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DISSERT A TION

CONCKRNING

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY;

CONTAINING

REMARKS

ESSAYS OF Dr. SAMUEL WEST,

AND ON X K B

WRITINGS OF SEVERAL OTHER AUTHORS, ON THOSE SUBJECTS.

By JONATHAN EDWARDS, D. D.

PRINTED AT WORCESTER,

Bt l e o n a r d w o r c e s t e r.

ADVERTISEMENT.

I BEGAN this Dijfertation he/ore I faw Br, Wejl'sfecond edition of^Jiis Firft P^tri pub lif/ied with his Second Part : But on hearing, that he was about to publijii his fentiments on Liberty and Necejfuy more largely^ I fufpended the profecution of my defign, that I might Jee what he Jliould further publifh. Since the pub- lication of the fecond part^ I have been neceffarily though reluBantly kept back till this time, from finifJiing what I had begun. At length I fend it forth, requc/ling the candour of all whojliall read it. If ever candour to a writer be reafonably requejled, it is fo, on the deep ami dificult fubjecls brought under confideration in this Dif fertation.

The quotations from the DoBors firfl: part, are made according to the pages of the frf edition, with ivhich T began. Yet wherever any variation in words, between the firf and fecond editions, has been noticed ; the fec- ond edition has been followed in that refpecl. When I quote the firfl part the page or pages only are referred to. When I quote the fecond part^ ^ fp^^fy ^^^^ P^^^ ^^ well as the pages.

A 2 A

ilia

DISSERTATION, &c.

CHAPTER I.

«

w 0

OJ Natural and Moral Necejfity and Inability.

0, ^ RESIDENT Edwards, in his book

r 1^"*-%^ on the Freedom of Will, diftinguiflies i^iiv^f^^^ between natural and moral ncceflity p j 1^ and inability. By moral neceffity he

us, he means, " That neceffity { • c|v' " of connexion and confequence,

vr .4.- ' 'r^4^' ' " which aiifes from fuch moral cauf- " e.<, as the ftrength of inch nation or motives, and the '« connexion which there is in many cafes between " thefe and certain vohtions and aBions." P. 21. "^y natural neceffity he explains himfelf to mean, " Such " neceffity as men are under, through the force of " natural caufcs, as diflinguiflied from what are call- " ed moral caufes ; fuch as habits and difpofitions of *' heart, and moral motives and inducements." Ibid, ile further holds, that " the difference between thefe ^' two kinds of neceffity, does not lie fo much in the ^' nature of the connexion, as in the two terms con-

iietled ;" that in moral neceffity,'' the caufe . is

" of a moral nature, either fome previous habitual dif- A 3 ^f poJiiioTtj

.^^

«' pojition^ or fome motive exhibited to the underiland-

" ing : And the effe61: is alfo of a moral nature

<« fome inclination or volition of the foul oicvol-

^'•^tntary aHion." F. 22. Alfo he held, that natural neceffity always " has reference to fome fuppofable *« voluntary oppofition or endeavour, which is infuffi- « cient. But no fuch oppofition or contrary will and « endeavour is fuppofable in the cafe of moral necefli- «« ty, which is a certainty of the inclination and will it- «/<?//, which does not admit of the fuppofition of a '' will to oppofe and refift it. For it is abfurd to fup- « pofe the fame individual will to oppofe itfelf in its (■' prefent atl" P. 23,24. And p. 16. " Philofophical «« neceffily is realiy nothing elfe than the full and fixed « connection between the things fignified by the fub- '« jeQ and predicate of a propofuion. When there is «' fuch a connexion, then the thing af&rmed in the

«• propofuion is necefli\ry In this fenfe I ufe

" the word neccjfity when 1 endeavor to prove,

" that nccejfity is not inconfiftent with liberty" Ibid. «' Philofophical neceffity is nothing different from the « certainty that is in things themfelves, which' is the « foundation of the certainty of the knowledge of « them."

This is the account given by Prefident Edwards, of the diftinftion, which he niade between natural and moral neceffity. Moral neceffity is the certain or neceffary connexion between moral caufes and moral efPeQs / natural neceffity is the conne6:ion between caufes and effe61s, which are not of a moral nature. The difference between thefe two kinds of neceffity lies chiefly in the nature of the tzuo terms conne£led by it. Natural neceffity admits of voluntary, but in- effeQual oppofition from him who is fubjeft to the ne- ceffity ; the immediate effis£t, produced by that ne- ceffity, may be oppofed by the will of' the fubjeft. But with refpecl to moral neceffity, which is a pre- vious certainty of the exiftence of a volition or volun- tary aftion, it is abfurd to fuppofe, that in that aB the

will

tvill fhould either oppofe itfelF, or the neceffity from which theaftarifes. The dilHn6lion between natu- ral and moral inability is analogous to this. Inability is the reverfe of neceffity.

Now Dr. Well teJls us, that this « is a dillin6lion " without a difference," p. 8. But if the terms con- nedled in thefe cafes be different, as Prefident Ed- v/ards fuppofes ; if in one cafe " the caufe, with which " the effeB is connefted, be fome previous habitual dif- " pofition, or fome motive exhibited to the under- " (landing ; and the efieQ be a volition or voluntary " aftion ;" in the other, the caufe be neither an habit- ual difpofition nor a motive exhibited to the under- ftanding, and the effe6l be neither a volition nor a voluntary adlion ; it is manifeft, that there is that ve- ry difference in the two cafes, which Prefident Ed-» wards's diftintlion fuppofes. To fay, that this is a dif- tinclion without a difference, is to fay, that an habitu- al difpofuion* or a motive, is the fame with fometbing, which is not an habitual difpofition or motive ; and that a volition or voluntary a8ion, is the fame with what is not a volition or voluntary action.

But Dr. Well endeavours to fupport his charge of a diftinQion without a difference. Let us attend to what he offers with this view : It is this, " That," according to Prefident Edwards, " the principal, if not the only

"difference between natural and moral neceffity

" and inability, is, that in the former cafe, the oppofi- *"' tion and endeavour againft what does take place, is " overcome and borne down by a fuperiour force; but " in the latter kind of neceffity and inability there is no '• oppolition and endeavour, that is overcome by any " fuperiour force. But that Mr. Edwards's moral ne- " ceffity and inability are attended with as much infuf- " ficient oppofition and endeavour, as his natural necef- A 4 " fity

* Gentlemen may differ in their explanations of that habitual difpofition or bias, which is the caufe or antecedent of volition or voluntary aftion ; lome fup- poling it to We a certain call or mould of the fubflance of the foul ; others ftip- pofing it to conlill in a divine coniUtution, that volitions of a certain kind, fhall, in« regular manner and on certain conditions, fucceed each other in the mind, ^uf it does not appnr, that Picfidcir. Edwaids meant to decide this <iue(lion.

8

" {ny and inabiiity ;" p. 8. Whether this, which is here faid to be, be indeed according to Prefident Edwardsthe only or the principal difference between natural and moral neceffity and inability, I fliall not at prefent Itand to difpute. It is. fufficient for my prefent piir- pofe to fhow, that Prefident Edwards's moral neceffity and inability are not, and cannot be attended with as iijuch infufficientoppohtion and endeavour, as his nat- ural necciTuy and inability.

Natural necelfity may compel a man to that, to ^vhich his whole will is entirely oppofed, and againlt ^vhich he puts forth aU the oppolition, of which his flrength of body and mind admits : As when he is thrown from a precipice or is dragged to prifon. But a man's whole will is never oppoied to the influence of that bias, difpofilion or motive, or of any moral ne- ceffity, with which he complies. Whenever any of ihefe influences a man to put forth a volition or a vol- untary external aBion, it prevails on his will ; his will therefore confents, though it may be with fome degree of relu£lance occafloned by the other bias or motive. Nothing is more common than fach oppofition between reafon or confcience, and depraved appetite ; between covetoufnefs and ambition ; indolence and a wifli for gain, &c. But whenever any of thefe principles be- comes ftronger than its oppofite, the will confents, and the man a8s voluntarily under the influence of moral neceffity ; and though he may a6l with fome degree of relu6lance from the oppofite principle, yet no man will fay, that he is compelled to a61 againfl: his zvhole will, or even againd his flrongeft inclination ; for by the very cafe fuppofed, he aBs agreeably to his flrong- eft inclination.* But by natural neceffity he is or may be compelled to that, to which every inclination and afcl of his will, the flrongeft as well as the molt feeble, is moft direftly oppofed. A man dragged to prifon Hiay be compelled to enter it, in dire6l oppofition to

every

• Bv ivclinaiion, difftcjiticn or bia\ I mean fomelbing diiliiift horn volitloo, 'r'-;s ciift:u£i:oii is /sade by Br. V/eftjp. 13.

fvcry a6l of his will. This is natural neceffiiy. But an indolent man, who is influenced to labour by the profpcft of gain, is not compelled to labour in oppo- iition to every inclination or act of his w ill, but complies with the flronger inclination and afct, in oppofuion to the weaker, which would lead him to indulge hnnreirin

eale. This is an indanceof moral nece(ruy. -One

difference between natural neccfTny and moral, is, that eveiry inclination and a6l of the will does or may di- reftly oppofe natural neccility ; but every a6t of will always coincides with that moral neccflity, from which it arifcs, and when there is a ftruggie between differ- ent inclinations or propenfities and their a6ls, the a6U of that which prevails, never oppofe the moral necefli- ty by which they take place.

When Prefident Edwards fays, that no voluntary in- fufficient oppofition or endeavour is fuppofable in the cafe of moral neceffity ; his evident meaning is, that it is not fuppofable, that an a.Q: of the will fliould beop- pofed to that moral neceffity, by which it lakes place. For inllance, if a man be under a monl neceffity of choofing a virtuous courfe of life, this choice is not op- pofe d to the neceffitv, which is the fource of it, nor is It fuppofjble, that it fhould be oppofed to it or at all re- fill it. The cafe is very different with regard to natu- ral neceffity. A man dragged to execution may in every refpetl oppofe with his will, that neceffity, by which he is carried on.

But though a man, who is determined by moral ne- ceffity to choofe a virtuous courfe, cannot in thai aB oppofe that choice or the caufe of it ; yet he may in other aHs of his will oppofe both this choice and the caufe, and thus in different a£ls choofe and aft incon- iiftently. He may from prevailing motives and from moral neceffity, choofe virtue. He may at the fame time from weaker motives and ineffeQuai temptations, choofe vice, and fo far feel reluctant or indifpoled to virtue. And this weaker choice is no more oppofed to the moral neceffity, which caufes it, than the ftronger

choice

iO

' choice of virtue is to tlie moral neceffity whicli caufes that. In both there is no fuppofable oppofition to their refpedive neceffities, which are their caul'es. This is true with refpeS; to every choice whether Wronger or weaker, whether prevailing to govern the heart and conduB, or not. Yet there is a mutual op- pofition between the forementioned different aQ;s of choice, the choice of virtue and choice of vice. In- deed thefe two oppofite choices cannot both prevail, fo as to govern the heart and life at the fame time. They may in particular cafes be equal, or fo nearly equal, that neither of them at that inftant appears to pre- vail, and the man '• is in a ftrait betwixt two." In oth- er inltances they may for a time at leaft alternately pre- vail, and exhibit a man of very inconfiftent condu6l. In other inftances one may generally prevail, and de- r.ominate the fubje£l a virtuous or vicious man, accord- ingly as the choice and love of virtue, or of vice, pre- vails and governs him. Thus we Ihall have all thofe four modes of infufficient oppofition to moral neceffi- ty, which Dr. Well fays, p. lO, Prefident Edwards al- lows may take place, and from which he argues that Prefident Edwards's moral necefTuy may be attended with as much infufficient oppofition, as his natural ne- ceffity; and (that therefore Prefident Edwards's diftinc- uon between natural and moral neceffity is without a difference, i . The weaker motives to vice may oppofe the flronger motives to virtue. 2. The man may now have ffrong and prevailing a6ls, defires and refolutions againft thofe afts of vice, to which he forefees he fhall in certain circumftances be expofed, and which he ac- tually indulges, when the foreieen circumftances take place. 3. The will may remotely and indirectly refift itfelf, not in the fame a6ls, but in different a6fs ; the depraved appetites may flruggle againft the principles ofvirtue. 4. Reafon pleading in favour of virtue, may refift the prefent ac'ts, which incline, and perhaps pre- vailingly, to vice. Nor is there any- thing in all this, but what was long fince obferved by the poet, and has

always

li

always been noticed by all attentive obfervers of hu- man nature :

" Video mcUora^prohoque; deteriorafequor."

Now, it will not be pretended, that this oppofition of one a£t of the will, to another, is parallel to the en- tire oppofition of the will which there is or may be, to natural neceflity ; e. g. to falling when a man is thrown down a precipice, or to going to the gallows, when a man is forced thither. In ihe latter cafe, there is or may be an entire and perfeQ oppofition of the whole will, to the neceflity. In the former, there is a con- fent of the will to the neceflity, though there may be a degree of oppofue choice arifing from fome otlier motive, bias, caufe or neceflity.

Dr. Wefl: infers from this actual or pofi^ble oppofi- tion of the a6tsof one propenfity in human nature, to thofe of another, acknowledged by Prefident Edwards, that all thofe afts which admit of this oppofition are neccfl'ary with natural neceflity. If this inference bejuft, doubt- lefs every att of the human will is neceflary with na- tiiral necefl[ity. If a man choofe virtue, he doubtlefs does or may from temptation feel fome inclination to vice. In this cafe then his choice of virtue is, accord- ing to the reafoning of Dr. Weft, the eflett of natural neceflity ; for natural neceflity is, according to that rea- foning, that which admits of any voluntary oppofition. And as there is no propenfity in human nature, which may notbeoppofed by fome other propenfity ; and as the human mind is not capable of any a<St, which may not be attended with fome degree of relu8ance at leaft ; there- fore human nature is not capable of any aB, which is not neceflitated with a natural neceflTity, a neceflity, which is equally inconfiftent with praife and blame, as that by which a man falls, when he is thrown from an eminence.

This oppofition of one propenfity in human nature to another, and of one a6; of the will to another, is a- bundantly granted by Dr. Weft: : So that if this prove or imply a natural neceflity, he holds that the afts of the will are fubje^l to natural neceflity. P, 14. "A

" roan

«' man may love a perfon, whom he knows to be lUtertjr " unworthy of his affeClions, and may really chooje to '^ eradicate this propenfion from his mind ; and yet he *' may find this palhon rifing in his brcaft, in direft op- '* pofition to his -will ox choice. And the fame obferva- « lions may be made with refpe61 to every other pro- 'vpenfion in the human mind. They may all be in di- " re.H oppofition to prefeiit acis of the will and choice. *< Were not this the cafe, there could be no ftruggle in <• the mind, to overcome wrong propenfions and vicious " habits. But common experience will teach us, that «• there is frequently a very great ftruggle in the mind, *'• to gain the vitlory over vile affections." Whatever diftintiion Dr. Weft makes between propenfion and volition, he will doubtlefs grant, that there may be a6ts of the will agreeable to a propenfion, as well as in op- pofition to it ; that there may be volitions and actions agreeable to a vicious propenfion, and yet there maybe a ftruggle of virtuous propenfion and volition in op- pofition to the vicious. On the other hand, there may be a ftruggle of vicious propenfion and volition in op- pofition to the virtuous. Dr. Weft will not deny that love to God, to his law and to virtue, is a voluntary exercife. Now he who has a degree of voluntary love to God and true virtue, and a degree of volun- tary love to vice, has an oppofition not only of pro- penfions, but of voluntary acts and exercifes, i. e. of volitions. Yet would l^v. Weft allow, that this love of virtue, which is oppofed by a degree of love to vice, is neceffitated by a natural neccftlty ? Tins will follow from the principle of his argument to prove, that Preli- dent Edwards's moral neceftityisreally a natural neceftity. Dr. Weft, p. 14, afferts, '• thiit it is abfurd, that the « will ftiould dircBly oppofe its own prefent a6ls ;" and yet in p. 9, he fays, " theffe may be will and en- <« deavouf againft, or diverfe from prefent acis of the ** will.'* Thefe propofitiohs fecm incapable of recon- ciliation, urtlefs on' the ground of the diftinclion, which I have made between the will oppofing itfelf

m the fame aBs, and in different aQs arifing from dif- ferent motives or propenfitics.

Prefidcnt Edwards conftantly holds, that natural neceffity and inability arc inconfiftent uiih blame in any inftancc. The reafon of this is, that all our fin- cere and mofl ardent defires and afts of will, as well as external endeavours, may be refifted, cppofed and overcome as to their effc8s. But this is not the cafe in moral necclLty and inability ; therefore they do not excufe from blame. \\^hen under a moral nc- ceffity we will to do an aOion, our ftronged defires and a£ls of will coincide with the moral ncccffiry, and we voluntarily aft agreeably to it. And if we have weaker wifhes and defires oppofing the nccefii* ly and the fironger defires and acts of our will, whicbi follow from that iieceflTuy, we are not to be excufed" from blame on that account, becaufe on the whole we confent to do the aftion. No man will pretend, that he who is influenced by the malice of his own heart, to murder his neighbour, is excufable in that aftion, becaufe he has fome weak and incffeBual re- luBance arifing from a knowledge of the divine law and from the dictates of his own co-nfcience.

It has been faid by fome of our opponents in this- difquifition,. that they cannot find out what we mean by moral neccffity,. as diQinguifhed from natural or phyfical. If it be not fufficiently plain from his owra writings, \\hat Prefident Edwards meant by it, I can only give my opinion concerning his meaning. ButJ concerning my own meaning I have a right to fpeak more peremptorily, that 1 inean all ncceffity or pre- vious certainty of the volition or voluntary adion or a rational being, whatever be the caufe or influence^ by which that nccefiity is edabliflied, or the volition brought into ex i Hence, and however great and effica- cious thst influence be. When '* God's people are made willing in the day of his power," there is doubt- ]d's a neccffity of their being willinpj. This necefliiy I. call a mora! ncceffity. Againll tliis willingnefs, or

the

14

the necefTity, or the neceflitating caufe, from which it arifes, the will of him who is made willing, does not and cannot poffibly make entire and dire6l oppofi- tion. By the very fuppofition he is made willing, his will therefore coincides with the neceflity and con- fents to it ; gnd fo far as i-t confents, it cannot diffent or make oppofition.

Some fcem to imagine, that the difference between .natural and moral ncceffity, is, that the former is the effeO: of a ftrong and irrefiftible caufe ; but the lat- ter of a weak one, which may be refifted and over- come ; and that entire oppofition of will is fuppofable in both cafes ; though with this difference, that in nat- ural neceffity it isineffeQual, but in moral it may be ef- fe8ual. Whereas the truth is, that let the caufe of a moral a6l be what it will, it involves a moral necef- fity only, becaufe it is not fuppofable, that the will Ihould be entirely oppofed to it.

The perfons abovementioned objeft to the appli- cation of fuch ftrong epithets as infallible, unavoidable, imalterable, unfrujlrable, Sec. to moral neceffity and inability, fuppofing that they imply a natural neceffi- ty inconfiftent with praife and blame. But when our Lord had given the prediftion, was there not an in- fallible, unavoidable, unalterable and unfruftrable cer- tainty, that Judas would betray his Lord ? And will it be pretended, that on that account he was not to be blamed for fo doing ? Yet this adion of Judas %vas rendered no more unfruftrably neceffary by the prediction, than it was before, as it was before cer- tainly foreknown. Nor was it more certainly fore- known, than every event and every moral aftion, which ever has or will come to pafs. Therefore all moral a6lions are unfruftrably certain previoufly to their exiftence ; and all thofe epithets are as prop- erly applicable to them, as to the treachery of Judas, after it was divinely predifted.

It has been faid, that till the meafure of influence implied in moral neceffity, is diftindly known, it is

impoffible

fmponible to tell, when or how far a perfon is re- uardable or punifhable. But this is faid, under a miftaken idea of moral neceflity, viz. that moral ne- ceflity implies a low degree of influence only. Mor- al neceffity is the real and certain conneftion be- tween fome moral aftion and its caufe ; and there is no moral 7ieceJ/i/y in the cafe, unlefs the connexion be real and abfolutely certain, fo as to enfiire the ex- iftencd of the a6lion. And will it be pretended, that if the meafure of influence be increafed beyond this, the neceflity ceafes to be moral and becomes natural ? That if a motive or a malicious temper be barely fuf- ficient certainly and infallibly to influence a man tO' murder his neighbour, the neceflity is moral and the man is blamable ; but if it become more than barely fufficient for this, fo as to excite him to perpetrate the aftion with great eagernefs and with the overflow- ing of malice, that in this cafe the neceflity is natur- al and the man entirely unblamable ? The truth,

is, that there is no ineonfiftence between the moft ef- ficacious influence in moral neceflTity and accounta- blenefs. Let the influence be ever fo great, ftill the man afts voluntarily, and there is no fuppofable en- tire oppofition of will ; and as he is a rational crea- ture, he is accountable for his voluntary aftions. The contrary fuppofition implies, that in order to account- ablcnefs a man muft; have a liberty of confingence, and it mult be, previoufly to his ading, uncertain how he win aft. A bare previous certainty of the voluntary aBion of an intelligent being is as inconfifl:ent with liberty and accountablenefs, as any poflible degree of influence producing fuch an aBion. In either cafe there is an equal confent of the will, and an entire oppofition of the will is no more fuppofable in the one cafe, than in the other.

Some infift, that moral neceflity and inability are always of our own procuring ; and whatever necefli- ty is not caufed by ourfelves is not moral neceflTity. But moral neceflity is the previous certainty of a

moral

t6

moral ft6ian. Now as it was divinely foretold, agea before it came to pafs, that the |ews would crucify^ our Lord, and that the man of fin would petfecute the faints, Sec. &c. there was a moral neceiruy, that thofe fafts fhould come to pafs : And as this neceffi^ ly exiited long before the perpetrators of thofe fatts exifted, they did not caufe the neceflity. Therefore according to this account of moral and natural neceffi- ty, it was a natural neceffity, and the Jews and the marv of fin were in thofe aftions, as innocent as they were i«

breathing or in any involuntary motion. Further, as

all the acTtions of rational creatures are foreknown by- God, before the authors of them come into exiftence, they are equally certain and neccffary, a^ thofe whicb are predicled. But this neceffity, for the reafon already- given, cannot be the effeft of thofe, wbofe anions they are. Therefore either this is not a natural ne- ceffity, or there never was, is now nor can be any crime or fin in the univerfe.

Dr. Clarke in his Remarks on Collins gives a true account of moral neceffity; p. 16. " By moral necejfi- " ty confident writers never mean any more than to- " cxprefs in a figurative manner, the certainty of fuch " an event." And he illuflrates it by the impoffibili- ty, that the world fhould come to an end this year, if God have promifed that it fhail continue anoth- er year. Yet in his difpute with Leibnitz he gives a very different account of it; p. 289. " That a good " being, continuing to be good, cannot do evil ; or a " wife being, continuing to be wife, cannot do iin- " wifely ; or a veracious perfon, continuing to be ve- " racious, cannot tell a lie ; is moral necejfity." This' laft account implies no other neceffity, than that a thing muit be when it is fuppofcd to be ; which is \\o more than the trifling propofition. that what is, is, but the certainty implied in the divine predi6lion, that the world will continue to a particular period, is a very

different matter. Dr. Wefi, if I underftand him, has

adopted the la-fl account given by Dr. Clarke of nror-

al

al ^ecelTuy. No doubt lie and Dr. CHirkeh^d a iii2,ht to give their own dcHnitions oF moral necedity ; bvit Dr. Wed bad no right to impute bis idea to Preiident Edwards, and then difpute a^ainft it as belonging to . him. Dr. Clarke's lad del'cribed moral necc(Ety would exid, if human volitions came into exidence by a felf-determining power or by mere chance. On ei- ther of thofe fuppofiiions, what is, is, and mud be, lb lonff as it is. But Preddent Edwards's idea of moral neceflity is utterly inconfident with volitions' coming into exidence by chance, or by felf determination, unlefs felf-determination be previoufly edablifhed.

In all matters of difpute, it ought to be confidered how far the parties are agreed, and wherein they dif- fer. As to natural and moral necedtty, I believe both parties are agreed, in this, that all necedity incondd- ent with moral agency, or praife and blame, is natur- al neceflity ; and that all neceflity confident with praife and blame, is moral neceflity. Therefore if all ne- ceflity of the volitions of rational beings, be confident with praife and blame ; all fuch neceflity is mora! ne- ceflity. But if any neceflity of the volitions of a ra^ tional being, be inconfident with praife and blame ; then 1 have given an erroneous account of moral ne- ceflity. Therefore on this let us join iffue. If an in- fl:ance can be produced of the volition of a rational being in fuch a fenfe ncceflary, as to be on that ac- count the proper object of neither praife nor blame ; I will confefs, that 1 am miiiaken in my idea of moral neceflity. But until fuch an indance can be produced,

may I not fairly prefume, that rav idea is right ?

If it diould be faid, that no volitions of rational crea- tures are in any fenfe necefliiry, or that they are not previoufly certain ; 1 recur to the indanccs of Judas's treachery, Peter's falfehood, Pharaoh's refufal to let If- rael go, and to every other voluntary action of a ra- tional being divinely prcdifted or foreknown.

If any fiiould difpute, whether this previous cer- tainty of voluntary aUions, be properly called neccffi- B ty ;

ty ; this would be a merely verbal difpiite, which they who choofe, may agitate to their full fatisfa6tion. It is fufficient to inform them, that it is what we mean by moral neceffiiy.

I have already ihown that Dr. Weft grants the mutual oppofition of different propenfions and volitions ; it may be further obferved that, though he fo (irenuoufly dif- piTtes againft the diftm6lion between natural and moral rieceffity, and fays it is made without a diderence ; yet the fame Oidinciion is abundantly implied in his book, particularly in his diird elfay. He there holds forth, that a man may have a pLyJical pozvcr to do an action, and yet not exert \\\ai power ; that it may be certain., there may he. a certainty., 2<nd it maybe certainly fore known, thdit a man will do fomething, which he has a ph\jical power not to do ; p. 46. That a bare certainty, that an agent will do fuch a thing, does not imply, that he had not a power to refrain from doing it ; p. 45. Now by moral neceffity we mean the previous certainty of any moral atlion. , Therefore when Dr. Weft, p. 46, holds, that there may be a cektaiuty, that a man will do fuck a thing, though he may have at the fame time a phyfical power of not doing it : he holds, that there may be the very thing which Prefident Edwards calls a moral ne- ceffity, that the man will do the thing, though he may have at the fame time a phyfical or natural power not

to do it. Thus Dr. Welt makes and abundantly

infifts on that very diftinftion, which he reprobates in Prefident Edwards, and which he declares to be made without any difference. Indeed it is impoffible for any man to write fenfibly or plauhbly on this fubjecl, without going on the ground of this diftinftion.

It has been inquired concerning Prcfrlent Edwards's moral inability, whether the roan, who is the fubjefl; of it, can remove it ? I anfwer, yes,, he has the fame phyfical power to remove it and to do the aftion, which be is morally unable to do, which the man, concern- ing whom Dr. Weft fuppofes there is a certainty, that he will not do an attion, has to do the allien

and.

^9

and fo to defeat or remove the faid certainty. I agree with Dr. Welt, that he has a phyfical power fo to do.

Perhaps after all feme will infift, that natural and moral ncceflity are the fame. It h ardently to be wifh- ed, that fuch perfons would tell us, in what refpetis they are the fame. We have informed them, in what refpefts we hold them to be different. We wifli them to be equally explicit and candid. If they mean, that natural and moral neceffity are the fame in this refpet^, that they are or may be equally certain and fixed, and may equally enfure their refpective confequenccs or effects ; I grant it. Still they may be different in oth- er refpe6ls, particularly this, that natural neceffity re- fpefts thofe events or things only, which are not of a moral nature, while moral neceffity refpefts thofe only, which are of a moral nature ; and there may be an entire oppofition of will to the former, but not to the latter. If they mean, that they are the fame as to vir- tue and vice, praife and blame, Sec. this is not grant- ed, and to aflert it, is a mere begging of the queftion. If they mean, that both thofe kinds of neceflity may arife from nature ; meaning by this the fixed proper- ties of beings and the eftabliffied courfe of things and events ; this is granted. Still there may be the grounds of diftinfilion before mentioned. If they fay, that moral neceffity is natural neceffity, becaufe it is or may be born xvilJi us ; I grant it. But this is mere quibbling on the word natural. Though volitions may be the effefts of a bias of mind born v»'ith us, yet thofe volitions are moral atls, and therefore the neceffity from which they proceed, is a moral neceffity. A man born with a contrafted, felfifh difpofition, (till has a phyfical power to be benevolent, and it is not fuppof- able, that his will or difpofition fliould be entirely op- pofed to felfifhnefsj whenever he is the fubjeft of it.

B 2 CHAPTER

so:

CHAPTER 11.

OJ Liberty,

DR. Weft fays, p. 16, " By liberty we mean £ " potoer of a^l;irig, willing or choofing ; and by a ^"^ poivcr of afting, we meat), that when ail circumltan- " ces necefTary for aftion have taken place, the mind *^ can Si€t or not. dW This is not explicit : There is an ambiguity in the words pjzver, can. not aH. 11' by pow- er and can, he mean natural power^ as it has been ex- plained in the preceding chapter ; I agree tliat in any given cafe we have a power to a£l or decline the pro- pofed action. A man pofleffes liberty when he poflelTes a natural or phyfical power to do an aftion, and is un- der no natural inability with refpedl to that a6lion. The word liberty fuggefts a negative idea, and means the abfence of certain obflacles, confinement or re- itridion. A bird not confined in a cage, but let loofe in the open air, is free; a man not fhut up in prifon, is in that refped, free ; a fervant delivered from the control of his mailer, is free ; a man, who has difcngaged him- felf from the tie of a civil bond, is in that refpeft free. In all thefe cafes liberty implies fome exemption, or fome negation. In a moral fcnfe and with rcfpeft to moral condud, a man is free or poCTeffes liberty, when he is under no involuntary redraint or compnlfion y i. e, when he is under no reftraint or compulfion, to ■which his will docs not confent, or to which it is or may be entirely oppofed. An exemption from this reftraint or compulfion, is liberty, moral liberty, the liberty of a moral agent ; and this is an exemption from natural neceflity and inability as before explained. He who is thus exempted, has a natural power of a6ling,jiilt fo far as this exemption extends. Even though *■' all cir- cumftances necelTary for a£lion, have taken place," yet '' then the mind can," in this fenfcj " a£i;" in any

particular

«(

21

■particular manner, or decline tliat aflion. For in- flance, when all circumflances neceirary for judas's betraying Iiis Lord, had taken place, Hill he had a nat- ural power either to betray him or not betray him. He was under no compullion to betray him, to which his will did not confent. He was not, nor could he poffibly be, under any fach compulfion to chooje to betray him. It is a contradidion, that the mind fhould chooje to do a thing involuntarily and with an entire oppofition of will.

If this be the liberty, for which Dr. Weft pleads, he has no ground of controverfy on this head, with Prefident Edwards, or with any who embrace his fyf- tem. There is nothing in tl^is inconfiftent with the influence of motives on the will, to produce volition; or with the dependence of volition on fome caufe ex- trinfic to itfelf, cxtrinfic to the power of will, or to the mind in which it exids. What if motives do ex- cite to volition ? What if the ccnneQion between motive and volition be fuch, that volition never takes place without motive, and always takes place, when a proper motive appears? What if volition be the effed of a caufe extrinfic to the will ? Siill it is true, that volition never takes place without the content or with the entire oppofition of the will. The will or mind then is ilill free, as it is exempted from natural nccc-lTiiy and has a natural or phyfical power to aft otherwife.

If it be faid, that it is not fulficient to liberty, that the mind aft with its own confent, in the aH itfelf ; but it mull in every free aft, act from its own con- fent prtvioui to the free aft ; I obferve, that this im- plies, that in order to any free aft, there muft be an infinite feries of free a£ls following one another. For indance, the objeftion fuppofes, that if I now freely choofe to write remarks on Dr. Weft, this free choice muft arije from a prtvioui confent of my will, or from a previous choice, to write fuch remarks. Again, this previous choice, in order to be free, muft for B 3 the

22

the lame reafon arife from another previous free choice ; and fo on infinitely, which is abfurd.

Or if it fiiould be faid, ihat liberty implies nor on- ly an exemption from all natural or phvjical neceffity, but alfo an exemption from all moral neceffity ; then, as moral neceflity is nothing but a previous certainty of the exiftence of any moral aft, it will follow that any aft, in order to be free, muft come into exift- ence without any previous certainty in the nature of things or in the divine mind, that it would exilt ; i. e, no a6t can be free, unlefs it come into exiftence by pure contingence and mere chance.

But let us proceed to confider what Dr. Weft fays in further explanation of his idea of liberty.

" To a£t," fays he, " to will or to choofe, is to be «free." P. 16. If this be liberty, furely Dr. Weft could not imagine, that Prefident Edwards, or any man in his fenfes, ever denied that we are free. It is to be preiun^ed, that no man ever denied, that we deter- mine, that we will, or that we choofe. However, though I allow all thefe things, yet I cannot allow, that this is a true account of liberty. Will Dr. Weft pretend, that we are never free, but when we are in a6lion ? That we have no liberty to determine, be- fjde when we do aftually determine ? That we have no liberty to will or choofe, but when we are in the exercife of volition or choice ? Will he fay, that he himfelf had no liberty to determine to write effays on liberty and neceffity, before he aftually determin- ed to write them ? Dr. Weft, in p. 46, holds that there may be a certainty, that a man will do an ac- tion ; yet that he may have a phyfical power of doing the contrary. He would therefore doubtlefs grant, that he js at liberty to do the contrary, though he ac- tually does it not ; and this whether the a£lion be external or mental. Befides ; this definition of lib- erty is wholly inconfiftent with the other favorite one of Dr. Weft, vi^. a pozoer to ad or not. If liberty be a power; furely it is not an aHion ; bu^ " to aft, to

•will

■^3 _

''willorto choofe," is an aBion. Efpecially if liberty be a power to not aB, it cannot be an adion. And if a power of acting, be a6\ion ; a power of willing be volition ; and a power of choofing be choice ; then a power of walking or writing, and aftnal walking and vvrking is the fame thing ; and whoever is able to write, and lb long as he is able, is aBually employed in writing. Does Dr. Welt hnd by experience, that this is true ?

1 know there is a clafs of divines, who have holden, that God is free to good only, becaufe he does good only ; that the faints and angels in heaven are for the famereafon free to good only ; that Adam in paradife was free to both good and evil ; that unregenerate Imners and devils are free to evil only ; and that the regenerate in the prefcnt life are free to both good and evil. But I prefume Dr. Weft would not choofe to rank himfeif in this clafs.

Dr. S. Clarke is equally inconfiftent in his defini- tion of liberty, as Dr. Weft. " The whole eflence of " liberty," lays he, " confifts in iho. poxuer of aBing. " AHion and liber'y are identical ideas : And the true « dejinition of a free being, is one that is endued with " a power of ading," Remarks on Collins, p. 15. How true it is, that great men are not always wife ! And how furprifmg, that Dr. Clarke, whom the advo- cates for felf-determmation, fet up as unequalled in nietaphyfical acutenei's, fliould contradi6l himfeif twice in four lines, in what required fo much accuracy, as the definition of liberty ! 1. The whole eflence of lib- erty is here faid to coniift in a poiver of afting. 2. Ac- tion and liberty are (aid to be identical ideas ; and therefore the power of a61ion and liberty are not iden- tical ideas, unlefs the power of atlion and aBion are identical ideas. 3. The true definition of a free be- i-ng is faid to be one that is endued with the power of atling. Thus the DoBor ends where he began, for- getful of the middle.

B 4 But

24

Bat that part of Dr. Weft's account of liberty, with which he feems to be moft plcafccl, and on which he feems Tnofl to depend, remains yet to be confidered. It is this, a pozoer to aH or not atl^ in all cafes whatev- er. On this 1 obferye, that if by atling or ?ioi aBmg, the Doctor mean choofing or refuting, 1 grant, that we have a natural power to do either of thefe in any cafe. But refufing is as real an aft of the mind, as choofing, and therefore is very improperly called noi aBing. I grant, that we have a natural power to choofe of refufe in any cafe ; but we have no moral power,, or power oppofed to moral nccejfuy : For mor- al neceffiiy is previous certainty of a moral a6tion ; and a power oppofed to this mult imply a previous uncertainty. But no event moral or natural is or can

be uncertain previoufly to its csiH:! nee. But if by

a power to a^ or not aft, the Dotlor mean a power either to choofe an objeft propofed, or to refufe it, or to do neither; this is an impoffibiliiy. Whenever an objeft is propofed for our choice, if there be any me- dium between choofing and refufing, it is a Itate of perfeft blockifli inaftion and infenfibility or torpor ; and this inaftion mull be involuntary ; as a voluntary inaftion implies an aft or volition, which is inconfift- ent with perfeft inaftion. A voluntary Itate of inac- tion and torpor is a contradiftion in terms: It implies, that the mind is the fubjeft of no aft at all, and yet at the fame time is the fubjeft of a volition, by which it confents to inaftion. Or if it fhould be faid, that a voluntary ftate of inaftion means a ftate, to which the mind is indeed reduced liy an aft of volition, and that the volition having accomplifhed a ftate of inac- tion, ecafes itfelf to exift, and thus perfeft and uni- verfal inaftion follows; 1 obferve, (i) That ftill this plea does not jid the matter of the contradiftion. The caufc of the perfeft inaftion is a volition. This caufe muft continue in exiftence and in operation, till the efFeft is accomplifiied ; i. e. till entire and perfe6l inaftion has aftually taken placfc. And yet fo long as

thjs

a5

this caufe continues to exill, it is a contradiflion, that perfeft and entire inadion fhouM take place. (2) Befides this contradi8ion, if the mind could by an aft of volition or by other means be reduced to a ftate of entire inaftion and torpilude, this Ibte would be utterly incondllent with the exercife of any liber- ty. The man in this Itate can no more exercife lib- erty, than if he were under ever fo great natural ne- ceffity, or than if he were turned into a ftock or Itonc, During this ftate he cannot poffibly put forth any aft, to aroufe himfelf from this torpor. It is in the power of no man, to reduce himlelf to this ftate, with rcfpect to any object propofed to his choice ; or when he is re- duced to it, to recover himfelf from it.

If to this it fhould be objetted, that we are entire- ly indifferent with regard to many objefts ; we nei- ther choofe nor refule them : 1 anfwer, be this as it may with refpetl to objeGts not propofed for our choice ; it is not true with refpeft to ihofe, which are propofed for our choice ; and this is all that I have aflerted, and all that the fubjed requires me to aflert; for Dr. Weft's account of liberty is " a po\ver of aci- " ing ; and by a power of afting, we mean, that when " all circumliances necefl'ary for action have taken " place, the mind can a6t or not a£l ;" i. e. when an occafion for volition, choice or determination, is prc- fented ; or when an objeft of choice, or an objec!;, with refpeft to which we are to will or determine, is exhibited.

Mr. Locke's obfervations on this point are very pertinent and convincing : They are as follows ; " A ". man in refped of willing, or the a6l of volition, when " an aftion in his power is once propofed to his " thoughts as prefcntiy to be done, cannot be free.

" The reafon whereof is manifeft he cannot

" avoid willing the exiftence or not exiftence of that '• action ; it is alafolutely neceffary, that he will the " one or the other, i. e. prefer the one to the other, [^ fince one of them niuft neceffarily follow ; and that

" which

25

« which does follow, follows by the choice and deter- «' mination of his mind, that is, by his willing it. For " if he did not will it, it would not be. So ihat in re- " fpetl of the atl of willing, a man in fuch a cafe is «' not free : Liberty confining in a power to aft or not « a8:, which in regard of volition, a man upon fuch a «« propofal has not. For it is unavoidably neceffary -«' lo prefer the doing or forbearance of an aflion in « a man's power, which is once propofed to a man's «'- thoughts. A man muft neceffarily will the one or " the other of them, upon which preference or voli- &» tion the a6tion or its forbearance certainly follows « and is truly voluntary. But the a£l of volition or <« preferring one of the two, being that, which he can- s' not avoid, a man in refped of that act of willing is

« under a necefiity. This then is evident, that in

« all propoials of prcfent action, a man is not at liber- €' ty to will or not to will ; becaufe he cannot forbear

«• willing." " A man that is walking, to whom it is

« propofed to give off walking, is not at liberty, «' whether he ivill determine himfelf to walk or give « off walking, or no. He miijl ntajfanly prefer one or

«' fother of them, walking or not walking." " The

<i' mind in that cafe has not a power to forbear willing :

«' It cannot avoid fome determination. It is man-

" ifeft, that it orders and direfts one in preference to, «' or in the negleB of the other." Dr. Weft himfelf gives up his favourite power o( 7iot oBmg^ in the fol- lowing paiTage : " As foon as ideas are prefentcd to " the mind its aftive faculty is exerted, and the mind «« continues conftantly acting, as long as it has ideas, " jult as the a61 of feeing takes place the very inftant « the eye is turned to the light, and continues as long " as the light ftrikes the eye." Part II. p. 9. " The " mind is always atting." P. lO. If it continue to aft as long as it has ideas, as the eye coniinues to fee as long as the light ftrikes it ; then the mind has no power of not afting, while it has ideas. And I think it will not be pret-ended that the mind has a power to

banifb

banifli from itfelf, all ideas at pleafure. This would be a torpor indeed ! a torpor of the underftanding as well as of the wi^l ! And if the mind be always ading, it never exercifes the power of not a6ting.

Doctor Welt thinks it Itrange, that his priA'ate cor- refpondcnt does not know what the Doftor means hf a power to ad or not aH ; and the Doclor proceeds to give feveral inRances of it, as of a man, who had been confined in prifon, fet at liberty to go out or ftill to tarry in prifon ; and of an hufbandman, who has the offer of a farm, on certain conditions, and he is at lib- erty to take the farm or not. But neither of thcfe is an inftance of a power to ad or not ad ; they are mere inftances of a natural power to a6t differently, to a6t one way or another. If the man who has the offer to go out of the prifon, choofe to tarry in it ; he as re- ally atis as if he had chofen to go out. If the huf- bandman choofe to decline the farm offered him, this is as real and pofitive an a6t, as if he had chofen to take it. And the Dodor, though he has attempt- ed to give an inftance of a power to aft or not aft, has not given one. For this reafon, as well as from the nature of the cafe, I helieve it is not in his power to give an inftance of it. If it be in his power, I wiih him to do it. He acknowledges this to be " the " m.in point, on which the hinge of the whole contro- " verfy turns." A power to aft or not aft, is his def- inition of that liberty, for which he contends, and in fupport of which he has written his two books. And if he be not able to give a fingle inftance of fuch a power, it is high time for him to give it up, and the whole controverfy, of which this is the hinge. No wonder Dr. Weft's correfpondent did not underftand what the Doftor meant by this power, if the Doftor himfelf did not underftand it fo far as to be able to

give an inftance of it. A porver to ad or not ad

muft either mean a power to choofe or refufe ; or a power to aft, or to ceafe from all a6lion in either choofing or refufing. If the former be the meaning.

at is no more than we all grant, provided by power be fneant natural power. But if in this cafe moral pow- €r be intended, a power oppofed to moral neceffity, vhicli is the previous certainty of a moral aftion ; this \v'e utterly deny, becaufe it implies, that there is a pre- vious perfeft uncertainty in the nature of things and in the divine mind, whether we fliall choofe or refufe

the propofed objeft. If the laft be the meaning of

€L power to act or not aB^ as this is a power to link our- fel ves into a (tate of unfeeling and blockifii torpor, I ap- peal to the reader, whether Dr. Weft, or Limborch, or any other man, has ever had or can have any idea of fuch a power ; or if they have, whether it would be any deiirable liberty, or would imply any qualification for moral agency.

I am fenfible, that Dr. Weft tells us, that he has given a definition of" a power to a6l or not a6t,"and that this definition is, " that there is no infallible con- " neciion between motive and volition." But this, ■which he calls a definition, does not at all relieve the difficulty, if it mean, that when motives are prefent- cd, the perfon can comply with them, or can refufe to comply, or can neither comply nor refufe; I deny it, declare it to be an impoffibility, and call on Dr. Weft to Ibew the poffibility of it. If when he fays, there is no infallible connedtion between motive and volition, he mean, that the mind may a£t, whether in choofing or refufing, without motive ; this is contrary to Dr. Weft himfelf.

The Doftor, in p. 86 and 87, Part II, refumes the queftion of afcting or not a6lmg, and mentions feveral cafes, which he confiders as inftances of not aftinc; ; e. g. when of two objeds one is chofen and the other not ; when of the Ipots on a chefs-board, A is touched and B not, &c. But not one of thefe is a better inftance of not afting, than there always IS, when any one thing is chofen and not another, or in preference to another. Suppofe a man to offer a beggar a fhilling and a guinea, of which he may have

his

fis choice, and he take the goinea ; will it be faid, ihat his leaving the fliilling is an iiiflance of not afcl- ino ? Then wc never do any thing, without at the lame lime not acting } i. e. while we do one thing, we omit many other things, which we might do. iF this be what Dr. Weft means by not ading, it is read- ily granted ; but it comes to little or nothing ; it is a mere power to do fome things and to refufe or omit fome other things. This power is confirtent with the iTioft infallible connexion between motives and voli- tions. Whenever under tiie influence of motives, we do fome things, we certainly have a power to do thofe things, and to omit other things, which in faOr we do not.

Dr. Clarke in his Remarks on Collins, p. 6, fays, ^ All power of afting effentially implies, at the fame " time, a poner of not acting : Otherwife it is not ad- '• n?^5 but barely a being aBed upon by that power, which " caufes the atlion." If he mean hy power ^ nakiral or phyfical power, as before explained ; and if by not aEling he mean, refujing or voluntary forbearing to a6l in a^ certain propofed manner ; I agree with Dr. Clarke. But if by power to aft, he mean foniething oppof- cd to moral neceffity or inability, which is a previ* ous certai!)ty, that theaciion will or will not take place, in tl.is cafe power to acl will be a previous uncer- tainty concerning the exiftence of the a6lion : And in this fenfe of the words, the Doftor's propofiticn, that a " power of atling elfentially implies a power o£ " not a8i!ig," will amount to this merely, that a previ- ous uncertainty concerning the exiftence of anaBion, eftcntialiy implies a previous uncertainty concerning the non-exillcnce of the fame action : Which is mere

trifling. If the Doctor mean by not ading, entire

inaction, 1 deny that a natural power to a6t implies a power to fall into entire inadion and toipitude. Nor docs an uncert;iinly whether we fliall a£t in any par- ticular maimer, imply an uncertainty whether we Ihall be pcrfe6tiv inactive and torpid,

Dr.

Dr. Wefi, [uppoks felf-dderminaiicn is effential ta liberty ; but his account of fe!f-detcrmination is equally inexplicit, as his account of liberty. " We " ufe ielf-determination," fays he, " not to fignify, that " felf afts on felf and produces volition ; or that the "mind fome how determines to will ; i. e. wills to "will, or choofes to choofe. But the fenfe in which " we ufe felf-determination is fimply this, that we our- " felves determine ; i. e. that we ourfelves will or " choofe ; that we ourfelves aO; ; i. e. that we are " agents and not mere pafTive beings ; or in other "words, that we are the determiners in the a8ive " voice, and not the determined in the paflive voice."

P. 17. Now one would expeft, that in all this

profufion of words, in this variety of expreflion, with the help of three i. es. we fliould have a moft clear and explicit account of felf-determination. But the account is entirely inexplicit, and equally confident with Prefident Edwards's fcheme of necelTity, as with the oppofite fcheme. He holds, that we ourfelves determine ; but he does not hold, that we are the ef- ficient caufes of our own determinations. Nor can Dr. Weft confidently hold this ; as this would imply, that our determinations or volitions are effefts, which Dr. Weft denies. Prefident Edwards holds, that we ourfelves will or choofe ; that we ourfelves aft and are agents : But he does not hold, that we efficiently caufe our own mental a6ls : Nor for the reafon already -given, can Dr. Weft confidently hold this. Befides, this would imply, that " felf afts on fclf and produces " volition," or that " the mind fome how determines to will ;" i. e. " wills to will, or choofes to choofe," which the Do6lor renounces. Prefident Edwards does not hold, that we are mere paflive beings, unlefs this expreffion mean, that our volitions are the effe6ts of fome caufe extrinfic to our wills.* If this be the irjeaning of it, he does hold it, and the believers in

his

* In caufes extrinfic to the will I include both original and acquired tafle, bias, propcnfion, or whatever it be called.

his fyftem are ready to join ifTue with Dr. Weft., on this point. Tliough we hold that our volitions arc the efFecls of fome extrinfic caufe, and that we are paflive, as we are the fubjeCts of the influence of that caufe ; yet we hold, that we are not merely paf- five ; but that volition is in its own nature an a£l or adion, and in the exercife of it we are aftive, though in the eaufiition of it we are pallive fo far as to be the fubjetls of the influence of the efficient caufe. This we concede ; and let our opponents make the moft of it : We fear not the conlequcnce. In this fenfe we hold, " that we are determiners in the aftive voice, " and not merely determined in the paflive voice." We hold, that we are determiners in the aftive voice, in every fenfe which does not imply, that " felf a6ls on "felf and produces volition ; or diat the mind fome "how wills to will, and choofes to choofe," which- Dr. Wefl; utterly denies ; and " he entirely joins *' with Mr. Edwards in exploding the idea, that the « will determines all the prcfent ads of the will."

Though we are determiners in the adive voice, and not merely determined in the paflive voice ; yes our determination may be the confequence of fufii- cient motive or the efl^ed of fome other extrinfic caufe. We fee, hear, feel, love and bate, in the ac- tive voice ; yet we are or may be caufed to fee, hear, &:c. And when we are caufed to love or hate, we are indeed tlie fubjeds of the agency or influence of fome caufe extrinfic to our own will, and fo far are paflive : Still the immediate effed of this agency is our ad, and in this ad we arc certainly ac- tive. So that we are not merely in the palfive voice cauled to love, but we alfo in the adive voice love. Dr. Weft will not fay, that bccaufe a man is influ- enced or perfuaded by proper motives to the love of virtue, he does not love it at all in the adive voice. Yet it is often faid by men of his clafs, thaZ if we be influenced to will or choofe an objed, it i-i no adion at^all. It is indeed no adion in their fenfa

O.C

3^

of the word, as they mean by a6lion, felf-detcrmind' tion : But inftead of taking it for granted, that this is the true fcnfe of the word aclion, they ought to fhow the reahty and poffibihty of fuch an adion, and re- move the abfurdities, which are faid to be inlepara-

ble from it. To fay, that we are felf-dctermined

or felf-moved, becaufe we ourfelves determine and move, is as improper and groundlefs, as to fa\, that a body is felf-moved and felf-determined in its motion, becaufe the body itfelf moves. Extrinfic caufaiity is no more excluded in the one cafe, than in the other.

The Do6lor puts the cafe of his choofing coffee, when that, tea and chocolate were offered him, and all appeared equally eligible ; and fays, " I believe, that "it will be impoffible in this and a multitude of fimi- " lar inftances, to affign any accident or circumftance, " which determines the mind to its choice among things^ " which appear equally lit and eligible. Confequenily " here is an undeniable proof of the liberty for which " we contend." The liberty for which he here con- tends, is a power to choofe one of feveral equally eli- gible things. If by power he mean nalural or phyfical power, 1 grant, that we have fuch a power to choofe not only one of feveral things equally eligible, if any fuch there be, but one of things ever fo unequally el- igible, and to take the leaft eligible. A man may be under no involuntary reftraint from taking an objeft ever fo ineligible. But if by power to choofe one of feveral equally eligible things, he mean a power oppof- ed to moral neceflity, it is a previous uncertainty which he will choofe. But there is in this cafe no more pre- vious uncertainty in the nature of things and in the divine mind, than in any cafe whatever.

The Doftor denies, that " any accident or circum- " fiance," or any extrinfic caufe, " determines the mind " to itft choice among things which appear equally eli- *• gible." If this were granted, though it is not, what would follow ? DoubtlelJs either that the choice is de- termined and caufed by the mind irfflf, or that it

comes

83

comes into exillence without caufc. But Dr. Weft cannot with confillcncy hold either oFihcie. To hold that choice or voUtion is caufed by the mind, is ut hold, that it is an effc6l and has a caufe, which Dr. Weft denies, and has written an elfay to prove ii. It is alfo to l)oId, that " felt' ads on felf and produces " volition ; or that the mind fbme how determines to " will, i. e. wills to will or choofes to choofe," and that " the will determines the prefent afts of the will ;" all which are denied by Dr. Weft. On the other hand, that volition comes into exiflence without caufe, though this is maintained by the Dottor, in that h^ maintains, that " volition is no elFeft and has no caufe ;" yet it is alfo denied and renounced by him, in that he lays, p. 27, " We cannot be charged with holding, that e- " vents take p'ace without caufc."

In p. 19, he fays, " All who believe there is a De- •' ity, muft grant, that he has a fclf-determining power : " For he being the firll caufe, his volitions cannot be " determined by any caufe antecedent or extiinfic to " himfelf." If by felf-determining power here be meant, what Dr. Weft fays he mQansfi7n/7l]\ That the Deity himfelf has a power to determine ; that he him- felf has a power to will or choofe ; we grant, that not only the Deity, but all intelligent beings have a lelf- determining power. A feli-dctermining power accord- ing to this definition, is nothing but a power of will, which we all grant belongs to every intelligent and moral agent. Nor does this imply any thing inconfift- ent with the idea, that the Deity and all other intelli- gent beings are {governed by motives, in the only icnfc in which we hold government by motives ; which is, that the Deity does every thing which he does, be- caufe there is a motive to <lo it, arifintr from his own infinite wifdom and goodnefs. But if by fed'-dctcr-

ro-

mining power, be meant a power by which God p duces volition in himfelf, by which " felf ads on felt '•and produces volition," we join with Dr. Weft m reprobating fuch a power. He exprcfsly fays, " The C '• divine

m

"divine volitions are no effe£ls produced by the Deii " ty." P. 28. If any thing elfe be meant, when- ever Dr. Weft will inform us what it is, (as we cannor imagine any befide one or other of the forementioned fenfes) we wiil inform him, whether we allow or deny it, and will give our reafons.

As to the argument, that " The Deity being the firftr " caufe, his volitions cannot be determined by any " caufe antecedent or extrinfic to himfelf ;" it may be anfwered, Still he may will as he does, becaufe of mo- tives and reafons arifing from his own infinite wifdom and goodnefs. It may be further faid, that the lame argument, v;hich Dr. Weft here ufes to prove, that God determines himfelf, will prove, that God created bimfelf : Thus, All who believe that there is a Deity, niuft jrrant, that he has a fclf-creating power and did' create himfelf. For he being the firft caufe, his cxift- ence cannot be caufed by any thing antecedent or ex- trinfic to himfelf. But it no more follows from the eonfideration, that God's volitions were not caufed by any thing antecedent or extrinfic to God, that they ivere caufed by God, than from the eonfideration, that his exijlenge was not caufed by any thing antecedent or extrinfic to himfelf, it follows, that it was caufed by himfelf. The truth is the divine volitions were no more caufed, whether by God himfelf or by any other caufe, than the divine exiftence was. The divine vo- litions are the divine holinefs uncreated and felfexift- ent. And one attribute of God is not more caufed or created, than all his attributes, or than his exiftence.

An exemption from extrinfic caufality, in the a6ls of the mind, is effential to Dr. Weft's idea of liberty. Suppofe then, that a free volition is one that comes into exiftence without any dependence on a caufe ex- trinfic to the mind, which is the fubje6l of that voli- tion ; the confequence is, that either fuch a volition is caufed by the mind iifclf. and " fclf ads on fclf and ^ produces volition ;" or it is abfolutely without caufe, and comes into exiftence by mere chance; neither of

which

35

V'hich wll! Dr. Weft avow : Indeed he has already exprefsly diiavowed them boih. And if he either cx- prefsly, or by neceflary implication, avows them both, that does not help the matter ; lo be inconfiUcnt re- lieves no difficulty.

Liberty is by fome writers diftinguifhed into ex- ternal and internal. Internal or the liberty of the mind, is the principal fubjetl of the prefent inquiry ; and this, as is implied in what has been faid already, confills in the power or faculty of will. Every intel- ligent being who has this power, is free, or has inter- nal liberty, and fo long as he retains tl)is power, can- not be diveded of liberty. I am fenfible, that our opponents fuppofe, that fomcthing further, viz. a fell- determining power is necefTary to liberty : J^nd to this I fhall particularly attend in the next chapter. As internal liberty confifts in the very faculty of the will, fo that which is external confifts in opportunity externally to execute our determinations and wiflies. To define internal moral liberty to be, " an opportu- *' nity and capacity of choofing and a£ling otherwife '' than the fubjetl in faft does," is nothing diUinguifh- ing b-tween the fyftem of thofe who hold, that all moral adions are morally neceflary, and that of thofe who deny it. *'• Opportunity and capacity of choof- *' ing otherwife," may mean mere natural power, as be- fore explained. When Pharaoh chofc to retain the Ifraelites, he was under no natural inability of choof- ing to let them go. Still it was a matter of previous abfolute certainly, that he would for a time refufe to

let them go, and had been divinely foretold. If

" opportunity and capacity of choofing otherwife, than " the fubjeft in fatl does," mean any thing inconliftent with the mod abfolute moral neccffity, it muit mean a previous uncertainty how he will choofe : And if this be the meaning in the aforefaid definition of mor- al liberty ; I deny that any man has in this fenfe op- portunity to choofe otherwife than he does. Every event and confequently every a6l of choice, is previ- C 2 oullv

3^

oufiy foreknown by God and therefore is prcvioufiy certain : And to take it for granted, that any is pre- vioufly to its exigence, uncertain in the divine mind andin reaUtyjis an intolerable begging of the queftion.

The following account has been given of liberty, as oppofed to moral neceffity : *' I find I can abftaiii " from any particular good ; 1 can defer ufmg it ; I " can prefer fomething elfe to it ; I can helitate i« " my choice ; in fhort, 1 am my own mailer to choofe, " or which is the fame thing, 1 am free" Perhaps this is as popular a reprefentation of liberty and as agreeable to the ideas of thofe who are the mod zeal- ous advocates for libt^rty as oppofed {o moral necefli- ty, as can be given, — —But all this is talking in the dark and confounding the fubjeft by the ufe of am- biguous words ; particularly the word can. To fay, *^ 1 can abftain from any particular good," is the very fame as to fay, I have j&owfr to abftain, &c. But ihere are two fenfes to the words power and inability already noticed and explained. In one fenfe Pharaoh had power to let the Ifraelites go ; he was under no natural inability in the cafe. Still there was an abfo- iute previous certainty, that he would not for a time let them go. Therefore there was a moral neceffity^ that he fhould not let them go, and he was morally unable to let them go ; and in this fenfe he was not free ; it was not a matter of uncertainty whether he would let them go or not. This account of liber- ty reminds me of ihc argument, by which a certain man endeavoured to convince his neighbour, that there ■were no divine abfolute decrees. The argument was, that having a child newly born, he felt himfelf at lib- erty to call it by what name he pleafed, without re- gard to any divine decree. As if God had decreed, that he fhould call his child by a particular name, whether with or without his own confent.

Liberty or freedom muit mean freedom from fome- thing. If it be a freedom from coa6lion or natural raieccffityj this is what we mean by freedom. The

mind

37

TTiind in volition is in its own nature free. But our opponents mean by freedom an exemption from all exirinfic caufal influence, and from all previous cer- tainty. And when they hold, that the mind caufes its ov;n volitions, they mull, to be confident, hold that it caufes them contingently and without any previous certainty that it would caulc them ; and they mud (Jeny that the mind's caufation of them is determined, fixed or limited by any caufe whatever. For that the mind fhould caufe them according to a previous ef- tablifhment, would be as inconfiltent with liberty, as that it fliould not caufe them at all, as it imphes an entire limitation of the mind in its operations.

The very inquiry, whether the mind in the exercife of the will, or as poffeffed of the power of will, be free, is apt to lead into error. It leems to imply, that freedom is fomething elfe than the freedom of the will. To inquire whether the mind as poffeffed of will be free, is to inquire whether the mind as poffeffed of freedom be free ; or whether freedom be freedom.

Alen in general have no other idea of freedom, than a power of will, or an exemption from coaftion or natural neceffity, as their language on the fuhje£l: im- plies no more than this. With them to atl freely, znd lo ad vohinlanly is the fame thing, and they never once think of propagating one free acl by an antecedent free a6l, or that in order to freedom it is requifite, that the atls of their wills fljould come to pafs with- out caufe and by mere chance : Nor do they once imagine, that in order to freedom, there muft be no previous certainty what their a8s will be ; or that the divine foreknowledge or prediction is inconfiftent with liberty.

Liberty in the fenfe of our opponents, is not poffi- ble or conceivable. By liberty they mean a power to caufe all our own volitions, and to caufe them free- ly. But that we fliould thus caufe them, is neither -poflible nor conceivable. If we fliould thus caufe a •volition, we fliould doubtlefs caufe it by a caufal aft-: C 3 Xt

38 ,

It is impoffible, that we caufe any thing without a caufal a6l. And as it is fiippofed, that we caufc it freely, the caufal aft muft be a/reeaS:, i. e, an aft of the will or a volition. And as the fuppofition is, that all our volitions are caufed by ourfelves, the caufal volition mufl: be caufed by another, and fo on infi- nitely : Which is both impofTible and inconceivable. It is no more poffibic or conceivable, that we fhould caufe ail our own volitions, than that all men fhould beget themfelves.

Some have laid, that volition or voluntary exercife is liberty. It i^ undoubtedly a free ad and liberty is a property of that aft ; but it is not more proper to call it //^^r/jj;itfeif, than to call the apprehenfion of the equality between the three angles of a triangle and two rights, intelled, becaufe it is an aft of intelleft. The flying of a bird at large in the open air is a free (iB, but not liberty itfelf.

Our opponents fay, they plead for that liberty, in men to do as they pleafe. 3y this with refpeft to the mind, they muft mean, either that the mind caufes its own volitions, or that it afts voluntarily. As to the firft, it has been in part confidered already, and fhall be further attended to in the next chapter. The laft is no more than we all allow ; and for our opponents to mean this only, is to give up the difpute.

It is generally if not univerfally granted by our opponents, that God is necejfarily holy ; and to be fure, the fcripture affures us,^that " he cannot lie," and " cannot deny himfelf." And Dr. Weft grants, thai be is perfeBly holy, p. 38 ; and that he is immutable, ibid. Therefore he is ivimiUahly and necejfarily holy. Yet the Doftor fuppofes God to poflefs a felf-deter- mining power. And although his definition of felf-de- termination, as obferved before, is not at all inconfift- ent with the neceffity which we hold ; yet it is mani- feft, that 1 e fuppofes felf-determination to be incon- fiftent with that neceflity. And did he mean, in afcribing felf-determination to the Deity, to afcribe

fomethins

39

fomething to him inconfiftent with immutahle and nec- ejfary holinefs ? Docs he bcHeve, that it is not abfo- iutely ariain, that God will for ever continue to be holy ? Yet abfoliite certainly^ as 1 have often fard, is all the neccfliiy for which we plead. The Dottor therefore has fallen into a dilemma, or rather a trilem- ma, and he may make his choice, whether to concede, -that there is no felf-determination in God, and that therefore it is not necelfary to liberty ; or that felf- determination is not at all inconhftent widi ablolutc moral neceffity, and then he will ^ive up the difpute ; or to hold that God is not neceflarily holy, and that he can lie tind.caii deny himjelf. 1 wait for the Doc- tor's decifion or explanation.

It is well known, that Dr. S. Clarke places liberty in felfdetermnration or felf-motion ; and he holds, that" liberty in the higheft and compleielt degree is " in God himfelf ;" and "that God is a mod pcrfed- *' ly free agent ;" yet he immediately adds, that " he *' cannot but do always what is beft and wifell in the " whole. The reafon is evident ; bccaufe perfe61 " wifdom and goodnefs are as Jleady and certain prin- " ciples of action, as necejfity iileJf." Perfeft wildom and goodnefs therefore iiriply a certainty of aftion. hnt certainty \s \.\iG. nece£ity m queftion. How then can any liberty or felf-determination inconfiftent with abfolute moral necelfiiy, coexilt in the Deity with that

necelhty .? Thus the mod able advocates for felf-

<letermination, and Dr. Clarke as much as any of them, are neceffitated by their abfurd and contradic- tory fyftem, perpetually to contradict themfelves.

Aloft of our opponents hold, that we are the effi- cient caufcs of our own volitions, and that in this our liberty confifts. But Dr. Weft exprefsly denies this with regard to the Deity ; p. 28 ; " The divine vo- " liiions are no effefcis, either produced by the Deity, ^' or by atiy extrinfic caufe." Indeed that volitions are no efiPcds of any caufe, is a favourite aiad princi- ^di\ doQrine of Dr. Weft. Therefore the felf-deter- C 4 , minatioi!

40

mination which he afcribes to both God and man, produces no volition in either. What then does it ? How does it contribute at all to liberty ? In the De- ity it is confUlent with abfolute moral necefliiy, as we have juft feen ; and what reafon can be given, why it is not as confident with the iike neceffity in man ?

Or does liberty in God confifl: in a contingence or previous uncertainty of his volitions ? This, it is pre- fumed, w:Ii not be pretended ; as it overthrows the <'ivine immutability, and is direftly contradiftory to what our opponents, particularly Dr. Clarke and Dr. Weft, hold, of the necejjity of God's moral perfeftions. And if liberty in God do not require fuch contin- j^ence and uncertainty, let a realbn be given why it

Ihould in man. We deny, that caufing our own

volitions and aBing by chance are either realities or poihbiliiics ; but if they were both poflibleand real ; fince they do not belong to the liberty of God, need we wifh for any more liberty or higher kind of liberty and power, than God has ? Or fliall we vainly imagine, that we poffe fs it ?

Liberty is no pcfitive exiftence. Exiftence or be- ing is divided into fahjlance and mode. But liberty is certainly no fub/la^ice. Modes are divided into ab- folute or pofitive, and relative. Liberty, as it is a power, falls into the lat^er clafs ; it is a relative mode. All powers are relations or relative modes. It is then, as I faid, no pofitive exiftence.

1 have long fince thought, that this controverfy concerning liberty and neceffity, fo long agitated, might be eafily fettled to mutual general fatisfaftion, if the difputants would but fully explain their own ideas of the fubjefts of the difpute. But till this is done, what profpeft or poffibility is there of fettling it ? Our opponents accufe us of denying the liberty of moral agents. Now the truth or falfehood of this charge depends on the ideas they affix to the word liberty. If by liberty be meant what Law in his notes on King, p. 248, defines it to be, " A certain phyfical

" indifference

4i

" indifference or indeterminatenefs in its own exer- *' cile ;" then we do deny liberty. We deny that a man is or can be indifferent in the exercife of his

liberty or his will. Or if by liberty be meant, an

exemption from all previous certainty, fo that it is a matter of uncertainty and mere chance, what our vo- litions are to be ; in this fenfe alfo we deny liber- ty. Further, if by liberty be meant, an exemption

from all extrinfic caufality or influence, fo that our volitions are efficiently caufed by ourfelves ; this al- fo we deny. But if by liberty be meant a power

of willing and chooling, an exemption from coaBion and natural necelTity, and power, opportunity and advantage to execute our own choice ; in this fenfe we hold liberty.

We wifii our opponents to tell us with the fame precifion, what they mean by liberty and in what fenfe they contend for it. Unlels they do this, it fii^nifies nothing for them to tell us, that we deny all liberty, and that they are contending for liberty againfl; necef- (ity ; and as Dr. Wed has done, to give fuch gener- al and vague definitions of liberty, of felf-determina- tion, Sec. as are perfeBly confiftent with our ideas of liberty and free aftion.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER III.

Of Stlf-Delermination.

LIBERTY and felf-determination are fo blended by our opponents in this controverfy, that it is impolTible to write a chapter on one of thefe fubjefts, %viih proper attention to the fentiments of our oppo- nents, without running into the other. Therefore in the hift chapter I was neceflitated to fay 4nftany things concertiing felf-determination. Yet 1 wifii to make foiTie further obfcrvations on the fame fubjeft.

All our opponents agree, that felf-determination is efiential to liberty. Let us firit attend to what Dr. Weft fays on this fubje6l ; then we fhall make fome remarks on what Dr. Clarke and others have faid.

Dr. Weft tells us, that " determining, when we ap- *' ply it to the active faculty, is the fame with volition." P; 16, 17. And " the fenfe in which we ufe Jelf-de- " termination is fimply this, that we ourfelves deter- " mine; i. e. that we ourfelves will or choofe." Now I cannot believe, that Dr. Weft imagined, that Pfcfi- dcnt Edwards, or any of his followers, would deny, that we ourfelves determine, v/ill and choofe. We doubt- lefs will and choofe as really as we think, fee, hear, feel, &c. But who or what is the efficient caufe in eidier cafe, remains to be confidered. To fay, that •we are determiners in the aftive voice, and not the deter- mined in the paffive voice, gives no fatis(a6tion. We grant, that we are determiners in the attive ; and yet affert, that we are determined, or are caufed to de- termine, by fome extrinfic caufe, at the fame time, and with refpe6l to the lame "aQ : As when a man hears a found, he is the hearer in the aQive voice, and yet is caufed to hear the fame found, by fomething ex- trinfic to himfelf It will not he pretended, that a man is the efficient caufe of his own hearin^^, in every in- f^ance in which he hears in the aftive voice. . - Though

43

Though Dr. Wefl: in general maintains, and has written an eflay to prove, that volition is no eO'cLt and has no caufe ; yet he Ibmetimes forgets himfclf and falls in with the generality of the defenders of the felf-determining power, who hold, that the mind is the efficient caufe of its own volitions. Me evory where maintains, that volition is not the effeft of an txlrinfic caufe ? Why does he exprefs himfelf thus, if he do not fuppofe it to be the effed of an intrinfic caufe ? The expreffion implies this. This is not all. In p. 24, he puts the queftion, " whether the mind in choof- " ing or ading, do not modify itfeif .?" which he an- fwers in the affirmative, and fays, that this " modifi- " cation is the etfetl of the mind willing or choof- " ing." The mind then in willing modifies itfelf, i. e. brings itfelf into the mode of willing. This mode then is volition ; and this volition is the efFe6t of the mind ^yilling, or the effe6t of volition. So that Dr. Weft here, in direct contradiilion to his general do£lrine, aflerts, agreeably to Dr. Clarke and moft writers of his clafs, that volition is an effeft and has a caufe ; is the effeft of the mind whofe volition it is, and is the effett of the mind willing or of a volition of that mind. Agreeably to this he fays, p. 28, " No agent can bring " any effefts to pafs, but what are conjequerd upon his " acling ; i. e. that all effects are in confcquence of " the aftivcnefs or operativenefs of fome being;'' And p. 22, '• No being can become a caufe, i. e. an effi- " cient, or that which produces an effisd, but by first " operating, aBing or energijing :" And in the fame

page, " Volition, when ufed intelligibly is real-

" iy an efficient caufe." Volition then is an efficient caufe, and an efficient caufe of a modification of the ipind, which is another volition, and this by Jirjl op- erating, ading or energifing : And doubtlefs this ope- ration, aft or energifing is a volition. So that here we have three volitions in train, all neceffary to the exift- ence of one volition and of every volition. The Jirjl volition is an efficient caufe of afecond) called by Dr.

Wea

44

Weft a modification of the mind ; and it produces this cfFeft by a third volition, which is the operation, aB, or

energifing of the. firjl. Wliat is this, but " felf aO:-

" ing on fdf and producing volition," and this by the inftrumentality of an intermediate volition. Dr. Weft cannot conliltentiy deny any of thefe abfurdiiies of his fcheme. He cannot fay, that one volition, as an -efficient caufe, does not produce a fecond ; as he holds, that "the mind in willing modifies iifelf" But according to him volition is the mind willing. He al- fo holds, that the faid " modification is the effe6l of *' the mind willing ;" i. e. by his own definition, the cffed of volition ; volition then is the ejicierd caujedi the fdid modification. That this modification is voli- tion he will not deny. Then we have one volition as an efficient caufe, producing another volition as its eiFd6l. But he grants that "no being can produce an " effeft, but by Jirjl, acting or energifing" This gives us the intermediate volition.

It has been long fince charged on the advocates for felf-dctermination, that their doclrinc involves the ab- furdity of one volition before every volition, and even before the firft. But Dr. Weil has made improve- ment in the fcheme : He has taught us, that felf deter- mination implies two volitions before every volition and before ihef rfl.

That volition is produced by the mind, as the effi- cient caufe, is implied, however inconfiftently with himfelf, in various other pafTages of Dr. Weft's books ; asp. 25, " If volition or internal aQion be the effeOt " of an extrinfic caufe, our reflexions could never af- " ford us an example of an efficient caufe." "As we " are rational beings, it follows, that our volitions are " not the effeds of an extrivfic caufe. but that we are iifelf determined.'' " Confcious, that we ourfelves

*• are the determiners and not the determined we

« have the idea of our independence in willing and « choofing." Our volition muft either he the effect oJf an extrinfic caufe, or of an intrinfic oncjor it muft hap- pen

45

pen without caufe. If it happen without caufe, our re- flections could no more afford us an example of an effi- cient caufe, than ihey would on the fuppofition, that it is the effetl of an extrinfic caufe. So that the Doftor's ar- gument necelfarily implies, that volition is produced by the mind as the efficient caufe. 1 n the fecond quotation above, he fpeaks of our being feif determined, as in di- re£l oppofition to our volitioDS being effefts of an ex- trinfic caufe. But there is no iiich oppofition unlefs by our beinj; felf determined be meant, that our volitions are the effctls of an intrinfic caufe. If felf-determin- aiion here mean no more than that we are the fuhjctls of a determination, or that we ourfelves determine, as we ourfelves think, feel, &c. this may be, and yet thai determination may be the effeft of an extrinfic cauie. So that there appears to be no meaning in this pai- fage, unlefs, in direcl contradi8ion to what Dr. Weft elfewhere holds, it mean, that our volitions are ejjeds and have an effic'unt caufe ; that this caufe is our own mind ; and this efficient caufe, as the Dr. declares all efficient caufes do, produces its effect, " by^r/i ope- " rating, ading or enefgifing ;" and thus felf would a6l " on felf and produce volition," by an efficient ope- ration. Again ; if we were " confcious, that we

" ourfelves are the determiners, and not the determin- '• ed," we ffiouid thence derive no "idea of our inde- '* pendencc in willing and choofing," if our willing and choofing cither were the efl'ed of an extrinfic caufe, or happened without caufe ; or unlefs we were the ef- ficient caufes of our own willing and choofing.

Thouvh all this is abundantly denied and renounc- ed by Dr. Weft, as appears by quotations already made ; yet it is the real ground work of his book, and the only ground, on which he could confiflenily oppofe the doctrine of moral neceffity and extriniic caufaliiy of volitions : And this is the common doc- trine of the advocates for felf-determination. Thus Dr. Claikc, in Papers between him and Leibnitz, p. 289, tells u.^; " The true and only queftion concern-

" ing

46

" ing liberty, is, whether the immediate phyfical caufe "or principle ofaftion be indeed in him, whom we " call the agent ; or whether it be fome other reafon " fufficient, which is the real caufe of the adion, by " operating upon the agent and making him to be, "not the agent but a mere patient." I underftand the Dodor by phyfical caufe, to mean efficient, pro- ducing caufe ; otherwife it is not to the purpofe.

Dr. Chauncy is flill more explicit. " Self-deier-

" mination gives rife to our volitions and is

" the caufe of them." Benevolence of the Deity, p. 128. " A power in man, that fubjefts his volitions to his " command, is the only bottom, upon which agency " can be founded." Ibid, p. 129. And in the next page he fays, the fame power " conffitutes us agents, " or beings that are evidently the caifes of their own " volitions."

Now this felf-determination, which " gives rife to our volitions," and in which we are " the efficient " caufes of our own volitions," is a determination or a8; either of the will, or of fome other faculty. If it be an aft of the will, it is a volition. So that here we have one volition caufed by another : And as the doBrine is, that all our volitions are the efFed of felf- determination, they are all the efFeft of volition, the caufing aft the efFeft of a preceding aft, and the firfl the efFeft of one before that. This abfurdity attend- ing the fcheme of felf-determination, has been long fince pointed out ; nor have the advocates of that fcheme been able to fhow, that their fcheme does not really labour under that abfurdity, if by that felf-de- termination, which is the caufe of volition, they mean an aft of the will.

But if this felf-determination be an aft of the un- derftanding ; then it feems, that the will or mind wil- ling, is influenced to volition by a ditlaie of the un- derllanding, or by a motive. Then we are at once involved in what is fo hideous to Dr. Wef^, and all other believers in felf-detenninationj the government

by

-.lis

by motives and the moral ncceflity implied in it : Alfc" our volitions are determined by extrinfic caufes and we are the paflive fubjetts of the operation of ihole caufes.

Or if we fuppofe the determining a6l to proceed from any other faculty, if other there be, the difficulty will re- main. Dr. Well holds, " that thc|;e are three effen- <• tial faculties of the mind, which ought always to be " confidered diftinftly ; and iheCe are fiej'ception, pro- *■' penjion and will ■/' and that " the lalt only is prop- " erly the a61ive faculty." Then doubtlefs that felf- determi nation, which is an aMion^ and which gives rife to volition, is an aft of this aftive faculty. In this cafe we have will putting forth felf determin- ation, in order to give rife to volition ; as we had be- fore volition as an efficient caufe, firft operating, a6t- ing or energifmg, in order to produce the efledi vo- lition. As the will is, according to the Doftor, " the "only aftive faculty," he will not pretend, that voli- tion produced by felf-determination, is the effecl of cither of the other two faculties, as he reckons them, perception and propenfion. If he ffiould fay, that it is the effetl of perception ; this it feems is a paffive faculty J and then felf-determination and all volition are the efifefts of a paffive faculty and of paffion, of which alone that faculty is by the terms capable ; and therefore, it feems, felf-determination and volition mult themfclves be paffions or mere impreffions, and we are paffive in them. Befides, perception confid- ered as a faculty, as Dr. Well fingularly confiders it, appears to be nothhig elfc, than intelle6l or the pow- er of undcrOanding. And if felf-determination pro- ceed from this, the confequcnce is, that the will is governed by the underftanding and by the dictates and motives which it fuggefls ; which brings us where we were before, into the midll of neceffity. The fame Gonlequence will follow, if we fuppofe, that felf deter- mination proceed from ptrception in the common fenfe of the word; meaning an a^ of the underftand-

ing

48

ing. If Dr. Weft fay, that felf-dcter mi nation pro- ceeds from profienjion ; then he entirely coincides -w'nh Prefident Edwards, who afcribes a great part of our volitions to difpofition, inclination, paflion and habit, meaning certain biafes of the mind diitinti

from volition and prior to it. Befides ; as propen-

lion is according to the Do6lor a paffive faculty, if volition and felf-determination proceed from this they are paflions or impreffions, they proceed from an ex- trinfic caufe and we are paffive in them.

The caufing of one a6l of volition by another is attended with this abfurdity alfo, it fuppofes the cauf- ing a6l in this cafe to be diftin6i from the a£l caufed; ■when in reality they coalefce and are one and the fame. For inftancc, to choofe to have a choice of virtue, is nothing but a choice of virtue ; to choofe the choice of an apple, is to choofe an apple : So that we have the volition before we have it, and in order that we may have it.

Some fenfible of the abfurdity of fuppofing, that the mind determines one volition by another, as this runs into an infinite feries of volitions, and im- plies that there is volition before the firft volition, have renounced this idea of felf-determination. A- mong thefe we may reckon Dr. Weft. But at the fame time he gives up felf-determination in every fenfe in which we difpute it, and in every fenfe incon- fiftent with the moft; abfolute moral neceffity. This

has been already illuftrated. Others, to avoid the

fame difficulty exprefs themfelves differently : They profefs to mean, that volition is caufed not by a pre- ceding volition, but by the man or the mind, whofe volition it is. But this gives no fatisfadion. Sup- pofing it ffiould be faid, that a certain carpenter him- lelf was the efficient caufe or builder of fuch a ffiip ; and it fhould be thence inferred, that he built it by working, labouring or exerting himfelf to the end of building the ffiip ; would not this be a natural and a jieceffary inference ? Would not the man, who ffiould

afferi.

■ 49

nffert, that the carpenter did indeed himfclf imrncdi- aieiy build the Ihip, but not by uPy labourer exertion, whether of body or mind, be univer(i\lly confidorcd as talking abfurdly and coniradn^iorily ? And docs not the man talk as abfurdly and contradidorily, who aflerts, that a man is the eilicient caufc of his own voHtion, yet puts Ruth no exertion, in order to caufe it ? If any other way of efficiendy caufm^i^ an eH'ett, than by ait or exertion previous to the efled, be pof- fiblc or conceivable, let it be pointed out : Tdl this be done, we who conceive {uch a vvay t(j be impoiTi- ble and inconceivjble, have a right to fay fo, and to prefume, that our opponents, who aflcrt that there is fuch a way, are unable to point it out, and have no more idea of it, than we iiave. li^ upon tiial, tliey Ihall find, that they are unable to point out the way, let them honeftiy confefs, that all tliey mean by felf- determination is what we and all allow, that they are the fubjcdi of volition, and as Dr. Well e;<prtirc& it, that they thevif elves will and choofc.

I perfcdiy agree with Dr. Weft when he favs, p. 2 2, " No being can become an efiicieni c-jufc, but "by FIRST operating^ nBiug or energjjing." Operation, aft or energifing is as much prefuppoi'cd in order to an effect, as an efficient caufe is prefuppofed in order to it. To fuppofe an efficient caufe to produce ari effetl: without any a6l by which he produces it, is the fame as to fuppofe the fame cauic produces il)e eftod, without any ejiciency : It is as ablurd, as it would be to fuppofe, that Dr. Weft wrote his eflays widiout any exertion in order to the produ£lion of them, or that God created the world, without any creating aft. If this be noLtrue,letthefaIfchoodofii be made toappear. Let any man fliow, that an effed cannot as well come to pafs without an efficient caufe, as wiihout a caul- ing a6l ; and that the world could not as well have come into exiftence without a Creator, as wiihout a

creating a6l.

D Some

Some of ilie advocates for fclf-detcimfnation hold, that the mind is theefficient caufe of its own voli- tions, yet not by any ail or exertion of the mind, but by the power or Jacjdiy of the will. And how can this power or faculty produce volition, unlefs it he exerted jirjl in order to the effeft ? The man, v;l o is the fubjetl; of a certain volition, had the power of will long hnce ; yet it never produced that volition, Tve may fuppofe, till this moment. What is the caufe or reafon, that it produces it now and not before ? To fay, it does, becaufe it will, is to fay cither, that this volition is produced by another precediiig, which runs into the infinite feries ; or that the power of will, or rather the man in the exeicife of that power, is the fubjeft of volition, becaufe he is the fuhje6i: of it, .which is mere trifling. — — On the whole the exiftence of a power of will in a man, will no more account for any particular volition, of which he is the fubje6l, than the exiftence of the man will account for the fame volition, or the exigence of a fhip-carpenter will ac- count for the building of a certain fliip ; or than Dr. Weft's having a power to write effays of Liberty and Neceffity, will account for his adually writing them at the precife time, at which he did write them, or than his having an ear will account for his hearing a particular found at a certain time.

That we have a power of will or of determining is granted on all hands : But that we Ihould effi- ciently caufe our power of will, to put forth a voli- tion, without exer'ing any efficiency to this effetl; ; only wants proof to make it credible, and explanation to make it intailigible or conceivable. Merely the circumftance, that we have a power to will and de- termine, no more proves, that without motive or any influence from without j and without any caufing aft within, we caufe that power to exert itfclf ; than the circumftance, that we have a power of hearing proves, that without any pulfalion in the air, any caufation

from

5^

from without or from within, we caufc ourfelvt-s to hear a particular lound.

Some others, as well as Dr. Weft, have denied, that by felf determination they mean the caufing of one aft of the will by another. We have no objedion to their denying this : But then we wifli them to inforni us explicitly, what they do mean. If they have any meaning they doubtleis can exprefs it iiUelligildy : And fo long as they do not exprefs a meaning diHer- ent from what we mean by willing or choofinj; ; and fo long as their definitions oF felf determination ex- prefs. either bare volition, or the caufing of one voli- tion by another, though they infift, that they mean fomething different from either of thefe ; I leave the reader to judge, whether they have any clear mean- ing to that word at all.

In convcrfation once with a gentleman of eminence among the advocates for felf-detcrmination he cold me^ that Prefident Edwards had abufed thofe who write in favour of felf determination, in reprefenting them as holding, that the mind caufes one att of volition by another. On my inquiring of the gentleman what then they did mean ; his anfwer was, " They mean, tliat in determining the mind determines." Whether this an- fwer at all explained the matter ; or whether it con- vey any other idea, than that the mind does determine, and has a volition, without touching the queftion con- cerning the caufe, extrinfic or intrinfic ; 1 fubmit to the reader. If a man fhould fay, that in walking, he walks ; in writing he writes ; in hearing he hicais ; it is prefumed, that no man could certainly hence con- clude, that the fpeaker meant, that he was not influ- enced to walk or write, by motive or by fome extrin- fic caufe ; or that his hearing was felf determined.

If we caufe our own voliiions at all, we caufe thern either by a previous volition, or without fuch volition. If we caufe them by a previous volition, this is what I have been particularly confidering, and fliall fay no more upon it« If we caufe thein without fuch voli- D 2 tion,

52

tion, we caufc them Involuntarily, without any defign,- any motive or agency. Now I wifli it may be inquir- ed, whct'ier fuch a caufation of volition as tliis, if it be palfible or conceivable, as I contend it is not, be at all more favourable to liberty, than that volition ihouid proceed from the influence of motive or fome other extrinfic caufe ; and whether it would be any advantai^e or privilege in any rcfpeft ; and whether it would not be a great difad vantage and calamity to mankind, and an infupportabie incumbrance on the influence of reafon, revelation, virtue, duty and hap- pinefs both here and hereafter. For vyhatcver any of thefe may di6late, and with whatever motives they en- force thofe dittates ; whatever virtue and our own fcappinefs may require, fince the fclf-determining pow- er is not influenced by thefe or any other motives ; and fince, as Dr. Clarke lays, " There is no connec- " tion at all between the perception of the underftand- " ing and the exertion of the aftive faculty;" all thofe dilates and motives would be in vain ; the felf deter- mining power is a fovereign, ungovernable principle, perfedtly deaf and unmoved by any motive, realbn, argument or reprefentation whether of duty or inter- eft. It therefore de(iro)s the very ufe not only of our reafon, of revelation and of the motives of both ; but of our affeftions, paffions, appetites and fcnfes, in every part of our conduct as moral agents. For fo far as we are influenced by any of thefe, we are not feif-detcrmined, and dierefore, according to our oppo- nents, we are incapable of moral aftion ; and efpecial- ly are we not felf- determined in the fenfe now partic- ularly under confideration ; caufmg our own volitions involuntarily and without a previous volition.

Self-determination uninfluenced by motive, is in- confiitent with all religion and morality and with all virtue and vice. To love God without motive, prin- ciple, aim or end, is no religion. To love and do good to mankind in like manner, is no virtue. To bate God or mankind in like mannerj is no irrelig-

ion

53

ion or vice. Jufl: fo as to dealing, robbiiig, kill- ing, &c.

The felf-detcrmining power is, as 1 faid, an ungov- ernable principle. It not only cannot be governed by reafon, revelation, &c. But not by any laws human or divine ; for thefe are only motives. Nay, it can- not be governed by God, his providence or his grace. To be governed by either of" thefe would be to be governed by an cxtrinfic caufe, and under fuch gov- ernment men would be paffive. If God in his provi- dence govern and control them and their a6tions, they are limited, and aft only by permiflion, and have no power to a£l or not a6l, no liberty to either fide, but are confined to one fide. Where then is felf-determina-

tion ? On the other hand, if men determine and

control all their own aftions, none of their aBions are controlled by God.

Dr. Reid, a late ftrcnuous advocate for felfdcter- mination fays, *• The name of a caulc and of an agent, " is properly given to that being only, wiiich by its " a6tive power, produces fome change in itlelf, or in " fome other being. The change, whether it be of " thought, of will, or of motion, is the eff'eft. A6live " power therefore is a quality in the caufe, which en- "^ ables it to produce the efiFecl. And the exertion of " that active power in producing the effetl, is called " attion, agency, efficiency. In order to the produc- " tion of any efie^l, there muft be in the caufe, not on- " ly power, but the exertion of that power : For power « that is not exerted produces no effe6l." Effays on the A8ivc Powers, p. 259. Therefore if we be the efficient caufes of our own volitions, as Dr. Clarke, Dr. Chauncy, &c. held, we mull not only have a power to produce them, but there muft be an exertion of power in order to the production of volition. This ext rtion is doubtlefs an exertion of the will. Thus we run into the infinite feries feveral times mentioned. And however others attempt to evade the abfurdities D3 of

54

of this infinite feriesj Dr. Ried and his followers muft fall into them.

" All our power," fays Dr.Reid,ibid5 299, " is dire6t- '' ed by our will ; wc can form no conception of power, «' properly fo called, diat is not under the dire6lion of f* our will." Then we have no power to direft or de- termine our will, unlefs we go round in a circle. If our will direO: all our power, as the Do61or aflerts ; and our felf-determining power dire6t and determine our will, then we go round in a circle, our will direfl- iiig all our power, and our feif-determining power di- recting our will. Glorious liberty this ! And this jiiuft be an age of glorious improvement and illumi- nation, or we fliould never have made fuch difcove- ries as thefe ! Yet Dr. Reid had great reafon to fay, that ail our power is dire6kd by our will, oiherwife ibme of our power might aB involuntarily and our idf-determining power (if we have any) might dire8; and govern us without our confent ; with which Dr. Reid's fcherae would very ill agree. vStill the DoBbr in this gives up a point, which he had before pofitive- iy afferted and had laboured hard to ettablifli, " that if the will be not, " nothing elfe is, in our pow- er ;" p. 258. Now if the will be in our power, it is under our direction, or is dire8ed by our power. So that we have the circle complete ; all " our power is diretled by our will ;" and yet our will is direBcd by our power. Into what glaring in- confifiences will not men run, rather than give up a favourite and indefenfible hypothefis ! Yet they are fo blinded by their attachment to that hypothefis, that they fee no inconfiftency attending it. — — The truth is, that both thefe principles, ^/z^z^// our poxvcr is direB- cd by our will ; and that our will is direBc.d by our f elf - (leUrmiiiing power, are effcntial to the Doftor's fcheme, and to the fcheme of all who hold a felf determining power. To reconcile thefe two principles deeply con- cerns therii. But they have never yet been able to do it ; nor, it h prefumed; ever will be able.

Some

55

Some of the writers iti favour of felf-detcrmination Teem to be fenlible of the mxjlery in it ; particularly Dr. Chauncy. " It is readily allowed," fayi he, "lib- " erty in man, in oppofitlon to neceffity, is one of th^ " great zuonders of God. The power in our nature, " that conflitutt's us free agents, is an amazing contriv- *' ance of infinite wifiom. The modus of its opera- " tion is loo great a deep for us to fathom. It has tri- " ed and puzzled the greateft gcniufes in all pans of " the world." Benevolence oj lite Deily,'p. 135. No wonder then, that nobody has ever been able to give a confifknt or intelligible account of this power. So long as thofe who believe in it, are puzzled with it, we may expeci, that their accounts of it will be con- fufed, unintelligible and contradictory. But the ac- count of no one of them appears to be more contra- didory than that of Dr. VJcii. He gives up the idea of Dr. Claike and Dr. Chauncy, that the mind is the efficient caufe of its own vohtions ; yet he falls into the fame, in holding, that the mind in willing modifies iifelf, and that this modification is the ejjecl of the mind willing, p. 24 ; and that we are independent in will- ing, p. 2-,. He holds that volition has no caufe; yet: h')lds, that the modification made of the mind by it- fe!f in willing, is the effect of the mind willing. He holds that volitions have no caufe; yet denies, that he can he jultly charged with holding, that events take place without a caufe ; p. 27. Surely the Doclor can never expeci, that his unbiafed readers will re- ceive his fyftem, until he fliall have removed thefe inconfillences.

Archbifliop King is grofsly inconfiRent with him- felf, in holding, that the will determines itielf to choofe certain objects, without tl.e inlhience of motive or ?ny caufe out of the wdl ; and yet holding, that the will is determined to choofe thole objetls, becaule of ilic picafure which will be in coni'cquence of that choice. Law's edition, p. 2-j6. In fuch a cafe the \^i\\ h as much determined by motive, as if a man D 4 were

56

^vc;le determined io go to a debauch, in the profpe£l of the rcnfiial pleafuie, which he expelled there.

Dr. Wed lays, p. 23, " Every effeB is wholly paf- " five with regard to the caufe, Vv'hich produces it." And this equally holds, whether the caufe be extrin- fic or intrinfic. '« Confequently, if human volition '• be an effed" even of an intrinfic caufe, " the man '- mull be paffive in willing. But if man be paffive *• in willing, he can be active in nothing elfe ; i. e. he " i& no agent, but a mere paffive machine." What then is the great advantage, which the advocates for j'elf-determinmg power and the intrinfic caufation of voluion, would gain, could they eftablifti their favour- ite doctrine ? According to their own fcheme, every voliiicn would be an effeB, 2i paffive efFe6t, and "man " inuit be paiTive in willing. But if man be paffive *• in willing, he can be active in nothing elfe : i. e. he " !s no agent, but a mere paifive machine." Ibid. More than this cannot be faid on this head, if we fup- pofe volition to be the effe6l of an exirinftc caufe. Therefore they are grofsly inconfiflent with ihemfelves! in rejetiing one of two hypothcfes, on account of fup- poled abidraities, which equally attend the other, and yet retaining that other.

Although Dr. Clarke and others affi^rt, that the true and only queftion concerning liberty, is, whether we be the efficient caufes of our own volitions ; yet they themfelves would not abide by this conceffion. For if it were previoufly fixed and ellabliffied, what par- ticular volitions we ffiould efficiently caufe in our- felves, this would be as inconfiftent with their ideas of liberty, as the fuppofition, that they are produced by an extrinfic caufe. Gentlemen of that clafs uni- verfally hold, that abfolute decrees arc inconfiftent with liberty, bccaufe they eftabliffi the a6\ions decreed. . Therefore if God have decreed that we oiirfelves fliali efficiently caufe fuch and fuch volitions in our own minds ; tl is as effis6lually eftabliffies and fecurcs the exiRcncc of thofe volitions, as if he had decreed,

that

57

tnat they fliould be efFe£lcJ by any oiher ctiufe. Therefore not only docs their idea uF liberty require fclf-deiermination, but it equally requires perfect pre- vious uncertainty and chance, and an entire exemp- tion from all rule, limitation or confinement, f'o that the mind not only produces its own volitions; but produces them at random and by mere chance, with- out the influence of motive and without arly previous certainty, what particular atls it fhall produce, and whether any. Thus according to them felf determin- ation is atting.by clianceand becoming the fubjed of volitions without any proper caufeat all : For a caufe that a(-ls by chance and ftupidly, without motive or dcfign, is no proper efficient caufe at all.

Dr. Weft lays, p. 17, " We have fet afi^e the no- " tion, that the will determines all the prefent afts of " the will : For we entirely join with Mr. Edwards " in exploding that idea." \Vhat myltcry there may be couched under the xoill, I will not pretend to fay. But as he " entirely agrees widi Mr. Edwards in ex- " ploding that idea," Dr. Weft muft hold not only, that the v.'ill as a diftinft power of the mind does not determine the prefent ads of the will ; but thai the mind in the excrcife of the power of will, does not determine thole atfcs. For this is equally exploded by Mr. Edwards, as the other. The Do6lor lays, tliat " the will does not determine all the prefent ads " of the will." But does it determine any of the adls of the will, whether prefent^ pajl or future ? As he agrees in this particular with Mr. Edwards, he mutl anfwer in the negative. All pofl atls of the wdl were once prefent ; and when they were prefent Dr. Weft denies, that the will determined them : And he will not fay, that the will determines them now that they are paft. Alio all future afts of the will erelong will be prefent ; and when they fliall be prefent, they will not, according to Dr. Weft's conecffion, be determin- ed by the will. Therefore he will not fay, that they arc determined by the will now, before they come in- to

to exigence. Doubilefs by whatever tliey are deter- fnined, ihey are determined by it at the very inftani of their coming into exiftence. No caufe produces an tfrefl. at a time before or after the exifience of that effett : Therefore by this conceflion of Dr. Vv'elt it feems he holds, that no voHtion. paft, prefent or future is determined by the will, or by the mind in the exercife of the will. Yet Dr. Weft iirenuoufly pleads for a felf determining power : But what good purpofc does this power anfwer, fince it determines no ad of will ? It feems it is a very innocent and harmlcfs thing, bccaufe it is very inefficacious and dormant, doing neither good nor hurt.

Dr. Clarke, in papers between Leibnitz and him- felf, p. 73, grants, that " nothing is, without a fuffi- *' cient reafon why it is, rather than not ; and why it « is thus, rather than otherwife. But" fays, that " in *' things in their own nature indifferent, mere zuili, " without any thing external to influence it, is alone " that fufficient reafon." By will the Dodor muft inean either an act o^ volition, or the pozver of. the will. If he mean that the formef is the reafon or oround of our a6\s of the will, he runs into the infi- nite ferics. If he mean the latter it is as abfurd as to fjy, The ability of Dr. Clarke to write his replies to Leibnitz, was alone the fufficient reafon why he wrote ihem.

Dr. Price in his correfpondence with Dr. Prieftly, p. 136, fays, '• It cannot be juftly faid, that felf-deter- " mination implies an efFe6l without a caufe. Does it " follow, that becaufe I am rayfelf ibe caufe, there is "no caufe ?" To this I anfv^er, that though it does indeed not follow, that bccaufe I afn myfelf the caufe of a volition, there is no caufe ; as it is tak- en for granted, that there is a caufe, and that 1 am that caufe ; yet from the fuppofnion, ihat volition is not the effect of a caufe ex-trinfic to the mind in which it takes place, it will follow, that there is no caufe of it ; bccaufe it is abfolutely impoffibic, that the mind

iifclf

59

itfelf (liould be the caufe of it. The impofTibility of this has been already ftated in the preceding difcourfe, and more largely illuftrated by other \Ariters : And if aiiy man will fhow the pofFibiiity of the mind's cauf- ing its own volitions, and will remove the abfurdiiies attending that fuppofition ; erit viihi Magnus Apollo : It will then, and not till then, be incumbent on us to I'pcak of felf determination in a very diiTerent drain.

In fine ; thofe who plead for a felf-dctermining pow- er, either mean what Dr. Well declares he means, that we ourfelves determine whenever we do deter- mine ; which is no part of the i'ubjetl of this coniro- verfy, is difputed by none and is nothing oppofite to moral nccelfity, extiinfic caufaliiy of volition, &c. but amounts to this merely, that we aro die fubjefts of volition : Or they mean, that we are the efficient caufcs of our own volitions. But thefe men feem never to have refleftcd fo far on the fubjc6l, as to fee, that this idea of felf-determination runs into what has been fo often charged upon them, an infinite fe- rics of volitions caufing one another : And therefore when this difficulty is fuggefted to them, they are ei- ther filenced and have nothing to anfwer, or elfc an- fwer jn iuch a manner as to fhow, that by efficiently caufing. our own volitions they mean merely what Dr. Weft profefles to mean, that we will or are the fub- je6sof volition, which no more implies, that we caufe them, than that we caufe all our own perceptions and feelings follows from our being the fubjeds of them.

" 1 take it to be an important truth," fays the Doc- tor, Part II, p. ig, " that wherever neceffity begins, *' liberty ends ; and that a neceffary agent is a eontra- " diclion." What a pity, that the Do6lor fhould under- take the defence of a propofition, which he is neceffi- tatcd perpetually to beg ! Or if he be not neceffitat- ed to beg it, what a pity that he fhould do it without neceffity ! He knows or ought to have known, that this which he here takes for granted, is not conceded ; tiiat Prefident Edwards and all his followers hold, that

the

-60

the raoft abfolute moral neceflity is confident with perfect liberty, and that an agent acting under moral necelfity, is lb far from a contradidlion, that neither God nor creature is or can be any other agent. If Dr. Welt Ihould fay, that a neceflary agent is a con- tradi6lion according to his idea of agent, i. e. a felf- determinate agent or one atling by chance : Be it i'o ; he ought to prove, and not affume, that his idea is pofiible and according to truth.

". When a man confiders," (fays Dr. Weft, p. 23, Part II,) " that he is not moved by any extrinfic <' caufe to do evil, but that his wickednefs has origin- ^' ated luholly frorn himfeif, he muft feel himfelf e.x- *• ceedingly vile and unworthy of any divine favour." This is talking altogether in the clouds : What does he mean by wickednefs originated from a man's felf ? He cannot confiilently mean, that " felf a6ls on felf " and produces wickednefs ;" for this he rejefts as abfurd. If he mean, that a man is himfelf the fub- ject of wickednefs, wicked volitions or a6lions ; this is granted ; but it is not at all oppofed to his being moved by an extrinfic caufe to that wickednefs, any more than a man's being the fubjecl of pain is incon- fiitent with the pain's being effected by an extrinfic caufe. If there be any fenfe befide thefe two, in ».vhich wickednefs can be originated from a man's felf, let it be pointed out.

" If men have an exiftence diftinQ from Deity," fays the Do£lor, " endowed with a confcioufnefs dif- " tinft from Deity, then they have a felf active prin- *' ciple diftin£l from Deity ; i. e. they have a felf-de- " termining power ;" ibid, p. 24. That men have an exiftcnce and confcioufnefs diflinft from Deity, is granted ; but that it thence follows, that they have a fclf-determining power, if by that be meant any thing diftind from a faculty of will influenced by extrinfic motives and caufcs is not granted, and ought not to have been taken for granted, nor alfcrted without prooF. From the fame preniifes it would follow, that

brutes

brutes have a felf-dctermining power ; which is not generally allowed by the advocates for that power. For brutes have both an cxifkncc and a confcioufnefs diftind from the Deity.

" He that cannot govern his own mind ; but is " conftanily determined by an extrinfic caufe, is c'er- " taiiily the fubjcft of mere chance and accident ;" ibid, p. 28. Indeed [ and is tlie planetary fyftem the fubjed of mere chance and accident ? The mate- rial world cannot govern itlelf, yet not an hair of our head efcapes the notice or the difpofal of our heaven- ly Father. Surely the Dodor afferted this without

confideration.

" Our doctrine of felf-determination implying, that *• wlien the mind afts, it always has an objeft in view, " and that there is always a reafon for ading, is as " fully confident with our being the fubje6ls of com- " mands and promifes, prohibitions and threatenings, " and edablifhes as hire a connection between means " and ends, as he" [Prefident Edwards] " can fuppofe «' to ariCe from the dotirine of Neceffiiy." Ibid, p. 29. Yet the Doftor's do6lrine is, " that men are not " always governed by tie ftrongeft motive," and that there is no fure connexion between motives and ac- tion. Ibid, p. 6. Now the Do£tor is fpeaking of the means and ends of moral agents and moral attions ; and particularly oF commands and promifes, prohibi- tions and threatenings, conGdcred as motives and means of aclion. And does that dodrine which teaches that there is no fure connection between the ftrongeft motive, or even any motives, whether ftrong- cr or weaker, and a6tion, eliablifli as fure a connec- tion between fuch mean.; and their ends, which are moral anions, as that dottrine which teaches, that there is a fure and infallible connc61ion between fuch means and their ends ? Is it not furprifing, that the Dotlor fhould alfert fuch a thing ?

He tells us, ibid, p. 29, " That he holds no fuch « kind of lelf-dctcrminatiop; as a power to ad without

« and

62

" and againft every kind of reafon or argument." But he does hold a power to aft without and againft the Jlrongejl reafons and arguments : Therefore he ought much more to hold a power to aft without and againft the weaker ; and confequenlly a power to aft widiout and againft every kind of reafon and argument. Nay, the DoQor does exprefsly hold a power to rcjijl all motives, reafons and arguments, and a power to remain inaBive notwithftanding the folicitations of them all And is it not ftrange, that he who poffefles a power to refift and remain inaftive, without and againft every kind of reafon and argument ; has not alfo a power to refift them in afting againft them ?

CHAPTER

^3

CHAPTER IV.

OJ Motives and tkeir Injluence.

DR. Weft has given his definition of a motive, p. 17 ; " It is the ocGafion, realbn, end or defign, " which an agent has in view, when he afts." And he grants, ibid, " that the uiind a6ts upon motives j *' /. e. when the mind a8s or choofes, it always has " fome end, defign or reafon, which is the occafion of " its a8in;^ or choofing. Therefore motives, in our " fenfe of the term, arc the previous circumftances, " which are neceffdry fora6lion." And, Part II, p. 93; '• Action cannot take place without fome objed, rea- " fon or motive ; and the motive or reafon for aftingmw/? " be prior to the action of the mind, and he perceived by " it, before it can ad." " Nothing can become an object " of choice, except it appears to be eligible;" p. 95, Part II. Yet he inaintains, " that there is no infalhble connec- " tion between motive and atlion ;" and that "when mo-" " tives have done all that they can do, the mind may " atl or not acl," The reafon which he afligns for this, is, " that though the mind never afts without " fome reafon or defign in a6iing ; yet there is no '• need of afTigning a reafon for not aBing" P, 17, 18. If by acling or not aHing he mean a volunta- ry a6lmg or not a6ling, or a choofing or refufing of the motives prefentcd ; it is to be obfcrved, as 1 have already otjfcrved, that refufing is as real an action as ( l.oofing ; and a voluntary not aftin^ is a voluntary ivlulal to a6l and to comply with the motives propos- ed, and is as real a volition as any other; and there- ^)re by his own concclfion, " motive is neceffary 10 • it," equally neceffdry as for any other volition or

.idion. Or if by not aUiUg Dr. Welt mean no a6fc

of either choofing or refufing, hut a perfed inadion ; then what he fays, -will come to this. That when mo- tives

64

lives are propofed, the mind may choofc to comply with them, or it may refute to comply with them, of it may do neither. But the impoffibility of this 1 en- deavoured toilluitrate in the fecond chapter, and fliall fay no more on it at prefent.

But if it were poffible, that on the propofal of mo- tives, the mind Ihould not aB at all ; how would it follow, as Dr. Wefl; fays, that there is no infallible connexion between motive and aBion ? It is granted by Dr. Welt that motive *, .neceflary to every aciion, whether of choice or refufal ; and to fay as the Do6lor does, that it is not neceffary for not aHivg^SLmouuts to tl.is merely, that it is not neccllary for involuntary, block-

ilh inaBion or torpitude. By infallible conncdion

we mean no more than conftant invariable connexion, fo that whenever the mind a6ls, whether in choice or refufal, it is under the perfuafive influence of fome motive, which, as Dr. Wefl grants, " is the reafon " and occafion of its atiing," and " a circumliance " neceffary for a61ion." We pretend not but that the man, when motives are prefented, may poffibly fall into a fwoon or other ftate of involuntary Cupidi- ty. If this fhould be the cafe, it would be nothing to the prefent purpofe. For the queftion before us is, whether volition be or be not in all cafes accord- ing to motive in the large fenfe of Prefident Edwards, including reafons, apd external objefts, with the talte and bias of the mind. This is what is meant by a determination by motive. Let what will be the caufe of involuntary and torpid inaftion ; fo long as it is granted, as Dr. Well does grant, that motive is nec- effary to volition, and that every volition, whether choice or refufal, is occafioned by motive, and never extfts without it, every thing is granted on this head, for which we contend.

Dr. Weft fays, " We cannot agree with Mr. Ed- " wards in his affertion, that motive is the caufe of voli- «'• tion;" p. 17. Mr. Edwards has very particularly in- formed us in what fenfc he ufes the word caufe. Thus,

p. 41 ;

65

p. 41 ; "I fometimcs ufe thv" word caiife in this In- " quiry.) to'tignify any antecedent cither natural or mor- « al, pofitive or negative, on which an event, either a *• thing or the manner and circumltance of a llnng, « fo depends, that it is the ground and reafbn, either « in whole or in part, wliy it is rather than not ; or " wliy it is rather than othcrwife. Or in other words, " any antecedent with which a confequcnt event is '* fo connefted, that it truly belongs to the reafon " why the propofitionj which affirms that event, is *' true ; whether it has any pofitive influence or not." Now, does Dr. Weft deny, that motive is an antece- dent, on which volition either in whole or part de- pends ? Or that it is a ground or reafon, either in whole or part, either by pofitive influence or not, ■why it is rather than not ? Surely he cannot with confidence deny this, fince he does fay, " By mo- tive we " underftand the occafion^ reafon, end or de- " fign, which an agent has in view, when he acts ;" and that motives are the previous " circumftances, " which are necejfary for atlion ?" Surely a previous circumftance, which is neccfTary for action or voli- tion, is an " antecedent on which volition depends ;" and " a reafon which an agent has in view, when he " aQs," and " a reafon which is the occafion of his *' ading," " is a reafon either in whole or pan, whv *' the aftion is." So that however defirous Dr. Welt may be, to be thought to differ, in this point, from Prefident Edwards, it appears, that he moll exatlly agrees with him. Yet he fays, p. 1 1, " Mr. Edwards, *' by making motives the caufc of a6ts of the will, and " by declaring, that the exiftence of the a61s of the " will is the effeft of their motives, appears full as un- " intelligible to vie, as Chubb could poflibly appear " to him." But as it appears, that Prefident Edwards has explained himfelf to mean by caiife no other than occafion, reafon or previous circufnjlana necejfary for volition ; and that in this Dr. Weft entirely agrees with him ; if Prefident Edwards appear abfurd to E Dr.

66

Dr. Weft, Dr. Weft muft appear abfurd to himfeif, even as abfurd as Chubb could poffibly appear to Frefidcnt Edwards.

I do not pretend, that motives are the efficient caufes of vohtion. If any expreffion importing this, have dropped from any defender of the connedion between motive and volition ; either it muft have happened through inadvertence, or he muft have meant, that motive is an efficient cavfe in no other fenfe than rain and the rays of the fun are the efficient eaufe of the growth of vegetables, or than medicine is the efficient caufe of health.

When we affcrt, that volition is determined by mo- tive, we mean not that motive is the efficient caufe of it ; but we mean, that there is a ftated connexion between volition and motive. To that as Dr. Weft fays, " Whenever the mind aBs or choofes, it always has «« fome reafon" or motive, " which is the occajion of " its afting or choofing," and "., is a previous circum- " ftance neceffary for a6lion" or volition. This a- mounts to all we mean by an infallible connexion be- tween motive and volition ; and therefore though Dr. Weft denies fuch a conneBion, he in fa6l holds it, as much as we do. By infallible connexion be- tween motive and volition, we mean, that volition never takes place without fome motive, reafon or caufe of its exiftence, either in the views of the mind of him, who is the fubjeft of the volition, in the dif- pofition, bias or appetite of his mind or body, or from the influence of fome extrinfic agent. In a fenfe large enough to comprehend all thefe Prefident Edwards explains himfelf to ufe the word motive. His words are, " By motive I mean the whole of that which " moves, excites or invhes the mind to volition, '« -whether that be one thing lingly, or itiany things con- « junclly ;" p. 5. He then proceeds to enumerate fev- eral things whic:h operate as motives, viz. the views of the mind, the Jlate^ frayne and temper^ &-C. which the mind may have by nature, or which may have been

introduced

introduced by education, example, cuftom or oiher means.

Dr. Weft grants an infallible connexion between

motive and volition ; 1. In that he grants, thac

motive is necejfary to volition ; 2. In that he

grants, that " there is ahcays a reafon for the mind's acting or choofing, and ihat " when the mind atts, it *' always has fome end, dcfign or reafon, -which is the *' occafion of its ading ; and in that he defines motive to " be the occafion, reafrn, end or defign, which an agent " has in view, when he atts." In thefe concefrions not onJy does he e.xprefsly grant, that whenever there is a volition there is a motive ; but he implicitly grants alfo, that whenever there is a motive there is a volition. He e.xprefsly grants, that motive is the rea- fon of the mind's adling. But the reafon of the mind's a£ling is infallibly conne8ed with its atling : Other- wife it is not the reafon of its ading. If either ihe mind fhould aft without the fuppofed reafon ; or if when the fuppofed reafon exifts, the aftion does not follow ; this fa6t in either cafe fhows plainly, that the fuppofed

reafon is not the real reafon of the aftion.- Again,

motive is conceded to be the occafion of the mind's afting. But if the motive exift and the a8ion do not follow ; it is plain, that the motive is not the occafion

of the action.- As motive is allowed to be the i ea-

fon of the aflion of the mind, it is as abfurd, that the motive fhould exift without the adion, as that the reafon of an a6tion fliould exill without the aflion ; indeed it is the fame thing. Let what will be fuppof- ed to be the reafon of an a6lion, if that fuppofed rea- fon exift, and the a6lion do not follow, thus proves, the fuppofed reafon is falfely fuppofed to be the rea- fon ; and that either fomething elle is the true reafon, or that the aftion came into exiftence without rea- fon. If then motive be, as Dr. Weft grants, the

occafion and reafon of aftion, it is as abfurd and con-

tradiftory to fay, that thcte is not an infallible con-

ne6lion between aQion and motive, as that there

E 2 is

6d

is not fuch a conneclion between a thing and its- caufe.

Dr. Weft argues, that motives cannot be univer- fally the caufes of volition, as this would imply, that they are the caufe of the divine volitions : But that ** motives cannot be the caufe of the divine volitions; " for this would be to aiTert, that motives were the « caufe of the firft caufe." Now the fame reafoning will equally confute Dr. Well's fcheme of motives ; thus, Motives cannot be neceffary occafions of voli- tions, as this would imply, that they are the neceffary occafions of the divine volitions. But to affcrt this, would be to affert, that motives are the neceffary oc- cafions of the firfl caufe.

As volition always implies and fuppofes a motive ;. fo does a motive as evidently imply and infer a voli- tion. For by the very terms, that is no motive to a man, which does not perfuadc, move or excite him to volition. This is the fenfe in which Prefident Ed^ wards ufes the word motive. It is not pretended by the mofl zealous advocate for the influence of mo- tives, that the fame obje6k and reafons will always alike influence a man, and in like manner move or l>e motives to him ; unlrfs it be fuppofed, that the ftate of the mind and every thing relating to it, be the fame. The mind of man is from various caufes exceedingly changeable, and by no means at all times fufceptible of the fame impreflions from the fame intellcftua! views and from the fame biafes. The intelleBual views may be the fame, and the biafes may be differ- ent ; and the biafes may be the fame and the intel- le6lual views may be different. It will not be deni- ed, that there is an infallible ronneftion between caule and effeft : Yet this does not imply, that the fame ef- feft always follows from the fame caufe, unlcfs by ths fame caufe be meant, all the fame things and circum- iiances, which related to tl e effeft, or may have had influence to produce it. And with the like explana- tion

tmn of the word motive, it is true, that the fame mo- tive is always attended with the Came vohtion.

Since then wherever there is a vohtion, there is a motive, and wherever there is a motive, or, which is Dr. Weft's explanation of motive, wherever there is the reafon and occafion of volition, there is vohtion, and alfo fince wl>:rever there is the fame motive In the I'enfe juft now explained, there is the fame voli- tion ; what is wanting to fupport the propofition, that there is an infallible connexion between motive and volition ? y\ conne6tionjuft as infallible as that between caufe and efPeft ?

Since our volitions are thus entirely limited, bound- ed and deiermiiied according to motives ; wherein confifts the impropriety of faying, that our volitions are determined by motives ? \Ve mean no more by the latter exprcflion, than v;e do by the former.

If all our volitions be in iliis fcnfe determined by motives,. in what fenfe can it be pretended, that they are felfdetermined ; or that we determine and caule our own volitions ? And what will become of the whole doctrine of felf-determination ? It will not be pretended, that we caufe all the ©bjecls, with which 'we are furrounded, and v;hich prefent thcmfelves to us as objeBs of choice ; nor that v/e caufe all our nat- ural bialcs, taftes and appetites, which ar^ the fources

of fo many volitions. If it fliould be faid, that we

determine our own motives, determine which motives we will comply with and which we will rcje6l ; Hill as this very determination is the a6]t; of the will, a motive is necefl'ary to that. Thus we fliall go round in a circle ; motive, determining, or (in the language of Dx. Weft) being previoujly necejfary to volition, and volition being neccflary to motive.

It feems, that allowing what Dr. Weft does allow, no man can hold felf determination, in any other fenfe than one of thefe two ; (i) That we ourfelves deter- mine, as we ourfelves think, perceive, hear, tafte, &c. which is no more than wc all allow ; and to explain E 3 felf-determinatioji

7^

felF-determination thus, is to explain it away and give, it up J and, as has been fiiown, it is thus given up by

Dr. Weft. (2) That we efficiently caufe our own

vohtions, but invariably according to motives, reafons or preeftabUrhed antecedents. This cannot be con- fiftcMitly avowed by Dr. Weft, both becaufe he main- tains, that volition is no efFetl and has no caufe, there- fore we cannot be the caufe of it ; and becaufe to be the efficient caufes of our own vohtions implies, that " fdf afts on feif and produces volition ;" yhich is ex- prefsiy renounced by him.

Dr. Weft, to prove, that there is no infallible con- yieclion between motive and volition fays, p. 17, 18 ; ^^ Though it is true, that the mind never aBs without " fome reafon or defign in ading ; yet there is no " need (if affigning a reafon for not aBmg." By not a^ing. Dr. Weft means, as obferved before, either I'e- Jufing and voluntary negleB, or entire inaction. If he mean the former, it is a real a£l of the mind and by his own conceffion therefore is not " vvithout a reafon ^^ and defign." If he mean the latter, his argument is juft as conclufive to difprove an infallible connexion between motive and volition, as the fame argument is to difprove the connexion between caufe and effed : Thus, though it be true, that an effi;6l never comes to pafs without a caufe ; yet there is no need of affign- ing a caufe for no ejfeB. It is undoubtedly true, that perfeft nihility requires no caufe : But no man in his fenfes would hence infer, that an efFe6t requires no caufe, or that there is not an infallible connexion be- tween caufe and effeft. In like manner " there is no « need of affigning a reafon" or motive for perfeft in- a6lion, which is pure nihility. But it cannot be hence inferred, that there is no need of a motive for a6lion, or that there is not an infallible connexion between motive and a6lion. Dr. Weft denies an infallible connexion between motive and aQion, and he en- deavours to prove it by making it out that there is no qoqnedion between motive and inaUion : And what

is

is. this to (he purpofe? How docs it hence follow, that there is not an infallible connc61ion between motive and a5lio}i ?

Dr. Weft puts the fuppofition, that at a gentleman's table he has the offer of tea, coffee or chocolate ; that they can all be had with equal cafe, and all appear equally eligible to his mind, and ihathe determines to take coffee. He then adds, p. 18, "I believe, that it is "impoffible in tl.isanda multitude of fimilar inftances " to affign any accident or circumftance, which deter- " mines the mind to its choice among things, which ap- " pear equally fit and eligible. Conl'equently here is " an undeniable proof of the liberty for which we " contend. And this inftance will explain my idea, '' that there is always a reafon for aQingor choafing : "But that there is not always a reafon for not a61ing ; " and that things may appear eligible to us, and yet " not bechofcn; e.g. I accepted the coffee, bccaufe I " wanted fome rcfrcfliment. Coffee appeared to me '' properly .fuited toanfwermy defire. I'his was a fufB- " cient reafon for my receiving coffee. The other two "appeared equally eligible. About them 1 exerted no " ails : But this being a viere negation^ could require ^' no pofitive reafon." On this I remark,

1. If it were ever fo true, that in choofing between things perfe£lly indifferent, (if any fudi there be) the mind atls without motive, how would this prove, that it afts without motive in any other cafe ? And the inftances of its choofing things perfedly indifferent are fo rare, that with jefpetl to the main objeft of this difpute, they feem hardly worth mentioning. The great obje6l of this difpute is, to invcftigatc that liber- ty which is neceffary to virtue and vice, praife and blame. Dr. Weft, if 1 underftand him, contends, that an exemption from an infallible connexion between motive and volition is effential to that liberty. Or if J do not underftand him aright in this inftance, he is at liberty to make his choice, whether or not to main- tain, that an exemption from fuch conne6lion be ef- E 4 fential

fcntial to that liberty, without which we cannot pf^c- fife virtue or vice. If he maiHiain, that thisexemp- tion is ell'ential to that liberty, I afk, Do we exercife virtue or vice in thofe inftances only, in which we choofe one of things perfeBly indifferent ; or does it follow from the fiippofition, that we aft without mo- tive in thofe inftances, in which we do choofe one of things perfeftly indifferent, that we alfo a£l without motive in other inftances ; viz. in choofmg one of things perfedly different, as virtue and vice, wifdom and folly, our eternal happinefs and eternal mifery ? If it be not true, that we exercife virtue or vice in thofe inftances only in wliich we choofe one of things perfeftly indifferent ; nor that from the fuppofition, that there are things perfeBly indifferent, and that we aB; without motive when we choofe one of fuch things, it follows that we a8; without motive in other cafeff too ; what is the great advantage of a power of choof- ing without motive in fuch a rare cafe ? And is it ■worth while todifpute about it ? If we exercife moral agency in thofe inftances only, in which we choofe one of things pcrfeflly indifferent ; our moral agency is confined to very narrow limits indeed, not extend- ing to one of ten thoufand of our rational voluntary a£tions, as, I prefume, our opponents themfelves wilt grant. If we exercife moral agency in ihofe inflanceSj in which we choofe one of things entirely different, either we are perfuaded and influenced by the differ- ence and fo are governed by motive, and then the in- fluence of motives is not inconfiftent with moral agen- cy or with liberty ; or we choofe and acl without any regard to the difference of the propofed objeds: But this mud be proved, to obtain credit. If our oppo- nents fuppofe that it follow from our aBing without motive, when (as they fay) we choofe one of things indifferent, that alfo we a£l without motive, whea we choofe one of things not indifferent ; let them fhow that it does follow. They have not as yet done li-

2. In

73 ^

i. In the paffage quoted above, Dr. Well confid- crs his choice of coffee, as a real aft of his mind a- rifing from a rearoi> or motive; but his negleft or re- fufal of tea and chocolate as a mere negation^ whicii requires no rcafon or motive. But 1 appeal to every candid reader, whether a voluntary refufdl of any ob- je6l, be not as real an a6l of the mind, as a choice. If fo, in truth ond according to Dr. Weft's conceflion, it requires a reafon and motive, as much as any other aft. I do not mean, that his rcfufal of tea and cho- colate in the cafe put, is necelTarily a diftinft aft from his choice of coffee : It may be no more a di6tin.ft: aft, than fuppofing coffee alone had been offered him, and he had accepted it rather than nothing, his ac- ceptance of it and his refufal of nothing had been two entirely diftinft afts. The truth is, that his choice of coffee is one complex comparative aft, implying a preference of coffee to tea and chocolate. I am fen- fible, that Dr. Weft holds, " that choice, when ufed *« about the determination of the mind refpefting the *' things that appear to us equally eligible, docs not »« include in it the idea o^ preference ;" p. 16. But what elfe is meant by prefer ence, than the choofing of one thing rather than another or in the negleft of that other, when both are offered ? If Dr. Weft mean by preference any thing different from this, he ought in all reafon to inform us what it is. The reafon which the Doftor gives, to fliow that a choice of one of two equally eligible things, is not a preference is, that *' they are both confidered as equally eligible :" P. 16 : i. e. they are, (if I may fo fay) equally chonfablc or equally worthy of choice. And if one cannot be preferred^ bccaufc ihey are equally worthy of choice ; let it be ftiown, that it u not equally irapoffible that one of them fhould be chofen when ihey are equally worthy of choice. If the confideration that they are equally worthy of choice, preclude the poffibility of preference, why does it not equally preclude the pol- bilitv of elision or choice ?

Dr.

74 ■

Dr. Weft fays, that his acceptance of coffee, as it vas an a8, required a reafon ; but about tea and chocolate he exerted no a£l ; and this being a mere negation, could require no politive reafon. Now if coffee or nothing had been offered him, and he had accepted the coffee, he might as well have faid, that his acceptance of coffee, as it wa^ an aft, required a reafon ; but about nothing he exerted no att ; and t4iis being a mere negation, could require no pofnive reafon. The truth is, every a6i of choice is a com- parative aft, whether one or more things be offered to our choice. When only one thing is offered, the com- parifon is between that and nothing. When one of feveral things is offered, the comparifon is between thofe fevcral things. And if we accept the one thing, which alone is offered, we no more refufe or decline the alternative nothing or the abfence of that one thing, than when we accept one of fcveral things we refufe the reft.

3. If when feveral things, which Dr. Weft calls equally eligible, ar^ offered, and a man choofe one of them, it be true, that he exerts no aB: about the reft; the fame would hold, though the things were not equally eligible and the things refufed were manifeft- ly moft eligible : And thus it would be moft eafy to account for an att of preference of a moft infericnir objeft, to a moft fuperiour one. It is but faying, that about the laft " I e.xerted no aft : And this be- " inga mere negation would require nopofitive reafon." Thus fuppofe a guinea and a (hilling be oftered to a beggar: He takes the fliilling, but leaves the guinea. May not the beggar account for his conduft in the fame way that Dr. Weft accounts for his, in taking the coffee in the ncgleft of the tea and the chocolate .►* He might fay, " I accepted the fliilling, becaufe I " wanted a little money: The ftiillins appeared prop- « erly fuited to anfwer my defire. I'he guinea ap- <« peared equally" and much more «* eligible : About f that I exerted no aft. But this being a mere ne-

" gat ion.

n

^' gatiorij could require no pofiiive reafon." But the queftion would Hill remain unanfwered, Why did not the beggar exeit an a6t about the guinea, as well as about the (iiilling, or even in preference to it ? Or, "which comes to the fame, why did he exert an a6l about the fhilling in the neglecl of the guinea ? ]uft fo, why did \^i. Weft cxeit an aft about coffee, in the ncgled; of tea and chocolate ? Whatever be the propel' anfwer to the lalt queftion, will doubtlefs as properly anfwer the former. Nor need Dr. Weft puzzle himfelf and his readers about things equally eligi- ble. His principles are jufl; as applicable to any oth- er things, and equally prove that there is no connec- tion at all between motive and volition, as that there is not an infallible and univcrfal connexion.

4. Dr. Weft grants, that " when the mind choofes, " it always has fome reafon^ which is the occafion of '' its choofing." Therefore when he chofe coffee in the negleft of tea or chocolate, there was fome reafori for it. But I appeal to the reader, whether accord- ing to the Dotlor's own ftatemcnt of the cafe, there was any reafon why he fhould choofe coffee in the negleft of tea and chocolate, and whether there was not the very fame reafon why he fhould have chofen tea or chocolate in the negleft of coffee. He fays, they all appeared equally eligible to him. Therefore there was no reafon, according to him, why he fhould choofe one, to the negleft of the others.

In his fecond part as well as in his firft the Doftor grants, that " the mind never a8s without fome rea- " fon for afting." P. 14, and 29. Yet he holds, that of things equally agreeable, it fometimes choof(Ss one and leaves the reft. Now what is the reafon of its afting in this cafe .? It is not enough to affign a rea- fon why the mind fhould take fome one of fever- ai things propofed. As all thofe things are fuppof- ed to be equally eligible, a reafon ought to be given vhy it finally takes one particular one in the negleft x>f the reft. Unlefs this be done, no reafon is given

why

75

why it aBs in tliis manner, in this cafe ; and therefore for oupju that appears, it a£ls without reafon, which is contrary to the Dodor's conceffion. Therefore let -the Dodor either retract his conceffion, and hold that the mind fometimes atls without any reafon ; or re- nounce the idea, that it fometimes choofes one of fev- ■eral things equally eligible, in the negleft of the reit.

The Doaor fays, p. 28, Part II, " When two ob- '<' je6ts are equally fit, if one is taken and the other ^' left ; the mind Had a purpofe to anfwer." We ihould have been greatly gratified, if the Do6lor had pointed out, what purpofe the rnind had to anfwer in taking that one which it did take, and in leaving the reft by fuppofition equally fit to anfwer the fame pur- pofe, for which the one is taken. Until he does point out the .purpofe, he muft excufe us in withholdmg our

affent and denying his pvopofition. The DoBor in

this repeats what he had faid in his firft pnrt, that ^^ about that which is not taken the mind exercifes no a6t at all." To this I have already anfwered, that the mind does exercife an att about it ; that the a6l of the mind is complex and comparative, having a refpefl to more objecls than one, becaufe more are fuppoled to be offered a-nd brought into the viev/ of the mind ; that the mind does as really exercife an att about the obje6l left, as if it were ever foinferiour or fuperiour to the one taken ; and that the Doctor's reafoning, if it prove any thing, proves too much, viz. that if things ever fo unequal be offered and the mind choofe the bafefl and that which is in the loweft degree fuited to anfwer its purpofe, it may be f^ill faid to have a rea- fon for the a6lion. " But about the other, which is

" not taken, the mind exercifes no aft at all no

'' reafon can be affigned for the nonexiflencc of that " which is not."

However, perhaps lUe Do6lor will avow this lad obfervalion, though he has not cxprefsly done it a« yet : For he " denies, that men are always governed ■^9 by tlie ftrongeft motive," P. 6, Part II. To

avoid

rr

avoid all difpute about words, let it be remembered, that by being governed by the ftrongeft motive, h meant no more than that the mind 2i\w ay ^follows, or coincides with the Ihonged motive : And by flrongejl motive Prefident Edwards has explained himfelf to mean, " that which has the greaieft degree of previous " tendency to excite choice;" p. 6. Or it is the moft perfuafive motive. Now will Dr. Weft fay, that wher^ fevcral motives are propofed to a man, he fometimes palfes by the moft perfuafive, and follows the Icaft pcrfudfive ? If fo, what is the reafon and what is th« motive of its adion in this cafe .? He allows, that there is a reafon and a motive for every aftion : Let him point out the reafon and the motive in this aftion.

The Doftor, p. 31, Part II, fays, " If the mind " never a6ls without fome motive or reafon for ading, « then it follows, that the motives or reafons for a vir- " tuous conduft, and the reafons and arguments againft *' the prafticc of iniquity, ought to be fet before us in " the Jlrongejl light, to enable us to choofe virtue and

" to avoid vice." 1. Are we then unable to choofe

virtue and to avoid vice, unlefs the motives to the former and againd the latter, " be fet before us in the Jlrongeji light ?" It feems then, that unlefs thofe mo- tives be thus fet before us, we are uwder no obliga- tion to choofe virtue and to avoid vice, becaufe we are not ahk to do it : For it is no part of Dr. Weft's f\ ftem, that our duty extends beyond our ability. He denies the diftinOion between natural and moral ne- celfity and inability, and holds, that where neceffity or inability begins, liberty and moral agency end.

Part IK p- 19- 2. Gf what advantage can it be

*' to fet the motives to virtue and againft vice in the " Jlrovgcjl light," if there be no tonneftion between the JIro77gfJl 7?i0i'ives,3n6 volition ? Surely none at all. It is therefore implied in the paffage juft quoted, as in many other paftages in Dr. Weft's book, that there is a connexion between fuch motives and volition, and that fuch connexion is not incor.Gftent with liber-

78

ty. Yet as the Do6lor " denies, that we ai'e always "governed hy i\\t Jtrongejl motives^" he muft hold^ that there is x\o Jure conneclion between the ftrongeft motive and volition. Then the queflion arifes, What degree of connexion between the Itrongeft motive and volition does he grant to exift and to be confid- ent with liberty ? If the higheft degree of probability^ reaching to the ftep next to certainty, be allowed in the cafe, what fhould render the only remaining ftep fo baleful to liberty, as to be inconfiitent with it ? Or if it be allowed, that the probability, according to the degree of it, does indeed diminifli liberty j then it diminifhes moral agency too ; and therefore fuch a reprefentation of the motives to virtue, as " fets them <« in the ftrongeft light," and makes it more or lefs probable, that they will influence to a certain conduft, has in reality no tendency to perfuade to a virtuous conduft ; becaufe juft fo far as it has a tendency to lead to any particular conduft, it deftroys moral agency and precludes the poflibility of virtue. And fuch a repre- fentation is fo far from " enabling us to choofe vir- " tue," that fo far as it has any efFeft on us, it ren- ders it impoflible that we fliould choofe it morally ; and any other than a moral choice of virtue, if other there be, is no fubjeft of exhortation.

The Do6lor aflerts, " that there is not an infallible " connexion between motives and volition ;" p. 80, Part II. And in the fame page, " That the infalli- " ble connexion between motives and volition can- «' not take place, till the mind has determined to e.x- " amine the feveral motives or reafons for a6ling in " any particular manner, in order that it may adopt " the beft. In that cafe the mind will certainly choofe ** that which appears the hejl" Indeed ! This is com- ing down wonderfully : This is acknowledging an in- fallible connexion between motive and volition in all cafes, in which the mind ex ainines the feveral motives er reafons for aBing : It is alio acknowledging, that in every fuch cafe the mind is governed by ihtjlrong-

19

tfi motive, as '• it will certainly choofe that which ap- " pears to be the befl," Of courfe there is an infalli- ble connexion between motives and volition in all cafes, except thofe in which the mind a6ts abruptly and without due confidcration. And is it indeed true, that when the mind ads abruptly, it does not ehoofe that which appears to be bell, but that which at the tmie appears to be worit, or at leaft lefs good and eliiJible, than fomcthing elfe, at the fame time in view of the mind ? When men a6t abruptly and with- out due Gonfideration, no wonder if they be mifled by mere appearance, which is not always well found- ed. But do they in fuch a cafe, aft without regard to any appearance well or ill founded, and even con- trary to the greateft appearance of good ? That this is generally fu6t, needs to be confirmed by fomething Itronger, than mere affertion or implication.

Df. Weft, throughout his books in general oppofes the infallible connection between motive and volition, as inconfiltent with liberty and moral agency : But in the paflage on which I am now remarking, grants fuch a connexion whenever " the mind" afts with proper deliberation, and " examines the feveral mo- *' tives and reafons for a£ling in a particular manner." It feeras then, tl*at on Dr. Weft's plan, whenever the mind a6ls with proper deliberation, it is under fuch an infallible neceflity of fo afting,' as is inconfiftent with liberty and moral agency, and confcquently muft be deftituie of liberty and moral agency ; and that it poffeftes liberty and moral agency then only, when it acts abruptly and without proper deliberation. Will the Do6lor avow this conlcquence ? Or if he fhould fay, that although when " the mind has examined the ** motives and reafons, it will certainly choofe that " which appears to be the beft," and there is an infalli- ble conneclion in the cafe ; yet that conneflion is not inconfiftent with liberty and moral agency ; why does be difpuie agiinft that conne61ion at all ? If it do not

infringe

So

infringe liberty and moral agency, why is it fo Tio lenely oppofed ?

The Do6lor, in p. 85, Part II, quotes thefe lines from Prefident Edwards ; " I fuppofe none will 6c* *« ny, that it is polTible for motives to be fet before the

<^ mind fo powerful — as to be invincible ;" and

then he remarks on them, " If he means, that argit- " ments may be placed before the underftanding in fo " ftrong a light, as to become invincible, and iiich as " the mind cannot but yield to, it is readily granted, *' and is nothing to the purpofe ; For the underftand- «' ing is not the a6live, but the perceptive faculty of " the mind ; and liberty is placed in the will, which " is the only a6live faculty of the mind. But if the « meaning is, that motives may be fo ftrong, as necef- ^''farily to determine the rvill^ this is denied to be puf- " fible, while the mind has the free exercife of reajon. " But when the mind is fo violently agitated, as to " lofe the free exercife of reafon, as in the cafe of

" running in a fright liberty is deftroyed.

" Things that are not eligible in themfelves nor in « their confequences, cannot become obje6ls of choice; " which is to fay, there can be no motive to choofe " them, though we may find it difficult, and in fome « cafes imprafticable to bring our propenfities to fub- " mit to our choice. When one is convinced, that " he has contracted a wrong habit, he finds no diffi- " culty in choofing to overcome that habit ; but " he will have a vaR deal of difficulty in his en- " deavours to overcome it, becaufe in every unguard- *• ed hour, he will be liable to be led aftray by his evil " habit. And therefore fuch a perfon may fay with " the Apoftle, To -will is prefent with 7ne, but how to " perform that which is good, I find not ; for the good " that I would, I do not ; but the evil that I would not, " that I do. Here we fee, that we may have a power *« to choofe, when we find it extremely difficult and '•' in fome cafes impoffible to do the things which we

" have

gl

<^ have chofen. This fhows the ahfolute nacjjdy of *' divine grace iojlrcngthcn us to do our duty." On this remarkable paffage, I beg leave to obfervc,

1. That Dr. Weft, according to his own principles, cannot confidently maintain, that " when the mind " loies the free excrcife of reiT/on its liberly is dcftroy- « ed." For rtajon belongs to " the underllandir.g, " the perceptive facuhy," and not " to the will, the " only aftive faculty ;" but " liberty is placed in the " will." Therefore according to him liberty is not afFe61cd by what takes place in the underOanding, as the free exercife of rcafon does. On this ground it is, that he pleads, that thofe arguments which are invin- cible to the underRanding, are nothing to the purpofe as to the quedion concerning liberty, which is placed in the will. The ground of the argument nianifellly is, that there is no certain connexion between the un- derRanding and tlie will ; and therefore that which overbears the underRanding, does not at all, on tliat account, afietl: the will. Therefore that fear, which overbears reafon, does not on that account affect the will or liberty. Otherwife if that fear which overbears reafon and the right exercife of the undtrUanding, do on that account affeQ and deRroy liberty ; why do not thofe arguments, which are invincible to the un- derRanding and overbear it, alfo afFeft and dcRroy liberty ; which is denied by Dr. WcR.

2. In this paffige. Dr. WeR, however inconfiRently with himfelf, holds, that motives necefiarily determine the will. In the firR place he declares, that it is im- poflible, that motives fhould be ^o Rrong as neccRii- rily to determine the will, while reafon remains. Yet in the fame pafTjge he afierts, that " when once wc " are convinced, that things arc for our greateR good, '• we can eafily choofe them,"' and " things that are " not eligible inthemfclves nor in their conlequenccs," and of courfe things that we do not " p'-rcnve' to be in either of thefe refpe6ls eligible, " cannot become *• objeQs of choice." In p. 93, Part 11, the Dosftor

82

lays, " The obje6l, motive or reajon for afting mull be " prior to the aftion of the mind and perceived by it, " before it can a£t." " Nothing can become an ob- «' jeft, except it appears to be eligible." Ibid. p. 95. •' There mnjl appear fome fitnefs or pleafingnefs to the " mind, antecedent to its choice." Ibid. Nothing then can be an objet^ of choice or be chofen, which is not and does not appear to be eligible. Jit and pleafing. Now all obje8s of choice are of two kinds, pofitive or neg- ative, the poffeffion or abfence of the things propofed for choice. And things which do not on the whole appear to be eligible, cannot be chofen ; then the ab- fence of them being propofed for choice, is of courfe chofen, and muft be chofen, becaufe it muft appear eligible. The poffeffion and the want, the prefence and the abfence, of the fame things cannot, upon the whole, be at the fame time eligible : This would im- ply a contradiftion. To refufe an obje6"l is to

choofe the abfence or want of it. Therefore to refufe thofe things which appear to be eligible is impoilible : Of courfe fuch things muft be chofen ; there is a ne- ceffity of it, otherwife that would be chofen, which does not appear to be eligible, which Dr. Weft de- clares to be impoffible.

The fame thing may be more briefly and perhaps more clearly expreffed thus ; Dr. Weft grants that nothing can be chofen which does not appear to be eligible. Therefore the abfence of that which appears eligible cannot be chofen, becaufe that cannot on the whole appear eligible while the prefence and poffef- fion of the objed appears eligible : And as the ab- fence of the obj,e6l cannot be chofen, or, which is the fame thing, the objeft cannot be refufed ; of confe- quence it muft be chofen ; and fo there is an infalli- ble connexion between motive and volition, and mo- lives neceffarily determine the will.

If to this it fliould be anfwered, that though thofe things, which are not fcen to be eligible, cannot be- come c^bjeCts of choiccj and therefore we cannot refufe

or

J3_

or dioofe the abfence of thofc things which we perceive to bech'gible ; yet wcmay not ad at all withrefpcft lo them ; and may neither choofe nor refufe them ; 1 reply, as 1 have faid before, that is an impoffibility ; there is no medium with refpeft to any thing offered as an obje£l of choice, between choofing and refufmg ; neither to choofe nor refufe in Inch a cafe is to be block- ifhly infenfible. Or if it be faid, that we only confidcr and deliberate on the ofTer; ftill we choofe to deliberate.

3. According to this paffage, a man can never choofe vice or (in. For furely they are neither eligi- ble in themfelves, nor in their confequences, and therefore according to this paffage, " cannot become " objefts of choice," i. e. cannot be chofcn. But will Dr. Weft abide by this ? Or if to avoid this confc- quence, the Dr. lliould fay, that his meaning is, that a thing which is not fcen or veizved, as eligible in either of thofe refpeds, cannot be chofen ; 1 anfwcr, this implies, that the will in all its ads complies with the didates of the underllanding, and is neceffarily deter- mined by motive, as I have juft now endeavoured to illuftrate ; nor, as I can conceive, is there any way to avoid this confequence, but by recurring to what is denied to be poffible, a fuppofed power of the mind, to ad or not ad at all, and to be perfedly torpid, in view of whatever motives. To take this for granted is a proftrate begging of the qucftion.

5. As this paflage holds forth, that the human mind always ads upon motive and cannot ad without it, and therefore as is illuftrated in a preceding paragraph, is always determined by motive ; fo it follows, that it is always determined by the Jlrongeft motive, that which appears the moft eligible, or has the greatcil previous tendency to induce volition. Surely there can be no motive or reafon to a6\ on a weaker mo- tive in preference to a ftronger : This can never appear eligible ; and Dr. Weft holds, that the mind never ads without fome reafon or motive ; without the ap- pearance of fomeihing as eligible.

F a 6. As

S4

6. As the will is the only aftive faculty, and the feat of liberty and moral agency, fo there is no moral- ity in any other faculty, aclions or impreffions, than thofe of the will ; and Dr. Weft fuppofes in this very pafTage, as well as elfcwherc, that our propenfities and habits do not belono to will. Therefore, provid- ed we choofe things, which are for our greateft good, it is of no confcquence, as to morality, whether or not « we find it difficult and impradicable to bring our " propenfities to fubmit to our choice ;" of no more confequence, than whether we can bring our under- ftandings to be as acute and comprehenfive, as we may choofe. And though we have contracted a wrong habit, if we " choofe to overcome it,", it is of no more confequence in a moral view, that we find " a vaft " deal of difficulty in our endeavours to overcome " it ■" or that we are " liable to be feduced and led *' altraybyit;" than that we find a vaft deal of difficul- ty in our endeavours to overcome our ignorance of af- tronomy, and then that vve are liable to be led aftray by falfe guides and falfe witneiTes. For fo long as our will and choice are right, all in which there is liberty and moral agency, is right, and fo long v.e canriot poffibly be led aftray from our duty. And if our wrong propenfities and habits, under thefe circum- ftances be not fubdued, it will imply no fault in us, provided, as is fuppoied by Dr. Weft, thofe pro- penfities and habits confift not in the aclive or moral faculty or depend not on it : For on this fuppofition they are not of a moral nature and imply nothing mor- ally wrong.

7. Nor is it true, as Dr. Weft here afferts, that though we eafily choofe that which is good, we ftand " in abfolute necejfity of divine grace, to ftrengihcn us " to our duty." So far as we choofe that which is good, our wills are right, and our moral part is right. So far therefore vve adually do our duty, and have no neceffity of divine grace to ftrctigthcn us, to do that which we have done already. Docs the Doctor fup-

pofe.

J5_

pofe, that our duty calls us beyond our flrenoth ? And that it obliges us to a6t againit ahjolute nccefjuy. ?

8. Nor if we were to be aflilled by divine power to perform any thing beyond the reach of our moral fac- ulties, would there be any grace in fuch adiilance. It is grace to enable a man to perform his duty ; but it is no grace, to enable him to perform that which is not his duty 3 c. g. to fly to the moon.

The DoBor fuppofes, that Prefidcnt Edwards held, that there is always a reafon for v.ct acling. No doubt there is always a reafon for the mind's refufing an ob- je£l offered. But Prefident Edwards never held, that the mind ever fmks itfcif into perfeft ina6lion and torpor ; and of gourfe he did not hold, that there is a reafon for this.

The Dodor infills, that " Tlie mind determines up- '• on motives, and is not properly determined by mo- " lives.;" p. 87. This feems to be a mere difpute about words. The Doftor might as well have faid, that veg- etables grow upon, or in confeqiunce of the rain, and rot ly the rain. And would it be worth while to dif- pute that matter with him ?

" Strange fo much difference there fhculd be •* 'Tv/ixt tivcedle-dum and t-vjeidle-dee"

It is confidered by the compilers of the Encyclopae- dia lately printed at Philadelphia, as an invincible ar- gument agsinfl the infallible conncBion between mo- tive and volition, that if equal motives were fet before a man to travel an eaftern road and to travel a fouth- ern road, he would, on the fuppolition of fuch a con- nection, travel in a diagonal line, to the foutheaft. But this is contrary to faCl and experience. There- fore they conclude, there h no fure connexion be- tween motive and adion. They might jufl: as conclu- lively liave proved, that there is no infallible connec- tion between evidence and the opinions of men. Thus, on the fuppofiiion that the arguments, that the world was created in the fpring and that it was creat- ed in autumn, balance each other, the conclufion F 3 muft

86

mult be, that it was created in neither of thofe feafons, but midway between them. If the arguments, that Dr. Weft wrote the Eflays on liberty and neceflity,and that fome other perfon wrote them, fhould be equal ; %ve ought to believe that neither of them wrote them ; but a middle man between them.

Dr. Weft, in his fecond part, infifts more largely on ^ the fubjeB of choofing between things equally eligiWe, than in his firft part ; and puts the cafe of four equal lines, one of which is to be touched ; and he fuppofes that he dctermineo to touch one of them, and this deter- mination be luppofes to be without motive and with- out extrinfic caufe. Now in any fuch cafe there ap- pears to be no more difficulty in accounting for my determination to take or choofe one in particular, than there is in accounting for my feeing or thinking of one in particular. Though our thoughts roam freely and apparently without control, yet Dr. Weft will not pretend, that they happen by mere chance and without a caufe. Juft fo as to our volitions ; they no more happen in any cafe without a caufe, than any other events. Nor can the mind itfelf, in ■which they take place, be the efficient caufe of them, without running into an infinite feries of volitions,

and implying volition before the firft volition.

Therefore let the Do6lor bring as many inftances as he pleafes, of things apparently indifferent, fo long as choice among them has a caufe, and a caufe extrinfic to the mind too ; they make nothing to his purpofe. I aflc Dr. Weft, Is his determination to touch one of his equal lines, which he calls C, an uncaufed event ? He will not pretend it. Is it efficiently cauf- ed by the mind itfelf, in any other fenfe, than as the mind is the fubjeft of it, or as it is the caufe of all its own thoughts and feelings ? To anfwcr in the af- firmative, and not to clear the anfwer of the abfurdi- ties and impoffibility charged upon it, is mere dog- matizing. To all inftances, in which creatures are

fuppofed to choole one of feyeral indifferent things,

n}y

J7__

my anfwcr is, that though we cannot point out the particular motive or accident, which is the occafioii of the choice of that particular one ; (till this choice has a caule, and a caufe cxtrinfic to the mind too, and it is as eafy to account for our choofing one of feveral indifferent things, as to account for our think- ing of one of them in particular.

But perhaps the Dodor meant to evade this, by faying, that in the very a6l of determining to touch one of his equal lines, viz. C, he " voluntarily called it to mind." What does the Do£lor mean by this ? That he firft wifhed to think of C, and that in conlb- quence of this wifli, it came to his mind ? If he did mean this, it is to be prefumed, that he will not un- dertake to defend it. And as I can imagine no oth- er meaning of" voluntarily calling C to mind," I muft be excufed from further anfwer until 1 am better in- formed. If the Do61;or mean, that he wiflied to think of one of his lines, and then C came to his mind ; the queltion returns. What made C come to his mind ?

But the Dodor argues, that the Creator has a felf- deiermining power, and that he does or may exert that power in creating two or more perfeftly fimilar bodies and in placing them in different fituations, or in caufing one of them to move, while the other is at rell, <&:c. As to all fuch cafes I obferve,

1. That every determination of God is as eternal, as unchangeable and neceffary, as his exiftence is, and therefore none of his a6ls are any more felf-determin- ed, than his exiltence. To fuppofe otherwife is to fuppofe that the Deity is mutable. If therefore he have determined to create ever fo many bodies per- fe6lly aJike, and to difpofe of them in different cir- cumftances, this is no proof of felf-determination in the Deity, if by that term be meant any thing oppofite to the mod abfolute and irreverfible moral neceffity : I fay moral neceffity, becaufe all neccllity of moral a6ls, is moral neceiiity.

F 4 2. U

8S

2. If God have created two bodies perfe£lly aUke» and placed the\n in different fituations ; it will not follow, that he has done it without wife defign and moliv'r.'.

3. But why did he not place them in a reverfe of jTituations, that which is on the right hand, on the left, and that which is on the left hand, on the right ? And

fo with refpeft to reft and motion. The anfwer

has been long fince given by Prefident Edwards : 'i hefe bodies, though faid to be numerically different, are no more different than the fame found repeated at diirerent times. Thefe founds are as numerically different as the bodies, and with the fame reafon it may be aOvcd, why wa.s not the firft found made laft and the lait firft ? Or v/hy were not thefe numerically different founds interchanged ? The abfurdity of put- ling this queftion mull appear to every one, becaufe it implies, contrary to the very fuppofiiion, that the founds are different in fome other refpetl than time. So the quefiion, why the two perfectly alike bodies were not interchanged in their Situation, implies, con- trary to the fuppofition, that thofe bodies differ in fome other refpetl befide their fituation.

The Do6lor fuggefls feveral confiderations to fiiow, that thefe bodies do differ in fome other refped be- fide their fituation -, as that one of them may be in motion, the other at reft. And what is motion but a change of fituation ? So the fame found may move from one place to another ; yet no body would con- clude from that merely, that it was a different found from a perfedlly fimilar found, i. e. different from a repetition of the fame found in a different place or

at a different time. Alfo the Doftor infifts, that

thofe fimilar bodies are numerically different ; that is, ihcy differ \\\ number, fo that you may number them, and if you pleaf--, may call that on the right hand No. 1 or A, and that on the left hand No. 2 or B. And in the fame manner you may number the founds; and you may as wel' ^fk why found Nq. 2, was not

made

J9_

made firft, as why No. 2 of the bodies was not phiced on the left hand. If two bodies be different numer- ically only, they differ in no other refpeft, than in iituation ; for if they did not diiler in (ituation, they would become one body.

The Dodor proceeds, p. 1;;, " That they [the " bodies] are numerically different from each other, " appears from this confideration, that if the globe A, " on the right hand, fhould he removed to a far dif- " tant place, the Deity could create another jufl; like " it, and put it in the fame place from which A was " removed." So if found A fiiould be removed from the place in which it was firli made to a far dif- tant place, the Deity could caufe another found juft like it, in the fame place, from which A had been re- moved.— '■ — P. 16. " It is evident, that thefe two " globes are as really two, as though they were ever " lo diffimilar." This is no more evident, than that the two founds are as really two, as though they had

been ever fo diffnnilar. Ibid. " And they were

" made to anfwer different piirpofes ; and yet being '' perfectly fimilar, A could have anfwered the pur- " poles of B and B of A." So the found A may have been made to relieve Saul troubled by an evil fpirit ; and the found B may have been made to anfwer the purpofe of the temple worfhip. Yet being perfectly fimilar and indeed no more than the repetition of the fame found, A could have anfwer- ed the purpofe of B, and B of A..

Dr. Wefl fays, that Prefident Edwards, in fuppof- ing that two globes perfcQly alike, are the fame in every relpeft except their filuation, has confounded fimilar- ity with identity; p. 16, Part II. Prefident Edwards does indeed fuppofe, that two globes perfeftly alike in all refpe6ls except their fituation, arc the fame in all refpefls except their filuation ; and if they could be ali.^e in their fituation too, as they then would be in the fame place, no doubt Dr. Weft will grant, that in that cafe they would become one and the fame

globe :

90

globe :' If not let him point out in what refpe6l they would not be the fame.

The Do6lor dwells long on the cafe of the two globes, and yet every thing that he fays to make out, that they are two in any rerpe6l befide place, may be faid to make out, that perfeftly fimilar founds given in different times or places, are not the fame found re- peated. What he fays, p. 16, may be applied to the cafe of the founds thus ; " What fuperiourfitnefs has" the found A, to the found B, " that makes it necefla- « ry, that it fhould be" given firfl and be continued in one place ? " Or what fuperiour fitnefs has" the found B to the found A, " that makes it neceffary, " that it fliould be" given in the fecond place in point of time, and fhould be moved to another place in point of fituation ? " It is certain no reafon can be " affigned : For they being perfe6lly fimilar, one " cannot in the nature of things be more fit than the " other. So then, here are two very different effe£ls *' of the divine power, without any pofTible reafon" why found A fhould not be given in the fecond place and be moved, and found B, in the firft place and not be moved.

The Do6lor conceives, p. 17, that the ideas ad- vanced imply, " that one and the fame body may be " in two different places at the fame time." No doubt they do imply, that a body which is in all re- fpeBs one and the fame with another body, except fituation, may be in a different place from that other body at the fame time ; and may be the fubjeft of effefts different and contrary to thofe, of which that other body may at the fame time be the fubjeB.

All that the Doctor fays on this fubjetl, implies, that a body different from another numerically only, differs from it in feme other refpefcl befide fituation. But he will doubtlefs perceive, that this is an error, if he reficft, that provided the diverfity of fituation were removed and they were at the fame time in the fame place, they would no longer be numerically differ- ent.

9^

cnt. Yet Dr. Weft fays, p. 17, « If tlicy differed

« only in place, then put A in the place of B, and it «J would become B ; and B, by changing with A, <« would become A ; which is not the cafe : For « fliould we fee A and B change places, dill we Ihould « call each by the fame name we did before." If you put A in the place of B, it would become B, in the lame and no other fenfe, than if you make the found A, in the place and time of the found B, it will become B. If we fhould fee thofe two bodies change their places with each other, Hill ibey would be all the while in different places, as much fo as two founds would be, if we fliould hear the found, which is now in this apartment, gradually move to another place, and the perfeftly fimilar found, which is now made in the adjoining apartment, gradually move into this apartment. Thofe founds being all the while thus different in place, do not become in all refpeds one found; the difference of place flill remains- And is all the difference of the bodies fuppoied to be fecn

to interchange places. And if the globes fhould

be annihilated and then be created anew, and that which is now on the right hand fhould be created on the left, and vice verfa ; this would be as abfurd a ^ fuppofition, as to fuppofe, that if the two perfeftly fimilar founds now exifling in this apartment and in the adjoining apartment, fhould ceaie ; that which is now in the adjoining apartment could be renewed in this apartment, and that which now exifts in this a- partment could be renewed in the adjoining, in the ftead of the one which is now there. Every one muft fee, that this implies, that the founds are differ^ ent from each other, in fomc other refpecl, than their place ; which is contrary to the fuppofiiion.

The Doftor proceeds, ibid, " If one of the globes " fhould be dafhed in pieces, it would not in theleafl « afFe6l the other, but it would be as whole as it was *' before." So if one of the perfeflly fimilar founds made in different flaces, though at firft entirely me- lodious,

9^

lodious, Should become harfb and grate on the ear, it would not in the leaft aflFe6l the other. Yet Dr. Weft grants, that thefe before the alteration of one, are only the repetition of the fame found.

The Do6l:or continues, " If the two globes were " one and the fame in every refpeB, except their oc- «* cupying tv/o places at the fame time, then whatever " accident fhould take place with refpeft to one, " would equally take place with refpect to the other : " Ihat is, if A be dafhed in pieces, Ji muft Ihare the " fame fate ; which we fee is not the cafe." This is faid without proof or reafon given for its fupport, and therefore a bare denial is a fufficient anfwer. If two founds in every other refpedl; one and the fame, fhould be made in two places, whatever accident fliouid take place with refpetl to one, might not in tije leaft afFett the other.

The fum of my anfwer concerning the two globes, is. That they are no more two, than two perfedly fim- ilar founds made in different places or times ; that the fuppofjtion of their being interchanged, is as ab- furd as the fuppofition, that the two founds fhould be interchangv.d; that it implies, contrary to what is fup- pofed, that they are different from each other, in fome odier refpetl befide fituation ; and finally, that it is no more in- the power of the Deity to interchange

them, than to interchange the two founds. If Dr.

Weft Ihould reply to this, as he often has done in other cafes, that '• this is paft his pou-er to conceive :" Be it fo ; what follows ? That therefore it cannot be true ? And is Dr. Weft's fidll to conceive the ftand- aid of truth ?

" To fay, that no two things can have equal de- " grces of eligibility and fitnefs in the divine mind, is " to confound the reafon of acling, with atlion itfelf ; " and to make the Deity a mere pallive being, or a

*• mechanical medium of fate." Part II, p. 19.

The Do6ior has not told how thjis confounds the rea- fon of a6\ing with action, and he muft not expeft.

93

tliat all his readers will receive it upon his mere af- fertion. It is to be prefumed, that many of them will liill believe, that the divine mind always a£ls accord- ing to the diftates of wifdom, and on account of fu- periour litnefs chooles whatever it does choofe, and ihi't this is not to confound the reafon of ading with

aftion, but to preferve them diflinft. If for the

Deity to acl always voluntarily according to the dic- tates of perfect uifdom, be what the Do£lor means by his being " a mere paflive being," we grant it ; but we appeal to the reader, whether the Do£lor be not in this cafe guilty of a perverfion of language ; or at leaft whether he be not guilty of begging the quef- tion, in fuppofing, that there is no aftion but that which is fclf-determinate ; as that is manifeftly fup-

pofed in the proportion now under confideration.

As to " the mechanical medium of fate," the reader will fay, whether it' be not mere rant, unworthy of a grave philofopber and divine.

Dr. Weft frequently fays, and every where takes it for granted, that in the divine mind there may be innumerable things, which differ in many refpefts, which yet may have equal degrees of eligibility and fitnefs to anfwer God's particular purpofes ; and among thefe innumerable things the Deity can choofe one and not another, and, with refpect to any of them can

acl or not a6l. That things thus different may be

equally fit to anfwer the purpofes of God is not grant- ed and ought not to have been afiferted' without proof or inflance. It appears to be a mere conjedure ; and if mere conje£lur,&6 be admitted as truth, truth is the moft uncertain thing in the world. Befides, it is very improbable, that things differing in feveral re- fpe^ls, fliould be equally adapted to the fame pur- pofc. As to the idea that God can in any cafe attor not aclj this appears to be an impoffibility, for the rea- fons already mentioned.

" if a m-^-n is led by any means or mothes or rcafoKS, « to choole that which he formerly abhorred," fays the

Dodor,

94

Doftor, *• and to abhor that which he formerly loverj^ " he is flill as free as ever he was ; for nothing being " an objecl of choice, but what appears ehgible, it is « impofiible that the mind fliould choofe that which « is neither eligible in ilfelf, nor in its confequences ; /'. e, « nothing is an objeft of choice but eligible things. « When then things appear to us eligible, which fornrier- « ly we abhorred, and we abhor things, that formerly « were eligible, we have only changed the objeBs of <« our choice, but not our freedom : We are as free " now, as we were before." Part II, p. 30. The truth fo naturally obtrudes itfelf on every man, that it is difficult for him confiftently to contradi£l it.* The DoClor here grants, that when a man choofes an ob- jeft, by " whatever means, motives or reafons he is « led to the choice," « he is ftill free." Therefore to be led by motives in any cafe is not inconfiftent with freedom ; therefore to be led by them always, in an ejlablijhcd and infallible conneHion between motives and choice, is not inconfiftent with freedom. Why then does he difpute Prefident Edwards for holding

fuch a conne8ion ? Befides, Dr. Weft here grants,

that if a man be led by any means to choofe an objeft, ftill he is free. Then he is free, when he is led to choofe an objeB, by an extrinfic caufe. Nay, he is frecj when he is led by a divine injluence, to choofe an obje6l. It is further to be obferved, that in this paffage, Dr. Weft declares, that it is impojfible, that the mind ftiould choofe any thing, which does not ap- pear to it eligible. What then becomes of felf-deter- mination ? Has the mind a power to make things ap- pear agreeable or difagreeable at pleafure ; to control all its own views, and to create its own happinefs in any circumftances whatever .? This indeed is the thor- ough fcheme of felf-determination advocated by Arch- bifliop King, but which has been fince given up, though inconfiftently, by Dr. Clarke, and fo far as I know, by all other believers in felf-determination ; and

to

♦ Naluram ex^dla furca^ tmen ufquc remrret, Hor, Ep. I, lo.

95

to be fure cannot be confiftently adopted by Dr. Weft for many reafons ; particularly this, that Dr. Weft holds that the will always follows motive j but this fcheme is, that the will always goes before motive.

" Mr. Edwards and his followers," fays ipr. Weft, " fuppofe, that there muft be a particular reafon why

" every determination of mind ■ ■ is in thispartic-

" ular manner, rather than any other which

" will imply, that there can be no two obje£ls in the

" mind equally eligible. The contrary we

" know to be true by our own experience." Part II, p. 14. How does Dr. Weft know what our own experience is ? He may indeed claim a right to know HIS own experience ; but I defy him to tell what my experience, or the experience of any other man, is, unlefs he have had information. Who then gave him a right to fpeak in the plural number in this cafe ? And whom does he mean, when he fpeaks of our ex- perience ? If he mean mankind in general, I call on him for proof, and wifli he had been a little more re- ferved in this inftancc. Strong aflertions are equally open to all ; and if they be good arguments, it is ea- fy to prove, that the experience of mankind is dired- iy the reverie of what Dr. Weft aflerts it to be.

As to the queftion, whether any two obje£ls are, at the inftant of the choice of one of them, equally eligible in the view of the mind ; Tanfwer it in the negative ; and in my own experience never found them to appear any more equally eligible, than any two objeds, to be equally the obje£ls of my fight or of the attention of my mind. And as to the various inftances of feveral eggs, guineas and fpols on a chefs board, one of which is propofcd to be taken or touch- ed ; there is no more difficulty, as I have faid already, in aftigning a reafon, why one of them rather than any other, is taken or touched, than why one rather than any other, i« more particularly feen or attended to, by the eye or the mind. The circumftance, that one of them is more dire6Uy and particularly feen or

attended

96

attended to, is a fufficient reafon, why that rather than any of the red (hould be taken or touched : And when this circumftance takes place with regard to any one of feveral guineas for inftance, they are not all, or GO not appear, equally eligible. That which is the immediate obje61; of fight or attention is, for that reafon, raoft eligible : And how that came to be more particularly the objeQ; of light or attention, I am under no more obligation to account, than Dr. Weft or any other man.

It is a fcntiment entertained by forac, that we ef- ficiently caufe our own volitions, but invariably ac- cording to motives, reafons or preeflablifhed antece- dents. Dr. Clarke expreffes this in various parts of his metaphyfical works; as in the following, "The " true, proper, immediate, phyfical caufe of adion, is « the power of felf-raotion in men, which exerts itfelf ^^ freely in confequence of the laft judgment of the un- « derftanding. Butthelaftjudgmentof theunderftand- «« ing is not itfelf a phyfical efl&cient, but merely a moral " motive upon wkichihe phyfical efficient, or motive pow- «' er begins to a6l." Being and Attributes, p. 93. « The " experience of a man's ever doing what he judges rea- « fonable to do, is not at all an experience of his being *s under any necejfity fo to do. For concomiiancy in « this cafe is no evidence at all of phyfical connec- " tion. Upon fuppofition of perfeB liberty, a reafon- " able being would ftill conjlantly do what appeared ^« reafonahk it fiiould do : And its conjlantly doing fo, " is no proof at all of its wanting liberty ©r a phyfical « power of doing otherwife." Remarks on Collins, p.

25. Dr. Price entirely agrees in this fentiment

with Dr. Clarke. " A felf-determining power, which

*• is under no injliience of motives has never

" been contended for or meant by any advocates for

" liberty. E>ery being who ads at all, muft at!

*' for fome end and with fome view.*' Correfpondcncc zuiih Prifjllvi p. 156. " The influe?icc of motives is

^ «« perfeftly

97

'' perfe81y confident with liberty and indeed fuppolcs " It." Reid on the Atlive Powers, p. 275. On thefe paliagcs 1 remark,

1. Dr. Clarke, as well as tlie other advocates for fclf-dctermination, abundantly contradi61ts thelc fenti- nicnts. Thus in his fccond letter to the gentleman at Cambridge^ fpeaking of the final perception of the undcrltanding and Hrll operation of the atlive faculty, he fays, " I think there is no connexion at all be- " tvveen them ; and that in their not being conneQed *' lies the difference between a8ion and pafTion, which

" diflercnce is effcntial to liberty." But if a man

" on the fuppofiiion of perfeCl liberty," " conftanily '• do what appears reafonable ;" then a man may in a confiftence with perfect liberty condantly acl agreea- bly to the final perception of his underftanding ; i. e. the final perception of the underftanding and aclion, or " the operation of the active faculty," may be con- ftantly conneded confidently with liberty. And is conflant connection, no connedion at all ? And if in their not being connefled lies the effence of liberty, the eflence of liberty cannot be confiftcnt with their conftant connexion.

2. That Dr. Clarke places liberty in a phficcl power to do an a6lion. His words are, " A being's " conftantly doing what appears reafonable it fiionld " do, is no proof of its wanting liberty or a phyfical " power of doing oiherwifc." He evidently ules liber- ty and p/njical p^zcer, as fynonymous expreffions. Ma- ny other pafTages might be quoted from Dr. Clarke, Dr. Price, and other principal authors of that clafs, in which they exprefsly aflcrt or evidently fuppole, that whoever has a phvfical power to do an action, is free ; and that the reafon why motives are not inconfiltent with liberty, is, that they infer not a phyfical necefli- ty or inability. But this is no inore than we all grant. Peter had the fame ph) fical or natural power to con- fefs his Lord, which he had to deny him ; and Judas, the fame phyfical power to be faithful to him, as to

G betray

betray him. Nor do the mofl; abfolute decrees and predi6lions deftroy ibis phyfical power. So that ab- iolute decrees and predittions are, on this plan, pcr- feftly confiftent with Uberty.

3. Thele paffages imply, that though the mind is ihe efficient caufe of its own vohtions ; yet this effi- ciency is limited to exert itfclf or to be exerted, ac- cording to motives and the diftates of the under- ftanding. But this, on the plan oP thofe who deny that volition can be free and yet be the effect of an extrinfic caufe, is no more liberty than the flave cxercifes, who moves and acls at the control of his mafter ; or than the man has, v;ho walks in a prifon and whofe liberty is bounded and determined by the walls and gates of the prifon, and by the confent of the gaoler. We might as well fay, that a flave is in poifeffion of his liberty and is not controlled by the will of his mafter, but controls himfelf ac- cording to the will of his mafter ; as that we are free with the liberty of feif-determination and contingencc,- and yet be always limited to determine ourfelves ac- cording to the influence of motives. If there be a real connexion between motive and volition, that conneSlion is as inconflftent with liberty as if motives were the efficient caufes of volition ; provided liber- ty mean coniingence or previous uncertainty of ac- tion : And if liberty mean felf-caufation of volitionj and this felf-caufation be under the control of mo- tives or any extrinflc caufe, ftill where is liberty in the fcnfe contended for by our opponents ? Volition in this cafe is equally limited and controlled, as if it were efficiently produced by motive.

Such felf-determi nation as this, is not at all rncon- fiftent with efficacious grace, abfolute decrees, and the moft firm preeflablilhment of ali events and voli- tions. If felf-detcrmination exert itfelf according to motives only, let God in his providence bring the proper motives into view, and we are efficacioufly dc- i^i^miiied, or if you pleafcj it is efficacioufly brought

to.

99

to pafs, that we fliall determine ovirfelvcs in a partic- ular limited manner ; and let God decree abfoluteiy that thole motives fliall come into view, and he abfo- lutely decrees and foreordains what our condutfc fhall be. So that this kind of felf-determinaiion docs not at all anfwer the purpofe of avoiding the dread- ful dodrine of ablblute decrees, the fatality implied in that do6lrine, or other do6hines conne61ed with it.

4. If a man caiife his own volitions according to motives only, and this be a univerfal rule ; doubtlefs this rule was eftabliOied by fome caufe. This rule is an eftablilhmenl ; this eftablifliment is an effefcl. and requires a caufe as much as any other eifecl:. Who or what is that caufe ? It is doubtlefs either the Firft Caufe, or fomc fubordinate caufe appointed by him. In either cafe the original caufe oF this efiabliiliment, by which intelligent creatures caufe their own voli- tions according to motives, is God. Alfo he in the courfe of his providence brings all thofe motives into our view, on which we afl. And doubtlefs both this eftablifliment and the comino; of the motives into our view were caufed by hrm, in confequence of a previ- ous determination to caufe them. Therefore this fcheme of fclf-determination not only is confident with abfolute decrees and the clficacious providence of God; but it necefTuily implies both thefe. It necef- farily implies, that God has decreed all our volitions and is either mediately or immediately the caufe of them all. Therefore it is inconfilicnt, that ihofc who cfpoufe this fcheme of liberty and feif determination according to motives, fiiould oppofe the doQrines of God's abfolute decrees and efficacious grace.

5. Bcfide this, the common abfurdiry of felf-detcr- mination equallv attends this fcheme of determinin;» ourfelves according to motives ; I mean the abfurdi ty of an infinite feries of volitions caufing one anoth- er. If all free volitions be caufed by the fubjc6f. th-u volition in which a man complies with a motive, muit have been caufed by himfelf and by a preceding vo-

G 2 lition 3

tco

lition ; and this laft volition, for the fame reafon, muS have been caufed by one preceding that, and lb on infinitely.

6. Nor is this all. The doftrine now under con- fideration is, that every volition is according to a mo- tive, and is under the perfuafive influ<?nce of it. Therefore every one of that infinite ferics of volitions mufl: have been put forth in the view of feme motive. So that here we have not only an infinite fcries of vo- litions producing one another ; but an infinite feries of niotives,accordingtowhich they doproduceoneanother.

Dr. Rcid holds, that " there are innumerable ac- <« tions done by a cool and calm determination of the " mind, with fore-thought and willy but without mctive" ABive Powers, p. 275. This is ciiredly contrary to DTo Weft. He holds, as before quoted, " That the ''• infallible conneBion between motives and volition « cannot take place, till the mind has determined to « examine the feveral motives or reafons for a6^-

« ing In that cafe the mind will certainly choofe

«' that which appears the beft ;" Part II, p. 80 ; i. e. will certainly atl with motive. It is equally con- trary to Dr. Reid himfelf. In tlie next page he grants, *« that an adion done without any motive can neither «* have merit nor demerit ;" and fays, that this is a felf-evident propofition, and that he knows of no au- thor that ever denied it. Now an a6tion in which there is neither merit nor demerit, is not a moral ac- tion.' But is not every aftion done by a cool and calm determination of the mind, Vv'ith fore-thought and -will, a moral aOion ? If it be, fmce according to Dr. Reid, fuch an a61ion may be done without a motive, it follows, that, dire 611 y contrary to what Dr. Reid him- felf afferts, an aflion done without a motive, can have merit or demerit : Or a moral adion may have no merit or demerit in it. Or if an aBion done by a cool and calm determination of mind, be not a moral aOion, then in this controverfy we have no more to dc^with itj than we have with the beating of the pulfc

101

ox winking of ilie eyes : For tliis controverfy relpeBs

moral aflions only, Again, in the page lall relerred

to, Dr. Rcid tells us, " If a man could not a6l; wiih- " out motive, he would have no power at all." But if we have a power to a6i without motive, this power, according to Dr. Reid, docs not enable us to do thofe ac- tions, which have either merit or demerit ; i. e. mor- al actions. Therefore for the purpofes of morality, of virtue and vice, reward and punidiment, fuch a power would do us no good. So that according to Dr. Reid, we have no power to perform any moral a£lion. For according to him, power to act with mo- tive only, is no power at aU. Therefore whatever power we have, is a power to a6l without motive. But a power to a6l without motive, is a power to per- form thofe aftions only, which have neither merit nor

demerit ; /. e. which are no moral aBions. Yet in

p. 277, he fays, " The a6lions, which ar^ done with- " out a motive, are of moment in the queltion con- ** cerning77207'(3/ libcrly." By moral hberiy 1 conclude, he means that liberty, in the exercife of which we aft morally, or with merit or demerit. Therefore quel- tions concerning this liberty are queftions concerning moral aftions. But how can thofe a6lions, which have no morality in them, be of moment in <]ue(lions con- cerning moral a6lions ? Can the periftaltic motion or the adion of the folids on the fluids in the human conflitution, be of moment in a queftion concerning maHce or envy ?

In the page laft quoted. Dr. Reid fays, " If we " have a power of afling without motive, that power " joined to a weaker motive, may counterbalance a " dronger." What if it may ? The a£lion or aflions, which ihould be the refult in fuch a cafe, would not he of a moral nature. For if an aflion done entirely without motive be not of a moral nature, as Dr. Reid grants, that which is done againft the ftronger motive, "being on the whole done without motive, muft alfo be not of a moral nature. As the weaker motive is G 3 wiihftood

102

xvithftood and balanced by a part of the firength of the ftronger, lb far as a man a£ls againft the excefs of the ftrength of the ftronger, be muft aO: without mo- live. Therefore if a man be influenced by a regard to his duty, as with the force of i, to preferve his tem- perance ; and be iriduenced by his appetite, as widi the force of 2, to intemperance, and then by a felf de- termining power determine himfelf to temperance againfl ihe ftronger motive ; there is according to Dr. Reid's.own conceftion, no virtue and no morality in the determination. Who then would wifti for fuch a power as this ? And why did Dr. Reid think it worth his while, to difpute for it ? Surely in difputing for it, he fpent his time and ftrength in a very ufelefs manner.

Though Dr. Reid holds^ as jufl; quoted, that " if a *' man could not aft without motive, he would have ^* no power at all ;" yet he holds, as has been quoted alfo, that ". the influence of motives is perfeftly con- " fiftent with liberty and indeed fuppofes it." And he defines liberty, p. 251, to be " a power over the " determinations of the will." Therefore as " the in- «' fluence of motives is perfeBly confiftent with liber- " ty and fuppofes it ;" and as " a pov/er over the de- « terminations of the will" is liberty ; the influence of motives is perfectly confiftent with " a power over the " determinations of the will :" And if a man could not att without motive, but always afted under the influence of it, he in the firft place, " would have no power at all ;" in the fecond place, he would have ibme power ; viz. " a power ovet the determinations " of his own will," which according to him, is liberty, and not only is confiftent, with the influence of mo- tive, but is iuppofed in it. But the defenders of the

felf-determining power are fated to inconfiftency, and felf contradidion, and not one of them more fo th^n this Dr. Reid.

He alfo holds, that in order to have any power at ■^ll, we muft have a power to aft without ipotive, and

therefore

103

therefore without the influence of motive. But the influence of motive is, according to his own concef- lioD, fuppofcd in liberty. Therefore to have any power at all, we mull have a power to aft without that which is fuppofcd in liberty and therefore without lib- erty itfelf : And if we have that which is fuppofed in liberty, and of courfe have liberty itfelf, we have no power at all ; L e. if we have a power over the deter- uiinations of our own will, which is liberty ; we have no power at all and have no liberty ; or if we have power and liberty, we have no power nor liberty. > But it is endlefs to trace the abfurdities of the fclf-de- termining power and of the raoft acute writer that ev- er undertook the defence of it. It is indeed a bur- denfome flone, which like that of Sifyphus, will forever roll duv/n on the heads of thofe who give it a place in their buiiJing.

If we have a power to a^ without motive, we have a power to a6t without end or defign ; and fuch an aftion IS as totally without morality, as the blowing of the wind, or the motion of a -cannon-ball : And a power to perform fuch an aftion, is not a power to perform any moral a£lion, nor can fuch a power be called moral liberty ; but it is a power to divert our- felves, in that aftion at leaft, of all moral agency.

To choofe any thing without motive, is really a contradiction ; it is to choofe it and not choofe it, at the fame time. Whatever is chofen, is chofen as be- ing agreeable in fome refpeft or other ; and whatever is agreeable, is agreeable cither in itfelf immediately, or on account of its connexion with fomething elfe and its fubferviency to it. which fomething is immedi- ately agreeable in itfelf. Now whatever is agreeable on account of its conne8ion with fomething elfe, is chofen on account of that fomething elfe, as the mo- tive. Whatever is in itfelf agreeable to a man, is chofen from the motive of his appetite, tafte or bias, which is included in PrefidentEdwards'sfenfe of motive. And whatever is not agreeable to a man on one or G 4 other

i04

other of tbefe accounts, is not agreeable at all, and therefore is not chofen.

To choofe an objccl without motive, is to choofe it Tvithout any end or delign, either of immediate or re- mote gratification of any principle in him, who makes the choice : And whether this be pofiible or conceiv-^ able, 1 wifii every candid perfon to judge.

An aft of choice w^ithout a motive, in the large fenfe of motive as defined by Prelident Edwards, is an event without a caufe : For every caufe of voli- tion is included in Prefident Edwards's definition of motive. '' By motive," fays he, " I mean the whole *' of that wliich Qnovcs, excites or invites the mind to «' voliLion, whether it be one thing fingly, or many " things conjunQIy ;" p. 5. Accordingly in his fur- ther explanation of his idea of motive, he mentions all agreeable obje6ls and views, all reafons and arguments, and all internal biafes and tempers, which have a ten- dency to volition ; i. e. every caufe or occafion of volition. And if an immediate divine influence or any other extrinfic influence, be the caufe of volition, it may be called a motive in the fame fenfe that a bi- as is. Now, if an aft: of choice be without motive in this fenfe, it is abfolutely without a caufe. The evafion of Doftor Clarke and others, that the mind itfelf is the caufe of its o\m volitions, has been already confidered ; befide other abfurdities, it has been found to lead to an infinite feries of volitions caufing one another ; which is as great an abfurdiiy, as an infinite feries of men begetting one another.-«— -Or if it were allowed, that a man does efficiently caufe his own volitions without motive ; ftill he mud caufe |hem without defign or end, and therefore mud caufe them in the dark and by mere chance.

Archbifliop King in Law's edition, p. 394, fays, «• The will cannot be determined to good by objefts." Then all the good and evil in the univerfe cannot de- termine one aft of the will. In p. 354, he fays, 'J Jhc more free any one is and the Uh liable to ex-

" ternal

J2L

" ternal motions, the more pcrfc^^. he is." Therefore the lefs liable a man is to be influenced by the di- vine law and its precepts, by the beauty of virtue, by right and wrong, by the divine glory, or by the re- ^vards and punifhments of virtue and vice here or hereafter ; the more perfe6l he is ! ! !

If motives have not influence on men they are not capable of moral government. The whole of moral government depends on influencing the fubjeQ by the motives of laws, precepts, penalties, rewards and punifhments. Sec.

However, the Archbifliop is perhaps the mofl: con-< fiflent advocate for felf-determination, that has ever^ written. Clarke, Johnfon, Price and Reid grant too much. They grant, though they do not hold to it throughout, that the will always afts according to mo- tives, and allow the influence of motives ; yet they hold, that the will determines itfelf and caufes its own a£ls ; which is jufl: like the idea of fome concerning the power of the civil magiilraie, a power to govern the people, who have the entire government of the magiflrate. But Archbifliop King ftrikesa bold ftroke. He holds, that there is " a faculty" in human nature " naturally inclined to excrcife, and that one exercife " is more agreeable than another, not from any nat- " ural fitnefsin one rather than another ; but from the " application of the faculty itfelf : For another would " often be no lefs agreeable, if it had happened to be *' determined to that." J bid, p. 269. " It is the very " nature of an active power, to make an objeft agree- " able to itfelf, i. e. good, by its own proper a6^, *' For here the goodnefs of the objeft does not pre- '' cede the aB of eleOion, fo as to excite it, but elec- " tion makes the goodnefs in the objetl ; that is, the " thing is agreeable becaufe chofen, and not chofen " becaufe agreeable. We cannot therefore juftly in- " quire after any other caufe of ele8ion, than the " power itfelf." Ibid, p. 279, 280. It feems then, that it is the nature of a felf-detertnining power to

exercife

exercife itfcif, not in any particular manner, but in ■Siny manner and every pollible manner. It preffes like water in a ciftern on every fide alike, endeav- ouring lo flow out in exercife. And whenever it does in fa6l flow out in any particular exercife, there was no caufc or reafon for this exercife, more than for any other poffible exercife : The only caufe or rea- fon is the natural inclination of this power to flow out in any and all pofliblc exercifes. This is juil as good accounting for any particular exercife of this power as it would be, to account for the Arcbbiftiop's writ- ing his book, by faying, that he had a general power ^nd inclination to write fomething or other.

In this fcheme of Dr. King, we fee the gen^jinc idea oi liber iy of indifference : It is an equal inclina- tion, previoufly to eieftion, to ail poflibte ele6tions and volitions, and a perfeft indifference to all con- ceivable objetls ; fo that no particular obje6l or fit- uation is more fuited to give pleafure or mifery to a man, than another ; and pleafure and pain are the confcquence and depend entirely on a man's own choice and will ; fo that it is entirely in a man's pow- er and depends entirely on his own will, to render Nebuchadnezzar's furnace more pleafant, than a bed of down perfumed with rofes.

It is further obfervable, that according to this account of the fclf-determining power, whenever it does exer- cife itfelf, it does it by mere chance, or as Dr. King iiimfclf expreffes it, it happens to be determined to that exercife. Thus we have the famous liberty of contingence. or peifecl uncertainty, a liberty of blind fate or chance !

Our opponents hold, that the governing influence of motive is inconliftent with liberty and moral agen- cy ; then if a man be influenced by any motive to a compliance with the gofpel and its precepts, or by any temptation to the commiffion of any adion com- monly reputed ever fo criminal ; in reality there is no virtue in the former nor vice in the latter : Be-

caufe

I

* 10/

caufc the influence of the motive deflroys liberty and moral agency, the man is wrought upon by an extrin- fic caufe and therefore is a mere patient and not an agent. Therefore no man needs to be at all afraid of any temptation, nor according to this fcheme ought the Lord's Prayer to remain any Ioniser without cor- reQion : The lis^ht of this improved age requires a new edition of it correcied and improved.

If it be objected, that motives do indeed have an influence to perfuade men, but not a certain infallible influence ; I anfwer, jull fo far as they have influ- ence, their influence is certain and infallible, becaufe it is an influence that really exifts. That which does exift, certainly exifts, and it is an infallible truth, that it does exift.

Or if it be pleaded, that the mind is flill free, be- caufe motives are not the efficient caufes of volition ; I anfwer, that the fame plea would prove, that a Weft-India Have is free, becaufe his atlions are not efficiently cauled by his maftcr or driver, and they only exhibit fuch motives as influence the Have him- felf to perform thofe aBions : And the fame plea will prove, that moral neceflity is pcrfeftly confiltent with liberty. For moral neceffiiy is a mere previous cer- tainly of a moral aftion ; and this is no more the ef- ficient caufe of the aftion, than the perfuafive motive, which is the occafion of an a8ion.

I am entirely willing, that the advocates for the felf- determining power (hould take their choice of either Dr. Clarke's fcheme of conflant concomitancy of mo- tives and volitions ; or Archbifliop King's fcheme, that motives have no influence, and that previoufly to election all things are perfe611y indiflercnt to the man who makes the ele8ion. If they choofe to a- dopt the fcheme of conjlant cone ovii tan cy^ they at once allow an infallible connedion between motives and volition ; they rauft give up the power to ad or not ad, the liberty to either fide, and their favourite ar- gument frow choofing one of feveral indifferent things ;

they

so8

they mufl; renounce the independence and fovereign^ ty of the will, and allow that it is as really bounded, limited and controlled by motives, as the flave is by his driver, or as the will is by moral neceffity ; and there is nothing of their boafted liberty left worth contending for, nothing but the pitiful power of man- ufaduring volitions according to the mandates of mo- tives ; juft as a Weft-India negro manufaftures fug- ar under the lafh of his driver.

Or if they choofe Archbifliop King's fcheme ; ab- furdities no lefs glaring will follow. If all things be- fore election be indifferent, then every ele6lion is made without motive, reafon, end, defign or any con- fideration right or wrong ; every acl of choice is an a6l of as perfe6l ftupidiiy, as the motion of a canon ball or the falling of a ilone ; every man by choice or rejeftion makes any objed either agreeable or dif- sgreeable, good or bad, to himfelf ; every man, in every fituation has the perfe6t control of his own hap- pinefs and mifery ; and it is hut for him to choofe to lie on a gridiron, which he can as eafily do, as choofe any thing elfe, and he converts it into a bed of rofes. This is feif-determination to fome purpofe.

Such exclamations as the following have been made, in relation to this fubjedl ; " ]f man be gov- «' erned by motives, how is he free ? Where is free- «' dom ? What liberty has man more than a beaft ? *« All his aflions are fubjedt to a fatal chain of caufes « and effeCis ?" But fuch exclamations may juftly be retorted, on either of the forementio.ned hypothefes of determining our own volitions agreeably to motives, or without motives. If we determine them agreea- bly to motives only ; then we are limited to mo- tives, we can go in one track only, we can a£l no oth- erwife than according to the dilates of fovereign and all controlling motives. Then " how is man free ? « Where is freedom ? What liberty has man more <« than a beaft ? All his aflions arc fubjeft to a fatal " chain of motives." Or if it be faid, that we de- termine

10^

fermine our own volitions without motives, end, de- {\<yn or any confideration good or bad ; as in this cafe we ad with perfeft (lupidity, it may with the greateft propriety be demanded, " How are we free ? Where is " freedom ? VVhal liberty has man more than a beaft ?" If there be, as Dr. Clarke, Dr. Price, &:c. allow, a eoriftant concomitancy or connexion between motives and volitions ; this connexion is an eftablifhed law ; as really fuch, as the connexion between a certain temperature of the fcafons and the growth of vegeta- bles. Now of thiseflablifhment there is fome author: It is an effctl: and has an efficient eaufe. Nor will it be pretended, that the mind, which is the fubjeft of the volitions, is the efficient caufe of this eftablifh- ment. This befide other difficulties attending it, would imply a direft contradiftion ; as it is now granted, that the mind acls invariably according to motives ; and yet in eftablifliing the influence of mo- tives, it muft aft without that influence, i. e. without motive. For a motive can have no influence, be- fore influence is given to it ; and nothing can be a motive, which has no perfualive influence or tenden- cy. Therefore the influence of motives and the cob^ neftion between them and volitions, are the effeds of fomc caufc extrinlic to the mind. And this caufa- tionof the influence and confcquences of motives, or of the conncdfeion between motive and volition, is really a caufalion of volitions themfelve5, and that by an ex-

trinflc caufc. Thus the authors juft mentioned

and ihofc who with them acknowledge a conftant con- comitancy of motives and volitions, arc brought into a dilemma. If they hold that this concomitancy and conflar.t connection is cauicd by the mind iifclf, they mull: grant, that it is caufcd without motive, and i'o coniradift the very principle they grant, of conftant concomitancy. If they allow, that this connexion is caufed by fame other caufc, than the mind itfelf ; they mull of courfe grant, that volitions arc the ef- fects of an extrinflc caufe,

no

"If volition and agreeable perception," fay^ Dr, Weft, p. 12, " be one and the fame thing, then mo- «« live and volition are one and the fame thing : For «« nothing can be a motive, but an agreeable percep-

*' tion ; or — -^ motive is the perceiving of the

" fitnefs of an objecl to anfWer a particular purpofe." Hence he argues, that " if motive be agreeable pcr- " ception, and agreeable perception be a volition, and *' motive be the caufe of an a6t of the will, then an " afl; of the will is the caufe of an a8: of the will." And that " motive and volition are one and the fame

« thing." No doubt Dr. Weft has a right to tell his

own fenfe of the word motive. But when Prefident Edwards has particularly given his fenfe of that word, and it appears to be entirely different from that of Dr. Weft, the Do6lor has no right to argue from his fenfe, to confute the Prefident. He by motive meant not only a perception of the fitnefs of an obje£l to a particular purpofe, but, as has been already ob- ferved, " the whole of that which moves, excites or " invites the mind to volition ;" and not only " the « views of the mind," but " the ftate, frame, temper '^ and habit of the mind," however caufed. Therefore many volitions may be caufed or occafioned by motive in this fenfe, which are not caufed by any perception at all, but by appetite, bias, tafte, &:c. And if a man perceive ever fo clearly the fitnefs of an objeQ; to an- fwer a particular purpofe, and in this refpeft its agree- ablenefs, this is not the fame as aflual choice of that objeft, all things confidered. A man may perceive, that hard and conftant labour is well fitted to the in- creafe of his property ; yet he may not choofe it.

Though it ftiould be faid, that every agreeable per- ception is a volition ; it would not follow, that a vo- lition is a motive to itfelf, which is what Dr. Weft means, if he mean to fi>: any abfurdity, in faying, that motive and volition are one and the fame. There is no abfurdity in the fuppofition, that one volition ihould be a motive to another volition ; that a ftrong

wifti

t1^{

villi for honour fhould be a motive to determine a man to gencrofiiy, hofpitality, a general good treat- ment of his neighbours, and many fervices ufeful to the public ; and charity requires us to believe, that a defire to do good, was the motive, which made Dr. Weft willing to write and publifli his EJfays on Liber- ty and Neccjfity. The principle from which Dr.

Weft endeavours to faften an abfurdity on Prefident Edwards, is that nothing can be a motive but an agree- able perception ; which is both contrary to truth and contrary to Prefident Edwards.

Archbiftiop King fpeaks abundantly of " depraved elcOions." What docs he mean by depraved eke^ ticns ? Eleflions not according to truth, reafon or di- vine revelation ? But if a man were to choofe accord- ing to thefe, he muft not be perfuaded to fuch elec- tion by any regard, to truth, reafon or divine revela- tion ; this would imply, that all things were not per- fectly indifferent to him before election, and that fome things are cholcn, becaufe they are previoufly adapt- ed to excite choice, and not agreeable merely becaufe they arc cholcnj as he holds in places before quoted. Belides ; if a man choofe what is agreeable to truth, reafon or revelation, yro7?j a regard to truth, reafon or revelation, or which is the fame thing, from the mo- tive of truth, reafon or revelation, he is perfuaded, in- Jliienced and wrought vpon by thofe motives ; confe- quently he is pajjive in being the fubjeft of this influ- ence of the motives, and not free in the fenfe of free- dom, which the Archbifliop holds Again, if a man

choofe what is dictated by truth, reafon or revelation, from regard to any thing elfe than truth, rcal'on or rev- elation ; as he is influenced by motive, which is the thing which he regards, he is in the fame fenfe not free. Therefore to be free in that fenfe he muft ehoofe it from no regard to any thing, but without: motive, end or defign. And in fuch a choice what tiicre is of depravity or virtue, more than there

13

112

is in the fiiining of the fun or in the blowing of ihc mndi let any man point out.

Whether there be an infallible connexion between motives and volitions or not ; ftill fo far as they influ- ence and have effeQ ; fo far the fubjedl is wrought upon by an extrinfic caufe and is paffive ; and there- fore according to our opponent?., fo far his liberty and moral agency are deftroyed. Why then fliould mo- tives ever be ufed with any man ? We ought not to ufe them, wifhing that they may have no effect or in- fluence at all. Nor ought we to ufe them, to deltroy moral agency, and to turn men into machines. For what purpofe then fliould we ufe them ? We common- ly ufe them to perfuade. But to perfuade is to influ- ence a man by motive, which is an exlrinhc caufe ; and under the influence of motive, he is paffive ; and in fuch a cafe our opponents fay his liberty and mor- al agency is deftroyed. But if they be not in this way dellroyed ; an infallible connexion between motive and volition is not inconfifl:ent with liberty ; and there- fore why fhould Dr. Wefl; or any other man difpute againft it ?

Moft, if not all writers in favour of felf-determina- tion allow, that men generally a6i; on motive ; and 1 pre- fume they would not deny, that whenever they do a6l on motive, they are perjuaded to a6t by the motive. Therefore on their principles, men are generally de- prived of liberty and moral agency, generally aft as mere machines and paflive inftruments ; and all their objeftions againfl; an infallible conneQion between mo- tives and volition, may be retorted, with refpeft to the general conduct of mankind : And as to the liberty and moral agency exercifed in fome rare inflances, when men ad without motive, as when they are fup- pofed to choofe between things perfeftly indifferent ; it is a mere trifle not worth difputing about.

Dr. Price declares (Correfpondence with Prieftly^ p. 347,) " That by determining as we pleafe," he Hieansj '« our poffcflinga power to make cither of two

" motives

^^3

'• motives the flron^efl ; /. t. to make cither of them ** the motive that liiall prevail, and the motive on " which we fhall plcafc to determine." But this a6f, by which we make one motive ihe ilrongcft, mu(l be without motive. If it be not without, but be under the infhicnce of motive, not we, but that prior motive mikes that motive Ih-ongcft, on which we pieafc to determine. And as the compHancc with that prior motive is an aft in which v;c determine as we pleafe, a ftill prior motive is neceffary to that a6^, and we muft give flrcngih to that motive too, and fo on to

infinity. On the other hand, if without motive we

make one motive Wronger than another, we in this cafe at leall a61; without motive ; which is contrary to what Dr. Price abundantly profefles : He fays, " A felf determining power which is under no infiu- *' encz from moiives, has never been meant by any.

" advocates for liberty." But if we may and do

a6l without motive in making one motive to prevail ; why may we not immediately acl widiout motive, as well as firit without motive make one" motive the ftrongeft, that we may comply with it ? Befides ; to give ftrength to a motive, that we may comply with it, is really, in the a6l of giving that Ilrength, to com- ply with the motive, and to choofe the obje£]t which it recommends. It is like giving money to a friend, that he may procure for us a certain commodity. This certainly implies, that we choofe and wi(h for that commodity.

In the fame page Dr. Price puts the qucHion ; " Has a man urged by contrary inclinations, no con- " trolling power over his inclinations, to make one of ** them preferably to the other, the inclination wliich " he will follow ?" I anfwer, no ; there is a contra- diftion in it. The fuppofuion implies, that before he *' makes one of them the inclination that he wiil " follow," it is not the inclination which he choofcs to follow. But this is not true : In that he volunta- rily makes it the inclination that he will follow, it is H implied

114

implied that he is inclined to follow it. He is willing and choofes to follow it, and therefore he voluntari- ly makes it the inclination, which he will follow. Thus it is previoufly what he makes it to be ; and he is willing before he is willing. In making it the inclination, which he will follow, he does follow it. He follows it before he follows it.

Dr. Price in the fame book, p. 348, fays, " I am " fenfible, that it is nonfenl'e, to deny the influence " of motives, or to maintain that there are no fixt " principles and ends, by which the will is guided." Then is it not nonfenfe, to affert, that we give ftrength to motives ? And that we make an inclination, the inclination that we will follow ? This feems to be the inevitable confequence, unlefs we give ftrength to one motive, under the influence of another, and fo run in- to the infinite feries.

Dr. Clarke in his Remarks on Collins, p. 12, 13^ fuppofes, that motives have Jome influence, but not a prevailing, governing one ; and that over and above the perfuafive influence of motives, the felf determin- ing power muft by its own force exert itfelf to pro- duce volition. Thus, p. 12, he reprobates the fuppo- fition, that if a man be not determined by motives neceffarily, i. e. certainly and really ; he can in no degree be influenced by them. But to be influenced by motives, is to be really and efFe8ually influenced, juft fo far as the fubje£l is influenced by them at all : And fo far as he is influenced or perfuaded by them, fo far is he governed and determined by them : For that is what we mean by a determination by motives. On the other hand, fo far as a man is not influenced or determined by motive, he afts without motive and without regard to it. So that there is no medium between no real or perfuafive influence of motive, and a determining governing influence.

Again, p. 14, he reprobates the idea, " that mo- '• lives and reafons can be of no weight and no ufc « at all to men, unlefs they necejfuate them ; and thtjt

" if

^ if a perfon be not determined irrefijlihly, then he " muft be totally indifferent to all actions alike, and " can have no regard to motives and reafons of ac- « tion at all." By necejj'itating ard determinwg irre- Jijlibly^ if he mean any thing to the purpofe, he mull mean really and aQually to influence by perfuafion, fo as to give fome bias or inclination to the will. And it is plain, that if motives do not at all bias or incline the will, the man remains in a ftate of total indifference, and " has no regard to motives or rea- " fons of attion at all." Nor is there any medium between an inclination of the will and total indiffer- ence ; for this is the fame as to fay, that there is no medium between an inclination of the will and no in- clination of it. And if " motives and reafons" do rot incline men's wills and have no previous tenden- cy to ipclinc them, " they are of no weight or ufe at all " to men ;" and if a perfon be not really inclined by them, he is totally indifferent to them.

In the fame page, the Doftor confiders it as need- ing proof, " that a felf-moving power is inconfiftent " with having any regard to reafons of aQinq." So far as a perfon is perfuadcd to aft, by reafons and motives ; fo far he is injlucnced by motives, in ihe fenfe, in which we hold, that any perfon is influenc- ed by them ; therefore fo far is not felf-determined or felf-moved. Or if by felf-determination be meant, that under the effeftual perfuafion of motives, wa caufe our own volitions ; (though we deny the poffi- bility of caufing our own volitions) yet as to liberty in the fenfe in which I oppofe it, it would come to the fame. The flave, who always afts by motives exhibited by his mafter, is as abfolutely controlled by his mafter, as the whip in the matter's band. Be- fidesj to be effc6lually perfuaded by motive to voli- tion, and to caufe our own volition independently of cxtrinfic influence, is a direft contradiftion.

"The doing of any thing upon or after or in confc-

^ q^uencc of^ that perception" (the perception of mo-

H 2 tive)

ttS

tive) " this is the power of felf-motion or aftion^

« which in moral agents we call libcry."

If the doing be merely in confequence of motive, without any influeirj-e of the motive perfuading to the doing ; that which in this cafe is called a motive, is very improperly fo called. So a motive would be no reafon at all for the doing. If it be a reafon and properly a 7notive, it moves the agent to the doing ; confequently the doing is not /^//-motion, unlefs felf- motion and motion excited by an extrinfic caufe are one and the fame. Nor is this motion a free aBi.on in a fenfe oppofed to moral neceffity. It is not free from extrinfic caufality, nor of courfe free from a de- pendence on an extrinfic caufe. Every effedl is de- pendent on its caufe. Nor is it free with a liberty oF contingence. Thi^ implies, that fomething happens without a caufe.

If it fliould be faid, that motive in this cafe is not the ejicient of the action or doing : This is granted ; but at the fame time, for reafons already given, it is denied, that the man himfelf is the efficient caufe of it. He who efiablifhed the laws of nature, fo called, is the primary caufe of all things. What is meant by efficient caufe in any cafe, in which an cffe6l is pro- duced according to eftabliflied laws ? For inftance, what is the efficient caufe of the fenfation of heat from fire ? If it be anfwered, fire is the efficient caufe ; I alfo anfwer, that the motive is the efficient caufe of the volition and doing aforcfiiid. If it be faid, that the Great Fird Caufe is the efficient of the fenfation of beat ; the fame Great Agent is the efficient caufe of volition, in the fame way, by a general lav; eftabliffi- ing a conne6lion between motives and volitions ; as there is a connexion between fire in certain filuations and the fenfation of heat.

To allow, that we are free, though we always a6l in eonfequence of motites, unlefs by afting be meant an a6lion not excited or influenced by moiive, and of which the motive is no reafon, is to plead for no oth-

, cs

er liberty, tlian is perfeflly confillent with the moft abfolute moral neccffity and with abfolute decrees.

Dodors Clarke and Price confider the man free, who efficiently caufes his own volitions according to motives, becaufe he himfelf and not the motives, is the efficient caufc. Yet as by the fuppofition he caufes ihcm according to motives, he is Hmited by them. And is a flave free, who manufa6tures a com- modity under the control and lafli of his maftcr ? Or is the convitl free, who himfelf walks around the ftake, to which he is chained ? Yet according to the fyflcm of the faid gentlemen, the ilave and not the mailer is the efficient caufe of his own volition to labour. The convict and not the flake, is the efficient caufc of his own volition to walk around the ftake. Nor is the matter the efficient caufe of the limitation of the vo- litions of his flave ; he merely exhibits the motives to their limitation : And it will not be pretended, that the flake is the efficient caufe of the limitation of the volition of the conviQ:.

Dr. Price, in Correfpondcncc with Prfeflly, p. 341, fays, " that no influence of motives, which is Ihort of " making them ph) fical efficients or agents, can clafh *' with liberty." Nov/ the walls, gates and bars of a prifon are not phyjical efficients or agents ; yet they are as inconfiftent with the liberty of the prifoner, as if they were fuch efficients and agents, and flood around him with gun and bayonet, to confine him to the (pot ; or as if they had built and made themfelves for the purpofe of his confinement. So if man be limited to a6l agreeably to motives only, they are as inconfiflent with his liberty, as they would be, if they were intelli- gent agents, had created themfelves and had eflabliffi- ed the connexion between themfelves and volition. It is as to liberty, immaterial who or what has eftab- liflied the connexion between motives and volitions, provided the connexion be infallibly eftabliffied : As it is immaterial as to the liberty of a prifoner, who or what made the walls, gates and bars of the prifon, II 3 whether

ii8

whether the walls, gates and bars thcmfelves, any cx- trinfic caufe, or even the prifoner himfclf. If he had built and made them all, had locked himfelf in and had flung the key through the grates, he would be as effeftualiy deprived of his liberty, as if the fame things

had been done by any other agent. Thefe obfer-

vations lead to a further anfwer to the plea, that we give ftrength to the motive which determines us. What if a man fliould give ftrength to a motive ? Af- ter it is thus become ftrong, it as efFetlually governs the man, and as really deprives him of his liberty, as if it had derived its ftrength from any other fource. Suppofe a man were poffeffed of creating power, and fliould create another man ftronger than himfelf, and this other man fhould bind the former hand and foot : Would he not be as effe6lually deprived of his liberty, as if he had been in the fame manner bound by any other man ?

CHAPTER

11^

CHAPTER V.

In which it is inquired, whether Volition be an EffeEi and have a Caufe,

THE title of Dr. Weft's fccond ejfay is, « That vo- " lition is not properly an effcQ, which has a <« caufe." Whether his meaning be, that it is an ef- feft which has no caufe, or that it is not an elFeO: at all, the words do not determine ; but from the fequel I conclude, the latter is his meaning. This, as has been already noticed, is indeed contradifled by the DoSlor, as in this paffage, p. 24, " The modification in <' qucdion" (i. e. the modification which the mind gives itfelf in willing or ading, which the Do6lor explains to be volition) " is the confcqucnce or effect of the " mind willing or choofing." Then volition is an ej^ JeH ; and an etfeft of a preceding volition.

I prcfume the Doftor has the merit of originality in this part of his fyl^em. Many things in the common fcheme of felf-detcrmination do indeed imply, that vo- lition has no caufe ; viz. Liberty as oppofed to all neceffity or certainty ; the fovereignty and indepen- dence of the will ; its exemption from all influence of motive or extrinfic caufe, &:c. Still 1 have not met with one writer before Dr. Weft, who had boldnefs enough cxprefsly to avow the fentiment. Dr. Clarke and all the reft hold, that volition is the efFeft of the mind itfelf in the excrcife of its felf-moving or fe!f-de- termining power. And Do6lor Price, when charged by Dr. Prieftly with holding, that volitions come to pafs without a caufe, rejeBs the imputation and takes it hardly, that ever it ftiould have been made to him or his fyftem. Correfpondence with Prieftly, p. 349.

But let us examine the reafons, by which Dr. Weft endeavours to fupport this dotlrine. They are the following ;

H 4 1. That

420

1. That volition is an abftrafl: terra and fignifies fomething, which cannot cxift without a fubjeft ; or voliiion is nothing but the mind wilHngor a6ting ; and therefore is not an cff'ctt ; p. 21. But Ibppofe vo- lition be nothing but tlu mind willing or aHmg ; is that ftate of the mind or the mincj in that ftate, not an efFe6t ? Dr. Weft will not deny, that the mind abfo- jutely confidered is an effeft. If then the mind will" ing or in the exercife of yoiition, is not an efFe6l ; it ieems, that the mind while without voHtion is an efFe6l or a creature ; but in the exercife of voHtion ceafe* to be an efFecl, and therefore ceafes to be a creature.

Wiil Dr. Weft avow this ?- Motion is an abftrad

term and fignifies fomething, which cannot exift with- out a fubjetl; ; oif motion is nothing but a body mov- ing. But will it hence follow, that motion or a body moving is not an effeft ? No more does it follow from the argument of Dr. Weft now under con fid era lion, that volition is not an effe£i; ? The DoBor grants, that volition is the modification or mode of the mind; and is not that mode an effeft ? If it be not an efFeft, be- icaufe it is a mpde of the mind, thep doubtlefs no oth- er mode of the mind is an effe6l. And ftrip the mind pf all its modes, and you will take away the mind it- felf ; becaufe fome of thofe modes are ejfential modes. If all the modes of the mind, eflential and accidental, taken fingly and colle6lively, be not efFefts ; the mind jtfelf is not an effeft.-^ — On the principle of Do£lor Weft's argument, no mode whatever is an efFeft. The principle is this, That whatever cannot fubfift of itfelf put of any fubjed, is not an efFe6l. But no mode, fo- lidity, extenfion, figure, colour or motion, can fubfift without a fubjeft. Therefore not one of them nor any other mode is an efFe6t. And if not one of thofe modes by itfelf, is an effe6l, all of them taken together are not an efFe6l ; and therefore body or matter is pot an efFeft : Yea neither matter nor fpirit is an efFeft. And as matter and fpirit with their modes, comprehend the whole creation -, it will follow,

i21

tbat no creature is an effe£l ; i. e. no creature is ^ creature.

2. That volition or the mind willing, is not an ef-

fed, becaufe it is an efficient cauib. Dr. Wed be-

Jieves, that a carpenter is the efiicient caufe of a fhip ; And docs he therefore beheve, that the carpenter in ijuilding the fhip is not a creature ? This would fol- Jow on the principles of this argument. The princi- ple is, that whatever is an efficient caufe, cannot be an effi^ft. Therefore as a carpenter is the efficient caufe of a ftiip, he is not an efied, or not a creature. Dr. Weft and others take it for granted, that if voli- tion be an efFe6l, it cannot be a caufe. This is juft ^s abfurd as to hold, that unlefs a carpenter be un- <:aufed, he cannot build a ffiip ; and that a creature can be the caufe of nothing.

3. That if the operation or aflion, which is effen- tial to the idea of a caufe, be itlclf an efFedl ; then its caufe muft operate to produce the faid effcQ:; and confequently the laft mentioned operation being an effed, muft have another caufe to produce it, and fo on in infinitum ; and this infinite feries of caufes and effetts entirely excludes the firft caufe and any

efficient caufe ; p. 22. But it is denied, that in

the cafe here fuppofed, an infinite feries of caufes and effe6ls is involved. Suppofe it be true, that the ac- tion which is necefTary to conftitute a man an efficient caufe, be the efFeft of an extrinfic caufe ; how does it follow, that there muft be, in this cafe, an infinite feries of caufes ? We maintain that aftion may be the cffeO: of a divine influence ; or that it may be the ef- fe6l of one or more fecond caufes, the firft of which is immediately produced by the Deity. Here then is not an infinite feries of caufes, but a very ffiort fe- ries, which terminates in the Deity or firft caufe.

I know that it is often fuppofed and ajfnttd by Dr. Weft, that volition cannot be an efFeft at all ; and that jt h fuppofed by all others, who maintain Dr. Weft's general fcheme, that it cannot be an cffeft of an ex- trinfic

122

trinfic caufe. But their Tuppofing it is a mere afiump^ tion of the thing in difpute, in this part of the argu- ment. Let ihem prove it and they will do fomething

to the purpofe. Again ; the caufe or feries of

caufes, which is implied in the idea, that volition is an cfFe6, is fo far from excluding the firft caufe and any efficient caufe, as Dr. Weft fays, that it inevitably leads to the firfl: caufe, and implies, that there is an efficient caufe of all volition in creatures, as well as of every thing elfe (hort of the firft caufe.

4. That volition in the Deity is no effeft, but is on- ly the Deity confidered as willing or caufing ; and therefore to affert, that volition is no effis6t, is not in itfelf an abfurdity. Why then may we not affert, that

volition in the creature is no effeft ? P. 23. On

this I obferve, It is granted, that volition in the Dei- ty is not an effisft ; but it no more hence follows, that volition in the creature is not an effe6l, than that ex- iftence and knowledge in the creature, are not effisfts, becaufe they are not effe6ls in the Creator.

5. Thatif human volition bean effedjthen man muft bepaffivein willing,butifhe bepaffive in willing, he can be aSlive in nothing elfe ; i. e. he is no agent, but a mere paffive machine. But if man be a£livc in willing, then volition cannot be the effe6t of an extrinfic caufe, and will be nothing but the mind afting or operating ; p. 23.

No doubt if human volition ht an effefl, man is lb far paffive in willing, as to be the fubjefl: of the influence of that caufe which produces volition ; ftill he is aftive too in volition, is ftill an agent and not a mere paffive machine. In volition man is both paffive and adive ; paffive as he is the fubjefl of the influence of the caufe "which excites volition, and active in the cxercife of it. As the day-labourer is paffive in that he is influ- enced by the profpecb of wages, to confent to labour, and a6tive in exerting and in confenting to exert him- felf in labour. Nor does it follow from a man's being aftive in volition, that volition cannot be the effedl; of an extrinfic caufe. The idea, that it does follow, takes

for

123

lor granted the very thing in queftion, viz. that an ac- tion cannot be an cffedt, clpccially of an extrinfic caufe. Dr. Well ought to have proved this.

Befides ; why docs the Doctor lay, "If man be « a6livc in willing, then volition cannot be the efl'edl «« of any extrmfic caufe ?" Ibid. His dotlrine equally implies, that it is not the effeft of an intrinfic caufe. His doftrine is, that volition is, in general terms, not an efFed and has no caufe. But now, it feems the Do6lor recedes from this, and holds only, that voli- tion is not the eflPe6l of an extrivjic caufe, implicitly granting, that it is an effcB, and an eftetl of an intrin- Jic caufe.

The Do6lor tells us, that " if man be paffive in

" willing he is ■ a mere pajfive machine ;"

p. 23. How does this appear ? A man is paffive

in his intelle£lual views ; but is he in thofe views a mere paffive machine ? The human intelled is very different from what we commonly call a machine. Or if by machine the Do5tor mean any thing that is influenced by an extrinfic caufe ; I grant, that in this fenfe, both the human intelleft and human will are machines ; and in granting this, 1 grant no more than is implied in the moral neceffity for which I plead. Yet fuch an application of the word machine^ vould be a grofs perverfion of it.

6. That the Deity has not ohly a£led from all eter- nity ; but is continually a6ling upon the whole crea- tion, for the prefervation and government of it. Yet thefe operations and energies of the Deity are not ef- fefts, though they take place in time. Therefore the energies or volitions of the human mind are not ef-

fe6ls, though they alfo take place in time ; p. 24.

But 1 deny, that the operations or energies of the Deity begin in time, though the efFefts of thofe opera- tions do. They no more begin in time, than the di- vine exiftence does ; but human volitions all begin in time. There is no fucceffion in the divine mind ; therefore no new operations take place there. AH

the

the divine aSs are equally from eternit/j nor is there any time with God. " One day is with the Lord as " a thoufand years and a thoufand years as one day." The effeBs of ihofe divine a6ls do indeed ail take

place in time and in a fucceffion. If it fliould be

laid, that on this fuppofition the efFe£is take place not till long after the aSs, by which they are produc- ed ; 1 anfwer, they do fo in our view, but not in the view of God. With him there is no time, no before nor after with refpefl to time ; nor has time any ex- iftence either in the divine mind or in the nature of things, independently of the minds and perceptions of creatures ; but it depends on the fucceflion of thofe perceptions. So that from the confideration, that the divine energies and operations are no efFeds, it no more follows, that human volitions are no ef- fe6ls, than from the confideration that the divine cx- iftence and knowledge are no effefcls it follows, that our exiftence and knowledge are no eftedb.

7, That if volition were an efFe6l, we could not be the caufes of any effeBs : At the moli we fhould be 9nere pajfive ivjlruments ; p. 25. This wholly de- pends on the meaning of -words^ as moll of Dr. Weft's arguments do. If by caiife the Dr. mean ?i f elf .deter- minate caufe, he, as ufaalj begs what he has no right to expeft will be given him. But if by caufe he mean a rational, voluntary agent, aQing under the pcrfua- five influence of light and motives ; we may be fuch caufes, though volition is an efFe6l ; and a6ling as fuch caufes we may produce cfFe6ls. Thus Noah built the ark ; Mofes hewed two tables of ftone,

&c. And if under the name of a pcfjlve inflrument

the Do6lor mean to include fuch a rational, volunta- ry a^ent, as I have jufl dclctibed ; I grant, that in this fenfe we are paffive inliruments, and it is impofli- ble, that a rational creature fliould be any otiier than fuch a paffive inftrumcnt. But I reprobate the call- ing of fuch an agent a mere paffive inrtrument, as a great abufe of language.

3ut,

_7^5 But fuppofe volition were not an efFeft ; fhould •^e then be caufes of effeds ? or fhould we then be leCs paflive iiiftruments ? If volition were no effeft, we ourfelves fhould no more be the caufes of it, than any extrinfic caufe. It would happen in us by mere chance. And fhould we in the exercife of that voli- tion, which is without caule and is merely accidental, be any more caufes of an effefi, than we fhould be in the exercife of a volition excited by a proper mo^ tive ? If any reafon can be given to fhow, that we fhould, let it be given. Though it may be pleaded^ that when we become the fubjetts of volition by mere chance, we arc not the fubjeds of the operation of a caufe in the production of volition, and in that fenfe are not pafTivc • yet in this cafe volition takes place in our minds equally without our caufation, our pre- vious agency or confent, as if the fame volition were can fed by fomeihing extrinfic. So that if we be nol equally xvrvught upon in thefe two cafes, we are e- quallv inaBcve^ and therefore can no more be caufei in the cue cafe, than in the other ; And there '\i nothing more favourable to liberty or felf-determina- tion in the one cafe than in the other.

8. That if volition were an effect, we could have 710 more ideas of caufe and efFe8, than a blind mart has of colours. For we being paflive in our ideas of fen rations, they Could never fuggefl to us the ideas of Caufe and efFeft ; and if volition or internal a61ion be the efft^l of an ex'.rinfic caufe, our refleBixDns could never afford an example of an ejSicient caufe, and fo we mull for ever be deflitute of the ideas of

caufe and cfFett ; p. 25. On this I obfcrve,

(1.) It wliolly depends on the meaning of the word" ca^fr. If as I before obferved, it mean a fclf-determin- atc caufe, which " a6ls on itfelf and produces voli- tion ;" I grant, that we have no idea of fuch a caufe, more ihnji a blind man has of colours. Nor has Dr. Wed any idea of fuch a caufe, 2s he reprobates it »id does not believe in its exiftcnce. Neither God

i±6

nor creature can be fuch a caufe as this ; it is an inh- poffibility ; it is perfe6lly like the animal, which Prefident Edwards luppofed the traveller proielTed to have feen in Terra del fuego. But if caufe mean a rational, voluntary agent producing efFefls under the influence of motives ; fuch caufes we ourfelves are or may be ; and the idea of fuch a caufe we derive from every artificer, whom we fee employed at his trade, from every hufbandman, who in our view tills the ground, and from every external atlion which we perform.

(2.) Though we are paffive in our ideas of fenfa- lion, yet every idea of that kind, for the very reafon that we are paffive in it, fuggefts to us the ideas of both caufe and effeft. In that we are paffive in thofe ideas both caufe and efFe6l are implied. If no caufe operated upon us to produce the effeft, fenfation, we Ihould not be paffive in fenfation. It is true, the be- coming paffively the fubje£ls of fenfation, does not fuggeft to us the idea of a felf-determinate or felf-ac- tuating caufe ; for fuch a caufe does not exift, is an impoffibility, and therefore no idea of it can be coa- ceived ; as I have already endeavoured to ffiow.

(3.) This argument fuppofes, that we get the idea of an efficient caufe by the experience, that we our- felves are the efficient caufes of volition. But in the firft place we deny, that we ever do experience ourfelves to be the efficient caufes of volition : And in the fecond place, if we did, it would be entirely inconfiftent with Dr. Weft's propofition now under confideration ; it would prove, that volition is an ef- feft, and that we ourfelves are the efficient caufes of it.

(4.) Be it fo that " our reflexions can never afford « us an example of an efficient caufe ;" what ab- furdity follows ? We avow that our reflexions can- not afford us an example of fuch a caufe. We nei- ther efficientty caufe our own volitions nor our own perceptions. Yet we arc not deflitute of ideas of

caufe

12/

caufe and cfFe£l, as I have already fliown.- -But

certainly according to Dr. Weft our reflexions do not afford us an example of an efficient caufe of vo- lition ; for volition is, according to him, no effedl and has no caufe.

g. That if our volitions were the effeQs of an extrin- fic caufe, we could never have the idea of dependence and independence, and therefore could not conneft our ideas together, i. e. could not be rational beings. And as we are rational beings, it follows, that our volitions are not the effc6ts of an extrinfic caufe, but that we are felf-deternainate> and that we get the ideas of de- pendence and independence, by experiencing in our- felves, that in willing and choofing we aft independ- ently of any extrinfic caufe ; p. 25.

This implies, that in volition we a£t independently, and that from fuch independent adions we derive the idea of independence. But this again is a fheer beg- ging of the queflion. How does it appear, that we ad independently ? The DoBor might as well have taken it for granted, that we a6l feif-determinately* \Vc no more grant, that we acquire the idea of inde- pendence, by experiencing it in volition, than that we acquire the idea of an efficient caufe by experiencing ourfelves to be the efficient caufes of our own voli- tions. And if any man have the idea, that any crea- ture is in volition independent of all extrinfic caufes, this idea is not allowed to be according to truth. As to the divine independence, which is indeed entire and abfolute, Dr. Weft will not pretend, that we get the idea of this by experiencing the like independ- ence in ourfelves. We no more get that idea in this way, than we get the idea of the divine omnipotence, by experiencing omnipotence in ourfelves. So that though we have the ideas of dependence and inde- pendence, can conneft our ideas together and are ra- tional beings, it by no means follows, as Dr. Well in- fers, " that our volitions are not the effcds of an ex- " trinfic caufe, and that we are felf-determinate."

And

42^

And why does the DoQor continually deny voVition fo be the efFed of an extrinfic caufe ? The propofs- tioft which he has undertaken to fupport, equally im- jf)liesj that it is not the effc6l of an inirinjic caufe.

10. That volition is only the relation of the energy of a caufe in producing an effeB, and therefore is not an efFe6l, and has no proper exiftcnce of its own ; p.

ijg. -If volition be only the relation of the energy

of a caufe, it is not the energy itfelf or adion of a caufe ; and how then is it a part of the fubje6t of the prefent inquiry ? The prefent inquiry and difcuflion relate to the voluntary aBions of a rational being. As to the relations and external denominations of thofe anions, they may be and commonly are different in every aftion, yet the actions themfelves may be the fame. Befides ; the Do£lor will not pretend to de- ny, that volition is an aftion of the mind, or as he choofes to expre fs it, the mind aBing. And is the mind a6ting only the relation of the energy or a6lion of that mind ? And has the mind a6ling " no proper " exiftence of its own ?" If it have, it is an efFc6t doubtlefs, becaufe it is a creature. An aftion of the human mind is an event, and an event coming to pafs in time, and therefore has a caufe : And Dr. Weft fays, he " cannot be charged with holding, that events « take place without a caufe ;" p. 27.

11. That no agent can bring any effe6l to pafs, but what is confequent on his ailing. Therefore it is very abfurd to call the a6ling or a6livenefs of a being, an cfFe6l ; becaufe it introduces the utmoft abfurdity in- to language, by confounding and blending things to- gether, which are very different ; p. 28. It is an

undoubted truth, that no agent can bring any effeft to pafs, but what is confequent on his aQing. But how does it hence follow, that it is very abfurd to call the aftion of a being an effeft ? And how does this confound and blend things together, which are very dif- ferent ? It will not be denied, that the prophefying of a prophet may be the a6t of that prophet ; yet a6ling

by infpiraiion he is cscitcd to that aB by a divine agency. No doubt the Divine Being brings to pafs this efFefl by a previous aft or exertion of himiclf. But where is the abfurdity of calHng this prophcf\iiig an cffcQ of the divine influence ? How does the call- ing ofit fo, confound and blend the divine influence and the aB of the prophet, which arc acknowledged to be very diifcrent from each other p

12. That caufe and effeB are not fynonymous terms ; and therefore " in whatever fenfe any thing is " a caufe, in that fcnfe it is not proper to call it an " effecl ; for this realbn, that caufes confidercd as " caufes, are not effcBs." Part II, p. go. This is jufl as conclufive fcafoning as if the Dofctor had faid, the words Iree and ejfe^ are not fynonymous term?^. Therefore in whatever fenfe any thing is a f.rec, m that fenfe it is not proper to call it an ej/e^ ; for this reafbn, that trees confidered as trees are not cffe^s. Rain confidered as the caufe of the growing of grafs, is an effeB; ; a medicine confidered as the caufe of a cure, is flill an effeB ; and Dr. Welt confidered as the author of feveral effays on liberty and neccffitv, is as really a creature of God, as he is when he is confidered to be in the exercife of his favourite liber- ty or power of not aBing and is in perfed torpor. —

The DoBor proceeds, " The mind aBing is the mind '' caufing ; for I conceive, whenever the mind aUs, " it produces fome effeB." Ibid. If the DoBor mean that whenever the mind is the fubjeB of an internal aB or volition, it produces fome external efFcB ; this is manifeftly a millake, and the DoBor himfelf will not avow it. If he mean, that whenever it is the fub- jeB of volition, it produces that volition as an ejfcEl ; this in the firft place is giving up what he himfelf had vritten an efifay to prove, viz. that volition is rot an effeB ; and fecondly it is a begging of the main point. In fliort, Dr. Wefl is a mofl fturdy mctaphyfical beg- gar. But as charity demands no gratuities to fuch

beggars, he is to expe61 none, He adds to the;

1 lali

laft quotation, it '^ Vk'ilj introdace the greateft confu- ^ fion in i.mguagc, to fpeak of the mind, confidered ^^ as cauiing, as being an efFe6i." But what confufion of language is it, to ("peak of Dr. Well confidered as the author of efiays on Hberty and neccfiitv, as being a creature ? 1 hope, when the Doclor fhall write again, he will //zoa; that it confounds language, and not mere- ly qJ/cTl; it.

The Do6lor, in the page lafl quoted, fays^ " The '' queftion is, whether every afl; of the will is a new ^' effefl produced by the Deity or by fome other ^' extrinfic cauie." 1 do not allow this to be the quef- tion. /rhe Do6lor afferts in general terms, that voli- tion is not properly an effeti. The queftion is entire- ly genera!, whether volition be an effect of any caufe, extrmfic or intrinfic. When this queftion Ihall have been fettled, a lubfequent one may arifc, whether it be an effetl of extrinjic caufe.

Thus I have conlidered Dr. Weft's arguments to prove, that volition is not an effect and has no caufe. Whether they do really prove it, the reader will judge.

Dr. Price in his Correfpondence with Prieltly, p. 341, fays, " An agent that does not put himf^lf in mo- "" tion, is an agent that is always a6ed upon, and an « agent that never a6^s." Gn this I remark, that it is not true, that every agent, who does not put him- felf in motion, is always aded upon, by an extrinfic agent. The Deity did not at firft put himfelf in mo- tion, meaning by motion volition.- If he did, he

\vas before without motion or volition. And Dr. Price would not pretend, that Qod exifted from eter- nity without any volition, and that when he came down within the limits of time, he puthimfdf into volition, i. e, he created volition in his own mind. Or if by being aBed upon. Dr. Price meant, the Deity's a8ing according to the moft wife and holy reafons, which his infinite un- derftanding can fuggeft ; no doubt in this fenfe the Dei- ty himielf is atled upon j and if this be inconfiftent with agency, inftcad of but one, as Dr. Price fays,

there.

tliere is noi one agent in the iiniveiTe. God no more put himfclf in motion or volition at firft, than ha put himfelf into cxillcnce. Nor has he at any time put himfelfinto any particular volition. This would nn- ply a new thing and a change in God.

To fay, that an agent that is a6cd upon cannot a6>, is as groundlcfs, as lo fay tliat a hody a8ed upon, cannot move ; unlefs the main qucftion is beg;ed, by fuppofing, that atlion means fclf-determinate a6tion.

The advocates for felf-determinaiion are in like manner guilty of begging the queliion, by ufing aHive power to mean a felf-determining or felf-nioving pow- er ; a power which puts iifelf into excrcife, without the agency or influence of any extrinfic caufe. We deny the exigence and poilibility of fuch a power : We hold, that it is as impofTiblC) as that an animal fhould be;:,et itfelf, or take one liep before the fird ftep. If this be meant by aHive power, we deny that any being pofTeffes it ; and our opponents ought to be afliamed to be^ it.

■o

Dr. Wefl holds, that volition is no efFeft and has no caufe : He alfo holds, that volition is a modiHca- tion of the mind. Indeed it is maniff (l, that the mind ■willing, is the mind in a different mode or diiferently modified, from what it was, when not willing. Now is the event of this modification taking place in the mind, not an efPett ? And is it uncaufed ? Then not only does an event come to pafs without caufe, which Dr. Weft denies ; but it happens by mere blind, 11 -.i-

pid, undefigning chance. It might as well be f^iid,

that the event of a canon ball moving is not an effcB, as that the event of the mind willing is not an cffett.

It is pleaded, that if volition be the effect of an ex- trinfic caufe, it is wholly paffive : Dr. Weft joins vith others in this plea, p. 23. But if volition be the efFed of an intrinjic caufe, it is equally paflive. For as Dr. Weft himlelf fays very rightly, p. 23, '• Every " effeft is wholly palTivc with regard to the cauic *« which produces it."

I 2 Dr,

Dr. Weft fays, volition is " a property of a mind."""

P. 21, 22. Therefore when volition exifts in the mind, it is the fubjeft of a property of which before it was deftitute. Now is not this an efFe6l ? Does not fome efficient caufe, either the mind itfelf or fome other caufe, endue it with that property, as really as if it were endued with any other property ? Or as if a body were endued with a particular colour ?

He further holds, page 6 and 7, that " virtue and ^- vice are mere modes or attributes of a rational agent." But virtue and vice are voluntary a8s of the mindj or volitions. Therefore volitions are modes or attri- butes of a rational agent. But according to him thefe modes have no caufe and are no eflFefts, And if fome modes be not effe6lsj how fhall we know, that other- modes or any modes are efFeds ? If no modes be ef- fefts, fince we know nothing of fubPxances but by tlheir fenfible modes and qualities ; how fhall we knowj that fubftances themfelves are efFefts ?

Volitions are afts and events : Aad if fome e- Tents be uncaufed, why may not all ?

Dr. Weft contradifts and gives up his dotlrine, that volition has no caufe, in all thofe places, in which he allows, that volition is not without motive : As when he grants, " that the mind a6ls upon mo- tives" " that when the mind atls or choofes,

" it always has fome end, defign or reafon, which is

" the occafion of its a6\ing or choofing" that

" motives are the previous circumftances which are " neceffary for adion," &c. Sec. Motives then are the reafons, the occafions, the neceftary previous cir- cumftances or antecedents of volition. And what are thefe hut fecond caufcs ? Caufes in the fenfe, in which Prefideni Edwards explains himfelf to ufe the word

caufe with relation to this very fubjc^jp. 41, 42.

We fay, that fire is the caufe of the fenfation of heat ; that rain and fun-ftiine are the caufcs of vegetation, (&c. Yet they are no more than the ftaled antece- (^j^iMi. In the fame fenfe motivesj according to Dr.

Weft,.

Weft, are caufes of volitions. Befides, all fecond caufes are the efFe6ls of the firft caufe. Therefore ultimately volitions are effefts of the Great Firll Caufe*

If volition be no effeft, it is not the effe6l of the mind in which it exiils. That mind has no control over it : It comes to pafs without its wifh or confent, as fully as if it were the effctl of fome extrinfic caufe. How then is the mind any more, or in any more de- firable fenfe, free, than if volition were produced by an extrinfic caufe ? Which would a wile man choofe ? to have all volitions take place by pure accident, by blind chance and fate ? or to have them ordered by a wife and good caufe, in the application of proper motives ? And are we agents in the former of thefe cafes, more than in the latter ? On this hypothefis voli- tions are his, in whofe mind they exirt, in this fenfe only, that he is the fubje6l of them. And this is true on the fuppofition, that they are caufed by an extrinfic caufe. And how on this plan, are we more accountable for our volitions and adions, than on the fuppofition, that ihey are produced in us by an extrinfic caufe ?

If volition be no effed; and have no caufe, it pro- ceeds from no power or faculty in human nature as its caufe ; not from the power of will, nor even from any f elf -determining poiver, whether it confifl in the will or in any other part of human nature. What then is the advantage of the felf determining power fo ftrenuoufly advocated ? It cannot produce one voli- tion nor one free a6l. How then does liberty confift in it ? or depend on it f.Or how does it contribute any aid toward liberty ? And what becomes of the boafted independence and fovereignty of the will ?

That a volition is produced in me by fome extrin- fic caufe, is not at all oppofed to liberty, unlefs by liberty be intended contingence or an exemption from all caufality. If I could caufe a volition in myfelf, it ■would be as neccfiary, as if it were produced by fome other caufe. Dr. Weft rightly obfcrves, that "every " efFeft is wholly paflTive with regard to the caufe, I 3 " whick

134

t-i .

«' which produces it." As the volition then produced by myfelf is wholly paffive, it could not be mo^e paf- fjve, if it were produced by foine extrinfic caufe. " .

Dr. Weil, in p. 25, fays, " Our coafcioufnefs, that " we are fejf-active, fuggefts to us the ideas of caufe " and effcd, of dependence and independence :" i.e. Our confcioufnefs that we are* the bare fubjeQs of vo- liiions, which are no effefts at all, whether of ourfelves or of any other caufe, and therefore are not dependent on any caufe, fuggelts to us ihe ideas of caufe and ef- fetl, dependence and independence. Whether this be rational, let the reader judge.

In p. 26, Dr. Weft explains himfelf to mean by vo- lition, " the relation of energy exerted by a caufe in " producing an effeft ;" and fays, " It cannot be con- s' fidered as being an effetl of any caufe whatever, or as " having any proper exiftence of its own." In fup- port of this idea he quotes Prefident Edwards, where lie fays, that a£lion and paffion are fometimes ufed to fignify the mere relations of a61ivencfs of fomething on another, and of pafiivenefs or of being aded up- on by another thing ; and that in this cafe they do not fignify any pofitive effeft or caufe or any real ex- iftences. ' Hence Dr. W^eft infers, that according to Prefident Edwards, he cannot be charged wilh hold- ing that events take place without a caufe. On this

jt may be obferved,

1. Prefident Edwards tells us, that whenever the word a6lion is ufed to fignify a mere relation, it does not fignify •^?2 aSion or fome motion or exercife of body or mind. But Dr. Weft generally ufes volition to fignify an aBion or exercife of the mind : And yet in the paflage now under confideration, he gives an explanation of volition, in which he fays it fignifies " the relation of the energy of a caufe," and therefore not the energy itfclf, the exercife, exertion or a6l of that caufe. Prefident PLdwards did not fuppofe, that the word aclion generally and properly figuifies a mere relation ; but that it generally and properly fignifies a

pofitive

•^35

pofitive exiflence,* or an event which has as real an cxiltence, as any fact or event. As to the word vo- lition, Prefident Edwards never confidcrs that as hgni- fying a mere relation. Whereas Dr. Weil conliders this to be the proper meaning of volition.

2. As to the p.iflage, which Dr. Well quotes from Prt fident Edwards, the latter had good reafon to fay, that when the aBion is ufed to exprefs not any exer- tion, fa6t or event, but the mci'e relation of atlivity with refpett to fomething as the fubjeft ; it fignifies no efFe6l or caufe and no real exiftence. This may be illuflrated by fomc other relation ; asxfonflifp, the relation between father and fon. A father is a real exiftcnce, and every created father is an effe6l. So is a fon. Bvitfoii/Iiip is nO real exiflence ; nor is it a proper effed or caule, more than the relation between the three angles of a triangle and two right ones. No'V volition is nut fuch a meie relation : It is a real pofi- tive a6i;, motion or exercife of a mind, and Dr. W^ell abundantly grants this.

3. If volition he a mere relation of energy, it is not " an exertion of an aflive principle," " an aft of " the wilf," " an exercife of the mind," &c. as Dr. Weft afferts it to be. Bcfides, if it be a mere " lela- " tion of the energy exerted by a caufe" or mind, what is the energy, acl, exercife or exertion of which volition is the relation ? Surely an aQ or exertion, and the relation of that aft ; a thing and the relations of that thing, are not one and the fame. The fame thing may have different and oppofite relations. The fame man may fuftain the oppofite relations of a father and a fon. And if fuch a man be the lame thing with his relations, he is the fame thing widi his fonfliip, and the fame thing with his fatherhood. Thus, as two tilings which a^ree with a common meafure, agree be- tween themfclves, it will follow, that fonfhip and fa- therhood are the fame thing.

I4 4-By

• It will be rcmcmbcTcd, that loj'icians and ftictaphyHcians tiivide beings in- to fubdancc and mode, and contdcr modes as having as real aud peli i»e as xxillcncc, as fubllancc.

4. By volition Dr. Weft means either an a£l of the ir.ind, or not. If he do mean an adl of the mind, vo- lition with him is not a mere relation, but a proper pofitive event or fa6l ; and therefore muft; be an ef- fefcl and have a caufe ; or an event takes place with- out a caufe. If he do not by volition mean an aft of the mind, it is furely not a/ree aft; and if we do not atl freely in volition, we do not aft freely at all, i. e. ■we are not free agents. It is generally granted, and to be fure Dr. Weit's whole book implies, tliat all the moral liberty which we have is exercifed in volition. But if volition be a mere relation, and not an aft and a free aft ; we have no liberty ; and by holding, that volition is a mere relation and not an aft. Dr. Weft gives up all that liberty for which he difputes.

The Doftor,in his fecond part, p. 1 2, grants that "afts *' of the will, volition, choice and determination of the *•' mind vcxdiy W\i\\ propriety be called efFefts, when they *' fignify thofe determinations or conclufions, which '• the mind makes in confequence of its comparing <' two or more things together." Therefore fome afts of the will are efFetls. How is this confident with what the Doftor holds both in his former book and in this, that volition cannot be properly called an efFeft ? Befides ; what the Doftor here fays, is applicable to all volitions, and therefore all volitions are according to his own account, efFefts. For all volitions are " de- *' terminations or conclufions, which the mind makes '^ in confequence of its comparing two or more things *' together." If two or more things be exprefsly pro- pofed, and one of them be chofen, it is the very cafe here ftated by Dr. Weft. Or if one thing only be exprefsly and pofitively propofed as the objeft of our choice, ftill there is a real competition between this thing and the abfence or negleft of it ; and the mind comes to a determination in confequence of its com- paring thefe two together. Therefore according to Dr. Weft's own account every volition " may with '' propriety be called an efFeft f and yet according to

the

^37

tne fame Dr. Weft, " volition cannot be properly call- ed an effeft." " How can thcCe things be ?"

Bat Dr. Well: endeavours to evade this confequcnce, hv faying, " I have uled the term volition to fignify *' the mind conjidcred as atling. In this lenfc and in ** this only, 1 lay volition is not an eJfeB." iiut the mind confidered as ading, atls in confequence of comparing two or more things together, and fach an a6l Dr. Weft allows to be an effeCl. Alfo he grants, " that the human mind and all its powers and facul- " ties are efFeds ;" p. 13. But will he fay, that the human mind with all its powers and faculties dormant and inatiive, is an effeB, but the fame mind with its powers and faculties aHing^ is not an effeft ? And docs it ceafe to be an effe6i or a creature, as foon as it begins to aft ^

" If volition he only the mind afting ; and if the ** mind ading is properly a caufc, then it is not prop- *• er to call it an efFetl." Ibid, p. 13. But what or where is the impropriety of calling it an cffe6l ? In fuch a difpute as this, to aflert fuch a novel propofi- tion without proof or illuftration, is unreafonable. 'E>y the fame reafoning it may be proved, that any man who makes any thing is himfclf not an eft'etl or crea- ture. Thus, If a carpenter at work be properly a caufe of a ftiip, then it is not proper to call him an ef- fe6l or creature ; and if Dr. Weft writing be proper- ly the caufe of feveral eflays on liberty and ncceflity ; then it is not proper to call him a creature.

" When volition is ufed to fignify the mind a6:- " ing, in that view it is properly a caufe and not an " efFe61;;"ibid, p. 28. What if it be properly a caufe ? This docs not prevent its being properly an cft'eft too, any more than the Doftor's being properly the caufe of feveral elTays prevents his being, or proves that he

is not, properly a creature of God. " Caufes as

" caufes, are not effefts ;" ibid, p. 13. Then authors ai; authorsj are not the creatures of God,

"The

i3g

The Dr. argues, ibid, p. 94, That an aQion can- not be the eflPe6l of the Deity, becaufe " an effect is

'• mofl: certainly paflive in coming into being ■

'' but this will imply pojjive adwn or inactive aBion^ «« wliich is abfurd." I grant, that an cffe6"l is in this fenfe paffive, that it is produced by the agency of tlie effi- cient caufe ; and in that fenfe a volition caufed by the Deity or other efficient caufe is pafnve. If Dr. Weft mean by paffive a£lion, an a6lion which in its production is caufed by an exlrinfic caufe, I grant it; and however Dr. Weft pronounces it abfurd, he iinows, that it is as eafy for another to pronounce it not abfurd ; and the one pronunciation is juft as good proof as the odier. VoJiiion is aclion, and if the Do61or will prove to the conviction of candid inquir- ers, that fuch an aftion cannot be the cffeQ of a di- vine agency or other extrinfic caufe ; he will 'do fomething more than affirm the contrary to be ab- furd. As to the expreffion inaBive aclion, if by this he mean, that the aftion is the effis^l of an extrinfic caufe, 1 grant it, and demand proof that the idea of fuch an atlion is abfurd. If he mean an attion, which is not voluntary ; I know of no perfon who .pleads for fuch an action.

What the Do6lor fays here, as well as almoft his whole book, may be eafily retorted. Suppofe voli- tion is not from an extrinfic caufe, but from the fub- je6l: as the caufe ; ftill it is as really and fuHy paffive with r6fpe£t to its caufe and in coming into exiftence, as if it were the eifettof an extrinfic caulc. It would as much be the fubjeB: of the operation of this intrinfic caufe, in order to its exiftence. Therefore in this cafe too we have pajjive aclion and inaHive aclion.

The Do£lor in p. 23, Part I, fays, " IIow can he" [man] " be an agent, if volition be the effecl of «' an extrinfic caufe ?" To which 1 anfwer by aflung another queftion or two ; How can he in volition be

an

^3^

an a^ent, if it be the efFeft of an intrinfic caufe ? The volition IS ftill as padive in this calc and equally pro- duced by the efficiency of its cau'c, as it is when pro- duced by an cxtrinfic caufe. And how can man be an agent, if as the Do6lor holds, volition be the etfedl of no caufe, extrinhc or intrinfic ? In that cafe, it is merely cafual or accidental, like the motion of one of Epicurus'^j atoms in the infinite void.

CHAPTER

14^

CHAPTER VI.

':Qj Foreknowledge and the Certainty or Necejfity impli- ed in it,

DR. Weft begins his third effay thus ; « We fhall «• endeavour to fhow, in this eflayj that infalli- " ble foreknowledge in the Deity does not prove, that «« events take place in confequence of an antecedent *' or previous neceffity ;" p. 29. Let foreknowledge prove or not prove what it will, unlefs events take place abfolutely without a caufe, they do take place in confequence of an antecedent or previous neceffi- ty. Unlefs they take place abfolutely without a caufe, they are efFe6ts ; and every efFeft necellarily follows its caufe. Dr. Weft grants, p. 23, "that every ef- ^' fe6l is wholly paffive with regard to the caufe which *^* produces it." And as it is paffive, it is brought into -exiftence by the caufing or neceffitating influence of its caufe. Its exiftence therefore " takes place in ^' confequence of an antecedent or previous neceffity ;" and this is true of all events, which happen without caufe. But Dr. Weft denies, that any events take place without a caufe. Therefore he muft concede, that all events " take place in confequence of an " antecedent neceffity."

If to this it ffiould be faid, that though all &.vents are efFefts, and are neceffitated by their refpeBive caufes, and in that refpcft take place in confequence of an antecedent neceffity : Yet as volitions are the effefts of the mind, in which they exift, this caufe does not j)rGduceA\\tm or exert its producing acl, in confequence of an antecedent neceffity ; I anfwer, The n^ind, if it do efficiently caufe volitions, caufes them either in confequence of an antecedent certainty, or without that certainty. If it caufe them in confequence of antecedent certainty, it caufss them under the influ-

eace

^4^

ence of moral neceflity ; for antecedent certainty of moral a61ions is all we mean by moral neceflity. If it caiife them without that certainty, it caufes them contingently and by mere chance or blind fate.

Befides, if the mind caufe its own volitions, it ne- ceflStates them into cxiftence, and therefore they come into exiftence under the influence of antecedent ne- ccffity ; and the caufing a6l is an event and there- fore mu(t have a caufe, and this caufe muft nc- cclfitate this event into exiOcnce ; and fo it runs into- an infinite feries of afts caufing one another, every one of which comes into exiftence in confequence of an antecedent neceffity.

That the infallible divine foreknowledge of any event does imply all that antecedent neceflity of the future exiftence of that event, for which we contend, may appear thus : The infallible or certain fore- knowledge of any event is a knowledge of the certainty or certain truth, that the event will come into exiftence ; and that certainty which is the objeQ of this knowledge, is all the neceffity, for which we contend. This is what Prefidcnt Edwards calls philofophical neceffity, which with regard to moral atlions is moral necefTity ; and it muft exirt at the time the knowledge of it exifts, and in- deed in order to be the objcfl: of knowledge : And as the knowledge is by the fuppofitiony<3rf^7zott/<r</^f, there- fore it muil exift before the event foreknown, and lliereforc the certainly or neceffity of that event mufl exift before the event iilelf y of courfe it is antecedent neceffity. To fuppofe otherwife is to fuppofe, that a certainty or certain truth may be feen and known be- fore it exifts, and that what is not, may be feen and known to be.

Dr. Weft argues, p. 32, that becaufe " the Deity is " poftcfTcd of an underived felfexifting knowledge, " which is independent of any caufe or medium what- " ever, and his knowledge can extend to all futuri- ^ ties, independent of the imperfcft mode of inferring " conclufions from their prcmifcs ; confcquently in-

'* fallible

143

" fallible prefcience in the Deny cannot imply any " antecedent necefnty of the event foreknown." By antecedent neceffity w:^ mean antecedent certainty or antecedent certain truLh, Now does Dr. Weft mean, that fince the Deity pofTefres an underived and feif- exiftent knowledge^ therefore he fees and knows, that there is a certainty of the iiiture exiftence of an event, when there really is no fuch certainty ? Or that God knows that to exift, which does not exift ? He does mean this, if he mean any thing to the purpofe. For if he mean, that God fees a certainty which exifts, it does exift in order to be feen ; and therefore antece- dent certainty or moral neceffity is implied in the di- vine prefcience. But let the knowledge of God be ever fo underived, felf-exiftent and independent, it "will not enable him to difcern that which is not, to fee truth or certainty, before it exifts, or to fee truth to

be fallehood and falfehood to be truth. If by inde-

pcndnit knowledge he mean a knowledge which is not dependent on the truth and has not truth for its foun- dation and object ; he muft ftill mean, that God can know a propofuion to be true which is not true.

It is manifeftly implied in what Dr. Weft fays on this fubJT?6l, that if divine foreknowledge were deriv- ed through any medium, or if it be founded on decrees, it would be utterly inconhftent wii.h human liberty. But fince it is, as he fuppofes, immediate and not de- pendent on decrees, it is perfcGly confident with hu- man liberty. That there will be a general rejeftion

of antichrift and antichriftian errours, we know by the medium of divine prediRion : And does the Do6lor believe that this our knowledge is more inconfiftent with the liberty of thofe, wlio fliall rejetl antichrift, than the abfolute and underived knowledge of God ? Or than our own knowledge of the fame faft, if it "were intuitive and underived ?

The Do61;or adds, " If this definition of the divine knowledge," viz. that it is underiv.,d, felfexiftent and independent^ " be juft j then it will follow that there

>* is

'•' is no previous or antecedent certainty in the things «• ihemfelves, upon which divine prefcicnceis founded.'* This inanifelUy implies, that God foreknows things before they are future, and fees a certainty before it is. " Bv certainty," lays the Do6lor, " in the things " themfelves, previous to the divine knowledge, mujl *' be meant fomc medium diltinCl fromlhe things them- " felves, by which they render themfelves evident ** to the divine knowledge." He here afferts, but brini^s nothing to prove what he afferts. And what fignify luch bare affertions ? Does the DoQor expeft bis readers will receive them as proofs ? May they not juftly demand evidence, that this medium which he here mentions, mull be meant by certainty in things themfelves ? By that certainty I mean no fuch thing; But pofitively I do mean what Prefident Edwards de- clares that he meant, " The firm and infallible con- '• nctlion between the fubject and predicate of the '' propofition," which affirms thetn to be conncQed ; or the real truth of the propofition. For inftance it is a real truth, that I am now writing, and the certain- ty or reality of this truth or fact, is the ground of the divine knovvledoe of it ; and this certainty confifls in th(#firm and indiffoluble connc6lion of the fubjeft and predicate of the propofition which affirms, that I am writing. This certainty or truth of the thing is no " medium didintt from the thing" or fa£l " itfelf, by " which it renders itfelf evident to the divine knowl- " edge ;" but it is the real exiltence of the very thing or

fad. Again, it is to all Chriftians a real and cer-

tnin futurity and truth, that Jefus Chrift will judge in righteoufnefs. But the truth and certainty of this fu- Une event is not a medium dillinft from the futu- rity of the ev^nt iifelf, by which it renders itfelf ev- i'lciu to the divine mind ; but it is the real and infal- lib'e futurity of the event itfelf and confifls in the firm and iiifallihle connexion between the fubje^l and predicate of the propofition which affirms the futurity «>f the cvcnl. Now will Dr. Well pr-etendj that there

is

<44

is no truth or no firm and infallible conneQiorr be*- Iween the fubjeft and predicate of the propofition, that I a?}i now writing, which is the foundation of the divine knowledge of that event ? If this were fo, real truth and fa6l would not be the foundation, rule or objeft of the divine knowledge ; but God might in- differently know truth to be falfehood and falfehood iruth.

Or if by " the medium by which things render *' therafelves evident," the Dodor mean the truth and reality of things ; 1 grant that what ever is known whether to God or creatures, is known by this medium ; and this is true of the mod felf-evident propofiiions and of the moft independent and underived knowl- edge. But to call this a medium of knowledge is a perverfion of language. Surely truth is not the me- dium by which itfelf is known.

Dr. Weft himfelf notwithftanding his abundant la- bour " to fhow, that infallible foreknowledge in the « Deity does not prove, that events take place in con- *' fequence of an antecedent neceffity 3" I'ully and fre- quently grants all that we maintain. Thus, p. 37. « That the Deity does perfectly difcern all connec-

" tions between fubjefls and predicates • is

" readily granted." Now this implies, that the faid fubjeds and predicates are really and in themfelves con- nected, and in order of nature before that connexion is difcerned. This real and certain connexion is the certainty or certain truth of things themfelves, of ■which we have been fpeaking ; and which with regard to moral events and aftions is moral neceflity. P. 41. " The future volitions of moral agents are fo infalli- «' bly and indiffolubly connefted with the divine fore- «'• knowledge, which has had exiftence from all eterni- « ty, that it is impoffible, that the Deity fliould be de- " ceived ; and therefore all thefe volitions will moft '« certainly take place." P. 46. " There may be a

c« certainty that fuch a thing will take place,"

fpeaking of an human atlion. But certainty with re- gard

_U5_ gard to moral aflions is moral neceflity? and if all vo- litions foreknown by God will certainly lake place,

they will take place by moral neccflTity. P. 52.

" All things from eternity to eternity being prefent to *' the divine mind, he fees all things as they are" Therefore if he fee fomc events as certainly future, they are certainly future i for he fees them as they- are. And this certain futurity is the objetl of the divine knowledL;e, and in the order of haiiire is an- tecedent to it, as really as the exiftcnce of this paper, on which I am writing, is in the order of nature antecedent to my fight of it. But this antcce(ienr certain futurity of any moral aftion, is antecedent ihoral necefTny. Therefore as all moral attions are foreknown by Go^ in confequence of an antecedent moral neceffity, much more do they come into exji- ence in confequence of fucli an antecedent necefli-

ty. P. 53. " Deity would from all eternity have

" infallibly foreknown this propofition, as a. certain " truth," viz. the propofition concernmg Peter and! Judas denying and betraying their Lord. It feems then that whatever propofition concerning a future event is infallibly foreknown by God, is foreknown ds a certain and infallible truth ; or which is the fame thing, it is known, as an infallible truth, that the event will come to pafs ; and therefore it is a certain and infallible truth antecedently in the order of nature to the knowledge of it ; and therefor^ the event being a moral aft, was morally necelTary antecedently to the foreknowledge, and much more antecedently to the

event itfelf. P. 52. " This neceffity being only^

" a confequence founded upon the cercainty of ihc « thing foreknown." Thus notwithftanding all Dr. Weft's clamour againft Prefident Edwar is, becaufe he had fpoken of a certainty in things theinfclves, h(i himfelf here exprefsly holds the very fame. And will Dr. Weft deny, that this "certainty of the tiling foreknown" is the ground of the divine foreknowl- edge of that thing, in the fame fertfe, that my prefent K cxiftence

14G

exiftence is tlie ground of the divine knowledge, that 1 exifl: ? If this be not denied, it cannot be denied, that certainty or moral necefTity is in order of nature antecedent to the foreknowledge, and much more an. tecedent to the exiftence, of a moral a£lion.

Dr. Weft will not deny, that any future event foreknown by God, will certainly come to pafs. Then there is a certainty, or it is an infallible truth, that every fuch event will come to pafs, and this cer- tainty now exifts antecedendy to the exiftence of the event. But this certainty with regard to moral events, is moral neceflity. Therefore there is a neceffity of the exiftence of all events divinely foreknown, and this neceffity is antecedent to the exigence of the eyp-nts. Thus, mere foreknowledge is an infallible proof of antecedent neceffity.

. " We frequently fay, It is a pity fuch a perfon did. «*. fo ; there was no occafion for it ; he might eafily « have omitted the doing of the thing in the time cf " it, if he would. Why may we not as well fay, A « man will certainly do a particular thing, though he ^^ will have power to forbear doing it ? There could •« not be the leaft appearance of abfurdity or contra- '^ diftion in fpeaking in this manner about a future «' adion, any niore than about a paft a6tion, were it " not for the great difficulty or fuppofed impoffibility *' of conceiving how a thing can be foreknown, un- *' lefs it be conne6led with fomething that now ex- « ifts ; that is, a thing cannot be foreknown, unl efs *' there is a medium, which has a prefent exiftence." P. 30. -On this pafTage I remark,

1. Here again Elr. Weil holds that certainty im things, which he fo abundandy reprobates in Prefi- dent Edwards. He fays, " a man will certainly do a particular thing ;" and he doubtlefs means, that it is a certain futurity, the event itfelf is certain, or it is a certain and infallible truth, that the man will do the thing ; and not merely that this truth is known, whether by God or creature. Truth is truth wbeih-

«51f

'H7

' £r known or not : And tliis infallible truth is the very certainty in the things themfelves, of which Pref- idcnt Edwards fpeaks.

2. What does Dr. Weft mean, when he fays, " He might eafily have omitted the doing of the thing, " if he would F" Suppofe the thing done was an in-^ Urnal aft, a volition to go to a debauch ; In what fcnfe does Dr. Weft mean, that the man could have avoided this volition, if he -would ? Does he mean, that if he had not had the volition, he would not have had it ? This is an undoubted truth, but does not difprove the neceffity of it. If God had not always fpoken the truth, he would not have fpoken the trutlv. But it does not hence follow, that God does not al- ways necefiarily fpeak the truth, when he fpeaks at all, or that he can lie. If there had been no God, there would indeed have been no God ; but does it hence follow, that the divine exiftence is not necef- fary ? — ^ — To fay, that if a man had chofen not to go to a debauch, he would indeed have chofen not to go to it, is too great trifling to be imputed to Dr. Weft. Yet to fay, that the man could have avoided the external aBion of going to the debauch, if he would, would be equal trifling ; for the queftion be- fore us is concerning the liberty of the will or mind and

not of the body. On the whole, we have before us

one of Dr. Weft's things hard to be under foody and wc xnuft wait for an explanation.

3. When we fay concerning any paft aftion of a man, " There was no occafion for it ; he might eafi- " ly have omitted the doing of the thing in the time " of it, if he would ;" if we mean, that there was no antecedent certainty, that he would perform that ac- tion, we mean a falfehood. That adion was as much from eternity the objeft of the divine omnifcience, as any aBion which is now future ; therefore the cer- tainty of its then future exiftence preceded its a£lual exiftence. And this certainty w<is as fixed, unalterable **nd indefeafible, as the divine foreknowledge or the

•o'

K 2 divine

•14^

divine decree. The foreknowledge and decree ok God imply no other kind or de,ree of neceffity, than the aforefaid abfoluie certainty. A iuturity that is abfolutely certain is impli d in the divine foreknowl- edge ; and the addition of a decree cannot increafe that certainty,

4. When we fay, A perfon might eafily have omit- ted a certain paft atlion, in the time of it, if he would ; we commonly mean, that he was under no compul- fion or coaclion, or no natural necelfity j and that he had a natural -power to omit the atUon. This un- doubtedly every man has wih regard to every volun- tary aQion, and this howevc-r tiat aBion be foreknown or decreed by God. Though Ju ;as 'betrayed his Matter, " according to the determinate counfel and « foreknowledge of God ;" yet he was under no nat- ural neceffity to betray him, but had a full natural power to do otherwife. Now Dr. Weft reconciles foreknowledge with liberty, on the ground that we have ftiU a phyfual or natural power to do otherwife. On the fame ground we may reconcile abfolute de- crees with liberty.

5. In the fame fenfe "we may as well fay, Such a " man will certainly do a particular thing, though he " will have power to forbear the doing of it." He may doubdefs have a natural power to forbear j ftill this does not at all diminifh the certain J iiturity of the aftion ; and that whether the atiion be foreknown only, or foreknown and decreed. An i a nawjral pow- er is all the power, which the man will have to for- bear the a8ion. Any power oppofed to moral neceffity or the certain futurity of the adion, would imply that it is uncertain, whether he will perform that attion ; which is contrary to the fuppofition made by Dr. Weft, " that the man will certainly do the thing."

6. As to " the great difficulty or fuppofcjd impoffi- " biIityofconcciving,^a;athingcan be forcknown,un-' «lefs it be connefted with fomething that now exifts;" this is needlefsly brought in here. In this part of the

argumenc "

M9

argument we are under no ncccflity of inquiring or fhowing how God foreknows future events, but may, fo far as relates to the certain futurity of all events foreknown by God and the antecedency of that cer- tainty to the exiftence of the events, allow, that God fore knows future events in the independent and un- derived manner, which Dr. Weft maintains. This would equally imply a certainty antecedent to the ex- iftence of the events foreknown, as a foreknowledge found d on a decree would imply it. Dr. Weft's ac- count of the divine foreknowledge implies, as I have fhown, all that certainty or necelhty, for which we plead. Befide what has been already fa:d to fhow this, I add, that Dr. Weft grants, that foreknowledge has no caufal influence to bring thintjs into exiftence, or to make their exiftence more certain, than it would be without foreknowledge. " I fuppofe it will be " readily granted on all fides, that even the divine " foreknowledge itfclf has no influence or caufal force, " with regard to the thing foreknown, either to bring ^' it into exiflence or to h nder its happening ; but *« that all things would take place juft in the fame " manner, if they were not forLknown, as they do " now j" p. 45. Dr. Weft alfo grants, that all future events are foreknown by God, and that all things which are foreknoym by him, will certainly and infal- libly come to pafs. Now as this certainty is not cauf- ed by foreknowledge, it muft exift independently of it. And as God fees all things as they are ; therefore when he fees them to be certainly future, \\\Qy are certainly future; and this certain futurity, which is the obje6l of the divine knowledge, exifled in the order of nature antecedently to the divine knowledge, and much more antecedently to the atlual exiftence of the events themfelves. Othcrwife God would fee events to be certainly future, while they arc not cer- tainly future.

" The obvious reafon," fays Dr. Weft, p. 3I9 " why we cannot know things but only bv intuition

«•' "or proof, is bccaufe all our knowledge is entirely aS. ^^ extra." And does the Doftor believe, that if part, of our knowledge were not ab extra, we fhouid know fome things neither by intuition nor by proof ? What- ever is known by intuition is felf-evident ; and what- ever is known by proof, is evident by the medium of fomething elfe. And whatever is known at all, is ei- ther evident by itfelf immediately, or is evident by fomething elfe mediately. Therefore Dr. Weft, in fuppofmg, that if our knowledge were not all ah extra^ "we fhouid know fome things neither by intuition nor by proof, fuppofes that fome things would be evident . 16 us, neither immediately nor mediately, neither by themfelves nor by any thing elfe : And what kind of : a fource of knowledge W£ ftiould then have, I leave the Doftor to explain.

" If previous certainty in things themfelves means "nothing diftinS; from the things themfelves, then all "that can be meant by this previous certainty in things "themfelves, upon which the divine knowledge is "^founded, is only this, that the Deity cannot know « that things will exift, which he knows never will ex- « ift. Arid therefore to fay, that there is a previous « certainty in things themfelves, upon which the di- « vine knowledge is founded, is only faying in other « words, that the divine knowledge is founded on the " divine knowledge ;" p. 34. By certainty in things themfelves I have already explained myfelf to mean the truth and reality of things themfelves, or the truth of the proportion whicli aflerts their exiftence or re- lation : And previous certainty of things themfelves means nothing difFerent from the truth of the propofi- tion, which afferts their future exiftence, or its being a. real truth, that thofe things will exift. Now, wheth- er to fay, that the divine foreknowledge of an event,> is founded on the truth, that the event will come into exiftence, be the fame as to fay, " that the divine fore- 6' knowledge is founded on the divine foreknowledge," liam willing any candid pcrfon lliould judge.

The--

The Do£lor fays, p. 34, " That knowledge in the *« Deity mull mean the fame thing with certainty." No douht knowledge in the Deity is the fame thing with fuhjeclive certainty or certain Unowiedge ; but it is not the fame with objcHive certainty, or the truth which is the object of the divine knowledge.

The DoBor grants, p. 41, " That the future vo- *' litions of moral agents are fo infallibly and indilfo- «' lubly connefted with the divine foreknowledge^ " which has had exiftence from all eternity, that it is " impofTible, that the Deity fliould be deceived ; and «' therefore thefe volitions will moft certainly take " place. For by necejfary here he" [Prefident Ed- wards] " can ■— mean nothing di(tin6l from in-

''^ fallible certainty. But how does their being necefla- *-^ ry in this fenfe, i. e. infallibly certain, prove that the ** volitions of moral agents are efFe6ls produced by ati

'• extrinfic caufe." Undoubtedly by necefTity in

this cafe Prefident Edwards means nothing diftin6t from infallible certainty. This is the very thing whicli he abundantly declares himfelf to mean. " And as '■^ the divine foreknowledge," by Dr. Weft's concef- fion, " has had exiftence from eternity ;" and as " the " volitions of moral agents are indifiTolubly connefled " with that foreknowledge," and " thofe volitions will '• moft certainly take place ;" of courfe there was art infallible eternal certainty, that all human volitions ■would come into exiftence juft as they do exift, and Dr. Weft grants all that we hold'on this head. What then becomes of liberty to either fide, to act or not aEl ? For inftance, it is now divinely foreknown, that Gog and Magng will rife and compafs the camp of the fainls. Therefore when Gog and Magog fliall come into exiftence, they will no rriorc have a liberty to act or not act, as to this inftance of their condu6l, than they would have, on the fuppofition that the fame

conduft were decreed. It is true, there would be

this difference in the cafes, that the decree would

cavfc the certain futurity of that condutl, but the-

K c^ foreknowledge

1^1^

foreknowledge would not caufe it : Nor is it oF any importance as to liberty, by uhom or by what this certain futurity is caufcd, or whether it be without caufe. If a prifon when bui||, be no obftru£lion to liberty, then the agency of the mafon and carpenter who built it was nothing oppofed to liberty. So if cer ain/uturdy, when ellabHfhed, be not inconfiftent with li'">erty ; then the divine decree, by which ii is eftabliflied, is not inconfiftent with liberty.

If it (hould be faid, that God forefees, that Go^and Magog will influence tbemfelves to the condudt juft now mentioned ; be it fo ; then it is now infallibly cer- tain, that Gng and Magog will influence tbemfelves to tha' condu6t. Where then is their liberty to a6t or not a6l ? It is not left loofe and undetermined, whether they fhall influence tbemfelves to that condud ; but ;t is previoiifly certain, that they will infliience tbem- felves to it.

The Do6lor in the laft quotation, aflcs, "How " does their being infallibly certain, prove that the " volitions of moral agents are eflPeds produced by

' " an extrinfic caufe .?" — Suppofe they are not ef-

JfeBs of an ex.rinfic caufe, but are effeded by the fubjedof thofe 'volitions, if that were poflible;yet if it be prcvioufly and from all eternity certain, that the fub- jeB will produce thefe volitions in himftlf ; ftiU there is no liberty o either fide, to aU or not aB ; but he is lim- ited to produce in himfelf thofe very definite voli- tions, which are diyinely forefeen, and therefore he is confined to one Jide, is con^ned to aH and that definitely*

Or fuppofe thefe volitions are produced by np caufe whatever, then God forefees that they are a- bout to happen abfolutely without caufe and by mere chance ; flill there is in this cafe no liberty to either fide, but the volitions are wilhaut caufe confined to one fi;!e only.

It is abundantly pleaded by Dr. Weft and others, that the circumftance that the divine foreknowledge is not the efficient caufe of human volitions; renders^

ilut

ihat foreknowledge entirely confident ^vith their idea of liberty, even as the divine knowledge of a voiidoiji in prcfent exidcncc is confiftcnt with the liberty of

that voliiion. If by liberty in this cafe they mean

felf determin.tion or the cauiaiion of volition by the fubjeft himfelf j 1 grant, that the moft abfolutc forelsnowiedge is perfedly confident with this ide?i of liberty : And lb is an abfolute decree as confid- ent with it. If God were abfolutely to decree, that a particular man fhall caufe in himfelf a particu- lar volition, the man would accordingly caufe that volition in himfelf, and therefore according to the

definition of liberty now given, he would be free.

But if by liberty in this cafe be meant, what the writ- ers to whom I am oppofed, call a liberty to either Jul . and a power to aH or not aB, as oppofed to moral nc- ceffity ; the divine foreknowledge of a volition is utr terly inconfiftent with the liberty of that volition- For according to this definition, liberty implies, that the volition is not fixed or determined, and therefore it is uncertain what it will be, or whether it will bz at all. But divine foreknowledge implies, that it is abfolutely certain, that a volition foreknown will be, and what it will be, as Dr. Weil grants.

The circumftance, that foreknowledge does not ef- ficiently caufe an event to be certainly future, is noth- ing to the prefent purpofe. We are not now inquir- ing what caufes an eyent to be certainly future, but "whether it be certainly future. -If it be certainly fu- ture it is neceflary, in the fenfe in which we ufe the word nccejjity, let what will be the caufe of that futuri- ty, or if the futurity be uncaufed. Divine prophecy is not the caufe of the futurity of the event foretold, yet no man will fay, that it does not prove the cer- tain futurity of that event. But prophecy no more implies or proves the certain futurity of the event foretold, than the divine foreknowledge implies and proves the certain futurity of the eventforeknown.— Jo fay, that a divine decree is inconfiftent wiui iibcr-

I

ty, becaufe it makes tfie a6lion certainly future, wfieil the certain futurity iifelf is allowed to be confiftenC with liberty, is very ftrange ! What if it does make it certainly future ? That certain futurity, when made, is not inconfirtent with liberty. So long as this is granted, to hold that the divine decree as making or producing that certain futurity is inconfiltent with liberty, is as abfurd as to grant that a free circulatiort of the fluids in the animal conftitution is confident with health ; and yet to hold, that exercife as produc- ing and merely becaufe it produces that free circula- tion, is inconfiRent with health.

I grant, that divine foreknowledge is as confiftent* with liberty, as the divine knowledge of a prefent volition is. If by liberty be meant the caufation of volition by the fubjedl, God may undoubtedly as well forefee this, as lee it prefent. But if by liberty be meant a liberty to either fide, a liberty to atl or not a6t, as oppofed to moral neceflity ; fince this im- plies, with regard to an aft now in exiftence, uncer- tainty whether the a6l does exifl:, and with regard to a future aft, uncertainty in the nature of things and in the divine mind, whether it will exift ; I fay, no fuch uncertainty is or can be with regard either to an aft feen by God to be now in exiftence, or an aft divinely forefeen. As therefore the divine knowledge of the prefent exiftence of an aft, is utterly inconfilt- ent with this kind of liberty in that aft ; we need not and we do not pretend, that the divine foreknowledge of an a6t is more inconfiftent with the fame kind of liberty in the aft foreknown. There is this differ- ence however in the cafes ; knowledge of a prefent aft does not imply, that the aft was certain previ- cnjly to its exiftence. But the foreknowledge of an aft does imply this. This difference ought carefully to be noticed, or we fliall run into great errour. \^^ when it is laid, that foreknowledge no more proves a neceflity of the aft foreknown, than the knowledge ®f an aft at prefent exifting, proves the neceflity of

thi* ,

this aQ, the meaning be, that foreknowledge no more proves, that the future aft foreknown is certainly fu- ture previoii/ly to the exiftence of it, than the knowL edge of a prefent a6t proves, that this a6t was certain- ly future prcvioufly to its exiftence ; the truth of this propolition is by no means allowed. Foreknowledge by the very term refpefts a future event ; of courfe the foreknowledge exifts before the event. Andasic is granted on all hands, that foreknowledge implies a. certainty of the event foreknown ; it follows, that there is. a certainty of thefutureexiflence of every eventfbre- known, and this certainty is previous to the exiftence of the event. But the knowledge of a prefent event may not exift before the event itfelf ; if it does, it m then foreknowledge. And as it does not, fo far as it. is the bare knowledge of a prefent event, exift before the event ; it does not imply a previous certainty 3.. that the event would come into exiftence.

My feeing a man perform an a£lion does not proves that it was certain beforehand, that he could perform it. But if a prophet under infpiration fee, that a man- will tomorrow perform a certain aftion, this does prove, that it is beforehand certain, that he will per- form it. And furcly the forefight of a prophet no

more proves this, than the foreknowledge of God.

Suppofc the a6t foreknown by God, is about to be felf originated, ftill it is as neceffary or certain before- hand, as iF it were not to be felf-originated ; becaufe tl^ foreknowledge is from eternity and therefore pre- cedes the exiftence of the a6f out of the divine mind. For though all things are always prefent in the divins mind ; yet all things are not always in prefent exiftence outofthe divine mind,^x\y more than all creatures exifted from eternity. Be it fo, that in the divine foreknowl- edge all things are prefent ; then all human volitions are from eternity as hxed and certain, as if they exifted from eternity not only in the divine mind, but out of the divine mind, and are as incapable of not exifting, «Ls the divine mind is incauable of dclufion or crrour.

" Bare

ji5^

" Bare certainty^ that an agent will do fuch a thing, « does not imply in it, that he had not in himfelf ^a " potx:.cr to refrain from doing it ;" p. 45. This de- pends on the meaning of the word power to refrain, jif this mean natural power, as it has been explained, it is granted, that ever fo great certainty and even a divine abfolute decree, that an agent fhall do fuch a thing, does not imply in it, that he has not in himfelf a power to refrain from doing it. But if by power to refrain be meant moral power, or a power oppofite to m«ral neceffity, which is the bare certainty of a moral adion, it is abfurd and fclf-contradiclory to fay, that the bare certainty that an agent will do fuch .a thing, does not imply in it, that he has not a power to refrain from doing it. It is the very fame abfurd- ity and contradidion, as to fay, that a bare Certainty, that an agent will do fuch a particular thing, does not imply in it a certainty, that he will do it.

In the fame page the Doctor tells us, " The only " queftion is, whether fuppofmg it to be foreknown, «« that an a.gent will conduft in fuch a manner, at c' fuch a time, it will be any contradiftion to affirm, " that the faid agent will have a power, at the fame « time, to afcVin a different manner." If it be fore- known, that an agent will a6l in a particular manner, at a particular time ; it will be granted, that there is a certainty, that he will a6l in that particular. But certainty of moral atlion is moral necejfily^ and moral inability of the contrary. And to affert, that an agent is under a moral inability to aft in a different man- ner, and yet has a moral power to a6l in a different manner, is a direft contradiction.

The Doftor fays, p. 29, " That infallible fore- <^« knowledge in the Deity docs not prove, that events ^^ take place in confequence of an antecedent or pre- " vious neceffity ; that it only proves a logical necef- ^^ fity or a neceffity of conftquence ; i. ^. it being cer- ^« tain, that a thing will take place, it follows, that to ^'^ affert that it will not take place, muft be falfe and

" cannot

<* cannot be trlic." As the DoQor makes much

of this, which he calls a logical necefliiy, or a nectili* ty of confequence, let us examine it.

The foreknowledge of God is here faid to prove a logical ncceffity only, or a nectffity of confequence ; which is laid to be this, that " it being certain, that a <^ thing will take place, it follows, that to affert that: «' it will not take place, muft be falfe and cannot be " true." Here one thing is faid to follow from an* c^her, by a logical necellity or a neccflity of coirfe-i quence. L'et us take an example : It is a certain truth that the dead will rife ; and does it hence JcU low, that it is a falfehood, that the dead will not rile ? No, the latter is no more a confequence from the former, than the former is a confequence from the latter ; or than that twice two are not unequal to four, is a confequence from this propofition, that twice tv^cr are equal to four ; or than from its being true, that a thing IS, it follows as a confequence that it is not tr\ie^ ihat it is not. The one is no confequence from the other, but is precifely the fame thing exprcffed in dif* ferent words, which convey the very fame idea. You might as well fay? that if a man be kindi it follows as- a confequence, that he is benevolent ; or that if a man be bujj', it follows as a confequence, that he is- employed in bvjinefs. Thus we may argue and drav/ confequences all day long, yet make no more progrefs^ than the foldier who marches without gaining ground.

Dr. Weft fays, p. 32, " No necellity is implied inr " divine prefcience, except merely a logical one ;

" but this is in the nature of ih'mgs fubf qnent

" to the infallible foreknowledge of the exiftence of " the thing foreknown." Lut docs Dr. Weft mean, that in foreknowledge Cod forefees an event as uncertain, and that in confequence of this forefight the event becomes cert.an ? Surely the Dodor did not well confider the fubjeft, if this be his meaning. To fore- know is certainly to forefce : And certainly to fore- fee, is to fee a future event as certainly about to be.

This

This certainty of its futurity is fuppofed and impHekf in foreknowledge, and is not the confequence of h. Dr. Weft fays, " It will be readily granted on all fides, *' that even the divine foreknowledge itfelf has no in- « fluence nor caufal force, with regard io the thing ^' foreknown, either to bring it into exiftence, or to ^' hinder its happening." Tiierefore it has no influ- ence to make its exillence certain or neceffary ; how fhen is the neceffKy/M^/^^z^^^z^ to foreknowledge? The certainty of its exiftence is antecedent in the order of nature to the foreknowledge, and is the ground or the objeft of it. This alfo is abundantly implied in va- lious paffages of Dr. Weft's book, as has been fhown above. In p. 53, the: Do£lor fpeaks of his logical jieceffity as " only a confequcnce founded upon the "certainty of the thing foreknown." But this cer- tainty of moral a£lions is the very moral neceflity, for 'vi'hich we plead. If the DoQor mean this by his log- ical neceffity, it, is prefumed, that the reader fees the abfurdity of faying, that this neceffity is confequent on the divine foreknowledge ; and alfo the abfurdity of iaying that it is founded on the certainty of the thing foreknown. A thing is not confequent on itfelf nor on that which is founded on itfelf, as foreknowledge is founded on the certainty of the thing foreknown. If the Do£lor mean any thing elfe by his logical ne- ceffity, I wifh to be informed how he means any thing to the purpofe of oppofing that moral neceffity of hu- man actions, which Prefident Edwards had advanced, and by which he explained himfelf to mean the certain- ty of moral aftions. A logical neceffity confequent on that certainty is a different thing from the certainty itfelf. But allowing, what Dr. Wefl holds. That fore- knowledge proves a neceffity confequential to fore- knowledge ; this neceffity would be as inconfiftent with liberty, as one that is antecedent to foreknowl- edge ; becaufe the neceffity would exift antecedently tp the aftions of creatures, as it follows immediately from foreknowledge.

The.

^59 _

Ihe Do£lor, in Viis Second Part, p. 92, fays, "Mr. «f Edwards had railed a fpedre, \vhich he could not " lay. With him neccffity was ncccfTity ; and with " him it was all one, whether the neceffity was previ- *« ous to the thing in quellion, or a confcqucnce drawn « from the fuppofition of its having taken place." This is an injurious reprefentation. The neceffity for which President Edwards pleads, is " previous to «« the thing in queOioij," and he never pleads for a ne- ceffity which is "a confequence drawn from the mere *' fuppofition of its having taken place." The neceffi- ty for which he pleads, is that which is implied in di- vine foreknowledge ; and as this exifts before the event foreknown, fo the neceffity which is implied in it and proved by it, is alfo previous to that event, and does not follow or begin to exift in confequence even of that foreknowledge, and much lefs in confequence of the fuppofition, that the thing foreknown has taken place. The only thing, fo far as I know, which could give occaGon for this reprefentation by Dr. Weft is, tJiat Prcfident Edwards c?.ils this neceffity a nccpjfiiy of conjeqiunce, and lays, that a thing neccffary in its" own nature, or one that has already come into exift- ence, being fuppofed, another thing recefiariiy con- netled with either of the former, and the neceffity of whofe exiftence is in queftion, certainly follows ; i. e. the neceffity of this laft thing certainly follows from tJic exiftence or fuppofition of the exillence, of either of the former. For inftance, when the divine decree or foreknowledge of an event is fuppofed, the exift- ence of the event decreed or foreknown will certain- ly follow. But the neceffity, which Dr. Weft inju- rioufly imputes to Prefidcnt Edwards, is not the ne- ccffary exiftence o^ one things implied in the fuppofed LKxWtnzt o^ another ; but the neceflary exiftence of one and the fame thing, io long as it is fuppofed to ex- ift ; and this neceftary exiftence amounts to no more than the mere identical, trilling propofition, that zohai PJif is. Of fach trifling Prefidcnt Edwards was inca- pable.

i6o

pable, and the implicit imputation, that he has writ. ten an oBavo volume in fupport of a propofuion fo>^ infignificant, ought either never to have been made,' or to have been better fupported, than by mere af- fertion.

In the htter part of his third eflay, the Do6lor has* fpent a number of pages to fhow, that a certainty that a man will perform particular anions does not imply that he is under a neceffity of performing them, or that he has no power to avoid them. But all this is' labour loft, and is eafily anfwered by making the dif- tinftion between natural and moral inability ; or it all depends on the ambiguity of words and is mere logomachy.

Dr. Clarke endeavours to evade the airgument for moral neceffity drawn from the divine foreknowledge, by faying, that foreknowledge no more implies necef- fity, than the truth of a propofltion afferting fome fa* ture event implies neceffity. This may be granted. If a propofltion aflerting fome future event, be a re- al and abfolute truth, there is an abfolute certainty of the event ; fuch abfolute certainty is all that is impli- ed in the divine foreknowledge ; and all the moral neceffity for which we plead. And though this cer- tainty is confident with a phyfical or natural ability to* do otherwiftf, it is not confiftent with the coniingence' or uncertainty of the event. So that there is no lib- erty of contingence in the cafe, no liberty to cither fide, to aft or not aft, no liberty inconfiftent with" previous certainty of moral aftion, which is moral' neceffity.

Dr. Weft ftrenuoufly oppofes the doflrine, that the divine decrees are the foundation of God's foreknowl- edge. As I have already obferved, this queftion' feems to be foreign from the difpute concerning lib- erty ; therefore 1 do not wiffi to bring it in here y otherwife I ffiould have no objeftion to entering on the difcuffion of it. But fuppofe the contrary were trucj that foreknowledge is the foundation of decrees ;;'

1 prcrume it would be granted, that decrees immedi- ately follow foreknowledge. Therefore all events are decreed before they come to pafs. And as de- crees eftablifii, or imply an eftablifament of the c- vents decreed, and this antecedently to their exigence ; therefore on this plan there is an abfolute certainty of all events and moral aftions, and that antecedent- ly to the exiltence of ihofe anions ; becaufe they are all abfolutely decreed by God immediately on his fore- knowledge of them and before they come into cxiil- ence.

" If this does not imply, that foreknowledge is not ''an effeniial, attribute, I am under a great miftake;" p. 35. Beit fo, that Dr. Weft is under a great miftake ; what follows ? Is if impofTible, that he fnould be un- der a great miftake ? If foreknowledge be an efTen- tial attribute, it doubtlefs exifts antecedently to hu- man aOions, and therefore implies a certainty of them antecedent to their exiftence. The truth is, that the foreknowledge of any particular event is no more an eflential attribute of God, than the knowledge of any prefent or paft eveiit. Knowledge in general is an eftential attribute ; but any par- ticular perception of the divine mind is no more an clTcntial attribute, than any particular act of the di- vine will, or any one decree of God. \Vill in gener- al is an effcntial attribute; but Dr. Weft will not pre- tend, that every aQ of the divine will is an effentia! attribute. Or if it be, doubtlefs every inftance of foreknowledge is an elfential attribute. By the fame argument by which Dr. Weft proves, that accordin^r to our idea? of decrees and foreknowledge, knowledge is not an effential attribute ; it may be proved, ihdf. according to Dr. Weft's ideas of thofe iubjeds, will is not an effential attribute of God. The DotlOr, p. 36, tells us, "That the divine determinations are the Dei- ty decreeing and willing ;" i. e. ihey are the will of God. J]ut according to him the divine determioa- lionsordecrees are founded on foreknowledge. There- L

fore the divine will is founded on God's foreknowl- edge and is not an eflcntial attribute of God, but is felf-created, or a creatureof the divine underftanding.

The advocates for liberty to aft or not att, " pre- " tend not to be able to folve the difficulty arifmg from " divine prefcience." This is an honeft confeffion. Yet with this acki)owledged infuperable difficulty attending this favourite doftrine, they are determined to adhere to it. This confeffion Dr. Price in particular makes in the followingwords;" The foreknowledgeof a " contingent event carrying the appearanceofa contra- " diftion, is indeed a difficulty ; and I do not pretend to "be capable of removing it." Correfpondence with

Prieltley, p. i -j^. If this be a fufficient apology for

holding a doctrine, which cannot be reconciled with an acknowledged truth, it will beeafy to apologize for holding any dotlrine whatever ; e. g. the doftrine of tranfubftantiation. It is only neceffary to fay, "That a body fhould be turned into fleffi, and yet retain all the lenfible qualities of bread, as it carries the ap- pearance of a contradiftion, is indeed a difficulty ; and we do not pretend to be capable of removingit.

Dr. Weft holds, p. 53, that what is foreknown by God, is eternal truth ; yet, p. 33, he holds, that « there " is no antecedent certainty in things themfelves, on '• which divine prefcience is founded :" i. e. God knows a propofuion to be a certam truth, before it is a certain truth, and after his knowledge of it, it becomes a certain and eternal truth ; yet the divine knowledge

has no caufal influence to make it a truth. He

flrenuoufly oppofes the idea, that human moral anions are certainly future antecedently to the divine fore- knowledge of them ; at the fame time, he grants, that they are not ma^c certainly future by the divine fore- knowledge ; and yet holds, that as foreknown by God, they are eternal truths. If they be eternal truths, doubtlefs the propofitions which affert them, were certainly true from eternity, and therefore in the di- vine foreknowledge of them God perceived that eter- nal

nal truth and certainty, and that certainty was the ob- jeft and Co the ground of the divine foreknowledge, and therefore there was " an antecedent certainty in " things themfelves, on which the divine prefcience is

«' founded." Befides, as the Doctor grants that

foreknowledge has no influence to caufe that certain- ty, I afk, By what is it caufcd ? Is it caufed by noth- ing ? According to the Doflor the certain futurity of the things foreknown by God, does hot exift antece- dently to foreknowledge, and is not caufed by it ; yet it exifls from eternity ; and it is that very eternal truth which there is in ail things foreknown by God.

In page 45, he grants, " that all things would take " place juft in the fame manner, if they were notfore- " known, as they do now." Then all things and all e- vents are fixed and efiablifhed independently of fore- knowledge and antecedently to it, and were indepen- dently of foreknowledge certainly about to be. With what confiftency then does Dr. Weft deny a certainty in things themfelves antecedent to foreknowledge. And on what ground can he oppofe the doctrine ofdir vine decrees, which reprefents thofe decrees as antece- dent in the order of nature to foreknowledge ?

If God from all eternity knew events to be future, they were future, and future in the order of nature before foreknowledge, and were future by the divine agency or by the agency of fome other caufe, or of no caufe at all. If they were future by the agency of God, that is all that the doftrine of abfolute decrees im- plies; If they were future by the agency of any oth- er caufe, this fuppofes another eternal caufe. If they were future by no caufe, they may and will come in- to exiftence by no caufe ; which is abfurd. To im- agine, that they are from eternity future by the agen- cy ofhumian free will, is to fuppofc, thnt human free will either exifted from eternity, or could and did pro- duce effefts eternal ages before it exiflcd.

It is faid, that there is properly no foreknowledge

in God, that all his knowledge is prefcnt knowledge,

L 2 and

and that paft, prefent and future, are now all prefent

in the divine mind. Still God does not view all'

^ojfibk things as prefent. The exijlence o{{omt thing* is prefent to God ; only the poffibility of other things is prefent to him. Whence arifes this difference ? What gives fome things a prefent exiftence in the di- vine mind, when other things have only a poffible ex- iftence in the fame mind ? This difference is an ef- fe6l ; otherwife all real exillences and events are ne- ceffary exiftences, or thofe which are not neceffary, become future, and finally come into exiftence, with a caufe. The difference between poffible and future volitions cannot be the effeft of the mind of the crea- ture ; becaufe it exifted before that mind exifted.

By all things being prefent in the divine mind, is meant not that God now fees them to be prefent to creatures and in their view j but that his view of all things, fo far as relates to himfelf, is the fame as it will be, when they fhall have come into exiftence in the view of creatures. He fees them not to be in exift- ence as to us, but fees their exiftence to be as to us future. And this is all that we mean by foreknowledge. So that faying, that all knowledge in God is prefent knowledge, does not fliow, that there is no foreknowl- edge in him. A knowledge of things as future with re- fpeftto creatures, is foreknowledge: And the whole ob- jeftion, that the divine knowledge is all prefent knowl- edge, is founded on the ambiguity of words, or of the phrafe, all things are prefent in the divine mind^ or this, that, all the divine knowledge is prefent knowledge. If the meaning of that phrafe be, that God fees now, that certain things will at fome future time be in e.K- iftence in the view of creatures ; this is granted on all hands ; and what follows from it ? Surely not that there is no certainty previous to the exiftence of thofe things in the view of creatures, that they will thus be in exiftence ; but, that there is fuch a certainty. Therefore in thisfc^nfe of the phrafe it is not at all op- pofed to, but implies the doctrine of previous certainty

and

i^5

and moral neceflity, which we maintain. If that phrafe mean, that God now fees all events, which ever take place, to have a prefent exiftencein the view of crea- tures ; this is not true and will not be pretended by our opponents. Yet this is the only fenfe of the phrafe, which oppofes the doQrine of previous certain- ty as argued from the divine foreknowledge. That all things are prefent in the divine mind, can meaa no nwre, than that all things are now fcen by God, and that there is no pad nor future with him. Stjll he views fome things to be pad, and other things to be future, with refpe8; to creatures : And his view of fome things as future with refpeft to creatures, is what we mean by the divine foreknowledge ; not that he views things as future with refpeft to himfelf. If therefore God now fees, that certain volitions will hereafter take place in the minds of Gog and Ma- gog, according to prophecy, they will certainly take place, and there is a moral necelhty of it, and a moral neceility now exijling ages before thofe volitions will have an exiftcncc in the minds of thofe nien. The confideration, that all things are prefent with God, docs, as before obferved, not at all prove, that there is not now a previous certainty or moral neceflity, that thofe volitions will come into exiftence ; but ev- idently proves that there is fuch certainty, and that in two refpecls ; (i.) A certainty previous in order of time to the exiftence of thofe volitions in the minds of Gog and Magog. (2.) A certainty previous in the order of nature to the divine foreknowledge itfelf, and which is the foundation of that foreknowledge.

Moft: or all the obje6lions brought againlt moral neceflity, may be brought with equal force againft di- vine foreknowledge. For example ; "If there be *' an abfolute moral neceflity, that John go on in fin, and "be finally damned, there is nopoflibiliiy that he be *' faved. Then why fliould heor any other perfon ufe

" any endeavours toward his falvation ?" If there be

force in this objedion, it is equally forcible againft: L 3 divine

i65

divine foreknowledge : Thus, If God foreknow, tliz^t Joha will go on in fin and be finally damned, there is an abfolute certainty or moral neceffity of it. There- fore there is no poffibility of John's falvation ; and -why fliould he or any other perfon put forth any en- deavours toward it ? This and all objeBions of the kind imply, that all moral events are left in a ftate of per- feft uncertainty, till they come to pafs, that they come to pafs by mere chance, and that they are not, and can- not poffibly be, the obje£ls of foreknowledge.

It has been already obferved, that though divine foreknowledge is not the efficient caufe of the certain futurity of any event ; yet it implies, that the event is certainly future, and this certainty^lct it be caufed by what it will, or though it be uncaufed, is with refpeflt to a moral event, moral neceffity, and equally confid- ent or inconfiftent with liberty^ as if it were caufed by foreknowledge. 1 now obferve further, that this cer- tain futurity undoubtedly is caufed by fomdhing. It is equally abfurd to imagine, that an event may become future without a caufe, as that it may come into exijl- ence without a caufe. Certain futurity implies, that the a£lual exillence of the event is fecurcd to take place in due time. And whatever is able thus to fe- cure the event, is able to bring it into exiftcnce. If h may be fecured without a caufe, it maybe brought into exiftence without a caufe. This certain futurity of all events from eternity is an effcQ, and cannot be the effeft of any creature, becaufe no creature exifled from eternity. It mull therefore be the efFe£l of the Creator, who alone exifted from eternity, and who alone there- fore could from eternity give futurity to any event.

Therefore however frightened Dr. Well and other writers be at the idea, that moral aBions fhould be the effefl of a caufe extrinfic to the fubjeft of thofe anions, we feem to be neceffitated to give into this idea, from the confideration, that all moral a£lions of creatures were from eternity foreknown and therefore • were certainly future. This eternal futurity mufl be • " ' ' an

^6;

an effefl; of a caufe extrinfic to all creatures. Thi§ exirinfic caufc fecures their cxillence, and in due time a6lua!Iy brings them into exigence.

It isfaid, that God knows all things from eternity, as we know things prelcntly exilling before our eyes. Now tl-.e aftual exiltence of diings out of our minds is the foundation of our knowledge in the cafe. But it will not be faid, that all things cxiflcd from eternity out of the divine mind, and that tliis exiftence of them is the foundation of the divine eternal knowl- edge of them or of their exiflencein the divine mind. If they did eternally exift out of the divine mind, they were neceflanly exiftent in the fame fenfe in which God is ; and confequenily none of our a8ions are caufed by ourfelves or by our fclf-dctermining power : They are as uncaufed, as neccffary and as eternal, as the divine exiftence.

Dr. Clarke in his remarks on Collins, p. c^g, fays, that " in the argument drawn againft liberty from the *' divine prefciencc, or power of judging infallibly con- " cerning free events, it mud be proved, that things " otherwife fuppofed free, will thereby unavoidably *' become necefiary." On this 1 remark, (i.J That if by the \fjord/ree the Do6lor mean any thing oppo- fite to the mod abfolute moral neccflity, he muii; mean comiingeni, uncertain^ net certainly j-ulure. But nothing is in this fenfe fuppofed, or allowed, to be

free. (2.) Vv^e do not pretend from the divine

prefcience to prove, that " thereby things unavoida- bly become ncceffary," or certainly future. But wc do pretend from prefcience to prove, that all events -were certainly future, in the order of nature, aiuecc- ' dently to the prefcience ; and that they are certainly future, in the order of time, antecedently to their cx- iflence.

Dr. Clarke in his Being and Attributes^ p. 95, Va- grants, that all things are and vere certain from eter- nity, and yet fuppofes, p. 97, that an univcrial fatali- ty would be inconfiftent with monihty. But it fecms, L 4 that

i68

that according to the Doflor an univerfal and eternal certainty of all things is not inconfiftent with morali- ty ; and if by fatahty he meant any thing different

from certainty, he oppofes what nobody holds.

Ibid, p. 98, the Dodor fays, " mere certainty of " event does not imply necefiity." But mere cer- tainty of event doubilefs implies itfelf, and that is all the necefiity, for which we plead. The Dodor's ar- gument to prove, that certainty docs not imply necef- iity, is, that foreknowledge implies no more certainty, than would exifl: without it. At the fame time he grants, that there is " the fame certainty of event in *' every one of man's adions, as if they were never fo " fatal and neceflary." Now any other certainty or ne- cefiity than this we do not pretend to be implied in foreknowledge. And as the Dodor himfelf grants this neceflTity to exift, whether there be or be not fore- knowledge ; then in either cafe all that necefiity, for which we plead, is granted to exift.

Dr. Welt, in p. 20, 21, Part II, thinks Prefident Edwards inconfiftent with himfelf, in denying, that the divine decrees are founded on foreknowledge, and yet holding, that " the perfedion of his underftanding *' is the foundation of his decrees." The Dodor ar- gues, that " If foreknowledge in the Deity, is part of " the perfedion of the divine underftanding. Then is it " the foundation of his wife purpofes and decrees ; " and fo his objedion lies juft as ftrong againft him, " as againft us." Doubtlefs the perfedion of the di- vine underftanding ; i. .e God's perfed view of the iitnefs of certain things to certain ufes and ends, is the reafon why he decrees and appoints thofe things to ihofe ufes and ends. But this is very different from fuppofing that foreknowledge is the foundation of de- crees, and that God firft forefees certain events about to take place, and then decrees to permit them to take place. And the inconclufivenefs of Dr. Weft's argu- ment juft quoted, may appear thus ; If after-knowledge, or a knowledge, that events have taken place; be a part

of

169

of the divine underftanding ; then it is the foundation of his wife purpofes and decrees. But it will not be pre- tended, that the confequent in this cafe juftly follows from the antecedent. Yet it follows as juftly as in the argument of the Do£lor. Not every perception which belongs to the divine underftanding is the foundation of God's decrees univerfally or generally : Befide the inftance already mentioned, I might men- tion God's perfedl knowledge of geometry, mechanics, Sec, The divine perfe6l knowledge of ihofe fciences is not the foundation of all God's decrees : No more is God's foreknowledge.

CHAPTER

170

CHAPTER VIL

Ohjediom confidtred*

1. TT is argued, that we are pofieffed of a felf-deter- X mining power and a liberty to either fide, be- (Caule we find, that we have a power to confider and examine an a6iion propofed to us, and to fujpend our determination upon it, till we fhall have duly confid-

cred it. But as the determination to fuCpend and

examine is a voluntary afl, it no more appears to be without motive or without moral neceffity than any other vohjntary aft.— Sufpenfioniseither a vol- untary a6t or not. If it be a voluntary aft, it no more appears to be without motive and moral necef- fity, than any other voluntary a6l. If it be not a volun- tary acl, it is not a/?Y(?a6l, nor is any liberty exercifed in it ; and therefore it is nothing to the prefent purpofe.

To argue, that we have a power of felfdetermina* tion, becaufe we have a power to fufpend an aftion, is as groundlefs, as to argue, that we have a power of felf-determination, becaufe we have a power to choofe to ad, or becaufe we have a power of will. Sufpen- fion is a voluntary a£l ora volition, and the argument Under confideration is this ; A man has a volition, not at prefent to determine in a certain cafe ; therefore he has a power efficiently to caufe volition in him- felf. This argument is juft as conclufive as the fol- lowing ; A man has a volition at prefent to determine in a certain cafe ; therefore he has a power efficiently to caufe volition in himfelf : Or as this ; A man has a a volition, therefore he has a power efficiently to caufe volition in himfelf.

But if fufpenfion be no voluntary a8, but a total fufpcnfion of all volition, it is, if poffible, flill lefs a proof of felf-determination. Self determination is a vol- untary aft, and fufpenfion is brought as ra inftance

of

of f jlf-detcrminaiion. But how can that, which is nq voluntary aft be an indance of a voluntary acl P I'bis is as abfurd as to argue felf-determination from any inlellc61ual pcrccpiion, or from the perfc6l infenfihil-

iiy of a dead corpfe. But this mode of arguing is

familiar with Dr. Weft, who conftantly ar^^ues a felf- determining power, from a power to not a^, a power to be perfeftly torpid.

2. Self-determination is argued from our own con- fcioufnefs and experience. Dr. Wefl fays, page 26, that *' we experience in ourfeives, that in willing " and choofing we a6t independently of any extrinfic caufe." Others hold, that we are coiifcious of ft;lf-de- termination and an exemption from extrinfic caufal-

ity. When gentlemen fpeak of experience and

con fcioufnefs, they ought to confine their obfervations to themfeives ; as no man is confcious of more than paffes in his own mind, and in fuch things a man can with certainty tell his own experience only. For my own part, I am not confcious of either felf-caufa- tion of volition, or an exemption from extrinfic cauf- ality ; and to be fure I am not confcious, that my volitions take place without caufe and by mere chance. I am confcious of volitions of various kinds ; but I never yet caught myfelf in the a6l of making a volition, if this mean any thing more than having a volition or being the fubjefl; of it. If any man be confcious, that he makes his own volitions, he is doubilefs con- fcious of two diHindl ads in this, one the act made by bimfelf, another the aH making or by which he makes the aEl made. Now will any man profefs to the world, that he is or ever has been conlcious of thefc di(lin£l afts ? If not, let him tell the world what he means by being the efficient caufe of his own volitions. If he mean, that he has volitions, this is no more than the advocates for moral neccflity are confcious of, and to grant that this is all that is meant, is to give up the argument. If it be meant, that he caufes them by the mind iffdfox bv fome power of the mind and no't

by

172

by any aB of the mind or oJF tliofe powers ; I appeal to the reader, whether this be, or can be, a matter of confcioufnefs. I take it to be univerfally granted, that no man can be confcious of more than the aBs and perceptions of his own mind. The exiftence of the mind and of its powers, is inferred from the ads, and we are not properly confcious of them. Dr. Reid may be an authority with the gentlemen, with whom I am now concerned. *' Porcer," fays he, " is " not an objeft of any of our external fenfes, nor '' even an oh^tdio^ confcioufnefs. That it is not feen, <' nor heard, nor touched, nor tafted, nor fmelt, needs " no proof. That we are not confcious of it, in the *' proper fenfe of the word, will be no lefs evident, if " we reflect, that confcioufnefs is that power of the «« mind, by which it has an immediate knowledge of " its own operations. Power is not an operation of '« the mind, and therefore is no objeEt of confcioufnefs, '' Indeed every operation of the mind is the exertion '' of fome power of the mind ; but we are confcious «« of the operation only^ and the power lies behind the " fcene : And though we may juftly infer the power « from the operation, it muft be remembered, that *« inferring is not the province Q>i confcioufnefs^ but of " reafonr EJfays on ABive Powers, p. 7.

If from our confcioufnefs of volitions, it follows, that we ejficiently caufe thofe volitions, let a reafon be given, why it will not equally follow from our con- fcioufnefs of any perception, e. g. the found of thun- der, that we efficiently caufe that too.

If we be the efficient caufes of our own volitions, they are effeds. But an effeft is produced by a pre- vious exertion of the efficient caufe, which a£l is as diftinft from the effeft, as the divine creating aft was diflin6l from the world created. Every effisd is paf- five with regard to its caufe, and paffive in this refpeft, that the caufal a6l; of the efficient operates upon it : Therefore the volition is and muft be diftinft from the a6t of the efficient by which it is caufed. If a man

be.

^73

be the efficient caufe of his own volition and he be confcious of it, he is confcious of an a6l of his own mind previous to every volition caufed by himfelf, efficiently caufing that volition, and as this caufingatl niuft be a voluntary a£l, in order to be a free one, there mud be an infinite feries of voluntary a£ls cauf- ing one another, or one a6l before the firft : And of this the man who is fubjecl, muft have a confcious experience, or elfe he cannot be confcious of felf de- termination. Whether any man will profefs to be confcious of all this, we muft wait to fee. It is to be prefumed however, that no man will profefs to have experienced an infinite feries of a£ls, or one aft before the firft aa.

As to knowing by confcioufnefs and experience, that our volitions are not the cffeQ ofanextrinfic caufe ; this I conceive is an abfolute impoflibility, unlefs we know by experience and are confcious, that we ourfelves efficiently caufe them in the manner juil now defcribed, viz. in an infinite feries, or with one aft before the firft. Unlefs we be confcious, that we caufe our own firft volition by a previous a61, we can- not be confcious, that we caufe it at all. And if we be not confcious, that we caufe that, we cannot be confcious but that it was caufed extrinfically. If we do not experience that we caufe our volitions by our own previous afts, we do not experience, that we caufe them at all. All we experience is^the volitions themfelves, and we have no more evidence, that they are not the eff^efts of an extrinfic caufe, than from the experience of any of our ideas of fenfation, we have evidence that thofc ideas are not excited by an ex- trinfic caufe.

Let an inftance he taken and I prcfume no man will pretend, that he is confcious, that he caufes one volition by another : e.g. di volition to give to the poor. Will any mjn pretend, that he is confcious, that he caufes in himfelf a volition to give to the poor, by a previous volition ; and that he in the firft place

finds,

^74

finds, by confcioufnefs, that he choofes to have a 76- ]ition to give to the poor before he has it, and that by this previous choice he becomes willing to give to the poor ? If no man will pretend this, but every man by the bare Rating of the cafe fees, that it implies the ab- furdity that he is willing before he is willing, furely it is high time to give up this argument from experi- ence and confcioufnefs.

It has been faid, that we perceive noextrinfic influ- ence producing our volitions. Nor do we perceive any extrinfic influence producing a great part of our thoughts and perceptions, which yet it will not be pre- tended, that we ourfelves caufe.

It is impoflible for a man to be confcious ofa negative, otherwife than as he is either not confcious of it, oris confcious of the oppofite pofitive. Therefore when it is faid, that we are confcious, that oUr volitions are not the effe6l of an extrinfic caufe, the meaning muft be ei- therthat weare not confcions, that theyare the efFeftof an extrinfic caufe, or that we are confcious, that we do efficiently caufe them ourfelves. That we are not confcious, that our volitions are the effeft of an extrinfic caufe, is no proof, that they are in fa6l not the effe6l of fuch a caufe, becaufe if they were the effeB: of fuch ai caufe, (till we fhould not be con- fcious of it. If whether they be the effeel of fuch d caufe or not, we fliould not be confcious, that they are the cffe6l of fuch a caufe, then the circumflance that we are not confcious, that they are the efteCl of fuch a caufe, is no proof either way. Nor are we confcious, that we do efficiently caufe our own voli- tions, as it is prefumed appears by what has been al- ready faid in this and former chapters.

But if we were confcious, that we do efficiently caufe our own volitions, this would be no argiiment againft the abfolute previous certainty or moral ne- ceffity of all our volitions. Such efficiency may have been from eternity the object of the divine ab- folute foreknowledge or decree. So that to a con- fcioufnefs'

*7}

fcioufnefs of liberty as oppofed to moral neceflity. is requifite,tbat webe confcious not only, that wc ctn- cientlycaufe our own volitions, but that we caufctbem, with the circumflance, that it was previoufly uncer- tain, whether we fhould caufe them or not. But of <his circumttance it is impollible, that we fhould be tonfcious ; it is no aft or perception of the xwii^d^ and therefore cannot be an obje6l of confcioaf- nefs.

Archbifhop King fpeaks of a man's being '' con- <' fcious, that it was in his power, to have done c ler- « wife than he has done." If this mean any ihirr^op- pofite to moral neceffity, it muft mean, that a man is confcious, that it was not previoufly certain, that he would do as he has done. But of this no man can be confcious, for the reafon already given.

3. It is further argued, that we aft as if we were under no neceflity, but at perfeft liberty ; and that therefore the doftrine of moral neceffity is contra-

difted by all our conduct, and the maxims of it.

To this I anfwer, that our conduft does by no means fliow, that we are not influenced by motives, or that we aft without motives, without defign, with- out biafes, taftes, appetites or anyfuch principles, and in perfeft indifference, infenfibility and Ilupidity. On the other hand, the conduft of all mankind fhows, that they are aftuated by motives, biafes, various paf- fions and appetites, which have as ftated and regular an efFeft on their minds and conduft, as fecond caufes have in the natural world. The conduft of men does by no means fhow, that their conduft is previoufly altogether uncertain and left to mere chance. It does indeed fliow, that they are free agents in the proper fenfe ; z. e. intelligent, voluntary agents, afting upon motives and various principles in human nature, natural and acquired ; and therefore we ufe ar- guments and motives with one another to in- fluence each other's conduft. All this is perfeftly confiftent with thfe fchemc of moral neceflity for

which

176

which I plead, and is implied in it : And aH govern- ment civil and domeftic is not only confident with that fcheme, but is built upon it; otherwife in vain would be all the motives of rewards and punifhments exhibited as the means of government, and by which government is carried into efFeft.

If moral neceffity be inconfiftent with the praQice of mankind, fo is that previous certainty implied in the divine foreknowledge ; for that, with refpetl to moral aflions, is moral neceffity.

4. It is objefted, that on this plan all agency and

a6lion are deftroyed or precluded. Anfwer ; If by

agency and aftion be meant felf-determinate or con- tingent agency and action, I grant that this fcheme does preclude them and means to preclude them. But it is not allowed, that fuch agency and adion are neceflary to a rational, moral being, or are at all de- firable or even poffible : And to take thefe for grant- ed, is to beg the main points in difpute. Let it be Ihown that fuch agency and aftion are neceflary, defirable, or poflible, and fomething to the purpofe will be done. But rational voluntary agency or atl:ion, arifing from motive and principle, and dire6led to fome end, is not precluded, but fuppofed and eftablilhed by this fcheme.

It is faid, that on the hypothefis of a^ divine agen- cy in all things, there is but one agent in the univerfe. But the Deity is no fclf-determinate agent : He is no more the efficient caufe of his own volitions than he is of his own exiflence. If he were, his volitions would not be from eternity, nor would he be unchangeable. Therefore with as much reafon, as it is faid, that there is hut one agent in the univerfe, it might have been faid, that there is not one. Self-efficiency of volition is either neceflary to agency and aftion, or it is not. If it be neceflary, God is not an agent. If it be not neceflary, we are agents and God too.

It is further faid, .that on this plan of a moral ne- ceflity ellabliflied by G®d, all human actions are

nothing

nothing but the operations of God aftuating men, as

tlie foul afluates the body. If this mean, that God

is the remote and firft caufe of all things, and that he brings to pafsall things and all human adions, either hy an immediate intluence, or by the intervention of fecond caufes, motives, temptations, &:c. we allow it : We firmly believe, that thefe are under the con- trol and at the difpofal of Providence. But bccaufe the devil tempted Eve, it will not be pretended, that flie afted nothing, and was merely atled upon by the devil, as the human body is afluated by the foul ; that bccaufe Godfent his prophets to thelfraelites, to preach to them, the prophets a6ted nothing ; that when God affords the aids of his grace to any man, fo far as he is influenced by thefe aids to an aQion, it is no aftion of his ; that when the goodnefs of God Icadeth a finner to repentance, the finner does nothing, does not repent • but this repentance is the a6l or exer- cife of the divine mind, and in it God repents.

If when it is objefted, the fcheme of moral neceffity precludes adion, a6lion mean volition ; the obje8ion is groundicfs : We hold as ftrenuoufly as ouropponenfs, that we all have aftion in this fenfe. But if by aflion they mean any thing elfe, they muft mean fomething in which there is no volition. But that any fuch thing fhould be an action is abfurd and what they will not pretend. The circumRance, that a man caufes his own volitions, if it were poHible, would not imply a- gcncy or a£lion, unlefs the caufation or caufing a6l were a volition. For inftancc, if a man in a convul- fion, having a fword in his hand, involuntarily thrult it into his friend's bofom, this is not agency : Yet the man caufes the thrufl and the wound. But if the caufing a6l be a volition, it runs into the abfurdity of an in- finite fcrics of volitions caufing one another.

Dr. Wen,in Part II, p. 8, fays," If the Deity is the

*^ proper cfiicicnt caufe of volition, then the m-ind is

** entirely palfive in all its volitions, and confequcntly

" cannot be in -dx^y proper fenfe <2n a^cnt.' Wc grant,

M that

that the Deity is ihe primary efficient caufe of all things, and that he produces volitions in the human mind by fuch fecond caufes as motives, appetites, biafes, &c. and the human mind, in being the fubjeft of the di- vine agency whether mediate or immediate, ispaflive. Still we hold, that volition is an aBion^ as has been al- ready explained. Nor is there the leaft abfurdity in the fuppofition, that an aftion fliould be the effeft of a divine or other extrinfic agency, uniefs by a£lion or volition be meant a felf-caufed or an uncaufed aftion or volition. But for Dr. Weft in the prefent cafe to mean this by aHion in the proper fenfe^ is to beg the queftion. The very queftion is, whether aftion in the proper fenfe of the word, be felf-caufed or uncauf- ed. And if, when he fays, " If the Deity is the effi- " cient caufe of volition, the mind cannot be in any ^^ proper fenfe an agent;" he mean an agent, who efficiently produces an a6l of will in himfelf, or who is the fubjeft of a volition which is uncaufed ; I grant, that the mind cannot be fuch an agent ; I believe, that fuch agency is an abfurdity and impoffibilty, and call on Dr. Weft to clear it of the abfurdity and im- poffibility, which has long fince been pointed out to be implied in it.

Befides ; the Do£lor's reafoning may be retorted, thus ; If the mind itfelf be the proper efficient caufe of volition, then the mind is entirely paffive in its vo- litions, and confequently in volition cannot be in any proper fenfe an agent. For every efFe6l muft be paf- five, feeing it cannot contribute any thing towards its ownexiftence. Volition or the mind a6ling is either an effeft, or it exifted from eternity, or it came into exiftence without caufe. Neither of the two laft will be pretended. Therefore it isaneffi^£l; and as every effeft is paffive, the mind in volition is, on the ground of Dr. Weft's argument, in no proper fenfe an agent in volition.

The Doftor proceeds, ibid, p. 8, " Either volition is « only the immediate aBion of the Deity on the mind,

. «or

^7^

''or it is diftinfl from it- If volition is diflintl; from " the a6lion of the Deity on the mind, then the at1;ion *' of the Deity on ihe mind, is only to produce all the " requifites for a6lion ; and confeqticnily there is no " abfurdity in fuppofing, that wlien all thefe requifites " have taken place, the mind is then only put in a ca-

" pacity for aiSting." On this I remark, Volition

is granted to be entirely diflinQ from the a8ion of the Deity, as diftinfl from it, as the motion of a plan- et is. liut It is not granted to follow hence, that the action of the Deity does no more than produce all the necelfary requifites for aBion. Dr. Weft will grant, that when the Deity caufes a planettomove, he does more than to produce the requifites for its mo- tion, unlefs in requifites for its motion be compre- hended the a8ual produBion of its motion. If this be his meaning with regard to the a6lion of the mind, there is an abCardity in fuppofing, that when all thole requifites have taken place, the mind is only put into a capacity foraBing or notaBing. And whatever be his meaning in producing requifites, I do not allow they do or can put the mind into a capacity of v.ci aBing^ i. e. of finking itfcif into perfeB torpitude.

What immediately follows the laft quotation is, "If «* befides prefeniing to the mind the requifites for ac- " tion, the Deity does produce a certain modification *' of the mind called volition, in which modification the '• mind is wholly paflive, then there is no aBion, but on- " ly the immediate aBion of the Deity on the mind; and " volition isnothingdiftinBfromtheimmediateaBionof '•theDeity." The very fame mode ofreafoning will prove, that bodily motion is nothing diilinB from the a6tion of the Deity ; thus. If befides producing the requifites for motion, the Deity produce a certain modification of matter, called motion, in which matter is wholly paf- five, then there isonly the immediate aBion of the Deity on maltcr,and motion is nothing diftinfcl from the imme- diate aBion of the Deity. Vet it is prerumcd,thai Dr.

Welt will not pretend, that when God caufes a pbn- M 2 ct

iSo

ct to move round in its orbit, the Deity liimfelf and lie only moves round in that orbit ; or that the mo- 1#n of the planet is nothing diftincl from the a8ion of the Deity. Now vohtion, though caufed by the Deity, is as diftintl from the a6lion of the Deity, by which it is caufed, as the motion of a planet is from fhe aflion of God by which that is caufed.

The Do6lorfays, p. lO, "If when the mind afts on " any particular objeft, the Deity produces a new aH "or a new operativenefs in the mind, then there muft " be a change in the mind." Doubtlefs there is fo far a change, as is implied in the new a6l : And what then? Why the Doflor " upon the clofefl examination can- " not find any change in the operativenefs of his mind." Beit fo ; yet as it is fuppofed, that his mind isthefub- jeB: of a new aH, he can doubtlefs find a change in the aH of bis mind ; and if he cannot find a change in the operativenefs o^il,\im\i?i be becaufe operative- nefs, which is a peculiar and favourite word with the Do£lor, means fomething diflPerent from <5;^, and there- fore is nothing to the prefent purpofe, as the fubjeft under confideration is the production of a new a6l by the Deity : And we do not pretend, that when the Deity produces a new acl in the mind, he produces a new operativenefs too, unlefs acl and operativenefs be the fame. If they be the fame, whenever the Do6lor can perceive a change in the aB of his mind, he can doubtlefs perceive a change in this operativenefs of it.

The Doctor thinks he has faid fomething new con- cerning his favourite word operativenefs: But 1 fee noth- ing new or important in it, unlefs it be a new word ufed in an ambiguous manner.

" I fay, that the operativenefs of the mind on «'• different objefls is always uniformly one and the " fame thing, and not that there are as many ope- '• rations, as there are obje6ls on which the mind " a8:s;" ibid, p. 13. Here it is manifeft, that the D96lor ufes the word operalivenufs as fynonymous with operation^ othersvife he is guilty of the moll

,grofs

grofs equivocation. And" is it indeed one and the fame operation of mind to love virtqe and love road beef? To choofe the ferviccof God and chool'e a pine apple ? This is new indeed : In this, I pre- fume the Do£lor is an original !

5. My aflions are jniiie ; but in what fcnfj can they be properly called vime, if 1 be not the ef- ficient caufe of them ? Anfwcr; My thoughts and

all my perceptions and feelings are 7nine ; yet it will not be pretended, that I am the efficient of them all,

6. It is faid to be felf-evident, that abjolute necejjhy

IS inconfillent with liberty. Anfvver ; Tliis wholly

depends on the meaning of the words UhcrLy and nc- cejjity. Abfolute natural ncceffity is allowed to bo inconfiflent with liberty ; but the fame conceflion is not made with regard to abfolute moral neceffity. All that is requifiie to anfwer this and fuch like ob- jeftions is to explain the words liberty and neceffity. If by liberty be meant uncertainty, undoubtedly abfo- lute moral neceffity, which is the certainty of a moral event, is utterly inconfiflent with liberty. But if by liberty be meant exemption from natural neceffity, there is not the leafl inconfiftence between the molt abfolute moral necefTity and the moft perfc6l freedom or exemption from natural neceffity. The rnofl per- feft exemption from natural neceffity is confiflent with the mofl abfolute previous certainty of a moral aftion. Judas in betraying his Lord " according to the deter- minate counfel and foreknowledge of God," was en- tirely exempted from natural necefTity ; yet his con- du6l was according to an abfolute previous certainty.

7. That v;e have liberty of lelf-determination is ar- gued from our 7/ior<2/ difccrmiunt, or fcnfe of right and wrong and of defert of praile and blame. And Ibmc are lb confident of the fufliciency of this argument a- gainfl moral neceflTuy, that they are willing to rtltthc •whole caufe on this fingle point. It is therefore a very important point. It is fjid, that our eflimating the moral charatler of the man, from his internal dif-

M 3 pofi lions.

l82

pofitions and a£ls, is on the fuppofition. that thefe are within the pQu.tr of iht man. But ihe word power is equivocal ; if.it mean natural power, and that the agent is under no natural inability, (as before ex- plained) to other difpofitions and atls ; it is granted, that in this fenfe they are in his power. But if it mean, that there was no previous certainty, that he ■would have thofe very difpofitions and a6ls ; and that no man will or can reafonably blame himfelf or an- other but incafe of a perfect previous uncertainty with refped to thofe difpofitions and ads ; this is not granted, nor is it proved.

It is faid, that no man ever did commend or blame himfelf for what he knew to be necejfary and unavoid- able^ not within his power, or not determined by him- felf. I'his ftript of the ambiguity of words is this merely ; that no man ever did commend or blame him- felf for what he knew to be previously certain, and was not entirely cafual. But this is manifellly falfe ; becauie every man knows or may know, that all things are pr^vioiifly certain, as they are theobjeds of the in- fallible foreknowledge of God : Andif noman can com- mend or blame himfelf for what is previoufly certain, no man can commend or blame himfelf for any thing.

Will it be pretended, that we are more blamable for an adion,' which is previoufly uncertain and cafu- al, and which we perform by chance without motive, end or defign, than for that which is previoufly cer- tain and future, and which we do from motive, and vith an end and defign ? Take the inflanceof Judas's treachery. The fad is, that this treachery was pre- yioufly certain and infalliby foreknown by God. Now, was Judas lefs blamable than if bis condud had been previoufly uncertain, and had taken place by pure chance "^ To fay, that he was biamable, if this conducl proceeded from fclf determination, afFoids no fatisfadion, unlefs this felf determination were by chance. For otherwife the felf determining ad was pre- vioufly certain and morally neccffary, and therefore li- able

i83

able to all the objeflions, ^vbich arc brought againft moral neceflity in any cafe.

Blarneworthinefs is nothing but moral turpitude or odioufnefs ; praifeworthinefs is nothing but moral amiablcnefs or excellence. But the moral amiable- uefs of an adtion does not depend on the circumllance, that it is efficiently caufedby ourfclves ; becaufe tins runs into theabfurdiiy and impoflibility of an infinhe feries of aftions cauhng one another. Nor does it depend on this circumllance, that the a8ion is, as Dr. Wed holds, uncaufed ; for no actions of creatures fall under this defcription. Either of ihofe hypothe- fes would fliut moral amiablcnefs and odioufneis out of the world.

That moral neceflity or previous certainty of mor- al conduft is confident with moral difcernment, may be argued from the cafe of the faints and angels in heaven. It will not be pretended, but that there is a certainty, that they will continue in their date of perfe6l holinefs and happinefs to eternity. Nor will it be pretended, but that they are the fubjeds of mor- al difcernment and of that virtue and holinefs which is truly amiable in the moral fenfe, and the proper objecl of approbation and reward. Therefore moral neceflity is not inconfident with praife and blame.

I need not infift on the neceflary holinefs of God and of our Lord Jefus Chrid.

The writers in oppofition to moral neceflity infift much on its inconfidence with accountablenefs. This is rea^ly no other than to infid, that it is inconfident with praife and blame or with moral agency ; aiid i& the fame objedion, which wc have been confidering. To be accountable is to be liable to be called to an account for an aftion, and to be the proper fubjecl of reward or punifhment. But this is no other than to be worthy of praife or blame, and to defcrve love or hatred, complacency or difapprobation,on account of moral temper or condu6t. So that what has been M 4 laid

i84

faid concerning praife and blame, is equally applica- ble to accountablenefs.

It has been long fince fhown by Prefident Edwards, that the moral amiablenefs and odioufnefs of a6lions, and their deCert of praife or blame, or the eflcnce of virtue and vice, depend not on die circumftance, ihataSions arc efficiently caufed by the fubjeft ; but that the aQ.s themfelves, without any confideration of their efficient caufe, are amiable or odious : As oth- erwife virtue and vice will be thrown back from the caufed aB, to the caufmg aft, till they are thrown out of the univerfe. If they confift not in a6ls of the will themfelves, but in the acl^ by which they are caufed, as thefe caufing atts are alfo caufed, virtue and vice mull for the lame reafon confifl: not in them, but thofe by which they are caufed, and fo on to an aft which is not caufed. But this being not caufed by the fubjeft, can, on the principle of our opponents, have no virtue or vice m it. Thus there would be no place found in the univerfe for virtue and vice : Not in the caufe-l atts, becaufe virtue and vice con- lilt not in them, but in their caufe. Not in any un- caufed aQ or a6tsj becaufe they, by the fuppofition, are not caufed by their fubjeft. There is no way to avoid this confequenc.e, but to allow that virtue and vice, defert of praife and blame, confift, in the a61;s themfelves and not in their caufe ; or if there be any virtue or vice in the caufe, this is diftinft froni the virtue or vice, which there is in the a6ts them- felves. If I be accountable for any volition, for the fole reafon, that I caufe it ; then I am accountable for the aft, by which I caufe it, for the fole reafon, that I caufe that, and fo on in an infinite feries.

Befides ; the mere circumftance, that I caufe my own volition, does not on the principles of our oppo- nents, make me accountable for it : Becaufe that I Ihould caufe it may be a matter of previous certain- ty, as it may be foreknown, and even decreed, by God, that I fhall caufe it ; and therefore I caufe it

not

not freely in the fenfc of our opponents, but nccdfa- riiy, under the influence ofabfolute moral ncccifity.

3ut Dr. Welt holds, that all our volitions are with- outcaufe. I'hen they take place by blind fate or chance. And how, on his principles, art' we accountable for them?

The true ground of accountablenefs and of praife and blame, is not the circumnance, that we ourlclvcs efficiently caufe our own volitions ; or the circum- Itance, that they take place without caufe, by mere chance; but the nature, moral aipeft and tendency of ihofe volitions, and of the aftions which flow from them.

Our opponents oblerve, that we allow, that men mud be the voluntary caufes of their external adions.^ in order to be accountable for them : And then they afli, why we do not for the fame realbn allow, that we muR be the voluntary caufes of our a61s of will, that we mav be accountable for them ? The anfwer is, that external anions are not volitions. The volitions of rational beings, are in their own nature moral ads, and for that reafon the fubjeOs of them are accountable lor them. Bui external adions are not of a moral nature in themfelves, and therefore the fubjeBs of them are ac- countable for them then only, when they aiethe effefls of volition. Bcfides ; that external aBions fliould be the cfTefts of volition does not run into the abfurdity of an infinite feries, as is implied in the fuppofition, that all volitions are the effctts of previous volitions.

Dr. Weft fays, " I have already fhown, that necef- " fity fhuts out all fenfeof vilenefsand unworthinefs ;" Part II, p. 39. Where he has fhown this, he has net informed us. If he had, perhaps his readers, on pe- rulal of the pafl'age, would not have joined with him in the opinion, that he had fhown it. For my part, I cannot find, that he has fhown it in any part of hi:;

two books. If moral ncceifity, which is previous

certain futurity of a nunal aft, " fhut out all fi^nfe of " vilenefs and unworlhinefs ;" then it fcems, that in or- der that a man may have anv fenfe of vilenefs in fin, he muft a£l without anv previous certainty in the na- ture

i86

ture of things, or in divine foreknowledge, what his adions will be ; i. e. he mull a6l by mere chance.

8. It is objeded, that this do6lrine of moral necef-

fity makes men mere machines. This objetlion,

which is frequently made by all our opponents, de- pends on the fenfe affixed to the word machine. If it mean an intelligent voluntary agent, who does not aft by perfe£l contingence or chance, and who does not take one ftep before his firft ftep ; but afts from fuch motives and purfues llich objefts, as appear to him moft eligible ; I grant, that we are machines : And in the fame fenfe the faints and angels in heaven, and all intelligent beings, are machines. But whether it be not a great abufe of language, and whether it be not an artifice of our opponents, to excite a popular pre- judice and clamour againft our do6lrine, to life the word machine in this fenfe ; 1 leave the reader to judge. If by machine be meant, what is common- ly meant by it, a mere material engine, without voli- tion, knowledge or thought in itfelf ; I prefume, that our opponents ihemfelves will not pretend, that on our principles, men are fuch machines as this.

Do thofe who make this obje6lion, hold, that the human underftanding is a 7nachine ? Or that, in under- Itanding, reafoning, judging, remembering, &c. man aQ.s mechanically ? Yet all grant, that in thefe things he afts necelTarily.

If moral neceffity imply,that we are machines, then whatever induces a moral neceffity, or actually influ- ences or perfuades us to any conduft, turns us into ma- chines. Now the oppofers of moral neceffity often fpeak of the aids of grace and of the Spirit, as necef- fary and influential to virtue and religion. But if any man become the fubjeft of true virtue or piety hy the aids of God's grace^ fo far he is paffive, he is wrought upon and governed by an extrinfic caufe, and his conduft is the cfTefl of that caufe. But every eiFe6l is nccejfary with refpeft to its caufe. Therefore whoever is led by this caufe to virtue or

piety.

piety, is led neccfTarily, and according to the objec- tion now before us, is {mued'uiio d.mciemachnie. -

On the groun.l oFihis objetlion ail finners abandon- ed by God, a!l the damned and devils in hell, all the faints and angels in heaven, the man Chnft jefus, and

even God himfelf, are mere machines. How ncccl-

fary it is, that thofe who make an objeftion to any fyiiem, fhould confider tirit whether the objection be not equally forcible againft doftrines which they ihemfelves hold !

9. It is further objeBed, that moral neceffity places

men, with refpett to liberty, on a level with brutes.

If by liberty be meant contingence or previous un- certainty, 1 grant that the actions of men and brutes are in this fenfe eq\ially void of liberty ; a previous certainty attends them enually. Or if it could be made to appear, that the atlions of men arc previ- oufly uncertain ; I (hould maintain, that thole of brutes are equally uncertain, and in this fenfe equally

free. If by liberty be meant exemption from ex-

trinfic caufality of volition ; 1 grant, that in this fenfe alfo the adionsof men and brutes are equally void of liberty. Men no more manufadure their own volitions, than brutes ; and there is no more ev- idence, that men act without motive or defign, than that brutes do. But if by liberty be meant rational liberty, the liberty of « moj-al agent, I hold that men are pofTcfTed of this, and brutes not. Brutes are no moral agents ; but it is for the want of reafon and intelligence, not of any power of will. If Sir Ifaac Xewion's horfe had had as much reafon and knowl- edge as his mafter', he no doubt would have had as much moral liberty, and would have been equally a moral agent and equally accountable. Without rea- fon and intelligence, thouoh a horfe (liould have a liberty of perfetl uncertainty and adt by the purelt chance ; and though he Ihould propagate one voli- tion by another, or without another, with ever lb great dexterity ; he would be a brute Ihll, and no more 3

moral

i88

moral agent, than he is now that he aBs by motive or appetite. So that the difference between a man and a beaft, as to moral agency, confids not in liber- ty of contingence or hberty of felf-determination ; but in reafon and knowledge.

We might on this fiibjeB venture to turn the tables on our opponents, and hold, that if a power of felf-de- termination be liberty, brutes are free as well as men. The afs determining to eat of one of two equally good bundles of hay, is as good an inftance to prove, that fhe has a felf-determining power, as any brought to prove it in men. So that if thofe inftances prove it in men, this proves it in brutes. Self-determining power then is nothing diftin6live between men and brutes.

The capacity of confidering and judging, of dif- tinguifliing virtue and vic^of deliberating, reafoning, refleeling, and fufpending, have been mentioned as diitinguifliing between men and brutes. But all thefe, except fufpending^ are ads of the intelleQ, not of the will : And fufpenfion, though an aQ of the •will, does not appear to imply felf-determination more than any other ad of the will. Befides ; brutes fuf- pend, as well as men. A dog in quell of his mafter, will fufpend proceeding in any road, till he is fatisfied, in which his mailer has gone. And Ihecp, a more flupid race, on hearing a dog bark, will often iuf- pend their flight, till they fee from what quarter their enemy is approaching.

It is faid, that external liberty and fpontaneity be- long to brutes and mad men, as well as to rational men. Be it fo ; yet the power and proper exercife

of reafon does not belong to them. It is faid, that

if an action's being voluntary makes it virtuous or vicious ; then brutes would be the fubjefts of virtue or vice. But merely that an aftion is voluntary does not conrtitute it virtuous or vicious. ' It muft befidcs be the action of a rational being.

Dr. Clarke, the greateft champion for the felf- determining power, exprefsly grants that chil- dren,'

i89

dren, beafls and even every living creature pofl'cls il. Remarks on ColJins, p. 27. " The adions of chiU *' dren, and the a6lions of every living creature are *' ali of them effentially free. The mechanical and «' involuntary motion of their bodies, fuch as the pul- «' fation of the heart and the like, are indeed all nee- «4 efTary ; but they are none of them anions. Every « aHion, every motion ariling from the filf-moving « principle, is e{reniiallyy7T(?. The difference is this <« only, in men this phylical liberty is joined with a « fenfe or confcioulnefs of moral good or evil, and « is therefore eminently called liberty. In beafls " the fame phyfical liberty or felf-moving power, is *« wholly feparatc from a fenfe or confcioufnefs or ca- " pacity of judging of moral good or evil and is vul- " garly called fpontaneity. In children the fame *« phyfical liberty always is from the very beginning; " and in proportion as they increaie in age and in ca- " pacity of judging, they grow continually in degree " not more Jree, but more moral, agents." Thus we have the DoBor's authority, that children and beafts poffefs a felf-determining power, as well as men, and that they are not only as really free as men, but that their freedom is in degree equal to that of men ; and that what they want to conftitute them moral agents, is not liberty, but rcafon and a capacity of judging. lO. Much has been faid by Dr. Clarke and oth- ers after him, concerning the beginning of motion ; by motion meaning volition, if they mean any thing to the purpofe. The argument is, that if motion, i. e, volition, had a beginning, it was begun by God, and of courfe he had a felf-moving or felf-determining power, a power efficiently to caufe volition in him- felf, and aQually did thus caufe it. That volition even in the Deity had a beginning, the Do8or ar- gues thus ; " Motion muft cither finally be rcfolvcd *' into a firft mover, in whom confcquentlv there is " liberty of aftion," i. e. fclf-determinaiion, *• or elfe " into an infinite chain of caufcs a»d efFcds without

" any

igO

" any caufe at all ; which is an exprefs contradidioq, " except motion could be necefl'arily exiflent in its " own nature ; which that it is not, is evident, be- " caufe the idea of reft is no contradiftion j and alio be- ^' caufe there being no motion without a particular *' determination one certain way, and no one deler- <* mination being more necefl'ary than another, an ef- " fential and neceflnry tendency to motion in all de- " terminations equally, could never have produced '' any motion at all." Remarks on Collins, p. ii, 12. Motion throughout this quotation means internal mo- tion ar volition, or the whole is nothing to the pur- pofe. I grant that external motion, the motion of matter, had a beginning, and that after the creation of matter. But the whole queftion is concerning vo- lition, the aft or motion of the mind. That this is not neceffarily exiftent, and therefore not from eter- nity, the Dotlor argues firfl; from this, that "the idea of reft," i. e, of an entire abfence or non-exiftence of volition, " is no contradiBion." It is doubdefs as much and in the fame fenfe a contradiBion, as the idea of the entire non-exiftence of knowledge or in- telligence, or of all being -. And if this argument prove, that volition had a beginning, it will equally prove, that knowledge or the divine exiftence had a begin- ning. Volition isjuft as neceffarily exiftent as God is ; without volition he would not be God. It is impof- lible, that God fliould from eternity have intelligence and not from eternity have volition.

The DoftoF goes on to argue the beginning of vo- lition thus ; " There being no motion, i. e. volition, '' without a particular determination one certain way, " and no one determination being in nature more *' necedary than another, an efiential and neceffary " tendency to volition in all determinations equally, " could never have produced any volition at all." On this I obfervc,

1. That by the lame argument all intelleftual ideas and perceptions of happincfsin the divine mind have

^9^

a beginning ; tlius, There being no intellc6lual idea without a particular determination one way, and no one determination being in nature more necelTary than another, an elTcntial and neceflary tendency to all determinations of idea equally, could never have produced any idea at all. And with regard to per- ception of happinefs, thus ; There being no percep- tion of happinefs or mifery without a particular de- termination one certain way, and no one determina- tion being in nature more neceffary than another, an eflential and neceflary tendency to the perception of happinefs or mifery in all determinations equally could never have produced any particular percep

tion of them at all. The fame argument will prove

that God's exiftence is not eternal and neceflary ; thus. There can be no being, who is not a particular, dc terminate being ; and no particular form or kind of being is in nature more neceflary than another. But an elfcntial and neceflary tendency to exiftencc in all forms and kinds equally, could never have been the foundation of any particular being at all.

If in thefe cafes it fliould be objefted, that one determination of idea is in nature more neceflary than another ; that which is according to truth and fa6l, is more neceflary than that which is contrary to truth ; and that feeling of happinefs, and that form of cxift- cnce which is mod complete and perfeft, is more neceflary, than that which is lefs perfcft : 1 anfwer, for the fame reafon, it muft be granted, that the vo- lition which is mofl rational, wile and holy, is more neceflary, than that which is lefs wife and holy ; and therefore this particular volition or determination of will is neceflarily exiflent in its own nature, and is without beginning.

2. From the luppofition, that the volitions of God are not eternal and as neceflarily exiftcnt as the di- vine knowledge or divine exiftence, it follows, that he is very far from an unchangeable being ; that from elcrniiy he exifted without any volition or choice of

one

19^

one thing in preference to another ; that when the eternity a parte ante^ as it is called, had run out, he began to will and choofe, and from that time he has been the fubjefl of various ads of v/ill, but never before, and therefore has been the fubjeft of a very great change.

That God Uiould from eternity exift ir-ithout vo- lition, and that in time he fhould become the fubjecl of volition, implies not only a very great change in God, but that from eternity he was not a voluntary agent, and therefore no agent at all. So that the very argument which Dr. Clarke ufes to prove, that God is a felf-dcterminate agent, in faft does, direflly contrary to his intention, prove, that he was from eter- nity no agent at all.

If God began volition in himfelf, he began it either voluntarily or involuntarily. If he began it voluntarily, he would be the fubje6l of an infinite feries of volitions caufing one another; whichisanabfurdity, impoffibili- ty and contradiflion. If he began it involuntarily, he did not begin it freely.

In his remarks on Collins, p. 6, Dr. Clarke fays, " To be an agent fignifies, to have a power of begin- *' ning motion." Motion here, if it be at all to the purpofe, mud mean volition : And to fay, " To be an " agent fignifies to have a power of beginning volition." is a fervile begging of the queftion, utterly unworthy of Dr. Clarke.

In the fame book, p. 44, he obferves, " That if mo-

«'tion exift neceffarily of itfelf with a determina-

" tion one certain way ; then that determination is " neceffary, and confequcntly all other determina- '• lions impoflible ; which is contrary to experience." And how does it appear by experience, that any oth- er determinations of will are, or ever were, pofTible in the divine mind, than that which aftually exifts in it ? Did Dr. Clarke experience divine exercifes, and find by that experience, that other volitions are pof- fiblc in God than what adually exift ? Surely this

was

was written by the Doftor with great inattention !

If to fave the Do6lor it fhould be f,iid, that this ob- fervation relates not to volition, but to the motion of matter ; this, if it were the meaning of the Do6lor, would ar;;uc equal inattention. Would he have im- agined, that becaufe the motion of matter is not from eternity and neccfl'arily cxiflent ; therefore the fame is true of thought and volition ?

11. Self-determination has been argued from the irregular condu6l of mankind, and efpecially from the confideration, that their moral exercifes are fo ir- regular and out of courfe. But the exercifes and conduft of men, are not more irregular than the blow- ing of the wind, or the (late of maw's body often is in fickncfs. Yet it will not be pretended, that this con- fideration proves, that ficknefs or the blowing of the wind is felf-determinate.

12. Dr. Weft objeds, that "according to Mr. Ed- " wards, the mind muft always be governed by chance *• or accident ; i. e. by fomething unforefeen or not de- " figned bvthe mind beforehand. Thus,let a man's mind "be ever fo ftrongly determined at prefent, topurfue "any particular obje£l, yet thatextrinfic caufe, which *' has the entire command of his will, may the next " hour fruftrate ail his purpofcs, and determine him to " a quite contrary purfuit. If this is not to be gov- " erned by blind fate and chance, I know not what is." Fart II, p. 31. On this I obfervc,

1. Whether the Da6 or do or do not know, what it is to be governed by blind fate and chance, is of no importance to his readers ; and what a pity, that he fhould confume fo much of his own and his readers' lime, in appeals to himfelf as an authority.

2. According 10 this account, to be under the govcrnin;^ influence of any extrinfic caufe, is to be governed by blind fate arid chance. Therefore the planetary fyftem and all the material world are under the government of blmd faie and chance ; fo were the prophets and apoilles, fo far as they were infpired

N" and

194

and influenced by the Spirit of Godi Does Dr. Weft acknowledge this ? If not, mult he not own, that when he wrote the pafTage above quoted, he was miftaken in his idea of being governed by blind fate and chance ? 3. Doubtlefs Prefident Edwards holds, that the human mind is often governed by motives " un- « forefeen and not defigned by the mind before- « hand." And as Dr. Weft holds, that the mind never a6ls without motive, unlefs he hold alfo, that it always forefees beforehand, the motives on which it will in future a6}, he muft join with Prefident Ed- wards in the idea, that it afts on, or which is the fame, is governed by motives " unforefeen and not defign- ed by the mind beforehand :" And therefore on the fame gro\ind, on which he charges Prefident Edwards vith holding principles, which imply that the mind is governed by blind fate and chance, he may be charg- ed with the fame.

- He alfo holds, that God " regulates and governs "all things and fets bounds to the actions of all ra- '* tional creatures, to bring about his own purpofes," and that " infallibly." Part II, p. 46, 47. " That " the Deity governs free agents as perJeHly and viakes " them perform his purpofes as m/allibly, as though " they had no agency at all." Ibid, p. 67. And that "every thinghjirmlyjixed in the divine mind." Ibid, p. 49. Now the Deity is a caufe extrinfic to the hti- man mind, and by conceflion, he regulates, governs, and overrules all the aftions of intelligent creatures, and makes them infallibly perform his purpofes. There- fore " let a man's mind be ever foftrongly determin- " ed at prefent to purfue any particular objetl, yet " that extrinfic caufe," the Deity, " which has the *' entire command of liis will, may," and certainly will, '• fruftrate all his purpofes," unlefs the objeft of his purfuit be agreeable to the purpofes of the De- ity. Now then I appeal to the reader, whether Dr. Weft do not as fully hold ihofe principles which he fays imply, that men are governed by blind fate and chance, as Prefi^ient Edwards. CHAPTER.

^95

CHAPTER VIl/.

'In which is coiijidered the Obje&ion, that Moral Nccejfi- ty mplieSi that God is the Author of Sin.

IT is objeBed to tlie doftrine of moral neceflityi fliiU fince this ncceflity and the conneclion between motives and volitions are eftablifhed by God, he is the author of all the fin and wickednefs in the uni- verfe ; that he by the motives which he lays before creatures, tempts them to fin, and is himfelf anfwera- ble for all the fin committed by them. And a great deal of vehement declamation is poured out on this fuhjeft, well fuiied to take hold of the feelings and paflions of men, but not to inform their underfland- ings and affilt their reafon.

Before we proceed to amoredireft and particular confideration of this objeflion, it is proper to fhow in what fenfe the advocates for moral neceffity hold that the divine agency is concerned in the exiflcnce of fin.

1. They do hold, that all neceffity and certainty or certain futurity, whether of natural or moral events, is eftablifhed by God ; of courle that the connedioii between all caufes and tfl'e6ls, and particularly the: connection between motives and volitions, is eftab- lifhed by the fime fupreme agent.

?.. They hold, that all things, which come to pafa in time, were certainly foreordained by God from e- ternity ; that he foreor dained them not in conftquence of forefeeing, that the free will of man will bring them into exiftcnce ; but the free will of man brings them into exiftence, in confequenceof the divine de- cree, fo far as that will does at all bring them into ex- iftence.

3. They hold, that whatever fin takes place among

creatures, takes pl.ice not by the bare permifljion or

non-influence of God ; but under his fuperiniend-

X 2 ing

ing providence, and in confequence of his difpofing things fo, that fin certainly or with moral neceffity,

follows. Prefident Edwards has explained himfelf

fully on this head. Inquiry, p. 254 ; *' If by the au- ^^tkor offm be meant thej'zn/zcr, the agent ov adlor of " fin, or the doer of a wicked thing ; fo it would be " a reproach and blafphemy, to fuppofe God to be the " author of fin. In this fenfe I utterly deny God to " be the author of fin ; rejecting fuch an imputation " on the Mod High, as what is infinitely to be abhor- " red ; and deny any fuch thing to be the confe- " quence of what I have laid down. But if by author of ^^ fin is meant the permitter or not hinderer of fin, and '* at the fame time, a dfpofer of the fate of events in fuch *• a manner, for wife, holy and moft excellent ends and " purpofes, THAT SIN, if it bepermitted andnot hinder-

*' edjWILL MOST CERTAINLY FOLLOW 1 do HOt

" deny, that God is the author of fin it is no re-

" proach for the Moft High to be thus the author of fin."

The objediions againft fuch an agency of. God in the exiftence of fin, as has been now defcribed, are two ; (1) That fuch divine agency is inconfiftent with human liberty, moral agency and accountablenefs : (2) That it is inconfiftent with the perfeft holinefs of God. Before I anfwer thefe objeftions diftinftly, 1 wi(h it to be obferved, that they are inconfiftent and mutually deftroy each other.

If the divine agency in the eftablifliment of moral neceffity and the connexion between motives and vo- litions, be inconfiftent with our liberty and moral a- gency ; then God in eftabliftiing fuch a neceffity of any adion in us, which we call fin, is not the caufe or author offn ; for his agency fo far from produc- ing fin in us, renders us incapable of fin. Suppofe God with moral neceffity influence a man to kill an- other with malice prepenfe ; if this neceffitating influ- ence as really deftroy his moral agency, as if it turn- ed him into a windmill, though the man kills the ©therj he commits no more fin in it; than if a windmill

had

^97

had killed hira ; and confequently God is no more the author of fin in this inflance, than if he had in- fluenced the windmill to kill him, or had firft turned the man into a windmill, and this windmill had in the courfe of providence been the inftrument of his death. So that they who hold, that moral neceffity is inconfiftent with moral agency, muft never objedt, that GodisMi? author ofjin^ by eftablilhingthatnecef fity, and thus aBs inconfillenily with his perfeftholinefs.

On the other hand, if God do influence any man to commit fin, and thus afl; inconfiftently with his perfeft holinefs, the man is a moral agent notwithftanding fuch influence, and there is no foundation to objeft, that the influence is inconfiftent with liberty and moral agcn. cy ; and they who obje6l that fuch influence implies, that God is the author of Jin, muft forever be filent concerning the inconfiftency of that influence with human liberty and moral agency.

If moral neceflity be inconfiftent with moral agency, it is abfolutely impoffible and contradiftory for God lo difpofe things fo, that fin will certainly or with moral neceflity follow. For on thisfuppofition whatever cer- tainly follows fuch a difpofal cannot be fin or any other moral a6t, as moral agency is in the cafe deftroyed by the difpofal. Therefore it is impoflTible, that God in this way fliould caufe fin, and therefore it is abfurd and felf-contradiBory in thofe who hold, that moral neceflity is inconfiftent with moral agency, to charge us with blafphemy, as they frequently do, becaufe we avow the fentiment, that God fo difpofes events that fm certainly follows.

Yet fo far as I know, all thofe who oppofe moral neceflity, make both the obje8ions before mentioned, and thus pull down with one hand, what they buildup with the other. This is eminently true of Dr. Weft.

I now proceed to confider thofe obje8ions dif- tinaiy.

1. It isobjefted, that a divine agency eftablifliing

a moral neceflity of fin, is inconfiftent with human

N 3 liberty,

iiberty, moral agency and accountablenefs.— -» Anfwer : The divine agency in this cafe js no more inconfiftent with human liberty, &c. than the njoral ncceffity which il eflabliflies. If this neceffity be incor)fiftent with liberty, be it fo ; the divine agency which caufcs it, does not increafe the inconfiftency, beyond what would be, if that neceflity took place ■without fuch agency. A mountain placed acrofs the .channel of a river, may be inconfiftent with the river's flowing in that channel. But whether it were placed there by God, were conftruQed there by human art and labour, or happened there without caufe, are queftions immaterial as to the river's running in that channel, fg long as the mountain is the very fame. Therefore let our opponents prove, that moral necef- lity or a previous certainty of moral a6lions, j^ irjconfift- pnt with moral agency, and that moral agents tnuft a5t by perfeft coniingence, mere chance and blind fate, and they will carry their point, without faying a word concerning the divine agency : And until they prove this, whatever they may fay concerning the divine agency, will ferye no good purpofe to their caufe, as to this part of the argument.

2. It is objeded, that for God to eftablifli a moral neceflity of fjn, or as Prefident Edwards expreiles it, ?' for God to difpofe of the (late of events in fuch ^ " manner, for wife, holy and moft excellent ends, " that fin will mt>ft certainly and infallibly follow;"

is inconfiftent with ti,e perfe£l hoiinefs of God.

But in y»'hat refpeflsis it inconfiftent with his hoiinefs.? Or for what reafons are we to conclude, that it is in- confiftent with his hoiinefs ? So far as I have been able 10 coUeti the reafons from the ableft. writers on that fide of the queftion, they are thcfe :

(i) That whatever is in the effcft is in the caufe, and the nature of every caufe may be known by the effe6l. Therefore if God foorder things, that fin will certainly follow, he is the caufe of fin, and therefore

is finlul himfelf. If this argument be good, Go4

' ' ' is

^99

is the fubjeft of pain, ficknefs and death, fmce he is the caufe of them : He is material and is the fubjeft of ail the properties of matter, extenfion, fohdity, mo- bility, figure, colour, Szc. becaufc he created matter and all its properties. Yea he fuffers the torments of

hell, bccaufe he inflitls ihcm, This argument,

though urged by men of great fame, is too weak and abfurd to bear inrpe6lion !

(2) If God difpofe things fo, that fm will certainly follow ; he doubtlefs takes pleafure in fin, and this

implies fin in God himfelf. If God do take a di-

redl and immediate complacency in fin, it is granted, that this would imply fin in God. But if he cboofe the exigence of fin as a mean of good only, as pain and ficknefs may be the means of good ; this implies; no fin in God. Nor does it follow from his difpofing things fo, that fin certainly takes place, that he does direftly delight in fin itlelf ab(lra6^ly confidcred, any more than it follows from his inflifting ficknefs and mifery on his creatures, that he takes a dire£t com- placency in thcfe. And we do not allow, but utterly deny, that God from a dire6l complacencey in fin difpofes things fo, that it certainly follows. If our op- ponents believe that a direfl complacency of God in lin is implied in our doftrine, it behoves them to make it out, and not to take it for granted.

Dr. Weft infifts on this argument. Part II, p. 43.

" If the Deity produces finful volitions then fin

" is his own work and then he cannot hate fin,

*' but mult love it and delight in it." It fcems the Dodor forcfaw that to this argument it would be an- fwered that God's producing fin in the manner before explained, no more implies a dirc6l complacency in it, than his producing mifery implies a dire£l compla- cency in that ; and he replies, that " the two cafc^

" are by no means parallel that the Deity is no

" where reprefcnted as being angry at his creatures,

" becaufe they fuflTcr pain and difirefs whereas.

"with regard to moral evil, Godisalwaysreprefentcd N 4 ^' as

200

^' as haling it, and punifhlng the impenitent." To this 1 rejoin, that the want of parallehlm does not ap- pear. P'or though God is not reprefenled to be an- gry at pain and mi/cry, as they are not the proper ob- je6ls of anger ; yet he is reprefented to be difpleafed with them j and anger is only one kind of difpleafure, (difpleafure at moral evil. And if God do produce a thing, with which he is difpleafed, why may he not produce a thing with which he is angry, and which he is difpofed to punifh as it deferves ? Let a reafon be given, why he may not do the latter, as well as the former.

(3) God hates fin and doubtlefs he mufl hate to bring it into exiftence ; and therefore he will notfo dif- pofe things, that it will certainly come into exiftence. But God hates the pain, mifery and death of his crea- tures in the fame fenle, that he hates (in ; yet we fincj in faft, that he docs difpofe things fo, that they do take place among his creatures.

(4) That God fhould fo difpofe of events, that .finr is the certain confcquence, is doing evil, that good may come of it ; which is contrary to fcripture, as

well as reafon. -This is merely aiferting, bat not

proving what is afleried. Hov/ does it appear, that for God fo to difpofe of events, that fm is the certain confequence, and this to fubferve the moft wife and holy pi{.rpofes, is dojng evil ? To do evil is to commit fin } and to fay that this is to commit fin. is to beg the queftion. Let it be proved to imply, that God commits fin, and the point is gained. We af- fert, that to fay, fuch a dtfpofal implies, that God com- miis fin, is as groundlefs a propofiiion, as to fay, that if God fo difpofe of events, that ficknefsis the certain confequence, implies, that God himfelf is fick. I prefume. it will not be denied, that God did fo dif- pofe of events, that the certain confequence would be that jofeph fiiould be fold into Fgypt, and that our Saviour Ihould be crucified. Nor will it be denied, ^hat God made this difpofition of events with a holy

an4

201

and wife purpafe. And if God may do thi$ in one or two iuHanccs ; why may he not do the fame in every jn(tance, in which (in atlually exids ?

(5) That God fliould make an eftabliflimenl V/heve- by any creature is laid under a moral necciluy of fin-, ning is a great injury, both lo the creature himfelf, and alfo to the fyllem ; as all fin is injurious lo the

fyflem. Anlwer : What injury can be pretended to

be done to the creature, who is the fubjc6lof ihe fin, in the cafe defcribed, fo long as his liberty and moral agency remain entire ? And they do remain entire by the fuppofition ; elfe he would be incapable of fin. A creature which is not, and fo long as it remains to be, not a moral agent, cannot be influenced even by God himfelf to commit fin : It would imply a contra- di£lion. So that there is no foui^dation for com- plaint, that the fubjetl is injured, by being laid un- der a moral neceffity, or previous certainty, of lin-

ning. Befides; this objection in)plies, that every

moral agent is injured, unlcf;; it be a matter of per- fect uncertainty, what his future atlions fhall be, un- certainty not only to himfelf and all creatures, but to God and in the nature of things ; i. e. every moral agent is injured, pnlefs he be left to a6l by puie chance.

With regard (o injury lo the fyftem of intelligent beings, there is, ifpollible, Itilllefs foundation for ob- jetlion on this ground. For it is a part of the doc- trine of moral neceffity, that God never eflabliihes it, excepting when it's eliablifhment is fiibfervicni and neceffary lo the general good of that f\ fiem, in;pl\ int; the divine glory ; and to be furc, that God never fa difpofes of events, that fin certainly follows, unlefs fuch a difpenfalion is neceffary to the general good : Nor ought the contrary to be taken for granted. If God do in any infiance fo difpofe of events, that fii.i certainly follows, when the exidence of that fin is net neceflary to the general good, but injurious to it ; [ confefsj I fee not how in this cafe, the divine holinefs

can

202

can be vindicated. But this is nothing peculiar to the introdudion of fin. It would alfo be inconfiftent Avith the divine perfeft holinefs and wifdom lo create matter, or to caufe holinefs, in fuch circumftances as lo differve the general good"

(6) It is inquired, Where is the confidence between God's laying a man under a moral necefiity of finning, and then punifhing him for that fin ? 1 anfwer,

1. How can God confidently make a man fick, and then apply medicines or any remedy toward his reftoration ? Punifhment is inflifted to prevent either the fubjeft of the punifiiment, or others, from falling into the fame pratlice. If there be no inconfiftence in bringing ficknefs on a man, and then healing him by medicine ; where is the inconfiftence in bringing fin, which is moral ficknefs, on a man, and whereby both he and that fyftem are fo far morally difeafed, and then by punin:iment healing him or the (yftem ?

2. There is no confiftence in the cafe, if moral neceffity be incompatible with moral agency. But if it be entirely compatible with moral agency, there is no inconfiftence in the cafe : For in la\in!J a man under a moral necefiity o^Jinning^ as he is fuppofed iiWlio fin^ nothing is done to impair his moral agency or his defert of punifhment. On this fuppofition it is immaterial as to defert of punifhment, who or what is the caufe of the moral necefliity, whether God or any other being, or whether it happen without caufe. Therefore God may as confiftently punifh a finner, whom he himfelf has laid under a moral necefi[jty of finning, as he may punifli him, provided he be laid under the fame moral necefiity by any other being, or by mere chance. ]f moral necefiity be entirely confident with defert of punifhment, it is as imper- tinent to afk bow God can confiftently lay a man un- der a moral neccfTity of finning and then punifii him for it, as to aflv bow God can confiftently make a man of a dark complexion or a low ftature and then pun- ifh him, for any fins, which he may commit. For

moral

203

moral nccefCny is no more incohfiftent with fin and detVrt of punifhnicnt, than a dark complexion or a low (taturc. To lay a man under a moral necelTity of finning, is to make it certain, that he will fin : And to afk how God can confidently make it certain, that be will fin, and then punifh him for that fin, implies that previous certainty is inconfiftent with fin, and that in order to fin a man muft atl by mere chance. It is no more inconfiftent, for God to forbid men to fin, and yet h difpofe things, that they certainly will commit fin ; than it is to forbid them to fin, and yet voluntarily to fuffer other caufes to lead them into fin. Nay, fince liberty is out of the queftion, as by the very flatement of the obje8ion, it allows, that not- \vithftanding the divine difpofal, the man who is thq fubje6t of that difpofal does commit Jin ; it is no more inconfiflent for God to forbid men to fin. and yet fo difpofe things, that fin will follow, than ii i.s for him to forbid it, and yet voluntarily permit men tQ fin by felfdetermination. For in Hifpofing things fo that fin follows, when the difpofal is fuppofed to be confident with fin and moral agency, nothing can be pretended to be inconfillent with the prohibition of fin, unlefs it be the divine confept, that fin fliould come into exiftcnce ; and this equally exifts in the cafe of bare permiflTion, as in the cafe of the aforcfaid difpofal. The law of God, which forbids all fin, does not imply, that God will prevent fin, by introducmg the greater evil of defiroying moral agency. Nor docs it imply, that he will not confent in his own mind, that it be committed by men or other moral agents, rather than the faid greater evil or other as ;^rcat evil (hould take place. Tiicrefore rather than that the fame or as great an evil Ihould take plac e, the Deity may not only conferit to the exill- ence of fin, hut may confent, that fccond caufes, mo- tives, temptations, &c. fhould do whatever they can do, toward the introdu6lion of it, confidently with the freedom of ihc creature. He may do all this without

inconfiftcncc

204

inconfiftence and infincerity. The prohibition of fin in the law does not imply a wifh or choice of the di- vine mind, all things conlidered, that fin fhould not be committed. It barely points out our duty, but reveals nothing of God's defign, whether or not to per- mit it, or to difpofe things fo, that it will follow. Therefore there is no inconfiftence between this pro- hibition and fuch a difpofal in providence, as will be followed by fin. A good mafter may ftridly for- bid his fervant to fteal ; yet convinced, that he does fteal, the mafter may in a particular cafe, wifh him to flea!, and even leave money expofed to him, that he may fteal, and ultimately with a defign that an advan- tage may be put into the matter's hand, to convi6l, pun- ifti and reform his fervant. There is no inconfiftence in the mafter's thus forbidding theft, and yet from the motive before meniioned wifhing to have it committed.

(7) It is faid, that if God choofe that the fmiulnefs of volitions fliould come into exiftence, and if he fo difpofe events, that it will certainly come into exift- ence ; there is no difference between this, and God's

being himfelf the fubjedt of fmful volitions. 1 an-

fwer, there is the fame difference in this cafe, as there is between God's choofing that a man fliould be fick, and being the fubjeft of ficknefs himfelf ; as there is between creating matter, and being himfelf material ; and as there is between willing andcaufingthe damna- tion of a finner, and being himfelf the fubjeft of dam- nation. It will not be pretended, that if God difpofe events and circumftances in fuch a manner, that re- pentance, godly forrow, faith in a Redeemer, fubmif- fion and holy fear, take place in the heart of a man, God himfelf is the fubje6l of thofe exercifes.

If, though human liberty be left entire, God can- not fb difpofe things, that fin will certainly follow, without being himfelf the fubje6l of a difpofition friendly to fin ; he cannot without the fame implica- tion choofe, that fin fhould take place, rather than a greater evil. But our opponents allow, that God did

choofe,

^Q5

choofe, that fin fhoiild take place, rather than a great- er evil ; they allow, that he had a pcrfeft foreknowl- edge, that if he fhould create man with a felf-deter- mining power, and leave him to the free exercife of that power, the confequence would be, that he would commit fin. Therefore they allow, that God chofe, that fin fhould come into exigence, rather than hu- man liberty fhould be deflroyedjand rather than free agents fhould not be brought intoexifience. So that in the fame fenfe, in which we hold, that God chofe or was willing, that fin fhould come into exiflence, our opponents hold the fame. We hold, that God chofe that fin fhould take place, rather than a greater evil ; and therefore difpofed of events confiftently with human liberty, fo that it certainly followed. They hold, that God chofe, that fin fliould take place, rather than a greater evil, and therefore difpofed of events, confidently with human liberty, fothat it cer- cainly followed, and when God certainly forefaw, that it would follow.

In that our opponents charge us with holding prin- ciples, which imply, that God is the author of fin^xhty allow, that whatever God does according to our prin- ciples toward the introdu61ion of fin, is confident with free agency in the fubjc6t of fin. This muft be con- ceded by them ; elfe their charge is perfcttly incon- fiftent and felfcontradifclory, as has been fhown. Therefore fince it is allowed, that whatever God has done toward the exiftence of fin, is confiflcnt with the creature's free agency, the only queflion remain- ing, is, whether he have adled in this affair, with a holy and wife defign, a defign to promote the gener- al good : And we arque from the effential perfeflions of God, that whatever he has done in this, as well as in every other inllance, mufl have been done with fuch a defign.

If it be faid, that fin cannot even bv the Deity, be made fubfcrvient to good ; the qucliion will arife, why then did he fo dilpofe circumllanccs that it did

come

-o6

come into eNiftencp, and this when he forcfaw theJ conC^qirence ? To anfwer, that he could not, confift- ently with free agency, keep it out of exiltence, is on the prefent fuppofition groundlels. It is now fuppof- ed, that God did bring it into exiftence, confidently with free agency ; and therefore he could doubtlefs keep it out of exiftence, confiftently with the fame free agency.

If the exiftence of fin be ultimately made fubfervi- ent to good, or if it be neceflary to the prevention of greater evil ; what reafon in the world, can be given^ why God fhould not bring it into exiftence, in a way confiftent with human free agency ? In this way it muft be brought into exiftence, if at all. Our op- ponents themlelvcs allow, as has been obferved, that the exiftence of it was neceftary to the prevention of greater evil, the evil ofdeftroying human liberty, or of the non-exiftence of free agents : And for God in this view to'confent to the exiftence of (in, as our oppo- nents grant that he did, is as inconfiftent with his moral charafter, as to give the fame confent and to put forth any exertion toward its exiftence, confiftent with human liberty. So long as the exertion is con- fiftent with liberty, it cannot be pretended, that there is any thing in it more oppofile to the moral charac- ter of God or more friendly to fin, than there is in the confent implied in that permiffion of fin, which our opponents hold. Therefore their plan is in this refpetl equally liable to the fame objeftion of being inconfiftent with the moral chara6ler of God, as our's.

(8) Dr. Weft argues, that if the Deity order things io that finful volition follow, " he muft place the ob- " jecl in fuch a view before the mind, as to make it " appear the greateft good under prefent circumftan- " ces ; which implies, that he prefents the objeft in " a falfe point of light, and eftedually deceives the "mind;" and '• theapoftlewas under a great miftakc. " when heTaid, it was impoftible for God to lie ;" and to lie is fin. The Do6lor, as ufual, tells us, " I

" can

20'/

" can have no idea, that the Deity can produce a fin- " ful volition in the human mind, in any other wav, " than what I have now defcribcd ;" Part II, p* 41. On this I remark ;

1. It is very imn^aterial to others, what Dr. Weft can, and what he cannot, have an idea of. Does the Dottor mean this as an argument, that no other per- fon can have an idea of it, or that it cannot be true ?

2. If when he fpeaks of God's making fin appear the greateft good, he mean, that he makes it appear fo to a man's unbiafed reafon, this is not true, nor is it pretended by any man.

3. When fin appears to any man the greateft good, it is in confequence of the influence of his cor- rupt appetites, and not by the dictates of his unbiafed reafon. How a man becomes the lubjeti of corrupt appetite, I do not undertake to fay any further than Prefident Edwards has faid already, that God has dif- pofed things fo, that it takes place as an infallible confe- quence. But if God fo difpoi'e things, that an inordi- nate appetite for ftrong drink lake place in the mind of a man, and by the itifluence of fuch appetite ftrong drink appear to him the greated good ; does it hence follow, that God is a liar ? Will Dr. Well affert it .? If not, the ground of his argument fails.

The Do6tor further obfervcs, that "• if God is the "author of men's lulls, he deceives them, by caufing " them to view things through the falle medium of

" their lulls ;" ibid, p. 4*, 43. The exprellion,

" God is the author of men's lulls," is the Poftor's, not Prefident Edwards's. It tendsto miflead, and cannot be admitted, without explanation and qualifying. Suppofe a man by leading his neighbour, fiequenily into the immoderate ufe of ilrong drink, fliould pro- duce an appetite for it in his neighbour, fo tjiat hence- forward flrong drink fliould appear to him the greatcit good ; is the man, who does this, a liar ? Whether he be guilty of other fin, than lying, is nothing to the prefect piirpofe ; for Dr. Wcd'i argument is, that

God

20S •

God byproducingluft in men, deceives the man infuch a fenfe, as to difprove the words of the apoftle, that God cannot lie. l{ the man above fuppofed be not guihy of lying, neither is the Deity in fo difpofing things, that luft infallibly follows.

(9) " If the Deity be the pofitive efficient caufe of " fin, then there can be no foundation for repentance : " For how can a man repent or be forry, that he is juft « fuch a creature, in every refpeft, as the Almighty has

" been pleafed to make him ?" Ibid, p. 44. 'With the

fame objedion to the expreffion, " pofitive efficient caufe of ^n," I obferve, that this argument is equally good with refped to pain, ficknefs and calamity j and •will prove that no manought to be forry for any calamity befalling liimfelf or others : For " how can a man be forry, that he is juft fuch a creature," juft as mifera- ble, " as God has made him ?" If the Do£tor fay, that though calamity in itfelf is an evil and therefore to be regretted ; yet as God fends it, he will overrule it for good, and that in that view it is not to be regret- ted ; the fame obfervations are applicable to the ex- iftence of fin. Sin in itfelf confidered is infinitely vile and abominable, and proper matter of forrowand repentance. But confidering that it no more came into exiftence without the defign and providence of God, than calamity did ; and confidering, thatiis ex- iftence will be certainly overruled for final good ; its exiftence is no more to be regretted, than the exift- ence of calamity and mifery, efpecially extreme and eternal mifery.

The Doftor proceeds ; " What remorfe of con- "fciencecan there be, when the finner believes that " every finful volition was formed in him by the De- " ity ?" Ibid. Sinful volitions proceed from fome caufe, or no caufe. If they proceed from no caufe, what remorfe of confciencc can there be, when the finner believes and knows, that every finful volition happen- ed in him bv pure chance ? If finful volitions pro- ceed from fome caufe, that caufe is either the finner

himfeif

himfelf or fome extrinfic caufe. If they proceed from any other extrinfic caufe, befide the Deity, the fame difficuhy will arife, and it may be afked with the fame pertinency, as the above queftion is afked by Dr. Welt, What t-emorfe of confcience can there be, when the fmner beheves, that every finful vohtion was formed in him by an extrinfic caufe ? Ifthe effi- cient caufe be the finncr himfelf, then " felf a61s on felf and produces volition," which the Doctor denies: And if he did not deny it, it is abfurd and impoffible, as it runs into an infinite lericsof volitions propagating one another, and yet all thisferies would really amount to but one fingle volition, and this, as there would not then be a preceding caufal volition, would not be efficient- ly, voluntarily and freely caufed by the fubje6l himfelf.

Befides; ifthe fubje6i: efficiently caufe his own volitions, he either caufes them under the influence of motives or not. If he caufe them under the in- fluence of motives, he caufes them neceflarily, and a6ls neceffarilyin caufingthem ; andDr. Weft fays, " Where *'neceffity begins, liberty ends ;" ibid, p. 19. There- fore if a man cfhciently caufe his own volitions io as to be free from necelfity, he mufl caufe them with- out motive, aim or end ; i. e. he muft caufe them in perfe£l flupidity, and in the exercile of Dr. WefVs torpid liberty of not ading. And then I atk, what remorfe of confcience can there be, when the (inner believes, that he himfelf caufed every finful volition in himfelf, as involuntarily as a man in a convulfion ftrikes his friend, and as flupidly and unmeaningly as a door turns on its hinges ?

Remorfe of confcience is a fenfe of having done wrong J and whenever 3t perfon has done wrong, there is a foundation for remorfe of confcience; and to take it for granted, that there can be no remorfe cf confcience, unlefs we determine our own volitions, is to take it for granted, that wiiliout felf determination we can do no wrong and are no moral agents ; which is to beg the wain qucdion in this controverfv. Let it O be

ato

be ftiown, that without felf-determination, we are not tnoral agents, and one important Hep will be taken toward fettling this controverfy. Yet even this Hep will not be decifive : It muft be alfo fliown, that our felf-determination was not previoufly certain, but is fexercifed ^y mere chance : For if it be previoufly certain, it is morally neceflary.

(lo) If God have fo difpofed of events, that fin certainly follows, it is his work ; and to be oppofed to fin is " to be oppofed to God's work, and to be op- pofed to God ;" ibid. So calamity is the work of

God, and to be oppofed to that, is to be oppofed to God's work, and to be oppofed to God. And will Dr. Welt admit that every one who wiflies to efcape any calamity, is in a criminal manner oppofing God ?

(ii)" If the Deity has formed finful volitions in a " man^ becaufe his glory could not be promoted '' without it ; then furely the finner, if he loves God, " muft love him becatifehe has made him a finful crea- «' ture, and ought to thank him for all the fins, which *' he has committed ;" ibid. The difficulty attend- ing moft of Dr. Weft's arguments, is, that if they prove any thing, they prove too much, and confute principles and fads, which he will not dare to deny. So with refpeft to this argument. The Do6lor will not deny, that pain and calamity are the work of God. " And if the Deity has" fent pain and calamity "on " a man, becaufe his glory could not be promoted " without them ; then furely the finner, if he loves * God, muft love him, becaufe he has made him a" miferable " creature, and ought to thank him for all" the calamity and mifery, which he fuffers, for all his ficknefs and dangers, for the death of his wife, chil- dren, &c. Sec. And if a man ought to thank God for thefe things, no doubt, " a finner ought to thank God « for damnation." If thefe confequences do not in- evitably follow from the principle of IJr. Weft's ar- gument, let the contrary be ftiown, and not merely

aiferted. -Again ; " If we are to thank God for

all

211

all the calamities and miferies which we do or fhall fufFer ; " this will imply, that" calamity and tnifery " are bieffings or favours ; and confequentljs^ iF the « finner is to thank God for damnation, then damna- « tion is a bleffing and favour- — Hence finners who « believe this doftrine, will be apt to conclude, that « it is a matter of no confequence, whether they be " faved or damned ; feeing upon either fuppofition, " they are fure that whatever they receive from God « will be fuch a bleffing, that they ought to be thank-

*« ful for it." Ibid, p. 45.- Thus may the Dodlor's

arguments be retorted againft himfelf.

If theDoftor fhould anfwer, Though calamity and mifery in themfelves are no bieffings^ yet wheii they are overruled by God to the good of thofe who fuffer them, br to the general good, they become bieffings ; I acknowledge the fufficiency of the anfwer. But the fame anfwer may with equal truth and force be made to his obfervations concerning fin. The Doc- tor grants, that the wickednefs of the vicious fhall be overruled to the glory of God and the advancement of thehappinefsofthe righteous; ibid, p. 49. Though wickednefs is in itfelf no bleffing and no matter of thankfulnefs ; yet when God overrules it to good, greatergood than could have been efFe6led in any other way ; in this conne6lion it is in the fame fenfe a bleffing, and matter of thankfulnefs, as calamity and mifery are.

(12) On the plan of moral neceffity, God tempts

mankind to fin.- If the meaning of this be, that

God eftabliffies a connexion between motives and volitions, and a previous certainty of thofe volitions; and in the courfe of his providence brings into the View of men motives which a^ually influence them to fin ; I grant, that God does in this fenfe tempt mankind to fin ; as he did our firft parents, Judas, Sec. Nor is there any ground, on which this can be denied, unlefs it be allowed, that t\'s previous cer^ tainty is eftabliffied by fome other caufethan the De- ity> or that it txiUs without caufe, or that volitions O 2 arc

are not previoufly certain, but happen by chance. To hold that the previous certainty of all volitions is ef- tablifhed by fome other caufe than God, is to run in- to the Manichean fcheme of two Gods, and at the fame time to hold, that the fecond God is an involun- tary agent and is the caufe of all the volitions of the voluntary God, as well as of all creatures. If we fay, this previous certainty of all volitions is uncaufed, Ave may as well fay, that every thing elfe is uncaufed. Ifwe fay, that volitions are not previoufly certain, but happen by mere chance, we may as well fay, that every thing elfe happens by chance.

But if by tempting be meant foliciting or enticing to fin, as the devil tempts men, we deny that this is implied in our doftrine.

Dr* Weft makes fome remarks. Part II, p. 75, &c.on Jam. i. 13 16, which appear to be remarka- ble. 1. He tells us, that " a man is tempted, when

" he confents to the gratification of his own luft ; i.e» '• when he commits fin." Indeed! Is no man tempt- ed, but he who aftually commits fin in confequence of the temptation ? The apoftle Paul declares, A6ls XX. 19, that he " ferved the Lord with all humility " of mind, and with many tears and temptations, which " befel him by the lying in wait of the Jews." And were all thefe temptations fuccefsful with the apoftle? The very text implies the contrary. Gal. iv. 14. " And my temptation, which was in my flefii, ye def- «'• pifed not nor rejeQed, but received me as an angel « of God, even as Chrift Jefus." Jam. i. 2. " Count " it all joy, when ye fall into divers temptations." V. 12. "Blefledisthe man, that endureth temptation : For when he is tried, he fhall receive the crown of life." Or if Dr. Weft fhall allow, that a man is or may be tempted without falling into fin, this will fpoil his ar- gument. His words immediately following thofe laft quoted from I iin, are, " This proves, that when it is « faid, neither tempteth he any man, the fenfe is, «' God caufeth no man to fin." But if a man may be

tempted

^^3

tempted without committing fin, then God may t€mpt a man, without cauiing liim to fin.

2. He obfervcs from Leigh, that the Greek verb tret^a^cc, ufcd in the paffage in James now under con- fideration, fignifies to make trial, i. e. to try a perfon. But becaufc James fays of God, neither tempteth he any man, will Dr. Weft adventure to fay, that God never 'ries any man ? and particularly thgt he did not try Abraham?

3. Becaufe this text declares, that God does not tempt, i. e. according to the DoQor's explanation, try any man, he infers that God <' does not caufe them to " fin." This confequence follows not from the prin- ciple premifed. Whether God do or do not, try men, he may fo difpofe things that fin will be the cer- tain confequence -, and this may be done not to try any man.

4. He fays, that <' a voluntary confcnt to indulge or " gratify luft, is fin." Yet in the next fentcnce he fays, " the apoftle makes every fin to be the effe^ of '• a confent to gratify fome particular luft :" i. e. eve- ry fin is the cffe6l of fin.

5- The whole force of this text, to prove, that God does not difpofe things fo^ that fin is the cert^ain confequence, if it prove any thing to this effed, lies in thefe words, " Neither tempteth he any man." The Doftorfays," thefe muft mean. Neither caufcth he

*« any man to lin ;" ibid, p. 75. But if" the Deity

" infallibly and perfe6ily regulate, govern and fet *'. bounds to the a6"Hons of all rational creatures, and '« overrule all thofe aftions to accomplifli his pur- *• pofes," if he make them perform his purpofes infal- libly ; as Dr. Weft fays ; then every thing which they in faft do, and every fin which they commit, was God's purpofe and he makes them perform it. Is he then in no fenfe the caufe of their fin ? Does he not at IcaftfodifpofelhingSjthat finisthecertainconfequcnce?

Dr. Weft abundantly afferts thofe things which

neceflarily imply both abfolute decrees and fuch dif-

O 3 pofal

2J4

pofal of God, that fin cettainly and infallibly follows, « The creature," fays he, " in every moment of its «« exiftence, is fabje6l to the divine control ; confe- f' quently no aB can take place, but what the Deity « iforefaw and determined from all eternity to overrule « to his own glory and the general good. If the Dei- « ty forefaw, that a creature — —would do that f' which could not be overruled to the divine glory '* and the general good — — —he would rejlrain him^ " from doing that ;" Part II, p. 22. " He who has

^' made all things — - does regulate and govern

" all things, and y^^s bounds to the aHions oj all ration-

" al creatures. The Deity, by his permiflive de-

*'} zxt.t, fuper intends ar)d governs all the aHions of his f' creatures to accomplifh his own purp.ofes,in as Jlrong f Offenfe, as though he brought them to pafs by his pof- " itive efficiency ;" ibid, p. 46. " We believe, that " the lycxiy governs and overrules the aflions of thefe " beings" [rational creatures]] " to bring about his own

f' purpofes and deHojns as injallibly, as though

^'they were mere pajjive beings ;"ibid, p. 47.

Now if thefe things be fo ; no a9; of the creature can take place, but what God determined from all e- ternity, to overrule to his own glory. If God re- jlrain the creature from the contrary ; if he overrule all thofe aflions to accomplifh his purpofes, in as flrong a fenfe, as though he brought them to pafs by his pofit'iye efficiency, and as infallibly as though they ■were mere paffive beings ; then certainly he does difpbfe things fo, that all thofe a8ions do infallibly take place. To be fubje6l to the control of our Creator in every moment of our exiftence, fo that no aft can take place in us, but what God from eternity deter- mined-yKoht. regulated andgoverned by God mall things-, if he fet bounds to all our anions ; and if he govern and overrule all our a£lions in as ftrong a fenfe as if he brought them to pafs by his pojitive efficiency,and as infallibly as though they" were mere pajfive beings ; furely all this implies, that God does fo difpofe of e-

ventSj

vents, tliat fin certainly follows. And on this plan, vhere is feif-de termination ? Where is liberty to ei- ther fide ? liberty toad or notaft ? All the anions of rational creatures are limited, bounded and retrained to certain dehnitepbjefts and purpofes, which God from eternity had in view. They are therefore fhut up to aft oneway only, and cannot aft otherwife. They can a6l in fuch a manner only, as God from all eternity faw would accomplifli his glorious purpofes, i. e. his glorious decrees. Therefore all the anions of crea- tures are decreed from eternity to be precifely what they are, and all creatures are as infallibly reftraine4 from afting contrary to the decrees of God, as if he brought their aftions to pafs by his pofitive efficiency, and as though they were mere paffive beings.

If it fhould be faid, that though God bounds and reftrains his creatures from ading in a manner which is oppofite to his purpofes and decrees; yet he does not neceffitate them to a6l at all, but leaves them at liberty to aft or not aft : — On this I obferve,

1. As I have already faid, whenever any thing is propofed to any intelligent being, as the objeft of his choice, it is, as Mr. Locke has long fince thought, abfolutely impoflible for that being not to aft. He may indeed either choofe or refufe the objeft. But to refufe it is to aft, equally as to choofe it. In ei- ther cafe the being afts and cannot avoid a61ing, un- lefs he be fijnk into a ftate of perfeft unfeeling ftu- pidiiy.

2. If it were poffible for a creature to aft or not aft ; ftill according to Dr. Weft he could do neither the one nor the other, unlefs it were fubferv;ient to the glorious purpofes of God. For if God will in- fallibly reftrain creatures from afting in all inftances, in which their afting is not fubfcrvient to. his pur- pofes ; will he not reftrain them from not aHing, i. e, prevent their finking into unfeeling ftupidity, and ex- cite them to aftion, in all inftances in which not aft- ing would not in Hke manner be fubfervient to his

O 4 purpofes ?

2l6

purpofes ? If not, let a reafon be given ; a reafon ■why God will not prevent creatures from countera8;-- ing his purpofes by not aBing^ as well as by aEling. Surely it will not be pretended, that to excite by ra- • tional motives and confiderations, a creature to ac- tion, is more inconfiftent with liberty, than infallibly to rcftrain, whether by ipotive§ or without motives, the fame creature from action.

3. I appeal to the reader, whether the DoQor have not in the paffages above quoted, given up the vhole queftion both with refpeft to liberty as oppoled to infallible moral neceflity or certainty ofmoralaftion, and with refpect to abfolute decrees. If all men be limited and bounded by God, to a6l in all cafes according to his purpofes ; if they be fliut up to this way of aQing, and cannot voluntarily refufe to a6l in this way, as that would be to acl contrary to God's purpofe ; if they cannot abfolutcly ceafe from all aBion when an objeflis propofed to theirchoicCjbut muft either choofe or refufe, and that according to God's purpofe ; if, as DoQor Weft exprefsly declares to be according to his fentiments, " Every thing is as firmly fixed in the '' divine mind, by his permiflive decree, and fhall be " as infallibly accomplifhed, as though he was the im- " mediate author or efficient caufe of all the anions " of creatures ;" ih.id, p. 49. Let the candid reader ■judge, whether the Do6itor do not grant both abfo- lute neceffity and abfolute decrees.

lie as we have fecn in his Part II, p. 22, allows, that God permits and overrules fin to his own glory and the general good ; but thinks this a demon- ilrative proof of felf-determination. Let usxonfider v;hat he fays on this fubjedt. — Ibid, p. 34; " If the « doftrinc of neceffity be true, and we are not felf- " determined, then it will follow, that we arc conftant- " ly determined by the pofiiive efficiency of the Deity." if it be true, as the Doftor holds, that God regulates «• and governs all things, ^ndfcts bounds to the anions i< of (ill ^rational crealuresj to bring about infallibly

" his

« his own purpofes ;*' if he " govern free agents as- ' " perfectly pnd make them perforin his purpofcs as in- '• ialiibly, as if they had no agency at all ;" 1 leave the reader to judge, whether we, in all our atlions, be not, mediately or immediately, determined by the pofi- tive efficiency of the Deity. " If God make them perform his purpofes injallihly^' it fccms he mult by his pofitive efhcienry determine them to the perform- ance ; for what is it to make men perform a purpofe, - but to put forth pofitive exertions to this end ? This is alfo by pofitive efficiency to abolifli all liberty of

felf-dctermination.- If thefe things be denied, and

it be affirmed, that ftill the man is at liberty to a£t in that particular manner, which is fubfervicnt to the di- vine purpofe, or not to a6l at all, and thus there is room for felf-determination ; I anfwcr,

1. It is not allowed, that a man on a propofal to a6\, can poffibly not aH cft all ; and this ought not to be taken for granted, i

2. Then God docs not infallibly make men com- ply with his purpofe, but leaves them to comply or not ; which is diredlly contrary to Dr. Weil himfclf, in the quotations made above.

3. If the Deity by his pofitive efficiency prevent; his creature from every aftion, but that which is agreeable to his purpofe, he will prevent him by his pofitive efficiency from rcfufing to comply with that- purpofe, and this is by pofitive efficiency to deter- mine him to comply with that purpofe. And the Dottor gratits, that all the aftions of rational creatures arc agreeable to God's purpofcs. Therefore all ra- tional creatures in all their atlions are determined by the pofitive efficiency of God. And all thofe which Dr. Samuel Wefl mentions as abfurd confequcnccs of the fentimcntsofDr. Stephen Weft, may be retorted on the former, thus ; Since God infallibly makes and determines all men to perform his purpofes, in al«l their actions, " fin is as much the work of God. as " any thing that he has made. But that the Deitv

« flioul'd

21

*' fhould have an infinite averfion and an immutable ** hatred to his works, is inconceivable. It is fome- " times faid, that the tendency of fin is to dethrone " the Almighty, to kill and utterly to deftroy his ex- *' iftence. But is the Deity conftantly working to " deftroy himfelf ? This will make the Deity a ftrange " contradiftion to himfelfj and will conftitute fuch a be- <« ing, as cannot exift in the univerfe. If the Deity ^' forms wicked volitions in the human mind, and *' then infinitely hates and abhors thofe very works of " his, he muft be infinitely miferable and wretched.

" God is faid to rejoice in his own works If then

«• fin is God's work he rejoices in it God is the

" greateft lover of fin in the univerfe." Whatever abfurdities thefe be, it concerns Dr. Samuel Weft, as much as any man, to remove them. As appears, it is prefumed, by what has been faid already.

Befides ; moft or all thefe obje6lions lie with equal force againft the divine efficiency of pain, mifery or death. The Doftor will not deny, that thefe are in- flifted by God. Therefore mifery and death'' are as *'muchthe works of God, as any thathehas made." Yet " he does not willingly afflift and grieve the children " of men." And " he has no pleafure in the death «' of" even " the wicked." Therefore " God has an in- "finiteaverfion and an irreconcilable hatred to his own " works :" And if this be inconceivable to Dr. Weft he will not deny it to be faB ; and therefore that a thing is inconceivable to him, is no proof, that it is not true. And that the Deity fhould hate mifery and death and yet caufe them, would equally as in the cafe ftated by Dr. Weft concerning the introdu£lion of fin, *'• make the Deity a ftrange contradi6lion to " himfelf, and would conftitute fuch a being as can- " not exift in the univerfe." " If the Deity forms" mifery and death, " and then infinitely hates and ab- «» hors thefe very works of his hands, he muft be in- " finitely miferable and wretched. God is faid to re- " joice in his own works. If then" mifery and death

«« be

SI 9^

« be his works, he rejoices in them, and God is the " greatcfl: lover" of all the mifery and death " in the '* univcrfe," Whenever Dr. Weft will anfwer thefc obfervaiions concerning the divine efficiency of mif- ery and death, he will furnifh himfelfwith an anfwer to his own fimilar obfervations concerning the divine agency in the introdu8ion of moral evil. If he fliall fay, that God does indeed hate mifery and death in thcmfclves confidered, and infli61s them, becaufc they are neceffary to greater good, and to the ac- complifhment of his own moft benevolent purpofcs 3 the fame may be faid concerning moral evil.

The Doftor quotes the following paffage from Dr. Hopkins ; •' If God be the origin or caufe of moral evil " this is fo far from imputing moral evil to him, or " fuppofing, that there is any thing of moral evil in " him, that it neceffarily fuppofes the contrary :" On which he remarks, " Confequently, if God be the or- " igin and caufe of holinefs, this by the fame kind of ** reafoning, is fo far from imputing holinefs to him, or " fuppofing, that there is any thing of that nature in " him, that it neceffarily fuppofes the contrary ; that <• is to fay, that the Deity has no moral charafter at " all." In the above quotation, Dr. Hopkins evi- dently means, If God be the caufe of ^/Z moral evil, or of the firft which exifted in the univerfe. This the word or^g•^7^ implies ; he evidently ufes it to mean orig- ' inal caufe. Now whatever is in God, is uncaufed. Therefore if there be moral evil in him, neither he nor any other being is the caufe of that ; of courfe whatever moral evil he caufes, muft all be out of him- felf; and if he caufe all moral evil, it muft all be out of himfelf and none of it in him. So that Dr. Hop- kins's propofition on this head is manifcftly true. Suppofc theDo6lor had faid, If God be the caufe of all matter, this fo far from fuppofing matter in him, ne- ceffarily fuppofes the contrary ; no doubt Dr. Weft himfelf would have acknowledged the truth of the propofition : And let a rcafon be givenwhy the form- er

220

er propofition, in the fenfe now given of it, is not as true as the latter. As to the confequence which Dr. Weft draws from Dr. Hopkins's propofition, " that " if God be the caufe of holinefs [of all hoHnefs] this " is fo far from fuppofmg holinefs in God, that it ne- " ceffarily fuppofes the contrary ;" this is fo far from an abfurdity, as Dr. Weft imagines, that it is a man- feft truth. Holinefs in God is no more caufed or created, than the divine effence. If then there be no other holinefs, than created holinefs, there is and can be none in God,

On a paflage in which Dr. Hopkins afferts, that moral evil and holinefs are equally the confequence of the divine difpofal, but whether by the fame mode of operation he could not tell ; Dr. Weft remarks, « This makes it extremely unhappy for us ; for we " feem to have no way to know a true revelation '^ from a falfe one, both equally coming from the De- «' ity ;" p. 46, Part 11. But how this confequence fol- lows from the affertionofDr. Hopkins, Dr. Weft does not illuftrate. God may fodifpofe things, that fin in- fallibly follows, and yet not be the author of a falfe revelation : And as the Do£tor merely alferts, with- out attempting to prove what he afferts, he has no right to expe£l, that his affertion fhould be received as truth. If the Do6lor take it for granted, that if God, in the way which I have explained, introduce lin, he is hirrjfclf as real a finner, as he would be, if he were to give a falfe revelation, he takes for grant- ed the very thing in queftion, which is to be fairly proved, not pitifully begged.

In the fame page, he fays, " According to Dr. " Hopkins will it not follow, that many who are led « by the Spirit of God, are the children of the devil ?" This implies, that whenever God, by means of mo- tives or in any other way, fo difpofes of things, that fm inBillibly follows, the man who is the fubjeft of that fm, is in that fin led by the Spirit of God. The principle on which this argument is built, is,

that

2Sfl

that whenever God fo difpofes things, that an a£lion is the certain confequence, in that a6lion the man is led by the Spirit of God. But Dr. Weft will not a- vow and abide by this principle : For he grants, that men always a£t upon fome motive and never without motive. Nor will he deny, that the conftitution, that men fhould always aft upon motive and never with- out, is eftablifhed by God. Yea, the Dodor exprefs- \y aflerts, that " God overrules all the aBions of his " creatures to accomplifh his own purpofcs in as " ftrong a fenfe as though he brought them to pafs " by his pnjitive efficiency'' Yet he will not pretend, that in all thofe aftions they are led by the Spirit of God. The Doftor proceeds ; " The Deity is called the " Father of lights, from whom proceeds every good «' and perfcft gift. But according to thefe principles, " may he not, with as much propriety, be called the " Father of darknefs, from whom proceeds all ma- " lignity and wickednefs ?" Since the Do£lor holds, that " The Deity governs free agents as perfe£lly and " makes them perform his purpofe as infallibly, as if *' they had no agency at all ;" the queflion which the Do6lorhere propofes concerning the principles of Dr. Hopkins may with equal propriety be propofed on his own principles. And notwithftanding any agency ■which God exercifes toward the produtlion of moral evil, he may with the fame truth and propriety be called the Father of lights, as he is called //zg Father of mercies and the God of all covifort, although all the pains and miferies, which his creatures fuffcr, whether in this world or the future, are infjitled by him.

The Doclor feems to attempt to fcreen himfelf from thofe, which he fuppofes to be abfurd confe- quences of Dr. Hopkins's fcheme, by reprefeniing, that he hcdids, that God barely permits Jin. But to fuperintendi govern atid overrule the atlions of ration- al creatures " as infallibly, as if they were mere paf- " five beings;" Part H, p. 47 ; ar\jd "in as ftrong a fenfe, "asihowgh hebrought them to pafs by hispohtive cf-

" ficicncy ;"

222

" ficiency ;" ibid, p. 46. « So to fix them, that they " (hall as infallibly be accomplifhed, as though he was '• the immediate author or efficient caufe of them," ibid, p. 49. " And to govern free agents as perfe5lly and "to make them perform his purpofesas infallibly^ as " though they had no agency at all ;" ibid, p. 67 ; is more than barely to permit free agents to aO; of them- felves. Barely to permit them toafl; of themfelves, by which the Doftor explains himfelf to mean, " ordaining " things contingently, i. e. avoidably, and with a poffi- « bility of hot coming to pafs," ibid, p. 47 ; is not to govern them at all, but to leave them to govern them- felves ; it is not to overrule their aftions, but to leave them to overrule their own a6lions ; it is not to make them perform his purpofes, but to leave them loofe to perform or to omit thofe purpofes. And much lefsis it to govern and overrule their aftions as infallibly as if they xvere mere paffive beings^ and in as flrong a fenfe as though he brought them to pafs by his pofitive ef- ficiency ; to fix thofe aBions as infallibly as though he was the immediate author of them ; or to govern them as perfeBly and to make them perform his purpofes as infallibly^ as though they had no agency at all.

Dr. Weft conftantly infifts, that " the Deity has " communicated to man a feif-moving or felf-a6live "principle." But what kind of a felf-moving prin- ciple is that, which is always and in all its aflions in- fallibly and perfeftly regulated, governed and over- ruled by an extrinfic caufe .? and which is made by God as infallibly to perform his purpofes, as if it were no felf-moving principle at all .? Such a felf-moving principle as this, is fo like a principle that never moves jifelf, but is always moved by an extrinfic caufe, that I requeft Dr. Weft to point out the difference.

The DoBor grants, that " there is a fenfe in which " Cod hardens the hearts of men," and that this is by his " taking from them what he had granted them, as " a juft punilhment of their negleft and abufe of the « advantages which they enjoyed ;" Part II, p. 52. He

grants

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grants therefore, that God may confidently with hh holinefs harden the heart, and caufe fin in men, in fome cafes ; viz. when they deferve it as a juft pun- ifliment of their fin. But the only reafon, \i'hich renders it confiftent with the divine perfeftions, to in- flict this or any other juft punifhment, is, that the glo- ry of God and the general good of his kingdom re quire it. J^ow no one pretends, that God ever in any fenfe caufes fin to take place, unlefs its exilt- ence be fubfervient to the glory of God and the good of his kingdom. And if this reafon will in one cafe juftify his fo difpofing of things, that fin is the infalli- ble coniequence, why not jn another ? Until a reafon is given to the contrary, we may prefume, that when- ever the glory of God and the general good of the crea- tion require it, God may and does fo difpofe things, that fin is the infallible confequence.

" A man's becoming a veffel to honour or difhon- "our, is in confequence of his own conduft and be- *« haviour." Part II, p. 54. If by becoming a vef- fel to diflionour the Do6lor mean, heitig puntpied, no doubt it is in confequence of aman'sown mifconduft, and to affert this is to affert nothing very great or pertinent to the queftion concerning the caufe of fin. But if he mean by it committing fin ; this is not, nor can be always in confequence of the finner'sown mif- condudl; becaufeihis like the fclf-deicrmining power, impliestheabfurdity of an infinite feries of a6tions, in confequnce of each other ; and that a man is doomed to commit fin in the firft inftance, in confequence of a prior fin committed by him.

" God does not harden the hearts of men, by any " pofitive efficiency in forming or infufing any wick- " ednefs into their heart, but only taking from thcni " thofe things, which were defigned to reltrain them "from the committing of fin, and by permitting them " to walk in their own wicked ways ;" ibid, p. 55. Of all men Dr. Weft fo long as he holds, that God as perfectly and infallibly regulates, governs and over- rules

242

rules all the actions of free agents and makes thtm conform to his purpofes, as perfetlly as if they had no agency at all, fhould be ihe lad to objed to the idea of God's politive efficiency of fin '; as has been already iliiiftrated. But afide ftom this, if God by taking from men what is neceffary to reftrain them from fin, lay them under an infallible certainty or ab- folute moral neceflity of finning ; what advantage is gained by this mode of reprefenting the matter ? Is it at all more favourable either to the liberty of men, or to the holinefs of God ? To be fure this reprefenta- tion implies all that neceffity, for which Prefident Ed- wards pleads in the cafe. It is fo to difpofe things, that iin is the infallible confequence. Or if this tak- ing away of reftraints beattended with nocertain confe- quence of fm, how does God by it harden the fin- ner ? It feems, that after all he is left in a Rate of un- certainty, i. €. Dr. Weft's perfe6t liberty, whether he willfmornot. Where then is hardnefs of heart? Doesit confi [I inperfe6l liberty ? Itis further tobeobferved, that if fin, for inftance, ah aft of malice, envy or inordinate felf-love, fhould come into exiftencC) without any pof- itive caufation, whether by motive or in fome other way ; why may not any other pofitive thing, either fubilance or mode, and even the whole material uni- verfe, come into exiftence in the fame way ?

Dr. Weft remarks on Ifai. Ixiii. 17. 0 Lord, why kcijl thoib mads us to err from thy ways, and hardened our hearts from thy fear ? " Now it is certain from " the texts that have been already examined, that " nothing more is intended, than that God leaves •' men to err, and to harden their own hearts;" ibid, p. 51. This pofitive aflertion led me to review the Do6lor's remarks on thole texts, and 1 am very willing the candid fliould judge concerning the Dodor's ex- hibition of certainty, that nothing more is intended, by God's hardening the hearts ol men, than that God leaves them to hi:rden their own hearts. He fays, p. 525 in what fenfe God hardens the heart, our Saviour

will

225

ivill inform us, Mat. xiii. i.], 15. " This people's "heart is waxed grofs, and their ears are dull of hcar- "ing, and their eyes they havc'clofed." In anfwcr to this it may be faid with equal force, \n whatfenfe God hardens the heart, we are informed in Joh. xii. 40. " He hath blinded their minds, and hardened their "hearts, that they Ihould not fee with their eyes,"&c. Whatever right the Do6lor has to fuppofe, and without a reafon to deliver the opinion as truth, that Joh. xii. 40, is to be explained by Mat. xiii. 15 ; any other perfon has the fame right to fuppofe and to deliver the opinion as truth, that Mat. xiii. 15, is to be ex- plained by Joh. xii. 40.

The Dodor conflanily infi-ls, that" God never hard- '* ens any man or withdraws his fpirit and grace," ibid, p. 52, butin confequence ofhisabufe of them. Ifthis were ever fo true, it would not fettle the quclliori concerning the origin of moral evil. For the quef- tion is not what is the caufe or fource of fin in fome particular cafes, as in hardening the heart, in confe- quence of a former fin or fins; but what is the caufe of all fin, and particularly of the frfl fin, whether in man or in the univerfe. Now toanfwer this qucf- tion by faying, that when a man has " abufed God's fpirit and grace," God delivers him up to fin, is asab- furd as to anfwer the quefiion concerning the origin of the human race, by faying, that after Adam had lived a while, he begat a fon.

Although the Do8or thinks it certain from the texts, which he had examined, that Ifai. Ixiii. 17, '• in- " tends nothing more than that God leaves men to *• err and to harden their own hearts ;" he does not choofc to reft the matter en that foundation ; but ob- ierves, that " Hebrew verbs in Hiphil often fignify only " permiffion." Ifthis were ever fo true, it would de- cide nothing concerning Ifai. Ixiii. 17. If verbs in Hiphil do often fignify or.ly permiifion, this implies, that they often do not fignify that only. Then the queftion would be, wlnt docs it fignify in this text ? P Neither

226

Neither Dr. Weft nor any other Hcbraid, wiil pretend, that a verb in Hiphil natiirally fignifies per- miiTion only. If therefore any verb in that conjuga- tion do lignify that only, it niuft be for fome other reafon. than merely hecaufc it is in that conjugation. If there be any fuch reafon in this cafe, the Doftor has not informed us of it. Nor can I conceive of any, unlels it be the fuppofed abfurdity of underftand- ing the text as it is tranfiated. But the Do6lor muft on refjedtion be fenfible of the impropriety of taking that fuppofed abfurdity for granted. Let him prove it, and he will oblige us to believe him.

On 1 Sam. xvi. 14, " The fpirit of the Lord de- " parted froni Saul, and an evil fpirit from Godtroub- " led him," the Dodor remarks, " i. e. he was left " of God to his own gloomy and frightful imagina- *' tions ;" ibid, p. 57 : But who was the efficient caufe of his own gloomy imaginations ? Surely they did not happen out of nothing, like the atheilVs world. Nor will the Doftor pretend, that Saul defignedly pro- duced them in his own mind. So that he gives no account of the caufc of thofe imaginations, and no explanation of the text.

" If then the Deity creates fin, in the fenfe in which " he creates darknefs, it will follow, that as darknefs is *• the confequence of God's withdrawing light, fo the " confequence of God's withdrawing his fpirit and " grace from any perfon, is fin ; which will fall in " exa6tly with our fenfe of God's hardening the heart." If fin in no inftance take place, but in confequence of God's withdrawing his fpirit and grace from a per- fon ; then God's fpirit and grace are fometimes with- drawn from a perfon, antecedently to his finning : And in thofe cafes they are not withdrawn in righteous judgment, and asa juft punifhment offin ; becaufe the perfon, by the fuppofition, has been guilty of no ante- cedent fin. Yet the Doftor every where confiders the withdrawment of God's fpirit and grace as a juft punifhment of the fin of thofe from whom it is with- drawn ;

227

drawh ; as a jiift punifhment of the ncgleft and abiifc of the advantages, which ihcy enjoyed, &c. &c. And on this ground only he attempts to juUify the with- drawnncnt. If on the other hand, fin in any inftance, do take pUice when there has been no withdfawment of the divine fpirit and grace ; then the Dodor has here given no account of the exiftence of fin in that inftance ; and fuch an inftance there was, when fm firfl catne into exiftence ; it took place without a withdrawment of grace, in the way of righteous judg- ment.

It may here be added, tliat though dark nefs, a mere nonentity, will take place in confequence of the withdrawment of light ; yet malice, envy and inordi- nate fclf-love, pofitive ath of the mind, will no more take place in confequence of mere withdrawment of influence, than benevolence or fupreaie love to God. or the whole material creation, would come into ex- iftence in confequence of a mere withdrawment of the influence of God.

" We fee in what fenfe God is faid to move, fti'r " up or incline men to evil ai:lions ; viz. bv permit- *• ting Satan to tempt men to evil, or by pcrtnitting " things to take place, which occnjion men to become "perverfe." Ibid.p. 64. If the Doi^oih) '■' per mil Lin i^ " things to take place," mean that God fo difpoles things that certain defintte events will infallibly fol- Jow ; this is all for which I plead, and which Preii- dent Edwards held on this head. And furely the Do£tor does not mean, that things are of their own accord and by their own native power, independently of the divine agency, endeavouring to take place, and vill effe£l the objedl of their endeavour, if they be permitted by the Deity ; as a high mettled Heed, when permitted by his rider, leaps into a race. This would favour t()o much of atheifm, to he holden by a Chriitic^-n divine. As to the human mind's making one volition by another or without another, I have nothing more to fay ; nor do I wilh to fay any more P s concerning

228

concerning ft, till an anfvver is given to what has been already faid.

This text, " I will fend liim againft an hypocritical " nation, and againft the people of my wrath will I " give him a charge," Ifai. x. 6 ; Dr. Weft fays, " implies no more than that the Deity meant to pun- '• ifli the Jews, by letting loofe the King of AlTyria upon *' them ;" ibid, p. 67. Yet in the fame page he fays, that the king of Affyria " was as much under the " control of the Deity, as the a?^e and the faw are un- '' der the control of the workman." Yet this control over that king implies no more, it feems, than that God let him Joofe en the Jews. And is no more implied in the control which the workman has over the axe and the faw, than that he Ictstlievi loofe on the timber.*^ I appeal to the reader, whether if the king of Affyria " was as much under the control of the Deity, as the *'axe and the faw are under the control of the work- " man ;" a pofitive and| efficacious influence, and not a bare permijfion^ be not implied in fuch con- trol.

On Rev. xvii. 17, <• For God hath put in their " hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree and giye their " kingdom untd the bcaft. until the words of God «« fiiall be fulfilled ;" the DoBor remarks," Thefe

«'• ten kings are to agree in giving their kingdom

" to the beaft, that by his prptedion and affiftance,

*^ they may be able entirely to defiroy the whore,

^.' by whom they have been long oppreffed." Jbid, p. 68. Thus the Dodor fuppofes, that the end, for which thefe ten kings give their power to th^ beaft, is that by his afliftance they may deftroy the great whore. Bui this is a mere fuppojition, unfupported by any thing in the text or context ; nor does the DoBor give any reafon toward its fupport. Eefides, what advantiige is there in this fuppofiiion ? Is the beaft mentioned a friend to virtue and religion ^ And did thofe kings do their duty in giving their power into his hands .? If they did not ; of Gourfe they did wrong ;

and

£29

and then the difficuhy of God's putting it into their hearts to do this wrong ftill rcnnains.

On quoting Ifai. v. 4 ; " What could have been " done more to my vineyard, that 1 have not done " in it ? Wherefore, when I looked, that it flioiild *' bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes ?" the Doftor adds, "according to the fchcmc lam " oppohng, all diat the Deity has done to his vinc- " yard, was to make it biing forth wild grapes. How '• could he then appeal to the men of Judah and the '* inhabitants. of Icrulalem, to judge between him and " his vineyard?" Ibid, p. 71, &c. Now this and all the reft ihat the Do(5Ior adds in his remarks on that text, lies equally agninft the fcheme of a permiflive decree " pcrfedly and infallibly boundmg,"" reftrain- " ing," " marking out" and " fixing bounds to the ac- *' lions of men, beyond which they cannot pafs." For *• according to this fcheme" of the Dotlor, " all that " the Deiiy has done to his vineyard was" by re- training them from all other anions, by bounding them to thofe very aflions which they have perform- ed, and by fixing fuch bounds as they could not pafs, ♦' to make them bring forth \vild grapes. Plow then "could he appeal to the men of Judah and jerufalem '• to judge, between him and his vineyard ? Will ''• it be faid, that the means ufed with them ^vere fuch, *' that if they had been rightly improved they would " have enabled them to have brought forth good

^'grapes ? Theanfv:cr is very eafy ; ihefe means

" could have no cfredl but fuch as the Deity defigncd <^' theratohavej'becaufe'* the Deity fixed their bounds, <• beyond which they could not pafs," " and they " muft produce either good or bad grapes, according

" to the" bounds fixed by the Deity. And fo on

through the fame and following page. But I need not rcpublifli Dr. Well's book by way of retortion.

The Do6lor in his 4ih elfay, Part II, (and in hi«

Poflfcriptj on 1 Kings xxii. 23, '• Now therefore, bc-

<' hold, the Lord haih put a lying fpirit in the mouth

? 3 _» of

« of all thefe thy prophets ;" fays, " The word trant '• lated put ought to have been tranflated, The Lord " hatU permitted ox fuffered a lying fpirit, &c. for the " verb here tranflated j^uif, frequently fignifies io per- *• mit orfitffer. For the truth of this I appeal to " every good Hebrician. Thus in Ezek. xx. 25, '• inftead of, 1 gave them ftatutes that were not good, *' it fliould be, I fuffered them to have flatutes that '• were not good ;" p. 66. It is always a fufficient anfwer to a mere confident affertion, as confidently to deny it. Therefore ray anfwer is, ^' The verb here " tranflated j&m/," which is :ini does not " frequently fig- nify permit or fuffer ;" and in Ezek. xx. 25, " Inftead " ofj I gave them ftatutes that were not good, it fliould" not " be, I fuff'ered them to have ftatutes that were not " good." Dr. Weft for the confirmation of his criti- cifm " appeals to every good Hebrician." Whom he would acknowledge as a good Hebrician, is very un- certain. Therefore, inftead of appealing to fo uncer- tain a judge, I call on the DoQor himfelf, or any oth- er Hebrician good or bad, to point out the inftances, whether frequent or unfrequent, in which :inj figni- fies merely to j^ermz^ or /i^e?'. Befide this, fufiBcient reafons muft be given to convince the candid and ju- dicious, that it IS ufed in this fenfe, in the text now under confideration, and reafons which do not beg the main point, that God can do nothing toward the exiftence of fin, but barely to permit it^ When thefe things fliall have been done, we fhall have better ground, on which to believe the Do6lor's criticifm> than his mere round affertion.

CONCLUSION.

231

CONCLUSION.

1HAVE now finifhed my remarks on Dr. Weft's EJIays on Liberty and NeceJJity. If he fliall think proper to write again on thofe fubjefls and to reply to theie remarks, I reqiieft him to attend to thofe points only, which are material and affetl the merits of the caufe. If I have expofed myfclf by ever fo many inadvertencies, which do not aflfeft the merits of the caufe, to take up his own time andthatof his readers, to exhibit them, feems not worth while. In difputes of this kind fuch inadvertencies are frequent. Alfo fuch difputes are apt to degenerate into mifreprefenta- lions, pcrfonal reflections and logomachy. How far 1 have fallen into any ofthefe, it is not proper for me to fay. However, 1 may fay, that I have endeavour- ed to avoid ihcm. 1 hope the Dodorwiilbe fuccefs- iul in the lame endeavour.

If he fi>all write again, I requelt him to inform us more clearly, what he means by fclf-determination. If he mean no more than he hitherto profefles to mean, " that we ourfelves determine ;" he will in- form us, wherein on that head he differs from Prefi- dent Edwards or any other man j and whether it be his opinion, that we determine our own volitions in any other fenfe, tlian we determine all our perceptions

and feelings. If he fhall be of the opinion, that we

r.fficieiuly caufe our own volitions ; 1 requeft him to inform us, how we do or can do this otherwife than by antecedent volitions. If he fhall grant, that this is the way, in which wecaule them ; he will pleafe to remove the abfurdides fuppofed to attend that fuppo- iition ; and alio decide whether or not we caufe them without any icflraint by previous certainty, i. e. wheth- er wc caulc them by mere chance, and at hap-hazard.

If he fliall flill be of the opinion, that voliiion is no effect ; he will pleafe to inform us how to recon- cile

ciie that with the idea, that it proceeds from an intrmr fie caufe and is originated by him who is the lubje£l of it. If volition have a caufe, whether intrinfic or extrinfic, it is of courfe an effeO:. — He will alfo be h kind as to inform us, whether every human volition cxifted from eternity, or whether it came intoexiftence wnhout caufe.

If he flill maintain, that with refpeft to praife and blame, there is no difference between natural and mo- isn neceiTity ; I wifh him to informus. whether Judas lA?ere as blamelefs in betraying his Lord, becaufe it was previoufly certain and certainly foretold, that he %vould do it, as he was for being attached to the fur- face of the earlbj and not afcending to heaven as Eli- jah did.

I hope the Doftor will explain himfelf concerning antecedent and confequent neceflity. If he mean, that before the exiftence of any hunnan aftion, there was no certainty, that it would exill ; he will pleafe to reconcile this both with divine foreknowledge, and with the prophecies of fcripture. If by antecedent iieceffity, he mean any thing elfethan antecedent cer*- tainty, he will pleafe to ftiow how it is tothepurpofe, or how it oppofes what we mean by antecedent ne- ceffity.

I requeft him to fhow the confiftency between thefe two propofilions, that motive is neceffary to every volition ; and that men do not always a£l on the {Irongeft motive. He will of courfe fhow, what the motive is which perluades a man to pafsby theflrong- ell motive, and to a6l on a weaker.

It is to be wifhed, that the Doftor would explain liis favourite power to aH or net aH. If he fhall own, that he means a power to choofe or refufe merely, it is prefumed, that his candour will lead him to own al- io, that he means nothing on this head different from Preiident Edwards, unlets by power he mean previous uncertainty^ and by a man's power to choofe or refufe, he mean, that it is in itfelf and in the divine view un- " ' ^ certain^

^crtain^ whether he \vill choofe or rcfufe : And if he mean this, I wifh him to avow it.

I hope he will not fpcnd time in difcufTing quef- tions, which are merely verbal, fuch as whether mo- tive be the canfe or the occafion of volition. All that Prefident Edwards means by cauje in this cafe, isJlaU cd cccafion or antecedent.

Perhaps the Do6lor will find his book to be no lefs ufefnl, if he (hall confine himf^If more to argument^ and indulge himfclf lefs in hijlory. Narratives, how- ever true and accurate, of his own opinion without hisreafons, and of his ability or inability whether to do or to conceive, are very unintereftingto thofe who think for themfelves, and do not depend on the Doc- tor as an authority. If he had hitherto fpared all fuch narratives, his books had been confiderably fiiorter and no lefs demonllrative.

1 hope the Do£ior will be very explicit in commu- nicating his idea of liberty. I prefume he will join with me in the opinion, that the whol? controverfy turns on this. If the liberty neceffary to moral ac- tion be an exemption from all cxtrinfic influence, we hold that the certain confequence is that either we caufe one volition by another ; or that our volitions come into exigence without caufe and by mere chance. Therefore the DoBor will pleafe to fhow, that nei- ther of thefe cotifequences follow^ ; or will avow whichever he believes does follow.

He fuppofes felf-determination is free aBion. Now 1 wifh him to inform us, whether felf determination, that is limited, bounded, governed and overruled, to a conformity to the divine purpofc, as he aflerts all the a£lions of rational creatures to be. is free a£lion. If it be, I requed him to inform us, why an action decreed to be conformed to the fame divme purpofe, is not alfo free.

I rejoice, that this important fu!)je61: has been tak- en up by fo able an advocate as Dr. Weft. From his high chara6ler we have a right to expcB, that if

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the fcaufe which he has iindettaken, be capable of fupport, it will be fupported by the DoQ;or. 1 wifh the other fide of the queftion had an advocate able to doitjuftice. However, fince I have embarked in the caufe, I fhall, fo long as important matter is brought forward, do as well as I can, till 1 fhall either be con- vinced that the caufe is a bad one, or find myfelf un- able to reply : And I doubt not, that ray failure will draw forth to the fupport of the truth, fome more able advocate, who no;v through modefty or fome other caufe, does not appear lor its defence.

I think it is but fair, that Dr. Weft, and all others "who write againft moral neceifity, fliould take the ex- planations, which we give of moral and natural necef- fity and inability, and all other important terms in this difquifition. And fo far as they oppofe any doQrine which we hold, they ought to oppofe it in the fenfe in which we hold it, and not in a fenfe which they may find it convenient to impute to us, becaufe they can more eafily confute it. Such a management of any queftion as the laft mentioned, will never bring it to an iffue, and befides is exceedingly difingenuous, and gives reafon to fufpeQ; the goodnefs of the caufe, in favour of which it is employed.

As this queftion concerning liberty and heceflity affefts the moft important fubjefls of morality and religion ; it is to be wifhed, that the difcuffion of it may finally conduce to the more clear underftanding and the more fmcere and cheerful praQice of virtue and piety, and to the glory of our God and Redeemer.

F I N 1 S.

ERRATA.

THE Reader is requefted tocorreft the following Errors, moft of which efcaped the Author, in preparing the Alanu- fcript for the Prefs.

Page 8, line 21, for the, rezdifome.

{or freedom, read pow;r. read, it does it. read, why it is as it is. for then, read than. for John/on, read Jack/on, read, which do not happen read, judge the world. 11, read, without a caufe. for this, read the. for thought, read taught.

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