


3/6

A DIGEST
OF THE
DOCTRINE OF S. THOMAS
ON THE
INCARNATION.

“ Bene scripsisti de Me, Thoma : quam ergo mercedem accipies ? Non
aliam, Domine, nisi Teipsum.”



LONDON :
J. T. HAYES, LYALL PLACE, EATON SQUARE.



JAN 2 1936

8354

LONDON:
SWIFT & CO., REGENT PRESS, 55, KING STREET,
REGENT STREET, W.

TO
THE BLESSED SAINT,
AND
ANGELIC DOCTOR OF THE CHURCH OF GOD,
THOMAS AQUINAS,

THIS VOLUME IS HUMBLY DEDICATED

BY
HIS LOVING AND GRATEFUL DISCIPLE.

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

P R E F A C E.

THE writer dare not publish a *Digest of the Doctrine of S. Thomas on the Incarnation*, without warning his younger readers that the view presented in the following pages is not the only one taught and received in the Church of God.

Three theories of the Incarnation are, or have been current in the schools, and they are these:—*

1. That taught by Raymond Lully, and since his time by various modern optimists. Admitting that the Incarnation is not simply

* NOTE.—The reader will find this subject, of which the writer has given a summary, treated at some length by the late Father Faber in his volume on *The Blessed Sacrament*, Book iv.

BQ
6905

.D5

b

and absolutely necessary to God—a proposition which could not be asserted without impiety, it maintains that, given the Creation, the Incarnation must follow as its necessary consequence. God, decreeing Creation, was bound to decree the best and most perfect kind of creation ; but that involves the union of a created nature with an uncreated Person : and so God could not decree creation, without at the same time decreeing the Incarnation, which was its perfection.

There is in this view much truth and great beauty, but it is founded more on what theologians call *convenience* than on necessity.

2. The second theory of the Incarnation is that formulated by S. Thomas, and generally taught by that school of theological thought which from him takes its name of Thomist. The Thomists teach that Jesus not only came principally to save sinners, in which all agree, but that, if there had been no sin, there would have been no Incarnation. They say that His coming was altogether remedial, and that He could not have come otherwise, so far as God's present decrees are concerned. In support of this view there is a large amount of Scripture

evidence, that would seem at first sight to decide the question in their favour, especially when taken in connection with several congenial expressions in the Hymns and Offices of the Church. The greatest modern exponent of this view is Vasquez.

3. The third view of the Incarnation is that taken by the Scotists, by Suarez, and by many other theologians both ancient and modern. It teaches—and so far in accordance with Thomist theology, that Jesus came principally to save sinners, and for that end came in passible flesh; but here its agreement ceases. It asserts that even if Adam had never sinned, Jesus would yet have come, and come by means of Mary, in impassible flesh; that He was predestinated the Firstborn of creatures before the decree which permitted sin; that the Incarnation was from the first an intentional and integral part of the scheme of creation; that it was not merely occasioned by sin, but that sin only determined the manner of it, and its accompaniments of suffering and death. And it is as regards the *manner* of the Incarnation alone, as speaking of our Lord's coming in passible and mortal flesh, that the Scotists understand those passages in Holy

Scripture, in the writings of the Fathers, and in the Office Books of the Church, which at first sight seem to make for the Thomist view. The Scotists dwell very much on the doctrine that Jesus was decreed before all creation, and therefore before the permission of sin. They hold that all men exist because of Christ, and not Christ because of them, that all creation was for Him, and was not only decreed subsequently to His predestination, but for His sole sake.

They found again upon His being the First Begotten and Exemplar of the predestinate. And they go on to establish their view by arguments drawn from reason, from the natural order of things, from the relative value of means and ends, from the grace of the unfallen Adam, which is alleged to have been conferred on him because of Christ, from the Incarnation having, as S. Thomas teaches, been revealed to Adam, who, although he lost hope and the love of God when he sinned, did not lose his faith.

They urge further, that on the Thomist view, Christ was only an "occasioned good," and, a still more unworthy supposition, occasioned by sin; or again, that Christ would have to rejoice

in Adam's sin, as owing to it His existence, grace, and His glory as man.

Again, it is said, that if Christ was decreed after us, and because of us, and only to redeem us, three monstrous consequences would follow :—

1. That Christ would owe us a debt of gratitude.
2. That we should in certain respects be more excellent than He.
3. That sin was necessary to His existence.

On the Scotist view of the Incarnation the following would be the order of the Divine Decrees—the order of intention, that is, for there can of course be no order of time with God.

1. God understood Himself as the Sovereign Good.
2. He understood all creatures.
3. He predestinated creatures to grace and glory.
4. He foresaw men falling in Adam.
5. He pre-ordained the Passion of Christ as the remedy for this fall.

Thus Christ in the Flesh, and all the elect members of His mystical Body also, were foreseen

and predestined to grace and glory, before the foresight either of sin or of the Passion.

It will be observed that both Thomists and Scotists lay the utmost stress on the doctrine that Jesus came, as He has come, expressly and principally to redeem mankind from sin, and that consequently a remedial character pervades all His mysteries, both such as have to do with His being our example, and such as have to do with His being our atonement, while the same character is stamped also upon His enactments as our legislator.

Further, the Thomists allow that redemption from sin was by no means the sole end of the Incarnation. They admit that the manifestation of the Divine Omnipotence, Wisdom, and Goodness was one end, and the Headship of the whole Church of angels and men was another.

Both views then have much in common : there may be no insurmountable repugnance between them, it may be that a little modification would reconcile them, and yet it is a patent fact that each gives a distinct tone and colouring to a man's theology, and altering his standpoint affects his views on every subject that falls

within the range of his theological vision. Having said thus much, we say no more, inasmuch as both theories are permitted opinions in the schools.

Lent, 1868.



THE

Mystery of the Incarnation.

I. THE nature of God is the essence of goodness, and it belongs to the idea of goodness that it seek to communicate itself to others, and to the idea of the highest good that it communicate itself in the highest possible manner—hence the Incarnation.

II. By it the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: His goodness in that He despised not the infirmity of the work of His hands; His justice in that the tyrant who had conquered man should by man be conquered; His wisdom in devising, and His infinite power in accomplishing, the mystery—than which there is none greater—that God should be made man.

III. God could, by virtue of His Omnipotent power, have restored mankind in many other

ways, but that of the Incarnation was the best, and the best suited to its end, the attainment by us of everlasting salvation, as affording us : 1. An object of faith ; 2. A ground of hope ; 3. An incentive to charity ; 4. An example ; and 5. A means in order to a full participation of divinity, which is the true beatitude of man, and the end of human life : as S. Augustine says, " God was made man that man might be made God." Similarly with regard to the removal of evil : 1. Man is by the Incarnation taught the exceeding dignity of human nature, and so prevented from defiling it by sin. 2. Not to presume, seeing the grace of God is given to no preceding merit of our own. 3. Man's pride is rebuked and healed by God's humility. 4. Man is freed from the bondage of sin, its author the devil being vanquished by the Man Christ Jesus, who satisfied for us. Mere man could not, God ought not, it needed a God-Man to satisfy for the whole human race.

IV. Although God might have become Incarnate had sin never existed, yet it seems more probable that if man had not sinned God would not have become Incarnate, because everywhere in the sacred Scriptures the cause of the Incarnation is assigned to the sin of the first man. " The Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was lost." " Jesus Christ came into the world to

save sinners." Take away the disease, take away the wounds, and there is no cause for the medicine.

V. Although Christ came into this world to destroy all sins, yet it was chiefly to take away original sin, if we regard its universality, inasmuch as that wherewith whole human nature is infected is greater than that which is special to the individual, but 2, chiefly to take away actual sin, if we regard its voluntariness.

VI. God was not Incarnate before sin, as the medicine is not given before the disease. "They that are whole have no need of a physician." Nor immediately after, that man might be humbled and recognise his need of a liberator. God therefore placed him, first, under the natural law to learn the strength of his nature, then under the law, and then under grace. 2. To preserve a due order of progress from the imperfect to the perfect, first that which is animal, thereafter that which is spiritual—the first man, of the earth, earthy; the Second Man, the Lord from heaven. 3. The greater the judge, the longer the procession of heralds.

Neither was the Incarnation delayed to the end of the world, lest the knowledge of God should die out among men, as threatened to be the case when it was renewed once and again by the sending of Abraham and Moses: and 2,

that men might have faith not only in the future, but also in the present and the past. 3. The end of the world is the time, not of grace, but of glory.

VII. The name *nature* is taken *à nascendo*. Primarily, it signifies the generation of living things, which may be called their nativity or pullulation, and so nature may take its name *quasi nascitura*. Secondly, the name *nature* is transferred to signify the beginning or principle (*principium*) of this generation. And inasmuch as the principle of generation in living things is intrinsic, the name *nature* is further derived to signify any intrinsic principle of motion; as The Philosopher says, in *The Physics*, Nature is the principle of motion in that, in which it is *per se*, and not *secundum accidens*. But this principle is either form or matter, and so nature is sometimes called form, and sometimes matter. And inasmuch as the end of natural generation is in that which is generated, namely, the essence of its species, which its definition signifies; so such essence of species is also called nature. In this way Boetius defines nature as the specific difference which informs a thing.

If we speak of nature, as nature signifies essence, or quiddity of species, we must lay it down as impossible that the union of the Incarnate Word could be made *in nature*.

VIII. Any one thing may be constituted of two things or more ; and this in three ways. In one way, of two whole things remaining perfect ; which, indeed, cannot be done unless in those things of which the form is composition or order, or figure. Many stones united without any order, form by virtue of composition alone, a heap : stones and timbers disposed according to a certain order, and reduced to a certain figure, form a house. Some have accordingly laid it down that there is union by way of confusion, namely, without order ; and union by way of commensuration, namely, with order. But this cannot be. 1. Because composition, or order, or figure, is not substantial form, but accidental : and so it would follow that the union by the Incarnation would be not *per se*, but *per accidens*. 2. Because in an union of this sort there would not be unity (*unum*) *simpliciter*, but relatively, *secundum quid* ; for the component parts would in act remain several. 3. Because the form of such things is not nature, but rather art ; as the form of a house. And so there would not be constituted one nature in Christ, as these will have it.

IX. In another way, any one thing may be made of several perfect but transmuted things ; as, for instance, it may be a mixture of elements. And so some have said that the union of the

Incarnation was made by way of commixtion. But this cannot be: 1. Because the Divine Nature is altogether immutable; and hence it can neither be converted into anything, since it is incorruptible, nor can anything be converted into it, since it is ingenerable. 2. Because that which is commixed is the same in species with nothing mixable: for flesh differs from every species of element. And so Christ would be of the same nature neither with His Father nor with His Mother. 3. Because there cannot be made a commixtion of those things between which there is a very great divergence, for the species of one of them is destroyed; as, for instance, when a drop of water is placed in a cask of wine. Accordingly, since the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds human nature, there cannot be a mixture of the two; the Divine Nature would remain alone.

X. In a third way, one thing may be made up of other things not mixed or transmuted, but imperfect, as a man is made up of soul and body, and similarly as one body is made up of diverse members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of the Incarnation. 1. Because both natures, the Divine and the human, are, according to their own idea (*ratio*) severally perfect. 2. Because the Divine Nature cannot constitute anything by way of quantitative parts,

as the members constitute the body, because the Divine Nature is incorporeal. Nor by way of form and matter, because the Divine Nature cannot be the form of anything, especially of a corporeal thing. For it would follow that the species resulting would be communicable to several, and so there would be several Christs. 3. Because Christ would be neither of a human Nature nor of a Divine, for a difference added varies the species, as a unity does the number.

XI. The fathers of Chalcedon decreed that in the Incarnation there was an union of two Natures—the human and the Divine, and that, 1, inconfusedly ; 2, immutably ; 3, undividedly ; and 4, inseparably.

XII. Certain expressions of the earlier fathers seem at first sight to be at variance with the faith ; but this arises simply from the terminology of their day being less precise, definite, and exact than that of later times. For instance, S. Cyril says that we must not understand two Natures, but one Nature, of God the Incarnate Word. He did not mean that in the Incarnation there was of two natures constituted one, but that the Divine Nature of the Word of God united to Itself Flesh in a Person.

The Athanasian Creed says, “As the rational soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is

One Christ." This would seem at first sight to imply, that as the rational soul and flesh come together in the constitution of one human nature, so in the Incarnation God and man come together in the constitution of one nature. But of soul and body there is constituted in each one of us a twofold unity—of nature and of person. Of nature, inasmuch as the soul is united to the body, formally perfecting it, so that of two there is made one nature, as in the case of action and potentiality, or of matter and form. But in regard of this, the cases are dissimilar, for the Divine Nature cannot be the form of a body, as we have said. Unity of person is constituted, inasmuch as it is one who subsists both in flesh and soul. And here the cases are similar, for one Christ subsists in the Divine Nature and in the human.

S. Cyril says that the Divine Nature has been incarnated: and S. Gregory Nazianzen says that human nature has been deified. But one of two natures is not denominated from the other, unless they have been in some way transmuted, the one into the other. SS. Cyril and Gregory's denomination of the one Nature of Christ from the other would seem at first sight to imply that they held that of the two natures there was, in the union of the Incarnation, made but one. But it must be remembered, as S. John Damas-

cene says, that the Divine Nature is said to be incarnate because It is united to flesh personally, not as if It was converted into the nature of flesh. Similarly also flesh is said to be deified, as the same saint says, not by conversion, but by union with the Word, its own natural properties being preserved. Flesh is said to be deified, inasmuch as it was made the Flesh of the Word of God, not that it was made God.

XIII. Person has a different signification from nature: for nature, as has been said, signifies the essence of the species, which the definition signifies. If to those things which belong to the idea of species nothing else could be found joined, there would be no necessity to distinguish nature from the *suppositum* of nature, which is an *individuum* subsisting in that nature; since every *individuum* subsisting in any nature would be entirely identical with that nature. But it happens that in some subsisting things there is found something which does not pertain to the idea of species—to wit, accidents and individuating principles (as is chiefly apparent in those things which are composed of matter and form), and so in such, nature and the *suppositum* differ *secundum rem*, not as do things altogether separated, but because in the *suppositum* is included the nature of the species, and there

are superadded certain other things which are beyond the idea of species. Hence the *suppositum* is signified as a whole, having nature as its formal part, and perfective of itself. Accordingly, in things composed of matter and form, nature is not predicated of the *suppositum*, for we do not say that this man is his own humanity. But if there be anything in which there is nothing else whatever over and beyond the idea of species and of its nature (as in God) then in that case nature and the *suppositum* do not differ *secundum rem*, but only *secundum rationem intelligendi*; for it is called nature inasmuch as it is an essence, and it is called *suppositum* inasmuch as it is a subsistence. And what has been said of the *suppositum* is to be understood of the person in the rational or intellectual creature; since, according to Boetius, the person is none other than the individual substance of the rational nature. Everything, therefore, which is in any one person, whether it pertains to its nature or not, is united to it *in personâ*. If, therefore, human nature is not united to the Word of God in a person, it is united to Him in no way. But this would wholly destroy the faith of the Incarnation, and subvert the whole Christian belief. Since, therefore, the Word has human nature united to Himself, but not pertaining to His

Divine Nature, it follows that the union was made in the Person of the Word, and not in nature.

XIV. Although in God nature and person do not differ, as has been said, *secundum rem*; yet they do differ by way of signifying, person signifying by way of subsistence. And since human nature is so united to the Word that the Word subsists in it, albeit not so that there is added to it anything adding to the idea of its nature, or that its nature is transmuted into something else, therefore the union of human nature with the Word of God was made in person and not in nature.

XV. Personality pertains to the dignity and perfection of a thing only in so far as it pertains to its dignity and perfection to exist *per se*—by itself. This existence *per se* is what the word *person* signifies. But it confers greater dignity on a thing for that thing to exist in another thing of greater dignity than its own, than for it to exist *per se*. And so human nature is of greater dignity in Christ than in us, because in us it has its own personality, as existing *per se*, while in Christ it exists in the Person of the Word. As also to be complete of the species pertains to the dignity of the form, yet the sensitive is more noble in man, by reason of its conjunction with a nobler complete form, than

it is in a brute animal, in which it is the complete form.

XVI. The Word of God assumed human nature—not *in universali*, but *in atomo vel individuo*, that is, undivided; otherwise it would become every man to be the Word of God, as it becomes Christ. The Word of God assumed undivided human nature, for universal Nature does not subsist *secundum se*, but as considered in naked contemplation.

But it must be remembered that not every individual or atom in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, has the idea of person, but only that which exists *per se*, and not that which exists in another more perfect existence. A hand, although it be a sort of individual, is yet not a person, because it does not exist *per se*, but in something more perfect, to wit, in its whole. This also is signified in the definition of person as an individual or individual substance; for the hand is not a complete substance, but part of a substance. Although, therefore, this human nature is a sort of individual in the genus of substance, yet, inasmuch as it does not exist separately and *per se*, but in something more perfect, to wit, in the Person of the Word of God, it consequently has no personality of its own. And so the union was made in a person.

XVII. Some men, being ignorant of the relation of *hypostasis* to person, although granting that in Christ there was one person only, have yet held that there was in Him one *hypostasis* of God and another of man, as if the union had been made in person and not in *hypostasis*. But this appears to be erroneous, and that in three ways. 1. Because the person does not add, over and above the *hypostasis*, aught save a determinate nature, to wit, a rational nature, as Boetius says, A person is the individual substance of a rational nature. And so it is the same thing to attribute a proper *hypostasis* to human nature in Christ as it is to attribute a proper person. Understanding this, the holy fathers of Constantinople anathematized all those who should endeavour to introduce into the mystery of Christ two subsistences or two persons; for a subsistence is the same as a thing subsisting, and that is a proper *hypostasis*. 2. Because, if it be given that the person adds something over and above the *hypostasis*, in which there can be union made, this is then nothing else than a property pertaining to dignity; according to which it is said by some that a person is an *hypostasis* distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity. If, therefore, an union was made in person and not in *hypostasis*, it would follow that there would be no

union made save according to a certain dignity. This, with the approbation of the Synod of Ephesus, was condemned by Cyril. He anathematized any man who should divide the subsistences in the One Christ, after their admixtion, coupling them together by conjunction alone, which is according to a certain dignity or authority, or according to power, and not rather by concourse according to natural admixtion.

3. Because that only is an *hypostasis* to which are attributed operations and properties of nature, and those things which in the concrete pertain to the idea of nature. For we say that this man ratiocinates, and is risible, and is a rational animal. And for this reason this man is said to be a *suppositum*, because he is supposed in those things which pertain to a man, and they are predicated of him. If, therefore, there be in Christ another *hypostasis* besides the *hypostasis* of the Word, it would follow that all those things which belong to a man would be true of some one other than the Word, such as, to be born of the Virgin, to suffer, to be crucified and buried. This also was condemned with the approbation of the Council of Ephesus. Those were anathematized who should apportion to two persons or subsistences the words which are written of Christ in the Gospels and Apostolical Scriptures,

or said of Him by the Saints, or spoken by Him of Himself, and apply certain of them to Him as He is man, and certain others to Him as He is God.

It is clear then that it is a heresy, condemned in old times by the Church, to say that in Christ there are two *hypostases*, or two *supposita*; or that the union was not made *in hypostasi vel supposito*.

The truth is, as S. John Damascene declares, that in the Lord Jesus Christ there are two natures, but one *hypostasis*.

XVIII. Although the person or hypostasis of Christ is *ex se* altogether simple, as is the nature of the Word, yet as subsisting in two natures it is said to be composite.

XIX. Christ is said to be man univocally with other men, as existing in the same species; as the Apostle taught the Philippians, He was made in the likeness of men. But it belongs to the idea of the human species that a soul be united to a body. And so we must say that in Christ there was a soul united to a body; and the contrary is heretical, as derogating from the truth of the Humanity of Christ.

A body is not said to be animated, unless by reason of its union with a soul (*anima*). But the Body of Christ is animated, as the Church sings in the Lauds of the Circumcision, *Anima-*

tum corpus sumens, de Virgine nasci dignatus est.

XX. By the union of the soul and body in purely human beings there is caused and constituted the person or hypostasis of a man. And this happens in beings merely human, because body and soul are so conjoined in them that they exist *per se* ; but in Christ they, the body and soul, are united the one to the other as joined to something else, and that nobler than either, which subsists in the nature composed of both. And so by the union of soul and body in Christ there is not constituted a new hypostasis or person, but the two come together, and are conjoined to a pre-existing person or hypostasis. And yet it does not follow, by reason of this, that the union of soul and body in Christ is of less efficacy than it is in us ; since the conjunction of one thing with another more noble than itself does not take away its virtue or dignity, but increases it. For instance, the sensitive soul in animals constitutes their species, seeing it is considered as their ultimate form, but not in man, even although it be in us of greater virtue and more noble ; and this by reason of the adjunction of an ulterior and more noble perfection, to wit, a rational soul.

XXI. The soul is joined to the body to quicken

it and make it live. But the Body of Christ might have been quickened by that to which It was united—the Word of God, which is the fount and principle of life. True, but it must be remembered that the principle of bodily life is twofold. One is effective; and so the Word of God is the principle of all life. The other is formal; and so the body lives by its form, to wit, its soul. It is, therefore, apparent that from one point of view, that is to say, regarding the matter *formaliter*, the body cannot be said to live by the Word, which cannot be the form of a body.

XXII. With regard to the mystery of the union of the two natures in Christ there arose a twofold heresy. One, that of Eutyches and Dioscorus, confused the natures. They held that of the two natures there was constituted one nature; and maintained that while Christ was of two distinct natures before their union, He was not in two natures after their union, the distinction of the natures ceasing with their union.

There was another heresy, that of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia, who separated the personality. They held that there was one person of the Son of God, and another person of the Son of Man, which they said were united the one to the other; 1. By inhabitation, inas-

much as the Word of God dwelt in the man (Christ) as in a temple. 2. By unity of affection, inasmuch as the will of the man (Christ) was always conformed to the will of the Word of God. 3. By operation; they said the man (Christ) was the instrument of the Word of God. 4. By dignity of honour, inasmuch as all honour which is exhibited to the Son of God is co-exhibited to the Son of Man, by reason of His conjunction with the Son of God. 5. By equivocation, that is, communication of names, as we say that that man is God and the Son of God. But it is manifest all these modes import an *accidental* union.

XXIII. Certain later masters, thinking that they were keeping clear of these heresies, have ignorantly and unwittingly fallen into them. For some of them, granting that there was one person of Christ, have said that there were two *hypostases*, or two *supposita*, and that a man composed of body and soul was from the beginning of his conception assumed by the Word of God. This is the first opinion given by the Master of the Sentences (Book iii. Dist. 6). Others, desirous to preserve the unity of person, have maintained that the Soul of Christ was not united to His Body, but that these two, separate from each other, were united to the Word *accidentally*; and so did not cause a number of persons.

This is the third opinion given by the Master. Both of these opinions fall into the heresy of Nestorius. The first, inasmuch as to maintain two *hypostases* or two *supposita* in Christ is the same as to maintain two persons, as we have before shown. The other falls into the heresy of Nestorius, as maintaining an accidental union. For there is no difference between saying that the Word of God is united to the man Christ by inhabitation as in a temple, as Nestorius said, and saying that the Word of God was united to the man Christ by induction, as of a vestment.

The Catholic faith, holding the mean between the foresaid positions, does not say the union of God and man was made according to essence or nature, nor accidentally, but by a middle mode, according to subsistence or hypostasis.

The second, then, of the three opinions given by the Master of the Sentences, which asserts one hypostasis of God and man, is not to be called an opinion, but an article of the Catholic faith. Similarly, also, the first opinion, which maintains two hypostases, and the third opinion, which maintains an accidental union, are not to be called opinions, but heresies condemned in Council by the Church.

XXIV. S. Paul wrote to the Philippians concerning the Son of God, that He was found in

habit as a man. Here human nature in Christ is likened to a habit, that is, a vestment, not as regards accidental union, but in regard of this, that the Word is seen by His human nature as a man is by his vestment. And also in regard of this, that a vestment is changed, since it is formed according to the figure of him who puts it on, and whose form is not changed by his vestment. Similarly human nature assumed by the Word of God is made better, but the Word God Himself is not changed.

XXV. That which comes to a complete being, unless it be drawn into the communion of that completed being, comes accidentally—that is to say, it can either be present or absent without corruption of its subject. In the resurrection the body will come to the pre-existing soul, but not accidentally, since it will be assumed into the same being; so that the body will have its vital being by the soul. The Word of God had from all eternity a complete being, according to hypostasis or person; but in time there came to Him human nature, not as assumed to one being, as of nature, as a body is assumed to the being of a soul, but to one being as of an hypostasis or person. And so human nature is not united accidentally to the Son of God.

XXVI. Whatever does not pertain to the nature or essence of a thing is its accident, because

everything which is, is either substance or accident. Now human nature does not pertain to the essence or Divine nature of the Son of God, since the union was not made in nature. But yet the union was not made accidentally, and for this reason. Accident is divided as it is contrary to substance. But the term substance is taken in two ways. In one way for essence or nature; in another for *suppositum* or *hypostasis*. Hence it suffices, in order that the union be not accidental, that be it made according to *hypostasis*, although it be not made according to nature.

XXVII. To say with S. John Damascene that the Flesh of Christ was the instrument of His Divinity is perfectly orthodox, inasmuch as that which is assumed into the unity of an hypostasis, may be used by way of instrument, although everything which is assumed as an instrument does not pertain to the *hypostasis* of the person assuming it.

XXVIII. The union of the human and Divine natures is a certain relation between the two considered as coming together in the one person of the Son of God. But every relation considered as between God and the creature is *really* in the creature, by reason of whose mutation such relation has its origin. It is not *really* in God, but only *secundum rationem*; for it has not its origin from any mutation in God. It is, there-

fore, to be said that this union of which we are speaking is not in God *really*, but only *secundum rationem*; but in human nature, which is created, it is *really*; and so it is true to say that it is something created.

Everything which in time begins to be, is created. This union was not from eternity, but began to be in time. It is, therefore, something created.

XXIX. As has been said, the union imports a certain relation between the Divine and human natures, according as they come together in one person. Every relation which begins to be in time is caused by some mutation. And mutation consists in action and passion.

The first and principal difference, then, between assumption and union is that union imports the relation itself—but assumption, the action, by reason of which some one is called the assumer, or the passion, by reason of which some person or thing is called the assumed.

From this difference arises secondarily another difference: for assumption is spoken of as in the making (*in fieri*)—union, as in the made (*in facto*). And so the uniter is said to be united, but the assumer is not said to be assumed. Human nature is signified, as in the term of its assumption to a Divine hypostasis, by this, that He is called man; and so we say

truly, that the Son of God, who is the uniter of human nature to Himself, is man. But human nature considered in itself, that is, in the abstract, is signified as assumed; and we do not say that the Son of God is human nature.

From the same arises also a third difference. Relation, especially of equiparance, has regard to one extreme not more than the other. But action and passion have regard in diverse manners to the agent and patient, and also to diverse terms. And so assumption determines the terminus *a quo*, and the terminus *ad quem*; for it is called assumption as being a sumption from another to oneself (*ab alio ad se sumptio*). But union determines none of these; and so it is said indifferently—human nature is united to Divine, and *è converso*. Now it is not said the Divine nature has been assumed by the human, but *è converso*; because human nature has been joined to a Divine personality, that is to say, a Divine person subsists in human nature.

The Divine nature, then, is said to be united; it is not said to be assumed.

XXX. Uniting and assuming are not altogether identical, for every person assuming is a person uniting; but not *è converso*. For the person of the Father united human nature to the Son, but not to Himself; and so He is said

to be an uniter but not an assumer—*quasi ad se sumens*. But the person of the Son, which united human nature to Itself, is both uniter and assumer.

Similarly also, united and assumed are not identical, for, as we have seen, the Divine Nature is said to be united, but not to be assumed.

XXXI. Assumption determines to whom the copulation has been made *ex parte* of the assumer. But incarnation and humanation *ex parte* of the assumed, which is flesh or human nature. And so assumption differs in idea both from union, and from incarnation or humanation.

XXXII. Union imports a conjunction of certain things in some one thing, and so the union of the Incarnation may be taken in two ways. In one way *ex parte* of those things which are joined together; in another way, *ex parte* of that in which they are joined together. In regard of this last, the union of the Incarnation has a pre-eminence among all other unions, for the unity of the Divine Person, in which the two natures are united, is the greatest of all unities. But it has not a pre-eminence *ex parte* of those things which are joined together.

XXXIII. The term grace is used in two senses: 1. To signify the will of God freely (*gratis*) giving somewhat. 2. To signify the

gratuitous gift of God. Now human nature needs the gratuitous gift of God in order that it may be elevated into God, since to be so elevated is beyond the faculty of such nature. But human nature is elevated into God in two ways: 1. In one way, by operation; that, namely, by which the saints know and love God. 2. In another way, by personal being. And this way is singular to Christ, in Whom human nature was assumed that it should be in the Person of the Son of God. But it is manifest that ~~in order to~~^{for} the perfection of operation, it is required that power be perfected by habit; but that nature have its being in its *suppositum*, does not require the intervention of any habit. And so it is true to say that the union of the Divine and human natures in Christ was made, not according to any habitual grace, but by the gratuitous gift and will of God, and not from any preceding merits.

XXXIV. That grace which is an accident is a likeness of divinity which is shared by man. But by the Incarnation, human nature is not said to have shared any likeness of the Divine Nature, but to have been conjoined to the Divine Nature itself in the person of the Son. The grace of union is therefore greater than the grace which is an accident, as a thing itself is greater than the shared likeness of it.

XXXV. Habitual grace is in the soul only. But that grace—the gratuitous gift of God—which is to be united to a Divine person, pertains to whole human nature, which is composed of soul and body. And in this way, as S. Paul said to the Colossians, there dwelt in Christ all the fulness of the Godhead bodily, since the Divine Nature was united not only to the soul, but also to the body. The fulness of the Godhead may also be said to have dwelt in Christ bodily, in opposition to dwelling after the manner of a shadow (*umbraliter*). After the manner of a shadow He dwelt in the sacraments of the old law, which were a shadow of good things to come, but the body was Christ.

Some also say that Divinity or Godhead dwelt in Christ corporally or bodily in three ways, as a body has three dimensions. 1. In one way, by essence, by presence, and by power, as in all creatures. 2. In another way, by grace, *gratum faciens*, as in the saints. 3. And in a third way, by personal union, which is peculiar to Himself.

XXXVI. As to Christ Himself, it is manifest that no merits of His could precede the union. For we do not hold with Photinus, that there was first a mere (*purus*) man, who afterwards by the merit of a good life obtained to be the Son of God; but we hold that from the begin-

ning of His conception that man was truly the Son of God, inasmuch as He never had any other hypostasis than that of the Son of God, as S. Luke records the saying of the Angel, "That holy thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God." Every operation therefore of that man was subsequent to the union ; and so no operation of His could merit the union.

XXXVII. Neither could the works of any other man be meritorious of this union *ex condigno*. 1. Because the meritorious works of a man are ordained properly in order to beatitude, which is the reward of virtue, and consists in the full fruition of God. But the union of the Incarnation, since it is in personal being, transcends the union of the mind of the Blessed with God, which is by an act of enjoyment, and so cannot fall under merit. 2. Because grace cannot fall under merit, since it is the principle or source of meriting. Much less can the Incarnation fall under merit, since it is the principle and source of grace ; as S. John says, "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." 3. Because the Incarnation of Christ is reformatory of whole human nature, and so it does not fall under the merit of any single individual man, since the good of any mere (*purus*) man cannot be the cause of the good

of whole human nature. *Ex congruo*, nevertheless, the holy fathers merited the Incarnation by longing and praying for it, for it was congruous that God should hear those who obeyed Him.

XXXVIII. The Blessed Virgin is said to have merited, as the Latin Church sings, "to bear the Lord of all things." Not that she merited that He should be incarnated; but because, by the grace given to her, she merited such a degree of purity and holiness, that she might congruously be the Mother of God.

XXXIX. According to The Philosopher, nature is in one way taken to mean nativity itself, and in another the essence of a thing. And so a thing may be said to be natural in two ways. In one, from the essential principles of the thing: as to fire it is natural to be borne upwards. In another way, that which a man has had from his nativity is said to be natural to him; as it is said in the Epistle of the Ephesians, "We were by nature the children of wrath;" and in the Book of Wisdom, "Surely vain are all men by nature."

The grace of Christ, therefore, whether that of union or habitual grace, cannot be called natural, as if caused by the principles of human nature in Christ; although it may be called natural as coming to the human nature of Christ, being caused by His Divine Nature.

But both graces in Christ are called natural, inasmuch as He had them from His nativity, since in the first instant of His conception His human nature was united to His Divine Person and His Soul was replete with the gift of grace.

XL. The word assumption imports two things, the beginning and the end, the principle of an act and its term; for one is said to assume as taking somewhat to oneself, (*ad se sumere.*) But of this assumption a person is both principle and term, beginning and end; principle, inasmuch as to a person it properly belongs to act—and the assumption of flesh was made by Divine action: term, inasmuch as the union was made in person and not in nature. It therefore most properly belongs to a Divine Person to assume a created nature. The Only-begotten took upon Himself, that is, united to His person, the form, that is, the nature, of a servant.

XLI. Nor does this assumption of a created nature detract from the perfection of the person, which is perfect, inasmuch as there can no addition be made thereto; since in the union of man with God, which is by grace of adoption, there is not added anything to God, but that which is Divine is added to man, and so, not God, but man is perfected.

XLII. A person is said to be incommunicable, inasmuch as it cannot be predicated of

several *supposita* ; but its incommunicability in no way forbids several things to be predicated of a person. And so it is not contrary to the idea of a person to be so communicated as to subsist in several natures, since even in a created person several natures may concur *accidentally* : as, for instance, in the person of one man is found both quantity and quality. But it is the property of a Divine person, on account of its infinity, that there be in it a concourse of natures, not indeed accidentally, but according to subsistence.

XLIII. A person is constituted by a nature. Now, in the Incarnation the human nature does not constitute the Divine person *simpliciter* ; but according to the Divine Nature the Divine person is constituted *simpliciter* : and so the Divine person is not said to assume the Divine Nature, but to assume the human nature.

XLIV. To be the principle of the assumption belongs to the Divine Nature *secundum seipsam*, since by virtue of It the assumption was made. But to be the term of the assumption does not belong to the Divine Nature *secundum seipsam*, but by reason of the person in which it is considered. And so primarily and most properly a person is said to assume ; but secondarily, it may be said that nature also assumed a nature to its own person. Accordingly it is called an

incarnate nature, not as converted into flesh, but as assuming the nature of flesh. Hence, according to S. John Damascene, we say that the Nature of God was incarnate, following therein the Blessed Athanasius and Cyril.

XLV. Although the Eternal Father takes human nature to the Person of the Word, yet He does not thereby take it to Himself, because the Father and the Word have not the same *suppositum*: and so it cannot properly be said that the Father assumes human nature (*a se sumptio*).

XLVI. What belongs to the Divine Nature *secundum se*, belongs to all the three Divine Persons, as goodness, wisdom, and the like. But to assume belongs to it by reason of the Person of the Word: and so belongs to that Person alone.

XLVII. The intellect has a twofold relation to Divine things. 1. In one way, so as to know God as He is; and in this way it is impossible that something in God should be circumscribed by the intellect, and something else remain; because all that is in God is *one*, save and except the distinction of persons. 2. In another way, so as to know God—not as He is, but in its own way, and so *multipliciter* and *divisim*, to know that which in God is one. In this way our intellect can under-

stand the Divine goodness, the Divine wisdom, and the like, which are called the essential attributes of God : paternity, or filiation, or procession not being understood. These last are called the Divine personalities, that is, personal properties. These being removed, as abstracted by the intellect, there yet remains the Omnipotence of God, whereby the Incarnation was accomplished : for, as Gabriel said to Mary, “ With God nothing shall be impossible.” Personality, then, being abstracted by the intellect, the Divine *Nature* can assume.

XLVIII. As has been said, assumption imports two things, the act of the assumer and the term of the assumption. Now, in the Incarnation the act of the assumer proceeds from the Divine virtue or power, which is common to the three Persons : but the term of assumption is a person. That, therefore, which belongs to action in the assumption is common to the three Persons. But that which belongs to the idea of the term of assumption belongs to one Person, and so belongs to one Person that it may not belong to another.

The three Persons caused human nature to be united to the one Person of the Son.

XLIX. The assumption of men which is made by grace of adoption terminates in a participation of the Divine Nature, by an

assimilation to the Divine goodness ; as S. Peter says, "That ye may be partakers of the Divine Nature." An assumption of this sort is common to the three Persons, both *ex parte* of its principle or beginning, and *ex parte* of its term or end. But the assumption of human nature by the Person of the Word, which is made by grace of union, is common to the three Persons *ex parte* of its principle, but not, as has been said, *ex parte* of its term.

L. Whatever the Son can do, that can also the Father and the Holy Ghost, otherwise the three Persons would not have the same power. But Incarnation was possible to the Son. It was, therefore, possible also to the Father and to the Holy Ghost.

LI. Temporal filiation, whereby Christ is called the Son of Man, did not constitute His Person. That was done by eternal filiation. Temporal filiation is a consequence of temporal nativity. And so if in this way *filiation* were predicated of the Father or of the Holy Ghost, there would follow no confusion of the Divine Persons.

LII. Adoptive filiation is a participated similitude of natural filiation. It is caused in us appropriately by the Father, Who is the principle of natural filiation ; and by the gift of the Holy Ghost, Who is the Love of the Father

and of the Son ; as S. Paul wrote to the Galatians, " God sent forth His Son that we might receive the adoption of sons ; and because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father." And so, as from the Incarnate Son we have received adoptive filiation by a similitude of His natural filiation, so from an Incarnate Father we would have received an adoptive filiation as from the principle of natural filiation ; and from an Incarnate Holy Ghost, as from the common *nexus* or bond of the Father and the Son.

LIII. From the union of soul and body in Christ there was made neither a new person nor a new *hypostasis* ; but the human nature was assumed into the Divine Person or *hypostasis*. This was done, not by the power of the human nature, but by the power of the Divine Person. Now the condition of the Divine Persons is such that one of them does not exclude another from the communion of the same nature, but only from the communion of the same person. And so it is not impossible to the Divine Persons that two or three of them should assume a human nature numerically one ; but it would be impossible for them to assume one *hypostasis*. An incarnate person subsists in two natures, a Divine and a human. But three persons can subsist in one Divine nature. And so they can

subsist also in one human nature. One human nature, therefore, might be assumed by the three Persons.

LIV. Granting this, then, it would be true to say that the three Persons were one man, by reason of the one human nature. For, as it is now true to say that the three Persons are one God, by reason of the one Divine Nature; so it would then be true to say that they were one man by reason of the one human nature. Nor would this import an unity of person, but an unity in nature. For from this, that the three Persons are one man, it could not be argued that they were one *simpliciter*; for nothing forbids our saying that men, who are many *simpliciter*, are one relatively; as, for instance, many men are one people.

LV. Further, supposing this case, human nature would be assumed in the unity not of one person, but into the unity of each single individual person; so that as the Divine Nature has a natural unity with each single Divine Person, the human nature would also have an unity with each of them by assumption.

LVI. In the mystery of the Incarnation there is a communication of the properties belonging to the nature, since whatsoever things belong to the nature may be predicated of the person subsisting in that nature. Now, of the Person

of the Father might be predicated both those things which belong to the human nature and those things also which belong to the Divine Nature. And similarly of the Person of the Son, and of the Person of the Holy Ghost. But that which would belong to the Person of the Father, by reason, and in virtue of His own person, could not be attributed to the Person of the Son, or to the Person of the Holy Ghost, by reason of the distinction of the Persons which would remain. It might, therefore, be said that as the Father is unbegotten, so man is unbegotten; as we now say that God is unbegotten because the Father is unbegotten. But we could then no more say, Man is unbegotten, the Son is man, therefore the Son is unbegotten, than we can now say, God is unbegotten, the Son is God, therefore the Son is unbegotten.

LVII. That which can do only one thing and not more has a power limited to one thing. But the power of a Divine Person is infinite, nor can it be limited to any created thing. Hence we may not say that a Divine Person so assumed one human nature that He could not assume another. For from this it would follow that the personality of the Divine Nature would be so comprehended by one human nature, that to its personality another could not be assumed: which is impossible, for the un-

created cannot be comprehended by the created. It is patent, therefore, that whether we consider the Divine Person according to the Divine virtue or power, which is the principle of the union, or according to its personality, which is the term of the union, we must say that a Divine Person, besides that human nature which He has assumed, might assume another human nature numerically differing therefrom.

LVIII. Whatever the Father can do, that can also the Son. But it is possible to the Father, after the Incarnation of the Son, to assume a human nature numerically other than that which the Son assumed; for in no way has the Incarnation of the Son diminished the power of either the Father or the Son. The Son, therefore, after His Incarnation, might assume another human nature, besides that which He has assumed.

LIX. It was most fitting that the Person of the Son should be incarnated. 1. *Ex parte* of the union; for those things are most fittingly united which are similar. Now there is a certain agreement between the Person of the Son, Who is the Word of God, and entire creation. The word of the artificer, that is to say, his concept, is a likeness or exemplar of those things which are made by him. The Word of God, Who is His eternal concept, is the likeness and

exemplar of entire creation. And, therefore, as by participation of this likeness the creatures were instituted in their proper species, but subject to change, so by a—not participated but personal—union of the Word with the creature, the creature should be restored in order to its eternal and unchangeable perfection. For so does the artificer restore his work when it has been destroyed, according to that model by which he made it at the first. 2. The Word is the concept of Eternal Wisdom, from which all wisdom of men is derived. And so it is fitting that by participation of the Word, man should be made perfect in wisdom. 3. It is fitting that by Him Who is the natural Son of God, men should participate the likeness of this filiation according to adoption; as the Apostle says to the Romans, “Whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the first-born among many brethren.” 4. The first man sinned by the lust of knowledge, as appears from the words of the serpent promising him the knowledge of good and evil; and so it was fitting that by the Word of true knowledge man should be led back to God, who, by an inordinate lust of knowledge had gone far away from Him.

LX. As the first creation was effected by the power of God the Father, through the Word, so

was also the re-creation effected by the power of God the Father, through the Word; as S. Paul taught the Corinthians, "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself."

LXI. In the mystery of the Incarnation was made manifest the wisdom and the power of God. And it was most fitting that it should take place in the Person of the Son, since these attributes are specially appropriated to Him, according to the text, "Christ, the power of God, and the wisdom of God."

LXII. It is the property of the Holy Ghost to be the Gift of the Father and of the Son. The remission of sins is made by the Holy Ghost, as by the gift of God. It was, therefore, most fitting, in order to the justification of men, that the Son should be incarnated of Whom the Holy Ghost is the gift.

LXIII. A thing is said to be assumable, inasmuch as it has an aptitude for being assumed by a Divine person. And this aptitude cannot be understood according to passive natural power, which does not extend itself to that which transcends the natural order, which the personal union of the creature with God does transcend. It remains, therefore, that a thing be said to be assumable by reason of its congruency with the foresaid union. This congruency regards two things in human nature, to wit, its dignity and

its necessity. 1. As to its dignity; human nature, inasmuch as it is rational and intellectual, has some points of contact with the Word, by its operation, that is, by knowing and loving Him. 2. As to its necessity; human nature needs reparation inasmuch as it lives under original sin. Now these two congruencies are found side by side in human nature alone; for to the irrational creature there is wanting the congruity of dignity; while to angelic nature there is wanting the congruity of the foresaid necessity.

Human nature alone, then, is said to be assumable.

LXIV. Qualities are predicated of creatures by reason of that which belongs to them according to their own proper causes, and not from that which belongs to them according to first and universal causes; as we say a disease is incurable, not because it cannot be cured by God, but because it cannot be cured by the proper principles of its subject. And so a creature is said to be not assumable, not as subtracting aught from Divine power, but in order to show the condition of the creature, which has not an aptitude for such assumption.

LXV. If a body has no aptitude for being perfected by a sensitive soul, much less has it any aptitude for being perfected by an intellectual soul. In like manner, since the irrational

creature has no aptitude for union with God by operation, that is, by the capability of knowing and loving Him, still less has it any congruity for union with Him according to personal being.

LXVI. Some say that an angel is not assumable, because from the beginning of his creation he is perfect in his personality, since he is not subject to generation and corruption. Hence, say they, he could not be assumed into the unity of a Divine person unless his personality were destroyed, an event which would belong neither to the incorruptibility of his nature nor to the goodness of the assumer, to which goodness it does not pertain to corrupt aught of perfection in the creature assumed. But this does not seem wholly to exclude the congruity of an assumption of angelic nature; for God is able, by producing a new angelic nature, to couple it to Himself in the unity of His Person, and so nothing pre-existing therein would be corrupted. But, as has been said, there is wanting a congruity *ex parte* of necessity; because although angelic nature, in certain individuals, lies under sin, yet their sin is irremediable.

As the Incarnate Word and Wisdom says, His delights are with the sons of men.

LXVII. The Son of God assumed the nature of man, and not a person; otherwise there would be two persons, one assuming and the other assumed,

which is erroneous. 2. The Son assumed human nature *in atomo*, that is, *in individuo*, and this is none other than an increased *suppositum*, which is the Person of the Son of God.

LXVIII. The human nature assumed suffers no defect by want of a human personality; on the contrary, it is added to in dignity by its union with a Divine person.

LXIX. Since the word *man* (*homo*) signifies human nature as it is *in supposito*, we may not say that Christ assumed man, since there is in Christ only one *suppositum*, and one *hypostasis*.

LXX. The nature of man, or of any other sensible object, besides that being which it has in individuals, may be understood in two ways. 1. As having a being by itself, and besides matter, as the Platonists say. 2. As existing in the intellect, whether human or divine. But it cannot subsist by itself, because to the nature of the species of things sensible there pertains sensible matter; and so there cannot be human nature apart from sensible matter. But even if human nature did subsist in this way, it would not be becoming that it should be assumed by the Word of God. 1. Because that assumption terminates in a person, and it is contrary to the idea of a common form that it be in a person, because in a person it is indi-

viduated. 2. Because to a common nature there can only be attributed common and universal operations, according to which man neither merits nor demerits; but the assumption of human nature was accomplished, amongst others, for this very end, that the Son of God in this assumed nature should merit for us. 3. Because a nature so existing is—not sensible but intelligible; but the Son of God assumed human nature that He might therein be visibly apparent unto men, as it is written in the Book of Baruch, “Afterwards did He show Himself upon earth, and conversed with men.”

LXXI. Similarly also human nature could not be assumed by the Son of God as an existence in the Divine intellect, since as such it is nothing else than the Divine nature; and in this way human nature would have been from all eternity in the Son of God.

LXXII. In like manner it is not becoming to say that the Son of God assumed human nature as an existence in the intellect of man, since this would be either the same as saying that He assumed human nature, or, if He did not assume it in the nature of things, it would be a false intellect, and such an assumption of human nature would be but a fiction of the Incarnation.

LXXIII. It was not fitting that human

nature should be assumed in all its *supposita*, that is, as distributed into its individuals, by the Word. 1. Because there would be taken away the multitude of the *supposita* of human nature which is connatural to it. 2. Because it would be derogatory to the dignity of the Incarnate Son of God, who is the First-born among many brethren according to His human nature, as He is the First-born of every creature according to His Divine Nature; for then all men would be of equal dignity. 3. Because, as one Divine *suppositum* has been incarnated, so it is fitting that one human nature only should be assumed, in order that in both unity might be found.

LXXIV. Although God could have received human nature from another source than from Adam, yet it was very becoming and meet that He should assume it of his seed, for three reasons. 1. In order to a full satisfaction for sin; that the nature which had sinned might satisfy. 2. In order to the greater dignity of man; that that nature which had been conquered might in turn conquer the enemy of man's race. 3. In order to show forth the Divine Power; by promoting a nature corrupted and infirm, to power and dignity.

LXXV. It became Him who came to take away sin to be separate from sinners, as to the

guilt of sin, which He had come to destroy; but not as to the nature which He had come to save, for, as to it, it became Him, as the Apostle says to the Hebrews, "in all things to be made like unto his brethren." So much the more marvellous was His innocence: that a nature assumed from a sin-infected mass should have such purity as had His.

LXXVI. Since Christ was very man, Who died for man's salvation, and was recalled from death by God, He consequently assumed a true body.

As S. Augustine says, "If the body of Christ was a phantom, Christ was false. If He was false, He is not the Truth. But Christ is the Truth. And so He assumed, not a phantom, but a real and true body."

And this for three reasons. 1. From the very idea of human nature, to which it pertains to have a true body. 2. If He had not had a true body, He would not have suffered a true death, nor any of those things which the Evangelists narrate with regard to Him would He have undergone in reality, but only in appearance. It would follow also that He would not have wrought out a true salvation; for the effect must be proportioned to the cause. 3. From the dignity of the person assuming. It became not Him Who is the

Truth, that in any work of His there should be fiction.

Our Lord Himself deigned to declare this truth to His disciples, when, disturbed and terrified, they thought they saw a spirit, and not a true body. "Handle Me," said He, "and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see Me have."

LXXVII. Christ not only assumed a true body, but that body was an earthly body, and not an heavenly; and that for the same reason that it was a true body and not a phantom. 1. In order to the verity of human nature, which would not be preserved were the body of an heavenly nature; the form of man requiring determinate nature, to wit, flesh and bones. 2. In order to the reality of Christ's bodily acts. If the Son of God had assumed an heavenly body, which is impassible and incorruptible, He could not have hungered and thirsted, or suffered and died. 3. It would have been derogatory to the Divine truth, for the Son of God, if He had an heavenly body, to show Himself to men as having a fleshly and earthly one.

LXXVIII. To say that His body was a phantom, was a heresy of the Manichæans. To say that it was an heavenly body, was a heresy of the Valentinians.

LXXIX. Christ is said to have come down from heaven in two ways. 1. By reason of His

Divine Nature ; not that His Divine Nature ceased to be in heaven, but that It began to be in this lower world after a new manner, namely, according to His assumed nature : as Jesus said to Nicodemus, “No man hath ascended up to heaven, but He that came down from heaven, even the Son of man which *is in heaven.*” 2. In another way, by reason of His Body ; not that the Body of Christ, according to Its substance, came down from heaven, but because by heavenly power, that is, by the Holy Ghost, His Body was formed. And so S. Paul says to the Corinthians, “The first man was of the earth, earthy ; the second man is The Heavenly, from heaven.” And S. Augustine says to Orosius, “I call Christ heavenly, because He was not conceived of human seed.”

LXXX. It was the opinion first of Arius, and afterwards of Apollinaris, that the Son of God assumed flesh alone without a soul. They held that the Word was to the flesh in place of a soul. From this it followed that in Christ there would be, not two natures, but one only, for human nature is constituted of soul and body. But their opinion was heretical, and these positions cannot stand, for three reasons : 1. As repugnant to the authority of Scripture, in which the Lord makes mention of His Soul, “My Soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto

death." And again : "I have power to lay down My Soul, and I have power to take it again." To this Apollinaris answered, that there, "soul" is to be taken metaphorically, as in the Old Testament, in the Book of the Prophet Isaiah, God says, "Your new moons and your appointed feasts My soul hateth." But as S. Augustine says, the Evangelists in the Gospel narrative record that Jesus marvelled, and was angry, and was sorrowful, and longingly desired. All which demonstrate that He had a true soul, as the fact that He ate and slept and was fatigued demonstrates that He had a true human body. Besides, prophetic figure is one thing, and historical narrative is another. The one is of its very nature metaphorical; the other is of its very nature matter of fact.

2. The foresaid error derogates from the utility of the Incarnation, which is the liberation of man. For, as S. Augustine argues against Felicianus, Why, having taken flesh, did the dispensation of the Mediator omit a soul? Unless, perhaps, either knowing it to be innocent, He believed it not to need a medicine; or regarding it as alien to Himself, He did not gift it with the benefit of redemption; or judging it to be wholly incurable, He was unable to heal it; or regarding it as vile and fit for no use, He cast it aside. Two of these

suppositions import blasphemy against God, for how can He be called the Omnipotent if He cannot cure the desperate? or how can He be called the God of all if He has not Himself made our souls? As to the other two; in the one the cause of the soul is ignored, in the other the idea of merit is lost sight of. How can he be thought to understand the cause of the soul who endeavours to separate from the sin of voluntary transgression a soul which has been endowed with the infused habit of reason in order to its reception of the law? or what knowledge has he of its nobility who says that it is despised by reason of its insignificance? If you look to its origin, the substance of the soul is very precious; if you look to the guilt of transgression, its sin is the more heinous by reason of its intelligence. I say and know that Christ is Perfect Wisdom, and that He is most piteous I do not doubt: and therefore that which was itself the best and had the greatest capacities He did not despise; and that which was worst wounded He also took. 3. This position is contrary to the verity of the Incarnation; for the flesh and other parts of a man obtain their species by the soul. Take away the soul, and there are neither bones nor flesh, save equivocally.

LXXXI. When S. John, delivering the

mystery of the Incarnation, says, "The Word was made flesh;" flesh is taken for the whole man, as if it were said, the Word was made man; in like manner Isaiah says, "The Glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together."

1. Whole man is signified by flesh, since by flesh the Son of God became visibly apparent. And so it is added, "And we have seen His glory."

2. Another reason for the Evangelist's choice of words is, that in the unity of the assumption they express its principle, to wit, the Word, and its extreme, flesh. S. John, wishing to commend to our love the humility of God, contrasts the extremes, the Word and flesh; the soul standing midway between these two, inferior to the Word,—in dignity greater than the flesh.

3. A third reason is, because the flesh, by reason of its greater distance from the Word, would seem to be less assumable.

LXXXII. The soul is necessary to the body to quicken it and make it live. But this the Word would have done, as it is written, "O Lord, with Thee is the well of life." It would thus at first sight seem that, the Word being present, a soul was superfluous, inasmuch as God and nature do nothing in vain, and never ordain

two causes to produce one effect. But it must be remembered that there is a difference between these two, the Word and the Soul, as causes of life. The Word is the Fountain of Life, as the first cause effective of life: the soul is the principle of life to the body, as it is its form.

LXXXIII. The Apollinarians and Arians, defeated by the Gospel testimony, in their heresy which, contrary to the faith of the Catholic Church, taught that Christ had a body without a soul, its place being supplied by the presence of the Word, said that a mind (*mens*) was lacking to the Soul of Christ, its place being supplied by the Word. But this position is overthrown by the same testimonies as the former are. For 1. It is adverse to the Gospel narrative, which records that Jesus marvelled. Now, there cannot be wonder without reason, inasmuch as it imports a comparison of the effect with the cause. When one sees an effect, and is ignorant of its cause, or does not observe a due proportion between them, he marvels. 2. It is repugnant to the utility of the Incarnation, which is the justification of man from sin; for the human soul is capable neither of sin nor of justifying grace, save by the mind. And so it was especially important that a human mind should be assumed. S. John

Damascene says, "The Word of God assumed a body, and an intellectual and rational soul." And afterwards he adds, "Whole was united to whole, in order that on my whole self salvation might be bestowed : for what was unassumed is incurable." 3. It is repugnant to the verity of the Incarnation ; for since the body is proportioned to the soul, as is matter to its proper form, that would not be really human flesh which was not perfected by a human, to wit, a rational, soul. And so if Christ had had a soul without a mind, He would not have had true human flesh, but only bestial flesh, because by the mind alone does our soul differ from the bestial soul. That He had a mind and intellect, He Himself asserted when He said, "Learn of Me, for I am meek and humble in heart;" and again, by the mouth of the Prophet Isaiah, God says, "Behold, My Son shall understand."

LXXXIV. A thing is called a medium or mean in respect of its principle or beginning and its term or end. And hence, as the principle and end import a certain order, so does also the mean. This order is twofold. 1. One is of time. 2. The other is of nature. According to order of time, there is not, in the mystery of the Incarnation, said to be any medium or means, because the Word of God united to Himself whole human nature *at once*. The

order of nature is twofold. 1. According to degree of dignity; as we say that angels are *medii* between God and men. 2. According to the idea of causality; as there is said to exist a middle cause between the first cause and the last effect. And this second order in a manner follows the first. God acts by means of substances which are nearer of kin to Himself on those things which are more remote from Him. If then we look to degree of dignity, the soul is found to be midway between God and the flesh; and, according to this, it may be said that the Son of God united flesh to Himself *mediante animâ*. But also according to order of causality the soul is in a way a cause of flesh being united to the Son of God; for flesh would not be assumable, save in virtue of its relation to the rational soul, which relation causes it to be human flesh.

LXXXV. There is a twofold relation between the creature and God. 1. As the creatures are caused by God, and depend on Him as on the principle of their being; so, by reason of the infinitude of His power, God comes into *immediate* contact with everything soever by causing and conserving it. He is *immediately* in everything by essence, by presence, and by power. 2. They are led back to God, as to an end. And in this relation there is found a

medium or mean between the creature and God, for the inferior creatures are led back to God by the superior. And so flesh was united to the Word *mediante animâ*.

LXXXVI. That which, by reason of aptitude and congruity, is the cause of anything, may be taken away, and yet that thing which it has caused, remain. Or for instance, a friendship between two persons is caused by means of a third. That third person is removed, but the friendship remains. Or again, a woman is wedded for her beauty; her beauty vanishes, but the marriage bond remains. And so, even during the separation of the Soul from the Body by death, the union of the Flesh with the Word of God remained.

LXXXVII. As the Son of God assumed flesh *mediante animâ*, so did He also assume a soul *mediante* a mind and intellect, or spirit as it is called. And this as well according to order of dignity as by reason of congruity of assumption. For the soul is not assumable save as it is capable of bearing the Image of God, which it is according to its mind or spirit, as it is written, "Be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind." And similarly, among the other parts of the soul, the intellect is the superior, of the greatest dignity, and most like to God.

The spirit, mind, or intellect, is not other

than the soul, as to essence ; but it is distinguished from the other parts of the soul by reason of its power. And it is in this light that the idea of a mean belongs to it.

The soul, between which and the Word of God there is placed the *medium* of the intellect, is not understood as the essence of the soul, which is common to all the powers, but as the inferior powers, which are common to every soul.

LXXXVIII. An angelic spirit does not lack congruity of assumption by reason of defect of dignity, but by reason of the irreparability of its fall.

LXXXIX. Since the Soul of Christ never had a subsistence of its own without the Word, and since It is of the same nature with ours, it is clear that It was assumed by Him at the same time with His Flesh. Not as some falsely say, according to S. John Damascene, that before that Incarnation which was of the Virgin an intellect was united with God the Word, and was then called Christ.

XC. Origen laid it down, in his *Periarchon*, that all souls were created in the beginning, and among them the Soul of Christ. But this cannot be, if it is meant that It was then created, but not immediately united to the Word ; for it would follow that that soul had at one time a

subsistence of Its own without the Word ; and so when It had been assumed by the Word, the union would either have not been made according to subsistence, or the pre-existing subsistence of the soul would have been corrupted. Similarly also, it cannot be, if it is meant that the soul was from the beginning united to the Word, and afterwards incarnated in the Virgin's womb ; for then this soul would appear not to be of the same nature with our souls, which are created at the same time as they are infused into our bodies.

XCI. The Soul of Christ excels our souls, not by diversity of *genus*, but by sublimity of power, as S. Leo says : " It is of the same *genus* with our own souls ; but excels even the angels by reason of Its plenitude of grace and truth."

XCII. As the soul is the form of the body, it is fitting that it should be created at the same time as it is infused into and united with the body.

XCIII. Of the plenitude or fulness of Christ all men receive according to the faith which they have in Him ; as S. Paul taught the Romans, " The righteousness of God is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe in Him." Now as we believe on Him as born, so did the ancients believe on Him as to be born ; for, as the same Apostle taught the Corinthians, " We believe, having the same spirit

of faith." But the faith of Christ has power to justify, from the purpose of the grace of God; as it is written in the Epistle to the Romans: "To Him that worketh not, but believeth on Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness, according to the purpose of the grace of God." This purpose being eternal, there was nothing to prevent men being justified by the faith of Jesus Christ, even before His Soul was full of grace and truth.

XCIV. Human flesh is assumable by the Word, by reason of the relation which it has to the rational soul, as to its own proper form. This relation it does not have before the rational soul comes to it, since matter becomes the property of a form at the same time that it receives that form; and so the alteration terminates in the same instant in which is introduced the substantial form. Hence it is that the flesh ought not to be assumed before it is human flesh, which it becomes on the advent of the rational soul. As, therefore, the soul was not assumed before the flesh, since it is contrary to the nature of a soul that it should exist before it is united to the body; so also it became not the flesh to be assumed before the soul, since it is not human flesh before it has a rational soul.

XCV. When, in the assumption of the Incarnation, a *medium* or mean is spoken of, it is not

intended to designate order of time, since the assumption was made at once of the whole and of all the parts. But there is thereby designated an order of nature: and hence by that which is first in nature there is assumed that which is last. A thing is first in nature in two ways. 1. *Ex parte* of the agent. 2. *Ex parte* of the matter; for these two causes are pre-existent to the thing itself. 1. *Ex parte* of the agent, that is first *simpliciter*, which is first in the agent's intention; that is first relatively, *secundum quid*, from which his operation begins. And this, because intention is prior to operation. 2. But *ex parte* of the matter, that is first which first exists in the transmutation of the matter. Now in the Incarnation we must chiefly look to the order which is *ex parte* of the agent. It is clear that according to the intention of the agent, the complete was before the incomplete, and consequently the whole before the parts. And so it is true to say that the Word of God assumed the parts of human nature *mediante* the whole; for as He assumed a body by reason of its relation to a rational soul, so did He also assume soul and body by reason of their relation to human nature, they being the parts, and it the whole.

The assumption of the parts was first in the way of operation,—in intellect, not in time. The

assumption of the nature, that is, of the whole, was first in the way of intention.

XCVI. In no way did the Son of God assume human nature, *mediante* grace, save by way of —not means, but efficient cause; grace being understood as—the Will of God freely (*gratis*) doing or giving.

Grace is an accident of the soul. But the union of the Word with human nature was made according to subsistence, and not according to accident.

XCVII. There was in Christ habitual grace; and that necessarily: and for three reasons. 1. By reason of the union of His Soul with the Word of God. The nearer aught receptive is to the influencing cause, the more does it share the influence. The influx of grace is from God, according to the Psalm, “The Lord will give grace and glory.” And so it was most becoming that that soul should receive an influx of Divine grace. 2. By reason of the nobility of that soul, whose operations must come very closely into contact with God by knowledge and love. And in order to these, human nature must be raised by grace. 3. By reason of the habitude of Christ Himself to the human race. For Christ, inasmuch as He is man, is the Mediator between God and man, as S. Paul taught Timothy; and therefore it became Him to have grace redounding to

others, as it is written, "Of His fulness have all we received, and grace for grace."

XCVIII. Christ is Very God according to His Person, and according to His Divine Nature ; but inasmuch as along with unity of person there remains a distinction of natures, the Soul of Christ is not by Its essence Divine ; and so It must be made Divine by participation, which is according to grace.

XCIX. To Christ, inasmuch as He is the natural Son of God, there is due an eternal heritage, which is uncreated beatitude, by an uncreated act of knowledge and love of God, the same, to wit, whereby God knows and loves Himself. Of this act a soul was not capable, by reason of the difference of nature ; and so it became it to attain to God by a created act of fruition ; and even this could not be, save by grace.

C. Similarly, inasmuch as He is the Word of God, He had a faculty of doing all things well, by Divine operation. But since there is in Him, besides the Divine operation, a human operation, there must be in Him habitual grace whereby such operation may be perfected.

CI. The Humanity of Christ is the instrument of the Divinity, not indeed as an inanimate instrument which in no way acts but is only acted on ; but as an instrument animated with a

rational soul, which is so acted on that it also acts. And therefore, in order to the fitness of such action, it became Him to have habitual grace.

CII. Grace regards the essence of the soul ; virtues regard its powers. As the powers of the soul are derived from its essence, so virtues are derivations from grace. The more perfect the principle, the more does it impress its effects. And so, since the grace of Christ was the most perfect, it follows that from it proceeded virtues to perfect each single power of the soul, in order to the performance of all the acts of the soul. Since, then, there was in Christ the fulness of all grace, there were necessarily in Him all virtues.

CIII. Christ, from the first instant of His conception, fully saw God by essence ; but “faith is the evidence of things not seen,” as the Apostle says to the Hebrews : and so in Christ faith had no place.

CIV. The merit of faith consists in its obedience, whereby a man assents to those things which he does not see, because God has commanded him ; as it is written, “By Whom we have received grace and apostleship to the obedience of faith among all nations for His Name.” But Christ had obedience toward God in all its plenitude, for, as S. Paul writes to the Philippians, “He was made obedient, even

unto death." And there was nothing pertaining to merit which He taught, which He did not Himself most excellently fulfil.

CV. As it belongs to the very idea of faith that one assent to those things which he does not see, so it is of the very idea of hope that one long for those things which he does not yet have. As it is written, "Hope that is seen is not hope: for what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for?" And as faith, inasmuch as it is a theological virtue, is not of everything which is not seen, but only of God: so also hope, inasmuch as it is a theological virtue, has for its object God Himself: the fruition of Whom a man principally longs for by the virtue of hope. But he who has the virtue of hope may also long for Divine aid in other things; as also he who has the virtue of faith not only believes God concerning things Divine, but also concerning any other things whatsoever which have been divinely revealed to him. Now Christ, from the first instant of His conception, enjoyed the full fruition of God: and therefore He had not the virtue of hope.

CVI. He had hope nevertheless in respect of some things which He had not yet attained to; although He had not faith in respect of anything, since He had the fullest knowledge of all things, and by that, faith was wholly excluded.

He could hope for all those things which pertained to His perfection, and which He did not yet have, as for instance, immortality and a glorious body. The glory of the body does not pertain to beatitude as being that in which beatitude principally consists, but is a certain redundancy from the glory of the soul. Hence hope, as it is a theological virtue, does not regard the beatitude of the body, but the beatitude of the soul, which consists in the Divine fruition.

CVII. Gifts (*dona*) are properly certain perfections of the powers of the soul, according as they are moved by the Holy Ghost. The Soul of Christ was moved by the Holy Ghost in the most perfect manner, as S. Luke narrates, "Jesus, being full of the Holy Spirit, returned from Jordan, and was driven by the Spirit into the wilderness." There were then gifts in Christ in a most surpassing manner and degree.

Isaiah prophesied, "In that day seven women shall take hold of one man." These seven women were the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: that one man was Christ.

CVIII. As is commonly said, Gifts are given in aid of virtues. Now that which is perfect in itself does not need outward aid. And in Christ the virtues were perfect. But that which is perfect according to the order of its own nature

needs to be aided by that which is of a higher nature; as man, however perfect he be, needs to be aided by God. And in this way the virtues which perfect the powers of the soul, according as they are drawn out by the reason, however perfect they may be, yet need to be aided by the gifts which perfect the powers of the soul, according as they are moved by the Holy Ghost.

CIX. Christ was both receiver and giver of the Holy Ghost, but not *secundum idem*, for to give belongs to him who has, to receive to him who has not. He gives, as He is God; He receives, as He is man. And so S. Gregory says, in his Morals, "The Holy Ghost never deserted the Humanity of Christ, from Whose Divinity He proceeds."

CX. Fear (*timor*) has regard to two objects, of which one is—a terrible evil; and the other is—he by whose powers that evil can be inflicted: as one is said to fear the king inasmuch as he has the power of death. But he who can do hurt would not be feared, unless he possessed also an eminency of power such as could not easily be resisted; for those things which we can readily repel we do not fear. And so we say that in Christ there was the fear of God, not—1. As regards the evil of separation from God by guilt; nor 2. As regards the evil of punishment for

guilt. But 3. As regards the Divine eminency. The Soul of Christ, acted on by the Holy Ghost, was moved toward God by an affection of reverence, as S. Paul tells the Hebrews, "When, in the days of His flesh, He had offered up prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears unto Him that was able to save Him from death, He was heard in that He feared," or, for His reverence. This affection of reverence towards God, Christ as man had more fully than all other men. And so Scripture attributes to Him the fulness of the fear of the Lord. As, for instance, Isaiah prophesies, "The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him, the spirit of the fear of the Lord, and shall make Him of quick understanding in the fear of the Lord."

CXI. By the gift of fear, one fears either—1, separation from God, which belongs to chaste fear; or 2, to be punished by Him, which belongs to servile fear. Neither was possible to Christ, because it was impossible to Him to sin. But further, perfect charity casteth forth servile fear, and so such fear was not in Christ.

CXII. Graces *gratis datæ* are ordained in order to the manifestation of the faith and of spiritual doctrine. For it becomes him who teaches to have those things whereby his doctrine may be made manifest, or otherwise his doctrine would be useless. Now the

first and principal Doctor of spiritual doctrine and of the faith is Christ, as it is written to the Hebrews: "The great salvation which at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard Him, God also bearing them witness, both with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to His own will." It is clear, then, that there were in Christ, and that in a most surpassing manner and degree, all graces *gratis datæ*, as in the first and principal Doctor of the faith. S. Augustine says, "As in the head are all the senses, so in Christ were all graces."

CXIII. As grace *gratum faciens* is ordained in order to meritorious acts, as well inward as outward, so grace *gratis data* is ordained in order to certain outward acts manifestative of the faith. Christ had the fulness of both graces, for inasmuch as His Soul was united to Divinity, It had full efficacy to effect all the foresaid acts. But other saints, who are moved by God as instruments, not united but separate, receive efficacy to perfect this or that, or these or those, particular act or acts. And so in other saints, but not in Christ, there are, as S. Paul says to the Corinthians, diversities of gifts, that is, divisions of graces.

CXIV. The gift of tongues was given to the

Apostles, because they were sent to teach all nations. But Christ willed personally to preach in one nation alone, that of the Jews, as He said to the woman of Canaan, "I am not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel;" and as the Apostle wrote to the Romans, "Now I say that Jesus Christ was a minister of the circumcision." And so it needed not that He should speak with several tongues. At the same time, the knowledge of all tongues was not lacking to Him, from Whom even the very secrets of the heart are not hid. Nor was this knowledge of His useless, any more than the possession of a habit is useless, although it is not used from lack of occasion or opportunity.

CXV. A prophet takes his name from being a far-sayer or far-seer, *quasi procul fans vel procul videns*; inasmuch as he knows and speaks those things which are far removed from men's senses. But not every one is to be called a prophet who knows and announces things removed from others, and this both as to place and time. For if one living in Gaul should know and announce to others living in Gaul things which were being then done in Syria, he would be a prophet, as was Elisha, when he said to Gehazi, "Went not mine heart with thee, when the man turned again from his chariot to meet thee?" But if one living in Syria should announce things that were being

done there, he would not be a prophet. Then as to time. It was a prophecy when Isaiah foretold that Cyrus, king of Persia, would build again the temple of God; but it was not a prophecy when Ezra, in whose time it was brought to pass, wrote this. If therefore God, or His Angels, or the Blessed Saints know and announce things far removed from our knowledge, their so doing does not belong to prophecy, because in no way is their estate ours. But the estate of Christ before His Passion was our own. He was a wayfarer (*viator*) like ourselves, yet in the way (*in via*) leading to our native country and fatherland (*patria*); as well as a comprehender (*comprehensor*) enjoying the full, unveiled Beatific Vision of the Divine Essence. As a wayfarer then He was a prophet, in that He knew and announced things far removed from the knowledge of other wayfarers.

In this sense we are to understand the words of Moses, "A prophet shall the Lord your God raise up unto you of your brethren:" and His own words, "A prophet is not without honour save in his own country."

CXVI. An angel, as being a comprehender, is above a prophet, who is merely a wayfarer; but not above the man Christ, Who was at once both a comprehender and a wayfarer.

CXVII. S. John says, the Word made Flesh

was full of grace and truth. A thing is said to be had fully which is had perfectly and totally. Totality and perfection may be regarded in two ways. 1. As to its intensive quantity ; as I say that a thing has whiteness fully, if it has it as fully as its nature will permit. 2. According to virtue or power ; as one may say that he has life fully, since he has it according to all the effects and works of life ; as a man has life fully, but not so a brute animal or a plant. In both ways Christ had plenitude or fulness of grace. He had grace to the utmost and according to the most perfect mode in which it can be had. This is apparent, 1, from the propinquity or close relationship of the Soul of Christ to the cause of grace ; for, as has been said, the nearer any receptive thing is to the influencing cause, so much the more abundantly does it receive. The Soul of Christ, which, of all rational creatures, is most closely and intimately united to God, receives the greatest influence of His grace. 2, in comparison of its effect. The Soul of Christ received grace, that from It grace might be poured out upon others. It became It therefore to have greatest grace, as fire, which is the cause of heat in all things hot, is itself hottest of all.

CXVIII. Similarly also as to the virtue of grace. He had grace fully, because He had it in

order to all the operations and effects of grace. And this, because grace was conferred on Him as on the universal principle in the *genus* of those who have grace. Now the virtue or power of the first principle of any *genus* extends itself universally to all the effects of that *genus*: as the power of the sun, which is the universal cause of generation, extends itself to all things that fall under generation. And so there is this second plenitude of grace in Christ, inasmuch as His grace extends itself to all the effects of grace, as virtues, gifts, and the like.

CXIX. Plenitude of grace is attributed to the Soul of Christ according to Its capacity as a creature, and not in comparison of the infinite plenitude of the divine goodness.

CXX. Plenitude of grace may be regarded in two ways. 1. *Ex parte* of the grace itself. 2. *Ex parte* of him who has the grace. i. *Ex parte* of the grace itself, there is said to be plenitude of grace in that one attains to the summit of grace, both as to essence and as to virtue or power, as having grace both, 1, in the greatest excellency in which it may be had; and 2, in the greatest extension to all the effects of grace. Such plenitude of grace was special, proper, and peculiar to Christ. ii. But *ex parte* of the subject there is said to be plenitude of grace, when one has grace fully

according to his condition, or according to intension, that is, when grace is intense, or spread abroad in him up to the term or limit prefixed to him by God; as S. Paul writes to the Ephesians, "To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the gift of Christ." Also according to virtue or power, as when one has the faculty of grace in order to do all things which belong to his office or estate; as to the same Ephesians the Apostle saith again, "Unto me, who am less than the least of all saints, is this grace given, that I should preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ." Such plenitude of grace was not peculiar to Christ, but is communicated to others by Christ.

CXXI. Plenitude of grace is attributed to Christ as He is the Only-begotten of the Father, as it is written, "We beheld His glory, the glory as of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." But to be the Only-begotten of the Father is special and peculiar to Christ. And so, in the sense we have indicated, it is special and peculiar to Him to be full of grace and truth.

CXXII. The Blessed Virgin Mary was hailed by the Angel Gabriel as *full of grace*, not *ex parte* of grace itself, for she had not grace in the highest excellence in which it may be had,

nor in the greatest extension to all the effects of grace. But she is said to have been *full of grace* in comparison of and in relation to herself, inasmuch as she had grace sufficient for that state to which she had been chosen and called by God, that she should be the mother of His Only-begotten.

CXXIII. Similarly also S. Stephen is said to be *full of grace*, because he had grace sufficient for him to be a faithful minister and witness for God, to which estate he had been chosen and called by Him.

CXXIV. The same is to be said of all others who have grace. Of plenitudes of this sort, one is fuller than another, according as the individual is divinely pre-ordained to a higher or a lower state.

CXXV. The saints have two kinds of graces—one common to all saints, the other peculiar to individuals, and given in order to produce in them their special and individual excellencies. The plenitude of grace, which is common to all saints, is that grace which is sufficient to merit eternal life, which consists in the full fruition of God. This plenitude of grace the Apostle desires for his faithful Ephesians, to whom he writes, “That ye may be filled with all the fulness of God.”

CXXVI. The grace of union in Christ is said to be infinite, inasmuch as the Person of the

Word, to which human nature has been united, is infinite. But His habitual grace is said to be finite as existing in a finite subject, His created Soul, which, as created, has a certain finite capacity.

CXXVII. S. John Baptist says that God gave not the spirit by measure unto Christ. That is to say, grace was conferred on the Soul of Christ as on an universal principle in order to the gratification or bestowal of grace on human nature; as it is written to the Ephesians, He hath graced us, or made us accepted in the Beloved. In this sense, the grace of Christ may be rightly called infinite; just as the light of the sun may be called infinite, as the universal principle of light to all things that are capable of light, and inasmuch as it has everything that pertains to the idea of light; although of course it is not infinite according to its essence or being.

CXXVIII. But these words of S. John Baptist are variously interpreted. 1. As of the gift which God the Father from all eternity gave the Son, namely, the Divine Nature, which is an infinite gift. 2. As of the gift which has been given to human nature, that it should be united with a Divine Person, which is also an infinite gift, that Person being infinite. 3. As of habitual grace, inasmuch as the grace

of Christ extends itself to all things which are of grace.

As S. Augustine says, "The Divine measure is the Divine division of gifts; for to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge: but Christ who gives does not Himself receive by measure."

CXXIX. Since there was in Christ all the fulness of grace, for He was not only a wayfarer, but, as we have already seen, a comprehender as well and at the same time, — grace was in Him incapable of increase.

Grace in the saints is incapable of increase because they have attained their end, and are no longer wayfarers *in viâ*, but comprehenders *in patriâ*. But the grace of men who are only wayfarers may be added to: and that both *ex parte* of the form, because they have not yet attained to the highest degree of grace; and *ex parte* of the subject, because they have not yet arrived at their term or end, union with God.

CXXX. The union of human nature with a Divine Person, which is the *grace of union*, precedes *habitual grace* in Christ, not in order of time but of nature and understanding. And this for a threefold reason. 1. According to the order of the principles of both. For the principle of union is the Person of the Son assuming human nature, which ac-

cordingly is said to have been sent into the world. The principle of habitual grace, which is given with charity, is the Holy Ghost, Who accordingly is said to be sent, as He dwells in the mind by charity. Now the mission, or sending of the Son, according to the order of nature, is prior to the mission of the Holy Ghost, for, according to the order of nature, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, as does love from wisdom. Hence the personal union, according to which is understood the mission of the Son, is prior in order of nature to habitual grace, according to which is understood the mission of the Holy Ghost. 2. The idea of this order of precedence arises from the habitude of grace to its cause. For grace is caused in man by the presence of divinity, as light is caused in the atmosphere by the presence of the sun. Now, the presence of God in Christ is understood according to the union of the human nature with the Divine Person; and hence habitual grace is understood as a consequence of this union,—following it, as brightness follows the sun which precedes it. 3. A reason of this order may be found in the end of grace, which is ordained in order to well-doing. Now doing, or action, belongs to *supposita* and to individuals. Hence action, and consequently the grace ordaining to it, presupposes an *hypostasis* operating. But

there is no *hypostasis* pre-supposed in the human nature before the union ; and so the grace of union, according to understanding, precedes the habitual grace.

CXXXI. As the whole Church is spoken of as one mystical body, by its likeness to the natural body of a man, with its diverse acts done by diverse members, so Christ is said to be the Head of the Church, according to the similitude of a human head. S. Paul teaches the Romans, "As we have many members in one body, and all members have not the same office ; so we, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another." And in a like strain he writes to the Corinthians, "As the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body, so also is Christ. For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one Body, and have been all made to drink into one Spirit. . . . And God hath set the members every one of them in the body, as it hath pleased Him. . . . Whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it, or one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it. Now ye are the Body of Christ, and members in particular."

Here we may consider three things. 1. Order. 2. Perfection. 3. Virtue, or power. 1. Order : because the head is the first part of man, begin-

ning from above. And hence every principle, or beginning, is wont to be called a head. 2. Perfection : because in the head there flourish all the senses both interior and exterior, there being in the other senses touch alone. 3. Virtue, or power : because the power and motion of the other members and the government of them in their acts is from the head, on account of the sensitive and motive forces (*vis*) there dominant. Hence a ruler is called the head of the people. Now, all these three spiritually belong to Christ. For, 1, by reason of His propinquity to God, His grace is higher than and before that of others, although not in time. For all others have received grace in respect of His grace, as says the Apostle to the Romans, "Whom He did foreknow He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren." 2. He has perfection, as having the fulness of all graces. 3. He has the power of causing graces to flow into all the members of the Church, as it is written, "Of His fulness have all we received, and grace for grace."

CXXXII. To give grace, or the Holy Ghost, belongs to Christ as He is God, *authoritatively* ; but *instrumentally* it belongs to Him also, as He is man, inasmuch as His Humanity is the instrument of His Divinity. And so His actions

done of the power of His Divinity brought salvation to us, as causing grace in us, and that both by merit and by efficiency.

CXXXIII. True, the Head of Christ, as He is man, is God, as it is written; but that no more prevents Him being the Head of the Church, than the ruler of a city being the head or the father of a family interferes with the relation of the latter as head of the members of his own household.

CXXXIV. The head has a manifest eminence in respect of the other members of the body; but the heart has a hidden influence. And so the Holy Ghost is compared to the heart, because He invisibly quickens and unites the Church; while Christ is compared to the head, by reason of His visible human nature, according to which He as man rules men.

CXXXV. The human body has a natural relation (*ordo*) to the rational soul, which is its own proper form, and its mover. Inasmuch as the soul is its form, it receives from the soul life and other properties belonging to the human body by reason of its species. But inasmuch as the soul is the mover of the body, the body instrumentally serves the soul. The Humanity of Christ therefore possesses Its power of influence as It is united to the Word of God, to Whom the Body is united by means of the Soul.

Hence the whole Humanity of Christ, Body and Soul, influences, flows in upon men, both body and soul; but *principally* as to the soul, and *secondarily* as to the body. In one way, the members of the body are, as S. Paul wrote to the Romans, instruments of righteousness unto God. In another, the life of glory is derived from the soul to the body, as he says to them in another place, "If the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, He that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you."

He writes also to the Philippians, "Jesus Christ shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto His glorious Body, according to the working whereby He is able to subdue all things unto Himself."

CXXXVI. Christ is the head of all men; although not of all men in the same manner.

There is this difference between the natural body of a man and the mystical body of the Church, that the members of the natural body exist together, and all at the same time, while the members of the body mystical do not all exist at the same time. And that neither as to their natural being, since the body of the Church is made up of men who have been from the beginning of the world, are now, or will be even

unto the end; nor according to the being of grace, since even of those who do exist together and at the same time, some as yet lack grace, while others have it.

Of the members of the Body Mystical, some are so actually, others are so potentially.

Of those who are so actually there are three grades. 1. Those who are so by faith. 2. Those who are so by charity, while yet in the way. 3. Those who are so by fruition, *in patriâ*.

Accordingly, 1. First and principally Christ is the Head of those who are actually united to Him by glory. 2. Of those who are actually united to Him by charity. 3. Of those who are actually united to Him by faith. 4. Of those who are united to Him only potentially, and not as yet actually, but to be actually united according to the Divine predestination. 5. Of those who, although potentially united to Him, will never be actually united, not being predestinated. And these last ceasing, when they leave this world, to be even potentially united, thereby wholly cease to be members of Christ.

S. Paul wrote to S. Timothy, "The living God is the Saviour of all men, specially of those who believe." And S. John in his First General Epistle, "Jesus Christ the righteous is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world."

CXXXVII. Unbelievers, although they are not actually of the Church, are yet of the Church potentially. And this potentiality is founded on two things. 1. Primarily and principally on the virtue or power of Christ, which is sufficient in order to the salvation of the whole human race. 2. On the freedom of their own wills.

CXXXVIII. That the Church be glorious, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing, is the last end to which we attain by the Passion of Christ. This will be in our fatherland, and not while we are yet in the way, for if, while we are here we say, We have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us.

CXXXIX. Where there is one body, there is necessarily one head. There is said to be one body when there is one multitude, ordained to one end, although the individuals who compose it have diverse and distinct acts to perform and offices to fulfil. Now to one end, and that the glory of the Divine fruition, both angels and men are ordained. Hence the mystical body of the Church consists not only of men, but also of angels. Of all this multitude the Head is Christ: 1, as nearest of kin to God; 2, as sharing His gifts more perfectly, not only than men, but than even angels; and 3, because as flowing from Him, not men only but angels also

receive. And so S. Paul writes to the Colossians : “ Ye are complete in Him, Who is the Head of all principality and power.” And again to the Ephesians : “ God, the Father of glory, raised Christ from the dead, and set Him at His own right hand in the heavenly places far above all principality and power, and might and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come, and hath put all things under His feet, and gave Him to be the Head over all things to the Church, which is His Body.”

CXL. The Church *in viâ* is the congregation of faithful wayfarers ; the Church *in patriâ* is the congregation of comprehenders. Now Christ was not only a wayfarer, but a comprehender also. And so He is the Head not only of all faithful wayfarers, but of all comprehenders, whether angels or men.

CXLI. The habitual personal grace of Christ, belonging to Him as an individual, and being that whereby His Soul was justified, was the same in essence with that grace according to which He is the Head of the whole Church and the Justifier of others. These graces differ however in idea.

CXLII. Original sin in Adam, which is a sin of nature, was derived from his actual sin, which was a personal sin. In it the person corrupted

the nature. By means of this corruption, the sin of the first man is derived to his posterity, the corrupted nature now corrupting the person.

But grace is not derived from Christ to us by means of human nature, but solely by the personal action of Christ Himself; and so it needs not that we distinguish in Christ a twofold grace, one corresponding to nature and another to person, as in Adam we distinguish a sin of nature and a sin of person.

CXLIII. The head influences the other members in two ways. 1. In one way, by an intrinsic influx, whereby motive and sensitive power is derived from the head to the other members. 2. In another way, as regards external government, namely, by the sight and other senses which have their roots in the head, and by which man is directed in his outward acts. Now, the interior influx of grace is from no one save from Christ alone, Whose Humanity, from its union with Divinity, has power to justify. But the outward influx, or influence on the members of the Church as to external government, may belong to others. Accordingly certain persons may be called heads of the Church. This however differently from Christ, for: 1. He is the head of all belonging to it, in all places, in all time, and in every estate. Other men are called heads of the Church in

regard of special places, as the Bishops are the heads of the Church in their several dioceses ; or in regard of a fixed, limited, and determinate time, as the Pope is the head of the whole Church during his pontificate ; or in regard of a special estate—that of wayfarers.

Again : Christ is the Head of the Church by His own power and authority. Others are called heads of the Church as being His vicegerents : as it is written by S. Paul to the Corinthians, “ If I forgave anything, to whom I forgave it, for your sakes forgave I it in the Person of Christ.” And again, “ We are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us.”

CXLIV. Christ, as being set over the Church, is called not only the Head of the Church, but also the Pastor, and the Foundation of the Church, and these names, too, are common to His ministers. As for instance, S. Peter says, “ When the Chief Shepherd,” or Chief of the shepherds, “ shall appear.” And in the Apocalypse, S. John, referring to the twelve Apostles, says, “ The wall of the city had twelve foundations.” But there is one name which is not common property, but belongs to our Blessed Lord alone. He says, “ I am the Door.” The word *Door* here imports principal authority, inasmuch as a door is that whereby all enter into the house ; and

Christ alone is He by Whom we have access into that grace wherein we stand.

CXLV. The head not only inwardly influences the members, but also outwardly governs them, by directing their acts towards a certain end. And the head of any multitude may do both, as does Christ ; or may only govern outwardly, as does a prince or prelate. In this latter way the devil is said to be the head of all the evil ; or, as it is written in the Book of Job, “ He is a king over all the children of pride.”

Now it belongs to a governor to draw those whom he governs towards his own end. The end of the devil is the aversion or turning away of the rational creature from God. And so from the beginning he has tempted man to turn him away from his obedience to the Divine precepts. This aversion from God is called an end, inasmuch as it is desired under the appearance of liberty ; and when it is attained to by sinning, the sinner falls under the rule and government of the devil. And hence the devil is called the head of all the evil.

CXLVI. Although the devil does not inwardly influence the rational mind, yet he induces it to sin by way of suggestion. But all our evil thoughts are not from the devil, some are motions of our own free will.

The devil is the head of all the evil inasmuch

as they follow his example as well as listen to his suggestions.

CXLVII. As has been said, in the natural head are found three things: 1. Order; 2. Perfection; and 3. Power of influencing. 1. As to order of time, Antichrist is not said to be the head of all the evil because his sin did not precede theirs, as the devil's did. 2. Similarly, he is not said to be the head of all the evil as to his power of influencing; for although he may turn some of his contemporaries towards evil by outward inducements, yet those who lived before him were led into wickedness neither by his influence nor by his example. And so in this way he is said to be head, not of all the evil, but of some only. 3. It remains that he be called head of all the evil by perfection of malice or wickedness. As in Christ there dwelt all the fulness of divinity, so in Antichrist there will dwell all the fulness of malice or wickedness; not indeed that his humanity will be assumed by the devil into the unity of his person, as was the Humanity of Christ by the Son of God, but because the devil will pour into him his malice or wickedness by way of suggestion in a higher degree than into others. In this way all other evil persons who have preceded him are, as it were, figures of Antichrist; and this S. Paul understands when he says to the

Thessalonians, "The mystery of iniquity doth already work."

CXLVIII. The devil and Antichrist are not two heads, but one, since Antichrist is said to be a head, inasmuch as there is found in him impressed in all its fulness the malice of the devil.

As the Head of Christ is God, and yet Christ Himself is the Head of the Church; so Antichrist is a member of the devil, and yet a head of the evil.

CXLIX. As has been said, the Son of God assumed human nature entire (*integra*), that is, not only a body, but also a soul; and not only a sensitive soul, but also a rational soul. It behoved Him therefore to have a created knowledge, (*scientia*); and that for three reasons. 1. On account of the perfection of His Soul: as otherwise It would be more imperfect than the souls of other men. 2. Because otherwise in vain would He have had an intellectualive soul. 3. Because a created knowledge belongs to the nature of a human soul: and inasmuch as Christ assumed whole human nature, He was lacking in nothing that was natural thereto.

CL. The knowledge of the blessed, that is, of the comprehenders, consists in the cognition of God. Man has a potentiality to this knowledge, and is ordained to it as to his end, for the rational creature is capable of that blessed

cognition, the Vision of God, inasmuch as he is made in the Image of God. To this end of blessedness men are brought by the Humanity of Christ, as it is written by S. Paul to the Hebrews : "It became Him, for Whom are all things, and by Whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the Captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings." It was becoming, then, that the cognition of the Blessed, which consists in the Vision of God, should belong to the Man Christ, and that in the most surpassing manner and degree, for the cause ought always to be greater than the caused.

CLI. Since the Soul of Christ was perfect, there belonged to It of necessity, besides Its divine and uncreated knowledge, an imparted or infused knowledge, whereby things were known to Him as they are in their own nature, by intelligible species, proportioned to the human mind : for this belongs to the perfection of the Soul of Christ.

To this S. Paul refers, when he says to the Colossians that in Christ "are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge."

CLII. None of those things which God has implanted in our nature were lacking to human nature as it was assumed by the Word of God. Now in human nature God has implanted not only a possible intellect, but also an acting intellect ;

and so in the Soul of Christ there was not only a possible intellect, but also an acting intellect. Now if in others, God and nature do nothing in vain, much less in the Soul of Christ was there aught in vain. But it would be in vain if anything had not its own proper operation, since everything exists because of its operation. The proper operation of the acting intellect is to make species actually intelligible by abstracting them from phantoms. And so there was in Christ acquired or experimental knowledge,—acquired by the natural light of the intellect acting in manner as aforesaid.

CLIII. There are two ways of acquiring knowledge, namely—1, by invention, or finding it out; and 2, by discipline, or learning it. Invention is the highest mode: learning stands second. We read in the Ethics, “He is best who understands all things by means of himself; but he is good who obeys him who talks well.” To Christ, therefore, it belonged to have knowledge acquired by invention more than by learning: especially since He was given by God to all men for a Doctor, as God spake before by the mouth of His prophet Joel, “Be glad then, ye children of Zion, and rejoice in the Lord your God, for He hath given you a Teacher of Righteousness.”

S. Paul writes to the Hebrews, “Since He

was the Son of God, He learned obedience by the things which He suffered," that is, by the experience of suffering He acquired knowledge.

CLIV. The union of the Natures was made in the Person of Christ in such wise that the properties of either nature remained unconfused. That which was uncreated remained uncreated : that which was created remained within the limits of the creature. Now it is impossible that any creature should comprehend the Divine Essence, for the infinite cannot be comprehended or shut in by the finite. And so the Soul of Christ, being a creature and finite, in no way comprehended the Word, or uncreated and infinite Divine Essence.

CLV. The Soul of Christ knew all things in the Word, *proprie*, which in any way are, or were, or will be, either done, or said, or known, by any one whomsoever, at any time whatsoever, for every created intellect has knowledge in the Word, not only of all things *simpliciter*, but so much the more as he sees the Word more perfectly. For to no beatified intellect is there wanting a knowledge in the Word of all things that concern itself. Now all things in some way concern Christ and His dignity, inasmuch as all things are subjected to Him. For He has been appointed by God the Judge of all, because He is the Son of Man. The Soul of Christ, there-

fore, had knowledge in the Word of all existences, at whatsoever time, and even of the thoughts of men of whom He is the Judge: so that what is written of Him in S. John's Gospel, "For He Himself knew what was in man," may be understood not only of His Divine knowledge, but also of that knowledge which His Soul had in the Word.

But *all things* may be understood in a larger sense, as extending not only to all things which actually are at any time, but also to all things which exist potentially, and may perhaps never exist actually. 1. Of these some are in the Divine Power alone, and the Soul of Christ does not know *all things* of this sort, in the Word, for that would be to comprehend all that God can do, which would be to comprehend the Divine virtue or power, and consequently the Divine Essence, for every power is known by knowing all that it is capable of doing. 2. But some things are not only in the Divine power, but also within the power of the creature; and *all things* of this sort the Soul of Christ knows in the Word, for It comprehends in the Word the essence of every creature, and consequently its power and virtue, and all things which lie within the creature's power.

S. John, in the Apocalypse, heard the voice of many angels, saying with a loud voice,

“Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power and riches and *wisdom*,” that is, the knowledge of all things.

CLVI. Jesus said to His disciples, “Of that day (of judgment) and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father.” Arius and Eunomius understood this passage to refer not to the knowledge of the Soul, which they did not ascribe to Christ, but to the Divine knowledge of the Son, Whom they reckoned to be inferior to the Father as to knowledge. But that cannot stand, since by the Word of God were all things made, as S. John says, and *inter alia* there were made by Him all times. But nothing could be made by Him of whose existence He would be ignorant.

He is said, therefore, not to know the day and hour of the judgment because He does not make men know them: for, when questioned about them by His apostles, He would not reveal the matter to them. But the Father is said to know, because knowledge of this sort He has delivered to the Son.

Hence, when it is said, *but the Father*, it is given to understand that the Son does know, and that not only as to His Divine Nature, but also as to His human nature, because, as S. Chrysostom argues, “If it be given to the

Man Christ to know how He ought to judge, which is the greater, much more has it been given to Him to know the time of judgment, which is the less." Origen, however, expounds the passage of Christ according to His Mystical Body, which is the Church, and which is ignorant of the time of judgment.

But some say it is to be understood of the adoptive, and not of the natural Son of God.

CLVII. God has more perfect knowledge of His Own Essence than the Soul of Christ has. He therefore knows all things, not only those which are at any time in actual being—these He is said to know by the knowledge of vision : but also all things whatsoever, which He is able to do. And these He is said to know by simple intelligence. The Soul of Christ therefore knows all things which God knows in Himself by the knowledge of vision ; but not all things which God knows in Himself by the knowledge of simple intelligence. And so God knows more in Himself than the Soul of Christ does.

CLVIII. Quantity of knowledge regards two things. 1. The number of things knowable (*scibile*), and 2. The clearness of their cognition. Although, therefore, the knowledge of the Soul of Christ, which It has in the Word, be paralleled to the knowledge of vision, which God has in Himself, as to the number of things

knowable, yet this knowledge of God infinitely exceeds the knowledge of the Soul of Christ as to the clearness of cognition; since the uncreated light of the Divine Intellect infinitely exceeds the created light in the Soul of Christ.

Albeit, speaking absolutely, the Divine knowledge exceeds the knowledge of the Soul of Christ, not only as to the manner of knowing, but also, as has been said, as to the number of things knowable.

CLIX. The Soul of Christ has knowledge of the infinite—not the actual infinite, but the potential infinite. This It has knowledge of in the Word, by a knowledge of simple intelligence, but not by a knowledge of vision.

CLX. The vision of the Divine Essence belongs to all the Blessed in proportion to the share of light derived to each from the fountain of the Word of God. The Soul of Christ, since It was united to the Word of God more closely than any other creature, seeing It was so united *in a person*, beholds more perfectly and more clearly than all other creatures the Divine Essence.

CLXI. It became the Soul of Christ to be altogether perfect, inasmuch as in Him all the potential was reduced to the actual. Now in the human soul, as in every creature, there is a twofold passive potentiality. One is in relation

to the natural agent ; the other is in relation to the primal or first agent, which can reduce the creature to an act higher than the act to which it is reduced by the natural agent. This is wont to be called the potentiality or power of obedience in the creature. Both potentialities of the Soul of Christ were reduced to the actual, according to His infused or divinely bestowed knowledge. According to it, therefore, the Soul of Christ, in the first place, knew whatsoever could be known by man in virtue of the light of the intellect in action, as—all things that belong to human science. And, in the second place, by this knowledge He knew all those things which are made known to men by Divine Revelation, whether they pertain to the gift of wisdom, or to the gift of prophecy, or to any other gift of the Holy Ghost. All these things the Soul of Christ had knowledge of more abundantly and more fully than all other creatures. But the Essence of God It did not know by this knowledge.

CLXII. Isaiah prophesied, “ The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him, the Spirit of Wisdom and Understanding, the Spirit of Knowledge and Counsel.” And under these are comprehended all things knowable. For to wisdom pertains the knowledge of all divine things ; to understanding, the knowledge of all immaterial things ;

to knowledge or science, that of all conclusions ; and to counsel, that of all possible actions (*omnium agibilium.*) Christ, therefore, according to the knowledge infused into Him by the Holy Ghost, had knowledge of all things, the Divine Essence alone excepted.

CLXIII. Christ, before His Passion, was at once a wayfarer and a comprehender. The conditions of a wayfarer attached to Him chiefly *ex parte* of His Body, inasmuch as It was passible. The conditions of a comprehender were His chiefly *ex parte* of His intellectual soul. Now it is a condition of the soul which comprehends, that it can in no way be subdued or subject to its body, or depend upon it, but must wholly dominate or lord it over it. Hence, after the resurrection, glory will redound from the soul to the body. And so, without conversion to phantasms, the Soul of Christ, He being a comprehender, could understand by virtue of His infused knowledge.

The Soul of Christ was indeed of the same nature with our souls, but not in the same estate. He had then in reality what we have now but in hope, the estate of a comprehender.

CLXIV. The senses, which are given to man to subserve the intellect, were not bestowed on Christ in vain ; for although the Soul of Christ could understand without conversion to phan-

tasms, which are received by the senses, yet It could at the same time understand by conversion to phantasms. And besides, the senses are not given to man solely in order to intellectual knowledge, but also for the necessities of animal life.

CLXV. Knowledge may be discursive or collative in two ways. In one way, as to the acquisition of knowledge; as happens in ourselves, who proceed from knowledge of one thing to knowledge of another, or from knowledge of causes to knowledge of effects, or *è converso*. In this way the knowledge of the Soul of Christ was not discursive or collative, since it was divinely bestowed upon Him, and was not acquired by investigation of the reason. In another way, knowledge may be said to be discursive or collative as to its use: as sometimes those who know conclude effects from causes, not as acquiring any new knowledge, but as making use of that which they already have. In this way the knowledge of the Soul of Christ might be discursive and collative, for He could from one thing conclude another, as it pleased Him. As for instance, when He asked Peter, "Of whom do the kings of the earth receive tribute, of their own children or of strangers?" and Peter answered, "Of strangers;" He concluded, "Then are the children free."

CLXVII. The infused knowledge of the Soul of Christ exceeds the knowledge of the angels, *ex parte* of God, the influencing cause, both as to the multitude of things known and as to the certitude of knowledge, since the light of spiritual grace which was bestowed upon the Soul of Christ is much more excellent than the light which belongs to the angelic nature. But *ex parte* of Itself, the subject receiving, the knowledge bestowed upon the Soul of Christ is beneath angelic knowledge, as to the mode of knowing which is natural to the human soul, that is to say, by conversion to phantasms, and by collation and discourse.

It was not by reason of His knowledge, but by reason of His sufferings and death, that Christ was said to be made lower than the angels, as S. Paul wrote to the Hebrews: "We see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour."

CLXVIII. It belongs to that manner of knowing which is connatural to the soul of man, that it be sometimes actually and sometimes potentially intelligent. Now the mean between pure potentiality and completed act is a habit. But the mean and the extremes are of the same genus; and so the mode of knowing connatural to a human soul is to receive knowledge by way

of habit. The infused knowledge of the Soul of Christ therefore was habitual, and He could use it when He willed.

It was univocal with our knowledge, as His Soul was of one species with our souls. But our knowledge is in the genus of a habit; and therefore the knowledge of Christ was habitual.

CLXIX. The infused knowledge of the Soul of Christ was distinguished into diverse habits, according to the various *genera* or kinds of things knowable, for this is a mode connatural to the human soul.

CLXX. Besides the knowledge bestowed upon or infused into the Soul of Christ He had also an acquired or experimental knowledge. And as by His infused knowledge He knew all things that could in any way be potentially known; so by His acquired knowledge He attained to a knowledge of all things to which the power of the intellect in action extends.

CLXXI. Acquired or experimental knowledge may be gained not only by experience of the things in question themselves, but also by experience of certain other things; for, in virtue of the light of the intellect in action, a man may go on to understand effects by causes, similars by similars, and contraries by contraries. And so, although in one way Christ had not ex-



perience of all things, yet from those things which He did experience, He arrived at an experimental knowledge of all things.

CLXXII. According to this knowledge the Soul of Christ did not know all things *simpliciter*, but only all those things which are knowable by the light of the human intellect in action. For instance, by this knowledge He did not know the essences of separated substances, neither did He know particulars in the past, in the present, or in the future, which yet He knew by His infused knowledge.

In a word, His experimental knowledge was the most perfect of its kind, and it could be no more : for if it had been, its kind would have been altered. If Christ had by this knowledge known all things *simpliciter*, then His acquired knowledge would have been equal to His infused knowledge, and to His knowledge as a comprehender, which would have been other than becoming ; for God does not ordain two causes to produce one and the same effect.

CLXXIII. Christ is said to have increased in wisdom, in age and in grace, not as to the habit of knowledge infused into His Soul, for that could not be augmented, seeing He had from the first instant of His conception a plenary infused knowledge of all things ; but inasmuch as, in proportion to the increase of His age, He did

greater works, which showed greater knowledge and grace.

CLXXIV. Both His infused knowledge and His knowledge as a comprehender were effects of an agent of infinite power who can at once operate the whole. And so in neither knowledge did Christ make progress, because He had both in perfection from the beginning. But His acquired knowledge was caused by the action of the intellect, which does not operate the whole at once, but successively. And so, according to this knowledge, Christ did not from the beginning know all things, but only little by little, and by degrees, and after a time, that is, when He had arrived at a perfect age. The Evangelist therefore brackets the two progresses—the progress in knowledge and the progress in age.

CLXXV. In every genus that which is the prime mover is not moved according to the species of motion common to the moved. Now Christ was constituted by God Head of the Church, in order that from Him and by Him all men might receive not only grace but also the doctrine of Truth; as He said, “To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, to bear witness to the truth.” And so it was not becoming His dignity as a teacher that Christ should be taught by any man.

CLXXVI. As the human soul stands midway

between spiritual substances and corporeal things, so in two ways may it naturally be perfected. In one way, by knowledge received from sensible things ; and in another by knowledge bestowed or impressed by the illumination of spiritual substances. Now, in both ways was the Soul of Christ perfected. By things sensible, according to His experimental knowledge, in order to which there is not required angelic light, the light of the intellect in action being sufficient. Also, by impression from on high, according to His infused knowledge, which He obtained immediately from God. For as, above the common mode of the creature that Soul was united to the Word in unity of Person, so above the common mode of men It was replenished with knowledge and grace immediately by the Word of God Himself, and not through the mediation of angels, who also themselves, from the influence of the Word, received in the beginning their knowledge of things.

CLXXVII. In the mystery of the Incarnation, the union was so made in a person, that there yet remained a distinction of natures, each nature retaining that which was proper to itself. Now omnipotence was a property of the Divine Nature and a specialty of the Creator ; and so could not be predicated of the Soul of Christ, It being part of His human nature, and a creature.

CLXXVIII. As to the omnipotence of the Soul of Christ in respect of the immutation of creatures, a twofold distinction must be kept in view ; one being *ex parte* of the transmutation of creatures ; the other *ex parte* of the Soul of Christ. The first is threefold : one transmutation is natural, that, namely, which is done by the proper agent, according to the order of nature. Another is miraculous ; that which is done by a supernatural agent, above and beyond the accustomed order and course of nature, as, for instance, the resuscitation of the dead. A third, according as every creature is convertible into nothing. The second distinction, that *ex parte* of the Soul of Christ, may be considered in two ways. In one way, according to Its proper nature and virtue, whether natural or gratuitous, that is, aided, supported, or elevated by grace. In another way, as It is the instrument of the Word of God, personally united with It. If therefore we speak of the Soul of Christ according to its own proper nature and virtue, whether natural or gratuitous, It had power to produce those effects which belong to the soul, as, for instance, to govern the body, to dispose human actions, and even to illuminate by plenitude of grace and knowledge all rational creatures that fail of its own perfection, by that mode which appertains to the rational creature. But if we speak of the Soul of Christ as It is the

instrument of the Word united to It, It had instrumental virtue to make all miraculous commutations which are ordainable to the end of the Incarnation, which is to restore all things, whether in heaven or on earth. But the immutations of creatures according as they are convertible into nothing, correspond to the creation of things according as they are produced out of nothing. And, therefore, as God alone can create, God alone can reduce creatures to nothing. He also alone preserves them in being, and prevents them from crumbling into nothing. It belongs to Him to transmute creatures, to whom it also belongs to preserve them, or, as S. Paul says to the Hebrews, to whom it belongs to uphold all things by the Word of His Power.

CLXXIX. In like manner as the Soul of Christ could not change outward bodies from the course and order of nature, so neither, according to Its own virtue, had It omnipotence in respect of Its own Body; unless inasmuch as it was the instrument of the Word of God united to the Word of God in a person. So considered, there was wholly subdued to Its power every disposition of Its own Body. But, inasmuch as the virtue of an action is not properly attributed to the instrument, but to the principal agent, so such omnipotence is

rather to be attributed to the Word of God Himself than to the Soul of Christ.

CLXXX. S. Paul says to the Hebrews that it became Jesus in all things to be made like unto His brethren, and chiefly in those things which pertain to the condition of human nature. But to the condition of human nature it pertains that the health of the body and its nourishment and its increase be not subjected to the dominion of the reason or the will; for natural things are subjected to God alone, Who is the Author of nature. And so they were not subjected to the reason or the will in Christ. The Soul of Christ, therefore, was not omnipotent in respect of His own Body.

CLXXI. The Soul of Christ had omnipotence by Its own power to effect all those things which It willed to effect *per se*. It may be said that It could do whatever It willed to do, for it belonged to Its wisdom not to will to do *per se* aught that did not lie within the province of Its power. But what It willed to do by Divine power, as to raise Its own or other dead bodies, It could not effect save as the instrument of the Divine Word.

CLXXXII. It was becoming that the Body assumed by the Son of God should be subject to human infirmities and defects; and that chiefly for three reasons: 1. Because for this did the

Son of God come into the world in His assumed Flesh, that He might satisfy for the sins of the human race. Now one satisfies for the sin of another when in himself he bears the punishment due to the sin of that other. Corporal defects, as death, hunger, thirst, and the like, are the punishment of sin which was introduced into the world by Adam, as it is written, "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin." And so it was becoming, in order to the end of the Incarnation, that Jesus should bear such punishments in our nature in our stead, as it is written again, "Verily, He bore our griefs and carried our sorrows." 2. In order to confirm, strengthen, and brighten our faith in the Incarnation, for since human nature is not known to men in any other condition than as subject to human defects, so if the Son of God had assumed human nature without these defects, He would not have appeared to men to be true man, nor to have true flesh, but to have a phantastic body, as the Manichæans asserted He had. And so, as S. Paul wrote to the Philippians, Christ Jesus "made Himself of no reputation, and took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness or habit of men; and being found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross." It was by the sight of His Wounds

that S. Thomas was recalled to faith in the Incarnation. 3. For an example of patience, which He gave us, by bravely bearing human sufferings and defects. "Consider," writes S. Paul to the Hebrews, "Him that endured such contradiction of sinners against Himself, lest ye be wearied and faint in your minds." S. Paul says, in another place of the same Epistle, "In that Jesus Himself hath suffered, being tempted, He is able to succour them that are tempted." And so David also says, "I have lifted up mine eyes unto the hills, from whence shall come mine aid."

CLXXXIII. By the assumption of corporeal defects the end of the Incarnation seems at first sight to be hindered in many ways, and chiefly in three: 1. Because by such infirmities men were repelled from the knowledge of His Divinity. Isaiah prophesied, "When we shall see Him, there is no beauty that we should desire Him. He is despised and rejected of men, a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief, and He hid, as it were His face from us. He was despised, and we esteemed Him not." 2. Because the desire of the Holy Fathers seems thereby prevented from being fulfilled. In their person Isaiah cries, "Awake, awake, put on strength, O Arm of the Lord." 3. Because it seems more meet that by strength and not by weakness the

power of the devil should be overthrown, and human infirmity be healed. But this is not so. For not only did the infirmity assumed by Christ not hinder the end of the Incarnation, but it greatly promoted it; for although by these infirmities His Divinity was obscured and veiled, yet by them His Humanity was made manifest, and It is the way whereby we arrive at Divinity. It was not bodily strength, but spiritual strength, that the ancient Fathers desired and longed for in Christ; and it was by it that He overcame the devil and healed human infirmity.

CLXXXIV. Necessity is twofold. There is a necessity of co-action, which is caused by an extrinsic agent. This necessity is contrary both to nature and to will, both of which are intrinsic principles. The other is a natural necessity, the consequence of natural principles or originating causes; for instance, form—and so it is necessary that fire produce heat: or matter—and so it is necessary that a body composed of contraries be dissolved. According therefore to this necessity, which is a consequence of the matter, the Body of Christ was subject to the necessity of death and other like defects, since by the good pleasure (*benepiacito*) of the Divine Will, it was permitted to the Flesh of Christ to do and suffer such things as are proper to flesh. This necessity is caused by the first principles of

human nature. But if we speak of necessity of co-action, according to what is repugnant to corporeal nature, again the Body of Christ, according to the condition of Its own proper nature, was subject to the necessity both of the perforating nail and of the stinging lash. But according as such necessity is repugnant to the will, it is manifest that in Christ there was no necessity of these defects, either in respect of the Divine Will, or in respect absolutely of the Human Will of Christ, as consequent on the deliberations of the reason,—but only according to the natural motion of the will, which naturally shrinks from death, and even from all bodily harm.

CLXXXV. Christ did not contract corporeal defects by any debt of sin, for He took human nature without sin, in that purity in which it existed in the estate of innocence. He assumed these defects of His own free will; and He could have assumed human nature without them.

CLXXXVI. The cause of death and of other corporeal defects in human nature is twofold. One is *remote*, that namely which is *ex parte* of the material first principles of the human body, inasmuch as it is composed of contraries. This cause was hindered by original righteousness. And therefore the *proximate* cause of death and other defects is sin, by which original righteousness is taken away. It was because Christ was

without sin, the proximate cause, that He is said not to have contracted its effects, death and other corporal defects, but to have voluntarily assumed them.

CLXXXVII. Christ assumed human defects in order to satisfy for the sin of human nature : and in order to this it was required that He should have in His Soul perfection of knowledge and grace. It therefore behoved Christ to assume those defects which follow the sin common to whole human nature, and yet are not repugnant to the perfection of knowledge and grace. And so it was not becoming that He should assume all human defects or infirmities. For there are some defects which are repugnant to the perfection of knowledge and grace, as ignorance, proneness to evil, and difficulty in following after good. And there are also certain defects which are not consequences common to whole human nature by reason of the sin of the first parent, but are caused in some men by certain particular causes, as leprosy, the falling sickness, and the like. And there are certain defects which are caused sometimes by the individual man's own fault, as by inordinate living ; and sometimes by defect of formative power. Neither of these kinds of defect belonged to Christ, for His Flesh was conceived by the Holy Ghost, Who is infinite in wisdom and power, and Who cannot err or

fail. And Jesus Himself did naught inordinate in the conduct of His life. But there is a third class of defects which are found in all men in common, and arise from the sin of their first parent. It comprehends death, hunger, thirst, and the like. All these defects Christ assumed. S. John Damascene calls them natural and indetractable passions; natural, because they are consequently common to whole human nature; indetractable, because they do not import any defect of knowledge or grace.

CLXXXVIII. Christ assumed our defects *dispensative* to satisfy for our sins; and so it was not necessary that He should assume all our defects, but those only which were sufficient to satisfy for all the sins of whole human nature.

CLXXXIX. Since Christ assumed our defects, as we have seen: 1, to satisfy for us; 2, to prove the reality of human nature; and 3, to give us an example of virtue; in no way did He assume the defect of sin, either original or actual, inasmuch as, 1, Sin in no way works satisfaction, but hinders its virtue. 2. Sin does not demonstrate the reality of human nature, because it does not pertain to human nature, of which God is the cause; but it is rather, on the other hand, contrary to nature, being introduced by the sowing of the Devil. 3. Sin does not afford an example of virtue, but is its contrary.

Jesus, as S. Peter says, "did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth."

CXC. As S. Augustine says, "Christ was in Adam and in the other ancient fathers, not in altogether the same mode as we were there; for we were in Adam both according to the idea of seed, and also according to corpulent substance. Christ took the visible substance of flesh from the flesh of the Virgin; but He was conceived not from seed of man, but by power from on high. And so He was not in Adam according to the idea of seed, but only according to corpulent substance. Christ therefore did not receive human nature from Adam *actively*, but only *materially*: He received it actively from the Holy Ghost: just as Adam took his body materially from the dust of the earth, and actively from God. Consequently, Christ did not sin in Adam, in whom He was only according to matter.

CXCI. Since there was in Christ virtue and grace in the most perfect degree, there was in no way in Him that inclination to sin which is known by the name of *fomes*. That defect is not only not ordainable to satisfaction, but it rather inclines to the contrary of satisfaction.

CXCII. As there was in Christ plenitude of grace and virtue, so there was also in Him plenitude of all knowledge. And so in Christ

the plenitude of grace and virtue excluded the *fomes* of sin; so the plenitude of knowledge excluded that ignorance which is opposed to knowledge.

Ignorance is not taken away by ignorance. But Christ came for this, that He might take away our ignorances, for He came to illuminate those who were sitting in darkness and the shadow of death. In Christ, therefore, there was no ignorance.

CXCIII. A soul established in a body can suffer in two ways. In one way, by corporeal or bodily passion or suffering; in another, by animal or spiritual suffering. It suffers corporeal passion by bodily lesion; for since the soul is the form of the body, it follows that there is one being, both of soul and body, and therefore when the body is perturbed by any corporeal passion, the soul also is necessarily perturbed *per accidens*. Since, therefore, the Body of Christ was passible and mortal, His Soul was also necessarily passible. Again, the soul is said to suffer by animal passion, according to that operation which is either proper and peculiar to the soul, or belongs to the soul more principally than to the body. And although also, according to intelligence and sentiment, the soul may be said to suffer somewhat, yet those which are most properly called the passions of

the soul are the affections of the sensitive appetite. And these were in Christ, as were all things else which pertain to the nature of man. At the same time it must be remembered that passions of this sort were in Christ after another fashion than they are in us; and that in three ways: 1. As to the object. In us the object of these passions is frequently illicit. It was never so in Christ. 2. As to the first principle. In us such passions frequently precede, anticipate, go before or prevent, the judgment of the reason. In Christ all motions of the sensitive appetite arose according to the disposition of the reason. 3. As to the effect. In us, motions of this sort sometimes do not stay in the sensitive appetite, but drag the reason along with them. In Christ it was not so; for the motions naturally belonging to human flesh, so remained, by His disposition, in the sensitive appetite, that the reason was in no way hindered by them from doing those things which were becoming.

When passion does not dominate over the reason, but is inherent in the sensitive appetite, and does not extend itself beyond it, it is called *propassion*. It was by *propassion* that the Soul of Jesus was sad, sore amazed, and very heavy.

The Stoics did not call all motions of the sensitive appetite whatsoever by the name of passions, but only inordinate motions. And it is

in reference to these that Cicero calls passions sicknesses of the soul. Such passions were not in Christ.

CXCIV. Since the Body of Christ was passible and mortal, and the Soul of Christ possessed in the most perfect manner all natural powers or potentialities of the soul, there was in Christ, real and true, sensible pain (*dolor*).

CXCV. Christ did not assume the defects of hungering, thirsting, weeping and sorrowing of necessity, in relation to the first cause of these defects, which is sin. But as to their proximate cause, which was the composition of His Body from contraries, the Flesh of Christ was of necessity subject to them.

CXCVI. Flesh conceived in sin is subject to pain, not only of the necessity of its natural first principles, but also of the necessity of the *reatus* of sin. This necessity was not in Christ, but only the necessity of natural first principles.

CXCVII. By virtue of the Divinity of Christ, His beatitude was *dispensatively* so contained within His Soul that it was not derived to His Body, lest Its passibility and mortality should be taken away. And in the same way, and for the like reason, the delectation of contemplation of Divine things was so retained within His mind that it was not derived to His sensitive powers,

lest thereby His sensible pain should be lessened or taken away.

CXCVIII. As sensible pain (*dolor*) is in the sensitive appetite, so also is sorrow (*tristitia*). But they differ according to their motive or object; for the object and motive of pain is lesion, perceived by the sense of touch, as when one is wounded: while the object or motive of sorrow is something hurtful or evil interiorly apprehended either by the reason or by the imagination, as when one is sorrowful for the loss either of grace or of money. Now the Soul of Christ could interiorly apprehend certain things as hurtful, both as regarded Himself, as His Passion and Death, and as regarded others, as the sin of the Disciples, or of the Jews who slew Him. And, therefore, as in Christ there could be true pain (*dolor*), so in Him there could be also true sorrow (*tristitia*). They were in Him, however, after another mode than they are in us, for the three reasons we have assigned above, when treating of the passions of the Soul of Christ in common.

CXCIX. As sorrow (*tristitia*) is caused by the apprehension of present evil, so fear (*timor*) is caused by the apprehension of future evil. But the apprehension of future evil, if that evil is altogether certain, does not induce fear, for, as the Philosopher says in his Rhetoric, fear is not

save where there is some hope of evasion, for where there is no hope of evasion the evil is apprehended as present; and so causes sorrow rather than fear.

Fear, then, may be considered in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite naturally recoils from lesion of the body, both by sorrow, if it be present, and by fear, if it be future. And in this way there was fear in Christ, as there was also sorrow. In another way, it may be considered according to the incertitude of the future event, as when in the night we fear by reason of some sound, not knowing whence it is. In this way, there was no fear in Christ.

CC. Fear was in Christ, not according to passion, but according to propassion, which does not dominate over the reason, but is inchoate in the sensitive appetite, and does not extend beyond it. Jesus *began* to be sore afraid.

Although Christ could have avoided future evils in virtue of His Divinity, yet these were inevitable or not easily evitable by reason of the infirmity of the flesh.

CCI. Since to Christ, according to His Divine knowledge and also according to His infused knowledge, there was nothing new or unwonted, there could not be in Him admiration or wonder, which concerns the unwonted and the new. But there might be something which was to Him

both unwonted and new, according to His experimental knowledge, by which He daily increased in the knowledge of new things. And so there might be in Him admiration or wonder. S. Matthew records that Jesus, hearing the words of the centurion, marvelled.

CCII. Anger or wrath (*ira*) is the effect of sorrow (*tristitia*). Now a consequence of sorrow is a desire arising in the sensitive appetite of repelling the injury done to oneself or to others. And so anger is a passion composed of sorrow and the desire of revenge. Now in Christ, as we have seen, there could be sorrow. As to the desire of revenge, it is sometimes with sin, as when one seeks revenge without reason. This is technically called anger by vice, and this could not be in Christ. But sometimes such a desire is without sin, nay is even praiseworthy, as when one desires revenge according to the order of righteousness. This is technically called anger by zeal; and this was in Christ. When Jesus made a scourge of small cords and drove out of the temple those that sold oxen and sheep and doves, and the sheep and the oxen, and poured out the changers' money, and overthrew the tables, His disciples remembered that it was written of Him in the Book of Psalms, "The zeal of Thine House hath eaten Me up."

CCIII. One is said to be a wayfarer (*viator*), who is tending towards beatitude. A comprehender (*comprehensor*) is one who has attained to beatitude. So S. Paul wrote to the Corinthians, "So run that ye may comprehend;" and to the Philippians, "I follow after, if that I may comprehend." The perfect beatitude of man consists both in soul and body. In soul, as seeing and enjoying God: in body, as rising spiritual, in power, in glory, and in incorruption. Now Christ before His passion clearly saw and fully enjoyed the vision of God. But His Soul before His Passion was passible, as His Body also was passible and mortal. And so Jesus was at once a comprehender and a wayfarer; a comprehender as enjoying beatitude of soul; a wayfarer as tending towards beatitude in regard of those things which were wanting to it.

CCIV. The proposition, God is man, is granted by all Christian men; but not by all for the same reasons. For some grant this proposition, but not according to the proper acceptation of these terms. For, 1. The Manichæans say that the Word of God is man, not, indeed, true or very man, but a similitudinary man, inasmuch as they say that the Son of God assumed a phantastic body; so that God is called man as a figured copperplate is called a man, because it has the similitude of a man. 2. Similarly also those who

maintain that in Christ Soul and Body were not united, cannot say that God is very or true man, but that He is called man figuratively by reason of His parts. 3. Others admit the truth *ex parte* of man, but deny the truth *ex parte* of God. They say that Christ, Who is God and man, is God not naturally but *participatively*, namely, by grace ; as also all holy men are called gods, but Christ in a manner and degree more excellent than others, by reason of His more abundant grace. Accordingly, when they say God is man, they do not by God intend a true and natural God. This is the heresy of Photinus. 4. Others grant this proposition, admitting the reality of both terms, and confessing Christ to be both very God and very man ; yet, nevertheless, they do not preserve the truth of their predicates. They say that man is predicated of God by a certain conjunction either of dignity or of authority, or even of affection or inhabitation. In this way Nestorius said that God was man ; meaning thereby merely that God was united to man by such a conjunction that man was inhabited by God and united to Him according to affection and according to participation of authority and Divine honour. 5. Into a similar error those fall who place two *hypostases* or two *supposita* in Christ ; for it cannot possibly be understood that of two things which are distinct according

to *suppositum* or *hypostasis*, the one can properly be predicated of the other, but only according to a certain figurative mode of speech. 6. The Catholic faith teaches that a true Divine Nature was united with a true human nature, not only in person but also in *suppositum* or *hypostasis*; and so we say that the proposition, God is man, is proper and true, not only by reason of the truth of the terms, but also by reason of the truth of the predicates.

CCV. The verity of both natures being granted as well as their union in a person or *hypostasis*, it follows that as it is true to say—God is man, so it is also true to say Man is God.

CCVI. Since God and Lord (*Deus et Dominus*) are predicated essentially of the Person of the Son of God,—but the word lordly is taken denominatively from Lord, (*Dominicus a Domino*,)—and to predicate denominatively is derogatory to the verity of that union which may be predicated of essentially, so the man Christ Jesus is to be called not a lordly man but Lord (*non homo dominicus, sed Dominus*).

Had there been two *supposita* in Christ, as Nestorius alleged, then the title lordly would have been fitting, by reason of the human nature participating in the Divine honour.

CCVII. Since both natures, the human and the Divine, exist in one and the same Divine

hypostasis, the Person of the Eternal Word, those things which belong to the Divine Nature may be predicated of the man as existing in the *hypostasis* of the Divine Nature, while those things which belong to the human nature may be predicated of God as existing in that Person which is also the *hypostasis* of the human nature.

S. John Damascene says that God received those things which are *idiomata*, that is, properties which are peculiar to the flesh: and so God is rightly called passible; and it is true to say, that the God of Glory was crucified.

CCVIII. Since the Divine Nature is not identical (*eadem*) with the human nature, although both have the same *hypostasis*, so the properties of the one nature cannot be predicated of the other nature in the abstract, but only in the concrete. For instance, it is true to say that God was createable and passible, but we cannot say that Deity or Godhead was so.

CCIX. Since to be man is predicated of God, not from eternity but in time, therefore the proposition is true that God was made man. It is, however, understood diversely by divers persons, in like manner as we have shown when treating above of the proposition—God is man. As S. Athanasius says in his Epistle to Epictetus, the proposition, God was made man, is

equivalent to the proposition of S. John, "The Word was made flesh."

CCX. Since in the proposition Man was made God, taken according to the received and real meaning of the words, the word *man* imports a human personality, while the Person of the Son of God was always Divine, it is clear that this proposition is false.

CCXI. Lest we should appear to favour the error of heretics, and especially of the Arians, who said that Christ was a creature, and less than the Father, not only by reason of His human nature, but also by reason of His Divine Person, we may not say absolutely that Christ is a creature, but only with a determination, that is, according to His human nature.

CCXII. Since these words, "This man," or "That man," meaning Christ, signify one eternal Person, *suppositum* or *hypostasis*, the proposition This man, or That man, began to be, is simply false. And even were it not false, its use would be inexpedient as seeming to favour the Arian heresy, which, attributing to the Person of the Son of God that He was a creature and less than the Father, in so doing attributed to Him that He began to be, saying, *Erat quando non erat*, There was a time when He was not.

CCXIII. Everything which is, is either Crea-

tor or creature. But it is false to say, Christ as He is man is Creator. And so it is true to say, Christ as He is man is a creature.

CCXIV. The proposition, Christ as He is man is God, is true but equivocal. It is true, the word *man* being taken to represent the *suppositum* of the nature, and not the nature. It is not true, if it refer to the nature instead of the person, its *suppositum*.

CCXV. The same applies to the proposition, Christ, as He is man, is an *hypostasis* or Person.

CCXVI. Since there is in Christ one *suppositum* and one Person, He is rightly said to be one, and not two, in number.

CCXVII. Since human nature was united to the Son of God in a Person, and not accidentally, there is in Christ one, and one only.

CCXVIII. Some have maintained that in Christ there was one will only; and their motives for saying so seem to have been various. Apollinaris did not recognise an intellectual soul in Christ, but asserted that the Word was in place of a soul and in place of an intellect. Hence, since the will is in the reason, it followed that in Christ there was not a human will, and so that in Him there was not save one will.

Similarly Eutyches, and all who supposed one

composite nature in Christ, were compelled to suppose also but one will in Him.

Nestorius also, who said that the union of God and man was made only according to affection and will, supposed one will in Christ.

But afterwards Macharius, the Patriarch of Antioch, Cyrus of Alexandria, Sergius of Constantinople, and certain others of their followers, supposed in Christ but one will, although they at the same time supposed two natures, for they imagined that the human nature in Christ was never moved by its own proper motion, but only as it was moved by His Divinity.

Accordingly in the sixth Council, that of Constantinople, it was decreed that—as the prophets had foretold, as He Himself had taught, and as the holy fathers had delivered, there were in Christ two natural wills and two natural operations.

And this was necessary. For the Son of God assumed human nature in its perfection, and it was necessary in order to its perfection that it should include a human will. But the assumption of human nature in no way derogated from the Divine Nature, to which also it belongs to have a will. And so in Christ there were necessarily two wills—one Divine and the other human.

CCXIX. As has been said, the Son of God assumed human nature with all those things which pertain to the perfection of that nature. But in human nature is included also animal nature, as in the species is included the genus. Hence the Son of God assumed, along with human nature, those things also which pertain to the perfection of animal nature, and among them the sensitive appetite, which is called *sensuality*. And so there was in Christ the sensual appetite or sensuality. This sensuality, or sensual appetite, inasmuch as it is naturally obedient to the reason, is called rational by participation. And since the will is in the reason, it may be said that sensuality is will by participation.

CCXX. Will is sometimes taken for a potentiality, and sometimes for an act. If it be taken for an act, then there must be supposed in Christ, *ex parte* of the reason, two wills, that is, two species of acts of the will. There is what S. John Damascene calls *thelesis* (*θελησις*), that is, simple will, or as the Masters say, will as nature (*voluntas ut natura*). It concerns what is willed for its own sake, as health. Another act of the will wills a thing for the sake of something else, as the taking of medicine for the sake of health. It is called by S. John Damascene *bulisis* (*βουλησις*), that is, con-

ciliative will, or, as the Masters say, will as reason (*voluntas ut ratio*).

But this diversity of act does not diversify the potentiality, since both acts tend to one common end or good. And so if we speak of the potentiality of the will, we must say that in Christ there is only one human will, speaking essentially and not participatively.

CCXXI. Will *simpliciter* is the same as *will as nature*; election is the same as *will as reason*, and is the proper act of the free will. Therefore, since in Christ there is *will as reason*, there is necessarily also election, and consequently free will, of which election is the act.

And so Isaiah prophesied, "Butter and honey shall He eat, that He may know how to refuse the evil, and to choose the good."

CCXXII. S. John Damascene excludes election from Christ, as understanding it to import dubitation. But dubitation is not of necessity to election; it is only the accident of an ignorant nature.

CCXXIII. In Christ, according to His human nature, there is a twofold will—a will of sensuality, which participatively is called will—and a rational will. Now, as has been said, by dispensation the Son of God, before His Passion, permitted His Flesh to do and

suffer those things which were proper to It. And similarly, also, He permitted all the powers of His Soul to do and suffer those things which were proper to them. Now, it is clear that the will of sensuality naturally recoils from sensible pain and corporeal lesion. Similarly, also, *will as nature* repudiates those things which are contrary to nature, and which are *secundum se* evil, as death, and the like. But then, nevertheless, the will may sometimes, by means of the reason, elect in order to an end; as also in any mere man his sensuality, and even his will considered absolutely, recoils from the actual cautery which, nevertheless, his will, according to reason, may elect by reason of the end of health. Now, the will of God was that Christ should suffer pains, and passions, and death; not that these were willed by God *secundum se*, but in order to the end of man's salvation. And hence it appears that Christ, 1, according to the will of sensuality, and 2, according to the will of reason, considered by way of nature, could will other than God wills; but 3, according to that will which is by way of reason, He willed always the same as God: as is evident from His own words, "Not My will, but Thine be done."

CCXXIV. Christ was at once a comprehender and a wayfarer, inasmuch as by His mind He

enjoyed God, and yet He had passible flesh. And so *ex parte* of His passible flesh there could happen in Him something which was repugnant to His natural will, and even to His sensitive appetite.

CCXXV. Since His will of sensuality and His natural will were moved in Christ according to the order of His nature, by the good pleasure of the Divine Will, and by His rational will, there was in Him no contrariety of wills.

CCXXVI. In us, by the concupiscence of the flesh, there is impeded or retarded the concupiscence of the spirit. But in Christ there was no contrariety of flesh and spirit, as in us.

CCXXVII. In Christ there were two operations and not one only, since there were in Him two natures, a Divine and a human; and of these, each had its own proper form and virtue by which it operated.

CCXXVIII. Operation follows nature. But in Christ there was only one human nature, and so in Christ there was only one human operation.

Since there was in Christ no motion of the sensitive part that was not ordained by the reason, and the natural and corporeal operations themselves also pertained to His will, it is clear that there was in Christ one human operation only, as in any other man, and in Him much more evidently than in any other man.

CCXXIX. To acquire any good by oneself is better than to acquire it by means of another, for the cause which is *per se* is always greater than that which is *per aliud*. But one is said to have a thing *per seipsum*, of which he is himself in some way the cause. Now the first cause of all our good, by authority, is God. And in this way no creature has any good *per seipsum*, as S. Paul said to the Corinthians, "What hast thou that thou didst not receive?" One however may be *secondarily* the cause of one's having some good thing, inasmuch as in order to have it he co-operates with God. And so he, who has anything by his own merit, has it in a manner *per seipsum*. Hence that is reckoned more excellent which is had by merit than that which is had without merit.

But since every perfection and excellence is to be attributed to Christ, it follows that He had by merit whatsoever others have by merit, save and except those things the want of which would have been prejudicial to His dignity and perfection. For instance, He merited neither grace, nor knowledge, nor beatitude of soul, nor divinity: because, since merit concerns those things only which are not yet possessed, Christ would in that case for a while have wanted them, and to want them would have diminished His dignity rather than increased His merit. But glory of

body, and other like things pertaining to outward excellency, as ascension, veneration, &c., which it became Him to want for a season, He is said to have merited for Himself.

CCXXX. In Christ there was grace not only as in an individual man, but as in the Head of the whole Church, to whom all the faithful are united as members to a head. Of them is mystically constituted one person. Hence the merits of Christ extend to others, inasmuch as they are His members: even as in one man the action of the head extends to all the members of his body.

S. Paul taught the Romans, "As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of One, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life."

The sin of the individual person injures but himself, but the sin of Adam, who was constituted by God the principle, source, and origin of whole human nature, is derived to others by propagation of the flesh. Similarly also the merit of Christ, who is constituted by God Head of all men, as to grace, extends and is derived, by spiritual propagation, to all His members. By baptism men are incorporated into Christ, or, as S. Paul says to the Galatians, "As many of you as have been baptised into

Christ, have put on Christ." And this itself is of grace that it is granted to a man to be regenerated in Christ.

CCXXXI. To every one who has a nature there belong those things which are proper to that nature. Now human nature, from its condition, has a threefold subjection to God: 1. By reason of goodness: the Divine Nature being the very essence of goodness. A created nature has a participation of the Divine goodness, as subjected to the rays of that goodness. 2. By reason of God's power: human nature, like every creature, being subject to the operation of the Divine disposition. 3. And specially human nature is subjected to God as to its own actions, inasmuch as by its own will it obeys His commands. This threefold subjection to the Father Christ confesses concerning Himself. 1. In His words to the young man, "Why callest thou Me good? There is none good but one, that is, God." 2. He took upon Him the form of a servant, subjecting all things which concerned His Humanity to the Divine disposition and ordination. 3. Jesus spoke in the Treasury, as He taught in the Temple, "I do always those things that please the Father." And, as S. Paul wrote to the Philippians, "He became obedient to the Father even unto death."

CCXXXII. Even as it is not to be under-

stood *simpliciter* that Christ is a creature, but only according to His human nature, so also it is not to be understood *simpliciter* that Christ was subject to His Father, but only according to His human nature, otherwise we should fall into the error of Arius, who said that the Son was less than the Father.

CCXXXIII. "When all things shall be subdued unto Him, then shall the Son also Himself be subject unto Him that put all things under Him, that God may be all in all." Then will Christ deliver up the kingdom to God and the Father, when He will lead to sight the just in whom He now reigns by faith, so that they may behold that Essence which is common to the Father and the Son. And then will He be wholly subject to the Father, not in Himself only, but also in His members, by a full participation of the Divine goodness. Then also will all things be fully subject to Him by the final fulfilment of His will concerning them; although even now all are in a manner subject to His power. As He Himself said, "All power is given to Me in Heaven and on earth."

CCXXXIV. Christ cannot be said to be subject to Himself if dominion and subjection be referred to His Divine Person; but He may be said to be subject to Himself if they be referred to His human nature.

CCXXXV. Prayer is an unfolding of one's own will before God that He may fulfil it. If in Christ there were one will only, and that one will divine, in no way would it be competent for Him to pray, because the Divine Will is of itself effective of those things which It wills; as it is written, "Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did He in heaven and in earth, and in the sea, and in all deep places." But because in Christ there was one will which was divine, and another will which was human, and the human will is not by itself efficacious to accomplish that which it wills, without the aid of divine power conferred upon it, therefore to Christ as He was man, and as having a human will, it belonged to pray.

S. Luke records that He went out into a mountain to pray, and continued all night in prayer to God.

CCXXXVI. Christ was able to effect all that He willed, as He was God, but not as He was man; for, as He was man, He had not omnipotence.

CCXXXVII. The God-man willed to pray to the Father, not as if He were impotent, but for our instruction. 1. To show that He was from the Father. S. John narrates that at the grave of Lazarus Jesus lifted up His eyes and said, "Father, I thank Thee that Thou hast heard

Me, and I know that Thou hearest Me always, but because of the people which stand by I said it" (My prayer), "that they may believe that Thou hast sent Me." 2. To give us an example of prayer.

CCXXXVIII. Since prayer is an act of the reason, and an elevation of the mind to God, it did not belong to Christ according to sensuality to pray. Sensuality in Him was of the same nature and species as it is in us. But in us sensuality cannot pray, because the motions of sensuality cannot transcend the sensible, and so cannot ascend to God, which ascent is required in order to prayer.

But Christ may be said to have prayed according to sensuality, inasmuch as His prayer expressed affections of sensuality; which it did in order to instruct us in three things: 1. To show that He had received a true human nature, with all natural affections. 2. To show that, according to natural affection, man might will something which God does not will. 3. To show that man ought to subject his own affections to the Divine will. He showed His human will in His words, "Let this cup pass from Me;" and His submission of It to the Divine will in those which follow: "nevertheless, not My will, but Thine be done."

CCXXXIX. Christ prayed for *Himself*, by

expressing affections not only of sensuality, or of simple will (considered as nature), as when He prayed that the cup of His Passion might be taken away ; but also of deliberate will (considered as reason), as when He prayed for the glory of resurrection. And this He did—1. To give us an example of prayer ; and, 2. To make manifest that the Father was his Author, from whom He eternally proceeded according to His Divine Nature, and from Whom also, according to His human nature, He received every good thing which He possessed. For the good things already received, He gave, and thereby taught us to give, thanks : for the good things not yet received, He prayed, and thereby taught us to pray.

CCXL. That glory of resurrection which Christ prayed for for Himself pertained also to the salvation of others, as it is written by S. Paul to the Romans, “ He rose again for our justification.” And so even the prayer which Christ made for Himself was in a manner made for others. When, therefore, any one asks any good thing from God, it should be for the use of others as well as for his own.

CCXLI. Since the absolute will of Christ, that is, His will of deliberate reason, was always conformed to God, He willed nothing save what God willed, and therefore every absolute will of

His was always fulfilled, and His prayer was always heard.

In like manner their prayers are always heard who entirely conform their wills to God. As it is written to the Romans, "He that searcheth the hearts knoweth," that is, approveth, "what is the mind of the Spirit," that is, what He makes the saints to desire, "because He maketh intercession for the saints according to the will of God."

CCXLII. The proper office of a priest is to be a mediator between God and His people; inasmuch as he delivers things divine to the people. Hence his name, *sacerdos quasi sacra dans*. And again, inasmuch as he offers the prayers of the people to God, and makes satisfaction to Him for their sins; as S. Paul taught the Hebrews, "Every high-priest taken from among men is ordained for men in things pertaining to God, that he may offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins." To do this belongs especially to Christ, for by Him are divine gifts conferred on men, as S. Peter says, "By Christ are given unto us exceeding great and precious promises, that by these ye might be made partakers of the Divine Nature." Christ also it is who has reconciled the race of man to God, as S. Paul wrote to the Colossians, "It pleased the Father that in Christ should all fulness dwell," and

by Him to reconcile all things unto Himself." It belongs to Christ therefore, and that in an especial manner, to be a priest; and so S. Paul says to the Hebrews, "We have a high-priest who has entered into the heavens, Jesus the Son of God."

CCXLIII. Hierarchical power belongs to the angels, inasmuch as they also are *medii* between God and man. It is as he is *medius* between God and His people that a priest has the name of angel, as it is written in the Book of Malachi, "The priest's lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek the law at his mouth, for he is the messenger, or angel, of the Lord of Hosts." Christ was greater than the angels, not only according to His Divinity, but also according to His Humanity; inasmuch as He possessed the fulness of grace and glory. Hence He had above the angels, and in a more excellent manner, hierarchical or sacerdotal power; in such wise that the angels themselves were ministers of His priesthood, as S. Matthew records, "Angels came and ministered unto Him." Yet by reason of the passibility of His Flesh, He was, as the Apostle says to the Hebrews, "made a little lower than the angels." And in this way He was conformed to men, who, while yet in the Way, are placed in the priesthood.

CCXLIV. Since the priesthood of the old

law was a figure of the priesthood of Christ, Christ willed not to be born of the line of figural priests, in order to make manifest that the Jewish priesthood was not altogether the same (*idem*) as His own, but differed from it as does the figural from the true.

CCXLV. Some men have certain particular graces, and some have certain other graces, both to fit them for the places which they have to fill and the works given them to do. But Christ, as the Head of all men, has the perfection of all graces. To one man, therefore, it belongs to be a law-giver, to another a priest, to a third a king. But all these offices concur in Christ, as in the fountain of all graces; as Isaiah prophesied, "The Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our Law-giver, the Lord is our King, He Himself will come and save us."

CCXLVI. As S. Augustine says, every visible sacrifice is a sacrament, that is, a sacred sign of an invisible sacrifice. The invisible sacrifice is that whereby man offers his spirit to God, as it is written in the Book of Psalms, "The sacrifice of God is a broken spirit." Everything, therefore, which is exhibited to God for this end may be called a sacrifice.

CCXLVII. Man stands in need of sacrifice for three reasons: 1. In order to the remission of his sin whereby he is turned away from God;

and so the Apostle says to the Hebrews, that it pertains to a priest to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins. 2. In order that he may be preserved in the estate of grace, cleaving always to God, in Whom consists His peace and salvation. Hence in the old law there was immolated a peace-offering for the salvation and welfare of its offerers. 3. In order that the spirit of man may be perfectly united to God, which will occur in its entirety in glory. Hence in the old law there was offered an holocaust or whole burnt-offering.

Now all these three: 1. Remission of sin; 2. Preservation in grace; and 3, Union with God, have come to us through and by means of the Humanity of Christ, for—1. By Him were our sins destroyed, as it is written by S. Paul to the Romans, “He was delivered for our offences.” 2. By Him we have received grace, saving us, as it is written by the same Apostle to the Hebrews, “He became the author of eternal salvation unto all them that obey Him.” 3. By Him we attain to the perfection of glory, as he says again, in the same Epistle, “We have boldness to enter into the holiest,” that is, into celestial glory, “by the Blood of Jesus.”

Christ therefore, as He was man, was not only a Priest, but also a Sacrifice and Perfect Victim (*Hostia*); being at once—1, a Sacrifice

for ever ; 2, a Peace-offering ; and 3, an Holocaust.

CCXLVIII. It appertains to the priest to slay the victim, and so, although we may not say that Christ slew Himself, yet He voluntarily exposed Himself to death, and is therefore said to have offered Himself.

CCXLIX. The slayers of Christ were not offerers of Christ, for in that they slew Him they sinned most grievously. Their sin resembled, as it exceeded, the impious sacrifices of the Gentiles, who slew men and offered them in sacrifice to idols and to devils.

CCL. In order to perfect cleansing from sin two things are required, corresponding to two things in sin, to wit : 1. The stain of guilt (*macula culpæ*), and the liability to punishment (*reatus pœnæ*). The stain of guilt is destroyed by grace, whereby the heart of the sinner is turned toward God ; and the liability to punishment is wholly taken away by man's satisfying God. Both processes are effected by the priesthood of Christ ; for in virtue thereof, grace is given to us whereby our hearts are converted or turned toward God, as it is written to the Romans, " Being justified freely by His grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in His Blood." He also fully satis-

fied for us, in that He bore our sorrows and carried our griefs. The priesthood of Christ, therefore, had full power to expiate sins.

CCLI. As S. Augustine says, there are four things to be considered in every sacrifice. 1. To whom it is offered. 2. By whom it is offered. 3. What is offered. 4. For whom it is offered. The One True Mediator, Who by the Sacrifice of Peace reconciled us to God, was One with Him to Whom He offered, and made Himself One with those for whom He offered Himself. He was one and the same who offered and was offered. Christ was at once Priest and Victim.

CCLII. A priest is established as a *medius* between God and His people. But he needs no *medius* who can by himself come to God. This Christ could do, and so it became Him not to receive in Himself the effect of His own priesthood.

CCLIII. Christ is the sole fountain of priesthood. The legal priest was a figure of Him. The priest of the new law operates in His person; as S. Paul wrote to the Corinthians, "If I forgave anything, to whom I forgave it, for your sakes forgave I it, in the person of Christ."

CCLIV. In the office of a priest two things are to be considered: 1, the offering of the

sacrifice ; and 2, its consummation ; which consists in this, that those for whom the sacrifice is offered obtain the end of the sacrifice. Now the end of the sacrifice which Christ offered was the possession not of temporal but of eternal goods, and by reason of this the priesthood of Christ is said to be eternal.

The consummation of the sacrifice of Christ was prefigured in the old law by the high-priest's entrance once a year into the Holy of Holies with the blood of the bullock and the goat, which were slain not in the Holy of Holies but without. And so likewise Christ entered into the Holy of Holies, that is, into Heaven itself, and prepared for us a way of entrance, in virtue of His Blood Which He poured forth for us on the earth.

CCLV. The priesthood of Christ is said to be after the order of Melchizedek, by reason of the excellency of the true priesthood above the figural priesthood of the law. The legal priesthood—1, could not cleanse from sin, and 2, it was not eternal. The excellency of the Melchizedekian priesthood was made manifest by his receiving tithes from Abraham, in whose loins Levi then was.

CCLVI. In the priesthood of Christ two things have to be considered : 1. His oblation, and 2, its participation. 1. Of His oblation the

sacrifice of the legal priesthood was the more express figure, as involving the shedding of blood. 2. Its participation was more expressly prefigured by the sacrifice of Melchizedek, who offered bread and wine, under the *species* of which there is, under the new law, communicated to the faithful, the Sacrifice of Christ.

CCLVII. Melchizedek was said to be without father, without mother, without descent, having neither beginning nor end of days: not that he had not these, but because they are not recorded of him in Holy Scripture. And he was thereby likened to the Son of God, who on the earth was without father, and in heaven without a mother; without descent, for, as Isaiah says, "Who shall declare His generation?" And according to His Divinity He had neither beginning nor end of days.

CCLVIII. One man adopts another as his son, inasmuch as of his bounty he admits him to a participation of his heritage. God is of an infinite bounty, and hence He admits His creatures to a participation of His goods. He chiefly and specially admits those of His creatures who are rational, inasmuch as they have been made in His own Image, and are capable of Divine beatitude. This beatitude consists in the fruition of God. By it God is Himself also

blessed, inasmuch as He enjoys Himself, in the complacent contemplation of Himself. This beatitude is the Riches of God, and one's riches form one's heritage. When then God, of His bounty, admits men to a share in the heritage of beatitude, He is said to adopt them.

CCLIX. There is this difference between Divine and human adoption. God makes the man whom He adopts fit, by the gift of grace, for a share in the heavenly heritage. Man chooses him whom he adopts by reason of an existing fitness which he discovers in him.

CCLX. To man it pertains to work in order to the supply of his own indigence : to God, in order to communicate the abundance of His own perfection.

CCLXI. There is this difference between the sons of God adoptive and natural, that the natural is Begotten, not made ; the adoptive, made ; for, as S. John says, " As many as received Him, to them gave He power to become " —be made, *fieri*—" the sons of God."

CCLXII. An adoptive son is sometimes, however, said to be begotten by spiritual generation. which is, nevertheless, of grace, and not natural ; as S. James declares, " Of His own will begat He us with the Word of Truth."

CCLXIII. Although in Divine things, to generate is the property of, that is, especially belongs

to, the Person of the Father, yet to cause any effect in the creature is common to the whole Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity, by reason of their unity of nature; for, when the nature is one, there must of necessity be but one virtue and one operation. Jesus said, "What things soever the Father doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise." The adoption of men, therefore, to be sons of God is common to the Blessed Trinity.

CCLXIV. By adoption we acquire the right to call God, Father: as it is written, "Ye have received the Spirit of Adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father."

CCLXV. When we say to God, in prayer, Our Father, we may be addressing ourselves to all or any of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity, since this name of Father belongs to them, as do all other names which are spoken of God relatively to the creature.

CCLXVI. We are made by adoption the brethren of Christ, and Christ's; and hence He says, "I ascend unto My Father and your Father."

CCLXVII. Christ is the Son of the Father by natural generation; He is not, as we are, the Son of the whole Trinity.

CCLXVIII. Adoptive filiation is a similitude of eternal filiation, as all things which are in time

are similitudes of those things which have been from eternity.

CCLXIX. Adoption, albeit it is common to the whole Trinity, is appropriated, 1, to the Father, as its author; 2, to the Son, as its exemplar; and 3, to the Holy Ghost, as impressing on us the similitude of this exemplar.

CCLXX. The creature may be assimilated to the Uncreated Word, the Only-begotten Son, by nature, of the Father, in three ways: 1. By reason of form, not of intellectuality: as the form of a house outwardly constituted is assimilated to the mental word by the artificer, according to the species or appearance of form, but not according to intelligibility, for the form of a house is not intelligible in matter, as it was in the mind of the artificer. In this way man's creation is assimilated to the Eternal Word, since it was made by the Word. 2. Not only by reason of form, but even as to intellectuality; as the knowledge which is in the mind of the disciple is assimilated to the word which is in the mind of the Master. In this way the rational creature is, according to its nature, assimilated to the Word of God. 3. The creature is assimilated to the Eternal Word by reason of the unity which it has with the Father, which unity is effected and preserved by grace and charity. Hence Jesus prayed, "That they all may be One, as Thou, Father, art in Me,

and I in Thee, that they also may be one in us: and the glory which Thou gavest Me I have given them, that they may be one, even as We are One." Such an assimilation completes the idea of adoption, because to those so assimilated is due the eternal heritage.

CCLXXI. Adoption belongs to the rational creature ; and not to every rational creature : but to those only among rational creatures who have that charity which is spread abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is therefore called the Spirit of Adoption. And He it is Who, dwelling in our hearts, cries Abba, Father. God is called the Father of the irrational creature ; but by creation, and not by adoption.

CCLXXII. The angels are called the sons of God by the filiation of adoption, not that it principally belongs to them, but because they were the first to receive the adoption of sons.

CCLXXIII. Filiation is a property not of nature, but of person ; but the Person of Christ is one, uncreated and divine, and so in no way can Christ be called the adoptive Son of God.

CCLXXIV. Predestination is a Divine pre-ordination from all eternity concerning those things which by the grace of God were to be done in time. Now although the union of natures in the Person of Christ was made in time, yet inasmuch as it was pre-ordained from eternity, and

effected by grace, it falls under the eternal predestination of God, and consequently Christ is said to be predestinate.

CCLXXV. Since human nature was not always united to the Word of God, and this union was conferred on it by grace, therefore it is true to say that Christ, as He was man, was predestinated to be the Son of God.

CCLXXVI. Predestination may be considered in two ways: 1. In one way, according to the act of the predestinator; and in this way the predestination of Christ cannot be called the exemplar of our predestination; for by one mode and by the same eternal act God predestinated both us and Christ. 2. In another way, according to that to which one is predestined, which is the term and effect of predestination. And according to this the predestination of Christ is the exemplar of our predestination. And this in two ways: 1. In one way, as to the good to which we are predestined. For Christ was predestined to this, that He should be the natural Son of God; but we are predestined to the filiation of adoption, which is a participated similitude of natural filiation: as S. Paul says to the Romans, "Whom He foreknew, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son." 2. In another way, as to the mode of attaining that good, which is by grace. And this was indeed

in Christ most manifest, for human nature was in Christ united to the Son of God for no preceding merits of its own: and, as S. John says, "Of the fulness of His grace have all we received."

CCLXXVII. God pre-ordained our salvation, by from all eternity predestinating that it should be completed by Jesus Christ. For under eternal predestination there falls not only that which is to be done in time, but also the manner and order according to which it is to be completed in time.

CCLXXVIII. If Christ had not been to be incarnated, God would have pre-ordained men to be saved by another cause; but because He pre-ordained the Incarnation of Christ, He pre-ordained, at the same time along with it, that He should be the cause of our salvation.

CCLXXIX. Since there is in Christ but one Person, one *hypostasis*, and one *suppositum*, there is but one adoration and one honour exhibited to Him *ex parte* of that which is honoured. But *ex parte* of the cause of honour there may be said to be several adorations, as, for instance, one by reason of His uncreated wisdom, and another by reason of His created wisdom.

CCLXXX. The Humanity of Christ is to be adored with *latria*, as existing in a Divine *hypostasis*, and to the *hypostasis* it is that the honour of adoration is properly due. But if the

Humanity of Christ be considered as caused by Its perfection by reason of Its every gift of grace, then the adoration due is not that of *latria*, but that of *dulia*.

CCLXXXI. The adoration of *latria* is not exhibited to the Humanity of Christ by reason of Itself, but by reason of the Divinity to which It is united, and according to which Christ is not less than the Father. The Humanity of Christ cannot, apart from His Divinity, be adored with *latria*, but such a separation is impossible. It could only occur were there in Him two *hypostases*, one of God, and another of man. Supposing It, however, to be so separated, there would be due to the Humanity of Christ an adoration of *dulia*, and that exceeding and excelling the *dulia* which is due to the high and holy of Its fellow-creatures. This is called *hyperdulia*.

CCLXXXII. As the Philosopher says, in his book Of Memory and Reminiscence, the motion of the soul towards an image is twofold: One is towards the image itself, as it is a thing; the other towards the image as it is the image of another thing. And between these two motions there is this difference, that the first motion differs from the second, while the second is one and identical with the first, as including it. To the Image of Christ then, as it is a thing, (of wood

for instance, sculptured or painted,) no reverence is exhibited, because reverence is not due save to a rational nature. It remains therefore that reverence be done to it solely as it is an image. And so it follows that the same reverence is to be exhibited to the Image of Christ as to Christ Himself. But Christ is adored with the adoration of *latria*: consequently with the adoration of *latria* His Image is also to be adored.

CCLXXXIII. So long as God was incorporeal so long was it impossible for any corporeal image of Him to be made. To attempt it would have been the very height of folly and impiety. It was not till the Word was made flesh, and God was made man, that He could be adored under a corporeal image.

CCLXXXIV. The worship of images was forbidden under the Old Law for two reasons: 1. As given to the images themselves. 2. As given to the false gods of the Gentiles, or demons, of which they were the images: a true image of God before the Incarnation being impossible, for that cannot be imaged which has not been seen. When we adore with *latria* the Image of Christ, we adore not the Image, but that Christ, (to Whom, as very God, *latria* is due,) of Whom it is the Image.

CCLXXXV. Honour or reverence is not due save to a rational nature. Hence to the insen-

sible creature is not due honour or reverence unless by reason of a rational nature. This in two ways: 1. In one way, inasmuch as it represents a rational nature. 2. In another, inasmuch as it is in some way conjoined therewith. In the first way, men are wont to venerate the image of the king; in the second, they venerate his vestments. And they venerate both with the same adoration wherewith they venerate the king. If, therefore, we speak of the True Cross, that on which Christ was crucified, in both ways it is to be venerated by us; in the one, to wit, inasmuch as it represents to us the figure of Christ extended on it; in the other, from its contact with the members of Christ, and from its having been soaked with His Blood. In both ways, then, it is to be venerated by us with the same adoration as Christ Himself, namely, with the adoration of *latria*. Hence also we speak of and address and deprecate the True Cross as we do the Crucified. But if we speak of an effigy of the Cross of Christ, made in any material whatsoever, be it stone or wood, silver or gold, we venerate it also with *latria*, but for the first reason only, that is to say, only as an image.

CCLXXXVI. By reason of their contact with the members of Christ we venerate not His Cross only, but everything that belongs to Christ. As S. John Damascene says, "The precious wood

sanctified by the touch of the Holy Body and Blood, the Nails, the Garments, the Lance; the Holy Tabernacles, as the Manger, the Stable-cave, and the like, are all becomingly to be adored." Still these do not represent the Image of Christ, as does the Cross, which is called in Holy Scripture the Sign of the Son of Man which will appear in the heavens on the Day of Doom.

CCLXXXVII. *Latria* is due to God alone, and not to any creature. Insensible creatures are not capable of veneration by reason of aught in themselves. But the rational creature is capable of veneration for somewhat in itself. To no rational mere creature then is there due the worship of *latria*. Since the Blessed Virgin is a rational mere creature, there is not due to her the worship of *latria*, but only the veneration of *dulia*. *Dulia* however is due in a more eminent degree to her than to any of her fellow-creatures, inasmuch as she is the Mother of God. This highest possible kind of *dulia*, which belongs to her, is called *hyperdulia*.

CCLXXXVIII. As S. Augustine says, "If a father's robe and a father's ring be cherished by his posterity in proportion to their affection for him, what shall we say of men's bodies, which are so much more closely associated and allied with them, forming part of their very

nature? Those who have an affection for any one, venerate even those remains which death leaves, and not only their bodies or parts of their bodies, but also their raiment and the like. It is clear then that we ought to hold in veneration the saints of God as the members of Christ, the sons and friends of God, and our intercessors. All their relics therefore whatsoever, we ought to venerate with an honour becoming their memories, and chiefly their bodies, which were the temples and organs of the Holy Ghost, Who dwelt in them and wrought in them, and which are also to be configured to the Body of Christ by a glorious resurrection. God Himself honours the relics of the saints, by working miracles in their presence.

“He who honours not the relics of the saints, and especially of the blessed martyrs, is not a Christian, but an Eunomian and a follower of Vigilantius.”

CCLXXXIX. To the office of a mediator it properly belongs to conjoin and unite those between whom he is a mediator. For extremes are united in the midst. Now, to unite men to God *perfective* belongs to Christ, by Whom men have been reconciled to God, as it is written by S. Paul to the Corinthians, “God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself.” Christ then, and Christ

alone and solely, is the perfect Mediator between God and men, inasmuch as by His Death He reconciled the human race to God. Hence, when the Apostle has said to Timothy, "There is one God, and one Mediator between God and men, the Man Christ Jesus;" he adds, "Who gave Himself a ransom for all men." This however in no way hinders many others from being called mediators between God and men, not absolutely but relatively, as fellow-workers with God, and as such co-operating with Him in the work of union. Christ is *the* Mediator *simpliciter*, and *perfective*; they are mediators *dispositive*, and *ministerialiter*.

CCXC. The Prophets and Priests of the Old Testament were called mediators between God and men dispositively and ministerially, inasmuch as they announced and prefigured the true and perfect Mediator between God and men.

The Priests of the New Testament may be called mediators between God and men, inasmuch as they are ministers of the true Mediator, and deliver in His place the life-giving sacraments to men.

CCXCI. The good angels cannot rightly be called mediators between God and man, for they, in common with God, possess both beatitude and immortality, while they share neither with miserable and mortal men. They are rather removed

from men, and united to God, than placed in the midst between the two. In a sense however they are, and Dionysius calls them *medii*, inasmuch as they are, according to natural gradation, below God and above man, and they exercise the office of mediator, not indeed principally and perfectly, but ministerially and dispositively. And hence S. Matthew says that angels came and ministered to Christ.

Demons have immortality in common with God, and misery in common with men: and so far an immortal and miserable demon is a mediator, that, although he cannot pass to a blessed immortality, he can lead to an immortal misery. Such an one is an evil *medius* who separates friends. Now Christ had beatitude in common with God, and mortality in common with men. As such, He was a *medius* to make the mortal, immortal; and the miserable, blessed. Such an one is a good *medius*, who reconciles enemies.

CCXCII. The Holy Spirit, since He is in all things equal to God, cannot be called a *medius*, a mediator between God and man. Christ alone can be so called, Who, although according to His Divinity He is equal with the Father, yet according to His Humanity He is less than the Father. The Holy Spirit is said, as in S. Paul's Epistle to the Romans,

to make intercession for us, inasmuch as He causes us ourselves to intercede.

CCXCIII. In a mediator two things are to be considered: 1. The idea of a *medius*; and, 2. His office of conjoining. Now it belongs to the idea of a *medius* that he be equally distant from both extremes. And a mediator conjoins by transferring to the one those things which belong to the other. Now neither of these can belong to Christ as He is God, but only as He is man. For, as He is God, He does not differ from the Father and the Holy Spirit in nature and power of dominion. And neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit have anything which is not also the Son's; so that the Son cannot communicate to others that which is Theirs, save as being also that which is His own. But both belong to Him as He is man. For as He is man, He is distant from God in nature, and from men in dignity both of grace and of glory. As He is man also, it belongs to Him to conjoin men to God, by exhibiting to men the precepts and gifts of God, by satisfying God for men, and by making intercession with Him for them.

CCXCIV. It is rationally believed that the Blessed Virgin Mary, who bore the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth, received greater privileges of grace than others,

and was sanctified in the womb, as we read Jeremiah was, and as was also S. John the Baptist. Yet, even in the Blessed Virgin, there was first that which is animal, and afterwards that which is spiritual, for she was first conceived according to the flesh, and thereafter sanctified according to the Spirit. But although she was sanctified from original sin, so far as personal stain is concerned, she was not freed from that liability to punishment which is common to human nature, in such wise that she could enter Paradise without the sacrifice of Christ.

CCXCV. The sanctification of the Blessed Virgin could not be before her animation. 1. Because the rational creature only is the subject of grace, and this she was not before the infusion into her body of a rational soul. 2. Again, the rational creature only is susceptible of guilt, and a rational creature she was not before there was infused into her body a rational soul. Had she been sanctified before her animation she would never have incurred the stain of original guilt, and so would never have needed that redemption and salvation which is by Christ, and He would consequently not have been the Saviour of all men.

CCXCVI. There remained in the Blessed Virgin after her sanctification the *fomes peccati*

as to its essence, but it was restrained as to its exercise or operation until her conception of Jesus, when it was wholly taken away. "Thou art all fair, My Love, there is no spot in thee;" saith the Spirit to His Spouse. The Blessed Virgin, seeing the Son of God dwelled with her after so singular and marvellous a manner, never committed sin, either mortal or venial, for He is the Wisdom of God, and into a malicious soul Wisdom shall not enter, nor dwell in the body that is subject unto sin.

She obtained a greater plenitude of grace than others, who merited to be the mother of Him Who is the Origin and Principle of all grace.

CCXCVII. In her conceiving, in her bringing forth, and ever after, Mary remained Virgin, and so her vow of perpetual virginity was not broken when she became the Mother of God. To believe otherwise would be to dishonour—1, the Eternal Father, Whose Paternity might not be transferred to another; 2, the Only-begotten Son, Who came to take away all corruption, and so might not corrupt the virginity of His Mother; 3, the Holy Ghost, Whose shrine was the Virgin's womb; 4, the Mother of God, who would have been most ungrateful had she not been content with such a Son, and had she voluntarily violated that virginity which

had been so miraculously preserved; 5, S. Joseph, who would have been guilty of most heinous presumption had he dared to pollute her who was, as the angel revealed to him, the Mother of God. As a word is conceived and brought forth without corruption of the mind, so was the Word of God conceived and brought forth without corruption of the Virgin Mother's womb.

CCXCVIII. It was meet that Christ should be born of a virgin espoused: i. In regard of Himself: 1, lest He should be rejected by the unbelieving as illegitimately born; 2, that, according to custom, His genealogy might be described in the male line; 3, for His safety, that His birth might be concealed from the devil, who, aware of His existence, would seek to do Him harm; 4, that Joseph might nurture Him, whence he called His father—that is, His foster-father. ii. In regard of the Blessed Virgin; 1, to shield her from the punishment of stoning due to an adulteress; 2, to shield her from shame; 3, that she might have the protection of Joseph. iii. In regard of ourselves; 1, that the fact of Christ's birth from a virgin might be proved by the testimony of Joseph; 2, that her own word might be rendered more credible, all occasion of lying in order to shield herself from shame and punishment being taken away,—childbirth being the reward of wedlock and the grace of nuptials;

3, to warn all virgins to shun all occasion or appearance of scandal; 4, as signifying the Universal Church, which is a virgin, espoused to One Man, even Christ; 5, the Mother of God was at once a virgin and espoused, in order that in her person both virginity and matrimony might receive due honour.

CCXCIX. There was true and lawful matrimony or wedlock between Joseph and Mary, so far as regards the *form* thereof, which consists in the indivisible union of souls which consent to preserve fidelity the one to the other. As to the *end* of matrimony, which is the generation and education of offspring, it was obtained in all but the joint matrimonial deed of carnal union. S. Augustine says that in their marriage existed all the three goods of nuptials: 1. Offspring—the Lord Jesus. 2. Fidelity—there was no adultery. 3. Sacramentality—there was no divorce.

CCC. It was meet that it should be *announced* to the Blessed Virgin that she was to conceive Christ: 1. That her mind might be first instructed concerning Him Whom she was to conceive in her flesh. S. Augustine says, “More blessed was Mary in receiving the Faith of Christ than in conceiving the Flesh of Christ.” And again, her maternal propinquity would have profited Mary nothing, had she not borne Christ more

joyfully in her heart than in her flesh. 2. That she might be a more certain witness of this Sacrament or Mystery, being divinely instructed therein. 3. That she herself might make prompt and voluntary offering of her services to God. "Behold the handmaid of the Lord." 4. To manifest the spiritual matrimony between the Son of God and human nature, as representing which the consent of the Blessed Virgin to the union was waited for and given.

CCCI. It was meet that the mystery of the Divine Incarnation should be announced to the Mother of God by an angel. 1. As in accordance with the ordinary rule of God's dealings, whereby divine things come to a man through the mediation or intervention of angels. 2. Through a woman deceived by an angel mankind fell; through a woman instructed by an angel mankind was restored. 3. By reason of her virginity, a property also of the angels. To live in the flesh, yet not after the flesh, is a life, not of earth, but of the angels.

CCCII. The announcing angel appeared to the Mother of God in a bodily shape, and this was fitting: 1. That an invisible angel should announce the Incarnation of the Invisible God, by which He was to be made visible, by himself assuming a visible form. 2. That the Mother of God, who was to conceive God, not only in

her mind, but also in her womb, should have her bodily senses as well as her mind refreshed by an angelic apparition. 3. That she might be the more surely certified of that which was announced; for of those things which are subjected to our eyes we have a more certain apprehension than of those things which appeal merely to our imagination.

CCCIII. In his salutation the angel had three things in view. i. To engage the attention of her mind to the consideration of so great a matter—1, by a new and unwonted salutation which, 2, declared her fitness—“full of grace;” 3, for the fact of her conception—“the Lord is with thee;” 4, whence results the honour due to her—“Blessed art thou among women.” ii. To instruct her in the mystery she was to accomplish: 1. “Behold thou shalt conceive,” and, 2, “bring forth a Son.” 3. Of Whose dignity—“He shall be great and shall be called the Son of the Highest;” and, 4, “the Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the Power of the Highest shall overshadow thee.” iii. To induce her consent he cites the example of her cousin Elizabeth, and reminds her of the almightiness of God.

Since Christ assumed human nature to purge it from corruption, it was fitting that He should take flesh of matter derived from Adam, in whose person it was first corrupted.

CCCIV. Christ is specially said to be the son of two ancient fathers, of Abraham and of David—1. Because to them were the promises concerning Him specially made: “In thy seed shall all nations of the earth be blessed.” “To Abraham and his Seed were the promises made. He saith not: And to seeds, as of many. But as of one. And to thy Seed, which is Christ.” To David also it was said, “Of the fruit of thy body will I set upon thy seat.” Hence the multitude of the Jews, hailing Jesus as a King, cried, “Hosanna to the Son of David.” 2. Christ was to be a King, a Prophet, and a Priest. But Abraham was a Priest. He was also a Prophet, as God told Abimelech, King of Gerar. David was a King and a Prophet. 3. With Abraham began circumcision. David was the choice of God, a man after His own heart.

CCCV. Although the Son of God might have taken flesh of whatever matter He willed, yet it was meet that He should take it of a woman. 1. To ennoble whole human nature—He was a man, being born of a woman. 2. To make manifest and confirm the verity of the Incarnation. 3. To complete the diversity of human generation. Adam was made of the dust of the ground without the intervention of man and woman; Eve from a man without the aid of a woman. All other human beings are conceived

and born of a man and a woman : it remained as the peculiar property of Christ to be conceived and born of a woman without a man.

CCCVI. In the conception of Christ there was somewhat according to the condition of nature, and somewhat above the condition of nature. According to the condition of nature He was born of a woman ; above the condition of nature He was born of a virgin. In ordinary generation the female supplies the matter : the male the active principle. The generation of Christ was ordinary in that the matter was supplied from the most pure and chaste blood of the Blessed Virgin : it was extraordinary in that the active principle was the supernatural virtue of the Divine power.

CCCVII. Although the conception of the Body of Christ was an operation of the whole Trinity ; yet it is specially attributed to the Holy Ghost, and that for a threefold reason. 1. Because He is the Love of the Father and the Son, and it is from the Love of God that the Word was made flesh. 2. Because the Incarnation was not of merit, but solely of grace ; and grace is especially attributed to the Holy Ghost. 3. Because the term of the Incarnation was that He Who was to be conceived should be Holy, and the Son of God, and by the Spirit of Holiness, the Spirit of the Son

Whom God sends into our hearts, are we made the sons of God, and taught to cry Abba, Father.

CCCVIII. Christ is said to be conceived by the Holy Ghost, in regard of His Body, of which the Holy Ghost was the efficient cause ; as to His Divinity He and the Holy Ghost were consubstantial.

The Holy Ghost is not to be called the Father of Christ, nor is Christ to be called the Son of the Holy Ghost, or the Son of the whole Trinity. As He is the Son of Man, He is the Son of Mary ; as He is the Son of God, He is the Begotten of the Eternal Father.

CCCIX. In the first instant of His conception there was perfectly formed in the womb of the Blessed Virgin a human body ; and It, 2, was in the same instant animated by a rational soul, and that Body and Soul were, 3, *mediante Animâ*, in the same instant, united to His Divinity in the One Person of the Eternal Word. Had there been a single instant between the formation of the body and its assumption by the Son of God, it must have had a human person ; which is heresy. 4. In the same instant He possessed the use of free will, the motions of which were meritorious. 5. In the same instant He had also plenitude of grace, sanctifying both Body and Soul ; 6, including the grace of com-

prehension, not vouchsafed to those who are yet in the Way, and greater too than that of other comprehenders, for in the first instant of His conception He saw God more clearly than do they. 7. He was sanctified in such wise as to be the Sanctifier also of others.

CCCX. Seeing there were in Christ two natures, we must necessarily attribute to Him two nativities: one eternal, whereby He was the Only Begotten of the Eternal Father; and one temporal, whereby He was born in time, of His mother.

CCCXI. The Body of Christ was not brought down by Him from heaven, as the Valentinian heretics assert, but was taken of the substance of the Blessed Virgin, wherefore she is rightly said to be His true and natural mother.

And because It never for a moment existed apart from the Divine Person of the Eternal Word, by Which It was assumed in the first instant of Its conception, and there was never aught in the womb of the Blessed Virgin which was not God, Mary is rightly called the Mother of God. To deny this is to assert the heresy either of the Photinians, who say that the Humanity was subjected to conception and birth before the man was the Son of God, or of the Nestorians, who say that It was not assumed in the unity of the Person or Hypostasis of the

Word of God. The Council of Ephesus decreed that Mary was the Mother of God.

CCCXII. As in the conception of her Son she was spotless, so in His birth she was without sorrow. The one was without lust, the other was without pain. Seeing that she had brought forth the God-man, she was filled with joy and gladness. As in His incoming so in His outgoing her Virginitv remained inviolate, *et utero clauso*.

CCCXIII. He willed to be born in Bethlehem—1. Because He was made of the seed of David according to the flesh, the man who was raised up on high, the anointed of the God of Jacob. And so Joseph and Mary went into the City of David, which is called Bethlehem, because He was of the house and lineage of David. 2. Bethlehem is by interpretation the House of Bread, and Jesus said, "I am the Living Bread which came down from heaven." 3. According to the words of the Prophet Micah, "Thou Bethlehem Ephrata, though thou be little among the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall He come forth unto Me Who is Ruler in Israel, Whose goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting."

CCCXIV. As He chose His mother and His birthplace, so He, Who was not subject to the necessities of time, but was its Master and

Lord, chose also His birthday. Those things which are of God are by Him fitly ordered and disposed; and so Christ was born when the fulness of time was come which had been fore-ordained by the Divine Wisdom.

CCCXV. The Birth of Christ was not made generally manifest to all men; and fitly—for, 1. Man's redemption might have been thereby hindered, because, if men had known Him, they would never have crucified the Lord of Glory. 2. It would have lessened the merit of faith. 3. It would have cast suspicion on the verity of His Humanity. 4. As His resurrection was made manifest not to all the people, but to certain witnesses foreordained of God, so was His birth made known to chosen witnesses, by whom it should be afterwards declared to all.

CCCXVI. To prefigure at the outset that the salvation which was to be by Christ was common to all men, for in Him there is neither male nor female, Jew nor Gentile, bond nor free,—His birth was made known to all sorts and conditions of men, to Jews and Gentiles, to men and women, to saints and sinners, to rich and poor, to old and young, to wise and unwise, to kings and shepherds, to great men and small.

CCCXVII. And, as is usual in other births, the birth of Christ was made manifest not by Himself, but by others, lest in declaring His

Divinity He should prejudice men's faith in His Humanity.

CCCXVIII. As a syllogistic manifestation is made by means of those things which are already best known to him to whom a further matter is to be made manifest, so ought also a manifestation which is made by signs, to be made by those signs which are already familiar to those to whom it is to be made. To Simeon and Anna, the just and devout, Christ's birth was made manifest by an interior instinct of the Holy Ghost—a method of teaching to which the just are accustomed. To the shepherds and Magi, as more familiar with corporeal things, it was made by visible appearances. To the shepherds, as Jews, by a vision of angels, a means of Divine communication to which the Jews were accustomed, who received the law by the disposition of angels. To the Magi, as astronomers devoted to watching the courses of the heavenly bodies, the heavens declared the glory of God, and the firmament shewed His handiwork.

CCCXIX. There was observed in the manifestations of Christ's birth a most meet order—
1. To the shepherds on the day of the nativity, as signifying the Apostles and first believers, among whom were "not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble." 2. To the Magi on the thirteenth day, the Feast of

the Epiphany, as signifying the fulness of the Gentiles. 3. To Simeon and Anna, Jews and just, on the fortieth day, the Feast of the Purification, as signifying the end of that blindness in part which has happened unto Israel until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in.

CCCXX. It is evident that the star which appeared to the Magi was not one of the celestial stars—1, because none of these stars proceed in that direction, from north to south, for so India and Persia, whence the Magi came, lie; 2, because it appeared not only by night but also by day, which the moon does not, much less a star; 3, because it was sometimes apparent and sometimes hidden; 4, because, like the pillar of cloud in the desert, it sometimes stood and sometimes went forward, according as they were to halt or proceed; 5, because it did not always remain in high heaven, but descended towards earth, in order to point out the dwelling of the Virgin-born. It was a star newly created by God, superior in brightness to all other stars, placed in the lower atmosphere, and with its movements immediately under the control and direction of the Divine Will.

The Magi, the first-fruits of the Gentile believers in Christ, were inspired with wisdom to adore Him, and so to fulfil the prophecy of

Isaiah : “ Gentiles shall come to Thy light, and kings to the brightness of Thy rising.”

CCCXXI. It was meet for many reasons that Christ should be circumcised—1, to shew forth the verity of His human flesh, and rebut the heresy of the Manichæans, who said that His body was of the nature of a phantom ; of the Apollinarians, who held that His body was consubstantial with His Divinity ; and of the Valentinians, who affirmed that He brought it down from heaven ; 2, to signify His approval of circumcision, which God had instituted of old time ; 3, to prove that He was of the seed of Abraham, who received the precept of circumcision for a sign of the faith which he had of Him ; 4, to take away an excuse from the Jews, who might have refused to receive Him on the ground that He was uncircumcised ; 5, to recommend to us by His example the virtue of obedience, wherefore He was circumcised the eighth day, as the law prescribed ; 6, having come in the likeness of sinful flesh, He did not disdain the remedy of sin ; 7, He Himself bore the burden of the law, that He might free others therefrom.

CCCXXII. Names ought to correspond to the properties of the things named—in fact, to express their definition. Men’s names are bestowed either from some peculiarity, or from

the time of their birth, *e.g.* after a saint, if on a saint's day; or after some one of their kindred, as in the case of S. John the Baptist, whose relatives wished to call him Zacharias, after his father, and objected to his mother's calling him John, "Because," said they, "there is none of thy kindred that is called by this name;" or from some special circumstance, as when Joseph called his first-born son Manasseh, "For God," said he, "hath made me forget all my toil;" or from some personal peculiarity, as in the case of the first of the twins of Rebeccah, who came out red all over, like a hairy garment, and "they called his name Esau." But names which are divinely bestowed always signify some gratuitous gift divinely given, as "Thy name shall be called Abraham, for a father of many nations have I made thee;" or "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build My Church." Seeing therefore there was conferred on Christ the gift of divine grace, that He should be the Saviour of all men, there was rightly bestowed on Him by the angel the Name of Jesus, which is, The Saviour. "When eight days were accomplished for the circumcision of the child, His name was called Jesus, which was so named of the angel before He was conceived in the womb."

CCCXXIII. Concerning offspring, the pre-

cept of the law was twofold. One was general and included all. The days of the mother's purification ended, sacrifice was to be offered, whether for a son or for a daughter. And this sacrifice was—1, for expiation of the sin in which the child was conceived and born; and 2, for a consecration of it, seeing it was then first presented in the temple. And so, 1, there was something offered for a holocaust, and, 2, something for a sin-offering. The other precept of the law was special, and concerned the first-born as well of cattle as of men. For the Lord had reserved to Himself all the first-born, whether of man or of beast, among the children of Israel, because for the liberation of the people of Israel He had smitten the first-born of Egypt. And herein was Christ prefigured, "Who is," as the Apostle says, "the First-born among many brethren." Seeing then that Christ was born of a woman, and was called her first-born and willed to be made under the law, that He might redeem them that are under the law, S. Luke the Evangelist shows that these two things were observed with regard to Him—1, that which pertained to the first-born, when he says—"They brought Him to Jerusalem to present Him to the Lord, as it is written in the law of the Lord, Every male that openeth the womb shall be called holy to the Lord;" and 2, that

which pertained to all in common—to offer a sacrifice according to that which is said in the law of the Lord, “A pair of turtle-doves or two young pigeons.”

CCCXXIV. As plenitude of grace was derived from Christ to His mother, so it was seemly that the mother should be conformed in humility to her Son, for God giveth grace to the humble. As Christ, therefore, although He was not subject to the law, yet willed to undergo circumcision and the other burdens of the law, for an example of humility and obedience, to testify His approval of it, and to take away from the Jews all occasion of calumny, He willed for the same reason that His mother should fulfil the observances of the law, although she was not bound so to do.

CCCXXV. It was right that S. John should baptize, for four reasons—1. Because Christ must needs be baptized of him in order to consecrate Baptism. 2. That Christ might be manifested, as S. John said—“That he should be made manifest to Israel, therefore am I come baptizing with water.” To the multitudes that came together to John’s baptism he preached Christ. 3. That by his baptism he might accustom men to, and pave the way for, the baptism of Christ. As the precursor anticipated in his birth his Lord who was to be born, so did he in his baptism anticipate his Lord who was to be



baptized. 4. To lead men to penitence, and so to prepare them for rightly receiving the baptism of Christ. Bede says that as the teaching of the faith is profitable to catechumens who are not yet baptized, in like manner the baptism of John was profitable before the baptism of Christ. Just as he preached penitence, and announced the baptism of Christ, and led men to a knowledge of the Truth which had dawned upon the world, so do the ministers of the Church first instruct, thereafter convince men of sin, and finally promise remission of sins in the baptism of Christ.

CCCXXVI. In the baptism of John there is to be considered 1, the rite, and 2, the effects. The rite of baptism was from God, made known to John by a familiar revelation of the Holy Ghost ; but, 3, the effect of his baptism was from man, because in it nothing was effected which exceeded man's powers, and not from God, save inasmuch as God operates in man.

CCCXXVII. The whole teaching and work of S. John the Baptist was preparatory to that of Christ, as it belongs to the inferior artizan to prepare the material to which the superior artist is to give the form. The baptism of John did not confer grace. It prepared and disposed men, in manner as has been mentioned, for the reception of that grace and truth which came by Jesus Christ.

It behoved not Christ only, but others also, to be baptized with the baptism of John, because, 1, had Christ alone been baptized with his baptism, there had not been wanting men to say that his baptism was more worthy than the baptism of Christ; and 2, as above, by way of preparation.

John's baptism was not to cease on the baptism of Christ, lest it should be supposed he did so from anger or jealousy; or 2, lest it should excite jealousy among his disciples; 3, continuing to baptize, he was enabled to continue sending his hearers to Christ; 4, as yet there remained a shadow of the old law, and the Precursor was not to cease till the Truth should be made manifest.

It was necessary that all those who had been baptized with John's baptism should be again baptized with the baptism of Christ, because by it alone was, 1, grace conferred, and, 2, character impressed.

CCCXXVIII. Although Christ needed not to be baptized, yet He willed to be baptized, in order that, by the touch of His most Sacred Flesh, He might for ever sanctify water to the mystical washing away of sin. He was the Cleanser, not the cleansed. 2. Although not a sinner, yet He had taken upon Him the nature of sinners, and the likeness of sinful flesh. 3.

He willed Himself to do what He commanded to be done by all, "For so," said He, "it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness." And this is righteous, that one first do oneself what one commands to be done by another. Example ought to accompany precept.

John baptized—not with the Holy Ghost, but with water only. Rightly, therefore, was He baptized with John's baptism, who stood not in need of spiritual baptism, having been filled with the grace of the Holy Ghost in the first instant of His conception. By submitting to the baptism of John He testified His approval thereof.

CCCXXIX. It was fitting that Christ should be baptized *in His thirtieth year*—1, because He then began to teach and to preach, for which functions there is required perfection of age, and this is supplied by thirty years. Joseph was thirty years old when he got the government of Egypt; David was thirty years old when he began to reign; in his thirtieth year Ezekiel began to prophesy. 2. Mystically to signify that baptism begets perfect men. It is ordained "for the edifying of the Body of Christ, till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature (or age) of the fulness of Christ." The number thirty is formed by the union of the ternary and denary numbers; by

the first is signified the faith of the Trinity, by the second, the fulfilling the precepts of the law : in the two consists the perfection of the Christian life.

CCCXXX. It was meet that Christ should be baptized *in the river Jordan*. 1. It was through the waters of Jordan that the children of Israel entered on the promised land. It is by the baptism of Christ that men enter into the Kingdom of God, which was figured by the earthly Canaan. "Verily, verily, I say unto thee," said Jesus to Nicodemus, "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter the Kingdom of God." 2. Elijah, when about to be taken up into heaven in a chariot of fire divided the waters of Jordan ; and to those who pass through the waters of baptism is an entrance opened into heaven by the fire of the Holy Ghost.

CCCXXXI. The efficacy of baptism is derived from above. Water is endued with heavenly virtue, and therefore it was fitting that to Jesus when He had been baptized, and as He prayed, the heavens should be opened. 2. There is required, in order to the efficacy of baptism, the faith of the Church, or of him who is to be baptized, who before his baptism makes profession of his faith, whence baptism is called the Sacrament of Faith. By faith we look into those

things which are heavenly, which exceed human sense and reason, and to signify this the heavens were opened to Christ at His baptism. 3. By the baptism of Christ there is opened to us an entrance to the heavenly kingdom, the door of which was shut against the first man by reason of his sin. And so to Christ, when He was baptized, were the heavens opened, to declare that to the baptized the way to heaven lies open.

CCCXXXII. In order to signify that all who were to be baptized with the baptism of Christ would, if they approached it with singleness of heart and faith unfeigned, receive the gift of the Holy Ghost, the Holy Ghost descended in bodily form as a dove, which is a simple animal, and abode upon Christ when He had been baptized. - And as it became not the Son of God, Who is the Truth of the Father, to use fiction, wherefore He received not a phantastic but a true body; so also did the Holy Ghost, Who is called the Spirit of Truth, form for Himself a real dove, under the species of which He appeared, albeit He did not assume it in the unity of His Person. To the Omnipotent God, Who from nothing formed universal creation, it was not difficult to form the real body of a dove without the ministry of other doves, even as it was not difficult for Him to form a true human body in the womb of Mary without seed of man.

CCCXXXIII. In order that in the baptism of Christ, which is the exemplar of ours, might be made manifest the mystery of the Trinity, in the Name of Whom, and by Whose powers, the faithful are baptized, He was baptized in His human nature; the Holy Ghost appeared in the form of a dove; and the voice of the Eternal Father was heard from heaven testifying, "This is My beloved Son, in Whom I am well pleased."

CCCXXXIV. The conversation of Christ was in accordance with the end of His Incarnation—with the cause for which He came into the world. He came into the world—1, to manifest and bear witness to the truth. And so He did not seclude Himself and lead the life of a solitary, but went about preaching publicly. When the people sought Him, and, having found Him in the desert place, stayed Him that He should not depart from them, He said unto them, "I must preach the Kingdom of God to other cities also, for *therefore* am I sent. 2. Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners, and to give us an example He went about seeking them as a shepherd does a lost sheep, and coming to them as a physician does to a sick man. 3. That men might by Him have access unto God. And so He conversed familiarly with them, that they might have access with confidence unto Him. At the same time He sometimes secluded

Himself and dwelled alone in solitary places, to give us an example of the contemplative as well as of the active life.

CCCXXXV. It being meet that Christ should have His conversation among men, it was fitting that in eating and drinking His practice should be conformed to theirs.

CCCXXXVI. It behoved Christ to lead *a life of poverty* in this world—1. As consistent with the office of a preacher, which does not consist with the cares of the world and the possession of riches. As Jesus said to His Apostles when He sent them to preach, “Provide neither gold nor silver;” and the Apostles themselves declared, “It is not reason that we should leave the Word of God and serve tables.” 2. As He assumed corporeal death to bestow on us spiritual life, so did He sustain corporeal poverty to bestow on us spiritual riches. “Our Lord Jesus Christ,” says the Apostle to the Corinthians, “though He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor, that ye through His poverty might be rich.” 3. Lest if He or His disciples possessed riches their preaching should seem to be for the sake, not of men’s souls, but of filthy lucre.

CCCXXXVII. Christ walked in all things according to the precepts of the law. In token whereof He willed to be circumcised;—circumcision being a protestation by the circumcised

that he is a debtor to do the whole law. Christ willed to have his conversation according to the law—1, to testify his approval ; 2, by observing it to consummate and terminate it in Himself, showing that in order to Him it was ordained ; 3, to take from the Jews all occasion of calumny ; 4, to set men free from its yoke. “ God sent forth His Son, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law.”

CCCXXXVIII. Christ willed to be tempted—

1. To obtain aid for us against temptation. It was meet that He should subdue our temptations by His own, Who by His death conquered ours. So S. Gregory.
2. For our caution, that no man, however holy, deem himself secure and safe from temptation. He willed moreover to be tempted after His baptism, to signify that the devil chiefly assails with his temptations them that are sanctified, seeing that over such, a victory is the most to be desired. “ My son,” says the Son of Sirach, “ if thou come to serve the Lord, prepare thy soul for temptation.”
3. For our example, to instruct us how we are to overcome the wiles of the wicked one.
4. To give us a sure trust in His mercy ; “ for we have not an high priest who cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities, but He was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin.”

CCCXXXIX. As Christ of His own free will gave Himself to be slain, so did He by His own free will give Himself to be tempted, otherwise the devil would not have dared to come to Him. Knowing that the devil especially attacks the solitary, He went forth to the solitary place, as to a battle-field. He did so also in a mystery, to lead man back from the desert to which he was condemned when he was thrust forth of Paradise by the first sin.

CCCXL. Christ willed to be tempted after a fast, and most meetly. 1. For our example, to teach us the value of fasting, which the Apostle numbers among the pieces of the armour of righteousness. 2. He was tempted not only after baptism, but after fasting, to show that the devil specially assails those who give themselves to this and other good works. His fasting was followed by hunger, and hence the devil's audacity.

The devil was to be conquered, not by God, but by man, and this fast of Christ's did not exceed in duration those of Moses and Elias, lest it should throw discredit on the reality of His Humanity.

CCCXLI. The temptations of the enemy are made by way of suggestion: and the manner of suggestion is not the same in all cases: it is modified and adapted according to the indi-

vidual subject. And so the devil does not immediately and at once tempt a spiritual man to grievous sins, but beginning with lighter offences leads him on little by little to more heinous transgressions. Such was the case in the temptation of the first man. He first solicited his consent to the sin of eating of the forbidden tree, "Yea, hath God said Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden?" secondly, to vain-glory, "Your eyes shall be opened;" and lastly, to the extreme of pride, "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." He observed the same order in the temptation of Christ. For first he tempted Him with regard to that which even spiritual men desire, the sustentation by food of their corporeal nature; he next proceeded to that with regard to which spiritual men have sometimes a failing, *viz.* vainglory: and lastly, to that which pertains in no way to spiritual men but to carnal, *viz.* the lust of riches and worldly glory, even to contempt of God. And so in the first two temptations he said, "If Thou be the Son of God," but not in the third, which in no way belongs to spiritual men, who are by adoption the sons of God,—as do the first two.

CCCXLII. It was fitting that Christ should, both in His own person and by His Apostles, first preach to the Jews only—1. To show that

by His Advent were fulfilled the promises made of old, not to the Gentiles, but to the Jews. "Now I say," writes S. Paul to the Romans, "that Jesus Christ was a Minister of the Circumcision for the Truth of God, to confirm the promises made unto the fathers." 2. To show that His Advent was from God. For whatsoever things are from God are set in order by Him. Now, due order demanded that to the Jews, who were nearer to God by their faith and worship of the One God, the doctrine of Christ should be first propounded, and by them transmitted to the Gentiles; even as in the heavenly hierarchy the Divine illuminations come through the superior to the inferior angels. "I will send those that escape of them," that is, of the isles, said God by the mouth of Isaiah, "unto the nations, to the isles afar off, that have not heard My fame, neither have seen My glory; and they shall declare My glory among the Gentiles." 3. To take from the Jews all occasion of calumny, and to prevent the supposition that He had rejected them because He sent Apostles to the Gentiles and Samaritans. And so Jesus commanded the Twelve when He sent them forth, "Go not into the way of the Gentiles, and into any city of the Samaritans enter ye not, but go rather to the lost sheep of the House of Israel. 4. Christ

by His Passion merited power and dominion over the Gentiles. "To Him that overcometh," saith He in the Apocalypse, "will I give power over the nations, even as I received of My Father." And the Apostle teaches the Philippians, that because He "became obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross, therefore God hath also highly exalted Him, that at the Name of Jesus every knee should bow, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord." Before His Passion, therefore, He willed not to have His Doctrine preached to the Gentiles; but after His Passion He said to His disciples, "Go, teach all nations." Wherefore, when on the eve of His Passion, certain Greeks wished to see Him, He replied, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone, but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." As S. Augustine says, "He was the corn of wheat, mortified in the infidelity of the Jews, multiplied in the faith of all nations."

CCCXLIII. The salvation of the multitude is to be preferred to the peace of the individual. So when any, by their perversity, hinder the salvation of the multitude, preachers and doctors who have to provide therefor, must not scruple about giving them offence. The Scribes, Pharisees, and Rulers of the Jews, hindered exceed-

ingly the salvation of the people, as well by evil living and example as by opposing the Doctrine of Christ, through which alone cometh salvation. And so the Lord, notwithstanding the offence to them, publicly rebuked their evil deeds, and taught that Truth which they hated. To His disciples who came to Him saying, "Knowest Thou that the Pharisees were offended after they heard Thy saying?" He answered—"Let them alone, they be blind leaders of the blind, and if the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch." Moreover, Esaias prophesied, "He shall be for a stone of stumbling, and for a rock of offence, to both the houses of Israel."

CCCXLIV. One's doctrine may be called hidden in more ways than one; 1, from the intention of the teacher, who intends not to interpret his doctrine to the many, but rather to conceal it; and this, 2, either from jealousy in that he desires to excel, and is unwilling to communicate to others his doctrine, the cause of his excellence; 3, or from the shameful nature of the subjects treated of. 4. Again, doctrine may be hidden because it is propounded to the few, or 5, from the manner of teaching. The doctrine of Christ was not hidden by intention of the teacher, 2, from jealousy, which could have no place in Him in whose person it is

said in the Book of Wisdom, "I learned wisdom without guile, and do communicate her without envy, I do not hide her riches;" or 3, from the shameful nature of the subjects treated of, for the doctrine of Christ had in it naught of error or uncleanness; and is a candle, that is, is true and honourable doctrine, brought to be put under a bushel? 4. Christ's doctrine was not propounded to the few, but either to the whole multitude or to all His disciples in common. He speaks not in secret who speaks to the few, that through the few he may speak to the many. 5. In this way Christ *did* sometimes speak in secret, using parables to announce to the multitude heavenly mysteries, for the direct reception of which they were unfit or unworthy. Even so, it was better for them to hear spiritual doctrine hidden behind the veils of parables, than to be altogether deprived of it. And the hidden truth of these parables He laid naked and open before His disciples, through whom it should be conveyed to those who were fit therefor. In like manner, as S. Paul taught Timothy, "The things that thou hast heard of me among many witnesses, the same commit thou to faithful men, who shall be able to teach others also." And this was signified in the command to the sons of Aaron to cover with coverings the vessels of the sanctuary which the Levites were to carry.

CCCXLV. It was not meet that Christ should Himself commit His doctrine to writing—1. By reason of His own dignity. The more excellent the doctor, the more excellent the manner of his doctrine. Christ was the most excellent doctor, and to Him it belonged in person to impress His doctrine on the hearts of His hearers. 2. By reason of the excellence of His doctrine, which is not to be comprehended by writing. As S. John says: “There are also many other things which Jesus did, the which if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written.” And this S. Augustine interprets, not of local space, but of the mental capacity of all the reasoning world to comprehend.

CCCXLVI. It was fitting that Christ should work miracles on earth,—1, in order to confirm His doctrine, which, as it transcended human reason, could not be proved by human arguments; 2, to make manifest to men that God was in Him, not by grace of adoption, but by grace of union. “If ye will not believe Me,” said Jesus, “believe the works. The works which My Father hath given Me to finish; they bear witness to Me.”

Whatever miracles Christ wrought, were wrought by Divine virtue, since God alone can

change the order of nature, which change is implied in the idea of a miracle. Christ's human nature was the *Instrument* of the Divine action.

CCCXLVII. Miracles were wrought by Christ to confirm His Doctrine, and, 2, to manifest His Divinity. It was fitting, therefore, 1, that He should not work miracles before He began to teach, and that He should not begin to teach till He had arrived at a perfect age; 2, it was fitting that He should by His miracles, so manifest His Divinity as not to discredit the reality of His Humanity, which might have occurred had He wrought them earlier. His first miracle He wrought at the marriage in Cana of Galilee.

CCCXLVIII. Christ's miracles sufficiently declared His Divinity, 1, because they transcended all human power; 2, because they were wrought by His own power, and not by God in answer to prayer, as the miracles of others were; 3, because the doctrine, which these divinely wrought miracles confirmed, asserted that He was God.

CCCXLIX. It was fitting that Christ should work miracles on *demons*, Who came to deliver man from the power of the devil; 2, on *celestial bodies*, as well as bodies terrestrial, in order to show that He was God, the Maker of the one

as well as of the other: "There was a darkness over all the land from the sixth hour until the ninth, and the sun was darkened." 3. On *men*, to show that to save men He came into the world; 4, on *irrational creatures*, for all things are subject to Him.

CCCL. Christ came in infirmity of the flesh, which was manifested by His sufferings; He came also in the power of God, which was manifested by His miracles.

CCCLI. Miracles diminish the merit of faith, and declare the hardness of men's hearts. Yet better far to be converted by miracles than to remain in unbelief. S. Paul says: "They are a sign, not to them that believe, but to them that believe not."

CCCLII. The miracles which some say were done by Christ in His boyhood, are fables and falsehoods.

CCCLIII. A miracle takes its name from the admiration which it excites. This admiration arises when effects are manifest and causes hidden. Those effects produced by God the causes of which are altogether unknown to us, are called miracles.

The justification of a wicked man is a wonderful thing, but not a miracle, because it takes place in the region, not of nature, but of grace.

One miracle is said to be greater than another, not with reference to the Divine Power which works it; but with reference to the measure, greater or less, in which it exceeds the powers of nature. Of this excess the scale is three-fold: 1. That which nature can in no way do, as for instance to cause the sun to go backward, or a human body to be made glorious. This holds the highest place. 2. That which exceeds the power of nature, not in itself, but in its circumstances, as resuscitation of the dead, and illumination of the blind—for nature can cause life, but not in the dead, and sight, but not in the blind. 3. That which exceeds the power of nature as to mode and order of doing, as when anyone is *suddenly* cured of a fever by the Divine Power, without the ordinary process of nature. This holds among miracles the lowest place.

No. 1, concerns the substance of the fact; No. 2, the subject of the miracle; No. 3, its mode.

Miracles, as exceeding the power of nature, are called virtues; as manifesting somewhat supernatural, they are called signs: by reason of their excellence, they are called prodigies, or portents.

The grace of miracles is of the number of those graces divinely bestowed on one person in order to the salvation of others, which are called by theological writers, *graces gratis datae*. This

grace is ordained for the confirmation of the truth, and so far is common to all men, good and bad, who preach the true faith, and invoke the name of Jesus ; but, as a proof of the sanctity of him who works them, it is special to the just and holy.

CCCLIV. It was meet that Christ, having foretold His Passion to His disciples, should give them a foretaste likewise of the glory to which it was the entrance. "Ought not Christ," said He to the disciples of Emmaus, "to have suffered these things, and to enter into His glory?" Glory of soul He had in the first instant of His conception. He was, after His passion, to have glory in body also. This glory He revealed to them in His transfiguration, as being the same glory to which He will lead those who follow in the footsteps of His sufferings. As S. Paul taught the disciples at Lystra: Exhorting them to continue in the faith, and that we must through much tribulation enter into the kingdom of God, "Who shall," as he said to the Philippians, "change our vile body that it may be fashioned like unto His glorious Body."

CCCLV. The brightness of a glorious body in the resurrection redounds from the soul which animates it, and extends to it its glory. The Soul of Christ, glorious in the first instant of His conception, would have rendered His Body also

glorious, had It not been restrained by a divine dispensation in order that in a passible body He might accomplish the mysteries of man's redemption. This restraint was in the Transfiguration, temporarily removed. The difference between the glorious Body of Christ in the Transfiguration, and the glorious body of a Saint in the resurrection, is, that the glory of the one was transient, the glory of the other will be immanent.

CCCLVI. Christ willed to be transfigured to show His glory to men, and provoke them to desire the like. But among those who are led by Christ to the glory of eternal blessedness, there are not those only who came after Him, but those also who went before Him. Whence, on the eve of His Passion, both the multitudes that went before, and those that followed, cried, saying, "Hosanna," as seeking from Him salvation. And so there were fittingly present as witnesses of His transfiguration, Moses and Elias, of the number of those who had gone before, and Peter, James, and John, from among them who followed after, in order that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word should be established.

CCCLVII. As in the baptism of Christ the Son of God by nature, so also in His transfiguration was the testimony of the Eternal Father heard, in order thereby to signify our

sonship also by adoption, imperfect here, in the way, in the grace of our baptism ; perfect there, in our fatherland, in the glory of our resurrection : “ Now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be ; but we know that when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is.”

CCCLVIII. That Christ should suffer was not necessary by any necessity of co-action, either in regard of God, Who had decreed Him to suffer ; or of Himself, Who voluntarily suffered : but it was necessary and expedient for a threefold end. 1. In regard of *us* who have been set free by His Passion : “ As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of Man be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have eternal life.” 2. In regard of *Christ Himself*, Who, by the humility of His Passion, merited the glory of His Exaltation : “ Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into His glory ?” 3. In regard of *God*, Whose decree concerning the Passion of Christ, foretold in the Scriptures and prefigured in the observances of the Old Testament, behoved to be accomplished : “ The Son of Man goeth, as it was determined.” And again : “ These are the words which I spake unto you while I was yet with you, that all things must be fulfilled which were written in the Law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and

in the Psalms concerning Me." . . . Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer.

CCCLIX. Although God might have otherwise than by the Passion freed mankind, for with Him nothing is impossible, yet supposing His foreknowledge and fore-ordination, it was impossible that otherwise than by the Passion so great a benefit should accrue to man.

CCCLX. It was more fitting that mankind should be freed by means of the Passion than by a mere act of the will of God, by reason of the many and great benefits over and above freedom from sin, which the Passion has conferred upon man. 1. Thereby learning how much God loves him, he is stirred up in turn to the love of God, wherein consisteth his perfection: "God commendeth His love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." 2. He thereby gave us an example of obedience, humility, constancy, justice, and other virtues displayed in the Passion of Christ, and necessary for the salvation of men: "Christ suffered for us, leaving us an example that we should follow His steps." 3. He thereby not only freed man from sin, but merited for him justifying grace here, and the glory of beatitude hereafter. 4. There is thereby laid on man a greater necessity of keeping himself free from stain of sin, when he considers that he has

been redeemed from sin by the Blood of Christ : “Ye are bought with a Price, therefore glorify God in your body.” 5. It was for the greater dignity of man, that as a man was vanquished and deceived by the devil, so a Man should in turn vanquish him; and that as a man merited death, so should a Man by dying destroy death : “Thanks be to God, Who giveth us the victory, through our Lord Jesus Christ.”

CCCLXI. The death of the cross was of all deaths the most fitting : 1. To teach men that no death, not the most horrible and shameful, is to be feared by those who live well. 2. As a satisfaction for the sin of Adam, thereby, as it were, restoring to the tree what Adam had taken therefrom : “I paid the things that I never took.” 3. Being in mid air, and not beneath a roof, it purified the sin-infected atmosphere, and the Precious Blood dropping from the Wounds of God redeemed the earth from the curse. 4. Dying lifted up, He prepared the way for our ascent to heaven : “I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto Me. This He said, signifying what death He should die.” 5. The four radiating arms of the cross signified the universal salvation of every quarter of the globe ; and the outstretched Arms of the Crucified the embracing of both Jews and Gentiles. 6. The Cross of the Sufferer was

also the Pulpit of the Preacher, Who all day long stretched forth His Hands to a disobedient and gainsaying people. 7. It fulfilled its figures: the Ark of Wood, whereby men were saved from the waters of the deluge; the Rod of Moses, whereby the Red Sea was divided, and the people of God, fleeing from Egypt, were delivered, and their enemies overwhelmed in the waters; the wood cast by Moses into the spring, whereby the bitter waters became sweet; the rod wherewith he smote the rock, whence the waters flowed; the outstretched arms of Moses on the mount, while Israel warred with Amalek in the valley beneath; and the Ark of the Testament made of wood, which contained the Law of God.

CCCLXII. Christ bore all human sufferings, not indeed according to *species*; for according to species many sufferings are contrary one to the other; as, for instance, combustion by fire, and submersion by water; but all according to *genus*: 1. In regard to the men at whose hands He suffered, Gentiles and Jews, men and women, princes and people, friends and acquaintances: "Why do the heathen so furiously rage together; and why do the people imagine a vain thing? The kings of the earth stand up, and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord, and against His Anointed." 2. In regard of those things in which a man may suffer—in

His friends, who forsook Him—in His reputation, by the blasphemous accusations—in His honour and respect, by the mockings and contumelies—in His substance, by the spoiling of His vesture—in His Soul, by sadness, weariness, and fear—in His Body, by wounds and stripes. 3. In regard of the members of His Body—in His Head, pierced by the Crown of Thorns—in His Hands and Feet, riven by the nails—in His Face, by the smittings and spitings—in His whole Body, by the scourgings. He suffered in every bodily sense—in touch by the scourgings and the nailings—in taste, by the vinegar and gall—in smell, by the rotting skulls of Calvary—in hearing, by the blasphemies and mockings—and in sight, by the tears of Mary and the disciple whom He loved.

CCCLXIII. The pains which Christ suffered exceeded all the pains which man may suffer in this life, not only by reason of their bitterness and their universal character, but by reason also of the perceptibility of the Patient, and that both in body and soul—in Body, because of Its most excellent constitution; and in Soul, because of Its supernatural faculties. But further, He voluntarily suffered pains in proportion to the end of His Passion—namely, the freedom of man from sin—and therefore in excess of all earthly and human pains: “Is it nothing to you,

all ye that pass by ? Behold and see if there be any sorrow like unto My sorrow ?”

CCCLXIV. Since the whole essence of the soul is joined to the body, and exists in the body not only *tota in toto*, but the whole also in every part of the body, it follows that when His Body suffered, Christ suffered also in His whole Soul, and in all Its inferior powers. He did not suffer in His Reason, in regard of Its *object*—viz., God, Who was the cause to the Soul of Christ, not of pain, but of joy and delectation ; but in regard of their *subject* all the powers of His Soul suffered, as being all rooted in Its essence. David said in the person of Jesus : “ My soul is full of trouble.”

CCCLXV. The whole Soul of Christ, by Its essence, during His Passion, enjoyed God, but not according to all Its powers ; only the superior.

CCCLXVI. Since the Will of Christ, to which His Passion was subjected, was ruled by the Divine Wisdom, His sufferings were undoubtedly undergone at the most fitting time.

CCCLXVII. Christ suffered in the flower of His age—1, the more to commend His love toward us by giving His life for us at its prime ; 2, to prevent any suspicion of a diminution of natural force, as in old age ; 3, to determine the quality of the bodies of those who, dying in Him, will also rise in Him.

CCCLXVIII. All Christ's acts were done at the proper places, as well as at the proper times, seeing places as well as times were in His own hand.

CCCLXIX. He suffered at Jerusalem — 1, because it was the place appointed of God for offering sacrifice, and He was the True Sacrifice, prefigured by all that had gone before; 2, because the virtue of His Passion was to radiate to the confines of the world, and Jerusalem was called the Navel of the earth; 3, it became His humility, Who chose so shameful a death, to suffer it in so celebrated a place. He was a Prophet; and it cannot be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem.

CCCLXX. He suffered without the camp—1, that the truth might respond to the figure; 2, lest the Jews should appropriate to themselves what was common to the world.

CCCLXXI. He suffered between two thieves fittingly — I, that He Who was wounded for our transgressions should be numbered with the transgressors; 2, to prefigure the general division at the Doom—those who believe on the right hand, those who believe not on the left.

CCCLXXII. The Human and Divine Natures were united in the One Person of the Eternal Word, their distinction remaining; so that both had but One Person or Hypostasis, while at the

same time the properties of each were preserved. It follows that, the Divine Nature being impassible, Passion is not to be attributed to It by reason of Itself, but by reason of the passible Human Nature united therewith, in the One Person of the Eternal Word. And so, in virtue of this Hypostatic Union, it is true to say, with S. Cyril, that the Word of God suffered and was crucified in the flesh.

CCCLXXIII. Christ was, so far as direct act is concerned, slain not by Himself, but by His persecutors; but He is said to have been the cause of His own death, to have laid down His life, and to have voluntarily died, in that He did not prevent His death when He might have done so, 1, by restraining the will or power of His adversaries; or 2, by preventing the effects of their deeds on His Body.

CCCLXXIV. It was most fitting that Christ should suffer from obedience—1. For the justification of man, that as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of One should many be made righteous. 2. For the reconciliation of God and man. We were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, as by a sacrifice well-pleasing to God; but obedience is better than sacrifice, and must accompany it: therefore was it most fitting that the Sacrifice of the Passion and Death of Christ should proceed

from obedience. 3. In order to His victory, whereby He triumphed over death and the author of death. A soldier cannot conquer unless he obey his leader, and the Man Christ obtained the victory in that He was obedient unto God: "He humbled Himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross."

CCCLXXV. God the Father delivered Christ to His Passion—1, by eternally fore-ordaining Him to suffer for the freedom of mankind; 2, by infusing into Him such charity that He willed to suffer; 3, by not protecting Him from, but exposing Him to His persecutors: "God spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all;" and He, hanging on the Cross, cried out, "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?"

CCCLXXVI. In order that, in the mode of His Passion, its effects might be prefigured, it was fitting that it should be begun by the Jews, who were the first-fruits thereof, and finished by the Gentiles, who were afterwards called to a share in its effects.

CCCLXXVII. The elders of the people knew, as did the demons, that Jesus was the Christ promised in the law, for they saw in Him all the signs which the prophets had foretold; but of the mystery of His Divinity, that He was Very God, they were ignorant: "Had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory."

Their ignorance was, however, inexcusable, by reason of the evident signs of His Divinity, but these from hatred and envy they perverted, and would not believe His words when He declared that He was the Son of God : “ If I had not come and spoken unto them they had not had sin, but now they have no cloke for their sin.” And again : “ If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin.” To them apply the words of Job : “ Therefore they say unto God, Depart from us, for we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways.”

The people who were not versed in the mysteries of the Scriptures, did not fully know Him to be either the Son of God or Christ the Messiah, for although some believed on Him, yet the multitude did not ; and if, by reason of the many signs and the efficacy of His doctrine, they sometimes doubted whether He were not indeed the Very Christ, yet were they afterwards deceived by their leaders, and believed Him to be neither God nor Christ. And so Peter : “ Brethren, I wot that through ignorance ye did it, as did your rulers ;” and also Jesus : “ Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.”

CCCLXXVIII. The sin of the rulers of the Jews was the most grievous of all in kind, and by reason of the malice of their will. The sin of the other Jews, equally grievous in kind, was

lessened in value from the circumstance of their ignorance ; they had a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge. The sin of the Gentiles was much more excusable, in that they were ignorant of the Law and the Scriptures.

CCCLXXIX. To Christ was given grace, not only as an individual, but as Head of the Church, in order that from Him it might redound to all His members ; and so He merited eternal salvation, not only for Himself, but for all His members.

CCCLXXX. He properly satisfies for an offence who exhibits to the offended that which he loves as well, or better, than he hated the offence. The Passion of Christ, undergone from charity and obedience, exhibited to God more than the recompensation which the offences of whole mankind exacted. It was not only a sufficient, but a superabundant satisfaction for the sins of the human race, by reason, 1, of the general character of His sufferings, and the bitterness of His pains ; 2, the dignity of the Life laid down, that of the God-Man ; and, 3, the greatness of His charity.

CCCLXXXI. A sacrifice is something done for the honour due properly to God, in order to appease Him. S. Augustine says, (*De Civ. Dei*, 10.) “Every work is a true sacrifice, which is done in order that we may cleave to God in a

holy fellowship, and referred to that end of good whereby we may be truly happy. Christ offered Himself in His Passion for us, and this work voluntarily undertaken was very acceptable to God, as springing from a great charity. And hence the Passion of Christ was manifestly a True Sacrifice. Of this True Sacrifice there were manifold and various signs in the sacrifices of the old Law. This one was figured by those many, in like manner as one thought is expressed in many words, and in order that without weariness much may be set forth. Four things fall to be considered in every sacrifice : 1, to whom, 2, by whom, 3, what, and 4, for whom it is offered. Christ, the One, True, and Alone Mediator, reconciling us to God by the Sacrifice of Peace, remained One with Him to Whom He offered, made Himself One with them for whom He offered, and was Himself one and the same Who offered and was offered.

CCCLXXXII. Man was in two ways bound by sin : 1. He was under bondage to sin and to the devil : “ He who committeth sin is the servant of sin.” And again, “ Of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage.” 2. By his liability to punishment for sin, according to the justice of God. For it pertains to bondage that a man suffer what he wills not, as to freedom that he employ himself as he wills.

But the Passion of Christ is a sufficient and superabundant satisfaction for both the sins and the liability to punishment of the human race, and it was, as it were, a price paid whereby we are freed from either obligation. It is therefore called our Redemption: "Ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, from your vain conversation received by tradition from your fathers, but with the Precious Blood of Christ, as of a Lamb without blemish and without spot." And again: "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the Law, being made a Curse for us."

CCCLXXXIII. In order that one may be said to redeem, two things are required: 1, the act of payment: 2, the price paid; for if one, for the redemption of anything, pay a price which is not his own but another's, he is not said to be the principal redeemer, but he rather whose is the price. Now the price of our redemption is the Blood of Christ, or that corporeal life of His which is in the Blood. This Christ Himself paid. Hence both requirements pertain to Him as He is man, *immediately*, although they may be ascribed to the whole Trinity *remotely*, and as a first cause; for Theirs was the Life of Christ as Its first author, and by Them It was breathed into the Man Christ, in order that He might suffer for us. Immediately to redeem is therefore specially proper to Christ, although Redemp-

tion may be attributed to the whole Trinity as to a first cause.

CCCLXXXIV. Although God be the principal efficient cause of our salvation, yet the Humanity of Christ being the Instrument of the Divinity, all the actions and passions or sufferings of Christ in that Humanity, and by virtue of the Divinity, operate as instrumental causes of man's salvation.

The Passion of Christ is the cause of the remission of sins, 1, by provoking us to charity; 2, by way of redemption by the Head for the members of the One Mystical Body; 3, by way of efficiency, the Flesh wherein it was undergone being the Instrument of the Divinity.

CCCLXXXV. As to the power over men which the devil exercised before the Passion of Christ, three things have to be considered: 1, in regard of man, who, by his sin, merited to be delivered into the power of the devil, by whose temptations he had been overcome; 2, in regard of God, Whom by his sin man had offended, and Who, by His justice, had abandoned him to the power of Satan; 3, in regard of the devil, who, according to his most depraved will, hindered man from the attainment of his salvation. As to the first, man was set free from the power of the devil by the Passion of Christ, inasmuch as it was the cause of the remission of his sins. As to the second, inasmuch as it reconciled us to God.

And as to the third, inasmuch as in the Passion of Christ the devil exceeded the measure of the power given him by God, by plotting the death of Christ, Who did not merit death, inasmuch as He was without sin. S. Augustine says, "The devil was vanquished by the Righteousness of Christ; he found in Him nothing worthy of death, and slew Him nevertheless; it was but just, therefore, that those whom he held debtors should be set free by believing on Him Whom without any debt he had slain. "Now," said Jesus before His Passion, "Now shall the Prince of this world be cast out."

CCCLXXXVI. The Passion of Christ being a sufficient, nay superabundant, satisfaction for and the cause of the remission of sins for which man merits punishment, it follows that we are thereby delivered from our liability to punishment.

CCCLXXXVII. The Passion of Christ was the cause of our reconciliation to God—1, by the removal of sin, whereby we are His enemies; 2, inasmuch as it was a sacrifice well pleasing to Him. Man forgives an offence committed against him for an acceptable service rendered to him; and so God.

God found in human nature somewhat good, namely, Christ's Humanity, and was therefore reconciled thereto, and to all that He found united therewith.

CCCLXXXVIII. The gate of heaven is closed against us : 1, by reason of the sin common to mankind, the sin of our first parent ; 2, by reason of our own individual sins. By the Passion of Christ we are freed from the first, both as to its guilt and to its punishment, He paying the price for us ; and from the second, by communicating in His passion by Faith and Charity, and the Sacraments of the Faith. And so by the Passion of Christ is opened the gate of Heaven to all believers.

God prefigured the closing of the gate of Heaven for the original sin when He placed at the east of the garden of Eden cherubim and a flaming sword, which turned every way, to keep the way of the Tree of Life. Again, the manslayer was to remain in the City of Refuge until the death of the High-Priest, who was anointed (Christ) with the holy oil ; but after the death of the High-Priest he was to return into the land of his possession. “ We have an High-Priest of good things to come, Who by His own Blood entered in once into the Holy Place, having obtained eternal redemption for us.”

CCCLXXXIX. In his Passion Christ humbled Himself: 1, by His sufferings and death, to undergo which He was in no way bound ; 2, as to place, by His Body being laid in a sepulchre, and His Soul descending into hell ; 3, by the confusion

and opprobrium which He bore ; 4, by His being delivered into the power of man. And so by His humiliation in His Passion He merited exaltation in four corresponding modes : 1, by a glorious Resurrection : Thou knowest My down-sitting, My humiliation, and Mine uprising, the exaltation of My resurrection ; 2, by an Ascension into Heaven : “Now that He ascended, what is it but that He also descended first into the lower parts of the earth. He that descended is the same also that ascended up far above all heavens ;” 3, by a session at the Right Hand of the Father, and manifestation of His Divinity. “He shall be exalted and extolled, and be very high.” “As many were astonied at Thee.” “His Visage was so marred more than any man, and His Form more than the sons of men.” “He was made obedient unto death, even the death of the cross, wherefore God hath also highly exalted Him, and given Him a Name which is above every name,” that by all men He should be called God, and that all men should do Him reverence as God. Therefore “at the Name of Jesus every knee shall bow, of things in Heaven, and things on earth, and things in hell.” And 4, by a judiciary power. He shall come again from the Right Hand of the Father, and with glory, to judge both the quick and the dead.

CCCXC. It was fitting that Christ should not

only suffer, but also die: 1. In order to satisfy for mankind, condemned to death by reason of sin: "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." He rightly satisfies for another who voluntarily subjects himself to the punishment which that other merited. 2. To make manifest the verity of that nature which He had assumed. If, after dwelling among men, He had suddenly vanished and avoided death, He might have been reckoned a phantom. 3. By dying to set us free from the fear of death. He took part of flesh and blood, "that through death He might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil; and deliver them who, through the fear of death, were all their lifetime subject to bondage." 4. In order that dying unto the likeness of sin, that is, to its penalty, in the body, He might give us an example of dying unto sin in the spirit: "In that He died, He died unto sin once; but in that He liveth, He liveth unto God. Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God, through Jesus Christ our Lord." 5. That, by rising from the dead, He might make manifest His power whereby He had overpowered death, and afford unto us the hope of a resurrection from the dead: "If Christ be preached that He rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead?"

CCCXCI. Since the gift which is granted by the grace of God is never recalled without man's fault, and in Christ there was no fault, the grace of union whereby the Divinity was united to the Flesh of Christ in the One Person of the Eternal Word was never recalled : and so in Christ's death, His Divinity was in no way separated from His Flesh.

Much less was It separated from His Soul, which was more immediately and *per prius* united to the Word of God than was His Body, His Body having been united thereto *mediante Anima*.

CCCXCII. Since it is an article of faith that Christ truly died, it is an error against the faith to affirm aught which might impugn the verity of His Death. But it pertains to the verity of the death of a man or of an animal that he or it thereby ceases to be a man or an animal, for the death of a man or an animal proceeds from the separation from the body of the soul, which completes the idea of a man or of an animal. To say, therefore, that Christ, during the three days of His Death, was a man, is simply and absolutely erroneous. Some authors, as Hugh of S. Victor, have used erroneous words, without thereby intending an erroneous sense. It may, however, be said that Christ was, during the three days, a dead man.

CCCXCIII. Since the *suppositum* of the Body of Christ was the same in number whether alive or dead, viz., Divine, His Body was the same in number alive or dead—*simpliciter*; but not *totaliter*, otherwise It would not have known first corruption, that is, the separation of the Soul. Second corruption, that is, resolution into Its elements, It of course never knew.

CCCXCIV. The Death of Christ, considered as a deprivation of life, operated our salvation, not by way of merit, but only by way of efficiency, in virtue of His Divinity. But if by death we understand simply the latter part of His sufferings, the same remarks apply to it as to the Passion. S. Augustine says “The one death of our Saviour (of His Body) saved us from two deaths (that is, of both soul and body).”

CCCXCV. It was fitting that Christ should be buried : 1. To prove the verity of His death, or one is not laid in a sepulchre till there be no doubt of the verity of his death. “Pilate marvelled if He were already dead, and calling unto him the centurion, he asked him whether He had been any while dead,” and he knew it of the centurion before he gave the Body to Joseph of Arimathea, the honourable Counsellor, who craved It of him. 2. Because by His resurrection from the dead, a hope of rising through Him is given to those who lie in the sepulchres. 3. For an example of spiri-

tual sepulture, of seclusion from the distractions of the world, to those who in Christ are dead unto sin: "Ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God." "We are buried with Him by baptism unto death, that, like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life; for if we have been planted together in the likeness of His Death, we shall be also in the likeness of His Resurrection. If we be dead with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with Him."

CCCXCVI. Christ was buried in a garden, to signify that by His Death and Burial we are free from that death which we incurred by the sin of Adam committed in the Garden of Paradise.

He was laid in the grave of another, 1, because He died for the salvation of others; and 2, to show His perfect poverty. He Who of His own had no house in life, had no dwelling in death; and owed the covering of His nakedness to the charity of Joseph.

He was laid in a new tomb, to prevent all question of indentivity, and 2, to figure the virginal womb of Mary. And in a tomb hewn out of the rock, and with a great stone rolled to the mouth thereof, to prevent all suspicion of fraud.

CCCXCVII. It was not fitting that the Body

of Christ should putrefy, or be in any way incinerated, because the putrefaction of a body proceeds from the infirmity of its nature, which can no longer preserve its unity. But it was not meet that the Death of Christ should proceed from infirmity of nature, lest it should be believed to be involuntary; and therefore He willed to die, not from disease, but from inflicted sufferings, to which He of His own accord offered Himself. And so, lest His Death should be ascribed to infirmity of nature, He willed not His Body to be in any way putrefied or resolved, but willed on the contrary, that It should remain entire and uncorrupted, to make manifest the power of His Divinity, which never left It.

CCCXCVIII. Since by the One Death of Christ, undergone not by reason of His sin, but by reason of His Charity, we are delivered from a double death, the death of the body and the death of the soul, He lay in the Sepulchre two nights to imply these two deaths, and one day to signify His one charitable death, which has in it not of the nature of darkness but of the light. S. Augustine says that from the evening of the burial to the dawn of the resurrection, there were thirty-six hours—that is, one whole night, one whole day, and another whole night. Holy Scripture reckons a part

for the whole and the parts of three days, as three days.

CCCXCIX. It was fitting that Christ should descend into hell : 1. Because He had come to bear our punishment, and to deliver us therefrom, as Isaiah, " Surely He hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows." Now by sin man had incurred not only a death of the body, but also a descent of his soul into hell. And so, as it was fitting that Christ should die that He might deliver us from death, it was fitting also that He should descend into hell to deliver us from our descent thither. And so Hosea, " I will ransom them from the power of the grave ; I will redeem them from death : O death I will be thy plagues ; O hell I will be thy destruction." 2. It was fitting that the devil having been vanquished by the Passion, Christ should set free the bound, who were detained in Hell : " As for Thee also," says Zechariah, " by the Blood of Thy covenant, I have sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit wherein is no water." And S. Paul to the Colossians : " Having spoiled principalities and powers, He made a show of them openly, triumphing over them." 3. That as He had shown forth His power upon earth, by living and dying thereon, so should He also make manifest His power in hell by visiting and illuminating it.

CCCC. Christ, i., by way of effect, descended into every place of hell, and 1, convicted the damned of their unbelief and malice; 2, gave to the souls detained to be purified, a hope of future glory; and, 3, infused into the souls of the holy Fathers, detained for original sin only, the Light of Eternal Glory. But ii., by way of substantial presence, He descended only to the hell of the just, and His Soul locally visited theirs, whom, according to His Divinity, He had interiorly visited by His grace. The effect of His Descent by substantial presence to one part of hell was produced in all parts thereof, in like manner as the effects of His Passion, undergone on one spot of this world's surface, are perceived to the ends of the earth.

CCCCI. Although in the death of Christ, Body and Soul were separated the one from the other, yet neither were separated from the One Person of the Eternal Word, the Son of God; and so during the three days Whole Christ was in the Sepulchre, because His whole Person was there by His Body united thereto; and in like manner Whole Christ was in hell, because the whole Person of Christ was there, in virtue of His Soul united thereto, while Whole Christ was also everywhere by reason of His Divine Nature.

The Soul of Christ was in hell as long as His Body lay in the sepulchre.

CCCCII. Christ descending into hell, by virtue of His Passion, absolved the holy Fathers from all liability to punishment for sin, whether original or actual; which punishment consists in bodily death, and exclusion from the Life of Glory: and gave them to see God in His Essence, in which sight consisteth the perfect blessedness of man.

CCCCIII. As the damned had no faith informed by charity, and as thus only can man be joined to the Passion of Christ which operates his redemption, they did not in any way reap the fruit of His descent, which had power of deliverance only in virtue of the previous Passion.

CCCCIV. Neither were children who had died in original sin delivered by Christ's descent into hell, not being joined to His Passion by faith and love; for neither by faith of their own or of their parents, nor by any sacrament of faith, had they been cleansed from their original sin. The holy Fathers were delivered from hell by being admitted to the Glory of the Divine Vision, to which no one can attain but by Grace; and so, as these children had not Grace, they were not delivered from hell.

Those souls which were already purified His

Soul released, but not those whose purification was not yet accomplished.

CCCCV. The resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead was necessary for five reasons. 1. To commend the justice of God, to which it pertains to exalt those who for His sake humble themselves: "He hath put down the mighty from their seat, and hath exalted the humble." Seeing, therefore, that Christ by reason of His charity and obedience humbled Himself, even to the death of the Cross, it behoved Him to be exalted by God, even to a glorious resurrection. As in His person it is said in the 139th Psalm, "Thou knowest, that is, Thou hast approved, My downsitting, that is, My humiliation and passion; and Mine uprising, that is, My glorification in My resurrection. 2. For the instruction of our faith, which is thereby confirmed as to His Divinity. Though He was crucified through weakness, yet He liveth by the power of God. "If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain." And by the Psalmist He says, "What profit is there in My Blood when I go down to the pit?" 3. For the support of our hope, because when we see that Christ, Who is our Head, rose again, we have hope that we who are His members shall rise again also. "If Christ," says S. Paul, "be preached that He rose from the dead,

how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead?" And holy Job, "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that He shall stand at the latter day upon the earth, and though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God, Whom I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold, and not another." 4. For the information of the life of the faithful: "Like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life. Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord." 5. For the completion of our salvation. He bore evils to free us from evils; He was glorified to raise us to glory: "He was delivered for our justification."

CCCCVI. The resurrection of Christ was necessary for the instruction of our faith. Our faith concerns both the Divinity and the Humanity of Christ. It will not suffice to believe in either, without believing also in the other. To confirm our faith, therefore, in Christ's Divinity, His Resurrection was not deferred to the end of the world, or even for a long time; to confirm our faith, likewise in the reality of His Humanity and Death, a certain delay was necessary in order to make the latter manifest; had

there been no real death, there would, by consequence, have been no real resurrection.

CCCCVII. His resurrection on the third day was fitting by reason of the perfection of the ternary number, the number of everything, as having beginning, middle, and end. The three days mystically signified three periods: 1. Before the law. 2. Under the law. 3. Under grace.

The resurrection, moreover, began the third estate of the saints. The first was, under the figures of the Law; the second, under the truth of faith; the third, in the eternity of glory, whereunto the Risen Christ first entered.

CCCCVIII. The Risen Christ was the first-fruits of those that slept. Resurrection is a restoration from death unto life. This may occur in two ways: the first, a simple resuscitation from the state of death; the second, a farther reparation from the necessity of dying, and what is more, from the possibility of again dying. This last alone may be called true and perfect resurrection, because so long as a man is subject to the necessity, or liable to the possibility of death, death may be said to have dominion over him. Of this resurrection is Christ said to be the first-fruits: "He, being risen from the dead, dieth no more." The other imperfect resurrection was that whereby women

received their dead from the hands of Elijah and Elisha, and whereby were resuscitated the three persons by Jesus Christ, *viz.* :—the damsel, the daughter of Jairus, the widow's son of Nain, and Lazarus, the brother of Martha and Mary of Bethany. There is a twofold opinion as to those saints who rose with Christ. Some say they returned not again to die, a second death being a greater torment than their return to life a joy. If so, they rose *after Christ*. It was when Jesus yielded up the Ghost that the rocks rent and the graves were opened, but it is specially recorded that it was *after* the Resurrection that many bodies of the saints which slept arose, and came out of the graves, and went into the Holy City, and appeared unto many.

CCCCIX. His Divinity was not separated by death from either Body or Soul of Christ. By virtue of this Divinity, therefore, the Body resumed the Soul which It had laid down, and the Soul the Body It had left. It is to be said, therefore, that by His own power Christ rose. "No man," said He, "taketh My life from Me, but I lay it down of Myself; I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again."

CCCCX. That must rise which fell. The Body of Christ fell by death, inasmuch as the Soul, which was Its formal perfection, was

separated from It. It was necessary, therefore, in order to a true resurrection, that the same body should be re-united to the same soul. And seeing the truth of the nature of a body is from its form, it follows that the Body of Christ after His Resurrection was both a true body and of the same nature as It was before. Had It been a phantom body, there would not have been a true, but only an apparent resurrection.

CCCCXI. Whatever pertains to the nature of a human body, as flesh, blood, bones, and the like, was integrally and without any diminution in the glorious Body of the Risen Christ. To deny this would be to affirm the heresy of Eutychius, Bishop of Constantinople, who asserted that our bodies in the glory of the Resurrection would be impalpable and more subtle than a breath of air, and that our Lord, after confirming the hearts of His disciples by permitting them to touch Him, reduced to such a subtilty all that in Him was palpable.

CCCCXII. The Body of the Risen Christ was glorious. 1. Because His Resurrection was the exemplar and the cause of ours. Our bodies, sown in dishonour, shall be raised in glory. Much more was His, as the exemplar excels what is framed thereon, and the cause what is caused thereby. 2. By the humility of His Passion He merited glory in His Resurrection.

3. His Soul from the first instant of His conception was glorious by Its perfect fruition of Divinity. But this glory was dispensed from redounding from His Soul to His Body, in order that He might, by His Passion, accomplish the mystery of our redemption. That done, His Soul, resumed by His Body in the Resurrection, made that Body also glorious.

CCCCXIII. It became the Soul of Christ to resume in the Resurrection His Body with Its Wounds : in order, 1, to surround Itself with trophies of His triumph ; 2, to confirm the faith of the doubting ; 3, to plead to the Eternal Father ; 4, to enkindle the affections of the faithful ; and 5, to convict the reprobate at the day of judgment.

CCCCXIV. Those things which exceed the common cognition of mankind, God wills to come to the knowledge of His lower creatures, through the intervention of His higher creatures ; and so the glorious Resurrection of Jesus Christ was manifested not to all the people, but to choice witnesses fore-ordained of God, upon whose testimony it should be believed by others.

CCCCXV. Seeing Christ rose again not to that life of which men have knowledge, but to a life immortal, heavenly, and conformed to God, "in that He liveth, He liveth unto God ;"—it was fitting that men should not see Him rise,

but that it should be announced to them by Angels.

CCCCXVI. Two things had to be declared to Christ's Disciples regarding His Resurrection : 1, its truth, or reality ; 2, the glory of the Risen. To prove the first, He appeared to them many times, familiarly conversed, ate and drank with them, and allowed them to touch Him ; 3, to manifest the second, He would not abide with them continuously, lest they should suppose Him to have returned to a mortal life.

CCCCXVII. Under His own effigy Christ appeared after His Resurrection to those who were well disposed to believe ; to those who were otherwise disposed, under other effigies, according to their dispositions.

CCCCXVIII. Christ did not prove His Resurrection to His Disciples by argument, because argumentative proof proceeds from premises which must have been either known or unknown to them. If unknown, it was impossible, because we cannot proceed from the unknown to prove the known ; if known, it was unnecessary, the proof being in their own power.

He contented Himself with the testimony of Holy Scripture, the foundation of our faith, as contained in Moses, in the Prophets, and in the Psalms. But He shewed Himself alive after His Passion to the disciples by many infallible proofs

or sensible signs ; to the intent that, 1, their own hearts might be disposed to believe ; and that 2, their testimony might be the more efficacious.

CCCCXIX. His proofs were sufficient to show, 1, a true, 2, a glorious resurrection. That it was a true resurrection, He shewed—1. Because His Body was true and solid, not rare and a phantom : “ Handle Me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see Me have.” 2. It was a human body which they recognised. 3. It was the same in number as the body He had before ; witness the wounds : “ Behold My Hands and My Feet, that it is I Myself.” Further, He shewed them the truth of His Resurrection on the part of His Soul, again united to His Body. And this by the works of a threefold life : 1. By a work of *nutritive* life, in that He ate and drank with His disciples. 2. By works of the *sensitive* life, in that He answered their questions, and saluted those who were present, thus shewing that He both heard and saw. 3. By works of the *intellectual* life, in that He spake with them and expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning Himself ; and lest aught should be wanting to the perfect manifestation of His Resurrection, He shewed His Divine Nature by the miracle of fishes, and by His ascension into Heaven.

He shewed also the glory of His Resurrection by His entrance through the closed doors ; and by His evanishing from the sight of His disciples when they knew Him in the Breaking of Bread. As S. Gregory says : He, after the Resurrection, shewed that His Body was of the *same nature* and of *another glory.*”

CCCCXX. The first in any genus is the cause of all which follow. Christ was the first in the genus of true resurrections ; and therefore His Resurrection is the cause of ours. He is the first-fruits of them that slept. The Resurrection of Christ is not, properly speaking, the meritorious cause, but the efficient and exemplary cause of our resurrection, and this not only in respect of bodies, but in respect also of souls.

CCCCXXI. The place ought to be accommodated to him who dwells in it. Now Christ, by His Resurrection, entered upon the life which is immortal and incorruptible, and so the earth where we now dwell, being the place of generation and corruption, was no longer a meet abode for Him. It was fitting, therefore, that He should ascend to the Land of the Incorruptible, even unto Heaven.

CCCCXXII. Christ ascended into Heaven, not according to His Divine Nature, Which had never left Heaven, and Which was not subject

to the conditions of place and motion, but according to His Human Nature. At the same time, the cause of the Ascension was His Divinity hypostatically united therewith.

CCCCXXIII. Christ ascended into Heaven by His own power. 1. By the power of His own Divinity. 2. By virtue of His glorified Soul, to whose will the motions of His glorified Body, as in the case of all other glorified bodies, were altogether subject. Where a glorified soul wills to be, there the glorified body instantly is.

Elijah ascended into Heaven in a chariot, to shew that *mere* man ascends by power other than his own.

CCCCXXIV. Local order being proportioned according to greater or less participation in the Divine goodness, and the glorious Body of Christ having participated therein in the most perfect manner, it became It to be raised above all heavens: "He ascended up far above all heavens that He might fill all things."

CCCCXXV. Albeit the Body of Christ, according to the condition of Its nature, was beneath all spiritual substances, yet by reason of Its union with God in the One Person of the Eternal Word, It excelled them all, and so fittingly ascended far above all creatures, "far above all principality and power and might and dominion, and every name that is named,

not only in this world, but also in that which is to come."

CCCCXXVI. The ascension of Christ is a cause of our salvation in two ways : 1. *Ex parte* of ourselves—our minds being thereby moved towards Him, as the object of our faith, of our hope, of our love, and of our worship ; our reverence being increased by His residence in the Heavens. 2. *Ex parte* of Him : 1. As preparing for us a way of ascending Heavenwards. We His members, must follow whither He, our Head, has gone before. " I go," said He, " that where I am there ye may be also." And so, for a sign of this, He led with Him into Heaven the Holy Souls whom He had delivered from hell. " When He ascended up on high He led captivity captive." 2. As, in the Old Testament, the High Priest entered the Sanctuary to stand before God for the people, so did Christ also enter Heaven to intercede for us : for this presentation of Himself in our nature, which He introduced into Heaven, is an intercession for us, that as God has so highly exalted human nature in Him, He would have mercy on those for whom He assumed it. 3. Seated in Heaven as God and Lord, He thence gives gifts unto men.

CCCCXXVII. The idea of Session is twofold. 1. Dwelling or abiding in a place. 2. The en-

joyment of royal or judiciary power. In either sense it belongs to Christ to sit at the Right Hand of the Father. 1. Being Incorruptible, He eternally remaineth in the Presence of God, which is the fulness of joy, and at His Right Hand, which is pleasure for evermore. 2. He sits at the Right Hand of the Father as with a king, reigning together with Him, and having from Him judiciary power.

CCCCXXVIII. It belongs to Christ, as He is God, to sit at the Right Hand of the Father, that is, to have one glory of Divinity, one blessedness, and one judiciary power, with the Father. At the same time, this imports only a personal distinction and order of origin, not a degree of nature or dignity, such degrees having no existence among the Divine Persons.

CCCCXXIX. Christ is said to sit at the Right Hand of the Father *as He is God*, as having one nature with the Father. *But as He is man* : 1, in virtue of the grace of union, which imports a distinction of nature, but an unity of person. 2. According to habitual grace, which is more abundant in Christ than in all other creatures, inasmuch as human nature in Him is more blessed than other creatures, and has over them all royal and judiciary power.

CCCCXXX. To Christ alone, and not to angel or to man, does it belong to sit at the Right Hand

of God the Father, since He alone is equal in nature to the Father according to His Divinity, and He is set high above all creatures in the possession of His Father's goods, according to His Humanity. "To which of the Angels said He at any time, Sit thou on My Right Hand?" If not to Angels much more not to any other creatures which are less than they.

CCCCXXXI. Since Christ is the Wisdom begotten of, and the Truth proceeding from the Father, and perfectly representing Him, to Him alone and specially belongs judiciary power, which requires—1, wisdom ; 2, a zealous rectitude, not to be led astray by passion or hatred ; and 3, a power of coercion : all of which are found in Christ. He commanded the Apostles to preach unto the people, and to testify that it is He which was ordained of God to be the Judge of quick and dead : "The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son."

CCCCXXXII. Since Christ, as He is man, is the Head of the Church, to Him, *as He is man*, does it belong to have judiciary powers. The Father hath given Him authority to execute judgment, because He is the Son of Man. S. Augustine says "that as it is right that the judged should see their Judge, He will appear in the Judgment in the form of a servant, the

sight of the form of God being reserved for the just alone."

CCCCXXXIII. Although the enjoyment of judiciary power be due to Christ—1, by reason of His Divine Person ; 2, of His dignity, as Head of His Body, the Church ; and 3, of His plenitude of grace ; yet at the same time, it is true to say that He obtained it by merit. He merited, according to the justice of God, to be Judge, Who for that justice had fought and conquered, and had been unjustly judged.

"He," says S. Augustine, "shall sit as Judge, Who stood before the judge : He shall righteously condemn, Who was Himself falsely found guilty."

CCCCXXXIV. Christ's judiciary power extends to all things human and all things else. "The Father hath committed *all* judgment unto the Son." By His Word, wherewith He made all things, will the Father judge all things.

CCCCXXXV. Since a perfect judgment of aught which is changeable cannot be given till its entire consummation, there must of necessity be, besides the judgment which takes place on the death of every man, a final judgment at the last day, when due consideration will be had to the deeds of every man, not only in themselves, but also in their effects.

CCCCXXXVI. Since by the propinquity of His assumed Nature to God, human nature is

in Christ exalted above the Angels ; and since by the humility of His Passion, human nature merited in Christ to be made higher than them, it is clear that, to His judiciary power, Angels, as well good as evil, are subject, not only by reason of His Divinity, but by reason also of His Human Nature. “ Verily, He took not on Him the Nature of Angels, but He took on Him the seed of Abraham.” “ Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to minister to them who shall be heirs of salvation ?” “ Know ye not,” says S. Paul to the Corinthians, “ that we, by virtue of His authority Who is our Head, shall judge Angels ?”*

CCCCXXXVII. As we say that God is in Heaven, so we say also that to the Blessed Souls who are in the perfect participation of Deity, there are places assigned in Heaven, while to the souls which are hindered yet awhile from such participation, there are allotted contrary places.

CCCCXXXVIII. Incorporeal beings may exist in a corporeal place, not after a mode known to us, and to which we are accustomed, but in a mode appropriate to spiritual subsistency,

* Note.—That 500 sections, containing the Doctrine of S. Thomas on the Sacraments, are here omitted. (See Index.) They are published as a separate volume by J. T. Hayes, Lyall Place.

which mode cannot now be made fully manifest to us.

CCCCXXXIX. There is an appropriateness between certain souls and certain places; as between souls spiritually illuminated and luminous bodies, and between souls darkened by guilt, and dark places.

CCCCXL. As in bodies there is heaviness or lightness, by which each is borne to its own place, which is the end of its motion, so also in souls there is merit or demerit, whereby souls come either to reward or punishment, which are the ends of their actions. And hence as a body is by its heaviness or its lightness immediately borne to its own place, unless it be hindered, so also souls, on their deliverance from the prison of the body, having loosed the chain of the flesh whereby they are detained in the estate of the Way, immediately attain either to reward or punishment, unless something hinder them. Sometimes venial sin hinders their immediate attainment of reward. It must first be purged. And so it follows that the reward is deferred. Now since places are allotted to souls according to congruency of reward or punishment, immediately the soul is loosed from the body it is either plunged into hell or flies towards heaven, unless it be hindered by some liability (*reatus*) to punishment, which renders it necessary

that its flight be deferred until it first be purged. This truth is manifestly attested by authorities from Canonical Scripture and by the writings of the Holy Fathers. The contrary of this truth is heresy.

CCCCXLI. S. Paul writes to the Corinthians : “ We know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the Heavens.” The soul, therefore, on being loosed from the flesh, has a mansion which is laid up for it in the heavens.

Again, the same Apostle writes to the Philip-
pians : “ I desire to be dissolved, and to *be with Christ.*” Now as no one denies or doubts that the Soul of Christ is in Heaven, for that is an article of the faith, so no one can doubt but that the Soul of Paul is there, as also the souls of all the Blessed Saints.

That some souls also descend into hell immediately after death, is clear from the passage of S. Luke, “ The rich man also died, and was buried in hell.”

CCCCXLII. The time before the resurrection differs from the time after it in this, that before the resurrection the souls are in their several places without their bodies, but after it, with their bodies ; and also because in some receptacles there are now souls, which

will not contain souls after the resurrection.

CCCCXLIII. The union of soul and body after the judgment will increase alike the joys of the just and the torments of the damned.

CCCCXLIV. To go out of hell or of paradise may be understood in two ways—1. In one way, to go out *simpliciter*, so that hell or paradise should no more be one's place. This no one, finally allotted to either, can possibly do. 2. In another way, to go out for a time. And here one must make a distinction, according to what belongs to the law of nature, and what to the order of Divine Providence. Some things are within the boundary of human affairs; others are signs of Divine power; some things are done naturally, others are done miraculously. According therefore to the natural course, separated souls allotted to their respective receptacles are entirely segregated from the conversation of the living; for, according to the course of nature, men living in mortal flesh do not immediately unite with separated substances, since all their knowledge springs from their senses; nor does it become them to go out from their receptacles, save to interfere in the affairs of the living. But, according to the disposition of Divine power, separated souls do sometimes go forth from their receptacles and present themselves before the

eyes of men. And we may also believe that this sometimes happens to the damned. They are permitted to appear to the living to inspire terror into them, or for their instruction. Those who are detained in purgatory are also sometimes permitted to appear to the living in order to ask their prayers. But there is this difference between saints and the damned, that the saints can appear to the living when they will; but not so the damned. For as holy persons living in the flesh receive by the gifts of grace (*gratis data*), power to perform healings and signs, which signs are miraculously wrought by Divine virtue, and cannot be wrought by others who lack these gifts: so also it is not unmeet that, in virtue of their glory, a power should be given to the souls of the saints whereby they can miraculously appear to the living when they will, which others cannot do, unless sometimes permitted.

CCCCXLV. S. Jerome, arguing against Vigilantius, says that "of certain souls it is written, that they shall follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth. But the Lamb goes everywhere. These souls therefore follow Him everywhere. And so it is ridiculous to say that the souls of the dead cannot leave their receptacles.

Again he says, "Since the devil and demons roam over the whole world, and are present in every place with a but too great celerity, where-

fore should the martyrs, after shedding of their blood, be shut up in a prison and prevented from issuing thence?" Hence it may be gathered, with regard not only to the good but also to the wicked, that they may sometimes issue from their receptacles, seeing that they have not greater damnation than the demons who run to and fro everywhere.

CCCCXLVI. Even although the dead have the power of appearing to the living when they will, yet they do not always use this power when or as often as we should expect them to do so from their affection while in the flesh for the living. The fact is, they are either entirely conformed to the Divine Will, and so do nothing save in accordance with the Divine disposition; or, 2, they are so weighed down with their own pains, that their sorrow for their own misery exceeds and swallows up their desire of appearing to those of the living who are dear to them.

CCCCXLVII. In no way is the joy and the sorrow, the reward and the punishment of the redeemed and of the damned respectively lessened when they issue from their several receptacles, any more than the honour assigned to a Pontiff of sitting on a throne in his cathedral is lessened when he goes forth, and is not actually seated thereon.

CCCCXLVIII. Although sometimes the souls

of the saints or of the damned be present *presentialiter* where they appear, it is not, however, to be believed that this always happens. For sometimes apparitions of this sort are effected, whether in sleeping or in waking, by the operation of good or of evil spirits, in order respectively to the instruction or the deception of the living.

CCCCXLIX. The souls of men after their death cannot arrive at rest, save by the merit of faith, for, as S. Paul writes to the Hebrews, "He that cometh to God must believe." Now the first example of believing is given to men in Abraham, who was the first to segregate himself from the congregation of the unbelievers, and who received a special sign of faith. That rest, therefore, which is given to men after death, is called Abraham's Bosom. But the souls of the saints after their deaths had not on every ground the same rest, for since Christ's advent they have entire rest in the enjoyment of the Divine vision, while before His advent, although they had rest by freedom from pain, yet they had not rest from desire or longing, by the attainment of their end. The estate of the saints, therefore, before Christ's advent may be considered—1. Both according to that which it had of rest, whence it is called Abraham's Bosom; and also 2. According to that which it

lacked of rest ; whence it is also called (*limbus inferni*) the Limbus of Hell.

The Limbus of Hell and Abraham's Bosom therefore, before Christ's Advent, were one *per accidens*, but not *per se*. Nothing therefore prevents there being, after the advent of Christ, an Abraham's Bosom, and that it should be altogether distinct from Limbus, seeing those things which are one *per accidens* may be separated.

In short, in respect of good, the estate of the saints before Christ was called Abraham's Bosom—in respect of defect it was called Hell.

CCCCL. Since the advent of Christ the rest of the saints is complete, since they see God. Such rest may be called Abraham's Bosom. And so the Church prays that Holy Angels may carry the soul of the defunct to the Bosom of Abraham. In no way can it be called Hell (*infernus*.)

CCCCLI. A twofold distinction has to be made as to the receptacles of souls after death : 1. As to site. 2. As to quality of place, that is, inasmuch as in certain places souls receive rewards, and in certain others—punishments. If, therefore, we consider the Limbus of the Fathers and Hell as to quality of place, there is no doubt that there is a distinction between them : for 1, in Hell there is sensible pain, which there was not in the Limbus of the Fathers ; and 2, in

Hell there is eternal pain, while in the Limbus of the Fathers the saints were detained temporarily only. But if we consider them as to site, it is probable that the place is the same, or as if Limbus and Hell were continuous, in such wise, however, that the higher part of Hell may be called the Limbus of the Fathers; for those who are in Hell suffer punishment diverse according to the diversity of their guilt. Therefore the more grievous the sins whereby the damned have been ensnared, the darker and the deeper place do they obtain in Hell. Similarly also the Holy Fathers had the highest and the lightest place.

CCCCLII. It is because Hell and Limbus are the same as to site that Christ is said to have descended into Hell, and to have harried Hell when by His descent He delivered the Fathers from Limbus.

In Hell is no redemption; but the Holy Fathers were redeemed from Limbus; therefore Limbus is not the same as Hell.

CCCCLIII. The Limbus of the Fathers and the Limbus of Children differ without doubt, according to the quality of reward and punishment. For children have not that hope of a blessed life which was ever present with the Fathers in Limbus, in whom also shone the light of faith and grace. But as to site, it is probably believed that the place of both was the same, save that

the Rest of the Blessed was in a higher place than the Limbus of the Children, in like manner as has been already indicated with regard to Limbus and Hell.

CCCCLIV. As to actual sin there is due temporal punishment in purgatory, and eternal punishment in hell; so also to original sin there was due temporal punishment in the Limbus of the Fathers, and eternal punishment in the Limbus of the Children. If, therefore, Hell and Purgatory are not identical, it would appear that the Limbus of the Children and the Limbus of the Fathers are not identical either.

CCCCLV. The relation of the Fathers and the relation of the Children to original sin was not the same. For, in the Fathers the original guilt had been expiated, inasmuch as it was infective of the person, although it remained an impediment *ex parte* of the nature, for which full satisfaction had not yet been made. But in the children there was an impediment both *ex parte* of the person and *ex parte* of the nature. And therefore to the Children and to the Fathers there were assigned different receptacles.

CCCCLVI. The receptacles of souls are distinguished according to the diverse states of souls. The soul joined to the mortal body is in a state to merit. The soul divested of the body is in a state to receive for its merits either good or evil.

After death, therefore, it is either in a state to receive its final reward, or it is in a state which hinders it from so doing. If the soul is in a state to receive its final retribution, it may be so in two ways. Either, as to good; and so there is Paradise. Or, as to evil; and so, by reason of actual guilt, there is Hell; and by reason of original sin, there is the Limbus of the Children. But if the soul is in a state which hinders it from receiving its final retribution, it is either from defect of person, and so there is Purgatory, in which souls are detained, and prevented from immediately entering on their reward, by reason of the sins which they have committed; or it is from defect of nature, and so there is the Limbus of the Fathers, in which the Fathers were detained from entering on their glory by reason of the *reatus* of human nature, which could not yet be expiated.

CCCCLVII. There are then five receptacles of disembodied souls—

1. Paradise, for Saints since Christ.
2. The Limbus of the Fathers, for Saints before Christ.
3. Purgatory, for those who have not yet fully satisfied.
4. Hell, for the damned.
5. The Limbus of the Children, dead in original sin.

CCCCLVIII. "Good," as S. Dionysius says, "happens in one way, but evil multifariously:" and so it is not unfitting that there should be one place for Blessed Retribution, and several places for punishment.

CCCCLIX. One may be punished for original sin in two ways, either by reason of person, or by reason of nature only. And, therefore, there is a double limbus.

CCCCLX. There is a celestial paradise, and there is an earthly paradise, to which some, as Enoch and Elias, have, after the estate of this life, been translated; but the earthly paradise pertains rather to the estate of the wayfarer than to the estate of him who receives for his merits, and so it is not reckoned among the five receptacles of souls.

CCCCLXI. Admitting the position to be possible, that one dies in original sin along with venial sin only, in which of the five receptacles of souls would his soul find place? 1. Not in paradise, as lacking grace. 2. Not in the limbus of the Fathers, for the same reason. 3. Similarly, not in the limbus of the children, for in it there is no sensible pain, and that is due to venial sin. 4. Nor in purgatory, for in it there is only temporal pain, while to such an one is due perpetual pain. 5. Nor in the hell of the damned, for he lacks actual mortal sin.

Admitting, we say, the position to be possible, which it is not, such an one would be punished: 1, In hell, and 2, eternally. For that venial sin is punished temporally, and in purgatory, happens because, being alone, it co-exists with grace. Did it co-exist with mortal sin, it would exist apart from grace, and so be punished eternally, and in hell. Since, then, he who dies in original sin along with venial sin has venial sin without grace, it is not unmeet that he be punished eternally.

CCCCLXII. As some dying in grace have certain venial sins for which they must be punished, so also some who die in mortal sin have certain good works for which they must be rewarded. And even in hell they may receive the reward of their good works in the past, inasmuch as these procure for them a mitigation of that punishment which is due to their past mortal sins.

CCCCLXIII. The sensitive powers (*potentiæ*), and other like powers which depend on the body, do not remain in the soul which is separated from the body—*simpliciter*, but according to origin only: in that way, to wit, in which conclusions exist in their premises.

CCCCLXIV. S. Augustine says that man consists of two substances only, soul and body, the soul with its reason, the body with its senses.

The sensitive powers therefore belong to the body. And so, when the body is corrupted, the sensitive powers no longer remain in the soul.

CCCCLXV. That which is common to soul and body cannot remain in the separated soul. But all the operations of the sensitive powers are common to soul and body, as appears from this, that no sensitive power can proceed to action save by means of a bodily organ. The separated soul therefore lacks the acts of the sensitive powers.

CCCCLXVI. Demons and separated souls are alike spiritual and incorporeal. But demons can suffer by means of corporeal or material fire, for the fire whereby they now suffer is the same as that into which the bodies of the damned will be cast, and that must be material. And so separated souls can suffer by means of material fire.

CCCCLXVII. Our acts avail for two things. 1. To attain to a certain state: as, for instance, by a meritorious work a man attains to the estate of beatitude. 2. To acquire something which is a consequence of a state: as, when by an act of his own, a man merits accidental reward, or remission of punishment. In order to both our own acts may avail; and in order to each in two ways: 1. In one way, by way of merit. 2. In another way, by way of prayer. There is this difference between these two ways,

that merit depends on justice, prayer on mercy. He who prays impetrates that which he seeks of the sole liberality of him to whom he prays. The work of one man, therefore, can in no way avail for another, in order that that other may attain to any state, by way of merit. For instance, by means of those things which I do, another cannot merit eternal life, for the lot of glory is given according to the measure of the receiver. One is disposed by one's own act, and not by another's: disposed, that is, made worthy of reward. 2. But by way of prayer, and that even in order to attain to a state, the work of one can avail for another, while he is in the way; for instance, one man can impetrate for another first grace. Since, therefore, the impetration of prayer is according to the liberality of God, Who is prayed to, the impetration of prayer can extend itself to all those things which, in their order, fall within the Divine power. But as to anything which is not a state, but a consequence or accessory of a state, the work of one can avail for another, not only by way of prayer, but even by way of merit. This may occur in two ways. Either by communication in the root of the work, which root, in meritorious works, is charity. All, therefore, who are connected with each other by charity, derive emolument from their mutual works, but each according to the

measure of his state; even as, in Fatherland, each will rejoice at the good of the other. Hence it is that the Communion of Saints is made an article of the Faith. 2. In another way, of the intention of the doer, who does certain works with the special intention of profiting others. Hence these works are in a manner effectual for those for whom they are done, as if conferred on them by their doer. And so they may avail for the fulfilment of satisfaction, or of aught similar which does not change the state.

CCCCLXVIII. All the faithful, united by charity, are members of the One Body of the Church. But one member is aided by another. And so one man may be aided by the merits of another.

CCCCLXIX. Although one may impetrate for another that that other come to life eternal, yet this can never take place but by means of his own works, for eternal life is not given to anyone save in reward of his own works. By the prayers of one grace is given to another, by which grace that other merits life eternal.

CCCCLXX. It pertains to the justice of God to give to everyone in accordance with his merits, as it is written in the Book of Psalms. "Thou, Lord, rewardest every man according to his work." But the work which is done for anyone is effectual for him for whom it is done. And, similarly, the work which is his who is one with

me is, in a manner, also mine. Hence it is not contrary to the Divine justice if one receive fruit of works done by him who is one with himself in charity, or from works done for himself. This occurs even in accordance with human justice, that the satisfaction of one be taken for another.

To give a good thing to anyone which is not due to him, is not contrary to justice. It is outside the province of justice, and belongs to liberality. And no one is hurt by the good of another, unless something be taken away from himself in order to supply that good.

CCCCLXXI. Charity, which is the bond uniting the members of the Church, extends itself not only to the living, but also to the dead, who die in charity. For charity is the life of the soul, as the soul is the life of the body; and charity, as S. Paul says to the Corinthians, "never faileth." Charity, moreover, never forgets. Similarly, also, the dead live in the memories of living men. The intention of the living, therefore, can be directed towards them: and so the suffrages of the living avail the dead in two ways, as they do also the living. They avail, 1, by reason of the union of charity, and, 2, by reason of intention directed towards them. The suffrages of the living do not avail the dead in such wise as to change their state from misery to felicity, or *e converso*. But they do

avail to the diminution of punishment, or aught similar which does not change the state of the dead.

CCCCLXXII. It is written in the Second Book of the Maccabees, "It is a holy and a healthful thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from their sins." S. Augustine says that, "In the prayers of the priest, which are offered to the Lord God at His Altar, a commendation of the dead has also place, and that this custom began with the Apostles themselves."

S. John Damascene says that "The disciples of the Saviour and the Holy Apostles sanctioned that in the tremendous and life-giving mysteries a memorial should be made of those who have fallen asleep in the faith." Dionysius mentions the practice of the primitive Church to pray for the dead; and asserts that the suffrages of the living profit the dead.

CCCCLXXIII. In suffrages made by evil men, two things have to be considered: 1. The *opus operatum*, as in the case of the Sacrifice of the Altar. Since Sacraments have efficacy of themselves, apart from the *opus operantis*, they avail equally by whomsoever celebrated. In this light therefore, suffrages made by evil men profit the dead. 2. The *opus operantis*. And here we must make a distinction.—i. The work of the sinner

making the suffrages may be considered in one way as it is his own; and so in no way can it be meritorious, either in his own behalf or on another's.—ii. As it is the work of another; which it may be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as the sinner who makes the suffrages is doing so in the person of the whole Church, as the priest does when in Church he celebrates the exequies of the dead. The suffrages of such a priest, albeit he is a sinner, do profit the dead. Secondly, when he acts as the instrument of another, for the work of the instrument is more that of the principal agent than his own. Hence, although he who acts as the instrument of another is not in a state to merit; yet his action may be meritorious by reason of the principal agent. For instance, if a servant, being in sin, do a work of mercy at the bidding of his lord, he being in charity. Hence, if a man die in charity, and ordain suffrages to be made for himself; or if another man who is in charity ordain suffrages to be made for the dead man, these suffrages will avail the dead man's soul, even although those by whom they are made be in sin. But the suffrages would avail more were those who made them in charity, for then the works would be meritorious for two several reasons.

CCCCLXXIV. No one can know about another for certain, whether he is in a state of guilt or a

state of grace. If, therefore, those suffrages alone profited which are made by men in grace, one could not know by whose suffrages one would profit one's departed friends : and so many men would be kept from procuring suffrages for them at all.

CCCCLXXV. The dead are aided by suffrages, inasmuch as, while they were alive, they merited to be aided after their death.

CCCCLXXVI. The work of suffrage for others may be considered in two ways : 1. As it is expiative of punishment by way of recompensation, as in satisfaction. In this way the work of suffrage looses him for whom it is done from his debt of punishment. But it does not loose him who does it from punishment due to himself : for this would be contrary to the equality of justice. 2. As it is meritorious of eternal life, which it is, inasmuch as it springs from the root of charity. In this way it profits not only him for whom it is done, but still more him who does it : as it is written in the Book of Psalms, "My prayer shall return into mine own bosom."

CCCCLXXVII. S. John Damascene says, "As he who anoints the sick, himself first shares the anointing with the holy oil, so he who wrestles for the salvation of his neighbour, first profits also himself."

CCCCLXXVIII. Opinions as to the damned

are threefold: 1. Some have made a double distinction.—i. as to time. They say that, after the day of judgment, no one then in hell will be aided by suffrages, but that before the day of judgment some are aided by the suffrages of the Church. ii. As to the quality of the persons detained in hell. They said some were very evil (*valde mali*), such, namely, as had died without faith, and apart from the sacraments. These belonged to the Church neither by merit nor numerically, and so the suffrages of the Church could in no way profit them. Others there were, they said, who were not *very evil*; such, namely, as had been numerically of the Church, and had faith, and had been steeped in sacraments, and had done works generically good. Such, they said, the suffrages of the Church ought to profit. But here they found themselves in a difficulty, for it seemed to follow from the foregoing that, since the punishment of hell is finite by intension, although it is infinite in duration, by multiplying suffrages, that punishment would be wholly taken away, which was the error of Origen. This inconvenience they tried to evade in manifold ways. One said that suffrages could only be multiplied for the damned that they might be wholly freed from [punishment, not *simpliciter*, as Origen puts it, but for a time, to wit, till the day of judgment: for

that then the souls, wedded evermore to their bodies, would be thrust back into the pains of hell without hope of pardon. But this opinion appears to be repugnant to Divine Providence, which leaves nought inordinate. Guilt cannot be ordained, save by punishment; and so pain cannot be taken away unless first the guilt be expiated. Since, therefore, guilt remains continually in the damned, in no way can their punishment be interrupted. The Porretanians invented another mode of evading the difficulty. They compared the division of pains by means of suffrages to the division of lines. Lines are finite, but may be divided *ad infinitum*, and yet are never consumed by the division, since the subtraction is not according to the same quantity, but according to the same proportion. But this mode is in many ways defective: 1. Because infinite division, which is congruous to continuous quantity, cannot apparently be transferred to spiritual quantity. 2. Because there is no reason why the second suffrage should diminish pain less than the first, both being of equal value. 3. Pain cannot be diminished unless guilt be also, and in proportion, diminished, just as it cannot be taken away without guilt being taken away as well. 4. Because, in the division of a line, it comes at length not to be sensible; for a sensible body is not divisible

ad infinitum: and so it would follow that, after many suffrages, the remaining pain would not be sensible by reason of its smallness, and so it would not be pain. Others, consequently, have invented yet another mode. Altissiodorensis said that suffrages profit the damned, not by diminution of pain, or by interruption of pain, but by the comforting of the sufferer. As if a man were bearing a grievous burden, and one refreshed his face with water, he would be comforted and strengthened in order to bear it the better, and yet the burden would in no way be made the lighter. But this, again, cannot be, for every one suffers less or more from the eternal fire according to the merit of his guilt; and the pain cannot be lessened while the guilt remains unchanged. But, moreover, the opinion is presumptuous, as contrary to the sayings of the saints, and vain, supported by no authority, and irrational, because the damned in hell are beyond the bond of charity, by means of which the works of the living are connected with the dead. Suffrages, then, do not profit the damned; neither for them does the Church intend to pray.

CCCCLXXIX. It says in the Second Book of the Maccabees, that when Judas and his company came to take up and bury with their kinsmen in their fathers' graves the bodies of the

slain, they found under the coats of every one that was slain things consecrated to the idols of the Jamnites, which is forbidden the Jews by the law. Then every man saw that this was the cause wherefore they were slain. It would appear at first sight that these all died in mortal sin, and, if so, were all in hell. And yet Judas and his company betook themselves unto prayer, and besought the Lord, the Righteous Judge, that the sin committed might wholly be put out of remembrance. And Judas, when he had made a gathering throughout the company to the sum of ten thousand drachms of silver, sent it to Jerusalem to offer a sin-offering, doing therein very well and honestly, in that he was mindful of the resurrection, for if he had not hoped that they that were slain should have risen again, it had been superfluous and vain to pray for the dead. Did Judas, then, pray and cause an offering to be made for persons dead in mortal sin, and so alive in hell? In no way. For, 1. Possession of offerings to idols did not imply that the slain men had revered the idols, and so committed the mortal sin of idolatry, but only that they had taken as conquerors what was theirs by right of war, and were chargeable at most with a venial act of avarice. Hence their souls were not in the hell of the damned, and so might be profited by the suffrages of the living.

2. Even supposing them to have committed mortal sin, they might have repented when they saw themselves in peril of death, as it is written in the Book of Psalms, "When He slew them, they sought Him."

CCCCLXXX. The dead need prayer to be made for them more than do the living, for the dead cannot help themselves as the living can: but the condition of the living is better than that of the dead, for the living can be transferred from a state of mortal guilt to a state of grace, and this the dead cannot be.

CCCCLXXXI. Demons are said to rejoice when they draw men into sin, and yet their pain is in no way lessened thereby; just as the joy of the angels is in no way lessened when they grieve, as they are said to do, over our wickednesses.

CCCCLXXXII. The pain of purgatory is in supplement of satisfaction which was not fully consummated in the body. As has been shewn, the works of one may profit another by way of satisfaction. And so suffrages made by the living avail the souls in purgatory.

CCCCLXXXIII. The purgation of the soul by the pains of purgatory is none other than the expiation of the *reatus* which hinders the soul from the reception of glory. But by the pain which one bears for another, the *reatus* of that

other may be expiated. And so, by the satisfaction of one, another may be purged.

CCCCXXXIV. A dying man directs suffrages to be made for his soul when in purgatory. By the neglect of those whom he entrusts with them, he may be defrauded of their efficacy *ex opere operato*; but not of their efficacy *ex opere operantis*, for to that he attains as principal agent, even before the suffrages are made, when he directs them to be made.

CCCCLXXXV. Unbaptized children are detained in Limbus as lacking grace. But the state of the dead cannot be changed by the suffrages of the living as to the merit of essential reward or punishment. And so the suffrages of the living do not profit the souls of the unbaptized children in Limbus.

As S. Augustine says, "Suffrages do not profit those who go hence without the faith that worketh by love."

CCCCLXXXVI. The very idea of suffrage imports the necessity of aid, which does not appertain to those who suffer no defect. He is to be aided, who lacks. But the saints in Fatherland lack nothing, for they are inebriated with the Divine glory. And so they need not, nor are they aided by, the suffrages of the Church.

As S. Augustine says, "It is an injury to pray for a martyr in the Church, to whose

prayers we ought instead to commend ourselves."

CCCCLXXXVII. S. Augustine fittingly assigns three works as the principal subsidies or aids by the living of the dead : to wit, 1. The Sacrifice of the Eucharist ; 2. Almsgiving ; 3. Prayer. The first two by reason of that charity which binds together the living and the dead : and the third by reason of its direction of the intention. 1. The Eucharist in a most special manner belongs to charity, as the Sacrament of ecclesiastical unity, containing Him in Whom the whole Church is united together and consolidated, namely Christ. The Eucharist is, as it were, the origin and bond of charity. 2. A principal effect of charity is the work of almsgiving. 3. Prayer, from the very idea of it, specially directs the intention towards its subject. These three works are the chief aids of the dead ; but every good work done from charity profits them.

CCCCLXXXVIII. In order that an indulgence profit any one, there is required a meet cause for which the indulgence is given. Now such a cause cannot be *ex parte* of the dead, for the dead cannot do anything to the utility of the Church, and for this cause indulgences are chiefly granted. So *simpliciter*, directly and principally, indulgences do not profit the dead. But

secondarily and indirectly they may, if the terms of the indulgence permit the transference of its effect to third parties.

CCCCLXXXIX. Sepulture was ordained for the sake both of the living and of the dead. For the living, lest their eyes should be offended by the foulness of corpses, and their bodies infected by the effluvia of them. It also spiritually profits the living, by increasing and guarding their faith in the resurrection. It profits the dead in this way, that beholding sepulchres men retain a memory of the dead and pray for them. Hence their name of monument—from memory: or, as S. Augustine says, “as *monens mentem*.” There was a pagan error that sepulture profited the dead by the soul’s thereby receiving rest. They did not believe that the soul could have rest before the body had burial; which was altogether ridiculous and absurd. Sepulture in a consecrated place profits the dead *ex opere operantis* rather than *ex opere operato*, that is to say, when either the dead man, or some one for him, has ordered his body to be buried in holy ground, and so commended himself to the patronage of some saint, by whose prayers he will be aided, and to the prayers of those who care for the holy place and pray frequently and specially for those whose bodies are buried therein. Sepulchral

ornaments profit the living as a solace. They profit also the dead, not *per se*, but *per accidens*, inasmuch as by means of them they are excited to compassion, and in consequence, to prayer. Moreover by sumptuous sepulture the poor derive advantage, and the Church is decorated; and so sepulture is reckoned amongst alms-deeds.

CCCCXC. Suffrages made for one dead person profit other dead persons also, by reason of charity, by which all good works become the common property of all good persons. 2. By reason of intention, they profit him most for whom they are specially made. 3. And him only, if regard is had simply to the remission of punishment.

CCCCXCI. As satisfactions transferred to the dead by the intention of him who makes them, suffrages profit the individual more when they are made specially for him than when they are made for him in common with others.

CCCCXCII. As regards more speedy freedom from punishment, special suffrages are of more avail than general suffrages. But as regards final deliverance from punishment they avail equally.

CCCCXCIII. The Divine Essence is a medium sufficient in order to the knowledge of all things. But it does not follow that whosoever beholds the Divine Essence has knowledge

of all things. Those only have knowledge of *all* things who *comprehend* that Essence, that is, who can embrace it in Its entirety, by whose souls It can be, as it were, shut in. In the same way, it does not follow that, because one knows a principle, one is to know all its consequences or results. Those only can have knowledge of *all* these who *comprehend* the principle in its entirety.

So again, all the angels behold the Divine Essence, but as to certain matters some of the inferior angels are instructed by some of the superior. Now since the beatified souls of the saints *do not comprehend* the Divine Essence, they clearly do not know *all* things. But every individual saint knows as much as the perfection of his beatitude requires. Perfection of beatitude requires that one have whatever he wills, and that he will nothing inordinately. But this every one wills with a right will, that he have knowledge of those things which pertain to himself. And as no rectitude is lacking to the blessed saints; so they will to have knowledge of those things which pertain to themselves: and among other things, seeing it pertains to their glory that they assist in the salvation of those who need their aid—than which nothing is more divine, for thereby they are made fellow-workers with God—they have

knowledge of all that is required in order to this. It is manifest, therefore, that they have knowledge *in Verbo* of the vows, devotions, and prayers of men who flee to them for succour.

CCCCXCIV. The blessed saints grieve not in their knowledge of the ill-fortunes of those whom in this life they loved, for they are so replete with the joys of their beatitude that sorrow finds in them no place.

CCCCXCV. The order of the Divine Law requires that the ultimate be brought back to God by means of the mediate. The saints in Fatherland, *in Patriâ*, are the mediate: we, while yet in the way, *in viâ*, are the ultimate, and so by the mediation of the saints do we return to our God, our First Beginning and our Last End.

CCCCXCVI. As it is not from defect of Divine Power that God acts through second causes as mediating agents, but in order to the greater diffusion of His goodness—for so things receive not only their own proper and special goodnesses, but over and above exist as causes of goodness to others—so also it is not from defect of mercy that God's clemency is obtained through the prayers of saints.

CCCCXCVII. Although the greater saints are more acceptable to God than the less, it is yet useful sometimes to pray to the minor saints,

and that for five reasons: 1. One sometimes has greater devotion to a minor saint, and on devotion the efficacy of prayer much depends. 2. For the avoidance of distaste or satiety, which assiduity in one thing is apt to beget. By varying our devotions we excite fervour. 3. Because to certain saints is given the chief patronage in special cases. 4. In order that we pay to all the honours due to each. 5. Because that is sometimes given to the prayers of many which is withheld from the prayers of one.

CCCCXCVIII. Prayer is an act. Acts suppose particular agents. And so, if we say, *O Christ, pray for us*, without any addition, we appear to agree with the error, either of, 1, Nestorius, who supposed there was in Christ a Person of the Son of Man distinct from the Person of the Son of God; or, 2, Arius, who made the Person of the Son inferior to the Father. To avoid and give no countenance to these errors, the Church does not say *O Christ, pray for us*; she says, *O Christ, hear us*, and, *O Christ, have mercy on us*.

CCCCXCXIX. The saints pray for us in two ways: 1. By express oration, when by their prayers they assail for us the ears of the Divine Clemency. In this way they are always heard, since they will not save what God wills; and they only ask what they will to be done.

What God wills is always fulfilled, unless we speak of His antecedent will, according to which, for instance, He wills all men to be saved. Since this will of God is not accomplished, we need not wonder that what the saints will by this will is sometimes not fulfilled. 2. By interpretative orations, *i. e.* their merits exist in the presence and in the sight of God, not only to their own glory, but as efficaciously impetrative for us; even as Christ's Blood shed for us on earth, and existing now in God's sight in Heaven, is said there to plead our pardon.

D. The prayer of the martyrs whom S. John in the Revelation saw under the altar—the souls of those that were slain for the Word of God, and for the testimony which they held, and whom he heard crying with a loud voice and saying, “How long, O Lord, Holy and True, dost Thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth?”—implies their desire to put on once more the garment of the flesh, their longing for the society of all the elect saints, and their consent to the punishment of the wicked by the Divine Justice.

DI. There is no contest of contending prayers before God. The saints refer the diverse merits of both parties who severally implore their aid to the Divine examination, and await the Divine sentence. So S. Gregory interprets of the

prayers of the guardian angels of kingdoms whose interests are diverse.

DII. Although the saints in Fatherland may no longer merit for themselves, yet they may for others. Or rather, from their preceding merits they have the power of helping others, inasmuch as while living they merited that their prayers should be heard.

DIII. It was the error of Vigilantius that although while we live we may pray for each other, yet that when we are dead the prayers of no one of us for the other will be heard. But this is altogether false, for seeing prayer made for others cometh of charity, and inasmuch as the saints in Fatherland are more perfect in charity, so do they the rather pray for us who are yet in the way; and this they do the more efficaciously the more closely they are united to God. "If," says S. Jerome, "the Apostles and Martyrs, while in the body, when they ought to be solicitous for themselves, pray for us, how much more after they have obtained their crowns, their victories, and their triumphs."

DIV. Souls in purgatory, although superior to us by reason of their impeccability, are inferior to us by reason of the pains which they suffer; and so are to be prayed for rather than invoked.

DV. Christ, when He comes to Judgment, will appear in a glorious form, by reason of that

authority which is due to a judge. Now it belongs to the dignity of judiciary power to have certain signs which induce men to reverence and subjection. And so, many signs will precede the advent of Christ as a Judge, in order that men's hearts may be brought into subjection, and that they, being premonished by these signs, may be prepared for their judgment.

DVI. But what these signs are, cannot easily be known, for, as S. Augustine says, "the signs of which we read in the Gospels refer not only to Christ's coming to judgment, but also to the time of the destruction of Jerusalem, and moreover to the advent whereby Christ continually visits His Church.

DVII. S. Jerome lays down fifteen signs as preceding the Judgment. He says: 1. That all the seas will be exalted fifteen cubits above the mountains. 2. That all the plains will be cast into the deep, so that they can hardly be seen. 3. They will be brought back to their old state. 4. The monsters, and all that move in the waters, will be gathered together, and will lift up their heads above the sea, menacing and bellowing at each other. 5. All flying creatures of the heavens will be gathered together on the plains, and will bewail greatly, tasting nothing, neither drinking anything. 6. Floods of flame will rise against the firmament,

and corruscate from the setting of the sun, even to the rising of the same. 7. All the stars will wander from their courses, and the fixed stars will cast forth fiery tails like comets. 8. There will be a great earthquake, and every living thing will be thrown to the ground. 9. All the plants will distil a bloody dew. 10. All stones, great and small, will be divided into four parts, each dashing against the other. 11. All mountains, hills and houses, will be reduced to dust. 12. All the animals will come to the plains from the mountains and from the woods, roaring, and tasting nothing. 13. All the sepulchres, from the rising of the sun to the going down of the same, will open, that the corpses therein may rise. 14. Men will one and all issue from their dwellings, understanding nothing, but running to and fro. 15. They all will die and rise again, with those who had died long before.

DVIII. In His first advent, Christ came hidden, although the time of His coming, determined beforehand, was known to the prophets; and so it needed not that such signs should appear in His first advent as will appear in His second advent, in which He will come manifestly, although the time of His coming, determined beforehand, is hidden.

DIX. If we speak of the sun and the moon, as to the very moment of the advent of Christ,

it is not to be believed that they will be obscured by privation of their light, for the whole world will be renewed at the coming of Christ, and at the rising of the saints. But if we speak of them as to the time just before the Judgment, then we may say that the sun, the moon, and the other luminaries of heaven will be obscured by 'privation of their light, either at diverse times or all together, in virtue of the Divine power, and in order to the terror of men.

DX. According to astrologers, the sun and the moon cannot suffer eclipse together; but the obscuration of the sun and moon is said to be together when the Lord comes to Judgment; and so such obscuration will not be by way of natural eclipse.

DXI. S. Matthew records that Jesus foretold that the virtues of the heavens should be shaken. Virtues among the angels may mean one of two things. The name of virtues is sometimes appropriated to one order; that order, namely, which, according to Dionysius, is the middle one of the central hierarchy; or which, according to S. Gregory, is the highest of the lowest hierarchy. In another way, it is taken commonly for all celestial spirits. In either way, it may apply to the words of the prophecy. For all the angels will then be moved, marvelling at the newness of the world. But especially will

the angelic order of Virtues, whose proper office it is to move the heavenly bodies which are the causes of those things which are enacted in inferior nature, be shaken. They will then be said to be shaken, as ceasing to produce their effects, that is, as no longer moving the celestial bodies; just as those angels to whom is committed the custody of men, will no longer exercise that office.

DXII. The world was in a manner made for man. Hence, as man will be glorified as to his body, the estate of the material world will be changed for the better, that so it may be a fitter place for him to live in, and a fairer for him to look on. But in order that man may attain to glory of body, there must first be removed whatever is opposed to it. Two things are opposed to it. 1. Corruption. 2. The infection of guilt. 1. Corruption; for, as S. Paul says to the Corinthians, "Corruption doth not inherit incorruption." 2. The infection of guilt; for, as it is written in the Apocalypse, "There shall in no wise enter into the City of Glory anything that defileth." Similarly also, the elements of the world must be purged from contrary dispositions, before they can be brought to the newness of glory. Now, although things corporeal cannot properly be the subjects of the infection of guilt; yet by reason of guilt, there

arises in things corporeal a certain incongruity which prevents their dedication to spiritual purposes. Hence we see, that places in which certain crimes have been committed are not reckoned fit for the exercise in them of sacred functions, without previous purification. Such purification, then, the world stands in need of. Similarly also, the elements must be purged from all corruptions, generations and alterations which derogate from their purity.

DXIII. The foresaid purgation of the world will remove from it the infection left by guilt and the impurity of commixtion, and it will be a disposition in order to the perfection of glory; and therefore as regards these three things, it will be most meetly made by fire. 1. Because, since fire is the most noble of the elements, it has natural properties similar to the properties of glory, as is chiefly apparent with regard to light. 2. Because fire does not receive commixtion of the extraneous, by reason of the efficacy of its active virtue, in like manner as do the other elements. 3. Because the sphere of fire is remote from our habitation, neither is the use of fire so common to us as that of earth, water, or air. Hence it is not so infected as these are, and therefore has the greater efficacy to purify and to divide by subtilizing. And so it is written in the Book of Psalms, "Our God

shall come, and shall not keep silence. There shall go before Him *a consuming fire*; and a mighty tempest shall be stirred up round about Him. He shall call the heaven from above, and the earth, that He may judge His people." And again, in the Second Epistle General of S. Peter, "In the day of the Lord, the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that are therein shall be burned up."

DXIV. The first purgation of the world, which was made by the Deluge, had regard only to the infection of sin, for then there existed chiefly the sin of concupiscence. Meetly, therefore, was purgation effected by its contrary, namely, by water. But the world's second purgation has regard both to the infection of guilt and the impurity of commixtion; and in regard of each, it is more meet that it be made by fire than by water, for water has not the power of disgregating, separating and dividing, but rather that of congregating, collecting, or assembling. Hence, by water, the natural impurity of the elements cannot be taken away as by fire.

Similarly also, towards the end of the world there will reign the vice of tepidity, as if the world were then in its dotage. As Jesus said, "The love of many shall wax cold." It is therefore very

meet that the purgation be made by means of fire.

Moreover, there is nothing which cannot be purged by fire : and there are some things which cannot be purged save by fire.

DXV. S. Peter compares the Deluge and the Doom. As in the first purgation of the world by water, the water was of the same species with our ordinary elemental water ; so in the second purgation of the world by fire, the fire will be of the same species with our ordinary elemental fire.

DXVI. In the last conflagration there will be a congregation of all the causes, high and low, which, of their own nature, have the power of igniting. This congregation will be made by Divine power, and not according to the natural course of things.

DXVII. The higher heavens, since there may be removed nothing of their substance, will be purged neither by fire nor by the action of any other creature ; but rest and cessation of motion, caused by the Divine will alone, will be to them in place of purgation.

DXVIII. The words of the Psalm, "The heavens are the works of Thy Hands. They shall perish, but Thou shalt endure. They all shall wax old as doth a garment ; as a vesture shalt Thou change them, and they shall be

changed"—refer, as S. Augustine says, "to the aerial heavens, which will be purged by the fires of the last conflagration." If they are understood of the higher heavens, they are then said to perish as to that motion by which they are now continually moved.

DXIX. And so also are to be understood the words of S. Peter, "In the day of the Lord the heavens shall pass away with a great noise the heavens being on fire, shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat." As he was speaking formerly of the earth and the aerial heavens perishing by water, so does he now speak of both as reserved unto fire against the day of Judgment.

The fire will occupy the same space of the air in the last purification, as the water did in the first. The water did not rise to the highest heavens, but only fifteen cubits above the highest hills; and so the fire will not rise to the highest heavens, but only fifteen cubits above the highest hills.

DXX. The four elements in the purgation of the world by fire will remain as to their substance and own proper qualities, as they did in its purgation by water; but they will be purified from all the soils and infections which they have contracted from the sins of men.

DXXI. The resurrection will precede the

Judgment, otherwise every eye would not see Christ the Judge. As regards the purification of the world, the conflagration will precede the Judgment. But as regards the fire enveloping the wicked, the Judgment will precede the conflagration.

DXXII. The fire of the final conflagration, in so far as it precedes the Judgment, acts both, 1, as the instrument of the Divine Justice ; and 2, by the natural virtue of fire. According to its natural virtue, it acts alike on the evil and on the good, who are then found alive, and the bodies of both alike are resolved into dust. But as the instrument of the Divine Justice, it acts diversely on diverse persons, so far as regards the sense of pain. The wicked will be tortured by the action of the fire. The good, in whom will be found nothing to be purged, will be altogether free from pain by fire, in like manner as were the three children in the burning fiery furnace. It will be by an exercise of Divine Power that their bodies will suffer resolution into ashes without the torture of pain : for their bodies will not be preserved entire, as were the bodies of the three children.

The good in whom is found somewhat to be purged away, will feel the torture of pain from that fire, more or less according to the diversity of their merits.

But as to the action of the fire *after* the Judgment, it will have power only on the damned, the bodies of the good being then impassible.

DXXIII. By the fire of the last conflagration, whatever is base and foul will be separated from whatsoever is fair and noble. The one will be turned into hell. The other will be treasured in Heaven. As it is written, "His fan is in His hand, and He will thoroughly purge His floor. He will gather the wheat," that is, the elect, "into His barn: and the chaff," that is, the reprobate, "He will burn with fire unquenchable."

DXXIV. As the glory of the elect after the Judgment will be greater than before, so will also the pains of the damned. As brightness will be added to the superior creature, in order to the increase of the glory of the elect, so also whatsoever is base among creatures will be cast into hell for the increase of the misery of the reprobate.

DXXV. In accordance with the diverse opinions which have at various times prevailed with regard to the last end of man, have been the diverse opinions of those who affirmed or who denied the resurrection. For the last end of man, which all men naturally long for, is beatitude; and to this some have said that man may

attain in this life. Hence these were not obliged to suppose another life after the present, in which man should attain to his ultimate perfection; and so they denied the resurrection. But this opinion is sufficiently negatived by the variety of fortune, the infirmity of the human body, and the imperfection and instability of knowledge and virtue, all which are impediments to the perfection of beatitude.

Others, therefore, have said that there is a life after the present in which man lives after death, but only as to his soul. And they said that this life was sufficient to satisfy the natural longing for the attainment of beatitude. These, therefore, held no resurrection. Of this opinion there were divers false foundations. Some heretics held that all things corporeal came from the evil principle, and all things spiritual from the good principle. It followed that the soul could not attain the summit of its perfection save as separate from the body, which draws it away from its principle, participation of which constitutes its beatitude. All sects of heretics, therefore, who hold that things corporeal were created or formed by the devil, deny the resurrection of the body.

But some said that the whole nature of man consists in the soul, in such wise that the soul uses the body as an instrument, or as a sailor

does a ship. According to this opinion, it follows, that were the soul alone beatified, man's natural longing for beatitude would not be disappointed. And so there was no need for them to suppose a resurrection of the body. But this foundation the Philosopher, in his treatise "Of the Soul," demolishes, where he shews that the soul is united to the body as is form to matter. It is patent, therefore, that, if in this life man cannot be happy, there must be a resurrection in which the soul will be united with its body as is form with matter, and that for ever.

And so Job says, "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and I shall arise from the earth on the latter day, and I shall be once more encompassed with my skin, and in my flesh I shall see my God."

DXXVI. The gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam. But death was introduced by sin, for, if there had been no sin, there would have been no death. And so, by the gift of Christ, man will be restored from death unto life.

DXXVII. The members ought to be conformed to their head. But our head liveth, and will live for ever in body and in soul, for "Christ being risen from the dead, dieth no more." Men, therefore, who are His members, will live for ever in body and in soul. And so there must needs be a resurrection of the flesh.

DXXVIII. Whatsoever happens of *the nature* of the species must needs be found in all who are of the same species. In this category comes the resurrection. The soul, in the ultimate perfection of the human species, cannot be separate from the body. And so no soul will perpetually remain separate from the body. It is necessary, therefore, that, as one will rise, so will also all.

Resurrection is necessary in order that men may receive for their merits either punishment or reward. But either is due to all men. And so all men must needs rise.

Jesus said, “*All that are in the graves shall hear His voice.*” And S. Paul wrote to the Corinthians, “*We shall all rise again.*”

DXXIX. The relation of motion or action to nature is threefold. For, 1, there is a motion or action the nature of which is neither principle nor term, beginning nor end: and such motion is sometimes from a supernatural principle, as in the glorification of the body; and sometimes from any other principle, as in the violent motion of a stone thrown upwards which terminates in violent rest. There is also another motion of which nature is the term or end, but not the principle or beginning. This is sometimes supernatural, as, in giving sight to the blind, for sight is natural, but the principle

of its restoration is supernatural. And sometimes it is otherwise, as in the forcing of fruits or flowers by artificial process. But that nature be the principle, but not the term or end, cannot be, because natural principles have been limited to produce determinate effects, beyond which they cannot extend. Operation, therefore, or motion, related to nature in the first way we have mentioned, can in no way be called natural, but is either miraculous, if it be from a supernatural principle, or violent if it be from any other principle. Operation or motion, related to nature in the second way, is natural *simpliciter*. Operation, related to nature in the third way, cannot be called natural *simpliciter*, but relatively, inasmuch, namely, as it leads to that which is according to nature, but is called either miraculous, or artificial, or violent. For that is properly called natural which is according to nature, and that is said to be according to nature which has nature and the consequences of nature. Hence motion, simply speaking, cannot be called natural, unless its principle be nature; but the principle of the resurrection cannot be nature, although the resurrection terminates in the life of nature. For nature is the principle of motion in that in which it is, either active, as appears in the motion of things light and heavy, and in the natural alterations of animals, or pas-

sive, as appears in the generation of simple bodies. Now, the passive principle of natural generation is natural, passive power (*potentia*), which always has some active power corresponding to it in nature. Nor does it make any difference whether the active principle corresponds to the passive principle in nature in respect of ultimate perfection, to wit, form, or in respect of disposition, which is a necessity in order to ultimate form: as in the generation of man, according to the position of faith, or even of all others, according to the opinion of Plato and Avicenna. Now, there is no active principle of resurrection in nature, either in respect of the conjunction of the soul with the body, or in respect of the disposition, which is a necessity in order to such conjunction, for such disposition cannot be induced by nature, unless after a determinate mode, by way of generation from seed. And hence, although it may be said that there is a passive potentiality *ex parte* of the body, or even an inclination to conjunction with the soul, it is not such as to suffice to an idea of natural motion; and so the resurrection, simply speaking, is miraculous, and not natural, unless relatively, as has been shewn.

DXXX. As Christ, by reason of His Human Nature, is the Mediator between God and man, for by means of His Humanity divine gifts come

from God to man : therefore, as we cannot be freed from spiritual death save by the gift of grace divinely bestowed, so neither can we be freed from bodily death save by a resurrection effected by Divine Power. As Christ thus, according to His human Nature, divinely received the first-fruits of grace, and His grace is the cause of our grace, “for of His fulness have all we received, and grace for grace ;” so in Christ was the resurrection begun, and His resurrection was the cause of ours. As it became Him by His death to abolish our death, so did it become Him by His resurrection to effect our resurrection.


DXXXI. That which is first in any *genus* is the cause of those things which follow. Christ, by reason of His corporeal resurrection, is called by S. Paul, writing to the Corinthians, “The First-fruits of them that slept :” and by S. John, writing to the Seven Churches in Asia, “The First-begotten of the dead.” And so His resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of others.

DXXXII. The resurrection of Christ agrees rather with our corporeal resurrection than with our spiritual resurrection, which is our justification. But the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our justification, as it is written by S. Paul to the Romans, “He was raised

again for our justification.” And so the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our corporeal resurrection.

DXXXIII. A sufficient cause *immediately* produces its effect, that effect to which it is immediately ordained, but not the effect to which it is ordained, a mediate cause intervening, even although it be sufficient. Heat, for instance, although it be intense does not immediately and in the first instant cause heat, but it immediately begins to move towards heat; for heat is its effect, motion—a mediate cause intervening. Now the resurrection of Christ is called the cause of our resurrection, not that it immediately effects our resurrection, but by means of its principle, to wit, Divine Virtue as a mediate cause intervening, which will effect our resurrection after the similitude of the resurrection of Christ. Now, Divine Power operates, the will which is nearest to the effect mediating or intervening. Hence it needed not that, immediately the resurrection of Christ was effected, our resurrection would follow. But it will follow, and then when the will of God has ordained it.

DXXXIV. The Divine Power is not bound by second causes, and just as another way of delivering men was possible to God, so there might have been, had God so willed and



ordained it, a cause of our resurrection other than the resurrection of Christ.

DXXXV. The Humanity of Christ is nearer to Divinity, the power of Which is the first cause of resurrection, than the humanity of others. And so the resurrection of Christ was caused by the Divinity *immediately*, but the resurrection of others *mediately*, by means of the intervention of the Man, the Risen Christ.

DXXXVI. The resurrection of all men will have some likeness to the resurrection of Christ as belonging to the life of nature, according to which all men are conformed to Christ. But in the saints who in the present life were conformed to Christ by grace, there will be a conformity as to those things which are of glory.

DXXXVII. Cause and effect must be in some manner joined, as are the mover and the moved, the doer and the done. Now the Risen Christ is the universal cause of our resurrection; and so in the common resurrection of bodies, at a corporeal sign given, Christ will operate the resurrection. And this sign will be the appearance of Christ as a Judge, or rather the voice of Christ commanding the resurrection, as He commanded the sea, and stilled the tempest. This voice is sometimes spoken of as the cry of a herald citing to judgment, and sometimes as the sound of a trumpet. By a trumpet men are

gathered to the council, excited to the battle, and called to the feast. The risen will be gathered to the Council of the Judgment, will be excited to the battle in which the whole world will fight against the insensate, and will be called to the feast of the Eternal Solemnity.

DXXXVIII. As the forms of the Sacraments have power of sanctifying, not because they are heard, but because they are uttered, so that voice, whatever it be, will have instrumental efficacy to resuscitate, not because it is heard, but because it is uttered.

DXXXIX. S. Augustine, herein agreeing with S. Gregory, says that as the lower and more crass bodies are ruled by the more subtle and powerful, so all bodies are ruled by God through the rational spirit of life. Hence, in all things which are done corporeally by God, God uses the ministry of angels. Now, in the resurrection there is something pertaining to the transmutation of bodies, to wit, the collection of the ashes and their preparation, in order to the restoration of the human body. Hence as to this, God will in the resurrection use the ministry of angels. But as the soul was created immediately by God, so will it be again united to the body immediately by God, without any operation of the angels. Similarly also He will effect the glory of the body without the

ministry of angels, even as He also immediately glorifies the soul.

DXL. This angelic ministry will be performed principally by one archangel, namely, by S. Michael, who is Prince of the Church as he was of the Synagogue. He, however, will employ the influence of the Virtues and of other superior orders. And the inferior angels too will co-operate with him in the resurrection of individuals who have in time past been committed to their guardianship.

DXLI. Since the whole matter of human and other inferior bodies is subject to variation according to the motion of the heavenly bodies, it would be contrary to the order which Divine Providence has established if the matter of the inferior bodies should be brought to a state of incorruption, the motion of the superior bodies remaining. And so the resurrection of human bodies is very fitly deferred to the end of the world, when the motion of the heavenly bodies will cease.

Hence certain philosophers who held that the motion of the heavens never ceases, held also the return of human souls to mortal bodies, such as we now have: whether they held the return of the soul to the same body in the end of the great year, as did Empedocles: or to another body, as did Pythagoras.

And so it is written in the Book of Job, "Till the heavens be no more, men shall not awake, nor be raised out of their sleep."

DXLII. Over and above its oneness with its members, the head has a causality which the members lack; and herein the members differ from the head, and agree with each other. The resurrection of Christ is the exemplar of our resurrection; and from our belief in it our hope of our own arises. But the resurrection of any member of Christ is not a cause of the resurrection of other members. And so it was fitting that the resurrection of Christ should precede the resurrection of others, who should all rise together in the end of time.

DXLIII. Although among the members there be some which are more honourable than others, and more conformed by grace and merit to their Head, yet this greater dignity and conformity does not make them to their fellow-members either exemplar or cause. And so there is no reason why their resurrection should on this ground precede that of others, as the exemplar does that of which it is the example. It is piously believed that the resurrection of the Blessed Virgin and of S. John the Evangelist was not deferred to the end of the world, but followed close on the resurrection of Christ. This, however, was not due

to them of merit, but given to them of special privilege.

DXLIV. Mention is made in S. Matthew's Gospel, before his narrative of the resurrection of Christ, of the resurrection of many bodies of the saints which slept. But this is by anticipation, as is not uncommon with historians, for he goes on to say that it was *after the resurrection* that they came out of the graves, and went into the Holy City, and appeared unto many. None rose by a true and real resurrection before Christ, for, as S. Paul says to the Corinthians, "He is the first-fruits of them that slept;" although some were resuscitated, again to die, as was Lazarus, before the resurrection of Christ.

DXLV. It is written in the Revelation of S. John the Divine, "I saw the souls of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the Word of God. . . . And they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years: but the rest of the dead lived not again until the thousand years were finished." This is the first resurrection. Certain heretics supposed, from these words, that there would be a first resurrection of the dead, who should reign with Christ a thousand years on the earth. They were thence called Chiliasts, or Millenarians. But S. Augustine, in his book "Of the City of God,"

shews that these words are to be understood of the spiritual resurrection, whereby men are raised from sins by the gift of grace. The second resurrection is one of bodies. Not only the martyrs, but all the elect saints reign with Christ; but special mention is made of those as reigning who contended for the truth even unto the death.

DXLVI. In order that we may be ever watchful and ready to meet Christ at His Second Coming, the time of the future resurrection cannot be calculated or ascertained, either by the natural reason or by Divine revelation.

DXLVII. The length of the Last Age of the human race, which began with the Lord's First Advent, and will extend to the end of time, and the number of the generations it will comprehend, is uncertain: even as old age, which is the last age of man, has no determined duration like his other ages, for it sometimes lasts as long as all the rest put together.

DXLVIII. That which is unknown to the angels is much more hidden from men, for those things to which men can attain by their natural reason the angels can have clearer and more certain knowledge of by natural cognition. Similarly, also, revelations are not made to men save by the mediation of angels, but the angels have no determinate knowledge as to when the

Day of Judgment will be, for, as it is written in S. Matthew, Jesus said, "Of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no not the angels of heaven."

DXLIX. The Apostles were more familiar with the hidden things of God than any other of the followers of Christ. They had, as S. Paul says to the Romans, "the first-fruits of the Spirit." And yet to them Jesus said, "It is not for you to know the times or the seasons, which the Father hath put in His own power." Much more, then, are those times hidden from other men.

DL. Although the time of the Resurrection cannot be determinately foreknown or calculated, yet it will probably be at dawn, when the sun is rising in the East and the moon setting in the West. It was in this position the sun and moon are believed to have been created; and their return to this position will accomplish their circulation. It was at dawn, too, that Christ rose: and His resurrection is the exemplar or model of our own.

Moreover, our Lord's Second Coming is compared to that of a thief—who cometh in the night.

DLI. In the resurrection, something will be done by the ministry of angels; and something immediately by Divine Power. That which will

be done by the ministry of angels will not be done in an instant, if by an instant we mean an indivisible point of time; although it may be said to be done in an instant, if by an instant we mean an imperceptible period of time. That which will be done immediately by Divine Power will be done in an instant, and in that instant in which the work of the angels will be completed, for the higher power brings the lower to perfection. As S. Paul said to the Corinthians, it will be done "in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye."

DLII. All men will die and rise again from death: and that for three reasons. 1. In accordance with the Divine Justice, which condemned human nature for the sin of its first parent, so that all men who derive their nature from him contract the infection of his original sin, and consequently are debtors unto death. 2. In accordance with the Divine Scriptures, which foretell a resurrection of all men. And there cannot properly be said to be a resurrection save of that which has fallen and been dissolved. 3. In accordance with the order of nature, in which we find that that which has been corrupted and vitiated is not brought back to newness save by the mediation of corruption. And so, since human nature has fallen under the defect of the necessity of dying, it can have no

return to immortality save by the mediation of death.

S. Paul writes to the Corinthians, "That which thou sowest is not quickened *except it die*;" and again, "As in Adam *all die*, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."

DLIII. All men shall rise again *from ashes* in the common resurrection, unless it be otherwise permitted to some, by a special privilege of grace. For, 1, as Holy Scripture foretells a resurrection, so does it foretell a re-formation of bodies. And as all men must truly die in order that they may truly rise, so the bodies of all men must be truly dissolved, that is, resolved to ashes or turned into dust, in order that they may be truly re-formed. S. Paul wrote to the Philippians, "the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ, shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto His Glorious Body, according to the working whereby He is able even to subdue all things unto Himself." 2. Similarly, the order of nature demands that not only the conjunction of soul and body be dissolved, but also the commixtion of their elements. That commixtion is caused and conserved by the motions of the heavenly bodies. When these cease, all things mixed are resolved into their pure elements.

DLIV. The Flesh of Christ saw no corrup-

tion, as it is written in the Book of Psalms ; but although the resurrection of Christ is the exemplar of our resurrection as to the *terminus ad quem*, it is not as to the *terminus a quo*.

DLV. There is in the ashes of men no natural inclination to union with the soul : it is effected only in virtue of the order of Divine Providence.

DLVI. As to the numerical identity of the body with which the soul will be united, certain ancient philosophers have erred and certain modern heretics do err. For some philosophers have held that souls separated from the body are again to be united to bodies. But herein they erred ; and in two ways. 1. As to the mode of conjunction, holding that the separated soul would be again united to the body naturally, by way of generation. 2. As to the body to which it was joined, holding that the second conjunction was not with a body numerically identical with the body laid down in death, but other than it : sometimes the same in species but sometimes diverse. It was diverse when the soul existing in the body led a life transcending the order of reason. Hence it passed after death from the body of a man into the body of another animal to whose manners it had, by its mode of living, conformed itself : as into the body of a dog, by reason of luxury ; into the

body of a lion, by reason of rapine and violence—and so on. But into a body of the same species—when the soul, having led a good life in the body, and having after death enjoyed a certain felicity, began after the lapse of some ages to desire to return to the body, and so was again conjoined to a human body. Now this opinion springs from two false roots, of which the first is that they said that the soul is not united to the body *essentially*, as form to matter, but only *accidentally*, as the mover to the moved, or as a man to a vestment. And so they could hold that the soul pre-existed before it was infused into a body generated in natural generation; and again, that it might be united to diverse bodies. The second was that they held that the intellect does not differ from the sense, save *accidentally*, so that a man may be said to have intellect above the other animals because in him, by reason of the more excellent complexion of his body, the sensitive power is of greater vigour. Hence they could hold that the soul of man might pass into the body of a brute animal. But the two roots foresaid are destroyed by the Philosopher, in his book “Of the Soul,” and these being destroyed, the falsity of the foresaid proposition is patent. In a similar manner are destroyed the errors of certain heretics, some of whom fell into the foregoing

opinions of the Philosophers. But some held that the souls were again united to heavenly bodies, or to bodies subtle as the wind, as S. Gregory, expounding that passage of Job, "In my flesh shall I see God," narrates of a certain Bishop of Constantinople. But all these heretical errors are destroyed by the fact that they are prejudicial to the truth and reality of the resurrection which the Holy Scriptures declare. For there cannot be said to be a resurrection, unless the soul returns to the same body, for resurrection is simply iterated surrection, and rising and falling belong to the same thing. Resurrection has regard rather to the body which falls after death, than to the soul which lives after death: and so, if it be not the same identical body which the soul resumes, it will not be called resurrection, but rather an assumption of a new body.

DLVII. S. Augustine says, "To rise again is simply to relive." S. John Damascene says, "The resurrection is the second surrection of that which fell."

DLVIII. It is heretical to say that the same man will not rise again who died; for otherwise man would have been made in vain, if he could not come to the end for which he was made.

DLIX. Although transference of the matter from part to part of the same species does not

take away the identity of the whole, yet *verisimiliter*, and of congruity, it is believed that in the resurrection, the matter composing the human body will occupy the same site therein as it had before its dissolution : ,and this chiefly as to its essential and organic parts, although perhaps not as to those parts which are merely accidental.

Variation of accident does not cause diversity in number ; but the site of the parts is an accident ; such a diversity therefore in man would not cause diversity in number.

DLX. The relation of the soul to the body consists not only in a habitude of form and end, but also in a habitude of efficient cause. For the soul is related to the body, as the art is related to the work of art. Whatever appears explicitly in the work of art, the same is wholly contained implicitly and originally in the art itself. And similarly, whatever is apparent in the parts of the body, is wholly contained originally, and in a manner implicitly, in the soul. As therefore the work of art would not be perfect if any of those things were wanting in it which the art contains, so neither could a man be perfect, unless all which is implicitly contained in the soul were exteriorly displayed in the body : nor would the body also plenarily and proportionally correspond to the soul. Since therefore in

the resurrection the body of man must be wholly correspondent to his soul, for it will not rise save by reason of its relation to a rational soul, man must needs rise perfect, and in order to this all the members which are now in the body of man must be restored in the resurrection.

DLXI. The members of the human body may be considered in two ways in regard to his soul: 1, either according to the relation of matter to form; 2, or according to the relation of the instrument to the agent; for the relation of the whole body to the whole soul, is the same as the relation of the parts to the parts. If, therefore, we take the members according to their first relation, their end is not operation, but rather perfection of species, which also will be required after the resurrection. But if we take them according to their second relation, their end is operation. Yet it does not follow that when there is a failure of operation, the instrument exists in vain; for the instrument serves not only to execute the operation of the agent, but also to shew forth its power. Hence all the members will be necessary in order to demonstrate the virtue of the powers of the soul in corporeal instruments, even if they never proceed to action.

The works of God are perfect; the resurrection is a Divine work: and so man will be

restored and raised perfect in all his members.

DLXII. The soul is related to the animated body as the art is to the work of art, and to its parts as the art to its instruments. Hence also the animated body is called organic. But art uses certain instruments in order to the execution of the work intended. And these instruments are of the first intention of the art. It uses also other instruments in order to the conservation of the principal instruments. These are of the second intention of the art. For instance, the military art uses the sword for war, and the sheath for the preservation of the sword. So also, of the parts of the animated body some are ordained in order to execute the operations of the soul, as the heart, the liver, the hand, and the foot : while others are in order to the conservation of the other parts, as the hair and the nails. These are not of the first, but of the second perfection of the human body. But inasmuch as man will be raised in all the perfection of his nature, his hair and nails will be restored in him.

Again, hair and nails are given to man for ornament. But the bodies of men, especially those of the elect, ought to rise with all their ornaments ; and so they ought to rise with their hair and nails.

And again, it is written: Jesus said, "there shall not an hair of your head perish."

DLXIII. Since certain humours in the human body pertain to the perfection of the human nature, such humours must necessarily rise along with the human body.

DLXIV. Our resurrection will be compared to the resurrection of Christ. But in Christ was raised His Blood; otherwise wine would not now be transubstantiated into His Blood in the Sacrament of the Altar. In our resurrection, therefore, will be raised in us our blood.

DLXV. The genitalia will exist in the body after the resurrection, in order to the integrity of human nature, not in order to the operation which is now exercised by means of these members. So also the humours will exist in the risen body, not in order to the restoration of decay, but, as has been said, in order to the integrity of human nature and the manifestation of natural power.

DLXVI. If aught had been subtracted from the body of man which is essential to the verity or truth of human nature, that body which was raised would not be the perfect body of a man. But in the resurrection all imperfection will be taken away from man. And so all that pertains to the verity of human nature will be raised in man.

DLXVII. A natural *res* is what it is, not by reason of its matter, but by reason of its form. Hence, although that matter which was sometimes under the form of the flesh of an ox will rise in man under the form of human flesh, it does not follow that there will rise the flesh of an ox, but human flesh: otherwise it might be concluded that there would rise the clay of which was formed the body of Adam.

DLXVIII. The rib which was taken by God from the side of Adam was not in him of the perfection of the individual, but was ordained in order to the multiplication of the species. It will rise, therefore, not in Adam, but in Eve, even as seed will rise, not in him who begat, but in him who was begotten.

DLXIX. An embryo, before its animation by a rational soul, will not be raised.

DLXX. Since the matter which was in man from the beginning of his life to its end would exceed the quantity due to his species, all that has ever been in man *materially* will not rise with him, but only so much as belongs to the verity of his human nature, is ordained with relation to his rational soul, and pertains to the totality of his species, which has regard to quantity, figure, situation, and order of parts.

Totality of species, and not totality of matter, is to be considered in the resurrection; for, if

all the parts according to matter were to be raised, then either the risen body would be exceedingly dense, or it would be of immoderate quantity.

DLXXI. Man will rise again without any defect of human nature, for, as God instituted human nature without defect, so also without defect will He restore it. Human nature is subject to defect in two ways. In one way, as not yet having attained to its ultimate perfection; in another way, as having fallen from that perfection. The first defect occurs in children, the second in old persons. In both cases, therefore, human nature will be restored by the resurrection to that state of ultimate perfection which exists in youth, at that point where the motion of increase ends and the motion of decrease begins.

DLXXII. S. Paul taught the Ephesians that we should "all come unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ." But Christ rose youthful, *in ætate juvenili*, at an age which begins at about thirty years. Others, therefore, will rise at the same age.

Again, man will rise in the greatest perfection of his nature, but human nature is in its most perfect state in youth. And so in youth all men will rise.

DLXXIII. Reverence belongs to age, which

is venerable not by reason of the condition of the body, which is defective, but by reason of the presumed wisdom of the soul. Hence there will remain in the elect the reverence due to old age, on account of the fulness of Divine wisdom which will be in them, but there will not remain the defects of age.

DLXXIV. We may speak of age not as to the number of years, but as to the state in which the human body is left by the years. And so Adam is said to have been formed in youth by reason of the condition of his body on the first day of his formation.

DLXXV. In the resurrection, human nature will be restored not only as to identity of species, but also as to identity of number. We have in the resurrection, therefore, to look not only to what belongs to the nature of the species, but also to what belongs to the nature of the individual. Now, the nature of the species has a certain quantity which it neither exceeds nor fails to attain without error; which quantity, nevertheless, has certain degrees of latitude, and is not to be taken as one determinate measure. But every individual in the human species attains, within the limits of that latitude, a certain degree of quantity which belongs to the nature of the individual: and to this he is brought in the term of augment, or limit of

increase, if there be not some error in the work of nature whereby something is either added to or subtracted from the foresaid quantity. All men, therefore, will not rise in the same quantity; but every one will arise in that quantity or stature which either was, or would have been, his at the period of his youth, which is the term or end of augment, supposing there had been no error or failure of nature. In that case, such error or failure, whether by way of superfluity or defect, will be corrected by the Divine power retrenching or supplying.

DLXXVI. The natural quantity is consequent on the nature of each individual. But in the resurrection, the nature of the individual will not be varied: and so neither will his natural quantity. But the same quantity is not natural to all men. All, therefore, will not rise of the same stature.

DLXXVII. Human nature will be restored by the resurrection in order to glory, or in order to punishment. But there will not be the same quantity either of glory or of punishment in all the risen. And so neither will there be the same quantity of stature.

DLXXVIII. As the risen will be of diverse statures, so will they be of diverse sexes, for diversity of sex belongs to perfection of species. But, although there will be difference of sex, there will be wanting the confusion incident on their mutual gaze, because the lust will be

absent, which incites them to foul acts, by which such confusion is caused.

DLXXIX. The woman is subjected to the man by reason of the imbecility of her nature, both as to mental vigour and bodily strength. But after the resurrection there will be no difference in these things according to diversity of sex, but rather according to diversity of merits.

DLXXX. The resurrection will not be necessary to man by reason of his *first perfection*, which consists in the integrity of those things which regard nature, for to this perfection man can arrive in the estate of the present life by the action of natural causes. But the resurrection is of necessity to man in order that he may attain to ultimate perfection, which consists in his arriving at his ultimate end, to wit, eternal beatitude. Those natural operations, therefore, which are ordained in order either to cause or conserve the first perfection of human nature, will not exist in the resurrection. Of this sort are actions of the animal life in man, and the mutual actions in the elements, and the motions of the heavenly bodies: and all these, therefore, will cease in the resurrection. And because to eat, and drink, and sleep, and beget belong to the animal life, since they are ordained in order to the *first perfection* of nature, therefore such operations will not exist after the resurrection.

DLXXXI. Christ is recorded to have eaten after His resurrection. S. Luke narrates that He ate a piece of a broiled fish, and of an honeycomb. But this eating was *not of necessity*, as if His human nature had needed food after His resurrection, but *of power*, in order to show that He had resumed that very human nature which He had before, when He was wont to eat and drink with His Disciples. But such a manifestation will not be necessary in the common resurrection, since the fact will be known to all men. Christ, therefore, is said to have eaten *dispensatively*, as the Jurists say, a dispensation being a relaxation of a common law.

DLXXXII. True, the whole man will be beatified both in soul and body. And beatitude or felicity, according to the Philosopher, consists in perfect operation. But it does not follow that all the powers of the soul and all the members of the body be in action after the resurrection, for those operations do not belong to man as man, and therefore in them the beatitude of man's body does not consist. The human body will be beatified of redundancy, from the reason which causes man to be man, inasmuch as it will be subject to the reason.

DLXXXIII. True, in the blessed after the resurrection, there will be blissful and perfect jucundity. And jucundity includes all delecta-

tions, since beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things, and that is perfect from which there is nothing wanting. But it does not follow that, because in the act of generative and nutritive power there is great delectation, such acts of the animal life will belong to the blessed, or other rising bodies. For corporeal delectations are medicinal; and spiritual delectations alone are those which are to be sought *simpliciter*, and for their own sake, and therefore these only are required in order to beatitude.

Men who inordinately delight in corporeal delectations as if they were true delectations, resemble a man who has an infected taste, and who in consequence delights in things which are not delectable to a healthy taste. Such delectations, then, are not of the perfection of beatitude, as the Jews and Saracens and certain heretics called Chiliasts hold.

DLXXXIV. Since the bodies of the blessed and all that is in them will, after the resurrection, be perfectly subjected to their souls, even as their rational souls will be perfectly subjected to God, therefore there cannot be in the glorious body any mutation contrary to that disposition of the body which is effected and perfected by the domination of the rational soul. And so the glorious bodies of the blessed will therefore be impassible.

DLXXXV. "Passion," as S. John Damascene says, "is a motion beyond nature, *præter naturam*." Hence an immoderate motion of the heart is called its passion; a moderate motion its operation. The reason of this is, that everything which suffers is drawn to the *termini* of the agent, because the agent assimilates to himself the patient or sufferer. The patient, therefore, is drawn beyond his own *termini*. Everything passible is corruptible; but the bodies of the saints, after the resurrection, will be incorruptible, as S. Paul wrote to the Corinthians, "Sown in corruption, raised in incorruption:" and so they will also be impassible.

DLXXXVI. A potentiality may be either free or restrained. This is true not only of active, but also of passive potentialities. For the form restrains and circumscribes the potentialities of the matter by determining it to one thing. It accordingly dominates over it. But in things corruptible, the form does not perfectly dominate over the matter, and so cannot perfectly restrain it in such wise that it does not sometimes receive by means of passion a disposition contrary to its form. But in the saints, after the resurrection, the soul will entirely dominate over the body, nor can that dominion be in any way taken away, inasmuch as the soul itself will be unchangeably subjected to God,

which it was not in the estate of innocence. There will remain, then, in those bodies the same potentiality as to its substance, but it will be restrained by the victory of the soul over the body, so that it can never proceed to an act of passion.

DLXXXVII. The scars of the martyrs, like the wounds of Christ, will impart not defect but dignity, inasmuch as they are signs of that most constant virtue whereby they suffered for the faith and righteousness sake. To themselves, and to all, they will be for an increase of joy.

DLXXXVIII. Impassibility may be considered in two ways, either in itself or in relation to its cause. Considered in itself, as solely importing negation or privation, it cannot include the ideas of greater or less, but it will be equal in all the blessed. Considered in relation to its cause, it will be greater in one than in another. Its cause is the dominion of the soul over the body, which dominion is caused by this, that the soul itself immovably enjoys its God. Hence, in him who enjoys the most perfectly, there will be the greatest cause of impassibility.

DLXXXIX. Potentiality, when conjoined with action, is more perfect than when not so conjoined. But human nature will exist in the blessed in its greatest perfection. There will then be in them all the senses, and each in action.

DXC. The sensitive powers lie nearer the soul than the body. But the body will be rewarded or punished on account of the merits or demerits of the soul. Therefore, also, all the senses will be rewarded in the blessed and punished in the wicked by delectation or pain respectively.

DXCI. The term *subtility* expresses a power of penetrating. A body may be penetrative in two ways. First, by smallness of quantity, and that principally according to depth and breadth, not according to length, for length does not interfere with penetration. Secondly, by smallness of matter. Hence we call rare things subtile. And, because in rare bodies form predominates over matter, therefore the name of subtility has been transferred to those bodies which are in the best subjection to their form, and are perfected by it in the completest mode. So we say, that there is subtility in the sun, in the moon, and the like. Because incorporeal things lack quantity and matter, therefore the name of subtility is transferred to them, not only by reason of their substance, but also by reason of their power; for, as the subtile is said to be penetrative because it penetrates even to the inwards of a thing, so also an intellect is said to be subtile which penetrates to the inspection of intrinsic principles and the latent

natural properties of a thing. Similarly, one is said to have a subtile vision when, by his eyesight, he can perceive something very small. Similarly, also, as to the other senses. Accordingly diverse men have in diverse ways attributed subtilty to the glorious bodies. For some heretics, as S. Augustine relates, attributed subtilty to them according to that mode in which spiritual substances are called subtile: saying that, in the resurrection the body would be turned into spirit, and that by reason of this the Apostle, writing to the Corinthians, called the bodies of the risen "spiritual bodies." But this cannot stand. 1. Because bodies cannot pass into spirit, inasmuch as they do not communicate in matter. 2. Because, even if this were possible, then what would be raised would not be *man*, for *man* consists naturally of soul and body. 3. Because, if the Apostle had so understood it, as he calls corporeal things spiritual, for the like reason he would have called the bodies animal which had been turned into soul (*anima*). Hence some heretics, as S. Gregory narrates, said that the body will remain in the resurrection, but will have subtilty by way of rarefaction, so that human bodies in the resurrection would be like air or wind. But this, also, cannot stand, because the Lord had, after His resurrection, a palpable body. Besides, the

human body is to rise with flesh and bones, as did the Body of the Lord, witness His words: "A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see Me have." And the words of the Patriarch Job: "In my flesh shall I see God my Saviour." It is impossible for the nature of flesh and bones to suffer the foresaid rarity.

There is, therefore, to be assigned to the glorious bodies another mode of subtilty. They are called subtile by reason of their most complete perfection. This completion some attribute to them by reason of a fifth essence, which will then be principally dominant in them, and which they supposed would enter into the composition of the human body, in order to conciliate its elements into harmony, and render it impassible. But it is impossible for a fifth body to enter materially into the composition of a human body. And even given that it might, it could not be understood to dominate then more than now over the elementary nature, unless inasmuch as it would then be in human bodies more, according to quantity, of a heavenly nature: and so human bodies would not be of the same stature, unless, perhaps, the elementary matter should be diminished in man—an idea repugnant to the integrity of the risen: or that the elementary nature should be clothed with the properties of a heavenly nature from

its dominion in the body: and so a natural virtue would be the cause of a glorious property—which is absurd. Others, therefore, say, that the said completion, in consequence of which the risen bodies will be subtile, will arise from the dominion of the glorified soul (which is the form of the body) over the body, and by reason of this the glorious body is called spiritual, as wholly subjected to the spirit. There are two subjections of the body to the soul. The first, in order to participation of its specific being—as matter is subjected to form. The second, in order to operation—as the moved is subjected to the mover. This first spirituality is subtilty; the second is agility.

DXCII. Since it belongs to the very idea of a body composed of matter and form that it be sensible and occupy a place, in no way can it belong to a glorious body in virtue of its subtilty to co-exist in the same place with another more glorious body. This could only be by an operation of Divine power in order to perfection of glory: just as the body of Peter had no power, in virtue of any property bestowed upon it, to heal the sick—this was effected by the Divine power in order to the building up of the faith.

DXCIII. The Risen Body of Jesus Christ had not, in virtue of the gift of subtilty, the power of co-existing with another body in the

same place. This was effected by the virtue or power of His Divinity after His Resurrection, as in His Nativity. Hence S. Gregory, in his Homilies, says, "That Body of the Lord entered to His Disciples through the closed doors, as It came forth to men's eyes in Its Nativity through the closed Womb of the Virgin."

DXCIV. Hence it is true to say, that two bodies could, by means of a miracle, co-exist at the same time in the same place, since, by God as the First Cause, a thing may be preserved on the cessation of the second causes; just as, by the Divine power, and by it alone, an accident may miraculously exist without its subject, as in the Sacrament of the Altar.

DXCV. That one body be at the same time *locally* in two places cannot be effected by a miracle (for the Body of Christ is not on the Altar *locally*), although two bodies may *miraculously* coexist at the same time in the same place: for the latter idea contains no contradiction: the former does—it would be repugnant to the oneness of the one, and destroy the individuality of the individual.

DXCVI. Although it might be effected by the Divine power that two glorious bodies should co-exist at the same time in the same place, just as, in the former case of the possible co-existence of a glorious with a non-glorious body;

yet, inasmuch as in the Blessed there will be preserved a due order, which requires distinction, and as one glorious body may not oppose itself to another, such a thing will never be.

DXCVII. Two spirits cannot co-exist in the same place (although body and spirit may), much less two bodies, glorious or not, in virtue of any property of their own.

DXCVIII. Of two bodies co-existing at the same time in the same place, the one must be penetrated by the other. But to be penetrated by another body is ignoble; and ignobility is wholly apart from glorious bodies. Therefore, as before.

DXCIX. The necessity of existing in a place equal to itself is not taken away from the glorious body by its subtlety, because it can neither be, 1, rarefied, nor, 2, condensed.

DC. Since Christ's Body, after Its Resurrection, was palpable, albeit It was glorious, it follows that the glorious bodies will be, according to their nature—palpable. It belongs to the heresy of Eutychius, Bishop of Constantinople, to say that our bodies will, in the glory of the resurrection, be impalpable.

DCI. The glorious body will be wholly subjected to the glorified soul, not only so that there shall be in it nothing which may resist the will of the spirit (for that was the case even in

the body of Adam), but also, so that there shall be in it a certain perfection flowing forth from the glorified soul over the body, rendering it capable of, and disposing it to the foresaid subjection. This perfection is called the wedding-gift (*dos*) of the glorified body. Further, the soul is conjoined to the body, not only as its form, but also as its mover. And in both ways the glorious body must be subject to the glorified soul. Hence, as by the gift of subtilty the body is wholly subjected to the soul as its form, partaking thereby in its specific essence; so, by the gift of *agility*, it is subjected to the soul as its mover, acquiring thereby a capacity and disposition for obeying the spirit in all the motions and actions of the soul.

DCII. As the Glorious Body of Christ was moved in His Ascension, so will the glorious bodies of the saints be moved by their agility at their will. As Isaiah prophesied, "They shall mount up with wings as eagles, they shall run, and not be weary; they shall walk, and not faint." And, as saith the Wisdom of Solomon, "They shall run to and fro like sparks among the stubble."

DCIII. Since glorious bodies still retain the nature of bodies, and must therefore continue to occupy determinate places, their moving takes time. And in regard of this, the utmost the

glorified soul can effect is, that that time be, by reason of its brevity, imperceptible.

DCIV. A body must lose its corporeity before it can be relieved from the necessities of place, and motion, and time. Their corporeity, glorious bodies will never lose; and so they must always exist in a place, and pass by motion from place to place, such motion occupying time, although that time may be so small as to be imperceptible.

DCV. Although after the resurrection there will not be time as computed and divided in accordance with the motions of the heavenly bodies, there will yet be time as including the ideas of before and after, in regard to motion.

DCVI. It is most certain, on the authority of the Sacred Scriptures which promise it, that the bodies of the Saints after the resurrection will be luminous. This brightness will be caused by a redundancy of glory from the glorified soul to the body. And, as the brightness of the soul will be greater or less in proportion to its merit, so will there also be a difference of brightness in the different bodies correlative to the different merits of the souls to which they are united.

DCVII. The glory of the body does not take away its nature, but perfects it. Hence the natural colour of the body and its parts will remain, having added to it, from the glory of the indwelling soul, its supernatural brightness.

DCVIII. Since it naturally belongs to light, of its essence, to move the vision, and the vision, of its substance, to perceive the light, it is true to say that the brightness of the glorious body can be seen *naturally* by a non-glorious eye.

DCIX. The brightness of the Transfiguration-body was similar to the brightness of the Resurrection-body. The one brightness was perceived by non-glorious eyes, those of the disciples: so also may be the other.

DCX. And again, part of the torture of the wicked in the Judgment will be beholding the glory of the Just. As it is written: "When they see it, they shall be troubled with terrible fear, and shall be amazed at the strangeness of his salvation, so far beyond all that they looked for: and they, repenting and groaning for anguish of spirit, shall say within themselves, This was he whom we had sometimes in derision, and a proverb, a parable of reproach; we fools counted his life madness, and his end to be without honour, how is he numbered among the children of God, and his lot is among the saints!"

DCXI. As the brightness of the glorious body proceeds *ex merito* of the will, the term of the glorified soul, it is therefore subject to the will, so that it can be seen or not seen at will. It will be in the power of the glorified soul then

to display or to hide the brightness of the glorious body, as appears in the case of our Lord and His disciples after the Resurrection.

DCXII. Deformity may exist in the human body in two ways. In one way, from defect of some member. And so we call mutilated persons ugly, inasmuch as there is wanting in them the due proportion of parts to the whole. But such deformity will not exist in the risen bodies of the damned, for all bodies, whether of the good or of the evil, will rise in their integrity. In another way, deformity may occur from an undue disposition of parts, or by an undue quantity, quality, or situation. This also hinders the due proportion of the parts to the whole. Concerning such deformities and similar defects, as fevers and the like sicknesses, which are sometimes causes of deformity, S. Augustine, in his "Enchiridion," leaves the question as doubtful and undetermined. But among modern doctors (*i. e.* of S. Thomas's time), there are two opinions. Some say that such deformities and defects will remain in the bodies of the damned, in consideration of their damnation, whereby they are appointed to the chiefest misery, from which nothing savouring of inconvenience should be taken away. But this does not appear to be reasonable. For, in the restoration of the risen body, greater regard will be had to the perfection

of the nature than to the conditions of its previous existence. Hence those who die under age will be restored in the stature of youth, as we have already said. And hence, also, those who had in their bodies any natural defects, or deformities thence arising, will be restored in the resurrection without those defects or deformities, unless the merit of sin hinders: and so, if any one rise with deformities or defects, it will be to him for a punishment. Now, the mode of the punishment is according to the measure of the guilt. Suppose, then, a sinner, who will ultimately be damned, has certain deformities or defects, and another, who will also ultimately be damned, has not these deformities or defects; suppose, also, that the latter is ensnared by sins more grievous than those to which the former is subject; the former, if he arose with his deformities or defects, would be punished more grievously than the greater sinner, for a less sin. And so the mode of the punishment would not correspond to the quantity of the guilt; but it would rather seem as if one were punished for punishments which he had suffered in this world: which is absurd. Some, therefore, more reasonably say, that the Author who built up the nature will restore that nature in its integrity in the resurrection. Hence whatsoever of defect or ugliness arising from corruption or

debility of nature or natural principles, was in the body, will be wholly removed in the resurrection, as fever, blearedness of eyes, and the like. But defects which naturally follow from natural principles in the human body, as ponderosity, passibility, and the like, will be in the bodies of the damned—defects which are excluded from the bodies of the elect by the glory of the resurrection.

DCXIII. In the damned there will not be anything to hinder in them the sense of pain. But sickness hinders the sense of pain, inasmuch as by it the organs of sense are weakened. And similarly, the defect of a member would hinder pain from being universal over the body. The bodies of the damned will therefore be raised without sicknesses or defects.

DCXIV. The punishments which are inflicted for sin in this temporal life are temporal, and do not extend beyond the term or end of this life. Of such sort are sicknesses and mutilations. And therefore, although the sin which caused them be not remitted to the damned, yet it by no means follows or is necessary that they bear the same punishments in Hell which they have borne in this world.

DCXV. Corruption is both a change and a principle, or source or mainspring of motion. After the resurrection the one will be absent and the other will be restrained. There will

therefore be nothing whereby the bodies of the damned could be corrupted.

DCXVI. The damned will be punished both in soul and body by a perpetual pain, as it is written, "These shall go away into everlasting punishment." But this could not be if their bodies were corruptible. They will therefore be incorruptible. It is written in the Revelation of Jesus Christ, "In those days shall men seek death, and shall not find it, and shall desire to die, and death shall flee from them."

DCXVII. Although death is the greatest of punishments *simpliciter*, yet relatively there is nothing to prevent death being a release from pains, and consequently the inability to die being increase of punishment. "For to live," as the Philosopher says, in the Ethics, "seems to all creatures to be delectable, inasmuch as all things long to exist." But, as he says in the same place, we are not to understand by this life, an evil or a corrupt life, or a life passed in sorrows. As therefore living is delectable *simpliciter*, but not a life passed in sorrows, so also death, which is the privation of life, is *simpliciter* penal and the greatest of punishments, inasmuch as it deprives of the prime good, to wit, existence, along with which also all things else are taken away. But, inasmuch as it releases from an evil life, and a life passed in

sorrows, it is a release from punishments which it terminates. And consequently the deprivation of the ability to die is an increase of punishment, which it renders perpetual. But if we speak of death as penal by reason of the corporeal pain which affects the senses of the dying, there is no doubt that the damned will have to bear, and that perpetually, a much greater pain. Hence they are said to be in a perpetual death, as it is written in the Book of Psalms, "Death gnaweth upon them."

DCXVIII. The principal cause wherefore the bodies of the damned will not be consumed with fire will be the Divine Justice, whereby there is assigned to those bodies a perpetual punishment. They will be passible nevertheless, without any mutation of natural disposition.

DCXIX. As the body co-operates with the soul in order to merit, so does it co-operate with the soul in order to sin. By reason of this co-operation, not only the soul but the body as well will be rewarded after the resurrection: and for a like reason the bodies of the damned will be punished, which they could not be if they were impassible. They will therefore be passible.

DCXX. As it is written by S. Paul to the Romans, "In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ, men's consciences will bear them witness, their thoughts

the meanwhile accusing, or else excusing one another." There must be in every judgment, a witness, an accuser, and a defender, and they must have knowledge of those things which are brought into judgment. In the Common Judgment, all the works of men will come into judgment. And so it is necessary that every one then have knowledge of all his works. The conscience of every one will be as a book containing a record of the deeds he has done. And on that record the judgment will proceed, even as in human judgments men use registers. These are the books of which S. John speaks in his Apocalypse, "And the Books were opened; and another Book was opened, which is the Book of Life, and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the Books, according to their works." The Books are the consciences of men: the Book of Life is that which contains the sentence of the Judge written in accordance with the record, and by that Providence which foresaw the deeds which the conscience recalls.

DCXXI. Although many merits and demerits may have then passed away from the memory, yet there will be none of them which will not in some way remain in its effects; for the merits which have not been mortified, that is, slain, or deprived of their existence, will remain in the reward which is rendered to them. Those which

have been so mortified remain in the *reatus* of ingratitude, which is increased by man's sinning after receiving grace. Similarly also, demerits which have not been destroyed by penitence, remain in the *reatus* of punishment which is due to them. What penitence has destroyed, will remain in the memory of that penitence. Hence there will be in every man something by means of which he will be able to recall his works to his memory, and this by virtue of an operation of Divine Power.

DCXXII. Although charity be now in this world a cause which induces us to grieve for sin, yet the Saints in Fatherland will be so flooded with joy, that sorrow can have no place in them. And so they will not grieve for sin, but rejoice rather in the Divine mercy whereby they have been loosed from their sins; even as now the angels rejoice in the Divine Justice, whereby those of their charges who forsake grace fall into sin, albeit they solicitously watch for their salvation.

DCXXIII. The wicked have knowledge of all the good things which they have done, and yet their grief is not thereby diminished, but rather added to: for the greatest of griefs is to have lost many good things, as Boetius says, "The height of misfortune is *to have been happy.*"

DCXXIV. In the Last and Common Judgment it is necessary that the Divine Justice be evidently apparent in all things, which is now

latent in many things. Now the sentence of him who condemns or rewards cannot be just unless it proceed according to merits or demerits. And, therefore, as it is necessary that the Judge and the Assessor of the Judge should have knowledge of the case, in order that they may deliver a just sentence ; so also, in order that the justice of that sentence may be apparent, it is necessary that all who have knowledge of the sentence should have knowledge also of the merits of the case which dictated it. Hence, as to every one will be known his own reward or his own damnation, so will they also be known to all others. It is necessary, therefore, that as everyone will recall to memory his own merits or demerits, so also those of others must be included in the subject-matter of his knowledge.

DCXXV. All his preceding merits or demerits form a certain quantity in the glory or misery of the risen man, and so are also made, by the Divine power, apparent unto all.

DCXXVI. The publication of sins to the ignominy of the sinner is an effect of negligence committed by the omission of their confession. But the revelation of the sins of the Saints cannot be to them a cause of blushing or shame, even as it in no way tends to the confusion of S. Mary Magdalene that her sins are publicly recited in the church, for shame is the fear of

loss of fame or glory, and this cannot exist in the Blessed. Such a publication will, on the contrary, be to their greater glory by reason of the past penitence which it indicates, even as a confessor commends the sinner who bravely confesses great crimes. The sins of the saints are said to be destroyed or forgotten, inasmuch as God does not see them in order to punish.

DCXXVII. Although one will not in an instant see all his own merits or demerits as well as those of others, yet he will in a very brief time see and consider them all collectively and individually, and that by the aid of Divine power.

DCXXVIII. As operation belongs to the principle or source of things, whereby they are produced into being, so does judgment belong to their term or end, whereby things are produced or brought to their ultimate completion.

DCXXIX. Every man is—not only a single individual person, but a part of the whole human race. To every man, therefore, a twofold judgment belongs. 1. The first, a singular or particular judgment. This takes place immediately after his death, when he receives according to those things which he has done in his body, although not totally, because not as regards his body but as regards his soul only. 2. Another judgment must be made concerning him inasmuch as he is a part of the whole human race.

There will then be an universal judgment of the whole human race, and an universal separation of the good from the evil. And yet God will not thereby judge any one twice over, for He will not inflict two punishments for one sin, but the punishment which, before the judgment, was not completely inflicted, will be completed in the Last Judgment, after which the wicked will be tortured in body and soul together.

DCXXX. As to the question whether judgment will be made and sentence given by way of vocal speech, it cannot for certain be defined what is the truth. But the most probable opinion is, that the whole judgment, both as regards discussion and as regards the accusation of the wicked and the commendation of the good, and the sentence of both, will be accomplished *mentaliter*, mentally. For, if the facts with regard to every single individual should be narrated vocally, there would be required an inconceivable and well-nigh infinite length of time. It is probable, therefore, that the incidents of the narrative of S. Matthew (chap. xxv.) are to be understood not *vocaliter* but *mentaliter*.

DCXXXI. The sentence ought to correspond and be in proportion to the testimony. But the testimony, both by way of accusation and by way of excuse, will be mental. As it is written by S. Paul to the Romans, "The *conscience*

bearing witness, and the *thoughts* the meanwhile accusing, or else excusing one another, in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ." Both judgment and sentence will therefore be accomplished *mentally*.

DCXXXII. God, by His knowledge (*scientia*), is the cause of things. He communicates both knowledge and cause to His creatures. He bestows on certain things a power of acting on certain other things, of which they are the causes. On certain creatures, also, He bestows a knowledge (*cognitio*) of certain things. But in either case He reserves somewhat for Himself. For He operates some things in which no creature co-operates with Him. And, similarly, He has knowledge of some things which are known by no mere creature. He will, without the co-operation of any creature, operate the end of the world, in which will be the Day of Judgment: for by no created cause will the world be ended, even as from no created cause did the world begin. It began to exist immediately from God. Fittingly, therefore, is the knowledge of the end of the world reserved to God alone. And this reason the Lord Himself seems to assign when He says, "It is not for you to know the times or the seasons, which the Father hath put in His own power:" as if to say, which have been reserved to His power alone.

Again, it is written, "Jesus said, Of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father." The Son is said not to know, inasmuch as He does not cause us to know. S. Paul writes to the Thessalonians, that "the Day of the Lord so cometh as a thief in the night." But the coming of a thief in the night is altogether uncertain. So also is the day of the Last Judgment.

DCXXXIII. In His First Advent Christ came hidden, as Isaiah prophesied, "Verily, Thou art a God that hidest Thyself, O God of Israel, the Saviour." And so, in order that He might be known by the faithful, it was necessary that the time of His coming should be determinately predetermined. But in His Second Advent He will come manifestly and openly, as it is written in the Book of Psalms, "Our God shall come, and shall not keep silence. There shall go before Him a consuming fire, and a mighty tempest shall be stirred up round about Him. He shall call the heavens from above, and the earth, that He may judge His people." As to the knowledge of His Second Advent, there will not then be the possibility of error.

DCXXXIV. Many signs are mentioned in Holy Scripture as preceding the Last Judgment, but we cannot thence determine the time thereof. For, as S. Augustine says, "The signs indicated

by the Evangelists do not, all of them, pertain to the Second Advent, which will be in the End. Some of them pertain to the time of the destruction of Jerusalem, which is now in the past. And some, and these several, pertain to that Advent whereby Christ comes daily to His Church, visiting her spiritually, and dwelling in us by faith and love. Nor do those things which are recorded in the Gospels and in the Epistles as having reference to the Last Advent avail in order to a determinate knowledge of the time of the Judgment, for those perils which are there announced as heralding the near approach of Christ, have existed from the time even of the Primitive Church, sometimes with greater and sometimes with less intensity. Hence, even the days of the Apostles were spoken of as the "last days"—*dies novissimi*: for so S. Peter, on the Day of Pentecost, expounded, as of his own time, the words of the Prophet Joel, "And it shall come to pass in the last days, saith God, I will pour out of My Spirit upon all flesh." And yet, since that day, a very long period of time has passed away: and sometimes more, and sometimes fewer, tribulations have fallen on the Church. And hence it cannot be determined when the time will be, as to the month, or as to the year, or within a hundred, or even within a thousand years. Although

it may be believed that, towards the end, perils of this sort will more abound, yet it cannot be determined what is that quantity of perils which will immediately precede the Day of Judgment or the Advent of Antichrist. In the time of the Primitive Church there were some persecutions so grievous, and the corruption of error so abounded, that the Advent of Antichrist was expected as imminent and near, and still that day has not yet arrived.

DCXXXV. S. Paul, writing to the Corinthians, spoke of himself and them as those on whom the ends of the world were come. And S. John, in his First Epistle, says, "Little children, it is the last time. . . . We know that it is the last time." These expressions do not signify any determinate quantity of time; they are employed to signify the last estate of the world, as it were, its last age: and that does not imply a space of time of definite duration any more than old age, which is the last age or estate of man, implies any certain and definite term, for sometimes it is found to last as long as all the ages that precede it.

DCXXXVI. Besides the motives to watchfulness which the uncertainty of the day of one's death suggests, the uncertainty of the Day of Judgment is valuable in two ways. 1. Because one does not know whether that day is not even

nearer than the day of one's death ; and so one has two motives, instead of one, to greater diligence. 2. Because the solicitude of man concerns not only his own person, but his family, his city, his kingdom, or the Church at large. So neither is there determined a time of duration, according to the life of man, and therefore one and all must be so disposed that the Day of the Lord may find them ready.

DCXXXVII. Much cannot be known *for certain* with regard to the mode of the future judgment ; yet it is most probable, from indications in Holy Scripture, that, as Christ ascended into heaven from the Mount of Olives, so in like manner will He also descend from heaven to the same place, in order to shew that He Who ascended and He Who descends is one and the same Person.

DCXXXVIII. While the Apostles, as is written in their Acts, looked stedfastly toward heaven as Jesus went up, behold two men stood by them in white apparel, which also said, "Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing up into Heaven? This same Jesus, which is taken up from you into Heaven, shall *so come in like manner* as ye have seen Him go into Heaven." But He ascended into Heaven from the Mount of Olives, which overhangs the Valley of Jehoshaphat. In the same place therefore will He come to judgment.

It is written also in the Word of the Lord that

came to Joel, the son of Pethuel, "I will gather all nations, and will bring them down into the Valley of Jehoshaphat, and there will judge them."

DCXXXIX. Although Christ, by His being judged unjustly, merited the power of judging, yet He will not judge in the form of His infirmity, wherein He was unjustly judged, but in that glorious form wherein He ascended to His Father. And hence the scene of the Ascension has a greater fitness for being the place of judgment than either the Prætorium of Pilate, where the sentence was given, or Golgotha, where it was carried out.

DCXL. As He ascended in a cloud, so it is meet that on the clouds He should come to judgment. The clouds, by reason of their refreshing, indicate the mercy of the Judge.

True, there will then be no evaporation or resolution of vapours; and therefore those clouds will not be produced in the ordinary way. They will either be generated by an operation of the Divine Power in order to make manifest the conformity of the Judgment with the Ascension; or, as some say, what are here spoken of as clouds are certain densities of the light shining from the bodies of the Saints.

DCXLI. To judge—may be understood in many ways. 1. *Causaliter*; as that is said to judge whereby it is apparent that one is to be

judged. In this way, some are said to judge by comparison, inasmuch as, by comparison with them, the judgment of others is made manifest. And so Jesus said, "The men of Nineveh shall rise in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it, because they repented at the preaching of Jonas, and behold, a greater than Jonas is here." And again, "The Queen of the South shall rise up in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it, for she came from the uttermost parts of the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon, and behold, a greater than Solomon is here." So to judge in the judgment is common to all men, both good and bad. 2. *Interpretative*; as one is interpreted as doing a thing who unites his consent with him who does it. Those then who will unite their consent with Christ the Judge, by approving His sentence, are said to judge. And so to judge will belong to all the Elect. Hence it is written in the Book of Wisdom, "The just shall judge the nations." 3. In a third way, one is said to judge, as it were, by similitude; having the likeness of a judge, as seated on an eminent place as a judge. And so assessors are said to judge. In this way some say that the perfect men, to whom judiciary power was promised by Jesus, when He said, "Verily, I say unto you, That ye which have

followed Me, in the Regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit on the Throne of His Glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel,"—will judge, to wit, by an honourable confession, inasmuch as they will appear superior to others in judgment, and will meet the Lord in the air. But this does not seem sufficient to fulfil the promise of Christ—"Ye shall sit, judging." And so judgment must be superadded to confession. 4. There is therefore a fourth way of judging, which belongs to perfect men, inasmuch as in them are contained the decrees of the Divine Justice, from which men will be judged: and inasmuch also as they will publish and make manifest to others the sentence of Christ the Judge.

To judge, of His own authority, belongs to God alone, inasmuch as also to Him alone belongs dominion and power.

DCXLII. Judiciary power is especially given to voluntary poverty; not to every poverty, but to that which consists in leaving all to follow Christ:—and that for three reasons. 1. By reason of congruity, for voluntary poverty is that of those who, despising all that belongs to the world, cleave to Christ alone. There is therefore in them nothing to turn aside their judgment from justice; and so they are rendered fit for judging, as loving the truth of justice above

all things. 2. By way of merit: for in regard of merit, exaltation corresponds to humility. Now, among all things which make a man to be despised in this world, the chief is poverty, and so to the poor is promised the excellency of judiciary power, in order that he who for Christ's sake has abased himself, may by Him be exalted. 3. Because poverty disposes to the foresaid mode of judging.

DCXLIII. As S. Augustine says, We are not to understand by the promise to the Twelve Apostles of sitting on twelve thrones, and judging the Twelve Tribes of Israel that twelve men only will judge along with Jesus Christ; otherwise, since we read that Matthias was ordained an Apostle in the place of the traitor Judas, Paul, who laboured more than all the rest, would have no place left for him on the Judgment seat. By the duodenary number is signified, he says, the universal multitude of judges; by reason of the two parts of the septenary number, three and four, which multiplied by each other, make twelve. The duodenary is a perfect number as consisting of two senaries, which are perfect numbers. Besides, the promise was made to the twelve as personating all their followers.

DCXLIV. True, virgins and martyrs offer their bodies as a sacrifice to God, while the voluntarily poor offer only their external goods,

and the sacrifice of oneself is greater than the sacrifice of one's property. But virginity and martyrdom do not dispose one to retain in his heart the decrees of divine justice as does poverty; even as, *e contrario*, it is external riches which, from the solicitude they excite, are said to choke the Word of God.

Besides voluntary poverty not only merits the reward of judiciary power, but it is the first step in the progress towards perfection; and to it judiciary power corresponds as being the first act in the attainment of perfection. Hence among those things which follow poverty as regards perfection may be reckoned virginity, martyrdom, and all other works of perfection; but yet they are not so principal as poverty, inasmuch as the root, source, mainspring, first beginning or principle (*principium*) is the chiefest part of a thing.

DCXLV. The Assessors of the Judge ought to be conformed to the Judge. Now judgment is attributed to Christ, as He is the Son of Man; as it is written, Jesus said, "The Father hath given authority to the Son to execute judgment, because He is the Son of Man." In His human nature, therefore, He will appear to all men, good and bad (although the whole Trinity will judge by authority); and so it is necessary that the assessors of the Judge have His human nature, in which they may be seen by all men,

good and bad alike. To judge, then, does not belong to the angels; although the angels may, in a manner, be said to judge, by their approbation of the sentence.

DCXLVI. It does not belong to the same person to judge, and to be the minister of the Judge. But the angels will in the judgment be as the ministers of the Judge; as it is written, Jesus said, "The Son of Man shall send forth His angels, and they shall gather out of His kingdom all things that offend and them which do iniquity, they shall sever the wicked from among the just, and shall cast them into a furnace of fire." The angels, therefore, will not judge as will elect men. They will come with Christ, not as judges, but as witnesses of human actions, good or evil, done by those who have been in their custody.

DCXLVII. The orders of angels take their names from the offices which they execute; and one order of angels is the order of Thrones, which name indicates that their office has reference to judiciary power, for a throne is the seat of a judge, or king, or the chair of a doctor. But this name of Throne is attributed to that order of angels, by reason of that judgment which God is always executing, by His most righteous government of all things, of which judgment the angels are, in a manner, the exe-

cutors and promulgators : and not by reason of that last general judgment which will be made of all men by the Man Christ Jesus. It requires the assessor to be man.

DCXLVIII. Among the saved there will be preserved an order whereby some will be illuminated and perfected by others, so that the order of the heavenly hierarchy will be perpetual. In like manner there will be preserved an order among the damned, as to their punishments, whereby men will be punished by demons : and this, lest that Divine order which has established angelic beings as *medii* between the Divine and Human natures, should be wholly annulled. As, therefore, the Divine Illuminations are brought home to men by good angels, so also are demons the executors of the Divine Justice on the wicked. Nor is the punishment of the demons in any way a degree hereby lessened, for in torturing others they are themselves tormented. The society of wretches will not diminish, it will add to their own wretchedness.

DCXLIX. S. Paul writes to the Corinthians, "Then cometh the end, when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father ; when He shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power." That prelation which is to be put down by Christ in the future is that prelation which is caused by the state of

men in this world, whereby men rule over men, angels over men, angels over angels, angels over demons, demons over demons, and demons over men. And all this in order either to lead to an end, or to draw away from an end. But then, when all things shall have arrived at their end, there will be no prelation either drawing away from or leading to an end. The only prelation will be that which preserves in the end, whether that end be good or evil.

DCL. Good angels are not the principal cause of reward to the elect, for this all receive immediately from God; but yet angels are the cause of certain accidental rewards to men, inasmuch as by the superior angels, inferior, both angels and men, are illuminated concerning certain hidden things of Divinity which do not pertain to the substance of beatitude. Similarly, also, the damned receive their principal punishment immediately from God, to wit, perpetual exclusion from the Vision of God, but there is no unfitness in other sensible punishments being inflicted on men by demons. There, however, occurs this difference—merit exalts, sin depresses. Hence, since the angelic nature is higher than the human, some will, by the excellency of their merit, be so highly exalted that their exaltation will exceed the altitude of nature and reward in certain angels. And so, certain

angels will be illuminated by certain men, but no human sinners will, by reason of any degree of malice or wickedness, ever attain to that eminence which is due to the nature of demons.

DCLI. Judiciary power has been conferred by God on the Man Jesus Christ, in reward of that humility which He exhibited in His Passion. Now, in His Passion He shed His Blood *for all men*, as to sufficiency, although It produced not Its effect in all men, by reason of the impediments found in some. And so it is meet that *all men* should be gathered together in the Judgment in order to behold His exaltation in His Human Nature, according to which He has been established by God as the Judge of quick and dead, under which two categories are comprehended *all men*. And so it is written in the Apocalypse, "Behold He cometh with clouds, and *every eye* shall see Him, and they also which pierced Him: and all kindreds of the earth shall wail because of Him."

DCLII. Children, dying before a perfect age, and having no merits either good or bad, will yet appear in the judgment, not that they may be judged, for that implies the possession of merits, but in order that they may behold the glory of the Judge.

DCLIII. Two things pertain to judgment, to wit, discussion of merits, and retribution of

rewards. As regards retribution of rewards all will be judged, the good as well as the evil, inasmuch as they will every one receive, by the Divine sentence, rewards corresponding to their merits. But there will not be discussion of merits, save where there is commixtion of good and evil merits. Those then who build upon the foundation of the faith, wood, silver, and precious stones, and apply themselves wholly to the Divine Service, and have in them no notable admixture of any merit of evil—in them discussion of merits has no place. Those who, entirely forsaking the things of the world, assiduously and solely meditate on the things of God, will be saved, but will not be judged. But those who build upon the foundation of the faith, wood, hay, and stubble, that is, those who still love the things of time, and are entangled in the affairs of earth, in such wise however that they place nothing before Christ, but study to expiate their sins by alms-deeds—such men have in them a mixture of good merits along with the evil. And so discussion of merits has place in them; and they will be judged, but yet be saved.

DCLIV. S. Paul writes to the Corinthians, “We must all appear before the Judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done,

whether it be good or bad." But there is nothing else to be judged: and therefore all men, even the good, will be judged.

Moreover, universal comprehends all. But that judgment is called universal. And so all be judged.

DCLV. Punishment is an effect of justice; reward rather of mercy. And so to judgment, which is an act of justice, is *autonomastically* attributed punishment; so that judgment is sometimes to be taken for condemnation, as in that passage of S. John, "He that believeth on Him, is not judged."

DCLVI. Discussion of merits will be in the elect, not to take away uncertainty of beatitude from their hearts, but in order that the pre-eminence of their good merits over the evil may be manifestly made clear to all; and so the justice of God be commended. Those are not to be called "blessed"—*beati*—to whom their beatitude is uncertain; and hence S. Augustine proves that the demons have never been "blessed." The saints are "*blessed*," and therefore certain of their beatitude; and so it is not on this account, but for the reason foresaid that holy men will be brought into judgment.

DCLVII. Judgment, as it is a retribution of punishments for sins, belongs to all the wicked; but as it is a discussion of merits, to the faithful only; inasmuch as in the unbelievers there

is not the foundation of the faith, and it being taken away, all subsequent works lack perfect rectitude of intention. Hence there is not in them any mixture of good works or merits with the evil, so as to require discussion. But the faithful in whom there abides the foundation of the faith, have an at least laudable act of faith, for although it be not meritorious without charity, yet it is ordained in order to merit. In them therefore judgment, as discussion, has place. Hence the faithful who have been, numerically at least, citizens of the City of God, will be judged as citizens, on whom, without discussion of their merits, sentence of death is not wont to be passed. But the unbelievers will be condemned as enemies, whom men are wont to exterminate without a hearing as to their merits.

DCLVIII. Although the damnation of those who die in mortal sin is even then certain, yet in order to the manifestation of the Divine Justice it is necessary that there be discussion of their merits, whereby it will be shown that they have been justly excluded from the City of the Saints, of which they were citizens numerically, and, to all outward appearance, in reality.

DCLIX. Judgment of discussion in no way has place either in good angels or in bad, since neither in the good can anything of evil be found, nor in the bad anything of good. But

if we speak of the judgment of retribution, we must distinguish a twofold retribution : 1. One corresponding to the individual and special merits of the Angels : and this was from the beginning made to both good and bad, since some were exalted to beatitude while others were plunged in misery. 2. Another retribution corresponds to the good or evil merits procured by Angels ; and this retribution will be made in the future judgment, since the good Angels will have more joy by reason of the salvation of those whom they have induced to do meritorious works ; and the wicked Angels will be more exceedingly tormented by reason of the manifold ruin of wicked men whom they have seduced to do evil deeds. And hence, directly speaking, there will not be a judgment of angels but of men, whether *ex parte* of the judges or *ex parte* of the judged : but indirectly it will, in a manner, regard the Angels, inasmuch as they have been mixed up with the acts of men.

DCLX. God will not judge the same twice over. But evil Angels have been judged already, as it is written, Jesus said, “ The Prince of this world is judged already.” And so in the future judgment, angels will not be judged, but men only.

DCLXI. Judgment requires power of dominion, as it is written by S. Paul to the Romans, “ Who art thou that judgest another

man's servant?" It belongs, therefore, to Christ to judge, inasmuch as He has dominion over men, with whom the final judgment is principally concerned. He is our Lord by reason of creation, as the Psalmist sings, "Be ye sure that the Lord is God; it is He that hath made us, and not we ourselves." He is our Lord also by reason of Redemption, which belongs to Him in His Human Nature, as S. Paul writes to the Romans, "To this end Christ both died and rose and revived, that He might be Lord both of the dead and living." Now, in order to attain to the reward of eternal life, the goods of creation would not be sufficient for us, unless there were added to them the benefit of redemption, by reason of the impediment supervening to created nature from the sin of the first parent. And hence, since the final judgment was ordained to this, that some should be admitted to the Kingdom, and others excluded therefrom, it is meet that Christ Himself, by the benefit of Whose Redemption we are admitted to the Kingdom, should in His Human Nature preside at that Judgment. And therefore, as S. Peter testified in the house of Cornelius, He commanded His witnesses chosen before of God, even His Apostles, who did eat and drink with Him after He rose from the dead, to preach unto the people and to testify that this was He

which was ordained of God to be the Judge of quick and dead. And because, by the redemption of the human race, He restored, not men only but universally the whole creation, inasmuch as the condition of every creature is ameliorated by the restoration of man, as S. Paul wrote to the Colossians, "Having made peace through the Blood of His Cross, by Him to reconcile all things unto Himself, whether they be things in earth, or things in Heaven." Not only over men, therefore, but over universal creation, did Christ, by His Passion, merit dominion and judiciary power; and so He said, "All power is given unto Me in Heaven and on earth."

DCLXII. In Christ, according to His Divine Nature, there is authority of dominion in respect of universal creation *ex jure* of creation. But in Him, according to His Human Nature, there is an authority of dominion which He merited by His Passion. This is, as it were, a secondary and acquired authority; the other is natural and eternal.

DCLXIII. Although Christ, as He is Man, has not of Himself invincible power; from any virtue natural to the human species, yet from the gift of Divinity bestowed upon it, He has, even in His Human Nature, invincible power, for, as S. Paul wrote to the Corinthians, and again to the Hebrews, "He hath put all things in subjection under His Feet." And therefore He will judge *in*

His Human Nature, but by virtue of His Divinity. This invincible power is necessary to a judge, as it is written in the Book of Ecclesiasticus, "Seek not to be judge, being not able to take away iniquity."

DCLXIV. Christ would not have sufficed to the redemption of the human race, if He had been mere man. As therefore He was able, in His Human Nature, to redeem the human race, so in the same nature was it possible for Him to attain to and exercise judiciary power. This manifestly declared Him to be God, and, as such, to be honoured equally with the Father: as it is written, Jesus said, "The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son, that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father."

DCLXV. In the vision of Daniel is set forth the *order* of judiciary power; which, in its first origin, is in God Himself, and more especially in the Father, who is the Fountain of the whole Deity; and therefore he says in the first place that the Ancient of Days did sit. But from the Father judiciary power has been translated to the Son not only from eternity, according to His Divine Nature, but also in time, according to His Human Nature in which He merited it. And so Daniel adds, "Behold, One like the Son of Man came with the clouds of

Heaven, and came to the Ancient of Days, and they brought Him near before Him, and there was given Him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve Him; His dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and His Kingdom that which shall not be destroyed. And when the Ancient of Days came, judgment was given to the Saints of the most High, and the time came that the Saints possessed the Kingdom."

DCLXVI. Christ is the mediator between God and man, inasmuch as He satisfies for men, and intercedes with the Father, and communicates to men those things which are the Father's; as it is written, Jesus said, "The glory which Thou hast given Me, I have given them." In this way He communicates, as Mediator, with both extremes. For, inasmuch as He communicates with men, He is their vicegerent with the Father; but, inasmuch as He communicates with the Father, He transmits to men the gifts of the Father. Since, therefore, in His First Advent He came in order to satisfy the Father for us, it became Him to appear in the form of our infirmity; but since in His Second Advent He will come in order to execute on men the justice of the Father, it will become Him to show forth that glory which is His by communication with the Father: and

therefore, in the Last Judgment He will appear in a glorious form ; as it is written, Jesus said, “ Then shall they see the Son of Man coming in a cloud with power and great glory.”

DCLXVII. He who judges ought to excel those who are judged. But the elect, who will be judged by Christ, will have glorious bodies. And therefore it is most meet and necessary that Christ the Judge should appear in a glorious form.

DCLXVIII. As to be judged belongs to infirmity, so to judge belongs to authority and glory. In the First Advent Christ came to be judged, and so He came in a form of infirmity. In the Second Advent, Christ will come to judge, and so He will appear in a form of glory.

DCLXIX. The sign of the Son of Man, that is, the sign of the Cross, will appear in the heavens, as a sign not of existing but of past infirmity, and in order that their condemnation may appear the more just who have neglected so great a mercy, and theirs above all who unjustly persecuted Christ.

The scars of the wounds which will then be apparent in His Body will not betray infirmity, but be signs of that mighty power whereby Christ, through the infirmity of His Passion, triumphed over His enemies.

DCLXX. As the glory of a friend whom one loves is delectable, so the glory of an enemy

whom one hates is detestable. The sight of the glory of the Humanity of Christ will be to the just for a reward, as it will be to the wicked for a torture: as Isaiah prophesied, "They shall see and be confounded for their envy toward My people, and the fire, that is, envy, shall devour thine enemies."

DCLXXI. In every thing which is desirable or delectable, two things have to be considered, namely, that which is desired or delights, and that which is the reason wherefore it causes desire or delights. Now their cause may be accidental and apart from the essence of the thing, and in that case the sight of the thing need not necessarily cause in its beholder desire or delight. But if the cause be the essence of the thing itself, the sight of that essence must necessarily produce these effects: Hence, since God is essential goodness, and essential goodness must cause joy in its beholder, the Divine Essence cannot be seen by any one without causing in him joy. Consequently the Divine Essence will not be beheld by the wicked. They will most certainly know that Christ is God, not however by seeing His Divinity, but by most manifest signs of that Divinity.

DCLXXII. All things corporeal are believed to have been made by reason of man, and hence they are all said to be subject unto him. They serve man in two ways. In one way, in order

to the sustentation of corporeal life; in another, in order to increase in the knowledge of God; for, as S. Paul said to the Romans, "The invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His Eternal Power and Godhead." Of the first ministry of creatures, glorified man will no longer in any way stand in need, seeing his body will then be altogether incorruptible, an estate effected by the Divine power through the soul, which it immediately glorifies. Of the second ministry, man will not stand in need, as to intellective cognition, for by such cognition the saints will see God immediately and by essence. But to beholding the Divine Essence the eye of flesh could not attain, and therefore, in order to afford it a solace corresponding to the vision of Divinity, it will behold Divinity in its corporeal effects, in which will be apparent manifest signs of the Divine Majesty—principally, in the Flesh of Christ, thereafter in the bodies of the Blessed, and finally, in all other bodies. These other bodies will receive a greater influence from the Divine goodness than now, not indeed varying their species, but adding to them a perfection of glory. And this will be the renewal of the world.

Since the world was made because of man, it is fitting that the world should be renewed at

the same time that man will be glorified. And so it is written in the prophecy of Isaiah, "Behold, I create a new heavens and a new earth, and the former shall not be remembered, nor come into mind." And again, by S. John the Divine, in the Revelation of Jesus Christ, "I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth were passed away."

DCLXXIII. The dwelling ought to correspond to the dweller therein. But the world was made to be the dwelling of man. Man will be renewed, and therefore so will also the world.

DCLXXIV. "Every animal loveth his like," says the Son of Sirach, for likeness is included in the idea of love. Man has a certain likeness to the universe, and hence he is called a little world. Man therefore naturally loves the universe; and so desires its good. To satisfy this desire of man, the universe will be improved.

DCLXXV. The disposition to newness will not be natural, neither will it be against nature, but it will be above and beyond nature, or supernatural, as grace and glory are above the nature of the soul. It will be effected by a perpetual agent, which will also perpetually preserve it.

DCLXXVI. Although insensible bodies cannot, properly speaking, merit that glory, yet man merits that that glory be conferred upon the universe, in order to the increase of his own.

DCLXXVII. The heavenly bodies having, like other corporeal bodies, been made for the service of man, therefore, inasmuch as glorified man will not need their service any longer, the motion of the heavenly bodies will, not from any natural cause, but by an operation of the Divine Will, cease on his elevation to the estate of glory.

DCLXXVIII. It is written in the Apocalypse, that the angel which S. John saw stand upon the sea and upon the earth, lifted up his hand to Heaven, and swore by Him that liveth for ever and ever, Who created Heaven, and the things that therein are : and the earth, and the things that therein are ; and the sea, and the things that are therein, that there should be *time no longer*. Namely, after the seventh angel has sounded his trumpet, and the dead thereupon rise, as S. Paul wrote to the Corinthians. But if there be no time, there will be no motion of the heavenly bodies. The motion of the heavenly bodies will therefore cease.

DCLXXIX. Isaiah prophesied, "The sun shall no more go down, neither shall the moon withdraw itself." But the going down of the sun and the lessening of the moon is caused by the motion of the heavenly bodies. It will therefore cease.

DCLXXX. The motion of the heavenly bodies is ordained in order to the continuance of the

process of generation in the lower bodies. But generation will cease when the number of the elect is completed. And so will also cease the motion of the heavenly bodies.

DCLXXXI. Every motion is in order to some end. But every motion which exists by reason of an end, ceases when that end is attained. The motion of the heavenly bodies therefore, will either never attain to its end, and so have been ordained in vain; or it will one day cease.

DCLXXXII. Rest is more noble than motion, for things at rest have a greater likeness to God in Whom is supreme rest. But the motion of the lower bodies terminates naturally in rest. And therefore, the heavenly bodies being much more noble than these, their motion will naturally terminate in rest.

DCLXXXIII. Motion is not of the perfection of the heavenly bodies, save inasmuch as it makes them to be causes of generation in the lower bodies, and so, as it were, enables them to share in the causality of God. The cessation of their motion will therefore in no way affect the essential perfection of the heavenly bodies.

DCLXXXIV. The renewal of the world will be ordained in order that more manifestly, and as it were sensibly, God may be shewn forth thereby. Now the creature leads us to the knowledge of God chiefly by two things—its

form and its beauty. These respectively manifest the wisdom of the Maker and of the Governor, as it is written in the Book of Wisdom. By the greatness and beauty of the creatures proportionably the Maker of them is seen. But the beauty of the heavenly bodies principally consists in light, as says the Son of Sirach, "The beauty of heaven, the glory of the stars, an ornament giving light in the highest places of the Lord." And so in the great renewal, the chief melioration of the heavenly bodies will be as regards their brightness. But the measure and mode of that brightness is known to Him alone Who will be its author.

DCLXXXV. We have said, the whole world will be renewed for the better. But the heaven is the most noble part of the corporeal world. It will therefore be renewed for the better. But this it cannot be, save by a more brilliant splendency and a more magnificent brightness. And so, as Isaiah prophesied, "the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold, as the light of seven days, in the day that the Lord bindeth up the breach of His people, and healeth the stroke of their wound."

DCLXXXVI. S. Paul wrote to the Romans : "The earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God." But

the creature which was made subject unto vanity, and under the bondage of corruption, and which groaneth and travaileth in pain, and will so groan and travail even unto the end, would not long for the glory of the saints, unless somewhat were therefrom to accrue to itself. What will accrue to the heavenly creature, and that for which it longs, is an increase of that brightness which is its chiefest ornament.

DCLXXXVII. As is the relation of heavenly spirits to earthly, that is, to human spirits, so is also the relation of heavenly bodies to earthly bodies. And as the corporeal creature was made by reason of the spiritual creature, and is governed by it, so similarly things corporeal are disposed as are things spiritual. But in that Final Consummation of all things, the lower spirits will receive the properties of the higher spirits, for then, as S. Matthew recorded, Jesus said, "Men will be as the angels of God in heaven." Similarly also, since the lower bodies have nothing in common with the heavenly bodies save light and translucency, so the chief perfection of the lower bodies will be as regards their brightness. All the elements then will be clothed with a certain brightness, not equally, but each after its manner.

DCLXXXVIII. Since the renewal of the world is on account of man, it must needs be

conformed to the renewal of man himself. Now the renewed man will pass from a state of corruption to a state of incorruption, and of perpetual quiet, as S. Paul wrote to the Corinthians, "This corruption must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality." The world therefore will be so renewed that, delivered from all corruption, it will perpetually abide in quiet. Nothing then can be ordained towards that renewal save what has some relation to incorruption; and of this sort are the heavenly bodies, the elements, and men. The heavenly bodies are in their nature incorruptible, both in whole and in part. The elements are corruptible as to their parts, but incorruptible as to their whole. Men are corrupted both as to whole and as to parts, but this *ex parte* of their matter, and not *ex parte* of their form, the rational soul which after the corruption of the man remains incorrupted. Brute animals, plants, minerals, and all mixed bodies are corrupted both as to whole and as to part, and both *ex parte* of the matter which loses the form, and *ex parte* of the form which does not remain in act. As having therefore in no way any relation to incorruption, these will not remain in the renewal of the world.

DCLXXXIX. The perpetuity of the species of animals and plants and other corruptible

things is not preserved save by the continuation of the motion of the heavenly bodies. That will cease. And so will they.

DCXC. When the end ceases to exist, that also ceases to exist which is ordained in order to that end. Now the plants and animals were made in order to the sustaining of the *animal* life in man. After his renewal, this *animal* life will not remain. And therefore this necessity will not continue for the existence of plants and animals.

DCXCI. Since the Last End and highest happiness of human life is to see God, it is to be believed that it is possible for the human intellect to attain to the vision of the Divine Essence.

DCXCII. S. Paul wrote to the Corinthians, "Now we see through a glass, and in an enigma, but then face to face." Now that which is seen face to face is seen by essence. And so God will be seen by essence by the Saints in Fatherland.

Again, it is written by S. John, "When He shall appear, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is." Therefore we shall see Him by essence.

And Jesus said, as S. John also records, "He that loveth Me shall be loved of My Father. And I will love him and will manifest Myself unto him." But that which is manifested is seen essentially. And therefore God will be seen *essentially* by His Saints in their Fatherland.

DCXCIII. The desire of the Saints cannot be altogether in vain. But the common desire of the Saints is to see God *by essence*, as Moses said unto the Lord, when he spake with Him face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend, "I beseech Thee, shew me Thy Glory." And as David says, in the Psalms, "Shew the light of Thy Countenance, and we shall be whole." And as Philip said unto Jesus, "Lord, shew us the Father, and it sufficeth us." The Saints therefore will see God *by essence*.

DCXCIV. "No man hath seen God at any time," as S. John says, either, 1, by corporeal vision; or, 2, by intellectual vision, while yet in mortal flesh; or, 3, by the vision of comprehension; for the incomprehensible Essence of Divinity cannot be comprehended by created intellect; and so the Evangelist adds, "The only-begotten Son, which is in the Bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him."

DCXCV. As God exceeds all existences which have a determinate being, by His Infinite Essence; so His knowledge (*cognitio*) whereby He knows is above all knowledge. And the proportion of our knowledge to our created essence, is the proportion of the Divine Knowledge to the Infinite Essence. In knowledge two things concur—he who knows, and that whereby the thing is known. Now that vision

wherewith we shall see God by essence, is the same with the vision wherewith God beholds Himself, *ex parte* of that whereby God is seen : for, as He sees Himself by His Essence, so by His Essence shall we also see Him. But *ex parte* of him who knows, there is found the same diversity as exists between the Divine Intellect and our own. Now in knowing, that which is known follows the form whereby we know, as by the form of a stone we see a stone, but efficacy in knowing follows the virtue or power of him who knows. As he who has the strongest eyesight sees the most acutely. In the Beatific Vision, therefore, we shall see the same as God sees, to wit, His Essence, but not so efficaciously.

DCXCVI. In no way will the Blessed after the Resurrection see God by corporeal vision ;— see God, that is, *per se* : they will *per accidens*, to wit, in His creatures, and principally in the glorious Body of Christ.

DCXCVII. God, by beholding His Own Essence, has knowledge of all things which are, or were, or will be : and thus He is said to know by the *knowledge of vision*. But besides this, He has knowledge of all things which it is possible for Him to do, although He may have never done them and may never do them, otherwise He would not have perfect knowledge of

His Own Power, for power cannot be known unless the objects of power be known; and thus He is said to know by the *knowledge of simple intelligence*. This latter knowledge is impossible to created intellect: but not so the knowledge of vision. All those things which God knows by the knowledge of vision, a created intellect, to wit, that of the Human Soul of Christ, knows in the Word. But glorified souls, other than that of Christ, although they see God by Essence, yet do not see all things that God sees, inasmuch as they do not comprehend the Divine Essence. For it is not necessary that he who knows the cause should know all its effects, unless he comprehends the cause, to do which does not belong to the created intellect; and therefore one who sees God by essence, discerns more things in that Essence the more clearly he beholds It. Hence it is that as to these things one may instruct another, and so the knowledge of angels and of holy souls may be increased even to the Day of Judgment, as will all those other things which appertain to accidental reward. But beyond that there will be no farther progress, for then will be the last state of things; and in that state it is possible that all men should know all things which God knows by the knowledge of vision.

DCXCVIII. Every kind of knowledge where-

by the created intellect is perfected, is ordained in order to the knowledge of God as to an end. And so he who sees God by essence, even if he should know nothing more, would have a perfect understanding ; nor would it be made more perfect by a further knowledge of the creature unless that gave a fuller knowledge of the Creator. In this light, S. Augustine says in his Confessions, “ Wretched is the man who knows all created things, and knows not Thee ; but blessed is the man who knows Thee even if he knows not them. And he who knows both Thee and them is not more blessed because of them, but is blessed because of Thee alone.”

DCXCIX. The desire of the Saints to know all things will be fulfilled by their vision and knowledge of God, just as their desire to have all good things will be fulfilled by their possession of God : to the knowledge and possession of Whom the knowledge and possession of all good things is ordained as a means towards an end.

DCC. Our bodies will be conformed to the Body of Christ in glory according to similitude, but not according to equality, for they will be bright as is the Body of Christ, but not of an equal brightness. Similarly our souls will have a glory, not equal to, but after the similitude of, the Soul of Christ. And so likewise they will have a knowledge as has the Soul of Christ, but

not so great a knowledge, to wit, that they should know all things as does that Soul.

DCCI. There is nothing to prevent our saying that, after the Day of Judgment, when the glory of men and of angels will be entirely consummated, all the Blessed will know all things which God knows by His knowledge of vision, in such wise, however, that they do not all see all things in the Divine Essence. But the Soul of Christ will there fully see all things, as also It now sees: and others will see there some more, some fewer, things, according to the degree of clearness wherewith they see and know God. And so the Soul of Christ will enlighten all others with regard to those things which, above all others, It sees in the Word. This is what S. John means when, in the Revelation of Jesus Christ, he says, "The glory of God will lighten the City, and the Lamb will be the light thereof."

Similarly, the other superior beings will enlighten their inferiors, not, indeed, by a new illumination, but by a continuation of illumination, as the sun enlightens the atmosphere. And so it is written in the Book of Daniel, "They that be wise and teachers shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever."

DCCII. It is clear that the beatitude of the Saints, after the resurrection, will be increased

extensive; for there will then be beatitude, not only in the soul, but also in the body. And the beatitude of the soul itself will also be increased *extensive*, inasmuch as the soul will rejoice, not only at its own good, but at the good of its body as well. It may be said, moreover, that the beatitude of the soul itself will be increased *extensive*. The body of man may be considered in two ways. In one way, as it is perfectible by its soul. In another way, according as there is in it something repugnant to the soul in its operations, in proportion as the body is not entirely perfected by the soul. Now, according to the first consideration of the body, the union of the body with the soul adds to the soul a certain perfection; for every part is imperfect, and the part is completed in the whole. Hence, also, the relation of the whole to the parts is as the relation of the form to the matter. The soul, therefore, is more perfect in its natural being when it is in its whole, to wit, in a man composed of soul and body, than when it is a separate part. But in regard of the second consideration, the union of the body hinders the perfection of the soul. And so it is said in the Book of Wisdom, "The corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind." If, therefore, there is removed from the body all whereby it resists the

action of the soul, the soul will *simpliciter* be more perfect as existing in such a body than as separated therefrom. Moreover, the more perfect a person or thing is in being, the more perfect he or it is in operation. Hence, also, the operation of a soul conjoined with such a body will be more perfect than the operation of a separated soul. Now, the glorious body, which is wholly subdued to the spirit, will be a body of this sort; and hence, since beatitude consists in operation, the beatitude of the soul will be more perfect after the resurrection of the body than before. For, as the soul, separated from the corruptible body, can operate more perfectly than when conjoined with it, so, after it has been conjoined with the glorious body, its operation will be more perfect than when it was separated. Every imperfect thing also desires its perfection, and therefore the separated soul naturally desires conjunction with the body, and by reason of this desire proceeding from imperfection, its operation whereby it is borne towards God is less extensive.

DCCIII. Beatitude will be given to the good for a reward, as misery will be given to the wicked for a punishment. But the misery of the wicked after the resurrection will be greater than before it, for then they will be punished, not in soul only, but in body also. And so the

beatitude of the Saints will be greater after the resurrection of their bodies than before.

S. John, in the Revelation of Jesus Christ, saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain for the Word of God, and for the testimony which they held. The expression *under the altar* denotes the lower dignity which they now enjoy, compared with that which will be theirs hereafter.

DCCIV. A soul united to a glorious body is more like to God than a separated soul, inasmuch as it is more perfect; and the more perfect a thing is, the more like it is to God. Thus the heart, the perfection of whose life consists in motion, is more like to God when in motion than when at rest, although in God there is no motion, but all is rest.

DCCV. Local motion is prior to all other motions; and so the names—motion, distance, and the like, have been derived from local motion to all other motions. Now the end of local motion is a place, at which when aught arrives it remains there quiescent, and is preserved there in rest. In every motion, therefore, there is in the end of that motion a quiet or rest, which we call a *collocation* or *mansion*. And so, since the name of motion is derived to acts of the appetite and the will, the attainment of the end of the motion of the appetite is called

a mansion or collocation in that end; and further, diverse modes of attaining a last end are called diverse mansions. In this way the unity of a house corresponds to the unity of beatitude which exists *ex parte* of its object, and the plurality of mansions corresponds to the difference which is found in the beatitude *ex parte* of the Blessed, whose various degrees of blessedness are spoken of as various mansions.

DCCVI. Those who were in *Limbus* or are now in Purgatory had not or have not attained to their end; and therefore in *Limbus* and in Purgatory there is no distinction of mansions, but only in Paradise and in Hell, where is the end respectively of the good and of the evil.

DCCVII. Seeing a reward is rendered to men's works, inasmuch as they are informed by charity, so according to the diverse degrees of charity in the Saints will be their diverse mansions in the kingdom of Heaven.

The more closely one is united to God, the more blessed will he be; but union with God is by way of charity: and so, according to the difference of charity will be the diversity of beatitude.

DCCCVIII. Nothing may be taken away from the Blessed which pertains to the perfection of their blessedness. But as contraries are made most manifest by their juxta-position, so

it is given to the Blessed to have a perfect view of the punishments of the damned, in order that they may, by way of contrast, enjoy the more their own blessedness, and also be drawn to give to God more hearty thanks for their possession of the same.

This Isaiah prophesied when he wrote, "All flesh shall come to worship before Me, saith the Lord, and they shall go forth and look upon the carcasses of the men that have transgressed against Me, for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched, and they shall be an abhorring unto all flesh."

DCCIX. Pity or compassion occurs in two ways: in one by way of suffering, in the other by way of choice or election. But in the Blessed there will be no suffering (*passio*) in the lower parts, save as following or consequent on an election or choice of the reason. Now, so long as sinners are in the world, they are in an estate wherein they may, without prejudice to the Divine Justice, be translated to beatitude from an estate of misery and sin: and so the compassion of the Blessed has place with regard to them, both according to election or choice of the will, as God, the angels, and the saints are said to have compassion on them by willing their salvation; and according to suffering, as good men yet in the Way are said to have compassion upon them.

But in the future, the damned can in no way be translated from their miseries, and therefore with these miseries there can be no compassion by way of choice or election of right reason. The Saints in glory will then have no compassion on the damned.

DCCX. Whoso has compassion on another, is in a manner partaker of his misery. But the Blessed cannot be partakers of any misery. And so they have no compassion on the miseries of the damned.

DCCXI. The Saints in the kingdom of Heaven will rejoice at the punishments of the damned, not *per se*, but *per accidens*, as contemplating in them the Divine Justice, and as thankful for their own deliverance. And so it is written in the Book of Psalms, "The just shall rejoice when he seeth the vengeance."

DCCXII. To rejoice at the evil of another, belongs to hatred; but it does not belong to hatred to rejoice at something connected with that evil. One may rejoice at one's own afflictions as a source of merit. S. James says, "My brethren, count it all joy when ye fall into divers temptations."

DCCXIII. To the Saints in Paradise are divinely given certain adornments, which are by theologians called their marriage-gifts or dowries, (*dotes*,) in regard of the spiritual matrimony

between Christ the Heavenly Bridegroom, and His Spouse, the holy soul.

DCCXIV. This gift is not the same as beatitude. Beatitude consists in operation, that perfect operation whereby the holy soul is united to God ; but this gift is not an operation, it is rather a habit or disposition or quality, which is ordained in order to that operation : so that those gifts are rather ordained towards beatitude, than in beatitude as its parts.

A gift is given without merit ; but beatitude is *not given*, but rendered for merit : and so beatitude is not a gift.

Further, beatitude is one, gifts are many ; and so beatitude is not a gift. Beatitude, properly speaking, is not an ornament of the soul, but something which arises from the adornment of the soul. Beatitude is not ordained in order to union, but is itself the union of the soul with Christ. Towards this union, which is by operation, the gifts dispose.

DCCXV. These gifts, *as such*, either did not belong to Christ at all, or at any rate not in suchwise as to other saints ; although what are called gifts belong to Him in the very highest manner.

It does not belong to the same person both to give and to receive the same gifts ; but it is

Christ Who gives spiritual gifts : and so it does not belong to Christ to receive them.

DCCXVI. Since there is required between bridegroom and bride a conformity of nature, that they should both be of one and the same species, and since Christ is not conformed to angels by unity of species, either according to His Divine Nature or according to His Human Nature, the idea of dowry or marriage-gift, (*dos*,) does not belong to angels so properly as to men. Since, however, in those things which are said metaphorically, similitude as to all things is not required, it cannot be concluded from some dissimilitude that one thing may not metaphorically be predicated of another ; and so we may not say simply that the marriage-gifts do not belong to angels, but only that they do not, by reason of the aforesaid dissimilitude, belong to them so properly as to men.

DCCXVII. Origen, commenting on the Canticles, distinguishes four persons, the bridegroom, the bride, the maidens, and the friends of the bridegroom. He says that the friends of the bridegroom are the angels. But a dowry is not due save to the bride. And so to the angels these gifts do not belong.

DCCXVIII. Christ espoused the Church to Himself by His Incarnation and Passion ; as was prefigured by the words of Zipporah to

Moses, "Surely a bloody husband art thou to me." But Christ by His Incarnation and Passion was in nowise more united to the angels than He was before. The angels therefore do not belong to the Church in that sense according to which the Church is called a Spouse : and therefore to the angels these dowries do not belong.

DCCXIX. There are three marriage-gifts of the soul in Heaven, namely, vision, comprehension, and fruition : and these three correspond to the three theological virtues of the soul on earth, namely, vision to faith, comprehension to hope, and fruition to charity.

These *dotes* are somewhat inhering to the nature, whereby that nature is ordained in order to the operation wherein its beatitude consists.

DCXX. The essential reward of man, which is his beatitude, consists in the perfect union of his soul with God, inasmuch as it perfectly enjoys Him, as perfectly seen and loved. This reward is metaphorically called a crown, and a golden crown, *corona aurea*, both *ex parte* of the merit of the fight, for the life of man on the earth is a warfare ; and *ex parte* of the reward, whereby man is made, in a manner, partaker of Divinity, and, consequently, of royal power ; as it is written in the Revelation : "Thou hast made us unto our God kings and priests." But a

crown is the proper sign of royal power: and for the same reason, *accidental* reward, which is added to and is over and above *essential* reward, partakes of the idea of a crown. A crown signifies also perfection, by reason of its circular figure. But, inasmuch as nothing can be superadded to the essential but that which is less than it, so superadded accidental reward is called, not *aurea*, but *aureola*.

DCCXXI. The *aurea* is given to all, the *aureola* to some only. The *aureola*, therefore, is sometimes different from, and over and above, the *aurea*.

DCCXXII. To the fight which is followed by victory, a crown is due. Where the fight is of a special nature, there is due a special crown. This special crown is called *aureola*.

DCCXXIII. Beatitude includes within itself all good things which are necessary in order to the perfect life of man, which consists in his perfect operation. But some things may be superadded, not as necessary to perfect operation, so that without them that could not be, but because, by the addition of them, his beatitude would be the brighter. These pertain to the—not being, but—well-being of beatitude, and become it, in like manner as political felicity is adorned by nobility, and bodily felicity by beauty, without which, however, both might have exist-

ence. This, then, is the relation of the *aureola* to the beatitude of our Fatherland.

DCCXXIV. Charity is the first principle of meriting, but our act is, as it were, the instrument whereby we merit. Now, in order to the attainment of an effect, there is required, not only due disposition in the prime mover, but also right disposition in the instrument. And therefore in the effect somewhat is obtained *ex parte* of the first principle, which is the principal effect, and somewhat *ex parte* of the instrument, which is the secondary effect. Hence, in man's reward there is somewhat *ex parte* of charity, to wit, the *aurea*, and somewhat *ex genere* of operation, to wit, the *aureola*.

DCCXXV. Spiritual fruit differs from both *aurea* and *aureola*. The *aurea* consists in the joy that one has in God; the *aureola*, in the joy that one has in the perfection of His works: the *fruit*, in the joy that he has in his own disposition as worker, according to the degree of spirituality which has grown from the seed of the Word of God sown in his heart.

DCCXXVI. Whatsoever things are not of the same division are also not of the same idea. But the fruit and the *aureola* are not of the same division, for the *aureola* is divided into the *aureola* of virgins, of martyrs, and of doctors; but the fruit, into the fruit of spouses, of widows,

and of virgins. And so the fruit and the *aureola* are not one and the same.

If the fruit and the *aureola* were one and the same, then to whomsoever the fruit was due there would be due also the *aureola*. But this is not so, for the fruit is due to widowhood, while the *aureola* is not. They are, therefore, not identical.

DCCXXVII. Although the *aureola* be an accidental reward superadded to essential reward, yet not every accidental reward is an *aureola*, but only the reward of the works of perfection whereby a man is chiefly conformed to Christ, according to perfect victory.

DCCXXVIII. Since the fruit is a reward which is due to a man in that he has passed from the carnal to the spiritual life, therefore the fruit principally corresponds to that virtue which principally sets a man free from his subjection to the flesh. This continence does: for by venereal delectations the soul is principally, as by carnal acts it is entirely, subdued to the flesh. To continence, therefore, the fruit corresponds more than to any other virtue.

DCCXXIX. Through continence, to which the fruit corresponds, a man is brought, by the casting away of carnality, to a certain spirituality. And therefore, according to diverse modes of the spirituality which continence causes, there are

distinguished diverse fruits. For one spirituality is necessary, while another is superabundant. The necessary spirituality consists in this, that the rectitude of the spirit is not perverted by the delectation of the flesh. This occurs when one, in accordance with right reason, uses the delectations of the flesh. This is the spirituality of spouses. Superabundant spirituality is that whereby a man wholly withdraws himself from such delectations of the flesh as suffocate the spirit. This occurs in two ways; either in respect of all time—past, present, and to come, which is the spirituality of virgins; or in respect of a certain time, which is the spirituality of widows. To those who observe conjugal continence is given the thirtyfold fruit; to those who observe the continence of widows, the sixtyfold fruit; and to those who observe the continence of virgins, the fruit an hundredfold.

DCCXXX. Since by virginity there is obtained a singular victory over the flesh, there is due to virginity a special crown, which is called *aureola*. It is due of merit to those virgins who have had the purpose of perpetually preserving their virginity, whether that purpose has been confirmed by vow or not.

DXXXI. In keeping continence, the struggle of virgins is greater in one way, and that by

widows in another. A longing to experience the delectation, arising from curiosity, inflames the concupiscence of virgins, and sometimes also an expectation of greater pleasure than in reality exists, and a want of allowance for the drawbacks connected with it. In these ways the struggle of virgins to preserve continence is greater than that of widows: but the struggle of widows is greater by reason of their remembrance of past delectation. But whatever may be said as to the struggle, it is certain that the victory of virgins is more perfect than that of widows, and the crown is due, not to the struggle, but to the victory. To virgins, therefore, more than to widows, the *aureola* is due.

DCCXXXII. The Blessed Virgin has the *aureola* in order that in this she might be conformed to the other members of the Church in whom is found virginity; not that she had any struggle with the temptation which is from the flesh, for she was free from that *fomes* whence it springs. But she had to struggle with that temptation which is from the enemy, from which not even Christ Himself was free.

DCCXXXIII. The *aureola* is not due to virginity save inasmuch as it adds an excellence beyond the other degrees of continence. Now, if Adam had not sinned, virginity would have had no perfection beyond that of conjugal conti-

nence, for, there existing no foulness of concupiscence, nuptials would then have been honourable, and the marriage vow immaculate. In that case virginity would not have been preserved, neither would there have been due to it the *aureola*. Hence in the estate of innocence it was of precept to increase and multiply and replenish the earth. But the condition of human nature having been changed, virginity has a special comeliness, and so there is rendered to it a special reward. In the time of the Law of Moses, the number of the worshippers of the true God had to be increased by means of natural propagation, and so the barren were held accursed. It was therefore at that time not reckoned praiseworthy to abstain from marriage, nor was there a special reward attached to the purpose of virginity, unless it had proceeded from a Divine instinct, as in the cases of Jeremiah and Elias, of whom we do not read that they were married.

DCCXXXIV. A virgin ravished by violence and without any consent of her will, loses neither her virginity nor the *aureola* due to virginity by reason of her purpose of perpetually preserving continence. And this whether she suffered violence for the faith or otherwise. If for the faith, then her suffering is meritorious and pertains to martyrdom. And so S. Lucy said, "If

you violate me against my will, my chastity will merit me a double crown.”

DCCXXXV. To martyrs, as victors in the fight against external passions or sufferings, of which the greatest is death, the aureola is due as well as to virgins, the victors in the fight against internal passions, the greatest of which is concupiscence. And thus both by reason of the greatness of the suffering, and by reason of the greatness of Him for Whose cause they suffer—even Jesus.

DCCXXXVI. As the delectation of touch exceeds all other delectations, so does the pain of touch exceed all other pains. As the aureola is due to him who overcomes the delectation of touch by chastity, so it is also due to him who overcomes the pain of touch by martyrdom.

DCCXXXVII. As by martyrdom and virginity one obtains a most perfect victory over the world and the flesh, so also is there obtained a most perfect victory over the devil, when one does not only not yield to him, but expels him, and that not only from himself but from others. This is done by preaching and doctrine. And so to preaching and doctrine the aureola is due, as it is to virginity and martyrdom. Nor is it to be said, as some say, that it is due only to prelates, to whom it belongs *ex officio* to preach

and teach, but to all who lawfully exercise this function. Moreover it is not due to prelates, although the function of preaching belongs to them, unless they actually exercise it, for the crown is not due to a habit, but to an actual struggle, as S. Paul said to S. Timothy, "A man is not crowned, except he strive lawfully."

DCCXXVIII. Although the *aurea* is due to Christ inasmuch as He strenuously strove and overcame, yet the *aureola* is not due to Him, because the *aureola* denotes a participation of perfect victory, and this does not belong to Christ, in Whom exists the plenitude of perfect victory, of which all other victors are but partakers: as it is written, Jesus said, "Be of good cheer, I have overcome the world." And again in the Revelation, one of the elders said unto S. John, "Weep not, behold the Lion of the tribe of Judah hath prevailed." And unto the Angel of the Church of the Laodiceans, S. John was commanded to write, "To him that overcometh will I grant to sit with Me in My Throne, even as I also overcame, and am set down with My Father in His Throne."

DCCXXXIX. Christ was most truly both Virgin, and Martyr, and Doctor, but yet the accidental reward corresponding to these in Christ has no notable quantity in comparison with the magnitude of the essential reward. And

so He does not have the *aureola* in the strict sense of that word.

DCCXL. The *aureola* is not due to angels, for it properly corresponds to some super-excellent meritorious perfection, and those things which in men belong to perfection of merit are connatural to angels, either as common to their estate or as pertaining to their essential reward. For instance, virginity is called the life of angels, inasmuch as by grace virgins imitate that which angels have by nature. Abstinence from carnal delectation is no virtue in angels, because such delectations are not possible in them.

Moreover it is written, "A man is not crowned, except he strive lawfully;" but in the angels there is no struggle: and so to them no *aureola* is due.

DCCXLI. The *aureola* is properly in the mind (*in mente*), for it is a joy concerning those works for which the *aureola* is due. But as from the joy of essential reward, which is the *aurea*, there redounds a certain comeliness to the body, which is the glory of the body, so from the joy of the *aureola* there results also a comeliness to the body. But be it observed, the *aureola* is principally in the mind, and only by a redundancy shines out in the flesh.

The souls which are now in Paradise have



aureolas. But they have not bodies, and so the proper subject of the *aureola* is, not the body, but the soul.

All merit is from the soul; therefore all reward ought to be in the soul.

DCCXLII. The ornament of their wounds, which will appear in the bodies of the martyrs, cannot be called *aureola*; for some martyrs will have the *aureola* in whose bodies will appear no wounds, as those who have suffered by drowning or starvation.

DCCXLIII. There are three *aureolas*, those of virgins, martyrs, and doctors. And they correspond to their three struggles with and victories over the flesh, the world, and the devil respectively. They correspond also, as some say, to the three forces (*vires*) of the soul, the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible. The chief act of the rational is to diffuse to others the verities of the Faith; and to this act is due the *aureola* of the doctors. The chief act of the irascible is to overcome death for Christ; and to this act is due the *aureola* of the martyrs. The chief act of the concupiscible is wholly to abstain from the delectations of the flesh; and to this act is due the *aureola* of the virgins. Others distinguish the three *aureolas* according to those things whereby we are most chiefly conformed to Christ. He was

a Doctor in that He manifested to the world the truth which He had received from the Father. He was a Martyr inasmuch as He suffered persecution from the world. He was a Virgin inasmuch as He preserved purity in Himself. And so to doctors, martyrs, and virgins as conformed to Him, above their fellows, are due their respective *aureolas*.

DCCXLIV. Since the struggle of the martyrs is the greatest and most vehement, their *aureola* is, speaking *simpliciter*, above all others the chiefest.

DCCXLV. Since merit is the cause of reward, by reason of the diversity of merits there must be a corresponding diversity of rewards, and so one may possess the *aureola* in a manner more excellent than that in which it is given to another.

DCCXLVI. As the damned have sinned by many and various sins, so by many and various pains will they be afflicted.

DCCXLVII. S. Basil says, that "in the last purification of the world there will be a separation of the elements. Whatever is pure and noble will be for the glory of the Blessed; whatever is impure and ignoble will be for the torment of the damned."

DCCXLVIII. As the sinner cleaves to the material and seeks in it his end, so it is just

that by means of the material he should be punished : as it is written, " Upon the ungodly He shall rain snares, fire and brimstone, storm and tempest ; this shall be their portion to drink."

DCCXLIX. After the day of judgment there will exist no animal or mixed body, save and except the body of man only ; and so the worm which will then afflict the damned will not be a material worm, but a spiritual worm, that is, remorse of conscience. It is called a worm, both because it springs from the putrescence of sin, and because it will afflict the soul by piercing it, as a corporeal worm does the body. It will afflict also the flesh in so far and in like manner as the passions of the soul redound to the body.

DCCL. In bodily weeping there is a resolution of tears. This cannot be in the damned, because, after the Day of Judgment there will be neither generation, corruption, nor corporeal alteration, no humours, and no restoration by food. But there will be that commotion and perturbation of the head and eyes which accompanies the shedding of tears.

DCCLI. The pain of punishment corresponds to the delectation of sin. The latter was both external and internal, bodily and spiritual : so will be the former.

DCCLII. It is written in the Book of Psalms that "The Voice of the Lord divideth the flames of fire." On this S. Basil says that by the power of God the brightness of fire will be separated from its burning qualities. The one will be for the joy of the Blessed; the other for the torment of the damned.

DCCLIII. Vision considered absolutely (*secundum se*) is delectable; but considered relatively (*per accidens vel secundum quid*) it may be afflictive, that is, when it is exercised on what is hurtful or repugnant to the beholder. Although from its position in the centre of the earth, the fire of hell is feculent, turbid, and smoky, whence it is called the place of darkness; yet there is just so much light in hell as to reveal to its inhabitants those objects the sight of which will torment them.

DCCLIV. There must be corporeal punishment for a corporeal being, and so the fire of hell must be corporeal. S. Gregory proves the corporeal nature of the fire of hell from the fact that the reprobate after the resurrection will be cast into hell.

DCCLV. As the bodies of the damned will be of the same species as they are now, so will the fire wherewith they will be tormented in hell be of the same species as that which we

have among us, although certain of its properties will be different.

DCCLVI. As S. Augustine says, "In what part of the universe hell is situated no man can know for certain, save he be taught by the Holy Spirit." And S. Gregory, when questioned on the subject, says, "As to this I dare not rashly define. Some have thought hell to be situated somewhere on the surface of the earth. Others have supposed it to be under the earth." This latter opinion appears to be the more probable for two reasons. 1. From its name (*infernum, quia inferius jacet*). 2. From what is written in the Revelation, "No man in heaven, nor in earth, neither under the earth, was able to open and to read the book, neither to look thereon." By those in heaven he refers to the angels; by those on earth to men living in the body; by those under the earth to souls in hell.

S. Augustine gives two reasons why it is fitting that hell should be under the earth. 1. Since the souls of the dead have sinned by the love of the flesh, they are treated as dead flesh is wont to be treated, that is, they are deposited beneath the earth. 2. What heaviness is to bodies, that sorrow is to souls; and what lightness is to bodies that joy is to souls. And as lightness bears the body which it characterizes upwards, so does heaviness bear the body which it

characterizes downwards. It is fitting then that the damned should have their place in the lower parts of the earth, even as it is fitting that the blessed have their place in the celestial empyrean.

DCCLVII. Two wills have to be considered in the damned, namely, the deliberative will, and the natural will. The natural will is not in them from themselves, but from the author of their nature, who in nature has placed the inclination which is called the natural will. And hence, since their nature remains to them, there may remain in them a good natural will. But the deliberative will is in them from themselves, and, according to it, it is in their power to be inclined by their affections to the one side or to the other. Such a will is in the damned altogether evil. As the will of the Blessed is towards good, so is the will of the damned towards evil; but the Blessed have never any evil will, so neither will the damned have ever any good will.

DCCLVIII. One may repent of a sin in two ways. In one way, *per se*; in another way, *per accidens*. One repents of a sin *per se* who abominates the sin as sin. One repents of a sin *per accidens* who hates it by reason of its adjuncts, as punishment, or the like. The damned will not repent of sins *per se*, but *per accidens* only, by reason of the pains they

suffer, and which their sins have brought upon them.

DCCLIX. *Non-existence* may be considered in two ways. In one way *secundum se*, and in this way non-existence is not desirable, as it contains in itself no good, but is purely a privation of good. It may be considered in another way, inasmuch as it prevents penal life or misery, and so non-existence is, in a manner, a good thing, for, as the Philosopher says, "The lack of evil is a good." In this sense, it would be better for the damned not to exist than to exist in misery, and therefore they might choose and desire non-existence by an act of their deliberative reason. And so Jesus said of Judas, "It had been good for that man that he had not been born." And in the prophecy of Jeremiah it is written, "Cursed be the day wherein I was born." And in the Revelation, "In those days shall men seek death, and shall not find it; and shall desire to die, and death shall flee from them." In Ecclesiasticus also, "O Death, acceptable is thy sentence unto the needy, and unto him whose strength faileth, that is now in the last age, and is vexed with all things, and to him that despaireth and hath lost patience."

DCCLX. As among the Blessed in their Fatherland there will exist the most perfect

charity, so among the damned in outer darkness there will exist the most perfect hatred. As the Saints will rejoice at the good of all, so at all good will the reprobates grieve, and chiefly will they be afflicted by the felicity of the Saints and long for their damnation.

DCCLXI. One's affections are moved by his apprehension of either good or evil. Now God is apprehended in two ways. In one way *in Se*, as He is by the Blessed, who see Him by essence; in another, by the effects which He causes, as He is seen by us and by the damned. Being in Himself essential goodness, those who see Him by essence cannot hate Him, for goodness can displease no one. But the wicked do not see God by essence, and they do see Him by His effects; and by reason of one effect in particular, to wit, His Justice, which they perceive in their own punishment, they hate God, as it is written in the Psalms, "The presumption of them that hate Thee increaseth ever more and more."

DCCLXII. A distinction must be made between the damned before the day of judgment and the damned after that time. All agree that after the day of judgment there will be neither merit nor demerit, for merit and demerit are ordained in order to the attainment of some ulterior good or evil respectively, and after the

day of judgment there will be an ultimate consummation of both good and evil, to neither of which can aught be thereafter added. Hence a good will will in the Blessed not be a merit but a reward, while a bad will will, in the damned be not a demerit but a punishment only; for the operations of virtue are, as it is said in the Ethics, chiefly in felicity, while their contraries are chiefly in misery. But before the day of judgment, some say that the Blessed merit and that the damned demerit. But this cannot be in respect of essential reward or principal punishment, since with regard to these both have arrived at their term or end. But it may be in respect of accidental reward or secondary punishment, both of which may be increased up to the day of judgment. And this is especially true of the demons and of the good angels. By their offices some are drawn to salvation, and so the joy of the blessed angels is added to, and some to damnation, so the pains of the demons are increased.

DCCLXIII. As, in order to the perfect beatitude of the Saints, there will be nothing in them which is not to them matter of joy, so in order to the perfect misery of the damned there will be nothing in them which is not to them matter of sorrow. Now the consideration of things which one has formerly known, may

cause in one joy or sorrow, and either in two ways. 1. *Ex parte* of the thing known, as loved or hated for its own sake. 2. *Ex parte* of the manner of knowing, which is either perfect or imperfect. And so in the damned there will be actual consideration of those things which they have previously known, as matter of sorrow, but not as a cause of delectation. For they will consider both what evils they have done for which they have been damned, and the delectable goods which they have lost, and by both considerations they will be tormented. Similarly they will be tormented by the consideration that the knowledge which they had of things speculative was imperfect, and that they had lost the highest perfection of knowledge to which they might have attained.

DCCLXIV. In no way may the damned meditate on God *secundum Se*, and according to that which is proper and special to Himself—namely, to be the only principle and sole source of goodness; for such a meditation, concerning, as it would, essential goodness, could not be made without delectation. But the damned may and will meditate on God *per accidens*, that is, with regard to effects which He causes, as for instance, His punishment of themselves: and such considerations of God will cause sorrow.

DCCLXV. Before the day of judgment, the damned will see the Saints in glory, not that they will have knowledge of their glory, what it is, but they will know them to be living in an inestimable glory. And this knowledge will trouble them both as exciting their envy, and causing them to grieve at the felicity of others, and as exciting the thought that this glory they themselves have lost, and so it is written in the Book of Wisdom, "When the wicked shall see it, they shall be troubled with terrible fear, and shall be amazed at the strangeness of the salvation of the righteous man, so far beyond all that they looked for. And they repenting and groaning for anguish of spirit shall say within themselves, This was he whom we had sometime in derision, and a parable of reproach; we fools accounted his life madness and his end to be without honour: how is he numbered among the children of God, and his lot is among the Saints! Therefore have we erred from the way of truth, and the light of righteousness hath not shined unto us, and the Sun of Righteousness rose not upon us. We wearied ourselves in the way of wickedness and destruction, and were consumed in our own wickedness." But after the day of judgment the damned will be wholly deprived of the sight of the Blessed; yet will not their pains be thereby lessened, but

the rather increased, for they will have a remembrance of the glory of the Blessed which they have beheld either in the judgment or before the day of judgment; and this will be for their torment. A further affliction will be the reflection that they themselves are reckoned unworthy even to behold the glory which the Saints have merited to possess and enjoy.

DCCLXVI. Punishment may be greater or less both as to quality or severity and as to duration. It cannot be infinite in severity, because the creature is not capable of an infinite quality, and so it must be infinite in duration, if it is to be infinite at all. A venial sin is punished by a pain finite in duration, but a mortal sin is visited with eternal pains, or punishment of infinite duration. And this, 1. Because they have sinned against an eternal good, when they despised eternal life. 2. Because he who sins mortally establishes his end in the creature, and inasmuch as his whole life is ordained in order to the end of his life, he thus ordains his whole life in order to that sin, and wills perpetually to remain in sin, if he may do so with impunity. 3. Because the God Who is sinned against is infinite. 4. Because the guilt (*culpa*) remains to all eternity, since it cannot be remitted without grace, and man cannot after death acquire grace; and it is not fitting that the

punishment should cease so long as the guilt remains.

DCCLXVII. As reward stands to merit, so does punishment to guilt. But according to the Divine Justice, to a temporal merit there is due an eternal reward, as it is written by S. John, "Jesus said, This is the will of Him that sent Me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on Him, may have everlasting life." And so, according to the Divine Justice, to temporal guilt there is due eternal punishment.

DCCLXVIII. As the Philosopher teaches in the Ethics, punishment is calculated according to the dignity of him against whom the sin has been committed ; as, for instance, one who strikes a prince is punished with a heavier penalty than one who strikes a person of lower rank. But whosoever sins mortally, sins against God, Whose majesty is infinite. And so he is worthy of an infinite punishment. Justly, therefore, is perpetual punishment awarded for mortal sin.

DCCLXIX. It was an error of Origen's that the demons would, at some time, by the mercy of God be freed from punishment. But this error has been condemned by the Church for two reasons : 1. As manifestly repugnant to the authority of Holy Scripture, which in the Apocalypse declares that the Devil that deceived

was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever. 2. As good angels and good men have been made blessed by conversion to God, so have evil angels and evil men been made miserable by aversion from God. And as the beatitude of the Blessed will never have an end, so in like manner will it be with the misery of the damned.

DCCLXX. As S. John Damascene says, "That is death to men which was fall to the angels." But the fall of the angels was irreparable, and so will be the death of the souls of men which depart from the body without charity and obstinate in the malice of sin.

DCCLXXI. As prayer is not made for demons, so neither is it made for men who have died reprobate. They belong neither to the Church militant nor to the Church triumphant, and by neither are they prayed for.

DCCLXXII. Those Christians only who finally persevere in the Catholic faith, and are found free at the last from mortal sins, will be delivered from eternal punishment.

DCCLXXIII. Since nothing without charity can profit to the attaining of life eternal, neither faith nor works of mercy will deliver from eternal punishment those who have died in mortal sin.

It is written by S. James that "whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all." Whosoever, therefore, keeps the law as to works of mercy, and neglects other works, incurs liability to punishment for transgression of the whole law, and so will be punished eternally.

DCCLXXIV. It is foreign to the Catholic faith to deny that there is a Purgatory for the souls of the faithful who depart hence in the estate of grace.

DCCXXV. It is written in the Second Book of Maccabees, that "it is an holy and good thought to make reconciliation for the dead, that they may be delivered from sin." But we do not pray for the dead in Paradise, for they lack nothing. We therefore pray for the dead in Purgatory.

DCCLXXVI. As to the place of Purgatory, there is nothing in Holy Scripture expressly to determine it; nor are there reasons which would effectually settle it; but the probable opinion is, and it is one in consonance with the sayings of the Saints and with revelations made to many, that the place of Purgatory is twofold. One in or near to, or connected with Hell, in which in ordinary cases the just are purged, and with the same fire wherewith the wicked are tormented. Another by dispensation, and not

according to the ordinary and common rule. In this way, some are punished in divers places, either for the instruction of the living, or for the relief of the dead, whose pains might be mitigated by the prayers of the Church, were they made known to the living.

DCCLXXVII. The Holy Fathers before the advent of Christ were in a higher place than the place in which souls are now purged after their death, for there was there no sensible pain. But that place was connected with Hell, or the same as Hell, otherwise Christ, descending to *Limbus*, would not be said to have descended into Hell. Purgatory, therefore, is in the same place as Hell, or is near to Hell.

DCCLXXVIII. In Purgatory there is a two-fold pain. One of loss, inasmuch as the Divine Vision is delayed ; and one of sense, inasmuch as the souls are punished with corporeal fire. In both cases, the least pain of Purgatory exceeds the greatest pain of this life. As S. Augustine says, "The fire of Purgatory will be harder than any pain one can feel, or see, or think of in this life."

DCCLXXIX. A thing is said to be voluntary in two ways. In one way, by an absolute will ; and in this way no pain is voluntary, inasmuch as it belongs to the very idea of pain that it be

contrary to the will. In another way, a thing is said to be voluntary by a conditioned will, as burning is voluntary when it is suffered in order to the attainment of health. This also in two ways. In one way, when by the pain we acquire some good, and so the will itself assumes the pain, as in satisfaction; or as when one willingly accepts the pain, and would not have it otherwise, as in martyrdom. In another as when, although by the pain no good accrues to us, yet without the pain, we cannot arrive at the good, as in the case of natural death. Then the will does not assume the pain, and it would be freed from it, but it supports it; and in this way the pain is said to be voluntary. In this sense, the pains of Purgatory are voluntary, inasmuch as the suffering souls know that without them they cannot arrive at beatitude.

DCCLXXX. It would be unjust that he who has triumphed over another should after his triumph be subjected to that other. But the souls in purgatory are the souls of those who have triumphed over the demons, and so they will not be subjected to demons in purgatory to be punished by them. Neither will they receive their punishment at the hands of good angels, who would not so vehemently afflict their fellow-citizens. During the struggle of the present life men are punished both by evil angels, as in

the case of Job, and by good angels, as in the case of Jacob.

DCCLXXXI. Venial sin, that is, all sin that can co-exist with grace in the soul, is expiated by the pains of Purgatory, not only as to its punishment, but even as to its guilt. S. Paul refers to venial sin when, writing to the Corinthians, he speaks of the wood, hay, and stubble, which along with the gold, silver, and precious stones, have been built on the one foundation, which is Jesus Christ. The one will be purified, the other will be consumed, and the man "himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire."

DCCLXXXII. The fire of Purgatory frees one also from the *reatus* or liability to punishment which sin lays the sinner under. One is loosed from a debt who pays it. The *reatus* is the debt of punishment the sinner owes: when he pays the debt with the pains of Purgatory, he is free from the *reatus*.

DCCLXXXIII. One venial sin receives, as it requires, a longer purgation and punishment in purgatory than another, as being a greater drawing to the creature than that other. This difference of the value and punishment of venial sins the Apostle signifies by his threefold distinction of wood, hay, and stubble; of these the wood remains longest in the fire before it is

consumed. Severity of punishment corresponds to the greatness of the sin; length of purification correspond to the hold which the sin has of its subject.

ORATIO.

Deus, Qui Ecclesiam Tuam Beati Thomæ Confessoris Tui mirâ eruditione clarificas, et sanctâ operatione fœcundas, da nobis, quæsumus, et quæ docuit, intellectæ conspicere, et quæ egit, imitatione complere. Per Dominum.

Laus Deo.

TABLE OF CONTENTS ;

OR,

GENERAL INDEX.

1. Of the fitness of the Incarnation.
2. Of the mode of union of the Incarnate Word, *as to the Union itself.*
3. Of the mode of union, *ex parte* of the person assuming.
4. Of the mode of union, *ex parte* of human nature itself.
5. Of the mode of union, *ex parte* of the parts of human nature.
6. Of the mode of assumption, as to order.
7. Of what was co-assumed by the Son of God, in human nature, as pertaining to its perfection ; and, first, of the grace of Christ, as He is an individual man.
8. Of the grace of Christ, as He is Head of the Church.
9. Of the Knowledge of Christ, in *common.*
10. Of the Blessed Knowledge which pertains to the Soul of Christ.
11. Of the imparted or infused Knowledge of the Soul of Christ.
12. Of the acquired or experimental Knowledge of the Soul of Christ.
13. Of the Power of the Soul of Christ.
14. Of the defects which Christ assumed in human nature, as to His Body.

15. Of the defects which Christ assumed in human nature, as to His Soul.
16. Of the consequences of the union, as to those things which belong to Christ *secundum Se*.
17. Of those things which belong to unity in Christ—as to His Being (*quantum ad esse*).
18. Of those things which belong to unity in Christ—as to will.
19. Of those things which belong to unity in Christ—as to operation.
20. Of those things which belong to Christ, according to His subjection to His Father.
21. Of the Prayer of Christ.
22. Of the Priesthood of Christ.
23. Of the Adoption of Christ.
24. Of the Predestination of Christ.
25. Of the Adoration of Christ.
26. Of Christ, as He is called the Mediator between God and man.
27. Of the Sanctification of the Blessed Virgin.
28. Of the Virginitv of the Blessed Virgin.
29. Of the Espousal of the Mother of God.
30. Of the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin.
31. Of the Conception of the Saviour, as to the matter of which His Body was conceived.
32. Of the Conception of Christ, as to the active principle.
33. Of the mode and order of the Conception of Christ.
34. Of the perfection of the Offspring conceived.
35. Of the Nativity of the Saviour.
36. Of the Manifestation of the newborn Christ.
37. Of the legal observances connected with the Child Jesus.
38. Of the Baptism of John.
39. Of the Baptization of Christ.
40. Of the manner of the Conversation of Christ.
41. Of the Temptation of Christ.
42. Of the Doctrine of Christ.

43. Of the miracles of Christ, *in general*.
44. Of the miracles of Christ, *in special*.
45. Of the Transfiguration of Christ.
46. Of the Passion of Christ.
47. Of the efficient cause of the Passion of Christ.
48. Of the mode of the Passion of Christ, *as to effect*.
49. Of the effects of the Passion of Christ.
50. Of the Death of Christ.
51. Of the Sepulture of Christ.
52. Of the Descent of Christ into Hell.
53. Of the Resurrection of Christ.
54. Of the reality of the Risen Christ.
55. Of the manifestation of the Resurrection.
56. Of the causality of the Resurrection of Christ.
57. Of the Ascension of Christ.
58. Of the Session of Christ at the Right Hand of the Father.
59. Of the Judiciary power of Christ.
[Here follows the Treatise on the Sacraments, see Special Index, page 431, note.]
69. Of those things which regard the Resurrection; and first, of the place of souls after death.
70. Of the quality of the soul departed from the body; and of the pains inflicted upon it by corporeal fire.
71. Of Suffrages, or Prayers for the Dead.
72. Of Prayer, in respect of the Saints who are in Fatherland.
73. Of the signs which precede the Judgment.
74. Of the fire of the Final Conflagration.
75. Of the Resurrection.
76. Of the cause of the Resurrection.
77. Of the time and mode of the Resurrection.
78. Of the term of Resurrection.
79. Of the conditions of the Risen; and first, of their identity.
80. Of the integrity of the risen bodies.
81. Of the quality of those who rise again.

82. Of the Conditions of the Blessed who rise again.
83. Of the subtilty of the bodies of the Blessed.
84. Of the agility of the bodies of the Blessed.
85. Of the brightness of the bodies of the Blessed.
86. Of the conditions of the risen bodies of the damned.
87. Of the knowledge of the resuscitated in the Judgment, in respect of merits and demerits.
88. Of the General Judgment ; as to time and place.
89. Of the Judges and the judged, in the General Judgment.
90. Of the form of the Judge who comes to Judgment.
91. Of the quality of the world after the Judgment.
92. Of the vision of the Divine Essence—in relation to the Blessed.
93. Of the Blessedness of the Saints ; and of their mansions.
94. Of the relations of the Saints to the Damned.
95. Of the dowries of the Blessed.
96. Of aureolas.
97. Of the pain of the Damned.
98. Of the will and intellect of the damned.
99. Of the Mercy of God, in respect of the damned.
100. Of Purgatory.

SPECIAL INDEX.

I. Of the fitness of the Incarnation.

	SECT.
1. Whether it was fitting that God should be Incarnated?	1
2. Whether it was necessary that God should be Incarnated in order to the reparation of the human race?	3
3. Whether God would have been Incarnated if there had not been sin?	4
4. Whether God was Incarnated principally to take away original sin or actual sin?	5
5. Whether it was fitting that God should be Incarnated from the beginning of the world? ..	6
6. Whether His Incarnation ought to have been deferred to the end of the world?	6

II. Of the mode of union of the Incarnate Word, *as to the union itself.*

1. Whether the union of the Incarnate Word was made in Nature?	7
2. Or in person?	13
3. Or in <i>hypostasis</i> or <i>suppositum</i> ?	17
4. Whether the person or <i>hypostasis</i> of Christ after the Incarnation was composite?	18

	SECT.
5. Whether there was made any union of body and soul in Christ?	19
6. Whether human nature was united to the Word accidentally?	22
7. Whether the union itself was anything created? ..	28
8. Whether it was the same as assumption?	29
9. Whether it was the greatest of all the unions which belong to the creature?	32
10. Whether the union of the two natures was made by grace?	33
11. Whether any merits preceded it?	36
12. Whether grace was natural to the man Christ? ..	39

III. Of the mode of union, *ex parte* of the person assuming.

1. Whether to assume belongs to a Divine person? ..	40
2. Whether it belongs to the Divine Nature? ..	44
3. Whether Nature can assume, personality being abstracted?	47
4. Whether one person can assume without another? ..	48
5. Whether any person soever can assume? ..	49
6. Whether several persons can assume a Nature numerically one?	53
7. Whether one person can assume two natures? ..	57
8. Whether it was more fitting that the Person of the Son should assume Human Nature, than any other of the Divine Persons?	59

IV. Of the mode of union, *ex parte* of human nature itself.

1. Whether <i>human</i> nature be more assumptible by the Son of God than any other nature? ..	63
--	----

	SECT.
2. Whether He assumed a person?	67
3. Whether He assumed a man?	69
4. Whether it was fitting that He should assume human nature separated from individuals? ..	70
5. Whether it was fitting that He should assume human nature in all its singularities?	73
6. Whether it was fitting that he should assume human nature in any man begotten of the race of Adam?	74

V. Of the mode of union, *ex parte* of the parts of human nature.

1. Whether the Son should assume a true body? ..	76
2. Whether He should assume an earthly body— namely, flesh and blood?	77
3. Whether He assumed a soul?	80
4. Whether He should assume an intellect?	83

VI. Of the mode of assumption, as to order.

1. Whether the Son of God assumed flesh, <i>mediante animâ</i> ?	84
2. Whether He assumed a soul <i>mediante spiritu vel mente</i> ?	87
3. Whether the soul was assumed before the flesh? ..	89
4. Whether the flesh was assumed before it was united to the soul?	94
5. Whether whole human nature was assumed <i>mediantibus partibus</i> ?	95
6. Whether the Son of God assumed human nature, <i>mediante gratiâ</i> ?	96

VII. Of what was co-assumed by the Son of God, in human nature, as pertaining to its perfection; and first, of the grace of Christ, as He is an individual man.

	SECT.
1. Whether there is in the Soul of Christ any habitual grace?	97
2. Whether there were virtues in Christ?	102
3. Whether there was faith in Christ?	103
4. Whether there was hope in Christ?	105
5. Whether there were gifts in Christ?	107
6. Whether there was in Christ the gift of fear?	110
7. Whether there were in Christ graces <i>gratis datæ</i> ?	112
8. Whether there was in Christ prophecy?	115
9. Whether there was in Christ plenitude of grace?	117
10. Whether such plenitude was peculiar to Christ?	120
11. Whether the grace of Christ is infinite?	126
12. Whether it could be augmented?	129
13. What was the relation of this grace to the union?	
Did it follow, or precede it?	130

VIII. Of the grace of Christ, as He is Head of the Church.

1. Whether Christ is the Head of the Church?	131
2. Whether He is the Head of all, as to body, or only as to souls?	135
3. Whether He is the Head of all men?	136
4. Whether He is the Head of Angels?	139
5. Whether the grace, according to which He is the Head of the Church, is the same as the habitual grace which belongs to the individual man?	141
6. Whether to be Head of the Church is peculiar to Christ?	143

SECT.

7. Whether the Devil is the Head of all the evil? .. 144
 8. Whether Antichrist can also be called the Head
 of all the evil? 145
-

IX. Of the Knowledge of Christ, *in common.*

1. Whether Christ had any knowledge besides His
 Divine knowledge? 149
 2. Whether He had that knowledge which the
 Blessed, or those who comprehend, have? .. 150
 3. Whether He had imparted or infused knowledge? 151
 4. Whether He had any acquired knowledge? .. 152
-

X. Of the blessed Knowledge which pertains to
 the Soul of Christ.

1. Whether the Soul of Christ comprehended the
 Word, or the Divine Essence? 154
 2. Whether He knew all things in the Word? .. 155
 3. Whether His Soul in the Word had knowledge of
 things infinite? 159
 4. Whether It sees the Word or Divine Essence
 more clearly than any other creature soever? 160
-

XI. Of the imparted or infused Knowledge of the
 Soul of Christ.

1. Whether according to His knowledge Christ knows
 all things? 162
 2. Whether He could use His knowledge without
 phantastic conversion? 163

	SECT.
3. Whether this knowledge was collative?	165
4. Whether this knowledge in Christ was less than the knowledge of the Angels?	167
5. Whether it was habitual knowledge?	168
6. Whether it was distinguished by diverse habits?	169

XI. Of the acquired or experimental Knowledge of the Soul of Christ.

1. Whether, according to this knowledge, He knew all things?	170
2. Whether He made progress in this knowledge? ..	171
3. Whether He learned anything from man? ..	175
4. Whether He received anything from Angels? ..	176

XIII. Of the Power of the Soul of Christ.

1. Whether Christ had omnipotence <i>simpliciter</i> ? ..	177
2. Whether in respect of corporeal creatures? ..	178
3. Whether in respect of His own Body?	179
4. Whether in respect of His own Will?	180

XIV. Of the Defects which Christ assumed in human nature ; as to His Body.

1. Whether it was becoming that the Son of God should assume, in human nature, bodily de- fects?	182
2. Whether He assumed the necessity of being sub- ject to these defects?	184
3. Whether He controlled these defects?	185
4. Whether He assumed all defects of this sort? ..	188

XV. Of the Defects which Christ assumed in Human Nature ; as to His Soul.

	SECT.
1. Whether in Christ there was sin?	189
3. Whether there was in Him the fuel (<i>fomes</i>) of sin	191
3. Whether there was ignorance in Him?	192
4. Whether the Soul of Christ was passible? ..	193
5. Whether there was in Christ sensible dolour? ..	194
6. Whether there was in Christ sorrow?	198
7. Whether there was in Christ fear?	199
8. Whether there was in Christ wonder?	201
9. Whether there was in Christ anger?	202
10. Whether He was at once a wayfarer and a comprehender— <i>viator et comprehensor</i> ?	203

XVI. Of the consequences of the Union ; as to those things which belong to Christ *secundum Se*.

1. Whether this is true—God is man?	204
2. Whether this is true—man is God?	205
3. Whether Christ can be called a Dominical Man? ..	206
4. Whether those things which belong to the Son of man can be predicated of the Son of God, and <i>e converso</i> ?	207
5. Whether those things which belong to the Son of man can be predicated of the Divine Nature ; and of the human nature, those things which belong to the Son of God?	208
6. Whether this is true—The Son of God was made man?	209
7. Whether this is true—man was made God? ..	210
8. Whether this is true—Christ was made a <i>creature</i> ?	211

	SECT.
9. Whether this is true—that man, Christ being demonstrated, began to be, or always was? ..	212
10. Whether this is true—Christ, as He is man, is a creature?	213
11. Whether this is true—Christ, as He is man, is God?	214
12. Whether this is true—Christ, as He is man, is an <i>hypostasis</i> , or person?	215

XVII. Of those things which belong to unity in Christ—as to His Being (*quantum ad esse*).

1. Whether Christ is one, or two?	216
2. Whether there is in Christ only one <i>esse</i> ? ..	217

XVIII. Of those things which belong to unity in Christ—as to will.

1. Whether there is in Christ one Divine Will and another human?	218
2. Whether in the human nature of Christ there is one will, in respect of sensuality, and another in respect of reason?	219
3. Whether <i>ex parte</i> of reason there were in Christ several wills?	220
4. Whether there was in Christ free will?	221
5. Whether the human will of Christ was altogether conformed to the Divine Will in the thing willed?	223
6. Whether there was in Christ any contrariety of wills?	225

XIX. Of those things which belong to unity in Christ—as to operation.

	SECT.
1. Whether there was in Christ one operation of Divinity and humanity, or several?	227
2. Whether there were in Christ several operations according to His human nature?	228
3. Whether according to human operation He merited anything for Himself?	229
4. Whether He thereby merited anything for us? ..	230

XX. Of those things which belong to Christ, according to His subjection to His Father.

1. Whether Christ is subject to the Father? ..	231
2. Whether Christ is subject to Himself?	234

XXI. Of the Prayer of Christ.

1. Whether it became Christ to pray?	235
2. Whether it became Him according to sensuality? ..	238
3. Whether it became Him to pray for Himself or for others only?	239
4. Whether His prayer was heard?	241

XXII. Of the Priesthood of Christ.

1. Whether it became Christ to be a priest? ..	242
2. Of the Sacrifice (<i>hostia</i>) of this priest	246
3. Of the effect of this priesthood	247
4. Whether the effect of this priesthood pertains to Him alone or to others?	252

	SECT.
5. Of the eternity of His priesthood	254
6. Whether He ought to be called a priest after the order of Melchizedek?	255

XXIII. Of the Adoption of Christ.

1. Whether it becomes God to adopt sons? ..	258
2. Whether to do so is becoming to God the Father only?	263
3. Whether the adoption of sons is peculiar to men?	271
4. Whether Christ can be called an adoptive son? ..	273

XXIV. Of the Predestination of Christ.

1. Whether Christ was predestinated?	274
2. Whether He was predestinated as He was man?	275
3. Whether His predestination was the exemplar of our predestination?	276
4. Whether it is the cause of our predestination? ..	278

XXV. Of the Adoration of Christ.

1. Whether the Divinity of Christ and His Hu- manity are to be adored with one and the some adoration?	279
2. Whether the Flesh of Christ is to be adored with the adoration of <i>Latria</i> ?	280
3. Whether the adoration of <i>Latria</i> is to be ex- hibited to an image of Christ?	282
4. Whether it is to be exhibited to the Cross of Christ?	286

SECT.

5. Whether it is to be exhibited to His Mother? .. 287
 6. Whether the relics of the Saints are to be adored? 288
-

XXVI. Of Christ, as He is called the Mediator between God and man.

1. Whether to be mediator between God and man is
peculiar to Christ? 289
 2. Whether to be so belongs to Him, according to
His human nature? 293
-

XXVII. Of the Sanctification of the Blessed Virgin.

1. Whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before
her Nativity? 294
 2. Whether she was sanctified before her anima-
tion? 295
 3. Whether by her sanctification there was wholly
removed from her the *fomes peccati*? 296
 4. Whether it was a consequence of her sanctifica-
tion that she should never sin? 296
 5. Whether by her sanctification she attained to
plenitude of grace? 296
 6. Whether so to be sanctified was peculiar to her
after Christ? 296
-

XXVIII. Of the Virginitv of the Blessed Mary.

1. Whether she was a virgin in her conceiving? .. 297
2. Whether she was a virgin in her bringing forth? 297

	SECT.
3. Whether she remained a virgin after her bringing forth?	297
4. Whether she made a vow of virginity?	297

XXIX. Of the Espousal of the Mother of God.

1. Whether it was becoming that Christ should be born of one espoused?	298
2. Whether there was true matrimony between the Mother of the Lord and Joseph?	299

XXX. Of the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin.

1. Whether it was fitting that it should be announced to her what was to be generated within her?..	300
2. Whether it was fitting that it should be so announced by an angel?	301
3. Of the mode whereby it was fitting that the Annunciation should be made to her	302
4. Of the order of the Annunciation	303

XXXI. Of the Conception of the Saviour—as to the matter of which His Body was conceived.

1. Whether the Flesh of Christ was taken from Adam?	303
2. Whether It was taken from David?	304
3. Whether the genealogy of Christ is fittingly given by the Evangelist?	304
4. Whether it became Christ to be born of a woman?	305

	SECT.
5. Whether His Body was formed of the most pure blood of the Virgin?	306
6. Whether the Flesh of Christ was in the ancient Fathers?	306
7. Whether It was in them liable to sin?	306
8. Whether It was tithed in the loins of Abraham?	306

XXXII. Of the Conception of Christ—as to the active principle.

1. Whether the Holy Ghost was the active principle in the Conception of Christ	307
2. Whether it can be said that Christ was conceived of the Holy Ghost?	308
3. Whether it can be said that the Holy Ghost is the Father of Christ according to the flesh? ..	308
4. Whether the Blessed Virgin did aught <i>actively</i> in the conception of Christ?	308

XXXIII. Of the mode and order of the Conception of Christ.

1. Whether the Body of Christ was formed in the first instant of His conception?	309
2. Whether in the first instant of His conception It was animated?	309
3. Whether in the first instant of His conception It was assumed by the Word?	309
4. Whether His conception was natural or miraculous	309

XXXIV. Of the perfection of the Offspring conceived.

	SECT.
1. Whether in the first instant of His conception Christ was sanctified by grace?	309
2. Whether in the same instant He had the use of free will?	309
3. Whether in the same instant He could merit? ..	309
4. Whether in the same instant He was fully a "comprehender?"	309

XXXV. Of the Nativity of the Saviour.

1. Whether it was a nativity of nature or of person?	310
2. Whether there is to be attributed to Christ another nativity besides His eternal nativity?	310
3. Whether, according to His temporal nativity, the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of Christ? ..	311
4. Whether she ought to be called the Mother of God?	311
5. Whether Christ, according to the two filiations is the Son of God the Father and of the Virgin Mother?	311
6. Whether He was born without pain to His Mother?	312
7. Whether it was fitting that He should be born in Bethlehem?	313
8. Whether He was born at a fitting time? ..	314

XXXVI. Of the Manifestation of the new-born Christ.

1. Whether the birth of Christ ought to have been manifested to all?	315
--	-----

	SECT.
2. Whether it ought to have been manifested to some?	315
3. To whom it ought to have been manifested ..	316
4. Whether He ought to have manifested it Himself, or rather have had it made manifest by others?	317
5. By what things it ought to have been manifested	318
6. Of the order of the manifestation	319
7. Of the star whereby the birth of Christ was manifested	320
8. Of the veneration of the Magi, who by means of the star had knowledge of the birth of Christ	320

XXXVII. Of the legal observances connected with the Child Jesus.

1. Whether it became Him to be circumcised? ..	321
2. Whether His Name was fittingly given Him? ..	322
3. Whether it became Him to be offered in the Temple?	323
4. Whether it became the Mother of God to come to the Temple for purification?	324

XXXVIII. Of the Baptism of John.

1. Whether it was fitting that John should baptize?	325
2. Whether that baptism was from God?	326
3. Whether it conferred grace?	327
4. Whether it was fitting that others besides Christ should be baptized with that baptism? ..	327
5. Whether that baptism ought to have ceased when Christ was baptized?	327

SECT.

6. Whether those who had been baptized with the baptism of John were afterwards to be baptized with the baptism of Christ? 327

XXXIX. Of the Baptization of Christ.

1. Whether it became Christ to be baptized? .. 328
 2. Whether it became Him to be baptized with the baptism of John? 328
 3. Of the time of His baptism 329
 4. Of the place of His baptism 330
 5. Of the opening of the heavens 331
 6. Of the appearance of the Holy Ghost under the *species* of a Dove 332
 7. Whether that dove was a real and true animal? 332
 8. Of the voice of the Paternal testimony 333

XL. Of the manner of the conversation of Christ.

1. Whether Christ ought to have led a solitary life, or to have had His conversation among men? 334
 2. Whether He ought to have led an austere life as to meat, drink, and raiment, or a life like that of others? 335
 3. Whether He ought to have led a lowly life in the world, or a life in the midst of riches and honour? 336
 4. Whether He ought to have lived according to the Law? 337

XLI. Of the Temptation of Christ.

1. Whether it was fitting that Christ should be tempted? 338

	SECT.
2. Of the place of the temptation	339
3. Of the time of the temptation	340
4. Of the manner and order of the temptation ..	341

XLII. Of the Doctrine of Christ.

1. Whether Christ ought to have preached to the Jews only or to the Gentiles also?	342
2. Whether in His preaching He ought to have avoided disturbing the Jews?	343
3. Whether He ought to have preached publicly or secretly?	344
4. Whether He ought to have taught by word only, or by writing as well?	345

XLIII. Of the Miracles of Christ *in general*.

1. Whether Christ ought to have wrought miracles? ..	346
2. Whether He wrought them by Divine virtue? ..	346
3. At what time ought He to have begun to work miracles?	347
4. Whether by His miracles His Divinity was sufficiently shewn forth?	348

XLIV. Of the Miracles of Christ *in special*.

1. Of the miracles which Christ wrought on spiritual substances	349
2. Of the miracles which Christ wrought on heavenly bodies	349
3. Of the miracles which Christ wrought on men ..	349
4. Of the miracles which Christ wrought on irrational creatures	349

XLV. Of the Transfiguration of Christ.

	SECT.
1. Whether it became Christ to be transfigured? ..	354
2. Whether the brightness of the transfiguration was the glorious brightness?	355
3. Whether there was a fitting choice of witnesses of the transfiguration?	356
4. Of the testimony of the Paternal voice	357

XLVI. Of the Passion of Christ.

1. Whether it became Christ to suffer for the libera- tion of men?	358
2. Whether there was another mode of human libe- ration possible?	359
3. Whether that mode was the most fitting? ..	360
4. Whether it was fitting that He should suffer on the Cross?	361
5. Whether He endured all sufferings?	362
6. Whether the pain which He bore in His Passion was the greatest?	363
7. Whether His whole Soul suffered?	364
8. Whether His Passion hindered the joy of frui- tion?	364
9. Of the time of the Passion	366
10. Of the place of the Passion	368
11. Whether it was fitting that Christ should be crucified along with the thieves?	371
12. Whether the Passion of Christ is to be attributed to His Divinity?	372

XLVII. Of the efficient cause of the Passion of Christ.

1. Whether Christ was slain by another or by Him- self?	373
--	-----

SECT.

- | | |
|--|-----|
| 2. From what motive did He give Himself up to suffer? | 374 |
| 3. Whether it was fitting that He should suffer at the hands of the Gentiles, or of the Jews? .. | 376 |
| 4. Whether His slayers knew Him? | 377 |
| 5. Of the sin of those who slew Christ | 378 |
-

XLVIII. Of the mode of the Passion of Christ,
as to effect.

- | | |
|---|-----|
| 1. Whether the Passion of Christ was the cause of our salvation by way of merit? | 379 |
| 2. Whether the Passion of Christ was the cause of our salvation by way of satisfaction? | 380 |
| 3. Whether the Passion of Christ was the cause of our salvation by way of sacrifice? | 481 |
| 4. Whether the Passion of Christ was the cause of our salvation by way of redemption? | 382 |
| 5. Whether to be a Redeemer is special and peculiar to Christ? | 383 |
| 6. Whether He caused the effect of our salvation by way of efficiency? | 384 |
-

XLIX. Of the effects of the Passion of Christ.

- | | |
|--|-----|
| 1. Whether it frees us from sin? | 385 |
| 2. Whether it frees us from the power of the Devil? .. | 385 |
| 3. Whether it frees us from liability to punishment? | 386 |
| 4. Whether it reconciles us to God? | 387 |
| 5. Whether it opens to us the gate of Heaven? .. | 388 |
| 6. Whether it procured for Christ His exaltation? .. | 389 |
-

L. Of the Death of Christ.

	SECT.
1. Whether it became Christ to die?	390
2. Whether the union of Divinity and Flesh was separated by death?	391
3. Whether the union of Divinity and Soul was separated?	391
4. Whether Christ, during the three days of His Death, was man?.. ..	392
5. Whether His Body was numerically the same, dead and alive?	393
6. Whether His Death operated somewhat in order to our salvation?.. ..	394

LI. Of the Sepulture of Christ.

1. Whether it became Christ to be buried?	395
2. Of the manner of His burial	396
3. Whether His Body was decomposed in the Sepulchre?	397
4. Of the time during which He lay in the Sepulchre	398

LII. Of the Descent of Christ into Hell.

1. Whether it became Christ to descend into Hell?	399
2. Into what Hell did He descend?	400
3. Whether Whole Christ was in Hell?	401
4. Whether He made any stay there?	401
5. Whether He delivered the Holy Fathers from Hell?	402
6. Whether He delivered the damned from hell?	403
7. Whether He delivered children who had died in original sin?	404
8. Whether He delivered men from Purgatory?	404

LIII. Of the Resurrection of Christ.

SECT.

- | | |
|---|-----|
| 1. Whether it was necessary that Christ should rise again? | 405 |
| 2. Whether it was necessary that He should rise again on the third day? | 407 |
| 3. Whether He should be the first to rise again? .. | 408 |
| 4. Whether He was the cause of our resurrection? | 408 |
-

LIV. Of the quality of the Risen Christ.

- | | |
|---|-----|
| 1. Whether after the Resurrection Christ had a true body? | 409 |
| 2. Whether His Body was glorious? | 412 |
| 3. Whether He rose with His Body in Its integrity? | 411 |
| 4. Whether His Body rose again with Its wounds? | 413 |
-

LV. Of the Manifestation of the Resurrection.

- | | |
|--|-----|
| 1. Whether it became the Resurrection of Christ to be manifested to all men, or only to certain special persons? | 414 |
| 2. Whether it was fitting that He should rise before their eyes? | 414 |
| 3. Whether it became Him after His Resurrection to converse with His disciples? | 416 |
| 4. Whether it was fitting that He should appear to His disciples under another effigy or form? .. | 417 |
| 5. Whether it became Him to prove His Resurrection by arguments? | 418 |
| 6. Of the sufficiency of these arguments | 419 |
-

LVI. Of the Causality of the Resurrection of Christ.

	SECT.
1. Whether the Resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection?	420
2. Whether it is the cause of our purification? ..	420

LVII. Of the Ascension of Christ.

1. Whether it became Christ to ascend?	421
2. According to which nature His Ascension became Him	422
3. Whether He ascended by His own power? ..	423
4. Whether He ascended above all corporeal heavens?	424
5. Whether He ascended above all spiritual creatures?	425
6. Of the effect of the Ascension of Christ, whether it is a cause of Salvation?	426

LVIII. Of the Session of Christ at the Right Hand of the Father.

1. Whether He sits at the Right Hand of the Father?	427
2. Whether it becomes Him to do so according to His Divine Nature?	428
3. Whether it becomes Him to do so according to His Human Nature?	429
4. Whether this is special and peculiar to Christ? ..	430

LIX. Of the Judiciary Power of Christ.

1. Whether judiciary power is to be attributed to Christ?	431
---	-----

	SECT.
2. Whether it belongs to Him, as He is Man? ..	432
3. Whether He acquired it by His merits? ..	433
4. Whether His judiciary power is universal in respect of all men?	434
5. Whether besides the judgment which He enacts in time, there is to be looked for another universal judgment by Him?	435
6. Whether His judiciary power extends to the angels?	436
[Questions LX. to XC. of the third part of the Summa, and questions I. to LXIX. of its Supplement, treat of the Sacraments as the extension of the Incarnation. A digest of the doctrine discussed in these questions will be found in <i>A Digest of the Doctrine of S. Thomas on the Sacraments</i> . London: J. T. Hayes, Lyall Place, Eaton Square, 1867. That volume and this together embrace the whole doctrine of the <i>Tertia</i> , or third part of the Summa of S. Thomas.]	

LXIX. Of those things which regard the Resurrection; and first, of the place of souls after death.

1. Whether receptacles are assigned to souls after death?	437
2. Whether immediately after death souls are taken to Heaven or Hell?	440
3. Whether souls living in Paradise or in Hell can go forth of either?	444
4. Whether the Limbus of Hell is the same as Abraham's Bosom?	449
5. Whether it is the same as the Hell of the damned?	450

	SECT.
6. Whether the Limbus of Children is the same as the Limbus of the Fathers?	453
7. Whether so many receptacles ought to be distinguished?	457

LXX. Of the quality of the Soul departed from the Body, and of the pain inflicted upon it by corporeal fire.

1. Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?	463
2. Whether the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?	464
3. Whether the separated soul can suffer from corporeal fire?	466

LXXI. Of Suffrages, or Prayers for the Dead.

1. Whether suffrages made by one may profit another?	467
2. Whether the dead can be aided by the works of the living?	472
3. Whether suffrages made by sinners profit the dead?	473
4. Whether suffrages made by the living for the dead profit those who make them?	475
5. Whether suffrages profit those in Hell?	478
6. Whether suffrages profit those in Purgatory?	483
7. Whether they avail children in <i>Limbus</i> ?	485
8. Whether they profit the Saints in <i>Fatherland</i> ?	486
9. Whether the prayers of the Church, the Sacrifice of the Altar, and almsdeeds profit the dead?	487
10. Whether the indulgences of the Church profit the dead?	488

	SECT.
11. Whether exequies profit the dead?	489
12. Whether suffrages made for one dead person profit that person for whom they are made more than others	490
13. Whether suffrages made for many, avail individuals, in like manner as if they had been made specially for each?	490
14. Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not made, in like manner as they avail those for whom both special and general suffrages are made?	490



LXXII. Of prayer, in respect of the Saints who are in Fatherland.

1. Whether the Saints have knowledge of our prayers?	493
2. Whether we ought to invoke the Saints to pray for us?	493
3. Whether the prayers of the Saints poured forth to God for us are always heard?	503



LXXIII. Of the signs which precede the Judgment.

1. Whether there are signs which precede the coming of the Lord to Judgment?	505
2. Whether the sun and the moon will be darkened at the Judgment?	510
3. Whether the powers of the heavens will be shaken at the coming of the Lord?	511



LXXIV. Of the Fire of the final Conflagration.

	SECT.
1. Whether there will be a purgation of the world ?	
2. Whether it will be by fire?	512
3. Whether the fire wherewith the world will be be purged is of the same species as elementary fire?	515
4. Whether that fire will also purge the higher heavens?	517
5. Whether it will consume the other elements? ..	518
6. Whether all the elements will be purged by that fire?	519
7. Whether the fire of the final conflagration ought to follow the Judgment?	522
8. Whether it will have such an effect on men as it is designed to have?	524
9. Whether it will envelope the reprobate?	524

LXXV. Of the Resurrection.

1. Whether there will be a resurrection of bodies? ..	525
2. Whether the resurrection will be of all in general? ..	528
3. Whether the resurrection will be natural?	529

LXXVI. Of the cause of the Resurrection.

1. Whether the Resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection?	530
2. Whether the sound of the trumpet will be the cause of our resurrection?	537
3. Whether the angels will operate in order to the resurrection	539

LXXVII. Of the time and mode of the Resurrection.

	SECT.
1. Whether the time of the resurrection ought to be deferred to the end of the world?	541
2. Whether the time of the resurrection should be hidden?	548
3. Whether the resurrection will be in the night-season?	550
4. Whether the resurrection will take place instantaneously or successively?	551

LXXVIII. Of the term of the Resurrection.

1. Whether death will be the <i>terminus a quo</i> of the resurrection in all men?	552
2. Whether the resurrection of all men will be from their ashes?	553
3. Whether the dust from which the human body will be restored has any natural inclination to the soul with which it will be united?	555

LXXIX. Of the condition of the Risen ; and first, of their identity.

1. Whether in the resurrection the soul will resume a body numerically the same?	556
2. Whether the man who rises will be numerically the same?	558
3. Whether the dust of the human body will, in and by means of the resurrection, return to that part of the body which it occupied when the body was dissolved?	559

LXXX. Of the integrity of the risen bodies.

	SECT.
1. Whether all the members of the risen body will rise again?	560
2. Whether the hair and nails of the human body will rise again?	562
3. Whether the humours of the body will rise again?	563
4. Whether all which was in the body of the verity of human nature will rise again in it? ..	566
5. Whether whatsoever was materially in the members will rise again entire?	570

LXXXI. Of the quality of those who rise again.

1. Whether all will rise again of the same age? ..	572
2. Whether all will rise again of the same stature?	575
3. Whether all will rise again of the male sex? ..	578
4. Whether all will rise again to an animal life? ..	580

LXXXII. Of the conditions of the Blessed who rise again.

1. Whether the bodies of the saints after the resurrection will be impassible?	584
2. Whether impassibility will be equally in all? ..	588
3. Whether impassibility will exclude actual sense from the glorious bodies?	589
4. Whether in the Blessed after the resurrection all the senses will exist in action?	590

LXXXIII. Of the subtilty of the bodies of the Blessed.

1. Whether subtilty is a property of the glorious body?	591
---	-----

SECT.

2. Whether by reason of this subtilty it is competent to the glorious body to be in the same place with another body which is not glorious? 592
 3. Whether it can be effected by a miracle that two bodies be in the same place? 594
 4. Whether the glorious body can exist in the same place with another glorious body? 596
 5. Whether by its subtilty there is removed from the glorious body the necessity of existing in an equal place? 599
 6. Whether the glorious body, by reason of its subtilty, is impalpable? 600
-

LXXXIV. Of the agility of the bodies of the Blessed.

1. Whether the glorious bodies will be agile? .. 601
 2. Whether the Saints sometimes use their agility so as to be moved? 602
 3. Whether they are moved in an instant? .. 603
-

LXXXV. Of the brightness of the bodies of the Blessed.

1. Whether brightness belongs to glorious bodies? 606
 2. Whether the brightness of the glorious body may be seen by non-glorious eyes? 608
 3. Whether the glorious body is necessarily seen by a non-glorious body? 609
-

LXXXVI. Of the condition of the risen bodies of the damned.

1. Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities? 610

	SECT.
2. Whether the bodies of the damned will be corruptible?	615
3. Whether the bodies of the damned will be impassible?	618

LXXXVII. Of the knowledge of the resuscitated in the judgment in respect of merits and demerits.

1. Whether after the resurrection every one will have knowledge of the sins which he has committed?	620
2. Whether every one will be able to read all things which are in the conscience of every other? ..	624
3. Whether all one's own merits and demerits, and all those of others, will be intuitively seen? ..	627

LXXXVIII. Of the general Judgment, as to time and place.

1. Whether there will be a general judgment? ..	629
2. Whether the judgment will be given by vocal speech?	630
3. Whether the time of the future judgment is unknown?	632
4. Whether the judgment will be in the valley of Jehoshaphat?	638

LXXXIX. Of the Judges and the judged, in the general Judgment.

1. Whether any men will judge along with Christ? ..	641
2. Whether judiciary power corresponds to voluntary poverty?	642

	SECT.
3. Whether it becomes the angels to judge? ..	646
4. Whether the demons execute the sentence of the Judge upon the damned?	648
5. Whether all men will be present in the judgment?	651
6. Whether the good will judge in the judgment? ..	657
7. Whether the wicked will be judged?	658
8. Whether the Angels will be judged in the future?	659

XC. Of the form of the Judge Who comes to Judgment.

1. Whether Christ will judge in the form of humanity?	661
2. Whether Christ will appear in the Judgment in the form of glorious humanity?	668
3. Whether His Divinity can be beheld by the wicked without joy?	671

XCI. Of the quality of the world after the Judgment.

1. Whether the world will be renewed?	672
2. Whether the motion of the heavenly bodies will cease?	677
3. Whether the brightness of the heavenly bodies will be increased in their renewal?	684
4. Whether the elements will be renewed by an access of brightness?	687
5. Whether in the renewal the plants and animals will remain?	688

XCII. Of the vision of the Divine Essence in relation to the Blessed.

	SECT.
1. Whether the human intellect can arrive at the vision of the Divine Essence?	691
2. Whether the Saints, after the resurrection, will see God with their corporeal eyes?	692
3. Whether the Saints who see God, see all things that God sees?	695

XCIII. Of the Blessedness of the Saints ; and of their mansions.

1. Whether the blessedness of the Saints will be greater after the judgment than before? ..	702
2. Whether degrees of blessedness should be called mansions?	705
3. Whether the different mansions are distinguished according to the different degrees of charity? ..	707

XCIV. Of the relations of the Saints to the damned.

1. Whether the Blessed who will be in Fatherland, will behold the pains of the damned?	708
2. Whether the Blessed will have compassion on the miseries of the damned?	709
3. Whether the Blessed will rejoice at the pains of the wicked?	711

XCV. Of the Dowries of the Blessed.

1. Whether the Blessed will have dowries?	713
2. Whether dowry is the same as blessedness?	714

	SECT.
3. Whether it belongs to Christ to have dowries? ..	715
4. Whether the angels have dowries?	716
5. Whether it is fully reckoned that there are those dowries of the soul?	719

XCVI. Of Aureoles.

1. Whether the <i>aureole</i> be other than the essential reward which is called <i>aurea</i> ?	720
2. Whether the aureole differs from "fruit?" ..	725
3. Whether fruit is due to the virtue of continence alone?	729
4. Whether these fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of continence?	731
5. Whether the aureole is due to virgins?	731
6. Whether the aureole is due to martyrs?	743
7. Whether the aureole is due to doctors?	743
8. Whether the aureole is due to Christ?	738
9. Whether the aureole is due to angels?	740
10. Whether the aureole is due to the body also? ..	741
11. Whether there are fitly reckoned three aureoles— those of virgins, of martyrs, and of doctors? ..	743
12. Whether the aureole of virgins is the chiefest? ..	744
13. Whether one may have the aureole more excel- lently than another?	745

XCVII. Of the pain of the damned.

1. Whether the damned in Hell are afflicted with the pain of fire only?	746
2. Whether the worm of the damned is corporeal? ..	749
3. Whether the weeping of the damned will be cor- poreal?	750
4. Whether the damned will be in corporeal dark- ness?	753
5. Whether the fire of Hell is corporeal?	754

	SECT.
6. Whether the fire of Hell is of the same species as our fire?	755
7. Whether the fire of Hell is under the earth? ..	756

XCVIII. Of the will and intellect of the
damned.

1. Whether every wish of the damned is evil? ..	757
2. Whether the damned repent of the evil which they have done?	758
3. Whether the damned would rather not exist? ..	759
4. Whether the damned will the existence of other damned souls in hell?	760
5. Whether the damned hate God?	761
6. Whether the damned demerit?	762
7. Whether the damned can use the knowledge which they had in the world?	763
8. Whether the damned will sometimes meditate on God?	764
9. Whether the damned will behold the glory of the blessed?	765

XCIX. Of the mercy of God, in respect of the
damned.

1. Whether of divine justice eternal punishment is inflicted on the sinner?	766
2. Whether by the Divine mercy all punishment both of men and demons will have a termina- tion?	767
3. Whether the Divine mercy will suffer men to be punished for ever?	769
4. Whether the punishment of the damned Chris- tians will be terminated by the Divine mercy? ..	772

	SECT.
5. Whether all those who do works of mercy will be punished eternally?	773

C. Of Purgatory.

1. Whether there is a Purgatory after this life? ..	774
2. Whether the place in which souls are purged is the same as that in which the damned are punished?	776
3. Whether the pain of Purgatory exceeds all the pains of this life?	778
4. Whether that pain is voluntary?	779
5. Whether the souls in Purgatory are punished by demons?	780
6. Whether venial sin is expiated by the pain of Purgatory?	781
7. Whether the fire of Purgatory delivers from the <i>reatus</i> of punishment?	782
8. Whether one is freed from that pain more quickly than another?	783



Thomas on
8354

Digest

THE INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES
10 ELMSLEY PLACE
TORONTO 6, CANADA

8354

