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THE DISPATCHES

OF

FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS

FROM

1799 TO 1818.

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“ Monumentum ære perennius.”

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THE DISPATCHES

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS

IN

INDIA, DENMARK, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, THE LOW  
COUNTRIES, AND FRANCE,

FROM

1799 TO 1818.

COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL AND AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS,

BY

LIEUT. COLONEL GURWOOD,

ESQUIRE TO HIS GRACE AS KNIGHT OF THE BATH.

VOLUME THE FIRST.

A NEW EDITION.

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
TO  
HER ROYAL HIGHNESS  
VICTORIA OF KENT,  
*PRINCESS OF ENGLAND.*

THIS  
HISTORICAL COMPILATION OF THE DISPATCHES AND DOCUMENTS  
RELATING TO THE VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS

OF  
FIELD MARSHAL  
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

IS  
MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED,  
BY  
HER ROYAL HIGHNESS'S  
VERY DUTIFUL AND OBEDIENT SERVANT,  
JOHN GURWOOD.

*London, 1834.*



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## INTRODUCTION.

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THE favorable reception of the "GENERAL ORDERS OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON," in a condensed form, induced the Compiler to request permission to publish, as a companion to them, the whole of his Grace's Dispatches relating to his various military services and commands. The permission was accorded by the Duke, in terms that excited every exertion to seek for official authorities which might tend to elucidate the personal detail of his Grace's professional services, contained in his public Dispatches.

The victories and successes in the early campaigns of the Duke of Wellington in India, have never been generally known: their importance having been absorbed by the events which were then occurring in Europe, and their celebrity eclipsed by the Duke's subsequent fame. The Dispatches themselves contain much military information and instruction in great detail. But an elucidation was necessary in order to connect them: and this explanation is offered as an apology for the presumption that might attach to what is not official in the narrative of the Mysore and Marhatta campaigns. The Governor General's letters to

Tippoo Suldaun have been inserted. as the best authority of the events which led to the campaigns of 1799, in Mysore; to the command of which country Colonel Wellesley was appointed. on the fall of Seringapatam.

The causes and results of his Grace's campaigns in Europe, are to be found in the numerous histories of the eventful period in which they occurred, which renders it unnecessary to recapitulate them. A brief narrative of the events, connecting the subjects of the several Dispatches from Denmark, the Peninsula, the Low Countries, and France. is interspersed with occasional notes, to supply the absence of official details.

In the compilation there has been an adherence, as strictly as possible, to the Calcutta and London Gazettes; with the single omission of the names and lists of the killed and wounded, and other returns, which accompanied the Dispatches: the form observed in the Bulletins, printed annually during the war for the superior officers in the Government, has been followed.

The Compiler has adhered to the Calcutta Gazettes in the orthography of Indian names, and in assimilating the English pronunciation to the sound of the Indian character, without any reference to more modern authorities, since their publication. Not so, however, with the names of battles and towns mentioned in the Gazettes of the Peninsular campaigns, for they will be carefully corrected; thus, Roliça Vimeiro, and others, although erroneously printed in the Gazettes, and even in the present day, will be restored to the correct spelling of the country.



Miñano's *Diccionario Geografico-Estadistico* of Spain, and Lopez's Maps, have been the authorities for the spelling of Spanish names; and the *Mappa de Portugal* of João Baptista de Castro, for that of Portuguese.

The drafts of various dispatches and letters written in India are missing from the Duke of Wellington's Papers: and many of those written in the Peninsula during the years 1809, 1810, 1811, and 1812, were lost by shipwreck in the Tagus. The Indexes containing the *Précis* of each letter having been fortunately preserved, the Compiler has been enabled to replace many of them by applying to those to whom the dispatches and letters were addressed, or to their representatives.

From December, 1812, the drafts of the dispatches and letters are complete according to the Indexes.

It is presumed that this compilation will afford, in many essential respects, as complete a history of the great military achievements of the Duke of Wellington, as can be offered to the present age and posterity. His Grace certainly must be the best authority for the details of what he knew, and of what he saw; and for what did not actually come under his observation, he had the information of all those whose duty it was to report to him the results of his orders. No presumption of visionary advantages, which might have been produced by different conduct, or different circumstances, will be attempted: but, what is far better, a simple description of the events, written as they occurred. The Duke of Wellington is therefore now presented to the world, for the first time, the historian of his own brilliant career.

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PRÉCIS  
 OF THE  
 COMMISSIONS, SERVICES, OFFICIAL COMMANDS,  
 AND PUBLIC HONORS  
 OF  
 FIELD MARSHAL  
 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

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Born . . . . .	1 May, 1769
Ensign . . . . .	7 Mar. 1787
Lieutenant . . . . .	25 Dec. 1787
Captain . . . . .	30 June, 1791
Major . . . . .	30 April, 1793
Lieutenant Colonel . . . . .	30 Sept. 1793
Colonel . . . . .	3 May, 1796
Major General . . . . .	29 April, 1802
Lieutenant General . . . . .	25 April, 1808
General, in Spain and Portugal . . . . .	31 July, 1811
Field Marshal . . . . .	21 June, 1813

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1794.

Embarked at Cork in command of the 33rd regiment to join the Duke  
 of York's army in the Netherlands, and arrived at Ostend . . . June.  
 Re-embarked and proceeded by the Scheldt to Antwerp . . . July.

1795.

As senior officer commanded three battalions on the retreat of the  
 army through Holland . . . . . Jan.

Early in the Spring, on the breaking up of the ice, the army, including the 33rd regiment, re-embarked at Bremen for England.	
On return to England, embarked in the command of the 33rd regiment for the West Indies, on board the fleet commanded by Admiral Christian . . . . .	Oct.
1796.	
But owing to the heavy equinoctial gales, after being six weeks at sea, returned to port . . . . .	19 Jan.
Destination of the 33rd regiment changed for India . . . . .	12 April.
Joined the 33rd regiment at the Cape of Good Hope . . . . .	Sept.
1797.	
Arrived in Bengal . . . . .	Feb.
Formed part of an expedition to Manilla, but recalled on arrival at Penang . . . . .	Aug.
Returned to Calcutta . . . . .	Nov.
1798.	
Proceeded on a visit to Madras . . . . .	Jan.
Returned to Calcutta . . . . .	Mar.
The 33rd regiment placed on the Madras establishment . . . . .	Sept.
1799.	
Appointed to command the subsidiary force of the Nizam, the 33rd regiment being attached to it . . . . .	Feb.
Advance of the army on Seringapatam ; Colonel Wellesley moving on the right flank, attacked and harassed by the enemy . . . . .	10 Mar.
Tippoo Suldaun in position at Mallavelly ; the attack and defeat of his right flank by the division under Colonel Wellesley, and the cavalry under Major General Floyd . . . . .	27 Mar.
Arrival of the British army before Seringapatam . . . . .	3 April.
The army take up their ground before the west face of that fortress : first attack on the Suldaunpettah Tope, by the 33rd regt. and 2nd Bengal Native regt., under Colonel Wellesley . . . . .	5 April.
Second attack with an increased force, the Scotch Brigade, (94th regt.) two battalions of Sepoys, and four guns . . . . .	6 April.
Siege of Seringapatam, until . . . . .	3 May.
Assault and capture : Colonel Wellesley commanding the reserve in the trenches . . . . .	4 May.
Colonel Wellesley appointed Governor of Seringapatam . . . . .	6 May.
A Commission, consisting of Lieut. General Harris, Lieut. Colonel Barry Close, Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley, the Hon. H.	

Wellesley, and Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick, appointed by the Governor General for the settlement of the Mysore territories	4 June.
Commission dissolved . . . . .	8 July.
Colonel Wellesley appointed to the command of Seringapatam and Mysore . . . . .	9 July.

1800.

Colonel Wellesley named to command an expedition against Batavia, in conjunction with Admiral Rainier, but declines the service, from the greater importance of his command in Mysore . . . . .	May.
The tranquillity of Mysore troubled by Dhoondiah Waugh, a Marhatta freebooter. Colonel Wellesley takes the field against him . . . . .	July.
Defeats him; death of Dhoondiah, and end of the warfare . . . . .	10 Sept.
Recalled from Mysore to command a force assembling at Trincomalee . . . . .	Oct.
Appointed to command this force, to be employed at Mauritius, or in the Red Sea, in the event of orders from Europe to that effect; or to be ready to act against any hostile attempt upon India . . . . .	15 Nov.

1801.

A dispatch, overland, received by the Governor General, with orders, dated 6th Oct., 1800, to send 3000 men to Egypt . . . . .	6 Feb.
The expedition being ready at Trincomalee, the Governor General directed the whole force to proceed to the Red Sea; and appointed General Baird to command in chief, and Colonel Wellesley to be second in command . . . . .	11 Feb.
In the mean time Colonel Wellesley, having received from the Governors of Bombay and Madras copies of the overland dispatch from Mr. Dundas, sailed from Trincomalee for Bombay in command of the troops . . . . .	15 Feb.
Colonel Wellesley, on his way to Bombay, informed of the appointment of Major General Baird to the chief command . . . . .	21 Feb.
Prevented, by illness, from proceeding on the expedition to Egypt; Colonel Wellesley is ordered to resume his government of Mysore . . . . .	28 April.

1803.

Appointed to command a force assembled at Hurryhur to march into the Marhatta territory . . . . .	27 Feb.
Advance from Hurryhur . . . . .	9 Mar.
Arrival at Poonah . . . . .	20 April.

The Peshwah replaced on the musnud . . . . .	13 May.
Empowered to exercise the general direction and control of all the political and military affairs of the British government in the territories of the Nizam, the Peshwah, and of the Marhatta States and Chiefs in the Deccan; similar authority being given to General Lake in Hindustan . . . . .	26 June.
The Marhatta War commenced . . . . .	6 Aug.
Siege and capture of Ahmednuggur . . . . .	11 Aug.
Siege and capture of Baroach . . . . .	29 Aug.
Battle of Assye . . . . .	23 Sept.
Siege and capture of Asseerghur . . . . .	21 Oct.
Battle of Argaum . . . . .	29 Nov.
Siege and capture of Gawilghur . . . . .	15 Dec.
Treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar . . . . .	17 Dec.
————— with Dowlut Rao Scindiah . . . . .	30 Dec.

## 1804.

Surprise of a body of predatory Marhattas, who were routed and destroyed, after an extraordinary forced march, near Munkaiseer	6 Feb.
A sword of the value of 1000 pounds voted to Major General Wellesley by the British inhabitants of Calcutta . . . . .	21 Feb.
Visits Bombay . . . . .	} 4 Mar. to 16 May.
Fêtes and address by the garrison and inhabitants . . . . .	
A golden vase voted to Major General Wellesley, by the officers of his division; afterwards changed to a service of plate, embossed with "Assye" . . . . .	26 Feb.
Returns to the army near Poonah . . . . .	17 May.
Resigns the military and political powers vested in him by the Governor General . . . . .	24 June.
Left the army for Seringapatam . . . . .	28 June.
Address voted to Major General Wellesley, on his return from the army, by the native inhabitants of Seringapatam . . . . .	6 July.
Called to Calcutta to assist in military deliberations . . . . .	
Appointed a Knight Companion of the Bath . . . . .	1 Sept.
The civil and military powers vested in him on the 26th of June, 1803, and resigned on the 24th of June, 1804, renewed by the Governor General . . . . .	9 Nov.
Returns to Seringapatam by Madras . . . . .	30 Nov.

## 1805.

Resigns the political and military powers in the Deccan, and proposes to embark for Europe . . . . .	24 Feb.
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Addresses on quitting India :

From the Officers of the division lately under his command	27 Feb.
Answer . . . . .	8 Mar.
From the Officers of the 33rd regt. . . . .	28 Feb.
Answer . . . . .	Mar.
From the native inhabitants of Seringapatam . . . . .	4 Mar.
Answer . . . . .	4 Mar.

Grand entertainment given to him at the Pantheon at Madras, by the civil and military Officers of the Presidency . . . . .	5 Mar.
Appoints Colonel Wallace, Major Barclay, and Captain Bellingham to superintend the prize affairs of the army of the Deccan . . . . .	6 Mar.
The Thanks of the King and Parliament for his services in the command of the army of the Deccan, communicated in General Orders by the Governor General . . . . .	8 Mar.
Embarks in his Majesty's ship Trident for England . . . . .	Mar.
Arrival in England . . . . .	Sept.
Appointed to command a brigade in an expedition to Hanover, under Lord Cathcart . . . . .	Nov.

1806.

Appointed Colonel of the 33rd regt., vice Marquis Cornwallis, deceased	30 Jan.
On the return of the expedition from Hanover, appointed to command a brigade of infantry in the Sussex district . . . . .	Feb.
Returned to serve in Parliament . . . . .	

1807.

Appointed Secretary to Ireland (the Duke of Richmond being Lord Lieutenant) . . . . .	3 April.
Sworn of His Majesty's Privy Council . . . . .	8 April.
Appointed to a command in the army under Lord Cathcart, in the expedition against Copenhagen . . . . .	July.
Affair at Kioge . . . . .	29 Aug.
Appointed to negotiate the capitulation of Copenhagen . . . . .	5 Sept.

1808.

Receives the Thanks of Parliament for his conduct at Copenhagen, in his place in the House of Commons, and replies to the Speaker . . . . .	1 Feb.
Returns to Ireland . . . . .	
Appointed to command an expedition assembled at Cork . . . . .	July.
The expedition sails for Coruña and Oporto . . . . .	12 July.
Finally lands at the mouth of the river Mondego, in Portugal . . . . .	1 to 3 Aug.
Affair of Obidos . . . . .	15 Aug.
Roliça . . . . .	17 Aug.

Battle of Vimeiro . . . . .	21 Aug.
Superseded in the command of the army by Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard . . . . .	21 Aug.
By the desire of Lieut. General Sir H. Dalrymple, the Commander of the Forces, he signs the armistice with Lieut. Gen. Kellermann, which led to the convention of Cintra . . . . .	22 Aug.
A piece of plate, commemorating the battle of Vimeiro, voted to Lieut. Gen. Sir A. Wellesley, by the General and Field Officers who served at it . . . . .	22 Aug.
Commands a division of the army under Sir H. Dalrymple . . . . .	22 Aug.
Convention of Cintra . . . . .	30 Aug.
Returns to England . . . . .	4 Oct.
Court of Inquiry on the Convention of Cintra . . . . .	17 Nov.
His evidence before it . . . . .	22 Nov.
Returns to Ireland . . . . .	

## 1809.

Receives the Thanks of Parliament for Vimeiro, in his place in the House of Commons, and replies to the Speaker . . . . .	27 Jan.
Appointed to command the Army in Portugal . . . . .	April.
Resigns the office of Chief Secretary in Ireland . . . . .	April.
Arrives at Lisbon, and assumes the command . . . . .	22 April.
The Passage of the Douro, and battle of Oporto . . . . .	12 May.
By a decree of the Prince Regent of Portugal, appointed Marshal General of the Portuguese army . . . . .	6 July.
Battle of Talavera de la Reyna . . . . .	27 and 28 July.
Created a peer, by the titles of Baron Douro of Wellesley, and Viscount Wellington of Talavera . . . . .	26 Aug.
Meets Marquis Wellesley at Seville and Cadiz . . . . .	2 Nov.

## 1810.

Thanks of Parliament voted for Talavera . . . . .	1 Feb.
Pension of 2000 <i>l.</i> per annum voted to Lord Wellington and his two succeeding heirs male . . . . .	16 Feb.
Appointed a member of the Regency in Portugal, in conjunction with Lord Stuart de Rothesay, then Mr. Stuart, His Majesty's Minister at Lisbon . . . . .	Aug.
Battle at Busaco . . . . .	27 Sept.
Takes up a position to cover Lisbon in the Lines, from Alhandra on the Tagus, to Torres Vedras and the Sea . . . . .	10 Oct.
Follows the retreat of the French army, under Marshal Massena, to Santarem . . . . .	16 Nov.



## 1811.

Again follows the retreat of the French army to Condeixa, and from thence along the line of the Mondego, to Celorico, Sabugal, Almeida, and Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	} 5 Mar. to 10 Ap.
Affairs with the French army on its retreat :	
at Pombal . . . . .	11 Mar.
at Redinha . . . . .	12 Mar.
at Cazal Nova . . . . .	14 Mar.
at the Passage of the Ceira, at Foz d'Arouce . . . . .	15 Mar.
at Sabugal . . . . .	3 April.
Thanks of Parliament for the liberation of Portugal . . . . .	26 April.
Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro . . . . .	3 and 5 May.
Fall of Almeida . . . . .	11 May.
Battle of Albuera . . . . .	16 May.
Siege of Badajoz raised . . . . .	10 June.
Concentration of the army on the Caya . . . . .	19 June.
Carries the army to the north . . . . .	1 Aug.
Affair at El Bodon . . . . .	25 Sept.
at Aldea da Ponte . . . . .	27 Sept.
License granted in the name of the King, by the Prince Regent, to accept the title of Conde do Vimeiro, and the insignia of Knight Grand Cross of the Tower and Sword, from the Prince Regent of Portugal . . . . .	26 Oct.
General Hill's surprise of General Girard, at Arroyo Molinos . . . . .	28 Oct.

## 1812.

Storm of Fort Renaud, near Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	8 Jan.
Siege and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	19 Jan.
Created by the Regency a Grandee of Spain, with the title of Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	
Thanks of Parliament for Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	10 Feb.
Advanced in the British peerage by the title of Earl of Wellington	18 Feb.
Vote of Parliament of 2000 <i>l.</i> per annum, in addition to the title . . . . .	21 Feb.
Siege and capture of Badajoz . . . . .	6 April.
Thanks of Parliament for Badajoz . . . . .	27 April.
Forts at Almaraz taken by General Hill . . . . .	19 May.
Siege and capture of the fortified convents at Salamanca . . . . .	27 June.
Battle of Salamanca . . . . .	22 July.
Charge of Cavalry at La Serna . . . . .	23 July.
The Order of the Golden Fleece conferred by the Regency of Spain	
Enters Madrid . . . . .	12 Aug.
Appointed Generalissimo of the Spanish armies . . . . .	

Advanced in the British Peerage by the title of Marquis of Wellington	18 Aug.
Advanced by the Regent of Portugal, to the title of Marquez de Torres Vedras . . . . .	
Marches towards Burgos . . . . .	4 Sept.
Siege and failure of Burgos . . . . .	22 Oct.
Retreat to the frontier of Portugal, to the . . . . .	19 Nov.
Thanks of Parliament voted for Salamanca . . . . .	3 Dec.
A grant of 100,000 <i>l.</i> from Parliament, to be laid out in the purchase of lands to that value, as a reward for his services, and to enable him to support the dignity of his peerage . . . . .	7 Dec.
Advanced by the Regent of Portugal to the title of Duque da Victoria	18 Dec.
Visits Cadiz, where he is received by a deputation of the Cortes . .	24 Dec.

## 1813.

Appointed Colonel of the Royal Regiment of Horse Guards . . .	1 Jan.
Returns to Portugal by Lisbon, where he is received by the whole population . . . . .	16 Jan.
Fêtes given by the Regency, and at San Carlos . . . . .	
Letter on quitting the 33rd regiment as Colonel . . . . .	2 Feb.
Elected a Knight of the Garter . . . . .	4 Mar.
Advance into Spain in two columns; the left column, under Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, by the north bank of the Douro; the right column to Salamanca . . . . .	6 May.
Quits Freneda for Salamanca . . . . .	22 May.
Affair near Salamanca . . . . .	25 May.
The Commander of the Forces proceeds to the left column, at Miranda de Duero . . . . .	29 May.
Affair of the Hussar brigade at Morales de Toro . . . . .	2 June.
Junction of the two columns at Toro, and advance of the army on Valladolid and Burgos . . . . .	4 June.
The castle of Burgos blown up . . . . .	12 June.
The Ebro turned at San Martin and Rocamundo . . . . .	14 June.
Affair at San Millan . . . . .	18 June.
Battle of Vitoria . . . . .	21 June.
Promoted to Field Marshal (Gazette, 3rd July) . . . . .	21 June.
Pursuit of the French army to France by Pamplona, and the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya in the Pyrenees; and by Tolosa, San Sebastian and Irun . . . . .	
Thanks of Parliament for Vitoria . . . . .	8 July.
Siege of San Sebastian . . . . .	17 July.
The Regency of Spain, on the proposition of the Cortes, offer to bestow on the Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo the estate of the Soto de Roma in Granada, 'in the name of the Spanish nation, in testimony of its sincere gratitude' . . . . .	22 July.

First assault and failure at San Sebastian . . . . .	25 July.
Advance of the French army under Marshal Soult, by Maya and Roneesvalles; the right and centre divisions of the army concentrating near Pamplona . . . . .	24 to 27 July.
Battle of Sorauren . . . . .	23 July.
Retreat of the French army into France . . . . .	30 July.
Affair at the Puerto de Echalar . . . . .	1 Aug.
Re-occupation of the positions on the Pyrenees by the Allied Armies . . . . .	2 Aug.
Second assault and fall of San Sebastian . . . . .	31 Aug.
Affairs on the Bidassoa and San Marcial . . . . .	31 Aug.
Castle of San Sebastian capitulated . . . . .	8 Sept.
Passage of the Bidassoa, and entrance into France . . . . .	7 Oct.
Surrender of Pamplona . . . . .	31 Oct.
Thanks of Parliament for San Sebastian, and the operations subsequent to Vitoria . . . . .	8 Oct.
The whole of the army descend into France; passage and battle of the Nivelle . . . . .	10 Nov.
Passage of the Nive . . . . .	9 Dec.
Marshal Soult attacks the left and right of the British army, and is successively defeated . . . . .	10 to 13 Dec.

## 1814.

Leaves two divisions to blockade Bayonne, and follows Marshal Soult with the remainder of the army . . . . .	Feb.
Affair at Hellette . . . . .	14 Feb.
Battle of Orthez . . . . .	27 Feb.
Passage of the Adour at St. Sever . . . . .	1 Mar.
Affair at Aire . . . . .	2 Mar.
The permission of the Prince Regent granted to the Marquis of Wellington to accept and wear the insignia of the following Orders . . . . .	4 Mar.
Grand Cross of the Imperial Military Order of Maria Teresa.	
the Imperial Russian Military Order of St. George.	
the Royal Prussian Military Order of the Black Eagle.	
the Royal Swedish Military Order of the Sword.	
Detaches two divisions to Bordeaux . . . . .	8 Mar.
Affair at Tarbes . . . . .	20 Mar.
Thanks of the Prince Regent and the Parliament for Orthez . . . . .	24 Mar.
Passage of the Garonne . . . . .	4 April.
Battle of Toulouse . . . . .	10 April.
Advanced in the British peerage by the titles of Marquis of Douro and Duke of Wellington . . . . .	3 May.

Visits Paris . . . . .	4 May.
Visits Madrid. King Ferdinand confirms all the honors and rewards conferred upon him in His Majesty's name by the Regency and the Cortes . . . . .	24 May.
A grant of 400,000 <i>l.</i> voted by Parliament, in addition to the former grants . . . . .	June.
Arrives in England . . . . .	23 June.
Proceeds to pay his respects to the Prince Regent, then at Portsmouth with the Allied Monarchs . . . . .	24 June.
His reception in the House of Peers on taking his seat as Baron, Viscount, Earl, Marquis, and Duke . . . . .	28 June.
Returns thanks at the bar of the House of Commons, and is addressed by the Speaker . . . . .	30 June.
Appointed Ambassador to the Court of France . . . . .	5 July.
Banquet given by the Corporation of London . . . . .	9 July.
Heraldic honors bestowed . . . . .	25 Aug.
Assists at the Congress at Vienna . . . . .	1 Nov.

## 1815.

On the arrival of Buonaparte in France, appointed Commander of the British Forces on the Continent of Europe, and from Vienna joins the army at Bruxelles . . . . .	11 April.
Puts himself in communication with Prince Blücher, in command of the Prussian army on the Meuse . . . . .	2 May.
Moves the allied army towards Nivelles, on the French army, under Buonaparte, crossing the frontier at Charleroi . . . . .	15 June.
Battle of Quatre Bras . . . . .	16 June.
Retires to a position to cover Bruxelles, on the border of the forest of Soignies . . . . .	17 June.
Battle of Waterloo . . . . .	18 June.
Created Prince of Waterloo by the King of the Netherlands . . . . .	
Thanks of the Prince Regent and Parliament for Waterloo . . . . .	22 June.
Pursuit of the fugitive remains of the French army to Paris . . . . .	
Surrender of Cambrai . . . . .	25 June.
of Peronne . . . . .	
Paris capitulated . . . . .	3 July.
By his interference, prevents the column in the Place Vendôme and the Bridge of Jena being destroyed . . . . .	6 July.
A grant of 200,000 <i>l.</i> voted by Parliament, in addition to the former grants . . . . .	July.
Appointed Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies of Occupation in France . . . . .	22 Oct.

## 1818.

Assists at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle . . . . .	Oct.
Appointed Field Marshal in the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian Armies . . . . .	Oct.
The evacuation of France by the Allied Armies . . . . .	1 Nov.
Appointed Master General of the Ordnance . . . . .	26 Dec.

## 1819.

Appointed Governor of Plymouth . . . . .	9 Dec.
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## 1820.

Appointed Colonel in Chief of the Rifle Brigade . . . . .	19 Feb.
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## 1821.

Attends George IV., King of England, to the field of Waterloo . . .	1 Oct.
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## 1822.

Assists at the Congress of Verona . . . . .	22 Oct.
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## 1826.

Proceeds on an especial embassy to St. Petersburg . . . . .	Feb.
Removed from the Government of Plymouth to be Constable of the Tower of London . . . . .	29 Dec.

## 1827.

Appointed Colonel of the Grenadier Guards . . . . .	22 Jan.
Appointed Commander in Chief . . . . .	22 Jan.
Resigns . . . . .	30 April.
Re-appointed . . . . .	27 Aug.

## 1828.

The King having called upon him to serve in the office of First Lord of the Treasury, he resigns the command of the army . . .	15 Feb.
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## 1829.

Appointed Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports . . . . .	20 Jan.
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## 1830.

Resigns the office of First Lord of the Treasury . . . . .	Oct.
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## 1834.

Elected Chancellor of the University of Oxford . . . . .	Jan.
Intrusted by the King with the whole charge of the Government and the seals of the three Secretaries of State . . . . .	Nov.
Continues Secretary of Foreign Affairs . . . . .	Dec.

## 1835.

Resigns . . . . .	April.
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*Explanation of Indian Terms, Titles, and Countries which occur in this Work.*

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- ACKBAR.** A journal, newspaper.
- AMILDAR, or AUMILDAR, AUMILS.** Native officers, uniting civil, military, and financial powers; employed in the collection of the revenue.
- ANNA.** The sixteenth part of a rupee.
- ATTAVESY, The.** A country between the Taptee and the Damungunga rivers.
- BAEB, BAYE.** Princess or lady of high rank.
- BAJARY.** Millet.
- BALLA, Above—**Balla-ghaut, above the ghaut. Balla killa, the upper fort or citadel in a fortress.
- BANDY.** A cart or gig.
- BATTA.** Field allowance to the army in money.
- BAZAAR.** Market. One was always established in camp.
- BEETEL.**—See *Otter* and *Paun*.
- BEGUM.** Lady of high rank; widow of a prince.
- BEHAUDER.** Title of courtesy of high respect; literally, Invincible.
- BERAR.** A country of the Eastern Marhattas, Ellichpoor the capital. It was formerly a jaghire of the Marhatta empire to the Rajahs of the Bhoonslah family, residing at Nagpoor, but afterwards declared independent.
- BERAH.** The ancient Hyphasis river beyond the Suteje, on the south-east frontier of Punjaub.
- BHEELS, The.** Supposed to be the aborigines of India, inhabiting the mountainous districts bordering on Candeish and the Northern Conkan. These wild and uncivilized people, who usually live by plunder and robbery, are governed by chiefs called Naiks, most of whom are now paid by the British Government.
- BHOONSLAH.** The family name of the Rajahs of Berar. The name and titles of the Rajah, in 1803, were Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah.
- BHOW.** A Hindu title.
- BRINJARRIES.** Grain dealers who supply armies with rice and grain, loaded in bags on bullocks.
- BUCKSHEE.** Commander in Chief of an army, or officer holding that rank.
- CAMAVISDAR.** A native revenue collector in Guzerat.
- CAMPOOS.** Brigades of regular infantry in native armies.
- CANARA.** A fertile district below the Western Ghauts, between the provinces of Goa and Malabar.
- CANDAHAR.** A capital of the king of Caubul.
- CANDEISH.** A country between the Nerbudda and Taptee rivers.
- CARCOON.**—See *Karkoon*.
- CARNATIC.** The country to the east of Mysore, between the Ghauts and the sea.
- CASTE.** The Hindus are born to different ranks and classes, which are so called.
- CAUBUL.** One of the capitals of the kingdom of that name.
- CHINNA.** A sort of grain, pulse.
- CHOULTRY.** A covered building for travellers or for troops.
- CHOUTE.** Tribute; a fourth of the revenue exacted as tribute by the Marhattas.

- CHOIRE CHITTY.** A written order or authority on papers.
- CIRCAR, or SIRCAR.** The Government; also a province or geographical division of a Soubah.
- COAST, The.** Applied formerly to the territory subject to the Presidency of Madras.
- CONFEDERACY,** the Marhatta, as mentioned in this work. The alliance formed by Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar, against the Peshwah, who sought and obtained British aid.
- CONKAN.**—See *Konkan*.
- COOLIES.** Men and women of low caste, who carry baggage, &c., with armies. Porters, laborers.
- COORG, or KOORG.** A country in the Ghauts between Mysore and Malabar.
- COROMANDEL, Coast of.** The eastern coast of the peninsula of India.
- Coss.** A geographical measure, irregular, but generally equal to two miles.
- COULTHEE.** A grain for horses.
- COWLE.** Mercy, quarter, protection, solemn pledge or promise.
- COWLNAMAH.** Paper of protection, given usually in time of war; an agreement in writing, a proclamation.
- CRORE.** One hundred lacs, or ten millions.  
— of Pagodas. About 4,000,000/.  
— of Rupees. About 1,000,000/.
- CUSHOONS.** Brigades of infantry.
- CUTCH, or KUTCH.** A barren but strong country in the western part of Guzerat.
- CUTTACK.** A country on the coast to the east of Berar.
- CUTWAHL.** Chief officer of police and superintendent of Bazaars.
- DAR.** When joined to another word, means the holder of an office, or an officer in charge of a post.—See *Killadar, Soubahdar, Zemindar*.
- DAWK.** The post, as also the post manner of travelling in India, carried in palanquins by bearers.
- DECCAN, South.** Applied to the country south of the Nerbudda, and between that and the Kistna rivers.
- DELTA.** A country situated between the mouths of rivers, usually applied to that of the Ganges.
- DESHMOOK.** An officer in the Decan receiving ten per cent. upon the clear revenue of the district.
- DESSARAH.** A great military festival among the Marhattas.
- DEWAN.** The principal native minister, or chief of the revenue department.
- DHURMSALA.** A place at or near a village for the reception of travellers.
- DIVAN.** A council of a prince and his ministers.
- DOLL.** A yellow pulse or pea.
- DOOAB.** A country between two rivers which run into each other, particularly that between the Ganges and the Jumna, in Hindustan, and that between the Kistna and the Toombuddra, in the Deccan.
- DOOLIES.** Palanquins made light for carrying sick and wounded soldiers.
- DROOG.** A fortified hill or rock.
- DUBASH.** An agent. The native at Madras who manages the money concerns of Europeans, and serves as interpreter. In Bengal this person is called Banyan and Sircar.
- DUFTER.** Record office.
- DURBAR.** Court of an independent prince; levee.
- DURRAR of horse.** Corps of.
- ENAU.** Grants of land, rent free.
- FANAM.** A coin 45 to a pagoda. Madras currency 2*d.* to 2½*d.* each.  
— **GOLD.** A coin 3½ to a rupee. Silver and gold coins of the same denomination are generally of the value of 15 to 1.



- FOUJDARRY.** See *Phousdarry*.
- GARCE.** A measure containing 4800 pucca seers, of 2 lbs. each.
- GHAUT.** A pass through hills; a ferry over a river; a range of mountains.
- GHAUTS.** Ranges of mountains which separate the upper or table land in the Deccan and Mysore from the lower countries bordering on the sea to the east and west, and on the Taptee river to the north. The country above the Ghauts is called Balla-ghaut; the country below is called Payen-ghaut.
- GHEE.** A kind of butter made of buffalo's milk.
- GHURREE.** A gong or bell upon which time is struck; also a wall flanked by towers.
- GOA.** A Portuguese settlement on the Malabar coast.
- GOLLAH.** That part of the camp where the brinjaries are stationed.
- GOLUNDAUZE.** Artillerymen of native troops.
- GOMASTAH of Brinjarries.** Agent or Commissioner.
- GRAB.** A small two-masted vessel, chiefly used for coasting in the East.
- GRAM.** A kind of pulse or grain with which the horses and gun bullocks are fed in India.
- GUALIOR, GWALIOR.** The modern capital of Scindiah.
- GUICKWAR.** The family name of one of the great Marhatta chiefs holding Guzerat. The name and titles of the chief, in 1803, were Rajah Anund Rao Guickwar.
- GUNNY BAGS.** Sacking in which rice is carried.
- GUZERAT.** Part of the Marhatta empire, of which it was formerly a jaghire under the Guickwar, who afterwards declared it independent. Baroda the capital.
- HAVILDAR.** A non-commissioned officer of native troops, of the rank of serjeant.
- HINDUSTAN Proper.** The country so called between the Indus, the Ganges, and the Nerbudda, and bounded on the north by the mountains of Thibet and Tartary.
- HIRCARRAHS.** Messengers employed to carry letters, generally brahmins. They are sent also to gain intelligence and used as guides.
- HOLKAR.** The family name of one of the great Marhatta chiefs, formerly a jaghiredar of the empire, but afterwards declared his independence; his territory in Malwa, and his capital Indore. The name of the chief, in 1803, was Jeswunt Rao Holkar.
- HURGOORY, or HUZOOORIAHS.** Personal attendants of a chief, of his own tribe or caste.
- HYDERABAD.** The capital and seat of government of the Nizam's dominions.
- INDORE.** The capital of Holkar in Malwa.
- JAGHIRE.** A grant of territory from a sovereign prince to a subject.
- JAGHIRE DAR.** The holder of a jaghiredar, usually for life only.
- JAH.** Title of the Nizam and of Scindiah.
- JEMIDAR.** The junior rank of officer in the native troops.
- JOWARRY.** A kind of Indian corn.
- JUNGLE.** Wood, high grass or reeds, waste country.
- KANARA.**—See *Canara*.
- KARKOON, or CARKOON.** A native revenue officer under the collector. An agent.
- KHAREETAH.** A letter, dispatch.
- KHELAUT.** Robe or dress of honor with which princes confer dignities.
- KILLA.** Balla Killa, the upper fort or citadel of a fortress.
- KILLADAR.** The governor of a fort.
- KARKANA.** Term applied to the cattle department of the army; and where the elephants are kept.

- KISTNA.** A large river dividing the Deccan from Mysore.
- KONKAN, or CONKAN.** The country between the Western Ghauts and the sea, near Bombay, under the Peshwah.
- KOORG, or COORG.** A country in the ghauts between Mysore and Malabar.
- KUR.** When attached to a name, as Nimbulkur, Nepauneekur, &c., designates the chief of that family.
- KURCH, Durbar.** Court charges.
- LAC.** One hundred thousand.  
— of Rupees, at 2s., about 10,000l.  
— of Pagodas, about 40,000l.
- MAHA.** Great.
- MAISTRY.** Head artisan.
- MALABAR.** The country on the western coast of the peninsula of India.
- MALWA.** A country north of the Nerbudda, divided between the Peshwah, Holkar, and Scindiah.
- MARHATTA EMPIRE.** Founded by the celebrated Sevajee over a considerable race of people about the middle of the seventeenth century, afterwards divided into several independent governments; the Rajah of Sattarah, a descendant of Sevajee, still being chief, although only nominally governing through the Peshwah, the chief magistrate of the empire. The principal chiefs of the Marhatta empire in 1803, were,  
The Rajah of Sattarah.  
The Peshwah.  
The Rajah of Berar.  
Dowlut Rao Scindiah.  
Jeswunt Rao Holkar.  
Anund Rao Guiekwar.
- MATROSS.** A bombardier.
- MAUNKARRIES.** Men of high easte, nobles.
- MEER SUDDOOR.** One of the great officers of Tippoo's government; his particular charge was the forts, &c.
- MOGUL.** The title of the Mahome-
- dan emperors of Hindustan; one of the seats of Musselmann.
- MOHUR.** A gold coin varying in value, according to weight, from 12 to 14 or 15, and even 16 rupees.
- MOOLUCK-GHERY, MULUK GEEREE.** Collection, exaction, or kind of revenue, in Guzerat.
- MOONSHEE.** Letter writer, tutor, secretary.
- MOPLAHS.** A race residing in Malabar Proper, descended from the Arabs who colonized on that coast.
- MUCCUDUM of Brinjarries.** Conductor.
- MUSNUD.** Throne.
- MUTASEDDEE.** Accountant, chief clerk, or secretary of brinjarries.
- MUTULUK.** Deputy.
- MYSORE.** A country south of the Deccan, conquered from the native Hindu Rajahs by Hyder Ally, retaken from Tippoo Suldaun by the British, and restored to the ancient family on the fall of Seringapatam.
- NABOB, or NAWAUB.** Mussulman king or chief, often a title of courtesy unattended with power.
- NAGPOOR.** The capital and the seat of government of the Rajah of Berar.
- NAIG, NAIK, or NAIGUE.** The lowest rank of non-commissioned officer in native troops, answering to that of corporal. Naik is also a title of the chiefs of the Bheels.
- NAIRS.** A warlike race of Hindus, inhabiting the mountainous and jingly parts of Malabar.
- NANPERVERISH.** Persons who are destitute.
- **FUND.** For such as are destitute.
- NERBUDDA.** A large river dividing Hindustan from the Deccan.
- NERRICK.** Price-current of the market.
- NIMMUK WALLAH.** Literally salt-eater. Eating salt in the East is a bond of faith and friendship among

the natives, to those with whom they eat it.

**NIZAM.** The Soubahdar of the Deccan, reigning over a large portion of territory between the Wurda, Godavery, and Kistna rivers. Capital at Hyderabad. The names and titles of the Nizam in 1803, were Nizam and Dowlut, Asoph Jah, Soubahdar of the Deccan; he was succeeded in the same year by his son, Secundar Jah.

**NOTCH, NOUTCH.** A dance, Indian fête.

**NULLAH.** A stream, watercourse.

**NUZZER.** An offering, a present made to a superior, a fine or fee.

**OOMRAH.** High rank of nobility.

**OTTER and PAUN.** Essence of the preparation of beetel nut, presented to visitors on quitting a durbar.

**OUGEIN.** The ancient capital and seat of government of Scindiah in Malwa.

**PADDY.** Rice in the husk.

**PAGODA.** Hindu temple of worship. A gold coin, of about eight shillings value.

**PATAN.** Name applied to the Afghan tribes.

**PATEL, or POTAIL.** The hereditary head manager of a village, and the medium of communication between a village and a government.

**PAYEN.** Lower. Payen-ghaut, the country below the Ghauts.

**PEONS.** Irregular infantry, armed with swords or matchlocks, employed chiefly in the defence of forts, and in the collection of the revenue.

**PERGUNNAH.** A district. The largest division of land in Zemindarry.

**PESHCHSH.** Tribute, fine, quit rent on the stipulated revenue.

**PESH-KANAH.** Chief agent, or manager to a Resident.

**PESHWAH.** Literally, the First. The chief magistrate of the Marhatta empire, nominally under the Ra-

jah of Sattarah, but usurping his authority. His capital and seat of government at Poonah. The names and titles of the Peshwah, in 1803, were Sreemunt Bajee Rao, Ragonaut Rao, Pundit Purdhaun.

**PETTAH.** A suburb, or outwork of a fortified place, with wall and ditch.

**PHOUSDARRY, or FOULDARRY.** The criminal court of law in Mysore.

**PINDARRIES.** Freebooters, who ravaged the countries of other nations.

**POLYGARS.** Natives who consider themselves independent: they inhabit forts, hills, and woods, armed with pikes and matchlocks.

**POONAH.** The capital and seat of government of the Peshwah.

**PUNDIT.** A learned Brahmin.

**PUNJAB.** Five rivers; the country intersected by, between the Indus and the Sutleje.

**PURNAH, or POURNEYA.** The celebrated Dewan of Mysore.

**PURWANAH, PURWUNNA.** A government, or official order.

**RAHDARRY.** An order of route and supplies.

**RAJAH.** The Hindu title of a prince.

**RAJPOOT.** A high caste of Hindu soldiers, inhabiting the country Rajpootana.

**RANNEE.** Hindu princes. The wife of a Rajah.

**RAO or ROW.** A title under the rank of Rajah.

**RUPEE.** A silver coin, value about two shillings in the explanation of lac, but is sometimes one shilling and ten pence: it varies in value all over India. Of this coin there are several kinds, viz., Chandorce, Sicea, Pondicherry, Rajah, &c.; all varying in relative value.

**RUSSALAH of horse.** A division or corps of, less than a durrah.

**RYOT.** Peasant or labourer.

**SATTARAH.** The capital of the country so named. Though the Rajah of Sattarah was, as descendant of Sevajee, nominally the head of

- the Marhatta empire, yet the real power had been usurped, and was exercised, by the chief magistrate, the Peshwah.
- SCINDIAH.** The family name of a great Marhatta Chief, jaghiredar of the empire, but afterwards independent. His territory was in Malwa, and his capital Ougein. The names and titles of the Chief, in 1803, were Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah. He had much increased the territory of his predecessors by conquest in Hindustan, and his power at Poonah by his influence over the Peshwah.
- SEBUNDY.** Irregular native soldiers, country militia employed generally in the police and revenue.
- SEER.** A dry measure, rather more than a pint. Or two pounds weight.
- SEPOYS.** Native troops.
- SERINJAUMY, or SURINJAM.** Grants of Jaghires for personal expenses, or for raising troops. Charges of collection.
- SEVAJEE.** The founder of the Marhatta empire in the seventeenth century, whose descendants were Rajahs of Sattarah.
- SEWARY, SOUARREE, SOIREE.** Retinue, suite.
- SHEKAR.** A hunt.
- SHROFFS.** Native bankers, money changers.
- SILLADAR.** Horsemen bearing arms, and finding their own horses and equipment.
- SIRCAR.**—See *Circar*.
- SIRDAR.** Chieftain, captain, headman, gentleman.
- SIRDESHMOOK.** See *Deshmook*.
- SIRLUSHKUR.** One of the principal officers of state under the Peshwah.
- SIRSOUBAH.** An officer under the Soubah.
- SOUBAH.** A province.
- SOUBAH, SOUBAHDAR.** Governor general, prince over other rajahs or princes; used indiscriminately by General Wellesley and others, as applied to the Nizam. Viceroy or governor of a soubah or province. Subaltern officer in native-troops.
- SOUCAR.** Banker, merchant, money lender.
- SULTAUN.** Mussulman king, the title assumed by Tippoo.
- SUNGUM.** Literally the confluence of two rivers. As the British Residency at Poonah was situated at such a position, the Sungun means the Residency.
- SUNNUD.** Patent, authority for holding land or office. Grant or command of a prince or chief.
- TALOOK.** Lands and villages under the protection of a fort. District held under superior authority.
- TANDAH.** As applied to brinjarries, a body, a horde, an encampment.
- TANK.** Reservoir for water.
- TANNAH.** Police station.
- TAPPALL.** The Post.
- TITLES.** Attached to proper names among Hindus, beginning with the lowest rank:
- 1st. Rao or Row.
  - 2nd. Rajah.
  - 3rd. Wunt.
- Attached to proper names among Mahomedans.
- 1st. Khan or Cawn.
  - 2nd. Behauder.
  - 3rd. Jung.
  - 4th. Dowlut.
  - 5th. Moolk.
  - 6th. Oomrah.
  - 7th. Jah.
- TOPE.** A grove or thicket.
- TUNCAWS.** Orders for the collection of the revenue.
- VAKEEL or VAQUEEL.** Envoy, ambassador, agent.
- VISIAPPOOR, or BEEJAPOUR.** Formerly the most splendid Mahomedan capital of the Deccan, now in decay. It is situated in the country between the Kistna and Beemah rivers.

**WHEEL.** Called the perambulator, to measure distances, always used by General Wellesley in India at the head of the column of march, to regulate the rate of it.

**WYNAAD.** A country to the south of Coorg, above the Ghauts, between Mysore and Malabar.

**ZAFET.** An entertainment, an extraordinary allowance on particular occasions, either in money or provisions, as a reward to the troops.

**ZEMINDAR.** Landholder, government officer, charged with the finance department, superintendence of the land revenue.

**ZENANA.** The apartment of the women.

**ZEREEN PUTKA.** The golden pennon; the standard of the Marhatta empire, which always accompanied the Peshwah when he took the field in person, and was sometimes sent with another commander, when the Peshwah chose to remain at Poonah. The charge of the zereen putka constituted such officer commander in chief. Major General Wellesley was anxious that this charge should be conferred on Appah Dessaye, with whom he was satisfied; and it would have indicated that the Peshwah was earnestly engaged in the prosecution of the war.

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*Names, as written in this Work, and as they are sometimes written in other Books and Maps.*

Bednore,  
Binkenholy,  
Burhampoor,

Calpee,  
Candeish,  
Chichkaira,  
Canara,  
Casserbary,  
Cuddapa,

Darwar,  
Decean,

Erroor,

Ferdapoor,

Gwalior,  
Gutpurba *river*,  
Guzerat,

Kistna *river*,  
Konkan,  
Koorg,

Naulniah,

Panowullah,  
Perinda,

Biddenoor, Bennoor.  
Bunkinnola.  
Berhampore, Boorhaunpoor.

Kalpee.  
Khandes.  
Cheesekair, Cheechekhera.  
Karnara,  
Kasarbaree.  
Kurpa.

Dharwar.  
Dekan, Deekan.

Enoor.

Furdapore.

Gualior.  
Gulpurba.  
Goujerat.

Krishna.  
Concan, Conkan.  
Coorg.

Nulnair.

Panowly, Poonowla, Poonawellee.  
Paraindah.

Phoolmurry,	Foolmerry.
Puttun,	Moongee Pyetun.
Pahlood,	Palode.
Rackisbaum,	Rakshusbowan.
Toombuddra <i>river</i> ,	Tungbudra.
Umber,	Amber.
Visiapoor,	Beejapour.

The names of Chiefs and towns, are variously written, to signify the same persons and places. These, from the liberty observed in Indian orthography, the reader of Indian history will understand. The Compiler has adopted the most general spelling of such names, and has attempted to adhere to it; but not always, for when he had a doubt, he has left it as in the manuscript.

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# THE EARLY SERVICES

OF

## FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON

IN

### HOLLAND AND INDIA.

WITH THE OFFICIAL AND OTHER DISPATCHES.

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LIEUT. COLONEL the Hon. ARTHUR WELLESLEY embarked at Cork in command of the 33rd regiment in May, 1794, and landed in the month following at Ostend, to join the British army under his Royal Highness the Duke of York, then in the Low Countries. The approach of the French army under General Pichegru rendered it necessary to evacuate Ostend without delay; and the 33rd regiment, with two other battalions, proceeded round by the Scheldt to Antwerp, where it remained encamped during the month of July. On the retreat of the army under the Duke of York from Alost into Holland, Lieut. Colonel Wellesley took up his allotted station with his regiment, and joined in the retrograde movement on Breda and Bois-le-duc. The French army followed; and on the 14th of September there was a serious affair near Boxtel.

The British army afterwards continued to retreat towards Nimeguen, and took up a position on the right bank of the Waahl. While posted between the Waahl and the Leck, several affairs took place with the advance of the French army, in which the 33rd were engaged both in the attack on Tuyl, on the 30th December, 1794, and at Meteren and Geldermalsen, on the 5th January, 1795. Crossing the Leck, the retreat was continued by Amersfoort, Deventer, and Coeverden, to Meppen on the Ems. In these operations, Lieut. Colonel Wellesley, as senior officer, commanded a

brigade, consisting of three battalions, in the rear guard; evincing that zeal and intelligence which, in the opinion of Sir James Craig and several officers of merit and reputation, gave promise of future distinction. The campaign ended by the re-embarkation of the British army at Bremen, on the breaking up of the ice in the spring of 1795.

On the return of the army to England, the 33rd regiment landed at Harwich, and was for a short time encamped at Warley. In the autumn it proceeded to Southampton, and Lieut. Colonel Wellesley embarked with it for the West Indies, in the fleet commanded by Admiral Christian. After many delays from contrary winds the fleet sailed; but the expedition having been about six weeks at sea during the most tempestuous weather, in which many of the vessels composing it were lost, was obliged to return to Portsmouth.

The 33rd regiment was landed and quartered at Poole. Its destination having been changed for India, it was again embarked in the beginning of April, 1796; but Lieut. Colonel Wellesley, in consequence of severe illness, was unable to leave the country. He, however, followed shortly afterwards, and joined his corps at the Cape of Good Hope. He proceeded with it to Bengal, and arrived at Calcutta in the beginning of 1797. At the end of that year, the 33rd regiment formed part of the expedition from Bengal under General St. Leger, projected by the Governor General, Sir John Shore, to attack Manilla: but on arriving at Penang, where the other part of the expedition from Madras had joined, fresh orders were received for the recall of the troops to their several presidencies, in consequence of apprehensions entertained by Lord Hobart, Governor of Fort St. George, that Tippoo Suldaun might be induced, by the absence of the troops, to invade the Carnatic.

The 33rd regiment returned to Bengal; and Colonel Wellesley soon afterwards went to Madras on a visit to Lord Hobart, previously to the departure of his Lordship for Europe. After an absence of two months, he returned to



Calcutta, having rapidly examined the establishments of Madras, and other parts of the Carnatic.

The Earl of Mornington (afterwards Marquis Wellesley) having been appointed to succeed Sir John Shore\* as Governor General of India, arrived at Calcutta on the 17th of May, 1798, after having touched at the Cape of Good Hope, and at Madras, where he had remained a few days.

Lord Mornington had been for some time an active member of the Board of Control, and he had the advantage of being well acquainted with the general state of affairs in India.

At the period of his departure from England, it was generally believed, and he was himself confident, that he would find India in a state of profound peace; and that expectation was fully confirmed by the reports which reached him upon his arrival at Madras, from the several authorities at the different Presidencies of India.

Internal tranquillity prevailed throughout the Company's possessions, and no apprehension was entertained of hostile designs on the part of any of the neighbouring states.

In the absence of all appearance of danger from abroad, his Lordship's attention, upon his arrival at Calcutta, was principally directed to internal affairs. This state of tranquillity was not, however, of long duration: it was interrupted by the discovery of the hostile designs and treacherous conduct of Tippoo Suldaun, and followed by the campaign of 1799.

It may be proper here to advert shortly to the circumstances which gave rise to the second Mysore war, as the commencement of Colonel Wellesley's military career in India; the more so, as some of the publications, which profess to record the events of this period, have ascribed to the Indian Government at home, and to the new Governor General, an inclination to take advantage of any pretext for reducing the power of Tippoo Suldaun, and for removing

\* Afterwards Lord Teignmouth.

from India the French officers in the service of the native princes. This assumption is directly at variance with the general tenor of the public records. On the contrary, it appears that one of the first acts of the new Governor General was to address a conciliatory letter to Tippoo Suldaun, dated 14th of June, 1798, in reply to an application received by Sir John Shore at the moment of his departure, claiming restitution of Wynaad, and some other districts on the western frontier of Mysore; which Tippoo alleged had been erroneously transferred to the East India Company, under the treaty of Seringapatam in 1797.

*The Governor General to Tippoo Suldaun.*

‘ Fort William, 14th June, 1798.

‘ Immediately on my arrival in Bengal, Sir Alured Clarke communicated to me your friendly letter to him, stating that some people of the Koorg country, having descended from the woods and mountains, had fixed their residences in the villages of Kauntamungle, Coloorbajee, &c.

(The contents of the letter recapitulated.)

‘ Sir Alured Clarke has also communicated to me your answer to the letter from the late Governor General, Sir John Shore, respecting the claims of the Company and of your Highness to the district of Wynaad, bordering on Tambercherry.

‘ Being anxious to afford you every proof in my power, of my sincere desire to maintain the good understanding which had so long subsisted between your Highness and the Company, I made it one of the first objects of my attention to examine all the papers existing on the Company’s records, as well respecting Wynaad, as the district of Souleah, in which it appears that Kauntamungle and Coloorbajee are situated.

‘ From these papers, I find that not only the right to the districts of Wynaad and Soulcah has remained in doubt; but also to the district of Amerah and Ersawaraseemy, and to some other inconsiderable territories on the side of Malabar.

‘ Your Highness is well aware that it is a maxim among states, who are sincerely disposed to maintain the relations

of amity and peace, to bring all contested points of this nature to a speedy determination.

‘ A seasonable and temperate discussion of those differences of opinion, which must occasionally arise between powers of the most pacific disposition, tends to prevent quarrels between their subordinate officers, and to obviate the misrepresentations which each party is apt, in such cases, to make to their respective governments. This is the most friendly, as well as the most prudent course, and will always defeat the views of interested and designing persons, who may wish to foment jealousy and to disturb the blessings of peace.

‘ For this object Lord Cornwallis, the Nawaub Nizam Ali Khan, and the Peshwah Pundit Purdhaun, wisely provided in the treaty of peace, concluded with your Highness at Seringapatam, by establishing a regular mode of bringing to an amicable adjustment, with the knowledge and approbation of all parties, any questions which might hereafter arise between your Highness and any of the Allies respecting the boundaries of your adjacent territories.

‘ I am persuaded that it is your Highness’s disposition to maintain faithfully your public engagements with the Company. On my part, you will always meet with a religious adherence to every article of the treaties subsisting between us. On this occasion, therefore, it is my intention to depute a respectable and discreet person to meet upon your frontier such of your officers as your Highness may please to name, for the purpose of conferring together, of discussing the grounds of the respective claims, and of satisfying each other on all points respecting which any doubts may be entertained on either side.

‘ It would not be consistent with your Highness’s high reputation for justice and good faith, to refuse to enter into this candid investigation; I therefore entertain no doubt that, as soon as you shall have fully understood the nature of this representation, you will afford every facility to the conduct of the necessary inquiries, and will use your endeavors to bring them to a speedy determination; and, for this purpose, that you will, without delay, direct your officers at Korial Bunder (or Mangalore) to enter into conference with those deputed by the managers of the Honorable Company’s

affairs on the coast of Malabar. The result of the conferences will be communicated to me by the government of Bombay, with all practicable dispatch; and you may rely upon it, that after a regular discussion shall have taken place, according to the established law of nations, and to the practice uniformly observed on every occasion of disputed boundary which has arisen between your Highness and the Allies, since the conclusion of the treaty of Seringapatam, I will not suspend, for one moment, the full acknowledgment of whatever shall appear to be your just right.

‘ In the mean time, as the districts of Amerah and Souleah have been in the possession of the Koorg Rajah for several years, your Highness will, no doubt, see the propriety and justice of recalling the troops sent into the neighbourhood of Souleah. Your Highness must be sensible that, until I have been satisfied of the justice of your claims in a regular and amicable manner, I will never suffer any of the Company’s allies or dependents, whose country and interests I consider to be, in every respect, the same as those of the Company, to be forcibly deprived of territories of which they have so long held possession: with the most cordial disposition to maintain the intercourse of friendship with your Highness, I trust that I shall always meet an equal return on your part; and, therefore, I cannot but lament that your Highness did not immediately resort to the established channels of peaceable negotiation, in place of stationing a military force upon the frontiers of the territory possessed by an ally of the Company.

‘ Confident, however, that your Highness, upon a full review of all the circumstances of the case, will be equally inclined with myself to conform to the dictates of justice, I am satisfied that, after our respective officers shall have conferred together, and explained to each other all matters that remain in doubt, we shall have no difficulty in terminating these long depending questions to our mutual satisfaction.

‘ *Tippoo Sultaan.*’

‘ MORNINGTON.’

Tippoo Sultaan’s claims were accordingly referred to certain Commissioners, then employed in Malabar under the orders of the Government of Bombay, for the investigation of claims of this nature; and upon their making a report in favor of the Sultaan’s pretensions, those districts were immediately re-

stored to him, under a Proclamation by the Governor General.

This circumstance alone would be sufficient to demonstrate the pacific intentions of the British Government at that period; in addition to which, the exhausted state of the Company's treasury, and of its credit in India at that moment, were also reasons to deter the Governor General from engaging in war, if it had been possible to avoid it: but the destruction of the power of Tippoo Suldaun, or of the influence of France in India, did not then form any part of the policy, either of the Earl of Mornington or of the British ministry, or of the East India government at home.

Early in the month of June, a paper was received by the Governor General, at Calcutta, containing a Proclamation by Mons. Malartic, the Governor General of the Isle of France, and of the French establishments east of the Cape of Good Hope, which announced the arrival of two Ambassadors with letters from Tippoo Suldaun, proposing an offensive and defensive alliance, for the purpose of expelling the English from India. This intelligence, which at first appeared incredible, was, in a few days, confirmed by a dispatch, received at Calcutta, from Lord Macartney, the Governor at the Cape of Good Hope, conveying a copy of Mons. Malartic's Proclamation; and it was further confirmed by the arrival of a ship from the Mauritius, the captain of which deposed, upon examination before the Governor General, that he was on shore when the Proclamation was issued, and that he had witnessed the reception of the Ambassadors.

General Malartic, having no regular troops to spare, invited all French citizens, so disposed, to join the standard of Tippoo: and it is a coincidence worthy of remark, that Tippoo's Ambassadors, with as many Frenchmen as they were able to engage for the Suldaun's service, landed from 'La Preneuse' French frigate at Mangalore, on the 28th of April, 1798; being the very same day on which Lord Mornington had landed at Madras when on his way to Calcutta.

Although Tippoo's hatred of the British nation, and his eager desire for vengeance, and for the recovery of the provinces which Lord Cornwallis had compelled him to cede to the Company and its Allies, in 1791, were well known ; yet it appears that no suspicion was entertained, before the receipt of this intelligence from the Mauritius, that he had actually adopted such decided measures of hostility. It was, however, soon afterwards discovered that he was engaged in similar negotiations with Zemaun Shah, and several other native princes, as well as with the French officers in their service ; and it was also ascertained that he had actually succeeded in engaging the French officers in the Nizam's service to enter into his views.

His Highness the Nizam, Soubahdar of the Deccan, had in his service a force of 14,000 well disciplined infantry, commanded by M. Raymond, with 124 French officers, eager partisans of the French republic, and who were on the point of erecting the French standard at his capital, Hyderabad. The strength and efficiency of this corps, and its position on a vulnerable part of the frontiers of the Company's territory, demanded immediate attention. By the judicious and prompt interference of the Governor General, a British detachment, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Roberts, was secretly but expeditiously dispatched to Hyderabad on the 10th of October, 1798 ; and on the 22nd of the month, under the orders of the Nizam, the whole of the French officers were compelled to surrender without firing a shot. His Highness being thus relieved from their control, concluded a new treaty of alliance with the British Government, whereby he bound himself to exclude, not only from his army, but from his dominions, all Frenchmen or other adventurers from Europe ; and likewise engaged to maintain at his capital a corps of British troops for the effectual security of the alliance. A treaty was also formed with the Peshwah, the nominal head of the Marhatta empire, which secured the neutrality of that Chief, in the absence of any other stipulated advantage.

Lord Mornington obtained information of all the Sul-taun's measures, and prevented their execution with that vigor which characterized his administration in India. After a very able minute in the Secret department, on the 12th of August, 1798, in which he fully and satisfactorily stated the grounds and motives of his proceedings, he ordered Lieut. General Harris, the Commander in Chief at Madras, to assemble the forces of the Company in the Carnatic. His Excellency, having written to Tippoo Sul-taun the following letters, proceeded in person to Fort St. George, where he arrived on the 31st of December, 1798, for the purpose of superintending and directing the preparations for war, in the event of failure in negotiation.

*The Governor General to Tippoo Sul-taun.*

Fort William, 8th November, 1798.

‘ I have received your letter informing me (the substance of the letter, received on the 24th of October, recited.)

‘ It affords me sincere satisfaction to learn that you have nominated two persons of integrity and honor to meet and confer with the deputies appointed, under my orders, by Mr. Duncan, the Governor of Bombay, for the purpose of investigating the question regarding the talooks of Amerah and Souleah. It is only by means of regular inquiry and amicable discussion, that such questions can be adjusted among independent powers. My determination in the case of Wynaad was dictated by those principles of justice and moderation which always direct the Company's government; nor shall my scrupulous adherence to the same principles be less manifest, in my decision on your claim to the district at present in question: the possession of which shall not be withheld from you for an instant, if, after full investigation, I shall be satisfied of the justice of your title to them.

‘ It is a well-known truth, that they, who are the most ready to respect the just rights of others, are the most vigilant and resolute to maintain their own.

‘ I have understood your sentiments concerning the “turbulent disposition of interested men, who, by nature, are ever seeking opportunities of sowing the seeds of dissension.”

For the happiness of mankind it is to be lamented, that these authors of confusion are too numerous, assiduous, and successful, in all parts of the world. In no age or country were the baneful and insidious arts of intrigue ever cultivated with such success, as they are at present by the French nation. I sincerely wish that no impression had been produced on your discerning mind by that dangerous people; but my situation enables me to know, that they have reached your presence, and have endeavored to pervert the wisdom of your councils, and to instigate you to war against those who have given you no provocation.

‘ It is impossible that you should suppose me to be ignorant of the intercourse which subsists between you and the French, whom you know to be the inveterate enemies of the Company, and to be now engaged in an unjust war with the British nation. You cannot imagine me to be indifferent to the transactions which have passed between you and the enemies of my country; nor does it appear necessary, or proper, that I should any longer conceal from you the surprise and concern with which I perceived you disposed to involve yourself in all the ruinous consequences of a connexion, which threatens not only to subvert the foundations of friendship between you and the Company, but to introduce into the heart of your kingdom the principles of anarchy and confusion, to shake your own authority, to weaken the obedience of your subjects, and to destroy the religion which you revere.

‘ Immediately after my arrival in Bengal, I read your correspondence with the late Governor General, Sir John Shore, and with the acting Governor General, Sir Alured Clarke; and I perceived, with great satisfaction, that in all your letters you constantly professed a disposition to strengthen the bonds of sincere attachment, and the foundations of harmony and concord, established between you and the Honorable Company. I received particular pleasure from reading your last letter to Sir John Shore, in which you signified your amicable desire that he should impress me with a sense of the friendship and unanimity so long subsisting between the two states. Your subsequent letters to me have abounded with professions of the same friendly nature.

· Combining these professions of amity on your part, with the proofs which the Company’s government have constantly



given of their sincere disposition to maintain the relations of friendship and peace with you; and adverting at the same time to your reputation for wisdom and discernment, it was natural for me to be extremely slow to believe the various accounts, transmitted to me, of your negotiations with the French, and of your military preparations. But whatever my reluctance to credit such reports might be, prudence required, both of me and of the Company's allies, that we should adopt certain measures of precaution and self-defence; and these accordingly have been taken, as you will no doubt have observed. The British Government and their allies wishing, nevertheless, to live in peace and friendship with all their neighbours; entertaining no projects of ambition, nor any views in the least incompatible with their respective engagements; and looking to no other objects than the permanent security and tranquillity of their own dominions and subjects, will always be ready, as they now are, to afford you every demonstration of these pacific dispositions.

• The Peshwah, and his Highness the Nizam, concur with me in the observations which I have offered to you in this letter; and which, in the name of the Company and of the allies, I recommend to your serious consideration. But as I am also desirous of communicating to you, on the behalf of the Company and of their allies, a plan calculated to promote the mutual security and welfare of all parties. I propose to depute to you, for this purpose, Major Doveton, who is well known to you, and who will explain to you more fully and particularly the sole means, which appear to myself and to the allies of the Company, to be effectual for the salutary purpose of removing all existing distrust and suspicion, and of establishing peace and good understanding on the most durable foundations.

• You will, I doubt not, let me know at what time and place it will be convenient to you to receive Major Doveton; and as soon as your friendly letter shall reach me, I will direct him to proceed to your presence.

• I shall expect your answer to this letter, with an earnest hope, that it may correspond with the pacific views and wishes of the allies; and that you may be convinced that you cannot in any manner better consult your true interests, than by meeting with cordiality the present friendly and moderate advance to a satisfactory and amicable settlement of all

points, on which any doubts or anxiety may have arisen in the minds either of yourself or of the allies.

‘ *Tippoo Sultaun.*’

‘ MORNINGTON.’

*The Governor General to Tippoo Sultaun.*

‘ Fort William, 10th December, 1798.

‘ I had the honor of addressing a friendly letter to your Highness on the 8th of November last, in which I stated a variety of important points, to which your Highness would no doubt perceive the propriety and necessity of giving your earliest and most serious consideration. I particularly hope that your Highness will have been sensible of the advantages likely to result, to all parties, from the conciliatory measure of my deputing Major Doveton to you, which I proposed in that letter.

‘ I expect to have the pleasure of finding your answer to that letter on my arrival at Madras, for which place I am on the point of setting out from Calcutta. I hope to arrive at Madras about the same time that this letter will reach you; and should any circumstances hitherto have prevented your answering my letter of the 8th of November, I assure myself that you will immediately, on your receipt of this, dispatch a satisfactory reply to it, addressed to me at Madras. ’

‘ *Tippoo Sultaun.*’

‘ MORNINGTON.’

The 33rd regiment had been in the mean time sent from Bengal to be placed on the Madras establishment, where it arrived in September, 1798. In November the greater part of the troops were assembled and encamped at Wallajahbad, under the orders of Colonel Wellesley, with whom the general superintendance remained until February following, when General Harris arrived to assume the personal command of the army, which had proceeded to Vellore. The attention which Colonel Wellesley had bestowed on the discipline and well-being of the troops, and in practising them in combined field movements, with the admirable system he adopted for supplying the bazaars, which were kept constantly well provided, attracted general notice and approbation; and when General Harris joined the army to take command, after receiving the reports of the heads of corps and departments,

he was so pleased with all Colonel Wellesley's arrangements, that he conceived it to be an imperative duty to publish a general order conveying commendation of the merits of Colonel Wellesley during his temporary command.

Soon after the arrival of the Governor General at Fort St. George, his Excellency again wrote to Tippoo on the 9th of January, recapitulating, at considerable length, the complaint, contained in the letter of the 8th of November, with other details of the whole of the Suldaun's hostile proceedings, unnecessary here to be introduced, being subsequently embodied in the Declaration of War. The Governor General requested that a reply might not be deferred for more than one day after this communication of the 9th of January should reach the Suldaun's presence, or dangerous consequences would ensue. No reply, however, having been received, and the difficulties inseparable from the equipment of so large a force having at length been overcome, the Governor General, on the 3rd of February, dispatched his commands to General Harris, to enter the Mysore territory with the forces assembled at Vellore; and to Lieut. General Stuart to cooperate with the Bombay army from Malabar; while, at the same time, he gave intimation to the Allied Courts, and the British Admiral on the coast, that he now considered the Company at war with Tippoo Suldaun.

The army assembled at Vellore exceeded 20,000 men, whereof 2,600 were cavalry, and 4,300 Europeans. It marched on the 11th of February, and on the 18th was joined by the British detachment serving with the Nizam, 6,500 strong, under Lieut. Colonel Dalrymple; with an equal number of the Nizam's infantry, including a portion of the Sepoys lately under French, but now, according to treaty, under British officers, commanded by Captain John Malcolm\*; and a large body of the Nizam's cavalry under Captain Walker.

The whole of the Nizam's force was under the superintendence of Meer Allum, his Highness's minister, and in order

\* Lieut. General Sir John Malcolm, G.C.B.

to give it the utmost degree of efficiency and respectability, it was deemed proper to add one of his Majesty's regiments of infantry to the Company's battalions serving with it; and to form the whole into a separate division. Meer Allum expressed a wish that the Governor General's brother should be appointed to command the Nizam's forces; and General Harris felt the importance of selecting an officer who possessed his own confidence, and who was likely to enjoy that of Meer Allum. The 33rd regiment was accordingly attached to the Nizam's contingent, as this force was denominated, and the general command of it was thus given to Colonel Wellesley. This arrangement was very agreeable to the Nizam and to Meer Allum; and it contributed very much to maintain the good understanding between the Court of Hyderabad and the British Government.

The forces assembled under the orders of General Harris consisted of upwards of 30,000 men, and in the words of the Governor General, an army more completely appointed, more amply and liberally supplied in every department, or more perfect in its discipline, and in the acknowledged experience, ability, and zeal of its officers, never took the field in India. The army of the western coast, equal in excellence, under Lieut. General Stuart, consisted of 6,400 fighting men, of whom 1,600 were Europeans; whilst a detachment of about 4,000 under Lieut. Colonel Brown, and another of 5,000 under Lieut. Colonel Read, marched to co-operate with the Commander in Chief, from the southern districts of the Carnatic and the Baramahl.

On the 13th of February, the Governor General received a letter from the Suldaun, to which, on the 22nd, his Excellency replied; accompanied by a Declaration of the same date from himself and his allies, the Nizam and the Peshwah.

*The Governor General to Tippoo Suldaun.*

Fort St. George, 22nd February, 1799.

'I had the honor, on the 13th instant, to receive your letter acknowledging the receipt of my two letters of the 9th

and 16th of January, informing me of your intention to proceed on a hunting excursion, and desiring me to dispatch Major Doveton, unattended, to you.

‘ I lament most sincerely that the friendly intimation, contained in my letter of the 9th of January, regarding the dangers of delay, produced no effect on your discerning mind; and that you deferred your reply to that letter to so late a period of the season. Your long silence, on this important and pressing occasion, compelled me to adopt the resolution of ordering the British forces to advance, in concert with the armies of the allied powers. You are not ignorant that the period of the season rendered the advance of the army absolutely necessary to the common security of the allies. This movement of the army is to be imputed entirely to your repeated rejection of my amicable proposal of sending an ambassador to your presence.

‘ Under the present circumstances, to send Major Doveton to you could not be attended with those advantages which would have resulted from his mission at a proper season.

‘ The allies, however, retaining an anxious desire to effect an adjustment with you, Lieut. General Harris, Commander of the British troops, has been empowered to receive any embassy which you shall dispatch to him. Lieut. General Harris will also authorize such persons as he may think proper, to concert, in communication with your ambassadors, a new treaty of friendship with your Highness, founded on such conditions as appear to the allies to be indispensably necessary to the establishment of a secure and permanent peace.

‘ *Tippoo Sultaun.*’

‘ MORNINGTON.’

*Declaration of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council for all the Forces and Affairs of the British Nation in the East Indies, on behalf of the Honorable the East India Company, and the Allies of the said Company, their Highnesses the Nizam and the Peshwah.*

‘ Fort St. George, 22nd February, 1799.

‘ A solemn treaty of peace and friendship was concluded at Seringapatam, between the Honorable Company and the Nabob Asoph Jah and the Peshwah on the one part, and the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun on the other part; and from that

day all commotion and hostility ceased. Since that day the three allied states have invariably manifested a sacred regard for the obligations contracted under that treaty with the Nabob Tippoo Suldaun. Of this uniform disposition abundant proofs have been afforded by each of the allies: whatever differences have arisen with regard to the limits of the territory of Mysore, have been amicably adjusted without difficulty, and with the most exact attention to the principles of equity and to the stipulations of the treaty.

‘ Such has been the solicitude of the allies for the preservation of tranquillity, that they have viewed with forbearance, for some years past, various embassies and military preparations on the part of Tippoo Suldaun, of a tendency so evidently hostile to the interests of the allies, as would have justified them not only in the most serious remonstrances, but even in an appeal to arms. On the part of the British Government, every endeavor has been employed to conciliate the confidence of the Suldaun, and to mitigate his vindictive spirit, by the most unequivocal acknowledgment and confirmation of his just rights, and by the removal of every cause of jealousy which might tend to interrupt the continuance of peace.

‘ These pacific sentiments have been most particularly manifested in the Governor General’s recent decision on Tippoo Suldaun’s claim to the district of Wynaad, and in the negotiation opened by his Lordship, with regard to the districts of Amerah and Souleah. In every instance, the conduct of the British Government in India, towards Tippoo Suldaun, has been the natural result of those principles of moderation, justice, and good faith, which the legislature of Great Britain and the Honorable the East India Company have firmly established as the unalterable rule of their intercourse with the Native princes and states of India.

‘ The exemplary good faith, and the pacific disposition of the allies, since the conclusion of the treaty of Seringapatam, have never been disputed even by Tippoo Suldaun. Far from having attempted to allege even the pretext of a complaint against their conduct, he has constantly acknowledged their justice, sincerity, and good faith; and has professed, in the most cordial terms, his desire to maintain and strengthen the foundations of harmony and concord with them.

‘ In the midst of these amicable professions on the part of Tippoo Suldaun, and at the moment when the British Government had issued orders for the confirmation of his claim to Wynaad, it was with astonishment and indignation that the allies discovered the engagements which he had contracted with the French nation: in direct violation of the treaty of Seringapatam, as well as of his own most solemn and recent protestations of friendship towards the allies.

‘ Under the mask of these specious professions, and of a pretended veneration for the obligations of treaty, Tippoo Suldaun dispatched ambassadors to the Isle of France, who, in a period of profound peace in India, proposed and concluded, in his name, an offensive alliance with the French, for the avowed purpose of commencing a war of aggression against the Company; and consequently against the Peshwah and the Nizam, the allies of the Company.

‘ The ambassadors, in the name of Tippoo Suldaun, demanded military succours from the French; and actually levied a military force in the Isle of France, with the declared view of prosecuting the intended war.

‘ When the ambassadors returned, in a French ship of war, from the Isle of France, Tippoo Suldaun suffered the military force, which they had levied for the avowed purpose of making war upon the allies, to land in his country, and finally he admitted it into his army; by these personal acts ratifying and confirming the proceedings of his ambassadors.

‘ This military force, however, was not sufficiently powerful to enable him immediately to attempt his declared purpose of attacking the Company’s possessions: but, in the meanwhile, he advanced his hostile preparations, conformably to his engagements with the French; and he was ready to move his army into the Company’s territories, whenever he might obtain from France the effectual succours which he had assiduously solicited from that nation.

‘ But the providence of God, and the victorious arms of the British nation, frustrated his vain hopes, and checked the presumptuous career of the French in Egypt, at the moment when he anxiously expected their arrival on the coast of Malabar.

‘ The British government, the Nizam, and the Peshwah,

had not omitted the necessary precaution of assembling their forces, for the joint protection of their respective dominions. The strict principles of self-defence would have justified the allies, at that period of time, in making an immediate attack upon the territories of Tippoo Suldaun; but even the happy intelligence of the glorious success of the British fleet, at the mouth of the Nile, did not abate the anxious desire of the allies to maintain the relations of amity and peace with Tippoo Suldaun:—they attempted, by a moderate representation, to recall him to a sense of his obligations, and of the genuine principles of prudence and policy; and they employed every effort to open the channels of negotiation, and to facilitate the means of amicable accommodation. With these salutary views, the Governor General, on the 8th of November, 1798, in the name of the allies, proposed to dispatch an ambassador to Tippoo Suldaun, for the purpose of renewing the bonds of friendship, and of concluding such an arrangement as might afford effectual security against any future interruption of the public tranquillity, and his Lordship repeated the same proposal on the 10th of December, 1798.

‘ Tippoo Suldaun declined, by various evasions and subterfuges, this friendly and moderate advance on the part of the allies; and he manifested an evident disposition to reject the means of pacific accommodation, by suddenly breaking up, in the month of December, the conferences which had commenced with respect to the districts of Amerah and Souleah; and by interrupting the intercourse between his subjects and those of the Company on their respective frontiers. On the 9th of January, 1799, the Governor General, being arrived at Fort St. George, notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances in the conduct of Tippoo Suldaun, renewed with increased earnestness the expression of his Lordship’s anxious desire to dispatch an ambassador to the Suldaun.

‘ The Governor General expressly solicited the Suldaun to return an answer within one day to this letter; and as it involved no proposition either injurious to the rights, dignity, or honor of the Suldaun, in any degree novel or complicated, either in form or substance, it could not require a longer consideration. The Governor General waited with the utmost solicitude for an answer to the reasonable and



distinct proposition contained in his letter of the 9th of January, 1799. Tippoo Suldaun, however, who must have received this letter before the 15th of January, remained silent, although the Governor General had plainly apprized that prince that dangerous consequences would result from that delay. In the meanwhile the season for military operations had already advanced to so late a period as to render a speedy decision indispensable to the security of the allies.

‘ Under these circumstances, on the 3rd of February, eight days having elapsed from the period when an answer might have been received from Seringapatam to the Governor General’s letter of the 9th of January, his Lordship declared to the allies that the necessary measures must now be adopted, without delay, for securing such advantages as should place the common safety of the allies beyond the reach of the insincerity of Tippoo Suldaun, and of the violence of the French. With this view, the Governor General, on the 3rd of February, issued orders to the British armies to march; and signified to the commander of his Majesty’s squadron, that the obstinate silence of the Suldaun must be considered as a rejection of the proposed amicable negotiation.

‘ At length, on the 13th of February, a letter from Tippoo Suldaun reached the Governor General: in which the Suldaun signifies to his Lordship, “ that being frequently disposed to make excursions and hunt, he was accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excursion;” adding, “ that the Governor General would be pleased to dispatch Major Doveton to him, unattended.”

‘ The allies will not dwell on the peculiar phrases of this letter; but it must be evident to all the states of India, that the answer of the Suldaun has been deferred to this late period of the season, with no other view than to preclude the allies, by insidious delays, from the benefit of those advantages which their combined military operations would enable them to secure. On those advantages alone, (under the recent experience of Tippoo Suldaun’s violation of the treaty of Seringapatam, and under the peculiar circumstances of that prince’s offensive alliance with the French,) can the allies now venture to rely for the faithful execution of any treaty of peace concluded with Tippoo Suldaun.

‘ The allies cannot suffer Tippoo Suldaun to profit by his

own studied and systematic delay; nor to impede such a disposition of their military and naval force as shall appear best calculated to give effect to their just views.

‘ Bound by the sacred obligations of public faith, professing the most amicable disposition, and undisturbed in the possession of those dominions secured to him by treaty, Tippoo Suldaun wantonly violated the relations of amity and peace; and compelled the allies to arm in defence of their rights, their happiness, and their honor.

‘ For a period of three months he obstinately rejected every pacific overture; in the hourly expectation of receiving that succour which he has eagerly solicited for the prosecution of his favorite purposes of ambition and revenge. Disappointed in his hopes of immediate vengeance and conquest, he now resorts to subterfuge and procrastination; and by a tardy, reluctant, and insidious acquiescence, in a proposition which he had so long and repeatedly declined, he endeavors to frustrate the precautions of the allies, and to protract every effectual operation until some change of circumstances and of season shall revive his expectations of disturbing the tranquillity of India, by favoring the irruption of a French army.

‘ The allies are equally prepared to repel his violence, and to counteract his artifices and delays.

‘ The allies are therefore resolved to place their army in such a position, as shall afford adequate protection against any artifice or insincerity, and shall preclude the return of that danger which has so lately menaced their possessions.

‘ The allies, however, retaining an anxious desire to effect an adjustment with Tippoo Suldaun, Lieut. General Harris, Commander in Chief of his Majesty’s and the Honorable Company’s forces on the coast of Coromandel and Malabar, is authorized to receive any embassy which Tippoo Suldaun may dispatch to the head quarters of the British army; and to concert a treaty on such conditions as appear to the allies to be indispensably necessary for the establishment of a secure and permanent peace.

‘ By order of the Right Hon. the Governor General,

‘ N. B. EDMONDSTONE.’

The Bombay army, under Lieut. General Stuart, marched

from Cannanore on the 21st of February: General Harris entered the Mysore territory on the 5th of March, and commenced his operations by the reduction of several forts on the frontier.

General Harris was not only invested with unrestricted military command, but was empowered to exert all the civil authority which would have belonged to the Governor General in his situation. He was further provided with a political and diplomatic commission, composed of Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley, Lieut. Colonel Barry Close, Lieut. Colonel Agnew, and Captain Malcolm, with Captain Macaulay as Secretary. This commission was not, however, entitled to act, except in obedience to the orders of the General.

On the 6th of March, Tippoo Suldaun passed his own frontier, and attacked a detachment of the Bombay army near Sedaseer. This attack, though sustained by a body not exceeding 2000 men, was repulsed, and the enemy thrown into disorder, even before General Stuart could collect the whole of his divided force. After this signal failure Tippoo retreated precipitately to his camp at Periapatam, and remained there until the 11th of March, without making any further attempt to molest the Bombay army. He then moved to Seringapatam, and afterwards marched from thence to meet the Madras army under General Harris.

The army under General Harris was not ready to make its united movement upon Seringapatam until the 9th of March. Many delays occurred from the British army being overloaded with equipment and materials for siege, in addition to the cumbrous baggage of the Nizam's army, a host of brinjaries, and the innumerable followers of the camp. The draught and carriage bullocks died in great numbers, and the arrangements necessary to remedy this evil compelled the army to halt on the 11th, on the 14th, on the 15th, and again on the 18th. On the 21st, it encamped at Cankanelli; and on the 22nd, two tanks of importance, which the enemy had begun to destroy, were secured at Achel.

This slow movement brought the army on the 27th, only as far as Mallavelly; when, on approaching the ground of encampment, the army of Tippoo Suldaun was discovered at a few miles distance, drawn up on a height. The advanced picquets of the British army were attacked by the enemy, and more troops being sent out to their aid, a general action ensued. The British army, under General Harris, formed the right wing; and the Nizam's army, with the 33rd regiment, under Colonel Wellesley, formed the left. The right wing, having deployed into line, began to advance: an opening between two brigades tempted the Suldaun, and he marched against it in person with a body of cavalry with much spirit; but was unsuccessful, as it produced no disorder in the British ranks, which soon outflanked the enemy's left. In the meanwhile the division commanded by Colonel Wellesley was formed nearly opposite the enemy's extreme right, which was strongly posted on the elevated crest of a rocky ridge. General Harris having dispatched an aide de camp to Colonel Wellesley, approving of the attack he had proposed, and also to General Floyd to support it, Colonel Wellesley advanced *en échelon* of battalions, supported by three regiments of cavalry; when a column of the enemy, consisting of about 2000 infantry, moved forward in excellent order towards the 33rd regiment, which corps, reserving its fire, with the utmost steadiness received that of the enemy at a distance of about sixty yards; then quickening its advance, the column gave way and was thrown into disorder. General Floyd, seizing this critical moment, charged them with his cavalry, and destroyed great numbers.

The army moved on the 28th of March to Sosilay, where there is an easy ford to cross the river Cauvery. Tippoo Suldaun being thus disappointed in the route which General Harris took after the affair of Mallavelly, fell back on Seringapatam; and the British army arrived on the ground for the siege of that fortress on the 5th of April. A new line of intrenchments had been constructed between the Dowlut Baug to the Periapatam Bridge, and covered that part of the

fort. Between these works and the Cauvery, the infantry of Tippoo Sultaan were encamped. Fronting the east, the right of the British camp was posted on high commanding ground, whence it gradually descended to the left flank which was doubly secured by an aqueduct or watercourse, and by the Cauvery. From the left of the position, the aqueduct took an easterly direction till within 1700 yards of the fort, when it turned off towards the Sultaanpettah Tope. There were several ruined villages and rocky eminences in front that afforded cover, from whence the enemy threw rockets, which fell among the tents of the British camp. It became, therefore, indispensable to the quiet and security of the besieging army to dispossess the enemy of these posts without loss of time. For this purpose the 12th regiment and two battalions of sepoy, with their guns, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Shawe, of his Majesty's 12th regiment; and another division, consisting of the 33rd regiment and a Native battalion, under Colonel Wellesley, were ordered to be in readiness at sunset on the 5th; and whilst Colonel Shawe was to attack the posts at the aqueduct, Colonel Wellesley was to make a diversion by scouring the Tope.

The following letter, found amongst the papers of the late General Lord Harris, relates to this attack.

*To Lieut. General Harris, Commander in Chief.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 5th April, 1799.

‘ I do not know where you mean the post to be established, and I shall therefore be obliged to you if you will do me the favor to meet me this afternoon in front of the lines and show it to me. In the meantime I will order my battalions to be in readiness.

‘ Upon looking at the Tope as I came in just now, it appeared to me that when you get possession of the bank of the nullah, you have the Tope as a matter of course, as the latter is in the rear of the former. However, you are the best judge, and I shall be ready.

‘ I am, my dear Sir,

‘ Your most faithful servant,

‘ *Lieut. General Harris.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Both divisions marched a little after sunset. The darkness of the night was very unfavorable to their advance. Colonel Shawe seized a ruined village within forty yards of the aqueduct: Colonel Wellesley advancing about the same time with one wing of the 33rd regiment to attack the Tope, was, upon entering it, assailed on every side by a hot fire of musketry and rockets. This circumstance, joined to the extreme darkness of the night, the badness of the ground, and the uncertainty of the enemy's position, were inducements to confine the operations to the object of causing a diversion to Colonel Shawe's attack, and to postpone any further attempt until a more favorable opportunity should occur; and Colonel Wellesley, after the firing had ceased, returned to camp to make his report of the failure of the Commander in Chief\*.

\* *A literal extract from the private Diary of Lieut. General Harris, Commander in Chief of the British Army marching in the Mysore country in the year 1799, between the 4th and 8th of April.*

‘*4th April.* Commissioned General Baird to form a party of not less than the flank companies of his brigade, supported by the picquets, to beat up a tope in front of the ground the picquet was on, and said to have had parties of men with arms assembling on it. It appears to me, from the report, they are only intended for rocketing; but our beating them up, instead of their attempting us, will have the best effect; for if our intelligence is true, his whole army are in a complete state of terror; of course we should keep it so.

‘*5th April.* Marched to Seringapatam; rocketed a little on the march. Took up our ground nearly for the siege. Concluded the arrangements for detaching General Floyd and General Stuart. Formed parties for the attack of the post occupied formerly by the Bombay troops, and the tope of Sultaunpettah. Lieut. Colonel Shawe to command the detachment for the Bombay post; Colonel Wellesley that of the tope, as being composed of his own people. Remained under great anxiety till near twelve at night, from the fear our troops had fired on each other. Lieut. Colonel Shawe very soon reported himself in possession of the post; but a second firing commenced, and as he had previously sent to know what had become of the two native battalions, I could not be satisfied but that, in the dark, they had mistaken each other. It proved that all the firing was from the enemy, his Majesty's 12th regiment scarcely firing a shot the whole night. Near twelve, Colonel Wellesley came to my tent in a good deal of agitation, to say he had not carried the tope. It proved that the 33rd, with which he attacked, got into confusion and could not be formed, which was great pity, as it must be particularly unpleasant to him. Altogether, circumstances considered, we got off very well. General Baird's expedition of last night so far answered our expectations, as he fell in with a small party of the enemy's horse and cut up eight or ten of them, which will tend to prevent their plaguing us with rockets, I trust. He missed his road coming back, although one would have thought it impossible; no wonder night attacks so often fail.

General Harris, finding that the village occupied by Colonel Shawe was very much annoyed by the enemy's musketry from the aqueduct, to which the enemy had sent a reinforcement, and that the possession of the Sultaunpettah Tope was absolutely necessary to secure the camp, as well as to support Colonel Shawe's post, ordered a new disposition on the morn-

*6th April.* Determined to make another attack on the tope; Lieut. Colonel Bowser's and Halyburton's corps with the Scotch Brigade (supported by the 25th dragoons and 2nd regiment native cavalry, on seeing the Sultaun's cavalry appearing from the fort,) were destined to assist in this service, and, with scarcely any opposition, carried it.

*Sunday, the 7th.* Yesterday evening walked down to the advanced post with Baird and Macleod. Found it very strong against so contemptible an enemy as we have to deal with; and such as may, with a little trouble, be made very strong against any. How fortunate thus to find a good parallel prepared to our hands! The fort fired a great deal yesterday, with no other effect than furnishing shot to us. A long line of cavalry seen coming out of the fort about twelve; reported at three, by Colonel Wellesley, to have come more round our right; and that he has therefore ordered the battalions we spoke of when looking what they were about, on the road which leads to Periapatam. Our foraging party coming in fast; but this cannot be their object, and they would move more rapidly than they have done. Great many of us much fatigued. Beatsou, among the rest, very much relaxed and weak. Our duties pretty severe; but if the whole is not pressed on with vigor we shall fail; for no doubt there will be more difficulties to overcome than we yet foresee.

*Monday 8th.* Visited the post taken possession of by Colonel Wellesley on the 6th instant. Found it a continuation of the nullah which makes Shawe's post, but not so favorable in that part for keeping hold of. Directed a burnt village on a rise above the nullah, to be made the right-hand post, by barricading the streets and cutting down the walls to six feet, thickening them next the fort, and putting a banquette within. Brisk cannonade from the fort. Colonel Close brought Dallas and Hart to speak about the bullock drivers, &c.

[The Compiler has thought proper to insert, as a note, a copy of this authentic document, relating to an affair of little importance, from some circumstances attending it having been detailed in the Memoirs of the late General Sir David Baird, by Mr. Hook. A conversation is there related as having taken place between General Harris and General Baird, on the parade on the morning of the 6th of April; although there is little doubt that both General Harris and General Baird were capable of feeling and acting in the manner represented by Mr. Hook, yet as General Harris makes not the slightest mention of it in his minute private diary, and as Colonel Wellesley does not allude to it in his several letters to General Harris on that and the following days, and until many years afterwards never even heard of it, it is very possible that Mr. Hook has been misinformed.]

The authentic documents relating to the appointment of Colonel Wellesley to the command of Seringapatam must exculpate the Commander in Chief for unduly favoring Colonel Wellesley to the prejudice of General Baird, a charge which Mr. Hook has permitted himself to cast upon that honorable and distinguished officer General Harris.]

ing of the 6th, to drive the enemy from their whole line of outposts, extending from the Cauvery to the Tope. For this purpose he directed that three simultaneous attacks, under the orders of Colonel Wellesley, should be made, covered by guns previously posted. The troops were paraded: and, at nine in the morning, Colonel Wellesley, with the Scotch brigade, two battalions of sepoy, and four guns, in addition to his former force, again advanced on the Tope, which was soon carried; as parties being detached to take the enemy in flank threw them into confusion, and obliged them to retire with precipitation. Precisely at the same moment, Colonel Shawe quitted the ruined village and rushed upon the enemy; whilst Colonel Wallace drove them out of a village on the right flank. Lieut. Colonel Barry Close, who had accompanied Colonel Wellesley on this service, soon came back; and, on entering General Harris's tent, he announced—'It has been done in high style and without loss.' The posts evacuated by the enemy were immediately occupied by the British troops, who thus secured a strong and connected advanced line, extending from the Cauvery to the village of Sultaunpettah, a distance of two miles; forming, in fact, a line of contravallation, principally by the aqueduct, at a convenient distance from the fort, and from the encampment of the army.

The following notes and letters, written by Colonel Wellesley after this attack, show the terms on which he was with his General; and at the same time substantiate a fact, not sufficiently known, that General Harris himself conducted the details of the victorious army which he commanded.

*To Lieut. General Harris.*

MY DEAR SIR,

‘Camp, 6th April, 1799.

‘I find that by moving Malcolm's corps to the rear a little, and by an arrangement of my posts on my right and rear, I shall be able to protect Meer Allum, the brinjarries, the park, and the cavalry, from any attempts that may be



made by horse and rocket boys, which alone seem to me to be destined to annoy us in that quarter.

‘ I shall now go out and see what support I can give to my post at Sultaunpettah, and will report to you on my return.

‘ I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Harris.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Harris.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 7th April, 1799.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know whether you think the guards for the outposts can now be reduced a little, as between foraging parties and outline picquets, we have not men enough left to give a relief. The outline picquets were not relieved this morning for want of men. You were talking yesterday of looking at these posts this afternoon, and if you have an inclination I will go with you at any hour you may appoint. I think I can show you a situation where two embrasures might be opened in the bank of the nullah with advantage, and that would add to the strength of the post.

‘ I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Harris.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Harris.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ 3 P. M. 7th April, 1799.

‘ A body of horse, of about seven or eight hundred, has passed, and is getting round by my right and your rear. They keep clear of our picquets, and are most probably a reconnoitring party.

‘ They have some few straggling footmen with them, but I have seen no infantry.

‘ I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Harris.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Harris.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 7th April, 1799.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you, that the foragers are coming in fast, well loaded with forage, and I have therefore ordered the battalion to stay where it is, ready to turn out,

but (as battalions are now scarce articles) not to move till further orders.

‘The body of cavalry has passed our right flank, and seems inclining rather to its left. It appears more like a line of march than a body intended for a *coup de main*, as there are with it bullocks and baggage of different kinds. At all events, it can do our right no harm, as, excepting by the high road which Malcolm’s corps will cover as soon as it shall have moved, no cavalry can approach us.

‘I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Harris.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘I see the cavalry has come more round our right, and I have therefore ordered the battalion on to the high road, whence it will afford protection to the foragers coming in, as well as to the rear of our camp, should they be inclined to molest it.’

*To Lieut. General Harris.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Camp, 7th April, 1799.

‘I have drawn back the battalion, as the foragers are come in, and the cavalry have disappeared. As soon as Schoey’s brigade shall have taken up its ground, we shall have four field pieces, at least, bearing upon that road, when I shall have an opportunity of looking at it again. I will let you know whether they will be sufficient, or what will.

‘I have fourteen 6 pounders, of which eight are out of the lines at the outposts and picquets.

‘I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Harris.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Harris.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Camp, 7th April, 1799.

‘Since I returned home, I have received a report from the outposts in Sultaunpettah, that some infantry had passed this evening in the same direction in which the cavalry passed this morning; and there are some persons in this camp who say they saw guns pass likewise.

‘I have not yet received a report from my picquets in my front; when I do I will let you know what it is.

‘ At all events, I am prepared for him, if his attack is directed against this flank of your line, whether it be made by day or by night. I do not intend to relieve the outposts until after it is ascertained whether or not he intends to make his push here: if he does attack us here, he will probably attack the outposts at the same time; and, in that case, we must depend upon your line for the support of our posts.

‘ I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Harris.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Harris.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 7th April, 1799.

‘ The Field Officer of the day was at the picquet in my front till sunset; saw cavalry pass, but no infantry, or guns.

‘ I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Harris.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The siege proceeded, when fresh overtures were made by Tippoo Sultaan. The advanced period of the season and the failure of provisions made it hazardous to delay the siege for an instant; particularly as the Governor General, in his letters to the Court of Directors, afterwards described in his own words:—‘ Towards the end of April fresh circumstances arose, which disposed me to think that, if the course of the war should favor the attempt, it would be prudent and justifiable entirely to overthrow the power of Tippoo; accordingly, on the 23rd of April, I signified to Lieut. General Harris my wish that the power and resources of Tippoo Sultaan should be reduced to the lowest state; and even utterly destroyed, if the events of the war should furnish the opportunity.’

*To Lieut. General Harris.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ 7 A. M., 3rd May.

‘ We did all our work last night, except filling the sand-bags, which could not be done for want of tools: I shall have them filled in the course of this morning, and there will be no inconvenience from the delay, as it was not deemed advisable last night to do more than look for the ford; and it

is not intended to do anything to it until the night before it is to be used.

‘ Lieut. Lalor, of the 73rd, crossed over to the glacis, I believe, on the left of the breach. He found the wall, which he believes to be the retaining wall of the glacis, seven feet high, and the water (included in those seven feet) fourteen inches deep. It is in no part more so, and the passage by no means difficult. Several other officers crossed by different routes, but none went so far as Lieut. Lalor. All agree in the practicability of crossing with troops. The enemy built up the breach in the night with gabions, &c., notwithstanding the fire which was kept up upon it. It was impossible to fire grape, as our working party was in front of the five-gun battery, from which alone we could fire, as we repaired the other.

‘ Lieut. Lalor is now on duty here with his regiment, but if you wish it, he will remain here to-night, and try the river again.

‘ I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Harris.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I have not heard anything of the 12 pounders ordered to a new situation by the general orders of yesterday.’

On the 3rd of May the breach appeared to be practicable, and preparations were eagerly made for the assault. On the morning of the 4th, the troops destined for the attack were placed in the trenches before daylight, that the enemy might not observe any particular movement. The heat of the day, when the people of the East, having taken their mid-day repast, give themselves up to repose, and when it was confidently expected that the troops in the fortress would be least prepared to resist, was chosen for the hour of assault; the experience of former wars, and especially of that under Lord Cornwallis, having proved that the enemy was always found more watchful and alert at night than in the heat of day.

Two regiments and ten flank companies of Europeans, three corps of grenadier sepoys, and 200 of the Nizam's troops, formed the storming party, consisting of 2,500 Euro-

peans, and 1,900 native infantry. Major General Baird, who had solicited the command, divided this force into two separate columns, which, on mounting the breach, were to file off to the right and left. Colonel Sherbrooke commanded the right column, destined for the attack of the southern rampart; and Lieut. Colonel Dunlop commanded the left, to clear the northern rampart. The forlorn hope of each attack consisted of a serjeant and twelve Europeans, who were followed by two subalterns' parties; that of the right column was commanded by Lieut. Hill of the 74th, and the other of the left column by Lieut. Lawrence of the 77th regiments. Colonel Wellesley remained in the advanced trenches in command of the reserve, to support the troops in the assault, in case it should be necessary.

At one o'clock the troops began to move from the trenches. The width and rocky channel of the Cauvery, though it contained but little water, its exposure to the fire of the fortress, the imperfection of the breach, the strength of the place, the numbers, courage, and skill of its defenders, constituted such an accumulation of difficulties, that nothing less than unbounded confidence in the force and courage of his men could have inspired a prudent general with hopes of success. The troops descended into the bed of the river, and advanced, regardless of a tremendous fire, towards the opposite bank. 'In less than ten minutes from the period of issuing from the trenches, the British colors were planted on the summit of the breach.' Tippoo Suldaun, although advised by the most judicious of his officers, had neglected to cut a trench, so as to insulate the angle of the fort in which the breach had been effected; and the assailing parties under Major General Baird, Colonel Sherbrooke, and Lieut. Colonel Dunlop taking the directions ordered, soon cleared the ramparts. The further details of this eventful enterprise are to be found in 'Lieut. Colonel Beatson's Narrative of the Operations of the army under Lieut. General Harris, and of the Siege of Seringapatam,' from which the foregoing

are chiefly selected; and in which will also be found the translations of several State papers, unequivocally proving the systematic and unremitting ardour of the late Sultaun in his attempts to subvert the British power in India.

General Harris, the Commander in Chief, in his dispatch to the Earl of Mornington, the Governor General, announcing the fall of Seringapatam, reports—

‘ Of the merits of the army I have expressed my opinion in Orders, a copy of which I have the honor to enclose; and I trust your Lordship will point out their services to the favorable notice of their King and country.

‘ G. O.

‘ Camp at Seringapatam, 5th May, 1799.

‘ The Commander in Chief congratulates the gallant army which he has the honor to command, on the conquest of yesterday. The effects arising from the attainment of such an acquisition as far exceed the present limits of detail as the unremitting zeal, labor, and unparalleled valor of the troops surpass his power of praise. For services so incalculable in their consequences, he must consider the army as well entitled to the applause and gratitude of their country at large.

‘ While Lieut. General Harris sincerely laments the loss sustained in the valuable officers and men who fell in the attack, he cannot omit to return his thanks in the warmest terms to Major General Baird for the decided and able manner in which he conducted the assault, and for the humane measures which he subsequently adopted for preserving order and regularity in the place. He requests that Major General Baird will communicate to the officers and men, who, on that great occasion, acted under his command, the high sense he must entertain of their achievements and merits.

‘ The Commander in Chief requests that Colonel Gent, and the corps of engineers under his orders, will accept his thanks for their unremitting exertions in conducting the duties of that very important department: and his best acknowledgments are due to Major Beatson, for the essential assistance given to this branch of the service by the constant exertion of his ability and zeal.

‘ The merit of the artillery corps is so strongly expressed

by the effects of their fire, that the Commander in Chief can only desire Colonel Smith to assure the officers and men of the excellent corps under his command that he feels most fully their claim to approbation.

‘ In thus publicly expressing his sense of their good conduct, the Commander in Chief finds himself called upon to notice in a most particular manner the exertions of Captain Dowse, and his corps of pioneers ; which, during the present service, have been equally marked by unremitting labor, and the ability with which that labor was applied.

‘ On referring to the progress of the siege, so many opportunities have occurred for applause to the troops, that it is difficult to particularize individual merit ; but the gallant manner in which Lieut. Colonel Shawe, Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley, Lieut. Colonel Moneypenny, Lieut. Colonel the Hon. F. St. John, Major Mac Donald, Major Skelly, and Lieut. Colonel Wallace, conducted the attacks on the several outworks and posts of the enemy, demands to be recorded. And the very spirited attack led by Lieut. Colonel Campbell of his Majesty’s 74th regiment, which tended so greatly to secure the position our troops had attained in the enemy’s works on the 26th ultimo, claims the strongest approbation of the Commander in Chief.

‘ The important part taken by the Bombay army, since the commencement of the siege, in all the operations which led to its honorable conclusion, has been such as well sustains its long established reputation. The gallant manner in which the post at the village of Agrar was seized by the force under Colonel Hart, the ability displayed in directing the fire of the batteries established there, the vigor with which every attack of the enemy on the outposts of that army was repulsed, and the spirit shown in the assault of the breach by the corps led by Lieut. Colonel Dunlop, are points of particular notice ; for which the Commander in Chief requests Lieut. General Stuart will offer his best thanks to the officers and troops employed.

‘ Lieut. General Harris trusts that Lieut. General Stuart will excuse his thus publicly expressing his sense of the cordial co-operation and assistance received from him during the present service : in the course of which he has ever found

it difficult to separate the sentiments of his public duty from the warmest feelings of his private friendship.

‘ G. O.

‘ Seringapatam, May 8th, 1799.

‘ Lieut. General Harris has particular pleasure in publishing to the army the following extract of a report, transmitted to him yesterday by Major General Baird, as it places in a distinguished point of view the merit of an officer, on the very important occasion referred to, whose general gallantry and good conduct, since he has served with this army, have not failed to recommend him strongly to the Commander in Chief.

‘ “ If, where all behaved nobly, it is proper to mention individual merit, I know no man so justly entitled to praise as Colonel Sherbrooke, to whose exertions I feel myself much indebted for the success of the attack.” ’

*Return of the Corps and Regiments which assisted in the Siege and the Assault of Seringapatam.*

EUROPEANS.		NATIVE INFANTRY.		
		BENGAL.		MADRAS.
Corps of Madras Engineers				
Detachment of Bengal	} Artillery.	1st Batt. }	} 10th Regt.	1st Batt. 1st Regt.
1st Batt. } Madras		2nd do. }		2nd do. 2nd do.
2nd do. }		1st do. }	2nd do. 3rd do.	
Detachment of Bombay		2nd do. }	} Volunteers.	2nd do. 5th do.
H. M.'s 12th Regiment	3rd do.	1st do. 6th do.		
— 33rd do.	} Infantry.	—		2nd do. 7th do.
— 73rd do.		BOMBAY.		1st do. 8th do.
— 74th do.		1st Batt. }	} 2nd Regt.	2nd do. 9th do.
— 75th do.		2nd do. }		1st do. }
— 77th do.		1st do. }	} 3rd do.	2nd do. }
— Scotch Brigade		2nd do. }		1st do. }
— Regt. de Meuron		1st do.	1st do.	11th do.
Bombay Regiment of		1st do.	4th do.	12th do.
European Infantry.		5th do.		
		The Pioneer Corps.		The Pioneer Corps.

*General Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of Corps composing the army before Seringapatam, from the 4th of April to the 4th of May, 1799 :—*

	Officers.	Europeans.	Natives.
Killed . . .	22	181	119
Wounded . . .	45	622	420
Missing . . .	—	22	100

In the abstracts it appears that the strength of Tippoo Sultaun's forces on the 4th of May, 1799, consisted of 48,000



men, about 22,000 of whom were either in the fort or in the dependent entrenchments of Seringapatam; and that the army commanded by Lieut. General Harris consisted of 8700 Europeans and 27,000 natives, of which force 20,000 assisted at the siege.

The Governor General, on the arrival at Madras of the dispatch announcing the fall of Seringapatam, issued the following General Order to the army in India :—

‘ General Order by the  
Earl of Mornington,  
Governor General.

‘ Fort St. George, 15th May, 1799.

‘ The Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, having this day received from the Commander in Chief of the allied army in the field, the official details of the glorious and decisive victory obtained at Seringapatam on the 4th of May, offers his cordial thanks and sincere congratulations to the Commander in Chief, and to all the officers and men composing the gallant army, which achieved the conquest of the capital of Mysore on that memorable day.

‘ His Lordship views with admiration the consummate judgment with which the assault was planned, the unequalled rapidity, animation, and skill with which it was executed, and the humanity which distinguished its final success.

‘ Under the favor of Providence, and the justice of our cause, the established character of the army had inspired an early confidence that the war in which we were engaged would be brought to a speedy, prosperous, and honorable issue.

‘ But the events of the 4th of May, while they have surpassed even the sanguine expectations of the Governor General in Council, have raised the reputation of the British arms in India to a degree of splendor and glory unrivalled in the military history of this quarter of the globe, and seldom approached in any part of the world.

‘ The lustre of this victory can be equalled only by the substantial advantages which it promises to establish, in restoring the peace and safety of the British possessions in India, on a durable foundation of genuine security.

‘ The Governor General in Council reflects with pride, satisfaction, and gratitude, that, in this arduous crisis, the

spirit and exertion of our Indian army have kept pace with those of our countrymen at home; and that in India, as in Europe, Great Britain has found, in the malevolent designs of her enemies, an increasing source of her own prosperity, fame, and power.

‘ By order of the Right Honorable the Governor  
 ‘ General in Council,  
 ‘ JOSIAH WEBBE, Secretary to Government.’

It may be necessary here to mention that Colonel Wellesley entered the fort immediately after the assault; and was one of the few present when Tippoo Sultaun's body, which was still warm, was discovered in the sallyport gateway.

Major General Baird having desired to be relieved—Colonel Wellesley, being next on the roster, was ordered on the same night to command within the fort.

*To Lieut. General Harris.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Ten A. M., 5th May.

‘ We are in such confusion still, that I recommend it to you not to come in till to-morrow, or, at soonest, late this evening. Before I came here, General Baird had given the treasure in charge to the prize agents. There is a guard over it, and it appears to be large.

‘ As soon as I can find out where the families of the great men are, I shall send guards to take care of them. At present I can find nobody who can give me any information upon the subject. I have here now the 12th, 33rd, and part of the 73rd, and the 2nd of the 5th, 2nd of the 9th, and 2nd of the 7th. These troops ought to be relieved this day as early as possible by two regiments of Europeans and three of sepoy.

‘ I am, dear Sir, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Harris.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ There are some tigers here, which I wish Meer Allum would send for, or else I must give orders to have them shot, as there is no food for them, and nobody to attend them, and they are getting violent.’

*To Lieut. General Harris.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Half past twelve. .

‘ I wish you would send the provost here, and put him under my orders. Until some of the plunderers are hanged, it is vain to expect to stop the plunder.

‘ I shall be obliged to you, if you will send *positive* orders respecting the treasure.

‘ I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Harris.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Harris.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Seringapatam, 5th May, 1799.

‘ Things are better than they were, but they are still very bad; and until the provost executes three or four people, it is impossible to expect order, or indeed safety.

‘ There are, at this moment, sepoy and soldiers belonging to every regiment in your camp and General Stuart’s in the town.

‘ It would surely be advisable to order the rolls to be called constantly, and to forbid any people to leave camp.

‘ For a few days likewise it would be very advisable that the officers of the army should suspend the gratification of their curiosity, and that none but those on duty should come into the town. It only increases the confusion and the terror of the inhabitants. Till both subside in some degree, we cannot expect that they will return to their habitations.

‘ I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Harris.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I hope the relief is coming, and that I shall soon receive your orders respecting the treasure.’

*To Lieut. General Harris.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Seringapatam, 6th May, 1799.’

‘ Plunder is stopped, the fires are all extinguished, and the inhabitants are returning to their houses fast. I am now employed in burying the dead, which I hope will be completed this day, particularly if you send me all the pioneers.

‘ It is absolutely necessary that you should immediately

appoint a permanent garrison, and a commanding officer to the place; till that is done, the people will have no confidence in us, and every thing must be in confusion. That which I arrange this day, my successor may alter to-morrow, and his the next day; and nothing will ever be settled. A garrison which would be likely to remain here, would soon make themselves comfortable, although it might be found convenient hereafter to change some of the corps sent in: but these daily reliefs create much confusion and distrust in the inhabitants; and the camp is at such a distance, that it is impossible for the officers or soldiers or sepoy to get down their dinners.

‘ I shall be obliged to you, if you will order an extra dram and biscuit for the 12th, 33rd, and 73rd regiments, who got nothing to eat yesterday, and were wet last night.

‘ In hopes that you will attend to my recommendation to send a garrison in to-morrow, I shall look out for a place to accommodate one or two battalions of Europeans and three or four of sepoy.

‘ I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Harris.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel Wellesley exerted himself to the utmost to prevent excess of every kind; Cowle flags were hoisted in different parts of the town, and public notice given that severe examples would be made of any persons detected in the act of plundering the houses or molesting the inhabitants; for, although General Baird had given protection to some of the principal families, and used every means in his power to restore order in the town, yet it could not be expected that the tumult and disorder, which were unavoidable in a city so extensive taken by assault, could immediately subside; nor was it until four men had been executed for plunder that perfect tranquillity was restored. These examples and the personal activity of Colonel Wellesley, who went himself to the houses of the principal families with safeguards, soon inspired a general confidence. The inhabitants, who had quitted the town during the night of the storm, and had slept in the open fields, returned quickly to their houses and

occupations. In a few days the bazaars were stored with all sorts of provisions and merchandise, for which there was a ready and advantageous sale; and the main street of Seringapatam, three days after the fort was taken, was so much crowded, as to be almost impassable, and exhibited more the appearance of a fair, than that of a town just taken by assault.

General Harris, on the receipt of Colonel Wellesley's report, contained in his letter of the 6th, lost no time in carrying into effect the recommendation. He immediately directed a regular garrison for Seringapatam, and appointed Colonel Wellesley to the command of it, as he felt satisfied that he could not confide the complicated and delicate duties of a civil and political, as well as of a military nature, required from the officer in charge of the capital, to any other better qualified to conduct them with advantage. These duties of necessity devolved upon the officer in command of Seringapatam, in consequence of the sudden and complete dissolution of Tippoo's government, the dispersion of all the public functionaries, and the helpless situation of the late Suldaun's family, then in the palace.\*

\* Mr. Hook, in the 'Memoirs of the late General Sir David Baird,' professes to give the copies of the letters of remonstrance of that officer to the Commander in Chief, on the appointment of Colonel Wellesley to the command of Seringapatam, as well as to his former appointment to the command of the army of his Highness the Nizam. Mr. Hook was probably not aware that the original letters remain in the possession of the family of the late Lord Harris; as, on comparing these original letters with those published by Mr. Hook, it appears that some passages have been omitted in his publication of them, which in a great measure contain in themselves a refutation of the partiality and injustice of which General Baird complained.

The great end of history is the exact illustration of events, as they occurred; and there should be neither exaggeration nor concealment to suit angry feelings or personal disappointment. It should contain the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Mr. Hook has, however, in this respect, wandered from his proper province as a historian, at the expense of the reputation of his gallant hero, by attacking the judgment, justice, impartiality, and duty of the Commander in Chief and of the Governor General, for the purpose of establishing a grievance and an insinuation, which the facts and results do not warrant; and to which Sir David Baird, had he been alive, would have never given countenance. But Mr. Hook, being a civilian, could not be aware of the impropriety of publishing these letters of remonstrance, which are so inconsistent with subordination

The complete subjugation of Mysore was the immediate consequence of the fall of Seringapatam and the death of Tippoo Suldaun. A commission, composed of Lieut. General Harris, Lieut. Colonel Barry Close, Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley, the Hon. H. Wellesley, and Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick, was appointed by the Governor General in Council, to carry into effect his arrangements for the settlement of the conquered territories. Captains Malcolm and Munro were appointed Secretaries to the Commission. The arrangements for removing the family of the late Suldaun were particularly committed to Colonel Wellesley, who had been confirmed as Governor subsequent to the capture. 'The detailing this painful but indispensable measure,' said the Governor General, in his instructions, dated 4th June, 1799, 'cannot be entrusted to any person more likely to combine every office of humanity with the prudential precautions required by the occasion, than Colonel Wellesley; and I therefore commit to his discretion, activity, and humanity, the whole arrangement, subject always to such suggestions as may be offered by the other members of the Commission.'

On the settlement of the Mysore territory by the Commission, the provinces which fell under British protection and authority became a distinct command; and Colonel Wellesley was confirmed in it by the Governor General, receiving his orders from, and reporting direct to, the Supreme Government at Calcutta. He availed himself of the intelligence and experience of all those who had served under Tippoo Suldaun, and replaced them in their former posts; their chief security for retaining which rested on the correct discharge of their several duties. His active superintendence, discernment, impartiality, and decision, in the arduous and im-

and discipline; particularly when it is known that General Baird requested permission to withdraw his intemperate appeal, which General Harris, from personal regard, allowed to pass without further notice. And certainly, what General Baird thought unworthy of him as a soldier, his biographer had no right to bring up against him, with no other apparent purpose than that of attacking the honor of those who are living, and the memory of those who are dead.

portant duties of the civil, as well as of the military administration of the command, were such as to have fully warranted his brother's judicious selection; and he soon deserved and obtained the gratitude of the conquered people.

The tranquillity of Mysore was, however, interrupted by the celebrated Dhoondiah Waugh, one of those adventurers who have so often subverted empires and founded dynasties in the East. This freebooter had formerly committed various depredations on the territories of Tippoo Suldaun, who having secured his person, compelled him to conform to the Mahomedan faith, and afterwards employed him in military service; but either detecting him in some treacherous project, or suspecting his fidelity, the Suldaun confined him in irons in Seringapatam. After the assault he was released, with several other prisoners, by the inconsiderate humanity of the British troops, and immediately fled, accompanied by several of Tippoo's disbanded army. He proceeded to Bednore, and laid that rich country under severe contributions, which he exacted with unrelenting cruelty, perpetrating throughout the province the most atrocious acts of rapine and murder. His band being considerably increased, a light corps of cavalry and native infantry, under Lieut. Colonel Dalrymple, moved against him from Chittledroog; and another light corps, under Colonel Stevenson, advanced into Bednore in another direction. Dhoondiah crossed the Toombuddra, followed by these corps, and suffered considerable loss; but he effected his escape into the Marhatta territory; and the pursuit ceased, as the Governor General had strictly prohibited any violation of the Marhatta frontier.

Colonel Wellesley was now in chief command, the following being published in the General Orders of the Commander in Chief of the Madras army:—

‘ G. O.

‘ Head Quarters, 11th Sept. 1799.

‘ The Commander in Chief, being about to proceed to the Presidency, in obedience to the orders of the Governor Ge-

neral in Council, appoints Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to command the troops serving above the Ghauts.'

Colonel Wellesley was long occupied in visiting the different provinces of the late conquest, making roads and communications, and organizing the civil as well as the military establishments.

*To the Right Hon. the Governor General.*

' MY LORD,

' Seringapatam, 19th Aug., 1799.

' I take the liberty of recommending to your Lordship, that out of the fund allotted for the family of the late Tippoo Sultaan, a pension of twenty Cantarai pagodas per mensem may be allotted to the mother-in-law of Schuckur Oolla, the wife of Zemul ab Dien Taker. She received this sum from the late Sultaan.

' I have the honor to enclose a statement of the numbers of the family still remaining in Seringapatam, and an estimate of the carriage which will be required to take them from hence. It does not appear possible to furnish it till bring off the army quits the field.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Right Hon.  
the Governor General.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Harness, 74th Regt.*

' SIR,

' Camp four miles west of Hulliball,  
6th October, 1799.

' I beg that you will be so kind as to desire Captain Mackay to order sixty of the Hon. Company's draught bullocks to be taken from the place where they are grazing to Seringapatam, where they are to remain in readiness to treasure to the army.

' The person who goes to Seringapatam in charge of the bullocks, will receive orders to report himself to the paymaster.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Lieut. Colonel Harness.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Lieut. Colonel Harness.*

‘ Camp four miles west of Hullihall,  
6th October, 1799.

‘ SIR,

‘ I enclose you the extract of a letter from the Secretary of Government, which I beg that you will be so kind as to communicate to the parties concerned. When I return to camp, I will arrange the establishment of servants for the departments left under the orders of Major Corner and of Captain Mackay.

‘ By your letter, and some I have received from Captain Barclay, I perceive that the brinjaries have been sent across the Werdah with a very considerable supply of rice. Three hundred bags from the grain department will, therefore, be sufficient for the present, and I beg that you will not send more, notwithstanding what was ordered in my letter from Soopah of the 4th instant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Harness.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Munro, Collector at Canara.*

‘ Camp in the Province of Loo,  
8th October, 1799.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I have received your letter, and as I had some hand in sending you to Canara, I am much concerned that your situation there is so uncomfortable to yourself. It is one of the extraordinary and unaccountable circumstances attending the commission at Seringapatam, that my brother and I should have imagined that you were desirous of being appointed Collector at Canara; that we should have been seriously angry with Kirkpatrick, who, it appeared, had proposed an arrangement for you, of which you did not approve, and which had occasioned your refusal of the appointment for which you wished; and yet that, after all, we should have done you an injury, instead of a benefit, (as well as one to the service,) which we intended. I acknowledge that, knowing my own wishes in your favor, and being very sensible of my brother's, I cannot but attribute what has happened, to yourself. One word from you would have stopped the arrangement, and there is every reason to believe that provision would have been made for you elsewhere. It is, per-

haps, not now too late. I have written to my brother upon the subject; and I hope that he will make an arrangement suitable to your wishes. Whether he does or not, I hope that you will believe that your cause has not failed for want of zeal on my part.

‘ This country, into which I have come to visit my posts on the Marhatta frontiers, is worse than that which you curse daily. It is literally not worth fighting for. Hereafter, it will be necessary to communicate with it from Canara; and I have desired the amildar to make a good road from Soopah towards your borders. I am told that Seedasheeghur is not more than sixty miles by the road from Soopah, my most western post; that in the war of 1780, a detachment of Matthews’ army advanced upon Soopah by that road. I wish that you desire one of your people to communicate with the amildar of Soonda respecting this road, and that you would have a good one made from Seedasheeghur to meet it.

‘ The drubbing that we gave to the Marhattas lately has had the best effects; and although all the robbers are in motion to cut each other’s throats, they treated us with the utmost hospitality, and have sent back our people whom they had driven away.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Munro.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Harness.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 28th October, 1799.

‘ I received your letter respecting the grain in the grain department last night, and I will delay to order the committee to sit upon it till I return to camp. Lieutenant Campbell arrived this morning, and Colonel Campbell is rather better.

‘ I shall be with you on the day after to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Harness.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.





amount of the pensions between Macleod's list and mine is to be attributed to the alteration of the periods of payment. When I came to give the sunnuds I consulted the Paymaster respecting the nine payments in the year, and found it to be so inconvenient to him, that after having ascertained the annual amount of each pension, I thought it better to divide it into twelve payments, according to our system.

‘ The annual amount, however, is precisely the same as it would have been if the pension had been paid in nine payments, although the amount of each payment is different. The addition which I made to the list is the cause of the difference in the annual amount of the whole.

‘ As I told you before, I am not so certain about the list of nanperversish as about the other pensioners, as some were granted by order of Colonel Kirkpatrick, of which I never had a return. The best method of proceeding would be to keep a certain latitude for them.

‘ I intend to include Chiibleas in the Family Fund, as we settled when I saw you last.

‘ I shall do as you desire respecting the Bengal troops when they march. In the meantime I write to Colonel Stevenson this day respecting the conduct of the battalion at Chittledroog.

‘ I enclose the extract of a letter which I have received from Colonel Sherbrooke respecting the conduct of the amildar at Chenapatam. In my opinion, the rule of proceeding between officers and amildars is, to take the most serious notice of the conduct of the former, when it appears to have been such as to deserve the complaint of the latter, and never to pass over any disrespect from the amildars to the officers. Upon that principle I removed the officer from Anantpoor, of whose conduct complaint was made.

‘ It is a mistake to suppose that the amildars in the country are uniformly attentive to the officers, either passing with detachments or travelling. They are generally so, I allow; but I have had some serious and well-founded complaints of their behavior, which I have not brought forward, and Purneah can let you know that I had some reason to complain of one of them in a case which went to the starving of the people who were with me in Soonda.

‘ We well know the character of the natives of this

country ; when they are likely to be supported they are the most tyrannical and impudent of men, and there is no falsehood which they will not tell in support of, or as an excuse for their conduct. The unpleasant situation in which officers are who travel through the Tanjore country ought to be a warning to us here to avoid the error into which the gentlemen there have fallen, and to take the most serious notice of any attempt at disrespect made by people in authority. The case is just this ; an officer of rank is travelling, he sends for the amildar to speak to him, who refuses to attend to him. Without entering into the other subjects of dispute, or other circumstances which ought to have gained for Colonel Sherbrooke the greatest respect and attention ; such as his having an hircarrah and a purwunnah from Purneah, his acquaintance with the amildar, to whom, as commanding officer of Seringapatam, he had given a cowlamah, there is enough in that statement to draw upon the amildar the displeasure of the Government, if it is to proceed in these kind of disputes according to the only rule, which, in my opinion, can ensure for the officers who are obliged to travel the conveniences which they have a right to expect, and for the amildars good treatment.

‘ I have no object upon this subject excepting tranquillity in future, and I therefore recommend that whatever complaint may be made of the officer, the amildar who has shown an inclination not to be quite so civil as he ought to be may be removed to some situation not immediately on the high road to Madras.

‘ I have received a letter from Colonel Hart, in which he enclosed me an order which he has given to a battalion of sepoys to march to relieve the 1st of the 8th in Soonda. I had, in consequence, yesterday written to Captain Macfarlane, to order him to begin his march towards Chittledroog as soon as he should be relieved. But from what you say in your letter, I have this day written to him to desire that he will halt at Hullihall till he shall hear further from me ; and I have directed him to endeavor to ascertain the truth of the intelligence which you have received. The 4th regiment of cavalry has already arrived at Bangalore, the 1st at Chittledroog, the 2nd at Sera ; the 4th could be up with them before they could be ready to begin any operations.

They ought, however, to be all together, and to be near the south Marhatta frontier, according to my former proposition.

‘ In consequence of a letter from Colonel Oliver, an extract of which I enclose, I wrote to Government for an allowance for the destruction of tigers in the neighbourhood of Chittledroog, similar to that given in the Baramahl. I enclose you the copy of the answer.

‘ I have received orders to discharge the bullocks and departments, which I have completed.

‘ Your man has been with me with a statement of the quantity of timber which he wanted. I diminished it to that which he thought would be sufficient to complete the buildings which you told me you intended to begin immediately. Even that the stores could not at this moment supply. However, we shall have more very shortly. He has got the carts and bullocks to bring the earth for the wells, and I believe is going on.

‘ I have established the zabeta for the shops in the Fort, as fixed by Macleod. It is to be paid annually, and when Symonds comes, we can make an arrangement for its collection, and for that of the land-rent of the island after the present year. The shops in Ganjam are rent free till the 4th of May, 1800, by agreement.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 16th Dec., 1799.

‘ I enclose the copy of my letter to Government upon the subject of the settlement of the accounts of the Family Fun .

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 17th Dec., 1799.

‘ I have received from Government a copy of their letter to you of the 10th inst., and I lament that it did not arrive before I sent that, a copy of which went to you yesterday. By the letter from Government to me, as well as that to you,

it appears that they were not aware of the letter written to me by Colonel Kirkpatrick on the 24th of August, which I have considered as sufficient authority for granting the pensions asked for in my two letters of the 31st July and 19th August. I shall this day send to Webbe a copy of Colonel Kirkpatrick's letter.

‘ The 2nd of the 12th and 1st of the 2nd are to be in Seringapatam. The 1st of the 8th and 2nd of the 9th go to Hyderabad; the 1st of the 1st to Chittledroog. The 77th is ordered into Mysore from Malabar, and a battalion of sepoy from Canara country into Bednore. It shall go into Soonda, where, with two battalions, we shall be very respectable. I have written (privately) to the Adjutant General, to inform him that I should not move the 1st of the 8th until I heard something more of the intelligence which you sent me the other day.

‘ I have just heard from Sir William Clerke that he has got one regiment of Europeans and two battalions of sepoy at Goa, which, being upon the back of the Kolapoor man, will make him cautious how he offends us.

‘ I enclose you the copy of a letter received from Uhtoffe, by which you will perceive that we have but a small chance of establishing the tappall to Poonah.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Harness.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 18th December, 1799.

‘ You must excuse me for not answering your letters regularly, but the truth is that I have not time always to write to every body to whom answers are due, and I am obliged to begin by those which are most pressing.

‘ Captain Aytone has my permission to go to Krotenguy for the time that you mention.

‘ I am glad to find that your quarters are so good, but, as the 77th are ordered into this country, I do not imagine that you will occupy them for any length of time. I should have written to Colonel Campbell to apprize him of this circumstance, but as his state of health is so bad, and I know him





better station. I wish that Government would reconsider my proposition to post the cavalry in one place on the bank of the Toombuddra, to put one battalion of native infantry into Hurryhur, and three between Nuggur and Soonda. That frontier is not now secure from insult, and, in my opinion, will be insulted, should the Kolapoor man succeed against Goklah.

‘ You mentioned some time ago that Purneah would bid for the gram contract when it was offered. In case you should not have observed that the Military Board has advertised it in the newspaper, I mention it to you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 21st Dec., 1799.

‘ I have just been down at the Laal Baug, and I find that your works are going on well. Your man had begun a wall close to the water-course, and if that should at any time hereafter let any water through, your wall would suffer and probably come down. I have therefore desired him to cut away half the thickness of the wall which he has begun, to leave about a foot distance between the water-course and your wall, which may answer for a channel for the water which will ooze through, and to add to the other side of the wall the thickness which he takes from that on the side of the water-course. The foundation of the whole proposed range of offices is laid, and the walls about two or three feet above the ground. It is unfortunate for the sake of both Gordon and you, that he should have built his house in the garden, as it prevents either house from being private. What I should propose would be to wall off that part occupied by him, to have a common entrance where he now drives in his phaeton, which might be made in such a manner as that you would not interfere with one another. If you wish it, I will have this done before your return, and as walls are not very handsome, I will cover those which must be near your house with a creeper.

‘ I have received your letter of the 19th. I wrote to Webbe about the bridge, and sent the estimate.

‘ I have sent you some plantain trees, and shall have others for you when the season for cutting arrives.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 22nd Dec., 1799.

‘ I have received your letter of the 13th inst., from Malla-velly, by the hands of Mahomed Yaseen, formerly nanper-verish. By the letters from Government it does not appear that I have any authority to grant any further pensions, and I therefore think that you had better give this man a sunnud.

‘ It seems that your letter upon this subject was written before you received the last intimation from Government.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 24th Dec., 1799.

‘ I enclose you a letter from Captain Munro, and I shall be obliged to you if you will return it to me.

‘ A reference having been made to Government by Captain Graham, nothing can be done in the business of which he complains till their decision arrives. I have not written to Captain Munro, nor shall I. You will probably be near him, and instruct him as you think best. I was at your house yesterday; you have many people employed, but your work does not advance. I understand that they do not work during many hours in the day, and I have therefore desired Mr. Piele to speak to your dubash upon the subject. I am afraid that by their idleness the work will be more expensive than we expected, and that they will bring us to disgrace.

‘ I enclose you the copy of a letter from Captain Mackay. I do not yet know how many bullocks are added to each karkana in consequence of the arrangement which I made some time ago, but if any of the calves to which he alludes are of a size and age fit for work, it will be desirable to have them transferred to Captain Mackay as soon as possible.

‘ I intend to go to Mysore the day after to-morrow to see the Rajah.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 24th Dec., 1799.

‘ I have spoken to Barelay respecting Seyd Saheb’s camels; he still thinks that they were not bought, but he says that, even if they were, they are now dead, and there is an end of them. He also says that they might be set off against the elephants which Kawder Bodeem has got.

‘ I have lately recommended to Government to dispose of all the camels; and it might be proper, instead of paying Seyd Saheb, to send him the number which we received from him; of this, however, you are the best judge.

‘ There is to be a native corps from the Bombay establishment at Hullihall in Soonda, another at Nuggur, and another European corps at Chittledroog. It appears to me, that the best way of paying the first would be for Government to order the collector in Canara to make issues to the Bombay Paymaster in Canara upon his receipt. Munro and the Paymaster can then settle whether the advances shall be made in cash below the Ghauts or by bills upon his amildars in Soonda. I have written to Hart upon this subject, and he thinks that this plan will answer.

‘ The best method of paying the Bombay troops at Nuggur and at Chittledroog will be by means of our Paymaster. He makes advances to the commanding officers of corps upon their receipts, and they settle their abstracts, accounts, &c. with the officer at Bombay. It will then be necessary to provide a sum at Nuggur, amounting to about 3000 pagodas per month, and another at Chittledroog, amounting to about 6000, in addition to what we receive there at present from Purneah’s amildars. If you approve of all this, let me know it, and I will write to Government upon the subject.

‘ Munro has paid Macfarlane 3000 Behaudry pagodas, for which the latter has given his receipt. I have desired Mr. Gordon to send Munro a bill upon the Paymaster-General at Madras for that sum. Macfarlane’s receipt will go back

to him, as Mr. Gordon has got his abstracts with a receipt to them.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 24th. You are the best judge what ought to be done with the amildar at Chenapatam. Colonel Sherbrooke complains of him, and it appears by the man’s own account that he had no reason to complain of the Colonel. As he had a gentleman with him who understands the language, there could be no doubt of his having refused to go to Colonel Sherbrooke. This the amildar now denies; but I observe a probability that it is true even in the excuse which he makes; viz., that he had not received orders to advance and meet him. Colonel Sherbrooke is not a man who requires all the extraordinary attentions described in your letter, nor, if he did, is it probable that any of the amildars would pay them; but it is proper that he and all the officers passing the road should receive civility, and therefore it is that I wish that this amildar may receive a check for his conduct, which will be an example to others. Of this we may be very certain, that the officers will not bear incivility, and therefore it is better for all parties that the natives should understand at once that they are to be attentive to travellers.

‘ You must be as sensible of this as I am, and whatever you will do will be right.

‘ I gave Butcha Rao a letter yesterday to send to Captain Deas, with 100 horsekeepers and four gram kettles, which he has procured. The Bengal columns have marched, and are to go to Madras, to be embarked there for Bengal. I enclose the copy of an order which I issued yesterday, and I hope that we shall have no complaints of them.

‘ It would be very desirable to have an order given out, stating the number of coolies which an officer may call for from a village, the distance which he may be allowed to take them, and the amount which he is to pay to each. If you will speak to Purneah upon the subject, and let me know his opinion and yours, I will issue orders which will prevent complaints (if possible) in future.

‘ We can make the payment on the beginning of January without the assistance of the lac of Cantaria pagodas which you gave to Mr. Gordon. He, however, will require your assistance in January, as he did in this month, for the pay-

ments at Bangalore and Chittledroog, and Mr. Gordon will let you know to what extent. Let us know as soon as possible if Purneah should not be able to lodge money at these places, as, if he cannot, we must send it from hence.

‘ After the capture of Seringapatam, and before the country was given over to the Rajah, some brass swamies, which were in the toshekanah, were given to the brahmins of different pagodas by order of Macleod and the General. The prize agents require payment for them, and say, that if they are not paid for, the Committee will charge the value against them. This amounts to about 500 pagodas. Butcha Rao, to whom I have spoken upon the subject, says that, as they were given to the brahmins by order of the General and before the country was given to the Rajah, it is not proper that he should pay for them. I have desired him to give the prize agents a receipt for the swamies, and, as it appears that they are to be paid for, you will be the best judge, whether by the Rajah, by the Company, or *by the General*.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 28th December, 1799.

‘ I was at your house the day before yesterday, and had a long conversation with your servant. I find that your works are going on, although slowly, yet that he has made such contracts as will prevent the delay from creating any very great expense. I shall go to Laal Baug whenever I have time.

‘ I went yesterday to Mysore, and was happy to find the Rajah so much improved. It gave me great satisfaction also to see the progress which has been made in building the palace and the works of the old fort. These are strong proofs that the conveniences and prejudices of the family are not unattended to. I will not do anything in regard to this nanpurverish till I hear further from you.

‘ I have written to Campbell a long letter about the nerrick of exchange, in which I have endeavored to explain the principles of the whole system of shroffing, against the evils of which his regulations are to guard. From what I am going to mention to you, however, I am afraid that if the

nerrick at Bangalore is permanently fixed, I must loosen my system here, and must allow the exchange to fluctuate.

‘ In all the conversations which you and I have had upon this intricate subject, we have agreed that the shroff derived a profit only by fluctuations. It is therefore clear that in Seringapatam there is no, or but little profit, and that there would be no shroffs here if they did not find one elsewhere, or that they would combine to force me to allow the exchange to fluctuate. I have lately made inquiries upon the subject, and I find that the great shroffs here have houses at Bangalore, at Sera, and at the principal places on the Malabar coasts, and they make their profit by the fluctuation at those places.

‘ Seringapatam is a place of great security, where there is much trade, and of course exchange of money. In order to have this security, the shroffs forego the advantages which they would derive upon the fluctuation in the exchange, and they have all the advantages of the fluctuation at places at no great distance, where the exchange is not fixed. But fix that exchange, and there is an end of their means of livelihood; and of course they must either abandon the trade entirely, or force me to allow a fluctuation in the place where they carry it on.

‘ I doubt whether the destruction of our fixed nerrick at Seringapatam will not be an inconvenience to the country, as well as to us; and therefore nothing ought to be done which can endanger it.

‘ Let me know your opinion upon this subject. There is no reason, however, why Campbell should not now alter the nerrick so as to make it more convenient to Purneah.

‘ One of the principles resulting from the position that the shroff’s profit is made by fluctuation is, that if the exchange is fixed, it is immaterial what proportions of gold, silver, and copper are exchanged for one another. The Company’s exchange, therefore, is as convenient as any other, and as near the standard relative value of the three metals; and as the fixation of the nerrick, was readily adopted by the shroffs in Seringapatam; in the same manner, if the exchange is allowed to fluctuate from month to month in any place, provided the shroffs can know in one month what value relatively to each other the different coins in use will bear in the

next, it is immaterial to them what that value is. By means of their correspondents and connexions in other places, they will be prepared for, and will gain by it.

‘ What I should recommend would be, that Campbell should fix a reasonable nerrick, and inform the shroffs that in fifteen days that shall have effect; and then fix another, which he must likewise communicate to them, and inform them that that must have effect in the following month. Thus he will free himself from a part of the grievance felt, at the same time that his operations will not affect us here. I shall not relieve your cavalry for some time.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 30th Dec., 1799.

‘ I enclose a letter which arrived yesterday for you, from the Rajah of Koorg, and one which came with it for me. I shall write a civil answer, and not enter into any one of the topics which he has started.

‘ I sent you a letter yesterday from Uhtoffe, which I opened, as it was directed to you or to me.

‘ I now enclose the order omitted in a former letter. The Bengal troops have marched, and I have heard no complaints; I do not send after them your routes, as I hope they will be nearly out of the country before they can receive them.

‘ When you send me the papers, which you say are in your contemplation, I will consider them, and shall issue orders to the troops accordingly.

‘ I was at your house yesterday, which is getting on tolerably, but not very quickly.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I have written to Munro, to desire that he will give Macfarlane 3000 Behaudry pagodas, in January.’



*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                                    ‘ Seringapatam, 3rd January, 1800.

I have received a letter from Lambton, in which he informs me that he has had a conversation with Mr. Webbe, who told him, that his plan for the survey of the Company's territories, and those of the Rajah, had the full concurrence of Government, and that he had been referred to you for the establishment, which he will find necessary to enable him to put his plan in execution. He tells me that he shall want some people for the carriage of his instruments, a draughtsman, and a writer, and a young man from the observatory, who will assist him in his calculations, if there should be one capable of so doing. As the tent which he will want is an observatory, and, as he cannot procure such a one from the stores, he is desirous of being put on tent allowance. All this appears reasonable. Webbe desired Lambton to send for the instruments, which he was desirous of having from Bengal; so that nothing remains to be done but to arrange the little matters above mentioned, and to set him to work.

‘ I have this day received a letter from Webbe, in which he says that, from considerations of expense, they are inclined to decline for the present to adopt any plan for building a bridge at Seringapatam. He has, however, written upon the subject to Bengal, where I observe that their ideas are not quite so economical; I believe because they do not feel so sensibly the pressure for money.

‘ I enclose an extract of Webbe's letter upon the subject of pensioners, and copy of an endorsement at the back of my letter of the 16th December (a copy of which I before sent you). I understand this to be the arrangement proposed by Government, and I shall be obliged to you, if you will let me know whether I have formed a correct notion.

‘ The family here, and the pensions upon the Family Fund, are to be paid by the Paymaster of the stipends at Vellore (i. e. Lieutenant Colonel Doveton). The mosques and tombs by the Paymaster at Seringapatam, chargeable to the Company. The pensioners residing at Seringapatam and at Mangalore (not upon the Family Fund) to be paid by you, and are chargeable to the Rajah. The pensioners

residing in the Carnatic and Baramahl to be paid by the Company's Paymasters, and (I suppose) chargeable to the Company; those at Madras chargeable to the Rajah.

‘ In conformity to Webbe's desire, stated in the endorsement, I propose to send him a list of all the pensions which I have granted since the receipt of Colonel Kirkpatrick's letter of the 24th August, divided into the different classes. These will be confirmed, and then the matter will be smooth. I likewise propose to transmit to Doveton the account of payments to the family here made by me. I will, however, send neither of these papers until I hear from you in answer to this letter.

‘ Webbe tells me that an order upon the subject of prize affairs is arrived from Bengal, and will be published here in a few days; he also says that an arrangement is made for Tanjore, by which the whole country is permanently annexed to the British empire. He says that it will be carried into execution in a few days.

‘ I enclose you a curious packet of papers which I have received from Cummer Oo Dien. I shall send him a civil answer this day, and inform him that you are gone to the frontier, where you will settle every thing with him.

‘ The walls of your offices are raised to within about four feet of the height which it is intended they should be; it will take, however, ten or twelve days to build them up, as the people cannot build more than about a foot and a half in a day, which must be allowed to dry and settle for three or four days before more can be added to it. In the mean time the doors and door-cases are nearly ready, as is the roof; so that I have hopes that the offices will be finished by the end of the month.

‘ I have received a letter from Campbell, in which he says that you and Purneah settled the exchange at Bangalore. I conclude that he showed you my letter. If you are of the same opinion with me upon the subject of fixing permanently theerrick of exchange in the principal places about Seringapatam; and if, in consequence of leaving it subject to variation, the Rajah should suffer in his revenues, would it not be possible and proper to make the people pay the circar according to the exchange fixed at Seringapatam? This, it

must be allowed, is as nearly according to the value of the different coins as it can be made.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 7th January, 1800.

‘ I some time ago addressed Government upon the subject of certain wounded inhabitants of Seringapatam, and sepoys in the service of the late Tippoo Sultaun, who had received medical assistance, and had been fed since the fall of the place by order of the Commander in Chief. Some of them still remained in the hospital, and others were disabled by their wounds in such a manner as to render it very improbable that they would again be able to gain their own livelihood. Government conceiving, as it appears, that these natives were in the Company’s service, desired that I would order an invaliding Committee to assemble and examine and consider their cases; and that I should transmit their proceedings to the Commander in Chief. Having done so, it appears by the enclosed letter that Government now intend that these invalids should be pensioned, and that the burthen should fall upon the Rajah.

‘ There are some of these invalids still in the hospital, and they, as well as others who do not require medical assistance, but who are entirely disabled by their wounds, receive three quarters of a seer of rice and one pice per day; I propose to keep them upon this allowance until you can make a proper arrangement for them in concert with Purneah.

‘ I will to-morrow transmit you a list of the names of those who will receive this allowance, and a copy of the proceedings of the invaliding Committee who considered their cases.

‘ I enclose you copies of two letters from Captain Macfarlane. If Goklah falls a prey to this Dhoondiah, I think it probable that the peace either of the Rajah’s, or of the Company’s territories, will be disturbed.

‘ Believe, me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ The 74th regiment are ordered to Trichinopoly, and the 77th are coming from Cannanore, on their way to Chittle-



as follows; and I will keep my letter open to the last moment to send you lists of them. If you do not get them this day you shall to-morrow.

‘ They have hitherto received three quarters of a seer of rice and three pice, or thirty cash per day: the expense to the Company, about one fanam each. As they would be much better enabled to live by getting the fanam than by getting the rice and the pice, I have determined to give it to them.

‘ They were nearly all examined by an invaliding Committee; from those which this rejected I have withdrawn the allowance, and have extended it to a few who are in the general hospital, who were so sick as to be unable to attend the invaliding Committee, and whose names do not therefore appear on its proceedings. The whole number is under ninety, so that the expense will amount to about two pagodas per day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 13th January, 1800.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter from Captain Macfarlane. I have recommended to Government that the 1st of the 8th may be left in Soonda till the event of the approaching contest is known. I likewise enclose some papers received from Cummer Oo Dien.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 17th January, 1800.

‘ I have received your letter of the 13th. Long ere this you will have received the account of the wounded inhabitants and sepoys, and will have perceived that the temporary provision which I have arranged for them is not extravagant.

‘ I saw a letter from Mr. Bowles some time ago, and I desired Captain Barclay to inform him. that as I concluded he had reported himself to head quarters, he would do well

to apply there for leave for himself, and for orders for his detachments to march, which, under the existing circumstances, I could not give him.

‘Your business at the Laal Baug is going on well. In a few days the cook room and the remainder of that side of the building will be covered in, and I expect that the whole will be finished by the end of the month.

‘I have had a conversation with Butcha Rao about the roof of the palace, which will be begun in a few days; your doors, painting, &c., are going on well.

‘If possible to obtain it, Mr. Gordon will want, as soon as he can get it, about 17,000 rupees at Nuggur; I think you told me, in a former letter, that Purneah could give that sum there monthly.

‘There has been some difficulty between Munro and Mr. Gordon respecting the payment of the Behaudry pagodas, which the former advanced to Captain Macfarlane.

‘Mr. Gordon sent him a bill for star pagodas upon the Paymaster General, calculating the exchange as ordered here by the General, and which is in future the Company’s exchange. Munro says that he cannot take it, as it is not the exchange settled in Canara, which is 10 per cent. I have recommended that they should settle the matter, or rather that they should shove it off their shoulders on those of the Revenue Board, and of Ben Roebuck, by Mr. Gordon giving Munro an order upon the Paymaster General for the amount in Behaudry pagodas instead of in stars; I rather believe that this expedient will be adopted.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘Seringapatam, 23rd January, 1800.

‘I have received your letter of the 20th, and I have, in consequence, ordered to Nundydroog the two companies of the 5th regiment, now at Bangalore, a troop of cavalry, two field pieces and artillery attached. I hope that they will be at Nundydroog on the 25th.

‘I have desired Major Cuppage to station Captain Irton in Gonnair Pollam, and have left it to his discretion to weaken Captain Munro to such extent as he might find

necessary: under all the existing circumstances, however, I think it desirable that he should be strong. I have ordered Major Cuppage to draw in the post from Dronelly, and Lieut. Colonel Tolfrey to relieve from Mudgherry that at Chenroydroog. If, however, it is clear that the post at the latter place will not be wanted, it will be best that it should be called to Nundydroog without waiting for the relief. Of this, being on the spot, you will be the best judge, and will make Major Cuppage acquainted with your wishes.

‘ When the whole force shall have arrived at Nundydroog, it will be a respectable reinforcement. If it wants an increase, we must add cavalry to it from Bangalore, until I can send more infantry from hence.

‘ As two companies, and some cavalry, and two guns, will be at Nundydroog on the 25th, and you will probably find them sufficient for your purpose, I have not disturbed the post at Mudgherry; but I have written to Colonel Tolfrey to desire that he will order the officer there to be in readiness to move at a short notice, if you should find it necessary to call for him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 24th January, 1800.

‘ I have received your letter of the 21st, with a duplicate of that of the 20th, and I am glad to find that the arrangements, which I communicated to you in my letter of yesterday, will meet your wishes.

‘ I have given Major Cuppage full power over the detachments, which are from Nundydroog, so that all will, I trust, go on well. I shall leave it to him either to detain or to send back the troop of the 4th regiment ordered from Bangalore. I have this day sent a supply of emergent ammunition.

‘ When you shall have settled matters with the Nizam’s vakeel, there will be no longer any difficulties with the polygars on the frontier.

‘ Mr. Gordon will take the money at Nuggur, at the Seringapatam exchange.

‘The cook room and zodoun at the Laal Baug are covered in, and the remainder of the building is ready for the roof, which will be on, I hope, by the end of the month. Things are going on well inside of the palace; but I do not like the painting of the outer room above stairs. It wants ornament sadly, and looks very bare and unfinished, in comparison with the other highly ornamented apartments. Nothing has yet been done to the roofs; but I had another conversation with Butcha Rao about it yesterday, and pressed him to commence upon it.

‘We have had much trouble in procuring dooley boys to send away the 74th regiment. There are numbers of them in this country, as I am informed; but Purneah’s people, instead of providing them, have sent to the 74th about half the number of coolies; and even of those that were sent from hence one half have deserted, and the remainder refuse to carry the doolies. The inconvenience of all this is, that the corps is delayed. If Purneah’s people had said at first, either that they could not get people of the proper kind, or that they would not answer for them, I could have sent off some of our own dooley bearers who are here, and who were to have been employed in emptying our hospitals at Chittle-droog, Sera, and Seringapatam. These dooley bearers must now be sent to the 74th; and the hospitals must remain full. It is very desirable that Purneah’s people should give us all the assistance which the country can afford, and that they should not deceive us respecting the nature of it. I am afraid that it will be imagined at head quarters, either that I have not used all the exertion in my power, or that I am not inclined to move the 74th.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘Seringapatam, 25th January, 1800.

‘I have received sad complaints from Colonel Campbell about his dooley bearers, but I have applied a remedy by sending those belonging to the army, which I had intended should be used to carry the convalescents and wounded from our different hospitals. It was unfortunate that they de-



ceived me by assurances, that the country bearers would not disappoint us; as otherwise I should have had the 74th in march about ten days ago. I have long objected to sending a regiment to Chittledroog, because there is no accommodation for them, and the battalion has been found very unhealthy, and I am afraid that the delay of the march of the 74th will be attributed to my wish to detain them at Bangalore, instead of to its real cause. This makes me feel the disappointment more than I should otherwise.

‘ I enclose some papers which I have received from Captain Mackay, and I shall be obliged to you if you will request Purneah to send orders to the amildars to assist our bullocks as much as they can. Mackay has sent a man to look at a feeding ground, between this place and Periapatam, which, he understands, will answer for all the bullocks for some time. If it should be found to answer, he will remove them thither.

‘ I have lately written to Government about them, and have recommended that they may be kept as an establishment, and that the cows, by which the breed is to be kept up, may be left in the hands of the Rajah’s people.

‘ I believe I informed you, some time ago, that while I was absent with the army, Colonel Sherbrooke had altered the nerrick of artificers, and of all kinds of materials for building, at the instigation of Captain Norris. My attention has lately been drawn to this subject by intelligence which I have received, that the Government intend to put the troops in this country on half batta, and to give the officers the usual lodging money. As then they will have to build their own houses and quarters, the expense of building becomes an object; and, in the examination of the subject, a system of engineering has come out well worthy of the example set at Madras.

‘ I have not yet been able to remedy the mischief done in my absence, as we have the advantage here of the assistance of some Madras dubashes and maistries: but I have sent notice to these gentlemen that, if they do not settle the matter to my satisfaction, in the course of a few days, I shall send away all the Madras people who are now in this place.

‘ With this and a remedy for thieving, which, since the

camp thieves have joined the old gangs upon the island, has increased to an immoderate degree, I have been much taken up lately; but I hope that I have made some progress in applying the cure. I conclude that you will be here in the middle of next month.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Butcha Rao has just been with me, and I find that some steps have been taken to collect materials for the roof of your house. I hope that considerable progress will be made in the repair of it before you return.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 26th January, 1800.

‘ I enclose a letter from Captain Mackay. I approve of his plan for collecting the bullocks in one place, and keeping them under his own eye.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 29th January, 1800.

‘ I have lately received a letter from Captain Macfarlane, in which he says that Dhoondiah and Kutraha Pundit had received directions from the Kolapoor Rajah to draw nearer to Kolapoor. This is attributed to his fears of the force coming from Poonah: Goklah had not moved from Savanore, but was preparing to do so.

‘ A letter has been received by Colonel Campbell, from head quarters, which proves that I was not mistaken in my conjectures respecting the opinion which would be entertained in consequence of the delay of the march of the 74th regiment.

‘ I am glad to find that we are able to keep down the polygars so easily. Residence with Purneah is an essential article in any agreement that may be made with them.

‘ Believe me, &c.,

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 31st January, 1800.

‘ I am obliged to you for the account of your proceedings with the Hyderabad vakeel contained in your letter of the 28th instant, which I received this morning; I see plainly that we must still keep ourselves strong on that frontier; and accordingly I have made my arrangements for strengthening Major Cuppage to such a degree as to enable him to detach to the posts which it appears to be necessary to occupy to keep a sufficient garrison in Nundydroog, and to have a force ready to send out in pursuit of the robbers who are likely to disturb the country. But to do this I am obliged to withdraw the troops from Severndroog, and to leave nothing there excepting a small guard. This I conceive to be of little importance at the present moment, and it will enable me to put under the command of Major Cuppage nearly fourteen companies of native infantry. These will be distributed as follows:—two in Gommail, one in Gorrybundah, one in Busla Gunta, three with Captain Munro, seven in Nundydroog. This, with one troop of cavalry, and two field-pieces, besides what Captain Munro has, will be sufficient to answer all calls which may be made either for reinforcements or new detachments.

‘ It will be desirable to keep Captain Irton at Nundydroog, in order to send him out in command of any detachments which it may be necessary to make from that garrison.

‘ I hope that the 74th regiment has marched, and I am not very anxious about the immediate removal of the convalescents from the hospitals. I will not therefore take the workmen, who I see are so well employed at Mysore, and I will wait with patience until proper bearers can be supplied from the country.

‘ Mackay’s letter will have pointed out the place to which he wishes that the bullocks should be taken.

‘ I have completely succeeded against the artificers, and have made some progress against the thieves: at least, thieving is stopped here for the present. I have not received orders to carry into execution the plan for the court of justice. I have altered the ornaments of your room, and

wait till it is finished to see whether any more extensive ornaments will be necessary; I will then assemble there the Committee which you propose.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Harness.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 2nd February, 1800.

‘ I have received your letter of the 31st January, which has given great satisfaction. It rarely happens (particularly in this country) that it is in the power of an officer in command to please those who are under his orders; and when he is so fortunate, it is to be attributed as much to their good disposition, as to any efforts he may have made for that purpose. I regret exceedingly, on public as well as private grounds, that the 74th regiment is removed from Bangalore; but you must have been long enough in this country to perceive, that the public interest and convenience are not upon all occasions the cause of the public measures.

‘ I do not think that your corps will be drafted, at least not for some time; although I have seen the resolutions of thanks from the Court of Directors, and their songs of triumph, the burthen of all of which is the prospect of permanent peace in India, and of course the consequent diminution of the military establishments and expenses.

‘ I think you are right in going to England, even if the 74th should remain here.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Harness.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 3rd February, 1800.

‘ I have no concern whatever about the dooley boys, excepting that the want of them created a delay in the march of a corps, and I feared that that delay would be attributed to a desire to detain them in this country. Government have placed great confidence in me; and I should be sorry to have any thing happen which might have the appearance of a job, as that would, in one moment, destroy the whole edifice.

‘ I am afraid that it will be impossible to have the 77th

removed to Bangalore, although I think that Chittledroog is at present an improper place for them. My sentiments upon this subject, and the grounds upon which I have formed them, are known at Madras.

‘ Mackay will take the bullocks to the places which I mentioned to you ; and it is certainly very desirable that a person from Purneah should reside with him. I have strongly recommended that the bullocks should be retained as an establishment in the Company’s service, and have represented that to give them gram would be beneficial to them, and not add materially to the expense. It does add about twenty pagodas per month to the expense of each karkana (of which there are thirty five), supposing the gram to be at forty two seers for a rupee ; but it is now at fifty two in this neighbourhood, and at forty five in the bazaar at Seringapatam. Every diminution of the expense which can be made will be an additional motive for keeping the bullocks, and therefore I am desirous of not making a bargain to take gram at the price contracted for the cavalry, as the contract may be monopolized as it has been hitherto ; but I should prefer that Purneah should give it us as he has hitherto, at the rate of the country in which the bullocks may be. There is, however, no occasion for hurrying a decision upon this subject, and it will be as well to defer the further consideration of it until we meet.

‘ The same reason which induces me to wish to keep down the expense of gram for the bullocks, induces me to try to get the straw for them for nothing. It appears that in the distant countries there is no demand and no sale for it, and it therefore cannot be stated to be a grievance upon the people to take from them that which they cannot use, cannot dispose of, and must burn. It is but for a short time in the year, as I understand, that the bullocks want straw, and at that time I should propose that they should be sent to a particular place at a distance from any great town, cantonment, or garrison, where a certain proportion of the whole quantity of the straw produced might be collected for them in each village. This they might get for nothing.

‘ Mackay tells me that Purneah has made an arrangement already similar to the above for the bullocks in the neighbourhood of the grazing ground in which they are

now. He has in his hands the order for what is called the sircar's share of the straw, which in general rots. I approve highly of any arrangement which can be made which will give the people a fair price for their straw; and it is to be observed that the lower it is bought the better it is for them, provided it is sufficient to pay for the trouble of taking care of it, and to compensate them for it. As the straw is to be paid for, I agree with you that the whole of it must be forthcoming when wanted. The straw for the bullocks stands upon a different footing; and of this it is but fair that the ryots should have as much as they can use. Indeed, it is taken from them for nothing, only on the principle that they cannot make use of it.

‘ I wish you joy of the conclusion of your negotiations with the Nizam's vakeel.

‘ I shall send on Wednesday twenty elephants and one hundred draught bullocks for Lady Clive's use. She leaves Madras in the first week in March, and I propose to go to the frontier to meet her. She will do well, in my opinion, to stop at Bangalore till the month of June, as April and May are very hot here. I have desired Grant to ask her to Dowlut Bang, the zenana of which, when a little improved, will accommodate her and her family admirably. Neither of the palaces would answer for a woman at all, as they are so much exposed.

‘ I have already improved your room much, and I wait to see the effect of what has been done, when I propose to go there with Mr. Gordon; and if it wants further ornament it shall have it.

‘ I enclose a letter from Macfarlane. A fellow came here this day and informed me that he had come from the Marhatta country as far as Toomkoor, with a gang employed by Dhoondiah to carry me off when I should go out hunting. He says that Dhoondiah proposes to collect a large gang in this neighbourhood, and to join them himself. In order to prove to him how little I fear his gang, I go out hunting to-morrow; but I have desired my friend to join his gang again, and I have promised him a reward if he will enable me to lay hands upon them in this neighbourhood.

‘ I have a letter from Stevenson, who having employed some of Oliver's hircarrahs, has got accounts that Scindiah

had joined the Kolapoor man; that Nana had sent 50,000 horse from Poonah to join Appah Saheb; that Aristo Jah was discharging all the Nizam's horse, and sending them to Dhoondiah; that he was in secret communication with Scindiah, and that Scindiah had sent 10,000 *northern beggars* to Beder to escort him from thence into the Marhatta country; that he had shut up the gates of Hyderabad, &c. &c. all about a cock and a bull!

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 4th February, 1800.

‘ My friend was with Barclay again this morning, and repeated his story and assurances of its truth. He added, what he only hinted at yesterday, that the gang have some designs upon Mysore; and upon the whole it appears more like a plundering party than any thing else. As nothing could be more unpleasant than any accident to the family at Mysore, I have apprized the officer in command there of the intelligence which I have received, and have put him on his guard; but I have desired him to be cautious to do nothing which can in the smallest degree alarm the family. I was out hunting this morning, and West\* thinks that he saw some people, about twenty, on horseback. I acknowledge that I saw nothing of them. But if they were there, and my friend keeps true to us, I shall have them this night.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, February 5th, 1800.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2nd instant. Since I wrote to you yesterday I have heard from Captain Stewart, who informs me that there had been for some days a bazaar report at Mysore that there was a vagabond party of cavalry belonging to Dhoondiah in the country; but he had given no credit, nor paid any attention to it. He promises to take all the precautions which I pointed out to him.

\* Captain West, 33rd regiment, aide de camp to Colonel Wellesley.

‘ My opinion is this ; the man who gave me the information very probably heard the bazaar report, and thought that by adding my name, and informing me that my safety was in question, he should get a reward. But I conceive that the bazaar report does not add to, indeed I rather think it takes from the degree of credit which might be given to the story. If it be true that there has been this bazaar report for several days, it cannot be true that this man came with the party from Savanore, that he left them at Toomkoor, and that he arrived here only two days ago. Upon the whole, therefore, I think that the business has originated in a bazaar report, for which it is probable there is no foundation, as it does not appear that the country in this neighbourhood has been at all disturbed, which it would have been if such a banditti had come into it, or that the Rajah’s people have received any information of their arrival, which it is certain would have been given to them.

‘ However, the man who gave the information is now out, and I am prepared for any that he may bring.

‘ I have still some trouble with brickmakers ; and in order to bring matters to rights I am afraid that I must give a monopoly ; I have threatened it this day, from which I hope the best consequences. They have come down from ten rupees a thousand to six ; I want to bring them to five, which will answer.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 8th February, 1800.

‘ My friend came in this morning and gave me information that a party of the people, about whom he had spoken to me before, was at Coorghelly, about three coss beyond Nunjuncode, and other parties in different villages and in the jungles between the two. That four sirdars (two of whose names are Imaun Khan and Kawder Saheb, the latter of whom had been a russildar, under the orders of Khan Jehan Khan) were with their followers, their baggage, and, he believes, the treasure, at Nunjuncode, in a large house in the fort, inhabited by a musselmann, whose brother is one of the party. That this musselmann owner of the house is the



man who formerly, when Dhoondiah was a prisoner, had charge of him, and paid him his allowance. That besides these parties there is one, at a village about a coss from Mysore, called Ennechully, of five Marhattas: and there are four musselmenn upon the island of Seringapatam, near the Chendgall ford. It is supposed that there are other parties in different villages, as by this man's story it appears that there is a tappall to these sirdars from hence.

‘ I have made the following arrangements, and if there is any truth in the story, I hope to have the sirdars in the morning. Captain Robertson rides over to Mysore this evening; and about twelve this night will start from thence with fifty men; and in order that he may be able to surround the house completely, he will take with him from Mysore some officers, who went there this morning on a party of pleasure. He takes with him the man who has given the information, and he will reach Nunjuncode before day, and will seize the sirdars. He then sends back a party to Ennechully, who it is hoped will catch the Marhattas; but as they have no regular place of abode, and nobody knows them, excepting the man who has given the information, and who is to return with this party, I do not expect that they will be taken. There is a thief here who knows the musselmenn on the island, and is acquainted with their place of abode: I shall send a party towards morning to seize them.

‘ I think it probable that if we get the sirdars, the people at Coorghelly and in the jungles will disperse and be off; at all events we could not expect to catch them, and therefore I do not send after them.

‘ My plan is to give orders that all the principal men may be kept separate; I shall have them examined separately, and send to Government copies of their examinations, and the story of the man who first gave the information. The proper thing to do with them would be to punish them; but it is to be observed that we have no evidence of their evil intentions, excepting the story of one man, and that as yet they have not done any thing to disturb the peace of the country. It may be thought better to wait till they do something, which can give ground for punishing them on the spot; but to this I answer that it is difficult to obtain a

knowledge of their motions, and that it is probable they could find out that I had heard of them, and would quit the country; and that they would certainly do so or would conceal themselves, so as not to be found out if they should ever commit an outrage which would deserve punishment. Besides, if there is any truth in the story, I rely a good deal upon the contradictory accounts of themselves, which they will give when examined separately, to elucidate and confirm it; and it is not improbable but that the hopes of pardon may get for us another evidence.

‘ Upon the whole I have thought it best to endeavor to seize them immediately.

‘ The man is still positive and consistent, which is very extraordinary.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I relieve the party at Mysore early in the morning, so that we shall have in that quarter to-morrow a respectable force.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 9th February, 1800.

‘ We were successful last night in taking the people on the island, and those at Nunjuncode; and, by Captain Robertson’s account, I hope that he will have taken the Marhattas this morning. I expect the sirdars in to-morrow, and, after I shall have had them examined, I shall be able to form a more decided opinion respecting the business. I have formed none from the examination of the persons taken upon the island last night.

‘ I am much at a loss to know how to form the detachment for Wynaad. We can spare nothing from Seringapatam, excepting the two flank companies of each of the European, and two of each of the native corps. I have ordered a battalion, the 2nd of the 3rd from Chittledroog, the 1st of the 12th from Paughur, leaving two companies to take care of that post and its dependencies, and five troops of the 2nd regiment of cavalry from Sera. We have here about 500 pioneers, and they shall accompany the detachment. I reckon that the whole will be ready to start from Seringa-

patam in the second week in March. I doubt whether that will be sufficiently early to enable us to conclude matters before the setting in of the monsoon. But it will be impossible to get the battalion from Chittledroog sooner than the end of the first week in that month, and even Tolfrey's battalion will not be here above one or two days before it. It is very desirable that Purneah should write to the amildars at Chittledroog, and at Paughur, to desire that they will assist in procuring bullocks for the carriage of the tents of the two corps.

‘ I reckon the detachment will be strong as follows :—

4 Companies of Europeans	-	-	250	—
4 Flank Companies of Sepoys	-	-	-	400
2nd of the 3rd	-	-	-	800
1st of the 12th	-	-	-	500
			<hr/>	<hr/>
			250	1700
Pioneers	-	-	-	500
5 Troops 2nd Regiment of Cavalry	-	-	-	250
			<hr/>	<hr/>
			250	2450

‘ This will be sufficient, with guns and artillery-men, to eat the Pyche Rajah !

‘ I intend to proceed with the detachment myself. In the meantime every thing shall be prepared here for the arrival of the troops.

‘ I shall answer your official letter to-morrow. Since writing the above, I have made arrangements for the carriage of the tents of the corps, and I hope that they will all be here in the first week in March. Tolfrey's, I am afraid, will be last.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 11th February, 1800.

‘ I had not time to write to you yesterday, after the examination of the prisoners. Of course they all denied the truth of the charge which had been brought against them, and all declared that they have resided in the villages, in which they were arrested, since the fall of Seringapatam.

There was much inconsistency in the stories of some of them, which may be attributed as much to the nature of a native of this country, as to the want of truth in the story. The amildar of Nunjuncode, and two or three of the principal people from thence, and from Ennechully, where the Marhattas were taken, have been sent for. They will throw much light upon the whole business, and, in the meantime, all the prisoners are kept separately. The informer persists in his story, has identified the persons of most of the people arrested, and has repeated the charge before them.

‘ A circumstance has occurred which shows how cautious we should be in receiving the evidence of a native. There is a fakir upon the island, who of course knows that he exists under the Company’s protection. He came forward and declared most positively, that two of the people, charged as being of the party, had been at his tuckiah ever since the fall of the place. Of course this declaration occasioned much doubt of the truth of any part of the information; but yesterday he sent word that he should come forward and tell the truth if I desired it. Barclay will see him this day.

‘ I acknowledge that I have many doubts of the truth of every part of the information; but I am the only person here who has any.

‘ I shall be prepared to march with the detachment at the time I stated to you in my public letter. I think that it would be very desirable to have one of the surveyors with the detachment, and I wish much that you would write to Mackenzie upon the subject. I should write to him, only that I am afraid he would think it an interference, on my part, in business in which I had no concern. Mr. Frazer is here, but he is sick, and going on leave to the Carnatic. If we have any body, therefore, it must be Mr. Warren, and I do not know where he can be employed to greater advantage than in the Wynaad country. I have written to Colebrooke to desire him to send me some of his native guides who are more useful than any people I have yet seen, in exploring roads for our troops. They know to a nicety where we can go.

‘ They are going on well with your house. Doctors disagree about your principal room; I therefore think it better that just so much should be done to it as can be finished

before you return; and if you should go away again for a month, it will be easy to add any ornament which you may think necessary. I think it will want but little; but that will depend much upon the mode in which you propose to close it in. For this I think that you will approve of the mode in which I am closing my rooms.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Fort St. George.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 15th Feb., 1800.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter from Lieut. Colonel Montresor. In consequence of your letter of the 9th January, I proposed that the 77th should not be taken in the establishment of the government of Fort St. George until they were arrived in their quarters, and should have had time to discharge their Bombay establishment. The orders from the Military Paymaster General were different, and the Paymaster was directed to take them on this establishment, and to pay them from the day on which they entered the Mysore country. It will therefore be necessary that he should be further authorized to pay their Bombay field establishment.

‘ I have directed Mr. Gordon to prepare as follows for the detachment ordered for the field. He is to supply, for 300 Europeans, three months’ arrack; and for 2500 natives, one month’s grain, at half allowance. I have thought it proper to order this last; as it is probable that the troops will be but ill supplied with bazaars, it will be difficult to collect immediately those who heretofore attended the camps. And it is probable that every thing will be destroyed in the Wynaad country before we enter it. I have likewise desired him to provide carriages for these provisions, and for about 350 loads of stores, of which I have sent an account to the Military Board. Draught bullocks will not be required, nor will carriage for the tents, excepting a few bamboo coolies, &c., to bring them with the corps coming from the northward.

‘ It will be necessary to appoint an officer to act as Adjutant and as Quarter Master to the European flank companies, and one as Adjutant to the native companies; and,

with the permission of Government, I shall appoint an officer of each belonging to the companies employed to act in those capacities.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Secretary of Government,  
Fort St. George.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 15th February, 1800.

‘ I have received your letter of the 12th instant. If Purneah should be desirous of going towards Chittledroog, he would do well to go there; in my opinion the oftener all parts of this country are visited for some time the better, and he will do right in visiting that part soon. I shall be glad if you come with the detachments; but as you come only out of compliment to me, you will do better to consult your own convenience. You will probably wish to be here when Lady Clive arrives in the country, and in that case it is much better that you should not come.

‘ At all events I shall be glad to have Bistnapah’s pundit or some body belonging to Purneah, who will have influence in the country. I am obliged to Purneah for his attention in ordering 2000 loads of gram to be collected; I have ordered a month’s grain at half allowance for the native troops, to be got ready in case of accidents, as I am convinced that the first step the Rajah will take will be to destroy every thing in the country. It will be well if Purneah orders all kind of bazaar articles to be got together.

‘ I am glad to hear that we shall see you so soon. I have not yet released all the prisoners; and unless something further appears in their favor, I intend to detain them for another day or two. Barclay has been most laborious in his investigation of this business, and has brought it to light in a masterly manner. He has examined the dates and marches of the party as stated by the informant, and what is very extraordinary the account comes out right. The man first told his story, the number of marches he made, where he halted, &c. &c. Barclay then questioned him as to the time, and made him tell at what places he had seen each new moon; and his answers have corresponded exactly with his marches and halts and his arrival here. This is a strong

mark of truth, particularly in a native, who never knows any thing of time. He is now gone to bring more witnesses, and I hope that you will be here before I release the prisoners. I acknowledge that the proof of the alibi has much weight with me, and that I detain the people now only out of respect for the opinions of those who have made the investigation, and who do not agree with me.

‘ Believe me, &c.,

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I enclose advertisements about gram from the Military Board.’

*To Colonel Sartorius.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 26th Feb., 1800.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter from the Secretary of the Government of Fort St. George.

‘ I have received your letter of the 18th instant, and Lieut. Colonel Close has communicated to me that which you wrote to him on the 17th. By both it would appear that the Pyche Rajah was in actual possession of the Cotiote district, whereas I had always imagined that you had posts in it which, not being sufficiently strong to support the Company’s authority, the Pyche Rajah had an influence in the country very prejudicial to the British interests. If I should be founded in my conjectures that you have a post in Cotiote, I shall be glad if you will let me know it; and if you will be so kind as to make arrangements for posting the detachments from Cannanore in conformity with the following plan, giving me information of the place where it is posted, and of the nature of the communication between that place and the Wynaad country.

‘ The first object in forming both detachments is to establish the Company’s authority in Wynaad, which is now held by the Pyche Rajah. It appears to be your opinion that as soon as he is pressed by the detachment from Seringapatam, he will move into Cotiote, where his influence is still extensive, and where his former successes would give him reason to hope for success in future. But if it be true that you have a post in Cotiote, and that the Pyche Rajah, instead of being in possession of that district, only exercises an influence there,

I should hope that the detachment of the Bombay army would be strong enough to support itself against him until I could reach him from Wynaad; and that you would find no inconvenience, and that there would be no risk in placing your detachment, so that it would intercept him on the route which you may imagine he follows to his proposed retreat at Cotiote.

‘If, then, my conjecture is well founded, I beg that you will do me the favor to order the detachment to move forward to Cotiote, that you will place it so that it may either stop the Rajah, or may induce him to take a longer and more difficult route to his place of retreat. If, however, the Rajah should remain in the Wynaad country contrary to your expectation and to mine, it will be necessary that the detachment from Cannanore should be prepared to move into that district likewise.

‘If you should have no posts in Cotiote, the plan must be different, although the object will be the same, and must depend upon the strength of your detachment compared with that which the Pyche Rajah can produce in Cotiote, upon the nature and state of the roads, and of the country through which it must pass in order to reach the border of Wynaad.

‘If the detachment should run any risk in entering the Cotiote country, it will be best that it should enter Wynaad by the Tambercherry ghaut; as it is very clear that if the Pyche Rajah is so strong in Cotiote that the Bombay detachment cannot enter it with safety, the Seringapatam detachment will not be able to drive him out of both Wynaad and Cotiote in this season, and that the absence of the Bombay detachment may risk success even in the former. I therefore propose that the Bombay detachment should enter Wynaad by the Tambercherry ghaut, if, as you say, the Rajah is in possession of, and strong in Cotiote, instead of remaining upon the borders and straitening him in the latter. All this, however, depends upon a comparison of your strength and his: you will perceive that my plan is, that your detachment should move through Cotiote towards, or, eventually, into Wynaad, if possible; but if that should not be possible, as the possession of Wynaad is, in the first instance, the object, it should move into it by the Tambercherry ghaut.



‘ As the season is advancing, I cannot sufficiently express the anxiety, which I am convinced you feel in common with me, that your detachment should move as soon as possible. The Right Honorable the Governor General having resolved to get possession of Wynaad, and, with this view, having ordered detachments to be prepared in Malabar and Mysore, it is not economy to spare money in fitting them out.

‘ Of this you will be convinced, and I beg therefore that you will spare no expense to equip the troops with their provisions, stores, carriage, &c. I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know when your detachment will be ready to move; the route which, according to either of the foregoing plans, it will pursue; and such other information as it may be in your power to favor me with. My detachment is already collected and prepared to move. I have posted camel hirearrahs upon the road towards Cannanore as far as they can go, and I shall be obliged to you if you will give directions that your letters may be given to them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Colonel Sartorius.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Munro.*

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Seringapatam, 2nd March, 1800.

‘ Since Colonel Close’s return to Seringapatam, I have had some conversation with him respecting the thieves in Soonda. It has appeared to him and to me, that the only mode by which you can expect to get rid of them, is to hunt them out. In the province of Bednore we employed some of the Rajah’s cavalry; with the support of our infantry, some thieves were caught, some of them were hanged, and some severely punished in different ways: the consequence has been, that lately that country has not been visited by them; and most probably a similar operation in Soonda would have a similar effect. I have spoken to Purneah on the subject, and I find that he can assist with about two hundred and fifty or three hundred horsemen, without inconvenience; these, divided into two or three small parties, supported by our infantry, would give a proper *shekar*; and I strongly advise you not to let the Marhatta boundary stop you in the pursuit of your

game when you shall once have started it. Two or three fair hunts, and cutting up about half a dozen, will most probably induce the thieves to prefer some other country to Soonda, as the scene of their operations. Let me hear from you upon this subject, and if you approve of the plan, I will make all the arrangements for putting it into execution.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Munro,*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 4th March, 1800.

I enclose letters just received from Madras, which I beg you will return to me when you shall have read them. It appears that Government is very anxious that the object of the detachments should be obtained, but still I conceive that our letters will have the effect of stopping operations till the next season.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 7th March, 1800.

‘ I have received your letters respecting the arms. The whole number of serviceable captured English arms is about 1600, and of these about two thirds have already been delivered to the troops. There are 13,485 repairable English arms, and these we can either repair for Purneah, or we can deliver them to him, and he can have them repaired for his troops. If you approve of this plan, let me know it, and I will write to the Military Board, and recommend that I may be permitted to issue to Purneah 1000 stand of the repairable arms. It will also be necessary that I should take their opinion respecting the issue of the accoutrements.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Fort St. George.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 9th March, 1800.

‘ I enclose copies of two letters from Colonel Sartorius, that dated the 5th instant being an answer to one which I

wrote to him on the 26th of February, a copy of which I likewise enclose.

‘By this and by other information, it appears that the Pyche Rajah is in possession of Cotiote as well as of the Wynaad country.

‘In order to put in execution the orders of Government to get possession of Wynaad, these methods have been proposed. It was first proposed that the detachments of the Bombay army should penetrate through Cotiote, while that from Mysore should enter from the eastward; but it appears that the influence and strength of the Pyche Rajah in Cotiote is much greater than that of the Company, and that a detachment, such as that proposed to be assembled by Colonel Sartorius, cannot pass through without the risk of being destroyed. As under the circumstances of the present moment it is impossible to collect a larger detachment and equip it in time, I am obliged to relinquish that plan, by which alone the Pyche Rajah can be completely subdued.

‘Colonel Sartorius then proposes that he should collect his detachment at Cotapuramba, on the western borders of Cotiote, that it should remain there until the detachment of this army shall have penetrated Wynaad, and then that a combined attack of the two detachments shall be made on the Cotiote district.

‘I am not acquainted with the nature of the Wynaad country, and I am not certain that the combined operations of the two detachments as ordered by the Government will not be necessary to get possession of, and establish the Company’s authority in, that district. The season is so far advanced as to render it very probable that even that object can scarcely be effected before the rains set in, and it is certain that both objects cannot. Colonel Sartorius proposes that in case it should be found that the detachment of this army cannot alone get possession of Wynaad, he should embark his troops, re-land them at Calicut, and move into Wynaad by the Tambercherry ghaut; but I must observe, that the length of time which would elapse between the period at which the want of his assistance might be felt, that at which he would receive information of this want, and that at which he would be at the proper place to afford his assistance, would be so great, as in all probability to render it useless.

‘ Upon the whole, then, considering the weakness of the Bombay detachment compared with the strength of the Pyche Rajah in Cotiote, I have determined not to attempt to move it through that district; and considering the lateness of the season, and the orders of Government, I propose to desire Colonel Sartorius to collect his detachment at Calicut, and to enter Wynaad by the Tambercherry ghaut, while I shall enter it from this side.

‘ By Colonel Sartorius’s letters, it appears that he will be prepared to leave Calicut towards the end of this month, or in the beginning of the next, and I propose to march from hence about the 20th; my detachment having been collected and prepared to move since the 26th of last month.

‘ The information regarding the weather which I have received from many quarters, but which, by Colonel Sartorius’s letters, does not appear to be well founded, is, that it begins to rain in Wynaad in the middle of this month, that the showers increase, and become more frequent gradually, till the middle of April, when the rains become violent, and the rivers and nullahs fill.

‘ If this information be well founded (and the early period at which, in comparison with the Cavery, is a proof that the rains are early in Wynaad), there will be a further question whether the expedition ought to be undertaken at all, if the equipment of the Bombay troops is to be delayed beyond the end of this month.

‘ Upon this subject it will be necessary to receive the orders of Government, on the advantages to be derived from prosecuting the expedition in this season; and that we shall obtain a knowledge of the country; and that we shall be enabled to establish at Wynaad a post, from whence we can complete the succession of the Pyche Rajah early in the next season.

‘ The Company’s affairs cannot well be worse than they are in Cotiote, and therefore no evil is to be apprehended from the Rajah seating himself there during the rains.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Secretary of Government,  
Fort St. George.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 9th March, 1800.

‘ I have made arrangements for sending to Paughur two companies of the 1st of the Sth, who, I hope, will keep matters quiet.

‘ I do not know on what day the Bombay troops will be collected at Calicut, but I rather believe at about this time, and they will be prepared to march on the 7th or 8th of April. I propose, that my troops should cross the rivers tomorrow, and march to the Dalway Tank on the next day, that is to say, if I am well enough, as I had an attack of fever yesterday which kept me in bed all day.

‘ We have been perfectly quiet here since I wrote to you. The court martial sentenced the four men to be hanged, but as I have not the power of putting the sentence in execution, excepting in a case of emergency, which, when they had finished, their proceedings did not exist, and as the men tried were not at the head of the riot, I have had them well flogged, and sent about their business.

‘ Besides, I do not conceive that the connexion between the four men tried and the gang at Caryghaut appears so clear upon the face of the proceedings as it was in fact, or as I expected it would. It is very certain that the gooroo was at the head of the business.

‘ Return the court martial, and

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 11th March, 1800.

‘ I enclose a memorandum relating to gold mohurs and soolacky rupees, which I have received from Mr. Gordon. He proposes to coin 100 of each, in order to prove the truth of the paper.

‘ Upon considering Sartorius’s letter to Lord Clive, and the slight dependence to be placed on 1500 coolies pressed and detained by a guard, I have determined to increase our supplies of provisions to such extent as may be practicable between this and the time of our departure.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Fort St. George.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 12th March, 1800.

‘ Colonel Sartorius has transmitted me a copy of his letter of the 8th instant to the Right Honorable the Governor in Council. As from that, it appears that he is obliged to depend for supplies for his detachment on 1500 coolies, “passed and detained under a guard,” I have thought it proper to order that the quantity of rice and arrack to accompany this detachment may be increased to such extent as may be found practicable, between this and the day on which I shall march. This will add to my encumbrances, and I have therefore ordered the flank companies of the 77th regiment from Chittledroog to join me.

‘ Colonel Sartorius has proposed to draw from Goa four companies of sepoy, but I have desired him not to increase his numbers, unless he is certain of being able to feed his troops.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter from Capt. ———, who commands the pioneers on the Bombay establishment, and who has been much employed in Cotiote. It does not appear possible to bring a detachment through that district till we are in possession of Wynaad.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Secretary of Government,  
Fort St. George.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 14th March, 1800.

‘ Abdoo Ghoffar’s son called upon me this morning. I had before examined my papers and made inquiries respecting him, and I find that he is not included in the list of persons of the Binky Nabob’s family, for whose use the pension of 400 star pagodas per annum is granted. It will therefore be proper that some provision should be made for him; and as the Binky Nabob’s widow and his family are on the Family Fund, it will be right that this branch of the same family should be upon it likewise. Will you write to Government upon the subject?

‘ I have been a little out of order these two last days with a cold, but I am getting better.

‘M<sup>r</sup>Intire will furnish Purneah with some arms, ammunition, and flints, for the expedition against Kistnapah Naig.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘Did you recollect to mention to Purneah the carpenters at Nuggur for Grant’s cots? He will likewise want the assistance of the village coolies (paying for the same) to carry them over to Chittledroog.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Seringapatam, 16th March, 1800.

‘We are in want of the dooley bearers, and I shall be obliged to you if you will have them sent over.

‘I have had a conversation with Mr. Gordon about money matters, and it appears that we begin to want a little, and I believe that we shall be obliged to call for some from the Presidency. I intend to ask Munro to pay the Bombay corps at Nuggur for this month, which will relieve us a little. We shall then want about 20,000 pagodas at Chittledroog, as much at Bangalore, and about 30,000 here. If the coinage succeeds, we shall have money enough for two months; but in the meantime, until all the bad, or rather useless, money is recoined, we are in distress.

‘I enclose part of a letter from Sydenham, by which you will perceive that the road plan is not entirely abandoned.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘Will you be so kind as to return Sydenham’s letter?’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Seringapatam, 17th March, 1800.

‘Having received the answer from the amildar of Sera regarding the carts of the persons named in the agreement of the Belgywars and Sonars, I yesterday gave the parties counterparts of their paper signed by myself; at the same time I called for the two men, who I before told you had refused to come into the agreement, informed them of the

answer received from Sera, and desired that they would give security for their behavior, and that they would no longer disturb the peace of the place. This they positively refused. Last night and early this morning parties of Pariah people and cook boys went about the streets armed with clubs, and threatened the bazaar people in case they should open their shops; of these four were caught in the fort in the fact. This morning a large body assembled at the Caryghaut, and another at the Chendgall Ford, who plundered the country people coming with their goods, broke the chatties of those bringing milk, and stopped all communication with the country by the lower fords. The bazaars in the Fort and Ganjam were shut. Under these circumstances it became necessary to take some serious and decided steps towards restoring peace and confidence. I ordered a small party of Europeans out from the garrison to cross at the Chendgall Ford, a small party of sepoy's from camp to the Caryghaut hill, as the largest mob had put themselves at the choultries at the bottom of it, and a party of cavalry into the Lockary to assist in case they should make off *unhurt* before the infantry should reach them. Notwithstanding repeated messages, and that the cavalry was within 100 yards of them for near an hour, they remained till the infantry got on both sides of them within pistol shot. The infantry fired; two of them and the two head men whom I had sent out were killed, and two wounded. The whole dispersed, and the communication is going on, and all is as quiet as if nothing had happened.

‘A native general court martial is now sitting to try the fellows who were taken in the fort, and I intend to hang two of them if they should be sentenced, as I imagine they will. The people concerned were mostly gentlemen’s servants, and horsekeepers, and soldiers’ cooks; I dare say set on by the higher classes in the service of the officers. It is fortunate that the attempt has been made whilst I have been here, and I dare say it will not be renewed during my absence, or ever again.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.





prices charged by the gram agents of the cavalry; and Captain Mackay says that they are much higher than the prices on the spot where the gram was received. The Company's bullocks have been at Seringapatam, at Bangalore, Nundydroog, Chittledroog, &c. &c., and Captain Mackay has vouchers from the officers in charge of them at those different places, all of which give the gram cheaper than it is given by Purneah; all these with the prices charged by the gram agents will be before General Sydenham when he will have Captain Mackay's accounts under his examination; and he will require some kind of certificate from Purneah, that the price charged was paid to him by Captain Mackay. If Purneah has been defrauded by those whom he employed to furnish the gram for the bullocks, and the prices cannot be lowered, the best method of settling the account will be to strike an average upon the whole quantity received since he first began to deliver it to our bullocks in the month of September, and to let it stand as an agreement made between you and me, or with Purneah, for the convenience of both parties. It was impossible last night to strike a correct average, but, from a rough calculation, it appears that it will run about thirty seven or thirty eight seers for a rupee. If you should see no objection to this, the only matter remaining to be settled on this first is the number of seers delivered, upon which I imagine there is no difference.

‘ In September and October the cavalry were in Soonda, and got no gram; but since that period, in general the price has been about forty seers for a rupee; and certainly, the cavalry gram is not the cheapest.

‘ The only point remaining to be settled is the manner of procuring gram for the bullocks in future. Mackay is very desirous still to receive it from Purneah; and if a stated price were once fixed, his giving it might be free from the detail and trouble of which you complain. But if you should be of opinion that it will be attended with inconvenience, Captain Mackay does not think that he will find any difficulty in procuring gram, provided the sircar will relax the regulations which restrict the sale of it to such a degree as almost to amount to a prohibition. I conclude that these restrictions are occasioned by the necessity of furnishing a

quantity of gram for the Company's bullocks, and therefore, when that necessity no longer exists, there will be no objection to allowing the sale of gram to be as general and as easy as is the sale of any other commodity.

‘ At all events, it will be convenient that Purneah should continue to deliver the gram till the end of the month, and before then you will have had time to settle both as to the mode of payment for that already received, and as to the mode of procuring gram for the bullocks in future. Let me know when you shall have decided upon these subjects.

‘ I have considered the proposition to deliver over entirely to the Rajah the stud of cows, and all the calves, and I have talked it over with Mackay. He seems to be of opinion, that if the bullocks are not occasionally recruited by drafts of fresh calves, the establishment will very soon fail entirely. I have no doubt but that for *purchase* it will at all times be possible to procure bullocks fit for the draught, and probably equal to those already in the Company's service. But I know the nature of those to whom all propositions for expense to be incurred upon this subject must be submitted, and I should as soon expect that they would consent to a disbursement of a lac of pagodas as to one of 500 or 1000 pagodas a year for a convenient arrangement of this matter for the Rajah's Government. I therefore foresee that the establishment of bullocks will fall to the ground, or the Company must keep the stud which is to support it, or both establishment and stud must be given over to the Rajah's Government. As a Company's servant, I certainly should prefer to have an establishment and stud in the hands of the Company.

‘ A more convenient arrangement for the Company would be that the stud should be in the hands of the Rajah, and that the Company should receive supplies from it; but it may be said, why is the Rajah to be fettered with a Company's concern? and we must therefore look to other means of taking care of it. We are in possession of the country from whence it is said the bullocks were originally brought, and the gentlemen in charge may not find it impossible to arrange matters so as to give an annual supply of calves without incurring *expense*, which appears to be the object. Under this arrangement, the cows will be given over to

them: but I do not conceive that this or any other plan will ever answer so well for us as to leave the stud in the hands of the Rajah, and to receive from it certain supplies.

‘ I have been detained this day for tents, but I shall set out early in the morning.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 26th March, 1800.

‘ Just before I received your enclosure I had received Mr. Smee’s dispatch of the 22nd. I now send you that of the 21st, being Mr. Smee’s letter to me, and copies of a letter from the Pyche Rajah.

‘ I likewise send a letter about the bullocks which was going by tappall.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 26th March, 1800.

‘ The particular restriction upon the sale of gram which Mackay mentioned, is an order from Purneah to sell no gram (or at least a very small quantity) to any person excepting to the sircar. As this order has not been given in the neighbourhood of the cavalry stations, I conclude that it has been in the neighbourhood of the places where the bullocks are, or have been grazing, merely because he had engaged to furnish these with gram, and that he would be more certain of performing his engagement in consequence of the restriction. But it is clear that there will be no occasion for the restriction, when he will have nothing to do with the supply of the gram, and equally so that Mackay will not be able to get any unless it is taken off.

‘ Captain Mackay is aware of the road duties, and makes no objection to them.

‘ As soon as you have settled the average price with Purneah, let me know it, and I will write to Mackay to settle the account, and there will be no difficulty hereafter.

‘ I assure you that I find no fault with Purneah’s prices

for gram; but as they differ from those of the country which have already gone before the person who is to pass the accounts, it is necessary that there should be some certificate of the cause of the difference, or that the whole should be put together, and an average struck, and that the price should stand upon some original agreement made for the convenience of both parties.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Veerajundrapett, 30th March, 1800.

‘ I arrived here this morning, in four marches, from Seringapatam, but they were very long. It is forty miles to Periapatam, and twenty five from thence. The Rajah came over from Nauknaar this morning, and I have been to see him. He received me well, but spoke but little. He complains of sickness, and has really got a fever, and Mr. Trevor, surgeon of the 33rd regiment, is going to stay with him for a day or two.

‘ He received your letter immediately previous to my seeing him; and as his Persian moonshee was not here, Ogg read and interpreted it. I rather think that as he is really sick, you will do well to defer your journey and meeting with him for a few days. I shall desire Mr. Trevor to let you know when he recovers.

‘ I have received from Colonel Sartorius the copy of a letter written to him by the Commissioners in Malabar, in which they desire that at least the native part of the troops collected for the expedition into Wynaad may be suffered to remain in Malabar, until they shall have had time to consider of the propriety of making a requisition to employ them to the southward. At present I see no objection to suffering these troops to remain in Malabar; but there may be very strong objections to their being employed upon any wild-goose expedition that the Commissioners may point out. When the requisition comes I shall be a better judge of the propriety of complying with it.

The country, from Sedaseer hither, is an almost continued jungle: I had scarcely room to encamp at Seedapoor.

In the neighbourhood of this place there is some cultivation; but this magnificent capital is about of the same extent, and has a similar appearance to a country town in Ireland.

‘ I propose to get down the ghaut to-morrow, and to be at Cannanore on the 2nd of April.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Stony River, 31st March, 1800.

‘ After I had written to you yesterday, the Rajah sent to me to say that he would pay me a visit. He began by saying that he had intended to meet me at his frontier, but that I had not given him notice of the day on which I intended to leave Seringapatam; and that he had been so ill on the day when he heard that I was arrived at Periapatam, that he had not been able to quit his house. He then said that as I was going to Cannanore I should see the Bombay gentlemen, and should have an opportunity of conversing with them respecting him, and they would tell me whether he was such a man as he had been represented to be. I told him that I knew no person who had less reason to complain of misrepresentation; that in India, in England, and every where, his character was perfectly known and established, and that he did not do justice either to himself or to us, in imagining otherwise. He then, from beginning to end, related the history of his connexion with Hyder, and with Tippoo, and with us; and he repeatedly said that the brahmins were his enemies. He declared that from the commencement of his connexion with the British Government (which was founded on their mutual enmity to Tippoo) to this day, he had never done any thing relative thereto without an order from them, or from their agents, which he could produce, and offered to do so for my satisfaction. I then took an opportunity of letting him see that I had nothing to do with political matters; that he would soon see you, that you had been many years in this country, had a perfect knowledge of its affairs, &c. &c., and that you were not ignorant of the nature of his connexion with the Company; and I recommended to

him to listen to what you should say to him as to the advice of his best friend. He said that if he was sufficiently recovered he would go with me to Seringapatam when I should return thither, of which he said he had informed you. After having stayed about three hours he went away.

‘ It appeared to me that pains had been taken to induce him to believe that we (Madras people) were prejudiced against him, and that we listened to brahmins, against whom he appears to have an inveterate hatred, and who, he believes, have an equal one towards him. He repeatedly said that we could not be aware of the services which he had had it in his power to render to the Company, that we were strangers to him and his actions, and that it was natural that we should listen to those with whom we had been acquainted, and who he knew were his enemies. I am of opinion, however, that a little better acquaintance, more intercourse, and a little gentle treatment, will remove all these impressions.

‘ He speaks Moorish fluently; but Ogg says, with an idiom that belongs, he supposes, to his own language: he has more simplicity, and, apparently, more sincerity in his manners, as well as in what he says, than any native I have ever seen.

‘ It struck me as remarkable in his conversation, that he should have urged repeatedly that he had orders for every thing he had ever done either from the Company’s Government or their agents; particularly when I recollected that —— had declined to ask him to give up the families which he had seized in Mysore, because they had been seized by his desire.

‘ The Rajah was better this morning, and went to Naulnam when I came here. He had still, however, some fever, and the doctor accompanies him.

‘ I omitted to mention to you, in my letter of yesterday, that the amildar at Periapatam proposed to me that he should seize some bullocks which had come in there with gram from the Koorg country; as (he said) some of the inhabitants knew them to have belonged to themselves, and to have been taken off by the Rajah of Koorg, I recommended him to take the orders of his sircar before he did such a thing.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, Cannanore, 3rd April, 1800.

‘ I arrived here this morning, having been on the road one day longer than I expected. I found the weather exceedingly hot, and a want of water upon the road to refresh the followers and cattle obliged me to make two marches, where, under other circumstances, I should have made only one. We have, however, had rain nearly every night since I left Seringapatam.

‘ I met here Mr. Smee and Captain Moncrieffe. The former has induced some of the nairs, under his influence, Kydree Amboo at their head, to commence to open a road from Cotaparamba by Mananderry to Tutucullum and Canote, and another by Pyche to Montana; the latter will not be difficult, as Tippoo had made one on the same line formerly. It is intended, if possible, before the rains, to establish a post at Canote, and another at Montana, to connect them by a road directly across from one to the other, and by another road between them by Perrywell, which last requires only to be opened. Mr. Smee has no doubt but that the nairs will effect these objects; and in order to facilitate them, I have sent in the pioneers and 1200 of the coolies, which had been hired for the expedition. If the Pyche Rajah is disposed to make an opposition to this measure (which Smee and Moncrieffe think he will not), it must then be given over; as all parties agree that the force in this country is not sufficient to carry it through. If it should be necessary to give over the plan, Smee does not apprehend that the Company’s influence will be diminished in consequence of the failure, and as every yard of road which is made is so much gained towards effecting the great object, I have, upon the whole, thought it a measure which ought to be attempted. Excepting thirty men employed in guarding Kydree Amboo’s house, not a sepoy will be engaged in the operation; so that however anxiously I may look forward for its success, I do not conceive that the honour of the Company’s arms will be engaged in it. As soon as the roads will have been completed; or if it should be necessary to discontinue them, or, at all events, at the commencement of the monsoon, the coolies will be employed in carrying provisions to Cotaparamba, where I understand there are sheds and buildings sufficient to contain provisions for 3000 men for



two months. If it should be possible to make posts at Montana and Canote, they must, in the first instance, be held by the friendly nairs till we can move forward our provisions, first for a garrison, next for the number of men, and for the time above stated.

‘ It will be a curious circumstance, if without troops we should be able to effect objects which it was imagined the largest detachment which could conveniently be brought together could not undertake; but it is to be observed that they will be effected by the nairs themselves, with the assistance of our people, and not by our force.

‘ I have heard from Colonel Mignan that he had received a report from the officer commanding the post at Soobramany, stating that Kistnapah Naig had beat the Rajah’s troops, and had taken Munserabad on the 24th of March. As I have not heard from you, or from Colonel Tolfrey, I conclude that there is no truth in the report; but if it should be true, we must only send off the flank companies of the 77th, now at Seringapatam, in readiness to march to Tolfrey’s assistance, with orders to storm Munserabad.

‘ I enclose a copy of Colonel Mignan’s letter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Cannanore, 5th April, 1800.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Colonel Tolfrey, and one of a translation of a proclamation which he has published. The account I received from Colonel Mignan cannot be founded.

‘ I likewise enclose the copy of a letter from Mr. Hodgson, the collector of Cheral to Colonel Sartorius. It appears that he has heard of the son of Tippoo, about whom Colonel Mignan gave me information, as being the cause of the desertion among his sepoy recruits. Since the receipt of this letter I have seen Mr. Hodgson, and have explained to him the present state of Tippoo’s family, and the consequent impossibility that one of his sons, or even one of Hyder’s stock, should be in or near the place which he mentions. In answer to this he said, that the person alluded to might not be one of Tippoo’s sons, or might not belong to the family;

but that there was no doubt that there was a man in the southern part of Canara who assumed that character, was collecting troops, and was well received, and respectfully treated by the disaffected in those parts. I urged him strongly to have an eye towards him, and to keep you and me informed of his motions, which he promised. But he said, that being unacquainted with Munro, in whose district the man was, he was fearful of sending any people into it. He said that Munro had an amildar in the country, and that it might be convenient if that man and he were to communicate upon these matters which arise occasionally. It will be well if you give Munro a hint upon this subject; and I hope that before long we shall discover something interesting regarding this impostor.

‘ The Commissioners in Malabar will most probably have sent you a copy of their letter to Colonel Sartorius, regarding the distribution of the troops which I had ordered consequent to the directions from Government to postpone the expedition. I have complied with their wishes regarding the native part of the detachment as far as six companies; the other two will go to Cotaparamba to be in readiness to occupy our new posts in Cotiote if they should be finished; or if not, they will remain at Cotaparamba as a farther security to the stores, which, at all events, will be thrown in there during the rains. If we should want more native troops in Canara, I must send them from Nuggur. The Europeans here join their corps at Mangalore and Goa.

‘ The six companies are to be in the southern part of Malabar, and will keep matters quiet there during the rains; and I am now making inquiries relative to the mode of penetrating into that part of Malabar from Wynaad or Mysore, should Government think it proper to make a complete settlement of all matters in the province in the next season.

‘ Our road-making in Cotiote gets on well. I believe that it will be open as far as Monanderry this day, that is, if the rain and storm of last night has not impeded the work.

‘ I have received a letter from Disney, who has lost his wife, and is attacked by the liver complaint himself, and is so much out of sorts altogether as to have determined to quit the service and go home immediately. His command, which is, on many accounts, a very important one, will

devolve upon a Lieutenant in the Bombay army; and I assure you, that considering the disturbance on the Marhatta frontier, the riches of Nuggur, and the general inclination of all manner of people to plunder, I am rather uneasy at the charge being in the hands of a person who must be so inexperienced. Under these circumstances I am desirous of sending there Colonel Montresor from Chittledroog, whom I do not know, but he bears an excellent character. I shall not do so, however, till I hear from you whether there is any objection to it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Cannanore, 6th April, 1800.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 3rd. I hear from Koorg that the Rajah is better, although still weak and unwell. I propose to go to Tellicherry to-morrow, and I shall probably return here on the 10th or 11th; and I think matters will be so forward in Cotiote as to allow me to depart for Mysore on the 15th. I shall let you know whether the Rajah will come with me either to Seringapatam or Periapatam; and I will stay with him a day or two in order to give you time to set out from Seringapatam if I should find him disinclined to do either. If you was to set out about the 12th or 13th, and to come as far as Cuttee Mulwary, or Periapatam, at all events it would expedite our meeting, and I think make it certain that the Rajah will come out to Periapatam at least.

‘ When I write to you I will send my letters in a separate packet.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Tellicherry, 10th April, 1800.

‘ I received last night the accounts of Colonel Tolfrey’s defeat, and sent off expresses to make the following arrangement to remedy it. The flank companies of the 77th are on their march towards Chittledroog; and as they are nearest to the Rut country, and have all their equipments prepared, I have ordered them to Ouscota. I have ordered

from Seringapatam, arrack, provisions, and gram, and ammunition; and I have desired that the four companies of the 4th regiment, under Major Capper, may be sent with these articles as an escort. I have no doubt but that the Europeans will settle all matters without difficulty; and from the accounts received I am at a loss to guess from what cause they failed in forcing a barrier to which they could march in three columns, one of them in companies, and upon which they could bring their guns to bear. Colonel Tolfrey has quitted Munserabad, and if he has not thrown into it a proper supply of provisions for the garrison, that fort will be lost, as it may be depended upon that Kistnapah Naig will occupy all the barriers between Munserabad and Ouscota, which it will not be an easy matter to force after what has happened; and I do not expect that the Europeans will reach Ouscota till the 20th at soonest.

‘The post at Anakery, at which Colonel Tolfrey failed, does not lie towards the Bissolee Ghaut, but is situated on the right of the road from Ouscota to Munserabad, and is apparently between the road and the Hyawatty. The co-operation from Canara, therefore, if it were possible, would not answer for some time, at least not till the post at Anakerry shall be forced, and the detachment from this side shall be prepared to force the post which Kistnapah Naig has on the Bissolee ghaut. But the fact is, that there is not a soldier either in Canara or Malabar who can be moved. There are 300 sepoy, and 120 Europeans, at Mangalore; of the latter there will be 400 more in about ten days, when they will have reached that place from hence. I will order them forward to the Soobramany pagoda; and when the Bissolee ghaut comes to be attacked on our side, they can operate from theirs. There is nothing at Cannanore, nothing here, nor nearer to Mangalore than Calicut. They can march thither sooner than they can go by sea at this time of the year; and if they could move immediately the rains would set in before they would arrive at the scene of operations. We must make the best of it, and depend upon the bayonets of the Europeans; but I acknowledge myself to be much disappointed and vexed at the failure of 1000 sepoy, and 1600 of the Rajah’s troops against not a larger number of ryots, in a country by no means difficult, and from which the same people were driven like sheep, and their fort

taken from them in September last by a similar body of troops.

‘ I went this morning to Cotaparamba, which is a neat little mud redoubt about nine miles from hence. It contains buildings which will hold a large quantity of provision and ammunition, with which, please God, they shall be filled in a few days. The road-making goes on well, and has not been interrupted. On the day after to-morrow I shall occupy Pyche fort on the Montana road, and Monanderry pagoda on that leading to Canote, and I hope in a few days afterwards to be able to take possession of the posts, which will be constructed at Montana and Canote.

‘ I propose to return to Cannanore on the day after to-morrow. Mr. Spencer comes here in the morning, which detains me till then, and I shall be at Seringapatam, I hope, on the 22nd.

Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Colonel Montresor will join the detachment with the flank companies of the 77th, and will command it; and, after what has happened, I do not think that will do us any harm.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Tellicherry, 11th April, 1800.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received your letter of the 7th, and Colonel Money penny’s. As I find that the preparations have been made for moving the Europeans from Seringapatam, I have ordered the flank companies of the 73rd, as well as those of the 77th, to join the detachment at Ouscota; so that they will now have an ample force for everything that it may be necessary to undertake. I quake for the fort at Munserabad.

‘ If there is any difficulty about removing the sick and wounded of Tolfrey’s detachment, Ouscota will answer to hold them till doolies can arrive.

‘ I have received a letter from Government, in which I am asked for my opinion, whether Bangalore will answer for a cantonment for two corps of cavalry. I never thought it would answer for one, as I understood that there was a

scarcity of wood, water, gram, and grass. I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know what you think of it, and whether Chenapatam will not answer better for one regiment at least, if not for both.

‘ According to my former plan, I have ordered the 2nd regiment to Chenapatam for the present. Before I left Seringapatam, Colonel Pater desired I would apply to Purneah for leave for that corps to cut date trees, or other jungle wood, in the forest which runs from Chenapatam to Sultaunpett. If there is no impropriety in it, I shall be obliged to you if you will speak to Purneah upon the subject, and desire him to send orders to the amildar of that district. As these corps must draw every thing from Seringapatam when they are to take the field, all other things being equal, there is no doubt but that Chenapatam will be the most convenient situation; but I believe that it excels Bangalore in many respects, besides that it is in the neighbourhood of the place from which the corps are to be equipped.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Cannanore, 12th April, 1800.

‘ I have ordered a detachment from Mangalore to the Soobramany pagoda, which will consist of 400 of the 75th, and a detachment of the grenadier battalion, with one month’s provisions, for which, however, they are not to wait, but to proceed with that quantity for which they have at present carriage. The remainder will follow, and I have sent carriage for it from hence.

‘ In order to facilitate the communication between the detachment on the Mysore side, and that in Canara, I have ordered first, that the officer in command at Jemalabad may ascertain the road between his post and the Soobramany pagoda; secondly, that the postmaster in Canara may post many runners upon it; thirdly, that the officer at Jemalabad may take care that all letters, between the detachments, may proceed as addressed. The tappall from Seringapatam to Mangalore has, since its interruption by Kistnapah Naig, run by Oustara, the Gamut Kull ghaut, and Jemalabad. I have, therefore, ordered Colonel Tolfrey,

fourthly, to post runners from his camp to Oustara; fifthly, to correspond with the officer in command at Jemalabad, and ascertain the distance from his post to Soobramany, and the length of time which the communication will take; thus the chain will be complete, and its length known.

‘ Colonel Tolfrey, however, may want a few peons, and, to complete the arrangement, there ought to be a steady writer at Oustara, who would take care that the packets for the officer commanding the detachment on the Mysore side, should proceed to him regularly. For this I must request your assistance with Mr. Cochrane.

‘ I hope that the detachment of the Bombay army will be at Soobramany on the 20th; but, as Anakeery is to be forced in the first instance, and as Colonel Tolfrey’s re-inforcements will not have reached him before that day, the arrangements for attacking the post at the Bissolee ghaut will most probably not be made till towards the end of the month. I hope, however, that, after Anakeery will have been forced, it will not be necessary to attack the Bissolee ghaut.

‘ I shall be with you in a very few days. I shall not stay in Koorg as I proposed in a former letter; nor, even if the Rajah should be inclined to come to Seringapatam, shall I wait for him, but push on and leave him with the gentlemen.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Stony River, 15th April, 1800.

‘ I have received your letters of the 11th and 12th. Enclosed I send you a letter from the Rajah of Koorg, which, in my opinion, affords a symptom of an intention not to proceed to Seringapatam. I shall be at Veerajundrapett to-morrow, from whence I shall be able to give you more certain accounts of his plans. His man says he is really ill; the doctor left him a few days ago free from disorder, but weak and wanting appetite.

‘ The account which you send me enclosed in your letter of the 12th, differs so much from that which I received before of the position at Anakeery, and is so little foundation for the opinions given of its impregnable strength, that I

am at a loss to form any opinion upon the subject. It is clear that there are three principal entrances to the place, that no one of them can be distant from the other above two miles, and that the forest, as it is called, cannot be six miles in circumference. Guns were brought to bear with grape upon the barrier attacked, and it appears that more guns are asked for or expected, therefore the road cannot be very difficult; and, as a havildar is recommended for promotion, for having got over the barrier, I rather imagine that that must be assailable to determined troops. We here imagine that the sepoy's did not behave with their accustomed resolution, which was the cause of the failure; and I am the more induced to be of that opinion as Colonel Tolfrey particularly praises the European officers, and non-commissioned officers, and the Rajah's troops, but avoids mentioning the natives in the Company's service. I have, therefore, great hopes from the Europeans which will join the detachment. But it is impossible to say whether the attack ought to be made in one body, or two, or three; and if successful, whether, at this season of the year, it would be proper to press matters farther than to carry the post at Anakeery. For this reason I have determined, if there should be nothing to detain me at Seringapatam, to join the detachment myself. I have but little doubt that, if one barrier is carried, the whole will be abandoned, or so feebly defended that they will fall without much difficulty, notwithstanding what Colonel Tolfrey says; but it will be a question, whether we ought to push on to the Bissolce ghaut, which must be decided by the true state of the case, in regard to the distance, (which, by the bye, is greater by half as stated by Colonel Tolfrey than as given by Moncrieffe, who has laid down the ghaut by survey, and Munsarabad by different bearings,) the road, the thickness of the jungle, and the positions said to be held by the polygar. Anakeery must be carried at all events, on account of the lateness of the season; the other operations may be postponed without disgrace.

‘ I shall reach Seringapatam on the 19th in the morning. In the meantime, by this post, I order 100 pioneers to be got ready to move, and provided with cutting tools. I have likewise ordered the grape-shot and other things, for which Colonel Tolfrey has asked.



‘ The tappalls in Malabar are like every thing else there. They are managed by a gentleman in the civil service, who resides at Mahéc where he is Deputy Commercial Resident. It was not easy to get an addition made to the number of runners.

‘ I hear from the frontier, that Dhoondiah has not yet taken Gudduck; but it was expected that he would attempt to storm it in three or four days after the 4th instant. He was settling the country, and even had collected from it some money.

‘ I have this instant received yours of the 13th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Veerajundrapett, 16th April, 1800.

‘ I omitted to enclose the letter, No. 1, in mine of yesterday, from Stony River; the letter No. 2 is just arrived. I am informed that the Rajah has a disorder in his bladder which confines him to his bed at Nauknaar. I have desired his man to inform him that I will return to meet him when I hear that he is recovered.

‘ I received your letter of the 14th this morning. If I find on the road that you have left Seringapatam I shall not hurry from Periapatam as I proposed yesterday.

‘ An officer is arrived at Hullihall in Soonda; his name is Captain Marshall. I this day write to the coast to inquire what kind of man he is, and if he should not be fit for his station, I will send somebody to take charge of the post.

‘ I propose to dsire Sir William Clarke to have an eye to that frontier for the present, and to afford it relief if necessary, as there are no troops in Canara to send to it if it should be desirable to reinforce it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I have desired Sir William Clarke to make an arrangement with Uhtoffe for running a tappall between Soopah and Goa. It appears that Uhtoffe will be able to settle it more easily than Mr. Cochrane, who is so far from the road.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Seringapatam, 21st April, 1800.

‘ The circumstance of the charge for working money I perfectly recollect, and it was as follows.

‘ The right wing of the army was encamped on the Mud-door, the Nizam’s detachment at Allagoor, the left wing was expected at Sultaunpett, and arrived there with the heavy train on that evening. A large quantity of forage had been discovered on the right of Allagoor, and had been guarded by the piquets of the army under Colonel Campbell of the 74th, and by those of the Nizam’s detachment, and in the evening by order of the Commander in Chief. This forage was carried over to Sultaunpett for the use of the bullocks of the heavy train by the 2nd batt. 11th regiment. This enabled the train to get on, at least as was imagined at that time. It may be true, as General Sydenham says, that the working money ought to have been paid by the bullock owners, but at all events the sepoy were entitled to it. Barclay recollects the circumstance perfectly.

‘ I received last night a letter from Colonel Tolfrey, from which I guess that he neither thinks his force sufficient to force Anakeery, nor does he like his equipments, as he wants hand grenades, of which I believe there are none in India, certainly none at Seringapatam. I have therefore desired him not to attack the post till Colonel Montresor reaches him; and by a letter received from him last night I hope that he will join the detachment on the same day, or at least one day after the Europeans will reach it.

‘ When I found that the Europeans were likely to join the detachment before Colonel Montresor could reach it, I wrote to Colonel Tolfrey from Tellicherry a letter, which I sent express, and desired him to attack the post as soon as he found himself sufficiently strong. When a man says that the largest equipment which, under the circumstances of the moment can be brought together, is not sufficient to force a post such as Anakeery, it is not very prudent to take upon oneself the responsibility of ordering him to attack it. And it would be particularly imprudent in me to do so, as Colonel Tolfrey having already failed, there is reason to believe that he would be very anxious to seize the first opportunity

of revenging himself, and, therefore, that he would not object to the size and strength of his detachment upon light ground. As hand grenades, however, are upon the whole all that are wanting, I have no doubt but that Colonel Montresor will find muskets and bayonets sufficient, and that he will succeed.

‘ I will write this day about the Postmaster at Nuggur.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 23rd April, 1800.

‘ I conclude that there will be no impediment to the communication by the Candulgull ghaut as soon as the post at Anakeery will be carried, and, therefore, it is desirable that the peons should remain upon the road, and the writer at Oustara. I have written to the commanding officer, in Canara, to tell him that this interruption of our intercourse is to make no alteration in the instructions which I before sent to the officer commanding the detachment at Soobramany, and that the Post Office people are to be prepared to carry on the communication when it may be practicable.

‘ I have received a letter from Colonel Sartorius, by which it appears that our road was advanced about six miles beyond Pyche on the 18th.

‘ Will you and your gentlemen dine with me on Sunday?

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 26th April, 1800.

‘ I enclose an extract from a letter, which I have received from Lieut. Colonel Mignan, which contains uncomfortable news. I have before now received news from this same man which has turned out unfounded; and this fort is represented as so strong, and so difficult of access, that, if any part of the garrison was on the top of it, I am in hopes that it is still in our hands; I shall know it to-morrow. At all events, I have desired Colonel Mignan to equip to take it if it has fallen, and in case he should have no howitzers at



find that any such person ever belonged to Tippoo's family, or that he is at all known here.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I have just received a letter from Colonel Tolfrey, dated 25th, in which he says that Bishtoo Pundit had informed him that he had received a report from the amildar at Oustara, stating that the fort of Jemalabad had been surprised and taken, and the whole garrison put to death. There is another letter from Kistnapah Naig, in much the same terms as the last.

‘ I rather believe that Anakeery will have been attacked on this day.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 1st May, 1800.

‘ I did not write to you yesterday, when I had ascertained that we had entirely lost Jemalabad, because I concluded that you would have seen the letter which I wrote to the Secretary of Government. The fort was taken, not by Kistnapah Naig, but by 150 of the recruits, who deserted from Mangalore in March, and they were under the orders of the havildar, who deserted with them. Colonel Cumine expected to take the lower fort without difficulty; and he has been ordered to attempt it: to take the upper fort will be a long operation, for which I have made arrangements by collecting troops, &c. &c. I have not given orders for collecting the troops to the northward as I intended, as really the measure appears to me to be one of some consequence. Government have had before them, since the 19th of April, the orders for putting the cavalry in the field, the information upon which they were founded, and such other information as might render necessary a more formidable equipment. Upon these they have given no opinion; and, as it is not a measure of absolute necessity, I do not like to go any farther.

‘ Mr. Cochrane was to arrange with Purneah about sending off to Gonnair 450 of the infantry now at Mysore.

‘ I expect to hear this evening or to-morrow morning of the success of the attack upon Anakeery.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 7th May, 1800.

‘ As I expected you back, I have not written to you for several days. You will have heard from Mr. Webbe of our success at Anakeery. By the last letters from Colonel Montresor it appears that he was about to march towards the Bissolce ghaut with the Europeans and part of the detachment, and to send Colonel Tolfrey to Saylispoor, with his own corps and the Rajah’s cavalry and infantry, to complete the provisioning of Munserabad. The polygar had occupied Anakeery again, and had begun again to establish the barriers. Indeed they had not had time to destroy the jungle entirely, and until that was done it could not be expected but that the polygar would still remain in it if possible, and endeavor to re-establish himself there. The great object has been gained; he and his people have been made to understand that it is not so easy to keep out our troops as they imagined, and I am afraid that the further subjection of him must be delayed to some future period. I will write to Colonel Montresor to desire that, if possible, he will clear out the jungle at Anakeery; but it is really not worth while to lose any man for that object, as there are many polygar stations of the same kind on both sides of the Hynwatty, and it will be impossible to destroy them all at present.

‘ We have got possession of the lower forts of Jemalabad; but the holders of the upper fort have fired upon Colonel Cumine’s flag, and refuse to have any communication. I have adopted a plan for blowing up the lower part of the steps, so as to cut off all hope of relief; and then we shall be able to secure the blockade by a force which will be equal to the defence of the lower forts against the attempts which Kistnapah Naig will make upon them. Howitzers will not answer at Jemalabad; and I have therefore ordered there a thirteen and a ten-inch mortar, which must go from Cannanore in order to amuse those in the upper fort during the rains.

‘ Dhoondiah, it is said, has got possession of Dummul, in the same manner that he got Gudduck, and that with his whole force he was advancing to Havanoor in the Savanore country,

about two coss from Oollall, but on the other side of the Toombuddra. The cavalry will be collected by this time at Chittledroog; and I have given orders that they may march immediately to Hurryhur, with eight companies of the 1st battalion 8th regiment, and four field-pieces, for which I have sent bullocks from hence. The 1st regiment will have their gallopers, and the 2nd regiment will have theirs in a few days, which I have cramped up for them; it is impossible to do any thing to those belonging to the 4th regiment.

‘ I have sent orders to occupy Hurryhur with a small detachment of this infantry and two guns if necessary; to remain in that neighbourhood with the remainder of the force, likewise to occupy Hoonelly with infantry and guns if necessary: when the river comes down here the boats will be collected.

‘ When the rains set in it will not be difficult to ascertain Dhoondiah’s plans, and to take effectual measures to oppose him. He must determine upon an invasion of Bednore and Soonda, or of Harponelly, Anagoondy, and Chittledroog. If of the former, he will remain on the other side of the Toombuddra till it fills; if of the latter, he will cross the river early. Our boats at Hoonelly, and a little intelligence in the people employed on the frontier, will give us great advantages in opposing either plan.

‘ At Purneah’s desire I altered the disposition of the infantry as proposed by you. He thought cavalry would answer better in Gonnair (and if his description of the country be correct, I agree with him), and infantry at Bullum, where, by all accounts, the cavalry has not been of much use. We have, therefore, drawn away from the latter 200 horse, which are ordered to Gonnair, making in the whole 500 horse on that side, and have sent the infantry into Bullum. I saw the corps, and had some of their cartridges changed, and other exchanges made at the arsenals, and they are gone well equipped.

‘ I thought that collecting the army was a more serious matter than it appears at first, and I am glad that I have omitted to do it, although, as a military measure, it is certainly desirable.

‘ We are getting a grand equipment of field carriages from Madras, and I hope that all will go smooth.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Munro.*

‘ DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Seringapatam, 7th May, 1800.

‘ I am glad to find that your people in Canara are so free from the foul crime of rebellion. We shall not be able, in this year, to make an impression on Kisanpah Naig, which will keep him entirely quiet; but on the 30th of last month he received a beating from Colonel Montresor, who took from him his post of Anakeery, which will, at least, give him reason to believe that it is not easy to keep our troops out of any place into which they are ordered to enter. The entire subjection of him depends upon the destruction of his strong holds; and for that, as we cannot expect much more fair weather, we have not at present a sufficiency of time.

‘ Colonel Montresor is now gone through to the Bipolla ghaut; but I do not expect from that, that we shall be able to re-establish the tappall upon the road; that, I am afraid, must still go round by Canara. Measures have been taken for collecting in Canara as many troops as Lieut. Colonel Mignan will require: one battalion must come from Goa, if he wants it, and another from Malabar. It would not do to withdraw every thing from Goa; for in that case how is Soonda to be assisted, if it should be attacked? Not from Mysore certainly, for we cannot get there during the rains. Not from Canara, where there are no troops; but from Goa.

‘ Soonda appears a favorite place of yours, and it is extraordinary that you should not have provided for it some way or other; and that you should not allow your amildars to assist the paymasters in procuring provisions for the forts which are to be kept.

‘ I think that upon the whole we are not in the most thriving condition in this country. Polygars, nairs, and moplas in arms on all sides of us; an army full of disaffection and discontent, amounting to Lord knows what, on the northern frontier, which increases as it advances like a snow-ball in snow. To oppose this, we have nothing that ought



to be taken from the necessary garrisons, and the corps we have in them are incomplete in men and without officers. If we go to war in earnest, however, (and if we take the field at all, it ought to be in earnest,) I will collect every thing that can be brought together from all sides, and we ought not to quit the field as long as there is a discontented or unsubdued polygar in the country.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Munro.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Munro.*

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Seringapatam, 10th May, 1800.

‘ I have again, this morning, received a letter from the Commanding Officer at Hullahall, stating that the paymaster’s servant cannot get grain, and that he begins to feel a want in the bazaar.

‘ I acknowledge, in general, the propriety of the refusal of those charged with the civil government to interfere with the purchases which it may be necessary to make on account of the military; but there may be cases in which such an interference may be not only proper, but absolutely necessary. If the paymaster’s servant is dishonest, it may be possible that nothing more may be required than to turn him out; and an honest servant may be able to procure all he wants, notwithstanding the neutrality of the sircar. But it may happen that the sircar, or his servants, are not neuter; and that (as it is stated in this instance) the amildar throws difficulties in the way of procuring the necessary supplies for the troops; in that case, surely the interference of the collector is necessary to check the improper conduct of his servant.

‘ As the frontier is disturbed, it may happen that the people are unwilling to part with their grain at any price; or there may be a real scarcity, which may induce the people to wish to keep it. But in either of these cases, it surely is necessary that the Company’s garrisons should be provided; and in order to procure a provision, the authority of the civil government must be exercised.

‘ There are other circumstances under which the interference of the civil government might be desirable in order

to procure supplies; but I only allude to those which it appears have hitherto prevented us from making any store of grain in Soonda; and into them I wish you would make inquiry, and to take such measures as you may think necessary to remedy the evil.

‘ Government have approved of the measure of throwing grain into the garrisons in that country; they will require about one thousand loads; and all I can say upon the subject is, that if the grain is not procured, I do not conceive that I am answerable for the consequences.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Munro.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Munro.*

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Seringapatam, 17th May, 1800.

‘ You will be glad to hear that I have called away both the battalions of native infantry from Goa; and I hope they will join the army, which is forming to the northward, by the end of the month.

‘ I have attended to your suggestion regarding the interference of commanding officers of posts in the prices of grain, and I have this day issued an order of which the enclosed is a copy.

‘ An officer of Chandergooty has contrived to drive away all the bazaar people; and if I find upon inquiry that this is to be attributed to his improper interference, I shall put in execution the threat contained in the order.

‘ I hear from Mr. Gordon this morning, that your amildar in Soonda has given his servant some assistance, and the consequence is, that he has got some grain. I hope the assistance given has not been to enable him to get it at a low price, but to get it at any price the ryots may ask.

‘ You will perceive, by my letters to Colonel Mignan, that I am entirely of your opinion regarding the utility of providing against disaffection at all points; we shall do well if we can provide against those places where it manifests itself by acts of violence and rebellion. I have urged Colonel Mignan to provide for a call which you may make upon him for troops, to be stationed at Vittell; and as he will not require so large a force for the blockade of Jemalabad

as I expected, he will be able to furnish what you may require.

‘ Colonel Montresor has been very active and successful in Bullum. But I am of opinion that nothing has been done which can tend effectually to put an end to the rebellion in that country; and that the near approach of the rains renders it impossible to do that which alone, in my opinion, will ever get the better of Kistnapah Naig.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Munro.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 18th May, 1800.

‘ In regard to Munro’s public letter I have to answer, that the moment I heard of the riot he mentions I wrote to the commanding officer in Canara to desire that he would provide a force to check it; and I do not believe there will be any difficulty in sending to Vittell the number of troops which it appears Munro thinks sufficient.

‘ It is very true that the mortars were all at Cannanore at the time when Jemalabad was taken; but it is not true that there has been time to get them from thence. I have heard that they have left Cannanore; but as the northerly winds prevail at this season of the year, I do not believe that they are yet at Mangalore.

‘ Munro is mistaken also regarding the howitzer, which he says is fitting up at Mangalore. It has been at Jemalabad since the 10th.

‘ I am sorry that Munro thinks that matters do not go on so quickly as they ought in Canara; but one fact proves that they have not been very slow there, which is, that the fort of Jemalabad was surprised on the 19th, a force was before it on the 21st, and the lower forts were retaken in a day or two afterwards. That the mortars and shells were in Malabar, that they are difficult to move, and that the winds are contrary, is no more to be attributed to Colonel Mignan than the surprise of the place was.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Archinelly, 22nd May, 1800.

‘ I am obliged to you for your account of the murder, which shocked me much. I hear from Colonel Saxon that he has taken measures for the apprehension of the perpetrators of it, in case they should be on the island; and I have hopes that at all events they will be caught, and will meet with the punishment which they deserve.

‘ We are within three miles of Chinna, have got on well, excepting the Company’s carts, which already want repair. We likewise want some bullock drivers, coolies, spare bullocks, &c.; but I have threatened a muster at Nagamunglum, which I hope will bring out of Seringapatam all those who belong to us, and have remained behind.

‘ I have received a letter of the 18th from Colonel Mignan, in which he says that some fellows had plundered Buntwell in the neighbourhood of Vittell, and about half way on the road between Mangalore and Jemalabad. He had sent a force there, and there were hopes of being able to cut off the upper fort of Jemalabad entirely.

‘ I have received a most distressing account of the state of the 1st regiment of cavalry; they had been very sickly; latterly some men have died; the whole regiment are much frightened and out of spirits, and about twenty sepoy, nine of whom had been many years in the service, have deserted. I have desired Pater to halt them at Hurryhur, to put the sick under cover, and the whole regiment into the fort, if necessary.

‘ As Dr. Anderson thinks they will not recover either health or spirits till they reach Arcot, I am afraid that I shall be obliged to send them to the rear entirely, and eventually to the Carnatic.

‘ General Braithwaite tells me that he will be obliged to call for the 4th regiment, and will send four troops of the 19th. I have informed him of this circumstance regarding the 1st regiment, and I have asked for the whole of the 19th. With that, the 25th, and the 2nd regiment, we shall still be strong enough.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ The 74th regiment are ordered to halt at Wallajahbad.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp at Archinely, 22nd May, 1800,

9 P. M.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Major Browne. Jerrah is in Soonda, about four miles from the Werdah, and close to the Marhatta frontier; it is twelve miles from Chundergooty, where we have a post of one officer, and a company of sepoy, and there is another at Bilghy, twelve miles from thence.

‘ To order the cavalry to cross the Toombuddra and the Werdah to Jerrah will never answer. The distance would be very great; and the country is so jungly that they could not act when they should arrive there. I have written to Sir William Clarke letters in triplicate, to inform him of what has happened, and I do not doubt but that the party will move out of the Company’s territories as soon as they hear that the battalion is coming up, which must now be far advanced on its march from Goa. To attempt any thing else will be useless till I approach nearer to the frontier.

‘ The communication with our troops in Soonda is cut off, as the tappall necessarily passed through Jerrah.

‘ I have desired Major Brown to draw the troops from Bilghy, to destroy that place entirely, and to re-inforce with them the fort at Chandergooty.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ As I think it desirable that Government should receive this intelligence as soon as possible, as it may quicken their decision regarding our operations, I sent it off this night by express.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp, two miles north of Chinna,

23rd May, 1800.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I have this morning received a letter from the Adjutant General, by which I am ordered to send to Ryacotta two companies of the 2nd of the 5th. This will weaken us at rather a valuable point, but it cannot be helped. There is nothing for it but to withdraw some men from Nundydroog, and form a little detachment for field service, with guns, under

Cuppage, which might move about from place to place as it might be necessary.

‘ It is not yet certain that the 74th will come up; but if they do they shall be halted somewhere in front of Bangalore, to give a countenance to our troops thereabouts until we absolutely want them in this country.

‘ I get on well; our bazaar is not quite so numerous as I expected from the appearance of that which was placed on the north side of the river. I rather imagine that the dealers there find their situation very advantageous, and that they will still remain there; and if they can, keep the exemption from duties which Purneah has been so kind as to allow the bazaar hitherto. As this was granted only that they might be at all times prepared to take the field with the troops, it will be proper to withdraw it now that these are in the field. If any of them are staying behind with an intention of taking an unfair advantage of Purneah’s indulgence, the discontinuance of it will bring them out to join us.

‘ I desired Captain West to write to Mr. Cochrane to request that the runners might be again posted on the road between Bangalore and Sera, and that he would write to the Post Master General at Fort St. George, to desire that letters for the army and the northern garrisons might be sent by that road in a separate bag.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Upon looking over Cuppage’s returns, I find that he can have a detachment of 4 or 500 men, with two guns, leaving his garrison well provided, and a good detachment in Goomnair, which, in case of disturbance, he would of course join.

‘ I have desired Barclay to write to Cuppage, and desire him to put this measure in execution if he thinks it will answer better than the present arrangement; and I shall, by this day’s post, desire Mr. Gordon to prepare for it, and MacIntire to send muskets and ammunition, which is all they can want.

‘ Severndroog and Oustraydroog are occupied by small parties from the 2nd of the 5th; will you be so kind as to speak to Purneah about placing in those two forts a few trusty peons, on whom he can depend, that they will give them up to us when we may require them? I have written

to the commanding officer in the Baramahl to desire that he will make a similar arrangement with Mr. Graham for occupying Anchitty Droog, Ratengerry, and Shoolgerry.

‘ I enclose a letter from Colonel Pater; will you desire Purneah to give orders to the killadar to make the repairs to the fort of Hurryhur, and throw in there a supply of provisions?’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp at Nagamunglum,  
24th May, 1800.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I have received a letter from Colonel Pater, in which he says, that there are no provisions in Hurryhur. He has, however, thrown in there five companies of the 1st of the 8th, and two guns; but I am afraid the want of provisions will oblige him to withdraw them again.

‘ He likewise complains of want of gram. There is plenty in the country, and I have informed him that Purneah has taken all restrictions off the sale of every kind of grain. I suspect the gram agents do not exert themselves as they ought; but I have given them a brush through Colonel Pater, and have informed him that the system under which they are agents, has not been hitherto approved; and that if the service fails for want of gram after all that has been done to procure it, it is more than probable that another system will be adopted.

‘ What do you think of Government having given power to the gram agents to draw upon Madras for 4500 pagodas each, without saying one word to any of us in this country upon the subject; the monthly interest of which sum alone is sufficient to pay for the monthly expenditure of gram?’

‘ I get on famously, and expect the detachment from Bullum to-morrow.

‘ The 1st regiment must go to the Carnatic, nothing else can save them.

‘ I hope the Rajah of Koorg is not dead; we generally lose by the transfer of a government from one hand to another.

‘ The battalion is on its march from Goa. I reckon that it will have arrived at Hullihall by this time, and will be at

Hoonelly as soon as I can. I have sent it orders to attack our friend at Jerrah.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp at Nagamunglum,  
24th May, 1800.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I think the plan of marking the calves a very good one, and I shall be glad if it is carried into execution.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Montresor’s detachment is come in, but the native corps are miserably weak. Lieut. Colonel Tolfrey’s battalion has only about 300 men for duty.

‘ I have had another letter from Pater, by which it appears that he had had an interview with the amildar at Hurryhur, with whom he was perfectly satisfied. The amildar had expressed his readiness to do every thing in his power to assist the detachment.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp at Nagamunglum,  
26th May, 1800.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I have received from Major Cuppage rather a curious account of a fellow who is raising horse in that neighborhood, with the knowledge of the amildar, and who has not communicated to him any thing upon the subject; I conclude that you have received the account, and therefore I do not send it to you.

‘ I march on to-morrow. Purneah has sent some orders here to allow all provisions coming to camp to pass free of toll. I understood that he had given orders to that effect in all parts of the country; and if that is the case, it will be better that our brinjaries and bazaar people should not have these papers in their hands, of which it may be certain that they will make a bad use.

‘ If, however, Purneah prefers that they should have in their hands these papers, rather than give one general order to all his amildars, &c., upon this subject, it will be necessary



that we should have more of them in camp. I shall not allow any of these orders to be given out till I receive your answer to this letter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Belloor, 27th May, 1800.

‘ I have received yours of the 26th and its enclosures. I had already heard of the march of the battalion from Goa, and have provided bullocks for them. I did not know of their want of money; but Captain Munro’s supply of that, and of bullocks, to bring them through Soonda will be very acceptable.

‘ I enclose you a letter which I received last night, which agrees with Captain Munro’s account, rather than with that of Ram Rao, of the nature of the force which has entered Soonda; Ram Rao’s cavalry will have driven them out before the Bombay battalion will be near them. It does not come by the Budnaghur road, but by that of Soonda and Severy, unless the officer commanding it should alter his route upon hearing of the irruption of these vagabonds.

‘ Whether they belong to Dhoondiah, or are only robbers, it is clear that it is necessary that we should come to an understanding with the Marhattas regarding that frontier.

‘ I enclose you some papers which I received last night from Colonel Sartorius, by which it appears that Dhoondiah has been meddling in Malabar. I acknowledge that I should rather believe the truth to be that the letter to the Cheral Rajah was written by the Pyche; but whether it was or not, it is very clear that the name of Dhoondiah is made use of among all the Company’s turbulent subjects, to create disturbances; and it is therefore the more incumbent upon our Government to get the better of him. I have received an excellent account of Hoonelly from Colonel Pater, who desired Captain Balfour of the artillery to visit it. He reports it to be in a perfect state of defence, guns, powder, shot, provisions, &c., well arranged and prepared. All appears to be so perfect, that I do not propose to put any of our troops into the fort unless the killadar wishes it; and I shall be

obliged to you if you will mention him to Purneah, as a man deserving encouragement. The boats are in great forwardness; and there is a large wooden boat at Hooly Honore, which I propose to have brought down to Hoonelly as soon as the river fills.

‘ I return you the bill for the cook rooms, which I have signed, and to which I have annexed a copy of the authority which I received from Government to build them. If you will send the bill to Gordon he will pay it.

‘ The pension to Mahomed Ally is 250 star pagodas per annum, payable at Seringapatam on the Family Fund, and is in Class No. 1. He received the arrears of it from the 1st of January. We agreed about Shah Abbas, as you say.

‘ The guards at Severndroog and Oustradroog belong to the companies of the 2nd of the 5th, and they will soon be withdrawn. This is the reason why I am anxious that Purneah should place people in those forts on whom he can depend.

‘ I write to Colonel Sartorius this day, and I shall desire him, in case he perceives any symptoms of serious insurrection in Malabar, to begin to bring his forces together in such manner as that they will be secure and prepared to join one another when the season opens.

‘ I conclude that Stevenson will have informed you of the attempts which have been made to seduce the sepoys to desert from the 2nd of the 3rd. A committee was assembled to examine into the matter, but they could make nothing of it, although Stevenson thinks that Dhoondiah has been endeavoring to raise men at Chittledroog, as it appears that Cuppage thinks that he has been making the same endeavor at his post and district. It certainly is very desirable, on many accounts, that our troops should be kept separate from the inhabitants at Chittledroog, and I accordingly desired Stevenson to turn over the subject in his mind, and to let me know whether it would not be possible to remove all the inhabitants from the fort, properly so called, into what I understand is the pettah, although it is equally surrounded by a strong wall, and that the former might be given up solely and entirely to the troops, who should have nothing to do with, and should not inhabit the latter. I do not know whether Colonel Stevenson has entirely compre-

hended the meaning of what I wrote to him; but if he has, he appears to be of opinion that it will be practicable, and not difficult to remove from the fort all the inhabitants.

‘ I shall be glad if you will let me know what you think upon this subject, and whether there will be any objection to the arrangement on the part of Purneah. I understand that the inhabitants of Chittledroog are very numerous, that they are of the cast of the old Rajahs, and were, in general, heretofore sepoy and peons in the service of the Suldaun. They refuse to take service with us in any manner whatever; at Chittledroog we can get neither recruits, servants, lascars, coolies, or bullock drivers; and I cannot think that it will be very safe to leave in a fort with our troops a large number of fellows such as these are described to be.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Upon looking over the authority from Government I perceive it goes only to repairs; but the building of the offices was allowed, I know, in a private letter from Webbe. Send the authority to the Paymaster, or not, as you think fit.’

In May, 1800, whilst occupied in the important command of Mysore, Colonel Wellesley received a proposition from his brother, Lord Mornington, to be united with Admiral Rainier in the charge of an expedition which the Governor General, in obedience to the King’s orders, had planned against Batavia. The letter of the Governor General, and the consequent correspondence, will best elucidate the motives which induced Colonel Wellesley to decline this service.

*To Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley. (Extract.)*

‘ MY DEAR ARTHUR,

‘ Calcutta, 13th May, 1800.

‘ The object of this letter is to propose to you a situation which I think it would be unjust not to submit to your option, although I entertain considerable doubts whether you will think it eligible with a view to your individual interests; and I am still more apprehensive of the difficulty of reconciling it with the exigencies of the public service in Mysore at this crisis. You will, however, exercise your own

free judgment on the subject, and I have no doubt that you will decide in the manner most honorable to yourself and most advantageous to the public.

‘ I have received instructions directly from the King, addressed to me in my individual capacity, empowering me to take measures for the purpose of endeavoring to induce the settlement of Batavia to accept his Majesty’s protection on the same terms lately granted to the colony of Surinam, and some time past to those of Demerara and Berbice.

‘ It is not the intention of ministers to attempt to reduce, or to retain Batavia by force. Indeed, a sufficient force for that purpose could not be spared from India at the present moment. The plan is, therefore, to send to Batavia several ships of war, with a force sufficiently numerous to furnish an ostensible justification to the Governor General to surrender the colony into our hands.

‘ The King has given me the power of selecting the persons who are to conduct this expedition; and I have thought it, on every ground, most expedient to place the principal conduct of the equipment and negotiation in the hand of Admiral Rainier. It will be necessary to join a military officer in the commission with him, and a conscientious sense of duty induces me to think that you are the most fit person to be selected for that service, provided you can safely be spared from Mysore for the period of the expedition, which I imagine may be four or five months, but probably cannot be longer.

‘ In proposing this service to you, justice requires that I should state to you its contingent advantages. I have every reason to believe that the warehouses at Batavia contain public property to a very large amount. This will necessarily fall to the crown; and in the instructions for the expedition to Surinam, the whole property of the same description was reserved expressly for his Majesty’s pleasure, no part of it being granted to the captors by the tenor of those instructions.

‘ The instructions, however, are so expressed, as to admit little doubt that the King’s intention was ultimately to grant a proportion, at least, to the captors, of the public property at Surinam. My instructions, with relation to this point, will be precisely the same as those given in England with

respect to Surinam; and I therefore conclude, that the expedition will be very advantageous to the naval and military commanders.

‘The importance of Batavia, especially when considered with relation to the illicit and contraband trade, which has excited so much alarm in England, will certainly render the success of the negotiation creditable to the officers concerned in conducting it. No previous negotiation has taken place with Batavia; and it is therefore possible, although I believe it to be, from all accounts which have reached me, highly improbable, that our flag of truce may not be favorably received, and that the whole plan may fail of success.

‘Having thus stated the whole of this case to you without reserve, I desire you to make your option, upon your own view of the question! with this single reservation, that I am persuaded you will be aware of the necessity of postponing any decision upon it until you have ascertained that Lord Clive can substitute in your present command, during your absence, a person completely satisfactory to him in every respect. For this purpose, I request you to write privately to Lord Clive, and to act according to his wishes.

‘On this part of the question, much will certainly depend on the season which the Admiral may choose for the enterprise. I cannot, at present, give you any information on that subject; but I shall request Lord Clive to communicate to you the Admiral’s intentions by the earliest possible opportunity.

‘Believe me, my dear Arthur,

‘Yours most affectionately,

‘Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

‘MORNINGTON.

*To Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Fort St. George, 24th May, 1800.

‘I showed you a note from Wilks at Seringapatam, mentioning the receipt of dispatches from hence for restraining the Dutch at Batavia; and I think we agreed that an armament against that place would be impracticable, under the present circumstances of this government.

‘Since my arrival, I find that orders are arrived from Bengal, for equipping a naval and military force for that

purpose; the latter, however, not to exceed 600 European, and 600 natives. Lord Mornington proposes that you should command the military; but no force is to be used, and the government of Batavia is to be persuaded to put itself under our protection, in the same manner as Surinam: this negotiation will be conducted by the Admiral, so that I fear you are likely to obtain neither fame nor prize money.

‘ I have no doubt, therefore, that you will prefer your present independent and extensive command, to being stationed at Batavia; and Lord Clive has made a most earnest request to the Governor General, that some other officer may be appointed, as his Lordship would not know how to supply your temporary absence from Mysore. I hope this will be satisfactory to you.

‘ The immediate consequence of this order is the countermand of the 74th; and the 12th is so sickly, that it is again gone into quarters at Ponawally. So that if the expedition goes on, we shall be under the unavoidable necessity of crippling your detachment. Lord Clive has however recommended, on the ground of our defective military force on the coast, that no detachment should be made from this army for the armament; and I hope that Lord Mornington will consent to convert it into a naval blockade. In the event of the expedition going on, his Lordship has requested that the European regiment may be partly drawn from Goa for the service in Mysore.

‘ You are to pursue Dhoondiah Waugh wherever you may find him, and to hang him on the first tree. For this purpose you will receive immediate authority to enter the Marhatta frontier.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ JOSIAH WEBBE.

*To Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 26th May, 1800.

‘ You have been already apprized by Mr. Webbe, that the Governor General has received his Majesty’s commands to take measures, in conjunction with Vice Admiral Rainier, to induce the settlement of Batavia to accept the protection of Great Britain; upon terms similar to those which have been

granted to the colony of Surinam. To effect this important object, it is intended to open a negotiation with the leading people in Batavia; and in order to give weight to the negotiation, it is proposed that a considerable portion of the Vice Admiral's squadron, accompanied by a land force under the command of a respectable officer, should be in readiness to blockade the principal Dutch ports in the island of Java.

‘ The force allotted for this expedition is to consist of a detachment of artillery and 600 Europeans, to be furnished by this Presidency and Ceylon, and of the Bengal Marine battalion, now encamped in this neighbourhood.

‘ By a private communication which I received last night from Lord Mornington, I find it is his Lordship's desire, that I should inform him how far I may think it advisable for you to quit your present command, for a few months, that you may be joined with Admiral Rainier in the conduct of the negotiation with Batavia, and take the command of the troops intended for embarkation. But in all events it is his Lordship's wish, that the option between the two situations should be left to the decision of your own choice.

‘ Previous to my receipt of Lord Mornington's private letter, I had, in a dispatch of the 24th instant, fully stated to his Lordship my sentiments upon the inexpediency and danger of further weakening our present incomplete and divided army; and I have not scrupled to give it as my opinion, that in the actual state of affairs in the Carnatic and in Mysore, it will be most for the public good to attempt the attainment of the object of his Majesty's commands by a naval blockade only of the principal port of Batavia. But whatever may be the result of Lord Mornington's deliberation upon my dispatch, I have deemed it my duty to represent, that it is not possible for you to quit your present command, even for a few months, without the greatest detriment to the affairs of Mysore; and I have made it my earnest request that his Lordship will select some other officer for this service.

‘ In sending you, therefore, the offer of the command of the land forces about to sail to the eastward, I have no hesitation in recommending in the strongest terms, and in requesting you, if I may be permitted so to do, to remain in a situation which I have long felt, and still feel, that you fill

with singular advantage to our own country, as well as to Mysore; a situation in which for the prosperous settlement of our new acquisitions, integrity and vigilance of conduct are indispensable; and in which your acquired knowledge and experience, especially in the event of active operations, must give you the advantage over other men; and in which I should find it not only difficult, but impossible to replace you to my satisfaction. I remain, with respect and sincere regard, &c.

‘Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘CLIVE.

‘P. S. I learn from Admiral Rainier that the detachment of His Majesty’s ships, which he proposes to appoint for the service in question, will be ready in three weeks.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘Camp at Curruh, 29th May, 1800.

‘I received yours of the 27th yesterday, and I immediately wrote to Colonel Stevenson to desire he would inquire into the circumstances stated by ———. I also requested him to let ——— know my opinion regarding the concluding paragraph of his letter to Mr. Cochran.

‘I have given out an order to the purport proposed by you regarding the disputes of the officers with the Post Office people.

‘I arrived here this morning, and I shall halt to-morrow, as my cattle have suffered much from the rain and from the refusal of the people of the country to sell their straw. The protection which has been afforded to the villages has nearly ruined us; but I have pressed my hircarrah and the amildar of this place a good deal upon the subject, and I hope to get on better. I shall be obliged to you if you will speak to Purneah upon the subject, and prevail upon him to write to the amildars in this country to desire that we may have straw, paying for the same at the rate fixed for that delivered to the cavalry; viz. four bullock loads for a rupee.

‘I am afraid that I shall not be able to allow Colonel Tolfrey’s battalion to go to Paughur; as, however weak it may be, we cannot spare it. I may, perhaps, be able to take out from Chittledroog one of the battalions which are stronger,



and to put his in there; but as he will not be permanently fixed there, I do not think that his situation will be much mended by that arrangement, although I shall gain a strong instead of a weak battalion.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Laal Baug, 29th May, 1800.

‘ I have now to intimate that I have just received a confidential communication from the Presidency, containing matter which quite alarms me.

‘ In consequence of orders from home, a force is to be sent off from the coast to take charge of Batavia, and it is said you are destined to command it. How is this to be reconciled? Is not Mysore a great charge, and is not the command of the troops in it at the present conjuncture particularly important? Lord Clive, I understand, cannot bear the idea of your quitting this country; and concluding that the conduct of the service at Batavia cannot be viewed as equally important as your present charge, means to solicit Lord Mornington to forbear taking you from Mysore. I hope your inclinations go with his Lordship’s intention on this point.

‘ I cannot prevail on myself to look forward to the various uncomfortable consequences that would follow your vacating the command here.

‘ Yours most faithfully,

‘ BARRY CLOSE.

*To Josiah Webbe, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Fort St. George.*

‘ MY DEAR WEBBE,

‘ Camp at Curruh, 29th May, 1800.

‘ I have received a letter from Lord Mornington, in which he offers me the command of the troops intended against Batavia, provided Lord Clive can spare me from this country. I have written to Lord Clive upon the subject a letter which he will probably communicate to you; and I have left to him to accept for me Lord Mornington’s offer or not, accordingly as he may find it most convenient for the

public service, after having ascertained from the Admiral the period at which he would propose to depart from the coast upon this service.

‘ The probable advantages and credit to be gained are great ; but I am determined that nothing shall induce me to desire to quit this country, until its tranquillity is ensured. The general want of troops, however, at the present moment, and the season, may induce the Admiral to be desirous to postpone the expedition till late in the year. In that case it may be convenient that I should accompany him ; but I beg, if you have any conversation with Lord Clive, you will assure him, that if it should be in the smallest degree otherwise, I shall be very sorry to go.

‘ It appears by Lord Mornington’s letter to me, that the order for the attempt upon Batavia comes direct from the King, and that it is reckoned a matter of some importance in England. I think it probable that it will be made ; although not immediately, on account of the great want of troops, and the employment already cut out for those we have at command.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Josiah Webbe, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I have just received your letter of the 24th, and you will perceive that I have decided upon the offer in the manner that Lord Clive would wish. Lord Mornington, in his letter to me, seems to think that it will be advantageous to me, and from the importance of the object, in England, one from which I may derive some credit ; but I feel all that entirely out of the question, and I leave to Lord Clive to decide according to his sense of the public convenience.’

*To Lord Clive.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Curruh, 29th May, 1800.

‘ I have just received a letter from Lord Mornington, by which he offers me the military command of certain troops intended to be sent on an expedition against Batavia, provided your Lordship can spare me from this country.

‘ I am fully aware of the advantages which may attend, and of the credit which may be gained by the attainment of the

object proposed in sending troops to that place ; but, under the present circumstances of this country, I cannot express a wish to quit it.

‘ From the information which your Lordship will have of the time at which Admiral Rainier would prepare to go to Batavia, you will be enabled to judge whether it may possibly be convenient to the public service that I should accompany him. I beg, therefore, that your Lordship will give Lord Mornington an answer, whether I am to be employed on this service or not, according to your Lordship’s view of the public interest and convenience, after having ascertained from the Admiral the period of his departure from the coast.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Earl of Mornington.*

‘ MY DEAR M.,

‘ Camp at Curruh, 29th May, 1800.

‘ I have received your letter of the 13th instant, and I am very much obliged to you for the offer which you make me of sending me with the Admiral to Batavia.

‘ I do not deny that I should like much to go ; but you will have learned, before you receive this, that my troops are in the field, and it is therefore probable that Lord Clive will be desirous that I should remain in this country until its tranquillity is ensured, and the troops can be sent back to their different garrisons. I have written to him upon the subject, and I have desired him to accept your offer for me or not, as he may find it most convenient for the public service, after having ascertained from the Admiral at what time he proposes to depart from the coast on this service. If he should not depart until late in the year, I think it more than probable that I shall be able to go with him. I do not know which of the services will answer best ; but I am certain that it will be more easy to spare troops from the Carnatic and Mysore, towards the end of the year, than it is at this moment.

‘ Dhoondiah is certainly a despicable enemy ; but, from circumstances, he is one against whom we have been obliged to make a formidable preparation. It is absolutely necessary to the peace of this country of Canara and Malabar,

that that man should be given up to us; and I doubt not that before now you will have made a demand for him upon the government of Poonah. If we do not get him, we must expect a general insurrection of all the discontented and disaffected of these countries. I have information that letters have been received by most of them, either from him, or from others written in his name, calling upon them to take the opportunity to rebel against the Company's government, or that of their allies; and his invasion of our territory is looked to as a circumstance favorable to their views.

'The destruction of this man, therefore, is absolutely necessary for our tranquillity; and nothing will be more easy, if the Marhattas are really disposed to enter into the plan. If they are not, it will be a matter of difficulty, and it may become a question whether the whole power of the Company ought not to be turned to this object. I was aware that this was the case before the troops were collected; and although I was certain that it was the only mode of saving this country from being plundered, I did not like to put it in execution without Lord Clive's orders.

'It was clear that when an army should be collected to oppose a man who had an asylum in the Marhatta country, and who may therefore be reckoned a part of the Marhatta state, the government would be committed with that of the Marhattas, and our honor would require that we should go through with the business until that man should be given up to us, or that we should have some adequate security for his good behaviour.

'If, then, the government of Poonah is inclined to give this man up to us, or to co-operate with us in his destruction, it may be possible for me to go to Batavia. If they should not, matters here will take a very serious turn, and no prospect of advantage or of credit to be gained shall induce me to quit this country.

'Besides the destruction of this Dhoondiah, there are other objects, which comparatively, however, are of a trifling nature. The attainment of these might be given in charge to other people, if it should be thought desirable to postpone the expedition to Batavia until matters are settled on the Marhatta frontier.

'Ever yours most affectionately,

'*The Earl of Mornington.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lord Clive.*

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Camp at Cheyloor, 31st May, 1800.

‘ I had the honor of writing to you on the 29th instant, after I had received a letter from Lord Mornington \* upon the same subject with that from your Lordship of the 26th. Since I wrote to you on the 29th, I have received your Lordship’s instructions of the 25th, which I am proceeding to put in execution; and I beg leave to decline to accept the command of the troops destined to sail with the squadron under Admiral Rainier.

‘ When I wrote to your Lordship on the 29th, I imagined that under the present circumstances it might have been desirable to postpone to send troops on this service until a late period of the year, when it might possibly have been convenient that I could accompany them; but as it appears that the Admiral will be prepared to sail in three weeks, I cannot think of relinquishing the command with which your Lordship has intrusted me at this interesting period, for any object of advantage or credit to be gained in another place.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp near Cheyloor, 31st May, 1800.

‘ I conclude that you will have received a copy of the instructions which I received yesterday from Government, dated the 25th instant, and therefore I do not enclose you one. By these I am authorized to enter the Marhatta territory.

‘ Upon a consideration of the whole of our situation, it

\* *To Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley (Extract).*

‘ MY DEAR ARTHUR, ‘ Fort William, 6th June, 1800.

‘ Lord Clive has pressed for your continuance in Mysore with an earnestness so honorable to you, that I think you cannot accept the command of the forces destined for Batavia; indeed, I suspect that you could not quit Mysore at present. Your conduct there has secured your character and advancement for the remainder of your life, and you may trust me for making the best use of your merits in your future promotion.

‘ Ever, my dear Arthur,

‘ Yours most affectionately,

‘ WELLESLEY.’

appears to me that the best thing I can do is to cross the Toombuddra immediately, with the troops which I shall have with me by the time I reach it, and I think that I ought to cross it below Oollall and the junction of the Werdah with it; I shall then be in the Marhatta territory, and on the same side of the river with Dhoondiah; and if I find it necessary I may wait there till I am joined by the 25th dragoons and the money, and I can collect there boats which may be wanting to transport across the river brinjarries, &c., which will follow me. The advantage in my being across the river will be, that when it comes down, there will be less to be crossed over than if I remain on this side of it, and by crossing below Oollall and the junction with the Werdah, I save the passage of that river, and the march through the northern part of Bednore, and I am in a better place for receiving every thing than if I were to go up to Anawooty and Jerrah. I might certainly cross the Toombuddra at Hoonelly, and wait there in our own territory till I should receive every thing; but then I shall have the Werdah to pass after it will have filled, and exclusive of the difficulties of the march through the Bednore country, the passage of that river will be found as difficult as that of the Toombuddra; therefore, at all events, it would seem proper to cross the latter below the junction, whatever may be the period at which it may be crossed, and the question is narrowed to this point, shall I cross it immediately and wait on the other side, or shall I wait on this side till I am joined by every thing I expect? I acknowledge that I think I ought to cross immediately, but I shall be glad to have your opinion upon this subject.

‘I believe Ball Kishen Punt is the principal Marhatta personage in Savanore, and I ought to write to him. Would it not be advisable also to open a correspondence with Appah Saheb and Goklah, Bappojee Scindiah, &c. &c.? Let me have your opinion on these points.

‘I think of moving two heavy guns up to Oollall, in case I should find them necessary. I have bullocks for them.

‘I made a famous march this morning of fourteen miles in four hours.

‘I enclose the copy of a letter from Captain Macgregor to Colonel Pater; I have written to the latter to inform him that I have received repeated letters from you, in which you

state that there is no impediment to the sale of gram, or any thing else on the part of the sircar, therefore that the gram agents have only to offer a good price, and they will get what they want; and if they do not get it, they must expect that other means of procuring it will be adopted, which may not prove very agreeable to them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Curruh, 31st May, 1800.

‘ I enclose the letter from Major Cuppage, by which you will perceive how the matter stands regarding the amildar. It appears, however, very clearly that he was mistaken, as he reported the matter to Purneah.

‘ I received last night a letter from Lord Mornington regarding the offer of the command of the troops intended for Batavia. He seems to think it an advantage to me, and that some credit will be gained by it, as the object is a great one in England; but I have written to Lord Clive to desire that he will accept of it for me, or not, according as he may find it most convenient for the public service, after having ascertained from the Admiral the period of his departure from the coast. A letter received this day from Madras, with instructions to enter the Marhatta country, has determined me not to accept of it in any event.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Have you heard any thing from Macleod, or Munro, or Graham, about money? that is the subject upon which I am most anxious at the present moment.

‘ What do you think of ———, who, when the 25th dragoons were about to ascend the Pednaig Durgum pass, ordered them round by Ryacotta? I expected them to join me at Sera; they will not now be there for a fortnight; and I cannot guess for what reason they were not allowed to proceed by the route first intended.’

In the mean time that bold adventurer, Dhoondiah Waugh, had re-appeared at the head of a very numerous

body, with which he ravaged the Mysore frontier. It was found necessary again to send a force to subdue him ; and Colonel Wellesley, with detachments of the army of Mysore proceeded in person against him.

The details of the short but decisive campaign against Dhoondiah Waugh are described in the following letters :—

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp, two miles south of Columbella,  
1st June, 1800.

‘ I have received your letter of the 30th May, from which it appears that you and I agree in one point, viz., that, till we cross the Toombuddra, we can do nothing effectual towards destroying Dhoondiah or dispersing his force. You fear for our want of provisions, and I have the pleasure to inform you that I have every reason to expect to have really 10,000 brinjarries. I shall have besides 1200 loads of gram in a gram department, and, in the provision department, arrack, which I can make to last four or five months, but sheep only for one. Of this last we shall find the greatest want.

‘ I do not believe that the Savanore country has been much laid waste ; that part of it which I saw last year was in good order, and appeared well cultivated. Soonda is certainly supplied from it ; and, from the price of grain there, even when I was in it, I should not imagine that article to be scarce in Savanore. We shall certainly have some party in the country in our favor, and, if that is the case, we may expect to draw some supplies from it. I fear, however, a want of gram for the cavalry : the agents are very remiss. The regiments have carriage only for fourteen days. There will probably be but little gram in the Marhatta country, and it is in general an article so cheap and so common that it will be difficult to prevail upon the brinjarries to carry much of it. I must, however, try that, and I must likewise endeavour to remove the depôt now collecting at Chittledroog, from thence to Hurryhur, or to Oollall, if you should agree in opinion with me as to the propriety of crossing the Toombuddra immediately.

‘ I see no prospect of co-operation with the Nizam’s troops if they are to remain north of the Kistna. All these objects



of ——, so incompatible with one another, will at last ruin us. If he is in earnest about Dhoondiah, why is not the subsidiary force to cross the Kistna and to come near him? But the truth is, that, while he fears Dhoondiah on the one hand, he has some wild plan in view to the northwards, and, if we do not cross the Toombuddra, Dhoondiah will plunder the Dooab, and —— will not be able to effect his purpose with his troops on the north bank of the Kistna; at the same time that they will, most probably, be too far removed from the scene of action to be able to give their assistance towards forwarding his northern plans.

‘I will push off a letter to Lieut. Colonel Maclean, as soon as I shall have determined upon my plan after hearing from you; but I think our communication will be useless, as he is to remain on the north bank of the Kistna.

‘Your account of the horsemen in the Nundydroog district is unpleasant, but I think that the measures taken by Purneah to keep them in check will have its effect, particularly when Cuppage shall have his detachment in the field. The families of these Musselmen are a strong hold upon them, and they ought to be prevented from moving either with or without them. If there is any serious collection of them, would it not be proper to seize the horse of every man not in the Rajah’s service, or who may not be licensed to keep one? To do this will require some previous arrangement to provide for their sudden seizure, and for the care of them after they have been seized; but I do not think it will be absolutely impracticable. My idea of Chittledroog is to separate the garrison and the inhabitants, so that the former shall not be liable to be surprised by the latter. This, I understand, can be done without removing the inhabitants from what I improperly called the pettah, but which is in reality the fort. If I find that that is the case, I do not intend to bear hard upon them; but, as Purneah agrees in the propriety of the measure, I shall request the amildar to remove them outside entirely by degrees, and at their convenience.

‘I am glad to hear such good accounts from Bullum, as I was afraid, from Colonel Montresor’s account, that there might have been some difficulty in keeping the garrison in

Munscrabad during the monsoon. It appears, however, now, that they have got confidence in themselves.

‘ I have got a long packet from Pater, with what it is useless to trouble you. It is just the old story of opposition on the part of the amildar, for which there are *secret springs* which are entirely unaccountable. The pith of it is in the enclosed letter.

‘ I have written to him again, to tell him that orders have been given to sell every thing to his detachment, and that he has nothing to do but to pay. I have got on well in every respect, and I have not received any complaints respecting my followers. We have been well supplied with forage since I wrote last on that subject, for which the people pay the regulated price. The green forage is beginning to appear, and we shall then be nearly entirely independent of the dry.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I enclose the concluding paragraph of Pater’s letter, which gives some consolation, notwithstanding the “*secret springs.*” I likewise enclose a letter which was brought to me by mistake last night.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Sera, 2nd June, 1800.

‘ I enclose a correspondence with Colonel Stevenson upon the subject of —— and the Postmaster.

‘ My opinion of this correspondence is just this; that I ought to put —— in arrest as soon as I shall have received Colonel Stevenson’s answer to my letter of this day, and then forward the whole correspondence to head quarters. As a trial will be the consequence of this measure, it may be doubted, as the issue is always uncertain, and as ——’s letter, however indecent, is so worded as in some parts to have two meanings, whether I ought to put him in arrest, and whether I ought not to confine myself to the transmission of the papers to General Braithwaite; but the persons to whom I have shown ——’s letter are clearly of opinion that no Court Martial can pass it over, and, therefore, I am afraid

that, if I report him without putting him in arrest, I shall receive from head quarters a censure for not supporting my own authority.

‘No man is a competent judge in his own cause, and I shall, therefore, be obliged to you for your opinion upon this subject, if you will send it to me together with the enclosed papers, and either the original letter, written by —— to Mr. Cochrane, or a certified copy, as soon as possible.

‘I enclose a letter from Captain Macgregor to Colonel Pater, upon which some inquiry may probably be necessary.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp at Sera, 3rd June, 1800.

‘I am sorry to tell you that there are many complaints from the officers who have been here, of the behaviour of the amildar. It appears that he sends them insolent messages; that what they want, such as artificers, &c., he will not allow them to have without his orders, which he afterwards will not give; that he keeps provisions, meat, &c., at an enormous price. I give some credit to these reports, because they are confirmed by a very good young man, a Mr. Macgregor, of the 73rd, who was some time in the 33rd, and who I know is not very difficult to please, and would not make the report if there was not some foundation for it. It will be proper that at all events he should be put upon his guard, as we cannot expect moderation from our young men here, if they are not civilly treated.

‘The place appears in fine order and getting on, so that it would be unfortunate if he were removed from it.

‘I enclose you a Marhatta letter from Purneah to the amildar of Buswaputtum, from which I fear that he misunderstood the arrangement we made with him. I intended, and so did you, that there should be perfect liberty to purchase gram every where for every body, and, so far from wishing that Gordon should buy it near Chittledroog, I particularly desired him to make his purchases at a distance, in order that

he might not interfere with the cavalry in the field. I am afraid that our friend the Paymaster has disobeyed my orders, and that he has teased Purneah into giving him or his servant the enclosed letter.

‘ I enclose the draft of a letter, which I have written to the amildar of Buswaputtum, in order, if possible, to avert the evil effects of Purneah’s letter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Hurryhur, 4th June, 1800.

‘ I enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from Major Blaquiere, regarding the complaint of a bazaar man at Bangalore, about cumleys purchased by Mr. Ward.

‘ Yesterday I sent a patrol to Arnee to reconnoitre the place, meaning to attack it this day, as soon as some ladders were made. It was evacuated last night; my troops are now in the fort, and I propose that it should be delivered over to Ball Kishen Punt this afternoon.

‘ I hear that Dhoondiah is gone to the northward.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Woodanelly, 5th June, 1800.

‘ Some of our dooley boys from the Carnatic have deserted, and others are likely to follow their example. I shall be obliged to you if you will speak to Purneah, and request him to give directions to his amildars to stop them or any others of our followers that may pass through their districts. One deserter stopped and brought back to camp will tend greatly to put an end to desertion. I am very anxious to receive your answers to my letters of the 1st and the 2nd. I have received Colonel Stevenson’s answer to the letter, a copy of which I enclosed to you, and he says that he does not think ——’s letter in question an improper one. This by no means alters the state of the case, unless I choose to avail myself of it as being the opinion of an officer of rank

upon the subject, and to let off ——— by referring all the papers to the Commander in Chief. In that case it is not unlikely but that Colonel Stevenson may be as severely reprimanded for his opinion as ——— will be for his letter.

‘ However, I do not feel myself by any means inclined to this mode of proceeding; and I only wait for your answer to my letter of the 2nd, in order to put him in arrest.

‘ Colonel Pater sent an officer to look at Oollall, who reports favorably of it, and of the killadar. They want, however, some ammunition and stores, which I will forward to them from Chittledroog.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Eyamungalum, 7th June, 1800.

‘ I have received your letter of the 4th, for which I am obliged to you. I shall immediately make my arrangements for crossing the river; but I am afraid I am too late for Savanore, as it is reported (but by Stevenson’s hirearrahs) that Dhoondiah has got possession of that fort. Ram Rao wrote on the 2nd, that he was still at Dummul.

‘ I have written to Colonel Maclean, and sent off my letter by camel hirearrahs. I have told him that my intention was to cross the Toombuddra as soon as I could have represented the necessity of his co-operations, and have proposed generally that he should cross the Kistna and proceed towards the frontier. I have promised that I would write farther when I had determined upon my own plan of operations, and should have been able to decide in what manner he could co-operate in them from a farther knowledge of the country, &c. &c.

‘ In the mean time his crossing the Kistna and moving up the Dooab will place him in such a manner that he will be prepared for whatever may be found most proper.

‘ I have written to Ball Kishen Punt, and have proposed a meeting with him.

‘ I stated generally in my letter the outline of Dhoondiah’s history, as far as we had any thing to do with it, have told

him that we were about to enter the Marhatta territory, where we expected to be treated as allies, and have promised that I should exert myself to prevent any injury to the country in consequence of our army being in it.

‘ I have also written to Appah Saheb to tell him that I was advancing to oppose Dhoondiah, and should be glad to communicate with him on our common object.

‘ I will let you know about ——— when I hear the result of a message which I sent to him this morning.

‘ The order which I have already given about the Post Office is nearly what you propose, but I will alter it, and I will give out the order which you wish for regarding the price of straw, &c., on the roads. I have not yet seen any of the heads of the brinjaries, although I have sent for them frequently; I conclude that Purneah has desired them to attend our camp. If he has not I shall be obliged to you if you will request him to send them orders to that effect; at all events I have written to Vincatjee to desire that he will collect them at Chittledroog as soon as he can.

‘ The elephant belongs to the karkana, but you may as well keep him with you till we meet.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Chittledroog, June 8, 1800.

‘ I told you in my letter of yesterday that I had sent Captain West to ———, to inform him that I conceived his letter to be highly disrespectful and improper; as such, that I called upon him to withdraw it, and acknowledge his sense of its impropriety in a form which I sent him. He had one hour to consider of this proposition; he declined to do as he was required, and he was in consequence put in arrest.

‘ I sent by this post all the papers, and a statement of the case to the Adjutant General. Since I arrived here a gentleman has come on the part of ———, to say that he was willing to withdraw his letter. I desired him to inform ——— that he was now in arrest; that he had had an opportunity of withdrawing his letter and acknowledging his error, which he had not taken, and therefore that all he

had to say upon the subject must go to the Commander in Chief.

‘ I shall be able to make an arrangement of the garrison, which will preclude the necessity of hurrying the inhabitants out of the outer fort.

‘ Dhoondiah has got possession of Savanore, and I must lose no time in getting to the river. I believe I must alter my plan, and cross it at Hurryhur, or even at Hoonelly, rather than at Oollall; as whilst I am on my road to the northward he may cross the Werdah, enter and plunder Bednore, before I can get over the Toombuddra to stop him. My plan now must be to cross the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, and to move up by the route marked in Little’s map to Deogerry, and across the Werdah upon Savanore. It will still be possible to cross my brinjarries, &c., at Oollall, as after the river is full I shall not apprehend for their safety on this side of it; and from Savanore I shall always have it in my power to protect their passage of the river and their junction with me.

‘ There is a man here by name Govind Rao, who I think would be very useful to me, and I have requested him to prepare to accompany me with his fifty horse and some of his peons.

‘ He is afraid that Purneah will not be pleased at his coming, and I shall therefore be obliged to you if you will speak to Purneah upon the subject. As I shall receive your answer to this letter before I shall be far from hence, if there should be any inconvenience in his being removed from Chittledroog I will send him back immediately.

‘ I have got a cock and bull story from —— about the amildar of Chandergooty having promised Dhoondiah to deliver up that fort, and a correspondence between Dhoondiah and Raddamy Bisnapah, a commander of 2000 horse in the Rajah’s service. This I take to be our friend the Pundit in the Bullum country. There is likewise another story of the same kind about an attempt to be made by three men to murder Purneah. From all which I judge that our friend —— has got hold of his old intelligences, and that the sooner I join him the better.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I hope General Braithwaite will not order a Court Martial upon ——— till my hands are less full of business. I have hinted this in my letter, and I shall be glad if you will give him a line upon the subject. In that case ——— shall cool his heels or his head at Chittledroog till the campaign is over.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Chittledroog, 9th June, 1800.

‘ Between the officers on the one hand, and the amildars on the other, you and I have much trouble. I have given out an order which I hope will prevent matters from going wrong in future, as they have hitherto, and in which I have endeavored to interest the seniors and those who are likely to travel.

‘ The behavior of the amildar at Sera was ridiculously rude to the officers by all accounts; however, the lecture to him will doubtless have its effect.

‘ I expect to march from hence on the day after to-morrow; I wait only to see some of the brinjarries.

‘ I got on well in every respect, and I have anxiety only about money. Has Munro given no answer to Webbe’s letter from Seringapatam, to desire him to send to Nuggur all he had?

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Chittledroog, 10th June, 1800.

‘ I am afraid that there is some mistake regarding the duties. I hear that they still continue to levy them in the country; and 1000 grain merchants, not brinjarries, coming to our camp, were stopped, and are now detained near Paughur. No brinjarries in yet, and I wait only for them.

‘ The collection of gram in this country also by the Paymaster, contrary to orders, is a sad grievance and difficulty but I hope to get over it all by perseverance.

‘ I am very anxious to be across the river. It turns out now (at least so Govind Rao says) that Dhoondiah is not at



Savanore, but gone towards Noolgoond, which I acknowledge I think most probable.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Chittledroog, 11th June, 1800.

‘ I have received your letter of the 8th; and you will have perceived by mine of the same date what steps I have taken with ———. He is in arrest, and all the papers upon the subject, among others Colonel Stevenson’s opinion, are gone before the Commander in Chief. I have heard from Cuppage regarding his success against his neighbouring Musselmén.

‘ I have the power of ordering a General Court Martial, and I will order one if you think it will answer, which can try all fellows of this kind found in correspondence with a man against whom there is at present an army in the field.

‘ Two or three questions occur to me upon this occasion, upon which I beg to have your opinion.

‘ Is the Court Martial to be composed of European or Native officers? If of Native officers, which is the most regular composition, when Natives are to be tried, it is to be feared that they will not pass the sentence which the criminals deserve, and the expectation of which alone induces us to wish for a trial by a General Court Martial. They will not pass this sentence certainly, if they have not the assistance of a very good judge advocate; and the question is, is there a person in the Nundydroog district, or one who could be sent there at present properly qualified for this service? Cuppage I believe is; but it may be doubted whether it will be proper that he should act in that situation. I believe there are a sufficient number of Native officers in the Nundydroog district to compose a General Court Martial.

‘ If all these objections to a native Court Martial operate to create a preference for one composed of European officers, it will be necessary that the criminals should be removed to Seringapatam, or to the army, to be tried, as there are not a sufficient number of officers in any other part of Mysore to compose one. There must besides be a good judge advo-

cate; and, I think, I shall find no difficulty in procuring one at Seringapatam.

‘The inconvenience to be apprehended from the removal of the prisoners either to Seringapatam, or to the army, is, that their punishment will not be so speedy as it ought, or so notorious as might be wished in the country in which they have resided hitherto, and in which they have all their relations, friends, and accomplices.

‘I have written to the officer commanding in Soonda to desire him to drive that party out of Budnaghur if possible.

‘It will not answer to put either of the battalions coming through that district out of their road for a trifling object of that kind, more particularly as it is in the power of the troops destined to remain there to perform this operation.

‘I have received a letter from Mr. Gordon, in which he mentions that Macleod has in hand one lac of Behaudry pagodas, which he will give us if he receives orders, and a guard is sent for it. I have ordered the guard to be sent forthwith from Seringapatam; and I shall be obliged to you if you will write to Macleod that the money may be given to Mr. Gordon’s people, who will go for it. I march to-morrow.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘I have heard that another party of people are stopped near Paughur for duties.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘Camp, four miles west of Burumsagur,  
13th June, 1800.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘The brinjarries came to me at Chittledroog, and I gave them dresses, turbans, &c. &c.

‘I have ordered the guard from Seringapatam into the Coimbatore country for the cash, in order to lose no time; and I have desired the gentlemen at Seringapatam to apprise Macleod of this arrangement, and to desire him to send a person to meet this guard in the Guzzlehutty Pass, who will conduct them to the place where they are to receive the treasure. There will be no European officer with this guard.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will give Macleod a line upon this subject. Macleod’s account of his warfare is excellent.

‘ I had received the accounts of the discontinuance of the bombardment of Jemalabad, and had given orders that measures should be taken for its immediate renewal. I believe, however, that the 75th have gone back to Mangalore, and that only a sufficient number of troops to ensure the blockade of Jemalabad have been left there. That need not prevent the renewal of the bombardment as soon as all matters shall be prepared for it.

‘ I conclude, from the extract from Lieut. Colonel Mignan’s letter to Major Munro, that it is not necessary that grain should be stored in any of the forts in Canara; but I will inquire more particularly into this subject.

‘ Some time ago I wrote to Government and forwarded a proposition from Lieut. Colonel Mignan, that he should be permitted to destroy a number of forts which are on the sea-coast in Canara, which contained stores of different kinds, and which he could not afford troops to guard; I gave him orders to destroy the stores at all events, which could not be deserving of our attention, and it might have been unpleasant if they had fallen into the hands of even the well-affected inhabitants of Canara.

‘ Government have answered Colonel Mignan’s proposition in a letter which I received last night, of which the enclosed is an extract; and I shall be obliged to you if you will ascertain from Major Munro his means of occupying any of the posts in question.

‘ Most of them are upon the sea-coast; and, in my opinion, there can be no doubt whatever of the propriety of destroying them; but Government are right to ask for all kind of information upon the subject, and in the meantime they must be guarded by somebody.

‘ The same letter contained a paragraph from Government regarding the disaffected in Mysore, and in the Company’s territories, and an authority to try them by military process.

‘ This authority is certainly entirely distinct from that which I hold by General Braithwaite’s warrant, and which was in my contemplation when I wrote to you on this subject

on the 11th instant. Under this authority from Government it might perhaps be possible to take the whole matter upon myself, having a report made to me in some kind of form of the true state of the case. But it appears to me that the best mode of proceeding under this authority will be to adhere, as nearly as the nature of the case will admit, to the forms of General Courts Martial, and under that notion I have framed the warrants, instructions, &c. &c., which are enclosed in a letter to Major Cuppage. These papers I beg you will peruse, and if you approve of every thing they contain, I beg that you will forward them to Major Cuppage, and desire him to put the orders they bring into execution. You will easily perceive the difference in the warrant and in the other papers from those usually given for a General Court Martial; they are such only as are required by the nature of the case, and the only material one is in the number of members which will be assembled. All that can be said upon that is, that it is the largest number which can be assembled with convenience; and that, in fact, it is as equal to all purposes of justice as if it were larger.

‘ I hope that Lady Clive will stay some time at Bangalore. Desire Brown to give me timely notice of her departure, as it is absolutely necessary that I should have an officer of intelligence there during the time that I may be in the field.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Upon considering the warrant and instructions enclosed to Major Cuppage, I am afraid that the officers will have some scruple of proceeding to trial on account of the deficiency of their numbers, &c. &c.: and that they will scruple about sentencing death, as they will not have the number of members competent to pronounce it. But if you write to Cuppage upon the subject, I shall be obliged to you if you will desire him to quiet them by assuring the officers that in case of any irregularity in their sentence the responsibility for it will rest upon me, who must confirm it, and must order it to be carried into execution.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                    ‘ Camp at Hurryhur, 16th June, 1800.

‘ I have received your two letters of the 12th. Captain Barclay wrote to Major Cuppage an opinion which I delivered, in case there was any evidence against the man in question. It has since appeared that there is; but, for many reasons, I should prefer his being tried.

‘ I send what you say respecting Mr. Ward of the 25th dragoons to Major Blaquiere, who will make inquiries into the circumstance. It is extraordinary that the bazaar man should not have gone to Major Blaquiere, or to Captain Brown, to make his complaint, at the moment when cause for it was given.

‘ I have likewise received your letter of the 13th. I desired Lieut. Colonel Maclean to communicate my letter to Captain Kirkpatrick and to Lieut. Colonel Dalrymple. This fully explained my wishes and my own plans as far as was practicable at the moment; I shall, however, write to Captain Kirkpatrick upon the subject.

‘ I enclose you a letter from Lieut. Colonel Palmer, which I received this morning, and which I shall be obliged to you if you will return to me deciphered. I beg also that you will send me a key of the cipher. The postscript of the letter is very satisfactory.

‘ The river is come down, and I shall be obliged to cross every thing in boats. Of these there are scarcely any, and no materials here; notwithstanding that nearly two months have elapsed since you and I spoke particularly to Purneah upon the subject, and explained to him the necessity of having boats at this place, at Hoonelly, and Hooly Honore. I besides desired Colonel Pater to give his attention to this object: but he says that he never could prevail upon the amildar to do any thing in the business. This inattention in the amildar is a most serious inconvenience at the present moment, and may be attended with very unpleasant consequences.

‘ I have to complain of him upon another subject. The fort of Arnee is about six miles from hence, and the Bhow’s killadar of it the brother of the peshwah of Hurryhur. The two places were in constant communication. He allows

this killadar to evacuate the fort, without giving any notice of this intention to Colonel Pater, who was within six miles of him ; when it was evacuated he apprized me of it, and, as I was at the distance of sixteen miles from hence, I could not send people to take possession. I wrote to him, however, by express, and begged that he would send over some people to keep possession till I came up ; this he omitted. Dhoondiah's people are in the fort, and I must now take it by force. I cannot impute treachery to him, but he certainly wants ability, and zeal, and activity, and, therefore, ought not now to be at this important station.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Hurryhur, 16th June, 1800.

‘ Since I wrote to you this morning, I have received a letter from Captain Kirkpatrick, in which he encloses sunnuds to all the Nizam's sirdars in this part of the country, and another from Colonel Maclean. The latter informs me that he has not been joined by Saddoolah Khan, but that he has with him 1000 horse. His two corps are about 1400 men with eight guns. Saddoolah Khan is at Copaul or at Bellary. The Kistna and Toombuddra are both full ; Colonel Maclean is employed in crossing the former, but he does not know whether Saddoolah Khan is in the Dooab or not.

‘ I have written to him to desire that he will endeavor to communicate with Saddoolah Khan immediately, and form a junction with him. If he should be at Copaul that will not be difficult, consistently with a compliance with the wish I expressed in my letter of the 6th, that the detachment should move up the Dooab towards the frontier. If he should be at Bellary, and should not yet have commenced to cross the Toombuddra, it is not reasonable to expect any co-operation from him immediately, and I have, therefore, left it to Colonel Maclean to move forward to the frontier or not, according as he may think it safe, from the intelligence which he will receive, apprizing me of his situation. At the same time I have asked Heshmut Jung for the grenadiers

and the cavalry from Hyderabad, which I expect will be well forward before I am across the Werdah.

‘ One Goa battalion joined me this day, the other was not to leave Hullihall, I believe, till the 8th, and probably later.

‘ I have got a battalion and four guns and a regiment of cavalry across the river. This day some fellows showed themselves in our front in the old way, but went off immediately.

‘ Ball Kishen Punt was expected this night, and I hope I shall see him to-morrow. My idea is to give him charge, and to make him put tannahs in those forts, &c., which I may not think it absolutely necessary for our own safety to keep in our own hands. I looked at Arnee this morning, and I intend to attack that fort, or Rannee Bednore, as soon as I shall have had a conference, and shall have made my arrangements with Ball Kishen.

‘ By the bye, I forgot to mention to you that Grant has informed me that duties are levied upon gram coming to Seringapatam. Was there any thing settled upon that subject lately?

‘ I propose to send a letter to Saddoolah Khan in the morning, to desire him to join Lieut. Colonel Maclean as soon as he can.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                    ‘ Camp at Hurryhur, 18th June, 1800.

‘ I have been more concerned than I can express at the receipt of your letter of the 15th. The misconduct of these gentlemen undoubtedly gives you, as well as me, a great deal of trouble; but I declare that it gives me more anxiety than any thing in which I have any concern.

‘ If I had heard of the circumstance which you mentioned to me at Seringapatam previous to the appointment of the gentleman in question to his command, he certainly never should have been appointed; and he never should have gone to it, if, in the conversation which I had with him at Naganunglum, he had not expressed himself much like a gentle-

man, and stated a determination to adhere to what had been settled by ————. I acquainted him with every circumstance which you told me, and at the same time informed him of my determination to remove him from his command, if I should hear the smallest complaint of his dubash. He promised that he would not have one; and I acknowledge I little expected to hear that there were grounds of complaints still stronger than they would have been if the dubash had been at ————.

‘ He is a gentleman, a man of the world, and one who appears to look to his character. I write to him by this post, and you may depend upon it that he must either act as he ought, or he shall be removed from his command.

‘ I acknowledge that, both as an officer and as a gentleman, I should be glad to see all those commands abolished; nothing can be more prejudicial to discipline, and nothing more disgraceful to the character and feelings of a gentleman, than what goes on almost daily; but, as long as they are even more than tolerated by Government, it is difficult for any man in a subordinate situation to draw a line, and these kind of unpleasant circumstances must certainly arise: but from what you say, I hope ere long to see some arrangement made which will really abolish the whole.

‘ The disputes between the officers and the amildars are equally irksome, and, I believe, owe their origin to the same circumstance. There is not, at this moment, a post by which I do not receive letters of complaint from some man or other. To enter into a detailed inquiry upon the subject is impossible, and to decide without inquiry would be unjust, and one is, therefore, reduced to an impotent expostulation to be upon good terms with the officers of the Rajah’s Government. We have never been hitherto accustomed to a native Government, we cannot readily bear the disappointments and delays which are usual in all their transactions, prejudices are entertained against them, and all their actions are misconstrued, and we mistrust them. I see instances of this daily in the best of our officers, and I cannot but acknowledge that, from the delays of the natives, they have sometimes reason to complain; but they have none to ill-use any man.



‘ The river has risen, and we get on but slowly. I have not yet got over another regiment of cavalry. I expect some boats in the course of this night or to-morrow from Hoonelly.

‘ About 300 horse appeared in our front yesterday, but went off immediately after Pater opened his guns upon them.

‘ Ball Kishen Punt arrived yesterday, and I had a long conversation with him. He told me that Appah Saheb and Goklah were pressed for money, and had gone towards Kittoor to procure some from the polygar; but they would doubtless advance upon Dhoondiah in co-operation with me, as soon as I should be prepared to move from the river. He said that, as we advanced, we should find plenty of grain, forage, &c., and that there was not a fort in the possession of Dhoondiah, Dummul excepted, into which we should not walk with the greatest ease. He was rather solicitous to know our object. I told him that we had none excepting to get the better of Dhoondiah, of whom we saw clearly that, as long as he existed and had power, the Company’s territories would never be in tranquillity. I desired him to prepare to co-operate with us, and to cross the river with me. He has here about 300 or 400 horse.

‘ Dhoondiah is still at Savanore with the largest part of his force; there are some troops on this side of the river Werdah, but I do not know what number, and I am not quite certain that the Werdah has filled.

‘ As soon as I find out the general number of troops on this side, and if the Werdah fills, I intend to advance Stevenson with the cavalry, and a corps of infantry, guns, &c., and hunt out every thing on this side of that river. I have desired Ball Kishen Punt to be prepared to throw people into Rannee Bednore when we shall get possession of it.

‘ I enclose a copy of a proclamation which I propose to issue. Ball Kishen Punt has seen it, and approves of it, and has even altered some of Ogg’s bad Marhatta phrasology.

‘ I have just had one of Pater’s men with me, who swears that Dhoondiah, with his whole army, is on this side of the Werdah; that all his sirdars have sworn to conquer or die; that Purneah, Bishnoo Punt, Kistnapah, Ram Rao, Kistna

Rao, and all the amildars, mutaseddees, &c. of the Rajah's government, and all the musselmen, are on his side, and that he is determined that his victorious standard shall fly on Seringapatam. I have recommended to Pater to confine this fellow, at all events till we are stronger, on the other side of the river; whether for knavery or folly will be decided hereafter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Hurryhur, 20th June, 1800.

‘ I send you an affidavit taken by a brinjarry, regarding duties taken from him at Chindgerry. I made him swear to his story, in order that there might be no mistake about the matter.

‘ I have also the pleasure of enclosing you an extract of a letter, which I have received this morning, from ———, from which I judge, either that Ram Rao misunderstood what passed, or that it has been misrepresented. It is very desirable that the matter should be sifted to the bottom. I hope, however, from your last letter, that some general arrangement will be made which will wipe off at once and entirely all these commands.

‘ We are getting on by degrees. All the cavalry are across the river, and every thing belonging to them. The Europeans, and every thing belonging to them, will be across early to-morrow, and I think every thing will be clear over in a few days.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. Lord Clive, Governor of Fort St. George.*

‘ MY LORD,                                      ‘ Camp at Hurryhur, 20th June, 1800.

‘ I have received the honor of your Lordship's letter of the 14th instant, in which you desire to have my opinion regarding the extent of the military force which will be necessary for the new territory which your Lordship informs me will be assigned by the Nizam to the exclusive management of the Company for Mysore, Malabar, Canara, and Goa. It is

difficult to give an opinion regarding the new territory, of which I have but little knowledge, but as your Lordship has desired it, I shall proceed to state what has occurred to me upon the subject.

‘The question which your Lordship has put to me involves considerations affecting the whole of our military system in this country. When the country proposed to be ceded to the Company is likewise to be defended, its inhabitants to be kept in tranquillity, and its revenue to be realized by means of the troops, it is impossible to expect to be able to effect these objects on the system of weak and dispersed garrisons, on which we have been acting hitherto. This must be changed; neither the new territory nor the old can be kept in awe by troops dispersed in forts, which they cannot quit with safety; and, therefore, the system which I should recommend would be to garrison those posts only which are absolutely necessary to us, and to have at all times in the field, and in motion, two or three regiments of Europeans, all the cavalry, and as large a body of native infantry as can be got together. This will be a real security, not only to the new territory and to Mysore, but to the Carnatic, Malabar, and Canara, and nothing else ever will. It will appear more clearly that this system is necessary in the new territory, when the nature of its inhabitants, and the governments to which they have been accustomed, are considered.

‘The whole of the country to be ceded by the Nizam is inhabited by petty rajahs and polygars, who have never been entirely subdued, and have never submitted to the species of government which must be exercised by the Company’s servants. They have been accustomed either to the rapacity and corruption of Tippoo’s government, or to the weakness of the Nizam’s; but they are entirely unacquainted with the restraint of a regular authority, constructed upon the principles adopted by the Company’s Government. This they will resist, and they must be kept in awe, particularly at first, by a large and an active force. For this purpose troops in garrison will never answer; and supposing that your Lordship should adopt the system I propose for having, at least for some time, a large detachment in the field, I shall proceed to estimate the number of troops which will be necessary in the garrisons which ought to be occupied.

‘ The number of troops in Malabar is two companies of artillery, one regiment of European infantry, three battalions of the Company’s sepoy, three battalions of sebundies, and three of Travancore troops.

‘ The civil government of Malabar is now conducted upon such a system, that it is impossible to recommend that this force should be weakened; a partial alteration in any part of the civil or military government will not answer. Hereafter, when there shall have been time to settle that country, it may be practicable to diminish that force considerably. In Canara there are one company of artillery, one regiment of Europeans, and four battalions of the Company’s sepoy; none of these battalions are complete; two of them are of the new 18th regiment; and since the loss of Jemalabad, I have been obliged to add to this force the flank companies of the native corps which were at Goa. I do not think it would be proper to diminish it at present.

‘ The violence of the monsoon in Malabar and Canara, which prevents the troops from keeping the field, will at all times operate as a reason for keeping more troops in the garrisons which may be in those countries, than would otherwise be necessary. The circumstance which made it desirable that there should be a British force at Goa no longer existing, the troops might perhaps be withdrawn entirely from thence for the present, or Goa might be made a station for one native battalion. If that arrangement should take place, there will be required below the ghauts—

	Companies of Artillery.	European Regt.	B. Sepoys.	Sebundies.	Travancore Regt.
In Malabar ..	2 ..	1 ..	3 ..	3 ..	3 ..
In Canara ..	1 ..	1 ..	4 ..	..	..
At Goa ..	..	..	1 ..	..	..
	3	2	8	3	3

‘ As long as any of the inhabitants are suffered to remain in Seringapatam, there ought not to be a smaller body of troops there than are there at this moment; but if the inhabitants were removed to the pettah, a very small garrison would keep it, excepting at the time when an attack upon it might be expected. As, however, the removal of the inhabitants must be a work of time, I shall estimate the garrison of Seringapatam at its present strength: two companies

of artillery, one regiment of Europeans, two battalions of native infantry.

‘ There ought to be at Chittledroog at least one company of artillery, and two battalions of native infantry. The province of Bednore will require one battalion of native infantry, and the province of Soonda at least another. There ought likewise to be a battalion in the Nundydroog district. As Paughur is upon the frontier of the territory to be ceded to the Company, it may not perhaps be necessary that there should be a battalion there.

‘ Thus the troops necessary for garrisons only in the Mysore country will be three companies of artillery, one regiment of Europeans, and seven battalions of native infantry ; but if it should be necessary to have a garrison in the Paughur district, another battalion will be required. Excepting at Chittledroog, where I have left only one battalion, and at Paughur, where there are 200 men, I have been obliged to leave troops in the garrisons, as I have above estimated them. In the new territory there ought to be a battalion between Harponelly and Anagoondy, as those places are immediately upon the Marhatta frontier ; one at Adoni ; one, at least, at Gooty ; one at Kurnool ; one at Cuddapa, and one at Gurrumeonda. Every other post or strong hold in the newly ceded territories, and those in Mysore, not occupied by the Honorable Company’s troops, or those of the Rajah of Mysore, ought to be immediately destroyed, and particularly their means of affording water ought to be entirely annihilated. Thus the whole body of troops which will be required only as garrisons, should your Lordship determine to accept the plan of having a strong detachment in the field, will be as follows :—

	Companies of Artillery.	European Regt.	B. Sepoys.	Sebundies.	Travancore Regt.
Malabar ..	2	1	3	3	3
Canara ..	1	1	4	..	..
Goa ..	..	..	1	..	..
Mysore ..	3	1	7	..	..
New territory	..	..	6	..	..
	<hr/> 6	<hr/> 3	<hr/> 21	<hr/> 3	<hr/> 3

‘ It must however be very clear to your Lordship that nothing can be more weak than this distribution, if it is not



ral Court Martial. I sent orders into Canara to try by military process all criminals of the same description.

‘The second Bombay battalion is not yet arrived, and I felt some little anxiety about it, as it has been reported to me that all the cavalry on this side of the Werdah are gone towards Shikarpoor and Ondagurry to interrupt its junction with me. They amount to about 700 men. I have sent Stevenson that way with two regiments of cavalry and their guns, and they will give a good account of the fellows, who, I now understand, instead of looking after this battalion, are employed in plundering the country.

‘Ram Rao’s cavalry are at Shikarpoor, and I have written to Servitun Rao to request that they may be ordered to join themselves with the Bombay battalion, and may come with them as far as Hoonelly.

‘From a parcel of blunders and surmises, and unnecessary precaution in the gentleman in Soonda, &c., this battalion, which left Goa on the 28th of last month, had not marched from Hullihall on the 12th of this, and I do not think it was likely to march till the 15th. It had not reached Chandergooty on the 20th.

‘Dhoondiah has certainly left Savanore, and he is, I believe, gone to Hoobly Darwar.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘Camp, left bank of the Toombuddra,  
23rd June, 1800.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘I have crossed nearly every thing, and if the 25th dragoons were arrived, and the Bombay battalion in safety, I might advance to-morrow. I have nearly 4000 full brinjaries, and the quantity I before told you I should have in the gram department; there are besides quantities of other brinjaries coming on. The difficulty will be to make them cross the river and move on, and upon this subject I trouble you with a few lines.

‘I had some thought of leaving an officer here, who should take charge of every thing that might come forward for the troops, and who should send them across the river and on

towards us; but the scarcity of officers with the corps, the difficulty of finding one qualified for the service, and the probability that there would be, as usual, a jarring between him and the Rajah's officers, have determined me not to adopt that plan, from which I could expect nothing but failure. It remains then that I must rely upon the exertions of the amildar at Hurryhur.

‘ The man who is here at present is, I believe, honest and willing; but he is totally incapable of understanding any arrangement, or of making any exertion to carry it into execution. Accounts have arrived of his mother's death, and he is confined to his house, and all business with him is at a stand.

‘ It is therefore absolutely necessary that some person should be sent here on whose abilities and exertions some dependence can be placed, and from what I have seen of all those in this part of the country, I see no man so fit for the charge as Servitun Rao. Purneah, however, is the best judge; and all I can say upon the subject is, that it is essentially necessary to the troops that it should be a person of intelligence and activity.

‘ To enter into complaints at present of their general inactivity, and of their disobedience of all the orders which I believe they have received from Purneah and from you, is useless. All that I can say about it is, that they certainly want a little looking after in this part of the country; and I think it probable that when you come this way you will find some changes necessary.

‘ I think it probable that I shall not march from hence till the 27th or 28th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,  
‘ Camp, left bank of the Toombuddra,  
25th June, 1800.

‘ I have received your letters of the 21st and 22nd, and I am glad to find that there is a prospect that the Court Martial will go on. It does not appear to me that nine members are necessary.



‘ The court is one held under a civil authority, and is therefore the civil court, in which the forms usual in military courts are to be observed, and which is composed of military men ; but it is not necessary that it should be composed of the number of members required by the articles of war : provided that the forms of a military process are observed as required by Government, it is a matter of indifference what number of judges there may be.

‘ If there should be any further difficulty upon the subject, I must proceed by a court of inquiry, and give orders that the criminals shall be executed after the facts shall have been clearly ascertained by an examination of witnesses on each side.

‘ I heard from Nuggur this morning ; Ram Rao only received his orders to join me on the 23rd. Major Munro had not received any directions about the money, and even if he had, he did not think that the garrison of Cundapoor could afford an escort for it. Major Browne was about to send one from Nuggur, in order to lose no time. Upon examining the true state of the case regarding the brinjarries, I find that I have not so many of them in camp as I ought to have. Many of their bullocks are behind and at a distance. They complain much of impediments, such as that they are detained by demands of duties, &c., and that the amildars have got the greatest part of the rice of the country in their hands, which they are unwilling to part with at present, as they have reason to expect that the price of it will rise. It besides appears that the accounts of the number of their bullocks are very erroneous, and that they are counted over in three or four tandahs. I believe, however, that I shall be able to move from hence with a stock sufficient to last till I shall have cleared out every thing on this side of the Werdah ; but it will not be safe to cross the Werdah till I have a certainty of a larger quantity of supplies.

‘ No tidings yet of the Bombay battalion, excepting that they had not marched on the 15th. The officer commanding in Seonda complains sadly of Major Munro’s people, who absolutely refuse to give the smallest assistance in forwarding the equipments of this corps. Their demand cannot be very heavy, at least if they have not much more baggage than their friends, who arrived some days ago. They had

literally nothing, excepting what was carried by twenty-four bullocks, and about fifty coolies: and the private baggage of all the officers goes upon sixteen bullocks.

‘ From intelligence received in a private letter from Colonel Dalrymple of the 9th, I was in hopes that the grenadiers and the cavalry would have joined Lieut. Colonel Maclean, but I now find they have not. If Lieut. Colonel Maclean is joined by Saddoolah Khan, which I hope he will, it will still do; if not he will, I am afraid, be too weak.

‘ I have not yet heard either from Saddoolah Khan or from Lieut. Colonel Maclean, in answer even to my letter of the 6th; but as soon as I had reason to believe that the grenadiers and the cavalry would join him, I wrote to the latter to desire that he would move up towards Copaul.

‘ Ball Kishen Bhow thinks that Dhcondiah will fly to the Dooab. I received from Goklah a letter, of which a copy was sent to you by Captain Greenlay from Hullahall; the person who brought it is not yet arrived, and I believe will come with the Bombay battalion.

‘ Stevenson has had some successes towards the frontier, but has not taken possession of Massoor, a strong fort about three coss from Shikarpoor. He has, however, driven to the northward all the cavalry, which were hanging thereabouts for the purpose of annoying the Bombay battalion. I have desired Servitun Rao to send his cavalry to join them; and, indeed, I think that that cavalry might be useful at this place in bringing forward our convoys, if I should not be able entirely to clear this side of the Werdah of all the enemy’s horse.

‘ I shall be able to ascertain this in a few days, and will acquaint Ram Rao, if I should find it necessary to call for the assistance of his cavalry.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have just received from the officer at Sera. I have desired Barclay to acquaint the young man that the wholesale price of sheep, as stated in the orders, is three for a pagoda; that of course, when retailed in the bazaar, they must be dearer. When you go that way you will be able to see how these matters stand at Sera.

When I was there they complained that literally the amildar would not allow their servants to buy butter, bread, or milk, in the bazaar. They did not mention this to me, but to some of their friends, and talked of the behavior of this man as a tyranny which it was quite painful to be obliged to submit to.'

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

'Camp, left bank of the Toombuddra,  
26th June, 1800.

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'I enclose copies of letters which I have received from Appah Saheb and Goklah.

'Goklah's vakeel arrived last night, and I had this morning an interview with him. He said that his master had received orders to attack and crush Dhoondiah; that he was then at Moorgoor, on the other side of the Malpoorba, with 10,000 horse, 5000 infantry, and eight guns; that he wished to be joined by three of our Bombay battalions, which he said he heard were coming from Goa, and that he would then advance and destroy Dhoondiah without loss of time. I told him that it was impossible to detach to him the battalions in question, as they were either in this camp, or on the road to join me, and probably very close. It appeared to me, however, that if he had the force which he said he had, he would have no difficulty, and would incur no risk in crossing the Malpoorba, and approaching Dhoondiah's force at the time when I should cross the Werdah, and approach him from this side. In this the vakeel acquiesced, and promised that when I should give him notice that I was going to cross the Werdah, Goklah would cross the Malpoorba, for which he would make all the arrangements immediately, and that when I should be at Savanore he would be at Darwar. He then began a long story about his differences with Appah Saheb; said that Appah Saheb had not received orders from Poonah to attack Dhoondiah, and that I might depend upon it he neither could nor would make any effort towards a co-operation in my designs. I asked him whether, in case Appah Saheb should co-operate to destroy Dhoondiah, it would at all affect the intended co-operation of his master? He said not in the least; that to put down Dhoon-

diah was the first object and the most urgent; and that after that was effected, it would not be difficult for Goklah to put in execution his own designs, and the orders which he had and might hereafter receive from Poonah regarding Appah Saheb.

‘It appeared to me to be very desirable to ascertain from this vakeel, to whom the administration of this country belonged, whether his master had any claim to it; and whether he was likely to be dissatisfied in consequence of the arrangements which I had made, and according to which I propose to act, viz. to hand over to Ball Kishen Bhow all the forts which should fall into our hands, and to give over the country to his management.’ Questions were put to him leading to these points, and he said that the administration of the country belonged to the family of Pursheram Bhow, that his master had no claim to it, and that the arrangement which had been made was perfectly satisfactory to him, and by no means likely to affect his intended co-operation. He added, that when Dhoondiah should be driven out, if we remain neuter, he should have no difficulty in getting possession of the country, if he should be so ordered from Poonah.

‘Upon the whole the conversation with this man was very satisfactory, and proved three things clearly; first, that Goklah is very desirous, and will co-operate with us in the attack upon Dhoondiah; secondly, that although at enmity with Appah Saheb, his co-operation will have no effect upon him; thirdly, that he will be perfectly satisfied with the arrangement made, and proposed to give over the country to the management of Appah Saheb and his dewan.

‘The difference between Appah Saheb and Goklah seems to be more like one originating at Poonah than any thing personal between the parties: the vakeel said that orders had been received to sequester a part of his (Appah Saheb’s) country, which he said was a secret. At all events, he said that the obedience to that order would be deferred till Dhoondiah should be driven out of the country.

‘I march to-morrow to Rannee Bednore. I have just received your letter regarding Lieut. Mackay’s bullock mutas-  
seddee; and he writes by this post to desire that he will

keep the bullocks at grass at such place as may be most convenient to the ryots, and by no means to interfere in the business of the country, or with their cultivation.

‘ I am quite confounded by the intelligence that we shall have no money from Captain Macleod; we shall really be quite aground in August if I do not get a lac of pagodas somewhere.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Munro.*

‘ Camp, left bank of the Toombuddra,  
26th June, 1800.

‘ SIR,

‘ I have received your letter of the 22nd instant, and its enclosure; and I am obliged to you for the intelligence which you give me, that a lac of Behaudry pagodas, for the use of the troops in this country, were likely to leave Cundapoor on the 23rd instant. From a conversation which I had with Mr. Webbe at Seringapatam, early in the last month, I had reason to expect that this sum would have been at Nuggur some time ago. I sent orders to the officer commanding in Soonda to drive the party which had got possession of Budnaghur out of that post. He would have done this before now, according to the former orders which his predecessors received from me, only that he has found it impossible to move even a small detachment of the troops under his orders, for want of the common assistance which the country can afford.

‘ This, he informs me, the amildars have refused to give; and I am waiting here at this moment for a battalion of Bombay sepoy, which are detained at Hullihall, in Soonda, for want of a few bullocks, which cannot be provided without the civil government.

‘ If the officer commanding in Soonda should be enabled to detach a force to get possession of Budnaghur, I do not propose to have a post there, and I conceive that it will be expedient to raise as many more peons as you can get in Soonda. The number of troops allotted to that province, by Government, was one battalion; and although it is certainly

much exposed, I have not means of increasing that force at present.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Munro.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Rannee Bednore,  
28th June, 1800.

‘ I arrived here yesterday, and instantly attacked the fort with my piquets, and the 1st of the 1st. The garrison consisted of 500 men, who fired upon our cavalry as they approached, and the greatest part of them were put to death. We did not lose a man.

‘ Colonel Stevenson goes off to-morrow towards Mussoor and Shikarpoor to clear every thing down that way, and to bring up the Bombay battalion if it should have reached that quarter; by the time that he will return I hope that I shall have been joined by a sufficient number of brinjaries to enable me to go forward.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Rannee Bednore,  
29th June, 1800.

‘ I have received from Lieut. Colonel Maclean an answer to my letter of the 6th instant, dated the 15th; on that day he had not made much progress in crossing the Kistna, and he did not expect to be in readiness to advance from that river till the 1st of July. He proposed, however, to join Saddoolah Khan immediately, and to move up to Kanagherry. He expected that Colonel Bowser, with the cavalry and the flank companies, would march from Hyderabad, and he had received orders to have boats in readiness that these troops might pass the Kistna with ease; but in case they should not have reached the river by the time that he should be prepared to advance from it, he did not propose to wait for them.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Maclean says, that by all accounts Saddoolah Khan’s detachment is not half so strong as it is stated

to be by Heshmut Jung; and, indeed, he says himself, in a note to Lieut. Colonel Maclean, that one-third at least of the stated numbers might be subtracted.

‘ I received a letter from Lieut. Colonel Dalrymple yesterday, dated the 13th, in which he says that the march of the cavalry, and of the flank companies had been postponed: but it does not appear by his letter that it is determined that they should not come at all. I have therefore still hopes that they will come.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp at Rannee Bednore,  
30th June, 1800.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I have received your letter of the 27th, and I beg that you will tell Purneah that I am much obliged to him for the readiness with which he has complied with my request regarding Servitun Rao. I hear that Ram Rao is arrived at Hurryhur; but the unfortunate death of the old lady at Benares has put a stop to all business, and I shall not see him for three or four days more. The passage of the river also has been a good deal obstructed since I left Hurryhur; but I write to Ram Rao this day upon the subject, and I hope that we shall get on better.

‘ The road between this and Hurryhur is open; indeed I understand that Dhoondiah has not a man on this side of the Werdah. Stevenson is gone with some infantry, and the 2nd regiment of cavalry, to Mussoor, to possess himself of that post, and then I expect that I shall have cleared out every thing from this side of the river. Dhoondiah has been at Hoobly, where he made a composition for 10,000 rupees; he then went to Misserycotta, of which he had not got possession on the 28th. Goklah, it is said, had crossed the Malpoorba, and was come forward to Jeygoor, with an intention of fighting; but this I doubt. After getting Misserycotta, I think Dhoondiah will either make a dash at Hulhall, which is about twelve coss distant, or he will move upon Goklah.

‘ What a pity it is that I cannot move on for want of

grain! My troops are in high health, order, and spirits; but the unfortunate defect of arrangement in the poor man at Chittledroog, previous to my arrival, has ruined every thing.

‘ I had at one time nearly 4000 loads in camp; if I had been able to reach the river one day sooner I should have been across before it filled. The delay in crossing was one of about ten days; during that time we were feeding upon the brinjarries, as we did not draw a grain from the country, which reduced the full bags in camp to about 2000, and about as many more they say on the road. Then comes the delay in filling, travelling, passing the river, &c.; and it becomes absolutely impossible to say at what time we shall have a sufficiency to cross the Werdah, although all the brinjarries swear that there are large quantities of rice coming on to us.

‘ All this delay would have been avoided, if, when I wrote on the 10th of May, measures had been taken to make them all fill, and to collect them together; but instead of that, until I wrote on the 5th of June to know what had been done, no steps were taken, and I was four days at Chittledroog before I could even see one of the naigs. How true it is that in military operations time is every thing!

‘ The three troops of the 19th not having been ordered on is a mistake of —— or —— . The former swears that the interpretation of his letter is, that the dragoons were to come on with the army to Chittledroog. I acknowledge that it might bear that meaning, but it is not so clear as all orders and arrangements ought to be, and as they are in general. I write to —— upon the subject this day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I have just heard of some rice coming into camp from Shikarpoor.

‘ I hear from Bowser, on the 17th, that he was under orders to be in readiness to march with the cavalry and the flank companies.’



*To Major Munro.*

‘ Camp, three miles south of Havery,

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

3rd July, 1800.

‘ I do not deny that I did believe that you were not quite so ready to assist my wants as you might have been, as I understood from Mr. Webbe that you had been desired to send to Nuggur all the money which you had in your treasury, and which was not immediately wanted for other purposes; and I therefore did not think it necessary to take any further steps to procure the money, than to desire the officer in command at Nuggur to have in readiness an escort to bring it to camp. I also thought, and from the complaints which have been received it appears to be true, that your servant in Soonda gave no assistance whatever to enable the battalions, marching through that district, to move. For want of money and every thing, one of them has not joined me yet; and, from what I am going to tell you, you will perceive that it is probable that I shall not see it for some time.

‘ Dhoondiah has beat Goklah; and I am informed that a body of the troops of the latter fled to Hullihall with Chintomeny Rao, where they are at this moment.

‘ Dhoondiah followed them, and if the battalions had not marched before the 30th of June, on which day was the action, it is probable that Dhoondiah will have kept such a watch upon Hullihall, as to have rendered it impossible for them to march since. I have no orders to take possession of any part of the country, and I have hitherto put the Bhow's people in possession of every part that has fallen into my hands. I have done this as much because I have no troops to spare for garrisons, as because it is a most desirable and necessary thing to me, that the country on this side of the Werdah, towards the Rajah's frontier, should be settled, that I may draw from it its poor resources, and have my communication with Mysore unimpeded. I enjoy all these advantages at present; and I am therefore desirous not to risk the loss of them, even for a moment, by asking you to come up to settle this country. The change of government would, I fear, have this effect; and, besides, as I already told you, I have no order to take possession of the country in any manner.

‘ I approve of your proposal to advance your peons to Hangal, or where else you please, when your amildars hear that I have crossed the Werdah. I will also apprize you when I shall have done so. It will be proper that I should tell the Bhow that I have desired them to enter the Savanore country, and to possess themselves of the districts on the borders, for the general good.

‘ It appears to me, that when at Hangal they will be able to assist me with some rice, of which I stand woefully in need: all that I have comes from the rice countries in Mysore, which are at a distance of about a month’s march; and you will perceive that, to bring it to me, will require a tolerably large number of brinjarries. If I could get a little at Hangal it would be a great relief.

‘ Desire your amildars to let me know if they can give me any assistance whatever in rice; from what country it is to come; to what place I am to send for it; the distance such place may be from Savanore; and such other information regarding it as they can afford.

‘ There is not a single paddy field in this whole country, but plenty of cotton-ground swamps, which in this wet weather are delightful.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Munro.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Havery, 4th July, 1800.

‘ I send you two papers regarding traitors, which I have received from Grant.

‘ I have heard no more of Goklah since yesterday.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp on the right bank of the Werdah,  
6th July, 1800.

‘ As I found that every thing became settled towards our frontier, I have advanced here, and I am making my arrangements for crossing this river. The brinjarries come on by

degrees, and I hear of some on the other side of the Toombuddra, who appear to wait only to be forced to advance.

‘Goklah has certainly been beat and killed, and the circumstances of the affair are nearly as I stated them to you in my last letter. The majority of his troops, however, I am informed are still together, and can be brought forward. I have written respecting them to Chintomeny Rao, and to Bappojee Scindiah, and I hope that I shall still derive some advantage from him.

‘No accounts yet of the Bombay battalion. It is said that Dhoondiah is at Kittoor.

‘I have received, from Colonel Cuppage, the proceedings of the Court Martial. Sheik Fereed is found guilty of treason, and is sentenced to be imprisoned to the end of the war! Hyder Beg is acquitted. I cannot approve of, although I have confirmed these sentences, and I have desired Colonel Cuppage to keep Hyder Beg in confinement.

‘In future I must proceed by a court of inquiry, which shall deliver an opinion whether the prisoner is guilty or not, as I find it is impossible to impress officers with an accurate notion of the extent and consequences of the crime of treason, and of the punishment which it deserves and meets in all civilized societies.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘One of my people employed in Dhoondiah’s camp has sworn, in the most positive manner, that he saw Lingo Punt, Goklah’s vakeel, with Dhoondiah in the camp. If this is true, it may be the clue to the necessity of Goklah’s crossing the Malpoorba, which he certainly did a very short time after Lingo Punt left him. Lingo Punt has been the person employed between Dhoondiah and Goklah, and negotiated the delivery of the family of the former by the latter; and I do not doubt but that he was employed to try to negotiate with him before he came to me.

‘Goklah, then, met with the fate which he deserved.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp, right bank of the Werdah,  
8th July, 1800.

‘ I received your packet of the 4th last night. A man came to me some time ago, and made me an offer similar to that which has been made at Hyderabad. These arrangements answer well there; but I think them unbecoming in an officer at the head of a body of troops, and I, therefore, declined to have any thing more to do with the business than to hold out a general encouragement. The proposer said, that there was a sirdar at the head of a body of horse, to whom if I would give a cowle he would come away. I gave the cowle, but I do not expect, either that the sirdar will come off with his troops, or that the proposed deed will be put in execution. Government have authorized me to offer a reward for him, and I propose to avail myself of this authority as soon as he is at all pressed, and I find that his people begin to drop off from him. This will be, in my opinion, the fittest period.

‘ To offer a public reward by proclamation for a man’s life, and to make a secret bargain to have it taken away, are very different things; the one is to be done, the other, in my opinion, cannot by an officer at the head of the troops.

‘ I have made my arrangements for crossing the river, and I hope that I shall have every thing over in a day or two. I have made a bridge which answers perfectly for foot passengers, and will answer equally for horses and cattle, when I shall have given it rather a better footing. I propose to leave this bridge here, and a number of boats which I have besides. For the care of these and of every thing which will come up, I shall establish a post immediately on the river side, and I am now constructing a redoubt for their security.

‘ As soon as this work gets tolerably forward, I shall seize Savanore, where I understand there are but few people at present. I do not intend to advance from Savanore until I shall hear that Bowser is tolerably forward, unless I should find it necessary, in order to prevent Dhoondiah from putting in execution any design, which might tend to give him

more stability in the country, or in order to give assistance to our friends at Hullahall, if I find he presses them.

· I propose to stretch out towards Hangall and Budnaghur, in order to clear the Soonda frontier, if the report should be true which I hear, that the detachment sent against that place has failed in its attack. I can hardly believe it, however.

· I have heard nothing yet of the Bombay battalion, and I am much afraid that, for want of money, they did not march before the 30th, and that Dhoondiah's position near them has prevented them from marching since that day. It is fortunate that I thought of ordering the provisions to be thrown into Hullahall in April. I understand that there was a sufficiency for two months for one battalion at the end of June.

· What do you think of taking this opportunity of making peace with Kistnapah Naig? The officers who were in his country say that he was well disposed to accept any reasonable terms; and, as our prospects of being able to reduce him are very remote, particularly if Heshmut Jung's plan of increasing our territory is to be carried into execution, it appears desirable to come to a settlement with him on almost any terms which he could point out, and for the observance of which he would give us security.

· I write to Major Cuppage this day, and desire him to let me know what he wants at Nundydroog, and his wants shall be supplied as far as is possible. In the mean time, I desire Gordon to be prepared to answer a call for a store of rice there.

· The brinjarries drop in by degrees, and I get a little from the country; but I have determined that no more brinjarry rice shall go into the bazaar; and I have adopted a plan for issuing gratis to the troops, and have reduced the consumption of the rice of which I have the command to fifty bags per diem. At this rate I have, on this side of the Toombuddra, at least fifty days' stock; and my industrious followers must live either upon jowarry, of which there is an abundance everywhere, or they must be more industrious in procuring rice for themselves in a country which produces none, or their friends the brinjarries must come up more quickly. From Hangall, however, I expect to draw some

rice, which is another reason for extending myself that way.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I have received the proceedings of a court of inquiry upon Mahommed Ismael, late Asoph of Chinreydroog, and I have given orders that he may be hanged, and his crime published in the district of Nundydroog. Binnillal Khan is to remain in confinement in Nundydroog.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, left bank of the Werdah,  
10th July, 1800.

‘ I have received letters from Hullahall up to the 5th of July. The circumstances of the defeat of Goklah are nearly as they have been already represented to you, and a great part of his army are under the walls of that fort. The 1st of the 4th are still there, having been detained for money till the end of June, and having then found it impracticable to move. Dhoondiah was encamped two days ago at Gurry, about 4 coss beyond Darwar, and it is said that he intended to come this way, that he intended to attack Hullahall, and that he intended to move upon Noorgoond. I have got every thing over the river, excepting the 1st and 4th regiments of cavalry. My bridge answered for every thing, excepting for the followers of the cavalry. Horses, bandies, and even camels crossed without difficulty, but the followers rushed upon it in such numbers from both sides, and were so little subject to regulation, arrangement, or order, that they sunk several of the boats, and I have been obliged to take the bridge to pieces, before I could get over the two last regiments of cavalry.

‘ I was in hopes that, hearing nothing of Kistnapah Naig, it might have been possible to come to an arrangement with him; but I see that it is not. Our good understanding with the Rajah of Koorg, which deprives him of the money which he used to get for defending Tippoo’s country from the Rajah’s plunderers, must be rather inconvenient to him, particularly as he always understood matters with the Rajah, and it was not necessary that he should incur any great expense on that account.

‘ I have not been over at Savanore yet, but it appears to be, and I hear it is, in a ruinous condition, and so large, that it will not be possible to do any thing with it. We must, therefore, press to have Darwar, and Munro might at all events make his arrangements for sending grain to Hullihall. If matters should be settled previous to the time at which it will be possible to send up grain from Canara. Munro will be no loser, as he will sell it at a large price. I doubt whether the Peshwah will be willing, or, if willing, whether he will have it in his power to give over to us Darwar. If Dhoondiah is able to hold out at all, he will certainly receive support against us from the great body of Marhattas.

‘ Ram Rao has been with me, and he yesterday went back to Shikarpoor, having made arrangements for sending some peons into the country on the right bank of the Werdah. I do not believe that Servitun Rao is come to Hurryhur, or that he is likely to come there, but it would certainly be very desirable that either he or Ram Rao should be permanently stationed at that place. Probably the latter would be of most service, as I understand that he is the head amildar of Nuggur, Hurryhur, &c.

‘ All the grain which Purneah can collect for us ought to be sent to Hurryhur, from whence it will be forwarded with other grain from other parts.

‘ The people who had possession of Jemalabad found means to make their escape over the rock. They left in the upper fort four men of the 2nd of the 3rd Bombay regiment, being some of those who had been surprised there. These men they put in confinement on the day preceding the night in which it is supposed they escaped. Above fifty of them have been taken by parties sent in pursuit of them, aided by the people of the country; and Lieut. Colonel Mignan informs me, that he had still hopes that he should be able to take Jerim Naik the leader. He proposed to bring them all before a General Court Martial, and to hang those to whom death might be sentenced in different parts of the province.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I have no certain accounts about Budnaghur.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp five miles south of Savanore,  
11th July, 1800.  
‘ I enclose you the copy of a letter which I have received from Lieut. Colonel Palmer. You will perceive the manner in which Appah Saheb stands at Poonah.

‘ I am afraid that, having given over the country to Ball Kishen Bhow may have the effect of setting the Peshwah, or at least Scindiah, against us, although I believe that this is not the country which has been sequestered, but it is that of Tasgaum and Meritch. I have written to Colonel Palmer a letter, the duplicate of which I enclose, and beg you will forward by tappall, in which I explain the reasons which induced me to give over the country to the Bhow, and the grounds which I have for believing that it is possible to remedy the evil if it is one.

‘ In truth the Bhow is but a bad manager, and is very unpopular in the country; but he has made no objections to the admission of Ram Rao’s peons to whatever place I pleased. It will, therefore, be a matter of no difficulty to make an arrangement to transfer the country to whomsoever Colonel Palmer may point out as the rightful owner.

‘ It is said that Dhoondiah is coming down towards us; if he does come, I shall certainly dash at him immediately.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I do not place much reliance on the proposed attack of Scindiah’s troops, but I write this day to their commanding officer.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Savanore, 13th July, 1800.

‘ I was prevented from answering your letter of the 9th yesterday by our march hither from the river, and by my preparations to attack Dhoondiah. I reconnaitred this place on the 11th, and I was induced to move to it because I found that Dhoondiah was approaching us, as it was said to engage us, and I thought that I should perform the operation better by being disencumbered of baggage, to receive which



this place appears tolerably well calculated, and that I should derive some advantage from making the attack, if he should come within reach, instead of by halting upon the Werdah, to wait till he should attack me. He is now at Hoondgul, about twenty two miles from hence, and, if he moves any nearer, I shall certainly leave my baggage here, and attack him.

‘ The redoubt upon the Werdah is nearly finished, and I have left there the pioneers, and two companies of Bombay infantry, two 12 pounders, two 6 pounders, ammunition for the 12 pounders, &c. These people are to complete the work, and half the latter to be its future garrison. It is on a fine spot, which commands the banks of the river, and will give protection to all our cattle, brinjaries, &c., and confidence to the latter, which is a great object.

‘ By Colonel Palmer’s letter, which I sent you the other day, you will perceive that whatever may be the real intentions of Scindiah in this quarter, he declares that he has ordered the commanding officer of his troops to attack Dhoondiah Waugh. If that be the case Dhoondiah Waugh is still in a bad way.

‘ I have long regretted that such a body of troops as this should be assembled, and that they should have, in fact, no object before them. What you point out is certainly the right line of proceeding; but as I informed you in a former letter, I do not conceive that the Peshwah either will consent to our taking possession of Darwar, or that if he did consent, Bappjee Scindiah would give it up to us. It then comes to this, if the Peshwah should consent to give us the place, and Bappjee Scindiah should withhold it, we must force it from him by means of a heavy train.

‘ I have nothing here now but two iron twelves; but the eighteens are at Chittledroog, and I could easily get them up if that plan is to be adopted: and, certainly, unless it is true that Dhoondiah means to fight, I do not see any other mode of bringing this warfare to a close.

‘ This place is, in fact, little better than a large plain, and our troops would walk into it at any time. It will, however, keep my baggage in security for a few days if I should wish to attack him.

‘ I am afraid that until we get Darwar, or some hold in

the country, the plan of putting Munro into the management of the districts, which have fallen into our hands, will do us more harm than good, as, in fact, there would be an interval in which they would be under the management of nobody, or the people might resist Munro's management, and thus we should suffer all the inconveniences, for a time, of a contest in our rear. We get on now, and that is all; but if we come to have a contest in the rear, we must fall back to see the end of it.

‘ The attack upon Budnaghur failed, God knows how; I propose to move upon Hoondgul, and to clear that frontier if Dhoondiah keeps at a distance; but if he comes near me I think the best method of settling Soonda, and every other place, is to attack him. Munro talks of losing the revenues of Soonda (as if that was not foreseen and expected at the moment we took possession of it) on every occasion where there should be confusion in this country; and certainly confusion may be expected in this country for some years to come.

‘ I recollect that in different conferences which I had with you upon this subject at Nuggur, we agreed that this would be the case; I apprized Government of it early, and yet they withdrew from it one of the battalions which alone could keep it in tranquillity, or make it deserving our attention.

‘ I have written to Ram Rao for 500 peons, which I shall find of great use.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Sirhitty, 16th July, 1800.

‘ On the 13th, after I had written to you, I learned that Dhoondiah had come from his camp at Hoondgul, with his whole army and his guns, to within about two coss of mine at Savanore; this he examined for some time on a hill, and then returned towards Hoondgul. I threw my baggage into Savanore on the morning of the 14th, and marched with five days' provisions, as light as possible, to Hoondgul; he had gone off six coss to Darwar on the night of the 13th, as soon as he heard of my intended march; so that between the morning of the 13th, on which he marched towards me, and

that of the 14th, he had gone on the most moderate computation about eighteen Sultauny coss.

‘He left a garrison of about 600 men in Hoondgul, which I surrounded and stormed on the evening of the 14th, with but trifling loss. On the 15th I marched about seventeen miles to the eastward to Lukmaisier, which place was evacuated; and on this day I have marched about twelve to Sirhitty, which place has been surrounded for the last three weeks by 4000 men belonging to the Dessaye of Dummul, and besieged in the country manner. This siege has been raised, and I return to-morrow towards Savanore, in order to get my baggage, a supply of provisions, &c.

‘Dhoondiah is in the jungles behind Dummul, and already his people have begun to desert him in numbers. His march to the front was merely to cover the retreat of his baggage, which was sent off to Darwar at the same time.

‘As soon as I found that he was gone off to the eastward, I wrote to the chiefs of the remnant of Goklah’s force, to request them to march immediately from Hullihall to join me at Savanore, as the road was clear for them: if they should comply with this requisition I shall probably find them at Savanore on the day after to-morrow, and I shall then move forward again with all my baggage, &c.; and I hope to be able (with the assistance of Bowser, who will by that time be pretty close on his rear) to run down this fellow completely. At all events, by this expedition, I have gained some objects of importance; I have established my superiority in the opinions of my own people, of his, and of the country. I have cut off one of his garrisons, and have taken from him one place of consequence, and I have raised the siege of another; and if the chiefs of Goklah’s force attend to my requisitions, which, as their horses are starving at Hullihall, I hope they will, I shall be joined by that body of cavalry which will at least enable me to move with all my baggage, and will probably enable me to cut the fellow off completely.

‘When I found that he ran away from me at Hoondgul, I took the opportunity of offering a reward for his person of 30,000 rupees, as I was heretofore authorized by Government. This will give a spur to the negotiation at Hydrabad; and it is not impossible but that some of the hungry

moor-men, who are leaving him, will think that they may as well have these rupees as not, and that at least they will endeavor to earn them; this will increase the confusion which I understand is in his camp.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I have written to Bowser to order him forward to Copaul, and eventually to Dummul. If I find that he is approaching upon my return to Savanore, I shall move this way immediately, and push Dhoondiah so as to secure Bowser’s march. From all reports, however, of the diminution of his numbers, I have reason to believe that Bowser is fully equal to him. All has remained quiet at Savanore, and at the redoubt on the Werdah, I understand, since I marched.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Savanore, 18th July, 1800.

‘ I wrote you on the 16th, on account of the circumstances which induced me to march from hence, and of my proceedings from the 14th to that day. Nothing particular has happened since the 16th. I marched to Lukmasier yesterday, and to this place this day; and what is very extraordinary, I saw fewer horse about us than I have seen on any day since I quitted the Werdah. Dhoondiah was yesterday morning at Unigury, somewhere between Darwar and Dummul. The remnant of Goklah’s army, contrary to my advice, and even orders, had marched to Darwar; and I had intelligence yesterday, that on the night before they had marched from Darwar to join me at this place; but upon this intelligence I place no reliance whatever. I shall know the truth probably this day, and if it is necessary I can march tomorrow with my whole force to their assistance. Dhoondiah keeps at the distance of about two marches from me, which clearly proves that he is not very easy.

‘ I have just received your letters of the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, to which I am proceeding to reply.

‘ I have called upon Ram Rao for some peons to put into some of the principal places in the great communications with Hurryhur and with Bednore; but the country still remains under the management of Ball Kishen Bhow; and

for the reasons which I stated in my letter of the 13th, I think it will be better to allow it to remain so, at least till we have a stronger hold of it.

‘ By what has passed in the last five days you will perceive that I can have no anxiety about Hullihall. If I had not the upper hand I should certainly be reduced to the dilemma to which you allude, particularly if I attempted to keep a garrison in Savanore. But I have at present no such intention. I believe I told you that I had been obliged to take to pieces my bridge, so that my communication is now kept up by boats only; the redoubt is on the other side of the river, and guards them well, and gives good cover to my brinjarries. Even if Savanore was a good post it would not answer to cover my boats and brinjarries, as it is seven miles from the river, and even at the present moment the communication for unarmed people is insecure from the straggling horse which are constantly about this camp; it would of course be much more so if I had not established the post upon the river, and if I was not here myself. Upon the whole then, I shall leave Savanore to be occupied by the first comer, excepting a body of peons can keep it for me.

‘ I have heard from Bowser, but I really cannot tell from his letter at what time he was likely to march; I think, however, about the 10th. If he marches at that time he may be at Copaul by the 25th, and before then I shall be within reach to cover him. I have, however, no apprehension for Bowser, but much for my Marhatta friend, who appears so little willing to obey orders, and so unable to defend himself.

‘ I will make arrangements for the payment of the bullocks coming with the 19th dragoons; I shall make an arrangement, if possible, this day, for bringing forward Munro’s amildars upon the frontier, and I will connect their operations, if possible, with my own. My next step must of course depend a good deal upon the necessity of going to the assistance of our allies, upon which I hope to be able to decide this afternoon.

‘ I can say nothing about the bandies, excepting that it is the most scandalous affair that can have happened. We have not one at Chittledroog, and all that can be done is to get them on to Chittledroog as well as we can.

‘ The post at Montana has certainly been threatened, and I believe attacked; but unless they have been guilty of a gross neglect in Malabar, have disobeyed orders, and made a false report, the new post at Cotaparamba must be well supplied with provisions, and of course in perfect security. If the Pyche Rajah comes into Cotiote, or attacks one of these posts in reality, it is certainly necessary to reinforce Tellicherry, if not with a view to the safety of that place, at least with one to the ability of assisting the posts in advance when they are attacked. There is now nothing at Tellicherry excepting a corps of mopla sebundies, consisting of about 100 men; and I should certainly look upon the loss of that place as a very serious misfortune.

‘ I have a letter from Major Walker upon the subject of raising a body of nairs: he seems to think that Kydree Amboo is at the bottom of what he calls the unfounded feuds in Cotiote, and that he wishes to be paid to keep that country quiet. If the plan of employing the nairs should be connected with this notion of Major Walker’s, it will require some consideration whether we ought to pay a tribute to Kydree Amboo for our tranquillity. The truth is, that the posts in Cotiote are fully sufficient to keep it in tranquillity, till Colonel Sartorius can find means to reinforce Tellicherry or Cotaparamba, so as to have a little party ready to take the field, and make a dash at any thing which the Pyche Rajah may attempt to collect together. It is now as easy to move troops through that country as through any other that I know of.

‘ I have spoken to Captain Mackay about his mutaseddy, and you will have no further trouble upon that subject.

‘ I will write to you again to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Savanore, 19th July, 1800.

‘ I had received from Mr. Uhtoffe copies of the letters you enclosed. The wants of the troops in Soonda have been entirely relieved since he wrote. I have written to the commanding officer in Soonda to desire him to throw the rice

(now in Sargaum) into Soopah, about which I conclude he also wrote to you. Gordon neglected to provide that garrison, and if it falls I am sure I do not know how it is to be retaken till after the rains.

‘ I have written to the amildar of Bonawasi to desire him to collect all the peons he can, and to drive the banditti out of Soonda; also to the commanding officer in Soonda, to desire him to assist this amildar, and to make another attempt upon Budnaghur in concert with him. If it should fail again, I must take an opportunity of stretching out that way, and the siege will in the meantime be converted into a blockade. The amildar is to advance and take possession of Hangal, to give protection to the inhabitants, &c.

‘ I have not yet heard any thing of my Marhatta friends, and I therefore conclude that they remain in safety under the walls of Darwar. I expect to hear from them this evening, when I shall determine upon my next movement. Mr. Wilson’s letter to Mr. Smece describes the business which I mentioned to you in my letter of yesterday. The advanced posts I find from private accounts received by other hands, are really as well supplied as they were reported to me to be; and I have therefore no fear for them. A small corps collected at Tellicherry to move about from post to post in the triangle, of which we have the three angles, will in my opinion soon send the Pyche Rajah up the ghauts.

‘ ——— is giving Colonel Stevenson some trouble about his allowance, which he receives from the amildar at Chittledroog. The service upon which the latter is now employed is not one likely to last very long, or one for which it is usual to deprive an officer of his command; and I am afraid that if it was so, we should not find people so willing as they now are to quit their garrisons in order to take the field. Our friend here is really most useful to me, and I should not like to tempt him back to Chittledroog by stopping his allowance during his absence. Will you do me the favor to settle with Purneah that Colonel Stevenson is to receive the allowance, and not ——— ?

‘ I am much obliged to you for the trouble you have taken about our carts and stores. I was very anxious about the gallopers, which, by the by, ought not to have been loaded by

the Commissary stores; the latter, however, are in general to be left at Chittledroog; and I still hope that the gallopers will come in from the Toombuddra with the 19th dragoons.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Munro.*

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Camp at Savanore, 19th July, 1800.

‘ I have received your letters of the 7th and 12th, and I have written to your amildar at Bonawasi, to desire him to increase his peons as much as possible, to endeavor to drive the banditti out of Soonda, and to retake Budnapoor, in concert with the officer at Mudnapoor, to whom orders will be sent to make another attempt on that place. I have also desired the amildars, if the attempt on Budnapoor should fail, at all events to turn the siege into a blockade, and to advance and take possession of Hangal, and give protection to the inhabitants on the borders. If we cannot restore tranquillity to Soonda in any other manner, I must stretch out that way myself, which will certainly do the business effectually.

‘ I am prevented from doing so at this moment by the necessity of looking out for the safety of Bowser on one side, and of the remains of Goklah’s army on the other.

‘ I have given Dhoondiah one run, and I have established an opinion of our superiority in our own people, in his army, and in the country in general. His people begin already to leave him. I have not time to write you the particulars.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Munro.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Munro.*

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Camp at Savanore, 20th July, 1800.

‘ I was joined last night by Goklah’s cavalry, and expect to be joined this day by that under Chintomeny Rao. This materially alters my situation as it stood in regard to Soonda. In order to get the corps from Hilleah, it must now come to me; and, on its route, it may as well clear out Budnaghur, and all that country. I have sent orders accordingly; and if guns are wanted for Budnaghur, they will be furnished from



a redoubt which I have upon the Werdah, which is about seven miles from Bancapoor.

‘ Send orders by express to your people, to use every exertion to supply the wants of the corps, and afterwards the same exertions to forward supplies to my troops. I wrote to Mungush Rao this day upon the subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Munro.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S.—I have just received your letter of the 15th, and I shall be obliged to you if you will delay the sale of your rice for a short time.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Savanore, 20th July, 1800.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you that I was joined in the middle of last night by about 1000 of Goklah’s horse; they marched from Darwar yesterday, and say that the remainder of the party, as well as that under Chintomeny Rao, are on the road, and will come in on this day. I have, therefore, no longer any uneasiness about them, or about that quarter, and look only to Bowser. We have had a terrible day and night’s rain, which render the roads in this country almost impracticable for any troops, excepting like those of Goklah; they are frightened out of their wits. This will prevent my marching to-morrow, but I hope on the day after to move forward in great style.

‘ I have no fears whatever for Hullihall, which place for this country is strong at all times; but in this season nothing can hurt it, as it is almost covered by a large tank. I have, therefore, written to the commanding officer in Soonda to detach the 1st of the 4th to clear out Soonda about Budnaghur, and to get possession of that place; and if he finds that he cannot do so without guns, he is to make a requisition for them upon the officer commanding the redoubt on the Werdah.

‘ They will not be more than two marches from each other. After having given a good clearance to Soonda, this corps is to move to the redoubt, at which place I shall have occasion for it as a convoy for provisions, &c. My route will be by Luckmasier, Sirhitty to Doodwar, which place I shall storm,

and then stretch out towards Copaul. I think that I shall be able to keep my rear open by means of this Marhatta cavalry, and you shall hear from me constantly.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, near Luekmasier,  
23rd July, 1800.

‘ In two days at Savanore I was entirely destroyed. I lost, upon a moderate calculation, about half my cattle. I have, however, contrived to crawl here; I am in the midst of large villages full of cattle, which I am now employed in seizing and arranging to departments, and I hope to be able to move on to-morrow. Never surely was there any thing so unfortunate; but I hope to remedy it in some degree. There is nothing so faulty as our bullock system, and its effects are now most severely felt. I assure you that we have never wanted forage at Savanore; it is true the cavalry in the first two days used all there was in the fort, notwithstanding the orders to cut grass for the horses; but still forage was plentiful at the distance of two or three miles. There is, however, clearly so little interest in the preservation of the bullocks in the breast of the bullock-men, that they could not be prevailed upon to go out these two or three miles to bring in forage; in some instances they were driven out; the weather became severe to a degree, and the consequence has been that we have lost half our cattle. We lost only four gun bullocks; and from yesterday’s march I should imagine that the private cattle of the army, and those belonging to the bazaar people, are as well, if not better, than they were on the last day’s march.

‘ I have some suspicion of dubash tricks, such as fictitious owners and maistries in camp, the real owners being conicopolies in the office at Seringapatam; and if I find a real and clear proof of that transaction, I shall send the whole of it to Madras. Mackay swears that it is so.

‘ Dhoondiah is gone to the Malpoorba, and I believe intends to take refuge with the Rajah of Kolapoor. I hear from Munro that there is a vakeel from that Rajah on his way from Goa to my camp, having left at Goa his fellow. I have

written to Uhtoffe to desire him to dispatch the vakeel from Goa to inform his master that he must prevent Dhoondiah from crossing the Malpoorba; and that if he does not do so he may possibly be treated as an enemy by the combined armies of the British, the Nizam, and Goklah. If he stops him at the Malpoorba I think we shall give a good account of him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I have got bullocks, and am able to get on again once more.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp, near Luckmasier,  
24th July, 1800.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I have been able to move this day, and I hope to be at Dummul on the day after to-morrow, where I have ordered Bowser to join me.

‘ Dhoondiah certainly wants to cross the Malpoorba, but he has no boats, and the river has overflowed its banks. General Braithwaite has appointed Nundydroog as the station at which Cuppage’s corps is to be raised, and Bangalore for that of another person; it will be necessary to prevail upon him to alter that arrangement, and I shall be happy to assist in forwarding any view of Cuppage’s.

‘ In the meantime as it is impossible for Cuppage to reside there at present, and as it is absolutely necessary for me to have there some body, I have desired Mr. Read of the 33rd to go over and take charge of the place. He is a sensible man, and understands the language, and will answer well for a time; either till Cuppage is removed there, and able to take charge, or till the officer in command of the corps to be raised at Bangalore shall arrive.

‘ Cuppage has sent me some papers regarding stores and provisions for Nundydroog, which are so incomplete that I can make nothing of them, and I have been obliged to return them to him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Sirhitty, 25th July, 1800.

‘ I arrived here this day, and was joined on the march by Chintmoney Rao and his party, which is called 3000 horse, but is in reality about 1500. Colonel Bowser was at Kanegherry on the 20th, expected to be at Copaul on the 22nd, and I have ordered him to join me at Dummul to-morrow.

‘ You will observe by my letters that I had, on the 1st of July, ordered that a party, such as you proposed, should be assembled at Tellicherry, and I have no doubt but that they will clear out Cotiote in a short time; that is to say, if they behave like men.

‘ The success at Oustara is capital.

‘ Bowser has not a grain of any thing. I have in camp for my own people twenty six days’ rice from the — of July, and there are 1200 bags at Savanore, which will give Bowser a supply to the same period; but send on to us every thing that you can get together.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Dummul, 26th July, 1800.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you that I stormed and got possession of Dummul this morning. I attacked it in three places, at the gateway and on two faces, and carried it with a trifling loss, which was to be attributed chiefly to the eagerness of the soldiers to get upon the ladder, and it broke.

‘ It is a strong stone fort, well built, with a dry ditch. The ladders used were above thirty feet long, and, in my opinion, the fort ought not to have been attacked with them.

‘ Bowser has not joined me yet; I know he is at Copaul, and I ordered him here. I shall not wait for him, however, but shall proceed on my march to-morrow morning.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp right of the Malpoorba,  
opposite Manowly, 31st July, 1800.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you that I have struck a blow against Dhoondiah, which he will feel severely.

‘ After the fall of Dummul and Gudduck, I heard that Dhoondiah was encamped near Soondootty, west of the Pursghur hill, and that his object was to cover the passage of his baggage over the Malpoorba at Manowly. I then determined upon a plan to attack both him and his baggage at the same time, in co-operation with Bowser. His detachment, however, did not arrive at Dummul till the 28th, and was two marches in my rear; but I thought it most important that I should approach Dhoondiah’s army at all events, and take advantage of any movement which he might make. I accordingly moved on, and arrived on the 29th at Allagawaddy, which is fifteen miles from Soondootty, and twenty six from this place. I intended to halt at Allagawaddy till the 31st, on which day I expected Colonel Bowser at Nurgood; but Dhoondiah broke up from Soondootty, as soon as he heard of my arrival at Allagawaddy, sent part of his army to Doodwar, part towards Jellahaul, and part, with the baggage, to this place.

‘ I then marched on the morning of the 30th, to Hoogurgoor, which is east of the Pursghur hill, where I learnt that Dhoondiah was here with his baggage. I determined to move on and attack him. I surprised his camp at three o’clock in the evening, with the cavalry, and we drove into the river or destroyed every body that was in it, took an elephant, several camels, bullocks, horses innumerable, families, women, and children, &c. &c.

‘ The guns were gone over, and we made an attempt to dismount them, by a fire from this side; but it was getting dark, my infantry was fatigued by the length of the march; we lost a man or two; and I saw plainly that we should not succeed, and I therefore withdrew my guns to my camp.

‘ I do not know whether Dhoondiah was with this part of his army, but I rather believe he was not. Bubber Jung was in the camp, put on his armour to fight, mounted his horse, and rode him into the river, where he was drowned. Numbers met with the same fate.

‘ One tandah of brinjarrics, in this neighborhood, has sent to me for cowle, and I have got the family of a head brinjarry among those of several others. I have detained them; but have sent cowle to the brinjarry.

‘ I hear that every body is deserting Dhoondiah; and I believe it, as my Marhattas are going out this night to attack one of his parties gone towards Doodwar. They were before very partial to my camp.

‘ I have a plan for crossing some Europeans over the river to destroy the guns, which I am afraid I cannot bring off; and then I think I shall have done this business completely. I am not, however, quite certain of success, as the river is broad and rapid.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I have just returned from the river, and have got the guns, six in number. I made the Europeans swim over to seize a boat; the fort was evacuated. We got the boat and guns, which I have given to the Marhattas.’

*To Major Munro.*

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,      ‘ Camp at Soondooty, 1st August, 1800.

‘ I have received your letters of the 22nd and 23rd. I have sent orders to the commanding officers of Hullihall and Nuggur to furnish ammunition, in moderate quantities, on the requisition of your amildars; in any quantities you please on your own. Do not press Hullihall too much, as I know they are not well supplied there. Take what you please from Nuggur.

‘ I have taken and destroyed Dhoondiah’s baggage and six guns, and driven into the Malpoorba (where they were drowned) about five thousand people; I stormed Dummul on the 26th of July. Dhoondiah’s followers are quitting him apace, as they do not think the amusement very gratifying at the present moment. The war, therefore, is nearly at an end, and another blow, which I am meditating upon him and his brinjarrics in the Kittoor country, will most probably bring it to a close.

‘ I must halt here to-morrow, to refresh a little, having

marched every day since the 22nd July; and on the 30th, the day on which I took his baggage, I marched twenty six miles, which, let me tell you, is no small affair in this country.

‘ My troops are in high health and spirits, and their pockets full of money, the produce of plunder. I still think, however, that a store of rice at Hullihall will do us no harm; and if I should not want it, the expense incurred will not signify.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Munro.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Soondooty, 3rd August, 1800.

‘ The Marhattas were so slow in their motions to take possession of the fort of Manowly, that the enemy occupied it on the night of the 31st before they attempted to get in. They also appeared so unable to take away the guns, and so unwilling to remain opposite Manowly for their protection, that I determined to destroy them, and did so immediately. I marched here on the 1st, and have halted yesterday and this day to refresh a little, and get matters again into order. Dhoondiah has brought back from the eastward that detachment which he had made to that quarter, and the whole of his force is gone along the Malpoorba towards the jungles of Kittoor and Soonda. I follow him to-morrow.

‘ Bowser’s corps, with an additional regiment of cavalry, and commanded by Colonel Stevenson, proceeds along the Malpoorba, and is to follow his track; I shall go with my troops to-morrow to Belgary, the next day to Kittoor, and shall keep at the distance of about fifteen miles from the river.

‘ The Marhattas will be on the look out between me and Stevenson, and me and Darwar, and thus we shall sweep along that whole line from Darwar to the river, and Dhoondiah must either go into the jungles, or he must go to the southward of Darwar into the open country. If he goes into the jungles we shall easily come up with his rear; if he takes to the plain, I shall cross upon him with my detachment.

‘ It is now impossible for him to get over the Malpoorba, unless that river falls more than is expected at this time of the year ; and even if he does contrive to cross in consequence of the falling of the river, I hope to have means of stopping him on the other side.

‘ The vakeel of the Kolapoor Rajah arrived yesterday ; I had a conversation with him immediately, and made known to him very clearly my sentiments regarding his master. I told him that if Dhoondiah entered his country, I should follow him, and that if he assisted Dhoondiah, he was to understand that I should enter the country as an enemy. That the fort of Manowly had allowed Dhoondiah’s army to encamp under the protection of its guns, and had given shelter to the people who escaped from the Company’s troops across the river Malpoorba, and had fired upon us. That the killadar must either have acted in consequence of orders from his master, or he must have disobeyed the orders he had received ; that in the one case the Rajah must be considered as having committed an act of hostility against the Company, or, in the other, his killadar would deserve a punishment which it would be my duty to inflict, and I desired that he might be given up to me.

‘ The vakeel said that the Rajah was sincerely desirous of being on the best terms with the Company ; that he would positively prevent Dhoondiah from entering his country, and would assemble men for that purpose ; and that the killadar of Manowly should be given up.

‘ He afterwards, in the course of yesterday, consented on the part of the Rajah to admit Baba Sabebe (the younger son of Pursheram Bhow), with his army, into the country, in order to watch and prevent any attempt of Dhoondiah to cross the river. Baba Saheb was yesterday near Badamy ; but I have written to him to ascend the river, and he and the Rajah’s troops will certainly be able to stop Dhoondiah on that side.

‘ It appears to me very clearly that the Rajah of Kolapoor is much afraid of our entering his country at all, on account of our connexion with the Bhow’s family, as he thinks it probable that we should take their part in the quarrel subsisting between the two parties. In all the conversations I have had with the Bhow’s people, I have urged them to make



peace with the Rajah of Kolapoor, as the only means of re-establishing their power in this country, or of keeping out such people as Dhoondiah. To this idea they at first manifested strong objections; but latterly they have listened to it a little more, I believe in consequence of finding that I was not disposed to listen to their propositions to attack the Kolapoor Rajah; and yesterday, in the conference which I had with all the parties in order to arrange the expedition under Baba Sahib, I again urged them to make peace, and desired that both parties should write down what they had to say upon the subject. The Bhow, Lingo Punt, and the Rajah's vakeel, all then declared that they were persuaded it was the only measure which could save the countries, and that they would really do their utmost to bring it about.

'I wrote to Colonel Palmer upon the subject some days ago; and if we can only arrange this matter, and get Appah Sahib appointed sole zemindar, or jaghiredar, upon this frontier, which I also mentioned to Colonel Palmer, we may hope to have matters in Soonda and to the northward of Mysore in tolerable tranquillity. Our friend Munro has sent an amildar into the countries right of the Werdah, who is playing the devil. I have, however, ordered him to the presence, and have proclaimed in the country that he has no authority from me. He is a kind of *rights of men* man, who has ordered the people to pay no revenue to any body, and of course is obeyed. One of the consequences of his orders is, that the peons put into the different villages and forts by the Bhow do not receive their subsistence; they have threatened to hang their havildars, and now plunder the country.

'We have hitherto enjoyed the greatest of all blessings for troops, a quiet rear, and a secure communication with our own country, and I am anxious, to a degree, that it should not be disturbed for any trifling object.

'I think that matters in Cotiote will soon take a favorable turn; Sartorius will certainly by this time have marched to the assistance of the advanced posts.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,                    ‘Camp at Kittoor, 5th August, 1800.

‘I arrived here this morning upon the plan which I stated to you in my letter of the 3rd. Dhoondiah is gone quite into the jungles, and his head is beyond the sources of the Malpoorba. Stevenson is at a place called Eytetul, about six miles from hence, and will follow the tail of Dhoondiah to-morrow, part of which he may probably cut off. I halt here to construct boats, to make certain other arrangements which I am about to detail.

‘1st. It is very certain that as Dhoondiah has crossed by the sources of the Malpoorba, I could follow him by that route; but I must have a communication with this country, which by the same route would be long and difficult, and would be liable to constant interruption from the violence of the rains in these jungly countries. I have therefore determined to have my communication by boats, and at Sungoly, which is three coss from hence, and I halt here to construct the boats, as it is in the neighborhood of a bamboo jungle, and of Darwar, where I can get hides, and it is a plentiful country, with rice, green and dry forage, &c.

‘2ndly. I must throw my sick and wounded into a place of security, and none will answer so well as Hullihall, which place is five coss from hence.

‘3rdly. I propose to make a collection and depôt of rice at Hullihall, and that cannot be done unless I go there myself to have a little conversation with the dubash in office. What do you think of the difficulties stated in procuring the supply for that garrison, when I tell you that about half an hour after my arrival, a buccall of this place told me that he would let me have 500 bags to-morrow, and would make it 1000 before eight days elapsed?

‘4thly. It is necessary to curb Munro’s amildars a little, who are taking possession of every place in the country, whether belonging to friends or to foes, and who have given great disgust to the allies.

‘The first is the only reason which induces me to halt; but I shall have a sufficiency of occupation while I am here.

‘I have made all the arrangements for constructing the boats; and I shall go over to Hullihall to-morrow morning to settle the other points which are objects of my attention.

‘ Although I think I shall be able to fill, in this country, 3000 empty brinjarries which I have got, let Purneah desire his amildars to forward supplies to us as fast as they can.

‘ I wait only for Palmer’s answer from Poonah to begin peace making, according to the plan which I stated to you in my letter of the 3rd. All parties appear anxious for it, and I think that we ought to be so.

‘ Budnaghur is in our hands, and the frontier of Soonda is clearer of the banditti. I hear also that the rogues who went to Nurjin, in Canara, have withdrawn.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Munro.*

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Camp at Kittoor, 7th August, 1800.

‘ I arrived here on the 5th. Dhoondiah had gone even to the sources of the Malpoorba, where he passed, and his baggage is following him. Colonel Stevenson is after them, and will cut off part of the tail, I hope.

‘ I have halted here in the neighborhood of a bamboo jungle, to make boats, which I must have upon the river, in order to keep up my communication with my rear.

‘ I went yesterday to Hullihall, and was glad to see the country so much improved since last year. It is now one sheet of cultivation. The dubash there ought to be hanged, for having made any difficulties in collecting the rice to be stored.

‘ My principal objects in going to Hullihall were to converse with your amildar respecting his operations upon the frontier; and with him and the paymaster’s man, respecting a depôt for my troops, to be made at that place.

‘ In regard to the forts, the allies, respecting whom it would be inconvenient to convert them into enemies at the present moment, are exceedingly offended at their forts being taken from them by a parcel of peons. Besides, to tell you the truth, now that Dhoondiah is off, I do not see what end it will answer to put your guards in the forts on the frontier, excepting to perpetuate confusion.

‘ The Company do not intend, I believe, in consequence of this warfare, to take possession of any territory. To garrison

a fort, then, against the inclination of the person who deems himself, and is supposed by the Government to be the rightful owner, will only tend to bring on a kind of minor contest on the borders, between your amildars and the Marhatta killadars, in which nobody will be gainers, excepting the thieves; and which we, above all other people, ought to endeavor to avoid.

‘ I have, therefore, desired your man to withdraw his people from Jeygoor, &c., which are Goklah’s jaghires; and to use the peons he has raised in preserving tranquillity in that part of Soonda, and not to pass the Company’s borders till he hears further from me.

‘ Many circumstances have tended heretofore to occasion this system of thieving upon the borders; and that of one party giving protection to the robbers of the other, which I hope will no longer exist.

‘ First, the government of this country has been for some time in a very disturbed state, and every man has been accustomed latterly to do very nearly whatever he chooses.

‘ Secondly, the Marhattas undoubtedly took possession of Soonda; and if they were not encouraged to do so, they were not opposed by us, until a very late period, when they broke off a treaty which was pending. They have always, therefore, looked at our possession of that country, with a jealous and an envious eye; and of course saw with pleasure, and rather encouraged, any attempt made to disturb the tranquillity of the people living there under our protection.

‘ I hope now, that, before we shall have done in this country, (if we do not take it for ourselves,) we shall establish in it a strong government—one which can keep the relations of amity and peace. At all events, we have already established a respect for ourselves; we have gained a knowledge of, and have had a friendly intercourse with, the principal people; and it is not probable that they will hereafter be very forward to encourage any disturbance in our country. They see plainly that it is in our power to retaliate; and from what I have seen of their country, and their mode of management, I am of opinion, that at present our robbers would get more than theirs; or, in other words, that they have more to lose than we have. I have had some conver-

sation with them all upon the subject; they promise fairly that nothing of the kind shall happen in future; and I acknowledge that, if we are not to take possession entirely of the country, I rather prefer to trust to what they say, than to the desultory operations of amildars and peons.

‘ In regard to the storing of rice, the dubash swore that he could not get a grain; although the head man of this place, which is only twenty five miles from Hullihall, promised a large quantity in eight days, on the evening that I arrived here. I was, therefore, under the necessity of desiring your amildar (whom I believe to be the brother of Mungush Rao) to exert himself to collect some. He says that he will begin to do so immediately; and he thinks he shall be able to procure a quantity in a short time, which will be of no use to me. He is to put it with the store at Hullihall; to take the receipt of the dubash, and it is to be drawn from thence as I may want it. There was some doubt whether the amildar would not want money for his purchases of grain upon this occasion, as he had given over to the dubash all he had collected. In order to obviate this difficulty, I have ordered the commanding officer at Hullihall to give him whatever money he may want, from the dubash’s treasury, upon his receipt; and I have also desired the commanding officer to inform you whenever he will authorize an issue of money to him.

‘ A store of rice at Hullihall will be a great comfort and convenience to me; and I shall be glad to have it increased to any extent that may be practicable. If you should wish any other arrangement, either for the mode of collecting it, or for that of advancing the money, let me know it, and I will alter that above stated accordingly.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Munro.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Kittoor, 8th August, 1800.

‘ I went to Hullihall and returned again on the 6th, having arranged there every thing I had to do.

‘ Dhoondiah is fairly across the Malpoorba; he left camels, &c., upon the road; but Stevenson has not been able to

come up with any part of his rear. Stevenson is now encamped at Kanapoor, where he proposes to cross the river. Dhoondiah was yesterday morning within three coss of his camp, but he marched in the evening (as it is reported) to the N.E. My opinion is that he is going towards Bauggreecotta, that he will cross the Gutpurba and the Kistna, and get among the polygars of Solapoor, &c., who are dependent both upon the Marhattas and the Nizam.

‘ There was a mutiny in his camp yesterday morning, and there is no doubt whatever that his army is reduced almost to nothing: if we are able to push him a little between the Gutpurba and Malpoorba, we shall probably reduce him so low as to make him a very despicable enemy. In my opinion we ought not to cross the Gutpurba, if that should be the case; but ought to confine our endeavors to giving strength to the chiefs on the frontier, in order to prevent Dhoondiah’s return.

‘ The war will literally have no object nor no end, if we are to follow a single man with a few horsemen to the end of the world; and at the same time, if we do not take some measures to strengthen the frontier, Dhoondiah, or some body else, will certainly return as soon as we withdraw to our own country.

‘ Let me know your opinion upon this subject, in order that I may make a proposition to Government without delay. I have already taken measures to make peace between the Kolapoor Rajah and Appah Saheb.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Kittoor, 10th August, 1800.

‘ I omitted to answer one part of your letter of the 1st instant regarding Reyman Beg, the prisoner at Nundydroog. In my opinion, unless Baba Saheb gives his consent, he cannot be punished, but that may probably be obtained through the means of Captain Kirkpatrick.

‘ Nothing new here. Stevenson is crossing the Malpoorba at Kanapoor, and I am making preparations to cross it at Sungoly. If my native friends were a little alert, I should have twenty boats ready to-morrow.

‘ I heard from Webbe last night, and I am very much concerned to find that he is not going to Poonah. Among other things, he informs me that the five companies of the 12th, and the 2nd of the 5th, are coming up the ghauts, as he says, to enable me to oppose the Rajahs in Malabar. I have already ordered these corps to Seringapatam, there to remain encamped under the Caryghaut hill till further orders; and I have ordered guns to be equipped for them at that place, and every thing else to be prepared.

‘ The question is, in what manner shall they be employed against the Rajahs in Malabar? In my opinion they ought to go below the ghauts as soon as the weather will permit, if Purneah’s people are able to keep the Rajah at all within bounds on the Mysore side of Wynaad; and if I hear from you that that is the case, I shall order them to Cannanore without loss of time. The season will be fair by the time that they will receive my orders, after I shall have heard from you.

‘ If they are to oppose the Pyche Rajah on the side of Wynaad, they must, I am afraid, remain on the defensive, as they are not sufficiently strong by themselves to enter that jungly country; and I am besides informed that it will be impossible to commence operations in it till the month of November.

‘ It may be possible to open the campaign early in Cotiote, and push forward the roads, and establish ourselves at the foot, if not on the top, of the ghauts; and then, if I am in luck, I shall have settled matters here before November, and can march down to Wynaad, and settle matters there before the setting in of the next rains.

‘ Let me hear from you as soon as you can respecting the ability of Purneah’s troops to confine the Rajah to his jungles.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Kistnapah arrived this morning. The 19th not come yet.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp at the right bank of the Malpoorba,  
 ‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, 13th August, 1800.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th instant. The loaded bullocks which come from Mysore sell off their goods as soon as they arrive in camp. We have a bazaar called the Rajah’s, into which they go, and I do not believe they are detained one day. Among these I do not include the brinjaries; they have been detained, as their rice has been issued to the troops through the grain department. But even the brinjaries were detained only once, and that was while the troops were marching from Savanore to Manowly. You may depend upon it that the dealers from Mysore shall not be detained one moment after they arrive.

‘ I have delayed to send instructions for the 12th regiment, and the 2nd of the 5th, till I should hear from you; but by your two last letters I perceive that we must use these troops in the first instance to regain possession of Edatera; however, as the 12th will not arrive at Seringapatam till the beginning of September, I shall still delay to send instructions to the detachment till I hear further from you.

‘ Kistnapah is arrived, and is a little wild; but I have given him a check, and I hope he will go on well.

‘ I hope that we shall not be involved in a war with the Marhattas, on the crude notions of——.

‘ Is it possible that any man can believe that it is Scindiah’s intention to attack the Nizam at this moment, above all others? We have now a strong force in the centre of the Marhatta country, and should have on our side, in case of a contest with Scindiah, all the Marhattas of these parts, and others from the side of Sera, &c. Scindiah’s army has crossed the Kistna; and if the armament has been increased lately, I conceive that he is desirous of co-operating with us in the destruction of Dhoondiah; and, probably, by means of a large force, to check any arrangements of the country on our frontier, which we may think it proper to make. A strong army will give much weight and effect to his intrigues in this part of the country.

‘ There is another reason which most probably has weighed considerably on producing the armament at Poonah. Goklah was looked upon by all the Marhatta chiefs to be invincible,



and he was much respected at Poonah. His defeat and death have had great effect there, and it is not improbable but that these events may have urged the Peshwah to make some exertion. Whatever may be the real motive of Scindiah's conduct, it is certainly not his intention to attack the Nizam at this moment.

‘ I have heard nothing from Colonel Palmer in answer to my letters upon the subject of the arrangements of the countries in our frontier. I do not think it improbable but that Scindiah may himself be desirous of obtaining Darwar and Savanore, as well as Meritch and Tasgaum. I should think it a misfortune if he were to succeed in that object, as without attacking us openly, which in my opinion the Marhattas will always avoid, he will contrive to put an end to the tranquility of our frontier. If the Bhow's family retain possession of these provinces, and we can establish them firmly, we shall be quiet, and we ought to be contented. If Scindiah is to have them, my opinion is, that we ought to ask for compensation for our expenses ; that we ought to push ourselves at least as far forward as the Werdah, if we do not ask for Darwar and the open country bordering upon Soonda. When I talk of the Bhow's family retaining possession of these provinces, I mention them because they have had them hitherto, and are attached to us, and under our influence ; any other family under our influence would answer equally well after a short time : and when I talk of the bad effects of allowing Scindiah to have these provinces, I mean him or any of his creatures ; in short, there ought to be a strong government in this country, the head of which ought to be attached to us ; and I prefer the Bhow's family to any other, because they have had possession, and have it now ; and if we wish to put in another family, we must have a contest to effect our object.

‘ These are my notions, after the fullest consideration, of the state of this country.

‘ All the jaghiredars hereabouts would of course be averse to our strengthening to any considerable degree the hands of the Bhow's family, as they thereby become proportionably weak and insignificant. They therefore now bring forward to notice every little man who has any claims whatever to the soil, such as the Rajah of Kittoor, &c. I receive them all,

call for their co-operation against Dhoondiah in the first instance, and refer the consideration of their claims to the Bhow and to a future period. Hereafter, if the Bhow is supported at Poonah, he will be able to crush all these petty Rajahs, and put them on the footing on which they were heretofore in better times; if he is not supported at Poonah, and we should abandon his cause, the Rajahs will do him no harm.

‘ My friend Kistnapah has taken some of these Rajahs in hand, and has brought them forward. I have, however, given him a hint that the Bhow’s family are my object, and that any man who has any thing to say to the country must look up to them.

‘ I have got three battalions of infantry over the river, and many boats prepared, and I shall not be long crossing the remainder of the troops.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Munro.*

‘ Camp on the Malpoorba,  
16th August, 1800.

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ I wrote to you on the 7th, and informed you of the manner in which Dhoondiah had escaped. A detachment from Stevenson’s corps followed his track, and the road was covered with dead camels, bullocks, and people; but we got hold of nothing.

‘ Bowser has since crossed the river Malpoorba, and has advanced to Shawpoor; and he tells me, that he found many dead cattle and people of all ages and sexes on the road. The people of the country beyond Shawpoor plundered 4000 brinjaries. I am now employed in crossing the Malpoorba, and I hope to be prepared to advance in two or three days. I shall leave something on this side, in case Dhoondiah should double back.

‘ I wrote you fully respecting your amildars on the 7th: since that day I have received a letter from Soubah Rao, (whose name, by the by, I never heard till he put himself in possession of part of the country,) in which he tells me that he will neither come to me, nor withdraw his tannah, without orders from you; and he makes many bad excuses for this determination. I had no idea that he had so many peons as

he says he has (1200), or I should not have called him to me; and I have since begged of him to go wherever he pleases, and never let me see or hear of him again. I agree with you, that, provided he does not disturb my rear, his expedition will do me more good than harm with my allies.

‘ I have put them to the test respecting the thieves you mention at Mundragoor. They promise that the cattle shall be forthwith restored, and that the head men of those villages, which, by their own acknowledgment, are inhabited by thieves only, shall be given up to me.

‘ Your people at Hullihall are behaving capitally: they have sent me leather for my boats.

‘ Captain Greenlay informs me that they will send me some arrack, which I expect from Goa; and this will be a considerable relief to my cattle.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Munro.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp on the Malpoorba,  
17th August, 1800.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I have received your letter of the 12th, and I agree with you that I ought not to follow Dhoondiah further than the Gutpurba, and I should not even have crossed the Malpoorba if it had not been to give confidence to the allies, and to awe the Rajah of Kolapoor.

‘ This Rajah has positively refused to allow Dhoondiah to enter his country, and he has assembled an army to cooperate against him; but it is at such a distance that I can make nothing of it at present. This Rajah appears heartily tired of Scindiah and his politics, and well inclined towards us: if Colonel Palmer is only tolerably firm, this would be the time to send Scindiah to Hindustan.

‘ I am going to give Dhoondiah one more run between the Gutpurba and Malpoorba, and I think I have a chance of picking up some baggage, &c.: it is clear I shall never catch *him*. His baggage has only one way to escape, and that is to recross the Malpoorba near Badamy; but I guard against that by detaching two corps of Marhattas and a brigade of infantry towards Jellahaul, and I pursue him with my troops

along the Malpoorba, Stevenson's along the Gutpurba, and Goklah's and the Mogul's between us, as far as the junction of those two rivers with the Kistna. I think I shall make something of this plan, although I may not probably get hold of him.

‘ I shall write to Government this day respecting my future operations. I can tell you that I have supplies to carry me to Poonah, if that were necessary, and my prospects are improving daily. I was a little anxious about arrack for a few days, but Uhtoffe (who is full of zeal) has sent me a supply from Goa, which will arrive at Hullihall, I believe, this day, and will be here before I can march.

‘ I have reports of 10,000 full brinjaries between this and the Werdah; and I have 3000 out along the skirts of Soonda filling with rice; besides these the Mysore dealers come in apace.

‘ Our price brings a few sheep from this country; and I have encouraged my (Amut Mahal) friend, by paying him for the sheep as they were in numbers at Hurryhur, taking upon the Company (which is only fair) all the loss between that place and the camp.

‘ In short, I have as yet experienced no serious want, and I have more of every thing now than I ever had; I have better prospects before me.

‘ It is supposed that the rivers Werdah and Malpoorba will be fordable in two or three weeks, and that the Gutpurba will be fordable in a month.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Montana has been relieved, but with loss on our side.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Hoobly, 20th August, 1800.

‘ I return the papers from Major Walker. I had before received accounts from Malabar of the relief of the two posts. These roads will not answer unless they do as I desired them at first; that is, cut the underwood to a considerable distance on each side of the road. I have ordered Sartorius to employ the pioneers and coolies on this work immediately, as whatever may be the plan for the next cam-

paign, the communication with Montana must be made secure, or all will be lost. It will be fortunate if Purneah can check the Nairs on the Mysore side; if he cannot, the 12th and 2nd of the 5th must go that way.

‘ If he can check them they shall go to Malabar; and I will send orders to begin by pushing the roads to the foot of the ghauts. Major Walker’s plan of having a force assembled in Mysore, to give room for apprehension in that quarter, would be excellent, if we had troops in Malabar to stand even upon the defensive, or to make such improvements in our roads and posts as are necessary to their security, and to give us the means hereafter of deriving a full advantage from them. But they are so weak in Malabar, their force is so dispersed, and it is so difficult to persuade the commissioners to allow it to be collected, that I am afraid we shall suffer in Cotiote if we should not be able to send thither this reinforcement. However, Mysore is the first object, and if Purneah cannot stop the Nairs, the 12th and 2nd of the 5th must.

‘ I hope to be able to march on the 22nd. Dhoondiah is in a bad way; his people are starving, are leaving him, and reproach him with their misfortunes. He retorts upon them, and desires them to give their wives and daughters to the Europeans, whom they are afraid to fight. This is the report, and that the Patans have left him.

‘ All my arrangements are made, and in a few days I shall press upon him at all points at the same moment.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Munro.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                    ‘ Camp at Hoobly, 20th August, 1800.

‘ I have received your letter of the 14th. My state of supplies is as follows:—I have 1200 loads in the grain department, and 1500 full brinjarries in camp; I am told that I have 5000 between the Werdah and Malpoorba; and as the head man has not deceived me lately, I believe it. Besides that, 3000 brinjarries left me at Kittoor on the 5th, in order to fill along the borders of Soonda, Savanore, and Darwar. There are 5000 brinjarries full, who are following the Nizam’s camp; but some of them, I believe, have only jowarry.

‘ Now for my consumption. It is impossible to say exactly what it is, when every body can get as much rice as he can eat ; as Marhattas, Moguls, and all, go to the same bazaar on one day, and to different bazaars the next ; and it is not practicable to form any rational estimate.

‘ The fighting men of the Company’s troops, to whom alone I allow rice in times of scarcity, consume eighty loads a day, including those of Bowser’s detachment. Thus, then, as long as rice is produced at all in the bazaars, that is to say, while we are in a country which produces rice, I allow about 100 loads of brinjarry to be sold : or, if the country is plentiful, I allow still more. When rice was not to be got in the country, as was the case between the Werdah and Toombuddra, and, indeed, till we came to Kittoor, I allowed none to be sold by the brinjarries, excepting to the grain department ; and I issued it to the troops at the rate of half a seer gratis. They then consumed eighty bags per diem.

‘ At this rate of consumption, I have now in camp some thirty three days’ rice ; and between the rivers, Lord knows what. It is, however, very clear that I am now in no want, and that I am not likely to suffer any.

‘ The brinjarries I look upon in the light of servants of the public, of whose grain I have a right to regulate the sale as I may find most advantageous to its interests ; always taking care that they have a proportionate advantage. But, besides these, there are another set of people who have attended my camp ; these are dealers from Mysore, of whom I have kept no account. They come and sell their grain, and go off again ; and, till we arrived at Kittoor, the rice they brought was all that was sold. Of these, I am told, there are many upon the road at this moment.

‘ I look forward in future to the following sources of supply : first, a few hundred loads at Hullihall, suppose five hundred ; secondly, when the season opens, two thousand one hundred loads, for which I will make the brinjarries go to the Seedasheeghur river ; thirdly, as much more from Canara as you can let me have.

‘ You see, by the state of my supplies, that I can wait till the ghauts are practicable for bullocks ; and I must beg of you to let me know the road, and the name of the place to which I shall send upon the Seedasheeghur river ; and

the districts to which you would wish my brinjarries to go in future.

‘ My ideas of the nature of the Indian governments, of their decline and fall, agree fully with yours ; and I acknowledge that I think it probable that we shall not be able to establish a strong government on this frontier. Scindiah’s influence at Poonah is too great for us ; and I see plainly, that, if Colonel Palmer\* remains there, we shall not be able to curb him without going to war. There was never such an opportunity for it as the present moment ; and probably by bringing forward, and by establishing in their ancient possessions, the Bhow’s family under our protection, we should counterbalance Scindiah, and secure our own tranquillity for a great length of time. But I despair of it ; and I am afraid that we shall be reduced to the alternative of allowing Scindiah to be our neighbor upon our old frontier ; or of taking this country ourselves.

‘ If we allow Scindiah to be our neighbor ; or if the country goes to any other through his influence, we must expect worse than what has passed—thieves of all kinds, new Dhoondiahs, and probably Dhoondiah himself again. If we take the country ourselves, I do not expect much tranquillity.

‘ In my opinion, the extension of our territory and influence has been greater than our means. Besides, we have added to the number and the description of our enemies, by depriving of employment those who heretofore found it in the service of Tippoo, and of the Nizam. Wherever we spread ourselves, particularly if we aggrandize ourselves at the expense of the Marhattas, we increase this evil. We throw out of employment, and of means of subsistence, all who have hitherto managed the revenue, commanded or served in the armies, or have plundered the country. These people become additional enemies : at the same time that, by the extension of our territory, our means of supporting our government, and of defending ourselves, are proportionably decreased.

‘ Upon all questions of increase of territory, these considerations have much weight with me, and I am in general

\* Colonel Palmer was the British Resident at Poonah.

inclined to decide that we have enough; as much, at least, if not more than we can defend.

‘ I agree with you that we ought to settle this Marhatta business, and the Malabar Rajahs, before the French return to India; but I am afraid that to extend ourselves will rather tend to delay, than accelerate the settlements; and that we shall thereby increase, rather than diminish, the number of our enemies.

‘ As for the wishes of the people, particularly in this country, I put them out of the question. They are the only philosophers about their governors that ever I met with,—if indifference constitutes that character.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Munro.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Hoobly, 21st August, 1800.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 18th. I am afraid that the attempt to establish a depôt at Hurryhur, or on the Werdah, would ruin us entirely, as I should find that the brinjaries, who of course, like the other dealers, object to coming to such a distance, would lodge their rice at the depôt instead of bringing it forward. It would be impossible to frame any arrangement to prevent that, and the idea must therefore be laid aside, although it would certainly be desirable to have a depôt, and the nearer the better.

‘ If the dealers from Mysore do not like to come forward, it cannot be helped, we must do without them.

‘ The loss at Montana was very great certainly; but not so much so as is represented by the commissioners, whose letters I return. There is a post half way between Cotaparamba and Montana, called Pyche, which was abandoned, but since the roads have been made, at the particular desire of Sartorius, who had not troops to take care of it. My opinion is, that the Pyche Rajah will now withdraw his people from both those posts in Cotiote, where he has lost many men, and that he will direct his efforts to the Mysore side. If he does withdraw, they should lose no time in throwing in a further supply to Montana, and in making such improvements on the roads as will render the communication more easy in future.



‘ I see no reason why all the troops that can be spared should not be immediately collected, be pushed forward to Cotaparamba, and employed to cover the working parties upon the road between the river and Montana.

‘ I have yet received no intelligence whatever from Colonel Palmer. I suspect that he has made a proposition of some kind to Bajee Rao, as Goklah has just communicated to me a letter from him, in which he desires him to join himself with Appah Saheb and Chintomoney Rao, and settle the country. Baba Saheb and Chintomoney Rao are gone away with Capper; but I do not doubt that they have received letters of a similar tendency.

‘ The system hitherto has been to divide these chiefs, to keep those of the Bhow’s family in the back ground, and to bring forward Goklah.

‘ I have besides private information from Ball Kishna Bhow, that private orders have been sent to Appah Saheb to increase his forces to the utmost degree possible; and Ball Kishna Bhow says, that a blow against Scindiah is meditated, and that he is convinced that I shall receive a requisition through Colonel Palmer to assist in freeing the Peshwah from Scindiah’s clutches.

‘ There is certainly some change at Poonah, otherwise Goklah would not have been desired to join with Appah Saheb; but what that change is, I cannot say.

‘ I received a letter this morning from the commander of Scindiah’s forces; they are on this side of the Kistna. He says that he also is occupied in the destruction of Dhoondiah, and that if he goes towards him he will fall upon him and destroy him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I omitted to inform you, that having received some dooley bearers from Madras, I have discharged seven sets of the Mysore bearers, and have given them their pay to the end of September, to carry them to their villages. I found them so attentive, and they behaved so well in marching with the troops upon all occasions to the attack of all these places, and at Manowly, that I gave them a present of a pagoda each man at the end of last month.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,                   ‘Camp at Hoobly, 25th August, 1800.

‘I enclose two letters from Lieut. Colonel Palmer, from which it is clear that no arrangement can be made in this country, and I shall therefore confine my endeavors to the recommendation of peace to all the parties. In my opinion Scindiah will very soon be in possession of Savanore.

‘I received yesterday a letter from the European commanding officer of his troops, by name Dawes, who says that they have received no orders to co-operate with me, or to interfere at all in the present warfare.

‘Dhoondiah left five guns, a large quantity of ammunition, some arms (Company’s), in possession of the Jalloor polygar, near whose place I encamped the day before yesterday. I sent Colonel Montresor with a detachment yesterday to take and destroy them, and he did so effectually.

‘I hear that Colonel Capper has taken the fort of Hooley, which is about six miles east of Soondootty. I had passed this place on my way to Manowly, and on the day after the action had given it cowle; whether it was taken possession of by some of the fugitives from Manowly, or from what cause I know not, but some of the baggage of the dragoons was plundered by the people belonging to it. I hear from the Marhatta chief that Capper suffered no loss.

‘Dhoondiah made two marches towards Badamy to cross the Malpoorba at Tolusgur; but when he heard of the march of Lieut. Colonel Capper (who must have reached Jellahaul yesterday), he returned, and is now gone to the junction of the Kistna and the Gutpurba. Stevenson is moving down the Gutpurba, and I directly upon him, at the distance of about one march from each river. I could not move along the Malpoorba as I intended, on account of the difficulty of the roads; but I have some Marhattas on all parts of the river.

‘I think I have some chance of falling upon him.

‘To do Colonel Stevenson justice, as soon as I mentioned to him your notion of Major Isaac’s claim to the allowance at Chittledroog, he acquiesced in it, and desired that it might be paid to the Major. I omitted to write to you upon this subject as I ought; but I had many other things to think of.

‘ I have no power to order the repairs of magazines, store-rooms, &c. ; but as soon as Franks sends me the estimates you mention, I shall apply to Government that he may be allowed to make the repairs. As Macintyre is at Seringapatam, I shall make the arrangement you propose for the pioneers, and do every thing else in my power to make Chittledroog a good and useful fort. While writing upon this subject, it occurs to me to mention, that in my opinion we ought to have a post at Hurryhur, with a granary well provided. Hullihall ought to be made a proper post, and to be well stored with grain and provisions, and we may then defy all the Scindiahs of the Marhatta empire. I shall write to Government upon this subject as soon as matters shall have become a little settled.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I enclose a letter from Mr. Uhtoffe, which throws further light upon the intended co-operation of Scindiah in concert with the Kolapoor Rajah.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp at Herty Kernal,  
28th August, 1800.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I am sorry to inform you that Dhoondiah escaped across the Malpoorba at Boodeyhaul on the night of the 24th, the river having fallen considerably on that day. He is gone towards the Nizam’s country.

‘ Stevenson will be at Boodeyhaul, and, I hope, across the river this day ; I shall be at Johughur, and, I hope, across tomorrow. I have made all the arrangements for altering the line of communication for my supplies, and I hope to be able to follow Dhoondiah without inconvenience in a day or two. As soon as I found that he pointed to the eastward, I wrote to Meer Allum, who is at Copaul, and apprized him of the possibility that he might cross the Malpoorba, notwithstanding the measures which I took to stop him ; and I requested him to provide for such an event.

‘ It is to be hoped, that if he has done so, Dhoondiah will not have it in his power to do much mischief before I can approach him. It is said that there are some brinjarries and baggage still on this side of the river ; I do not know

whether that is true or not, but I send a detachment after them to-morrow.

‘ I have received your letter of the 22nd, and wrote to you fully respecting Scindiah and the Kolapoor Rajah some days ago; since that I find that Scindiah’s troops south of the Kistna have attacked a polygar, who was, at my request, on the banks of Gutpurba to stop Dhoondiah; and in his absence on this service have taken his fort of Naibaug. I send the polygar’s letter to Colonel Palmer and to Government. The hircarrahs report that some of his troops are in Dhoondiah’s camp, but that I do not believe. -

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Jellahaul, 30th August, 1800.

‘ I marched seventeen miles yesterday and crossed the Malpoorba at the deepest, but in other respects the best, ford that I have seen.

‘ My opinion still is that Dhoondiah will go to the Soora-poor man; but he may do otherwise. He may seek to cross the Toombuddra and to get among his friends the Patans, and the polygars on our frontier, and the Nizams. My plan is therefore as follows,—to go off myself towards Kanagherry, and to get well into the Dooab with a large number of boats collected at Anagoondy, and when I shall have got well forward towards Kanagherry to push Stevenson at him from his present encampment on the Malpoorba. The Marhattas will be between us. If he commences to cross the Kistna, Stevenson may dash at him at once; if he turns back into Savanore, I move again to my left, and cover my supplies, Bednore, &c.

‘ The Marhattas are so much afraid of him that I can get them to do nothing alone; and that is the reason he escaped this time. They were ordered to push on in front of Capper, and to possess themselves of those parts of the river most likely to be fordable and to get intelligence; but as soon as they heard that he intended to cross the Malpoorba, they kept in Capper’s rear, and no orders or entreaties could get them forward. He could not have dared to cross in their front, particularly as Capper would have been within a

forced march of them ; and at the time he crossed it would have been impracticable for him to return to any of the upper fords without falling into my hands.

‘ I sent Colonel Montresor after the brinjarries, &c. ; he informs me that they were last night at the place where I heard they were, in number 10,000, and he intended to move upon them this morning, so that we shall at least have gained so much by our operations.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Badamy, which I passed yesterday, is a kind of fortified pettah, between two hill forts : these last are much of the same construction with those in Mysore.’

*To Major Munro.*

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Camp at Jellahaul, 1st Sept., 1800.

‘ Unfortunately the Malpoorba fell on the 24th ; and Dhoondiah crossed it on that night, and the next day, at a ford a little above the junction with the Kistna. Lieut. Colonel Capper was then at this place ; and although I had desired the Marhattas to push on for the very place at which Dhoondiah passed, and Colonel Capper entreated them to attend to the orders I had given them, and promised to follow with all expedition, they would not move from the camp. If they had occupied that place, Dhoondiah could not have passed there ; he must have returned to look for another ford higher up the river, and would then have fallen into my hands. He is gone towards the Nizam’s country ; and left behind him on the north side of the Malpoorba, a tandah of ten thousand brinjarries, which I have got. I likewise took and destroyed five excellent guns and carriages, some tumbrils (Company’s), arms, ammunition, &c. &c., which he had left in charge of the Jalloor polygar.

‘ I have crossed the river, and I am going to the Nizam’s country immediately.

‘ I sent off this day eight hundred empty brinjarry bullocks to load in Canara, on the Seedasheghur river. I shall desire them to go by Hullihall, and shall give them a letter to your amildar there. I shall be obliged to you if you will write to

him, and point 'out the place to which you would wish them to go to get the rice.

' I shall also be obliged to you if you will let me know what sum of money you can let me have between this time and the month of November, after providing for the payment of the troops in Canara, till January; when I understand that you begin to make your collections.

' I have money in camp to pay the troops for the months of August, September, and nearly for October.

' I expect at Chittledroog one lac of rupees; so that you see I am not in want; although it is necessary to look forward to the means of procuring a supply in future.

' Believe me, &c.

' Major Munro.'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

' Camp at Kanagherry,  
7th September, 1800.

' MY DEAR COLONEL,

' I arrived here this morning upon the plan which I stated to you in my letter of the 30th August. Dhoondiah is forward in the Dooab, so that so far my plan has succeeded in preventing him from making a dash at my communication. It is said that he has boats with him; if so, I shall push on with the cavalry in order to impede the operation of crossing either of the rivers, and have desired Meer Allum to prepare boats for me at Anagoondy, in case Dhoondiah should by any means contrive to get any large force over the Toombuddra.

' Colonel Stevenson is with three battalions and two regiments of cavalry this day at Moodgul, and I have desired him to have an eye to a large number of brinjaries, and some baggage which are in the jungles about Deodroog, and whose intention it is to cross the Kistna into the country of the Soorapoor Rajah. The Marhatta and Mogul cavalry are between me and Colonel Stevenson.

' God knows whether I shall catch Dhoondiah; but I hope I shall prevent him from doing us any mischief.

' I did not tell you that I had got a tandah of above 10,000 brinjaries beyond the Malpoorba. I have given them 6000 rupees upon *good security*, and have sent them

into Canara to load. I write to Munro upon the subject by their opportunity.

‘ These brinjarries give a curious account of the manner in which Dhoondiah goes on. They say that he has with him still above 40,000 of their class, that he employs them and gives them the means of living in the following manner. When he approaches a village or a town which is unprotected by a fort, he sends a body of horse, and of brinjarries to levy a contribution; he takes to himself all the money he can get, and gives them at a certain low price all the grain and all the cattle they can find. They pay him this price for the gram and cattle, and they are allowed to sell them at such profit as his camp will afford.

‘ They say that he has with him nearly all the brinjarries of this part of India. These people who were taken belonged to the Baramahl, and they say there are many others from that country, from the Nizam’s and Marhatta country. In the latter, indeed, there is not now a brinjarry to be found, and, from the state of Colonel Bowser’s supplies, I should imagine that there can be but few in the Nizam’s country.

‘ I send orders by this opportunity for the march of the 12th regiment, and 2nd of the 5th to Malabar.

‘ For the reasons I heretofore sent to you in my letter of the 25th of August, I do not think that we shall be able to make any arrangement here. The Bhow’s son Baba Saheb spoke to me upon the subject most earnestly a few nights ago, and said that he saw plainly that, unless we interfered, Scindiah would have every thing. I told him that I had seen that long ago, and therefore had urged them to make peace with the Kolapoor Rajah. He seemed anxious to make peace; but, by a letter received last night from the Kolapoor Rajah, it appears that he will not make peace with them, and from the difference of the style of the letter, and from the manner of rejecting my offer to bring about a reconciliation, I am of opinion that he must have received some new lesson from Scindiah. I was informed lately that, in a conversation between Colonel Palmer and Scindiah upon the subject of the differences between the Kolapoor Rajah and the sons of Pursheram Bhow, the latter asked what right we had to interfere in the business, when the former replied

that we never should give up the claim to a certain sum of money due to us by the Rajah. This may not be true, but I have no other mode of accounting for the sudden refusal of the Rajah to listen to my mediation.

‘ The conversation above recited was reported to me by Baba Saheb, when I informed him that we certainly should not take part in their dispute with the Kolapoor Rajah, unless he gave an asylum to Dhoondiah.

‘ The sum of money said to be due is, I believe, the ransom of Malwaur.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Adjutant General of the Army of Fort St. George.*

SIR,

‘ Camp at Yepulpurry, 10th Sept., 1800.

‘ After I had crossed the Malpoorba at Jellahaul, I marched on the 3rd instant, and entered the Nizam’s territories at Hunmunsagur on the 5th. As Colonel Stevenson was obliged to cross the Malpoorba in boats, he was not able to advance from that river till the 4th. It appeared to me probable, that when Dhoondiah should be pressed by the whole of our force on the northern side of the Doob, he would return into Savanore by Kanagherry and Copaul, and would thus impede our communication; or, if favored by the Patans of Kurnool, and the Poligars on the right bank of the Toombuddra, he would pass that river, and would enter the territories of the Rajah of Mysore. I therefore determined to bring my detachment to the southward, and to prevent the execution of either of those designs, if he had them; and afterwards to push him to the eastward, and to take such advantage of his movements as I might be able; while Colonel Stevenson should move by Moodgul and Moosky, at the distance of between twelve and twenty miles from the Kistna, and the Marhatta and Mogul cavalry collected in one body between his corps and mine.

‘ I arrived at Kanagherry on the 7th; and on the 8th moved with the cavalry to Buswapoor, and on the 9th to this place; the infantry being on those days at Huttery and Chinnor, about fifteen miles in my rear. On the 9th, in the morning, Dhoondiah moved from Mudgherry, a place about



twenty five miles from Raichore, at which he had been encamped for some days, towards the Kistna; but on his road having seen Colonel Stevenson's camp, he returned and encamped about nine miles in my front, between me and Bunnoo. It was clear that he did not know that I was so near him; and I have reason to know that he believed that I was at Chinnoor.

‘ I moved forward this evening, and met his army at a place called Conahgull, about six miles from hence. He was on his march, and to the westward; apparently with the design of passing between the Marhatta and Mogul cavalry and my detachment, which he supposed to be at Chinnoor. He had only a large body of cavalry, apparently 5000, which I immediately attacked with the 19th and 25th dragoons, and 1st and 2nd regiments of cavalry.

‘ The enemy was strongly posted, with his rear and left flank covered by the village and rock of Conahgull, and stood for some time with apparent firmness; but such was the rapidity and determination of the charge made by those four regiments, which I was obliged to form in one line, in order at all to equalize in length that of the enemy, that the whole gave way, and were pursued by my cavalry for many miles. Many, among others, Dhoondiah, were killed; and the whole body dispersed, and were scattered in small parties over the face of the country.

‘ Part of the enemy's baggage was still remaining in his camp about three miles from Conahgull; I returned thither, and got possession of elephants, camels, and every thing he had\*.

‘ The complete defeat and dispersion of the enemy's force, and, above all, the death of Dhoondiah, put an end to this warfare; and I cannot avoid taking this opportunity of ex-

\* Among the baggage was found Salabuth Khan, a son of Dhoondiah, an infant of about four years old. He was taken to Colonel Wellesley's tent, and was afterwards most kindly and liberally taken care of by him. Sir Arthur, on his departure from India, left some hundred pounds for the use of the boy in the hands of Colonel Symmonds, the judge and collector at Seringapatam. When Colonel Symmonds retired from service, the Hon. Arthur Cole, the Resident at the Court of Mysore, took charge of him, and had him placed in the Rajah's service. He was a fine, handsome, intelligent youth. Salabuth Khan died of cholera in 1822.

pressing my sense of the conduct of the troops. Upon this last occasion, their determined valor and discipline were conspicuous; and their conduct and that of their commanding officers, Colonel Pater, Major Paterson, Major Blaquiere, Captain Doveton, and Captain Price, have deserved my most particular approbation. At the same time I must inform you, that all the troops have undergone, with the greatest patience and perseverance, a series of fatiguing services.

‘It is also proper that I should inform you how much reason I have to be pleased with the gentlemen charged with the business of procuring supplies for the troops. Notwithstanding the distance of the scene of my operations from the usual sources of supplies, and rapidity of my marches; and the necessity, from the species of warfare carried on, of perpetually altering their direction, I have always been well supplied with every thing which the troops could want.

‘The Marhatta and Mogul cavalry are now employed in the pursuit of the fugitives; and I propose to draw off towards the frontier of the Rajah of Mysore in a few days.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Agnew,*  
*Adj. Gen.’*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp at Yepulpurry,  
11th September, 1800.

‘I have the pleasure to inform you that I gained a complete victory yesterday in an action with Dhoondiah’s army, in which he was killed. His body was found and recognized, and was brought to the camp on one of the guns attached to the 19th dragoons.

‘I had before informed you of my plan of operations in the Dooab. I marched from Kanagherry on the 8th, left my infantry at Nowly, and proceeded on with the cavalry only. I arrived here on the 9th, and the infantry at Shinnoor about fifteen miles in my rear. On the 9th Dhoondiah marched from Mudgherry, about twenty five miles on this side of Raichore, towards the Kistna: but he saw Colonel Stevenson’s camp, turned back immediately, and encamped on that night about nine miles from hence, between this

place and Bunnoo. The night was so bad, and my horses were so much fatigued, that I could not move till morning, although I had intelligence of the place at which he was encamped. After passing a most anxious night between the 9th and 10th, I moved yesterday morning, and met the whole of the enemy's army at Conahgull, about six miles from hence, and three from the ground on which he had been encamped. He had not heard of my being near him, was on his march with an intention of passing to the westward between my detachment, which he supposed to be at Chinnoor, and the Mogul and Marhatta cavalry at Moosky Bilganoor. He, however, drew up in a remarkably strong position when he saw me, and his people, whom I think to have been 5000 in number, stood with apparent firmness. I charged them with the 19th and 25th dragoons, and the 1st and 2nd regiments of native cavalry, and drove them till they dispersed, and were scattered over all parts of the country. I then returned to the camp and got possession of elephants, camels, baggage, &c., which were still upon the ground. If the Mogul and Marhatta cavalry had marched in decent time, the whole body must have been destroyed, as they fled in the line on which they must have met them; but I imagine they did not march till after they had heard that I had moved, and of course were late: they have been employed in the pursuit since yesterday evening, and, I expect, will destroy the whole body.

‘The troops behaved admirably, and I assure you that if they had not done so, not a man of us would have quitted the field.

‘Thus has ended this warfare, and I propose to draw off gradually toward Savanore in a day or two. Lieut. Colonel Bowser, and the Mogul cavalry, will be able to set all matters to rights in the Nizam's territories, and my Marhattas must arrange for themselves.

‘I have this morning received a letter from Colonel Palmer, in which he desires me to hand over to Gunput Rao all the Peshwah's concerns in this country, which man has to my certain knowledge assisted Dhoondiah, and did so even in his escape from me across the Malpoorba. I look upon it that I have now nothing to say to the concerns of the Marhatta country, excepting to get myself out of it;

and I shall accordingly not interfere in any manner in any thing which is going forward.

‘ I wish to have your opinion as soon as possible respecting my route. My own idea is to cross the Werdah at the redoubt, to proceed from thence by Shikarpoor, and along the left bank of the Toombuddra to Oostara, and thence to Seringapatam. My reason for preferring this road is that I may awe Kistnapah Naig into a peace, and next because I shall do less injury to the country on that road than on any other. It is a grass country; will afford plenty of forage, and as the cultivation is in general paddy, it will not be injured. You can have no conception of the number of people and cattle that I have got with me; and I shudder at the thoughts of the injury which they will do to any dry grain country through which they will pass. I had some thoughts of crossing the Toombuddra at Anagoondy; but I should lose much time there from the want of boats, the difficulty of procuring them, and the rapidity of the river. Besides, it will be convenient to pass by the redoubt, in order to get some things which are there. If I pass by the redoubt, there is no doubt but that the road I propose is the fittest, and that on which I am likely to do least damage. Purneah, however, will be the best judge on this subject, and I will move any way he pleases. Let me hear from you soon, that I may make my arrangements accordingly in good time.

‘ This country is in a terrible state, almost a desert, and where there are inhabitants, no authority. The Nizam’s killadar of Chinnoor had a regular tappall posted, in order to give intelligence to Dhoondiah. He wrote to him on the 8th, to inform him that I was to be on that day at Nowly, and on the 9th at Chinnoor; and it is incredible what pains he took to induce me to go no further. I was not to be prevailed upon, however, and came on here, and by coming put a stop to the communication. Thus Dhoondiah was not apprised of my situation, and even had reason to believe that I was at least fifteen miles farther from him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. It has occurred to me, that now that we shall be able to carry on the war in Wynaad, it will not be necessary

to send down the 12th and 2nd batt. of the 5th regiments to Malabar; and it will be very inconvenient to send away the latter particularly. We must have some kind of force to the northward of Mysore when I go south. I can manage so as to have a sufficient number of Europeans for Wynaad, but I cannot of natives, without the 5th battalion. Let me hear from you upon the subject, what are the intentions of Government.'

*To Major Munro.*

'MY DEAR MUNRO,                      'Camp at Yepulpurry, 11th Sept., 1800.

'I have the pleasure to inform you that I gained a complete victory yesterday, in an action with Dhoondiah's army, in which he was killed. His body was recognised, and was brought into camp on a gun attached to the 19th dragoons.

'After I had crossed the Malpoorba, it appeared to me very clear, that if I pressed upon the King of the Two Worlds, with my whole force, on the northern side of the Dooab, his Majesty would either cross the Toombuddra with the aid of the Patan chiefs, and would then enter Mysore; or he would return into Savanore, and play the devil with my peaceable communications. I therefore determined, at all events, to prevent his Majesty from putting those designs in execution; and I marched with my army to Kanagherry. I sent Stevenson towards Deodroog, and along the Kistna, to prevent him from sending his guns and baggage to his ally the Rajah of Soorapoor; and I pushed forward the whole of the Marhatta and Mogul cavalry in one body, between Stevenson's corps and mine.

'I marched from Kanagherry on the 8th, left my infantry at Nowly, and proceeded on with the cavalry only; and I arrived here on the 9th, the infantry at Chinnoor, about fifteen miles in my rear.

'The King of the World broke up on the 9th, from Malgherry, about twenty five miles on this side of Raichore, and proceeded towards the Kistna; but he saw Colonel Stevenson's camp, returned immediately, and encamped on that evening about nine miles from hence, between this place and Bunnoo. I had early intelligence of his situation; but the night was so bad, and my horses so much fatigued, that

I could not move. After a most anxious night, I marched in the morning, and met the King of the World with his army, about five thousand horse, at a village called Conahgull, about six miles from hence. He had not known of my being so near him in the night,—had thought that I was at Chinnoor, and was marching to the westward with the intention of passing between the Marhatta and Mogul cavalry and me. He drew up, however, in a very strong position, as soon as he perceived me; and the victorious army stood for some time with apparent firmness. I charged them with the 19th and 25th \* dragoons, and the 1st and 2nd regiments of cavalry; and drove them before me, till they dispersed, and were scattered over the face of the country. I then returned and attacked the royal camp, and got possession of elephants, camels, baggage, &c. &c., which were still upon the ground. The Mogul and Marhatta cavalry came up about eleven o'clock; and they have been employed ever since in the pursuit and destruction of the scattered fragments of the victorious army.

‘ Thus has ended this warfare †; and I shall commence

\* Afterwards the 22nd light dragoons.

† ‘ G. O.

By Major General  
Braithwaite. }

‘ Head Quarters, Choultry Plain,  
24th Sept. 1800.

‘ The operations of the force employed under the Hon. Colonel Wellesley on the frontier of Mysore have been frequently marked by circumstances which demanded and obtained the applause of the Commander of the army in Chief; but in no instance has judgment in the plan, and gallantry in the execution of a military movement, been so eminently conspicuous as in the conclusion of the campaign of the 10th instant; when the rebel chief, Dhoondiah Waugh, baffled by the judicious disposition of Colonel Stevenson’s detachment. in his attempt to escape in a northern direction, was intercepted in his retreat at Conahgull by Colonel Wellesley, with the cavalry of his division only; and forced to a decisive action, which terminated in his total defeat and death. Colonel Stevenson’s detachment on the same day dispersing the remnant of his force, then employed in crossing the Kistna near Deodroog, and seizing the remaining cannon and baggage of the rebel army.

‘ Major General Braithwaite requests that Colonel Wellesley will accept this public thanks for the judgment with which his measures have been planned, and the vigor which has marked every movement of his force. He has particular satisfaction in publishing to the army at large, the very honorable report Colonel Wellesley has made of Colonel Stevenson’s conduct, and the activity of the detachment under his command, to which that officer attributes the occurrence of the opportunity he seized of forcing Dhoondiah to a decisive action. And the Commander of the army in Chief is happy to record, in honor of his

my march in a day or two towards my own country. An honest killadar of Chinnoor had written to the King of the World by a regular tappall, established for the purpose of giving him intelligence that I was to be at Nowly on the 8th, and at Chinnoor on the 9th. His Majesty was misled by this information, and was nearer me than he expected. The honest killadar did all he could to detain me at Chinnoor, but I was not to be prevailed upon to stop; and even went so far as to threaten to hang a great man sent to show me the road, who manifested an inclination to show me a good road to a different place. My own and the Marhatta cavalry afterwards prevented any communication between his Majesty and the killadar.

‘The brinjarry bags must be filled, notwithstanding the conclusion of the war, as I imagine that I shall have to carry on one in Malabar.

Believe me, &c.

*Major Munro.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘Camp at Yepulpurry, 12th Sept., 1800.

I have just received a letter from Government, dated the 27th of August, and another private letter from Webbe: by the former of which I am ordered, at all events, to remain some time in the Marhatta territory; and by the latter the cause of this order, and the nature of the negotiations now pending at Poonah and Hyderabad, are explained. Of

Majesty’s 19th and 25th regiments of light dragoons, and the 1st and 2nd regiments of native cavalry, that those corps, under Colonel Pater, Majors Paterson and Blaquiere, and Captains Doveton and Price, composed the line, whose rapid charge upon a body of 5000 horse, formed to receive them, achieved this glorious conclusion to a campaign, distinguished throughout every stage of its operations by peculiar and progressive energy.

‘The Hon. Colonel Wellesley has expressed his obligation to Lieut. Colonel Bowser for his services with his detachment from the subsidiary force; and reported, in the warmest terms of praise, the uniform good conduct of the troops in general, under circumstances of uncommon fatigue and difficulty, incident to the nature of the recent service. The advantages derived from the able arrangements of the gentlemen charged with the department of supply have been pointed out to the particular notice of the Commander of the army in Chief; and he is happy in adding this record of their merits to the general expression of his thanks to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, and the army employed under his orders, on the recent service on the frontiers of Mysore.’

course the order must be obeyed, and I shall take up a convenient position in front of Savanore, I now think, on the borders of Soonda, in order to get rice; but it will be necessary that exertion should be used to force on our brinjaries, &c. It would be very desirable that they should bring a larger proportion of rice, and a smaller of dry grain: they have latterly brought little else than gram; and as for Bowser's brinjaries, about whom so much boast has been made at Hyderabad, they have brought nothing but dry grain, and that chiefly jowarry. There has not been a grain of rice in Colonel Bowser's camp that I have not supplied him.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘Camp at Yepulpurry, 13th Sept., 1800.

‘Ball Kistna Bhow came to me yesterday, and urged me in the most pressing manner to give an asylum to his family in the Mysore country. He seemed to wish for a place of safety for them at Chittledroog; and I promised him to write to you upon the subject, and to request you to mention it to Purneah.

‘He says that it is certain that as soon as we withdraw from the Savanore country Scindiah will enter it, and will destroy the whole of the Bhow's family; they are determined to oppose him as well as they can, and they are desirous that their families should remain under our protection.

‘To this measure I see no objection, particularly as we have reason to believe that the Peshwah secretly favors this family; and as it appears to be the intention of Government either to come to an arrangement at Poonah, which will drive Scindiah to Hindustan, or to interfere in the Marhatta politics in such a manner, that he and his Frenchmen shall be kept away from our frontier.

‘The Bhow again yesterday said that something was brewing at Poonah, and that the Peshwah was determined to shake off Scindiah, and had intimated to Appah Saheb his wish that he should increase his forces to the utmost extent possible. He hinted that their intention was, when they should have placed their families in safety under our protec-



tion, to go with their light armies to join Amrut Rao, who, they say, is collecting troops at or near Bassein.

‘ I hear that the treaty at Hyderabad is concluded, and I am in momentary dread of receiving an order to detach thither the troops which are to form the increased subsidiary force. I have only 1892 Coast and 1200 Bombay sepoy, and I am sure you know that Mysore cannot afford another. I have been obliged to do all the duty of convoys, &c., by means of Marhatta and Mysore cavalry and peons; and if I had not done so, my battalions would probably on a march have shown about 100 men each. I have written to Webbe, however, upon the subject, have stated the impossibility that I should be able to make these detachments, and perform the other services pointed out for me, and I hope that he will adopt some means of procuring the additional subsidiary corps without calling upon me.

‘ Ball Kistna Bhow says, that all eyes at Poonah are directed to this army, and that our movements from this time forward will have great effect in determining Scindiah’s.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I have omitted to mention to you that I have received a report from Colonel Stevenson, stating, that on the 10th he had come up with the only two remaining pieces of cannon the enemy had, baggage, camels, bullocks, &c., brinjaries, &c.; that he had taken, dispersed, and destroyed the whole. The cannon belonged to the Soorapoor polygar, and were destroyed in his country. Thus the business has been completed.’

*To the Adjutant General of the Army of Fort St. George.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Yepulpurry, 13th Sept., 1800.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you that I have this day received a report from Colonel Stevenson of his proceedings on the 10th instant; by which it appears that near Deodroog he came up with and took the only two remaining guns the enemy had, a quantity of baggage, camels, bullocks, brinjaries, &c., and that he dispersed and threw the whole into confusion. Their object had been to pass the Kistna, and to go to Soorapoor: the guns belonged to the Soorapoor

polygar, and were destroyed in his country; and Colonel Stevenson found his people employed on the Kistna, giving assistance to the baggage to pass the river. Thus the service upon which the troops have been employed has been completely performed.

‘ I attribute the opportunity which was given of destroying the enemy’s army to the movements of the detachment under Colonel Stevenson: in no part of the army has there been greater exertion, or more fatigue, nor has it been more cheerfully borne; and I conceive Colonel Stevenson, Lieut. Colonel Bowser, and the officers and troops under their orders, to be entitled to my approbation, and to the favorable report of their conduct which I now make to you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Agnew,*  
*Adj. Gen.’*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Yepulpurry, 14th Sept., 1800.

‘ I have received your letter of the 8th. Purneah’s observations upon the harvest in Bullum had already occurred to me, and my idea was to destroy it, if Kisanpah Naig should refuse to settle matters with Purneah, when I should approach his country with my troops. The fertility of Bullum, and the constant intercourse between that district and Koorg, to which it will be impossible to put a stop, is what constitutes the difference between Kisanpah Naig and the Pyche Rajah, and render it more desirable to come to an arrangement with the former than with the latter. If we destroy the harvest in Bullum this year, Kisanpah Naig will still find means of subsistence, and we must perform the same operation in the next year. The Pyche Rajah, on the contrary, has no communication with Koorg, and draws all his subsistence either from Mysore or from Malabar, countries in our possession. Means might and ought to be taken by the Commissioners to stop the trade in grain between the coast and Wynaad, and thus the Pyche Rajah would be much distressed. But I am afraid that the destruction of the harvest in Bullum will do no more than create a temporary inconvenience.

‘ When I thought that the success of the 10th instant

would enable me to return to Mysore immediately, I turned over in my mind the propriety of halting the 12th regiment and the 2nd battalion of the 5th, in order to form a part of the corps which should operate upon Wynaad from the Mysore side. It appeared that when I should go so far to the southward, I ought not to leave the northern frontier so much exposed as it has been lately, and that when I should have provided sufficiently for the strength of this frontier, I should not have a body of troops such as, in my opinion, ought to be collected to be sent on the expedition to Wynaad. However, upon looking over my papers regarding the relief of Montana, I found that at that post they had provisions only for fifty two days from the beginning of August, and therefore that measures ought to be taken as soon as possible to throw in a further supply. I recollected that in one of the papers sent to you by the Commissioners, it was stated that the post must be relieved again before October, and that a large body of troops ought to be collected for that purpose; and I referred to a private letter which I have received upon the subject from Disney, who was at Telli-cherry, in which he tells me that the troops employed upon the last occasion did not behave as grenadiers ought. I therefore determined, at all events, that as Government had sent these corps to Mysore merely to enable me to oppose the Pyche Rajah, they should go, in the first instance to Malabar, even if the arrangements to be made to provide a sufficient force for the northern frontier, while I should be to the southward, should oblige me to bring them back to Mysore, in order to form a sufficient detachment to enter Wynaad.

‘ You are now in possession of all my reflections upon this subject, and of the considerations which induced me to allow those corps to march to Malabar, even although I thought it probable that I should want them in Mysore, for the very purpose for which Government sent them to me. You are nearer the scene of action, however, than I am; you must have had later intelligence from Malabar than I have, and must be a better judge whether it will be necessary that those corps should descend the ghauts, in order that Montana may be relieved. If you should think that they ought allow them to march on according to the orders they have

already received. If you should not think it necessary, send the enclosed letters to Lieut. Colonel Harcourt and to Colonel Sartorius; and upon hearing from you that you have done so, I will transmit further instructions to Lieut. Colonel Harcourt.

‘ But, to tell you the truth, I do not think that we shall ever make any hand of Kisnapah Naig till we can bring the army into his country, and can spare troops to establish in it a post of our own.

‘ Another mode of providing troops for Malabar occurred to me, but that again is attended with great inconvenience: it is, to send them from Canara, where matters are now tolerably quiet. But they suffered so much inconvenience from detaching their old soldiers upon the attack and fall of Jemalabad, that I am afraid I should get nothing at present but the recruits. I will speak to Lieut. Colonel Montresor respecting the man for M. Kenzie. I have been detained here this day on account of a violent fall of rain last night, but I march to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Sartorius.*

SIR,

‘ Camp at Yepulpurry, 14th Sept., 1800.

‘ I have been under the necessity of ordering the 12th regiment and the 2nd battalion of the 5th to halt at Seringapatam, if they should still be there, or to return thither if they should have marched from thence, according to my former orders, as it is necessary that they should remain in Mysore.

‘ You will therefore provide for the relief of Montana without the assistance of these corps.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Sartorius.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. Lord Clive.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Nowly, 16th Sept., 1800.

‘ I have this day had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s letter of the 9th instant.

‘ My letter to the Chief Secretary of Government, of the

12th instant, in answer to his letter of the 27th August, will have informed your Lordship that, in obedience to your orders, I should remain in the Marhatta territory; and I shall look forward to the measures to be further adopted, in case of the occurrence at Poonah of either of the two events which the Governor General thinks possible at the present crisis.

‘It does not at present occur to me that any place, excepting Darwar, would be of any service to me in the operations which may be necessary. I wrote to Lieut. Colonel Palmer to request that he would obtain an order from the Peshwah to have that post given over to my charge, in case of either of the events against which your Lordship is providing.

‘I imagine that the arrangements which I have already made of the country which has passed through my hands in the course of the contest with Dhoondiah Waugh, viz., to give it over to those who had possession, and who enjoyed its revenues previous to his rebellion, is perfectly agreeable to the Peshwah’s wishes and to the laws and customs of the Marhatta empire. I know from Lieut. Colonel Palmer that it was agreeable to his Highness to have these countries delivered to the sons of Pursheram Bhow, and I believe that their possessions in the provinces of Darwar and Savanore were never confiscated. Those which they had north of the Kistna, at Meritch and Tasgaum were confiscated, as Lieut. Colonel Palmer says, in consequence of the violence of Scindiah; the latter were, I understand, strictly military jaghires; the former were given to Pursheram Bhow as payment of a debt for expenses incurred in the former Mysore war; and I am informed, and it is probable, that of these they have never been deprived.

‘Those parts of the Marhatta territory in which I have been, which are not, as I have above described, in the possession of the family of the Pursheram Bhow, are either the jaghires of other chiefs, who have, or ought to have, bodies of troops in the service of the empire, which are maintained from the produce of the land; or they are divided among polygars, who pay a pesheush to the Peshwah, or to the jaghiredars; or they belong immediately to the Peshwah, and the revenue is collected by the officers of the Poonah

sircar: but there are tuncaws\*, either for the payment of different garrisons, or of the army of Goklah, upon the whole amount of the peshcush due by each polygar, and upon the whole amount of the revenue of the sircar, not granted to the family of the Pursheram Bhow or to the jaghiredars.

‘ In the course of the campaign in the Marhatta territory, I delivered over to each individual that which belonged to him, and to the officers of Government those districts belonging immediately to the Peshwah; and by this arrangement I secured the tranquillity of the country, and its resources, which was all that I could desire.

‘ I do not apprehend that any inconvenience will arise hereafter from an adherence to this system; or that it will give reason to the friends of Bajee Rao to doubt of the sincere disposition of the British Government to act effectually in his behalf; and I am afraid that the adoption of any other system would deprive me of the cordial co-operation and assistance of those chiefs who have acted with me hitherto, would create doubts generally of our views, and that I should be obliged to break up my force into detachments, in order to secure any new arrangement of the country which I might make.

‘ From what I have above mentioned of the state of these countries, your Lordship will observe that I should have no chance of procuring from them any supplies of money or of provisions (excepting for payment) if I were to call for them.

‘ The revenue in the Marhatta territory, particularly since Dhoondiah’s rebellion, is collected only by force, and I should get none of it, excepting by making detachments from mine. But it is all appropriated to particular purposes, either to pay a debt, to pay jaghiredars who have troops in the service of the empire, or to pay the Peshwah’s troops and garrisons. These, I must observe, are considerably in arrears, and all the chiefs have come to me at different times to request to borrow money to satisfy their demands. Thus it is probable that I should find great difficulty in procuring any money from the country; and that by the demand of it, I should distress those whose assistance

\* Orders on the collectors of the revenue.

would be very desirable in case of the occurrence of one of the events expected at Poonah.

‘The same facts and reasoning apply to the demand of provisions ; I get them sent, as I want, for payment ; and I am afraid that the demand of them upon receipt would not only have the bad effects I have above attributed to the demand of supplies of money, but that I should not be able to procure them at all when wanted.

‘Excepting to call upon the Rajah of Kolapoor to prevent Dhoondiah from entering his country, I have not had any communication with him. As Scindiah’s force south of the Kistna is large, as he has lately added to it two battalions, and as it may be reinforced by the army of the Kolapoor Rajah, I wrote to Captain Kirkpatrick to suggest that, in case the subsidiary force at Hyderabad should not be employed otherwise, upon the occurrence of one of the expected events at Poonah, it might be of importance that I should have the power of calling for Lieut. Colonel Bowser’s detachment, and, therefore, I request that it may be left in the Dooab under my orders.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Right Hon. Lord Clive.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Nowly, 17th September, 1800.

‘ I have received your letter of the 11th, and I have spoken to Captain Mackay respecting the bullock man, to whom he writes by this post. All the superannuated bullocks are at the grazing ground near Seringapatam.

‘ I enclose you the copy of a letter from the Military Board to Government, upon which my opinion has been called for. All the places mentioned therein ought to have stores of rice, if they are to be kept as garrisons ; but in my opinion Cowleydroog ought to be destroyed, as ought Chandergooty, and the depôts of grain for this frontier ought to be at Hurryhur and Hullihall. I admire the attention to economy in the Military Board, which doubtless induces them to lay all the expense and trouble of storing the grain on the Rajah’s dewan. I shall give Government a hint upon this subject in my answer to their letter ; and shall

leave it to you to fight the battle, in order to throw all the Company's concerns off the shoulders of Purneah.

‘ I enclose the duplicate of a secret dispatch from Colonel Kirkpatrick, which will point out that it is probable that we must look for the means of establishing depôts at stations much more forward than are thought of by the Military Board. I have received one of a similar tendency from Lord Clive, of which most probably a copy has been sent to you.

‘ I shall remain in preparation in the Marhatta territory. I have written to Kirkpatrick to recommend that I may have the power of calling for Lieut. Colonel Bowser's detachment, if it is not intended that the whole subsidiary force should act in case of the occurrence of one of the events expected at Poonah. I have written to Palmer to request that he will ask the Peshwah for an order to the killadar to give me Darwar, which order is to be delivered into his hands only in case of the occurrence of one of those events.

‘ I expect one lac of pagodas in silver from Madras, which will pay the troops in November; I have besides written to Munro to know what he can spare, and I expect to get 50,000 pagodas from him; if I could besides ease Mackay of 50,000 pagodas, or Graham, it would enable me to go on till the beginning of the year. I expect Munro's answer every day, and I shall be obliged to you if you will write to Macleod and to Captain Graham. The Rajah's monthly payments I reckon upon only as sufficient to pay the monthly expense in Mysore, and I do not meddle with them for that reason.

‘ If I do advance to Poonah, we must look out at Bombay for money and other supplies in the beginning of the year, and I have all the arrangements ready for that purpose.

‘ As to money from the Marhatta territory, or provisions without paying for them, it is all a joke. The money must be collected by a military force, and I have none to spare; and if I was to attempt to take provisions upon receipt, I should probably get none for money when I might want them. Besides, the whole revenue of the Marhatta territory south of the Kistna belongs to jaghiredars, who maintain troops, to the Bhow's family, or there are tuncaws upon it for the maintenance of the Peshwah's army under Goklah, or for that of his garrisons, such as Darwar, &c. Not only I



should get none of it, but I should distress and dissatisfy those who do, from whom I now receive most cordial assistance.

‘ In regard to Colonel Kirkpatrick’s fears respecting the transfer of the government of the country to the Bhow’s family, I have explained to him fully the nature of their claim to any part of it, and that of the arrangement, which I have made as follows. The government of Poonah granted posts of the Savanore and Darwar countries to Pursheram Bhow as payment of a debt for expenses incurred in the former Mysore war: I do not imagine that the family have ever been deprived of those possessions by the Peshwah, although they have been deprived of their military jaghires of Meritch and Tasgaum, which have been surrendered to Scindiah.

‘ The arrangement which I made was, to give over to every man that which he had previous to Dhoondiah’s rebellion, and among others to the Peshwah’s officers those parts of the country which belonged to the sircar, although there were tuncaws upon the revenues: of course the Bhow’s family received their share of the country among others. I do not conceive that there is any thing in this arrangement to give to the adherents of Bajee Rao reason to doubt of our real intentions to act in his behalf; and I think that the adoption of any other arrangement at the present moment would create numberless doubts, would throw the whole country into confusion, and would require an army, which I have not, to carry it into execution.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. Since writing the above I have seen Mackay again, who proposes that all his bullocks should move up the river to Tenaherra, where they were last year, excepting about 200, which must be near Chittledroog, in order to bring on the money when it arrives from Madras. He says that he will be glad to delay to give over to Purneah the superannuated bullocks till we return to Mysore. At Tenaherra the bullocks can do no harm, and will have plenty of forage, and the bullock men cannot interfere with the cultivation.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘Camp at Kanagherry, 18th Sept., 1800.

‘I have received your letter of the 14th, from which I judge that you will have been agreeably surprised at our complete success against Dhoondiah.

‘I am rather desirous to keep the Mysore horse and peons for a short time in order to assist my convoys in case matters should turn out at Poonah as expected, and my friends here should not relish the part which we shall take. You have the power to keep the 12th, and 2nd batt. 5th, if you wish it.

‘Believe me, &c.

*Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘I enclose a duplicate of Lord Clive’s letter to me in case you should not have received a copy of it.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘Camp at Copaul, 22nd Sept., 1800.

‘It is wonderful that my letter of the 11th did not reach you sooner.

‘My bazaars are most capitally supplied; I have every thing that I can want in them. But it will be necessary to keep the grain merchants in motion towards us.

‘I have sent near 7000 brinjarry bullocks to Munro, and I hope that he will be able to furnish them with loads before long; I shall have 1800 loads of rice in the grain department: there is no want of sheep, and I have drawn large quantities of arrack from Goa to Hullahall, where I propose to have a depôt of this necessary article.

‘If we get Darwar I shall move this arrack, the rice which I have at Hullahall, the garrison reinforced by some Europeans from Goa, and some natives from Canara to the former place.

‘In a day or two I shall be able to arrange my bullock department in some kind of style. The camp equipage presses upon me sadly, and I cannot prevail upon Government to come to the determination to make the officers carry their own tents. In bad weather it is impossible to carry officers’ tents at the rate which we march.

‘ We have had some very heavy rain here, and the swelling of a nullah has detained me this day. I am sorry for this, as I think that my stay here will give some uneasiness to our friend at Hyderabad.

‘ Meer Allum told me that the sole object of the Court at Hyderabad now was to amass money; that for this alone they sacrificed their territory, their honor, and their troops; that they wanted to involve us in a war with the Marhattas for their security, and that when that object should be effected they would disband all their troops (of which they had but few remaining), save all their money, and depend upon us for their defence. He said that the transfer of territory to us was a great object to them, as they found they could not govern it without troops, which they were determined not to raise. He said that he had stated this to ————— upon his return from Madras, before he heard of his tricks in his family; but that ————— passions had then thrown him into the hands of Aristo Jah, and that he would do nothing.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Cadloor, 24th Sept., 1800.

‘ The reason why the brinjaries bring so much gram is, that in our bazaars it sold for almost as much as rice did. Latterly it has fallen, and is now twenty nine seers for a rupee. The process was just this: they bought in Mysore sixty seers for a rupee, and these they sold here for six rupees. They could not have bought sixty seers of rice for less than three rupees, and they sold in general at nine seers for a rupee. You see that the profit is evidently on the side of gram. I write to Seringapatam upon the subject of the dealers in Ganjam; but there has been a system of dubashery there lately which has annoyed me considerably, and I am afraid that if it has not been put a stop to, in consequence of what I have already written to Saxon, the people, whom I have taken such pains to induce to come to the place, will leave it.

‘ The grain at Seringapatam is paddy, and the operation

of beating it out is slow. All the beaters are now employed in beating it, and it is sent forward to the army on the bullocks hired for the public service. If there is more rice beat, however, than there are bullocks to carry, it might be given to the dealers in Ganjam at a cheap rate, to be brought forward to the army, and I will write to settle an arrangement upon this subject.

‘ I wish that my instructions permitted me to move forward to the Kistna immediately, as I should do so with many advantages. In the first place, I should cut off that detachment of Scindiah’s troops, now on this side of that river, and in the next place I should be certain of the co-operation of all my allies. They are now going off, some to keep the Dessarah feast at their jaghires, and others on other occasions; and I dare not hint to them that I may have further occasion for their services, as they would immediately discover the object. Colonel Palmer says, in his letter of the 7th, “ he (the Peshwah) is in a manner a prisoner in the hands of Scindiah, who has posted a large body of troops in the city, on pretence of compelling a chief, called Prittee Niddee, to dismiss a party of Arabs from his service, but in reality to watch and control the motions of the Peshwah, whom he suspects of an intention to withdraw.”

‘ Refer to my instructions from Lord Clive, and the letter from Kirkpatrick, and let me know whether you think me warranted to advance in consequence of that paragraph. The advantage in doing so is evident; and besides those above mentioned there is this additional one, viz., that if the crisis does not already exist (if the Peshwah is not already a prisoner or has not made his escape), I shall force it forward; and otherwise Scindiah by his position in Poonah may keep matters in that state that he will be perfectly certain that the Peshwah cannot make his escape, although he will not have found it necessary further to secure his person.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Dummul, 25th September, 1800.

‘ I some time ago promised Mr. Sullivan that a relation of his should be recommended for the first vacant ensigncy in

the 33rd regiment, but I rather believe that he has been appointed an ensign in another corps. If that should be the case, which Lieut. Colonel Shee will know, Mr. Morris will be recommended for the ensigncy now vacant in the 33rd. I write to Lieut. Colonel Shee upon the subject by this post.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. Upon talking with West regarding an ensigncy for Mr. Morris, I find that there is no vacancy in the 33rd: there ought to be two vacancies; but we are obliged to keep on the strength two gentlemen, whose removals from the regiment have not been approved of in Europe. I will recollect your wishes regarding Mr. Morris.’

*To Major Munro.*

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,      ‘ Camp at Dummul, 26th September, 1800.

‘ After receiving my letter of the 14th, I hope that you will have sent the rice to Ankola, notwithstanding that you will before have stopped it, as you state in your letter of the 22nd, and that you will have allowed the brinjaries to go into Canara by the Arhigh ghaut, as you first proposed. If, however, you should have ordered them down to Cundapoor, it does not much signify, as I have plenty; and I am going over towards Soonda, from which country I expect to draw enough for my consumption during the time that I may find it necessary to remain in its neighbourhood.

‘ Between ourselves, I imagine that I shall have to carry on operations on a much more extended scale than you suspected; but I am well prepared for everything.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Munro.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Dummul, 27th Sept., 1800.

‘ I have received your letter of the 22nd; I told you before what steps I had taken, in order to procure directions from the Peshwah to Bappojee Scindiah to give up to me the fort of Darwar, and I am in momentary expectation of receiving Lieut. Colonel Palmer’s answer to my letter upon

that subject, whether the Peshwah complies with my request or does not. If I am to advance to the Kistna, I must have Darwar; and I have already made all the arrangements for getting into it in some manner or other. I have told you that I shall move thither the garrison of Hullihall, reinforced by Europeans from Goa, and that I shall establish there the supplies of arrack and rice which I have collected at Hullihall. This last place shall be given over to Mungush Rao and his peons.

‘ My force is very respectable, and passes for much more than it is; I have besides called upon Kirkpatrick to leave Bowser under my orders, if it is not intended that the whole of the subsidiary force and of the Nizam’s army should co-operate on the north side of the Kistna. No answer yet from that quarter.

‘ My fingers itch to begin; I should break that detachment to pieces which has been pushed across the Kistna; should by that means gain a powerful body of allies, which I reckon upon only as so many taken out of the opposite scale, and should have the whole game in my hands immediately. If the Kistna falls, that detachment will escape to the northward; and Scindiah, if he has spirit, will collect there, and endeavor to make a stand.

‘ I look upon myself to be fully equal to all he can collect, if I can keep together my allies. They are of use in protecting my rear, my baggage, and my camp. If I had not had them my cavalry would have been much distressed; and yet they would not have kept off the Pindarry horse half so well as the Marhattas did in the late service. Scindiah has not got a very large body of country horse; but he will of course have some, and they would distress me much if I should have none.

‘ The object of the force on this side of the Kistna is to seize this country the moment that I shall withdraw from it. This is the opinion of Lieut. Colonel Palmer, and he has repeatedly so stated it. I do not believe they yet suspect our intention to interfere at Poonah.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                    ‘ Camp at Sacoonda, 29th Sept., 1800.

‘ I had heard, from Mr. Warren, of the behavior of Colonel Harcourt’s dubash, and I propose to write to the Colonel upon the subject this day.

‘ A part of our cavalry, viz. a detachment of the 1st regiment, is at Coimbatoor in the Carnatic; and I am informed that many of the men have already recovered. I shall write to General Braithwaite to request that your cavalry guard may be relieved by a detachment from the 1st regiment at Coimbatoor. I think the state of Mysore will be unpleasant when we get to a distance. Seringapatam requires so large a garrison that it runs away with all our troops; if we could remove the inhabitants from the fort, one battalion would be sufficient for the garrison at present; but as it is, we cannot leave the arsenal there unprotected, and it would be so if the garrison were smaller.

‘ I have long wished to remove my regiment from thence, as they have been uncommonly unhealthy; and it is Anderson’s opinion that they will not recover till they are moved out. But we must have there an European regiment as long as the inhabitants are there; and how to replace them I know not.

‘ We have had terrible rains, and I am stopped here.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. I wish that you would take into consideration the mode of repairing the buildings to be used as granaries and provision store-rooms in Mysore. It is impossible to do it by means of the commanding officers. First, they have never been a sufficient length of time in a place to be able to do much good, and I do not see any probability that this circumstance will be altered soon: secondly, it is not to every one that I should think it proper to entrust the execution of these repairs: and thirdly, they find great difficulty, on account of the many works going on in the country, to procure workmen to repair the buildings to be occupied by themselves and their troops. This being the case it might

perhaps be possible to get the amildars to undertake these repairs (after the heavy part of the country work shall be gone through), the Company paying the expense. Turn this subject over in your mind, and let me know the result.

‘ I have written to Government respecting the formation of depôts of grain, and I have recommended that they should be at Chittledroog, Hurryhur, Hullihall, Nundydroog, Seringapatam. Those at Hurryhur and Hullihall will of course be moved forward, if all the pending arrangements are made.

‘ I have scouted the notion of throwing all the expense of the depôts on the Rajah and the trouble on his servants, on the ground of the inexpediency of allowing the servants of one government to have any interference or connection with the concerns of the other; and have recommended that if the expense of forming depôts for the Company’s troops is to be paid by the Rajah, it may be a separate transaction, to be arranged in the usual manner; but that the depôt may be formed by, may be in charge, and be disposed of by the Company’s servants.

‘ I have recommended all that you desired for Chittledroog. I have given orders to have the troops moved from Chundergooty and Cowleydroog, and I have desired the officers in charge to deliver the forts, provisions, stores, &c. to the amildars, taking their receipts for the same. I shall be obliged to you if you will mention this to Purneah. The provisions and stores in both these forts belong to the Rajah, according to the arrangement of Government made last year; but I think that Purneah will do well to dispose of or remove them.

‘ I think that a breach ought to be made in Cowleydroog. It borders upon the Polygars; as long as we hold Nuggur it can be of no use; and if it is kept in repair, those circumstances which might render it necessary that we should occupy it with troops, would render it very inconvenient to spare any for that purpose. However, it is an ancient place about which prejudices may be entertained, and at all events the palace must be kept in repair.

‘ I wrote to Purneah a letter in Persian, in which I recommended his three officers now with me, but particularly



called his attention to Govind Rao. The reason is only because he is not so high in the service as the others; for I have had every reason to be pleased with them all.

‘I see that I have made my postscript longer than my letter.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘Camp at Nalloody, 1st Oct., 1800.

‘I have received a letter from Webbe, dated the 25th September, in which he informs me that he has written to Lieut. Colonel Mackay, to desire him to halt at Seringapatam with his corps. It is intended that it should form a part of the Nizam’s subsidiary force; and Webbe proposes that it should march through the newly ceded districts to join Lieut. Colonel Bowser in the Dooab, as soon as the completion of the new treaty at Hyderabad shall be commenced at Madras.

‘I propose to send orders to Lieut. Colonel Mackay to move up to Chittledroog, and he can then move to Anagoondy and join Lieut. Colonel Bowser whenever that may be thought proper.

‘It appears not to be intended to attempt to make any great effort against the Pyche Rajah in this season; and I am therefore clearly of opinion that the 12th regiment ought likewise to be stopped. They will certainly be wanted in the Mysore country for one of the many objects in view; and as the 88th regiment is expected in Malabar from Bombay, the 12th regiment will not be much wanted there. If you should agree in opinion with me, I shall be obliged to you if you will forward to Lieut. Colonel Harcourt, as soon as possible, the letter which I enclose for him. At all events, Lieut. Colonel Harcourt is too late to relieve Montana, if, as we imagine, that post now wants relief.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘Camp at Nalloody, 2nd Oct., 1800.

‘I received your letter of the 27th yesterday, and the other to the 29th in the course of last night.

‘ I am obliged to you for the arrangements respecting grain. I will take care that the dealers shall not be detained in camp one moment.

‘ Some settlement regarding the camp equipage is absolutely necessary. I am now obliged to take 300 bullocks from the grain for that department, and the whole number now provided for it since the end of July is 1200. This falls entirely upon the grain.

‘ As soon as you hear from Webbe, that the money will be sent into Canara by one of the ships of the squadron, Munro may be desired to send up to Nuggur a sum proportionate to that which will be sent round. I will give orders to have every thing ready at Nuggur to forward it to the army.

‘ The history of Captain ——’s conduct is quite shocking. A particular caution was given by me to Lieut. Colonel Mignan, when I desired him to send these troops through the Rajah’s country; which caution I conclude he gave to Captain ——. There is no remedy for this conduct, excepting to bring this gentleman to a Court Martial as soon as possible; and I shall be obliged to you if you will write me a public letter upon the subject.

‘ The bygarry system is not bearable: it must be abolished entirely, or so arranged and modified as to render it certain that the unfortunate people employed as coolies are paid, are not carried farther than their usual stage, and are not ill treated. When all that is made certain, it will be found cheaper and more convenient for these gentlemen to hire coolies than to trust to the chance of procuring brinjarries on the roads, and there will be but little call for the latter. In truth, the public service but seldom requires the brinjarries: I know of no instance in which they have been required, excepting by the Bombay troops, who have nothing of their own, and are unwilling to pay for what they get belonging to others. It seldom happens, also, that individuals want them; and when a want of them does exist it is generally to be attributed to the laziness, the neglect, or the misconduct of the person who suffers it. In my opinion, therefore, the system may be abolished without inconvenience; but, in any event, it may be modified, and people may be prevented from calling upon the country for brinjarries whenever they think proper.

‘ Besides Captain —, I have another Bombay gentleman in my eye, who has lately come through this country with a convoy of arrack, and I suspect played the same tricks; that is to say, never paid the people pressed and employed by him in the public service. I have desired that inquiries may be made upon the subject, and if I find my conjecture to be founded I shall try him at the same time with Captain —.

‘ I informed you yesterday that Webbe had written to Lieut. Colonel Mackay, to desire him to halt at Seringapatam; and as the 12th would certainly be too late for the relief of Montana, and the 88th are coming down to Malabar, I requested you to forward the letter I sent you some days ago to Lieut. Colonel —. I received last night a letter from that gentleman (from whom and of whom I have received nothing but complaints since he entered the Mysore country), in which he informs me, that as Webbe’s letter to Colonel Mackay was private, and as the orders to halt the 2nd of the 5th had not come through him, he should not allow Lieut. Colonel Mackay to halt, but would march on the 30th, according to the orders he had received before from me. I have written to him this morning, to desire him to halt immediately, and to return to Seringapatam if he should have marched, and to allow Lieut. Colonel Mackay to obey any orders he may receive.

‘ I think it probable that Lieut. Colonel Mackay will have refused to obey his order to march; and if so, we shall have a fine kettle of fish at Seringapatam; but, in any event, I don’t think the Government will pass over his refusal to allow an officer to obey their orders, although conveyed in a letter beginning ‘ Dear Colonel.’ I find that his dubash is a fellow, by name Sauny, who had formerly been dubash to poor Aston, and who, when I was with the army last year, came up to Seringapatam, under pretence of being my dubash. He plundered the country all the way up, and, when arrived at Seringapatam, began the old dubash tricks, to turn people out of their houses, to threaten others in various ways with his and my displeasure, in case they did not conform to his wishes in every respect. At length I heard of him, and wrote to Colonel Sherbroke, to

desire him to turn him out of the town, and of the Mysore country.

‘ If the Colonel does not dismiss him from his service after what I have written him, and the perusal of the papers from Ooscotta, &c., which I have sent him, I shall be obliged to order him to send him away. There is an officer of reputation and rank in the army, of great family connexions, &c. &c., ruined in his outset by the scum of the earth.

‘ I am obliged to you for your sentiments in answer to my letter of the 24th. I have already written to Lieut. Colonel Palmer to request from him the earliest and most accurate intelligence regarding the crisis wished, and waited for; and I conclude, that the Governments of Bengal and of Fort St. George will have given him directions to communicate to me every thing that passes. But I suspect that the communication between Colonel Palmer and me, and indeed that between him, and all other parts of India, has been interrupted. I do not find that Captain Kirkpatrick has heard from him since the 7th of September, the date of the last letter I received; Uhtoffe certainly has not; and I suspect that the Government of Fort St. George has not received a letter from him even of so late a date as that, as Webbe does not mention the state of Poonah (as described by Colonel Palmer) in his letter to me of the 25th of September, received yesterday.

‘ I will write to him, however, as you propose. There are two circumstances which induce me to wish not to begin, as you propose, by advancing to the Gutpurba, under the pretence of seeing how matters stand with my friends the Polygars, to the northward of that river. In the first place, when I do advance to the Kistna, I must look forward to the further operation intended, and must make my arrangements accordingly. One of the most important of these is to get possession of Darwar. If I go forward, upon the pretence under consideration, I cannot take possession of Darwar in the name of the Peshwah; indeed I do not see in what manner I could demand that place, without declaring war against the whole Marhatta race. If I go forward, without having possession of Darwar, I must either return to take it, or I must make up my mind still to go forward without

having it in my possession. Either would, in my opinion, be attended with infinite disadvantage to the operations which are intended hereafter.

· Secondly, the reason for not making the conduct of Scindiah towards my friends, north of the Gutpurba, the pretence for moving to that river is, that I find that Scindiah is strictly right in having taken possession of their places. They are dependent upon the jaghire of Meritch and Tasgaum, which has been granted to him by the Peshwah; and although it would have been more generous to desist from taking possession of their countries till another opportunity he had a right to them, and must eventually have taken them. Under these circumstances I am afraid, that to pretend to move to their assistance will have the effect which Government are most desirous I should avoid. It will give to the Peshwah's friends doubts, whether our intentions are to assist him, or to reinstate in their former power the family of Pursheram Bhow. For these reasons, which I think will also be conclusive with you, I deem it better not to advance till the crisis arrives, which is expected. It may certainly fairly be said, that when a man's capital is in the possession of the troops of another, all his friends imprisoned, and his own person only not under restraint, he is under the power of that other. But the danger of acting upon the state of affairs, as they are now at Poonah, arises from the indecision, the weakness, and duplicity of the Peshwah's own character. To these bad qualities I attribute the strictness of the orders which I have received, viz., to advance only in case he should be in confinement, or should fly. Suppose him not to be in confinement, and that I were to adopt the measures proposed by Government, were to take possession, in his name, of all the countries south of the Kistna, and to place garrisons in those situations most convenient to my operations; and that he were to fly off and to declare that I had no authority from him, that I was an enemy, and was to be treated as such, Government or I would be in a scrape, from which it would be difficult to extricate either of us. In truth, if the Peshwah is not in confinement he has the power to call for our assistance; and if he does not call for it, we have no right to force it upon him. By the same reasoning, if, as long as he has the power, he omits to con-

clude with us that treaty so advantageous to him, and so often offered, we ought to suspect his sincerity, and ought not to interfere in his affairs till the last extremity. From all these reasons then, in my opinion, I ought not to move till the crisis is certain.

‘ I have spoken to Mackay regarding his bullocks near Seringapatam. There are on that grazing ground 500, mostly old and unfit for the service; they are placed between the road to Periapatam and the river Cauvery, therefore far north of the probable haunt of the Nairs. Mackay says, however, that if there is any danger they may as well be moved; and proposes a place for them on the north side of the river, also near Seringapatam, where they were heretofore.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Palmer.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Hoobly, 3rd October, 1800.

‘ I had yesterday the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th of September, which was opened in Scindiah’s camp, on this side of the Kistna.

‘ I conclude you have been furnished with a copy of the instructions which I have received from the Right Hon. the Governor in Council of Fort St. George.

‘ I am directed to maintain my position in the Marhatta territory till one of two events expected to occur at Poonah takes place, when I am directed to adopt the further measures pointed out in my instructions.

‘ There will be no difficulty in acting in case of the occurrence of one of the events. If the Peshwah flies from Poonah, there can be no ambiguity in that step; and I shall immediately know in what manner I am to act. But it will be difficult to judge at what time his person is imprisoned.

‘ When you wrote to me on the 7th of September that Scindiah had occupied Poonah with his troops under pretence of disarming a party of Arabs, but really to watch the Peshwah, and to prevent him from making his escape, which his Highness meditated; and when I heard from other quarters that guards had been placed over the houses and

persons of all his Highness's friends and adherents; and all that could be said in regard to the Peshwah was, that he was not immediately under a guard, I concluded that the crisis was nearly arrived, and I expected every moment to receive further intelligence which would enable me to act.

‘ But I now find that on the 15th the crisis was farther removed than it was on the 7th; and it is desirable that I should receive from you a statement of your sentiments regarding this part of my instructions.

‘ At what time am I to understand that the Peshwah is in imprisonment? The difficulty which occurs in the decision of that question arises from the wiliness of Scindiah, and from the weakness and duplicity of his Highness's own character. When I received information that Scindiah had possession of the city, by introducing there his troops, and posting guards over the Peshwah's adherents, and had most probably taken possession of all the avenues to his Highness's palace, I should have had no scruple of acting immediately as I was instructed, only that there was reason to fear that his Highness would disavow every thing that I should do in his behalf.

‘ I conceive that this duplicity in his Highness's character is the cause of the strictness with which my instructions are worded. In truth, if his Highness is at liberty at all, he can call for our assistance if he wants it; and it may not be deemed assistance if it is given to him before it is called for. What, then, is the degree of *duress* which is to constitute imprisonment? My opinion is, that when the secret provisional commission commences to exercise its functions, when Amrut Rao and the Peshwah's friends think that it is necessary for them to take a decided part for the restitution of his authority, I ought to begin to act, whatever may be the degree of restraint in which his Highness's person is held. I do not conceive that it will be safe or proper to do so in any other case, excepting when I hear that there is actually a guard over the person of the Peshwah. I should be glad to receive your opinion upon this point.

‘ I shall also be much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give me every information of Scindiah's proceedings, of his strength, &c. &c., in order that I may be able to act promptly, as may appear best for the public interest.

‘ It is unfortunate that this crisis has not occurred, as I should certainly cut off that detachment which has been pushed across the Kistna before it could repass that river ; as it is, I am afraid that the river will become fordable, and that the detachment will find means to escape before the occurrence of either of the events which will authorize me to act.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Palmer.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. Lord Clive.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Hoobly, 3rd October, 1800.

‘ I have come here in execution of your Lordship’s secret instructions of the 9th of September, and I propose to remain in this neighborhood until the occurrence at Poonah of one of the events expected by your Lordship. There will be some difficulty in ascertaining the exact moment at which one of them may occur. From the manner in which Scindiah has gone on hitherto, I judge that he may long be completely master of the Peshwah’s person, and may guide all his actions, and there may be no outward sign of his Highness’s imprisonment ; at the same time, until there is such an outward sign, I do not conceive myself authorized by your Lordship to act.

‘ If, upon conviction that the Peshwah’s person is really in imprisonment, although he should not be actually under a guard, I should take possession of all the countries south of the Kistna in his Highness’s name, and he should afterwards disavow all I should have done, which from the indecision and duplicity of his character is not improbable, I should be in an awkward situation, from which I should find it difficult to extricate myself.

‘ If he is really under a guard, this cannot happen. Scindiah, however, it is probable will never go so far, although he will make it equally certain that the Peshwah cannot escape, and cannot act without his knowledge. Thus between the weakness and duplicity of one party, and the willingness of the other, the time of action will pass by.

‘ Under these circumstances it has occurred to me to address Colonel Palmer a letter, in which I have stated to



him my opinion of the species of *duresse*, attended by other circumstances, which will render it safe for me to act on behalf of the Peshwah under your Lordship's instructions, short of an actual imprisonment of his person under a guard.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a copy of my letter to Lieut. Colonel Palmer upon this subject.

‘ I have received a letter from Captain Kirkpatrick, in which he informs me that Lieut. Colonel Bowser's corps will remain in the Dooab, liable to be called upon by me if I should find its assistance or co-operation necessary. Captain Kirkpatrick also informs me that it is intended that a part of the remainder of the subsidiary force, and a large proportion of the Nizam's cavalry and infantry, should likewise co-operate with me eventually.

‘ I have recommended to Captain Kirkpatrick that magazines of grain, rice particularly, should be forwarded in the Dooab, and on his Highness's frontier, north of the river Kistna ; as we may apprehend want when all these troops are collected.

‘ I also take the liberty of suggesting to your Lordship the propriety of requesting the Governor General to have sent round to Bombay, as early as possible, a large quantity of rice from Bengal ; also that Mr. Duncan should be apprized of the possibility of a call for rice from Bombay, and should be requested to have all the means prepared of transporting it to the nearest situation, at which it will be most convenient for the cattle of the army to receive it. With your Lordship's permission I shall immediately communicate with Mr. Duncan on this point.

‘ I have already proposed to Colonel Close the means of procuring a supply of money for the month of December : I beg leave to submit to your Lordship that there ought besides to be one lac of pagodas at Bombay for the use of this army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Right Hon. Lord Clive.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Hoobly, 3rd October, 1800.

‘ I omitted to mention to you yesterday that I thought it probable that a relief would be required for some of the Mysore dooley bearers with the army, who have been with it for a considerable length of time. A few in addition to those now with it may also be desirable.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Hoobly, 3rd October, 1800.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday I have received a letter from Lieut. Colonel Palmer, dated the 15th September, in which he says, “ the Peshwah is not at present under that degree of restraint in which he was when I had the honor of writing to you last, Scindiah having withdrawn all his troops except one battalion from the city; he is however still narrowly watched and attended by the spies of that chief to prevent his flight, which he certainly meditated, though I doubt his resolution to attempt it.” Thus you see matters are farther from the expected crisis than ever, and it behoves me to attend strictly to the spirit of my instructions. The Peshwah is just in that state from which he can extricate himself by the twinkling of an eye if he wishes it; and, being in that state, if he does not express a wish for our interference or assistance, I do not see in what manner we can give it to him.

‘ I shall remain in this neighborhood between this place and Hullihall until the crisis arrives, or I shall receive orders from Government to withdraw from the Marhatta territory entirely. In my opinion I shall receive those orders. This crisis, which appears farther removed on the 15th than it was on the 7th of September, must have been expected and talked of early in August, at which time Colonel Palmer must have written to Calcutta the circumstances which occasioned Colonel Kirkpatrick’s letter to me of the 25th August. The Marhattas, it is true, are slow; but can it be believed that this plan of the Peshwah’s, this secret commission, and all these arrangements which have been talked of at Poonah

for the last two months, have not come to the knowledge of Scindiah, and that he has not taken every measure in his power to prevent their accomplishment ?

‘ It appears now by Lieut. Colonel Palmer’s letter, that the Peshwah has never signed the grant of the jaghires of Meritch and Tasgaum to Scindiah ; and the Colonel tells me that he has remonstrated strongly against the violence used towards my friends north of the Gutpurba. I neither know nor care what the result may be.

‘ The Peshwah’s conduct in the affairs of these jaghires shows clearly his duplicity, and his fear of our influence. When first pressed on the subject by Colonel Palmer at my instigation, he would not listen to our proposition to restore these jaghires to the Bhow’s family, but swore that he had been forced by Scindiah to surrender these possessions to him. He at the same time told Colonel Palmer that he had secretly encouraged the Bhow’s sons to oppose Scindiah in his attempt to take possession of them. It now turns out that he has never given them to Scindiah. At Scindiah’s solicitation he has sent an order (as Colonel Palmer says) to the Bhow’s family to give up to the Rajah of Kolapoor the fort of Manowly ; at the same time Colonel Palmer says he has sent them secret orders to resist that which Scindiah has got to deliver the fort to the Kolapoor Rajah, and to assert that they have my direction to maintain possession. How is it possible to account for this system of deceit ?

‘ This appears to be a magnificent place.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Munro.*

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Camp at Hoobly, 6th October, 1800.

‘ I have received your letter of the 27th September. I have been ordered by Government to remain for some time in this country ; and I have come here in order to eat rice, which I propose to draw from the borders of Soonda, without using any brought from Mysore by my brinjarries. You will, therefore, perceive the necessity that my brinjarries should return to me to the northward ; but I am not in a

hurry about them; and it does not much signify if they do go to Cundapoor and Mangalore to receive their loads.

‘ I fancy that you will have the pleasure of seeing some of your grand plans carried into execution; all that I can say is that I am ready primed, and that if all matters suit, I shall go off with a dreadful explosion, and shall probably destroy some campoos and pultans, which have been indiscreetly pushed across the Kistna; that is to say, if the river remains full.

‘ I have written to Colonel Close about your money, which I shall want. The only reason why I cannot get it is, that you are obliged to keep enough in your hands to pay the troops in Canara, &c. till January. I have written to desire that a sum of money for that purpose may be sent round from Madras, in one of the ships of the squadron; and whatever sum I hear that they will send, I will draw an equal one from you; that is the only mode that occurs of procuring the supply of money which I shall want in December.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Munro.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Hoobly, 7th October, 1800.

‘ I enclose the crime on which I propose that Captain —— should be tried. Let me know whether it will be convenient that the evidence against Captain —— should come to camp, as otherwise I am afraid that the trial must be delayed for some time. If it should be convenient for them to come here they shall be detained only while it is necessary.

‘ I knew that Colonel Harcourt would be too late for the relief of Montana. I have received from Colonel Sartorius a letter of the 27th September, by which it appears that the operations were going on well, and that but little loss had been sustained. No news from Poonah.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. Lord Clive.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Hoobly, 9th October, 1800.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s letter of the 2nd instant, and I am prepared to proceed to whatever point your Lordship may order me, or to make such detachments as you may think proper. The acquaintance which I have obtained in the late war of the characters and views of the Marhatta chiefs in this part of the empire, renders it my duty to state to your Lordship the effects which are to be apprehended from weakening, to any degree, this body of the troops, by whose exertions we hope to accomplish all that is wished at Poonah.

‘ The object appears to be to establish the legal power of the Peshwah over the Marhatta empire. In order to effect this, Scindiah must be removed to his own territories. It is not to be supposed that he will relinquish all that he has been endeavoring to obtain for the last four or five years without a contest; and all the chiefs of the Marhatta empire look to the event of this expected contest with the utmost anxiety. They will join the one party or the other, according to their own ideas of their relative strength, and of the chances of ultimate success: and in case of our interference, which is not expected, the question with them will be, whether our force employed is sufficient to get the better of that which will be brought against us by Scindiah.

‘ It therefore appears necessary that, at least at first, the interference of the Company should be by the means of a powerful body of troops, such as will convince the whole Marhatta empire of our firm determination to attain our object, and to establish the Peshwah in the enjoyment of the whole of his legal authority. The force which I have at present under my command in the field, consists of 690 European dragoons, 975 native cavalry, 142 British artillery, 1160 British infantry, 3538 Native infantry, including sick, present and absent, of which there are but few. This force, with the assistance which may be expected from the subsidiary troops at Hyderabad, will be fully sufficient; but any diminution of it, or any detachment made to other parts of the Company’s territories, will occasion doubts of our in-

tentions to adhere steadily to our object till it is accomplished.

‘ The assistance of the chiefs of this part of the Marhatta empire is necessary to us for several reasons.

‘ First ; they give protection to our convoys of provisions which must come from Mysore ; if we could suppose that they would remain neuter in this contest, we should still experience great difficulty and inconvenience from the necessity of detaching our own troops from this small force for the protection of our convoys. But they will not remain neuter. If they do not join the enemy, they will, under various pretences, render the communication with Mysore so difficult, as to be almost impracticable.

‘ Secondly ; by having them with me, the country in my rear will certainly be in tranquillity, and I shall draw from it all the resources which it can afford. The whole of the Marhatta empire is divided in jaghire among the Marhatta chiefs or polygars, as I heretofore represented to your Lordship ; and each of these chiefs can command the resources of his own jaghire. The jaghiredar or polygar, who will doubt of our success, and will wish well to the cause of the enemy, will of course impede our progress by the various means in his power. This I experienced in the late contest in several instances ; and it is probable I should experience it in many more in a contest, the object of which will be, in whose hands the power of the empire should be placed hereafter.

‘ Thirdly ; by having the Marhatta chiefs with me, I keep so many out of the opposite scale.

‘ I may therefore conclude that, if this object is to be attained with celerity, we must have on our side the largest proportion of the Marhatta chiefs in this part of the empire ; they will not come forward unless they are clearly convinced by the efforts which we shall make, that it is our firm determination to attain our object.

‘ Under these circumstances it has occurred to me to consider of the means of collecting a body of troops from Mysore for the Ceded countries, which will be at least equal in size to that which I should conceive myself authorized by your Lordship’s orders to detach.

‘ In consequence of your Lordship’s orders to halt the

2nd batt. 5th regiment, in order that it might join the subsidiary force at Hyderabad; and as I foresaw that there would be some difficulty in collecting a force for the districts to be ceded by the treaty, which augments the subsidiary force, I ordered the five companies of the 12th also to halt at Seringapatam, in order to form a part of the detachment to take possession of the Ceded countries.

‘ I have reason to believe that the 88th regiment is coming to Malabar, and the 12th will be no longer necessary in that province. There are eight companies of a battalion of Bombay sepoys at Nuggur, which I would propose to relieve by a small detachment from the province of Canara, and to move the former to Chittledroog, when they should join the five companies of the 12th, and the 2nd batt. of the 5th. I would also propose to add to this detachment seven companies of the 33rd, leaving at Seringapatam only three companies of that corps. There is a detachment in the field in the Nundydroog district, which might be moved forward into Gurrumconda, and would still cover the Rajah’s territories. Thus there would be twelve companies of Europeans, and eight companies of natives, besides the detachment in the Nundydroog district, and guns, which could enter the Ceded districts immediately, if your Lordship should approve of that arrangement.

‘ If the Resident at Hyderabad would consider one of the corps of this army as belonging to the subsidiary force, the 2nd of the 5th might likewise remain in the Ceded countries.

‘ I shall propose to your Lordship that this force should be kept collected in one body to be thrown on any point when their exertions might be necessary; and that until more troops can be spared from other services, a body of peons should be retained in the Company’s service, by whose means the Collector will be able to take possession of the country, and to make his arrangements.

‘ There are many objections to weakening Seringapatam at this moment, but the arrangements which may be made at that place will, I hope, keep it in perfect security.

‘ If your Lordship approves of this plan, rather than that I should weaken the body of the troops in the field in this

country, I shall give orders to have it carried into execution without loss of time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Right Hon. Lord Clive.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                    ‘ Camp at Hoobly, 10th October, 1800.

‘ I have ordered committees to assemble in the different garrisons in Mysore, in order to examine and report upon the state of their granaries and buildings for containing provisions. I gave these orders in consequence of a letter from the Military Board, in which they call for detailed information upon this subject. All the information which I could procure has been before them repeatedly, but they shall have it again at one view. I shall send you a copy of these reports.

‘ I am not surprised that Purneah should be desirous to have nothing to do with the Company’s concerns; the common practice is to accuse a man of being either a fool or a knave. If he is so fortunate as that it is impossible to give him the former appellation, it is certain that he will be accused of knavery. Our friend, with his sandal wood, has done no more than all his fellows have at different times.

‘ If we should not permanently keep Darwar, I shall recommend that a granary may be built at Hurryhur.

‘ I am more pressed than ever about troops. Lord Clive calls upon me to have a detachment ready to take possession of the Ceded province, and then to march to Poonah. Sir William Clarke and Uhtoffe swear that the French are coming from Egypt, and want all the native infantry I have got; on the other hand, the last relief of Montana cost us 154 men killed and wounded (most of them coolies, however), and they are crying out there because they do not see the 12th and 2nd of the 5th marching into Cannanore on the 30th September, on which day they left Seringapatam. My business is to get over these difficulties in the best manner I can, and what follows is the arrangement which I propose. In addition to every thing, I must also inform you that the fright which affects Sir William Clarke and Uhtoffe pervades



Bombay, where, on account of the supposed danger, the 88th, which I expected in Malabar, is detained.

‘Webbe, in a letter of the 4th, which I have just received from him, appears doubtful of the propriety of my making a detachment from my corps. I wrote to Lord Clive fully upon that subject yesterday, and told him that a contest with Scindiah for the power of the Marhatta state must be entered upon at first, at least, with a powerful body of troops, if it is intended that we should have the assistance of any of the chiefs of the Marhatta empire. If we have not their assistance, we shall want a still larger body of troops, and even when we collect them we must expect that the contest will last longer than it would otherwise. I have, therefore, strongly urged that my corps may not be diminished, and that I may enter upon the contest in such a manner as that all the chiefs may be convinced of our determination to attain our object, and punish those who oppose us, and may be induced by a sense of their own interests to join my standard.

‘But if a corps is to be assembled to take possession of the Ceded districts, how am I to collect it? In the first place there are five companies of the 12th, and then I would add seven companies of the 33rd, leaving three of that corps in Seringapatam, or, probably, according to your suggestion, the whole 33rd, leaving the 12th at Seringapatam; eight companies of the 2nd of the 5th (Bombay) sepoys now at Nuggur, which I would relieve by three companies of the corps at Cundapore, and one company at Bilghy. Besides this I have proposed that one of the native corps of this army should be considered as belonging to the Nizam’s detachment, and that the 2nd of the 5th should remain in the Ceded countries, at least for a time. This I believe will be acquiesced in. Thus I shall have for the Ceded countries one regiment of Europeans at least; eight companies of sepoys, and one battalion, if the 2nd of the 5th are left.

‘Nuggur will not be weaker than it was before the posts of Chandergooty and Cowleydroog were drawn in.

‘Besides this force, it might probably be convenient to Cuppage to be able to move forward into Gurrumconda, which would add strength to our operations in the Ceded

countries. Webbe tells me that Munro is appointed Head Collector. I shall recommend to him to operate much at first by means of peons, which will be attended with a double advantage; and this corps of mine to be assembled, ought to be kept in one body.

‘ I now come to the most difficult part, which is Malabar. They say there is a rebellion in Wynaad, and we may hope, like Voltaire, that the Nairs of the Pyche Rajah may be strangled with ropes made of the bowels of those on the side of Yeman Nair: but still it is necessary to take measures for sustaining that post if possible. There is nothing that can be done, excepting to send into Malabar half of the 75th regiment from Mangalore. I gave orders upon that subject this day. Thus, then, I shall have provided for all the immediate calls for troops, excepting those dictated by the fears of an Egyptian invasion.

‘ We shall weaken Seringapatam a little, but I shall write to Colonel Saxon directions upon that subject, which I hope will prevent inconvenience from that measure. The objection I have to putting the 12th into Seringapatam, is the dubash attached to that corps, who will ruin us there completely. I enclose a letter from Lieut. Cafrae, which you may find of use.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Not a word yet from Madras respecting my last proposal about money. I am rather anxious about this.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Hoobly, 12th October, 1800.

‘ By all means take the 50,000 pagodas from Macleod, which he says will be in his hands in November. If I do not want that sum here, it will be wanted in the Ceded districts, or in Mysore. We have got in Mysore all the expensive part of the army, and we certainly ought to get some of the money to pay them.

‘ I have received a letter from Lieut. Colonel Palmer, dated the 1st, in which he does not mention one word of

news. nor does he notice any one of my letters written in September. He says, "The Peshwah has not hitherto made any remonstrance to me against your continuance in his dominions. I am confident that so long as he may acquiesce in your retaining such a position, you will be happy to show every attention to his wishes, that the country or individuals should not sustain any loss or disturbance."

'This does not look like calling for our assistance.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. Lord Clive.*

'MY LORD,

'Camp at Hoobly, 13th October, 1800.

'By the last accounts which I have received of the state of affairs at Poonah, it appears that Scindiah is acting with great caution. He has put a stop to certain operations which had been commenced by his troops on the south side of the Kistna, and has manifested a disposition to be reconciled with the family of Pursheram Bhow, and to withdraw his pretensions to the possessions of that chief.

'Lieut. Colonel Palmer writes on the 1st of October;—"The Peshwah has not hitherto made any remonstrance to me against your continuance in his dominions."

'From the circumstances I have above mentioned, it appears that the crisis expected by the Governor General is far removed; and by that paragraph in Colonel Palmer's letter, I should imagine that he is not certain that the Peshwah will not remonstrate against my remaining in his Highness's territories.

'Under these circumstances I shall be glad to receive your Lordship's orders whether I am to withdraw from the Marhatta territory, if I should receive through Lieut. Colonel Palmer a remonstrance from the Peshwah against remaining longer within it.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Right Hon. Lord Clive.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Camp at Hoobly, 15th October, 1800.

'The enclosed extracts of Lieut. Colonel Palmer's dis-

patches to Lord Wellesley, will show you that I was not wrong in my conjecture respecting the unsteadiness and duplicity of the Peshwah. Either we shall go to war in grand style with the whole Marhatta nation, or I shall be ordered to withdraw; and in my opinion the last will be adopted. Lieut. Colonel Palmer hints that I might remain in the Marhatta territory, under a pretence of adjusting a claim of a debt from the Rajah of Kolapoor; but, first, I do not see what end that is to answer; secondly, it will be tantamount to a declaration of war against the Peshwah, which the measure is intended to avoid.

‘ It is evident that his Highness is as much averse to us as he is to Scindiah; that he has now some hopes of freeing himself from the latter without our assistance, and without being obliged to make the sacrifices which we require, and, as Colonel Palmer truly says, “ it is the policy of Baajee Rao to deceive every body.”

‘ I write to Webbe this day my opinion of the dispatches, that orders will certainly come for me to withdraw; that it is better that I should withdraw immediately, as I shall thereby have the whole fair season before me for all that I have to do.

‘ I think that, besides depriving Dhoondiah’s followers of their arms and horses, they might for a time be under the inspection of the municipality (to use a French phrase). I have long thought that it would be proper that orders should be given throughout the Rajah’s country, that no man should be suffered to pass on horseback, or with arms, through or near any village where there might be peons, without having an order from some regular authority to move through the country thus equipped.

‘ I shall call for the Court Martial which you mention. Colonel —— lately made a complaint of an Assistant Surgeon, just arrived in the country, who disobeyed his orders. The young man was put in arrest, and has since made the most ample apology. The Colonel will not receive the apology, and I am about to send him an order to join the army, to prosecute the Assistant Surgeon; so that there is an end of his career for some time.

‘ I am in capital style here; I get as many bullocks as I can want, arrack from Goa, and I am thereby enabled to

hand over to the detachments to be formed for the Ceded districts the bullocks hired in Mysore, and the arrack on the road from Madras. I still want the supplies of rice, which they will get of course in the Ceded countries.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Hoobly, 26th Oct., 1800.

‘ I am rather anxious about money; wherever I may go I shall want some for December’s payment; and I do not see that any arrangement has been made by Webbe to provide for it, although it is impossible to adopt that which I proposed, as the ships of war do not go to the Malabar coast. One lack of pagodas ought to be sent to us by Golah Peons as soon as possible.

‘ I mentioned the want of money in a letter to Lord Clive; but I wish you would write to Webbe upon the subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Hoobly, 28th Oct., 1800.

‘ I received a letter from Webbe last night, dated the 20th, in which he informs me that the treaty with the Nizam is concluded; and he proposes that I should make my arrangements immediately for taking possession of the territory ceded to us. I, therefore, march to-morrow with my whole force towards Savanore, from whence I shall send a detachment directly to Harponelly if the Toombuddra should be fordable; if it should not be so, the detachment must go round by Hurryhur.

‘ My reasons for moving to Savanore, and there to await the further orders of Government with the remainder of the army, are as follows:—

‘ It is clear, from Colonel Palmer’s dispatches, that the Peshwah is not less adverse to us than he is to Scindiah, and that he has some hopes of being freed from the latter without our assistance. He has hitherto made no objections

to our remaining in his territory, and it is probable that he will make none, as long as he thinks that we are sufficiently strong to keep in check Scindiah's army to the southward of the Kistna; but as soon as we begin to weaken ourselves, it is probable not only that he will desire that I may withdraw, but that he will order some of his officers on this frontier to see that his wishes in this respect are complied with. I shall then be in an awkward situation, with an army unequal to offence, very forward in the Marhatta territory; and, after having overrun the country, I shall be obliged to sneak out of it.—That will not answer.

‘ If Lord Wellesley proposes that I should remain in the Marhatta territory, notwithstanding the contents of the dispatches which I sent to you, I shall be better placed at Savanore than here for collecting again; and on the other hand, if he proposes that I should withdraw entirely, I shall be so much nearer our other objects.

‘ Whether I detach from hence and remain here with the main body, or go to Savanore and detach from thence, my allies will be equally convinced that there is no intention to interfere in their affairs. Upon the whole then, in some points of view, it is better that I should go to Savanore, and in others it is equal; and, as I think I shall be there in greater safety, I move that way.

‘ I yesterday ordered the Rajah's cavalry to Hurryhur from Rance Bednore. I shall be obliged to you if you will request Purneah to allow it to remain at Hurryhur till it is decided what is to be done in this country. As soon as I receive a copy of the treaty, or information respecting the countries ceded to us, I propose to order the Nundydroog detachment forward as you wished.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Hoobly, 30th Oct, 1800.

‘ I am detained here by the rain, which is violent and incessant. Munro will not be at Hurryhur before the 7th of November at soonest; and if the rains extend to the Bednore country, not so soon. I will contrive to have a detachment

across the Toombuddra before that time, if it should become at all practicable to move.

‘ I have written to Colonel Harcourt again about his dubash, and I expect good consequences from his receipt of this last letter; I have also written to Gordon respecting victualling the troops, and I have desired him to send into the Carnatic immediately the Madras conicopoly belonging to the Madras Provision Department, heretofore attached to the five companies of the 12th regiment. As soon as I receive from Mr. Gordon his answer to my letter, requiring the reason for which he did not victual this corps on its march to Cannanore as I ordered, I shall issue the order which you proposed in your letter of the 24th, or even one much stronger if I should find that in truth the dubash drove away Mr. Gordon’s people.—This I now suspect to be the case.

‘ My allies are much dejected upon receiving information of my intention to withdraw. They, however, propose to exert themselves in their own defence, to which I have strongly urged them. It will be a great object gained, if Scindiah is really obliged to go to Hindustan, to prevent him from extending and establishing himself to the southward before he takes his departure. In this view only does it appear to me at all desirable that I should remain within the Marhatta territory.

‘ The allies have again returned to the proposition which they made to me some time ago, to allow them an asylum for their families in the territories of the Company or of the Rajah, only that they have stated precisely their wishes.

‘ They desire to be allowed to place their families in one of the places mentioned in the enclosed paper, and that Purneah should employ one of them, or one of their dependants, as the amil of the district, for the revenue of which they would be answerable, and allow them to have their tannah in the place: if Purneah should object to giving them the management of the district in which he may allow their families to remain, they request that he will at least allow them to have their own people and peons in the place; and if he should object to that, they beg to have an asylum in any one of these places upon an assurance of protection. If it should not be convenient to Purneah that they should inhabit any

one of these places, they request that he will appoint any other for their residence which shall be contiguous to the Marhatta frontier.

‘ The only reason why they wish to have the amildary of the district, and their own people in the fort with them, appears to be the fears which their women and families will have among strangers, particularly Europeans. I acknowledge that I am very anxious that they should be gratified to the fullest extent of their wishes; and I shall be obliged to you if you will mention the subject to Purneah, if you do not see any impropriety in their requests.

‘ The families which will come to us will be that of Appah Saheb and his brothers, that of Chintomeney Rao, of Ball Kistna Bhow, and probably those of some of their dependants.

‘ If Purneah should have no objection to allowing them to hold the amildary of the district immediately contiguous to the fort, which he might allow them to inhabit, I will inquire from them the name of the person into whose hands they may wish it should be placed.

‘ I have spoken to Mackay respecting the receipt for the young bullocks. He takes them on his returns as received from you, and will send you a receipt for them by this day’s post.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Misserycotta, 31st Oct., 1800.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday I have received Lord Clive’s orders of the 24th to enter the Ceded countries with my whole force. The intention is, I imagine, to keep it together till orders are received from Bengal consequent to Palmer’s dispatches, which I sent you; and I believe that hereafter, if there is no objection from Bengal, it will be broke up, and a part will operate to the westward.

‘ I marched this morning, but only a short distance. The weather still threatening.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,            ‘ Camp at Misserycotta, 1st Nov., 1800.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 25th October ; I am detained here by the rain.

‘ I do not propose to enter the Ceded districts by Mysore ; but I assure you that my numerous followers are in such order that I might venture to produce them any where. We were a month at Hoobly ; and the grain fields in the middle of the camp were not touched, and the people in the neighboring villages sent to tell me that the safeguards which I had given them upon my arrival there were no longer necessary. Lieut. Colonel Mackay will enter Harponelly from Hurryhur, either with Munro, or immediately after him. I shall enter that province to the northward with the army, if it should be possible to cross the Toombuddra below the junction of that river with the Werdah. If that should not be possible, I shall continue my march along the left bank of the Toombuddra as far as opposite Adoni ; as I conceive it to be of the first importance that a strong corps should be in the centre of the Ceded districts as soon as possible, and Colonel Mackay and Munro will be able to settle the provinces of Harponelly and Anagoondy most probably without my assistance. It will be hard indeed if the Toombuddra should not be fordable by the time that I shall arrive opposite Adoni.

‘ Lord Clive has desired me to join ———— to this army, and not to detach him on any account whatever. I have therefore ordered him direct from Chittledroog to Anagoondy, where I may expect to be : if I should be obliged to march along the left bank of the river, he must proceed along the right bank of it.

‘ I have not desired him to take any measures for settling the country as he comes along, but have merely apprized him that he will pass through a strange country, and have desired him to be upon his guard.

‘ I am obliged to you for your information regarding the Ceded countries ; I applied to ———— for some, having understood that his attention for the last years of his life has been entirely taken up by inquiries into and surveys of those very countries. In answer to my application he proposes

that I should send him a map of my marches, and all the geographical information which I have received from Bombay (which, by-the-by, is nothing less than true); and he then promises to make a map of the whole. Into this he will most probably insert the result of his own dreams.

‘ You some time ago wrote to me about employing — — of the Bombay engineers on the survey of Soonda; and having desired that gentleman to undertake it, he has desired to have an order which would authorize him to draw surveyor’s allowances while employed on the work. Upon this subject I wish to have your sentiments.

‘ Surveyor’s allowances given to a man till he completes a survey are an encouragement to delay; and to tell you the truth, I am rather anxious that this gentleman should be employed as an engineer in the repair and improvement of the fort of Hullihall. For these he has given a plan which I have already submitted to the Military Board, and during the time that they will take to decide upon carrying it into execution, I have desired — — to make the survey of Soonda.

‘ My idea is to order him surveyor’s allowances during the time that he may be employed on the survey; and to inform him that I shall order him from the survey as soon as the Military Board shall have decided upon his plan for the reform and repair of the works at Hullihall.

‘ Do you think that this will answer ?

‘ You will have heard from Webbe that I am to have the money in Canara. I shall send back Bistna Punt, pcons, &c. Would not you wish that some person should remain here in charge of the Amrut Mahal ?

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I enclose a copy of the order which I have given respecting — —; also one of that respecting the employment of sepoys to seize sheep. It will be necessary that Purneah should give orders throughout the country to supply sheep upon these receipts whenever they may be required.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp, ten miles south of Copaul,  
13th November, 1800.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Our tappall Brahmin has written to Appah — to desire that peons may be posted up to Anagoondy from Chittledroog for the use of the army. As soon as I arrive at Anagoondy, and find that these peons are posted, I propose to take off those which I have now upon the road from Chittledroog by Hurryhur and Savanore.

‘ Hereafter I propose that Munro should run a tappall from Chittledroog by Rydroog into the Ceded districts; I write to him upon this subject. But in the mean time it is desirable that until that tappall can be arranged, and until I get more forward into the Ceded districts, the peons should be posted direct to Anagoondy as I have above pointed out.

‘ I have settled with the Amrut Mahal man to get sheep from Mysore, until we can ascertain the state of our supplies in the Ceded countries.

‘ Bistna Punt did not join from Hoobly till we had got so far as to render it advisable that he should return to Mysore through the Ceded districts. There are hopes that the river will be fordable in a day or two, and he shall go off the moment he can cross.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp, ten miles south of Copaul,  
16th November, 1800.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I have received the orders of Government to break up the army, to send a detachment into the Ceded countries, to prepare one for Wynaad, and to proceed myself to hold a conference with the Admiral upon some proposed arrangements. I shall have settled every thing to-morrow, preparatory to breaking up the army, and I shall set out immediately for Seringapatam, leaving the troops to follow me.

‘ Colonel Moneyppenny stays in the Ceded districts, with the 25th, 1st, and 4th regiments of cavalry, the 73rd, 2nd, 4th, 1st, and 12th.

‘ I shall be at Seringapatam, I hope, by the 26th or 27th. I shall proceed by Hurryhur, Hooly Honore, and Chinapatam.

‘ General Dugald Campbell commands in the Ceded districts.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Anajee, in Mysore, 20th Nov., 1800.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 16th. I had before written to the Commissioners, to desire that they would send Yeman Nair to Seringapatam, and that they would address him to you, as I thought it probable that I should be absent when he would arrive.

‘ I shall be at Seringapatam by the 27th or 28th, and will talk over with you then the other points in your letter of the 16th. I have pressed Webbe hard to be allowed to conduct the Wynaad expedition, and that arrangements should be adopted to render my journey to the Carnatic, and my absence from Mysore, as short as possible.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Colonel — appears to have mistaken the troops of Cummer oo Deen for the garrison of Gurrumconda. I have desired him to try to get into the fort at all events; and if the killadar refuses to give him possession, to threaten him with the resentment of the Nizam, and with the responsibility for all the evil consequences of his disobedience of his master’s orders. If he still holds out, arrangements must be made to get the place by force; have it we must, and that speedily.’

*To the Chief Secretary of Government, Fort St. George.*

‘ SIR,    ‘ Santa Bednore, 21st November, 1800.

‘ In consequence of the orders of the Right Hon. the Governor in Council, of the 9th instant, I broke up the army on the 16th, on the banks of the Toombuddra, and made arrangements, as stated hereafter, for providing a force

for the Ceded districts, and one for the proposed service in the Malabar.

‘ I sent into the Ceded districts, under the orders of Lieut. Colonel Money Penny, the 25th dragoons, the 1st and 4th regiments of native cavalry, the 73rd regiment, the 2nd of the 4th, and 1st and 12th native infantry, with six field pieces, besides the cavalry guns.

‘ I made a requisition upon Lieut. Colonel Bowser, who was still in the Dooab, for two battalions of native infantry.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Mackay has taken possession of Harponelly, and is now, with the corps under his command, on his march to Rydroog, to get possession of that fort. Major Munro is with Lieut. Colonel Mackay.

‘ Before I had received his Lordship’s orders not to send into the Ceded districts any part of the detachment which has been hitherto in the field in the Nundydroog district, I had desired Lieut. Colonel Cuppage to send a detachment to take possession of the fort of Gurrumconda; and to post the field detachment in the Pollams, between that fort and Pennaconda. This arrangement appeared likely to be of service both to the territory of the Company and of the Rajah. I was in hopes that it was carried into execution when I had received his Lordship’s orders, and I therefore did not countermand it. I have since received a letter from Lieut. Colonel Cuppage, from which it appears that the troops in the service of the late Cummer oo Deen and of his son, had mutinied, and were disposed to plunder the country. Lieut. Colonel Cuppage likewise mentions that the troops in the fort of Gurrumconda had mutinied, and he did not believe that they would allow the fort to be delivered over to the Company’s troops. The troops within the fort are in the service of the Nizam.

‘ Under these circumstances, I have considered it of the first importance to endeavor to get possession of the fort without loss of time, lest the troops of the Nizam and of Cummer oo Deen should co-operate to keep it from us: and, notwithstanding his Lordship’s orders, I have desired Lieut. Colonel Cuppage to urge the killadar in the strongest manner to give him up the fort, to threaten him with the resentment of the Nizam, and with the responsibility for all the evil consequences which are likely to result from his

retaining possession after he had received the orders of his employer to deliver the fort to the Company's troops.

' I have desired Lieut. Colonel Money Penny to cross the Toombuddra at the Untoor ghaut, below Anagoondy, to proceed by Bellary to Adoni, of which place and of Gooty he is to take possession. He has not got from the head aumil the orders to the killadars of Bellary and of Gooty, to deliver to him the possession of those forts, and it is probable he will not receive the orders for some time: I have therefore desired him not to delay at Bellary, but to proceed with expedition to Adoni, for the delivery of which place he has an order.

' I have supplied Lieut. Colonel Money Penny with rice, provisions, arrack for 50 days, bullocks and military stores, and money. I have arranged a communication between his detachment and Mysore, by way of Rydroog, by means of which I propose to supply him with arrack, rice, and bullocks, until Major General Campbell shall have arranged a communication with Madras, from whence he must draw the former, and shall have brought forward the resources of the Ceded districts in the two latter. I have ordered into the Ceded districts immediately for the use of the troops 50,000 pagodas, in charge of Lieut. Read, whom I have appointed Mr. Gordon's Deputy Paymaster in those countries. This officer has lately done the duty of Paymaster at Seringapatam, and is strongly recommended by Mr. Gordon.

' The remainder of the army is now crossing the Toombuddra, and will march to Seringapatam immediately. I hope to arrive at that place on the 29th, and I shall make all the arrangements preparatory to the expedition to the westward.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Chief Sec. of Govern.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

' MY DEAR COLONEL,      ' Vencaty Gherry, 9th December, 1800.

' I hear from camp that the followers are going on but badly; and as intelligence to a similar purport may have reached you, I write to inform you, that I have given a strong hint to Colonel Pater upon the subject, and I hope

that after he shall have received my letter there will be no further reason for complaint.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I have this instant heard from Colonel Money penny, who had arrived, and got possession of, Bellary. He was going to Gooty; all quiet, but the Nizam’s horse are going about the country squeezing what they can get. Colonel Money penny has sent to Chittledroog the prisoners belonging to Mysore, taken by Colonel Bowser in the Dooab after the battle of the 10th of September. I spoke to you about them on the 29th.

‘ I have written to the commanding officer at Chittledroog, to desire that he will take charge of them on their arrival, and that he will subsist them at the usual rate (*viz.*, one single fanam per diem), till he hears from you regarding them. You will probably wish that they should be delivered over to the amildar, and that some examination of them should be made before they are finally discharged. At all events, make known your wishes to the commanding officer at Chittledroog.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Fort St. George, 18th December, 1800.

‘ I have had some conversation with our friends here regarding the settlement of Wynaad, the arrangement to be made with Yeman Nair, and in general the employment of the Nairs during the campaign in Wynaad. Our idea of placing Wynaad eventually under the same administration with Malabar has been approved, as has the measure of calling up to Seriagapatam Yeman Nair and one of the Commissioners to Seringapatam. I have informed Webbe that you intend to take the field with Stevenson, and have communicated to him your notion regarding the council, to consist of the Commissioners, Colonel Stevenson, and yourself. It is proposed to leave to the decision of this council all the future arrangements in Wynaad, whether regarding the settlement with Yeman Nair, and other chiefs of the same description, or the employment of the Nairs in general on the service.

‘Webbe writes this day to Colonel Stevenson upon the subject, and to the Commissioners in Malabar, and you also will probably hear from him yourself.

‘The pensioners have been a subject of conversation since I have been here. Several modes of relieving the Rajah have been proposed, which I will state to you. One was, to throw these pensioners upon the Rajah, according to the old arrangement, and to relieve Purneah from the engagement into which he voluntarily entered lately, to pay the full subsidiary of seven lacs of star pagodas: the second was to throw the pensioners upon the Rajah, and to enter into a discussion with the Rajah’s Government regarding the burthens upon him, to compare these with his means, and if the result should be that the country is overburthened, that the subsidy should be permanently lessened: the third was, to leave matters as they were originally arranged, and for the Company to pay these new pensioners (the Ambassadors), in consideration of the heavy burthens upon the Rajah, and of the situation of the Ambassadors having been sent to European powers. I objected to the first mode, because I thought it would be disagreeable to Purneah, and because, at all events, the relief would be only temporary. I objected to the second, because any new discussion upon the Rajah’s situation would be disagreeable, would be a bad precedent, and would tend to shake the first settlement; and, at all events, would create a notion among the natives that that settlement was not permanent. I think that the third will be adopted, and that the pensions of the Ambassadors will be paid by the Company.

‘Upon the whole, this appears to me to be the best arrangement. I do not like the proposal for a discussion upon the Rajah’s situation: it would open a door for another discussion some years hence, and the consequence would be, that the settlement made last year, which was certainly intended to be permanent, would be overturned by the first Government which should look to Mysore as a place from which it might be possible to get a few more pagodas.

‘The officer commanding at Mysore is to have full batta.

‘Webbe proposes to establish the court at Seringapatam: he talks of Leith as the Registrar, and rather prefers him to



Symonds. If you, however, prefer the latter, I think it probable that he will be appointed. I know neither of them very well.

‘ Pater is appointed to command at Arcot.

‘ I enclose a letter from Colonel Cuppage, regarding the pensioners in the Nundydroog district ; I shall be obliged to you if you will make known to him your wishes regarding them.

‘ I embark to-morrow for Trincomalce, from whence you shall hear further from me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Chief Secretary of Government, Fort St. George.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 19th Dec., 1800.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a copy of a report which I have received of the extent, state, and condition of the forts in Canara. They all appear to be in ruins, and it is desirable that they should be entirely destroyed, excepting Seedasheeghur, Rajahman-droog, Morjee, Cundapoor, and Coomblah. I recommend that these should not be destroyed, only because they stand at the mouths of the principal rivers in the province of Canara, and it may be desirable to retain them ; but some of these may be useless, and it may be advisable hereafter to destroy entirely those of that description.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Chief Sec. of Government.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Braithwaite, Commanding the Army,  
Fort St. George.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 19th Dec., 1800.

‘ Having been appointed by the Most Noble the Governor General in Council to command a body of troops collected for foreign service at Trincomalce, and having been directed by his Lordship to appoint a certain staff for conducting the duties of those troops, I have to request your permission to take from this Presidency, for that purpose, the officers whose names are written hereafter.

- ‘ Lieut. Colonel Coleman, 84th regiment,
- ‘ Lieut. Colonel Capper,
- ‘ Captain Scott of the artillery,
- ‘ Captain Fitzpatrick,
- ‘ Captain Ogg,
- ‘ Captain West, 33rd regiment, my aide de camp.

‘ I likewise request your permission to take Mr. Sechino, conductor, in charge of certain provisions embarked in the Rockingham for the troops, and that you will be so kind as to allow a conductor, with a detachment of tent and store lascars, to accompany the ordnance and military stores to be sent from Fort St. George.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Braithwaite.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor of Ceylon (the Hon. F. North).*

‘ SIR,

‘ Trincomalee, 27th Dec. 1800.

‘ As it is very desirable that the quantity of provisions which will proceed from hence with the armament now lying in the harbor should be as large as possible, I shall be obliged to you if you will allow the Commissary of provisions at Trincomalee to issue, upon my requisition, 150 casks of salted beef of 360lbs. each, of those lately received from Bengal, and now in his charge, and 4000 bags of rice. I shall also be obliged to you if you will order him to supply the European troops embarked in the transports, as well as those still on shore, with fresh provisions as long as the means in his power will permit him to do so, upon their regular indents.

‘ The consumption of wood on board the transports has already been great; and, as I understand that the Master Attendant at this place has a considerable quantity in store, I shall be obliged to you if you will give him orders to issue it to the ships which may be in want of it, upon the requisition of either Vice Admiral Rainier or myself.

‘ A certain number of hammocks will be wanted for the troops; and as it has been found practicable to make them of gunny bags, I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders to the Commissary of Stores to issue 5000 gunny bags upon my requisition.

‘Tents for the 19th and 80th regiments have been embarked at Fort St. George; but it was impossible to procure tonnage for the proportion of lascars which ought to be attached to them. I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that ninety lascars, with the proportion of native officers, may be added to the armament from Ceylon. Such proportion of them as you may think proper to order from Trincomalee will embark at this place; and such proportion as you may think proper to order from Colombo will embark at Pointe de Galle, with the detachment of the 19th regiment now in garrison there.

‘I learn from the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, that your Excellency will add a sum of money to our military chest; and I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that the part of it, which it is proposed should be furnished from the Pay Office at Trincomalee, should be embarked here; and that the other part of it, which it is proposed should be furnished from Colombo, should be embarked at Pointe de Galle, in the ships which will receive the detachment of the 19th regiment. I request that your Excellency will be so kind as to give orders to the proper officer to make me acquainted with the sum which he will embark at Pointe de Galle in consequence of this arrangement.

‘I have already given your Excellency much trouble in the detail of the wants of the armament, and I have stated all that appears necessary at present: but as more wants may be discovered hereafter, and as your Excellency is about to depart for Pointe de Galle, I shall be obliged to you if you would leave orders with the persons in charge of the public stores, and the heads of departments at this place, to furnish what may be required for the armament, which their stores can afford, upon the requisition of Vice Admiral Rainier or myself.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor of Ceylon.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor of Ceylon.*

‘SIR,

‘Trincomalee, 27th Dec., 1800.

‘It will be attended with great convenience to the troops

and their followers about to embark from Ceylon, if their families could be permitted to receive from the paymasters in the island those portions of their pay which they may think proper to leave for them. If you will be so kind as to allow those paymasters to pay such sums, I will give orders that the family certificates shall be prepared in the usual manner ; copies of which will be given to the paymasters of the troops embarked, who will stop from the amount of each man's abstract the amount of the family certificate of each corps and individual.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Ceylon.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. As I understand that the European women attached to the 19th and 80th regiments receive a certain allowance from Government, I shall be obliged to your Excellency if you will permit that allowance to be continued to them during the time that the corps to which they are attached may be employed upon service.’

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Trincomalee, 30th Dec., 1800.

‘ 1. In obedience to your Lordship's orders, I have come here to take the command of the troops assembled at this place for service.

‘ 2. I shall proceed to state to your Lordship the arrangements which I have made for conducting the duties of the troops under my command, which appear to me to require explanation, in consequence of the authority for that purpose which I received from your Lordship.

‘ 3. I have appointed Lieut. Colonel Coleman Deputy Adjutant General, and have directed that he shall receive 500 rupees per mensem for assistants in addition to his personal staff allowance. I could not find that any regulation had been made in Bengal, fixing the amount of the allowance for assistants to a Deputy Adjutant General, and I therefore fixed this allowance upon a statement of the number of persons to be employed in that manner by Lieut. Colonel Coleman.

‘ 4. I have appointed Captain Scott, of the Coast artillery,

Commissary of Stores, with an establishment as stated in the orders of . . . . January. The lascars for the camp equipage for the 19th and 80th regiments are included in this establishment, but they are not yet arrived from Fort St. George.

‘ 5. I have appointed Mr. Sechino Deputy Commissary of Provisions, with an establishment as stated in the orders of the . . . . January. This gentleman has long been employed in the provision departments of the Coast army, and his services will be absolutely necessary in the event of landing the troops. The establishment brought from Fort St. George with him, although calculated for but a small number of men, will serve as a groundwork for that department, which it will be necessary to form for the Commissary of Provisions, should the troops land and be employed in the field.

‘ 6. The Right Honorable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George was pleased to send with me, at my request, one company of artillery, with three companies of gun lascars, and a detachment of pioneers, under Captain Fitzpatrick. His Lordship likewise proposes to send camp equipage for the 19th and 80th regiments, with tent and store lascars, and artificers for the service of this camp equipage, and of the store department; and certain military stores, of which the Commissary of Stores will send a return to the military board in Bengal, as soon as they shall be received.

‘ 7. He was likewise pleased to send with me Lieut. de Haviland, of the corps of engineers, and an establishment which appeared necessary, of which a statement is made in the orders of the . . . . January.

‘ 8. As these detachments of artillery, gun lascars, and pioneers, and the whole of these departments and establishments, belong to the Coast army, to which they will hereafter return, and as it would be inconvenient to alter the rate of the pay and allowances which they have hitherto received, and which they would receive hereafter, I have thought it proper that they should continue to receive the pay and allowances which they have received heretofore, and that they should be paid in abstracts, made out according to the forms in use under the government of Fort St. George.

‘ 9. I have therefore furnished the Paymaster with a state-

ment of the rates of pay and allowances on the Coast to all descriptions of persons detached from the Coast, and with the forms of the abstracts according to which they are to be drawn, Copies of which papers I have the honor to enclose. I have appointed Captain Fitzpatrick, who was muster master in Mysore, to muster the Coast troops and establishment employed in this service.

‘ 10. I have the honor to enclose copies of the orders by which these and other arrangements, which do not require further explanation, have been made, and I request your Lordship’s confirmation of them.

‘ 11. Besides the appointments made by these orders, I have appointed Captain Lowe Agent of Transports, at the recommendation of Captain Malcolm\*, of his Majesty’s ship Suffolk, to whom, as well as to myself, this appointment appeared absolutely necessary. I beg leave to recommend that he may be allowed to draw the salary which was given to Captain Kemp, when Agent of Transports to the expedition prepared against Manilla. I am unacquainted with its amount.

‘ 12. I likewise enclose copies and extracts of letters to Mr. Rider, in which authority is given for incurring certain expenses, of which I request your Lordship’s confirmation.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Trincomalee, 30th December, 1800.

‘ Since my arrival here I have received a letter from Lord Wellesley, in which he talks of going through Mysore in the next season, in execution of a plan which I proposed to him, in consequence of a letter which I received from him in November, in which he started this notion.

He proposes to inhabit the Dowlut Baug at Seringapatam, and the palace at Bangalore; and although I think it very probable that the plan will never be put in execution, I shall be obliged to you if you will now and then take a look at my house, and urge forward the painting of it: and

\* Vice Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm, G.C.B., brother to the late Lieut. General Sir John Malcolm, G.C.B.

Lord Wellesley has desired me to request that you will have the palace at Bangalore put in a state to receive him.

‘ The Admiral is not here, and I can tell you nothing of our future plans.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Trincomalee, 22nd January, 1801.

‘ A month has nearly elapsed since I arrived here, but I have hitherto received no tidings of the Admiral or Mr. Stokes. It is evident from the papers received from Mr. Stokes, of which I am at present in possession, that he is of opinion that the attempt upon Mauritius should not be made, if it is not possible to reach the island before the month of February. It is probable, therefore, that it will be postponed, and that you will have to determine whether you will make the attack on the return of the season in April.

‘ As I think it desirable that you should be acquainted as soon as possible with certain circumstances, which in my opinion have altered the situation of affairs, I lose no time in writing to you.

‘ The circumstances of the island have altered in some degree since Mr. Stokes was there, and procured the information upon which you determined to undertake the expedition. In the first place, it is impossible to suppose that the enemy will not have suspected the real object of the armament, and will not have prepared for defence. Indeed, before I arrived at Madras, and *before it was known that I was going there*, I received letters from the western coast, stating that the armament was destined either for Mauritius, Egypt, or Batavia, and would be commanded by Sir J. Craig. The removal of the 88th regiment from Bombay to Pointe de Galle has made it very clear that it was not destined for Egypt; and the alteration of the rendezvous, and the removal of the squadron from the Straits of Malacca to Trincomalee, in consequence of the alteration of the plan, have made it equally clear that it was not destined for Batavia.

‘ Therefore, those who judge of the intentions of government by their acts, must have found out the real object of the expedition. But not only have the French had that

mode of ascertaining our intentions, but Mr. Webbe informed me of a circumstance at Madras, which proves that they must receive intelligence of them from what they must have deemed at the time the best authority.

‘ A French lady residing at Madras knew that an expedition was about to sail against Mauritius, and she had been desired to make known the names of her friends upon the island, in order that they and their property might be protected. It cannot be doubted but that this intelligence flew to Tranquebar immediately, and as no object for the armament was defined, it must have obtained great credit. It is probable, therefore, that the French will be made acquainted with the design, and will prepare themselves accordingly.

‘ I acknowledge that I have never been very sanguine in my expectations of the success of Mr. Stokes’s plan to surprise the place, for many reasons; but I expected that the enemy would not have heard of the armament, would be unprepared, and their works in bad condition: this cannot be expected in April.

‘ In the second place, the number of men at present upon the island is greater than was stated by Mr. Stokes.

‘ I conclude that the government of Fort St. George will have communicated to you the accounts received at Tranquebar by the Esther. Two ships of war and several merchant ships intended for privateers had arrived at the island, and these must have added to its strength. But if we had been able to sail as first proposed, it is probable that we should have found that some of them were gone out on a cruise, and the others unprepared for their defence. We cannot expect in April, that a ship will be out, or a man will be absent, and we must therefore reckon upon an addition to the numbers stated by Mr. Stokes of at least 1500 men. In this calculation I do not reckon upon the troops expected; but only upon the vessels and their men positively stated to have arrived. Upon this statement the question is, whether our numbers will be sufficient to ensure the object in April; and whether it would be proper to make a trial of Mr. Stokes’s plan.

‘ I want much information, which Mr. Stokes alone can give, to enable me to decide upon his plan, and I therefore defer to write upon it till I see him. What I have above



written may be, however, considered as independent of all particular plans, and applies only to the general question.

‘ The state of our provisions on the first of next month will be as follows :—

4 months’ provisions remaining, for	.	.	1080 men
4 months’ in the Rockingham	.	.	100
6 months’ nearly, in the other transports	.	.	500
5 months’ in the ship at Pointe de Galie which brought the 88th from Bombay	.	.	600

‘ This will give provisions for the whole number of Europeans for three months and a half, exclusive of some beef which I have taken from hence, and will last them more than four months, with the savings which I hope will be made upon the issue.

‘ The difference between this and my former statements upon this subject, arises from the want of the ship from Madras, which was to have carried 200 men, and to have been provided with provisions for them for six months; from the consumption of this month, in the ships occupied by the 10th regiment, the Bengal and Madras artillery at this place, and by the 88th regiment at Pointe de Galle; and from the deficiencies in the Rockingham, owing to the difficulty of embarking provisions at Madras in the bad season.

‘ I told you heretofore, that no refreshments could be procured upon this island for the troops; that if they had been landed, they must have lived upon their sea provisions; and therefore I thought it better to keep them in their ships, than to expose them in tents to the worst weather I have seen in India. Besides, so long as there was a prospect that the Admiral would arrive in such time as to enable us to undertake the expedition, I did not wish to increase the difficulty and trouble at the moment of our departure, by having so many more men to embark.

‘ The natives have been on shore ever since they arrived, but have been obliged to live upon their sea provisions till within this fortnight; and I propose to land the Europeans as soon as I have seen the Admiral, if it shall be determined that we are not to sail immediately.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lord Clive, Governor of Fort St. George.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Trincomalee, 28th January, 1801.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a list of certain provisions, which are required at this place for the use of the armament, which should be sent as soon as possible.

‘ A large proportion of the troops have been embarked nearly two months, and have consumed the provisions laid in for that period; and the quantity of provisions now remaining in the transports for the whole number of European troops, will not be sufficient for more than four months, even at a reduced allowance. The 80th regiment, and seven companies of the 19th, have been subsisted upon the garrison stock of Trincomalee, since my arrival at this place, many articles of which are already deficient, and the whole will shortly be consumed; and as no fresh provisions can be procured, it is obvious that if the troops should remain here much longer, a supply of provisions must be sent, or so large a quantity of those intended for the armament will have been used, as to render it impossible to proceed on any service which may be proposed.

‘ I have not received any intelligence of Admiral Rainier or of the squadron, and there is every reason to believe that the armament will be detained at this place for some time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Chief Secretary of Government, Fort St. George.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Trincomalee, 7th February, 1801.

‘ I have received your dispatch of the 1st instant by the Dragon, and I have the honor to enclose the triplicate of a letter to the Governor of Bombay, which will point out the arrangements which I propose in order to carry into execution the plan of the Secretary of State, as detailed in his letter to the Most Noble the Governor General of the 6th of October.

‘ I request that you will do me the favor to forward the letter to the Government of Bombay by express.

‘ There will remain in Ceylon, of the body of troops collected here for service, the 19th regiment, seven companies of which are at Trincomalee, and three companies at Pointe de Galle. The other corps, exclusive of the artillery, will amount to about 2000 firelocks.

‘ I have been induced to take from hence a body of European troops so much larger than that proposed by the Secretary of State for the service,—

‘ First, Because I have not got with me the number of sepoys which he proposes should be employed; and I have reason to believe that it will be difficult to collect such a body on the western coast of the Peninsula.

‘ Secondly, Because I think it probable that the body of Europeans, which it is intended should be sent from the Cape, will not arrive till the season for sailing up the Red Sea will have gone by; and that it may be thought proper to be provided from India with a body of troops which can carry into execution the wishes of the Government.

‘ Thirdly, Because if the Governor General should think proper to stop any part of his European force, and to employ upon the proposed service only the proportion stated by Mr. Secretary Dundas, I shall, till a late period in the next month, have it in my power to receive his Lordship’s orders; and at that period the troops will be able either to return to this place, or to proceed to any part of India that his Lordship may think proper to appoint.

‘ It is probable, however, that his Lordship may think it desirable that the armament should proceed from India in full force; and that even the battalion of sepoys should form part of it, for which I have suggested to Mr. Duncan to make preparations.

‘ I hope that this arrangement, and the reasons on which it is founded, will meet with the approbation of the Honorable the Governor in Council; and if his Lordship will be so kind as to send me his orders to Anjengo, Calicut, Cannanore, Mangalore, Goa, or Bombay, I will take measures to ensure the receipt of them.

‘ The provisions called for in my letter to the Governor of Bombay, are in lieu of those which I requested the Right Honorable the Governor in Council to send here in my ad-

dress of the 28th of January. These will not now be wanted, excepting for the supply of the garrison of Trincomalee.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ *The Chief Sec. of Gov. Fort St. George.*’

*To Captain Malcolm, H.M.S. Suffolk.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Trincomalee, 7th February, 1801.

‘ 1. I enclose dispatches which I have received this day from the government of Fort St. George.

‘ 2. I have to inform you that one of the objects for which this armament was assembled at this place, was to answer the probable demand of his Majesty’s ministers for the co-operation of a force from India in an attack upon Egypt, which demand has now been made in the enclosed dispatches.

‘ 3. I am therefore of opinion that it will be proper, that measures should be adopted immediately for proceeding towards the rendezvous pointed out by the Secretary of State; and if you should be of the same opinion, I request that you will furnish such convoy for the fleet of transports as you may think proper.

‘ 4. I have already made known to you the state of the provisions in the fleet for the use of the troops, and it will probably appear necessary to you, as it does to me, that the deficiency should be supplied before the fleet proceeds to the Red Sea. With this view, and in order to have an opportunity of receiving the further orders of the Most Noble the Governor General, and his Excellency the Admiral, upon the contents of the enclosed dispatches, I should propose to proceed in the first instance to Bombay, if the passage to the Red Sea would not thereby be materially delayed.

‘ 5. If you should approve of this disposition, I will write this day to the Governor of Bombay, to request that provisions, &c. should be prepared for the fleet.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain Malcolm, R.N.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor of Bombay.*

‘ HONORABLE SIR,

‘ Trincomalee, 7th February, 1801.

‘ The Right Honorable the Governor of Fort St. George has transmitted to me copies of the dispatches which he received from Mr. Dundas and the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated the 6th and 10th of October last, copies of which papers, it appears, have likewise been sent to you.

‘ You will have been made acquainted by the Most Noble the Governor General with the objects proposed for the body of troops collected at this place, and at Pointe de Galle, under my command; and you will have perceived that one of his Lordship’s reasons for collecting this force was, to be prepared to answer the call of his Majesty’s Ministers, in the quarter for which troops have now been called for by the letter of the Secretary of State of the 6th of October.

‘ Under these circumstances, and in consequence of a letter which I have received from the Chief Secretary of the Government of Fort St. George, I propose to proceed towards the rendezvous pointed out by the Secretary of State, with the troops as per margin\*, as soon as I shall have been joined by the ship Wellesley, which was to leave Madras, loaded with stores, on the 3rd instant.

‘ You will perceive that I shall have with me a larger proportion of Europeans, and a smaller proportion of natives, than the Secretary of State proposes should be employed on the service; and as the Most Noble the Governor General may think proper to withdraw from this force some of the Europeans, I take the liberty of suggesting to you the propriety of making preparations to add to it a battalion of native infantry.

‘ I shall sail from hence under the convoy of his Majesty’s ship Suffolk; and Captain Malcolm is of opinion, that to go to Bombay will not materially retard the fleet. I am induced, therefore, to go there, not only to have the honor of paying my respects to you, and to receive the orders which I may expect from the Most Noble the Governor General,

\* Bengal, Madras, and Bombay artillery, 10th regiment, 80th regiment, 88th regiment, detachment of the 86th regiment, Bengal Volunteer Sepoys, 1st battalion.

but to receive certain refreshments and provisions, of which the troops are in want, and of which I am about to give you a statement.

‘ As the troops have been for nearly two months at Trincomalee, at which place there are no refreshments, it is desirable that they should have the full advantage of those which I understand that Bombay can afford ; and that preparations should be made to supply them as soon as they shall arrive in that harbour. I hope that I shall be able to depart from hence on the 12th instant, and you will be able to form a judgment of the period at which it is likely that we shall arrive at Bombay.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a return of certain articles of provision, which it is desirable should be in readiness at Bombay, to be embarked on the fleet as soon as it shall arrive.

‘ It will be very desirable that an addition should be made at Bombay to our military chest, if this measure should suit the convenience of your government.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will favor me with such intelligence as you may think it proper that I should have, while on my passage along the Malabar coast.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Trincomalee, 8th February, 1801.

‘ I only yesterday received your letter of the 25th of December, which Webbe had kept, I imagine, till he was certain that I had not left this place. By the same opportunity I received a letter from Colonel Stevenson of the 16th of January, by which I learn, with great satisfaction, that matters are going on in Wynaad in the most prosperous manner, and that there was every reason to hope at that time that they would be brought to the issue for which we all wish, before the conclusion of the fair season. How much I lament that I have not had the conduct of the operations which have led to this situation of affairs ! But it is useless to regret what cannot now be remedied.

‘ The expected call has at last been made for the co-ope-

ration of a force from India in an attack upon the French in Egypt from the Mediterranean by Sir Ralph Abercromby's army. The force called for is much smaller in European troops than that which is now collected here; and it is proposed by Mr. Dundas that it should be joined by a regiment from the Cape of Good Hope. I judge, however, that the ships in which these last were to sail from the Cape, would not leave England till the beginning of November; and if the commanding officer of the squadron pursues what is called the shortest route along the coast of Africa, he will reach the mouth of the Red Sea at Midsummer. In any event, by the other route he must come to India, he will not reach the Straits of Babelmandel till the season most favorable for a voyage up the Red Sea has gone by. Under these circumstances, I shall have to depend only upon what I bring with me from India. I shall leave this place in a few days, and proceed to Bombay to take in some provisions, as the troops have been obliged to live upon their sea stock at this place for the last two months. I shall call upon the coast of Malabar, at Calicut, and Cannanore, where I shall hear of you, though I am afraid not from you. If, however, you should write to me, and desire Colonel Sartorius to forward your letter to Bombay, in case the fleet should have passed Cannanore, I shall receive it.

‘ I am not without hopes that I shall be relieved from this command, and that I shall soon return to my old situation. Lord Wellesley, in a late letter, proposes this measure, and I assure you that I shall receive my successor with great satisfaction.

‘ I am sorry to see that General —— did mischief to the country; I suspected something of the kind, when I read General Braithwaite's order.

‘ I observe that Mofuhkar ool Dowlah is ambassador to Poonah; and, by a late letter from Tom Sydenham, there appears some chance of settling our matters with that court. However, I am afraid of the ambassador's temper with the Brahmins; but if he should adopt the interest of the Peshwah as that of his employers, as is the case sometimes, there is no doubt but that he will bring all matters to bear.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Trincomalee, 9th February, 1801.

‘ 1. The Right Honorable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George has transmitted to me copies of the dispatches of the Secretary of State to your Lordship and himself of the 6th of October, and of the letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the 10th of the same month to his Lordship, in a letter from the Chief Secretary of the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, of which I enclose a copy.

‘ 2. These letters have induced me to come to a determination to proceed to Bombay, with the troops under my command, under convoy of his Majesty’s ship Suffolk; and I have the honor to enclose copies of my letters to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, written in consequence of my forming this determination, that will best explain the motives which urged me to it, and the arrangements which I have proposed to the latter government for the speedy supply of the deficiency of provisions required for the troops.

‘ 3. Since I have formed this determination and have written these letters, further information has reached me, although through private channels, which has tended to confirm me in the opinion which I had formed of its propriety.

‘ 4. I have learned that Vice Admiral Rainier dispatched the Cornwallis to your Lordship from Prince of Wales’s Island on the 24th of December, and Mr. Charles Stokes in that ship, in charge of his Excellency’s dispatches. It is therefore clear, that his Excellency did not think it practicable to undertake in this season the expedition, with a view to which your Lordship might still wish that the troops should remain at Trincomalee; at the same time that, if it should be practicable, and your Lordship should wish to undertake it in the approaching season, it will not be difficult to bring back the troops, so that they will be at Trincomalee long before the period for sailing will arrive.

‘ 5. I have besides learned, that on the 31st of December, his Excellency the Vice Admiral had received intelligence that part of his squadron which had been to the eastward



was very unhealthy, and that he had determined to remain at Prince of Wales's Island till the end of January.

' 6. From the whole of this intelligence, and from the tenor of your Lordship's dispatches and instructions, I conceive and hope that I shall conform to your wishes in proceeding to Bombay immediately, and eventually to the rendezvous pointed out by Mr. Secretary Dundas, in his letter to your Lordship.

' 7. I beg leave to recommend, that, if possible, the full number of troops, supposed to be required for the proposed service, should proceed from India; as, by my letter to Fort St. George, your Lordship will perceive that I fear that the squadron under Sir Home Popham will not be able to effect its passage in time. There is every reason to believe that it will not have sailed from England before the 1st of November, in which case it cannot arrive in the Red Sea before the end of March, and probably later.

' 8. If your Lordship should determine that the whole of the armament required should proceed from India, it will be necessary that you should order the Governor of Bombay to furnish one battalion of native infantry.

' 9. My different letters to your Lordship will have pointed out to you the want of tonnage for the troops; and notwithstanding that I expect the Wellesley from Madras, I have thought it proper to take up the ship Maria Louisa at this port. I will hereafter transmit a statement of the terms on which this ship is taken up.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Governor General.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Vice Admiral Rainier.*

' H. M. S. Suffolk, Trincomalee,  
14th Feb., 1801.

' MY DEAR SIR,

' I arrived here on the 24th of December last, in consequence of orders which I received from the Governor General, and in hopes that I should have an opportunity of aiding you on a service which was proposed for the troops assembled at this place and at Pointe de Galle.

' It is probably fortunate that it has not been possible to carry that service into execution, and that the troops are

still here in preparation to obey the orders of the Secretary of State.

‘ Captain Malcolm informs me that he will leave here, for your perusal, certain dispatches from the Secretary of State to the Governor General, and Governor of Fort St. George, dated the 6th of October; and a letter from the Secret Committee to the latter government, dated the 10th of October, which I received from Lord Clive on the 7th instant.

‘ From the tenor of the dispatches of the Governor General to yourself and to me, I had not a doubt, upon the receipt of those dispatches, but that it was my duty to proceed with the troops towards the rendez-vous pointed out by Mr. Secretary Dundas; and accordingly I wrote a letter to Captain Malcolm on the 7th instant, of which, and of his answer, I understand from him that he sends you copies.

‘ Captain Malcolm is of opinion, that to go to Bombay will not materially retard the fleet; and we proceed there, not only that we may be able to receive the provisions, of which there is a deficiency, in consequence of the troops having been so long at this place and having lived upon salt provisions, but that we may have an opportunity of receiving the further orders of the Governor General and of yourself.

‘ If the Governor General, or you, should still be desirous to undertake the expedition which was first proposed, and if it should be determined that the troops which I now take from hence are to form part of the armament for that purpose, I understand that it will not be difficult to bring them back to Trincomalee from Bombay, before the season will come round at which it would be proper to undertake that service.

‘ On the other hand, if the Governor General should depend upon this body of troops, to carry into execution the wishes of his Majesty’s Ministers, as stated in the letter of Mr. Secretary Dundas of the 6th of October, it is absolutely necessary that we should proceed towards the rendez-vous pointed out by him without loss of time.

‘ These are the considerations which induced me to propose to Captain Malcolm to proceed towards Bombay immediately; and since I proposed that measure to him, other

circumstances have come to my knowledge which have convinced me of its propriety.

‘ I have heard from Mr. North, that the Governor of Bombay did not propose to make any preparations to send a force to the Red Sea, in consequence of the letter of Mr. Secretary Dundas of the 6th of October, a copy of which was sent to him from England, until he heard that the armament which was assembled at this place had been otherwise disposed of; and, besides, I learn that he had only two battalions of sepoy of 600 men each, of which he could dispose. It appears then, not only that he has no troops to answer the call of his Majesty’s Ministers, but if he had them, or if they could be sent to him, it is probable that the preparations to be made previous to sending them to the proposed rendez-vous would take up so much time, that the season for sailing up the Red Sea would be gone by, before they could reach its mouth. Therefore some of the troops assembled at Ceylon must proceed on that service; and if it should be determined that a part of them should be employed on any other service, and should return here, there will be no difficulty in obeying any orders which may be given to that purport, as I have before observed.

‘ Captain Malcolm has put up for you a large packet of dispatches from the Governor General, some of which I opened according to his directions. They are in triplicate, and relate principally to the expedition which it was proposed to carry into execution in December,

‘ The Governor General sent here five Assistant Surgeons, who, I believe, were intended for the ships, and I have disposed of them as follows. One of them, Mr. Small, is in the Suffolk; Mr. Rice in the gun boat Fury, and in charge of the sick in her and the Wasp; Mr. Carnegy in the Waller, which vessel remains at this place; and Mr. Pollock in the Anna Maria transport.

‘ Mr. Cheese is a gentleman much esteemed in Bengal, on account of his professional abilities, and he is desirous of returning thither. I have allowed him to return to Calcutta, as I understand from Captain Malcolm, that it is not likely that you will be desirous of detaining him contrary to his inclination, particularly as it is not probable that any of the

ships of your squadron will be sent on any service which will detain them long at sea.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral Rainier.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Chief Secretary of Government, Fort St. George.*

‘ SIR,                    ‘ H.M.S. Suffolk, off Trincomalee, 15th Feb., 1801.

‘ I have the honor to inform you, that the fleet of transports went out of the harbour yesterday, and the whole are now at sea with a fair wind. The Honorable Company’s ship Waller remains at this port to receive the orders of the Admiral or of Government; the gun boats Fury and Wasp accompany the fleet.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Chief Sec. of Gov. Fort St. George.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor of Ceylon.*

‘ SIR,                    ‘ Pointe de Galle, 18th Feb., 1801.

‘ I have received your letters of the 17th instant; and as I am so unfortunate as to differ in opinion with you, regarding the propriety of going to Bombay, and as you have recorded your opinion, and the communication of it to me, it is necessary that I should trouble you at some length, as well to justify myself in your eyes, as that those who will have to judge hereafter of the propriety of my decision upon this occasion, may know the real grounds upon which I formed it.

‘ First; I learn from Captain Malcolm that the passage from hence to the Red Sea will not be materially retarded by going to Bombay; that the fleet must proceed along the coast as far as the Vingorla rocks, to the northward of Goa, before it crosses; and in some cases, that it may be necessary to go still farther north.

‘ Secondly; Supposing the delay by going to Bombay were likely to be greater than it appears at present, it is impossible to think of going to the Red Sea until the ships and troops are provided with many articles which are at present deficient.

‘ This deficiency has been occasioned by the necessity of using at Trincomalee what was intended to be used upon the voyage. On the 1st of this month, there were on board the fleet about four months’ provisions for the whole armament; at this moment this quantity will last three months and a half; and supposing my passage to Mocha should be much better than even you suppose it would, I should reach that station with a sufficiency of provision to last the troops two months and a half; and my first thoughts must be directed to taking measures for procuring a further supply.

‘ You propose that I should send my indent to you for the articles which are deficient; and from the kindness and attention which I have already experienced, I should certainly have every inclination to do so. But I must observe, that you have neither the means of supplying all my wants, nor those of transporting to me the articles which you could supply. You then propose that they should be supplied from the Malabar province, which I beg to inform you is equally destitute of what I want as the territories under your government.

‘ But you propose that I should proceed without the articles which I have requested the Governor of Bombay to prepare, and you have no doubt but that he or the Governor of Fort St. George will send them after me.

‘ Articles of provision are not to be trifled with, or left to chance; and there is nothing more clear than that the subsistence of the troops must be certain upon the proposed service, or the service must be relinquished.

‘ If there is a chance that by going to Bombay with the fleet we shall be late, is it not more probable that the provisions for which shipping must be prepared at Bombay will be late, and is there not a chance that the provisions will miss the fleet entirely, and that the troops will be in want? If the provisions are to be supplied from Madras or Calcutta, the probability of want is greater in proportion to the greater length of the voyage.

‘ Upon the whole, then, as far as regards supplies wanted for the fleet, I conceive that I act with propriety, and that I do that which will tend most to insure the object of the armament, by proceeding to Bombay to receive provisions on board the ships in which the troops are embarked.

‘ I have taken every measure which I can think of to make it certain that these articles and certain refreshments, of which the troops who have been at Trincomalee are greatly in want, may be prepared by the time I reach Bombay; and if they are so, I shall certainly be in time for every thing. If they are not, and if I am detained at Bombay, I have seen letters from Admiral Blanquet, which lead me to be of opinion, that I shall not be too late for one of the objects proposed even in the end of April; and as for the other, it is possible to reach it at all seasons.

‘ Thirdly: I am very anxious to receive the orders of the Governor General regarding the armament, and I can receive them only by going to Bombay. The orders of Mr. Secretary Dundas confine the demand upon India to one regiment of Europeans and two battalions of sepoy; and it may probably be the intention of his Lordship to employ upon another service the Europeans which I have under my command, which are above the number demanded. It is surely my duty to afford his Lordship an opportunity of giving me his orders, particularly as I am strongly urged to take the steps which will put me in the way of receiving them, by the motives which I have above stated, and which affect so nearly the final success of the service proposed; when I learn from the best authority that the fleet will not be materially delayed by taking those steps; and when I have reason to believe, from another excellent authority, that even after the greatest delay which can possibly be expected, I shall still be in good time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Ceylon.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Hon. Frederick North, Governor of Ceylon.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pointe de Galle, 18th February, 1801.

‘ I have received your letter upon the subject of my proceeding to Bombay, to which an answer will accompany this letter.

‘ I am concerned that you, or General Macdowall\* should have thought it necessary to write a public letter upon this subject, as I hope that I have always shown myself ready to

\* Commanding the forces at Ceylon: he was lost at sea, in returning to Europe.

attend to your wishes in whatever manner they may have been made known to me. The existence of your public letter upon the records of your government increases considerably my responsibility upon this occasion.

‘ However, notwithstanding that, I conceive the grounds upon which I have determined to go to Bombay are so strong, and the urgency of the measure is so great, and will appear so much so to all those who will have to judge of my conduct, that I persist, and I still hope that it will meet with your approbation and that of General Maedowall.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Hon. Frederick North.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 10th February, 1801.

‘ 1. Since the date of my last dispatches to you on the subject of the intended expeditions against Batavia and the Isle of France, I have received dispatches overland from England, which have determined me to relinquish for the present the prosecution of those expeditions.

‘ 2. For the contents of those dispatches, and for the measures which I now propose to pursue, I must refer you to my instructions, of this date, to Major General Baird, which he is directed to communicate to you.

‘ 3. I have appointed Major General Baird to command the armament, which is now destined to the Red Sea, and I have appointed you second in command on that important service.

‘ 4. For my instructions for your guidance, I must refer you to my above mentioned dispatches of this date, to Major General Baird.

‘ I have forwarded a copy of this letter to Major General Baird for his information and guidance.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLESLEY.’

*To Major General Baird.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ On board H.M.S. Suffolk, 21st Feb., 1801.

‘ I have just received a letter from Lord Wellesley, dated the 24th of January, by which I am informed that you are

appointed to take the command of the body of troops which have hitherto been under my orders ; that you were likely to leave Calcutta for Trincomalee towards the end of the month ; and that the object was an expedition against the Dutch settlement in Java. You will probably be much surprised to find that I have left the island of Ceylon with the troops, and have gone towards Bombay ; and I write you this letter to explain the motives which urged me to take this step without waiting for orders from the Governor General.

‘ On the 7th of February, I received from the Governor of Fort St. George a copy of a letter from Mr. Dundas to Lord Wellesley, dated the 6th of October, calling for the co-operation of a body of troops from India in an attack upon Egypt. As the troops were collected in Ceylon, partly with a view to be prepared to answer this call, I conceived it to be my duty to proceed immediately towards the rendezvous pointed out by Mr. Dundas ; and I go to Bombay because I understand that it will not materially retard the arrival of the fleet in the Red Sea ; because I know that the troops are in want of provisions, which can be furnished at Bombay only ; and because I am desirous of receiving the orders of the Governor General before I proceed finally to the Red Sea.

‘ In my opinion, the letter from Mr. Dundas, which I have above mentioned, will make a considerable alteration in the plan which the Governor General had on the 24th of January ; and that he will in consequence be obliged either to relinquish the attack upon Batavia entirely, or to provide another body of troops for that purpose. I therefore proceed on my voyage, notwithstanding that I have received his orders of the 24th of January.

‘ It is true, that the number of European troops, called for in Egypt, is not equal to that which I have with me at present, although the number of natives is greater ; and I might immediately send back to Trincomalee some of the European troops, in order to give Lord Wellesley an opportunity of sending both expeditions, if he should think it proper.

‘ Upon this last notion I must observe, that I do not think it probable that he will wish to send both expeditions ; if he should wish it, I shall know it upon my arrival at Bombay, from the tenor of his orders to Mr. Duncan ; and I can im-



mediately send back to Ceylon the troops which it may be intended to employ upon the expedition to Batavia. These will arrive at Ceylon long before the period for sailing will come round.

‘As I before observed to you, I do not think it probable that Lord Wellesley would wish to send both expeditions; he will send that to Egypt only: and as I know that it was his intention to give you the command of this body of troops, in case they should go to Egypt, I recommend you to come to Bombay and take the command of them without loss of time.

‘If Lord Wellesley should determine to send both the expeditions, and if he should wish that you should command that to Batavia, you will be with the troops which must go on that service. On the other hand, if he should determine to send troops to Egypt only, you will be late, unless you proceed to Bombay immediately.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General Baird.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘MY DEAR ARTHUR,

‘Fort William, 3rd March, 1801.

‘I received this day your private letter of the 7th of February, and the dispatches noticed in Mr. Barlow’s letter of this date.

‘Being in hourly expectation of receiving a direct communication from you, of the grounds and motives which induced you to act upon Mr. Dundas’s letter of the 6th of October, before you had received any intimation of my intentions with respect to the mode of prosecuting the expedition to the Red Sea, I have not expressed any official opinion on the subject. I entertain a confident hope that you will furnish me, at the earliest possible period of time, with such official documents as shall enable me to deliver my sentiments in a regular form, and in a manner agreeable to my wishes and satisfactory to you.

‘After the fullest deliberation, my determination is to make the most powerful diversion which may be practicable on the coasts of the Red Sea, and for that purpose to employ,

in the first instance, the whole force assembled at Ceylon and Bombay. If the campaign in Egypt should be protracted, it will become a question to what extent the army acting upon the coast of the Red Sea may be augmented within the next season.

‘ My first opinion inclined to the literal execution of the King’s commands, and to the prosecution of an expedition either against the Mauritius or against Batavia, with such forces as I might have been able to collect for either purpose after having satisfied Mr. Dundas’s requisition: under this impression I directed Colonel Kirkpatrick to write the private letter addressed to Mr. Duncan on the 7th of February; but a fuller consideration of the subject induced me to change my opinion.

‘ The result of attempting operations in Egypt and in India at the same time, would probably have proved an unfavorable one to both services; and it is evident that the diversion on the coasts of the Red Sea cannot prove advantageous unless it be powerful, and unless it be prosecuted at the earliest possible moment.

‘ General Baird will bring you several letters from me, which will serve to explain my motives for wishing you to retain the second command of this expedition. I am persuaded that a full consideration of the question will induce you to agree with me in opinion, that the extent of the force to be employed rendered it necessary to appoint a general officer to the chief command; while the sudden call to active service precluded the possibility of removing you from the second command without injuring your character, or of leaving you officially the power of option, without reproach upon the impartiality and justice of my administration.

‘ You will, however, exercise your judgment upon the propriety of desiring leave to return to Mysore; and if you should retain your anxiety on that subject, I shall not attempt to obstruct your wishes, nor shall I feel any sentiment of unkindness upon the transaction; but my decided opinion is, that you will best satisfy the call of your public duty, and maintain the reputation of your public spirit, by serving cheerfully and zealously in your present situation.

‘ Henry arrived safe and well on the 22nd of February. I

enclose an abstract from the Duke of York's letter \* respecting your future situation in India.

‘ Ever, dear ARTHUR, yours most affectionately,

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Bombay, 23rd March, 1801.

‘ 1. The letters which I have received since my arrival at this place, give me reason to apprehend, that neither my departure from Ceylon, nor my coming here have been approved by your Excellency.

‘ 2. Although my address of the 9th February, with its enclosures, stated the outlines of the reasons which induced me to take those steps, without waiting for your Excellency's orders, I am induced to enter again into further detail of them, in order, if possible, to remove an impression which has given me great uneasiness; or at least, to prove that I acted upon the most mature deliberation, and did what I thought best for the service, and most likely to be agreeable to you.

‘ 3. I always considered that your Excellency's intentions were, that I should attend to the intelligence which I should receive from Bombay, of a call from Europe for the co-operation of a force from this country in an attack upon the French in the Red Sea, which you foresaw would be made; and even that the expedition upon which you ordered that I should proceed at the end of December, was to be relinquished in case intelligence came of a call for co-operation in the Red Sea.

‘ 4. Upon this point I must observe, that the government of Fort St. George conceived that I ought to proceed towards the rendez-vous pointed out by Mr. Secretary Dundas, when they sent me the copies of the dispatches, as appears by their Secretary's letter of the 1st February, a copy of

\* *Extract from the Duke of York's Letter.*

‘ Having the pleasure of knowing personally Colonel Wellesley, I am thoroughly acquainted with his merits, and your Lordship may be assured of the satisfaction I shall feel in laying his name before his Majesty, to be placed upon the Staff in the East Indies, as soon as his standing in the army shall admit of his being promoted to the rank of Major General.’

which has been already laid before your Excellency; that the government of Bombay expected that I should proceed towards it, and therefore did not send the troops which they had in preparation; and that the Governor of Ceylon conceived that I ought to proceed towards it, and urged me repeatedly, in the strongest manner, to lose no time previous to my departure.

‘ 5. I received the dispatches of the Secretary of State on the 7th of February, and I knew that your Excellency could not receive them till about the same day. If I had waited at Trincomalee, and you had written me your orders immediately, I should not have received them by post till the 3rd or 4th of March, and at that time the stock of provisions for the troops would have been reduced to one, for three months.

‘ 6. I consulted with Captain Malcolm regarding the passage to the Red Sea, the season, and the line which it would be most proper to follow. He was of opinion that no time ought to be lost; that it would be necessary to proceed up the coast as far as the Vingorla rocks, before the fleet could go to the westward; and that to go to Bombay would not create a material delay. Upon this opinion I formed my plan, and determined to sail as soon as a vessel loaded with military stores, then expected, should arrive from Madras.

‘ 7. The only doubt I had upon my mind, was whether I should take from Ceylon more than one regiment of Europeans and the battalion of sepoys, and trust to the preparations at Bombay for the remainder of the equipment. But although the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay had been ordered to have troops in readiness in case I should want them, I was ignorant of the resources of the latter, and I did not believe that they would be able to furnish the troops which have been sent to the Red Sea; and, therefore, I took with me the whole of the force for which I had tonnage, knowing, that if your Excellency should wish that some of the troops should be employed upon another service, and should return to Ceylon, they would be there in good time.

‘ 8. I determined to go to Bombay, because, when I sailed from Trincomalee, I had provisions for only three and a half months; and I knew by your letter of the 1st of

December, 1800, that it was your opinion that the troops ought not to go to the Red Sea with a smaller quantity than for six months. I was very anxious to receive your Excellency's orders, which would reach me at Bombay; and as I have above stated, I was informed by Captain Malcolm, that as the fleet would be obliged to go as far north as the Vingorla rocks, the passage to Mocha was not likely to be materially delayed, by putting into Bombay to receive the supply of provisions, which I had requested Mr. Duncan to prepare.

‘ 9. I have thus laid before your Excellency the grounds upon which I conceived myself obliged to come to a decision, when I received the dispatches of the Secretary of State; and those upon which I determined to sail immediately with all the troops for which I had tonnage, and to go to Bombay; and I now proceed to state the reasons for which I have persisted in that determination, notwithstanding the receipt of subsequent advices from you and Mr. Duncan.

‘ 10. When I was off Cape Comorin, I received your Excellency's orders of the 24th January, in which you inform me that you have appointed Major General Baird to the command of the troops, and that you intended to send them on an expedition to Batavia. I was certain that you had not received the dispatches of the Secretary of State when you wrote that letter; I knew that you must depend for the expedition to the Red Sea upon some of the troops which had been, till then, under my orders; and as I did not know what might be your wishes after you should have received the dispatches, I determined to proceed according to my original plan; and I dispatched a letter to Major General Baird to Trincomalee, to apprize him of my motions. If your Excellency had determined to carry on both expeditions, the troops for that for Batavia would have been at Ceylon, before the season for sailing would have come round; and if you determined to carry on only that to the Red Sea, they would be at Bombay collected for that purpose.

‘ 11. I received a letter from Mr. Duncan on the 16th instant, in which he enclosed a copy of a letter from Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick, dated the 7th February, and informed me that General Baird was to command the expedition to the Red Sea. Notwithstanding the contents of the enclosure, I

did not know till then of the intention to dispatch from Bengal any of the vessels loaded with provisions mentioned by Mr. Secretary Barlow. At that time I was so near Bombay, that I was induced to adhere to my original plan. The intelligence received from Mr. Duncan did not state what your Excellency's intentions were regarding the proposed expedition to Batavia; although Mr. Duncan informed me that Major General Baird was appointed to command the expedition to the Red Sea. It was therefore necessary that I should come here to receive your orders. The fleet was in want of water, which could not be procured at any port to the southward of the Vingorla rocks, on account of the want of conveniences for that purpose, without losing more time than was likely to elapse while it was coming to Bombay; and the troops, in general, wanted refreshments. The 10th regiment in particular had become sickly from having been so long on board ship, living on salt provisions, and has lost men. Upon the whole, therefore, I determined to come on to Bombay.

‘12. Since my arrival here, I have perused your Lordship's instructions to Major General Baird, and your dispatches to the Governor of Bombay; and I perceive that I have anticipated your wishes in bringing from Ceylon all the troops for which I had tonnage. I imagine that I should have incurred your disapprobation in a great degree, if I had not taken steps to insure the receipt of your Excellency's orders before the final departure of the troops for Mocha; and I certainly could not have received them, the ships would have gone ill supplied with water, and the troops in want of refreshments, which no other place can afford, if I had not come on to Bombay.

‘13. Having thus explained all the motives which urged me to depart from Ceylon, and to come here, I beg to observe, that notwithstanding the unexpected length of the passage hitherto, it is probable that the fleet will be at Mocha sooner than it would have been had I waited at Trincomalee for your Excellency's orders, and certainly better refreshed and supplied with water and provisions. But whatever may be your Excellency's determination upon my conduct, I hope that you will give me credit for having maturely considered the points upon which I had to decide;

and for having had an earnest and zealous desire to forward the service in view, and to give it the full benefit of your Excellency's foresight in collecting the troops in Ceylon.

' 14. The whole of the fleet is not yet come in, but as the ships arrive, I will take care that they shall be dispatched as soon as they receive their water. All the arrangements are made for putting the provisions into the ships, and your Lordship may depend upon it that not a moment shall be lost.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Governor General.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.\**

' MY DEAR HENRY,

' Bombay, 23rd March, 1801.

' I have received your note of the 3rd of March, but none of your other letters which you say that you have written to me. I hope that you received those which I wrote to you while you were in England, giving an account of how we were going on in this country. I enclosed them to the Doctor, † and desired him to destroy those which should arrive subsequent to your departure, on your return to this country; so that some of them written lately you will probably never see. I was very anxious about you, as you must have come from the Cape in the track of the French privateers homeward bound; and you were longer on your passage than we had reason to expect you would be.

' I have written a long letter to Government this day, about my departure from Ceylon, which I hope will explain everything. Whether it does or not, I shall always consider these expeditions as the most unfortunate circumstances for me, in every point of view, that could have occurred; and, as such, I shall always lament them.

' I was at the top of the tree in this country; the governments of Forts St. George and Bombay, which I had served, placed unlimited confidence in me, and I had received from both strong and repeated marks of their approbation. Before I quitted the Mysore country, I arranged the plan for taking possession of the Ceded Districts, which was done

\* Now Lord Cowley, G.C.B.

† The Hon. Dr. Gerald Wellesley, now a Prebend of Durham Cathedral.

without striking a blow; and another plan for conquering Wynaad and re-conquering Malabar, which I am informed has succeeded without loss on our side. But this supercession has ruined all my prospects, founded upon any service that I may have rendered. Upon this point I must refer you to the letters written to me and to the Governor of Fort St. George in May last, when an expedition to Batavia was in contemplation; and to those written to the governments of Fort St. George, Bombay, and Ceylon; and to the Admiral, Colonel Champagné, and myself, when the troops were assembled in Ceylon. I then ask you, has there been any change whatever of circumstances that was not expected when I was appointed to the command? If there has not, (and no one can say there has, without doing injustice to the Governor General's foresight,) my supercession must have been occasioned, either by my own misconduct, or by an alteration of the sentiments of the Governor General.

‘I have not been guilty of robbery or murder, and he has certainly changed his mind; but the world, which is always good-natured towards those whose affairs do not exactly prosper, will not, or rather does not, fail to suspect that both, or worse, have been the occasion of my being banished, like General Kray, to my estate in Hungary. I did not look, and did not wish, for the appointment which was given to me; and I say that it would probably have been more proper to give it to some body else; but when it was given to me, and a circular written to the governments upon the subject, it would have been fair to allow me to hold it till I did some thing to deserve to lose it.

‘I put private considerations out of the question, as they ought and have had no weight in causing either my original appointment or my supercession. I am not quite satisfied with the manner in which I have been treated by Government upon the occasion. However, I have lost neither my health, spirits, nor temper in consequence thereof.

‘But it is useless to write any more upon a subject of which I wish to retain no remembrance whatever.

‘I enclose a memorandum upon the subject of Trincomalee, which will point out to you the inconveniences of that port as one of rendezvous or equipment. You will find it of use in the next expedition. Remember, also, that it is difficult for



ships to get round Ceylon in the south-west monsoon after the middle of March.

‘ Yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Hon. Henry Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Bombay, 25th March, 1801.

‘ Letters arrived last night from Muscat, by which I learn that it is probable that Sir Ralph Abercrombie has commenced his operations. If the expedition from India against Egypt means any thing, it is to encourage the Mamelukes in Upper Egypt to rise against the French, and to create a diversion in favor of Sir Ralph Abercrombie. This must be done immediately, or as soon as possible, or it will be useless.

‘ General Baird is not come. They tell me that he will find it difficult to get round Ceylon, and the Lord knows when he will arrive. I therefore intend to go off immediately, and to commence the operations in the Red Sea with the troops now there, if General Baird should not be on board any of the ships now in the offing.

‘ My former letters will have shown you how much this will annoy me; but I have never had much value for the public spirit of any man who does not sacrifice his private views and convenience, when it is necessary. As all my baggage, &c. are on board one of the transports not yet come in, I go as bare as is possible.

‘ Yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Hon. Henry Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*The Hon. Henry Wellesley and Marquis Wellesley to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ MY DEAR ARTHUR,

‘ Calcutta, 28th March, 1801.

‘ You will perceive, by the accompanying dispatch, that Mornington has authorized you to return to Mysore, if you think proper. I think this is contrary to his own opinion; but Lord Clive and Webbe have strongly urged it. You will judge for yourself, after weighing all the advantages and disadvantages of your quitting the army under the command of Baird; and it is for the express purpose of enabling you to act as you shall think best, that Mornington has furnished you with the annexed dispatch.

‘ Perhaps you will think it better to remain with him, and Mornington’s objects will then be completely fulfilled, of employing the two men of the highest reputation in the army, and of combining the talents which are most likely to conduce to the success of this most important expedition.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ HENRY WELLESLEY.

‘ MY DEAR ARTHUR,

‘ Calcutta, 28th March, 1801.

‘ This letter entirely expresses my sentiments. It may not be unpleasant to you to know, privately, that I entirely approve of your movement from Ceylon, under all the circumstances of the case, and that I think it will prove a very useful step. I shall hereafter say a word too, *privately*, on the nature of the precedent which might be created by this step, unless guarded by the special exigency of the case, or rather (what is much safer) by your knowledge of my intentions and objects.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ WELLESLEY.

‘ I fear, my dear Arthur, that you will have quitted Bombay before this letter can reach you. Act as you shall think best, without any apprehension of displeasing Mornington; for I am certain he will approve whatever step you take, upon full consideration. No news. Kirkpatrick is gone to Poonah.

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*’

‘ H. W.

*The Governor General to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 28th March, 1801.

‘ The several arrangements being now completed, which induced me to avail myself of your knowledge and experience in the equipment of the expedition to be employed on the shores of the Red Sea, it appears to me that your services may, at present, be more usefully employed in resuming the chief command of the troops stationed in Mysore. You have, therefore, my permission to return to that station; but you are to consider this dispatch as containing merely my permission for your return to Mysore, and not any peremptory order to that effect.

‘ You will communicate this dispatch to Major General Baird.

‘ If the troops now employed in the Red Sea should proceed to the Isle of France, after you shall have quitted the second command, my intention is, that Colonel Champagné should hold it; and, in this case, should the French islands be reduced, I propose to authorize Major General Baird to hold the government of that conquest until his Majesty’s pleasure can be received.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLESLEY.

*The Marquis Wellesley to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 28th March, 1801.

‘ Having judged it expedient to appoint a Major General to the chief command of the expedition proceeding to the Red Sea, and not thinking it probable that the course of events will enable me to call upon you for your service in the separate command of any part of the forces now destined to act in Egypt, it appears to me that your talents, skill, and activity might now be employed, with more public benefit, in the chief command of the troops stationed in Mysore, than in the station which you hold under my recent orders.

‘ You have, therefore, my permission to return to Mysore; but you are to consider this dispatch as containing merely my permission for your return to Mysore, and not my peremptory order to that effect.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Bombay, 31st March, 1801.

‘ 1. I have the honor to enclose copies of the orders which I have had occasion to issue since the 31st of January last, which will require your confirmation.

‘ 2. I likewise enclose copies of letters to the Paymaster, giving my authority to incur expenses, of which I request your approbation.

‘ 3. When quitting Ceylon, I received from the Government of that island a sum of money amounting to 55,905

Porto Novo pagodas and 8000 Bombay rupees, which money was brought to this place in his Majesty's ship Suffolk.

‘4. Mr. Duncan, however, having informed me that those coins were current in the countries on the shores of the Red Sea, but at a considerable loss, I have requested the Governor and Council of Bombay to receive them into the treasury; and he proposes to supply the armament, instead of them, with a sum nearly equal in Spanish crowns and German dollars.

‘5. I have the honor to enclose the copy of the proceedings of a committee on some provisions, which have been condemned and destroyed in the ship Gabriel. Other committees have been assembled at different times, and have examined and condemned provisions, and their proceedings will come before you in the regular channel; but the quantity examined and condemned by this committee is so large, that I have thought it proper to lay its proceedings before you without further loss of time.

‘6. Major General Baird arrived yesterday, and I delivered to him the command of the troops.

‘7. The ships stated in the margin \* have received their provisions and sailed this morning; the others will be ready to sail when the General may think proper to order them to sea.

‘8. It has been necessary to put into some of the ships above 100 tons of ballast, besides their water and provisions, which has been the occasion of their being detained so many days longer than I expected.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Bombay, 31st March, 1801.

‘When I wrote to you on the 25th, I was in hopes that should be able to sail the next day; but on that night I was seized with a fever, which has lasted ever since, and of which I have not yet recovered. It is of the intermitten kind.

‘General Baird has arrived. I am quite distressed about my officers who followed me through the Mysore country.

\* Gabriel, Calcutta, Minerva, Pearl, Eliza, Ruby.

However, I have seen enough already to be certain, that if I do not go, matters will be uncomfortable ; and if I well can, I will go. I have the satisfaction of finding that there is not a man here who would have come, had he known what was likely to happen to me, if he had the power of refusal. Indeed, in this respect the feelings of the greater part of the army agree with mine. Mr. Stokes is not yet come.

‘ Believe me yours affectionately,

‘ *The Hon. Henry Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Josiah Webbe, Esq., Secretary of Government.*

‘ MY DEAR WEBBE,

‘ Bombay, 7th April, 1801.

‘ Since I wrote to you last I have had a fever, which prevented me from putting in execution the intention I then had of going to the Red Sea immediately.

‘ The General arrived on the 30th, and is gone, and the troops are gone likewise. I am not quite well ; and this circumstance, together with the probability resulting from the contents of the last dispatches from Europe, that Sir Ralph Abercrombie’s attack on Lower Egypt will be relinquished, and, therefore, that our troops will be recalled from the Red Sea, and many other good reasons, have made me desirous not to go. To this Lord Wellesley has consented in his last letter. I shall write to Lord Clive upon the subject as soon as I can. If I am well enough, I shall go to Malabar by the first opportunity.

‘ You will have heard that Coleman has been dismissed from his situation, to which I had appointed him. The General offered to make him Deputy Quarter Master General, which Coleman declined, and he is now here.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Josiah Webbe, Esq.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Bombay, 8th April, 1801.

‘ My fever has left me, but I am still weak, and I have got another disorder, of which it appears the medical men here do not know the nature, and which, I think it probable, will oblige me to go to a cold climate. This circumstance, and the great probability held out by the late dispatches from

Europe, that Sir Ralph Abercrombie's attack upon Lower Egypt will be postponed, or rather will never take place, and, therefore, that the operations proposed in the Red Sea will likewise be relinquished, have induced me to determine not to go. I shall write to the Governor General upon this subject as soon as I am able.

‘In the meantime, it is but justice to General Baird to say, that his conduct towards me has by no means occasioned this determination, but that it has been perfectly satisfactory. He offered Colonel Coleman to appoint him Deputy Quarter Master General, which the latter declined.

‘I hope that if the service goes on, matters will be conducted satisfactorily. I have been a slave to it till this moment, notwithstanding I was sick; and now they have only to take care of what they have got, till the operations on shore commence. I have given the General my opinion fully in writing upon this part of the subject.

‘The ships are all gone, excepting one which came in only yesterday, having sprung a leak at sea. Arrangements were immediately made to move the troops to other ships, and they will go to-morrow. From what I have seen of the state of the ships, the troops, the water casks, &c., I am convinced that if we had not come here, the expedition would have been obliged to quit the Red Sea before they would have been there one month. The 10th regiment have to a man got the scurvy, and lost above twenty men on their passage from Ceylon.

‘Affectionately yours,

‘*The Hon. Henry Wellesley.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Baird.*

‘DEAR GENERAL,

‘Bombay, 9th April, 1801.

‘The first circumstance I have to detail to you is the state of my health, which is indeed the cause of this letter. I have had no fever since I saw you, but I am sorry to say that the breaking out of which I complained is worse than it was; and has become so bad as to induce Mr. Scott to order me to begin a course of nitrous baths. This remedy, exclusive of the disease itself, is sufficient to induce me to be desirous to wait, at least rather longer than the Susannah will; if not to give over all thoughts of joining you.

‘ I do this, I assure you, with reluctance, notwithstanding I think it very probable that I shall soon hear of your being recalled ; however, considering that circumstance, and the bad state of my body, and the remedy which I am obliged to use, I should be mad if I were to think of going at this moment.

‘ As I am writing upon this subject, I will freely acknowledge that my regret at being prevented from accompanying you has been greatly increased by the kind, candid, and handsome manner in which you have behaved towards me ; and I will confess as freely, not only that I did not expect such treatment, but that my wishes before you arrived, regarding going upon the expedition, were directly the reverse of what they are at this moment.

‘ I need not enter further upon this subject, than to entreat you will not attribute my stay to any other motive than that to which I have above assigned it ; and to inform you, that as I know what has been said and expected by the world in general, I propose, as well for my own credit as for yours, to make known to my friends and to yours, not only the distinguished manner in which you have behaved towards me, but the causes which have prevented my demonstrating my gratitude, by giving you every assistance in the arduous service which you have to conduct.

‘ I shall stay here as long as the season will permit, and then I propose to go round to Madras ; and if I cannot get well, I believe I must try a cold climate.

‘ The Maria Louisa is unable to go on at present, and the 80th regiment will sail by Saturday in the Morad Bey, 150 ; the Nelson, 70 ; the Dundas, 70 ; and about seventy followers distributed in the three ships. They will have six months’ provisions of every thing, even of meat. The Asia would have been taken up for this detachment, according to your desire, only that she is dismasted, and wants copper on her bottom ; and the owners were desirous she should go into dock, if only for three days, before she should take her departure for the Red Sea. This operation, however, and the equipment of her with masts, &c., were likely to take more time than will be lost by the slow sailing of the vessels above mentioned ; and I therefore preferred them, and they will be ready immediately.

‘ I enclose the memorandum upon your operations, and I refer you to my public letter for other matters. Wishing you every success,

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Baird.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM ON THE OPERATIONS IN THE RED SEA.

[Enclosed by Colonel Wellesley to Major General Baird.]

‘ The objects proposed by Mr. Dundas, and by the Governor General, in the expedition to the Red Sea, are—

‘ 1st, To get possession of the forts and ports which the French may have on its shores.

‘ 2ndly, To urge and encourage the natives of Upper Egypt (Mamelukes and Arabs) to commence operations against them.

‘ 3rdly, To assist the operations of the natives by giving them arms and ammunition ; or by a junction with them, either of a part or of the whole of the force.

‘ The advanced state of the season renders it probable that it will be so difficult to reach Suez, that the object is not attainable. It is possible, however, that the force which left Bombay in December last, under the orders of Admiral Blanquet, may have succeeded in effecting the objects in view, when it was fitted out, as far as they relate to Suez. Cossier will then be the first object of attention, and the operations of the army ought to be directed, in the first instance, to gain possession of that place.

‘ The General is already acquainted with the measures which have been taken to facilitate these operations, and it is needless to enumerate them here ; and I shall now proceed to the second object of the expedition, viz., to encourage the natives of Upper Egypt to shake off the French yoke and to act on our side. The success of this measure, it is evident, will operate most forcibly in favor of Sir Ralph Abercrombie, and it appears to me to be the principal object of the expedition.

‘ From the intelligence lately received from the Red Sea, I am induced to believe that after the Turkish army was beaten by General Kleber, in March last, and after Colonel Murray had evacuated Suez, Morad Bey made peace with



the French, and that the latter ceded to him all Upper Egypt. He is now stationed there, and from the accounts and distribution of the French force in Egypt, which I have occasionally seen, I am induced to believe that they have no troops in Upper Egypt, excepting such as are necessary to watch Morad Bey, who are encamped with him, and such as are necessary to keep up the communication with their post at Cossier. It is probable that when Sir Ralph Abercrombie commences his operations, they will draw to Lower Egypt all the troops not absolutely necessary for their safety in Upper Egypt; and thus they will leave to Morad Bey the power of acting as his sense of his own interests may point out.

‘ I have always understood this man to be the head of the Mamelukes; and certainly, until the French made peace with him, he was supposed to be a friend of the English; and showed his power of doing injury to the French, by keeping in constant employment a large part of their army under General Dessaix, in pursuit of him.

‘ It is very probable that he does not deem his tenure in Upper Egypt very secure. He must be aware that, as soon as the French gain quiet possession of Lower Egypt, they will have the power to break their engagement with him; and from his own experience of their fidelity in adhering to treaties, he must expect that they will use that power to his disadvantage. Indeed the fact that the French have found it necessary to have a body of their troops encamped with Morad Bey’s army, is a clear proof that they do not place much faith in him; and as he must know that he is suspected and watched, he has still stronger reason to expect that, as soon as the French have the power, they will not fail to exert it to get rid of a neighbour and an ally in whom they have so little confidence.

‘ Without being too sanguine, we may expect then that, as soon as Morad Bey shall perceive a prospect of driving the French from Egypt, he will co-operate and join with those employed in that object. For this reason the very first opportunity ought to be taken to open a communication with him; his situation and his prospects, if the French should remain in Egypt, ought to be clearly pointed out to him; and he ought to be urged in the strongest manner to

exert himself to shake off the yoke. The power of the armies employed on the side of Lower Egypt ought to be made known to him; their prospects of success, founded as well on their own strength, as on the impossibility that the French should receive assistance, ought to be stated to him: and, finally, an offer ought to be made to supply him with arms and ammunition, and even to join him with a part or the whole of the army in the Red Sea, in order to ensure the speedy success of the objects which he, as well as the English, must have in view.

‘The possession of the port of Cossier, and of the navigation of the Red Sea, will be a strong inducement to Morad Bey, as the Governor of Upper Egypt, to be favorable to the English.

‘The trade in corn is carried on by this port to Jedda in Arabia; and this trade is such an object both to Upper Egypt and Arabia, and to Mecca in particular, that it may be expected that the Governor of Upper Egypt will not be disinclined towards those who will have it so much in their power to annoy him. Having now stated the reasons which induce me to believe that it will not be difficult to urge the head of the Mamelukes to shake off the French yoke, I proceed to the consideration of the third object of the expedition, viz., to assist the natives with arms and ammunition, and even to join them with a part or the whole of the army.

‘The first question which I shall consider, and which will lay the grounds for a consideration of, and decision upon others, is, whether it would be practicable, or even desirable, to cross the Desert from Cossier at all, if that operation is not performed in concert and co-operation with a body of the natives posted upon the Nile.

‘It is needless to enter into a statement of the difficulties to be apprehended in crossing the Desert: they are certainly great, but I imagine not insurmountable. But, if it is not certain that the army, or detachment which may cross the Desert, will partake of the plenty of the banks of the Nile, when they reach them; if they should be certain of having water only, and such forage as their cattle should be able to pick up, I apprehend that the difficulty will become so great, that the operation ought not to be attempted.

‘It is impossible that the Mamelukes in Upper Egypt can

be neutral in the contest in contemplation; they must take part with the French or with us. If they take part with the French, the army will be in the situation in which I have above described it, enjoying no advantage from having reached the banks of the Nile, excepting water, and probably no forage: and it is needless to point out that, if the Desert is to be crossed under these circumstances, care must be taken not only to send with the body of troops which may cross a very large proportion of provisions, but means must be adopted to add to them, until the operations of this body shall have given them such a hold of the country, as to leave no doubt of their steady supply of provisions. It is obvious that this will require a great number of cattle; a number much greater than the government of India, with all the zealous exercise of their power and means, can supply; but there is another consideration connected with this subject besides the supply of cattle, and that is the means of feeding them when landed from the ships.

‘ Upon this point, I need only call to the General’s recollection the difficulties to which he has been a witness in moving large supplies of stores and provisions, even in fertile, cultivated, and inhabited countries, well supplied with well-water, and every other advantage of arrangement in the supply, distribution, care, and food of the cattle; and draw a comparison between such difficulties, and those to be expected in a march through a desert. But this is not the worst that is to be apprehended: the cattle will of course land in weak condition, in a desert; and it must be expected that even those which survive the voyage will starve, or at least be in such a state before they commence their march, as to render it very probable that they will not carry their loads to the end of it. Upon the whole, then, I am decidedly of opinion that, if the Mamelukes are not on our side, no attempt ought to be made to cross the Desert.

‘ This opinion, the General will observe, is by no means founded on the impracticability of crossing with troops, because I am convinced that it can be done; but it is founded upon the danger that the troops will starve, if they do not return immediately; and upon the inutility of the measure, if they do.

‘ It may be imagined, that supposing the Mamelukes to

be wavering, if an attempt is not made to cross the Desert, the advantage of their co-operation will be lost. Upon this point I observe, that a knowledge of our strength, not of our weakness, will induce them to come forward; and that it might be expected that the sight of our weakness, occasioned by our march over the Desert without concert with them, might induce them to take advantage of it, and to join the French.

‘But those who will urge this consideration must suppose it possible that the Mamelukes can be neutral for a moment; and this their history from the beginning of time, particularly since the French invasion, will show to be impossible.

‘I come now to consider the propriety and mode of crossing the Desert, supposing that the Mamelukes should be inclined to shake off the French yoke and to co-operate with us.

‘The first point for the General to ascertain is their sincerity in the cause, of which, as I have above stated, there is every probability. As soon as he shall have ascertained this, it will be necessary that he should make arrangements with them for posting a supply of water on that part of the Desert where it is most wanted; and for having a supply of provisions ready on the Nile, that he might cross over a part of his army immediately. The first object on his arrival on the Nile should be to establish a post at Ghennah; and, if possible, another in the Desert, between that place and Cossier, in order to ensure his communication between the sea and the Nile. At Ghennah he should make the depôt of his stores, &c., which might be brought across the Desert by degrees; and then he might commence his operations against the enemy.

‘On the consideration of the question regarding the crossing the Desert, I have omitted to mention the interruption which may be given to that operation by the enemy; because it is entirely distinct from the difficulties which are peculiar to the operation itself. It is obvious, however, that if the Mamelukes are not on our side, and if they should not have driven out of Upper Egypt the small French force supposed to be in that country, before the operation is attempted, that force, however small, will greatly increase the distress of the British troops who may cross the Desert.

‘ I have not adverted to the supply of arms and ammunition to be given to the natives. As long as their co-operation is doubtful, these supplies ought to be withheld, but promised; when they have shown their sincerity in our cause, the arms may be given to almost any extent.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Major General Baird.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 9th April, 1801.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter from Captain Moor, the garrison storekeeper at Bombay, which will explain the arrangements which have been made at this port, to complete the supply of provisions to me for six months for the Europeans and natives embarked. Besides the supply noticed in the enclosed letter to have been sent, there is a further supply on board the other ships dispatched from hence; and one will sail in a few days for the troops on board the Wellesley, London, Experiment, Anna Maria, Hydra grab, and Fancy brig, of the amount of which Captain Moor will apprise you in due course.

‘ I likewise enclose a packet, containing the invoices and bills of lading of treasure, sent for the service of the armament when I had the honor of commanding it. Enclosed is the receipt of Mr. Rider, the Paymaster, for the treasure on board the Experiment, which he has carried to account.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a packet of papers and returns relating to the amount, the nature of which their titles will explain. In obedience to your orders, I dispatched Lieut. Colonel Capper to Sir Ralph Abercrombie on the 7th instant with a letter, of which a copy is enclosed.

‘ I have the honor to enclose copies of the orders which I have signed for money received from the pay office at Bombay since your departure.

‘ When all the troops shall have gone from hence, I propose to take up all the vouchers, and to forward them to Mr. Rider, and to give the Paymaster General at Bombay a receipt according to the form enclosed. I beg leave to refer you to my private letter of this date, for a statement of the reasons which have prevented me from joining you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Baird.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Major General Baird.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 11th April, 1801.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter from Captain Moor, giving an account of the provisions which have been embarked in some of the ships in this harbor.

‘ I likewise enclose a letter from Colonel Champagné; and a copy of a letter which I have written to the Governor of Bombay, upon the subject of the mode of settling the account of the money received from the Paymaster General, since the departure of Mr. Rider and yourself.

‘ This mode appears well calculated to ensure the satisfactory settlement of the account, without the risk of the loss of the vouchers. If it should meet with your approbation, I request you will order Mr. Rider to transmit his receipt to the Paymaster General in Bombay, as soon as certified copies of the vouchers, as prepared in the enclosed copy of my letter to the Governor, may reach him.

‘ I have the honor to enclose accounts of the sums of money which have been received from the Paymaster General, under authority from me since I wrote to you last.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Baird.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lord Clive.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Bombay, 11th April, 1801.

‘ I have to inform you that I have had a fever since I arrived here, which has prevented me from accompanying the armament to the Red Sea, although I have recovered all but my strength. I therefore purpose, with your Lordship’s permission, to proceed to join my command.

‘ I judge by the Governor General’s private letters to me, that he would have had no objection to this, even if my health had not obliged me to give over all thoughts of going to the Red Sea; but, under the present circumstances, he must approve of it.

‘ I acknowledge that although I expected to return to put myself under your Lordship’s orders, more worthy of your favors than I have been hitherto, I shall even now return with the greatest satisfaction. I have not forgot the confidence which was placed in me, nor the favor with which all

my endeavors to serve the public were viewed, by your Lordship's government; and if your Lordship should think proper to employ me again in the same situation, an adherence to the same line of conduct which has heretofore gained your approbation will, I hope, gain it again.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Bombay, 11th April, 1801.

‘ You will be glad to hear that I propose to leave this place for Malabar in a day or two. The Governor General consented to my return to Mysore if I wished it; at the same time that he said he should regret my quitting the army employed on the expedition. Upon the whole, therefore, I determined to go on, notwithstanding that I was superseded in the command.

‘ When upon the point of carrying into execution this *laudable* but highly disagreeable intention, I was seized by a fever, which kept me in bed for some days; and although I have now recovered, I am still weak, and am taking a remedy which prevents me from going to sea. It has, therefore, been impossible for me to go on the expedition, and I return to my old situation, with a pleasure more than equal to the regret which I had on quitting it.

‘ I enclose a letter to my friend Quin, to desire that he will send my elephants, bullocks and some coolies to meet me at Cannanore; and if he should be out of the way, I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that these means of conveying my baggage, &c., may be sent to meet me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Champagné, with the Army under Major General Baird.*

‘ MY DEAR CHAMPAGNÉ,

‘ Bombay, 11th April, 1801.

‘ I take the opportunity of the departure of Colonel Ramsay to write you a few lines.

‘ I am entirely ignorant of the circumstances which have caused my removal from the command of the troops; but I

conclude that the Governor General found that he could not resist the claims that General Baird had to be employed. I believe you know that I always thought that General Baird had not been well used, when I was called to the command. But I do not think it was proper that I should be disappointed more than he was, in order that he might have no reason to complain. However, this is a matter of little consequence to any body but myself, therefore I say no more on the subject.\*

‘Lord Wellesley allowed me to return to my old situation, but said that he should regret my doing so; and for this reason, and because I saw in the General the most laudable intention to allow me to render him the services I could, I determined to proceed upon the expedition. I was, however, seized with a fever, and a breaking out all over my body; and here I am under a course of nitrous baths for a cure. When I shall be well, God knows! but, in the mean time, I cannot join the armament.

‘I see clearly the evil consequences of all this to my reputation and future views; but it cannot be helped, and to things of that nature I generally contrive to make up my mind.

‘I heard you were ill, but I hope not seriously. I thought it probable that you would not like to go one step beyond this, and that you would take advantage of your illness to

\* G. O.  
By Government. }

‘Fort St. George, 28th April, 1801.

‘Circumstances having occurred which enable the Right Hon. the Governor in Council to avail himself again of the services of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, his Lordship in Council is pleased to direct that Colonel Wellesley shall return to Seringapatam, and resume the command of the forces in Mysore.<sup>a</sup>

‘The Governor in Council takes this opportunity of expressing his Lordship’s high sense and approbation of the conduct of Colonel Stevenson in the command of the forces in Mysore during the absence of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley: and the eminent success which has attended the operations entrusted to that officer in Malabar, having entitled him to a distinguished mark of his Lordship’s approbation, the Governor in Council has resolved to appoint Colonel Stevenson to the special command of the provinces of Malabar and Canara, under the orders of the officer commanding in Mysore.’

<sup>a</sup> During the following year, Colonel Wellesley was fully occupied in organizing the civil and military administration of the important territory of Mysore, of which he gave a detailed account to the Governor General in July, 1804, that will be inserted according to date.



go home. However, as you are well, you are in the right to go on.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Champagné.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Baird.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 13th April, 1801.

‘ The detention of the ships till this morning has given me an opportunity of sending you a further report on the provisions sent from hence. You will observe from that report that Major Bell has a tolerably large quantity of provisions, besides what he brought here. Allowance ought also to be made for about 150 natives, taken out and drafted from the Rockingham, which of course leaves a larger share of provisions for those who remain.

‘ I am sorry to tell you that the Dundas and the Nelson are so small, and have so little capacity to hold provisions and water, that there is not a supply of the latter for more than four months on board each of those ships. The Morad Bey, however, has provisions and water for six months, as indeed have the two others a supply of provisions for the same time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Baird.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I must inform you that none of the ships have their full quantity of rice: the reason is, that rice is scarce at Bombay, and as I knew there were in the fleet about 10,000 bags of rice, I did not wish to press to have a large quantity taken from hence.’

*To the Hon. the Governor of Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 13th April, 1801.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that all the ships having troops on board, which I have expected at this place, have arrived, received their provisions, water, &c., and have sailed towards the place of their ultimate destination, excepting one ship, the Maria Louisa, from which the troops have been removed, and in which it is proposed to send to the Red Sea provisions, and water, and forage for the cattle. She will be ready to sail in the course of a few days.

‘ As I commanded the expedition when it came here, and as all the ships have been revictualled in consequence of requisitions made by me, and I have had the best and most frequent opportunities of observing the manner in which the business was conducted by Captain Moor, it is but justice to him to represent to you that some of the ships were completely refitted, took in ballast, and received three months’ water and provisions for their crews and the troops embarked in them, and sailed in four days after they arrived; that five ships, which have been added to the armament from this port since my arrival, were equipped with six months’ provisions, &c., and the troops embarked in five days after the requisition was made for them; and that, in short, the whole business has been conducted with regularity and rapidity, and satisfaction to myself, and to all the parties concerned. As Captain Moor was the only person concerned in making the arrangements and conducting the details of the service, I cannot but attribute to him all the merit; and I therefore beg leave to recommend him to your notice, and to your favorable report of his exertions to the Governor General.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Hon. the Governor of Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 1st June, 1801.

‘ I have commenced the examination with the complaint from the store department, which you mentioned to me some time ago. The Lascars, &c., denied any knowledge of the letter and petition which had been sent to Madras; and when questioned as to the particular grievances alleged in the different paragraphs, they denied that they existed. They said that they had claims upon the Company for the amount of family certificates which had been unpaid, but that they did not believe that ———’s dubash had received the money from the Pay Office. The day before I commenced the inquiry I ordered ——— to dismiss the dubash from his service, and from all interference in the store department; and his house was searched, his doors were sealed, and a sentry was placed over the house to prevent the removal of property. But still if there was any real ground for complaint, his influence over the people was suffi-

ciently strong to prevent it from coming out. I have appointed Wednesday for continuing the inquiry into the state of the family certificates, and I did every thing in my power to encourage the people to come forward with their complaints, if they had any, on that day.

‘ I have besides published a proclamation, in which I have called upon all persons who have purchased stores to come forward and state from whom they have purchased them; and I have promised that no injury shall be done to those who come forward voluntarily to make a discovery; but I have stated that those who do not discover, and who shall be found to have purchased stores, shall be punished. The consequence is, that I understand that several people have come forward, and have disclosed some valuable secrets; among others, one man has stated that he bought from Colonel \* \* \* between three and four hundred maunds of salt-petre. You shall hear more upon this subject as we go on.

‘ Lord Clive has consented to my plan for filling the ditch, and I shall begin that work as soon as Heitland arrives, which will be, I believe, on the 3rd of June. I spoke to Purneah this morning, and he said that he could furnish any number of cammaties we might want without injury to the country, as in reality the people were without employment. I have therefore asked now for five hundred, and if I find that Heitland arranges the work well I shall call for more. I shall settle with Butcha Rao the most convenient mode of paying these people, working them, &c.

‘ Purneah has asked me for another gun, which is the fourth I shall have given him. Send me a requisition for a six-pounder, its carriage and limber, and ammunition in the limber box. As the carriage is old, it would probably be better for Purneah if he borrowed it only at present, and if he got a gun only. Gordon will hereafter give him an excellent new carriage and limber. However, let that be as you please.

‘ I am glad to hear that you are better, but I hope that you will go to Madras.

‘ I swear in Captain Symonds on Tuesday.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I have been obliged to alter the disposition I had

made of the cavalry, and to send the 2nd regiment to Arcot, and keep the 5th regiment in this country. The General represented to Lord Clive that if the 5th regiment came it would be obliged to return here soon to relieve the 2nd, which corps must go down to the Carnatic, and therefore it was best to send down the latter alone. I have besides received an official order through the Adjutant General's Office to send the 2nd.'

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 4th June, 1801.

‘ I have been so much taken up by the inquiry into the complaints from the store department, that I have not had time to write since I received your letter.

‘ The result of the inquiry, so far as it has gone, is, that \* \* \* took saltpetre from the godown and sold it at his house. I have sent the Commander in Chief a copy of the evidence against the Colonel, and I think that he will be put in arrest forthwith.

‘ Our friend, the Commissary, has been guilty of making false musters, as appears in the clearest manner; and I have therefore suspended him from his office, and I have appointed Captain Browne, of the Bengal artillery, to take charge of it. I am afraid, that besides ——— will be found to have been concerned in many, if not in all of the evil doings of his dubash.

‘ . . . does not appear to have been quite clear, and I think that the dubash intends to tell the truth, and to produce his books, from which he has already told us that he will show that he had authority for all he has done from . . . or from ———: the false musters clearly proved and brought home to the Commissary could not be passed over in my opinion, and I believe that upon the whole the only chance ——— has of saving his commission eventually is to lose his office immediately.

‘ You cannot conceive what a scene of villany has come out, almost the whole of it since I went to the field last year, or when I was away with the army upon the former occasion.

‘ I have given orders to have the sentry placed as you wish at the Laal Baug.

‘ Believe me, &c.

§ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Seringapatam, 6th June, 1801.  
 ‘ Our committee sit daily from nine till four and five, and I have not therefore time to write much.

‘ ————— has been guilty of an act of great indiscretion. The dubash declared publicly before the Committee that he had papers which would prove that all that he had done was by order from the Commissary or . . . ————— went and broke open the desk, and took away those papers. We have forced him, however, to restore some of them, and they prove against him every thing that is bad. . . . is not quite clear, and I think that he will be broke.

‘ I received your letter about the Koorg Rajah last night ; and according to your wish I went out this morning to the ground on which the ladies were encamped, under pretence of taking leave of them, and mentioned the subject of your letter to the vakeel. He said that he would say to the Rajah what I had desired him.

‘ I have recommended that Scott should be made Commissary at Seringapatam, and Browne to act for him till he returns from the service on which he is now employed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ There is a report to the northward that Dhoondial is still alive, but there is no such report here. There is some fellow collecting troops about Padshapoor.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Seringapatam, 7th June, 1801.

‘ Captain Symonds has pressed me for an opinion regarding the time to which the reference may be had for the decision of causes in his court. I wish to know what you think upon this subject. I was formerly of opinion that it would be proper not to go farther back than the 4th of May, 1799 but a better acquaintance with the subjects which will come under discussion and for decision before Captain Symonds, and a longer consideration of the question, have altered my opinion upon it.

‘ In the first place, almost all the disputes about property had their origin before the place was stormed, when the

people had some property to dispute about. They are, in general, cases of deposit of the following nature: a moorman, in general, has borrowed from a shroff or chitty a certain sum of money upon a pledge of jewels of a greater value than the money which he received; the shroff or chitty either was or was not plundered (for it is by no means true that they were all plundered) of his property, and pleads that as an excuse for not paying his debt; on the other hand, the chitty sometimes has the pledge, and knowing that the moorman has no money, presses him for payment.

‘ This outline is that of nearly every case that is likely to come before Captain Symonds, and I acknowledge that I conceive that justice will not be done if they are not decided. Of course the storm of the 4th of May, 1799, must always be taken into consideration in all questions of property which arose prior to that day; and where it can be clearly proved, or at least proved to the satisfaction of the judge, that the debtor lost all his property in the general wreck, the debt must be a matter of composition, and time must be given him for payment; but I acknowledge that I think that to consider no question of property which arose prior to the 4th of May, or, in other words, to take a sponge and wipe away all debts and credits, would not be justice.

‘ In the second place, there are some instances in Seringapatam of property having been plundered by natives from natives, either on the 4th of May, or immediately previous to it. In the last year I referred a case of this kind to be decided by Ogg and Barclay, and Hubbeeb Oollah, and it ended in a composition, and a bond from the plunderer for the amount of the sum which it was fixed he should pay: such cases cannot be decided, and no evidence of facts prior to the 4th of May can be had recourse to, if questions which arose prior to that period cannot be considered.

‘ Thirdly, I believe that it is contrary to the practice of all nations to deprive the conquered of all right to property which arose prior to the conquest; and yet this would be the effect of the limitation under discussion.

‘ Fourthly, the object of the limitation is only to save trouble to the judge and his court; and as I have above shown that injustice must be the consequence, the value of the object is not equal to the evil which it will occasion.

These are my sentiments upon the subject, after having long considered it, and I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know what you think about it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 9th June, 1801.

‘ Captain Symonds has mentioned to me, that duties are levied at the different chokeys close to the island upon goods coming to Seringapatam; and upon inquiry from Butcha Rao I received from him a Marhatta paper, of which the enclosed is a translation. Probably you settled something upon the subject since my departure; or if you have not, the zeal of the amildars on the other side of the river may have induced them to levy these duties without orders. At all events, let me know your sentiments upon this subject.

‘ We have nearly done with the Store Committee; nothing can be so bad as ——, excepting . . . . . and \* \* \* \*. To-morrow will be a most interesting day. The dubash is to come forward with a general confession of all the villanies in the Store Department since the capture of the place.

‘ I hope that you continue in good health.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 11th June, 1801.

‘ The General Court Martial have closed their proceedings, and have found Mr. —— guilty of only one of the counts, upon which was founded the charge of ungentleman-like behavior, viz., that of beating Chunbuswah chitty; but although they have found him guilty of that charge, they have *honorably* acquitted him of the charge of ungentleman-like behaviour. They have found him guilty of disobedience of the orders of the Commander in Chief for this crime. They have sentenced the president to give him a private reprimand. Of course I have sent the proceedings to be revised; but I do not expect much benefit from the revision. When they come to me again I shall send them to the Commander in Chief, with my remarks upon them;

and I shall write you a public letter, in which I shall enclose a copy of my letter to the Commander in Chief, and one of the proceedings and sentence of the Court Martial.

‘ You will thus be enabled to fight the battle against Mr. ——— by a complaint to Government of his conduct on the part of the Rajah’s Government, and the least that can be done will be to remove him from this country with disgrace.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter from Colonel M’Alister upon the subject of the complaints made through Servitun Rao. What shall be done upon this occasion ?

‘ Yesterday’s proceedings of the Committee went more against the Commissary than those of any other day. You may recollect that I informed you that Roebuck’s house had employed people to purchase old arms, locks, &c. &c. at Seringapatam, and the steps that I took to put a stop to the traffic. ——— was acquainted with the circumstance at that time by myself, and was particularly warned to look after his people. Notwithstanding this, he sent off from the arsenal seven bandies loaded with gun-locks as soon as I had turned my back to take the field with the army ; and he found out the people who were collecting old arms, seized all they had collected for his own use, paid 45 pagodas for what he seized, and never communicated to me, or to any body, one word about the matter. He threw these arms, locks, &c. into the arsenal, where they are at this moment.

‘ Besides this, it has been proved that he has made Purneah pay for a large part of the arms and stores which have been issued to him upon your public requisition, and by my authority or that of Colonel Stevenson.

‘ I wish you would get from Purneah an account of all the sums of money which he has paid to \* \* \*, and for what.

‘ I hope that we shall close our proceedings this day ; when they are closed they shall pass through your hands on their way to the Military Board, as I judge that you will be curious to peruse them.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from a lady ; she wishes to pass for the relation of Seid Ibrahim. I have told her that I referred the letter to you, who are charged by Government with the care of this family.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.





more benefit from a strict observance of it, than either could derive from a partial departure from it upon the present occasion.

‘ In the conversations which you and I had upon this subject heretofore, it appeared that the object was, that Seringapatam should have all the benefit of the treaty; at the same time, that care was taken that the Rajah should not suffer in his revenues by an abuse of the exemption in favor of that place, by the general class of dealers in Mysore. With this view, it was settled that no duties should be levied upon goods coming to Seringapatam nearer than thirty or forty miles; and, that the duties at the chokeys at that distance should continue at the rate at which they were at the time that we had that conversation. I was furnished at that time with a statement of the rates of the duties paid at places at that distance. This arrangement was made to avoid one of two evils which the Rajah’s country would experience from the operation of the treaty. One was, that all dealers passing through his country would say that they were coming to Seringapatam, which would have occasioned perpetual disputes and inconveniences. The other was a remedy for the first, viz., to give to dealers really belonging to Seringapatam passports, of which it was feared that they would take advantage to oppress the country. There was besides an apprehension of other evils from placing the issue of these passports in the hands of the commanding officer.

What is the object proposed in altering this arrangement? I do not see any, excepting to add to the Rajah’s revenues what he could collect upon the consumption of Seringapatam, and I do not think that it will at all compensate for the evil to both parties of the smallest departure from the treaty. What has happened already shows the necessity of adhering to it strictly. Purneah, with the best intentions, levied duties upon all articles of consumption, excepting on some kinds of grain; and although it is true that no inconvenience has been felt from the levy of those duties, it cannot be argued that none would ever have been felt from the exercise of the right to increase them, which certainly results from the exercise of that of laying them on at all.

· In writing my opinion upon this subject, I do it as an individual much interested in the Rajah's prosperity; the decision upon it rests with you. In the same manner I shall tell you what I think regarding the continuance of the Rajah's duty upon beetle and tobacco, supposing that you should be of opinion that it is proper that any duties should be levied by his amildars upon goods coming to Seringapatam.

· The Company, for certain reasons, think it proper to raise a revenue from the island of Seringapatam; the reasons are, to pay the expense of a court of justice there established. This certainly must be supposed to be a benefit to the inhabitants, and as such it is reasonable that they should pay for it.

· You are of opinion that if the Company's farm of beetle and tobacco is to last, the Rajah's duties ought to continue, otherwise that the Company's profit from the farm would be so much out of the Rajah's pocket. In the first place, the Rajah by treaty ought to levy no duties upon the consumption of Seringapatam; and if it were true that he would lose all that the Company would gain, he must attribute the loss to the treaty, and not to the Company's farm or their collector. In the next place, supposing that you should determine that the Rajah should continue to levy the duties, there is no reason why the collector should not continue his farm, which (by-the-bye) was established during the existence of the Rajah's duties. What is the consequence? By this arrangement the inhabitants of Seringapatam and the troops would pay two duties upon the consumption of their articles instead of one, viz. one to the Rajah, the other to the Company.

· As the collector may find it necessary, or may think it proper to raise revenue from many articles of consumption, besides those already farmed out (and it may be depended upon that the Board of Revenue will stimulate him to levy all he can), it becomes of still more importance to Seringapatam than it has been hitherto, that the treaty should not be departed from, at least that it should not be departed from in a greater degree than you settled that it should in our former conversations upon this subject.

· I omitted to tell you that a man had come here from

Baba Saheb, and from Ball Kishna Bhow; I will send you to-morrow the purport of his conversation. It was upon the old subject,—their desire that we should join them in an attack upon the Rajah of Kolapoor, &c.

‘ Our Committee has finished its proceedings, and I hope to send them off this day. If they do go, it shall be through your hands, and I shall be obliged to you if you will forward them without delay.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 15th June, 1801.

‘ I have received your letter of the 13th; we have all suffered from a want of water lately, as the repair of the aqueduct is not yet completed, and it will take some days still. When that is finished, and, indeed, sooner, if a sufficiency of water comes into the nullah, I will take care that your garden shall not want. The nullah, when completed, will be put under Symonds; and I propose to give out an order, and to publish a proclamation to forbid that any mound should be built up in it by any body. Thus every body will have his share. I go to the Laal Baug occasionally, to see how they are going on, and I will take care that the place shall not suffer by your absence.

‘ I enclose a memorandum of the conversation with the Marhatta Vakeel, which was drawn up by Ogg, and is nearly word for word accurate.

‘ The Military Board permitted some time ago that I should give Purneah the three or four elephants which he lately returned to the karkana, under an idea that they had only been lent to him. If Purneah wants them, he shall have them, but I shall be glad to give one of them to Bisnapah. He has a kind of claim upon me for an elephant, which Govind Rao’s party took during the campaign, and which I bought for the Company for 200 pagodas. I could not give him this elephant without making a reference to Government, and should be glad to give him one of those which the Military Board permitted me to give to Purneah, provided he has no objection.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.





refer to them all in a public letter which I shall write to you as soon as I shall have closed this transaction.

‘ I do not agree in the General’s notion, that because the Court Martial have thought proper to acquit Mr. —, against the evidence, it is not in the power of Government to mark his conduct by their disapprobation. But whatever may be their opinion upon that subject, it is absolutely necessary that Mr. — should be removed from this country.

‘ I likewise enclose a letter from \* \* \*, and one from Servitun Rao. By the latter it appears very clearly that the complaint was well founded, and so I have observed to \* \* \*. You will be the best judge whether, after what has happened, and considering the temper in which \* \* \* is, and the probability that it will also pervade the Court Martial, it will not be best to reprimand the naig and the conicoply, and order them to be dismissed from the guard. Let me know your wishes upon this point. If they are to be tried, Servitun Rao must be ordered again to send the people who can give evidence upon this subject.

‘ The river has risen to a greater height than it has been known to rise to for some time. It has in consequence destroyed the glacis on the southern face of the low outwork in the *fausse braie*, which flanks our breach, and I am afraid that that outwork will likewise go, if the river does not soon fall. It has also destroyed the sluices in the northern glacis.

‘ If Government do not soon determine to commence in earnest a repair of this fort, the expense will be saved, as there will be no fort to repair. Between the river on one side, and the weather on the other, the whole is crumbling to pieces, and nothing can save it but a speedy repair. I am convinced that one lac of pagodas, which could not be laid out in less than two years, would complete it. Literally nothing has been done to the fort since we came into it, excepting to repair part of the breach over which our troops marched. I say only part of it, as it is at this moment just as easy to get in at the western bastion, and indeed all along the southern face, as it was to get into the main breach, on the day the fort was stormed. I shall of course report these late disasters, as soon as the river shall fall sufficiently low

to allow me to ascertain their extent; but I acknowledge I am tired of reporting where no remedy is applied.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 10th July, 1801.

‘ My last letter will have pointed out to you what I had done in consequence of the refusal of the Commander in Chief to interfere in the case of Mr. —, and what I proposed to do hereafter.

‘ I have anticipated your wishes respecting the dubash, and he is, I believe, at this moment before a native General Court Martial which is sitting. I shall send you a copy of the proceedings on his trial with the other papers.

‘ The General’s conduct upon this occasion is certainly very extraordinary, but not more so than it has been lately in other instances. I rather believe that he has not behaved very candidly towards me in making a reference to Government regarding the appointment of certain commissaries in Malabar, in the course of the last year. I reported such of those appointments as were made in my time in November last, and stated particularly the reasons why I had not given orders that they might be discontinued, which reasons were then deemed satisfactory. When a further reference was made regarding them lately, knowing that poor Turing was gone, and that Webbe might forget what had passed in November last, in the hurry of the present moment, I sent the General an extract of my letter to Government of the 14th November, in which the appointments had been reported along with the other papers upon the subject. I am convinced that he never sent that extract to Government, or they would not have written the answer that they have written upon that subject. However, the subject is not deserving of further inquiry.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I was last night at Mysore, at the marriage of the Dalway’s son. The Rajah and every thing in high style.’



*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Seringapatam, 17th July, 1801.

‘ I have received from the General an answer to my letter, from which I cannot judge whether he approves or not of the order which I proposed to issue, regarding Mr. —, and the Court Martial; but I shall issue it in the course of two or three days, if I do not hear further from him.

‘ The dubash has been tried, and sentenced a punishment, &c. &c., but in consideration of his having ill treated the inhabitants of Chittoor, in the presence of Mr. —, and, as he says, in his defence, by his particular order, the Court Martial have recommended that he should be pardoned the punishment. They have sentenced that he should pay all the expense of the damage he did, and I have desired that they should sentence that he should be banished.

‘ I propose to publish the whole at one and the same time, and the proceedings of the native Court Martial will make a good commentary upon Mr. —’s conduct, and upon the proceedings of the Court Martial which tried him.

‘ I am glad to find that you are recovering; every thing goes on well here.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ SIR, ‘ Seringapatam, 22nd July, 1801.

‘ In consequence of the complaints which you communicated to me, of the conduct of Mr. Assistant Surgeon —, on his journey from Sera to Seringapatam, I ordered a Court Martial to assemble for his trial, on charges founded on the complaints preferred by the inhabitants of the nearest village, Chittoor.

‘ Enclosed I send you a copy of the proceedings of this Court Martial, and of a correspondence which I have had with the Commander in Chief upon this subject, from which you will perceive that I am by no means satisfied with the sentence which has been pronounced against Mr. —.

‘ As it appeared that a dubash, by name Vinket Soubah, belonging to Mr. Boxley, a sutler, had been in many cases the instrument of the oppression complained of by the in-



was to provide for her support for a certain time, and was to pay her dower, he said he was a servant of the Rajah's, and desired that the case might be referred to Butcha Rao. Butcha Rao joined in this request.

‘ In the course of the different conversations which I had had with Captain Symonds since the establishment of the Adowlut at Seringapatam, I had taken opportunities of expressing to him my wish that he should be cautious in entertaining complaints of the Rajah's servants, of which I thought it probable that many would be made in which the courts of Seringapatam can have no concern whatever. Accordingly Captain Symonds never had entertained any, excepting of the kind above alluded to. However, the claim of Butcha Rao to interfere in this case, brought a letter from Captain Symonds to me, in which he desired that I would consider and state my opinion whether, and how far, the Rajah's servants are, and should be, liable to the jurisdiction of the court.

‘ I have done so nearly to the following purport; and I hope that this opinion, and the practice which I have recommended, will be agreeable to you and to them. In the first place, the regulation makes no exception of any persons being natives; all of that description residing upon the island of Seringapatam are liable to the jurisdiction of the courts which it establishes. It could not have been in the contemplation of the Government to make an exception in favor of the Rajah's servants, because, in fact, it is not supposed that they reside on the island; and the tendency of such an exception would have been to confine the jurisdiction of the court to those who should choose to submit to it, and to those of whom it could be proved that they received the pay of the Company, or were in the service of some of their officers and servants.

‘ I have therefore no scruple in laying down the principle broadly, that every person being a native, residing in the island of Seringapatam, is liable to the jurisdiction of the court.

‘ I now come to consider the restrictions upon acting upon that principle thus laid down, which are required by expediency, policy, and good manners. Purneah resides in the Fort, with all his property and his family; and the principal

officers of the Rajah's Government reside there likewise. I do not see any necessity for restricting the operation of that principle in the court of Phousdarry. It is not very probable that the persons in whose favor we might wish to restrict it, will commit crimes for which they could be tried there, and it is clear that their servants and adherents must be subject to its jurisdiction, as long as they remain on the island.

‘ The question is entirely different when the crimes are considered, which it is possible might come before the Cutchery. In the course of the administration of the Government of this country, it is not possible but that Purneah, or his officers, must occasionally do injury to, or seize private property. It would be a curious circumstance if the person whose property should thus receive injury, should have a right, by taking a house at Seringapatam, to bring Purneah into the court of Cutchery.

‘ Considering the connexion between the island of Seringapatam and the Rajah's country, it is impossible but that questions must arise daily between the inhabitants and the Rajah's servants residing on the island, some of whom it would be highly improper, and others it would be very necessary, to bring into the Cutchery : and yet without more experience than we have yet had of the operation of the court (of the manner in which the machine works), it is not possible to define cases so as that Government may enforce a regulation which will secure the jurisdiction of the court on one hand, and will prevent the Rajah's principal servants residing upon the island from suffering inconvenience on the other.

‘ I have therefore proposed to Captain Symonds the following arrangement and rules for his proceedings in the cases above described.

‘ In the first place, I have proposed that whenever a complaint is made in the court of Cutchery against any of the Rajah's principal servants, or any of his servants, for an act of Government, the matter of it should be referred to the Resident, or to the commanding officer, before any further steps should be taken.

‘ Secondly ; that whenever a dispute shall be brought into the Cutchery between two persons notoriously in the Rajah's

service, that dispute shall be referred to the Rajah's tribunals, provided both parties consent.

‘Thirdly; that disputes regarding property in which no act of the Rajah's government is concerned, and in which one of the parties is not one of his principal servants, shall be tried and decided in the Cutchery.

‘Notwithstanding my desire to gratify my little friend Butcha Rao, I have recommended to Captain Symonds to enforce his decision regarding the Moorman's divorce, as there appears to be nothing in that, excepting a desire on the Moorman's part to get rid of his wife, and to allow her to starve, and on Butcha Rao's only a desire to oblige his friend the Moorman.

‘I hope that you are getting better. The river is rising again, and the weather is very harsh here just now.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Seringatam, 1st August, 1801.

‘I think it probable that you will be returning to us soon; and before you leave Madras I wish you would hint to our friends there the necessity of sending a force to this country towards the end of November, in order to enable us to undertake the Bullum business. We ought to be strong in order to be able to do it in style.

‘The river has come down again with some violence, but is not so high as it was in the beginning of July by nearly two feet.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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MEMORANDUM UPON SERINGAPATAM.

‘1. In consequence of the possibility that it may be necessary to alter the arrangements for the government in Mysore after the peace expected in Europe, it has been proposed to destroy the fortifications of Seringatam; not only as a measure of precaution to prevent a fortress so difficult of access from falling into the hands of our enemies, but as one advisable, even if it were certain that the ar-

rangements for the government of Mysore would remain as they are.

‘ 2. If there is a prospect that Great Britain will be obliged to make a peace so bad, as that Mysore will come again into the hands of our enemies, there is no doubt whatever but that the destruction of Seringapatam would be for many years a considerable drawback upon them. It would be so, however, only till the place could be rebuilt; the position, which is the great strength of Seringapatam, would still remain, on which a new and a stronger fort might in time be raised.

‘ 3. Admitting, however, the propriety of the measure, connecting it with a bad peace in Europe, there are several considerations which lead me to be of opinion, that it would be an improper one, if the present arrangements for the government of Mysore are likely to continue.

‘ 4. Seringapatam has long been the capital of an extensive and powerful empire, the whole of which is now in the possession, or under the government, or under the immediate influence of the Company’s government of Fort St. George. The conquest of Seringapatam, which, it is true, was accompanied by the fall of Tippoo, and the possession of his principal arsenal, gave the Company the possession and the power of disposing of this vast empire.

‘ 5. Whatever may be the real state of the case regarding the power of Seringapatam, resulting from its strength and its position in Mysore, there is no doubt whatever but that the natives look to it as the seat of power, and that they consider themselves under the government of that power in India which has possession of that fortress.

‘ 6. There is a double government in Mysore, the operations of which are now conducted in such a manner, as that there can be no occasion for exerting the influence and power in the hands of the Company from the possession of the fort of Seringapatam. But however well the person, in whose hands the conduct of that government is at present, may establish his system, can it be certain that it will last? Is it known who will succeed to him? Who will be the native successor of the present Dewan? If the French are to return to India, and particularly if they are to be allowed to have any but commercial establishments, is it known the

effect that such a change may have upon the system of government in Mysore?

‘ 7. The treaty with the Rajah provides, that under certain circumstances, the country may be resumed by the Governor General in Council. It is to be supposed that whenever the Governor General shall be desirous of resuming the country, it will be in consequence of the difficulties in which the general government will be involved by the pressure of an extensive warfare. It is hardly possible to suppose any other case in which the resumption would be justifiable, or could be attempted. In this case, however, it will not be possible to spare troops to force the execution of the treaty, if the Rajah should be inclined to resist it. Will Bangalore or Chittledroog give the power and influence over the country which will be necessary under such circumstances, and which doubtless Seringapatam has?

‘ 8. Seringapatam has been found by experience to possess means for equipping an army, which no other place in the Company’s territories or under their influence has, Madras excepted. It is supposed, however, that these means are to be attributed to its being the ancient seat of empire, to its large garrison, and to the residence of many of the Rajah’s servants in the fort, and on the island. It is also supposed that this effect of its being the ancient seat of the empire will soon be done away by the emigration of the people who depended upon the former government; that the means which are the consequence of the size of the garrison will exist whenever there may be an equal number of troops; and that those which are the consequence of the residence of the Rajah’s principal servants will remove with them to Mysore.

‘ 9. Admitting that any other garrison of equal strength would draw to it the same number of people that have been brought to Seringapatam by the troops, and that the removal of the Rajah’s servants to Mysore will occasion a diminution of the population of Seringapatam, I cannot admit that the fall of the empire of Tippoo has diminished, or will diminish, its population in the least. In fact, the place is more populous now than it ever was, if the armies that Tippoo had are struck out of the calculation; and supposing that those who were attached to his government and person should be in-

clined to leave it, which they are not, they would find it difficult to pitch upon a place in the peninsula in which they would not live under a British government.

‘ 10. But I attribute the facility which has been found in equipping an army at Seringapatam, the great means which that place affords, to its being a British possession, as well as to the other causes to which have been attributed those excellent effects. Bangalore, Chittledroog, Sera, Nuggur, Colar, are nearly, if not equally populous with Seringapatam: some of them are places of great trade and riches, and all of them might afford, and doubtless afforded to Tippoo the means of bringing his troops into the field.

‘ 11. When I took the field last year, the Rajah’s government had the strongest interest in my success, and I do them no more than justice in saying that they did every thing in their power to forward it; yet, notwithstanding their exertions, and those of the officers in command of the different forts, I did not get a bullock, or a man, or any thing which could enable the troops to remain in the field from any place excepting Seringapatam.

‘ 12. At Chittledroog, there was a numerous, if not a more numerous garrison at that time, than at Seringapatam; but still, the followers of the corps at the former were brought from the latter; which fact may be adduced as a proof that the means of Seringapatam are not to be attributed exclusively to the size of its garrison; and that even those means which depend upon its garrison might possibly not be removed with it. When the troops were ordered into the field, one regiment of cavalry was brought from Bangalore, the followers and equipments of which were sent from Seringapatam.

‘ 13. It may be said that, although the fort of Seringapatam may be destroyed, and its garrison and depôt of stores removed to another place, the island will still belong to the Company; and that the population and means of equipment which it affords will still be in our power, and in the Mysore country. But admitting that to be true, I contend for it, that we shall not enjoy the same advantages from them which we have hitherto; we shall not be able to apply them with the same readiness to the service, if it should be possible to procure them for it at all.



‘ 14. We have experience of the benefit of equipping an army at Seringapatam; we know that those means still exist; and we have reason to believe that they will continue as long as the garrison and depôt of stores are at that place. We do not know that they would exist at Seringapatam if the fort were destroyed and the garrison removed; and we have reason to know from experience, that they would not exist at Chittledroog, even if the garrison and stores were removed thither; and I believe that they would not exist at Bangalore, if they were removed to that place.

‘ 15. But not only have we experience of the singular advantage of Seringapatam as a place of equipment, but we know it is acknowledged by all parties as the most convenient depôt in point of locality for service in the province of Malabar: I might also add, in the province of Canara. In truth, next to the opinion which universally prevails of the power attached to the possession of this fort, this is the point of view in which to have possession of it appears to me to be the most important.

‘ 16. From Goa to Cochin, there is not a single post which could be held by any body of troops for a moment. The works of Cannanore have been erected at vast expense, but the garrison could not remain in that fort opposed to the fire of a man of war anchored in the roads. The works are commanded in such manner as to render the situation of the besieged very disadvantageous, if the fort should be attacked on the land side; and the fort is so small as to be incapable of holding even the quantity of stores which are necessary for the desultory service in the Malabar province. Besides, it is falling down, as appears by the reports made to the military board. The stores in Canara are now in the open town of Mangalore.

‘ 17. The state of the seasons on the coast of Coromandel and Malabar operates as a strong reason for preserving the fort of Seringapatam, and making it the depôt of the troops in those provinces. The vessels which could be employed to convey stores could keep up the communication only in the months of January, February, March, April, and part of May; and even during those months with considerable difficulty and delay. In the latter part of May, in June, July, August, and September, it is impossible for vessels to

approach the Malabar coast; and in October, November, and December, it is equally so to approach Madras. It is more easy to communicate between Bombay and the coast. But the consequence of supplying the troops in those provinces with stores either from Madras or Bombay is, that a fort must be constructed, and arsenals must be built for their preservation. The question is, therefore, whether it is better to keep Seringapatam with all its supposed inconveniences, or to build a fort in one of the provinces below the ghauts to the westward.

‘ 18. Many objections might be urged against building a fort in those provinces, the expenses of which are sufficiently obvious; but there is one objection, to which particular attention is requested, as it may bear upon the general question in other respects.

‘ 19. A fort situated upon the sea coast is liable to particular objections. An enemy, although of inferior strength, has the power of attacking it, and unless it is of great strength, would possess himself of it before assistance could be sent to it. This would certainly be the case, if the supposed enemy were stronger at sea; which, it is true, we have no reason to expect at the present moment. But it might be the case if we were stronger at sea.

‘ 20. The extent of the seas under the Admiral in this part of the world renders it impossible for him to provide for the protection of every part; and the difficulty, in all seasons, of going to all parts of both coasts, must for ever render the situation of a fort on the sea coast in some degree dangerous.

‘ 21. If such a fort should fall, the enemy has immediately an establishment on the coast, to deprive him of which would require an army, and the equipment for a siege; whereas, his landing under any other circumstances would be an event, the bad consequences of which might be defeated as soon as the body of troops in the western provinces, supported by those above the ghauts, could be collected.

‘ 22. In regard to the insurgents in Malabar, the war against them cannot be carried on at all without assistance, either from Seringapatam, or from Bombay, or Surat. Stores, ordnance, and grain, might be sent round from Madras, or from Bombay; but a fort must be built to re-

ceive them, and then there are no means of moving them in those provinces independent of the assistance above mentioned. In point of economy, there is no doubt whatever but that it is more expedient to supply these means from Seringapatam, than from Bombay or Surat.

‘23. Having thus stated the grounds which I have for believing that Seringapatam is the most convenient depôt for the coast of Malabar, I proceed to consider that place in the same point of view in reference to the line of frontier to the northward. I must first beg, that the principles of European warfare may not be applied to this country in arguing this question, to a greater degree than they are applied to the service when that is to be carried on.

‘24. It would be convenient that a depôt of stores for a service intended in any particular country should be as near the scene of operations as possible. In European warfare, it is absolutely necessary that the expense magazines, &c., should be on the spot, and they are usually moved forward in proportion as the army is enabled to advance. But in this country, in which armies take the field with such formidable equipments, with arsenals and magazines, in fact, which they always carry with them, it is not necessary, however convenient it would be, that the depôt which is to supply those equipments, and the wants of the service, should be immediately in the neighbourhood of the scene of action.

‘25. My experience of service in this country proves the truth of that observation. In General Harris’s war, notwithstanding the number of posts in advance, in which depôts had been formed, every article of provisions and stores and ordnance was brought from Madras; and in fact, if the cattle could have been fed in that neighbourhood, and if there had not been a necessity of forming a corps of observation at Arcot, for the speedy support of which it was necessary to provide, General Harris would have gained time by collecting his army at Madras, and marching at once from thence, instead of collecting at Vellore. In the last campaign in the same manner, although Chittle-droog was not unprovided with stores, every article was brought from Seringapatam. In neither case was there either delay or inconvenience; and in both cases, the armies

would have been as well provided, and equally secure, if there had not been a gun or an article of military stores or grain in any of the advanced posts.

‘26. I do not contend that in the one case it would not have been convenient to have had the arsenal and means of Madras at Vellore or Kistnagherry; or in the other, that it would not have been convenient to have had the arsenal and means of Seringapatam at Chittledroog; but I contend for it, that it was not inconvenient to have them otherwise; and that the service, in either case, did not suffer from the distance of the depôts, as it would have done if the same warfare had been carried on in Europe, without moving forward the magazines.

‘27. This circumstance arises as well from the nature of the service in India, in which immense equipments always accompany the troops, as from the manner in which those troops are usually posted in times of peace. Considerable time must elapse before a body of troops can be collected on the frontier for service, and the stores required for such service would be on the frontier from Seringapatam, as they were in the last campaign, before all the troops for the service could be collected.

‘28. I am aware that the consequence of this reasoning goes the length of giving up Chittledroog: upon which I have to observe, that if I am to choose between Seringapatam and Chittledroog, for a general depôt for all possible services, I should certainly prefer Seringapatam, and that I have no desire to keep the stores in Chittledroog, even for service in the Marhatta territory. I prefer by far the fort of Hullahall in Socnda, on the one hand, and that of Hurryhur on the other, and in these I should desire to have no stores or grain, excepting such as I might find it convenient to lodge in them, at the time the service should be going on.

‘29. With a view to service on the frontier, there is but little difference in the distance of Seringapatam and of Bangalore from the scene of action. Bangalore is 85 miles distant from Sera, Seringapatam is 104. It is true, that those articles of ordnance and stores, which must come from the presidency by going to Seringapatam, must thus go 80 miles more than they would if the depôt were fixed at Bangalore. But in the first place it is to be considered, that if

the resources of the Mysore country are fairly called into action, but few articles will be required from the presidency. In the next place it is to be recollected, that a large proportion of those articles which might be wanted from the presidency will be required in the western provinces, if it should be determined, according to my system, that the corps serving in those provinces should be provided from this country; and, therefore, that they will not suffer by being transported at once to Seringapatam. But supposing the circuitous route to the frontier by Seringapatam should be an objection to that place, of such weight as to occasion a preference to Bangalore, let the other advantages of Seringapatam be taken into consideration, the general opinion of its power, the means which experience has proved it possesses of equipping an army, its superior convenience as a *depôt* for the Malabar coast, which will more than compensate for the trifling disadvantage of being obliged to go eighty miles of distance to reach it.

‘30. But there are other objections to Seringapatam which, if well founded, would be decisive of the question. In the first place it is supposed that Seringapatam requires a garrison, even in times of peace, of one regiment of Europeans, three battalions of sepoys, and a large proportion of artillery. Seringapatam is full of Moorish inhabitants, and as it contains a large arsenal, it is not deemed safe to trust this arsenal without a large garrison, till these inhabitants are removed from the fort. But measures are now taking to remove these inhabitants to the *pettah*, and when they and the Rajah’s servants shall have left the fort, there will be no reason to have any apprehension for the arsenal. The works of Seringapatam are in ruins, because they have never been repaired since the siege, and the weather and river have done them damage to a much greater degree than they would if they had been in good repair; and they are accessible in many places. The communication between one part and another of these works is not complete, and it is therefore necessary that the guns which may be required for the works should be always in their places. These two inconveniences, which the repair of the fortifications would remedy, create a necessity for larger guards, and a greater number of them on the works than would otherwise be necessary. The gar-

garrison of Seringapatam furnishes the Rajah's guard, and that of the Resident. It is the seat of the head quarters of the division, which necessarily causes the employment of a number of men on duty; it furnishes the guards for the public elephants and cattle, and other small detachments; and as the paymaster, the treasure, and the stores are at Seringapatam, the detachment with the treasure and stores for the out stations are furnished from its garrison. These circumstances naturally create a want of troops; but the removal of the Moorish inhabitants, and the repair and completion of the fortifications, would enable us to provide for those duties, and to keep the arsenal in safety, with as small a body of men at Seringapatam, as at any other place in the country. In time of war and in case of a siege, Seringapatam would require as small, if not a smaller garrison for its defence, than any other place that has been proposed as a great depôt. An army which should besiege Seringapatam must determine at once to attack it from the north, or from the south side of the river, or from the island. No army could be brought there sufficiently numerous to form three divisions, or even two divisions large enough to make two or three attacks upon the place, because these divisions would be effectually separated from each other, and each must be strong enough to defend itself against the army which would be employed to raise the siege. In providing a garrison for the defence of Seringapatam, if such a measure should ever be necessary, no more men will be required than would be necessary to defend it on one point of attack. But looking to Seringapatam as a place liable to be attacked, it has a singular advantage over every other fort in India, viz., that from the month of June to the month of December in every year, it is impossible to approach it.

‘31. It is also said that Seringapatam is unwholesome, and that art cannot remedy that defect; but that Bangalore is otherwise. Seringapatam certainly has been found to be unwholesome to the European troops; and indeed in the last year the same objection applied to all parts of the upper country. I apprehend, however, that Seringapatam is not really more unwholesome than Bangalore, and upon that point I should be glad to have the opinion of Mr. Anderson. I apprehend that a great part of the sickness at Seringa-

patam is to be attributed to the nature of the buildings which the officers and the troops have occupied. Open choultries and buildings which do not keep out the weather cannot be supposed to answer in this country, and have been equally fatal in all parts above the ghauts. Since the buildings have been improved, the health of the troops has improved; and in this season we have not had any sick officers, or more sick men than there have been in other garrisons.

‘32. It is also said that the position of Seringapatam is bad, not only in reference to a depôt for service on the frontier, but as a fortress to cover the country and stop the enemy. In this respect, Seringapatam is not worse than we know Chittledroog to have been. Pursheram Bhow passed in sight of that fortress more than once, and it appears to have been no impediment to his operations in the northern parts of Mysore. But, in fact, no fortress is an impediment to the operations of an hostile army in this country, excepting it lies immediately in the line on which the army must necessarily march; or excepting it is provided with a garrison of such strength and activity, as to afford detachments to operate upon the line of communication of the hostile army with its own country. In case the Company should be involved in hostilities of such extent, as that they should be obliged to stand on the defensive in this country, when at war with a foreign power, it is not probable that the Government will be able to give garrisons to the fortresses in this country, of the strength sufficient to afford detachments to operate upon the enemy’s line of communication with his own country; and all the fortresses which have been proposed as depôts would be equally incapable, from situation, of stopping an enemy.

‘33. The advantage of the possession of them, therefore, would be the power which each would have over the country, and their relative advantage would be in proportion to the power of each. I have already pointed out the power which, in my opinion, is attached to the possession of Seringapatam; and the history of this country has pointed out more than one instance, in which the Mysore country has been overrun by a victorious army, which, however, has been obliged to quit it, because it had not possession of Seringapatam.

‘34. An objection has been made to Seringapatam, on account of the expense of the repairs which will be necessary to that place. These repairs will not cost one-third of the sum at which they have been estimated; but it is said, that at all events they will be more expensive than the repairs of Bangalore. When the buildings required for Bangalore are completed, I should much doubt it. But it is forgotten that Seringapatam affords cover for one regiment of Europeans at least; and that it will afford cover for two regiments, when the family of the Sultaun shall have been removed from the place. The buildings at Seringapatam will also give an hospital, some quarters for officers, &c. In comparing the expense of the repair of Seringapatam with that of Bangalore, and the establishment of the depôt at that place or at Chittledroog, the expenses of the cantonment, arsenal, hospital, &c., to be built, ought to be added to the latter. Besides, I have above shown the necessity of building a fort on the Malabar coast in case Seringapatam is destroyed, the expense of which ought likewise to be added to that of establishing the depôt at Bangalore or at Chittledroog.

‘35. There is no doubt but that Seringapatam is better provided with timber, than almost any other place in the peninsula: that article is cheaper in the bazaar at Seringapatam, than it is at Madras. Provisions and every other article are cheap; firewood alone is dear, but not dearer than at Chittledroog, or than it would be at Bangalore, if Bangalore were equally populous. The dearness of firewood is a necessary, although a greatly inconvenient consequence of large populations in almost every part of India.

‘36. In regard to the inconvenience of the river, it is trifling. The communication has seldom been interrupted, and never for more than two, or at most three days at a time, and even then not entirely. Six iron 18-pounders, four 12-pounders and howitzers, with all their equipments, were sent to the northward in the year 1799, when the river was full, with but little inconvenience; and in the last year (1800,) the army in the Marhatta country received regular supplies of every thing from Seringapatam, not only across the Cauvery, but across the Toombuddra, Werdah, and Malpoorba, by means of basket boats, without any inconvenience.



*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                    ‘ Seringapatam, 6th September, 1801.

‘ Before I had received your letter of the 3rd, I had received the intelligence of your appointment to Poonah, which I regret much on public, as well as on private accounts.

‘ I hope that you will see Malcolm before you go. I imagine that Purneah heard some time ago of the probability that you would not return to this country; at least Butcha Rao appeared to be acquainted with it.

‘ I see clearly that we shall get no troops from the Carnatic for the Bullum business in this year; but if we are fortunate in our pursuits of the Pychy Rajah, I am not quite certain that I have not under my own command the means of settling it. I shall know more about it in the course of a few weeks. In the mean time the arrangements going on at Seringapatam to decrease the number of idle Moormen will enable me to weaken that garrison considerably for any occasion for which troops may be wanted.

‘ I find Symonds a most active and able assistant, and matters go on very smoothly.

‘ I acknowledge that I do not agree with Webbe respecting the destruction of this place. I think that he has not considered its utility in some points of view; that he has been misinformed regarding the difference between its distance from the frontier and that of Bangalore; and that he has overrated the additional distance occasioned by coming here. He has also given more weight than it deserves to the consideration that the depôt is too far from the frontier, and too little to the superior advantage of Seringapatam as a place of equipment.

‘ In regard to the expense, I believe that it will be equal whatever plan is adopted; but if the destruction of Seringapatam is to be accompanied by the building of a fort in Malabar or Canara, which I believe must be the consequence, that plan will be the most expensive. The fort of Cannanore is just large enough to contain the Commanding Officer’s house; it is tumbling to pieces; and a frigate in the roads would blow a garrison out of it. The stores in Canara are in the open town of Mangalore.

‘ Webbe talks in his Memorandum of sending stores to

the Malabar coast by sea; but when they arrive there, where are they to be kept? and he has not considered the difficulty, amounting almost to an impossibility, of communicating by sea between the two coasts. During the months of May, June, July, August, and part of September, it is not safe to approach the western coast; and in October, November, and December, equally unsafe to approach the eastern. During the remainder of the year the north west winds prevail so generally upon the Malabar coast, that it is with difficulty that the best ships make their passage to the northward, as was found to be the case in the last year; and the kind of vessel in which stores are sent from Madras by sea in general, would not be able to get to the northward at all. But in truth there is such a want of carriage upon the coast, and the inland communication along it is so difficult, that the troops in those provinces must always in a great measure depend upon this country for many of their supplies.

‘Has Madras sent any one article to those provinces since they have been under its government? Medicines and military stores from Seringapatam are the only articles that have been supplied to them; and even the monsoon has not stopped the communication.

‘Upon the whole I think it fortunate that the success in Europe and Egypt gives us a prospect of a better peace, and that we have time to review our opinions upon this subject, and to reconsider the question. In a very short time Seringapatam will be to be kept with as small a garrison as any other place in the country.

‘I gave orders to Gordon to pay the bill for the repairs at the Laal Baug at the time that you sent it to me, and I understand that he had done so. I shall inquire, however.

‘We are tolerably well here now. No officers sick, and but few soldiers. I attribute the healthiness of the soldiers to an improvement which I have lately made in their barracks; having built up the whole of the verandah in the Green Palace in which they are quartered.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘The Court Martial is sitting on the trial of the offenders in the store department.’

MEMORANDUM  
UPON OPERATIONS IN THE MARHATTA TERRITORY.

‘As before long we may look to war with the Marhattas, it is proper to consider of the means of carrying it on. The experience which has been acquired in the late contest with Dhoondiah Waugh, of the seasons, the nature of the country, its roads, its produce, and its means of defence, will be of use in pointing them out. I shall detail my observations upon each of these points, for the benefit of those in whose hands may be placed the conduct of the operations of the army in case of such a war, as I have above supposed we may expect. The season at which it is most convenient to commence a campaign with the Marhattas, is that at which the rivers which take their rise in the western ghauts, fill. This happens generally in the month of June. In this year, the Toombuddra was not fordable after the 14th of June, the day before the army reached Hurryhur; and in other seasons, I understand that that river fills nearly at the same time.

‘The reasons why I think that the most favorable season for operations against the Marhatta nation, are as follow:

‘First. The Marhatta army is principally composed of cavalry, and their plan of operations against a British army would be to endeavor to cut off its communication with its rear, and to impede the junction of its supplies from the Mysore country. As the rivers are not fordable, as there are no bridges, and no means of passing them excepting by basket boats, which it is difficult, and might be rendered impossible to procure, the fulness of the rivers operates as a barrier. It is certain, that the enemy cannot pass them in large numbers, and it is probable that they would not venture to throw across a small body, or rather, that they would not be able to prevail upon a small body to remain on a different side from the main body of their army.

‘The inconvenience and delay which the British army experience in crossing the rivers by means of boats, when they are full, is trifling; and in fact they would experience no inconvenience or delay, if good pontoons were provided, and a bridge were thrown across each river for the passage of the army. The communication might afterwards be kept up by means of the common basket boats. If the army

should be thus equipped with a bridge, the Marhattas would never dare to detach a body across any river, for the purpose of annoying our communications. Thus, then, we should enjoy all the advantage of a river not fordable, to shorten the line of our communication, which river our enemy could not pass with a large body of troops, and over which he would not dare to detach a small body; and we should have it in our power to pass it with as much ease, and with as little inconvenience and delay, as we should experience if the river were fordable.

‘Secondly, the Marhatta country in general is but ill supplied with water. The rains which fill these rivers, although not heavy at the beginning of the rainy season, are sufficient to fill many nullahs; and an army has at this time some chance of being supplied with water, of which, in the dry season, it is certain it would never find much, and frequently none. The inconvenience to be apprehended from the rains is trifling. It is true, that heavy rain would ruin the cattle of the army, and would put the roads in such a state as to render them impracticable for wheel carriages. But heavy rain for any long continuance is not to be expected in the Marhatta territory; and particularly not early in the season. During the last season, which was extraordinarily severe upon the coast, we had only two days of distressing rain; but we had some rain nearly on every day.

‘The Marhatta country is in general a fine black soil, very fertile and highly cultivated. The roads are all excellent, excepting when the rain is heavy. At that time the black cotton mould becomes a swamp, through which it is scarcely practicable for a man to move; the wheels of the carriages sink to their axletrees, are clogged with mud, and it is impossible for the cattle to draw them.

‘The produce of this fertile country is jowarry principally, and other dry grains, but no rice. This is the great difficulty with which our army would have to contend. The rice which must be procured for them must be brought from the distant rice countries in Mysore or from Canara, with which country, in the rainy season, it is impossible to keep up a communication.

‘The army also might depend upon procuring some sheep and bullocks in the Marhatta territory; but if its European

force should be large, it will certainly require supplies of the former from Mysore, and in any case supplies from thence of the latter.

‘It is well known that jowarry straw is the best kind of forage for horses and cattle, and of this there is an abundance everywhere; and besides this forage, it seldom happens that green forage cannot be found.

‘The means of defending this country are trifling; and it must depend upon the strength of the army which is in it, compared with that of the British army. All the strong places are liable to be carried by assault, excepting, perhaps, Darwar or Kooshgul; and it is doubtful whether these last might not be thus taken if attacked by resolute troops.

‘Having thus detailed my observations on the Marhatta territory, with a view to operations within it, I come to state those which I would recommend, and the preparatory steps to be taken in order to have the means of carrying them on with vigor, celerity, and effect. The first object in any Marhatta war, commenced in the season which I think most favorable to a British army, would be to push the enemy across the Kistna, and to establish ourselves firmly on that river as a barrier, from which we could advance to their capital, or to suit other ulterior objects as might be held out.

‘I would propose, then, to assemble the troops at Chittledroog; but they must be provided with every necessary before they arrive there, as nothing at all useful to military operations can be procured at that place.

‘The army ought to be provided with pontoons and other materials for building a bridge. On account of the difficulty of procuring rice and arrack in the Marhatta territory, a large store ought to be collected and kept at Chittledroog, and another at Hurryhur. This last place ought to be repaired, and put in a defensible state for a small garrison, as well for a point of communication with the Mysore country for the army when it should be advanced into the Marhatta territory, as for a post to guard the basket boats, &c., which must be made use of to convey over the Toombuddra the supplies which must follow the army. The fort at Hullihall, in Soonda, ought also to be put in repair. Granaries and storehouses for arrack and for military stores ought to be built at this station. Large stores of rice and arrack for the

supply of the army, when it should be advanced into the Marhatta territory, and certain military stores, ought to be collected at Hullihall. This post, if strengthened, would be an excellent depôt, and would be supplied at all times without difficulty, from Bombay by Goa.

‘The army being assembled at Chittledroog, should cross the Toombuddra at Hurryhur. Its first object should be to drive the enemy across the river Werdah, and to establish itself between those two rivers. After this shall be effected, it might cross the Werdah. The best place for this will be between Deogerry and Savanore. It must be recollected, that although the army will cross this river by its bridge, it will still be necessary that it should be provided with basket boats, in order that its supplies may cross the river likewise. These, or materials to make them, cannot be procured at or near Deogerry, and the boats must therefore be brought from the Mysore country. The boatmen must likewise come from the Mysore country.

‘It will be necessary to establish a post upon the Werdah as a guard for the boats, which otherwise it would be in the power of the enemy to seize or destroy, as a link in the communication with Mysore, and in order effectually to establish the British power in the country between that river and the Toombuddra.

‘The next object would be to get possession of Darwar. The straight road to that place, by Savanore and Hoobly, is the best. If the rains should have been heavy, the road to Darwar should be from Savanore to Bindigerry, and along the Soonda hills. The soil near these hills is red, and the roads are practicable, even in rainy weather.

‘In my opinion, Darwar can be taken by a *coup de main*. The attack ought to be made on the south-west side. Means might be adopted for keeping down the fire of the besieged, by one of cannon from two hills, on which the Bhow’s and the British batteries were erected in the former war, and by an enfilading fire from a height above a tank on the north-west angle.

‘The assailants might move under cover of the back of that tank to the foot of the glacis, where they would be covered from the fire of the besieged. They might move along the foot of the glacis till they should come opposite the

hills above mentioned. They ought then to possess themselves of a square and a roundwork in the glacis, by turning them by the covert way. They ought to be provided with fascines to fill a part of the ditch, and they might escalate the outer wall, taking care to carry over some ladders for the purpose of escalating the inner wall.

‘After having got within the outer wall, they should turn to their left, and proceed to a tank between the two walls. Along the back of this tank, it is said there is a passage over the inner ditch to a gateway. At this gateway the wall is not more than twenty feet high, and might easily be escalated. This passage is represented as being an aqueduct from the tank outside, on the north-west angle of the fort, into the body of the place. There is a passage for water from this tank through the glacis, and it is probable that it leads over both the ditches.

‘At the same time that this attack should be made, another ought to be directed against the gateway, which is on the south-east face.

‘There are other gates. The party which should proceed on this attack, might also get under the glacis, by the back of the tank above mentioned; only it should proceed along the northern face and round to the gateway by that route. After blowing open the gates in the outer wall, it is said that the inner wall, near its gate, is not more than twenty feet high. This party ought also to be provided with scaling ladders.

‘If the attack should fail, or if, from any reason, it should be thought advisable to attack the place regularly, and to effect a breach in the walls, the only mode of doing this is, by erecting the breaching battery on the crest of the glacis. The face to be attacked will be the same.

‘The troops would establish themselves under the glacis, and in the round and square works within it, as I have above recommended. These works would be excellent flanks to the trenches under the glacis. The troops would have to work back to the hills above mentioned, on which the Bhow’s batteries were erected in the last war; and at which would, of course, be collected the reserve for the trenches.

‘Having by one of these modes got possession of Darwar, but particularly if by assault, all the other places in the

country would fall of course. The first object would be to establish a garrison and the depôts in that place.

‘The garrison, &c., might be moved forward from Hullihall, which ought still to be held by a small force, as a post of communication with the sea coast. The enemy should then be driven across the Malpoorba, and the country between the rivers should be cleared entirely.

‘Boats should be made and prepared, and the army should cross the Malpoorba between Doodwar and Moor-goor. A post should be established on the river for the care of the boats.

‘The river Malpoorba is more rapid than the Werdah or the Toombuddra, is more liable to rise and fall suddenly, and therefore the enemy would be more likely to return from the country between that river and the Gutpurba, than from that between the Malpoorba and the Werdah. The only place which on this route is worthy of attention is Belgaon; this place has a wet ditch, but I am informed that it is dry in parts, and that the place is otherwise liable to be taken by assault. Belgaon lies to the westward of the high road to the Kistna, and is situated in a rice country. It might be possible to draw supplies from this country; and, with this view, it might be desirable to have a garrison of British troops in Belgaon, otherwise it will be useless.

‘The fort of Badamy, which is esteemed of some strength, lies north of the Malpoorba, but about seventy or eighty miles from the road to the Kistna. Unless it was found that the enemy hung about this fort, it would be better not to lose any time in going to attack it, until they are all driven across the Kistna. If they hang about Badamy, it must be attacked. Badamy ought, more properly, to be called two forts than one. There are two forts on two separate hills, and a fortified pettah between them. It appears to me that the hill forts might be taken by storm, by approaching them from the westward.

‘After the enemy should have been driven across the Gutpurba, this river ought to be crossed in the same manner as the Malpoorba, somewhere near Gokauk, and a post ought to be established upon it.

‘*Jan.*, 1801.—Since the commencement of this memorandum was written, the Company have got possession of the



countries to the southward of the Toombuddra, which river has become their northern boundary; and it may, perhaps, be thought that the plan of operations, in case of a war with the Marhattas, ought to be altered. There are several reasons, however, for which they should continue to be the same.

‘1st. The treaty by which the countries to the southward of the Toombuddra have been ceded to the Company, has allied it more closely with the Nizam, whose interests now appear to be inseparable from those of the Company. The quarrel of the Company, therefore, with the Marhattas, which may create a necessity for any military operations, will equally involve the Nizam; and it will be necessary that measures should be taken, either by himself or by the Company, to defend the Dooab from the incursions of the Marhattas.

‘2ndly. The defence of the Dooab will provide for that of the ceded districts, which that country covers entirely. If the Nizam’s army is collected at Copaul, and Moodgul is occupied with strength, it would be impossible for the Marhatta army to make any impression of consequence on the Dooab, or to penetrate the ceded countries in any strength. It may be a question whether, when the British army should cross the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, the army of the Nizam should not immediately cross the Kistna, and guard his Highness’s frontier to the northward of that river, if they should not operate offensively upon the enemy. At all events, they ought to cross the Kistna as soon as the Marhattas begin to retire from the countries to the southward of the rivers which fall into the Kistna. But it may be said, as the Company have now got possession of extensive countries immediately to the southward of the Toombuddra, and in the neighbourhood of the Marhatta territory, they ought to carry on their operations from thence, and leave Mysore to its own defence.

‘There are several objections to this measure, which I will detail.

‘1st. Mysore is very defenceless towards the Marhatta territory; a body of Marhatta horse would overrun the whole of the rich province of Bednore, would plunder Bednore itself, and might push their devastations to within

sixty miles of Sringapatam, without the chance of danger or molestation.

‘2ndly. They would immediately connect themselves, and act in co-operation with the polygars along the range of the western ghauts, as far as Koorg; and probably the provinces of Malabar and Canara would be the scene of their intrigues, and the Company’s dependants in those provinces would take arms.

‘3rdly. The countries into which they would thus push themselves, are those from which supplies of rice for the army must be drawn, when it enters the Marhatta territory; and thus rice must come by the road of which the enemy would have possession.

‘4thly. The first step to be taken, after crossing the Toombuddra (suppose at Anagoondy), would be to clear out the countries beyond the Werdah, of the detachments of the enemy, which would have entered them, and thus much valuable time would be lost. Therefore, there is no doubt but that it would be best to assemble the troops at once at Chittledroog, and to cross them quickly over the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, by which measure a stop will be immediately put to the operations of the enemy in that quarter.

‘In case it should be determined to enter the enemy’s country by Anagoondy and Copaul, either with the whole British army, leaving Mysore defenceless, or with the Nizam’s army in co-operation with the British troops collected in Mysore, the first place of consequence which will be met with is Dummul. This is a stone fort, the walls of which are above thirty-five feet high, with a dry ditch of unequal depth. On the south and west sides there is a flank of a tank, and some rough ground and buildings which give cover to the near approach of a body of troops. In the centre nearly of the south side there is an old gateway, now blocked up, where the place may be escaladed with ease. There is a trench cut across the road that used to lead to the gate, which, however, may be easily passed. The gateway also, on the north face leading to the pettah, may be attacked with advantage.

‘The road from Dummul to Hoobly and Darwar is good in dry weather; but during the heavy rains it is impassable,

as there are about twenty miles of the black cotton soil which I have above mentioned.

‘ If the rains should be heavy, the best road for a body of troops, marching from Dummul to Darwar, would be by Sirhitty, Luckmaisir, and Savanore, and along the Soonda hills.

‘ Kooshgul lies not far from the direct road from Dummul, by Hoobly to Darwar. This place is strong from its situation and its works. It is situated in the middle of a plain of cotton ground. There is no water within several miles of it for the supply of an army; and it is surrounded by two walls, two ditches, a covert way and glacis. The ditches, however, though deep, are very narrow, and might easily be filled up, particularly that one in the glacis. On the east side of the south face, there is a dam of some water across the outer ditch, over which it would be very practicable to pass; and it appeared to me that it would be most easy to assault the inner fort on the same side. It is to be recollected, however, that after having passed the outer ditch in the glacis, the assailants would have to pass into the covert way, an inner ditch, the outer wall, and afterwards the inner wall, to parts of which there is no ditch.

‘ It is clear that this place can be taken by a *coup de main*, and probably in no other manner; but I strongly recommend that it should be avoided if possible, and that its fall should be considered as dependent upon that of Darwar.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To J. H. Piele, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 30th Nov., 1801.

‘ I enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from the Chief Secretary of Government, relative to the repairs of the fort at Nuggur, respecting which I had a conversation with the Dewan in your presence some time ago.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will procure from the Dewan the estimate of the expense to be incurred in the proposed repairs, as mentioned in the first paragraph of the enclosed extract (3).

‘ I imagine that the repairs which the Dewan proposes to give to the fort of Nuggur will not be greater than that

alluded to in the second paragraph (4) of the enclosed extract; and if that should be the case, I will use the discretion given to me to authorise expense on that account.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *J. H. Piele, Esq.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. Lord Clive.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Seringapatam, 28th December, 1801.

‘ I enclose you a letter for the Governor General, which I have received from Sir William Clarke. That addressed to your Lordship, dated the 20th instant, which Sir William Clarke mentions therein, has not yet arrived here, at least it has not passed through my hands.

‘ The Commander in Chief will have acquainted your Lordship with the disposition of the troops in the province of Canara, made with a view to enable Sir William Clarke to hold his position. Besides these troops, I shall march from hence towards the Bullum country on the 4th of January, and shall be in readiness to move to his assistance whenever that may be necessary.

‘ I have written to Mr. Read, to request that he will take care to keep Sir William Clarke supplied with rice from the northern parts of Canara by boats; and I shall write to Sir William Clarke this day, to desire that he will bring such quantity as he may be able, to last our troops as long as their salt provisions will. As, however, Sir William has the sea open, and the province of Canara so near him, I do not apprehend any thing from the momentary scarcity and dearness of rice at Goa.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Right Hon. Lord Clive.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

## THE MARHATTA WAR IN THE DECCAN.

It will be necessary to precede the narrative and dispatches relative to the war in the Deccan, which followed in 1803, against the Marhatta chiefs, by a brief geographical and historical description of the country which was the seat of it.

Hindustan Proper is that part of India north of the Nerbudda river;—the Deccan is that part between the Nerbudda and the Kistna;—and south of the Kistna are the Carnatic, Malabar, and the newly conquered territory of Mysore.

A predatory and formidable race, the Marhattas, had long subdued a great extent of country, both north and south of the Nerbudda, or held the different states composing it under regular tribute. The greatest length of what were termed the Marhatta territories, from Delhi on the northern extremity, to the river Toombuddra on the southern, is 970 miles; and the extreme breadth, from east to west, where they stretched across the peninsula, from the Bay of Bengal to the Gulf of Cambay, is 900 miles. This immense tract of country contained the provinces of Delhi, Agra, Ajmeer, Malwa, Guzerat, Candeish, Baglana, Beejapoor, the Konkar Berar, Cuttack, and part of Dowlutabad. Some of these provinces are very fertile and populous, yielding abundance of the finest grain, thronged with towns and villages, and enriched by a busy internal commerce. The whole population of the Marhatta dominions was computed at about forty millions, composed of different nations of various tribes, of whom nine-tenths were Hindus, and the rest Mahomedans.

Fortunately, however, for the neighbouring states, the power of this immense empire was, soon after its foundation, divided amongst five princes or chiefs; who, although nominally united in one general confederacy, under an acknowledged superior, the Peshwah, had, nevertheless, not only

separate but rival interests ; and were in the constant practice of supporting against each other their private and individual views. Had it not been for this disunion, their collective military strength, consisting of about 200,000 cavalry, and about 100,000 infantry, would have been extremely formidable.

The principal founder of this extensive empire was the celebrated Sevajee, descended from the Rajahs of Chittoor, the most ancient of the Hindu princes. He had succeeded to his father, the Rajah of Sattarah ; when, after various successes, obtained over the veteran armies of the Mogul Emperor Aurungzebe, and the disciplined forces of the Portuguese, he founded the powerful monarchy consisting of the various Marhatta provinces. On his death, he was succeeded by his son Sambajee ; whose imbecile son and successor, Sahojee, delegated the whole of his authority to Bellajee, his minister. Gaining a complete ascendancy over the mind of his master, Bellajee was appointed Peshwah, or chief magistrate of the empire ; and he so firmly established the power of his family, that his eldest son, Bajee Rao, became his successor in that office without opposition. Bajee Rao, possessing a more adventurous ambition than his father, usurped the government ; and the Rajah of Sattarah and his descendants, who regularly succeeded to the titles and dignities of nominal sovereigns of the Marhatta dominions, were actually kept in a state of imprisonment in their palace at Sattarah ; whilst Bajee Rao, as Peshwah, having secured the fidelity of the several military chieftains, fixed his place of residence at Poonah, established a court there, and invested himself with every regal insignia.

The military chieftains, however, soon viewed the conduct of the Peshwah with envy ; and, encouraged by his example, they successively established their jaghires into independent principalities ; but still acknowledged him as the representative of the Rajah of Sattarah. Thus the nominal Marhatta empire became afterwards divided, at different periods, into

five separate independent states, under the following princes and chiefs.

BAJEE RAO, the second Peshwah, holding the hereditary dominions of the Rajah of Sattarah, in whose name he and his descendants governed. His grandson Bajee Rao, second Peshwah of that name, succeeded to the musnud of Poonah in 1796.

RAGOJEE BHOONSLAH, the first Rajah of Berar, who had been Buckshee, or Commander in Chief, received from the Rajah of Sattarah the province of Berar in jaghire, as a reward for his eminent services; but having in his own hands the power of asserting his independence, he converted his jaghire into a separate state, admitting only the political authority of the Peshwah. He died in 1749. Ragojee, his grandson, and fourth Rajah of Berar, succeeded his father in 1788.

RANOJEE SCINDIAH commanded the body guard of the Peshwah, the first Bajee Rao; and on the conquest of Malwa had part of that province granted to him in jaghire, which, with the whole of Candeish, was afterwards formed into a powerful state by that distinguished warrior. Madajee, his fifth son and successor, increased his territory by possessing himself of the person of the Mogul, Shah Allum; and taking the cities of Delhi and Agra with their surrounding districts, the principal part of the valuable province of the Dooab, between the Jumna and the Ganges; and before 1794, actually extending his sovereignty over the provinces of Sirhind and Jallingdoor, on the banks of the Byah or Hyphasis river. His seat of government was at Ougein, in Malwa; but, like his nephew and successor, his court was generally in his camp. Dowlut Rao Scindiah succeeded his uncle, Madajee, in 1794.

MULHAR RAO HOLKAR, another military officer in the service of the Peshwah, Bajee Rao the first, received also a portion of Malwa in jaghire. He likewise established his independence, at Indore, and founded a considerable state.

His nephew and successor, Tuckajee, died in 1797, leaving two legitimate sons, and two illegitimate; one of these, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, became the active and enterprising chief in the war which followed with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who had possessed himself of the person of Kundee Rao, nephew to Jeswunt, and pretended to govern in his name.

The GUICKWAR had also contributed, in an eminent degree, to establish the fame of the Marhatta arms, and had obtained, in consequence, some valuable grants in jaghire. He afterwards asserted his independence and usurped the fertile province of Guzerat, which remained in his family.

The Marhatta empire, as established by Sevajee in 1680, had thus undergone a complete change; for it had become only a nominal confederation of the five powerful chieftains, the Peshwah, the Rajah of Berar, Scindiah, Holkar, and the Guickwar; but, in fact, all independent of each other, yet all acknowledging a sort of honorary fealty to be due to the descendants of Sevajee, on the throne of Sattarah; and respecting the office of Peshwah, as the legitimate executive authority of the empire. In the intercourse between this chief magistrate and his nominal authority, every form of respect was observed; and on the succession of a Peshwah, he received the dress of honor from the Rajah of Sattarah, before he entered on the administration of his government.

By this arrangement of political power, and the forms with which it was administered, the Marhatta empire, in its foreign as in its domestic relations, was considered as a confederation of princes, of which the Peshwah was the acknowledged organ, as all negotiations with foreign states were carried on through him: although, since the death of Bajee Rao, first of that name, no Peshwah ventured to conclude any treaty with a foreign power, affecting the general interests of the empire, without the express concurrence of all the principal chieftains. On the other hand, the Peshwah always exercised the right of contracting engagements with other powers, when involving only his own interest and



those of his subordinate military tributaries, without any reference to the other powerful chieftains; who, on their part, uniformly exercised a similar right: thus each of them formed alliances, and made war and peace, as it suited his own particular views.

Madajee Scindiah had been indebted for the success of his enterprises in Delhi and the Dooab to his military establishment, planned, formed, and disciplined by Mons. de Boigne,\* a native of Savoy, who entered his service in 1784, and raised eighteen battalions of regular infantry, which he officered by European adventurers, chiefly French, and formed them into brigades: these, with a body of cavalry and a train of well appointed artillery, he disciplined on the European system. M. de Boigne afterwards augmented his regular infantry to 38,000, his cavalry to 8000, and his artillery to 120 pieces of iron, and upwards of 150 pieces of brass ordnance. On quitting India, he was succeeded in his military command, authority, and titles, by Mons. Perron,† a native and subject of France. To this officer Dowlut Rao Scindiah confided the government of his northern provinces; whilst he devoted his attention to the politics of the Deccan, and to the maintenance of that ascendancy over the Peshwah and court of Poonah, which his predecessor had so effectually established. In the exercise of this ascendancy, it was manifestly the main principle of his policy, under the influence of Mons. Perron's advice, to obstruct the interests and views of the British government, by every secret means; and to encourage the introduction of French officers, both into his own army and that of the Peshwah.

The absolute control and direction of the councils of Poonah, by Scindiah, were, however, viewed by Holkar with a jealous animosity, which his inability for a time to prevent

\* Mons. de Boigne returned to Europe with immense wealth, which he expended in princely charities at Chamberry in Savoy, where he died in 1830. His enterprising career and subsequent honorable retirement form a singular and interesting memoir.

† Mons. Perron returned to France in 1806, but was not very well received by Napoleon: he died wealthy, in May, 1834.

seemed to embitter and increase. In order, therefore, to put his army on a footing that might enable it to contend with Scindiah in the Deccan, or at least to bear some proportion to his vast military establishment, Holkar sought also for European officers to discipline and lead his troops; and as at that time there were a greater number of itinerant adventurers from France, than from any other country in Europe, who found their way to India, it consequently happened that three-fourths of the Europeans introduced into his service were Frenchmen.

Thus the infantry establishments of the armies of Holkar, as well as of Scindiah and the Peshwah, were, in the year 1800, principally officered by Europeans, three-fourths of whom were natives of France.

It may be necessary here to remark, that the Marhatta territories of the Peshwah, Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, were bounded to the east and to the south by the dominions of the Nizam, Soubahdar of the Deccan, who reigned over the whole of the country between the Kistna, Godavery, and Wurda rivers; Hyderabad being his chief city and seat of government.

Although the court of Poonah had acquiesced in the justice and necessity of the late war against Tippoo Suldaun; the Peshwah, being under the entire control of Scindiah, did not fulfil the conditions of the treaty of alliance, concluded with him by Marquis Cornwallis: and Scindiah not only maintained a secret correspondence with Tippoo, during the whole progress of the last Mysore war, but, even after the fall of Seringapatam, certain emissaries from Poonah attempted to excite the family and remaining officers of the deceased Suldaun to resist the final settlement of Mysore. Marquis Wellesley, however, on framing the settlement, omitted not to offer a considerable portion of territory to the Peshwah, on the condition of his reviving the alliance between the Marhatta empire and the British government, on a basis calculated to render it secure and efficient. But

this proposition, together with others of a like nature, which were also at the same time made to Scindiah, were explicitly rejected; and, consequently, all the extensive territories of Mysore, formerly conquered by Hyder Ally, were divided between the British government and the Nizam, excepting a portion of the ancient kingdom, which was restored to the Hindu Rajahs.

The unfriendly, if not hostile disposition thus manifested by Scindiah towards the British government; and the increasing strength and influence of Mous. Perron's army, then stationed on the most vulnerable part of the British possessions in India, induced Marquis Wellesley to form alliances which might tend to lessen the influence of Scindiah, in the event of a rupture. With this view, in the beginning of 1802, he concluded a subsidiary treaty and defensive alliance with the Guickwar, chief of Guzerat; and no time was lost on the part of the Governor General in exerting every effort of policy to prevent a French influence in the Deccan, which might subsequently extend its authority over the whole of the Marhatta chiefs. Accordingly, overtures were made, in June, 1802, to the Peshwah by the British resident at Poonah, for forming an alliance: he nevertheless declined to accede, not only to the specific terms, but even to any admissible modification of them. This arose entirely from the known wishes of Scindiah on the question of an alliance with the English; for although that Chief was then absent in Malwa, carrying on hostilities against Holkar, yet his opinions and views continued to rule the councils at Poonah.

Holkar, however, in the mean time, having changed his plan of operations, crossed the Nerbudda, and was actually but a few days' march from Poonah, at the head of a powerful army; for the evident purpose not merely of destroying Scindiah's ascendancy at that court, but of usurping himself the whole authority of the Peshwah, and converting it into a useful instrument for his own aggrandizement.

Scindiah immediately dispatched a force under Suddasheo Bhow, to co-operate in the defence of Poonah; when, after some fruitless negotiation, a general action took place near Poonah, between the hostile armies, on the 25th October, 1802, in which the combined forces of the Peshwah and Scindiah sustained a complete defeat; and the Peshwah fled to the maritime province of the Konkan, leaving his country to devastation and plunder, and the capital of the Marhatta empire to rebels and usurpers.

On the morning of his defeat, the Peshwah sent his minister to the Resident at Poonah, soliciting the aid of a British subsidiary force; and expressing a desire of forming a general defensive alliance, founded on the principles of that concluded between the English and the Nizam, in October, 1800. These propositions were acceded to by the Resident; and an agreement was immediately concluded with the Peshwah, which was ratified by the Governor General on the day he received it at Calcutta. The ratification was returned, accompanied by an assurance from Marquis Wellesley, that it was the determination of the British Government to employ every justifiable means for the restoration of the Peshwah's authority. Judging it also to be a fit opportunity to endeavour to extend this alliance to the other members of the Marhatta empire, Colonel Collins was sent as plenipotentiary to Scindiah, in order to propose terms on which he might be included in the engagement just contracted with the Peshwah.

When Holkar found the Peshwah had effected his retreat to the strong fortress of Mhar, in the Konkan, he placed the son of Amrut Rao on the musnud of Poonah, and invested the father with the office of prime minister; Holkar assuming the command of the troops of the state, and administering the government in Amrut Rao's name. Amrut Rao was the adopted son of Ragobah Rao; and, as such, brother to the Peshwah, whose authority he was thus unwillingly forced to assume.

In this state of the Marhatta powers, it became indispensably necessary, as a measure of precaution on the part of the British government, to assemble a strong army of observation on the southern frontier of the Marhatta dominions, for the security of the British possessions, and those of the Nizam and the Rajah of Mysore; for, according to the habitual custom of the Marhattas, the military chiefs attached to the cause of Holkar would undoubtedly attempt to overrun and plunder the territories of their neighbours. The government of Madras, aware of the necessity of this precaution, without waiting for the instructions of the Governor General, judiciously assembled, in November, 1802, an army of 19,000 men at Hurryhur, on the north west frontier of Mysore, under the command of Lieut. General Stuart. The Government of Bombay also prepared for service the disposable force of that Presidency; and, at the request of the British Resident with the Peshwah, the subsidiary force at Hyderabad was held in readiness to take the field.

Able and zealously supported by Lord Clive and Mr. Duncan, the Governors of Fort St. George and Bombay, the Governor General had been particularly happy in his selection of officers of ability and reputation, as the Residents at the several durbars of the native princes: and to those only who are unacquainted with Indian history will it be necessary to mention the names of some of the distinguished diplomatic agents, whose combined talents, at this eventful period, assisted the military successes of Generals Lake and Wellesley in the extraordinary aggrandizement, and successful administration, of the British empire in India by Marquis Wellesley.

The Residents at the different courts, south of the Nerbudda, in 1803 and 1804, were Lieut. Colonel Close with the Peshwah at Poonah; Lieut. Colonel Collins, with Dowlut Rao Scindiah; Major Kirkpatrick, with the Nizam at Hyderabad; Mr. Webbe, first at Mysore. and afterwards

appointed to the durbar of the Rajah of Berar, but who died in Scindiah's camp at the end of 1804; and Major Malcolm, who accompanied Major General Wellesley to Poonah, and, on the removal of Mr. Webbe to the court of Nagpoor, became Resident at Mysore. The Hon. Mount-Stuart Elphinstone, Mr. Wilks, and Major Munro, employed at this period in the Deccan and Mysore, were also constellations in that galaxy of worth, which shone so conspicuously in the government of India under Lord Wellesley.

It will be seen, by the following Journal and Letters, that Major General Wellesley was very attentive to the events passing at Poonah; the peculiar importance of which was increased by his local knowledge and personal intercourse and influence with the Marhatta chieftains on the frontier of Mysore.

*Journal of the Measures taken, Arrangements made, and Orders given in consequence of the notice received from Mr. Webbe and the Commander in Chief, that it was probable that an Army would be assembled on the Toombuddra, with a view to Operations in the Marhatta Territory.*

‘ 12th November, 1802. Received a letter from Mr. Webbe, dated the 9th, giving me notice of the probability that an army would be assembled on the Toombuddra.

‘ I had a communication with Mr. Piele, in which I urged him to desire Purneah to put the forts of Hurryhur and Hoonelly in decent repair. I gave him notice of the probable want of grain and rice, and desired him to urge the Dewan to stop the exportation of the former entirely, and of the latter from the countries bordering on the Ghauts. I likewise desired him to give notice to the Dewan that we should want 20,000 sheep *per mensem*, and that they ought to begin to collect between Sera and Chittledroog. I desired the Commissary of Stores of Seringapatam to prepare an equipment for a force which would require twenty field pieces, and to repair all the carriages that required it.

‘ I wrote to Captain Johnson, of the Bombay Engineers, to desire that he would carry into execution his

plan for removing six 12 pounders from Goa to Hullihall.

‘ I wrote to Lieut. Dillon, the Acting Resident at Goa, to request that he would undertake to remove to Hullihall all the Company’s stores at Goa, beginning with the arrack and the 12 pounder shot.

‘ I wrote to Mr. Reeves, the Paymaster; Major Doolan, the commanding officer at Goa; and Mr. Read, the Collector, to urge the adoption of all the measures which could facilitate these operations.

‘ I ordered Mr. Gordon to lay in thirty garces of rice, at Hullihall in Soonda.

‘ I wrote to Mr. Read, to request he would facilitate this measure, and that he would let me know how much more Soonda could supply.

‘ Captain Barclay wrote, by my orders, to the Brinjarry gomastah, Mutrim Lallah, to desire him to come up from Conjeveram immediately, and to inform him that all the brinjarries in the Carnatic, Mysore, and Ceded districts, would be immediately wanted; that they were to load and join the army.

‘ He also wrote to all the naigs of the brinjarries, directing them to load and wait for orders to move.

‘ I received a letter from General Stuart of the 9th, ordering certain corps to be prepared for the field, and certain other preparations, and desiring my opinions on certain points. I gave him those opinions in a letter of this date.

‘ 13th November. Captain Barclay, by my orders, gave directions to the Garrison Storekeeper to prepare 30,000lbs. of salt beef for the European troops, and kegs for it.

‘ He also desired him to entertain 3000 carriage bullocks. He also desired him to stop the sale of gram at Chittledroog. To beat out the paddy at Chittledroog and Hullihall. To purchase rice in this neighbourhood, and to report when 1000 bags should be ready.

‘ 14th November. The officers commanding the 5th and 7th regiments of cavalry were ordered to hold their corps

in readiness for field service, and to make the necessary preparations.

- ‘ 15th November. I gave authority to make advances to the bullock owners, of two pagodas for each bullock.
- ‘ 16th November. I made a report to General Stuart upon the subject of the bullock establishment, in a letter of this date.
- ‘ 17th November. I received a letter from the Secretary of the Military Board, dated 12th November, ordering doolies to be repaired. Ordered. I received from General Stuart a letter of the 13th of November, apprising me of stores being sent from Madras, requiring gunny bags from Cannanore and Tellicherry, information regarding the galloper carriages attached to corps of cavalry in Mysore, and brinjarries.

‘ I reported to the General, in a letter of this date, the state of the galloper guns of the regiments; the number of brinjarry cattle, as far as I had accounts of them; the arrangement of the proposed depôts at Hurryhur. I wrote to Lieut. Colonel Boles, to order up the rice bags from Tellicherry and Cannanore. It was reported to me that the arrack kegs in store, at Hullihall in Soonda, were in bad order. I wrote to Lieut. Dillon, the Acting Resident at Goa, to desire that he would take measures to have them repaired; I desired that he would send for them, if he should require them, to carry up the arrack from Goa. I apprized him that I had applied for arrack and salt provisions to Mr. Duncan, which I begged him to forward to Hullihall.

‘ I wrote to Major Doolan, to desire he would also assist in repairing the arrack kegs at Hullihall, and in removing them to Goa, if wanted.

‘ I wrote to Mr. Duncan, to request that he would send arrack in large quantities to Goa, consigned to the care of the Acting Resident, and four hundred kegs with iron hoops, of four gallons each. Also 30,000 lbs. of salt provisions, packed in kegs of 45lbs. each.

‘ Captain Barclay gave directions, by my order, to



the 1st of the 2nd, 2nd of the 3rd, 2nd of the 18th, and 2nd of the 10th, to prepare for field service, and to provide carriages for the sick.

‘ 18th November. I had a conversation with Mr. Anderson upon the subject of the medical arrangements of the troops in the field; in consequence of which, I gave Mr. Piele a memorandum of articles which would be required to construct temporary buildings at Hurryhur for a field hospital.

‘ I reported to General Stuart the request I had made to Mr. Duncan, and recommended that a Resident might still be kept at Goa, although our troops were withdrawn.

‘ I ordered fifty artillery men from Malabar, with one hundred and twenty gun lascars.

‘ 19th November. I forwarded to General Stuart Mr. Anderson’s proposed medical arrangements, with my remarks. I reported to him that there were twenty tents in store for the 1st battalion of artillery at Seringapatam. I ordered that as many gunny bags as could be procured in a month should be made at Seringapatam, Chittledroog, Paughur, Hullihall, Mudgerry, and Nuggur.

‘ Likewise that 30,000lbs. of biscuit should be prepared.

‘ 20th November. Received a letter from General Stuart, of the 16th, desiring me to order ammunition, &c., to be prepared for six 12 pounders, with a proportion of shells. Ordered.

‘ Likewise allowing me to order lead from Paugher, Mudgerry, and Mergasy to Chittledroog, or elsewhere.

‘ 21st November. I wrote to Captain Baynes, to order it to Chittledroog, notwithstanding orders to the contrary he might receive from the Military Board.

‘ Likewise desiring me to send off as many cattle as might be spared from the Mysore equipments. I ordered four hundred to Madras.

‘ I received a letter from the Military Board, of the 16th, ordering 500,000 musket and 20,000 carbine balls to be cast ; and wooden bottoms of sizes for shot to be prepared in the arsenal of Seringapatam. Ordered.

‘ I received a letter from the Military Board, desiring that four howitzer carriages at Seringapatam might be repaired. I reported to the Board that they were repairable for garrison purposes only, in a letter of this date.

‘ I wrote a letter to General Stuart, in which I again recommended that the cattle might not be sent to the Carnatic.

‘ I observed upon the number of guns to be sent from the Carnatic, and compared them with those ordered here, and those that could be provided in this country. I recommended that the whole equipment, excepting the four 18 pounders and four howitzers, might be provided in this country.

‘ I received a letter from General Stuart, dated the 17th, in which he desires I will order Captain Scott to prepare platform carts.

‘ 22nd November. I wrote to General Stuart, and informed him that it appeared that Captain Scott could prepare the 6 pounder gallopers, and not the platform carts ; that I therefore indented for twenty carts.

‘ In consequence of my proposition of yesterday to General Stuart, to prepare twenty six field pieces in Mysore, I wrote to Colonel Whitelocke, to prepare six field pieces, and to send nineteen tumbrils to Seringapatam, by bullocks, which were sent off for that purpose.

‘ To examine the musket ammunition in store.

‘ I gave Mr. Piele a detailed memorandum regarding the mode of supplying gram for three objects: viz., to have 7000 stock in the Gram Agent General’s department on the frontier ; to have a bullock load for each horse in the regimental stock on the frontier ; to have a supply of gram in stations there, so that none in the Gram Agent General’s stock should be touched.

‘ I ordered up the gun bullocks stationed at Mangalore.

‘ 23rd November. I ordered that the gram at Chittledroog, and arrack kegs, &c., at Hullihall, might not be sold according to the orders of the Military Board, and reported this to the Commander in Chief.

‘ 24th November. I received a letter from General Stuart, in which he informed me that he should require field pieces from Mysore, only for the seven corps which would pass through Mysore from the southward, and come from garrisons in this country, and for the 33rd regiment, and four iron 12 pounders from Chittledroog, and in answer to mine of the 13th.

‘ I reported to the General, in a letter of this date, my notion of a depôt at Hurryhur; likewise the arrangements made for the supply of gram.

‘ I received a report from Colonel Boles, that the gunny bags were sand bags.

‘ 25th November. In consequence of General Stuart’s letter of the 19th, I countermanded the 6 pounders ordered on the 22nd, at Chittledroog, and directed four iron 18 pounders to be completed there.

‘ I likewise countermanded four 6 pounders at Seringapatam, and ordered four tumbrils, with fixed ammunition, to be prepared for four iron guns at Chittledroog.

‘ I gave Mr. Gordon orders to prepare servants for the depôt at Hurryhur; likewise to lay in gram at that station. My reason for deferring to give these orders to this period is, that I know the gram was to be in bags, of which we had none; that the first of it would go from Seringapatam, and that the bullocks are only now ready.

‘ 26th November. I received a letter from Captain Walker of the 23rd, in which he requires the communication of my sentiments upon two points connected with his department: viz., the mode of paying for gram procured in Mysore, and that of procuring it. I answered this letter, and gave my opinion upon both points in detail,

and pointed out the object of the arrangements for procuring gram, and how they were to be carried into execution. (Vide letter of this date.)

‘ I received a letter from General Stuart of the 22nd of November, in which he tells me that he approves of not sending the public cattle to Madras. I countermanded those ordered away on the 21st.

‘ I gave Mr. Piele a memorandum upon the subject of the depôt at Hurryhur, in which I required that Purneah might repair the pagodas there; that he might give me the list of the names of places in that neighbourhood in which rice could be procured; that he would try to get some gunny bags for the service from Purneah.

‘ 30th November. Received from General Stuart a letter of the 26th, in which he details the pieces of ordnance required from Mysore, amounting to twenty field pieces. In consequence thereof wrote to Colonel Whitelocke, to prepare four field pieces, with six tumbrils, including the two field pieces heretofore ordered. Desired him also to send here only eighteen instead of nineteen tumbrils, heretofore ordered.

‘ Received a letter from the Military Board of the 26th, ordering from 2000 to 2500 four and half inch shells, 600 to be filled, fused, &c., and arms and accoutrements for the 1st of the 3rd. Ordered.

‘ I wrote to General Stuart, and pointed out that if the shells above mentioned were surplus to 300 he had ordered, we should require twelve tumbrils to carry them; if not, six tumbrils.

‘ 1st December. Conceiving there was a mistake respecting the report from Colonel Boles, that the gunny bags in Malabar were sand bags, I wrote to Colonel Montresor to desire that he would inquire whether there were none in charge of the Garrison Storekeeper, and if there were any, to send them up.

‘ 2nd December. I this day ordered Mr. Gordon to entertain 1000 more bullocks, making in the whole 5000.

‘ 4th December. I had a conversation with the vakeel of



long message from him, translations of which I shall have the honor of transmitting to-morrow, as soon as I can procure them. The purport of the letter was a history of the late transactions at Poonah; that he and Holkar could not agree; that the Peshwah had fled below the Ghauts, and had desired him to join him with his army; that the road was difficult, and if he should go there, his presence would be useless; that he was then encamped upon the Kistna, and wanted to know what orders I had to give him. I propose to detain the vakeel until I can receive your answer, if I may; and I shall be obliged to you if you will give me your orders on the subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 4th December, 1802.

‘ It gives me great pleasure to be able to send you so immediately a satisfactory account of the sentiments of the Marhatta chiefs on the frontier. I had a conversation again this morning with Goklah’s vakeel, the purport of which was as follows:

‘ He says that Bappojee Goneish Goklah was the person who arrested the person of Holkar, afterwards put to death by order of the Peshwah; in consequence thereof he has nothing to expect from Jeswunt Rao Holkar; that he is determined to be faithful to the Peshwah, whose troops he commands, and he wishes to know what orders I have to give him.

‘ The vakeel appears to think it probable that his master will be obliged to retreat from his present position on the Kistna; and he wishes to know whether, in that case, he could be allowed to retreat with his troops into the territories of the Company, or of the Rajah of Mysore; and he promises faithfully, that in case he should receive the permission for which he now asks, his troops shall pay for every thing they might receive, and no depredation shall be committed. The vakeel also requested that an asylum might be afforded within the territories of the Company, or of the Rajah of Mysore, to the females of Bappojee Goneish Goklah, and

those of some of his principal officers. He also presented me a letter from Goklah, and another from Lingo Punt, translations of which I have the honor to enclose. Lingo Punt was the vakeel from the father of Bappojee Goncish, and afterwards from his son to me, during the campaign of 1800.

‘ In answer to these verbal requests, I told the vakeel that it would be necessary that I should refer the matter to Government, and I gave him general assurances of friendship and good will. I desired him to wait here until I should receive the answers of Government to his requests; and I shall be obliged to you if you will honor me with your orders, as well regarding them, as regarding the military conduct of Goklah hereafter. In the mean time I propose to write general answers to the letters, translations of which are enclosed.

‘ I took an opportunity this morning of entering into a general conversation regarding the views and objects, and probable line of conduct, of all the Marhatta chiefs in this part of India, in the present crisis of Marhatta affairs. It is obvious that Goklah must be very decided in his conduct; he has no favor to expect from Holkar; and this is probably the reason for which he, so immediately after his success, dispatched this vakeel to me. The vakeel says that the Putwurdun family (Pursheram Bhow’s) are exactly in the state in which you could wish them to be, viz., in anxious expectation of future events, and intending to adopt a line of conduct suitable thereto; or, in other words, to take part with the strongest. He says that it is reported that Holkar intends to place on the musnud a son of Amrut Rao, and that if he adopts that line of conduct, and places some power in the hands of Amrut Rao himself, the minds of people in general may be more reconciled to him than they are under the existing order of things; for that, at present, every man is doubtful, and determined to take part with the strongest. He says that Goklah, although he has no hopes from Holkar, will hold his ground if power should be thrown into the hands of Amrut Rao. I questioned him regarding the strength of the chiefs at present; he says that Goklah’s body of troops consists of 4000 horse, and 3000 foot, with some guns. He says the horse are 2000 good, and 2000 indifferent; that 500 of the good are pagah, and 1500 silla-

dar; 1000 of the foot are good, commanded by two European officers, 1000 are Arabs and Rohillas, and 1000, I believe, of the ordinary peons of the country. This state of Goklah's force I believe to be true; it is nearly the same as I recollect it to have been in 1800.

‘ The Putwurdun have four bodies of troops, nearly of the same strength and description as Goklah's; and they are situated, for the present, in the neighbourhood of the Kistna. One commanded by Appah Saheb, another by Baba Saheb, and another by Dada Saheb, being three brothers, and sons of Pursheram Bhow, and a fourth by Chintomey Rao, who is the son of Pursheram Bhow's brother, and is, in fact, the head of the family. I have no doubt that all these chiefs will join you forthwith; but I propose to send a man into that country to find out their intentions exactly, and the strength of their troops, and to discover the intentions of Bappojee Scindiah, the killadar of Darwar, and of the Rajah of Kittoor. Both these chiefs have now bodies of troops on foot.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Purport of a Message delivered by Suddasheo Rao, vakeel from Goklah, to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ Seringapatam, 16th December, 1802.

‘ As it is probable that Sree Munt Bajee Rao will claim the protection of the English, Goklah has a great desire to join their army and to act in their cause; and Goklah wishes to make known to General Wellesley, that should he receive orders from Sree Munt Bajee Rao, it is his intention to acquaint him (the General) with the nature of those orders, to take his advice on the subject, and to act accordingly: and should he receive any from Amrut Rao, or Jeswunt Rao Holkar, he will act in the same manner; as it is his particular desire to act agreeably to the General's wishes upon every occasion, let his orders from the people above mentioned be what they may.

‘ Goklah wishes that the friendly communication which at present exists between him and the General may continue; and he will make known to him, in his correspondence, every circumstance, of a public nature, which may occur in the Marhatta country; and he hopes that the General will be



kind enough to let him know any of importance, that may be determined on, relative to arranging the affairs of the Marhatta empire.

‘ Goklah has sent his vakeel, Suddasheo Rao, to General Wellesley, not only to request a place for his family to remain in, but also to cultivate his friendship.’

*To the Right Hon. Lord Clive.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Seringapatam, 19th December, 1802.

‘ In consequence of your Lordship’s orders of the 8th and 11th instant, I have had a conference with the vakeel sent here by Bappojee Goneish Goklah, the purport of which I am about to lay before you.

‘ I informed the vakeel of your Lordship’s concern at the difficulties which opposed the progress of Bappojee Goneish to the Konkan with his troops, in obedience to the Peshwah’s commands; and that the state of the connexion between his Highness and the British Government did not admit of the junction of any part of the force under my command with that of Goklah. I then pointed out to him the mode of political communication between the British government in India and the Native states; and informed him that the negotiations, then depending between his Excellency the Governor General and the Peshwah, had been committed exclusively to Lieut. Colonel Close; and that the result of those negotiations must determine the mode of conduct to be observed by the British government, in the present convulsion of Marhatta affairs. I expressed a sanguine expectation, however, that the events which had recently happened might ultimately tend to augment and corroborate the relations of amity between the two states.

‘ In respect to the specific proposition of Bappojee Goneish Goklah, that his army should be received into the Company’s territories, and that an asylum should be given to his family and to those of his principal officers and adherents, I informed the vakeel, that no application had been made by the Peshwah that any body of Marhatta troops might be admitted within the British territories; and consequently, that the relations at that moment subsisting between the British government and the Marhatta empire did not admit of your receiving an armed force. I told him that I had

received your Lordship's orders to give security, and treat with respect such persons as might be obliged to seek protection, with their families, within the territories of the Company, or of the Rajah of Mysore, under the present aspect of public affairs; and I pointed out Seringapatam, in Mysore, as the place to which it would be most convenient that such persons should go. At the same time I told him positively that no armed men would be admitted within the frontier.

'The vakeel appeared to be satisfied with this communication, and then delivered another message from Bappojee Goneish Goklah, of which the inclosed paper contains the purport. In answer thereto, I referred him to what I had before said, by your Lordship's orders, and expressed myself much gratified by his confidence in British officers. I also stated my sanguine expectation that recent events would have the effect of augmenting and strengthening the relations of amity between the two states, and those in the service of each.

'The vakeel then asked whether, in case the course of events should occasion a junction between the British army and that under the command of Bappojee Goneish Goklah, it was probable that any pecuniary assistance would be afforded by the commander of the former to the latter? I replied that the supposed junction of those two bodies of troops, as well as every arrangement depending thereon, and the nature and extent of the assistance to be afforded by the one to the other, must depend upon the negotiations between the British government and the Peshwah; which I had before informed him were committed exclusively to Lieut. Colonel Close.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Right Hon. Lord Clive.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

The Peshwah in the mean time had removed to Severndroog, and afterwards embarked for Bassein, where a treaty of alliance was concluded on the 31st of December, 1802, between his Highness and Lieut. Colonel Barry Close, the Resident at his court.

The restoration of the Peshwah to the musnud of Poonah,

under the exclusive protection of the British power, was very essential, as it would necessarily supersede any preponderating influence at the court of Poonah, by either Scindiah or Holkar, who were known to have had personal and interested views on the supreme magisterial authority of the empire.

The Rajah of Berar had also always maintained pretensions to the supreme authority of the Marhatta empire, founded on his affinity to the reigning Rajah of Sattarah; and convinced that the permanency of the defensive alliance, lately concluded at Basscin, between the British government and the Peshwah, would preclude all future opportunity of accomplishing the object of his ambition, the Rajah of Berar was equally concerned with Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the subversion of that alliance.

Although the views ascribed to these chieftains were manifestly incompatible with the accomplishment of their respective designs, the removal of an obstacle which would effectually preclude the success of either chieftain, in obtaining an ascendancy at Poonah, constituted an object of common interest; and sensible that the combination of their power afforded the only prospect of subverting the alliance, they apparently agreed to compromise their respective and contradictory projects, by an arrangement for the partition of the whole power and dominion of the Marhatta state.

The Governor General lost no time, at this critical period, in forwarding instructions to Lord Clive, and to the Residents at the several durbars of the Marhatta chiefs. These instructions, with the correspondence of Lord Clive and Lieut. General Stuart, the Commander in Chief, elucidate the preparations made for the advance of a division of the British army to Poonah, and the subsequent war in the Deccan.

*To the Right Hon. Lord Clive.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Seringatam, 1st January, 1803.

‘ Captain Mahony, heretofore Resident in Koorg, arrived at Seringatam some days ago; and, in obedience to the

orders of the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, I have, in communication with that gentleman, taken into consideration the proposed plan of remuneration for the services of the Koorg Rajah\*. For the reason stated by the Governor General in Council, in his Excellency's letter to your Lordship upon this subject, I am clearly of opinion, not only that no part of the territories of the Rajah of Mysore ought to be given to the Rajah of Koorg, but that care ought to be taken that the executive government of Mysore should not be informed that it was ever in contemplation to propose an exchange of territory with the Honorable Company, with a view to granting to the Rajah of Koorg the territories which they should cede.

‘ The services of the Rajah of Koorg, however, still deserve remuneration. It appears, by Captain Mahony's accounts, that he expended sums of money, and furnished supplies of cattle and provisions, in the late war against Tippoo Sultaan, of a value amounting in the whole to about four lacs of rupees. If he had consented to be reimbursed this expenditure, he would have received bonds of the Bombay government for this sum of money, bearing an interest at twelve per cent. per annum, in the beginning of the year 1799; and in this manner would have added nearly two lacs of rupees to the sum above mentioned. It may therefore be fairly concluded, that by the liberality of the Rajah of Koorg, the Company's Treasury is richer at this moment no less than six lacs of rupees, than it would have been, if he had taken payment of the money expended, and for the supplies furnished by him. In this view of the question, I do not take into consideration the nature of his services, or the time at which they were rendered; but I have stated particularly what the supplies furnished by him would have cost the Company, if they had been furnished by any other person, as I found thereon the amount of remuneration which I intend to recommend to your Lordship to grant him.

‘ When the arrangements of the territory of the late

\* The Rajah of Koorg was an ally of the Company in the last war of the Mysore, and was present at Tippoo's attack on the detachment of the Bombay army under General Stuart at Sedaseer. His report of that affair to the Governor General is to be found in the Appendix to Colonel Beatson's War in Mysore. There is also an interesting account of this Rajah of Koorg in Captain Basil Hall's *Fragments of Voyages and Travels*, vol. ii. p. 248, 3rd Series.

Tippoo Suldaun were made, in the year 1799, the Rajah of Koorg was desirous to have the districts of Panjah and Bellary in Canara, to which he conceived he had a claim, as they had belonged heretofore to his family, and they connected with Murca and Soobroo, in the same province. It is supposed that these districts are worth about six thousand canterai pagodas per annum, and they might form part of the proposed remuneration to the Rajah of Koorg.

‘ The districts in Mysore, to which the Rajah of Koorg in like manner stated a claim, are Penapatam, Betudpoor, and Akibgoor, the value of which, by the schedule, appears to be 17,500 canterai pagodas. It will not be proper to give the Rajah those districts; and I recommend to your Lordship that others of equal value, connected with Panjah and Bellary, and the Bentwall river, in the province of Canara, may be ceded to him.

‘ Under this arrangement, he will have nearly 24,000 canterai pagodas per annum, which is about the value of the sum which the Company have annually, by his forbearing to demand payment of the money due to him: he will have two districts in Canara, to which he conceived he had a claim, and certain other districts in the same province, connecting him with the Bentwall river, of the same value with districts in Mysore which he is desirous to possess; but which, under existing circumstances, it is not possible to grant him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

In the autumn of 1802, the advance and capture of Poonah, by Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the consequent flight of the Peshwah, and the warlike preparations of the several chiefs, led to the interference of the British Government in the affairs of the Marhatta states, in which it will be seen Major General Wellesley bore a conspicuous part.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 1st January, 1803.

‘ Webbe has desired me to write to you upon the subject of our operations to the northward; and although it is difficult to form an opinion on the subject of any military opera-

tions without knowing precisely their object, I comply with pleasure with his wishes, and I shall be happy if what I may write shall prove at all serviceable.

‘ I shall suppose our object to be to march the army to Poonah, there to re-establish the Peshwah’s authority. At this season of the year, I do not know of any natural obstacle to impede our progress, excepting the great distance. The principal obstacle of art is the fort of Darwar, which I conclude that the Peshwah will have ordered the killadar to deliver up to us. If his Highness should not have given these orders, or if the killadar should not think it proper, we must make ourselves masters of that fortress. I am of opinion that it is to be taken by a *coup de main*, and I should certainly attempt it. It may not, however, be thought proper to attack the place in this manner; but at all events, I do not conceive that it will stop the British army more than a few days. It will also take three or four days to arrange our garrison in the place, and to remove thither our stores, grain, &c., from Hullihall in Soondah.

‘ After Darwar shall be in our possession, I do not know of any place that will stop the British army for a moment.

‘ I will suppose that the army shall have arrived upon the Toombuddra, and that General Stuart will be prepared to advance from Hurryhur on the 1st of March. I do not think it possible that he could be there sooner; he has a very large and heavy equipment, which he brings from Madras; he has Carnatic cattle to move it; and he meets with the old disappointments in procuring them. He does not quit Madras till the 15th of this month; his troops and stores about the 12th; he has then four hundred miles to march to Hurryhur, which will take him more than six weeks.

‘ After quitting Hurryhur, he will have eight marches to Darwar, and from thence, twenty two to Poonah, by Padshappoor, Chickoree, Meritch, and Tasgaum; and one more, if he should go by Shahpooor and Belgaum to Meritch. I should recommend the latter road, because I believe that it will be convenient, if not necessary to us, to have possession of Belgaum; and that by that road we shall be more certain of finding water than by the other.

‘ According to this account, I do not think that you ought to look out for us at Poonah before the end of April.

‘ In this estimate of the time which will elapse before we arrive at Poonah, I have concluded that we shall meet with no impediments on our progress, occasioned by the efforts of the enemy. I am far from thinking, however, that we shall not meet with such impediments, and if we do, our progress must be considerably slower than I have supposed that it will be, and the period of our arrival at Poonah be considerably delayed.

‘ I have not yet had any satisfactory communication from the Putwurdun family of their intentions upon the present occasion: it appears that they and Rastia’s family are leagued against Goklah, whose troops they are driving from the Kistna towards the Toombuddra. It is possible, that when they shall see our army in the field, they may be induced to join our standard, but at present I very much doubt their intentions. It will not be very practicable to make great progress through the southern Marhatta territories with such a heavy equipment as General Stuart has proposed, if the chiefs of this family and Rastia are united against us.

‘ At all events, at present, owing to the confusion at Poonah, and the delay in assembling our troops on the frontier, the countries on the other side of the Toombuddra are in a sad state of disorder. The heads of districts and of villages have seized the supreme authority, and have raised troops, and are carrying on against each other a petty warfare, which will be as destructive to our supplies and our communications with Mysore, as it is to the country itself. Unless, therefore, the Putwurdun, and all the chiefs in this part of the empire, join cordially with us, and take advantage of our presence to settle the country, it is very obvious that we shall lose our communication with Mysore on the day we shall quit the Toombuddra.

‘ These circumstances have made me turn my mind seriously to a project which the great distance between Mysore and Poonah had induced me before to take into consideration; viz., to establish a depôt, by means of the Bombay government, either at Panwell or Bassein, or some other place on the coast opposite to the island of Bombay, or Salsette, of not very difficult access from the ghauts: this post to be occupied by the Bombay troops, and to be filled

with rice, arrack, salt provisions, and military stores for a field train, if we should have fought an action. By this arrangement we should carry on the war at Poonah with an army provided with cattle, &c., from the eastern side of the peninsula, and with the resources of Bombay; and we should shorten our line of communication many hundred miles.

‘ I propose this plan to General Stuart, and if he should adopt it, I shall write a detail upon the subject to Mr. Duncan. In the mean time, it will be well if you turn it in your mind, and if you should agree in opinion with me of its propriety, and should think it practicable, fix upon a place upon the coast which the Peshwah must be requested to give up to us.

‘ I cannot conclude this letter without letting you know how amply Mysore has contributed to the supply and equipment of the army to be assembled on its frontier, and how readily our little friend Purneah has come into all my plans for the service.

‘ First. I have raised here 8000 bullocks before they had got one at Madras; besides the bullocks for the cavalry gram.

‘ Secondly. At the end of the gram harvest, one month before the new gram comes in, the cavalry Gram Agent General is supplied with 7000 loads; and the cavalry are brought upon the frontier, with 500 loads each regiment, where they find 6000 loads to supply their consumption while they remain there.

‘ Thirdly. A depôt is formed of 7000 loads of rice at Hurryhur.

‘ Fourthly. Mysore alone gives 32,000 brinjarry bullocks loaded, which will meet the General at the back of the Chittledroog hills, at the end of this month.

‘ Fifthly. 60,000 sheep, assembled in different flocks between Sera and Chittledroog; and

‘ Sixthly. A body of silladar horse, amounting to above 5000.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Jonathan Duncan, Esq., the Governor of Bombay.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 20th Jan., 1803.

‘ General Stuart will have informed you that, adverting to the probability of the march of the army to Poonah, and the possibility that our communication with Mysore and the seats of the resources of the army on this side of India might be precarious, and at all events would be difficult, on account of its length, I had proposed to him a plan for the formation of a depôt at Panwell or Bassein, or some other place on the coast opposite to the islands of Bombay or Salsette, by means of the Government of Bombay. He has been pleased to approve of this plan, and has desired me to write to you upon the subject in detail. You may recollect that I before hinted the subject to you, and I should have written to you upon it more particularly, before now, if I had seen clearly the object which General Stuart proposed for the campaign. It is clear now that our object must be Poonah, and to re-establish the government of the Peshwah in that city; and we must provide for our subsistence while in that neighbourhood, supposing that the object of our enemy should be to cut off our communication with the source of our supplies, or that, from its length and difficulty, our subsistence should become precarious.

‘ The first point for consideration is the situation for the proposed depôt. It should be somewhere on the coast, within reach of water carriage from Bombay, both that the depôt may be formed without difficulty or great expense, and that it may be in the power of the government of Bombay to provide for its defence with ease, supposing that the enemy should have a design to attack it. It should be at no great distance, and of easy access, from the ghaut leading to Poonah. It should have two gates at least, if not more, all of easy access to cattle; and it should be of such strength as to render it probable that a small body of troops could keep it till reinforcements could be sent from Bombay. I say nothing of the buildings which the fort ought to have, in order to hold the articles which I am about to detail as a list of our probable wants, for I know that temporary buildings can be constructed with great celerity everywhere, par-

ticularly when Bombay can furnish such quantities of materials and workmen.

‘ From this description of the kind of place wanted, and of the situation in which it ought to be, you will be the best judge on what place upon the coast to fix; and you will of course communicate your wishes upon that subject to Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ The articles of which we shall be principally in want, are food for our Europeans, for our native troops and followers, and for our horses, military stores, medical stores, and money.

‘ First. For the Europeans we ought to have 10,000 gallons of arrack, in kegs of six gallons each, well fortified with iron hoops. It will not be possible for you, I should imagine, to procure the number of kegs that will be necessary to hold all this arrack; but the greater the number you can procure the better: that part for which kegs cannot be procured, might be sent in casks of fifty or sixty gallons each, for which the General might send his carts, if the state of the road would permit it; and if not, there will be a proportion of kegs with the army.

‘ For the European troops, 90,000 pounds of salted meat will be required, also packed in kegs well fortified, 45 pounds in each keg, besides pickle, &c.; and the same quantity of biscuits in round baskets, containing 60 pounds each; these baskets to be covered with waxed cloth. Slaughter cattle for 3000 Europeans for one month, would likewise be useful; but these might remain in a situation in which it would be probable they might get some food, and would be attended to till the army should be prepared to send for them.

‘ Secondly. For the natives, all that we shall require is 600 garces of rice. Each garce contains 4800 pucca seers, each seer two pounds.

‘ It would be desirable that encouragement should be given to some of the traders at Bombay to have ready for those of our camp, ghee, turmeric, doll, and other bazaar articles: but in the formation of a depôt of this kind, it is impossible to enumerate these, or for the Government to lay them in.

‘ Salt, however, is an article of necessary consumption,

both to the European and the native troops; and of this article it is desirable that there should be in the depôt 60 garces.

‘ Thirdly. We shall want military stores only in case we should have fought an action previously to our arrival at Poonah; but it would be as well that they should be prepared for us: the expense of them is not great, and if we do not want them, they will be available hereafter in the arsenal of Bombay.

‘ Enclosed I have the honor to send an account of the ordnance we shall have with us, for which a quarter equipment ought to be prepared according to the Madras regulations; or, if that Book should not be at Bombay, according to those of the Bombay government.

‘ Fourthly. In respect to food for our horses, I am afraid that that which they use is not procurable at Bombay, viz., coulthee; but if coulthee is procurable, there ought to be 150 garces of that grain in the depôt; if not, an equal quantity of chenna.

‘ Fifthly. Medical stores—we ought to have three months’ consumption of these for 3000 Europeans and 15,000 native troops, particularly bark, Madeira wine, mercurial ointment calomel, and not forgetting nitrous acid.

‘ Sixthly. In respect to money, I conclude that General Stuart will write to you particularly. I have not the means of estimating our expenses; but I think you ought to be prepared to send us sixteen lacs of rupees.

‘ The next point to which I beg to draw your attention, is the mode of taking care of this depôt, and in which its contents are to be delivered to those whom General Stuart will send for them.

‘ The provision stores for the Europeans will not be very bulky, and not very difficult to be counted and delivered from the charge of one person to that of another; it will not be necessary therefore to employ many persons in the charge of these stores, and they might be under the superintendance of the person who will have charge of the rice.

‘ It is not probable that the rice will remain any length of time in store, and therefore there does not appear any necessity for its being in bags; particularly as every head of cattle which will be sent from the army to carry it away, will

have its bags. It is essentially necessary, however, for the sake of regularity and expedition, that there should be a great number of conicopies, measuring men, and servers, attached to this grain, and that it should be stored in buildings in different parts of the fort, all of easy access from the gates. One gentleman should be appointed to superintend this department, that of the provisions for the Europeans, and that of the grain for the horses; for the care, measuring, and delivering of which, the same measures ought to be taken as for the rice.

‘ The medical and military stores ought each to be under charge of an officer of the departments to which they belong, with the proper number of servants for their care and delivery. The treasure might remain at Bombay till the General should call for it.

‘ It has occurred to me, that you may find some difficulty in procuring the large quantity of rice for which I have called as above; but I have provided for this difficulty, and I wish I could do so for all the others in which you may be involved by this call upon your resources. I have written by desire of General Stuart to the collectors in Canara, and have apprized them of the possibility of your wanting a large store of rice; and I have requested them to stop the exportation from that province till they should hear from you whether you would want it or not. If you should want any, they could send you any quantity that you could require; if you should not want it, I beg you to desire your secretary to apprise them of it, in order that they may take off the embargo which I conclude they will lay on in consequence of my request.

‘ I believe that I have now adverted to all the points which I had to detail to you; but if I should not have done so, and should recollect any thing further, I am sure that you will excuse my troubling you again upon this subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Jonathan Duncan, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I have omitted in this letter to mention draught and carriage bullocks to you, because General Stuart tells me that he has already drawn your attention to this part of our equipments. I beg leave, however, to call to your recollection

tion the necessity that every carriage bullock with which you will supply the army, should have a saddle. I conclude that you will not be able to procure any cattle for hire at Bombay, as we do in this part of India; and that all those with which you will supply us will be Company's property, and their drivers in the Company's service.

'Wheat is not an article for depôt in general; but it is one very necessary for the consumption of the European officers and soldiers of the army, and ought not, if possible, to be left to chance. It would therefore be very desirable that there should be four or five garces of wheat in the depôt.

'It is likewise desirable that the traders at Bombay should be encouraged to have ready to be purchased by the dealers of our camp, sheep, or slaughter cattle.'

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Seringapatam, 21 Jan., 1803.

'I have just received from Sir William Clarke a copy of your letter of the 6th, to Mr. Grant, the Secretary of Government at Bombay, in which you desire to have from Sir William a particular account of the intentions of Appah Saheb, and the other chiefs in the Marhatta territories towards the Toombuddra, in the present crisis of Marhatta affairs. In my letter of the 1st instant, I alluded to this topic, as the intentions of these chiefs might affect our military operations, and might retard our progress towards Poonah; and I stated some facts regarding the Putwurdun, and Rastia's family, and Goklah.

'Matters regarding these three chiefs remain nearly as they were when I then wrote. Goklah is encamped near Savanore, and he has a detachment at Anee upon the Toombuddra. Rastia's son has a force near Jellahaul, which drove Goklah down to his present position from the neighbourhood of the Kistna.

'I have the most positive assurances that our army will be joined by Goklah, and I believe them to be sincere; as his vakeel, who was here, told me that his master had nothing to hope from Holkar, as he had taken and given up to Ballogee Koonger the brother of Holkar, who had been put to death. His only reliance, therefore, was upon the English,

and their endeavors to restore the power of the Peshwah. I have not had hitherto any communication with any of the Putwurduns, excepting a civil letter from Chintomeny Rao, and an answer from Ball Kischen Bhow, to a letter which I wrote to him and sent by Govind Rao. I at the same time desired Govind Rao to discover the intentions of the Putwurduns upon the present occasion. Ball Kischen Bhow declared that he considered himself as belonging to the English, and should join our army himself, and should do everything in his power to influence the others to adopt the same line of conduct. But he said he could not answer for the others of the family; and he and Govind Rao are gone together to Hurrypeoor upon the Kistna, where the whole family are encamped, to discover their intentions. I shall hear from Govind Rao in a few days, and I shall let you know what he will write.

‘I have had no communication with Rastia, and do not know his intentions; but I am certain that if I were to go to the frontier with the army, I should have vakeels from him and all these chiefs.

‘The Rajah of Kittoor has a vakeel here now, with a proposition to join us with 4000 horse and 7000 infantry, and a desire to be taken under our protection. I have informed Lord Clive of the arrival of this vakeel, and have treated him with attention.

‘Futty Sing was encamped with the armies of the Putwurdun at Hurrypeoor, and the avowed intention of this junction was to punish the Rajah of Kolapoor. But Futty Sing has now returned towards Poonah, having been recalled, as it is said, by Holkar, as Scindiah’s army was advancing rapidly to the southward from Burhampoor.

‘I can say nothing positive relating to Appah Saheb’s reconciliation with the Peshwah; but I shall hear every thing from Govind Rao, to whom I have given detailed instructions to ascertain those points which could lead me to form a judgment of the real intentions and wishes of every chief in that part of the empire.

‘I have not heard any thing of the horse which you say was sent up the ghauts from Mhar, under the chiefs named by you, to remain on the road between the Kistna and Poonah.

‘ You will hear from Mr. Duncan that General Stuart has approved of the plan for the depôt; and I wrote yesterday to Mr. Duncan in detail upon the subject of the General’s desire.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. Lord Clive.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fort William, 2nd February, 1803.

‘ 1. I have received from the Resident at Poonah, the intimation of his intention to recommend the advance of the British army assembled at Hurryhur into the Marhatta territory, at the earliest practicable period of time.

‘ 2. The situation of the affairs of the Marhatta empire, and the views and intentions of the contending parties, were not sufficiently decided, when my instructions to the Resident at Poonah, of the 29th of November and 30th of December, were issued, to enable me to determine the precise extent of the force which it might be expedient to advance into the Marhatta territory, from the several stations at which troops had been ordered to assemble for eventual service. The regulation of that question was, therefore, entrusted to the discretion of the Resident at Poonah, to be guided by future events and circumstances.

‘ 3. The length of time required for the complete equipment of the force which your Lordship had directed to be assembled on the frontier of the Marhatta territory, precluded the necessity of immediate instructions with regard to the ultimate destination of the army. The transactions in the Deccan, and the situations and views of the several contending parties, having now assumed a more distinct form, I am enabled to apply the general principles by which I propose to regulate the proceedings of the British Government in the actual crisis of affairs.

‘ 4. The objects of assembling British troops on the frontier of Mysore were, the effectual defence of our possessions during the convulsed state of the Marhatta empire; and the eventual establishment of a subsidiary force at Poonah, under the operation of the general defensive alliance concluded with the Peshwah.

‘5. Your Lordship is apprized of my intention (in conformity to the system of alliance, founded by the treaty of Hyderabad in 1800) to exert the British influence and power for the restoration of the Peshwah to the musnud of Poonah, on the basis of the subsidiary treaty, recently concluded by Colonel Close. In pursuing this intention, it is, however, absolutely necessary to attend to the leading principles of policy by which my conduct has been governed. First, the maintenance of peace with the Marhatta states: Secondly, the preservation of the internal tranquillity of the British possessions. Our proceedings, in the present crisis of affairs, must be strictly conformable to these leading principles.

‘6. The stipulations of treaty on which I found my intention to facilitate the restoration of the Peshwah’s authority, originated in a supposition that the majority of the Marhatta jaghiredars, and the body of the Peshwah’s subjects, entertain a desire of co-operating in that measure; justice and wisdom would forbid any attempt to impose upon the Marhattas a ruler, whose restoration to authority was adverse to the wishes of every class of his subjects. The recent engagements with the Peshwah involve no obligation of such an extent; whatever might be the success of our arms, the ultimate objects of those engagements could not be attained by a course of policy so violent and extreme. If, therefore, it should appear that a decided opposition to the restoration of the Peshwah is to be expected from the majority of the Marhatta jaghiredars, and from the body of the Peshwah’s subjects, I shall instantly relinquish every attempt to restore the Peshwah to the musnud of Poonah.

‘7. Even under an assurance of a decided support and co-operation from the jaghiredars, it is, however, advisable that such a detachment of British force should advance into the Marhatta territory, as shall not endanger the internal tranquillity of the Company’s territories. The advance of the whole of the British army assembled at Hurryhur, into the Marhatta territory, would greatly diminish the internal security of the Company’s possessions in that quarter of India; such a movement would therefore be inconsistent with a principal object of this armament.



‘8. Under all the circumstances of the case, therefore, I consider the advance of the whole English army assembled at Hurryhur, to Poonah, to be a measure of such hazard to the tranquillity of the English possessions, as could not be justified by any probable expectation of a more speedy and complete accomplishment of our views at that court.

‘9. With the view of fulfilling our engagements with the Peshwah, without deviating from the principles stated in this dispatch, it is my intention ; First, that the whole of the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Nizam, together with the regiment of Europeans, and the regiment of cavalry to be furnished for the service of his Highness, under the orders of the Governor General in Council of the 31st December, 1802, shall proceed to join the troops of the Nizam, assembled on his Highness’s western frontier ; and that the whole of that force shall occupy, within his Highness’s territory, the station nearest to Poonah ; and shall be prepared, at a proper season, to advance to that capital. Secondly, that as large a proportion of the English army assembled at Hurryhur, as can be detached consistently with the internal security of the English territories, shall advance, in concert and co-operation with such of the Marhatta chiefs and jaghiredars, occupying the southern frontier of the Marhatta territory, as are attached to the Peshwah’s cause ; and that the remainder of the English army shall maintain its position on the frontier of Mysore, for the combined purpose of eventually supporting the advanced detachment, and of preserving the internal tranquillity of the Company’s territory. Thirdly, that the advanced detachment shall proceed from Hurryhur, together with such of the Marhatta forces as may unite with it, either to Meritch, or to any other station where the Peshwah may be enabled to join that force ; or that the detachment from Hurryhur shall form a junction with the combined army of the Nizam, and with the English subsidiary troops, on the frontier of his Highness’s dominions. The immediate destination of the advancing army must necessarily be regulated by contingent events ; the extent of the force, to be thus detached from the main body of the English army at Hurryhur, must be decided by the discretion of your Lordship in Council, aided by the judgment of the Commander in Chief, and strictly

regulated by the principles stated in the preceding part of this dispatch.

‘10. Such detachment of English troops, supported by the co-operation of the majority of the southern jaghiredars, or by the force united with the army of the Nizam, will be sufficient to preclude the opposition of any individual chieftain, who may consider the restoration of the Peshwah to the musnud of Poonah to be incompatible with his separate interests; and who might be disposed to resist or embarrass the progress of that measure.

‘11. The actual period of the advance of the proposed detachment from Hurryhur must be regulated by the information which your Lordship may receive of the progress of the subsidiary force from Hyderabad, and of the Nizam's troops; and also by the tenor of the advices which may be transmitted to your Lordship by the Resident at Poonah.

‘12. The co-operation of the majority of the Marhatta jaghiredars for the restoration of the Peshwah to the due exercise of his authority, being considered to form an indispensable part of the arrangement for the accomplishment of that object, it is necessary that your Lordship should be apprized of my sentiments, with regard to the conduct to be observed in encouraging those jaghiredars to co-operate with the English troops.

‘13. It may be expected that those jaghiredars will require, as the condition of their support, assurances from the English government of security for their respective rights and interests, in the general settlement of affairs. Without an accurate knowledge of the respective rights of the jaghiredars, and of the Peshwah, we cannot justly pledge the faith of the British government to any special engagement on this subject.

‘14. Every practicable means should be employed to conciliate the good will of those chieftains, and to obtain their co-operation in the general object of restoring the Peshwah to the due exercise of his authority; and for that purpose it will be proper to afford to the jaghiredars every assurance, that the utmost influence of the British government will be employed, after the successful restoration of Bajee Rao, to provide for the security of the interests of each chieftain, to the extent which may be practicable, consistently with the

just rights of the Peshwah. Any engagements of a more definite nature might involve obligations inconsistent with public faith.

‘ 15. In framing any engagements with the several Marhatta jaghiredars, occupying the frontier of Mysore, for the purpose of securing their aid and co-operation on the present occasion, your Lordship may be disposed to avail yourself of the services of Major Malcolm, whose extensive information with regard to the general political system of India, and whose intimate knowledge of my sentiments on this particular branch of policy, will furnish peculiar advantages in accomplishing the measures which your Lordship may pursue, for the purpose of securing the support of the Marhatta feudatories. Your Lordship may anticipate my approbation of any orders which you may issue, for the purpose of employing the services of Major Malcolm in the discharge of any duty of a political nature, connected with the views and interests of the British Government, with the Marhatta chieftains, or at the court of Poonah.

‘ 16. Your Lordship will issue such instructions to the commanding officer of the detachment as may appear to be proper, with the view to conciliate the good will of the inhabitants of the country, through which the detachment may have occasion to pass, in the Marhatta territory.

‘ 17. Copies of this dispatch, together with corresponding instructions to the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad, will be forwarded to those officers with all practical expedition.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*’

‘ WELLESLEY.

*The Governor General to Lord Clive.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fort William, 3rd February, 1803.

‘ Adverting to the power and influence of Ragojee Bhoonslah, as a branch of the Mahratta state, it is expedient that I should possess the means of obtaining timely knowledge of that chieftain’s views in the present crisis; and avail myself of the favorable opportunity of the important object of comprehending the Rajah of Berar in the system of defensive alliance, lately concluded with the Peshwah. These cannot be effectually secured otherwise than by the presence of an

able and active resident at the Court of Nagpoor. The talents, knowledge, and activity of Mr. Webbe qualify him in an eminent degree for that station ; and I have resolved to appoint him resident at the court of the Rajah of Berar, in which capacity I shall furnish him with detailed instructions for the regulation of his conduct.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*’

‘ WELLESLEY.

*Memorandum in answer to Captain Moor's Paper, enclosed in a Letter from Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ 14th February, 1803.

‘ 1. I see no material objection to the formation of the depôt at Bombay, and to the delivery of its contents to the army from boats, provided the gentlemen at Bombay are of opinion that the navigation to Panwell is practicable during the monsoon. If it should not be so, the troops may never enjoy the advantage of the depôt, unless it should be placed in security on the coast before the monsoon sets in.

‘ 2. I concur in Captain Moor's proposal in regard to the packages, particularly if the contents of the depôt are to be brought to the coast in boats and delivered as wanted. But the rice and the grain ought to be packed in packages, each of three mercals, and each mercial twelve pucca seers, each seer two pounds.

‘ 3. The suggestion in the 10th paragraph must of course be attended to.

‘ 4. Boats must of course be established on the two rivers noticed in paragraphs 23 and 24. There will be no difficulty in crossing the cattle.

‘ 5. The rivers in the southern part of the peninsula, viz., the Malpoorba, the Werdah, the Toombuddra, the Cauvery and the Cubbany, do not fill till between the 15th and 20th of June. I write this from the experience of four years. The rains set in to the southward before they begin to the northward ; it is therefore to be supposed that the rivers which rise in the hills to the southward will fill first. I mention this in order that the exact time at which these rivers may be expected to fill may be investigated ; as to procure boats to pass them is an object of much importance, and one which will take much time.

‘6. Skins to cover the boats, which must be of the basket kind, might be prepared at Bombay.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘Camp at Hooly Honore,  
22nd Feb. 1803.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘I enclose a letter from Govind Rao, and another from Ball Kischen Bhow, by which you will perceive that the dispositions of the chiefs of the Putwurdun family are favorable to the Peshwah. They are all encamped on the Kistna. I shall send you Govind Rao’s detail as soon as I receive it.

‘I might arrive at Hurryhur on the 25th, and I am finely equipped for the service in every respect. I make long marches with the greatest facility, and my cattle are all fresh. I wish I could say as much for General Stuart; but he is badly off indeed. He has lost a number of cattle, and those which remain are in a very bad state.

‘We are to halt in three divisions; General Stuart at Mayaconda, General Campbell at Harponelly, and myself at Hoonelly, till further orders are received. General Stuart’s cattle will recruit a little there, but not much; and I see no remedy but that which I have recommended to him, viz., to diminish his monstrous equipment, and to leave behind every thing not absolutely necessary. I shall see him at Mayaconda on the 26th, and will try to persuade him to adopt this measure.

‘I have not heard where Gungurdhur is, but Bappojee Scindiah will certainly refuse to give him up Darwar till he sees our army approach it. The threat to use six baums of rope may then be useful. But at all events I think we can take it by a *coup de main*.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*Translation of a Memorandum given to Major General  
Wellesley by Goklah’s vakeel Ram Rao.*

‘1. Goklah sent a vakeel to Bajee Rao, the Peshwah in the Konkan, who represented to his Highness the situation of Goklah’s affairs. His Highness said, that the country in general was in great confusion; that Goklah must conduct

himself according to the wishes of the commanding officer of the British forces ; and his Highness was desirous of hearing of his fidelity to his cause through Lieut. Colonel Close. Goklah wished, therefore, that Major General Wellesley would write to Lieut. Colonel Close, and inform him that he had full confidence in Goklah ; that he was a brave man, &c.

‘2. Accounts to the following purport have come from Poonah. For the settlement of the countries towards the Carnatic, Shekamut Khan, Meer Khan Patan, and Futtu Sing Maunia, have come with their troops into their zillah of Gurkan. Besides these chiefs, others of inferior note are about to take their departure. Holkar himself is with his army in Poonah. For these reasons Goklah’s vakeel at Poonah recommends it to him to connect himself with the Company, and that speedily, as, without their assistance, there is no safety for him. Goklah therefore requests, that if the army should not enter the country, some battalions might be sent to his assistance, and that a place of safety may be given to him for his family.

‘3. Goklah saw Govind Rao at Nurgoond, who, he concludes, wrote Major General Wellesley an account of his interview with him.

‘4. Goklah’s army is in some difficulties for want of pay, and the Peshwah, Bajee Rao, is at a great distance. Goklah therefore wishes for assistance in a pecuniary way.

‘The conversation which Major General Wellesley had with the vakeel, was to the same purport with the memorandum nearly:—The General told Ram Rao, that he would write a letter to Lieut. Colonel Close as desired. In regard to the second point, he observed to him, that the British army was upon the frontier, and therefore there could be no great danger to be apprehended from the forces of the chiefs mentioned: and in regard to the third, he said, that the Company were not bound by treaty to pay the Peshwah’s troops; that it appeared that his Highness had provided already for the payment of the army under Goklah’s command; that Goklah should take measures to reap the advantages of that provision; and that as no more had been provided for the British troops than was absolutely necessary for them, he was to expect nothing from the Commander in Chief.’

*Extract from 'The Notes relative to the late Transactions in the Marhatta Empire.'*

'The command of the advanced detachment necessarily required the united exertion of considerable military skill and of great political experience and discretion; and Lord Clive was therefore of opinion, that it could not be confided, with equal prospects of advantage, to any other person than the Honorable Major General Wellesley, whose extensive local knowledge and personal influence among the Marhatta chieftains (acquired by his conduct in the command of Mysore, and by his victories over Dhoondiah and other refractory chiefs) were peculiarly calculated to ensure success to the intended operations. Lord Clive accordingly desired that General Wellesley might be appointed to the command of the advanced detachment, under instructions to be furnished to him by Lieut. General Stuart, according to the spirit of the Governor General's orders of the 2nd of February, 1803.

'In conformity to these instructions, Lieut. General Stuart directed a detachment from the main army assembled at Hurryhur, to be formed under the command of Major General Wellesley, for the purpose of advancing into the Marhatta territory.'

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

'SIR,

'Camp at Hoonelly, 2nd March, 1803.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st. The cavalry of this division will march to-morrow morning for Soolekairy. I delayed ordering their march till I should arrive here, purposely that I might make arrangements for supplying them while at that place. They have all got good bazaars, and will take from hence as much rice as their bazaar people can carry; and I shall do my utmost to keep them supplied hereafter. I wrote yesterday to Colonel Dallas, on this subject, and recommended that in case the bullocks attached to the bazaar of this camp could not supply his wants regularly, on account of the greater distance, he should apply to you, through Lieut. Blacker, for some of the brinjarry rice. If you should consent to grant him any, their bags may be filled again in the same manner as those emptied in your camp. I have, however, hopes that I shall

be able to supply his wants without coming upon the brinjaries, or any public store ; the only doubt I have of it is the distance he is from me.

‘Mr. Gordon’s bullocks that are in this camp are very well supplied with drivers, indeed better than any that I have yet seen. It is not improbable but that some of the drivers of those sent to you may be at Hurryhur with the owners and maistries, who are there settling their accounts. As soon as I ordered these bullocks to your camp, I sent Mr. Gordon’s servant from hence to settle their accounts, in order that they might be delivered over in every respect clear to Major Symons. I dare say they will be found not deficient in drivers, and I know that they left Seringapatam complete.

‘The bullocks which left Seringapatam on the 18th of February, are marching to join you by the road of Sera and Chittledroog, and not by the lower road, as I imagined. They are in charge of a guard of the 1st of the 2nd, and may be expected every day.

‘I had a conversation with the Dewan yesterday respecting draught cattle ; he promises to supply 400 for sale. They will be all trained cattle, and fit for immediate work. I shall report upon them from time to time as they arrive.

‘I also mentioned to the Dewan your wishes respecting the pay of the shepherds, to which he has readily consented ; viz., that they are to have the country pay,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  pagodas, while within the Rajah’s territories, and two pagodas when they shall pass the frontiers.

‘I settled with him that his servants were to take charge, for the Company, of 40,000 sheep, as many within, and as many beyond, the frontier as you might think proper ; that shepherds were to be entertained and kept up for this number ; that he has also to keep up that stock of sheep, and if at any time there should be a few more, the same number of shepherds should take care of them.

‘By this arrangement much of the expense will be saved, you will always have a stock of sheep at your command, and a difficulty will be avoided in settling a detailed account of shepherds’ wages according to the number of sheep in the charge of the Rajah’s officers, which must vary daily. Besides, it would be hard to discharge a number of shepherds



at a distance from the frontier when the sheep should be consumed; and equally so to throw the expense of maintaining them upon the Rajah. By this mode his officers in camp, in charge of the sheep concern, will take care to send the shepherds back to the depôt flock in Mysore, in proportion as the flocks in camp shall be delivered over to the commissary.

‘ I beg to know from you whether you approve of this arrangement? I believe it would be proper that I should leave to Colonel Dallas the order of the casting committees on the cavalry horses; or if you wish that I should still order these committees, and give them instructions according to the General Orders of the 28th of February, I shall do so, and shall go over to see the horses which the committee may cast.

‘ Upon a reference to Major Munro’s last letter to Captain Barclay, I find that he has not received your orders, not to forward on to the frontier of Mysore the depôt formed at Bellary, and he is still paying Wurdy bullocks for this purpose. The Wurdy bullocks will be useful to you empty, and under present arrangements the depôt at Bellary will be more useful there than it can be elsewhere.

‘ It would be well if a hircarrah camel were dispatched from your camp to Bellary, with a letter to Mr. Cochrane, (Major Munro has gone to Adoni) to desire that he would send you the Wurdy bullocks without loads, without loss of time, consigned to Major Symons.

‘ I enclose a memorandum upon the subject of the salary of the superintendent of supplies and his establishments, by which you will observe that Major Macleod’s salary was 300 pagodas, and not 500, as I imagined; and that Captain Barclay had, when he was acting in that capacity under me, 100 pagodas, the scale which you fixed as that to be paid to Lieutenant Blacker.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Hoonelly, 3rd March, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2nd instant. The failure of the Seringapatam cattle is very

extraordinary indeed. They are not hired under any particular bargain, and there is nothing to prevent the rejection of those deemed unserviceable. I find that some of the drivers were at Hurryhur settling their accounts, which is probably one cause of a deficiency of these people found at muster. The cattle were very fine and complete in drivers when they left Seringapatam.

‘ Besides the cattle in your camp, 973, including spare, are gone to Chittledroog, to take thither the loads of stores left in that garrison.

‘ I now enclose a state of our wheel carriages, and the draught cattle required for them. The number of spare is 180, and they will go off to your camp to-morrow morning. This number will soon be increased by the emptying the treasure tumbrils, and by transferring to the horses the cavalry guns and tumbrils.

‘ But till these measures are effected it would answer no purpose to send away more bullocks, and would render it necessary to leave carriages behind, if you should order me suddenly to march.

‘ I also expect some deliveries of cattle immediately from Purneah; 136 carriage bullocks will also go to your camp to-morrow morning; these are above the number required for this camp, and will make the total number delivered to Major Symons stand as follows: mustered by Major Symons 1928; sent to Chittledroog for the stores 973; and from this camp 136—total 3037.

‘ Mr. Gordon’s man tells me that the owners will replace the bullocks which Major Symons has rejected. I sent some rice to Colonel Dallas’s camp this morning, and I shall send some more to-morrow.

‘ Upon looking over the memorandum I sent you this morning, I find that the paper No. 1 is erroneous, as it includes four tumbrils, with fixed ammunition for iron 12 pounders, to be transferred from the grand army to this camp, whereas these tumbrils are now here.

‘ I enclose another paper No. 1, corrected; and I shall be obliged to you, if you will destroy that which I sent this morning.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY,

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Hoonelly, 3rd March, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a memorandum and certain other papers, upon the subject on which you have desired my sentiments, of which I hope you will approve.

‘ It may appear extraordinary that it should be necessary that this detachment should be so much stronger than that which is advancing from Hyderabad; but it must be recollected, first, that the latter will not advance beyond the Nizan’s frontier, till the former shall be at hand to join it; and that the supposed enemy will be much disinclined to pass that frontier to attack it. Secondly, that this detachment must be not only of sufficient strength to defend itself, but also to give confidence to, and keep together the Peshwal’s party in the state.

‘ It is not so strong in the essential points, cavalry and European infantry, as that which I commanded in the country heretofore; but I think it is respectable, and I know it is so well equipped, that it will answer all the objects in view.

‘ If you should take the command of it yourself, I hope you will do me the favor to allow me to accompany you in any capacity whatever. All that is known of that country and its inhabitants, in a military point of view, was learned when I was in it, and I shall do every thing in my power to make myself useful to you. If you should not think proper to take the command of this detachment yourself, and in consideration of the information which I have had opportunities of gaining of that country and its inhabitants, and the communications which I have constantly held with its chiefs, you should be pleased to intrust it to me, I shall be infinitely gratified, and shall do every thing in my power to forward your views.

‘ Although I have in this letter adverted to the command of the detachment to be sent forward, I am by no means desirous to press you to make known your sentiments upon it till the proper time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Memorandum submitted to Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ It appears now to be intended that a detachment from the army upon the frontier shall enter the Marhatta territory, and that the main body shall remain within the territories of the Company.

‘ Upon this subject several questions are to be considered, upon which I shall enter into detail.

‘ The first of these is the number and description of the troops and equipments that would be required to form a detachment which could with safety be trusted within the Marhatta frontier, until a junction should be formed with the detachment from Hyderabad.

‘ Secondly, the quantity of provisions which this detachment ought to have with it.

‘ Thirdly, the mode according to which this detachment is to subsist in the Marhatta territories.

‘ Fourthly, the situation in which it would be most convenient for the main body of the army to be placed, with a view to the subsistence of the advanced detachment, and giving it support and countenance, and to the general defence of the frontier.

‘ Fifthly, the manner in which the main body of the army is to be fed in this position.

‘ 1st. It is my opinion that a detachment, consisting of either the 25th dragoons and the 1st and 4th regiments of cavalry, or the 19th dragoons and the 2nd, 5th, and 7th regiments of cavalry, with the five companies of the 33rd regiment, another regiment of European infantry (the 73rd would answer best, as that corps has been in that country before), 150 artillery, six battalions of native infantry, one corps of pioneers, four iron 12 pounders, two brass 12 pounders, sixteen 6 pounders for the line, and as many guns drawn by horses as could be fitted out, would be, with the Rajah’s and Marhatta horse, such a detachment as could be sent with safety into the Marhatta territory. The Seringapatam equipment, having ten lacs of musket ammunition, would be sufficient for this detachment.

‘ 2ndly. It ought to carry with it two months’ arrack at full allowance; and provisions for 1500 European troops, and 2000 loads of rice in the grain department.

‘ 3rdly. The Mysore brinjarries, amounting at present to

26,000, ought to be sent with it, all full. What will remain of the depôt collected at Hurryhur, as well as that at Hullihall, ought to be allotted to it, as well as all the resources which the Mysore country can afford. Besides these, the bullocks attached to the Mysore bazaar will be able to supply the camp with the resources of the country in which the detachment may be situated.

‘ 4thly. With a view that this advanced detachment may have the full advantage of the resources of provisions above stated, it would be necessary that the army should move out of Mysore as soon as the arrangements for the advance of the detachment shall be made.

‘ Under present circumstances, the best defensive position which the army could take would be in the Ceded districts on the Toombuddra, in advance of Bellary, and probably of Anagoondy, with Purneah’s army in Mysore, on the Toombuddra, near Hoonelly.

‘ They would then be able to move forward to the support of the advanced detachment; they would protect the Ceded districts, if the enemy should attempt to penetrate into those countries, or by a movement to their left, Mysore, if he should attempt to penetrate into that country.

‘ 5thly. The army might be fed in this position: first, by the 12,000 brinjarries belonging to the Ceded districts; secondly, by 14,000 brinjarries belonging to the Baramahl, and which are now on their march to join the army; thirdly, by the depôt formed at Bellary, which can be increased to any extent that may be thought proper; and fourthly, by the resources of the Ceded districts. The 5000 loads of rice also, brought up in the grain department from the Carnatic, are not disposed of in this memorandum, and would be applicable to the subsistence of the main body.

‘ The annexed papers will show the detail of every thing excepting money, medicines, and gram, that will be required by the advanced detachment of the strength supposed. I have no means of calculating the two former, and the quantity of the latter to be sent must depend upon the number of horses of which the detachment of cavalry will be composed.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*Lieut. General Stuart to Lord Clive.*

‘ Head Quarters, Camp near Mayaconda,  
3rd March, 1803.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ I this day had the honor to receive your Lordship’s dispatch by express, dated the 27th ultimo. I have directed the divisions of the army to assemble at Hurryhur on the 6th instant\*, and I expect that the detachment under Major General the Honorable Arthur Wellesley will be able to commence its march into the Marhatta territory on the 8th. I shall have the honor, on my arrival at Hurryhur, of communicating to your Lordship a detail of the arrangements which I propose to adopt relative to that movement.

‘ I have acquainted the Residents at Poonah and Hydera-

\* Force assembled at Hurryhur under the command of Lieut. General Stuart.

	CAVALRY.	<i>Eur.</i>	<i>Nat.</i>	<i>Total.</i>	<i>Grand Total.</i>
H. M.’s 19th dragoons	.	413			
.. 25th do.	.	562			
				975	
1st regiment native cavalry	.	.	437		
2nd do.	do.	.	438		
4th do.	do.	.	438		
5th do.	do.	.	421		
6th do.	do.	.	434		
7th do.	do.	.	438		
				2606	
					3581
Artillery . . . . .		390			390
Gun Lascars . . . . .			563		563
	INFANTRY.				
H. M.’s 33rd reg. 5 companies		322			
H. M.’s 73rd do.		756			
H. M.’s 74th do.		754			
H. M.’s Scotch Brigade		1013			
				2845	
					2845
1st battalion 2nd regiment N. I.	.		1005		
1st do. 3rd do.	.		1109		
2nd do. 3rd do.	.		998		
1st do. 4th do.	.		1010		
2nd do. 4th do.	.		1010		
2nd do. 5th do.	.		1014		
1st do. 8th do.	.		997		
1st do. 12th do.	.		1014		
2nd do. 12th do.	.		1000		
2nd do. 18th do.	.		1014		
1st do. 14th do.	.		1014		
1st do. 17th do.	.		997		
				12,182	
Corps of pioneers . . . . .					800
				Grand Total	19,793

With 4 iron twelve and 4 iron eighteen pounders ; 4 brass twelve pounders ; 40 field pieces, 12 galloper guns, and 4 howitzers.

bad with the period of time when Major General Wellesley's detachment will be ordered to advance from the frontier; and I have informed the latter of the arrangement which I have made in regard to the junction of an European corps with the subsidiary force\*.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Lord Clive.*'

' J. STUART.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

' SIR,

' Hooneley, 4th March, 1803.

' I had the honor of receiving yesterday your first letter of the 3rd, and I have stopped here this day in order to see the vakeels, to write letters to the sirdars upon the frontier, and to make various arrangements preparatory to the march of the troops. I shall go to Hurryhur to-morrow morning, and shall join you at Kurdewarrah on the 6th. This division will march from hence on the 6th, and will be at Hurryhur on the 7th.

' I have given orders that the brinjarries may be collected. They will be in good time. Major Robertson will give his own directions to Kischen Rao, who is in your camp, regarding the sheep; but I have sent to Purneah on the subject.

' I am entirely at a loss whom to recommend for the offices mentioned in your second letter of the 3rd; as all the officers who have been employed with me heretofore have been selected by you for situations of importance in the army.

\* Subsidiary force attached to the Nizam under Colonel Stevenson.

		CAVALRY.				
rd regt.	native cavalry	.	.	.	.	516
6th do.	do.	.	.	.	.	502
						— 1018
		INFANTRY.				
2nd battalion	2nd regiment	native	infantry	.	.	1275
1st do.	6th	do.	.	.	.	1288
2nd do.	7th	do.	.	.	.	1290
2nd do.	9th	do.	.	.	.	1286
1st do.	11th	do.	.	.	.	1008
2nd do.	11th	do.	.	.	.	1035
						— 7182
Artillery	.	.	.	.	.	168
						— 8368

With 310 lascars and two companies of pioneers.

The 94th, then the Scotch brigade, afterwards joined from the advancing division under Major General Wellesley.

‘ It occurs to me, however, that as the business of all the departments of the army will, under present arrangements, be much less than was expected when the appointments were made, the business both of the army and of the advanced detachment might be done by the same officers, only by a different arrangement of it. Major Robertson might superintend the business of Major Symons’ bullock department in the army, and Major Symons might superintend Major Robertson’s grain and provision department, and Mr. Darval’s pay department with the advanced detachment; or *vice versâ*, Major Robertson might take charge, in the advanced detachment, of Major Symons’ and Mr. Darval’s departments, and Major Symons of his in the army.

‘ I should, however, prefer to have Major Symons with the advanced detachment, because he could give me a little assistance in the language, of which I stand much in need, my Persian interpreter being at Seringapatam, doing his duty at that place.

‘ In case you should adopt this proposal, it would be necessary that the gentlemen at the heads of departments should send with the advanced detachment, or leave with the army, as the case may be, proper servants to carry on their respective duties.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Hoonelly, 4th March, 1803.

‘ You will have learned from Lord Clive’s instructions to General Stuart, of the 27th of February, that every thing ends, at last, in my going forward with a detachment; and that the main body of the army is to remain on the frontier with a view to its defence, or to giving support to the advanced division, if it should be necessary.

‘ The army joins, consequently, at Hurryhur, on the 7th, and I shall move forward as soon afterwards as circumstances will permit; but as I sent to General Stuart, yesterday, detailed arrangements for detaching a body of about the strength stated in Lord Clive’s instructions, I imagine that all the preparations for my march will be in readiness in a very few hours after the army shall join. I shall leave this to-morrow for General Stuart’s camp, to forward them,



and you may depend upon my not losing one moment of time.

‘ I enclose my last letters from Govind Rao, from which you will perceive the state of the opinions and intentions of the jaghiredars upon the frontier. Besides this, Goklah’s vakeel in my camp still assures me of the determination of his master to adhere to the cause of the Peshwah and to join me.

‘ I have desired Govind Rao to urge Ball Kischen Gungurdhur to come and meet me; and if Darwar is not to be got by force, I shall, at least, try what I can do by fair means and threats.

‘ I return you a copy of Captain Moor’s memorandum, with a memorandum in answer thereto. I like the depôt at Bombay well, particularly as I find from General Stuart that the harbour at Bombay is, at all seasons, practicable for boats.

‘ I shall keep you informed of every thing that occurs.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 7th March, 1803.

‘ I have had every reason to be highly satisfied with the mode in which the intercourse with the Marhatta jaghiredars has been hitherto carried on through the medium of Major General Wellesley; and the same causes which induced me to suggest to your Excellency the expediency of employing that officer in the command of the detachment destined to advance in co-operation with the southern jaghiredars, lead me to recommend your continuing to take every advantage of that officer’s personal influence with these chiefs, and of his extensive knowledge of their views and sentiments, in order to carry the intentions of the Governor General into full execution; and it is by no means my intention, when I recommend to your Excellency, in conformity with the wishes of the Governor General, to employ the abilities of Major Malcolm on such affairs of a political nature as may arise, to limit the powers of your Excellency in authorising Major General Wellesley, or any other officer, to hold direct intercourse, or to negotiate an arrangement with any of the Peshwah’s officers, upon the principles pre-

scribed by the Governor General. I am well convinced your Excellency cannot have too great a latitude in this respect, and that it is essential to the success of the public service that you should feel yourself at perfect liberty to act on every emergency that may occur in the mode dictated by your own judgment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ CLIVE.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp upon the Toombuddra,  
opposite Anee, 8th March, 1803.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ In my last letter I told you that I should not be very long arranging the detachment to proceed under my command towards Poonah. Accordingly I moved into camp yesterday, and am this day six miles in advance of it, and I shall proceed on my march to-morrow. I have with me the 19th Light Dragoons, 4th, 5th, and 7th regiments of cavalry, under Colonel Dallas; the 74th and Scotch brigade, and six complete battalions of native infantry; four iron 12 pounders, two brass 12 pounders, sixteen 6 pounders, four galloper 6 pounders, besides the guns attached to the cavalry. I cannot cross the river till I shall be opposite Havanoor, because there is no water between Rany Bednore and Havey.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Gubgurry, 9th March, 1803.

‘ Every thing allotted to this detachment arrived in camp yesterday evening, excepting the medicines, which I knew from Mr. Anderson were not to be sent from the army till this morning, and I marched to this place this day. I expect the medicines this evening, and I propose to commence my march to-morrow morning. All the brinjarries have not yet joined me; indeed, some that engaged in the service, I believe, will not come at all. I have desired Captain Baynes to march on the 12th, with a certain number that will be collected at Hurryhur before that day; and I have requested Mr. Piele to arrange that a party of the Rajah's horse shall wait for others expected at Hurryhur on the 15th or 16th.

By taking care to keep the bags filled of those I have with me, by giving them orders upon Hurryhur as long as I am in this neighbourhood, and upon Hullihall when I get more forward, I have little doubt but that I shall have plenty. It is necessary, however, that Lieut. Blacker should give directions that none of the brinjaries allotted to this detachment should be allowed to remain with the army; and that all the persons attached to my bazaar may be sent after me with Captain Baynes.

‘ I send with this, for Hullihall, to be forwarded by the tappal, a letter which contains orders regarding the preparations to be made for issuing the supplies at that place, so that the cattle, &c., may not be delayed there.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ SIR, ‘ Head Quarters, Camp at Hurryhur, 9th March, 1803.

‘ You have already been apprized of your appointment to the command of a detachment destined to advance into the Marhatta territory, and of the description and extent of the force composing that detachment.\* You have also been fur-

\* Force composing the advancing division under Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

CAVALRY.				<i>Eur.</i>	<i>Nat.</i>	<i>Total.</i>	<i>Grand Total.</i>
H. M.	19th	light	dragoons	412		412	
	4th	native	cavalry		438		
5th	do.				421		
6th	do.				438		
					—	1297	
						—	1709
INFANTRY.							
H. M.	74th	regiment		1013			
Scotch	Brigade			754			
				—		1767	
1st	battalion	2nd	regt. native	infantry	1005		
1st	do.	3rd	do.		1109		
2nd	do.	3rd	do.		993		
1st	do.	8th	do.		997		
2nd	do.	12th	do.		1000		
2nd	do.	18th	do.		1014		
					—	6123	
						—	7890
Artillery				108			108
Gun	lascars						206
Pioneers							704

Grand total 10,617

Major General Wellesley had earnestly proposed that his own regiment, the 33rd, to which he was much attached, should accompany the advancing division under his command: but circumstances prevented the desired arrangement.

nished with the instructions of his Excellency the Governor General and the Right Honorable the Governor of Fort St. George, relative to the purposes of its movements, and have been supplied with copies of all the public communications that I have received regarding the present state of affairs in the Marhatta empire, the strength and disposition of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's forces, and the probable objects of his designs. The above instructions from government will fully explain to you the plan of proceedings, by which the Governor General has proposed to re-establish the authority of the Peshwah, and fulfil the conditions of the defensive alliance concluded with his Highness. The information derived from these papers, together with your own extensive knowledge of the state of the subject, has therefore obviated the necessity of furnishing you with detailed instructions from myself, on the particular measures to be adopted in pursuit of those objects; more especially as the nature of the service upon which you are proceeding, depending on the sentiments of a people, whose views and opinions are but imperfectly known at this distance, and on events of a contingent nature, precludes the practicability of ascertaining the exact operations which it may be thought proper to undertake.

‘ Although I have considered it to be expedient to avoid prescribing the particular plan of the operations of your detachment, yet I judge it necessary to state certain principal objects which, in my judgment, ought to regulate the course of your proceedings.

‘ 1. To encourage the southern jaghiredars to declare in favor of the Peshwah's cause; to employ every means to reconcile their mutual animosities, and to induce them to unite their forces with the advancing detachment, for the purpose of re-establishing his Highness's government.

‘ 2. To proceed to Meritch, and form a junction with the Peshwah; or, should that measure be deemed unadvisable on the part of his Highness, with such of his chieftains and troops as may be able to meet you there.

‘ 3. To open a communication, and form a junction with the subsidiary force under Colonel Stevenson, and the contingent of his Highness the Nizam.

‘ 4. To proceed eventually to Poonah, and establish an order of things in that capital, favorable to the return of

the Peshwah, and the attainment of the ends of the late treaty.

‘ The means of accomplishing those objects must be regulated by your own judgment, in conformity to circumstances. It will require every exertion of your ability to unite the southern jaghiredars in an effectual support of the Peshwah’s cause, distracted as they are at present by internal dissensions and hostilities. The interests and fears, however, of those chieftains will render them solicitous to avert the calamities threatened by the further success of a power, that derives its support from contributions and plunder; and they must be sensible that the retreat or overthrow of that power, and the restoration of a regular government, are the only means by which the dangers to which they are now exposed can be prevented, and the possession of their tranquillity secured. But in encouraging the co-operation of those chieftains, you will carefully abstain from any specific engagements of a nature incompatible with the rule established by his Excellency the Governor General for the conduct to be observed towards them. You will receive herewith duplicates of the letters stated by Lieut. Colonel Close to have been transmitted by the Peshwah to the chieftains in the neighbourhood of Meritch and the Kistna, who are considered to be attached to his cause, enjoining them to join and co-operate with the British troops on their advance. You will forward those letters to their respective addresses, at such times, and accompanying them with such instructions to the chieftains on the subject of their co-operating with you, as you may find to be most expedient.

‘ The general state of affairs renders the rapidity of your advance of essential advantage; as your early arrival upon the Kistna, and your junction with the Peshwah’s troops and the subsidiary force, will materially contribute to frustrate any designs which may be meditated against his Highness’s interests, or the arrangements of the late treaty, and to give union and efficacy to your operations. I consider it therefore of importance that you should employ every practicable degree of expedition in collecting the forces of the southern jaghiredars, and proceeding in conjunction with them to join the Peshwah and the Nizam’s force. I attach the greatest consequence to the latter junction, and I request

that you will keep the means of accomplishing it at all times in view.

‘ The detachments under you and Colonel Stevenson, while separated from each other, are exposed to misfortunes from which their united strength would effectually secure them.

‘ The subsidiary force in particular, destitute of Europeans, and occupying an advanced position, may be liable to the necessity of acting under very unfavorable circumstances.

‘ Every view of our situation appears to me to require that your junction with Colonel Stevenson’s force should be effected at the earliest practicable period of time, as that measure will secure, more than any other, the safety of the British troops, and the general success of the plans of government.

‘ I have not noticed in the foregoing orders the conduct to be observed on your part, in case of the opposition of any chieftain; and in particular of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, from whom we are led to expect most opposition to your proceedings.

‘ The instructions of the Governor General and Lord Clive contain no orders, and afford no positive rule to guide my determination on this important head. I infer, however, from the spirit of those instructions, that if the majority of the southern jaghiredars, and the sentiments of the body of the people, are found to declare in favor of the restoration of Bajee Rao, the British detachment ought to persevere in the endeavor to re-establish his authority; and should the detachment, during the prosecution of that endeavor, encounter the hostility of any individual jaghiredar, that they are to employ, in concert with the well-affected jaghiredars, every practicable means to overcome his opposition. In the event, therefore, of any single feudatory opposing resistance to the restoration of the Peshwah, after you have ascertained that the sentiments of the majority of the chieftains are favorable to that measure, I am of opinion that the instructions which I have received justify me in authorising you to compel his submission.

‘ This authority must, however, be understood to apply to the case only of your experiencing hostility from any of the

Marhatta chiefs, for the principle of his Excellency the Governor General's policy is, to avoid a war; and as his Excellency has directed me to bear this principle in mind, as the rule of our conduct on every emergency that may arise, you will carefully forbear from the adoption of any measure that is likely to involve the occurrence of hostilities with any of the parties of the Marhatta empire.

‘ The numerous considerations which recommend the early and expeditious advance of the detachment, render it unadvisable, in my judgment, to undertake the siege of Darwar.

‘ The reduction of that fortress might be attended with delays extremely detrimental to the success of our cause; and I do not apprehend that Bappojee Scindiah, intimidated, as he will be, by the vicinity of the army under my command, and afraid to exasperate his future treatment from the Peshwah, will attempt to molest your communications.

‘ I therefore consider it to be expedient that this fortress, notwithstanding the important advantage which would be derived to your operations from its possession, at the present crisis of affairs, should be permitted to remain under its present killadar. It may, however, be proper that you should avail yourself of the impression which the advance of the British force will produce upon the minds of the people, to require of Bappojee Scindiah his probable views.

‘ The instructions to Colonel Stevenson, which I have ordered to be furnished to you, will explain the measures prescribed to that officer. I have instructed him to communicate regular information of his proceedings and situation to you, and to obey your orders. When you shall have opened a safe communication with this officer's force, you will detach his Majesty's Scotch brigade to join it; and consider that corps, from the time of its removal from your detachment, as attached to the establishment of the subsidiary force. Colonel Stevenson, according to the last letter which I received from that officer, was to be at Perinda on the 16th of March.

‘ I have written to the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad, informing them of your advance, and requesting them to communicate with you; and I am desirous that you should

afford them every information regarding your progress that it may be requisite for them to know.

‘ You are aware of the importance of making me regularly acquainted with your operations, with the sentiments of the people, and the general state of affairs connected with the proceedings of your detachment. It will be particularly necessary for you to transmit to me the earliest possible information of such circumstances as may be expected to occur, to obstruct the progress of the detachment, either from the disinclination of the people in general to the cause which it supports, or from the opposition of any individual chieftain.

‘ The army will take a position in the ceded districts ready to support your operations, when support shall appear from either of these causes to be necessary.

‘ I shall, on receiving information of the probability of serious resistance being opposed to your advance, anticipate this necessity by a movement of the army to support you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

‘ J. STUART.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Oollull, 10th March, 1803.

‘ I have received a letter from the minister of the Rajah of Kolapoor, in which he asks me by what route it is proposed that the troops shall march, as it is his master’s intention to join with his troops. The Rajah of Kolapoor is attached to Scindiah.

‘ I have desired Colonel Carlisle to send the galloper 12 pounders and their harness to your camp; also all the bullocks which Mr. Gordon may have hired at Seringapatam. I do not want any; and if I did, those behind me now would not be able to catch me.

‘ I have ordered a company under an European officer from the garrison of Nuggur to Hooly Honore, on the Toombuddra, to relieve the escorts from the garrison of Seringapatam, and to have a look out for all that is coming from thence, and to correspond with Colonel Carlisle and the gentlemen in your camp. You will find them useful in this position.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Lieut. General Stuart.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.





effect its relief: and were the detachment weaker, it might be exposed to serious misfortunes.

‘ Upon strict military principles, I should have been solicitous to render a detachment, destined to proceed upon a remote service, sufficiently strong to remove the apprehension of its requiring support; and it has appeared to me that I ought to recur to those principles as the rule of my conduct, in the event of any serious hostility being offered to the force under Major General Wellesley. In that case, therefore, setting aside all secondary considerations connected with the temporary tranquillity of the frontier, I shall deem it to be the principal object of my duty to secure the general safety of the British army, by a prompt movement, to join the detachment in advance.

‘ I am however led, by a view of present circumstances, to think that the support of the army will not be required; as the favorable disposition already manifested by some of the southern jaghiredars, and the undecided conduct of those from whom opposition might be expected, will, it is probable, enable the advancing detachment, the Peshwah’s troops, and the Nizam’s force, to effect a junction. After that event, the British army will be equal to the prosecution of any service which it may be required to undertake.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*’

‘ J. STUART.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Oollull, 11th March, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th. The tumbrils will leave this camp to-morrow morning, but I cannot yet say in what numbers, as the Paymaster’s people have not yet completed their payments, and I do not know what sum in silver will remain to be carried in them. None of them are very good, and two of them are quite unserviceable. Indeed all the tumbrils are old and very bad. They have been in every campaign in the Mysore country since the year 1798, and I sent the greater number of them into Chittledroog in an unserviceable state, in the year 1800.

‘ Goklah’s letter was only complimentary, and to request that I would protect his country. He also informs me that

he is sending to me a man, whom I know to be his uncle. I have besides received, through Govind Rao, letters from Appah Saheb and other sirdars, and one from the killadar of Darwar. This man said to Govind Rao that he was the Peshwah's servant, and was willing to obey all orders that he should receive from him. I learn, however, from a man at Darwar, that the killadar is much afraid that we shall attack his place; but I have desired this man to give him assurances that we were the enemies of nobody; and that if he remained quiet, offered us no interruption, and allowed us to enjoy the resources of the country, he should not be molested; and that we were advancing at the call of the Peshwah, whose orders must be obeyed.

‘ The route which I sent you yesterday did not contain the marches which must be made to join Colonel Stevenson. The reason is, that, from the want of sufficient information, I have not yet determined by what route they shall be. I am, however, making inquiries upon the subject, and I hope in a few days to be able to give you a decided answer upon it. I am obliged to conduct these inquiries with caution, lest in appearing too anxious to form this junction, they should suspect that I think myself weak; and that the junction is absolutely necessary for the safety of both detachments.

‘ The want of water in the country will oblige both detachments to keep upon the rivers as much as possible; and I rather believe that I must proceed by the way of Beejapoor to the Beemah, and march up that river; and that Colonel Stevenson should advance and join me upon it. By that mode the Nizam's frontier will not be uncovered for a moment.

‘ Mr. Darval has equipped us but badly with servants; but that is his own affair; he will be the loser if the accounts are not regularly kept. I take care of the money, which is the principal point, and have it always in front of my tent, under an officer's guard.

‘ I write to Major Robertson also, respecting some shepherds, whom I request he will send with Captain Baynes tomorrow.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



preventing plunder and all excess, and in conciliating the inhabitants of the districts through which his route was directed.'

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

' SIR,

' Camp at Richter, 12th March, 1803.

' I crossed the Toombuddra into the Marhatta territory at Havanoor this morning, and marched to this place, which is upon the Werdah. The inhabitants are all in their villages, and have promised to supply the camp with every thing that the country can afford.

' I sent off four tumbrils to your camp this morning, some of them containing the treasure which remains after paying the troops in this camp, out of the lac of pagodas sent here for that purpose. I cannot say exactly what the sum is, as I could not procure any account of it from Mr. Darval's servant. Besides this sum, there are 30,070½ rupees belonging to the money allotted to this detachment in Mr. Piele's tumbril. It is part of the 80,000 pagodas sent by Mr. Ravenshaw. These rupees were put in Mr. Piele's tumbril for the convenience of carriage, and were forgotten by Mr. Darval's servants. I have, however, retained 30,070½ rupees of the surplus money; so that I have in camp three lacs of pagodas clear, and I have written to Mr. Piele to request that he will pay Mr. Darval the money which he has in his tumbril.

' The money tumbrils are all in a very bad state; indeed I am surprised that even one of them has come on so far as it has; and I think it very probable that, although empty, it will not get back to your camp. There are forty eight of the Company's draught bullocks drawing these tumbrils. Those in the cavalry guns cannot be sent yet; as, owing to some mistake between the gentlemen of the cavalry and Captain Mackay, the bandy with the harness was left behind in the cavalry lines at Gubgurry; but I hope it will join this day, and if it does, these bullocks will also be sent to you tomorrow.

' We had some deserting last night, both of sepoy and followers; many of the bazaar people, and others attached to this bazaar with bullocks, have joined the army. However, we are well supplied, and by means of the stores at

Hurryhur and Hullihall, I think we shall quit the Malpoorba with every bag full.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ Camp at Karisgy upon the Werdah,  
13th March, 1803.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ You will be anxious to hear from me as soon as possible, after I have entered the Marhatta territory, and I lose no time in writing to you.

‘ I crossed the Toombuddra at Havanoor yesterday, and marched to this river, and made another march towards Savanore this day. We have been well received by the inhabitants of the country; the villages are all full, and the camp is well supplied with forage and provisions: I have no doubt whatever but that I shall be able to bring forward, for the service of the Peshwah, all the jaghiredars in the southern part of the empire, and I think that all your plans will be carried into execution.

‘ This detachment of the army is well supplied with provisions, and every thing it can want: and excepting in forage, for which every large body of troops must depend upon the country which is to be the seat of its operations, is nearly independent of the resources of this country. We owe this state of our supplies to the flourishing resources of Mysore, and to the ease with which they are brought forward for the use of the British armies. But any change in the system of government in that country will be immediately felt, and particularly by that body of troops which will be in advance.

‘ I draw your attention to this subject, because I have learned from General Stuart that Lord Clive is going to England immediately in the “United Kingdom;” and I suspect that the person who may succeed to him in the government of Fort St. George is not likely to preserve matters in Mysore in the state in which they are at present. It is impossible to suppose otherwise than that, after a residence there for four years, I have acquired considerable influence in that country, which has lately been exerted to bring forward its resources for the use of the armies, and will have

the effect of keeping this body of troops well supplied; but this influence depends upon my retaining the command in Mysore, of which, I think it probable, that the new Government of Madras will wish to deprive me.

‘ I had an explanation with General Stuart upon this subject some time ago, and he declared that he was determined that I should exercise the command in Mysore, while in advance with the army, which he then imagined that he should lead into the Marhatta territory. When leaving him on the 5th of this month, I spoke to him upon it, and he desired me to make such arrangements as I might think proper, to enable me to exercise the command in Mysore, while in the Marhatta territory. I have submitted to him these arrangements, and he has approved of them. But still I fear the new Government of Madras; one of whose objects, I believe, is to overturn the existing system in Mysore, of which I have hitherto been the principal support.

‘ I am willing to resign the command of Mysore as soon as this campaign is over; but I am anxious that this detachment should be in a state of efficiency and well equipped. It can be well supplied only by the resources of Mysore, and I am certain of having the use of them, only by keeping the command in Mysore in my own hands. I wish, therefore, if it should be possible, that the new Government of Fort St. George may be prevented appointing a person to fill my situation in Mysore while I am absent.

‘ I should not have written to you on this subject, as I know that you are unwilling to interfere in matters that concern the subordinate governments, only that the risk of this detachment is great; and that if the change is intended, advantage may be taken of General Stuart’s absence from Madras to effect it. If he should be consulted, or should have time to give his opinion, I know that he will object to the measure.

‘ Malcolm had not, yesterday, reached General Stuart’s camp at Hurryhur.

‘ I hear nothing of any of Holkar’s troops, and I do not know that we have an enemy in this country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Karisgy, 13th March, 1803.

‘ The bandy, with the harness, arrived in camp yesterday, after I wrote to you; and to-morrow I shall send you the bullocks which have been employed in drawing the cavalry guns. I heard yesterday evening that one of the empty treasure tumbrils had broken down near Oollull; at which indeed I am not astonished, as it has been in a very bad state ever since it came from the army.

‘ I find that the brinjarries like the mode of filling the bags at the stores so well, and are so active in carrying it into execution, that I think it probable that I shall be able to advance from the Malpoorba with every bag full. In that case it will be necessary that I should have 500 bullocks more to carry on the salt beef, and 400 kegs of arrack in store at Hullihall, and sent from Bombay. I have accordingly arranged with the bullock owners in this camp to raise that number, which they say they can procure with great ease. I write to your Secretary on this subject.

‘ I have a letter from Seringapatam, by which I learn that four carriages, for 6 pounders, with brass naves, are preparing at that place. Should you wish that they should be sent to your camp?

‘ I enclose a paper of intelligence received from Sir W. Clarke. Ram Rao, who resides at Darwar, wrote on the 4th, that Bappojee Scindiah was in Darwar with his troops, and much afraid of being attacked, and he did not allude in the most distant manner to this agent of Holkar, nor have I received an account of him from any body else. It is very improbable that Bappojee Scindiah will give up his fort to a Bramin sent to take it without troops. If his disposition be thus friendly to Holkar, he would probably be the fittest person for Holkar to leave in charge of the fort, and it would not be necessary to send any other to take it.

‘ Therefore I do not believe that this intelligence of Sir W. Clarke’s is true. But if it should be true, it is a matter of some consequence. The question, in that case, will be, whether we ought not to send for Ball Kischen Gungurdhur, and call upon the present possessors of the fort to give it up to him, as the killadar appointed by the Peshwah. With such



a force as I have, and with all the people of the country on our side, I do not think that they would refuse it; or if they did, it is, in fact, not a strong place, nor one which would take much time to reduce. I should be glad to be favored with your directions upon this subject.

‘ I have proceeded hitherto, in regard to Darwar, in this manner: I wrote to Ram Rao, and desired him to calm the apprehensions of Bappojee Scindiah; to assure him that I was not ordered to attack him, or any body, that did not molest the British troops; that the English were the allies of the Peshwah, and that all we required from the country was, to be treated as friends by his officers and servants, and to enjoy our share of its resources which were necessary to us. I, at the same time, gave him a hint that the Peshwah’s orders, whatever they were, must be obeyed; and I did this, lest, notwithstanding the late orders of the Governor of Fort St. George, and your present intention that Bappojee Scindiah should not be attacked, the Peshwah should press the taking possession of the fort for Ball Kischen Gungurdhur, and that it should consequently be necessary to attack it with British troops.

‘ As I do not credit this intelligence of Sir W. Clarke’s, I shall still proceed upon the same principle in all my communications with Bappojee Scindiah; and as he is a clever fellow, it is not improbable but that, if not already in the hands of Holkar, we may make him our friend; and the fort may be as useful to us in his hands, as if it were in our own.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Deogerry, 14th March, 1803.

‘ I arrived here this morning, and I propose to continue my marches forward on the day after to-morrow. You will probably have received from General Stuart a copy of my instructions, in which I am urgently desired to take the earliest opportunity of effecting a junction with you. You will observe, however, that other objects are also held out to my attention; the collection of, and junction with, the southern jaghiredars, and the junction with the Peshwah, should

his Highness come to Meritch. At present, I think that none of these objects are incompatible. I can collect and join myself with the southern jaghiredars on my road towards you; and if his Highness should come from Bassein, and join his army upon the Kistna, I can also join myself to him. The only inconveniences attending these different objects are, that they will take time, and that I cannot fix that at which I shall be in your neighbourhood. However, every thing cannot go on as we could wish.

‘ I shall make you acquainted in this letter with my intentions, as far as I can determine them, and you must make your own calculations where I cannot. I intend to march to Meritch on the Kistna, by the route of Darwar, Belgaum, and Chickoree. I shall be at Darwar on the 22nd, at Belgaum on the 27th, at Chickoree on the 1st of April, and at Meritch on the 5th. All this, however, will depend much upon my being able to find water on the road, of which I have not very favourable accounts. If I should be able to go by the proposed road, and should not be obliged to deviate from it to find water, I shall certainly make the marches above stated. How long I shall be obliged to remain at Meritch, God knows; but my route to join you ought to be by Punderpoor. I do not know yet whether there is a road direct from Meritch to Punderpoor, or the nature of it; but I imagine there must be one. At all events, there is the circuitous road by Beejapoor, mentioned in Moore’s book, on which I shall certainly be able to march.

‘ When once I arrive upon the Beemah our junction will not be very difficult.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Deogerry, 15th March, 1803.

‘ I arrived here yesterday, and halted this day, to give some rest to my brinjarries, who have joined, with Captain Baynes. Ball Kischen Letchma, one of the Putwurdun family, arrived in this camp yesterday evening, and gives the strongest assurances of the cordial co-operation of all the sirdars of that family, in our measures for the restoration of the Peshwah’s government.

‘ Govind Rao also, who was employed by me, by your desire, for the purpose of ascertaining the dispositions of the different chiefs in the same cause, gives a most favorable account of them. He had seen the killadar of Darwar, Bappojee Scindiah, who told him that it was reported that the British troops were to attack the fort; that it was not necessary to attack it, for if we wanted it he would withdraw with his family, and would give it up. The garrison is very small, consisting of about 500 horse and 1000 peons, ill paid; and Govind Rao has no doubt whatever but that the fort would be given up upon our demand of it. I have sent off the letters to the different sirdars, and have written to each to inform him of my approach, and to desire he would join me.

‘ Upon a perusal of the letters respecting the killadary of Darwar, I do not find that any mention is made, in the copy which I have got, of the delivery of the fort to the officer commanding the British troops. It may be mentioned, however, in the sealed letter to Ball Kischen Gungurdhur. Under these circumstances, I have many doubts whether it would be proper to take any steps to get possession of this fort, even if the measure had been left to my discretion; which, as you have desired to have my opinion upon all points, I shall detail to you.

‘ The advantage of having this fort is the security it would give to our rear, and the hold which it would give us of the country. In case of an accident also, it might be ruinous to us if in the hands of an enemy. In respect, however, to these advantages and benefits, I have to observe, that so long as your army remains upon the frontier, we shall enjoy them whether we have the fort or not, supposing that the killadar should not be decidedly hostile to us; and if he should be so, or should become so, and if any accident should happen to us, it would always be in your power to get possession of that fort.

‘ On the other hand, it may not be so certain that Bappojee Scindiah is inclined or willing to give up this fort; and if it is asked for and refused, it must be taken. To take it will not require time, but it may occasion the loss of lives; there will be some wounded, at all events, and it would be necessary to halt to make arrangements for establishing an

hospital and a garrison in it. At the same time, I have no doubt whatever but that to take the fort, particularly if the killadar is friendly to us, and gives promises and security that he will not interrupt our communication, will occasion great jealousy of our views among the jaghiredars, and will make them less hearty in our cause.

‘ This will be the case, particularly if it be true that the Peshwah has not given an order to Ball Kischen Gungurdhur to deliver the fort to the British commander; which order certainly does not appear in the copy of the letter to that chief transmitted to me.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I think that to ask for the fort is attended with risk; that even to have possession of it may be disadvantageous to the line of measures which are carrying on; and that all the advantages which can be expected from the possession of it will be ours, whether we have it or not, in consequence of your position on the frontier.

‘ A salute in your camp was heard here this morning, by which I conclude that Malcolm is arrived; I do not therefore delay to send off this letter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Kandegy, 16th March, 1803.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you that I am getting on as well as I could wish. On account of the want of water on the direct road from Hurryhur to Savanore, I have been obliged to come by a circuitous route, which has detained me longer than I should otherwise have been; but I expect to be at or near Darwar on the 21st or 22nd, at Belgaum on the 27th, and at Meritch on the 5th of April. From thence, even if obliged to go by Punderpoor, to join Colonel Stevenson, I shall be at Poonah before the time at which I told you, in my letter of the 1st January, that I thought it probable that General Stuart would arrive there with his army.

‘ My cattle are in good order; I get plenty of forage, and I have little doubt of bringing up my detachment in good style, at least as far as the Kistna. Our cattle afterwards

will depend upon the state of the country for forage, of which, particularly in the neighbourhood of Poonah, I have but bad accounts.

‘ I have sent the Peshwah’s letters to the sirdars to whom they were addressed, with a short letter from myself, stating that I had entered the country with the army, and was anxious to be joined by them. I also enclosed them a copy of my proclamation on entering the country. To these letters sufficient time has not yet elapsed for me to receive answers; but by the accounts which I have received from Govind Rao of the disposition of all the chiefs in this part of the empire, and from the letters which I have from Goklah, the Putwurdun, and others of inferior note, I have little doubt that all will come forward in the Peshwah’s service in this crisis. You shall hear from me as soon as I receive any answers to my letters.

‘ The people of the country have received me well; my communication is perfectly free and secure, and the camp is supplied with all that the country affords. I believe that my passport is the only safe conduct through the country at the present moment. I enclose a copy of my proclamation, also a copy of a memorandum from Appah Saheb, and one from Goklah, with my answers. You will have observed in my instructions, that General Stuart has desired me not to attempt to take Darwar. I think that place of great importance in a military point of view; but as this expedition of mine partakes as much of politics as of military operations, I am of opinion that it is best I should not meddle with Darwar; particularly as in case of accident, or if the killadar should misbehave, or attempt to use the means given him by the position of his fort to annoy my communication with Mysore, General Stuart will be at hand to take his fort from him. I observe that the copy of the letter from the Peshwah to Ball Kischen Gungurdhur which I have got does not contain the orders to deliver the fort to the British commander. They may, however, be in the sealed letters which I have sent to that chief.

‘ The fort of Darwar gives such a hold of this country, that the possession of it by us, in any manner, would create great jealousy of our views in the minds of all the chiefs; but it would do this particularly if we were to take possession

without communication with Ball Kischen Gungurdhur, who is I do not know where, and without the Peshwah's orders to him to deliver it.

‘ Govind Rao has communicated with Bappojee Scindiah, who said he heard that we intended to attack his fort; that if we wanted it we had only to ask for it, and that he would withdraw with his family, and deliver possession of it. Govind Rao says also that the garrison is very weak and ill paid. I look upon it, however, to be not so certain that Bappojee Scindiah will deliver the fort when asked for it: if it is asked for and refused, it must be attacked; and then force commences, which the Governor General deprecates, and from which he has ordered us to desist as long as possible. If, along with this, we consider that the possession of the fort, in whatever manner it is obtained, will create jealousy, and that, in consequence of General Stuart's position upon the frontier, it is not absolutely necessary, even in a military point of view, there appears every reason for my refraining from interfering with it at all.

‘ Ram Rao, our agent at Darwar, wrote me word that Bappojee Scindiah was much alarmed in consequence of the report that we intended to attack his fort: upon receiving this letter I desired Ram Rao to tell him that I had no instructions to attack his fort, and that I did not intend to molest any body that did not interfere with me. I at the same time hinted that the Peshwah's orders must be obeyed; and I did this lest it should be necessary hereafter for any body of British troops to attack this fort in order to put the Peshwah's officer in possession of it. I propose now to proceed in regard to Darwar as follows: I shall send Govind Rao to Bappojee Scindiah to-morrow, to tell him that I am marching near his fort, and that I have no intention to interfere with it; that I require from him an engagement of fidelity to the Peshwah, and an assurance that he will not interfere with my communications.

‘ I shall desire Govind Rao to hint to him that we have orders to put Gungurdhur in possession of the fort, with which I doubt not he is acquainted already, and that General Stuart is at hand to carry into execution that measure if I should receive any thing from the fort of Darwar but assistance. I shall also instruct Govind Rao not to make a direct

proposition of it, but to urge him to satisfy me of his intentions by sending his son to my camp. I am nearly indifferent whether he sends him or not, as I know that his fears of General Stuart, and his hopes of future favor, will be more likely to keep him in order than any thing else; but to have his son in my camp will have a good appearance.

‘The Peshwah will not be pleased that the fort is not taken possession of immediately for Gungurdhur; but he must recollect that that chief is not upon the spot, and not to be found at present. You shall hear the result of this negotiation at Darwar.

‘I omitted to mention that I intend to desire Bappojee Scindiah to desist from annoying the Rajah of Kittoor, from whom I shall receive the greatest assistance in grain, &c., while in his neighbourhood.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,                    ‘Camp at Kandegy, 16th March, 1803.

‘The Putwurdun family are particularly anxious that I should give their letter to you, to request that you would recommend them to the Peshwah. I have every reason to believe that every member of this family will come forward in his Highness’s service in the present crisis of his affairs, and I therefore recommend this family to your good offices.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘SIR,    ‘Camp at Tuddus, 17th March, 1803.

‘I have received a letter from Colonel Montresor, from Calicut, of the 6th, from which I learn that the rebellion has spread much in Malabar, and that the rebels were in force not far from that place. The criminals confined in the gaol at Calicut had also got loose; sixty had made their escape, many were killed and some wounded in attempting it. The guard over the gaol had been surprised. Those people were chiefly rebels confined by Colonel Stevenson.

‘I mislaid Colonel Montresor’s letter yesterday evening, otherwise I should send it to you, but I have above stated

the outlines of the information which it gives. I now enclose a letter which I have written to Colonel Montresor upon this subject, and if you should approve the directions it contains, I beg you will allow it to be forwarded to him. In fact, no more can be done in this season than I have there stated. It will be useless to leave more posts, or to have more men in Wynaad than the post at Manuntwaddy and those on the tops of the ghauts. If there were two battalions in that district they would be obliged to remain shut up in their posts, where they would be useless; at the same time, the greater the number of troops to be left in Wynaad, the greater will be the difficulty of providing for them.

‘I received yesterday your letter of the 15th instant. I have sent Govind Rao with a message to Bappojee Scindiah of the same kind with that which I formerly sent, of which you approved.

‘I shall march to-morrow to Misserycotta, where I shall halt next day to allow Major Malcolm to join me, and to give time to Govind Rao to arrange every thing with Bappojee Scindiah.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Captain Cunningham.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Hoobly, 20th March, 1803.

‘By the description rolls of remount horses which I have received from you up to the 14th instant, it appears that you have now at Mangalore 30 mares for the stud and 308 horses. Upon the receipt of this letter you will be so kind as to make arrangements according to the orders you heretofore received, to send to Fort St. George the mares and the number of horses required for the remount of the body guards of his Excellency the Governor General, and of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George; and the remainder of the horses are to be sent by the route heretofore given to you for Santa Bednore to the Soolikainy Lake, to which place further orders respecting them will be sent.

‘I wrote to the Dewan this day to request that preparations of grain and forage may be made at each stage on the road to Botnunghur for 100 horses, and at each stage on the



road to Santa Bednore for 250; so that there will be no want. I informed him also that you will settle with Mr. Piele whether you will take the grain, giving a receipt for it, or you will pay for it as it is received. You will accordingly immediately acquaint Mr. Piele at Hurryhur with your wishes upon this subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain Cunningham.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. As I apprehend there will be a scarcity of water between Belloor and the Lake, by the route of Adjumpoor, I recommend that the horses should be sent from Belloor to Terrakerra, Benkeypoor, Hooly Honore, Soolikainy Lake.’

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Hoobly, 20th March, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 17th and 18th, to the former of which I should have yesterday written an answer, only that Major Malcolm arrived in the morning, and the whole day was passed in discussions with him. He will have informed you that he proposes accompanying the detachment, at least as far as Meritch, which I think may be attended by the best consequences. I yesterday received an answer from Bappojee Scindiah to a message I sent him by Govind Rao. I enclose translations of letters from that chief and Govind Rao, which will point out the nature of the arrangement with him.

‘ I desired Govind Rao to hint that, in case any harm should be done to my followers, you would instantly fall upon his fort; that the Peshwah had given orders that it should be given over to another person; and that his only chance of saving it would be to be faithful to his Highness in the present crisis of his affairs. I expect his son in camp this day.

‘ My letter to Colonel Montresor will have settled the Malabar question. If your whole army was to move that way, you could effect no more in this season than I have suggested to him.

‘ I am concerned that you have been disappointed in the number of brinjaries expected from the Ceded districts. Captain Barclay has sent to Captain Blacker all Major

Munro's letters, by which it appears that the number he expected from the Ceded districts was 22,000. I cannot conceive in what manner he can have been disappointed. Mr. Cockburne wrote, on the 7th of February, that 7000 brinjarry bullocks, loaded with rice, had on that day commenced their march for the army, and 7000 more loading. Since that time he has sent no intelligence of either party.

‘I have been disappointed in the number of those people I expected from Mysore, but I know the cause of their absence. Some of those, also to the amount of 6000, have been counted among the Ceded districts and Baramahl brinjarries, and are to join your army. But I am so well supplied from the country, that I think if Colonel Stevenson is supplied at all, I shall still have enough. I now enclose the memorandum upon the subject of boats, which I had drawn up some days ago, but which I detained till Major Malcolm should arrive; as, before I should submit it to you, I wished to consult him upon a point connected with politics relating to this subject. You will observe that in the memorandum I propose that a post should be established in a redoubt to be constructed on each of the rivers.

‘It appears to me that it would add essentially to the safety and convenience of the advanced detachment, if these redoubts were to be constructed and the troops established in them immediately; and Major Malcolm agrees in opinion with me, that, however it may secure our communication with Mysore, and give confidence to those inclined to come to us, the measure will not create any jealousy in the minds of any of the jaghiredars in this part of the country. If you should be of that opinion, the first post to be established is that on the Werdah. There is already a redoubt there constructed by me in 1800, which could be repaired by 300 pioneers in a few days. It wants only a gate and a bridge, either of hurdle or plank, and the earth which has been washed from the parapet into the ditch to be cleared out. If you can spare the pioneers from your camp for this service it would be most convenient; and in case you should approve of the plan, and of occupying those posts directly, I enclose a letter to the commanding officer of Nuggur to send a company to the Werdah, which I request you will allow to be forwarded. The road from Oollull to the Werdah is by

Richter and Deogerry. The redoubt is on the river about a mile from Deogerry.

‘ At all events, whether or not the post is now established upon the Werdah, it will be necessary for me to take measures to establish one upon the Malpoorba. We have several sick men, particularly in the Scotch brigade, and it is necessary to have a field hospital at some place or other. Whenever we have such an establishment we must have a guard for it; and it is as well to establish it at once in a place in which we must have one eventually. I therefore now propose to establish the hospital at Sungoly, a village in which I had heretofore the guard over the boats on the Malpoorba. If I find that village will hereafter answer all the purposes of the redoubt, it will be unnecessary to construct one; if not, it would be desirable that the 300 pioneers should proceed to Sungoly as soon as they shall have finished the work upon the Werdah.

‘ Upon this point, however, I have to observe that I am well provided with pioneers, and that I can spare the number which will be required for this work; although I am aware that eventually I may have great occasion for their services. I consider always that your army may be obliged to move, and it will not answer to cripple you for my convenience; but if your 300 pioneers can be spared, it would be desirable that they should finish these works.

‘ With a view to the establishment of the hospital, I have ordered a company from Hullihall to the Malpoorba; and in case you should approve of the plan of establishing our posts directly, I shall order forward the two other companies from the garrison of Hullihall for the posts on the Gutpurba and Kistna.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

#### MEMORANDUM ON BOATS.

‘ Between the 14th and 20th of June, the rivers Toombuddra, Werdah, Malpoorba, Gutpurba, and Kistna will fill, and it will be necessary to cross them in boats. Those which have been found most convenient for this purpose are the common country basket boats, which ought to be covered

with double skins of leather. They can be made with ease in all parts of the country, and can be transported from one river to another.

‘ There ought, however, to be a permanent establishment of twenty boats upon each of those rivers. Each boat ought to have three boatmen.

‘ For the care of these boats there ought to be a guard at each of the rivers; and in order to preserve regularity in the passage of them, and the regular payment of the boat people, without which they will not stay in the service, this guard ought to be commanded by an European officer.

‘ The whole of the boats might be placed under the superintendence of Captain Cunningham, who managed this concern heretofore, and who might reside at a central situation.

‘ The boats for the passage of the Toombuddra ought to be at Hurryhur; those for the passage of the Werdah at Deogerry. I shall hereafter point out the places at which it would be most convenient to have those for the passage of the other rivers.

‘ I shall write to Purneah to take measures to have prepared twenty boats of a proper description at Hurryhur upon the Toombuddra; likewise to prepare a similar number at Chandergooty and Anawooty, and to float them down the Werdah to Deogerry.

‘ I propose to give directions to the amildar at Hullihall in Soonda to prepare forty boats, which will be carried to the Gutpurba and the Kistna. Major Munro might make up the remainder in his districts, and send them to the Mal-poorba.

‘ The whole number of boat people that will be required is 300; viz., 60 at each river. I shall write to Purneah to make arrangements to furnish as many of these as he can. Major Munro likewise might furnish some. We cannot depend upon the country for any. Besides these people there ought to be a mutaseddee, at ten pagodas *per mensem*, four chucklers, and two basket makers, with the establishment at each river.

‘ The pay heretofore given to each boatman was one gold fanam for every day he did not work, and two gold fanams for every day he did. The same pay ought to be given to them now, and they ought to be paid daily.



up well, and I much fear that the country iron will not answer.

‘At all events, we know that it will take more working, and will require a greater expenditure of charcoal than that brought from Europe; and consequently, the latter is preferable, even if it does not possess other superior advantages. I have had a correspondence with Captain Scott upon this subject, since the carriages he first made broke down; and he has proposed that an indent should be sent to England for iron which might come out in the Company’s ships as ballast, and might be landed at Cannanore; from thence it could be moved without expense, or at a very moderate one, to Seringapatam.

‘Enclosed, I have the honor to send a list of articles of iron, for which Captain Scott would propose to indent, if you have no objection to the measure. In the mean time, we can make a fair trial of the new country iron; and if it should be found not to answer, this will arrive in India in time for the manufactory in the next year.

‘Nothing new here this day. I propose to transmit to you an account of my route, in order that you may see at what places you will find water, in case you should have occasion to move forward.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,                    ‘Camp at Sungoly, 23rd March, 1803.

‘I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 15th.

‘I sent to Bappojee Scindiah regarding the fort of Darwar, as I told you I would. The result of my message to him, was a promise on his part to be faithful to the Peshwah; an engagement that he would not molest our supplies; that he would refrain from attacking the Rajah of Kittoor; and he has sent his son to this camp as a security for his good behaviour.

‘I sent Govind Rao to hint to him, that General Stuart was upon the frontier with a large army; and that he must expect that Darwar would be attacked by the General, if

he departed from his engagements upon this occasion: he also hinted to him, that the Peshwah had given the command of Darwar to another sirdar.

‘I am getting on well, and shall be at Meritch before the 5th. Every thing continues in the highest style. I have not yet been joined by any of the sirdars; but I expect some of them to-morrow from Manowly, on this river. Goklah is gone forward, and proposes to join on the Gutpurba.

‘Malcolm, who is in this camp, and I, are very anxious to receive accounts of the Peshwah’s intentions regarding joining his army in the neighbourhood of Meritch. It is exceedingly desirable that he should join, and almost absolutely necessary that we should communicate with you. Indeed, without this communication, I do not think it possible to be able to settle this business in the manner wished for by the Governor General; and in this crisis of our affairs in Europe, as well as in India, this mode of settling it appears most desirable. I hope, therefore, that we shall soon hear from you upon this point decidedly, whether the Peshwah will join his army at Meritch or not.

‘It is unfortunate that his Highness cannot be prevailed upon to make some offer to Holkar; even supposing that it should be such a one as it is certain that Holkar could not accept, the negotiation upon this point would be something gained. It would prevent that Chief from making any attempt upon Colonel Stevenson or the Nizam’s contingent, which I now consider our weak point; and on the other hand, it might prevent him from concluding with Scindiah. In the mean time, I should be in Colonel Stevenson’s neighbourhood; and although we might fail in making the peaceable arrangement of which the Governor General is desirous, we should at least be certain that no disaster could happen to any of us.

‘Hitherto, I have not been able to send Colonel Stevenson any positive instructions. The Commander in Chief has directed him to take a position in the neighbourhood of Perinda, and to wait there till he should receive further orders from me.

‘He is not strong enough alone, or even reinforced by the Nizam’s troops, to contend with Holkar; and therefore I cannot desire him to move till I shall arrive within reach

of him. I have apprized him of my marches towards Meritch, and of my intention afterwards to move towards Punderpoor.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                    ‘ Camp at Nassaree, 25th March, 1803.

‘ Siddajee Rao Nimbilkur, commonly called Appah Des-saye, joined my camp yesterday ; and in an interview which I had with him, he promised to do every thing I should desire him in the support of the cause of the Peshwah, and has desired me to give him a letter to you, to apprize you of this circumstance.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,    ‘ Camp at Nassaree, 25th March, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 23rd. One of the sirdars, to whom the Peshwah wrote, came into camp yesterday evening, and I received him in due form. He promised to obey all orders I might give him in the Peshwah’s cause, excepting to pay for straw and wood. His name is Jaun Rao Nisnuker, and he has about one thousand horse.

‘ Goklah is gone forward, and joins me on the Gutpurba on the day after to-morrow. I get on as well as I could wish, and by the supplies which I have received from Hurryhur, I have now more provisions of every kind in camp than I had on the day I quitted the army. The bazaar is well supplied from the country, and the brinjarry bags are all full. They will continue so until I march from the Kistna. The gram agents’ bags likewise are nearly full.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Longford.*

‘ SIR,    ‘ Camp, 26th March, 1803.

‘ Mr. Piele has informed me that you have made a demand upon the Rajah’s servants of the keys of the fort of Hurry-



hur, the propriety of complying with which has been referred to me.

‘I have no doubt whatever regarding who ought to have the keys of forts in the territories of the Rajah of Mysore, occupied by the Company’s troops: but I do not think it material to decide upon the present occasion who should keep the keys of Hurryhur; I therefore request that you will cease to demand those keys; and I beg you will in all cases endeavor to conciliate the servants of the Rajah’s government.

‘You will be so kind as to desire Mr. Gordon’s servant at Hurryhur to receive into store at that place, and carry to account on the books, all the grain which the Rajah’s servants may throw in there.

‘I have received your letter upon the subject of clothing for the corps in this detachment; and I beg that you will detain it at Hurryhur till I send you further directions.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Longford.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘Camp upon the Ankoley nullah, 3 miles south of Padshappoor, 27th March, 1803.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘I enclose the answers which I have received from some of the sirdars, and a letter from Chintemeny Rao to the Peshwah. You will observe that the former are as favorable as I could expect them to be.

‘I get on as well as I could wish. I shall be on the Gutpurba to-morrow, and on the Kistna, at Erroor, on the 1st of April.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To J. H. Piele, Esq.*

‘MY DEAR PIELE,

‘Camp, 27th March, 1803.

‘It is possible that the detachment of the army under my command may remain in the Marhatta territory after the rains shall have commenced, and the rivers which run in the western ghauts shall have filled; and it is necessary to take measures immediately to provide for this contingency. I propose to have twenty basket boats upon each

river; and I wish you to request Purneah to provide those to be placed upon the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, and upon the Werdah at the redoubt under Deogerry. These last may be made at Anawooty and Chandergooty, and may be floated down the river to their stations.

‘ I enclose a memorandum stating the size of which the boats ought to be, and the mode in which they ought to be constructed: I beg you to have it translated and communicated to Purneah. The object now is to take measures to procure a sufficient quantity of leather, well tanned; respecting which, I should imagine, if measures are taken in time, there will be no difficulty. Besides boats, I must look to Purneah’s districts for a large supply of boatmen. I shall altogether want three hundred of this description of people. I have called for an account from Soonda of the number of people of that description which that province can afford; but I imagine that I shall not find many. I must therefore depend upon Purneah for all that he can get for me; their pay shall be a gold fanam for every day they do not work, and two gold fanams for every day they do. I commence from the day on which they shall leave their villages for this service, besides payment to the muttaseddees and duffadars, &c., whom Purneah may place over them. The rivers will fill on some day between the 14th and 20th of June; all our arrangements, therefore, will be in readiness at the commencement of that month.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ J. H. Piele, Esq.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ Camp, 12 miles N. of the Gutpurba,  
29th March, 1803.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I enclose a duplicate of my letter of the 14th. I have nothing to add to it, excepting that I am getting on as well as I could wish; and that I shall be at Meritch two days sooner than I told you in that letter. My motions afterwards must be guided by the accounts I may receive of you, of Holkar, and of the Peshwah.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ Camp, 12 miles north of the Gutpurba,  
29th March, 1803.

‘ SIR,

‘ I have written to Colonel Stevenson and Colonel Close, but I cannot say whether my letters have reached them. I apprized Colonel Stevenson exactly of my intended movements; but it was, and is still, impossible for me to give him any orders. Those which you sent him provided for his safety till I should reach him; and it will not be proper to order him to move till that time, or till I shall ascertain exactly the position of Holkar.

‘ It is now reported, that Holkar is gone towards Ahmednuggur and Chandore; and if the report be true, there will be no inconvenience in Colonel Stevenson’s making a movement towards the Beemah, on the road to Poonah, as I shall advance towards Jejoory. But till I shall approach Jejoory, or till it is ascertained that Holkar is gone off towards Chandore, it will not be proper that Colonel Stevenson should quit his position at Perinda.

‘ I enclose the translation of a paper, which, with the concurrence and advice of Major Malcolm, I have given to Appah Saheb’s vakeel.

‘ He has had 3000 pindarries in his service, to whom he gave no pay, and who subsisted by plundering the Rajah of Kolapoor. In order that all those chiefs may come forward in the service of the Peshwah at the present crisis, I have prevailed upon them to cease hostilities, and of course Appah Saheb’s pindarries can no longer subsist upon the plunder they might acquire in the territory of the Rajah of Kolapoor. If they had been dismissed from Appah Saheb’s service, which would have been the natural consequence of a cessation of hostilities between him and the Rajah, they would have gone into the service of Holkar, or of some of his chiefs, and would have increased the number of that description of troops which have always been found to do our armies most injury; and as these particular pindarries were in Tippoo’s service, they know the mode in which we carry on our operations, and that by which they can injure us, much better than that description of people in Holkar’s army who come from Hindustan. If they had not gone into Holkar’s service,

they would have set up for themselves under some independent chief, and would have plundered the Savanore and Darwar countries, and have entirely interrupted our communication with your army. It therefore appeared to me, and to Major Malcolm, to be absolutely necessary that Appah Saheb should retain them in his service.

‘ It is impossible, however, that they should be retained on the footing upon which they have served hitherto; viz., to subsist by the plunder of the country. We shall pass through the countries of the Peshwah, or of his friends and adherents, and it would be very inconvenient that they should plunder there: indeed, I doubt whether Appah Saheb could venture to lead this description of troops into those countries. Under these circumstances, the only measure that could be adopted was, that Appah Saheb should take them into pay; but as none of the chiefs have much confidence in the Peshwah’s gratitude for their services, he was unwilling to adopt that measure without our guarantee that the Peshwah would allow of the muster of those troops, and that his Highness would reimburse the expense of their maintenance while they should be employed in this manner.

‘ This measure, of which I now request your confirmation, may draw after it a necessity to advise the employment, and to guarantee the payment by the Peshwah, of troops of this description, in the service, at present, of other sirdars; but I do not believe that the number will exceed 1000. It may also occasion a necessity to give an advance of money for their pay; but this sum, under present circumstances, can be afforded.

‘ I have to observe, on this subject, that a month will bring our military operations to great maturity. In that space of time we shall be able to ascertain whether Holkar will acquiesce peaceably in our arrangement with the Peshwah, or whether that chief must be driven from his Highness’s territories by force. In less than that time, also, the measure of hiring those troops can be laid before his Highness, and he can decide whether or not he will retain them in his service. If he should not approve of retaining them, they may either be discharged, or may be employed in the plunder of the enemy without pay, according to circumstances: and, at all events, supposing that his Highness should refuse

to pay their expense, which is scarcely possible, the charge to the Company will be trifling in comparison with the benefit which this detachment must derive from keeping this body of pindarries out of Holkar's service, and from cutting off our communications with the army. Upon the whole, therefore, I request your confirmation of this necessary arrangement. Goklah has joined me with his army, and I am to meet him this afternoon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Gen. Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Engagement given by Major General Wellesley to the vakeel of Appah Saheb.*

‘ Narrain Rao, vakeel of Appah Saheb, having represented that his master had in his service 3000 pindarries, to whom he gave no pay, and who had been in the habits of subsisting by plunder, he desires to have Major General Wellesley's advice and opinion regarding the best mode of disposing of these people in the present crisis, for the service of the Peshwah.

‘ Major General Wellesley is of opinion, that these troops ought not to be discharged; because, if discharged, they might be employed against the Peshwah: and they ought not to be employed by Appah Saheb without pay, because, as they must subsist, they would plunder the countries of the Peshwah, or of his adherents, for their subsistence. Major General Wellesley, therefore, advises that they should be taken into pay at the rate of twenty rupees per month each man; and he guarantees to Appah Saheb that the Peshwah will allow them to be mustered, and that his Highness shall reimburse to him the sums paid to them.

‘ Under this arrangement the pindarries must not be allowed to plunder.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ 30th March, 1803.

‘ I enclose an extract of a letter, and of its enclosure, that I have addressed to General Stuart upon a subject of some consequence, which will explain itself.

‘ I shall be on the Kistna at Erroor to-morrow, where I shall halt one day; and at Meritch on the 3rd. The accounts

which I have received are that Holkar has gone towards Chandore with his army; and it appears to me to be of the utmost importance that I should reach Poonah with the least possible delay. If I find, therefore, that it is true that Holkar is gone to the northward, I shall march directly to Jejoory; and I shall send orders to Colonel Stevenson to arrive at Gardoon, on the Beemah, on the day that I shall reach Jejoory. I shall then move by my left to Poonah, and bring him either to Jejoory, or in front of that place on the Beemah, leaving the Nizam's troops at Gardoon.

‘ If Holkar should remain at a small distance from us, it will be necessary to alter this plan thus far: viz., that Colonel Stevenson and the Nizam's troops should either join me, or be at one march from me on my right; or march towards Poonah on the direct road from Gardoon, while I march by that from Jejoory.

‘ If it should not be true that Holkar is gone to the northward, and he should post himself in such a manner as apparently to have an intention to impede the junction of Colonel Stevenson with me, or to have the power of impeding it, I shall move towards Colonel Stevenson at Perinda, before I proceed to Jejoory.

‘ In any one of these cases, I hope to reach Poonah about the 20th of April.

‘ After my arrival there, in my opinion, it will be necessary that the Peshwah should come up the ghauts as soon as possible; and I conclude that you will have formed all your arrangements for that purpose.

‘ Of course my movements from Poonah must be guided in a great degree by those of Holkar; but if he should have gone off to the northward, I shall stretch out towards the ghauts, as well to open the communication with Bombay, at the earliest possible period, as to provide for the Peshwah's safety on his journey from Bassein.

‘ You will observe that this letter is written under the impression that I shall not see you at Meritch, of which I think there is at present no prospect.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Fully Sing Maunia.*

‘ 1st April, 1803.

‘ I hear that you are encamped with your army at ———.

‘ I am advancing with the British troops on the Peshwah’s business. I hear from Colonel Close that he has held communications of a friendly nature with your master, Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and I should be much concerned that there should be any interruption of these friendly communications.

‘ I therefore recommend that you should draw off with your troops to the northward of Poonah, and wait there the further orders of your master.

‘ I send Kawder Nawas Khan, a person of consequence, to you, who will converse with and inform you of various reasons which render this measure expedient.

‘ *Fully Sing Maunia.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ Camp at Erroor, north bank of the Kistna,

‘ SIR,

1st April, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that I arrived here on the 31st of March, and have halted for two days, in order to establish at this place a field hospital, which is much wanted on account of the general deficiency among the native corps of carriage for their sick. I have the satisfaction to observe, however, that the sick are by no means numerous; and that if the corps were rather better provided with carriage, or if the weather was not so extremely hot, it would not be necessary to have a field hospital at this place.

‘ I have taken the opportunity of this halt to have a general muster of the cattle, &c., attached to the different corps and departments; and have the pleasure to inform you, that although they have made a long march from Seringapatam in a short space of time, and in a season very unfavourable, they are still capable, with very little assistance, of moving the grain, provision, and ordnance stores, for which they were hired. The Company’s draught cattle are in high condition.

‘ I have now in this camp 10,000 brinjarry bullocks with

full bags. The daily consumption of the bazaars is 200, so that I have a supply which will last fifty days. Besides these, other brinjarries are following, of whose number I cannot give any accurate account. None of them are at a greater distance than three marches, and they will soon overtake us.

‘ I attribute this prosperous situation of the detachment, at this advanced station, to the supplies afforded us by the depôts formed at Hurryhur upon the Toombuddra, and Hullihall in Soonda; and to the favorable manner in which this detachment has been received by all classes and descriptions of the people of this country.

‘ It is needless to enter into a detail respecting the animosities between the chiefs in whose hands is placed the power over the countries through which this detachment has passed. In order, however, that the Commander in Chief may form a judgment respecting what has been done, it will be necessary to inform him, that since the year 1800, when I was in this country before, it has been one continued contest for power and plunder between the different chiefs who have armies under their command; between the Putwurdun’s (Purserham Bhow’s) family and Goklah, in the countries bordering on the Toombuddra, Werdah, and Malpoorba; between the Putwurdun and the Rajah of Kolapoor in those bordering on the Gutpurba and Kistna; between Bappojee Scindiah, the killadar of Darwar, and the Rajah of Kittoor; between Goklah and the Rajah of Kittoor, and Goklah and Bappojee Scindiah; besides various others of inferior note, either immediately employed under these, or for themselves, under their protection.

‘ I have prevailed on all these chiefs to cease their contests for the present, and to join this detachment with the troops, which would otherwise be employed in the plunder of the country, or in the prosecution of their private quarrels, and to co-operate with me in the service of the Peshwah. They have also allowed me the use of the supplies of the countries under their management or protection, on payment; and have protected the people belonging to my camp in their passage through their countries.

‘ For the further protection of the people with supplies, who are on their road to join this camp, I have placed posts



on the Werdah, the Malpoorba, Gutpurba, and Kistna, at the places at which it will be necessary to have posts hereafter, if this detachment should be in advance of the army, when the rivers will fill which rise in the western ghauts.

‘ I have been joined by the troops of Goklah, of Bappojee Vittell, of Appojee Rao Nepauncekur (commonly called Appah Dessaye), of the Putwurdun family, of the Rajah of Kittoor, and of Bappojee Scindiah, the killadar of Darwar, whose son is in camp.

‘ I expect to be joined at Meritch by the troops of Prittee Niddee of Rastia, and some others. It is impossible to say to what number the whole will amount, but I imagine not less than 20,000 horse.

‘ My next object must be to join Colonel Stevenson, in the attainment of which I imagine I shall find no difficulty.

‘ It is now reported that Holkar, with the main body of his army, is gone towards Hindustan by the Nimderrah ghaut. If that should be the case, the junction will not be difficult; but, even if it should not be true, as this detachment is of sufficient strength to move anywhere, I can march towards the Nizam’s frontier, and then form this junction.

‘ Futtu Sing Maunia, and Mheer Khan Patan are in my front, nearly in the station in which they have been represented to be in the different letters received from Lieut. Colonel Close. It is said that they intend to fall back as I shall advance.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp at Erroor, north bank of the Kistna,

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

2nd April, 1803.

‘ I have this morning had a long conversation with Goklah and his vakeels; in the course of which he represented strongly the distresses under which he labors. He has requested me to write to you upon the subject. It is very desirable that some steps should be immediately taken by the Peshwah for his relief; and I shall be obliged to you if you will speak to his Highness upon that subject.

‘ If his Highness should be disposed to relieve his dis-

tresses, I can, at your desire, advance him a sum of money amounting to 50,000 rupees, without incurring the risk of distressing my own troops.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 23rd of March. My future line of march still remains in the same state of uncertainty in which it was when I last wrote to you. It is still reported here that Holkar is gone to the Nimderrah ghaut: but he has left Futty Sing Maunia and Mheer Khan to the southward; there is, therefore, reason to apprehend, that his line of operation does not lie on the road by which he has moved himself. With a view, however, to ascertain the intentions of Futty Sing, I have sent off Kawder Nawaz Khan with a letter to that chief, of which the enclosed is a copy, and I shall hereafter have a similar communication with Mheer Khan.

‘ I shall march from hence to-morrow, and I am still in style.

‘ In regard to the depôt, I enclose a memorandum for Captain Moor, which will explain particularly what I shall first want. In your letter of the 23rd, you talk of bringing up a convoy with the detachment which will attend the Peshwah’s person; but you forget that the bullocks from this division will not have reached Panwell at the time at which you will march from thence. I conclude, therefore, that all that you will be able to bring will be loads on the bullocks which Mr. Duncan will have provided for the service of the army.

‘ The loads which I should wish to have on them, whatever may be their number, are rice; we have plenty of arrack and of every thing else.

‘ In the memorandum which goes enclosed, you will observe, that I have pointed out to Captain Moor the number of bullocks which I imagine that I shall first send down, and the loads which I should wish to have prepared for them. These bullocks are exclusive of those which I suppose will be sent with the Peshwah’s detachment with loads of rice.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Memorandum for Captain Moor.*

‘ 1. Major General Wellesley is well satisfied with the loads as prepared by Captain Moor, viz., each of 120 pounds.

‘ 2. At the end of April, or the beginning of May, the following number of bullocks will be sent to Panwell, to receive a corresponding number of loads.

‘ Gram department:—1700 bullocks for rice.

‘ Provision department:—500 bullocks for salt provision; 200 for arrack; 20 casks, of sixty gallons each, to be filled with arrack.

‘ Gram department:—3000 bullocks for gram.

‘ Brinjarries:—10,000 bullocks for rice; 2000 bullocks for gram; 200 bullocks for wheat; 500 bullocks for salt.

‘ 3. In this estimate is included the probable first call of the detachments of troops expected from Hyderabad; and the quantity of articles which Major General Wellesley requested Mr. Duncan to have prepared, with a view to the supply of the troops under Lieut. General Stuart, will answer for these which, it may be expected, will be assembled in the neighbourhood of Poonah.

‘ 4. It is recommended that the articles for each department, above specified in paragraph 2, may be in separate boats. The boats for each department to be distinguished by a flag.

‘ Those of the grain, red; those of the provisions, white; those of the gram, blue; those of the brinjarries, red and white cross.

‘ 5. The heads of departments will indent regularly upon the Garrison Storekeeper at Bombay, for the articles which they will require and can carry away; and these indents will be countersigned by Major General Wellesley.

‘ 6. The brinjarries will have orders for the delivery of the number of loads required by them, signed by Captain Barclay, the superintendent of supplies, for which a gomastah of brinjarries will pass his receipt in duplicate: one copy of this receipt to be kept by the officer who shall deliver the grain; the other to be forwarded to Captain Barclay in camp. The brinjarries will afterwards pay for the rice in camp; and this account will be one to be settled between the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay. .

‘ Major General Wellesley will write upon this subject fully to the government of Bombay.

‘ 7. As the heads and servants of the departments will be strictly accountable for every article they shall receive, it is doubtful whether they will be willing to receive them by tale. The brinjaries will certainly require to measure the grain in some of the bags which they shall receive; and therefore Major General Wellesley recommends that besides intelligent accountants to keep the accounts, and make the deliveries with regularity, there should be a number of measuring men and sewers in readiness at Panwell.

‘ 8. It is also desirable that there should be in readiness in the service of the public, three or four hundred coolies, to assist in the removal of the loads from the boats to the bullocks, so that there may be no delay.

‘ 9. If the neighbourhood of Panwell should not be well supplied with forage, a few boats loaded with straw, to be sold at a reasonable rate, would be very necessary.

‘ 10. Answers will be given hereafter to the other paragraphs of the memorandum.

‘ *Captain Moor.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major Malcolm to Lord Clive.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp near Meritch, 3rd April, 1803.

‘ When I had the honor to inform your Lordship of my intention to join the Hon. Major General Wellesley, for the purpose of communicating with that officer on a variety of subjects intimately connected with the present service, it was not my intention to proceed farther than a few marches with the British force under his command, and my letter of the 15th ultimo must therefore have conveyed that impression to your Lordship’s mind. Circumstances have, however, since occurred, which have made me determine to accompany this detachment to Poonah; and in adopting this resolution I trust I have not acted contrary to the spirit of your Lordship’s instructions.

‘ As political questions of a serious magnitude seemed likely to arise, and to press for decision as this force approximated Poonah, it was suggested to me by the Hon. Major General Wellesley, that the information I possessed of his Excellency the Governor General’s sentiments, as applicable

to the present crisis of affairs in the Marhatta empire, and to the general system of politics in India, might be more required in this quarter than in any other; and that considerable advantage to the public service might eventually be derived from my accompanying him to Poonah; a circumstance which would also enable him to take measures, in communication and concert with me, for the conciliation of the southern sirdars and jaghiredars of the Marhatta empire who were expected to join his corps as he advanced.

‘As this suggestion of the Hon. Major General Wellesley entirely corresponded with the dictates of my own judgment, as to the mode in which my exertions would best conduce to the promotion of the public interests on the present important occasion, I readily acquiesced in his wishes; and in doing so, I am assured my conduct will be honored by the approbation of his Excellency the Governor General, whose flattering and liberal confidence has left me unrestrained to pursue, in this particular and in all others, the line of conduct which circumstances of the moment lead me to think most likely to contribute to the success of the service in which we are engaged.

‘I have the honor to enclose, for your Lordship’s information, a memorandum of the state of the southern Rajahs, sirdars, and jaghiredars of the Marhatta empire; which, though perhaps full of small errors, is correct in the leading facts; and will convey to your Lordship a tolerably just idea of the state of the country through which this corps has passed, and in which it still continues.

‘The march of a British force through this distracted country has had the happy effect of reconciling its contending chiefs, and of giving confidence to its oppressed inhabitants; and the union of all ranks in a sentiment of respect for the English name has occasioned an abundance of supplies of every description, which will enable the detachment to leave the banks of the Kistna with more provisions than it did those of the Toombuddra.

‘The discipline and conduct of the English troops who have before served in this quarter have, no doubt, contributed much to this favorable general impression. But the confidence and respect of every class in the provinces to the south of the Kistna is in a very great degree personal to the

Hon. Major General Wellesley: to the admiration which the Marhatta chiefs entertain of that officer's military character, and the firm reliance which the inhabitants place on his justice and protection, the extraordinary success which has hitherto attended the progress of this force must be principally attributed.

‘No specific engagements have been entered into with any of the sirdars or jaghiredars:—they have received general assurances that they shall be recommended in the strongest manner to the Peshwah, if their conduct is such as to merit that mark of favor and friendship.

‘Several of the chiefs who were under the Peshwah's displeasure have been excited to action by a promise of the British influence being exerted to restore them to the confidence of their sovereign; and there is reason to expect some of this class will serve with much zeal and activity, as they cannot but view the present opportunity as the only one which could have occurred to afford them a prospect of regaining that favor which their conduct had justly alienated.

‘Every means has been taken which could be devised to prevent the jaghiredars plundering the districts of each other while the British troops are in this quarter; as it was obvious that, unless this could be effectually checked, we could neither expect supplies from the adjacent country, nor aid from the different chiefs, whom it was so essential to combine in one general cause. The success of the measures which have been adopted with this view have exceeded expectation; and there is good reason to hope these provinces will enjoy, during the present season, a comparative tranquillity to what they have known for many years.

‘For the purpose of securing this important object, and of preventing an accession to the strength of Holkar, General Wellesley has engaged both to the chiefs of the Putwurdun family, and to Goklah, that his Highness the Peshwah will admit of their return, and pay all the troops (including pindarries) extra of their quota, with which they accompany the army on the present service: by this measure he has prevented the dismissal of that part of their horse which is, above all others, calculated to destroy a country, and to distress and harass an army.

‘I inclose for your Lordship's information a list of the

chiefs, and the number of their troops, who have joined the British force. There is reason to expect that their numbers will be considerably increased in a very few days: they are all professedly warm in their attachment to the Peshwah, but most of them only view the general cause as the means of advancing their particular interest.

‘ The Rajah of Kolapoor, and several others of the chiefs of this part of the country, are under the influence of Scindiah, and likely to act as he dictates; and I am concerned to observe, from the last dispatch from Colonel Collins, there is little prospect of this chief being brought to take a favorable view of our present connexion with the Peshwah.

‘ Your Lordship will observe, in the memorandum which I have the honor to inclose, that Abdul Kher Khan, the Nabob of Savanore, is in a state of the extremest misery. He has represented his situation through a vakeel to General Wellesley, and pressed the General to oblige Bappoo Goklah to pay him part of the arrears of his pension, to prevent him and his family perishing from absolute want. The difficulty and distress which Goklah has to pay his troops upon the present service made it impossible to urge him upon a point of this nature; and the General has, therefore, in attention to my suggestion, relieved the distresses of the Nabob of Savanore, by a present of 5000 rupees in the name of the Honorable Company.

‘ This act of charity will, I am sure, be honored by your Lordship’s approbation. It relieves from severe distress the representative of a noble family, and the brother in law of the late Suldaun; and is calculated to raise the reputation of the British government.

‘ It was stated some time ago to General Wellesley and myself, by the vakeel of Appah Saheb, that Muraba Furnavees, the cousin of Nana Furnavees, would join the British army, provided he was assured of protection; and that he should hereafter be permitted to retire to Benares, or where else he chose, without molestation, in the event of his not coming to a satisfactory accommodation with the Peshwah. As Muraba was at liberty to proceed where he chose when he made this overture, his conduct showed a desire to be restored to favor by his master; and as his junction, from his rank and respectability, was an object of importance, and was

considered as such by the chiefs who were co-operating with the British army, the assurance he required was given; and I am happy to inform your Lordship he is in Meritch, and will probably join in a few days, and proceed with the British force to Poonah.

‘ From a general view of the disposition of the Marhatta chiefs in this quarter, of the actual state of the British detachments under the Hon. Major General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson, and the present distribution of Holkar’s force, I am satisfied the great object of reinstating his Highness on his musnud in Poonah will be speedily effected; and that measure once accomplished, it will be easy to form a disposition of the troops in this quarter that will defy the efforts of any combination which can possibly be formed with the view of defeating the important ends of the present arrangement.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*

‘ J. MALCOLM.

‘ Names of Marhatta sirdars and jaghiredars who have joined General Wellesley, and list of their forces:—

	Horse.	Infantry.
Appah Saheb . . . . .	2500	1000
Bappoo Goklah . . . . .	3000	1500
Bappoo Vittell . . . . .	300	
Appah Dessaye, the Jaghiredar of Nepawnee	300	100
Vakeel of Kittoor Rajah . . . . .	100	100
Bappoo Scindiah . . . . .	150	100
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	6350	2800

‘ N. B. Chintomeny Rao Pandoorung, Gunput Rao Paunseh, Vittell Seo Deo, and Pursheram Pundit Prittee Niddee, are expected to join to-morrow: their force will more than double that already in camp.’

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ Camp, 3 miles south of Meritch,

3rd April, 1803.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I arrived here this morning, and received your letter of the 23rd of March. I have just heard that Futtu Sing Maunia, who was in my front, has moved off to the eastward,



it is supposed, with an intention to join Meer Khan. This movement enables me to decide to march towards you immediately.

‘ If they hang about the Beemah, I shall go to Punderpoor; from which place you shall hear further from me, and I shall then point out to you the modes by which I propose that we should join. In that case I shall be at Punderpoor on the 11th or 12th.

‘ If they follow their master to the northward, which I think most probable, I shall not go so far to the eastward as Punderpoor, but shall endeavor to reach the Beemah river by a direct route. In that case also I shall communicate, with all possible speed, by what route I wish you to join me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor in Council at Fort St. George.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fort William, 4th April, 1803.

‘ The Governor General in Council has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship’s official dispatch to the Governor General, dated the 15th of March, inclosing the copy of a letter from his Excellency the Commander in Chief of the army of Fort St. George to your Lordship’s address; in which his Excellency has detailed the arrangements, adopted under your Lordship’s authority, for the formation and march of a detachment under the command of the Hon. Major General Wellesley towards Poonah, in conformity to the instructions of the Governor General, addressed to your Lordship in an official letter under date of the 2nd of February.

‘ Those arrangements appear to have been regulated by Lieut. General Stuart, under your Lordship’s orders, with the utmost degree of judgment and ability, and to have embraced every object connected with the successful accomplishment of the service on which the detachment is employed. The Governor General in Council entirely approves of the selection of the Hon. Major General Wellesley for the command of the troops detached towards Poonah. The extensive local knowledge and influence possessed by that officer, and the confidence reposed in his approved talents,

firmness, temper, and integrity, by the Marhatta chieftains on the frontiers of Mysore, render him peculiarly qualified to discharge the complicated duties of a command which will require the united exertion of considerable military skill and great political experience and discretion.

‘ The Governor General in Council observes with peculiar satisfaction the judicious arrangements which have been adopted for securing to the detachment regular and sufficient supplies of provisions, independently of the resources of the country through which the detachment will have occasion to march.

‘ Those supplies being principally derived from the resources of Mysore, it becomes an object of the utmost importance to provide, by every practicable precaution, against the decline of that active influence and energy by which we have hitherto been enabled to apply the resources of Mysore to the exigencies of the army in the field.

‘ The activity and energy which have distinguished the conduct of the executive authority in Mysore are principally to be ascribed to the influence which Major General Wellesley has been enabled to establish in that country, by his judicious conduct of the British army stationed at Mysore.

‘ The preservation of that influence is inseparably connected with the continuance of Major General Wellesley in the command of the British forces in Mysore; while that officer shall be employed in the immediate conduct of the operations of the detachment advancing towards Poonah.

‘ The Governor General in Council, therefore, considers Major General Wellesley’s continuance in the military command of Mysore to be essentially necessary to the successful accomplishment of the service in which that officer is at present engaged. With these sentiments his Excellency in Council deems it to be proper to direct, in this special manner, that Major General Wellesley retain the military command of Mysore until further instructions shall reach your Lordship from this government. Your Lordship will be pleased accordingly to instruct his Excellency the Commander in Chief on the coast to frame, in concert with Major General Wellesley, such arrangements as may appear to be necessary to enable Major General Wellesley to exercise the military command in Mysore, while employed in con-

ducting the operations of the detachment, and other public duties, within the Marhatta territory.

‘ If any officer should have been appointed to succeed Major General Wellesley in the military command in Mysore, previously to the receipt of this dispatch, his Excellency in Council directs that the command in Mysore be restored to Major General Wellesley immediately upon the receipt of these instructions.

‘ The instructions which his Excellency the Commander in Chief on the Coast has issued to Major General Wellesley are framed with the greatest wisdom and prudence, and are entirely conformable to the views and intentions of the Governor General in Council.

‘ The state of the internal government of Mysore, in all its branches, being intimately connected with the subject of these instructions, his Excellency in Council further directs that no alteration be made in any civil or military appointments in Mysore (including the appointment of all native officers, civil and military) without previous reference to the Governor General in Council, and without his express authority; and that no change be suffered to take place in any part of the existing system of the civil or military government of Mysore without the previous sanction of this government.

‘ The Governor General in Council requests that your Lordship in Council will be pleased to consider the instructions stated in this dispatch to be intended to form the basis of a permanent system for the future administration of Mysore, and for regulating the extent and nature of the control to be exercised over the affairs of that possession by the Governor General in Council.

‘ We have the honor, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. the* }  
   *Governor in Council,* } (and other Members of the Council).  
   *Fort St. George.* }

‘ WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ Camp at Doondewarry, eight miles N. E. from

‘ SIR,

‘ Meritch, 4th April, 1803.

‘ I heard yesterday that Futtu Sing Maunia, who has been

some time on the road between Meritch and Poonah, about twenty miles to the northward of Tasgaum, had moved to the eastward, it is supposed, with an intention to join Meer Khan. As I could not expect that any of the chiefs assembled upon the Kistna would move from the neighbourhood of Meritch while Fuddy Sing should remain in his station on the road to Poonah, I was rather embarrassed until he marched. I am, however, now upon my road to Pundepoor, at which place I shall arrive on the 11th. My junction with Colonel Stevenson, in two or three days afterwards, then becomes certain.

‘ I have received two letters from Colonel Stevenson, the last dated the 20th. He had arrived at Perinda, and had been joined by 6000 horse and 5000 infantry, with 40 guns, of the Nizam’s army. The hircarrahs, who had been in Holkar’s camp, reported that it was eight or ten coss from Ahmednuggur about the 20th of March, his army moving to the northward, but not with great celerity.

‘ I have apprised Colonel Stevenson of my movement towards him, and shall send him orders regarding the mode in which he is to join me as soon as I shall see what is done by Fuddy Sing and Meer Khan when they will have joined. I think that they will follow their master to the north, and leave the game in our hands.

‘ Every thing here goes on well. The brinjaries have had a little dispute with their mutaseddee, which has given me some trouble; but after sitting up a great part of last night with them, I have settled it to the satisfaction of all parties. They have desired to have an officer to reside in the gollah with them; and on this account, as well as because by the enquiry it appears that a more active superintendence is necessary, than could be given by the superintendent of the bazaars, I have appointed Captain Baynes to do this duty under Captain Barclay. He will reside in the gollah; but whenever his corps is wanted for service he is to join it, which will not be attended with inconvenience.

‘ All the papers relating to this transaction will be sent by Captain Barclay to Lieut. Blacker, as, in fact, all the brinjaries are generally concerned; and the abuses which have

prevailed would sooner or later create discontent among them all.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Hungomgaum, 5th April, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st instant, and am happy to find that you approved of the engagement into which I entered with the Putwurdun family. I have not yet ascertained what number of these pindarries they have with them. In the last conversation which I had with their vakeel on this subject, he said that they had sent the greatest number of those they had to Rastia, in the Sholapoor country, not expecting that I should consent to the proposed arrangement. If this is the case, there will be employment for these people without injury to our cause, and at no expense.

‘ I had a conversation with Goklah, two or three days ago, regarding his situation, in which he complained much of his distress for money. In consequence, I wrote to Colonel Close, to request that he would urge the Peshwah to take some steps to relieve their pressing distresses. I also told Goklah to keep his troops together, and that I would engage that he should be allowed to muster the overplus of his established numbers.

‘ As Goklah is in possession of the revenues of Savanore, the Nabob of Savanore has claims upon him for 50,000 rupees per annum, allowed him from those revenues by the Peshwah. This pension, however, is paid very irregularly, or rather is not paid at all; and the consequence is, that the Nabob and his family are starving. He represented his situation to me as I was passing, and has since sent a man here to desire that I would urge Goklah, at least, to provide for his subsistence; but it is obvious, that when I was obliged to refuse Goklah all pecuniary assistance, and at the same time to urge him to endeavour to keep his army together without pay or plunder, when he stated that he was in the greatest distress, I could not ask him to pay money to the Nabob of Savanore.

‘ This man is of an ancient and respectable family, and is

nearly allied to the house of Hyder. He was married to the sister of Tippoo, and his sons are at this moment living at Seringapatam on a pension which they receive from the British Government. Under these circumstances, Major Malcolm has recommended that I should relieve the Nabob's distresses by a gift of 5000 rupees. To this I have consented; but I have yet given nothing to the Nabob, nor have I made any promise of assistance to his servant.

‘In my opinion, even if the whole of this sum of money is given to the Nabob, it will be well laid out. At all events, his family is an object of charity; and although not to such an extent as Major Malcolm now proposes, I relieved their distresses myself, when I was in this country in the year 1800.

‘In consequence of the general appearance of affairs, I have desired Colonel Stevenson to move towards Punderpoor, if he should not have heard that Holkar is on his return to the southward, or that he meditates an attack upon the Nizam's territories to the northward.

‘If I should find Futtu Sing Maunia and Meer Khan go off to the northward, I shall turn that way also as soon as I reach the main river, and shall not touch upon the Beemah. In that case, also, Colonel Stevenson will turn to the northward, and we shall join upon the Beemah.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘Camp at Hungomgaum, 20 miles N.E. from Meritch,  
‘MY DEAR COLONEL, 5th April, 1803.

‘I am now on my march towards Punderpoor, with a view of forming a junction with you. I have received your letter of the 28th.

‘If you should not have received any intelligence of Holkar's return from the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur, or of his threatening the Nizam's territories to the northward, you will be so kind to commence your march towards Punderpoor, to join me as soon as convenient, after you shall receive this letter.

‘I propose to be at Punderpoor on the 11th; but, before I

arrive there, it is probable that I may receive intelligence of the movements of Futtý Sing Maunia, which will enable me to turn at once to the northward. I shall, in that case, move immediately towards Jejoory, and I shall request you to direct your march upon that place.

‘I recommend that you should leave the Nizam’s troops within the Nizam’s territories, unless you should think it necessary to have them with you; and, at all events, that they should not cross the Beemah. They can march in a separate column up the river as far as opposite Gardoon, where you will turn to the northward.

‘I must request you to preserve the most strict discipline among your troops, when in the Marhatta territory, and that you will take measures to make them pay for every thing. We have got on by these precautions.

‘The Nizam has accepted the proposition of Meer Khan to be taken into his service.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Sterenson.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Nogeze, 7th April, 1803.

‘ I hear that Futtý Sing Maunia and Meer Khan are about to join, and will then move off to the northward. They are about twelve cos from this camp. I have arranged with Major Malcolm that he is to give the Nabob of Savanore an order upon Mr. Piele for 5000 rupees, which he is to receive. This arrangement will save our funds here, and will be more convenient to the Nabob than any other could be.

‘ I wish to have your directions regarding the mode in which I shall charge for the carriage of the tappall for this detachment. The peons who carry the letters are matchlock men, in Purneah’s service: there are five of them at present at each station, and as they were brought from the Mysore country early in March, they have been paid from the beginning of that month. You will observe that the arms in the hands of these runners, and an additional number at each stage beyond the usual proportion, are necessary in this country, in which every second man that is met is a soldier;

and that it was but fair to pay the peons from the time that they were employed exclusively in our service. This, however, will make the expense greater than that of the army tappall, and much greater than the receipts. I therefore take the liberty of suggesting that I should charge the expense monthly, as an extraordinary, not provided for by the regulations, supported by the necessary vouchers. This appears to me to be a more simple mode than to have the bills sent with all their long explanation to the Postmaster General.

‘The company have arrived upon the Werdah, but they have no spare ammunition. It would be very convenient if four or five bullock loads could be sent to them from the army.

‘I have received from Colonel Close a letter of the 28th of March, which, however, contains no news. He had received a letter from me of the 18th, in which I detailed the plan according to which I proposed to proceed at Darwar, with which he was perfectly satisfied.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘Camp at Nogeze, 7th April, 1803.

‘I have just received your letter of the 28th March. I am now upon my march towards the Beemah, with an intention of forming a junction with Colonel Stevenson. When I arrived in the neighbourhood of Meritch, I found that Futtu Sing Maunia, who had been upon the Kistna, and Meer Khan, who had been upon the Beemah, drew off, apparently with an intention to form a junction somewhere in the neighbourhood of Punderpoor. The march of Futtu Sing made the chiefs on the Kistna easy regarding the safety of their possessions during their absence from them, and enabled me immediately to urge them to accompany me on my march towards Colonel Stevenson; which was rendered more necessary, as Futtu Sing and Meer Khan were about to join in his neighbourhood. I saw the probability that, when joined, they would draw off to the northward; but still they were not to be trusted, and my junction with Colonel Stevenson was likely to insure the safety of both, and eventually the success of all our future operations.



‘Since forming the determination to effect this junction, and giving Colonel Stevenson orders accordingly, I have received information that the Nizam has accepted Meer Khan’s offers of service; that both he and Futty Sing are in full march to the northward; and you tell me that the Peshwah is in treaty with Futty Sing. By whatever route, therefore, I should approach Poonah, it is probable that Colonel Stevenson and I could both be in safety; but I persevere in my march to the Beemah: first, because that route to Poonah is nearly as short as that by which I must have gone from the place where I heard of the change of circumstances which no longer rendered the junction necessary: secondly, because it is desirable that I should communicate immediately with Colonel Stevenson, and form such an arrangement of our force as will provide for all probable events.

‘By this route I shall reach Poonah on the 23rd or 24th of this month; and I now proceed to communicate to you my ideas of the mode in which his Highness’s march from Bassein to Poonah must be secured.

‘He ought to leave Bassein on the 20th, so as to arrive at the ghauts about the 27th or 28th. I shall not stay at Poonah more than one day, because there is no forage there; and because I must approach the ghauts to cover his march, if the enemy should return from the northward in force to impede it; and at all events, to send my cattle down to Panwell for my supplies. I shall arrive at the ghauts about the 27th or 28th. If Holkar should not return from the northward, and there should be no threatening appearance when I get farther to the northward, I do not propose to draw Colonel Stevenson’s corps to Poonah, or that the Nizam’s army should pass his Highness’s frontier. For the sake of forage the troops must separate in some degree; at the same time that they may be so stationed as that they may join at short notice. The mode in which I should propose to station them, in that case, would be, the Nizam’s corps of infantry and cavalry on his Highness’s frontier, at the nearest point to Poonah; Colonel Stevenson’s corps in front of Jejoory, upon the Beemah; Colonel Murray’s at Poonah, with the Marhatta cavalry coming up with me; and my own division towards the ghauts.

‘By this disposition we shall subsist with ease, and I shall

be able to draw from Bombay the supplies we shall require ; and we can form a junction of all our troops, if that measure should appear necessary. I have been joined by Goklah, by Appah Saheb, and one of his brothers, and the son of Baba Saheb of Meritch ; Chintomeny Rao comes in this evening ; by Bappogee Vittell ; by Vittell Seo Deo's nephew, Narsy Kundee Rao ; by Appah Dessaye ; by Rubran Chowdy, and some others of inferior note.

‘ Ball Kischen Gungurdhur, Gopal Rao, Paunseh Madhoo Rao Rastia, and Prittee Niddee have not made their appearance. The latter sent me word that Fuddy Sing was plundering his jaghires ; but I hinted to him that I had heard a report of the Peshwah having given orders that the jaghires of those persons who had joined the enemy should be confiscated ; and had said that those only who should join this force would be in favor hereafter ; I therefore imagine that I shall bring him in.

‘ It is true that his Highness has given these orders, and has directed that the jaghires of such persons should be confiscated immediately ; and that the revenues arising from them should be applied to the payment of the troops now with me. But it is impossible to take measures to carry these orders into execution, without spreading over the whole country, and employing his troops in confiscating jaghires, instead of in one uniform operation directed against the common enemy.

‘ I observe what you say regarding slaughter cattle ; and I will immediately put a stop to the killing of bullocks in this camp, which has continued to this time. Sheep, however, are but bad travellers in wet weather ; and I must request of you to urge Mr. Duncan to have a large quantity of salt provisions prepared, as the best substitute for every thing else. I will send him down casks to pack it in, in proportion as I shall consume that which I have already.

‘ I also observe what you say regarding Scindiah. I am in good marching trim ; and if I can keep my cattle alive, I do not fear any confederacy that can be formed, after I shall once reach Poonah.

‘ We must, however, keep our southern jaghiredars in good humor ; and upon this point I wish you to urge the Peshwah. I also suggest to you the propriety of altering

the treaty with him thus far: viz., not to take any part of Savanore, but territory elsewhere, for obvious reasons referable to other chiefs. But if that cannot be effected, it would be advisable, in settling what districts are to be ceded to us, to avoid touching any of their jaghires, and to urge the Peshwah to provide handsomely for Goklah, in lieu of the revenues of Savanore, which he will lose by the transfer to us of the countries not already given away in jaghire.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I enclose you a paper giving the dimensions of wheels wanted for four iron 12 pounders, respecting which I wish you to make some arrangements with Mr. Duncan. I shall also want twenty tumbril wheels.’

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Hutteer, 8th April, 1803.

‘ Appah Saheb called upon me last night, and told me that a carkoon had come in from Futtu Sing Maunia, with proposals as follow: viz., First, that Futtu Sing should be taken, with his troops, into our service: Secondly, that a country should be allotted for their subsistence: Thirdly, that if those propositions should not be accepted, he should be permitted to go wherever his fortune might lead him.

‘ I desired that he might be referred to the Peshwah for an answer to his propositions; and that until he should receive that answer, he should go off with his troops to the northward of Poonah, and there wait the Peshwah’s orders. The carkoon was called in afterwards, and I encouraged him to continue the negotiation, which I had understood from Lieut. Colonel Close, that the Peshwah’s durbar had already commenced with him.

‘ It appears by this man’s account, that Futtu Sing is an adventurer, with a body of Hindustance troops, amounting, as he says, to 40,000, but really about 10,000, with some guns; and is ready, avowedly, to serve any person who is willing to pay him. The result of the communication of last night is, that he is going off from my front; but whether he will enter the service of the Peshwah or not,

depends upon his sense of the ability and will of the Peshwah to pay him, or to afford plunder for his troops.

‘ Meer Khan, as well as Futtu Sing, is drawing off.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Hutteer, 8th April, 1803.

‘ As I find that as I advance Futtu Sing Maunia and Meer Khan draw off to the northward, I propose not to go to Punderpoor, which is two or three marches out of my road. I shall, however, strike upon the Beemah at Nursingpoor, the place where that river and the Neera join; and I beg that you will direct your route upon the same place. I shall be at Nursingpoor on the 13th or 14th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Hutteer, 8th April, 1803.

‘ After I had written to you yesterday, Appah Saheb called upon me, and told me that a carkoon had come to him from Futtu Sing Maunia, with certain propositions to the following effect:—

‘ The first was, that he should be taken into our service. The second, that countries should be allotted for the subsistence of his army. The third, that if these two were not accepted, he should be allowed to depart, and go wherever his fortunes should lead him.

‘ I referred him to the Peshwah for an answer regarding his proposals for service; and I begged that he would retire to the countries beyond Poonah, till he should be made acquainted with the Peshwah’s decision regarding his proposals.

‘ The carkoon was called in, and he said that Futtu Sing was ready to serve any body who would provide for the subsistence of his troops; and that as I had not accepted his proposals, he should seek his fortune elsewhere. I encouraged him to offer himself to the Peshwah; and as, by

your account, his Highness's durbar had already had communications with him, it is probable that, having failed here, he will bring to a close his negotiation with his Highness.

‘ Appah Saheb pressed strongly upon me the situation of Vittell Seo Deo and his troops. The countries allotted for their subsistence are in Hindustan, and have been destroyed by Holkar, in consequence of the attachment of Vittell Seo Deo to the Peshwah's cause, and his services to his Highness.

‘ The distresses of these troops appear to be very great; and it is an object of the utmost consequence that some steps should be immediately taken for their relief.

‘ In case measures should not be provided by the government of Bombay to feed the Europeans coming up the ghauts with the Peshwah; and if these troops are to be fed by my departments, it will be necessary to add to my establishment of servants in the provision departments; and I enclose a list of servants, artificers, &c., which I request you to urge Mr. Duncan to send to me. I shall write to him fully upon this and other points, as soon as I can get upon the tappall road.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Munro.*

‘ Camp at Hutteer, 50 miles from Meritch,

8th April, 1803.

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ As it is impossible that the service on which I am employed may last after the rivers shall fill, it is necessary that I should make arrangements for having boats upon all of them. I have accordingly written to Purneah, and to Mr. Read, to have some prepared in Mysore and in Soon-dah; and I must request you to have twenty basket boats made in the Ceded districts. They should be of the size of ten feet diameter, and three feet deep, and I wish that they may be covered with double leather. The leathers ought to be sewed with thong, and of such a size as to cover the gunnels of the boats all round. I intend that your boats should be upon the Malpoorba, respecting which I will write to you hereafter. Besides boats, I shall want boatmen, of which your districts ought to furnish a large proportion. Purneah

says, that when he managed Harponnelly, that district in particular furnished a large number of people of this description. The total number that I shall want is three hundred, of which Soondah can give only twenty; Mysore, I suppose, about one hundred; and I must depend upon you for the remainder.

‘ The pay which I have given the boatmen is one gold fanam for every day they do not work, and two gold fanams for every day they do; this money paid daily if they choose it. Let me know how many people of this description you can send me for this pay. You will see, by the date of this letter, that I have lost no time; and I am still in high style. I am now moving towards the Nizam’s frontier, to facilitate a communication with Colonel Stevenson, and eventually our junction. As I advance, Futty Sing and Meer Khan fall back, and I meet with no opposition. I expect to be at Poonah some time about the 20th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Munro.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Kowlaspoor, 10th April, 1803.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 1st, by which I observe that you have not got the key of the cipher. It is therefore more than probable that you will not have been able to read the orders which I sent you on the 5th, and the 8th instant, to desire you to march towards Punderpoor, and afterwards to march towards Nursingpoor, at the junction of the Neera and Beemah, and to meet me there on the 13th.

‘ If you should have received the cipher, and those letters, you will of course have commenced your march, and probably will now be near Punderpoor, or Nursingpoor, and you will continue to your destination. If you should not have been able to read those orders, and of course have not obeyed them, then I request you, upon the receipt of this letter, to commence your march to Gardoon, on the Beemah, at which place you will hear further from me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Kowlaspoor, 11th April, 1803.

‘ I have received your letters of the 30th and 31st of March, and the 2nd instant; and I have delivered to the different sirdars the letters enclosed in the former.

‘ About a month ago, the vakeels of Appah Saheb made a proposition to me regarding Moraba Furnavees, which I did not exactly comprehend, and to which I then gave no answer, but referred the subject to Malcolm. It was that he might be received under the Company’s protection, and that he might be allowed to retire from Poonah whenever he might think proper. At a subsequent meeting, the vakeels were told that he might come to camp, where he should remain in safety; that endeavors would be made to reconcile the Peshwah towards him; and that if they should not succeed, he should be permitted to go wherever he pleased. The groundwork of this engagement was the probability that this man would be useful to the cause of the Peshwah and ourselves. But he certainly might do it an injury; and there did not appear any objection to placing him in the situation in which we found him; that is to say, at liberty to go where he pleased, if the Peshwah should not be reconciled to him.

‘ Three weeks elapsed without hearing more of Moraba Furnavees, when I heard that he was arrived at Meritch; and it was even reported that he was in camp. About the same time, a few days ago, Bappojee Vittell, the Peshwah’s officer, came to me, and told me that the Peshwah had given him directions that Moraba Furnavees should be arrested and given over to his charge. I then desired Moraba not to come here, as I found that the Peshwah was so much irritated against him, that he had desired that he might be arrested; and it was therefore probable that his Highness would never be induced to pardon him. At all events it was not proper that I should receive in my camp a person respecting whom the Peshwah had given orders that he might be arrested. He is now gone to the northward.

‘ Appah Saheb sent to me yesterday, to inform me that when we should arrive at Poonah he should desire to take leave, as he could not meet the Peshwah. The causes of his

wish not to meet his Highness, are the Peshwah's conduct towards him upon the subject of the Rajah of Kolapoor, and his general fears of the Peshwah's suspicious and jealous disposition. I told his vakeels that there was plenty of time to take into consideration this determination, and that I hoped he would not so far forget his own interest as to take such a step in a hurry. The result of the conversation was a promise on their part to endeavor to alter his intentions; but they said that they thought I should have most influence over him.

‘ When I sent Appah Saheb the Peshwah's letter, enclosed in yours of the 30th, I told his vakeels that I understood from you that the Peshwah was very desirous to be reconciled to their master, and that that letter would probably contain some expressions of friendship which would be agreeable to him. They informed me yesterday that the letter was no more than a copy of the first, sent to desire him to join me, and in the same terms as that written to every other sirdar.

‘ The departure of this man from Poonah would be a severe blow upon us; and you may therefore rely upon my exerting all the influence I may have over him to induce him to stay. In truth, excepting his family, and those under his influence, and Goklah, and one of the Peshwah's officers, Bappojee Vittell, not a soul has joined this detachment; although all have been repeatedly written to, and places have been appointed for their junction, to which they have promised to come.

‘ There can be no doubt but that the establishment of our influence at Poonah will be highly disagreeable to the majority of the Marhatta chiefs, and that it will interfere materially with the interests of some, and the objects of ambition of all. It may be expected that it will be opposed by the more powerful of the members of the Marhatta States; and, upon the whole, it is clear that, in this crisis of Marhatta affairs, all means of conciliation ought to be adopted by the Peshwah, to reconcile as many of his servants as possible to the new system introduced into the Government. It would appear, however, from the Peshwah's conduct, either that he does not feel the nature of his situation in this respect, or that, feeling it, he is indifferent



to it. There are some instances of his conduct, as it affects those who are serving him in concert with us, which appear rather extraordinary: one is his having sent a man, by name Soobarow Mooty, to seize the talooks of Savanore, and Darwar, and to collect the revenues of them; thus depriving Goklah of the only means of paying his army; and at all events creating a disturbance in those countries, in which it is so material to us to maintain tranquillity.

‘ This Soobarow Mooty is the man who was in the service of the Rajah of Mysore, from which he was turned out by your desire, in consequence of his having had improper communications with Holkar at Poonah.

‘ I have him in this camp, where he shall remain till we get to Poonah.

‘ Another instance is his employment of the Rajah of Kolapoor to seize the person of Moraba Furnavees, who he says, in the letter he writes upon that subject, is with the Putwurdun, near Meritch. Will the art of man be able to convince the Putwurdun of this one fact, that the Peshwah will reconcile with them, and will make a reasonable arrangement of their affairs with the Rajah of Kolapoor?

‘ Another extraordinary instance of counteraction in the Peshwah, is his order to the only servant he has here, Bappojee Vittell, to seize the jaghires of all those who have joined Holkar. This may be a very proper measure at any other time; but the consequence of carrying it into execution, at present, would be the separation from this detachment of every Marhatta horseman that now accompanies it; and if they once separate from us, I do not think them likely to join again.

‘ I mention these circumstances to you, because I think that in your arduous situation you ought to be made acquainted with every thing. In the present state of the Peshwah’s government, he must be considered as engaged in a civil war, in which there can be but two descriptions of persons, loyalists and rebels. The general effect of his measures ought to be to increase the numbers and to bring forward the services of the former, which, particularly as his government is to be re-established by strangers, can be done only by extraordinary conciliation. You know best whether his disposition is of a kind to adopt this mode.

‘ I have already written to you fully respecting our junction with you. Colonel Stevenson has not got the cipher; and therefore I am afraid that he will not have been able to read the orders which I sent him to join me at Nursingpoor, at the junction of the Beemah and Neera rivers on the day after to-morrow. In case he should not have been able to read my former orders, I have sent him directions to march to Gardoon.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I enclose a memorandum upon an important subject, which I beg you to give to Mr. Duncan, and request him to have the measures proposed carried into execution.’

MEMORANDUM RESPECTING BOATS, &c., FOR BRIDGES.

(*Copy sent to Mr. Duncan.*)

1. In the present state of our affairs, it is possible that the troops stationed in the territories of the Peshwah, and on the frontiers of the Nizam, may be under the necessity of carrying on military operations at an early period after their arrival in the neighbourhood of Poonah. The western rains will have set in in the month of May, and the rivers which rise in the western ghauts will fill in June; and although to carry on military operations in that season is attended with some inconveniences, I conceive that it is also attended by advantages to our troops; particularly if they possess the power of passing the rivers, which the superior knowledge of European nations in the art of war has brought to the highest state of perfection.

‘ 2. When a force shall be stationed at Poonah, there will be a complete chain across the peninsula, of which Bombay must be considered the point of support. The junction of the corps at Hyderabad and Poonah, with what Bombay could afford, would effectually oppose the invasion of the Deccan by any of the powers of Hindustan. But in order to do this with success, it is necessary that they should collect, at least as soon as the powers of Hindustan commence to approach the Nerbudda, and this can be done only by the use of the superior European mode of crossing

the numerous rivers during the rains which intersect this part of the Peninsula.

‘ 3. The operations, therefore, which it may be necessary to carry on during the approaching rains, and, at all events, the efficiency of the forces to be stationed at Hyderabad and Poonah, and their support by Bombay, require that a pontoon establishment should be formed immediately at that presidency.

‘ 4. The cheapest mode of forming this establishment would be at once to make the pontoons which it might be expected would be required for the service; but it is necessary that something of this kind should be proposed immediately, and there is not time for the construction of the pontoons on that plan which has been most approved. It appears, however, that by incurring a trifling expense, a substitute can be found at Bombay, and that the troops in this country will have all the advantages of a pontoon establishment, even in this season, should the operations take place, which I think possible.

‘ 5. I shall now proceed to detail the substitute which I would propose for pontoons; the mode in which they ought to be fitted up; the stores, &c., which ought to be prepared for a bridge of boats; and the establishment which ought to be formed for it. I shall afterwards point out the mode in which I propose it should be carried.

‘ 6. There are in all parts of the coast of Malabar boats cut out from the solid teak trees, flat bottomed, and with sharp prows; they are to be found also of all dimensions. These would answer if they could be obtained of that size which is most approved of for pontoons, or of one nearly approaching to it. That size is as follows:—

	Feet.	Inches.
Greatest length . . . . .	21	0
Length at bottom . . . . .	16	8
Width within . . . . .	3	11
Width at bottom . . . . .	3	5
Depth . . . . .	2	1

But if they cannot be procured of that size, I shall be satisfied with them if of 18 feet long and  $3\frac{1}{2}$  feet broad; but the greatest possible breadth, and the length as above stated is desirable. It is necessary, however, that they should be all

of the same length, and nearly of the same breadth, and of the same height. They ought also to be painted or stained with the oil used for Patamar boats, in order to preserve them from the sun and weather.

‘ There ought to be forty of these boats: for each boat there ought to be the following stores—four beams called baulks, 22 feet 8 inches long, 1 foot wide, and 4 inches thick; one gang board 22 feet long, 1 foot wide, and  $2\frac{1}{4}$  inches thick: ten planks 12 feet long, 2 feet wide, and  $1\frac{1}{2}$  inch thick.

- 1 Oar.
- 1 Anchor.
- 1 Graplin.
- 4 Iron bolts with keys.
- 4 Binding sticks.
- 4 Spring lines.
- 4 Fascines.
- 4 Pickets.
- 1 Cable.
- 1 Sheer line.
- 1 Pontoon carriage.

With this Memorandum goes a paper, which will point out the mode in which a bridge of boats is made; and consequently that in which the beams above mentioned should be prepared for being bolted together; and that in which the planks should be prepared to be laid upon the beams.

‘ 7. Besides these stores, there ought to be two five inch cables, each of 500 yards in length.

‘ 8. There ought to be the following establishment for these boats:—

- 1 Officer of the corps of Engineers.
- 1 Bridge Master.
- 1 European Conductor.
- 6 Carpenters.
- 6 Smiths.
- 6 Hammermen.
- 6 Bellows Boys.
- 80 Harbour or River Lascars.

‘ 9. The common mode of carrying pontoons in Europe is on a two wheeled carriage, on which is placed the pon-

toon, and within it all its stores. That mode of carriage, however, is inconvenient, and would not answer, particularly in this country, in which all carriages are drawn by bullocks. The carriages, therefore, for these boats ought to be on four wheels.

‘10. That which would answer best, and would be most easily prepared, would be one made of the old axle trees and wheels of common brass 6 and 12 pounder gun carriages. Two of these ought to be joined together by a perch. A bed for the boat ought to be fixed on each axle tree; that on the front axle tree being made so high, as to permit the wheels to traverse under the boat, when it should be required to turn the carriage: this bed, on the fore axle tree, ought to be fixed by a pin in the centre, on which it would turn.

‘11. The common calculation of the weight of a pontoon with its equipment, is 1200 pounds. I am not certain of the weight of one of the boats, which I have above pointed out as a substitute, but I imagine it may be about 300 or 400 pounds! In that case, one of these carriages may be able to carry two of these boats with their equipment. But upon this point those who will fit them out will be the best judges. I have only to observe, that the carriages ought not to bear a greater weight than 1200 or 1300 pounds.

‘12. It is recommended, that as soon as the boats can be procured and the machinery completed, the bridge should be fitted in the strong tideway in Bombay harbour, between the shore and a vessel moored.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

MEMORANDUM ON THE MANNER OF LAYING A BRIDGE OF BOATS  
ACROSS A RIVER.

‘The bank on each side where the ends of the bridge are to be, must be made solid and firm by means of fascines or otherwise. One end of the cable must be carried across the river, and being fixed to a picket, or to any thing firm, must be drawn tight across where the heads of the boats are to be ranged.

‘The boats are to be then launched, having on board each two men, with the necessary ropes, &c., and are floated down

the stream under the cable to which they are lashed end-ways, by the rings and small ropes at equal distances, and about their own breadth asunder, more or less, according to the strength required.

‘If the river be very rapid, a second cable must be stretched across it, parallel to the first, and at the distance of the length of the boats, and to which the other ends of the boats must be lashed.

‘The spring lines are then lashed diagonally from one boat to the other to brace them tight; and the anchors, if necessary, carried out up the stream, and fixed to the cable or sheer line across the river.

‘One of the chesses or planks is then laid on the edge of the bank, at each end of the bridge, bottom up, which serves to lay the ends of the baulks or beams upon; (it appears that the beams ought to lay in lines across the boats, from one end of the bridge to the other, and must be bolted together in such manner as to allow of fixing them in that mode;) and as a direction for placing them at the proper distances, to fit the chesses or planks that cover the bridge.

‘The baulks should be then laid across the boats and keyed together, their numbers proportioned to the strength required in the bridge. If the gang boards are laid across the heads and sterns of the boats, from one side of the river to the other, they will give the men a footing for doing the rest of the work.

‘Across the baulks are laid the chesses one after another, the edges to meet, (the chesses or planks must have laths nailed upon them in such manner as to form four grooves to receive the four beams on which the planks are to be laid,) and baulks running between the cross pieces on the under side of the chesses. The gang boards are then laid across the ends of the chesses on each edge of the bridge.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Kowlaspoor, 11th April, 1803.

‘I did hope to be joined by Colonel Stevenson on the day after to-morrow, according to the orders I had sent him to that purport; but I received a letter from him last night, of

the 8th, by which I learnt that on that day he had not received the cipher from Hyderabad. A letter from me in cipher had reached him on the 1st; so that I am in great hopes still, that if he then wrote to Hyderabad for the cipher, he will have received it soon after he wrote to me on the 8th: lest, however, he should not, I have sent a party of horse to him, with a letter to desire him to march to Gardoon, to which place I shall send him further orders.

‘ I have no news. Holkar appears to be in full march to Chandore. Futty Sing and Meer Khan cross the Beemah this day, I believe, to follow him: all his troops are withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Poonah; in which city however, Amrut Rao still remains with about 2000 horse and 2000 infantry, with guns. I shall be at Poonah about the 20th.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp at Aklooss on the Neera,  
13th April, 1803.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Appah Saheb called upon me on the evening of the 11th, to apprise me of his intention to ask to take leave, as soon as we should arrive in the neighbourhood of Poonah. All possible arguments were urged to induce him to remain and meet the Peshwah, to which he did not pretend to give an answer; but merely said that he had made a vow that he would not meet his Highness, till his affairs with the Kolapoor Rajah were settled. Upon being told that he could not expect that any measures would be taken in his favor, if he did not come forward heartily in the present crisis, he said that he was sorry for it, and that he must submit to his fate. Never did I see a man so obstinate, and so little able to bring forward even pretences to justify his obstinacy.

‘ His vakeels declare that he is obstinate, that he really feels what he says, and they have desired me to urge him to alter this intention. I rather suspect, however, that he has expressed this desire to take leave, either in order that we may press the Peshwah to settle his affairs with the Rajah of Kolapoor, or in consequence of some arrangement made

with Moraba Furnavees. Appah Saheb and his brother had a meeting with this man, which lasted all night, at which nobody else was present, and nobody knows what passed.

‘ I am now seven marches from Poonah. Stevenson ought to be this day at the junction of the Beemah and Neera, eight miles from here.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ Camp at Sarhatty upon the Neera,  
14th April, 1803.

‘ SIR,

‘ I was in hopes that I should have been joined by Colonel Stevenson this day, as he is but a short distance from me. But the baggage of his division was misled yesterday by accident, and he is obliged to halt for it. He will be here, however, to-morrow.

‘ I have heard from the Peshwah’s vakeel, at Sattarah, that Futtu Sing Maunia has settled his affairs with the Peshwah, and is gone into his Highness’s service. I believe it to be true, although that chief and Meer Khan went off together from this place towards Poonah, five days ago.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp at Aklooss and Sarhatty,

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

14th April, 1803.

‘ The heat of the weather and the badness of the roads destroy my wheels, particularly those of my tumbrils. I shall therefore be obliged to you if you will apply to the government of Bombay for forty wheels for tumbrils, instead of twenty, for which I before asked. It is possible, however, there may be no wheels at Bombay, and that we must repair those we have got. In that case we shall require all the seasoned timber stated in the enclosed paper. At all events we shall require a large portion of it for cart and gun wheels, and for tumbril wheels, which I know cannot be replaced at Bombay.

‘ It would be very convenient also if we could have a few artificers from Bombay for a short time.



‘ I was in hopes that Colonel Stevenson would have joined me this day, but an accident has misled his baggage, and he was obliged to halt for it this day ; I hope, however, that it will have joined him this morning, in which case he will be here to-morrow. I shall still be at Poonah on the day I told you.

‘ This timber might be sent up by coolies. I have no news.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ Camp at Akloos and Sarhatty, upon the Neera, 15th April, 1803.

‘ SIR,

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you, that Colonel Stevenson came to this camp this morning. His detachment is encamped near the junction of the Beemah and Neera rivers, and would have joined, only that, owing to a mistake, their baggage missed the road on the 13th, and had not joined till late yesterday evening.

‘ The Scotch brigade, with a third part of the provisions, remaining with this detachment, will join Colonel Stevenson’s detachment to-morrow morning.

‘ The next objects of my attention are to secure the march of the Peshwah from Bassein to Poonah, and to open a communication with the coast, so as to draw from thence the supplies which I may require. I have already arranged with Lieut. Colonel Close a plan for the Peshwah’s march ; and in order to secure the execution of it, I shall move immediately towards Poonah, and from thence towards the Bhore ghaut. I shall reach the head of the ghaut before the Peshwah will be at the foot of it.

‘ Holkar himself is near Chandore, about 300 miles from Poonah, and the officers and troops in his service have all followed in the same direction. Amrut Rao alone remains at Poonah with about 1500 men, and I have no doubt but that he also will go off as I shall advance. Under these circumstances, it has appeared to me to be unnecessary to bring to Poonah all the troops ; and as the country is much exhausted, and there is but little forage in any place, I have thought it best to dispose of them in such situations as that

the whole will procure forage and subsistence, and they may join with facility and celerity in case that measure should appear to be advisable. Accordingly, I have desired Colonel Stevenson to march from his present position up the Beemah to Gardoon; to leave near that place, within the Nizam's frontier, all his Highness's troops; and to place himself, with the Company's troops, farther up that river towards Poonah, near its junction with the Moota Moola.

' Hereafter, when the Peshwah shall have arrived at Poonah, and I have received supplies from Bombay, it will be equally convenient and consistent with the safety of all the troops to make a movement to the eastward, and to place more of them within the Nizam's frontier, and I shall accordingly adopt this measure when circumstances will permit it.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Lieut. Gen. Stuart.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

' Camp at Aklooss and Sarhatty upon the Neera,  
15th April, 1803.

' SIR,

' I have the pleasure to inform you that Colonel Stevenson came over here from his camp this morning, and the Scotch brigade will join him to-morrow. I have written to the Adjutant General this day upon the subject of my future operations, in which letter you will observe a detail of the line of march which Colonel Stevenson will take.

' The proceedings of a General Court Martial go this day to Major Pierce, as Judge Advocate, on a sepoy for desertion. I am sorry to have to inform you, that this crime has been very common lately, particularly in Colonel Chalmers' corps, to which that sepoy belongs, and in Colonel Orrock's. The former has lost eighty men since the 15th of last month, and the latter thirty three since the first of this month. I therefore think it desirable that the sentence on this sepoy should be carried into execution.

' I have heard that Meer Khan, having learned that Futty Sing Maunia had made his bargain with the Peshwah, and had sent his family, with a body of horse, towards Sattarah, attacked his camp, plundered it, and took Futty Sing prisoner. His infantry, however, had got off, and had been

taken into the service of the Peshwah by his ladies at Poonah, who had even supplied them with money. Meer Khan, after this feat, went off to the northward, with some degree of precipitation. I believe the principal facts of this story to be true.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ Camp at Aklooss, upon the Neera,

15th April, 1803.

‘ SIR,

‘ I should have written to you before now, only that I had no direct mode of communicating with you, and I know that Major Malcolm, who has accompanied me, wrote to you daily.

‘ I have now the pleasure to inform you, that I joined Colonel Stevenson this day, and have reinforced the detachment under his command by the Scotch brigade. I have advanced thus far without the smallest opposition. I have been joined by some of the Marhatta jaghiredars of the southern countries, principally those who served in the year 1800, with the British troops under my command; and by some of the sirdars, who quitted the Peshwah by his Highness's desire, when he fled from Mhar; others, of both descriptions, are expected, and I know that some are on their road to join.

‘ As I have advanced, Meer Khan and Futtu Sing Maunia, the former of whom, with other Patan Chiefs, was on the Nizam's frontier, and the latter, with other Marhatta chiefs, towards Meritch, have gradually fallen back. They joined their forces near this place, and marched five days ago towards Poonah.

‘ I hear that Futtu Sing Maunia, who offered himself to me, has made an arrangement with the Peshwah. I have this account from the Peshwah's vakeel at Sattarah, the person, I believe, who concluded the arrangement.

‘ Whether Futtu Sing has made this arrangement or not, it is very obvious that he does not think himself equal to cope with either of the British detachments, even when joined by Meer Khan. It is therefore probable that the two chiefs will continue to draw off as I shall advance towards

Poonah ; and at last, if they should not have quitted Holkar's service, that they will retire entirely with Amrut Rao, who is still at Poonah.

‘ My plan of operations now is to bring the Peshwah up the ghauts ; to receive from Bombay the supplies of provisions which are necessary for the troops, and which have been prepared ; and while I am effecting these objects, to keep the troops in such situations as that they will procure forage, and can join with ease and celerity, in case an attack should be threatened from the northward. With this view I have desired Colonel Stevenson to leave the Nizam's troops on the Beemah, within the Nizam's frontier, and they will move on towards Gardoon, where they will remain. The Colonel, with his detachment, will be either upon the Beemah or the Kurrah river, about two or three marches from the Nizam's troops, and the same distance from Poonah, and I shall be in that neighbourhood. By this disposition we shall all get forage, and shall subsist with ease ; at the same time that we shall be able to join at any point which may be threatened.

‘ I beg that in case you should think it necessary to acquaint the Nizam's ministers of this disposition, you will do me the favor to inform them that I shall pay due attention to the safety of the Nizam's frontier. As soon as the Peshwah shall have reached Poonah, and I shall have received the supplies which I require, it will be consistent with the general objects in view, and with the safety of the troops, to make a movement of all these bodies to their right, and thus to bring more of them into the Nizam's territories. In the mean time I do not think there is any reason to apprehend that they will be attacked.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Akloos, 15th April, 1803.

‘ You will be desirous to hear from me, and to receive my opinion of the state of our military affairs in this country ; and I take the earliest opportunity of writing to you, afforded by the junction of the Nizam's army.

‘ My march to this place has been unopposed, and I have

received from the country all the assistance which it could afford. I have been joined by some of the southern jaghiredars, and of the Peshwah's officers, who quitted him by his desire at Mhar, after he had fled from Poonah; but there are many of both descriptions still absent. The jaghiredars who have joined are principally those who served with the troops under my command in the campaign of 1800; and the sirdars are those lately raised by the Peshwah to high offices in the state from very inferior situations. In all it is easy to observe a want of attachment to the cause of the Peshwah, but particularly in the jaghiredars I have observed not only a want of attachment and zeal, but a detestation of his person, and an apprehension of his power, founded upon a long series of mutual injuries.

‘None of these persons have ever hinted to me the nature of our engagements with the Peshwah, or their sentiments upon them: as, however, these engagements may affect the interests of some, and the objects of ambition of all, it is not unreasonable to suppose that they view them with jealousy. I am far from thinking, however, that if, in consequence of these engagements, we should be attacked by any thing like a confederacy of the greater Marhatta powers, we shall have to carry on this contest unassisted by these chiefs; but the number of those who will assist us, and the degree of assistance which they may give, will depend much upon the Peshwah.

‘We have, undoubtedly, an influence over those chiefs, one which is daily increasing, to which I attribute our successful progress to this moment. This influence is founded in some degree upon their fear of our power, but much more upon their hope of our support in forwarding their views, and of our protection against the violence and oppression of their own government, and the greater Marhatta powers.

‘Here we must depend upon the personal character of the Peshwah, and upon the manner in which the new treaty will work: upon which points I shall defer to write any thing until I am better informed.

‘Having brought up my corps thus far, and effected a junction with the Nizam's army, it is my intention to march to Poonah, which place I shall reach about the 20th, and

then to bring up the Peshwah from Bassein. I have already arranged a plan for this purpose, which I have sent to Colonel Close, according to which the Peshwah will ascend the ghauts about the 28th. Holkar himself has gone towards Chandore, about two hundred miles from Poonah, and his detachments, under Futtu Sing and Meer Khan, which were, the former near Meritch, and the latter on the Nizam's frontier, near Beejapoor, have fallen back gradually as I advanced. They joined at this place, and went off towards Poonah five days ago.

‘ You will have heard of Futtu Sing's treating with the Peshwah, and Meer Khan's treating with the Nizam, to enter into the service of those princes respectively. Futtu Sing offered himself to me. I referred him to the Peshwah, and I heard last night from the Peshwah's vakeel at Sattarah, who, I believe, conducted this treaty, that all matters between the Peshwah and Futtu Sing were arranged. If, however, they should not be so, and these chiefs should still continue in Holkar's service, I conclude that they will fall back still farther as I advance to Poonah; and that they will take with them Amrut Rao, who is still in that city with a small force. I intend therefore, at present, to dispose of the troops between the ghauts and the Nizam's frontier in such a manner as that all will find forage and subsistence; and that if there should be any appearance of an attack, the whole may form and protect the part menaced without loss of time. The question, whether the supposed confederacy will be formed, and whether we shall have to contend with it, ought to be brought to a decision as soon as possible :

‘ First, Because, if we are to have a war, we shall carry it on with great advantage during the rainy season :

‘ Secondly, Because we are ready, and the supposed enemy are not; and every day's delay after this time is an unnecessary increase of expense to us, and an advantage to them :

‘ Thirdly, Because we shall immediately ascertain the views and intentions of the Peshwah regarding the alliance in general; and we shall leave no time for intrigues among the jaghiredars in his and our interest :

‘ Fourthly, Because nothing but our determined and early opposition to the confederacy can save us from it, supposing

it to exist. To withdraw from our engagements with the Peshwah will rather accelerate its attack, with the addition of the Peshwah's force.

‘ In order to bring this question to a decision, the Peshwah should be urged immediately (if possible before he should arrive at Poonah) to desire Scindiah to re-cross the Nerbudda. This chief ought at the same time to be pressed upon this point by our minister at his camp: and all the screws, menaces, &c., might be brought to bear upon him, upon his Frenchmen, and upon the Rajah of Berar.

‘ If Scindiah should cross the Nerbudda, and our minister is kept in his camp, we shall know upon what to depend. We ought immediately to break up our army in this country, taking care to have at Bombay a sufficient number of Europeans to reinforce the Poonah detachment, whenever their services can be required, and to keep our north-west frontier of Mysore and the Ceded districts in strength.

‘ My reasons for thinking that the army here ought to be broke up, if Scindiah goes across the Nerbudda, are,—

‘ First, That it does not weaken us, because the same number of native troops as we have at present will be at Poonah; we shall have the Europeans and train of ordnance at Bombay, to join the Poonah detachment; and the cavalry in the Ceded districts can always join the Hyderabad detachment in a short time:

‘ Secondly, Because the corps at Hyderabad and Poonah, thus reinforced, can join as soon as Scindiah shows an intention to cross the Nerbudda:

‘ Thirdly, Because by breaking up the army, and leaving nothing more at Poonah than the usual detachment, the jealousy of our strength will cease in a great degree, and we may then see in what manner the new treaty will work.

‘ I think it probable that a system of menace towards Scindiah, his Frenchmen, and the Rajah of Berar, will put a stop to the negotiations for the formation of the confederacy, to which there are already many natural obstacles, particularly as we and the Nizam are prepared, and already in the field. But if Scindiah should refuse to give an unequivocal symptom of his good intentions by retiring across the Nerbudda, I can have no doubt of the confederacy; and, for the

reasons I have above stated, we ought to attack it without loss of time.

‘The operations in this event will be of a nature so general, that it is difficult to give an opinion concerning them. The battle must be fought either on the Nizam’s frontier, or near Poonah, by these troops; but the impression which will put an end to the contest, like that which will prevent the confederacy, must be made from the northern frontier of Bengal, and from Midnapoor.

‘This letter is already of a greater length than I intended to make it, and contains a consideration of points which requires a more detailed discussion than I can give them at present; but still, I think it is best to send it to you. Malcolm has apprised me of the reasons for which you are anxious to bring these questions to a decision as soon as possible, of the validity of which I am fully sensible. But exclusive of these reasons, which must be conclusive to every friend of yours, those of a military nature, to which I have above alluded, are decisive.’

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Nimbsakur, 16th April, 1803.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 7th. I am glad to find that there is, in your opinion, so little chance of a combination. I agree entirely in opinion with you, and I wish sincerely that the gentleman at Hyderabad was of the same opinion, or thinking differently, that he would keep his opinion concealed.

‘ There is a report in camp that the Rajah of Berar is dead, which will certainly put an end to all thoughts of the combination which has been apprehended; although it may eventually occasion others which may give us equal or greater trouble.

‘ I have written a letter to Amrut Rao, of which I enclose a copy; I shall also write a letter to Govind Rao Praunsepy, to apprise him of my approach, and to request him to inform the ladies thereof. Likewise to learn from them what guards



they would wish to have in the city, on the day that the troops will encamp in the neighbourhood.

‘ I wrote to you fully respecting the march of the Peshwah, and shall say no more on that subject till I receive your answer.

‘ Goklah’s distresses press upon him very strongly, and I have some apprehension of the effect which the approaching departure of Appah Saheb may have upon him, as well as upon others. I have, therefore, in consequence of your letter, given him 10,000 rupees; but I shall give him no more, till I receive from you a positive request from the Peshwah to make him an advance.

‘ You will have heard of the plunder of Futtu Sing’s camp by Meer Khan; the latter has marched off to the northward. As there remains in these parts at present no force of any consequence, I have directed the execution of that disposition of which I apprised you.

‘ Accordingly, Colonel Stevenson, who was in my camp yesterday, and was joined by the Scotch brigade, marches up the Beemah, with the Nizam’s troops, on the left bank of that river. They will halt within their own frontier, opposite Gardoon; and the Colonel will move on with the Company’s troops to his station, which will be somewhere below the junction of the Beemah with the Moota Moola. He will arrive there much about the same time that I shall arrive at Poonah.

‘ I enclose a list of medicines wanted for the troops, which I request you to apply for:—they must be sent up by coolies. The sheep contract will answer well.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ Camp at Somergaum, Junction of the Neera  
and Kurrah, 17th April, 1803.

‘ SIR,

‘ I received last night your letter of the 10th. As I observe you have not received regular information from Lieut. Colonel Close since the 22nd of March, I enclose copies of the letters which I have received from him, since that date, which contain any thing of importance; a practice which I

shall continue till I shall hear from you that you receive regular intelligence from Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ The dispatch from Lieut. Colonel Collins, of the 25th of March, is very important and satisfactory. You will observe the communication to Lord Wellesley of the intention of burning Poonah. With a view to prevent the execution of this plan I have written a very civil letter to Amrut Rao to announce my approach, in which I have stated that I shall take measures to ensure the safety and tranquillity of the city on my arrival there.

‘ I think it possible that this letter may draw from him an answer, and that he will send me a vakeel ; and if he does, and remains at Poonah, I shall keep up the correspondence till I get within reach of Poonah with the cavalry, when I shall move forward briskly to prevent the execution of this horrible plan.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ Camp, 4 miles west from Baramootty,  
18th April, 1803.

‘ SIR,

‘ In a letter which I addressed to Mr. Duncan by desire of Lieut. General Stuart, on the 20th of January last, I apprised him of the probable wants of the body of troops, which it was at that time expected would march from the frontiers of the territories of the Rajah of Mysore towards Poonah ; and I requested him to give orders that preparations might be made at Bombay for supplying those wants.

‘ I have now the honor to inform you that I have advanced thus far towards Poonah, in command of a detachment from the army, which it was heretofore supposed would enter the Marhatta territories ; and that I shall immediately send bullocks to Poonah for loads from the different departments of the body of troops according to the statement which follows hereafter. Grain department: 1700 bullocks for rice. Provision department: 500 bullocks for salt provisions ; 200 bullocks for arrack, 20 casks of 60 gallons each, to be filled with arrack. Gram department: 3000 bullocks for gram. Brinjarries:—bullocks for rice,—for

grain,—for wheat,—for salt. I have above mentioned the greatest number of bullocks which can be sent immediately from each department. As, however, the cattle have made an extraordinary long march in a short space of time, and in an unfavorable season, it is probable that the number which will be sent from each department will not amount to that above set down. But that will be a matter of immaterial consequence.

‘ I propose to direct the heads of departments to indent upon the garrison storekeeper at Bombay for the number of loads for which cattle can be sent ; specifying in the indent the contents of the loads, according to an account of the mode in which they will be prepared, which I have received from Captain Moor. I shall countersign these indents ; and I shall be obliged to you, if you will lay my request before the Honorable the Governor in Council, that the garrison storekeeper may receive orders to supply at Panwell all indents countersigned by me.

‘ The brinjarries are a species of dealers who attend the armies with grain and other supplies, which they sell in the bazaars. In general, they seek for those supplies which are sold at the cheapest rate, and they bring them on their bullocks to the armies. Occasionally, however, these supplies have been issued to them from the public stores, as well by the native, as by the Company’s governments, at a cheap rate, and they are allowed to sell them at the usual rate of the camp bazaars. It would not be reasonable to expect that the brinjarries who attend this camp would return in such time as to be at all useful to this body, if they were to go to Mysore to procure fresh supplies ; and as this country is exhausted, and at all events does not produce rice, which is the ordinary consumption in the camps of the Company’s armies, it will be necessary to issue rice and other supplies to the brinjarries from the stores collected at Bombay. Indeed, I requested Mr. Duncan to collect this store with a view to this issue.

‘ The mode in which the issues of supplies to the brinjarries ought to be regulated, is as follows. The superintendent of bazaars ought to give the gomastah of the brinjarries an order upon the stores for the quantities of the different species of supplies required. The gomastah will

accompany the brinjaries to the stores, and will pass his receipt in duplicate for the quantity received. One copy of the receipt ought to remain with the garrison storekeeper, to form, together with the order of the superintendent of bazaars, his voucher for the issue; and the other copy ought to be forwarded to the superintendent, to enable him to recover from the brinjaries the price of the supplies in proportion as they shall dispose of them. The superintendent then becomes responsible to Government for the price which may be settled for each article of supplies, thus issued upon receipts to the brinjaries.

‘ If the Governor in Council should approve of this mode of regulating the issue of supplies to the brinjaries from the public stores at Bombay, I have to request he will give orders to the garrison storekeeper to issue whatever may be required upon an order signed by Captain Barclay, the superintendent of supplies, taking from the gomastah of brinjaries a receipt for the same in duplicate; one copy of which is to be forwarded to Captain Barclay in camp, the other to remain with the garrison storekeeper, to form together with Captain Barclay’s order his vouchers for the issue.

‘ I shall hereafter lay before the Governor in Council an account of the prices at which I may be able to agree with the brinjaries that they shall take these supplies; and I shall request his orders regarding the mode in which the money received from them is to be disposed of.

‘ I have transmitted to the Resident with the Peshwah, a list of the medical stores, which will be required for the use of the troops under my command; and I beg you to lay my request before the Governor in Council, that these may be sent to Poonah by such conveyance as he may think proper. I have also transmitted to the Resident with the Peshwah an account of wheels which are required for iron 12 pounders, and others for ammunition tumbrils, and of timber which will be required for the repair of nearly all the wheels and the ordnance carriages in this detachment. I request, that if it should be possible to send these articles from the arsenal at Bombay, they may be transmitted by such conveyance as the Honorable the Governor in Council may think proper.

‘ I have communicated to the Resident with the Peshwah a list of artificers who will be required for the department of the commissary of provisions with this detachment; and a list of servants who will be required by the same officer, in case it should be intended that he should victual the European troops advancing with the Peshwah. I request that orders may be given that these may be hired and sent; and that the assistance of the artificers belonging to the arsenal of Bombay may be given to repair the ordnance carriages in this detachment, as far as may be practicable, consistently with the performance of other necessary work at Bombay.

‘ By a copy of a letter from Captain Moor to the Governor of Bombay, which I have just received from Lieut. General Stuart, I observe that he has made an agreement for the purchase of 15,000 sheep, to be delivered at Poonah. Some of these will be necessary immediately for the subsistence of the troops; and at all events, as the rains may soon be expected, it is desirable that the whole should be sent up the Ghauts without loss of time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp, 4 miles west of Baramooty,  
18 April, 1803.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I have just received your letter of the 11th; the cossids who brought it, and who left Poonah on the 16th, in the morning, report that Amrut Rao marched five days ago. I think this report is probable; but if I should find that it is not true, and that Amrut Rao is still at Poonah, I shall do something of the kind that you recommend, but in a more effectual manner. I shall march to-morrow night to Poonah with the cavalry. I had intended this before I received your letter.

‘ Ball Kischen Gungurdhur is not here. The other sirdars also, who quitted the Peshwah when he was at Mharr, are absent, excepting Bappojee Vittell, whose party is but small. The Putwurdun and Goklah, in my opinion, are not to be trusted in a business of this nature.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ Camp, 4 miles west of Baramootty,  
18th April, 1803.

‘ Sir,

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received this morning from Lieut. Colonel Close. The messengers who brought it from Poonah, report that Amrut Rao quitted that city four days ago, which report is confirmed from another quarter. But if he should not have done so, I shall, to-morrow night, carry into execution the plan which I yesterday informed you that I had formed, in order to frustrate his designs.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Harness.*

‘ Bottom of the Bhore Ghaut,  
20th April, 1803, 8 A. M.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ The road down the ghaut is so bad that the cavalry guns have been detained at it till now, and I think that we shall not march from hence till 9 or 10. I have ordered Colonel Macleod to halt at Lovey this day, and to join me to-morrow.

‘ The pioneers, excepting those employed in the forage business, and a battalion, must work at the ghaut this day. If Heitland is not satisfied with this day’s work, he must begin upon it again early in the morning, and you must defer the march of the line till the road down the ghaut is finished.

‘ Send on your advanced guard and a battalion to Lovey with the baggage departments, brinjarrics, &c.; the road down the ghaut will answer for them, and is sufficiently extensive; but it will require much repair to make it what it ought to be for our wheel carriages, and the march of the line and park must, therefore, be late.

‘ I shudder when I think of the dreadful destruction of the wheel carriages which there will be, on this day’s and to-morrow’s march.

‘ You will find some of my leavings upon the road. If the cavalry tumbrils which I mean cannot be repaired, the

3 pounders shot in particular must be taken out of them, and brought forward. That is a scarce article.

‘ Your march of this day will be something about twelve miles ; that of to-morrow to Lovey about ten ; the following day, twelve.

‘ I do not recommend a halt, as its consequence may be that some belonging to us may stay on the ground for ever.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Harness,*  
*74th Regt.’*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Poonah, 20th April, 1803.

‘ After I wrote to you on the 18th, I heard that Amrut Rao still remained in the neighbourhood of Poonah ; that he had removed the Peshwah’s family to Sevaghur ; that many people were flying, and all believed that the town would be burnt. In consequence of this information, I marched last night with the cavalry and a battalion, and arrived here this day at about two, and the town is safe. Appah Saheb, Goklah, Appah Dessaye, and Bappojee Vittell, with their forces, accompanied me. I was detained about six hours in getting the cavalry guns through the Bhore ghaut, in consequence of which, I imagine that Amrut Rao received intelligence of my march, at such time as to enable him to depart this morning before I arrived.

‘ The infantry will be here on the day after to-morrow, and on the next day I shall move towards the ghauts.

‘ We have marched sixty miles since yesterday morning.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I am in your house, and have some of the troops quartered in your stables. I eat your forage and grain also.’

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 21st April, 1803.

‘ You will observe by my letter of this date to the Adjutant General, that I arrived here yesterday, and the effect





troops; and at last, a request from the Peshwah, that I would detach some of his officers with their troops, to provide for the safety of his family. It was obvious, that even if I could have prevailed upon these officers to go to Poonah, their force was not of the description, or of such strength, as to prevent the execution of Amrut Rao's design; and I therefore determined to march forward with the British cavalry and the Marhattas, as soon as I should arrive within a long forced march from Poonah. In the mean time I received intelligence that Amrut Rao was still in the neighbourhood on the 18th; and that he had removed the Peshwah's family to Sevaghur, a measure which was generally supposed to be preparatory to burning the town; and I marched on the 19th, at night, above forty miles to this place, making the total distance which the cavalry have marched, since the 19th in the morning, about sixty miles.

‘ Amrut Rao heard of our march yesterday morning, and marched off with some precipitation, leaving the town in safety. It is generally believed here, that he intended to burn it, and that it was saved only by our arrival. The infantry will come here to-morrow.

‘ I received a very civil letter from Amrut Rao, in answer to one which I wrote him. He says that he will send a person to talk to me upon his business. I consider it to be very important that he should be brought in, and I will do every thing in my power to induce him to submit to the Peshwah's government.

‘ Matters in general have a good appearance. I think they all will end as you wish. The combined chiefs, of whom we have heard so much, have allowed us to come quietly, and take our station at this place; and, notwithstanding their threats, have taken no one step to impede our march, or to divert our attention to other objects. Here we are now in force, in a position from which nothing can drive us, and in which we shall gain strength daily. On the other hand, they have not yet made peace among themselves; much less have they agreed to attack us, or in any particular plan of attack.

‘ If I should be mistaken, and that, in opposition to the conclusions of reasoning upon the state of our affairs with each of the Marhatta chiefs, who, we are told, were to com-

bine to attack us ; and, upon a comparison of our means of annoying each and all of them, with theirs of annoying the Nizam (which is all that they can do), we should still have a war with them, you will have the satisfaction of reflecting, that in consequence of the course of measures which you have already pursued, you have removed the seat of war to a distance from the Company's territories ; and that you have the means of carrying it on in such a state of preparation, as to insure its speedy and successful termination.

‘ In thus reasoning upon the subject, I conclude that we should have had to contend with this confederacy at all events ; or at least, that we should have had a war with the Marhatta powers, in some shape, even if this treaty with the Peshwah had not been concluded.

‘ Upon this point I have only to observe, that the establishment of Holkar's power at Poonah, founded as it was upon repeated victories over Scindiah's troops, would probably have occasioned demands upon the Nizam. But supposing that I may be mistaken, I declare, that from what I have seen of the state of this country, it would have been impossible for Holkar to maintain an army in the Deccan without invading the Nizam's territory. They have not left a stick standing at the distance of 150 miles from Poonah ; they have eaten the forage and grain ; have pulled down the houses, and have used the materials as fire-wood ; and the inhabitants are fled with their cattle. Excepting in one village, I have not seen a human creature since I quitted the neighbourhood of Meritch ; so that the result of your omitting to make some arrangement for the Peshwah, which was to occasion the re-establishment of his power, must have been the invasion of the Nizam's territories ; if only for the subsistence of those multitudes in Holkar's suite, or their march to the countries to the southward of the Kistna. This last course might have procrastinated the evil ; as they might, in those countries, have found subsistence for another year ; but then their next step would have been to seek for it in the Company's territories, the very sources from which we should have been obliged to draw our supplies in the contest which must have ensued.

‘ Supposing, therefore, that you should be blamed for adopting a course of measures in which there is a distant

risk that you may have a contest with the Marhatta powers, you have the satisfaction of reflecting, that in consequence of those measures, the scene of action must be at a distance from the Company's territories; and that you are in such a state of preparation as to insure its speedy success: at all events, it is probable that if you had not adopted those measures, either the Company or their ally must have suffered all the evils of war, without having the same means of averting them, or of limiting their duration.

' In all great actions there is risk, which the little minds of those who will form their judgment of yours will readily perceive in that which I am now considering; but their remarks ought not to give you a moment's uneasiness; and I have in this letter made you acquainted with a fact which must silence every objection to your measures, and which I shall take care to send in an official form, through the channel which I believe to be the source of the croaking which I hear.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Governor General.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

' SIR,

' Camp at Poonah, 21st April, 1803.

' After detaching the Scotch brigade to join Colonel Stevenson, as reported in my letter of the 15th of April, I continued my march towards this place by the road of Bara-mootty; I received different intimations from Lieut. Colonel Close, that it was Amrut Rao's intention to stay in this neighbourhood till I should approach with the British troops, and then to burn the city; and an urgent request from the Peshwah to detach some of his Highness's officers, with their troops, in order to provide for the safety of his family. It was obvious that, even if I could have prevailed upon these officers to go to Poonah, the force they have with them was not of the nature, or of sufficient strength, to prevent the execution of Amrut Rao's designs; and as I had intelligence that he was still in the neighbourhood on the 18th, and that he had removed the Peshwah's family to Sevaghur, a measure supposed to be preparatory to burning the city, I determined to march to Poonah in the night of the 19th, with the cavalry and a battalion of native infantry.

‘ Accordingly, I arrived here yesterday about three o’clock, having been detained about six hours in the Bhoze ghaut, and found the city in safety. Amrut Rao heard of this movement in the morning, and marched off with some precipitation. He is now at Juneer with a small force.

‘ It is generally believed here that Amrut Rao did intend to burn Poonah, and that the city has been preserved by the arrival of the British troops.

‘ The infantry of the detachment under my command will arrive here to-morrow.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Poonah, 22nd April, 1803.

‘ There is a report in circulation that Holkar had given orders to one of his officers, by name Wahag, to join Meer Khan; and to the latter, when joined by the former, to proceed towards Gardoon, and act in the Nizam’s territory. I do not believe this intelligence to be founded; however, I observe that Holkar is still upon the Godavery, and I believe Meer Khan has not gone far to the northward. It is therefore desirable that you should have an eye upon Meer Khan, and receive constant intelligence from his camp. If you should have any reason to believe that that Chief intends to attack the Nizam’s country, or the troops under Mohiput Ram, it will be necessary that you should place yourself a little nearer to those troops than we before settled: viz., within a good march of them; and your communication ought to be constant.

‘ Let me hear from you all the intelligence you may receive from Meer Khan’s camp, and I shall keep you informed of every thing that I shall learn here. I wrote you yesterday an account of the mode in which I had come here.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Poonah, 22nd April, 1803.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have had some further conversation with Appah Saheb’s vakeel, the result of which

is, that Appah Saheb consents to remain in the neighbourhood of Poonah, till the Peshwah can consider his demands and claims upon his Highness's government; but he refuses to meet the Peshwah, till he has some reason to be certain of his favor. He is very anxious that some steps should be taken in this business as soon as possible; and I now enclose the copies of memorandums which he gave me some time ago, and the copies of my answers, and the copy of an additional memorandum which he gave me this morning. These papers contain all his demands. It appears to me, that if he should be satisfied regarding his claims upon the Rajah of Kolapoor, there will be no difficulty in settling other inferior points.

'The infantry are now coming in. We have suffered a sad loss by the fracture of carriages within these last three or four marches; but by the assistance of a little maistry here, I hope that we shall soon get to rights again.

'As we can get forage here, I propose to halt for a day or two.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

'MY DEAR COLONEL,                      'Camp at Poonah, 23rd April, 1803.

'I have received your letters of the 19th. In regard to that containing intelligence of the plunder of the Nizam's territories, we are now adopting the measures most likely to secure them from that evil. I think that you doubted Sookroodoor's intelligence; and whatever may be Holkar's intention and line of action hereafter, I do not think that at present his preparations are so ripe as to induce him to make a demand upon one of the Nizam's pergunnahs. I wrote to Rastia and to Ball Kischen Gungurdhur this day, regarding their irruption into Solapoor. In respect to that letter in which you have copied an extract from one which you have received from the Resident, I have to observe, that whatever may be the Resident's private opinion, it would be as well that he should refrain from a communication of it. The fact is—here I am at Poonah, unopposed, and in strength; and the Resident knows, or ought to know, that those Chiefs, who are supposed to intend to combine against

us, have not yet made peace, and cannot have settled any plan of operations. It is true, that as we have taken into our hands the bone for which they have been contending for some years, not one of them is very well pleased, and each gives out that the whole will combine against us. But there are many considerations which must be maturely weighed, by at least two of the parties, Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, before they will venture upon a war with the English; particularly when we are prepared, and they are not.

‘It may be asked, why they give out that they intend to combine? I answer, because they know that some of us are like other men, to be frightened by their threats; that, particularly, they have their effect at the Nizam’s durbar, in which they are daily brought forward; and for this reason it is that our Resident at that durbar, instead of listening to the fears of that court, and propagating them, ought, above all other men, to inculcate the improbability of this combination; or its certain failure, if it should ever be attempted.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp at Poonah, 23rd April, 1803.

‘I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 20th. You will have been informed, by mine of yesterday, that Appah Saheb will remain in this neighbourhood; and that it is my opinion he will be satisfied with a very moderate settlement of his differences with the Kolapoor Rajah. In respect to the Peshwah’s interference in those affairs, I have to observe, that the Putwurdun must be considered as his subjects; and that they have a right to expect that he will interfere to afford them a protection, which it is his duty to give them.

‘According to the instructions I have received, I have entered into no engagements; but I have promised generally that those who should join this army in their master’s cause should be recommended to his favor. From respect to the British nation, and I may almost call it a personal attachment, the chiefs of the Putwurdun family and Goklah have joined us; but not a chief belonging to the Peshwah, excepting Bappojee Vittell. Indeed, as appears by the enclosed

letter from Colonel Stevenson, some of these are employed in the plunder of the Nizam's country. If our recommendation of these chiefs who have joined us is to be unattended to, we must expect not only that they will leave us, but that no others will ever join us. Soobarow Mooty showed me the Peshwah's sunnuds; they may be forgeries, but I have him here and you will judge for yourself. I wrote to Mr. Duncan this day respecting his forwarding to us certain of the stores; as my carriage bullocks are so completely done up, that if I attempt to send them down the ghauts till they shall have had some rest, I shall lose them all.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*Major Malcolm to Lord Clive.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Camp near Poonah, 24th April, 1803.

‘I have much satisfaction in informing your Lordship of the arrival of the whole of the force under the Honorable Major General Wellesley at Poonah, which city, there is every reason to conclude, was saved from total destruction by a rapid movement of the cavalry under the General's command, who actually marched near sixty miles in thirty two hours to its relief.

‘2. The inhabitants have testified, by the most lively gratitude, their sense of the exertions by which they have been saved from entire ruin; and great numbers have already shown their confidence in the protection of the British government, by returning to the habitations which they had deserted.

‘3. Few other chiefs, except those who I informed your Lordship were with General Wellesley's corps when it was encamped near Meritch, joined it on the march; but though there is ground to suppose this conduct in some has proceeded from want of zeal and attachment to the Peshwah, it is perhaps to be attributed in others more to the rapidity of General Wellesley's advance, and to their own dilatory habits, than any other cause.

‘4. Appah Saheb early intimated to the General and myself that, though he would show his duty to the Peshwah, and his friendship to the English, by accompanying the British force to Poonah, it was his intention to return imme-

diately from that capital to his jaghire; as he had vowed never to pay his respects to the Peshwah till that prince had done him justice on the Rajah of Kolapoor, by whom his possessions had been despoiled and his father murdered.

‘ 5. As the defection of the Putwurdun family, of whom Appah Saheb is, in fact, the representative, would at this moment have been attended with serious injury to the interests of his Highness, every argument was opposed to the resolution which this chief had taken; but he continued, unmoved, to persevere in his determination, till he was explicitly informed that the effect which such conduct, at this crisis, would have on the interests of the Peshwah, and the interests of the British government as connected with that prince, was such as must place him in the relation of an enemy to both governments. This communication, which was made after our arrival at Poonah, alarmed him so much that he has agreed to stay near this city until his case has been recommended to the Peshwah’s attention; and he has promised, should that prince attend to his situation, and give him the relief that his services demand, that he will no longer hesitate in paying his personal respects at court, or in remaining there as long as he is required.

‘ 6. I understand by a letter from Colonel Close that the Peshwah proposes to leave Bassein on the 25th instant. His Highness will therefore be re-established in his capital early in May; and that object, when accomplished, will admit of the disposition of the force in this quarter, that will put an end to those fears now entertained of a combination among the Marhatta chiefs, which I consider as unlikely to be formed, and, if formed, still more unlikely to act with either union, vigor, or effect.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*’

‘ JOHN MALCOLM.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 24th April, 1803.

‘ I have received a letter from Colonel Close, in which he tells me that the Peshwah was to quit Bassein on the 26th. We may therefore expect him here in the beginning of May.

‘ I intend to move from hence towards the hills on the



26th, in order to procure forage with more facility; but I shall be obliged to leave here the greatest number of the wheel carriages to be repaired, and the loads of the carriage cattle. There is not now a serviceable wheel in the whole detachment, excepting those in Captain Scott's form, 6 pounder carriages and tumbrils; but I expect that the whole will be put in a serviceable state at this place in a short time; and besides the means here, I have called upon Bombay for assistance, both of new wheels and materials, and artificers to repair the old.

'The carriage cattle, also, are much knocked up; they have been marched hard, and have had no forage for some days; I therefore leave their loads here, and take them on to the hills to forage. A few days' rest will recover many of them, and I am able to get here about 1800 fresh bullocks.

'I leave here a corps to guard these articles, which will be in safety, particularly as I shall not be more than one march or two from them.

'I intend to purchase from the brinjaries all the rice they have left, and to send the whole down to Panwell to receive fresh loads. We have been so well supplied that the brinjaries are in some degree losers by attending us, and it is therefore necessary to give them this advantage. Besides, by this arrangement I enjoy the advantage of having at Poonah, before the rains will set in, a larger quantity of rice than I should have if I were to send down the brinjaries to receive fresh loads only in proportion as those should be consumed that they have at present. Indeed, as long as we remain in this neighbourhood we shall not be under the necessity of consuming any of the brinjarry rice, as the bazaar of Poonah is plentifully supplied from the neighbouring countries.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. General Stuart.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Camp at Poonah, 25th April, 1803.

'I have received your letter of the 22nd. It is surprising that you should not have known, on that day, of my arrival at

Poonah on the 20th, as I have reason to believe that it was known to the Peshwah on the 21st.

‘ I shall march to-morrow towards Tullygaum. I enclose you a letter which I received this morning by a vakeel from Amrut Rao. I had a conversation with this vakeel, in the course of which he expatiated much upon the conduct of Bajee Rao towards his master, and all the principal sirdars of the empire.

‘ The end of the conversation was a desire that the Company’s Government should interfere to place Amrut Rao in a situation suitable to his great rank and expectations in the state. In answer I told him that Amrut Rao had connected himself with the enemies of the Peshwah, and that he must be considered as an enemy; that the first step towards reconciling him with his brother was, that he should withdraw himself from all communication with the Peshwah’s enemies.

‘ The vakeel replied that the Peshwah had given orders that he might be seized (which is true), and that it was therefore impossible for him to stay in the neighbourhood of this army; and that he had therefore gone to Nassuck, where he should remain. I still insisted that his secession from the Peshwah’s enemies was necessary; and that, as he could not come near this army, it was desirable that we should have his declaration that he had separated himself from them, to show in answer to the reports which would be circulated, in which his name would be used to his disadvantage. The result of the conference was, that I should write him a letter to that purport; and I enclose you the draught of one which I have made.

‘ Amut Rao’s vakeel declares that Holkar and Ambajee Inglija have not met. He blames Holkar’s conduct much, and says that it has been inconsistent in respect to ourselves. He declares that he has neither opposed us nor made friends with us; and that by his conduct he has suffered us to establish ourselves here. There is some truth in the remark. This man, who appears to have some ability, is come here either with an intention of treating with our allies, or to lull us into security, and probably both. However, we have a strict watch over him, and I shall have no scruple in sending him off if I find that he attempts the

former; in regard to the latter, I defy him to do us any mischief. The vakeel said that the Rajah of Berar was every body's friend, and was determined to remain at peace. I am glad that you have occupied Panwell. My pioneers went this morning to clear the Bhoire ghaut; but I wish I could be certain that Bulwunt Rao had left the lower country.

' I conclude, however, that he will not like to remain cooped up between Colonel Murray and me, when I shall have made a march or two towards the ghaut.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut. Colonel Close.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

' SIR,

' Camp at Poonah, 26th April, 1803.'

' I did not march this morning, as I intended, as I heard last night that Holkar had made three marches towards this place, and I thought it proper to halt this day to ascertain the truth of this report. The result of my inquiries is, that he has marched towards the Nizam's frontier, and he was, on the 21st, at a station about eight coss from the Godavery, and at a small distance from the frontier of Holkar's, of the Nizam's, and of Scindiah's territories. He had not, on that day, had the interview with Ambajee Inglija, which it is supposed will produce a peace between Holkar and Scindiah; and it is reported that Ambajee Inglija had sent to the Rajah of Berar the boy Kundee Rao Holkar, who is a great bone of contention between Scindiah and Holkar; and this circumstance may delay the negotiation for peace. If they are only delayed till the Peshwah's arrival here, and that we shall be enabled to take up a better position for the defence of the Nizam's frontier, I think that all will end well.

' I intend to-morrow to march towards the hills.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Lieut. General Stuart.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

' I believe the Peshwah was to leave Bassein yesterday.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

' MY DEAR COLONEL,

' Camp at Poonah, 26th April, 1803.

' I heard last night that Holkar had moved this way, which induced me to halt till I could learn the truth of this report;

and the result of my inquiries into it is, that he is on the other side of the Godavery, that he has been joined by Meer Khan, and that the movements of which I had heard were directed towards the Nizam's frontier to the eastward. It does not appear, however, that he has passed the boundary, and the marches which he has made are directed towards a point at which his territories join with Scindiah's. By all accounts he had not had the interview with Ambajee Ingliah which, it was supposed, would produce peace on the 21st of this month; and therefore, whatever may be intended, no peace has yet been concluded between Holkar and Scindiah.

'There is a report here that the boy, Kundee Rao Holkar, whom Jeswunt Rao is desirous of getting into his hands, has been placed in the hands of the Rajah of Berar; and if this should be the case, Jeswunt Rao will not be pleased. However, this is merely a report.

Upon a full consideration of the state of affairs, I have not yet seen any thing to induce me to alter the disposition of the forces already made, with a view to bringing the Peshwah to Poonah, and giving strength and security to his government. That must still be our object; and we must not disturb a disposition which must secure it on account of a possibility that a few villages may be plundered by Holkar's army in the vicinity of the Nizam's north west frontier.

'I believe that the Peshwah put himself in motion yesterday; if he did he will be here in a few days; and I think that in ten days, at the furthest, we may bend all our means towards the security of the Nizam's country.

'I shall march to-morrow towards the hills.

'Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Stevenson.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

'MY DEAR COLONEL,                      'Camp at Poonah, 26th April, 1803.

'I received accounts last night that Holkar had made three marches towards this place; and I was induced to halt this day in order to ascertain the truth of those reports. The result of my inquiries is that he is gone towards the Nizam's frontier; and that he was on the 21st at a place about eight coss beyond the Godavery, at a small distance

from his own, or the Holkar territory, the same from Scindiah's, and the same from the Nizam's. He has sent his baggage towards Chandore, which is the only symptom of an intention to attack the Nizam. It is certain that on the 21st he had not had the interview with Ambajee Inglia which it is supposed will produce a peace between Holkar and Scindiah; and it is now reported here that Kundec Rao Holkar has been given up by Ambajee Inglia to the Rajah of Berar.

' This circumstance may have some effect upon the negotiations for that peace; at all events it proves the interference of the Rajah of Berar to produce it, which alone will occasion delay, and that under present circumstances is almost all that we could wish.

' God send the Peshwah soon here! My fingers itch to do something for the security of the Nizam's frontier; and, till the Peshwah is re-established at Poonah, and his government begins to have some authority, it will not answer to alter the disposition which must insure that object only to save a few villages from plunder. I enclose a duplicate of a letter which I have written to Colonel Murray; be so kind as to peruse and send it to him.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut. Colonel Close.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.\**

' SIR,

' Camp at Poonah, 26th April, 1803.

' I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 22nd and 23rd instant.

' I learn from Lieut. Colonel Close that he has communicated to you the wishes of his Highness the Peshwah respecting the movements of your detachment, according to which you are of course to conduct yourself. The Colonel, however, has informed me that he has requested you to send off five or six companies to Panwell, with two guns, for the purpose of occupying that place, and of affording security to the sup-

\* Since the publication of the first edition of this work, the question has been asked, who was the Colonel Murray to whom these letters are addressed? Colonel Murray was of the 84th regiment, and afterwards, as Lieut. General Sir John Murray, commanded the division of the army on the Eastern coast of Spain, and was tried by a General Court Martial for his conduct at Tarragona.

plies which will have been forwarded thither from Bombay. I conclude that you will have complied with this request, and that the troops on their march to Panwell will have driven off the troops belonging to Amrut Rao, occupying Abtah and Carnallah. If that should not have been done, it appears to me a very necessary measure, and I request you to turn your attention to it.

‘The ghaut, I am informed, is exceedingly bad; and some time will elapse before you will be able to bring up all your carriages; a part of your troops therefore might be employed in clearing the road to Panwell of enemies, while the remainder should move your advanced carriages up the ghaut, and no time would be lost.

‘I have written to the government of Bombay for certain articles of supply, which must be forwarded by means to be furnished within that settlement; and I request you to afford protection to such of them as you may hear are prepared to leave Panwell, when your troops shall move from that quarter towards the Bhoie ghaut.

‘I send from hence brinjarry bullocks to load with rice, but it will be some time before they will arrive at Panwell, and they will be too late for your troops; and at all events an escort from this camp will go with them, which will be sufficient for their protection, particularly if the road should be cleared by you.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Panowullah, 27th April, 1803.

‘I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 19th last night. I have great hopes, notwithstanding the threats held out at Hyderabad, that the combination of the northern Chiefs will end in nothing.

‘The Governor General has a strong check upon Scindiah to the northward, and another upon the Rajah of Berar; and it is not very probable that these Chiefs will involve themselves in a war in which they must be certain losers merely for the pleasure of plundering the Nizam’s country.

‘ The result then of the peace between Scindiah and Holkar, and of this combination, may be that Holkar will be made the tool to annoy the Nizam: but, supposing that to be the case, against which there are many probabilities, the enemy, although not to be despised, will not be very formidable. But I should doubt Holkar entering immediately so far into the views of his rival as to undertake to conduct this contest, as principal, merely for the gratification of his feelings of disappointed ambition. It is much more probable that Holkar will avail himself of the moment of peace to gain possession of the territories belonging to his family, which will probably be ceded to him.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I think that, although there will be much bad temper and many threats, there will be no hostility.

‘ I have observed, from the commencement of the negotiations with the Peshwah to the present moment, that no British agent has ever been threatened with this combination. We have heard of it principally from the court of Hyderabad, and from the native servants in the employment of our Residents, upon which description of people threats are supposed to have some effect; but these threats have never been held out to Major Kirkpatrick, Colonel Collins, or Colonel Close, in their communications with the servants of the principal Marhatta chiefs or the principals themselves. Amrut Rao’s vakeel, with whom I had a long conversation the other day, never hinted that there was an idea of a combination of the Marhatta chiefs.

‘ I do not conclude from this silence of theirs towards us that they have no such idea, because I know it is the common conversation; but I conclude from it that they are well aware that we are not people to be frightened by threats; and that they know that, as soon as they should hold out this threat, we should immediately take some steps to ward off its effects. They know well that we have it in our power both to defend ourselves and annoy them, of which I believe them to be much more afraid than we are of their combination.

‘ I have heard frequently of the supposed combination of different Marhatta chiefs; but when the nature of our situation upon the frontiers of Scindiah and the Rajah of

Berar has been explained to them (of which they are in general very ignorant), and they have been informed of Scindiah's answers to Colonel Collins, they will be satisfied that the combination, if ever formed, will not do us much harm.

‘ I marched this morning with an idea of procuring forage with more ease.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 28th April, 1803.

‘ I have received intelligence that Jeswunt Rao Holkar has entered the Nizam's territories, in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad and Dowlutabad. It is said by some, that he has only encamped in the neighbourhood of villages belonging to himself, within the Nizam's boundary; but at all events, the officers in the Nizam's service, with Colonel Stevenson's corps, are much alarmed for the safety of his Highness's possessions, and of those two forts, and have urged strongly that some measures should be taken for their defence.

‘ The Peshwah will arrive at Poonah on the 2nd, and it is probable that the troops which are with him will arrive in a day or two afterwards. Meer Khan, Holkar's sirdar, in command of his largest detachment, still keeps open his negotiation with the Nizam to enter his Highness's service. On the 2nd of May, therefore, we shall be in greater strength than ever at Poonah, and have attained one great object of our expedition; and, if Holkar should not be weakened by the defection of Meer Khan, at least his confidence in that chief must be shaken.

‘ Under these circumstances, I have thought it proper to desire Colonel Stevenson to collect the Nizam's army and the subsidiary force at Gardoon, and to make three or four marches to the northward. If he should find that Holkar is only plundering the villages on that frontier, in the same manner that they have been plundered in every year by every chief who approaches the boundary, he is not to go farther on; but if he should find that Holkar makes a serious attack upon either of the Nizam's forts of Dowlu-



tabad or Aurungabad, he must move quickly to their support.

‘ In the former case, although at some distance from me, we shall still be able to combine our operations, or to join, if necessary; and in the latter case I must move to the northward and eastward, to be at hand to support Colonel Stevenson, in the event of any support being given to Holkar by the other parties. My opinion is, that this is only a plundering excursion of Holkar. It is certain that he has not yet made his peace with Scindiah; and whatever he may do hereafter, he would not venture upon so desperate a course of action as a regular attack on the Nizam previous to that event; and I think that Colonel Stevenson’s first movement to the northward will induce him to withdraw; whether it has that effect or not, Holkar is so much weakened, and Colonel Stevenson is so much strengthened, that the force of the latter must be considered more than a match for that of the former. The only doubt I had upon my mind respecting the propriety of giving Colonel Stevenson those instructions, was occasioned by the Governor General’s wish that all hostilities should be avoided; but I conceive an attack upon the Nizam’s country must be resisted, and that means must be taken to prevent Jeswunt Rao from obtaining such a footing within it, as he would have by the possession of the forts of Dowlutabad or Aurungabad.

‘ As soon as I shall receive a true account of the state of affairs in that quarter, I propose to write to Holkar, respecting his situation on the Nizam’s frontier.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from Lieut. Colonel Dallas. When the cavalry arrived here on the 20th, they had made such a march that their grass cutters could not keep up with them; and in fact they did not arrive till late on the 21st, and on the 22nd. There was no straw to be got for the horses, and the long grass which was brought from the hills was bought and given to them. As there is no fund in the cavalry for paying for this grass, and as it was necessary to give it to the horses, I have ordered that it might be paid for, and the charge will be laid before you for your approbation.

‘ From the 22nd, the grass cutter establishment ought to have supplied the horses with forage; but such is the nature

of the soil in the neighbourhood of Poonah, that the grass cutters cannot find any thing to cut, without going to a great distance to the hills, which is not possible at present, and the officers are still obliged to buy large quantities at some expense for their troops.

‘As this is a new expense for an article already provided for, I do not wish to allow it without referring the subject for your decision. The ground certainly is very bare, and forage is very dear. In case you should think proper to authorize the incurring any expense on this account, there are two modes in which charge may be made: either by allowing the Quarter Master to purchase the quantity of forage which is deficient, and charge for it upon honor, or by giving an allowance for each horse, either to that officer or to the officer commanding each troop, for procuring the necessary quantity of forage. According to either mode it ought to be understood, that so soon as the country shall afford green grass, or that forage becomes cheap, the charge is entirely to cease.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘Camp at Panowullah, 10 miles N.W. from Poonah,

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, 28th April, 1803.

‘I have received your letters of the 25th. It is certain that, on the 25th of this month, the supposed peace between Holkar and Scindiah had not been made; and Ambajee Ingliia, through whose medium it was supposed that it would be negotiated, had not met the former; on the contrary, Ambajee was then at Burhampoor.

‘It is true that Holkar has approached the Nizam’s frontier, and he may have entered it. He has two villages within the Nizam’s boundary, near which he encamped; but it does not appear by any of the accounts that he has made attempts upon either of the forts of Dowlutabad or Aurungabad, both of which are in the neighbourhood of the place at which he is stated to be encamped; or that he has plundered the country to a greater degree than it has been plundered every year, or than will continue to be the case, so

long as the Nizam continues to have forts without garrisons, and the walls tumbling down.

‘ I am still of opinion that there will be no combination of the three Marhatta powers against us ; and that, supposing there should be a peace between Holkar and Scindiah, Holkar is more likely to take advantage of that peace to establish his power in the territories belonging to his family, than to employ himself as the tool of his rival in the plunder of the Nizam’s country, a game in which he must sooner or later meet with his certain destruction. However, it will not answer to expose the Nizam’s country to invasion upon my political speculations: and we must therefore immediately turn our minds to taking measures for its defence.

‘ In doing this, however, we must not lose sight of our great object, that of securing the Peshwah in his seat; nor must we put it out of our power to join all our forces, or to combine our operations, if this great combination should be made, and we should have to contend against its force.

‘ The Peshwah will be at Poonah on the 2nd; and the British troops, which have been at Bassein with him, will probably arrive about a day or two afterwards. My opinion therefore is, that you might now move three or four marches to the northward, towards Aurungabad.

‘ If you find that Holkar makes any serious attempts, either upon that place or Dowlutabad, you must move quickly to their support; but if he is only seated upon the frontier, it will not answer to disturb the arrangements, which must produce success in the end, merely to save a few villages at present; and in that case I do not wish you to move to a greater distance than three or four marches from Gardoon. You will be within the Nizam’s country, and I conclude will find forage, &c. in plenty. I wish that you would ascertain exactly where the tappall runners, on the road between Poonah and Hyderabad, are stationed nearest to Gardoon; and fix a writer at that place to receive and forward all letters from Poonah to your camp. I shall send them by the Resident’s dawks as far as the neighbourhood of Gardoon. I will write to Holkar upon the subject of the plunder of the Nizam’s country.

‘ You will observe from this letter, that I think it desirable we should keep so near one another as to preserve the power of combining our operations, if that should be neces-

sary; and that, with that view, I do not wish you to move beyond three or four marches from Gardoon, unless Holkar should have made an attack upon Aurungabad or Dowlutabad.

‘The Nizam’s troops are of course to accompany you. Meer Khan’s letter to Noor ool Oomrah tends strongly to convince me that Holkar does not mean to attack the Nizam. He would not venture upon such a measure, when threatened with the defection of so large a portion of his army. I shall speak to Colonel Close respecting the Peshwah taking Meer Khan into his service; but it is my opinion that the Nizam ought to take all the troops he has; and I dare say they will not amount to a third of the number of which he boasts.

‘I do not go farther to the westward than this place. When I marched from Poonah yesterday, all the people of any property, who had returned to that city, quitted it again.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘Camp at Panowullah, 28th April, 1803.

‘I have halted here this day because I found that my march from Poonah created great alarm, that several of the principal inhabitants were leaving the place, and that the ladies of the Peshwah’s family, who had been desired by his Highness to come down from Sevaghur this day, were afraid to venture in. I have therefore sent back all the Marhatta troops, and I shall remain here. I have sent the cattle farther up the valley to graze.

‘It is reported that Holkar has entered the Nizam’s country near Dowlutabad and Aurungabad; and that he is about to attack those places. I have therefore ordered Colonel Stevenson to make a movement to the northward, and even to go to their support, if he should find that Holkar has really attacked either of them.

‘Meer Khan still keeps open his negotiations with the Nizam. In a letter written to Noor ool Oomrah, about ten days ago, he says that he has written to Holkar to desire leave to quit his service.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Panowullah, 29th April, 1803.

‘ I enclose a letter from Colonel Close, from which you will perceive the difficulties which he experiences in moving the Peshwah.

‘ You will hear from ———— sad accounts of the invasion of the Nizam’s territories by Holkar’s troops. He is within the boundary certainly, somewhere near Aurungabad and Dowlutabad; and wherever a body of troops of that kind is placed, they can do nothing but injury. But I doubt his intending more than to take from the Nizam’s country the common plunder taken by every Marhatta chief passing to the northward. This will always be the case so long as the Nizam keeps his frontier forts of Aurungabad and Dowlutabad without garrisons and in ruins, although the countries in their neighbourhood have been annually plundered.

‘ Till now, I expected the Peshwah at Poonah on the 2nd of May; and yesterday I directed a movement to the northward of the Nizam’s army and the subsidiary force, which are on his Highness’s frontier, according to the former disposition. If this expedition of Holkar is only for the common plunder, Colonel Stevenson’s movement will check it; and the Nizam’s army will still be in a situation to combine its operations with, or even to join, this force.

‘ If Holkar attacks Aurungabad or Dowlutabad, or attempts any other solid enterprise, Colonel Stevenson will move to the assistance of the part attacked with all celerity; and I must move to the northward and eastward likewise, as soon as the Peshwah shall arrive at Poonah, in order to keep up our communication, and to be able to afford him assistance, if any movement should be made by Scindiah.

‘ However, I am sure that Holkar will move off directly; and I shall write to him this day, to desire him to desist from these attacks upon the Nizam’s territory.

‘ I am most anxious for the Peshwah’s arrival. If he had moved on the day that I proposed, he would have been at Poonah before now, and I should have been at liberty to take up a position on the Nizam’s frontier, which must have secured it from insult.

‘ Malcolm is gone to meet the Peshwah.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Panowullah, 30th April, 1803.

‘ In hopes that the Peshwah would be at Poonah by the 2nd of May, which I have entertained in consequence of my communications with those of his sirdars here who correspond with him, I disturbed the disposition which I had made of the troops, and authorized Colonel Stevenson to move for the relief of Aurungabad. You may easily conceive, then, how uneasy I am at his Highness’s delays: however, they cannot be helped, and must be submitted to.

‘ In my letter of the 28th, I apprised you of my reasons for halting here. The cattle are gone up the valley to graze, and are as far on as Worgaum.

‘ I get plenty of forage for the cattle that remain here.

‘ I have written a letter to Holkar, to desire him to withhold from the plunder of the Nizam’s country, which I dare say will have no effect. I have also written to Chinchore Deo, to desire him to withdraw from the Konkan entirely, and, lest he should make an excuse for not complying with my desire, that my troops are in the ghaut. I have told him that he may come up to the Bhore ghaut, and that my troops will allow him to pass. Bistnapah Punt is there with the Mysore horse, a company of infantry, and the pioneers. I write to Colonel Murray to forward my supplies, particularly of arrack, even although the Peshwah should not march.

‘ Malcolm went on to the ghaut yesterday, but returned this day, when he heard of his Highness’s delays.

‘ I have no news for you. It is reported that Holkar intends to make a slight dash at Hyderabad. I have desired Stevenson to have an eye to that quarter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 30th April, 1803.

‘ I learn by letters from Colonel Close, that some delay has occurred in the movement of his Highness the Peshwah, and it is possible that there may be more. Under these

circumstances, I have to request that as soon as any of the articles of supply which I have required from Bombay shall have arrived at Panwell, with the means of moving them, you will order them to be forwarded without delay. Those of which I am principally in want at present are arrack, and wheels for ordnance carriages. The former can be carried upon coolies, which I requested might be sent from Bombay for that purpose; or upon 400 bullocks, which I learn from Colonel Close you have hired for the public service, and have dispatched to Panwell. The latter can be carried upon coolies: a small escort can protect their march to the Bhore ghaut, where there are troops belonging to me. I am most anxious for the arrival of the arrack. I shall not want the wheels till after the Peshwah shall arrive at Poonah.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I have received your letter of the 27th.’

‘ *To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Panowullah, 30th April, 1803.

‘ There are reports here that Holkar intends moving upon Hyderabad with a light army; and they appear to come from something like authority. However, I do not believe these reports; although we ought to be prepared for every thing, from a disposition so wild and unmanageable as Holkar’s is represented to be. I therefore recommend you to have an eye to your right; and if you find that Holkar really makes this dash at Hyderabad, you must move upon that place as quickly as you can.

‘ You will of course prevent the pindarries from cutting off your communication. Indeed, they will not venture to attempt it when there is such a body of horse in your camps, and they ought to be cut up most unmercifully whenever they are caught.

‘ I am sorry to tell you that the Peshwah has delayed his march, and that he will not arrive at Poonah till the 6th or 7th. However, that must make no difference in your movements, under present circumstances.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Panowullah, 1st May, 1803.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 28th April.

‘ My former letters will have informed you of my reasons for staying here, and of those I had for sending back to Poonah the Marhatta chiefs, with their troops.

‘ The ladies of the Peshwah’s family are now in Poonah, and have particularly requested that I should not go farther off than Tullygaum, and that the Marhatta troops should remain near the city. I am afraid also that if I march towards the ghauts, there will be great alarm in the town.

‘ On the other hand, I do not see any probability that an attempt will be made by any party to obstruct the Peshwah’s march; and therefore, upon the whole, I think it best to remain in my present position, and that the Marhatta chiefs should stay at Poonah.

‘ If, however, you think that I ought to move towards the ghauts, or that the Peshwah would be gratified by my making a march or two to meet him, I will do so, either with the troops, or alone, as you may think best.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ SIR,    ‘ Poonah, 2nd May, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ult., with its several enclosures.

‘ Having already had a sufficient number of wheels constructed at this place for the iron 12 pounders, I do not now want any wheels of that description from Bombay; but I request to have as many tumbril wheels as can be prepared, to be sent forward from time to time, as they may be in readiness. The dimensions of the axletrees of the tumbrils were sent on to the Resident with the Peshwah; but if the naves of these wheels are unbored, they will answer so much the better, and the brass boxes can be fitted in them here.

‘ I can procure whatever timber I want at this place; and I have directed Captain Noble, the Commissary of Stores, to correspond with Captain Blackall regarding the quantities



and dimensions of the iron which will be required for tires ; and I beg that the latter officer may be instructed to attend to Captain Noble's representations on that head, and to send that iron as soon as possible.

' I have also desired Captain Noble to transmit a list of the artificers required by him, specifying all the particulars relating to them, upon which Captain Blackall has desired information.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

' MY DEAR COLONEL,

' Poonah, 2nd May, 1803.

' I came over here this morning to see how my park was coming on ; and I have received your letters of the 29th and 30th April. The account of your hircarrahs, transmitted in your letter of the 29th, is very satisfactory. There is, however, no reason to believe that the Rajah of Berar has taken the field ; or that any thing like a peace has been concluded between Scindiah and Holkar. My last accounts from Burhampoor are in a letter from Colonel Collins, of the 25th April, in which he does not mention that event as probable.

' I think that the Nizam's government would do well to take Meer Khan into pay ; and I dare say that his numbers will not amount to many more than those that his Highness is willing to entertain. I shall write my sentiments upon this subject to the Resident.

' I conclude that you will move to the northward on this day. I do not expect that the Peshwah will arrive here for some time ; but as all those who would be likely to interrupt his approach are at a distance, I do not think that your being at a distance from Poonah can be of any detriment ; and I think that your movement to the northward will check Holkar's career. I have already written to him, to desire that he will refrain from plundering the Nizam ; and to inform him that I had desired you to move towards Aurungabad, for the defence of his Highness's provinces in that quarter.

' I have perused Mr. Kennedy's memorandum, and the

medicines which he requires shall be supplied at Poonah, as well as the wine and the clothing.

‘ You must authorise him to entertain carriage for these articles, which carriage he must immediately send over to Poonah, to remove them to your camp. Send a small guard either of sepoy, or Nizam’s cavalry, with the cattle.

‘ You must immediately establish an hospital, and leave in it all the sick of the Scotch brigade that require carriage. Look for some secure place for this establishment within the Nizam’s frontier. If you do not do this, the first action you will have will be ruinous to you. I know that the surgeons will carry about the sick men till they die; although I am aware that, generally speaking, it is best to keep the sick with their corps; but in a case of this kind, where there are so many men sick, and the carriage for the sick is so insufficient, and there is every probability that there will be more sick, an hospital must be established, in which every case not on the mending hand ought to be thrown.

‘ I cannot give Mr. Kennedy any assistance of surgeons. The best man you have should be left in charge of the hospital, and the care of the corps from which you take him given to somebody else. One gentleman will easily attend two corps.

‘ I shall go back to my camp this night.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Panowullah, 2nd May, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 30th of April. I approve of your leaving only three companies at Panwell, under the notion that the Konkan is quiet, and likely to submit to the Peshwah’s government; and that these companies will be sufficient to afford escorts to the supplies coming from thence, at least as far as the Bhoie ghaut, where I have some troops.

‘ I learn from Colonel Close, that there is a prospect that the places of which I requested you to get possession, in my letter of the 26th of April, are likely to submit to the Peshwah. Their submission will bring matters in the Kon-

kan to a state very favorable to our communications with Panwell. But their submission ought to be insured before our troops quit the Konkan: otherwise I shall either be obliged to send thither another detachment, or to have larger escorts than can be conveniently afforded for the supplies which must be drawn from Panwell.

‘ I expect that those articles, of which I am most in want, will have been prepared to move from Panwell with you; otherwise the arrack, in particular, must follow at the earliest possible period, escorted by a party of the troops left for the security of the post. I have sent a small detachment with my brinjaries, who, however, I do not expect will arrive at Panwell for some days.

‘ It is difficult to determine what ought to be done with your money. I brought from Mysore many coins not the currency of some of the districts through which I marched; but I prevailed upon the chiefs with me to publish proclamations stating the value of those coins, and promising that they should be received in payment of the revenue at the same.

‘ This expedient has also been lately adopted at Poonah, in respect to some of the coin in my camp.

‘ It is probable that if you mention this subject to Lieut. Colonel Close, he will be able to prevail upon the Peshwah’s government to adopt a measure of the same kind.

‘ If that cannot be done, I can suggest no remedy, excepting that you should purchase, with your gold mohurs, coins which are the currency of the Konkan, if they can be found.

‘ To issue the gold mohurs to the troops, or to the dealers, at a depreciated rate of exchange, will answer no purpose; and will only tend to increase hereafter our inconveniences, from having coins not the common currency of the country.

‘ My pioneers are at work upon the Bhore ghaut, and I dare say that it will be very practicable by the time that you will arrive there.

‘ Be so kind as to leave behind your sand bags.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Poonah, 2nd May, 1803.

‘ I came over here this morning to see how my park was coming on, and I am happy to tell you that I have completed new wheels for four iron 12 pounders; and that even if Bombay cannot assist me, of which I have my doubts, I shall soon be in style again.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 30th of April. Amrut Rao’s vakeel is still with me; we have frequent conferences with him, and we know that he has no communication with any body else. No answer, however, has yet been received from Amrut Rao.

‘ I am on good terms with the killadar of Loghur, though I believe he is a little afraid of me. I have, however, written to him twice, and have received friendly answers.

‘ I have written this day to Colonel Murray about Bulwunt Rao’s posts in the Konkan, and other matters, a letter which he will communicate to you. I told you that I had written to Chinchore Deo; but my letter will now be of no use, as he has joined the Peshwah.

‘ I hear all that Ram Dyall says, but I do not believe one word of it. I had yesterday a letter from Collins, dated the 25th of April, from which it appears that no steps had been taken in the supposed treaty of peace so late as that day.

‘ I get some bullocks here, and I hope my own are recovering.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803.

‘ I received last night your letters of the 12th and 24th, the former of which had gone to Madras by mistake.

‘ I enclose a copy of a letter from Colonel Collins to the Governor General, of the 25th April, which contains some information of importance. Colonel Collins’s private letter to me contained nothing but the account of Holkar’s movement upon Aurungabad, of which I heretofore informed you. I likewise enclose an extract of a letter from Colonel Close,

in which he gives his opinion of the measures to be pursued, if it should be true that Scindiah is about to march from Burhampoor.

‘ It is my opinion that it is by no means certain that Scindiah will advance to Poonah, and it is most probable that the report of his intended march has been circulated for the purpose of intimidating us, or the Nizam; however, it is as well to be prepared with a consideration of the measures to be adopted in case Scindiah should advance to Poonah.

‘ I have no doubt whatever but that the force which will be here when the Peshwah shall arrive will be more than equal to contend with his, of which I enclose you an account; I also am of opinion that Colonel Stevenson’s force with the Nizam’s army are fully equal to the defence of the Nizam’s country against either Holkar or Scindiah. If both should unite in an attack on the Nizam’s country, Colonel Stevenson and I must co-operate or join in the defence of it, leaving at Poonah a sufficient force for the protection of the Peshwah’s person against straggling parties: on the other hand, if both should approach Poonah, Colonel Stevenson must come nearer to me.

‘ You will probably be desirous that I should give my opinion regarding Lieut. Colonel Close’s proposal contained in the enclosed paragraph of his letter. In the event of Scindiah’s advance, our military position ought to be such as to give confidence to those connected with us, and to show the wavering, and our enemies, that we are really in strength. It would not answer to move at once to Hyderabad, as you would thereby leave open the Rajah of Mysore’s country, and the Company’s; and would remove the check upon the southern jaghiredars. But if you were to cross the Toombuddra, and move to Moodgul, you would be nearer the scene of action at Poonah, within twelve or fourteen marches from Hyderabad, and close upon the southern jaghiredars. You would also be in a better situation to defend the Company’s frontier.

‘ In six weeks from this time the rivers which rise in the western ghauts will fill. I know that native armies are then very incapable of carrying on their operations; and you will

be so near the Kistna, that you can decide whether you will cross it, and at once carry your decision into execution.

‘ We are upon very good terms with those of the southern jaghiredars who are with us. I have prevailed upon Appah Saheb to remain here till the Peshwah shall arrive ; and in consequence of a letter from Colonel Close, in which he communicates the desire of the Peshwah that I should distribute 30,000 rupees among his officers who may be most distressed for money, to be repaid on his Highness’s arrival at Poonah, I have advanced 20,000 rupees, at two different times, to Goklah. He also appears in very good temper. It is very probable, however, that in case Scindiah should advance towards Poonah, the jaghiredars will become at best neutral, and will return to the southward under various pretences ; and if there should be nothing to check their enterprises, their neutrality would very soon degenerate into enmity.

‘ I have opened a communication with Amrut Rao, and he has a vakeel in his camp. I have written to him, to recommend that he should separate himself from the Peshwah’s enemies, and that he should formally declare that he had done so. In that case, hopes are held out to him that measures will be taken to reconcile him to his brother, according to his request through his vakeel to that purport.

‘ The Rajah of Berar is certainly not dead.

‘ I am getting on well in the repair or rather re-construction of the carriages.

‘ I have called upon Mr. Duncan for a lac of pagodas, which, I believe, I shall receive. I will write to the Adjutant General on this subject as soon as I am certain that I shall get the money. I shall then have money sufficient to go on to the end of July ; but I think it will be as well, in the present times, always to have two months’ pay in hand.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803.

‘ I received last night, upon my return from Poonah, your letters of the 28th, and one of the 1st instant.

‘ It is very probable that Meer Khan intends to enter the Nizam’s service ; but he found the durbar rather dilatory in giving an answer to his proposals ; and although he said that he had desired to be dismissed from Holkar’s service, it is probable that he delayed to express that desire till he should be certain that he was to be received by the Nizam, with the number of followers that he should think proper to bring with him. Indeed, I think that if he should quit Holkar’s service, he will not take a formal leave ; in the mean time, so long as he remains in it, it is natural that his troops should be enumerated amongst the forces of Holkar, and that the hircarrahs, who report what they hear, or the more numerous people who report what they invent, should detail the intended operations of that body as well as of the others.

‘ In respect to the route to be taken by your provisions expected from Hyderabad, you must give your own orders to them. They are now, I suppose, directed to march upon Perinda by Beeder, and along the Mangeyra river : by the time that they will arrive at Beeder, it is probable that you will have been able to determine upon the position which you will take, or upon your march to the northward, according to my letter of the 28th of April, and you can direct the march of your provisions accordingly.

‘ I heard yesterday evening at Poonah, that Holkar had received some money from Aurungabad, how much I cannot say ; and that he was gone off towards Hindustan. If this account be true, it will enable you to take up your proposed position on the Seenah.

‘ I am sorry to find that you have reason to complain of your brinjarries. If you should want arrack, you must send carriage bullocks to Poonah for it, with a guard.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803. .

‘ Colonel Stevenson will have acquainted you with the orders which I sent him on the 25th of April, to move to the northward, towards Aurungabad, in consequence of the in-

telligence which I have received, that Jeswunt Rao Holkar had approached that place with a body of troops. I also wrote to Jeswunt Rao to urge him to refrain from the plunder of the Nizam's territories, and to apprise him that I had desired Colonel Stevenson to move in the direction of Aurungabad to give them protection.

‘I have since been informed that Jeswunt Rao has levied a contribution upon Aurungabad, and that he has gone off to the northward; but I have not received this intelligence from any good authority.

‘I have perused a dispatch from Colonel Collins to His Excellency the Governor General, of the 25th of April, in which Colonel Collins informs His Excellency that it is reported in Scindiah's durbar, that that chief intends to commence his march towards Poonah on the 6th instant. I cannot give credit to this intention; and I am inclined to believe that the report of its existence is circulated with the same view that so many other reports of the same kind have been circulated lately, viz., to intimidate the Nizam, or the Honorable Company's government. However, it is necessary that we should be prepared to meet the hostility which must be intended if the chief should advance.

‘This operation may be connected with a predatory invasion of the Nizam's territory by Holkar; or both parties may join in an operation against the force at Poonah; or the advance to Poonah may be laid aside, and both may invade the territories of the Nizam.

‘In any one of those cases it is my opinion that Colonel Stevenson, with the Nizam's army, ought to be placed three or four marches to the northward of Gardoon, nearly in the position in which he will find himself after having made the movements directed with a view to checking Jeswunt Rao Holkar's irruption into the Nizam's territory.

‘If Holkar alone should operate on the Nizam's territory, Colonel Stevenson will be fully equal to its defence: if both parties should join, either to force the British troops from Poonah, or invade the Nizam's territory, the Colonel and I will be so near each other, that we can combine our operations, or join, if it should be necessary.

‘I have received several letters from Colonel Stevenson upon the subject of the negotiation between the officers of



the Government of his Highness the Nizam, and Meer Khan, to take that chief into his Highness's service. It appears that his Highness consents to take into service only 3000 men, whereas the number of Meer Khan's followers amounts to 25,000, according to his statement.

‘ From my experience of these native armies, I doubt whether Meer Khan will produce at muster more than double the number of men that his Highness consents to receive; but when I am considering the means of defending his Highness's long line of frontier from the plunder of a light body of horse, I cannot refrain from recommending that, whatever may be Meer Khan's numbers, his Highness should take them into pay. If hostilities should be commenced, the expense will be more than repaid to him and the people under his government; and the very circumstance of the purchase of the service of a chief commanding so large a body of horse, of such repute as Meer Khan, and much in the confidence of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, will certainly shake the general confidence of his army, and may have the effect of preventing the threatened hostilities.

‘ I repeat that I do not believe that Dowlut Rao Scindiah will venture to cross the Godavery, and expose himself to a conflict with the troops in this quarter, and to the certain consequences to himself of hostilities with the British government. I have to observe, however, that if hostilities with Scindiah and Holkar should be the consequence of the present crisis of our affairs, the British government were never so well situated to carry them on with success, and to bring them to a speedy termination. The territories of the Nizam may suffer from their vicinity to the scene of action; but that is a misfortune for which there is no remedy. It is probable that they would have suffered in a greater degree, if hostilities had commenced under other circumstances.

‘ By all that I can learn, the Nizam has apprehended an attack from the Marhattas, at different periods in the last three or four years, and his frontiers have never been exempt from their predatory operations. If the attack had been made when the British troops were not in this quarter the country must have suffered more than it can at present. But supposing that there was no foundation for his Highness's former apprehensions, and that it was not probable,

at the different periods supposed, that the Marhattas would attack him, I may safely assert that the certain consequences of the establishment of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's power at Poonah, founded as it was upon the momentary defeat of Scindiah's armies, must have been the invasion of the Nizam's territories. It would not have been possible for Jeswunt Rao to support his army for another season, in the countries which I have passed between the river Kistna and Poonah; and he must either have passed the Kistna or have entered the Nizam's territory, if only for their support. The former measure, it is true, might procrastinate the evil for another year, and might divide it between the Nizam, the Company, and the Rajah of Mysore; but within a year, and certainly with smaller means of defence, the Nizam's territories must have been the scene of operations of a Marhatta army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 3rd May, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2nd, in which you enclosed a copy of your address to the Governor General of the same date, with a copy of its enclosure.

‘ It gives me great satisfaction to reflect that as soon as I had received intelligence of the irruption of Jeswunt Rao Holkar into the territories of the Nizam, I took measures for their defence; although, in order to do this, I was obliged to break up the disposition of the allied forces, of which his Highness the Nizam and his ministers had approved. The orders for Colonel Stevenson's march were dated on the 28th of April.

‘ It is unfortunate that his Highness the Nizam's territories should be so situated as to be liable to the predatory invasions of the Marhattas; and it must be obvious to his Highness that no army can give them complete protection. Those places in which there are the greatest riches, and which may happen to be unprotected, must suffer; and for this reason it is advisable that his Highness should at an early period adopt measures for the defence of the rich cities, placed, like Aurungabad, upon his extreme frontier.

In case there should be a contest with the Marhatta powers, the operations which may be necessary for the general defence of his Highness's territories must oblige the army to leave some of these places at a distance; and each of them being at a distance from the army, and not having in itself the means of defence, is liable to, and probably will be plundered.

‘It is easy to perceive from the tenor of the paper which was sent to you by Azim ul Oomrah, that the Nizam is considerably alarmed at the prospect of a war with the Marhattas. A war with the Marhattas must have been the consequence of the proceedings in this part of India in the months of October and November last, and the Nizam's territories must have been the scene of its operations.

‘The advantageous military positions which we have taken up in consequence of our political arrangements with the Peshwah, and the additional force which those arrangements give us, may, in my opinion, still prevent the hostilities which are apprehended, at all events will considerably alleviate their evil. But this must depend upon our own determination and exertions. We are much mistaken if we suppose that to depart from our engagements with the Peshwah, and to give up the advantageous military position which we have taken, will alter the supposed intentions of the northern Marhatta powers to go to war, or will save the Nizam's territories. Such a line of conduct not only would expose his Highness's interests and power, but those of the Honorable Company to the most imminent danger.

‘I beg that you will do me the favor to assure the Nizam's government that every thing I can do shall be done for the safety of his Highness's territories. I apprised Colonel Stevenson some days ago of the reported intention of Jeswunt Rao Holkar to move towards Hyderabad; I desired him to watch his movements towards that place, and if he found that he went that way, to march upon Hyderabad with all celerity.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803.

‘ I have received your letters of the 1st and 2nd instant.

‘ I return Collins’s dispatch, of which I have transmitted a copy to General Stuart.

‘ It is my opinion that Scindiah will not move, and that the report of this intention has been circulated in order to try to intimidate us or the Nizam; or that if he does move, that he will not venture to cross the Godavery. If he should, however, come this way, I think that General Stuart ought to cross the Toombuddra and come to Moodgul.

‘ I shall be more than equal to Scindiah; and Stevenson is fully equal to the defence of the Nizam’s country. Hyderabad is reinforced by two battalions. If Scindiah and Holkar should join in moving here, or in an attack upon the Nizam, Stevenson and I must approach one another and cooperate; leaving here, in the latter case, a sufficient force for the protection of the Peshwah’s person.

‘ General Stuart’s position at Moodgul will enable him to move upon Hyderabad, or Poonah, from neither of which he will be at any great distance, to provide for the defence of the Company’s frontier, till the rivers fill, and to keep the southern jaghiredars in check.

‘ If he moves to Hyderabad at once, he abandons all the other objects.

‘ I am pretty certain that we cannot expect much more than neutrality from the southern jaghiredars, if Scindiah and Holkar join hostilities against us, unless the Peshwah should cordially reconcile with them, and handsomely reward them.

‘ They will return under various pretences to their jaghires; and unless there should be some check upon them, their neutrality will soon degenerate into an enmity, more destructive to us by far than any we shall have to contend with in this quarter.

‘ I will go to the ghaut to meet the Peshwah with pleasure; but you must be aware how prejudicial any length of absence will be; and I shall not therefore move till I hear from you, either that his Highness is at the ghaut, or the

certain day on which he will be there. These delays are certainly terrible, particularly at the present moment.

‘ I am glad to find from Colonel Murray that the Peshwah has possession of Abtah and Carnallah.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 4th May, 1803.

‘ I have to inform you that I have lately arrested in this camp two wandering Europeans, who, I rather believe, are deserters from the Portuguese service; and I have sent them in charge of a party going from hence to Panwell with brinjarry bullocks.

‘ My object in arresting them was to prevent people of this description from frequenting this camp, with a view to entice the European soldiers to desert; and I have directed that they may be sent over to Bombay, and delivered over in charge to the town major of that garrison.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will bring my request before the Honorable the Governor in Council, that these men may be sent to Goa by the first opportunity that may offer.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 4th May, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter from Colonel Montresor, in which he recommends that Lieut. Bruton may be appointed Brigade Major in Malabar. You will observe what he says respecting Captain Watson, to whom I believe it was your intention to give this appointment.

‘ I likewise enclose a letter which I have received from Captain Noble, upon the subject of his allowances. I have seldom seen an officer who has taken more pains with a department, and has brought one on with more success than Captain Noble has that entrusted to his charge; and he is now most usefully employed in the re-construction of all our wheels, in which he has made more progress, under

all disadvantages, than has been made in the arsenal of Bombay.

‘The Peshwah had not arrived at Panwell at two o’clock yesterday, but Colonel Close wrote at that hour that he expected him in the evening.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,                    ‘Camp at Panowullah, 4th May, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 3rd. This delay of the Peshwah’s is terrible.

‘A letter goes this day to Captain Young at Panwell, upon the subject of the supplies there. The first plan was to lodge every thing in storehouses; afterwards it was determined that nothing should be landed, but that all should remain in boats, till the cattle should be prepared to receive their contents. I do not know for what reason this last plan has been departed from; but I have desired Captain Young to take care to place every thing under cover that he may land. The brinjarries are gone down, and this day a number of bullocks will go off for grain. Captain Young, as well as Captain Moor, will be apprised of their number.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘SIR,    ‘Camp at Panowullah, 4th May, 1803.

‘I have received your letters of the 2nd and 3rd; and have desired the officer in command of the troops in the Bhore ghaut to relieve the detachment coming with the arrack, and to forward it to me.

‘It is very desirable that the tranquillity of the Konkan should be insured, before the whole of your detachment moves up the ghauts. But I imagine that when the Peshwah moves forward, and is prepared to ascend the Bhore ghaut, it will not be possible for you to remain behind with the main body of the detachment. This, however, will depend upon the communications which you will have with Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ I have little doubt but that the forts of Abtah and Carnallah will admit the Peshwah’s garrisons, and that then the tranquillity of the Konkan will be insured.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 5th May, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 3rd. I am glad to find that you are getting on so well, and that you have so fair a prospect of reaching your destination.

‘ It is now reported that Holkar has quitted the Nizam’s territories, and is about to move to the northward; but I cannot say what truth there is in this report. Colonel Collins writes that Scindiah was to march from Burhampoor on the 6th instant; I cannot say whether or not he will carry that intention into execution, or supposing that he should, with what object. But it is necessary that we should take into consideration the general views which he may have, and that we should be prepared with plans accordingly.

‘ This march of Scindiah may be preceded by, or connected with a reconciliation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and it may be intended to interrupt the execution of the arrangement between the Company and the Peshwah. The parties may attempt to carry into execution this intention, by an invasion of the Nizam’s territories by Holkar, while Scindiah will advance towards Poonah. In that case, the defence of the Nizam’s territories must depend upon you and the Nizam’s army; while I shall deal with Scindiah: or both parties may invade the Nizam’s territories, in which case your force and mine must confine their operations to their defence, leaving at Poonah a sufficient force for the protection of the Peshwah’s person: or both parties may advance together towards Poonah, in which case your force and mine must co-operate, or join in this quarter.

‘ In each of these last hypotheses, you will observe the necessity that we should be within reach of each other; at the same time that it is necessary that you should be in a situation to defend the Nizam’s territories, if they should be attacked, and that I should be at no great distance from

Poonah. The position which you propose to take upon the Seenah appears to be the best that you could have for all purposes ; and I think it probable that it will check all predatory invasions of the Nizam's territory ; particularly if you keep the Nizam's light cavalry in motion along the frontier, and thus frighten any small party from coming in.

‘ I beg you to bear in mind the general view I have above given of the probable plans of those to whom we may be opposed, and that of the mode in which we must act to defeat them.

‘ With the imperfect knowledge we have of their designs, it is impossible to do more at present than lay down general principles and objects ; and I rely upon you for doing every thing in your power to forward my wishes.

‘ I have just heard that the Peshwah will be up the ghaut this day, in which case he will be at Poonah about the 7th or 8th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

[ ‘ Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 5th May, 1803. ]

‘ I have received your two letters of the 3rd in the evening. In respect to Colonel Murray's march, my first idea was, that I should put the Peshwah in possession of Abtah and Carnallah, with a part of the detachment ; while the remainder should be employed in removing the carriages up the ghaut, and in escorting his Highness towards Poonah. The Colonel then informed me that he believed that Abtah and Carnallah had surrendered ; and that he proposed to leave only a small force at Panwell, with which arrangement I told him in my letter of the 21st that I was satisfied, provided it was certain that we had Abtah and Carnallah. Yesterday I got a letter from him, proposing to remain in the Konkan with his whole force ; in answer to which, I told him that it would not be possible for him to remain behind with the main body, when the Peshwah would ascend the ghaut ; and that the strength of the detachments to be left, if the forts of Abtah and Carnallah should not have surrendered, must depend upon his communications with you.



‘ In regard to the depôt at Panwell, my first idea was, that every thing should be landed, storehouses erected, and all matters arranged in such manner, as that none of the difficulties and inconveniences would have occurred which you have mentioned. The gentlemen at Bombay, however, seemed to think that the best mode of proceeding was not to land the stores, till the cattle, &c. should have arrived to receive them, and that they should then be delivered from the boats. I agreed to this proposal, and suggested all the arrangements which were likely to facilitate its execution. I imagine that they now find that large boats cannot come up to Panwell; that small boats loaded reach it with difficulty; and that the stores would be exposed to the weather in these last; that it would be difficult to deliver them from these small boats, and therefore that it is best to land them at once; and now they experience some inconveniences on account of the want of storehouses, and they are reduced to adopt the expedients which you have mentioned.

‘ A little inquiry upon these points, before they sent over the stores, and proposed that they should be delivered from the boats, would perhaps have been as well. However, as it is now, a letter has been written to Captain Young, referring him to the government of Bombay for orders to build store rooms, if they should be wanted, and a copy of this letter has been sent to Bombay.

‘ In respect to the use which I shall make of the depôt at Panwell, I have to observe that it must depend upon circumstances. I have sent down to Panwell all the bullocks I had that could walk; I have apprised the government of Bombay of their number, of the loads which they could carry, and of what kinds of stores; and I have regulated the mode in which these stores should be issued.

‘ I have also required from the government of Bombay certain stores for which I could not send carriage; viz.: arrack, ordnance wheels, and iron to repair ordnance wheels; and I have requested the government of Bombay to collect the coolies, who could be hired in Bombay in certain proportions to carry up these articles. If they have in the first place proceeded upon false information regarding the river at Panwell, and afterwards have omitted to give their officer proper instructions regarding the issue of the stores, I see

no remedy for the inconvenience which will be the result of these errors and omissions, excepting patience to wait till they shall have corrected them. I have no officer whom I could send there, that would be of the smallest use; indeed, from what I have above written, you will observe, that if I were there myself, I could do no good. I have considered Captain Moor's proposal to supply me with cash, upon which the following reflections have occurred.

‘ The expenses of my division amount to about one lac of pagodas per mensem; and it is my opinion that I ought to have always two months' pay in hand. Captain Moor's source of supply is a good one, if I can stay at or near Poonah; and if matters at Poonah should become so settled as to restore confidence to the people of property, that they will not be afraid to show their riches.

‘ I cannot be certain, under present circumstances, that it will be proper for me to remain at or near Poonah. Many events may occur which will render it absolutely necessary that I should move towards the Nizam's frontier; and, on the other hand, if Scindiah commences his march on the 6th of this month, as is supposed, we must not expect the immediate revival of confidence in Poonah. I have therefore written to Mr. Duncan to desire him to send me money; and I have suggested that I should give bills upon him for money to whoever would advance me any, and that I should be allowed to take it up upon receipt from any person that will give it, which receipts are to be replaced by bills to be drawn upon Benares or Calcutta, by the government of Bombay. By all these modes put together, I may get the sums I want. After paying the troops their pay for April, I shall have money enough to pay them for May, in the beginning of June, independently of all foreign supplies.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I have just heard that the Peshwah will be up the ghaut, and I leave this place in the morning to meet him at Karly, or wherever he may encamp to-morrow.’



require any gunpowder to blow rocks, in order to make a practicable road down the pass.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Officer commanding Pioneers,  
Bhore ghaut.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                    ‘ Camp at Panowullah, 7th May, 1803.

‘ I have received your notes of the 4th. I have little doubt but that if Hoikar should be still before Aurungabad when you have made your supposed four marches, he will leave that place; and it is then desirable that you should halt, for the reasons I have mentioned to you in my late letters. But if, notwithstanding your first advance and my letter, he should still remain near Aurungabad, and should still press that place, you must continue your march forward and beat him off.

‘ Under present circumstances, however, I do not mean that you should follow him; as in so doing you might get yourself so far forward that, if he and Scindiah should join, you might be in a scrape, before I could give you support.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you that the Peshwah is now between this camp and Poonah.

‘ I have pressed Major Kirkpatrick upon the subject of Meer Khan; and you may inform his friend Noor ool Oomrah of this circumstance, and tell him that I think he and his whole party will be taken into the Nizam’s service. But tell Noor ool Oomrah that it is necessary that Meer Khan should now move across the Godavery, and out of the Peshwah’s territory; and take care not to touch upon those of the Nizam, otherwise he may chance to feel the weight of the English swords, before he comes to be in the way of fighting on our side. If he does not immediately move out of the Peshwah’s country, I must arrange an expedition against him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 7th May, 1803.

, I delayed to answer your different letters upon the subject of the refusal of the killadar to deliver up the fort of Carnallah to the Peshwah’s officers, till I should have an opportunity of conversing with Lieut. Colonel Close upon that subject. I availed myself of an opportunity afforded by the arrival of the Peshwah yesterday in this neighbourhood. I have determined that I will not suffer the Peshwah’s authority to be trampled upon in the manner in which it has been by the killadar of Carnallah; and that the detachment under your command shall be immediately employed in getting possession of that fort for his Highness.

‘ As soon after the receipt of this letter as may be convenient for you, you will march back to Choke. I enclose an order to the officer commanding the pioneers in the ghauts to prepare scaling ladders, and to send them after you, by a number of pioneers, sufficient to carry them with ease to the attack of the place.

‘ On your arrival at Choke you will reconnoitre closely the Fort of Carnallah. If from the view which you will take of the place, and the accounts which you will receive of its strength, you should have reason to believe that you will be able to get possession of it without breaching the wall, you will attack it as soon as the pioneers shall have brought you the ladders from the ghauts. If you should think it necessary to delay in order to breach the place, you must wait at Choke till the guns arrive, for which I have written to Bombay.

‘ In either case you will send to the killadar a letter, (which will be transmitted to you this afternoon,) about two hours before you make your attack.

‘ For many reasons, but principally because it will save time, and will contribute much to our military reputation in this country, I should prefer to attack this fort without breaching its walls: but I must observe that those attacks are not certain in their issue, unless they can be made at more than one point at the same time; and unless you can cover the advance of the troops for the assault by a heavy

fire of musketry on the defences, and if possible by an enfilade of the part attacked.

‘ You will keep these observations in your recollection, in coming to a determination upon the mode in which you will attack the place ; but if the ground should be at all favorable, you have such a fine body of European troops, that I have no doubt but that they will take the place by escalade.

‘ If you should attack Carnallah, the garrison must be made an example of.

‘ It will not answer to be obliged to attack many of these places ; and nothing but a severe example of the garrisons of those which may be attacked will prevent the occurrence of this necessity every day.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 8th May, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 29th of April, and I rejoice to find that your means of movement are so ample. My cattle were certainly much distressed upon their arrival in this neighbourhood, but rest has brought some of them about again. I get some in this country, and I have called upon Mr. Duncan for supplies of others.

‘ I think that upon the whole I shall be as well off as ever, before circumstances will permit me to move from Poonah. At all events, I doubt whether I should derive any benefit from your cattle if you were to send them ; because, although I know that forage is to be got all along the road, excepting perhaps near Poonah, I do not think the bullock people would make the necessary exertions to procure it, and the cattle would arrive here in a state unfit for service. Thus, without doing this detachment any benefit, you would deprive yourself of an advantage, which may be essentially necessary to you hereafter. I do not want either grain or military stores, and I believe I shall not want money. However, I shall be able to form a better judgment upon this point in a few days, when I hope I shall have ascertained whether the persons who have been employed by

Mr. Duncan to supply me have the necessary means in their power.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter from Colonel Collins. You will there see what his opinion is of the views of the northern chiefs at present. In a letter, however, he says he knows from undoubted authority, that Scindiah disapproves of the present measures of his minister, and he has privately signified thus much to the Colonel.

‘ The Peshwah does not go into Poonah until Friday or Saturday next; but that is a matter of little consequence, as we shall immediately begin our business with him, and I hope we shall make more progress here than we should even if he were at Poonah. Colonel Close has pressed him to allow me to have a conference with him this evening. I shall inform you of all the particulars that may pass whenever I shall see him.

‘ Colonel Close has given up his opinion of your movement towards Hyderabad, and entirely agrees with me that the best position for your force would be that which I took the liberty of suggesting to you. He says that the fact is that all the southern jaghiredars, and every man who has any property in the empire, wish to see the present arrangement carried into execution, as the only security for that property; but that they are afraid and ashamed to join in its establishment on account of the adverse party, and of the abuse which has been lavished upon the Peshwah and all those who have adhered to him, or who have assisted us. The force stationed at Moodgul, which would be an obvious check upon them, would likewise afford them an excuse for doing that which they must see to be their interest.

‘ You will probably have heard from the Resident at Hyderabad, of the irruption at Aurungabad. It is fortunate I took such early measures to defend his Highness’s country, of which the Resident at Hyderabad has been informed.

‘ I hear daily from Colonel Stevenson; he is getting on well; and he says in his last letter that Holkar is gone off from Aurungabad. I had already heard this report, but I cannot say whether it is true or not. I do not know whether Holkar has levied a contribution upon Aurungabad.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Killadar of Carnallah.*

‘ Camp, 8th May, 1803.

‘ I have learnt with some degree of concern, that, when you were desired by Naroo Punt Chinchore Deo to deliver up the fort of Carnallah to Pundit Purdhaun, you refused, and have kept possession of the fort, contrary to his Highness’s wishes and commands.

‘ I have now to inform you, that I have orders from the British Government to establish and support his Highness’s just and accustomed authority in the Marhatta empire, and to defend it against all who may be inclined to attack it; and a sufficient force has been placed under my command to enable me to obey those orders. I shall therefore begin by putting his Highness in possession of the fort of Carnallah, which undoubtedly belongs to him.

‘ I hereby desire you immediately to deliver up that fort to Colonel Murray; and I give you notice, that he has my orders to attack it in two hours after you shall receive this letter.

‘ I also give you notice, that if he should be obliged to attack the fort, he has my orders to make an example of you and the garrison. I therefore recommend you to take advantage of the leisure afforded you, to send away your women and children.

‘ On the other hand, if you choose to deliver up the fort, Colonel Murray has my orders to give you cowle; and you may go wherever you please with your garrison, your property, and that of your troops, excepting Government stores and public property; but your decision must be immediate.

‘ *The Killadar of Carnallah.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Bappoo Rao Angria.*

‘ Camp, 8th May, 1803.

‘ You will have heard that in consequence of engagements entered into between the British Government and Pundit Purdhaun, I have advanced with a British army to Poonah, and the consequence is, that his Highness is restored to his musnud.

‘ I enclose you a proclamation, according to which I have



directed, and shall continue to direct, my conduct, while I shall remain in this country. I shall attack nobody who does not attack me or the Peshwah, or who does not oppose the just and accustomed authority of his Highness's government; and I write to you as a friend, to apprize you of these circumstances, and to desire you to remain in full confidence, that so long as you conduct yourself like a faithful servant to his Highness, no harm shall be done to you.

‘ *Bappoo Rao Angria.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 8th May, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter for the killadar of Carnallah, and another for Angria. You will transmit the former according to the directions contained in my letter of yesterday: you will send the latter to Angria, whenever you may find it convenient. I likewise enclose translations of those letters.

‘ I learn that there is a scarcity of water in the fort of Carnallah, for which reason the garrison was lately diminished in numbers. I conclude from this circumstance, as well as from your account of the strength of the garrison, either that the fort will be evacuated upon your return to Choke, or when the killadar shall learn that you intend to attack it; at all events, that you will be able to attack it as soon as you shall receive the ladders.

‘ When you shall have possession of Carnallah, you will deliver it over to the Peshwah's officer, who is in that neighbourhood, and you will march to join me as soon as it shall be convenient to you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 9th May, 1803.

‘ Matters have taken rather a serious turn to the northward. It appears by the dispatches come in from Colonel Collins, one of the 1st, the other of the 2nd, that the Rajah of Berar has marched from Nagpoor towards Oomrawooty, which place appears to be within the Nizam's northern

boundary; that Scindiah was about to move from Burham-poor on the 4th, to meet the Rajah of Berar near that place, also within the Nizam's boundary; and that Scindiah has, in a letter to the Governor General, positively declared his right to demand choute from the Nizam's territories.

‘ Colonel Collins had written a letter to Scindiah on the 2nd, to desire to withdraw from his court, if he was about to enter the Nizam's territories to meet the Berar Rajah; and to have an escort to conduct him to Poonah. He had not received an answer to this letter. I do not know where Holkar is, but I imagine that he also is gone to the northward.

‘ Colonel Collins says that Meer Khan has joined him. As soon as I can get the Peshwah into Poonah, I intend to march towards the Nizam's frontier. You must have an eye to this collection to the northward. Scindiah has rather hurried forward his march from Burhampoor, from which I conjecture that some enterprize of importance in the Nizam's country is intended previous to the rains.

‘ The only enterprize which will signify one pin, will be an attempt upon Hyderabad. You must therefore be prepared to march towards Hyderabad immediately, if you should find that they go that way. Ascertain the road, distances, &c. If they do not move towards Hyderabad, in a few days after you receive this letter, you may depend upon it they will not attempt it. They will not have time to establish themselves there, or to plunder the place, before the Godavery fills; and they will not like to risk an attack upon their armies, by our united force, with that river full in their rear. Upon these grounds, therefore, I recommend that, for a short time, you should keep your eye upon Hyderabad. Afterwards we may look to other objects.

‘ The Peshwah goes into Poonah on Friday.

‘ I shall move immediately afterwards towards the Nizam's frontier.

‘ I have received your letter of the 7th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ Camp at Chinchore, near Poonah,  
10th May, 1803.

MY LORD,

‘ I received this day your letter of the 22nd of April, and I shall immediately write the dispatches which you have desired I should. As, however, appearances are doubtful to the northward, as you will perceive by Colonel Collins’s late dispatches, I cannot fix the time at which the troops can return to their stations. But I still think we shall not have a war.

‘ We are playing a little at cross purposes here : Colonel Collins encourages Scindiah to march to Poonah, or rather does not object to that march, which ought to be done at present. Colonel Close and I think that the Peshwah ought to write to Scindiah to inform him that he has regained his power, and that he must not come here ; and that I ought to write a letter to Scindiah in similar terms. The consequence of his coming will be a contest, preceded by a long Marhatta negotiation, in the course of which he will intrigue with all the Peshwah’s chiefs, shake their allegiance, and throw the country (which is getting into order) into a new scene of confusion. It is better by far that the contest should be at a distance ; but there is a far better chance of avoiding it entirely, if we keep him away.

‘ We ought to have some authority here to settle matters with all these chiefs, under some general instructions from you. The state of affairs varies daily, and before orders can come from Bengal upon any question, the circumstances which ought to guide the decision have entirely changed. Besides, the fact that Colonel Collins does not object to Scindiah’s march to Poonah, and that Colonel Close and I think it necessary to object to it, shows the propriety of vesting some person with authority to direct all our affairs in this quarter.

‘ Malcolm is not very well, and is gone into Poonah ; but I have proposed to him to go to Bengal, to point out to you the state of affairs in this quarter, and to urge the adoption of this measure.

‘ You will hear from Colonel Close how the Peshwah is going on. As soon as he makes his entry into Poonah, and

I shall have settled at that place the detachment which may be deemed sufficient for the protection of his person, I intend to move towards the Nizam's frontier.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 10th May, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a copy of a dispatch of the 2nd instant, from Colonel Collins. The purport of the Persian letter to the Governor General was, an assertion of Scindiah's claim to choute from the Nizam, and a determination to support it. The paragraph to which Colonel Collins objects is one in which Scindiah declines the interference of the British Government in the dispute between him and the Nizam, about choute.

‘ I hope that Colonel Collins will have been induced to remain in Scindiah's camp: I think that he was rather hasty in his determination to withdraw; and that, by withdrawing on the grounds of Scindiah's altering the direction of his march, he has done no good. Scindiah's ministers will still go on negotiating with Colonel Collins's native agents, and they will persuade their master that the absence of the Colonel from his camp is not a novel occurrence, and is not a sign of war. Thus we shall lose all the advantages of the check upon them of Colonel Collins's presence, and of his influence over Scindiah; and by the manner in which he has withdrawn, he has not given Scindiah any reason to fear the commencement of hostilities with the Company.

‘ The Peshwah is not yet gone into Poonah; but business goes on here, and his Highness is making the necessary arrangements of his government, and appointing his ministers, and appears determined to adhere to his treaty with the Company and to carry into effect the objects of the alliance.

‘ We do not yet know that Scindiah has marched; but as soon as the Peshwah goes into Poonah, and Colonel Murray arrives with a detachment of the Bombay army, I propose to move towards the Nizam's frontier, in order to be rather nearer to Colonel Stevenson.

‘ The number of the royalist Sirdars is increasing; I have

received messages from two or three this morning, to desire to send vakeels to me to intercede for them with the Peshwah.

‘ This moment is critical : the rivers will fill in about a month, and it appears to me that Scindiah, if he intends hostilities, has marched in this hurry, either to establish himself in some post of consequence, or to make a dash at Hyderabad, so as to get back across the Godavery before that river fills. Colonel Stevenson is well placed to impede this operation, and I have desired him to have a watchful eye upon the proceedings to the northward, and march at once on Hyderabad, if he should find that they have views upon that place : but I do not imagine that any of those chiefs would like to incur the risk of the consequences of their being to the southward of the Godavery, when that river may fill. A few days will put that place in safety ; as, after the period at which the Godavery shall fill, they will not choose to venture across that river.

‘ We are all anxious to receive a communication of your sentiments upon the subject of Colonel Collins’s former dispatch, announcing Scindiah’s intention to march on the 6th. Major Malcolm is unwell, and is gone into Poonah.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart,*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 10th May, 1803.

‘ Since I wrote you this morning, another dispatch has been received from Colonel Collins, a copy of which I enclose. I do not know where Badowly is. It is very obvious that they are afraid of allowing Colonel Collins to quit Scindiah’s camp, although it is difficult to say what is their object.

‘ Colonel Collins intends to press the Peshwah to desire Scindiah not to advance to Poonah ; and I think that I ought to write him a letter to say that such is the Peshwah’s wish, and that it is proper it should be complied with.

‘ Before I determine upon this point, however, I shall see what the Peshwah will write. I am very anxious to know your determination regarding your future position.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. Lord Hobart, Secretary of State.*

‘ MY LORD,            ‘ Camp at Chinsura, near Poonah, 10th May, 1803.

‘ In consequence of orders from his Excellency the Governor General, of which I enclose a copy, I transmit to your Lordship an account of the proceedings of the British troops under my command to this date.

‘ You will have heard from the Government that I was detached in the month of March from the army assembled on the frontiers of Mysore, with about 9000 men, to effect a junction with the Company’s troops subsidized by the Nizam, and his Highness’s army assembled on the western frontier; and then to proceed to Poonah, in order to assist in the restoration of the Peshwah to the exercise of the power of his government. I marched nearly six hundred miles through the territories of the Marhattas, not only unopposed by them, but receiving all the assistance which their country could afford. As the country, however, through which I marched since I crossed the river Kistna had been the scene of the horrid depredations of Jeswunt Rao Holkar’s troops, I could not draw much from it.

‘ I was joined on my march by several of the jaghiredars in the southern districts, principally those who served with the British troops under my command in the year 1800; and by the Peshwah’s officers who had quitted his Highness, by his desire, when he fled from Mhar, after the defeat of his army by Jeswunt Rao Holkar, in the neighbourhood of Poonah. At length I formed a junction with the subsidiary force and the Nizam’s army, to the northward of Punderpoor, on the 15th of April.

‘ Jeswunt Rao Holkar quitted Poonah in the end of March, and went towards Chandore, a fortress in his possession to the northward of the river Godavery. His detachments, which had been as far to the southward as the neighbourhood of Meritch and that of Beejapoor, fell back as I advanced, and at length went off to the northward when I formed the junction with the Nizam’s army. I was thus enabled to make a disposition of the troops which would provide for the security of the Nizam’s frontier; and for that of the march of the Peshwah from Bassein to his capital.

‘ Accordingly, having reinforced the subsidiary force by a

regiment of European infantry, I broke up immediately again and moved upon Poonah, with my own division and the Marhattas, where I arrived on the 20th of April; and I left the Nizam's troops upon his Highness's frontier.

From thence, in the neighbourhood of Gardoon, our line extended to the western ghauts, and the troops could subsist with ease, and could assemble at any point at a short notice. After I had made this disposition, I learned that Jeswunt Rao Holkar had entered the Nizam's territories in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad, that he had surrounded that city with his troops, and had demanded large sums of money from the inhabitants.

The Peshwah was not arrived at Poonah; but as he was attended by a detachment of the Bombay army, consisting of the 78th regiment, five companies of the 84th, and a battalion of native infantry, with artillery, under Colonel Murray, there was every appearance that his march to his capital would be uninterrupted.

On the 28th of April, I ordered Colonel Stevenson, the commanding officer of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, to move to the northward with that force and the Nizam's army. I expected that Jeswunt Rao Holkar, whom I apprised of these orders, would draw off, as soon as he should find that Colonel Stevenson was approaching him, and he has done so. Colonel Stevenson is now posted upon the river Seenah, about fifty miles to the northward of Gardoon; from which place he can protect the Nizam's frontier as far as Aurungabad, or he can move towards Hyderabad, or can join with my division, as may appear advisable.

The Peshwah arrived at Chinsura, about eight miles from Poonah, on the 7th instant, and his Highness proposes to make his entry into his capital on the 13th instant. By that time the detachment from the Bombay army under Colonel Murray will have got possession of the fort of Carnallah, in the Konkan, the killadar of which refused to deliver the fort to his Highness the Peshwah; and I shall then move towards the frontier of the Nizam.

It is impossible to obey the orders conveyed in the second and third paragraphs of the enclosed copy of a letter from his Excellency the Governor General, for reasons con-

needed with certain political events which have occurred since the probable date of his Excellency's dispatches to your Lordship. At that period the Governor General must have received the accounts from the Resident in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; from which there was every reason to believe, from his own declarations, that that prince was satisfied in his own mind that the treaty of Bassein contained no stipulations injurious to his interests, and that he would not endeavor to prevent the parties from carrying it into execution.

‘ But by dispatches written to the Governor General by the Resident with Scindiah, on the 25th of April and the 1st and 2nd instant, copies of which I have perused, it appears that the disposition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah towards the Nizam is not so friendly as might have been expected, and that that prince intended to march from Burhampoor on the 4th instant. I am doubtful of the direction of his march; but it is reported that he intends to approach the Nizam's frontier to meet there the Rajah of Berar.

‘ Your Lordship will observe that I have already taken measures for the defence of the territories of his Highness the Nizam; and that I propose to march to that quarter with my own division, as soon as the Peshwah shall have entered Poonah; leaving at that city such a detachment of the Bombay troops as may be deemed sufficient for the protection of his Highness's person.

‘ These measures, as they must preclude all hopes of forming an establishment within the Nizam's frontier, or of any very lucrative plunder, in the short space of time between this and the period at which the rivers will fill, that rise in the western ghauts, may probably prevent the supposed march into the Nizam's territories. At all events, it is my opinion that neither Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, nor Jeswunt Rao Holkar will venture to remain within our reach, where their operations will be confined by the rivers. Therefore the invasion of the Nizam's territories, if it should be made, will be confined to his frontiers.

‘ Upon the whole, considering the slight hopes of advantage which these Chiefs can have in this invasion, and the certain loss to which two of them at least must be liable, from a state of hostility with the British Government, with



which your Lordship must be well acquainted, I cannot believe that they will venture upon a course of measures so hopeless ; and it is probable that the reports of the march of the Rajah of Berar, and of the direction of the march of Dowlut Rao Scindiah towards the Nizam's territories, have been circulated with a view to intimidate the Peshwah and the Nizam. But until the views of these princes are decided, it is impossible to recommend that the army in this quarter should be broken up. In the mean time, the Peshwah's government is settling fast ; and his Highness appears to be decided to adhere to the treaty with the Company, and to forward all the objects of the alliance.

‘ If, contrary to my expectations, the northern Chiefs should be determined upon hostilities with the British Government, the military position which we have obtained by the treaty of Bassein and by the rapid march of the division under my command, and the advanced state of our military preparations, afford means of protecting the territories of the Company and of the Rajah of Mysore.

‘ It is unfortunate that the territories of the Nizam should have suffered by the irruption of a freebooter at Aurungabad, and that they should be threatened again by Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. But scarcely a year has passed in which his Highness has not suffered or apprehended a similar misfortune ; and there is no doubt but that he must have suffered in a greater degree in this year, if the treaty of Bassein had not been concluded.

‘ The certain consequence of the establishment of the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar at Poonah must have been the invasion of the Nizam's territory, if only for the subsistence of the troops. It would not have been possible to draw subsistence for those numerous bodies of horse, for another year, from the countries between the Godavery and the Kistna, through which I have marched ; and they must have sought for it either in the Nizam's territories or in the countries to the southward of the Kistna. In either case the Nizam's territories would have been invaded ; and in the latter those of the Company and of the Rajah of Mysore.

‘ Although it is by no means certain that endeavors will be made by any of the Marhatta chiefs to interrupt the

execution of the treaty of Bassein; yet as appearances are doubtful, and the reports which are in circulation may reach your Lordship, I have thought it proper to avail myself of the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, to make you acquainted with the real state of the public affairs in this quarter; and with the means which we have of resisting this interruption, and of defending the Company's ally, the Nizam.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Hobart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 11th May, 1803.

‘ I have received a letter this day from Mr. Duncan, by which I learn that the chance of my being supplied with money from Bombay is but very small; and I think that I cannot depend much upon getting money at Poonah for bills upon Bombay or Bengal. I shall therefore be obliged to you if you will send me a lac of pagodas. Silver answers better here than gold, that is to say, if they are rupees of the proper kind, such as Chandory, of which I believe you can have but very few. But Sultany or Behaudry pagodas will answer better than any other silver coin—than those or than any gold coin.

‘ There is another advantage in these pagodas, which is, that they can be easily coined. In my opinion, the best way of sending this money would be on the hircarrah camels, escorted by a company of native infantry. They ought to go from your camp to Sungoly, on the Malpoorba, either direct by Dummul, Gudduck, Noulgoond, Bedkeerah, and Sungoly; or by the Werdah and the road by which I marched. If they come by the former route, it would be as well that there should be two companies for the escort as far as Sungoly, as they will pass through Goklah's country, where there may be some of his troops in distress. From Sungoly they will go to Goorgerry upon the Gutpurba, and thence to Erroor on the Kistna; and from Erroor by the direct road to Poonah, upon which instructions will be sent to the officer commanding at Erroor. The officer ought to be instructed

to take care to keep the camels well fed, and to make long marches, generally in the night if he can. I have no news this day; I am to see the Peshwah this evening.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Chinchore, 11th May, 1803.

‘ I received yesterday your letter of the 9th instant; and by one which I have also received from the officer commanding the pioneers, I observe that the scaling ladders will have arrived at Choke yesterday, I hope therefore you will have received them this day.

‘ By a dispatch I have this day received from Mr. Duncan, I learn that, agreeably to my request, the 18 pounder guns were to be sent from Bombay to Panwell on the 9th, in the event of their being found necessary for the reduction of the fort of Carnallah: as, however, their arrival at Panwell may still be considered doubtful—and, at all events, their being used may be attended with considerable delay—it is very desirable that the business at that fort should, if possible, be effected without them.

‘ I am glad you propose to supply your want of cash from that coming from Panwell to my camp, amounting, as I understand, to 40,000 rupees.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 12th May, 1803.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Colonel Collins. I do not know where Shawpoor\* is.

‘ I came here this day, in order to turn out our line for the Peshwah, on his arrival to-morrow.

‘ I visited his Highness yesterday evening according to appointment; but as his ministers said that he had no apartment in his dwelling at Chinsura, in which I could have a private conference with him, this was deferred till Saturday.

\* Shawpoor, near Burhampoor.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you that Colonel Murray has put the Peshwah’s officers in possession of the fort of Carnallah. The killadar delivered up the place. The Colonel will now march here immediately.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Poonah\*, 12th May, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th, and I think you have done right in making the forward movement which you have reported.

‘ Holkar was at Aurungabad, as far as I can learn, on the 7th. I have received two letters from him, professing friendship. In one, in answer to my letter, he says that the only money he has taken from the Soubahdar of Aurungabad,

*\* Extract from ‘ The Notes relative to the late Transactions in the Marhatta Empire.’*

‘ Arrangements were made by the Governor of Bombay, and by Lieut. Colonel Close, for the march of the Peshwah towards Poonah. A detachment, consisting of his Majesty’s 78th regiment (which left Bengal on the 7th of February, and arrived at Bombay on the 5th of April, 1803), five companies of his Majesty’s 84th regiment, a proportion of artillery, and 1035 Sepoys, in all 2205 men (a), was formed, and placed under the command of Colonel Murray, of his Majesty’s 84th regiment, as an escort to his Highness, who left Bassein, attended by Colonel Close, on the 27th of April.

‘ On the 7th of May the Peshwah passed General Wellesley’s camp at Panowallah, near Poonah. On the 13th his Highness, attended by his brother Chimmajee Appah, and by a numerous train of the principal chiefs of the Marhatta empire, proceeded towards the city of Poonah, and having entered his palace, resumed his seat upon the musnud, and received presents from his principal servants.’

*Lieut. Colonel Close, Resident at Poonah, to the Secretary of Government, Bombay. (Extracts.)*

‘ SIR,

‘ Chinchore, 11th May, 1803.

‘ 5. To yield protection to his Highness the Nizam’s territories, secure the alliance alluded to, and perfectly establish his Highness the Peshwah in his government, are objects which his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor

(a) European	. . . . .	1170
Natives	. . . . .	1035
Artillery	. . . . .	93

Total 2298

With 177 gun lascars.

was a sum due for the revenues of two villages belonging to him, by name Savygaum and Amberry, which the Soubahdar has received for five years. He swears that he has done no other injury to the Nizam's country. I dare say that there is not one word of truth in this story. This letter is dated the 15th of Mohurroum. His army at Aurungabad consisted mostly of cavalry; he has sent the infantry, excepting one campoo, in different directions. His cavalry altogether are not more than 16,000, of which 8000 only are fighting men, exclusive of Meer Khan's and Shahamut Khan's parties. These two are likewise detached; and it is reported in the camp, that Holkar and Meer Khan have quarrelled. Holkar says, in the end of his letter, that he has marched forward; but where, he does not say; and I do not believe he has marched at all. Scindiah marched from Burhampoor on the 4th.

‘ Colonel Collins writes me from Shawpoor on the 7th, that Ballojee Koonger, the vakeel from the Peshwah, was to meet him there on that day; and that after having had a conference with that person, Scindiah would proceed by forced marches to Badowly, to meet the Rajah of Berar. Colonel

General has committed to the conduct of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, whose military authority is not limited to the troops under his immediate command, but extends over the whole of the force headed by Colonel Stevenson.

‘ 6. Adverting to the nature and extent of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley's situation, I of course considered that as his Highness the Peshwah approached the ghauts, the troops that accompanied him from Bassein naturally fell under the orders of the above officer; and on this principle Colonel Murray is now acting against the fort of Carnallah under his express instructions.

‘ 7. Having consulted Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley on the present crisis of affairs, I have received it as his decided opinion, that the services of the whole of the detachment under Colonel Murray are indispensably necessary to afford him the means of accomplishing the great object committed to his charge, to which he conceives all considerations of a military nature must at present be wholly subordinate.

‘ 8. In so far as my opinion may be considered of any weight, I must say, that my ideas on the present subject perfectly coincide with those of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley; and thus impressed, I have only to add my judgment, that while every possible effort is exerted to cover the Attavesy, and effect the transfer of the lands lately ceded to the Honorable Company in Guzerat, any extremity should be hazarded in regard to these objects, rather than deprive the Major General of the services of any part of the detachment now employed under Colonel Murray.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Secretary of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ BARRY CLOSE. ’

Collins also tells me, that it is reported that Scindiah and Holkar had made peace.

‘ I shall not be able to march from hence certainly before the 20th. You must keep a good look out forward, therefore; and take care not to adventure yourself single handed, against the combined forces of those chiefs.

‘ You do well to make basket boats. But if the Government of Bombay are as active as they ought to be, I shall have a bridge of boats. With this, we shall be able to carry on the war wherever we please. I believe that the rivers will not fill till the middle of June.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 13th May, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Jeswunt Rao Holkar, in answer to one which I wrote to him upon the subject of his conduct at Aurungabad.

‘ It is reported here that Holkar was invited to plunder Aurungabad by the Nizam’s sirdar in charge of that city. From your knowledge of the character of this sirdar and of his connexions, you will be able to form a judgment of the probable truth of this report.

‘ His Highness the Peshwah will arrive at Poonah this day; and I propose to march as soon as Colonel Murray will have joined with the detachment of the Bombay army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Dhoondoo Bullall, Killadar of Loghur.*

‘ Camp, 13th May, 1803.

‘ Governor Duncan has communicated to me the letters which you have written to him, and to Mr. Lima de Souza, and the purport of the verbal message delivered from you by Appojee Punt; and I am happy to observe, from the perusal of these documents, that you are both willing and ready to aid and assist in accomplishing the Peshwah’s views.

‘ The English army has come to Poonah in consequence

of a treaty between the British government and his Highness the Peshwah; and, by the blessing of God, his Highness has this day returned to his capital, and has resumed the powers of his government.

‘The orders which I have received are to support his just and accustomed authority, and I certainly have no intention to do any injury to those who do not oppose his exercise of it.

‘I am therefore happy to observe, that you do not intend to oppose it, but that you propose to forward his Highness’s views; and as long as you persist in that line of conduct, and that you refrain from communicating with, and giving aid to his Highness’s enemies, which is entirely inconsistent with the duty of a faithful servant, you may rest confident that nothing will be done to injure you, or Mattoo Sree Baye Saheb.

‘*The Killadar of Loghur.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Bappoo Rao Ingliu.*

‘Camp, 13th May, 1803.

‘Since I wrote to you last, a detachment of the troops under my command has taken possession of, and delivered over, the fort of Carnallah to the officer of his Highness the Peshwah; and his Highness’s colors are now displayed in that fort, and his authority established in the district depending upon it.

‘As there may be still some plunderers lurking about that district, I beg that you will give orders to your officers to exert themselves to prevent them from finding an asylum in your districts.

‘*Bappoo Rao Ingliu.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Poonah, 14th May, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 8th. Nothing new has occurred here since I last wrote to you, excepting that the Peshwah entered his capital yesterday, and I am to have a meeting with him to day.

‘I have received an answer from Holkar to my letter upon the subject of the plunder of the Nizam’s territories. It is

very civil. He says that the subahdar of Aurungabad had for years collected the revenues of two villages, which he names, belonging to him ; that he had gone to demand this money, and that he had received some of it ; that he had done no mischief to the country, and that he was then going away. It is true that he has two villages near Aurungabad, and it is reported that he has done no mischief to the country ; but I believe that he has not moved farther than six or seven miles from Aurungabad.

‘ Colonel Stevenson was within fifty miles of the place ; but in consequence of the reports of Scindiah’s march, I desired him to be aware of going too far forward, lest he should be exposed to the attack of their united army, or that Holkar should get round him, and march upon Hyderabad. I have desired him to watch the movements towards that place very particularly.

‘ The place at which Scindiah was on the 7th, is only one march from Burhampoor ; and there are no accounts that the Rajah of Berar has marched, although he has gone into his tents.

‘ Colonel Murray will be here about the 18th.

‘ The Peshwah has written to Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, to desire that they will not come to Poonah.

‘ When I saw a possibility that we might have to contend with this confederacy, I wrote to Mr. Duncan to request that he would supply us with a bridge of boats, respecting which I sent him a detailed memorandum. He has made but little progress in this work, which is most essential, (in this country so much intersected with rivers, none of which are fordable in the rains,) as well for the protection of the Nizam’s country, as for the safety of the two detachments ; nor has he managed our depôt so well as might be wished, or supplied us with other articles called for, so quickly as might have been expected. I have had, therefore, some thoughts of running down to Bombay ; and if I can settle matters with the Peshwah in a satisfactory manner for the chiefs this evening, I shall carry that plan into execution to-morrow. I shall be here again on the 18th, and I propose to march on the 20th towards the Nizam’s frontier.

‘ My aide de camp, Captain West, has informed me that the office of Judge Advocate to the King’s troops is vacant,



and he has requested me to apply for it for him. He has been with me for four years, and has served with me upon every occasion in which I have been employed, and of course has rendered me the greatest assistance. He appears to me to be qualified for this situation, and I shall consider myself much obliged to you, if it should suit your arrangements, to appoint him to it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Munro.*

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 14th May, 1803.

‘ I learn from General Stuart, that he has desired you to supply me with twenty boats for the Malpoorba, and some boatmen.

‘ You know that the rivers will fill between the 14th and 20th of June ; and I beg you will take early measures for providing this mode of passing them.

‘ As you are too far from me, and it is possible that you may not be able to send off the boats at a period sufficiently early for my purpose, I have directed that ten of the boats made in Soonda, which were intended for the river Gutpurba, may be left on the river Malpoorba. Ten of your boats consequently are to be sent to the Gutpurba, about thirty miles farther on. I beg you to give orders upon this subject to the people you will send with the boats. Their station upon the Malpoorba will be at Sungoly ; that upon the Gutpurba will be at Goorgerry. The boatmen whom you send should be divided equally between the stations on the rivers Malpoorba, Gutpurba, and Kistna ; their pay is to be one gold fanam for every day they do not work, and two gold fanams for every day they do : it is to commence from the day they leave their villages, and to be paid weekly. I will settle with you for them, to the day of their arrival at their posts, as well as for the expense of the carriage of the boats. Afterwards, they will be paid by the officer in charge of the posts.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Munro.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ The Peshwah arrived yesterday, and is going to be seated on his musnud.’



from the plunder of the Nizam's country near Aurungabad, has written a very civil answer; in which he says that he went to Aurungabad to claim some money which the Nizam's soubahdar had received for five years from two villages belonging to him, in the neighbourhood of that city; that he had received part of what he wanted, and that he had done no injury to the country, and was then about to depart. It is true that he has two villages near Aurungabad; and I am informed that it is true that he has done no injury to the country: but I do not believe that he has moved farther than six or seven miles from Aurungabad.

‘It is reported here, that the Nizam's soubahdar of Aurungabad invited Holkar to the plunder of that place; and I think there is some foundation for this report.

‘Scindiah marched from Burhampoor on the 4th instant, but on the 7th he had made only one march. He waited for the Peshwah's vakeel, Ballojee Koonger, who was the person deputed by the Peshwah to communicate the treaty of Bassein to Scindiah. In fact, Ballojee Koonger was Scindiah's vakeel at Poonah, and he continued to act in that capacity after he was appointed to be the Peshwah's Dewan. He was in that situation when the Peshwah concluded the treaty of Bassein, to which he was privy. After this circumstance, and Scindiah's declaration to Collins, which you will read in the Governor General's dispatch to the Secret Committee, it is strange that there should be now a prospect that Scindiah will oppose the arrangement. I have had more dealings with the Marhattas than any other man now in India; and it is my opinion that they must be brought into order by an operation on their fears.

‘The Governor General tells me that he is going to send me instructions, and I delay to do any thing till I hear further from him.

‘My own opinion is, that I ought to write to Scindiah to point out to him the danger of involving himself in hostilities with the British Government, and to tell him that I was going into the Nizam's territories; that we are bound by treaty to defend them, and that he must expect very unpleasant consequences if I should find him there. At the same time, I should recall to his recollection his own sentiments on the treaty of Bassein; and I should press him to state

openly his doubts, if he entertained any, as well as his claims upon the Nizam. If this letter should have any effect, I would press him by another to cross the Nerbudda. In the mean time, at all events, whether I write to him or not, I shall march into the Nizam's country; and if the Government of Bombay supply me with a bridge of boats, for which I have asked them, I shall carry on the campaign during the rainy season, which the Marhattas cannot do; and I think that a few months will entirely settle the question.

‘ I have got a fine army in excellent order, and I think that this combination or confederacy, with which we are threatened, will find that we can march as well as fight.

‘ The Peshwah appears determined to adhere to the alliance, and to forward all its objects; he has written to Scindiah, and to the Rajah of Berar, to desire that they will not enter his country.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart\*.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 15th May, 1803.

‘ I saw the Peshwah last night according to his appointment. The object of my visit was to press his Highness to relieve the distresses, and to attend to the requests of those chiefs, who had come forward in his cause with me, and thus to excite them to fresh exertions in his service, and to bring forward others who still remained behind. It was agreed between me and Colonel Close, that he should begin by pressing him to prepare the army which he is bound by

\* *Lieut. Gen. Stuart to Lord Clive, Governor of Fort St. George.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Head Quarters, 25 miles north of Bellary,  
23rd May, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to forward to your Lordship a copy of a dispatch from the Major General Hon. A. Wellesley, bearing date the 15th instant.

‘ The state of my health, which has suffered considerably from fatigue, and the intense heat of the weather, has obliged me to proceed to Bellary.

‘ I have left the army under the command of Major General Campbell, and have furnished that officer with instructions for his guidance. I trust that in the course of a few days my health will be sufficiently re-established to enable me to rejoin the army at Moodgul: in the mean time, my presence at Bellary will be useful in forwarding various necessary arrangements connected with the subsistence of the troops in the positions which they will probably occupy.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*

‘ J. STUART.

treaty to produce; and that then he should be informed of the distresses and claims of the chiefs, whose troops it was certain that his Highness would enumerate among those to be appointed to join the British detachment. In the course of the conversation his Highness showed much quickness and ability; and I observed that he appeared particularly anxious to perform all the stipulations of the treaty, of course at the smallest possible expense to himself. But he gave satisfactory assurances that he would immediately commence to settle with the different chiefs who had come here with me; and that in proportion as his Highness should satisfy them, he would signify the same to the Resident; and that they were thenceforward to be considered as part of his Highness's contingent.

By this mode of settlement we shall know whether any progress is made or not; and as the production of the force is referrible to the treaty, it will be possible to urge his Highness to accelerate his negotiations with these chiefs, by pointing out to him, as occasion may offer, that the progress made by him in fulfilling the obligation laid upon him by that instrument, is not so great as might be expected. It is satisfactory to observe, that the Peshwah considers the treaty as highly advantageous to him, and that he is anxious to fulfil all its stipulations. Upon the whole, we were all satisfied with the meeting.

‘ I find that it will not answer to go to Bombay; I therefore stay here.

‘ It is reported that Holkar has gone to a considerable distance from Aurungabad, which I believe to be true.

‘ Colonel Stevenson was, on the 12th, half way between that place and Gardoon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 15th May, 1803.

‘ I find that I cannot leave this without very great inconvenience, and I have therefore determined not to go to Bombay: you have my permission to go there, however, if you should think it proper, and you may keep the escort laid upon the road for me. If you do not think them necessary,

or if you do not propose to go to Bombay, order the troops composing it to join their corps.

‘I am obliged to you for the horses laid upon the road, and I beg you to have them taken off.

‘In answer to a question which I put to the Government of Bombay regarding the provisioning the troops under your command in future, I was informed that it was to be done by the Bombay Government and its servants exclusively, and that my departments had nothing to do with it: accordingly I have made no arrangements for feeding your troops; but of course they must be fed by my departments, if the Government of Bombay have omitted to take any measures to insure your regular supplies.

‘I have written to Bombay frequently respecting supplies. The articles which I want principally are salt provisions in the Provision department; and ordnance wheels and stores in that of Stores. But, excepting the arrack sent upon 200 bullocks hired by you, I have received no arrack yet, and no provisions, and no iron, nor ordnance wheels.

‘If you should go to Bombay, it will be well if you would urge the gentlemen at the head of departments there to send forward 3000 or 4000 gallons of arrack: 400 bullocks, or 300 coolies out of 4000, which they have promised, would bring up this supply. Salt provisions, also, will be much required, as the Bombay sheep contractor has failed entirely; but this is not so necessary as arrack, for sheep can be got in the neighbourhood of Poonah.

‘It is a most extraordinary circumstance that I cannot get iron from Bombay. I hear that some is landed at Panwell; but instead of sending it up, or arrack, or provisions, they are sending medicines, which, however useful, might have been deferred, till we get other articles essentially necessary to our consumption, or to enable us to move from hence.

‘I mention these circumstances to you in case you should go to Bombay; but if you should not go there, you will do well to write to have your own provisions forwarded; and till they arrive, of course your troops will be fed by my departments.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘SIR, ‘Camp at Poonah, 16th May, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th instant.

‘In conformity to the directions contained in the second paragraph, I have ordered the officer in command of the two companies in charge of the treasure to march as soon as he shall have procured carriages for it, (if carriages should not have been sent from Bombay,) and to proceed to the top of the Bhore ghaut. He is to be relieved at Condallah by a similar detachment from Colonel Murray’s corps, now encamped at Karly.

‘Agreably to the wishes of the Honorable the Governor in Council, I should have ordered a detachment of this corps down to Panwell to take charge of the treasure; but this measure would have caused a delay of three or four days in its arrival at Poonah; which, as I wait to receive the treasure, before I can march from Poonah, might be very inconvenient.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Jonathan Duncan, Esq., Governor of Bombay.*

‘MY DEAR SIR, ‘Camp, 18th May, 1803.

‘I am about to march from Poonah in a few days; and it is necessary that I should make every arrangement which can insure the supplies of my troops whilst they will be employed to the northward: I therefore trouble you with a plan upon this subject.

‘The brinjarry cattle which I brought with me, or which followed me from Mysore, are completely knocked up; I may expect that about 6000 out of 25,000 which have left that country will still attend me, but no greater number.

‘I have already formed a depôt at Poonah, which consists of 4000 bags of rice, and I propose to keep it up to this quantity. This will be done either by purchases made at Poonah, or by rice forwarded from Panwell.

‘The rice collected at Poonah will be brought on to the army in the field; either by my own cattle, which I shall send back for it, if they should live, or by cattle to be hired here

by Colonel Close for that service. The rice at Panwell I should wish to be forwarded upon cattle to be hired for that service below the ghauts. The larger the number of them, the more certain I shall be of supplies of grain.

‘I wish, therefore, that instructions to the following purport may be given to the officer in charge of the store at Panwell.

‘First, That he should hire as many cattle as he can procure, to carry grain and provision stores from Panwell to the army in the field, at a monthly hire for each head of cattle.

‘Secondly, That the bargain with the owners of these cattle is to be, that they are either to lodge at Poonah the loads received at Panwell, or to carry them on to the army; according to the orders which they will receive from the Resident, or the commanding officer of the troops stationed at Poonah.

‘Thirdly, that the owners of the cattle are to make no unreasonable or unnecessary delay on the road, either from Panwell or in returning to that place; and in case it should appear to the commanding officer of the army, or to the Resident at Poonah, or to the storekeeper at Panwell that there has been such unnecessary delay, either in marching from Panwell with loads, or in returning thither, a stoppage for a proportionate number of days is to be made from the hire of the bullocks whose owner may have delayed.

‘Fourthly, That whenever the storekeeper at Panwell may dispatch a number of bullocks from that place with grain or provision stores, he is to make a register of such bullocks according to the form enclosed. He is to send one copy of this register to the officer commanding at Poonah, and to give another to the owner of the cattle going with the grain, to be produced to the commanding officer or Resident at Poonah, when the cattle shall arrive there, or to the commanding officer of the army, when the cattle shall reach the army.

‘In case it should be thought proper at Poonah to order on the cattle to the army, the register will be sent on to the commanding officer of the army; and the Resident or the commanding officer at Poonah will insert in it any sums of money which they may advance to the owner of the cattle.



‘ All sums of money advanced on account of these bullocks hired at Panwell, either at Poonah or by the commanding officer of the army, will be carried to the account of the store-keeper of that place.

‘ The article which I should wish to have forwarded by these bullocks is rice ; but in case I should require any other articles, such as arrack or salt provisions, I shall apprise the officer in charge of the store at Panwell thereof.

‘ I shall immediately take measures to have boats on all the rivers in which there may be water to impede materially the march of the bullocks.

‘ The bullocks already hired by Captain Young may be employed in this manner, and ought to be registered as soon as possible.

‘ It is needless to point out to you the mode in which the accounts of these bullocks ought to be settled ; but there appears no difficulty, particularly if all the advances made are carried to the account of the storekeeper at Panwell, and as that officer may support his charge by means of the copies of the registers as vouchers.

‘ Colonel Murray will be here to-morrow, and I could march the next day if the iron for the wheels had arrived ; but it is not yet come.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Jonathan Duncan, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Poonah, 18th May, 1803.

‘ I have received all your letters. Matters appear to have turned out nearly as we expected. It is unlucky that Holkar should have got any thing from Aurungabad ; but under the circumstances of the treachery of the Soubahdar, of which I have no doubt, that was not to be avoided.

‘ Meer Khan certainly intends to come over to the Nizam ; and although it would give a decided turn to the general state of our affairs, if we could strike some one party a severe blow, I think he is the last whom I should wish to attack. His defection from the party will shake it as much as a defeat, and his numbers will add considerably to the strength of the Nizam’s army. On the other hand, if you move against him, it is ten to one if you can come up with him, so

as to strike a blow of any consequence, and the movement may prevent his defection.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that the best thing to do is to remain nearly where you are. Meer Khan cannot do much mischief to Aurungabad; and even if you should drive him off, the Soubahdar will do as much harm as ever Meer Khan could have done.

‘ I have recommended strongly that Meer Khan, with his whole party, may be taken into the Nizam’s service, and the Resident has forwarded this information to the durbar.

‘ You will have heard that a child is sick, and all business is stopped on that account; but I think that, in a day or two after you shall have received this letter, positive orders on the subject will come from Hyderabad. You may as well inform Noor ool Oomrah of these circumstances.

‘ I think Hyderabad is now safe, and we must look immediately to crossing the Godavery. Colonel Murray will be in here to-morrow, and I shall march from hence in a day or two afterwards: I wait only for some iron, expected from Bombay, to put tires on some new wheels which I have made.

‘ I wish that you would send me a draft of your route to your present station; and insert in it the relative situations of Ahmednuggur, Aurungabad, Chandore, Burhampoor, as nearly as Colebrook can find them out.

‘ I am making boats here, and do you make as many as you can in the Nizam’s territories, and try to get boatmen: for if we have boats, we shall always contrive to navigate them. Besides, I still hope to have the pontoons for a bridge.

‘ Scindiah has moved on, and was, on the 12th, at Eedlabad, a place which you will find in Rennell’s map, nearly at the junction of the territories of the Nizam, the Rajah of Berar, and the Marhattas. He marched also on the 13th, but I cannot find in the map the name of the place to which he marched.

‘ Some of the medicines left this three days ago; the others are ready, but I have no carriage for them, and you must send for them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



ously ill, and although all the measures are prepared for the succession of Secundar Jah, the death of the old man, at this moment, may create some confusion; and at all events, may be the cause of some intrigues.

‘Keep up the communication with Meer Khan, and tell Noor ool Oomrah that, although from circumstances there are delays in giving him his final answer, I have no doubt whatever, that he and his whole party will be taken into the service.

‘By all means prevent the Nizam’s troops from plundering the villages you mention. There is a story in the Northern ackbar of the plunder of Chumargoonda, a village of Scindiah, by his Highness’s troops, which has created much dissatisfaction, and has been given as the ground of Holkar’s plunder of Aurungabad. I presume that the plunder of the brinjarries, for which you punished them, is what is alluded to; but all this plunder must have a tendency to prevent an amicable settlement, which we must ever desire. Besides that, it deprives us of the means of subsisting ourselves and cattle, as we move through those countries. I beg therefore that you will forbid it in the most positive terms, and punish any disobedience of your orders on this head.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Poonah\*, 20th May, 1803.

‘I have the pleasure to inform you that Colonel Murray’s corps arrived here yesterday, and they appear in good order and to be well equipped.

\* *Lieut. Colonel Close, the Resident at Poonah, to the Governor General.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Poonah, 21st May, 1803.

‘I agreeably to the arrangement which had been previously adjusted, the Hon. Major General Wellesley visited his Highness the Peshwah on the 14th instant, in Poonah. At this meeting the General recapitulated what he had formerly stated, and, with the view to inspire his Highness with confidence, went into an explanation of the principles which should invariably govern his conduct, in prosecuting the objects committed to his charge, connected with the interests of his Highness’s government. He observed, that although he felt it to be his duty to recommend to his Highness’s notice and favor, such of his sirdars as were distinguished by their attachment to the Poonah state, he had yet been careful not to make any promises to them from himself; assuring them only, that he should represent their conduct respectively to his Highness, in

‘ All the iron, which I required for the repair of my carriages, is not yet arrived from Bombay; but it is coming in

order to their being rewarded, or discountenanced, according to their merits, that he was certainly anxious that his Highness should afford relief to such of his meritorious servants as suffered from want, and adopt measures for conciliating others, who, from different circumstances, might require encouragement and confidence; but that whatever his feelings might be in those respects, he would strictly adhere to the rule he had hitherto followed, by avoiding to make promises to any of the sirdars, and contenting himself with stating their merits to his Highness.

‘ 2. This declaration from the Hon. Major General Wellesley appeared to afford the Peshwah the highest satisfaction. He said, that nothing could be more just or pleasing to him than the principle which the General resolved to follow; and added, that he should be ever attentive to the recommendation of the General in favor of his sirdars, and indisposed towards those who, from misconduct, should incur the General’s displeasure; and that, on these principles, it would be with the General to direct their efforts, and represent their services, and with the Poonah state to favor or discourage them according to his report.

‘ 3. His Highness went on to observe, that a few of the southern jaghiredars were still backward in affording their services; that as it was requisite to call forth the whole force of the state, he would repeat his summons to those jaghiredars to attend, and would be happy if the General also would address them to the same effect. To this the General expressed his acquiescence; adding, that obedience to his Highness’s authority from the subordinate sirdars of the state was indispensably necessary; and that in time it would be only proper to coerce such of them as should be obstinately refractory.

‘ 4. The General now observed that he should soon be prepared to march, and that he looked to be accompanied by his Highness’s troops; that the Goklah and the Vinchoor jaghiredars stood in need of most aid from his Highness to enable them to satisfy their troops; and that he would give in a memorandum respecting the claims of those sirdars, which, he trusted, would soon be satisfied. His Highness replied, that the wants of those sirdars should be immediately relieved; and that he would so adjust with the whole of the sirdars, as that they should encamp near the General by the time he should be ready to move, and willingly proceed on service under his orders.

‘ 5. A conversation now took place concerning the Putwurdun family, of whom Appah Saheb in particular has been averse to visit the Peshwah. After his claims had been discussed, it was agreed that an assurance should be given to him, that on the Poonah affairs being finally settled, his Highness the Peshwah would examine into his claims, and proceed to arrange matters permanently on fair grounds between him and the Rajah of Kolapoor, who has gradually stripped the Putwurdun family of a large part of their possessions.

‘ 6. At every stage of the interview it was observable that his Highness’s manner was less formal than usual. He showed no disinclination to converse largely on the business of his government; and at the close of the conference he told the Hon. Major General Wellesley, with great cordiality, that he could not permit him to march till he should have the pleasure of giving him an entertainment.

‘ 7. It would now appear that the Peshwah derived the happiest impressions from the foregoing conference. His confidence has increased so much, that he does not hesitate to avail himself of the influence which the Hon. Major General Wellesley has, from a variety of causes, acquired over the sirdars and jaghire-

daily, and before the carriages can be ready I hope that I shall receive your answer to my letters.

‘ There is nothing new from the northward. Scindiah has continued his march to the eastward, and was on the 13th at Eedlabad, a place which appears in Rennell’s map to be near the junction of the boundaries of the Nizam, the Rajah of Berar, and the other Marhattas.

‘ It is certain that peace has not yet been made between Scindiah and Holkar, although it is talked of every where. Holkar is gone off towards Chandore, and it is now said that he is to go to the Rajah of Berar. But it is a curious circumstance that it is currently reported that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar intend to endeavor to seize Holkar, when he shall arrive in their neighbourhood. This shows how little dependence can be placed on any of these reports.

‘ It is now said that even if the peace should be made between Holkar and Scindiah, and the three parties should confederate, their views are merely defensive, and I believe this to be true.

‘ We do not know that the Rajah of Berar has marched from Nagpoor.

‘ The Peshwah gets on but slowly in his arrangements with his chiefs.

‘ I have received a letter from Major Shawe, in which he tells me that the Governor General is going to send further instructions. It is very unlucky that he is not nearer to us.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

dars of the state; his orders to them on points of importance are generally transmitted through the General, who enforces them by dispatches from himself, an united mode of proceeding which can scarcely fail of efficient operation.

‘ 8. His Highness having arranged with Goklah, paid him a visit yesterday evening, and there is reason to believe that he has satisfied the jaghiredars of Vinchoor. Chintomeny Rao, of the Putwurdun family, has visited the Peshwah a second time, but was received by his Highness with some reserve. Appah Sahib, it is hoped, will be prevailed on to pay his first visit in the course of a few days.

‘ 9. The Hon. Major General Wellesley talks of marching in five or six days, and here is every prospect that he will be accompanied by a handsome corps of Marhatta horse.

‘ 10. Amrut Rao has a party of troops at Sungum-nair, on this side of the Godavery; and the Peshwah has intelligence that a corps in his interest has lately invested the fort of Puttun, held by his Highness, and situated south-west of Sungum-nair.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ BARRY CLOSE.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 22nd May, 1803.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 15th. I now enclose a copy of a dispatch that Colonel Close received last night from Colonel Collins, which gives rather a better account of affairs in general than we have had lately.

‘ Ballojee Koonger has likewise written to the Peshwah, and says that Scindiah is himself much disinclined to break with his Highness and the English; and that his principal confidential servant, Jadoon Rao, entertains the same sentiments. Jadoon Rao is now absent on an embassy to the Rajah of Berar, and Ambajee Ingliia appears to govern at that court. He, it is well known, is an enemy of the English, and he is personally much interested in keeping Scindiah to the southward, as in his absence from Hindustan he has carried on the government in those countries, whereby he has acquired vast riches and influence. In this state of affairs Colonel Collins and Ballojee Koonger appear determined to delay carrying on their negotiations till Jadoon Rao shall have returned to Scindiah’s camp.

‘ Ballojee Koonger may be mistaken respecting the sentiments of Jadoon Rao; but he says positively that that minister is of the same opinion with himself, and would advise his master to acquiesce in the arrangements between the British Government and the Peshwah; and it appears that Colonel Collins entertains the same opinion of the sentiments of Jadoon Rao.

‘ The Peshwah saw our line out this morning and was much gratified: indeed I never saw the troops look better. When I march, which I expect will be in three or four days, as the iron for the wheels is arrived, I intend to leave here under Colonel Murray, the five companies of the 84th, one battalion of native infantry, and the Bombay battalion; and I shall take with me the 78th regiment.

‘ I beg leave to suggest that the Resident at Hyderabad should run a tappall from Hyderabad to your camp at Moodgul. I believe that the tappall from Hyderabad and Gooty goes already by Raichore; in which case he will only have to post runners on the road from Raichore to Moodgul.

‘ I shall speak to Colonel Close about posting runners on the road from Poonah to Beejapoor. The postmaster in camp might post runners on the road from Moodgul to Beejapoor. By these means our communications with you will be much shortened, and you will be able to direct all our operations.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 23rd May, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch received yesterday by Lieut. Colonel Close. The orders contained therein will bring matters to a speedy issue, and, I judge, are entirely in conformity with your sentiments.

‘ The dispatch from me, to which the Governor General alludes in his letter to Colonel Close, was a private letter which I wrote to him on the day that I was joined by Colonel Stevenson, to inform him of that event, and the general situation of our affairs at that moment. I sent it by Hyderabad.

‘ I have this day received a private letter from Colonel Collins, in which he tells me that, since he had asked leave to retire from Scindiah’s camp, he had been treated by the ministers with increased politeness and respect; and that Scindiah’s conduct towards him had been uniformly polite, and even kind. He says that Scindiah will certainly not think of marching to Poonah till after the rains, if he should then.

‘ Colonel Collins communicated to me a proposal of Holkar, that he should be permitted to send a news writer to my camp. I think that I shall permit this fellow to come, because in fact there is nothing to be communicated which I do not wish to have publicly known: secondly, because, if I refuse to allow the man to reside in my camp, he may be allowed to reside in that of the Marhattas: and thirdly, because these news writers are generally a species of vakeel, and it may be important that I should have this mode of communicating with Holkar.

‘ I have sent the letter to Colonel Close; but if I should



get it back before the post goes out, I shall enclose a copy of it; at all events I have above given you its purport.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 23rd May, 1803.

‘ I enclose the answer from the killadar of Poonadur.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will speak to Ragonaut Rao, respecting the duties levied upon our bazaar people bringing provisions to camp. In consequence of this practice, which has been commenced only for the last three or four days; and of the difficulty and loss they experience from the refusal of all classes of people in the neighbourhood to take our Mysore coins, the bazaar people are becoming disgusted; and a large number of them went away this morning with their cattle, with Ram Rao, who is returning to Mysore.

‘ Will you remember the tappall to Beejapoor?

‘ It is very desirable that we should have some knowledge of the nature of the fort of Ahmednuggur. I have set inquiries on foot regarding it, but the more we know of it the better, and I shall be obliged to you if you will have inquiries made.

‘ It is also very desirable that we should have some knowledge of the state of the rivers in this country during the rains.

‘ The points to which I am directing my inquiries on this subject are as follows; and I shall be obliged to you if you will have inquiries made to the same purport:—

‘ 1st, What number of rivers are there between Poonah and Panwell, which are constantly full of water during the rains; their names and situation?

‘ 2ndly, What number of rivers are there between Poonah and the Godavery, which are always full during the rains; their names and situation?

‘ 3rdly, How many branches of the Godavery are there which are full during the rains, before that river enters the Nizam’s country?

‘ 4thly, Whether the rivers Goor, Seenah, and Mangeyra, are always full during the rains?’

‘ I send you two letters, with enclosures, for Colonel Stevenson; likewise a letter from Colonel Collins. I think there will be no harm in allowing the news writer to come to my camp.

‘ I enclose a letter from Malcolm to Dallas.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 24th May, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copies of papers received this day by Colonel Close, from the Governor General. These fully open his future plans and intentions in regard to this country.

‘ I have before informed you that I propose to leave Colonel Murray here for the present; and I shall be glad to know whom you would wish that I should leave in the command of the subsidiary force hereafter; supposing it to be possible to establish it at Poonah, on its original plan, in a short time, which I think by no means improbable.

‘ I know nobody more fit for such a situation than Colonel Wallace; but I shall be glad to receive your instructions upon this point.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 25th May, 1803.

‘ I enclose the copy of a paper which I have received from Major Kirkpatrick, from which it appears that Mohiput Ram imagines that you have assured him that the British Government will pay half the expense to be incurred by taking Meer Khan into the Nizam’s service. I conclude that this is a misconception of Mohiput Ram; but the sooner he is undeceived the better. We have no right to engage that the British Government shall pay one farthing of the expense to be incurred by the measures to be adopted for the defence

of the Nizam's territories, beyond that incurred by our own armies in the field.

' The communication with Meer Khan ought to be kept up; and I have no doubt but that he and his whole force will be taken into the Nizam's service. But as it is impossible to send a person of any consequence to his camp, without coming to the knowledge of every body there; and as then the negotiation must become known to Holkar, who will take measures to frustrate its effects, either by the removal of Meer Khan to a distance, or by falling upon his army and weakening him considerably, I recommend that you should not send any body there again.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Colonel Stevenson.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

' SIR,

' Camp at Poonah, 25th May, 1803.

' I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 15th and 19th instant.

' I conclude that Rajah Mohiput Ram must have misunderstood Colonel Stevenson's meaning, when he supposed that the Colonel told him that the British Government would defray any part of the expenses of taking Meer Khan and his troops into the service of his Highness the Nizam.

' When Colonel Stevenson wrote to me upon this subject, I told him that I should write to you, and recommend that Meer Khan should be taken into his Highness's service, with all his troops. I desired him to apprise Noor ool Oomrah of this intention; and to urge that chief to keep open the negotiation with Meer Khan, until the determination of his Highness the Nizam could be communicated to him. But I knew that you had positively objected to the proposal made by the Nizam's Government, that the British Government should defray any part of the expense to be incurred on this occasion. I recollected that, on the same principle, you objected to a proposal formerly made, that the British Government should defray part of the expense of hiring the troops under Jetlingah Cawker; and I am fully sensible that it would be much better for the British Government to incur lacs of expenses, to subdue a freebooter of this kind, than to

purchase his forbearance from plunder; or his service at the moment at which he should threaten to plunder the country.

‘ For all these reasons, I should never have authorized any one to hint, much less to give assurances, that the British Government would defray any part of the expense of hiring Meer Khan and his troops; and I conclude that, without such authority from you, or from me, Colonel Stevenson would not give these assurances to Rajah Mohiput Ram.

‘ I have been detained till now by the want of iron, which I expected from Bombay, for the repair of the wheels of my ordnance carriages; but this article is now arrived, and I intend to march in a few days.

‘ Colonel Stevenson is now at Puttun.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Poonah, 26th May, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 17th, 18th, and 19th.

‘ I have not received your secretary’s letter upon the subject of Captain Mackay; and I have therefore omitted to communicate to that officer your determination respecting him, as stated to me in your letter of the 17th. Captain Mackay is an honest and zealous servant of the public, and he conducts his own important department in such a manner as always to have the cattle under his charge in a most efficient state for work; but he is the most unaccommodating public officer that I have met with. He has never failed to contrive to quarrel with the head of every other department with which he has been concerned; and I have always had the greatest difficulty in keeping matters between him and others in such a state, as that the service should not be impeded by their disputes.

‘ I imagine that the difficulties between Captain Mackay and Major Symons, to which you have alluded, are to be attributed to the state of Captain Mackay’s temper; and possibly, in some degree, to a want of accommodation on the

part of Major Symons. I make no doubt but that you will have observed that this officer also, although an excellent man, has more of the oak than the willow in his disposition.

‘ Under these circumstances, and as it would be a matter of great difficulty to find an officer at present in whose hands I could with safety place Captain Mackay’s great charge, I shall be much obliged to you if you will delay for a short time to carry into execution your intention of removing him.

‘ When your secretary’s letter shall arrive, I shall communicate to him your displeasure, and the causes of it; and I shall call upon him to make me acquainted with the circumstances which may have caused his error, and which he may be of opinion will induce you to alter your intentions.

‘ I am getting an account of the state of all the rivers to the northward of the Kistna during the rains, which will enable you to decide regarding the propriety of your crossing the Kistna and the Beemah. I shall send it to you as soon as I get it. I believe that your position at Moodgul will be nearly central for all objects.

‘ However, we have two points now depending at the durbar, which will set every thing right respecting the southern jaghiredars. One of them is to give Appah Saheb the Zereen Putka, provided a nuzzer of one or two laes of rupees is received for it. The point on which there is a doubt is, whether Appah Saheb will give the nuzzer. But I think I shall be able to prevail upon him to do this. In respect to Amrut Rao, I have drawn from him a declaration and an engagement, that he has not at present, and that he never will have in future, any intercourse with the Peshwah’s enemies. He has given this under his seal in the most formal manner, with a view to obtain our intercession with the Peshwah in his favor.

‘ These papers are now before the Peshwah, and I have requested him to let me know what answer I shall give him. It is not certain that we shall contrive to reconcile these brothers: but if we succeed in this object, we shall entirely settle the interior of this state, and we shall give a sad blow to the congress to the northward: and if we satisfy the Putwurdun family, we shall draw to the Peshwah’s standard, not only that powerful family, but also that of Rastia, and several others who adhere to their politics.

‘ If we succeed in either object, we shall insure the tranquillity of the southern countries, during the supposed contest, which will set your mind at rest in respect to that important point.

‘ I am much obliged to you for the money. That sum, together with what I brought with me, some dollars that I have received from Mr. Duncan, which I am coining in camp, and others which I have picked up for bills on Bombay, will enable me to pay the troops, &c. to the 1st of August.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 26th May, 1803.’

‘ I have received your letter, and I am concerned that you did not speak to me upon the subject to which it relates, when I apprized you of the arrangements of which you now complain. It appears, however, that your complaint is not grounded upon your being left here in command of the troops, but upon the composition of the detachment to be under your command, and upon the state of uncertainty in which you are, respecting your prospect of commanding the corps to be stationed here in future.

‘ In regard to the detachment to be left here, I intend that it shall be composed of those troops; and that it shall have such equipments as will enable it to perform the service which I expect will be required from it: and in forming this detachment, as well as the division which will march from hence under my command, I have exercised a discretion for which I am aware that I am responsible to my superiors. But I do not see any necessity for altering these arrangements; and I should certainly deem it very improper to alter them, only that I might have an opportunity of gratifying the private feelings of the officer whom I should leave in command here, by giving him a better description of troops than I think will be required for the service.

‘ In regard to your future prospect of commanding the corps to be stationed in the Peshwah’s territories, I must decline at present to give any answer upon that subject.

‘ In general, I imagine that it is not intended by the Commander in Chief, that an officer shall keep his leave of ab-

sence in his pocket, in order to avail himself of it at any moment that he may think proper, however inconvenient to the service. But I am aware that there is no use in detaining an officer in an employment to which he has a dislike; and therefore you will avail yourself of your leave when you may think proper; only I request you to give me timely notice of your intention.

‘ In case you should have any thing further to say to me upon this subject, I request you to do me the favor to call upon me at any hour that may be convenient to you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Poonah, 27th May, 1803.

‘ I conclude that Colonel Close keeps you acquainted with every thing as it occurs here, and therefore I do not write to you constantly.

‘ It is evident that the Peshwah’s confidence in us increases daily. He calls for our assistance frequently, to support and enforce, by our influence over the jaghiredars and other chiefs, his authority and orders; and he pays attention to our recommendation of their claims upon his government. He has consented to give Appah Saheb (the eldest son of Pursheram Bhow, and the chief of the Putwurdun family) the Zerreen Putka to go out with me, provided that chief will present him with a nuzzer of one or two laes of rupees. By this measure he shows his confidence in us; he secures to his cause this powerful family, and secures the tranquillity of the southern districts, if there should be a war; and as Appah Saheb is known to have been our friend, and the determined enemy of the Peshwah, all the chiefs of the empire will know to what quarter they are to look in future for the favors and honors of the state. We do not know yet whether Appah Saheb will or can give the nuzzer which will be required from him; but I make no doubt that if he can afford it, I shall be able to prevail upon him to give it.

‘ I have had a correspondence with Amrut Rao, the result of which is that he has written a letter, which he calls an engagement, regularly sealed, &c., as such; in which he

promises, that from that moment he will separate himself from the Peshwah's enemies, and will have no further communication with them; and he requests that the British Government will interfere to reconcile him to his brother, and to obtain for him a provision in the state.

‘ All the former letters which passed between Amrut Rao and me were given to the Peshwah some time ago; and this last letter from Amrut Rao was given to him three days ago, with a request that he would take it into consideration, and let me know what answer he wished me to give to it. He was at the same time informed, that the British Government was very desirous that he should be reconciled to Amrut Rao, and that that chief should have a provision in the state, as the best mode of insuring the internal tranquillity of his Highness's territories; and as we expected that he would urge Amrut Rao's disposition to intrigue, as an argument against a reconciliation with him, we desired that it might be observed to him, that now that his government was strengthened by an alliance with the Company, and that all his subjects saw that the British Government was determined to support his lawful and accustomed authority, it was not probable that any of them would venture to enter into intrigues to disturb or overturn it, as they had heretofore; or that, if they did, he had much to apprehend from those intrigues.

‘ We have not yet received his answer, but if we succeed in reconciling the Peshwah with Amrut Rao, the interior of this state will be settled as far as it can be at present; and this defection will shake the nerves of the members of the congress to the northward. This will be a greater object than the disposal of the Zerreen Putka; but the two measures secure every thing within, in case of a contest.

‘ Your instructions to Colonel Collins of the 5th will have arrived just in the proper time. The treaty of Bassein is, in fact, a better security to Holkar and to Scindiah for the possessions which they have extorted from the Peshwah, and those lying to the southward of the Nerbudda, than either of those chiefs could have under any other arrangement which could secure the Peshwah's power. They will see that clearly; and their sense of their own interest will combine with their fears to prevent a war.



‘ You will have seen Holkar’s letter to me upon the subject of the plunder of Aurungabad. If matters are brought to a peaceable conclusion with Scindiah, and Holkar goes off to Hindustan, towards which quarter he is now moving, in my opinion, it will be most proper to take no further notice of the contribution levied upon Aurungabad ; at least not to go to war to force Holkar to pay it back again. In fact, this chief is only a freebooter, and the Nizam’s government allow that the soubahdar of Aurungabad had combined with him. They acknowledge that they were aware of the intercourse between Holkar and the soubahdar some time before the contribution was levied ; but they were afraid to attempt to dismiss their own treacherous servant. Upon the whole, therefore, the levy of the contribution upon Aurungabad may be considered as the act of two rebels to the states of the Peshwah and of the Nizam.

‘ In case Holkar should be considered in the light of a power in India, his conduct at Aurungabad affords ample ground for hostilities against him ; but upon the whole, considering that the Marhattas have long been in the habit of plundering the Nizam’s territories ; that his Highness’s government omit to take any measures for their defence ; and that, in this particular instance, they were aware of the combination between their own servant and a Marhatta chief, and they were afraid to take the most obvious steps to frustrate their designs ; I think that if all parties acquiesce peaceably in the arrangements of the treaty of Bassein, it will not be worth while to commence a chase after Holkar to recover the plunder of Aurungabad.

‘ I propose to march from hence in a few days. I am detained here only by the want of iron to repair the wheels of my ordnance carriages.

‘ If I should find that the congress to the northward determine upon war, my first operation will be to seize upon Ahmednuggur, by which Scindiah will lose a territory worth nine lacs of rupees, and which he extorted some years ago from the Peshwah. Malcolm is still very unwell : he was talking of going back to Mysore, but I have prevailed upon him to stay with me some time longer.

‘ The letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor of Fort St. George is shocking. I hope that you do not

propose to stay in India longer than the end of this year. Such masters do not deserve your services.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 27th May, 1803.

‘ The hircarra has positively no orders from me to require more than an answer, which I conclude he ought to receive.

‘ It is possible that the other party may have desired him to urge Ball Kischen Gungurdhur to pay the money; and therefore it will be best that Ragonaut Rao should inform that chief that the hircarra has no orders to require, or even to receive, more than an answer.

‘ I conclude, however, that the Peshwah will not support Ball Kischen Gungurdhur in a disobedience of his own orders, and that he will be forced to pay back this money; otherwise we must not expect either obedience or cordial co-operation in future. I return Colonel Collins’s letter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 27th May, 1803.

‘ I have spoken to Govind Rao, and he seems to think that Appah Saheb does not wish for the proposed honor, and at all events would not pay for it. He said that if it was given with full confidence, power and treasure, he would of course be rejoiced to receive it; but not otherwise. He proposed to inquire further regarding his views to this office, and I shall know the result to-morrow.

‘ Appah Dessaye has sent to ask for his leave. He says that they propose to give him pay for only 1000, instead of 1500 horse, which number he has; and that, in fact, no determined engagement is made even for them.

‘ I wish also, that you would speak to Ragonaut Rao respecting the Darwar man, and the Rajah of Kittoor. The former sent 100 horse by my desire, and partly to attend upon his son: the other likewise sent 100 horse. But neither have any serinjaumy, and their troops are starving,

and they want to go home. I gave the Rajah 500 pagodas some days ago ; but it will be better to allow both parties to go back, unless some arrangement is made for their pay.

‘ Goklah also complains that he is not getting on, and has sent to ask for a passport for some of his horse, that he is going to send back to Noulgoond.

‘ I enclose you a letter from Ball Kischen Gungurdhur, in which he acknowledges that he took the money in question. Unless that money is repaid, we have no chance of putting the Putwurdun in any style.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Observe, that Ragonaut Rao first said that this money was taken as a debt due by Appah Saheb’s carkoon ; and since I told him that there never had been any transactions between the parties, and could be no debt, another reason has been found out and stated. There is really no getting on with such people.’

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 27th May, 1803.

‘ The brinjarries with this division have sustained great losses in cattle, and they appear to apprehend still greater, and are very unwilling to continue with the troops. With these impressions on their minds, they have certainly prevented the brinjarries of this country from coming forward in our service ; and these people have taken great pains to prevent all communications with the persons employed by me to endeavor to bring them forward for the service.

‘ Since the 20th of April my brinjarries have sold nothing, as the troops have been subsisted entirely upon the produce of the country purchased in the bazaar. I have therefore thought it necessary, in order to secure their services and their good will, in the present situation of our affairs, to make them a present of two rupees for each bullock they may have. This is not unusual : General Harris made them a present, nearly of a similar kind, at Seringapatam ; and I have reason to believe that it may induce some of the country brinjarries to come forward.

‘ I find the brinjarries, and indeed all the people of the

Mysore country and the Carnatic, very averse to staying in this country. It is true that forage, and all kinds of provisions, are uncommonly dear : I therefore take the liberty of recommending to you to bring forward as many hired bullocks as possible, and to depend less upon the brinjarries for supplying your troops than I have.

‘The more I see of them, the more I am convinced that we have entirely mistaken the character of these people ; and that unless they are permitted to plunder the country through which they pass, or to have profits such as the native armies are able to give them from plunder, they will not follow the troops to any distance from the place at which they usually reside. I have had the greatest difficulties with them, and they have deceived me, and broken their engagements upon every occasion. Colonel Stevenson, who has another set, has been obliged to punish, and even to put some to death, for plunder in the Peshwah’s country.

‘By a letter from the Governor General, of the 9th, I see that he has sent you copies of the notes of instructions to Colonel Collins and Colonel Close, which I had sent you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Poonah, 29th May, 1803.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 25th, in which you inform me that you have entered into an engagement with Meer Khan, to take into the Nizam’s service 5000 horse and 5000 foot.

‘ I am glad to observe that, before you adopted this measure, you referred to all my letters to you upon the subject of Meer Khan ; and that you found, although I was fully aware of the benefit which was likely to be the result of the Nizam’s taking that chief into his service, that I was exceedingly anxious that he should be employed, and requested you to urge Noor ool Oomrah to keep alive the negotiation. I gave you no authority to enter into any engagements with Meer Khan, and referred every thing to the answer to be expected from the Nizam’s durbar.

‘ In fact, I could give you no authority to conclude with Meer Khan, because I have no such authority myself.

‘It is probable that when you shall have received my letter and its enclosure of the 25th instant, you will have set the Nizam’s servants right, respecting the share which they supposed the British Government would bear in the expense of hiring Meer Khan and his troops; and they will have seen that the negotiation with Meer Khan is referrible only to them, although they have referred it to you, and you to my opinion. When they shall see this clearly, they will be best able to judge whether there are powers from the Nizam’s government to conclude an arrangement with Meer Khan, such as that stated in the Persian paper, which you enclosed, of which I return a translation.

‘If there are such powers from the Nizam’s government, all is well; and I consider that a great advantage will have been gained by detaching Meer Khan from Holkar’s service. But if there are no such powers from the Nizam’s government, and the engagement is considered in every respect as one entered into by a British officer, acting on account of the British Government, under my authority, I request you to write a letter to Meer Khan, to inform him that I have perused your letter addressed to him; that the British Government are not in the habit of entertaining troops of the description of those under his command; that as a British officer, therefore, I can enter into, and can authorise no engagement for hiring his troops; that I have recommended to the Nizam’s government that his Highness should take Meer Khan and his troops into his service; and that I must refer him, for a final answer upon this subject, to his Highness’s durbar.

‘I enclose you the translation which has been made for me of your letter to Meer Khan, in order that you may see what I understand are its contents.

‘It occurs to me, that you have entered into this engagement with Meer Khan under a strong impression of the benefit to be derived from drawing that Chief from the service of Holkar, in which I participate: and under another equally strong, of the urgency of bringing him into the Nizam’s service at the present moment, on account of the probability of a war with the confederated Marhatta Chiefs. Upon this point, I have to observe, that it does not appear that this war is more probable, and it is not more talked of

at this moment, than it was three months ago; and it is my opinion that it will not take place.

‘ You must not spare any party belonging to any Marhatta Chiefs that you find, or that may be within your reach, within the Nizam’s territories; and you must also seize any fellow that you may hear of raising men within them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 29th May, 1803.

‘ I have received a letter from Colonel Stevenson, by which I learn that he has written a letter to Meer Khan, and has consented to take 5000 horse and 5000 foot, into the service; although upon a re-perusal and re-consideration of the different letters he had received upon the subject of that Chief, he found that he had no authority from me to conclude such an arrangement. I have, in consequence, written to him a letter this day, of which the enclosed is a copy; and I send it to you, that you may have it in your power to show the Nizam’s durbar that, as far as I may be supposed to have had authority to bind the Government in a transaction of this kind, Colonel Stevenson was not authorised by me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM.

‘ When General Stuart stated his intention to appoint Captain Mackay to do Major Symons’s duty in this detachment, I apprised him of Captain Mackay’s objections to have to do with the accounts of the hired bullocks; and I understand from the conversation which then passed between the Commander in Chief, the Adjutant General, and myself, that it was not his Excellency’s intention that Captain Mackay was to have any thing to do with the settlement of the bullock accounts, but that he was only to receive money on account of Major Symons from the pay officer; that he was to pay money to the bullock owners on account of Major Symons, and under his directions; and that Major Symons alone was to be the responsible accountant to the public for

all the hired cattle. If the intention had been different, it would have been better to have appointed a separate bullock agent for this detachment.

‘ In respect to the form and mode of settling the accounts, it is my opinion that Major Symons can call upon Captain Mackay to send the account of the money he disbursed, in any form he may think proper, provided that form does not occasion any evidently unnecessary trouble.

‘ Although Captain Mackay has not relied much upon the forms of the accounts required from him, I conclude that, provided the future responsibility is taken from him, he will be satisfied ; and that the complaints of the forms in which the accounts are required are intended only to swell the catalogue of grievances.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 30th May, 1803.

‘ I have received your secretary’s letter of the 20th instant, upon the subject of the bullock accounts, to which I have replied this day. I am concerned that I should have been the cause of error in Captain Mackay, respecting the accounts of the hired bullocks ; but I wrote the memorandum, which is enclosed, to your secretary, from what I understood to be your intention in the conversation which I had with you, and in the General Order regarding Captain Mackay’s appointment.

‘ In respect to the Company’s gun bullocks, I have the honor to enclose some papers which I have received from Captain Mackay, from which it appears that Captain Mackay was not unwilling that Major Symons should interfere in that department, as far as he might think proper.

‘ In Major Symons’s letter of the 8th of May, he calls for an additional voucher of the payments made in this department, which was not ordered by the Military Auditor General. This voucher may be a very necessary one, and it may be very proper to introduce it into the department : but it must be introduced by an order from superior authority ; and at all events, I believe that every day’s experience of the service shows that the business of every department f

the army has become so complicated from the multiplicity and variety of checks and vouchers, that it is scarcely possible to carry on the duties of any one department exactly in the mode pointed out by the regulations. It is therefore better not to increase these vouchers in a department, which has constantly proved itself to be more efficient than any other in the service.

‘ From a perusal of these papers, I am convinced that if these gentlemen chose to accommodate, the business would be very well carried on, without giving you further trouble; but, at all events, it must be carried on according to your orders.

‘ As it appears by the papers which I have enclosed, that Captain Mackay wished that Major Symons should carry on the duties of the gun bullock department in any manner he might think proper, and as I was partly the cause of this error respecting the mode of settling the accounts of the hired bullocks, I did not inform him that it was your intention to dismiss him from his office. But he has since desired leave to resign it.

‘ I have refused to allow him leave to resign it: first, because if you should still think proper that he should be punished, I do not wish that he should evade that punishment by resigning the office, by which means he would certainly avoid the disgrace that would attend his dismissal: secondly, I should feel much inconvenienced in having to transfer that extensive concern, the Company’s elephants and draught bullocks, as well as the hired cattle with this detachment, to other hands at the present moment. Indeed, the people attached to the gun bullocks appear so much under the influence of Captain Mackay; they are so miserable on account of the smallness of their pay, and the high price of any article of provisions in this country; and so discontented on these accounts, as well as because they see a similar or a worse description of people, belonging to the Bombay army, receiving more than double their pay, that I should fear they would all desert, if Captain Mackay lost his employment. This misery and discontent are so great, that I much fear, when the rains set in, to aggravate them; and that I shall be obliged to make a proposition to you to give the bullock drivers a temporary allowance as a gratuity,



while serving in a part of the country in which provisions are so dear.

‘ Although I have refused to receive Captain Mackay’s resignation, it is proper that you should be informed of the reasons for which he has offered it. I before informed you that the state of his health, as well as other causes, induce him to wish to go home, as soon as the service on which the troops are now employed shall be performed; and that was one reason for which he wished to have nothing to do with the accounts of the hired bullocks with this detachment, and they are to go to Major Symons. But Captain Mackay will not be freed from this responsibility when he shall have sent these accounts to Major Symons, and that officer shall have approved of them; but he must still be responsible till the accounts shall have been passed by the proper officers at Madras.

‘ Captain Mackay would be perfectly satisfied to incur this responsibility, if his accounts had no connexion with Major Symons. But he urges, that although his accounts may be settled monthly, and may be perfectly correct, and made out according to Major Symons’s wishes, he shall not be freed from his responsibility, and will not be able to leave the country, should you permit him to do so, until Major Symons’s accounts be settled. Therefore he wishes to resign the appointment he holds at the earliest possible period, in order that he may be responsible for the accounts of a smaller number of months.

‘ I beg to refer this subject to your consideration; and to request your orders whether I shall accept Captain Mackay’s resignation, or shall dismiss him. Knowing well the inconvenience which would be the consequence of his resigning the gun-bullock and elephant departments at the present moment, he has offered to keep the charge of these, without salary, till the service may be concluded.

‘ I received a letter last night from Colonel Stevenson, in which he informed me that the Nizam’s commander, Mohi-put Ram, had received orders from Hyderabad to agree to entertain Meer Khan and all his army, amounting to 30,000 men. Some time ago Colonel Stevenson referred to me a letter from Meer Khan, in which that chief urged strongly the necessity that he should have an immediate answer to

his proposition to be taken into the Nizam's service with his whole army. I desired Colonel Stevenson to keep up the communication with Meer Khan, and to inform the Nizam's commander, who appeared to be very anxious that he should be taken into the service, that I had recommended to Major Kirkpatrick that he and his whole party should be entertained. Many letters passed between me and Colonel Stevenson upon the subject, in all of which he expressed how much he was pressed by Meer Khan for an answer. I always referred him to the Nizam's government, and desired him to inform the Nizam's commanders, that, owing to his Highness's indisposition, and that of one of his sons, all business at Hyderabad was stopped, which was one cause of the delay.

‘ In the course of this correspondence, I received a letter from Major Kirkpatrick, in which he informed me that the Nizam's commanders conceived that the British Government would defray half of the expense to be incurred by entertaining Meer Khan and his troops; I therefore immediately wrote to Colonel Stevenson, to desire him to set them right upon that point, and to inform them that the whole question had been all along referrible and referred to the Nizam's government alone.

‘ Since I wrote that letter, I have received one from Colonel Stevenson, in which he tells me, that notwithstanding he had re-perused and re-considered my letters to him, and found that he had no authority whatever to conclude with Meer Khan, he had written to that chief to consent to take into the service 5000 horse and 5000 foot, at an enormous expense. I immediately wrote to him to desire, that if it was understood that he had bound the British Government in any manner by that letter, he should write immediately to Meer Khan to tell him, that neither he nor I had any authority to enter into such an agreement.

‘ Last night, however, I received his letter of the 26th, in which he tells me that Mohiput Ram has authority to entertain Meer Khan; and that it has been agreed that half the expense is to be paid by the Company, and half by the Nizam.

‘ I cannot comprehend what could have induced Colonel Stevenson to write to Meer Khan the letter by which he

engaged to hire the troops; for he positively says in his letter that he was aware that he had no authority to make such a bargain. But he appears to have been strongly impressed with a sense of the advantages of detaching that chief from Holkar, to whom, as well as to the supposed confederacy, it is a fatal blow; and to be very apprehensive of the combination of the northern Chiefs, of which he had read very late assurances from Major Kirkpatrick. This combination, however, I think now more unlikely than ever.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 31st May, 1803.

‘ After the Nizam’s officers had informed Colonel Stevenson that Meer Khan, with his whole army, were to be taken into the service, and that the expense was to be paid equally by the Company and the Nizam, they came forward on the following day with a paper, which they said required only the Colonel’s signature, in order that they might conclude with Meer Khan.

‘ The purport of this paper was, that the Colonel engaged that the British Government would defray half of the expense of entertaining Meer Khan and his troops. Colonel Stevenson refused to sign this paper, and there the matter rested.

‘ In the mean time, he received a letter from me of the 25th, in which I enclosed the copy of a report of Moonshee Uzzeez Oollah, stating that the Nizam’s minister had declared that Colonel Stevenson had engaged that the British Government would defray half the expense; and I desired Colonel Stevenson to set the Nizam’s servants right upon this subject.

‘ The Colonel then drew from them a paper, being a copy of their letter to the minister, from which it appears clearly, not only that Colonel Stevenson never did enter into these engagements, as stated by the Nizam’s minister, but that his Highness’s servants never thought that he did, and never wrote that he had.

‘ It appears, therefore, that the whole has been a trick, in which the Nizam and his minister have been concerned, and his officers the instruments to endeavor to draw some Eng-

lishmen into an engagement to pay half the expense of hiring Meer Khan; and then to take advantage of our scrupulous adherence to our good faith, to make the Government adhere to this engagement. However, it has entirely failed; and I think there is reason to hope that Colonel Stevenson will not have dispatched the letter to Meer Khan, which I yesterday reported to you that he had written.

‘ I think we are not getting on so quickly at this durbar as we hoped we should. None of the sirdars have yet been satisfied, although great promises have been made.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 31st May, 1803.

‘ I have received your letters of the 26th, 27th, and 28th. After reading that of the 26th, I was convinced that the proposition would be made to you, which you recite in that of the 27th; and I am glad that you resisted to comply with it with so much firmness. It appears by your letter of the 28th, that mine of the 25th arrived just in time to show you the designs of the Nizam’s servants; and I still hope, that if you had not then sent off the letter to Meer Khan, you will have stopped it.

‘ My letter of the 25th, and its enclosures, will have shown you clearly the art of the Nizam’s servants.

‘ They know how scrupulous we are regarding our faith; and they first endeavor to make Major Kirkpatrick believe you have pledged your faith that the British Government would pay a part of the expense of hiring Meer Khan, in hopes thereby to draw him in to make some engagement.

‘ When they found that would not answer, they come back upon you, and tell you that it is settled that 35,000 men of Meer Khan’s are to be hired, and that the Company are to pay half of the expense; and then they call upon you to sign an agreement that that half shall be paid in the manner in which it had been settled. After all, when you were informed by me of what had passed at Hyderabad, it turns out to be a low trick, in which both the minister and the Nizam were concerned, and Mohiput Ram, and Noorool Oomrah, the instruments to take you in to sign an

engagement for which you had no authority; in hopes thereby to bind the British Government to participate in an act, to which they know well they would never be able to prevail upon the Governor General to consent to.

‘What has passed, is now all well; particularly if you have not sent your letter to Meer Khan. It ought, however, to be a lesson to us to beware not to involve ourselves in engagements either with, or in concert with, or on behalf of people who have no faith, or no principle of honor or of honesty, or such as usually among us guide the conduct of gentlemen, unless duly and formally authorised by our Government.

‘If you should have dispatched the letter to Meer Khan, the letter which I desired you to write to him will set all matters right, as far as the British Government may be concerned. It will rest with the Nizam’s servants, either to abide by the agreement made in that letter, or not, as they may think proper. For the sake of the Nizam’s territories, I hope they will abide by it; but if there should be the most distant hint, or even idea, that the British Government is bound by your letter to Meer Khan, I hope that you will have written him a second letter, as directed by me in my letter of the 29th.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Poonah, 31st May, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Colonel Stevenson, written in answer to one from me of the 26th instant, in which I sent him a copy of the report of Moonshee Uzzeez Oollah, on the subject of the supposed consent by Colonel Stevenson, that the British Government should pay half of the expense to be incurred in hiring Meer Khan and his troops.

‘The transaction has not the appearance of a very candid one, either on the part of the government at Hyderabad, or on that of the Nizam’s officers with Colonel Stevenson. However, he resisted firmly all their attempts to induce him to sign a paper by which he should engage that the British Government would pay half of the expense; and at last, when from my letter he discovered that the durbar alleged

that he had engaged himself, he got from the Nizam's officers a paper, which proved clearly that even they had never thought so.

'I cannot tell, from his letter of the 28th, whether he had dispatched the letter to Meer Khan, of which I sent you the translation. But if he had, an obedience to the orders given to him in my letter will prevent any inconvenience from that measure.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Kirkpatrick.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

'P.S. I enclose a copy of a second letter from Colonel Stevenson, upon the subject of his communications with Mohiput Ram, which I have just received.'

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

'SIR,

'Camp at Poonah, 31st May, 1803.

'I have the honor to inform you, that I proposed to march on the 3rd of June, being fully prepared for that purpose. From the communications, however, which I have had with the different chiefs in the service of his Highness the Peshwah, who accompanied me before my march to this city, I find that, notwithstanding his Highness's positive promise to me in your presence, no steps have yet been taken to satisfy the claims of any of them. These chiefs, therefore, appear to entertain great anxiety upon the subject of my approaching march. Some of them have determined to ask for permission to return to their homes, and none are prepared to march with the British troops under my command.

'Under these circumstances, I think there is strong reason to apprehend, that the whole of the troops of his Highness the Peshwah will disband, when I shall commence my march from Poonah.

'You are well aware how strongly I am urged by the situation of the affairs of the government of his Highness the Peshwah to the northward, and by the advanced state of the season, to commence my march at the earliest possible period. But in hopes that some arrangement will be made, I have no objection to halt till the 4th, on which day I must march.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Poonah, 2nd June, 1803.

‘ I was concerned to hear from Lieut. Colonel Agnew that you have suffered much from the heat of the weather. You will have received immediate relief from the removal to a house; and it is to be hoped that the rains, which we may expect every day, will enter the Doab, and cool the weather, and that you will be able to return to camp. There is nothing new here.

‘ I do not know that the Peshwah has concluded anything for any of his sirdars, but he promised that they should have their sunnuds last night. Colonel Collins had asked for an audience from Scindiah, but he had not received an answer on the 27th of May. It appears, from a conversation which passed between Ballojee Koonger, the Peshwah’s vakeel with Scindiah, and a man of Colonel Collins, and from a letter from Ballojee Koonger to the durbar here, that the confederacy has now subsided into a plan to frighten the Peshwah; and by working on his fears to induce him to cede his lands in Guzerat to Scindiah, in order to conciliate that chief, but this will not answer.

‘ Holkar is certainly moving off to the northward of the Taptee. It is said he intends to cross the Nerbudda likewise, and to enter Guzerat, but I doubt it: if he crosses the Nerbudda at all, it will be with a view to establish himself in the Holkar territory in Hindustan.

‘ I shall march on the 4th: I have made 150 wheels since I came here; by which exertion, and the assistance I have got from Colonel Murray’s corps, I am better equipped in respect to carriages, than I was on the day I quitted the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 2nd June, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 31st of May, with its enclosures. I think it very desirable that the forty pontoons, which I first mentioned, should leave

Panwell as soon after the 8th instant as may be possible. But I do not see any objection to making ten additional pontoons, which may be sent afterwards, if it should be found necessary to require an additional number.

‘The report upon the trial of the pontoons does not state at what distance they were from each other; and therefore it is impossible for me to give an opinion whether the size of the balks ought to be increased.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Poonah, 2nd June, 1803.

‘I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th of May, in which you enclose the extract of a letter from the Military Board, and a copy of a letter from the garrison storekeeper of Bombay to the Military Board.

‘It is my opinion that it will not answer to form a depôt at Cundalla, on the top of the Bhoze ghaut.

‘First, it will not be possible to construct the buildings necessary to cover the stores before the rains shall set in.

‘Secondly, it will not be possible to procure cattle at Cundalla to remove the stores from thence to Poonah or to the army. Cattle must consequently be provided at Poonah, or must be sent from the army for this service. And supposing them to be procurable at Poonah, it is better that they should be employed to carry on the stores from thence to the army; and supposing that the cattle of the army should be able to return for stores, it is better that they should have to go no farther than Poonah for their loads.

‘Thirdly, the intermediate depôt between Panwell and Poonah, even supposing that it was not liable to the objections above stated, would only create delay in forwarding supplies, and add to the confusion incident to the formation of all new establishments of this description.

‘I observe in Captain Moor’s letter to the Military Board that he finds it difficult to adhere to the plan which I suggested to the Honorable the Governor in Council, in my



letter of the 18th of May, for forwarding the supplies from Panwell to Poonah or the army. If the owners of the hired cattle cannot be prevailed upon to agree to go farther than Poonah, of course they must not be forced to do so; but the only mode of inducing them by degrees to agree to a proposition which I consider as beneficial to the troops under my command, will be to hire them by the month, to accustom them to regular payments and strict justice, which ought to prevail in all the Company's transactions with the natives of this country. Accordingly, to stop their pay if they delay unreasonably on the road; and then they will find it more advantageous for them to work their cattle in the upper country between Poonah and the army, than in the lower between Panwell and Poonah; as in the former they will be less exposed to the violence of the rains.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Instructions for Lieut. Brown, of the First Battalion of Madras Artillery.*

‘ 3rd June, 1803.

‘ 1. Lieut. Brown is to remain at Poonah according to the General Orders for the purposes therein stated. He is first to complete with wheels all the carts left by Captain Noble.

‘ 2. He is to make wheels for the 6 pounder carriages belonging to Major General Wellesley's division, left at Poonah with Colonel Murray's corps.

‘ 3. He is to make wheels for the tumbrils left at Poonah belonging to Major General Wellesley's division.

‘ 4. If seasoned timber of a proper description for naves can be procured, he is to make new wheels, including naves, for the ten 6 pounders which march with Major General Wellesley's division. The naves can be bored, and the brass boxes placed in them, when the wheels are to be put on the carriages.

‘ 5. Lieut. Brown is to pay the artificers according to the instructions which he will receive from Captain Noble.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp near Poonah, 3rd June, 1803.

‘ When I shall march from Poonah, I shall have occasion to draw supplies from the depôt formed at that place; and I beg your attention to the following directions respecting it.

‘ I wish that there should be in this depôt at all times 4000 bags of rice, of 72 pucca seers each, each seer of two pounds. In respect to other articles of provision stores, which I may think it necessary from time to time to have in this depôt, I shall send orders occasionally respecting their being laid in.

‘ Enclosed I have the honor to send an extract of a letter which I wrote to Mr. Duncan on the 18th of May, to provide for filling the depôt at Poonah.

‘ It is probable that the storekeeper at Panwell will be able to hire a number of bullocks sufficient for the purpose, under the instructions which have been given to him, in consequence of that letter.

‘ You will be so kind as to give directions that a committee may be assembled to ascertain the quantities and quality of provision stores which may from time to time arrive at Poonah from Panwell. In consequence of these instructions, you will desire the officer in charge of the stores at Poonah to give a receipt for such quantity, specifying in what manner they came, and on what day they were dispatched from Panwell.

‘ In case the owners of the cattle which bring up the stores from Panwell should require advances of money on their arrival at Poonah, you will authorize the officer in charge of the stores at Poonah to make these advances on account of the storekeeper at Panwell; taking care to insert in the register that he had made the advances according to the arrangements suggested to Mr. Duncan, in the letter of which the enclosed is a copy. He will also enter at the bottom of the register, the date of the arrival of the stores at Poonah, the number of bullocks that arrived, and the number of loads they brought.

‘ From your correspondence with the storekeeper at Panwell, you will be able to ascertain whether he can procure bullocks in such numbers as to keep the depôt at Poonah

complete to 4000 bags; and if you should have reason to apprehend that he will not be able to do so, you will authorize the officer in charge of the depôt at Poonah to purchase rice in the bazaar of that place, to keep it complete to that quantity.

‘ But as rice is scarce and dear at Poonah, and as a large quantity has been already provided for the public service at Bombay and Panwell, it is desirable that the latter should be used if possible, rather than that any should be purchased at Poonah.

‘ Having thus provided for keeping the depôt at Poonah as full as I think it necessary, I proceed to inform you in what mode I propose to draw the stores from it to the body of troops who will be in advance.

‘ If the state of the public cattle will allow of it, I propose that they should return to Poonah for fresh loads, in proportion as those they shall now take from thence will be consumed. When these shall arrive, they will have an indent, signed by the officer at the head of the department to which they belong, and countersigned by me, which will specify the quantities required.

‘ These indents are to be complied with. Advices will be sent to you by post when these cattle shall be dispatched from camp, by which you will be informed of their numbers, and the quantities and quality of the stores which it is intended they should bring.

‘ It is also possible that I may be able to prevail upon some of the Mysore brinjaries to return to Poonah for loads. These people will have orders signed by the superintendent of supplies for the quantities and quality of the stores which they will require; which orders are to be complied with, and the receipts of the brinjaries, or their mutaseddee, are to be taken for the stores. You will be advised of the departure of the brinjarry cattle from camp from time to time, and will be informed of the numbers sent to Poonah, and the quantities of stores they will take.

‘ I have had many conversations with the Resident respecting the hire of cattle at Poonah, to carry on provision stores to the body of troops in advance; and I still hope that the Government may be able to prevail upon some of the Marhatta brinjaries to enter into engagements to perform that

service. All the cattle which the people attached to the Residency may be able to procure, will be handed over to the officer in charge of the store at Poonah; and they must be dispatched with loads of rice to the body of troops in advance, by routes, of which from time to time I shall give you the details.

‘ Before they are despatched, however, they must be made to enter into the engagements proposed in the enclosed extract of a letter to Mr. Duncan, to be required from the owners of cattle hired at Panwell, for the service. And a register must be made according to the form thereunto annexed; and all the regulations therein suggested for the conduct of the storekeeper at Panwell must be observed by the officer in charge of the stores at Poonah, in forwarding them to the body of troops in advance. The sums of money which he may advance will be on his own account; and all the sums which it may be necessary to advance to the owners of the bullocks, when they shall reach the army, will also be charged to him, and entered in the register, which he will send with the owners of the cattle.

‘ In case you should find it necessary to use any part of the depôt of provisions formed at Poonah, for the consumption of the body of troops under your command, you will be so kind as to take care that it is replaced, so as to be kept complete to the quantity above stated.

‘ Should Lieut. Colonel Close be able to procure bullocks to carry rice to the army, the owners of them may want bags. Those in which the rice is contained must be examined, and if they should not be found fit for the service, 2000 bullock gunny bags must be immediately provided, to contain the stores which it may be in the power of the officer in charge of the depôt to send on.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Colonel Murray.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY DEAR MORNINGTON,      ‘ Camp at Charowly, 4th June, 1803.

‘ I marched from Poonah this morning, and shall proceed towards the Godavery.

‘ I am sorry to tell you, that notwithstanding our strong

recommendation of the southern jaghiredars and the Peshwah's officers to his Highness; his solemn promise to me that he would satisfy their claims in order to secure their future services; and the assurances of his servants from time to time to Colonel Close, that his Highness was taking measures to satisfy them, and to send out an army with me, I have not got with me one Marhatta horseman. Ragonaut Rao, however, has told Colonel Close that the Peshwah will give the Zereen Putkah to Appah Saheb, and will not make the demand of the nuzzer. Appah Saheb has visited him, and Bulwunt Rao Nagonath is in treaty with Appah Saheb respecting the satisfaction of his other claims. But the Peshwah trusts none of his ministers, and pretends to do his own business; although his time is much taken up by religious ceremonies and his pleasures, and he is very undecided. These faults in his character, added to a slowness natural to every Marhatta negotiator, render hopeless the conclusion of any important transaction.

‘ In the mean time the season is advancing, the rivers which rise in the western ghauts will soon fill; and then, if I am not on the spot to urge the chiefs, to take all the trouble, and to make all the arrangements which are necessary to cross the rivers with the troops, months will elapse before they will overtake me; even if the Peshwah should settle their claims, as far as to induce them to march from Poonah at all.

‘ This conduct of the Peshwah would appear like treachery; but I declare that I do not suspect him of treachery. I really believe that he thinks his only safety is in the alliance with the Company, and that he wishes to carry into execution all the stipulations of the treaty. But he is incapable himself of doing business; he will not trust his ministers, and he is jealous of, and detests his sirdars.

‘ The news which came from England yesterday makes it very desirable that we should break up in this quarter.

‘ I have seen Colonel Collins's letter to you of the 29th of May; and as I think it possible that the Rajah of Berar and Scindiah may never meet, I have urged the Colonel to press Scindiah to name a day on which he will explain his intentions; and if Scindiah should decline to name a day, he should fix one for him, beyond which, in my opinion, he

ought not to remain in his camp, if the explanation should not be satisfactory.

‘ If Scindiah should move off, which I still think is very probable, I shall break up immediately. There must be troops in the Carnatic when the French arrive at Pondicherry. There will be none, unless General Stuart’s army can march to that quarter; and if he should move before Scindiah shall have declared himself, the movement may have much effect upon Scindiah’s declaration. And if there should be a war, the operations of this body of troops, at such a distance from our own frontiers, will be unpleasant, unless General Stuart’s force should be so posted as to preserve tranquillity in our rear, and defend the Company’s territories. Upon the whole, therefore, it is absolutely necessary that Scindiah should immediately declare himself, and that if his declaration should be favorable to our wishes, we should break up.

‘ Holkar’s army is melting away: he is gone to the northward of the Taptee, and it is reported that he is going into Hindustan.

‘ I wish that there were powers here to act at once, and to direct the negotiations with the different Marhatta chiefs to certain points as they arise. These questions occur daily, and nearly six weeks elapse before your orders can be received upon every fresh occurrence. At this moment Colonel Collins ought to be ordered to press Scindiah to give an answer, particularly as he has hinted that he is wavering between peace and war; and time, which is all that Scindiah requires, and which is fatal to us, will be gained by the necessity of waiting for your orders, unless Colonel Collins should attend to my suggestion. A communication ought also to be opened with Holkar and the Rajah of Berar, upon the subject of the treaty of Bassein, and endeavours made to separate them from Scindiah; and the Peshwah ought to be made to show his correspondence with Scindiah. I conclude, however, that Colonel Close will ascertain whether his Highness has written to that Chief, as he asserts he has.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Charowly, 4th June, 1803.

‘ I return Colonel Collins’s packet, and the letter from Mr. Duncan.

‘ It is obvious that the object of Scindiah is to gain time, which we ought to prevent, if possible, under present circumstances. It is very unfortunate that we have not now an agent with the Rajah of Berar, and another with Holkar.

‘ Are there no means of discovering whether the Peshwah has or has not invited Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar to Poonah? If he has, no dependence can be placed on him; and we must immediately decide what steps the British Government ought to take for its own security; considering all the circumstances of our situation in India, with the prospect of a war in Europe.

‘ In respect to Parchole, my opinion is, that without negotiating or offering money to Scindiah’s amildars, or Scindiah’s troops, Mr. Duncan ought—

‘ First; To prepare a body of troops to take possession of that district.

‘ Secondly; To communicate to Scindiah’s amildar the Peshwah’s sunnud making over the district to the English, together with the note given by the Peshwah, stating that Ballogee Koonger had no authority to grant it to Scindiah.

‘ Thirdly; To require him to withdraw from the district instantly, and to attack him if he does not comply with this requisition.

‘ If this question was to occur between any two powers excepting the Company and a Marhatta, I should be of opinion that it would be proper to call upon the employer of the amildar, to desire him to withdraw. But in cases in which the Marhattas are concerned, this course of action would be too tedious, even if successful in the end; but it would probably terminate in the necessity of driving out the amildar, which I have recommended in the first instance. Mr. Duncan might as well make Colonel Collins acquainted with all the circumstances of this case at an early period.

‘ I have had an opportunity of seeing all my cattle this day. The gun bullocks are in excellent condition; the carriage cattle, in general, better than I ever expected to find

them; that is to say, they can march, and, if we can get a little forage, will live; but the brinjarry cattle are terribly out of condition. I think they cannot live; and at all events they will not be able to work, so as to feed the troops. In my opinion, we cannot venture to cross the Godavery, unless some cattle can be hired at Poonah to attend us.

‘ I have received a letter from Colonel Collins, but it contains nothing particular.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Charowly, 4th June, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch from Colonel Collins. It is probable that the advance of the troops will draw a declaration from Dowlut Rao Scindiah; at all events, I have urged Colonel Collins to press him to fix a time when he will make known his sentiments.

‘ Our situation is rather critical in this country. The Peshwah has hitherto done nothing for his sirdars who came with me, and none of them have marched from Poonah. He has broken the treaty by not producing an army, and he has broken his word with me. He has told Colonel Close that he has urged Dowlut Rao Scindiah not to come to Poonah; and that chief declares that he has invited him and the Rajah of Berar to his capital. The Peshwah went so far as to communicate to Colonel Close a copy of the letter which he said he had written to Scindiah.

‘ I do not believe that the Peshwah is treacherous; on the contrary, I am convinced that he sees that his only safety is in the treaty with the Company; but he is incapable of transacting the business of his government; he is jealous of the influence we have acquired over his chiefs, although he knows that he owes to that influence his restoration to power; and his disposition is so vindictive, that he cannot be brought to pardon those who have injured him, or to whom he has done an injury.

‘ Upon the whole, I am concerned that the alliance will not work on the footing of the treaty. But at all events, he has broken the treaty by not producing his army; and the Bri-



tish government must be considered as at liberty to act according to its sense of its own interests.

‘ It is difficult to determine what is its interest at the present moment. If Scindiah had made the declaration required of him, and had consented to withdraw his army, I should have no scruple in deciding what is the interest of the British government. In my opinion, it would be to break up the army in this quarter, and to leave that part of it under your immediate directions at liberty to move towards the Carnatic, in case the war with France should be renewed. The six battalions might be left at Poonah, and government might withdraw them or not, as they might think proper; and as for Holkar, he might be left in possession of the Peshwah’s territories to the northward, till his Highness himself should think it proper to assemble an army to drive him out.

‘ The troops moving from hence to the southward might be employed to take possession of the district of Savanore. But as long as Scindiah remains in his menacing position on the Nizam’s northern frontier, and will let us know whether we are to have peace or war, only when he shall have had a conference with the Rajah of Berar, which may never take place, it is not possible to move away from our position in this country, even if we never had a treaty with the Peshwah.

‘ I marched this morning, and propose to move on towards the Godavery. If I can get a little forage, the cattle will do well, excepting the brinjarry cattle, which I am afraid cannot live.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Bardoly, north of the  
Beemah, 5th June, 1803.

‘ I have received your letters of the 30th and 31st May. I marched from Poonah yesterday, and intend to continue my march till I get beyond the Goor river, on the road towards Ahmednuggur or Puttun. I must then halt for a few days, if I can procure forage, as well to rest and refresh the cattle which have had no forage since the day before yester-

day, as to bring forward the Marhatta Chiefs, who are still at Poonah.

‘ You have done right to cross the Godavery. It is uncertain whether the northern Chiefs will confederate for the purpose of hostility against the British Government. Scindiah has told Collins that he cannot make him acquainted with the object of his negotiations with the Rajah of Berar, until he shall have had a meeting with that Rajah; and he hints that he has made peace with Holkar, which I do not believe to be true. But Holkar still remains to the northward of the river Taptee; and if this confederacy should take effect, and there should be a war, your force may be the first object of the confederates, before I can give you any assistance. I therefore recommend that you should not advance too great a distance from the Godavery.

‘ You must send a sufficient detachment to cut up Baba Phurkia, or any other Marhatta that may enter the Nizam’s territories; but I recommend that you should not make the detachment of the Company’s troops. The Nizam’s troops will effect this service well; and I make no doubt that any detachment you may send on it, will take care not to expose itself to the greater Marhatta armies.

‘ I am very anxious indeed that they should avoid plundering either in their own or the Marhatta territory; and that they should not enter the latter, unless Baba Phurkia, or the chief of whom they may be in pursuit, should have entered the Nizam’s territory, and that they are certain of striking an important blow by following him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp at Bardoly, north of the Beemah, 5th June, 1803.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ We had no forage yesterday, and none again this day. But the villages in this quarter are full of inhabitants, and do not appear to have been plundered. The country was cultivated last season; but I am afraid that, either from the want of seed grain or of cattle, it will not be cultivated this year; as I observe small patches of cultivation scattered in different situations, which I conclude are intended to provide for the food of the unfortunate inhabitants.

‘ We have lost some brinjarry cattle already ; and I have been obliged to leave 500 loads belonging to the provision department, on the ground which I quitted this morning. I wrote to Colonel Murray regarding them, and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire your man to give him every assistance in his power to hire cattle to bring them back to Poonah. All this shows the necessity that we should have some assistance from the country.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Colonel Murray, upon the subject of the depôt formed at Poonah ; and of the assistance of cattle, which I still hope you will have it in your power to afford us.

‘ I shall march on in hopes that as I get to a distance from Poonah, I may find something for the cattle to eat. Every thing near it, excepting to the westward, has been consumed.

‘ I shall, to-morrow or next day, write to you regarding the place at which the boats ought to be on the rivers Beemah and Goor, in order to keep up the communication with us.

‘ Do you not think that I ought now to write to Holkar to communicate to him the treaty of Bassein, and to point out to him its nature, &c. ? If you are of that opinion, it will be necessary that you should send me a copy of the treaty in English, and in one of the native languages.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ North of the Beemah, 5th June, 1803.

‘ The bullock owners informed me that they had more cattle for the service than they produced at muster on the 31st May ; and as the muster was taken at the grazing ground, and they said that the additional number of cattle were at Poonah, I had no means of ascertaining the truth of their report till after yesterday’s march. I then found that they had no more than had been produced at muster, and that I had given orders that they should receive more loads than they could carry.

‘ These loads, of which I now enclose a return, were left as therein stated. Those at Charowly are under charge of a

jemidar's guard, and I intend that the whole of them should be taken into the depôt at Poonah.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if, upon the receipt of this letter, you will be so kind as to send to Charowly a jemidar's guard, to relieve that left in charge of the provisions on the ground there; and if you will take measures to have these stores removed to the depôt at Poonah as soon as possible.

‘ I have written to Colonel Close to request that he will give you assistance in effecting this object.

‘ We have had no forage yet, but I have hopes that we shall get some, when at a greater distance from Poonah.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 6th June, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 3rd, with its enclosures.

‘ In my opinion, basket boats will answer all the purposes which I had in view, when I requested the Honorable the Governor to give orders that boats might be placed on the rivers on the road from Panwell to the Bhore ghaut; but these boats are difficult to manage, and indeed cannot be managed at all, excepting by persons accustomed to them, who, I imagine, cannot be found at Bombay.

‘ As common boats are used upon all the rivers above the ghauts, I conclude that they could likewise be used upon the rivers in the Konkan, and the boatmen at Bombay must be expert in managing them. They can likewise be immediately procured; but time will elapse before the basket boats can be made.

‘ As the basket boats are in general only ten feet in diameter, they cannot contain the number of persons supposed by Mr. Anderson.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 7th June, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 6th with enclosures, for which I am much obliged to you.

‘ I now send you a dispatch received this day from the Governor General, which I beg of you to return after perusal. You will see that there are more calls for our troops.

‘ I got a little forage yesterday towards evening; and I see some now coming in. But we have sad losses of brinjarry cattle.

‘ I delay to write to you upon the subject of the boats till I cross the Goor river, which will not be till the day after to-morrow; as I purpose to halt here to-morrow, if we can feed at all.

‘ Amrut Rao’s vakeel is very anxious for his answer.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 7th June, 1803.

‘ I have received the Governor General’s instructions (upon the subject of the probability that the French will endeavor to get possession of the Portuguese settlements in India and in China), addressed to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, of which I observe that a copy has been sent to you; and as I conceive that you will be desirous to have my opinion upon this subject, I lose no time in writing to you.

‘ It appears to be the Governor General’s intention, that if the Viceroy of Goa will receive a British garrison, British troops should be sent to Goa without loss of time. I have nothing to say upon this part of the subject. You are aware of the state of the garrisons in Canara, and of the number of troops in Malabar, and of the call for their services in the latter provinces. There are already at Goa two companies of the garrison of Hullahall, which, after making that detachment and the others to the posts on the Malpoorba, Gutpurba, and Kistna, consists of five native companies; and in my opinion that post ought to be kept at its present strength. But the Governor General anticipates the refusal of the Viceroy of Goa to receive the British troops at present, which I acknowledge I think more than probable; and in that case he wishes that troops should be so stationed as to prevent the French from carrying into execution their plans,

or to drive them from Goa in case they should get into that place.

‘ The question is, in what situation ought those troops to be placed ?

‘ The Governor General suggests Bancapoor as the station which may be fixed upon for the troops which are hereafter to occupy the Marhatta cessions to the southward. But Bancapoor is at a great distance indeed from Goa, very nearly as far as you are from it at this moment.

‘ There are two situations which might be occupied with a view to the defence of Goa, but both are exceedingly inconvenient ; the access to that place from both is difficult, and the march of the troops might be impeded with ease : one is Hullihall in Soonda, the other Seedasheeghur in Canara. I shall hereafter send you a particular account of the difficulties which occur on both roads.

‘ Hullihall has now one advantage over Seedasheeghur, which is, that troops placed there give us general strength in this country ; but, on the other hand, it is an unhealthy station, and more distant from Goa than Seedasheeghur. This place enjoys an important advantage over Hullihall, and that is, that the troops stationed there might almost see, and at all events could have instant intelligence of an attack upon Goa ; but under present circumstances such a body of troops must be taken from all other services, however much they press in all quarters, and must be allotted to the care and guard of Goa alone.

‘ I have also to add that, before you will receive this letter, the march of the troops to Seedasheeghur will have been rendered almost impossible, by the setting in of the rains, and by the swelling of the numerous rivers in Canara.

‘ Considering the advanced state of the season ; that we know that the French had not sent from France their troops destined for India on the 4th or 7th of March ; that they will first go to Mauritius ; and that it is very improbable that, even if they do intend to take possession of Goa, they will commence their career in India by that feat ; or that they will venture with a large squadron upon the coast of Malabar during the western monsoon, I am of opinion that Goa is safe, at least for a time.

‘ It is true that some of these considerations may have

occurred to the Governor General when he wrote the instructions; but all of them certainly did not; and he was not aware of the whole of our situation in this country, of the difficulties which would occur in defending Goa by means of troops placed in any neighbouring station, and of those which would attend the formation of a corps at Seedasheghur, and of providing, at the same time, for all other services and objects. But those who are to carry into execution his instructions, and who, being upon the spot, must know more at the moment than he does, must be considered to have the power of weighing probabilities, and adopting a course of action in conformity thereto; and upon this principle I am of opinion that you ought not to alter the position and operations which you have directed, in order to provide for this particular service. Your position at Moodgul is, in fact, as near to Goa as that at Bancapoor would be; and there is no material obstacle to impede your march to that place, at least as far as Hullihall in Soonda.

‘Consistently with some of the objects you had in view when you took that position, you might move in nearer to Goa; but then you would, in some degree, give up Hyderabad and the Nizam’s country; and after all, in these unsettled times, and in the present state of the Nizam’s health, and the general weakness of his government, I am not quite certain that your firm support will not be required in that quarter sooner than in any other.

‘Upon the whole, I take the liberty of giving you my opinion, that unless the Viceroy of Goa will admit British troops into that settlement, it will be best that your arrangements should remain as they are for the present, with a view to all possible occurrences.

‘I have found but little forage yet, and have lost many brinjarry cattle; but we have found some forage this day, and I hope to have more as I advance to the northward and eastward.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.





heavy at Poonah as to render it necessary that you should have a shed for the gun cattle. If he should think it so, you will do well to construct one of Arcot roof.

‘ I wish that you would send two companies of the second battalion of the 3rd regiment to the ghaut, to assist the pontoon carriages in getting up. You will learn from Captain Young when they will leave Panwell; and send the companies from Poonah in such time that they meet them when they shall arrive at the bottom of the ghaut. I request you to correspond with Captain Young upon this subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Paglah, 7th June, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Colonel Stevenson, with a copy of its enclosure. Colonel Stevenson has already had occasion to complain of the conduct of Rajah Sookroodoor, and although there was no cause for it, Dowlut Rao Scindiah has made a complaint to Lieut. Colonel Collins of the conduct of the troops of his Highness the Nizam, in his districts bordering on the river Beemah.

‘ It is very desirable that nothing should be done by the British government or its allies, which can tend to provoke hostilities at the present moment; and above all, it should be the object of all regulated governments, to prevent the unauthorized attacks of their subordinate officers upon the territories of each other, merely for their individual advantage. The Nizam’s government, in particular, should discourage this species of warfare, in which his Highness must be a loser.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I request that you will exert your influence, that Rajah Sookroodoor may be ordered to desist from these practices in future; and, in the mean time, I have recommended to Colonel Stevenson to desire Rajah Mohiput Ram not to allow any of his Highness’s troops to be employed, without previously apprizing the Colonel fully of the purpose for which their services are required.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 8th June, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 7th. I am rather inclined to doubt the delivery of Indore to Holkar’s amildar. It does not appear that Colonel Collins has the intelligence from any good authority.

‘ My being in the field here, without any of the Peshwah sirdars, is rather an awkward circumstance; and, in my opinion, we must immediately take into consideration the general situation of our affairs, and to act in such manner as may appear best for the public interest.

‘ I have always thought the Peshwah to be incapable rather than disaffected; and I have imagined that he would send out an army with us, if he could. But two or three facts have occurred which rather warrant a conclusion to the contrary. One of these is, that he has not ordered out even Bappojee Vittell, whose troops were sent to encamp in my front, with great parade, on the day after I had the interview with his Highness; another is his shuffling backwards and forwards with Goklah and Appah Dessaye; and the third is his offer of the Zereen Putka to Appah Saheb, without the power attached to it, and of course without the honor. These are three stubborn facts, which we cannot conceal from ourselves, and which prove that there is something to prevent our having a Marhatta army in the field, besides his Highness’s incapacity for business.

‘ The present moment is critical. Our appearance in strength may prevent the threatened hostilities; but if it is clear that we are not strong at Poonah, which it must be to the whole world, if we continue in the field without even one Marhatta horseman, it is obvious that we are weak, not only in appearance, but in a military point of view. There can be no doubt but that a war with these confederated Marhattas would be rather a difficult undertaking, and attended with some kind of risk, if this body of troops be not accompanied by a corps of the light cavalry.

‘ The question is, whether by our own influence and negotiations we can bring forward immediately the body of cavalry, and the chiefs who came with me to Poonah, and, at the same time, keep up an appearance of an understanding

with the Peshwah. If that can be effected in any manner, it is my opinion that the public interests imperiously demand it, and I shall do every thing to bring them forward. My objects in bringing them forward would be to give us such strength as would probably prevent hostilities, or if the hostilities should take place, would give us a prospect of bringing them to a speedy conclusion. In either case I am decidedly of opinion that the alliance in its present form, and with the present Peshwah, will never answer; and my efforts would be directed to withdrawing from it with honor and safety.

‘ If we cannot bring forward a body of this horse, and as, in my opinion, the alliance will not work in its present form, or at all with the present Peshwah, with whom it is not possible to have a community of interests, the question is, whether we ought not to alter the mode, and form, and object of our negotiations with Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar. All these questions press for immediate decision, and I put them to you and Malcolm for your consideration.

‘ I wrote to the Governor General on the 5th May, and suggested the necessity of his having powers on the spot to settle every thing regarding these Marhatta affairs. His answer may be expected in a day or two; and in the meantime, in my opinion, our minds cannot be better employed than in considering the line of conduct which ought to be pursued.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will have every thing prepared to send off the boats.

‘ I hope to be across the Goor river to-morrow, and as it may be expected that the rivers will soon come down, I shall let you know where the boats ought to be placed.

‘ Have you made any progress yet with the brinjarries?

‘ If you could prevail upon some of them, as many as one thousand, to bring us loads of grain to the Goor river, something would be gained.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 8th June, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter, in which you have given a more detailed account of the disaster which happened to Major Johnson. In my opinion, Scindiah ought to require that Rajah Sookroodoor should be punished; and if he does make such a requisition to Colonel Collins, and it is sent to me, I shall certainly urge it in the strongest manner to Major Kirkpatrick and the Nizam’s durbar.

‘ I observe by the correspondence which Major Kirkpatrick has sent to Colonel Close, that the Nizam is desirous that Suddoor ool Deen should be dismissed from the charge of Aurungabad; and that you should place some of Rajah Mohiput Ram’s troops, and a proper person to command in concert with Rajah Mohiput Ram. I conceive this to be a very proper measure, and one of urgency at the present moment. It is probable that you will hear from Major Kirkpatrick upon this subject; but in the mean time, that you may be prepared to carry into execution the Nizam’s wishes, and that no time may be lost, you will do well to move towards Aurungabad. But you must keep the object of your march secret, and not take any steps to relieve the garrison till you hear from Major Kirkpatrick.

‘ The Rajah of Berar and Scindiah were to meet between Mulcapoor and Chickly, where Scindiah’s camp was on the 4th of this month.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To J. H. Piele, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR PIELE,

‘ Camp, 8th June, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 1st, upon the subject of the brinjaries. The sepoy are sent with each party, in order to urge them forward, and to prevent them from doing mischief in the country through which they pass. It frequently happens, as it has in the instance to which you have alluded, that the sepoy are of no use, and their presence deters the country magistrates from interfering, and keeping the brinj-

jarries in order. But sometimes the brinjarries will not attend to the sepoy, and even beat them; as a party did lately some of my sepoy who urged them to move from Rany Bednore, where, by all accounts, I judge that they have been halted for about two months.

‘ I see very clearly that we have been too indulgent to the brinjarries. It may be said that the harsh treatment which Purneah always recommended would have driven many out of the Mysore country; but on the other hand, I have to acknowledge that the mild treatment which they have uniformly experienced has not brought them forward for the public service in the moment of need. They have deceived me in every instance; they have broken every engagement they have made; and I think it not unlikely that I shall be in some distress, unless I can bring forward some of the brinjarries of this country.

‘ Pray request Purneah to pay no attention to our sepoy, but desire the amildars to beat them well, whenever they find them loitering on the road, or doing mischief. Purneah ought to send the bills for the rice and grain, supported by the receipts of the officer who received those articles. Separate bills ought to be made for the rice and grain delivered to Mr. Gordon’s servants at Hurryhur; and for the gram for the cavalry at the different stations to the eastward, at Bangalore, Sera, and Chittledroog, delivered to Captain Walker’s servants, or to the regiments of cavalry.

‘ Let the bills be sent to me, and I will sign them. You can settle with Mr. Gordon for the payment from his office, and I shall desire Captain Walker to pay for the gram.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ J. H. Piele, Esq.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, north of the Goor river, 9th June, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Colonel Collins.

‘ It would be desirable that the government of Fort St. George should take measures to supply me with money. When that sent under charge of Captain Buchan shall arrive, I shall have a sufficiency to pay the troops on the 1st of July and 1st August; but no more.

‘ I cannot depend upon any supplies of money from Bombay. That which I have already received from thence was in dollars taken out of two Indiamen consigned with their cargoes to Fort St. George. The government of Bombay have no specie, and the general property of that place has been so completely destroyed by fire and its consequences, that none can be borrowed. The credit of the government also is not very good, as their treasury notes are circulated at a discount; and the Poonah soucars who have any money are unwilling to advance it for bills upon the government of Bombay, which they apprehend will be paid in their treasury notes.

‘ I recommend, therefore, that if you cannot supply me from your tunbrils, the government of Fort St. George should immediately send to Bombay one lac of pagodas, either in silver or in Behaudry pagodas, for the use of this detachment; and another lac to arrive there in the month of August. Mr. Duncan will be able to send these up to me.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp, north of the Goor river,  
9th June, 1803.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I have received your letter of the 8th, and I am happy to find that there is a chance of having some of the Marhatta chiefs with this body of troops.

‘ We got a tolerable quantity of forage yesterday; but in the evening there was a fall of rain, by which we have lost numbers of cattle, as well belonging to the brinjarries as to the public departments. The cattle are so weak in consequence of the want of forage near Poonah, and the bad quality of that which they get, that they are unable to stand the rain. It is difficult to decide what to do; we cannot march, and we cannot halt in the same place, because we soon destroy the little forage we find. I was obliged to move a few miles this morning, and have left 800 loads of grain. It is not possible to keep a body of troops in the field at such a distance from our own country, unless we can get some assistance from that in which we are situated. If I could get

the 2000 head of cattle which I required from Mr. Duncan, it would be something; or if we could get even a small number of the Poonah brinjaries to attend us.

‘ We must be sparing of our money; for including that which is to be paid into your hands, and 20,000 rupees which were lent to Colonel Murray, and which he promised to repay on the next day, I have not got more than enough to pay the troops in the next month. One lac of pagodas is on the road from General Stuart’s army; but Captain Buchan, who is in charge of it, does not appear to come on very quickly. He was only at Hoobly on the 3rd, although he marched from the Toombuddra on the 21st of May.

‘ I enclose a letter from Colonel Collins, which I beg you to return to me after perusal. I likewise enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to General Stuart upon the subject of the demand of troops for Goa. You will see therein all my reasons for thinking that General Stuart’s army ought not to be broken up, and ought not to quit its position near Moodgul.

‘ It is my opinion that the state of the Nizam’s health, and the probable disturbances in his country, which would be the consequence of his death, are the cement of the supposed confederacy at the present moment; and that country would certainly be our weak point, if his Highness should die, particularly while the rivers continue full. General Stuart, therefore, ought not to move from it. Malcolm will see that Moodgul is as near to Goa as Bancapoor is; and as for sending me reinforcements, I do not want them, as I cannot feed and equip all the troops I have at present.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ Camp, north of the Cookrah,  
10th June, 1803.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I enclose you an account of the road from Poonah to the crossing place of the Goor river, by which the communication must hereafter be kept up with me. Besides the two boats now at Coraygaum, on the Beemah, we ought to have four basket boats there, and four at Seroor, on the Goor.

The Cookrah and Goor join before they reach Seroor. There is now no river between me and the Godavery.

‘ I long to hear what progress you make with the brinjaries. If they would engage to come forward even in a month, it would answer.

‘ I think that we might do some good by purchases of cattle at Poonah, particularly if the restriction on the sale of bullocks is taken off, and the Government give encouragement, rather than discourage the purchase made by our agents.

‘ If any thing of this kind could be done, I should wish the purchases to be made on account of the Company, by the officer in charge of the cattle with Colonel Murray’s corps; that they should be taken care of by the drivers of the unserviceable bullocks now in the neighbourhood of Poonah; and whenever one hundred are purchased, that they should be sent off to me in charge of a guard, and loaded with rice. The saddles belonging to the unserviceable bullocks will answer for those to be purchased.

‘ By this scheme I might get a few bullocks. But if the gentlemen of the Bombay establishment do not take care that the cattle which they shall buy are fed and looked after, when they are at, or in the neighbourhood of Poonah, and do not make the attendants on the cattle do their duty, I shall have nothing for the large expense that will be incurred by carrying this plan into execution.

‘ I write to Colonel Murray upon this subject: I desire him to consult you, and shall be obliged to you if you will give him a hint upon the necessity that the public money should not be thrown away in that service, by the inattention of those whose duty it will be to superintend the cattle after they are purchased.

‘ I want to have some of the Peshwah’s proclamations and orders authorizing goods to pass to my camp duty free, and that my coins may be taken at the Mysore rates of exchange.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close,*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp north of the Cookrah, 10th June, 1803.

‘ The great disinclination of the Poonah brinjarries to come forward at all in the service of the British army, and the certainty which I have that, owing to the great distance from Mysore, and the difficulties of the road, which will be increased by the swelling of the rivers, I can expect no more of that class of people to join me from the Rajah’s country, have induced me to turn my thoughts seriously to find out means of feeding the body of troops under my command till the month of October; at which period I may hope that the Poonah brinjarries may be induced to serve us, or that those still in Mysore may be brought forward.

‘ One mode has occurred in which the officers and departments belonging to your corps may be essentially useful. It is, to purchase cattle at, and in the neighbourhood of Poonah, by means of the officer in charge of the cattle with your detachment; to have those cattle attended and driven by the drivers attached to your unserviceable cattle, and equipped with their saddles; and to have them sent off to me in proportion as they are purchased, by 100 at a time, in charge of a guard, each carrying a load of rice.

‘ I request you to consult Colonel Close upon this subject, and to give orders to carry it into execution, in concert with him, if the plan should appear to be practicable or advisable.

‘ I request you however to draw the attention of the gentlemen in charge of the cattle to the necessity that their cattle should be well taken care of during the time that they shall remain at and in the neighbourhood of Poonah; and that every practicable mode of insuring their subsistence, while on the road to join me, should be adopted. When they join me, my officers shall be responsible for them. It is obvious, however, that if they are not well taken care of while they are at Poonah, and if they do not leave that place in good heart, I shall reap no advantage whatever from the expense which will be incurred upon this occasion.

‘ As under this arrangement it is not probable that there will ever be at Poonah more than 100 of those bullocks at a time, I recommend that a shed should be run up to cover that number of cattle; provided Colonel Close should have

informed you that such shelter is necessary, in consequence of the reference which I desired you to make to his opinion upon this subject, in relation to your gun cattle.

‘ Besides this resource, I expect that Mr. Duncan will send me 2000 bullocks, with their drivers, from Bombay; and when I hear that they are ready to start from Panwell, I shall send you directions respecting the loads which I wish they should carry.

‘ You may as well order Captain Young to send up some arrack by the first opportunity.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 11th June, 1803.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 9th. Certainly your conference with the Peshwah was as satisfactory as words could be. However, I hope that he will write to Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; and that he will now enter heartily into the cause in which we are embarked for his government. The settlement with the chiefs will then advance with rapidity, and they will soon join me.

‘ You misunderstood me regarding a depôt on the Goor river. I have no means to make such an establishment, and it would be very insecure if I could make it; and nearly useless on account of its distance from the Godavery, beyond which river I must look forward. My idea was to bring forward one thousand bags of rice to the river Goor, upon which I am likely to be for some days yet; and either to take from them my consumption for the ten days ensuing that on which they would arrive, or to take them into the departments. This plan has been partly knocked on the head by the loss of cattle on the night of the 8th. However, if you can send forward one thousand loads, I think that I can still dispose of them. More than that quantity, however, at the Goor river, would be thrown away.

‘ I move a short distance daily, and get a little forage, and just keep alive: I dread a fall of rain however. I am able now to carry on all my loads; and if I get the bullocks required from Bombay, and promised by Mr. Duncan, and

those upon the subject of which I wrote yesterday to you and Colonel Murray, I shall still weather all these little difficulties and mishaps.

‘I have made arrangements also for recruiting in camp, and have people employed in making purchases for me in the Nizam’s territories.

‘The pioneers know nothing about basket boats. I have always said, however, that there is nothing they cannot do when under their officers; but they are not so expert when left to themselves. There must be some boat people at or in the neighbourhood of Poonah, and possibly high wages would tempt them to come forward; but if they will not serve in any manner whatever we cannot help it; we must do the best we can for ourselves.

‘You will observe by the paper I sent you yesterday, that there are boats upon the river Beemah and the Goor at the crossing places, which I propose to use. I hear that these boats are not in very good repair; possibly you might be able to get them repaired, and they would answer to carry over our tappall, and any small parties of troops. Notwithstanding the Peshwah’s exertions, I cannot hope that we shall draw much besides from Poonah.

‘If boatmen can be hired for the boats, they will be more useful upon the river Indoorowny, and upon the Beemah and Goor, than they would be in this camp. But if boatmen cannot be provided for them, I should be glad to have six or eight, as soon as they can be procured.

‘You will observe that it is desirable that boats should soon be forwarded to the Indoorowny, otherwise the communication with Panwell will be stopped.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 11th June, 1803.

‘I received this morning your letters of the 8th (which ought to have been dated the 9th, I believe) and of the 10th. Colonel Close misunderstood me regarding the provisions which I wished to have forwarded to the Goor river. I have

however explained myself to him fully upon that subject, in a letter which I have written him this day.

‘ My letter of yesterday will have explained fully my views regarding the assistance which I expect from you in bullocks. I do not like to take your old bullocks, because Captain Mackay, who understands the matter well, has reported that all those left behind are quite unfit for service.

‘ Cattle that are at all weak, and those that have sore backs, will not answer during a monsoon ; and it is therefore much better that the plan, which I proposed in my letter of yesterday, should be carried into execution. There is, however, no harm in working out what remains of your old bullocks in carrying forward grain to this army. After delivering their loads they can be sent back, and their drivers may be employed in bringing forward the new bullocks which may have been purchased. Supposing that you are able now to send forward 800 old bullocks loaded, you will still have a sufficient number of drivers to take charge of, and bring forward the new bullocks as they shall be purchased.

‘ I have made arrangements with Mr. Duncan for placing boats upon the rivers below the ghauts, and I understand from him that they will be in their stations in good time.

‘ I fear that you will make no progress by means of coolies, to bring forward provisions ; and you must take care not to disgust your dooly bearers.

‘ Keep the pontoons at Poonah till Lieut. Goodfellow shall arrive, but give a hint to have the cattle taken care of.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 12th June, 1803.

‘ I wrote to you fully yesterday respecting the boats. I can furnish no means of working them. In the first place, the pioneers do nothing when they are away from their officers ; in the next place, a great proportion are now employed in keeping alive my half-starved cattle ; and even if they understood how to navigate, they could not be spared. If you cannot get boat people for them (and there must be

some in the country), the best thing will be to depend upon the boats now in the rivers; and to send me those which are made, excepting such as are necessary to keep up the communication over the Indoorowny, between Poonah and the ghaut. For this number I should still hope that you will be able to supply boat people.

‘Your progress with the brinjarries is capital; and if they only perform their engagement, I am indifferent respecting the confederacy.

‘The boats ought to be sent to the rivers as soon as possible.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

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