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A

DISCOURSE,

IN WHICH IS SHOWN,

THAT THE STATE OF MAN WAS ORIGINALLY NECESSARILY MUTABLE, AND THEREFORE IMPERFECT; THAT THIS IMPERFECTION NEVERTHELESS LEADS TO A STATE WHICH WILL BE PERFECT AND IMMUTABLE.

“ Mutability is the attribute of imperfection; immutability must therefore be the attribute of perfection, whether in God or man.”

SUMNER'S Records of Creation, Vol. i. p. 43.

Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect. Matthew, v. 48.

IN TWO PARTS.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

TWO DISCOURSES ;

ONE

ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY TRINITY,

AND THE OTHER

ON THE DOCTRINE OF CHRIST'S DIVINITY.

A NEW EDITION, CORRECTED AND ENLARGED.

BY THOMAS BABER, ESQ.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY S. GOSNELL, LITTLE QUEEN STREET.

1822.

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DEDICATION.

TO HIS GRACE THE
DUKE OF ROXBURGH.

MY LORD DUKE,

As there has been a similitude between Your Grace and myself in respect of the pursuits in which much of our time was spent, and which were our delight in the earlier part of our lives, I venture to suppose that there has been a similitude likewise between us in respect of better pursuits, and such as are suited to our present time of life. Should this have been the case, the subject of the following Discourse will be a pleasing one to Your Grace: although the Discourse itself will have little else to recommend it either

to Your Grace's attention, or to that of any other person who may peruse it, than the novelty of many thoughts which it contains. It is not, however, upon this ground so much as on that of the friendship which Your Grace formerly had, and, as I have reason to believe, continues to have towards me, that I presume to dedicate this work to you.

It is a singular circumstance, that the writer, who in the preface is mentioned as having suggested the plan of this work to me, was patronized by a predecessor of Your Grace's in the honours which you are now in the possession of; his being so at least may be supposed, from his dedicating another work of his to the aforesaid predecessor of Your Grace's; and as I doubt not that this work of his was favourably received by the then Duke of Roxbrughe, I flatter myself that this of mine will meet with a like favourable reception from Your Grace, notwithstanding the greater excellency of this writer's work, as compared to this of mine. My

consciousness indeed of its defects in point of composition has been a reason with me for not publishing it; this defect, however, I trust will be overlooked by Your Grace, as well as by such other friends as I may send a copy to, and who may be as partially inclined towards me, as I persuade myself your Grace is.

I have the honour to be

Your GRACE'S very faithful

And obliged humble Servant,

THOMAS BABER.

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P R E F A C E.

THE plan of the following Discourse was first suggested to me by Dr. Cheyne, in a work of his, entitled, "*Philosophical Conjectures.*" The subject came afterwards recommended to my notice by what has fallen from the pen of Bishop Butler, in his very excellent discourse "*on the Analogy of Religion;*" and there is reason to suppose the learned author was not unacquainted with the aforesaid work of Dr. Cheyne, which, when the Bishop wrote, had been recently published: on the contrary, that the plan of the Bishop's discourse had been suggested to him by the aforesaid work of Dr. Cheyne likewise; for what the Bishop undertakes to shew is, that "our moral state and condition in this world is, by reason of the afflictions, the dangers, and difficulties to which we are subject, so well calculated for our improvement in virtue, as that without these we could not be virtuous; and as without virtue we cannot be qualified for that happiness for which we were originally

intended, so is our having this qualification the great purpose for which we have our abode in this world.”

Such is the plan of the Bishop's work, such is the plan of Dr. Cheyne's, and such (in part) is the plan of the following Discourse:— I say in part; for mine, in other part, proceeds on the mutability of our present state, necessarily preceding a state which will be immutable; and on a state of imperfection necessarily preceding a state of perfection. Now, as Bishop Butler (upon the supposition of his being acquainted with Dr. Cheyne's book) would have thought, not only that the subject on which he himself has written was a very important one, but that neither Dr. Cheyne nor any other writer would have said so much thereon, as not to have left room for much more being said; I, in my turn, have thought so likewise, notwithstanding the additional knowledge which I have gained on the subject from what the Bishop has said thereon.

To show a further resemblance which there is between the opinions which have been adopted by Bishop Butler and Dr. Cheyne,

on this subject, it is observable, that the former of these supposes “the constitution of human, and of all creatures which come under our notice, to be such, as that they are capable of naturally becoming qualified for states of life, for which they were once wholly unqualified;—that the faculties of every species are made for enlargement,—for acquisitions of experience, and for habits;” that the end, however, for which matters are thus ordered of Providence, is our future happiness, is a notion which runs throughout the whole of the Author’s discourse.

Now, when on the one hand, the Bishop says, “that our improvement in virtue and piety, as the requisite qualification for a future state of happiness and security, is the end (or reason) why we are placed in a state of so much affliction, hazard, and difficulty;” and Dr. Cheyne, on the other, says, “that it is by a gradual progress, viz. by experience, and many appropriate trials, that this qualification (and which he had before mentioned) is to be attained,” there can scarcely be said to be any difference at all between them.

There is a notion, however, which has been adopted by Dr. Cheyne, which in a peculiar manner distinguishes his system from that of Bishop Butler, and is as follows:—supposing a perfection of moral character to be the end for which we have our being in this world, he considers life to be too short, in the case of any one, for this purpose; and that, in the case of many thousands of men, no moral character at all is acquired; for instance, in the case of infants, dying before they arrive at an age to distinguish between good and evil, and idiots; his notion accordingly is, that all men, as they shall have departed this life, will pass through various states; that their being disposed of, in each new state, will be suitable to their condition as moral beings; that they, in short, who have attained to no moral character in this life, may have this defect supplied in another; whilst they who have made advances in goodness, may in another state make still farther advances, and so on, until the purpose for which their passing through these various states shall have been answered, so far as is consistent with the freedom of will in the case of each man; and which purpose is, as hath been said, their attaining to

a perfection of moral character; and when, as he supposes, they will pass into a state that will be permanent, and endure for ever.

Bishop Butler mentions a notion of this kind, as having obtained with some ancient moralists and poets; "Reason," he says, "did, as well it might, conclude, that it should finally, and upon the whole, be well with the righteous, and ill with the wicked. But it could not be determined upon any principle of reason, whether human creatures might not have been appointed to pass through other states of life and being, before distributive justice should finally and effectually take place." Where it was that the learned Bishop found these notions of ancient moralists and poets mentioned, he does not say; certain however it is, and as since his time it has been found, that the notion of various states to be passed through by men, if not by superior beings, has obtained for many ages back, and still obtains in the Eastern parts of the world, and particularly with the Hindoos: they do not however suppose, as Dr. Cheyne does, that this passing of men through various states, is in order to their arriving at a state that will be permanent, and endure

for ever; but that men will for ever be passing through various purifying states, and be always approaching in purity to the Deity, but without any possibility of their ever attaining to his purity and perfection.

Now, to return to Dr. Cheyne's system, it is observable, that he supposes it to be suitable only to the divine wisdom and goodness that all men should finally attain to everlasting life; and that it is for this purpose that they will pass through the above-mentioned different states. Our author, however, is not the first writer that has adopted the notion of a general redemption, and to which the above notions of his evidently lead, and as in the Second Part of this Discourse will more fully be shown. On the present occasion, however, I shall observe, that the doctrine of a general redemption was, as I have learnt, first adopted by Origen, and afterwards by some of the latter Fathers. The opposition, however, which a doctrine, apparently contradictory to the Scriptures, met with from divines, schoolmen, and commentators, whenever it was publicly avowed, did not, it seems, deter our author (Dr. Cheyne) from adopting it; the

same may be said of Dr. Burnet, and Mr. Wm. Whiston, both of whom published treatises in defence of it. The latter of these treatises was so ably replied to by Mr. Matthew Horbery, as that my labour in the same walk might well have been spared, and would accordingly have been so, had I not in the course of my reading met with a tract, the secret purpose of which, as it appeared to me, was to establish the doctrine of a general redemption, although no such doctrine is mentioned in it. The thoughts contained in this tract were, it seems, communicated to Dr. Gregory, with the expectation, probably, of their being published; and they are accordingly given in his Letters published in 1815. Some mention of these thoughts (so far as they agree with what has been said upon very respectable authority) is made in Section V. of this Discourse; and what is there said cannot, in my humble opinion, be denied by any one who shall think seriously on the subject; and neither indeed can any good objection be made to the remaining part of them, except as they shall be considered as the ground on which the doctrine which I have mentioned may be built. As introduc-

tory, however, to some thoughts of my own on the subject of a general redemption, a transcript of them from Dr. G.'s book will be given in Section I. of the Second Part of this Discourse.

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That in consequence of the curse which came upon the earth, the food which Adam would eat would have a tendency to destroy rather than nourish his body: that this is the case when a man denies himself, as well when he eats as when he abstains from eating.— That in consequence of our having been redeemed, the foundation of a new nature was laid in us; which being the case, every one that denies himself will be acting for the destruction of the old, but for the preservation and growth of the new nature; and thus will be acting in violation of the law of his old nature, but in agreement with that of his new nature.

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establishment of the doctrine of original sin, which these men deny, it is contended, that if the sinfulness of each man originate with himself, the death of each man, contrarily to what the Scriptures say, will originate with himself; that if infants, who are incapable of sinning, die, their dying will have no preternatural cause; that these infants therefore will be punished without their having done any thing to deserve it.—The justice of God in this respect, vindicated: for that Christ was punished; that in consequence thereof he was free to show mercy, and to forgive men their sins, as they should in sincerity repent.—That this is a denial of the doctrine of atonement; a farther argument to show this.

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for that Cornelius, although a heathen, had a righteousness by reason of which he was accepted of God, St. Peter, to whom this revelation was made, testifies.—That, according to a learned Commentator, who acknowledges this truth, more is required of those for their salvation who have the light of the Gospel, than of those who have only the light of nature: a reason given why this notion is not a just one, notwithstanding the seeming repugnance which it has to what has been said in a former section.—That when the covenant which God made with the Israelites had been broken, God said, “I will put my laws into their mind, and write them in their hearts:” that this new covenant was not confined to the Jews; but, on the supposition of all men having God’s laws written in their hearts, all are free to perform this covenant.—That St. Paul accordingly says of the heathens, that they (i. e. some of them) do the things contained in the law, and that this shows the law to have been written in their hearts.—That the truth of God’s existence was at all times to be known by men who had no other light than that of nature, is testified by St. Paul.—That God’s laws may have been written in

the hearts of those who have the light of the Gospel; that it may not however be for any eternal purpose that this will have been the case; that our praying that God would write his laws in our hearts, is a proof thereof: for that we pray for is, that it may be for an eternal purpose that these laws are written in our hearts; and from whence it is evident, that it may be for a temporal purpose only that they are so written.—That although they who having had no other light than that of nature to direct them, will, as they shall have been obedient to this light, necessarily have sought a good which is of this world; being ignorant, nevertheless, of any greater good; it may be presumed, that had a good which is of another world been revealed to them, they would have sought it, in preference to that which is of this world. Bishop Sherlock's notions on this subject.—That it is probable that many who were converted by the preaching of the Apostles, had been men of good lives, and therefore in a state of salvation; that had these refused to believe, they would no longer have been in a state of salvation.—That had they who believed died before they were baptized, and who therefore would not have been regene-

rate; that the faith of these nevertheless would have saved them.

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the mind being boundless, is not objectionable; nor as to that of the moral capacity, as the principle shall be considered in which moral virtue originates; and that this notion has been adopted by Mr. Norris, who supposes every man to have a principle of love implanted in him, whereby he continually aspires to something more excellent than himself, with a design to perfect his being.—That his love as to particular objects may increase or decrease according to their excellences; but that, upon the whole, it will be the same with respect to these.—That love must needs have an object, and that if this object be not a satisfying one, it will be a torment; that God therefore can alone be its proper object; that to be a satisfying object, however, we must love him with all our heart, and with all our soul.—That such an entire dedication of our affections to God is not possible in this life; that we may nevertheless arrive to many degrees of it.—That notions similar to these, have been expressed by St. Austin, an example of which is given by an extract from his works.—That these two writers concur in obviating the objections which have been made to Bishop Horsley's notions.—That Dr. Cheyne, in his “Phi-

losophical Principles of Religion," has expressed sentiments similar to those of Mr. Norris: he says, that there is in all intelligent beings a restless desire of happiness; that as the supreme infinite Being is the object, the happiness, as this desire shall be satisfied, will be infinite.—That there are observations in this work of Dr. Cheyne's which confirm the moral notions expressed in former sections of the present Discourse; he supposes that there is a principle of action in all intelligent beings, analogous to that of attraction in material bodies: in agreement herewith, God, by the discoveries which he makes of his attributes, may be said to draw all men to himself; and that their seeking him as their chief good is necessary, and independent on their will: for that they seek him, even when they err as to their object.—The author supposes the aforesaid beings to have an ardent desire of re-union with God; and that Christian charity is peculiarly calculated to promote this end.—Of the end for which the author supposes rewards and punishments are established under the Gospel dispensation; that in a fallen state, this is necessary: for that it is by degrees that men must rise to a state of

perfection.—For the refutation of these notions it is observed, that a reward, considered in itself, consists in some pleasure which cannot be expected in future, but as it will be anticipated, and be felt at present.—This shown to be the case when we pray to God for any blessing; that as we pray in faith, the happiness which we conceive will arise from our prayer being granted, will be anticipated, and in some measure be experienced at the present time.—That prayer to God is another instance of this notion: for that the pleasure which we receive as we pray in faith will be an anticipation of that happiness which we expect to arise from the thing which we pray for.—That this is the case as we do good; that the happiness which we feel as we do good, will be a foretaste of that which we look to as our reward hereafter; that the happiness, however, which we feel will not be any reward: for that a reward implies something that is future, and the happiness which we feel is present.—That the notion above expressed has occurred to the author of “the Origin of Evil.”—That as the happiness which arises from virtuous actions is a spur to virtue, the strength of the moral capacity

will depend on that happiness.—That although the happiness which in a future life will be experienced, will depend on such virtuous attainments as are made in the present life, the measure of the moral capacity will not depend thereon.—Of the happiness which the saints will enjoy in a state of glory.—Dr. Ad. Clarke's notions on this subject; that in contradiction to what he supposes, grace is given to make men good, and not to make them wise.—That the degree of happiness hereafter, will be in proportion to the good which men will have done in this life; and as some will have done more good than others, the happiness of some in their glorified state, will be greater than that of others; that the good which some will have done will be as much as there was any possibility of their doing; that although some will have done less good than others, their future happiness nevertheless will be as great as their capacity will admit of.—That although some saints hereafter will be less happy than others, they nevertheless will not know that this is the case: for that if a saint hereafter will be as happy as he can be, it would be a contradiction to say, that he might have a conception of any greater

happiness.—That the lowest of the saints will have an eternal weight of glory, no less than the highest.

PART II.

SECTION I.

Thoughts on the notion of a general redemption.

SECTION II.

On motion.

SECTION III.

The notion of various states through which, according to Dr. Cheyne, angels, as well as men, will pass, previously to their arriving at a state which will be permanent, and endure for ever, explained.

SECTION IV.

That brute creatures, as making a part of a cone which has vegetative life for its basis,

and the highest created intelligences for its vertex, are, according to Dr. Cheyne, capable of a progressive procedure to perfection and happiness.

SECTION V.

Farther thoughts on brutes.

SECTION VI.

On the same subject.

SECTION VII.

On the same subject.

SECTION VIII.

On the doctrine of analogy.

SECTION IX.

On the body, soul, and spirit, as these three principles in the human constitution are spoken of in 1 Thess. v. 3.

SECTION X.

The difference between men in respect of mental capacity, accounted for on philosophical principles; to which are added some remarks on the doctrine of emanations.

SECTION XI.

On the will.

SECTION XII.

On the Millennium.



APPENDIX.

TWO DISCOURSES:

- I. On the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity.*
- II. On the Doctrine of Christ's Divinity.*

SECTION I.



THAT man was originally neither mortal nor immortal absolutely, but conditionally only the one, or the other, is an opinion which has not only obtained with some of the ancient Fathers, but has, in later times, been adopted by some of the most learned of our Divines; and of the number of these is Dr. Kennicott, who, in one of his two celebrated Dissertations, argues as follows:—"Adam was created either absolutely immortal, absolutely mortal, or conditionally immortal. If he was created absolutely immortal, he could not have died; but die he did. If he was created absolutely mortal, he could not but die; and therefore was not a candidate for immortality*." To the same purpose Bishop Bull, speaking of the command which God gave unto Adam, with respect to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, says, "God promised life, as Adam should abstain from

* Dissertation on the Tree of Life, p. 11.

eating of that tree; but threatened death, as he should eat thereof*." Now, as these words of this Prelate imply a possibility only of Adam's either living or dying, he must have thought, with Dr. Kennicott, that Adam originally was neither mortal nor immortal absolutely, but conditionally only either the one or the other: and he accordingly supposes the aforesaid command to have had the nature of the covenant between God and man. In farther and more direct proof, however, that this was the opinion of the learned Bishop, he, in a farther part of this Discourse of his, produces various testimonies of its having been adopted by several of the ancient Fathers, and in particular by Theophilus, who writes as follows:—"God made Adam neither immortal nor mortal, but capable of either state:" it thus (by the bye) appears, that this notion which I have stated, and which has been adopted by these two very respectable writers, was not new when either of them wrote.

There is an immortality, however, which man had when God first made him, which is

* Bull's Serm. vol. iii. p. 1097.

different and distinct from that which I have above mentioned: for the immortality which I have mentioned, is an immortality which was set before man when God gave him the command with respect to the tree of knowledge; an immortality, therefore, which, as I have said, it was then possible only for him to have, and *that*, as a being consisting of a body and a soul united; whereas the immortality of which I am now speaking, is an immortality that is proper to the soul: “for the body wherein man was first made (as St. Austin observes) was not made immortal; but yet it was made so as that it should not have died, unless man had offended*.” Now, although the soul, by reason of its natural immortality, cannot die, as the body may, it has a life, nevertheless, which it may lose, and so be, in the sight of God, dead; and if all men will have sinned in Adam, all men will come into the world destitute of this life of the soul; and this life is meant by that immortalizing spirit, ~~which has been mentioned, and~~ with which Bishop Bull, and others, suppose man to have been originally endowed, which he lost when he sinned, and which he recovers, as he has faith in Christ.

* City of God, B. XIII. c. xxiv. p. 469.

It is in agreement with these notions, that it has very properly been observed by a learned divine, that “ the good only, in whom the spiritual life was never extinguished, are to be called, in the truest and highest sense, the living, and most properly styled immortals, as the second death has no power over them*.”

To return, however, to the opinions which have been adopted by Bishop Bull, and others, with respect to man’s original state and condition, it is farther observable, that they suppose, that “ although man, as he came out of the hands of his Maker, was furnished with powers by the exercise of which the purposes of an earthly life might have been answered; that nevertheless being designed for a heavenly life, it would be necessary, in order to his attainment to that life, that he should be furnished with powers which, as these likewise should be exercised for the purpose for which they were given, would qualify him for that life: for that man’s powers, and faculties, even as they were before the fall entire, were not sufficient, or able of themselves to reach such a supernatural end †.”

* Hodges’s Elihu, n. *, 304.

† See Bull’s Serm. vol. iii. Disc. v. p. 1120.

They accordingly suppose, “ that when God breathed into man the breath of life, he at the same time, and with a view to the cœlestial life for which he intended him, endowed him, not only with supernatural gifts and graces, but with a divine Spirit, by means of which his mind might be raised to heaven, and he might aspire to the happiness of a heavenly life*.” They farther say, “ that when Adam brake the first covenant which God entered into with him, and which was the case when he disobeyed the command which God gave him with respect to the tree of knowledge, God, by the mercy of the second covenant which he established in Christ the Mediator, restored to him the divine Spirit which he had lost by the breach of the first covenant, and for the same purpose as that for which he had originally endowed him with it †.” These divines must accordingly (i. e.

* See Bull's Serm. vol. iii. Disc. v. p. 1120.

† Ibid. p. 1100. This notion has been adopted by Archbishop King. See his Origin of Evil, vol. i. p. 169. What in our text has been said with respect to a divine Spirit, with which Bishop Bull, adopting the opinion of some of the ancient Fathers, supposes man to have been endowed when God breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, has in fact been said by a celebrated Commentator of the present day (Dr. Adam Clarke) in a note on the following

as they should speak consistently) be supposed to say, that the gifts and graces which

text of Job, *There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding*, chap. xxxii. ver. 8. Our author takes no notice of what the above divines have said on this subject; he nevertheless differs from them only in respect of the terms in which he has expressed his own notions, and as in the sequel of this note will appear. In a former note, our author had observed, that, “*by the breath of lives* (according to the Hebrew version) which God is by Moses said to have breathed into man’s nostrils, that principle is meant from which animal and spiritual life proceeds” (chap. xxvii. ver. 3). In the present note he repeats this, and says of this Spirit, that “in man it is the fountain of his animal existence; and that by the *afflatus* of this Spirit, they (i. e. as I suppose, Adam and Eve) became capable of understanding and reason, and, consequently, discerning divine truth.” Having premised thus much, he says, that, “when man fell from God, the Spirit of God was grieved, and departed from him; but was restored as the Enlightener, Corrector, in virtue of the proposed incarnation and atonement of our Lord Jesus: hence He is the true light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. That *afflatus* is, therefore, still continued to man in his wretched fallen state; and it is by that Spirit that we have any conscience, knowledge of good and evil, judgment of divine things, and, in a word, capability of being saved; and when, through the light of that Spirit convincing us of sin, righteousness, and judgment, the sinner turns to God through Christ, and finds redemption in his blood, the remission of sins; then it is the office of the same Spirit to give him the understanding of the great work that has been done in and for him: for the Spirit of God beareth witness with his spirit that he is a child of God. It is the same Spirit which sanctifies, the same that seals, and the same that lives, and works in the believer, guiding him by its

were bestowed on the Apostles, and which in all ages of the church have been bestowed on believers, are the same in kind, as those with which Adam, as they say, was endowed.

Now, if God restored this divine Spirit which Adam had lost by his breach of the first covenant, it could only have been as he (Adam) was under the second covenant, that this could have been the case; and as Adam shall be supposed not only to have understood the prophecy which was contained under the words which God spake unto Eve, namely, that *her seed should bruise the serpent's head*, but to have believed in the truth thereof (both which are by divines supposed to have been the case), he would have been under the second covenant, notwithstanding that this covenant supposes Christ to have died, and to have risen again, and his dying, and rising again, were posterior to the time of Adam.

counsel, till it leads him to glory." Now, whatever commendation may be due to the learned commentator for this account, I nevertheless say it is so little different from that which is given in our text, as that he may well be supposed to have drawn from the same source as I have; and as, by comparing these (allowing for the different terms, or words, in which these notions are expressed by these writers respectively), will, as I conceive, be evident.

To return to my subject, I say, that when Theophilus says of man that he was originally neither mortal, nor immortal, but capable of either state; and Dr. Kennicott to the same purpose, that he was neither mortal nor immortal absolutely, but conditionally only either the one or the other; they must suppose his state and condition to be such as it was when God had given him the command with respect to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; and when, as the son of Sirach says, he was *left in the hands of his own counsel**: for man as he came out of the hands of God, was, no doubt, naturally mortal. “God (as Bishop King † has observed) can preserve man from actual death;” and this (as in a former part of this section has been supposed) he did in the case of Adam, by endowing him with a divine Spirit; and by virtue of which he would, so long as he should have preserved it, have been immortal; “but (as the above writer adds) that a machine consisting of heterogeneous parts, such as the human body is, should not be naturally mortal, is impossible ‡.”

* Eccles. xv. 14.

† See King's *Origin of Evil*, vol. i. p. 169.

‡ This notion of man's natural mortality is not only in agreement with, but confirms that of man's having originally been

It remains only for me to make some such observations on what has now been said, as are suitable to the subject of this discourse; I accordingly say, that man's state and condition will evidently have been mutable from the time that there was any possibility of his acting from that freedom of will with which

endowed with a divine and immortalizing spirit; and which, so long as he should have kept it, would have preserved him from death. When St. Paul then says, *by man* (i. e. by the sin of man) *came death*, we are not to suppose the Apostle to mean that death could only have come by sin: for so would not man have been originally mortal. The death which came by sin, was, and continues to be, the punishment of sin; if man then might have died, and death not have been felt as a punishment, it might, and in agreement with the above notion, would have come, though man had not sinned. Now, all living creatures have a natural desire to preserve their lives; brute creatures have this desire, no less than men; seeing, however, the death of the body in the case of man, arises from the sin of his soul, and is, in his case, the punishment of sin; death with brutes, who have no soul, can be no punishment. As death then shall be supposed to have come upon man without his having sinned, his case would have been like that of brutes; i. e. death with him would not have been a punishment, any more than it is with brutes. In consequence, however, of man's being an intelligent being, he may have, and in his present state, naturally has, a dread of death: as man then shall be supposed to have died gradually by decay, and without pain (and which, as I suppose, would have been the case had he been left to his natural mortality), he would, as I likewise suppose, have died without any apprehension, or fear of death, and as is the case with brutes.

God had endowed him, and which was when the command was given him with respect to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil: for, when good and evil were set before him, life and death would have been set before him, and he would have been under the necessity of choosing either the one or the other. As he shall be supposed to have chosen death (and which he really did), from his having been neither absolutely mortal, nor immortal, but capable nevertheless of either state, he would have become mortal, and he would surely die; his state and condition in consequence of his having chosen death, would, of course, have become immutable; for, having chosen death, the freedom of his will would be at an end; and although he might continue to live, he nevertheless, as well as his posterity, would be dying daily, so long as he, or they, continued to be inhabitants of this earth.

SECTION II.



HAVING in the preceding section, by an argument grounded on the freedom of the human will, shown that the mutability of man's natural state and condition hath a tendency to a state which will be immutable, and endure for ever; I propose, in the present section, by an argument likewise grounded on the freedom of the will, to show that this rule will likewise hold good, as man shall be considered in his moral capacity; and for this purpose I observe as follows:—

As death was threatened in case of Adam's disobedience to the command which God had given him, with respect to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, life would virtually have been promised him in case of his obedience; the life, then, which was promised in case of his obedience, would be a life, which, although he would have owed it ultimately to Him who is the fountain of life,

he, nevertheless, would immediately owe to himself : for otherwise he would not be responsible for those actions on which spiritual life or death depend.

Seeing, however, man could not have known evil (i. e. death) to have been of his own free choice, had there not been a life which might, consistently with God's threatenings, be left to him; I suppose it to have been with a view to this life, that the words by which this threatening is expressed are, in the Hebrew, *dying thou shalt die*, i. e. thou shalt be subject to all those evils which lead to, and which end in death. I scarce need to add, that the life with which every one now comes, or ever has, or ever will come into the world, is the same life in kind, as that which, as I have said, was left to Adam when he had sinned.

Now it is evident, that had there not been a life remaining to man, which would be consistent with the death which God had threatened, and which man, by his disobedience, had incurred, he could not have been redeemed. I accordingly suppose it to have been as God foresaw that man would sin,

that Christ is in Scripture said to be *the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world**. Adam, it is true, could not, after he had sinned, have had any notion of a Redeemer (and, before, he would not have stood in need of one) until it had been told Eve, that *her seed would bruise the serpent's head*; if Christ, however, was the Lamb slain (in the sight of God) from the foundation of the world, the virtue of this sacrifice would, as I conceive, have taken place from the moment of Adam's sinning. But if so, it will have taken place in the case of every man that cometh into the world, for every man that cometh into the world will have sinned in Adam.

Now the life which, as I have said, was left to Adam after he had sinned, would, because of the certainty of his dying, be death rather than life; and such is the life which

* Rev. xiii. 8.—By the foundation of the world, it is observed by a learned Commentator, the foundation of the Christian world is commonly understood; he nevertheless adds, “as Jesus Christ was in the divine purpose appointed from the foundation of the world to redeem man by his blood, he therefore is, in an eminent sense, the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, i. e. from the creation.”—AD. CLARKE in loc.

we have in this world. If all men then, because of their having sinned, will die; all men, nevertheless, because of their having been redeemed, will rise again. Some however, we are told, will rise to everlasting life, and some to everlasting death; that they who, in this life, shall have done good will be of the number of the former of these; and they who have done evil, of the number of the latter.

Now I say, that if they who have done good will rise to the resurrection of life, and they who have done evil to the resurrection of death, moral good and evil will in this life have been set before every one who shall have attained to an age to distinguish between these, in like manner as natural good and evil were set before Adam. If, then, the freedom of will with which man was originally endowed, and in consequence of which good and evil were set before him, was at an end when he chose evil, and dying he would, or might, in his posterity, have died to all eternity; nevertheless, having been redeemed, the freedom of his will would have been restored; and as it would be in vain that any created being should have a freedom of will,

except as good and evil were set before him* ; good and evil would be set before every man in the manner which I have mentioned, from a like necessity, if I may so say, that good and evil were set before Adam ; with this difference however, that it is moral good and evil that would be set before every one that now cometh into the world, and not natural good and evil, as was the case with Adam.

Now, if (and as in the preceding section I have shown) the state and condition of man were mutable, as natural good and evil were

* As the attaining to a moral perfection is the purpose for which man hath his abode on this earth, and everlasting happiness the end of his attaining to this perfection, it is evident that this perfection must be different from that with which he came out of the hands of his Maker : for, as this perfection shall be supposed to be a moral perfection, man could not have been, as he now is, a candidate for heaven, had he come morally perfect out of the hands of God. Man's present imperfection, it is true, was the consequence of the fall ; having however been redeemed, the foundation was laid for that perfection which I have mentioned, i. e. a moral perfection.

There is an imperfection, however, which not only man, but every created intelligent being, must necessarily have, as compared to the perfection of Him that created them : a perfection of which man as well as the most exalted of intelligent beings, must so evidently be incapable, as that I should not on the present occasion have mentioned it, but that it will prepare the way for the use that will be made of it in the second part of this discourse.

set before him; mutable likewise will be his state and condition, as moral good and evil shall be set before him: for, in both cases alike, he will be under the necessity of choosing either the one, or the other; and as Adam, and, in him, all men became mortal, as he chose evil; so will every one, now that the door of everlasting life has been opened by Christ, be immortal, whether he shall choose good or evil: for the death which the Scriptures mean, when they say that some will rise to the resurrection of death, is spiritual, and not natural death. The mutability of the condition of man as he is now in a state of grace, may thus be seen to lead to a state which will be immutable, in like manner as was the case, when he was in a state of nature.

The condition of man, whether considered in his natural or moral capacity, is analogous to that of the things of nature; for that these are fluctuating, and continually changing, our senses may witness to us. Now, that the mutability of the state of the things of nature hath this further analogy to that of things spiritual, namely, that it hath a tendency to a state which will be immutable,

has been remarked by a learned Commentator; and that they have this tendency is implied by the words of the Psalmist, *He (God) hath established them for ever* *. That the learned Commentator however has not had a right conception of this matter, will be shown in the following section, where the words by which he has expressed this mutability to which all things are subject, are stated.

* Ps. cxlviii. ver. 6.

SECTION III.



THE words to which I have, at the conclusion of the last section, alluded, are as follows :—“ Nature herself is subject to mutability ; though by her secret and inscrutable exertions, she effects her renovation from her decay, and thus change is prevented from terminating in destruction. Yet nature herself is tending, by continual mutations, to a final destruction, or rather to a fixed state, when time, the place, and sphere of mutability, shall be absorbed in eternity. Time and nature are coeval ; they began, and must terminate together. All changes are efforts to arrive at destruction, or renovation ; and destruction must be the term or bound of all created things, had the Creator not purposed that his works should endure for ever. According to his promise, we look for a new heaven, and a new earth ; a fixed, permanent, and endless state of things ; an everlasting Sabbath to all the works of God*.”

* Ad. Clarke on James, i. 27

On this I observe, in the first place, that the author supposes, that all things are subject to decay; and that they are, at the same time, subject to mutation; but which, if mutation be compatible with decay, is a contradiction; for, when a thing is changed, it exists (according to the philosophy which I have adopted) under some form different from that under which it before existed; but which is not the case when a thing decays; when a thing decays, it will be less perfect than it originally was; it nevertheless will be the same thing that it originally was; but which, as I have said, is not the case when it is changed. In the second place, it is observable, that our author, on the ground of a thing being subject to decay, supposes that there is a renovating power in nature; and, upon the ground of decay having a tendency to destruction, he says, that nature, by her secret exertions, effects her renovation by her decay. Now renovation implies, as change does, a thing to exist under some form different from that under which it before existed; except, then, by destruction our author be supposed to mean the destruction of some particular form, and which will not be inconsistent with its existing afterwards under some new form, there

can be no renovation; renovation may thus be conceived to arise from decay, but cannot with propriety be said to be effected by it. Destruction likewise may be said to arise from decay, as the destruction of form shall be supposed to be meant; there is a necessity, however, of things existing under some form, or they could not endure for ever; but, under what form soever a thing exists, decay cannot be said to effect, or be the cause of, that change which it will have undergone.

Now, when our author, supposing, as he does, all changes to be efforts to arrive at destruction, or renovation, says upon the supposition of the term destruction being synonymous with the term renovation (for he would not otherwise speak intelligibly), that destruction must, or would be the term, or bound of all created things, had not the Creator purposed that all his works should endure for ever, he evidently supposes destruction to have a natural tendency to inexistence, or annihilation*; and our author is

* Drew, in his *Essay on the Immortality of the human Soul*, supposes that annihilation is a thing impossible; and to show this, he argues as follows:—"Annihilation is not only inconceivable, but utterly impossible; because annihilation is an exchange of entity for nonentity. And if this nonentity

not the first writer who has supposed that all created things have naturally this tendency; and would return to their original nothing, were they not continually upheld in their existence by Him who first caused them to exist: a notion which, as I conceive,

cannot be ascertained with as much precision as entity itself, it is impossible to say where the former begins, or where the latter ends. But in supposing this strange point to be ascertained, where entity ends, and where nonentity begins, which must be admitted, if annihilation be supposed possible, we give a beginning to what we cannot admit to have any kind of possible existence. To suppose a nonentity to have no beginning, is to suppose an entity to have no end; and what has no end, instead of being annihilated, must be immortal. To give a beginning to a nonentity, is a contradiction, and to deprive it of it, is to make the soul immortal. Annihilation is therefore impossible in the nature of things. To reduce entity to nonentity, is to reduce that which is, to that which is not; it is to make entity and nonentity to meet together, and entity and nonentity can then be extremes no longer. But if the physical distance which is between all natural existences be done away, entity and nonentity must be the same thing; for that which is separated by nothing, must necessarily be the same; and if that which is, can be the same with that which is not, we are brought to this naked contradiction—that the soul may be annihilated, and not be annihilated at the same time.” Another writer observes—“To make a thing to be, is an act of power; but to make it not to be, at one and the same time, would reverse this act. Such conceptions are nonentities, and the supposition of producing them is the supposition that power is no power.”

—BROWN'S ESSAY, p. 193.

is completely refuted by the arguments contained in the note here referred to.

To return to my subject, I say, that things cannot be changed as to their forms, or modes of existence, but as they will exist, their existence merely being considered; but our author evidently denies this, in his saying, as is above stated, that destruction would be the term, &c. And here I shall observe by the way, and in favour of the notions which I have adopted, that as they suppose the everlasting endurance of all things, to have been provided for in their very nature (i. e. in the necessity of their existing under some form), the necessity of their being continually upheld in their existence by the power of God, is superseded; whereas our author, supposing the everlasting endurance of things to have originated in the divine purpose, or intention, supposes their everlasting endurance to have originated in arbitrary appointment; consequently, that things originally, might have been of a nature either to endure for ever, or not to endure for ever; but which, upon my system, is impossible. The system which I have adopted, I scarce need to say, is that of Aristotle, or, as it is commonly called,

the Peripatetic philosophy; and which (if it be, and as in a farther part of this section it will be shown to be, in perfect agreement with what the Holy Scriptures teach on this subject) may not improperly be made use of in confirmation, as well as illustration, of the truth of my notions, on the present occasion. Now, according to this philosophy, all things consist of matter, form, and privation; i. e. these are the principles of all things: I accordingly say of all earthly things, that whilst, by reason of matter, they will be permanent and imperishable, by reason of form they will be changeable and perishable; for, if a thing be changeable, as it may exist under some form different from that under which it before existed, *that* under which it before existed will have perished; as matter, however, will have constituted the substratum, or support of both these forms alike, matter, as I have said, will be something permanent and imperishable. Now, although matter, as I suppose it to be thus evident, will constitute the real essence of things, form however will be necessary in order for our knowing that they have a real existence; and St. Augustine accordingly says, “As I would imagine a thing, the earth for instance, or the

materia prima, to be wholly devoid of form, this I cannot do: seeing it is easier to believe that a thing which has not any form exists not at all, than that it is wholly devoid of form*." Such is the philosophy of Aristotle; so much of it, at least, as is necessary for its showing the truth of my notions, as they stand opposed to those which are contained in the above quotation from Clarke's Commentaries.

Having supposed of this philosophy, that it is in perfect agreement with what the Scriptures teach so far as they relate to the present subject of my discourse, I shall in the remaining part of this section, apply it to a doctrine which peculiarly distinguishes the religion of Christ from all religions which have been of human invention; I mean the doctrine of regeneration. Now, regeneration supposes a man to have ceased to exist according to an old nature, and to exist according to a new one; a man, however, cannot (as the Scriptures give us to understand), in this life exist according to a new nature, in other words, be regenerate, but as there will be

* St. Austin's Confessions. The words *without form*, as they occur in the English Bible, in the Sept. ver. are expressed by the word *ἀσπρόν*, invisibilis.

something of the old nature remaining in the case of this man; and, if so, he may fall back into his unregenerate state*: for we are to consider, that faith is the ground of regeneration; and I suppose, that no man can in such manner believe, as that his belief, or faith, will not be mingled with unbelief, or a want of faith. I accordingly say, that a believer not only may, but necessarily will be in part regenerate, and in part unregenerate; his faith will, it is true, have failed, as it shall be supposed that he has knowingly and wilfully fallen back into his unregenerate state; seeing, however, he may by faith, and repentance, recover, and be restored to his regenerate state, the faith of this man, it is evident, will not wholly have failed; but which, however, may be the case with a man, as his *faith* shall in such manner have *failed*, as that *his renewal, by repentance*, shall have become *impossible*: for, as this man will have *tasted the heavenly gift, and have been made a partaker of the Holy Ghost*†, this, as I suppose, will argue his having become regenerate; and if his faith will in such manner have failed, as that it

* See Dr. Waterland's discourse on Regeneration. See also Bishop Pearson's Preface to the Sept. ver. of the Old Testament, 8vo. Lond. 1653.

† Heb. vi. 4.

cannot by repentance be renewed, this will argue his being in a state of unregeneration, and in this state he will necessarily remain; for, according to the above Scripture, he cannot by repentance be renewed.

Now it is generally supposed by divines, and as, in the concluding part of the preceding section, has been observed, that there is an analogy between things spiritual and things natural; I accordingly suppose the doctrine which I have been considering, and which for this purpose I have endeavoured to explain, *that* namely of regeneration, as being a very remarkable example of this analogy. Regeneration, as I have said, supposes a man to have ceased from an existence according to one nature, or birth, and to exist according to another, and different nature or birth; the nature or birth from which he will have ceased to exist, may properly be said to constitute what St. Paul calls *the outward man*, i. e. the earthly nature; and the nature or birth, according to which he will exist, will constitute *the inward man*, i. e. the spiritual nature. Now, if regeneration be, as I have said, by degrees only; and the Apostle accordingly says of the outward

man, that he is *daily perishing*, and of the inward man, that he is *daily renewing*; there will be something in the state and condition of every believer, which will continually be perishing, and something which will continually be renewing; and so says the Apostle, *Though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day**. To show, then, the analogy which, as I suppose, there is between things spiritual and things natural, I say of the former of these, that, according to the philosophy which I have adopted, they are changeable by reason of form; but, by reason of matter, unchangeable; for, although in the case of things natural, it be as I have said, and as St. Austin has said, by reason of form, that we can know any natural thing to exist; there nevertheless must be a substratum, or something substantial to be the support of form, in order for its having a real existence; and this, as I contend, is in fact said of spiritual things in the above text of the Epistle to the Corinthians. Having supposed the things of nature to be changeable, and that they cannot, according to our conceptions, exist without form, their mutability

* 2 Cor. iv. 16.

will be the cause of their continually ceasing from an existence according to one form, and of their being continually existing *de novo* under some other form; there will therefore, in their case, be something by reason of which they will be continually renewing, or existing *de novo*. Now, as by the term decay, which the learned Commentator in the above extract makes use of, we shall suppose a perishing form to be meant; although the renovation of things, or their existing under some new form, will not be, as the author supposes, the effect of their decay; it nevertheless will be the *sine quâ non* thereof.

In farther proof of the analogy, which has been mentioned, and in conclusion of the present section, I observe as follows:—It will appear from what has above been said, that every believer has a two-fold existence; an existence according to an old and evil nature, and an existence according to a new and good one*; but if (and as hath likewise been sup-

* “The corrupt nature of Adam still remains, even in the regenerate, and as long as they dwell in this fleshly tabernacle, will ever be at war with the spirit.”—COPPLESTON'S Inquiry, &c. p. 163.

posed) he will (except as he shall fall away from his faith) be continually perishing in respect of the one of these natures, or modes of existence, and be continually renewing, or reviving, in respect of the other; it will be evident, that his existence according to both these natures, will be imperfect. But so it is with the things of nature; they are continually perishing in respect of some old form, but continually existing anew in respect of some other, and different form; their existence of course, like that of things spiritual, will be an imperfect one. Now, if both these will ever attain to a perfection of existence (and which the Scriptures, in their speaking of *a restitution of all things**, give us reason to suppose will be the case), the mutability to which things spiritual, as well as natural, are in this world subject, will have a tendency to that immutability, or everlasting endurance, which they will have hereafter; and if, when *that which is perfect is come, that which is in part* (i. e. that which is imperfect) *will be done away*; the present imperfection of the existence of things natural as well as spiritual, will have a tendency to a state, or existence,

* Acts, iii. 21.

which will be perfect. And so says Tertulian, as quoted by Mede, “ Videtur rationi consentaneum, ut corruptio, mutabilitas et peccatum (quibus subjicitur totus mundus) aliquando cessarent. Cœli procellæ in morem transibunt, elementa æstuantia solventur, terra, et quæ in ea sunt opera, exurentur; quasi diceret (Apostolus) mundus (uti in auro fieri videmus) totus igne repurgabitur, atque ad ultimam suam perfectionem reduceter, quem minor ille mundus, nimirum homo, imitatus, a corruptione, itidem et mutatione, liberabitur. Itaque hominis causâ (in cujus gratiam major hic mundus creabatur primum) renovatus tandem, faciem induet multo cùm jucundiozem, et pulchriorem*.”

* Mede's Works, p. 815.

SECTION IV.

HAVING in the preceding sections shown that the mutability of man's present moral state and condition has a tendency to a state which will be immutable, I proceed to the consideration of the other branch of the subject of my discourse; and shall endeavour to show, that although the natural state and condition of man as he came out of the hands of his Maker, was perfect, and might serve as the ground of a moral perfection;—that this moral perfection nevertheless must necessarily have been preceded by a state imperfect, morally considered; for this purpose I observe as follows—

God made man upright, i. e. perfect as to his moral capacity; “and whereby,” as by a learned Prelate* is observed, “he might ar-

* Bull's Serm. Dis. v. p. 1098.

rive to perfect virtue, and so to that eternal salvation which accompanies it;" but if so, his attaining to a perfection of moral character, would evidently depend on himself; and if a moral perfection will qualify man for that happiness for which he was originally intended, his attaining to it will likewise depend on himself; not, however, but as he shall have made a due use of those divine gifts, or graces, which in my first section have been mentioned, and with which I suppose every regenerate man to be endued.

Now, the purpose for which man was originally endowed with these gifts and graces was, according to the before-mentioned divines, his being qualified for a heavenly state; and this, they suppose might have been the case, although he had not been disobedient to the command which God gave him with respect to the tree of knowledge; there are, however, very cogent reasons to be given why this could not have been the case. I agree with these divines in supposing, that Adam's earthly was in order to a heavenly state, in like manner as is the case with us; seeing, however, *without holiness no man can see God*, and the immediate purpose for which we

have our present earthly abode is, that we may attain to this holiness, or righteousness, in order to our being duly qualified for a heavenly state, so must it have been (as, at least, we would argue from our own case) in the case of Adam. It is accordingly supposed by the learned Prelate, whose thoughts on this subject I had occasion to mention in my first section, “that Adam might have had a righteousness like unto that which arises in the case of the regenerate at this time* :” for what he, as well as other divines suppose is, that man, as he was redeemed by Christ, would have recovered only that righteousness which he lost as he sinned; and our Author accordingly, and in support of this opinion, cites the words of one of the ancient Fathers, who says, “that Adam, previously to his having sinned, would not have stood in need of the grace of a Saviour; for that the virtues which men, as Christians, have, namely, faith, continence, and charity, would have dwelt in him and his posterity †.” Now, seeing it is by these divines said, “that what man lost in Adam, to wit, the divine image, and similitude, *that* he receives again in Jesus

* Bull's Sermon. vol. iii. p. 1170.

† Ibid. 1155.

Christ *;" the having the divine image, will (according to this notion) be one and the same thing as the having faith, continence, and charity. In order, then, to our judging of the orthodoxy of the aforesaid opinions, it will be necessary that we should know in what the divine image may properly be said to consist; and for this purpose I observe as follows:—

What we call the divine attributes I suppose to be meant by St. Paul, by what he calls *the invisible things of God*, which he says, *are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made*. On these words of the Apostle it is observed by a learned Commentator as follows:—"The invisible perfections of the Deity are manifested by his visible works, and may be apprehended by what he has made; their immensity showing omnipotence; their vast variety and contrivance, his omniscience; and their adaptation to the most beneficent purposes, his infinite goodness, and philanthropy †." It thus appears, that not only the attributes which, in contradistinction to those which are of a

* Bull's Sermons, vol. iii. p. 1172.

† Adam Clarke on Rom. i. 20.

moral kind, are by divines called natural, such as power, wisdom, and goodness, obtain in God, but those likewise which are of a moral kind, such as justice, mercy, and truth; and if there are properties, or excellencies in man, corresponding to those which we suppose to be in God, man, as possessing these, will be the image of God. It is accordingly, and in agreement with the above notions, observed by Dr. Cheyne, that whatever natural powers, qualities, or faculties, we find in our own souls, we may safely conclude there are powers, qualities, or faculties, eminently corresponding, and analogous to them in the divine nature; with the difference that absolute infinitude has to the lowest finite*.”

* Philosophical Conjectures on spiritual Nature, Sect. 33. It is contended by a learned Prelate (Browne on Divine Analogy), upon the supposition of our being wholly ignorant of the divine nature, and of there being an impossibility of our having any conception, or idea at all of that great Being whom we call God, that our supposing powers or excellencies to reside in him the same in kind as those which reside in us, leads to atheism. The doctrine of analogy has likewise been adopted by Archbishop King, in a Sermon on Predestination annexed to his Origin of Evil; and it has since been adopted by the ingenious author (Copleston) of an Inquiry into the Doctrine of Necessity and Predestination, p. 88, n. c.

Now, I have supposed that man's having been made in the image of God, is the ground of a moral perfection to which he may attain, and which will qualify him for a heavenly life. Although, then, his possessing these properties, or qualities, which are called natural, would not, in his case, be in vain: for, on the contrary, I suppose them to be the ground of those which are called moral, in like manner as the natural man is the ground of the spiritual man; it nevertheless would evidently have been in vain, for any eternal purpose at least, that man had been made in the image of God, except as a due expansion should be given to those virtues, or excellencies, in which, I have supposed that image to consist.

The properties, or qualities, which, according to the above distinction, are called natural, such as power and wisdom, might, in the case of Adam, have been, and were called forth into action; and of this the Scriptures afford us an example, when they tell us, that *the Lord God brought unto Adam every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air, to see what names Adam would give unto them*; and as these names (as by the best

Commentators is supposed) were suitable to the nature of these animals*, this circumstance would have been a proof of Adam's being endowed with wisdom; and God's having given him dominion, *not only over all living creatures, but over all the earth*, may serve to show, that God had endowed him with power †.

Now, as the properties or qualities which are called moral must, in some way or other, have been drawn forth, in order for Adam's knowing that God had endowed him with them, in like manner as he would have known that God had endowed him with those which are called natural; I say, that, in a state of innocence, no such proof could have been given by Adam, as that he might know that God had endowed him with the former of these, as they shall be supposed to consist of justice, mercy, and truth: for justice implies sin, and consists in the punishment of sins; and

* See Browne's Essay, vol. ii. p. 140.

† With respect to Adam's knowledge, it is supposed by a learned divine, "that created, as Adam would have been, with the full vigour of his faculties, he would have received immediately from God the knowledge necessary to his state, and have been directed by him in regard to the right application of his powers."—Browne, 141.

I say the same of mercy: I say that mercy implies sin, and consists in the forgiveness of sins; and if the being true and just in our dealings one toward another, be a right notion of truth, truth would have been a virtue, which would have been equally unknown in a state of innocence, as justice and mercy. Had man not fallen, no such virtue as temperance could have been exercised: for temperance consists in moderating our inordinate desires; and, in a state of innocence, no inordinate desire could have been felt. I say the same of the virtues of forbearance and forgiveness: for these suppose wrongs and injuries, and no such could have been done in a state of innocence. Lastly I say, that had man not fallen, self-denial, the greatest of all virtues, could not have been exercised: for it consists in the sacrifice of a self, which could not have arisen in a state of innocence.

For these, as well as for many other reasons which might be given, it would not, as I humbly conceive, have been the divine intention to have translated man from an earthly to a heavenly Paradise in the manner supposed by the aforesaid divines. The life of a heavenly Paradise, I suppose, as these

divines do, depended on man's obedience; but not on his obedience to the command which God gave him with respect to the tree of knowledge; his living the life of an earthly Paradise depended on his obedience to this command: for so much do the words, *on the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die*, imply. There was a command, however, which grew out of the breach of this first command, which is positive, and not negative as this first command was, for the terms of this second command were, *This do, and thou shalt live*: i. e. although thou wilt die, yet, dying voluntarily, thou shalt live again, not a life of this, but of another world.

To return, however, from this digression, I suppose love to be the root from which the moral virtues spring; and I further suppose it to be, as this passion is a property which was originally interwoven in the nature of man, that he is the image of his Maker. In vain, nevertheless, according to our conceptions, would this have been the case, if man had not fallen: for, although God might, and did, show his love towards man in his having created him; in comparison, nevertheless, of

the love which he showed towards man in his redeeming him when he had fallen, the love which he showed towards him in his having created him, would have been no love at all. As man's apostacy, however, gave occasion for a love being shown on the part of God, which was the greater in proportion as it was undeserved on the part of man; so did the various evils to which men in general became subject by the sin of Adam, give occasion for a love being shown by men, i. e. one towards another, as their various wants and distresses should render them objects of compassion, which would be like unto that which God showed towards men, when, taking compassion on the deplorable state to which, by the sin of Adam, they were reduced, he redeemed them. If man then, by his apostacy, fell from that divine image in which he was made, he would, as by such works of charity, as his having fallen would give rise to, he should show himself to be like unto God, not only recover that image which he had lost, but exist in a brighter image than that which he had lost.

The fall of man has thus, eventually, shown the great power of God of bringing

good out of evil, or converting evil into good; it nevertheless is certain, that man might, like the angels, at the great apostacy of these cœlestial beings, have kept his first estate; i. e. he might have been obedient to the command which God gave him with respect to the tree of good and evil. Now, there is no ground in Scripture on which we can with any certainty say what would have been the consequence of Adam's obedience; all is uncertainty and conjecture. Adam's state, as it seems to me, could not have been a probationary one, as ours may be, and that for this reason, namely, that it could have been a passive obedience only, and not an active one, that he could have shown; and if so, his innocence only could have entitled him to a reward; seeing, however, he could not have been more innocent after an obedience of a thousand years, than he would have been after an obedience of a day, an hour, or even a moment, when or how God would have rewarded him (and as the aforesaid divines suppose he would), I am wholly at a loss to know.

The happiness of the angels, who, when a great part of them fell, are said to have

kept their first estate, would, as we may suppose, have been as great as their capacity would admit of; this however could not have been the case with a being whose only reward could have been his innocence; and consequently, whose greatest happiness would have consisted in the consciousness of his being innocent; but the capacity of happiness in the case of man, would have been greater, as he shall be supposed to have fallen, than it could in the nature of things have been, had he, like a part of the angels, kept his first estate: for man, having fallen, might be redeemed; and being redeemed, a love might spring up in his heart, from whence a happiness might arise which would be greater than angels are capable of; and greater of course than that of which man, as he shall be supposed not to have fallen, would have been capable of. A farther reason however may be given in proof of the truth of this proposition. That the happiness of man was the end for which God made him, I suppose to be perfectly consistent with the notion of the glory of God constituting that end. I accordingly farther suppose, that man, when God had made him, and placed him in Paradise, was as happy as his capacity, under

these circumstances, would admit of. Seeing however this happiness would arise from sensual enjoyments, it would not be different in kind from that which brutes may be supposed to enjoy. But man, it may be said, being an intelligent, as well as a sensitive creature, is capable of a happiness which may arise from heavenly contemplations. To this I answer, that as these contemplations would necessarily be grounded in sensible perception, for, *nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu*, no happiness could arise from these contemplations, which would not partake of the nature of the things on which they would have been grounded. Now it is supposed by divines, that by virtue of the promise which God made after man had fallen, that the seed of the woman should bruise the head of the serpent, a covenant was made between God and man, different from that which originally subsisted between them, and which the aforesaid promise supposes to have been broken. As this shall be supposed, it will be evident, that good and evil are again set before man; not the good and evil which were originally set before him, and which were a good and evil that are of this world, but a good and evil that are of another world. This being

the case, it is farther evident, that the happiness which will arise as a man shall choose good, in other words as he shall perform his part in the covenant which he will have entered into with God, will be a happiness of which he himself will be the author; as he will likewise be of the misery which will arise as he shall choose evil, i. e. as he shall break the covenant which he will have entered into with God. As this happiness however, and this misery, will not be of this life, neither the one nor the other can be experienced any otherwise than by anticipation, in this life. Although man then is a being capable of a happiness, in comparison of which *that* which is of this world is no happiness at all; and if he is a free being, he cannot be capable of this happiness, but as he will be capable of a misery which will be its proper contrary; I say, that, whatever may be the case with superior created beings, man's having originally been made capable of happiness would have been in vain, except as he himself might be the author of that happiness; this however he could not have enjoyed had he not fallen: for as to the happiness which he enjoyed, and which he might for ever have continued to enjoy in Paradise,

I say, that he would not more have owed it to himself, than a brute owes to itself that happiness which is like unto it. See n. [*] in Sect. IX.

These, and many more, are the difficulties which arise, as man shall be supposed not to have fallen; and yet certain it is, as I before observed, that man might not have fallen, in other words, that he might have been obedient to the command which God gave him with respect to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; the difficulties*, in short, are such as we shall suppose Adam to have been obedient, as that it exceeds, as I suppose, the human capacity to solve them.

I shall conclude this section with an account which is given of this matter by a learned writer, and which account, although it does not solve the difficulty which I have mentioned, is nevertheless as ingenious as it is (to me at least) new. The original possibility of man's falling, our author, in agreement with the Archbishop, on a part of whose treatise these thoughts of his are given as a

* See Annotation at the end of this section.

note, attributes to a circumstance which, according to the order of our conceptions, hath a priority to the freedom of man's will; i. e. it is attributed to an imperfection which every created being must necessarily have, as he shall be compared with Him who created him. When, however, our author supposes, as he does, that the end for which God permitted man to fall was, that he might be duly sensible of good and evil; however true this may be, it nevertheless is not consistent with his having attributed man's falling to the imperfection of his nature; for although, by reason of this natural imperfection, man might fall, he nevertheless would not, by reason thereof, necessarily fall: for this the freedom of his will would forbid; but, therefore, would his falling, as this shall be supposed to have happened, have been independent on any permission on God's part; and we cannot go farther back than man's creation for the origin of this permission, because we can have no idea of any thing that is prior to creation. When, however, our author, after his having supposed the fall of man to have been by the divine permission, and given a reason for it, adds (not literally, but in so many words), that the moral perfections of the Deity could

not have been known by man had he not fallen, I cannot object to this notion, having myself, in a former part of this section, adopted it. For the moral perfections of the Deity could not have been known by man, had not God created him in his own image; and not even then, had not expansion been given to certain properties, or virtues in himself, corresponding with the moral perfections of the Deity; by this expansion, or outgoing, I say, he would know the moral perfections of the Deity, because he would know, that it must be by reason of these, as they existed in himself, if by reason of any thing, that he was the image of God; but in all this, the fall of man is supposed by our author*, as it is likewise by me.

To the account which I have now detailed are added by our author some thoughts which, although very appropriate to the subject on which he had been treating, cannot, however, with propriety, make a part of our text; I shall, therefore, give it in the note here referred to †.

* See King's Origin of Evil, vol. ii. p. 466, n. 85.

† "Man is a very imperfect compound being, who, by the constitution of his nature, seems to be incapable of being

made truly wise and virtuous, or, which is the same thing, morally happy on a sudden, and must, therefore, receive improvement gradually; and as he is to complete his good habits by a series of virtuous acts, so it seems proper for him to be trained up by various dispensations, and a series of events adapted to the several faculties of his body and mind, the constituent parts of his nature, and different sources of his happiness; accordingly we find that the happiness of man in his first estate was chiefly animal, to which an earthly paradise was exquisitely fitted; a change in this was probably requisite to introduce the rational or moral kind (of happiness) into the world, and to make him direct his thoughts to something higher than mere sensitive delights. This, we are told, was the method of the divine Providence with the Jewish nation in particular, who had a law of carnal ordinances to exercise them for a while, and lead them on to the expectation of better things; to spiritualize their notions by degrees, and prepare them for the heavenly doctrines of Messiah. And why might not the like method be made use of in the government of mankind in general, or even all rational beings? What if God, willing to make known the greater riches of his glory, suffered our first parents to fall from that condition wherein he created them at first, in order to raise them and their posterity to a much higher state of glory and true happiness hereafter? and who can prove that the former was not conducive to the latter? We believe that the bliss of heaven will infinitely exceed the pleasures of a terrestrial Eden; why then should we not suppose that the less might be in some manner useful and introductory to the greater? Why might not a short life in Paradise be as proper a state of probation for the virtues of this present world, as this world is for the glories of another?" This last notion, I confess, is above my comprehension.

Annotation referred to in Page 45 of the preceding Section.

AMONGST the many difficulties which, in the text, are said to arise upon the supposition of Adam's obedience to the command which God gave him with respect to the tree of knowledge, there is one which, as being foreign to the subject of this section, and a difficulty at the same time of no small magnitude, I have thought it proper to mention and consider in the present Annotation.

It was, no doubt, with a view to the multiplication of the human species, and that *the earth* might be *replenished*, i. e. stocked with inhabitants, that God, soon after he had created man, said unto them, *Be fruitful, and multiply*. The question, however, which arises is, Whether Adam, previously to his disobedience to the command which God gave him with respect to the tree of knowledge, and which was after he had given him the command to multiply, could act in obedience to this last-mentioned command, had there been time and opportunity for his so doing? Of this divines in general seem to have had no doubt; and it is accordingly observed by a divine of some note, that "Adam, when God had given him the command with respect to the tree of knowledge, covenanted not only for himself, but for his offspring; and which indeed is evident from the circumstance of our mortality; and as we, in consequence of Adam's breach of this covenant, are mortal, so any such chil-

dren as Adam shall be supposed to have had previously to his breaking this covenant (i. e. in a state of innocence), would have been immortal*. But here the great difficulty arises which I have alluded to: for, if these children would have been immortal absolutely, and which the learned writer supposes, they could not sin; if conditionally so, on what conditions, I ask, would their immortality depend? Not on the same as those on which Adam's immortality depended, for various reasons that might be given. The conditions on which our immortality depends arise from the sin of Adam; and such abode as we have here on earth, is for the purpose of our performing these conditions, and, by so doing, of our being qualified for heaven; but no purpose that we can conceive could be answered by the innocent children of innocent parents being on earth, and who, being, as I have said, absolutely immortal, would be fit for being inhabitants of heaven. It is not, however, because these or any other difficulties which might be mentioned upon the supposition of Adam's obedience are insurmountable, that I suppose Adam would not have had children, had he continued to be innocent long enough for this purpose; there are, as I conceive, and shall endeavour to show, physical as well as metaphysical reasons to be given why he could not have had children; I accordingly observe as follows:

The command, *Be fruitful, and multiply*, I suppose it will be granted me, not only supposes, but requires, a peculiar desire in order for its being possible

* Turner's Boyle's Lect. p. 230.

for its being fulfilled: a desire, the impurity of which would, as I suppose, have forbidden its being felt, as man came out of the hands of his Maker; for, if it be an impure desire now, it always would have been so; and that it is an impure desire, its requiring to be sanctified as is the case now, evidently shows. But if so, with what propriety, it may be asked, could God have given our first parents a command which would require an impure desire in order for its being obeyed? My answer is, that this command was, as I suppose, given with a foresight of Adam's disobedience to the command which was afterwards given with respect to the tree of knowledge, and as a remedy against the extinction of the human species, which would have been the natural consequence of that disobedience; the giving this command therefore, as I contend, could only have been meant to sanctify that desire, when its being felt would not only be possible, but inevitable; and this desire, as I suppose, requires no other sanctification at the present day. Now, to show that our first parents could not until after they had sinned have felt the desire in question, and that after they had sinned they would naturally have felt it, I observe as follows:

Man, as in a preceding part of this discourse has been supposed, would have died by decay, although he had not sinned; the law, however, which God gave him with respect to the tree of knowledge, made it impossible that any thing but sin should be the cause of death; sin accordingly is the ultimate and moral cause of death, but disease is the immediate and na-

tural cause. Now disease, as I have likewise on a former occasion supposed, originates in the inflammatory quality which all food, in consequence of the curse which the sin of Adam brought upon the earth, has; and this inflammatory quality of food originates, as I suppose, not only in the disposition to corruption which all flesh has, but, in man, its sinful lusts: sinful because rebelling against the spirit, and incontrollable by reason*. -“The desire of perpetuity,” as by a sensible writer is observed, “is common to all living creatures; and into this desire is that of generating *sibi simile* resolvable; a desire which,” as the author further says, “revenges itself, as it were, on the law of corruption; and that immortality which man, as an individual, cannot retain, he procures, by deriving his continual nature to a continued offspring†.” Having thus proved the truth of my proposition upon natural principles, I proceed to a like proof on moral principles.

In the first chapter of Genesis we are told, that man was made *in the image and likeness of God*; and in the fifth chapter we are told that Adam *begat Seth in his own likeness*. Now, if Seth was begotten in the likeness of Adam, Cain, who was Adam’s first son,

* It is not at all inconsistent with this account, that the Egyptian philosophers of old, supposing the fruitfulness which all things are seen to have to be like unto, and to flow from that fruitfulness which God showed when he created all things, say of the love of procreation, that it was given and permitted in imitation of the divine fruitfulness. See Hermes Trismegistus, Book ii. ch. viii.

† Hales on the Corruptions of Man’s Nature, p. 127.

would likewise have been begotten in the likeness of Adam. But in what did this likeness consist? It consisted, as Adam's likeness to God did, in a moral likeness; and as Adam was like unto God as being righteous, and immortal, until by a free act of his will he became sinful and mortal, any son which Adam shall be supposed to have begotten previously to his having lost the divine image and likeness, would likewise have been in the divine image and likeness, and *that* by the same rule that Seth and Cain were in the likeness of Adam; i. e. they were sinful, and mortal, as Adam was when he begat them. Now, if it be by a supernatural power only that any man can at this day exist in the divine image and likeness, and which is the case with every one that is regenerated, it evidently is a contradiction to say, that the divine image and likeness might, under any circumstances, have been transmitted by human generation.

SECTION V.



IT is said by the author of *Divine Analogy**, that we can have, not only no true idea, but no idea at all, of spiritual beings; we may know upon divine authority that there are such beings, and may accordingly believe it; we nevertheless, according to our author, can know nothing of the nature of these beings, but by analogy; i. e. as we suppose them to possess certain properties, or excellencies, which have a resemblance to those with which we are endowed.

Now, exclusively of this analogical way of reasoning, it is commonly supposed (upon the ground that there are such beings as we call angels), that they are superior, in the rank of created beings, to man; to show, however, that this is not so, it is argued by a learned writer as follows:—"The angels we know to be ministering spirits; but which

* Bishop Browne.

is inconsistent with the notion which is commonly entertained of their having originally been superior to man; they however may well be so in our present fallen state, who stand in need of some such supernatural assistance to keep us in all our ways*.”

* Gregory's Letters, vol. i. p. 238.

Sir Matthew Hale, on the ground of angels being said in Scripture to be *ministering spirits*, supposes the will of God to be done, in many things, through the medium of angels. Our author might have given, as an instance of the truth of this observation, the command which God gave to his angels, *to keep Christ in all his ways*; as well as that Scripture where we are cautioned not to *despise those little ones who believe in Christ: for that in heaven their angels do always behold the face of their Father which is in heaven*. This text is, by Dr. Adam Clarke, thought to be in favour of the notion of every one having a guardian angel, and he adopts it accordingly; as to this matter, however, I have my doubts; but I agree with him when, in a farther part of this annotation, he says of this text, “that it gives us to understand, that humble-hearted child-like disciples are objects of Christ's peculiar care and attention.”

The author of *Transnatural Philosophy*, page 330, agrees with Sir M. Hale in supposing many other things beside those which the Scriptures mention as being done through the medium of angels; but over and above these, he supposes of all motion whatever, “that it is begun and continued at the will of angels, subject nevertheless to the divine will:” and this, according to our author, would be the case as the sea ebbs and flows; although in the Scripture it is said that God said to the sea, *Thus far shalt thou go and no farther*.

In confirmation of this reasoning, but more particularly, however, for the purpose of establishing an hypothesis which I have adopted, I observe as follows:—

We are told by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, that Christ *took not on him the nature of angels, but he took on him the seed of Abraham**; i. e. he took on him the nature of man. In regard, however, Christ derived his human nature from his mother, he would not have taken it upon him according to the perfection, or excellence, in which it was created; but according to the imperfection, or weakness, which had come upon it by the fall.

Now Christ, as he shall be supposed after his having risen from the dead, to have ascended into heaven, would, by reason of that ascension, have had an exaltation which was equal to his abasement, as he took our corrupt nature upon him †. But if Christ, by

* Heb. ii. 16.

† Christ was the son of Mary, as his body was flesh of her flesh; but he was the Son of God, as Mary's conceiving him was by the power of the Holy Ghost. In agreement herewith it has been said by Vincentius, that "in Christ

reason of his ascension, became *exalted far above all principalities and powers*, and his

there are two substances, the one divine, and the other human; the one from God the Father, the other from the Virgin mother. As man, he had a complete humanity, as containing in it both soul and flesh, real flesh of the same kind with ours, derived from his mother." (See Reeve's Apol. p. 300, vol. ii.) The same in substance is said in the Athanasian Creed. Hence I conclude, that the conception which Christ had in the womb of his mother, would have been no otherwise different from common conceptions, than that the one was supernatural, whereas the other was natural. In contradiction to this, however, it is contended by a learned commentator, "that the rudiments of Christ's human nature was a real creation in the womb of the Virgin by the energy of the Spirit of God." (Adam Clarke on Luke, i. 35.) Now, the rudiments of Christ's human nature was his body, in like manner as it is with us; for the body exists before the soul does; and this body was supplied by his mother: for he was flesh of her flesh. The seed of a man is by naturalists considered as being of an impregnating nature; and as the womb of the mother is impregnated by this seed being received into it, a mansion for the soul exists in the seed of the woman, which constitutes the body of the child. The child, however, is not conceived until it has life; and this life, as naturalists likewise suppose, it owes to the prolific virtue of the seed of the man. Now, in the case of Christ, whose conception was supernatural, the life would have been received from the Holy Ghost; and the soul, whenever that was joined to the body, in his case, would have been a new creation. As this account shall be admitted, it will be evident that Christ, in respect of his body, which was supplied by his mother, would have descended from David, and so from Adam, as his mother did; but which would not have been the case had his human nature been a new creation.

human nature would then exist according to the perfection, or excellence, in which it was created, he would, as respect shall be had to the original perfection or excellence thereof, have been superior to angels; and if he was, in respect of his human nature, considered in its perfection, or excellence, superior to angels, such would man be under like circumstances*.

Now, we may know something more with respect to angels, than what relates to their rank in the scale of intelligent beings, by our knowing that a considerable part of them fell from their first estate; and as they did not this, but as they might have kept it, we reasonably conclude, that they are not only intelligent, but free beings. From a part of them having fallen, we may know, that

I here take occasion to observe, that a learned Prelate, who has no doubt at all with respect to Christ's divinity, nevertheless thinks that his miraculous conception does not, in itself, amount to an adequate proof of his divinity, but is fully so of his superhumanity. It serves, he says, as an important link in the chain of argument for the divinity of Christ; for, though it does not itself prove this, it does in connexion with prophecy, by determining the event and application of certain predictions, and with our Saviour's declarations of himself.—Bp. HODGSON on 1 John, iii. 12. p. 12.

* See Adam Clarke on Heb. ii. ver. 16.

they are capable of the passion of love: for, as man's falling was as he loved himself more than God, such must have been the case with the angels that fell; and such might have been the case with those that did not fall; but who, as St. Jude says, *kept their first estate.*

Now, it has in a former section been supposed, that man, in consequence of his having fallen, may rise to a greater degree of happiness than could have been the case had he not fallen. As this shall be admitted, it will be evident with respect to angels, that they are incapable of any greater happiness than that in which they were created; and this, by the way, may be the reason why those who fell were incapable of being redeemed; for, were it otherwise, and those that fell had been redeemed, their happiness would have been greater than that of those that kept their first estate. Although angels then may love God as the author of their being, the love nevertheless of men towards God, will as far exceed that of angels, as redemption is a greater blessing than creation.

Upon the supposition of the angels being incapable of being redeemed, the love of which man is capable will, and may for this reason, be greater than that of which angels are capable, namely, that it may be in proportion to the goodness which God has shown to man in his having redeemed him, and which is far greater than any which can arise from any other consideration; and as the happiness which any intelligent being can experience will be in proportion to his love of God, the happiness of which man is capable will be greater than that of which the angels are capable, in proportion as the love of which man is capable, is greater than that of which the angels are capable*.

* The services which good angels are destined to do us, I suppose to be equally balanced by the dis-service, or harm, which the evil angels are permitted to attempt to do us. (See John, xiii. 2.) The fall of angels may thus be seen to have been providentially intended for the benefit of man; notwithstanding their having been free not to fall, equally as was the case with man; for, if even the malice of Satan be at any time not for our benefit, the fault will be our own.

I shall here take occasion to mention some singular notions which, in a late publication, appear to have been adopted by a learned German divine, on the subject of the power of evil angels with respect to men. Satan is in the Scriptures spoken of as being *the prince of this world*; and as Christ's kingdom was to be built on the ruins of that which Satan had gained, Christ's taking our nature upon him, is accordingly very properly by this writer considered as being for the purpose of

These thoughts which have occurred to me with respect to angels, are not wholly

destroying his (Satan's) kingdom. Christ's kingdom, as the origin of it shall be considered, the author supposes to be grounded on that which is mentioned in the Old Testament, and where God is very properly represented as being the sole and rightful governor of all men; but where he is at the same time considered as more especially governing those who, by reason of their piety, may be said to be united to him. To this kingdom men who exercised themselves in works of piety, without having any mercenary views, were, under the old dispensation, considered as properly belonging; so, even under this dispensation, a power, or kingdom, is supposed to which men of a contrary character, and who by reason of their multitude are called the world, would properly belong; and as none could reign in this kingdom, but he who is the author of all evil, so, even under the old dispensation, there would be a world of which Satan may properly be said to have been the prince. Now this, the author observes, is exactly the case under the new dispensation; for, under this dispensation there is a *peculium*, or select people, who have Christ for their king: for, because of their faith, and the purity of their lives, Christ will be their proper head, and they, by baptism, be properly his body. They, on the contrary, whose minds are abhorrent to the laws of Christ's kingdom, will as properly constitute the body of which Satan is the head, as the believers in Christ, as hath been said, constitute the body of which he is the head. The author supposes the kingdom of Christ will in some measure have had an establishment in the hearts of all believers: in regard however there will be a degree of unbelief even in the case of the truest believer, two opposite kingdoms will, of course, obtain in the heart of each believer, the one that of Christ, and the other that of Satan.

There are various instances in the Scriptures of the power of Satan being visibly exercised over the bodies of men, as well

foreign to the subject of this section, which is to show the power of contrast; and as this

as invisibly over their minds. The author, however, supposes that Satan has no power at all of this kind, but by God's permission (see Reeve's *Apol. of Tertullian*, ch. ii.); and that, although from a malignancy that is natural to this evil spirit, some harm is always meant by him to these; their spiritual good nevertheless is meant by God, as he at any time delivers men into the hands of Satan. The author, however, goes a step farther; he denies that any evil motions are ever stirred up in the minds of men by any power which Satan has; but that these motions always originate with men themselves; he mentions Eve as an example of the truth of this observation; whose eating of the forbidden fruit the author supposes to have been as she was stirred up by her own desires, although it was at the suggestion of Satan under the form of a serpent; that this likewise was the case with Adam, when, at the suggestion of Eve, he likewise ate of the fruit of which God commanded him that he should not eat: for the same evil spirit which spake in the serpent when Eve transgressed, would have spoken in Eve when Adam transgressed. The lesson which we are taught by the sequel of this story of Adam and Eve, as the author's hypothesis shall be supposed to be true, is, that we know not our own hearts. Eve supposed the serpent to be the cause of her eating of the forbidden fruit, and she accordingly laid the blame thereof on the serpent; and Adam in like manner supposed Eve to be the cause of his eating, and he accordingly laid the blame thereof on Eve. The author, having observed thus much, addresses himself to the reader and says, "Do not thou, as thou wouldst wash thyself of thy sins, after Eve's example, blacken the devil; and, by so doing, act injuriously not only to this evil spirit, but to God." (*Docderlein Opusc. Theol.*)

The dominion by reason of which Satan is, in the Scriptures, called *the Prince of this world*, according to a learned

contrast arises from man's being by nature in the scale of intelligent beings, of a rank

Prelate, originates in purchase; for this he has the authority of St. Paul, who, speaking of himself, says, *I am sold under sin.* (Rom. vii.) The Apostle, and every man that has sinned as Adam did, will have sold himself to Satan, as Adam did when he renounced the sovereignty of his Maker.—See Bp. Sanderson's 7th Sermon ad Aulam.

It is supposed by the author, that when Christ was tempted of Satan in the wilderness, Satan did not know who Christ was; for not having had it revealed to him that the person whom he saw, and whom he addressed, was God under the form of a man, he would naturally suppose him to have been a mere man. Knowing, however, that Christ pretended to be the Son of God, he took occasion from hence, not so much as he would know whether he really was the Son of God, as by way of ensnaring him; he bad him, supposing him to be an hungred, to command stones to become bread: for although the stones becoming bread at Christ's command, would have shown him to have been really the Son of God, seeing, however, it would have been in obedience to Satan, Christ would have shown himself to be a subject of Satan's kingdom. The same would have been the case, as Christ, in obedience to Satan, should have cast himself down from a pinnacle of the temple; but much more so would it have been the case, as accepting of the offer which Satan made him of the kingdoms of the world, he should have fallen down, and have worshipped him. This offer of Satan's, by the bye, shows, that he considered himself as being the prince of this world; and that this sovereignty arose from his having been successful in his tempting our first parents, and when they abjured the sovereignty of their Maker.

The notion expressed in the latter part of this extract, viz. Satan's not knowing who Christ was, is the author's, but the conclusions drawn therefrom, are, I confess, my own.

superior to angels, this account of this order of intelligent beings, such as it is, will not have been beside my purpose. I accordingly say, that in the abasement which Christ showed as he took our fallen nature upon him, as it stands opposed to his exaltation as he ascended into heaven, we have an eminent example of this power: for it is as the one of these has its contrast in the other, that the greatness of his abasement, as well as that of his exaltation, are chiefly conspicuous.

The power of contrast may be seen in many other examples which may be given *, although it will *per eminentiam* be to be seen in that which I have now given. It will nevertheless be to be seen in all the works of God; and for the truth of this observation we have the testimony of the son of Sirach,

* Among these examples I shall here give a very remarkable one which the text of 2 Cor. xii. 7, as it is interpreted by a learned divine, affords.

The thorn in the flesh, which in this text is said to have been given to the Apostle, means, according to a learned writer (Kennicott's Dissertations, p. 99), "*some bodily infirmity*;" and the purpose for which this thorn in the flesh was given, our author supposes to be, "that the greatness of the Divine power might be the more illustrious in the weakness of the instrument."

who writes as follows;—“ *Good is set against evil, life against death; so look upon all the works of the Most High, and there are two and two, one against another* *.”

Now, seeing evil must have made its entrance into the world in order that good should be set against it; good, from the want of its proper contrast, could not have existed previously to the existence of evil; any more than light, which in the beginning existed, could have existed, had not darkness first prevailed: and I say the same of that life which I suppose to be meant in the above scripture, namely, eternal life; I say that it could not have existed until death had made its entrance into the world; and *that* because death is the proper contrast of this life †.

Hence it is evident, that life may spring from death; and life accordingly (i. e. eternal

* Eccles. xxx. 14, 15.

† This notion of the power of contrast is (as, since this section was written, I have found) not new; it is expressed by the author of a learned work lately published, as follows:—“ Much of our enjoyments proceeds from our experience of pain, and is heightened by the contrast.” Our author proceeds to give various examples of the truth of this observation. (Browne’s Essay, vol. ii. p. 57.)

life) arose from the death which Christ suffered; and hence the necessity of Christ's dying in order, not that he, but we, who were already dead in trespasses and sins, might live. Christ, however, could have been under no necessity of dying in order that he himself might live, and *that* because, as God, he had already life in him; and which shows, that although, as being a man, he might die, his actual dying nevertheless was because he would die; but which, as being contrary to nature, must have been by a power that is above nature. We, in our present fallen state, must necessarily die; I nevertheless say, that if our dying may be voluntary, and as Christ's dying was, our living again will not be because our dying was voluntary, but because Christ's dying was so; for if he, as himself said, was the resurrection and the life, all true life must spring from him. I suppose it to be evident from what I have now said, that although good (i. e. life) might have been chosen by Adam when good and evil were set before him, he nevertheless must have chosen evil, and that *freely*, in order that life should spring from death; this I say would have been necessary; but how this could have been consistently with the freedom of

Adam's will, is to us an impenetrable mystery except as it may be explained by an argument which, in a farther part of this section, will be given on the subject of the divine influence, as being reconcilable with the freedom of the human will. Be this, however, as it will, I say that if good require to be contrasted by evil in order for it to exist, the same may be said of happiness: for, good and happiness (whether it be a happiness which is of this world, or a happiness which is of the world to come) are inseparable; it may be said, that misery must first be experienced, before happiness can be experienced; and from whence, by the way, it will follow, that how happy soever the state of man in Paradise may be supposed to have been, he nevertheless could not have known that he was happy, until he had experienced the misery which was the consequence of his being driven out of Paradise*.

* "The removal of pain," says a celebrated writer (*Essay on the Nature of the Passions*, p. 11), "has always the notion of good;" but that this arises from the power of contrast, is a notion which does not appear to have occurred to the author. Dr. Hartley, speaking of music, says, "Discords are originally unpleasant, and therefore, as in other cases, may be made use of to heighten our pleasures, by being properly and sparingly used in musical compositions,

There is a notion, which has obtained, and which I conceive the present to be a fit opportunity of mentioning; it is a notion which has been adopted by three different very respectable writers, the first of whom I have already had, and whom I shall, in the course of this work, again have occasion to mention, and which is expressed by him as follows:—"As none but God is a pure spirit by nature, none but him is infallible; but, therefore, any created being must necessarily be fallible, and consequently lapsible*." To the same purpose it has, by the second of these writers, been said, "All creatures must necessarily come short of the perfection of their Creator; they are therefore fallible; and being fallible, must fall, unless their de-

so as to make a strong contrast." Theory, published by Dr. Priestley, p. 260. It is upon the same principle that the diamond appears the more brilliant from the foil.

There is an observation which has been made by an ingenious writer, which, although not made with any view to the case of Adam, may nevertheless serve to confirm the truth of the notions expressed in our text. "That series of calm and regular enjoyment which pervades life, and renders it desirable, passes so unobserved, that we seldom, or never, allow it any degree of estimation, till it is interrupted by unexpected disease, or affliction." Brown on the Existence of a Supreme Creator, P. i. vol. ii.

* Cheyne's Philosophical Conjectures, p. 140.

fects are supplied by the aid of a nature more perfect than their own*." Lastly, it has by the third of these writers been said, "As all derivative perfection is finite, it must be attended by some degree of imperfection; and what is in some degree imperfect, must be capable of miscarrying †."

Now, all these writers agree in supposing that all intelligent created beings are lapsible; and which indeed must be the case, if they are free beings. They nevertheless may be kept from falling, according to the second of these writers, as their defects shall be supplied by the aid of a nature more perfect than their own; i. e. (as I suppose our author to mean) by their being supernaturally supported. Seeing, however, these are supposed to be free beings, there is a difficulty in conceiving how these beings may be enabled to stand, consistently with their being free to fall. This difficulty, however, in the case of men, is not, in my humble opinion, insuperable; and for the solution of it, I observe as follows:

* Gregory's Letters, p. 301.

† Kennicott's Dissertation, p. 33.

All the operations and influences of the divine Spirit are, on ordinary occasions, secret and unknown to us: for, although God may, and does on extraordinary occasions, speak to us in a loud voice, and so as that we cannot but know that it is He that is speaking to us; he nevertheless, on ordinary occasions, speaks to us in a still small (and therefore a secret) voice*; and so as that we neither do nor can know that it is He that is speaking to us; and from hence it will follow, as our minds shall be supposed at any time to be influenced by the divine Spirit, that their being so influenced may, and, if it be in a secret and still voice that God speaks to us will be influenced, without our knowing it; but, whether it be in a loud or in a small voice that God at any time speaks to us, it will necessarily appear to us that we are acting freely, as we shall be supposed to be influenced thereby, notwithstanding our minds are in reality influenced by the divine Spirit: for, if we cannot at any time know that our minds are influenced, it will be the same thing to us as if they were not influenced; but, therefore, as I have said, it will

* See 1 Kings, xix. 12.

appear to us as if we were acting freely; and we shall feel ourselves to have that responsibility which is the consequence of acting freely*.

* The following is another, and perhaps better solution of the difficulty mentioned in our text.

When the will of a man is influenced, in whatever way it may be supposed to be so, this man will have a more ardent desire for something, be it what it will, than he had before his will was influenced. Seeing, however, it is the same will after its being influenced that it was before, it will be as truly this man's will after, as it was before it was influenced. As an example of the truth of this proposition, I say of a stick that has been bent, that it will be the same stick that it was before it was bent.

Now, a man may know that he has a greater desire for a thing than he had, and he may know the reason thereof; let it be supposed, however, that he has a greater desire for something (for instance, for the things which concern his eternal welfare) than he ever before had; and without his knowing any reason for this (and which is the case when a man's mind, or will, is supernaturally influenced, it will not only seem to him that he is acting freely, as he shall be supposed more eagerly to pursue the thing which he is supposed to desire), but he really will be acting freely; and that for the reason which I have given, namely, that the will with which he does this, will be his own will; and his will, will in this case co-operate with the divine will; but this will be unknown to him, except as he may find it afterwards to be so, from what the written word of God may tell him. Now, I say the same thing of God's working in us to will and to do of his good pleasure, that I have said of the co-operation of the divine will with our will. I say we may be conscious to ourselves, that we are both willing and doing of God's good pleasure, in the true sense of these words; but, true as it is

Now, I suppose it to have been made evident by the above argument, that the falling

that this is the work of God, we neither do, nor can know that it is so; and were it not we ourselves that are, as I have said, willing and doing (and which our conscience will tell us), we should be mere machines.

The consistency of the divine influence with the freedom of the human will, has, I find, of late been shown by a learned writer, in a way different from the above; and is substantially as follows—"When men experience the evil consequences of their own misconduct, they naturally act more prudently for the future; but so likewise, agreeably to the rule, *Felix quem faciunt aliena pericula cautum*, as they see others suffering from a like cause, they naturally act more cautiously, than they otherwise would have done." Now, in either of these cases, our author supposes the will to have been influenced by the divine will; not arbitrarily exerted, but from its being of the divine appointment, that natural evil should be the constant effect of moral evil.—Copleston's Inquiry, &c. p. 52.

As it will not be inapposite to the above subject, I shall endeavour to show, that necessity may not be incompatible with free will; and for this purpose I observe as follows:—As a man shall be supposed to have been in a long habit of either virtue or vice, he will no longer have that freedom of will with which the habit, whether of virtue or vice, was begun; he will of course necessarily do either good or evil; i. e. the general tenour of his actions will be either good or evil. Seeing, however, the habit, whether good or evil, will have originated in a free choice, the necessity from which he will act, will be, if I may so say, a willing necessity; it will, in short, be a necessity of his own creating; and he will therefore justly be punished hereafter, as, in this world, he shall have done evil; although, by the mercy of God only, be rewarded as he shall have done good.

of created intelligent beings may be free, consistently with the necessity of their falling in consequence of their original lapsibility; and such I suppose to have been the case of man. Man, it is true, fell by his disobedience to the command which God gave him with respect to the tree of knowledge; except, however, he had originally been lapsible, he could not have fallen; and if he was originally lapsible, and (as one of the above writers says) would necessarily fall, he would have fallen, though God had given him no command at all; how he would in this case have fallen, I leave it to this writer to say; I nevertheless say, that a part of the angels fell, and they might all of them have fallen; and we know of no command that God gave them, and by breaking of which they might have fallen. Man had a command given him; and it was as he brake this command that he fell.

SECTION VI.



MAN'S mortality by nature, as it stands opposed to the immortality which came by Jesus Christ, might have served as another example of the power of contrast which has been the subject of the last section ; it is for a different purpose, however, that I now suppose man to have been originally by nature mortal: for that he was so, has in my first section been shown to have been the opinion of some of the best divines ; and indeed it is the ground of the different systems which in the course of this work have been mentioned ; it is the ground likewise of some notions which have been adopted by a learned divine * on the subject of the tree of life ; and which, as they differ from those which by other writers in general (so far at least as I know any thing to the contrary) have been adopted, and lead to some conclusions which are appo-

* See Dr. Kennicott's Dissertations.

site to the subject of this discourse, I the more willingly make these notions of his the subject of the present section.

Our author so far agrees with the aforesaid divines, as to suppose with them, that the tree of life had a virtue which, as it should from time to time be eaten of, would have counteracted that mortality to which man became subject by his eating of the forbidden fruit; I say *that* mortality: for although man would not have died, had he refrained from eating of that fruit; seeing, however, he would not have lived had he not made use of such food as is conducive to life, and God had accordingly provided against his dying by the trees which he had caused to grow in the garden of Eden; and had moreover given him that law which is called the law of nature, and which forcibly impels all animated beings to seek the preservation of that life which God has given them; there evidently must have been originally the same possibility of man's dying, as there is of a brute's dying; and as this is the mortality to which man was originally by nature subject, so is it different from that to which he became subject by his eating of

the forbidden fruit; and if the former of these was natural, the latter may not improperly be said to be preternatural. The mortality which, in the case of man, came by his disobedience, affected, it is true, his soul as well as his body: for, that the soul has a life no less than the body, has in a former section been shown; and I accordingly suppose the death of the soul to be principally meant by the Apostle, when he says, *by man* (i. e. by the sin of man) *came death*: for the soul does not die because the body dies; to the contrary of this we may know from the case of Adam, that the soul may be dead consistently with the body's being alive. The sin of the soul is the ultimate cause of the death of the body; but the immediate cause, in the case of Adam, was (as Dr. Kennicott very rightly, in my humble opinion, says) the deleterious quality of the food of which, in consequence of his being driven out of Paradise, he was under the necessity of eating; and as in the sequel of this section will more particularly be shown*.

* The writers who suppose the tree of life to have had a virtue which would have counteracted the internal cause of death, say, "that the external cause of death (commonly called accidental death) would have been prevented three

Now, to return from this digression, I say that our author, contrarily to the notions of divines in general, ancient as well as modern, supposes, that the tree of life had a virtue which the rest of the trees that were growing in Eden, and which in the sacred account are said to have been *for food*, had not; but these trees were, according to our author, the tree of life; and in support of this opinion he in a very learned manner shows the propriety with which the word trees (as it stands in the Greek) is, in our English version, rendered tree; although, as being for food, the word might more properly have been rendered trees in the English, as it is in the Greek; not however, as the author observes, that it is improperly rendered tree in the English*.

ways; first, by human providence, which, in that state, would have been most perfect; secondly, by divine providence, which, for that state, would have been greater, and extraordinary; thirdly, by the protection of angels." (See Matt. iv. 6.) St. Augustine supposes the tree of life to have had the reason of a sacrament (Airis, p. 42); he accordingly says (as I find it reported), "The tree of life in the corporal Paradise may be construed to be like the wisdom of God in the spiritual, i. e. in the intelligible Paradise; whereof it is written, *She is a tree of life to them that lay hold of her*; Prov. iii."—AIRIS on the Tree of Life, p. 36.

* See Kennicott's Dissert. on the Tree of Life, p. 81.

Now, as these trees, which in the sacred account are said to have been given for food (and therefore, as our author observes, were properly trees of life), would have continued to be Adam's food, had he not been driven out of Paradise; so, had he not been driven out of Paradise, he might have lived for ever. As God, however, had threatened Adam, that, in case of his eating of the tree of which he had forbidden him to eat, he should surely die; the reason for God's driving Adam out of Paradise, would, as our author observes, eventually have been the execution of the aforesaid threatening: for God, foreseeing that Adam would sin, had cursed the earth; i. e. that part of the globe which would properly be called the earth, as contradistinguishable from that which was called Paradise*; the consequence of which was, that the food which the earth would produce would be of a deleterious quality, but which, however, hunger † would have constrained

* See Kennicott, p. 87.

† Hunger would have equally constrained Adam to use the only food which there would have been for him when he was driven out of Paradise, although of a deleterious quality, as it would have constrained him to use such wholesome food as God had provided for the support of his life in Paradise, and for this reason, as I conceive, because

Adam to use, even as he shall be supposed to have known it to be unwholesome: but which he probably would not*. Hence would arise

hunger is a painful sensation, and all bodily pain is a symptom of death; it is the love of life, therefore, that excites men, as well as brutes, to satisfy their hunger; because, by their so doing, unconscious as even men are thereof, they act for their relief under a painful sensation; and as a pleasurable sensation naturally arises when a painful one ceases, there is in this farther provision made, in the wisdom and goodness of God, for the preservation of the lives of brutes as well as of men.

* I here take occasion to observe further on this subject as follows:—No believer will deny, that the death to which all that are descended from Adam are liable, originates in the sin of Adam; and the account which in our text has been given supposes this to have been the case; it nevertheless, in contradiction to the notion which generally obtains, supposes the food which Adam was reduced to the necessity of eating, for the preservation of his life after he had been driven out of Paradise, was the immediate cause of that mortality which would end in death: whereas, according to some writers, the deleterious or poisonous quality of the forbidden fruit was the cause. There are, however, as I find, some divines whose notions of this matter, although they differ from those which in our text have been adopted, nevertheless come nearer to them than that which has before been mentioned. These divines suppose the forbidden fruit no otherwise to have had a deleterious than as it had an inflammatory quality with respect to the blood: the consequence of which, in the case of Adam, would, as they suppose, have been, that his appetite, which before was moderate, and suited to the wants of his body, would have become inordinate and unruly; that, by the indulgence of this appetite, the blood and juices would have been disposed to corrupt, and so be ultimately the cause of

pain and disease; and pain and disease would in Adam's case, as it does in ours, end in death; and thus would God, as our author observes, in a natural way bring to pass the death which he had threatened our first parent in case of his eating of the forbidden fruit*.

death; that, as a disposition of the blood to corruption would thus have been transmitted by Adam to his posterity, it would have a like effect with them, notwithstanding any temperance or abstinence which they might use.—BURNETT on Art IX. p. 111.

* As this account shall be admitted, it will be evident, that as Adam shall be supposed to have been suffered to continue in Paradise, he might have lived for ever; his life, however, as Dr. Kennicott (who supposes this) observes, would have been a life of misery; because (as I suppose him to mean) of that anguish of mind with which a consciousness of sin is always accompanied. To this account I shall add, that seeing there would have been a necessity of Adam's dying, in consequence of his having sinned, there would have been a necessity, if I may so say, of his being driven out of Paradise; and *this* exclusively of the reason given above for his being driven from thence.

Upon the supposition of the curse which God pronounced on the earth not having extended to Paradise, the following reason may be given why Adam would necessarily have been driven out from thence. It is reasonable to suppose that, in consequence of the curse which has above been mentioned, a change would have taken place, not only in the earth, but in the air, which would have been suitable to that which, in my text, is supposed to have taken place with respect to its productions: for plants require a soil and atmosphere suitable to their nature, no less than animals. Now if Adam became

There is an effect, however, that the curse which God pronounced on the earth or ground had, which is different from that which has above been mentioned; and which is, that it became not only barren, but, what is worse than barrenness, naturally productive of *thorns and thistles*, the consequence of which was, that man, in the sweat of his brow, was to eat bread; bread, which at best would be calculated only to prolong a life, which would more properly be to be called death than life: and besides these evils to which man was more peculiarly doomed, God said unto the woman, *I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow shalt thou bring forth children; and thy desire shall be unto thy husband, and he shall rule over thee.*

mortal when he had sinned, a change would have taken place in his body similar to that which I have supposed to have taken place in the earth, and the air, in consequence of the curse; and the earth, and the air, would now be equally suitable to the nature of man, as I have supposed it to have been to that of the vegetables which the earth would now produce. Now as, under these circumstances, Adam could not have lived in Paradise (unaffected as I have supposed it to have been by the curse) any more than a fish can live in the air, or a fowl for any length of time in the water, he would, as I have said, necessarily have been driven out from thence.

Now, the system which I have adopted supposes (and the truth of it is grounded on the text which I have quoted from the Book of Ecclesiasticus), that without misery to serve as a contrast, happiness cannot be experienced; and this rule, as every man's experience may teach him, is verified, even in sensible pleasure, as it has its contrast in pain. In the misery, however, from which no son of Adam is wholly exempt, God will abundantly have provided for that contrast which, if it be necessary in order that an earthly happiness should be experienced, will be as much more so in order that an heavenly happiness should be experienced, as an heavenly is beyond all comparison greater than an earthly happiness*.

* There is a reason given why God cursed the earth, which, although different from, is not inconsistent with that which has been given in our text; and it has this at the same time to recommend it, that it is very beautifully expressed. "God made the earth amiable and sweet, and the world a scene of happiness to a creature that was to continue in it; but when sin introduced death, God in his goodness cursed the earth by a diminution of its excellence, to make the world less desirable to a creature who was now so soon to leave it."—DELANEY'S Revelation examined, vol. i. p. 77.

Dr. Kennicott says nothing on the subject of the flaming sword which was *to keep the way of the tree of life* (Gen. iii. 24), by way of explanation of this text. "By the flaming

sword," according to a learned annotator, "is meant the Gospel, called by St. Paul a *two-edged sword*: this," he says, "was to deter man from attempting to re-enter Paradise, and to drive him to Christ." (Ainsworth in loc.) "Man," according to another learned commentator, "was to learn by this guarding of the entrance into Paradise, that he was no longer to be immortal by eating of the tree of life, but was to seek that life and immortality which came by Jesus Christ." (Adam Clarke in loc.) Now every man, in whatever way it may be that he is seeking happiness (and happiness is sought by bad, no less than by good men), may be said to be attempting to regain that Paradise, which, from his having sinned in Adam, he will have lost: but the flaming sword mentioned in the above text, would, rightly understood, teach every man the vanity of this attempt; it would teach them, that, by the sin of the first Adam, the door of an earthly Paradise became for ever shut; and that, by the righteousness of the second Adam, the door of a heavenly Paradise became opened.

It is observed by a learned Prelate, that "it may seem strange, that of so great a multitude of men, so few should attain happiness."—KING, *Origin of Evil*, vol. ii. 450. Now, there is no happiness to which men can attain in this world, that will not be the same in kind as that which Adam may be supposed to have enjoyed in Paradise. As all men seek happiness, although few, as our author rightly observes, find it, all men may be said to be attempting to regain Paradise; but the door of an earthly Paradise became, as we learn from the Scriptures, everlastingly shut, when Adam was once driven out from thence; and as this is the happiness which is meant by our author (if at least he knows his own meaning) when he says but few attain it, he ought (if my notions on this subject are true) rather to have said, none attain it. Now, let it be said (and as it truly may be), that there is a happiness with which the practice of the social virtues is always accompanied in generous minds; seeing, however, the evils of this life

constitute the ground of these virtues, and that we cannot be disposed to relieve our afflicted brethren, but as we feel for them, and so partake with them in their distress; our happiness, although it will perhaps be the greatest which we can experience in this world, from the alloy nevertheless which it will have in the aforesaid evils, will fall short of being true happiness.

SECTION VII.

IT has in a former section been supposed that, except as man had sinned, his having originally been endowed with those properties or qualities, which in contradistinction of those which are called natural, are called moral, would, according to our conceptions, have been in vain; but which, however, would not be the case, as what is commonly called moral virtue shall be supposed to be a true notion thereof: for, in this case, there would have been nothing to have hindered man's being virtuous in a state of innocence; and it has accordingly been asserted by divines, as in our fourth section has been observed, not only that man might, in his state of innocence, have been virtuous, but that he might have had that virtue, or righteousness, which would have qualified him for a heavenly Paradise. In addition to the reasons which in that section have been given for a contrary opinion, and for showing at the same

time what I conceive to be the true notion of moral virtue*, I observe as follows:

An end, or good, is ever necessarily sought in all human actions; no good, however, can naturally be sought by man, in his present fallen state, but that which is of this world; for, naturally, man can have no notion of any other life than that which is of this world: if a good, then, which is future, and of another world, may be sought by us (and which, in consequence of our having been redeemed, is the case), it will be different from that which is of this world; so different indeed, that, in comparison of a good that is of the world to come, a good which is of this world will be no good at all. So long, however, as we are in this world, some good will necessarily be sought by us; it nevertheless, as we have faith, will be sought in subservience to that which is of another world. As we have faith, a good which is of this world will be sought by us as it is by inferior animals, i. e. without any anxious

* For the different principles from which moral virtue, according to the common notions thereof, proceeds, see a very ingenious *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions*, page 2.

care; for so much our Saviour saith when he says, *Seek ye first* (i. e. principally) *the kingdom of God, and his righteousness, and all these things* (meaning a good which is of this life) *shall be added unto you**. Now, as we have faith, we shall have charity; and, having charity, we shall have that virtue for which I contend, but which, as the end thereof shall be considered, is essentially different from any virtue, the end of which is a good which is of this life: for, as a good which is of this life is, as I have said, no good at all, in comparison of that which is of another and future life; so that virtue, the end of which is a good that is of this transitory life, is no virtue at all, in comparison of that, the end of which is everlasting life.

Having observed thus much on the subject of moral virtue, I proceed to show the nature and origin thereof. When God commanded Adam, that of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil he should not eat, not only good and evil, but life and death, were set before him; or, as it may rather be said, life was set before him in good having been set before him, and evil, in death having been

* Matt. vi. 33.

set before him ; for, as death is naturally considered as being the greatest evil that can befall us, and is accordingly by every means avoided by us, so is life considered as the greatest good we can enjoy, and by every means sought to be preserved.

Now Adam was disobedient to the command which God gave him * ; he nevertheless

* I take occasion here to observe, that it has been supposed by a learned divine, and who I find is not singular in his opinion on the subject, that Adam's disobedience to the command which God gave him with respect to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, proceeded from a rebellious sense of independence, and that it amounted to a complete abjuration of his allegiance to God. (Browne's Essay, vol. ii. p. 171.) Now, I grant that this was in fact the case ; I nevertheless, with submission, think, that a different interpretation may be given of this Scripture ; and I accordingly observe as follows :—God's commanding Adam to abstain from eating of the fruit of the aforesaid tree, supposes that he might have a desire to eat of it ; for, according to a learned interpreter, it was one of the trees which were made to grow in the garden of Eden for food to Adam. Adam's supposed obedience to this command would, as I venture to suppose, have amounted to a renunciation of the pleasures of sense, as being the *summum bonum* ; for, although it was with respect to a particular tree only that God had enjoined abstinence, seeing, however, this tree was, as has been observed, one of those trees which were given for food, the command, according to its hidden meaning, would amount to self-denial ; for obedience could not have been due from Adam with respect to one of the trees which were given

did not actually die, but became mortal only; i. e. he became subject to those evils which lead to, and which end in death; and thus much is implied by the words of his sentence (as it stands in the Hebrew), *dying thou shalt die*. As Christ, however, was the *lamb slain* (in the purpose of God) *from the foundation of the world*, the virtue of his death would apply from the moment of Adam's sinning: although Adam then, and all men that should descend from him, would die; by reason nevertheless of their having been redeemed by Christ, they would certainly rise again; as death will thus evidently be a sleep merely, and no real interruption of life, the death to which Adam, and to which all men, by his sinning, became subject, will be death in appearance only, so far, I mean, as the death of the body shall be considered; for it may be otherwise as respect shall be had to the soul.

It will, as I conceive, be evident from what has now last been said, that all such life as men have in this world, or as they will

as food, but as a like obedience would have been due from Adam had God forbidden him to eat of any of these trees. The trial which Adam was put to, may thus be seen to be the same, in fact, as that to which we under the Gospel are put.

have in the world to come, they ultimately owe to Christ; nevertheless, whether that life which they will have in the world to come will be a happy or a miserable one (or, to use the language of Scripture, whether *their rising again will be unto everlasting life, or unto everlasting death*), will depend on themselves, i. e. it will depend on the things which they will have done in this life; and we are accordingly told by our Saviour, that *they that have done good shall rise unto the resurrection of life; but they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation.*

As the above shall be supposed to be a true statement, it will be evident, that, in consequence of man's redemption by Christ, good and evil are as necessarily set before every man that is of an age and capacity to distinguish between these, as they were set before Adam; and that this necessity arises from the freedom of man's will: for it would be in vain that any created being should be endowed with a freedom of will, except as he might make use of it*; there nevertheless

* It is said in the text, that "it would be in vain that any created being should have a freedom of will, except as good and evil should be set before him;" and good and evil were

will be this difference between the good and evil which were set before Adam, and the good

accordingly set before man soon after God had made him. But why, it may be asked, was not man left to the determination of his will without Satan's being permitted to tempt him to choose evil? for, although it was Eve that this evil spirit, under the form of a serpent, tempted; it nevertheless was as this evil spirit had got a footing in her, that she tempted Adam; and so, in fact, would Satan have tempted Adam, not less than he did Eve. Now in this, as I conceive, there is contained a great mystery. It is by philosophers supposed, that God would that there should be a gradation of beings, from the lowest to the highest created being: but in this they argue *a posteriori*; they see (as they borrow their notions as to this matter from divine revelation) that it is so; and, upon this ground, they conclude, that it was from all eternity fit, and proper, that it should be so. I nevertheless suppose, that those beings, which, in this supposed scale of beings, are above man, were created, not so much because of any service which these angelical beings might do us here on earth, as on another reason, and which is as follows. Man, as I conceive, could not have sinned, had a created being superior to him in the rank or scale of created beings, not first have sinned. How it was possible that this supposed being might sin, I pretend not to say; it is sufficient for my purpose that it be granted, that a being of this description did sin; and that this was the case, we know from divine revelation. Now it is certain, that the possibility of our sinning, in this our fallen state, arises, not from the freedom of the will, and as was the case with Adam (for this freedom we lost, as, in him, we sinned), but from those lusts, or evil desires, which, in consequence of the sin of Adam, obtain in us; insomuch that now we cannot but sin in all we either do, or think. As we shall be supposed however to be taken out of this our state of nature, and to be placed in a state of grace (and

and evil which are set before us, namely, that it was natural good and evil that were set

which we are as we have been redeemed by Christ), the freedom of our wills will be restored, and our sinning will be after the similitude of Adam's sin. As no lusting of the flesh however could have tempted Adam to sin, when good and evil were set before him, his sinning (i. e. of his choosing evil) would have arisen from another cause; and that cause I have supposed to have been, immediately, his having been tempted of Eve, but ultimately of Satan. Seeing however Adam was under no necessity of sinning, because tempted of Eve, and so, in fact, tempted of Satan, his sinning would have been as our sinning is who have been redeemed by Christ, i. e. because he would sin; and no other reason can be given for our sinning. Now it is certain, that we cannot choose good, rather than evil, as these shall be supposed to be at any time set before us, except as we are supernaturally influenced: for the good and evil which are set before us as we are in a state of grace, are a good and evil which are not of this, but of a future life; and, as in our first section has been said, "man's powers and faculties, even as they were, before the fall, entire, are not able of themselves to reach such a supernatural end." If then we shall choose good rather than evil, as these shall be supposed to be set before us, we shall be acting freely, notwithstanding our being supernaturally influenced: for our being supernaturally influenced supposes the will from the energy of which we act, to be our own, and as it in reality will be. This good, however, neither would, nor could have been chosen, had we not been supernaturally influenced; and *that* for the reason above given. Good may appear to us to be freely chosen, and truly so appear; except however we are supernaturally influenced, it will, as I have before said, be a good that is of this life; but which nevertheless, in comparison of that which is of another life, will be evil, rather than good. But so exactly I suppose it to have been when Adam, or rather, when Eve was tempted of Satan; Eve, I suppose,

before him: but with us, moral or spiritual good and evil. It is not indeed possible that *natural* good and evil should be set before us: for, if the freedom of Adam's will became determined, as he chose evil, i. e. death, and we in consequence of this choice of his are born mortal, by what power that will be remaining to us shall we choose that which may properly be called life? For this purpose that freedom which we lost in Adam must be restored; and this, as I have said, is the case, as by Christ we have been redeemed, and *that* independently of our believing in him; and if so, good and evil will, as I have said, necessarily be set before every man; seeing, however, death has been abolished by Christ's

would have been supernaturally influenced; and which would have been the case, as by the enticing words, or glozing of the serpent, her will consented to the eating of the forbidden fruit; and the act, as we know, followed. It is not certain, however, that she would thus have transgressed, had she been left to herself, any more than Adam, as we may reasonably suppose, would. Now, admitting what I have supposed, i. e. that a supernatural influence was no less necessary for evil being chosen, when good and evil were set before our first parents, than a like influence is for our choosing good, as good and evil shall be supposed to be at any time set before us; we may, as I conceive, understand, why man's being tempted of Satan to choose evil, when good and evil were set before him (man), was permitted of God.

having voluntarily suffered death, natural good and evil, as I have before said, neither will, nor, in the nature of things, can be set before any man; the conclusion from the premises is, that moral or spiritual good and evil will be set before every man: and that this is the case, the conscience of every man, who is of an age and capacity to distinguish between good and evil, will testify to him. Now, if, when all men shall have arisen from the dead, they that have done good will go into everlasting life, it will be evident, as I have before said, that works of love or charity will, and alone can qualify us for the happiness of that life; which (as Christian charity, and moral virtue, shall be supposed to be one and the same thing; for they both equally consist in doing good) it has been the purpose of this discourse chiefly to show.

It appears from the above Scripture, that the going into everlasting life depends on the good which we shall have done in this life; and it is for this reason that the present is very properly to be considered as being a state of probation: a doubt, however, has arisen with divines, which it will not be foreign to

the subject of this section to consider; which doubt has respect to a late repentance, and where there has not been any such time as is necessary to show the sincerity of a man's repentance; and it has accordingly been observed by a learned divine on this subject, that "where conversion (and which supposes repentance) has not been the mere effect of terror, where the heart has been moved, as well as the conscience; where repentance has been such as that it would have been followed by a change of life, were opportunity of trial given, there is room not only for hope, but for confidence*:" from the impossibility, however, of a man's knowing his own heart (and which the author tacitly confesses when he says afterwards, "God alone can know the sincerity of such a conversion"), no hope, I conceive, can in this case arise, but what will be mingled with much fear, nor any confidence that will not be mingled with much distrust. That a man then may have such a hope as will be inconsistent with fear, and such a confidence as will be inconsistent with diffidence, he must, as I conceive, in such manner have persevered in a virtuous life, as

* Sumner on Apostolical Preaching. p. 206.

that the doing good shall have become so natural to him, as that it should seem to him as if he could not do evil; and from whence it will appear, that it is the habit of doing good, rather than the mere doing good, that will qualify us for heaven. The power of habit is indeed wonderful, of whatever kind the habit shall be; in the case under consideration, however, I venture to say, that a more miraculous change did not take place in the water which, at the supper of Căna, became wine, than that which is wrought in a man who, from his having been sunk in the dregs of profligacy and vice, becomes confirmed in virtue and all goodness; and of this change we have, in St. Augustin, as in his Confessions may be seen, an illustrious example*.

* If every one that comes into the world, be (as in one of the Articles of our religion is said) far gone from righteousness, and of his own nature inclined to evil, there will be a change to be undergone in the case of any man that would be saved. This change every one that is baptized undergoes; no such a change however takes place in the baptism of infants, as that, when they have arrived at an age to take upon them the vows which will have been made for them by their sponsors, they may not fall back into their natural, or unregenerate state; and this may be supposed to be the case with those that are mentioned in our text; I need not however add, that, in the case of these, faith is supposed.

To return from this digression to the proper subject of this section (and to which, as I have said, the foregoing remarks are not wholly foreign), it is observable, that it is only as the evils to which we are subject in this life lose the reason or nature of evil (but which can be the case only as we have faith in Christ), that they may voluntarily be chosen; and, except as they are so, we cannot have charity: for charity consists in love; and if Christ, by his offering himself up for us, showed his love for us in an eminent degree, there will be a like sacrifice to be made by us, as we would, in obedience to his commands, and after his example, love one another; if a love then such as Christ's was, be incompatible with the love of ourselves, evil will evidently be chosen, as we at any time show this love.

There was something the reverse of this in the original choice of evil which was made by our first parent; for he, by this choice of evil, showed that he loved himself more than God. Had Adam, however, not thus loved himself, God could not so have loved us, as to give his only Son to die for us. Had the evils to which we, in consequence of this original

choice of evil, became subject, not been suffered to have their entrance into the world, the great power which God has of bringing good out of evil could not have been known. Had Adam chosen good rather than evil, when good and evil were set before him, an earthly happiness would have been chosen by him, instead of that misery which he in reality chose. The happiness, however, of which God is the author, as he brings good out of evil, is as much greater than that of which man, had he chosen good, would, in a manner, have been the author, as the soul is of greater value than the body; and as this good is set before us, the happiness to which we shall attain, as we make a sacrifice of that which is of this life, is greater than that happiness which Adam would have enjoyed, had he chosen good rather than evil.

The sin of Adam, as it will have appeared, was the prolific source of the various evils to which, in this mortal life, we are subject; our happiness, however, and not our misery, was intended of God, as he permitted these evils to befall us: but if the evils, in general, to which we are subject were the natural effect of the sin of Adam, the sins which we

personally commit must have a like effect; and, in this case, the evils which we bring on ourselves will be added to those to which, in our general capacity, we are liable. But if these evils, which in general befall us, are calculated to cause a detestation of sin, much more will those be so which arise from our own perverseness. Now, we cannot hate vice, but as we shall love virtue; for, the deformity and unloveliness of vice implies a beauty and loveliness in virtue. The loveliness of virtue consists in nothing more than in this, namely, that when a virtuous man has departed this life, his virtue will survive him: for it will live in the memories of those who will have profited by it; his death will be a gain to himself, but it will be accounted as a loss by his relations and friends. And although, as loving virtue and embracing it, we shall still be liable not only to the evils to which, in common with others, we are subject, but to the scorn and malice of wicked men; in regard, however, our virtue will be more exalted, in proportion to our patience and resignation under these evils, the satisfaction which will arise in our minds will be a happiness which will be, as I may so say, a foretaste of that which we may expect hereafter; and this is

a reason, in addition to that which has above been given, for God's permitting Adam to sin.

I shall conclude this section with the following remarks of a learned divine, whose notions of moral virtue I have had the pleasure, since this section was written, to find have coincided with mine. "The belief and energy of the Gospel, remedies every temporal evil, as far as it can be remedied in consistence with our present state. It shows the evils of this life to be our appointed course of probation, and intended to prepare us for a better. It assures us of the divine support and favour, if we submit with resignation to the divine will. It informs us that these very trials *work out for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory*. It teaches us, that as *the Captain of our salvation was made perfect through sufferings, so many sons must thus be brought into glory*; and that, *after we have suffered awhile, we may hope, as the Apostle prays, that God will make us perfect, establish, strengthen, settle us**."

* Browne's Essay, vol. ii. p. 244.

SECTION VIII.

IT has been observed by a celebrated French philosopher, “ that God loves all his works, and that it is only his love that preserves them in their being. He supposes it to be God’s will that all created spirits should have the same inclination (or love) with his own; and this will of God’s (he says) has its fulfilling in the love which they have for themselves, or that desire for their preservation of which self-love properly consists. As God, however, is infinitely more lovely than man, or any created being is, it is reasonable only (he says) that man should love God more than himself; and which (he adds) would be the case, as we should place our ultimate end in ourselves, and centre our love there, without reference to God: for, as man has no real goodness or subsistence of himself, but only in the participation and being of God, he

is no farther lovely than as he is related to God*.”

“ The love of God (our author, in another chapter, observes) was lost by the fall; and the love which man now has, is a love for himself without any reference to God; the consequence of which is, that the inclination or desire which we naturally have for our preservation (i. e. our self-love) is so mightily increased, that it is become the absolute master of our will; it has ever converted the love of God, or love which we have for good in general, and that which is due to other men, into its own nature: for it may be said, that the love of ourselves at present ingrosses all, because we love all things, but with relation to ourselves; whereas we should love God only first, and all things after as related to him †.”

Such, according to our author, is the case of man in a state of nature, i. e. in his present fallen state; and this account, it must be confessed, is not materially different from

* Malbranche, *Search of Truth*, Book IV. chap. viii.

† *Ibid.* Book V. chap. ix. p. 27.

what the Scriptures say, when they tell us, *that the wickedness of man (after his having sinned) was great on the earth; and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually* *. In a state of grace, however, it is otherwise; and our author accordingly observes, that “when faith and reason certify to us, God is the sovereign good, and that he can fill us with pleasure, we easily conceive it our duty to love him, and readily afford him our affections; but, unassisted by grace, self-love is always the first mover. All pure and defecate charity is above the strength of our corrupt nature; and so far are we from loving God for himself, that human reason cannot comprehend how it is possible to love him without reference to ourselves, and making our own satisfaction our ultimate end.” Here our author supposes that we may love God without any reference to ourselves: but which we certainly do not, if our own happiness be the end for which we love him; and it is equally certain, that our love will then only be disinterested when we do so: for, if we love God

* Gen. vi. 5.

with a reference to ourselves, our own satisfaction or happiness will (as Malbranche rightly says) be the ultimate end of our love; and such, as I conceive, is the notion which commonly obtains with modern moralists; a proof of which will appear from the following extracts from writers who, from their eminence as moral writers, may be supposed to speak for the rest. “ Self-love is a disposition that is essential to our nature, and inseparable from our being, by which we desire to be happy—by which we seek the happiness which we have not, and rejoice in it when we possess it:” to this he adds, “ The object which I love, I love not for its own sake, but for the sake of the happiness which I enjoy through it*.” To the same purpose it is observed by a learned prelate as follows:—“ Though happiness, private happiness, is the proper or ultimate end of all our actions whatever, yet that particular means of happiness which any particular action is chiefly adapted to procure, or the thing chiefly aimed at by that action; the thing which, if possessed, we would not undertake that

* Adam Clarke on Matt. ix. 19.

action, may, and generally is, called the end of that action*.”

There is a notion, however, which has been adopted by an ingenious writer of the last century, which, to say the least of it, is more scriptural than those which are above mentioned appear to me to be, wherein a very judicious distinction is made between the love of God, and the love of our neighbour. “The word love (says our author), as applied to God, and as it is in the first of the two great commandments, signifies the desiring him as a good; but when, in the second, it is applied to our neighbour, it signifies, not desiring him (our neighbour) as a good, but desiring good to him †.” There is a selfishness in benevolence, even as we shall be supposed to show it as it is spoken of by a judicious writer, as follows: “As to love them of whom we receive good things is duty, because they satisfy our desire in that which we want; so to love them on whom we bestow, is nature, because in them we behold the effects of our own virtue ‡.” We love ourselves in this case

* Preliminary dissertation to King’s Origin of Evil, lxvi.

† Norris’s Letters, p. 104.

‡ Hooker, Eccles. Polity, B. I. p. 78.

as seeing ourselves in others as in a mirror. The following is a notion of St. Bernard's on this subject:—"Duo sunt præcepta a Deo nobis data, dilectio Dei, et dilectio proximi; at licet sint duo præcepta, unus tamen est amor; quia alius amor non est quo quis diligit proximum, sed quo diligit Deum. Amando igitur proximum eodem amore quo Deum amamus, proximum amamus propter Deum; quia ut ametur, creatus est proximus a Deo*."

The last opinion on this subject which I shall mention, previously to that which I have adopted, is that of a writer, who, in abilities perhaps, is exceeded by no moral writer that has gone before him; whose opinion, however, as the truth of it shall be admitted, steers clearer of the disinterestedness of our love, as our neighbour is the object of our love, than those which I have mentioned (Mr. Norris's excepted) seem to do. Upon the supposition of love being a principle of action ingrafted in man, as a social being, he contends, "that disinterestedness is, in its very notion, implied in bene-

* *Medit. Idiotæ*, c. xxix.

volence; and that it would be impossible that we should have any notion of our being interested, but from a preconceived opinion of its being so. Benevolence, or compassion towards others," he says, "presupposes some knowledge of what is good or evil to them;" he denies, however, with respect to our benevolence and compassion, that, "in their true nature, they arise from any previous opinion, that the good of others tends to the good of the agent; they are," he says, "the determinations of our nature previous to our choice from interest, which excite us to action as soon as we know other sensitive or rational beings, and have any apprehension of their happiness or misery*." Now I suppose that it would be granted to me by our author, that as any one shall be persuaded that his benevolence is disinterested (and I agree with him that it commonly seems to us to be so), it will be the same thing, as to any such purpose as it may be intended to answer, as if it really was so; i. e. as if self-love was not at the bottom; but which, however, as I conceive, will necessarily be the case with men in a state of nature. Having

* Nature and Conduct of the Passions, p. 19.

premised thus much, I observe, that our author supposes benevolence to be a principle that is ingrafted in the nature of man, as a social being; but if so, every man will come into the world actuated by two principles, the one contrary to the other: for, the actions of a child as evidently proceed from a principle of self-love as those of a brute do; and self-preservation, which is a dictate of nature, is at the bottom of this love with both alike; but true benevolence implies self-denial: for we never act for the good of others, but as we make a sacrifice of some good of our own. When reason, which distinguishes us from brutes, begins to dawn, we find ourselves, by degrees, not only inclined, but forcibly impelled to seek the good of others: for we then find ourselves in a great measure dependent on others for our preservation and well-being; and there is no way so well calculated to conciliate the affections of others, as to do them all the good we can. This I suppose to be the case of men as they are in a state of nature; a state of grace, however, does not in such manner take us out of our state of nature, as that we are not still liable to the various evils which originate in the sin of Adam: for, it is only as we are liable to

these evils that we can, upon the system which I have adopted, act with benevolence; and our author* himself supposes true moral virtue to consist in acts of benevolence. Seeing, however, it is only as a man is in a state of grace, that he can, according to my notions, act with disinterested benevolence, it will follow, that self-love will be at the bottom of all such kindness and benevolence as he may show towards others, notwithstanding that it will necessarily seem to him to be otherwise: for a brother cannot be the object of a man's love, and he himself constitute that object at the same time; self-love nevertheless not only may, but, as I have said, necessarily will be at the bottom of a man's benevolence, as he shall be supposed to be in a state of nature, even when another is the object of his benevolence. Having now proved, as I conceive, against this writer, that self-love not only may be, but, in some cases, necessarily is the spring from which our benevolent and most virtuous actions arise, notwithstanding its seeming to us to be otherwise; I shall take my leave of our author, and conclude this section with some

* Page 115.

remarks which are suitable to the proper subject thereof.

The purpose for which we have, in the divine intention, our being in this world, I have supposed to be our being qualified for that happiness which is suitable to our immortal nature; and the longing which we have for it will show that it is a happiness which is not of this world, and must therefore be of another. In regard, however, a qualification for future happiness arises as we do good; and no good which we may do can avail us for any eternal purpose, except as it shall be done in obedience to Christ's commands, and after the example which he has set us, it will be evident, that no good works will qualify us for future happiness, but such as spring from faith in Christ. Seeing, however, the good works which we do, as we act from natural benevolence, may be the same in appearance as those which spring from faith; and we cannot, as St. Austin well observes, know, "*an sit radix dulcis, an sit amara,*" i. e. as hath been said above, whether our benevolence be disinterested, or interested; the question which arises is, whether there is any criterion by which the dis-

interestedness of our benevolence may be known: for if, as I have said, self-love may be at the bottom of our benevolence, notwithstanding its seeming to us, as we do any act of kindness to others, that it is their good or benefit that we intend, and not our own, its merely seeming to us that our benevolence is disinterested, will be no true criterion at all. Now, I say that the Gospel will, and that no other moral system can afford this criterion; and to show this, I observe as follows:—The sum of the answer which Christ gave to one who came to him to know *what good thing he should do to have eternal life*, was, Keep the moral law; *this*, he answered, *he had kept from his youth up*, and asked, *what lack he had yet?* Christ replied, *If thou wilt be perfect, go sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven, and come and follow me**. *When the young man had heard that saying*, we are told, *he went away sorrowful*; and from whence it may be supposed, that he took not the advice which had been given him; had it been otherwise, however, and which might have been the case, he would have given an un-

* Matt. xix. 16, et seq.

equivocal proof not only of the sincerity of his belief in a future state, but likewise of the disinterestedness of his benevolence; for he would have given a proof of that self-denial which is inconsistent with self-love; self-denial, therefore, is the proper criterion of the disinterestedness of benevolence; and as it can arise only from a belief in a future state, it is a criterion which the Gospel alone can afford: for it is from divine revelation only that we can have any assurance of a future life; hence the necessity, if I may so say, arises of future rewards and punishments, not so much that we may be encouraged to pursue the path of virtue, or be deterred from that of vice, as that we may have an assurance of a future life, and may thereby be enabled to make a willing sacrifice of a life which is of this world.

Now, this sacrifice we make, as we deny ourselves; we give the most unequivocal proof of our belief in a future life. The same thing may be said of meekness, patience, and humility, and which are a species of self-denial; and which, like self-denial, are incompatible with any hope that is of this life. If these virtues are condemned, and even

held in contempt upon principles of philosophy, it is because a future life ever was, and ever will be, unknown to philosophy. With the ancient philosophers, who had no notion of any good or happiness but what is of this world, fortitude, prudence, temperance, and justice, were in esteem, as being virtues by which that good or happiness could only be enjoyed; and they to whom revelation has since their time, in vain, proposed a higher good and greater happiness, of course think as the aforesaid philosophers did, and endeavour to follow their steps.

SECTION IX.

SELF-DENIAL has, in the preceding section, been shown to be the criterion of disinterested benevolence. As self-denial, however (such, I mean, as it must be in order for its constituting the aforesaid criterion), would, under any other system than that of the Gospel, be contrary to the dictates of nature; I shall endeavour in the present section to show, that self-denial is not only reconcilable with the law of nature, but that human nature can only be restored to that purity which it lost by the fall, as this virtue shall be practised.

The word self, as applicable to an individual of the human species, implies the existence of some one, or more, other individuals: for, like the word person, it distinguishes each individual from all other individuals; with this difference, however, that the word person distinguishes them exter-

nally, and as each individual may be known by other individuals; but the word self, internally, i. e. as each individual may be conscious to himself that he has an existence separate and distinct from that of others. On this ground I say, that as man first came out of the hands of his Maker, he cannot properly be said to have had either a self, or a person; and *that* because of the want of any other man from whom he was distinguishable. Adam can scarce indeed be said to have been a being distinct from Eve when she had been made; for, whatever distinction there might have been between them in respect of sex, there would, as I suppose, have been none between them with respect to a self; for, as Adam and Eve shall be supposed to have been so united in will, as that what Adam willed Eve would have willed, and what Eve willed Adam would have willed, they would mutually have seen a self in each other; and if so, Adam in his loving Eve, would have loved himself, and Eve in her loving Adam, would have loved herself; and which, as I conceive, would have been inconsistent with any gross or carnal love. Things, however, would have been otherwise when the multiplication of the species had once taken place:

for, a son of Adam's, how like soever he might have been to Adam, would have been not less distinguishable from Adam, than the son of a man at the present time is from his father.

Now, besides this distinction which arises with respect to the individuals of the human race, and which I call natural, there is a distinction which, in consequence of the freedom of the will, may arise, and which may properly be called moral; there is a sameness, it is true, between men as they are either good or evil; a diversity, or distinction, nevertheless, arises, as they do those things by which they show themselves to be either the one or the other. By way of illustration of my meaning, and in confirmation of the truth of this remark, I observe as follows:—A man, as he shall be supposed to act in his natural capacity, will no doubt be the same man at one time as he was at any former time; and it is accordingly contended by the learned author of *the Analogy of Nature*, against those who, because men are continually undergoing a change with respect to their bodies, suppose them to be con-

tinually undergoing a like change with respect to their persons, as follows:—"Every man is conscious that he is the same person, or self, he was, as far back as his remembrance reaches; since, when any one reflects upon a past action of his own, he is just as certain of the person who did that action, namely, himself, the person who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the act was at all done. It is a man's consciousness," as our author adds, "that is an assurance to him of his being the same person he was at any former time: for," as he further observes, "although the consciousness of man's existence in any two successive moments is not the same consciousness, but different consciousnesses, the person nevertheless that is conscious at these different times, is the same person*." Now, all this, as I have said, may be very true, as a man shall be considered in his natural capacity; as he shall be considered in his moral capacity, however, it may be otherwise; i. e. considered in the latter of these capacities, he may be a different man at one time from what he was at another, con-

* Bishop Butler on Personal Identity, p. 307.

sistently with his being the same man at all times, considered in the former: for instance; when a man repents of the evil which he is conscious to himself of his having done, he becomes, morally considered, a different man from what he was before †; and it is accordingly observed by a commentator of no mean abilities, paradoxical as it may seem to be, “that every man is (or at least may be) two men;” and, as this shall be supposed, he will have two selves, as a moral personality or character shall be supposed to arise, as men do either good or evil; and, in confirmation of the truth of this observation, our author quotes the following words of St. Bernard:—“Domine, libera me de malo homine meipso [*].” Now, seeing the word *me* in this

† Trapp on Rom. viii. 20.

[*] We stand not in need of a divine revelation for our knowing that man is in a fallen state; for I suppose that there is no man, how virtuous soever he may be, who may not find something in himself that will witness to the truth thereof; but much more will he know this, when he sees in how dreadful a state of depravity and wretchedness a very considerable part of mankind are immersed; and it is by the grace of God only that any man in particular is not of the number of these; and we have the truth of this observation witnessed to us by St. John, when he says, *We know* (i. e. naturally and not supernaturally) *that the whole world lieth in wickedness.* (1 John, v. 19.) Now, seeing man was perfect, or upright, as he came out of the hands of his Maker, and this perfection or upright-

prayer of Saint Bernard, implies a self, equally as the word *meipso*, it will be evident

ness was of a moral kind, he would, as he came out of the hands of God, be united in will with him; and so much I suppose to be meant by the word upright. Having, however, a freedom of will, he might fall from this original uprightness; and as his falling shall be supposed, the union which I have mentioned would be dissolved. If man, however, was intended for a greater happiness, than any which he could have enjoyed in an earthly Paradise, and the divine intention could not be frustrated by man's perversity, his being reunited in will to God, in other words, his being restored to his original perfection, or uprightness, must have been possible. Now, of what kind soever the happiness which Adam enjoyed in Paradise, and which he might have continued to enjoy, may be supposed to have been, it evidently would have been a happiness that he would have owed wholly to God, and in no part to himself; there is something, however, in the happiness for which man, as I have supposed, was originally intended, that is the reverse of this; i. e. it is a happiness which man must so necessarily owe to himself, as that, except as this was the case, he could know himself to be happy; for it would not only arise from a consciousness of his owing it to himself, but consist in that consciousness. It may, perhaps, be said, in objection to this notion, that had God not set this good, or happiness, before man, man could not have chosen it, and therefore he would have owed it to God; to which I answer, God did not set good or happiness before man, but as he, at the same time, set evil or misery before him; and as the choosing either the one or the other of these would depend upon man himself, so the satisfaction which he would feel as he shall be supposed to choose happiness, would constitute that happiness; and the remorse which he would feel as he shall be supposed to choose evil or misery, would constitute that misery. The good and evil which are now set before us,

not only that the self from which it was his desire to be delivered, was a different self from that which he had as he prayed, and that both these selves existed at the same time.

It will be in agreement with the above-mentioned reasoning of Bishop Butler to say, that a man cannot wilfully do any evil thing, but as he will be conscious that he himself did that thing; and the truth of this will be further testified to him by the remorse, or

suppose an original choice of evil; and the very wretched state which in a former part of this note has been mentioned, we know to have been the consequence of that sad choice; seeing, however, that by faith in Christ who has redeemed us, a greater happiness may be enjoyed than any which man, as I have shown, could have experienced had he not fallen, we know not which of these two things most to admire and wonder at, namely, the great power of faith, or the great power of God, by which good has been brought out of evil; a change such as that which is mentioned in our text, must take place in each man, or he cannot be saved. Now if, as I have said, it be not necessary that we should see the very wretched state of depravity into which a very considerable part of mankind are fallen, in order to our knowing man to be in a fallen state; for that there is something, even in the best and most virtuous, that may witness this truth to them; it will be evident, that no greater faith will be necessary in order that the change which I have mentioned should be wrought in the case of the worst, than in that of the best and most virtuous among men; great then must be the power of faith, in whomsoever this change shall be wrought. See n. * p. 96.

anguish of mind, with which the remembrance of the evil which we have done is usually attended: I say usually; for a man's conscience may, by repeated acts of sin, become seared, as if by a red-hot iron. Seeing, however, the *conscience* of every true believer will have been *purged of dead works**, i. e. of "the sins which he has committed; a man, with whom this shall be supposed to be the case, will evidently, morally considered, be a different man from what he was before: at the same time that, naturally considered, he will continue to be the same man as he always was. Let it, however, be said (for this has been said in objection to this doctrine†), that a man cannot but remember the evil which he has done; a man cannot, I admit, well forget, during his abode in this life, the evil which he has done in any former part thereof, neither is it fit that he should: for, if an amendment of life be necessary in order for a man's knowing the sincerity of his repentance, he, to whom God grants time and gives grace for this purpose, will, as he shall make a due use of these, have no reason to regret his remembering his past sins; for he must remember

* Heb. ix. 14

† Balguy.

them, in order for his repenting of them. If the peace of mind, however, which he from time to time will experience who lives according to a newness of life, will testify to him that God remembers his sins no more, this man will have reason to bless God that he himself has not forgotten them *; “*ut mala mea non obliviscar, aliena non requiram,*” was accordingly a prayer of St. Austin’s.

Now, if a newness of life be one and the same thing with a virtuous life, and which I suppose it to be, the above remarks, were it

* The observation of Archbishop King, that “the remembrance of any wickedness which we have committed will sting us, and we cannot forgive ourselves, though we were secure both from human punishment, and the divine wrath” (*Origin of Evil*, vol. ii. p. 325), is a notion which is not peculiar to him. There is, however, a fault in it, and which is as follows: So long as the remembrance of any sin stings us, we are not forgiven of God; and we cannot be secure from his wrath, either in this world, or in that which is to come, except as we are forgiven all such sins as we may have committed. We may remember the sins we have committed for the whole of our life, and, perhaps, in a future life (in order, as the Psalmist, in his own case, said, *that the bones which thou hast broken may rejoice*); but if this remembrance does not sting us, and which it will not do, if we have faith in Christ, their being remembered by us, will, as in our text is said, be of no consequence: except as the purpose which I have mentioned, and which we may suppose was answered in David’s case, may be answered in ours.

for this reason only, will not have been foreign to the subject of the present section: for, in a former section it has been shown, that self-denial is (upon the Christian system at least) the very essence of moral virtue. In consideration, however, of there being something in self-denial which may seem to be contrary to nature, my more particular intention has been to show, that as this virtue shall be well understood, the very reverse of this will appear to be the case: this indeed has in a great measure already been shown; for, what we deny, or devote to destruction, as we practise this virtue, is that corrupt and sinful nature, or self, which we derive from our parents; and which we cherish as we gratify those inordinate lusts, to which, as I suppose, the very corruption of that nature incites us; and which therefore could not, in a state of innocence, have been felt.

It has in a former section been supposed, that, in consequence of the curse which came upon the earth when Adam had sinned; all food came to be of a deleterious quality; and that it was thus in a natural way that God's threatenings were carried into execution. Hence it will be evident, that Adam's satis-

fyng his hunger would have an effect the reverse of that which would have been intended by him, ignorant as he may be supposed to have been of the unwholesomeness of such food as he would have been under the necessity of making use of; i. e. instead of acting for the preservation of life, he would in reality be acting for its destruction; and as this was the case with Adam, so will it have been the case with all men ever since. Now, this we do when we deny ourselves; i. e. we act for the destruction rather than for the preservation of life; and *that*, whether we eat or whether we abstain from eating; with this difference, however, that in the one case we deny ourselves ignorantly, but in the other knowingly.

Now, seeing that, in consequence of our having been redeemed by Christ, the foundation of a new nature will have been laid in every man; every man, as he denies himself, whether it be by eating, or by abstaining from eating, will be acting for the support or cherishing of that nature, and for the destruction of an old and corrupt nature, according to which he will be existing at the same time. Although, then, a man, as he shall deny him-

self*, in whatever way he does this, will be acting in violation of the law of his old and corrupt nature,—he nevertheless will be acting agreeably to the law of his new and uncorrupt nature, as any such nature shall be supposed to have been formed in him, and which is the case with every one that is regenerate; and which is the thing that was to be proved.

* To deny ourselves, and to take up our cross, are, in a Gospel sense, synonymous terms. Now there is a cross that is to be taken up in the case of every one that would be saved. For there is in every one an evil nature, or self, which, as he would be saved, he must devote to destruction; and as a man shall do this, he will be taking up his cross. Hence it is that the taking up the cross is the great stumbling-block as Christ is preached to us. For, if every man naturally loves himself, how shall any man do those things, which show that he hates himself? As St. Paul however found, that, as *strengthened by Christ, he could do all things*, of course, that he was able to take up his cross; we, as we have a like faith with the Apostle, shall be able to take up our cross, in whatever it may please God that this shall consist.

SECTION X.

GODLINESS, St. Paul tells us, *is profitable unto all things: having promise unto the life that now is, and of that which is to come**. Now, as, by the promise unto the life which now is shall be supposed to be meant (and which evidently is meant) a good, or happiness, which is of this life; a good, or happiness, which is of another life, will of course be meant by the promise of that which is to come; and if so, it will, as I conceive, be evident, that as any one shall be supposed to be living a godly life (i. e. as he shall be living in obedience, for the most part, to the precepts of the Gospel), he will not only be seeking a good which is of this life, but a good likewise which is of the life to come; the good, however, which is of this life will, in this case, be sought in subservience to that which is of another.

* 1 Tim. iv. 8.

Having premised thus much, I think myself well warranted in saying, that if upon any supposed religious system a good which is of a future life be not principally sought, and, in which case, a good which is of this life will only be sought, that system will be a system which may upon the principles of philosophy be established, and where there can be no certainty as to a future life, but which cannot stand on the ground of religion: for religion proceeds upon the certainty of there being a future life, however mistaken men's notions may be (and except as they are supernaturally enlightened, will necessarily be), with respect to the true nature of that life.

St. Paul, upon the supposition of there being no future life, says, *Let us eat and drink*; i. e. let us freely enjoy the good things which are of this life; and Solomon had before, and upon the like supposition, said the same thing: for in the book of Ecclesiastes we find it written as follows:—*There is nothing better for a man, than that he should eat and drink; and that he should make his soul enjoy good in his labour**.

* Chap. ii. 24. See Mercerus in loc.

Now, I scarce need say, that this is the system of Epicurus; I am bold, however, to say, that although others of the ancient philosophers differ from Epicurus in many points, their moral principles, nevertheless, as these shall be traced to their source, will be found to agree with the system of Epicurus: *that* even of Aristotle not excepted. And as we shall further suppose, that the present will not be succeeded by a future life, the notions of these ancient heathen philosophers, with respect to the *summum bonum*, will certainly have been well grounded; and that they were so, we have the testimony of St. Paul, in the above text, *Let us eat, drink, &c.*

It is further observable, however, with respect to these ancient philosophers, that they perceiving a general depravity of manners to prevail amongst men, concluded (from some acquaintance which they probably had with the writings of Moses), that as man was made by God, so would this depravity consist in a departure from that righteousness, or uprightness, in which he must have been originally created; they therefore, upon the ground of there being no true happiness but what arises from the practice of moral virtue,

and confirmed in this opinion by their perceiving that the misery of these men was, for the most part, in proportion to the degree of their wickedness, benevolently thought they could not perform a kinder office to their fellow-creatures, than by endeavouring to reclaim them from their evil ways, and so, by degrees, bring them back to that integrity and uprightness, from which they supposed them to have fallen; and it was with this intent, as I suppose, that their different systems of ethics were composed.

As these men, however, had no other light than that of nature to direct them, and could therefore have no notion of any happiness but what is of this world, they could have been equal to no virtue, the end of which would not be sensual gratifications; and, in agreement herewith, Aristotle (whose ethics are esteemed as being the nearest of any others to those of the Gospel) says, "All moral virtue is conversant about those pleasures and pains which the body feels, and is founded on them*:" these notions differ not from those of Epicurus †, and to whose phi-

* De Moribus, lib. ii. cap. 13.

† It has been spoken of as being something strange, that

losophy I have supposed the before-mentioned text of Solomon, as well as that of St. Paul, to refer. In justice, however, to these men, who, as I have said, had no other light than that of nature * to direct them, I shall add,

although Epicurus placed the happiness of man in sensual pleasure, no man was more abstemious than he was. This, however, might have been perfectly consistent with what he taught: for no man, as I have reason to think, hath so much pleasure in eating and drinking, as he who is abstemious; i. e. as he who eats not more, or drinks not more, than what the refectation of the body requires; and as to the quality of foods and drinks, it is a rule with physicians, that the natural and genuine appetency for these will be the best direction as to the choice of them.

* As Plato is generally supposed to have been acquainted with the writings of Moses, he is to be excepted as being of the number of those philosophers who, in my text, are said to have had no other light than that of nature. I take this opportunity of observing, that Plato's writings so plainly show him to have been acquainted with those of Moses, as that it has been said of him, that "he was Moses speaking Greek." It has likewise been observed, "that in Plato's second Alcibiades Christ is plainly foretold: for that Plato (at least Socrates, whose scholar Plato was, and whose philosophy is contained in the writings of Plato), like the high priest, unknowingly pointed at that divine Teacher who was to come into the world some ages after him."—ADDISON.

In another part, however, of Plato's works it appears (if at least M. Dacier's translation may be depended on), that Plato has prophesied of Christ more distinctly than what is the case in the instance which Mr. Addison has given. "Plato (Dacier says) had so great and true an idea of perfect righteousness, and was so thoroughly acquainted with the corruption

that as the benevolence of their intentions in composing their different systems shall be considered, they deserve our commendation; and as the genius which some of them, but Aristotle in particular, has displayed, they excite our admiration.

There are men, however, of the present day, who have not only the light of revelation to enlighten them, but who profess to believe in the truth of that light, who nevertheless have in fact shut their eyes against this light; for they say of the depravity which now obtains, or which at any time since the fall has obtained amongst men, that it originates, not in any sinfulness or evil inclination which is derived from a sinning parent, but that it begins with each man by a free determination of the will, and that this determination of the will is commonly owing to a bad education, or bad examples; and thus, according to these men,

of mankind, that he makes it appear, in the second book of his Commonwealth, that if a man perfectly righteous should come upon earth, he would find so much opposition in the world, that he would be imprisoned, reviled, scourged, and in fine crucified, by such who, though they were extremely wicked, would yet pass for righteous men."—Disc. p. 5.

the sinfulness of every son of Adam is no otherwise different from that which Adam's was (as education and example shall be put out of the case), than as the temptations to sin are different; for that with both it consists in the prevalence of the sensitive over the intellectual nature, i. e. of the passions over reason. They further say, that God, foreseeing this general depravity which would obtain amongst men, and that the wisdom of philosophers would in vain be used to prevail on them to quit those gross pleasures to which they would have been devoted, and to tread the arduous path of virtue, for any eternal purpose at least, had, in his wisdom, provided a remedy for this evil; that he nevertheless chose that men should first see that human wisdom, although exemplified in the lives of philosophers, and taught by their precepts, was an ineffectual remedy; that the remedy, however, which God had provided, required, in order for its reaching the evil which it was intended to correct, that vice should have arrived at its greatest height*;

* The very deplorable state which the world was in, with respect to religion and morals, at the time of Christ's appearance on earth, and for a considerable time had been in previously thereto, has been the subject of Chap. XIX. of

and this, they say, was the case when Christ was born; that Christ, however, had no existence until he was created in the womb of the virgin Mary, and of whom he was accordingly born; that being supernaturally enlightened, he would be enabled to teach a purer morality than any of which men, who had the light of nature only to direct them, could have any notion, should come into the world; and that the truth of his doctrines, as well as of his divine mission, was witnessed by the power which he had of working miracles.

Now, these men (and that by these I mean the followers of Socinus will readily be understood), denying original sin, as this doctrine is taught by our church, suppose, that there is no obstacle in the way of any one, as he shall have become acquainted with the Gospel, to practise its moral precepts, so far as they should be found to square with

Leland's Necessity of a Divine Revelation. Such, indeed, was the state of things, that had not the power of original sin, and which I suppose to have been the cause thereof, been counteracted by the preaching of the Gospel, it evidently would have desolated the earth, and brought all things to ruin.

his reason*; and they say, that if this man be conscious of his having done any thing which his conscience tells him he ought not to have done, as God is merciful, he will, upon this man's repentance, forgive him; and so likewise, as he shall afterwards fall into any sins. Thus these men deny that Christ either did, or could, make any satisfaction to the divine justice; and they say, that any such notion is inconsistent with forgiveness of sins.

These false notions, however, of these men, in their denial of Christ's divine nature, and the necessity of the satisfaction which he made for the sins of the whole world, in

* " We cannot appeal to any natural power of man, as an ultimate test of merit or demerit, without assuming that human corruption has not affected that natural power."—(Sumner on Apostolical Preaching, p. 118.) Now, the Socinians, as in our text has been observed, deny that any corruption has come upon the human nature; they accordingly say, that the dignity of our nature requires it of us to suppose that reason is as good a judge of the truth of any doctrine now as it ever was. The pride, which the above writer supposes to be at the bottom of all these high notions which men have of human reason (see p. 210), their pride, I say, confutes them, for it argues the corruption of their nature: the corruption of our nature being the source of pride, as well as of every vicious propensity.

order that the sins of any one man should be forgiven, has been so clearly shown by many learned men, as to supersede the necessity of my adding any thing in confirmation of their arguments; it would likewise be foreign to the purpose of the present section, which has been to show, that the morality of the Socinians as little accords with that of the Gospel as the morality of the heathen philosophers does.

The same thing may be said of the doctrine of original sin; it may be said, that it has been so well established by the labours of many eminent divines, and in particular by Bishop Burnett, as that my labour in support of this doctrine might well have been spared, had not an argument occurred to me, which has not, to my knowledge, been made use of by any writer for the like purpose, and which argument is as follows:—If the sinfulness of each man originates, as these men say (and as in the above statement of their opinions it may be seen they do), with himself, they will virtually say; that the death of each man originates with himself: for death must, like all other things, have a cause, and sin, as the Scriptures say, was the cause; for St. Paul

says, *By man* (i. e. by the sin of man) *came death*; and upon this ground he, in the following verse, says, *In Adam all die*; i. e. all men became subject to death. Now, if infants, who are incapable of sinning, die no less than adults, and actual sin cannot in their case be the cause of their dying, either the sin of Adam will be the cause of their dying, or their dying will, contrarily to what has been supposed, have no cause at all. If they say, that their dying is owing to the natural corruption of their nature, they in fact say, that Adam would have died, even though he had not sinned: for if corruption be natural to the flesh, it would have been as natural to Adam, as it is to us; and, in which case, God's threatening with death would have been nugatory. Seeing, however, these men say, not only that sin, but an evil inclination, originates, in the case of each man, with himself, I say, in objection to this notion of theirs, that, as sin is an act of the soul, and the body dies, not by reason of any mortality to which it was originally by nature subject, and which may be supposed to be the case with brutes*, but

* Solomon says, "As a beast dieth, so dieth a man;" fallen man, however, is here spoken of, and not man as he

by reason of the sin of the soul*; the soul of Adam will have been sinful; and as a clean cannot come out of an unclean thing, nor the stream be pure when the fountain from which it flows is foul, the soul of every one descended from Adam will be sinful; and if so, every one that cometh into the world will be inclined to evil, and *that* continually; and so say the Scriptures; for they say, *And God saw that the wickedness of man was great on the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually* †.

came out of the hands of his Maker; and what but sin could have thus brought man to be upon a level with a brute beast?

* Except as we suppose natural evil to originate with man, it must originate with God, but which is impossible; death, then, which is the greatest of all evils, must have originated with man. Now, if all men will have been contained in Adam (and which, if all men spring from Adam, must have been the case), all men will have sinned in Adam; and if all men will have sinned in Adam, the death to which each man is born subject, may be said to originate with each man, because each man will have partaken of the sin of Adam. ‘Adam,’ says a learned divine, “was our federal head, in whom we covenanted, and in whom we sinned.”—HOPKINS, p. 112.

† Gen. vi. 5.

The Gospel goes further back than the outward or sensible act for the sinfulness of that act; the truth of which remark is witnessed by the text, *Whosoever looketh on a*

These men, however (viz. the Socinians), as a learned prelate observes, say, “ that as Adam was made mortal, and had died whether he had sinned or not, so they think, that the liberty of nature is still entire, and that every man is punished for his own sins, and not for the sins of others: and to do otherwise, they say, seems contrary to justice, if not to goodness*.” In answer to which I say, that if death originate in the sin of

woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already. Now, we must suppose every imagination of the thoughts of men’s hearts to be only evil continually; for our knowing the truth of the above words of our Saviour, or even for their being intelligible, I say the same of anger, as I have said of lusting after a woman; I say, it is a sin of our nature, i. e. of our depraved nature, and what no man can help; if then it be a sin, on account of which, as our Saviour has told us, we are *in danger of the judgment*, i. e. for which we are responsible to God, it must be a sin of which we may be guilty in our personal capacity: for, it is in our general capacity, or that capacity by reason of which we are one with all men, that we are guilty of a sin which I have called the sin of our nature, and what we cannot but be continually committing. When St. Paul then, in his Epistle to the Ephesians, says, *Be ye angry*, he does not speak in contradiction to the above words of our Saviour: for, these words of the Apostle I suppose to have respect to our general capacity; but those of our Saviour, to our private or personal capacity; and to this capacity I suppose the Apostle to have respect, when to the words, *Be ye angry*, he adds, *and sin not*.

* Burnett on Art. IX.

Adam (and which these men cannot, consistently with that belief which they profess to have in the truth of the Scriptures, deny), the various evils to which, in this transitory life, we are subject, will likewise originate in the sin of Adam: for, these not only lead to death, but may be said to be death, as the Apostle witnesseth, when, with a reference to the various hardships which he had endured for the sake of Christ, he says, *In death often*; and if death be a punishment (and which these men, if they believe in the truth of the Scriptures, must likewise confess), the evils which I have mentioned, must likewise be a punishment; but if so, every man that cometh into the world will be punished before there is any possibility of his having done any thing for which he may deserve to be punished: for, the experience of pain and misery is coeval with the first breath which a child draws when it comes into the world; and as its crying (which is commonly the case with a child as soon as it is born) may serve to show; for its crying is a plain indication of its feeling pain.

Having thus, by an argument which I defy these men to refute, proved that death, and

the whole train of evils that lead to death, originate in the sin of Adam, it will be evident, in contradiction to what they assert, that men may justly be punished for sins of which they have not been personally guilty; and that this may be the case, even where the sin of Adam is actually the cause of his posterity being punished, God's visiting the sins of fathers on their innocent children is a proof*. Now these men, as hath been stated, say, that every man that is punished, is punished for his own sins, and not for the sins of others; and in support of this position of theirs, they say, that it being otherwise would be inconsistent with the divine justice and goodness: the very reverse, however, of this is the case, as the Scriptures account for these things; for if, as we learn from these sacred writings, Christ was punished for the sin of which all men, as being virtually contained in Adam, were guilty, the divine justice will have been satisfied; and if we, notwithstanding, die, from the certainty nevertheless of our rising again, death

* When God inflicts calamities on the children of vicious parents, these children will be innocent of the particular crimes of their parents; they nevertheless will have been criminal as having sinned in Adam.

will be as a sleep only : and if, by virtue of the second covenant, the sins of which we are personally guilty will, as the conditions of that covenant shall duly be performed, be forgiven, the goodness and mercy of God will be manifest.

There is however a stronger argument even than this which I, or than any which divines, to my knowledge, have made use of, to refute the Socinian notion of sins being forgiven without an atonement ; and which is as follows.—If God had not sanctioned the command which he gave to Adam with respect to the tree of knowledge by a penalty, he would have had no tie upon him for his obedience ; for Adam, having a freedom of will, might have disobeyed God, and in which case it would have been to no purpose that the aforesaid command would have been given. Adam accordingly did disobey God ; and although he did not immediately die, he nevertheless became mortal, and as he would most assuredly die, God's threatenings would have been put into execution. This being the case, it is evident that no repentance for the sin which he had committed, could have availed him for its being forgiven : for if he would in-

evitably die, there would be something in any repentance which he shall be supposed to have had that would contradict it; Adam no doubt saw this, and he accordingly did not (so far as we may judge from the silence of the Scriptures) repent. Now every man that has sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, will be situated exactly as Adam was: for although no such command will have been given him, as was given unto Adam, there nevertheless is in every man's conscience a command which is sanctioned by the same penalty as that by which the command given unto Adam was; and if so, though a man were not mortal in consequence of the sin of Adam (and which, by the way, the Socinians say that no man is: for they say, that every man will be punished for his own sin), he would become mortal by reason of his own sin, as Adam did, and would as assuredly die as Adam did. And as Adam's repentance could not in the nature of things have availed him for his sin being forgiven, so neither can repentance avail any man for a like purpose who shall have sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, except as he shall plead that atonement which the Socinians say Christ neither did make, nor could have made.

What then shall we say of these men, who, professing to believe the Scriptures, nevertheless see not the truth of these things, but that *God hath (judicially) blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart, that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted, and that he should heal them* * ?

* John, xii. 40.

SECTION XI.

As one great purpose of the Gospel is to reveal a life by which the present will be succeeded, more clearly than what had been done by former revelations, and to show us the way in which this life is to be attained to; it evidently would have been foreign to this purpose, that any thing decisive should have been said by the sacred writers with respect to the state of the souls of those who, having had no other light than that of nature to direct them, shall nevertheless have acted in conformity to that light. It has, however, been thought proper by the holy Spirit, by which the pens of those writers were directed, that we to whom the truth of the Scriptures has been revealed, should not be wholly in the dark as to this matter. The first instance which I shall give of the truth of this remark is a revelation which was made to St. Peter, and which is contained in the following text of Scripture: *Of a truth I*

perceive that God is no respecter of persons, but that in every nation he that feareth God, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him *. It is observable, however, in the case of Cornelius, that, after his having prayed to God (according to his usual custom, as it may be supposed), he is directed by an angel to go to Simon, surnamed Peter; and it was after he had so done, and after Peter had spoken the above words, that he (Peter) preached Christ to Cornelius; which shows, that, although Cornelius might have heard of Christ, he nevertheless did not believe in him; for so would Peter's preaching Christ have been useless; Cornelius's being accepted of God must therefore have been exclusive of any faith which he had; and, in which case, the righteousness of Cornelius would have been accepted in lieu of faith. This, however, would not have superseded the necessity of Christ being preached to Cornelius; for, having Christ preached unto him, he would

* Acts, x. 34.—The meaning of the word *accepted*, as the same word is made use of by St. Paul, and in the same sense, in his second Epistle to the Corinthians, chap. v. ver. 9, is, according to a learned commentator, “the being received into divine favour here, and into glory hereafter.”—ADAM CLARKE in loc.

know that, however acceptable his former righteousness was, no such righteousness would be acceptable for salvation in future; and that a righteousness which should spring from faith, would for the future be to be depended on for salvation. It was for this purpose, as I conceive, that Cornelius was directed to go to Peter; it nevertheless is evident, that Cornelius might have been saved without actual faith; for, he might have died, as many thousands of men do, without having ever heard of Christ. If Cornelius then was in a state of salvation previously to Peter's preaching Christ to him, and God be no respecter of persons, every one that is in the predicament of Cornelius will be in a state of salvation.

Not contenting myself, however, with this example of Cornelius in proof of the salvability of the heathens, I shall show that the Scriptures afford other proofs of the truth of this doctrine; and for this purpose I observe, that, in consequence of the covenant which God entered into with the people of Israel having been broken on their part*, God is

* This covenant, it has been observed by divines, was broken by the Israelites not by their non-performance of it,

said to have made a new covenant with them, and which, as this covenant is, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, spoken of, was as follows—*I will put my laws into their hearts, and in their minds I will write them**: in regard, however, it is in the following verse said, *and all shall know me*; it would from these words alone, be evident, that this covenant was not meant to be confined to the Jews, did we not know, from its being the covenant of the New Testament, that all men are free to enter into it. Now, it should seem from hence, that although all men are free to enter into this covenant with God, they nevertheless must know of this covenant, and have it offered to them, in order for their entering freely into it; St. Paul, however, speaking of the Gentiles, says, *These do by nature the things contained in the law* (i. e. the moral part of the law of Moses), *which shows the work of the law to be written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts*

but by their considering the works which it required as being justifying: for the true Israelites, such as Moses, Samuel, David, &c. stopped not at works, but considered these as leading to Christ, who was the end of the law, and thus depended on faith for their justification.

* Heb. x. 16.

*the mean while accusing, or excusing one another**. Now, if these men did by nature the things contained in the law, and their doing so showed the law to have been written in their hearts; and if the law mentioned in the above text of Hebrews, and which God says he will *write in the hearts and in the minds of all men*, can be no other law than that which is mentioned in the aforesaid text of Romans; God will have already written this law in the hearts and minds of these men, although his doing so is here spoken of as a thing that he will in future do; and which will be evident from the Apostle's saying, that their doing the things of the law showed the law to have been written in their hearts; and their doing these things was as they were Gentiles, and not as being converts to Christianity. But neither would God's existence have been any thing which they would have had to learn; notwithstanding that in the text of Hebrews it is said, that *they should know him*; and as if this would have been in consequence of God's writing his law into their hearts; for, as it is observed by a learned commentator, on Romans, i. 20, "those

* Rom. ii. 14, 15.

common notices and principles, concerning the nature of God, and obedience to him, and just dealings with others, are imprinted on the hearts of men by nature*.”

Now, although we who have had the Gospel preached to us have no advantage over those on whom this light hath not shone, as to those common notices, &c. above mentioned, there nevertheless must be some be-

* Adam Clarke in loc. “ God,” says another learned divine, “ never intended to exclude the Gentiles from the benefits their souls might receive by our Saviour’s incarnation ; not even those who were not then incorporated into the Jewish nation by a carnal circumcision : which being supposed, the assertion of Saint Clement cannot be thought strange, that philosophy might perform the same office for the Gentiles, which the law of Moses did for the Jews, in preparing them for the Spirit, which neither of them could receive, as an immortalizing principle, but by the Gospel. What is this philosophy but the moral duties of the Mosaic law being owned as reasonable and obliging, by the philosophers who were the guides of those Gentiles who knew nothing of the law of Moses ? and what is this but *the law written in their hearts*, which the Apostle owns as sufficient to make it law to those who find it so ? This doing the things prescribed in the law, under the sense of an inward conviction that they were obliged to do so, seems to be what God himself calls *having his law written in their hearts*, and wishes earnestly that it were his people’s case ; why then should we wonder if it should prove acceptable to him in the Gentiles also ?”—DODWELL’S *Distinction between Soul and Spirit*, p. 211.

nefit which we derive from God's putting his laws into our mind and writing them in our hearts, as we enter into the new covenant with him, and which they who have not had the Gospel preached to them cannot have: upon this presumption, I observe, that although when we enter into covenant with God, his laws, as I have supposed, will already have been put into our minds, and have been written in our hearts, it nevertheless will not have been for any eternal purpose (that we can know of at least) that this will have been the case; for, if it may, why is it that, notwithstanding this writing of God's laws in our hearts, which we have in common with all men, we pray, that "God would write his laws in our hearts*?" What we virtually pray God (according to my apprehension) is, that our obedience may proceed with the assistance of his grace, or holy Spirit. Now, if the end for which we shall act, as we shall be supernaturally influenced as to such obedience as we shall be supposed to show to God's laws, will be different from that which we may show as we shall act from the dictates of conscience

* Liturgy.

merely (and if it be not, our asking for the divine grace would be nugatory), it will follow, that it will be for temporal ends only that we either shall or can be acting, as our obedience shall be such, in its principle, as that of the Gentiles, mentioned in the afore-said text of Romans, must needs have been*.

Now, I am aware that I shall be treading on very tender ground in what I am about to add on the state of the souls of those who have been the subject of the present section, i. e. who having had no other light than that of nature to direct them, have nevertheless showed obedience to that light: for, admitting that they will necessarily have sought a good, or happiness, which is of this world,

* That the words of the Athanasian creed, *Whosoever will be saved must thus think of the Trinity*, do not exclude the Gentiles from salvation, it is argued by a learned prelate as follows:—"As we are authorized by St. Paul, when he says, *What the law saith it saith to those that are under the law*, to make a distinction between those who perish under the law, and without the law, to deny the possibility of salvation to those whose conduct has been conformable to the knowledge of duty which they actually possessed, would be a rigorous determination, and to which the above words of the Creed in no degree point."—Bp. CLEAVER'S Sermon on 2 Tim. i. 13. p. 12.

their seeking it nevertheless will have been on the presumption of its being the highest good that can be sought by any man; and as it will have been in ignorance of any higher good, that they will have sought that which is of this world, nevertheless, having sought it by a strict obedience to such light as they had, their not seeking a higher good will have been from no fault of theirs; and it may be presumed, that as a supernatural light should have been vouchsafed to them, and a higher good have been revealed to them, they would have sought it, whatever the conditions might be on which alone it was to be attained to, as ardently as they did *that* which is of this world; and which, as I have said, they would have sought on the presumption of its being the highest good, and in ignorance of there being a higher*.

* The salvability of the heathens is asserted by Justin Martyr, on the ground of Christ's being the eternal *λόγος*, or wisdom, of his Father: for, as such, he supposes him "to be the fountain of reason, as the sun is the fountain of light; and that from him there was a *λόγος*, or reason, naturally derived into every man, as a beam and emanation of light from that sun." He accordingly supposes, "the reason with which every man is endued, to be a light kindled from Him who is the *λόγος*, or wisdom, of his Father, and may so far be said to partake of Christ, the original wisdom; and

Much the same thing is said by a learned prelate, and who writes as follows: "Heaven is the reward of good men, who live in the exercise of all Christian graces and virtues; good men, therefore, must be judged by their works; they nevertheless must, at the same time, be judged by grace, because of the necessary imperfection of even our best works. Now, although Christ," as the learned author, in a farther part of his discourse, says, "has not been preached to all ages, nor to all parts of the world, yet he is the judge of all men, and therefore will judge all mankind, not by the rules of strict and rigorous justice, but by

"so far as they live after the image of Him that created them, they may be said *κατα λόγον βιωῦν*, and in this sense be called "Christians."—REEVE'S *Apol.* 83, n. o. There is, however, a better reason given by Dean Stanhope for the salvability of heathens, and which is as follows:—"Except as there shall be *a preparation of the heart* to receive the ingrafted word, he supposes that no one can be a believer, as that word shall be externally preached to him; and this preparation of the heart he supposes to consist in a disposition inclined to acts of kindness and compassion. Now, as heathens may have this disposition, there will evidently be nothing wanting in their case in order for their being believers, but that the word should be preached to them; and this preaching he supposes they will have by anticipation in this very disposition of theirs; these he likewise supposes to be meant by those *other sheep* which Christ says he has, and which are not of this fold." Comment on the Gospel for the 2d Sunday after Easter.

the mercy and equity of the Gospel ; no man," he adds, " shall perish merely for the misfortune of his birth ; no man that lived before Christ was preached to the world, or in such countries where he was never preached, after he had come into the world ; but though the Gospel was never preached to him, yet he shall be judged by Gospel grace ; and if he were a true penitent, and a sincere worshipper of God, he shall have liberty to plead his repentance, and the sincerity of his obedience, at the tribunal of Christ, when he comes to judgment ; which will be so undeniable a justification of the righteousness of the last judgment, that, were there no other reason for it, it would mightily incline any man who thinks honourably of God, to believe it*."

Sufficient, as I conceive, will now have been said in proof of the truth of my proposition, namely, that heathens may be in a state of salvation ; and here I might very well have ended this section, had not some observations been made by the learned writer whom I have last quoted, which might more properly perhaps have been noticed in a former section of

* Sherlock on Judgment, p. 364.

this discourse; but which nevertheless are so connected with what has above been said on the subject of works, as they will not improperly have a place in the present section. The observations which I have alluded to are in substance as follows.

Though we shall be judged for all the good and evil which we have done, yet our Saviour, in describing the process of the last judgment, mentions nothing else but acts of charity; for instance, he says, *I was an hungry, and ye gave me no meat; thirsty, and ye gave me no drink, &c.* All mankind, says our author, have a natural sense of the great evil of rapine, and injustice, and murder, &c.; their consciences terrify and scare them with such guilt; but they have but little sense of the obligations of charity: all this is very true; the reason of the thing, however, as I conceive, is this: men naturally shrink from the idea of committing theft, murder, &c. because they naturally love themselves; and their own happiness, and even their life would, as they know, be in danger by their committing them; so true is the aphorism, *Oderunt peccare mali formidine pœnæ.* This love, however, must be gotten the better of, as

charity, or the love of God, should be a principle of action; for so much is implied by the words of our Saviour, when he says, *If a man hate not his father and mother, and sister and brother, and his own self, he cannot be my disciple.* Self-denial has, in a former section, been said to be the criterion of virtue; and what has above been said confirms this notion, so far as charity may be said to comprehend in it all virtues*.

Many of those, no doubt, who were converted to the faith of Christ by the preaching of the Apostles, were men who, having lived good lives, would, as I suppose, have been in a state of salvation; had these men, how-

* In Section VIII. it is said, that had the young man whom our Saviour had to sell all he had and give to the poor, done so, he would have showed *that* charity which consists in self-denial; and yet St. Paul, in seeming contradiction to this, says, that *a man may bestow all his goods on the poor, and not have charity* (1 Cor. xiii. 4). A learned commentator, perceiving a contradiction in this text, as it is rendered in English, says, "Supposing the giving to the poor to be a charitable act, this text would in fact say, that a man may have charity, and not have charity; and for which reason the word *αγαπη* should have been rendered love: for such is charity; i. e. such a love as a man hath when he loveth God with all his heart, with all his soul, with all his mind, and with all his strength."

ever, not believed (if such a thing may be supposed) when the Gospel was preached to them, they would no longer have been in a state of salvation; and *that* because of their unbelief. A question, however, may arise with respect to those who were converted, and as any among these shall be supposed to have died before they were baptized, whether, not being regenerate by baptism, they would have died in a state of salvation? In answer to which I say, that having been converted, they would, by reason of their faith, have been in a state of salvation; and seeing their want of baptism, and, of course, of regeneration, would have been through no fault of theirs, these would have been in a state of salvation, for a reason as much greater than that which, in a former part of this section, has been given why a heathen may be so, as faith is more saving than obedience to the light of nature can be; the faith of these, I say, would save them, notwithstanding that their being saved would not be by reason of their performance of any covenant which they had entered into.

SECTION XII.

As the Jewish was in order to the Christian dispensation, there was no perfection to which the Jews might have attained by any strict observance of the law, but what would be to be renounced, as they should become enlightened by the Gospel ; it is accordingly argued by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, that *if perfection were by the Levitical priesthood (for under it the people received the law)*, it would not have been necessary that *another priest should rise after the order of Melchisedeck* ; and by which priest Christ is evidently meant. Now, the same thing may be said with respect to the light of nature ; it may be said, that if perfection might have arisen from any obedience which men might show to this light, the necessity of a divine revelation would have been superseded, and the reason of the thing would, as I conceive, have been the same in both cases ; for, although Christ was shadowed under the ceremonial part of

the Jewish religion, and the moral part was the ground of the morality of the Gospel, I nevertheless say, that no perfection at all could have arisen from any performance of the former of these; and no such perfection from the performance of the latter, as would have qualified men for any greater happiness than that which is of this world, until the spiritual meaning of the moral law was understood; and although the spiritual meaning of the law is supposed to have been understood by some who were under it, and who might have had faith in Him who was figured under it, it nevertheless would have been darkly only understood, until He, who was figured under it, should have appeared, and have shown an obedience to it, that men might follow his steps. As the present is in the divine intention in order to a future state; and its being a probationary one implies its being an imperfect state; I have thought it proper to observe thus much on the subject of perfection, as introductory to what I have to say in the present section.

A happiness may, and, with every generous mind, will arise from the practice of moral virtue (i. e. from doing good), which

will be greater than any which can arise from those sensual pleasures which men naturally seek, and which, as in a former section has been shown, are ever at the bottom of any virtue which men, who have no other light than that of nature to direct them, are equal to. The exalting our nature to its utmost capacity, to a capacity greater even than that which man had as he came out of the hands of his Maker, I consider as being the great purpose which will be answered by the practice of moral virtue in this life; it cannot, however, be the end intentionally for which it is practised. The capacity of happiness may likewise increase with an increase of virtue in this life; the experience of this happiness, however, will be reserved for another and future life, and will constitute the reward of that virtue which has been practised in this life. To the contrary of these notions, it has been said by a learned prelate, now no more, that "a habit of virtue, begun in this life, may, by virtue of the same principle with which it was begun, gradually advance beyond any limit that may be assigned, in quickness of perception and truth of judgment; and, as the will's alacrity to conform to the dictates of conscience, and the decrees

of reason, will be gradually heightened, the virtuous habit will correspond, in some degree, in proportion with the growth of intellect." Again—"In a future state, the capacity of the mind will be enlarged, in proportion to the acquisitions already made, and may correspond with the increase of the capacity, in every stage of a progressive virtue, in every period of an endless duration*." Now, on this I observe, that seeing it is here supposed that a habit of virtue is begun in this life, as men act in conformity to the dictates of conscience and to the decrees of reason, conscience and reason will, according to our author, constitute the principle of moral virtue, or spring from which it arises in a future life, in like manner as it does (according to our author) in this life.

Now, if advances in virtue cannot be made in this life, as a pure and genuine love shall be supposed to be the principle in which our actions originate, and the fountain from which they flow, such likewise will be the principle or fountain from which these will flow, as we shall suppose, with the learned

* Bishop Horsley's Sermons.

writer, that advances in virtue not only may, but will be made in a future life. The question, however, is, whether it will be possible for moral virtue to be practised at all in a future life? And if it will not, no advance in virtue can be made in that life: for, if advances in virtue might be made in a future state, that state would evidently not be a state of perfection; so far, at least, as a moral perfection shall be supposed to be meant. The disposition of mind which will arise from the practice of those virtues which the miseries to which we are subject in this life are well calculated to call forth (and it is for this purpose, as in a former section has been observed, that these miseries have been suffered to arise); this disposition, I say, may, and no doubt will, remain in a future life; but how should these virtues be practised in a life where all misery will be excluded, or, as St. John in the Revelations expresses it, *where all tears will be wiped away* *?

* "Religion," says a learned prelate, "will survive all virtues of which it is the source; for (in heaven) we shall be living in the noblest exercises of piety, when we shall have no objects on which to exercise many (if any) human virtues. When there will be no distress to be re-

Now, I have in former sections of this discourse supposed, that advances in goodness and virtue are made in this life, as, after Christ's example, we do good; and that the end for which we persevere in doing good is (although we are not conscious of it), that we may attain to that perfection of moral character which will qualify us for that happiness for which we were originally intended; and for which we may know ourselves to have been originally intended, by the longing desire which (as by an ingenious writer* it has been said) every man has for it; from these considerations, *that*, in the first place, of the impossibility of our doing good in a future, as we may in the present life; and *that*, in the second, of the end for which we do so†;

lieved, no injuries to be forgiven, no evil habits to be subdued, there will be a Creator to be blessed and adored, a Redeemer to be loved and praised."—Bp. HODGSON on 1 John, iii. 12. p. 50. These notions of the learned Bishop evidently coincide with those that are expressed in our text.

* Norris.

† A learned divine, speaking of a state of glory, supposes that "the ties of civil society will then be dissolved, and that all the duties arising from them will then fail of course; that several new engagements, founded on the then state of things, must succeed, of which we have now no distinct conceptions; and whether men may not advance infinitely in degrees of perfection, be always acquiring new relations, and still en-

I with submission say, that the learned prelate's notions, admirably as they are expressed, are nevertheless not well grounded. When, however, our author says, that the capacity of the mind will be enlarged hereafter, and that a virtuous habit will be strengthened and increase, so as to correspond with the increase of intellect, as well as of the moral capacity, in every period of an endless duration; I agree with him with respect to the moral capacity, so far as the principle of virtue shall be considered, and which I have supposed to be that love which was originally implanted in our nature; this love I say, as God shall be supposed to be the immediate object, may, to use the words of our author, increase in every period of an endless duration; and in this my notions will be the same as those of a writer whom I have mentioned; but who, I was pleased to find, had been beforehand with me as to some other notions which I have adopted, and which are expressed in former parts of this discourse; and to show this sameness

larging their duties to all eternity, is a point which, as it cannot be certainly evinced on the one hand, so neither can it be clearly disproved on the other."—CONEYBEAR'S Defence, &c. p. 152.

of opinion between us, I transcribe from a work of his as follows:—"Every man has a restless principle of love implanted in his nature, whereby he continually aspires to something more excellent than himself, either really or apparently, with a design and inclination to perfect his being. This affection and disposition of mind all men have, and at all times. Our other passions ebb and flow like the tide, and have their seasons and periods like intermitting fevers. But this of love is as constant as our radical heat, as inseparable as thought, as even and equal as the motions of time; for no man does or can desire to be happy more at one time than at another, because he desires it always in the highest degree possible. It is true, his love, as to particular objects, may increase or decrease, according to the various apprehensions he has as to their excellencies; but then, like motion in the universe, or water in the sea, what it loses in one part it gains in another; so that in the whole it remains alike, and the same. Now, this amorous principle, which every man receives with his soul, and which is breathed into him with the breath of life, must necessarily have an object about which it may exercise itself,

there being no such thing in love (if in nature) as an element of self-sufficient fire; for, though we may easily and truly frame an abstract notion of love, or desire in general, yet, if we respect its real existence, we shall as soon find first matter without form, as love without a particular object: and as it is necessary to the very being of love, that it have an object, so is it to our content and happiness that it be a proportionate and satisfying one; for otherwise that passion which was intended as an instrument of happiness, will prove an affliction and torment to us. Now, there is but one such object to be found, and that is God; we must needs, therefore, be miserable in our love, unless God be the object of it. But neither is our happiness sufficiently secure by making God the object of our love, unless we can centre our whole affections on him, and (in the strictest sense of the phrase) love him with all our heart, and with all our soul: for, otherwise, whatever portion of our love does not run in this channel, must necessarily fix upon disproportionate and unsatisfying objects; and consequently be an instrument of discontent to us. It is necessary, therefore, to the completing our happiness, that the object should

engross all our affections to itself, which only can satisfy them; and that our minds should have the same habitude to God, that the eye has to light. Now, as the eye does not only love light above all other things, but delights in no other thing, I confess such an absolute and entire dedication of our love to God is not always practicable in this life; it is the privilege and happiness of those confirmed spirits, who are so swallowed up in the comprehensions of eternity, and so perpetually ravished with the glories of the divine beauty, that they have not the power to turn aside to any other object. But, though this superlative excellency of divine love be not attainable on this side of the thick darkness, it being the proper effect of open vision, and not of contemplation: yet, however, by the help of this latter, we may arrive to many degrees of it; and the more entire and undivided our love is to God, the fewer disappointments and dissatisfactions we shall meet with in the world*.”

* Norris's Miscellany, p. 103.—The sentiments expressed in this extract are too Platonic to be practicable; they are in agreement, however, with the character of this writer, and who is generally considered as having been a Platonist. As the subject affords an opportunity for my availing myself

I say not that this admirable writer has borrowed the notions expressed in the latter

of notions which, as being more philosophical, are more to the purpose of the text, I gladly make use of it, and transcribe from the author of these notions as follows:—"The love of God, with its associates, gratitude, confidence, and resignation, is generated by the contemplation of his bounty and benignity to us, and to all his creatures, as these appear from the view of the natural world, the declarations of the Scriptures, or a man's own observation and experience in respect of the events of life. It is supported and much increased by the consciousness of upright intentions and sincere endeavours, with the consequent hope of a future reward, and by prayer; inasmuch as this (i. e. prayer) gives a reality and force to all the secondary ideas before spoken of. Frequent conversation with devout persons, and frequent reading of devout books, have great efficacy likewise, from the infectiousness of our tempers and dispositions. The contemplation of the rest of the divine attributes, his omnipotence, omniscience, eternity, ubiquity, &c. have also a tendency to support and augment the love of God, when this is so far advanced as to be superior to the fear of him; till that time, these wonderful attributes enhance the fear of God so much, as to check the rise and growth of the love of him for a time. Even the fear itself contributes to the generation and augmentation of the love in an eminent degree, and in a manner analogous to the production of other pleasures from pains: and indeed it seems, that, notwithstanding the varieties of the ways above mentioned, in which the love of God is generated, and the consequent variety of the intellectual aggregates and secondary ideas, there must be so great a resemblance amongst them, that they cannot but languish by frequent recurrency, till such time as ideas of an opposite nature, by intervening at certain seasons, give them new life.—The love of God, as our author further observes, is, according to this theory, evi-

part of the above extract from St. Austin; there nevertheless is so remarkable a coincidence of sentiments in what has been said on the above subject by both, that I with much pleasure transcribe from this ancient father as follows: — “ Quando (anima) te (Deum) habet, plenum est desiderium ejus: et jam nihil aliud quod desideretur exterius restat. Dum autem aliquid exterius desiderat, manifestum est quod te non habet interius: quo habitu, nihil est quod ultra desideret. Cum enim sis summum et omne bonum, non habet quod desideret amplius, sed possidet te omne bonum. Quod si non

dently deduced in part from interested motives directly, viz. from the hopes of a future reward; and those motives to it, or sources of it, in which direct explicit self-interest does not appear, may yet be analyzed up to it ultimately. However, after all the several sources of the love of God have coalesced together, this affection becomes as disinterested as any other; as the pleasure we take in any natural or artificial beauty, in the esteem of others, or even in sensual gratifications. It appears also, that this pure disinterested love of God may, by the concurrence of a sufficient number of sufficiently strong associations, arise to such an height, as to prevail over any of the other desires, interested or disinterested: for all, except the sensual ones, are of a factitious nature, as well as the love of God; and the sensual ones are, in our progress through life, overpowered by them in all their respective turns.”— HARTLEY'S Theory of the human Mind (by PRIESTLEY), p. 323.

desiderat omne bonum, restat, ut desideret aliquid quod non est omne bonum, ergo nec summum bonum: ergo nec Deum, sed potius creaturam. Cum autem creaturam desiderat, continuam famem habet; quia licet quid consideret de creaturis adipiscatur, vacua tamen remanet: quia nihil est quod eam impleat, nisi tu, ad cujus imaginem est creata. Imples autem tu eos qui nihil aliud desiderant præter te; et facis eos dignos te, sanctos, beatos, immaculatos, et amicos Dei, qui omnia reputant, ut stercora, ut lucri faciant te solum. Hæc est enim beatitudo, &c. &c.*”

Now, if the sentiments which are contained in the former of these extracts are inconsistent with Bishop Horsley's notions, and those which I have adopted are conformable to those which are contained in this extract, I shall have the authority of this writer at least for opposing my notions to those of the learned bishop. As it is necessary, however, that I should show that there is no material difference between Mr. Norris's notions and those which have been expressed

* Soliloquia, cap. 30.

in former sections of this discourse, I observe as follows:—Our author supposes the perfection of our being to be the end for which the passion of love is a principle implanted in our nature; and which, so far as it implies an imperfection previously to have subsisted, is in agreement with the doctrine which it is the purpose in part of this discourse to establish. Now, it would evidently be in vain that love should be a principle implanted in the nature of any being, except as it might have an outgoing; and this outgoing it will have, if, as our author supposes, a man, by reason of this principle, is continually aspiring to something more excellent than himself, and by which he can mean God only: seeing, however, our happiness, as our author supposes, will depend on these objects being proportionate to the love or desire with which it is sought; so he rightly concludes, that in order for this desire to be satisfied, God must be the object*.

* The learned Mr. Boyle, who, in his admirable treatise on Seraphic Love, has expressed sentiments similar to those of our author, supposes the love or desire which we have towards God to be something similar to that which the magnetic needle shows in its tendency to the north pole. As there is something curious, however, in his thoughts on this subject,

Now, it may have been by accident, it nevertheless seems rather to have been intentionally, that the author of *Philosophical Principles of Religion**, published a very few years only after Mr. Norris wrote, expresses himself on this subject as follows:—"There is in all intellectual beings a restless appetite or desire of happiness: from the moment of their being, through all the ages of eternity, all their labour and travail is for this purpose; nor are they devoid of it, either immediately in the end, or mediately in the means, for one instant of time, in their endless duration. This," as our author adds, "is the necessary effect of the faculty of desire, namely,

I transcribe from this work of his as follows:—"The trembling restlessness of the needle in any but the north point of the compass, proceeds from, and manifests its inclination to the pole; its passion for which both its wavering and its rest bear witness to. The unsatisfiedness which transitory fruitions that men deplore as the unhappiness of their nature, is indeed the privilege of it; as it is the prerogative of men not to care for, or be capable of being pleased with such fond toys as children doat upon, and make the sole objects of their desires and joys; and by this we may in some degree imagine the unimaginable suavity that the fixing our love on God is able to bless the soul with; insomuch, that the decreed discontentedness of all other goods is richly repaired, in its being but an aptness to prove a rise to our love's settling there." P. 52.

* Dr. Chelyne.

that no object less than infinite can satisfy it: for, let it be supposed to have come to the possession of any object less than infinite, it is plain it can desire yet a greater and greater, without bounds or limits; i. e. the desire itself is infinite in its capacity; its acts are instantaneous, and its enjoyments, or disappointments, for the time, swallow up the acts of all the other faculties; and therefore it is the most quick and sensible; it sets all the powers of the whole composition on action to obtain its ends, and therefore it is the most active, and upon all these accounts, the most cardinal faculty of the mind: choosing or refusing, i. e. willing, is but the desire applied to a particular object; the affections are but the complexions of the desire applied to this particular object; and therefore are both but particular modifications of the desire." Again—"As the desire is infinite, when it is filled and satisfied with its proper object, it must be infinitely happy. The supreme and uncreated infinite Being, the only proper object (since the supreme infinite is one), it must be the congruous object; and so, the faculty being infinite, the object infinite, and they infinitely congruous to one another, the desire, in the pos-

session or enjoyment of this object, must of necessity be infinitely happy*.” Such is the coincidence of sentiments between this writer and Mr. Norris; and which is a more remarkable one than that which I have mentioned, and which, as I have shown, there is between Mr. Norris and St. Austin: whilst the different extracts which I have made from the works of both these writers, will, as I conceive, alike answer my purpose in making them.

There are, however, some remarks which Dr. Cheyne has made, and which follow those which I have above transcribed, and which, from an analogical reasoning which he makes use of, are peculiarly calculated to confirm the moral notions which have been expressed in former sections of this discourse. Our author supposes, “that there is a principle of action in all intelligent beings, analogous to that of attraction in the material system; that all bodies, by reason of this principle of action, mutually draw one another to themselves: whilst they are all alike

* Philosophical Principles of Religion, part ii. prop. xv. For the like sentiments, see his *Conject. on Nat. Analogy*, § 7.

drawn to one common centre; and that so it is in spiritual matters." Now, when to this our author adds, "that the end for which God draws men is, the making them as happy as their different capacities will admit of," I cannot object to these notions, but lament only that these gracious ends are not oftener answered.

Our author, in continuation of the above sentiments, says, that "the Author of our being, who loves all his creatures better than they can love themselves, uses all motives that are honest, laudable, and just, to gain them; he knows perfectly the frame and original complexion of all his creatures, and that, in their lapsed state, they must ascend to perfection by steps and degrees; and, consequently, some are to be wrought upon by one motive, others by another, and that generally the first steps are mounted by the force of *the terrors of the Lord*, before *the love of God is shed in their heart*; that there are *babes in Christ*, as well as grown and perfect men; and their food (or motives of charity) must be as their years and strength. But our Saviour tells us, we must *love the Lord our God with all our heart, with all our*

soul, with all our strength, and with all our mind; and if so, we shall have very little love left behind for ourselves; and St. John tells us, that perfect love casteth out fear, and consequently hope, i. e. rewards and punishments.* In these last-mentioned notions, I confess, I agree not with our author. Moses, we are told, refused to be called the son of Pharaoh's daughter (i. e. he refused the splendour and delights of a court), choosing rather to suffer affliction with the people of God, than to enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season; for that he had respect to the recompense of reward †. Now, whether this

* Philosophical Principles of Religion, p. 94.

† "They understand not the nature of the reward promised to us in the Gospel, who think that the intention of the reward, in order to our progress in holiness and virtue, is acting upon mercenary principles: for glory, blessedness, and felicity, are not other things from piety and holiness, but the consummation and perfection of that divine nature whose efformation is begun in this life. Grace and holiness is but happiness wrapped up and closed, and glory is nothing but holiness explicated and unfolded to its due latitude and dimensions. Piety is heaven masked with a cloud of flesh, and begirt with sorrow; and heaven is virtue shining in its native brightness. And that aethereal and paradisaical body with which all believers shall be arrayed through the gracious bounty of the Lord Jesus at the resurrection of the just, is the necessary appendage of our felicity, and by its easy and obsequious motions, will raise in the exalted powers of the soul, the high-

reward were an earthly or a heavenly one, this example equally contradicts the above notions: it must, however, have been the latter; for, if the land of Canaan was the reward or recompense which Moses had an eye to, he was disappointed, having never set his foot on that land. A reward, in short, must necessarily be a motive of obedience to God in this life, even as we seek a good which is of another; and a pure and disinterested love may, as we have faith, be a principle of obedience to God, although not without the hope of a reward*; for, a future reward is the very ground of those virtues which distinguish the morality of the Gospel from all other moral systems, and without the hope of a reward those virtues, such as meekness, patience, the bearing of injuries, &c. could not be exercised.

Now, a reward, considered in itself, and exclusively of any service which has been per-

est sense of love and joy, and delightful enravishments of spirit."—CUDWORTH'S *God's Love vindicated*, p. 144.

* The hope of a future reward, in contradiction to the notions of Dr. Cheyne, is by Dr. Hartley considered as being consistent with a pure and disinterested love; and as may be seen in an extract from his *Theory*, contained in n *, p. 167, of this section.

formed, and which is rewardable, consists in some pleasure or delight, either sensible or intellectual, which cannot reasonably be expected in future, but as it will be anticipated and be experienced in some measure at the present time; and the measure or degree in which this pleasure or delight, which is at present experienced, will always be in proportion to the certainty with which *that* which is future is expected: for instance, when we pray to God for some blessing, this blessing, of whatever kind it may be, will be prayed for only, because of the happiness which we conceive will arise from the possession of it; I accordingly say, that our petitions, of whatever kind they may be, will (if we pray in faith) in some measure be granted at the very time of our making them: for, whatever the thing which we pray for may be, our future happiness, as we pray in faith, will (unconscious as we may be thereof) be the ultimate end of our prayer; and the happiness which we shall experience at the time of our praying, will not only be an anticipation of that happiness which constitutes the end of all prayer to God, but will be in proportion to the strength of our faith, and

the fervency of our devotion *. The incense of prayers and praises continually ascending to the throne of grace, we know from the

* The happiness which is spoken of in the text, is supposed to depend on the strength of our faith, and to arise from the fervency of our devotion: as neither the strength of our faith, however, nor the fervency of our devotion, are at all times the same, but may be greater at one time than they are at another, the happiness or gladness of heart which has been mentioned, will of course be greater at one time than it is at another: if, however, there be, and as I conceive there is, a physical reason to be given for this, no one will have just cause of being disheartened if, at any time, his devotions should be colder than usual, nor have reason to suppose himself deserted of the divine Spirit. It is well known, and every one will have experienced it, that in general we are in better spirits when we are well, than when we are sick; the fervency of our devotion will of course be in proportion to the degree of health we enjoy. Now, such is the dependence of the state of the mind on that of the body, as that the spirits of a man can at no time be so low and depressed by sickness, or any other cause, as that they may not be raised by art, for instance, by wine, opium, or tobacco; of course, the fervency of our devotion, and the happiness which will accompany it, will be greater, as a recourse shall have been had to any of these artificial means, and as any one that shall have recourse to this expedient will find: an expedient which will be an innocent one, if used with moderation, and not to any injury of the constitution. If a man be depressed in his mind from any consciousness of sin, let him confess, and be sorry for, his sins, and implore the divine mercy; but if from any natural cause, let him not scruple to use any such means as God may, for any thing that he knows to the contrary, have intended as an antidote to the poison.

Scriptures to be pleasing to God; and, in proportion as we feel a pleasure in offering them, our souls will be in unison with him. But this will in some measure be the case as we do good; i. e. as we act from a principle of love towards our fellow-creatures; a happiness will be experienced as we perform acts of benevolence, which will be the same in kind, although not perhaps in degree, as when we offer up our prayers, our praises, and our thanksgivings, to God; and of this happiness I say, that it will be an anticipation of that which we shall experience in heaven, and which, as I have said, will be the reward of the good which we shall have done on earth.

Of the satisfaction which arises from the performance of virtuous (i. e. benevolent) actions, it has been observed by a learned prelate, "that it is a good spur and incitement to many noble actions here, and will be part of the crown and reward of them hereafter*:" as this shall be supposed, the strength of the moral capacity will not so much depend on its being exercised, as on the happiness with

* King's Orig. of Evil, vol. ii. n. 70, p. 414.

which the exercise of it has been attended at some former time; and thus an increase of moral capacity will (or at least may) go hand in hand with an increase of happiness, in the case of any one so long as he shall be an inhabitant of this earth. Seeing, however, there will be no room (as in a former part of this section has been supposed) for the exercise of moral virtue in a future state; and that the happiness which will be enjoyed in a future life will depend on such virtuous attainments as shall have been made in this life; it will follow, that the measure of the moral capacity, as any one shall depart this life, will be the measure of his happiness in a future life. It is by divines supposed, that “a happiness may arise in a future life from the remembrance of virtuous actions performed in this; and this happiness will (as they likewise suppose) constitute, in no small degree, *that* which the saints will hereafter enjoy; although (as they further suppose) a far greater degree of happiness will be experienced by them from the reflection of their having escaped hell, and of their being in the possession of a heavenly state (not by virtue of any thing which they have done, but) by the free mercy and goodness of

God, and by the death of his Son. These (says the writer from whom I am now quoting) are thoughts which must create a new heaven, as it were, in heaven itself; I mean (says our author) they will enlarge our souls to the utmost capacity of our natures, and fill and actuate them with such divine ardours of love, as it would, as it will seem to us, have been impossible should have been raised in us, had we been necessarily kept from all sin*.”

Having mentioned the happiness which the saints will enjoy in a state of glory, I shall take occasion from hence to make some observations on this subject, which, although they have been suggested to my mind by what has fallen from the pen of a learned commentator †, nevertheless do not wholly coincide with his notions. With these observations I shall conclude this section, and the discourse at the same time of which it is a part. The learned writer, on the ground of the text, *There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory*

* Jenkin, vol. ii. ch. xii. p. 244. See also King's Origin, &c. vol. ii. subject vii.

† Dr. Adam Clarke.

*of the stars**, very rightly concludes, “that all glorified spirits will not have the same degree of glory.” When, however, he says “that the glory of each saint will depend on the quantum of mind and the quantum of grace which God will have given him †,” I do not, I confess, agree with him: for, admitting that a difference between the saints hereafter will arise by reason of a greater quantum of mind (as our author expresses himself) which some, than what others will have; seeing, however, grace, in whatever degree it is given, is not given to make men wise, but to make them good; grace will be wholly out of the case as the glory of the saints hereafter is in question; it will be otherwise, however, as their happiness is in question.

Now, I suppose, in agreement with the system which I have adopted, that happiness is so intimately connected with goodness, or virtue, that a man cannot be good, or virtuous, and not be happy; and from hence it will follow, that the quantum of happiness

* 1 Cor. xv. 41.

† See Remarks at the end of the above chapter.

(to use the language of the above writer) will, in the case of any one, be as the quantum of his goodness. Seeing, however, it happens, from various causes, that some depart this life with having done less good than what will have been the case with others (and this indeed is supposed, when, in the Scriptures, it is said, that each man will be rewarded in heaven according to the works which he will have done on earth), it may reasonably be supposed, that there will be a difference between the saints hereafter in point of happiness, as well as in point of glory *. In regard, however, some, as I have

* The future happiness of the righteous is spoken of in the Gospel under the name of a reward; and the future misery of the wicked under the name of punishment: and as the rewards of the righteous hereafter will be in proportion to the good which they shall have done in this life, and as is supposed in our text, there is reason to suppose that the punishment of the wicked hereafter will be in proportion to the evil which they will have done in this life; and indeed the Gospel says as much; for it says, *The servant which knew his lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes; but he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes.* Luke, xii. 47, 48. It thus appears, that rewards and punishments hereafter will be in proportion to the good or evil which men will have done here; with respect, however, to the eternity of these rewards and punishments, as from the same Gospel we likewise learn, there will be no

said, will have done more good than others, I say of these, that whether they shall have done much or little good, it will eventually be true, that they will alike have done as much good as there was any possibility of

difference between these men; he that has done good, how little soever that good may have been, will be eternally rewarded; and he that has done evil, how little soever that evil may have been, will be eternally punished. Now, as there is no man so good, as that he will not have done evil, i. e. will not be conscious of his having committed some sin, it will be necessary, as he would not be punished for that sin hereafter, that he should repent of it; for otherwise, the good which he has done will be forgotten of God, and it will be the same thing as if he had done no good at all. Now, seeing the punishment of a man hereafter cannot be so light, as that it will approach to the nature of a reward; for these are contraries, and between contraries there is no medium; so cannot the condition of a man supposed to be in hell, approach to the condition of a man supposed to be in heaven; and so much is expressed in the parable of Dives and Lazarus, where it is said by the former, *there is a great gulf fixed between us, &c.* The reason why the different conditions which have been mentioned cannot approach each other, as we shall judge of this matter by the light of Revelation, is this:—If there is no man so good as that he will not have done evil, there is no man that will hereafter be in heaven, who will not have repented of the evil he has done on earth. But if he has repented of the evil he hath done, he will have been born again; and in which case he will be a different man from what he was previously to his repentance. To say, then, that his condition might approach that of one who has not repented, would be to deny that a man who has repented is not the same man he was before he repented.

their doing. If the happiness, then, of those who have done little good only, will be less than that of those who have done much good, it nevertheless will be as great as their capacity will admit of: for, if happiness arises from doing good, the capacity of happiness * in the case of the saints in heaven will eventually have been bounded by the good which they will have done on earth; but if so, the happiness of the saints in heaven will, in the case of each saint, be as great as their capacity of happiness will admit of. Although then, as I have said, a saint supposed to be in heaven, may believe that some of his brother-saints enjoy a greater degree of happiness than he does, he nevertheless cannot know this; for, if he himself enjoys as great a

* It has been supposed by a learned divine (Brooke) in a discourse on this subject, that the happiness of the saints hereafter will arise from the glory which will be given them; and he accordingly says, that he that hath the least glory there, shall have enough to make him unspeakably and inconceivably happy. Seeing, however, he further says, every vessel of glory shall be full, but some shall have more of it than others, as being more capacitated to receive it, and that the glory of each saint will be a reward proportioned to his works done here on earth, there will be no material difference between what is here said, and what is expressed in our text; and if so, I shall have the support of this writer's opinion in favour of my own against Dr. Clarke's notion.

degree of happiness as his capacity will admit of, it would evidently be a contradiction to say, that he might have a conception of a greater happiness; and what we can have no conception of, we cannot know; the truth of which proposition is witnessed to us by the following observation of Mr. Norris:—"Heaven were not heaven, if we knew what it is." Although, then, there will be a difference between the saints hereafter in point of happiness, if they nevertheless cannot know this, it will be the same thing as if there was no such difference. Now, I say the same; as with the aforesaid writer we shall suppose, that the glory of each glorified saint will depend on the quantum of mind which God will have given him, I say, that although a saint may have reason to believe another saint to have a better understanding than himself, it nevertheless would amount to a contradiction to say that he might know this; for, to know it, his understanding must be equal to that of the other saint. If one glorified saint then cannot know that another has a greater quantum of mind than another, it will be the same thing as if there was no such inequality between them either in point of knowledge, or in point of happi-

ness: for, by the same rule that a glorified saint cannot know that another has more knowledge, he cannot know that such other saint is happier than himself; and therefore there can be no room, in his case, for either envy or discontent, and which might occasion a diminution of happiness; and so says a pious writer: he says, in agreement with what I have supposed, that “if, in a future state of glory, every vessel will have its capacity enlarged, and every vessel completely filled, and feel itself for ever full, and for ever happy,” and which he supposes will be the case, “there will not be found the shadow of envy amongst them*.”

To conclude.—The glory of the saints hereafter, it must be confessed, will be different; for some, as the Apostle tells us, will have more glory than others. I nevertheless, in confirmation of the above notions, suppose, that the glory which the lowest of the saints will hereafter have, will not less truly be, what the Apostle emphatically calls *an eternal weight of glory*, than that which the highest of them will have.

* Watts's Essays, p. 265.

The attention which in this section has been paid to the opinions of Dr. Cheyne has arisen, not so much from their agreement with those of Mr. Norris, as from the principal subject of this discourse having been suggested to me by him; and from my conceiving, as in the Preface has been observed, that much more may be said thereon, than what has been said either by him or by Bishop Butler. As various important observations, however, may be made on the subject of this last section, which have been suggested to my mind from what has fallen from the pens of other writers, it is my intention to resume the subject in the Second Part of this Discourse.

THE END OF PART I.

PART II.



SECTION I.

IN the concluding part of my Preface to this Discourse, it will appear to have been my intention, in this second part thereof, to take into consideration a notion which Dr. Cheyne, in his Philosophical Conjectures, has adopted with respect to various purgative states, through which, as he supposes, men will pass, as they shall have departed this life, previously, and in order to *that* which will be permanent, and endure for ever: a notion which, as he contends, is not without some support in divine revelation.

That the soul, as it shall have quitted its earthly mansion, will pass into an intermediate state, is a notion which has been adopted by all that believe in its immortality; but the passing of a man (a being consisting of a body united to a soul) into an intermediate state, is a notion which, if not peculiar to our author, has nevertheless been adopted by him, and will accordingly be more

particularly explained, as well as the purpose for which men, according to our author, will pass through these intermediate states, be shown in the course of this section. As this notion of our author's should be admitted, it would have this at least to recommend it to our adoption, namely, that it would render vain the various vague conjectures which have been made with respect to the soul's separate state.

Having premised thus much on the subject of various intermediate states through which all men, as our author supposes, will pass previously to their arriving at a state which will endure for ever, the reason why this will be so, in the opinion of our author, might very properly here be given; but that it cannot well, so well at least, be understood, till the whole of our author's system shall be explained, the present, of course, becomes a fit opportunity for my endeavouring to do so; I accordingly observe as follows:—

The great number of stars which are visible, and the still greater number that are invisible, except with the help of glasses, are

not uncommonly supposed by philosophers to be inhabited; our author, however, supposes of these, of that part of them at least which are not inhabited by angelical beings (for he supposes them to serve as habitations for these heavenly hierarchies, as he calls them), that they will be places of abode, not only for men, but for angels, as they shall be supposed to pass through the aforesaid intermediate state. Having said thus much on the subject of these states, I proceed to the purpose which, according to our author, will be answered thereby, and which is as follows:—

By way of introduction to his notion of the necessity of the aforesaid states being passed through in the case of men, our author observes, that as a great part of the misery which men experience is owing to their own imprudence, whilst *that* to which all men are subject is owing to the sin of Adam; he further observes, that the natural consequence of a man's having suffered through his own fault, is his abstaining for the future from doing those things which have been the cause of his sufferings. This reasoning of our author's, as it shall be con-

sidered unconnectedly with his system, would be of no great consequence: connectedly however therewith, it may be found to be well calculated to establish it; for his notion is, that all pain and suffering are of a purging and purifying nature, and this may be seen to have been so, in some measure, in the case which has been mentioned; for this man is supposed to have suffered from something which he has done, but which he ought not to have done; but if the effect has been his never doing the like again (for this must be supposed), he will have been purged of the sin of which he will have been guilty*. Now,

* This would not be true upon principles of religion: for religion (the Christian religion at least) teaches, that all such sins as are committed in this life, will, if not repented of, be punished in a future life; and whether we are punished for our sins, or purged of the foulness contracted by them, it amounts to the same thing. Our author's reasoning, however, proceeds upon principles of philosophy, and as such I see no fault in it; but neither do I see any fault in his notion of various states to be passed through by men hereafter, considered as a philosophical conjecture; nor indeed should I object to the purgatory of the church of Rome (and which is of near akin to our author's notion of various states to be passed through hereafter), considered as a philosophical conjecture. But the church of Rome considers this doctrine as being grounded in the Scriptures. Now the Scriptures speak of no punishment, but that which will take place after the general judgment; and that punishment will be only for sins that will

as this reasoning shall be supposed to apply to the sins in general which men commit, and on account of which they have suffered in this life, in mind as well as body, but of which they shall have repented, our author's further notion is (i. e. as we should judge from human reason), that it cannot stand with the divine justice that they should be punished in another life. These notions of our author proceed, as I have said, on natural principles; they nevertheless may be true on divine principles, he supposes them however to be not inconsistent with those that are divine.

If the sacrifice which Christ made be available for the blotting out of original sin, and as by divines is generally supposed, his sufferings will have had the effect for which our author contends; i. e. they will have purged the human nature of that foulness and sinfulness which it contracted by the sin of Adam. Seeing, however, men cannot, in their individual capacity, be conscious of the sin of Adam, and may, as they shall have

have been unrepented of in this life; for, as to all other sins, they will have been done away by Christ's death and sufferings, but which the church of Rome, by the doctrine of purgatory, virtually denies.

arrived at an age to distinguish between good and evil, commit sins of which they will be conscious, it will follow, that except as their own sufferings may be available for the blotting out of these personal sins, in like manner as the sufferings of Christ have been supposed to be for the blotting out the sin of their nature, it will be the same thing with respect to them, considered as individuals, as if Christ had not suffered at all. Christ's sufferings, it is true, will have been the efficient cause of these sins of theirs being blotted out; seeing, however, this will not have been without their sufferings, these sufferings of theirs will have been the *causa sine qua non* of their sins being blotted out.

Having thus given an account of our author's system, so far as, by a careful perusal of his book, I have been able to comprehend it; for, it is not given in a connected manner, but is intermixed with other subjects, which, although not foreign to his principal subject, nevertheless make a clear account of his chief subject very difficult; I proceed to the consideration of a doctrine which our author has had principally in view in the

aforesaid work, *that*, namely, of a general redemption.

This notion, I find, obtained not long after our Saviour's time; for, it was adopted by Origen, as well as by some of the early Fathers; and has likewise, in modern times, been adopted by Dr. Burnet, by Mr. Whiston, and of late by a Mr. Winchester, under the title of a general restoration.

This doctrine, however, has, as in my preface has been mentioned, been adopted secretly, although not avowedly, by a man of learning, who, in the first part of my Discourse has been mentioned*, not as having himself published any thing on this subject, but as having communicated his thoughts thereon to a learned writer †, and who has accordingly transcribed them without giving any opinion of his own upon them; but leaving it to those who may read them to think, every one as he pleases, about them. These thoughts are as follows:

* Section V.

† Dr. Gregory.

“ From what is known by sensible experiment of the world we live in, it is reasonable to infer, that in space there must be contained a multitude of similar worlds, so great, that, with respect to our limited faculties, it may be termed infinite. We may conclude upon similar grounds, that in each of these worlds there exists a race of animals endued with reason. Now, all creatures must necessarily come short of the perfection of their Creator; they are, therefore, fallible, and, being fallible, must fall, unless their defects are supplied by the aid of a nature more perfect than their own. Those who stray into a road leading away from the object at which they should arrive, must continually increase their distance; the natural consequence of falling is, therefore, continual deterioration. There is only one species of rational creatures which God has permitted to exist within the scope of our observation; we know that they have fallen, and we also know that it has pleased God, in his infinite goodness, to prepare for them a way of salvation, and to restore them by his power. Since all the counsels of God are perfect, and therefore uniform, eternal, and immutable,

we may always conclude, with tolerable safety, from what we know in one instance to have been the law of his working, that such it has been, and will be in every similar instance. We may therefore assume as certain, that there is a way of salvation for each of the mighty multitude of rational species which exist in space and eternity, and that the provision for their restoration, as far as their case corresponds with ours, resembles that which has been made for us. Now, where the cases are the same, the same means will have been pursued. But those who take what by many is regarded as the narrowest view of the subject, and consider the suffering of Christ as a price paid to cancel guilt, and to redeem mankind, need not surely be under any embarrassment in admitting that a similar sacrifice may have been offered whenever a similar occasion has occurred. Christ will still have laid down his life for men; that one oblation will have completed their redemption, and it is not in the least more derogatory from the infinite dignity and the infinite beatitude which we attribute to him, that he should have suffered a million of times, than that he should have suffered once." Our author proceeds to show, that although

we may collect something with respect to the attributes of God from his works, and more from revelation, we nevertheless are wholly ignorant of his substance. As this, however, is not material to the elucidation of our author's notions with respect to a general redemption, I content myself with having barely mentioned the above circumstance, and proceed to the concluding part of his discourse.

“ It is sufficient that we know that we are created in a rational and fallible nature ; that without the continual support of God we must fall ; that by leaning on our own powers and our own understanding, we all have fallen ; that the consequences of the fall must be perpetual deterioration ; that we cannot be restored but by the grace and power of God ; that it hath pleased God in his mercy and goodness, through his wisdom, and by his power, to decree that he will pardon and restore the penitent and the faithful, through the mediation of Jesus Christ, and the operation of the Holy Spirit ; and to give us by the incarnation, death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ, sensible evidence of this his merciful dispensation, and an example of

the obedience he requires ; promising that he will give, by the intercession, and for the merit of his Son Jesus Christ, his holy Spirit to those who turn to him with all their hearts ; and lead them finally to peace and salvation, of which, by any other means, they must have despaired. God has been pleased to reveal to us fully the plan of salvation ; and this (with regard to such subjects) is not only all that it concerns us to know, but probably all that our nature is capable of comprehending *.”

Among the different modern writers who have adopted the notion of a general redemption, or restoration, and with whose works I have been acquainted, I have mentioned a Mr. Winchester as being one : various objections, however, to his notions occurred to me in the course of my reading his book ; and as these will equally apply to the like notions, as they have been adopted by other writers, it will be suitable only to the purpose and plan of the present section, to propose them to the consideration of those who may be inclined to adopt the like no-

* Gregory's Letters, vol. i. p. 300.

tions; and of the number of these, as I understand, are the sect called Anabaptists. It is observed by our author, that of "the great number of heathens that die without their having been favoured with the light of the Gospel; the many that die in a state of innocence, together with the instances of idiots, and persons born deaf; all convince me more than any other logical arguments, that God has many ways of instructing and redeeming his creatures in another state*." I mention this not as being objectionable, but merely as a preliminary observation; it is foreign indeed to the subject of a general redemption, which supposes the fate of those whom I have above mentioned to have been determined; its supposing, however, that they who will rise unto death, will not rise unto death eternal, as the words of Scripture, literally understood, import, is a notion which, by divines in general, is considered as being not only objec-

* "Untried virtue," says a learned divine, "is the subject of love, esteem, and admiration, rather than of reward" (Sumner's Records of Creation, p. 97); and again, "A virtue which has proved itself to be victorious (after trial), is more properly the subject of reward, than untried innocence, which has never been exposed to danger" (p. 246). These observations seem to be in favour, not only of Mr. Winchester's, but of Dr. Cheyne's notions.

tionable, but unscriptural; and on this subject I observe as follows:—As death was destroyed by Christ's having voluntarily suffered death, all men will rise again; but whether the rising again of men in particular will be unto life and happiness, or unto death and misery, the Scriptures tell us, will depend on the things which they shall have done in this life. Now, if it would be to no good purpose that any man in particular should rise again, except as his rising again should be to life and happiness; for otherwise, better would it be for that man that he had never been born^{ly}, as this shall be supposed, it will be evident, that the redemption spoken of by our author, can relate only to those whose rising again will be to death and misery, i. e. to the wicked: for, seeing their rising again in common with all men, will be a proof that they, in common with all men, have been redeemed from death, this cannot be the redemption contended for by our author; and seeing the good will stand in need of no other redemption than *that* which Christ purchased for them, i. e. a redemption from the grave, in order that their rising again should be to life and happiness, Christ must die a second time, in order that they

whose evil deeds have consigned them to everlasting misery, should finally, and after their having suffered for any length of time short of eternity, enjoy everlasting happiness; for, if their length of suffering might compensate for the wickedness which they have committed on earth, then could not Christ be the author of that life and happiness to which these are supposed finally to attain.

A second objection, on the supposition of the wicked being finally saved, will be grounded on the first; and it consists in this, namely, that their being saved will be without their having contracted any such virtuous habit, as is necessary in order for their being qualified for, or indeed even capable of experiencing the happiness of a future state. Now we know that a habit of vice may be counteracted by a habit of virtue; a habit of virtue however, which has been preceded by a habit of vice, cannot be begun, except as there shall have been a conversion of the heart; and the conversion of the heart supposes repentance on account of those sins which a man has committed. This, however, cannot be the case with the men in question, i. e. with the wicked; for, as they are supposed to have been punished for their sins, no such

habit of virtue can be begun with them as is grounded on repentance; and on what other ground it can be begun I am at a loss to know: an objection starts, so far the same as this which I have now mentioned, as that the like reasoning which our author makes use of, might apply to this of mine, equally as to that which our author's friend in this dialogue between them; for he says that it is only as there shall be supposed to be two eternal principles, viz. a good and a bad one, that his friend's objection and reasoning thereon, can hold good. Now, our author might have known that this *Manichean* system is not necessary in order for our knowing that a good and an evil principle may obtain in a man at one and the same time: for St. Paul tells us, that in the case of every man, *the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and these, he says, are contrary the one to the other;* and this, by the way, is the case, when a vicious habit is counteracted by a virtuous one. A vicious habit, it is true, may not have been effectually counteracted in a man by a virtuous one, or even be at all counteracted to this man's knowledge, as no man, however, wilfully does evil, but as his conscience will witness

against him; a good principle will therefore obtain in this man, although it will be for no other purpose than that of tormenting him that this will be the case.

It was in the course of my reading his first dialogue, that the above-mentioned objections occurred to me; I was then ignorant of any thing that might be said in any of the following dialogues, which might be calculated to obviate any of these objections. I found however, on my reading his third dialogue, that he had been aware of some such objection as my last has been; for, upon the supposition that God will finally make all his intelligent creatures happy, he says, and upon the authority of various texts of Scripture endeavours to support the assertion, “that God will make them all his subjects, by destroying their sins, and making them holy in a way perfectly consistent with all his perfections and attributes, without doing the least injury to his character, or rendering his moral government weak, or making any of his words void, whether threatenings or promises, or in the least setting aside the sanctions of his law or gospel, or a future state of rewards and punishments, without derogation at all from the glory of

the Mediator, but rather exalting it to the highest possible pitch." — (P. 99.) Now, how God could destroy the sins of any man I am at loss to know; for, if a man has sinned, it will be always true that he has sinned. God may blot the sins of men out of his remembrance; he cannot however, at least he will not, if the Gospel be true, do this, except they repent, and believe in Christ; but which, exclusive of the objection which has above been mentioned, is wholly inconsistent with the notion of men having been punished for their sins.

Our author, in answer to the objection to his system proposed by his friend to his consideration, says, that sin, being an infinite offence, deserves an infinite punishment; and mentions the case of Jerusalem, *Speak ye comfortably to Jerusalem; and cry unto her that her warfare is accomplished, and that her iniquity is pardoned: for she has received of her Lord's hands trouble for all her sins.* Now, if Jerusalem's sins were pardoned, she was not punished: for her debt was paid by *the Lord*, i. e. by Christ.

To return to our author (Dr. Cheyne): it becomes necessary, as I would farther explain

the notion which he has adopted, to observe, that as it supposes men to be situated as the fallen angels are, so it relates to the wicked among men, and not to the righteous; seeing however, that in the case of the righteous, their being cleansed by the blood of Christ, according to our author, is not sufficient for their going into life; and that, as these must have a righteousness, or holiness, without which no one can see God; so will a like righteousness or holiness be necessary in the case of those who, having been punished, are supposed to have been cleansed of their sinfulness: it is accordingly supposed by our author, and as from the account of his system which, in a former part of this section, has been given, may be seen, that there will be one or more intermediate states through which all men will pass; and that the purpose which will be answered in the case of the wicked (i. e. of those who having been punished, will have been cleansed of their sinfulness) will be their attaining to that righteousness, or holiness, which has been mentioned, but which, in their case, will have been wholly wanting*.

* The notion of various states to be passed through by men departed from this life, and previously to their arriving

Having now, to the best of my abilities, explained the doctrine of a general redemp-

at a state which will be permanent, mentioned in our text to have been adopted by Dr. Cheyne, is, I find, new only in respect of the variety of those states: the notion of an intermediate state, different from the purgatory of the church of Rome, had been adopted by the learned Dr. Cudworth before our author's time, and who writes as follows:—"So far as the light of nature is able to judge, the soul doth not immediately go to heaven, or hell, in their strict significations, upon its separation from the body; but there is some middle state of being between death and the resurrection. By this middle state I mean no such condition of being, as that wherein a man from his impious transactions in this life, shall undergo very sharp torments, the protraction or abbreviation of which depend upon the will and pleasure of mercenary priests, &c." Again, "He that shall consider that the operations of the Spirit of God upon men's hearts, and that their progress in holiness and virtue, are wrought successively by parts, and that men attain to a glorious crown by patient continuance in well doing, &c. must necessarily conclude, either that the infinitely far greater part of men are damned, yea those who have had very few opportunities of doing good in this life, or that there is a time and place of bettering themselves, or (as the author in a farther part of his discourse expresses himself), for the recovery of their lapsed souls." Letter to a Friend, pp. 36 and 38. With all due deference to the opinions of this very learned man, the objection to them, in my mind, exclusively of their being unscriptural, is, that they lead to the doctrine of an universal redemption: for, if those who have made so little progress in a virtuous life, as to be scarcely distinguishable from bad man, will have an opportunity of bettering themselves, as our author calls it, it should seem to be inconsistent with the goodness of God, that bad men should not have some chance of the kind mentioned by our author,

tion, as it has been adopted by our author, as well as by Dr. Burnet, and, long before their time, by Origen, and some of the ancient fathers, I shall give my opinion on this very important subject.

As the doctrine of an universal redemption is inconsistent with that of the eternity of future punishments, and the advocates for this doctrine accordingly suppose, that the punishment of the wicked hereafter, will at some time be at an end, it will be evident, that if by any arguments I may show that the punishment of the wicked hereafter will necessarily be eternal, the doctrine of an universal redemption, or restoration, as by some it is called, cannot stand.

Now, although the main strength of my argument in proof of the eternity of future punishments, lies not in what the Scriptures say on this subject (for they, in various places, so expressly say that these punishments will be eternal, as that the sense of these Scriptures is not to be eluded); I nevertheless say, that except as this doctrine might

for their being saved; the consequence of which would be the salvation of all men.

be supposed to be really contained in the Scriptures, I should not think that it might be established by an argument drawn from any other source. I shall not be contented with such arguments as have been made use of by the advocates for the doctrine of the eternity of future punishments, grounded on sacred authority; but shall, after their example, produce a text of Scripture, which, although it has escaped the notice of any writer that I am acquainted with, nevertheless, in my mind, shows more forcibly, if possible, the truth of this doctrine than any one text which they have made use of.

Saint Paul says, that *Christ must reign until he has put all enemies under his feet**; in which words the Apostle alludes to those of the Psalmist †, *Sit thou on my right hand until I have made thine enemies thy footstool*; which text, although the same in sense as that of St. Paul, is the text I have alluded to. For the better comprehending, however, how any proof arises from this text with respect to the point in question, it is observable, that “the word *until*,” according to a learned

* 1 Cor. xv. 27.

† Ps. cx. i.

divine, “ is inclusive of the time to come, as well as of that which is past: and as it relates to Christ’s kingdom, it shows the everlasting nature of that kingdom *a parte post*, as well as *a parte ante* *.” Our author farther observes on the word *footstool*, “ that it implies a throne; he, then, that sitteth thereon must,” as the learned author rightly observes, “ be a king;” and he adds, “ if Christ, who is this king, will reign for ever, his enemies, who are his footstool, must necessarily continue to be his footstool so long as his kingdom endureth; but which, as hath been said, will be for ever †.”

I might well rest the proof of the doctrine for which I contend on the above scripture; there is another however, which has not, to my knowledge, been made use of by any writer for a like purpose, but which likewise undeniably proves this doctrine. We

* Berriman’s Sermons, vol. i. p. 353.

† This argument of the learned writer’s comes more strongly recommended from its not having been framed by him with any view to the doctrine of a general redemption; no such doctrine having at the time (as by any thing that appears to the contrary) been thought of by him; it therefore is an argument that is free from prejudice.

are told, that *a glory* like unto that which was given to Christ of the Father, will be *given to those that believe*; and that it is by reason of this glory that they will be one with the Father, even as the Father and the Son are one. They that believe then, as they shall be supposed to be in heaven, cannot cease to be one with the Father, any more than the Father and the Son can cease to be one. Now, if a glory like unto that which was given to the Son of the Father, never could have been given to those who, whilst on earth, believed not, and who, of course, never were one with the Father, these never can be one with the Father and the Son in heaven. And if they who, by reason of their unbelief, were the enemies of Christ on earth, they will also continue to be his enemies wherever they shall be; and, as enemies, will to all eternity suffer that punishment to which their wickedness will have consigned them. For the glory which believers will have in heaven, will depend on their having, by reason of their faith, been one with Christ on earth. As they then who never did believe, will not have been one with Christ on earth, they neither will, nor can, be one with him and the Father in heaven.

Having thus, by two very remarkable texts, shown, that an universal redemption is a doctrine that has no ground in Scripture, but, on the contrary, is inconsistent with Scripture, I shall conclude this section with an observation which, although it does not prove the truth of the doctrine for which I contend, nevertheless will, duly considered, be found to come in aid of it.

The necessary imperfection of the most exalted of created intelligences, as compared with the perfection of that Being who created them, has been before mentioned*; and has likewise been noticed by various writers, moral as well as theological; and the following reason for this has been given by a learned prelate who has adopted this notion: —“Created nature implies imperfection in the very terms of its being created: since what is absolutely perfect, is God; either therefore nothing at all must be created, or something imperfect †.” It has not, however, to my knowledge, been conceived by any, as being a subject which is at all connected with *that* of future punishments; it nevertheless consti-

* Part I. Sect. II.

† King's Origin of Evil, vol. ii. p. 380.

tutes the ground of my notions on this important subject, and as in the sequel of this section may be seen.

On this imperfection, the notion of the natural lapsibility of created intelligences, which in the fifth Section of the first Part of this Discourse has been mentioned as having obtained with various eminent writers, is grounded. Man has accordingly, in another section, been mentioned as an example of this natural lapsibility, which is supposed to obtain alike in all intelligent and free beings. Now, the freedom of will with which man was endowed shows, that his actual falling was not necessary; we know, however, what the consequences of his falling were; but what the consequences of his not falling, i. e. of his obedience to the command which God gave him with respect to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, would have been, is (as it shall be considered relatively to man's redemption by Christ) a mystery; it nevertheless is a greater mystery, if I may so say, as it shall be considered relatively to the subject of my present discourse.

As the fall of angels is another example of the natural lapsibility which I have men-

tioned, this fall of theirs may serve to illustrate and confirm the notions which I have adopted; the fall of man, however, as in the sequel will be shown, more fully confirms them. We may know what the case of those angels who, at the great fall of angels, are said to have kept their first estate, is; this, I say, we may know; and we likewise may know what the case of those angels that fell is: of the former of these we may know, that their falling is now become impossible; and of the latter we may know, that their being restored to their first estate is equally impossible, but which, however, was not impossible in the case of man; for Christ redeemed him by his taking on him the nature of man; but not having taken on him the nature of angels, the case of those angels that fell became, as I have said, remediless.

Now, the life which was originally set before man when good and evil were set before him, was natural life; for, although, in consequence of his creation, he had life, or, as the Scriptures express it, became *a living soul*, God nevertheless would that man should, if we may so say, owe this life to himself; i. e. that he should have in himself the principle of his happiness; but which however he cannot

have, but as he will at the same time have in himself the principle of misery; and this was the case likewise, as spiritual life was, after he had chosen death, set before him; for this life was set before him in consequence of Christ's having suffered the death which man had chosen: as Christ, however, is the author of spiritual life, faith, or belief in him, becomes the criterion of man's choosing it; by his unbelief, therefore, he will, virtually, choose spiritual death, and, having chosen this death, his case will be exactly the same as that of the angels which fell: and as both these will be eternal monuments of the divine justice, so will they to all eternity witness to the necessary imperfection of created intelligences, in comparison of the perfection of Him that created them.

As this notion shall be admitted, i. e. as the state of the wicked hereafter shall be considered as testifying merely to the truth of the necessary imperfection of all created beings, the reasoning which has been made use of by various writers, as well for as against the doctrine of the eternity of future punishments, becomes wholly excluded. I further suppose with respect to this imper-

fection, as it shall be considered in itself, that the reflecting on the misery of the wicked, as they shall be supposed to be suffering the punishment which was threatened, and which they will therefore have deserved; the reflecting, I say, on this misery, will be no diminution of the happiness of the saints, even as some who in this life were most dear to them shall be supposed to be of the number of these wretched men: for in this life for what there is no remedy, we do not trouble ourselves about; and so, as we may reasonably suppose, it will be with the saints in their mansion of bliss.

Nevertheless, when we consider what sort of men they are, who according to the Scriptures (as these are interpreted by divines), will perish everlastingly, it will not be to be wondered at that some, who, in other respects, have been true believers, have nevertheless found their faith put to too severe a trial with respect to this article, although at the risk of their own salvation. "The degrees of future punishment," it is said by a learned divine, "will be various, and exactly in proportion to the guilt and demerit of those who are punished; for, that the Scrip-

tures say, *It will be more tolerable for some than for others in the day of judgment; and that some will receive a greater damnation*.*" But this, as it seems to me, will not mend the matter with respect to those who will suffer less than others, for, as these shall be supposed to know that others suffer more than they do (and by the bye, how they will know this I cannot understand), it will be no alleviation of their sufferings; it nevertheless will be true, that their damnation will not be so great as that of others. Supposing, however, that there will be a difference between the punishment of some and that of others, with respect to their bodies (for, with respect to their minds, they will all alike be conscious of guilt), the dreadful reflection of

* Mr. Horbery, supposing, with respect to future punishments, that each man's punishment will be suited to the demerit of his sin and the malignity of his temper, scruples not to include infants among the number of those who will perish everlastingly.—P. 174. Dr. Brown, the ingenious author of an *Essay on the Existence of a Supreme Creator*, falls into the other extreme when he says, "The greater part of men sin more from imprudence and error, than from deliberate and desperate wickedness; and even crimes which appear to us invested with the most detestable colours, may, to Him who looketh on the heart, and knoweth all its springs, appear more deserving of compassion, than of interminable, unmitigated punishment."—P. 10, vol. ii.

there never being an end to their respective punishments, would bring all these wretched men upon an equality*.

To return from this digression, and to conclude. As the notion of a necessary imperfection in the case of even the most ex-

* There are some writers who, because they think it inconsistent with the goodness of the Deity that he should everlastingly punish creatures whom he himself had made, and for whom, according to the words of our Saviour, it would have been better that they had never been born, suppose that God, after they had been punished for a certain time, would annihilate them; this, however, would be impossible, and which may be shown as follows:—If God can annihilate a single particle of matter, he may annihilate any portion of matter. Supposing him then to annihilate any portion of matter, a general disorder in the mundane system would be the consequence; for, the order which the heavenly bodies observe in their various motions or rotations, depending upon gravitation, would likewise depend on the quantity of matter contained in each body. If only a single particle of matter then were annihilated, it would cause some disorder in the mundane system: and, if not more than a single particle of matter were annihilated, it would in time cause as much disorder as if any considerable portion of matter were annihilated. Now, seeing the bodies of the wicked will constitute a part of that globe of which they will hereafter be the inhabitants, it will be evident that these bodies of theirs cannot be annihilated consistently with that order which the heavenly bodies now observe, and have from the time of the creation observed (miracles excepted), in their various revolutions.

alted of created intelligences, as compared with the perfection of the Deity, shall be admitted, it will be evident that evil, or misery, must have existed somewhere, either in power or in act, from the time of the creation; and as it was coeval with the existense of the universe, so will it go hand in hand with that existence to all eternity*.

Had man, or some other intelligent being, not been endowed with a freedom of will, evil could not have existed. But man, no less than every other being, is, as has been said, an imperfect being; if then there was from all eternity a possibility of evil's existing, it is because there was from all eternity a possibility that such a being as man is should exist. A freedom of will in man would have been supposed, when God gave him the command with respect to the tree of knowledge; and no sooner had man disobeyed

* The church is represented by Solomon as saying to Christ, her spouse, *I am black, but comely*, or beautiful—(Song, v. 5). This blackness, by which sin is, by a learned annotator (Ainsworth), supposed to be meant, may, as I conceive, not inconsistently with this interpretation, be supposed to mean the imperfection mentioned in our text; for, although the creature be imperfect, it nevertheless is comely, or beautiful.

this command, but evil, natural, as well as moral, existed; for natural evil is the effect of moral, and produces it as naturally, as a tree does its fruit; as moral evil then shall be supposed to have had its full effect in the case of any one (but which must necessarily be in this life), he will be as miserable as there is any possibility of his being; but which must necessarily be in some future life: for, so long as a man is in this world, his wickedness cannot be so great, as that it may not be still greater. Now as we shall say, that God may, by any power, mercy, or goodness, put an end to the misery of a man who shall be supposed to be suffering in a future life, for the evil which he has done in this life; we shall deny what was supposed, namely, that this man is as miserable as there is any possibility of his being; he must therefore, as long as he exists, be miserable; for, if misery be the natural effect of moral evil, it cannot be so now, and not be so a thousand years hence; this however we deny, as we suppose the misery of any one that has done evil, and is suffering for the evil which he has done, to be, by any power, mercy, or goodness of God, put an end to. But so likewise I say of the righteous as they shall be supposed to be

in heaven ; heaven is in the Scriptures spoken of as being a place where the good will be rewarded ; and the happiness which the good will enjoy in heaven, will, no doubt, be esteemed by them as being a reward ; in like manner as the misery of the wicked will be felt by them as a punishment ; the happiness nevertheless of the former of these, will be as natural an effect of their righteousness, as the misery of the latter will be of their wickedness ; and it will be as impossible that there should ever be an end of the happiness of the righteous, as that there should be an end of the misery of the wicked : for this, nature would forbid in both cases alike. “ The misery of the wicked (as is rightly observed by Archbishop King) arises from the very constitution of the sinner* ;” and the same may be said of the future happiness of the righteous ; it therefore will be as impossible, by any supposed power to make a wicked man righteous (but which will be necessary in order to his being happy), as it will be to make a righteous man wicked, and, of course, miserable, as these shall respectively be supposed to have departed this life ; as well might a tree of a

* See King's *Origin of Evil*, Appendix XIV.

particular species, be made a tree of a different species.

The doctrine of an universal redemption, and the supposition of there being various intermediate states, through which angels as well as men will pass previously to their arriving at a state which will endure for ever, are the subject principally of Dr. Cheyne's *Philosophical Conjectures*. There are other subjects, however, of minor consideration, which, in the course of this work, are treated of, and which, agreeable to my plan, I now proceed to state and discuss.

SECTION II.

OF the number of those subjects which, at the close of the last section, I have mentioned, and which it is my intention to consider, one, and that of no small importance, is *that* which hath respect to the origin and cause of motion. It has been contended by a late well-known philosopher, in defence of the doctrine of necessity, “that the conjunction of motives and voluntary actions are as regular and uniform as that betwixt cause and effect in the things of nature: these circumstances,” he says, “form the whole of that necessity which we can conceive in matter; and, as they are universally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind, it must likewise,” as he supposes, “be acknowledged that all the operations of the mind proceed from a like necessity*.”

Now, if any actions of ours may proceed voluntarily, and which is here admitted, I

* Hume's Essay on Liberty and Necessity.

say, that no proof would arise from their proceeding regularly and uniformly, of their proceeding necessarily: for this is not the case with the things of nature; these for the most part (or perhaps always) proceed regularly and uniformly; it is, however, because it is the will of God that they should do so, and which, if at any time this has not been the case, i. e. if at any time this regularity and uniformity have been interrupted (a very remarkable instance of which will in the sequel of this section be given), will be evident.

In agreement with these notions of mine, it is supposed by our author (Dr. Cheyne), “that no material thing can move, but as its motion will originate in the will of some intelligent being: the heavenly orbs, for instance, could not first have moved, had it not been the will of that great Being who created them that they should move; and their continuing to move ever since has been from the same cause.” Our author further supposes, with respect to all such motion as arises from the energy of the human will, “that this energy will always be in proportion to the matter contained in the thing intended to be moved:” this I grant, and I say that it re-

futes the doctrine of necessity; for, as the will of an intelligent being must needs be free, so the motion in question might not have taken place.

Our author (Dr. Cheyne) supposes, with philosophers in general, that reaction is ever in proportion to action; this likewise I grant: upon the supposition, however, of all motion originating in the will of some intelligent being, it will be evident, of the motion which arises from reaction, that it will originate likewise in the will of that Being with whom the motion which arose from action originated. The axiom, that reaction is ever in proportion to action, supposes a resistance on the part of the thing moved; and this resistance arises from that *vis inertiae* which philosophers ascribe to all inert things: as this resistance, however, implies action, it is this action, rather than any motion which will arise therefrom, of which the reaction, or *vis inertiae*, of the thing moved will consist; and as this reacting of the thing moved would have been foreign to the intention of him by whose will it was moved, so must it, as I have said, originate in the will of some other being, and that being can only be God.

Now, I suppose, with our author, the energy of the will to be ever in proportion to the matter contained in the thing moved; and I will suppose, as an example of this rule, the thing moved to have been the stone which was rolled from the door of Christ's sepulchre: this, we are given to understand, was done by an angel; as the will of an angel, however, can have no greater power naturally than the will of a man, and this stone could not have been moved by any power or energy which the will of a man has, so neither, as I apprehend, could it have been moved by any power or energy which the will of the angel had; for, to suppose that it might, is to suppose that an angel might move the whole earth, if it was his will so to do: the conclusion is, that this stone was moved because it was the will of God that it should move, although not but as it was the will of the angel at the same time; and so precisely, as I conceive, is it, when any ponderous thing is moved by a man; for, if the will of man may, by any power which it has, cause a thing at rest to move, it may cause this thing to be at rest from its having been in motion, but which it cannot, as the power of the will merely is in question, and which

is the case in the present argument. My notion accordingly is, that God has so ordered, as that, whenever it is the will of a man that a thing shall move, and the supposed power of this man's will shall be in proportion to the matter contained in this thing, it shall move; this, I say, I suppose to be the case, and not that any power of God is, on any occasion of this kind, communicated to men.

That the will of God is the efficient cause of all motion, is the opinion of a learned writer; what he supposes, however, is, that whenever a thing is moved, in consequence of its being the will either of a man or a spiritual being, that it should move, it is as the power of God is delegated to that man or spirit; but as to which notion, it will have appeared that I do not agree with him; in other respects there is no material difference between us: for, what he supposes is, that it has been decreed of God, that whenever it is the will of man that any material thing shall move, for instance, his own body (to the moving of which the natural strength of this man must by him be supposed to be equal, and which, by the way, is the same thing as to say, the energy of the will must

be proportioned to the matter contained in the thing intended to be moved), it shall be moved accordingly*. Thus, as God is the sole efficient cause of all such changes as material things are subject to, so is he the sole efficient cause of all such motion as they may have †.”

Hitherto the motion of things which arises from the will of man, although not independently of the will of God, has been considered; seeing, however, there are motions incident to things natural, in which the will of man has nothing to do, and which must therefore be wholly dependent on the will of God, I suppose there can be no more eminent an example hereof, than what may happen in the case of *miracles*. Now, a miracle has, by a learned prelate ‡, been said to be, in its

* Watts's Essays, p. 136.

† In the Old Testament all natural events are ascribed to the will of God as their immediate cause; and it is accordingly observed by a learned divine, that the light of the day is not by Moses attributed to the sun, nor rain to the clouds, nor sight to the eyes, nor hearing to the ears, but all are referred to the Sovereign Head, the creator of substances, the giver of forms, the cause of causes.—Trapp's Marrow, &c. 719. The people of Israel did the same, and it was suitable to the nature of their government, which was a theocracy, that they did so.

‡ Butler's Analogy, p. 164.

very notion, relative to a course of nature, and to be an interruption of that course; this, however, has, by another writer*, been denied, and very cogent reasons have by him been given to show, that in a miracle there is no interruption at all of the course of nature: but neither of these two writers, in my humble opinion, is right in his notion of a miracle. Let the standing still of the sun (upon the Ptolemaic †, and which is the Mosaic system), when Joshua fought against the Amorites, be propounded as an example; in this case I say, that the sun's standing still was because it was God's will that it

* Turner's Essays.

† It has been shown by Sir Matthew Hale, in his *Origination of Mankind*, upon philosophical principles, and in defence of the Ptolemaic system, that "the heavenly bodies move *in liquido athere*; which liquid æther he supposes to be so much more rare than the air which we breathe, as that it would retard these bodies much less than the air of a grosser medium." "This," he says, "would in a great measure obviate the objections of astronomers to the system of Ptolemy, and which is in agreement with the Mosaic account; and which objection is, the incredible velocity of the motion of the heavenly bodies upon the Ptolemaic system;" but which is no objection at all, as the system which I have adopted with respect to motion shall be admitted: for, if a body move because it is the will of God that it should move, the motion being quick or slow will make no difference in the case.

should do so; but no other reason, according to my notions, can be given for its moving at any time. The sun's going on in its usual course is only because it is God's will that it should do so; and neither more nor less can be said of its standing still, and which it did in the instance which has been given. This example is peculiarly calculated to show the truth of my theory, but which, however, will equally apply in the case of all other miracles; the will of God being, as I suppose, the cause of all such extraordinary changes as take place in any of these.

SECTION III.



As man is a being consisting of a body and a soul, his soul is not more essential to his existence as a man, than his body. Angels are generally supposed to be of an uncompounded nature, and to consist wholly of an immaterial substance; to the contrary of this, however, our author (Dr. Cheyne) thinks it highly probable, and he says that not only Pagan but Christian antiquity agree in the opinion, that all created intelligences have bodies, or vehicles, of some kind fitted to their order or degree of moral purity, habitation, and situation, thereby to enable them to hold communion with one another, to contemplate the material world, and to converse with the lower ranks of intelligences; as also to enable them to execute the orders of the divine economy and providence, in God's government of this world of ours.

Seeing, however, the bodies with which these angelical beings are, according to our

author, clothed, are by him supposed to be nothing that is essential to their nature (but which is otherwise with men*), they cannot die as men may: for, as the soul of man was immortal, so would the death which was threatened, and which he incurred by his transgression, have been the death of the body. But if angels cannot die from their want of bodies, they cannot, for the same reason, feel pain; and if they cannot feel pain, they cannot know what it is to be hungry or thirsty; for these sensations arise

* If a man may be defined to be a being consisting of a body in union with a soul, the body will, as in the text is supposed, be equally essential to a man, as his soul is. It is accordingly observed by a learned divine, "that though the soul be the prime and chief principle of the individuation of the person, yet it is not the sole and adequate principle thereof; but the soul joined with the body, makes the adequate individuating principle of the person. Nor will any true philosophy allow, that the body was ever intended for the mere garment of the soul, but for an essential constituent part of the man, as really as the soul itself; and the difference of an essential half in any composition, will be sure to make an essential difference in the whole compound."—South's Serm. vol. iv. p. 251. To the contrary of this however, I find it asserted by a learned prelate, that the soul, in effect, is the whole man; the body but the shell of him: the body but the casket, the soul the jewel; and in support of this notion, he quotes the following words of Chrysostom, *ἰν προσωπίῳ χώρᾳ τὸ σῶμα περιίμεναι*, on Luke, ix. 25. I pretend not to decide between these two great authorities.

from some uneasiness which is felt, and of which we are relieved by food and drink. It is said, indeed, of the *manna* with which the Israelites were fed in the wilderness, that it was the *food of angels*, or, as the Psalmist calls it, *the bread of heaven*: these, however, as respect shall be had to angels, may be considered as figurative expressions; it is, for instance, under the notion of bread that *righteousness* is in the Scriptures said to be *hungered after*, and men may *thirst for living waters*; and so, in like manner, angels may be said to be hungry and thirsty.

Now, whether I have expressed our author's meaning rightly, or not, it will be sufficient for the understanding his hypothesis to suppose that angels are capable of pain of mind; for he supposes of the angels that fell, that they will have contracted a foulness, as well as a sinfulness, of which they will stand in need of being cleansed; and that these, no less than the wicked among men, will be reclaimed by the greatness of their sufferings, and will, like men, pass through various states, in order to their attaining to that righteousness, which will equally qualify them for heaven, as will the righteousness of the

angels that kept their first estate, or that of men whose rising again will be unto life.

Now, upon the supposition of the bodies with which our author supposes angels to be clothed, not being essential to their existence, they may, and as our author supposes, will be put off, as these angels shall be supposed to pass from one state to another, in order to their being clothed with such bodies as are suitable to the orb into which they will pass, and so on *toties quoties*; and which will be without any resurrection properly so called; for a resurrection implies the death of the body, and, of course, its separation from the soul; and our author accordingly supposes, that there is a separation of the soul from the body when a man dies, i. e. from that body which was taken from the dust of the ground, and which, as such, would have been suitable to his terrestrial abode: a circumstance which leads to a system which our author has adopted, which, although intricate at best, and not clearly expressed by him, is, as far as I can understand it, as follows.

He supposes the souls of all men to have been created at the same time, clothed with

bodies of a refined and æthereal substance ; and that these souls, thus clothed, were contained in Adam* : a notion, he adds, which there will be no difficulty for those to conceive who know and understand the infinite divisibility of matter †. These bodies he supposes to be indissolubly united to their proper souls, and to be imperishable. Hence it should seem to be our author's meaning, that the bodies of all men were created previously to the formation of Adam's body out of the dust of the ground.

Now, as the soul of Adam must, according to our author's notions, have been clothed with an æthereal body, no less than the souls of all other men, his soul thus united to a body, would have been contained in that body which was made of the dust of the ground ‡, no less than the souls and bodies

* The author, it must be confessed, has the authority of the Scriptures for this notion ; for Levi is said to have paid tithes (i. e. by anticipation) whilst in the loins of his father. Now, if Levi was in the loins of his father before he was begotten, Levi's father would have been in the loins of Levi's grandfather, and so on till we come to Adam, in whose loins, of course, all men would have been contained.

† Phil. Conject. § 22 and 24, p. 161.

‡ The author of an Essay on the Resurrection of the Body (Drew) supposes, as our author does, " that the body

of all other men ; and this body which was made of the dust of the ground, would have been a receptacle, if I may so say, of the bodies and souls which, according to our author, God had created : that body which would have been indissolubly united to the soul of Adam, not being excepted ; and, in this case, the breath of life which God is said to have breathed into the man which he

of a man as he shall have died, will return to its parent earth, never to rise again." What he supposes in this case is, " that the body of each man contains a small material substance which is indissoluble, and which is the germ," as he calls it, " of future life ; that this germ, when disencumbered of all the particles of flesh and blood which now enclose and surround it, vegetates in the grave until the general resurrection." (239.) Now, the body which our author (Dr. Cheyne) supposes to be indissolubly united to the soul, is somewhat like unto this germ of Mr. Drew's : this notion, however, of Mr. D.'s, it must be confessed, is nearer to the description which Saint Paul gives of this matter, and of which matter he gives a very ingenious account. As this notion of a germ, which, as it shall duly have expanded, Mr. D. supposes will constitute the resurrection-body, shall be admitted, the soul may be supposed to be united to it, in like manner as, according to Dr. Cheyne, it is to that æthereal body with which he supposes the souls of all men, as they were contained in Adam, were clothed ; and in which case, the necessity of a vestment to serve as a clothing to the departed soul (a notion adopted by Dr. Cudworth, and borrowed from Plato, and by Plato from the ancient Egyptian theology, as may be seen in *Hermes Trismegistus*, B. IV. § 59), would be superseded.

had made of the dust of the ground, would be only animal life.

For a farther explanation of our author's system, so far as I can understand it, I observe as follows :—He supposes of the æthereal body, to which in the case of each man the soul will be united, as before has been said, that it has all the properties of the body in which it will be contained, and which he calls the adamical body, as being derived, in the case of each man, from Adam. As this notion of our author shall be admitted, it will be evident, that as all such things as a man shall do will be done by means of the outward and gross body, so all such ideas as he will have acquired will have been acquired through the instrumentality of the same body, i. e. according to the common philosophy, by impressions made on the brain, as things sensible are seen, heard, or otherwise sensibly perceived ; and the things to the knowledge of which a man will thus have attained, will, according to the aforesaid philosophy, be remembered as the aforesaid impressions on the brain shall at any time be viewed by the soul. Now, whether it be in this, or in any other way, that the knowledge of things is

acquired, and these afterwards remembered (for I confess that I do not approve of this philosophy, and as may be seen in Section V.), it will be sufficient for my purpose that this shall be supposed to be a true account of the matter: for, according to our author's notions, when a man departs this life, the body, by means of which all his ideas have been acquired, will return to its original dust, never to rise again; that a body will have been prepared for him in some other orb, equally suitable to the moral condition of his soul, as the body which has been put off was to the soul's then condition; that with this new body the soul united to its æthereal body will be clothed, but without any remembrance of the things done in the body which has been put off; that with this new body the soul, united to its æthereal vehicle, will be clothed, and so continue to be until the purpose for which his having passed into this new orb shall have been answered; and he will then pass into some new orb, and so on, till the soul shall have attained to that moral perfection, which will fit it for a state that will be permanent; and when the æthereal body, duly expanded, will constitute its only body.

As the explanation which I have now given shall be supposed to express our author's meaning (and if it does not, I confess myself not to understand this philosophical system which he has adopted), it is farther observable, the body and soul of the woman, after her having been made out of one of Adam's ribs, would no longer be contained in his loins, but in this body which would have been prepared for it, i. e. for the soul of the woman; and the same thing would happen with respect to the children of Adam the moment bodies had, by natural generation, been prepared for those bodies and souls of theirs which had been originally created.

Now, as Adam's sinning was, as is generally supposed, before he had any carnal knowledge of Eve, the bodies which were contained in his loins would not have been mortal, by reason of this sin of his: but which, however, would be otherwise with respect to that body which I have mentioned to have been made out of the dust of the ground; and as this body would have become mortal by sin, so likewise would the bodies be of all men that should descend

from him : as would likewise be the body of the woman, because of the sameness which her body, as having been made of a rib of Adam's, would (notwithstanding its having become separate from Adam) continue to have with his body ; and the soul likewise of the woman would, as it may be conceived, have become contaminated and sinful by the sin of Adam, and for a reason like unto that by which I have supposed her body to have become mortal ; and which is, the union which the will of Eve would have had with the will of Adam when he ate of the forbidden tree : for, except as Adam had eaten when Eve had once eaten, *that* would have been *put asunder* which *God had joined together* ; and the reverse of this, as I suppose would have been the case, had Adam's eating of the aforesaid tree been antecedent to Eve's eating thereof ; i. e. her soul would, by reason of the unity of her will with the will of Adam, have partaken of the sinfulness of his soul ; and seeing a clean cannot come out of an unclean thing, sinful would have been the souls of all that should descend from them, in like manner as their bodies would, as I have supposed, have become mortal.

Now, to return to our author's system (supposing what has now last been said to have been his meaning); he supposes the mortal bodies of men to be a covering only to those pure æthereal bodies which are in indissoluble union with their souls; that this union, however, will be no hinderance to the soul's acting for the good of the gross outward body, and which, unconscious as a man must be of its being united to a pure æthereal body, will naturally be considered by him as being his only body: this I observe by the way only; for it is not material either to what I have said, or may farther say, on our author's system.

Our author, as in a former part of this section has been observed, supposes, that when a man departs this life, the outward body dies, and returns to the dust from which it was taken, never to rise again*;

* This certainly was not the case with Christ; our author's notions, nevertheless, may be true as they apply to men in general: for I say, that as Christ's rising again was that men might know that he was risen from the dead, so it was necessary in his case, that the same body that died should have life restored to it; it was likewise necessary that this body should ascend into some higher region, as otherwise this

and the inward body with the soul to which it is united, passes into some other orb, clothed with another body taken from that orb, in like manner as it had been here, i. e. from the earth; but if so, and this must have been the case with Adam, equally as it has been with all other men who have departed this life, the question is, what became of those bodies which, according to our author, would have been contained in Adam's loins, and which during his life would have been unborn? Now, except as these bodies united to their proper souls, may be said to have had a virtual or potential existence instead of an actual existence, as our author supposes, in the loins of Adam; for, in that case, all that were unborn would have a like existence in the loins of every man that is born; so long as there should be a man and

ascent could not have been witnessed by men on earth. Now, upon our author's system, the body which he supposes originally to have been united to the soul in the case of each man, will, as these men shall have passed through various intermediate states, constitute their only bodies: all such outward bodies with which they were clothed, and which were fitted to the different orbs which they inhabited, being no longer wanted. As Christ, however, was made perfect by his sufferings on earth, that body to which his soul was originally united, and which died, and rose again, would constitute his only body for ever afterwards.

a woman* left, there would be a possibility of there being still more; except, I say, as this shall be supposed, I will not say that our author's system is built on no solid foundation, but that I do not fully comprehend it.

* "The woman, in the work of generation, or procreation," our author says, "is but a second intention, or buttress for a falling edifice, i. e. that the thing conceived in her womb might be nourished and increased by the juices of the proper female." By which words we are to understand it to have been the author's opinion, not that women have no souls, but that originally there was no sexual distinction; and which he supposes to have been the case.

SECTION IV.

OUR author supposes “that the human race was originally made in a scale of intelligences, and in that cone of creation which seems to ascend from inert and passive matter through the human species, to the angels; and beyond the cherubim and seraphin, up to the utmost extent to which finite free intelligence reaches; that being free, and consequently capable of a progressive procedure, they may either go forward to perfection and happiness, to the greatest happiness of which they are capable, or backward to misery. All these intelligences our author considers as being emanations from the First Cause, and that, being impressed with the divine image, they may truly be said to be, what he calls, *infinitesimal deities*; i. e. they may, in some imperfect and gross manner, be so raised in our minds, as to give a faint idea of the Supreme Being*.”

* Philosophical Conjectures, § 28 and 33, p. 183.

This notion of a cone, of which inert matter constitutes the basis, and of which the highest intelligent created beings are the apex, has been adopted by various writers; with some of these, however, the Deity is the apex of this cone: a notion which is very properly reprobated by a learned prelate; and who, speaking of a certain celebrated writer* who has adopted this notion of a cone, says, “ he (the aforesaid writer) does not expressly say that God is the vertex of his cone; this he knows would have been read with abhorrence; but he leads you upward through the several contiguous ranks of intelligences, till he brings you towards the vertex, and there, if you keep to his hypothesis, he leaves you to stop short of including it (i. e. God being the vertex) if you can; from whence there is but one easy step to infidelity, and another as easy to atheism †.” “ Had Mr. Locke,” as the author in another part of his book observes, “ left the divine nature out of his cone, it might better have fitted the rest of the universe, and the whole system of created beings: among which it is not improbable there should be many dis-

* Locke.

† Div. Analogy, p. 130.

tinct ranks and species, one above another; though not differing by such insensible degrees only, as we imagine between the contiguous sections of a cone: for this implies that they are all one common mass, and scarce distinguishable heap of the same universal, similar, and uniform substance, knit together by a kind of fate and necessity, or by some chance or accidental disposition of parts of an eternal and infinite system of matter and endless motion, rather than by the voluntary contrivance of an infinitely wise and powerful Agent, who created all purely spiritual intelligences wholly and essentially different from one another*.”

Our author (Dr. Cheyne), in contradiction to these opinions of the learned Bishop, differing however from Mr. Locke, observes as follows: “As under the human species there is an almost infinite variety of the brutal and irrational species; and under these, a like or greater variety of the vegetable kind; and that all the several species, from the highest to the lowest, sink so gradually into one another, as that it is impossible to determine

* Div. Analogy, p. 125.

where one degree ends, and the next begins; so is it also highly probable, that above the human species there are orders of beings rising gradually and insensibly without end; and this, the infinite variety of systems, and fixt stars, and the analogy of things, makes it probable and philosophical to suppose; and that it is agreeable to the notion which we have of a Being of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, to suppose, that all these were made to be finally happy, in a manner consistent with their natures, and his own*."

Our author, under the name of those intelligent beings which make a part of his cone, includes *brutes*; for, although he mentions not either these, or vegetables, as being parts of his cone, he nevertheless, in express words, supposes the essential difference between the brute and the vegetable creation to consist in the self-motive and self-active powers of the former, and of which the latter are destitute; that vegetation depends entirely upon the powers of matter; but that animation, in all its degrees, requires a *spiritual substance* of some rank or

* Phil. Conject. § 8.

other: and here, as he says, the essential difference between vegetable and animal nature lies, viz. in the locomotive power of the latter, of which the former is destitute entirely, and is merely passive. But, as he farther says, since the brute creation, in some degree, plainly manifests the passions and affections of mind that we of the human race are capable of; since they live, or are actuated by a self-motive, self-active principle; since they feel pleasure and pain, and may be, at least most of them that fall under our observation, made to learn and understand some things, which is a proof that they are endowed, even with *intelligence* in a low degree; and since all of them suffer, and must necessarily suffer, a million of different ways here, and at last most intensely by their death; it is highly probable that they are in a lapsed, expiatory, and progressive state of being, and may advance to higher degrees of perfection and happiness*. Our author, it must be confessed, is countenanced in this notion of brutes being endowed with intelligence by a celebrated naturalist of a late date; “the bodies of brutes,”

* Conject. on Nat. Analog. § 3.

he says, “ are actuated by a principle of a like kind with that which is placed in man, but greatly inferior with regard to the degrees of reason and intelligence which a brute possesses: in the more perfect brutes, this principle is plainly intelligent as well as sentient: and their actions so evidently show them to be endued not only with a strong memory, but with reflection, and some degrees of reason, that it is wonderful to find Descartes and his followers so far imposing on themselves, as seriously to believe these were machines formed entirely of matter, and, as it were, so many curious pieces of clock-work wound up, and set a-going. Nor is it less surprising, that the generality of theological writers should, till of late, have been so far mistaken in this matter, as not to have perceived, that after once admitting all the actions of the most perfect brutes to result from mere mechanism, their ascribing every thing in man to no higher a principle, would be a natural and easy consequence*.” This last observation may be a very proper one; but when he ascribes the actions of brutes to the same principle as that from which the voluntary

* Whytt, *Essay on vital Motion*, p. 322.

actions of men proceed (I say voluntary; for, if it be involuntary actions of men that he means, reason is certainly out of the case in these), his notions are equally exceptionable as those of Dr. Cheyne.

The notion of actions as proceeding, in the case of brutes, from reason, or intelligence, has been rejected by an ingenious writer of a still later date, who nevertheless had not adopted the Cartesian system. "Instinctive action," he says, "is founded on impulse, and that which is reasonable on reflection. Whatever being is capable of being irresistibly driven to action by impulse, is so far under the dominion of instinct; and whatever being is capable of counteracting these impulses, and acting contrary to them, is under the dominion of reason. Impulses which originate in external causes, act through the medium of the senses; and these causes must be confined within the bounds of corporeal existence, without operating through this medium: but reason originates in another source*."

* Drew on the Immortality of the Soul, p. 96.—Impulse, according to Boerhaave and others, arises from, or rather consists in irritation; and irritation, they say, may

There is another respectable writer, who, speaking of brutes, makes no mention at all

be so great in the case of men, as that action, which otherwise might be voluntary, will be involuntary: for instance, a man may refrain from breathing for some time; irritation, however, will by degrees become so great, as that he will no longer have a power of holding his breath. In the case of brutes, however, Mr. Drew contends, that action in consequence of irritation, always proceeds involuntarily, and never voluntarily; it would be to no purpose then that brutes should be endowed with reason as men are, except as, being endowed with this principle, they might act either according or contrary to its dictates at will.

Sir M. Hale very properly says, that the actions of brutes originate in reason, but he denies that they are endowed with reason; and he gives a physical reason in proof of the contrary, and which is as follows:—"It has been found by anatomists, that there are in the brain, not only of a man but of a brute, certain portions of matter, which they call *protuberantia annulares*; NATES ET TESTES: that in brutes their sagacity and subtilty are always in proportion to these *protuberantia annulares*." The aforesaid anatomists, however, as the author adds, have found, that in brutes the only communication of the brain with the heart is by the *nervus paris vagi*, derived from the *cerebellum*, and spreading its branches into the muscle of the heart: whereas in man there is not only the same communication of that nerve, but a ramification of the *nervus intercostalis* is also inserted into the muscle of the heart, whereby a greater communication between the brain and heart is maintained in man than in brutes.—*Origination of Mankind*, p. 65. Now, the above-mentioned ramification of the *nervus intercostalis* certainly cannot be the cause of man's being a rational being: a circumstantial proof, however arises from this ramification obtaining in men and not in brutes, that men are endowed with reason, and that brutes,

of instinct as being a principle of action with them; he nevertheless says, "It is evident they are not machines; and as material principles cannot effect what we every day observe in them, it is impossible to deny them some degrees of thought or reason; and as, admitting the least degree, we know not where to stop, that which is capable of some reason will be capable of more." Our author further on observes, that "Salmasius and Locke allow that brutes have reason, and that the distinction between their reason and that of men consists in this, that brutes have only particular, but no abstracted general ideas; and that if their souls do not subsist after death, it is not owing to any imperfection in them, but to the will of Him that created them*."

The author of a letter on the knowledge of brutes "denies that there is any principle in

are not. A like reason is by our author given for the affection called *laughter* being excited in men, and which distinguishes them from brutes no less than reason:—"Another part of the above-mentioned ramifications of the *nervus intercostalis*, as the aforesaid anatomists have likewise found, are derived into the chest and *diaphragma* of a man, but not of a brute, whereby principally the aforesaid affection is excited."

* Ellis on the Knowledge of divine Things, p. 391.

them that is properly to be called a soul: for, as there are only two substances in nature, spiritual and material, the soul, which some attribute to brutes, must, if it be essentially different from the body, partake of the nature of the human soul. Our author, denying that brutes have souls properly so called, denies that they feel, hear, see, or otherwise sensibly perceive; they neither feel heat or cold, pleasure or pain; it is the soul, according to our author, that hath these sensations, but neither doth the soul feel pain immediately in divers parts of the body; for, make a ligation between the head and another part of the body, and it will stop all feeling; which, as he says, makes it plain that feeling is not immediately perceived in the parts themselves." (P. 53.) Our author, however, does not adopt the Cartesian system, which he considers as bordering on infidelity; what he says is, "that the union and correspondence of soul and body mutually acting upon one another, is caused by certain general laws always efficacious, which God has thought fit to establish in regard to the desires of the soul and motion of the body; these then occasionally determine and apply the efficacy of the divine will; but the immediate and

efficient cause of all is God himself" (p. 51); which, by the bye, is the notion precisely which has been adopted in our second section.

If brutes, as Drew and other writers contend, are wholly devoid of reason, they will be incapable of reflection; admitting then that they feel pain and pleasure as really as they appear to do, not being capable, however, of reflection, it will be the same thing, in point of misery and happiness, as if they felt neither pain nor pleasure; for misery and happiness depend not on sensible pain and pleasure: a man, for instance, may be happy under painful, and miserable under pleasurable sensations; seeing, however, there must be a cause of his happiness in the one case, and of his misery in the other, he cannot be either happy or miserable, so as to know himself to be so, without reflection. Again I say, that when we are asleep we may feel either pleasure or pain, and not be sensible of it; i. e. we shall not be able to reflect on the pleasure which we are here supposed to feel, so as to be conscious to ourselves that we feel pleasure; and I say the same as it shall be pain that we are supposed to feel. Now, such precisely is the case with brutes

when they are awake; and I accordingly say, that not being conscious to themselves either of the pleasure or pain which they shall be supposed to feel, it will, in the divine intention, be to no purpose of happiness, for the present or the future, that they at any time feel pleasure, and to no purpose of misery that they at any time feel pain.

That brutes have a life in common with men is witnessed by Solomon when he says, that *a man dieth as a beast or brute doth, yea, they have all one breath*: but when he adds, *the spirit of a man goeth upward, but the spirit of a beast downward*, he shows, that although a man, by reason of a life or spirit which he hath in common with a beast or brute, and which goeth downward as it no longer animates the body, and of course is then no more; a man, nevertheless, by reason of that spirit which the sacred writer describes as going upward, will be essentially different from a brute; for a brute, as it dies, will die to live no more; but a man, as he dies, will rise again with respect to his body, and, by reason of his spirit or soul, to which his body will again be united, he will live for ever.

On the ground of what has now been said, I say, that our author's notion of brutes passing into a future state which will be intermediate, and in order to a state which will be permanent and endure for ever; this notion, I say, proceeds on false grounds with respect to brutes, although it may be otherwise with respect to men.

SECTION V.

OUR author supposes “ that all the vital functions are performed by the spirit or soul, by the intermediation of vibrations caused by the action of external objects, or their effluvia, on the brain or retina ; which vibrations the soul naturally knows to denote the presence of such and such bodies, and their actions.” Thus “ seeing (according to our author) is performed by the impressions of the rays of light, emitted or reflected by the surfaces of bodies, and exciting particular vibrations on the optic nerves, and pointing out to the sagacious spirit the presence of such and such bodies ; and in a manner analogous hereto are hearing, feeling, &c. performed*.” As these notions differ not materially from the commonly received philosophy, any such objection as will apply to one will likewise apply to the other ; and this objection is, the absurdity of supposing an immaterial to be

* Phil. Conject. § 27.

capable of being acted on by a material substance ; or, vice versâ, a material by an immaterial substance : this, as I conceive, is not the case, even when two things are of the same nature.

My notion, if I may be allowed to have an opinion on this matter, is, that things are intellectually perceived, in like manner as they are sensibly perceived ; i. e. there is something, as I suppose, by reason whereof they are suited to the intellectual faculty, in like manner as they are to the senses ; insomuch that they cannot be sensibly perceived, and not be intellectually perceived at the same time by us, except as either the intellectual faculty shall not have had its due expansion, as in the case of young children, or as the mind shall be employed on some other thing than *that* which is sensibly perceived ; and in which case it will amount to the same thing as if they were not sensibly perceived at all.

In conformity with this notion, it has been supposed by philosophers, that there are two distinct principles in man ; the one of which they call the *animus*, or mind, and the other the *anima*, or soul : by the former they

understand the intellectual principle, or seat of reason ; and by the other, the principle of life and sense, influencing the vital motions. According to them, we have the *anima*, or vital sentient principle, in common with brutes ; but the *animus*, or soul, which is of a more exalted nature, they say, is proper to rational or intelligent creatures only*. Now, the *anima*, which is here said to be the principle of life and sense, whether in brutes or in men, is neither more nor less than what is commonly called *instinct* ; and which, as being more properly called the *anima*, is a principle from which all vital motions with brutes necessarily proceed ; whilst with men some of these motions, because of the *animus* which obtains in them, and which is a governing principle, do not necessarily proceed ; for instance, breathing, with a man, may be either accelerated or retarded, or it may be wholly withheld ; it can be withheld, however, for a time only ; for when a man finds his life to be in danger, he will necessarily breathe : whereas with brutes, who are wholly devoid of the principle called the *animus*, there is no power of the kind which has been mentioned ;

* See Whytt's Essay, p. 301.

and which, by the way, is an undeniable proof that they are wholly incapable as well of thought as of reason or intelligence; for these are properties of the *animus*, or superior principle, and of which, as I have said, brutes are wholly devoid. Now brutes, consistently with this philosophy (whatever may be the case with a truer philosophy), may as truly be said to feel pleasure and pain as men do; for, the feeling pain at least, or some uneasy sensation, is indispensably necessary for those motions which are properly called vital, to proceed: hunger, for instance, which arises from an irritation of the nerves of the stomach, is always an uneasy, and may be a very painful sensation, forcibly compels a brute, upon the principle of self-preservation, to satisfy his hunger, as an opportunity shall be supposed to offer for his so doing. This, however, is not the case with men; for, a man being endowed with a power or principle of thought and intelligence, may, as he shall be supposed to be in a situation which has been mentioned with respect to a brute, refuse to satisfy his hunger, even though death should be the consequence of his so doing. A man, it is true, cannot, consistently with his duty to God, wilfully destroy himself; and

God, as he has implanted in brutes, as well as men, a desire of life, he has, by reason of that desire, *given them a law which shall not be broken* (i. e. in the case of men) with impunity; and which shows, that this law which God has given them may be broken, and *that* because the *anima*, or principle of life, is the only principle of action which they possess; whereas, with men, to the *anima* is added the *animus*, and which is the proper governing principle.

The truth, after all that either has been or may further be said on the subject of brutes, is, that our attributing to them any such properties or qualities as we possess, as, for instance, knowledge *, or reason, or foresight, is by a fiction, i. e. not really supposing they possess those; for so would they be men, and not brutes: but, perceiving effects arising from their actions, similar to those which arise from ours, we, because of this analogy, suppose the cause to be the same †; whereas,

* The Scriptures speak of *the ox as knowing his owner*, and of *the ass as knowing his master's crib*; but in this, as in various other instances, they accommodate themselves to our apprehensions.

† I find this notion has been adopted in a late publication; it is expressed as follows:—"Sagacity, courage, fidelity, love,

according to my notions, the will of God is the true cause. In the case of man, the preservation of his life depends, in the first place, on that love of life, which is so strong, that, naturally, he cannot act contrarily to it; as the love of life, however, shows that it is the will of God that he should preserve this life, the knowledge, the reason, and the foresight which he possesses, he will know to have been given him, if not wholly, chiefly at least, for this purpose; and, I may say, as much more for this purpose, as the love of life is more, and greater, than the love of any thing which this world affords. To suppose, then, that the actions of brutes proceed from the same love of life in their case as they do in ours, is in fact to suppose that they know, not only that there is a God, but likewise that their being endowed with properties the same as those which obtain in us is for a like purpose. If life then, in the case of brutes, be not preserved in such manner as that they are conscious of it, and which consciousness no advocate for their know-

jealousy, revenge, are all predicated of brute animals, not less than of man, although they are not things, or existences, of themselves, but certain attributes, or affections, in them, exhibiting symptoms, and producing effects corresponding with the symptoms and effects attendant upon those qualities in ourselves." Coppleston's Inquiry, &c. p. 128.

ledge will suppose them to have; it is by the same fiction (as we would judge rightly of their actions) that we shall attribute to them even the love of life, as that by which, as I have said, we attribute to them knowledge, reason, and even sagacity.

From what has been said, I may perhaps be thought to incline to the Cartesian philosophy; for, if the will of God be the immediate cause of the actions of brutes, they certainly are equally machines, as the earth is a machine, as its diurnal rotation shall be supposed to be performed from the like cause. I nevertheless differ from Cartesius, by supposing that brutes feel pleasure and pain no less than we do, and which may be the case consistently with what I have said; for, with respect to these sensations, they, no less than we, are passive, and not active, and therefore, in this respect (i. e. as feeling pleasure and pain), not machines. They are active, as those motions, gestures, and utterance, shall be considered, which show that they feel pleasure or pain, and the divine will may be the cause of these motions, &c.; but they are passive, as these sensations shall be considered in themselves.

SECTION VI.

THE different lives which, according to our author, enter into the composition of man, viz. the vegetative, the sensitive, and the rational life, have, in a former section, been stated. Our author however, in the section where he speaks of all intelligent beings as constituting a cone ascending from inert matter through the human species up to the highest angelical beings, supposes brutes; as in that section I have said, to make a part of this cone; and that these, in common with man, partake of a vegetative, an animal, and a rational life. Now, the notion of a cone, such as above has been mentioned, has, as in a former section has been observed, been adopted by various writers, and, in particular, by Mr. Locke; and who on the subject of brutes, says, that, “in these the animal and vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined, that if you take the lowest of the one, and the highest of the

other, there will scarcely be perceived any difference between them*:" on which words I observe, that if these two kingdoms are so joined, as that there is scarce any difference between them, the notion of a cone will require that the same should be said of each link of the chain by which the different ranks of beings which constitute this cone, are joined together; and in which case, there will scarce be any difference between the lowest of the brutal, and the highest of the angelical species of beings; and the author will thus say more of the intelligence of brutes, than any the greatest advocate for this species of beings have dared to say, namely, that they partake of the intelligence of angels.

Our author, speaking of the order in which the aforesaid lives obtain in man, says that the first state of a child in the womb is that of an embryo†, and which he supposes to have a life that is merely vegetative; that when this embryotic state is at an end, and which he supposes not to be the case until the child is born, the animal state be-

* Book iii. chap. xvi. § 12, p. 262.

† § 27, p. 167.

gins ; this he supposes (although he does not directly say so) to be succeeded by the rational. What he says is, that “by the painful sensation which a child feels, and which it expresses by its crying as soon as it is born ; that by these, as well as by the like painful sensations to which it is afterwards exposed, and which it is doomed to suffer in this miserable world, it learns by degrees to avoid such evils as may add to those which, in its future life, it cannot avoid.” Now I say, in contradiction to our author, that animal life may commence previously to a child’s coming into the world : and of the truth of which the Scriptures afford us two examples ; one, in the case of Esau and Jacob, who are said to have *struggled together* in the womb of Rebekah*, and another in the case of John the Baptist, who is said to have *leaped* in the womb of Elizabeth †. This life I say a child may have, if not in its state as an *embryo*, as naturalists call its first state, in *that* at least as a *fœtus* (a distinction, by the way, which our author makes no mention of); and of this life having had a beginning previously to a child’s being born, is often, as I under-

* Genesis, xxv. 22.

† Luke, i. 41.

stand, if not always, witnessed to mothers by feelings like unto those which I have mentioned; and this is accordingly commonly called (although, upon my system, not truly so) the *quicken*ing of a child; its state of an embryo, according to the aforesaid naturalists, then ceases, and that of a fœtus begins.

There is reason however to suppose, that animal life may in some small degree have an earlier beginning in these cases than *that* which I have mentioned, and to be even coeval with a child's conception in the womb. *The blood*, it is true, is in the Scriptures called *the life* of an animal; meaning, as I suppose, blood in circulation (for, when the circulation hath ceased for a certain time, the body dies); and as the circulation of the blood depends on the breath, or external air which is drawn into the lungs, and a child cannot breathe until after it is born, so far our author may seem to have the authority of Scripture for his supposing that animal life does not commence in the case of a child until it is born: I suppose, however, in contradiction to this notion of our author's, that animal life may, as I have said, have an earlier beginning, and be even coeval with a child's

conception in the womb, and *that* without any contradiction to the Scriptures: for, when they call the blood the life, I suppose them to mean such life as a child, or any other animal, may be perceived or known to have, and of which the blood in a state of circulation is the cause. Now, if there be a something in the case of any animal, previously to its being born, that may properly be called life, it will or may be so in all animals: and it is well known in the case of a chick, whilst in the egg, that, in consequence of incubation, it has life; and this life is by naturalists called a *punctum saliens*, or small quivering motion, the seat of which, as they have ascertained, is the heart; and if this be so in the case of a chick, it not only may be so, but it is reasonable to suppose that it is so, in the case of every other animal at its first conception in the womb, the case of a child not excepted.

Sir M. Hale says much the same thing when he calls the soul a little spark of life, which at its first appearance might be contained in the hollow of a cherry-stone; he adds, however, as follows: "This little active principle increaseth, and dilateth, evolveth, diffuseth, and expandeth, if not its substan-

tial existence, yet its energy and virtue, to the utmost confines of its little province, and every particle and atom thereof; yea, and it is of that absolute necessity that it should do so, that without it the *compositum* would be dissolved, and the body dissipated into corruption and its first principles, as we see it falls out suddenly after separation of the soul from the body. As the body could not be reduced into that orderly frame in which it is constituted, without the plastic and formative power of the soul, so it could never be upheld in that state of order and convenience, without the continued influence of the soul*.”

From what has been said I think it conclusive, that animal life, whether in a man

* *Origination of Mankind*, p. 31. This notion of the learned writer cannot apply to brutes, who have no such soul as is here mentioned; and it is indeed contradicted by our author himself, who, in another part of his book, writes as follows: “The first (brute) animals that were made, and which was when God said, *Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind*, there was no mean portion of time between formation and animation, but both were together. In succeeding times, animals who come to their perfection by degrees, attain to this perfection by the formative power of the soul, or living principle; but the first formation, and information of them, by the divine fiat.” 305.

or a brute, is coeval with conception. The question, however, with respect to man is, when is it that rational life begins? But this our author does not positively say: for, although he says that the endeavours of a child to relieve itself of any such pain as it may feel after its first coming into the world, are the dawnings of reason; this dawning of reason, nevertheless, must have been preceded by the child's having a soul: for reason, in how small a degree soever it is shown, is an act of the soul; our author therefore must suppose the soul to have been given the child immediately after its having animal life; and, therefore, after its having been born. Now two different opinions have been adopted of old as to the manner in which men come by their souls, and the learned of the present day, as I believe, still continue to be divided about it: the one is, that it is by *traduction*; i. e. they that adopt this opinion, suppose the soul to have a prolific property, in like manner as the body has; according to which notion, the soul will be received by a child at its conception, and as its body is; both of which will thus be derived from a parent stock, and both properly be said to be propagated. The other opinion

is, that the soul is received by *infusion* as soon as the body is a fit mansion for it, and which will be when it first has animal life*; and in which case the soul would be a new creation; and as this was the case with Adam, the souls of all his posterity will, according to the doctrine of traduction, be derived from him, in like manner as their bodies would have been from Eve.

Having thus considered the state of men, as ever since the fall they first come into the world, I return from this digression into which I have, insensibly, as it were, been led, to the proper subject of this section, and which is the consideration of the different lives which obtain in men, viz. the vegetative, the sensitive, and the rational; but these our author supposes obtain likewise in brutes. Now I admit that brutes have not only a vegetative and a sensitive life, as we

* This must have been the case with Christ: for, being supernaturally begotten, his soul could not have been derived to him by traduction, and as I suppose to be the case at present with us; in every other respect I suppose the case of Christ to have been the same as that which in the text is described, and supposed to be the case with every man during the time of gestation in the womb; and it is so considered in Note †, Section V. Part I. p. 56.

have; but that they have, if not a soul properly so called, at least a principle of life; and which, in conformity with the Scriptures, which speak of brutes, or beasts, as being *living souls**, may be called a soul. In regard however the spirit, or soul of a brute, when it dies, is by Solomon said to go downward, and the spirit †, or soul of a man, when he dies, to go upward, there is, as in a former section I have said, an essential difference between these two species of beings.

Now, seeing brutes, as our author has observed, and as I have admitted, partake with men of a vegetative and animal life, there will be a soul in men of the same kind as that is which obtains in brutes; and this soul will be a principle of life and action with men, in like manner as it is with brutes; in

* Gen. i. 30.

† Sir Mat. Hale, speaking of the soul (or what in the book of Ecclesiastes is called a spirit, whether of a man or a beast), says, "In the human fabric there are two kinds of forms; the one, the *forma corporis*, whereby it has those properties, or operations, which are common to bodies of the like make and composition; whereby it is weighty, and descends as other bodies; lastly, whereby it has a tendency to corruption, and dissipation; nevertheless it is by reason of that form which distinguishes him from a brute, that he has the life of a man and not of brute."—*Origination of Mankind*.

us, however, it is controlable by that superior principle which is commonly called the soul, and by reason of which we differ essentially from brutes. The principle from which all the actions of brutes proceed is commonly called instinct; i. e. it is a principle by which, according to the notion which commonly prevails, they are instigated or excited to all such actions as they perform; and which actions of theirs are so well calculated to promote the end for which they proceed, and which always is the preservation of their lives*, as that it is no wonder that brutes are, by injudicious writers, so commonly supposed to be reasonable creatures; but which, for reasons that have been given, I scruple not to say, is a prostitution of the term reasonable. Seeing, however, there is no such necessity for the preservation of life in our case, as there is in that of brutes; for there is a life in our case, for the attaining to which we may act, and with which the preservation of that life which we have in common with brutes, may happen to be incompatible; it

* Emulation is a property in the case of brutes, which seems to be peculiar to horses (except as birds, who are a species of brutes, may be said to emulate one another in their singing), and is not easily to be accounted for, as their preservation does not seem in any degree to depend thereon.

will be fit that brutes, who have only one life, should act for the preservation of that life, were it only for this reason, namely, that they were originally intended for the use and service of man. Lastly, with respect to the amends which our author supposes will be made to brutes in some future state, for the sufferings to which they are exposed here, I shall not content myself with saying, as some writers have, that their pains are overbalanced by their pleasures; what I rather say is, that if the pain of body which we may feel from any cause whatever, will be of no account as the mind shall be supposed to be employed about other things, it will be evident, that brutes will stand in no need of any amends hereafter for any sufferings here: for, being incapable of reflection on any such pain as they may really feel, their case will be the same as ours with respect to any such pain as we may really feel, but not be conscious of it.

There is a notion which in the preceding section has been mentioned, relative to the two principles which in the present section have been supposed to obtain with men and brutes, and which would have superseded

the necessity of their being here again mentioned, but that it has occurred to me, that there is something farther that may be said on the subject of these two principles, than what in that section has been said. It is supposed by naturalists on the subject of that principle in brutes which is commonly called instinct, that not only all their external actions are regulated by it, and directed to their proper end; but that all their vital actions and motions, such as respiration, the circulation of the blood, &c. are immediately owing to the energy of this principle; and which, as if these actions of theirs might proceed intentionally, the aforesaid naturalists call a *mind*; but with what propriety, will in a farther part of this section be considered. The external actions and internal motions of brutes, as well as those of men, proceed from a principle which, as in a former section has been observed, may properly be called a sensitive soul, and which naturalists call the *anima*, in contradistinction to that higher principle which is called the *animus*, and which, properly considered, distinguishes men from brutes: these actions and motions, they say, are always involuntary in the case of brutes, and that they are, for the most

part, so in the case of men; for, with men, these, some of them at least, may be voluntary: and breathing, which may be either accelerated or retarded, or even wholly suspended, has been mentioned as an instance hereof*. Now these actions, as they shall be supposed to be uncontrolled by the *animus*, or governing principle, may, and usually do proceed instinctively; in regard, however, these and the like actions may be controlled, there will be a difference between them, and the like actions, as they proceed with brutes; for, with men they will proceed freely, but with brutes necessarily. I say the same of the external actions to which we may instinctively be excited: I say, that inasmuch

* Laughing and crying, whatever the cause of these may happen to be, are with children involuntary motions; they may, however, in time become voluntary, i. e. they may be moderated, suspended, or even wholly suppressed, for instance, from a sense of decency, respect, fear, or shame. The cause of laughter however, even with adults, may be so forcible, as that it cannot, from any consideration whatever, be restrained. Crying may likewise, from various considerations, be moderated or suppressed; the cause, however, of crying may be so great, as that a person may have no power either to moderate or suppress it; it may indeed be either moderated or suppressed, by a contrary passion being excited, i. e. laughter; but this can be only for a time; for it will return with an increased violence, as the cause of laughter shall no longer be felt.

as they are controllable by the mind, or intellectual faculty, they will have the reason of free or voluntary actions: and it is accordingly a rule in morals, that a man is responsible for what he has involuntarily done, in a case where his not doing it was possible. Again I say of actions which are indifferent either to good or evil, and which proceed instinctively, i. e. without the attention of the mind, and which, among the many instances which may be given, I will mention *that* of a man's conversing with others whilst he is eating his dinner, I say, that so long as he might have done this with attention, his doing it without attention, will have the reason of a voluntary act: for these various reasons I am of opinion, that the term instinct cannot properly be applied to man, even before his attaining to an age to make use of his reason: for, as reason, or intelligence, will require time only to expand, in order to its being as truly a reasonable or intelligent principle before as after its due expansion, so will man's state and condition, even from the time of his conception in the womb, have been essentially different from the state and condition of brutes.

I shall conclude the present section by observing, that as what has been said in the case of men, considered as part of a cone, would apply in the case of brutes,; and as, upon the notion of a cone, whether as adopted by our author, or by other writers, there is nothing that is true with respect to men, that will not be so with respect to brutes, as these respectively make parts of this cone, others may think as they please of this notion, but, as to myself, I utterly reject it: for those who suppose “the supreme Creator of all things, and the whole system of all creatures from the highest seraphim to brute matter, to be, as it were, an infinite cone” (for these are the words of our author), in fact suppose all created things, not merely to resemble, but in some degree to partake of the nature of the Creator; than which nothing can be more absurd; and of which, a learned Prelate* scruples not to say, that it is blasphemous.

* Preface to *Philosophical Principles of Religion*, p. 2.

SECTION VII.



I PROBABLY shall be thought to have said full as much, if not more than is sufficient to establish my notion as to the essential difference between men and brutes: there nevertheless are some observations on the subject of brutes which have fallen from the pen of a learned Prelate besides those of his which I have already mentioned, and which equally deserve to be noticed. “Brutes,” the learned writer says, “are capable of all the sensations that are in us; and though the senses in many of them are more acute than those in man, and consequently more susceptible of quick and vigorous impressions from sensible objects; yet all this is no more in them, than the striking of one material substance upon another; the effect of which remains just as long as there is a disposition in the animal spirits to retain it. But for want of

an higher and immaterial principle, when the *idea* is once formed, they can take no after-view, or notion of it, distinct from the sensation itself. This is the utmost extent of all that knowledge in brutes, which we call instinct; and is really no other than a disposition of their senses by the Author of nature, to excel in those particular instances of sensation wherein the being or preservation of every species is most concerned. They are never actuated or influenced by more than one simple *idea* at a time; nor by that neither but when there is some actual impression of the external object to stir it up within them, or some remains of the impression continuing in the imagination and brain; and all they perform is at the impulse and instigation of particular ideas of sensation, which is the only direction they have in all their operations *.”

Now there is, it must be confessed, something plausible in this account; it nevertheless, as I conceive, is objectionable; it is objectionable, as it supposes brutes to be capable of ideas. Brutes, as hath been said, are

* Browne's Procedure, &c. C. ii. Sect. 2.

usually supposed to see, hear, or otherwise sensibly perceive, and, according to the last-mentioned writer, even to have ideas of things sensible, in like manner as we have. Their actions, it is true, proceed as if this was the case; it is not however for this reason true that it is the case. It is certain that we see, hear, &c. and may have ideas of such things as we have seen, heard, or have otherwise sensibly perceived; but it is not certain that it is in the manner after which these things are commonly supposed to happen, that they are so seen, &c.: to show this I observe as follows.

We cannot conceive how any thing should be seen, but as, according to the common philosophy, we suppose certain effluvia, or films as some call them, are emitted from the visible object, and strike upon the retina of the eye; nor how any thing should be heard, but as the sound of an audible thing, and which sound is caused by a commotion or undulation of the air, striking upon the tympanum of the ear; nor can we have any idea of any such thing as we have seen or heard, but as we suppose the aforesaid effluvia to have acted on the brain, or sensorium, and to have made traces thereon; which traces,

as they are viewed by the soul, give it an idea of these things. These, I say, are the notions which commonly obtain with respect to sensible and intellectual perception *, and I do not pretend to say that we may have better: I deny, however, that these things really take place; I grant that we see, hear, and otherwise sensibly perceive, and that we may have ideas of these things; but I deny that it is in the manner which hath been mentioned (although the only way in which we can account for these things), that they happen; their happening in the manner which has been mentioned would indeed, should we consider the matter seriously, be found to be

* When things are intellectually perceived, in the sense intellectual perception is spoken of in the text, what is meant is, that when things are sensibly perceived, i. e. seen, heard, &c. they are judged of by mind as to what they really are; this is very commonly expressed by judging from the report of the senses; and this Archbishop King says the vulgar always do. "There are men however," he says, "who, puffed up with vanity of appearing wiser than the vulgar, leave truth behind them, and are blind in full light. Hence some have denied motion, others space, others all sense in brutes."—*Orig. of Evil*, vol. ii. p. 325. When our author however, who supposes that brutes really feel pain, says in the next page, that "not being conscious of feeling pain, we feel none," he in fact differs not in opinion from those men who he says deny all sense in brutes: for these certainly are not conscious of their feelings either pleasure or pain.

absurd; the case however, as we would philosophize on these matters, is, as I have said, remediless. What may, and all that can be said upon this subject, is this; as the Scriptures accommodate themselves to our weakness, when they represent God as seeing, hearing, &c. and even as having ideas, the impossibility of our having better notions of things which have been mentioned, imposes the necessity upon us of being contented with such notions only as we may, and as I suppose it to be the will of God that we should have, and so I suppose it to be in the present case.

Now, I suppose it to be the will of God likewise, that we should believe brutes to feel the pain which they at any time appear to feel, as really as we do; and we cannot absolutely say that they do not; nay, we cannot, in spite of our philosophy, but believe that they really feel the pain which they at any time appear to feel; and we do not at any time punish them as we would correct them, or pity them as we see them suffering undeservedly, but as we believe not only that they feel pain, but they are endowed with understanding; and if at any time we either

punish them wantonly, or pity them not when they appear to suffer undeservedly, we shall have to answer for it at God's tribunal*. As we then, by the exercise of our benevolence towards brutes, may be gainers, but which benevolence supposes them to feel both pleasure and pain, and in some measure to understand, we may be well contented to be deceived in this matter (if we really are deceived), when we consider, that our case, as we should be undeceived, would be like that of the madman who fancied himself to be a king, but who was restored to his right senses, "Pol me occidistis, amici, non salvâstis, mentis gratissimus error."

* "If Balaam had done justly, he would have spared his ass, and have corrected himself: but the false Prophet doth the fault, and the poor beast must bear both blame and strokes."—Bp. Sanderson's Sermons, p. 282, fol. ed.

SECTION VIII.

OUR author (Dr. Cheyne), in the thirty-third section of his *Philosophical Conjectures*, appears to have been well acquainted with the writings of Bishop Browne, on the subject of analogy; a subject which it seems had been much discussed in this learned Prelate's time, and much has since been written thereon. By some it has been defended; but by others condemned, as being, in their opinion, not perfectly orthodox: of the former of these is our author, who observes as follows:—"All systems of natural religion are as incomprehensible and inexplicable as any mystery in revealed, unless it be by analogy." And Bishop Browne, in his *Procedure of the human Understanding*, to the same purpose, says, "Except as we have recourse to an analogical way of reasoning in support of the mysterious doctrines of our religion, the objections of infidels are unanswerable."

Our author's (Dr. Cheyne's) notions on the subject of analogy are as follows:—He supposes “that all intelligent beings, as having been impressed with the divine image, are emanations from the First Cause; that the natural powers, or faculties, which we feel in our own souls, may fairly be carried up to absolute infinitude by analogy, and, in some imperfect and gross manner, be so raised as to give a faint idea of the Supreme Being; that therefore, whatever natural powers, qualities, or faculties, we feel in our own souls, we may safely conclude there are powers, qualities, and faculties, eminently correspondent and analogous to them in the divine nature, with the difference that absolute infinitude has to the lowest finite; and, on the other hand, that there are minute resemblances in all finite intelligences, correspondent and analogous to the essential and fundamental attributes in the divine nature, and consequently that we may fairly reason from our own spiritual nature up to the divine, keeping within the bounds and proportions above mentioned.” On the subject of the divine image, our author supposes, “that living (or life), understanding, and will, are the three radical powers of which our spi-

ritual nature consists, and that all our intellectual operations are modifications of these; that in the divine nature, the three analogous and correspondent attributes are self-existence, omniscience, and omnipotence. All these three natural powers and faculties are comprehended in one spiritual nature in all created intelligences: in them they are modalities only, powers or faculties; but in the divine nature they are realities, because of the infinite activity of that nature, for nothing is more certain in philosophy than the axiom in divinity, that *every thing in God is God**.

The human nature, these writers say, is so very different from the divine, that there evidently could have been no intercourse between God and man, had there not originally been some resemblance between heavenly and earthly things. Now, although man's having originally been made in the divine image and likeness is no argument to prove that all earthly things were made after the pattern of heavenly things, it nevertheless affords so much presumptive evidence of its having been so, that Plato, who is supposed to have

* Phil. Conject. § 33.

been well acquainted with the writings of Moses, supposed the same. In support of this notion, our author supposes it to be impossible that infinite power and perfection should bring any being into existence which had not his own stamp or image on it; and *that* for this reason, namely, that there would be nothing besides himself whose image it should be; and that it is absurd to say, that any thing which God had originally made should represent nothing at all that did previously exist—a sentiment which had been before expressed by St. Augustine, who says, “that as the three divine Persons of the holy Trinity concurred in the creation of all things, so do all things bear the stamp of their Maker.” In confirmation of this notion, St. Paul tells us, *We now see things darkly, and as in a glass*; for, by these things the Apostle, as commentators in general suppose, means things heavenly; and by the glass or mirror, in which they are seen, things earthly. Now, it is evident, that if heavenly things may as perfectly be seen in things earthly as a man’s face may be seen in a glass, there will be the same similitude between heavenly and earthly things, as there is between the face seen in the glass and the face

of which it is the image : as the face seen in the glass, however, will be darkly seen, because it is an image only, and not the face itself ; so likewise will it be with heavenly, as they are supposed to be seen in earthly things.

On the ground of what has been said, the doctrine of analogy may readily be understood ; for, if there be an exact resemblance between any two things, it is evidently impossible that we should know any thing of the nature of the one, and be wholly ignorant of the nature of the other : on the contrary, so much as we know of the nature of the one, so much we shall know of the nature of the other ; for, in this case we shall, without our knowing or being conscious of it, have transferred the ideas which we have of a thing with whose nature we were well acquainted, to a thing with whose nature we neither were nor could have been at all acquainted. Now, such precisely is the doctrine of analogy ; it supposes a resemblance to subsist between two things, of the one of which we have a conception, but of the other no conception at all. As this shall be supposed, it clearly shows, that as we shall substitute the ideas which we have

of the one in the place of the other, but of which we have no conception, we shall, as the advocates for this doctrine contend, evidently have the same conception of the latter as we have of the former.

For the refutation, however, of this doctrine, notwithstanding the support which it may seem to have in the before-mentioned words of St. Paul, I will suppose of the universe, that as it could not have been self-existent, and that it must of course have had a cause of its existence, we may know that nothing less than a power that is infinite could have been the cause of its existence: this power, I grant, we can have no conception of; seeing, however, any property or excellency which we are told we must substitute in the room of power must be adequate to the effect, i. e. to the production of the universe, and every effect implies a power in its proper cause, when we ascribe power to God as the creator of the universe, although we do no more, in fact, than say that he was the cause of the existence of the universe, we nevertheless, in our ascribing power to God, ascribe something to him of which we have a conception, although not an ade-

quate one. Again, I say that whether, perceiving, as we may do, the admirableness with which the world has been contrived for its answering the purposes for which it was made, we ascribe wisdom to God ; or, experiencing the comforts and conveniencies of this life, we ascribe goodness unto him ; we do the same thing as when we ascribe power to him, i. e. we acknowledge him to be the cause of which the admirable contrivance, and the comforts and conveniencies which have been mentioned, are the effects ; and from all which it will be evident, that God may, with the same propriety, be said to be powerful, wise, and good, as that he may be said to be the cause of those things in which power, wisdom, and goodness, are displayed : and if so, the necessity of any transferring of the ideas of things of which we have a conception, in the place of those of which we have no conception, is wholly superseded, and the danger of our doing so avoided ; but if so, the doctrine of analogy cannot stand, and that it cannot stand on any good foundation I observe as follows :

There is a doctrine which is not peculiar to Bishop Browne, but which has been adopt-

ed by another writer: they both of them suppose, that there is something in the nature of man, by reason whereof he can have no conception at all of a pure spiritual substance: the one of them says, that “it is impossible for us to have an idea of an active power in any degree, if we must have it only from an immaterial substance, of which we have no idea at all; nor indeed a conception of any one operation of it independent of matter or material organs, in conjunction with which the spirit of man exerts all its operations*.” To the same purpose the other writer says, “If we take a view of our thinking part in all its operations, we find in all these it is constantly joined and mixed with

* Browne's Procedure, &c. p. 73. It has been observed, in agreement with these notions of Bishop Browne, by a learned friend of mine, that there is no word, in ours, or any other language, that properly expresses the mind; that the words which we use to express things of a spiritual nature, are taken from things of a material nature; and the word spiritual is an example hereof, which signifies breathing, and which is an act of the body; that therefore there is no word that properly expresses God; and that when we say God is a spirit, we make use of a word that signifies breathing; and this notion of a spiritual thing being necessarily expressed by a material word, seems to be confirmed by the Scriptures, when they say, that Christ *breathed on them* (the Apostles), and said, *Receive ye the Holy Ghost.* John, xx. 22.

the bodily frame; nor can any of these take place unless the bodily system be in a condition to act with it, and assist it in its offices: how then shall we say that this mind of ours is a substance entirely simple and uncompounded, when experience shows that every action of it is from a mixed principle and source *?" In answer, and for the refuting of these notions, I say, that thinking must be the property either of a material or of an immaterial substance; for, as these are essentially different from one another, it cannot be the property of both, either in conjunction or separately.

The latter of the above writers says, "that it was Mr. Locke's opinion, that God might, if it pleased him, annex thought to a proper system of matter."—(P. 9.) In agreement herewith, he in a further part of his book says, "It seems consonant to reason that the thinking principle should be communicated to an elegant system of matter."—(P. 46.) Now, in answer to this I say, that if thinking be in such manner peculiar to the soul, as that it is properly to be called a

* Inquiry into the Nature of the human Soul, p. 57.

thinking substance, thought cannot be communicated to matter, however sublimized or refined, but as its nature will be changed; and from its having been a material, it will become an immaterial substance. This doctrine, then, is evidently rank materialism; and the same may be said of it as it has been adopted by Bishop Browne; for the principle on which it is grounded is the same with both.

For the reasons which I have given, the advocates for the doctrine of analogy fall into the error of the Epicureans. Epicurus, perceiving that good and evil fall indiscriminately to the lot of the good and the wicked, concluded that there was no providential governor of the world; i. e. he denied that the world was governed by any such power, wisdom, or goodness, as by some philosophers was supposed; for, that good and evil falling indiscriminately to the lot of good and bad men, was inconsistent with this notion. Now, if it be by reason of the divine attributes only that we can know that any such being as God is exists, on whatever ground we shall say that no such properties or excellences, as power, wisdom, and good-

ness, are displayed, either in the construction of the world or in the government thereof, we shall deny, as Epicurus did, that there is any such being as God.

The advocates for the doctrine of analogy say, that because (as they will have it at least) there are no properties in the Deity of which we can have any conception, we, as we would know that any such being as God is exists, must suppose that there are properties or excellences in him of which we can have no conception, but which, however, may have effects similar to those which may obtain in us, such as power, wisdom, and goodness; that therefore it is only as we shall substitute such properties or excellences as we may have a conception of, in the place of those of which we can have no conception, that we can know that any such being as God is exists*. In answer to which I say, that if there may be any such properties or excellences in the Deity as may have effects similar to those which arise from such properties and excellences as we possess, no good reason can be given why there may not be properties or ex-

* See Archbishop King's Discourse on Predestination, p. 6.

cellences in God, the same in kind, although not in degree, as those which are in us.

The strongest argument, after all that I have said against the doctrine of analogy, is, that it is inconsistent with *that* of the holy Trinity; for, according to this doctrine, the properties or excellences which are ascribed unto God, although similar to those which are found in man, are nevertheless different from these in their being essential to the divine nature. The power, the wisdom, and the goodness, which we ascribe unto God, are, according to the doctrine of the Trinity, as this doctrine is contained in the Athanasian Creed, three distinct subsistences, or Persons; they nevertheless are one in respect of that substantiality of which they alike partake. As then we shall say, that power, wisdom, and goodness, are in God, as they are analogous only to these properties as they obtain in us, we shall deny the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity, as it is contained in the Athanasian Creed. This argument, it perhaps will be said by the advocates for the doctrine of analogy, rather proves the falsehood of the doctrine of the Trinity, than that of the

doctrine of analogy; the doctrine of the Trinity, however, stands on too sure a foundation to be shaken by any thing which the advocates for the doctrine of analogy can say against it; it is grounded in the Scriptures, but which their doctrine is not.

The doctrine which has been discussed in this section has been adopted by Archbishop King, in his *Discourse on Predestination*: a discourse which has been lately very highly spoken of by a learned divine, as giving support to his arguments on the same subject*. The author, however, was probably not aware, that the learned Dr. Cudworth had long since condemned the doctrine of analogy, as being equally false as that of predestination, and which is the subject of his (Dr. C.'s) *Discourse*; for, had the learned author been aware of this, he probably would have thought it a respect due to the memory of this learned divine, to take some notice of this circumstance, but which he has not done. Dr. C.'s words are as follows:—"There are some who, by reason of a penury of an universal goodness and love within their own

* See Copleston's *Inquiry*, &c. p. 116.

breasts, and confining themselves to particular interests, shape the idea of God as suitable to and resembling their own contracted spirits as they can, and therefore attribute love to him only *secundum effectum*, and not *affectum*; whereby they would make us believe, that there is no such real propriety or affection as love existing and living in the Deity, but only a bare indication of it by certain effects, which, because our short and sterile understandings know not how to express otherwise, we give them the denomination of love and goodness. Now, although the Deity be not subject to those variable passions which in ourselves we style love and hatred, and which are seldom grounded but upon humour and fancy; yet to deny that there is any such thing really and formally in God as love and goodness, such a principle as carries him out to the production of all possible beings, and whereby he takes an eternal complacency and delight in whatever acts regularly within its sphere, is in itself but a groundless fancy: for that beloved disciple of the blessed Jesus, St. John, who leaned on a breast never void of love and pity to the sons of men, when he would set out and express the nature of God to us in

the most significant manner, tells us, that *he is love*; which doubtless denotes something real and certain, not a bare notion or airy idea, and fantastic dream known only by some effects, being something only *κατα δοξαν*, not *κατα ἀλήθειαν* *.”

It appears from the above extract, that the learned author, contrarily to the notion of Dr. Copleston, thought that there was no danger of his establishing the doctrine of predestination, by his contending against that of analogy.

I shall conclude this section with observing, that it is somewhat singular, that Archbishop King, who, as has been stated, has in his Discourse on Predestination adopted the doctrine of analogy, although in his preceding Discourse he has not expressly condemned it, it nevertheless has so happened, that he has coincided with me in my notions on this subject; as will appear from the following extract:—“That God must have the same judgment and approbation of that moral

* The divine Goodness vindicated against the Assertors of inconditionate Reprobation, p. 88.

good which all rational beings have; and that we must judge of the nature and perfections of the Deity, only by that nature, and those perfections which we derive from him, is, I think, very plain; I mean, that we must not endeavour to conceive the several attributes of God by substituting something in him of a quite different kind, and totally diverse from that which we find in ourselves, even though that could be in some respects similar and analogous to this: but we are to suppose somewhat of the very same kind and sort, the same qualities or properties in general to be both in him and us, and then remove all manner of defect or imperfection which attends the particular modus or degree of their kinds of apparent perfection observable in his creatures, except such as argue at the same time imperfection (v. g. motion, which necessarily implies limitation), or are inconsistent with some other and greater perfection (v. g. materiality, which excludes knowledge and liberty). We also remove from him all want, dependence, alteration, uneasiness, &c.; in short, all that results either from simple finiteness, or from the mere union of two finite imperfect substances, such as constitute man. And when we have

thus applied every thing in every manner of existence which seems to imply perfection, and exclude every thing, in every manner of existence which implies or includes the contrary, we have got our idea of an absolutely perfect Being, which we call God. It is therefore attributing to God some real qualities of a certain determinate kind (v. g. knowledge or power, goodness or truth), the nature of which qualities we do perceive, are directly conscious of, and know, which gives us an idea or conception of him, and a proper one too (if any such distinction of ideas were allowed), and not imagining some others we cannot tell of what sort, totally different in nature and kind from any that we ever did perceive or know, which would give us an idea or conception at all of him, either proper or improper*.”

* Origin of Evil, vol. i. p. 88, note R. k.

SECTION IX.



OUR author, in Proposition XXI. of his *Philosophical Principles of Religion*, supposes, “that in all intelligent beings there are faculties which are fitted to those objects with which they were originally intended to have communion; and that in man these faculties are of three kinds, viz. body, soul, and spirit: that the two former of these have relation to the mundane system, and enable him to have communion with his fellow-creatures and the things of this world; and that the last of them hath relation to the eternal Spirit, and enables him to have communion with this Spirit; and that from hence arises the distinction between the outward or natural man, and the inward or spiritual man: that the dictates of the natural man are in Scripture called the law of the members; and those of the spiritual man, the law of the spirit; and that these are in opposition the one to the other.” In a Corollary to this

Proposition, our author, in relation to this subject, observes, “ that the material system is the proper object of the senses *; that the body is, accordingly, endowed with outward senses, perception, imagination, understanding, and will; that the rational soul enables him to communicate with the created spiritual world, and is accordingly endowed with inward senses, imagination, understanding, and will; and that the third principle, the spirit, enables him to communicate with the supreme uncreated Spirit; and that for this purpose he is endowed with inmost senses, imagination, understanding, and will; and that as these three different principles, in their original constitution, harmonize and agree, so is the discord which at present subsists between them a proof of their degeneracy, and the effect of the fall; and that a further consequence has been an usurped government of the natural understanding or rational soul, whereby the spirit is in bondage, and the things of the spirit, contrarily to nature, are judged of by the natural understanding.” Our author, in a subsequent Proposition, to show that the rational soul is

* Corol. ii.

not a faculty appropriated to the consideration of things of a purely spiritual nature observes, "that all its ideas arise from the perception of things sensible, and that they therefore can be such only as have a congruity with these; inasmuch, however, as the spiritual world has nothing to do with things sensible, the things of this world cannot be properly considered by this faculty: that things material or corporeal have a contrariety to things immaterial or spiritual; that, therefore, it is as incongruous that the rational soul should be supposed to be a principle of communication with both those, as that the eye should be supposed to hear as well as to see." Our author does not attribute it to the fall, that the rational soul is not adapted to the consideration of things of a spiritual nature, but contends, "that it must, from its very nature, always have been so;" the conclusion, according to our author, is, "that as we cannot think on things of a material nature without those ideas which arise from things sensible, so neither can we on things spiritual without ideas which arise from the perception of these; and that, as the rational soul is a faculty fitted for the perception of the former, so the spirit is a

faculty fitted for the perception of the latter.” In a Corollary to this Proposition, our author observes, “ that as the light of the sun is the medium through which things material are seen and perceived, so the divine light, which the Sun of righteousness sends forth, is the proper medium through which things spiritual are seen and perceived; and as the just and the unjust are indiscriminately enlightened by the former, so is the latter a light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.” Our author, in another work of his, confesses, “ that human reason may with propriety apply itself to objects to which it is neither adequate nor appropriate, by supposing those to which it is adequate and appropriate to be images of the former; and it may thus form images of superior objects, from what it knows of the material world; images, not metaphorical, but real or physical: these images,” he says, “ will represent superior objects, as a seed does a full-grown plant, or an embryo an adult animal; that further than this reason cannot go in divine matters*.” Our author says, of the first of those principles which he supposes to be the con-

* Phil. Prin. of Religion, part ii. p. 126.

stituent part of man, viz. the body, that it is endued with senses; these, however, can no otherwise properly be said to be outward, as he calls them, than in respect of their objects, viz. the material system: the same would be true of perception, imagination, understanding, and will, were these acts of the body, but which they evidently cannot be unconnectedly with the second of the aforesaid principles, namely, the soul, even in the sense in which he understands this principle, and which, in conjunction with the body, he supposes to constitute what the Scriptures call *the outward man*, and that the *inner man* consists of the third of our author's supposed constituent parts of man, and which he calls the spirit. I do not, I confess, see any material objection to these notions; they border upon those of Bishop Browne; but as they agree in a great measure with those of Bishop Bull, and which in the sequel will be stated, I propose in the mean time to compare them with those of a modern learned commentator.

The learned commentator supposes, that by the word *soul*, mentioned in Heb. iv. 12, is meant "that inferior faculty by which we think of and desire what concerns our pre-

sent being and welfare:" and that by the word *spirit* is meant "a superior power, by which we prefer future things to present; by which we are directed to pursue truth above all things; and even to despise what is agreeable to our present state, as it stands in competition with, or is prejudicial to, our future happiness*." Now, it is observable, that St. Paul, in this text, speaks of two principles only as being essential to man, viz. soul and spirit; whereas, in 1 Thess. v. 23, he mentions three, viz. spirit, soul, and body. Our commentator, to reconcile these two texts, says, "We must suppose that, by the word soul, as it occurs in the former of these texts, the Apostle means that spiritual principle within us which, in conjunction with the body, constitutes that being which is called man." The text, however, of 1 Thess. v. 23, as hath been said, mentions three different principles as being essential to man, viz. body, soul, and spirit; and Justin Martyr, in a comment on this text, says, "The body is the house of the soul, and the soul the house of the spirit†." In conformity with, and in continuation (as it should seem) of these words of this ancient

* Dr. Adam Clarke.

† Cohort. sect. vii. p. 20.

father, his scholar Tatian says, “The soul, having obtained a conjunction with the divine Spirit, is not helpless, but ascends to those regions whither it is led by the same Spirit; for, the seat or habitation of the soul is from above, but the generation of the other (i. e. the body) is from beneath*.” In agreement with these notions, the learned Bishop from whom I have quoted, in the first Section of Part I. of this Discourse, supposes the soul, when it was breathed into Adam, to have been supernaturally endowed with a divine spirit, not which would immortalize the soul (for the soul being the breath of life would necessarily be immortal), but the man, consisting of a soul united to a body. Seeing, however, as in the above-mentioned Section has been observed, man would be immortal, by virtue of this divine Spirit with which his soul was endowed as is aforesaid, so long only has he kept this Spirit; for that, having a freedom of will, he might lose it; when the learned Bishop calls this divine Spirit “a third essential principle in man’s nature†,” he supposes man (as I understand the learned Bishop) to have been advanced to some state, in

* See Bull’s Sermons, vol. iii. p. 1093. † P. 1121.

which his losing this Spirit would be impossible; and this I suppose to be the case with us at the present time, who, having been baptized, are endowed with this Spirit, but whose keeping it will depend on our keeping those vows which we made at our baptism; and as we cannot keep these vows but as God shall give us the grace so to do, the Apostle prays that we may have this grace, when he prays that *our whole spirit, and soul, and body, may be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.*

SECTION X.

“ **W**HAT men usually call a genius, i. e. a man endowed with such an understanding as, when duly cultivated, it will qualify him for being a hero, a statesman, or a philosopher,” our author considers as being owing to the perfection of his bodily organs; for, that the faculties of the mind or soul are, as he supposes, alike in all men. To the same cause he attributes the greater sensibility, or quickness of the senses, which some men, or even brutes, have, than others; that it is accordingly found, that temperance in diet and bodily exercise conduce to this effect*.

The ingenious author of an *Inquiry into the Nature of the human Soul*, differs but little from Dr. Cheyne, when he says, “ that it is owing to mechanism, or the construction of the brain, that one head shall be clearer, or more capable of masterly reason, than another” (p. 7); and he agrees with Dr. Cheyne

* Philos. Conject. § xxvi.

in supposing there is no difference in human understandings, except what arises from the connexion which the understanding, or soul, has with the body; and that the variety in the understandings of men happens from the difference of the organs by which the finer parts are fitted to their service*. This philosophy has been adopted by the authors of the Quarterly Review; the effects, however, of organization they suppose to be much greater than any which, in our text, is ascribed to it. They suppose, "that the modification of the brain, whatever it may naturally be, is liable to change, in the case of individuals; and that the effects which it has in the case of nations, is, a change of manners, doctrines, and language." They farther observe, "that the climate inhabited by each nation, chiefly conduces to harden or soften their organs; and although many changes are gradually effected by time, still *that* most congenial to the organs of each people always prevails †."

It is, I grant, a circumstance in favour of these notions (and as being so, it is mentioned by Dr. C.), "that the understanding

* P. 7 et seq.

† No. LIII. p. 66.

may be impaired, and even be destroyed, by injuries on the brain." It may be doubted however, whether this was originally so; i. e. whether the perfection of Adam's understanding, as he came out of the hands of his Maker, depended on the perfection of his bodily frame; and if it did not, the fall of man will make no such difference in the case, as that it should be otherwise with us. The understanding of Adam became impaired by the fall, and his body became mortal; the weakness, however, of his present, in comparison of his former understanding, had a moral, and not a physical cause; and so it is with us who are descended from him.

This, it is true, may be so, consistently with the diversity which we see obtaining among men with respect to their minds or understandings, as well as with respect to their bodies. Now it will be difficult upon any rational grounds to account for the difference between men in the latter of these respects, as well as for a sexual difference; we may attempt this, and no harm will be done if we do not succeed. It will be otherwise however, as we would upon rational principles account for the difference between men,

generally considered, and as they come into the world, with respect to their intellectual powers; for we cannot attribute this difference to any other cause than that of the divine will, but as we shall fall into materialism: a doctrine which, like that of infidelity, to which it is nearly allied, I am sorry to find, prevails much in this country at this day.

It is as containing in them the doctrine of materialism, that I have in a former section supposed the notions of Bishop Browne to lead to atheism, although he probably was not aware of this. But not so the author of an *Inquiry into the Nature of the human Soul*: for, when he asserts, that “neither man nor the universe were made out of nothing, as it is nowadays supposed to be; but out of emanations, very possibly of different kinds and degrees, that flowed from the divine essence*,” there can be no doubt with respect to the point which he was driving at. But still less can we doubt of this when he adds as follows: “May we not, from this notion of emanations, give a reason why dividing and comminuting our blood and fluids, as

* Page 53.

it is done and brought about by constant circulations, into the most indefinitely fine particles, makes them fit for the reception and embraces of the mind? which seems to be because they are thereby brought nearer their fountain and original; which is no other than the divine emanations; from which, as we are taught by good authority to believe, the whole world of beings, not excepted gross matter itself, are derived; which matter was brought down into this compressed mass, in order the better to fit it for the wise ends and purposes of the great Creator and Framers of all things*.”

Now, this good authority, on which our author has adopted his notion of emanations, is that of Aristotle and his followers; and it is not to be wondered at, that men who had no other light than that of nature to direct them, should not be able to give a better account of the origin of the world.

The doctrine of emanations, as constituting the origin of the universe, was, it seems, prevailing much, early in the last century,

when the subject was taken up by a pious and learned writer, and who has shown, by an argument that is unanswerable, the impossibility of the world's existence from all eternity; and which must be the case, as it shall be supposed to have emanated from the divine mind or essence. This argument is as follows: "All things, as they are in their present state, are conereted of other things, and necessarily, in their own nature, require a pre-existence of those more simple bodies out of which they are conereted, and a pre-existence of some preparatory antecedent motion, for their coalition, mixture, and concretion, as animals, vegetables, minerals, and regularly all mixed bodies. These things, constituted and being in that state we find them, cannot be eternal, or without a beginning; or if, *gratia argumenti*, we admit that simple bodies, the four elements for instance, existed eternally, the things of which they are compounded could not have existed at all; for there could have been no time when they could have begun to exist*." This is a very small part of our author's argument; I must therefore, from a want of room in this Discourse, refer those

* Sir M. Hale's Origination of Mankind, p. 74.

who wish to see it supported by much powerful reasoning, grounded on the Mosaic account, and answering various objections which the learned author supposes might be made to this argument of his, to chap. iii. of sect. i. of his book. I shall conclude this section with observing, that this notion of emanations is evidently atheistical, and it was so considered by Sir M. Hale; and further proof of its being so will be given in the ensuing section. Whether or not Dr. Cheyne was aware of this I pretend not to say; but he, as in former sections may be seen, has adopted it with respect to the origin of man.

SECTION XI.

“THE will,” according to our author, “is the ruling and directing faculty in spiritual nature;” i. e. it rules absolutely and without control, even by the understanding. “Material objects,” he says, “may limit and moderate its operations; it nevertheless may, by its own energy, act beyond matter, at a distance, and without the intervention of a material medium*.” The will, according to Mr. Locke, is not properly a faculty, but a power or ability of doing things in such manner as that we may be conscious to ourselves that they are of our own doing; for, as these things shall be supposed to be of a moral nature, it is only as we are conscious to ourselves that they are of our own doing that we can be responsible for them; and this responsibility will arise, whether these things are judged of at the bar of our own conscience,

* *Philosoph. Conject.* § xxxi.

at that of the public community to which we belong, or at the divine tribunal.

Man, nevertheless, is free to choose evil, as good and evil shall be supposed to be at any time set before him, notwithstanding his foreseeing what the consequence will be of his so doing. It is, however, by reason of the twofold nature of which he consists that this is the case; for, as evil cannot be chosen as evil, so, in order to its being chosen, it must have the appearance of good. Now, there is a good which is peculiar to the sensitive nature, and there is a good which is peculiar to the spiritual nature; and of these two natures man consists. The good which is peculiar to the sensitive nature, is a good which is present and of this world; whilst that which is peculiar to the spiritual nature, is a good which is future and of another world*. Now,

* In the tragedy of "Romeo and Juliet," the apothecary, knowing the purpose for which the poisonous drug for which he was applied to was intended, says, "My poverty, but not my will, consents." Now, although his will, i. e. the will of his superior nature, did not consent, but, on the contrary, as we may suppose, revolted at the idea of the thing required of him, the will nevertheless of his inferior nature, signified by the word poverty, consented; and he accordingly complied with the request that was made to him. The poverty, how-

seeing a good which is of this world has the same contrariety to a good which is of another world, as the sensitive nature has to the spiritual, it will be evident, not only that they cannot both be chosen, but that if a good which is of this world be chosen, that which is of another world will virtually be rejected. A good, however, which is of this world, having, as hath been said, a contrariety to that which is of another, it will be evil as compared to that which is of another world: if any one, then, choose a good which is of this world, in preference to that which is of another, he will in fact be choosing evil. As this shall be supposed to be a true statement, the will certainly may truly be said to be, as our author supposes it to be, the ruling and directing faculty in spiritual nature. The question however is, what his meaning

ever, of this man, how great soever it may be supposed to have been, would not have justified the deed; for the province or proper office of the superior nature is to govern and overrule the inferior; and in this his fault consisted. The case seems to have been a hard one, and very trying, as we may suppose, to flesh and blood; he nevertheless certainly ought to have acted from the superior will, i. e. from the dictates of his conscience or understanding, whatever might have been the consequence; it nevertheless is, as I believe in the present case, generally understood otherwise.

is when he says that “ the will may by its energy act beyond matter, at a distance, and without the intervention of a material medium ; ” for the explaining this, so far as I can understand his meaning, I observe as follows.

As a good or happiness which is of a future life can be attained to only as a man shall qualify himself for it in the present life (and which, by the way, is in agreement with the notion of the present being a state of probation), the things which he shall have done in this life will in fact, and as they shall be judged of hereafter, show whether he has chosen a good which is of this world, or that which is of another: this, I say, will in fact be the case, although the question, as the Scriptures express themselves, will be, whether he has done good, or whether he has done evil. Now, as any one shall, by the grace of God, have chosen a good which is future and of another life, he will, although not knowingly and intentionally, have chosen an evil that is of this life: for it is only as the evils to which we are subject in this life are patiently borne, and so in fact chosen, that we can attain to a good which is of another.

Except, then, the term *matter* made use of by our author, these evils in particular, as we pass through this transitory life, in our way to a life which will endure for ever, may be supposed to be meant, I am at a loss to know what his meaning is. As this shall be supposed to be his meaning, the will may very well be said by its energy to act beyond matter; for, as a man shall be supposed happily to have chosen a good that is of another life, his will will continually be carrying him not only beyond the evils which befall him, but beyond the good things which may fall to his lot, in this life, to that good which he will have chosen, and which with the eye of faith he will see.

Our author, in a further part of his discourse, says, “that the will is self-active, and consequently that the perfection of the understanding will depend upon it.” In a former section our author had supposed the perfection of the understanding to depend on the perfection of the bodily frame; the goodness of the understanding may be in proportion to the activity of the will, and so vice versâ; but I cannot see how the one can in any degree depend on the other. It is

not, however, certain that the will is self-active, if, by this term, its acting without a motive be meant. The will, I grant, may act contrarily to the judgment, or dictates of the understanding; but it is not therefore self-active: for the will, I suppose, never acts contrarily to the dictates of the superior nature, but as it obeys those of the inferior; and this was the case in the tragedy of *Medea*, *Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor**.

* There is perhaps no subject on which more has been written, than that of the will; and this subject I believe I may say, has by none been treated of with greater ability, than Archbishop King. If, however, he is right in supposing elections, or determinations of the will, may be made with indifference with respect to the objects (see his *Orig. of Evil*, ch. v. sect. ii. passim); and in which notion he is not singular; if, I say, he is right in this, I am wrong. In defence, however, of my notions I observe as follows;—If the will hath necessarily a reference to good and evil, and which for reasons that will be given, it will be seen to have, it will be evident, that no act of the will can proceed with indifference in respect of these. We naturally desire happiness as earnestly as we do life, and seek the one as necessarily (although often mistakenly) as we do the other; but if so, there is nothing that we either do or think, but what, unconscious as we may be of it, will be with a view to these: for, in the case of suicide, and supposing the man to be in his right senses, it is not life that he would get rid of, but some tormenting idea, which makes him miserable instead of happy, and as he would be. If, then, in any other case a man may act with indifference,

The moral inclinations (and which, as Sir M. Hale observes, concern the volitive faculty) are, no doubt, as well as the common notions of right and wrong, innate; and which, if duly improved, are well calculated to promote our happiness in this

and as the above writer supposes, and instances the case of a man doing a thing merely to show the liberty which he has of doing it; what I say in answer is, that he cannot do this, but as he will, either knowingly or unknowingly, have some pleasure or satisfaction of mind, from the indulging a whim or fancy, in the doing of it; and if so, happiness will equally be sought by this man, as if he was more seriously and wisely employed. Now there is no case in which a man is in a situation to choose between good and evil (and, according to my hypothesis, there will be no time in which a man, if he be awake, and in his right senses, will not be in this situation, either in continuance of some former election, or in the beginning of some new one), there will be no time, I say, of this kind, in which he will not be situated as our first parents were, when good and evil were set before them; and if so, this case of theirs may be considered as being the touchstone by which the truth of any thing that has been written on the subject of elections, or the determinations of the will, will be to be tried; if it be in agreement with this case of our first parents, the notion which any such writer shall be found to have adopted, will be a true one, but otherwise a false one; and I suppose that there is no time in which a man can be acting freely, when his case will not have some resemblance, however faint, to this sacred story. Had this been duly considered, all the labour of the brain, and perplexities of the mind with which disquisitions on the subject of the will have been attended, might have been spared, or, at least, their reasonings have had a sure rule, by which they might have been regulated.

world; being, however, properties of the soul, the due use of them cannot but have a tendency to a happiness which, like the soul, will endure for ever; but so likewise will the abuse of them have a natural tendency to a misery which will endure for ever.

SECTION XII.

IT has been thought (and I conceive the notion to agree well with the doctrine of a *millennium*, or reign of Christ on earth for a thousand years, as it is taught in the book of Revelations) that moral depravity has been progressive from the time of the fall of Adam, and that it will continue to be so, until the world shall have arrived at a state when it cannot be worse*; that as this shall be the case, these millennarians suppose, that the moral state of

* I find that Sir Isaac Newton had a notion of this kind: he supposed that God had so ordered, as that an almost universal prevalence of infidelity would precede the ultimate diffusion of truth and righteousness. (EVANS' *Life of Gibbon*, p. 71.) This the writer whom I quote, supposes will be brought about by the objections which by infidels are, and will continue to be made to Christianity with the intention of subverting it. As God, however, showed the vanity of a like attempt when the Jews were gathered together against the Lord and against his Christ, by the Prophets foretelling this, so hath he done likewise with respect to the like attempts that are making in these days: for, as these attempts of infidels have been foretold, the truth of Christianity is established by the prophecies being thus fulfilled.

the world will be retrograde; and that such will be the prevalence of Christianity, as that virtue will, by degrees, be gaining ground of vice, until there is no vice or depravity in the world*.

Now, if the experience of misery be the natural consequence of vice, and the experience of happiness the natural consequence of virtue, vice will be found to be the foundation of virtue. In like manner I say of that happiness with which the practice of virtue is always attended: I say, that except as it had its contrast in misery, we could not be sensible of it. Happiness, it may thus be seen, will have a like foundation in misery, that I have supposed virtue to have in vice. We accordingly find in the case of individuals,

* It has been observed by a learned divine, that did a real spirit of truth and righteousness prevail in the hearts of men, and they were inoffensive and harmless as the sons of God, laying aside all envy, pride, and self-interest, and expelling the principles of the impious nature, and becoming in all things conformable to the holy Jesus, earth would differ but little from heaven."—CUDWORTH, *Letter to a Friend*, p. 60. "It is to be hoped therefore that a time will come, before the periods of this world are run out, that the divine life shall have a general conquest over the hearts and minds of men, and a spirit of love and righteousness overspread the face of the earth." P. 62.

that the virtue of those who have had the experience of the misery of vice, will be in less danger of being fallen from, than *that* of those whose lives have been for the most part virtuous; insomuch that the greater the misery which men may have experienced from vicious excesses, the less, as I have said, will be the danger of their falling back into them, as they shall have had the grace to repent. As the world shall thus be supposed, by the prevalence of vice over virtue, to have arrived at its lowest state of depravity and wickedness, it will be evident from what has been said, that the evil will cure itself; and that in like manner as vice had by degrees been gaining ground of virtue, so, by a retrograde course, as I have said, virtue will by degrees gain ground of vice; which being supposed, there evidently, as I have likewise said, would come a time when there would be no such thing as vice in the world.

On the ground of moral depravity having been progressive from the time of the fall of Adam, it has been observed by our author (Dr. Cheyne), who has adopted this notion, "that it was a noble design for rendering the succeeding generations partakers of all

the acquisitions of wisdom, knowledge, and other improvements of their predecessors; that as, by the lapse, the contrary of all this has happened, and

*Ætas parentum peior avis tulit
Nos nequiores, mox daturos
Progeniem vitiosiore,*—

so, what infinite love and goodness could not do, i. e. render finite, fallible intelligences fixed, and eternally stable in order and purity, punishment, experience, and trial, may at last effect, though in an unnatural and retrograde manner*.”

Now, as by the wrath which in the book of Revelations is spoken of, and which by the aforesaid millennarians is supposed to be at this time pouring out of the last of the *seven vials by the great dragon*, i. e. *the devil*, under the control and by the direction of the Almighty; as by this wrath, I say, *that* which the sin of Adam gave occasion to shall be supposed to be meant, the notions above expressed may be seen to be in perfect agreement with the account which is contained in the book of Revelations. And when, in fur-

* *Spiritual Nature*, Section 22.

ther agreement with these notions, we are told, that after the last vial shall have been poured out, the great dragon, or devil, shall be *bound*, what by a writer * on this subject is supposed to be meant is, that punishment will have had its proper effect; and which, as I suppose, will appear in the lives of men in general, and, as I have said, virtue will by degrees be gaining ground of vice; and as the quantum of happiness will be as is the quantum of virtue, so will the happiness of men in time be as great as it can be on this side of heaven.

As an earthly happiness, however, was not the happiness for which man was ultimately intended, when God, after he had made him, placed him in Paradise, so neither is that happiness which has above been mentioned, and which has been supposed to arise from the prevalence of virtue over vice, the happiness for which man was originally intended; it can at best be the forerunner only of that happiness. How true soever, then, it may be, that as the world shall have arrived at a state of the greatest moral

* The Rev. Wm. Bicheno.

depravity, the evil will by degrees cure itself; seeing, however, the stream cannot rise higher than the fountain from whence it flows, the happiness which will be thus experienced, will be *that* only which may arise from earthly enjoyments. The theory which I have now explained, and which I have adopted, may thus very well be true, as men shall be considered in their general or public capacity; but cannot be so as they shall be considered in their private capacity as individuals; for, in this latter capacity, every man has a self, of which he may make a sacrifice, as some happiness shall be revealed to him, which is greater than any which he can enjoy in this world.

Now, as Christ was *the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world*, and was spoken of to Adam and Eve, when to the woman it was told, that *her seed should bruise the serpent's head*, this light could not have become so obscured by the depravity of succeeding generations, as that some glimmerings thereof did not, as I suppose, prevail in the darkest times, although it was not sufficient to influence men in their conduct so as to prevail with them to make a sacrifice of a

happiness which is of this life to that which is future and of another, until Christ appeared in the flesh, and set them an example of so doing; this example, nevertheless, was followed by his Apostles, and many holy men in succeeding times. As the reign of Christ for a thousand years, however, implies the earth to be *full of the knowledge of the Lord*, so it likewise implies a faith to be generally prevailing amongst men, the sincerity of which would continually be shown by the holiness of their lives. This knowledge of Christ must needs be supposed to be generally prevailing, in order for our accounting for the conversion of the Jews, as a nation or people*; and who, as St. Paul says, will be *provoked to jealousy by the mercy shown to the Gentiles*; but which mercy will at no time so eminently appear as when the

* The learned Mr. Mede is of opinion "that the Jews will be converted in a way like unto that in which St. Paul was converted;" i. e. by "a luminous appearance and voice from heaven;" which luminous appearance accompanied by a voice, he supposes will move round the earth; and that something of this kind is hinted in Matthew, xxiii. 39. He speaks of a partial conversion of the Jews having taken place by a supernatural appearance in the year 570 in Arabia Felix. See Mede's Works, p. 761.

effects of it will be seen in the aforesaid holiness of the lives of the Gentiles*.

Now the theory which, in the first part of my Discourse, has been adopted on the subject of moral virtue, supposes, that unless man had fallen, no such virtue could have obtained amongst men: for, as the very deplorable state into which man was, by that sad catastrophe, brought, gave occasion for a love being shown on the part of God, greater than any which, according to our conceptions, could have been shown had man not fallen; so would that love which is called charity, and in the exercise of which moral virtue consists, have been a dormant principle

* The learned author of a *Lecture on the Prophecies*, speaking of the Apocalypse, says, "This book contains a detailed account of what would befall mankind under this last, and so much magnified dispensation (Christianity). It foretells all that history has recorded. It sets before us the corrupt state of the Christian world; but it likewise opens better things to our view. It shows that the end of this dispensation is to promote virtue and happiness: and that this end shall finally, but through many and long obstructions, be accomplished. It represents the cause of righteousness as still maintaining itself in all the conflicts to which it is exposed; as gradually gaining ground, and prevailing, through the secret aid of divine Providence, over all opposition; till it obtains a firm and permanent establishment; till the *saints reign in the earth.*" HURD on the Prophecies, p. 414.

in man, had he not fallen ; for charity consists in the relieving our fellow-creatures, to the best of our abilities, under the various evils to which, whether through infirmity, or any adverse fortunes, they became liable by the sin of Adam.

Now, charity, in its primary signification, means the love of God ; I accordingly say, that wherever a disposition to charity obtains in any society of men, a disposition to obey God will in proportion obtain in that society ; and men in that society will be eminent, not only for works of charity, but for those likewise of piety, as well as for the inferior virtues of sobriety, temperance, frugality, and chastity ; and I scarce need to say, that health of body is the natural consequence of these last-mentioned virtues. This, it is reasonable to suppose, will be the state of men in the course of the millennium, or reign of Christ on earth for a thousand years* : my drift accordingly, in the above remarks, has been to show, that, upon the supposition of the millennium being a state where virtue and good-

* 1000 is a mystic number among the Jews, and as used in the Revelations is not to be understood literally.—ADAM CLARKE.

ness will be progressive, a disposition to do good may in that state increase: the opportunities, nevertheless, of doing good will decrease; for, in proportion as men live soberly, temperately, frugally, and chastely, they will be less liable to disease, and the providence of God will be a safeguard to them against external injuries. This state, I accordingly say, will be continually approximating in happiness to *that* which the saints will enjoy hereafter; but which happiness, however, so long as they are on earth, can at best be only hoped for.

Having now performed the task which I proposed to myself, that, namely, of giving an account of Dr. Cheyne's system, so far as what has fallen from his pen has enabled me so to do; and made such remarks as occurred to me on various topics, which, in the course of this work of his, he has touched upon; I put an end to this Second Part of my Discourse.

APPENDIX.

ADVERTISEMENT.



THE following Discourse being on a subject which has been touched upon by Dr. Cheyne in his *Philosophical Conjectures**, might, agreeably to the plan of this second Part of my Discourse, have made a section thereof, rather than have been added as an Appendix thereto. My reason, however, for making it a separate Discourse, is not only the importance of the subject, but that I had found it to have been the ground of some notions which are contained in the first Part of my Discourse, although I was not conscious of this at the time of my composing that Part, the present Discourse having been written some years ago.

Having observed thus much, I think it proper, by way of preface to the following Discourse, to say, that the doctrine which is the subject thereof, has been borrowed

* Sect. iii. p. 184.

chiefly from what has fallen from the pen of a writer, the initials of whose name only (viz. J. S.) are given in the title-page of his book, and which he calls *Transnatural Philosophy*. My having found his notions on the doctrine of the Trinity to agree with what I afterwards learnt from the writings of two eminent divines, whose conceptions on this subject are, I believe, generally esteemed as being perfectly orthodox, was a reason with me for adopting them.

The doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been treated on by J. S. I found to be mingled with various references to the foregoing part of the author's book, which is wholly metaphysical; it was for this reason that I proposed to myself the plan, merely for my own amusement and satisfaction, of writing the following Discourse, and which will be found to be free from all metaphysical reasoning. It was many years ago that I accidentally met with this work, and which, not having since seen it in any collection or catalogue of books, I suppose to be scarce: I may say the same of Dr. South's animadversions on a book of Dr. Sherlock's, and which is referred to in the following Discourse.

DISCOURSE I.

ON THE

DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY TRINITY.



THE Scriptures are called a rule of faith, as containing all that is necessary to be believed by those who would be saved; and a creed is called a summary of faith; if the Scriptures then are a rule of faith, and contain all that is necessary to be believed, a creed, as being a summary of faith, will likewise contain all that is necessary to be believed; and such I consider the Athanasian Creed to be.

The Catholic religion requires us to believe that there is but one God; but it teaches us at the same time, that there are three divine Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, which constitute this one God; and the Athanasian Creed, declaring the unity of the Godhead in these three Persons, proceeds to show,

not only the particular character of each of them, but their unity among themselves; it then says, that "he that will be saved must thus think of the Trinity." Now, if the Scriptures, as hath been said, are a rule of faith, and if this creed contain nothing but what is contained in the Scriptures, the propriety, and even necessity, as we would be saved, of our thinking of the Trinity as in this creed it is set forth, will be evident. Under this persuasion myself, what I shall endeavour in the following Discourse to show is, that this doctrine has its ground in the nature of man, so far as the difference between the divine and the human nature will admit of it: and indeed, as this foundation shall have been laid, we shall be enabled the better to understand the Christian verity, as it is set forth in this creed; insomuch that, in like manner as a light shall be thrown on the doctrine of the Trinity from what we know of ourselves, a light will be reflected from that doctrine, by which we shall know what God is in himself. Thus much being premised, by way of introduction to my Discourse, I observe as follows:

The different modes according to which God exists are, in the Athanasian Creed,

called Persons; and which modes, persons, or subsistences, as by divines they are called, are grounded on God's substantial existence; these, although ultimately dependent on God's substantial existence, are nevertheless, and as in the sequel of this Discourse will be shown, mutually dependent on each other for their existence. Now, I have supposed, that from what we may know of ourselves, by the light of nature, we may better understand what God, as he is supernaturally revealed to us, is in himself, or, as by the schools it is called, *ad intra*; I accordingly observe, that personality, whether with God or man, is a mode of existence of which substantiality is, with both, the ground or substratum: with God however it is unchangeable, and always the same; whereas with man, depending on certain individuating accidents, it may be different at one time from what it is at another. Number likewise, whether with God or man, is essential to personality, and implies distinction with both; with man, then, it would have had a beginning; for, previously to the multiplication of the human species, one man could not have been distinct from any other man that would then have existed: whereas, with God, personality never could

have had a beginning, but must have been from all eternity.

The foundation being thus laid in the nature of man, we shall, as I have said, be the better enabled to understand the Christian verity as it is set forth in the Athanasian Creed; and for this purpose I observe as follows: The being of a man depends not on any individuating accidents, and by reason of which, as I have said, he is a person, or particular man, and distinct from all other men: for, exclusively of these accidents, he is a man; and it is as being so, that he is capable of individuation, or personality; and therefore, as being a person, or particular man, he will be different from himself as being a man merely: for, as being a man merely, he will differ nothing from all other men, considered as such; whilst, as being a particular man, he will differ from all other men, personally considered.

Now, it is evident, that personality cannot in like manner be predicated of God, but as we shall virtually be affirming, that there are Gods many; yea, as many as there may be men: a notion, by the way, which consti-

tuted the ground of the idolatry of the heathens. The unity of God, it is true, implies the possibility of his plural existence; and, vice versâ, his plural existence, the possibility of his existing as one, at the same time: we nevertheless say not of God, that he is one, as if there might be more *Gods* than he; and it is accordingly in the Athanasian Creed affirmed that there is only one God. If God, then, may exist personally, or according to some particular mode, it must be relatively to some other mode according to which he may exist at the same time, and in respect of which he may be a person; personal, then, must be essential existence with God, but it is not so with man; for, take away personal existence from man, and the man will still remain; but if, as I have said, personal be essential existence with God, take away personal existence from him, and nothing will remain. Sufficient, I apprehend, will now have been said on the word *Person*, as, in agreement with the determination of the Council of Nice, it is made use of in the Athanasian Creed, instead of the word *Hypostasis*, which was found to be exceptionable; and I accordingly proceed to the considera-

tion of other modes of existence which in that creed are attributed to God.

God's knowledge, as it stands opposed to *that* of the thing which he knows (for, without an object there can be no knowledge), implies distinction; and I say the same of his love, as it stands opposed to *that* which he loves. Hence it follows, that there must be some distinction in the divine nature itself. The sovereign perfection, however, of the divine nature requires, that the object of God's knowledge should be himself; for nothing less than this can fill the divine mind: and as nothing but what is most amiable can be deserving of his love, so must he himself constitute the object of his love.

Now, seeing God is spoken of in the aforesaid creed, as being a Father as well as a Son, I say, that if the habitudes, or modes of existence, after which I have supposed God to exist, be relative to each other, he must always have existed as a Father, or *that* which generates; and the Son, or *that* which is generated, must always have existed as a Son. Moreover I say, that as the Father, or *that* which generates, cannot be a Father without

a Son, so must the Father virtually have been contained in the Son. But, by the same rule, I say, that the Son, virtually likewise contained in the Father, as the Father is in the Son, cannot operate as a Son, but as supported by the Father; the Son, of course, must be a Son as having the Father, or him by whom he is generated, contained in him; and this is the ground on which the περιχώρησις*, or circumincession, which is attributed to the divine Persons of the Trinity, rests. Again, if that which generates, as God's existence after a trinal manner shall be considered, be virtually contained in *that* which is generated, and *that* which is generated, be a self-subsisting substance, a like substantial existence must be attributed to *that* which is generated; from whence it appears, that the divine Persons of the Trinity cannot exist relatively to each other, but as they are consubstantial, and, in this respect, one, and self-subsisting. As these, however, shall be considered as operating according to their

* This word, importing an in-dwelling of each Person of the Holy Trinity, was first used by Damascen, a father of the eighth century; but the thing meant by it, is contained in the words of our Saviour, *Believe me, that I am in the Father, and the Father in me.*

different and distinct modes, and relatively to one another *ad intra*, it cannot properly be said there is *μία ενεργεια*, one act, or operation, as it may when exerting an energy *ad extra*. As con-substantial and co-existent, or essential, the three Persons of the Trinity are one from the want of difference; but, as modes, or persons, they are distinct, and different; and if these together make one whole principle of action (and which, as hath been said, is the case in all their operations *ad extra*), this one being, or nature, which they thus constitute, is not a person, because of the want of individuality, and distinction from some other person.

The Persons of the Holy Trinity being con-substantial (i. e. equally partaking of the divine nature), are one: whilst, as being subsistential (i. e. as being modes of existence of which their divine nature is the substratum), they are many. The separate and distinct natures by reason of which they are subsistential and many, are incommunicable to each other; but this will not be the case as they shall be substantially considered: for *that* which makes a thing incapable of existing in another, must likewise hinder its being

communicated to another. But if those properties by reason of which the divine nature may exist as subsistential, are incommunicable, how that nature can thus exist as many and as one at the same time, is what constitutes the great mystery of the Trinity.

Now, it has been observed, that *that* which is communicable in the Trinity, is *that* which is essential to them; whilst *that* which is purely relative, namely, their personality, is incommunicable. Paternity, for instance, being purely relative, is incommunicable, and purely personal. The wisdom, nevertheless, of the Father, as being essential to the divine nature, may, notwithstanding its having the reason of subsistentiality, be communicated to the Son; whilst *that* by reason of which he is a person, namely, his paternity, is evidently not communicable. Thus it may be seen that God, as existing personally, must needs exist relatively; for a father has a necessary relation to a son, and a son to a father.

On the supposition of the divine attributes being essential to the divine nature,

and of wisdom constituting one of these attributes, it will be obvious, first, that to be, and to be wise, must, in God, be one and the same thing; secondly, that he cannot be infinitely as well as eternally wise, but as he must have been infinitely and eternally knowing; and as there can be no knowledge, but as there may be something that is known, so can there be no object adequate to the divine knowledge, but God himself: God, then, must be as truly *that* which is known, as he is *that* which knows. Now, although God, as knowing, hath a relation to himself, as *that* which is known (for, it is God that knows, and he himself that is known); God nevertheless, as knowing, is not one with himself, as *that* which is known, different as he that knows is from himself as known: or, vice versâ, he that is known, from himself as knowing: whether, then, we consider him in the one, or in the other of these characters, there must be something in him, by reason of which he is one and the same Being: as otherwise it would be one God that knows, and another that is known; and this something must be the suppositum or support of these different characters; i. e. it must be the divine nature itself. If, then, to know, as well

as to be known, be, as hath been said, essential to God, they are so only in respect of that prior notion which we cannot but have of him, as *that* only which can have any true and real existence: otherwise, in our acknowledging the Trinity, we should acknowledge three divine essences, but which would be inconsistent with the divine nature.

Now, seeing it is relatively only, and not essentially, that God, as knowing, is distinguishable from himself as something known; for, it is the same God, substantially considered, that both knows, and is known; the personality which thus arises in the divine character, although it make a distinction in that character, multiplies not the divine essence, or nature: for God is still substantially or essentially one, although many relatively, i. e. as these different characters have a relation to one another, and are personally considered. Now, the personal character which, in our apprehension, arises, as God shall be considered as knowing, is paternity: for, although God cannot know, but as something must already exist, which may be the object of his knowledge; and nothing can already exist, as we thus consider God in himself,

but himself; in consideration nevertheless, that, as knowing he knows not himself, as such, but as something known, he may thus be seen as existing under two distinct notions or characters, and, as knowing, be conceived to be generative of himself as known. For although, as I have said, God himself can be the only object that can fill the divine mind, and so be the only adequate object of his own knowledge: in consideration nevertheless, that he cannot exist under the notion or character of something known, but as he shall first be considered as knowing; the idea or notion which we shall thus have of God, as something known, will be found to spring out of *that* we shall previously have had of him, as something that knows; and this idea, or notion, which thus arises in our minds, as we consider him as something known, we shall refer to him as the true archetype thereof; as he must also be of *that* from which it had its rise, the idea, namely, which we must previously have had of him as knowing. And as this latter idea will have been the parent of the former, so will the same relationship be found to arise in the Godhead, as we contemplate God under these two distinct ideas, that there is between a father and a son.

Now, with respect to this productive or prolific virtue, to which the character of God, as something knowing, is owing, of this virtue I say that we cannot consider it exclusively of the thing produced or generated: for as *that* which is produced, or generated, is God under the character of something known, his being something known may be seen to be the thing itself in which that virtue, and consequently the notion thereof, terminates. All potentiality, then, is to be excluded from our minds, as we would consider God in himself; and therefore, although we necessarily ascribe a productive or prolific virtue to God, considered under the notion or character of knowing, we nevertheless cannot properly say of him, that he has the power of knowing himself; for, as he himself did eternally exist as known, equally as he did as knowing, there never could have been a time when he did not exist as something known; but which would be implied as we should ascribe unto him potentiality, or the power of knowing himself*.

* It must be confessed, that seeing the power of God is necessarily operative internally, and knowledge is *that* which it is the nature of this power to produce, knowledge will be seen to have as necessarily an eternal existence in God, and

In truth, the notion of that character which we ascribe unto God, considered as something known, can arise in our minds only, as we shall previously have considered him under the notion or character of something knowing; and it is owing to this successive manner in which alone we, from the very necessity of our nature, as existing in time, can arrive at the knowledge of any speculative truth, that we cannot have any clear conception of God, as we attribute to him the two distinct characters of knowing and known. Of these nevertheless we may conceive, that they are correlative; and that the relation between them is, as hath been said, the same as *that* which there is between father and son.

to be equally of the essence of his nature, as the power which we thus ascribe unto him. If knowledge, then, be with God a thing produced, it will be such only in respect of that power whose nature it is to produce it. But if that power be necessarily operative, and knowledge cannot have a potential existence with God, but will ever be a thing produced, our conceptions will not admit of our considering this knowledge of his, otherwise than as something *in fieri*, or about to be produced, and whereby we admit, in some sort, a potential existence; at the same time that, being of the essence of God, we necessarily consider it as being ever *in esse*, i. e. ever actually produced.

Now, in human generation there is nothing that is proper and essential to the character of a son, but what he will have derived from his father; but God, as hath been said, by reason of the prolific virtue which we ascribe to the act of knowledge whenever it is exerted, will beget something, and that something will be a son; the wisdom then of God, and which, with him, is of his essence, cannot be ascribed to him, considered under the notion or character of something known, but as it will as properly characterize him, as something knowing. In consideration nevertheless, that God, as known, is distinct, and different from himself, as knowing, there must needs be a corresponding difference and distinction between the wisdom which he possesses as a son, or something that is known, and *that* which he possesses as a father, or something that knows; but which difference, or distinction, can be no other than *that* which there is between begotten and unbegotten wisdom. Hence, and in consideration of this distinction, although we may say of the Son, that he has his wisdom from the Father* (and by the way, it is therefore that

* It is as the wisdom of the Son is derived to him from the Father, that the Son becomes the proper channel through

he is *the express image of the person of the Father*); we nevertheless cannot say of the Father, that he has his wisdom from the Son, for the Son hath his being wholly from the Father, but so hath not the Father from the Son.

Now, two distinctions have been found to obtain in the divine nature; the one, a something that knows, and the other, a something that is known. As all knowledge, however, is imperfect, the object of which is not a worthy one, God himself, as I have already said, must needs be the object of his own knowledge; because there is no other object so great and so noble as he himself is. But I say of love the same as I have said of knowledge; I say, that as no object but himself can be so worthy of God's love, as himself, so he himself must needs be the proper ob-

which wisdom flows, and is derived to us. *That* which might be known of God, as the wisdom of God did manifestly appear in the works of creation, was a light which might have answered the purpose of man's original creation: whilst that *light* by which alone any saving purpose, can be answered in man's present fallen state, must be *that* which, *shining out of darkness, giveth the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of him that hath redeemed us, even Jesus Christ.*

ject of his love. Now, in our case, knowledge may be acquired, or it may be lost after it has been acquired; and which shows that knowledge with us, is not essential to us, as it is to God. It evidently, then, makes no difference in our case, whether we ourselves are the object of our knowledge, or any external thing, even God himself, so long as the knowledge we have acquired, is what we did not before possess. For the object, be it what it will, is not affected by its being known by us; it neither gains nor loses any thing by our knowledge of it, but remains the same thing that it was before. Again I say, that the relation which God, as knowing, has to himself as known, is an essential relation, and not accidental; for, as he himself is necessarily the object of his own knowledge, he, as known, must be essentially related to himself, as knowing: whereas we, as knowing, have no necessary relation to *that* which may be the object of our knowledge: for *that* which is the object of our knowledge, may be any external thing, equally as it may be ourselves: and as the object may be any external thing, it can have no internal relation to us. No distinction, then, that is subsistential or personal, can arise between ourselves

who know, and that which we know; as is *that* where *that* which knows, is essentially the same as *that* which is known; and as is the case with God, where *that* which is known can be no other thing than himself. Now, the love which we feel, be the object what it will, is nothing that is essential to us, as is the faculty by means of which we love, namely, the will: for, by means of this faculty, we may hate, or be averse to any thing, equally as we may love or desire it. There may be a unity of affections between us who love, and those whom we love, but no union of persons: for the object on both sides will be distinct and separate; although the love which unites us, be one and the same; and if the love which unites us, be nothing that is essential to us, as is evident from its being possible that it may be changed into hatred, there can be no union in this case that is personal; because *that* which is the ground of our personal existence, namely, the faculty by which we love, is alone essential to us. With God, however, it is otherwise; he alone can be the object of his own love, considered *ad intra*; as he alone, thus considered, can be the object of his own knowledge; and

if, as hath been said, it be as his knowledge is of his essence, that he knows, it will be as his love is of his essence that he loves. Now, God's love will in this respect be unlike our love, namely, in its being unchangeable: for those whom God once loves he loves unto the end; nay, he loves them though they love not him; he will love them even when he punishes them; as they themselves would confess, could they see the end for which he punishes them.

Now, in regard a distinction that is personal arises, as hath been said, between God considered as knowing, and himself as something known; and a corresponding distinction arises between himself considered as loving, and as something loved; a twofold personality nevertheless arises not in the latter case, as there does in the former, and *that* for this reason, namely, that as God himself is the only proper and adequate object of his love, in his loving the Son, whom in his knowing he will have begotten, he will necessarily love himself as seeing himself reflected in the Son; there will not, however, be that mutual relationship between God considered as loving, and him-

self as something loved, as is necessary to constitute two distinct personal subsistences; but which is the case where the Father is *that* which knows, and the Son *that* which is known, and in which case the relationship will evidently be mutual.

Having thus given an account of the rise of the two first Persons of the holy Trinity, the order of my discourse requires that I should give an account of the natural rise of the third Person; as this subject, however, has been treated of in a well-known work, I shall give the learned author's account of this matter in his own words further on; and in the mean time shall speak to a point which has already been touched upon, the truth of which has been doubted by some, namely, the eternal begetting of Christ; and which, if the personal or subsistential existence of the Deity be equally eternal as his substantial existence is (however above human comprehension an eternal begetting may be), will undeniably be true.

Now, seeing, as in a former part of this Discourse has been said, all potentiality, as God's subsistential existence is considered, is

to be excluded from our minds, as we would consider this existence in itself, the power which, in the Scriptures, is ascribed unto God, must have respect to things external to him, and not to his existence internally considered; to things which might have a beginning of their existence, and not to those which, in their very nature, could have had no such beginning. We accordingly read, that *in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth*, and on a like divine authority we are given to understand, that it was by *his Son* that he made them, i. e. by the Word which afterwards became incarnate: for, *by faith*, saith the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, *we understand that the worlds were made by the word of God**; that word which the sacred writer had before spoken of as being the *Son of God*. This Son is in the following verse said to be *the express image of his person*†; i. e. of God considered as a father. Now this image he is, as being another subsistence like unto that of the Father; “a form, or draught (*χρατηρ*), manifesting the substance from whence it was taken, and in which Christ existed before he took our nature upon

* Heb. xi. 3.

† Heb. i. 2.

him *. The existence, then, which Christ had before he took our nature upon him, would have had no beginning ; his filiation, as his generation, would of course have been from all eternity.

The account which I have alluded to, and which has been given by a learned Prelate, is as follows : “ The divine essence which Christ had as the word, before he was conceived by the Virgin Mary, he had not of himself, but by communication from God the Father. For this is not to be denied, that there can be but one essence properly divine, and so but one God of infinite wisdom, power, and majesty ; that there can be but one person originally of himself subsisting in that infinite Being, because a plurality of more persons subsisting would necessarily infer a multiplicity of Gods ; that the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is originally God, as not receiving his eternal being from any other. Wherefore it necessarily follows that Jesus Christ, who is certainly not the Father, cannot be a person subsisting in the divine nature originally of himself ; and

* Whitby in loc.

consequently, being, as we have already proved that he is, truly and properly the eternal God, he must be understood to have the Godhead communicated to him by the Father, who is not only eternally but originally God. *All things whatsoever the Father hath are mine*, saith Christ; because in him is the same fulness of the Godhead, and more than that the Father cannot have: but yet in that perfect and absolute equality there is notwithstanding this disparity, that the Father hath the Godhead not from the Son, or any other, whereas the Son hath it from the Father: Christ is the true God and eternal life; but that he is so, is from the Father: *For as the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself*, not by participation, but by communication. It is true, our Saviour was so in the form of God, that he thought it no robbery to be equal with God; but when the Jews sought to kill him because *he made himself equal with God*, he answered them, *Verily, verily, I say unto you, the Son can do nothing of himself but what he seeth the Father do*; by that connexion of his operations, showing the reception of his essence; and by the acknowledgment of his power, professing his substance from the Fa-

ther. From whence he which was equal, even in that equality confesseth a priority, saying, *The Father is greater than I*: the Son equal in respect of his nature, the Father greater in reference to the communication of the Godhead. *I know him*, saith Christ, *for I am from him*; and because he is from the Father, therefore he is called by those of the Nicene council, in their Creed, ‘God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God.’ The Father is God, but not of God; Light, but not of Light; Christ is God, but of God; Light, but of Light. There is no difference or inequality in the nature or essence, because the same in both; but the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ hath that essence of himself, from none: Christ hath the same, not of himself, but from him*.”

I shall now show, that, according to the doctrine of the holy Trinity, as it is contained in the Athanasian Creed, there are three Persons in one Godhead, and no more; not, indeed, as if I had not already shown this, but that I may show this doctrine to have been taught by another divine, who, as well as Bishop Pearson, hath written very learnedly

* Pearson on the Creed, p. 134, fol. ed.

on the doctrine which is the subject of this Discourse.

Our author, speaking of the internal acts on which the divine relations are founded, and from which they flow, says, “ they are, first, the eternal act by which the Father communicates the divine nature to the Son, and which accordingly is called generation ; secondly, *that* by which the Son receives his divine nature from the Father, and which is called filiation ; thirdly, the act of spiration, by which the Father and the Son together eternally breathe forth the Holy Ghost ; and lastly, the act of procession, by which the Holy Ghost proceeds, and receives his divine nature jointly from them both. This account (as our author observes) may seem to infer four Persons to be in the Godhead ; the reason, however (as he further observes), why it does not is, because the same person may sustain several personal relations, and exert and receive several personal acts, where those acts, or relations, are not opposite to, or inconsistent with, one another in the same subject ; as, for instance, the person of the Father may exert both an act of generation and of spiration

tion, and sustain the relations resulting from both, without any multiplication of his person; and the Son likewise may receive and sustain the act of filiation, and withal exert an act of spiration, without any multiplication of personality; and this because neither are the acts of generation and spiration inconsistent in the Father, nor the acts of filiation and spiration incompatible in the Son: though, indeed, the acts of generation and filiation, and the relations springing therefrom, would be utterly inconsistent, because opposite, in any one person; as likewise, on the same account, would be the acts of spiration and procession. From whence, by plain and undeniable consequence, it follows, that generation and filiation, spiration and procession, constitute only three Persons in the eternal Godhead, and no more: for relations merely disparate, do not constitute several distinct persons, unless they be opposite too; that maxim of the schools being most true, *Sola oppositio multiplicat in divinis*. So that, although filiation and spiration are disparate with reference to one another, yet as both of them meet, and are lodged in one and the same subject (viz. the person of the

Son), they neither cause nor infer in him any more than one single personality*.”

Now, in agreement with this rule which is mentioned by Dr. South, I say, that the Son, by the acts of filiation and spiration (which are wholly different, but not incompatible with each other), may sustain several personal relations. But so likewise I say of the Holy Spirit; I say of this third Person of the holy Trinity, that it cannot proceed from the Father and the Son, but as the divine nature of these will be communicated to him; and, being so communicated to the Holy Spirit, he will know the Father and the Son, and be known by them, insomuch that, sustaining his own proper personal subsistence as proceeding from the Father and the Son, he will at the same time sustain those which are proper to the subsistences of the Father and the Son, and from both of whom he proceeds. Now, as knowing and being known, the Holy Spirit will be neither a father nor a son; for it is as proceeding from both the Father and the Son, that he knows and is known. I say moreover, that in like man-

* South against Sherlock, pp. 243, 244.

ner as God, as he knows himself, begets the Son, as something known; so, likewise, as he loves himself, and is loved of Him whom, in knowing himself, he will have begotten, doth the Holy Spirit, as something loved by Him, proceed from both these. I further say, that love or goodness being equally essential to the divine nature as knowledge or wisdom, and from which, as hath been said, the personal character of God as a Father arises, this love or goodness, cannot be possessed by the Father but as it will be possessed by the Son likewise; and the divine Person that proceeds from both these will be that love or goodness subsistentially, which is by them substantially or essentially possessed; for, it is as this love or goodness is essential to the divine nature, that it proceeds from the Father and the Son, and constitutes, as it proceeds, this third Person of the ever blessed Trinity, who in the Athanasian Creed is called the Holy Ghost.

Now, these attributes, essentially considered, equally belong to the three divine Persons of the holy Trinity; not, however, without some difference, as this matter was seen by the before-mentioned learned divine, and

who writes as follows:—"Wisdom, considered absolutely and essentially in itself, belongs in common to all the three Persons of the holy Trinity; but with the terms *genita*, or *ingenita*, joined with it, it imports a peculiar mode of subsistence, which determines it to a particular personality: so that *sapientia quatenus genita*, properly, only denotes the person of the Son. In like manner, when the third Person is called the Spirit, the term Spirit is not here taken essentially for that infinite, immaterial, incorporeal nature, absolutely considered (for so it is common to all the three Persons), but for that infinite incorporeal nature, *quatenus procedens, aut spirata*; and, under that peculiar mode of subsistence, it belongs not to the other two Persons, but stands appropriate only to the third. Nevertheless, this makes them not three distinct infinite Spirits, but only one infinite Spirit under three distinct modalities; so, when the Son is called the wisdom of the Father, that very term (of the Father) imports a modification of it peculiar to the Son; yet this modification does not make it another wisdom from that which is in the Father, since one and the same wisdom may

sustain several determining modes*." Hence it is evident, that the three distinct modes according to which God exists, do not multiply the divine essence, or common suppositum, of these modes; neither is the common suppositum, or divine essence, any thing which can be conceived as having an existence separately from these modes, there being no opposition between any of these, and the common suppositum, or essence, which supports them; on the contrary, it is coincident with all, or with each of them; and indeed, but for the opposition which there is between the modes themselves, they would, in such manner, be *one* with their common suppositum, or essence, as not to be distinguishable therefrom, or indeed be any modalities at all.

Having now explained the doctrine of the Trinity as it is taught in the Athanasian Creed, and as this Creed has been explained by various men of learning with whose writings I have become acquainted, I shall conclude this Discourse with observing, that if it should appear to those that read it, that the same things are said over and over again,

* South against Sherlock, p. 160.

this, however, I so far deny as to say, that there has been nothing repeated, throughout this Discourse, the repetition of which has not been necessary, in order that something which has been said before, might the better be understood.

As the doctrine of the Trinity is taught in the Scriptures, it is not so taught as to be level with a common understanding (and which is the case with respect to the historical and moral parts of them), but requires much penetration and labour for the comprehending of them, such, for instance, as are called the *τα απορρητα* of St. Paul. The purpose, however, for which God has endowed some men with great talents would be in vain, had he not afforded them subjects on which they might be exercised; and no subject, I may truly say, could have been afforded of more importance than the doctrine of the holy Trinity, inadequately as it has been treated by me.

ANNOTATION.

The *eternal* generation of the Son of God (our Lord Jesus Christ) being a notion which, by a learned

commentator, has been asserted to be unscriptural, and who has framed an argument by which he shows it to be absurd likewise, I think it proper, previously to my giving my thoughts on this important doctrine, to transcribe, if not all, so much at least of the aforesaid argument as will answer my purpose. “If Christ be the Son of God, as to his divine nature, then he cannot be eternal; for Son implies a Father, and Father implies, in reference to Son, precedency in time, if not in nature, and time also antecedent to such generation.” Again, “If the divine nature of Christ were begotten of the Father, it must be in time; i. e. there was a period in which it did not exist, and a period in which it began to exist. This destroys the eternity of our blessed Lord, and robs him at once of his Godhead*.”

Now, in order, if not to refute, at least to do away the force of this argument, I observe as follows:—“The ancients,” says Bishop Bull, “attributed to our Lord a threefold nativity: first, *that* by which he was born of the eternal mind of the Father; by this nativity he was a perfect hypostasis or person, nor did any thing afterwards accrue to him to fill up the measure of this perfection, his other perfections being rather condescensions of his as the Son of God; by this nativity he went out, as it were, of the womb of the Father, and let himself down to build the worlds. The second nativity was *that* when the same word was

* Dr. Adam Clarke’s Comment on Luke, i. 35.

made flesh, when, falling from the bosom of the Father into the womb of the Blessed Virgin, he was born a man, by the overshadowing of the Holy Spirit; by this lowest condescension he became the perfect Son of God*." Now, seeing Christ, as the *word*, was born of the eternal mind of the Father, this nativity would have been prior to *that* which he had when he was born of the Virgin Mary; and not being in time, as this last-mentioned nativity was, would of course have been from all eternity. The learned commentator, on the supposition of Christ's having been begotten in time, concludes, with respect to this begetting, that it had a beginning. To the contrary, however, of this, it is in the above extract said, that Christ was born (and which implies a begetting) of the eternal mind of the Father; and if so, it would be a contradiction (however incomprehensible this may be) to say that it might have a beginning. The question then is, Whether the opinion of the learned Commentator, supported only as it is by his own authority, shall be preferred to an opinion which has not only the support of the ancient fathers, and the best modern divines, but of the Scriptures, and which the quotation from Bishop Pearson in the foregoing discourse, undeniably shows? As the matter shall be put upon this issue, no one that believes in the Scriptures can, consistently with that belief, determine in favour of the learned Commentator. The notion of an eternal begetting is, it is true, beyond human comprehension;

* Defensio Fidei Nic. sect. iii. cap. x.

but so likewise are other mysteries of our holy religion; it nevertheless is a doctrine which we must as necessarily believe, as any other doctrine that is equally incomprehensible.

The Greek church professes to believe that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, but denies that he proceeds from the Son*; the Greek church is accordingly considered as being Arian; for if this church acknowledged the Holy Ghost to proceed from the Son, as well as from the Father, she would unavoidably believe the eternal begetting of the Son: and except as this were the case, the Holy Ghost would not proceed from the Son. Now, Dr. Adam Clarke, in his denying the eternal begetting of Christ, will virtually deny that the Holy Ghost proceedeth from the Son, as well as from the Father, and will be no less an Arian, than the Greek church is Arian.



In further support of the doctrine of Christ's eternal begetting, I shall add the following short account thereof, which I have met with since the foregoing Appendix was written.

The sum of the Christian doctrine, according to Tertullian, and as it is received by the church, is, that

* Brerewood's Enquiries, ch. xviii.

the Son, according to substance and hypostasis, eternally was, is, and will be in the Father; that when the Father willed, the Son did not then begin to exist substantially, but, as it were, proceeded, and went out of the Father operatively; that is, the Father exerted his strength, power, and almighty virtue, outwardly and creatively, namely, in the things of the universe. The word, then, is the operation only of that substance, or Son, which was eternally with God. We do not arrive at any origin of the Son in any supposed exertion of the divine will: for God willed not but wisely, and therefore as containing the Son in him already. The Son received the perfection of his nativity, as the word, when he went out of the Father, when the Father said, *Let there be light*. The word then received its species and dress. As the reason, or wisdom of God (and a true Son, as such), the word was from all eternity a perfect Son. As being the reason, or wisdom of God, he was God, and must have been the coeternal progeny of the eternal mind of God; and this is the procession from whence he derives his filiation, and in which his substantiality consists; and this procession, generation, and production, must have been from eternity; whilst the other procession, namely, that from which he received the species and dress of the word, was a manifestation only of the former procession, and no new generation. As the Son, or wisdom of God, was made the word, so was the word made flesh. The word was not of itself, or separately from the wisdom which became the word, any thing

substantial, or a Son; so could it not, as the word, give any substantiality to the flesh; but the substantiality of the flesh, at least its divine substantiality, it must derive from the same fountain from which the word which became flesh, drew. [*Vide Bullij Defen. Fidei Nic. sect, iii. cap. 10.*]

DISCOURSE II.

ON THE

DOCTRINE OF CHRIST'S DIVINITY.



THE divinity of Christ is a doctrine which is so plainly taught in the holy Scriptures, that the ancient fathers as little thought of setting about the proving the truth of this doctrine from the Scriptures, as they did of proving from these, that such a person as Christ once made his appearance on earth. Such however, unhappily, has been the spread of infidelity (although not unpredicted by those very Scriptures in which these men refuse to believe) since their days, that modern divines, as well as laymen, who at least have been equal to these divines in zeal, have found it necessary to employ their pens in proving what the ancient fathers, as I have said, thought to be as clear as the sun at noon-day.

The labour and pains even of men who profess to believe in the Scriptures, have not been wanting to discredit the doctrine of Christ's divinity; but, as it is not uncommon for good to come out of evil, so has it already happened in the present case; and so, no doubt, will it continue to happen, so long as so impious a doctrine as that is which denies the divinity of our Saviour, shall continue to be propagated; and which it probably will be, till the earth is full of the knowledge of the Lord. The good which has already arisen, and which, as I have supposed, will farther arise from the labours of these men, is this, that it has given occasion for the Scriptures being more critically examined, and more diligently searched, and therefore for their being better understood, than it is reasonable to suppose they would have been, had this false doctrine not been spread; and as there can be no end to this knowledge (for there are things in the Scriptures, the knowledge of which is inexhaustible), so, probably, will this knowledge increase, and go hand in hand with the spread of infidelity. This I suppose to be the good which has already arisen from the labours of these men, and which, probably, will in future arise from

like labours; but, as a learned Prelate on a like occasion said, “no thanks to these men for this, nor benefit from it*,” except, as he might have added, a benefit which is of this world.

The divinity of Christ is a doctrine which has been so sufficiently proved to unprejudiced minds, from various texts of Scripture which have been cited for this purpose by different writers, whose learning enabled them to give the true construction and unsophisticated meaning of those texts, that what either I, or any other person, may have to say on this subject, might well be spared, and this doctrine be left to stand on the foundation of the aforesaid texts, properly explained, as I have supposed them to have been, by the writers before alluded to. To this foundation the doctrine in question, that, namely, of Christ's divinity, would have been left by me for its standing, had there not been another, no less sure foundation, on which it may be shown to stand, but which however has not, to my knowledge, occurred to any writer, either ancient or modern; i. e. it has not been

* Sanderson's Sermons ad Aulam, p. 178.

made use of by any such writer, whereon to establish the truth of Christ's divinity. A discourse therefore on the subject of Christ's divinity, as it shall be made to stand on this other foundation which I have mentioned, and which in a farther part of this Discourse will be explained, will have novelty at least to recommend it, however deficient it may be in point of composition.

Having premised thus much with respect to my intention in this discourse, I observe, that, finding that Bishop Bull's Defence of the Nicene Faith contains (and as any one who has read that work, will know) the opinions of some of the most respectable of the ancient fathers, mingled with some of his own; and that, although it has not been the intention of these fathers, nor that of the learned Bishop, to prove the truth of the doctrine of Christ's divinity; for this doctrine, as I have supposed, is too plainly taught in the Scriptures to stand in need of proving; seeing, however, it is contained in those writings of the fathers of which Bishop Bull has given an account, and which, if this doctrine be contained in the Scriptures, may well be; I thought that all that it would be necessary

for me to do, as I would establish this doctrine, was to transcribe from the aforesaid work of Bishop Bull such passages as would best answer my purpose; as well as to transcribe from the writings of others any such opinions as are in agreement with those of the ancient fathers, and are of equally respectable authority as those either of the ancient fathers, or of Bishop Bull; this, I say, is all that is necessary for me to do, as I would establish the doctrine of Christ's divinity. As the doctrines, however, which are contained in Bishop Bull's Defence, &c. in that part thereof at least, which I shall be found to have transcribed, are chiefly upon the subject of the holy Trinity, it will be found, not only that the ground of my notions with respect to Christ's divinity is different from that which the writers I have mentioned, have made the foundation of their reasoning upon this subject, but that it carries us farther back in our conceptions on the subject of Christ's divinity, than *that* which constitutes the ground of their reasoning; it therefore is a surer, not to say a better, foundation than *that* which they have laid, for this reason, namely, that if the doctrine of Christ's divinity be not true, *that* of the holy Trinity cannot be

true; and so, è converso, if the doctrine of the holy Trinity be not true, *that* of Christ's divinity cannot be true: in short, the one of these doctrines will inevitably stand, or fall, as the other will do so. Having said thus much by way of preface to my discourse, I proceed to give the extracts which I have mentioned, and which, as they suppose Christ's divinity, cannot, as I have before said, have been intended by the authors of them to prove the truth of this doctrine, although they do as fully prove it, as if this purpose had been meant to be answered by these writers.

“ The ancients attributed to our Lord a threefold nativity, and filiation; the first, *that* by which, as the word, he was born of the eternal mind of the Father. By this nativity he exists as a perfect divine hypostasis; nor did any thing afterwards accrue to him to fill up the measure of this perfection: his other two nativities being rather condescensions of his, as the Son of God. The first of these two nativities is *that* by which the word went out of God the Father according to an out-working, whereby he went out, as it were, from the womb of the Father, and let himself down to build the worlds. The other nativity was *that* when the same word

was made flesh; when, falling from the bosom of the Father into the womb of the blessed Virgin, he was born a man of her, by the overshadowing of the Holy Spirit*. By this lowest condescension he became the perfect Son of God according to an out-working; and thus had performed every kind of filiation. The only begotten word, then, was no otherwise not a perfect Son without the flesh, than that, prior to his incarnation, he would not have discharged every kind of filiation; in other words, was not yet the Son of God in every manner after

* There is, according to a learned annotator, a fourth nativity, which in the case of Christ was wanting, in order to his becoming the perfect Son of God; *that*, namely, which he had when he rose again from the dead. For this nativity is referred to in the Psalms, where it is said, *This day have I begotten thee*. "These words relate to our Lord's resurrection, by which he is said to be begotten, as being made the first-born from the dead" (Whitby on Acts, xiii. 33); and it is to his descent *into the lower parts of the earth*, which was previous to his resurrection, that his ascent *into heaven* after his resurrection, stands opposed; not, however, but as this descent of Christ in respect of his human nature, presupposes, and indeed implies, a previous ascent in respect of his divine nature: for, who is he that ascended up to heaven, but he who came down from heaven, even the Son of man; as St. John saith, *No man hath ascended up into heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of man*. John, iii. 13.

which the Father would that he should be such*.”

“When God (as Hyppolitus, as quoted by Bishop Bull, says) was as yet alone, i. e. when as yet nothing external to him existed, and he would make the world, he, by thinking of it, as he thus willed its existence, did, by a word which he would be speaking, as thought on, and willed its existence, make it. Nothing external to God, then, could ever have been coeval with him. There was nothing besides himself, and he, although alone, was many: for, although alone, he was not without reason (*τω λογω*), without wisdom, without counsel (reason and wisdom, says our author, the interpreter of these words of Hyppolitus, are the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and both these are a counsellor to the Father: it being the custom of the times in which Hyppolitus wrote, to call the third hypostasis by the name of wisdom). All things were in him; he was all things †. When he willed,

* Bulli Def. Fid. Nic. Sect. III. c. viii.

† With this account the ancient Egyptian theology, as it is contained in the book of Hermes Trismegistus, agrees; and who says, “All things are one, and one all things; all things were in the Creator, before he created all things.” Book ii. p. 4.

and in the manner after which he willed, he showed his word in the times determined by him, by which he made all things; and who, when he wills, makes; when he thinks, finishes; when he speaks, shows; when he forms, utters wisdom. He made it (the world) then as he would: for he was God. Now, in begetting the word, he begat a captain, a counsellor, and a workman of those things which were made; which word, when he possessed it in himself, and it was invisible to the created world, he made visible, sending forth his former voice, and begetting light of light, he drew forth to the creature itself a Lord, his own sense (or wisdom), and who before was visible only to him, but invisible to the world; Him he makes visible, that the world, when it saw him who appeared, might be saved (*salvus fieret*); and thus another assists him. When I say another, I say not two Gods, but light only from light, water from the fountain, or the ray from the sun: for the virt^{ue} from the whole, is one; but the Father, from whom the virtue is, is the whole word. Now this word is the mind, or sense, which, going forth into the world, is shown as the child of God. All things then are made by him,

who alone is begotten of the Father.” (The generation of which Hyppolitus here speaks, says our author, is the production of the word; but the showing, drawing forth, and manifestation of it, co-existing eternally with the Father; as when David says, *This day have I begotten thee*; affirms his nativity then to have happened to men, when the same became known to them.)

“ These remarks of Hyppolitus teach us,” as our author observes, “ that when God sent forth the word, he generated anew: for he sent forth a former voice, or word, which, as having been born of his mind, had been something already generated, containing the reason, and whole essence of him, when he thought, or willed that the world should exist; and that this word, in being sent forth, is enabled to assist him, and so becomes another, or different from the word which was with him, born of his mind; but which difference arises only from its being sent forth: for although the word, so sent forth, became visible, from its having been invisible when the Father possessed it; yet doth this visibility arise from its being sent forth; and the word, or Son, is accordingly called light of light,

i. e. light generated of light. Now visibility," says our author, "although it depend upon the being sent, is not of the essence of the Son, in particular, inasmuch as that which is sent depends upon that which sends; and nothing can be of the essence of the Son as being sent, which is not of the essence of the Father likewise, as sending; and therefore when Hyppolitus says, that the Father, in sending forth the Son, made him visible, these words imply something external to God, something already made; and this is consonant to the Mosaic account, where *the heavens and the earth* are set forth as having been *created* prior to God's saying, *Let there be light*; and, by which last words, the sending forth the Son, or begetting light of light, is signified. Now the word, or Son, in going forth from the Father, could not be said to be made visible, unless the world, which had been already made, might see him. But *the earth* is said to have been *without form and void*; which words plainly intimate to us (if the subsequent words did not confirm it), that no earthly thing had as yet been awakened into sense, or could perceive at all; therefore could the word, or Son, have been visible only to the heavenly, or superior in-

telligences, or some universal soul belonging to the whole world; and *that* only when God said, *Let there be light*. The world, according to Saint Hyppolitus, could not be formed in the divine mind, and not be actually made; thinking of it, says he, he made it; but this he did not without the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Now the word, or Son, could not have been concerned in making the world, and the world not be intelligible; but if it was intelligible, it was potentially intelligent. Now the world, according to the words of Hyppolitus, was perfected in seeing him who did appear: for it did then only actually exist. Not that a potential existence is no existence at all: it is a defective existence, for there is wanting light, and life; and therefore was it, that, in seeing him who did appear, it was perfected. The world, in seeing him that did appear, would exist as the image of God: for it knew God; but it knew not God without conceiving him in its mind, and thus knowing his name. For we think not, but something exists in the mind as an object of thought; and if so, something hath already been born of the mind. But we necessarily speak *that* in our mind, which we think; and whilst ~~we~~ speak, we have a word speaking

within us, in which is contained that reason with which, and by means of which, we speak when we think. Now, the word which the mind thus hath within itself when it speaks (for it thinks not without speaking within itself, and it speaks not without a word), it generates of its own substance; and it generates that word of itself, which of itself it will have begotten. Nor hath the word which is thus born of the mind, any thing less, or other than the mind hath of which it is born. Nor is the word any thing inferior to the mind of which it is born: because, as great as the mind is which begets the word, so great is the word itself. For, as the word is born of the whole mind, so, when born, it remaineth in the whole mind; and because, whilst the mind thinks, there is no part of it in which the word is not, therefore is the word as great as the mind itself, of which it is; and when it is with it, it is in it; and as great as it is, so great is the word; because it is of the whole, and in the whole mind. It may thus be seen, that the word is as great as the mind and the word together." To return to the subject from which I have somewhat digressed (although I have used no other language than that of our author), I

transcribe as follows:—"It hath been said, that, in the word which you speak, you have a word speaking within you: for, in the word which you speak when you think, is contained the reason with which you think: for, if the reason with which you think, enables you to speak whilst you think, because it contains the same reason by means whereof you speak when you think. Thus is there a second word in you by which you speak when you think, and by which you think when you speak: the reason with which you think, and which is contained in the word by which you speak, being the first and original word born in the mind*."

"So far," says our author, "and with respect to a first, and second filiation, does the

* This reasoning, which is frequently made use of by the fathers, and the analogy which they show things divine to have to those which are human, is in agreement with some notions that are contained in our Discourse on the holy Trinity; particularly where it is said, "the Son is called the word, because in like manner as when a thing is first known, a name proper to it, or word by which that thing may properly be expressed, is conceived in the mind. So, when God knows himself (as from all eternity he must have done), the name proper to that which is known, or word by which it is properly to be expressed, is a something begotten in the mind, equally as there is something begotten when a man is first conceived in the womb of his mother."

mind of the creature appear to be an exact copy of the divine mind. It remains to be considered, whether it may resemble the divine mind likewise, with respect to a third filiation. For this purpose he observes, that it has been said of the word of God which was made flesh, that, falling from the bosom of the Father into the womb of the blessed Virgin, it was born a man of her, by the overshadowing of the Holy Spirit. In a manner resembling this, says our author, we utter, or speak by a word of mouth *that* which we think the word which has been born in the mind, and which hath already been spoken in the mind, is sent forth from the bosom of the mind, or heart, and by means of the corporeal organs, and the spirit, or breath of life, it acquires a sensible clothing, in other words, becomes audible." Again—"As it was for the sake of others, that the word of God was made flesh, so is it ever for the sake, and on the account of others, that the words of a man's mouth are uttered. It is for this reason said by our Saviour, *By thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned*; which saying of our Lord's may, it is true, be construed to extend to the thoughts of our hearts: for Christ, to

whom all hearts are open,—to whose eyes all things are naked, is he to whom we must give an account; and if all things are thus open and manifest to him, the word, or account (*λογός*) which we must give, is actually given, when he sees, as in reality he does, our hearts. Now it is said, that *a good man, out of the good treasure of the heart, bringeth forth good things; and an evil man, out of the evil treasure, bringeth forth evil things; and that out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh*. Thus will it appear to be the same thing, whether it be the word of the mind, or *that* of the mouth, the treasure of the heart, or *that* which is brought forth out of that treasure, by which we are judged. Lastly, as the words of a man's mouth are the index to the mind, or heart, or *that* by which a man is known by another; so is the word of God which was made flesh, and dwelt among us, a discovery of the mind, and will of God; such knowledge as we may have of God in any other way, being equally inferior to this, as the knowledge which one man can have of another by his looks and appearance, is inferior, and more uncertain, than such as may be conveyed by the words of his mouth."

Our author, having thus stated the notions of Hyppolitus with respect to the three different filiations of Christ, supposes it to be asked, "What it is that is written with respect to the first works of God immediately preceding the formation of the things of the earth?" He answers in the words of Tertullian (whose notions with respect to the aforesaid three filiations, he had stated: the words of Hyppolitus which follow, being illustrations merely of the notions of Tertullian), as follows:—"The Son not yet appearing, God said, *Let there be light*, and it was made instantly that word which is *the true light that enlightens every man coming into the world*, and by him the mundane light likewise was made. On this he observes, that when Tertullian says, the word was made when God said, *Let there be light*, we are to understand, as the light was the word, i. e. as it proceeded with a voice from the Father, God did not say, *Let there be light*, before the earth was made; if, therefore, the word was then first made when God said, *Let there be light*; i. e. if it began then first to exist substantially, and as a divine Person, its existence would be posterior to the *materia prima*, or earth; but which Tertullian positively denies. The Son, as the eternal rea-

son and wisdom of God, then first began to appear, when he undertook the disposing and adorning matter, which lay uninformed, and in a confused heap. Moses then first makes mention of the word; because the wisdom of which the word consists, was chiefly conspicuous in the distinction of things, or order of creation. Not that the Son was excluded from the creation of the earth, any more than the Father was from the disposing, or adorning the things created. The former of these the Father is said to have done by the Son; the latter, with the Son. As the word was with God the Father in the beginning, i. e. when the earth was produced, so was the Father with the word, when it (the earth) was disposed. The sum of Christian doctrine our author observes, and says it was so understood by Tertullian, is, that the Son, according to substance, and hypostasis, eternally was, is, and will be in the Father; that when the Father willed, the Son did not then begin to exist substantially, but, as it were, proceeded, and went out of the Father operatively; i. e. the Father exerted his strength, power, and almighty virtue, outwardly, and creatively, namely, in the creation of all things. The word then is the operation only

of that substance, or Son, which was eternally with God. We do not arrive at any origin of the Son in any supposed exertion of the will of the Father: for God willed not but wisely, and, therefore, as containing the Son in him already. The Son received the perfection of his nativity, as the word, when he went forth out of the Father; when the Father said, *Let there be light*. The word, according to Tertullian, then received its species and dress. As the reason, or wisdom of God (and a true Son as such), the word was from all eternity a perfect Son. As being the reason, or wisdom of God, he was of God, and must have been the coeternal progeny of the eternal mind of God; and this is the procession from whence he derives his filiation, and in which his substantiality consists; and this procession, generation, and production, must have been from all eternity; whilst the other procession, namely, *that* by which he received the species, and dress of the word, was a manifestation only of the former procession, and no new generation. As the Son or wisdom of God was *made the word*, so was the word *made flesh*. The word was not of itself, or separately from the wisdom which became the word, any thing substantial, or a Son;

it could not therefore, as the word, give any substantiality to the flesh ; but the substantiality of the flesh (at least, its divine substantiality) it must derive from the same fountain from which the word, which became flesh, drew. For the manhood being taken into God, the human nature was worked into the substance of the divine, in the second Adam, in the same manner as the animal nature was contained under the intellectual, in the first Adam ; and as it was in consequence of this union of natures, that the first Adam was intimately and inseparably united with the external world, and enabled to subdue it ; so by the union of the divine with the human nature, was Christ, the second Adam, made to have dominion over all things, and to have power in heaven, as well as earth, because of the unity and indivisibility of the intellectual nature, and of the connexion which man, as an intellectual being, had with superior intelligences ; by which means Christ is as truly the Lord over all intelligent beings, as the first Adam was over the beasts of the earth and fowls of the air ; but with this farther advantage over him (Adam), that in regard the superior nature is, in the case of Christ, divine, his dominion must needs be eternal, and

his kingdom an everlasting kingdom. The union of the divine and human nature, in Christ, was brought about by the conception of the blessed Virgin; in which conception, the human flesh, derived from Adam, or seed of the woman, was so incorporated with the substance of the word, or Son of God, as to become one substance with it. The human nature was thus taken into a personal union with the divine, in the same manner as the animal nature was taken into a personal union with the intellectual, when Adam first arose to intellectual life; and as the animal, or earthly man, became void of all personal being in himself, when he acquired a subsistence with the intellectual nature, so was the manhood, or human nature, void of all personal being in itself when it was taken into God, and had a subsistence with the word, or second Person of the Trinity; so that it would be a nature only, and not a person; exactly as was the case with the animal, or earthly man. The word then, or Son of God, did not put off his divine nature when he became incarnate, nor was the God transformed, or converted into a man, any more than was the case with the intellectual nature, when it was personally united to the animal, in the

case of Adam: at the same time that humanity was not so assumed by Christ, but he had all the essential properties of man's nature*: for, as St. Paul says, *it behoved him in all things to be like unto his brethren*. In like manner then as the animal, or natural man, in the case of the first Adam, was made intellectual, without losing his humanity; and what would have been a person without the divine nature being added to it, but produced by a natural conception, and by the will of man, became a nature only with that union, and produced by a miraculous conception, and by the will of God. Now, although with respect to the divine and human nature

* To obviate an objection which has been made by the Socinians with respect to the divine incarnation, and who say it is an absurdity to suppose that the great God might become a man, nay even a child; I here transcribe from the work of a learned divine as follows—"The whole Godhead was not incarnate when Christ took our nature upon him, nor any person of the divine Trinity, but the Son: the person of the Son subsisting in the Godhead." There was, in this case, no conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but a taking of the manhood into God. "That the manhood should in such manner be taken into the Godhead, as that these should be one, consistently with the two natures continuing to be distinct natures, is what we cannot conceive; and yet this is no greater difficulty, than that the body and soul make one man."—HOLLAND on the Creed, 135.

of Christ there be a perfect union of these two natures, yet is there no such *περίχωρησις*, circumincession, or in-being, as there is in the divine Persons of the sacred Trinity: for, as our author Bishop Bull observes, although the divine is in the human nature, yet is not the human, in its turn, in the divine nature; the human nature being finite, and circumscribed; the divine, infinite and immense; from whence it cannot be this should be wherever the former is. In regard, however, that the divine was, and is, and ever will be in the human nature, in the case of Christ, it is farther observed by our author, that he, at the time that he was conversant amongst men upon earth, must have filled all things with his universal presence; that he was at the same time with the Father and in the Father, and had the care of all things in heaven as well as in earth; nor did any thing hinder his being present every where. From whence, by the way, it will appear, that the Father being with the Son, and the Son being with the Father, is to be understood substantially, and not personally: otherwise a confusion of Persons would arise; and in the union of the divine and human natures, it

would not be true, that the Son rather than the Father was incarnate.

Previously to my proceeding to such observations as, in the sequel of this Discourse, will be made, I think it proper (the nature and drift of it being considered) to observe, that to those who have not made the writings of the ancient Fathers their particular study, and who, of course, will be unaccustomed to the reasonings which they make use of on such deep points of divinity as those are which are treated of in Bishop Bull's Defence, &c.; that these reasonings, I say, will appear to these men to be an unintelligible jargon; and that they are so far from proving the truth of the doctrine which is the subject of this Discourse, as that they prove nothing at all. To those, however, who are versed in these writings, I venture to say, that there is scarce a sentence in that part of the above extracts which contains the opinions of Hippolytus, in which the doctrine of Christ's divinity will not be perceived to be asserted. But with respect to the latter part of the above extracts, that, namely, in which the opinions of Tertullian are stated, this doctrine

is so plainly asserted, as to be level with the understanding almost of a child.

In the extract, however, which I have made from Bishop Bull's Defence, &c. and which contains the opinions of Tertullian, I should stand excused in the minds of the learned and ingenuous, for having given it, even though it were foreign to the subject of Christ's divinity (but which, however, it is so far from being, that he that runs may read it), were it only for the beauty of the language, and, as I may add, the philosophical spirit, in which these opinions of his are expressed.

Returning from this digression, I observe, that it has in a former part of this Discourse been shown, that it is as there is something in the nature of man analogous to that of the Deity, that we may understand what upon the divine authority we are taught, namely, that God created man in his own image. Now, although it cannot properly be said of any being inferior to man, that it was made in the image of God, certain footsteps nevertheless of the Divinity, similar to those which are in man, are to be traced in

the inferior parts of the creation; and thus God hath not left himself wholly without a witness in these.

“The human soul (says the learned Bishop from whose celebrated work I have been all along transcribing) is a faculty by means of which a man may not only know any thing, but may know all things that are within the compass of his knowledge: it can therefore never be satisfied with any such knowledge as it may have attained to, but, as being a power of knowing*, it will ever be athirst for still farther knowledge. Such likewise, comparatively, is matter; it is a

* If it be said of this expression, that it conveys no idea at all, and that it cannot therefore be any proper description of the soul, I answer, that the objection would equally hold good, as we should say of the eye of the body, that it is a power of seeing. And yet most certain it is, that except as there was a light which is external, and by which the power that the eye has of seeing may be reduced to act, in vain for any purpose of seeing, would this member of the body be possessed. Now, whether we say, either of the soul or of the eye, that the one is something, having a power of knowing, and the other a power of seeing, it amounts to the same thing. We have no true idea of the eye, as we say it is something capable of seeing, except as the existence of something external to it, whereby the power which it has may be reduced to act, is presupposed; and the same may be said of the soul.

power to something which is apt, or fitted, to receive that form which makes a thing something : for *the earth*, as we are told, *was without form, and void, or empty ; and darkness prevailed, until the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.* The power of matter was then determined, and it then received that variety of forms for which it was apt or fitted. The darkness which was upon the face of the deep, is not descriptive only of the darkened state into which man fell as he sinned, but of that likewise in which he originally was by nature, until that knowledge was derived to him, without which both the intellectual and moral powers with which he was endowed would have been given him in vain. The light which God sent forth when he said, *Let there be light*, decked all things according to their several capacities which had been given them, as with a garment ; and thus man became, not alone an image of God, but every creature, according to its capacity (for such was the will of God), had stamped on it the character of its Maker. The goodness which God saw in the lower orders of creatures was a communicated goodness (as that indeed would be which man, as using a freedom of will,

would have, should choose good rather than evil), flowing from the eternal source or spring of goodness. The instinct by which these inferior creatures seek the good of which they are by nature capable, is to them understanding; and the appetency with which they unremittingly and unerringly seek it, is to them a will. Thus these three properties, power*, understanding, and will go (and indeed are all that do in fact go) to the constitution or essence of any created being or thing whatever. Man, it is true, as that immortality shall be considered for which he is peculiarly fitted, may supereminently be said to have been made like unto God; and it is by reason of this immortal nature by which he is so widely different and distinct from the beasts that perish, that he is said to be *an image of God's eternity* (Wisd. ch. ii. ver. 23). He nevertheless is still but an image; and, as such, more distant from God than any, even the lowest created thing, is from him."

Now, the power, the wisdom, and the goodness of God, these being made manifest

* By power is here meant that capacity with which each created thing is endued by the constitution of its nature, whereby it seeks to preserve its being.

by his works, are all that we naturally know of him: for these are not qualities in God, and as they are in us, but constitute his essence, as he stands related to us as our Creator. But although these are qualities merely as they exist in us, yet, flowing from our essence, we may know ourselves to be substantially related to God; i. e. we may know, that, in respect of essence or substance, we exist in his image, and so are related to him in like manner as an image has a relation to *that* of which it is an image. It is accordingly as these properties are found to obtain in us, that we say, and that most truly, that we exist in his image; and upon this ground we rightly conclude, that the greater the power, the wisdom, and the goodness which we possess (and of this we judge by our works, for, *being of God's workmanship, we are by him created unto these*), the more perfect will be the image, according to which we shall be like unto him. The more perfect nevertheless an image shall be supposed to be, it will not approach a whit the nearer towards its being the very thing itself of which it is an image; for, the more perfect an image is, the more truly will it be an image: in consideration nevertheless that an image is, in its

very nature, distinct from *that* of which it is an image, it will follow, that the more truly any thing is an image, the more distant will it be from its being *that* of which it is an image. The more, for instance, we know of God (i. e. the greater the power, the wisdom, and the goodness of ours, by which we resemble him), the greater will the distance be perceived to be, in respect whereof our power, our wisdom, and our goodness, are from being the power, the wisdom, and the goodness of God.

Now, Christ, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, is said to be the express image of God's person, or, as it is in the Greek, ὑποστωσις; what has been said therefore on the subject of man as being the image of God, may be seen to be pertinent to the subject of this Discourse: for Christ likewise, as a man, must be the image of God; he is, however, something more than an image; for, in the above Scripture, he is said to be *the express image of God's person*; on which words it is, by a learned divine, observed as follows:—
 “ It is true, that in respect of the substance or essence of the Father, Christ is one with the Father, and no image; but, as a Son, he

evidently cannot be one with the Father. He nevertheless may, as a Son, be the image of the Father; although, as a Son (whatever the likeness and even sameness between him and the Father may be), he must ever be infinitely distant from the Father: for so is it in human generation, and where there is no other essential difference between a father and a son, than that the one is a father, and the other a son; as father and son they are two, but as men one only. In agreement herewith it is said, that if Christ be the express image of God's person, it will not be in respect of his humanity, but in respect of his divinity, that he is so; for, although, in respect of his humanity, he is consubstantial with men, and is, or at least may be, an image of God, as they are, being, however, in respect of his divinity, consubstantial with God, he is not an image of God as men may be, but is the express image of God's person, and which no man can be*." In agreement with what has been said, it has been observed by St. Athanasius, that "the Son is not so in the Father, as we ourselves are said to live, and move, and to be in God; for he (the Son), as being from

* Cudworth's Intellectual System, p. 619.

the fountain of the Father, is that life in whom all things are quickened and consist; neither does he who is the life live in another life, which were to suppose him not to be the life itself. Nor must it be conceived, that the Father is no otherwise in the Son than he is in holy men, corroborating them; for the Son himself is the power and the wisdom of God, and all created beings are sanctified by a participation of him in the Spirit."

Sufficient, I apprehend, will now have been said to show what it has been my intention in this Discourse to show, namely, that the doctrine of Christ's divinity hath as good, if not a better, foundation on that of the holy Trinity, than it has on those texts of Scripture which have been made use of by some late writers for a like purpose; giving them, at the same time, much credit for the learning and ingenuity which they have displayed in these writings of theirs.

I shall conclude this Discourse with observing, that there are, to the best of my remembrance, many remarks contained in Bishop Bull's Defence, &c. which prove the truth of Christ's divinity as fully as those do

of which I have made extracts in this Discourse of mine; as it would, however, be too great a labour for me again to examine this work of the learned Bishop's, and to draw the like conclusions from such passages thereof as I have supposed might be found, as I have from those of which I have made extracts, I shall content myself with these, conceiving that the purpose for which they have been made will have been fully answered.

THE END.

The first of these is the fact that the
 country is a very fertile one and
 the soil is very rich. The second
 is that the climate is very healthy
 and the air is very pure. The third
 is that the water is very soft and
 the food is very good. The fourth
 is that the people are very kind
 and the manners are very polite.

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