and *Actions* of *Human Kind*. But *Plato*, in the present Passage, is speaking of the *Subject-Matter* of *Rythms* or *Measures* in *Dancing*,—namely, *Motions of the Body*,—and not of *Figures*, which are described by those *Motions*, and constitute the *Structure* of the *Dance*; — in like manner, as he had just before spoken of the *Subject-Matter* of *Harmonys*, — namely, *Musical Sounds*, from which those *Harmonys* were composed, or constituted: and in the same scientific way, 'tis highly probable, that he should speak of the *Subject-Matter* of *Metres*,—namely, *Words*, — before he mentioned *Metres* themselves, which are framed by a fit *Choice* and *Composition* of those *Words*.— To this presumptive Argument for inserting—ἐν τε ῥήμασιν,— we shall add an Observation, of weight with all learned Criticks; One of whose Rules, in judging of the *Correctness* of dubious Passages in any ancient Author, is to compare them with his *Style* and *Language* in other Passages on the same Subject: our Observation is This, — that where *Plato* is speaking of the *Subject-Matter* of the *Poetic Art*, tho sometimes he calls it λόγος *Speech*, and sometimes λέξις *Diction*, yet in other places,

places, particularly in his Writings *de Legibus*, pag: 660, 800, and 812, Edit: *Steph*: he expresses the same Thing by the Term *ῥήματα Words*: and these Three Terms are used with equal *Propriety*; for all *Speech* and *Diſtion* conſiſt in *Words*. — Perhaps the old Greek Grammarians uſe a ſtricter *Accuracy*, when they ſay, that *Syllables* are the *Subject-Matter* of *Metres*, or of the *Feet* which compoſe them: ſee the *Scholia* to *Hepheſtion*, pag: 76, Edit: *Paw*: and again, pag: 79, lin: ult: for it is certain, that a good *Verſe* depends on the juſt and precise *Meaſure* of each *Syllable* in every *Word* of it. But an Account, ſo minute, as This the laſt mentioned, would have been, not only futile in *Plato*, but quite foreign to his more important Ends in treating of this Subject. Not the *Structure* of *Verſes*, but the *Sentiments*, conveyed by the *Words* which they conſiſt of, had He under his conſideration, whenever he wrote concerning Poets or Poetry, except in the Paſſage now before us. For he has here in View, as we imagine, a *ſtill more* important End, to be diſcovered in the latter Part of the Dialogue: and if in This we imagine rightly, an Exactneſs too minute would have leſs become him here, than any where elſe.—Since, however, the apparent and profeſſed Subject of the preſent Paſſage is *Muſick*, — and ſince the *Muſick* of every *Verſe* depends on the Quantity of the *Syllables* which compoſe the *Words* of it, meaſured by Time,— we are here to underſtand, by the term *Words*, their component *Syllables*. — Viewing the Paſſage in this Light, we may ſoon perceive, that *Words* are attended by *Affections* ſimilar to Thoſe, which attend *Muſical Sounds* and *Motions of the Body*. 'Tis eaſy to perceive, that, as every *diſtinct Syllable*, which enters into the compoſition of a *Word*, is compoſed of *Letters*, the Elements of all Speech, it muſt have Two *Bounds*,—namely, the *Fiſt* Letter of it, and the *Laſt*: 'Tis eaſy to apprehend,

that an *Interval*,—*not* an Interval of *Place*, (Such as there is in Musical *Notes*, marked on a *Diagram*; or Such, as in Musical *Sounds*, issuing from the *Organs of the Voice*;) — *not* an Interval of *Space*, (as there is between the *Beginning* and the *Ending* of every distinct *Motion of the Body*;) but an *Interval of Time* only, between the pronunciation of the *First Letter* and the pronunciation of the *Last*, must intervene. 'Tis easy to discern, that an *Interval of Time* also, in speaking, must divide every *Two Syllables* of a *Word*, as well as every *Two Words*, if pronounced *distinctly*, let the latter of them ever so rapidly follow the former.—Nor is it difficult to conceive, that those other *Affections of Musical Sounds*, mentioned in Note 98, may be attributed to *Words* or *Syllables*, with no less Propriety, than to *Motions of the Body*. From What *Principles*, in What *gradual Formation*, the ancient Writers have actually attributed such *Affections* to the *Syllables* of *Words in Metre*, we shall now endeavour to delineate.—The Masters of *Metrical Science*, measuring *Syllables* by *certain* or definite *Quantities of Time*, admit of only *Two such* *Quantities* in *Metre*, One *short*, the Other *long*; the latter of which is *twice the length* of the former. A *long* *Syllable* therefore is analogous to a *Whole Tone* in the *Scale of Musick*; as a *short* *Syllable* is to a *Semitone*. The *Interval* of *Time*, between the pronunciation of the *First Letter* of a *Syllable*, and the pronunciation of the *Last Letter*, *ascertains* the *Quantity* of that *Syllable*. From one *Syllable* to another *Syllable*, a *Motion* must of necessity be made: and the *quickest* *Motion* is made from a *short* *Syllable* to another such; the *slowest*, from a *long* *Syllable* to such another. *Two or more* *Syllables*, set together as *One* certain *Measure*, whether the *Syllables* be *short* or *long*, are called a *Foot*. Every *Foot* is *One progressive Step*; and consists of *Two Parts*,—an *ἀρσις* and a *ῥέσις*, an *elevation* and a *depression* of the *Voice* in pronunciation.

nunciation. Now these Two Parts have an evident Analogy to the *Two Sounds* in a Musical Interval, the relatively *Acute* and the relatively *Grave*: they are also exactly similar to the *Lifting up* and the *Setting down* of the *Foot*, (in the proper sense of the word) necessary to every *Step*, in all *progressive Motions of the Body*. From these very *Motions* indeed are the terms,—*Arsis*, *Theſis*, and *Foot*,—taken, and metaphorically used, in speaking of *Metres* in Poetry. Hence also a *Verse*, when the *Feet* or *Steps* of it are either *even* or *regularly uneven*, is said to *run well*; when they are uneven without any Rule or Law of Metre, the *Verse* is called *lame*, and is said to *stumble*. — In some Sorts of *Verse*, *Two Feet*, coupled together, and thence called a *συζυγία*, form the *Metre*, or Measure of the *Verse*. A certain Number of *Metres*, whether they be *single Feet*, or *συζυγίαι Pairs of Feet*, being collected and composed together, constitute either a *σίζχος a Verse*, or a larger *System of Metres*,—an *Integral Part* of a *Poem*: for a *Poem* is a *Composition* of many such *Verses*, or of many such larger *Systems*. — Where the *single Feet* are regularly uneven, or where the *Combination of Feet* (which is also called the *Figure*) varies in a *Verse*, or in some larger *System of Metres*, there is evidently a *Transition* from one *Kind of Metre* to another; and the *Metres* are then said to be *πολυαριθμητάςα variously figured*. See *Hephestion's Enchiridion*, especially in pag: 63, 65, and 59, together with the *Greek Scholia* thereon. — Our Aim, in giving this summary account of *Verseification*, is to show,—not only, that the *same Affections* are incident to *Musical Sounds*, to *Motions of the Body*, and to *Words spoken*; — but also, that in all the Three Musical Arts, whose respective *Subjects* are these Three several *Sets of Materials*, those *Affections* are expressed by the *same Terms*: And if we have not missed our Aim, the Meaning, which we have attributed to the word *μέτρα*, at the end of the present.

present Passage in this Dialogue, seems to be sufficiently confirmed. — Now if, on good grounds, we have supposed the *Greek* of this whole Passage to be, in some Part of it or other, faulty or imperfect, — if we have rightly conjectured, Where the Fault or Imperfection lay, — and if we have not ill succeeded in our Endeavours to correct and perfect it, — then have we before us three distinct Instances of *One and Many*, in the Three Musical Sciences, those of *Harmony*, *Rythm*, and *Metre*; — Sciences, which are by *Plato* in many other places, and by *Aristotle* in his *Poeticks*, spoken of together, because *Musical Science*, in the general, naturally spreads or divides itself into these Three Branches. But that Each of them alone, is a distinct, proper, and compleat Instance of *One and Many*, will appear by considering Each in That respect only. — For *Musical Sounds*, the Subject-Matter of Harmony, being also the *Elements* from which every *Form* of Harmony is derived, by Mixture of their different Intervals in different Proportions, they are to be considered as *One* comprehensive *Genus*, divisible into *Many Kinds* and *Species* of *Harmony*. — In like manner, those *Motions of the Body*, which are the Subject-Matter of Rythm, being also the *Elements* of Rythm, they virtually comprehend the several *Forms* and *Figures* of *Rythmic Motion*; for These all arise from those Motions and their different Transitions, measured by proportioned Parts of Time. Hence are they, as it were, some extensive *Monad*, comprehending every *Kind* and *Species* of *Dance*. — Nor otherwise, the *Syllables of Words*, being not only the Subject-Matter of Metre, but the *Elements* also, from whose different Compositions result the various *Forms* of it, may justly be considered as a most ample *Monad*, pregnant with all the *Kinds* and *Species* of *Metre*. — Thus we find, that *Each* of the Musical Sciences, taken by its Self, is *One and Many*. — Now it appears from the whole Tenour of the Argumentation

mentation of this Part of the Dialogue, that *Plato*, in bringing so many *Instances* of *One and Many*, meant to illustrate the following Doctrines; — that, when the Subject of Dispute, or of rational Conversation, is some *General Idea*, containing a *definite Many*, (that is, a *certain* number of *Kinds* or of *Species*,) it cannot be known *clearly* and *thorowly*, without a Knowledge of *All* those *Many*, which it contains: — that no *One* of those *Many* can be known *fundamentally*, (or, as derived from its *Principles*,) without a Knowledge of that *First One*, which *beads* *All* the *Many*, and from which they are, *All* of them, *derived*: — and that those *Many* must be accurately distinguished from each other, and their Specific Differences precisely marked, by all Persons in discoursing together, if they would avoid the Error, which *Protarchus* had fallen into, in his account of *Pleasure*, That of *confounding* One Kind or Species with Another quite *different* from it; an Error, owing to This Supposition, — that Two Things, which bear the same *General Name*, as having the same *General Nature*, must therefore be, in their *whole Essences*, the Same.—To illustrate these Doctrines, *Harmony*, *Rythm*, and *Metre*, seem to be the fittest *Instances* of *One and Many*, among all that could be chosen at the Time of this Dialogue. For a compleat and full Discovery of the *whole Science* of *Musick* was made but a short time before: the *Professors*, in Each of the Three large Branches of it, were then, but not till then, *thorow Masters* of what they respectively professed: it was now studied by All of the Athenian Youth who had a Liberal Education; Many of whom were Auditors of the Conversation here related. Whenever *Instances* are to be brought, for the Proof or the Illustration of any Doctrine, delivered from the Mouth of *Socrates*, *Plato* is always accurately careful to choose Such, as are the most *adapted* to the Understanding, Taste, and Characters, of his *Audience*. But in his Choice of the

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Instances,

way ¹⁰²;) when you have learnt all those things, and comprehend them in this ample manner, with all their several Diversities and Distinctions, then are you become Skilled in Musick. And by considering in the same way the Nature of any other Kind of Being, when you thus fully comprehend it, you are become, in that respect, intelligent and wise. But the infinite Multitude of Individuals, their infinite Variety, and the infinite Changes, incident to Each, keep you *infinitely far off* from Intelligence and Wisdom:

Instances, now before us, we imagine that he had a more important End, than merely the Observance of such a Propriety. We imagine, that in This he intended to give his Readers (of That Age, at least,) a Hint of what is to come in the latter Part of the Dialogue; where, in establishing the *Order of Things good*, he sets in so high a Rank all Those, the *Principle* of which is MEASURE. We imagine, that to prepare them for this Doctrine it is, that he raises up in their Minds afresh the well-known Ideas of Harmony, Symmetry, Rythm, Numbers and Proportion; and thus, obscurely at a distance, anticipates the Decision of the present Controversy concerning the *Chief Good*, by reminding them of Things better and more valuable than either *Pleasure* or *Knowledge*.

¹⁰² This long Parenthesis renders the Sentence, in which it is inserted, somewhat obscure and difficult. 'Twould have been easy for us to avoid the Parenthesis altogether, by breaking the Sentence, and out of One making Many. But we have chosen.

dom ¹⁰³: and as they make you to be behind other Men in every path of Knowledge ¹⁰⁴, they make you
incon-

chosen to follow the Steps of our Author all along, as closely as we are able. For we aim at presenting him to our Fellow-Countrymen, as he is; only clothing him in English Garments; but in his Make, his Gait, his Air and Aspect, throughout unchanged, with all his Blemishes, no less faithfully, than with all his Beautys. Successful should we think ourselves in this our Aim, could we exhibit his *Beautys*, as fairly and as fully as we can his *Blemishes*. And *long Parentheses* are, without doubt, great Blemishes in deliberate and cool *Writings*. But, as in *Conversation* they are customary, and in the warmth of *Oral Argumentation* are scarcely to be avoided, perhaps our Author purposely introduced Such a one here, to give his Dialogue more the Air of a real Conversation. Perhaps also, by inclosing Two of the Three Musical Sciences in This Parenthesis, wherein the natural Connection and the Similarity of all Three are shown, he would have us take them, all the Three, for One single Instance of *One and Many*: intimating to us, in this way, that All things, the *Excellence* and very *Essence* of which depend on MEASURE, naturally are allied together, as being *congenial*; just as afterwards he shows, how nearly related and how *connatural* they are, All of them, to MIND.

¹⁰³ In the *Greek*,—ἀπερον τῷ φρονεῖν.—Mons'. *Grou* (to whom the *French Nation* are greatly obliged for their having the *Philebus* and other of the finest Dialogues of *Plato* in their own Language,) rightly observes, that in this Passage there is a *Playing with Words*. We are not surprized, however, to find no *jeux des mots* in his French Translation of it. This

*inconsiderable*¹⁰⁵, and of *no account*, not to be *numbered* amongst the Knowing in any Subject¹⁰⁶; because you never *consider* any thing thorowly, and are
unable

-Sort of Wit is indeed impossible to be preserved in a Metaphrase, or strict Version from One Language into another, if the two Languages greatly differ in the *Words* by which they express the same *Things*. The Utmost that can be done, in such a case, is to imitate the original *Puns*, by making *new* ones, as *like* to them as possible. But 'tis very difficult to make such Puns in either *French* or *Latin*. Is it not therefore a little uncandid in the *French* Translator, to accuse the *Latin* ones of not understanding the Puns in this Passage? and is it not more probable, that they All equally found the Puns too difficult for Them to imitate, as well as impossible to translate verbally? But to imitate those Puns in *English*, we find a matter of no difficulty at all: the reason of which is, we presume, This—that the *English* Language approaches nearer to the *Greek*, in Copiousness of Words, and Variety of Meanings, than doth the *Latin*, or any of its Descendants now living.—Some of our Readers, after all, may perhaps condemn us, for attempting to imitate a meer *Sporting with Words*: or, if they admit the Plea, put in by us very lately on Another occasion, to be extendible to This, and acquit us as being only *Copiers*, they may perhaps condemn our *Author*; deeming so ludicrous a Sentence, especially at the Conclusion of this Speech of *Socrates*, to be beneath the Dignity of a Dialogue so deeply philosophical as *The Philebus*. But besides what we have to say in general on this Subject in a Note soon to follow, we imagine, that the great Philosopher plays upon words with a
particular

unable to give a true *Account* of it, never looking at the definite *Number* which it contains ¹⁰⁷.

PROTARCHUS.

Excellently well, O Philebus! as it appears to Me, has Socrates spoken in what he has now said.

PHILEBUS.

It appears so too to Me my Self. But how does all this Speech of his concern our Controversy? What was the Design or Drift of it?

particular view in this place,—to keep *Philebus* in Good Humour: for, by assuming a jocosè Air, he softens the Severity of the Censure, which, tho in appearance pointed at *Protarchus*, he here throws obliquely on the conceited Sophist.

¹⁰⁴ In the *Greek*,—ἐκάςοτε.

¹⁰⁵ Οὐκ ἐλλόγιμον, in the *Greek*.

¹⁰⁶ Οὐτ' ἐναρίθμιον. Alluding to this Verse of *Homer*, in *Iliad*. L. 2. ver. 202. Οὐτέ ποτ' ἐν πολέμῳ ἐναρίθμιος, εἴτ' ἐνὶ βελῆ.

¹⁰⁷ *Protarchus* is to be here considered as the Representative of every Man, who has not arranged and classed the Subject-Matters of his Speculation, or the Beings with which he has to do, their diverse Propertys and Accidental Affections, under distinct Heads justly, by referring them to their several *Kinds* and *Species* according to Nature; for These are Things invariable, and among the *Objects* therefore of *Knowledge*. See Note 26 to *the Meno*.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

A very pertinent Question, O Protarchus! This, proposed to us by Philebus.

PROTARCHUS.

Indeed it is : and by all means, give it an Answer.

SOCRATES.

That will I do, as soon as I have gone thro the Little yet remaining of the Subject, on which I have been speaking. For, as the Man, who applies himself to the consideration of any Kind of Things whatever, ought not, as I have said, to throw his Eye at once upon the Infinite, but upon some definite Number in the first place ; so on the other hand, when a Man is obliged to set out from the Infinite ¹⁰⁸, he ought not
to

¹⁰⁸ The Division of any Being, or Attribute of Being, into its *Kinds* and *Species*, descending from the *most General* gradually to the *most Special*, is (as we have seen) the Method, recommended by *Socrates*, for *teaching* and for *learning* any Science, *heretofore discovered*. See page 126 of this Dialogue.—The great Master of *Dialectick* proceeds to show the Method, by which every Science was *discovered first*; and to recommend the same Method, for *advancing the Discovery* of any Science, and for *rectifying* such *Errors* in the teaching and learning of it, as must have arisen from a Division originally *wrong* or *incomplete*.

incompleat. — Now this latter Method is directly contrary to that Other, which, beginning from *One*, descends to *Many* by Division and Subdivisions: for This begins from the *Infinity of Particulars*, collecting them into *Many* distinct *Species*; goes on, to comprise *Many* several *Species* in a few distinct *Genera* or *Kinds*; and thus gradually ascends to fewer still, and more *General*; till they are, all of them, discovered to have *One* common Nature, in which they, all of them, agree. — An Example of this *ascending* Method is here given us, in the Invention of *Letters*, those *Elements* of all *Language*. In this Example the *Ascent* is shorter, than perhaps in any other, possible to be given. For it consists of only *Three Steps*; wonderful of *Contrivance* in the *Master-Builder*; but when built, very easy of *Ascent*; so well have they been smoothed by good *Workmen* in this *Elementary Part* of *Grammar*. For this very reason, indeed, among others, we presume it was, that *Socrates* chose it for his Instance of the *congregating* and *uniting* Method, in the attainment of *Science*: as he before chose it for his *First Instance* of *One and Many*, because it was the most easy to be apprehended by his *Audience*;—a reason, which he *Himself* gave them, when first he mentioned *Sounds Articulate*.—His *Second Instance* of *One and Many*, That in *Musick*, would certainly have been alone sufficient; because all his *Audience* were versed in *Musick*, no less than they were in *Grammar*: but he began with the mention of *Sounds Articulate*, for the sake of introducing, regularly and scientifically, the mention of *Harmony*. For the *First Division* of *Vocal Sound*, in general, (as we observed in Note 90,) being into *Articulate* and *Musical*, (*Articulate* Sound, the *Subject-Matter* of *Language*, — *Musical* Sound, the *Subject-Matter* of *Harmony*,) — *Articulate* Sound ought to stand *First* in *Order*; because, tho' *Musical* Sound, with respect to *Universal Nature*, must be acknowledged *prior* to
 Articulate.

to mount up immediately to the One; but to some certain Number, in Each of whose Ones a certain Multitude is contained; and thus gradually rising from a greater to a less Number, to end in One. As an Instance of what I have now said, let us resume the consideration of Letters.

PROTARCHUS.

In what way?

SOCRATES.

Whoever it was, whether some God, or some Divine Man, (the Egyptian Reports say, that his name was Theuth,) who first contemplated the Infinite nature of the Human Voice, He observed, that, amongst the Infinity of the Sounds it uttered, the Vowel Sounds ¹⁰⁹

Articulate in *Dignity*; yet 'tis equally certain, that, with respect to *Man*, Sounds *Articulate* are not only *prior* in *Time* to Sounds *Musical*, (on every Scale of *Musick*;) but in *Value* also are *pre-eminent*: because *Language* is necessary to *Man's Social Life*, and perhaps even to his continuance in *Being*; whereas *Musick* is useful only to the Purposes of *Civil Life*, and contributive only to *Man's Well-Being*.

¹⁰⁹ That is,—Sounds *purely Vocal*; whence the Letters, by which they are distinguished, are called *Vowels*; in the utterance of which Sounds, the Voice solely is employed, whilst the other Organs of Speech remain inactive.

were

were more than One, they were Many. Again, Other Utterances he observed, which were not indeed Vowels ¹¹⁰, but partook, however, of some Kind of Vocal Sound ¹¹¹; and that of these also there was a certain Number ¹¹². A Third Sort of Letters, also he set apart, Those, which are now called Mutes

¹¹⁰ In the *Greek* of this Passage, as it is printed by *Aldus* and by *Stephens*, we here read—φωνῆς μὲν εἶ, φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά τινος. — a Reading which may be tolerably well supported by what soon follows. But the *Margin* of the First *Basil* Edition of *Plato* has suggested to us a Reading, in which appears a Distinction more obvious and plain, than there is between φωνῆ and φθόγγος, *Voice*, and *Sound of the Voice*. For, in that Margin, we are directed to read the word ὄντα (found perhaps in some Manuscript Copy of *Plato*,) immediately after the word φωνῆς, and before the words μὲν εἶ, in this Sentence. Now these Two words, φωνῆς ὄντα, put together, very little differ from φωνήεντα, a word, which gives to this Part of the Sentence a Meaning quite agreeable to the Tenor of the Whole of it, and to the Language of all Grammarians.

¹¹¹ These were by the old Grammarians called ἡμίφωνα *Semi-Vowels*; because, in their very formation by the Organs of Speech, they are, of necessity, so far accompanied by the *Voice*, as to give a *Half-Vocal* Sound, without the *open Aid* of any *Vowel*.

¹¹² The Greek Grammarians enumerate *Eight* of these *Semi-Vowels*.

by Us ¹¹³. After this, he distinguished Every one of These Letters, which are without any Vocal Sound, whether perfect or imperfect ¹¹⁴: the Vowels also, and those

¹¹³ *Socrates*, by expressing himself in this manner, concerning the general Name of this Third Sort of Letters, as if it were *then newly* given them at *Athens*, seems to disapprove it. Perhaps the ancient Term, *σύμφωνα Consonants*,—a Term, applied by the new Grammarians to the *ἡμίφωνα Semi-Vowels*, as well as to the *ἄφωνα Mutes*,—was, in His Judgment, properly applicable to Those Letters only, which yield, of themselves, no Sound at all. For *Mutes*, as they are called, cannot be pronounced, even imperfectly and obscurely, as *Semi-Vowels* can, without the *Concurrence* of some *Vowel*, some Sound *perfectly* Vocal.

¹¹⁴ In the *Greek*, — *ἄφωνα καὶ ἡμίφωνα* — evidently meaning Such, as are neither *Vowels* nor *Semi-Vowels*. It should seem therefore, that by *φωνή* *Plato* meant a *perfect* and *clear* Vocal Sound; Such, as we utter in pronouncing a *Vowel* singly; and that by *φθόγγος* he meant That *imperfect* and *obscure* Sound of the Voice, made in the forming and pronouncing of a *Semi-Vowel*, unaided by a *Vowel*. Now if This be true, then may the printed Reading of that Passage, to which belongs Note 110, be justified. *Aristotle*, however, who treats of this Subject in his *Poetics*, Cap. 20, recognises not any such distinction between *φωνή* and *φθόγγος*; for he attributes *φωνή ἀκυστή*, a *Vocal Sound, such as may be heard*, to the *Semi-Vowels*, no less than to the *Vowels*; and states the Difference between these Two Sorts of Letters thus;—the Voice, in uttering the *Vowels*, proceeds *ἄνευ προσβολῆς*, that is, it *makes no Allusion* against any
Parts

those of Middle Sort, every One of them, he distinguished in the same manner: and when he had discovered how many Letters there were of Each Sort, to every One, and to All of them together, he gave the Name of Element. But perceiving, that None of us could understand any One of them, by its Self

Parts of the Mouth, those upper Organs of Speech, so as to be *impeded* in its free and full Exit: but the expressing of the *Semi-Vowels* is μετὰ προσβελῆς, the Voice, in uttering them, *makes such Allision*, and meets with some degree of *Resistance*: by the *Allision* it is indeed *articulated*; but by the *Resistance*, the Passages thro the Mouth being straitened, it becomes weaker, and is diminished; —except it be in some *Syllable*; for here a *Vowel* will never fail to assist in the Delivery, by giving the Voice a free Passage into the Air. — Now *Aristotle* is indisputably right, in attributing to a *Semi-Vowel*, by its Self, φωνή *Vocem*, a *Vocal Sound*: but his learned Commentator, *Victorius*, is equally right, in giving to this *Vocal Sound* the Epithets *obscura*, *tenuis*, & *exilis*; since it is but *Half* of the full and whole *Vowel-Sound*: and *Plato* may fairly be allowed to distinguish the *Half-Sound* by a particular Name, and to call it φθόγγος. But we know not how to agree with him, if he says that a *Semi-Vowel* does not *partake of* the *Vowel Sound*; because the *Half* of any Thing whatever seems to *partake*, to be a *Part*, or to have a *Share* of its *Whole*. For this reason it is, that we incline to That Emendation of the printed Greek Text, proposed in Note 110.

alone, without learning them All ¹¹⁵, he considered, that this Connection, or common Bond ¹¹⁶ between them, was One; and that all these Letters made in a manner but One Thing ¹¹⁷: and as he thus in One
Idea.

¹¹⁵ No Man can know, What Share any Letter of a *known* Word has in the *pronouncing* of that Word,—nor how much any of the Three Sorts of Letters are able to contribute towards the *forming* of a new *Word*, — unless he knows, What Letters may be founded or pronounced, Each of them, singly and alone, — What Letters, joined together, have One *Simple* Sound Articulate, — What Letters easily slide into each other, and coalesce together in One *Complex* Sound Articulate, — and What Letters refuse all combination *immediate*, and require the *intervention* of some Third Letter, (a Letter of a certain Sort,) for a *common Link* between them, to produce any Sound at all. See *Plato's* Dialogue, named *Sophista*, pag: 253, Edit: *Steph.*

¹¹⁶ The Passage, referred to in the preceding Note, attributes the Virtue of this *common Link* to the *Vowels* διαφερόντως, chiefly or *eminently*,—and not *solely*; because the *Semi-Vowels* are not quite destitute of this *connecting Virtue*; a *Semi-Vowel* may be interposed between a Mute Consonant and a Vowel, or between a Vowel and a Mute Consonant, to connect them Both, in the same Syllable.

¹¹⁷ This Passage may be illustrated by considering any One of the Elements of outward Nature. Every Portion, every Part and Particle of such Element, whatever be its Size, whether large or small, is not only *One*, distinguishable, by its Local Situation, from all other congenial Parts, Particles and Portions of

Idea contemplated them All, he perceived the Science of them All to be but One Science; and naming it from its Subject-Matter, he called it the Science of Letters ¹¹⁸.

PHILEBUS.

This, which Socrates now says, O Protarchus! I understand still more plainly, than what he said just before;

the same Element,—but also, when it enters into any Compound-Body, it becomes *One* of the *Elements* of That *particular Body*: and yet all the Portions, Parts, and Particles of this Element which is diffused throughout the Universe, *distinguishable* as they are from each other *locally*, and *separated* as they are by entering into different Compound-Bodys, are still but *One* Element, *One* of the *Elements* of all *Corporeal Nature*: What farther Meaning, *enigmatical* and *profound*, we apprehend to be conveyed in this whole Sentence, may be seen near the conclusion of the next Note.

¹¹⁸ In the *Greek*—γραμματικὴν τέχνην, that is, (translated into English literally,) the *Grammatical Art*. As to the latter of these words, *Art*, we are to observe, that *Plato* here, and frequently elsewhere, useth the term *Art* instead of *Science*, in speaking of Sciences, which begin not with *First Principles*, the Principles of *All Things*; and no Science except *That of Mind*, rightly called by *Aristotle* ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία *the First Philosophy*, begins with laying down *These* for *its own* Principles: the Maxims and Axioms of every *inferior* Science take these Principles for granted; and such a Science sets out on a supposition of their being known to All men. One of these *inferior*

rior Sciences, depending on the *Science of Mind*, is That of *Grammar*; — a Science, which, ever since it was fully discovered, and especially now, when it has been lately illustrated from the Light of true Philosophy by our *English Hermes*, appears to extend itself to all the Words of every Language, possible to be devised.—The other of the two words, the term *Grammatical*, is here used by Plato in its *original* Meaning. For the *first Openings* of this Science were confined to the Knowledge of *Letters*,—to the knowing how to *spell Words*, that is, how to *resolve* them into their Elementary Parts, *Letters*; These being the *Elements* of all *Syllables*; and Syllables being either the *constituent Parts* of Words, or *whole* Words, themselves.—But the singular Propriety of mentioning the *Invention* (or *Discovery*) of *Letters*, as an Instance of ascending from *Infinite* to *One*, cannot be apprehended perfectly, without making use of that Kind of *Analysis*, by which the Wisest of the ancient Sages investigated the *First Principles* of All things;—That *general* and *concise* Analysis, which resolves every Individual Being or Thing, whether *natural* or *artificial*, into the *Matter* of it and the *Form*.—'Tis probable, that this Analysis began in the Minds of thoughtful Men from their observing, how the *Works of Art* were composed and framed. They had seen the *Materials* of these Works, totally *void* of the *Forms*, which afterwards they saw *created* by the Workmanship of *Man*. They knew, that those *Materials* had once been *Parts* of some of Nature's *Living Forms*, out of which *all Life*, whether Animal, Vegetable, or Plastic, was *departed*. Furnished with this previous Knowledge by Observation, when they came to philosophise, — that is, to inquire into the *Principles* and *Causes* of *Natural Things*, — reasoning in the way of *Analogy*, they inferred, that these Subjects of their Inquiry, Things Natural, were the *Works of Nature*, Creatures of her *forming*,
from

from *Materials* which every where lay before her. They were confirmed in the Truth of this Inference, by observing, that these Natural Beings either grew, or gradually were augmented, from very small Beginnings to a much larger Size; and from the meer Rudiments of some Form, attained nearer and nearer to the Perfection of it; by means of frequent Supplies of fit *Matter from without*, partly Solid and partly Liquid: whence it appeared, that this *extraneous Matter* furnished, at least, the *grosser* and the *bulky* Part of those *Materials*, from which the Buildings of Nature were raised up and enlarged to their due Size.—It was argued also, that, whatever *Life* these *Materials* had once possessed, whether a *Life of their own*, or whether only as they had been *connected* with Other Substances, pervaded by a *Life Common* to them all, as *Members* of some Great *Body*, — if it was a *Life of their own*, it must have *departed out of* them,—or, if it was some *General Life* only, the *Connection* between them and their Fellow-Members must have been *broken off*, and the *Life, Common* to them all, must have *passed by* them, — before any *fresh Life* could enter, so as to form them anew; or before they could again partake of any *General Life*, by new Vital Connections with foreign Substances. — It was observed farther, that to all Such Beings as possessed a *Life of their own*, (whether a *Life* of meer *Vegetation*, or of *Sensation* superadded,) besides a constant Supply of *solid* and of *liquid* Food, for *Aliment* to their Frames, *Warmth* also and *Coolness* from without were necessary, to support the *Life* and *Strength* within them:—and that, as to those Productions of Nature, which seemed to have no *particular* and *private Life*, — those various Substances, which are discovered in the Bowels of the Earth, or, on being ejected from beneath, are seen upon its Surface,—they were found by experience to be *porous* throughout, and *permeable* by *Fire* and by *Air*; and
that:

that Fire and Air did actually penetrate and pervade all the Earth, was evident, from the *Heat* and *Cold* felt low down *within* the Earth, — from the hot *Steams* and cold *Vapours* arising *out of* the Earth, — and from the visible Eruptions of Subterraneous *Fire*, and the alarming Sound of Subterraneous *Thunder*. — From all these Observations and Reasonings, considered together, Philosophers soon came to these Conclusions, — that *Earth* and *Water*, *Air* and *Fire*, were the component *Elements* of all visible and known Corporeal Beings, and the *Materials* of all the *Works* of operative and plastic *Nature*: — that to these Corporeal Beings *additional Substance* came from the Elements of *Earth* and *Water*; (perhaps, from *Earth* only, if *Water* served but as the *Vehicle of Earthy Matter* to every Part of every such Being;) but that *Life* was conveyed to them thro the Elements of *Air* and *Fire*: (if *Fire* was not rather the sole *Vehicle of Life*; and if *Air* served but to *fan the Fire*, and to push forward the grosser *Fluid Matter*:) — that *Life*, being thus conveyed to *every Part* of every Compound-Being, was continually *operating*, to apply and adjoin thereto the newly arrived Matter; *converting* this Matter into a *Substance* of the same *Form*, or *Nature*, with That of the Part to which it was applied; and thus fitting it for the *Growth* or *Increase*, as well as *Aliment*, of the Part: — that *Life* had these Powers, the Power of *transforming* all Terrestrial Substances, together with the Powers of *conjoining* the Separate, and *uniting* the Distinct, because it was full of *Mind*: for it evidently appeared, that *Mind* was the *Cause of Form* to all things formed by *Man*, and the *Cause of Union* or *Conjunction* to all things united or conjoined by *Art*: and from no less Evidence, That of Experience, it appeared, that *Mind* could form *New Fabricks* from the Materials of Such as were demolished; could even *change* the *Nature* of some of these Materials, and give them *other Connections* and *other Unions* than Such as they had *before*. —

But

But farther; the Contemplators of the Nature of Things, in continuing to make Observations and Inquirys, found, that the Elements of *Air* and *Fire*, in their vigorous and rapid Motion, were incessantly busied in *abrading* from all Compound-Bodys many Particles of their *solid* and *earthly* Substance; in *extracting* also from the same Bodys, and in *sucking up* from all Bodys of Water, many *aqueous* or *humid* Particles; and in *freeing*, and *carrying away* with them, many of the *Aerial*, and many of the *Igneous*, from all Bodys wherein *Air* and *Fire* were *confined*; for Any Particles of These Elements were ready to join with them, as being congenial to Themselves:— that, on the other hand, the same Active Elements did continually, in their Passage *along* and *through* all Compound-Bodys, *deposite*, and *leave behind* them, many of those *Earthy* Particles of various Natures, and many of those *Aqueous*, which they had compelled into their Marching Company; and that, wherever they met with Bodys, wherein *Air* and *Fire* were found to *circulate*, Some of their own Race *stopped there*, and for a while took up their Abode within those *animated Bodys*. For it appeared, that *Life* was imparted to every Compound-Body, so framed as that *Air* and *Fire* could remain therein and *circulate*; and that 'twas this very *Life*, (imparted by, or from, a Life more general and extensive,) which enabled any Portion of Fire and Air *actually* so to remain and circulate.—Farther, it appeared from the Evidence of the Senses, that the Earthy Particles of various Kinds, so abraded, so carried off, and afterwards so deposited, as before mentioned, did, by this Change of their *Places* and immediate *Connections*, suffer a Change also of their *Forms*; but that, notwithstanding these continual Changes and Variations, *absolute* as well as *relative*, in all Corporeal Beings, yet the *Bulk* of them All, taken together, continued always the *Same*.— These Appearances brought on, of necessity in reasoning Minds, This natural Conclusion,—that One and the Same

Y

Substance,

Substance, namely, the *Element of Earth*, was the *Subject-Matter* of all this *Variety*, and underwent all this *Transformation*. — Wider Observations, and deeper Researches into the Secrets of Nature, led those sagacious Inquirers to deem it probable, that *Earth*, That Element evidently so variable, and those other Three Elements seemingly invariable, *Water*, *Air*, and *Fire*, — however they might essentially differ, all the Four, Each of them from the Others, — yet exchanged their whole *essential Forms* or *Natures*, One with Another, thro a reciprocal Exchange of their *Situations* and *Connections*: — and that a frequent Intercourse, and mutual Commerce actually passed between Earth and Water, between Water and Air, and between Air and Fire, was visible to the Eyes of All men. Now if This was rightly judged, — “that all those Four Elements were subject to a Total Transformation, by an Interchange of their Forms,” — the following Consequences of this Position are rational and just: — In the first place, that those *Four Elements*, the Ingredients of all Compound-Bodys, (from the variously-proportioned Quantitys of which Ingredients all the Variety of those Bodys probably arises,) have, all of them, *One* and the *Same Substance*, — a Substance, capable of receiving *Form*; — its Self, considered abstractedly from *any* Form, (and *some* Form or *other* Every Portion of it must always wear,) being only the *Subject-Matter* of all *Forms*, — of all such Forms as, together with That *Substance*, (formless, immeasurable, and boundless in its Self,) constitute all *Bodys*, whether Elementary or Compounded: — Secondly, that all the various Forms, received by this Substance, the Subject of them, are introduced into it by *One* and the *Same Life*, — a Life, pervading, animating, and moving it throughout: — and Thirdly, that this *One* and the *Same Life* of that Substance is the *Efficient* of all those Forms therein, by its being the *Energy* of *One* and the *Same Mind*:

for *Mind*, being seated every where within *That Substance*, and ever contemplating within Himself those *eternal Forms*, his own *Ideas*, or, in other words, *energising* within Himself, (for actual *Contemplation* is the *Energy* of *Mind*,) must be, by the necessity of his own Nature, the ever-rising *Fountain of Forms* to a *Substance* capable of receiving them, but incapable of retaining them; and the first *Spring of Motion* to those *Forms* which for ever must be *in Motion*, for ever changing the Places of their Abode, because of the Poverty and Imbecillity of the *Matter* which receives them. — Thus much, for the present, concerning the *Elements* of *Outward Nature*; and concerning *Matter* and *Form*, their constituent *Principles*, ever united; as also concerning their *Efficient Cause*, the *Energy of Mind* within the *Matter*; and their *Formal Cause*, or Exemplar, the *Ideas* within the *Mind*. — What is soon to follow in this Dialogue, will give us Occasion to resume these Subjects: we have handled them, as yet, no farther than seemed necessary, for investigating the Grounds and Principles of the *Invention* (or *Discovery*) of *Letters*, and for showing, with what Propriety our Author has chosen This Instance, to illustrate the *Analytical* Method of ascending from *Infinite* to *One*. — For if the *Subject-Matter* of all *Outward Nature* be *infinite*, in *Extent* as well as in *Divisibility*, — and if no Portion of this infinite *Matter* can *subsist*, or *be*, without some *Form*, (united with which it is called *Body*, or *Corporeal Form*,) — it follows, that *Those Bodys*, or *Corporeal Forms*, of which *all other Bodys* are composed, are *infinite* in like manner, that is, infinitely *divisible*, and infinitely *extended*. *Air* is One of these *Elementary Bodys*, and therefore must be *infinite*. — Now *Air* is the *Subject-Matter* of *Sound*; if *Sound* be considered, not as a certain Sensation in Sentient Beings, but as something *External*, the Cause of that Sensation. *Sound* in general, so considered, is *Air*, put

into preternatural or unusual *Motion*, by the *Impulse* of grosser Bodys, whether Elementary or Compounded; which Bodys are, themselves, impelled against it. Bodys, differing in Degree of Force, give it different Degrees of Impulse. Some of these Air-impelling Bodys are the *Lungs* of such Animals as breathe. For to the *Air*, which they breathe out to mix with Common Air, an *Impulse* is given by their *Lungs*; and the *Lungs* are *impowered* to impell the Air, which is in their *Air-Vessels*, by the *Life* which is in their *Blood-Vessels*; it being necessary that the heated Air within should be breathed out, and that Common Air from without should be drawn in, to refresh the *Life*, to cool the *Blood*, and to invigorate the *Arterys*. The *Impulse* is so small in ordinary Expiration, that, if the Passages for the Air be quite unobstructed, little or no Sound can be heard. The *Impulse* is increased by whatever increaseth the Force and Velocity of the *Blood*; and the Expiration is then very audible. The Souls of Brute Animals, strongly moved by their Appetites and Passions, give a proportionate degree of *Vehemence* to that *Impulse*; and are instructed by Nature to express those different Emotions by different Sounds, which are formed by widening or straitening, more or less, the Air-Passages in Expiration. It appears from this account, that every meer *Animal-Sound* consists of *Matter* and of *Form*: the *Matter* of it is *Air*; and the *Form* of it is the *Kind* of Sound, that is, the *Quality* and the *Quantity* of it, — a *Form*, which it receives (as to its *Quantity*) from the *Lungs*, and (as to its *Quality*) from the Contraction or Dilatation of the *Larynx*. —But these Parts of the Body, in *forming* those Sounds, are meer Organs or *Instruments*, employed by the *Soul*.—The *Soul* of the *Animal* hath this *forming* Power from the *Soul* of *Nature*; and this *Universal Soul* has it from being full of *Mind*, the Fountain of all *Form* and of all *Efficient* Power.—But the

Soul of *Man* partakes of the *Mind of Nature*, as well as of *her Soul*. And from this *Universal Mind* it is, that a natural Sense and Love of *Harmony* is in the *Soul of Man*. To gratify a *Sense*, greatly superior to Those Senses, the Objects of which are *Corporeal*, (and Such is simple Sound, the Object of the external Sense of Hearing,) and to favour a *Love*, greatly superior to Those Loves, the Object of which is *Sensual Pleasure*, — a *Love*, leading to the Enjoyment of Things *Divine*, — Nature has endued Man with a Power of *modulating* his Voice, and of giving to his own *Breath*, (which he can impell with more or less Force at his own pleasure,) the *Form of Harmony*. This Power she has given him, by having framed his Respiratory Organs, (especially the *Glottis*, or Mouth of the *Larynx*,) of a Substance much more *yielding*, contractile and dilatable, than That, which she has employed in framing the like Organs of any other Animals, equal in Size to Man. In all *Animals* then, (Man included,) the *Soul* is the immediate and spontaneous *Former* of those indefinite Sounds, *unmodulated* and *inarticulate*, which may properly be said to issue from the Voice of *Nature animated* and *sentient*: in *Man* alone, his *Mind* is the immediate and voluntary *Former* of those *Musical* Sounds; in which he may figuratively be said to imitate the Voice of *Nature* universally *operative* and *forming*. For Nature's Self (as it were) *sings* continually whilst she *operates*; putting *Rhythm* into her *Motions*, *Measure* into her *Materials*, and *Harmony* into all her *Forms*; tempering the lulling Smoothness of *Concords* with the rousing Roughness of well-timed *Discords*; framing many *Systems*, correspondent to each other; and *composing* all of them together in One stupendous *Whole* *παναριθμῶν*, *comprehensive of all Harmonic Numbers*. — But farther; the Human Nature, by partaking of *Mind*, partakes of *Truth*, as well as of *Harmony*. For indeed Both are *connatural* to all Mind, and *congenial* to each:

each other; as they will be found to be from the latter Part of this Dialogue. But, *natural* as Truth and Harmony are to Man, he partakes of them in no other Way from *Nature*, than as he partakes of *General Ideas*; and That is by the *Power*, which he naturally has, of *perceiving* them when *offered* to his Mind. For in the *Human Mind*, only the *Principles* of Mind, properly speaking, are *innate*. By the *Principles of Mind* we mean the *Transcendental* and truly Universal *Ideas of Unity and Multitude, Identity and Diversity*: These are the *native Light* of the Mind, — That Light, by the Medium of which she sees whatever she attains at any time to see, of *Species* or of *Genus*, of *Sameness* amongst the *Different*, or of *Unity* amidst the *Many*. Without these Principles, inherent in all Mind essentially, Man would be incapable of acquiring any the least Part of any *Science*; because he could never have any *General Ideas*; and without *General Ideas*, he could never attain to view any *Truth* whatever. For a *Truth* of the most *simple* Kind is only the mutual *Relation* of *Two* General Ideas; and a *Truth* of the most *complex* Kind is nothing more than the *Agreement*, the System and Harmony, of *Many* of them. — Any *Two General Ideas*, which are in *Harmony* together *without* the Medium of a *Third*, are, to a *Mind*, in which her native Light shines unobscured and clear, what *Two Musical Sounds* in *Consonance* are to a *Musical Ear*; if they offer themselves Both at the same time, such a Mind is, of herself, sensible of their *Harmony*, or *Agreement*; and understands the *Relationship* between them, without being taught, What particular Truth is the result. But a Man can receive no *Instruction*, nor can his Mind be informed with any Truth, new to her, if the Terms, in which that Truth is delivered, apply not to certain *Ideas* in his *Mind*. Previous Ideas are necessary therefore to the Perception of the plainest Truth. — Now 'tis certain, that no
man,

man, from his *own acquaintance* with the Objects of Sense, can have his Mind *stored* with the *Ideas of All Things*. For, in that case, a Man must have had all those Ideas, at different times, *actually present* to his Mind. But, should the possibility of that case be admitted, the whole Time of Man's Life would not suffice for the longest Liver to *compare Each* of those Ideas distinctly with *every Other*: and yet This is the only Way, in which all Truths can ever be discovered. A Discovery therefore, so ample and compleat, is impossible to be made by any One Man. In fact, One Man alone can advance but a very little way towards it. And yet every Man, who is, what Nature made him, speculative and free, has, when his Bodily Wants are all of them supplied, such an insatiable Desire of *Knowlege*, and such a strong Tendency of Will towards *Truth*, as that, after he has attained ever so much, still they urge him on to the Pursuit of more. To indulge a Desire so rational, and to gratify a Love so godlike, with as much Enjoyment, as the Human Mind can bear, and to as great an Extent as her Powers can reach, the providential *Mind of Nature* has contrived the Means, how Each Man's small Stock of Knowlege and Truth, of his own acquiring, may be *communicated* to Others, without Loss to Himself; and farther, how it may be placed in a *Common Treasury*, which should be *exhaustless*, for every Man to draw from thence whatever his Occasions or Inclinations may require. These Ends are known to be accomplished, — the first of them, by *Speech*, — the latter, by *Writing* and publishing what is written. — For all the *Words*, significant of *Things* or of the *Attributes* of Things, in every Language *spoken* by Men, are the Representatives of *Ideas*: and all *Letters written*, or Characters, are the Representatives of *Words spoken*. — Now, with regard to *Speech*, it is admitted, that every *particular* Language, spoken by *Some*
Men

Men and not by *Others*, was *invented* by the First Speakers of it: for they must have been unanimous, and by Signs tacitly have agreed, that certain *arbitrary* Sounds Articulate, (that is, *Words*,) uttered from their Mouths, should *represent* or *signify* the *Species* of those Objects, to which they *pointed*. But, notwithstanding This, it must, on the other hand, be granted, that Language *in general*, or *Speech*, was derived *from Nature*; as Nature is employed by the Giver of all Good in the distribution of his *Corporeal* Gifts. From *Nature* it is, that Man hath this Faculty of Speech, this Power of *articulating* his *Voice*, and of giving it an infinite Variety of *distinct* Sounds, at his own Will and Choice. For *Nature* has provided him with the *Instruments*, by which he so articulates. It is She, who has formed the Human *Mouth* and *Tongue*, to be much more pliant, *moveable*, and *flexil*, than the same Parts in other Animals. She it is, who has furnished those immediate Organs of Speech, in Man, with peculiar *Muscles*; by which he can give to his *Mouth* any Degree of *Aperture* and *Curvature*; and to his *Tongue*, any Kind of *Flexure* that he pleases, with an *Application* of this agile Member to any *Part* within its Sphere of Motion.—With regard to *Letters*, considered as *Characters* or Marks, representing *Words* spoken, they are well known to be of *Invention* meerly *Human*; as being *arbitrary*, without any *natural relation* either to Words or to Things, and significant only by *Common Agreement*.—Again; if *Letters* are considered as the *Elements* of all Language, and the *indivisible Parts* of all Words, (in which Sense they are considered here by *Plato*,) 'tis but fair to acknowledge them to have been discovered, or found out, by *Man*. *Plato* indeed seems to make it a Question, whether the Discovery was not rather owing to some Being superior to Man. What the Philosopher means in raising this Doubt will presently be shown. But, to whatever
Being

Being we are obliged for the Discovery, we have great Reason to rejoice in its being made; This being of all Discoverys, by far the most important. — For, in the first place, if a Discovery had not been made, that the articulated Sounds of the Voice (or *Words*) were almost all of them *complex*, and divisible into Such as are *simple*, —that is, into Such as are formed, Each of them, by a *single Motion* of only *One Organ* of Speech, accompanying the *Voice*; —and that the *simple Articulations*, into which the *infinite Number* of Sounds Articulate (or *Words*) may be divided, were, All of them together, but a *Few in Number*; — we say, if these *Elementary Articulations* had not been found out, every *different Word* must have had a *distinct Mark* or Character, appropriated to it, in Writing or Engraving; for no Reader, not even the most sagacious, could have been always certain, What *particular Word* was meant to be represented by a Mark or Character, signifying *more Words* than *one*. But a Multiplicity of *Characters*, equal in Number to the *Words*, would have rendered the learning to *read a Language* the Work almost of the Life of any Man who *spake* it.—In the next place, without this Discovery of *Letters*, all Language would have been very defective; it would have consisted only of *Substantives* and *Attributives*, Such as are the Symbols of *corporeal* and *visible* Substances, and of their *sensible* Qualitys, Actions, and Affections: for to These things only could the Inventors and First Speakers of Words have pointed, so as to be certain, that they meant the same *Things* by the same *Words*. Instead of *Definitives* and those *Connectives* usually termed *Prepositions*, they must have used the natural Expedient of *Manual Signs* and *Gestures*: but, for those *Connective Words*, usually termed *Conjunctions*, so necessary in all rational Conversation, they must have been wholly *at a loss*. Labouring under this Poverty of Expression, they could have spoken only in very short and unconnected Sentences;

not with any *Series* of *Argumentation*, nor with any *Tbread* of *Discourse*; endeavouring to supply their want of Words by various Motions of their Eyes, Arms, Hands, and Fingers, and by many Gesticulations and Postures, properly now called *antick*, because in *antique days* Some of the Kind were practised perhaps in every Country, during the Infancy of its Language.— But what, most of all, renders the Discovery of *Letters*, those Elements of Speech, valuable to Man as a rational Being, is This,—that, without it, Language would have had no Words for any other *Objects* than those of *Sense*; none, for those of *Mind* or *Intellect*, considered *abstractedly* from Sense. Now it is true indeed, that Men, before they had Words for these *intelligible Things*, might have communicated, or made known, one to another, what they had observed separately, concerning the different Natures, Propertys, and Uses of the different *Species* of Things they *saw*: but they could not have communicated, or imparted, one to another, any *General Ideas*, which might have arisen in their private Minds; they could not have conversed together on any Subject beyond the reach of their *outward Senses*: and we presume, that a Man even of the quickest and most penetrating Genius would make as small a Progress in the *Abstract Sciences*, as he would in the *Knowledge of Outward Nature*, without being aided and supported by the *Conversation* of other Men, or without being (as it were) lifted up and carried on by their *Writings*. We presume, that, if *Socrates* himself had not studiously perused the *Writings* of many Philosophers before him, he would not have excelled them all in the Knowledge of Things the most important to be known, namely,—*What*, in the Order of Causes, ought *properly* to be deemed the *First Cause* of All things,—*What*, in the Order of Goods, is *absolutely* the *Best*,—and *What* is the Chief Good, *relatively* to Man. We presume also, that, if *Plato* had not studiously

studiously attended to the *Conversations* and *Discourses* of *Socrates* on these Subjects, he could not have written this divine divine Dialogue, *the Philebus*; to which, all subsequent Philosophers, who have thought rightly of these Points, seem to Us to be indebted for such their right Opinions.—Indeed, to this Discovery, which appears so trivial, if taken by its Self, This of *Letters*, the meer *Elements* of Speech, considered as the primary *Means* of Knowledge, we may ascribe justly whatever of *Philosophy*, *Science*, or *Art*, is, or ever was, amongst Men. For when *Letters* were universally once known, and pronounced distinctly, nothing was more easy than to invent *Characters* or *Marks* betokening them; nor was it less easy to learn or to remember those *Characters*, when they were seen to be so few. The *Letters* being also distinguished into Three Sorts, into *Vowels*, *Consonants*, and *Semi-Vowels*, as soon as it became commonly known, What Share each of those Sorts contributed to the pronunciation of Words, it was the easy Province of Any Man to combine *Letters* into *Syllables*, and to join *Syllables* together in framing longer Words; for it seems probable, that the *First Set of Words*, expressive only of *Sensible Objects*, were all of them *Monosyllables*. — It was *always* the Inclination of Every Man to express the *Ideas* of his own Mind, and to learn those of Other Men. So that when, by their acquaintance with Letters, all Men were enabled to frame Words expressive of their *General Ideas*, the Objects of their Minds, it is probable, that the *Second Set of Words* expressed those *Ideas*, which naturally rise in *all Minds*, and are *common* to *All men*. But while Men were thus *opening* their own Minds, One to Another, they *enlarged* at the same time, Each of them the Other's Mind; and *Ideas*, *latent* before, were *stricken out* between them, as it were, by *Collision*. To express these *Ideas*, new to them, it was expedient, in some Cases, to assign *Figurative Meanings*

to many Words, which until then signified certain *Objects of Outward Sense*: it was sufficient in some Other Cases, to compound Words, which had before signified *Ideas common* to All men: on many Occasions it became necessary to frame Words *intirely new*: and in this way the Improvements of *Language* kept even Pace with the Advancements made in *Knowlege*. Every Invention of a new *Art*, every new Discovery in *Science*, introduced a new Set of *Terms* and *Pbrases*, *Technical* or *Sciential*. And when, at length, the Sciences of *Mind*, of *Morals*, and of *Politicks*, (the Knowlege of the *Divine* Nature, and the Knowlege of the *Human*,) were carried as far as Human Abilitys could reach,—it well deserves Notice, that, nearly about the same Time, the Knowlege of *Speech*, in all its *Powers*, and with regard to all its *Uses*,—*Declarative*, *Didactic*, *Demonstrative*, *Entertaining*, and *Persuasive*,—attained the Summit of its Perfection.—But the remarkable *Coincidence* of these Two great Events will appear, not *casual*, but quite *natural*, if we consider the *Nature* and *Origin* of Human *Reason* and of Human *Speech*, as they are mutually *related*. — The Correspondence of their *Natures* will appear by considering, that, on the one hand, all *Words*, (except Such as represent *Particular Persons* and *Particular Places*,) are *Exhibitions* of *General Ideas*; and that Many of these Ideas lye as it were *dormant* in our Minds, till, being thus *exhibited* to us *from without*, by Words either heard or read, they are awaken'd and roused *within us* for the first time: — that, on the other hand, those *Ideas*, which are thus excited in us by *Words* either spoken or written, have so much the appearance of being the meer *Offspring* of those *Words* which excite them, that Some Persons have imagined all *General Ideas* to derive from *Names* and *Words* all the *Being* which they have; as if *Sounds* and *Characters* could generate or create *Ideas* in the *Mind*, instead of being themselves created
by

by some *Mind* or other, to facilitate the intercourse of *Ideas* between Man and Man. The Grecians therefore, who were sensible of this natural and near Relationship between *Reason* and *Speech*, gave the *same Name*, that of *λόγος*, to them Both. For the Word *λόγος* is taken in different Senses, severally to be determined by the difference of the Subject-Matters spoken of: sometimes it signifies *the Sentence of the Mind, pronouncing within her Self* her Judgment (or Opinion) concerning the *Agreement* or *Disagreement* of any *Two* (or more) of her *Ideas*, on viewing them *together*: on other occasions, it means the like *Sentence of some Particular Mind, pronounced in Words outwardly*; which indeed seems to be the *proper* and *Primary* Sense of the Word *λόγος*; the Other being *metaphorical*, and therefore *Secondary*. The same Word is used by Some of the Pythagorean and Platonic Philosophers, in a *Third* Sense more figurative still, to signify That *essential Form*, which is Common to all the Individuals of any One *Species*; such *Form* being (as it were) the *outspoken Sentence* of the Sovereign Creative *Mind*, determining or *defining* the *Nature* of those Individuals, and *pronouncing* it to be Such as he *wills*. Again, since every Specific *Form* in *outward Nature* is *copied* from some *Idea* within the Divine Mind, the Seat of all *Original Ideas*, on this account the Word *λόγος*, when the Epithet *θεῖος* *divine* is annexed to it, is by those Philosophers used, in a *Fourth* Sense, to signify That very *Divine Mind*, considered as *viewing* all those his *Ideas*, with the true *Relations* of Each to Every Other, and therefore *pronouncing* justly *within Himself*, concerning their *Samenesses* and their *Differences*. So that *Λόγος*, to begin with the last and most sublime Sense of the Word, and thence to go backward to the first and lowest, signifies—*Divine Reason*,—the *Expression* of Divine Reason by the *Forms of Nature*, — *Human Reason*,—and the *Expression* of Human Reason, by *Human Speech*.

or *Words spoken*.—Thus are these *Four Things* αἰὰ λόγον just *Proportionals*: for *Words spoken* have the same relation to *Human Reason*, as the *Forms of Nature* have to *Divine Reason*; they are express *Images*, or outward *Representations* of Things invisible. And the *Proportion* holds good ἐναλλάξ alternately: for *Human Speech* hath the same relation to That *Divine Speech*, *Outward Nature*, as *Human Reason* has to *Divine Reason*; it is only so far right and true, as it agrees with That, from which it is derived, and to which indeed its *immediate Birth* is owing.—With regard to *Speech*,—it has been before shown in this Note, that *Speech* is derived to *Man* from *Nature*. Now whatever is spoken, concerning *General Things*, in agreement with the *genuine Appearances* of *Nature*, must be *true*; because all such *Appearances* are *Transcripts* of the *Divine Ideas* and of their mutual *Relations*, which are *eternal Truths*; tho the *Transcripts*, it must be confessed, fall far short of the *Perfection* of their *Archetypes*: but those *Ideas*, when they arise in the *Mind of Man*, being obscured by *Images* of *Corporeal Things*, and being afterwards blended with false *Fancys*, the *Offspring* of those *Images*, *Man* is apt to mistake the *real Nature* of Things, to have his *Mind* filled with *false Opinions*, and consequently, in speaking his *Mind*, to say what is not true.—With regard to *Reason*,—it will presently be seen, proved by *Plato*, that *Reason* in the *Human Mind* is immediately derived from *Reason* in the *Divine Mind*: and this *Original Reason* is the only just *Standard* of *Rectitude* and *Truth*; whether we consider *Reason* as an *Object* of *Mind*, or as the *Power of viewing* such *Object*. Considered as the *Object*, *Reason* is the *relation* of some *One Idea* to some *Other*;—and accordingly, on the *Subject* of *Quantity*, such a *relation* is by the *Greek Mathematicians* termed λόγος, and by the *Latins* *Ratio*. Now in pure *Mind Universal* such *Reason* or *relation* is an *Eternal Truth*. On the other hand, if we consider

Reason

Reason as a *comprehensive Power*, by which the *Mind* views Two or more *Ideas* at once, *compares* them together, and *discerns* how far they *agree*, and in what respects they *differ*, this *Discernment* is clear and unerring in That *Mind* alone, all whose *Ideas* are *pure* and *perfect*, — whose *Power* is constant *Energy*, — and whose *Eye* is *Intellectual Light* its Self, unobstructed, unbroken, and unclouded by any of its *Objects*, being present to them all without the intervention of any *Medium*. But the *Eye* of *Man's Reason*, how short-sighted and how weak it is, — thro' what a *Medium* of false *Colourings*, and with what interrupted *Glances*, it discerns the few *Objects* to which it is directed, — and how frequently therefore and how greatly *Man's Judgment* errs, — is well known to every *fair Mind*, who has had Experience of her *particular* and *private* Self, and has conversed with *Universal Mind*, with *Truth* and *Right Reason*, intimately as with *Friends*, yet modestly as a *Disciple* with his *Teachers*, and simply as a *Child* with his *Natural Parents*, to whom he owes his *Being* and his *Nurture*. — Hitherto we have considered *Human Speech*, as very distantly related to the *Truth of Things* and to *Right Reason*; thro' the *defective* *Medium* of *Corporeal Nature*, from which the *Faculty* of *Speech* is derived; and thro' the *unsettled* *Medium* of *Man's Private Reason*, with which every *Sentence* spoken by *Man* is *coloured*. In Either of these *Views*, *Human Speech* appears *infinite*; so various are *Men's* several *Minds* and *Meanings*; and as to *Words*, or *Sounds* *Articulate*, they are known to be *without Number*. — We shall now consider *Speech*, as an *Object* of higher *Dignity*, — as *immediately* related to the *Divine Mind*, the *Author* of all *Corporeal Nature*, and the *Father* of all *rational* and *intellectual Light*. — For *Letters* are analogous to the *Elements of Body*. As all *Corporeal Forms* are composed from these *Elements* by *Plastic Nature*, thro' various *Mixtures* and *Unions* of the minute *Particles*

of

of Each, Each being infinitely divisible; — so in every Language all the *Words* are by *Man*, their immediate Maker, composed from *Letters*, in like manner, thro various Combinations. — Again; as *Plastic Nature* is but an *Instrumental Agent* in making her Compositions; and as She can make no *new Elements* of Body, nor any way *change* the *Essential Forms*, or *Qualitys*, of the *Few* she has to work on; for they are delivered into her hands, ready made by the great *Creative Mind*; who, in making them, *designed* all those *Forms*, made *out of them* by *Plastic Nature*; and in pursuance of that Design, impresses on her continually his own *Ideas* for the *Exemplar-Patterns* of her *Forms*: whence it is, that the *Kinds* and *Species* of the innumerable, the infinitely varying *Individuals*, are all *numbered*, *ascertained*, and *fixt*, according to the *Divine Ideas*: — just so is it with the *Words* of *Man's* making, the *Elements* of them are *Few*; and no *Man*, thro the Power of his Will, is able to increase the Number of these *Elements*, by making any *new simple Articulations*. The *Animal Soul* has here no forming Power; no *Passions* or *Affections* of this *Soul* vary the *Motions* of the *articulating Organs*: and tho these *Organs* are *corporeal*, and therefore come within the Province of *Plastic Nature* to frame them;—and tho her Power, in framing the *Organs* of the *Voice*, (or of the *Sound* issuing from the *Mouth* of any *Animal* whatever,) is bounded only by the *Essential Form* (or *Specific Nature*), of each *Animal*, and has a *Latitude*, which is perhaps *infinite*, in varying the *Voices*, or *Animal Sounds*, of *Individuals*;—yet has she no more Power over the *Organs of Articulation*, than she has over the *Elements* of all *Compound-Bodys*. Whether the *Voice* be strong or weak, rough or smooth, deep or shrill, the *Articulation of it*, made by Every one of the *Human Species* in the pronouncing of any *Letter*, is the *same*, and performed by the *same Motions* of the *Mouth* and *Tongue*. — Considering

then, that neither the *Rational* nor the *Animal* Part of Man's *Soul* can vary the simple *Articulations* of his Voice, — that *Nature*, in framing the *Organs* by which they are performed, has not her usual Scope and sportive Licence granted her, — and that nothing is here left to *Chance*, — we cannot but conclude as follows; — that those *Organs*, by which every *single Letter* is pronounced *distinctly*, are as much the Work of the *Supream Intelligent* Creator, as Letters engraved are the Work of the Engraver: — that *Nature*, considered as acting without Intelligence and Design, has in This case, as well as in That of the *Elementary* Bodys, no other Office than that of a *meer Instrument*, or Tool, in the directing hands of *Mind* and *Wisdom*: — that these Elements of Speech were given originally to Man, ready made, as *Materials* for Him to work up into *Words*; so that with regard to *Letters*, the Elements of Speech, Man has no other Office, than to *discover* this admirable Work of profound Design in the Great Creator; to *distinguish* it from his own Work, the Formation of *Syllables* and *Words*; to *find out* the *Power* of Each of these *Letters*, so as to perform That Work of his own the better; and to *pronounce* every Letter carefully and plainly, so as to be understood with ease. — Considering farther, that from *Letters* arose *Words*, expressive of Men's *Ideas*, and that from *Words* of various Sorts arose *Language*; — that *Language* and Men's *Ideas* improved gradually together; — that from Both these Improvements arose, in time, the Inventions of every *Art*, the Discoverys in every *Science*, and lastly, the *First Philosophy*, or the Knowledge (as far perhaps as attainable by Man) of the *Causes* and *Principles* of Things; — and that all these noble Edifices are constructed from those Primary Materials, the *Elements of Speech*, and are the natural Consequences of Man's having the *Faculty*s of *Speech* and *Reason*, which are inseparable Companions; — we cannot but conclude

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farther,

farther, that Man was *designed* for *Sciences* and *Arts*;—in the first place, for those of *Speaking* and *Reasoning*, the *Foundations* of all the rest;—and lastly, for those, the First in Value, and the Crown of them all, the *Science of Good its Self*, and the *Art*, thereon founded, of leading a *happy Life*. For, in pursuance of these Designs, the gracious *Designer*, being present within every *Particular Mind*, undraws the *Curtain of Sense* from before the *Mental Eyes* of all the real and disinterested Lovers of *Science*, and exhibits to them the pure *Ideal Objects* of their Love. Thus, for instance, we may find, near the End of this divine Dialogue, that he revealed to *Socrates*, (who, being perfectly free from every lower Attachment, was a thorowly sincere Lover of pure *Truth*,) the very and true *Essence* of the *Beautiful* and the *Good*.—It should seem, that *Orpheus*, and those allegorical Poets and mystic Theologers, who followed his Doctrine, reasoned after some such manner, and concluded the Origin of Letters to be Divine, when they taught, that *Hermes* was the Son of *Jupiter*, and was appointed by his Father to the Office of conveying his Mind to favoured Mortals, so far as it concerned them. For by this Fable, we presume, they meant to insinuate,—that the *Divine Ideas*, and those *Relations* between them, *Eternal Truths*, are conveyed from the *Mind Universal and Divine*, to such Men as will receive and honour them, by the *means* of *Human Reason* and *Human Speech*. For Both these Facultys, being naturally connected, were personified together, under the Name of *Hermes*, by the *Grecians*; and by the *Egyptians*, under the Name of *Theuth*. But the People last mentioned, thro' extream Veneration for their ancient *Princes*, *Legislators*, and *national Benefactors*, gave them severally the same Names, which they had before given to their *Gods*, the personified *Parts and Powers of Nature*; attributing to them severally the same *Divine Excellencys*, according to the *Virtues* for

which they were renowned. Thus to One of their remote Ancestors, renowned for Arts, and especially for *Eloquence*, they ascribed the *Invention of Letters*, and gave him the Name of *Theuth*. From this Part of the *Egyptian Archeology*, the Athenian Philosopher, who was well acquainted with it, took occasion to propose his pretended Doubt concerning the *Origin of Letters*, whether it was *Divine*, or whether it was *Human*.— And now in full Light may appear the singular Propriety of this Instance, *the Discovery of Letters*, for the Purpose of showing the *Progress* of the Mind from *Infinite* to *One*.—For if we resolve *Speech*, or *Sound Articulate*, into the *Matter* of it, and the *Form*, we find *Human Voice* to be the *Matter*, and the *Articulation* of that Voice to be the *Form*. If we begin our Progress from farther back, we find *Human Voice* its Self, *infinite* as it is, resolvable into *Matter* and *Form*; the *Matter* of it being *Air*, issuing from the *Lungs*, and *formed*, or modified, by the *Larynx*. If we advance forward, we find, that *Speech*, the *Compound* of *Voice* and *Articulation*, is *infinite* in its Self; but, that *Words* set *Bounds* and give *Forms* to it, different in different Countries, and among different People. If we proceed farther still, and resolve *Words* (which, like the Individual Beings of Nature, cannot be numbered,) into their *Matter* and their *Form*, we find the *Elementary Parts of Speech* to be the *Matter*, from which Every Word is composed, and the *Meaning* of Each particular Word to be the *Form* of that Word,— a Form, however, which is not *settled* and *permanent*, till it be looked on as the *Representative* of some *Idea* which is *common* to all *Minds*. — Thus we find, that, in searching after the nature of *Speech* and *Language*, we go on, just as we do in our Inquiries into any Part of *Outward Nature*;—we travel all the Way thro *Infinite*, till we arrive at those *Borders* of the Land of *Science*, where we have a *Prospect*, on the one hand, of the

before ¹¹⁹; and am at no Loss to apprehend, What relation Each of the Subjects, about which he has spoken, has to the Other ¹²⁰. But as to that Article,

component Elements of Things, — on the other hand, of their *Species* and *Genera*; — a Prospect, terminating in that *Highest Genus*, UNIVERSAL MIND, — the sole *Cause* of the *Common Bond* or *Connection* between *All things*, — or, to speak metaphorically, (and perhaps it is impossible to speak otherwise of Things Divine,) the *Ubiquitary Center*, in which the several Virtues and Powers of Nature meet; as from thence continually they issue forth, extending around thro All things, uniting All, and *making them to be in a manner One only Thing*. But these great Truths we shall see represented by Metaphors the most adequate perhaps and just, in the latter Part of the present Dialogue. — Our Readers, we presume, will now think it high Time to put an End to this Note; for the exorbitant Length of which we have no better Appology to make, than by assuring them, that 'twill lessen the Number of Notes to follow, and serve to explain, as well as we are able, many subsequent Passages in this Dialogue: to This Note therefore, when we come to those Passages, 'twill be sufficient to refer.

¹¹⁹ *Philebus*, it seems, did not comprehend, how *Musical Sound* was *One and Many*, so clearly, as he understood, how *Speech* was *One*, tho Words were *Infinite*. — The illiberal and ungentle Manners of the *Sophists*, in *Plato's Dialogues*, show them not to have had the most liberal Education: and perhaps the intention of this Passage is to confirm that Fact.

¹²⁰ The Connexion between the *Science of Musick*, and the *Science of Grammar*, may be seen in Note 90. The Meaning

ticle, in which his Argument on the First of those Subjects appeared to Me to be defective, I am at a Loss still ¹²¹.

SOCRATES.

To know, What those Instances are to the Purpose ¹²²; is not This your Meaning?

PHILEBUS.

Just so. This very Thing it is, that Protarchus and my Self are all this While in search of.

SOCRATES.

In search still, do you say, when you are just now arrived at it?

ing of this Passage may include also the *relation*, which the *Words* of an *Ode*, or *Poem* sung, have to the *Musick*; that is, to the *Harmony* and the *Measure*: for all Ears, tolerably good, are sensible that the *Musick* and the *Diction* ought to be adapted to each other.

¹²¹ For *Socrates* had not shown, What *relation* Either of those Subjects, *Musick* and *Grammar*, has to the Point in controversy. See before, in Page 157.

¹²² In the *Greek*,—τι πρὸς ἔπος ταῦτ' ἐστὶ; *What is all This to the Verse?*—a Saying, which seems to have grown into a *Proverb*, from its being frequently repeated by some of the People, on finding the *Harangues* of the *Rhapsodists*, in their Interpretations of the *Verses* of *Homer*, so frequently quite *foreign* to the *Poet's Meaning*.

PHILEBUS.

PHILEBUS.

How so?

SOCRATES.

Was not the Point, originally in Dispute between us, This,—whether Wisdom or Pleasure was the more eligible?

PHILEBUS.

Certainly it was.

SOCRATES.

And do we not admit, That Each of them is One Thing?

PHILEBUS.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

Now then must come this Question, arising naturally from what was said, a little before the mention of Mufick and Grammar ¹²³,—In what way, (or by what division,) are Wisdom and Pleasure, each of them, One and Many? or how is it, that Neither of them breaks into infinite multitude directly; but that Each contains some certain Number, before it pass into Infinity?

¹²³ See before, in Pages 82, and 83.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Upon no trivial Question, O Philebus! on a sudden has Socrates, after having led us a large round-about way, I know not how, thrown us. And now consider, Which of Us Two shall answer to the Question he has proposed. 'Twould be ridiculous in Me, who have undertaken the support of your Argument, to make an absolute Revolt, on account of my Disability in regard to the present Question; and so to remit over again to You the Task of giving an Answer to it: but I think, 'twould be much more ridiculous, for Both of us to fail. Consider then, what we shall do in this case, where Socrates seems to interrogate us concerning the Species of Pleasure; — whether it is divisible into different Species, or not; and, if it be, what is the Number of these Species; and how they differ in their Nature: and the like Questions he seems to put to us, concerning Knowledge and Intelligence.

SOCRATES.

Your Conjecture is perfectly right, O Son of Callias! And, if we are not able to answer to these Questions upon every Monad ¹²⁴, as to its Likeness ¹²⁵,

¹²⁴ Meaning every *Subordinate Genus*, and every *Species*, in any Subject, taken in hand to *manage*, or to *speak on*.

Sameness,

Sameness¹²⁶, and Contrariety¹²⁷, — unless, I say, we can do This, — the Instances, just now produced, have shown, that None of us, in any Matter we had to handle, would ever be of any Worth at all¹²⁸.

PROTARCHUS.

The Case, 'O Socrates! seems indeed to be not very different from Your Representation of it. — Well, 'tis certainly a Fine Thing to know 'All things, for a Wife and Prudent Person¹²⁹: but, I think, the Best Thing, next to That, is for a
Man

¹²⁵ The *Likeness* of One Monad to Another regards their *Common Genus*; for thro This it is, that They are alike.

¹²⁶ The *Sameness* of any Monad regards the *Species* of it; for 'tis in Every one of These, that the *Genus* is the *Same*. To see *Likeness* in all the *Species* of any *Genus*, and a *Sameness* running thro them all, shows a Knowledge of that *Genus*, which in common they partake of.

¹²⁷ The *Contrariety* of any Monad to *Some Other* regards only *One* certain *Species* under the *same Genus*; — a *Species*, from which it differs more, than it differs from *Any Other* of the same *Genus*. To see therefore such a *Contrariety* between *any Two* *Species*, implies a Knowledge of *All* the *Species* co-ordinate.

¹²⁸ See before in Page 156.

¹²⁹ That the word *Every*, in what *Socrates* said last, concerning the necessity of thorow Knowledge, regards *all* the *Subjects*

Man not to be ignorant of Himself ¹³⁰. With what Design I have now said This, I shall proceed to tell you ¹³¹. This Conversation, O Socrates! you have
granted

of Knowledge, taken *distinctly*,—that is, *any One particular Subject whatever*, — is evident from the very strong Expression, with which he concludes that Sentence. And the immediate Assent to it, given by *Protarchus*, shows that he understood it rightly. But presently after, ludicrously affecting to misapprehend it, he supposes, that the word *Every*, in that Sentence, was meant to include *all the Genera and Species of All things*. In confirming, therefore, the supposed Judgment of *Socrates*, and extolling *Universal* and perfect *Knowledge*, he subjoins very justly the *Restriction*, which occasions the present Note; because *Knowledge*, if not accompanied with *Moral Wisdom* and *true Prudence*, is often hurtful. (See the *Second Alcibiades*, page 82.) The *Restriction* also, in this place, serves Two particular Purposes; it prepares us for the being told of Something more valuable to Man than *Knowledge*; and it connects what *Socrates* had been saying, on That Subject, with what is next to follow.

¹³⁰ The *Excellence*, spoken of by *Protarchus* in this Sentence, as the *highest*, is either the incommunicable Property of the *Supreme Mind*; or, if it be imparted to any *Particular Minds*, it can only be to Such, as are greatly superior to the *Human*. Whether it be indeed the *highest Excellence* (or Best Thing) *absolutely*, or whether it be inferior to some Other, is offered to our consideration afterward: but, since the professed Subject of this Dialogue extends no farther, than to inquire What is Best *relatively* to Man, *Plato* slides again into his Subject by this easy and gentle Way: at the same time it gives him an opportunity

granted to us all, and have given your self up to us, for the Purpose of investigating What is the Best of Human Goods. For when Philebus had said, that it consisted in Pleasure, and Delight, and Joy, and all things of the like nature, You opposed him on this Point, and said, it consisted not in These things, but in Those, which we often repeat the Mention of; and we are right in so doing, that the Opinions on each side, being always fresh in our Memorys, may the more fairly be examined¹³². You then,

of insinuating This Truth,—that the Knowledge of our *Selves*, and the Knowledge of our *Chief Good*, are inseparable. See Note 208 to the *First Alcibiades*.

¹³¹ *Protarchus* says This, because he is sensible, that his high *Commendation of Self-Knowledge* might seem to be introduced improperly, and without a fit occasion: In these Days it may seem so still, notwithstanding the Account he gives of his Design in it. For the Relation, which it has to the Subject of this Dialogue, can be discovered by Those only, to whom the great Truth, mentioned at the end of the preceding Note, readily occurs. But in that philosophic Age and Country, the Connexion was perhaps easily seen: *Socrates*, to whom *Protarchus* addressed his Speech, must have understood the allusion therein to a principal Doctrine of his own: and 'tis probable, that all the younger Part of the Company had before heard *Socrates* discoursing on that very Subject.

¹³² It was necessary, that *Plato*, in this Dialogue, should, for the sake of his Readers, state the Points in controversy between
Socrates

then, it seems, say, what I shall be right in again repeating, that Mind, Science, Understanding, Art, and whatever is allyed to them, are better Things than Pleasure with Her Allys; and therefore, that the Possession, not of These, but of those Greater

Socrates and Philebus. And yet, on the other hand, the doing of this necessary Thing, must seem, at best, superfluous and idle, to Those who consider this Dialogue as the Author of it would chuse to have it considered, as the Transcript of a real Conversation, For it commences immediately after a *long Dispute* between those very same Persons, *Socrates and Philebus*, on the very *Points*, here litigated. To this Reason, for leaving out a *Recital* of those Points, it may be added, that the Dispute had been carried on hitherto, in a *dogmatical* way, by proofless and bare *Affertions*, and that in These the *Sentiments* of each Party must often have been *repeated*; so that, to propose the Question over again, at full length, in this *argumentative Part* of the Conversation, must be troublesome and tiresome to the supposed Audience of the former Part, the *assertive*. *Plato* therefore, to give the *necessary Information* to his Readers, without violating the *Decorum of the Dialogue*, has contrived to make a *Repetition* of the Sentiments of *Socrates and Philebus* appear *not unnecessary*, by introducing a *new Antagonist* to *Socrates*, and thus beginning the Dispute *de novo*. Not content with This, he has found means, in the Passage now before us, to state the Question once more, for the sake of renewing it in his *Reader's Mind*, after a long seeming Digression, and at the same time to make a sufficient Apology for it to the supposed *Auditors* of the whole Conversation.

Goods ought to the Object of our Aim. Now these Positions being laid down severally on each side, as Subject-Matters of our Debate, We in a jocular way threatened, that we would not suffer you to go home quietly, before it was brought to a fair Determination. You complied, and promised us to contribute all you could towards the accomplishment of that End ¹³³. We insist therefore, that, as Children say, you must not take away again what is fairly given. But in the present Inquiry forbear proceeding in your usual way.

¹³³ *Plato*, in this Passage, which has a *Retrospect* to the supposed *prior* and *unwritten* Part of the Conversation, imitates the Conduct of *Dramatick Poets* in their *Tragedys*. For, a well-formed Tragedy being the mimetic Representation of some *single* important Action, if this Action was *connected* with any *antecedent* Circumstances of Things or Persons, it was necessary, that the Poet should give a *Narration* of these Circumstances, in the *πρότασις* or *First Part* of his Drama, to make the Whole of it easily intelligible. And the most artful Way of doing this, — a Way, taken by every good Dramatic Poet, — is to put that Narration into the Mouth of some *Person* of his *Drama*; by making an Occasion for him to *recount* what he had done, and to *repeat* what he had said, previous to the Opening of the Scene then present. *Plato* has taken the same Way, and with so much *Art*, as to make this *Recital* of the *Engagement*, entered into by *Socrates*, to appear quite *natural*. And the *Recital* is *necessary*, because That *Engagement* is laid down as the *Foundation*, or *Occasion*, of this *Dramatic Dialogue*.

SOCRATES.

What way do you mean?

PROTARCHUS.

Bringing us into Straits and Embarrassments ¹³⁴; — propounding Questions, to which we should not be able, on the sudden, to give a proper Answer. For we are not to imagine, that our present Inquiry is brought to a Conclusion, meerly because All of Us are at a Loss what to answer. If therefore We are unable to extricate our Selves from these Difficultys ¹³⁵; You must help us out; for so you promised. Consider then what to do on this occasion; whether to distinguish Pleasure and Knowledge, each of them, into their proper Species; or whether to pass it by, if you choose to take a different Way, and can find some other Means of deciding the Matter, now controverted between us.

SOCRATES.

No Harm then need I be afraid of, any longer, to my Self, since you have said This ¹³⁶. For your

¹³⁴ See *the Meno*, page 98.

¹³⁵ Those concerning the Species of *Pleasure* and of *Knowledge*.

¹³⁶ Alluding to those jocular Threats, employed by the young Gentlemen, then in the *Lycæum*, and gathered around *Socrates*, to engage him in this Dialectic Inquiry. See page 112.

leaving

leaving to my own Choice, what Ways and Means to make use of, frees me from all Apprehensions on my own private account. But, to make it still easier to me, some God ¹³⁷, I think, has brought Things to my remembrance.

PROTARCHUS.

How do you mean? What Things?

SOCRATES.

Having formerly heard, either in a Dream, or broad awake ¹³⁸, certain Sayings, I have them now again present to my Mind;—Sayings concerning Pleasure and Knowledge, that Neither of them is, of its Self, Good, but some Third Thing, different from Both of those, and better than Either. Now if This should discover itself to us clearly, Pleasure is then to be dismissed from any Pretensions to the Victory. For we should then no longer expect to find, that

¹³⁷ See the *Greater Hippias*, Note 70. and the *First Alcibiades*, Notes 268 and 269.

¹³⁸ That is, — whether he had only had a *visionary* Notion, or *fanciful* Conceit, of what was the Chief Good of Man, — or whether, freed from *Sense* and *Imagination*, (by which the *Judgment* is fettered, no less than the *Outward Senses* are by *Sleep*,) his Mind was *then* thorowly awakened to the Consciousness of her *real Self*, and of her *true Nature*, when the *Idea of True Good* first arose within him.

Pleasure

Pleasure and Good are the Same Thing: or how say You?

PROTARCHUS.

Just so.

SOCRATES.

We shall have no Occasion then, in My opinion, for distinguishing the several Species of Pleasure. And in the Progress of our Inquiry 'twill appear more evidently still, that I am in the right.

PROTARCHUS.

Having begun so happily, proceed and finish with the same Success.

SOCRATES.

Let us, first, agree upon a few little Points beside.

PROTARCHUS.

What are Those?

SOCRATES.

In what Condition or State of Being is the Sovereign Good ¹³⁹? Must it of necessity be perfect ¹⁴⁰? or may it want Perfection?

¹³⁹ In the Greek, — τὰ γὰρ δὸν. — concerning which Word, see Note 35, toward the End.—*Three Characteristicks* of the Sovereign Good, whatever it be, are ascertained in what now follows.

PROTARCHUS.

Of all things, O Socrates! it is the most Perfect ¹⁴¹.

SOCRATES.

¹⁴⁰ In the *Greek*,—*τελεόν*.—the word is here used in a peculiar and philosophical Sense, to be explained only from the ancient Division of *Good Things* into *Two Kinds*,—into Such, as are good on *their own account*, or eligible for *their own sakes*; of which Kind is *Health of Body*;—and Others, which are good only as they *conduce* to the attainment of those Goods of the First Kind; of this Latter Kind are *Medicines* for the *sake of Health*.—A *Third Kind* of good Things, (namely, Such as are desirable on their own account as *Ends*, and at the same time are desirable as *Means* to attain farther Good,) seems to have been added by Some of the *Pythagoreans*: but this Addition was not received by *Plato*, nor by *Aristotle*. And indeed these *middle Goods* (for so they may be called, as they partake of the nature of *Ends* and the nature also of *Means*,) make not a *distinct* Kind, but are comprehended in the *First Kind*; as will appear from considering the *Answer* of *Protarchus* to the *Question*, here put to him by *Socrates*.

¹⁴¹ In the *Greek*,—*τελεώτατον*.—To this *Sovereign Good* alone the *Stoicks* allowed the *Attribute* of *τέλειον*,—a word, which *Cicero* very justly interprets by the Latin word *absolutum*;—accordingly, to this *Sovereign Good* alone they gave the Name of *τέλος End*, as being the *only End* of Man *κατὰ φύσιν according to his nature*: and to be thorowly consistent with themselves, and to avoid all *partial* Objections to their Doctrine,—all Objections, which attacked not the *whole System* of it at once,

once—they denied even the *Attribute* of good to all things commonly called good, if *inferiour* to this *Good Supreme*; at the same time, however, allowing them the *Preference* to things *contrary*, and admitting them to be *eligible* of themselves; as Health, Peace, Liberty, personal and civil: to these Things, which are commonly considered as *compleat Ends* absolutely desirable, the *Stoicks*, who were of all Philosophers perhaps the most *consistent* in their *Tenets*, and the most *accurate* in their *Terms*, gave the Name of *υποτελίδες*, that is, *Subordinate Ends*, or rather, *Objects of Pursuit in subordination to the End*. 'Tis easy to perceive, that the *disagreement* in this case, between *Plato* and the *Stoicks*, is merely *verbal*; as it is indeed in most other Points wherein they seem to differ: at the same time 'twill be admitted, that, if the *Stoicks* use expressions, philosophically more accurate than *Plato*, this Philosopher speaks more intelligibly to common Apprehensions. *Aristotle* herein follows his Master's manner of expressing himself: for, on this very Subject of *things good*, he speaks of *Ends* ε̄ τέλεια *imperfect*; he speaks of *Ends*, pursuable for their own sakes, as being *τελειότερα* *more perfect*, than the pursuable for the sake of something else; and he speaks of *That End*, which is *τελειότατον* *the most perfect* of all. By *Andronicus*, the *Paraphrast* of his *Nicomachean Ethicks*, This is called *τὸ ἕχατον τέλος* *the Ultimate End*; by *Eustratius*, the Greek Commentator on that Treatise, it is called *παντέλειον* *all-perfect*; and by *Cicero* it is called *finis bonorum*, — *bonorum ultimum*, — *extremum*, — *summum*. — To this *all-perfect* End, the Sovereign Good, the *Pythagoreans* and *Aristotle* gave the Name of *εὐδαιμονία* *Happiness*: for, that the Ancients understood This to be the Meaning of that Term, appears from this Passage of *Stobæus*, in *Eclog: Ethic: Cap. 3*. Τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν συνωνυμῆν τῷ τέλει λέγουσιν [sc. οἱ ἀρχαῖοι]. εὐδαιμονία δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἀριστον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἢ τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἢ τὸ κράτιστον. They

SOCRATES.

Well ; and is it also sufficient ¹⁴¹ ?

PROTARCHUS.

Without doubt : and in this respect it excells all other Things.

SOCRATES.

But farther ; This also, I presume, is of all things the most necessary to say of it, that Every Being, to

[the Ancients] say, that Happiness and the [ultimate] End are synonymous Terms. Now Happiness is the Best Thing in [human] Life, or the Greatest or most Excellent of Good Things. — And concerning this First Characteristick of the Sovereign Good, Aristotle himself, in *Ethic: Nicom:* L. 10, C. 6, thus writes, — *ἀπαντα, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἐτέρω χάριν αἰεόμεθα, πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὐτή.* Every thing, as I may say, except Happiness, we choose for the sake of something else : for [of all our Aims] Happiness is the End.

¹⁴² That is, sufficient to make those Beings happy, who partake of it.—This Attribute of the Sovereign Good, this Second Characteristick of it, is recognised as such by Aristotle in these words, — *τὸ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρχὲς εἶναι δοκεῖ.* The perfect [or final] Good is, we think, self-sufficient. *Ethic: Nicom:* L: 1, C. 7 ; and *The self-sufficient* is presently afterwards defined to be, — *ὃ, μονόμενον, ἄρκιον καὶ αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ.* that which, unaccompanied and left alone, suffices to make Life eligible and in want of nothing : — a Definition exactly agreeable to the Sense, in which Plato here uses the word *ἰκανὸν*, as will presently be seen.

whom it is known ¹⁴³, seeks it intently; as choos'ing the possession of it above All things; and indeed caring

¹⁴³ The *Third* and last *Characteristick* of Good, here mentioned,—namely, that 'tis *the chief Object of Desire*,—is to be understood in a Sense different from what is meant in the ancient *Definition* of Good,—that 'tis *That, which All things* [all Beings, in all their Actions and Operations] *aim at*.—For in this Definition, *Good* is to be taken in a *general* and *indefinite* Sense; the *aiming at it* is attributed to *All Beings*, whatever be their Nature; and the Good, which they *severally* aim at, is of *different Kinds*, respectively suited to their *several* Natures. But in the Passage of *Plato*, now before us, the *aiming at Good* is attributed to *such* Beings only, as have the *Knowledge of it*; and the Good, professedly here meant, is the *Chief Good* of One only *Kind of Being*, namely, the *Rational*. — *Aristotle*, in like manner, attributes the capacity of being *happy* to no Beings but Such as are endued with *Rational Souls*. For *Happiness*, in His Judgment, is seated only *in Souls*, *energising* [that is, moving within themselves, and operating without] *conformably to That Virtue which is the most excellent in Human Life*;—namely, the *Virtue of Man*, as he is a *rational and social* Being. — Thus we may observe,—that, in giving us the Three *Characteristicks* of Good, here noted, *Plato* and *Aristotle* are agreed. We make this Observation, to pave the Way for more such in some of the subsequent Notes, serving to prove how well these great Masters in the *Science of Good* agree in *all their Notions* concerning it, however they may differ in their *Expressions*. For those three *Characteristicks* of the Sovereign Good are not the *only* peculiar Property of it; several others have been justly enumerated by

caring for no Other Things,—except Such as are constantly attended with the Enjoyment of that Supreme Good ¹⁴⁴.

PROTARCHUS.

Mr. *Harris*, in his fine *Dialogue concerning Happiness*; and some others, differing in Terms at least, will be noted by *Plato* himself in the latter Part of *this Philebus*. But the Three, just now pointed out, are decisive enough to show, that neither *Knowledge* nor *Pleasure* can be the Sovereign Good of Man, because they are *Both* wanting in every one of those characteristick Marks; and to prove This, is all which is aimed at in this Part of the Dialogue.

¹⁴⁴ *Plato's* own Words are these,—πλὴν τῶν ἀποτελεσμένων ἀμα ἀγαθοῖς [sc: ἀποτελεσμένοις]. — The ἀποτέλεσμα τῶν ἀγαθῶν *Consummation of all Good*, meant in the Last Words of this Passage, is the *Sovereign Good* or *Happiness* of Man: and if this Sovereign Good, according to *Plato*, consist in *Virtue*, it follows, that those ἀποτελέσματα, which are meant in the First Words of this Passage, must be *virtuous* (honest and good) *Actions performed*, and *virtuous Designs accomplished*. For, just so, Those who place their *End*, the *Consummation of all Good*, in *Pleasure*, have no Concern or Care for any Thing beside; — excepting those Things, or those Designs, the possessing or the accomplishing of which is accompanied with the Attainment of This their *End*. — *Aristotle*, in *Ethic: Nicom: L. 1, C. 8*, writing on this very Subject, giveth the same Meaning to the word ἀποτελεῖν, which is here given it by *Plato*. — If then we have interpreted the present Passage rightly, — and if only *Virtue* can justify her Claim to those Characters of the *Sovereign Good*, which are before noted as Marks to ascertain it,—'twill be

be found, that *Plato* placeth a Man's *Possession* of this Good in his being *possessed of Virtue*,—in having his Mind furnished with *Virtuous Habits*, naturally productive of *Virtuous Actions*,—Actions, growing up, and *attaining their full Perfection*, ἀποτελέμενα, *together with those Habits*. — We take this occasion to observe, that *Aristotle*, when he placeth the Essence of all and every Virtue in *Habits* of the Soul, (that is, in the Soul's firm and sure *holding or possessing* of Virtue,) exactly agrees with *Plato*: for, according to *Aristotle*, virtuous *Habits*, acquired, as they are, only by virtuous *Energys* and *Actions*, become, after they are acquired, *Causes*, in their turn, of all the virtuous *Energys* and *Actions*, performed *in future*, and then, but not till then, performed *with perfect Ease*. See *Ethic: Nicom:* and the excellent *Greek Paraphrast* thereon, in L. 2, C. 2.—On this occasion also we may observe, that *Aristotle's* Definition of Happiness *supposes* Virtue to be the Sovereign Good of Man. For on this *Supposition* depends the Validity of his Reasoning, to prove that *Human Happiness* consists in *energising agreeably to* [the Rules of] *Virtue*: because no other Thing than the *actual Enjoyment* of Man's Sovereign Good, whatever it be, can constitute a Man's *Happiness*. If then *Man's Sovereign Good* be *Virtue*,—if *Virtue* be always *operative*,—and if she always operates, under the direction of Moral Wisdom, to the conscientious and affectionate Discharge of all Moral Dutys, unimpeded by Pain or Pleasure, —it follows, that the free *Energy* of Man's *Rational Soul*, whilst he is *actually* employed in *discharging* those Dutys, is the *actual Enjoyment* of his Sovereign Good, gives him *pure Pleasure*, unmixed with Pain, and *alone* makes his *Happiness*. For, to add one observation more, on this sole account it is, that *Aristotle* deems a *moderate Share* in the *Goods of Fortune* necessary to the *perfection* of human Happiness, — 'tis, that they furnish Good Men

PROTARCHUS.

There is no possibility of contradicting This.

SOCRATES.

Now then, let us consider and judge of the Life of Pleasure, and the Life of Knowledge: and to do this the better, let us view them, Each apart from the Other.

PROTARCHUS.

How do you mean?

SOCRATES.

Thus; let us suppose a Life of Pleasure, unaccompanied by Knowledge; and, on the other hand, a Life of Knowledge, unaccompanied by Pleasure. For, if Either of them be the Sovereign Good, it must be compleat and sufficient, in want of no Aid from any other Quarter. But, if Either of them should appear to be Indigent of aught, or Insufficient, we are no longer to imagine This to be that Real and True Good we are in search of.

PROTARCHUS.

In such a case, how could we?

with the *Means* of discharging every Duty, and of practising every Virtue: as may be seen in *Ethic: Nicom: L. 10, C. 8.*

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Shall we then examine their Pretensions thus separately, making your own Mind the Judge?

PROTARCHUS.

With all my heart.

SOCRATES.

Answer then to My Questions.

PROTARCHUS.

Propose them.

SOCRATES.

Would You, Protarchus, accept the Offer, were it made you, to live all your Life with a Sense and Feeling of Pleasures the most exquisite?

PROTARCHUS.

Undoubtedly. Why not?

SOCRATES.

Suppose you were in full possession of this Good, would you not think, that Something beside was still wanting to you?

PROTARCHUS.

I certainly should not.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Consider now, whether you would not want to have a just Discernment of Things in which you are interested, and to have true Notions, and to reason on them rightly, and to exercise other Powers of the Mind ¹⁴⁵, near of Kin to those; at least, whether you would not want to *see* something.

PROTARCHUS.

Why should I? when I had, in a manner, All things, in having continual Joy?

SOCRATES.

Living thus then continually all your Life, would the most exquisite Pleasures give you any Joy?

PROTARCHUS.

Why not?

SOCRATES.

Having neither Mind, nor Memory, nor Knowledge, nor true Opinion ¹⁴⁶, — in the first place, of this very thing, your *having* of Joy, you must of necessity be

¹⁴⁵ *Memory*, and *right Opinions*, or just Thoughts of Things, are particularly meant in this place; as will appear from what immediately follows; and also by comparing this Passage with the professed Hypothesis of *Socrates*, as stated by himself in the Beginning of this Dialogue. See Pages 36 and 38.

ignorant,

ignorant, and unable to say whether you *then had* any Joy, or *not*, being void of all just Discernment or *Knowledge* of things present.

PROTARCHUS.

I must.

SOCRATES.

Being also void of *Memory*, 'twould be impossible for you to *remember*, that you *ever had* any Joy; or to preserve even the least Memorial of a Joy *then present*: wanting also right *Opinion*, you could not so much as *think* you had any Joy, tho in the midst of it: unable also to *reason* or draw consequences, you could not possibly *conclude*, that ever you *should have* any Joy to come. Thus you would live the Life, not of a Man, but of a Sea-Sponge, or of an Oyster. Are these things so? or ought we to think *Otherwise* concerning them?

¹⁴⁶ We have followed *Ficinus* and *Grynæus* in attributing this Speech intirely to *Socrates*. With this agrees the First *Basil* Edition of the Original. *Aldus*, however, and *Stephens* break the Sentence just in this place, and put the word ἀληθῆ *true* in the mouth of *Protarchus*. Who are in the right, appears from the necessity of adding to the word δόξαν either the Epithet ἀληθῆ, as in the next Sentence of *Socrates*, or the Epithet ὀρθῆν, as in the Beginning of the Dialogue: for no man ever supposed it a *Good Thing* to have any sort of *Opinions*, or any *other than* such as are *right* and *true*.

D d

PROTAR-

PROTARCHUS.

A Life of meer Pleasure must be Such, as You have described it.

SOCRATES.

Do we think then, that such a Life is eligible?

PROTARCHUS.

The Description of it, O Socrates! has silenced me intirely for the present.

SOCRATES.

Nay; let us not shrink so soon from pursuing our Inquirys; but proceed to the consideration of that other Life, the Life of Mind.

PROTARCHUS.

What Kind of Life is That?

SOCRATES.

Let us consider, whether Any of us would choose to live with a just Discernment, and a right Understanding of things, and with Science, and a perfect Memory of all things; but without partaking of Pleasure, whether great or small; and on the other hand, without partaking of Pain; wholly exempt from all Feelings of either Kind.

PROTAR-

PROTARCHUS.

To Me, O Socrates! Neither of these Lives appears eligible; and I think never would appear so to any other man.

SOCRATES.

What think you of a Middle Life, where Both of them are mixed together—a Life, composed of the other Two?

PROTARCHUS.

Composed of Pleasure do you mean, on the one hand, of a right Understanding also and a just Discernment, on the other hand?

SOCRATES.

Just so: such a Life do I mean.

PROTARCHUS.

Every man would certainly prefer Such a Kind of Life to Either of the other Two ¹⁴⁷.

SOCRATES.

¹⁴⁷ This Sentence, in the *Greek*, is followed by these words,—
— καὶ πρὸς τούτοις, ἔχ' ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' ἄ. “and beside this, 'tis not
that One man would (prefer it), and Another not.” — But these
words neither *illustrate* nor *strengthen* those which precede, nor
convey any *additional Meaning*: we have therefore taken the
liberty of omitting them, as erroneous and corrupt. Where

SOCRATES.

Perceive we now, what the Result is of our discouraging thus far on the Subject now before us?

PROTARCHUS.

Perfectly well; 'tis This; that Three Lives have been proposed for our consideration, and that Neither of the Two first-mentioned appears sufficient, or eligible, for Any one, whether of Human Kind, or of a Kind superior to the Human ¹⁴⁸.

SOCRATES.

the Error lies, and how it may be rectified, is in the next Note conjectured. — *Ficinus* and *Serranus* deem it an *imperfect* Sentence; but the words, *added* by Them, to make it *perfect*, by no means amend the Fault here censured, making this latter Sentiment a meer Repetition of the former in other Words.

¹⁴⁸ In the *Greek*, — ὅτε ζώων ἄλλων. “nor to any other Animal whatever.” — But This could not be written with a view to *Brute* Animals; because *Brutes* are not only *incapable of partaking of any Good*, beside the Pleasures of Sense, or what is referable to those Pleasures, but are also *incapable of knowing*, What Good belongs to Mind, — inasmuch as they are unable ever to conceive, that there is any such Being as *Mind* any where in Nature.—Now the *having* of those *Capacitys*, or latent Powers, and the *having* of that *Knowledge*, (or rather, those *Pre-conceptions*, the *Principles* of that Knowledge,) are expressly said by *Socrates* to be requisite to the *Choice* and *Pursuit*, as well as to the *Enjoyment*, of *Mental Good*. — See Notes 9, 10, and

SOCRATES.

Is it not evident then, with regard to the Point in controversy, that Neither of those Two Lives can give the Possession of the Sovereign Good? for Whichever of them had such a Power, That Life would be sufficient, perfect, and eligible also to all those

and 143, to this Dialogue, and the Passages, to which those Notes belong.—These considerations have induced us to think, that, in the Passage now before us, we should either read *θεῶν* instead of *ζώων*, or, at least, should understand the word *ζώων* to have respect to other *Rational Beings* in other Parts of the Universe. For all These are expressly called *ζῶα*, *Animals*, by *Plato* in his *Timæus*. And this Thought suggested the following Alteration of the Passage, which in Note 147 we have supposed to be erroneous and corrupt; — καὶ πρὸς τέτοις, ἐν ἀνθρώποις μὲν, θεοὶ δ' ἔ· that is, “*Nay, and farther, not only Men, but the Gods also.*” This Reading gives great Propriety to the words πρὸς τέτοις, κ. τ. λ. For these Additional words considerably add to the Force of this Passage; as they express, much more fully, than the words preceding them, the strong Sense, which *Protarchus* had, of the Insufficiency of a *Life*, either *merely pleasurable*, or *purely mental*, for the Happiness of any Being, in whose *Body* dwells a *Rational Soul*.—It may well be, that the Passage was at first wilfully corrupted, from a suspicion of Impiety in the Sentiment therein expressed. But the Weakness of such a Suspicion will presently appear from what follows in the Dialogue.

Animals,

Animals ¹⁴⁹, who are capable of living in the continual enjoyment of the Good all their Lives. And whoever of Us should give any Other Life the preference to That, would make his Election contrary to the nature of the truly Eligible, tho not willingly, because thro Ignorance, or some unhappy Necessity ¹⁵⁰.

PROTARCHUS.

What you say, is highly probable indeed.

¹⁴⁹ In the Greek,—*πᾶσι φυτοῖς καὶ ζώοις*, *to all Plants and Animals*. — But are *Plants* capable of living a Life of *Sensual Pleasure*? or *Brute Animals*, a Life of *Science and Understanding*? — We are therefore inclined to think, that *Plato's* own Words were *πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις* for immediately he subjoins an Explanation of his Meaning, and limits the word *πᾶσι*, *all*, to Such only, as are *endued with Reason*; (see Note 148;)—and that the word *φῦτ* was written in the *Margin* of some Manuscript, opposite to the words *πᾶσι τοῖς*, by a Reader, astonished at the Boldness of the Expression, *πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις*, and not sufficiently attentive to the *qualifying* words subjoined.

¹⁵⁰ What this *unhappy Necessity* is, see in *Argument to the Lesser Hippias*, page 7. — The *happy Necessity* is That, which obliges every Mind, freed from the Power of the *unhappy Necessity*, and enlightened by *Divine Reason*, to assent to whatever That Reason shows her to be *true*, and to *will* whatever the same Reason shows her to be *good*.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

That we ought not then to think That Goddess of Philebus ¹⁵¹ to be the same thing with the Sovereign Good, has been shown, I think, sufficiently.

PHILEBUS.

Neither is that Mind of Yours, O Socrates ¹⁵²! the Sovereign Good; for 'twill be found deficient in the same respects ¹⁵³.

SOCRATES.

Mine perhaps, O Philebus! may; but not That Mind which is Divine and True ¹⁵⁴; for 'tis otherwise,

¹⁵¹ *Socrates* here alludes to that pompous Invocation of ἀφροδίτην πάνδημος, or *Venus Volupia*, made by *Philebus* in page 51.

¹⁵² *Philebus* here evidently means,—*Mind*, so much extolled by *Socrates*, who had placed the *Sovereign Good* in *Mind* and *Mental Energys*.—This Retort is very fair; for the Argument, brought by *Socrates* to confute the Position of *Philebus*, is equally conclusive against the Hypothesis, opposed to it by *Socrates*.

¹⁵³ The next Editor of *Plato*, we hope, will be more careful than the former, all of whom have in this place printed ταῦτα instead of ταυτά.

¹⁵⁴ *Socrates* here willingly joins his Adversary in rejecting the Hypothesis, hitherto espoused by him,—That, which affirms *Mind*, or *Intelligence*, to be the *Chief Good* of all Beings, who

are endued with Mind or Reason,—with an exception of One only Being, the Divine Mind; if He can properly be called an Exception to that Doctrine, He, who doth not *partake* of Mind, but is, Himself, *Mind Universal*.—For, as the Position of *Philebus* cannot be true, in as much as *Man* partakes of *Mind*,—so neither can the Hypothesis, opposed to it by *Socrates*, be true, inasmuch as the *Rational Soul of Man*, and every other Particular Mind, is invested with a *Body*; because the *Good* of every *Being* must be of such a Kind, as intirely agrees to the *whole Nature* of that Being whose Good it is. *Socrates* therefore, by intimating his Hypothesis to be still true of the *Divine Mind*, intimates at the same time, that the Divine Being alone is, in his *whole Essence*, TRUE MIND, — that is, *perfect* and *pure* Mind, exempt from *Body*. For, as all *Corporeal Forms* are not only fleeting, but *imperfect* also, *untruly* representing those *Originals*, of which they are but transient *Copys*, — so all *Particular Minds*, being invested with *Bodys*, are too intimately conversant with those *Corporeal Forms*, and too closely connected with the *Outward Senses*, to have any of their own *Ideas*, or *Mental Forms*, perfect, and pure from Images of *Things Sensible*. But *Pure Mind* is ἐπέκεινα τῆς φύσεως, *transcendeth* [all *Corporeal*] *Nature*, and consequently is free from all those Feelings and Sentiments, those Passions and Affections, to which *embodied Minds* are liable, on account of the *Bodys* to which they are united.——We have here only to remark farther, that *Socrates*, in this modest Reply of his to the tart but just Observation of *Philebus*, affects to understand the word *Yours* in a Sense, widely different from the evident Meaning of that Sophist, on purpose to *introduce*, as it were by the By, the *Mention* of this *Transcendant Being, Pure Mind*; — and that we imagine this *Mention* to be here *introduced* by *Plato*, with a view to excite the Curiosity of his Readers,—

wife, I presume, with This. However, I do not contend for the Chief Prize of Victory, in behalf of the Life of Mind, against the Middle or Mixed Life. But what to do with the Second Prize, and which Life to bestow it on, is next to be considered. For the Cause of that Happiness, which the Mixed Life affords, One of us perhaps may ascribe to Mind, the Other of us to Pleasure. And thus, Neither of these Two, would be Man's Sovereign Good ¹⁵⁵, and yet One or Other of them may perhaps be supposed the Cause of it. Now on this Point, I would still

to prepare them for seeing this Divine Subject more opened in what is soon to follow, — and perhaps also to give them the first Openings of an Insight into the Ultimate Design of the whole Dialogue; for it ends with showing us, that MIND, considered not as *Intelligent*, but as *Intelligible Being*, the *Object* of Intelligence, is τὰγαθόν THE SOVEREIGN GOOD absolutely, originally, and supereminently; — *absolutely*, or *independently*, as having all Good *within Himself*; — *originally*, as being the sole *Principle* or *Fountain* of Good throughout Nature; — and *supereminently*, as being the sole *Cause* of Good to all Beings who partake of *Mind*, — producing *Good* to them even from the *Corporeal Part* of their Frame, and from all *Outward Things* within the Sphere of their Enjoyment. See Note 35, near the Conclusion of it.

¹⁵⁵ In *Stephens's* fine Edition of *Plato*, by a strange Error of the Press, τῷ μὲν ἀγαθόν is here printed, instead of τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν.

more earnestly contend against Philebus,—that not Pleasure, but Mind, is the nearest allied, and the most similar to That, whatever it be ¹⁵⁶, by the Possession of which, the Mixed Life becomes eligible and good. And if this Account be true, Pleasure can never be said to have any just Pretensions either to the First or to the Second Prize of Excellence. Still farther is she from coming in for the Third Prize ¹⁵⁷, if any Credit may be given for the present to that Mind of Mine.

PROTARCHUS.

¹⁵⁶ Those of our Readers, to whom the present Dialogue is intirely new, are to be informed, that *Moral Virtue* is here meant; This being the *most nearly* of all things *allied to Mind*. For it is the *Offspring* of imparted Wisdom; and *Wisdom its Self* is That *Mind*, which alone is *Divine* and *True*, considered as contemplating and energising on his own Ideas, and their mutual Relations. — Again; *Moral Virtue* is of all things the *most similar to Mind*. For the very *Essence* of it consists in *Measure*; and the *Principle* of all Measure is *Mind*; the pure and perfect *Ideas* of the Divine Mind being the *Measures* of all the *Forms* of *Outward Nature*, and the *Standards* of their Truth, Rectitude, and Goodness.

¹⁵⁷ Before this Dialogue is ended, 'twill appear, that in the Order of such Things, as are good and valuable to Man for their *own sakes*, and not as *Means* only to some farther *End*, the *Third Rank* is assigned by *Socrates* to *Mind*; (so far as the Term *Mind* signifies a *Perception*, *Intelligence*, and *Discernment* of Things *abstractedly* considered;) that is, to meer *Theory* unapplied

PROTARCHUS.

Indeed, O Socrates! it seems to Me, that Pleasure is now fallen: Your Reasons ¹⁵⁸ have been like so many Blows given her; under the Force of which, fighting for the Master-Prize, she lyes vanquished.— But I think however, that we must say, 'twas prudent in Mind not to contend for that Prize; for She would otherwise have met with the same Fate. Now if Pleasure should also lose the Prize of Second Value, as already she has lost the Highest, she must intirely fall into Disgrace with her own Lovers:

plied to Practice and the Conduct of a Man's own Life. — Now Contemplations and Speculations, terminating in the *Mind*, and not referred to any Enjoyment or Use of things external and corporeal, are of all things the most remote from *Bodily Pleasure*; they are indeed *opposite* to it, inasmuch as abstracted *Mind* is *opposed* to *Body*: whereas *Moral Virtue*, and the *Principle* of it, (Both of which, in the Order of Human Goods, we shall find placed by *Socrates* in higher Rank than *abstracted Mind*.) have no Existence but in the *Union* of Mind with Body, and in the *Relation* which the Mind bears to all external things by means of that Union.

¹⁵⁸ The *Plural* Number is here used, because *Pleasure* being proved *deficient* in all the *Three* Characteristicks of Man's Sovereign Good, Each of those *Three Defects* may be understood to furnish a distinct Reason, or Argument, against Her Claim to that Character.

for even to Them she would no longer appear to merit such Honour, as they had paid to her before ¹⁵⁹.

SOCRATES.

Well then; is it not the better way, to dismiss her now directly ¹⁶⁰; and not give her Pain, by inspecting into her too nicely, and discovering all her Imperfections?

PROTARCHUS.

What you now say, goes for nothing, Socrates!

SOCRATES.

Do you mean, because I supposed an impossible thing, when I supposed, that Pain might be given to Pleasure?

¹⁵⁹ *Protarchus* seems, in This, to hint at the *Honours* given to *Venus*,—that is, in plain words, the *Encomiums* made on *Sensual Pleasure*,—by *Mimnermus*, and other ancient Greek Poets, the Writers of ἐρωτικά or *Love-Poems*.

¹⁶⁰ The Reader will observe the Argument to be here interrupted by a little of the Socratic Humour, a seeming to decline the continuation of the Debate. The Reason of this, and such other short Interruptions, in the most argumentative Parts of Plato's Dialogues, is given in Note 151 to *the Banquet*: and the Reason there assigned, is no where exemplified better, than it is here. For Plato is now preparing to conduct his Readers up to the Heights of real Philosophy, to the PRINCIPLES of the *Universe*, and to the CAUSE of *Outward Nature*.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Not on that account only, but because you are sensible ¹⁶¹, that None of Us will give you a Discharge, before you have brought these Arguments ¹⁶² to a Conclusion.

SOCRATES.

Ah! the copious Matter of Argument, O Protarchus, still behind! and scarcely is any Part of it

¹⁶¹ In the *Greek* we here read — ἀγνοεῖς. — But before that word, we presume, the Negative οὐκ ought to be inserted; because *Socrates* could not be *ignorant* of what *Protarchus* here tells him. For he had not only at first engaged himself, by a voluntary Promise, to discourse on this Subject in his usual Dialectic Way, till the Controversy was decided, — but he had also very lately been reminded of that Engagement by *Protarchus*.—see the Passage, to which belongs *Note 133*.—*Protarchus* therefore, apprehending, that *Socrates* either modestly or jocosely endeavoured to evade the prosecution of the Subject, here charges him with a Consciousness of his Promise; and tells him, that, on that very account, his Evasion will not pass or be accepted.

¹⁶² If the future Editors of *Plato* will compare the present Passage, with That to which the preceding Note refers them, probably they will agree, that we ought to read — τέτων τῶν λόγων—*here* as well as *there*.

very manageable on the present occasion ¹⁶³. For whoever stands forth, as the Champion of Mind, to win the Second Prize for Her, must, as it appears to Me, take another way of combating, and has need of other Weapons, different from those Reasons I before made use of: Some, however, of the Same may perhaps be of use again. Must we then proceed in that Manner?

PROTARCHUS.

By all means.

SOCRATES.

But let us begin cautiously, and endeavour to lay down right Principles.

PROTARCHUS.

What Principles do you mean?

¹⁶³ *Aldus's* Edition of *Plato*, by omitting the word εἰς in this Sentence, gives a quite contrary Turn to it. *Stephens*, in His Edition, has inserted the εἰς: and this Reading we have preferred to the former; because it makes much better Sense, and is agreeable also to *Ficinus's* Translation from the *Medicean* Manuscript. 'Tis strange, that *Grynæus*, who undertook to revise that Translation, should depart from it here, where it is evidently right, to follow the erroneous Reading in the *Aldine* Edition. *Cornarius*, *Serranus*, *Bembo*, and *Grou*, were not so mis-led.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

All Things, which are now in the Universe¹⁶⁴, let us divide into Two Sorts, or rather, if you please, into Three.

PROTARCHUS.

You should tell us, What Difference between Things it is, with respect to which you make that Division.

¹⁶⁴ Among the *Things, now in the Universe*, Plato means not here to include those *Originals of Things*, those *Ideas*, which are in the Divine Mind *now and for ever*, having there an *Eternal Being*: for these *Ideas* neither mix with *Matter*, neither is *Infinity* a *Principle* of their Essence. Soon after this, however, these reallest of all Beings will fall under our consideration. —From Plato's Meaning in this place are also to be excluded all the Doings and Effects of *Chance*; and all such Operations and Works of *Man*, as are *void* of *Rule* and of *Design*; — the mis-shapen *Rudiments* also of *Nature's* intended Forms; and the crude *Essays* of *Art* in its Infancy or Novitiate; — the *Carcasses* also and the *Ruins*, the *Pieces* and the *Fragments*, of regular Forms, once existing, whether Natural or Artificial:—for None of These can properly be called *Forms*, or *Figures*, or indeed *Things* of any *Kind* now in Being: if they are at all to be considered, as having any Concern in the Passage now before us, it can only be, as they are several Portions of the *πρώτη ἄλη* That *infinite Substance*, which furnishes *Materials* for all the Works both of Nature and of Man.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Some Things, which have been already mentioned, let us re-assume.

PROTARCHUS.

What Things?

SOCRATES.

The Gods, we said, have shown us, the Infinite of Things, and also their Bound ¹⁶⁵.

PROTARCHUS.

Very true.

SOCRATES.

Let us take These for Two of the Sorts of Things; and for a Third Sort let us take That, which is composed of those Two mixed together ¹⁶⁶. But I

¹⁶⁵ See the Passage, to which belongs Note 78, and the Explanation of it in the latter Part of that Note.

¹⁶⁶ *Plato* himself will soon explain, what he means by Each of these *Three Sorts* of Things. It will then appear, that his *Third Sort* comprehends all the *Forms of Nature*, together with all the *Works and Performances of Art*;—and that his *First* and *Second Sorts* are the *Two immediate Principles* of those *Forms*, and of those *Works and Performances*. At present, we shall only premise the following Observation, as preliminary to the next Note;—viz. that the *First* of these their immediate Principles is the necessary Consequent of *Matter*;—and that the *Other* is the natural Effect of *Mind*.

deserve,

deserve, methinks, to be laughed at for pretending thus to distinguish Things, and to enumerate their several Sorts.

PROTARCHUS.

Why so, my good Friend?

SOCRATES.

A Fourth Sort appears to have been omitted by me.

PROTARCHUS.

Say, What.

SOCRATES.

Of that Commixture, the Combination of the former Two, consider the Cause: and beside those Three Sorts of Being, set me down this ¹⁶⁷ Cause for a Fourth.

PROTARCHUS.

¹⁶⁷ *Socrates*, when he just before divided All Things, *now in the Universe*, into *Three* Sorts, had respect only to Things *external*. But there is *another* beside These, a different *Sort* of Things, which also *now are*. For besides a *Flowing Now*, called the *Time present*, in which exist the *present Individuals* of every *Genus* and *Species*, (present, with regard to their Predecessors in *Time past*, and their Successors in *Time to come*,) there is also a *Stable Now*, which has no relation to *Time*, or to any Beings existing *successively*, or *in Time*, whether past, present, or to come. This *Stable Now* is *Eternity*; the *Image* of

F f

which,

which, *Plato* says, is *Time*. And very justly may *Time* be said to be the *Image of Eternity*; because the *Beings*, which exist in *Time*, are but *Images*, or *Pictures*, of those *original and real Beings*, the *Ideas* of the *Divine Mind*, which have no relation to *Time*, their *Essence* being *stable* and *eternal*. For as much therefore as these are, in the *Dignity* of their *Being*, so much above those temporary and transient things, their *Images* or *painted Copys*, they are by *Socrates* set apart by *Themselves*, as not to be ranked or numbered amongst those *Others*. 'Tis on this account perhaps, that he here feigns to have *forgotten* them at first, and now at length to *recollect* them.—We may suppose also, that *Socrates* intended, by these means, to represent the *manner*, in which a man arrives, if ever, at some faint *View* or imperfect *Knowledge* of these *Ideas*, namely, by *Recollection* as it were; which he elsewhere terms ἀνάμνησις *Reminiscence*;—and to signify farther, how late this *Knowledge* is acquired by those *Few* of us, who do in *time* attain to it. If this last *Supposal* of ours be not improbable, it presents us with a fair *Opportunity* of offering our *Conjectures*, concerning this *Fourth Sort* of *Being*, here spoken of, *Cause* in general,—and concerning the *Steps*, by which *Socrates* attained to as much *Knowledge* of it, as perhaps is attainable by *Man*. — With regard to *Cause in general*;—as every *Cause* is *relative* to its own *Effect*, the *Divisions* of *Cause in general* ought to correspond with the *Divisions* of that whole *Third Sort* of *Being*, — That, which is *effected* or *produced*. If That therefore was rightly divided into the *Forms of Nature* and the *Forms of Art*, *Cause in general* ought to be divided into *Two Kinds*, respectively corresponding with the *Two Kinds* of *Production* or *Effect*: and thus *all Cause* is referable either to *Nature* or to *Art*. — Now 'tis evident, that *Art* acts with *Contrivance* and with *Design*; and that These are seated

in the *Mind* of the Artist. Evident therefore is the close *Alliance* between *Mind*, and That Kind of *Cause* which is termed *Art*. If *Contrivance* and *Design* appear also in the *Forms* of *Nature*, it follows by *Analogy*, that *Nature*, considered as an *Agent*, or *Efficient Cause*, acts agreeably to certain *Rules* or *Laws*, given her by some Intelligence or *Mind*, the *Designer* and *Contriver* of all those *Forms* which she produces;—a *Mind*, as much superior to the *Human*, as the Productions or Works of *Nature* are superior to those of *Art*, in the *Wisdom* of their *Contrivance*, and the *Goodness* of their *Design*. Here also by *Analogy* we may conclude an intimate *Connection* between this most excellent *Mind* and that Kind of *Cause* which is termed *Nature*. — Farther; whatever is effected or done by *Art*, is framed, according to certain *Ideas* in the *Mind* of the *Artist*; and whatever is effected or produced by *Nature*, we must by *Analogy* conclude, that 'tis formed according to certain *Ideas* in the *Mind* of *Nature*. In both Cases then, *Ideas* are the *Rules* of the Operation, the *Models* of the Work, and the *Causes* of its having Such a *Form* as it has; that is, in other words, they are the *leading* or *directing*, the *Archetypal* and *Formal, Causes*, of it. — Farther still, in *Nature's* Productions, the *Divine Mind*, and in the Productions of *Art* the *Human Mind*, always intends some *End*; and this intended *End* always is some *Good*: the attainment then of this *Good* is the *Final Cause* of the Production.—Thus we find, that every Effect or Production, whether of *Art* or of *Nature*, acknowledgeth *Three Causes*, properly so called, — the *Efficient*, the *Formal*, and the *Final*. — Of these *Causes* the *First* in *Dignity* is the *Final*, if *Good* be of all things the most *valuable*: in the Inventions of *Art*, the *End*, as it is in the *Mind originally*, is *First* also in point of *Time*: for the *Good*, sought by the Invention, must first be in *Contemplation*, before the *Mind* sets about the *Con-*

trivance.—Second in *Dignity* is the *Formal Cause*, if *Contrivance*, *Design*, or *Art*, which form the *original Idea* of the future *Work*, be more *honorable* than the meer *Copys* of that *Idea*, the *Works* of the *Efficient Cause*. For, altho this *Third Cause* be *That*, which *executes* the *Design*, and *accomplishes* the *End*, yet the *Workman* is praised *only* for his *Art*, and the *Work* is valued *only* for its *End*. Suppose a *Deed*, ever so *beneficial* to us, done by some other *Person*: if no *Good* was *intended* for us by the *Doer*, we feel no *Sense* of *Gratitude* toward him for his *Deed*. And suppose an *Action* or *Performance* ever so *admirable*: if *Art* or *Skill* had no *Share* in it, we yield our *Admiration*, not to the *Performer*, but to *Chance* or some other *foreign Cause*.—The *Distinction* between these *Three Causes*, the *Final*, the *Formal*, and the *Efficient*, is so *real*, that, in the *Works* or *Productions* of *Man*, the *Three* may severally belong to *Three* different *Persons*. For *One Person* may conceive and propose some *End*; *Another Person* may contrive the *Means*; and a *Third Person* may *use* or *employ* those *Means*. But 'tis otherwise with the *Operations* and *Productions* of *Nature*: sufficient for these is *One* and the *Same Cause*; in which, however, all the *Three Causes* concur;—and *That* is *Universal Mind*.—This will appear, if we consider this *Great Mind*, in the first place, as it is the *Formal Cause* of all *Corporeal Things*. And we may consider it in this way. — *Essential* to all *Mind* is *Intelligence* or *Thinking*: and accordingly *intelligent* or *thinking Being* is not a very imperfect *Definition* of *Mind*. In *thinking*, every *Mind* must have an *Object*; the *Mind* must think of *Something*: and the only *Objects of Mind* not immersed in *Body*, but pure and alone, are *pure Ideas*, — *Forms* unmixed with *Matter*, and unattended by *Sensible Images*;—*pure Truths* also, the *Relations* between those pure *Ideas*. *Mind* is, as we apprehend, a *Perception* and a *Comprehension* of *Ideas* and of
Truths :

Truths: and the *Mind Universal and Divine* is the Comprehension of *all* pure Ideas and of *all* pure Truths in *One*,—in the Unity of his own *eternal Essence*. Now, if these *pure Ideas* are the *Originals* and Archetypes of all the *Forms* which are *mixed* with Matter, they are the *Formal Causes* of all Corporeal Beings: and the *Union* of all those Ideas, — the *Divine Mind*, — is thus the *Formal Cause* of the whole *Corporeal World*, which is therefore *One*, and in which all Corporeal Beings are *united*. — In the next place, Universal Mind is to be considered as the *Efficient Cause* of all external Things in the following way. — All Thinking, all Comparing of Ideas, and all Reasoning, — the inferring of some General Truth from many Particulars, — the deducing of One Truth from Another, — and the resolving of any Compound Truth into its Principles, — every one of these things is an *Energy* of the Mind: and every determinate Thought, every Judgment or Sentence of the Mind, every settled Inference, Conclusion, or Result, is an *Act* of the Mind, energising within, or acting on, her Self. It is acknowledged, that the Mind, in perceiving any Truth or any Idea, seems, and *is* indeed in some respect, *passive*; as she cannot help perceiving what she does perceive: but the *directing* of her Eye to That Truth or to That Idea in particular, and the *keeping* of her Eye open, to continue in the actual Perception of it, may be justly stiled *Energys*, or *inward Actions*, of the Mind. We here speak of *Particular Minds*, such as the *Human*. For the Eye of the *Divine Mind* is always open, and is always viewing in Himself all Ideas at once, without comparing, compounding, or dividing them, — all Truths at once, without inferring, or deducing, Some from Others, — and the Principles of All things, without Analytical Investigation. — Thus the Divine Mind is always in *Energy*, and therefore always in *Motion*, — such Motion, as belongs to *Mind*; for
without

without Motion, of one Kind or other, there can be no Energy, neither of Soul, nor yet of Mind. — Now, the Energy of Universal Mind, being *within* and *throughout* the Infinity of *Matter*, (call it, if you please, *Extension*, or *Place*, or the *Receptacle of Forms*; see *Aristot: Phys: L. 4, C. 4,*) and This being *external* to Mind, the *Energy* becomes *Outward Action*; and *Mind*, energising only on *Mental Forms*, *impresseth* them on *Matter*, Mind's ubiquatary Throne: thus are produced *Forms without*, the *Expressions* of those *Forms within*. In like manner, *Mental Thought*, or *Energy*, being *Mental Motion*, is, we presume, the *Spring of Motion*, or the *First Mover*, to the whole *Corporeal Universe*,—to *Matter* invested every where with *Form*. And the *Motion* of this Great Body is *perpetual*, because the moving *Mind* is *eternal*: just as the *Kinds* and *Species* of all Corporeal Things are continued *invariably* the *Same* in all successive Individuals, because their *Archetypes* are *invariable* and the *Same* for ever. Thus Universal Mind is found to be the *Efficient* as well as the *Formal Cause* of All Corporeal Things thro infinite Ages. — It remains to be considered, in what respect Universal Mind is the *Final Cause* of All things. — *Invariable* are the Objects of the Divine Mind; so are those Objects of the Human Mind, the *Kinds* and *Species* of Things in Nature, — yet the *Individuals* of each *Species* and of each *Kind* are never in a settled State, but are continually varying in their Appearances, and either increasing or lessening in their Powers. Hence arises a real Distinction between Being *invariable* and Being *variable*. Mind is *invariable*, and Body is *variable*: but *Being* is common to them Both; for Both of them are. In this View it should seem, that *Being* is more *comprehensive* and more *universal* than *Mind*. But when we reflect, that these variable Individuals *derive from Mind*, not only their *Particular Forms*, and consequently their being *what they are*,
but

but also their having *any* Form or Being *at all*, it should seem, that *in Mind* there is Something *Superior* even to those *invariable* Beings, those eternal Forms, the *Mental*. — Again; if we consider the *Good* enjoyed by *All Animals*, in general, and the *Good*, enjoyed by *Rational Animals* only; that they are Goods of quite *different Kinds*; the former being the Good of *Sense*, the latter, That of *Mind*; (for we can judge of the Enjoyments of both Mind and Sense, as of Both we are Partakers;) from this consideration it may seem, that the nature of *Good* is more *ample* and *extensive*, than the nature of *Mind*. But if we consider, on the other hand, that all Animals receive the Good, which the Mind of Nature intends for them, partly by means of their own Organs of Sensation, and partly by means of Things abroad, the Structure of whose Frame is correspondent to the Structure of those Animal-Organs;—and that these *joint Means* of Animal-Good are provided by one; and the same forming *Mind of Nature*, who constructs all Corporeal Things together, *adapted to each other*, according to the *mutual Relations* and *Harmony* of his own Ideas; — and if we consider also, that 'tis only by partaking of *Mind*, that *Rational Animals* are capable of enjoying the proper *Good of Mind*; and that *Mind* alone bestows on them this Good, in presenting them with *Truth*;—when all This is considered, 'twill appear, that Whatever is *Good* to *all Animals* enters together with *Form*, (proceeding, Both of them, from *Mind*;) into *Outward Nature*; and that *Truth* enters together with *Mind*; (and Both of them, in the same Proportion and Degree,) into the *Rational Soul* of Man. — It should seem then, that the *Idea of Good* is That Universal Idea, which the Divine Mind, in energising, always beholds; and in beholding which, he enjoys Supream Happiness;—that, as *Mind* is the first *Spring of Motion* to *Body*, so the *Idea of Good* is the first *Spring* of the *Mind's* own *internal* Motions.

Motions, or *Energys*;—and that, in acting outwardly, that is, in producing Outward Forms, *Universal Mind* has no other End in View, than *Universal Good*.—In this way we conceive, that *Universal Mind* may rightly be considered as the *Final Cause* of All things, the *Idea of Good* being no where but in *Mind*: and hence it is, that every *Particular Mind* partakes of *That Idea*, is *moved* by it in all her *Energys*, and prompted by it in all those *Actions* of the *Soul*, which She directs. — To these considerations if we add the following;—that not only every Thing which hath its Being in the *World of Mind*, and every Thing which *proceeds* from *Reason*,—but every Thing also which hath its Being in the *World of Nature*, and every Thing which of necessity *follows* from *Nature*, is *good*; — that the Connection between *Being* and *Good* is so inseparable, that whatever is *Good* to any *Particular Being*, tends to the *Preservation* of that *Being*; and that whatever is *Evil* to it, tends to its *Destruction*;—that as soon as the *inherent Good* of any *Natural Being* wholly forsakes it, and fresh *Recruits* of *con-natural Good* cease to flow into it from *Outward Nature*, the *Dissolution* or *End* of That *Being* immediately ensues; but that so long as the *Being* retains any of its *native Good*, with *Strength* sufficient to receive a fresh *Influx*, *Nature* will, to prolong the *Being*, *heal* the *Evil* incidental to that *Being*, and even *convert* it into *Good*; — that, in the *Rational Soul* of *Man*, *Divine Reason* hath the like *Influence*, the like *healing* *Virtue*, and the like *converting* *Power*; which, if the *Soul* be willing, He exerts for the *preservation* of a *Being*, whose *Continuance* depends on its retaining a *Love* of its own proper *Good*, and a *Will* to enjoy it;—from hence it must appear, that every Thing, so far as it partakes of *Being*, partakes of *Good*,—a *Good*, *belonging* to its *Being*, and without which *Good* it can no longer be *what it is*. — To venture a *Step* farther in our inquiry into the nature of the *Cause* of *All things*: it appears

no less absurd than impious to suppose, that *Evil* has any *Place* in the *Divine Mind*. For the *Idea of Being*, or That of *Good*, is the sole Object of the *Mind Universal*: and this *Idea* comprehends every Kind of Being, and the Good belonging to each Kind; but excludes whatever is totally void of Being, and of Good. And since no Mind has any *Idea*, which is not derived from the *Mind Universal*, it follows, that of *Evil* there is no *General Idea*; — that *Evil* has no *positive Essence*; and that like *meer Matter*, it admits of no other Definition, than Such as is entirely *Negative*. As *meer Matter* then is only a *Negation*, a total Defect, of *Being*, — in like manner, *absolute Evil* is nothing more than a *Negation*, a total Defect, of *Good*. If this Reasoning be right, *Evil* is either the *same* thing with *Matter*, or 'tis at least the most extensive of those *Infinities*, which are said, in Note 166, to be the *necessary Consequents* of *Matter*: but, mixing with all *Individual Beings*, it is bounded in every One of them by *Form*, and controuled in every One of them by *Good*. Now, it is from *necessity*, that *Evil mixes* with them all: for no *Individual* of any Species, no *Particular* of any Universal, can be *perfectly good* in its *Kind*. — No one of them can possess all the Good belonging to its *Essence*, or *Ideal Form*, because of the *Mixture* of this *Form* with *Matter*: and This *Mixture* is necessary to constitute the *Existence* of every *Particular Being*: it is necessary for producing *Diversity* out of *Sameness*, and *Multitude* out of *Monad*; for without *Matter*, All would be *One* and the *Same* solitary *Being*, — happy perhaps in *Himself*, (if Want of Nothing be, as Some have said, sufficient to make Happiness,) — and *absolutely* perhaps good, but the *Cause* of no *Good* at all. It seems reasonable therefore to conclude, that, however absurd it is to suppose *Matter* to be, properly speaking, a *Cause of Being*, or *Evil* to be a *Cause of Good*, — yet, as *without Matter* there would be only

One Being,—so, without Evil no Good would be possessed or enjoyed, but by That One. — Upon the whole, it appears, that Evil is as necessary to the universal Diffusion, and the endless Communication of Good, as Matter is to the Evolution of Universal Form, and to the endless Communication of Being. It appears also at the same time, that Good bears the same relation to Being as Evil bears to Matter; and that, as Evil either is the same Thing with Matter, (the same Nothing rather, if Matter be a total Defect of Being, as Evil is a total Defect of Good,) or of necessity attends on Matter in every Mixture of Form with it,—so, Good either is the same Thing with Being, or constantly attends on Being, and follows the Divisions of it into Variable and Invariable, — Temporary and Eternal. — Thus much concerning Cause in general, (the Fourth Sort of Being, spoken of in the present Passage of this Dialogue,) and the different Meanings of the word Cause; as it is properly used to signify, not only the EFFICIENT, by which, or by whom, —but the PATTERN also, according to which,—and the END, for the sake of which any Thing is made or done. — We have endeavoured to show, that these Three Meanings are together applicable to the One Cause of All Things, THE DIVINE BEING, and to Him alone. In philosophical Language, however, the word Cause is sometimes applied to Matter, as a Cause in which All things are made,—or out of which they were at first made,—or without which they could not be made.—Now That, without which a Thing cannot be made, is either a concurring Cause, or an Instrument necessary to be used in the making, or some Means necessary to be employed by the Maker, and different from Himself. But Matter and Mind are not concurring Causes; nor is Matter an Instrumental Cause; neither is it a Mediate Cause: for Universal Mind is all-sufficient, and has no need of either Co-adjutors or Instruments, or Means. —

Farther;—That, *out of which* a Thing is made, must be Something *antecedently existing*; it must have some *Form* and some *Figure*: and indeed the Materials of every Human Work have some Form and Figure of their own, before they become the *Subjects* of the future Work. But the *Common Matter* of all corporeal, external, and particular Things is without either *Form* or *Figure*; it has indeed no real Being at all. And This is That, *in which* the Divine Mind energises, and energising operates, and operating produces all the *Forms of Nature*, All things to which belong both *Form* and *Matter*. As therefore these variable and temporary Beings, with respect to their *Forms*, derive their *Origin* from *Being invariable and eternal*, — so, with respect to the *Subject-Matter* of their Forms, they may be said to have their *Origin* in That which in reality is *Nothing*, — not so much as the *Image* or *Shadow* of any *real Thing*. — We apprehend, that, on this head, we speak the Sense of the *Pythagoreans*, the *Platonicks*, and the *Peripateticks*, Some of them at least; for 'tis highly probable, that These are the Ancients, meant by *Porphry*, in his *Ἀπορρηταί*, pag: 226, Edit: *Cantab:* where he says, that *the Propertys of Matter, according to the Ancients, are these*; — *It is incorporeal*; for it is different from *Bodys*: *it is lifeless*; for it is neither *Mind*, nor *Soul*; nor a *Living Thing* is it, of its *Self*: *it is formless*, *subject to Diversity*, *infinite*, *powerless*: wherefore it is not *Being*, but *Non-Being*; not such *Non-Being* as *Motion*, (for *Motion* is *Motion* of Something;) but truly and really (*ἀληθῶς*) *Non-Being* (*μὴ ὄν*) that is,—*Nothing*. — If then the above-given Account be true, we find the *Origin of Things* to be, on the one hand, the *Plenitude of Universal Being*, the Cause of Good to all, — on the other hand, a total *Vacuity of Being*, *Infinite Matter*, the Cause of all Evil. — The Readers of *Plato* will readily excuse the Length of this Account, when they are informed, that the

Design of it, partly, is to illustrate Two Passages in *Plato*;—One in his *Timæus*, vol. 3, pag: 52, Edit: *Steph*: concerning the *First Matter*;—the Other in his *Phædo*, pag: 260, &c, Edit: *Oxon*: concerning *Final Causes*;—but chiefly, to free from all obscurity Two other Passages;— One, in his *Republick*, vol: 2, pag: 70, Edit: *Cantab*: concerning the *Idea of Good*;—the Other, περὶ τῆς τῆ πρώτης φύσεως concerning the nature of THE FIRST, (or *The Supream*,) in the *Second* of his *Epistles*, pag: 312, Edit: *Steph*: where he professes to conceal his Meaning purposely, in this Enigmatical Sentence;—περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντ' ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐκείνῳ ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ἐκείνος αἴτιον ἀπάντων τῶν καλῶν· δεύτερον δὲ περὶ, τὰ δεύτερα· καὶ τρίτον περὶ, τὰ τρίτα. *All Beings are attendant on the King of All; for His sake are All things; and of all Beautiful Things He is the Cause: on the Second attend Things of the Second Order: and on the Third attend Things Third in Order.*— This last Enigmatical Passage is to be explained from what was said concerning the Three Causes of All things. For the FIRST, (or *Supream in Dignity*,) *the King of all Beings*, (the *Law to All*,) is *τ' αγαθόν*, *Essential Good*, the *Final Cause* of All things, and the *Fountain* of those fairest of things, *Measure and Moderation, Unity and Harmony, Justice and Goodness, Symmetry and Beauty, the Perfection* of each Kind, and the *Standard* of whatever in its Kind is *excellent*:—the SECOND (in Dignity) is *Universal Mind*, the *Formal Cause* of All things, and the *Fountain* of all *Ideas* and all *Truths, Intelligence and Knowledge, Sciences and Arts, and Right Opinions*:—and the THIRD (in Dignity) is *Universal Soul*, the *Efficient Cause* of All things, and the *Fountain* of all *Sense and Life, Love and Affection, Sympathy and Attraction.*— So that *all Beings* whatever depend on the SUPREME for their very *Being*, since without partaking of *Good* they could not be:— in

like manner, all *Intelligent* Beings depend on the SECOND for their *Intelligence*:—and all *Sentient* and all *Vital* Beings are, for their *Senses* and their *Lives*, dependant on the THIRD.—We have only to add This farther; — that, immediately after the Passage above cited, the *Mysteriousness* of which is fairly apologised for by *Plato* himself, he speaks of the *Human Soul*, and of her natural *Desire* to be made acquainted with those Things, (meaning the fair *Streams*, that flow from those Three *Fountains*,) because she is of *Kin* to them, and has them but imperfectly and defectively in her Self. Then follows the Mention of that important Problem, — “What is the Cause of all Evils?”—which Point, he says, whoever cannot clear up to his own satisfaction, will never attain to a real Knowledge of the Truth. And as This is the last of the Philosophical Points, stated in that *Epistle*; and as it compleats the Subject of those Inquiries, made by *Dionysus*, concerning the *Causes of Things*; we shall here finish this short *Essay* on the same Subject; (too short for a detached *Dissertation*; tho too long, considered as Part only of a Note;) and proceed to investigate the Steps, by which *Socrates* attained to his great Knowledge in it. This Investigation also will be long; but we hope, that ’twill not be tedious to the Admirers of *Socratic Wisdom*; as it leads to the Doctrine, taught first by *Socrates*, — the Doctrine of those *Universals*, which are the *Principles* of *Moral* and *Political Science*, and are, Themselves, immediately derived from the *First Cause* of All things. With this Hope, and this desirable End in View, we thus begin our Investigation. — That a Man’s *First Step* to any Kind of Knowledge is by means of his *Sensations*, was never, we believe, questioned by any Person, who considered, with a sober and unprejudiced Mind, the nature of Human Knowledge.—As soon as Infants are separated from the Womb, and are become intirely distinct Beings,

Beings, surrounded immediately with the external Air, they appear to be *sensible* of their own extream Weakness and Indigence: and as soon as they find their Weakness helped, and their Indigence relieved, by Something, which is not within Themselves, nor is in their own Power to procure, (and which, by a natural Instinct, they generally solicit to obtain by Crying,) they seem thereupon to have an obscure Sense of *Something external*, in respect of their own Beings,—Something, which is *no Part* of *Themselves*.—It appears also, that they have, at the same time, *Sensations* of those Primary Qualities of external things, *Moisture* and *Dryness*, *Cold* and *Heat*, so far as they feel themselves, on the one hand, hurt or incommoded by the *Excess* of any one of these Qualities, and on the other hand, benefited or eased by a Quality which is *contrary*. These are called the *Primary Qualities* of Body, because These, and none Other, belong to those *Primary Bodys*, the *Four Elements* of all *Bodys* which are *Mixt*, or composed of different Ingredients: and 'tis worthy of Remark, that these primary Qualities are the First, by which new-born Infants appear to be affected; excepting perhaps a Glimmering of *Light*: concerning which we shall have occasion to say more in a subsequent Note. To proceed at present with an account of the progress of our *Sensations*: for only by means of These have we any apprehension of *Outward Things*, or of their *Sensible Qualities*:—Next after those First Sensations, produced in us by an application of the *Primary Qualities* of Body to our Organs of *Touch*, we soon feel various other Sensations, from those various Qualities of Body which are called *Secondary*, because they are found, not in the Primary or Elementary Bodys, but in Mixt or Compound-Bodys only;—Some, which affect the *Touch*, as *Hardness* and *Softness*, *Roughness* and *Smoothness*;—Others, which affect the *Taste*, as *Sweetness*, *Sourness*,

Sourness, Bitterness, &c; — together with *Odours*, which affect the *Smell*; — *Sounds* also, which strike the *Ear*; and *Colours*, falling on the *Eye*. — The Sensations of these, and of such other Qualities of things external, as affect any of our outward Senses, are all of them, either *pleasurable* or *painful*, more or less: and the *Pleasures* and *Pains*, which attend them, are purely *Corporeal*; as being produced by *Bodys*, or Particles of Body, when these meet with *Bodys animated* by Sentient Souls. — Now the Pleasures and the Pains of this Kind are first felt, whilst the *Rational* Soul lies intirely dormant, and even before any Faculty of the *Animal* Soul, except That of *Sense*, are strong enough to exert themselves. All this while, tho the Infant-Sensations grow more and more lively, as the Organs of Sense strengthen, yet None of the *Objects of Sense* appear *distinctly*; or the *Mind*, newly pent up in *Body*, and clogged with *Matter*, is yet too weak to take Cognisance of any of them in the *Sensorium*: even there, None of them make any durable Impression; All vanish, with the Sensation which they produce: and in their present appearances, All of them belong to that First Class of Things, by *Socrates* termed *the Infinite*. — Not long afterwards, however, *the Mind* begins to expand herself; and Children then begin to *distinguish* outward *Things*, one from another; to *distinguish* also the *Parts* of a Corporeal Figure, one from another, and from the *Whole*. And as soon as *Imagination* and *Memory*, those Facultys of the *Animal-Soul*, are able to *receive* and to *retain* the *Images* of Corporeal Forms, the *Mental Powers* are excited, by which the *Mind* *views* them *together* and *compares* them; sees *Similarity* and *Dissimilarity* amongst them; *congregates* the Similar, and *segregates* the Dissimilar; and in the *Similar*, be they ever so *Many*, sees a certain *Sameness*, which intitles them to be called by one and the same *Name*, as having, All of them, one and the same *Nature*.

—It

— It seems, that, next after This, the Mind discerns some *accidental Qualitys, Conditions, and Circumstances*, — such as Colour, Size, Motion or Rest, Action or Inaction,—wherein the most *similar* Beings or Substances *differ*, one from another; and that, discerning This, she separates those *differing Qualitys, &c.* from That *Nature*, which is the *Same* in them *All*: for, notwithstanding her discernment of those *Accidental Differences*, she continues to give to All of them the *Same Name*. — Soon after this, the Mind seems to perceive farther, that *Qualitys, &c.* of the *Same Sort*, are the Attributes of *many* Substances or Beings *different* in thier *Names and Natures*; and hence she readily assigns to Each of those *Attributes* one and the *same Name*, as denoting one and the same Thing, *common to many* Beings of *different Natures*. — Thus far even Children, when they can speak, or understand what is spoken, concerning Objects with which they are conversant, are carried by *Common Sense*, aided by the *Principles of Reason*, in perceiving the *Samenesses and Differences* of Things. And the Multitude, or Bulk of Mankind, being wholly employed in providing for their comfortable Subsistence, seldom go any farther.—Now, to perceive *Sameness* and *Difference* together, in Objects of Sense, whether these Objects are *Substantial Beings*, or *Attributes* of such Beings, is to have *Ideas* of the *Species* of Things, and of their *Specific Differences*. To have such *Ideas*, in every *One* of which, many *Particulars* are *universalised*, (*many* Objects of *Sense* being, by the *Mind's Eye*, viewed in *One Special Idea*,) is *natural* to the *Human Mind*, when her dormant Powers are first awakened: it is the *First Stage* on the Road to *Science*, (properly so called,) the *Knowledge* of things *stable*; and the *same for ever*:—and it is so necessary to the Formation, Knowledge, and Use of Language, that the Words, which seem to have been the first invented in every Language, if it be original or underived

underived, are the *Symbols* (or Representatives) of those *Special Ideas*. Indeed the Things, which Men had always the most immediate Occasion to speak of, One to Another, were *Sensible Objects* in their *Species*, not This or That *Individual* or *Particular*; as appears from the *Pronoun-Words*, probably the next invented, to serve instead of dumb Directions by the Eye or Finger, pointing to some *Individual Being* or *Particular Thing*, either remote or near. For this reason we presume it is, that Nature has not given the *Organs of Speech* to *Brute Animals*, not even to those of the liveliest *Sense* and the most generous *Spirit*; 'tis because they could be of no Use to an Animal, the highest Faculty of whose Soul was a *Memory of particular Objects* of Sense, without *universalising* any of them, or conceiving an *Idea* of any *Species*: for without *such Ideas* at least, there can be neither *Speech*, nor *Understanding* of what is spoken.—But to proceed with our present Subject, the natural Progress of Human Knowledge, until it arrives at the *Cause* of All things. — When the Invention and the Improvement of useful Arts had more and more abridged the Labours of Human Life, and had procured with facility the means of comfortable Living, the Lovers of Knowledge had then Leisure to search deeper into the Nature of Things. In this Search they soon came to separate the *Properties*, severally *essential* to each *Species*, from those *accidental Circumstances*, which diversify the *Individuals*, and serve to distinguish them, One from Another. In the next place they found, that some of those *essential Propertys* were *common to many Beings* of *different Species*: and hence they acquired a Knowledge of the *Genera*, or *Kinds*, as well as of the *Species* of Things. In the same manner they went on, *generalising* more and more, as they found more and more *Kinds* of Being to *agree* in some of their *essential Propertys*; — until at length

they attained to see, that *Being its Self*, accompanied with the Property essential to all Being, was *Common to them all*, and absolutely *Universal*; inasmuch as it comprehended all the *Kinds* and *Species* of Being, together with the *Property essential*, and the *Circumstances incidental*, severally to Each.—In the mean time, for the sake of communicating this gradually increasing Knowledge, it was necessary, all along, to invent new Terms for all newly-discovered Things. And thus the Language of that People, amongst whom these Discoverys were made with the most Accuracy, became at length richer than any other Language, not only in *Substantive* Words, but in *Attributives* also; to express, not only all the different *Kinds* of Things, but also their different *Property*s and *Powers*, *Energys* and *Actions*, with the *Effects* of these last on other Things, and the *Relations* of One *Being*, or *Attribute* of Being, to Another.—But the *Knowledge of Nature* was far from being as yet completed. Nothing can be known perfectly well, without the Knowledge of its *Cause*. It remained therefore, to search out the *Cause* of those *Samenesses* and *Differences*, which appear together, in all the *Kinds* and *Species* of Being;—in the different *Species* of each Kind, the *Cause of Sameness*, as to their Kind;—and in each *Kind*, the *Cause of Difference* between its *Species*:—how *Being* comes to be *divided* into certain *Kinds* and *Species*; and how these *Kinds* and *Species* come to be continued the *Same* for ever, amidst the unceasing Change and Variation of all things throughout Nature.—The Speculators of Outward Nature seemed to think, that they gave a sufficient account of these Phenomena, in saying,—that the Multitude of Individual Beings, in every Age, were produced from *different Seeds*,—generically different, Some of these Seeds,—Others *specifically*,—and Others with a Difference merely *numerical*;—*Seeds*, which conveyed to every successive Generation the *Specific*

Forms

Forms and the *Generic Powers* of those Beings from whom they sprang. And if these Naturalists were asked, from *what Cause* came any *Difference* at all, other than *numerical*, between the productive *Beings*, or between the *Seeds* which they severally produced; — and from *what Cause* had those *Seeds* the Power of continuing on, from Generation to Generation, the *same Differences*, both *Generic* and *Specific*, without *Addition*, *Diminution*, or *Alteration*; — Some had no better Answer to make than This; — “ Things had always gone on after this manner; Hens produced Eggs; from Eggs came forth Chicken; Chicken grew up to be Hens, and produced other such Eggs as those from which they came.” — But “ Which were First, Birds or Eggs? for it does not appear, that an Egg could ever have existed without a Bird previous to it; nor that a Bird could, without a previous Egg.” — To this Question it was thus answered; — “ In Nature there was *no First*, no *Beginning* of Things: *Time* is *infinite*, the *past* as well as the *future*; and the successive Generations of all the Beings of Nature roll, along with Time, *beginningless* and *endless*”. — But “ you thus present to our Imaginations a Chain without a First Link,—an orderly March without a Leader,—an infinite Succession of Beings, Every one of which is an *Effect* of some *prior* Being, as well as it is a *Cause* of some *posterior*. Must there not have been, *before Nature*, some *Cause* of it? or at least *in Nature* must there not have been always *Something*, which is a *Cause*, without being also an *Effect*?” — These Questions drew from those ancient Physiologers the following Account of the Universe. They admitted, “ ’twas *necessary* that Something should have existed always, from infinite Time past, to be the *Cause* of that infinite Series of Generations, — some Being, which involved in its *Self* its own *Cause*, and existed by the *necessity* of its own *Nature* :” — “ but this necessary self-

existent Being, they said, was *Nature her Self*, the Nature of *the Universe*, which continued the Same for ever:" they farther said, that "to this Nature belonged incessant and everlasting *Motion*, by the same *necessity*,—a Motion of the whole Universe, and a Motion of every Part and Particle of it:"—that "whatever *Change* happens in any *Part* of the Universe, it is occasioned only by a Removal of *Particles* from one Place to another:"—that "*Particles* of a similar Sort often *meet together*, and afterwards *separate* again:"—and that "what we call *Generation*, is only a *Meeting together* of these Particles; and what we call *Death*, or *Corruption*, is only a *Parting* of them *asunder*, followed by a Dissolution of that Being which they had composed." — Other Physiologers gave a quite contrary Account of the *Cause of Nature*. For they said, that "Nature was not eternal, but began *in Time*:"—that "the *Beginning* of it was from Seeds, but not from any such Seeds, as by *natural necessity* produce Beings of any certain Kinds; the Seeds of All things being an infinite Number of minute Bodys; Some indeed more minute than others, but All of them *indivisible*, and All of them eternally in Motion by a *Necessity of their own*, antecedent to That of *Nature*; for Nature as yet was not:"—that "the *Figures* of these minute Bodys were infinitely various; and their *Motions* in no determinate Direction:" that "by this vague Motion, like that of Motes in a Sun-Beam, their relative *Situation* was continually changing; and by striking against each other, their *Posture* continually varied:" that "the irregular Curvatures in the Figures of Some, like Hooks, happening to take Hold of those of Others, thenceforward they wandered on together; and in their way, gathering up more by the same means, they sometimes inclosed, amongst them, Bodys the most minute and subtile, of a Spherical Figure, and moving with the greatest Celerity,—the Seeds of Life and Sense and Understanding:"—that "hence they grew together
into

into the various Beings of Nature, endued with Life in various Degrees, proportioned to the Number and the Fineness of the inclosed Vital Particles:”—that “ a Being, thus framed, must have endured as long as any *Vital Atoms* remained within it; and some or other of These always remained, as long as the *Lifeless Atoms* had a Strength of Coherence, sufficient to retain them:”—for that “ as the irregular component Particles of every Being were eternally in Motion, they must, sooner or later, have quitted their Hold of each other; and the Being, which they had composed, must have then come to Dissolution; the Vital Particles within, which had vitally connected them, being then let loose, must have taken Wing, and fled away:”—that “ as soon afterward, as these Seeds of Life, these Vital Particles, All or Any of them, met with some Vital Being, Animal or Vegetable, newly compacted, or, at least, open enough to receive and strong enough to retain them, they entered; and were followed from time to time by More such, until the Being was saturated with Life:”—that, “ from That time, all superfluous Vital Particles, which had entered, found their way out, together with Fragments and Shreds from every Part or Member of the full-grown Being; and, together with them, became the Seeds of a new Being, Such a one, as That from which they either sprang forth spontaneously, or were emitted by the Desire, Will, or Consent of the Parent-Being:”—for that “ Some of the original or First Beings happened to be so finely composed, that the Vital Atoms could run thro every Part of their subtile Frame; and in these Beings the *Abundance of Life* produced *Sense*,—a Sensation of *Pain* from *Superfluitys*, as well as from *Emptiness*,—and a Sensation of *Pleasure* in the *unburthening* themselves of *Superfluitys*, as well as in the *filling* of any Part empty, or not sufficiently full;—such Sensations produced *Desire*; Desire
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formed *Connexions* and mutual *Relations* between similar Beings, for the sake of yielding mutual Relief, or of supplying mutual Wants:”—that “from these Causes, every where acting, at length, out of That *boundless Ocean*, the Infinity of Space, wherein the *Seeds* of all Being had *swam* to and fro from all Eternity, arose *Venus*, That Order and Course of Nature, which in every Age produceth Beings similar to Those of the Age preceding:”—and that “in fine this constant Continuance of the same Similarity and Dissimilarity, which appeared between the various Original Beings,—those First Assemblages of such Atoms as could hold together for a Time,—giveth us the Notion of *Kinds* and *Species* in Natural Beings.”—It appears then, that, according to Both the Accounts, given by these ancient Physiologers, the *Cause* of this *Commixture* of the *Infinite* with *Bound*, (so called in the Passage now before us,) or in other words, the *Cause* of *Bounds* set to infinite *Matter*, is unintelligent and blind *Necessity*; whether it be *eternal*, or whether it arose *in Time* from the casual Concourse of *eternal Atoms*. From the latter of these Two Accounts, the Hypotheses of other ancient Physiologers, mentioned in Note 93 to the *Greater Hippias*, and in Note 83 to *the Banquet*, did not differ fundamentally. For All of These supposed *infinite Matter*, eternally in Motion, to be the *sole Principle* of All things; and this *Motion*, whether it was determined by coeval Necessity, or whether it was formerly vague and fortuitous, to have been originally their *sole Cause*.——But *Thinking Persons*, who indulged their *Imagination* less, and exercised their *Reason* more, than those *Mechanical Naturalists*, gave a more *rational* Account of the *Cause* of all Natural Things. These sober Thinkers, in their Speculations of Nature, observed every where the evident *Marks of Design*; — in the various Inanimate Beings, (Each having all its Parts *similar*,) they observed the *Regularity*

larity and Beauty of their several Forms;—in all Living Beings, (consisting of Parts *dissimilar*,) they perceived a *Beauty*, peculiar to each Kind, yet diversified in each of the Species of that Kind; they observed the *Proportion*, *Harmony*, and *Correspondence* of their Parts; and the *Fitness* of these Parts for the preserving of the whole Being, and for the generating of its Like. From such Observations, they reasoned easily to the consideration of some *designing Minds* invisible, the *Causes* of all those visible Forms. — Then widening their View, to behold the beauteous Spectacle of all Nature, they compared these Forms together; and finding, how exactly the Living Individuals of the same Species were fitted, Each to Other; every Species also, and every Kind of Being, fitted to other Species and Kinds; and the Elements of Nature, fitted to them All; so as to *connect* all the Parts of this visible World together, forming *One* great *Whole*; and so as to preserve this Whole for ever, sound and intire, in undecaying Vigour and in youthful Beauty; they discovered *Unity of Design* in the *Frame*, and *Uniformity of Conduct* in the *Administration* of Nature; and hence concluded, that either *One Intelligent Being* was the sole Designer and perpetual Director of all Nature's Motions, or, if *Many* such *Beings* were the Designers and the prime Movers, (which was more easy, tho less philosophical, to conceive,) yet such a Harmony and Union was between them, that *One Mind* must be in them all.——Now when these better Physiologists drew from their Discoverys this rational Conclusion,—that *One Mind* was the *Cause* of all Nature's Forms, — they could not but discern at the same time, that, for this Cause to *act*, 'twas necessary to suppose some *Subject* for it to *act in* or *upon*,—some *Matter* for it to *form*,—some *Principle* of Things without a Will of its own, but meerly *passive*, and passively obedient to the *Will of active Mind*. For they considered, that if Mind

energised *within its Self* only, and had no other Subject, *upon* or *within* which, it might act, — the Activity of Mind could produce no *External Form*; nothing but *Mind* could have any *Being* at all; but *All* would be *Mind*; — Conclusions, contrary to Sense as well as to Reason, but easily admitted by those few Persons, who deny the existence of an External World. — This Reasoning gave rise to the Notion of *Two Principles* of Things, — a Notion, greatly corrupted in After-Ages by attributing to Each of those Principles a *Will* of its own, — to the *One* a *benign* Will, preservative of Health and Soundness in every Part of the Universe; and restorative, whenever any Part of it was disordered by the *Other* Principle: for to this *Other* was attributed a *malignant* Will, mischievous and destructive to Nature, and to all her fair Forms. But what the ancient Doctrine was concerning this Other Principle, and how it came to be corrupted, will fall under consideration properly in the Note next after This. Our Business, at present, is to proceed in considering *Mind*, as the *Cause* of the External World; in which, Bounds are set to Infinity; or, as Plato speaks in the Passage now before us, *the Infinite* and *Bound* are every where mixed together. — Already it has been shown, in the *Dissertation on the Doctrine of Heraclitus*, page 29 & seq: what crude Notions of *Mind* were conceived and brought forth in the earlier Ages of Philosophy. These Crudities, in travelling abroad, engendered many a false and impious Conceit of the Divine Nature, in the Brains of *Enthusiastic Poets*, in those also of the *Superstitious Vulgar*, and in those of *Priests* interested to encourage both Enthusiasm and Superstition. Little or no Ground was gained in the Knowledge of this *Divine Cause* of all things, MIND, until the time of *Socrates*, except by the *Pythagoreans*, and a Colony, which came out of Their Schools, the *Eleaticks*. — The former, in their Doctrine of the

Principles of Natural Things, taught,—that *Matter*, considered by its *Self*, was totally *void of Form*, and therefore *indefinable*; but that of every *Form* it was *susceptible*;—and that the *λόγοι*, the *Forms* or *Essences*, by which the several *Sorts of Things* are *defined*, considered by *Themselves*, as *separate from Matter*, were *eternal* and *immutable*. — They saw, that those *Forms*, the *Place* of which was *Matter*, stay but for a *time*, and pass away; and that, during their *Residence*, wherever they reside, they never cease *changing* or *varying*. *Eternity* therefore, and *Immutability*, not being found any where in *Corporeal Nature*, those *Philosophers* concluded, that the *Forms*, to which those *Attributes* belong, were only to be found in *Mind*. From the *Truth* of This *Conclusion*, thus established, the same just *Reasoners* argued to this *Other*, — that those *immutable* and *eternal* *Forms*, the *Mental*, were παραδείγματα *Exemplar-Patterns* of the *temporary* and *changeable* *Forms*, the *Corporeal*. Accordingly, they called these *Corporeal* *Forms* *ὁμοιώματα* and *εἰκόνας*, *Similitudes*, *Images*, or *Copys* of those *Originals*. And since it was necessary, for the denoting of *newly-discovered Things*, that either *new Names* should be assigned, or that *old Words* should be used in a *new Sense*, they appropriated to every one of those *λόγοι ἀσώματοι* *Incorporeal* *Forms*, those *Archetypes* of the *Corporeal* εἶδη, the *Term*, *Idea*. That Such were the *Reasonings*, *Sentiments*, and *Expressions* of the *Pythagoreans*, we refer for *Proof* to all the extant *Remains* of their *Physiological* *Treatises*; in particular, see *Ocellus Lucanus*, in *Gale's Opuscula Mytholog*: pag: 519, Edit: *Amst: Timæus Locrus*, in the same *Collection*, pag: 544; and *Archytas*, in *Stobæus's Eclogæ*, pag: 92, Edit: *Ant*: These *Ideas* then being discovered to have their *Seat*, or *Place*, no where but in the *Great Mind of the Universe*; and being found also to be the *Originals* of all *Nature's* *Forms*; it was justly concluded that *Matter*,

the Subject of all Formation, was *formed*, (or, as we commonly speak, the *World* was *created*,) according to these eternal *Ideas*, or Exemplar-Forms; and that *Mind* was εἶδος εἰδοποιεῖν, the *forming Form* of All things.—In prosecuting the Study of *Principles* and *Causes*, the *Eleaticks* conceived, that all these *Ideas*, or *Intelligible Forms*, are united in *One* most general *Idea*, *Mind*:—that this *Mind* is eternally united with *Matter*; and in consequence of this *Union*, continually imprints on *Matter* all such *Forms* as are comprehended in its *Self*:—that these *imprinted Forms* are the *Objects* of *Sense*; as those, the *archetypal*, are the *Objects* of *Mind*:—that the *Objects* of *Sense* are *variable*; those of *Mind*, *invariable*:—that *Sense* and *Mind*, with their respective *Objects*, the *variable* and the *invariable*, are connected together throughout the *Universe*, both in *the One* and in *the Many*:—that, tho in reality the *Universe* is but *One*, ἘΝ ᾧ ΟΝ, *Mind in Matter*, *immoveable* and *immutable*; and tho all the *Kinds* and *Species* of *Things* are as *stable* as their *Ideas*, and appear so to the *Eye of Mind*; yet to the *Eye of Sense*, since all *Things* are continually varying their *Appearances*, all *Things* seem to be in continual *Motion*, and to change *Places*, each with other; whereas they are only fitting *Shadows*; or a succession of *Images*, beheld in a *transient Glass*.—Thus arose the *Distinction* between κόσμος νοητὸς, the *Ideal* or *Intelligible World*, and κόσμος αἰσθητὸς, the *Sensible World*; (for which see *Note 94* to *the Banquet*;)—a *Distinction*, merely *logical*, and without any other *Difference*, than Such as there is between a *real Man*, and the *Likeness* of that *Man*, *painted* or *printed* upon a changeable-coloured *Silk*. And hence may easily be reconciled the seeming *Contrariety* of *Doctrine* between *Xenophanes* and *Parmenides*, respecting the *Infinity* of the *Universe*;—That also between *Parmenides* and his *Disciple* *Zeno*, respecting its *Mobility*;—and That between *Melissus* and *Himself*,

Himself, respecting the *Instability* and *Deſtruſtibility* of all things. — The two *former* Contrarietys are well known to the Learned; and for the *latter*, ſee Dr. *Davis*, in his *Notes on Cicero's Academicks*, pag: 218. — Before we proceed farther in this brief account of the Progreſs, anciently made, in the Firſt or Chief Philoſophy, the *Knowledge of the Principles and Cauſes of all Natural Things*, we ſhall preſume on the Reader's Indulgence for a few Words, in defence of the ancient Doctrin, concerning thoſe eternal and Mental Forms, termed by the *Pythagoreans*, who firſt reaſoned up to them, *Monads* and *Ideas*: tho we ſhould not have imagined a Defence of that Doctrin neceſſary for Any Perſons, who acknowlege *immutable* and *eternal Mind* to be the *Cauſe of Outward Nature*, were it not, that Many in modern Ages ſeem to think ſuch an Acknowledgement very compatible with a Suppoſition, that the World was created by the all-wiſe Author of it on a Plan *not eternal*, but contrived and executed *in Time*, for ſome unknown Purpoſes, *ex mero arbitrio*; — a Plan therefore, *changeable* at pleaſure, and *in Time* perhaps to be quite *abolished*. — But we deſire Thoſe, who entertain Opinions, ſo inconſiſtent with their profeſſed Belief concerning *Mind*, to conſider, that the Being of *Mind* inferrs the Being of *Ideas*, and that the Being of a *Mind eternal and immutable* inferrs the Being of *eternal and immutable Ideas*; — that on *Ideas* of the Mind every Plan or Deſign is built; — and that Such as are the *Ideas*, Such will always be the Plan. — The Nature alſo of *eternal Ideas*, conſidered as the Foundation of the Plan of Outward Nature, may be argued from the *Analogy*, which they bear to *Human Inventions*. — They are *Mental Forms* alike; and they are alike capable, *Each* ſingle Form of either Sort, of being multiplied, or becoming *Many*, in the *external Copys* of it: but in This reſpect they differ, in that *eternal Ideas*, being original Con-

ceptions of an *all-perfect Mind*, are, All of them, brought into Outward Light *continually*, thro the *continual Operations* of Nature; whilst *Human Inventions*, being conceived in the imperfect *Minds of Men*, Many of them perish in their *Embryo-State*. Since, however, Such of them, as come to Light, and for a Time remain, are the *Originals* of all the *Works of Art*, we perceive This Analogy between *Divine Ideas* and *Human Inventions*,—that the former are to the *Works of Nature*, what the latter are to the *Works of Art*, — namely, *Formal Causes*, *Exemplar-Forms*, and *Archetypes*. — Now, we are well aware, that Those Persons, who have been used to consider every *Species*, or Specific Form, as an *Abstract*, made by the Human Mind, from a Collection of similar Images in the Imagination, may object to this Analogy, that the very Foundation of it fails: for, tho it were granted, that some Sort of Similitude subsisted between the *Divine Mind* and the *Human*, or between the *Ideas* of the *One* and the *Ideas* of the *Other*; yet, that the *Works of Art* are made from *Images* modelled in *Men's Imaginations*, and thence generally copied first, and drawn on Paper; and that these Images are composed from *Parts* of many other *Images*, those of *Sensible Objects*, whether Natural or Artificial, treasured up in the *Memory*; but that the *Works of Nature*, planned by the *Divine Mind*, are not made after any previous Models or Images of them; for that pure Mind excludes Imagination, and is prior to all Sensible or Outward Objects. — To these Objectors we believe it sufficient to answer, that they are mistaken in That Part of their Objection, on which depends the validity of the Whole: for in the *Works of Art*, tho their *immediate Model*, or Exemplar to be followed, be delineated perhaps on Paper, perhaps only rough-drawn in the Imagination of the Workman, yet the Design originates in Mind; the *designing Mind* of some *Artist* forms the

the Image in his own Imagination first, and transfuses it thence into That of the Workman, (if a different Person,) by such Words or Draughts, as explain it to his *Understanding*. — Thus much for the present, concerning the *Divine Ideas*, comprehended, all of them, in *One*, — in the Divine Mind, considered as *Intelligible*, or the *Object* of his own Intelligence, and as the *Archetype* or *Formal Cause* of the *Sensible World*, and of all the Forms of Outward Nature. — And thus much indeed is at present necessary; because on the *Reality* of those *Ideas* will depend the Truth of what we have to say farther, in the prosecution of our Subject. — If then the ancient Doctrine, concerning the *Cause* of all Natural Things, be admitted to be true, so far as we have already proceeded in the History of that Doctrine, it appears, that, *before* the Time of *Socrates*, MIND and MATTER were discovered to be the TWO PRINCIPLES of all external Things; and that MIND alone was discovered to be their FORMAL CAUSE, as well as their EFFICIENT. — In this State stood Human Knowledge, with respect to the present Subject, the *Cause* of this Outward World, at the time when *Socrates* the *Athenian* made his Appearance in it, — a Man, whose Wisdom and Virtue were the greatest Honour to his Country, and the Manner of whose Death therefore was an indelible Reproach to it. — Thus we preface the following Summary of the Moral Doctrine of *Socrates*; because the well-tried *Integrity* of his whole Life seems to have been founded on the *Wisdom*, which to this Day shines in his Doctrine of the *Supream Mind*, as the *Fountain* of Wisdom and true Virtue. — Of *Socrates* then it is thus said by *Aristotle*, (who never was suspected of Partiality in favour of any prior Philosophers,) — δύο ἔστιν, ἃ τις ἀν ἀποδῶη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τέστ' ἐπακτικὸς λόγος, καὶ τὸ ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου. ταῦτα γὰρ ἔστιν ἄμφω περὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης. — Ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης λέγω νῦν. “ *There are*

Two

Two Things, (meaning either *Two Discoverys* in the Science of Mind, or *Two Improvements* in the Manner of teaching that Science,) *which may justly be attributed to Socrates*, viz. *Reasoning by Induction*, and *to define things from Universals*: (that is, in giving a Definition of any thing, to ascend to That Universal, which the Thing to be defined partakes of:) *now Both of these* (Discoverys, or Improvements,) *regard the Principle of Science.*—By the Principle of Science, I mean MIND.—*Aristot: Metaphys: L. 11. C. 4. secundum Du Vall: & Poster: Analytic: L. 1. C. 33.* — What immediate reference Both of those Discoverys or Improvements, made by Socrates, have to Mind or Intellect, may be thus shown.—As to the First; *to reason by Induction*, is to conclude the Being or Truth of some Universal, some comprehensive One, from all its Particulars which are Many: such Reasoning therefore brings us directly up to MIND, by whose Eye alone can be seen *One in Many*, And as to the Other; Every right Definition, in ascending to That which is *more General* than the Thing defined, brings us One Step nearer to the *Highest Genus* of Things, the *most Universal*, the most comprehensive One, that is, UNIVERSAL MIND. Such Definition also sets together a *Sameness* and a *Difference*,—the *Sameness* of some Genus in all its Species, or Kinds *subordinate*,—and the *Difference* of the Thing defined from all *collateral* Kinds or Species:—the *Sameness* and the *Difference* are thus exhibited together to the Mind or Intellect, which alone can behold them *Both in One View*.—In this manner, and by these few and easy Steps, did Socrates lead his Followers to those *Prime Ideas* of Mind, reaching to all things,—and comprehending all things,—*One in Many*, and *Sameness amid Difference*:—from whence it was obvious to draw these Conclusions, that *Unity and Number*, *Sameness and Difference*, were the *First Universals*, were of the *Essence of Mind*, and, (as it were) *Mental Principles*;

Principles; and that, in viewing These, the *Mind* views her *Self*. See Note 82 to *the Meno*. In this way of thinking, *Socrates* perhaps was helped and forwarded by the Conversation, which in his early Youth he had with *Parmenides* and *Zeno*. But of himself he seems to have applied these Principles to other Things *the most Universal*, τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα, (next after the Principles themselves;) being Universal,—not as every *Genus* is, with regard only to its own *Species*, nor as every *Species* is, with regard only to its own *Individuals*,—but *absolutely*, and without any *restriction*, Universal. — The most obvious and striking of these is *Beauty*: and This he saw was spread over the Face of *All things*, (beheld in One View,) the whole Countenance of Nature; he saw it investing every *Kind* and *Species* of Things, (taken singly,) the several Features of that lovely Face; he saw it accompanying *Form* in all its Journeys from one Portion of Matter to another, and attendant on all its Changes and Variety of Appearances: and he considered, that *Sameness* in *Forms* is *Uniformity*; that *Difference* in *Forms* is *Variety*; and that *Uniformity* amidst *bounded Variety* is the Essence of *Beauty*. — Not less *universal* than *Beauty*, appeared to Him the *Constituents* of it, — *Harmony*, or the mutual Fitness and Correspondence of *Parts* in any *Whole*, — *Symmetry*, or the Mensurability of those *Parts* by *one* common *Measure*, — and *Mediocrity*, or a just *Temperament* in any Mixture of different Ingredients. For in the Frame of every distinct Being in Nature, as well as in the complex System of the Universe, he found *Harmony* and *Symmetry* combining all the *Solid* Parts, and *Mediocrity* running thro all the *Fluids*. And having learnt the Science of Geometry from *Theodorus*, he knew, that *Harmony*, *Symmetry*, and *Mediocrity*, are all measured by *Proportion*; — that *Proportion* is either between Things the *same* in *Kind*, but *different* in *Magnitude* or in *Multitude*, or else between

tween *many Parts* of *one Whole*; — that all Proportions are measured by *Numbers*; — and that every Number consists of *many Units* conjoined, or rather *united*. — The penetrating Genius of *Socrates* seems also then to have discovered, that those *Universals*, *Harmony*, *Symmetry*, and *Mediocrity*, are the immediate *Efficients* of *Good*, no less than they are of *Beauty*; seeing that *Inanimate Beings* owe to Them the *Coherence* of their *Parts*, and the *Soundness* and *Permanency* of their several *Frames*; — that *Vegetables* maintain their *flourishing Estate*, and the *Duration* of their *Forms*, only so long as those *Causes of Union* continue with them; — that all the *Pleasures of Sense*, which *Sensitive Beings* feel from external *Things*, (such as are *adapted* to their *Senses*, and *commensurate* with their *Organs of Sensation*,) they are indebted for to those *Principles* in *Nature*, which *connect* them with external *Things*; — that *Beings*, who partake of *Mind*, derive the serene *Pleasures*, enjoyed in contemplating the *Truths* of any *Science*, from the natural *Correspondence* and *Harmony* between the *Mind* and *Truth*; — that those *Sciences* only, which the *Capacity* of a *Man's Understanding* is *adequate to*, and as it were *commensurate with*, are to Him delightful in learning and acquiring, or in recollecting and reviewing the *Theorems* which they contain; — and that in exercising his rational *Facultys*, whether on the *Subjects* of *Science* or on those of *Art*, however natural and agreeable to all *Mind* such *Exercise* may be, yet for *Human Minds* no more *Exercise* than what is *moderate*, and *sufficient* to maintain their *Strength*, is beneficial; and that all, beyond the just *Measure*, is pernicious, is a weakening and a wearing of them out. — In contemplating *Mind*, the *Seat* of *Science*, *Socrates* discovered *another Universal*, — a *Universal*, of all the most *Divine*; — he discovered the *Being* of *Truth*. He perceived, that all the mutual *Relations* between the *Ideas* of *Mind* partake of this

Universal Being; these *Relations* being indeed no other Things than *Particular Truths*, the Truths of each respective Science. He perceived that Each *Idea* in the Mind, taken by its Self, lyes single and apart from all the rest;—that the most *obvious* and *simple* Truths are the *Relations* of these *single Ideas*, one to another;—that Truths more *remote*, more *general* and *comprehensive*, are more *extended Relations* between those Ideas;—and that, as *all Ideas* are *comprehended* in that most general one, *Universal Mind*; (of whose *eternal Being* Each of them partakes;) so, *all the Relations* between them, that is, *all Truths*, are comprehended in *Universal Truth*; which imparts its own *stable Eternity* to every *Particular Truth*. He perceived, that not only by their own Nature they are linked together, (Each of them drawn on by some Other, and drawing after it many More,) but farther, that in *Truth its Self* they are, all of them, *united*.—Thus the philosophic Genius of *Socrates* conducted his Speculations and his Reasonings to that sublime Place within the Soul, which *Plato* terms *νοητός*, *intelligible*, as being the Place of pure *Ideas*;—a Place, enlightened by the *Principles* of Science, *One and Many*, *Same and Different*;—Principles, which throw *Light* on all the *Objects* of Mind, to make them *visible* to the Mind's Eye, and at the same time, pour *Light* into that *Eye*, to see those *Objects*.—In this Place, and by this Light, *Socrates* discovered, that those Universals, *Good*, *Truth*, and *Beauty*, were *essential*, all of them, to *Mind*; or rather, that Each of them was the *Energy* of Mind, and therefore the Same Thing with *Mind*, whose very *Essence* is *Energy*;—that the Difference between these *Energys* lay meerly in the Difference between the *acts* or *Subjects* of the Mind's *Energy*;—that *Truth* was the *Energy* of Mind, considered *abstractedly* from Matter, and energising on its own *Ideas within its Self*; and that *Beauty* and *Good* were the *Energys* of Mind *within*

Matter, — *Beauty*, pouring its Self over and throughout the Forms, which the Mind, as their *Efficient Cause*, creates, — and *Good*, pouring its self into and throughout those Forms, as the *Cause*, or *End*, for which they were created.—He perceived accordingly, that the *Principles of Mind*, which are *One and Many*, *Same and Different*, were the *Principles* of those *Universals*, *Harmony*, *Symmetry*, and *Mediocrity*, those *Constituents of Truth*, of *Beauty*, and of *Good*. For he perceived, that Every Kind of *Harmony* was like That Kind of it, the *Subject* of which is *Sound*, — a Kind, called *Symphony*, — produced, as *Nicomachus* says in his *Enchirid: Harmonic: pag: 25*, when Sounds of different Magnitudes, or Tones, are so mingled together, as to generate a Sound *ἑνοειδῆ*, *uniform*, καὶ εἶον μίαν, and as it were *One*. (See a Passage of the same Tenour, in *Gaudentius*, pag: 110.) He perceived, that *Symmetry* was produced, when *many* Things, of the *same* Kind, but specifically *different*, are measured by *one* common Measure. And he also perceived, that *Mediocrity*, in any Attribute of any Substantial Being, is a *definite* and *certain* (always *one* and the *same*) *Degree* of such Attribute, in the midst of *many* Degrees of it, *infinitely* various and *uncertain*; and that on these *Excesses* and *Defects* the very Being of *Mediocrity* depends. In this divinely intelligent Part of the Soul he then discerned, that *Mind*, in governing *Matter*, was *Mediocrity*, or *Measure*, the *Cause of Good*; and that *Matter*, escaped for a while from the Government of *Mind*, was the *Cause* of infinite *Evil*.—But the same Godlike Genius, which had thus raised *Socrates* to a View of Things Universal and *Divine*, conducted him down again to *Human* Subjects. His Mental Eye being then filled with Light, from that original Light, *the Principles of Reason and of Science*, he applied these Principles to the Sciences of *Morals* and *Politics*; or rather, by establishing Moral and Political Truths

on their only firm *Basis*, the *Being* and *Nature* of the *Human Mind*, he united, and formed into *Sciences*, what before lay single and scattered, being but *Right Opinions*.—He perceived, that the *Constituents* of *Private Moral Virtue* are these which follow;—in the *Mind*, (the governing Part of the Soul by nature,) *Prudence*, founded on *Wisdom*, the Knowledge of Moral Right and Wrong;—in the *Affections* of the Soul, *Symmetry*; the *Human Nature*, considered as *Social*, in the various Relations of Human Life, being the true *Measure* of them all;—in the *Passions* of the Soul, (such as are implanted in every Animal, for the avoiding or the opposing of whatever is noxious to it, and such also as impel it to the Pursuit of what is any way needful or beneficial to it,) *Mediocrity*, or a just *Degree* of each Passion, *proportioned* to the others; the proper *Office* of Each being assigned, and the due *Bounds* of Each being fixed, by the *Ends of Nature*, the Preservation and the Well-being of the Individual, and the Continuation of the Species;—in the *whole* Soul, *Harmony*; whilst all the Parts of it, Rational and Irrational, rightly discharge their proper Functions, striking upon the *Nerves*, and uttering the *Voice*, in *Consonance* and *Symphony*, one Part of the Soul with another.—Homogeneous and corresponding with this *Personal* or *Private* Virtue, which is the Excellence of every Human Being, appeared the Virtue of a *Kingdom* or *Common Wealth*. For he perceived This also to consist of *Wisdom* in the *Law*, which is the *Mind* as it were of the whole *Body* of the People; and *Prudence*, joined with *Vigour*, in the *Execution* of that Law;—in every *Member* of the *Community*, an *Attachment* to that *Law* which is *Common* to them all, and to that *Constitution* by which they are all united;—in the *People*, a *Reverence* for the Administrators of Justice according to the Law; and a Respect, full of Gratitude, to the faithful Guardians of the Constitu-

tion; — in the *Deliberative* Part of the State, *Courage*, mixed with *Caution*, to guard against Evil; and in the *Military* Part, *Valour* to encounter Danger, and *Magnanimity* to endure Toils: — in *Every one* of the *People*, an assiduous *application* of his *Facultys*, Mental and Corporeal, to some particular *Employ*, conducive to the Well-being of All; and a just *attention* to the *Gain*, arising from that *Employ*, to Himself in the first place, for his own and his Family's Maintenance and Profit, but ultimately redounding to the Support of the Government, the Magistracy, the Military, and whatever Orders of Men beside are deemed necessary to support the whole Fabrick of the State. — With this *Public Virtue*, Socrates perceived the *Virtue* of a private *Family* to be essentially the Same. For he considered a single *Family*, with a *Father and Master* at the Head of it, as a petty *Kingdom*; and a *Civil State*, as a more extensive and widely spread *Family*. The *Virtue* of Each of them was, he saw, constructed on the *same Principles* with the *Virtue* of the Other: and the several *Parts* and Members of the *one*, with the distinct *Offices* of each of those *Parts*, were, he saw, *analogous* to the *Parts*, and their *Offices*, in the *other*. — He understood *Political Union* to be as *natural* to Human Kind as the *Conjugal*: for he perceived, that, however sufficient the *Parental Tye* might be, to relieve their *earliest* Wants; and the *Conjugal Tye*, those of their *riper* Years; — Tyes, created by *Natural Affection*, and by the *Natural Passion* between the Two Sexes; — yet the *Continuance* of these Tyes, or, at least, of their natural Effects, is *secure* only in *Civil Society*; and that only *there* is to be found a Supply of those numerous Wants, arising afterwards from an Increase of Family; and only *there* to be met with is a Gratification of other *Social Affections*, and of other *Selfish Desires*, not less *natural* than the former, tho less violent by nature, — those which arise when the Rational Faculty

is.

is grown more mature, and the Understanding becomes enlarged. — He considered, that, as the *Domestic* State and the *Political* are alike founded on Human *Indigence*, — on the Insufficiency of the several Members of Either, separately and singly to supply their own Wants, — so are they alike also formed by *Compact*, either expressed, or tacitly implied, — a Compact, which creates an *Obligation*, enforcing on them the Calls of *Nature*, and the Counsels of *Reason*, to continue in a State of *Union*, thro *Harmony* and *Concord*. — He considered, that, in the *Marriage-Contract*, either the Conditions of it are expressed formally in Words before Witnesses; or the Defect of such Form is supplied by mutual Confidence according to the Law of Nature; or some other Form is authorized by the Law of Custom, which adapts the Law of Nature to the peculiar Circumstances of each Country:—that, in a *Compact* between the *Master* of a Family and his *Domesticks*, the Conditions of it are wont to be made in express Terms, where the *Domesticks* serve for *Hire*,—but are implied in the *Nature* and *Reason* of Oeconomical Relation, (the *End* of which is the *Good* of all the Partys,) where the *Domesticks* are *born* in *Servitude*:—that the Terms of Agreement between many Heads of Families, to unite together in *Civil Society*, and to be subject to One Person or to More amongst them, are expressed in the Laws, made by Themselves, for the Maintenance of their Union:—that the Conditions also of *Civil Government* and *Subjection* are usually expressed in *Elective Kingdoms*, and wherever *the People* chuse their own *Magistrates*; and that the same Conditions are tacitly understood, from the *Nature* and *Reason* of Civil Government, in *Kingdoms* and Aristocracys *Hereditary*. — He saw, that in all these Cases, the *common Weal*, or Good of the whole State, whether Civil or Domestic, is the *End* intended; and that a faithful Discharge of their pro-

per Dutys, by all the Members of either State, the several Partys to the Contract, is the only Way leading to that End.—Thus it appeared to *Socrates*, that all *Combinations* in the *Moral* World, as well as in the *Natural*, were maintained only by *Union*, or by *Agreement*,—by the *Union* of many Parts in some Whole, or by the *Agreement* of Things, the single Powers of which were *different*:—he was sensible, that such Union or Agreement, between any *rational and social* Beings, could be maintained only by *Universal Justice*, that is, by thorow *Honesty* and *Goodness*;—and as he knew, that every Thing is supported only by the continuing Efficacy of the same Causes which produced it, he conceived, that the *Great Mind of Nature*, being full of Truth, Equity and Goodness, was the *Fountain* of every such Union or Agreement,—the combining and uniting *Cause*,—without the *continual Influence* of which, no rational or moral Society can subsist.—And it seems, that in this way, he discovered *Universal Justice* to be the *Law* of all rational and social Beings; by faithful Obedience to which *Law*, they continue to be what they are, that is, *Rational* and *Social*; and by Rebellion against which *Law*, they forfeit That their *Essential Form* or Nature. He discovered, that every Being, which *partakes of Mind*, and consequently is *Rational*, is at the same time *Social*:—that whatever Soul loseth her *Sociability*, at the same time loseth her *Rationality*, or Capacity of Reason, her *Mental Principles*, or, as our great Poet very *platonically* expresses it,

The Divine Property of her First Being :

—and that every *Act of Injustice*, and even every *Neglect* of any *Social Duty*, is a Step toward that total Loss. — He concluded therefore rightly, that every Being, which partakes of MIND, is, thro such Participation, subject by its nature to that Law of *Universal Justice*, for the same reason, that a *Child* is by nature

nature subject to the *Will* of an Affectionate *Parent*, namely, for its own Good: for he apprehended That *Law* to be the *Will* of the great *Parental Mind*, or, to speak more accurately, to be That very *MIND*, considered as governing the Moral World, and imparting to all those Beings, whom he forms for Rational Society, (by enduing them with Reason and a Social Disposition,) the *Principles* of *Moral Rectitude, Equity, and Goodness*: for these Principles are indeed none other, than the Principles of *Mind* and *Reason*, applied to all the several Relations in *Social Life*.——When *Socrates* had arrived at a full Discovery of this *Cause of Good* to all Beings, who are at the same time Rational and Social, — this *Beauty* of the Moral World, — this *Fountain* of all *Moral Virtue* and Excellence, — (and to *Socrates* justly, as it seems, may be attributed so full a Discovery, thro his Knowledge of the *Principles of Mind*;) from that time to the End of his Life, he made it his sole Business to discourse concerning *Morals* and *Politicks*, *fundamentally* and *universally*; reasoning to the *Principles* of those Sciences by Dialectic Questions and Inquiries: for this was the Method which he took, in teaching them to his Disciples: in this way he produced, out of Men's own Mouths, their *natural Notions*, and the *First Principles*, common to them All, on these Subjects: and in this way he convinced of Error many Persons, who had been seduced by Sophistry to depart from the *Principles of Reason* and *Nature*. The *Philebus* of *Plato*, now before us, exhibits to our View *Socrates* conversing with some of these Persons; rescuing them from the Errors into which they had been drawn, concerning the *Chief Good* of Man; and, from their natural Pre-conceptions, reasoning them into the Truth on this Subject. Not till toward the *Conclusion* of the Dialogue, ought therefore the Reader to expect a Proof of what, to gratify his Curiosity, we have in this Note anticipated,

P R O T A R C H U S.

Will you not want a Fifth Sort too ¹⁶⁸, for a Cause of Difunion and Separation?

S O C R A T E S.

pated, — namely, the Discovery, made by *Socrates*, that the same *Divine Being*, who is the *Cause* of *Outward Nature*, that is, of the *Commixture* of *Form* and *Matter* in the Corporeal World,—He, who is at once the *Designer*, the *Forming Form*, and the *Beginning*, or *Active Principle*,—is also the *End*, or *Final Cause* of all things; his *Meaning*, or *Design*, being *Universal Good*: — that consequently his *Mind*, that is, *He Himself*, is *Goodness its Self*,—That, by which he is eternally *happy within Himself*; and That, by which He is the *Sovereign Good* of all Such Beings, as, having a *rational* and *social* Nature given them, are capable of participating in that *Supreme Felicity*.

¹⁶⁸ 'Twas observed in Note 167, that prior to *Socrates*, other Philosophers had established the Doctrine of *Two Principles* of all things, *Mind* and *Matter*. *Protarchus*, in his present Question, evidently alludes to the *latter* of these Two, in a genteel and facetious way, between Jest and Earnest; doubting perhaps, whether this Principle ought to be numbered amongst the different εἶδη τῶν ὄντων *Sorts of Things* or Beings, as One of them; or whether, by its Self, it had no true or real Essence at all; for since it was defined by *Negative* Words, such as ἀνείδεος *without Form*, ἀμορφος *shapeless*, ἀχρημάτιστος *void of Figure*, &c. it seemed to imply a *Negation* of every *Kind* and *Species* of Being. 'Tis evident, we say, that *Matter* is here meant: for *Protarchus* speaks of a *Contrary* to the *Fourth* Sort of Being, a *Contrary* to *Mind*, which is the *Active Principle* in the

the Universe, the *Plenitude of Mental Forms*, the *Creator* of all *Forms Corporeal*, and the *Cause of Good* to All things. — Now the direct Contrary to *Active* is *Passive*; and meerly Such is *Matter*, as it possesses no *Quality* whatever, except that of being *Passive*, in receiving any Sort of Form.—Again; the direct Contrary to *Plenitude* of Forms is thorow *Indigence* of all Form; and in this Condition nothing is beside meer *Matter*. Farther; the direct Contrary to the *Creator* of all Corporeal Forms is the *Destroyer* of them all; and This only *Matter* is, thro its utter Impotence, and Inability to retain any Form impressed on it: for, tho it be the *Seat* of All external Forms by turns, 'tis a Seat for ever *sinking* under every One of them.—Again; the direct Contrary to the *Cause of Good* is the *Cause of Evil*; and this can be none other than *Matter*: for in the *Intelligible* or *Mental* World,—the World of *pure Forms*, unmixed with *Matter*, and exempt from *Body*,—all the Forms, and all the Connections or Relations between them, are eternally *true, good* and *perfect*; and no Form, partaking of these Attributes, can ever be the *Cause of Evil*: — on the other hand, in the *Sensible* or *Corporeal* World, every Individual Thing consists of some *Particular Form*, and of some *Portion of Matter*: and every One of these *Particular Forms* partakes of *Good only*: for it is an *Image*, however imperfect, of some *eternally true* Form, in which there is *no Evil* nor *Imperfection*; and it is produced by *Nature*, whose *Mind* is *Goodness its Self*; in as much as the *Whole* of this World of Outward Forms is the Image of that *all-perfect Mind*; and every Production of Outward Nature, an Effect of the Energy and Operation of that *all-perfect Goodness*. — Seeing then, that no Forms, nor any Combination of Forms, whether they be *original* or *copied*, can *cause Evil*, we must conclude, that the sole *Cause of Evil* is either *Matter*, in its Self void of Form; or, at least, some *Portion* of this formless Matter. — But Matter is not *divided*

into *Parts* or *Portions*, until it be *formed*.—It remains therefore past a Doubt, that *Infinite Matter* is to be considered, as the sole *Cause of Evil* to all Corporeal Beings.—Accordingly, it brings *Death* to all Such as are *Vital*, thro its *Contrariety* to all *Life*, and to all *Form*. For, by breaking the *Continuity* of those *Parts* of every *Vital Being*, thro which the *Life* circulates, it stops that *Circulation*, by which the *Life* is carried on throughout the *Frame*; and, by breaking the *Connections* between all the *Parts* of that *Frame*, it brings the *Form*, the *Being* itself, to *Dissolution*.—To all such Corporeal Beings, as are *Sentient* as well as *Vital*, it brings *Pain*, thro preternatural Distensions, Strictures, Wounds, and other Evils, incident to the Corporeal *Organs of Sensation*, and caused by extraneous *Bodys*, whose outward *Invasion* or inward *Intrusion* is unfriendly and noxious. But, if any Corporeal *Form* were *perfect*, and could, as long as it lasted, be kept *intire* and *sound*, it would feel no *Pain* from the *Stroke* or *Pressure* of any other *Bodys*, beyond the *instant* Time of such *Stroke* or *Pressure*. And *Body* can suffer no *Pain* except from *Body*, and only by means of the *Material Principle*, which is *common* to all *Bodys* whatever.—Nor is *Matter* less mischievous to *Reason* and *Intelligence*, in all those Corporeal Beings, to whose *Vital* and *Sentient* *Form*, or *Essence*, *Mind* is superadded. For by the Predominance of the *Material Principle* in their *Bodys*, their *Rational Facultys* are *weakened*, or their *Use* of them is *impeded*; 'tis That, which throws a *Cloud* over their *Understandings*, and *obstructs* the *Light of Divine Reason* within them; and hence the *Passions*, having their *Origin* from the *Body*, and their *Seat* in the *Irrational Part* of the *Soul*, gain the *Ascendant* over the *Rational Part*, suppress the *connatural Principles* of true *Virtue*, (the same with the *Principles of Mind*;) and lead the *Will* blindfold into all *Moral Evil*.—Such and so great being the *Mischiefs*, occasioned by the *Mixture of Matter* in all

Corporcal Forms, even in Those to whom *Mind* is imparted, we cannot wonder, if the Ignorant, who are always prone to Superstitious Fears, when they heard, that all these Evils were by the Wise and Learned ascribed to *Matter*, imagined a *malevolent Mind* within it, powerful to *hurt* and to *destroy*; in opposition to the *benevolent Mind* of the *Author of all Good*, whose Power was always exerted either to *blefs* or to *save*. When they heard it also said, that *Matter* was *without Form* or *Beauty*, they supposed it to be a *monstrous Being*, *deformed* and *ugly*. Indulging their Fancy farther, they imagined a Multitude of Particular Beings, *mis-shapen Portions of Matter*; inspired, all of them, with *Malice* by that *Evil Spirit*, which reigned in formless *Matter*; and actively contending against a Multitude of *beautiful* and *good* Beings, *Some* of whom they supposed to be the invisible *Protectors* of whole *Nations*, — Others, of inferior Sort, the *Patrons* of private *Familys*, — and Those of the lowest Order, the *Guardians* of Individual *Persons*. — These Opinions were favoured by crafty Men, of whose Authority and Dominion it was the Interest, to cultivate *Superstition*, and to draw the Minds of the People away from the *Religion of Reason* — the rational and sentimental Worship of One Supreme Mind, who is the sole Giver of all good Things, — to the Worship of Many fancied Deitys; whose respective Priests alone were supposed to know, What Kind of Worship was the most pleasing to Those, in whose Temples they severally served. — Agreeable to this Account of the Origin of *Dæmon-Worship* from Philosophical Truths mis-understood, and perhaps purposely mis-represented, are the Records of ancient History: for we learn from These, that a Belief of Good and Evil Dæmons, interfering in Human Affairs, prevailed most in Countrys, anciently the most celebrated for Knowledge philosophical and political; but in which Countrys One Set of

L 1 2

Men,

SOCRATES.

Perhaps I may; but not, I believe, at present. However, should there be occasion for it, you will pardon me, if I go in pursuit of some Fifth Sort of Being ¹⁶⁹.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

Men, from Generation to Generation, confined all That Knowledge to Themselves and their own Familys; being, by Hereditary Succession, and a peculiar Education which was denied to all Others, their only *Priests, Statesmen, and Philosophers*. Thus, in all probability, did the ancient Doctrine concerning the *Two Principles* of All things, — One the *Cause* of all Good, — the Other, of all Evil, — degenerate into *Dæmonism*, mixed, in some Countries, with *Polytheism*, in others, with *Theism* itself: and thus did even the purest, simplest, and easiest Religion, by Nature dictated to all Rational Beings, become corrupted, bedawbed, and loaded, with numberless and gross Superstitions.

¹⁶⁹ Altho the main Subject of Inquiry, in *the Philebus*, we acknowledge to be This, — What *Kind of Life* is the happiest for Man,—yet we must observe, that the Subject immediately before us, in *this Part* of the Dialogue, regards not the *Kinds of Human Life*, but the *Kinds of Being* in the *Universe*. It is surprising, therefore, that, in all the Editions of the Greek Original, we here read *πέμπτον βιον*, a *Fifth Life*; and that None of the Translators of it into other Languages appear to have suspected of Falsity a Reading, so foreign to the

Purpose, and so absurd. What makes it the more absurd, is, that only *Three Kinds of Life* are taken notice of any where in the Dialogue, — namely, a Life of *Pleasure*, a Life of *Speculation*, (the Object of which is the *Knowledge of Truth*,) and a Life of *Prætic Virtue*. Indeed only these Three Things, *Pleasure*, *Knowledge*, and *Virtue*, are loved and pursued by any Man, purely for their own sakes, as *Ends*, or *ultimate Objects* of his Desire. For all other Things, which many Men seem to be wholly intent on the attainment of, they consider but as *Ways* and *Means* to something else, which they cannot otherwise obtain. Now this Dialogue hath for its *Subject*, not the *Means* of being Happy, but the *End*, *Happiness* its Self: and the *Object*, which it hath in view, is to show, that this End can never be obtained, either in a Life of *Speculation*, or in a Life of *Pleasure*; and only in a Life of *Virtue*. For this reason *Plato*, in his *Philebus*, takes no notice of *Two* other General Kinds of Life, totally different from any of the *Three*, scrutinised in this Dialogue; notwithstanding that they engross the whole Attention, Time, and Cares, of far greater Numbers of Men, than doth the *Pleasurable* Life, the *Speculative*, or the *Virtuous*: on which account, they are by *Aristotle* of old, and in our own days by *Mr. Harris*, very properly ranked amongst those different *Great Roads* of Life, along one or other of which all Men travel:—by these *Two Other* Lives, we mean the *Lucrative* and the *Political*.—As to Men, who lead a *Lucrative* Life, that is, the Bulk of Mankind, they are generally bred to it by their Parents, or their particular Guardians, or by that General Guardian of all the People, the Government in each Civil State: and they are so bred, for the Purpose of procuring them a comfortable *Subsistence*, either by means of their *Manual* or *Bodily Labour*, or by their exercising of *Arts* beneficial to the Publick: Those also of riper Years, who commence

commence in any of the *Lucrative* Ways of Life, are led to it generally by the same Motive. When Any of these Persons, whose ordinary Views are confined to an acquiring of the Necessaries and Conveniencys of Life, think of enjoying *Happiness*, (and such a Thought must sometimes occur to the Mind of every Thinking Being,) they commonly extend their Views and Hopes beyond this *Earth* and the *present Life*, to an *Hereafter* in some *better Place*. The Utmost, which they usually hope for *here*, is *Rest* from Labour and from Cares in their Old Age. We except, however, a Few Persons, who, after they have acquired a competent Provision for the Remainder of their Lives, *continue* their Labour, (if it be not toilsome,) from *Habit*, or from *not knowing* how to employ their Time otherwise; but neither *Habit* nor *Ignorance* is a *Rational Motive*: and Some, who continue in the same Way of Life, thro *Avarice*; but this Motive is *irrational*: Some also, because they suppose it conducive to their *Health*, as a proper and accustomed *Exercise* of the Body; but no Man proposes such *Exercise*, or even *Health*, as his *ultimate End*: and Some, we doubt not but there are, who proceed in a *Lucrative Way* of Life, to acquire the Means of benefiting Others; but this End belongs only to the *Good Man*, and to the *Life of Virtue*. Besides these, we except a Few Persons more, who continue in the Practice of *Arts*, which they are Masters of, meerly from their *Love* of those Arts, and the *Delight* they feel in the Practice; — if indeed such Persons, having no Lucre in their View, can be deemed Exceptions, and are not rather to be ranked between the Lovers of *Speculation*, and the Lovers of those *Pleasures*, which *Plato* in the last Part of this Dialogue denominates *pure Pleasures*, *unmixed with Pain*; and which, he says in his *Gorgias* and *Greater Hippias*, are *innocent*, and *good*, and attendant on a Sense of *Harmony* and *Beauty*. Of these
Persons

Persons it may be farther observed, that, as the natural Dispositions of their Souls are generally found to be the very same, which *Plato* in the Sixth Book of his *Republick* deems requisite to the Study of Philosophy, namely, the *docile* and the *retentive*, the *magnanimous* and the *generous*, and above all other things *loving Truth*, the Parent, and nearest of Kin to *Harmony*, *Symmetry*, and *Beauty*,—so they generally lead a Life, the nearest to the truly *philosophical*, or completely *Wise* and *Virtuous* Life,—a Life of *Honesty* and *Goodness*.—Neither is the *Political* Life chosen for its own sake, more than is the *Lucrative*. For most of the Persons, whom we see in the *lower* and *middle* Stations of it, have undertaken the Offices, belonging to those Stations, meerly with a View to *Gain*. These are therefore to be numbered amongst Such, as live a *Lucrative* Life. And Those who occupy, or who aim at occupying, the *higher* Posts and Offices of State, generally have in View, as their immediate End, *Honour*, that is, the *Reputation* of Wisdom and Virtue. This Reputation they take *Delight* in, because, as *Aristotle* observes with his usual Acuteness, it persuades them, that 'tis their Due, and that they really possess the Wisdom and the Virtue ascribed to them;—a *Delight*, which, as the same great Genius finely remarks, argues an inward Sense and Acknowledgement, that Wisdom and Virtue are the Best Things; and that a Life, according to them, is the Best Life.—Beside the Motives of *Profit* and of *Honour*, by the one or the other of which Those who live a *Political* Life are usually actuated, a Few we believe there are, who engage in it purely from Motives of *Virtue*;—with a View to bless or to benefit the Publick;—to rescue the State from bad Management;—to free their Country from domestic Tyrants;—or to save it from foreign Foes:—but such Undertakings and Employments are so far from constituting a *Kind* of Life *different* from That which is *Virtuous*, that they are the noblest Efforts and

SOCRATES.

Of these Four Sorts then, in the first place, dividing ¹⁷⁰ the former Three ¹⁷¹, and perceiving, that
Two

and Exercises of a truly *Heroic Virtue*.—Seeing then, that no Man chuses either of these *Two* Kinds of Life, the *Lucrative* or the *Political*, for its own sake, or without some farther End in View; — seeing, that the other *Three* Kinds of Life, the *Pleasurable*, the *Speculative*, and the *Virtuous*, are Those only, which are embraced by any Man, with Expectations of finding his Happiness therein; and are Those only, which the present Dialogue treats of, or so much as mentions; — seeing also, that every Life, led by Man, is included in one or other of these *Five Kinds*; we presume, that, notwithstanding they happen to be just *Five* in Number, every Intelligent and Learned Reader will agree with Us, to reject the Reading of *πέμπλον βιον* in the Greek of this Passage; and instead of it, to read *πέμπλον τι ὄν* conformable to which, we have made our Translation.

¹⁷⁰ In the *Greek*, — *διελόντες*. But *Ficinus* here translates, as if in the Manuscript, from which he made his Translation, he read *ἐξελόντες*. that is, *taking out*, or *selecting*: Mons'. *Grou* has given the same Sense to it, in his French Translation. The Sentence is indeed thus made easier and plainer, at first View. But we have thought it best to adhere to the Reading, printed in all the Editions of Plato; because it gives a Sense, more agreeable to what follows, than the other Reading does; and much more agreeable to the Design of this Passage; which leads to show, What Things they are, which are capable of a *Division*; and This, chiefly with a View to the *infinite Diversitys*

Two of these, when Both are divided, and their Divisions separated, are, Each of them, Many ¹⁷²;— then, gathering together the Many of Each, and uniting them again, let us endeavour to understand, in what manner Each of them is, at the same time, One and Many.

PROTARCHUS.

Would you but express your Meaning more plainly, I might perhaps apprehend it.

Diversities of Pleasure, as to their Kinds, as well as to their Degrees, — in opposition to That, which is simply One, and indivisible.

¹⁷¹ We acknowledge to have no authority from the *Greek*, where we read only τὰ τρία, *the Three*, for inserting between them, the word *former*: but 'tis added, to lessen the Obscurity of this Passage, at the first Entrance. — The *Three* Sorts of Being, mentioned *together* before the *Fourth*, (which was then pretended to have been forgotten,) are here again spoken of *together*: because Each of those *Three* is divisible into *Many*; and what is to follow, relates only to Things which are thus *divisible*: the *Fourth* therefore, which is *Mind*, the *Cause* of All things, is here omitted; because *Mind its Self*, in the *Simplicity* and *Sameness* of its own eternal Essence, considered apart from *Matter*, is *One only*, and not divisible into *Many*.

¹⁷² The insertion of the word *eis* before πολλά, proposed by *Stephens*, seems not so necessary as the learned Printer thought it.

SOCRATES.

I mean then, by the Two, which I propose to be now considered, the Same which I mentioned at the first,—One of them, the Infinite,—and the Other, the Finite.—That the Infinite is, in some manner, Many, I will attempt to show: and let the Finite wait a while.

PROTARCHUS.

It shall.

SOCRATES.

Give me now your attention. It is, I confess, a difficult and doubtful Thing, That, which I would have you to consider. Consider it, however. First, with regard to Hotter and ¹⁷³ Colder, in things, see
if

¹⁷³ The Instances, here brought, the *Hotter* and the *Colder*, sufficiently distinguish the *Infinite*, now spoken of, from that infinite and formless *Matter*, by *Protarchus* called a *Fifth Sort* of Being. For to this *latter* belong no *Qualities* whatever, no *Powers*; and only a bare *Capacity* of receiving Figure and Form, with their attendant *Qualities* and *Powers*: whereas the present Instances are taken from the *Primary Qualities* of *Body*, that is of *Matter* which hath received *Form*. — The *Primary Qualities* of *Body*, which are *Heat* and *Cold*, *Dryness* and *Moisture*, belong severally to the *Four Elements* of all Corporeal Nature. The former Two *Qualities* are Contrary to each other; as also are the Two latter. — The *Pythagoreans*, followed.

lowed by *Plato* in his *Timæus*, hold, that the Four Elements differ only in *Shape* or *Figure*: the Particles of Elementary *Earth* being, as they suppose, *Cubical*; those of Elementary *Fire*, *Pyramidical*; those of Elementary *Air* having *Eight equal Sides*; and those of Elementary *Water*, *Twenty*. And if, as it is presumed, these Elementary Bodys are endued with no other *Qualitys*, than the *Four Primary*; — in other words, if their *Forms* or *Essences* differ, one from another, in *Figure* only, and in no other respect; — it follows, that their *Figures* make their *Essential Forms*, — that is, make them to be *such Beings as they are*, and to have *such Qualitys and Powers as they have*. — Now, as *some* Particles of all the Four Elements enter into the composition of every Compound-Body, Those Compound-Bodys, which have *more of Fire* in them than Other Bodys of the like *Kind*, *Magnitude*, and *Density*, are, *in themselves*, hotter than these Others; they *communicate more Heat* to all Bodys adjacent, by transmitting some of their igneous Particles; and, if the adjacent Bodys happen to be *Sentient*, they cause in them, by the same Means, a *greater Sensation of Heat*. — Just so, a *greater Quantity* of any other Element in Some Compound-Body, than is found in Other Bodys *similar* to it in *Kind*, and *equal* to it in *Magnitude* and *Density*, gives it a *greater Degree* of the *Quality*, belonging to that Element. — And in every Compound-Body, the *Degrees* of That elementary *Quality*, which happens to prevail over its *Contrary*, are *infinite*; because *Matter* is *infinite* in *Extent*, and is every where *formed*. For hence it follows, in the first place, that the *Primary Bodys*, the Elements of all Others, are *infinite* also: it follows next, that, notwithstanding the *fixed Number* of the *Kinds* and *Sorts* of Things in Nature, (fixed in the *Mind of Nature*, tho perhaps not knowable by *Man*;) yet the *Individuals* of each *Kind* and *Sort* are *innumerable* and *infinite*: and since

Individuals of the *same* Kind and Sort infinitely *differ in Magnitude*; and Such of them, as happen to agree in This respect, still differ infinitely in respect of their *Density* and *Weight*; (Differences, caused by a less or greater Quantity of the *Two heavier* Elements, in proportion to That of the *Two lighter*, in their Frames;) and since the Frame of each Individual admits of infinite Changes; it also follows from these *infinite Differences* between one Body and another, and in the same Body at different times, that the *Primary Quality*s of Compound-Bodys *infinitely differ in Degree*.—In this Class of *Infinities*, produced by the Infinity of Matter,—in this *first Sort* of Things, so placed by *Socrates*, because (tho of the *Four Sorts* of Things, into which he divides all *Being*, these *Infinities* are indeed the *Last* and of lowest Dignity in *Nature*, yet) to *Man* they are the *First*, the first in point of Time, to his Feelings and Apprehension,—among these *Infinities*—are to be ranked all the *Secondary Quality*s of Compound-Bodys, as well as the *Primary*. For no less *infinite* is the *Difference* of Every one of Them, in *different Bodys*, with respect to its *Degrees*: and this *infinite Difference* of theirs arises out of That *fundamental Infinite*, which is One of the Principles of all Outward Nature. This appears from considering, that, beside That *infinite Difference* of *Compound-Bodys*, already mentioned, — That between the comparative *Quantity*s of each *Element* in their Frames, — the minutest and invisible *Compound-Parts* of these Bodys have different *Figures*, according to their different *Texture*, the different *Positions* of the Elementary Particles in each of these minuter Parts, and the different *Places* therein, occupied by those different Particles, with respect to each other. — The *Configurations* also of these minute Parts, whose *Figures* singly are invisible,—Configurations, made, when they are assembled together, and combine to make Parts of the whole

Frame, large enough to be visible, — are *infinitely different* in different Bodys, and in the *dissimilar* Parts of one and the *same Organic* Body, because of the infinite Difference of their *Con-texture*. And if all the Secondary *Qualitys* of Bodys, and all their Active and Passive *Powers*, arise, as it is probable they do, from the *Configurations* of their Parts, the infinite Diversity of these *Configurations* must produce *infinite Diversity* in the *Degrees* of those *Qualitys* and *Powers*.——To this Class of *Infinities*, the Offspring of *infinite Matter*, referable also are all the *Kinds*, *Courses*, and *Degrees*, of *Motion*. For *Motion* belongs *only to Bodys*; that is, to Portions and Particles of *Matter* bounded by some *Figure*: and *Motion*, of some Kind or other, belongs to *all Bodys*,—not, by reason of the *Figures* which bound the *Matter* of those Bodys,—but by reason of the *Matter* which is bounded by those *Figures*. For *Matter*, being the *prime*, the original and perpetual, *Infinite*, cannot be *confined* within fixed *Bounds*: no Portion of it can *retain* any particular *Form*; and of *Inanimate Bodys* the only *Forms* seem to be their *Figures*, together with the *Qualitys* and *Powers* thence arising. *Motion* therefore, which is essential to *Body*, or *Matter* formed, is no less *infinite* than *Matter*. The *Degrees* of its *Celerity* are as *infinite* as *Time*: the *Kinds* of it, among which are the *tremulous*, the *wavy*, and the *spasmodic*, are as *infinite* as the *Figures* of mixt Elementary Particles in *Compound-Bodys*: and the *Courses* of Bodys, in motion, are as *infinitely various*, as the *Deviations* from a Right Line, or from a Circular.——Lastly, 'tis evident from what has been already said in this Note, that to the Class of *Infinities*, spoken of by *Plato* in the Passage now before us, we are to refer all the various *Sensations*, which we feel; whether those *Sensations* are caused by *Bodys extraneous*, operating on the Bodys which are *Ours*, according to the *Figures*, *Qualitys*, *Powers*, and *Motions* of the *extraneous* Bodys,
and

if you can think of any Bound. Or would not the More and the Less ¹⁷⁴, residing in the Kinds themselves of Things, hinder, so long as they reside there, an End from being fixed to them? For, if

and the *Passive Qualities* of *our own*; — or whether they are caused by Either of the Two *Active Elements*, operating upon or within the *Fibrous Part* of our Frame; — or by *all the Elements*, variously mixed, and variously flowing in our *Blood* and *Humours*. — Now all our Sensations are either *pleasurable* or *painful*, more or less, — in Degrees, proportioned to the *Force* of the *Causes* which produce them, and to the *Sensibility* of our *Organs of Sense*. And for as much as these *Organs* of ours, as well as the efficient *Causes* of the Pleasure or Pain we receive by Their Means, are, all of them, *Corporal*, and admit therefore of *infinite Diversity*, it follows, that the *Degrees* of *Pleasure* and of *Pain*, the *Effects* of those *Causes* operating by those *Means*, are no less *infinite*. — Thus we find, that *Pleasure* belongs to That Sort of Being, which is *infinite*, and which derives the *Infinity* of its *Nature* from the *Infinity* of *Matter*; — a Conclusion, which *Plato* intended should be drawn from This Part of the Dialogue; as may appear from the *Argument* of it, in Page 23.

¹⁷⁴ The *More* and the *Less* of any Sensible Quality, in *different* Compound-Bodys, relate to a *Comparison*, made between those Bodys, in respect of That Quality, which they *Both* partake of, in *different Degrees*. — In the *Greek* of this Sentence, we ought to read *οἰκῆντε*, the *Dual Number*, instead of *οἰκῆν*, the *Singular*. The *Verbs*, being in the *Dual Number*, put This out of all Doubt.

ever

ever they receive an End, to an End also are then come their very Beings.

PROTARCHUS.

Most certainly true.

SOCRATES.

And in speaking of either the Colder or the Hotter of any Two Things, we constantly attribute to them the More and the Less.

PROTARCHUS.

We do.

SOCRATES.

Reason then constantly suggests to us, that the *Colder* and the *Hotter* have no End: and being thus without any End, they are altogether Boundless¹⁷⁵.

PROTARCHUS.

¹⁷⁵ *End* is sometimes used as a word of *less extensive* signification, than the word *Bound*. Ἐκάστου καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος πέρασ καλεῖται. *Iamblichus in Nicom:* pag: 11. *Of every thing the Beginning, as well as the End, is called its Bound.* But in the present Passage of *Plato*, the word *End* seems to be used in the *larger* Sense; as when we say, in speaking of Things which are *motionless*, and have a bounded Length, — “Every thing has Two Ends;” — and the word *Bound* is to be taken in a more *confined* Sense; as when, speaking of Things in *Motion*,

PROTARCHUS.

I am strongly inclined to agree with You, Socrates! in this Point.

SOCRATES.

Well have you answered, my Friend Protarchus! and well have you reminded me, that the *Strongly*, which you mentioned, and the *Faintly*, have the same Power as the *More* and the *Less*. For, wherever they reside, they suffer not any thing to be just *So Much*; but infusing either the more *Intense*, or the more *Remiss*¹⁷⁶, into every Action, they always produce in it either the *More* or the *Less*; while the just *So Much* flies away and vanishes from before them. For, as it was just now observed, were they not to drive away the just *So Much*, or did they permit *This*, and the *Moderate*, to enter into the Regions of the *More* and the *Less*¹⁷⁴, or of the *Intense* and the *Remiss*¹⁷⁶, these very Beings must quit their own Places: because, if they admitted the just

Motion, and of setting *Bounds* to them, we mean the *putting a Stop* to their *Motion*. For those Things only, which are always in *Change* and *Motion*, are here spoken of.

¹⁷⁶ *Intenseness* and *Remission* relate to the *More* and the *Less* of any Sensible Quality, in *one and the same* Compound-Body, at *different Times*.

So

So Much, the *Hotter* and the *Colder* would be gone. For the *Hotter*, and in like manner, the *Colder*, is always advancing forward, and never abides in the same Spot: but the just *So Much* stops, and stays, having finished its Progress. Now according to this Reasoning, the *Hotter* must be *boundless*; and so must also be the *Colder*.

PROTARCHUS.

So it appears indeed, Socrates! But, as you rightly said, 'tis not easy to apprehend these Things. Questions, however, relating to them, again and again repeated, might perhaps show, that the Questioner and the Respondent were tolerably well agreed in their Minds concerning them.

SOCRATES.

You say well: and we should try so to do. But at present, to avoid lengthening out this Argument by enumerating Every Infinite, consider, whether we may take This for the characteristic Mark of the Nature of all Infinites.

PROTARCHUS.

What Mark do you mean?

N n

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Whatever Things appear to Us to be increasing or diminishing, or to admit of Intenseness and Remission, or the Too Much, and all other such Attributes, we ought to refer all These to that Sort of Being which is Infinite; collecting as it were All of them in One; agreeably to what was before said,—that whatever Things were divided and separated, we ought to assemble together and combine, as well as we are able, affixing to All of them the Mark of some One Nature;—if you remember.

PROTARCHUS.

I remember it well.

SOCRATES.

Every Thing then ¹⁷⁷, which rejects all such Attributes, and admits only such as are quite the
 Contrary,

¹⁷⁷ It was observed, in Notes 166 and 173, that the *First* Sort of Beings, the *Infinite*, is the Progeny of *Matter*, which, in its Self, is without Bound or Measure. This, the *Second* Sort of Being, *Bound*, is the Progeny of *Mind*. For pure Mind, being *Measure its Self*, and *Bound its Self*, contains within its self virtually all the *Measures*, which set *Bounds* to all the

Portions of infinite Matter; Bounds, which constitute their *Essential Forms*; inasmuch as they invest them with those *Figures* and *Shapes*, that give birth to their different *Qualities* and *Powers*, and dispose them for different *Kinds of Motion*. — The *Principles* of all *Measure*, and of all just *Bound*, are *Numbers*: on the *Proportions* of *Numbers*, in *Things continuous*, such as have *Shape*, or *Figure*, depends *Symmetry*; on the *Proportions* of *Numbers* in *Things separate*, as *Sounds* and *Motions* are, depend *Harmony* and *Rythm*: on the *Proportions* also of *Numbers* in any *One compounded Thing*, in whose *Composition* are mixed *Many Things* possessed of *contrary Qualities* and *Powers*, depends *Mediscrity*, in which those *Contrarys*, *infinite* in themselves, are equally and justly *bounded*.—Thus have we, in doing our Best to illustrate the present *Passage of Plato*, found ourselves obliged to anticipate a little of what is to follow; and to speak of *Things* belonging to the *Third Sort* of *Being*, in which all the *Infinities* are *bounded*; the better to explain what is here meant by the *Second Sort* of *Being*, — *Bound*. For it is neither obvious to see of one's Self, nor easy to assent to Another telling us, that *Numbers* and *Measures*, with their several *Relations* and *Proportions*, are real *Beings*, *independant* of *Things numbered* or *measured*.—The *Multitude*, or *Major Part* of *Mankind*, are conversant with no other *Objects* than those of *Sense*, and are apt therefore to consider those of *Mind*, or *Intellect*, as *imaginary* and *unreal*, whenever they hear them mentioned. Accordingly, *ideal* and *imaginary* are, with Them, *attributive Terms equivalent*. On the other hand, they look on the *First Sort* of *Things*, the *Infinities*, as *real Beings*,—*so real*, that, when they hear *Philosophers* speak of the *Sensible Qualities* of *Bodys*, as not being really in those *Bodys*, and only *Sensations* in *our Selves*, with no little difficulty it is, that they are persuaded to believe them.

Contrary, —in the first place, the Equal and Equality ¹⁷⁸, and, after the Equal, the Double ¹⁷⁹, and every

¹⁷⁸ The Ratio of *Equality*, or the Relation between *Equal Numbers*, — as $3+2=5$, $5-2=3$, and $2+3=1+4$, — is here mentioned in the first place, because, in the words of *Theon*, Cap. 51, pag: 158, Ὁ τῆς ἰσότητος λόγος, ἀρχηγός καὶ πρῶτός ἐστι καὶ φοιχῆον πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων λόγων, καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὴς ἀναλογιῶν. *The Ratio of Equality is the Prime Leader, and the Element of all the other Relations [between Numbers], and of all the Proportions which depend on those Relations.* The same Doctrine is taught by *Jamblichus*, in *Nicomachum*, pag: 61, in these words,—Ἀρχὴς λόγον ἔχει ἡ ἰσότης πρὸς τὴν ἀνισότητα. *Equality, with respect to Inequality, hath the nature of a Principle.* We presume, that *Jamblichus* means a *Principle* in the same manner, as a *Unite* is the *Principle of Number*. For he had observed just before, that *the Relation of Equality is as it were a Sameness and a Oneness.* Ἡ τῆς ἰσότητος χάσις, ὡσανεὶ ταυτότης ἐστὶ καὶ ἐότης. And the Cause of this we may learn from the same Treatise of that Philosopher, pag: 110, where he says,—Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τῶν ἴσων τὸ ἓν καὶ ἡ μόνος, εἶγε τὸ ἴσον ἓν πρὸς ἓν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὰ ἴσα κατ' ἓνα λόγον ἐστὶν ἴσα. *One and Monad [that is, One in Things numbered, and Unite in abstract Numbers] is the Principle of Equals; in as much as the Relation of One to One is that of Equality, and Equals have One and the same Relation [to each other].* It is otherwise with *Unequals*: for *Two to Four* hath the Relation of a *Half*; *Four to Two*, the Relation of *Double*.

¹⁷⁹ After the *Equal*, next in order comes the *Double*. For, since the Number, to which some Other Number bears the

every other Relation, which one Number bears to another, and one Measure to another, — all These Things, I say, in summing up, and referring them to that Other Sort of Being, Bound, think you not that we should do right? or how say you?

PROTARCHUS.

Perfectly right, O Socrates!

SOCRATES.

Well; but the Third Sort of Being, made up and consisting of the other Two, what Characteristick shall we assign to This?

PROTARCHUS.

You, as I presume, will show it to me.

SOCRATES.

Some God may; if any of the Gods will hearken to My Prayers ¹⁸⁰.

PROTARCHUS.

Relation of *Double*, bears to this Other the Relation of *Half*, it is *Equal* to the remaining Part [the other *Half*] of this larger Number; which is thus divided into *Equals*, that is, into Two *Equal Parts*.

¹⁸⁰ To every Reader, who is a tolerable Judge of Style, the Whole of this Passage must have an appearance of the *Falsè Sublime*, at the first time of his reading this Dialogue. He will

PROTARCHUS.

Make your Prayers then, and look *within your Self* for an answer to them ¹⁸¹.

SOCRATES.

I am doing so: and some God, O Protarchus! is now, methinks, become favourable to us.

PROTARCHUS.

will think, that the introducing of *Gods* and *Prayers* here, with so much Pomp, is far above the Dignity of the present Subject, the *Third Sort of Being*. For This will seem to him to be nothing more than *Corporcal Being*, or the *External World*, where *Infinite Matter* is bounded every where by *Form*. But 'twill partly appear soon, and more evidently before the Dialogue concludes, that whatever is most *lovely* and most *desirable* in *Human Life*,—in particular, the *Sovereign Good of Man*,—his *Virtue*, — the right Use and the true Enjoyment of all External Goods,—is to be found only in this *Third Sort of Being*.

¹⁸¹ In the Greek, — σκόπει. — The words of the translation, which are printed in Italic Characters, are added, by way of illustration. For, if we understand this Passage rightly, it alludes to the ancient way of *Divination* by *οἰωνοσκοπία*, called by the Latins *Augury*. A Diviner in this way, after offering *Sacrifice* (which implied a *Mental Prayer*) to the Gods, went to the *σκοπία*, or *σκόπελος*, a Seat on the Summit of some high Mountain; from whence he had an open View of the Hemisphere above. There he stood, looking out to all Quarters of it,

PROTARCHUS.

How do you mean? and what Sign do you know it by ¹⁸²?

SOCRATES.

I will tell you in plain Words: but let your Mind follow them closely.

it, in expectation of some *Sign*, or *Token*, of the Divine Will in Answer to his Prayer. For a *Sign from Heaven* it was believed to be, whatever Appearance in the Air, or the Æther, first presented itself; — such as a *Brightness* more than usual, *Flashes of Lightning*, *Clouds* rising or gathering together, and the *Flights* of certain Kinds of *Birds* in any particular Quarter of the Sky; — from which last Sight, as being the most ordinary, this whole *Art of Augury* was called *ὠωνοσκοπικὴ*.

¹⁸² In the Greek, — *τίμι τεκμηρίω χεῖν*; — This Question abundantly confirms our Opinion, that *Protarchus*, in what he said just before, alluded to Divination by *Augury*. For to know how to interpret these *Signs from Heaven*, is thus expressed by *Xenophon*, in his *Cyropæd*: *θεοῖσι σημεῖοις χεῖν*, — and in his *Memorab*: *μαντικῇ χεῖν*. — The same Kind of Divination seems to have been alluded to frequently by *Socrates*, in saying, that the *Dæmon within him* was wont *σημαίνειν* to give him *Signs*. And we suspect, that *Plato*, in the present Passage, had respect to that known Saying of *Socrates*; meaning hereby to intimate to us, that, if *Socrates* attained to a *Knowledge* of the *Sovereign Good*, 'twas by consulting the Divine Genius within him, — that is, by *Self-Intuition*, and by his frequent Converse with *Ideal Excellence* and *Perfection*.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Do You but speak them.

SOCRATES.

We mentioned just now the Hotter and the Colder ; did we not ?

PROTARCHUS.

We did.

SOCRATES.

To These then add the Dryer and the Moister ; the more Numerous and the Fewer ; the Swifter and the Slower ; the Larger and the Smaller ; and whatever Things beside, in our late account of them, we ranked under one Head,—That Part of Nature, which admits of the More and the Less.

PROTARCHUS.

You mean the Infinite.

SOCRATES.

I do : and mingle, together with This, That which we spake of next afterward,—the Race of Bound.

PROTARCHUS.

What Race do you mean ?

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Those things, which we did not (as we ought to have done) assemble together under One Head, in the same manner, as we assembled together the Race of the Infinite. But you will now perhaps do what was then omitted. And when Both the Sorts are assembled, and viewed together, the Race of Bound ¹⁸³ will then become manifest.

PROTARCHUS.

What things do you speak of? and how are they to be assembled?

¹⁸³ The *Rules* and *Measures*, bounding those *Infinities* which are mentioned in Note 173, are perhaps impossible to be discovered by the Facultys of the *Human Mind*, wholly abstracted from the *Outward Senses*. The *Numbers*, for instance, by which are constituted *Harmony* in Sounds, and *Rythm* in Motions, cannot perhaps be ascertain'd, (whatever *Some* of the *Pythagoreans* imagin'd) by the *Abstract Science* of *Musick*,—that is, without the assistance of the *Ear* and *Eye*, among whose *Objects* are those *Sounds* and *Motions*. But the *Numbers*, in Sounds *harmonious*, and in Motions *rythmical*, are by the *Mind*, thro the *Ear* and *Eye*, naturally and therefore easily perceived. Accordingly *Plato*, sensible of This, proceeds to mention some of the fine *Effects* of *Bound* set to those *Infinities* before mentioned, in the *Human Body* and in *Outward Nature*,—hinting also at Others in the *Soul*,—without the farther consideration (for the present) of *Bound* or *Measure*, as a *Principle* in the *Inward Nature* of Things, —the Principle of all *Good* to all things,—*Good its Self*.

O O

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

I speak of That Nature, in which are comprised the Equal and the Double; and whatever else puts an end to Contest between contrary Things; and introducing Number ¹⁸⁴, maketh them to be commensurate one with another, and to harmonise together.

PROTARCHUS.

I apprehend your Meaning to be, that, from the Commixture of those Two Sorts of Being, a certain Progeny will arise between them in Every one of their Tribes.

SOCRATES.

You apprehend me rightly.

PROTARCHUS.

Relate then the Progeny of these Commixtures.

SOCRATES.

In *Diseases*, doth not the right Commixture of those Two Sorts of Being produce the *Recovery of Health* ¹⁸⁵ ?

PROTARCHUS.

¹⁸⁴ That is,—Numbers *definite* and *certain*.

¹⁸⁵ All internal Diseases of the Body, (when they are not caused by the admission of Things *foreign*, and *noxious* to it,
6 even

even in their *smallest Quantities*,) have their Foundations, according to *Hippocrates* and *Plato*, in the improper and *ill-proportioned Quantities* of the *Four Elements* of Nature, mixed together in the *Human Body*; or from (what is the same Thing, but more obvious to sense,) a Disproportion therein of the *Primary Qualitys* of all Body, — *Heat* and *Cold*, *Dryness* and *Moisture*. — For the *Four Elementary Humours* of the *Human Body*, — *Red Blood*, *Phlegm*, and the *Two Biles*, the *Yellow* and the *Black*, — are severally produced by the *Mixture* of *One* of the *Four Primary Qualitys* with *Another*, not being its *Contrary*, — namely, by *Heat* or *Cold*, mixed with either *Dryness* or *Moisture*. — Now the *Predominance* of any *One* of those *Four Elementary Humours*, — a *Predominance*, caused by the *Excess* of any *One* of the *Primary Qualitys*, either in the *Whole* or in any *Part* of the *Human Body*, — destroys that just *Equilibrium* between their different Powers, on which depends the *Regularity* of the several *Secretions* and *Excretions*, necessary to preserve the *Health* and *Soundness* of the *Frame*. — Farther; as the *Secondary Qualitys* of all *Compound-Bodys* are produced, in various Degrees, by the various *Combinations* of the *Four Elements of Nature*, — so, from the various *Mixture* of the *Four Elementary Humours* in different *Parts* of the *Human Body*, is produced a variety of *Secondary Qualitys* in the mixt *Humours*, — *Fluidity*, *Glutinosity*, *Sweetness*, *Bitterness*, and many *Others*, — any *One* of which, in any *immoderate Degree*, introduces *Disorder*, immediately into that *Part* of the *Human Body* where it hath its *Seat*, and thence into the *Whole*. — Now, since the *Immoderate*, whether it be *Too Much* or *Too Little*, knows no *Bound*, the *Degrees*, as well as the *Kinds* and *Species*, of *Diseases* must of course be infinite. In every *Disease* therefore of the *Body*, to restore *Mediocrity* in all the *Humours*, by taking off the *Excess* and supplying the *Deficiency* of the *Secondary*

PROTARCHUS.

Intirely fo.

SOCRATES.

And in the *Acute* and the *Grave*, in the *Swift* also and the *Slow*, which are, all of them, *infinite*, doth not the *Other Sort*, received among them, and begetting *Bounds*, constitute the *Perfection* of all the *Muses' Art* ¹⁸⁶ ?

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly fo.

SOCRATES.

And in Weather excessively either Cold or Hot, doth not the Entrance of that Other Sort of Being take off the Excess, the Vehement, and the Infinite, —generating, in their stead, not only the Moderate and the Measured, but Symmetry also and Correspondence between their Measures ¹⁸⁷ ?

Qualitys,—to regulate the *Secretions* and the *Excretions* according to the Nature of a Sound and Healthy Body,—and to recover the *Equilibrium* between the Four *Elementary Humours*, — is to recover the Body from Disease, and to restore to it Health and Soundness. See *Plato's Timæus*, pag: 82, &c, Edit: *Steph:* and the *Banquet*, page 77 of the English Translation. See also *Galen* *περὶ τῶν Ἱπποκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος δογμάτων*, L. 8. *Idem* *περὶ τροχίμων*, L. 2. and *περὶ φυσικῶν δυνάμεων*, L. 2.

¹⁸⁶ See the *Banquet*, page 79.

¹⁸⁷ See *Banquet*, page 81.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Without Dispute.

SOCRATES.

And do not propitious Seasons, and all their fair Productions, arise to us from hence, from the Mixture of Things which are infinite, with Things which have a Bound?

PROTARCHUS.

Past all Doubt.

SOCRATES.

A thousand other things I forbear the speaking of; as, for instance, Strength and Beauty, the Attendants upon Health of Body; and in the Soul other Excellencys, very many and very noble. For Venus her Self, O good Philebus! observing lawless Lust and all manner of Vice every where reigning, the Love of Pleasure being in all Men boundless, and their Desires of it insatiable, She, her Self, established a Law and an Order, setting Bounds to Pleasure and Desire. This, you said, was to lessen and to impair Pleasure; but I maintain, that, on the contrary, it preserved Pleasure from Decay. And You, Protarchus! what think you of it?

PROTARCHUS.

For My part I am intirely of your Mind, Socrates..

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

I have shown you then those Three Sorts of Being ;
—if you apprehend my Meaning.

PROTARCHUS.

Partly, I suppose, I do. By One of those Three, I suppose, you mean the Infinite : by Another, the Second Sort, you mean That which in All Beings is the Bound : but What you mean by the Third Sort, I have no strong Apprehension of.

SOCRATES.

Because the Race of that Third Sort, my Friend ! has amazed you with its Multitude ¹⁸⁸. And yet, the
Infinite

¹⁸⁸ In this *Third Sort* of Being are comprehended not only all the Works of Art, but all those Beings also, which are the *Productions of Nature* ; when, having arrived at their Maturity, found and intire, they have arrived at the utmost *Bounds* of their several Beings, and have attained to the *Perfection* of their several *Forms*, as nearly as the *Subject-Matter* of their Forms allows them to proceed to. For tho *Nature*, in producing and raising them to a mature State, always aims at *absolute Perfection*, (intending to make every One of her Works a perfect Copy of some Form Archetypal,) her good Intention is every where unavoidably obstructed, and her right Aim, in some measure, frustrated. *Beside* the Incapacity of *Matter in general* to receive perfect Form, or fixed Bounds, by reason of its own
thorow

Infinite also appeared to contain many Tribes: but as they were, All of them, stamped with the Character of More and Less, they were seen clearly to be One.

PROTARCHUS.

True.

SOCRATES.

Then, as to Bound; That neither contained Many, nor found we any difficulty in admitting the Nature of it to be One.

PROTARCHUS.

thorow Weakness and absolute Infinity; — and *beside* the *particular Pravity* of such a *Portion* of Matter, as ordinarily occurs to or lyes before *Nature*, to be formed anew; (for these Portions usually consist not of simple Elementary Particles, but of mixed and mis-shapen Fragments, and the Relicks of prior Beings, not yet resolved into their pure Elements;)—*beside* this Viciousness of the First Materials, to be used by Nature; which are like bad Bricks, often necessary, for want of better, to be used by the Brick-layer, in building of a House; — we say, *beside* these primary Obstacles to the Designs of Nature, when she is *laying* the *Foundation* of some new Form, — continual Accessions of new Matter no better than the First, to be employed by her in *raising up* the *Building*, are farther Obstacles to the compleat Execution of her Designs. *A superabundant Quantity* of any One of the component *Elements*, or the Failure of a *Quantity sufficient*, — nay, even a *very small Excess* or *Defect* of any *Quality* essential to the Form, will in some degree marr the *Beauty* of that Form, and injure the *Delicacy* or the *Strength* of it, while *growing*; more of Either will prevent the *Growth* of it; and very Much of Either will immaturally destroy the *Being*. The *Virtues* also and *Powers* of every

every Being of Nature depend on *Mediocrity*: for they arise from a *certain Quantity* of Each of the *Elementary* Ingredients in its Frame, from the *due Mixture* also of these Ingredients, and a proper Degree or Measure of the *Qualitys* belonging to that Mixture. See Note 173. — The *Point* indeed, exactly in the *Middle* between *Excess* and *Defect*, cannot be known by Man, in any other Things than Such as he can *number*, *weigh*, or *measure*; but a Middle Point *there is*, the *Point of Perfection*, in every Thing which is compounded, whether by Art or Nature; tho such a Point is *known* only by That Mind, who is the *Efficient* Cause of the Composition; or by That Mind who was the *Designer* of it, and must therefore have viewed it *beforehand* in its Elements; — unless there be any Other Minds, which are connected with Senses able to penetrate into the Inmost of Things, and which therefore can, by means of those Senses, number all the Elementary component Particles.——But not only the Powers and Excellencys of the Human *Body*, and those of its several Members and Internal Parts, depend on *Mediocrity*; no less depend on it the Powers and Excellencys of Man's *Irrational Soul*: for This also is *Corporeal*, as well as the Souls of all other Animals: it is also, like Theirs, suitable to the Frame of that *grosser Body*, which it pervades: having its natural *Appetites*, *Passions*, and blind *Affections*, Such, and in such a Degree, as the Frame of That requires. As therefore the best State of the *Body* consists in a *just Temperament* of the Four Elementary *Humours*, mixt together;—and as This depends on the *Mediocrity* of Each, and its *well-numbered Proportion* to the Others;—so the best State of the *Animal-Soul* consists in the *right Temper* of it; and This depends on having the *Passions*, *Appetites*, and blind *Affections* of it, *bounded*, *moderate*, and *well-balanced*; and these Qualities they, All of them, possess, when the Strength and Weight of Each

is suitable to the Importance of its Object, with respect to the *Nature* and *End* of the Being, therewith indued.—Now, if the *Animal-Soul* of Man be, as we have presumed it to be, *Corporeal*, it seems necessary to suppose a *Fifth Corporeal Element*, finer than the finest of the *Four*, which compose all *Vegetable* and *Fossil* Substances; None of These being, like *Animals*, capable of *Self-Motion*, or Motion from an Impulse merely *within* them. And if this supposition of ours be true, 'tis possible, that the *Soul* of every *Animal* may be a *Portion* of that *Fifth Element*; the *Particles* of which, like those of the other *Four*, being *infinite* in *Number*, the *Motions* of the Irrational Soul of Man, as well as the *Motions* of other *Animal-Souls*, are, with respect to their *Liveliness*, (which is attended usually by a *Quickness* and *Strength* of *Sensation*) in a *Degree* proportioned to the *Number* of those enlivening *Particles*. All other Differences between *Soul* and *Soul*, in *Animals* of the *same Species*, seem to depend on the different *Temperament* of their *Bodys*; that is, on the different *Proportions* of their *Elementary Humours*: and the greater Differences between the *Souls* of such *Animals* as *differ* in their *Kinds* or *Species*, seem to depend on the different *Frame* and *Organisation* of their *Bodys*.—These Things, however, must be looked on as Subject-Matters of *Hypotheses*, founded on *Opinion* or meer *Conjecture*; and they are treated as Such by *Plato* on all occasions. But That *Mediocrity*, (or *Medium* between *Excesses* and *Defects*,) in which the Excellencies or Virtues of Man's *Rational Soul*, or *Mind*, consist, — and the *Proportions*, *Measures*, and *Numbers*, on which those Excellencies depend, — are Matters of *Science*, Things as certain as the Subjects of *Arithmetick*, *Geometry*, and *Musick*.— For, to begin with the consideration of pure *Mind*, and abstract *Science*: — it appears, from what has been already shown, that every *Idea* is a *Monad*, or *One Mental Being*; — that every

General Idea, the Idea of a *Kind*, is a *large* and *comprehensive* *Monad*, divisible into a *certain Number* of *smaller* *Monads*; — and that every Idea, properly called *Special*, the Idea of a *Species*, indivisible (or at least hitherto undivided) into any *smaller* *Monads*, virtually comprehends an *indefinite Number* of *Beings*, outwardly existing in any *given Time*, and a *Multitude*, absolutely *infinite*, of such *Beings*, along *infinite* successive *Ages*; — unless the *Species* should happen to fail in *Outward Nature*; for, in that case, the *Idea* of it would be, and remain, solely, in her own *Eternal Mind*.—Seeing then, that all the *Larger Monads*, the most *General Ideas*, contain, Each of them, a definite or certain *Number* of *smaller* *Monads*; Every One of which contains a certain *Number* of *Monads* *still smaller*; (in like manner, as the *Prime Divisions* of *Mathematical Numbers* are to be *sub-divided*;) we must conclude, that in *Ideas* are to be found all the *Relations*, and all the *Proportions*, between *definite Numbers*, united or conjoined with *Being*. And since *eternal Truths* are the *Relations* between *different Ideas*, it is natural to conclude, that the *Connections*, which are between all eternal *Truths*, consist in *Proportions*, — that is, in *similar Relations*.— — With regard therefore to *Mental Beings*, we see the Truth of that celebrated Saying of *Pythagoras*,—ἀριθμῶ πάντα ἐπέκειν, —that is, as Some understand it, “*All things are to be likened to Numbers* ;” or, as it is interpreted by Others, “*All things are fuitable to Numbers*.” The Saying, in Either Sense of it, is true. Accordingly, the Being *Universal* and *Divine* was by *Pythagoras* symbolically termed *Ἐν*, *One*; — *Μόνας*, *Monad*, κατ’ ἐξοχήν, in the most eminent Sense;—and ἀριθμὸς ἀριθμῶν, *the Number of Numbers*,—with the same Meaning, as he was by Other Philosophers defined to be εἶδος εἰδῶν, *the Form of Forms*; that is, *Form Universal*,—the *Great One*, who comprehends within Himself All the *Monads* or *Ideas*, All the *definite Numbers*.—But let it be observed concerning these *Ideas*, Each of which is *One* certain

certain *Number*,—a *Definite Many*,—that they admit of no *Excess* or *Defect* in any degree; and that consequently Their Perfection is not a Perfection of *Mediocrity*; (for This Sort of Perfection, being only *relative* to *Excess* and *Defect*, belongs only to the *Infinities* or *Innumerable*s, when they receive *Bounds* or certain *Numbers*;) *absolutely* perfect are the *Monads*; for These are the *archetypal* and *eternal* Numbers, imperfect *Images* of which are all the *Mediocritys*, — the *transient* Excellencys of *transitory* Beings.—One of these *Monads* is the *Human Species* in its *perfect Idea*: included therefore in This are all the *Excellencys*, to which a *Man*, a Being composed of *Body*, *Soul*, and *Mind*, is capable of attaining. By *Soul*, we here mean *Soul Irrational*; for Such is every *Soul*, in which *Mind* and *Reason* dwell not: and of all *Earthly* Beings, to *Man alone* are the *Principles of Mind* imparted. By partaking of these Principles it is, that he hath the Faculty of *Reason*, and a Capacity of *Reasoning*. For by *Reason*, we mean the *Perception* of *Mental Objects*, or the *Intelligence* of *Ideas*, — of *Kinds* and *Species*, and of every *Universal*, properly so called: — and by *Reasoning* we mean a *perceiving* of the *Connections* between *different* Ideas, the *remote* as well as the *near*; a *perceiving*, in What *Relations* they stand, Each to Other; — and a *perceiving*, that *Some* of these Ideas are *included* within Others; and these *larger* Ideas also within Others still *more comprehensive*. — In searching therefore into the Nature of any Thing within one of the *smaller* Inclosures, — to look whether it be contained also in the *larger*, and next *outer* Inclosure, is to reason rightly; and the *Mind's comprehensive View*, in seeing the Subject of its Search contained within *Both* those Inclosures, the *inner* and the *outer*, is very properly termed a *Conclusion*.—Now, as soon as the *Principles* of *Mind*, like *Seeds*, begin to *open*,—and when the Faculty of *Reason*, which before lay, like an *Embryo*, *dormant* in the *Mind*, comes to be

awakened by the surrounding Objects of Sense,—the Mind has an actual Perception of those Ideas, which *immediately*, and the *first*, arise from the universal *Principles of Mind*.—As the Human Mind gradually *dilates*, and is *enlarged*, as it were, for the *reception* of more and more Ideas, the *Faculty of Reason* is exerted more and more: so that *Ideas* less and less *General* are *excited* in the Mind, by her being conversant, thro the Senses, with many Objects of the same Kinds and Species; — excited, in proportion as she yields her *attention* to those *Objects*, and at every Turn *introverts* and looks within *her Self*.—But the *Capacity* or latent *Power of Reasoning* cannot *begin* to *energise*, till the Mind is sufficiently enlarged, so as to *comprehend* a *Genus* and its *Species* at the same time; that is, to *perceive*, not only *Many* Ideas, but *Many* comprised *in One*. The *Capacity* of Reasoning, thus grown up to be a *Power*, is improved and strengthened by *Exercise*; especially, in learning the *Sciences*, —first, the *Mathematical*, and then *Dialectick*, and the *Science of Mind*.—Now, if *Reason*, or the Perception of Ideas,—*Science*, or the Knowledge of eternal Truths,—and *Nēs* or *Mind*, considered as *Intelligent* of its Self, and of its own Principles,—if these Things are acknowledged to be the most excellent of All, which any Particular Mind is capable of attaining to, — (and we presume, that no Rational Being, except a *Philebus*, a Lover of Sensual Pleasure above all other Things, would ever deny or even doubt their Superiority,) — it may seem strange and inconsistent, that *Mediocrity*, in those very Things of acknowledged Excellence, should meet with *Praise*; or that *Moderation* in the Pursuit, and *Temperance* in the Enjoyment of them, should be deemed *Virtues*.—And indeed, were Man a Being designed by nature for *Knowledge* and *Contemplation* only, the more *assiduous* any Man was in the *Pursuit* of Knowledge, the greater Praise he would deserve; the more Knowledge
he

he *attained to*, the nearer would he be to the *Perfection* of his Nature; and the more he *enjoyed* the Objects of his Knowledge, in a constant *Contemplation* of them, the more would he fulfill the *Ends* of his Being, by enjoying the Happiness for which he was designed. But from every Part of *Human Nature* 'tis reasonable to infer, that the wise and good *Mind of All Nature* had quite other Ends in the Formation of Man.— The *Human Body* is evidently framed for *Motion* and for *Action*, — so compleatly framed for these Purposes of *Wisdom*, as to be a justly fit *Instrument* of the actuating and moving *Soul within*, in all her *Operations*.— This *Soul*, which by Nature is united with and pervades that Body, is by Nature also prompt to *Appetites* and *Passions*; and These impell her to give various *Motions* to the Body and all its Members, and by these means, to perform by turns all the various *Animal-Actions*. — The Connections, which every Man has from Nature, with other Individuals of his own Species, infuse into him *Natural Affections*; and These also incite his Soul to *Action*, as feelingly and as forcibly, as do those *Appetites* and *Passions* which arise in her from the *Wants* and *Sufferings* of the *Body*. — And the Civil and Social Connections, which are formed by Man, of his own free Will, tho by Nature *led*, and by the Feeling of his own Indigence *urged* to form them, These also engage him in *Affairs* peculiar to *Man*, and properly therefore stiled *Human*; putting his Soul into *Action*, more or less, as *Action* is more or less necessary for maintaining those voluntary and yet necessary Connections. — It seems evident therefore, from the *Active Life*, which the Frame of Man's Nature *obliges* him to live, that he was *designed* for a Life of *Action*; and not to be employed in the Pursuit of *Speculative Knowledge*, or in the Enjoyment of *Contemplation*.— But an obvious Objection to This will naturally here offer itself; and the following Questions may

may reasonably be proposed;—“ Why has Nature infused into Man a strong *Propensity* to search into the *Causes* of all Natural Things? Why has she inspired him with a *Love* of *Speculative Truth*? and Why has she given him a *Sentiment* of *Satisfaction* and *Delight* in the Perception of pure *Ideas* and their mutual *Relations*? In a word, to what Purpose is *Mind* super-added to his *Soul*?—To these Questions the right Answers will not only show, *what Bounds* we ought to set to our *Pursuits of Knowledge*, — *what Parts* of Knowledge are the most *valuable* to Man, — and *how far* he may laudably *indulge* his Mind in the Delights of *Contemplation*;—but also they will at the same time point out, What are those *Excellencys* or *Virtues* of the *Human Soul*, principally meant by *Socrates*, where he commends so highly the *Mediocritys*, which arise from a just *Commixture* of *Infinity* and *Bound*.——We have only to premise this fair Postulatum, — “ Whatever Part of Nature is obscure to us, or not readily understood by us, cannot be explained or made clear, but from what we *know* of *other* Parts, thro *Sense*, *Observation*, and *Experience*.”—Now we know, thro These, that the Appetites and Passions of all Animals, except Man, are confined by nature within those narrow Limits that circumscribe their several Ways of Life; namely, their natural and few *Bodily Wants*, and their accidental and short *Bodily Sufferings*. We find, that their *Appetites* are raised only by the *Feeling* of their *present Wants*, and are quite satisfied with the *Supply* of those Wants; and that the *Passions* of their Souls are roused only by the *Feeling* of their *present Sufferings*, and subside as soon as those Sufferings are ended. But the Appetites and Passions of Man’s Soul are infinite by nature: the Cause of which we find, from Experience of our Selves, and from the Observations made on other Animals, to be This,—that, tho the Human *Organs of Sensation* are, every One of them,

in Quickness and in Strength, inferior to those of some other Animals, yet the *inner Faculty*s of Man's Soul, his *Imagination*, his *Memory*, and his *Forefight*, are greatly superior to the Facultys of the same Kind which are in *Brutes*.—The *Imagination* of Man is, of its Self, boundless in extending, enlarging, varying, and compounding the minute *Images*, impressed on it by those *External Things*, which have occurred to his Sight, or have been *perceived* by him: his *Memory* of Things past hath a Reach *backward* to the *remotest*, both in Time and Place: and his *Forefight* reaches *forward*, along the *Infinity* of Time, to *future Things contingent*, and even to the barely *possible*.—Now, amongst the Multitude of External Things, which every day strike the several Organs of our Senses, from Some we feel *Pleasure* and *Delight*, *Pain* or *Offence* from Others; and to all the rest our Souls are quite indifferent. These therefore of the latter Sort very slightly affect us, and are soon forgotten. Those of the other Sorts make lasting Impressions on the Imagination, proportionable to the Pain or Pleasure felt. The *Painful* give to the Soul those Emotions which are properly called *Passions*. The *Pleasurable* excite in the Soul *Desires* of enjoying Pleasures of the same Kind again;—Desires, in their beginning, weak or strong, in proportion to the Depth of those Impressions. But afterwards, when exaggerating Reports of greater Pleasures of the same Kind, enjoyed by Others, reach our Ears, (and whether the Reports be true or false, it matters not, if they are credited,) Imagination always aiding and improving those Reports, the Impressions deepen; and the Desires, which they had raised, strengthen. In the same Case are all the other Natural *Desires*,—Those for instance, of *Property* and *Possessions*,—of *Praise* and *Honour*,—of *Freedom* from Subjection to the Will of Others,—and of *Power* to induce Their Wills to agree with Ours:—the Desires increase by
being,

being gratified; and what we see, or hear, or fancy, of greater Heights of such Gratifications, attained to by Others, and imagined to be within our own Reach, swell the Desires beyond all Measure.—Nor is it otherwise with the Passions of *Grief, Resentment, Hate, and Fear*,—Passions, naturally raised in us by the *Loss* of some *Good*,—by *Injuries* received,—by Objects *painful* and *present*, or *mischievous* and *to come*;—whether the Loss, Injury, or Mischief be real or imaginary, whether the Pain be great or little, whether the Fear be well or ill-founded, *Human Imagination*, if free Scope be given it, magnifies the Evil, and heightens the Passion; and the Passion, in its turn, gives, if it be indulged, Strength and Lastingness to the *Fancy*. As soon, therefore, as *Report* has filled a Man's Imagination with *Images* of *Things*, which he never saw;—or *History*, with Representations of Facts, which happened Ages since;—or *Poetic Fiction*, with *Fancys* of Things, which neither have, nor ever had, any Existence;—*Images*, as well-framed, as if the Substances Themselves were before his Eyes;—*Representations*, no less clear to him, than if Himself had been Eye-Witness of the the Facts;—*Fancys*, no less lively, than if they had been drawn from Reality, or answered to Things true in Nature;—these Objects of the Man's Imagination, these Representatives of the Persons and Things he reads or hears spoken of, (tho *unknown* to Him, or *uncertain*, or merely *fabulous*;) immediately beget *Love* or *Aversion* in his Soul, according as they are *agreeable* or *disagreeable* to his *Nature*, or to his present *Temper*. To these Persons and Things, afterward, he likens Such as he Himself has seen, or knows actually to exist. And tho the Resemblance be generally partial, or imperfect, and often only fancied, he *transfers* his Love and his Aversion, from the *distant*, the long *past* or *deceased* Objects of them, to the Objects which at present are in Being. Of These, Such as appear to
him

him *disagreeable*, and to which he now contracts an *Aversion*, of necessity he shuns and endeavours to avoid: but Such as are *agreeable* to his Fancy, and which he now conceives a *Love* of, he cannot but desire and pursue. In this latter case, Love, and the Desire of imagined Good, urge him to the Pursuit; and the hopeful Pursuit increaseth his Desire: in the other case, Aversion, and the Fear of imagined Evil, make him careful to avoid it; and thro this troublesome Care, his Aversion rises to *Hatred*, and his Fear rises to a *Dread*.—By these and other the like Means it is, that, in Man's *Imagination*, numberless false *Fancys* spring up continually; and that, since it is unbounded, there is still Room for more. On these *Fancys* the *Desires* and *Passions* feed, and grow to an enormous Size; by these they are inflamed, and frequently break forth in all Kinds of foul Mischief, — especially to the Persons themselves, who are tortured with those Feverish Distempers of the Soul; and often, by Contagion, they spread the Calamity thro whole Familys, Tribes, and Nations.—To prevent these Mischiefs and cure these Diseases, to cool the Passions and moderate the Desires, to banish the exorbitant or over-abounding *Fancys*, and to restrain the Wildness of Imagination, — we may reasonably presume to be the *chief Ends*, (at least, the more *immediate* Ends,) for which the Principles of Mind and Reason are imparted to the Human Soul. For 'tis only thro Mind and Reason, that these Ends, at present the most desirable to Man, are possible to be accomplished. And we presume, that no Doubt will be made of This, on considering what we have now to offer: — If it be true, that *Ideas*, unmixed with Images of any Sensible Things,—and eternal *Truths*, the *Relations* between those *pure Ideas*,—are the only proper Objects of *Intellect* and *Reason*; — if they are also *connatural* to all Mind, and are therefore by all Mind *naturally beloved* the

most of all things;—it follows, that *pure Science*, the Knowledge of those Ideas and of their mutual Relations, must be of all things the most *delightful* to a *Soul* wherein *Mind* is sown, as soon as she is conversant and becomes acquainted with them. So that if the Human Soul were not, *first*, intimate with *Objects* of the *Outward Senses*, and delighted with the *Pleasures* which they yield,—if the *Remembrance* of these *Pleasures* did not continue to *attract* her,—if the *Wants* of her *Body* did not *compel* her to attend to them,—and if her *Natural Affections* did not forcibly draw her to a Regard for the *Objects* of such *Affections*, — her whole Attention would be engaged by Those her *new* Mental Acquaintance; (possibly indeed *ancient*, but long *lost* to her, and *forgotten*;) and she would then live—not a *Human* Life, a Life of *Action*,—but a Life, peculiar to Beings more purely Intellectual and Rational than Man, the higher Life of *Contemplation*.—On the other hand, many *Objects of Sense* are so engaging, Many are so enchanting, and their Charms are so heightened by *Imagination*, — the Witchcraft of *Sensual Pleasure* is so powerful,—and the *higher Facultys* of the Soul are held, as it were, in Chains, so strongly by those Magicians, the *Fancys*, *Appetites*, and *Passions*,—whilst the lower Facultys drudge, like Bond-Slaves, in the Service of these their Despotic Lords,—that only the superior Charms of *Science*, the more potent Spells of true *Philosophy*, and That all-mighty Magick of *Truth*, which, in respect of *Outward Nature*, may not improperly be termed *Supernatural*, have Power to free the Mind from the Force of those ordinary, corporeal, and natural Enchantments. — Thus it is, that the *Irrational* Part of the Human Soul, and the *Rational*, according to the Idea of Man in the designing Mind of Nature, counter-balance Each the Other. The Weight of the *Irrational* lies in *Mechanical*, *Corporeal*, and *Natural Necessity*; thro which, all Bodys, whether
Inanimate

Inanimate or Animated, are passively, unresistingly, and *blindly* moved, attracted, or impelled: the Weight of the *Rational* Part depends on *Rational* and *Moral Necessity*; thro which, all *intelligent* Beings freely, willingly, and gladly, embrace *known Truth*, and adhere to *known Good*. The former Necessity weighs *alone*, and without a *Counter-poise* in the Soul, during the *Infancy of Reason*.—To supply this Want of an *Inward Principle* in *Children*, powerful enough to save them from the many Evils, into which they would be driven by their Fancys, Appetites and Passions, *Nature* has placed them under the Care and Management of their *Parents*; in Defect of their own Reason, giving them the *Reason of Others* for their Teacher and Governor. To secure this Government from being abused, to the Detriment of Those who are born in Subjection to it, *Nature* has implanted in the Souls of *Parents* a *στοργή*, or *Love to their Offspring*, stronger than any other Love, in all Souls governed by their *Natural Affections*. And to make this Subjection easy to the Children, *Nature* has made them dependant on their Parents for all the Good which they receive; enduing them with a Sense of their own thorow Weakness, and with a simple and intire Confidence in their Parent's Care.—The *Excellencys* therefore of a Child's Soul are — *Appetites*, mild and *governable*,—*Passions*, gentle and *submissive to Restraint*,—*Affections*, *proportioned* to the relative Nature of their Objects, — a *Quickness* of *Apprehension*, *sufficient* to receive Instructions, suited to the First Openings of the Mind,—*counter-balanced* by a *Strength* of *Memory*, *sufficient* to retain them. — Thus we find that the *Moderate*, the *just Degree*, and the *Sufficient*, are the Basis and the Essence of all which is amiable or admirable in the Souls of Children.—When the State of Childhood is past; when the *Body* has attained a sufficient degree of Strength, to discharge many of the active Offices and Employ-

ments of Human Life; and when the *Mind* is enlarged enough to collect *Ideas* from all the Sensible Objects with which she is conversant, and strong enough to *reason* concerning their various Powers and Uses; from Effects arguing backward to Causes, and from Causes arguing forward to Effects; we see, that the Bulk of Mankind still, and for ever throughout Life, continue in a State of Infancy, with respect to the *Objects of Intellect*; employing their whole Time and Care, their Faculty of *perceiving*, and their Power of *reasoning*, as well as their *Memory* and *Imagination*, solely in the Service of their *Bodys*: so that all their *Views* terminate in the secure Possession of Things *convenient to the Body*; all their *Ideas of Good* are invested with *Images* of These Things; and These Things are the only Subjects, on which they delight to *think*, to reason by Themselves, or discourse with Others. It appears then, that the far greater Number of Human Beings, for want of *Weight* in the *rational* Part of their Souls, sufficient to *counter-balance* That of the *irrational* Part, live, all their Lives, under the absolute Dominion of Corporeal Necessity, obedient to the Impulse of their Animal-Appetites, Passions, and blind Affections; and that, as These are of the same *Kind* in All Men, differing only in Degree, All Men would, thro the necessary Operation of these Causes, if not counteracted by Causes contrary, be for ever at Variance, and for ever in a State of War, until the whole Human Species were destroyed. Now, as such a Destruction would be against the plain Intention of Nature, whose Providential Care is directed to the Continuance of every Species in the Outward World, we must conclude, that the Majority of Mankind were intended to live in *Subjection to Government*; not in a *slavish* Subjection to the *arbitrary* Government of *Men*, who are, Themselves, governed by their own boundless Appetites and Passions; their own par-

tial,

tial and extravagant Affections; not in a *forced* or an *ignorant* Obedience to the *Mandates* or *Decrees*, issued by such Men; nor yet in perpetual Bondage to any *Customs*, *Institutions*, or *Ordinances*, proved to be pernicious;—but in a *voluntary* and *free* Submission to *Laws*, made, solely for their *Good*, by Men wiser and better than Themselves;—*Laws*, found from Experience to be the best Maintainers of Civil Society, Public Concord, and Domestic Union; to be also the best Guardians of every Man's Person, and the best Protectors of his Property;—*Laws*, harmonising with the Laws of all Nature, with Those by which the Rational World, as well as the Corporeal, inwardly is governed,—the *Corporeal* World, thro the *natural Connections* between all *Outward Things*,—the *Rational*, thro *natural Conscience*, the secret *Connection* of every *Mind* with eternal *Truth*, which is the Fountain of Universal Justice. — From this Account 'tis easy to perceive, that the *Excellencys of Soul*, in the major Part of Mankind, — in Those who are not qualified to be their own Masters,—are Such as follow,—viz. to have such a *Degree of Strength* in the *lower Facultys* of their Souls, as gives them a Capacity of acquiring That *Kind of Knowlege*, which is necessary to their acting well the Parts in Social and Civil Life, allotted to them by Providential Fate;—to have such a *Measure of Attention* in their *Minds*, as *suffices* them for the actual Attainment of that Knowlege; — to have *Industry*, *sufficient* to practise what they have learnt, for the benefit of Themselves and of Those who need the assistance of their Art, Skill, or Labour; — to have a *Temper*, *mild enough* to suffer their Appetites and Passions to be restrained by wise and good Laws; *yielding enough* to submit their *Wills* to be directed by Men knowing in those Laws; and *compliant enough* to follow, in their Fancies and Ways of living, such Public Customs and Manners as are not mischievous or inconvenient to Themselves;

—at the same time, to have a *Spirit, stout enough* to rise up against Oppression; *brave enough* to resist all Attempts to enslave them; *valorous enough* to defend, not only Each his own, but also each other's Person, Liberty, and Property, against Foreign Enemy's and Home-Invaders; and *magnanimous enough* to maintain those Libertys of their Country, and those Laws, which secure to them every Blessing they enjoy.— Here also we find, that the *Moderate* and the *Measured*, the *due Degree* and the *just Enough*, constitute those Excellencies in the Souls of Some of the Populace in every Country, by which they become Worthy Men and Worthy Members of the Commonwealth.—We are lastly to consider of those highest *Excellencies*, to which the Soul of Man, in her present State, is capable of attaining, and to which the Souls of Some Persons actually attain. For to the End, that such good and truly Legal Governments may be established among Men, as are necessary to their living a rational, social, and happy Life,— such Governments, as are intended for them by Nature, (who always intends what is relatively the Best for every Species of her Creatures,)— a Few Men there are in every Age, and in every civilized Nation, born with Intellectual Faculty's superior to those of the Multitude, — exempted also, by the good Fortune of their Progenitors, from the necessity of toiling for the Body, — and favoured, by their own still Better Fortune, with That which is termed by *Plato* *ἑὴν μοῖραν*, the having had their Minds, in early Life, cultivated by true Science, and timely initiated in the Studys of Universal Nature and of the Human. These Men, thus descended, thus born, and thus prepared by a proper Education, are, we say, designed, and as it were marked out, by the Providential and Creative Mind of Nature, to govern Those, who are unable to govern Themselves so as to be happy. The *Excellencies* of Soul therefore,

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in this higher Order of Men, are those Endowments, which fit them for answering this End of their Being;—in particular; *so much Knowledge* of the Great *Designer*, as will serve to acquaint them with the *Wisdom* and *Goodness* of his *Design*; — a Knowledge, to be acquired only thro the Study of his Works; — *so much Knowledge* of the *Laws*, by which the Rational or Moral World is governed, as, in the first place, will show them, how they must govern Themselves if they would be happy, and in the next place will furnish them with a Pattern to copy after in their Government of Others; — and *so much Knowledge* of *Human Nature*, of the several Appetites and Passions in All Men, and of the Difference of Temper and Degree of Understanding in Different Men, as to know, that Some must be driven to the Right Conduct of their Lives by Fear; and that Others are to be drawn or led on by Hope; that Some ought to be depressed, or kept down; Others, to be raised up, or supported; that, in managing or treating with the more intelligent and better Sort of the People, 'tis the better Way to address Arguments to their *natural Reason* and *Conscience*; but that above all things it is Best, (the Best for all Sorts of People,) to instill gradually and gently, thro *Civil* and *Religious Institutions*, (and more especially the *Laws of Education*;) the *Principles* of *Right Reason*, of *Honesty* and of *Goodness*, into the Minds of all Such as can imbibe them. — We have here attributed the noblest *Excellencys* of Man's Soul to *Such a Knowledge* of Universal Nature and of the Human, as of necessity infers a *Conduet* and *Behaviour*, on all Occasions, agreeable to that Knowledge. For no Man can have the *Knowledge* of what is *Best* for him to do, actually and habitually present to his Mind, without seizing every Opportunity and embracing every Occasion of doing it. *More Knowledge* than This, on those Subjects, supposing it to be acquirable by Man,

(a Supposition, the Truth of which may well be doubted of,) would be *useless* to those Persons, of whom we are now speaking, in the Parts of Human Life, allotted for Them to act in; besides that the Endeavour to acquire *more Knowledge* would be an Impediment to their well-performing of those Parts.— Here then we again meet with the *just so Much*, — no more than is *useful to Man*,—as the proper Boundary of that Kind of Knowledge, which (however admirable in its Self,) yet, if extended farther, belongs not to Man; tho it may perhaps be the Chief Excellence of some Superior Beings. — It cannot be denied, that *Infirmitys* from Old Age or other Natural Causes, and *Disabilitys* from various Accidents to which Human Life is subject, oblige Both Orders of Men, the Higher as well as the Lower, to abstain or to retire from all Public Offices and Active Employments. Such Persons, without doubt, may allowably and commendably employ as much Time as they please, in the pure Contemplation of Nature and her Divine Cause;—in the Speculation of Human Affairs, without taking any Share of the Business or of the Management;—in abstracted Sciences, without applying them to the Arts founded thereon;—in Arts, whether Liberal or Mechanical, without professing the Practice of them;—or in searching into the Propertys of Natural Things, and their immediate Causes, without a reference to their own private Emolument.—But What we are to think of this *Contemplative Wisdom*, this *Speculative Knowledge*, these *Rational Amusements*, these *Searches* and *Disquisitions*, so *delightful* to the *Mind*,—and in What Degree of Esteem we are to hold them, according to *Plato's* Doctrine,—will appear, from the Rank which he assigns to Each of those *Intellectual Goods*, near the End of the present Dialogue; where All Things, which are *Good on their own Account*, are placed in such an Order as they merit, from their relative Value to Man, considered

PROTARCHUS.

How could we?

SOCRATES.

'Twas not at all possible indeed. Of those Two Sorts then all the Progeny,—all the Things produced into Being thro those Measures, which are effected in the Immoderate, when Bounds are set to the Infi-

sidered in the whole Nature of his Being. — Thus much, in the mean time, falls in our way at present to observe, that, if the highest Excellency of Man be *Wisdom to govern Himself*, and Those who are under his Care, according to Right Reason, Universal Justice and Goodness, the *Law* of the whole *Rational and Moral World*,—and if this *Law* be MEASURE ITS SELF, intelligent of its Self, and of all those Things, of which it is the *Measure*, — and distributing equally, — to All of them their several Dues according to their Natures, — to each Being, That Share of Good, to which it hath a Right, conferred on it by Nature, — it follows from thence, that a Man's *Knowledge* of the *Bounds* and *Measures*, proper to be set to all things under his Guidance and Direction, — a *Knowledge* of the *Moderate*, the *Sufficient*, and the *Equitable*, in the Conduct of his Life, with regard to himself and to Others, — is *Man's Wisdom*; — and that a *Conduct*, agreeable to such a Knowledge, is *Man's true Virtue*, and *Man's Highest Good*. — In the *Greek* of the Sentence now before us, the word $\varphi\alpha\sigma\iota$ is evidently erroneous. *Stephens* conjectures, that $\sigma\iota\delta\alpha$ is the Right Reading. *Cornarius* would have us read $\iota\tau\omega$: and his Opinion is authorized by *Ficinus's* Translation. But the Emendation, proposed by *M. Grou*, which is $\varphi\alpha\delta\iota$, varies least from the printed Text.

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nite,

nite ¹⁸⁸,—in summing up All these Things together, and comprehending them in One, understand me to mean, by the Third Sort of Being, This One.

PROTARCHUS.

I understand you.

SOCRATES.

Now, besides these Three, we are farther to consider, What Sort of Being That is, which we said was the Fourth. And as we are to consider it jointly, see whether you think it necessary, that all Things, which are produced into Being, should have some Cause of their Production.

PROTARCHUS.

I think it is: for, without a Cause, how should they be produced?

SOCRATES.

The Nature then of the Efficient differs from the Cause in nothing but in Name: so that the Efficient and the Cause may be rightly deemed One.

PROTARCHUS.

Rightly.

SOCRATES.

So likewise, the Thing effected, and the Thing produced into Being, we shall find to differ in the same manner, in nothing but in Name, Or how?

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Just so.

SOCRATES.

In the Nature of things, does not the Efficient lead the way? and does not the Effect follow after it into Being?

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

Cause therefore is not the Same Thing with That which is Subservient to Cause in the producing of its Effect, but a Thing different.

PROTARCHUS.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

Did not the Things which are produced into Being, and the Things out of which they are all of them produced, exhibit to us the Three Sorts of Being¹⁸⁹?

PROTARCHUS.

Clearly.

SOCRATES.

That then, which is the Artificer of all these, the Cause of them, let us set down for a Fourth Sort of

¹⁸⁹ That is,—all the Productions of Nature and of Art, and their *Two immediate Principles*. See Note 166.

of Being; as it is fully shown to be different from those other Three ¹⁹⁰.

PROTARCHUS.

Be it so.

SOCRATES.

But the Four Sorts having been now described, every One of them distinctly, we should do well, for memory's sake, to enumerate them in Order.

PROTARCHUS.

No Doubt of it.

¹⁹⁰ On this Passage, which concludes a Summary Account of the whole Universe, we have only to offer the following short but important Observation;—*Socrates* here plainly distinguishes the *Mind of the Universe*, or Internal Nature, the Cause of All things, [in every proper Sense of the word *Cause*,]—from the *Corporeal Universe*, or External Nature, the Effect or Production of that Great Cause,—of that *Universal Mind*, who, by constantly energising within every Particle of Matter, and thus continually forming and re-forming it, produces and reproduces every Natural Body. — The great Athenian Philosopher does not confound the *Corporeal* and *Sensible* World together with the *Mental* and *Intellectual Cause* of it; as Some Philosophers have very injudiciously, or very inaccurately, done in their Expressions, speaking of them as *One* and the *Same* Substance or Being: nor does he, on the opposite hand, separate them, like some Others; so as to make a *Third* Substance or Essence, *distinct* from *Either* of Those,—a *Soul of the World*, or other subordinate *Divine Being*,—*necessary*, by way of a *connecting Medium* between them.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

The First then I call Infinite ; the Second, Bound ; the Third, That which is generated or produced into Being from the Mixture of those Two : and in saying ¹⁹¹, that the Cause of this Mixture and this Production is the Fourth, should I say aught amiss?

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly, not.

SOCRATES.

Well now ; What is next ? How proceeds our Argument ? and with What Design came we along this Way ? Was it not This ? We were inquiring, Who had a Right to the Second Prize of Victory ; whether Pleasure had, or Wisdom : was it not so ?

PROTARCHUS.

It was.

SOCRATES.

Now then, since we have laid down those Distinctions between the several Sorts of Being, may we not haply form a more finished Judgment, concerning both the Very Best, and the Second-Best of those

¹⁹¹ The Edition of *Plato* by *Aldus*, and That by *Stephens*, in this place erroneously give us to read λέγω, instead of the evidently Right Reading, which is λέγων, exhibited in the *Basil* Editions.

Things,

Things, which originally were the Subjects of Dif-
pute between us?

PROTARCHUS.

Perhaps we may.

SOCRATES.

We made no difficulty, I think, of setting down
for Conqueror, the Mixt Life, the Life of Pleasure
and Wisdom together. Was it not so?

PROTARCHUS.

It was.

SOCRATES.

We perceive then, of what Sort the Mixt Life is,
and to which Sort of Being 'tis to be referred.

PROTARCHUS.

Evidently.

SOCRATES.

And I think we shall agree, that 'tis Part of the
Third Sort. For the Mixt Life is not to be referred
solely to any One of the Infinites, mixed with some
One only of the Bounds: it is a Life of All such
Things together, as are Infinite in their own nature,
but are under the Restraint of Bound ¹⁹². So that
the

¹⁹² We cannot explain the Meaning of this whole Sentence
in a better Way, than by giving a few Instances to prove the

Truth of it.—*Cold* has been mentioned before, as *One* of the *Infinities*: a certain *Degree* of *Heat*, mixed with it, is a *Bound* set to it: this *Infinite* and this *Bound*, together, produce *Coolness*: now the agreeable *Sensation* of *Coolness*, felt by any Sentient Being throughout Life, cannot be the *Mixt Life*, here meant; because *Mind*, or *Wisdom*, has no Share in it.—In like manner, *Speech*, as we have also seen before, is *One* of the *Infinities*: a certain *Form* is given to it, as a *Bound* set to it, by *Mind* and *Reason*: this *Infinite* and this *Bound*, together, produce *Language*, or *Speech* Intelligible; the Intelligence of which, in daily Conversation throughout Life, be it ever so agreeable to the *Mind*, cannot be the *Life*, where *Pleasure* and *Wisdom* are blended and unite together; because *Body*, the *Outward Senses*, and the *Animal-Soul*, have no Share in the Enjoyment.—Neither is such a Life to be found in any *One Other* of the *Infinities*, tho mixed with its *proper Bound*; not even where the *Animal-Soul* and the *Rational* have, Each of them, a Share in the Enjoyment of that *Particular Mixture*. Thus, for instance, *Pleasure* thro the Sense of *Taste* is *One* of the *Infinities*, in which the *Animal-Soul* alone has a Concern: *Measures* are prescribed, or *Bounds* set, to her Enjoyment of this *Pleasure* by *Mind* and *Prudence*: and hence ariseth the *Virtue* of *Temperance in Eating*: but as this *Particular Virtue* is composed of *One only* of the *Infinities*, and of *One only* of the *Bounds*, it is but a small Part of that *happiest* of Human Lives, where *Pleasure* and *Prudence* meet, and go on together,—That Life, which according to *Socrates*, in the Sentence, to which we have made this Note, embraces $\xi\upsilon\mu\pi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha \acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\alpha$ *All the Infinities*, (All, which offer themselves,) confined within the *Bounds* of *Moral Wisdom*, and the *Measures* of *Universal Justice*.

the

the Mixt Life, this Winner of the Prize, may be rightly said to be a Part of the Third Sort of Being¹⁹³.

PROTARCHUS.

Most rightly.

SOCRATES.

'Tis well. But that Life of yours, O Philebus! a Life of Pleasure simple and unmixed, to Which of the Three Sorts may we rightly say that it belongs? But before you pronounce, answer me, first, to this Question.

PHILEBUS.

¹⁹³ The *Idea* of the *Mixt Life*, so highly extolled here by *Socrates*, is included in the *Idea* of *Man*: and *Man* is one of Nature's Forms, — a *Part* of That Nature, the Third Sort of Being, in which all the Infinites are bounded. — For, in the *Ideal* or *Perfect Man*, the *Acquisition* and the *Possession* of all those Things, which may be of any Use to him, are bounded by *Honesty* and *Goodness*; the *Use* and the *Enjoyment* of them are bounded by *Prudence*; and the *Appetites* and *Passions* of his Soul are bounded by the *Particular Virtues*: the *Nature of Things* he makes the Measure of his *Fancys* and *Opinions*: and the Measure of his *Ideas*, eternal *Truth*. — And we beg Leave to observe by the Bye, that *Aristotle* hath this very same Meaning in his *Nicomachean Ethicks*, where he says, in his concise way of expressing himself, — μέτρον ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος, — *Virtue and the truly good Man are the Measures* of every Man's Moral Conduct. — At the end of the Sentence now before us, in the *Greek*, we suspect, that λέγειτ' ἄν should be read, instead of γίγνεται ἄν.

P H I L E B U S.

Propose it then ¹⁹⁴.

S O C R A T E S.

Concerning Pleasure and Pain; have they in their own nature any Bounds? or are they ¹⁹⁵ among Those things which admit the More and the Less?

P H I L E B U S.

Pleasure, O Socrates! to be sure, admits the More. For it would not comprehend every Good in it, if it were not by nature Infinite, with respect to the Multitude which it contains, and the Increase which it is capable of.

The words of *Socrates* in his next Question justify our Suspicion: on which account we recommend it to the consideration of future Editors.

¹⁹⁴ *Aldus*, in his Edition of *Plato*, gave these words to *Protagoras*; though nothing is more plain, than that *Plato* meant them for *Philebus*. The *Basil* Editors restored them to the right Owner: and 'tis strange, that *Stephens* either knew it not, or did not acknowledge it.

¹⁹⁵ In all Editions of the *Greek*, we here read ἐτέρως, instead of ἐτέρον. We are ignorant of any authority for using so strange an Enallage; and therefore we suppose it an erroneous Reading.

S S

S O C R A T E S.

SOCRATES.

Nor can Pain be imagined, O Philebus! to comprehend every Evil ¹⁹⁶. So that we must consider of some Other Thing, different from the nature of the Infinite, for the imparting of any Good to Pleasures. — It is admitted, that your Life of Pleasure is the Issue of Things unbounded, and belongs therefore to That Sort of Being. But to Which of the Sorts before mentioned, O Protarchus and Philebus! may we refer Wisdom, and Science, and Mind, without being guilty of Impiety? For I imagine that we incur no trifling Danger, in answering the present Question, whatever be our Answer, whether right or wrong ¹⁹⁷.

¹⁹⁶ This Sentence in the *Greek* seems to be somewhat imperfect. For we apprehend the Reasoning in it to be This: — *Philebus* had acknowledged, that *Pleasure* (meaning the Pleasure of Sense) had *no Bounds* in its own Nature; and had made That very Infinity an Argument, to prove *every Good* to be *included* in it. This Argument is confuted by *Socrates*, in remarking, that, by the same way of reasoning, it might be argued, that *Pain* (the Pain of Sense) *included every Evil*; Pain, as well as Pleasure, being *infinite*: But all men acknowledge *other Evils*, beside the Evil of *Pain*: It was therefore a probable Conclusion, that *other Things* were *good*, beside *Pleasure*. The *Infinity* of *One particular Species*, which is *subordinate* to some *Genus*, (as *Pleasure*, for instance, is only *One Species* of *Good*,) does not prove *That particular Species* to include all the *co-ordinate Species*, or to be as comprehensive and universal as their *Common Genus*.

PHILEBUS.

PHILEBUS.

You magnify that God of yours, O Socrates! very highly, methinks.

SOCRATES.

So do You, my Friend! That Goddes of Yours. The Question, however, ought to be answered by us.

PROTARCHUS.

Socrates says what is right, O Philebus! and we must do as he says we ought.

PHILEBUS.

Have not You, Protarchus! taken upon your self My Part in the Debate?

PROTARCHUS.

'Tis true, that I have. But in the present case I find myself much at a Loss, how to answer. I must therefore request, O Socrates! that You, your Self, will take the Office of Prophet ¹⁹⁸ to us; lest by some Mistake,

¹⁹⁷ All Readers of this Sentence must be surprized at the Paradoxical Conclusion of it, till they have read a little farther on; where *Socrates* fairly confesses, that he mixed a little of his *jocose Humour* with the *Solemnity* of the Sentiment, here expressed. See Note 26.

¹⁹⁸ The Poet in the Temple at *Delphi*, whose Business it was to deliver in Verse the Oracular Responses to Those who con-

fulted the Oracle, was supposed to be *inspired* by *Apollo*, and had the Title of *Prophet* given to him. (See Note 44 to the *Io*.) *Protarchus* here alludes to that Office of the Delphic Poet, when he desires *Socrates* to undertake the like Office of *Prophet*, by delivering the *Dictates* of *Divine Wisdom* to the Company assembled there to hear him. This is *Plato's* usual Manner:—before he enters on any Subject of Importance more than ordinary, he sounds

some solemn *Note*

Of Preparation, — to engage his Readers to a more than ordinary Degree of Attention. In the present Passage, he uses great Propriety in his way of giving them this Notice. For it precedes a Doctrine, to be delivered at large soon afterwards, — a Doctrine, truly Oracular, derived immediately from the Fountain of Wisdom into the Minds of Such as *Socrates*,

And Tiresias, and Phineus, Prophets old;

if these Prophets were Such as they are described by ancient Poets. For of *Phineus* they tell us, that He, (like *Socrates*),

*Fearless and firm, had Boldness to reveal,
Oracularly, Jove's own hidden Mind
To Mortals.*

— ἄβ' ὅσον ὀπίζετο, καὶ Διὸς αὐτῷ
Χρέων ἀτρεκέως ἱερὸν νόον ἀνδρώποισι.

Apollonius Rhod: L. 2. v. 181.

As to *Tiresias*; on What account we have here likened Him to *Socrates*, will easily be discovered by a judicious Reader, on perusing Note 242 to the *Meno*.

Mistake,

Mistake, I should offend the Combatant ¹⁹⁹ whom You favour, and by singing out of Tune, should spoil the Harmony ²⁰⁰.

SOCRATES.

You must be obeyed, Protarchus! Indeed there is nothing difficult in your Injunctions. But, in asking you, to What Sort of Being Mind and Science were to be referred,—when I was magnifying, as Philebus says, the Subject of my Question,—the Joke, which I intended to soften the Solemnity of it, confused your Thoughts, I find, in good Earnest.

¹⁹⁹ This evidently is a *Metaphor*, taken from the *Contentions*, usual at that time, between *Dramatic Poets*, during the *Feasts of Bacchus*, for the Fame of Superiority in their Art. For the Grecians of those days had an Emulation to excel in the *Musical Entertainments* of the *Mind*, as well as in the *Gymnic Exercises* of the *Body*. To inspire them with that Emulation, *Combats in Poetry and Musick*, as well as in *Gymnastick*, were instituted by their Legislators: and the Contenders in either Kind were alike termed ἀγωνισταί, *Combatants*. — The *Metaphorical Combatants*, meant by *Protarchus*, are *Mind and Pleasure*.

²⁰⁰ In continuing the *Metaphor*, taken from *Theatrical Contests*, *Protarchus* likens *Himself* to One of the *Chorus* in a *Tragedy or Comedy*, and *Socrates* to the Κορυφαῖος or Χορηγός, the *Chief or Leader* of the whole Band. For in the *Chorus-Songs*, it was the Office of the Chief or President, to lead the *Vocal Musick*, keeping it in Time and Tune with the *Instrumental*: and in the *Dialogue-Scenes*, wherever the *Chorus* bore a *Part*, their *President* spake alone, for them all.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Very thorowly so, I confefs, O Socrates !

SOCRATES.

And yet 'twas an easy Question. For on this Point, there is a Consent and Harmony among all the Sages, dignifying thus Themselves, — that MIND IS KING OF HEAVEN AND EARTH ²⁰¹. And This, which they say, is perhaps well said ²⁰². But let us, if You are willing, consider the Nature of this Universal Being more amply, and not in so concise a manner.

PROTARCHUS.

Consider it in what manner you think best, without regarding the Length of the Inquiry : for the Length will not be disagreeable to Us.

²⁰¹ The unanimous Agreement of all the ancient Philosophers in this Dogma, — that *Mind governs throughout the Universe*, — seems to be introduced, as a *Presumptive Argument* in its favour ; to procure a serious attention to the *Inductional Reasoning*, which is soon to follow, as a *Rational Proof* of it.

²⁰² The word *perhaps* is here used by *Socrates*, not because he was, Himself, *doubtful* in this case, but because the Opinion, or Dogma, of an *Universal Mind*, tho' authorised and patronised by Persons the most respectable, is still but an *Opinion*, till it is shown to correspond with all the Phænomena of the Universe ; (see Note 204,) and till it is proved, moreover, to be founded on the Principles of Science and of sound Reasoning.

SOCRATES.

Fairly spoken. Let us begin then, by proposing this Question.

PROTARCHUS.

What ?

SOCRATES.

Whether shall we say, that the Power of the Irrational Principle governs all things in the whole Universe, fortuitously and at random ²⁰³? or shall we, on the contrary, agree with our Ancestors and Predecessors, in affirming, that some Mind and Wisdom,

²⁰³ The *Atheistic Hypothesis*, here spoken of, was broached at Athens by Critias, one of the Thirty Oligarchic Tyrants. Indeed we cannot find it to have made its appearance in Public *any where*, till a short time before. For it must be distinguished from the Hypothesis of those ancient Physiologers, who supposed, — that All things *originally* were in *Disorder*; and that *Mind*, thro the Infinity of Time past, was either *involved in Chaos* among the rest of Things, or else lay *dormant*, or *inactive*, somewhere *above*, or some how *apart from*, that wild Abyss, — *The Womb of Nature*; — but that, when at length *Mind* was *extricated* out of Chaos, by a casual *Co-incidence* of Things *similar* to each other, and a casual *Separation* of *dissimilar* Things, — or when *Mind awoke*, or *began to energise*, — immediately an *Infant-World of Beauty* burst forth from the *Womb*; *Order* every where took place of *Disorder*; and the *Government of Mind*, throughout the Universe, superseded the *Anarchy of Chaos*.

wonderfully

wonderfully Great, orders All things together, and governs throughout the Whole?

PROTARCHUS.

Alike in nothing, O Socrates! are these Two Tenets. That, which you mentioned just now, is, in My opinion, impious. But, to hold, that Mind disposes All Things in a beautiful Order, is agreeable to That View which we have of the World, of the Celestial Bodies, and of the whole Circumvolution of the Heavens ²⁰⁴. For my own part, I should never speak nor think any otherwise on this Subject.

SOCRATES.

²⁰⁴ The First Argument, here brought, in confirmation of this ancient Dogma, — “that Mind presides over and governs the Universe,” — is the natural Conclusion, drawn by *Common Reason*, from the Evidence of *Common Sense*. For Who, that sees

This universal Frame, thus wondrous fair,

but must infer the Cause of it to be full of wondrous Beauty? Who, that observes ever so slightly That *Constancy*, which is in the *Motions* of the Planets, and in the *Risings* and *Settings* of the Fixt Stars, can possibly imagine the *Inconstancy* of *Chance* to be the *Mover*? What Man, not *disordered* in his own *Mind*, can suppose any Other thing than *Mind* to be the Cause of that everlasting *Order*, which appears in the regular Interchanges of the *Elements*, and the circling Returns of the successive *Seasons*?—This short and obvious Reasoning seems alone to have

SOCRATES.

Is it then your Pleasure, that we add Our Voices to those of the Ancients, and openly avow that Tenet to be Ours; — not contenting our selves with a bare repetition of the Sayings of Others, in hopes of escaping Danger to our Selves; but resolved to run all Risque together, and to share in undergoing the Censures of some Great and Formidable Man, when He asserts, that in the Whole of Things there is no Order ²⁰⁵ ?

PROTARCHUS.

How can I do otherwise, than join with you in This ?

satisfied all the old Physiologers and earliest Philosophers: here therefore it is very properly put into the Mouth of *Protarchus*, whose Education, we may presume, made him acquainted with this their chief Doctrine. The more diffuse and copious *Proof* of it by *Induction* is, with equal propriety, reserved for *Socrates*. For this great Master of Dialectick, we are told by *Aristotle*, was the First who made use of the *Inductional* Method of Reasoning in his Philosophical Conversations.

²⁰⁵ That the Person here alluded to, is *Critias*, cannot be doubted of by Those who are acquainted with his Character, and the injurious Treatment he gave to *Socrates*.—A considerable Fragment of his Atheistick Poetry is extant in *Sextus Empiricus*, pag: 562.

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SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Attend now to the Argument, which comes on next to be considered.

PROTARCHUS.

Propose it then.

SOCRATES.

In the Bodys of all Animals somehow we discover, that Fire, Water, and Air, must be in their Composition by nature; and Earth, which gives Support to the other Ingredients in their Frame, we see plainly: as Mariners say, when they are tossed about in a Thunder-Storm at Sea, and descry Land ²⁰⁶.

PROTARCHUS.

²⁰⁶ This *Simile* presents to our Imagination a Scene, in which the *Four Elements* are by Sailors seen distinctly at the same time; — the *Watery Ocean*, upon which they sail,—the *Expanse of Air*, over their Heads, — The *Fire of Lightning*, flashing around them, and *Land*, at a Distance within their Sight.—In Animal-Bodys, we have only the *Earthy* Part of their Frame before our *Eyes*: the *Fire*, the *Air*, and the *Water*, which are within them, we discover by some other ways. That they have *Fire* in them when *alive*, we perceive, by *feeling* their *Warmth* in handling them: when we *hear* their *Voices*, we know, that *Air* issues out of them, and must therefore have been within them: and when we feed on them *dead*, we find, that *Moisture* is in them, by our *Taste*; for This Sense is not affected.

PROTARCHUS.

True: and tossed about indeed are We too in these Discourses; but for a Port, to anchor in, we are intirely at a Lofs ²⁰⁷.

affected by any Thing, which is totally deprived of its *native Liquid*. — However; we do not imagine the *Simile* to be here introduced, for the purpose of showing, that we have *Ocular Demonstration* of the *Existence* of the Four Elements: but the Exhibition of those *separate* and *larger* Parts of Each of them, presented to us in the *Simile*, is perhaps intended to prepare us for that vast View, which, immediately after This, opens itself on our Minds, in considering Each of those Elements as *Universal*, or rather *Infinite*.

²⁰⁷ *Protarchus*, by using the Plural Number, means Himself and his Young Companions. — The *fresh Subject*, just now started, This of the four Elements of Outward Nature, occasions him to renew his former *Complaint*, mixed with *Pleasantry*, in the name of all the Younger Part of the Assembly. We have here a remarkable Instance of our Author's fine Judgment in the composition of his Dialogues. For, being aware, that Some of his Readers are probably dissatisfied with this seeming Digression from the Subject, proposed to be considered,—viz. “to Which Sort of Being *Mind* belonged,” —he has contrived to intimate to them, in this Socratic way of Humour, that he is pushing forward, however he may appear to deviate; and that he offers to them this seemingly new Matter, only as a Vehicle to convey them the sooner to their Journey's End. We conceive this to be his Purpose, from the first words of *Socrates* in Reply.

SOCRATES.

Let us proceed then : — Concerning Each of those Elementary Ingredients in our Frame, understand This.

PROTARCHUS.

What ?

SOCRATES.

That, which there is in Us, of each Element, is small and inconsiderable ; no where in any Part of our Frame have it we at all unmixed and pure ; neither has it in Us a Power, worthy of its nature ²⁰⁸. Take One of them for a Sample, by which you may estimate all the rest. Fire in some manner there is in Us : Fire there is also in the Universe, throughout.

PROTARCHUS.

Most certainly.

SOCRATES.

Now the Fire, which is in Our composition, is weak and inconsiderable : but That, which is in the Whole of Things, is admirable for the vast Quantity

²⁰⁸ For, in the Bodys of all Animals, the Four Elements are so intimately mixed together, and (as it were) united, that the natural Quality of *Each Element* is *restrained*, and the inherent Force of it is *cramped*, by the other *Three*.

of it,—for the Beauty which it exhibits ²⁰⁹,—and for every Power and Virtue which belongs to Fire ²¹⁰.

PROTARCHUS.

Perfectly true.

SOCRATES.

Well then ; is the Universal Fire generated, fed, and ruled by the Fire which we have in Us? or, on the contrary, does My Fire, and Yours, and That of every other Living Thing, receive its Being, Support, and Laws, from the Fire Universal?

PROTARCHUS.

This Question of yours does not deserve an Answer.

SOCRATES.

Rightly said. And you would answer in the same manner, I suppose, if your Opinion was asked con-

²⁰⁹ For *Fire* is not only *luminous*, its Self, and therefore agreeable and pleasing to the Sight, — but also *enlightens* all Outward Forms, and renders their Beauty visible to Sense.

²¹⁰ The Power, for instance, of pervading all Bodys, whether Elementary or Mixt, with the most rapid Motion; — the Power of rarefying all Fluids and expanding all Solids; — the Power of fusing Metals and other Fossils;—the Power of producing or increasing Vegetation; — and the Power of causing a Sensation of Heat or Warmth in all Sentient Beings.

cerning

cerning the Earthy Part of every Animal here, compared with the Earthy Substance Universal: and just so, concerning the other Elementary Parts of Animal-Bodys, mentioned before.

PROTARCHUS.

What Man, who made a different Answer, would ever appear to be of Sound Mind?

SOCRATES.

Scarcely would Any man. But attend to what follows next. Wherever we find these Four Elements mixed together and united, do we not give to this Composition the name of Body?

PROTARCHUS.

We do.

SOCRATES.

Apprehend the Same Thing then, with regard to This, which we call the World. This should be considered as a Body in the same manner, being composed of the same Elements.

PROTARCHUS.

You are perfectly in the Right.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

To the Whole of this Great Body then does the Whole of that Little Body of Ours owe its Nourishment, and whatever it has received, and whatever it possesses? or is the Body of the Universe indebted to Ours for all which it is, and has?

PROTARCHUS.

There is no reason, O Socrates! for making a Question of This Point neither.

SOCRATES.

Well; What will you say to This Point then?

PROTARCHUS.

What Point?

SOCRATES.

Must we not affirm these Bodys of ours to be animated with Souls ²¹¹?

²¹¹ All which *Socrates*, in his present Argument, has said concerning *Body*, regards the Bodys of *all Animals* in general, and not the *Human* Body in particular; agreeably to his own words, when he entered on this Subject: see in Page 330. The *Souls* therefore of *all Animals* in general are meant in the Sentence now before us, and not Souls *Rational* or peculiarly *Human*: the *Rational Soul*, or *Mind*, is not brought into consideration by *Socrates*, until after his next Sentence.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

'Tis evident, that we must.

SOCRATES.

But from whence, O my Friend Protarchus! should Our Bodys derive those Souls of theirs, if that Great Body of the Universe, which has all the same Elements with Our Bodys, but in much greater Purity and Perfection, was not, as well as Ours, animated with a Soul ²¹²?

PROTARCHUS.

²¹² Unless *Soul* was infused throughout the *Body* of the World, every *Member* of this Great Body, every *Part* and *Particle* of the Corporeal Universe, could not be, as it is, in *perpetual Motion*. For the immediate Cause of all Corporeal Motion is either *out of*, or *within*, the *Body moved*. Causes, which are *out of*, or *exterior to*, the *Body moved*, are *other Bodys*, acting on it by *Impulse*, *Attraction*, *Repulsion*, &c. Causes *within* are either *Mechanical* or *Vital*. The *Mechanical* are, when the *First Spring* of Motion, tho it be within the *Body moved*, is, its Self, *Corporeal*; and tho it be a Part of the Machine, must have been wrought separately, and inserted afterwards. The *Vital* are when the *First Spring* of Motion is *Incorporeal*; when 'tis not only *within* but *throughout* the *Body* which it moves; when 'tis thorowly *united* with it, *holding* all the *Parts* of it *together*, and making it to be *One Being*, without consideration had of any *End* for which it may have been designed.—Where the Cause of *Motion* is *External*, there, on the *removal* of the Cause, or on its *ceasing* to act, the *Motion*, which

PROTARCHUS.

'Tis evident, O Socrates! that from no other Origin could they derive them.

SOCRATES.

Since therefore, O Protarchus! we acknowlege these Four Sorts of Being,—Bound,—Infinite,—the Com-

which it gave, gradually lessens, and at length intirely stops. Where the Cause of Motion is *Mechanical*, there the *Spring* of it has ever and anon need to be *wound up*, and will in time be quite *worn out*; when the *Motion* must of course *cease* for ever. But where the Cause is *Vital*,—where *Soul* is *united* with *Body*,—Life ceases not within that *Body*, till the *Body* is *worn out*, or *destroyed*; or till the *principal Parts* of it are so *injured*, as to be incapable of being *held together* by One Life, or of preserving their *Union* with the *Soul*. This *Principle* of their *Life* then *departs*; and either *passes* immediately into the Seeds of some other *Body*, or is *resolved* into That Great *Soul*, which animates the Universe. For it is absurd to suppose, that a *Vital Principle*, the very *Essence* of which is *Life*, giving Life to all *Bodys* where it enters and abides, can ever *dye*; no less absurd, than to suppose it possible for any *Being* whatever to be *annihilated*, or to become a *Non-Being*.—Now in the *Corporeal Universe* all *Bodys* are *included*: there is no *exterior* *Body* to act on it, in Any one of those ways, in which *Body acts on Body*. Neither can the Motion of this Great *Body* be *mechanical*; for it needs no *Renovation* or *Repair* from any *Foreign Hand*, but is *equable* and *everlasting*. The Motion therefore must be *vital*: and on this account the Best of the ancient Philosophers held, that *the World* was *ζῶον a Living Thing*.

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pound of Both Those, — and Cause, — to be in all Bodys; and since we find, that in this Part of the Universe, to which We belong, there are Beings of that Fourth Sort,—Causes, which produce Souls, build up Bodys for those Souls to dwell in ²¹³, and heal those Bodys when diseased ²¹⁴; Causes also, which create and frame other Compositions, and amend

²¹³ In the *Greek* of this Passage we read,—ψύχην τε παρέχον καὶ σῶμα σκιάν ἐμποιοῦν. — *Ficinus* translates the two last words of it thus,—“*dum imprimit umbram.*” But This being obscure, an Error in the *Greek Manuscripts* was justly suspected by the subsequent Translators, *Cornarius* and *Serranus*; the former of whom proposes, instead of σκιάν, to read ὑγέαν; and the latter imagines, that we should read σωμασκίαν, as One Word. *Grynæus* and *Bembo* never attempt an Emendation of the printed *Greek*, even where it is most apparently erroneous. And *Mons^r Grou* has taken the easy way of not translating the two last words. But all the Difficulty vanishes, if, instead of σκιάν, we read σκῆνος, a *Tabernacle*, or *Tent*, — a word, metaphorically used by the *Pythagoreans*, to signify the *Human Body*, as being but a *slight temporary Dwelling* for the *Soul*. See *Timæus* the *Locrian*, in several Passages; and a Fragment of *Ocellus* the *Lucanian*, *de Lege*, in *Stobæus’s Eclogæ Phys:* cap: 16: See also *Æschines* the *Socratic*, pag: 128, Edit: *Horrei*; the *Greek Index* to which will furnish the learned Reader with Examples of the same Metaphor, used by several *Greek Writers* in the succeeding Ages.

²¹⁴ The *Causes* here meant, we denominate *Natural*; and their *Effects* we call *Works* or *Operations* of *Nature*.

them

them when impaired ²¹⁵,—Caufes thefe, to Every one of which we gave a particular Name, betokening a particular Kind of Wifdom or Skill; — fince, I fay, we are perfuaded of thefe things, furely we can by no means think, that the whole Heaven, in the larger Parts of which ²¹⁶ are the fame Four Sorts of Being,—and Thefe, undepraved and pure,—can have any other Caufe, than a Being, who is full of Contrivance and Defign, and in whose Nature the moft beautiful and noble ²¹⁷ Things all unite.

PROTARCHUS.

It would not be at all reasonable to think it can.

SOCRATES.

If this then be abfurd, we may the better affert, as a Confequence of our Reafoning, that in the Universe there are, what we have feveral times repeated, *Infinite* in great quantity, and *Bound* fufficient; and

²¹⁵ Thefe Forms, Structures, and Compositions, we denominate *Artificial*: for Human *Arts* of various Kinds are known to be their *Caufes*.

²¹⁶ That is, the *Heavenly Bodys*. In the fame manner *Theophrastus* fpeaks,—ὅλος ἕρανός, καὶ ἕκαστα τῶν μερῶν. and *Plotinus*, —ὅλον ἕρανόν, καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆ τὰ ἄστρα. Pag: 99.

²¹⁷ In the *Greek*, — τὴν τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσιν,— The Things here meant are *Truth* and *Good*, *Mind* and *Wifdom*; to which in many other *Paflages* of *Plato* thofe Attributes are given.

besides these, a *Cause*, not inconsiderable or mean ²¹⁸, which, by *mixing* them properly together, marshalls and regulates the Years, the Seasons, and the Months, — a *Cause* ²¹⁹, which with the greatest Justice we may term *Wisdom* and *Mind* ²²⁰.

PROTARCHUS.

²¹⁸ That is,—a *Cause* the most excellent; according to a Figure of Speech, by the Masters of Rhetorick termed λιτότης, *Extenuation*; — a Figure, which is sometimes used, as it is here, to *amplify* the Sense, by conveying a Supposition, that Language affords no *positive* Epithet, of Force sufficient to express the Greatness of our Meaning. — This Figure is so employed by *Homer*, in his *Iliad*, Lib: 15, v. 11; where *Ajax*, the *strongest* of all the *Grecians*, is spoken of only as *not the weakest*, ἐκ ἀφαιρότατος. And just so, to signify the *Height* of the Indignation, Grief, and Reluctance, felt by *Achilles*, when *Agamemnon* sent his Heralds to demand *Bribeis*, the Poet says only,—ἐξ' ἄρα τῶγε ἰδὼν γήθησεν Ἀχιλλεύς.

These, when Achilles saw, no Joy he felt.

See *Hermogenes* περὶ μεθόδου, Cap: ult:

²¹⁹ That this *Cause*, to the Speculation of which we are at length conducted, is *Cause Universal*, — τ'αγαθόν, *Good its Self*, the *First Spring* of all *Motion*, — will evidently appear, if we look back on the Process of Reasoning, along which we have travelled.—In the first place, the *Element of Fire* was offered to our View, and perceived to be *Universal*. Then, by an easy and plain Analogy, proceeding to the other *Three Elements* of all *Mixt Bodys*, we perceived Them to be, in like manner, *Universal*. The next Step in our Progress opened to us a View

of all visible *Corporeal Nature*, in which all the Four Elements are combined together; the *Infinity* of Each being every where *bounded*, and the *Vehemence* or Mightiness of Each, every where *restrained* and *tempered*, by mixing with its Contrary. In proceeding farther, we found it a short Step from the Universality of *Body* to the Universality of *Soul*, the Life-giving and actuating Principle in Universal Nature. Next appeared the Universality of *Mind*, *within* the Universal *Soul*: it appeared from the *Regularity* and *Order* of the Motions, given by this Great Soul to every Part of its Great Body. And now, in the last place, *within* this Universal *Mind* appears the *Idea of Good*, as the *First Cause* of All things. For it appears, from the Share of *Good*, which every *Being* possesses, and which every *Sentient Being* enjoys, (a Good attendant on its *Nature*,) that *universal Good* was designed in the *wise Order* of all the *Vital Mundane Motions*;—in the Motions of the *Celestial Bodys*, in the first place;—next, in such Motions of the *Elementary Bodys*, as are governed or influenced by those *Primary* and *Leading* Motions;—and lastly, in Those of all *Mixt Bodys*, Animal, Vegetable, and Fossil, whose Natural Motions depend on the Motions of the Elements;—an Order, which is therefore *wise*, because it is *good*, and produces all the Good possible to be enjoyed by Temporary Beings, in their several Kinds and Degrees of Capacity, according to the *Divine* all-comprising *Idea*.—This *Fountain of Good*, the *Final Cause* of All things, is expressly termed *Wisdom* and *Mind* in the Sentence of *Socrates* now before us: by which the essential and undivided *Unity* of the *Supreme Being* is plainly acknowledged. And yet, immediately after This, we find *Socrates* *distinguishing* the *Cause of All things* from *Mind*, the *Exemplar* of them all, — and from *Soul*, their *Efficient*, — by styling it peculiarly and eminently *Cause*: for the governing *Mind* and *Soul* of the Universe are
spoken.

spoken of in the next Positive Sentence except one, as governing in *virtue* of this *sole Cause* of All things. But the distinction, there meant, is not *real*, as if it were made between *Two* different *Beings*; — 'tis merely *Logical*, like That, which is made between *Intelligible* and *Intellect*, in the *Argument of the Meno*, page 9. and repeated in the Notes to other Dialogues. For this *Triad* of Divine Causes (concerning which, see Note 167) is One and the Same *Mind Universal*. 'Tis of excellent Use, however, to Us Men, to consider the *Divine Mind* as thus *distinguishable λόγῳ*: it furnishes our Understandings with as full and clear a *Conception* of the *Government of the Universe*, as it concerns Us to have. For with this *Distinction*, we contemplate the Divine Being,—first, as he *possesses* in Himself the *ultimate End* of Being, *perfect Beatitude*, ἀγαθὸν ἀπροσδεές, *to which no Good is wanting*. We contemplate him again, as he *enjoys* this all-comprehensive Good by *energising*, that is, by an actual νόησις, *View* or *Intellection*, of *Himself* as τὰγαθὸν *Good its Self*, or Being *universal* and all-comprehensive. We contemplate him farther, as *acting outwardly*, in *this View*, and *with this Intellection*;—continually *displaying* the fair Forms comprehended in Himself; and thus creating an infinite number of *Individual Beings*, of all *Kinds* and *Species*, throughout the Immenfity of the Universe; — *diffusing* through all Nature every *Kind of Good*, adapted to every *Kind of Being*; and thus *providing* a sufficient Relief to the natural Wants of them All; — into Multitudes of those Beings, of different Kinds and Species, *inspiring Sentient Souls*, a distinct Soul into each Individual, with a Power of Self-Motion; thus creating *Animals*, endued with a *Sense* of their proper Good and Evil,—*Pleasure* and *Pain*; — endued with a *Sense* of their own *Wants*, an *Impulse* to seek *Relief*, and an *instinctive Direction*, pointing to the *Means*; — endued with a strong *Propensity* to produce an
Offspring

Offspring from Themselves ; with the strongest *Affection* also for that *Offspring* ; and with as much *Affection* for All of their own *Species*, as may be necessary to the Preservation of that *Species*, and to the Good of other Beings interested in its Preservation. — We perceive all these Animals no less endued with a *Discernment* of whatever is naturally hostile or noxious to them ; and with a *Forefight* of their Danger at distance, for their avoiding it :—we perceive *Fear* implanted in the *Weak*, for their escaping Danger at hand by Flight ; *Boldness* in the *Strong*, for their encountering and repelling it ; and in All, an *Apprehension* of the Means, afforded them by nature for those Purposes, *Swiftness* for Flight, *Armour* for Self-Defence, and *Arms* for Combating : for slight Wounds, given them by their Enemies, and for other Mischiefs incident to them from without, we discover them to have a *Balm* within them, a *self-restoring Nature* : and for the inward Maladys, to which they are liable, we discover in them an *inmate Physician*, directing them to the proper Remedys.—In this View, we contemplate the Great Author of All, as *Universal Soul*, full of *Goodness*, and full of *Wisdom*, continually putting in *Motion* the whole *Animal-World*, through *Appetites*, *Passions*, and *Affections* ; — from which are produced all Animal-Actions, and all Animal-Enjoyment.—In this manner then is the *World of Animals* governed by Universal Mind, the *King of All*. The sole *End* of the Government is the *Good* of those Beings, which are the Subjects of it ; 'tis *administered* by the *Wisdom* of the *Kingly Mind* ; the *Law*, or Rule of the Administration, is comprised in that *Idea*, with which the *Kingly Mind* is fraught,—the Great *Idea of Universal Good* ; — and the *Executer* of this Law is the *Agency* of the same *Mind*, considered as *Soul*, active thro all the *Sentient* Part of his Universal Kingdom. — But farther ; this Logical Division of *Universal Mind*, the *One* sole *Cause* of All things, into *Three*

Causés, the *Final*, the *Formal*, and the *Efficient*, (as if they were Three different essential Propertys, inherent in One and the Same Subject,) discovers to us the *Frame* and the *Origin* of our own *Souls*; and That Discovery opens to us the mysterious manner, in which the Rational and Moral World is governed by the Supreme Governor of all Beings. For by help of the *Distinction* above-mentioned, between the *Three Causes* concurring in *One* Universal Mind, we may perceive the *Rational Soul of Man* to be as it were an *Impress* of that *Divine Triad*.—In the first place; our Notions of *Universality*;—our *Ideas*, or Conceptions of all the Things we are acquainted with, (whether *Substances* or *Attributes*,) in their *Genera* and *Species*, where *Many* are comprised in *One*;—our Perception of *Truths*, the mutual *Relations* between those Ideas;—and our Powers of *Reasoning* from *one* Truth to *another*;—all these Forms and Energys of the Human Mind bear the Stamp of the *Original Ideas*, and of their *Union* in the *Divine Mind*, whose Intellect comprehends All of them together in *One* eternal View.—In the next place; our constant *Wishes* for *Happiness*; our unavoidable *Desires* of whatever we deem *conducive* to it;—our *Attachment* to *Life*, so long only as it promises more *Good* than *Evil* to us;—the Horror we feel at the Thought of *Annihilation*; as it destroys all Hopes of any future *Good* at all;—our Love of *Reality* and *Truth*; and the Delight we take in *Order*, *Harmony*, and *Beauty*, as con-natural to us, and congenial with our *Being*;—all these inward Motions, or Energys, are indelible Marks of our Descent from Him, the *Sovereign Good*, whose perfect Beatitude consists in his *Idea* or *Intelligence* of *Himself*, as the *Fountain* of those *Divine Universals*, just now mentioned, and the *Cause* of *Good* to *All*.—In the last place; the whole Business of *Human Life*, properly so termed, (in the account of which we are not to reckon those Hours, when

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our *Thinking Part* is employed alone, like *Beings of higher Order*, in the contemplation of *Nature* and of *Nature's Cause*, — nor that larger Portion of our Time, which, of necessity, is devoted wholly, like the Life of *Brute-Animals*, to the Service of *the Body*,) all the Actions, peculiar to *Man*, those of deliberate Choice, or of free Will, with every Study, and every Amusement, in which *the Mind* makes use of *the Body*, as her *Instrument*, — Eyes, or Ears, or loco-motive Members; — all these Employments of our Time (in some or other of which we are occupied continually, except when we descend to meer *Animal-Life*, or rise to the *Mental* and *Divine*,) show the restless Activity of the *Human Soul* in pursuit of some *Good*, which is peculiarly *Human*. For wherever the Mind and the Body are employed, Both together, it is always from an *Expectation* of Something, *good* for the *whole Man*, to be found in the *Employ* its Self,—or to follow it, as a *Consequence*, — or, as an *Effect*, to be produced by it.—And this Expectation is raised in us by *Opinion*; the Foundation of which is either *Experience*, or natural *Sagacity*, or *Fancy*, or *Faith* in the Fancies and Opinions of other Men. So that, in all these cases, the *Activity* of a Man's *Soul*, (whether it be exerted in *his own Body only*, without any farther Operation, or whether it be exercised on *external Subjects*, by means of his *Body*,) always operates agreeably to the *Thoughts* or *Opinions* of his *Mind*, with a *View* to the *Benefit* of his whole *Compound-Being*. Hence it follows, that the *Soul peculiar to Man*, if this Account of it be true, is no other than the active *Spirit* of the *Human Mind*, *energising* within a *Human Body*; in consequence of whose *effective Energys*, the *Body*, which it inhabits, is, in all those *Motions* which depend on a Man's Self, moved according to the Will of his own *Private Mind*: in like manner, as the *Great Body* of the *Universe* is actuated, and the Motion of

every Part of it directed, by the energetic and efficacious *Will* of the Sovereign *Mind Universal*. And in like manner, as this *Divine Mind*, by energising *within, throughout, and upon* the *First Matter*, is the *Efficient Cause* of the Outward World—of all those *corporeal and natural* Forms, which it consists of,—and of all the *Changes and Variations* of these Forms, thro *Motion*; (with relation to which *Effects*, the great Author of them is styled the *Mind of Nature*, and the *Soul of the World*, or *Mind and Soul Universal*;) — so the *Human Mind*, energising *within and throughout* her own *Body*, comes to be the *Soul* of this *Body* of hers, so as to move and govern it as She wills; and being also, by means of this moveable *Body*, able to *operate upon* such Forms of Nature as lye within her Reach, and within her Power to move, change, and manage at her pleasure, she becomes the *Efficient Cause* of *artificial* Forms. in every Art which she has learnt. — Now if Arguments from *Analogy* have the Weight of Proofs in any Subject at all, the *many concurring Analogys*, above shown, between the *Soul of the Universe* and the *Soul of Man*, are, we venture to say, abundant Proofs of the *Extraction or Derivation* of the latter from the former.—Against this Doctrine of the *Pythagoreans*, of *Socrates*, and of the chief Philosophers who came after him, except *Epicurus*, many Objections have been made: an Answer to the most formidable of them will serve to establish the Doctrine more firmly; and at the same time will instruct us in That Part of the Knowledge of Nature, which it concerns every Man to be thorowly well versed in,—That, relating to the *Divine Government of Man*, with a View to his *Happiness*. —It has been argued by the Objectors,—that, if *One only Being* governs the whole World, his *Government* must be *absolute*, his *Power unlimited*, and his *Will irresistible*: and that, if the same Being, who governs the World, was the *Creator* of it,
and

and the *Author of Universal Nature*, it follows, that the *Essential Form* or Nature of every Kind of Being, and the *Propertys*, or inherent Qualitys belonging to such Form, are, to every Individual of the Kind, the *Laws* by which it is and must be governed,—a Declaration of the Will of the Supreme Governor. — And the Fact, they say, is indisputable throughout *Inanimate Nature*: for 'tis well known, that all Bodys whatever, in all their *Motions*, uniformly obey the *General Laws*, imprest on all Corporeal Being by its *Creator*. Nor is the Fact less evident, say they, in the *Qualitys* of all Bodys, than it is in their *Motions*: the *Elements* of Nature, for instance, act and are acted on, according to the *Active* and *Passive Powers*, with which they are severally invested by *The All-powerful*: and every *Mineral* and every *Vegetable* operates according to the *Virtues*, with which the Essential Form or Nature of it is endued: for whatever is *certain* in any of the *Arts*, the Mechanical and the Military, in Agriculture and Navigation, or in Chemistry and Medicine, depends on the constant the unfailing Effect of those *Laws*, *Powers*, and *Virtues*.—And this Foundation of our Adversary's Argument undoubtedly is true. For all *Bodys*, and every Particle of Body, whether Elementary or Mixt, not endued with *Sense*, having no *Particular Souls* of their own, are as it were in the *Hands* of their *Creator*, to be moved and managed *immediately* by Him. Their *Motions* therefore, and the Operations and Effects of their several Powers, must of course be as *constant* and as *unerring* as That empowering *Mind* who moves them, as being the *Soul* of the *Universe*, the only *Soul*, which those Bodys have. — The Objectors to the ancient Doctrine concerning Human Nature proceed, and tell us, that all Beings, animated with Souls, no less uniformly obey the Laws implanted in *their* Nature,—the *Laws of Sense*,—being governed in all their

Actions by a Feeling of present, or an Apprehension of future *Pain* or *Pleasure*: for 'tis only thro these their *Animal-Feelings* and *Apprehensions*, say they, that we are able to tame many of the Wild by nature, and to make the naturally Tame subject to our Will. — This also is readily admitted. For all Souls, not endued with *Reason*, having no *Particular Minds* of their own, are *guided* in the Motions which they give their *Bodys*, by the governing *Mind of the Universe*: and his *General Directions*, in what Way they are to go, are given them thro *natural Impulses* or *Instincts*: but These being insufficient to guide them aright, in a World where all things are subject to Change and Motion, *Particular Directions* are superadded continually thro *Sense* and *Memory*,—Sense of the *present*, and Memory of the *past*.—Thus far then the *Defenders* and the *Opposers* of the original and native *Divinity* of Man's *Intellectual Soul* are agreed in their Notions concerning *Nature*, and the *Government of the World*. But here they divide. For the Degraders of Human Nature, proceeding on the Ground of those settled Preliminarys, assert, that the *Divine Government* is alike over all Creatures, uniformly *absolute*, and *despotic*; and that Man acts from *Necessity*, as well as all other Animals, being guided by the same irresistible *Law of Sense*, implanted in all the Sentient Part of Nature. That Faculty in Man, which is commonly called *Reason*, is, according to Them, only a larger Compass of *Imagination*, and a *Memory* more amply furnished, than other Animals are possessed of. And Man enjoys these superior Advantages, say They, from his acquaintance with a greater Multitude of Sensible Objects; into which acquaintance he is brought by the greater number of his Wants. For, being left by Nature less defended, than any other Animals, from the frequent Inclemencys of the Air, and less able to resist the Attacks of an Enemy; being also subject to more
internal

internal Maladys, and to more accidental Mischiefs from without; he is naturally led to seek for Protection and Defence, Relief and Remedy, from all the *Bodys* around him, the *Inanimate*, the *Vegetable*, and the *Animal*; and for these Purposes, to search out their *Occult Qualitys*, that is, such *Propertys* and *Powers* in them, as are *not obvious to Sense*. In the beginning of this Search, Man has no other Guides, say They, than his own *Five Senses*, together with the *Sensible Qualitys* of those Bodys. Afterward, as his *Knowlege of Nature* increases with his Searches and his *Experiments*, his *Memory*, say They, assists him with *Similitudes* and *Analogys*; and These supply his *Imagination*, (which his Wants keep in continual Exercise,) with copious *Matter* for the Invention of *Arts*. Those Arts, say They, which are the most boasted of, as Proofs of Human Wisdom, and of a *Divine Principle* in Man, derived from the *Legislator* and *Governor* of the *Universe*,—the Arts of *Government* and *Legislation*,—prove, that *Man* is no more a *Rational Animal*, than Such as he is pleased to term *Brutes*. For the necessity of making *Penal Laws*, and of governing by *Compulsion*, shows, say They, that Men are not to be restrained from following their Inclinations, Appetites, and Passions, otherwise than by *Fear of suffering* what is *painful*, or of *losing* what is *pleasurable* to the *Senses*. And they pretend, that all instituted *Religions* are built on that very Ground: for that the *Sanctions* of their Prohibitions and Injunctions suppose Men to be governable only thro the same Principles,—Fear of *Sensible Pain*, and Hope of *Sensible Pleasure*, in some Future State of Being. Now, say They, if the Principles of Reason, of Justice, and Goodness, were *essential* to the *Soul* of Man, (as they would be, if the *Essence* of it was *Divine*, or of *Divine Original*,)—if Man could naturally discern between *Just* and *Unjust*,—and if his *Nature* led him to adhere to the former, and to shun the latter,—Human

Laws, and Human Governments, would be then unnecessary for the direction of Man's Moral Conduct: *Universal Justice* would be his *Natural Law*; to which he would be subject, as irresistibly, as all other Beings are to the Laws of Their respective Natures.—But since the Case is quite otherwise, being as above stated, it should seem, say They, that the Soul of Man is derived from some *other Source* than the Divine Mind, the *Fountain of Wisdom*,—namely, from Matter, the *Root of Evil*;—and that, like the Souls of all other Animals, it is *Corporeal* and *Mortal*:—that, as the *Arts of Building* were invented by Men, to shelter them from foul Weather and fierce Animals, so *Religions, Governments, and Laws*, were contrived and framed by Men, to protect and secure them against Those of their own Species, who excelled in Bodily Strength; as it was to be feared, that, without these Inventions, the Men of Might would seize on all the Bountys of Nature for the sole Use of Themselves and their own Familys; and would rob and despoil, injure and destroy Others at their pleasure. — To these and other such Arguments, in which the *Rational* and the *Animal* Natures are confounded together, and the *Soul of Man* is put on a Level (as to *Kind*) with the *Souls of Brutes*, it is answered, — that *Mind*, or the Faculty of perceiving *Mental Objects*, differs from *Sense*, or the Faculty of perceiving *Sensible Objects*, as much, as *Monad* differs from *Multitude*, or as *Universal* differs from *Particular*. — By the *Mind* or Rational Faculty, *many* Sensible Objects, of one and the same Kind, (or rather *all* of the Kind, how *few* of them soever may have fallen under the cognifance of the *Senses*,) are viewed together as *One*, by an instantaneous *Act* (as it were a *Glance*) of the *Mind*; in which she seems to throw her Eye over the whole Sensible Universe; and immediately to sort out, collect together and unite, *All the Individuals* of some *One Kind*,—not only All, then
existing,

existing, but all Those also which are *past*, and all Those which are *to come*; — as if all *Places*, and all *Ages* were at once *present* to her View. So full and complete a *Transcript* of some *Part of Eternal Being*, is This and every other *Mental Object*, in every *Particular Mind*! — By the *Sense*, or Sensitive Faculty, Sensible Objects of the same Kind are perceived *separately* and *distinctly*, Each of them apart from the rest: and tho they may be, afterwards, assembled together in the *Memory* or *Imagination*, yet they still continue *separate*, as so many *distinct Ones*; and still they admit *more* of the same Kind. For *Imagination* is *indefinite*, as well as *Sense*; the *Objects* of Each are *infinite* in *Number*; and to every *Infinite* in *Number*, enumerate as *many* as you will, *More* may be for ever added: so far doth the greatest *Multitude* fall short of *All*! and so different a Thing is *Infinity* from *Universality*! not less far do *Sensible Objects* fall short of *Mental*; and not less different is *Sense* from *Mind*, in *Comprehensiveness*, as well as in *Purity* and *Perfection*. The Difference between them would easily be seen, were they not so closely connected, as they are, in Human Souls: for in These, on the one hand, *Objects of Sense* naturally excite *Ideas*; on the other hand, *Images* of Sensible Objects never fail to obtrude themselves on every *Idea*; nor do they ever fail to narrow and abridge, as well as to vitiate and deprave, every *Idea*, which they mix with.—Man is an Animal, to whose *Sentient Soul* is super-added a *Mind*; or rather, perhaps, in whose Soul are implanted the *Principles of Mind* and *Science*. In Some happy Souls, these Principles take deeper *Root*, than they do in Others of the Kind. Some also are so fortunate, as to meet with a better *Cultivation* of that divine Plant, than Others. In Some Places, it is *sheltered* from the Storms, raised by Malice and Ignorance; it is enlivened by the opening Warmth of Liberty and Independance; and is

6. *strengthened.*

strengthened by the Breath of cool Controversy and ingenuous Debate: in Other Places, it is *exposed* to the Tempests of Tyranny; *blasted* by the biting Airs of Oppression, Penury, or Superstition; or 'tis *dryed up* and *withered* by the Heat of religious Enthusiasm. Some *Kinds* of Science, especially if implanted in *generous Souls*, as it were in Soils fitted to receive them, shoot up quickest, or spread widest, in the Sun-shine of *Praise* and *Glory*: other *Kinds*, the most abstracted from Body, if implanted in Souls the noblest of all, as it were in the richest Soils of the hottest Climates, thrive perhaps better in the *Shade*; tho in Souls less noble, the Saplings of these *Kinds* are apt to dye the soonest of any, if those animating Rays from without do not reach them. To these and the like Causes are to be ascribed the different Degrees of Knowledge, Wisdom, and Virtue, and of their Contraries also, found amongst Men.—*Wisdom, Virtue, and Knowledge*, are seated in the *Rational* Part of the Soul: their *Contraries* possess the *Irrational* Part, in a *Degree* proportioned to the *Want* of those *Qualities* in the *Rational*. Nor only do Men differ greatly, One from Another, in these respects; but also the Same Man, at different times, as greatly differs from Himself. For sometimes we follow the Rules of Reason, Wisdom, and Virtue: at other times we suffer our selves, in violation of those Rules, to be led by *Sense*, and the *Passions* of the Animal-Soul: and These, tho regular and bounded in all Brute-Animals, yet in Man are lawless and infinite; because, Man's *Imagination* being unbounded, Whoever has not the Knowledge of True Good habitually present to his *Mind*, and the Attainment of it always at his *Heart*, is apt to employ his *Memory*, and his *Rational Powers*, in the gratification of his *Desires*; and a Man's Desires, limited as they are by *Nature*, and born of limited *Sense*, yet feeding on the *Fancys*, stretch and grow to a Size beyond
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all Bound and Measure.—Seeing then, that Man is so various and vague a Being, we cannot suppose, that he is to be governed well in any one certain way. Accordingly, in the Divine Government of the World, *Good* and *Evil* Men, the *Wise* and the *Foolish*, are led towards That, which is the *End* of Man, thro' different *Roads*; and *Philosophy* stands, as a *Mercury*, to point them out. — Now the nature of what is *good* is then most conspicuous, when viewed in the most *perfect State* of it, unmixed with *Evil*: and the nature of what is *evil* is not discerned clearly, unless it be carried to *Extremity*, unmixed with *Good*. Let us therefore, on one side, suppose a Man, intelligent and conscious of the *Divine Principle* within himself; and *wise* in knowing, from What *Fountain* he derives the *Superior Part* of his *Soul*: Such a Man must have his Inward Eye steadily fixed on the *Princely Ideas*, presiding in that Part, — namely, τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ καλόν, καὶ τ'αγαθόν, *The Just, The Beautiful, and The Good*,—Ideas, which comprehend the whole Choir of Particular Virtues, every Species of Beauty and Loveliness, and every Kind of Things conducive to real and permanent Felicity: and Such a Man cannot fail of keeping, in every Walk of Human Life, along that unbroken *Line* of *Truth* and *Moral Rectitude*, or *Universal Justice*, every Step of which is strown with Heart-felt Delights, and the End of which is the Height of Human Happiness. For a Man cannot but *fix* his *Eye* on That which he *admires*, if he continues *within Sight* of it; he cannot but *admire* Beauty, if he *perceives* it; he cannot but *perceive* the Beauty which he *looks at*, if he hath a *Sense* of Beauty; and if, having this Sense, or *Taste*, he *perceives* any thing beautiful, and *continues* to *look at* and *admire* it, he cannot help having a *Love* of it, proportioned to the degree of its *Beauty*. Farther; whatever a Man knows *beneficial* to him, he cannot but *prefer* it to every thing

thing which he knows *hurtful* to him, or less beneficial: if the Good, so preferred, is not in his *Possession*, or within his *Power* of possessing it, he cannot but *desire* and *pursue*, till he obtains it; and if he is already *possessed* of it, he cannot resist an Impulse or Desire, which he feels, to *hold* it *fast*. The Man therefore, who knows Himself, his Better Self, and his Origin, — the Man, who perceives, that *Truth* and *Universal Justice* are absolutely the *fairest* and the *best* of Things, and to Man the most *beneficial*, — or, in Platonic Language, that τὸ δίκαιον *The Just* is the Same with τὸ καλὸν καὶ τ' αγαθὸν *The Beautiful* and *The Good*, — He can never lose *Sight* of them; his Heart and Mind are fixed on the *Object* of his *Love* and *Desire*; and as far as he has it in *Possession*, every *Action* of his, moving from that *Love*, strengthens the *Habit*, or *Hold*, which he *has* of the *Object* of it. Now the State of such a Man's Mind must be attended with as much *Happiness*, as the *Human Mind* is capable of enjoying. For, if the *Beatitude* of the *Supreme Being* consists in the Contemplation of Himself,—and if those *Ideas*, of all the most comprehensive, *Beauty*, *Truth*, and *Good*, are *Himself*, — his *Mind*, — the eternal *Object* of his Contemplation,—it follows, that, in imparting those *Ideas*, he imparts *Himself*, and his own *Beatitude*;—on which Participation is founded all the *Happiness*, enjoyed by any Particular Mind. —In the Mind of Man, indeed, even of the *Wiseſt*, these *imparted* and *derivative* *Ideas* must ever fall short of the *Totality*, *Purity*, and *Perfection* of the *Divine Originals*: but Man, however, has a *Power* of purifying his Mind more and more, and of continually advancing it nearer to *Perfection*, by directing his *Mental Eye* to that Place within the *Soul*, (as *Plato* speaks in his *First Alcibiades*,) where the *Divine Mind* is always present; where he governs with *Paternal Authority*, by making his *Presence* perceived and felt; and where he directs, infallibly

aright, That Private Mind, which directs every Action of the Man. Here then the Wise and Good Man finds at the same time the perfect *Rule*, to *direct* his *Conduct*,—and the Parental *Guardian* of his *Mind*, to *prevent* his *Mis-apprehension* of that *Rule*, by rectifying his *Ideas* depraved by *Sense* and *Imagination*. So simple, uniform and easy, is the *Divine Government*, when the Subjects of it are Such happy Souls as, to use the Words of our admirable Poet, are

———*Self-knowing, and from thence
Magnanimous, to correspond with Heav'n;*

Milton, Par: Lost, B. 7.

Such, as are blest also with a *Consciousness* of that Correspondence, and with a *Certainty* of having their *Conduct approved* by the Author of their Being and Happiness, in their *knowing* it to be *agreeable* to his own Mind. — We may farther imagine, that the *Condition* of the Man, whom we have been supposing, is attended with a certain *Circumstance*,—Such a one, as sets in the strongest Light, every Article of the Subject immediately before us;—Such a one, as clearly shows, 1st, the wide Difference between *Sense* and *Reason*, — 2dly, the *Divine Origin* of the *Rational Part* of the Human Soul,—3dly, the *peculiar Happiness* of a Man, the whole *Conduct* of whose Life is under the Guidance of This his better Principle of Action, — and lastly, the *manner* of That *Government*, in which the *Father of all Minds* superintends, supremely blesses, and lifts the nearest to *Perfection*, (the nearest to *Himself*,) the most *excellent* of his *Offspring*. The *Circumstance*, here meant, is the Enjoyment of pure and perfect *Friendship*. That our Supposition of this Circumstance hath a *Foundation* in *Nature*, and is not merely *imaginary*, appears from its being the deepest Bosom-Wish of every Soul, susceptible of so godlike an Affection, to meet

with that Enjoyment. Now, if such a Wish be natural to the Best of the Human Species, the Enjoyment of it must be suitable to their Nature; and if so, it proves incontestably the Four Points, above recited: as will appear from the following summary account of the Nature and Cause of pure and perfect *Friendship*. — All *Benevolence, Love, or Affection*, from the lowest to the highest degree of it, seems to be founded on some real or supposed *Similitude*.—Sameness of *Kind*, inferring many *general Similitudes*, attracts Men, one to another, and associates them together.—Sameness of *Country*, by Birth and Education, producing a *Similitude* between Men in their outward *Manners and Customs*, conciliates a greater degree of *Benevolence*, than is felt by *Strangers* to each other. — Sameness of *Institution* in matters of Discipline or Teaching, as it produces a *Similitude* of *Notions*; and often of *Opinions* also, in the *Mind*, engages a degree of mutual *Benevolence*, greater than what arises from being born and bred in the same *Country*. — Farther; any Two Persons, who have a Knowledge of their *Descent* from one *common Ancestor*, conceive an *Affection* for each other, more or less, in proportion to the Degree of their *Propinquity in Blood*, from a natural presumption of some *Similitude* in their *Tempers and Dispositions*, which they suppose to be derived from the same *Fountain*. — A *Similitude* of *Mind*, between These or any other Two Persons, perceived by Themselves thro an *Acquaintance* with each other, draws on, by degrees, a mutual *Intimacy and Familiarity*, with a free *Communication* of their *Sentiments and Thoughts* on every Subject. — An *Amiability* of *Temper, Mind, and Moral Character*, in which any Two Persons are *alike*, combines them in mutual *Amity, Esteem, and Love*. And as the *Ideas, Sentiments and Manners*, above mentioned, are of all things the *fairest* and the most *amiable*, so they conciliate the most intire *Love and Amity*
between

between Persons, who have their *Minds* filled with those *Ideas*, pregnant with those *Sentiments*, and visible to each other in those *Manners*.—But nothing beside *Assurance*, in Each of the Persons so combined, of the *Continuance* of that amiable Temper, Mind, and Moral Character in the Other Party, can unite them in a *perfect Friendship*, as durable as their Beings. And, altho a particular *Temperament of Body*, in which some one Humour strongly predominates by nature, may perhaps *insure* (in some measure) a *permanent Temper* in the Soul; (an Insurance, rendered very fallible by the *Changes*, to which all Corporeal Things are *liable*;)—’tis certain, that the only firm Ground of Dependance on a *Constancy of Mind* and a *Consistency of Manners*, whether in one’s Self or in any other Person, is the *Science of Mind*, with which That of *Morals* is immediately connected:—nor is it less certain, that the *permanent Abode* of any Science in any *Human Mind*, (so apt to be forgetful as the Mind of Man is,) depends on frequently recurring to the *Principles* of that Science. Now the *Principles* of all the *Sciences* are contained in, and flow from, the *Principles of Mind*: and these *Universal Principles* in their *Purity*, free from all *Images* of Corporeal Things, are no where to be found but in *Mind Universal*;—in That *Divine Light* which, enlightening all *Particular Minds*, enables them to see *whatever Truth* is actually by Them seen;—That *pure Light*, in which eternally dwell all *pure Ideas*; and in which (we may presume) live for ever all such *Minds*, as are entirely *purified* from *Sense*, and *divested* of every the least *Relick* of *Sensible Things*: and from these Premises it follows, that an ample Security for *perfect Friendship*, (the Permanence of mutual Love and Amity, founded on Moral Science,) is to be obtained by Those, and by Those only, who are under the immediate Influence and Guidance of the great *Parental Mind*,—the sole *Bond of perfect Union* between

his *Offspring*.—Thus have we attempted to give a Sketch of the *Character* and the *Condition* of those godlike Souls, who may properly be said, in every Sense of the Expression, to be governed by *Divine Love*. Whether the *Character* does, or ever did, or indeed can, exist on *Earth*, in so high a degree of *Excellence* as we have supposed, is not our Business now to examine: its *Ideal Essence*, and the *possibility* of its *Existence*, suffice to the present Argument: but the *actual Existence* (at least for any considerable time) of a *Character*, the reverse of it, appears much more doubtful.—For if, on the other side, we suppose a Man, wholly blind to the Ideas of *Truth*, *Honesty*, and *Goodness*, — unconscious of any Principle within him, of higher dignity than the Power of Sensation, we must suppose him under the absolute uncontrolled Dominion of the Passions, which arise from external Things magnified by Imagination; — we must suppose *Conscience*, or the innate Sense of *Just* and *Unjust*, and every Feeling also of *Natural* and *Social Affection*, quite stupefied, if not *extinct*, in him; for such a *Sense* and such a *Feeling* always awaken those *Ideas* in every Soul, where they have a Place, as it were, but lye dormant: — we must suppose him therefore to act counter to the Nature of a *Rational* and *Social* Being, by violating the Laws of just *Bound* and equitable *Measure*, whenever they oppose the boundless Demands of his immoderate Passions. — Such are the chief Outlines of a *Character*, too hateful to be dwelt on. — As to the inward *Condition* of such a Man, if such a Man there be, 'tis evident, that he must ever be without the *Complacency* and *Satisfaction*, the *Delights* and *Joy*s, which attend those *Ideas* and *Sentiments*, those *Affections* and *Actions*, belonging to the Character above delineated.—'Tis no less evident, that, being ignorant of his own true Being, and the native Independance of it on all Exterior Things, he must be, first, a Slave to his
Desire

Desire of these Things, for want of knowing any better; and he will, then, easily become a Slave to Those of his own Species, who seem to have them in their Power to bestow, —especially, to some One, who assumes a Power, which of right belongs to None but the Supreme Governor of the World,—the Power of giving and taking them away as He thinks fit:—so that the wretched Mortal, we are here supposing, not only never enjoys any of the Sweets of his *native Liberty*, but has neither Inclination nor Relish for them, perhaps not the least Notion or Thought of them. — It is evident farther, that, being ignorant of his *Relation* to the great *Parental Mind*, (to his natural *Dependance* on whom, he owes his natural *Independance* on all Other things) he can never feel That *Freedom* from all anxious Care, That *Serenity* and *Cheerfulness* of Soul, which can only be inspired by a *Filial Confidence* in *Paternal Wisdom* and *Goodness*, together with a *Consciousness* of *Filial Gratitude*. — And farther still, 'tis evident, that, being ignorant also of the *Brotherly Relation*, which his Mind bears to the Minds of other *Rational Beings*, he can never enjoy the pure and sincere Delights of rational and social *Converse*: nor, abstracted from Selfish Views, can he take Pleasure in the *Company* or *Sight* of Any of his Species; for, conscious of no Benevolence towards them in his own Heart, he supposes none to be in the Hearts of Others: still less is it possible, that he should ever taste of the refined Pleasures of perfect *Friendship* and pure *Love*; since he is utterly incapable of either being, or having, a true *Friend*. — Thus much for the *Condition* of his *Mind*, — a Condition, which any Other, than Such a Man, would deem insupportable to a *Man's Self*. — As to his *Condition*, next, with regard to his *Fellow-Men*, in the Midst of whom he lives: to These, whatever be his Rank amongst them in Outward Life, he must be wholly insupportable,

able, if he acts according to his own Will and Pleasure. For, acting thus, if he be an *Absolute Monarch*, he will be soon slain by his own *Soldiery*: if he be a *King* or Supreme Magistrate, being condemned by *Laws* universally known, his own *Subjects* will become his *Executioners*: if he be a *Private Person*, a speedy End will be put to his lawless Life by the *Magistracy* of his *Country*. But if, living under a Legal Government, such a Man is restrained by the *Laws* from openly acting as he would, 'tis because the Passion of *Fear* is the predominant Passion of his Soul. For if, under this Restraint, he happens to be a *Private Person*, he will use *Fraud* instead of *Violence*, for the Means of accomplishing his Ends, and of escaping, at the same time, the Punishment threatened by the *Laws*: and if he happens to be *King*, he will employ all his *Cunning* to get rid of the Restraint, by secretly and gradually acquiring an *Authority* with the People, *superior* to That of the *Laws*, or a *Power* which may put him above their *Reach*.

——Tolle periculum,

Et vaga profiliet frænis natura remotis.

Horat: Sat:

*The Dread and Danger gone, he gives a Loose
To his wild Genius; like the Mountain-Colt,
Set free from Bit and Bridle, strait he bounds
Exulting; spurns at Man; and high o'erleaps,
Indignant, every Barrier Man can raise.*

But, when this Slave to his own Passions hath usurped an *absolute Dominion* over the *Persons* and *Property*s of the People, and hath assumed an uncontrolled or *arbitrary Sway* in all their *Public Affairs*, if, after This, he abstains from the commission of any Piece of Injustice, to which his *Passions* urge him, and from which (by our Hypothesis) no inward *Sense of Justice* witholds

witholds him,—in such a supposed case, we may fairly conclude, that *Fear*, to which every *Tyrant* must be always subject, operates in his Soul more forcibly, than the rest of his Passions, be they ever so violent. On the other hand, if ever he performs an Action, the Motives to which, in Other Men, would be *Generosity* and *Goodness*, or *Equity* and *Humanity*, 'tis not uncandid to presume, that His sole Motive is to lessen the *Odium* and the *Danger*, which he is sensible that his numerous Acts of *Cruelty* and *Oppression* must have drawn on him, from the People whom he still *dreads*.—And lastly, as to his Condition with regard to the Supreme *Governor of the World*: being (by the Hypothesis) without the least Sense of *true Religion*, or of the *really Divine* Nature, his Fears will make him prone to embrace any *Superstition*, which is suitable to his own impious Fancies. For he will be apt enough to suspect, that Gods there may be,—

*Gods partial, changeful, passionate, unjust ;
Whose Attributes are Rage, Revenge, and Lust :
Such, as the Souls of Cowards may conceive ;
And, form'd like Tyrants, Tyrants can believe.*

But now, as no erroneous Notions, no Ignorance of the Truth of Things, can exempt any Man from being a *Subject* of the *Divine Government*, this Government over Him is exercised thro his *Fear* ; by which he is made, maugre all his *Malevolence*, sometimes to abstain from doing Injuries ; and, notwithstanding his total *want of Benevolence*, sometimes to do Good ; for the avoiding or softening of the Punishment which he dreads. Such, with respect to *God*, to *Mankind*, and to *Himself*, is the *Condition* of the Man whom we have supposed,—a Man, if he may be so termed, thorowly *impious*, *unsocial*, and *unjust*,—incapable of

being governed, like a *Rational and Social Being*, thro *Reason*, *Kindness*, and *Love*; and incapable of the *Happiness*, designed for such a Being; because he is, by our Hypothesis, *dead* to all *Sense* of it. Yet this Wretch, irrecoverably lost as he is to Goodness and Honesty, is found to be, by means of his *Fears*, subservient, tho in a low degree, to the Ends of the *Divine Providence*; whose Views, in his *Government of Man*, are these, — to *oblige* every Man to do Good to Others, and to *restrain* every Man from doing to Others any Evil, — so far as such *Obligation* and *Restraint* are compatible with *Choice* and *voluntary Action*, or with *Man's* being what he is,—a *Moral Agent*. Accordingly, when this Passion of *Fear* ceases to be effectual for those Purposes, in governing Him who is wholly *Selfish* and *Unsocial*, the same Divine Providence *removes* him from amongst Men, — either thro the natural Operation of the same Passion of *Fear*, implanted in All men for a Guard against impending Evils, — or thro the natural Effects of their *Resentment* of the grossest Injustice, and heaviest Injuries, — or thro the *Prudence* of the Civil Magistrate, and the *Wisdom* of Good Laws.—If this Character, the purely *Selfish*, is not a meer *Creature* of Man's *Imagination*; — and if the other, the purely *Rational* and *Social*, hath any *Being*, besides its *Ideal* Being in *Mind*, — 'tis certain, however, that the *Existence* of *Either* of those Characters, on this Earth of ours, is extremely rare. The *real* Characters of *Human Mortals* are to be found between those *Two Opposites*; Some, *wavering* between; Some, *inclining strongly* yet variously to Both *by turns*; but the greatest Multitude, *tending* more or less, and *approaching* faster or slower, towards the One or the Other. 'Tis obvious to perceive, that this dubious or mixt Character must be governed, if governed well, by the mixt Motives of *Love* and *Fear*; — by Each of them, in proportion to the degree of Power and Prevalence, which
either

either the Faculty of *Reason*, or the Faculty of *Sense*, obtain in the Soul of any Man: for the *former* of those *Principles* in the Human Soul is always followed by the *Social Affections*; and the *latter*, by the *Selfish Passions*. Accordingly, the Divine *Cause* of *Harmony* in the *Moral World*, as well as in the *Natural*, employs Both of those Means, *Love* and *Fear*, in the *Government of Human Kind*; — *Love*, for the maintenance of Cordial Agreement amongst Men,—and *Fear*, for the prevention of Mischiefs, so great and so extensive, as would, in time, be destructive of the Species.—Now if the *Character* of a Man, who is governed thro *Love*, be *contrary* to That of a Man governed thro *Fear*; — if the *Objects* of *Love*, which are the Beautiful and the Good, be *contrary* to those of *Fear*, which are the same with those of *Hatred*, the Ugly and the Evil;— if the *Cause* of Concord, and true Love or Friendship, between one Person and another, be That *Congeniality* and *Similitude* of Minds, That constant *Agreement* in their Sentiments and Ideas, the sole *Fountain* of which is *Universal Truth*, and *Right Reason*, in the great *Parental Mind*; and if the *Cause* of Hatred and Fear be of a quite *contrary* Nature, namely, the *Opposition* between one Man and another, on account of the *Rival-Appetites* in Both, the *Fountains* of which are *Sense* and *Imagination*;—it follows, that *Mind*, or the *Rational Part* of the Soul, is so far from being the *same* thing with *Sense*, or the *Sensitive Part* of the Soul, as the Doctrine of *Democritus* affirms, that 'tis quite the *Contrary*. And thence it is, that *Mind* and *Sense*, taken apart, Each from the Other, produce quite *contrary Effects*, — contrary Dispositions, Sentiments, Actions and Habits. And thence also it is, that in the *Human Soul*, where they are joined together, they are often found to be Impediments to each other. We find the Energys of our Intellectual and Rational Powers interrupted and retarded, or an End put

to them for a time, by the intervention of external Objects, such as strike any of our outward Senses strongly. On the other hand, we find the Liveliness of our *Sensations* deadened or weakened by a concomitant Attention of the *Mind* to her own *proper* Objects.—Farther; it has been observed by Some, that Men of Athletic Strength of *Body* are generally weak in their *Mental Facultys*: and that Men of *Understanding*, greater than is ordinary, are wont to be more infirm or tender than ordinary, in their *Bodily* Frame and Constitution.—These Observations, if they are just, added to the before-cited Experience of us all, confirm the Truth of these Platonic Doctrines,—that *Mind* alone is the *Cause* of *Good* and Happiness to that Compound-Being, *Man*; and that his *Body*, one of the *Principles* of which is *Matter*, (the *General Cause* of Evil,) is, on that very account, the *Cause* of That *Evil* which is to Man *peculiar*.

²²⁰ 'Tis evident, that the word *Mind*, in this Sentence, means the *Mind* Universal and *Divine*: the preceding word *Wisdom* therefore is here used in its only true and proper Sense, to signify That *Wisdom*, which is peculiarly essential to the *Divine Mind*. But as it is here *distinguished* from *Mind* *nomi-*
nally, we are to observe, that σοφία *Wisdom* has, in this place, the same Meaning with φρόνησις in the *First Alcibiades*, page 321; and signifys, as it is explained in the *Note* to that Passage, the *Divine νόσις Intellection*;—or the *Divine Mind*, energising inwardly, and *intelligent of Himself*, as being νῆς νοητὸς *Mind Intelligible*, as well as νῆς νοερός *Mind Intelligent*, — and thus viewing in Himself the Originals of all things in all their *Beauty*, and disposed in perfect *Order*,—commensurate and justly congruous Each with Other, and every One of them with the Whole,—for the *sufficient Good* of every Part, and for *complete Good* Universal, flowing from Him, as He is τ'αγαθὸν *Good its Self*. —*Aristotle*, in *Ethic: Nicom: L. 6, C. 7*, defines *Wisdom*, or σοφία, which,

which he says is ἀκριβεστάτη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν *The most accurate of the Sciences*, thus,—ἐπιστήμη καὶ νῆς τῶν τιμιωτάτων *The Science and Intelligence of those Things which are highest in Dignity*;—meaning (as appears from his own words in *Mag: Moral: L. 1, C. 35.*) *Things divine and eternal*; the chief of which are those *Ideas* which are the most Universal, *The Just, The Beautiful, and The Good*,—and those *Principles* of all *Ideas, One and Many, Same and Different*.—*Plotinus*, in *Ennead: 1, L. 2*, distinguishes *Wisdom* from *Mind* thus,—ἡ σοφία ἐν θεωρίᾳ ὧν νῆς ἔχει. *Wisdom* consists in the *Contemplation of those Things, which Mind* (or *Intellect*) *possesses*.—*Iamblichus*, in *Vitâ Pythag:* defines *Wisdom* thus,—σοφία, ἡ τῶ ὄντι ἐπιστήμη τις, ἡ περὶ τὰ καλὰ πρῶτα, καὶ θεῖα, — ὧν μετοχῆ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἂν ἔποι τις καλὰ. *Wisdom* is in truth a certain *Kind of Science*; it is *That* (*Science*), *the Objects of which are those Original and Divine Beautys, by partaking of which, other things may be called beauteous*.—*The Author of the Life of Pythagoras* in *Photius* thus,—σοφία, ἐπιστήμη τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων. *Wisdom* is the *Knowledge of the First Causes*. *Pfellus*, in his ἐπίλυσις, or *Explication of the Six* (old) *Definitions of Philosophy*, speaks thus concerning *Wisdom*, — εἰ ἔστι πρόνοια, δηλονότι καὶ σοφία ἐστὶ, δι' ἧς προνοεῖται ὁ θεός. *If there is a Providence* (in the *Divine Being*), 'tis manifest, that *Wisdom* also is (in Him); for thro *Wisdom* it is, that *God* provides, (providet,) or views in Himself, before the *Generation* of Each temporary *Being*, what is good for such a *Being*.—We have made these Citations from *Philosophers*, who lived in different *Ages*, and were, all of them, well versed in *Plato's* Writings, the more fully to confirm our *Explication of Plato's* Meaning in the Sentence now before us. Hence also we may perceive, on what account *Wisdom* is here placed before *Mind*: 'tis because *Mind*, strictly speaking, is conversant only with *First Principles*; or rather, those *Principles* Themselves constitute *Mind*,
6 and,

and, taken together, are Mind, when *Intellect* only is signified by that word: but to the *Intellection* of those Principles *Wisdom* adds the *Knowledge* of those *Divine Universals*, which, together with the *Knowledge* of them, are derived from those Principles; as the *Parmenides* will afford Occasion to show. Rightly therefore is it observed by *Eustratius*, in commenting on the Passage of *Aristotle*, above cited, — that *Intellect*, taken by its self, τῆς κατὰ σοφίαν λέγεται τελειότητος falls short of the *Perfection* which it hath in *Wisdom*, where it stands at the Head of *Science*. — Nothing farther remains on the present Subject, unless it should be thought necessary to justify *Plato*, in his using the Terms φρόνησις and σοφία indifferently, as if they were synonymous; tho' only σοφία denotes the *Whole of Wisdom*, and hath for its Object all eternal *Truth*; whereas φρόνησις signifies at the most nothing more than *Moral Wisdom*, is peculiar to the *Human Species*, and regards only what conduces to *Human Good* in *Human Action*, and therefore is properly translated into English by the word *Prudence*. If this Objection should occur to any Man's Thoughts, it may be obviated, by considering, that when φρόνησις is attributed to the *Supreme Being*, it is the same with σοφία, because God is both *Truth* its Self, and *Good* its Self: his *Intellection* of Himself, or his *Intellect* in Energy, while he contemplates all *Ideas*, and all *Truths*, in the Archetype of *Universal Nature*, contemplates at the Same time all *Good*, and knows what is *Best* for the Great *Whole* and for every *Part* of it; and his *Outward Action*, for ever accompanying his *Inward Energy*, produceth That *Best*, and most conducive to the *Good* of all and every Being, thro' all successive Ages. — The learned *Porphyry* appears to have had the same Notion of those Terms, σοφία and φρόνησις, when applied to the *Divine Cause* of outward Nature. For, in his Treatise *de Antro Nympharum*, speaking of the *Sensible World*, he says, — κόσμος

PROTARCHUS.

With the greatest Justice, indeed.

SOCRATES.

But farther ; Wisdom and Mind could never be
be without Soul ²²¹.

PROTARCHUS.

ἐστὶ φρονήσεως θεῶν καὶ νοητῶν (1. νοητῆς) φύσεως ἀποτελεσμα· *it is the Effect of the Divine Prudence and of Mental Nature: (meaning the Divine Ideas:)* pag: 131, Edit: Rom: and a little afterward, his words are these, — ἐκ ἐξ αὐτοματισμῶ τοῦ ὅλου τῆτο, καὶ (f. ἡδὲ) τύχης ἀλόγου ἔργον γέγονεν· ἀλλὰ φύσεως νοητῶν καὶ σοφίας ἀποτελεσμα. *This Whole (or Universe) was not produced from Automatism, (or Self-Motion,) neither was it the Work of Fortune devoid of Reason; but 'tis the Effect of Intellectual Nature and of Wisdom.*

²²¹ This Sentence strongly militates against the Opinion of those *Pseudo-Platonists*, who imagine the account, given of the Creation of the World in *Plato's Timæus*, to be *Plato's own Doctrine*; gravely taking in a *Literal Sense* what is no less *Poetically* there written, tho in looser Numbers, than is the Seventh Book of *Milton's Paradise Lost*. — The *Formation* of Matter from *infinite Time past*,—a *Creation* without a *Beginning*,—an *Effect*, co-eval with its *Cause*,—are Things inconceivable to *Vulgar Understandings*. But no less inconceivable to Such are *Eternity* — the Being of eternal *Mind*, and of those pure *Objects of Mind, Ideas*.—The greatest Part of Mankind cannot apprehend any *Mental Object* to be *real*, unless it appears in their *Imaginations*, invested therein with the *Image* of some *Object of Sense*. They have therefore no conception of *Eternity*,

but thro its *Image*, *Time* ; and of This, only by Portions ;—no conception of *Ideas*, but thro their *Images* in *Things Sensible* ;—no conception of *Mind* its Self, devoid of *Body*, *Bulk*, and *Figure*.—As little can they conceive of *Infinity*, or of any *Infinite Things*, One of which is *Time*. — It is thro *Reason* alone, to a Few Persons, who are able in some measure to remove every *Sensible Image* from their Contemplations, that *Eternal Beings* are known to be, and even to be the only Things truly *knowable*, or indubitably *certain*. And only thro *Reasoning* it is, that the Series of Effects, continually produced by those eternal Beings, which are *always in Force*, (the Divine *Mind energising always* within the Subject-Matter of Outward Forms,) is concluded *never* to have an *End*.—But of *Time*, considered as *infinite*, or of *Infinity* in general, there is neither an *Idea*, nor an *Image* ; — no *Idea* of it is to be found in the nature of *Mind* ; no *Image* of it is to be framed in the Human *Imagination* : it is but obscurely knowable to have any Sort of Being at all, thro Conclusions, remotely tho rationally drawn from the following Considerations : — The *Causes* of corporeal Things, being *eternal* and always the *Same*, must have always been followed by their Effects ; and must for ever continue to be so followed :—All these Effects are produced in Outward Nature, and exist in *Time* :—of Such, as are temporary and *transient*, there must have been, and everlastingly must be, a never-failing Succession, if the Same Causes always produce the Same Effects :—and Such, as are *permanent*, are everlastingly in Motion, a *Motion periodical* :—these periodical Motions are the *Measures* of Time to each other, and to all Beings which are *transient* :—the *Periods* of their Motions are the larger Parts or *Portions* of *Time* ; and being *visible*, become Objects of *Imagination* :—Imagination can *divide* these Parts *ad infinitum* ; and borrowing from *Mind* whatever abstracted or pure *Numbers* she pleases, can
add

add one Portion of Time to another, and multiply any Portion of it, without End. — Now as *Number* is *Infinite*, the best Notion, that can be gathered, of *Infinite Time*, is thro its Analogy to *Infinite Number*. But as the *Notion* of Infinite Number is merely *Negative*, and consists in the rejecting of every *Bound* that can be set to Numbers by the *Mind*, our best Notion of *Time*, considered as *Infinite*, is no better than our Notion of *Infinite Number*, that is, merely *Negative*. Just such another Notion is That of the Infinite *First Matter*,—a Notion, framed in like manner, by rejecting every *Bound* that can be set to *Substance*, and every *Positive Attribute*, except the bare *Capacity* of receiving some *Form* or other into any imaginable Portion of it. Another such is our Notion of *Infinite Space*; for it is acquired by rejecting all *Form* and all *Substance* too,—*Mind* as well as *Matter*,—from our consideration of it. Hence it may be justly said of *Infinite Space*, and of *Infinite Time* also, the Same which *Plato* says of the *First Matter*, that 'tis *μὲν πρὸν* scarcely credible. Those Persons indeed, who duly consider of these Infinites, *Matter*, *Space*, and *Time*, are, by the sacred Laws of Reasoning, and the Necessity of admitting the truth of rational Conclusions from undeniable Premises, compelled to believe in them, merely *Notional* as they are, and Objects of neither *Intellect*, nor *Reason*, nor *Sense*, nor *Imagination*; because they are found *necessary* to the *Existence* of those Corporeal Forms, both the permanent and the transient, which are the *necessary* and *everlasting* Effects of *necessary* and *eternal* Causes. But because such Notions, founded on such Considerations, enter into the Heads of None but Speculative Persons, it was deemed proper, by the wise Legislators of ancient Ages, to induce the unphilosophical Multitude to a Belief (Such, as they are capable of,) in the *Divine Causes* of all Things which affect their *Senses*, by representing those *Causes*,

as *prior in Time* to the whole *Visible Universe*. They assigned therefore to the endless Motion, Change, and Succession of all Bodys whatever, a certain *Beginning in Time*; and thus rendered the *Creation* of this ever-moving, ever-changing, and ever-flowing Scene of Things a conceivable Object of *Religious Faith*.—In the mean time, however, the philosophical Truth, on this Subject, was not withheld from Any, whose natural *Genius*, favoured by a *Liberal Education*, and by a competency of external *Means*, inclined them to the Study of *Nature* and of *simple Truth*, regardless of Popular Opinion. Accordingly, Men who professed a Knowledge of *Nature*, and of the *Causes* of Natural Things, were not only *tolerated* by all Wise States, but were even *encouraged* to assist Others in their prosecuting of these Studys, to fit them the better for a Share in the *Government*, should they ever be called to it. For a Knowledge of the *Truth*, undisguised by *Fables*, was deemed one of the necessary Qualifications of a *Governor*; because if he knew not the *Reason* and the real *Foundation* of Popular Opinions and Public Establishments, he could not know, which of them were proper to be *supported*, or *improved*, and which to be *corrected*, or quite *abolished*.—Hence arose the *Two-fold Doctrine* of Those, who were both *Legislators* and *Philosophers*, concerning this Point. An Instance of This we have in *Orpheus* and his Followers. For in those Fragments of the *Orphic Theologers*, recorded by *Proclus*, we read an Account of the *Origin of Things*, very different from that Poetical Tale, (authorised by a Tradition, probably derived from *Orpheus* Himself,) with which *Apollonius of Rhodes* feigns *Orpheus* to have amused the *Argonautic Mariners*. Another Instance is the seeming Difference between the *Pythagoreans* on this Subject. For *Ocellus*, in whose Country, which was *Lucania*, his Brothers of the *Italic School* had never employed their Skill in
Legislation,

Legislation, teaches, as expressly and plainly as *Aristotle* Himself does, that *Time* and temporary *Things* always were; the *World* being co-eval with the *Principles* and *Causes* of it. On the other hand, *Timæus*, a Citizen of *Locris*, (in which, and in many neighbouring Cities of Italy, *Timaratus* and other *Pythagoreans* had instituted *Civil Laws*,) seconds, in his Treatise *περὶ ψυχᾶς κόσμῳ concerning the Soul of the World*, the established Opinion, that the *World* was created *in Time* out of a *Chaos* of pre-existing Particles of Matter. Perhaps also That illustrious *Pythagorean* Philosopher and Didactic Poet, *Empedocles*, at the inconsistency of whose Writings Mr. *Harris* expresses a very just Surprise, may be reconciled to Himself, if we suppose, that he wrote his Poem *περὶ φύσεως concerning Nature*, like *Parmenides*, for the Use of *Philosophers* only; and that, like *Hesiod*, he wrote another Poem, entitled, *κοσμοποιία the Creation of the World*, (cited by *Aristotle* in his *Physics*, Lib: 2.) suitable to the Taste of the *People*, and favourable to that Article of their Faith, founded by *Orpheus*,—the *Creation* of the *World* out of a *Chaos*. For *Such* a *Creation* is by all its Advocates supposed to have been *gradual*, one Part of it after another.—But, whatever was the meaning of *Empedocles* in his *Cosmopœia*, certain it is, that *Plato*, in his *Timæus*, delivers not the Sentiments of *Socrates*. That whole Dialogue is only a copious and elegant Commentary on the above-mentioned Treatise of *Timæus* the *Pythagorean*, who is there represented as the principal Speaker, expatiating on his own Doctrine. It is therefore not to be wondered at, that in That Dialogue the *Soul of the World* is said to be *created*; and yet that in the present Sentence of *the Philebus*, which asserts, that “*Mind can never be without Soul*,” the Co-eternity of That Soul with the Divine Mind is evidently implied; for this Sentence is spoken by *Socrates*. He had, before, shown the Truth of it,

by this Argument;—every animated *Body* infers an animating *Soul*; and every *Soul*, whose Actions and Operations are, all of them, *directed wisely* for the *Good* of that *Body* which it animates, infers a directing *Mind within*, intelligent of *Good*, and of the best *Means* to obtain it for That which is under its Government and Care. So that, to explain the nature of the Universe, according to the Doctrine of *Socrates* and *Plato*, we are to begin thus;—*Good* is in the *Mind*, as the *motive* Principle of *Mind's Design*;—*Mind* is in the *Soul*, as the *directing* Principle of the *Soul's Operations*;—and *Soul* is in the *Body*, as the *moving* Principle of all the *Body's Motions*.—But an attentive Reader must have observed, that *Socrates* divides his Argument in proof of a governing *Soul* of Nature, in the following remarkable manner;—First, he leads us to the contemplation of it, by considering the *External World* as One great *Body*, in which all the Elementary Parts of Nature are united; and afterwards, in the Sentence now before us, he brings back our Thoughts to it again, thro the consideration of the *wise and good Government* of that World, and the necessity of supposing a *Soul*, for That *Wisdom* and That *Goodness* to *reside in*. By this way of arguing,—first, from *Body*, which is *inferior* to *Soul*, — and afterwards, from *Mind* and *Wisdom*, which are at the *Head* of all things, — it should seem, that *Socrates* considered the *Soul of the World*, as the *intermediate Link*, connecting the *Divine Mind* with *Outward Nature*. This Opinion was certainly entertained by Those, who, for the wise Ends above mentioned, wrote Poetical Histories of an *original Creation* of the World at a certain *Time*, but to endure for ever; and by Those likewise, who framed an Hypothesis, somewhat different, of a periodical *Destruction* and *Renovation* of All things *alternately* for ever. For the Philo-
sophers,

phers, who favoured Either of these Systems, very consistently held, that the *Soul of the World* was a *Temporary Being*, *coeval* with That *World* which it animates. The *Eleaticks* also, 'tis probable, in asserting the *Unity of All things*, considered the *Soul of the World* in the same manner, as the *connecting Medium* between things *intelligible* and things *sensible*. For such seems to be the true Sense of this Verse of *Parmenides*, cited in Notes to *the Banquet*, page 114,

Ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τέτων, Δαίμων, ἡ πάντα κυβερνᾷ.

where, by using a Relative Pronoun Feminine, we presume that he means ἡ ψύχη *the governing Soul of the Universe*. — Agreeably to this Explication, when the same great Philosopher said, τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸν νῦν ταυτὸν εἶναι, *that the Soul and the Mind were the Same Thing*, he meant not to confound *Sense* and *Intelligence* together, as *Democritus* did afterwards: he seems to have had the same Meaning with *Socrates* and *Plato*, — that *Universal Soul* was essentially the Same Being with *Universal Mind*; but that, considered with regard to the *Sensible World*, He is the *Animating Soul*, — with regard to the *Intelligible*, he is the *Intelligent Mind*. It should seem also, that *Socrates*, in proving the Existence of an *Universal Soul*, from the beneficial, salutary, and restorative Operations of some universal *Active Cause* in and throughout Nature, — *after* he had *already* proved it, in the same way of arguing by *Analogy*, which he had used in proving the Existence of the Four Elements of Nature and their Mixture in One Corporeal World, — took this *Two-fold* way of instructing his Disciples in the true Doctrine of *One Divine Soul of the Universe*, on purpose to prevent their falling into That Error concerning Souls, which perhaps was
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the principal Ground of *Polytheism*, — the attributing to every *Element* and to every *Compound-Being* of Nature, to every *Mineral* and every *Vegetable* Form, as well as to every *Animal*, a *Particular Soul*, a Soul of its own; intelligent to govern the Corporeal Form which it animates, and concerned for the Interests of that Form; careful to defend it against the Danger to which it is naturally exposed, and studious to heal whatever Mischief it receives from the Violence of mightier Beings. But *Socrates*, as we have just now seen, ascribes the wonderful Powers, with which all Natural Forms are endued for their own Preservation, to the *Wisdom* of *One Mind*, dwelling in *One Soul*, active thro all Outward Nature. It appears therefore, that, in the Opinion of *Socrates*, all such Forms of Nature, as show no Signs of their being endued with any *Pre-sensation* of Danger incident to them, or with any *Sense* of Pain from Mischiefs befallen them, having no *Souls of their own*, are acted on immediately by the *Great Soul of the Universe*; that from His *conjoining* and *assimilating Virtue* they receive sufficient Nourishment, just Growth, and the Faculty of propagating their Species; and that from the *Providence of His Mind* they receive a natural Defensive Armour, innate Strength to bear up against ordinary Oppressions, and Remedys within Themselves against ordinary Maladys.—From this Doctrine it is argued, in the way of *Analogy*, that all those Beings, which are evidently endued with *Sense*, but show no Signs of having *Reason* or any *Universal Ideas*, — such Beings, as derive from *Nature*, thro an instinctive Perception of their Make, certain *προλήψεις*, or *previous Apprehensions* of their *native Powers*, long before they are able to exert them, — inspired also by *Nature* with a *Dread* of their *natural Enemies*, the first time they see them, and with an *Appetite* for their *natural Food*,

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the first time it is offered to any of their Senses, — deriving their Apprehension of future Things *contingent*, meerly from their *Memory* of *similar* Things past, without magnifying or adding to them in their Imaginations, — that such Beings, rightly termed Brute *Animals*, are under the Rule and Government of the *Soul of Nature*, in all their *Actions*, as immediately and as absolutely as the Passive and the Active *Elements* of Body, and as all *Fossil* and *Vegetable* Forms are, in all their *Motions*. For this *Universal Soul*, from whom the Particular Souls of all Animals are derived, (and by whose Influence every Animal-Soul is supported,) being full of *Providential Wisdom*, directs the Energys and the Actions of each *Particular Soul*, by giving it con-natural *Instincts* and occasional *Impulses* to energise and act as it ought; — in other words, by *exciting* in it those *Pre-Sensations* and *Pre-Conceptions*, those *Appetites*, *Passions*, and *Affections*, by which alone it is *impelled* to Action, for the Good of the Body which it animates, and for accomplishing the Ends of Divine Goodness in the formation of that Body. — It is farther argued, from the like Analogy, that those Beings, who are rightly termed *Rational Animals*, to whose *Souls* are super-added the Principles of *Mind* and the Faculty of *Reasoning*, — altho they derive their *Souls*, like all other Animals, from the Great *Soul Universal*, — yet derive their *Mental Principles* and *Rational Faculty*s immediately from the *Mind* of that Great Soul, *Mind Universal*: — that, in consequence of this *Highb Birth* of their Nobler Part, they are, by nature, *free* from an absolute Subjection to the Power of *Corporeal Necessity*; and that, for the Conduct of their Lives, they are, by nature, committed to the Guidance and Government of their own *Reason*, as soon as the Seeds of Universal Ideas within them are sufficiently developed, their Minds amply enough expanded, and their Powers of Reasoning matured; — that, till then, during the

long time of their Infancy and natural Nonage, they are, by nature, and the *superintendant* Care of Divine Providence, intrusted to the *immediate* Care and Government of their Parents; and that when this Parental Care is naturally superseded, and they are delivered over to their own free Will, to *choose*, whether they will subject Themselves and their Actions to the Rule of the *inferior* Part of their Souls, and to the Dominion of blind Necessity, or whether they will submit to the Laws of their *superior* Part, whose Government is perfect Freedom, and whose Leading conducts Such as follow it, (not blindly, but with their Mind's Eye open and clear to see every Step they tread,) to That End which they have in view,—Happiness. For if they make it their Choice to live under the Government of Reason, the Force of *their own Reason*, too weak of its Self to resist their *Passions*, (strengthened, as these are, by the subtle Sophistry of *Imagination*,) is always aided and supported effectually by That *Sovereign Reason*, That unconquerable *Truth*, ever present within every Particular Mind: with which *Standard-Truth*, and unerring *Reason*, a constant *Communication*, free and unobstructed, is necessary to prevent any *Mind*, inhabiting a *Human Body*, from falling into Error, and mistaking Falshood for Truth; perhaps, to prevent it from finally relinquishing its immediate Seat, the *Soul*: no less necessary is it, than a constant *Communication* with the *Universal Soul* is necessary to preserve any *Particular Soul* from sickening and drooping, and falling from its Seat, the *Body*. — Now, if the above Arguments are valid, and if these Conclusions are rightly drawn, — namely, that neither *Intelligence* nor *Sense*, neither *Mind* nor *Soul*, is imparted to the simple *Elements* of Body, nor to *Fossils*, nor even to *Vegetables*; and that no Degree of *Mind* or *Reason* is imparted to any *Animals*, known by Us,—to any Compound-Beings, having *Souls* of their own, or a

Principle

Principle of Self-Motion within Themselves, — except to Those of the *Human Species*;—it may reasonably be concluded farther, that no Portions of the simple *Elements*, no *Fossil* nor *Vegetable* Forms, are *capable* of receiving or retaining any *Sentient Soul* within them; and that the Souls of no *Brute Animals* are *capable* of receiving or retaining the *Principles* of *Mind* and *Reason*: for the *Divine Goodness* never withholds from Any of his Creatures any *Good*, which they are *capable of*. — The Cause of those Incapacities, which attend the Beings above-mentioned, seems to be the Structure of their Frames. It seems necessary to the Being of every particular *Sentient Soul*, that it be seated and *circulate* within a *Body*, *compounded* of all the Four Elements. For *Fire* and *Air*, the Active Elements, are the only fit *Vehicles* of the *Soul*, in her quick and vigorous Motions: *Earth* and *Water*, the Passive Elements, are the *Receptacles* of *Fire* and *Air*; none of whose Particles could be detained in any certain Place, otherwise than by Portions of *Earth* and *Water* inclosing them. Again; the *moist* and *fluid* Element is a necessary *Vehicle* for *Air* and *Fire*, jointly to perform their *regular Circuits* throughout the *Body*: the *dry* and *solid* Element is necessary to the composition of circulatory *Tubes* for the conveyance of the *Fluid*: the *hot* Element is necessary to *preserve* the *Fluidity* of *Water* from being destroyed by *Air*: and this *cold* Element is necessary to *cement* together the Particles of *Earth*; (by the *Medium*, we presume, of *Watery* Particles, *congealed* by *Cold*;) for intense Heat totally dissolves the strongest *Cement*, made by *Air* and *Water*, and destroys all Cohesion. It seems necessary too, that a *Body*, inhabited by a *Sentient Soul*, should not only be *compounded* of all the Four Elements, but should also be *organised*, for the sake of *Motion*, as well as of *Sensation*. For we presume, that *Organs of Sense* are necessary to *Sensation*; which Faculty not only would be *useless*, without the Power of *moving towards* what is felt agree-

able and good to the Sentient Being, but would also be *inconvenient*, without the Power of *moving away from* what is felt *disagreeable* and *evil*: and these Powers, we presume, they could not have, without having *Organs of Motion*. Now *Fossils*, which are by nature fixed within the Earth, and *Vegetables*, which are therein rooted, being thus denied the *Power of Local Motion*, have no occasion for *Organs* necessary to the *Exertion* of such a Power, — a Power, absolutely necessary to their Well-being, had they *Sense*. And as to the simple *Elements*, they are evidently moved only by the *Laws of Mechanical Necessity*, — *Laws, implanted in all Body by the Soul of the Universe*, and put in *Force* continually by that Great Soul Himself. — Thus it appears, that only *Animals* are so framed, as to be capable of *Sentient Soul* and *Self-Motion*, or of the *Passions* and *Appetites*; which arise in the Soul from her *Sensations*, and excite her to all her *Outward Actions*. — The internal and immediate *Organs of Sensation*, as well as of *Motion*, are the *Nerves*; which have their Origin, All of them, either in the *Brain*, or in that Production of the Brain, the *Spinal Marrow*. In these Glandular Parts is secreted from the Blood a *Fluid*, which is called the *Nervous Fluid*, because it is conveyed to the *External Organs of Sensation*, and to Those of *Motion*, thro the *Nerves*; — a Fluid, probably composed of the finest and purest *Lymph*, and of those Portions of *Air* and *Fire*, in which the *Animal-Soul* immediately is seated, and which are, on that account, not improperly termed *Animal-Spirits*. The *Nerves* have their *Fibres* more *elastic*, than are the *Fibres* of any other Parts of the Body; and their *Coats* more *solid*, and less *porous*, than any other *Membranes*. Their *Elasticity* perhaps is owing to the *Purity* of those Particles of *Air*, which they convey: and their *Solidity* (which seems necessary to prevent a Lateral Escape of the *Fire* which they convey,) is perhaps owing to the strong
Cement,

Cement, given to all their component *Earthy* Particles, by those *Aerial* and *Lymphatic* Particles together, which the more rapid *Igneous* leave behind them, there deposited. It seems therefore, that the *Sentient Soul*, tho' seated universally in the *Animal Spirits*, and carried throughout the Body in the *Nervous Fluid*, yet hath her *Chief Seat*, and as it were the *Metropolis* of her Dominion, in the *Head*. The *Irafcible Part of this Soul*, τὸ θυμοειδὲς τῆς ἀλόγου ψυχῆς, is by *Timæus* (whom *Plato* follows in his Dialogue of the same Name,) held to have its *Central Seat* in the *Heart*: the Ground of which Tenet, we presume, is This; — that to the *Cavity* of the *Heart*, as to some great *Sea* or Receptacle of Waters, all the *small Veins*, like *Rivulets*, which in their Progress unite and form large Rivers, are continually transmitting the *whole Mass* of Blood thro' the *great Veins*; whilst the *Arterys*, like subterraneous *Passages* from the *Sea*, continually convey the Blood again from the *Heart* to the *Capillary Vessels*, which are as it were the *Fountains* of the *Venous Blood*: now the Motion of the *Heart*, and consequently of the *Blood* in all its Vessels, is differently affected by *all the Passions* of the *Soul*, but chiefly by those which arise in her from her *Sense* of *present* Injuries, Mischiefs, or Misfortunes, or from her *Expectation* of any such to come, or from her *Remembrance* of the *past*.—The *Appetitive Part* τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν of the *Animal-Soul* hath, according to the Doctrine of the same *Timæus*, the *Liver* for its *Center*: — and this Doctrine is, we presume, founded on the following Discoverys in the *Animal Oeconomy*;—that from the *Blood*, which is a Mixture of various *Humours*, that is, of various Combinations of the Four Elements in different Proportions,—Combinations, differently figured, or endued with different Qualities, for the various Purposes of Nature in the *Animal*, — these *Humours* are, to serve those Purposes, *secreted* by different *Glands*, severally appropriated to the several Se-

cretions; — that One of These *Glands* is the *Liver*; which is appropriated to the Secretion of the *Bile*, — a Humour, containing a large Proportion of *fixt Fire*, combined with a gross muddy *Earth*; — that the *Bile*, after its *Secretion*, is the Soul's principal Instrument in her Work of *digesting* the *Food*; — and that, before its Secretion, whilst it *circulates* in the Blood, but more especially, when Part of what had been secreted is *re-absorbed* into the Blood, uncorrupted and exalted, it is the chief *Stimulus*, to excite all the *Appetites* which are natural. — Thus much seems sufficient to show, from What natural Incapacity it is, that *Sentient Soul* is communicable only to Those Corporeal Beings, in whose *compounded* and *organised* Bodys *Air* and *Fire* continually *circulate* together. — What is wanting in the Composition of all known *Animals*, except in Those of the *Human Kind*, to enable them to partake of *Intellect* and *Reason*, is much more difficult to be discovered. It seems inconceivable indeed in any other way, than by recurring to the very ancient Doctrine, (espoused by *Plato* in his *Epinomis*, and by *Aristotle* in his Treatise *de Cælo*,) concerning a *Fifth Element*, finer than the finest of the commonly known *Four*, and having its proper Place in the *Heavens*, or *Æther*; above that Region of Air and Fire, the *Atmosphere*. But the difficulty quite vanishes, on supposition of the Truth of that Doctrine; the *Ætherial* Fire being thus *distinguished* from *That* Fire, which is One of the Ingredients in all natural Compound-Bodys, either *fixt* in them as in *Fossils*, or *passing thro* them as in *Vegetables* from a warm Air, or continually *circulating within* them as in *Animals*. — For the Maintainers of this Distinction teach, that, as the *Sensitive* Soul has her *immediate Seat* in a Portion of *Air* and *Fire*, in like manner the *immediate Seat* of the *Rational* Soul of Man is a Portion of universal *Æther*; and that no other known Animals have, in their composition, any Particles of
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this finest of all the Elementary Bodys, unobstructed and disincumbered: whether it be, because their *Blood* is too *gross*, and the *Lymph* of it charged with too many *Earthy* Particles, not to depress, clog, or overwhelm a small Quantity of so delicate a Substance; (for Human Blood is less impure than the Blood of any Brute Animals;) or whether they want *Glands* in the Brain, *fine* enough to *secrete* the *Ætherial* Fluid, and to *free* it from the other Elements; or whether it be, that the *Membranes* of their *Vessels* in the Brain, however *thick* they may be, are yet too *porous* to prevent the Lateral Escape of it.—Such of the ancient Philosophers, as admit not of a *Fifth Element*, recognising only *Four*, hold, that the Two lightest of them, *Air* and *Fire*, are no where *pure*, but in the *Heavens* or *Æther*; for that, in all the Space between the *Heavens* and *Earth*, they are *mixed* with Particles of the Two heavier Elements,—with *Vapours* arising from the *Waters* of this Terraqueous Globe, and with *Effluvia* from the *Earth* and all *Earthy* Bodys.—According to this Account, it should seem, that the *Fire* of *Heraclitus*, and the *Stoicks*, is no other Element than the *Æther* of *Plato* and *Aristotle*. These Two Hypotheses are, indeed, *essentially* so much *alike*, that 'tis doubtful, to which of them *Virgil* alludes, in the Two following Passages of his Poems; One, in the *Sixth Book* of his *Æneid*; where he imitates *Plato* in espousing the Eastern Doctrine of a *Purgatory*, in which Human Souls, departed from their Bodys, and not doomed to *Tartarus*, are confined,—

*Donec longa dies, perfecto temporis orbe,
Concretam exemit labem, purumque reliquit
Ætherium sensum, atque auræ simplicis ignem.*

A Paraphrase of which Verses, by way of a Comment thereon, we have attempted thus,—

—Their

—*Their periodic Time
Till Ages have compleated; and the Stains,
Sunk in the Soul, (when erst in Body plung'd,
She flounder'd in the Mire of earthly Life,)
Now purg'd away, th' ætherial Sense is left
Pure; and the Soul, in pure celestial Fire
Seated, again inhales th' untainted Air
Of Æther.*—

The other Passage is in his *Fourth Georgick*; where, having produced several Proofs (Signs and Instances the Poet himself calls them) of the wonderful *Instincts* of Bees, he adds,—

*His Quidam signis, atque hæc exempla secuti,
Esse apibus partem divinæ mentis, & haustus
Ætherios dixere:—*

Of this Sentence also we have attempted an Explanatory Paraphrase, as follows,—

*Hence 'tis said by Some,
That from pure Æther, Particles of Air
Ætherial, fraught with Mind, on Bees descend.
Thus, as they breathe, their little Beings inhale
Sense Intellectual, of the Mind Divine
A Portion.*—

But, as we just now observed, the *difference* between the Doctrine of *Plato* and That of the *Stoicks*, concerning the finest of all Corporeal Substances, seems to have been, like the *differences* between their *Moral* Doctrines, merely *nominal*. For the Element, peculiarly termed *Æther* by *Plato* and *Aristotle*, (to distinguish it from the Element of *Fire*,) was by *Heraclitus*, (with whom

whom in his Doctrines concerning Nature the *Stoic* Philosophers agreed,) termed *Fire* and *Æther* indifferently; as being, with Him, words of the same Import, when applied to the *First corporeal Principle* of Things, or, as *Aristotle* more justly terms it, the *First Body*. *Anaxagoras* also is censured by *Aristotle* in *Meteorolog*: L. 1, C. 3. & *de Cælo*, L. 3, C. 6. for his promiscuous use of the terms *Æther* and *Fire*, in speaking of the *Heavens*; whereas, in all former Ages, they had been rightly distinguished, and applied to different Parts of the Universe.— But, that all these Philosophers had the same Meaning, is put beyond a Doubt by the Doctrines of *Chrysippus*, a genuine *Stoick*, on this Point. For *Chrysippus*, using the word *Æther*, just as we use the word *Sky* in *English*, to signify all that immense Tract of Space, which is (to Us) higher than Our Atmosphere, asserted, in his Treatise concerning *Providence*, that τὸ καθαρώτερον τῆ ἀϊθέρος the purest Part of *Æther* was the Seat of τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῆ κόσμου That which governs in the World, meaning MIND. — The Nature of this fine Substance was generally supposed to be the same with That of *Light*, and void of all *Sensible Qualities*; (some or other of which belong to all Bodys beside, to the *Elementary*, as well as to the *Mixt*;) for *Light*, tho' it gives *Visibility* to the External World, its Self is *invisible*: and the *Motion* of it was generally held to be swifter than That of the rapid *Lightning*; for *Lightning* is a Collection of *Fire* mixed with *Air*, let loose from its Confinement in that Region of impure Vapours, the *Atmosphere*: But the purest *Æther* was universally deemed to be the Seat of those Beings, who in the *Vulgar System* of Religion were stiled *Gods* of the highest Order: whence the *Populace* readily imagined that the *Bodys* of these Deitys were wholly *Luminous*; (the *Soul* or *Mind* of Each being invested with no other *Body*, than a Portion of *Light* or pure *Æther*;) and readily embraced the Worship of.

the *Celestial Bodys*, as soon as it was proposed to them by those Legislators, who seemed to think, that *visible* Objects of *Religious Worship* were the properest for the People.—That the truly Divine Being himself, the *Mind Universal*, the *Father* of all those *Particular Deitys*, hath his *Capital and Chief Seat* τὴν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρώτην ἔδραν in the *highest Heaven*, or purest *Æther*, was a Doctrine of the most remote Antiquity, and universally received; as we are assured by the ancient Writer of the Treatise περὶ κόσμου, who (if he was not *Aristotle* Himself) followed in this Point *Aristotle's Judgment*. See his Treatise *de Cælo*, L. 1, C. 3. And we are told by *Porphry*, in *Vitâ Pythag:* pag: 41, Edit: *Kuster:*, that *Pythagoras* embraced this Doctrine of the *Persian Magi*, which he had learnt from them,—τῷ θεῷ (for the word παρὰ, which precedes, ought to be omitted,)—εὐκέναι τὸ μὲν σῶμα φωτὶ, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἀληθείᾳ —that the *Supreme Being* has, for his *Body* as it were, the *LIGHT*; and for his *Soul*, *TRUTH*. — But farther; — the pure *Æther* was supposed by the Ancients not only to be the *Abode* of *Celestial Beings*, but to be also the *Native Place* of all *Rational Souls* whatever. See *Note 74* to this Dialogue. Indeed on no other Foundation, than Such an Hypothesis, could have been rationally built many ancient *Opinions*, almost universally received, and remaining to this day; — *Some*, concerning the *Lapse*, or the *Descent* of *Rational Souls* from *Heaven* into *Human Bodys*; (to account for which *Degeneracy*, many *Allegorical Fables*, and *Mythic Parables*, were of old spread amongst the *Eastern Nations*;) — concerning the *Return* also of the *Human Soul*, after its *Departure* from this *Earthly Body*, and travelling thro divers *Regions* or *States of Purification*, to her native Country, the pure *Æther*; — *Others*, agreeable to the Doctrine of the *Stoicks*, as well as to That of *Plato*, concerning a *distinct* and separate *Existence* of the *Souls* of *wise and good Men*,

Men, until a certain Period of Time, when they will have attained to such a degree of *Wisdom* and inherent *Virtue*, as may qualify them for being *essentially* and *substantially* united to the Universal and Divine *Mind*. — But Proofs of the near *Neighbourhood* between the Philosophers of the *Porch* and Those of the *Academy*, in their Notions of Man's *Rational Soul*, have their proper Place in Notes on the *Phædrus* and the *Phædo*; the Subject of Both which Dialogues is the *Superior Soul of Man*. Such Reasonings belong not immediately to Annotations on the *Philebus*; the Subject of which is much more *Divine*,—the *Mind* and *Soul* of the whole *Universe*. However, since in the *First Part* of this Dialogue, the Frame of Man's Nature is *divided* into its Two most General constituent Parts, *Body* and *Soul*, — his *Body*, analysed, and the *Elements* of it shown to be the Same with the Elements of all *Corporeal Nature*,—his *Soul* distinguished into *Sensitive* and *Intellective*,—the *former* of which he has in common with Brute Animals,—the *latter*, His sole Prerogative, no Brute Animal being able to receive and to retain it;—since also it appears, that the *Sensitive Soul* is seated in *Air* and *Fire*; and the *Intellective Soul*, in an *Ætherial Body*, a Portion of Universal *Æther*;—it may be pertinent in this place to observe, on the Subject of these *Two Souls*, (evidently found to be thus distinct,) that, tho they are *united* together in the upper Part of Man's Body, his *Head*, their common Mansion, (agreeably to the *Notions* and perhaps also to the *Consciousness* of all *Mankind*, as well as to the *Doctrine* of *Timæus*,) yet, at the Dissolution of this Compound-Body, when all the Elementary Parts of it return to their several universal Elements, 'tis highly probable, that the *Rational Soul* and the *Sensitive Soul* separate again; unless a Man's *Reason* and *Intellect* were, before that time, quite absorbed in *Sense*, and the *Rational Soul* sunk and

PROTARCHUS.

By no means.

SOCRATES.

You will affirm then, that in the nature of Jupiter ²²² there is a Kingly Soul and a Kingly Mind, thro

lost in the meer *Animal*; for that, otherwise, Each Soul would be carried by *Nature* to her *Native Place*.

²²² That is,—in the internal nature of the Universe. — In the *Orphic Verses*, the name of *Jupiter* is sometimes given to the *Whole Universe*,—including both Worlds, τὸν νοητὸν καὶ τὸν αἰσθητὸν the *Intelligible* and the *Sensible*;—including all *Causes* and all *Effects*;—including the *First Principles* of Things, *Mind* and *Matter*, ἀμέριστον ἔσῳαν καὶ μεριστήν the (actually) *Indivisible Essence* and the (actually) *Divisible*;—and including the immediate Principles, *Bound* and *Infinite*, together with τὸ ἑσῳμα the *Mixture* of them Both.—But generally in those Verses, the Term *Jupiter* is restrained to signify the *Mind, Soul, and Life* of the Universe; or, in other words, the *Forming Form Universal, acting with Intelligence*. And accordingly, the *Corporeal World* is there styled Ζηνὸς σῳμα the *Body of Jupiter*, and δέμας βασιλῆων the *Kingly Body*.—The Verses, termed *Orphic*, — as containing the Traditional Doctrine of *Orpheus*, and as being accommodated to those Religious Mysterys, of which He was the Founder, — obtained so great an Authority throughout *Greece*, that the Name of *Jupiter* was received and used in the same Meaning, which it bore in those Verses, by all the philosophical and learned Poets of that Country. Even when they *personify* the Supream Being, and represent him as some *Particular Deity*, by placing his *Throne* in *Heaven*, —

thro the Power of Cause; and that to the other Gods belong other Excellencys, whatever they are,

where he *overlooks, inspects* into, and *governs* All things,—they draw this representation from the *Analogy* between the *Divine Mind* and the *Human*. For the *Mind*, or Rational Soul, of *Man*, is univerfally deemed to be *feated* in the *Head*; where it takes *cognifance* of all things within reach of the *Senfes*; and from whence it *directs* and *rules* the *Motions* of every *Member* of the *Body*.—Nor did only the *philofophic Poets* give the name of *Jupiter* (not, like the Vulgar, to an imaginary Being, whom they fuppofed to be thundering in his Wrath, when they heard Thunder in the Air, but) to the true GOD, — the *Creator* and *Governor* of All things, — the *Fountain* of all *Intelligence, Senfe,* and *Life*:—even the beft *Philofophers* fometimes gave him the fame poetical and popular Name. Of This we have an Inftance, now before us, in *Socrates*, recorded here by *Plato*: and the Authority of *Seneca* we deem fufficient to vouch for all the reft. For of all Thefe *Seneca* thus writes, in *Natural: Quæft: Lib: 2, C. 45.*—Sapientiffimi viri — eundem, quem nos, Jovem intelligunt; custodem rectoremque Univerfi, animum ac spiritum; mundani hujus operis dominum & artificem; cui nomen omne convenit. Vis illum Fatum vocare? non errabis: Hic est, ex quo fufpenfa funt omnia; caufa caufarum. Vis illum Providentiam dicere? recte dices: Est enim, cujus confilio huic mundo providetur; ut inconfufus eat, & actus fuos explicet. Vis illum Naturam vocare? non peccabis: Est enim, ex quo nata funt omnia; cujus spiritu vivimus. Vis illum vocare Mundum? non falleris: Ipfe enim est totum quod vides; totus fuis partibus inditus, & fe fufstinens vi fuâ. — Compare this Paſſage with another of the ſame Writer, in his *Treatiſe de Beneficiis. L. 4, C. 7.*

by which their Deitys love to be distinguished, and from which they delight in taking their respective Denominations.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly I shall.

SOCRATES.

The Discourse, we have now had together on this Subject, O Protarchus! think it not idle, and to no Purpose. For it supports That Doctrine of our Ancestors, that the Universe is for ever governed by Mind.

PROTARCHUS.

Indeed it does.

SOCRATES.

And besides, it has furnished us with an Answer to My Question,—to What Sort of Being Mind is to be referred; in making it appear, that Mind is allyed to That, which we said was the Cause of All things, One of our Four Sorts of Being. For now at length you plainly have our Answer.

PROTARCHUS.

I have; and a very full and sufficient Answer it is: but I was not aware, What you were about.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

A Man's attention to serious Studys, O Protarchus !
is sometimes, you know, relaxed by Amusements ²²³.

PROTARCHUS.

Politely said.

²²³ In the *Greek*, — ἡ παιδία, *Play* or *Sport*. — For *Socrates*, with his accustomed *Irony*, shunning the invidious Character of a great *Philosopher*, is pleased so to term his Disquisition concerning the *Divine Nature*: and thus he makes, at the same time, a polite Apology for *Protarchus*, to prevent the young Gentleman from being ashamed of his not discovering the *Design* of *Socrates* in that Disquisition. — Compare also what *Socrates* says in the Middle of the Page, immediately preceding This, with what he said before in Page 325. — And perhaps this present Turn in the Discourse of *Socrates*, from the Serious and the Grave, at once to the Easy, the Familiar and Jocular, is designed by him to *recreate* the Minds of *Protarchus* and his other *Auditors*, by giving them an occasion to *unbend* a little the Strictness of their Attention: — for, as *Aristotle*, in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, observes, ἀναπαύσει εἶναι ἢ παιδία, *Play serves as an Interval of Rest* (from Labour). — In fact, if this whole Dialogue be supposed intirely fictitious, the present Turn, at the same time that 'tis quite agreeable to the usual manner of *Socrates* in conversation with his Friends, is contrived by *Plato*, according to his consummate Art in this Kind of Composition, to *refresh* the Minds and *relax* the Attention of his *Readers*, before they enter on the *Second* Argumentative *Part* of the Dialogue: for nothing now remains of the *First Part*, but to sum up the Capital Doctrines of it, in a brief Recital of the Two Conclusive Propositions, therein proved.

SOCRATES.

And thus, my Friend! to Which Sort of Being MIND belongs, and What Power it is possessed of, has been now shown tolerably well for the present.

PROTARCHUS.

It has indeed.

SOCRATES.

And to Which Sort also belongs PLEASURE, appeared before.

PROTARCHUS.

Very true.

SOCRATES.

Concerning these Two then, let us remember these Conclusions;—that MIND is allyed to Cause; and is as it were congenial with it:—and that PLEASURE is infinite in her own nature; and belongs to That Sort of Being, which, of it Self, neither has, nor ever will have in it, either a Beginning, or a Middle, or an End.

PROTARCHUS.

We shall not fail to remember them Both.

SOCRATES.

P H I L E B U S,

A

D I A L O G U E

C O N C E R N I N G

T H E C H I E F G O O D O F M A N .

T H E S E C O N D P A R T .

L O N D O N :

P R I N T E D B Y R . H E T T ;

A N D S O L D B Y T . P A Y N E A N D S O N , A T T H E M E W S G A T E .

M D C C L X X X .

[P R I C E T H I R T E E N S H I L L I N G S .]

SOCRATES.

Now we ought to consider next, in Which Sort of Being, Either of those Two Things, Intelligence and Pleasure, is found to have a Seat; and in what State or Condition those Beings must be, in whom Either of them is produced, at the time of its Production. And first in the case of Pleasure: for as we inquired, to which Sort of Being She belonged, before we considered, of which Sort was Mind; so with regard to the Points also, now proposed, She is the first to be examined ²²⁴. But separately from the consideration of Pain, we should never be able fully to explore the nature of Pleasure.

PROTARCHUS.

Well; if we are to proceed in this way, let us then in this way proceed ²²⁵.

²²⁴ *Cornarius* and *Stephens*, Both of them, perceived the *Greek* of this Sentence to be erroneous. But the Emendations, proposed by Them, appear insufficient. *Ficinus's* Translation from the *Florentine* M.S. helps to restore the right Reading thus;— Δεῖ δὴ,——ἰδεῖν ἡμᾶς· καὶ πρῶτον περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὡςπερ—ἔτω καὶ ταῦτα πρότερον [sc. δεῖ ἰδεῖν].

²²⁵ In the Edition of *Plato* by *Aldus*, and in That also by *Stephens*, this Sentence, by a strange Mistake, is printed as if it were spoken by *Socrates*.

SOCRATES.

Are You of the same Opinion with Me, concerning their Rise and Production?

PROTARCHUS.

What Opinion is That?

SOCRATES.

Pain and Pleasure appear to Me, Both of them, to arise, according to nature, in the Middle ²²⁶ Sort of Being.

PROTARCHUS.

²²⁶ In the *Greek*,—κοινόν, *Common*. But this attributive Term, in *English*, is never applied to any Thing, considered as *between Two* other Things, and *partaking* of them *Both*; which is the case of that Sort of Beings, meant in the present Passage. In a Passage before, where the same Word κοινόν occurred in the same Sense it has in This, it was rendered into *English* by the Term, *Compound*; and in a Passage prior to That, the Term, *Commixture*, was chosen to represent κοινωνία in the *Greek*: in all the other Passages on this Subject, *Plato* useth the Terms μικτόν or μεμιγμένον, and μίξις.—Now it is easy enough to perceive, that *Bounds*, set to Things which are *infinite* of themselves, are *together with* (or as it were *mixed* with) those *Infinities*. But the Terms, κοινόν, and κοινωνία, *Common*, and *Communication* or *Communion*, when applied to these *Mixt* Beings, seem to require some explanation.—By those Terms then it is here signified, as we apprehend, that all

such Beings, all *Natural* and *Artificial* Things, *partake* of *Form*, and *partake* also of *Matter*:—that, on the one hand, *Form* is *derived* to them from *Mind*; — *superficial* *Form*, derived to the Works and Performances of *Art*, from the *Minds* of *Human* Artists;—*internal* and *essential* *Form*, derived to the Works and Operations of *Nature*, from the *Divine Mind*, for ever *forming* or *reforming* *Nature's* Materials, the Substance of all *Natural* Beings: — and that, on the other hand, the *Substance* of all *External* Beings whatever, the *Substratum* of their *Forms*, the *Subject-Matter* of Formation both to *Nature* and to *Art*, is *derived* from the *First Infinite*, the common *Matter* of them all.—It seems also to be implied in those Terms, κοινὸν and κοινωσία, that the *Elements* (or *Elementary Forms*) of *Nature* have for their *immediate* Subject this *First* or *fundamental Matter*, and *communicate* with it continually: as it is certain, that they do; for they would not else be transmutable directly into each other: — that Such of the *Works of Nature*, as are *compounded* of the Four Lower Elements, *receive* from these Elements the first *Seeds* of their Being; and that Particles of their *Substance* are continually *departing* from them *into* these Elements; *from whence* they receive a continual *accession* of *fresh* Particles in their turn; thus keeping up a constant mutual *Communication*: — that, of these *Compound-Beings*, Such, as have *Sentient Souls*, render them up, at their Death, to the great *Soul Universal*, from whom they at first received them;—and that, from the time of their Birth to the time of their Death, nothing, but His continued *Communication* with them, by means of the *Active Elements*, enables them to retain those Souls of theirs, or to live.—On this Point, we farther thus argue from Analogy; that, of these *Sentient Beings*, Such as have *Mind* and *Reason* superadded to their Souls, by the *Divine Mind* immediately, preserve That their Rational Part, only by maintain-

ing its *Union* and *Communion* with its immediate Sire, — who Himself is *Right Reason* and *Truth*, The supremely *Fair* and the sovereignly *Good*, — so as to receive from him his continual Influence and Aid: for that 'tis impossible for the Mind of Man, or Human Reason, otherwise to be preserved in a sound State: wanting its sole Support, of necessity it must become contracted, vitiated and corrupted, a Slave to the Passions of its Partner; until finally, having lost all its governing, comprehending, and uniting Power, the *Unity* of its own Being be destroyed, and for ever lost in *Multitude*.—But beside this *Vital Intercourse* and *Communication* between all the *Compound-Beings* of Nature, on one side,—and those *Elements*, from which they derive their component Parts, on the other side;—and besides the *Continuity*, throughout the Universe, of the *First Matter*, the *Substratum* of all external Forms, thro which *Continuity* the *Vital Intercourse* between them is maintained;—there is also an *Occasional Correspondence*, either casual or voluntary, carried on, thro the *Continuity* of the *Elements*, between the *Senses* of all *Sensitive Beings*, on one side, — and the *Qualitys* or *Powers* of the *Elements*, simple or combined, on the other side;—from which arise actual *Sensations*, either *pleasurable* or *painful*, in those Sensitive Beings. — This *Correspondence* is divided into *Five Branches*, according to the number of the outward *Senses*, and the number of the *Elements* of outward Nature.—The Sense of *Seeing*, by the means of *Light within the Eye*, which is the Organ of that Sense, corresponds with the *Light without*; thro the *Continuity* of which Lucid Element, reaching to the inmost Membrane of the Eye, the Soul can take cognizance of Compound-Bodys at distance from her own, as to their *Colour*, *Figure*, and *Magnitude*.—The Sense of *Hearing*, by means of *Air within the Ear*, which is the Organ of that Sense, corresponds with the *Air without*, the
only

only Vehicle of *Voice* and of all other *Sounds*; thro the *Continuity* of which Elementary Air, reaching to the Membranes of the Ear, the Soul receives Notice of *Vocal* and other *Sonorous* Beings, afar off as well as near. — The Sense of *Smell*, by means of the *Igneous* or *Æthereal Fluid*, contained in the Nervous Membranes of the *Nose*, which is the Organ of that Sense, corresponds with the *same Fluid without*: for this Element flows in a continual Stream from Bodys which emit many Particles of it, combined with Particles of the other Elements, (Effluvia from the same Bodys,) and reaches home to that Organ of the *Smell*. — The Sense of *Taste*, by means of the *Moisture*, supplied plentifully from the Blood to the Organs of *Taste within the Mouth*, corresponds with the *Humid Element* in Exterior Things, whenever any of these Things are applied *immediately* to those Organs. For Particles of all the Lower Elements being intimately combined together in every Compound-Body, the Soul, by means of the *Humid Element*, is sensible of the *Hot* or the *Cold*, if either of These Elements hath the ascendancy over its Contrary in the Composition. By the *Degree of Moisture* therein, the Soul perceives, how much it partakes of the *Dry Element*. And, by the means also of the *Moisture*, she perceives Such of those *Qualities of the Elements combined*, called *Secondary Qualities*, as affect the Sense of *Taste*. — The Sense of *Feeling*, by means of the *Solid* or *Earthy* Part of our Frame, corresponds with the *Dry Element of Earth* in all exterior *Solid* Bodys, whenever any of These are applied *immediately* to any Membranous Part of our own Body, whether an inward Part, as the *Coats of the Stomach*, or outward, as the *Skin*. For only by the *Degree of Dryness* or *Solidity*, felt by the Soul in those Mixt Bodys, which are in Contact with her own, is she sensible, in what Degree they partake of the *Moist Element*: only by the *Contraction* or *Dilatation* of some *Membranous Part* of her

own Body, is the Soul sensible of either *Cold* or *Heat*, whether in Things outwardly or inwardly applied to it, or in the Atmosphere immediately surrounding it: and only by the different Effects, wrought in some *Membrane*, by the Appulse or Application of different Exterior Bodys, is the Soul sensible of their *Roughness*, or *Hardness*, or any other of their Secondary Qualitys, which affect the Sense of *Feeling*.—This whole Correspondence between the Five *Elements*, simple or combined, and our Five *Animal-Senses*, by means of the Membranous *Organs* of these Senses, is as it were a *Commerce* with *foreign* Countrys, from whence the Commoditys of these Countrys are conveyed to our own Ports. For, as all the *Membranes* of the Body are more or less replete with *Nerves*, the Sentient Soul, whose immediate Seat is the *Æthereal Fluid* in the *Nerves*, feels and perceives, thro these *Nervous Membranes*, What exterior Things are benign and friendly to her Body, and What are mischievous and hostile.—A more *intimate* and *immediate Correspondence*, without the intervention of Exterior Bodys, like a Home-Trade without newly-arrived Imports from abroad, is carried on between *Soul* and *Soul* in our own Species. The *Passions* and *Affections* of the Soul are *communicated* from one Person to another, thro inarticulate *Sounds*, and thro the visible *Impressions*, unavoidably and naturally made by those Passions and Affections, on the *Countenance*, *Gestures*, and *Behaviour*, of the Party first impassioned or affected. *Sentiments*, *Notions*, and *Opinions*, are *communicated* from one Person to another, thro the winged Conveyance by *Words*, understood in the same Sense by the Speaker and the Hearer. Every *Art* also, and every *Particular Science*, may be and often is *communicated* from one Mind to another, the same way; and from the Writer also to the Reader. — Now in all this *interior Commerce*, excepting That of the Sciences, it may be observed, that the *Articles* of it, as they are *derived* from *Things* the Nature of which is *infinite*, are Themselves also

infinite;

infinite; and that *Bounds* are set to them only by *Mind*,—the Mind of the Communicator, the Mind of the Participant, or the Minds of Both, according to the degree of their *Knowledge*, their *Wisdom*, and their *Virtue*.—So that thro *Sympathy*, mutual *Affection*, and the Intercourse of social *Conversation*, or by the Medium of *Writings*, That *Mixture* of the *Infinite* with *Bound*, which is in Each particular Soul and Mind, becomes common to *Two* or to *Many*: and thus a *Community* of Souls and Minds, a perfect *Pythagorean Friendship*, may be formed, and extended to as many Persons, as have All of them equally, a *Social Sense* of Things, and a *Delight in communicating*;— All of them, *Sentiments* agreeable to *Human Nature*, the Nature, *common* to all Men;—and *Notions* agreeable to that *Divine Reason*, of which all Men naturally *partake*. — For it is the natural Perfection of all *Particular Minds*, to hold a *Communion*, the most intimate and the most immediate, with the *Sovereign Mind*, the Parent of their Beings; who, as he is TRUTH ITS SELF, is the out-radiating *Centre of Union* to all Minds: as he is also GOOD ITS SELF, amply sufficient for all Beings, in Him the Desires of all Such, as know what is True Good, meet, *concentre*, and *unite*: and as he is the UNIVERSAL SOUL, the *combining Principle* to all the *Beings of Nature*, he inspires the *Spirit of Communion, Concord, and Amity*, into the Souls of all *Rational Beings*, who are not fully pre-possessed with the Contrary Spirit, That of *Selfishness, of Discord and Enmity*, but are open to receive That which is Divine or Godlike. — Thus it appears, that *Man*, who is of all *Compound-Beings* the most compounded, and to whom *Socrates*, in speaking of this *Third Sort* of Being, principally had a View, has *Communication*, remote or near, mediate or immediate, with all external and internal Nature. His *Body*, being compounded of the Elements of Outward Nature, communicates with the *Infinity* of those *Elements*,—with the *Infinity* of the *Qualities* and
Powers

Powers of all the Mixt Bodys and Compositions which surround him,—and with the *Infinity* of the *Common Matter* of them all. His Mind, if he studys to improve this nobler Part of his Being, by pure *Science*, abstracting his *Ideas* from the *Images* of things *Sensible*,—or, in other words, removing these *Images* from his *Ideas*,—converses with those *Eternal Monads*, those *Original Numbers* and *Proportions*, which set *Bounds* to all the *Infinities* in the Compound-Beings of Nature. And his whole *Soul*, being partly *Sensitive* and partly *Rational*, holds as it were a *Converse*, and feels as it were a *Sympathy*, with all Things, in which, (as in her Self,) the *Infinities* receive *Bound* and *Form*, *Number* and *Measure*. She delights to dwell with *Symmetry* in Buildings, *Rythm* in Motions, and *Harmony* in Sounds: and thro intimate and long *Converse* with These, she acquires the Art of giving to the like *Infinities* the like beautiful, graceful, and captivating *Forms*. If, after a thorow acquaintance with her own *Body*, she chooses to make This the Subject of her Art, she *co-operates* with the Great Soul of Nature, in *regulating* and *harmonising* the *discordant* Humours of that Body; the *Irregularitys* of which Humours, in Kind as well as in Degree, are *infinite*. And if, after a thorow acquaintance with her own Nature, she makes her Self the Subject of her Art, she *co-operates* with the *Supream* all-harmonising *Mind*, the great Physician of Souls, in effecting *Harmony* between all her Parts, and in procuring *Health* and *Soundness* to her whole Frame.—Thus have we endeavoured to explain the Attributive Term *κωμὸν*, *Common*, as here applied to all Beings *sensible* of *Pain* and *Pleasure*; but particularly applicable to *Man*; and, as we presume, meant by *Socrates* to be so applyed: for only *Man* has *Communion* with All things, whether *Sensible* or *Intelligible*; and only in the *best* and *most perfect* State of *Man's* Being, all the *Infinities*, as well those in his *Soul*, as those in his *Body*, meet with their proper and just *Bounds*.

PROTARCHUS.

Remind us, Friend Socrates! which of the Sorts of Being, mentioned before, is meant by the term Middle ²²⁷.

SOCRATES.

What you desire, young Gentleman! shall be done, —as far as My Power reaches ²²⁸.

PROTARCHUS.

²²⁷ *Socrates* had *before* explained, what he meant by the Term, *Mixt*, when applied to his *Third Sort* of Being; and *Protarchus* was quite satisfied with that explanation. It seems therefore, that nothing but the Term, κοινόν, could puzzle him, or make him at a Loss for the Meaning of *Socrates*, at this time. See from Page 54 to Page 60 inclusive.

²²⁸ 'Tis observable, that *Socrates*, in this Reply, seems uncertain, whether he was able, or not, to explain to *Protarchus* the nature of this Third Sort of Being; and yet, that he had, just before, without any hesitation, difficulty, or ill success, undertaken the Office of Expositor on this Subject. The *Thing*, to be explained, is the very *Same*: the only Difference lyes in the changing of the Term, *Mixt*, for the Term, κοινόν, *Common*. We are therefore to suppose, that *Socrates* deemed *Protarchus* incapable of apprehending the Philosophic Sense of the Word, κοινόν. Indeed, as this Young Gentleman had not been initiated in the Doctrine, by which alone That Sense of the Word could be explained, to *Him* it was not in the *Philosopher's Power* to explain it. None but his own Disciples, who were his *constant Auditors*, were able fully and clearly to apprehend his Meaning in this Expression: the rest of his *present Audience*, how-

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ever,

PROTARCHUS.

Fairly said.

SOCRATES.

By the Middle Sort of Being then, we are to understand That, which, in recounting the Four Sorts, we reckoned as Third.

PROTARCHUS.

That, which you mentioned next after Both the Infinite and Bound: — That in which you ranked Health, and also, as I think, Harmony ²²⁹.

SOCRATES.

ever, and among them *Protarchus*, might be set on thinking, afterwards when alone, What he could mean by the Term, *κωὴρ*, on this occasion.

²²⁹ *Man*, and his Chief Good, *Moral Virtue*, are not only the *Subjects* of this whole *Dialogue*, (as in *the Argument* is endeavoured to be shown,)—but they are also, (amongst the Multitude of Things, in which *Infinity* and *Bound* are mixed together,) the ultimate *Objects* of our Author's *View*, in delineating his *Third Sort of Being*. It is indeed only with a *View* to *Man*, to *Human Virtue*, and to *Human Good*, that he makes a *Division* of *Being* into *Kinds* or *Sorts*. And it seems, that *Health* and *Harmony* are here chosen for *Instances* of the *Nature* of this *Third Sort of Being*, because *Health* and *Harmony* in the whole *Human Soul* are the first, the internal and immediate, *Effects* of *Moral Virtue*. See also the latter Part of *Note 226*. — *Aldus* and *Stephens*, in their Editions of our Author, and *Bembo*

SOCRATES.

Perfectly right. Now give me all possible Attention.

PROTARCHUS.

Only speak.

SOCRATES.

I say then, that whenever the Harmony in the Frame of any Animal is broken, a Breach is then made in its Constitution, and at the same time Rife is given to Pains.

PROTARCHUS.

You say what is highly probable.

SOCRATES.

But when the Harmony is restored, and the Breach is healed, we should say, that then Pleasure is produced: if Points of so great Importance may be dispatched at once in so few Words.

PROTARCHUS.

In my Opinion, O Socrates! you say what is very true: but let us try, if we can show these Truths in a Light still clearer.

in his Translation, ascribe the Speech, now before us, to *Socrates*: but the *Basil* Editions agree with *Ficinus* and *Cornarius*, in restoring it to *Protarchus*, the right Owner; as they likewise do, in transferring the two next words,—“ Perfectly
“ right,”—from *Protarchus* to *Socrates*, in whose Mouth alone those words are, in this place, proper.

SOCRATES.

Are not such Things, as ordinarily happen, and are manifest to us All, the most easy to be understood?

PROTARCHUS.

What Things do you mean?

SOCRATES.

Want of Food makes a Breach in the Animal-System, and at the same time gives the Pain of Hunger.

PROTARCHUS.

True.

SOCRATES.

And Food, in filling up the Breach again, gives a Pleasure.

PROTARCHUS.

Right.

SOCRATES.

Want of Drink also, interrupting the Circulation of the Blood and Humours, brings on us Corruption, together with the Pain of Thirst: but the Virtue of a Liquid, in moistening and replenishing the Parts dried up, yields a Pleasure. In like manner, preternatural suffocating Heat, in dissolving the Texture of the Parts, gives a Painful Sensation: but a Cooling again, a Refreshment agreeable to Nature, affects us with a Sense of Pleasure.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Most certainly.

SOCRATES.

And the Concretion of the Animal-Humours thro' Cold, contrary to their Nature, occasions Pain: but a Return to their pristine state of Fluidity, and a Restoring of the natural Circulation, produce Pleasure. See then, whether you think this general Account of the matter not amiss, concerning That Sort of Being which I said was composed of Infinite and Bound,—that, when by nature any Beings of that Sort become animated with Soul, their Passage into Corruption, or a total Dissolution, is accompanied with Pain; and their Entrance into Existence, the Assembling of all those Particles which compose the nature of such a Being, is attended with a Sense of Pleasure.

PROTARCHUS.

I admit your Account of this whole matter; for as it appears to Me, it bears on it the Stamp of Truth ²³⁰.

SOCRATES.

These Sensations then, which affect the Soul by means only of the Body, let us consider as One Species of Pain and Pleasure.

²³⁰ As it corresponds with Nature and Experience.

I.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Be it so.

SOCRATES.

Consider now the Feelings of the Soul her Self, in the Expectation of such a Pain or of such a Pleasure,—antecedent to the Pleasure expected, an agreeable Feeling of Hope and Alacrity, — antecedent to the Pain expected, the Uneasiness of Fear.

PROTARCHUS.

This is indeed a different Species of Pleasure and Pain, independant of the Body, and produced in the Soul her Self thro Expectation.

SOCRATES.

You apprehend the matter rightly. Now the consideration of these Feelings of Pain and Pleasure, which immediately affect the Soul her Self, (and seem to be produced in her, Each of them, unmixed and genuine ²³¹;) will, as I imagine, clear up that Doubt concerning Pleasure, — whether the whole Kind be eligible,—or whether a particular Species of it be the proper Object of our Choice ²³².—And in the latter case, Pleasure and Pain, (in general,) like Heat and Cold,

²³¹ That is,—Pleasure without Pain, and Pain without Pleasure.

²³² Meaning That Pleasure which is pure and unmixed with Pain.

and

and all other things of this Sort ²³³, will deserve sometimes to be embraced, and at other times to be rejected; as not being good in themselves, but admitting the nature of Good ²³⁴ to be super-added to them only at some times ²³⁵, and Some of them only ²³⁶.

PROTARCHUS.

You are perfectly in the right. It must be in some such way as This, that we ought to investigate the Things we are in pursuit of ²³⁷.

SOCRATES.

If then what we agreed in be true,—that Animal-Bodys feel Pain, when any thing befalls them tend-

²³³ That is—such *Qualitys* and *Powers* of things corporeal, as, when these things are applied to Sensitive Beings, raise in them Sensations, different and even contrary in Kind.

²³⁴ In What the nature of *Good* consists, and What are its proper and constant *Attributes*, we learn from the latter Part of this Dialogue.

²³⁵ That is,—on certain occasions, when they tend to the production, preservation, or recovery of Life, Health, or Strength.

²³⁶ What Sorts and Degrees of *Pleasure*, strictly and properly so called, are at all times *incompatible* with the Enjoyment of *true Good*, 'tis the chief Object of this Second Part. of the Dialogue, to show.

²³⁷ See before, in Page 391.

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ing to their Destruction, — Pleasure, when they are using the means of their Preservation, — let us now consider, what State or Condition every Animal is in, when it is neither suffering aught that tends to its Destruction, nor is engaged in any action, or in the midst of any circumstances, tending to its Preservation. Give your earnest attention to this Point; and say, whether it is intirely necessary, or not, that every Animal at that time should feel neither Pain nor Pleasure, in any degree, great or small.

PROTARCHUS.

It is quite necessary.

SOCRATES.

Besides the Condition then of an Animal delighted, — and besides the opposite Condition of it under Uneasiness, — is not This a different, a Third, State or Condition of an Animal?

PROTARCHUS.

Without dispute.

SOCRATES.

Be careful then to remember this Judgment of ours. For, on the remembring of it, or not, greatly will depend our Judgment, concerning the nature of Pleasure.

Pleasure ²³⁸. But, to go through with this Point, let us, if you please, add a short Sentence more.

PROTARCHUS.

Say What.

SOCRATES.

You know, nothing hinders a Man, who prefers the Life of Wisdom, from living all his Life in that State ²³⁹.

PROTARCHUS.

In the State, do you mean of neither Pleasure nor Uneasiness?

SOCRATES.

I do: for, when we compared together the different Lives, it was supposed, that whoever should choose the Life of Mind and Wisdom, was not to have Pleasure either in a great or in a small degree ²⁴⁰.

²³⁸ *Stephens*, in the Marginal Notes to his fine Edition, too rashly rejects the Preposition *περί* in this Sentence; not considering that it governs the Participles *διαφθερομένων* and *ἀνασωζομένων*, tho it be placed after them: it should therefore be accented thus,—*πέρι*,—as it is in the *Aldine* and *Basil* Editions: a Comma should also be subjoined to it, in the Pointing.

²³⁹ See again the Passage, referred to in Note 237.

²⁴⁰ For he is free from the Sensations both of *Pain* and *Pleasure*; Either of which, during the continuance of it, is a *Hindrance* to the *Energys* of the Mind, the Mind's only *Enjoyments*.

F f f

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

That was the Supposition.

SOCRATES.

He must live therefore such a Life ²⁴¹. And perhaps it is by no means absurd, to deem That Life to be of all Lives the most Godlike.

PROTARCHUS.

It is not indeed probable, that the Gods feel either the pleasurable Sensation, or its Opposite.

SOCRATES.

Highly indeed is it improbable. For neither of them is consistent with the Divine Nature. But we shall consider farther of this Point afterwards, if it should appear to be of any service to Our Argu-

²⁴¹ See before, in Page 210. In the *Greek*, the first Words of this Sentence of *Socrates*, and the first Word also of the next Sentence, spoken by *Protarchus*, ought for the future to be printed thus, — "Ουκεν. — and not Ουκέν. — The wrong Accentuation of these Passages, in all the Editions, seems owing to the error of *Ficinus*, who mistook Both the Sentences for *Interrogations*: and the Mistakes are continued by *Grynæus*. *Serranus's* Translation is guilty of the same Mistakes: but in those of *Cornarius*, *Bembo*, and *Grou*, they are corrected.

ment ;

ment; and shall apply it to the Purpose of winning the Second Prize for Mind, though we should not be able to make use of it so as to win for her the First ²⁴².

PROTARCHUS.

Very justly said.

SOCRATES.

Now That Species of Pleasure, which we said is proper to the Soul her Self, is all produced in her by means of Memory.

PROTARCHUS.

How so?

SOCRATES.

But, before we consider of this Point, I think we should premise some account of Memory, What it is: and still prior to an account of Memory, some mention too, methinks, ought to be made of Sense; if we are to have this Subject appear tolerably plain to us ²⁴³.

PROTARCHUS.

Explain your Meaning.

²⁴² In the estimating of *Human Goods*.

²⁴³ The *Greek* of this Passage, it is presumed, ought to be read thus,—ἐπερ μέλλει ταῦτ' ἡμῖν κ.τ.λ.

SOCRATES.

Of those things, which are incident to our Bodys in every Part, coming from all Quarters around us, and affecting us in various ways, — Some spend all their Force upon the Body, without penetrating to the Soul, leaving This intirely untouched and free ²⁴⁴; — Others extend their Power thro the Soul, as well as thro the Body; and Some of this latter Sort excite a vehement Agitation in them Both, jointly and severally. Do you admit This?

PROTARCHUS.

Be it admitted.

SOCRATES.

If we should say of those Things, the Power of which is confined to the Body, and reaches not the

²⁴⁴ Such as, for instance, a *Temperate Air* immediately surrounding us, inhaled in every *Breath*, and entering at every *Pore*, without our feeling it,—if our Bodys happen to be in the same *Temperament*, that is, in a *Medium* between Hot and Cold.—Such also is the *Nutritional Part* of our *Food*, when, after it has been converted into *Chyle*, and mixed with the *Blood*, it is *actually employed* in nourishing every Part of our Bodys, in augmenting and strengthening the Young, in maintaining the Bulk and Vigour of the Mature, and in rendering the Decays of old Age slow and imperceptible.

Soul,

Soul, that the Soul is deprived of knowing them ²⁴⁵; but of other things which befall us, and have a Power to pervade both the Body and the Soul, that of These the Soul hath the Knowledge; should we not thus say what is most true?

PROTARCHUS.

Without dispute.

SOCRATES.

But when I say, that the Soul is deprived of knowing the former Sort, do not suppose my Meaning to

²⁴⁵ In the Greek—τὴν ψυχὴν λανθάνειν—that the Soul hath not the Knowledge (or Perception) of them.—In what follows, the Noun λήθη. *Oblivion* is supposed to have been derived from λέλθησα, the Preterit Tense of the Verb λανθάνειν, (or rather of the obsolete Verb λήθειν). — To preserve the *Allusion*, taken from this supposed *Etymology*, we have been obliged to vary a little from the simple and just Translation above given. — But we can imagine no reason, why *Socrates* here makes such an *Allusion*, (since it is of no service to his present Argumentation,) unless he meant by it to remind his Disciples, who were a Part of his Audience at this time, of the Doctrine which he had taught them, — “that all our *true* and *certain Knowledge*, That which enters not into the Soul thro the outward Senses, but is purely *Mental* and *Ideal*, is *Reminiscence*, a *Recovery* of some Knowledge, which the *Mind* lost in *Oblivion*, when she became *Particular*, by her being united to a Human Body.”

he,

be, that Oblivion happens to her in this case. For Oblivion is the Departure of Memory. But of the Accidents, now spoken of, the Soul never had a Memory. And of That, which neither is, nor ever was, it is absurd to say, that any Loss can happen to us. Is it not?

PROTARCHUS.

Undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

Only then alter the Terms.

PROTARCHUS.

In what manner?

SOCRATES.

Instead of saying, that the Soul is deprived of knowing what the Body suffers, when she is not affected by any Motions produced in the Body, by those ordinary Occurrences, — what we termed a Privation of Knowledge, let us now term Insensibility.

PROTARCHUS.

I apprehend your Meaning.

SOCRATES.

But when the Soul and the Body are affected, Both of them in common, by any of those Occurrences, and
in

in common also are moved or agitated ²⁴⁶, — in giving to this Motion the name of Sensation, you would not speak improperly.

PROTARCHUS.

Very true.

SOCRATES.

Now then do we not apprehend, What it is, which is commonly called Sense or Sensation?

PROTARCHUS.

What should hinder us?

SOCRATES.

And of Memory, if one should say, that 'twas the Retaining of Sensations, it would not be ill defined, in my opinion.

PROTARCHUS.

I think so too.

²⁴⁶ In the *Greek* of this Passage, instead of *γινόμενον*, the *Participle Singular*, agreeing with *σῶμα*, we ought to read *γινόμενα*, the *Plural*, agreeing with the *Two* preceding Substantives, *ψυχὴν* and *σῶμα*, *coupled together*; according to a Rule, the same in the Grammars of the Greek and Latin Languages. For the Words of this Sentence, placed in the Order of their Grammatical Construction, are these, — *Τῷ κοινῇ κινεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα, κοινῇ γινόμενα ἐν ἐνὶ πάθει, — ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν κ. τ. λ.* — If *Stephens* had perceived This, he would not have adopted *Cornarius's* Alteration of the Text.

SOCRATES.

Do we not hold, that Memory differs from Remembrance?

PROTARCHUS.

Perhaps it does.

SOCRATES.

Do they not differ in This respect?

PROTARCHUS.

In What respect?

SOCRATES.

When the Soul alone, unaided by the Body ²⁴⁷, recovers and resumes within her Self, as much as possible, the State which heretofore she was in, when she was affected jointly with the Body ²⁴⁸, we say, that the Soul then remembers ²⁴⁹. Do we not?

PROTARCHUS.

²⁴⁷ That is,—by the *Corporeal Organs* of Sensation.

²⁴⁸ That is, — when, by means of those Corporeal Organs of Sensation, she actually felt and perceived any external Objects at the time of their being presented to her.

²⁴⁹ Mr. *Locke* justly says of *Remembrance*, that 'tis a *Secondary Perception*. For the *Notice* which the Soul takes, and the clear *Discernment* which she has, of any *Sensible Object*, when the *Image* of it *first* enters the *Sensorium Commune*, (the Common Seat of all the Senses,) may very properly be stiled, as

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly we do.

SOCRATES.

So we do also, when the Soul, after having lost the Memory of something which she had sensibly perceived, or of something which she had learnt ²⁵⁰, recalls

it is by Mr. *Locke*, a *Perception* — to distinguish it from those *meer Sensations*, which indeed sensibly *act on* or *affect* the Corporeal *Organs*, but which the Soul is *inattentive* to, and takes *little Notice* of;—or which are *confused* or *indistinct*, when caused by Objects too remote, or when the Medium or Passage is obstructed or obscured.——The *Images* of those Sensible Objects, which the Soul has once *perceived* clearly, are *retained* within her by a certain Power, termed the *Memory*.—Now of these *Images*, Such, as the Soul *frequently reviews*, she hath the Power of *calling* into her Presence, as often as she pleases; and Such, as have lain by, within her, for a long time neglected and forgotten, she hath the Power of *recalling* to her *Remembrance*: and this *latter* Power she exerts, when of her Self she searches after and traces them out, thro *Images familiar* to her, and *connected* with those she seeks;—or when she is *reminded* of them by other Persons in Conversation, or by new Sensible Objects, such as *resemble* the forgotten Images, or such as, being directly *opposite* to them, remind her of them, as *Contrasts*.

²⁵⁰ We may observe, that Objects of *Science*, as well as Objects of *Sense*, are included in this Sentence; as they are by

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Aristotle

Aristotle also, in the First Chapter of his Treatise on this very Subject. An Account of Memory, thus comprehensive, is agreeable to the usual way of speaking: for Both those Sorts of Things, the *Intelligible* and the *Sensible* are, alike, commonly spoken of, as Objects of the *Memory*. It seems, however, on the one hand, very different from the Account of *Memory*, given in the preceding Note; and on the other hand, to contradict the Account of it, given by the *Pythagoreans*, as cited in Note 5;—unless we have *Two* different *Sorts* of Memory in our Souls,—*One* of them, a Repository for the *Images* of Things *Sensible*,—the *Other*, for *Intelligible Truths*, conceived by the Human Mind, in learning any Science.—For neither *Ideas*, nor consequently *Intelligible Truths*, are *Images* of any *Sensible* or *Corporeal* Things: on the contrary, all *Corporeal* and external Things, whether *Natural* or *Artificial*, Themselves and their Qualities, Powers and Relations, are *Images* of *Ideas*;—*Natural* Things being *Images* of *Ideas* in the *Divine Mind*; *Artificial* Things, *Images* of *Ideas* in the *Minds of Men*.—But we are to consider, that all *Ideas* in every Human Mind are *cloathed* with *Images* of external and *Sensible* Things; and that all the *Relations* between those *Ideas*, all the *Truths*, which we either conceive of our Selves or learn from Others, arise in our Minds either *cloathed* with *Words* heard or written, (that is, with *Sounds* Articulate, or with *Letters* and *Syllables*,) or, if the *Truths* are *Mathematical*, they arise *cloathed* with *Mathematical Figures* or *Symbols* of such *Figures*, or with the *Symbols* of *Numbers*: now all these things,—*Images* and *Figures*, *Sounds* of any Kind whatever, *Letters*, *Syllables* and *Words*, with all other *Symbols*, are Things *external*, and Objects of outward *Sense*.—As often therefore as we *recollect Truths* of any Kind, heretofore conceived or taught us, they *return* to our
Minds,

Minds, *cloathed* with the *Relicks* of those *Vestments*, in which they first appeared to us. Nay farther; it seems, as if 'twere only by these *decayed Vestments*, that we are able to *lay hold* of those *Truths* again, or to *recognise* them as Some of our old *Acquaintance*. Indeed, when they are thus recognised, every Mind, well informed, can distinguish between her old *Friends* and their *Apparel*: for their *Apparel* she overlooks; tho' it was the *Medium*, thro' which she recovered her Knowledge of them. Their flimsy *Dress* they keep, however, always on them; nor ever appear they to any Human Mind, unattired and naked. It concerns us therefore much, if we set a just Value on *simple Truth*, not to confound these *Mental Objects*, which are eternally *the Same*, tho' clad in a *variety* of *Corporeal Vestments*, with those *Images* of *Sensible Objects*, which have nothing *intelligible*, nothing *invariable*, *within them*: (all their *Substance* being meer *Matter*;) lest we should fancy, (as Some fanciful Philosophers have heretofore, and Some again in modern times,) that the *Intellective* and *Rational* Powers of the Soul, are not to be distinguished from the *Sensitive* and *Imaginative*; — that the *Understanding* is but a finer *Sense*, and a more enlarged *Imagination*; — that *Science* is nothing more than the Result of *Sense*; and that *Mind* arose always out of *Body*. — Now if, on the contrary, *Mind* and *Body* are Beings essentially *distinct*; — if *Intellect* and *Reason* are *different* from *Sense* and *Imagination*; — if the only *Objects* of *Intellect* and *Reason* are those *Intelligible* Beings, *Ideal Forms* and the *Truths* of *Mind* and *Science*; and if the only *Objects* of *Sense* and *Imagination* are those *Sensible Forms*, *Corporeal Substances*, together with their *Attributes*, the *Sensible Quality*s of *Body*; — it seems to follow, that the *Memory* of *Mental* or *Intelligible* *Objects* hath the same *relation* to those *Objects*, as hath the *Memory* of *Corporeal* or *Sensible* *Objects* to *These* the *Objects* of it. And if this *Analogy* be just, it certainly follows, by the Rules of *Alternate*

and of *Inverse Relations*, that the *Memory* of *Sensible* Objects hath the same *relation* to the *Memory* of *Intelligible* Objects, as the *Objects* themselves of the *former* Sort have to the *Objects* of the *latter* Sort. But the *Analogy* is *not* exactly *just*: for the *Relations* (the *Terms* of it) are not in all respects *Analogous*.—The *Memory* indeed of *Sensible* Objects is a *Retaining* of their *Images*, or other *Impressions* made by them, in the *Soul*: and That which is called *Memory* of *Intelligible* Objects is a *Retaining* of These also in the *Soul*. But the *Places* in the *Soul*, where these very different Sorts of Objects are separately retained, very widely *differ*,—as widely as their respective *Objects*.—The *Places* or *Receptacles* of those *Images*, and of all other *Impressions* made in the *Soul* by her Sensation of external things, are the *Common Sensory* and the *Passive Imagination*; of which *Places* the latter is also made their *Store-Room* by the *Memory*. Now *Memory* and *Passive Imagination* are *temporary* and *transient* Powers of the *Soul*, granted to many *Brute Animals*, as well as to *Man*; and consequently they are Powers, with which *meer Body* is capable of being endued; (if the *Souls* of *Brute Animals* are merely *Corporeal*;) no less than it is capable of receiving the Power of *Gravitation*, common to *all Bodys*, or any other *Passive Powers*, internal and invisible, given to *Bodys* of *peculiar* Kinds. — But the proper *Place* of *Intelligible* Objects is pure *Mind*, their native *Seat*, of the same nature with *Themselves*, *incorporeal* and *eternal*. Into this high and holy *Place* no *Images* can enter; nor even *Ideas*, unless they are divested of all *Remains* of *Images*, with which *Human Ideas* are wont to be apparelled.—Yet, as the *Soul* of *Man* *partakes of Mind*, his *Soul* hath also a *Place* within her, a certain *Ground*, (as the *Principles* of *Science* may be fitly called,) the *natural Soil*, for *Ideas* and the *Truths* of *Science* to arise in. Here accordingly they do in fact arise and spring up; but impure, disguised,

guised, and covered over with *Images* from the neighbouring Soil of *Imagination*, which is over-run with these flowering and light-flying Weeds. Every Soul, however, whose Disposition is truly philosophic, is studious to *purify* her Ideas, by *stripping* them of all *Images*; as she longs to behold the naked *Truth* and *Reality* of Things; of which she has, by her Origin, a native *Pre-conception*, almost as strong, as if she had them actually in *View* or in *Remembrance*.—From this cause probably it is, that a *learning* of the *Axioms* and simplest *Theorems* of any Science, seems like a *recollecting* of them; and that all our *Progress* in Science is by Plato (metaphorically perhaps,) termed *Reminiscence*.—But, whatever be the Cause of that *Facility*, *Complacency*, and *Delight*, with which a truly philosophic Genius acquires Science;—and whether We have rightly conjectured the Whole of *Plato's* Meaning in his Doctrine of the Soul's *Reminiscence*;—or whether he meant to intimate farther, that every *Human Mind* had, before its descent into a Human Body, an *Ideal Essence* in the *Divine Mind*,—as an *Intelligible Idea*, with respect to Him who contains all Ideas within him,—but at the same time, in its Self, a pure *Intelligence*, an *Idea intelligent*, more *general* than any general *Ideas* which are *unintelligent* and only *intelligible*; comprehensive therefore of These, tho in a manner infinitely short of the Divine All-Intelligence;—or whether *Plato* thought fit to favour the Notion of the *Pre-existence* of every Human Soul in some *other Body*, either celestial and *ætherial*, or pneumatic and *ærial*;—without entering into an examination of these Doctrines, probably fabulous and allegorical, as being of Eastern Extraction,—This we may be certain of from Reason,—“that to MIND *universal* and *eternal*, all Things in their Essences are always *really present*;” and therefore we must conclude, that neither *Memory* nor *Reminiscence* can be attributed to the *Divine Being*:

Being: for *Memory* is only of things *past*, things *absent* in reality, and present only by their *Representatives*, their *Images*; and *Reminiscence* is only of things, the *Memory* of which the Mind had *lost*, and hath again *recovered*. — As to *Memory*, the Souls of many *Brute Animals* have, as we before observed, this Power of retaining in their *Imagination*, the *Images* and *Impressions* of Things External. And we find from experience, that they often retain them for a longer Time, and with less Impair, than ordinarily doth the Soul of Man. — But as to *Reminiscence*, or *Re-collection*, no Irrational Soul hath this Power: it can belong, as *Aristotle* has justly observed of it, to no Animal we are acquainted with, except *Man*; if it be, what the same great Philosopher says, *συλλογισμὸς τις*, a *Sort of Syllogising*. — And indeed 'tis a *Collecting* of Some things from Other things, thro an *accidental Connection* between them — a Connection, which arises either from the *Sameness* of the Times *when*, or of the Places *where*, they made their first Impressions on the Soul, — or from other *Proximitys* or *Agreements* meerly external, and still subsisting between them, tho latent, in the *Memory*; — just as *Syllogistical Reasoning* is a *Collecting* of Some Truths from Other Truths, thro the *necessary Connection* between them, as being, all of them, *Parts* of Truth Universal, the *Intelligible World*. — We re-colle^ct, re-call, or raise up again to our Remembrance, *Sensible things* past, by investigating them thro the Remains of their *connected Images*, — or by following, in a *Series* of *Steps*, the Tracks of their *Impressions*: — and in the same manner, *Intelligible things*, (seemingly) forgotten, we recolle^ct — not, thro that *natural Connection* between all *Truths*, by which we first acquired the Knowledge of them, (for This would be like a learning of them anew,) — but thro the *artificial Combination* of *Words*, (Articulate Sounds,) formerly heard, or of *Characters*, (the
silent

silent Symbols of those Sounds,) formerly seen; (especially if the *Combination* be *Metrical*;) where One Word remembered draws after it Another, merely by the *Concatenation* of those *Sensible Impressions*, which the *Memory* retains in the *Imagination*. — Here however, an intelligent Mind, being within every Human Soul, perceives and takes notice of them; and, by the *Medium* of those remaining *Sensible Images* or *Impressions*, regains that Knowledge, which she had formerly acquired by the *Medium* of *Sounds* or *Characters*, the Objects of *Hearing* or of *Sight*. — *Aristotle* accordingly, in his short Treatise concerning *Memory and Reminiscence*, having first said of *Memory*, that 'tis φαντάσματος, ὡς εἰκότος ἔστι φάντασμα, ἔστι, the possessing (or retaining) of some *Phantasm*, as an *Image* of that *Thing*, of which it is the *Phantasm*, — afterwards says of *Reminiscence*, that 'tis ζήτησις ἐν τοῦτῳ φαντάσματι, a *Searching* for what we have lost the *Memory* of, thro (or by means of) such a *Phantasm*. — Having also observ'd, ὅτι νοεῖν ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος, that we cannot perceive or apprehend any thing in our Minds, (not any *Intelligible Truth*, nor any *Idea*,) without a *Phantasm*, (that is, unless it be clothed with the *Image* or *Impression* of some *Sensible Object*,) — farther on he says, that the *Memory* of *Intelligible Things* is not without a *Phantasm* (or *Image*). — Ἡ μνήμη ἢ τῶν νοητῶν ἔστι ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἔστιν. — Now, if the *Common Sensory*, and the *Passive Imagination*, are the *Places* of all those *Phantasms*, internal *Images* and *Impressions*, which are *true*, (that is, which are true *Representatives* of external *Things* affecting our *Senses*,) as well as they are the *Places* of a much greater *Multitude* which are *false*, (that is, which represent external and sensible *Things* untruly,) whether the *Phantasms* of Either Sort are *fresh arrived*, or whether they have *resided* there a long time, and are either *ready at hand*, or
hidden

bidden in some deep Hole or remote Corner,—if also *Intelligent Mind*, or the Intellectual Power of the Soul, is the only *Place of Intelligible Forms*. — a Doctrine, in which *Aristotle* and *Plato* Both agree, (as appears in *Aristotle's Treatise on the Soul*), L. 3, C. 5, together with the Commentary of *Philoponus* thereon,) we say, if the Powers or Facultys of the Human Soul, regarding her different Objects, are rightly thus distinguished, the following Consequences also are rightly drawn; — viz. that the immediate *Objects* of all *Memory*, and of all *Reminiscence*, whether it be That of Things *Sensible*, or That of Things *Intelligible*, are only *Images* or Phantasms, the *true* as well as the *false*: — that what we call a *Memory* of *Ideas*, or of the *Truths of Science*, is the *Mind's* continuing in *possession* of them *all along*, from the time when they first *arose* in her, *excited* (as it were) by the *Images* of things *Sensible*: — and that what is termed a *Reminiscence*, a *Remembrance*, or *Recollection* of them, is in truth a *Re-surrection* or *Re-suscitation* of them in the *Mind*, by (or thro) the same *Images*, again making their appearance in the *Imagination*, and again there beheld by the *Mind's* intellectual and comprehensive Eye.—From these Conclusions it appears, that the Terms *Memory* and *Remembrance*, — Terms, which are used, not only in speaking of *external* and *sensible* things, as the Objects of those Facultys of our Souls, but also in speaking of things *mental* and only *intelligible*,—on these Subjects, essentially so different, are used *homonymously*;—with strict *propriety*, in speaking of the *former* Sort of Things; but *figuratively*, in speaking of the *latter*.—

— For we find, on the one hand, that *Memory*, or *Mindfulness* of *External* Objects, is the *holding fast* of their volatile *Images* in the *Imagination*; and that a *Remembrance*, or *Reminiscence* of the same *Objects*, is a *Recovery* or *Re-inflating* of their *Images* in the

same Place, from whence they had disappeared, and were supposed to have slipped away: since it is known from experience, that the *Imagination*, a Power of the meer *Animal-Soul*, gradually decays, and loses by little and little its retentive Strength; and that, even while it remains in full Force, it confines None of the Images, arrived there thro the Senses, nor any Others, created by the Active Imagination of Man out of those prior Images, except Such as have made a deep Impression there, and Such also as the Percipient Power of the Soul frequently revisits.—On the other hand we find, that the Objects of *Intellect*, and Those of *Reason*, being seated, all of them, *within the Mind*,—a Seat, for ever permanent and undecaying, — (to which nothing ever comes from without, — from which nothing ever departs, to return again, — and nothing is for ever lost,) abide there eternally: tho Human Minds are not able actually to behold more than *One* of them *at a time*; and tho the Minds of None but Men of Science look at all at *Any* of them ever in their Lives.—Thus it appears, that neither *Memory* nor *Remembrance*, to speak properly and strictly, belongs to the *Rational Soul*, or to any of *her* Powers or Facultys. So that, when the Term *Memory* is applied to the Mind's reviewing of *Intelligible* Objects, it should be considered as a *Metaphor*, taken from that Power of the *Animal-Soul*, which *retains* the *Images* of *Sensible* Objects in the *Imagination*. In like manner, when the Terms *Remembrance* and *Reminiscence* are applied to the like *Intellectual* or *Rational* Review, they are to be considered as *Metaphors*, taken from that Active Power, which is only in the *Soul of Man* — That of *regainning* Images *lost*, by *tracing* them out thro their Connections. — But the great difference between *Mind* and *Memory*, or between *understanding*, (which is always of Things *present* to the *Mind*,) — and the *imagining* of Things *past*, (tho

formerly *present* to the *outward Senses*,) will best appear from the very different *Nature* and *Origin* of their respective *Objects*. — Images and Phantasms are *referable* only to *Things external*: and to These do they so much owe their *Origin*, as that *without them* they never could have had any Being at all. — But farther; the *Things*, from which all Images and Phantasms within us take their Rise, must not only be *external*; they must also be *corporeal*. For with respect to our Selves, the *Minds* of *Others* are *external*: and of *Minds* there are no *Images*, nor *Phantasms*: the sole *foundation* of These is *Body*: and of all *Body* the sole *Substratum*, or *Substance*, is the *Common Matter*. — Nor less necessary to the production of Images and Phantasms in our Souls are the *Organs* of *Sensation*, which are in *our own Bodys*. For only thro these *Organs* are the *Images* of external Things *transmitted* to their proper Place within us. — And farther; when our Imagination is furnished with a multitude of Images, so transmitted; if afterwards we meet with Relations of foreign Countrys, or with Memorials and Records of past Ages, they pour into that vast Receptacle of Images a much greater Multitude, — Images of Things existing in those Countrys, or of Things formerly in Being, but now extinct; — such Things being always represented, as similar or analogous to some *prior Images*, with which our Imagination is *pre-possessed*. — To these Things, all of which are Objects of the *Outward Senses*, and thence come to be Objects of *Imagination*, of *Memory* and *Remembrance*; — the Subjects also of all *Description*, whether in *Painting* or in *Sculpture*, in *History* or in *Poetry*; — to these Things quite contrary, in their Nature, are the Objects of *Mind* or *Intellection*, the Subjects of *Science* and sound *Philosophy*. — This will appear highly probable, if we consider, that all Human Beings from their Birth, for a long time after, converse wholly with

external and *Sensible Objects*, and the Offspring of these, their *Images* and *Pbantafms*:—that the Few Persons, who attempt afterwards to travel in the only Road to real Science, That along General Ideas, are obliged to set out from Things *particular* and *sensible*:—that presently they perceive all such *Ideas* enveloped with the *Images* of those *sensible* Things, from which they had departed:—that if the Traveller's Genius be *philosophic*, he will find these Images to *retard* his Progress; like violent Winds full against him, as if they strove to blow him back again to the Objects he left behind:—that, on the other hand, if his Disposition be *unfavourable* to the Journey undertaken, his Genius will prove like a restive Horse, or like a Jade mindful only of her accustomed Manger, resisting his continuance in the road onward, and pulling backward to the Stable and the Straw.—Beside these Remoras and Impediments, which a Man brings along *with him*, or carries *about him*, in travelling toward Truth and real Science, he is encountered ever and anon by new Sensible Objects unthought of; and These, if they do not altogether *block up* his way, never fail of *interrupting* his Progress for a while.—Seeing then, that all this *Opposition* to the Science of *Mind*, and of Things *intelligible*, comes from *Body*, from Things *corporeal*, and their *Images*,—we infer a natural *Opposition* between *Body* and *Mind*,—a natural *Repugnance* of the *Animal-Soul* to the *Rational*,—a natural *Inconsistency* of all vehement *Sensation*, and of all strong *Pbantasy*, with any present *Intellection*, or any Exercise of the Reasoning Faculty, —and a natural *Contrariety* between the Objects of *Sense* and the Objects of *Reason* and *Intellect*.—These widest of all possible Diversities, between Things of different Kinds, are owing to the very different Origin of the *Human Mind* from That of the *Human Body*, and That of the *Animal-Soul*. — The *passive* and *maternal* Parent of all *Body* is meer *Matter*: and *Bodys*, or

Things *corporeal*, (Portions of *Matter formed*,) and the *Images* of these Things, are not only the *Objects*, but also the immediate *Agent-Causes*, of all *Sensation*, of all *Imagination*, and and of all *Memory*: and the organical Parts of *organised Bodys*, endued with *Animal-Souls*, are the instrumental *Means*, by which those *Causes* act. — On the other hand, every *Particular Mind*; or *Rational Soul*, is derived,—not from *Sensation*, *Imagination*, or *Memory*, — but immediately from the Great *universal Mind* alone, its sole Parent: being by Him infused into a *Body* capable of receiving it, and united with a *Soul* capable of being governed by it. Into Such a *Body*, animated by Such a *Soul*, are infused, together with *Mind*, the *Principles of Science*; the same being the *Principles of Mind*, and to all *Mind essential*: and these *Principles* are the *native Light*, by which every *Mind* is enabled to perceive *One and Many* at the same time (*Sameness and Difference* together) in All things. — Thus are these *Principles* the *Seeds of Science*; opening by degrees into all *Ideas*, General and Special, as widely as a *Mind*, pent up in a gross and perishable *Body*, can shoot forth and extend itself. For in the *Principles of Mind* latent, or virtually included, are all such *Ideas*; like *Buds and Flowers* within the *Seed* of some *Plant*.—Now, as every *Particular Mind* is an *Offspring*, and as it were an *Image in Miniature*, (how imperfect a one soever it happens to be,) of the *Divine Mind*,—in like manner, those *Ideas*, the *Objects* of a *Particular Mind*, are *Descendants*, and as it were *Copys or Transcripts* (how diminutive and faint soever they may prove) of the *Divine Ideas*: from These are They *derived*: to These only are They to be *referred*: and only in and thro These have They an eternal Being; immortalising the *Soul* in which they dwell; when all the fading *Images* of temporary Things, all *Memory and Remembrance* of Sensible *Objects* in the lower World of Sense, are vanished away.

recalls and recollects the Memory of it again, her Self within her Self: and all This we term Remembrance, and a Recovery of things flipt out of our Memory ²⁵¹.

PROTARCHUS.

Very true.

SOCRATES.

Now the End, for the sake of which we have been considering these Facultys of the Soul, is This.

²⁵¹ In the printed *Greek* we here read,—ἀναμνήσεις καὶ μνήμας.—So that *Memory* and *Remembrance* are now confounded together; and the difference, but just before made between them, is annulled. — It is therefore apprehended, that we ought to read—ἀναμνήσεις καὶ μνήμης ἀνακτήσεις.—Probably the Transcriber of some ancient Manuscript omitted the last word, if read to him by another Person, (as usual,) on account of the similitude of its *Sound* with That of the word ἀναμνήσεις;—or on account of the similitude between the *Letters* of those two words, if he read with his own Eyes;—or because he supposed it to be a corrupt Reading, instead of ἀναμνήσεις, and to have been inserted, into the Manuscript which he was copying, from the Margin of some M.S, still more ancient.—In *Varinus*, —ἀνάμνησις is defined to be—μνήμης, ἐξιτήλα γενομένης, ἀνάκτησις, *the regaining of a departed Memory* (that is, of a Notion or a Phantasm, departed out of the Memory).—*Cicero* translates ἀνάμνησις into *Latin* by the word *Reminiscētia*. But to the English word *Reminiscence* we have preferred the word *Remembrance*, (a word, more in *Common Use*,) after the example of Mr. *Locke*, by whom it is rightly used, to express a *Revival* of (what *Hé* calls) an *Idea in the Memory*.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

For the fake of What?

SOCRATES.

That we may apprehend ²⁵², as well and as clearly as we are able, What is Pleasure of the Soul abstracted from the Body ²⁵³, and at the same time, may apprehend also, What is Desire. For the nature of Both these things seems to be discovered in some measure, by showing the nature of Memory and of Remembrance.

PROTARCHUS.

Let us, then, O Socrates! now explain, how such a Discovery follows from perceiving the nature of these Facultys of ours.

SOCRATES.

In treating of the Rise of Pleasure, and of the various Forms which she assumes, it will be necessary for

²⁵² All the Editions of *Plato* give us here to read,—“*Ἴνα μὴ—λάβοιμεν κ. τ. λ.* From this Sentence, thus absurdly printed, *Cornarius*, in his marginal Lemmas, extracted the following curious Precept,—“*Voluptas & cupiditas animæ, absque corpore, vitanda.*” *Pleasure and Desire in the Soul her Self, abstracted from the Body, are Both to be avoided.*—The French Translator has judiciously rejected the Negative Particle in this Sentence.

²⁵³ That is,—Pleasure, in which the Body has no Share.

us, I believe, to consider a great variety of things. But before we enter on so copious a Subject, we should now, I think, in the first place, consider the nature and origin of Desire.

PROTARCHUS.

Let us then : for we must not lose Any thing.

SOCRATES.

Nay, Protarchus! we shall lose One thing, when we shall have found the Objects of our Inquiry ; we shall lose our Uncertainty about them ²⁵⁴.

PROTARCHUS.

²⁵⁴ This jocular Turn, which is intirely agreeable to the usual Facetiousness and εὐτραπέλεια of *Socrates*, (on whose Mind the gravest Subjects of Discourse sat easy, because familiar to it,) is here thrown in by *Plato* very opportunely, just at the time of starting fresh Matter. For we imagine it a Contrivance of his, purposely to prevent the Patience of his Reader from being tired out by a longer Delay of the principal Pursuit. Such a Purpose is answered by an Intimation here given, that *Protarchus* was right in supposing this seemingly new Subject to make a Part of the proposed Inquiry, or essentially to belong to it; and that *Socrates* would put an End to all Doubts, concerning the Pleasures of the *Animal-Soul*, by showing to what Cause the *Motions* or *Affections* of this Soul were to be referred, and to what End they tended. —Some Hope also is perhaps here meant to be given us, that
the

PROTARCHUS.

You are right in your Repartee. Proceed we then to what is next.

SOCRATES.

Was it not just now said, that Hunger, and Thirst, and many other things of like Kind, were certain Desires ²⁵⁵ ?

PROTARCHUS.

the Philosopher will, in the Sequel make the greater Goods of *Mind*, of *Wisdom* and of *Science*, to appear manifest, by showing, in like manner, the more internal *Motions* and *Affections* of a *Rational Soul*, the *Tendency* of these *Motions*, and the *Objects* of these *Affections*.

²⁵⁵ This is evidently implied, tho not expressed, in what *Socrates* had said before concerning Animals,—that “ Want of Food, to fill up a Vacuity or Breach, made in the Bodily Frame, by the passing away of many solid Particles of it, is always attended with the *Pain* of *Hunger*.” — See page 402. For, as all *Sentient Beings*, whenever aught is wanting to the Soundness of their Frame, are made *sensible* of it, by feeling some *Pain* or *Uneasiness*, — and as Nature has given them an *Aversion* to *Pain*, — and all *Aversion* is of necessity attended by a *Desire* of having the *Object* of it removed *away*, — the *Pain* of *Hunger* must infer a *Desire* of being freed from it by *Food*; an instinctive *Appetite* to which, on that occasion, is given to every Animal by Nature. — But beside the Pains of *Hunger* and *Thirst*, *Socrates* had spoken of the *Uneasinesses*, arising in the Body from excessive *Heat* and *Cold*; as Instances of the general Position, he was then establishing, — This, “ that all things,

PROTARCHUS.

Without Doubt.

SOCRATES.

What is it then, which is the Same in all these things,—That, with respect to which we give to All of them, notwithstanding the great difference between them, One and the Same Appellation ²⁵⁶ ?

PROTARCHUS.

By Jove, Socrates! it is perhaps not easy to say: it ought, however, to be declared.

SOCRATES.

Let us resume the mention of That, with which we began the consideration of this Subject ²³⁷.

PROTARCHUS.

Of What in particular?

things, which have a Tendency to destroy the Animal-Oeconomy, or dissolve the Corporeal Harmony, produce *Pain*:” and such things are here meant by the *many other things of like Kind*. For every *Pain* or *Uneasiness*, in the same manner as *Hunger* and *Thirst*, infers a *Desire* of having it removed.

²⁵⁶ That of *Desire*.

²⁵⁷ Meaning — a Breach of the Harmony in the Constitution of any Animal. See page 401.

SOCRATES.

Do we not often speak of being thirsty?

PROTARCHUS.

We do.

SOCRATES.

And do we not mean by it some Kind of Emptiness?

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

Is not Thirst a Desire?

PROTARCHUS.

It is.

SOCRATES.

A Desire of Drink is it?

PROTARCHUS.

Of Drink.

SOCRATES.

Of being replenished by Drink: is it not ²⁵⁸?

PROTARCHUS.

I suppose it is.

²⁵⁸ A future Editor of *Plato* may consider, in the *Greek* of this Sentence, whether *διὰ* should not be inserted before the word *πόματος*.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Whoever of us then is emptied, desires, it seems, a Condition the Reverse of what has befallen him. For whereas he is emptied, he longs to be filled again.

PROTARCHUS.

Most evidently so.

SOCRATES.

Well now ; is it possible, that a Man, who at the first ²⁵⁹ is empty, should apprehend, either by Sense or by Memory, what it is to be full,—a Condition, in which he neither is, at the time, nor ever was, heretofore?

PROTARCHUS.

How can he?

SOCRATES.

We are agreed, that the Man, who desires, has a Desire of Something.

PROTARCHUS.

Without Dispute.

SOCRATES.

Now it is not the Condition in which he is, that he desires. For he suffers Thirst, that is, an Emptiness : but he desires to be full.

²⁵⁹ That is, at the Beginning of his Sensitive Life.

PROTARCHUS.

True.

SOCRATES.

Something therefore, belonging to the Man who is thirsty, must apprehend in some manner What it is to be full.

PROTARCHUS.

It must, of necessity.

SOCRATES.

But 'tis impossible, that This should be his Body : for his Body is supposed to suffer Emptiness.

PROTARCHUS.

Right.

SOCRATES.

It remains therefore, that his Soul apprehends What it is to be full, by means of her Memory.

PROTARCHUS.

Plainly so.

SOCRATES.

For indeed by what other Means could his Soul have such an Apprehension ?

PROTARCHUS.

Hardly by any other.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Perceive we now, what Confequence follows from this Reafoning of ours?

PROTARCHUS.

What Confequence?

SOCRATES.

It proves, that Defire doth not arife in the Body.

PROTARCHUS.

How fo?

SOCRATES.

Because it fhows, that the Aim and Endeavour of every Animal, is to be in a Condition oppofite to the Feelings, with which the Body is at that time affected.

PROTARCHUS.

It certainly fhows This.

SOCRATES.

And the Inclination, by which it moves toward this oppofite Condition, fhows the remembrance of a Condition oppofite to thofe prefent Feelings and Affections.

PROTARCHUS.

Clearly.

3.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Our Reasoning then, in proving that Memory leads us toward the Objects of our Desire, shows at the same time, What is the general Inclination and Desire of the Soul ²⁶⁰; and What is the Moving Principle in every Animal.

PROTARCHUS.

Perfectly right.

SOCRATES.

Our Conclusion therefore will by no means admit of an Opinion, that the Body suffers Hunger, or Thirst, or is affected with any other such Desire.

PROTARCHUS.

Most true.

SOCRATES.

Let us observe This also farther, regarding these very Subjects now under consideration. Our Reasoning seems to Me, as if it meant ²⁶¹ to exhibit, in those very Things, a certain Kind of Life.

PROTARCHUS.

²⁶⁰ Namely, — to have the Wants of her Body relieved, and her own Being perfected. For the *moving Principle* in every Animal is a *Desire* of that *Good*, which is *agreeable* to its *Nature*.

²⁶¹ That is, — *Socrates*, in explaining the Nature and the Cause of those Desires, incident to the Souls of *Sentient* Beings, meant it as introductory to a View of That Life, in which there is a *Mixture* of *Pain* and *Pleasure*. — In the *Greek* of this

PROTARCHUS.

What Things do you mean? and what Kind of Life do you speak of?

SOCRATES.

I mean the being filled and the being emptied, and all other Things tending either to the Preservation of Animal Life, or to the Destruction of it; and whatever Things ordinarily give Pain, — yet, coming in a Change from things Contrary, are sometimes grateful ²⁶².

PROTARCHUS.

True.

SOCRATES.

But what, when a Man is in the Midst of these Contrary Conditions, and is partaking of them Both?

PROTARCHUS.

How do you mean in the Midst?

this Sentence we here read βεβλεῦεσθαι. But 'tis presumed, that we ought to read βέλεσθαι—a Reading, which is confirmed by the *Medicean* and the *Hessenstein* Manuscripts; as appears in that *Ficinus* and *Cornarius* render it into *Latin* by the word *velle*.

²⁶² Such, for instance, as a *cold* or a *hot* Air; Both of which are very *disagreeable* to many Persons; but they are quite otherwise, when Either of them succeeds to Air of a *contrary Quality* in a high Degree. — In the *Greek* of this Sentence, ποτέ δέ (and not τότε δέ) χαίρει, is perhaps the right Reading. We may, however, read τότε δέ χαίρει, if we are permitted to change the word ἡμῶν, just before, into ὅτε μὲν.

SOCRATES.

When he is afflicted with an anxious Sense of his present bad Condition, but at the same time has a Remembrance of past Delights; he may enjoy an Intermision of his Pain, without having as yet the Cause of it removed ²⁶³; now do we affirm, or do we deny, that he is at that time in the Midst of Two contrary Conditions?

PROTARCHUS.

It must be affirmed.

SOCRATES.

Is he afflicted or delighted wholly?

PROTARCHUS.

By Jove, he is in a manner afflicted doubly; in his Body, from his present Condition; in his Soul, from a tedious Expectation, longing for Relief.

²⁶³ Thus have we rendered into English the *Greek* of this Sentence, as it is *printed*. But we are much inclined to adopt the *Emendation*, καὶ παύεται μὲν, proposed by *Stephens* in the Margin of his Edition: only changing εἰ into ἦ. If our learned Readers are of the same Opinion; and think with Us, that *Two* different *Cases* are here stated by *Socrates*; in *Both* of which there is a *Mixture* of *Anxiety* and *Delight*, but not a *Mixture* of the same *Kind*; then, instead of—*he may enjoy*, — the Translation should be—*or when he enjoys*, &c.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

How is it, O Protarchus! that you suppose his Affliction to be doubled? Is not a Man, whose Stomach is empty, sometimes in a State of Hopefulness, with Assurance of having it filled? and on the contrary, is he not, at other times, in a Condition quite hopeless?

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

Do you not think, that, when he is in Hopes of being filled, he is delighted with the remembrance of Fulness? and yet, that, being empty at the same time, he is in Pain?

PROTARCHUS.

He must be so.

SOCRATES.

In such a State therefore, Man and other Animals are at the same time afflicted and delighted.

PROTARCHUS.

It seems so to be.

SOCRATES.

But What think you, when a Man is empty, and hopeless of obtaining Fulness? must he not, in such

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a Condition, suffer Double Pain? with a view to which particular Condition it was, that just now you supposed the Memory of past Delight, in All Cases, to double the present Pain.

PROTARCHUS.

Most true, Socrates!

SOCRATES.

Now of this Inquiry into these Feelings of ours we shall make This Use.

PROTARCHUS.

What Use?

SOCRATES.

Shall we say, that all these Pains and Pleasures are True? or that they are all False? or that Some of them are True, and Others False?

PROTARCHUS.

How should Pleasures or Pains, O Socrates! be False?

SOCRATES.

How is it then, O Protarchus! that Fears may be either True or False? that Expectations may be True, or not? Or of Opinions, how is it, that Some are True, and Others False?

PROTARCHUS.

Opinions, I admit, may be of Either Kind: but I cannot grant you This of those Other Feelings.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

How say you? We are in danger of starting a Disquisition of no small Importance.

PROTARCHUS.

That is True.

SOCRATES.

But whether it has any relation to the Subjects which have preceded, This, O Son of an illustrious Father ²⁶⁴! ought to be considered.

PROTARCHUS.

²⁶⁴ We cannot conceive, to what Purpose this Compliment to *Protarchus* is here introduced, unless it be by way of a *Simile*; to represent the Dignity and Excellence of the Matters before discussed; and, by reminding *Protarchus* of his illustrious Birth, to signify to him,—that, as He ought not to degenerate from his Ancestors, so neither ought any New Matters to be brought upon the Carpet, if, in their Weight and Value, they fall short of Those which have preceded. — Perhaps also an Intimation is thus given by *Plato* to his Readers, that one of the Subjects of Inquiry just now mentioned by *Socrates*, — That concerning *Opinions*, — immediately related to that Other concerning *Pleasures*, as to their Truth or Falshood. — In the *Greek* of this Passage, it is probable, that the printed Reading κένε τῷ ἀνδρὶς is erroneous; and that *Plato* wrote κλειτῷ ἀνδρὶς; — but that, in after ages, a Reader of some Manuscript Copy of this Dialogue, where, instead of κλειτῷ, was written κλειῷ, (and *Hesychius* interprets κλειῷς by the more usual Terms ἐνδοξός, ἀγαμάτος,) on collating

PROTARCHUS.

Perhaps indeed it ought.

SOCRATES.

Tell me then : for, as to my self, I am continually in a state of Wonderment about these very Difficultys, now proposed.

PROTARCHUS.

What Difficultys do you mean ?

SOCRATES.

False Pleasures are not True ; nor True Pleasures False ²⁶⁵.

PROTARCHUS.

it with another M.S. Copy, where he found κλειτῶ written, wrote τῶ in the Margin of the former Copy, opposite to the Syllable ῖῶ with which perhaps a new Line began ; that afterwards a Transcriber of this Copy received τῶ into the Text of his own Transcript, just before ἀνδρός, supposing it to be a word casually omitted in the former Copy ; — and that, last of all, when κλειτῶ τῶ ἀνδρός was discovered to be a Solecism in the Greek Syntaxis, κλειτῶ, a word very uncommon, was easily changed into κείτῶ, and the Constrúction was thus purified.

²⁶⁵ In the *Greek* we read only, — ψευδέϊς, αἱ δ' ἀληθεῖς ἐκ εἴη ἡσονται.—All the Translators of *Plato* into other Languages justly suppose this Sentence to be imperfect in the Beginning of it : but in Their way of supplying the Words omitted,

PROTARCHUS.

How is it possible, they should?

SOCRATES.

Neither in a Dream then, nor Awake, is it possible, as You hold, not even if a Man is out of his Senses thro Madnes, or has lost the Soundness of his Judgment any other way, is it possible for him ever to imagine that he feels Delight, when he is by no means sensibly delighted; or to imagine that he feels Pain, when actually the Man feels none ²⁶⁶.

PROTARCHUS.

omitted, 'tis nothing more than a *Repetition* of the *Question* proposed before, without any new additional Matter. (See in Page 440.) — *Socrates* in fact is now *entering* on a Proof of the Distinction between the *True* Pleasures and the *False*: and we presume, that he here *builds* his Proof on That prime *Axiom*, on which is *founded* all *Demonstration*, — viz. “*Things cannot be what they are, and yet different from what they are, at the same time.* — In the Passage therefore, now before us, it seems probable, that the Sentence, to be made agreeable to the Sense of it, is to be completed thus, — Ἀληθεῖς αἱ μὲν ψευδεῖς, ψευδεῖς αἱ δ' ἀληθεῖς, ἐκ εἰσὶν ἠθροαί.—The Error of omitting the first Words is easy to be accounted for.

²⁶⁶ Those Persons, who are evidently in a State of *Insanity of Mind*, imagine many Things which have no Existence, and entertain a *firm Belief* of their *Reality*. Some of these unreal Fancys, meerly the Objects of *Imagination*, affect such Persons

PROTARCHUS.

All of us, O Socrates! constantly suppose these Facts to be, as You have now stated them.

SOCRATES.

But is it a right Supposition? or should we examine, whether it is right or not?

PROTARCHUS.

We ought to examine it, I must own.

SOCRATES.

Let us then explain a little more clearly what was just now said concerning Pleasure and Opinion. Do we not hold the Reality of our Having an Opinion?

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly.

with *Joy* or *Grief*, as strongly, as if they were Objects of the *Senses*, and did really produce in them pleasurable or painful *Sensations*. — That this is often the Case of *Dreams* in *Sleep*, every one of us hath ample Experience. — And Philosophers say, that Such, as are under the Power of *Passion*, and consequently under That of boundless *Imagination*, — nay, that All Persons who think not justly, (that is, not agreeably to Nature and to Right Reason,) — *dream waking*; and are affected with *Joys* and *Griefs*, which have no better a Foundation, than have the *Fancys* of *Madmen*, or the *Dreams* of *Men asleep*.

SOCRATES.

And the Reality of our having Pleasure?

PROTARCHUS.

To be sure.

SOCRATES.

Farther; it is Something, That which is the Object of our Opinion.

PROTARCHUS.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

And Something also That is, with which Whatever feels a Pleasure is delighted.

PROTARCHUS.

Most certainly.

SOCRATES.

In the Having then of an Opinion, whether we are right or wrong in entertaining that Opinion, the Reality of our having it abides still.

PROTARCHUS.

How can a Man lose an Opinion whilst he has it?

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

In the enjoying also of any Pleasure, whether we do right or wrong to enjoy it, 'tis certain, that the Reality of the Enjoyment still remains.

PROTARCHUS.

To be sure, these things are so.

SOCRATES.

On what account is it then, that we are used to call Some Opinions True, and Others False; yet to Pleasures only we allow the Attribute of True; notwithstanding that Pleasure and Opinion, Both of them, equally admit Reality in the Having of them?

PROTARCHUS.

This ought to be considered.

SOCRATES.

Is it that Falshood and Truth are incident to Opinion? so that, by the supervening of one or other of These, Opinion becomes Something beside what in its Self it is; and every Opinion is thus made to have the Quality of being either False or True. Do you say, that This ought to be considered?

PROTARCHUS.

I do.

SOCRATES.

And beside This; supposing, that Opinions universally do admit of Attributes and Qualitys; whether

ther only Pleasure and Pain are what they are in Themselves simply, and never admit any Quality to arise in them; ought we not to settle this Point also by agreement between us?

PROTARCHUS.

'Tis evident, that we ought.

SOCRATES.

But 'tis easy enough to perceive, that These also admit the accession of Some Qualitys. For of Pleasures and Pains we agreed a while since, that Some are Great, Others Little; and that Each Sort admits of Vehemence and of Intension ²⁶⁷.

PROTARCHUS.

Very true.

SOCRATES.

And if either to any Pleasure, or to any Opinion, there be added the Quality of Evil, shall we not affirm the Opinion thus to become Evil, and the Pleasure Evil in the same manner?

PROTARCHUS.

Without doubt, O Socrates!

²⁶⁷ See before in Pages 280, and 321.

SOCRATES.

And What, if Rectitude, or the Opposite to Rectitude ²⁶⁸, accede to any of them, shall we not say, that the *Opinion* is *Right*, if Rectitude be in it? and shall we not ascribe the same Quality to *Pleasure*, on the same supposition?

PROTARCHUS.

Of necessity we must.

SOCRATES.

And if the Object of our *Opinion* be mistaken by us, must we not in such a case acknowledge, that our *Opinion* is *erroneous*, and not right; and that We are not right, our selves, in entertaining such an *Opinion* ²⁶⁹?

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly we must.

SOCRATES.

But What, if we discover our selves to be mistaken in the Object of our *Grief* or of our *Pleasure* ²⁷⁰, shall

²⁶⁸ That is, *Pravity*.

²⁶⁹ For instance, if we mistake a *Friend* for an *Enemy*, or an *Enemy* for a *Friend*.

²⁷⁰ As for instance, if, mistaking our *Enemys* for *Friends* to us, we *rejoice* at their prosperous *Success*, or *grieve* at their *Disappointments*.

we give to this *Grief*, or to this *Pleasure*, the Epithet of *right*, or *good*, or any other which is fair and honourable?

PROTARCHUS.

We certainly cannot, where a Mistake is in the Pleasure.

SOCRATES.

And surely Pleasure is apt to arise in us oftentimes, accompanied, not with a *right* Opinion, but with an Opinion which is *false*.

PROTARCHUS.

Indisputably so. And the Opinion, O Socrates! then and in that case, we should say was a false Opinion. But to the *Pleasure* its self no Man would ever give the appellation of *false*.

SOCRATES.

You are very ready, O Protarchus! at supporting the Plea made use of by Pleasure on this occasion.

PROTARCHUS.

Not at all so. I only repeat what I have heard.

SOCRATES.

Do we make no difference, my Friend! between Such a Pleasure as comes accompanied with Right Opinion or with Science, and That Kind of Pleasure which often arises in every one of us at the same time with false Opinion or Ignorance ²⁷¹?

PROTARCHUS.

It is probable, I own, that no little difference is between them.

SOCRATES.

Let us now come to the consideration of What the Difference is.

PROTARCHUS.

Proceed in whatever way you think proper.

SOCRATES.

I shall take This way then.

²⁷¹ *Stephens's* Edition of *Plato* agrees with all the prior Editions, in giving us to read *ἀνοίας* in this place: but that learned Printer, in his latter *Annotations*, pag: 75, justly observes, that instead of *ἀνοίας* we ought to read *ἀγνοίας*. That Emendation was made, before *Stephens*, by *Cornarius* in his *Ectlogæ*, pag: 333. *Ignorance* is here opposed to *Knowledge*; as *False Opinion* is opposed to *True*. — The *Medicean* Manuscript exhibits the right Reading; as appears from the Latin of *Ficinus*.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

What way?

SOCRATES.

Some of our Opinions are false, and others of them are true: This is agreed.

PROTARCHUS.

It is.

SOCRATES.

Pleasure and Pain, as it was just now said ²⁷², oftentimes attend on Either of them indifferently; on Opinions, I mean, either true or false ²⁷³.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly so.

SOCRATES.

Is it not from Memory and from Sense ²⁷⁴, that Opinion is produced in us, and that room is given for a Diversity of Opinions on every Subject ²⁷⁵?

PROTARCHUS.

²⁷² See Note 266.

²⁷³ They attend on false Opinion, in that instance which is mentioned in Note 270:—they attend on true Opinion, when we have just reason to grieve or to rejoice.

²⁷⁴ That is, — from a *Memory* or *Remembrance* of Things *heretofore* seen, or heard of; and from a *Sense* or a *Perception* of Things *present*.

²⁷⁵ For the *Diversity* between *Things present* is *infinite*; as is the *Diversity* of *Places* where the *Things are*: and the *Diversity*

PROTARCHUS.

Most undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

I ask you then, whether or no, as to these Things²⁷⁶, we deem ourselves to be of necessity affected thus?

PROTARCHUS.

How?

SOCRATES.

Oftentimes, when a Man looks at Something, which he discovers at a great distance, but does not discern very clearly, will you admit, that he may have an inclination to judge of what he sees?

Diversity between many *past* Things, seen or heard of by different *Persons* now in *Being*, is *indefinite*; as is the Number of those *Persons*. Beside all this *Diversity* of *Things*, both present and past, different *Persons* are *affected differently* (at the least in *different Degrees*) by the *Same* Things. What an infinite Diversity of *Opinions* must all these Diversities occasion, or rather, of necessity, produce!—The word *διαδοξάζειν*, in the *Greek* of this Passage, being perhaps a *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον*, seems not to have been understood by any of the Translators, except *Ficinus*. It is plainly analogous to the words, *διαφωνεῖν*, *διαφέρεσθαι*, *διαπολιτευεσθαι*.

²⁷⁶ Meaning — our *Opinions*; together with those Sentiments of *Grief* and *Joy*, or those Fancys (or fancied Feelings) of *Pain* and *Pleasure*, which attend on our Opinions.

PROTARCHUS.

I do admit the Case.

SOCRATES.

Upon this, would not the Man question himself in this manner?

PROTARCHUS.

In What manner?

SOCRATES.

What is That, which appears as if it was standing under some Tree by the Cliff there? Do you not suppose, that he would speak those words to himself, looking at some such Appearances before him, as I have mentioned?

PROTARCHUS.

No Doubt of it.

SOCRATES.

Hereupon, might not this Man then, making a Conjecture, say to himself, by way of Answer,—It is a Man?

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

But walking on, perhaps he might discern it to be but the Work of some Shepherds, and would say again to himself,—It is only a Statue.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Most certainly he would.

SOCRATES.

And if he had any Companion with him, he would speak out aloud what he had first spoken within Himself, and repeat the very same words to his Companion: so that, what we lately termed an Opinion, would thus become a Speech.

PROTARCHUS.

Very true.

SOCRATES.

But if he were alone, this very Thing would be a Thought still within him; and he might walk on, keeping the same Thought in his Mind, a considerable Way.

PROTARCHUS.

Undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

Well now; does this Matter appear to You in the same Light as it does to Me?

PROTARCHUS.

How is That?

SOCRATES.

The Soul in that Case seems to Me to resemble some Book.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

How so?

SOCRATES.

The Memory ²⁷⁷, co-inciding with the Senses ²⁷⁸, together with those Passions of the Soul which attend this Memory and the present Sensation ²⁷⁹, seem to Me as if they concurred in writing Sentences at that

²⁷⁷ That is,—a Memory or Remembrance of other such Statues, formerly seen by him, — the *Effigys of Men*, wrought by Carpenters and Masons.

²⁷⁸ For his *Senses* exhibit to him an External Object, co-inciding with Those in his *Memory*, which he remembers to have been the *Works* of Human Artists.

²⁷⁹ As long as the Object appeared to be a real and living Man, the Appearance must have been attended with *Pleasure* in the Soul of the Spectator, if a Person of a *benevolent* and *social* Disposition; for such Persons are pleased with seeing the Fellows of their Kind: but quite contrary Sentiments would have arisen in his Soul, were he a *Misanthrope*, or afflicted with a Redundancy of *Black Bile*; for to such unhappy Persons the Sight of a Human Being gives a *Pain*. A Gen; as soon as the Object is discovered to be, what really it is, the wooden Effigy of a Man, carved by some Shepherd, a *good-natured* Spectator of it would be *pleased* with the Shepherd's Ingenuity and Industry: but if the Beholder happens to be a *Churl*, or an Admirer of nothing but what procures *Money*, he will reflect on the Shepherd as an idle Fellow or unprofitably employed, and will feel the *Pain* of his own *ill-natured* and *illiberal* Reflection.

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time

time within our Souls. And when the Scribe writes what is True, true Opinions and true Sentences are by Him produced within us: but when our Scribe writes what is False, then what we think, and what we say to our Selves, is contrary to the Truth.

PROTARCHUS.

I heartily agree to Your Account of this Matter, and acknowlege those joint Scribes within the Soul.

SOCRATES.

Acknowlege also another Workman within us, operating at that time.

PROTARCHUS.

What is He?

SOCRATES.

An Engraver, who follows after the Scribe; engraving within the Soul Images of those Thoughts, Sentences, and Sayings.

PROTARCHUS.

How and when is This done?

SOCRATES.

It is, when That which a Man thinks and says to Himself, concerning the Object of his Sight, or of
any

any ²⁸⁰ other Outward Sense, he separates from the Sensation which he has of it; and views somehow within Himself the Image of that Thought, and of that Saying ²⁸¹. Or is there no such Thing as This ever produced within us?

PROTARCHUS.

²⁸⁰ In this Disjunctive Particle of the Sentence, the Sense of *Hearing* is chiefly meant. For what we *hear* from Others often makes an Impression in the Imagination as strong as what we *see* with our own Eyes; nay sometimes a stronger: for in some cases, the Imagination of the *Speaker*, in *reporting*, is apt to *magnify* what he has *seen*; and the Imagination of the *Hearer* to *magnify* what he *bears reported*.

²⁸¹ The *Images* of *external* and sensible Things are undoubtedly fixed for a time, and as it were *engraven* in the *Imagination*, by that Faculty or Power of the Soul, termed the *Memory*. But it must sound strange to a modern Ear, and perhaps it may be deemed a Solecism, to say,—the *Image* of an *Opinion*,—or, the *Image* of a *Sentence*. Yet, on due consideration, it will be evidently perceived, that an *Opinion*, *Judgment*, or *Sentence* of the Mind, concerning any particular Thing, Person, or Action, is a *Combination* of *Images* in the Imagination;—the *Image* of That *Particular*, which is the *Subject* of our Opinion, *combined* with some prior *Image* within us,—with *such* an Image, as habitually *invests* or accompanys that *Idea*, which our Imagination now *connects* with her present *Subject*, and *attributes* to it, or, in Scholastic Language, *predicates* of or concerning it;—whether the *Idea*, thus *attributed*, be any *Quality*, *Condition*, or *Circumstance*, which the Subject may be supposed capable of, or liable to,—or whether it be any *Species*

or *Genus*, to which the Subject may possibly belong: — as in the Instance, just before brought by Plato; where the walking Speculator *combines* the internal *Image* of that *Object* of his *Sight*, which is the *Subject* of his *Thought* or *Opinion*, with his own pre-conceived Notion or *Idea* of a *Man* in general; and no *Ideas* ever present themselves to a *Human Mind* naked, or stript of all *Imagery*.—Agen; if the *Subject* of our *Opinion* or *Thought*, and what we *deem* or *think relative* to that Subject, be, *Each* of them, a *General Idea*, their concomitant *Images* will be *combined* in the Imagination, and a *Complex Image* will thence arise. — As, for Instance, if we *think* concerning *Man*, that he is naturally *mild* and gentle, as being a *rational* and a *social* Animal, endued with a natural Sense of Equity and Justice, and in Matters of Indifference, easily submitting the natural Freedom of his Actions to Laws and Government for the Common Good,—or if, on the contrary, we think him to be an Animal naturally fierce and cunning, selfish and lawless, and governable only by Force or Fear;—the Subject of Either of these Thoughts is *Human Kind*, or the *General Idea* of *Man*; and this Idea we *connect* in our Mind either with the General Idea of *Rational Sociability*, or with That of *Brutish Ferocity* mixed with *Cunning*: (for we *attribute* one or other of these *Qualitys* to that *Being* who is the *Subject* of our *Thought*;) now in these cases, some of the *external* and *visible* Signs of the *Quality* so attributed will be *imagined*, and as it were *painted* within our Soul, in *combination* with an obscurely or imperfectly *imaged* Person of a *Man*; and probably, particular Persons, mild or fierce, Friends or Enemy, (that is, the internal *Images* of them,) will then occur to our *Remembrance*.—These Cases will also serve as Instances to show, that *Pain* and *Pleasure* of the *Soul* attend our *Thoughts* and *Opinions* on Some Subjects which are General. For the Opinion unfavourable to
Human

PROTARCHUS.

Nothing is more certain.

SOCRATES.

The Images ²⁸² of true Thoughts and true Sentences, are They not true? and the Images of those which are false, are they not Themselves also false?

PROTARCHUS.

Human Kind, fills the Heart with Jealousy and Distrust, Misanthropy and Malevolence, Sentiments and Passions *painful*, we presume, to all of Nature's Children. On the other hand, the contrary Opinion, the benign, while it cultivates in the Heart universal Benevolence and Philanthropy, sown there by Nature, yields at the same time a calm *Pleasure* con-natural to the Soul, conduces to Ease and Tranquillity of Mind and to Health of Body, inspires a Cheerfulness of Temper, and leads to the livelier Pleasures of Civil Life and Social Converse, and the delightful Dearnesses of disinterested Friendship and perfect Love.

²⁸² It must be acknowledged by all thinking Persons, that the Philosopher was right, in distinguishing between That *Power* in the Soul, by which she *receives* sensible *Impressions* from external things, — and another *Power* of hers, by which she *retains* Such of those *Impressions* as she attends to:—for different Names are given to these different Powers: the First is termed *Sense*; the latter, *Memory*.—But we suspect, that many of our Readers will think him wrong, in distinguishing so greatly between the *Impression* which is received, and the *Impression* which is *retained*, as to call this latter the *Image* of the

the former. For it is well known, that in *Vision*, (or the *Act of seeing*,) the *Impression*, made on the *Retina* of the Eye, by the *Rays* which are extended to it from the *Object*, and viewed there by the Sensitive Soul, is the *Image* of that *Object*: and it may reasonably be asked, — “Whence is it, that the *Object*, which is long since (perhaps) out of Sight, is often remembered as if present to the View, unless it be thro the *imprest Image* of it, still *remaining*?”—To this we answer, that the *Presence* of any *Object* of the *Sight* always *accompanys* the *Impression* which it makes; and that the *Image*, imprest by it on the *Retina*, remains there no longer, than while the *Object* is within Sight and actually *beheld*: but that the Soul, if, in viewing the *Object* by means of its concomitant *Image*, she bestows on it any degree of her Attention, withdraws this *Image* into her *Imagination*, and there reviews it *abstracted* from its Archetype, the external *Object*, when this *Object* is vanished from her Sight.—The *Image* therefore in that inner Membrane of the Eye, called the *Retina*, is like the *Image* in a *Mirror*; it departs, on the departure of the *Object* which created it. — But the *Image* within the *Soul her self*, being *derived* from that *Image* which she beheld in the *Retina*, is nothing more than a *Copy* of it, the *Image* of an *Image*. Yet this *Copy*, imperfect as it is, and less like to the Original, being by the Memory as it were *engraven*, remains after the disappearing of the *First Image*: and abides in the *Imagination* for a short or a longer time in proportion to the *Depth* of the *Engraving*; and This is usually proportioned to the *Strength* of the *Affection* or *Passion*, raised in the Soul by that transient *Image*. — The Case is the same with regard to *Thoughts* or internal Sentences, and to their attendant Pains or Pleasures of the Soul. For the Cognifance, which the Soul takes, of any *Sensible Object*, thro its *Image* in the *Retina*, is immediately followed

followed by a *Thought*, of What Kind or Nature the Object may be: the Thought or *internal Sentence* on this occasion, whatever it be, is a *Combination of Images*; as we observed in the preceding Note: and the Mind's *Affent* to the Thought makes it an *Opinion*.—Now this *Thought*, or this *Opinion*, may be as *transient* as the *Object* of it, and vanish together with it. But if, after the *Object* is away, the Soul *dwells* on that *Combination of Images*, (or rather that *Complex Image*,) the Thought or *Opinion*, she views it now in no other manner, than as it is *engraven* in her *Imagination*, together with the *Pain* or *Pleasure*, which she there *feels* attending it. In that *Seat* the *Opinion* and the *Feeling* will remain, (if the *Memory* and the *Affection* or *Passion* are strong enough to retain them,) how *false* soever the *Foundation* of them may be,—until from an improved Understanding and a Mind enlightened, a truer *Opinion*, and a juster *Sense* of Things come and drive them out. And farther; should the *Opinion*, first *engraven*, be intirely *true*,—and the *Pain* or *Pleasure* which attends it, intirely *just*,—(that is, should they be quite *agreeable* to the *Nature of Things*,—) yet should the *Mind*, or *Rational Soul*, who entertains that true *Opinion*, and feels that just *Sentiment*, arrive afterwards at *Science*,—the *Science*, to which belong those *General Ideas* contained in the *Opinion*,—she instantly removes the *Opinion* out of the *Imagination*, which is the only *Seat* of all *Opinions*, into her own *Territorys*, where all *true Opinions* become *Parts of Knowledge*.—What *pleasing Sentiments*, abstracted from all *Sensation* by means of *Body*, attend the *Rational Soul* into her own proper and retired *Place of Abode*, are briefly mentioned in *Note 3*.—But whether the *First Opinion* be *true*, or *false*,—and whether the *Beginning* of it, the *Thought*, originally sprang from a *Man's own Imagination*, or was suggested to him first by some *other Person*, it makes no difference in the
 Depth

PROTARCHUS.

Undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

Now if we have pronounced thus far rightly, let us proceed to the consideration of one Point farther.

PROTARCHUS.

What is That?

SOCRATES.

Whether all the Operations of this Kind, such as are naturally performed within our Souls, regard only Things present and Things past, but not Things to come; or whether any of them have a Reference to these also.

PROTARCHUS.

Difference of Time makes no difference in these Matters.

SOCRATES.

Did we not say before, that Pleasures and Pains of the Soul, by her Self, arise in us prior to those Pleasures and Pains which affect the Body²⁸³? so as that we feel antecedent Joy and Grief in the Prospect of things to come hereafter.

Depth or Durableness of the *Engraving*.—What the difference is between *true* and *false* Opinions, or Thoughts, see in Page 421.

²⁸³ See Page 404.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Very true.

SOCRATES.

Those Writings then, and those Engravings, which, as we held just now, are performed within us, do they respect the Past and the Present Time only? and have they no concernment with the Future?

PROTARCHUS.

About the Future very much are they concerned, and chiefly.

SOCRATES.

In saying This, do you mean, that all these Things²⁸⁴ are Expectations of the Future; and that we are, All of us, throughout Life, full of Expectations?

PROTARCHUS.

²⁸⁴ By *these Things* are to be understood our *Thoughts* and *Opinions* concerning what we have *no Knowledge* of. For of *sensible* things, *present* to our *Senses*, we have an actual *Perception*,—such a Sort of Knowledge, as *Sense* furnishes:—of *sensible* things, *past* or *absent*, we have only a *Remembrance*:—of *intelligible* things, when *present* to our *Minds*, we have a *Certainty*, the Certainty of *Science* or perfect Knowledge.—None of These Things then are Subjects of *Opinion*.—Our Thoughts or Opinions, therefore, as they relate to Things, of which we have neither a *Sense* nor a perfect *Knowledge*, are either of Things *not yet* existing, but *to come*;—or of Things, which never *did* nor ever *will* exist, the meer Creatures of *Imagination*:—or if

PROTARCHUS.

The very Thing I mean.

SOCRATES.

Now then, since we are thus far agreed, answer to this farther Question.

PROTARCHUS.

What is it?

SOCRATES.

A Man who is just and pious and intirely good, is he not beloved by the Divine Being?

PROTARCHUS.

Undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

And What of the unjust and intirely bad man? is not the Reverse of it true of Him?

the Subjects of our *Opinions* are Things in nature *now existing*, —or Things which have an *eternal Being* in the Divine Mind;—our *Perception* of *Those* is still *to come*,—and the *Knowlege* of *These* we are *not*, as yet, *arrived at*: so that the *Subjects* of meer *Opinion* are, to the Mind which entertains any Opinion, all of them *future*: of such a *Future*, the Thought or Opinion begets an *Expectation*; and every *Expectation* is attended either with *Hope* or with *Fear*, proportioned to the *Pleasure* or the *Displeasure*, which it gives to the *Imagination*.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

How can it be otherwise?

SOCRATES.

Now every Man, as we said just now, is full of a multitude of Expectations.

PROTARCHUS.

True.

SOCRATES.

Sayings there are, written within every one of us, to which we give the name of Expectations.

PROTARCHUS.

There are.

SOCRATES.

And Phantasys also, engraven in us. Thus, for instance, a Man often sees in Imagination plenty of Money flowing in to him, and by that means many Pleasures surrounding him; and views Himself, engraven within Himself, as highly delighted.

PROTARCHUS.

That often is the case.

SOCRATES.

Of these Engravings, shall we say, that Good Men, because of the Divine Favour, have generally

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those

those which are True ²⁸⁵; and Bad Men, generally those of the Contrary Sort? or shall we deny it?

PROTARCHUS.

It cannot be denied.

²⁸⁵ The present Reasoning depends on these Principles: viz. that the *Divine Being* is *Universal Truth*, TRUTH ITS SELF:—that from Him are derived to Man not only *General Truths*, those of *Mind* and *Science*, but the Truths of *Sense* also; for These consist in the constant *Harmony* of all *Nature*, and in That *Agreement* between the *Senses* and their *Objects*, of which He is the sole *Cause*:—that from a clear *Perception*, or a true *Sense* of *Sensible* Objects, joined to such a *Knowledge* of *Intelligible* Objects, or *General Truths*, as a sound Mind and an upright Heart never fail of producing, arise all true *Opinions*, and whatever in Man's *Imagination*, whether *pleasurabſe* or *painful*, accords with *Reality* and the *Truth of Things*:—that the *Standard* of this Reality and Truth is the *Book of Nature*, open to every Man, and by the Author of it Himself *explained* to every Man, who with a Mind unprejudiced will attend to the *Divine Interpreter* within him:—and that all *false* Sentiments, Thoughts, and Opinions, all *imaginary* Pleasures and Pains, all *groundleſs* Hopes and Fears, spring from those unbounded Appetites and Passions, and those extravagant Affections, which are apt to fill a human Soul undisciplined, whose Mind is mis-informed, or its Attention drawn away from its only faithful and unerring Governor and Preceptor, the *Fountain* of all *Truth*.—From these *Principles*, the *Positions* here laid down by *Socrates*, in his usual way of *querying*, are clearly deducible, and need not any farther Proof or Illustration.

SOCRATES.

Bad Men then have Pleasures engraven within Them also; but These are of the False Sort.

PROTARCHUS.

No Doubt of it.

SOCRATES.

Wicked Men therefore delight mostly in False Pleasures; the Good, in Pleasures which are True.

PROTARCHUS.

It must of necessity be so.

SOCRATES.

According to this account, there are, in the Souls of Men, such Pleasures as are False; tho in a most ridiculous manner they imitate, and would fain pass for, True Pleasures: Pains also there are, with the like Qualitys.

PROTARCHUS.

Such Pleasures and such Pains there are.

SOCRATES.

May not a Man, who indulges Fancy at random, and embraces Opinions of any Kind whatever, always really
really

really ²⁸⁶ think and believe some Things to be, which neither are, nor ever were, and sometimes such as never will be?

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

And they are the False Semblances and Seemings of these unreal Things, which produce in him those False Opinions, and occasion him to think thus falsely. Are they not?

PROTARCHUS.

They are.

SOCRATES.

Well then; should we not say of the Pains and Pleasures, felt by those Bad Men, that their condition corresponds with the case of False Opinions?

PROTARCHUS.

How do you mean?

²⁸⁶ In the *Greek* of this Sentence, before the word *ἀέ*, we ought to read *ἕως* instead of *οὗτος*. This appears from a Sentence soon after, concerning a Man *really delighted* with the Thoughts of *things unreal*. Both the Sentences refer to what was said in Page 444. where the same Word is used in the same Sense as it is here.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

May not a Man, who courts and embraces Pleasure at random, Pleasure in general, of any Kind whatever, may not such a Man always really feel Delight from things which are not, and sometimes from things which never were, often too and perhaps the most frequently, from things which will never be?

PROTARCHUS.

This must of necessity be granted.

SOCRATES.

Should not the same be said of Fears and Desires, and all things of the like Sort²⁸⁷, that These also are sometimes False?

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

Well now; can we say of Opinions, that they are Bad, or that they are Good, any otherwise than as they prove to be False, or prove to be True²⁸⁸?

PROTARCHUS.

²⁸⁷ Meaning—every such *Passion* of the Soul, as hath, for the *Object* of it, the appearance of *Good* or the appearance of *Evil*, either present or to come; from the *Falseness* or the *Truth* of which *Appearance*, the *Passion* its self is denominated either *False* or *True*.

²⁸⁸ It is observed by *Cornarius*, that after the word $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ in the *Greek* of this Sentence, all the printed Editions omit

PROTARCHUS.

No otherwise.

SOCRATES.

And I should think, that Pleasures too we apprehend not to be Bad on any other account, than as they are False.

PROTARCHUS.

Quite the contrary, O Socrates! For hardly would any Man put to the Account of Falshood any of the Evils brought on by Pain and Pleasure; since many and great Evils accede to them from other Quarters.

SOCRATES.

Pleasures, which are Evil, thro the Evil they occasion, we shall speak of by and by, if we shall continue to think it requisite: but we are now to speak of a multitude of Pleasures, felt by us, and frequently arising in us,—Pleasures which are false in yet another way ²⁸⁹. And this other way of considering Pleasure

the words *καὶ ἀληθεῖς*: the *Sense* evidently demands them; and they are not wanting in the *Medicean* M. S. as appears from *Ficinus's* Latin Translation. See also *Stephens's Annotations*, page 75.

²⁸⁹ That is, — in a way different from That, mentioned before, in which the Pleasurable *Object* was *unreal* and *imaginary*; and on that account, the *Pleasure*, felt from it, was considered as a *False* Pleasure.

we shall have occasion perhaps to make use of, in forming a right Judgment of the several Sorts of it.

PROTARCHUS.

By all means let us speak of These, if any such Pleasures there are.

SOCRATES.

And there are such, O Protarchus! in My opinion. But as long as this Opinion lyes by us unexamined, 'tis impossible for it to become certain or incontestable.

PROTARCHUS.

Fairly said.

SOCRATES.

Now therefore, let us advance to this other argument, like Champions to the Combat.

PROTARCHUS.

Come we on then.

SOCRATES.

We said, if we remember, a little while since ²⁹⁰, that as long as the Wants of the Body, which are called Desires in us, remain unsatisfied, the Body all that time will be affected distinctly, and in a different manner, from the Soul.

²⁹⁰ See from Page 435 to Page 440.

PROTARCHUS.

We remember, that 'twas so held.

SOCRATES.

In such a Case, That within us, which desired ²⁹¹, would be the Soul, desiring to have her Body in a State contrary to its present Condition; and That, which felt Uneasiness or Pain from the Condition it was in, would be the Body ²⁹².

PROTARCHUS.

Things would be thus with us.

SOCRATES.

Now compute these things together, and consider the Amount.

²⁹¹ We are to understand the *Desire*, in this Case, to be accompanied with *Hope*; agreeably to the Case, stated in Page 439. For the *Soul* is here supposed to feel *Pleasure*; and the *Body*, at the same time, to feel Pain: but a *Desire hopeless* would add *Pain* of the *Soul* to that of the *Body*.

²⁹² The *Sensitive* Part of the *Soul* is joined so immediately to (or united with) the *Body*, that to all Human as well as other Sentient Beings the *Body* seems to be the *Seat* and the *Subject* of all *Sensual Pain* and *Pleasure*. But *Desire* is universally acknowledged to belong to the *Soul* only, as *distinct* from the *Body*. And by the word *Soul*, in the present Passage, only the *Appetitive* Part of the *Soul* is meant.

PROTARCHUS.

Say, What.

SOCRATES.

In such a case, it comes out, that Pains and Pleasures are placed together, each by the other's side; and that together, each by the other's side, arise in us a Feeling of Emptiness, and a Desire ²⁹³ of its contrary, Fulness: for so it has just now appeared.

PROTARCHUS.

'Tis indeed apparent.

SOCRATES.

Has not This also been said? and does it not remain with us a Point, settled between us by agreement?

PROTARCHUS.

What?

SOCRATES.

That Pain and Pleasure, Both of them, admit of the More and of the Less; and that they Both are of the Infinites.

PROTARCHUS.

It was so said and agreed ²⁹⁴.

SOCRATES.

²⁹³ See Note 291.

²⁹⁴ In the *Greek*, — εἰρηταί. — to which are added these two short words, — τί μὴν; — *without dispute*; — an expression, frequently

SOCRATES.

Is there not then some Way ²⁹⁵, in which we may judge of Pain and Pleasure rightly?

PROTARCHUS.

quently occurring in all such Dialogues of *Plato* as are of the *Inquisitive* or *Inquiring* Kind, particularly in This; and very proper in the Mouth of the Party *questioned*, where the *Subject* of the Question asked is an *Opinion* universally received. But where the *Subject* of the Question is a *Matter of Fact* well known, or a *Thing said* but just before, and agreed in by Both the Partys, (as in the present case,) the expression is unusual, and if not quite improper, is at least superfluous. Here therefore we suspect an Error in the Text; and shall endeavour to account for and rectify it in the next Note.

²⁹⁵ In the *Greek*,—Τίς ἐν μηχανῇ κ. τ. λ. *What Way then can be contrived, &c.*—*Cornarius* and *Grou*, in translating the *Question*, here put by *Socrates*, adhere to this Reading of it. But, if This were right, then the next words of *Protarchus*, instead of being an *Answer* to the Question, would amount to nothing more than a *retorting* of the same Question back again to *Socrates*.—*Ficinus* and *Serranus*, together with *Grynæus* and *Bembo*, make this Sentence, not *Interrogative*, but *Positive*, thus, — “*There is then some Way, &c.*” — But the *Greek Words* admit not this Interpretation; for the Indefinite τίς (*Some*) never, we believe, begins a Sentence.—Yet as the Passage stands at present, it seems, that every Interpreter must of necessity adopt either the one or the other of these wrong Interpretations. But Both of them may be avoided by a very slight alteration of the *Greek Text*; that is, by taking from *Protarchus* the words τί μιν, and transferring them to *Socrates*, with

PROTARCHUS.

What Way, and how do you mean?

SOCRATES.

In judging of them, are we not wont, in every case, readily to try them by these marks,—Which of them is the Greater, and Which is the Less, — Which of them hath the Nature of its Kind the most,—and Which is more Intense than the other, — in comparing either a Pain with a Pleasure, or one Pain with another Pain, or one Pleasure with another Pleasure ²⁹⁶ ?

PROTARCHUS.

Such Comparisons are often made; and from these Comparisons we are wont to form our Judgment and our Choice.

with the omission only of the last Letter in *μὴν*. The Sentence will then stand thus;—*Τί; μήτις ἐν μηχανῇ κ. τ. λ. Well, is there not then some Way, &c.*

²⁹⁶ This Sentence may be either taken as *Interrogative*, according to all the Translations of it into *Latin*, *French*, and *Italian*;—or it may be taken as *Conditional*: in the latter case, at the beginning of it, a few words, connecting it with what precedes, are to be understood; as thus;—(“*The Way appears plain,*) *if, in judging of them, we are wont, in every case, readily to try them, &c.*”—And indeed *thus* the Sentence more easily is seen to be what it really is, — an Answer to the Question of *Protarchus*,—than it would be, were it a new *Interrogatory*.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Well now ; in the case of Magnitudes, does not the Distance of visible Objects, Some of which are seen remote and Others near, render their real Magnitudes uncertain, obscuring the Truth of things, and producing false Opinions? and does not the same thing hold true with regard to Pains and Pleasures? is not the same Effect produced by the same Means in This case also?

PROTARCHUS.

Much more feelingly, O Socrates!

SOCRATES.

But in This case, it happens contrary to what was in the case, mentioned a little before ²⁹⁷.

PROTARCHUS.

What happens, say you?

SOCRATES.

In that case, the true and the false Opinions, entertained by us, impart to the Pains and Pleasures,

²⁹⁷ See in Page 451. — *Stephens's* Edition follows That of *Aldus*, in attributing this Sentence to *Protarchus*; an Error, the more inexcusable, in that the Two *Basil* Editions, Both of them prior to That of *Stephens*, agree with *Ficinus* in ascribing it to *Socrates*, to whom it undoubtedly belongs.

which

which attend them, their own Qualitys of Truth and Falshood.

PROTARCHUS.

Very right.

SOCRATES.

But in the case, which I am now speaking of, the Pains and Pleasures, being viewed afar off and near, continually changing [their Aspects with their Distances], and being set in comparison together, [it happens, that] the Pleasures [at hand], compared with the [remote] Pains, appear greater and more intense [than they really are], and [that] the Pains, compared with the Pleasures, [have an appearance] quite the contrary ²⁹⁸.

PROTARCHUS.

²⁹⁸ The *Pains* and *Pleasures*, meant in the former case, arise in us from certain *Notions* or *Opinions*: that is, certain *Notions* or *Opinions* there are, which give us Uneasiness, Grief and Sadness; and from certain Other we receive Comfort, Joy, and Delight. If therefore the *Opinion*, on which entirely depend any Pains or Pleasures of the Soul, be *false*, those *Pains* or *Pleasures* must be *false* themselves, as being merely *imaginary*. But in the case now put by *Socrates*, the *Pains* and *Pleasures* are supposed to be *real* in a *certain degree*, and from a natural necessity must be *felt* in a short or a longer time to come. These *Pains* however and these *Pleasures*, being by the *Imagination* *exaggerated* beyond their real Magnitude, or *diminished* to a Size below it, are so far *false*, as they either *exceed*, or *fall short* of, the reality of the *Feeling*, when it comes to be *present*.

sent. So that the Pains and the Pleasures, *here* spoken of, are *false*, as well as those in the *former* case; but their Falsity is of a different *Nature*, and proceeds from a different *Cause*.—*Those* are false *intirely* and *essentially*: *These* are only false in their *apparent Magnitude*.—The *Cause* of that total Falsity in the *former* is an Error of our own Judgement concerning the *Subjects* of our *Opinion*: the partial Falsity of the *latter* is owing to the nearness or remoteness of that *Distance* from our *Selves*, at which we view the Pleasure and the Pain, Each of them severally, in our *Imagination*, whenever we chuse to set them in comparison together: for they are there placed at *different Distances*, not by *Forefight* and *Prudence*, but by *Desire* and *Fear*, according to the *present Predominance* of either of these Passions. And as the Strength or Weakness of the *Passion* creates the *imaginary Distance* of its Object, so the nearness or remoteness of this *Distance* creates the *imaginary Quantum* of the Object; and the seeming *Magnitude* of This is still more increased, or its seeming *Minuteness* is still more diminished, by the comparison, made with its Antagonist.—The Instance of this, here brought by *Plato*, is when *Pleasure* appears to be *at hand*, and *Pain* to be *remote*, rather than in the contrary appearances of Both, for this reason, — because the *Falsity* of some Kinds of *Pleasure* is the immediate Subject of this Part of the Dialogue. The Conclusion, however, drawn from hence, in the next Sentence of *Socrates*, includes an *imaginary* and *false Magnitude* of both *Pain* and *Pleasure*.—The learned Reader, if he compares the Sentence, now before him, with the *Greek*, will observe it to be somewhat enlarged in the *English*. The additional Words, inclosed within *Hooks*, were left by *Plato* to be supplied by his Reader's own Understanding. But, as our modern Style of Composition admits not of such *Ellipses*, the Words, omitted in the *Greek*, are inserted

PROTARCHUS.

Such appearances must of necessity arise by these means.

SOCRATES.

As far therefore as the Pains and Pleasures appear less or greater than they really are, if from the Reality you separate this Appearance of what Neither of them is, and take it by its Self thus separated, you will not say that 'tis a Right Appearance; nor will you venture to assert, that this Additional Part of Pain and Pleasure is right and true.

PROTARCHUS.

By no means.

SOCRATES.

After these discoveries, let us look, if we can meet with Pleasures and Pains, still falser, and more remote from truth, than those already mentioned, which are not only in Appearance what they are called, but are felt also by the Soul ²⁹⁹.

ferted in the English Translation for the sake of Perspicuity. For, that these Words, or others of like Import, are to be understood as if they were expressed in this Sentence, may appear from the present explanatory Note.

²⁹⁹ Felt in the *Imagination*, or *Imaginative Part* of the *Soul*.— See Page 469.

P p p

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

What Pleasures and Pains do you speak of?

SOCRATES.

We have more than once said, that when the Frame of any Animal is on its way to Diffolution, thro' Mixtures and Separations, Repletions and Evacuations, the Increase of some and the Diminution of other Parts of it, that in such a Condition of its Body, Pains, Achs, and Oppressions, with many other uneasy Feelings to which are given various Names, are wont to arise in us ³⁰⁰.

PROTARCHUS.

True; this Observation has been again and again repeated.

SOCRATES.

And that, when all things in our Bodily Frame return to their natural and sound State, together with this Recovery, we receive some Pleasure from within our Selves.

PROTARCHUS.

Right.

SOCRATES.

But how is it, when none of these Changes are operating in our Bodys?

³⁰⁰ See Pages 401, and 431, &c.

PROTARCHUS:

PROTARCHUS.

At what times, O Socrates! may This be?

SOCRATES.

The Question, O Protarchus! which you have now put to me, is nothing to the Purpose.

PROTARCHUS.

Why not?

SOCRATES.

Because it will not hinder me ³⁰¹ from putting again My Question to You.

PROTARCHUS.

Repeat it then.

SOCRATES.

I shall put it thus: If at any time, none of those things were passing within us, What condition should we of necessity be in, as to Pleasure and Pain, at such a time?

PROTARCHUS.

When no Motion was in the Body Either way, do you mean ³⁰²?

³⁰¹ In the *Greek*, to read *κωλύσει* seems preferable to the printed Reading, which is *κωλύσεις*.

³⁰² That is,—when the Body is neither in such a condition as tends to its Dissolution,—nor, on the other hand, in such a condition as tends to the recovery of its Health and Soundness, after they have been injured.

SOCRATES.

Exactly so.

PROTARCHUS.

It is plain, O Socrates! that we should feel neither any Pleasure, nor any Pain, at such a time.

SOCRATES.

Perfectly well answered. But now in Your Question I suppose You meant This,—that some or other of those things were of necessity passing within us, continually at all times; agreeably to this Saying of the Wise,—“ that all things are in perpetual Flow, going upward and downward ³⁰³.

PROTARCHUS.

So they tell us: and this Saying of theirs is, methinks, worthy of Regard.

SOCRATES.

Undoubtedly it is: for 'tis said by Men, who are worthy, Themselves, to be regarded ³⁰⁴. But this

³⁰³ See the *Dissertation concerning the Doctrine of Heraclitus*, Page 17.

³⁰⁴ It is affirmed by *Socrates*, in Plato's *Theætetus*, page 152, Edit: *Steph*: that the Wise Men, (that is, the Philosophers,) in a continued Succession, All except *Parmenides*, (who stands for the whole *Eleatic* Sect, of which He was the Founder,) agree in asserting the *Instability of all things*; that is, of all things in the *Corporeal World*, or *Outward Nature*.

Subject,

Subject, which we have thus lighted on, I would willingly decline. Now I have it in my thoughts to avoid it This way ; but You must accompany me.

PROTARCHUS.

What way ?

SOCRATES.

Be it so then, let us say to these Wise Men : but You, Protarchus ! answer me to This Question : Do Animals feel all the Alterations which they continually undergo ? or whilst we are growing, or suffering in any Part of our Bodys any other Change, are we sensible of these internal Motions ? Is not quite the contrary true ? for almost every thing of this Kind, passing within us, passes without our Knowledge.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly so.

SOCRATES.

It was therefore not right in us to say, as we did just now, that all the Alterations which happen to our Bodys, and all the Motions within them, produce either Pains or Pleasures.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly not right.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

And it would be better, and less liable to Censure, to lay down this Position.

PROTARCHUS.

What Position?

SOCRATES.

That Great Changes within give us Pains and Pleasures; but that Such as are Inconsiderable, or only Moderate, produce neither Pleasures nor Pains.

PROTARCHUS.

This is more justly said, than the other Sentence, indeed, Socrates!

SOCRATES.

If then these things are so, we meet with the Life, mentioned before, recurring to us here again.

PROTARCHUS.

What Life?

SOCRATES.

That which is exempt from all Sensations both of Pain and Pleasure ³⁰⁵.

PROTARCHUS.

Very true.

³⁰⁵ See Page 408.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Hence we find, there are three Kinds of Life proposed to our consideration; One of them, full of Pleasure; Another, full of Pain; the Third, Neutral, and free from Both. Or how otherwise would You determine upon these Points?

PROTARCHUS.

No otherwise I for My part: for Three different Kinds of Life appear to Me in what has been said.

SOCRATES.

To have no Pain therefore cannot be the same thing as to have Pleasure.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly it cannot.

SOCRATES.

But whenever you hear a man say, that 'tis the most pleasurable of all things, to live all one's Life free from Pain, What do you take to be His Thought and Meaning?

PROTARCHUS.

He means and thinks, as I take it, that 'tis a Pleasure not to have any Pain.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Well now ; let there be any Three Things whatever ; to instance in Things of honourable name, let us suppose One of them to be Gold, Another to be Silver, and the Third to be neither Gold nor Silver.

PROTARCHUS.

We shall suppose so.

SOCRATES.

That which is Neither, is it possible for it any way to become either Gold or Silver ?

PROTARCHUS.

By no means.

SOCRATES.

The Middle Life therefore, if 'twere said to be pleasurable, or if 'twere said to be painful, would not be spoken of, in either way, rightly and agreeably to the true Nature of Things ; nor would any Person, who entertains Either of those Opinions concerning it, think rightly.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly not.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

And yet, my Friend! we find that there are Persons, who actually speak and think thus amidst ³⁰⁶.

PROTARCHUS.

³⁰⁶ Hence it appears, that in the time of *Socrates*, when Men of Leisure began to be much addicted to Philosophical Studys and Discourses, in many Grecian Countrys, and particularly at *Athens*, the chief Seat of all Philosophy for several Ages, from that time, Persons there were, who, like *Epicurus*, tho long before him, held, that between Pleasure and Pain there is *no Medium*; for that to be *free from Pain*, is not only a *Pleasure*, but the very *Height* and *Consummation* of Pleasure: as may be seen from the Reasoning of *Torquatus* an *Epicurean*, in *Cicero de Finibus Bon: & Mal: L. I, §. 11.* — But Who were the Persons, alluded to here by *Socrates*, and What Sect of Philosophers in His time held so paradoxical a Tenet, or rather, used the Term *Pleasure* in so new and strange a Sense, we are at a loss to conjecture,—unless they were Some of the *Cyrenaicks*. — And yet we learn from *Cicero* in his Treatise above cited, from *Laertius* also in L. 2, §. 89, and from *Sextus Empiricus*, pag: 411, that the *Cyrenaicks* thought like *Socrates* on this Subject; and spake of it in Terms, such as those which had been used by Him.—*Sextus* delivereth their Sentiments in these words;—πάντων τῶν ὄντων, τὰ πάθη κριτήριά ἐστι καὶ τέλη· τῶν παθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἡδέα· τὰ δὲ, ἀλγενα· τὰ δὲ, μεταξύ. Τὰ μὲν ἀλγενα, κακά φασιν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ ἡδέα, ἀγαθὰ· τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, ἕτε ἀγαθὰ, ἕτε κακά. And again;—ἕτε ἀγαθόν, ἕτε κακόν, πάθος ἐστὶ μεταξύ ἡδονῆς καὶ ἀλγηδόνος. *The Passions of Man* (or the Feelings of his Soul) *are* (to Him,) *the Criteria and Boundaries of the Good and Evil of all things.* Of

the Passions (or Feelings of the Soul) *Some are pleasurable; Some, painful; Others, between Both. The painful, say They, are evil; the pleasurable, good; those between Both are neither good nor evil. And the Condition of a Man between Both, in which he feels neither Pleasure nor Pain, is neither good nor evil.—*Laertius, speaking of their Opinions, says, — ἡ τῶ ἀλγῶντος ὑπεξαίρεσις δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς μὴ εἶναι ἡδονή, ἕδε· ἡ ἀηδονία ἀλγῶντων· ἐν κινήσει γὰρ εἶναι ἀμφοτέρω· μὴ ἕσσης τῆς ἀπονίας ἢ τῆς ἀηδονίας κινήσεως· ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπονία οἶονεῖ καθευδοντός ἐστὶ κατάστασις.—μέσας τε καταστάσεις ὀνόμαζον ἀηδονίαν καὶ ἀπονίαν. *The Removal of That, which gives Pain, they deem not to be Pleasure; nor the Privation of Pleasure deem they to be Pain: for that Pleasure and Pain Both, say they, consist in Motion: but the Absence of either Pain or Pleasure is not any Kind of Motion. The Absence of them Both is like the State of a Man soundly asleep. This therefore they termed a Middle or Indifferent State of Being.—*Now concerning this *Middle or Neutral State of the Soul. — a State of pure Tranquillity, and perfectly serene,—* That State, which according to *Socrates* in this Dialogue, page 408, is the most *Divine*, — That, in which *Hieronymus the Rhodian*. placed the *Sovereign Good*, and which *Epicurus* deemed to be the *Highest* of all *Pleasures*,—we are told in general by *Cicero* and by *Sextus*, as we have just now acknowledged, that the *Reality* of this State is held by the *Cyrenaicks*: but 'tis observable, that by *Laertius* it is recorded among the Tenets of Those only of the *Cyrenaicks*, who continued in the *Institutes of Aristippus*, ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγωγῆς τῆς Ἀριστίππου μέιναντες, and were alone peculiarly and properly termed *Cyrenaicks*. For; though the Disciples of this celebrated *Cyrenean* persisted, all of them alike, in his Capital Doctrine, — that “*Pleasure is the sole Good and End of Human Life,*”—yet, as they differed, one from another, about some of the *Means* fit for the procuring of this End, (One Party, for instance, admitting the Study of *Logick* and *Physicks*, Others rejecting them; and One Party recommending

recommending *Friendship* and *Patriotism*, Others renouncing them;) so 'tis probable, that the different Partys, into which they were divided, used the Term *Pleasure* in different Senses; and that, while it was confined by Some to signify *Sensual Pleasure* only, which is *common* to all *Animals*, Others enlarged its Meaning, so as to comprehend all those *Enjoyments*, which are *peculiar* to the *Soul of Man*, and are mentioned in Note 3.—Certain it is, that in the Life-time of *Plato*, the *Cyrenaicks* were divided into Four Partys, severally named from their immediate Heads or Leaders,—the *Theodorians*, from *Theodorus*,—the *Hegesacks*, from *Hegesias*,—the *Annicerians*, from *Anniceris*,—and the genuine *Cyrenaicks*, who were strict followers of *Aristippus*, the Founder and prime Leader of all the Four.—This their partial *Disagreement* gave occasion, perhaps, to the Charge, brought against them by Some Persons, as we are informed by *Sextus*, pag: 372, — the Charge of *Inconstancy* or *Inconsistence*. For the different Partys retaining, but for a short time only, the particular Names by which they were distinguished, soon became, All of them, included in their general and original Name, *Cyrenaicks*. In all likelyhood, they either laid aside or lost those Names of Distinction, by uniting in the Defence of that Doctrine, common to them all, — the supreme *Happiness* of enjoying *Pleasure*,—against those formidable Enemies of theirs, the *Stoicks*, whose Sect arose soon after the death of *Plato*. But however This may have been, 'tis certain that, in a short course of time, all the *Cyrenaicks* were easily absorbed in the wide-spreading Sect, founded by *Epicurus*. For the Principles of his Doctrine, in *Ethicks*, agreed entirely well with theirs: and his amiable Manners attracted to him all the Grecian Youth, whose Genius led them to *Philosophy*; but whose *Love of Ease* deterred them from undergoing the *rigid* Discipline of *severer* Moralists; or

PROTARCHUS.

It is very evident.

SOCRATES.

Do these Persons really feel Pleasure ³⁰⁷, whenever they are free from Pain?

PROTARCHUS.

whose *humbler Thoughts*, confined to *Body* and the *Corporeal World*, aspired not to contemplate the nature of *Mind* and *Science*, or to investigate the *Principles* of all Kinds of *Reasoning*. — The *Epicureans* also were not less unsettled in their *Notions of Pleasure*, than the *Cyrenaicks* had been; as we observed in page 34 of the present Dialogue. But this Inconstancy never broke the Harmony of the *Epicurean Sect*; the reasons of which probably were these; — that from the time of its Beginning, it always had to combat with the *Stoicks*; — and that All, who adhered to it, were Worshippers of the same *Deity*, — the multiform Deity of *Pleasure*, — as the *sole Cause* (the *Efficient*, *Formal*, and *Final Cause*) of all *Good to Man*. Accordingly, all the *Epicureans*, without Distinction, are by *Ammonius* and *Simplicius*, in their *Comments on the Categorys*, styled ἡδοναῖ, *Voluptuarys* (in Theory); — an Appellation, very properly given long before by *Cebes*, in his *Picture of Human Life*, to all the *Cyrenaicks*, tho at that time they were divided into Partys.

³⁰⁷ We have ventured to suppose an Error in the *Greek* of this Passage; and that we ought to read χαίρουν οὗτοι, instead of the printed words, — χαίρουν οἷονται. For without such an alteration, *Socrates*, in his next Sentence, (where these very words — χαίρουν οἷονται — appear again, and where they are very proper,)

PROTARCHUS.

So they say.

SOCRATES.

They must imagine then, that they are pleased; for otherwise they would not say so.

PROTARCHUS.

They do, it seems, imagine it.

SOCRATES.

They have a wrong Opinion then of Pleasure; if it be true, that Pleasure, and Freedom from Pain, have Each a distinct Nature, different from that of the Other.

PROTARCHUS.

Different indeed we have concluded them to be.

SOCRATES.

And are we willing to abide by our late Conclusion, that the Subjects, still under examination, are Three distinct Things? or do we choose to say, that they are only Two? do we now say, that Pain is Man's Evil, and that Deliverance from Pain is Man's Good, and is That to which is given the appellation of Pleasure?

proper,) is guilty of meer Tautology; and his *argumentation* proceeds not the least Step, but *halts* during that whole Sentence.

PROTARCHUS.

How come we, O Socrates! to propose this Point to be reconsidered by us now? for I do not apprehend your Drift.

SOCRATES.

In fact, O Protarchus! you do not apprehend, Who are the direct Enemies to Philebus.

PROTARCHUS.

Whom do you give that Character to?

SOCRATES.

Persons, who are said to have a profound Knowledge of Nature: and these Persons say, that Pleasures ³⁰⁸ have no reality at all.

PROTARCHUS.

³⁰⁸ Meaning *absolute*, and *positive* Pleasures, *independant* of *Pains*.—We have no doubt, but that the Persons, here meant, were *Antisthenes* and some of his Disciples. To this Opinion we have been led by the following considerations.—In the first place, the Persons, spoken of, are characterised by their aversion to *Pleasures*; that is, to Those Pleasures, which are *preceded* naturally by *Pains*; for only Such answer to the Description here given. And indeed the *Pleasures* of this Sort, whether those of the Body and Soul jointly, or those of the Soul alone, are always *great*, in proportion to the *greatness* of the *Pains* preceding them. As therefore *vehement Pains* are felt by the Soul, when her Body suffers in a high degree any
such

such Alterations, as are mentioned before in page 401, &c.;— proportionably *vehement* are the *Pleasures*, which attend the *Deliverance* from those *Pains*, thro' contrary Alterations in the Body. — And as the Soul is also *tormented* by her own imaginary Wants and immoderate Desires, — the *Removal* of that *Torment*, by a Supply of those Wants, or a Gratification of those Desires, is apt to affect her with so *tumultuous* a *Joy*, as sometimes to overwhelm her Reason.—In the former case, those *extravagant Pleasures* of *Sense*, which succeed to *Sensible Pains*, tend to relax the Nerves, and to weaken the Vigour of the Body. — And in the latter case, *extravagant Joys*, succeeding to *high Passions* of the *contrary* Kind, have a tendency to weaken the Understanding, and to loosen (as it were) the Joints of the whole Soul.—When Both these cases concur, as they sometimes do, all Strength of the Mind is wont to be dissolved, the Power of Judgment totally to fail, and every Faculty of the Soul to become engaged in the Pursuit of the like Pleasure and the like Joy for ever after. — Such Pleasures and Such Joys as These, we presume that *Antisthenes* had a view to, in This celebrated Saying of His,—μανεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἡδεῖν, *I had rather have my Soul seized with Madness, than possessed by Pleasure.* The Severity of the Sentiment, and the Harshness of the Expression, are quite agreeable to the rigorous Discipline, the rugged Manners, and the rough Language of the *Cynic* Sect, founded by *Antisthenes*: nor less exactly do they correspond with what *Socrates* says, presently after, of the Persons whom he is here speaking of.—The great *Respect* which he soon professes for them, and the high *Character* which he is about to give them, in likening them to Men *inspired* by the *God of Wisdom*, are farther Reasons for our Supposition. For between *Socrates* and *Antisthenes* subsisted the truest *Friendship*, That which is built on the Similarity of Two Minds, wholly devoted,

PROTARCHUS.

What do they mean?

SOCRATES.

They say, that all those things, which Philebus and his Party call Pleasures, are but Deliverances from Pain.

devoted, Each of them, to the Search of *Truth*, the Study of *Wisdom*, and the Practise of every *Virtue* necessary to the *Happiness* of *Private Life*, and to the very *Being* of *Civil Society*. Hence it was, that *Antisthenes* recommended to his own *Disciples*, to become Followers and Hearers of *Socrates*; ingenuously professing himself to have been advanced in *Wisdom* by His *Converse*. — Our last Argument to prove, that *Socrates* meant, by the *Adversarys* of *Pleasure*, his great *Friend*, and the peculiar *Disciples* of this *Friend*, is the *Description* which he gives of them, in the Sentence now before us,—that they are Persons, *δεινοὶ λεγόμενοι τὰ περὶ φύσιν*, said to be profound in the *Knowledge* of *Nature*. For, that *Antisthenes* answered to this *Description*, better than any other *Athenian* contemporary with *Socrates*, or than any *Foreigner* who in that age philosophised at *Athens*, must be acknowledged by all true *Theists*, if they are versed in the *History* of *Philosophy*; and if also they have read the only remaining *Fragment* of the *Treatise* of *Antisthenes*, *περὶ φύσεως*, as it is translated by *Cicero* in his *First Book* *de Naturâ Deorum*, §. 13,—“populares Deos esse multos, naturalem esse unum,” — that the *Gods* of the *People* are many, the *God* of *Nature* is only *One*.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Is it Your Advice then, O Socrates ! that we should hearken to these Persons ? or how otherwise ?

SOCRATES.

Not so ; but to consider them as a Kind of Diviners, who divine not according to any Rules of Art ³⁰⁹ ; but from the Austerity of a certain Genius in

³⁰⁹ The various Modes of *Divination*, practised anciently in Greece, are rightly comprehended, all of them, in Two Kinds, the *Artificial* and the *Enthusiastic*. Of the *First Kind*, were the Inspectors of the Entrails of Beasts sacrificed, the Observers of the Flight of certain Birds, the Interpreters of Dreams, and many other Sorts of *Artist-Diviners* ; All of whom prognosticated future Events, from the *Rules* of their several *Arts*, taught them by *Human Masters*. The Diviners of the *Second Kind*, the *Enthusiastic*, are distinguished into *Two Sorts* ; — into Those, who delivered the *Oracles* of the *Gods*, given in their *Temples*, — and Those, who were *inspired* by some *God within Themselves*. Mention is made of *Both* these Sorts in the *Apology of Socrates*, where they are called, the *former Sort* *χρησμοφοδοί*, the latter *θεομαντῆς*. *Socrates* there likens to them the *Poets* ; for that These compose their Poems *εὐ σοφία*, not from any *Wisdom*, or *Skill* in the Subjects on which they write, ἀλλὰ φύσει τι καὶ ἐνθεσιαζόμενοι, but from a Kind of *Natural Genius*, aided by *Enthusiasm*. And he here likens to those *Enthusiastic Diviners*, especially to Those of the *latter Sort*, *Anaximenes* and his *Disciples*, for much the same reason ; These

R r r

not

not having learnt their Doctrine from any *Human Master* of *Science*. For, if they had, they would have been taught to make a more *Sciential* and accurate *Distinction* between *Pain* and *Pleasure*: they would have known them Both to be equally *Sensations*, (if in the *Body*,) or *Sentiments*, (if in the *Soul* only,) but of two *contrary* Kinds: they would not have confounded the *Feeling* of *Pleasure* with the *Deliverance* from (a mere *Absence* of) the *contrary* Feeling, that of *Pain*: they would have placed, *between* *Pain* and *Pleasure*, as *Socrates* had done, an *Insensibility* to Either: They would also, like *Socrates*, have assigned the *Causes* of those *contrary* Feelings; and have described the *Alterations* made in the *Body* at the time of Each, and the *Tendency* of those *Alterations*.—Now, to confirm the Judgment of *Socrates* concerning the *Cynicks*, — that they philosophised ἐ τέχνη, *not from Art*, or any *Human Teaching*,—we are informed, in the *Emperor Julian's Sixth Oration*, that the *Cynicks* disowned *Antisthenes*, *Diogenes*, and every other *Man*, as the ἀρχηγός *First Leader* of their Sect, or *Founder* of their *Discipline*; acknowledging no *Teacher*, beside the *God of Wisdom*; and affirming, that He it was, who prescribed the *Way of Life* peculiar to them, in this *Symbolical Precept*, — παραχάραξον τὸ νόμισμα, “*Efface the current Coin*:” — by which it was signified, that *Whoever* would attain to *Wisdom*, must not conform his *Notions* to *Popular Opinions*, nor the *Conduct* of his *Life* to *Public Manners*, or the *Fashionable* way of *Living*; but should *erase* out of his *Mind* all *Impressions*, made by any *Teaching*, except the *Teaching* of That *Oracle within Himself*, which is *Divine*. They owned therefore the *Divinity* of the *Delphic Sentence*, — ἴσῳδι σεαυτὸν, “*Know thy Self*,” — only because *God*, they said, dictated to Them the same *Precept*.—But besides their own *disclaiming* of all *Human Instruction*, the learned *Emperor*, (to whom we are indebted

in them not ignoble ³¹⁰, have conceived an Aversion to the Power of Pleasure; and deem Nothing in her
to

debted for this Piece of Information concerning their above-mentioned *peculiar Maxim*,) taking upon himself the Office of Advocate for them, cites, in Their Behalf, the well-known Saying of *Heraclitus*,—*πολυμαθὴν νόον ἔδιδάσκει*, “*Much Learning doth not teach good Sense.*”——What *Socrates* meant farther, in styling them *Prophets* or *Diviners*, may appear, from considering the consequences of what he said before in this Dialogue,—viz. “that a Life of Insensibility to Pain and Pleasure is of all Lives the most Godlike:—for thence it follows, that such a Life is the Portion of those Beings, whose Nature is nearest to That of The Supream; and that ’twill also be hereafter the Portion of all Those, who may perhaps, in time, arrive at a State so exalted.—The *Cynic* Philosophers aimed at such a State of Life here on Earth. And indeed, could a Man live well and happily, independant on *Domestic* and *Civil Society*,—did not his natural Instincts and Affections strongly incline him, and his natural Wants forcibly impell him, to a *Conjugal*, *Social*, and *Civil Life*,—were he not a *Political* as well as a *Rational* Animal, — and were the *Cynical Life* a Life designed by *Nature* for any *Human Being*, — we should make no Scruple of pronouncing it the *happiest* of all *Human Lives*. — For a well-drawn Sketch of it, we refer the learned Reader to *Maximus the Tyrian* his *thirty-sixth Dissertation*, as numbered by *Dr. Davis*.

³¹⁰ Meaning—a Genius *the most noble*.—Concerning this *Figure of Speech*, see Note 218. — It is remarkable, that *Julian* useth the same Figure, in writing on the same Subject. For

to be Solid; but all her attractive Charms to be meer Illusions, and not [true] Pleasure. It is thus that we should regard these Persons, especially if we consider their other harsh Maxims. You shall in the next place hear, What Pleasures seem to Me to be True Pleasures: so that, from Both the Accounts, compared together, we may find out the nature of Pleasure, and form our Judgment of her comparative Value.

PROTARCHUS.

Rightly said.

SOCRATES.

Let us then follow after them, as our Allies, wherever their Austerity shall lead us. For I suppose, they would begin their Argument with some General Principle, and propound to us some such Question as

his account of the *Cynic Philosophy*, in his *Sixth Oration*, is ushered in by this general Character of it,—*ἕδος φιλοσοφίας ἔτι φαυλότατον, ἔδὲ ἀτιμότατον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς κρατίσιν ἐνάμιλλον*,—that 'tis none of the meanest or most ignoble Species (or Sects) of Philosophy, but comparable to (or a Match for) the most excellent.—In which Sentence, the beautiful *Contrast* between the Two Parts of it is very suitable to the florid Style of a *Declamatory Dissertation*; as all the *λόγοι* of *Julian* are; (Compositions very fashionable in those days;) but like other *Gorgiafms*, it would much enervate the proper Style of Dialogues, such as *Plato's*; the Energy of which consists in *Metaphors*, and other strong Figures of Speech, *laconically* expressed, and *unexplained* by the Writer.

This;

This;—Whether, if we had a mind ³¹¹ to know the Nature of any particular Quality of things, for instance, the nature of the Hard, whether or no we should not comprehend it better, by examining the hardest things, than we should by scrutinising a various multitude of the less hard. Now, Protarchus! you must make an Answer to these austere Persons, as if you were making it to Me.

PROTARCHUS.

By all means: and I make this Answer to them,—that to examine such Bodys, as exceed all others in Hardness, is the better way.

SOCRATES.

In like manner then, if we had a mind to know the nature of Pleasure in general, we are not to con-

³¹¹ In all the Editions of the *Greek*, we here read—βέλη, δείημεν,—but the Sense of this Passage will direct us to read—βεληδείημεν (one word):—and it appears to have been so understood by *Ficinus*, *Grynæus*, and *Serranus*, as well as lately by *M. Grou*; tho otherwise by *Cornarius* and *Bembo*. — This Observation, with many Others of like Kind in the Course of our Notes to *Plato*, we offer to all Readers of the *Greek Original*; but more especially to Those, who may oblige some future age with a more accurate Edition of it, than has yet been given.

sider the multitude of little or mean Pleasures, but those only which are called extream and exquisite.

PROTARCHUS.

Every man would grant you the truth of this your present Argument ³¹².

SOCRATES.

The Pleasures which are always within our Reach, those which we often call the greatest, do they not belong to the Body?

PROTARCHUS.

There is no doubt of it.

SOCRATES.

Are the [Bodily] Pleasures, which are produced in those Persons who labour under Diseases, greater than the Pleasures [of the same Kind] felt by Those who are in Health? Now let us take Care not to err, by making too precipitate an Answer.

PROTARCHUS.

What danger is there of erring?

³¹² In the *Greek* of this Sentence, all the Translators, except *Serranus*, seem to agree with Us, in reading ταῦτα, and not (as printed in all the Editions of Plato,) ταύτη.

SOCRATES.

Perhaps we might pronounce in favour of Those who are in Health.

PROTARCHUS.

Probably we should.

SOCRATES.

But What? are not those Pleasures the most excessive, which are preceded by the strongest Desires?

PROTARCHUS.

This cannot be denied.

SOCRATES.

The Afflicted with Fevers, or with Diseases of kin to Fevers ³¹³, are they not more thirsty than other Persons? do they not more shake with Cold? and suffer they not, in a greater degree, other Evils ³¹⁴ which the Body is subject to? do they not feel their Wants more pressing? and feel they not greater Pleasures,

³¹³ Meaning, as we presume, Such as are attended usually with a Kind of *Fever*,—as *Gouts* and *Rheumatism*, *Putrid Maladys*, and *Obstructions* of the *Viscera*.

³¹⁴ Viz. *Inappetency*, *Indigestion*, *Costiveness*, &c.

when

when they have those Wants supplied ³¹⁵? Or shall we deny all This to be True?

PROTARCHUS.

Your representation of those cases clearly is right.

SOCRATES.

Well then; should we not be clearly right in saying, that Whoever would know What Pleasures are the greatest ³¹⁶, must not go to the Healthy, but to the Sick, to look for them? Be careful now, not to imagine the Meaning of my Question to be this,—whether the Sick enjoy Pleasures more, in Number, than the Healthy: but consider me as inquiring into high Degrees of Pleasure; and by what Means, and in what Subjects, the Vehemence or Extreme of it always is produced. For we are to find out, we say, What the Nature is of Pleasure, and What those Persons mean by Pleasure, who pretend that no such thing as Pleasure has any Being at all.

PROTARCHUS.

Tolerably well do I apprehend your Argument.

³¹⁵ In all the Editions of the *Greek*, we here read ἀποπληρωμένων but certainly we ought to read ἀποπληρώμενοι.

³¹⁶ We are to observe, that the Philosopher is here speaking only of Pleasures belonging to the *Body*: Pleasures of the *Soul* he will examine afterwards.

SOCRATES.

And possibly, O Protarchus! you will equally well show the Truth of it. For tell me; in a Life of boundless Luxury see you not greater Pleasures, (I do not mean more in Number, but more intense and vehement,) than those in the Life of Temperance? Give your Mind to the Question first, and then answer.

PROTARCHUS.

I apprehend what you say: and the great superiority of the Pleasures, enjoyed in a Luxurious Life, I easily discern. For Sober and Temperate Persons are on all occasions under the Restraint of That Maxim, now become a Proverb, which advises them to avoid the Too Much of Any thing³¹⁷; to which Advice they
are

³¹⁷ In the *Greek*—Μηδὲν ἄγαν.—This most excellent Saying, which recommends *Moderation*, or due *Measure*, to be observed in all things, is numbered among the Grecian Proverbs by *Erasmus* and by *Schottus*. The Author of it, according to some ancient Writers, was *Solon*; Others attribute the Origin of it to *Thales*; and *Aristotle* is generally understood to have ascribed it to *Chilo*: but perhaps *Aristotle*, by calling it *Χιλώνειον*, as he does in his *Art of Rhetorick*, Lib: 2, only meant, that 'twas a Saying frequently in the mouth of *Chilo*. Indeed 'tis probable, that only on the like account the Honour of it was given to Any of the old Grecian Sages in

are obedient. But an Excess of Pleasure, even to Madness, possessing the Souls of the Unwise and Intemperate, as it makes them frantic, it makes them conspicuous, and famed for being Men of Pleasure.

SOCRATES.

Well said. If this then be the case, 'tis evident, that the greatest Pleasures, as well as the greatest

particular. For the Antiquity of it seems to have been much earlier than the Age of the celebrated *Seven*. See *Erasmus's* learned Explication of the ancient *Adages*. And 'tis reasonable to suppose, that the first Speeches of *Philosophy*, in her *Infant-State*, were short and sententious, comprehending, in a very few energetic Words, very deep or sublime or extensive Meanings. Now 'tis certain, that no *Sentence* can be *shorter*, than the Sentence now before us: for it consists only of *Two Words*. And no *Sentiment* can be more *comprehensive*, more *profound*, or more *sublime*, than the Sentiment conveyed in those Two Words: for it not only extends its *regulating* Influence to all *Human Energys* and *Actions*, — as it sets the proper *Bounds* to them, respecting the *End* and *Design* of Each,—but also it is the *Law*, observed by *Nature* in the *forming* of all her *Works*: it hath its *Foundation* therefore *deep* in the *Nature of Things*: and it lifts up our Thoughts *on high* to *Nature's Cause*, — to the great *Legislator* of the *Universe*:—all which Excellencies it will be found to have, when we shall be led to the consideration of it again, in the latter Part of this moral and divine Dialogue.

Pains,

Pains, are produced in a morbid and vitious Disposition of the Soul or of the Body; and not, when they are in their sound and right State.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly so.

SOCRATES.

Ought we not then to instance in some of these Pleasures, and to consider What Circumstances attend them, on account of which it is, that they are styled the Greatest?

PROTARCHUS.

That must be done.

SOCRATES.

Consider now What Circumstance attends the Pleasures, which are produced in certain Maladys.

PROTARCHUS.

In what Maladys?

SOCRATES.

In those of the base or indecent Kind; — Pleasures, to which the Persons, whom we termed Austere, have an utter Aversion.

PROTARCHUS.

What Pleasures do you mean?

SOCRATES.

Those which are felt in curing the Itch ³¹⁸, for instance, by Friction; and in other Maladys of like Kind, such as need no other Medicine ³¹⁹.

Now the Sensation, thence arising in us, in the name of the Gods What shall we say of it? Pleasure is it? or shall we term it Pain?

³¹⁸ *Hippocrates*, in his Treatise *περὶ πᾶσῶν*, accounts this Disorder among those, which are αἴχμη μάλλον ἢ νοσήματα. And *Foësius*, in his Note on that Passage, cites the following Sentence from *Avicenna*;—“*Istæ cutis affectiones, cùm morbi non sint, sed cutis sæditates potius & opprobria, morbis tamen annumerantur.*”

³¹⁹ This is to be understood of Cases, in which these Disorders are meerly *superficial*, and affect not any Parts of the Body deeper than the *Skin*. Such Cases frequently happened, in the fine Climate of *Greece*, to Bodys not perfectly free from ill Humours, at the Spring-time of the Year. For then the Humours, which had been condensed and driven to the Interior Parts by the Cold of Winter, are attenuated and rarefied, and tend toward the Surface. See *Galen* in *Hippocratis Aphorismos*, §. 3. Aph: 20.

PROTARCHUS,

PROTARCHUS.

A mixt Sort of Senfation, O Socrates! seems to arife from this Malady, partaking of both Pain and Pleasure.

SOCRATES.

It was not, however, for the sake of Philebus ³²⁰, that I brought this last Subject into our Discourse: 'twas because we should never be able to determine the Point now before us ³²¹, unless we had taken a view of these mixt Pleasures, and of Others also which depend on these. Let us proceed therefore to consider Such as have an Affinity with them ³²².

³²⁰ Meaning, — it was not for the sake of confuting those *Cynicks*, the Enemy of Pleasure and of her Advocate, *Philebus*, — Those, who held Sensual Pleasure to be nothing more than a Deliverance from Pain, — that he produced this Instance of a Malady, in which there is found a *Mixture* of *Pain* and *Pleasure*. See Page 494.

³²¹ The Point of Inquiry is this, — whether *all* and Every Sort of *Pleasure* is desirable for its own sake; or whether *One Sort* only; — viz. the pure, and unmixed with Pain. See Page 404.

³²² We have followed *Ficinus* and *Grynæus* in ascribing this last Sentence, — “ Let us proceed &c”, — to *Socrates*: the next Interrogative Sentence, — “ Such do you mean, &c”, — to *Protarchus*: and the short Answer, following it, to *Socrates*: though contrary to all the Editions of the *Greek*; in which, as well as in the rest of the Translations, the Persons of *Socrates* and *Protarchus* are interchanged.

PROTARCHUS.

Such do you mean, as partake of Pleasure and Pain by means of their Commixture ?

SOCRATES.

That is my very Meaning. Of these mixt Feelings then, Some belong to the Body ; and in the Body are these generated. Others are of the Soul ; and these have in the Soul their Residence. We shall find also Pleasures mingled with Pains, where the Soul and the Body have, each of them, a Share. Now these Mixtures [tho compos'd of Contrarys,] are, in some cases, termed only Pleasures ; in other cases, only Pains.

PROTARCHUS.

Express yourself more fully.

SOCRATES.

When a Man, whether in a sound or in a decaying State of his Body, feels Two contrary Sensations at the same time ; as when, chilled with Cold, he is warming himself ; or sometimes, when over-heated, he is cooling himself ; with a view, I suppose, to his enjoying One of those Sensations, and to his deliverance from the Other : in such cases, what is called

called the Bitter-Sweet³²³, thro the difficulty met with in driving away the Bitter Part, causeth a Struggle within, and a fierce Meeting together of opposite Qualitys and Sensations.

PROTARCHUS.

It is perfectly true, what you have now said.

SOCRATES.

Are not Some of these Mixt Sensations composed of Pain and Pleasure in equal Proportion? and in Others is not one of them predominant?

³²³ In the Greek,—τὸ λεγόμενον πικρῶ γλυκὺ μεμιγμένον.—But, if we are right in our Conjecture, the three latter words π. γ. μ. originally were a Marginal Gloss, meant only to explain the term γλυκύπικρον, found in the first and unadulterated Copys of the Dialogue. For this single word—γλυκύπικρον—was τὸ λεγόμενον, the common Saying, to express Pleasure and Pain mixed together, but most commonly was applied to the Passion of *Love*.—A Passage in *Plutarch, Symposiac: L. 5, C. 7*, at the same time that it proves this Use of the Word, explains it exactly in the same manner as it is explained by our supposed Glossographer; and may serve therefore to support our conjectural Reading of the Sentence in *Plato* now before us.—In that Passage of *Plutarch*, Lovers, when they look at the Objects of their Passion, are said to languish μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀλγυδόνι μεμιγμένῃς, ἢν αὐτοὶ ΓΛΥΚΥΠΙΚΡΟΝ ὀνομάζουσιν, with a Pleasure mingled with Pain, and termed by themselves a Bitter-Sweet.

PROTARCHUS.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

Among Those then, in which there is an Overplus of Pain, I reckon That of the Malady termed the Itch, and all other Pruriencys and Itchings, when nothing more than a slight Friction or Motion is applyed to them, such as only dissipates what Humours are at the Surface, but reaches not the Fermentation and Turgescence of those Humours which lye deep within. In this condition, the Diseased often apply Heat ³²⁴ to the Parts which pain them, and then the opposite Extream ³²⁵, thro Impatience, and Uncertainty which Way to take. Thus they excite inexpressible Pleasures first, and then the contrary, in the Interior Parts, compared with the Pains felt in the Exterior, which yet are mixed with Pleasures, according as the Humours are driven outwardly or inwardly. For by violently dispersing the

³²⁴ In the Greek, — φέροντες εἰς πῦρ αὐτά. By which probably are meant *Warm Fomentations by the Fire-Side*.

³²⁵ Meaning probably the ψυχρολασία, or *Immersions in the coldest Waters*. — Concerning the *cold Embrocations*, and *cooling Unguents*, used in such cases afterwards by *Themison* and the *Methodists*, see *Cælius Aurelian. de Morbis Chron: L. 4, C. 1.*

Morbific

Morbific Matter where it is collected, and by compelling it together from Places where it lyes dispersed, Pleasures and Pains are at once excited, and arise by each other's Side ³²⁶.

PROTARCHUS.

Most true.

SOCRATES.

Now wherever, in any case of this Kind, a greater quantity of Pleasure is mingled, the smaller quantity of Pain creates but a slight Uneasiness, no more than what serves to tickle: whilst, on the other hand ³²⁷, the great Excess of Pleasure, spread throughout, convulseth the whole Frame, and sometimes causeth involuntary Motions; operating also every Change of Colour in the Countenance, every Variety of Posture in the Limbs, and every different degree of Respiration; — and within the Soul it energises in Transports, uttered madly in Exclamations.

PROTARCHUS.

Intirely so.

³²⁶ External *Warmth* relaxes, attracts, rarefys, and disperses: external *Cold*, on the contrary, constringes, repels to the interior Parts, gathers together, and condenses.

³²⁷ In the *Greek*, as it is printed, we read, — τὸ δ' αὐτῆς ἡδονῆς. — but we should choose to read, — τὸ δ' αὖ τῆς ἡ.

T t t

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Farther ; a Man in fuch a Condition, O my Friend ! is apt to fay of himfelf, and Others are apt to fay of him, that he is dying, as it were, thro Excefs of Pleafure. From this time for ever after, he is wholly intent on purfuing the like Pleafures ; and the more fo, the more he happens to be intemperate, and lefs under the government of Prudence. Thus he calls thefe Pleafures the greateft, and accounts Him the happieft of Men, who fpend his whole time, as far as poffible, in the enjoyment of them.

PROTARCHUS.

You have defcribed all This, O Socrates ! juft as it happens to the Bulk of Mankind, according to their own Senfe and Opinion.

SOCRATES.

But all This, O Protarchus ! relates only to Such Pleafures mixed with Pains, as arife folety in the Body, in its Superficial parts and Interior parts alternately. And as to thofe Feelings of the Soul ³²⁸, which meet with a contrary Condition of the Body,

³²⁸ In the *Greek* of this Paſſage, immediately after the word $\psiυχῆς$, we preſume, that the word $\sigmāταν$, or $\omegāς$ in the ſame ſenſe, was dropt by ſome ancient Tranſcriber.

when Pleasure in the One is mixed with Pain in the Other, so as that Both are Ingredients in One Composition, we spake of Those before³²⁹; such as a Desire of Fulness, under a Sense of Emptiness in the Body; when Hope administers Delight, while the Emptiness gives a Pain. We did not indeed consider them at that time, as Evidences of the present Point; but we now say, that in all those Cases, (and the number of them is infinite,) where the Condition of the Soul is different from That of the Body, a Mixture of Pain and Pleasure happens to be produced.

PROTARCHUS.

You are, I believe, perfectly in the right.

SOCRATES.

Among the Mixtures of Pain and Pleasure, there is a Third Kind remaining, yet unmentioned.

PROTARCHUS.

What Kind is That?

SOCRATES.

That, where such Pleasures and Pains as we said arise frequently in the Soul herself by her Self³³⁰, are mixed together.

³²⁹ See before, in Page 439, and again in Pages 471 and 3.

PROTARCHUS.

In what Cafes, fay we, are Thefe Mixtures found?

SOCRATES.

Anger, Fear, and Defire, and Lamentation, Love, Emulation, and Envy, and all other fuch Paflions of the Soul her felf, do you not fuppose them to give Pain and Uneafinefs to the Soul?

PROTARCHUS.

I do.

SOCRATES.

And fhall we not find thefe very Paflions fraught with wondrous Pleafures? In the Paflions of Reſentment and Anger, do we need to be reminded of what the Poet fays ³³¹, — that

————— *tho Reſentment raiſe*
Choler, like Smoke, in even the prudent Breaf;
The luſcious Honey from its waxen Seat
Diſtills not half fuch Sweetnefs. —

And do we not remember in Lamentations and De-

³³⁰ That is, without the concurrence of any Senſation, pleafurable or painful, by means of the Body. — See before in Pages 409 and 428.

³³¹ Homer, in the Eighteenth Book of his *Iliad*, 108, &c.

fires, the Pleasures we have felt, mingled with the Pains which those Passions produce?

PROTARCHUS.

'Tis true; our Passions do affect us in the manner You have mentioned, and no otherwise.

SOCRATES.

And have you not observed, at Tragic Spectacles presented on the Stage, with how much Pleasure the Spectators shed Tears?

PROTARCHUS.

I certainly have.

SOCRATES.

But have you attended to the Disposition of your Soul at the acting of a Comedy? Do you know, that there also we feel Pain mixed with Pleasure?

PROTARCHUS.

I do not perfectly well comprehend That.

SOCRATES.

It is not perfectly easy, O Protarchus! at such a Time, to comprehend what mixt Passions possess the Soul in every Case of that Kind.

PROTARCHUS

PROTARCHUS.

Not at all easy, I believe.

SOCRATES.

However, let us consider What our Feelings are at that time; and the more attentively, on account of their Obscurity; that we may be able to discover with the greater ease, what Mixture there is of Pain and Pleasure in other cases.

PROTARCHUS.

Say on then.

SOCRATES.

The Passion, known by the name of Envy, will you set it down for a sort of Pain in the Soul, or how?

PROTARCHUS.

Even so.

SOCRATES.

And yet the Man, who envys another, will plainly appear to be delighted with the Evils which befall him.

PROTARCHUS.

Clearly so.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Now, Ignorance ³³² is an Evil; and so is what we term Want of Sense.

PROTARCHUS.

Undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

From these Premises you may perceive, what is the nature of Ridicule and the Ridiculous.

PROTARCHUS.

You must tell me, What it is.

SOCRATES.

Every particular Vice takes its Name from some particular Bad Habit in the Soul. But total Viceousness, the Habit of Wickedness in all respects, is the direct Contrary of That Habit, which the Delphic Inscription adviseth us to acquire.

PROTARCHUS.

That of knowing one's Self do you mean, O Socrates!

³³² Among the various Readings of the *Greek* Word in this place, — viz. ἀνία, ἀνοία, and ἀγνοία — we have made no doubt of giving the Preference to the latter, from the authority of *Ficinus's* Translation; which is followed, herein, by all the subsequent Translators, except *Serranus*, who preferred ἀνοία.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

I do. And the Contrary to this Advice of the Oracle would be, — Not to know one's Self in any respect at all.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly it would.

SOCRATES.

Try now to divide this Ignorance of our Selves into Three Kinds.

PROTARCHUS.

How, say you, should this be done? for I am not able to do it.

SOCRATES.

Do you say, that I should make this division, in Your Stead?

PROTARCHUS.

I not only say it, but desire you so to do.

SOCRATES.

Well then; Whoever is ignorant of Himself, must he not be thus ignorant, in one or other of these Three Respects?

PROTARCHUS.

What Three?

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

First; with respect to External Possessions, in imagining himself wealthier than he really is.

PROTARCHUS.

Many Persons there are, who labour under this Sort of Ignorance.

SOCRATES.

Yet more numerous are They, in the next place, who imagine themselves handsomer in their Persons, nobler in their Air, or graced with some other Corporeal Advantage in a higher Degree, than actually they are.

PROTARCHUS.

Very true.

SOCRATES.

But the Number is by far the greatest, I presume, of Such as are mistaken in themselves, with respect to the Third Kind of Excellence, That which belongs to the Soul, by fancying themselves possessed of more Virtue than in truth they have.

PROTARCHUS.

Nothing is more certain.

U u u

SOCRATES

SOCRATES.

Among the Virtues and Excellencies of the Soul, is not Wisdom That, to which the Generality of Mankind lay Claim with the greatest Earnestness, and in regard to which they are full of Contention, Opinionativeness, and false Notions?

PROTARCHUS.

Evidently so.

SOCRATES.

Now the Man, who should say that Ignorance and Error, in any of these respects, were Evils, would say what is true.

PROTARCHUS.

Very right.

SOCRATES.

But we are to make still another Division of this Ignorance of a Man's Self, O Protarchus! if we would discover the odd Mixture of Pain and Pleasure in that mirthful Envy, which is excited by Comedy, — a Division into Two Sorts.

PROTARCHUS.

Into what Two Sorts do you mean?

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

To those Persons, who foolishly entertain any such false Opinion of themselves, it necessarily happens, as it does to all Men in general, that Strength and Power attend on Some; while the Fate of Others is quite the contrary.

PROTARCHUS.

It must be so.

SOCRATES.

According to this Difference then between them, distinguish those ignorant Persons into Two Sorts. And all Those, whose Self-Ignorance is attended with Weakness, and with a Want of Power to be revenged on Such as laugh at them, you may justly say, that they are open to Ridicule, and may call their Characters properly Ridiculous. But as to the Others, who have Power to take their Revenge, if you should say, that These are to be dreaded, as being powerful and hostile, you would give a very right account of them. For such Ignorance, armed with Power, is powerful to do Mischiefs; and not only its Self is hostile and hurtful to all Persons within its Reach; but so likewise are all its Images ³³³ and

³³³ *Critias*, in particular, is perhaps here alluded to. See Notes 203 and 205.

Representatives. But Self-Ignorance, without Strength and Power, is to be ranked among the Things which are Ridiculous, and is a proper object of Ridicule.

PROTARCHUS.

There is much of Truth in what you say. But I do not as yet perceive clearly, what Mixture there is of Pain and Pleasure in our Feelings on such occasions.

SOCRATES.

You are in the first place to apprehend the Force of Envy in these cases.

PROTARCHUS.

Show it me then.

SOCRATES.

Is not Sorrow, on some Occasions, felt unjustly? and is it not the same case with Joy and Pleasure?

PROTARCHUS.

No doubt can be made of it.

SOCRATES.

There is neither Injustice, nor Envy, in rejoicing at the Evils which befall our Enemys.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly there is not.

SOCRATES.

But if at any time, when we see an Evil happening to our Friends, we feel no Sorrow, — if on the contrary we rejoice at it, — are we not guilty of Injustice ?

PROTARCHUS.

Without Dispute.

SOCRATES.

Did we not say, that 'twas an Evil to any Person, to be ignorant of Himself?

PROTARCHUS.

We did, and justly too.

SOCRATES.

If there be in any of our Friends a false Conceit of their own Wisdom, or of their own Beauty, or of whatever else we mentioned, when we divided Ignorance of one's Self into Three Kinds, is not this Conceit an Object of Ridicule, where 'tis attended with Impotence and Weakness; but an Object

ject of Hatred, if Power and Strength ³³⁴ are joined with it? or do we deny, what I just now said, that the having of such a false Opinion, if it be not hurtful to Others, is an Object of Ridicule?

PROTARCHUS.

You said what is intirely true.

SOCRATES.

And do we not acknowlege this false Conceit to be an Evil, as being built on Ignorance?

PROTARCHUS.

Most heartily.

SOCRATES.

Whether do we feel Delight, or Sorrow, when we laugh at it?

PROTARCHUS.

'Tis plain, that we feel Delight.

SOCRATES.

Did we not say, that whenever we feel Delight from the Evils which happen to our Friends, it is Envy which operates in us that unjust Delight?

³³⁴ It is hoped, that no future Editor of *Plato* will be either so absurd, or so careless, as to follow all the former Editors, in printing $\mu\eta$ (instead of $\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta$) $\epsilon\pi\beta\omega\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha$, in the *Greek* of this Passage.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

It must be Envy.

SOCRATES.

Our Reasoning then shows, that, when we laugh at what is Ridiculous in a Friend, mixing thus Delight with Envy, we mix together Pleasure and Pain. For we acknowledged long ago, that Envy gives Uneasiness and Pain to the Soul; and we have admitted, that Laughing yields Delight. Now in these Cases they arise, Both of them, at the same Time.

PROTARCHUS.

True.

SOCRATES.

We see then from the Conclusion of our Argument, that in mournful Spectacles, and no less in Comedys³³⁵, — not only as they are acted on the Stage, but

³³⁵ Every philosophic Admirer of the *Comedys*, of old written by *Terence* and *Plautus*, or of Some in modern days, written by Poets of *our own* or of the *French Nation*, — if he happens to read this Dialogue, and is unacquainted with the *History* of the *Athenian Theatre*, — must be surprized at the Severity of the Censure, passed on Comedy in this Part of the Dialogue; where the *Pleasure*, felt by the Spectators and Readers of a Comedy, is attributed to *Envy*; and represented as a *malicious Joy*, at seeing the ridiculous Faults of our Neighbours, Fellow-Citizens, and Countrymen, exposed to Public View. But the Conduct

Conduct and Manners of the Comic Muse at *Athens*, in the time of *Socrates*, are a full Justification of his Censure. For the time was not long before his Death, when a *Law* was made in that City,—*μη κωμωδεῖν ὀνομαστὶ τὰ προσώπα*, that *the Actors of a Comedy should personate none of the Citizens by name*. And such a Law was necessary, because the Comic Poets were used to gratify Such of the People, as were envious and malicious, by presenting to Ridicule, on the Public Stage, living Characters *by their names*, and even Some of the greatest Worth: as *Socrates*, for instance, was personated *by name* in the *Clouds*, a Comedy of *Aristophanes*, to please *Anytus* and the rest of the Cabal, formed for the destruction of that most excellent Man.—About the same time, on the same account, was suppressed, in all the Athenian *Comedys*, the *Chorus*; many of whose Speeches were abusive, either on particular Persons, or on whole Orders of Men, Parts of the Commonwealth; and whose Language was often very scurrilous: for this *Chorus* commonly represented the *Athenian Populace*; and it was indeed a just Representative or Image of the Sentiments and Style of that lowest Order of the People in every Free State. To this Rabble of a *Chorus* succeeded the Comic *παράβασις*: in which the Poet himself in Person (or his Representative, the Spokesman or Foreman of the old Comic Chorus,) *παρέβαινε*, quitting his place at the Back-Part of the Stage, came forward to the Front; and after addressing the Audience, and courting their Favour to him as Author of the Drama, indulged their Love of Contumely, by vilifying Foreign Nations, or by carping at the Best Poets of former Ages. And to show farther, in how small a degree the Licentiousness of the *Athenian Comedy* was restrained by the Law abovementioned, against personating on the Stage any Citizen *by name*, we are told by several ancient Writers, that successful Attempts frequently were made to elude that Law;

sometimes, by the Actor's wearing a Mask, resembling the Face of the Citizen who was meant to be exposed and vilified; sometimes, by pointed Allusions to certain Accidents of his Life, or Particulars in his Character, well known to the whole City; and sometimes by a small Alteration of his Name,—as, by calling him *'Αμύνιας Amynias* in the *Drama*, when his real Name was *'Αμύνιας*. — In this State remained the *Comic Muse* at *Athens*, until *Menander* rose, who taught her to philosophise: for he taught her to paint, in Moral Poetry, the *General Characters*, by which All of the Human Race are to be distinguished internally, or according to their Souls and Minds, Some from Others. — He had learnt *Moral Philosophy*, himself, under an excellent Master, *Theophrastus*: he had learnt from His Lectures the several *Passions* of the Human Soul; the *Predominance* of any One of which over the rest, in the Whole of a Man's Life, is the plainest of those Marks which *characterise* the Man. Of these *General Differences* he had learnt from Him the ordinary *Causes*; — a difference of *Natural Temper* in the *Soul*, arising probably from a different Mixture of the fundamental *Humours* in the *Body*; — a different *Education*; or a difference of *Notions* early imbibed, and of *Habits* early contracted; — a different *Way of Life*; a difference of the *Objects*, engaging a Man's serious *Study*, or continually presented to his *View*; — a difference of *Conversation*, of *Examples* casually met with, or of *Advice* from Persons whose Judgment we esteem. — He must have learnt farther, (for *Theophrastus*, who taught him, had farther learnt from *Aristotle*,) how to distinguish different Nations; not, by those Marks, so obvious to every Eye and Ear, and so easily counterfeited,—their *Attire* and *Language*,—but by the difference of their *National Manners*, owing to the differences of *Climate* and *Soil*, of *Government* and *Laws*, and of *Public Customs*, whether *Civil* or *Religious*.——*Menander*, being thus pro-

vided with a large Stock of Moral and Political Knowledge, adapted his Comedys,—not to the *bad Passions* of some Athenian Citizens, — but to the *common Sense* of all Mankind: — secretly appealing, for the Truth of his Characters, to every Man's *Experience* of Human Nature in Himself and Others, — to every Man's *Feeling* of such *Sentiments*, as are *common* to Persons of his own Rank and Nation, his own Age, Temper, Way of Life, &c.—and to every Man's *Knowledge* of the *Sentiments* of such Persons, as *differ* from him in any of those *Circumstances* which are *common* to Many.—So that the *Persons* of the *Drama*, in *Comedy*, were no longer, what they had formerly been, Caricature-Portraits of the Manners of *particular real Persons*; but they were, like the Characters in an *Epic Poem*, Pictures of the Poet's own *General Ideas*: for they represented, according to the Best of the Author's Knowledge and Fancy joined together, whatever appeared to Him most *striking* in the Moral Characters and Behaviour of the several *Kinds* and *Sorts* of Persons in the various Stations, Conditions, and Accidents, of Human Life.—Such, as we have here delineated, was the *New Comedy*, introduced by *Menander*, and followed by all the Greek Comic Poets, his Contemporaries and his Successors. The licentious and abusive Kind of Comedy, in Vogue until the making of the Law above-mentioned, was then, and for ever after, styled the *Old Comedy*: and that Kind, which succeeded to the Old, and obtained universally, till *Menander* had reformed the Comic Muse, took the denomination of the *Middle Comedy*.—But so powerful is the Force of *Truth* and *Nature*, and so amiable are *Decency* and *Good Manners*, (especially when *Envy* and *Malice* lurk not under that fair Covering,) that, in all Countries, to which the Greek Language extended, the *New Comedy* met with a much more general Approbation than Either of its Predecessors: and perhaps it contributed, more than any

other thing, (except That Part of *Philosophy*, from which it sprang,) to refine the *Public Taste*, and to civilize the *Public Manners*, wherever Grecian Literature was held by the *Publick* high in their Estimation.—From the same Causes it was, that a few Ages after,—when the *Romans*, having brought all *Greece* under their Dominion, received from their Grecian Captives the *Philosophy* and the *Poetry*, together with the particular *Sciences*, and the rest of the fine *Arts*, of that most ingenious and polished Nation,—the *Roman Poets* presently applied themselves to imitate, or translate into their own Language, the *New Comedy* of the *Grecians*. Thus *Menander* and *Apollodorus* were translated, or closely at least imitated, by *Terence*; *Diphilus* and *Philemon*, (Two other Greek Writers of the *New Comedy*;) by *Plautus*; tho it must be confessed, that *Plautus* for some time chose to tread in the Steps of *Epicarmus*, who wrote Greek Comedys before the Reformation of the Comic Stage. Nor was it long, before this Reformed or New Kind of Comedy grew to be the favourite Entertainment of the *Patricians* and the *Equites* or *Cavaliers*, (that is, of the Roman *Nobility* and *Gentry*;) and of other dignified *Citizens*: and the *Satyr* of the more ancient Romans, with the Ribaldry of the *Fescennine* and *Atellane Verses*, (which, in Personal Abusiveness, resembled the *Old Comedy* of the *Grecians*;) by degrees became antiquated, and utterly disused. Some time after this, the Whole Body of ancient Grecian and Græco-Roman Literature sickened and languished, and lay as it were dead for many Ages: the greatest Part of it, 'tis to be feared, has irrecoverably perished: a considerable Part, however, at length revived, and rose up into Light again. Among those long-lost Writings, which had been happily preserved and were recovered, there appeared some Comedys of *Aristophanes*, of *Terence*, and of *Plautus*. And here we find a fresh Instance of the truth of

but as they are presented to us also in the Tragedy and the Comedy of real Life, and in a thousand

our observation, concerning the Preference, given by all civilized Nations to the *New* or latest Kind of *Grecian Comedy*: for the Causes of that Preference have, ever since the Revival of ancient Literature and Politeness, operated again with their former Force: and, notwithstanding the infinite Wit of *Aristophanes*, notwithstanding the Musical excellence of his Verses, and notwithstanding the licentious Disposition of the lower Orders of the People, and the Delight they take in seeing their Superiours defamed or ridiculed,—yet we find, that *Terence*, and so much of *Plautus* as exhibits *General Characters*, those especially of Persons in the middle Stations of human Life, have ever since been the Models of Comic Poetry, and Patterns to all successful Writers of Comedy. And hence it is, that the most admired of our modern Comedys, however faulty in other respects, yield no Food for that *Envy* and *Malice*, so justly, and yet so gently, satirised in this Part of the *Philebus*. The Comic Muse now performs her proper Office; which is, to exhibit to all People, of whatever Country, who are between the Great and the meer Rabble in Civil Society, those *habitual Faults*, which are *common to Many* Persons of nearly equal Condition, in their Behaviour, Commerce and Conversation with each other, on the ordinary Occurrences of Private or Domestic Life;—showing every such Person to Himself, as in a clear Mirrour placed in the strongest Light;—painting in the liveliest Colours whatever is ridiculously wrong in his Character and Conduct;—and holding close to his Eyes as it were a *Magnifying Glass*, the more easily to perceive his Faults, instead of the *Microscope*, thro which he had been used to view them.

and intermediate Occurrences, Pains and Pleasures blended together.

PROTARCHUS.

'Twould be impossible, O Socrates! for a Man not to acknowledge This, were he ever so zealous an Advocate for the opposite Side.

SOCRATES.

When we entered on the present Subject, we proposed to consider Anger, Desire and Grief, Fear and Love, Jealousy and Envy, and such other Passions ³³⁶ of

³³⁶ That is, — not any Such *Feelings* either of *Pain* or of *Pleasure*, as belong to the *Sensitive* Part of the *Soul*, — or to that merely *Passive* Power in the *Soul*, by which she *feels* whatever immediately affects her *Body* in any important degree, — but such *Agitations* and *Emotions*, as are peculiar to the *Imaginative* Part of the *Soul*, — or to that *Power*, (*Passive* likewise,) by which the *Soul* *imagines* that she feels *present* Good or Evil, or *remembers* the Good or Evil, felt by her in *time past*, or *pre-conceives* some Good or Evil, to be felt by her in *time to come*. — For *imagined Good* or *Evil* (Good or Evil in *Opinion*) is the *Object* of all those *Passions* of the *Soul*, which are here meant: — and the *Ground* of them all is that general *Love* or *Desire* of *Good*, essential to the *Soul* of *Man*. — For *Love* infers the *Hate* of whatever is *repugnant* or *opposite* to the *Object* of that *Love*; in like manner, as the *Inclination* of a *biased Bowl* to *one Side* of the *Green*, in *Bowling*, infers a *Declination* from the *Side opposite*. And out of these *Two* con-natural *Dispositions* of the *Soul*, *Love* and *Hate*, arise
all.

all Such of her *Passions*, as are abstracted from any Bodily Feelings;—such as *Joy*, when the loved Object is attained;—*Grief*, when it is lost; and *Hope*, when it is expected; *Aversion*, where the Object of Hate is present; *Fear*, when the Approach of it is apprehended; and *Anger* at the supposed intentional Causes of its Presence or Approach. — Now these and all other such Passions of the Soul, — that is, all Such as have either *Good* or *Evil* for their Object,—are governed by *Imagination* and a *false Opinion* of Good and Evil. For since the *Knowledge* of *True Good*, and of its *Contrary*, is seated in the *Intellectual* Part of the Soul, the *Mind*, where no Passion finds an entrance, it can neither be accompanied nor followed by any *Passion*, *Emotion*, or *Agitation* whatever: the only Attendants on it are a simple *Pursuing* of the known *Good*, and a simple *Avoiding* of the known *Evil*. — Farther; the actual *Knowledge* of true *Good*, as far as the human Soul is capable of a *Knowledge* so divine, infers an actual *Possession* of it, proportioned to the degree of that *Knowledge*; so that no room is left for *Grief*: — the Expectation of attaining more of this Good, by continuing the Pursuit of it, is never liable to *Disappointment*; and this precludes all *Fear*:—a constant Possession of the present, and a continual Attainment of more and more by easy degrees, admit of no *Emotions* of *Joy*:—and the impossibility of suffering *real Evil* from any Person, without the Soul's own Consent, cuts off all occasion of *Anger*.—The *Knowledge* therefore of true Good is accompanied with no other Sentiments or Feelings than those of *Pleasure*; (if the Term, *Pleasure*, may besit the most internal, intellectual, and godlike *Satisfaction*;) in None of them is any Mixture of *Pain* ever to be found. — But with the *Passions* of the *Animal-Part* of the Soul it is quite otherwise. For if we consider the nature of each Passion severally, after having divided them All into Two Kinds, the

Pleasurable

of the Soul; promising ourselves to find in Them those Mixt Feelings, which again and again we had been speaking of: Did we not?

PROTARCHUS.

We did.

SOCRATES.

Do we perceive, that we have dispatched already all which relates to Grief, and Envy, and Anger?

PROTARCHUS.

Pleasurable and their Contrarys, the *Painful*, (according to those Instances in each Kind, brought by the Poet,

Love, Hope, and Joy, fair Pleasure's smiling Train;
Hate, Fear, and Grief, the Family of Pain;

Pope's Essay on Man, Ep. 2d.)

we shall perceive, that every Passion, of *Either* Kind, has, for an inseparable Companion, some one of the *Contrary* Kind. Thus *Anger* and *Resentment*, no pleasing inward Agitations, are always coupled with an *Exultation*, or self-applauding *Elation* of the *Imaginative* Soul:—the *Pain* of *Grief*, at the *Loss* of an imagined Good, is always joined with a *pleasing Remembrance* of the past *Enjoyment*:—the *pleasurable Hope* of obtaining is always combined with a *painful Fear* of Disappointment; and *Desire* is *pleasurable* in proportion to such a Hope, and at the same time *painful* in proportion to such a Fear.—*Sympathy*, or *Pain* felt at the seeing or hearing of Another's Woe, is mixed with the *pleasurable* Exercise and Feeling of *social Affection*:—and in the Instance, produced just now by Socrates, the *Delight*, felt by
the.

PROTARCHUS.

We perceive it clearly.

SOCRATES.

But there is much yet remaining.

PROTARCHUS.

Very true.

SOCRATES.

For What reason, principally, do you suppose it was, that I explained to you the mixt Feeling, which a Comedy occasions in us? Do you not conceive, that 'twas to show my self able to explain to you, with much more ease ³³⁷, the like Mixture of Pain and Pleasure

the Spectators of the *old* wittily abusive Comedy, was mixed with the Pain either of *Indignation*, or of *Pity*, or with the greater Pain of *Envy*.

³³⁷ That any *Pain* is felt in the Soul, amidst the Merriment which a laughable Comedy excites,—a *Pain*, occasioned by the very *Subject* of that *Merriment*,—must have seemed to *Protarchus* paradoxical, and difficult to be conceived, before *Socrates* had unravelled the difficulty, and explained the Paradox.—It is probable, that the greater Part of that multitude of Spectators, present at one of the *Old Comedys*, were *unconscious* of any *Envy*, lurking within them at the time. The Wit, with which many of those Comedys abounded, might easily hinder Any man who was in a Humour only to indulge Mirth, from a *Reflection*,
that

which affect them severally or jointly, full of a Sense of Pleasures mingled with Pains. Say then, whether you will dismiss me, or make it Midnight before we finish. But I imagine, that, after I shall have added a few things more, I shall obtain from you my dismissal: for I shall be ready to give you an account of all these things at large to morrow; but at present am desirous of proceeding to what remains on this Subject; that we may come to a Decision of the Point in Controversy, as Philebus hath enjoined us.

PROTARCHUS.

affected with Joy or Grief, abstracted from the consideration of any *Good* or *Evil*, which haply may result to our Particular Selves from what has befallen those Others.—Hence it is, that, where the *Selfish Passions* predominate in the Soul, thro the Weakness of the *Social Affections*, there *Envy* and *Malice* usually are found, either professed or latent:—that, where the *Social Affections* are felt strongly, tho the Soul should happen not to have the Knowledge of *True Good*, there the *Selfish Passions*, the *Seeds* of *Envy* and of *Malice*, are easily kept under, and yield to the Dictates of the *Social Affections*, even to Those of a Kind naturally cooler and weaker than the rest,—*Common Humanity*, and a *general Benevolence*, implanted in the Human Nature:—but that the Grounds of Malice and of Envy are quite *destroyed* in such happy Souls only, as have attained in some degree to know, and in some measure to enjoy, *Good compleat, sufficient* for Happiness, *stable* and *permanent*: for only These know, that None can deprive them of any Substantial Good:
their

PROTARCHUS.

You have well spoken, O Socrates! and as to what remains, go thro with it in whatever way is agreeable to your Self.

SOCRATES.

Well then; after the Mixt Pleasures, we are to proceed, by a Kind of natural necessity, to the several Pleasures which are unmixt and pure ³³⁸.

PROTARCHUS.

their *Social Affections* therefore have free Scope, and large Room to operate; and their natural Inclination to *Private Good* interferes not with the Good of any other Person.

³³⁸ To translate literally, we should here use these *Two Expressions*,—*According to Nature*, and *by some Kind of Necessity*,—For in the *Greek* they are *divided* and *distinct*.—But we presume, that, in *uniting* them, we have not deviated from our Author's Meaning; which, as we apprehend, is This; — that, for the Mixt Pleasures to *precede*, and for the Pure Pleasures to come *after them*, is agreeable to the *Order*, established by *Nature*, on the Basis of *Corporeal Necessity*.—For the *Pleasures*, which are mixed with *Pains*, are those of the *Taste* and of the *Touch*. Now these, according to *Nature*, are preceded by such *Bodily Wants*, as create an *Appetite* for the Enjoyment of them: and after the Enjoyment is past, they are apt to leave a Sting behind them, in Souls not otherwise employed, creating a new *imaginary Appetite*,—a *Desire* of enjoying the like again, without waiting for the *Calls* of *Nature*.—Appetites and Desires, while

PROTARCHUS.

Perfectly well said.

SOCRATES.

The nature of These I shall endeavour to explain to you, by converting to my own Use, with a little Alteration, what is said of them by Others. For I do not intirely give Credit to those Persons who tell us, that All Pleasure consists in a Cessation from Uneasiness and Pain.³³⁹ But, as I said before, I make Use of these Persons as Witnesses³⁴⁰, in confirmation of This truth,—that some things there are, which seem to be Pleasures, but by no means are so in reality³⁴¹; and of This also,—that some other
Pleasures

they remain unsatisfied, raise such *Passions* and *Comotions* in the Soul, as either *blunt* her *Relish* for the *Pure Pleasures*, or at least *disturb* her whilst she is enjoying them.

³³⁹ According to Their Doctrine, *all Pleasures* would be *equally pure*, and unmixed with Pain, contrary to the Doctrine of Socrates.

³⁴⁰ Our Translation of this Passage supposes, that the word *μάρτυσι*, in the *Greek*, is no erroneous Reading. It must however be acknowledged, that *μάντεσι* is the word, used before, in the Sentence to which Socrates here refers, and where, in translating it, we have used the word *Diviners*.

³⁴¹ For Pleasure is not *Indolence*, *Rest*, or *Ease*; but a *real* and *actual Feeling*,—the *Reverse* of *Pain*.—Those merely *seeming*
Pleasures

Pleasures there are, many and great in Imagination, accompanied with Pains, but, at the same time, with Relief ³⁴² from Greater Pains, amid the Distresses ³⁴³ of the Body and of the Soul.

PROTARCHUS.

But What Pleasures are those, O Socrates! which a Man would deem rightly of, in supposing them to be True?

SOCRATES.

The Pleasures, which are produced in us from seeing beautiful Colours and beautiful Figures; many Pleasures also of the Smell, and many Others arising in us from the hearing of Sounds; in a word, whatever Pleasures we feel from perceiving the Presence of any thing, whose Absence we are insensible of, or at least occasions no Pain in us, all These are unmixed and pure.

Pleasures are therefore, in Page 479, called *false* Pleasures, and the most *remote from truth* or reality.

³⁴² In which *Relief* consisted the *Pleasure* its Self, according to those *Cynicks*.

³⁴³ In the *Greek*, ἀπορίας. See before in Page 510.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

How do you explain this general account, O Socrates!

SOCRATES.

The Meaning of it indeed is not directly obvious: but we must endeavour to make it evident. I mean then, by beauteous Figures, not, as most men would suppose I meant, the Beauty of living Forms, or their Statues; but the Strait and the Round, whether in Surfaces³⁴⁴, or in Solids³⁴⁵; according to which are fashioned the Turner's Works, and those of the Carpenter by means of his Rules and Angles. For the Figures which I mean, if You apprehend me, have no Relative Beauty, like those other beauteous Forms³⁴⁶; but in their own nature, separately considered, are always absolutely Beautiful;

³⁴⁴ That is, — *Rectilinear Plane* Figures, — such as *Triangles*, *Rectangles*, and *Circles*.

³⁴⁵ Such as *Pyramids* and *Cubes*, *Spheres*, *Cylinders* and *Cones*.

³⁴⁶ The Parts of every Mathematical *Simple Figure*, whether it be *right-lined* or *circular*, are, all of them, *similar* and *commensurable*. — The Beauty of Figure, in all *Animals*, on the contrary, arises from the Proportions of *dissimilar* Parts, measured, not by any *Common Measure*, but by the *respective* Ends and Uses, for which they were severally designed by Nature.

and

and the beholding of them gives us certain peculiar Pleasures, not at all similar to the Pleasures excited in us by any Kind of Motion. And as to Colours, I mean Such as bear the like Stamp of Absolute Beauty³⁴⁷, and yield also Pleasures of a peculiar nature. But do we apprehend these things? or What say we to them?

PROTARCHUS.

I endeavour, O Socrates! to comprehend your full Meaning: but endeavour You, your Self, to explain thorowly the whole of it.

SOCRATES.

As to Sounds, I mean Such as are smooth, clear and canorous, conveying some pure and simple Melody³⁴⁸, without relation to any other Sounds³⁴⁹, but singly

³⁴⁷ Such as the beautiful Colours of many *Flowers*; or as those of a clear Morning or Evening-Sky: not such as the Colour of a *Complexion*,—*the Tincture of a Skin*,—in the Human Species,—a Colour *belonging* only to that Species, and *relatively* agreeable, as it indicates Health of Body, and a Purity of the Blood and Humours.

³⁴⁸ Such is That of many Species of *Birds*, whose *Whistling* is all *Monotonous*. Such also is That of the *Æolian Harp*, on which the Vibrations are made solely by the *Air in Motion*.

³⁴⁹ Exclusive therefore of all *Harmonizing* Sounds.—For the Essence of even the simplest *Harmony* consists in an *Interval* of

of *Consonance* between *Two* Musical Sounds; — that is, in the *Musical Relation* between the *Two*;—whether One of them be *subsequent* immediately to the Other; or Both be produced *together* from different Parts of *one* and the *same* Stringed Instrument; or Both issue *at once* from *different* Voices or Instruments, as in a *Concert*. — The *single* Musical Sounds, here ipoken of by *Socrates*, are merely Objects of the *Outward Sense* of *Hearing*: but the *Harmony* of Musical Sounds, harmonising *together*, is an Object only of the *Mind*; and gives Delight only to that Superior Part of the Human Soul. As much therefore as *Mind* is more excellent than *Outward Sense*, in the same degree are *Mental* and *Rational Delights* more excellent in themselves, and more valuable to all Intelligent and Rational (tho Sentient) Beings, than any *Pleasurable Sensations*.—Indeed, the difference is so great between those Delights and these Sensations, that, tho in some Modern Writings we read of *Intellectual* and of *Moral Pleasures*, — of the Pleasures of the *Understanding*, the Pleasures of *Reason*, and the Pleasures of *Virtue*, —and tho *Aristippus* introduced the like Phrases into the conversation of those Young Gentlemen, who philosophised at *Athens* in the time of *Socrates*,—yet *Socrates* Himself, and all the other Ancient Philosophers, to the best of our Knowledge, except the *Cyrenaicks* and the *Epicureans*, usually meant, by the term *Pleasure*, Pleasure of *Sense*, or Pleasure of *Imagination*; and the Vulgar, we believe, in all Ages, signify by it always one or other of these Two Meanings.—To this General Observation we are to add, with regard to the particular Passage now before us, that the difference between *Harmony* and the sweetest *Single Sounds* will, from the Conclusive Part of this Dialogue, appear to be so great, that, in the Order of Goods, there established, the *Enjoyment* of any Kind of *Harmony* is placed as near to the *Highest* or *Chief* Good,

singly of Themselves Musical : of Such I speak, and of the con-natural Pleasures which attend them.

PROTARCHUS.

That Such Pleasures also there are, I readily acknowledge.

SOCRATES.

The Pleasures, felt by us from certain Odours ³⁵⁰, as the *Pleasure*, received from any *Single Sounds*, approaches to the Goods of *Lowest* Rank.

³⁵⁰ Not any Odours, the Pleasure of which hath respect only to the Causes they proceed from, the Odour-emitting Bodys, and consists wholly in the prospect of enjoying Sensual Pleasure of a grosser Kind; — such are those Odours, by which every Animal discerns its natural and proper Food; — such also are those, which are connected by a Man's Imagination with Pleasure of the Palate, which awaken a dormant Appetite, tempt a luxurious one, or create a preternatural one: — for Odours of the former sort, to give *Pleasure*, must be preceded by a proportionate *Pain* of Hunger; and those of the latter Sorts are followed either by the *Pain* of unsatisfied Desire, or lead to the many *Pains* which attend Luxury and Indigestion. — The only Odours, meant in this Passage, are such as we receive from the Fragrancy of many Flowers, Herbs, and Shrubs: for the *Pleasure*, given us by These, is *confined* to the Sense of *Smelling*; and, if the Nerves, the Organs of all Sensation, are in a sound State, the *Pleasure* is attended with no *Pain* or *Mischief*.

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are

are indeed of a Kind less divine ³⁵¹ than the Pleasures just now mentioned ; but in respect of their being

³⁵¹ *Pure Pleasures* of the *Smell* are here said to be *less divine*, than Pleasures of the *Sight*, or those of the *Hearing*; and the Truth of this Sentence may be evinced from Two Arguments:—One of Them is This; that the Organ of the Sense of *Smelling* presents us with nothing better than Pleasurable *Sensations*; while the Organs of the *Sight* and *Hearing* not only present the *Sensitive Soul* with *simple Figures, Colours, and Sounds*; but thro these Organs are perceived also such *complex Figures*, such *conjunctiōns* or *juxta-positiōns* of different Colours, and such *combinations* or *sequences* of different Sounds, as excite in the *Rational Soul*, or *Mind*, her first imperfect *Ideas* of things so divine, as *Symmetry, Order and Proportion, Harmony and Beauty*. —Our other Argument for the so much higher Character, here given to the Senses of Sight and Hearing, is derived from the following ancient Doctrines in Natural Philosophy:—that the *Subject-Matter* of *Colour*, which is the general *Object* of the Sense of *Seeing*, (for the *Figures* of all Bodys are exhibited by *Colour*,) is (according to the hypothesis of a Fifth Elementary or Simple Body) *Light in Energy*; whether it be *reflected* from diversly *opaque* Bodys, or diversly *refracted* in passing thro different *transparent* Bodys, or whether it be diversly *coloured* by *Effluvia* from Bodys, where the Four Elements are diversly mixed, and where the Quantities of those Elements are in different Proportions:—that the *Subject-Matter* of *Sound*, which is the general *Object* of the Sense of *Hearing*, is *Air in Motion*:—that the *Subject-Matters* of all *Odour*, which is the general *Object* of the Sense of *Smelling*, are subtle *Effluvia*, (termed by the Chymists *volatile Oyls* or *Sulphurs*,) from those Bodys, in whose composition

composition *Fire* is the Principal Ingredient, but is mixed with the finest Particles of a *Moistened Earth*:— that the *Subject-Matters* of all *Flavour*, which is the general *Object* of the Sense of *Taste*, are those grosser *Juices*, (termed by the Chymists *fixed Oyls* or *Sulphurs*;) in which the *Aqueous* Particles predominate over the *Igneous* and the *Earthy*:—and that the *Subject-Matters* of all *Solidity*, which is the general *Object* of the *Feeling* or Sense of *Touch*, are only the *Earthy* Parts of Compound-Bodys; for that none Other resist the *Touch*:—that, in this way and manner, the *Five* outward *Senses* of the Soul correspond with the *Five Elements* of outward Nature:—that accordingly, in the First place, (to begin with the grossest of those *Senses*, and the lowest of those *Elements*;) when the *Earthy* Part of the *Body* communicates with the Element of *Earth* abroad, either by *Contact*, or by a large *Admittance* within of *Earthy* Particles from *without*, the Soul perceives the communication by her Sense of *Touch* externally, or of internal *Feeling*; the nervous Organs of this Sense being dispreed thro every *Membranous Part* of the *Body*, as well as throughout the *Skin*, that Covering of the *Whole*:—Secondly; when the *Juices*, or *Humid* Parts, of any Extraneous Bodys, received into the *Mouth*, mix with the *Saliva*, which is engendered in the *Blood*, and thence by the Salival Glands continually flows into the *Mouth*, the Soul perceives those foreign *Juices* by means of the Organs of *Taste*, the *Gustatory Nerves*, there seated:—Thirdly; when the *Igneous Particles*, which are secreted from the *Blood*, by the Glandular Vessels of the *Brain*, and thence rapidly fly thro the *Nerves*, meet with any invifible *Igneous Effluvia* from Extraneous Bodys, striking the Membranes of the *Nose*, where the *Olfactory Nerves*, the Organs of the *Smell*, are seated, the Soul perceiveth those foreign *Effluvia* by means of these Organs:—Fourthly; when the External *Air in Motion*, (Such a Motion as produces *Sound*;) striking

being equally pure, and not, of necessity, mixed with Pains, I rank them All under the same head.

striking against the *Auditory Nerves* of the *Ear*, communicates with the *Aerial* Part of the Nervous Fluid, the Soul perceives the communication of the *Sound*, by means of those Organs of the *Hearing*:—and Lastly; when *Light* from without, falling on the *Eye*, that tender Organ of the Sense of *Seeing*, communicates with Particles of the same Element there residing, the Sentient Soul actually then feels the existence of that finest of all Bodys, *Light*; and perceives whatever *Colour* the Light, so communicated, is tinged with, and whatever *Figure* it exhibits. — To these Doctrines we are to add, that *Light* alone anciently was deemed to be the immediate Seat of every *Particular Mind*; — *Fire* and *Air*, to be the only immediate Seats of *Soul* — and thus *Earth* and *Water*, to be farther removed from *Life* and *Sense*, and farther still from what is incorporeal, eternal and *divine*. — Now, tho Elementary *Fire* be finer than the Element of *Air*, and more nearly allyed to *Light*, (as appears not only from the greater *Velocity* of its *Motion*, but also from its being *luminous*, till it be overpowered and suppressed by *Air*,)—and tho it be the principal Ingredient in all *odoriferous Effluvia*, — yet, since in these it is mixed and clogged with Aqueous and Earthy Particles, it becomes less fine than Elementary Air, the pure Vehicle of Sound, not deadened by Particles of the grosser Elements.—From these Two Arguments, taken together, we may conclude justly, that the *Objects* of the *Sight* and *Hearing*, and these *Senses* also themselves, have a much nearer Affinity to *Mind*, than any other Outward *Sense* or the *Object* of it; and therefore that the *Pleasures* of those *finest Senses*, are the nearest, of any *Sensible Pleasures*, to the *godlike Enjoyments* and *Delights* of *Mind*.

For

For in whatever Pleasures there happens to be found this Quality of intire Freedom from Pain, all these I oppose to those other Pleasures, with which Pain is complicated. Now, if you observe, we have already spoken of Two different Kinds of Pleasure ³⁵².

PROTARCHUS.

I do observe it.

SOCRATES.

To these let us now add the Pleasures, taken in the Mathematical Sciences ³⁵³ ; unless we are of Opinion,

³⁵² Both these Kinds of Pleasure are *Sensual*; that is, they are Pleasures either of *Sensation* immediately *present*, or of *Imagination* and *Memory* derived from *Sensations past*. For *Sensible Objects* are the only *Sources* of the Pleasures of Either Kind, the *Mixed* with Pain, and the *Unmixed*, hitherto spoken of; the *Organs* of the Five *outward Senses* of the Soul are the only *Conveyances* of Any of those Pleasures; (no Faculty of the Mind ever being employed in that Office;) and only the meer *Animal-Part* of the Soul, (That which is *Sensitive* and *Imaginative*) ever enjoys any of them.

³⁵³ From the Pleasures of *Sense* our Philosopher proceeds to speak of the Pleasure, which the *Rational Part* of the Soul takes in *Science*; — a Pleasure which, tho it be of a higher Kind than the Pleasures of the *Sight* and *Hearing*, he here considers only as it is, like Those, *pure* and unmixed with Pain. Thus he ascends gradually from the *lowest Rank* in the Order of Goods,

Opinion, that fuch Pleasures are of necessity preceded by a Thirst of learning them; and that, when tasted and enjoyed, they raise a Thirst of more and more; so that, from our beginning to learn them, they are all along attended with Uneasiness.

PROTARCHUS.

I think, that such Uneasiness is not at all necessary.

SOCRATES.

Well; but suppose, that, having attained to full Possession of them, we happen afterwards to lose some Part thro Forgetfulness, do you see no Uneasiness arising hence?

PROTARCHUS.

Goods, the Pleasures of *Taste* and *Touch*, to the Goods of *highest* Rank, and to the *Head* and *Leader* of them all: and from These he afterward descends, in the same gradation inverted, down again to the *lowest*.—But concerning the Goods superiour to those of *Science*, we shall not anticipate, needlessly, what is to come in the remainder of this Dialogue: and shall only observe, at present, that *Socrates*, in the Sentence now before us, allows the name of *Pleasures* to the Delights of *Science*; unwilling perhaps to engage in a Dispute with the Disciples of *Aristippus*, about the Propriety of a Name, when they agreed in meaning the same Thing. 'Tis for the like reason, as we presume, that in the *Republick*, L. 9. pag: 255, Edit: *Cantab*: speaking of the *Delights*, which the superiour Part of the Soul takes

PROTARCHUS.

None at all from the nature of the Thing its self: but when the Knowledge is wanted to be applyed to some Use in human Life; then a Man is uneasy at having lost it, on account of its Usefulness.

SOCRATES.

And we are at present, my Friend! actually concerned about those Feelings only, which arise in us from the nature of the Knowledge its self, without any regard to the Usefulness of it in computing or measuring.

PROTARCHUS.

You are right then in saying, that, in Mathematical Knowledge, a Forgetfulness frequently befalls us, without giving us any Uneasiness.

takes in *Philosophy*, he gives them the appellation of *Pleasures*: it is because he is there speaking before a mixt Company, consisting of three Sons of *Cephalus*, two elder Brothers of *Plato*, besides other *Athenians*, and two *Foreigners* then at *Athens*, All of them used to the Language of the Multitude, and probably Some of them at least tinged with the Doctrine of *Aristippus*. —Perhaps the like Apology may be justly made for those improper Phrases, frequently met with in some Modern Writers of great Merit, which are mentioned in Note 349. They wrote to the prevailing Epicurean Taste of their times; and therefore used the fashionable Epicurean way of expressing their Ideas.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

These Pleasures therefore, the Pleasures of Science, we must acknowledge to be unmixed with Pains. But these Pleasures belong not to the vulgar Multitude, being enjoyed only by a very Few.

PROTARCHUS.

All This must certainly be acknowledged.

SOCRATES.

Now then, that we have tolerably well distinguished between the Pure Pleasures, and Those which are rightly called Impure, let us farther add These Distinctions between them,—that the Vehement Pleasures know not Moderation nor Measure; while Those of the Gentler Kind admit of Measure and are moderate:—and that Greatness and Intensity, and the contrary Quality, the Frequency also and the Rareness of Repetition, are Attributes of Such Pleasures only, as belong to the Boundless Kind of Being,—to That which is perpetually varying in its Quantity and Motions thro the Body and thro the Soul ³⁵⁴,—while the Pleasures, to which the like Variations never happen, belong to the contrary Kind
of

³⁵⁴ See pages 321, and 410.

of Being ³⁵⁵, and are allyed to all things wherein Symmetry ³⁵⁶ is found.

PROTARCHUS.

Perfectly right, O Socrates!

SOCRATES.

The Pleasures, beside these Assortments of them, are to be farther distinguished thus.

PROTARCHUS.

How?

SOCRATES.

We should consider, whether the Purity and the Simplicity of Pleasures serve to discover what True Pleasure is: or whether the Truth of Pleasures may best

³⁵⁵ That is, — *Bound and Measure.*

³⁵⁶ In the printed *Greek* we here read *ἐμμέτρων*, *Things in Measure.*—Now if this Reading were right, our Author would have been guilty of an evident Tautology. For the *ἐμμετρία* of the *Gentler Pleasures* had been already mentioned in the First Part of this Sentence, where it is opposed to the *ἀμετρία* of the *Vehement Pleasures*. But 'tis highly probable, that the word *συμμέτρων* is the right Reading: this probable Conjecture is confirmed by the *Medicean M. S.* as appears from the faithful Version of *Ficinus*; who renders it into Latin by the

best be known from their Intensity, their Multitude, their Greatness, and their Abundance ³⁵⁷.

PROTARCHUS.

What is your View, Socrates! in proposing This to be considered?

SOCRATES.

To omit nothing, by which the Nature of Pleasure, and That of Knowledge, may be set in the clearest Light; and not to leave it undiscovered, whether or no Some Kinds of Each of them are pure, while Other Kinds are impure ³⁵⁸: that thus,
what

words — *commensurati genus*. — And according to this Reading, the whole Sentence will be found agreeable to what we read before in Page 292; where ἔμμετρα *the Measurable*, and σύμμετρα *the Commensurate*, are expressly distinguished from each other. See also Page 290.

³⁵⁷ In the *Greek*, this last word is ἰκανόν, — a word, which, every where else in this Dialogue, means *Sufficient*: but it cannot have that Meaning here, where it is attributed to *Pleasures* of the *Infinite* Kind. For as *Sufficiency* implies *Bound* and *Measure*, it belongs only to That Kind of things, which is *contrary* to the *Infinite*. We suspect therefore the *Greek Text* in this place to be corrupted and erroneous.

³⁵⁸ It has been already seen, that *Purity*, when 'tis attributed to *Pleasure* of some certain Kind, means, that Pleasure of such
a Kind

what is pure and simple in Each being brought before us to be judged of, You and I and all this Company may the more easily form a right Judgment.

PROTARCHUS.

Very rightly said.

SOCRATES.

Well then; all those Kinds of things, which we commonly say are pure ³⁵⁹, let us consider of, in the following way; but first let us choose out some One among them for an Instance to consider of.

a Kind is *free* from any *Mixture* with what is *contrary* to the general *nature* of Pleasure, that is, *Pain*. In like manner, when *Purity* is attributed to some certain Kind of *Knowledge*, it means, that the *Knowledge*, whereto such an Attribute belongs, is not *mixed* with any thing, the *nature* of which is *contrary* to the nature of *Knowledge*; — not with things *uncertain*, the Objects only of *Imagination* or *Opinion*; — not with things subject to Change or Motion, the Objects only of *outward Sense*.

³⁵⁹ The Epithet “*pure*” is given to many things; — to Virgin-Earth or Mould; — to all Metals, separated from their Dross; and to the richer Metals, separated from their Allays; — to Fountain-Water and Rain-Water; — to the pure Virgin-Snow, says our Poet *Thomson*; — to *Air* upon the Tops of high Mountains; — to a cloudless and clear *Æther*; — to uncompounded or simple Colours; and to unmixt or simple Flavours.

PROTARCHUS.

Which would you have us choose?

SOCRATES.

Among the principal of those Kinds, let us, if you please, consider the White Kind of things.

PROTARCHUS.

By all means.

SOCRATES.

In What way then might we have any thing, which is called White, with the most perfect and pure Whiteness? whether by having the greatest Number of things which are White, and the largest of the Kind in Size, or by having what is White in the highest Degree, and not tinged with the least Degree of any other Colour?

PROTARCHUS.

Evidently, by having what is of the most simple and unmixed Whiteness.

SOCRATES.

Rightly said. Shall we not then determine, that this Pure White is the Truest, and at the same time the most Beautiful of all Whites; and not That
which

which is of the largest Size and whose Number is the greatest?

PROTARCHUS.

Most certainly we shall.

SOCRATES.

In pronouncing then, that a Little of Purely White is Whiter, and of a more Beautiful and True Whiteness, than a great Quantity of the Mixt White, we shall say what is intirely right.

PROTARCHUS.

Without the least Doubt.

SOCRATES.

Well then; I suppose, we shall have no occasion to produce many such Instances, to prove the truth of our conclusion concerning Pleasure: the Instance, already brought, seems sufficient for us, to perceive at once, that a Little of Pleasure, pure, and free from Pain, is more pleasant, more true, and perfect, as well as more comely, than Pleasure where Pain is mingled, be there ever so much of it, or be it ever so vast and vehement.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

By all means: the Instance, you gave in Whiteness, is an argument from Analogy, sufficient for the Proof of it.

SOCRATES.

But What think you now of This? Have we not heard it said concerning Pleasure, that 'tis a Thing always in generation, always produced anew, and having no Stability of Being, cannot properly be said to Be at all? For some ingenious ³⁶⁰ Persons there are, who endeavour to show us, that such is the nature of Pleasure; and we are much obliged to them for this their account of it.

PROTARCHUS.

Why so?

SOCRATES.

I shall recount to you the Whole of their Reasoning on this Point, my Friend Protarchus! by putting a few Questions to you.

³⁶⁰ In the *Greek*, — *νομοφῶι*, neat and trim, that is, in their Reasonings and Discourses; — subtle *Arguers*, or fine *Logicians*; — a Character, which distinguished the School of *Zeno* the *Eleatic*. — It will presently be seen, that the Persons, here spoken of, philosophised on the Principles of the *Eleatic* Sect, and probably were Some of the same *Zeno's* Athenian Disciples. See Note 34.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Do so; and begin your Questions.

SOCRATES.

Are there not in Nature Two very different Kinds of Things; This, in its Self alone compleat; That, desirous always of the Other ³⁶¹ ?

PROTARCHUS.

How do you mean? and what Things do you speak of?

SOCRATES.

One of Them is by nature always of high Dignity and Value; the Other, falling far short of it, and always indigent ³⁶².

³⁶¹ The First of these Kinds is *Form*; the Other is *Matter*. —By Things of the First Kind, we are to understand, — not these *Sensible Forms*, which every where invest Matter, and are for ever changing and passing away,—but those *Intelligible* and *Ideal* Forms, which are the *Originals* of the Other. — Again; by Things of this other Kind, are meant the Parts of Matter, considered — not abstractedly, or as negatively opposed to all Form,—but as it were solliciting the Embrace of every Ideal Form which presents itself, and vainly as it were endeavouring to retain the Image of every such Form, as it passeth thro them.

³⁶² See Note 123 to *the Banquet*.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Exprefs your felf a little more clearly.

SOCRATES.

Have we not feen Some of the Fair Sex, who excelled in Beauty and in Virtue? and have we not feen their Lovers and Admirers?

PROTARCHUS.

Often.

SOCRATES.

Analogous then to thefe Two different Sorts of Perfons, fee if you cannot difcover Two different Kinds of Things, to One or Other of which different Kinds belongs Every Thing, commonly faid to have a Being: The Third be to the Saviour ³⁶³.

PROTARCHUS.

³⁶³ This whole Sentence, in all the Editions of the *Greek*, is thus printed,—Τέτοις τοίνυν εοικότα δυοῖν ἔσι, δὲ ἄλλα ζητεῖ, κατὰ πάντα ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι τὸ τρίτον ἐτέρῳ.—A Sentence, quite unintelligible to us! — Monf. *Grou* very juftly apprehends fome Error in the Text. We prefume, that this fenfible and elegant Translator never faw the Emendation, propofed by *Cornarius*; for that, otherwife, he would have embraced it, and have made His Verfion, as We have Ours, agreeable to that Emendation: which is no more than a Change of the laft word—ἐτέρῳ—into σωτήρι.—The Sentence, thus amended, concludes with this Proverbial Saying,—*The Third*

PROTARCHUS.

Speak your Meaning, O Socrates! in plainer Terms.

SOCRATES.

to the Saviour.—It was a Form of words, anciently used at the Feast of every Victor in the Olympic Games, when he made an accustomed Libation, out of the Third Cup or Glass, Διὶ σωτήρι, to *Jupiter* in his Character of *Saviour* in all Difficultys and Dangers. — A Speech, so well known to all the Grecians, easily passed into a Proverb: and it is alluded to, as Such, by Plato in his *Charmides*, pag: 167; in his *Republick*, pag: 583; and in his *Seventh Epistle*, pag: 334. In the *Republick*, he applys it to the *Best* and *Happiest* of Human Lives; when Two inferiour Ways of Life had been already mentioned. — In the *Charmides*, he applys it to a *Third* and more profound *Inquiry* into the Meaning of that Delphic Sentence, “Know thy Self;” after it had been Twice considered superficially.—In the 7th *Epistle*, he applys it to the making of a *Third Attempt*; after Two had been made by him without Success.—And in the Sentence now before us, he applys it to this *Third Explanation* of his Meaning, in hopes of its being found fully sufficient; the Two former having been intended only as introductory to This. — But in all these applications of the Proverb, ’tis to be observed, that the several Cases, to which it is applyed, are of the most important and interesting Kind, — Cases, in which it was proper to implore the Divine Assistance.—For the Subject of that Case, in the *Republick*, is the Happiness of those Persons, who possess true Virtue, or *Universal Justice*. The Subject of that Case, in the *Charmides*, is the nature of true Prudence, or *Man’s highest Wisdom*. The Aim of Plato, in that Part of his *Seventh Epistle*, is to convince the Chief Men among the *Sicilians*, that ’tis Best for every

B b b b

City

SOCRATES.

I mean nothing, O Protarchus! but what is very simple and easy to be seen. But our present Argument is pleased to sport itself ³⁶⁴. However, it means no more than This;— that there is a Kind of Things, which are always for the sake of some Other; and there is also a Kind of Things, for whose sake always is produced whatever hath any Final Cause of its Production ³⁶⁵.

PROTARCHUS.

City and Community, not to be *subject* to the Will of Men, but to the *Laws* only; and that all Violation of the Laws is equally pernicious to the *Governors* and the *Governed*. And the Design of this present Part of the *Philebus*, is to open the Way to a discovery of the nature of *Mind*, by unfolding the nature of the *Universe*, and distinguishing this outward, mutable, and transient World, in which alone arises Sensual Pleasure,—from That World, which is intelligible, immutable and eternal, where all Wisdom, Law, Virtue and Happiness, are seated; and from which they are derived, tho in Streams polluted as they run, into and through this Other.

³⁶⁴ Meaning,—in the *Simile*, taken from that Courtship which is paid to the Fair by their Humble Lovers.—The Speech of *Socrates*, in the *Banquet*, abounds with *Metaphors*, taken from the same Subject.

³⁶⁵ All the Works of *Man* are for the sake of *Man*, who is their Efficient Cause: the *Good of Man* therefore is their Final Cause, or *End*.—Those Works of *Nature*, which are *inferiour* in

PROTARCHUS.

I find it difficult to understand your Meaning, after your many Explanations of it.

SOCRATES.

Perhaps, Young Man! 'twill be understood better, as we proceed in the Reasoning on this Subject.

PROTARCHUS.

I make no doubt of it.

SOCRATES.

Let us now make another Division of Things into Two different Kinds.

PROTARCHUS.

What Kinds are They?

in Dignity to *other* of her Works, are *for the sake of* Some of those which are *nobler*: the *Good of These* therefore is the *End*, or Final Cause, of the less noble. The noblest of all her Works are *for the sake of* That Highest Good, which only They are able to partake of: this *Highest Good* therefore is the *Final Cause* of their Being, and their *End*. And the whole Outward Universe, the *World of Nature*, is *for the sake of* Universal Good: *Universal Good* therefore is the *End*, or Final Cause, of the *whole Creation*.

B b b b 2

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

The Generation of all things is One Kind of Things ; and the Being of all is a different Kind.³⁶⁶

PROTARCHUS.

³⁶⁶ We are now brought to those Doctrines of the *Eleatic* Philosophers, on which the Whole of the present Reasoning is founded: as in consequence of Their Tenets it will appear; that *Pleasure* has no permanent or stable *Being*, and belongs only to the unsteady and vague *Appearance* of Things always in Flow;—an Appearance, which is but for the instant *Now*, and glides away from the Beholder, like a Shadow.—For the *Eleatic* Philosophers supposed *One* only *Principle* of the Universe,—*MIND*,—*One* and the *Same* for ever.—But they did not suppose this sole *Principle* to be Such, as an *Arithmetical One*, or as the abstract *Idea* of *Unity*: Neither did they suppose it to be Such a *One*, as empty *Space*, or as formless *Matter*; nor to be like absolute *Darkness*, or like total *Ignorance*: for the continual *Sameness*, or simple *Oneness* of all These, is nothing *Positive*, nothing more than a *Vacancy* or Want of *Form* and *Being*; an *Absence* of *Light*, or of *Intelligence*; a *Negation* of the Means or of the Power of *distinguishing* one thing from another.—On the contrary, they held this Principle, *Mind*, to be *Form* and *Being Universal*, *comprehending* and *uniting* all true *Beings*, all *Forms* eternally the *Same*, all pure *Ideas*; *intelligent* of all, thro *Self-Consciousness*; *contemplative* of all, thro *Self-Contemplation*, and *viewing* them all by *his own Light*, the *Light of Intelligence*, the *Principles* themselves of *MIND*, *Identity* and *Diversity*. — For, as every *General Idea* is ἐν καὶ πολλὰ *One and Many*, they held, that *Universal Mind*, comprehensive of all *General Ideas*, is ἐν καὶ πάντα *One and All things*,—the whole

PROTARCHUS.

I admit your difference between Being and Generation.

SOCRATES:

whole *Ideal* or *Intelligible World*,—the *True All*.—They held, that this Great *One-All* is determined, fixt, and immutable: for that every *Change* infers a *Diversity*, without a *Sameness*, in That which is *subject* to the Change; and it infers a *Multitude* of the *Principles* of that Change, or *Two* at least, without a *Union* between them: but This, they presumed, could not be the Case of *Mind*; because, as in every *General Idea*, so in *Mind*, the *Head* of them all, *Sameness* abides throughout *Diversity*, and *Multitude* is surrounded, embraced, and bound together by *Unity*. To the *Essential* nature of *Mind* they deemed it owing, that every *Idea* therein is exempt from all *Change*, and liable to no *Generation* or *Corruption*, no *Addition* or *Diminution*.——It should seem therefore, that *Matter*, (which, according to *Plato* and *Aristotle*, is another *necessary Principle* of Things,) was considered by the *Eleatic* Philosophers, either as *Empty Space*, the *κενόν*, the *Inane* of *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, or as Something very different from *real Being*, and as much a *Non-Entity*, as that imaginary *Vacuum*.——Accordingly they held, that all *Change* of *Forms* was only in *Appearance*;—that only the *Semblances* of *Form* suffered *Corruption*;—and that *Generation* was but the *Arising* of new fallacious *Semblances* to the ἀσκόπον ὄμμα, the *inconsiderate Eye of Sense*, followed by βροτῶν δόξαις, αἷς ἐκ ἐν πίσις ἀληθείης, the *uncertain Judgment of Human Opinions*:—that yet, as much a *Non-Entity* as *Matter* is, it is This only, in which those *Semblances of Form* arise, and out of which they are continually produced; *infinite Matter* being as it were their *Matrix*, or *native Bed*, all-capacious, and common to them all.——

SOCRATES.

You are perfectly in the Right. Now, Whether of these Two is for the sake of the Other? Shall we say, that Generation is for the sake of Being? or shall we say, that Being is for the sake of Generation.

PROTARCHUS.

all.—The *Eleatics* therefore, conceiving *Matter* to be thus intirely *passive*, and *Mind* to be the only *active* and *generative* Power in the Universe, deemed *Matter* unworthy to be styled a *Principle* of Things; and deigned this Title,—a Title of so high and universal Import,—to *Mind* alone. On the same account, those Philosophers denied the Appellation of *Beings* to *Sensible Forms*, the imperfect and short-lived *Products* (or rather, *Miscarriages*) of *Matter*, their ineffectually nursing-Mother: looking on them as only the *Shadows* of *Substantial Forms*. Accordingly, they held *Mind* to be the only *Place of Forms*, and *Matter* to be the *Place* but of their *Shadows*: agreeably also to this Tenet, and in pursuance of the same Metaphor, they held this *Shadowy Place* itself, this *unreal* and meerly *nominal One*, to be but the indefinite and indeterminable *Shadow* of Universal *Form*, the *real* and *essential One*.—From these Considerations, they taught, that this *Outward World*, the *World of Sense*, is mutable, infinite, uncertain, and untrue; continually *new-created*, as it were, in continual *new Generations*; and tho ever aiming at *Being*, unable to attain to it: for that *Being* and *Generation* are so intirely distinct, and incompatible, that of Things in *Being* there can be no *Generation*, nor can Things continually in *Generation* ever have what can properly be called a *Being*.—See page 250 of this Dialogue.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Whether or no That, which is termed Being ³⁶⁷, is what it is, for the sake of Generation, is This your present Question?

SOCRATES.

Apparently it is.

PROTARCHUS.

In the name of the Gods, how can you ask so strange a Question?

SOCRATES.

My Meaning in That Question, O Protarchus! is of such a Kind as this Other; — whether you would choose to say that Ship-building is for the sake of Shipping; rather than you would say, that Shipping is for the sake of Ship-building: and all other Things of like Kind ³⁶⁸, O Protarchus! I include in the Question which I ask you.

PROTARCHUS.

³⁶⁷ *Protarchus* seems, in This, rightly to apprehend, that *Socrates* means *Form* by the term *Being*.

³⁶⁸ That is, — whether all *Structures*, and all other *Forms*, intended to be made, are intended for the sake of the *Construction* or *Formation*, — the meer *Operation* of *constructing* or *forming* them; — or whether this *Operation* is not rather for the sake of the intended *Form*.

PROTARCHUS.

But for what reason, O Socrates! do you not give an Answer to it, your Self?

SOCRATES.

I have no reason to refuse that Office; do You but go along with me in my Answer.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly I shall.

SOCRATES.

I say then, that for the sake of Generation, it is true, that Medicines are composed; the Instrumental Parts, prepared by Nature, and all the Materials of it, provided ³⁶⁹: but that every Act of Generation is for the sake of some Being; Generation in every Species, for the sake of some Being belonging to that Species; and universally, all Generation, for the sake of Universal Being ³⁷⁰.

PROTARCHUS.

³⁶⁹ *Socrates* here again is pleased to temper the Gravity of his Reasoning, and the Dignity of his Subject, with that urbane Facetiousness, usual to him, and very becoming him, in the Mixt Company of those polite Athenian Youths, who frequented the *Lycæum*.

³⁷⁰ It is here intimated, that the Design or End of that *Generation* or Production of all *natural Things*, which is continued

PROTARCHUS.

Most evidently so.

SOCRATES.

If Pleasure then be of such a nature, as to be generated always anew, must not the generating of it be always for the sake only of some Being?

PROTARCHUS.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

Now That, for the sake of which is always generated whatever is generated ³⁷¹ for some End, must

tinued on for ever, is to communicate *Form* and *Being*, as far as possible, to innumerable Individuals of every Kind and Species, throughout the Universe, in everlasting succession. Now this End is impossible to be accomplished, without the *Dissolution* of all these Individuals, successively, for the sake of continual *new Generations*; as *every Generation* is for the sake of *Being*.—Thus it is, that, *Generation* keeping even Pace with *Dissolution*, the Universe is always full:—the *external World*, is no less full of *formed Matter*, than Matter is full of *Mind*, or than Mind is full of those *eternal Forms*, or true *Beings*, wrapt up in *One Universal Being*, for whose sake all created Things are generated and dissolved.

³⁷¹ The Greek word, τὸ γινόμενον, here signifys whatever is *produced, formed or created*, whether it be by Nature, or by Human Art.

be in the Rank of things which are Good ²⁷² : and That, which is generated for the sake of any Other thing, must of necessity, my Friend! be placed in a different Rank of Things.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly it must.

SOCRATES.

Shall we not be right then, in placing Pleasure in a Rank of Things different from That of Good ³⁷³ ;—if it be true, that Pleasure has no stable Being, but is always generated anew?

PROTARCHUS.

³⁷² Hence it should seem, that those philosophical Persons, whose Reasoning on the present Subject is here delivered to us by *Socrates*, denied the Attribute of *Good* to all *Instrumental* and all other *Means* of *Good* ; deeming it to belong only to *Final Causes* or *Ends*, and to Beings who *possess* and *enjoy* those *Ends*.

³⁷³ It is plain, that the Persons, here spoken of, by the term *Pleasure* meant Pleasure of the *Outward Senses* only. The same Term is used in the same Meaning by *Socrates*, in the *Conclusive Part* of this Dialogue, where he speaks only his own Sentiments. He agrees also with those Persons, in attributing the Quality of *Good* to no other things than such as are pursuable *for their own sakes* : (see the *Argument* of this Dialogue, page 11.) but he differs from the same Persons in this Point, that he there places the *Pleasures of Sense* in the order of things *Good* ; assigning, however, the last and lowest Place to those

PROTARCHUS.

Perfectly right.

SOCRATES.

Sensual Pleasures, which are of the *grosser* Kinds and are *mixed* with *Pain*; and a Place next above the lowest, to Such as are more *refined* and *pure*.—Now perhaps Both these Partys, *Socrates*, and the Persons whom he speaks of, may well be justified in their opposite Expressions on this Point; as they meant Two Things very different from each other, but very consistent together. — *Socrates*, in the present Dialogue, professedly treats of *Human Good* solely. Now if Man be considered as a *Sensitive Animal*, *Pleasure* is *The Good* of Man: and if Man be considered in the *Whole* of his *nature*, in all the Parts of it taken together, *Pleasure* is still a *Good* to Him; — it is One of the Goods, altho the meanest, which he enjoys. — On the other hand, the Studys of the *Eleatic* Philosophers (and Such we imagine to be the Persons, here spoken of,) were confined to the uppermost Regions of Philosophy: they spent their time, partly, in contemplating the Nature of the *Universe*, and the Causes of *All things*; and partly, in searching out the Principles of *Mind* and *Science*, and in building on those Principles the *Art of Reasoning*, commonly called *Logick*. Whenever they condescended to cast an Eye on the *Sensible World*, they looked on it, like the *Pythagoreans* from whom they sprang, no otherwise than as having a reference to the *Intelligible World*, *true Being*, of which it is an outward Representation or *Picture*: and consequently, they must have considered all *Pleasure* of the *Senses*, only as one of the *Means*, intended by the Providential Mind and Wisdom of Nature, to *freshen* the *fading Colours* of this *Picture*, or to lay Such as are similar to Those which are

SOCRATES.

Therefore, as I said in beginning this Argumentation ³⁷⁴, we are much obliged to the Persons who have given us this account of Pleasure, — that the Effence of it consists in being always generated anew, but that never has it any Kind of Being. For 'tis plain, that these Persons would laugh at a Man, who asserted, that Pleasure and Good were the same Thing.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly they would.

SOCRATES.

And these very Persons would certainly laugh at those Men, wherever they met with them, who place their Chief Good and End in Generation.

PROTARCHUS.

How, and what Sort of Men do you mean?

faded quite away. — To *Man* therefore the Pleasures of Sense may be in the Rank of *Ends*; altho in *Nature* they have only the Rank of *Means*.

³⁷⁴ See Page 556, and Page 498.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Such, as in freeing themselves from Hunger, or Thirst, or any of the Uneasinesses from which they are freed by Generation, are so highly delighted with the action of removing those Uneasinesses, as to declare, they would not choose to live, without suffering Thirst and Hunger, nor without feeling all those other Sensations, which may be said to follow from such Kinds of Uneasiness ³⁷⁵.

PROTARCHUS.

Such indeed there are, who seem to be of that Opinion.

³⁷⁵ *Socrates* very justly here distinguishes between those *Philosophers* in His time, such as *Aristippus* on the one hand,—who held that Pleasure was Good, and that Good was Pleasure; for that Pleasure and Good were the same thing;—and those *unphilosophical Voluptuaries* in every age, on the other hand,—who, because they have but little Taste for any other Good than Sensual Pleasure, and consequently have but little Enjoyment of any other, imagine, that either Sensual Pleasure in general, or some one Species of it, is the Highest human Bliss.—*Socrates* therefore, in speaking of these Two different Sorts of Persons, speaks of each Sort distinctly,—of this common Sort, in the present Sentence,—of the philosophical Sort, in the Sentence preceding.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Would not all of us say, that Corruption was the Contrary of Generation ?

PROTARCHUS.

It is impossible to think otherwise.

SOCRATES.

Whoever then makes such a Life his Choice, must choose both Corruption and Generation ³⁷⁶, rather than that Third Kind of Life, in which he might live with the clearest Discernment of what is Right and Good, but without the Feeling of either Pain or Pleasure ³⁷⁷.

PROTARCHUS.

Much Absurdity, as it seems, O Socrates ! is to be admitted by the Man, who holds that Human Good consists wholly in Pleasure.

³⁷⁶ For it is with the *Human Body*, as it is with all other Natural and Corporeal things ; not only every *Part* is continually in *Motion* and *Mutation*, but also every *Condition* of it is followed by its *contrary* Condition ; and every the slowest *Motion*, or most minute *Change*, in each *Part*, is a Step toward that contrary Condition.—Thus there is a continual Vicissitude of *Repletion* and *Inanition*,—*Augmentation* and *Diminution*,—*Growth* and *Decay*,—*Corruption* and *Generation*.

³⁷⁷ See Pages 210 and 485.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Much indeed. For let us argue farther thus.

PROTARCHUS.

How?

SOCRATES.

Since no Good nor Beauty is in Bodys, nor in any other things, beside the Soul ³⁷⁸; is it not absurd to imagine, that in the Soul Pleasure should be the only Good; and that neither Fortitude, nor Temperance, nor Understanding, nor any of the other valuable Attainments of the Soul, should be numbered among the Good things, which the Soul enjoys? Farther too; is it not highly irrational to suppose, that a Man, afflicted with Pain, without feeling any Pleasure, should be obliged to say, that Evil only and no Good was with him, at the time, when he was in Pain, tho he were the Best of All men? And is it not equally absurd, on the other hand, to suppose, that a Man in the Midst of Pleasures must be, during that time, in the midst of Good; and that the more Pleasure he feels, the

³⁷⁸ For only the Soul is capable of *enjoying* any *Good*, or of *perceiving* any *Beauty*: and *Good* is nothing, unless it be *enjoyed*; nor *Beauty*, unless it be *perceived*: just as *Pleasure* is nothing, if not *felt*; *Harmony*, nothing, if not *heard*.

more

more Good he is filled with, and is so much the Better Man?

PROTARCHUS.

All these suppositions, O Socrates! are Absurdities in the highest degree possible.

SOCRATES.

'Tis well. But now, let us not employ our selves wholly in searching into the nature of Pleasure; as if we industriously declined the examination of Mind and Science: but in These also if there be any thing putrid or unsound, let us have the Courage to cut it all off, and throw it aside; till, coming to a Discovery of what is intirely pure and sound therein, the Discovery may be of use to us, in comparing the truest Parts ³⁷⁹ of Mind and Science with the truest Parts of ³⁷⁹ Pleasure, and in forming our Judgment concerning the Superiority of Either from that Comparison.

PROTARCHUS.

Rightly said.

³⁷⁹ The truest Parts of *Mind* are, where *Ideas* are unmixt with *Images*: the truest Parts of *Science* are, where the Objects of *Science* are unmixt with Objects of *Sense*: and the truest Parts of *Pleasure* are, where the Pleasure is *pure*, and unmixt with *Pain*.

SOCRATES.

Do we not hold, that Mathematical Science is partly employed in the service of the Mechanic Arts, and partly in the liberal Education and Discipline of Youth? or how think we on this Subject?

PROTARCHUS.

Exactly so.

SOCRATES.

Now, as to the Manual Arts ³⁸⁰, let us consider in the first place, whether Some of these depend not on Science, more than Others; and whether we ought not to look on those of the former Sort as the more pure, and on these Others as the more impure.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly we ought.

SOCRATES.

And in Each of these we should distinguish, and separate the Leading Arts, from the Arts which are led and governed by them.

³⁸⁰ In the *Greek* of this Passage, it is presumed, that we ought to read *χειροτεχνίαις*, and not, as it is printed, *χειροτεχνικαῖς*,— and also to read *ἐστὶ*, instead of *ἐστίν*.

PROTARCHUS.

What Arts do you call the Leading Arts? and Why do you give that Epithet to them?

SOCRATES.

I mean thus: from all the Arts were a man to separate, and lay aside, those of Numbering, of Measuring, and of Weighing, what remained in every One of them, would become comparatively mean and contemptible ³⁸¹.

PROTARCHUS.

Contemptible indeed.

SOCRATES.

For room would be then left only for Conjecture, and for Exercise of the Senses, by Experience and habitual Practice; and we should then make use of no other Facultys, beside those of Guessing and Aiming well, (to which indeed the Multitude

³⁸¹ Praises, still higher than This, are, in Plato's *Epinomis*, pag: 977, ascribed to the *Knowlege of Numbers*. But indeed a Science more divine, than Mathematical *Arithmetick*, seems to be there meant; — namely, the Knowlege of those *Numbers*, (so termed by the *Pythagoreans*, and by *Plato* termed *Ideas*,) which are the true *Measures* of All things.

give the name of Arts,) increasing the Strength of those Facultys by dint of Assiduity and Labour.

PROTARCHUS.

All, which you have now said, must of necessity be true.

SOCRATES.

The Truth of it is evident in all Musical Performances throughout. For in the first place, Harmony is produced, and one Sound is adapted to another, not by Measuring, but by that Aiming well, which arises from constant Exercise. It is evident too in Musical Performances on all Wind-Instruments: for in these the Breath, by being well aimed, as it is blown along, searches and attains the Measure of every Chord beaten ³⁸². So that Musick has in it Much of the Uncertain, and but a Little of the Fixt and Firm.

³⁸² It seems doubtful, whether we ought not, in the *Greek* of this Passage, to read *φερομένη*, instead of *φερομένης*. In this Doubt, we have endeavoured to adapt our Translation to Either of those Readings: and shall only observe, that, if the printed Reading, by which that doubtful word is made to agree with *χορδῆς*, be right, it carries with it a probability, that the *Flute* was used by the Ancients to accompany the *Lyre*; as the Human *Voice*, in modern days, often accompanys the *Harp*-*chord*.

PROTARCHUS.

Very true.

SOCRATES.

And we shall find the Case to be the same in the Arts of Medicine and Agriculture, in the Art of Navigation also, and the Military Art.

PROTARCHUS.

Most clearly so.

SOCRATES.

But in the Art of Building we shall find, as I presume, many Measures made use of, and many Instruments employed; by which it is made to surpass in Accuracy many things which are called Sciences.

PROTARCHUS.

How so?

SOCRATES.

It is so in Ship-building, and House-building, and in many other Works of Carpentry. For in these, I think, the Art useth the Strait-Rule and the Square, the Turning-Lathe and the Compasses, the Plummet and the Marking-Line.

PROTARCHUS.

You are intirely right, O Socrates! it is so as you say.

SOCRATES.

The Arts therefore, as they are called, let us now distinguish into Two Sorts; — Those, which Musick is at the Head of, as they are less accurate than some Others, — and these Others, which partake of Accuracy the most, at the Head of which is Architecture.

PROTARCHUS.

This Distinction is allowed of.

SOCRATES.

And let us set down those Arts for the most accurate, which we lately said were the Prime or Leading Arts.

PROTARCHUS.

You mean, if I mistake not, Arithmetick, and those other Arts which you mentioned together with it but just now ³⁸³.

³⁸³ Namely,—*Mensuration* and *Statics*.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

The very same. But, O Protarchus! must we not say, that Each of these Arts is Twofold? or how otherwise?

PROTARCHUS.

What Arts do you speak of?

SOCRATES.

Arithmetick in the first place. Must we not say of This, that the Arithmetick of the Multitude is of One Sort, and that the Arithmetick of Those who apply themselves to Philosophy³⁸⁴ is of Another Sort?

PROTARCHUS.

What is the Difference, by which the One may be distinguished from the Other?

SOCRATES.

The Difference between them, O Protarchus! is far from being inconsiderable. For the Multitude, in numbering, number by Unequal Ones, put together; as Two Armys of unequal Force; Two Oxen of unequal Size; Two things, the smallest of

³⁸⁴ Meaning the Students in *Mathematicks*. For the Study of the *Mathematical Sciences* was deemed by Plato the best *Introduction* to the Knowledge of *Intelligible Things*.

All,—

All,—or Two, the greatest,—being compared with Others of the Same Kind. But the Students in Philosophy would not understand what a Man meant, who, in numbering, made any Difference between Some and Other of the Ones, which composed the Number ³⁸⁵.

PROTARCHUS.

You are perfectly right, in saying, that no inconsiderable Difference lyes in the Different Manner of studying and using Numbers; so as to make it probable, that Two different Sorts there are of Arithmetick.

SOCRATES.

Well; and What of Calculation ³⁸⁶ in Trade, and of Mensuration in Building? does the latter of these Arts

³⁸⁵ See Plato *de Republicâ*, L. 7. pag: 112, Edit: Cantab:

³⁸⁶ The *Art of calculating, computing, and accounting*, (*λογιστικὴ* in Greek) is here mentioned as an Art *different* from *Arithmetick*; tho by many Greek Writers, and by Plato himself elsewhere, *no Distinction* is made between them.—To know, in what respects they *differ*, and whence it is that the *Difference* is often *overlooked*, may be of *use* for the right understanding of the *Science of Mind*. For in this Highest Part of Philosophy, the Terms anciently made use of, were borrowed from the Mathematical Sciences: the reason of which was This,—that the *pure Objects* of these Sciences are, in some degree, *abstracted*.

Arts not differ from Mathematical Geometry? nor the other, from Calculations ³⁸⁷ made by the Students in pure Mathematicks. Shall we say, that they are,
Each

abstracted from *Body*;—being abstracted from *Matter*, and from all the *Sensible Qualitys* of *Body*, except *Figure*;—and are therefore allyed, more nearly than Corporeal Objects are, to Objects purely *Intelligible*.——Now Mathematical *Arithmetick*, in the strict Meaning of that Word, is the *Art of Numbering*,—that is, of *adding* Units to Units, so as to *compose* or *augment* some certain *Number*,—and also of *subtracting* Units or small Numbers from greater, so as to *de-compose* or *lessen* the greater Numbers:—for as to the Rules, which direct how to *multiply* and *divide* Numbers, they depend immediately and intirely on the Rules for *adding* and *subtracting*; and on these *Four* Rules depend all other Operations in Practical *Arithmetick*.—The *Primary Subjects* therefore of this *Art of Numbering*, are *Units*,—such *Ones* as are *all* of them *equal*, — as Socrates just before observed;—and the *Secondary* Subjects of it are *Numbers*, composed from those *Ones*, and considered meerly with respect to That their *Frame* or *Composition*, without regarding any of their *Propertys*, or any of their mutual *Relations*.—But as *Geometry*, in the larger signification of the word, is the *Science of Measures*, on which Science is founded the *Art of Mensuration*,) and includes *Stereometry*, or the *Art of measuring Solids*; altho, in a more confined sense, *Geometry* signifys only the *Art of measuring Surfaces*, and is then distinguished from *Stereometry*;—in like manner, Mathematical *Arithmetick*, in the larger sense of the word, is the *Science of Numbers*, and of all their *Propertys*, *Powers*, and *Relations*: thus it includes *Logistick*, or
the

Each of them, but One Art? or shall we set down
Each of them for Two?

PROTARCHUS.

the *Knowledge of Accounts*; the *Subject* of which Knowledge (according to the definition of it in Plato's *Charmides*, pag: 166,) is That *Property of Numbers*, by which they are, all of them, divided into Two Sorts, *Even* and *Odd*; and thro the Knowledge of which Subject, the nature of Both those Sorts is known, whether considered, each in its Self, or as they stand related to each other. So that the *Primary Subjects* of *Logistick* are—not *Units*, —but *Numbers*, composed of Units; and the *Secondary Subjects* of it are the *Equality*s and *Inequality*s of different Numbers, compared together, — and in *Unequals*, the precise *Quantity*, by which the One exceeds the Other. For the *Object* and *End* of this Art is, in all Calculations, Computations, and Accounts, to judge rightly of *Equals* and *Unequals*,—and between *Unequals*, to ascertain the *Quantum* of the *Difference*.

³⁸⁷ The *Logistick*, used in *Merchant's Accounts*, hath the same Analogy to *Mathematical Logistick*, as the *Arithmetick*, used in *Buying* and *Selling*, has to the *Arithmetick* of *Mathematicians*. For it is only the *Mathematical Science* or Art, applied to things *Sensible* and *Corporeal*. As *Arithmetick* teaches to reckon up the *Number* of any such Subject-Matters of Exchange, in Trade and Traffick,—so the *Accountant's Art* teaches to ascertain their *Comparative Value*, when the *Absolute Value* of Each Article is first settled, and when afterward they are all compared together. — Accordingly, in *Plato's Politicus*, pag: 259, the Office, assigned to *Logistick*, is—τὰ γνωθέντα κρίνειν, to judge of things known,—that is, to judge of their respective *Values*, and to pronounce what the *Difference* is between them. And

E e e e

occasion

PROTARCHUS.

For My part, I should give my Opinion, agreeably to your Division of Arithmetick; and should say, that Each of These Arts also was Twofold.

SOCRATES.

occasion is hence taken, presently after in that Dialogue, to apply the name of this Art, λογικὴ, in a figurative sense, to the Science of *Magistrates, Kings, Commanders of Armys, and Politicians*.—In *Plato's Republic*, L. 7. pag: 525, it is again so applyed: but the figurative application of that term λογικὴ is there carried still higher; it is there applyed to the *Science of Mind*,—a Science, peculiar to the true Philosopher. For the γνωθέντα to Him, the proper Objects of His Science, are, according to *Socrates*, TRUTH and BEING;—in which are included all *Ideas* less general than *Mind* or *Being its Self*, and all *Truths* subordinate to *Truth its Self*.—Now every single *Idea* is perceived and known by the First of all the Mind's Energys, commonly termed by Logicians *Simple Apprehension*. And all Positive *Truths*,—the Relations between *Ideas*,—are perceived and known by That Energy of the Mind, which the Logicians rightly term *Judgment*; because the perceiving of any of these *Relations* implys not only a *Knowlege* of the *Ideas* so related, and a Discernment of some *Difference* between them, but also a right *Judgment* of What the Difference is. This right *Judgment* therefore of the Mind concerning Mental Things, perfectly thus known, agrees to the above-mentioned Definition of *Logistick* in *Plato's Politicus*: and according to this Definition, the name of *Logistick* is applicable to the Mind's perception of *Truth*, in the same figurative sense, as the name of *Arithmetick* is given, in the *Epinomis*, to the Mind's perception of her First Objects, the most simple of pure *Ideas*.—

Now.

SOCRATES.

You would give a right Opinion. But with what Design I brought these Distinctions on the Carpet, do You conceive?

PROTARCHUS.

Now to distinguish between *Arithmetick*, (in the strict sense of that word,) the *Art of Numbering*, — and *Logick*, the *Art of Accounting*, — and again, to comprise them Both in One, — namely, in the *Science of Numbers*, (*Arithmetick*, in its larger sense,) — may help us to discern the *Logical Distinction* between *νῆς Mind* and *λόγος Reason*, — and to perceive, at the same time, how they are *aëtually* inseparable, and are Both comprehended in the larger meaning of the word *Mind*. — For this term *Mind*, in its stricter sense, denotes the *Intellect*, — That Power in the Soul, by which all our *Ideas*, but especially the *Principles of Knowledge*, are perceived, Each separately and singly. — The term *νῆς* is so used by *Aristotle*, in his *Posterior Analyticks*, L. 1. C. 33. where he says, — λέγω νῆν, ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης, by *Mind I mean the Principle of Science*: — and again, in his *Nicomachean Ethicks*, L. 6. C. 6. he says, — νῆν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, that *Principles are Objects of the Mind*. — By *Epicharmus* also the term *νῆς* is used, to signify the *Perception of Simple Ideas*, in that Verse of his, which is cited in Note 228 to *the Banquet*, page 240: for the *Platonists* agree in opinion, that the *Outward Senses* are meant, in that Verse by *τᾶλλα other things*. See *Maximus Tyrius*, in *Dissertat*: 1, or 17, § 10, and the Authors cited by *Heinsius* and *Davis* in their Notes thereon. — But the term *Mind*, in its larger meaning, includes *Reason*; whether *Reason* be considered as the *Relation* between *Ideas*, or the *Power* of *perceiving* that *Relation*: (see before in pages 182, 3.) and in

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this

PROTARCHUS.

Perhaps I do. But I could wish, that You your Self would declare, What was your Design.

SOCRATES.

this sense is the term *νῆς* used by *Aristotle* in his *Treatise de Animâ*, L. 3, C. 5. λέγω νῆν, says he, ὃ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχὴ. By *Mind* I mean *That (Power) by which the Soul thinks and conjectures*. — Now *One* single *Idea* is not the *Object* of a *Thought*, nor of a *Conjecture*: *Two Ideas* (at the least) are necessary in the forming of it. For a *Thought* and a *Speech* are the same thing; (says *Plato* in his *Sophista*, pag: 263.) except that the former is ἀνευ φωνῆς without *Voice*, being only in the *Mind*; (see pages 453, 4. of the present *Dialogue*;) and a *Speech* is a combination of (at least) *Two Terms*, signifying *Two Ideas*. — These *Samenesses* and *Differences*, — on the one hand, between *Arithmetick* and *Logick*, — on the other hand, between *Mind* and *Reason*, — as slightly as we have now touched on them, must appear to be so greatly alike, that the *Analogys* between the former *Two*, and the latter *Two*, are easily discovered. — The *Analogy* between λόγος, *Reason*, and λογιστικὴ, the *Knowledge of Accounts*, is so obvious, that the *Rational Part* of the *Soul* is termed by *Plutarch* in his *Symposiacks*, L. 3, C. 8. τὸ λογιστικόν, the *Accounting Part*: and in our own *Language*, the showing of a *rational Connection* between the *Moral Actions* of any *Person*, — or a *probable Concatenation* of *Historical Facts*, — the assigning also of a *reason* for any *One* *moral Action*, or *historical Fact*, — is often expressed by this *Phrase*, “the giving of an *Account*.” — The other *Analogy*, That between the *Science of Mind* and the *Science of Numbers*, is so just and exact, that the *Pythagoreans*, who were great *Masters* in Both those *Sciences*,
considering

SOCRATES.

These Distinctions seem to Me to have shown to us, that in Science there is That very Circum-
stance

considering *Ideas* as so many single *Ones*, termed them *εἰδῶδες Units*; — again, considering Each of them as *One Many*, or *Many* contained in *One*, they gave them the name of *Numbers*: and This indeed they seem to have had in their consideration, when they taught, that the *Soul of Man* was composed of *Numbers*: for such was their *general* or summary Doctrine concerning the Soul. But, (to step out of our way for the space of a few Lines, on this curious and interesting Point,) when they taught in *particular*, that the *Soul of Man* was *Harmonically* constituted, or composed of *Numbers* in *Harmonic Proportion*, they meant to insinuate (as far as We apprehend) a very high Doctrine, founded on the deepest Researches into the nature of the Universe, — This, — that the several *Parts* or *Powers*, both the *Active* and the *Passive*, of the *Human Soul*, with all their Effects and Consequences in Human Life, ought to be, and according to nature were, like the Energys, Operations and Productions, of the great *mundane Soul*, all harmonising together; — viz. in general, the *Intellectual* and the *Sensitive*, the *Rational* and the *Imaginative*, the *Affectionate* and the *Passionate*, the *Appetitive* and the *Aversative*, the *Nutritive* and the *Generative*. — From the Digression of these few Lines, we return to the Subject of our present Note; and shall finish it in Lines not many more, but of much more comprehensive Import. For if we inquire into the *Foundation* of those *Resemblances* and of

stance attending it, which we had before discovered to be in Pleasure; the One thus answering to the Other. For, having found, that some Sort of Pleasure was purer than some Other Sort, we were inquiring, whether the same Difference was to be found with regard to Science; and whether One Sort of This also was purer than some Other.

those *Analogys* above-mentioned, we shall discover it to lye in the *First Principles* of all *Form* and *Being*;—in those Principles of *Mind* its Self, as well as of *Outward Nature*,—*One* and *Many*, *Same* and *Different*:—these being also the Principles of *Numbers*;—the Principles of their several *Ratios*, or of the *Ratio* of Each Number to every Other;—and the Principles of every *Proportion*, how variously soever the *Terms* of it change their Places.—For Things which have nothing in *Common*, no *Sameness* between them, have no *Relation* to each other: and *Sameness* of *Ratios*, or *Relations*, is the very Essence of all *Proportion*. On the other hand, to every *Ratio*, or *Relation*, *Difference* is necessary; to the *Ratio* of perfect *Equality*, *Difference numerical*: for every *Relation* is between *Two* things, at the fewest: and *equal Ratio's*, *Two* at the fewest, constitute *Proportion*.—Again; *One*, and *More* than *One*, are essentially necessary to every *One Number*; and every *One large Number*, containing *many less*, contains *many Ratios* and *many Proportions*: every *Ratio* is *One Ideal Thing*; but *Two Ideal Things* are necessary to compose it: and every *Proportion* is but *One Thing in Idea*; yet *Three Things*, or *Numbers*, are the fewest *Materials*, to which that *Ideal Form* is or can be given.

PROTARCHUS.

'Tis very manifest, that your Distinctions between the several Arts were introduced for this very Purpose.

SOCRATES.

Well then; have we not discovered, in what has been said, that Some Arts are clearer than Others, having more Light within them; and that Others are more involved in Obscurity and Darknes?

PROTARCHUS.

Evidently so.

SOCRATES.

And has not the course of our Argument led us to take notice of some Art, bearing the same Name with some Other Art; and first, to suppose them Both to be, as they are commonly imagined, but One Art; then, to consider them as Two different Arts; to examine Each, with regard to its Clearness and Purity; and to inquire, which of the Two has in it the most Accuracy, whether That which is cultivated by Students in Philosophy, or That which is exercised by the Multitude?

PROTARCHUS.

Our Argument seems to bring on this Inquiry.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

And what Answer, O Protarchus! should we make to such a Question?

PROTARCHUS.

O Socrates! we are now advanced so far, as to discover an amazingly wide Difference between the Parts of our Knowledge in point of Clearness.

SOCRATES.

It will therefore be the easier for us, to answer to that Question.

PROTARCHUS.

Without doubt. And let us affirm, that those Leading Arts greatly excell the Others with regard to Clearness; and that Such of those brighter Arts themselves, as are studied by real Students in Philosophy, display, in Measures and in Numbers, their vast superiority to all other Arts, with regard to Accuracy and Truth ³⁸⁸.

SOCRATES.

³⁸⁸ This whole Sentence, beginning with the words “ *And let us affirm,*” is, in *Stephens’s* Edition, very improperly given to *Socrates*, and consequently the Sentence following, with equal impropriety to *Protarchus*. The *Basil* Editions are Both right; the *Aldine* not clear.

SOCRATES.

Granting these things to be what You say they are, let us, on the Credit of what you have said ³⁸⁹, boldly answer to those Persons, who are so formidable in argumentation, thus.

³⁸⁹ *Protarchus* was not sensible, that he had said any thing, beside what resulted plainly from the Reasoning of *Socrates* just before. He knew not, that, in the last words of his Answer, he had gone a Step farther, than he was authorized by That Reasoning. And because this Step exceeded the Bounds of Truth, in praise of *Arithmetick* and *Geometry*, for this reason it is, that *Socrates* here does not confirm the Answer, made to his Question by *Protarchus*, but proceeds to examine it.—In so easy and natural a way, is the brightest, the purest, and the highest Science,—That of *Mind*,—coming on to be introduced. Indeed, without some such contrivance, the Mention of that Science would have seemed abrupt: and yet, to treat of it, so far at least, as to delineate the nature of it, is no less essentially necessary to the *Subject* of this Dialogue, than to mention it, next after *Geometry* and *Arithmetick*, is necessary to the *Order*, observed in this *Second Part* of the Dialogue, regarding the *Conclusion*. For, having been conducted, thro a View of the *grosser Pleasures of Sense*, to the View of Such as are *finer* and *pure* from Pain; from These we proceeded to speculate the *Arts* and *Mathematical Sciences*: from *Arts* and those lower *Sciences*, we now rise to the consideration of *Mind*, as it is intelligent, the *Intelligence* of First Principles, and the *Science* of *Universals*.

F f f f

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

How ?

SOCRATES.

That there are Two Sorts of Arithmetick ; and that, dependant on these, there is a long Train of Arts, Each of them, in like manner, Twofold under One Denomination.

PROTARCHUS.

Let us give to the Persons, whom you call formidable, That very Answer, O Socrates ! with a confidence of its being right.

SOCRATES.

Do we then affirm, that in these Sciences there is an Accuracy, the highest of all.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

But the Power of Dialectick, O Protarchus ! if we gave to any other Science the Preference above Her, would deny that Superiority.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

What Power is it, to which we are to give that name?

SOCRATES.

Plainly That Power, O Protarchus! by which the Mind perceives all that Accuracy and Clearness, of which we have been speaking. For I am intirely of opinion, that all Persons, endued with even the smallest Portion of Understanding, must deem the Knowlege of the real Effence of Things, — the Knowlege of that Kind of Being, whose nature is invariable,—to be by far the most certain and true Knowlege. But You, Protarchus! to What Art or Science would You give the distinction of Pre-eminence?

PROTARCHUS.

As to Me, O Socrates! I have often heard Gorgias maintaining in all places, that the Art of Perswasion has greatly the Advantage over all other Arts, in over-ruling all things, and making all Persons submit to it, not by Constraint, but by a voluntary Yeilding; and therefore that of all Arts it is by far the most excellent. Now I should not choose to contradict or oppose either You or Him.

FFFF 2

SOCRATES:

SOCRATES.

As much as to say, if I apprehend your Meaning rightly, that you cannot, for shame, desert your Colours ³⁹⁰.

PROTARCHUS.

Let Your Opinion of these matters now prevail; and the Ranks of the several Arts be settled, as You would have them.

SOCRATES.

Am I now to blame for Your making a Mistake?

PROTARCHUS.

What Mistake have I made?

SOCRATES.

The Question, my Friend Protarchus! was not, Which Art, or Which Science is superiour to all the rest, with regard to Greatness, and Excellence, and Usefulness to Us; but of Which Art the Objects are the brightest, the most accurate and true, tho the Art its Self brought us little or no Gain: This it is, which is the present Subject of our In-

³⁹⁰ In this Metaphor it is implied, that *Protarchus* had been as it were *inlisted* under the Leading and the Discipline of *Gorgias*.

quiry.

quiry. Observe then; Gorgias will have no Quarrel with you: for you may still allow to His Art the Preference above all others, in Point of Utility and Profit to Mankind. But, as I said before concerning White, that, be there ever so little of it, so it be pure, it excells a large quantity of an impure White, with regard to the truth of Whiteness³⁹¹; just so is it with the Study which I have been commending; it excells all others, with regard to Truth its Self. And now that we have considered this Subject attentively, and discussed it sufficiently, laying aside all Regards to the Usefulness of the Sciences and Arts, as well as to the Reputation which they bear in the world, and thorowly sifting them to find out the Purity of Mind and Wisdom, — if there be in the Soul any Faculty of Loving Truth above all things, and of doing whatever she does, for the sake of Truth,—let us consider, whether it is right to say, that we have this Faculty improved chiefly by Dialectick, or whether we must search for some other Art, fitter for that purpose, and making it more her proper Business.

PROTARCHUS.

Well, I do consider the Point proposed; and I imagine it no easy matter to admit, that any other

³⁹¹ See in Pages 454, 5.

Science or Art seeks and embraces Truth so much as This.

SOCRATES.

Say you this, from having observed, that many of the Arts, even such as profess a laborious Inquiry after Truth, are in the first place conversant only with Opinions, and exercise only the Imagination; and that methodically, and according to a set of Rules, they then search into things which are the Subjects only of such Opinions³⁹²? and do you know, that the Persons, who suppose themselves to be inquiring into the Nature of Things, are, all their Lives, inquisitive about nothing more than this Outward World, how it was produced, what causeth the Changes which happen therein,

³⁹² Meaning, as we presume, Such as the Philosophers of the *Ionic* Sect, by *Aristotle* styled φυσικοί *Naturalists*. For we learn from *D. Laertius*, that *Archelaus*, a Disciple of *Anaxagoras*, and the last Professor and Teacher of the Doctrine of those Philosophers, did, in the time of *Socrates*, introduce into *Athens* Their Way of philosophising; which was none other, than That, spoken of in this Passage. It seems therefore probable, that the *Athenian* Scholars of *Archelaus* are the very Persons, whose Studys are here shown to fall short of attaining to the Knowledge of *Truth*, or the true *Nature of Things*.—The same Judgment of *Socrates*, concerning these *Ionic* Physiologers, we find recorded by *Xenophon*, in *Memorabil: L. 1, C. 1, § 11.*

and how those Changes operate their Effects? Should we acknowledge all This so to be, or how otherwise?

PROTARCHUS.

Just so.

SOCRATES.

Whoever of us then addict's himself to the Study of Nature in this way, employs his time and care, not about the Things which always are in Being, but about Things which are either newly come into Being, or which are to come, or which have been already and are past.

PROTARCHUS.

Very true.

SOCRATES.

What Clearness therefore, what Certainty, or exact Truth, can we expect to find in these Things, none of which had ever any Stability or Sameness in them, nor ever will have any, nor have such of them as now exist, any, even during their existence?

PROTARCHUS.

How can it be expected?

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Concerning Things, in which there is not the least Stability, how can we form any stable Notions?

PROTARCHUS.

I suppose it not possible.

SOCRATES.

Of those Things then there is neither Intelligence, nor any Sort of Science to be acquired; at least, not such as contains the highest degree of Certainty.

PROTARCHUS.

It is not probable, that there is.

SOCRATES.

We ought therefore, both you and I, to lay aside the consideration of what Gorgias or Philebus said, and to establish on a firmer Basis this Truth.

PROTARCHUS.

What truth?

SOCRATES.

This; — Whatever is in us of stable, pure, and true, it has for the Objects of it—either the Beings which always are, and remain invariable, intirely
 pure

pure and unadulterate ³⁹³,—or [if These are beyond the reach of Our Sight] then Such as are the nearest allyed to them, and are Second in the Ranks of Being ³⁹⁴: for all other Things come after those First Beings,—Second, and so on in Order ³⁹⁵.

PROTARCHUS.

³⁹³ Meaning the eternal and immutable *Ideas* of the *Divine Mind*. For, inasmuch as the *Divine Being* is the *Creative Cause* of all *Corporeal* Things, He himself (who is pure *Mind*) must be *unmixed* with any thing *Corporeal*: and consequently, the *Ideas* of his *Mind*, all of which are eternal and immutable, the *Formal Causes* of all things *Corporeal*, must be perfectly *pure* and unmixed with *Images*: because *Images* in the *Soul* are only in the *Soul's Imaginative Part*, are only of *Corporeal* things, and are *themselves* also *Corporeal*.

³⁹⁴ These Beings of Second Rank are the *Ideas* of all *Particular* Minds; and Such are not only Ours, the *Human*, but all Other Minds, inferior to the *Divine*. For, whatever Rational Beings there may be in the infinite number of Orbs, and vast Regions of the Universe, unknown to Us,—and how greatly soever Some of those Beings may excell Man in the highest Powers of his *Soul*, *Intellect* and *Reason*,—yet the *Mind* of Every One of them must be *Particular*; because it is united with only a *Part* or *Portion* of *formed Matter*, a *Body*, how fine soever; to the *Soul* of which *Body* superadded is a *Mind*.—Now by means of this *Body* it is, that the *Soul*, which animates it, not only receives from external Things the *Impressions*, which are made in her *Sensory*, the proper Seat of all her *Sensations*,—but receives also the *Images* of those Things into Their

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proper

proper Seat, her *Imagination*:—and by means of this *Soul* it is, — by means of those *Impressions* and those *Images* which she receives,—that the super-added *Mind* hath its *con-natural Ideas* at the first excited.—In other words; essentially *natural* it is to all particular *Minds*, to *universalise* every Object, presented to them by Sense and Imagination,—to rise from every *Individual*, which by those means they take cognifance of, to the *Species*,—thence to the *Kind*, and to those higher *Universals*, of which every Individual partakes, whatever Kind and Species it belongs to.—But whilst the *Mind* is thus rising from Beings of lower Order to those of Higher, it is, all the time, so closely joined to *Sense* and *Imagination*, that the *Images* of things Sensible, not only *reach* it thro the *Organs* of *Sense*, but are *retained* also in the *Memory*; and with *Memory* and *Imagination* the *Mind* is for ever conversant, even when the *Organs* of *Sense* are obstructed totally in *Sleep*: so that *Images* are mixed with all *Our Ideas*, and render them less pure and clear, less true and certain, than the *Divine Ideas*, their *Archetypes*.—In these *Divine Ideas*, the Seat of which is the *Divine Mind*, and only in Them, is to be found what *Socrates*, in *Plato's Phædo*, (pag: 266, Edit: *Oxon*:) styles ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων *the Truth of Things*, or *True Being*. For he there tells to his Disciples, who were attendant on him in those last Hours of his Life, that he had formerly sought to find that Truth ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις *in the Works of Nature*: (This was at the time, when he admired *Anaxagoras*, and studied the Writings of that great Physiologer:) but that, meeting only with Disappointments in this way of philosophising, (for that neither Outward Nature, nor Those who wrote concerning it, showed him the fundamental *Causes* of Things, or their real *Essences*, but the *Images* of them only,) he applyed himself, from that time, to the Search of Truth ἐν τοῖς λόγοις *in Reasonings*, — in the *inward Speeches*

Speeches of his own Mind, and in Logical or Dialectical *Discourses*.—But he plainly enough intimates, at the same time, that, in *Human Minds*, the *Universals*, the Subjects of those Speeches and Discourses, are, like the ἔργα *Works of Nature*, only εἰκόνες *Images* or *Copys* of true Beings, tho μάλλον *more* nearly resembling the *Originals* or *Realities*. See Note 62 to the present Dialogue, Pages 106, 7; and Note 118, Page 181.

——Very willingly therefore, and very consistently with himself, does *Socrates*, in *Plato's Parmenides*, (pag: 22, 24, and 26, Edit: *Oxon*;) acknowledge, that eternal *Ideas*,—Forms subsisting by *Themselves*, αὐτὰς καθ' αὐτὰς, apart from all external and sensible Things, are not, and cannot possibly be in *Us*;—that *Beauty its Self*, or *Good its Self*, in its own pure Essence, is not an Object of Our Knowledge;—and that an accurate Science of the *Truth of Things* is in *God alone*;—for that Science in *Man* reaches not to Any Thing which is *Divine*.—All these Inferences, drawn by *Parmenides* from the Doctrine of *Ideas*, (on which depends, according to that Great *Philosopher*, the Power of Dialectick,) *Socrates* says, are intirely agreeable to his own Mind.——*Aristotle*, on this Subject, seems to have been of a different Opinion. He seems either to have supposed that *Our νοήματα*, or *Notions* of the *Kinds* and *Species* of Things, were possible to be *divested* of all the *Images* of Sensible Objects; and that *Our Minds* were capable of becoming as *pure* and *simple* as *Mind its Self*;—or else to have deemed those *Kinds* and *Species* of Things as they exist in outward *Nature*, all the *Similitudes* and *Dissimilitudes* of *Corporeal Forms*, to be Objects of the *Divine Mind* as properly as of the *Human*.—Indeed he never departs from the Doctrine of *Plato* concerning the *Principles of Knowledge*, or concerning those *Universals*, the *Kinds* and *Species* of Things; rightly arguing, that, without them, no *Definition* could be given of any thing;—that,

without them, there would be no Demonstrative or Syllogistic Reasoning, no *General Conclusion* could be drawn from any *Premises*;—and that, without them, we should only have *Sensations*, or *Perceptions* of *Sensible* Things, but no *Science*.—And thus far the acute and learned *Stagyrite* confirms the Sentiments of his great Master. But, in many Passages of his Writings, he argues against the Being of any *Universals*, considered as lying *separate* or apart from the *Forms of Nature*, with which our *Senses* are conversant. For it is from these *Individual* and *External* Forms, that the Human Mind is by Him supposed to gather up as it were those *Universals*, and to collect them within her Self, by abstracting them λόγῳ from that ὕλη or Common Matter, with which all Form is united. On this supposition, rejected are the Forms of *higher* Order, — the Forms, *original* to those of outward Nature; — and the Great *Mind Universal* differs not from any *Particular Mind*, except by being *actually*, what every particular Mind by nature is only δυνάμει, or has a bare *Capacity* of being, viz. the *place of Forms Intelligible*, of *abstract* Forms, unmixed with Matter; — and except also, by comprising at once, in One eternal View, all the Forms of Nature: whilst every *Mind Particular*, even the largest and the most comprehensive, is obliged, in all her *Speculations*, if they are distinct and accurate, to view One Form only at a time; and in the *Process* of all her *Reasonings*, to make a transition from One Form to Another; either from one *Species* to another and so on, as in reasoning by *Induction*; or from *Genus* to *Species*, and back again to *Genus*, as in reasoning *Syllogistically*; or from Compound Forms to their Elements and Principles, in reasoning *Analytically*.

³⁹⁵ The several *Perceptive Powers* of the Soul have, for their respective *Objects*, all the several Kinds of *Form* or *Being*. The *primary* Forms, or those of highest Dignity, are, according to

PROTARCHUS.

Perfectly right.

SOCRATES.

The noblest therefore of the Names, given to Things of this Kind ³⁹⁶, is it not perfectly right to assign to Those of this Kind, which are the noblest?

PROTARCHUS.

Socrates and Plato, pure Ideas, the Objects of the Divine Mind, and the Subjects of Divine Wisdom.—Ideas probably, which the highest Power in Man's Soul, his Intellect, has but a bare Capacity of viewing, in their genuine Purity, or as they are in Themselves.—The Forms of second Rank, as they are rightly deemed by Socrates in the present Sentence, are Ideas in the Human Mind, of those Divine Forms original the Mental Copys, the natural and proper Objects of Man's Reason, and the Subjects of his Reasoning and of all his Science.—Third in Dignity are the vital Forms of Nature, the Objects of the Sensitive and Imaginative Powers of the Soul, and the Subjects of Opinion and Hypothesis.—Last and lowest in the Ranks of natural Being are things inanimate, the intirely passive Subjects of Human Art; Objects of Sense and Imagination these also, but not of Opinion.

³⁹⁶ In this expression, (*things of this Kind*) are meant to be included all the perceptive Powers or Facultys of the Soul, as well as all the Objects of Perception, mentioned in the preceding Note. For every perceptive Power, is united with its Object, by actually perceiving it. — The Sensitive Power, thro actual Sensation, is united with its present Object, so far as that

PROTARCHUS.

'Tis reasonable, so to do.

SOCRATES.

Are not Mind and Wisdom the noblest of those Names?

that Object is *sensible* or an Object of *Sense*: — the *Imaginative* Power of the Soul, in *imagining*, is united with an Object of *Imagination*: — the *Rational* Power, in the act of *reasoning*, becomes One with an Object of *Reason*, the present Subject of its *reasoning*: — and the *Intellective* Power, in actual *Intellection*, is One with that *intelligible Form*, its present Object. — In reality, both *Mind* and *Sense* are *formed* by their *Objects*. *Mind* without intellection of any Ideas, and *Sense* without a sensation of any *Objects of Sense*, are nothing more than ὕλη the *Matter* of their respective *Forms*; like the ὕλη or *common Matter* of all corporeal things, considered λόγῳ as *void of Form*. For *Mind* is the *Place* or Residence of *Ideas*, and *Sense* is the *Receptacle* of *Sensations*; just as *external Matter* is the *Receptacle* and the *Place* of *external Forms*. — No less true is it, on the other hand, that — as there would be in Nature no *external Forms*, if That *common Matter*, which is the Subject of them all, were away, — so, none of these *Forms*, considered as *Sensible*, or as Objects of *Sense*, could have any Existence, if there was not, in Beings of a certain Kind, viz. in all *Animals*, the Power of *Sensation*; nor could there be in the Soul any *Images* or internal Representatives of external Forms, if there was not in the Soul a Power of *Imagination*: neither would any *Intelligible Forms*, any *Ideas*, have a Being, was there not, in the internal Nature of the *Universe*, the *Power* (in *Man* perhaps, and in some other Beings, at the first, a bare *Capacity*) of *Mind* or *Intellect*.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

They are.

SOCRATES.

Rightly then are these Names, in accurate Speech, appropriated to the Intelligence and Contemplation of Real Being ³⁹⁷.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly so.

SOCRATES.

And the Things, for the excellency of which I at the first contended, are the very Things, to which we give these Names.

PROTARCHUS.

Clearly are they, O Socrates !

SOCRATES.

Well now ; were a Man to say, that the nature of Mind and the nature of Pleasure lay severally before us, like Two different Sorts of Materials before some Workman, for Him to mix or join together, and from them, and in them, to compose his designed Work, — would he not make a fair

³⁹⁷ See Page 240 of this Dialogue.

Comparison,

Comparison, suitable to the Task which our Inquiry has engaged us in ³⁹⁸ ?

PROTARCHUS.

A very fair Comparison.

SOCRATES.

Should we not then, in the next place, set about mixing them together ?

PROTARCHUS.

Why should we not ?

SOCRATES.

Would it not be our best way, to begin this Work by recollecting and repeating those things over again ³⁹⁹ ?

³⁹⁸ See Page 211, and 317; and the *Argument* also of this Dialogue, Page 27. — According to the *Division* of it, proposed in that *Argument*, the *Third* and last Part of it begins with the Sentence now before us. For the nature of *Mind* having been considered in the *First* Part, and the nature of *Pleasure* in the *Second* Part, the nature of that *greater Good*, which consists in the right *Mixture* of *Mind* and *Pleasure*, is the only remaining Subject of Inquiry.

³⁹⁹ See Note 132.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

What things?

SOCRATES.

Those, we have often mentioned before ⁴⁰⁰. For, I think the Proverb says well,—“ Again and again That which is right, by repeating it, to recall into our Minds ⁴⁰¹.”

PROTARCHUS.

Undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

⁴⁰⁰ In the *Greek* of this Sentence, as it is printed, there seems to be an Omission of the necessary word *πολλάκις*, See *Stephens's* Edition of *Plato*, vol: 2, pag: 19, D. 1. or Page 194 in this Translation.

⁴⁰¹ The Proverb, here mentioned, is recorded by *Zenobius* and by *Suidas* thus, — *Δίς καὶ τρίς τὸ καλόν*. And indeed the Whole of it seems to be contained in those few words; and the rest of the Sentence, now before us, seems added by *Plato*, to explain and illustrate the true Meaning of that Proverbial Saying.—*Michael Apostolius*, however, at first Sight may seem to report the Proverb more fully and perfectly in these words,—*Δίς καὶ τρίς τὸ καλόν τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἑδ' ἅπαξ*.

Again, and yet again, what'er is good:

But what is evil, not so much as once.

We have translated the Sentence last cited, thus into English *Metre*, because we apprehend it to be a *Verse* of some ancient Sentimental Poet, possibly *Euripides*, reciting the Proverb, and

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adding

SOCRATES.

In the name of Jupiter, then come on. The whole of our Controversy began, I think, with stating the Point in question, to This Effect.

adding to it; especially if, instead of τὸ δὲ κακόν, the right Reading be, as probably it is, τὸ δ' αἰσχρόν. For the *Sentiment*, tho very laudable, is not *single* enough, nor is the Sentence *concise* or *brief* enough, for a *Proverb*. If our Supposition be well founded,—that 'tis a *Verse*, containing in the First Half of it *the Proverb*, and in the Latter Half a *Thought*, how just soever, yet *foreign* to the Proverb,—this *additional* Thought so much agrees with That of *Sophocles*, in his *Oedipus Tyrannus*, ver. 1423,

Ἄλλ' εἰ γὰρ αὐδᾶν ἐστ', αἰ μὴδ' ἐδράν, καλόν,

Best, not to speak of what 'tis ill to do,

that we are apt to imagine it thence derived. However this be, the Proverb, as we have it delivered to us by those old Grammarians, first cited, and no more, is alluded to by *Plato*, in his Sixth Book *de Legibus*, pag: 754, C. 2. and again in his *Gorgias*, pag: 498, lin: ult: where he attributes to it the same Meaning as in the present Passage, but in other Words. *Zenobius* also interprets the Proverb, agreeably to *Plato's* Sense of it, as meaning—not to applaud the frequent *Doing* of good *Actions*,—(for the frequent Repetition of These is too evidently right, for the Praise of it to pass into a Proverb,—) but meaning to justify, or at least to apologize for, the Repetition, over and over again, of the same Words and Sentences, expressive of the same Thoughts, if those Thoughts are just and true.

PROTARCHUS.

How ?

SOCRATES.

Philebus affirms, that Pleasure is the right Mark, set up by Nature, for all Animals to aim at ; that they all ought to pursue Pleasure ; that the Good of them all is this very thing, Pleasure ; and that *good* and *pleasant*, these Two Attributes, belong but to One Subject, as they Both have but One and the same Nature : on the other hand, Socrates denies This to be true ; and maintains, in the first place, that as the Two Names, *good* and *pleasant*, are Two different Names, different also are the Things so denominated ⁴⁰² ; in the next place, that the Nature of Good differs from that of Pleasure ; and that Intelligence, or Mind, partakes of the Property of Good more than Pleasure does, and is allied nearer to its Nature ⁴⁰³. Were not some such Positions as These, O Protarchus ! severally laid down by us ?

PROTARCHUS.

They were.

⁴⁰² See Pages 68 and 74, and Note 35.

⁴⁰³ See Pages 50 and 218.

SOCRATES.

But was not This Point agreed on between us at that time, and do we not still agree in it?

PROTARCHUS.

What Point?

SOCRATES.

That the nature of Good its Self is more excellent than the nature of any other Thing, in this respect.

PROTARCHUS.

In what respect?

SOCRATES.

This,—that whatever animal Being hath the constant, intire, and full Possession of Good its Self, such a Being has no want of any thing beside, having always a most perfect and compleat Sufficiency⁴⁰⁴. Is it not so?

PROTARCHUS.

It certainly is.

SOCRATES.

Have we not endeavoured to consider separately a Life of Pleasure and a Life of Understanding,

⁴⁰⁴ See Pages 200 and 202.

Each unmixed with the Other, — a Life of Pleasure without Understanding, and in like manner, a Life of Understanding without the smallest degree of Pleasure?

PROTARCHUS.

We have.

SOCRATES.

Did Either of those Lives appear to Us, at that time ⁴⁰⁵, to be sufficient for the Happiness of any Man?

PROTARCHUS.

How was it possible ⁴⁰⁶?

SOCRATES.

But if, at that time, any Mistake was committed, let it be now revised and rectified. In order to which, let us take Memory, Knowledge, Understanding, and Right Opinion, comprehending them all in One Idea, and consider whether any Man, without having something of that Kind, would accept of Pleasure were it offered to him, either in the greatest abundance, or in the most exquisite degree;

⁴⁰⁵ That is, — when they were severally the Subjects of our consideration.

⁴⁰⁶ See Pages 206 and 212.

whether indeed he would regard the having or the receiving of any thing whatever; as he would not, in that case, have a right Thought or Opinion of his having any Pleasure; neither would he know What he felt or had at present; nor would he remember, in what condition or circumstances he had been at any time before ⁴⁰⁷. In like manner concerning Intellection or Understanding, consider, whether a Man would chuse to have it without a mixture of any Pleasure in the least, rather than to have the same Understanding attended with Pleasures of certain Kinds ⁴⁰⁸; and whether a Man would prefer the having of all possible Pleasures, without Understanding, to the having of them accompanied with some degree of Understanding.

PROTARCHUS.

It is impossible, O Socrates! for a Man to make any such Choice as you have supposed. And there is no occasion to repeat these Questions again and again ⁴⁰⁹.

⁴⁰⁷ See Page 209.

⁴⁰⁸ What Kinds are here meant, will soon appear.

⁴⁰⁹ This seems to refer jocosely to the Proverb, cited just before. See Note 401.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Not Pleasure then, nor Understanding, either of them alone, can be the perfect and consummate Good, eligible to all men, That which We are inquiring after.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly, not.

SOCRATES.

Of this Good then we are to give a clear and full Description, or at least some Sketch; that we may know, where the Second Prize of Excellence, as we called it, ought to be bestowed ⁴¹⁰.

PROTARCHUS.

Perfectly right.

SOCRATES.

Have we not then taken a Way, by which we may find out our Chief Good?

PROTARCHUS.

What Way do you mean?

SOCRATES.

As, if we were in search of any particular Man, and were already well informed of the place of his

⁴¹⁰ See Page 217.

Abode, we should have made a great Progress toward finding the Man himself.

PROTARCHUS.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

And our Reasoning has now declared to us clearly, what it pointed to before, that, not in the Unmixt Life, but in the Mixt, we are to seek for Happiness.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly so.

SOCRATES.

But in a proper and well-tempered Mixture, we may reasonably hope to discover what we are in search of, with more certainty, than we could by an ill-made composition.

PROTARCHUS.

With much more.

SOCRATES.

Let us then set about mixing, and making the Composition, first praying to the Gods for their assistance; whether it be Bacchus or Vulcan, or
some

some Other of the Gods, who presides over the Mixture of these Ingredients ⁴¹¹.

PROTARCHUS.

Let us, by all means, do so.

SOCRATES.

And now as it were Two Cisterns, or Vases, are set before us; the Vase of Pleasure, as of Honey; and the Vase of Understanding, cool and sober, as of some hard and healthful Water ⁴¹². These then we are to mix together in the best manner we are able.

PROTARCHUS.

With all my Heart.

SOCRATES.

Come then: but first say, whether, by mingling all Sorts of Pleasure with all the Kinds of Know-

⁴¹¹ *Bacchus* is here mentioned in particular, because the *Greeks*, in *drinking*, usually *mixed* Water with their *Wine*: and *Vulcan* in particular, because of the *Mixture* of different *Metals* by *Fusion*, as composing together the best *Matter* of many *Utensils* in common Life.

⁴¹² This Allegory seems to be *derived*, in the way of *Imitation*, from *Homer's* Allegorical Fable of the Two *Chests*, (in his *Iliad*, L. 24. v. 557.)—One, filled with things *Good*,—the Other, filled with *Evils*;—like the Allegory in *Plato's Gorgias*, pag: 493.—See *Porphyry*, in his Treatise *de Antro Nympharum*, pag: 129. Edit: Rom:

lege and Understanding, we may best obtain our End, the having of a proper and due Mixture.

PROTARCHUS.

Perhaps we might.

SOCRATES.

But 'tis dangerous to make the Experiment. And I believe, that I can point out a way to mix them with more Safety.

PROTARCHUS.

Say, What way.

SOCRATES.

Concerning Pleasures, I think, we held, that Some more truly deserved that name, than Others of them ⁴¹³; and of Arts, that Some were more accurate and exact, than Others ⁴¹⁴.

PROTARCHUS.

Undoubtedly so.

SOCRATES.

And that the Sciences also differed, one from another, in like manner: for that Some Kinds of Science have for their Objects only such things, as arise into Being and afterwards perish; whereas

⁴¹³ See Pages 479 & seq.

⁴¹⁴ See Page 589.

Another

Another Kind directs its View to things which are neither generated nor destroyed, but always are in Being, always have the same Propertys, and preserve always the same Relations. And this Kind of Science, with regard to the Truth of it, we deemed more excellent than the other Kinds ⁴¹⁵.

PROTARCHUS.

Intirely right.

SOCRATES.

In the first place therefore, mixing together the purest Parts of Pleasure and of Knowlege, when they have been thus distinguished from the less pure, if we view those purest Parts of Each in combination, are they not, thus combined, sufficient to furnish out, and present us with, an ample View of That Life which is most desirable? or is any thing farther, any Ingredient of a different Kind, wanting to perfect the Composition?

PROTARCHUS.

So as You propose, and only so, it seems to Me necessary for us to do.

⁴¹⁵ See Pages 593 & seq:

SOCRATES.

Let us then suppose a Man to have in his Mind the Idea of Justice its Self, so as to know What it is in its own Essence, and to be able to give an Account of it in consequence of that Knowledge. Let us also suppose him to have the like Knowledge of all other Beings ⁴¹⁶.

PROTARCHUS.

Be such a Man supposed.

⁴¹⁶ τῶν ὄντων, in the Greek of this Passage, signifies ὄντως ὄντων Things which *really* and truly *are*, as having some precise and *definable Being*, Each of them; and Such only are Those, which are *stable* and *invariable*;—*Ideal Forms*, unmixed with Matter;—the *Subjects* of pure *Science*; and the *Objects* of *Intellect*, of *Mind* and *Reason*, but not of *Sense* or *Imagination*.—Of these *Intelligible* or *Mental Objects*, the *Highest* are those *Universals*, which are the essential Property of the *Supreme Being*; One of which, viz. *Justice its Self*, is brought for an Instance of *Mental Knowledge*, in the Passage now before us.—In the next Sentence of *Socrates*, an Instance of the same Kind of Knowledge is taken from the *Lowest* of *Mental Objects*, as the *Subjects* of the *Mathematical Sciences* are justly deemed by *Plato*: for on this account it was, that he recommended to All, who were desirous of attaining to know the true Nature of Things, to begin their Studys with those Sciences; which he considered as the first Step, in ascending to the Heights of true Philosophy,—to the Contemplation of those Things, which alone are truly universal and divine.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Will this Man now be accomplished sufficiently in Knowledge, by knowing the nature of the Circle its Self, and of the Sphere its Self, whose Nature is Divine; whilst he is ignorant of That Sphere and of Those Circles, with which the Eyes of Men are conversant? Will that Knowledge of his be sufficient for his Use, in Building, and in other Arts, where Lines and Circles are to be drawn ⁴¹⁷?

PROTARCHUS.

Ridiculous we should call the condition of our Minds here, O Socrates! if our Knowledge were thus confined to things Ideal and Divine.

SOCRATES.

How do you say? Arts, which are neither certain nor pure, using untrue Rules, and conversant

⁴¹⁷ In the Study of pure Mathematicks, the Mind ought to *abstract* her *Ideas*, as much as possible, from all their *Images* or *Figures*, described *upon* any visible Substance, such as *Paper* and *Slate*,—or *in* any, as in *Wood* or *Stone*. For the Subjects of Mathematical Science are—not things *sensible*, or perceivable by any of the outward Senses,—but things *intelligible* to Mind, and *definable* to Reason. And the *Abstraction* from all *Figures*, even those in the *Imagination*, is absolutely necessary for the apprehending of any Mathematical *Truths*; because no other Faculty in the Human Soul, than that of *Reason*, is capable of seeing the *Demonstration* of them,

with untrue Circles, are we to throw such Arts into the Composition, and mix them with the other Ingredients?

PROTARCHUS.

It is necessary for us; — if, whenever we are any where abroad, we are desirous of finding our way home.

SOCRATES.

Are we to add Musick too?—an Art, which, not long since we said, is wanting in Purity, as being full of Conjecture and Imitation ⁴¹⁸?

PROTARCHUS.

Of necessity we must, as it appears to me, if the Life, which we are to lead, shall ever deserve to be called Life, or be at all worth the having.

SOCRATES.

Would you then, like a Door-keeper, when he is pushed and prest by a Throng of People, yield to them, set the Doors wide open, and suffer all Kinds of Knowledge to rush in, the less pure mingling themselves among the perfectly pure?

PROTARCHUS.

I see not, O Socrates! for My part, how any Man would be hurt by receiving into his Mind all

⁴¹⁸ See Page 577.

the other Kinds of Knowlege,—if he was already in possession of the First and Highest.

SOCRATES.

I may safely then admit them All to come pouring in, like the Torrents of Water in that fine poetical Simile of Homer's, rushing down into a Valley from the Mountains which surround it ⁴¹⁹.

PROTARCHUS.

By all means, let them be All admitted.

SOCRATES.

Let us now return to the Vase of Pleasure. For when we thought of mixing Pleasure and Knowlege together, the purer Parts of Pleasure did not present themselves immediately to our Minds: but, from our affectionate regard to Knowlege, we suf-

⁴¹⁹ This Sentence, which alludes to a Simile in *Homer's Iliad*, L. 4, v. 453, we have translated into English paraphrastically, for the sake of setting in a clearer light, than we could by a meer *Metaphrase*, the just application of it to the present Purpose of our Author: for, if we mistake him not, he here means to insinuate to us,—that Philosophical Knowlege descends into a Man's Mind from above, thro his studious Observation of all the Parts of Nature which lye before him, and thro his fair and honest Reasoning thereon.

ferred:

ferred all Kinds of it to crowd in, before any of the Pleasures.

PROTARCHUS.

Very true.

SOCRATES.

It is now time for us to consult about the Pleasures; whether we should let them All come thronging in, or whether we should admit those of the True Sort first.

PROTARCHUS.

It makes a great difference in point of Safety, to let in, the first, Such only as are True.

SOCRATES.

Let These then be admitted. But how shall we proceed? Must we not do, as we did with the several Kinds of Knowledge, admit as many Pleasures also, as are of the necessary Sort?

PROTARCHUS.

Without doubt, the necessary Pleasures also, by all means.

SOCRATES.

But now, as we held it both safe and advantageous, in going thro Life, to be acquainted with
every

every Art; — if we are of the same Opinion with regard to Pleasures, — if we hold it conducive to our Good, and at the same time harmless, to enjoy every Sort of Pleasure in the course of our Lives, — in this case, we are to intermix all Sorts of Pleasure with all the Kinds of Knowledge.

PROTARCHUS.

What say we then as to this Point? and how ought we to act?

SOCRATES.

This Question, O Protarchus! should not be put to Us. But the Pleasures themselves, and the Other Assembly also, That of the Sciences and Arts, are to be examined, each Party concerning the other, in this manner.

PROTARCHUS.

In What manner?

SOCRATES.

Friends! we shall say, [*addressing our Question to the Pleasures first,*] whether we ought to call you Pleasures, or whatever is your right Name, would ye choose to live in the same place with all Kinds of Knowledge and Discernment, or to live without
 K k k k knowing

knowing or discerning any thing whatever? To this Interrogatory, they must, as I imagine, answer thus.

PROTARCHUS.

How?

SOCRATES.

That, seeing, as was said before ⁴²⁰, were Knowledge and Pleasure to be left, Each of them, alone, single, and destitute of Aid, neither of them would have any Virtue or Power at all, nor would any Advantage arise from Either,—we deem it best, that all the Kinds of Knowledge should dwell with Us, One Kind of Knowledge with Each of us, One who is suitable to the peculiar nature of its Companion, and is perfectly acquainted with Her Power and Influence.

PROTARCHUS.

And well have ye now answered, We shall say to Them.

SOCRATES.

After this, we are to demand of Knowledge and Understanding, in the same manner, thus; —Have ye any occasion for Pleasures to be mixed among you? —On the other side, we may suppose Know-

⁴²⁰ See Pages 611, 12.

lege and Understanding to interrogate Us; and What Sort of Pleasures, they would perhaps say, is it that ye mean?

PROTARCHUS.

Probably they would.

SOCRATES.

And to this Question of theirs our Answer would be This:—Beside those True Pleasures, we should say, do ye farther want the Pleasures of the intense and exquisite Kind to dwell with you?—How is it possible, O Socrates! they would then perhaps say, that we should want These?—These, who give a thousand Hindrances to all our Proceedings; and who, by their Fury and Madness, are always creating Disturbance in the Souls where We dwell;—These, who had they been there first, would never have suffered Us to have admittance; and who intirely spoil our Children, there born, by letting Forgetfulness in upon them, for want of Care to guard the Dwelling-place. But the Other Pleasures, mentioned by you, the True and the Pure, you are to know, that They are nearly related to us, and belong to our Family: and beside These, the Pleasures who are accompanied by Health and Sobriety; Such also, as are the Followers of all Virtue,

K k k k 2

like

like the Train of some Goddess, every where attending her; let All of these come and mix amongst us. But those Pleasures, who are always found in Company with Folly, and with all Kinds of Vice, it is very absurd for a Man to mingle with Mind, —if he desires to see a Mixture, as clear, untroubled, and well-tempered, as possible to be made; —and if he would from thence try to discover, what the nature is of Good, not only in Man, but also in the Universe; from which discovery some Notion is to be gained, by a Sort of Divination, of What the Idea is of Good its Self. —Shall we not say, that Mind and Science, in thus answering, have spoken prudently and consistently with ⁴²¹ themselves, pleading in their own Cause, and at the same time in behalf of Memory and Right Opinion.

PROTARCHUS.

By all means ought we.

SOCRATES.

⁴²¹ This Sentence, in the Greek, begins thus;—*Ἄρ' ἐκ ἐμφορέως ταῦτα καὶ ἐχόντως ἑαυτὸν τὸν νῦν φήσομεν ἀποκρίνασθαι*—*Henry Stephens* imagined a gross Error in this Reading of the Passage; and he attempted a Correction of it, by transposing the *ἐχόντως νῦν*, (so as to read *νευεχόντως* in one word,) and by rejecting intirely the two intermediate words, *ἑαυτὸν τὸν*. — But in this bold Alteration, the words *τὸν νῦν* will be found wanting, tho
they

SOCRATES.

But in our Mixture it is necessary to add This also; for without it no One Thing could ever be.

PROTARCHUS.

What is That?

SOCRATES.

Whatever has not Truth mixed with it, in the composing of it, can never be produced into true Existence; or, could it be produced, it never can be lasting.

PROTARCHUS.

How is it possible, that it should?

they are necessary to precede the word ἀποκρίνασθαι in the Construction of the Sentence. — Many Years since therefore, supposing, with *Stephens*, the Greek Text in this Passage to be erroneous, we imagined, that it might be amended, by changing ἐχόντως ἐαυτὸν into ἐχομένως ἐαυτῆ (or ἐαυτῶ) agreeable to which we made our translation. But having, since that time, read and considered the judicious *Monf. Grou's* Note to his *French* translation of this Passage, we see no necessity for any Alteration to be made, either in the *Greek* Original, or in our *English* translation; especially, if it be true, what is said by *Constantine* in his *Lexicon*, that ἐχόντως ἑἑν is sometimes used for ἑἑχόντως.—*Cornarius* also, in translating ἐχόντως ἐαυτὸν into *Latin* thus,—*pro sui dignitate*, — seems to have understood those words in the same sense with *Monf. Grou*.

SOCRATES.

Certainly no way. Now if any thing farther be yet wanting to perfect our Composition, declare it, You and Philebus. For the Mixture, which we have now made in Speculation, appears to Me to have been as perfectly well composed, as if it were some incorporeal Order ⁴²², meant for the good Government of an Animated Body.

PROTARCHUS.

⁴²² The Mixture, now made in the speculation, represents the happy State of a *Man truly virtuous*. *Mind*, in such a Man, is That *incorporeal Order*, That Law, which governs his whole Conduct agreeably to Truth and Rectitude: and his *animated Body*, (his Animal-Soul and Body, joined together,) enjoys those *Pleasures*, which his *Nature* makes him capable of, and his *Fortune* offers to him,—all Such Pleasures, as are admitted and authorised by *Mind* and *Reason*,—all Such, as are consistent with an Acquisition of the *Sciences* and *Arts*, and with a Retention of them in the *Memory*, — and are not repugnant to a *Right Opinion*, concerning the relative Value of every thing to Himself. ——— The *Greek* word in this place is κόσμος, — a word, which often signifys *Order*, and is accordingly, in this Translation, so rendered into *English*; — but often also it signifys *World*; and this latter, this secondary and philosophical Sense of the word is, by all the other Interpreters of this Dialogue, attributed to it in the present Sentence.—Perhaps they considered *Man* as a *Microcosm*, and his *Nature* as partaking of the Two most general Kinds of Being in the Universe,—viz. the incorporeal, intelligible, and invariable,—and the corporeal, sensible, and variable. — Indeed, we have no

PROTARCHUS.

And be assured, O Socrates! that to Me it has had the same appearance.

SOCRATES.

Might we not then rightly say, that we were now arrived at the Dwelling-place of Good, and were standing in the very Entrance of his House?

PROTARCHUS.

I think, we might.

SOCRATES.

And now What should we deem to be the greatest Excellence in the Composition, and to be also the chief Cause, that such a Mixture must be grateful to All? For when we shall have discerned What this is, which is so grateful and so excellent, we shall then consider to which of the Two, to Plea-

Doubt of our Author's having in his Mind the last-mentioned Sense of the word *κόσμος*, when he wrote this Sentence. We have no Doubt, but that he intended to give us a Representation of the *Universe*, and (at the same time) of *Man*, as he is by nature an *Image* of it in *Miniature*,—an *animated Body*, under the Government of a *Mind*.—This Intention will perhaps appear more plainly in the *Conclusive Part* of this Dialogue, to which we are now approaching.

ture

ture or to Mind, it is related the most nearly, and familiar the most intimately, in the Constitution of the Universe ⁴²³.

PROTARCHUS.

Right: 'twill be of the greatest service to us, in determining this Point.

SOCRATES.

And there is indeed no difficulty in discovering the Cause, why Some Mixtures are most valuable, and Others good for nothing.

PROTARCHUS.

Explain your Meaning.

SOCRATES.

No Person is ignorant of This.

PROTARCHUS.

Of What?

⁴²³ The words of *Plato* are—ἐν τῷ παντί συνέστηκεν. Compare this Passage with a similar one in page 626, line 10. Both the Passages perhaps are to be explained by the latter Half of the Note preceding this.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

That in every Mixture, whatever it be, and whatever be the Quantity of it ⁴²⁴, if Measure pervades it not, and if thence it obtains not Symmetry and Proportion, all the Ingredients must of necessity be spoilt, besides the spoiling of the whole Composition. For in such a case, no One thing is really tempered by any Other thing; but a confused and disorderly Asssemblage is made, of various Things jumbled together; which, like a Concurrence of bad Accidents in Life, is a real Misfortune to the Persons who are to use it ⁴²⁵.

PROTARCHUS.

'Tis very true.

⁴²⁴ In all the Editions of the *Greek*, we here read *ὅπως ἔν*, “*however it be made.*” But this is contradictory to the Meaning of the Sentence; for the Meaning is this,—that “every right and good Mixture must be made *in one certain manner only*, viz. by *Measure.*”—We may fairly therefore presume, that *Plato* wrote, not *ὅπως ἔν*, but *ὅπως αἴν*, (or, by *Elision*, *ὅπως ἔν*) with a view to the *infinite Extent* of the *Universe*.

⁴²⁵ In the *Greek*, *συμφορὰ*,—a word, which has Two different Meanings, not to be expressed by One single word in *English*. A *Paraphrase* therefore was found necessary, for conveying (agreeably to our Author’s Intention,) Both Meanings together, to the Readers of this translation.

SOCRATES.

The Power of the Chief Good then is transferred, we find, into that Province, where dwells the nature of the Beautiful. For every where, from Measure and Mediocrity, and from Symmetry and Proportion, arise Beauty and Virtue.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly so.

SOCRATES.

And we said before, that Truth also was an Ingredient in the Composition.

PROTARCHUS.

We did.

SOCRATES.

If then we are not able to discover the nature of Good its Self in One single Idea,—yet, taking it in Three Ideas together, in Beauty, Symmetry, and Truth, we may conceive it as One Thing; and most justly attributing to it the Cause of whatever is graceful or agreeable in the Composition, we may most truly say, that by means of This, as being Good its Self, the Whole proves to be Such as it is, thus agreeable, and thus graceful.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Most truly indeed.

SOCRATES.

Now then, O Protarchus! any Person may be a competent Judge between Pleasure and Understanding, to decide, Whether of the Two is nearest allyed to the Supream Good, and of higher Value, than the Other is, both to Men and Gods ⁴²⁶.

PROTARCHUS.

What the Decision must be, is clear. However, it is the better way to go thro the Recital of it, in explicit Words.

SOCRATES.

Each of those Three Ideas then let us compare, severally, with Pleasure, and again with Mind. For we are to see and determine, Whether of these Two it is, that Each of those Three Ideas is most congenial to, and to give Sentence accordingly.

PROTARCHUS.

Do you speak of Beauty, and Truth, and Mediocrity?

⁴²⁶ See Pages 627, 8. and Note 422.

SOCRATES.

I do. Now take in the first place, O Protarchus! Truth; and look at all the Three together, Mind, Truth, and Pleasure: and after you have considered them a sufficient time, say whether, in Your opinion, Mind, or whether Pleasure is the nearer of Kin to Truth.

PROTARCHUS.

What need is there of Time, to consider of this point? for I presume, that very great is the difference between Mind and Pleasure in this respect. Of all things in the world, Pleasure is the most addicted to Lying: and it is said ⁴²⁷, that in the Pleasures of Venus, which seem to be the greatest, even Perjury is pardoned by the Gods; it being supposed, that Pleasures, like Children, have not the least Understanding in them, to know what they say. But Mind is either the same thing with Truth,

or

⁴²⁷ Plainly alluding to the Proverb, — Ἀφροδίσιος ἔρκος ἐκ ἐμποίνιμος; — in which words it is delivered to us by the Collectors of the ancient *Greek Proverbs*. But we imagine, that the Proverb, in common use, consisted of only the Two First of those Words, and that the latter Two were added by some Grammarian, to explain their Meaning. For, besides that to leave out this Explanation is more agreeable to the *Spirit* as well as to the *Brevity* of a *Proverbial Saying*, the word ἐμποίνιμος

or it is of all things, the most like to it, and the truest ⁴²⁸.

SOCRATES.

Next then consider Mediocrity in the same manner ⁴²⁹; and say whether you think, that Pleasure possesses more of it than Understanding, or that Understanding possesses more of it than Pleasure.

PROTARCHUS.

This, which you have now proposed for a Subject of consideration is not less easy than the Other. For there cannot, in my opinion, be found any thing more immoderate, in its nature, than Pleasure

is not found in *Plato's Symposium*, (pag: 183 Edit: *Steph*.) where this Proverb is cited: tho it must be confessed, that the very learned and judicious *Erasmus* was of opinion, that the word ἐμποινιμον is erroneously omitted in that Passage. See the *Banquet*, Page 66. However this may be, the Proverb seems to have been always understood in that Sense, in which it is used by *Plato*. And in all probability, *Tibullus* from hence borrowed that Sentiment in his *Elegys*, L. 2, El: 6, — *perjuria ridet amantum Jupiter*,—expressed after him by *Ovid* in the very same words.

⁴²⁸ See Pages 256, 7. and *Synopsis*, Page 14.

⁴²⁹ *Cornarius*, and *Stephens* after him, rightly observe, that in the *Greek* of this Sentence, we ought to read ὡσαύτως, and not, as it printed, ὡς ἕτως.

and

and extravagant Joy; nor any thing which has more of Measure in it, than Mind and Science ^{43°}.

SOCRATES.

You have well said. But proceed farther now to the Third Idea. Do you say, that Mind partakes of Beauty, more than any Species of Pleasure partakes of it? and that Mind is more excellent than

^{43°} Every *perfect Idea*, every Idea in the *Divine Mind Universal*, is the true *Measure* of every *Idea*, *synonymous* with it, in all *Particular Minds*. Nor is it less the *Measure* and the *archetypal Standard* of *Rectitude* and *Truth* to every *Copy* or *Image* of it, impressed on any Part of *Nature's Works*, or imitated in the *Works of Art*. — Thus, for instance, *perfect Rectitude* in the Government of the World, the great *Idea* of the *Divine Mind*, is the *Measure* of all Moral and Political Rectitude in *Man*: thus also, the *Ideal perfect Animal*, of any Kind and Species whatever, is the *Measure* of Rectitude in the Frame and Disposition of every *Individual* of that Kind and Species: and thus also, the *Ideal true Circle* is the *Measure* of every circular Shape or Figure, whether natural, or artificial. — These *Measures* of All things the *Divine Mind* is full of: and whatever is *immeasurable*, or immense, is not an Object of any Mind whatever. — Farther; every *Truth* in every *Science* is bounded by those *Ideas*, the mutual *Relation* of which *constitutes* that particular *Truth*: and these *Ideal or Sciential Truths* are the *Measures* of Rectitude to every Position or Hypothesis, laid down by any man, and to every internal Sentence, or *Opinion*, of any man's Mind.

Pleasure

Pleasure in This respect? or that the Contrary is true?

PROTARCHUS.

Did ever Any man then, O Socrates! whether awake or dreaming, see or imagine Understanding and Mind to be, in any Matter, or in any Manner, unhand-some or Unbecoming, whether in reflecting on the Past, or in perceiving the Present, or in looking forward to the Future?

SOCRATES.

Right.

PROTARCHUS.

But whenever we see any Person immersed in Pleasures, in Those Pleasures too, which are of all perhaps the greatest ⁴³¹, — when we behold, what a ridiculous Figure the Man makes in the very act of enjoying them, — or view what is of all Spectacles the most unseemly, the consequence of his Enjoyment, — we, our selves, are ashamed ⁴³²; and all such things, as far as possible, we conceal, veil-

⁴³¹ For the Nature of every Thing is most apparent in That, which is the greatest or most excellent of the Kind.

⁴³² Either ashamed *for him*, or ashamed of that Part of *our Nature*, by which we are subject to what appears to ourselves so unseemly.

ing them with Night and Darknefs, as not being fit Objects for the Light to look on.

SOCRATES.

Every where ⁴³³ then, O Protarchus! you will declare, fpeaking, your Self, to all Perfons about you, and publifhing abroad by Meffengers ⁴³⁴, that the poffeffion of Pleafure is neither of Supream nor

⁴³³ The *Greek* word in this place, as it is printed, is *πάντη*. *Ficinus*, by tranflating it “*cunctis*,” feems to have read, in the Medicean Manuscript, *παντι*, to every *Perfon*. But 'tis a matter of indifference, Which of thofe Readings we prefer. For in this Dialogue we are taught, that, to every *Perfon*, in whatever *Region* of the Earth he lives, all thofe Kinds of Things, which are good on their own account, and not meerly for the fake of fomething elfe, are, when compared together, more or lefs valuable, in That very Degree, which is affigned to Each of thofe Kinds in the following Sentences of Socrates.

⁴³⁴ By *Meffengers*, we prefume, that *Books* or *Writings* are here meant.—And we may well prefume farther, that *Socrates*, in this Speech of his, feemingly directed only to *Protarchus*, aimed obliquely at recommending to his Difciples, then around him, the *Propagation* (both *Oral* and *Scriptural*) of the Truths, he is about to utter,—Truths, which he deemed of the higheft Importance to every Man to be prefented with, and which he made the fole Buſinefs of his own Life to ftudy and to promulgate. — If *Plato* was of the Audience, it feems, that he took the Hint, and wrote the *Philebus*.

of

of Secondary Worth : but that ⁴³⁵ Whatever is of all things the most excellent and valuable, is to be found in Measure, in the Moderate, and the Seasonable, and in all ⁴³⁶ things of That Kind, whose Nature and Essence we ought to deem Eternal ⁴³⁷.

PROTARCHUS.

⁴³⁵ This is the *First* of the *Six Conclusions*, here drawn from the *Three Argumentative Parts* of this Dialogue, taken together. But in the *Third Part* only is the Subject-Matter of the *Two first Conclusions* particularly treated of: the *Third and Fourth Conclusions* relate chiefly to the *First Part*, whence they are especially derived: and the *Two last Conclusions* arise principally from the *Second Part*, where the Subject of them is accurately considered. — In proof of the *Conclusion* now before us, see particularly Page 420. — Why it hath the place of *Preeminence*, and in What respect the *Subject* of it hath the *Preference* to the Subject of the *Second Conclusion*, will be seen in Note 438.

⁴³⁶ Mons. Grou has observed very justly, that the word εἰρηδαί, in the latter Part of this Sentence, is an Error in the Text: and instead of it, he proposes the word ἡρηδαί. Gryneus, the Corrector of Ficinus's Translation of Plato, seems, in his rendering the *Greek* word in this place into *Latin* by the words *sortita esse*, (*to have obtained an allotment of*,) either to have read εἰληδαί in some Manuscript, or else to have thus amended the Text by a happy Conjecture of his own.

⁴³⁷ Of this Kind are the pure and perfect *Ideas* of the *Divine Mind Universal*, and *Ideal Truths*, the mutual *Relations* of those *Ideas*.—If there be also, *beside* that Great Mind, any other

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Minds,

PROTARCHUS.

Their supreme Excellence appears from what has been said and proved.

SOCRATES.

And that the Next in Value are Symmetry and Beauty, the Compleat and the Sufficient, and whatever else is congenial to these ⁴³⁸.

PROTARCHUS.

Minds, or Mental Beings, in whom any of those *Ideas* and Ideal *Truths* are, and will for ever be, pure and perfect, — if any *Ideas* within the Divine Mind are νοεραὶ ἄμα καὶ νοηταὶ, *intelligent* as well as *intelligible*, (as *Proclus* seems to have imagined,) — These also may properly be said εἰληχθῆσαι (*to have obtained for their Allotment*,) an *eternal Nature*. — However this may be, 'tis certain, that the *Divine Ideas* and their mutual *Relations*, being eternal and immutable, are the true *Measures* of all Human *Notions* and *Opinions* in all ages and in all places: — it is certain, that only by the *Divine Ideas* are *Bounds* and *Measures* set to any of the *Infinities*, in the natural production or generation of *Corporeal Forms*, every one of which is thus *limited* in its *Essence*; — that only by the *Divine Ideas*, imprest on *Outward Nature*, is the *regular Course* of her *Motions* maintained, amidst their various *accidental Changes*; — that only thus is the *Predominance* of the lower *Elements*, which are often prevalent by turns, *subdued* and *tempered* in *seasonable time*, so as to prevent the preter-natural or *untimely Dissolution* of every *Compound-Frame* on *Earth*; — and that only by the *Divine Ideas*, imparted to the *Rational Soul* of *Man*, are his natural *Appetites*

PROTARCHUS.

So it seems.

SOCRATES.

Appetites and Passions *moderated*, and restrained from any *unseasonable* or *vehement* Emotions.

⁴³⁸ The *Forms* and the *Qualities*, specified in the present Sentence, — namely, *Symmetry* and *Beauty*, the *Compleat* and the *Sufficient*, — are, in some prior Passages of this Dialogue, spoken of *together* with *Measure*; as if they were, in all respects, equal to *Measure* in Dignity and Value. Indeed they have a Relation to the same Kind of Being, — to That, in which the *Infinities* are *mixed* with *Bound*. — In this place, however, where the Order of Things, absolutely Good, is settled with the nicest accuracy, they are *distinguished* from *Measure*. In this place, *Measure*, with the *Attributes essential* to it, and inseparably attending it, is mentioned *singly* and *alone*; because, in the *natural Order* of Things, it is the *First* and *Highest* of all absolute or final *Goods*. — For, according to such Order, *Causes* are prior and superior to their *Effects*; and *Principles* are higher, and of more dignity than any of their *Derivatives*, as having a more extensive Power. — Now, 'tis *Measure* which is the *First Cause* of every *Good*, enjoyed, by any *Animal-Beings*, whether *Sentient* and *Rational*, or merely *Sentient*: — 'tis *Measure* also, which is the *First Cause* of every *Good* inherent in, or possessed by, any *Senseless* or *Lifeless* Beings, — a *Good*, to be felt, relished and enjoyed — not by Themselves, — but by Such Beings only, as are made for the Enjoyment of it. — 'Tis *Measure*, which is the *First Principle* of those *Goods*, celebrated in the present Sentence: for *Measure* is the immediate Principle of *Symmetry*; on *Symmetry* is founded all *Proportion*; on *Proportion* are

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founded

founded all *Beauty* in Figures, and all *Harmony* in Sounds: and to any Outward *Form*, in which are found these Excellencys, *nothing* is wanting to make it an Object most delightful to all *Rational* Animals, whose Eyes or Ears convey to them the Image of that Form: such a Form is, to Sense, *complete* in all its Parts, and possesses all the *Perfection*, which it is capable of by nature.——Full of these Excellencys is the *Frame*, or *outward Form*, of the *Universe*; because the Architectonic *Mind* *within*—the *Forming Form*,—is MEASURE ITS SELF, comprising all the *Kinds* of *Measure*: and since *Measure*, of some Kind or other, is the *Cause* of whatever *Good* is either enjoyed or possessed by any Kind of *Being*, it follows, that the Great *Universal Being*, in whom all those *Causes* of Good, those *Measures* of every Kind, are comprised, is the Cause of *All Good*,—is GOOD ITS SELF.—On this account especially it is, that, in the *First Conclusion* from all the Reasoning of this Dialogue, MEASURE stands by its Self, *single* and *alone*; it is because the word *Measure*, in an eminent Sense, as used by *Plato*, signifies That SOVEREIGN BEING, who is the SOVEREIGN GOOD, —That *Supream Beauty*, which, in the expression of our divine Philosopher in *the Banquet*, is αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτὸ, μετ' αὐτῆ, μονοειδὲς αἰὲν ὄν, *Alone by its Self, with its Self conversing, is eternally Sole and Single in its Essence*.——But we are here to consider the *Goods* mentioned in this *Second Conclusion*, with a view particularly to *Man*: for the Good of *Man* in *particular*, and not the Good of the whole *Universe* is the proper Subject of this Dialogue.—It has appeared from the Reasoning of it, that, as *Man* is a *Being*, partly *Rational*, and partly *Sensitive*, his *Happiness*, or highest Good, cannot be placed either in *Knowledge* alone, or in *Pleasure* alone: *Knowledge* being the Good of only *One Part* of his Nature, the *Rational*; and *Pleasure*, the Good of the *other Part* only, the *Sensitive*: it has appeared, that

that *Man's Happiness* must consist in the Good of *Both Parts* of his Compound-Nature, taken together, — the *Good* of the *Whole Man*. And this Good is MORAL VIRTUE. — For the *Sensitive Part* of every Man is an *Animal-Soul*, united with a *Human Body*: and his *Rational Part* is a *Particular Mind*. The *Animal-Soul*, as well as the *Body*, of every Man, with all those *Appetites*, *Passions*, and *Affections*, to which that *Soul* of his, thro its union with *Body*, is subject, belongs to the *First Kind of Being*, That which is *Infinite*; and every *Particular Mind*, by its nature, belongs to the *Second Kind of Being*, That which Sets a *Bound* to every *Infinite*; as in the *Body* of this Dialogue has been shown at large: (See from Page 274 to the End of the *First Part*.) The *Rational Part* of Man, his *Mind*, is the proper Seat of *Moral Virtue*; and *Moral Virtue*, the peculiar Excellence of *Man*, belongs to the *Third Kind of Being*, — to That, in which all the *Infinities* are *bounded*, or *mixed with Bound*. (See particularly in Pages 293 and 297; and in Notes 180 and 193.) In the Man therefore, whose Mind is accomplished with *Moral Virtue*, all the inward Propertys and Powers of his *Animal-Soul*, which in their own nature, and left to themselves, are *immoderate* and *boundless*, — and which, *outwardly* flowing, influence all his *Actions*, — receive *Bound* and *Measure*: and this Blessing they receive from *Prudence* or *Moral Wisdom*, — the Prime Excellence of the *Human Soul*, — and the *Virtue* of Man's *Rational Part*, respecting the *Good* of the *Whole Man*, as a Being composed of *Body*, *Animal-Soul*, and *Mind*. — The Excellencys of the *Body* are well known to All men; and are wont to be, by Most men, over-valued: they are these Six; — *Health*, — *Strength*, — *Agility*, — *Fineness* of the *Organs* of outward *Sense*, — *well-proportioned Features* of the *Face*, — and the *Comeliness* of those *Parts* of the *Body* where any of the other
Excellencys

Excellencys appear visible. — Of the Four first-mentioned *the Extreams* are generally admired, and are often celebrated with high Encomiums. But the Masters of Medical Science know, that *Excessive Health* is the Forerunner of *Disease*;—that *Athletic Strength* is unfavourable to the Powers of the *Rational Soul*; —that *extream Agility* is injurious to the *Firmness* of *Strength* and to *Robustness*; — and that *extream Fineness* of the *Organs* of outward *Sense* borders on *Delicacy*, *Tenderness*, and *Weakness*.—But let us suppose These and the other *Corporeal Excellencys* to be possessed in such a *Degree*, and so well *tempered* together, as to be *durable*, and *consistent* with each other, and, in no respect, *detrimental* to the *nobler Part* of Man;—yet, if their Owner knows not, *when*, and *where*, and *how* to employ them, —the *Use* of them will be often turned into an *Abuse*; and they will then prove mischievous or dangerous to the Welfare of the *whole Man*. —No less necessary to their being *beneficial* to Man is the *Measure* of their *Exhibition* or *Exertion*. For, if the *Exercise*, given to any *Members* of the Body, be *defective* and *insufficient*, they will become *sluggish* and unapt for *Motion*; if it be *immoderate* and *excessive*, they will grow *languid* and *heavy*, and prematurely be *worn out*. —In using the *Organs* of our Five *outward Senses*, it is no less necessary to the natural *Duration* of their *Liveliness*, that we apply them always, as far as lyes in our own Choice, only to those *Objects*, whose *Qualitys* and *Powers* are *moderate*. —For, to begin with the *Sense* of *Seeing*, to look at *Objects* too *distant*, or too *minute*, strains the *Eye*; and the looking only at *large* and *near* *Objects*, — as for instance the constant *Use* of *Convex Glasses* in reading, —incapacitates the *Eye* in time, for the sight of *smaller*: in viewing *any Object whatever*, too *weak* a *Light* too much dilates the *Pupil* of the *Eye*; and too *strong* a *Light* too much contracts it: *Colours* too *faint*, or too *glaring*, produce the like

Effects. — The Sense of *Hearing*, by an attention to *Sounds*, either *dying*, thro the remote distance of their Cause, or too *small*, however near to their Beginning, is apt to be overstrained; and by Sounds too *loud*, 'tis apt to be stunned and deafened. — The Senses of *Smelling* and *Tasting*, by too frequent a use of *pungent Odours* and *poignant Flavours*, are either deadened, or rendered too impotent to serve the Purposes, for which they were designed by Nature: on the other hand, if they are wholly confined to things of *mildest Smell* and *Taste*, they become wholly indisposed, or even utterly unable, to bear the meeting with *strong Scents* and *high flavoured Viands*, tho sometimes unavoidable. — It is the same with the Sense of *Feeling*; if habituated to no other *Touch* but the *smooth*, the *soft*, and the *gentle*, it is pained by the *rough*, the *hard*, and the *violent*: on the other hand, if it be conversant with only These, the violent, the hard, and rough, its *Sensibility* will be weakened, and finally be quite destroyed. — So that, to *retain* whatever *Corporeal Excellencys* a Man possesses, — and to *preserve* in their best State all those *Parts* of his *Body*, which are instrumental either to *Motion* or to *Sensation*, it is requisite for him to be *moderate* in the *exercising* and *employing* of those *Parts*, even in their natural and ordinary Functions; it is requisite also, that he should *choose*, for the *Subjects* of their Employment, Such as have *Mediocrity* in their *Qualitys* or *Powers*, relative to the *Use* of *Man*. — Now this *moderate Exercise*, (if *voluntary*,) and this *Choice of things moderate*, (if *free*,) are owing to the *Virtue of Prudence*. Those *Infinities* then, which immediately concern the *Body*, are *bounded* by this *Virtue*; and *Sensual Pleasure* is thus *combined* with *Understanding* and right *Judgment*. — The Excellence of such a Combination will appear farther, from considering the Four natural Facultys or Powers of Man's *Animal-Soul*, — *Instinct*, *Sense*, *Memory*, and *Imagination*. —

tion.—By These are generated *Appetites* and *Desires*, which are excited by every Appearance of any *Sensible Good*; whether such Good appears to *Present Sense* joined with *Instinct*, or to *Imagination* joined with *Memory*.—By the same Facultys or Powers are generated those *Passions* of the Soul, which are put in motion by every Appearance of *Sensible Evil*, whether present, past, or future. — Besides all these *Inhabitants* of the Soul, Others there are, who may properly be called *Natives of the Soil*, as they spring up and grow from innate *Instinct*: these are Such kind *Affections*, as are *natural* peculiarly to *Man*; being of much larger extent, than Such as are in the Souls of any *Brute-Animals*. Those in Us reach *backward* to remotest *Ancestors*, long since *deceased*; for we *naturally* revere their Memory, and delight to tread in their Footsteps: *forward*, they reach to *Posterity unborn*; for “*nati natorum, & qui nascentur ab illis,*” are embraced in Imagination by Us, and have a Share in our most benevolent Wishes: *sideways*, they spread to all our *collateral Kindred*; for we consider our Selves and Them *together*, as derived from One *common Ancestor*.——— But those *Facultys* or *Powers* of the Soul, and all this Progeny of theirs, the *Appetites* and *Desires*, the *Passions* of a *contrary* Sort, and the *kind Affections*, being, in their own nature, *infinite*,—as belonging to that Part of the Soul, which is corporeal, irrational, and blind, —must, to be *useful* and *beneficial* to Man, have certain *Bounds* and *Measures* affixed to them; they must also be *commensurate*, Each with the Others; and they must be, All of them, *proportioned* to their respective Ends.——— Now in Man, as well as in all other Animals, *Instincts*, or instinctive *Inclinations* and *Avoidances*, are by Nature thus *bounded*; are by Nature thus in *Harmony* together; and are, each of them, by Nature, thus *proportioned* to the Degree of Man’s natural *Wants* and *Weakness*. The *Utility* of these *Pre-conceptions* of Good and Evil

to the Animal-Nature, *measured*, as they are, by the natural *Necessitys* of the Animal, and being, as they are, in just *proportion* to them, is always confirmed by After-Feeling and Experience.—The *Senses* also are, in all Animals, *commensurate* by Nature with their respective *Objects*. The internal *Images* of external *Objects* are, in every Animal, *proportionate* to its *Sensation* of those *Objects*: and the *Memory* of them is always *proportionate* to the *Impressions* they have made on the *Imagination*.—All of this *Good* then is the Work of Nature. And the *Appetites* and *Passions*, raised by those External *Objects*, and by their *Images* imprest on the *Memory*, may justly be deemed *natural* likewise: and accordingly, These also, in all *Brute-Animals*, have the same *Bounds*, and the same *Measures*, with the *innate Instincts*.——But in *Man* the *Appetites* and *Passions* are *immeasurable* and *boundless*. For Man hath the Power of extending his *Imagination* to *Infinity*; and the *Images* therein are not *limited*, in their *Qualities* or in their *Number*, by the present or the past *Objects* of his *Senses*, nor indeed by any Things any where in *Nature*. Every Man's *Imagination* hath the *Power* of joining or dividing, associating or severing, the *Images* of those natural and real *Objects*, at his own *Will*,—or at the *Will* of Those, whose *Words* and *Speeches* have *Power* over Another Man's *Imagination*.—Thus are created *new Fancys*, innumerable, unlimited, and endless: and thus those *Desires* and *Aversions*, *Hopes* and *Fears*, which are apt to be raised in a Man's Soul by every Appearance of *Good* or *Evil* in his *Imagination*, are, by these preter-natural and false *Fancys*, enlarged and lengthened, *infinitely* beyond the *Bounds*, prescribed to them by Nature; for whatever is *beyond* these *Bounds*, is *infinite*.——It is the Work of *Moral Wisdom*, (in Man, termed *Prudence*,) to correct all these *Evils*, arising from the nature of *Infinity*: for all the *Infinities*, if left to follow their own nature, produce much *Evil*.

It is the Work of *Prudence*, in the first place, (taking *then* the Title of σωφροσύνη *Sobriety of Mind*;) not to entertain or harbour any *Fancys* of the *false* and *infinite* Kind, to which Nothing in *Nature* is correspondent; but on the contrary, to drive them away, as often as they return, by rational Studys, virtuous Employments, or innocent Amusements; giving no Credit to *Notions* or *Opinions*, suggested by our own or other Men's *Imaginations*, without a previous strict Inquiry, whether they agree with *Experience*, with the Truths of *Nature*, and with the Truth of *Facts*. And to this End, it is necessary to have our Minds stored with a competent *Knowledge* of *Nature*, with a Knowledge also of our *Selves*, and of *other Men*; having first prepared our *Minds* with *Sobriety*, and our *Hearts* with the *Love of Truth* above all things; so as to make a *right Use* of our Knowledge, and to *reason* judiciously thereon. When the extravagant *Fancys* and unreasonable *Notions* are, by these means, either banished, or so far subdued, as to be without the Power of raising any *immoderate Passion* or *Affection*, — when *Imagination* is confined within the *Bounds* of *Nature* by the *Laws* of right *Reason*, — the remainder of the Work of *Moral Wisdom* is easy for her to execute. All irregular, immoderate, and wild *Passions*, and *Affections*, unsupported by the *Fancys*, are easily reduced to *Rule* and *Measure*, subjected to *Reason*, and become *tame*. The *natural Appetites* are then excited only by the *present Wants* of the *Body*; and only *in proportion* to the *Sensible Evil* of those Wants, and to the *Sensible Good* experienced in relieving them. The *natural Desire* (in every Man) of those *External Goods*, which afford a probable *Security* against all Bodily Wants for the *future*, is then *moderated* by considering the *precarious nature* of such Securitys, the *Difficulty* of obtaining them, and the *Danger* of losing Greater Goods in the Pursuit. The *natural Passions*, ready to be roused at the

Sight of Evil present or approaching, or at the well-grounded Apprehension of Evil to come, are then also *proportioned* to the real Quantity of the Evil, and to the Value of that Good, which a Man is deprived of by such Evil. And by the same Virtue of *Prudence* governing the *Fancys*, are all those *kind Affections* which are *natural* to Man, felt in a Degree *proportioned* to the Degree of *Consanguinity* with the *Objects* of those Affections, without Partiality or ill-grounded Prejudices, and with no other Difference felt between them, than what the Laws of Nature and of Reason authorise the feeling of. The Natural Affections being thus *spread*, as widely as they *ought*, and the *Measure* of Each being settled *proportionately* to the Others, the Possessor of them is delighted, when he feels in his own Heart a due Degree of Kindness toward All, in whom he candidly and naturally supposes a Feeling of Kindness toward Him in the same Degree. And this natural and candid Supposition is another plenteous Source of Pleasure to every Person, who, without expecting or desiring from Others any Actions of Beneficence to Him, can feel a Pleasure in believing himself to have a Share in their *benevolent Affections*.—— Thus it is, that all the Facultys or Powers of a Man's *Animal Soul*, with all the natural *Motions* and *Emotions* of it, are only then *beneficial* to him, when they are *moderate*,—when they are *bounded* by the *Offices*, severally assigned to them by Nature,—and when they are exerted or employed, Each in proper *Season*, and Each on suitable *Occasions*.—But 'tis not sufficient for the perfection of the *Animal Soul*, that Each of those *Propertyts* of it, taken *singly*, be so *bounded* and so *measured*: to perfect and to bless that Part of the Human Nature, they must be, All of them, *commensurate* and well-*proportioned* to Each Other.— This will appear more fully, when we shall have considered the Capacities, Powers, and Attainments of Man's *Rational Soul*:

and we are now arrived at the place, where properly they fall under consideration.—The *Creator* of the *Universe*, in the Distribution of his various Gifts to the various Kinds of Being, imparts Himself and his own Happiness, in different Degrees, to All. In imparting *Mind*, *Understanding*, and *Reason*, he deigns to bestow a Share of these noblest of his Gifts on *Man* here on this Earth. But as Man, during his Infancy, is utterly incapable of enjoying, in the least, those great Endowments, nothing more of them is given at first, than a *Capacity* of arriving at them gradually in time. However, a *Foundation* for them is laid in Man's Soul, from the beginning, by infusing into it the *Principles* of *Mind*, the same which are the Principles of all *Reasoning* and of all *Knowledge*,—the Ideas of *One* and *Many*, *Same* and *Different*. For indeed 'tis only by means of these *Principles*, — these *Primary Ideas*, — which are no less *innate* than *Animal-Instincts*, — that every Man is born with a *Capacity* of *Reason*,—a *Capacity* of *universalising* all the Objects of his Senses, or of perceiving, with his Mental Eye, *General Ideas*.—It is by means only of those *Principles*, that Man hath a *Capacity* of *comparing* together the *Ideas* which he views; and of perceiving, by that comparison, the *Truths* concerning them.—Thro the same *Principles* it is, that Man hath a *Capacity* of *reasoning*; or of discovering, by the *Media* of those *Truths* which he perceives already, *other* *Truths* unperceived by him before. — These *Capacitys* in time grow up into *Powers*, and these *Powers* are kept in constant *Exercise*, by the continual *Occurring* of new Sensible Objects, and the perpetual *Activity* of the Mind, energising on the *Ideas* excited by those Objects. Hence it is, that more and more *Ideas* make their *appearance* in the Mind; that more and more *Truths* are discovered; and that more and more *Knowledge* is acquired. Hence it is, that Systems of the several *Sciences* are framed, augmented,

mented, and amplified; and hence are various *Arts* invented, improved, and perfected. — Such, and so great, are the *Capacities, Powers, and Attainments*, of the Rational Soul of Man. — But excellent as they are, yet, if they exceed the Bounds of *Mediocrity*, or if their Energys and inward Workings are not restrained by *Moderation*, they are always dangerous, and often prove fatal, to their Possessors. Any of those innate *Capacities* of Mind, just now mentioned, if they push unseasonably forward, either weaken the Body, or drop and perish, Themselves, before they have time to ripen. — Where they arrive at their Maturity, and actually become *Powers*, 'tis certain, that a *Quickness* of *Perception*, and a *Readiness* of *Apprehension*, whenever new *Ideas* and new *Truths* are offered to the Mind, are Excellencies to be admired. But if that *Quickness* and that *Readiness* be *immoderate*, the *Perception* of those *Ideas* will not be *clear*, nor will any *fast Hold* be taken of those *Truths*. — In like manner, a *moderate Slowness*, thro *Patience*, in reasoning to Generals from the *Induction* of *Particulars*, is more *satisfactory* to the Mind, than too precipitate a *Haste*. And *so much* Delay, as is requisite for Reflexion, leads to *Certainty* and *Truth*, in the drawing of *Syllogistical Conclusions*. — To maintain the *Powers* of the Rational Soul in their best State, 'tis no less requisite, that *Moderation* be observed, in the Quantity of *Exercise*, given them; — that *Mediocrity* be attended to, in the Choice of *Subjects*, to which they are applied; — and that *Bounds* be set to the Multitude of *Particulars*, in whatever *Kind* of Subject may be chosen. — For *too much Exercise* fatigues and weakens the Mental Powers; and with *too little* they languish, and are indisposed for ready Use on sudden Occasions. — If they are too conversant with *Subjects* insignificant and *mean*, they become Triflers, and unfit for handling Subjects of Importance: if, on the contrary, they reach at Subjects too *mighty*
for

for their Management, they effect nothing, and their Strength is exhausted idly. — In *too great a Number of Particulars*, they are apt to be bewildered; in *too small a Number*, they want the enlivening Pleasure of Variety. — Man has, before him, *all Nature*—the whole *World*, with which he is surrounded,—for the *Object* of his *View*, and the *Subject* of his Consideration. But his Mind can by no means conceive the Mechanism of so vast and complicate a Structure. No Experiments can show him the internal Frame of any One Part. The component *Elements* of it escape his Sight, thro their *Minuteness*: And the *Heavenly Bodys*, be they ever so large, are too *remote* for his *Introspection*. No other *Eye*, than the *Divine*, is equal to the View: and no *Mind*, less than That of the Great *Designer*, is able to perceive, with perfect Clearness, the *Uniformity* of the *Design*, amidst the vast *Variety* of *Parts*, which are, in all outward appearance, so thorowly *dissimilar* and so *heterogeneous*.—The World therefore, with all the *Beautys* of it, tho visible to us All, hath ever been the Object of *Amazement* to Most, — of *Admiration* to the Speculative Few: — the *Formation* also or *Composition* of it, and the *Essence* or *Nature* of it, are, after all our Searches, still the Subjects only of *Hypothesis*, *Conjecture*, and *Opinion*. — Seeing then these things to be so transcendently superiour to the Utmost of Our Reach, and the *Knowledge* of them so impossible for the Powers of *Human Reason* to attain to, the Wisest Men in all ages, *Socrates* for instance, have always considered such *Studys* and *Contemplations*, as intirely *useless* to a *Life* properly *Human*; but yet of the greatest *Benefit* to *Man*; as they tend to elevate his Soul above all the Objects of *Human Desires* and *Human Passions*; and thus, in begetting *Magnanimity*, lay the firmest Foundation for a *Happy Life*, and afford the strongest Security for its *Continuance* until the End.—To this consideration it seems to have
been

been owing, that the ancient *Masters* in all the Parts of *Philosophy* used to initiate their Disciples, early, in *Cosmography*,—so far, as to lift their Thoughts up to the *Divine Cause* of all the *Beauty* which they beheld, and of all the *Good* which they enjoyed. For at that time, the previous Studys of all the well-bred Youth, in *Arithmetick*, *Geometry*, and *Musick*, had brought them into an intimate acquaintance, not only with *Beauty* and *Harmony*, but with the *Principles* also of those delightful Forms.—The Students in *Philosophy*, being thus prepared and qualified to make rational Reflections, were led, in the next place, to take a Survey of those Parts of Nature, which every where exhibit ample Proofs,—Evidences to *Sense* and *Reason* in conjunction, — of the Truth of that *sound Theology*, taught them immediately before.—Their Speculations were pointed to the *Animal*, the *Vegetable*, and the *Fossil* Bodys within the compass of their View and Examination.—But this Survey was *general* and too *cursor*y to be exact. For an accurate and nice scrutinising of those *inferiour* Parts of Nature was, in those days, deemed unworthy of a Mind truly philosophical: it was found to plunge a Man's Thoughts, and his Inquiries, into a boundless *Ocean* of minute *Particulars*; and to prevent or lessen his attention to a *Subject*, the most important to his *Happiness*.—This Subject is *Himself*, as he is a Man,— an *Animal*, partaking of the nature of *Body*, partaking too of the nature of *Mind*, and thus as it were placed in the *Middle* between them *Both*. So that the *nature*, peculiarly *Human*, is That very Subject, of *Middle-Rank*, —That which is neither above the *Reach*, nor beneath the *Dignity* of Human Speculations.—In considering this Subject, nothing is more obvious to perceive, than This,—that *Man* is of all Animals the farthest from *Self-Sufficiency*. Indeed, he is the *only* Animal, totally unable, when arrived at Maturity, to provide for itself the necessary *Means* of *Subsistence*.

ence. Much less is any One Man, alone, able to procure for himself those *Conveniencys* of *Life*, and those *Delights* of *Sense*, which the Goodness of Divine Providence seems to have designed for him. For of the Beings Inanimate, which *fill* the *Earth*, as well as *cover* it, — Beings, inconceivably *various* in their *Kinds* and *Species*, and All of them in vast *Abundance*, — the Greatest Part are of no other apparent *Use*, than to furnish out a Plenty of *Materials* for those *Conveniencys* and those *Delights*. — It appears then, in the first place, that the Author of all Nature has laid *Men* under the *Necessity* of *associating* together in *Aggregate Bodys*, (more or less numerous, in proportion to the Fertility of that Region of the Earth which they inhabit,) for the sake of procuring the Means of *maintaining Life*, thro their joint Labour and Industry; for *mutual Defence* also against the Attacks of wild Beasts, who, perhaps, on Their side, were created for this very End, to *compel* Mankind into *Assemblies* and *Confederacys*. — Farther; as Men, *by Nature*, desire and seek, not *meerly* Places of *Rest* and *Abode*, but Such as are *commodious* and *delightful*; — and as *by Nature* they have Ingenuity to contrive *Buildings* for their Habitation, *Cloathing* for their Bodys, *Utenfils* for the Preparation of their Food, and various other *Conveniencys* for living, in all respects, with Ease and Satisfaction; — as *Nature* has also plentifully supplied Men with *Materials* for all these *Fabricks*; — and as a great Number of Hands are requisite for the *Construction* of such a Variety; — (few Persons having Abilitys to acquire Skill and Adroitness in more than One Kind of Art or Workmanship;) — it appears, that Men are instigated by their natural Desires, and by the Prospect all around them of attaining the Objects of those Desires, to form themselves into large *Societys*. — Now in every *large Society* of Men, — tho they have, All of them, One *common Interest*, — That of the whole Society, — yet, as Every

Member of it hath, beside That, a *separate Interest* of his own, — these separate Interests are apt frequently to clash. And as *Passions* of the same Kind are in the Souls of All men, the Passions of *One man* often meet and encounter with their Equals, the like Passions of *Another man*.—Hence appears, in the next place, the *Necessity* of appointing *Arbiters*, or *Judges* authorised by the Community, to decide the Controversys and Contests between Man and Man. Farther still; in every large Society of Men, Many a one there is, who aims at taking the Lead, unelected by the rest; — Many a one, who endeavours to get more than his due Share of the Good, procured by the joint Industry of All:—Some are found, who without any honest Art or Labour, and either by Stealth, or Rapine, seize on the Possessions and Property of their neighbours:—and sometimes start up Others, who, by Fraud, or Address, or Foreign Force, aim at getting All into their Power, the Possessions, Liberties, and Lives of All. —Hence other *Necessities* arise; — the *Necessity* of constituting and establishing *Civil Governments*, — the *Necessity* of ordaining and ratifying *Civil Laws*, — the *Necessity* of creating *Judicial Magistrates*, to support the Constitution or established Frame of Government, by public Judgments according to the Laws ordained,—and the *Necessity* of creating *Executive Magistrates*, to protect the Common-Wealth effectually, by putting those Laws into Execution. — And, as the *Necessities*, *first mentioned*, are indisputably *natural*; (for they appear evidently to flow from the *nature of Man*;) so we may venture to pronounce, that *Civil Societys* also, and the Consequences of them, *just now mentioned*, are no less *natural* and *necessary*; because they are the only sure *Preservatives* and *Remedys* against the Injurys, which Men are, from their *nature*, liable to suffer, One from Another.———Many various Doings of *Nature* conspire in the accomplishment of One great

Design. Accordingly, her *Providential-Mind*, the sole Designer, having thus *pre-destined* Men to a *Social and Civil Life*, he has so *prepared* and *pre-disposed* them for it, that they seem to enter into it, not of Necessity, but of their own free Will and Choice.—He has infused into their Souls strong *Inclinations* to assemble together.—He has given them to feel *Delight*, when they meet One with Another, tho' intire Strangers before, if no Harm be apprehended on either side to arise from the Meeting.—He has imbued them with *Sympatbetic Affections*, from which they rejoice *naturally* at the Good, and grieve *naturally* at the Evil, befallen to any Human Being, without consideration of Advantage, or Disadvantage, to accrue from it personally to Themselves.—He has provided them with *natural Instincts* to give immediate *Assistance*, to Such, as are accidentally in immediate Need of it.—He has endued them with *natural Propensitys* to relieve Those whom they see, or hear of, in Distress, if they are able; or, if not, to endeavour to obtain Relief for them from Others.—He has inspired them with a *Promptitude* to perform the common Offices of *Humanity* to All; and, on any Emergency, special Acts of *Kindness* to Any of the Human Species, without expectation of Recompence or Requital.—And, for every such Office or Act of Kindness, done to Themselves, he has sown in their Hearts the Seeds of *Gratitude*.——But of all our *inborn Preparations*, for leading a Social and Civil Life,—That Life which is properly and peculiarly Human,—the most efficacious and the most unerring are the *Ideas of Right and Wrong, Just and Unjust, Good and Evil in Moral Actions*; — Ideas, which arise *naturally* in our Minds, as soon as we are able to apply those Arithmetical Ideas, those Propertys of Numbers, — *Equal and Unequal*,—to the *Intercourse* between Man and Man, and to their *Behaviour* toward Each Other; — more clearly, however, in Such Minds,

as are able also, from their innate Principles, the Principles of all Mind, — *One* and *Many*, *Same* and *Different*, — to infer the Certainty of *One Universal Law*, the *Same Rule* of Conduct to all *Rational Beings*; (*Reason* being *One* and the *Same* in them All, how much soever they may *differ* in other Respects,—in other Parts and Propertys of their several Compound-Forms.—From this Point of View may be seen the wondrous *Beauty* of *Moral Virtue*; by which all the *Parts* of a *Human Soul*, as they are *united* by *Nature* in *One Being*, so they conspire as it were together in a *Moral Union*, under the government of *Mind* and *Reason*, for the Good of the *Whole Man*.—From the same Point of View, but extending our Sight more widely around us, we may behold the *Beauty*, no less admirable, of a well-constituted *Kingdom*, or true *Commonwealth*; the multitude of whose constituent *Parts*, all of them in continual Motion, and all severally moving in lines of different direction, are so controlled by the *Law*, — the governing *Mind*, and as it were the *Reason* of the *Whole State*, — that, maugre all their continual Thwartings, frequent Jarrings, and incidental Clashings, their *Political Union* is preserved: Each separately contributes, and All jointly conspire, tho Most of them un-intentionally, to promote the Well-Being of the *Head*, the Chief Part, and of all the *Members* of the *Whole Community*.—Now all this *Beauty*, both the *Moral* and the *Political*,—all this *Good*, both the *Private* and the *Public*,—is the Result of *Symmetry*, the *Symmetry* of various *Parts commensurable*, and actually measured by One common MEASURE, One *Law*, One *Reason*, running thro the *Whole*.—This Good and Beauty then, (since the Good of *Sense* and the Good of *Mind*,—Pleasure and Wisdom,—meet here together and unite,) is *sufficient* to satisfy all the Indigencys of Human Nature: the Happiness of Man, considered in his Private and Public Ca-

SOCRATES.

In the Third Degree of Excellence, if I divine aright, you would not greatly mistake the truth, if you were to place Mind and Understanding ⁴³⁹.

PROTARCHUS.

capacity together, is here perfect: and thus in this *Second Conclusion* we find delineated *Man's Sovereign Good*. — But in this place, it becomes necessary, for the justification of the *First Conclusion*, to repeat what was observed in the Beginning of this Note, — viz: that *Measure* is the *Principle* and the Cause of all this Good.—For to those *Personal Virtues*, which consist in governing well the Appetites and Desires, Passions and Affections, of the Animal-Soul, absolutely *essential* are *Moderation* in their Use, and *Seasonableness* in the Time of using them: now the *Principle* of those *Qualities*, so essential to those *Virtues*, is no other than the Being of *Measure*.—Of the *Virtues*, which consist in regulating a Man's Conduct toward Others in the various *Relations* of *Social* and *Civil* Life, (all of which *Virtues* are comprehended in *Universal Justice*,) That *Measure*, according to which distributed are to All their *just Dues*, is the very *Essence*: and of This and of all *Other Measures* MEASURE ITS SELF, that is, GOOD ITS SELF, the Measure of All things in the Universe, is the sole *Cause*.

⁴³⁹ In some of the *Notes* a little preceding This, as well as in the *Argument* of the Dialogue, we have willingly admitted, that the *Subject* of it hath a respect to the *Divine Nature*, the *Sovereign Good* of the *Universe*; tho it hath a more immediate and professed View to the *Nature* and *Good* of *Man*. In the present Sentence, however, it is most evident, that

that the word *Mind* cannot be understood to mean, even remotely, the *Divine Mind*. For the Sentence, with such a Meaning, would expressly contradict the Declaration of *Socrates* himself, in Page 215, as may appear from Note 154.—Besides; the *Divine Mind* hath been already spoken of: This was meant in the *First Conclusion*; the word *Measure* being there used in that supereminent *transcendental* Sense, in which it signifies *Measure its Self*, Measure universally; for the *Divine Mind* alone is full of those *Ideas*, the most truly Universal and Divine,—The *Good*, The *Beautiful*, and The *Just*;—Ideas which extend, to all the Forms of *Nature*; penetrating, and wherever they penetrate, adorning, those Forms both inwardly and outwardly; affixing to Each of them its due *Measure*; affixing to the Infinites *within* them, the Elements of their Frame, *Bounds*, which they cannot pass; *moderating* the Intemperature of the Elementary Infinites *without*; and causing Nature to operate the Vicissitudes of these Elements *καίριως seasonably*, and opportunely for the Good of all the Forms, which their different Mixtures compose and preserve, by being well-tempered—relatively to those different Forms.——In the Sentence therefore now before us, the word *Mind* must signify the Mind of *Man*: and indeed 'tis *Man*, whose *Good* is the direct and proper Subject of this Summary or Conclusive Part, as well as of the rest of the Dialogue.——Now the Human Mind reaches not ordinarily to see any Mental Objects, higher than the *Kinds* and *Species* of external Things. That every Person should perceive These, is absolutely *necessary* to Human Society: because Whoever was without Such *General Ideas* could not converse with any other Person; nor could the Affairs of Social Life be carried on. And such a *Degree* of natural *Understanding*, as *capacitates* a Man for the Perception of Such Ideas, is *sufficient*,—not only for the Purposes of Common Life,—but also

for the acquisition of that Kind of Knowledge, which is termed the Knowledge of *Natural History*.—A greater *Degree* of natural *Understanding* is necessary for the Perception of Those *Ideas*, which are, with more propriety than any *General Kinds* of things, styled Universal; — Such we mean, as are the Subjects of the Second Conclusion,—*Symmetry* and *Beauty*,—*Perfection* of Form, (comprehending the Perfections peculiar to Each Kind of Form,) —and *Sufficiency* of all things *contributive* to that Perfection.—Persons of this Genius, beyond what is ordinary, differ also, One from Another, in the natural *Byas* or *Tendency* of this Genius toward *some Kinds* of Sensible Objects, more than toward *other* Kinds, tho equally apt to excite in them those Universal and Divine Ideas. And to this *Diversity of Genius* are owing the natural Inclinations of different Persons to *different Arts*.—Nor is the Difference less, amongst different Persons, with regard to the *Extensiveness* of this *finer Genius*, when it is directed toward the *Sciences*: and Sciences are the properest of all Subjects, for the Exercise of it; because they are farther removed from Corporeal Things, than are the *Arts*, and consequently approach nearer to *Ideas*, or *Forms* purely *Mental*.—Some Persons, who partake of this finer Genius, rest in the *Mathematical Sciences*, the Objects of which are indeed Symmetry and Proportion, Harmony and Beauty, but in no higher Subjects, than *Numbers*, *Figures*, and *Sounds*.—Other Persons, who seem to have a Genius equal to the Genius of the former, returning back again to the Corporeal World, with a View of benefiting Human Life by an Improvement of the Useful Arts, apply Mathematical Theorems to *grosser Bodys* only, to Such as may be *weighed* or *handled*.—In some Persons, their Genius extends to those Sciences, in which the Divine Universals are best exemplified, — the Science of *private Morals*, and the Science
of

of *Government* and *public Laws*. And in a Few, their Genius reaches to That Science, in which are contained the Principles of all the rest—*Dialectick*, or the Science of *Mind*.——Wise Men have observed, with great truth, that the *intrinsic Worth* of Every *Man* is to be estimated by the *real* (not the imaginary) *Value* of those Things which he most *admires*, *studies*, and *delights in*. — No less true is it of Every man's *Mind*, that the *Dignity* of it is in proportion to the *Dignity* of its *Objects*: and that the *Greatness* and *Extent* of Every man's *Understanding* are in proportion to the *Greatness* and *Extent* of the *Subjects*, which it comprehends.—In reasoning then from *Analogy*, it follows, that were it possible to separate (even *λόγῳ*) the *Divine Mind* from the *Divine Ideas*, as in *Themselves* they are, and as of that Great Mind they are the constant *Objects*, it is neither absurd nor presumptuous to say, that the *Divine Ideas* have the Highest Place in the *Divine Nature*; and that the *Divine Mind* is, on this very account, *pure* and *perfect*, *universal* and *eternal*, because *Such* is the Nature of the *Divine Ideas*.— See Note 274 to the *First Alcibiades*.—But the Inseparability of *Mind* and *Ideas* seems to be peculiar to the *Divine Nature*. For only the *Divine Mind* is always in *Energy*, always energising on his own *Ideas*; or rather he *is* those very *Ideas*, on which he energises: — Himself is universal *Good* and *Beauty*, — universal *Truth* and *Rectitude*, — universal *Justice* and *Goodness*.—From these *Ideas* therefore the *Divine Mind* cannot be separated, so much as merely *λόγῳ*, or be considered as *distinct*. Nay perhaps these *Divine Ideas* are, *in Themselves*, but *One* and the *same Idea*,—and only by *Human Minds*, (Such as partake of this Universal and DIVINE IDEA,) are considered as *Many* and *Different*, from the Difference of its Appearances to Them, as they apply it to *Different Subjects*; or to the *Same Subject*, viewed in different lights: as the *Same Thing* is often both *good* and *beautiful*; the *Same*

Action

Action both *good* and *just*.—We dare not affirm, that *Chalcidius* had in view That *Unity* of the Divine Mind, spoken of last; but we observe, that, in his *Commentary* on *Plato's Timæus*, pag: 431, he useth the *Singular* Number, in speaking of the Divine Ideas thus, — “*naturam verè existentem, constantem, eandemque semper, nimirum IDEAM, quæ intellectus Dei æterni est æternus.*”—Possibly, this Platonic Writer meant only the Divine Ideas in the General. Be that as it may, his words are plainly expressive of an *Union* of the *Divine Mind* with its *Object*, whether *One* or *Many*—an *Union inseparable*, because *eternal*.——We should not have dwelt on so clear a Point, had not some Learned Men imagined, that *Ideas*, according to the Doctrine of *Plato*, are *Beings, subsisting by Themselves, apart from the Divine Mind*;—and that, beside the *Two Causes* and *Principles* of all things, according to the *Pythagorean* Doctrine, *God* and *Necessity*, or *Mind* and *Matter*,—*Plato* introduced a *Third Principle* and *Cause*,—*Ideas*, the *Originals* or *Exemplars* of all *Sensible Forms*. — a Principle, as distinct from *God*, or *Mind*, as from *Necessity* or *Matter*, — rightly therefore rejected by *Aristotle*, as unnecessary, notional, and groundless.—But *D. Laertius* tells us, plainly, that *Plato* asserted *Two Principles of all things, God and Matter*, δύο τῶν πάντων ἀπέφηνεν ἀρχάς, θεὸν καὶ ὕλην, and that to *God* he (*Plato*) gives the appellations of *Mind* and *Cause*, θεὸν καὶ τὴν προσαγορεύει καὶ αἴτιον. *Laertius*, Lib: 3, §. 69. Edit: *Amsl*: and afterwards in §. 76, resuming the same Subject, he says,—ἀρχάς εἶναι καὶ αἴτια τὰ λεχθέντα δύο τῶν ὄντων (as *M. Casaubon*, like a Man versed in Manuscript Abbreviations, and the Errors thence arising, hath taught us to read this Passage,) παράδειγμα τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὴν ὕλην, that the *Causes* and *Principles* of things are the *Two* which have been mentioned, *God* the *Exemplar* of them, and *Matter*: in which Sentence, the word παράδειγμα *Exemplar* means *Idea*, as appears from §. 64, agreeably to the *Pythagorean* Doctrine.

PROTARCHUS.

Perhaps I should not.

SOCRATES.

And is not the Fourth Rank due to those things, which we assigned to the Soul herself ^{44°}, as her own proper

Doctrine. See before in this Dialogue, Page 249. — But the *Human Mind*, the Subject of the Sentence now before us, ought to be *distinguished* from her own *Ideas*; because she has, at first, but a bare *Capacity* of perceiving them; or, in other words, She *is*, at first, in *Capacity*, every *Idea*, which ariseth in her afterwards, — whether excited by *Sensible Objects*, or by learning any *Art* or *Science*, or by *energising* within her Self on her *Ideas* already so excited. The *Human Understanding* is, in like manner, to be *distinguished* from those *Subjects* of any *Art* or *Science*, which are made *Objects* of the *Human Understanding*, by the receiving of such *Art* or *Science* from *Human Masters*, or their *Writings*, or from the internal and universal *Teacher* of all *Knowledge*. — Accordingly here, where only the *Human Mind* and the *Human Understanding* are meant, — and in *general* also, including all *Degrees* of *Capacity*, or natural *Understanding*, in *different Human Minds*, — *Mind* and *Understanding* are, as appears from the next Sentence of *Socrates*, (the *Fourth Conclusion*,) distinguished from *Sciences* and *Arts* and *right Opinions*; notwithstanding that neither *Opinions*, nor *Arts*, nor even *Sciences*, (so called by Men,) have place in any other *Minds* than Such as are the *Human*.

^{44°} Meaning the *Rational Soul* or *Mind* of *Man*. — *Plato*, throughout the *Argumentative* Part of his *Phædo*, useth the word *Soul*, in speaking of *Man*, to signify the *Mind*. For the

proper Goods, Sciences, and Arts, and Right Opinions ⁴⁴¹, a Fourth Order of Goods, following next after the first Three? ought we not here to place them,

Arguments, there made Use of, to prove the *Immortality* of the *Soul*, amount to nothing more than Proofs of the *Eternity* of all *Mind*. It may therefore reasonably be inferred, that *Plato* held the *Soul of Man* to become *immortal* only by partaking of *Universal Mind*, which is abundantly shown to be *eternal*.

⁴⁴¹ *Arts* are here placed in a Rank *inferiour* to that of the *Human Mind*, because *Human Minds* were the *Inventors* of them; and the *Inventor* must be allowed *superiour* to the *Invention*, as being the *intelligent* and *designing Cause* of it. Indeed, 'tis *Human Mind*, who is the *Artist*: and every *Artist-Mind* is only a *Human Mind*, acting on *Subjects* of some certain *Kinds*, according to a set of *Rules*, *invented* by her *Self* or by other *Human Minds*. ——— Even the *Sciences*, so far as they are known hitherto, are placed in this *inferiour* Rank, because the *Capacity* of the *Human Mind* reaches, we presume, to much greater *Heights of Science*, than *Man* hath as yet actually ascended to. — Many *Theorems* in every *Science* remain undiscovered: many a *Simple Truth*, the mutual *Relation* of *Two Ideas*, — the *Power* (as it were) of those *Two Ideas* in *combination*, — lyes in them still latent: and many a *Complex Truth*, the *Result* of *Simple Truths*, — a more extensive *Power* (as it were) of *Ideas*, — lyes hidden yet deeper. But how far soever extended, the *Power* of *Ideas* may be hereafter found, by *complicating* and *compounding* *Truths* known before; — how great a *Multitude* soever may arise out of a *Few*, by *Deductions*, *Inferences*, and *Corollarys*; — every *Mind* is, by nature, capable of such

them, if they are more nearly related to the Chief Good ⁴⁴² than they are to Pleasure?

PROTARCHUS.

Perhaps we ought.

SOCRATES.

Then follow, Fifth in Order, the Pleasures of That Sort, which we described to be unmixed with Pain, and denominated Pure, such as Those consequent to Sensation, but belonging to the Soul her Self, when she is engaged in the Sciences ⁴⁴³.

PROTARCHUS.

It may be so.

SOCRATES.

such Advancement, as to be able, in time, to follow, to apprehend, and to comprehend them all: and consequently the Human Mind is superiour to the *present* (or any *given*) *Stage* of any *Science*. — In what respect, *Right Opinions* merit a Place in the same Rank with *Sciences* on some occasions, — especially at present, when they are considered as Things absolutely and always *Good*, relative to *Man*, — may be seen in the *Meno*, Pages 232, 3; and 246. — In what respect, *Right Opinion* is inferiour to *Science*, appears in the intermediate Pages of that Dialogue.

⁴⁴² For all the Objects of Art, or of Science, or of Right Opinion, being every One of them *bounded*, partake of the Chief Good, — *Measure*.

⁴⁴³ In the *Greek* of this Sentence, the word ἐπιτήμιας ought to be either quite expunged, or changed for the word ἡδονάς, or im-

SOCRATES.

With the Sixth Race —— (says Orpheus)

Close we the finish'd Series of our Song ⁴⁴⁴.

Our Disquisition too seems to be now finished, and to close with passing our Sixth Sentence. After all This, nothing remains for us to do, but to affix a Head as it were to the whole Body of our Inquiry.

PROTARCHUS.

mediately preceded by the Preposition *περι*. See Page 547. — The *purest Pleasures*, those of Science, are certainly not *Sciences*, themselves.

⁴⁴⁴ This Verse of *Orpheus* we meet with again in *Plutarch's* Treatise concerning the *Delphic Inscription* Εἶ, and in no other ancient Author, whom We are acquainted with. It is introduced by *Plutarch* no otherwise, than as a Part of the present Passage in *Plato*, which is there quoted; and not so, as to give us any light into the Poet's own Meaning in that Verse. But if we may form a probable Conjecture from *Plato's* application of it, 'twas the End of a Description of *Five* different Ages of the World, with regard to Men's Manners and Ways of Life. For Men are generally supposed to have departed, more and more, from their primæval Purity, Simplicity, and Innocence; and each successive Age to have been less virtuous and honest than the preceding.—The Poet *Ovid*, in his *Metamorphoses*, writes of *Four* Ages, gradually degenerating in that manner; in the last of which *Four*, he says, the Giants made War against the Gods. The Fable was very ancient; and in *Ovid's* Days, a long Time had elapsed since the supposed Age of it.—The Poet *Hesiod*, in his *Ἔργα καὶ Ἡμέραι*, says, that he Himself lived in the *Fifth* Age. And 'tis highly probable, that

PROTARCHUS.

'Tis fit that we should.

SOCRATES.

Come then ; the Third to the Saviour ⁴⁴⁵ ; let us commemorate Him, whose Aid brought the Argu-

that *Onomacritus*, an Athenian Poet, who, long after the time of *Hesiod*, tho long before the time of *Socrates*, wrote a Poem, (ascribing it to *Orpheus*,) intitled "Ἔργα καὶ Ἡμέραι,—to imitate or to rival *Hesiod*'s on the same Subject, — briefly described therein the different Manners of those *Five Ages* ; as *Hesiod* had done, with regard to the first *Four* : but that, coming to the *Sixth Age*,—That, in which he Himself lived, he stopped short, like *Hesiod*. For the Muses, in those days, were modest ; and did not, as they did afterwards, exhibit in their Songs the most offensive Objects. Two Fragments of that Poem, feigned to have been written by *Orpheus*, are yet remaining, given us by *Tzetzes*, in the Proëm to his Commentary on *Hesiod*, pag: 4. And, in One of those Fragments, mention is made of χρυσῆν γενῆν *the Golden Age*, when Men employed themselves wholly in Agriculture and Planting.

⁴⁴⁵ For an account of this *Proverb*, the Reader is referred to Note 363. — *Mind* and *Right Reason* are here, as well as in the Passage to which That Note belongs, meant by *the Saviour*, —the only protecting and preserving Deity, in Cases where all other Protection, Aid, or Remedy, is insufficient. This is also the Meaning of the last Sentence of *Simplicius*, in his excellent Commentary on the *Manual of Epictetus*, where he alludes to the same *Proverb*.

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ment to a Conclusion; calling Him to witness the Truth of it.

PROTARCHUS.

Whom do you mean?

SOCRATES.

Philebus laid down this Position,—that the Good of Man was all and every Kind of Pleasure in full Abundance.

PROTARCHUS.

By commemorating the Saviour, it seems, then, Socrates! you meant, that we should resume the original Argument of our Inquiry.

SOCRATES.

Well: but let us observe what followed. I, viewing with Dislike that Position just now mentioned,—the Tenet, not of Philebus only, but of Thousands beside in all ages,—on the other hand asserted, that Mind was a thing far better and more beneficial to Human Life, than Pleasure.

PROTARCHUS.

That was Your Position.

SOCRATES.

But then suspecting, that many other things had Pretensions to the same Character of being the Good
of

of Man, I engaged, if Something ⁴⁴⁶ should appear Better than Both of Those, to combat for the Second Prize, in behalf of Mind, against Pleasure; that Pleasure, in her Claim to so much as This, might be defeated.

PROTARCHUS.

You did engage so to do.

SOCRATES.

Afterwards, on Trial, it was very sufficiently proved, that Neither of our Favourites answered the Character of compleat Good.

PROTARCHUS.

Perfectly true.

SOCRATES.

Mind therefore and Pleasure were, Both of them, quite dismissed from having any thing to do in the Controversy concerning Good its Self; as Each of them wanted Self-Sufficiency, and that Power which attends the Compleat and Perfect.

⁴⁴⁶ All the Editions of *Plato* give us to read τὸ instead of τῆ in this Sentence. *Ficinus*, however, translates, as if in the Medicean Manuscript he read τῆ, which undoubtedly is the true Reading; and herein he is followed by all the Translators who came after him.

PROTARCHUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Very right.

SOCRATES.

But after we had discovered a Third Thing preferable to Either of those Two, we found the nature of Mind to approach nearer to the nature of this Conqueror, and to be much more familiar with his Form, than Pleasure.

PROTARCHUS.

We certainly did.

SOCRATES.

The Sixth ⁴⁴⁷ and lowest Place then, according to the Judgment now given, as the Result of

⁴⁴⁷ A very gross Error has infected all the Editions, and all the Translations of *Plato*, in this place. For in all the Editions we read πέμπτον the *Fifth*, instead of ἕκτον the *Sixth*. Now the *Fifth* Rank was before assigned solely to the *pure* Pleasures. The *Sixth* and last Rank therefore remains to *Pleasure*, one of the Three great Subjects of this Dialogue;—to *Pleasure*, pretending to be the only or the chief *Good of Man*, and by *Philebus* avowed, and contended for, as Such;—*Pleasure* in general and undistinguished;—*Pleasure at random*, from whatever Quarter it comes;—in *Plato's* own words, vol: 2, pag: 40, Edit: *Steph: παράπαν, ἰπώσῃν, καὶ εἰκῆ χαίγειν*.—But the very next Sentence of *Socrates* puts it beyond all Doubt, that Pleasure of Sense,—*Sensual Pleasure*,—is here meant.

this

this Inquiry, belongs to the Power of Pleasure *unbounded*.

PROTARCHUS.

So it appears.

SOCRATES.

But the First Place belongs to her, as ⁴⁴⁸ Bulls would say and Horses ⁴⁴⁹, and all Beasts whatever of the Savage Kind: for it appears so from the manner in which they pursue Pleasure. And on the Credit of these Animals, just as the Judgment of Diviners depends on the Flight of Birds,

⁴⁴⁸ In the *Greek* of this Sentence, we presume that the word *ἐκ* ought to be changed into *ὡς*.

⁴⁴⁹ *Porphyrus*, in his Treatise *περὶ ἀποχῆς ἐμψύχων*, Lib: 3, §. 1. writes thus;—*Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸς ἡδονῶν διαμφορητέντας εἶναι τὸ τέλος, ἔδ' ἂν πάντες, ἔφη, σῦες καὶ τράγοι τέτω συναποῖεν, πειθήσειν δ' ἂν ἐν τῷ ἡδέει τὸ εὐδαιμον ἡμῶν κείναι, ἔς' ἂν ἴθι ἐν τοῖς πᾶσι κρατῆ.* *To certain Persons, who were disputing on this Point, — whether Pleasure was the Ultimate End of Man, — Socrates, said, that, were all the Swine and Goats in the world to joyn in applauding this Man, (the Advocate for Pleasure,) yet he should never be persuaded, that Human Happiness consisted in being pleased, so long as Mind excelled and prevailed in all things. — If Porphyrus, in This, alluded to the very emphatical Passage in Plato, now before us, he seems to have improved the Force of it not a little; — unless, in His Copy of this Dialogue, he read *σῦες καὶ τράγοι*, instead of *βόες καὶ ἵπποι*.*

Q q q q

Sentence

Sentence is pronounced by the Multitude, that Pleasures have the greatest Power in making our Lives happy. For the Loves and Joys of Brute Animals they deem a stronger Evidence, and fitter to be credited, than the Sayings of Men, prophetically uttered in all places, thro Inspiration of the Philosophic Muse.

PROTARCHUS.

That You have said what is most agreeable to Truth, O Socrates! we are, All of us, now agreed.

SOCRATES.

Now then ye will dismiss me.

PROTARCHUS.

There is a little, O Socrates! still remaining to be considered. For you must not quit the Company, before it breaks up: and I will put you in Mind of what you have left unsaid.

T H E E N D.

The Reader is desired to correct the following Errors ; and any other, which may have escaped our Notice.

Page 53, Line 10 ; for *Veneral*, read *Venereal*.

Page 68, in the Notes, Line 2 ; for *Acutenss*, read *Acutenesss*.

Page 257, Line 4 from the bottom ; for *eats*, read *Seats*.

Page 317, End of the Note ; for the *Basil Editions*, read *the first Basil Edition*.

Page 321, Note 195, for *all*, read *most* : and to the End of the Note add these words,—The 2d Basil Edition confirms our Opinion.

Page 407, Line 1, for 238, put 239. and in a few Lines after, blot out 239.—Note 238 belongs to page 406, Line 3.

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