




3 1761 04426 5486

JX
1949
D 500



Wm. B. Russell

Washington, D.C. 20540
800-424-2244



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2008 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation



天 地 人 三 才



DISSERTATION

ON THE SUBJECT OF A

CONGRESS OF NATIONS,

FOR THE ADJUSTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
WITHOUT RECOURSE TO ARMS.

BY A FRIEND OF PEACE.

FORCE TO BRUTES, TO MEN REASON.

New York :

EZRA COLLIER 148 NASSAU STREET.

1837.

TX

Entered according to the act of congress in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven, by EZRA COLLYER, in the Clerk's Office, of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.



849446

P R E F A C E .

THE following Dissertation is one of a few selected by a Committee of the American Peace Society as the best of a large number that were presented as competitors for the large premium offered by that Society in behalf of two individuals, for the best Dissertation on the subject of which this treats. It should be observed, that there have been two efforts made to obtain a decision relative to the merits of these Dissertations, both of which have failed ; the first Committee of Arbitration, Messrs. Wirt, Story, and M'Lean, being for a division of the prize among too many to meet the views of the donors ; and the second Committee, Messrs. Adams, Webster, and Kent, being unable to agree as to the most meritorious one, each of the three having made a different selection. This being the result of these two attempts to obtain a decision in the case, and it being highly desirable that the subject should be brought prominently before the public mind without longer delay, this Dissertation is now sent forth to the community, in the confident hope that it will tend, in no small degree, to the consummation of the great, the glorious, the blessed object for which it was written---the abolition of the horrid custom of war, and the permanent pacification of the world. That this may be the result, the public are earnestly solicited not to prejudge the work as visionary, but to peruse it with candor, and then to form their opinion according to its merits, thereby acting in accordance with the Divine injunction, "to prove all things, and hold fast that which is good."



DISSERTATION.

THE annals of the human race are inscribed in characters of blood on the tomb stones of slaughtered nations, the sad victims of ruthless ambition and lawless power. They tell us of cities sacked, of kingdoms desolated, of ruin and wretchedness in every form ; insomuch that were human nature to be judged by its history, man would be deemed a ferocious beast. War has been his grand occupation in every age ; so that, instead of regarding it as a most deplorable evil, he seems, by the avidity with which he has pursued it, to have deemed it his chief good.

To assail a custom so deep-rooted, so inveterate, seems at first thought a visionary undertaking. The attempt to change an order of things almost coeval with time, which has received the seal of approbation from generation to generation, under every condition of society, whether barbarous or civilized, Heathen or Christian, and which abides even the meridian beams of our own age of light, retaining as its advocates the talent, the wealth, the respectability, the prejudice, and the selfishness of the human race ; cannot fail of striking every mind in the *first* instance, as utterly hopeless and visionary. And even after the most mature consideration, it must be ad-

mitted to be an undertaking of no small magnitude, obstructed by obstacles numerous and formidable, and requiring for its accomplishment no puerile or puny effort.

But the case is not entirely desperate. For, notwithstanding the predominance of this custom, it is universally admitted to be a tremendous evil ; an evil *so* enormous, that if any practicable mode could be devised, whereby it could be avoided, it would be the indispensable duty of mankind to adopt it. And when it is considered, that the movement of the human mind is onward ; that discoveries are continually made in moral and political as well as in physical science ; that many barbarous and inveterate customs of long standing *have been abolished* ; that war is a species of barbarianism unsuited to the genius of the age ; and that the increase of moral principle and intellectual light is constantly rendering it so more and more ;—when all these considerations are brought into view, together with that of the absolute prediction of Scripture, that the time shall come when nations shall learn war no more ; we may gird ourselves to the great task before us with every hope of success.

We gain one most important point, then, on the very threshold of our enterprize :—Our object is not altogether visionary, but, on the contrary, it offers reasonable prospects of accomplishment. And surely, an object *so* important must command the means of success, when once it is decided to be feasible.

In this Essay, it seems requisite that we first consider the evil itself which it will be the object of our efforts to remedy ; for although it is readily conceded on all hands to be enormous, it is far from being *fully* realized.

The great mass of mankind never see a field of battle. They witness not the scenes of misery and devastation exhibited on the theatre of war. They *hear* only of its *generalities*, without considering its horrid *details*. Like the far off tempest, its thunders rumble, and its lightnings play in the distance, holding an admiring world entranced by its dread grandeur and sublimity ! They know indeed that life is sacrificed ; but then it is done on *so vast a scale, and in so scientific a style* ! Blood flows it is true, but it flows *in torrents*. Conflagrations light up the midnight skies ; but it is *whole cities* that feed the devouring flames ! Wretchedness and ruin reign ; but their empire is *universal* ! And then comes the *glory* of war, bedazzling all eyes, and blinding them to its *woes*. The nodding plume and waving banner, divert the gazing sight from the war-worn features and mangled forms which they enshroud. The murky cloud of the battle field envelopes in thick night the myriad horrors of the murderous strife ; while the roll of the drum and the trumpet's blast, the roar of musketry and the artillery's deafening thunders, o'erwhelm the loud shrieks of agony, and the faint moanings of death.

And thus it is, that War maintains his cruel sway from age to age. Divest him of his tinsel glories, and exhibit him in all his horrors, and few indeed would be his votaries. Were but a modicum of those horrors to be experienced in the ordinary course of human affairs, society would be deemed on the verge of dissolution. What would be thought of a midnight broil in which a hundred dead bodies should be left in the streets, and a few dwellings levelled to the earth? Nay, what dismay pervades society when hundreds, in times of high political excitement, assail their opponents with bludgeons, and these in return resort to arms. No lives, perchance, are lost, and but few, it may be, are injured at all. And yet the panic is universal, and society seems shaken to its centre. Or a mob may congregate, and it may become necessary to give them a single volley of musketry, killing and wounding some half dozen individuals; and behold the whole nation stands appalled at the tragic scene. If, then, events like these so deeply interest and excite, how evident it is, by our indifference in relation to the terrible occurrences of war, that we do not take them under due consideration. And indeed, there are many of those evils which seem not to be generally realized at all. It appears indispensable, therefore, that we take a brief survey of the whole subject in a dissertation of this kind.

In treating of the evils under consideration, the one that first most naturally presents itself, is, its sacrifice of life.

Oh! what is it to die! to bid an everlasting farewell to all the endearing scenes of time! to take the dark

leap into the invisible world ! What heart so insensate as to feel unmoved at the thought ! Under circumstances the most favorable, we stand aghast at the approach of the dreadful visitant, death ! How sedulously do we endeavor to bar every passage to his ingress ! With what solicitude do the friends of the sick hang o'er their sleepless couch, noting with anxious eye every symptom of disease, and striving by every possible expedient to baffle its fearful ravages. And when all efforts prove abortive, and death lays his cold hand on his victim, what deep, what bitter lamentations pervade the afflicted mansion. Then weep eyes that seldom weep indeed. Then vice itself sheds tears of terror and remorse, and rough ferocity relaxes its rigid features, adown which flow unwonted streams of grief. So precious is life, so terrible death. But, clad in tenfold horror, appears the direful monster in the field of battle. Thirsting for the blood of his foe, and maddened perchance with the incubriating draught, the warrior falls. Amid the din of arms, and "the shoutings of the Captains, and the confused noise of the warriors, and garments rolled in blood ;" amid groans, and shrieks, and imprecations, and horrors untold, he closes his eyes in death. There, no messenger of mercy cheers his departing spirit with the benign consolations of religion, to aid him in his passage through the gloomy vale. No father is there to bestow the parting blessing, nor mother nor wife to embalm him with her tears. Nor brother, nor sister, nor friend is there, to sorrow for his sad, his melancholy fate. The village bell tolls not his funereal honors, the slow procession

moves not with his relics to the tomb ; nor sleep those relics in the quiet grave of his sires : but the wild uproar of battle is his requiem, and his bones lie blanching in a stranger land !

Ill-fated victim of war ! How soon have thy dreams of glory vanished ! How soon has thy sun gone down, to rise no more ! How black was the tempest that howled through the heavens, as it sunk to its gloomy bed. But this is but the common fate of myriads in every age. This very generation has witnessed a similar destruction of millions of our race. It has seen half a million combatants marshalled in battle array, around the walls of a Leipsic ; a Borodino strown with 80,000 bodies of the slain ; a Muscovy, overspread with the wreck of the mightiest host of modern days. And if we turn our eyes to the history of past ages, we find the scene no less appalling. The siege and sack of Troy is said to have cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of Grecians and Trojans. The loss of the Persians in the battle of Issus was 100,000, and in that of Arbela 300,000. Julius Cesar, on a single occasion, annihilated an army of 363,000 Helvetii. On another occasion, he destroyed a body of German emigrants, men, women and children, amounting to 430,000. The number of Jews that perished in the siege of Jerusalem amounted to 1,100,000 ; and in a war afterwards waged against them by Adrian, their loss was 580,000. The Emperor Claudius, on one occasion, destroyed an army of 300,000 Goths,

Heruli, etc. Attila, surnamed the Scourge of God, was defeated by Actius, in the battle of Chalons, with the loss of 160,000. In the last battle of Gengis Khan with the rebels of Tangut, there fell 300,000. And in the great battle of Angoria, between Tamerlane and Bajazet, in which were engaged 1,000,000 combatants, 300,000 men were slain.

Such has been the sacrifice of life in *a few* of the *many* conflicts which have occurred in this great slaughter-house of the universe. What then must have been the sum total in all the battles ever fought ?

But the estimate does not terminate here. "War," says Dr. Johnson, "has means of destruction more formidable than the cannon or the sword. By incommensurable encampments and unwholesome stations, where courage is useless and enterprize is impracticable, fleets are silently dispeopled, and armies sluggishly melted away." Here is a loss of life scarcely considered at all ; a hazard of which the inexperienced youth is little aware, when, at the period of his enrollment, he calculated the probabilities of his safe return. It would be serviceable, therefore, to dwell a little on this point.

In our late war with Great Britain, our loss is said to have amounted to 40,000, of which the returns of the killed in battle formed but a small item. In an estimate of the celebrated Neckar, contained in his "Reflections on the Calamities of War," he says :—"I cannot remember without

shuddering, to have seen the following statement, in an estimate of the men requisite for the exigencies of war.

Forty thousand men to be embarked for	
the colonies	40,000
To be deducted, one third for the first	
years mortality	13,333
	—————
	Remainder 26,667

In the invasion of the Burman empire by the British army, *one half* perished by sickness. The invasion of Russia by Napoleon furnishes another, and most striking illustration. “Ten thousand horses,” says Count Segur, “perished on the march, and more especially in the bivouacs, which followed. A large quantity of equipage remained abandoned on the sands, and great numbers of men subsequently gave way. Their carcasses were lying encumbering the road ; they sent forth a mephitic smell, impossible to breathe. The army had advanced but a hundred leagues from the Niemen, and already it was completely altered. The officers who travelled post from the interior of France to join it, arrived dismayed. They could not conceive how it happened, that a *victorious* army, *without fighting*, should leave behind it more wrecks than a defeated one. From these sufferings, physical and moral, from these privations, from these continual bivouacs, as dangerous near the poles as under the equator, and by the infection of the air by putrified carcasses of

men and horses, sprang two dreadful epidemics—the dysentery and the typhus fever. Out of 22,000 Bavarians who had crossed the Odee, 11,000 only reached the Duna, and yet *they had never been in action!* This military march cost the French one fourth, and the allies one half their armies.” If this is *victorious invasion*, what must be *disastrous retreat?* We will see. “Marching from Smolensko,” says Labaume, “a spectacle the most horrible was presented to our view. We saw soldiers stretched by dozens around the green branches which they had vainly attempted to kindle; and so numerous were their bodies, that they would have obstructed the road, had not the soldiers been often employed in throwing them into the ditches and ruts.” Speaking of the passage of the Beresina, he says:—“Now began a frightful contention between the foot soldiers and the horsemen. Many perished by the hands of their comrades; but a greater number were suffocated at the head of the bridge; and the dead bodies of men and horses so choaked every avenue, that it was necessary to climb over mountains of carcases, to arrive at the river. At length the Russians advanced in a mass. At the sight of the enemy, the artillery, the baggage waggons, the cavalry, and the foot soldiers, all pressed on, contending which should pass first. The strongest threw into the river those who were weaker, and hindered their passage, or unfeelingly trampled under foot all the sick they found in their way. Ma-

ny hundreds were crushed to death by the wheels of the cannon. Thousands and thousands of victims, deprived of all hope, threw themselves headlong into the Beresina, and were lost in the waves.

Were it necessary, we might greatly extend these illustrations. We could point to sacked cities, and show you the aged and infirm, the delicate female and the tender infant weltering in their blood. We could exhibit large territories laid waste, and their inhabitants perishing by famine and pestilence.— Here we should behold the sick and the wounded expiring for want of the proper care ; and there others, through privation and fatigue. In fine, the task were almost endless, to designate the various means by which the victims of war are sent to an untimely grave. When nations are engaged in hostilities, we hear of the amount of their respective forces ; we are informed of their numbers slain in battle ; and, without once thinking of any other loss, we are surprised to find, that but a handful of troops remain at the termination of a campaign. In the foregoing details, the mystery is revealed. We find that war in very deed “ has means of destruction more formidable than the cannon or the sword ;” and we are no longer incredulous respecting the vast numbers said to have been sacrificed on his bloody altar.— We can understand how it was, that 5,000,000 persons perished in the ravages of Africa on the Mediterranean ; how, that out of 700,000 Croises that, in the famed Crusades, sat down before the walls of

Nice, 40,000 only encamped around Jerusalem ;— how, that the possession of Nice, Edessa, and Antioch, cost the lives of 8,150,000 ; how that the Crusades drained Europe of 2,000,000 of her inhabitants ; how, that during the first fourteen years of the Mogul empire, millions on millions of human beings were destroyed by Gengis Khan ; how, that Alexander, Cesar, and Napoleon, occasioned each the destruction of millions ; and how, that the whole number of earth's inhabitants destroyed by war in all ages of the world, amounts, according to the estimate of Burke, to the enormous sum of 70,000,000,000 !!!

Here let us solemnly pause, and ponder on the details now before us. All these millions, these thousands of millions of rational beings, accountable at heaven's dread tribunal, have been precipitated prematurely into eternity. Seventy thousand millions ? Eighty times the present number of the whole population of the earth ? And yet do we feel unmoved ?—*we*, who can weep over a well-told tale of *imaginary* evil, alas ! have we plaudits for these awful realities ? The sight of a murdered corse petrifies us with horror and amazement. We feel in viewing it as if the order of nature had been violated, and the eternal principles of right outraged.— But we can read of a battle where thousands, nay, hundreds of thousands strew the earth for miles around ; where the dying and the dead lie huddled together in mountain piles ; and where the most

heart-rending scenes of romance are more than realized a thousand fold:—of realities like these can we read with the utmost composure conceivable? How inconsistent a creature is man? How great was the consternation that seized the nations, as but recently the Angel of death swept through the world in the terrific form of pestilence. No pains were spared, no means left untried, to stay his direful progress. 'Twas well, 'twas as it should be, for human life was at hazard on a mighty scale; and who could feel indifferent in such a case? But now comes grim and bloody war. Embattled myriads rush to the deadly conflict, and thousands on thousands perish in a day. And lo? your church bells peal, and your cannon thunder, and your bonfires blaze, in token of your joy? Where now is all your anxious care of life, your shuddering at untimely death, your consternation at wide-spread destruction? True, you do not rejoice at the sacrifice of life, but at the victory achieved. But where's your *sympathy* for the *mangled* and the *slain*? for the mangled and the slain *in your own ranks* even? Nay, where's your sorrow for the vanquished? Human nature is equally the sufferer, whether an American or a Briton bleeds; and the philanthropist finds abundant cause of grief, whether victory perch on the lion or the eagle. Where then are philanthropist's tears for the horrors of victory, and the miseries of conquest? Is death less death, when inflicted by the sword? Are men no longer men, when they

perish in the field ? Again are we constrained to exclaim, how inconsistent a creature is man !

We are prone to regard an army as one immense individual mass, possessed of only one set of nerves, and of the feelings of only one individual. When thousands fall in battle, and an army is thereby diminished in point of force, the impression produced on our feelings is not so much that life has been sacrificed, as that a portion or member of the great body has been amputated. It is thus that we hear of the loss sustained by armies with so little emotion. Could we bring the subject home ; could we realize that each individual composing all these slaughtered millions just enumerated had struggled singly in the agonies of death, enduring all the physical and mental sufferings that would be endured by a whole army composing an individual mass ; could we analyse the sum of mortality, and, instead of feeling it to be *one general* death, realize it to be death *so many times repeated* ; ten thousand, ten million deaths ; how different would be our sensations on the subject. And when to this is added the consideration, that each of these individuals in all these millions had a circle of relatives and friends whose hearts were wrung with anguish at their untimely loss ; that vast numbers of them left families unprotected for, unprotected, and friendless, to make their way through life as they might ; how great in very deed does the evil under consideration appear.

The next evil that presents itself for consideration, is the multiform and frightful suffering, the loathsome and horrible wretchedness, realized in war ;---suffering and

wretchedness compared with which, the common ills of life, and even the fabled ones of romance, dwindle into insignificance. Of this suffering and wretchedness, which go so far towards constituting what is appalling and horrible in war, we are almost entirely ignorant. We hear indeed of the number wounded in battle ; but we do not think of their agonies, and deem their wounds of no consequence, so they do not prove mortal, and cause an ultimate diminution of forces. It does not occur to us, that the wounded sometimes lie on the field for days, with their wounds undressed, amid slaughtered heaps of their fellows, famishing with hunger, burning with thirst, chilled with the damps of night, drenched with the descending showers, scorched with the summer's sun, stiffened with the winter's frost, suffocated with surrounding putrefaction, trodden under foot by men and horses, crushed by the wheels of cannon, or torn by ravenous beasts and birds of prey !---We hear of the sack of a city ; but if the inhabitants are not absolutely massacred, we feel no further concern on their account, though they be exposed to insult and abuse from a brutal soldiery, or be plundered of their all, and forced to fly from their homes, or though pestilence or famine, springing from the surrounding havoc and desolation, sweep them by thousands from the face of the earth. We hear of a retreat ; and then we even find cause of gratulation, that the army is able to *make* one, without falling into the hands of the enemy. But whether any perish by fatigue or privation while making it, or whether the sick and the wounded have been abandon-

ed to the mercy of the enemy, without medicine, without nourishment, without care, is not entitled to a moment's consideration. It suffices that the *army*--the *general* and his *life-guard*---reach the goal of safety, where they can make *a stand*, and rally *recruits*. We hear of a capitulation ; and then we think of the laws and the chivalry of war, and of high-souled and magnanimous foemen ; and we cannot for a moment allow ourselves to suppose, that men possessed of so keen a sense of honor, will treat the unfortunate captives in any other than the most generous manner. It is as foreign as possible to our thoughts, that our captured soldiers and seamen are almost starving on their scant allowance, which, it may be is so execrable, that with all their ravenous hunger, they are hardly able to consume it. And as little do we imagine, that they are permitted to go in tattered garments, or to be annoyed by filth or vermin. We hear of marches and encampments ; and it does not once enter our heart, that any thing can be otherwise than agreeable in *these* cases. We do not consider that the regular supplies of food, and clothing, and medicine, are sometimes cut off by the enemy, thereby reducing an army to the greatest extremities ; that many often sink under the fatigue of forced marches, or the weakness of privation, and are left to perish on the road ; and that the camp fever or the plague oft times ravages the best regulated encampment. The official documents of an army are never encumbered with details like the foregoing ; and hence it is that we see only the bright side of the picture, and feel so

well reconciled to war-like operations. It is those only who participate in them, and who thus become acquainted with particulars, that view the subject in its true light ; and these are so few, compared with mankind at large, that those evils are not generally realized ; and consequently fail to produce the desirable effect on the public mind. To awaken it therefore, to a due consideration of the subject, I propose to give a few very brief details under this head.

“ In the space of *a square league*,” says Labaume, in his description of the field of Borodino after the battle, “ almost every spot was covered with the killed and wounded. But the most horrible spectacle was the interior of the ravines : almost all the wounded who were able to drag themselves along, had taken refuge there to avoid the shot. These miserable wretches, heaped one upon another, and almost suffocated with blood, uttering the most dreadful groans, and invoking death with piercing cries, eagerly besought us to put an end to their torments.”—“ Around our standards,” says Segur, in describing the same scene, “ were the remainder of the officers and subalterns, and some soldiers, hardly enough to protect them ; and these with their clothes torn, blackened with powder, and reeking with blood. The redoubts were blocked up with our fallen, and in following Napoleon, our horses’ feet would strike a wounded man, and bring from him his last groan. The Emperor, until then as mute as his victory, and oppressed by the view of so many

victims, could contain himself no longer : he found relief in expressing aloud his indignation, and causing kind offices to be lavished on the unfortunate creatures. Some, the youngest, were groaning forth the names of their mothers or their country ; others called upon us to dispatch them at once.”—“The French troops,” says Porter, “as they poured into the devoted city,” (Moscow,) “committed outrages so horrid on the persons of all whom they discovered, that fathers, desperate to save their children from pollution, would set fire to their place of refuge, and find a surer asylum in its flames. The streets, the cellars, the houses, flowed with blood, and were filled with violation and carnage.—“A great part of the population of Moscow,” says Labaume, frightened at our arrival, had concealed themselves in cellars, or secret recesses of their houses. As the flames spread around, we saw them rushing in despair from their various asylums.—Many old people, borne down with grief rather than by age, had not sufficient strength to follow their families, and expired near the houses in which they were born. Nothing could equal the anguish which absorbed every feeling heart, and which increased in the dead of night by the cries of the miserable victims who were savagely murdered, or by the screams of the young females, who fled for protection to their weeping mothers, and whose ineffectual struggles tended only to inflame the passions of their violators.” Segur, in describing the retreat of the French from Mos-

cow, says:—"Henceforward there was no fraternity in arms. Like savages, the strongest despoiled the weakest: they rushed round the dying, and frequently waited not for their last breath. When a horse fell, you might have fancied you saw a famished pack of hounds. They surrounded him, they tore him to pieces, for which they quarrelled among themselves like ravenous dogs." Describing those who perished with the cold, he says: "From their eyes burst forth real tears of blood, accompanied by profound sighs. At length they fell prostrate upon the snow, staining it with a gush of living blood, and all their miseries terminated. Their comrades even turned not their heads to look at them; for the slightest motion of the head to the left or to the right was attended with torture, the hair of their heads and beards being frozen into a solid mass. At Joupranoui, the soldiers set fire to whole houses, in order to warm themselves for a few moments. The glare of these conflagrations attracted crowds of wretches, whom the intensity of cold and of suffering had rendered delirious. These rushed forward like madmen, gnashing their teeth, and with demoniac laughter, precipitating themselves into the flames, perished in horrible convulsions! Their famished companions looked on without affright; and it is but too true, that some of them drew the half-roasted bodies from the flames, and ventured to carry to their lips the revolting food."—"The route," says Labaume, "was covered with soldiers who no long-

er retained the human form, and whom the enemy disdained to make prisoners. Some had lost their hearing, others their speech, and many, by excessive cold and hunger, were reduced to a state of frantic stupidity, in which they roasted the dead bodies of their comrades for food, or even *gnawed their own hands and arms*. On the 13th of Dec. we repassed the Niemen. Arrived at the opposite bank, like ghosts returned from the infernal regions, we fearfully looked behind us, and beheld with horror the savage countries where we had suffered so much." The following are a few short extracts from "The Rifleman's Comrade," a work on the French war in Spain.—"Many were *starved* in the Peninsula, and no account having been rendered of them, they are perhaps still expected at home! Many a night we found ourselves without the means to dry our drenched garments. Assassination by night and insults by day were the agreeable constituents of our life in Madrid. But we took deadly vengeance, sparing neither age nor profession. The penitent at the altar shared the fate of the armed rebel. The vestments and plate applied to the uses of religion were abstracted without remorse, and the unhallowed appetite of lust was let loose upon the persons both of matrons and virgins. Even the unhappy individuals confined by sickness to the wards of the hospitals, were thrown out of bed, and inhumanly lacerated. The point of the bayonet pierced alike children of ten or twelve years, and persons who had

arrived at manhood. One of our grenadiers encountered a young woman of high respectability, who, while she held a child on one arm, brandished a poignard with the other hand. He stunned the mother by a blow with the butt-end of the musket, and impaled the infant on his bayonet !” Speaking of some of their men who had been taken prisoners, the writer says : “ What an appearance did they present ! Their eyes were put out, their tongues were cut off, their fingers split up, and sundry parts of their body stabbed.” “ Many a day,” says he, “ did we pass, without receiving a morsel of bread, being restricted to a small portion of meat, accompanied with wretched soup, and at length even this provision likewise ceased, and we were compelled to resort to whatever substances fell in our way, among which may be enumerated the herbs which grew uncultivated in the open fields. By this kind of living, every species of malady was successively introduced among us, and a necessity arose for sundry medicines with which we were wholly unprovided, our field dispensaries having fallen into the hands of the Spaniards.” (The French army at length capitulated.) “ No sooner had we grounded our arms, than the Spaniards broke in upon us, and murdered in cold blood our defenceless people. Some were pierced with numberless stabs ; others taken, and *burnt alive* !!! We were finally conducted back to Cordova. The infuriated populace rushed upon us like tigers, and individuals were here and there plucked

from the ranks, and literally cut to pieces." (After a while they were sent to Cadiz, some by land and others by water.) "As soon," continues the writer, "as we had got on board these vessels, we were counted like so many cattle when driven into their stables. Each place of rest was made to contain six men; so that when once laid upon our backs, we had no room to enable us to change our position either to the right or to the left; and as may be easily conceived, the pestilential effluvia arising from so many bodies, thus huddled together, was offensive in the extreme, rendering the atmosphere of the ship quite putrid. Vermin were generated by thousands, and such was the climax of wretchedness and disgust that oppressed me, that with fervent sincerity I implored the intervention of the destroying Angel. A great many of my harassed companions sought refuge from misery by plunging into the sea, and others resorted to a different mode of self-destruction." (From Cadiz they were sent to Majorca, where they were thrown into an old barrack.) "Our garments," continues he, "scarcely sufficed to cover our nakedness, hanging about us in rotten shreds, and swarming with vermin, which we ineffectually endeavored to extirpate." (From this place they were shipped to the island of Cabrera, where they were forced to resort to grass for subsistence, their supplies having been cut off by a storm. Many died. A cuirassier shot and devoured three of his comrades. And when supplies arrived, they were consumed with such

eagerness as produced in many cases immediate mortality." (Overcome by his sufferings, our author at length enlisted into the service of Spain.)—In a letter of a British officer in the Peninsula, respecting the retreat of Massena from Portugal, he says: "Little naked infants of a year old, or less, were found besmeared in the mud of the road, transfixed with bayonet wounds. Young women and matrons were found lying dead, with cruel and shameful wounds; and, as if some general law to that effect had been promulgated to the army, the priests were hanged upon trees by the road side."—At the siege of Genoa in 1800, the distress was awful indeed. "Men and women, in the last agonies of despair, filled the air with their groans and shrieks. Sometimes, while uttering these dreadful cries, they strove with furious hands to tear out their ravening entrails, and fell dead in the streets." Children, left by the death of their parents in utter destitution, with mournful gestures and tears, and heart-broken accents, implored the passing stranger; but none either pitied them or aided them, the excess of his own anguish extinguishing in each man's breast compassion for the misery of others." For some days, the Austrian prisoners of war confined in certain old vessels, were left without nutriment of any description. In this extremity they ate their shoes, and the leather of their pouches. "Scowling darkly at each other, their sinister glances betrayed the horrid fear of being reduced at last to a revolting resource. So

great in the end was their desperation, that they endeavored to scuttle their floating prisons, in order to sink them ; preferring to perish thus, rather than any longer endure the tortures of famine. As commonly happens, a mortal pestilence was added to the ravages of death ; malignant fevers carried off crowds from the public hospitals, the lowly hovels of the poor, and the superb palaces of the rich.”—

At Wilna, during Napoleon’s operations in that quarter, the sick were frequently without food, without beds, without covering, and even without straw and medicine. As a substitute for lint in dressing wounds, the surgeons were forced to use tow and birch down. For three days, a hospital of a hundred wounded was forgotten ; and an accident led to its discovery after all !—It was sixteen days after the battle of Waterloo, before the surgeons could complete the dressing of the wounds of the soldiers, and the removal of the wounded. Twelve days after the battle, a visitant to this field of blood saw numbers of them who had crawled to the side of the putrid carcase of a man or a horse, contending with the worm for his meal ! “It is impossible,” says a British surgeon who was on the spot, “for the imagination to conceive the sufferings of men rudely carried at such a period of their wounds. Turn which way I might, I encountered every form of entreaty from those whose condition left no need of words to stir compassion. “Surgeon Major, oh ! how I suffer ! dress my wounds ! dress my wounds ! Doctor, I com-

mend myself to you ; cut off my leg. Oh ! I suffer *too much ! too much !*" And when these intreaties were unavailing, you might hear, in a weak, inward voice of despair, " I shall die ; I am a dead man." I know not what notions my feeling countrymen have of thirty thousand (wounded) men thrown into a town and its environs. They still their compassionate emotions by subscriptions ; but what avails this to the wounded, who would exchange gold for a bit of rag ?"—After the battle of Leipsic, thousands of ghostly figures from the field of battle staggered along the streets of the city, begging at every window and at every door. They even ransacked the very dunghills, in search of undigested fragments of food !—In the military hospitals in Aracan, monstrous reptiles, engendered in the masses of filth which the soldiers had been obliged to take for food, were often seen crawling from the mouths of the sick !—After the sack of St. Sebastian, a person might traverse the whole city, and meet scarcely a living creature.—Such were the scenes of horror exhibited at the destruction of Carthage, as to force tears from the eyes of Scipio, the Roman General.—Mothers killed their children for food at the seige of Jerusalem by Titus.—At the time of the pillage of Rome by Alaric, so great was the famine in the city, that human flesh was publicly exposed for sale !—When the destroyers of the Roman empire approached a fortified place which their undisciplined army could not reduce, they gathered together a multitude of prisoners, and putting them to the sword, left their bodies unburied,

that the stench of their carcasses might force the garrison to abandon it !—At the capture of Magdeburg wives were dishonoured in the arms of their husbands, daughters at the feet of their parents. The Croats amused themselves with throwing children into the flames ! Pappenheim's Walloons, with stabbing infants at their mother's breasts ! Here you could see the living crawling from under the dead ; there, children wandering about with heart-rending cries, seeking their parents ; and there, infants sucking the dead bodies of their mothers ! ! !—The Duke of Marlborough was *accustomed* to abandon the wounded to their fate, as being too great an incumbrance to an army !

I stay my hand—not because my materials are *exhausted*, but because they are *exhaustless*. I might continue making similar extracts till I should weary the patience of the reader. I shall therefore forbear on this point, by the introduction of another very nearly allied to it, viz. the severity of military discipline.

Pursuing the walks of civil life free and unmolested, we know little how to sympathize with the subjects of martial law. For the veriest trifles, nay, sometimes for unavoidable accidents, are soldiers subjected to a flogging ; and for faults which in civil life would be deemed venial, are they liable to suffer death. “I have heard the captain of a British man-of-war,” says one, “order a man to the gangway, to receive a dozen lashes for having on blue trowsers ! It is not uncommon to sentence sailors to receive

five hundred to a thousand lashes, which are inflicted day after day, as he is able to bear them. Nor is the condition of soldiers better than that of sailors, but rather worse. I was on parade one day, when preparation was making for the punishment of the gauntlet. All the soldiers of the regiment, consisting of six hundred or more, were placed in two ranks, facing each other, and about five feet apart. To each soldier was given a stick of a yard in length or more. I did not stay to see the execution, for I thought the pain I must necessarily endure in witnessing it, would not be compensated by the gratification of my curiosity. I was however informed, that the culprit was stripped naked to the waist, with his hands tied before him, and marched between the ranks, preceded by a drum, and a soldier walking backwards, with his bayonet presented to the sufferer's breast, to prevent him from going too fast. In this way, he is struck once by each soldier, officers going down on the outside of the ranks, to see that each man does his duty; and if any one is *suspected* of not laying on hard enough, he receives himself a blow from the officer's cane. Sometimes the deserter has to retrace his steps, and as a regiment consists of from six hundred to a thousand, and some German regiments even of two thousand, he must, on such an occasion, receive from twelve hundred to two thousand, and even four thousand blows, which often proves fatal. To so high a pitch of despair were these soldiers carried by their sufferings,

that many committed suicide.”—“ I have seen on the continent,” says the foregoing writer, “ the dreadful instrument of torture called *the picket*. A picket is a stake standing about a foot out of the ground, and sharpened to about the size of an English sixpence. A pole a rod long, acting on a pivot, is supported by a neighboring wall, or a crutch like a well-pole, and similar to that used for tying up slaves to be flogged, in the Southern States. One hand of the sufferer is made fast to this pole, by a noose round the wrist, and the other end is depressed, by which he is elevated from the ground, so that he can scarcely touch it. Sometimes an upright post, with a pulley by which a soldier is hoisted by the wrist, is used instead of a well-pole. He has no alternative but to *rest* his bare foot on the sharp point of the stake, or to hang by one arm, with the noose tightening round the wrist.”--Shipp in his Memoirs describes the punishment of a soldier for repeated drunkenness, as follows. “ When the offender was tied, or rather hung up, by the hands, his back, from intense cold, and the effects of previous flogging, exhibited a complete blue and black appearance. On the first lash, the blood spirted out some yards; and after he had received fifty, his back from the neck to the waist, was one continued stream of blood. When the poor fellow was taken down, he staggered and fell to the ground. This unfortunate creature afterwards shot himself in his

barrack room, in a sad state of intoxication, and was borne to his solitary pit, and buried like a dog. The poor wretch had scarcely ever looked up, from the date of his first flogging : his prospects as a soldier had been utterly destroyed, and his degradation had been so acutely felt by him, as to paralyze his best efforts towards amendment, and at length to sink him into a state of worthlessness and despair.”—In Thiebault’s “Original Anecdotes of Frederick the Great,” we have the following. “Nothing was more common than to see men cut off one or more of the fingers of their right hand, to be freed at once from the power of the recruiting officer.” Speaking of a review, he says : “I cast my eye on a young stripling of fifteen years of age, and witnessed his taking out of the ranks a soldier at least fifty, to whom he gave repeated blows with his cane on his arms and thighs, for some trifling fault he had been guilty of in the handling of his arms ; while the only reply of the unfortunate sufferer was silent and indignant tears.—Scenes like these rendered many of the soldiers desperate. “They said each to the other that the best thing they could do was, to die ; but to prevent their afterwards going to hell, for committing suicide, they would murder some child, (whom by that means they sent to paradise, whither they should then go of necessity themselves,) for the purpose of confessing the murder, and surrendering their persons, and thus procure themselves the opportunity of asking pardon of God previous to their being condemned to punishment !”

I adduce not the foregoing examples of severity for the purpose of holding them up to condemnation. I say not that this severity is unnecessary to the preservation of military discipline. But assuredly, a custom involving the *necessity* of such severity is the more to be deplored. But it is time to proceed to the consideration of another evil, following next in natural order; which is, the immense sacrifice of property ever the result of war.

To show how war swallows up our wealth, we need not even recur to the period of hostilities. We will consider a period of peace. Take for example the year 1827. Our revenue that year from the customs, amounted to twenty millions, or very nearly that sum. Our war expenditures were about the same. Yes, our *war* expenditures during the *peaceful* year 1827, amounted to nearly \$20,000,000 ! The items were as follows :

Military Establishment	\$ 5,675,741,62
Naval Service	4,263,877,45
Public Debt (incurred by war)	10,003,668,39
	<hr/>
	\$19,943,287,46

Thus did the war system in a year of profound peace consume all our revenue derived from custom-house duties. This sacrifice is the less realized, because the case of the customs is not duly considered. At the time our merchants were paying these twenty millions to government, the people were paying them 20 cts. extra on a bushel of salt, 10 cts. on a gallon

of molasses, 25 cts. on a pound of tea, &c. The people, therefore, while they supposed they were paying no taxes at all, were actually paying almost as much as they paid for the necessaries of life ! to say nothing of millions more, contributed by the appropriation of their time &c. to militia duties.

But what a trifle is our war account, when compared with that of nations that wage war in *style* ; that have their Waterloo fights, and their thousand gallant war-ships. The war originating from the French Revolution cost Great Britain three thousand million dollars. The war expeditue of all Christendom (Great Britain included) during the same period, may be estimated at five times that amount, viz : fifteen thousand millions. The present national debt of Great Britain is four thousand millions of dollars. Her war expenses in time of peace, including the interest on her debt, are about two hundred and fifty millions of dollars, or forty-nine fiftieths of her whole expenditure.

And how is this vast expense defrayed ? By the most oppressive system of taxation probably ever known. The tax on salt is fifteen shillings a bushel ; so that an Englishman has to pay, on that all-necessary article of food, thirty times its value to government. In short, there is nothing taxable that is not exorbitantly taxed in that country. The consequence of this system of taxation is, that one half of the inhabitants are reduced to penury, to be maintained by the rest. And such of the poor as obtain employment, and support themselves, can hardly be said

to live ; they barely *exist*, and that on two coarse meals a day---on oaten meal and potatoes ; on grass and water ; on almost any thing, indeed, capable of sustaining life. It is almost a regular rule for a poor man to apply to the parish for assistance, as soon as he has two children. The peasantry, *for the most part*, are paupers. Nor is the state of the continent better, but even worse ; insomuch that the very necessaries of life are in some countries esteemed luxuries.

But war has other means than armies and navies, for the annihilation of the wealth of nations.

First, there is the loss of the time of all engaged. Secondly, there is the loss of the time, and the maintenance, of those who are rendered invalids for life. Thirdly, there is the premature loss of many useful lives. Fourthly, there is the loss occasioned by the interruption of commerce, and the consequent stagnation and suspension of various branches of business. Fifthly, there is the loss consequent on alarms, and preparations to meet an expected foe. “ When hosts of enemies,” says Cicero, “ are not far distant, though no irruption has been made, yet flocks are abandoned, agriculture is deserted, the navigation of merchants ceases. So that, neither from duties collected in the harbour, nor from tithes on the soil and its productions, nor from the revenues of pasturage, can the tribute be secured ; whence the fruit of a whole year is often lost by a single rumour of danger, and by the single terror of a battle.” But lastly, and especially, the direct destruction of property. And this is indeed

immense. Take several instances as samples.--- Carthage is one---a city 24 miles in circumference, which required 17 days to reduce it to ashes. How vast the amount of property destroyed on that occasion. Then again the ravages of the Roman Empire by the Barbarians, who laid waste whole provinces, sparing not even the vines and fruit trees. During the ravages of the Palatinate by Louis XIV. 27 cities and towns might be seen at one particular time in flames! And how amazing was the destruction of property in the conflagration of Moscow, and the desolation of the Russian territory which preceded that event.

In short, when we look at the subject in every point of view, we are led to the conclusion that the direct expenses of war, as included in official estimates, are not one fifth of the actual pecuniary sacrifices. At this rate, our last war made us five hundred millions of dollars the poorer. This sum in silver would weigh 13,933 tons. To count it would require a man nearly thirteen years, at the rate of a dollar a second, twelve hours a day. The interest on this sum at 6 per cent, would be \$83,333 a day, \$3,472 an hour, \$57 a minute, and nearly a dollar a second! A man must therefore count night and day, to keep pace with the accumulation of interest on the real cost of our last war!!! What then must be the fact in relation to the wars of the world in all ages! Had the property thus destroyed been devoted to peace, this earth would have been rendered one vast garden, and want would be unknown.

Well might Franklin remark, that "if statesmen had a little more arithmetic, wars would be much less frequent." These wasted millions, these blazing cities, these flying communities, these desolated territories, are not taken into account by *warrior* statesmen. They know full well how to calculate indirect expenditures to a penny ; but there is no rule in their political mathematics which will apply to cases of so much greater consequence. The people, too, seem almost as bad calculators in this respect as their rulers. Let a small direct tax be laid, or an object of charity be presented, and we perceive indeed no extraordinary gratification on their part in making the payment, or bestowing the donation. Let pestilence invade the land, and give a temporary check to business ; and we hear of nothing but hard times, and poverty, and wretchedness. Let a single town or village be laid in ashes by casualty, and a whole nation's sympathies are elicited, and contributions pour in from every quarter to its relief. In all cases of this nature, men seem rational. But the necessities of life may be rendered doubly expensive by duties ; the commerce of nations may be ruined, their cities wrapped in flames, and their territories laid waste from frontier to centre by war, without producing any particular emotion. Verily, statesmen and people *do* need "a little more arithmetic," or an *improved edition* of what they already have.

The next evil which we will consider, is the demoralizing, brutalizing nature of war.

The very business of war is, the infliction of injury

upon the enemy ; and this is to be done by any means that may be requisite to its accomplishment. There is no moral precept that it does not violate, no dictate of humanity that it does not disregard. That the end justifies the means, is its favorite maxim ; and the nearer men can be rendered devils incarnate, the better for the accomplishment of its purposes. Hence the well known maxim, “The worse the man, the better the soldier.” Napoleon used to say, that if soldiers were not depraved, they must be made so. He did not like a religious soldier, and suffered no priests in his army. And George the Fourth laid it down as a settled point, that if religious principles were allowed to be urged by individual officers as a plea for disobedience of orders, the discipline of the army would sustain an injury which would be dangerous to the state. Thus, a soldier must have no conscience, or violate the one he has. *Obedience* is his motto. No matter what may be the mandate ; whether to practise deception and falsehood towards the enemy ; whether to plunder, to burn, or to massacre ; whether to violate an armistice, or to outrage decency, or to desecrate things sacred ;—whatever a capricious and unprincipled commander may chance to require, obey he must, or die ! “ It has been for a long time,” says Franklin, “ a generally received opinion, that a military man is not to inquire whether a war be just or unjust ; he is to execute his orders. On that principle, if the tyrant commands his army to attack and

destroy, not only an unoffending neighbor nation, but even his own subjects, the army is bound to obey. A negro slave, in our colonies, being commanded by his master to rob or murder a neighbor, or do any other immoral act, may refuse, and the magistrate will protect him in his refusal. *The slavery then of a soldier, is worse than that of a negro.*" Indeed, it is generally understood and expected, that the laws of morality which bind men in civil life, are not to be regarded in war. A certain individual having sent Antigonus an essay on justice, the latter observed : " What a fool is this fellow, to prate to me about justice, while I am engaged in war." Frederick the Great, on going to war, erased the name of God from his standard, declaring that God had nothing to do with the business. In short, war seems to be regarded as a license to all manner of wickedness. Deeds which in private life would suspend the one guilty of them between heaven and earth, are thought nothing of in war. The very occupation itself, its slaughter, its devastation, its miseries, and every thing connected with it, tend to harden the heart, to make the soldier reckless of human happiness and life, reckless of every obligation moral and humane, and to prepare him for the perpetration of deeds at the thought of which he would once have shuddered. Every evil passion is called into exercise, every generous and amiable feeling expelled from the bosom. " I saw the British soldiers," says one, " who in the

morning were moved by the piteous cries of those they carried," (the wounded after the battle of Waterloo,) "in the evening hardened by the repetition of the scene, and by fatigue, and indifferent to the suffering they occasioned."—"Every man in Onore," says another, "was put to the sword. It was rather shocking to humanity; but such are but secondary considerations to a soldier, whose bosom glows with heroic glory."—"The preparation for a battle," says M. Decon, "leaves little room for moral reflection. Agitated by every thing around me, my heart beats with joy whenever the Mamelukes are mentioned." "One of our men," says he, "lying on the ground, was seizing an expiring Mameluke and strangling him. An officer said to him, 'How can you in your condition do such an act?'" "You speak much at your ease," replied the man, "you who are unhurt; but I who have not long to live must have some enjoyment while I may."—Prior to the attack on Algiers in 1816, wine was pledged in a bumper to a successful attack, and an *unsuccessful negotiation*!—The celebrated Eugene fought against his own country, rather than not fight at all. He surprised a fort that was of no use, merely to mak ework for the newspapers. He cursed the courier who brought to him the 'unwelcome' intelligence of peace."—It is related by the celebrated Livy, that after the battle of Cannæ, a Numidian was found alive under the dead body of a Roman, who had thrown himself headlong on his

enemy, and beaten him down; but, unable any longer to use his weapons, on account of the loss of his hands, he had torn off the nose and ears of the Numidian with his teeth!—At the storming of Bezieres, a Cistercian monk, who led the victors, being asked how the Catholics were to be distinguished from heretics, replied: “Kill them all; God will know his own!”—“Oh! how many promotions!” exclaimed an English officer, while reading an account of a sanguinary battle.—During our Revolutionary war, a Lieutenant Colonel of a regiment passed the Colonel, who was his brother, and who lay wounded near the heart. “Ah! my dear brother,” exclaimed the former, “one inch nearer, and I should have had your regiment.”—The night before the battle of Bennington, a part of the members of a church went over to the enemy; and the next day witnessed the shocking spectacle of church members, who but a few days before had assembled together around the table of their Lord, arrayed in arms against one another!—In this connexion, it would be proper again to cite the reader’s attention to some of the diabolical scenes heretofore presented to view—to the maiming and massacreing of prisoners; to the butchering of women and children; to the bayoneting and burning of infants, and so on. And these infernal deeds, let it be recollected, are committed by the citizens of civilized, *Christianized* countries—deeds which nought but the murderous occupation of war could ever render them sufficiently

obdurate to commit. When the raw soldier first smells gun-powder, he shakes like an aspen leaf; but ere his maiden battle is half over, he becomes the veriest fearnought, and can rush up to the cannon's mouth undaunted. Nay, with fiend-like joy he can plunge his own death-blade into the bosom of the foe. The timid lamb is transformed into a raging lion, the man into a demon, and brute-like, devil-like, he seeks whom he may devour. Nor less does his familiarity with the *vices* of the army affect his *morals*. "It must certainly be concluded," says the author of "Recollections of an Eventful Life, chiefly passed in the Army," that if there is one method better fitted than another to make a man an abject slave to the will of his superior; one calculated to smother every generous and noble feeling; to destroy his morals and his constitution; there could not have been a better school chosen than the army. In general, the moment a recruit is enlisted, and gets a forage cap on his head, and a stick in his hand, he considers himself licensed to drink, curse, and swear, and associate with women of the town, whatever may have been his previous character." And he might have dated the commencement of this career of vice still earlier. It begins before the *enlistment* of the recruit. Inebriation is the great bait used to decoy the victim into the toils of war; and it is even admitted, that but few could be induced to enlist, if entirely sober. And as the tragedy begins, so it continues and ends. Rum is the alleviator of fa-

tigue, and the exhilarator of the social circle, in the army. From the toddy potation of the recruiting rendezvous, to the gun-powder sling of the field of battle, there is one continuous scene of intemperance; insomuch that a temperate soldier is almost a moral phenomenon. Intemperance enlists a soldier, intemperance accompanies him to the dreadful fight, and intemperance descends with him to his bloody grave! Nor should we confine our view of the subject to intemperance. The army and navy are schools of vice in general. *There* reign blasphemy, irreligion, debauchery, and every thing abhorrent, in their most abandoned form. *There* are the restraints of civil society, and the moralizing influences of religious institutions, unknown. *There* human depravity rages uncontrolled, and appears in its naked deformity. *There* it is, where are generated those monsters of depravity who are capable of deeds of atrocity that want a name. No wonder that Voltaire, in view of such scenes, uplifted his voice against war. No wonder he should say, as he did, "Put together all the vices of all ages and places, and never will they come up to the mischiefs and enormities of one campaign." There is something so opposite to every thing good in the very nature of war, that it is not surprising that David was prohibited from building the Temple, on the ground of his having been a man of blood. There was an incompatibility between the two employments, though sanctioned by God himself; for there is an appropriateness, a seem-

liness, that should be regarded in the *adaptation* of one thing to another. And if David was thus prohibited, what shall we say of those men of blood who cannot plead the Divine sanction, nor so much as bare justice, in vindication of their sanguinary deeds? And if a butcher of dumb animals should be excluded from a jury box, as is done in England, on account of the brutalizing nature of his employment, what disposition should be made of *human* butchers, such as have been described? If wars like David's unfitted *him* for the sacred work performed by *his son*; and if a lawful though sanguinary calling disqualifies an individual from serving as a jury man; how is the case of warriors in general? War, as we have seen, knows no religion, no morality, no humanity. If, by a battle or a march on the Sabbath, an advantage can be obtained, then must a battle be fought, or a march be made. If an enemy can be deceived by falsehood, truth must give place. If a desperate assault is to be made, the soldiers must be stimulated with strong drink, and sent inebriated into eternity. If a country is likely to furnish subsistence to the enemy, it must be rendered a desert, and its peaceful inhabitants reduced to famine. And an Andre must perish on the scaffold, though a Washington seal his death warrant with his own tears. And well would it be, were the vices and ferocity of war confined to the scene of military operations. But no. The *community* become infected. Familiarity with the details of battle produces a general feeling of in-

difference in relation to human life ; and the continual recollection of their country's wrongs, real or imaginary, harrows up their souls to wrath and vengeance ; and they hear with pleasure of the destruction of the ships of the enemy by tempests, or of their soldiers by pestilence, and would, were it in their power, sink the whole nation to the bottom of the ocean, and almost into the depths of perdition itself. In addition to this, a febrile excitement keeps them in continual agitation. Public attention is diverted from its ordinary and healthful pursuits, to brood o'er the atrocities of war. A military mania pervades all ranks, and the very children become heroes. War ! war ! war ! is all the theme, and every item of intelligence becomes insipid, that is not written in letters of blood ! Even the hallowed silence and repose of the Sabbath are desecrated, and the citizens throng the taverns to hear the recent tidings from the theatre of war, and hold a colloquy on battle. And when the soldier returns from " the wars," laden with vices as well as with honors, he becomes the centre of attraction to a circle of gaping admirers, who deem it brave and noble to ape *such a patriot*. And thus are all the abominations of military life introduced into the bosom of civil society. " In fact," says the celebrated author of *Lacon*, " the demoralizing tendencies of war are so notorious, that to insist upon them would be to insult the understanding of my readers."

The next evil which we will notice, is, that all who fall on the one side at least, are absolutely murdered ; and if the proper concessions, and overtures have been made by neither party, the same remark will apply to both. Allowing that the one party is in the right, it follows that it is forced into war unjustly, and therefore, that all who are slaughtered on that side, die undeservedly. If this is not murder, what is so ? And if neither party is not entirely in the right, then is the murder mutual. If, therefore, a single murder makes a *villain*, what but *demons* are those who, by plunging nations into avoidable war, murder by thousands and millions ? When we call unjust war murder, we give it too mild a name. It is *wholesale* murder ; it is what might be denominated *genticide*, or the murder of nations. Viewed in this light, how fearful appears the responsibility devolving on rulers and on nations, in relation to the subject of war—and the more especially, if we extend the idea, and take into consideration the number and magnitude of its evils in other respects. That there is blame—guilt—guilt to the extent of all those evils, is a conclusion at which we must unavoidably arrive. So true as that the one of the parties to a war is in the right, the other is in the wrong ; and if neither is entirely in the right, then both are in the wrong. All the evils of war, therefore, are wrongfully occasioned. Life is wrongfully sacrificed, property wrongfully expended, captured, and destroyed, misery wrongfully inflicted,

and so on through the long and fearful catalogue. What then is war but a mighty murderer, a mighty squanderer, a mighty plunderer, a mighty tyrant, and a mighty tormentor? And what are the rulers, what the people, that avail not themselves of every practicable means of avoiding it?

But what greatly aggravates the foregoing evil, is another closely connected with it, viz: that all must aid in war, whether they deem it just or unjust. An individual, *as a citizen*, has no discretionary power. It is not with him in this capacity as in his private one. What a *nation* decrees, an *individual* is required to obey. Would those who approve of war prosecute it entirely by themselves, it would be comparatively tolerable. But war spirits not only fight themselves; they require others to fight likewise. A citizen deeming his country's cause ever so unjust, is nevertheless required to maintain it—nay, even when it is *confessedly* unjust; for, what is the received doctrine on this point, but that a citizen is under obligation to obey his government. As therefore the one party, or the other, or both, are engaged in an unjust cause, it follows that the citizen is required to aid, not only in a war which he *regards* as unjust, but which is *really* so—to aid with his property at all events, and, if need be, with his services in the field—to shed innocent blood, and perchance to suffer his own to be shed, and himself to be precipitated into eternity, while unjustly attempting to send others thither—to contribute to all the long train

of plagues and curses ever the result of war—or be denounced and punished as a traitor. Some may ease their conscience on this point by arguing, that, as civil government is an institution of Heaven, they are bound to obey its requisitions, and consequently, that they are not participants in the *guilt* of unjust measures of a public nature. But there are others who contend, that there are obligations paramount to those of citizenship ; that right and wrong are immutable ; that it is unlawful to violate the one, or to commit the other under *any* circumstances ; and that they are no more at liberty to take life or to inflict evil unjustly in war, than in any other way. They cannot help recalling to remembrance a very pertinent observation made by the Apostles to the rulers of the Jews : “ We ought to obey God rather than man.” To such, the requisition to aid in an unjust war must be a sore, a grievous evil ; for it must be obeyed at the sacrifice of conscience, or disobeyed at their peril.

In considering the evils of war, we should not overlook one which, though a very great one, we are nevertheless, from its peculiar position, very liable to do :— I mean the circumstance, that the innocent, as well as the guilty, are involved in its calamities. We are accustomed to think of nations as of individuals. They seem, as it were, to be vast bodies, each actuated by unity of spirit, and possessing the attributes of individuality throughout. Hence we concern ourselves only to ascertain the merits of a dispute, and feel as if the

aggressor were rightly served, come what may ; not considering the cases of those individuals who disapprove of the war, but who are forced into the ranks, and compelled to fight ; nor of the women and children, the aged and infirm, who are driven from their homes, and made to endure every privation imaginable. Could retribution be visited on the heads of the guilty alone, and were it proportioned to the guilt, we would say, Amen. But on war's cruel altar *the innocent* must be sacrificed. The conscript, dragged from home by rufian bands, must perish by the hand of one equally averse perhaps as himself to the contest. The citizen, engaged in the peaceful avocations of life, must witness the conflagration of his dwelling, and the wreck of his fortune. And vast multitudes who have no more to do with the management of the concerns of the state, than with the affairs of the moon, must suffer the greatest inconveniences and privations, and are fortunate indeed if they fare no worse. No matter then, so far as this is concerned, which party to a conflict is right or wrong ; *the innocent* must suffer on *both* sides. And here is a radical difference between the case of a nation, and that of an individual. In meteing out justice to the latter, the guilty one suffers ; but in attempting to redress national wrongs by war, the innocent suffer, while the guilty authors of aggression escape—a consideration well worth the attention of the advocates of war. I know it will be said in reply, that this is only circumstantial ; that *national* retribution can be awarded in no other way ; that in the concussion of vast bodies, like nations, mere motes of individuals must

necessarily be justled out of place. I admit the fact ; and I would urge it as a special reason why nations should settle their disputes without those concussions which thus annoy the innocent, and let the guilty go free ; “ those mad frolics of kings, in which it is the common people, that is, the honest artizan, and the industrious tribes of the middle ranks, *unoffended* and *unoffending*, who chiefly suffer in the evil consequences.”

War is hostile to all the pursuits and institutions of civil society. The excitement resulting from a state of war gives to the public mind a disinclination to other subjects. Not only so : the community are kept in a state of perpetual alarm, apprehensive that the very next breeze may waft to their shores the myrmidons of destruction, to ravage their fruitful fields, and lay in ruins their peaceful habitations. Self-preservation becomes the order of the day, and all other concerns, temporal and spiritual, lie neglected. Then are suspended the pursuits of literature, science, and the arts, and the various operations of Christian benevolence. The house of God itself is left in desolate loneliness ; while its wonted visitants spend the day sacred to devotion in the tented encampment, or in labor on the ramparts necessary to their defence. How gloomy, how repulsive the scene ! And yet it is brilliancy, it is enchantment, compared with that which appears in the track of invasion ;— that blighting sirocco, that fiery deluge, which withers and destroys the noblest works of man ; before whose ravaging sweep “ is the garden of Eden ; behind, a desolate wilderness.” It demolishes the noblest piles of

architecture ; it shivers the rarest productions of statuary ; it defaces the finest touches of the pencil. The flames of human habitations warm and enlighten, and the plunder thereof gorges it. Colleges serve it for barracks, and churches for hospitals and stables. Fields are ravaged, fruit-trees destroyed, cellars, and store-houses, and barns, and farm-yards robbed of their contents, the works of taste and the labors of industry for ages swept away, and the wretched inhabitants left houseless, pennyless, desolate, and forlorn. The following paragraph, extracted from a history of our own country, will serve as a specimen, to show what war is in these respects.—“ During the 25 years preceding the peace of Utrecht, the country had enjoyed but four or five years of peace. For several years, not less than a fifth part of the inhabitants able to bear arms were in actual service, and sometimes one half of the militia. Those who were not in service were obliged to guard their fields and families at home, and were subject to constant alarms. The resources of the country were greatly diminished ; the aspect of affairs gloomy ; many fields untilled ; extensive tracts desolated ; the growth of the colonies exceedingly checked ; their frontiers laid waste ; several towns burnt ; and the greatest barbarities perpetrated.—Most of the families were in mourning for the loss of friends, who were either killed, or led into a miserable captivity.”—’Midst scenes of anxiety, desolation, and wretchedness like these, what opportunity can be found for literary pursuit, or benevolent enterprize, or any

operation calculated to benefit and elevate mankind. What would have availed the labors of an army of Apostles in those portions of Europe which for one fourth of a century were made the seat of war, while the armies of France and those of her foes were alternately spreading consternation and destruction in their course? What could philanthropy, what could Christianity even, have achieved, in the sanguinary fields of the Peninsula, or the desolated plains of Muscovy? An Ezekiel might prophesy to a valley of *dry* bones with better prospect of success, than to those armies of *animated* bones which so long kept one quarter of the globe in wretchedness, and the remaining three quarters in disquietude and alarm.

War opens a wide field for unprincipled speculation. It furnishes those vultures that prey on the vitals of the community, by taking advantage of public calamity to enrich themselves, full scope for their heartless speculation and extortion. "An army," says the illustrious Franklin, "is a devouring monster; and when you have raised it, you have not only the fair charges of pay, clothing, provisions, arms, and ammunition, with numberless other contingent and just charges, to answer and satisfy; but you have all the additional knavish charges of the numerous tribe of contractors to defray, with those of every other dealer who furnishes the articles wanting for your army, and takes advantage of that want to demand exorbitant prices." Dr. Johnson, in speaking on this subject, holds the following language:—"If he that *shared the danger*

enjoyed *the profit*, and after bleeding in the battle grew rich by the victory, he might *then* enjoy his gains without *envy*. But at the conclusion of a ten year's war, how are we recompensed for the death of multitudes and the expense of millions, but by contemplating the sudden glories of paymasters and agents, contractors and commissaries, whose equipages shine like meteors, and whose palaces rise like exhalations? These are the men who, without virtue, labor, or hazard, are growing rich, as their country is impoverished; they rejoice when obstinacy or ambition adds another year to slaughter and devastation, and laugh from their desks at bravery and science, while they are adding figure to figure, and cypher to cypher, hoping for a new contract from a new armament, and computing the profits of a siege or a tempest."

As if to make evil doubly evil, wretchedness doubly wretched, the principal burthen of war falls on the poor—the *poor*, who, Heaven knows, have ills enough besides. Who but the poor man enlists as a private soldier, and performs the drudgery and endures the hardship of military life? Find ye in the ranks the *gentleman*, or the gentleman's *son*? No! 'Tis with epaulette and sword, 'tis with plume and lace, you find *him*. It is the *poor* man who rears the parapet, and excavates the trench, and performs all the labours of the camp, maugre the fine story told him on his recruiting day, that he would be a *gentleman*, and have nought to do but *conquer*. 'Tis

he who draws but one scant ration, and that perchance of the tainted carcase of some sickly animal, killed to *keep it from dying*, and purchased by the army contractor for a song, as the rations for the soldiers, for which he draws full pay from the coffers of the nation. 'Tis he who stands the wakeful sentinel when the piercing blasts of winter come tingling round his ears, and the howling tempest pours forth all its fury on him. 'Tis he who makes the long and tedious march, his foot-steps tracked in blood; and who at night extends his weary frame on the frozen earth, to be inhumed in the descending snow, and to rise perchance no more. 'Tis he who fights the battle, and pours out his blood like water, that his *leader* may have *fame*. And after suffering all these ills, and many more; after having been subjected to privations innumerable, and insults and punishments the most degrading and relentless; after having been for years deprived of the inestimable pleasures of home, and the numerous advantages of civil society; he returns to his poverty-stricken family—it may be with a single leg or arm, to be by them maintained for the unhappy remnant of his days! O war! are these thy laurels? Is this thy recompense? this thy chivalry?—And then, if we consider the *expenses* of war, and its privations in society, we shall find these falling principally on the devoted heads of the poor. What though war makes luxuries rare and dear? The wealthy can obtain them. What though the landholder pays large taxes,

and the merchant heavy customs? How easy for the one to raise the rate of his rent, and the other the price of his merchandize. On the poor, then, fall the hardships, the sufferings, the privations, the perils, and the expenses of war.

War engenders national prejudice and antipathy. Hannibal swore eternal hatred against the Romans, and Nelson enjoined it on his men, to hate a Frenchman worse than the D—l. During war, every vengeful feeling is called into exercise, every feeling of benevolence banished. And for a long time after its termination, the parties find it no easy matter to eradicate the remains of enmity still lurking in their bosoms. They cannot forget their supposed grievances, and the evils endured in the attempt to obtain redress. The hatred fostered during the war with so much care, though now latent, is elicited and kindled into a blaze, whenever two individuals, citizens of the different countries, become involved in private quarrel; and you will hear mutual taunts of injuries inflicted and defeats sustained, ere either of the disputants saw the light; insomuch that, not merely the sins of parents, but of nations, are piled in mountains on each other's head. Years must roll on, generations pass away, ere this national prejudice and antipathy can be fully eradicated. Let a citizen of the United States even now, so long after the war, cross the Niagara, and the moment he sets foot on the Canada shore, he feels as if treading an enemy's ground. He almost fancies that he sees

the red coats of the British regulars, and hears the war-whoop of their red-skinned allies. He seems to himself like an intruder on forbidden ground, liable to be seized and executed as a spy. And when he re-crosses the stream, and lands again on his native soil, he feels almost as if he had just escaped from the enemy, and with difficulty reached his own country in safety.

War tends to despotism and national ruin. Military government is a most finished despotism. In the army, 'tis a word and a blow. No lawyers are there to plead the cause of the oppressed, nor jury to give a righteous verdict ; but at the mere *bidding* of an officer, is “ a patriotic defender of his country” subjected to “ a round dozen,” a degradation which in civil society would ruin a man’s reputation forever. And what is still worse, the citizens themselves are frequently subjected to the same arbitrary sway, by means of martial law ; in which case the writ of habeas corpus and the trial by jury are suspended, and the liberty and lives of the citizens are entirely at the mercy of the military chief. Thus are the peaceful inhabitants made liable to be dragged from their various avocations, nay, even the clergy from the sacred desk, and publicly flogged and executed, not for acts which the laws of the land declare worthy of such punishment, but for trifles which nothing but war would ever render crimes at all. And as the General is frequently the sole judge when martial law is necessary, and most

men are fond of power, it may well be supposed, that he will not be backward in the exercise of his prerogative. Nay, wars are sometimes excited for the very purpose of enabling the aspiring to grasp the greater power, by placing them above civil law. Plutarch says of Marius, that, "incapable of making any figure in peace, and unversed in political knowledge, he saw that all his greatness arose from war, and that in a state of inaction its lustre began to fade. He therefore studied to raise new commotions." A favorite saying of his was, "*Inter arma silent leges*"—Amid arms the laws are silent. We are likewise informed by Plutarch, that Pericles involved the Athenians in war, to prevent them from inquiring into his conduct, knowing that his services were too necessary in war, to permit his being accused. Thus we perceive, that a state of war is subversive of law, enabling the ambitious to violate it at pleasure; and that, by accustoming soldiers and citizens to feel the yoke of military despotism, the first measure is accomplished towards its being placed permanently on their necks. But the great danger of all lies in this: The people acquire a love of military glory, and a relish for the excitement and bustle of war. They learn to admire the warrior character, and to regard as tame and grovelling that of the civilian. In the plenitude of their military idolatry, they are prepared to confer extraordinary honors and privileges on the defenders of their country, and to surrender to them, as an act of gratitude, the very

liberties which they are fighting to maintain. In this state of the public mind, let but a dazzling military genius arise, the idol of the army, and the wonder of the millions ; and quickly indeed would constitution and law be given to the winds. In vain would the patriot, in vain would the sage, lift up their monitory voice. In vain would they point to the charter of their country's freedom, to her institutions, and her laws. They would be told, that *the will of the people* was the fountain of law ; and "Huzza for the chieftain ! huzza for the chieftain !" would break forth from myriads of voices, drowning the salutary monitions of reason and truth.— Thus would they bow to his yoke, and hug his chains. How fully is this view of the subject confirmed by the history of nations. "Since the time of Marius and Sylla," says the Abbe de Pradt, "one has been accustomed to see military men appropriate to themselves the power acquired by their arms, and enslave their country after having bravely defended her." "A dupe," says Gen. Wilkinson, "during my whole life, to the prejudices I now reprobate, I speak from experience, and discharge a conscientious duty, when I warn my country against military enthusiasm and the pride of arms, and against the arts and intrigues by which the yeomanry, the palladium of the Republic, are depreciated, and standing armies and navies are encouraged.— We have escaped from one war with a crippled constitution ; the next will probably destroy it ; there-

fore let the motto of the state be—PEACE.” War, then, is dangerous to liberty—aye, and ruinous to nations also. Where now are the mighty empires of antiquity? Where are the glories of Thebes, of Nineveh, of Babylon, Persepolis, and Carthage? “And echo answers, where?” And what is the cause of all this desolation? ’Tis war, not nature, that changes the seat of empire. “War,” says Fenelon, “never fails to exhaust the state, and endanger its destruction, *with whatever success it is carried on*. Though it may be commenced with advantage, it can never be finished without danger of the most fatal reverse of fortune. * * * Nor can a nation that should be *always victorious* prosper; it would destroy itself by destroying others; the country would be depopulated, the soil untilled, and trade interrupted; and what is still worse, the best laws would lose their force, and a corruption of manners insensibly take place. Literature will be neglected among the youth; the troops, conscious of their own importance, will indulge themselves in the most pernicious licentiousness with impunity; and the disorder will necessarily spread through all the branches of government.”—When will men be convinced,” inquires Franklin, “that *even successful wars* at length become misfortunes to those who unjustly commenced them, and who triumphed blindly in their success, not seeing all its consequences. Sensible people will give a bucket or two of water to a dry pump, that they may afterwards get

from it all they have occasion for." Again. "There never was a good war, nor a bad peace."—The immense booty that fell into the hands of the conquerors of Peru, became a source of contention among themselves, which resulted in war; in which both Pizarro and Almagro perished. This contention lasted seventeen years.—Frederick the Great gave his views of this subject of successful war as follows: "All that princes may hope from the greatest advantages in these days, is, to acquire, after accumulated success, either some small town on the frontier, or some suburb which will not pay interest for the debts incurred by the war, and the population of which is far inferior to the number of inhabitants which have perished in the field."—Louis the XIV, notwithstanding the brilliant success that crowned his arms, and the financial skill of Colbert, led France to the very verge of national bankruptcy, and a proposition was actually made to declare the nation bankrupt. For forty miles together, not a man was to be seen capable of bearing arms. During the victorious wars of Napoleon, she was again almost drained of blood and treasure. The burthen entailed upon her by the former, contributed much towards her Revolution; under that laid on her by the latter, she is still groaning, and Heaven only knows what will be the result. But notwithstanding all his victories, and all they cost France, England ultimately triumphed—though, indeed, another such triumph would be *her* ruin. Bonaparte

himself has exhibited this subject in a very interesting point of view, and furnished a valuable lesson of political wisdom to the rulers of the world. "England and France," said he "held in their hands the fate of the world, and particularly that of European civilization. What injury did we not do to each other ! What good might we *not* have done. Under Pitt's system, we desolated the world, and what has been the result ? You imposed on France a tax of fifteen hundred millions of francs, and raised it by means of Cossacks. I laid a tax of seven hundred millions" [pounds sterling] "on you, and made you raise it with your own hands by your parliament. Even now, after the victory you have obtained, who can tell whether you may not, sooner or later, sink under the burthen." And truly who *can* tell, or rather, who *cannot* tell ? Under the burthen of another such war, she would inevitably sink. How clearly then is peace the better policy for Great Britain—and for all other nations. Let Christendom follow peace, and she shall rise from glory to glory. Wealth shall fill her palaces, and plenty crown her cottages. Her villages shall become towns, her towns cities, and her cities rivals of the "eternal" ones of yore. Her name and fame shall fill all lands, and nations the most distant shall call her blessed. But let her know most assuredly, that if she pursues the warlike policy which has ruined others, theirs will be her doom. What that doom is, let mighty ruins and desolate regions tell.

There was Egypt, once peaceful, prosperous, and

happy ; the cradle of literature, of science, and the arts ; glorious, not so much in arms, as in the wisdom of her counsels, and her intellectual pre-eminence. But the war spirit, like the spirit of Evil, at length precipitated her to destruction. Inflated with her stupendous conquests, she became arrogant and oppressive, thereby embroiling herself in perpetual conflicts, by which she was finally overwhelmed and ruined. And now, no Homer sings her far-famed Thebes, through whose hundred gates went forth her hundred thousands to the work of death. And her matchless pyramids, though towering still, in defiance of the levelling hand of time, look down on desolation, exhibiting at a single view Egypt as she was, and as she is—once magnificent, now debased—and, as political beacons, warning others to beware of the career which has thus terminated in her case.

There was Assyria, with her famed Nineveh, and her swarming hosts. She had her day of conquest and military glory, but dark indeed was her night of ruin that succeeded. The cup of calamity which she had poured out for others, was she herself compelled to drink to its veriest dregs. Nineveh, her pride and glory, fell beneath the conqueror's stroke : her name alone remains—her glory, her being, have departed.

There was proud and mighty Babylon, “the glory of kingdoms, the beauty of the Chaldee's excellency,” with her stupendous walls, her brazen gates, her mountain temples, palaces, and towers. Before

her veteran legions nations quailed ; and e'en the spoils of hallowed Salem graced the temple of her Belus, and the palace of her king. But by so much the higher the elevation to which she ascended, by so much the more fearful and tremendous her fall. Her intolerable oppression roused to wrath and vengeance the nations of the world, and brought down frightful ruin on her own proud head. And now, "wild beasts of the desert lie there, and their houses are full of doleful creatures. Owls dwell there ; there dance the satyrs ; and wild beasts of the islands cry in their desolate houses, and dragons in their pleasant palaces."

There was the great, the magnificent Persia, the conqueror of conquesors, the captor of Babylon herself. Like a sweeping deluge, she poured forth in overwhelming torrents her armed millions, spreading havoc and ruin o'er the face of the earth. But dread reaction came. Exasperated nations rose in giant might, and rolled back in mountain billows the tide of war, inundating her own shores with the same flood of evils she had poured on them. And Persia, once the queen of nations, is now so changed by revolution, war, and rapine, that the descendants of her ancient race have for ages been unknown.

There was classic Greece, with her poetic Parnassus, her sylvan Arcadia, her flowery Tempe, and her lofty Olympus, dread mount of Jove ; the country of Lycurgus, of Solon, and Demosthenes ; the land of letters and the arts, of story and of song. And had she cultivated these yet more, and war

far less, she ne'er had worn the galling yoke of Macedon or Rome, or the still more galling yoke of Islam. Nor would she now behold the Bavarian on her throne. Her Alexander led her indeed to glory and renown, but he led her to ruin also. He exalted her to the heaven of military grandeur, to thrust her down to the hell of human degradation. And there, stripped of her glories, shorn of her beams, enervated, degraded, debased, we now behold her.

There was Rome, great and glorious, the rival of Greece herself in intellectual greatness, and her superior in martial prowess. Her eagle hovered o'er the ramparts of subject nations, and her name held in awe a wonder-stricken world. But the same war policy that elevated her to the pinnacle of worldly greatness, hurled her to the depths below. Her towering elevation made her giddy, and she fell like lightning from her heaven of fame. The Cæsar who led her up the rugged ascent to earthly immortality, was the first to precipitate her thence, bound hand and foot in the shackles of military despotism, for the service of his imperial successors, and a prey to barbarian hordes.

Needs it that I speak of the Saracen empire, that supplanted the Roman, and which in her turn was supplanted by that of the Tartars; or of the foreign wars which overthrew the one, and the internal convulsions which shivered in fragments the other? Have not we ourselves witnessed, with our own eyes, the doom of mad ambition? Have we not beheld with astonishment the baleful glare and the sudden

extinction of the portentous meteor that but recently shot athwart the world's political firmament ? Have we not seen a glory-loving Gallia tracking her bloody footsteps in the burning sands of Egypt, and the frozen wastes of Russia ; rousing by her aggressions a world to arms, to humiliate *herself* in the very dust, and to bind her matchless Chief in the chains of melancholy captivity, broken by death alone !

And is it not enough ? Will nations, with their eyes wide open on these sad mementos of the past, still rush on future ruin ? What is military glory ? What glory get the *multitude* ? On what scroll of fame are inscribed the individual feats of the soldiers of Napoleon, whose carcasses enrich the soil of the countries which once resounded with the clang of their arms ? To whom shall we rear the battle monument, or dedicate immortal verse ? How few of all those who have braved the perils of battle, are even “ *dammned* to everlasting fame.” How few are the Nebuchadnezzars, the Alexanders, the Hannibals, the Cesars, the Tamerlanes, the Gengis Khans, the Napoleons, that have figured on the stage of war. The great body of the warrior race lie slumbering in oblivion ! Cut off prematurely, many an aspirant to fame is snatched from the very distinction which he so ardently desired ; and his bones, instead of reposing in the mausoleum of departed greatness, contribute, along with those of his slaughtered steed, to the construction of the triumphal monument of some victorious Solyman ! Were fame one's object, far better would it be to keep out of danger long enough to obtain it. Or is it so, that war is the only road to distinction ? Are

not the thunders and lightnings of oratory superior to those of artillery ? or the lofty strains of poesy to the hoarse blasts of the war clarion ? Which requires the greater skill, to stab at random with the bayonet, or to ply successfully the surgical instrument ? which the greater intellect, to wield the sword, or the pen ? Fond as are nations of military glory, they are entirely willing that the “patriotic” *refuse* of their population should have it all, rather than share with them in its toils and its perils. How is this ? How is it, if war is the only road to eminence, that its authors do not more generally engage in it themselves ? Are they then so very humble, as not to desire distinction ? Rather, do they not consider all the distinction earned in this manner, unworthy of the labor and hazard necessary to its attainment. “Of what avail,” says Voltuire, “are humanity, benevolence, modesty, temperance, mildness, discretion, and piety, when half a pound of lead, discharged at the distance of six hundred paces, shatters my body ; when I expire at the age of twenty, under pains unspeakable, and amidst thousands in the same miserable condition ; when my eyes at their last opening see my native town all in a blaze, and the last sounds I hear are the shrieks and groans of women and children, expiring among the ruins !”

One evil more, and we will bring this department of our subject to a close.

It has been seen, that war has a demoralizing tendency ; that the army and navy are schools of vice ; that a moral soldier is almost a moral phenomenon ; and that in this depraved condition, vast multitudes are

precipitated into eternity. Now, without agitating the question of the lawfulness of war, and the consequent lawfulness of killing and being killed in battle; without admitting or denying, that while Christian assemblies on the Sabbath are praising the King of glory in his church, soldiers may be doing the same in the field of blood," as a British officer said he did at Waterloo; yet, if the doctrine of future retribution is true, as christians believe, then it follows inevitably, that war sends multitudes to perdition: an evil this, which so far exceeds all the others combined, as to render them scarcely deserving of a moment's consideration in comparison. Let me not be misunderstood. It is not my intention to inculcate, in this Dissertation, a system of theology. I realize for whom I am writing. Should it be the lot of this production to be adjudged worthy of publication, I am aware that it will go forth to **MAN-KIND**, and not merely to *Christians*. It will go before the eyes of multitudes who have no more faith in future reward and punishment, than in the tales of Munchausen, or the Arabian Knights. Nor shall I in this place discuss with them the merits of the question. My business for the moment is with those who *believe* in these things. On them alone would I press the point now under consideration. To them alone would I present the case of the warrior, sunk in the depths of human depravity, polluted with the abominations of military life, rushing into battle mad with inebriation and vengeance, and expiring on the field with imprecations on his tongue, and murder in

his soul ! And having fixed their attention on his deplorable case, I would next direct it to that of *the vast numbers* which leave the world in this manner. What an evil is here ! Who can estimate, who conceive its magnitude ? O ! think of the sentient principle in man—the soul—destined to survive the wreck of the universe ; to live on when the blazing orb of day shall go out in eternal darkness, and the brilliant queen of night be disrobed of her glories, and the stellar gems that stud heaven's ample canopy disappear, to shed their radiant beams no more ! When all material things shall have passed away—this earth which we inhabit, and thou, O glorious sun ! and thou, fair moon ! and ye, bright stars ! when temporal scenes shall close, and time's drama be o'er, and the solemnities of eternity begin, the soul shall still survive, it shall live while its Creator lives, in unutterable despair and misery, if impenitent at death, and orthodoxy be true. Ah ! what an evil is here ! And what Christian, in view of it, does not shudder at the thought of war ?

Methinks I hear from every quarter ten thousand voices exclaiming, “It is enough. We admit war to be a direful evil, the one half of which has not been told. Yet, notwithstanding all this, we see no way by which it can be avoided ; and moreover, we find it sanctioned, nay authorized, in scripture.

It will be my principal object, during the remainder of this Dissertation, to show that war *can* be avoided. In this place, I will notice the objection derived from scripture.

In reasoning from the Deity to man, we are prone to overlook the difference of circumstances between the two cases, and apply similar rules to both.—Forgetting that he is omniscient, and that from this circumstance he views things in a light widely different from that in which we view them, we judge of his actions as if he were altogether such a one as ourselves. And here we commit a most egregious error. *We* act in a very limited sphere, with very limited views, having particular interests exclusively to promote. In promoting those interests, we act according to the reasons which present themselves to us, in favor of a particular course of action. If, instead of acting exclusively for those interests, our sphere of action were to be enlarged, thereby connecting other interests with those, these new relations would produce a change of circumstances, which would require a corresponding change in the course pursued by us relative to the former objects of our care ; the more especially, if, with the enlargement of our sphere of action, there were a corresponding expansion of our views. A child may devote its attention to its toys ; but when that child becomes a man, he puts away childish things. With enlarged views, and an enlarged sphere of action, his course is changed, and what was once proper for him under former circumstances, is no longer so. Now the Deity acts in an unbounded sphere, and is possessed of unbounded wisdom. Having the highest interests of the whole universe to promote, and being able at

a glance to see the varied relations and bearings of all its vast and complicated machinery, it must be obvious, on the least reflection, that his doings in many respects *should* be very different from ours. How different is his sphere of action, and how many reasons can he perceive for a particular course which are altogether beyond the reach of human ken. And accordingly, we find many events transpiring in the course of Divine Providence which sadly puzzle and confound us. We cannot conceive how it is, that under the government of a benevolent and all-powerful Being, so much sin and misery exist. Had we the power of God, with only our present wisdom, we certainly should make things different. We should not permit the strong to oppress the weak, nor one to injure another in any manner. Nor should we send pestilence or famine upon mankind, or trouble them with earthquake or volcano. In one word, we should banish sin and misery from the universe. And with our limited views, we ought so to do. To make it proper for us to regulate the concerns of the universe as God regulates them, we should not only possess his power, but his wisdom, that we might see good reasons for our doings. *Without* this wisdom, some things would be improper for *us* to do, which would be proper *with* it : consequently, it would be improper for *us*, with *our* views, to do many of the very things which God does, and which are altogether proper for *him* with *his* views to do.

Let us now apply this argument to the case in hand. God, the great Arbiter of life and death, and the all-

wise Ruler of the universe, saw fit, at a particular period of time, to exterminate certain nations by the sword, instead of famine, or pestilence, or earthquake. Now tell me candidly, gentle reader, if this is any reason, even the least, why we, short-sighted mortals, acting within the limited spheres we do, should, *without his authority*, wage war on other nations. His direction to the Israelites to destroy particular nations, was no sanction *even for them* to destroy *others*: how then can it be for *us*? Besides, if it *were* so, it would not only be a sanction for war, but for extermination also—for the destruction of women and children, as well as men. Those therefore who deduce an argument for war from scripture, must unavoidably become advocates of extermination. And not only this. The wars of the Israelites against the Canaanites were not *defensive*, but *offensive*; so that, if the Bible afforded any argument for war in general, it would justify offensive war. Hence, the scripture argument for war proves vastly too much.

There are other arguments used in favour of war, which, however, are not entitled to a labored refutation. Yet it may be well, in an essay of this nature, just to state them, and to expose their weakness and absurdity in a very summary manner; the more for the reason that some distinguished men have made use of them, than for any intrinsic weight in the arguments themselves. They are as follows.

1. Wars are as necessary and inevitable as hurricanes, earthquakes, and volcanoes.

2. Were there to be a state of universal and perpet-

ual peace, the human flock would soon be fleeced and butchered by one or a few.

3. Though wars between small states are inhuman, because they are carried on with enmity against individuals, yet wars between great states tend to magnanimity and the elevated virtues.

4. A state of peace produces wealth, and wealth tends to luxury and effeminacy.

5. War serves to drain a country of its vicious idlers.

6. Alternate war and peace are on the whole better for the world, than perpetual war or perpetual peace; perpetual war converting men into beasts of prey, and perpetual peace into beasts of burthen; to prevent which calamities, Providence blinds kings to their true interest, deafens men to the voice of cool reason, and thus propels them on to war; in whose wise government we ought certainly to acquiesce.

7. God, in the government of the world, makes use of one nation to chastise another.

8. War seems to be an ordinance of nature. Even the brute creation prey upon one another; and nature has expressly armed them with claws, &c. for the very purpose.

9. The proximity of nations to one another, and their clashing interests, render them enemies.

10. Society without war has no object.

11. War is requisite to the health of the body politic, as an exciting stimulant.

12th. War affords an opportunity for the exercise of heroism, and the developement of various mental powers, which lie dormant in times of peace.

To reply to the foregoing reasons for war, all that is necessary is, to embody them in a manifesto. To form some idea how such a manifesto would be likely to be received, let us draft one of the kind ; which would read somewhat after the following manner.

“Whereas, wars are as necessary and inevitable as hurricanes, earthquakes, and volcanoes, inasmuch as the elements of society are *unlike* those of nature, and are *not*, like them, impervious to reason and moral suasion, but stand in the same relation to war as to any other moral evil ; and whereas, if *peace* should continue longer, the human flock would be *butchered* ; and whereas, *fighting* tends to *magnanimity* and the *elevated virtues* ; and whereas, we are becoming effeminate by means of our superabundant, peace-acquired wealth, having no way of employing it short of war—no public improvements to make ;—and whereas, our country needs draining of those *vicious idlers* whom, to decoy to destruction, we induce to enlist under the name of *patriots* ; and whereas, *prosperity* has already continued so long, that we are on the point of becoming *beasts of burthen*, to prevent which *calamity*, Providence has *blinded* us to our *true interest* of becoming so, (as we plainly *perceive*,) and now propels us on to war ; and whereas, God in the government of the world makes use of one nation to chastise another, (as he does of robbers and the like to chastise society ;) and whereas, nature, by furnishing beasts of prey with claws, and man with no claws, shows that she designed the former for war, and the latter for peace ;

and whereas, proximity and clashing interest are a *special* reason, as in the case of near neighbors in society, why we *should* preserve *peace*; and whereas, the arts of peace afford society no object, nothing but *brutal fighting* being worthy of *rational men*; and whereas, the people are becoming political dyspeptics, for want of the healthful exercise of cutting one another to pieces; and whereas, we shall have no wholesale murderers, (denominated heroes,) if we have no wars, excepting, indeed, "one or a few;" and whereas, our *intellectual faculties* have already become impaired for want of *brutal exercise*:—We, the *undoubted* executioners of Heaven's wrath on others, declare war against them, our *difficulties* with them being the *revelation* that dictates the duty. To prevent the fleecing and butchering of the human race by *one* or a *few*, we go by *thousands* and *tens of thousands* to the performance of the same barbarous work, to which we are impelled by our own *necessary* and *inevitable choice*, (as free in this case as in any other.) To increase our *magnanimity*, and to elevate our *virtues*, we will *wrest from others their territories*, and *distress* and *annoy* them in *every possible manner*. To preserve ourselves from the *luxury* and *effeminacy* occasioned by wealth, we will *plunder* all we possibly can, until "our equipages shine like meteors, and our palaces rise like exhalations." To drain our country of *vicious idlers*, we will congregate them under the deceptive name of *patriots*, and send them to *execution* under pretence that they *die for their country*, making

those who survive *twofold more the children of hell than before*, and producing from the ashes of the fallen a harvest of *vice and infamy a hundred fold*. To free ourselves from the *beastly* burthen of wealth, we assume the *brutal* burthen of war, which being for our *good*, we are *blinded* to our *true interest*, to enable us to see it. To aid *Divine Providence* in the government of the world, we will *scourge* a nation which perhaps is *less guilty* than ourselves--although, indeed, Providence can scourge sufficiently by famine, pestilence, and earthquake, without the aid of warriors, robbers, or pirates. To comply with an ordinance of nature, we who are *unfurnished* by her with *claws*, or *tusks*, or *any weapons of war*, will nevertheless *fight* like *lions* and *tigers*. As *proximity* and *clashing interest* ought to make us *particularly anxious to preserve peace*, we will on these accounts *wage war* on our *neighbor* nation with the *greater gust*. As a state of peace affords no national employment, no opportunity for public improvements, we will go to war to keep out of idleness; and as *fighting* is a *healthful* exercise to the *body politic*, we will engage in it to preserve our political health. Lastly, to acquire the name of heroes, and to display our martial prowess, we will murder, plunder, and destroy, not on the petty scale practised by common robbers and pirates, but on a wholesale, national scale."

Suppose, now, that nations were to issue war manifestoes similar to the foregoing, could war, think ye, be long continued? Yet these are some of the reasons

given in favor of the custom ; and if they will not bear to be embodied in a war manifesto, they need no other confutation.

We come now to the consideration of the great argument of all ; the supposed necessity of war.

And to this I reply at the very commencement, that there is no other necessity in the case than that imposed by human depravity ; no other necessity than there is for duelling, or any thing dependent on human volition ; and therefore, no *absolute* necessity at all.

I shall not, in this Essay, deny that it is lawful for nations to insist on *the security of their rights*. I shall not propose, as *the present* substitute for war, the doctrine of national non-resistance. I know full well that, in the *existing* state of society, such a proposition would render the very efforts in favor of peace an abortion. Nations, for the *present at least*, will insist on their rights, and obtain them by force, unless they can have them by other means. And so will *individuals* in general, whatever may be the case with the few. Now, as in the case of individuals, the means of the adjustment of their difficulties are provided, without resort on their part to violence, so let it be in the case of nations. For want of something of the kind in the latter case, war has continued, while private conflict has been in a great measure prevented. It will therefore be my great aim, during the remainder of this Dissertation, to show in what manner the rights of nations can be at least *as well* secured with-

out war as with it. This shown, the plea for its necessity is removed, and its abolition insured.

And at the very outset of the inquiry, it strikes me as one of the clearest cases conceivable, that nations that are parties to a dispute should not also be the judges, but should refer it to a third party, as is done in the case of individuals ;—and for the very obvious reason, that an interested party should not be judge in its own case. How strangely is this admitted principle overlooked in the case of nations.

But here arises a very natural objection, viz. whether the decision of this third party would always be correct. Perhaps not always ; but it would be far more likely to be so, than if made by either of the parties concerned—or by an appeal to the sword. For what justice is there in prejudice and passion ? What reason in physical force ? Suppose, then, a correct decision should not *always* be made, it cannot be doubted that it would be made much more generally than it is now ; nor will it be denied, that were it to be made *no* oftener, it would nevertheless be the duty of nations to adopt this method, rather than that of war. *Individuals* are not always *sure* of justice, and yet they refer *their* disputes to others, rather than resort to *private* war. How much more ought *nations* to do this, rather than resort to *public* war, an evil so much greater than the other.

It will be urged, that nations and individuals are differently circumstanced, the latter being mere subjects of government, the former independent and supreme ;

and that it would be derogatory to their independence and supremacy, for them to submit their disputes to the umpirage of third parties. But in what sense are nations supreme? Surely they are not above moral obligation. They are not independent of the Law of Nations. They are not at liberty to encroach on the rights of others—nor even on the rights of the humblest of their own citizens. Each nation is one of the community of nations, and is under certain obligations to the rest. No nation can therefore be said to be *absolutely* independent and supreme. Now, nations being under certain obligations, and being composed of frail and fallible human beings, are liable to do wrong; in which event, there is all the need of arbitration that exists in the case of individuals. How then can it be considered derogatory to their dignity, to make the reference under consideration? Great Britain and the United States seem not so to have considered it in their recent references; and this is but one of many similar instances that might be named.

We have now, I think, established two propositions on an immovable basis, viz. that the most probable way of ascertaining which is the aggrieved party in an international as well as in an individual dispute, is, to refer it to a third party; and that nations, as well as individuals, being fallible and frail, can, consistently with true dignity, refer their disputes in this manner.

But it is not merely the *principle* of national reference and arbitration that we are to consider: we are likewise to inquire into the *best mode*. And here too

we are furnished with a precedent in the case of society.

In the infancy of the world, each individual, as we will suppose was his own sovereign, and judged for himself. This state of things produced perpetual collision and strife, and "the earth was filled with violence." As a remedy for this intolerable state of things, men resorted to arbitration, referring their disputes to temporary arbitrators, selected for each occasion. This expedient, though far preferable to personal violence, was found by experience to need improvement, inasmuch as the decisions of arbitrators were governed, not by any settled rules, known and recognized beforehand by the parties, but by their own views of right and wrong, which was tantamount to *ex post facto* law. The very obvious improvement next suggested itself, to establish rules or laws for the regulation of society, by which each individual might know beforehand how he was *required* to deport himself, and be judged accordingly. But as new cases were continually arising, to which the existing laws were inapplicable, it became necessary from time to time to make *additions* to the laws, in order to meet those cases. These laws were variously enacted; in some instances directly by the assemblies of the people, in others by their elected representatives, and in others by their sovereigns. It was at length found, that laws themselves were liable to various interpretations by different individuals, thus leaving men still without a sure guide to their conduct. This led to the final step, the finish-

ing touch, in jurisprudence—the establishment of permanent courts of judicature, whose special business was, to trace the windings and explain the intricacies of law, and to form, by an unerring body of precedents, a rule of duty more clear than any mere law could be.

By the foregoing view of the nature of law, and the experience of mankind on the subject, we perceive at once the most eligible *mode* of arbitration for nations. After all the attainments of men in the science of government for so many ages ; after having carefully felt their way, step by step, up to the proud eminence whereon they stand ; they surely need not make the long and weary pilgrimage again, in their international capacity. At a single stride, they may rise at once from the international barbarianism of brute force, to the international refinement of a tribunal, to digest and prepare a regular code of international law for the observance of nations, and likewise to determine by that law the merits of their disputes.

Already is there existing what is denominated the Law of Nations. But this is far indeed from meeting their *exigencies*. In the first place, it is unlike any thing else denominated law, being but the general opinion as to the propriety or impropriety of certain acts of one nation towards another ; just as it would be in society, were there no laws, and no standard of duty but public opinion. Nations, then, after all we hear relative to this Law of theirs, are precisely in the condition of a community having no rule of action but the light of nature, or, in other words, having no

code of law. They have indeed certain admitted principles of national rectitude, as a community without law would have ; but these *admitted* principles are few, the writers on the Law of Nations disagreeing on many points, and leaving many others wholly unprovided for. Nor is this a matter of wonder in the least. Nay, it would be a subject of profound astonishment, *were* it otherwise. Just consider the nature of the case. No mere *individual* is competent to the production of a code of law satisfactory in all respects *to a single nation*. The *concentrated wisdom* of the nation is put in requisition for this purpose ; and even this is scarcely sufficient. How then is it to be expected, that *any one* writer on *the Law of Nations* can produce a satisfactory code of *this* description? As the congregated wisdom of a nation is requisite to form a suitable code of law for *itself* ; so, the congregated wisdom of the world is requisite to the formation of a code for *itself*—and equally necessary to the weight and authority of that code. Hence the difference of opinion between the writers on the Law of Nations, and the difference of reception which their writings find in different countries. Most assuredly, then, if nations are to *have* an international law or rule—*nations*, whose interests differ as widely as their localities—it needs, I think, no additional argument to prove, that they need a *tribunal*, composed of delegates from all parts of the world, to digest and prepare a well-balanced code, and to explain and apply it from time to time, as occasion may require. And do they not, in their recognition of what

they denominate the Law of Nations, virtually admit their obligations to one another, and the consequent propriety of a specific code designating those obligations?—and of a competent tribunal to prepare, expound, and apply it?

It will perhaps be objected, that such a tribunal might be partial. Partial to whom? I ask. Would not all the nations recognizing its jurisdiction be represented in it? Would there not be a balance of interest? a balance of power? an equilibrium in every respect? It would be no coalition of despots against the rights of man, no self-created umpire, dictating to those who might not recognize its authority, and exercising powers with which it was never invested. But it would be the representative body of the nations composing it. As well, therefore, might it be contended, that the Congress of these United States, composed of representatives from every state, would be likely to incline to partiality in favor of a particular state against another. Perhaps it will be said, that the United States' Congress, that is a majority, *is* partial in certain respects. Admitted for argument's sake. Yet, notwithstanding this supposed partiality, is it not, on the whole, considered better to *have* a Congress, than *not* to have one? Why then should this objection be urged against the establishment of an international Congress? and the more especially, when the character of the individuals who would compose it, and the circumstances under which they would be placed, are duly considered. It is not to be supposed that nations,

engaged in such an enterprize as the preservation of the peace of the world, an object the most sublime and God-like that was ever conceived by man, would depute for its execution men who would stoop to paltry shuffling and intrigue. No! They would commit this mighty work to the master spirits of earth; to their Franklins, their Broughams, their Lafayettes. Think ye there would be bribery, corruption, intrigue, and partiality, in such a tribunal? Think ye, that by the consent of such men, with their reputation at stake before the whole world, before all succeeding generations, one nation would be permitted to outrage the rights of another? So far from this, such a tribunal would be the greatest possible safeguard of those rights; so much so, that the principal obstacle to its establishment will be found to consist in the opposition of those who wish for an opportunity still to gratify their ambition by war and conquest. There cannot be a doubt, that the proposed Congress would be the most distinguished for impartiality and justice, of any tribunal on the wide earth. If men could not confide in this Congress, they could not consistently confide in any tribunal under heaven—could not consistently commit their government to the hands of rulers—could not consistently live together in communities, and confide in one another. If any earthly tribunal that can be conceived would be worthy of confidence; if nations can confide in civil government; if man can trust man; then would our Congress of Nations be entitled to their highest consideration.

There might, it is true, even in so august a tribunal, be the influence of conflicting interests. It might be for the interest of one nation to decide a dispute one way, and another another. This might hold in suspense the scales of justice, till the honor and integrity of the disinterested nations would add their overwhelming weight to the balance, which would quickly swing aloft the opposing scale. How is it that nations do not now become partizans in every dispute between belligerent nations. Have we, in all our international difficulties, had the least cause of complaint in this respect against neutral nations, on the ground of our political institutions, or on any other ground? Have we not even referred certain disputed points between the British *monarchy* and *ourselves* to *royal* and *imperial* decision?—to the decision of *one* crowned head alone, with *no* balance of interest to insure impartiality? Have the South American Republics been compelled by the monarchies of the world to succumb to monarchical Spain? Is not Switzerland permitted, in the very heart of monarchical Europe, to pursue unmolested her own republican course? *Something* then, whether it is the balance of interest, or the balance of prejudice, or whatever it may be; *something* makes the nations of the earth generally impartial in the cases of belligerent nations, and secures a righteous verdict in the chancery of mankind. And this, be it what it may, would secure a similar verdict in a Congress of Nations.

I have now, as I conceive, established an additional point in this investigation, viz: that nations should not

only refer their disputes to arbitration, but that they should have a regularly organized tribunal for that and other kindred purposes.

But can they be induced to adopt this measure? Admitting it to be reasonable, to be desirable, to be altogether for the best, will mankind, all depraved as they are, consent to such an arrangement? I shall undertake to maintain the affirmative of this question.

We find in society laws for the promotion of the common weal, with penalties annexed to their transgression, and force sufficient to inflict those penalties. We find tribunals for the adjustment of individual disputes, and all but a few recreants appealing to them, instead of force, for this purpose. We find hospitals for the sick, asylums for the unfortunate, schools and universities for children and youth, and in short, institutions of numerous sorts, looking to the benefit of human kind. And when we consider men in their international capacity also, we find them binding themselves one to another by treaties; recognizing certain principles as the Law of Nations; securing to small states their independence; preserving the balance of power; and, above all, occasionally referring to arbitration their cases of dispute, and actually holding occasional Congresses of Nations on a limited and imperfect scale.

It will be objected, that though this state of things has obtained in society, and among nations, yet, that war still continues; thus proving, that the principle that has accomplished so much, is unequal to the task now proposed. But this objection overlooks the *progress of*

improvement. It very incorrectly assumes, that whatever is not already accomplished, never will be. It forgets the many barbarous and inveterate customs of *long standing* that *have been abolished* ; that formerly, men fought with wild beasts, and cut one another to pieces by thousands, for the amusement of the public ; that individuals were wont, as nations are now, to settle their disputes by combat ; that petty wars between noblemen were almost continually occurring, thereby keeping whole countries in a state of agitation and distraction ; that, for the trial of title to real estate, personal combat was resorted to ; that the test of innocence in relation to crime, was made to consist in holding in the hand, uninjured, a red-hot iron, walking blindfold and barefoot over nine red-hot ploughshares placed at unequal distances, or plunging the arm to the elbow in boiling water ; that nations sanctioned the slave-trade ; that war itself was attended with circumstances of horror and calamity which rendered it a double curse, such as the massacre and enslaving of prisoners, the savage tortures inflicted on them, the captivity of peaceful citizens, with a long train of kindred evils ; that even religion was propagated with fire and sword, and men burnt for opinion's sake ; and that monarchs knew neither constitution nor law, but held in their own hands the destiny of their subjects. If, in the progress of things, such changes have been wrought as the abolition of these customs, why may we not expect the abolition of the custom of war ? There was not one them, the abolition of which, when

in its strength, seemed not impracticable. Without doubt, those were considered visionaries who suggested its practicability. And particularly with regard to two of these customs, they were in almost all respects under circumstances similar to those of war. The "Barons bold" might have urged the various objections against the reference of their disputes to arbitration which are now urged in the case of nations. They might have said—they doubtless did say—that it would be a sacrifice of their independence, a surrender of their rights, a compromise of their dignity, to refer their disputes; that perchance the arbitrators would, through mistake or partiality, make wrong decisions, and so on. And *private individuals*, too, might have said the same in *their* cases. Indeed, we are informed that when Alfred the Great had expelled the Danes from his dominions, he found his subjects little better than a community of robbers. One plundered another, and the latter plundered the former by way of obtaining satisfaction. Individuals settled their difficulties by physical force. And Alfred found all the obstacles in the way of establishing juries for the trial of those difficulties, that are now in the way of establishing a tribunal for the adjustment of international disputes. The plan was deemed impracticable and visionary, and men were fearful that they should not always obtain justice. Even after the establishment of juries by Alfred, it was long before their verdict was decisive in all instances. In important cases, the accused might still appeal to Heaven

by the ordeal of fire and water ; and under the Norman government of England, he might challenge his accuser, or the witness, nay, even the judge, and decide the cause by what was denominated the Judicial combat. Thus might the guilty add glory to his crime, and fresh injury to that for which he stood accused, by taking the life of his accuser—precisely as nations do, by resorting to war for the settlement of their difficulties, and precisely as duellists do. And how those who advocate war can find fault with duelling, it is difficult to conceive. For, what argument can be urged in favor of the former, that is not urged in favor of the latter ? Will it be said, that duellists might settle their disputes by law ? Nations too might *have* law, with all its necessary appendages, and settle their disputes in the same manner. Let them therefore cease to denounce *individual* duelling, till they themselves abandon *national* duelling.

But it is admitted by many that war *ought* to be abolished, and that nations ought to settle their disputes by other means, but who nevertheless deem our plan impracticable. The following letter from the late Judge Marshall, to the publisher of a dissertation on this very subject, appeared some time since in the newspapers.

Richmond, Sept. 12, 1832.

SIR,—I have received your pamphlet, proposing a Congress of Nations for the amicable adjustment of national differences, for which I thank you, together

with your note requesting my opinion on it. I have read it with deep interest, and a sincere wish that the attainment of its object were practicable. The argument is well-arranged and well-supported. The quotations from the New Testament are directly applicable, and the whole spirit of the Sacred Volume inculcates peace. The human race would be eminently benefitted by the principle you advance. The religious man and the philanthropist must equally pray for its establishment. Yet I must avow my belief that it is impracticable.

With great respect,

I am your ob't. servant,

J. MARSHALL.

There are in *society* two modes of avoiding *individual* conflict; the one by non-resistance, the other by reference of disputes to third parties. Which of these modes is the *better* one, either for individuals or nations, I say not here; but, as has been already observed, it must be obvious, that, *as mankind are*, the principle of non-resistance *will not* be adopted by individuals in general, or by nations at all. Their rights they will insist upon, and, unless they can obtain them by other means, they will resort to force. Were we at the present day to rely upon the doctrine of non-resistance, (how right soever it might be,) for the preservation of the peace *even of the community*, we should be woefully disappointed. Individual combat in society has measurably ceased, not because one portion of it submits

to the aggressions of the other, but because a way has been devised to secure them against aggression without fighting. And this is the only way in which it is reasonable to suppose *nations* will *at present* desist from war. 'Tis in vain to expect a whole nation, principally composed of worldly-minded men, unresistingly to permit another to overrun and enslave it. Right or wrong, it *will not* permit this. What will be the prevalent sentiment on this point when mankind in general shall have become *thoroughly imbued* with the *principles of Christianity*, is another consideration. But men will then no more inflict than resist evil, and wars will cease of themselves. The same may be said of individual combat, and every moral evil. Yet, till the arrival of that golden age, we shall need *temporary* checks for those evils,—and we *apply* such checks to all of them excepting war: why should we wait in the case of this alone till the Millenium? But if we would *accomplish* anything in this respect, we must act as we do in the other cases. No wonder that the project of universal peace, based on the idea of national non-resistance, in the present state of the world, when the propriety of that principle, even in the case of individuals, is not generally acknowledged, should be deemed visionary and impracticable, and be urged to so little purpose. For my part, I shall propose no such measure, *as a present remedy for war*. I shall not call upon nations, *as a peace measure, under existing circumstances*, to demolish their forts, and to dismantle their fleets; to “beat their swords into

ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks." Well do I know, that such a call, *for the present purposes of the cause of peace*, would be altogether useless. I say not that it would be wrong. I say not that it is not the duty of men and of nations to practise non-resistance. But I say, that whatever may be their duty in this respect, it is premature to expect the peace of society, or the peace of the world, to be *now* preserved by this means. I therefore propose a measure of a very different character; a measure open to no possible objection that might not as well be urged against all law, and all the tribunals of society. And here I would emphatically ask, if *such* a measure *is* impracticable. *Is* a project impracticable that "is well supported by argument," that "is fully sustained by scripture," that "would eminently benefit the human race," and "for the accomplishment of which, the philanthropic and the pious must equally pray?" I must be permitted to dwell a little on this point, for it is the grand pivot on which the whole subject turns, and the great obstacle of discouragement to the friends of peace. Men do not attempt enterprises which they deem impracticable, how desirable soever they may consider the objects in view. While, therefore, the idea possesses the public mind, that this plan is impracticable, nothing can be accomplished.

There is a great proneness in the minds of many, to a kind of ultraism, whereby they injure a good cause, by embarrassing it with what does not legitimately belong to it. Thus, some of the advocates of peace

deem it necessary, in order to advance the cause, to oppose capital punishment and personal self-defence, and, in short, to advocate the sentiment of the inviolability of human life in all cases, not excepting that of robbers, pirates, and murderers. I shall not in this Essay discuss these points ; for really, they have nothing to do with the subject. The case of personal self-defence when one is attacked, that of the extirpation of robbers and pirates, who are outlaws, and who are out of the pale of human society, and that of enforcing the laws of the land by the execution of the murderer, are concerns very different from the disputes of nations, who are bound one to another by treaties, by commercial relations, and by acknowledged obligations of various kinds. All, therefore, that I have to say to the objector, who asks me what I would do if attacked, and what I would do with robbers and pirates, is simply this : that those cases have no concern with the question of war between nations. Robbers, pirates, and murderers cannot be treated with ; they acknowledge no obligations to the human race. Not so with nations. And even the subject of revolution and civil war is foreign to our purpose. It is not proposed, that our tribunal interfere with the internal concerns of any nation. We merely propose, that nations settle their international disputes by means of an international tribunal, without war. This is the simple proposition to be considered.

The establishment of a tribunal of the kind in question *can* be considered impracticable in *no other sense*,

than that mankind *will not* consent to its establishment. This is the most that any one will pretend ; for, men can as easily send delegates to a Congress of Nations, as to a Congress of any other kind—and as easily abide by the decisions of the one as of the other. The point then to be considered is, not whether mankind *can* adopt this measure, but whether they can be *induced* to adopt it.

If the question could be put individually to the whole human race, there can be no doubt that a vast majority would be found in its favor. The reason why *the great body of the people* sustain their rulers in their warlike enterprises, is, that they are made to believe that those wars are forced upon them by the enemy. This belief is mutual, being holden by both parties. The interested few, who obtain wealth and distinction by means of war, have indeed different reasons for lending it *their* support ; but *the people* can have *no* other reason, every thing else connected with a state of hostilities going directly to their injury. And they are not such simpletons as to *desire* a state of things which involves them in every conceivable calamity. They barely *tolerate* war, because they suppose it cannot be avoided. On this principle, many eminent and benevolent individuals lend it the sanction of their names. Franklin, Washington, Jefferson, and indeed every truly great and benevolent man whose name has adorned the annals of this country, and, it might be added, of every other ; in short, all the benevolent, all the humane, all the pious, that have ever sanction-

ed war, have done so barely on the ground of its supposed necessity. And when ambitious rulers wish to embark in it, they never fail to place it on this ground, well knowing that the people would not sustain them on any other. Napoleon himself, when the sun of his glory was at its meridian ; when Europe trembled at his nod, and waited his imperial orders ; presumed not to let loose upon the nations his myrmidons of blood, without attempting to prove " his quarrel just." It will not then be disputed, that no ruler would dare engage in war without a plausible excuse—a plea of necessity. Now, suppose a Congress of Nations to be proposed, with all its advantages, its excellencies, its tendency to preserve peace, and its superiority to violence with regard to the security of the rights of nations, clearly delineated ; what excuse, let me ask, could any ruler make, for declining to participate in its establishment, and to refer to it his disputes ? Would he not, by such a course, give indubitable evidence of his unwillingness to come to the light of impartial investigation ? With what prospect of being heard, could he, under such circumstances, appeal to mankind for the rectitude of his cause ? Excuse for keeping aloof, he could find none. He could not pretend that it would endanger the institutions of his country ; for it is not proposed that this tribunal interfere with the internal concerns of a nation. Nor could he say that it would prostrate his country's independence ; for it is not proposed that a nation be *compelled* to abide

by a decision. In short, he could make no excuse whatever.

Rousseau, speaking of a Congress of Nations, says : “The only supposition we have made is, that mankind have sense enough, in general, to know what is useful to them, and fortitude enough to embrace the means of their own happiness. Should our project nevertheless fail of being put into execution, it will not be neglected because it is chimerical, but because the world is absurd, and there is a kind of absurdity in being wise among fools.”—“We daily make great improvements,” says Franklin, “in *natural*—there is one I wish to see in *moral*—philosophy;—the discovery of a plan that would induce and oblige nations to settle their disputes, without first cutting one another’s throats. When will human reason be sufficiently improved, to see the advantage of this?”—“Wonderful,” says Jefferson, “has been the progress of human improvement in other respects. Let us hope, then, that the law of nature, which makes virtuous conduct produce benefit, and vice loss, to the agent, in the long run; which has sanctioned the common principle, that honesty is the best policy; will in time influence the proceedings of nations as well as individuals; that we shall at length be sensible, *that war is an instrument entirely inefficient toward redressing wrong; that it multiplies, instead of indemnifying losses.* These truths are *palpable*, and *must*, in the progress of time, *have their influence on the minds and conduct of nations.*”—The President of the Congress of Panama, in

his opening Address, says, "Let us avoid war, by a common and a uniform reference to negotiation."—President Adams, in his Message to Congress, says in relation to the subject:—"The design is great, is benevolent, is humane. It looks to the amelioration of the condition of man."—The Editor of the *Journal de la Morale Chretienne*, the periodical of the Philanthropic Society of Paris, patronized, as is said, by "those who are nearest the throne," has declared, that "the hope of the establishment of universal and permanent peace, is no longer, as formerly, considered to be only the reverie of good men."—In the Edinburgh Review for March, 1829, is the following paragraph: "We earnestly hope, that the friends of liberal opinions in this great nation, will never cease to bestir themselves against War; will be instant in season and out of season, in subduing all lurking remains of that unhallowed spirit, and leading them to the real glories of PEACE."—The most pacific sentiments have of late years been avowed in the Parliaments of Great Britain and France. Sir James Mackintosh, in a debate in the House of Commons, remarked, that, "whatever might be the political intrigue of some parties, a passion for peace was visibly extending and growing throughout Europe; which was the best legacy left them by that fierce war that had raged from Copenhagen to Cadiz. He confessed he felt a strong passion for peace; (for he must call it by that name:) he trusted this feeling would ultimately become the ruling passion of Europe." Mr. Peel in fol-

lowing the preceding speaker, thus expressed himself:—"I do hope, that one great and most beneficial effect of the advance of civilization, the diffusion of knowledge, and the extension of commerce, will be, the reducing within their proper dimensions, of the fame, and the merit, and the reward of military achievements; and that juster notions of the moral dignity of, and the moral obligation due to, those who apply themselves to preserve peace, and avoid the eclat of war, will be the consequence." Mr. Brougham followed. "He rejoiced to hear it to-night declared to be the duty of the country to preserve peace inviolate. At all times he had prayed for this valuable object. He heartily rejoiced, that the ardor for military glory, and the thirst of fame, which was the curse of nations, and which our neighbors were more prone to admire than ourselves, had been so justly stigmatized to-night." M. Casimir Perrier, in addressing the French Chamber of Deputies, held the following language:—"Europe anxiously wishes for peace; it is her manifest interest. Why should she desire war? In this situation of affairs we venture to hope, that Europe will shortly come to an understanding which may lead to a general diminution of forces, the support of which weighs heavily on the several states. Let us by our policy hasten this disarmament." In reply to some war speeches, *Gen. M. Sebastiani* remarked: "Gentlemen, we know when war commences, but we know not when it will finish."

Sentiments like the foregoing are now gaining ground

throughout Christendom. And how much more rational are they than the opposite. How much more worthy of intelligent beings. "There are two kinds of contention," says Cicero; "the one by argument, the other by violence: the one belongs to man, the other properly to brutes." Knox in his Essays says, "While we are warriors, with all our pretensions to civilization, we are savages." These sentiments are making rapid progress, and they will continue to progress with the increase of knowledge. And as the progress of this has recently been greatly accelerated, there can be no doubt that the time is near, when nations will, by dispensing with war, cease to act like "brutes" and "savages," and assume their legitimate character of rational men. Indeed, there is reason to believe, that this great moral revolution is already begun. For, not again to notice the circumstance of the reference of international disputes in certain instances to arbitration, and the Conference of Nations already mentioned, the very project before us is likewise in agitation. A memorial on the subject is now in circulation in this country for signatures, which, when it shall be deemed advisable, is to be presented to Congress. The subject has already been agitated in the Legislature of Massachusetts. In Great Britain, a memorial similar to the one in this country is in circulation, for presentation to Parliament. In Switzerland, the Count de Sellon, member of the Sovereign Council of Geneva, has introduced the subject into that body, and has offered a prize of 400

francs, in the form of a gold medal, for the best Essay in relation to it. In France, there is a Society denominated the Society of Christian Morals, which is also a Peace Society, and is ready to co-operate in the same plan. Thus we perceive, that this project rests not altogether on the shoulders of a few Americans, but is exciting attention in various countries. Nor is it necessary that all nations be brought into the measure at first: a few can make a beginning. At any rate, this country might propose it to others, and if they all decline, the fault will be theirs. But there is no reason to believe that this will be the case. How would such a proposition affect us, coming from Great Britain, or France, or any respectable power on earth? Most readily indeed should we accede to it, and despatch our delegates forthwith. Some nations, then, would at once, no doubt, give a proposition of the kind, emanating from this country, a favorable reception. Let us therefore be up and doing. Let light be diffused abroad. Let writings calculated to show the practicability and vast importance of the plan, be scattered in every direction. Let the periodical press be as extensively enlisted in the cause as possible. Let the friends of peace every where embody themselves into Peace Societies, thus affording the cause the innumerable advantages ever the result of concentrated council and effort. But especially, let those Societies **BE ACTIVE**, holding public meetings, and scattering tracts and pamphlets in their respective vicinities. Let memorials on the subject be circulated for signa-

tures ; and let those memorials, filled with the names of petitioners, pour in from the East and from the West, from the North and from the South, and overwhelm our nation's capitol with a mighty inundation of PEACE. These petitions would not return void. They would have audience, and find advocates. This would produce discussion. And when once brought to this point, we should have nothing to fear. The object is too important, and the case too clear, to suffer by investigation. The measure would be adopted. And thus would the GREAT PROPOSAL go forth from this country, to the various nations of the earth. Meantime, let the friends of humanity on the other side of the great waters be on the alert, preparing their respective Governments to give a favorable response ; and, with Heaven's blessing, it would not be long, ere we should see such a tribunal as the world has never yet seen—a tribunal of nations exerting all their energies for the preservation of the tranquillity of the world.

But after all these bright anticipations, there seems to be still lingering a kind of presentiment of disappointment ; as if, in spite of theory clear as light, it is too much to expect so great a blessing as the abolition of so evil a custom of so long standing. For thus are we inclined to reason :—“ Had there been any practicable means by which war, that evil of evils, could have been avoided, nations would have adopted it long ere now ; nay, they would never have resorted to war at all : and even were a remedy to be discovered,

and were mankind in general disposed to adopt it, so trammelled are they by the shackles of despotism, that it is idle to expect the popular voice to be regarded on this or any other subject. Kings love war, and are not sufficiently disinterested to forego their own gratification for the good of their subjects. "And as wars always *have* been, so they will *continue* to be—at least till the time foretold in scripture, when nations shall learn war no more." Let us now consider these objections a moment.

1st. The greatness of the evil. This very circumstance encourages us to hope so much the more for its abolition ; for the greater the evil, the more desirous must men be to free themselves from it, and consequently, the more likely will they be to adopt a remedy when one shall be discovered.

2d. The non-discovery and adoption of a remedy hitherto, for so great and long-continued an evil. But, as new discoveries are continually made, not only in physical, but in moral and political science, and especially, as great changes are continually occurring in the system of international relations, why is it unreasonable to expect a change in relation to *this* international concern, seeing one is so much needed ? When we consider the various absurd and evil customs that have actually been abolished, together with the great progress already made in human society, from its infancy to the present period, I mistake if we do not find, that changes have occurred which are greater than would be the abolition of war. Nay, it would

perhaps not be going too far to say, that more has been done in relation to *the modification of the warlike principle*, than would now be requisite to its extinction altogether.

3d. But kings love war, and will not forego their own gratification for the good of their subjects. The great error in this objection consists, in its overlooking the essential difference in the relations subsisting between king and subject now, and those of former days. It supposes monarchs to be supreme : as when a Tiberius was permitted, in the capital of the world, to violate her most eminent females ; to consign to execution the accused, without examination ; to cause those who displeased him to be thrown headlong down some precipice ; and to put to death at will the very senators of the state ! when a Caligula could condemn the nobility to dig in the mines, or to repair the highways, and, to free the state from unserviceable citizens, could cast the decrepid, the infirm, and the aged to wild beasts, nay, could claim divine honors, causing temples to be erected and sacrifices to be offered to himself as a god ; and could squander, in the most wanton and foolish extravagance, the public resources, by dissolving jewels among his saucers, building a marble stable and an ivory manger for his favorite Incitatus, and constructing in a ridiculous manner a bridge three and a half miles across an arm of the sea, to be annihilated by the first storm ! when a Nero was suffered to murder his mother, his wife, his tutor, his benefactor ; to exterminate many of the noble families

of Rome; to set that city itself on fire, and then to inflict on the poor Christians the most unmerciful tortures, under pretence that it was fired by them! Or, descending much nearer our own times, and taking as a sample the infamous Henry VIII. who was permitted to divorce one queen, to make room for a successor whom he loved better, but whom in three short years he beheaded; to divorce another, because she proved less beautiful than she had been represented; to make and unmake religious creeds, and to require the nation to receive or reject them at his pleasure, under the penalty of banishment or death! Such were the pranks which a monarch could play on the throne of England three hundred years ago! And when we think of kings and subjects, we are prone to think of such as these, and then to calculate the probabilities or improbabilities of the success of some great plan for the melioration of the human condition. But how greatly do we in this way miscalculate. How different the state of things now, from the foregoing. So far from *decapitating* his wife at will, a British king cannot now even *repudiate* her *without good reasons*. Our modern Cæsars, too, find themselves an age too late for their mad projects. Does one essay at universal empire? he is stripped of his own. Does another attempt to rise superior to constitution and law? three days suffice to render him a wandering exile. Lo! on the throne of the ambitious Napoleon, and the despotic Charles, sits a Citizen King! Lo!

the Conqueror of Napoleon cowers before the majesty of the British nation, and "Reform!" "Reform!" triumphs o'er arms that won the field of Waterloo, and decided the destiny of the world! Lo! Europe is in commotion, and her potentates, warned by the unwonted omens of the times, are considering the measures necessary to the security of the favor of their people! Light and knowledge are increasing and spreading with unexampled rapidity through all Christendom; and even in the capital of the Mohammedan empire, we behold a "Moniteur de Ottoman!" Who can consider this state of things, together with the future and the rapid advance of knowledge, which must inevitably result from causes already in operation, without feeling that old systems are on the eve of dissolution, and the dawn of a new era is about to break forth upon the world—the ERA OF THE PEOPLE—when man shall recover his lost rights, and rise to his primeval dignity.

Such an era must eminently conduce to peace; for when the true interests of the human race shall be consulted, war must necessarily cease. Have not the friends of peace, then, abundant reason to take courage? And even now, while the elements of the political world are in commotion, by the approximation of things to the state just considered in prospective, they may be operating most efficiently in the promotion of their cause. That society will for a time be agitated and convulsed, that so great changes as those we have contemplated can be effected only by corres-

ponding commotions, there can be no doubt. But these commotions will be the struggles of a giant to break his chains; the throes and upheavings of the troubled earth, laboring to disgorge its oppressive accumulation within; the strife of human rights against human aggression; the effort of a world against ruin, of peace against war; the thick and final peltings of that great political tempest which will clear up the stormy atmosphere into the sunny sky of peace! And they will be *internal* struggles, like those recently witnessed in France and England, furnishing no legitimate cause for *external war*. Yet, without the establishment of a great Central court of Appeal, to hold with a steady hand the international balances, it is reduced almost to a moral certainty, that the political world will become one mighty chaos, state dashing against state, thereby enhancing the sum of human wretchedness to an amount far beyond computation. Such a tribunal, then, seems specially needed at this very period, when the volcano is rumbling within, and the earth trembling with a pent convulsion. Foreign tranquillity at such a crisis must be for the interest of all parties. Trouble enough will they have at home: they cannot therefore too sedulously cultivate peace abroad. And this appears to be the present opinion of the European governments themselves. There seems to be a general understanding, that the peace of Europe must not be disturbed. In adopting this policy, they do, for once at least, evince true wisdom. For suppose a general war—a war of principle, if you

please—in which liberty would attempt to overthrow tyranny, and tyranny to crush liberty; France and England leading on the one party, and Russia, Austria, and Prussia the other. It cannot be supposed that either party could *conquer*. What then *would* they do? After once more drenching Europe with blood, and increasing her already oppressive burthen to overwhelming, they would leave things as they found them, each party still managing its own affairs in its own way. It is in vain to think that any thing different would be the result. Never before, perhaps, has Europe been so equi-balanced as she is at present. France and England! What can conquer these combined? And Russia, Austria, and Prussia! Who would dream of their subjugation? Peace then is the true policy of Europe, and she seems inclined to adopt it. Now then is the period, of all others, to urge our project to its consummation.

But a great difficulty still remains. Suppose a tribunal of the kind established, and its decisions to be right, what would insure their observance, on the part of those towards whom they might be unfavorable? I reply: the same that would induce them to *refer their disputes at all*, namely, the want of a plausible excuse to do otherwise. To be sure, if those decisions should be flagrantly erroneous, there would be *room* for such excuse, and war might still occur; but it is not at all probable that wrong decisions would be made by such a body—far less probable, than that either of the *parties*, or *blind War*, would make them. And with

regard to many cases of international dispute, they are, in themselves considered, of so little consequence, that it would matter very little, whatever the decision might be. It is really astonishing to learn, for what trivial and iniquitous causes nations have engaged in hostilities. Take as samples the following. "In the year 1005, some soldiers of the commonwealth of Modena ran away with a bucket from a public well, belonging to the state of Bologna. The implement might be worth a shilling; but it produced a quarrel, which was worked up into a long and bloody war."—"Frederick the Great gives an account of a war between England and Spain, which originated from cutting off the ears of an English smuggler."—"In an old history of the kings of England, we have seen an account of a war between that country and France, the cause of which was this: one boy called another boy the son of a bastard; and as this reproach was founded in fact, it 'worked up into a bloody war.' One of the boys was son to the king of England; the other to the king of France."—"So paltry a sum," says Burke, "as three pence, in the eyes of a financier, so insignificant an article as tea, in the eyes of a philosopher, have shaken the pillars of a commercial empire that circled the whole globe."

Now suppose the decisions of our proposed Congress should not always be correct; suppose that for the want of sufficient evidence, (which would no doubt be the only reason,) they should not invariably award

“*the bucket*” to the lawful owner; would this be a good reason why that owner should waste millions to recover it? I know it will be said, that it is not the bucket for which they contend, but *the point of honor* involved in its possession. But a tribunal of reference would obviate this difficulty. It would not be an antagonist to either party. It would not assume an air of self-sufficiency, as if its very existence were depending on the contour of the features, or the toss of the head. It would not imperiously and insolently threaten a party with castigation, thereby laying that party under obligation, either to refuse compliance with a demand perhaps just in itself, or subjecting it, in the event of compliance, to the charge of doing so through fear. But, inasmuch as it would be a third party, its decisions would be deemed impartial. And as such decisions ought to be regarded, and as no threat of coercion would accompany those made by this tribunal, the point of honor would consist, not in their breach, but in their observance. Thus we find, that the very objection we are now considering, would be the reason why the decisions of the Congress would be observed.

But *will* rulers *really* be restrained by this consideration?” Will they not? we reply. A singular figure would they make, in going to war without even a *pretended* reason. Something after the following form must be their declaration.

“Whereas, by the investigation of the High Court of Nations, it has been ascertained, as well as impar-

tial investigation can ascertain, that we ought to comply with certain conditions ; and whereas, this decision is accompanied by no threats of coercion in the event of our non-compliance, thus leaving us at liberty to comply, without subjecting us to the imputation of cowardice, and therefore without compromising our honor ; and whereas, *an old bucket* is in itself an object of contention altogether unworthy of high-minded and honorable *individuals*, much less of *nations* ; and whereas, under these circumstances, we can honorably remain at peace, and cannot without the greatest dishonor embark in war : therefore, be it known to the world, that since we are deprived of all excuse, we will have war without any. To gratify our ambition, obstinacy, and malignity, we will still pursue the work of death ; still

“ Whelm nations in blood, and wrap cities in fire.”

We care not for justice. We care not for honor. We care not for your Congress of Nations. We will do as we please. And do you, our humble servants, the people of our realm, prepare to execute our good pleasure. Pay your hard earnings into our war coffers. Abandon your homes, your altars, your country, and march forth to the toils, and privations, and perils of war in a foreign land. There pour forth your lives ; there deposit your carcasses ; despised by ourselves for your base servility, and abominated by the human race for your reckless brutality.”

And now I ask seriously, if rulers, after the decision of our tribunal, could issue a better manifesto than the foregoing. What *could* they say for themselves? What excuse *could* they make? But if they could make none at all, it is certain that they would not venture on war.

But if non-coercion would be so efficacious in this case, why not adopt it in that of law? Why affix any penalties to that? I reply, that if individuals were circumstanced as nations are, there would be no need of these penalties. It is not the respectable citizen that submits to the laws of the land through fear of the punishment involved in disobedience. No. None but unprincipled recreants, lost to all sense of honor and propriety, need hand-cuffs and chains, need prisons and guards, to extort submission to the laws. Were there none of these in society, the decisions of courts of justice would need no sheriffs nor constables to enforce them, but might be safely left to take their own course. The penalties of law were never designed for those who act from principle, but only for desperados. Now, there are no nations answering the character of these desperados. By the term nation, however, I mean not a wandering tribe of savages, nor a piratical nest of barbarians, but a community recognized and treated by the civilized world *as* a nation. I repeat then the assertion, that there is no *nation* answering the character of a desperado of society. *Were* there such a one, treaties with it would

be an absurdity, and it would be necessary to take possession of its fleets and forts, and thus become its gaoler. As then there is no nation of this description, there exists not the necessity for a penalty to the Law of Nations that exists in the case of the laws of society.

In speaking of penalties, it is difficult to divest the mind of the idea of fine and imprisonment, of confiscation and banishment, of dungeons, chains, racks, and gibbets. We do not dream that there can be *any other* kind of punishment; much less, that there can be one far greater than these—and far more appropriate in the case of rational beings. We forget the difference between man and beast, and seem to think that both are affected alike by the same means; entirely overlooking the fact, that man has a *mind* susceptible of *shame*, as well as a *body* susceptible of *pain*, and that mental suffering is as much greater than corporeal, as the mental are superior to the bodily faculties. Keeping this idea in view, we shall find, that though no denunciation of devastation and destruction should be annexed to the decisions of the Court of Nations, as a penalty for their violation, it would by no means follow, that there would be no *sanction* to those decisions. “It is not to be understood,” says Chancellor Kent, “that the Law of Nations is a code of mere elementary speculation, *without any sufficient sanction*. It is a code of present, active, durable, and binding obligation. As its great fundamental principles are founded on the maxims of

eternal truth, in the immutable law of moral obligation, and in the suggestions of an enlightened public interest, they maintain a steady influence, notwithstanding the occasional violence with which that influence may be disturbed. The Law of Nations is placed, in the first place, under the protection of public opinion. It is enforced by the censures of the press, and by the moral influence of those great masters of public law who are consulted by all nations as oracles of wisdom, and who have attained by the mere force of written reason, the majestic character, and almost the authority, of universal lawgivers, controlling by their writings the conduct of rulers, and laying down precepts for the government of mankind." This Law of Nations, without any penalty, is by no means so often violated, as are the laws of a community containing penalties. It is therefore but for nations to *have* a regular legal code, in order to *observe* it. The wars which so frequently occur are not so much occasioned by a violation of the *established* principles of international law, as by difficulties to which none of those principles are applicable, or at least to which there is no impartial tribunal to apply them. Nations do not presume to violate what *they themselves* acknowledge to be those principles; and consequently, they *would not* presume to violate what *an authorized tribunal* might pronounce so. Yet, there are no penalties annexed to their violation, no threats of punishment thrown

out *in terrorem*. But if these sanctions are sufficient to secure the observance of the Law of Nations under present circumstances, what would they not be, when this Law would be promulgated to mankind by a *Congress* of "those great masters of public law" who *individually* "control by their writings the conduct of rulers, and lay down precepts for the government of mankind?" Surely, international law, emanating in due form from *such a body* of men, would find a support in public opinion absolutely irresistible.

As so much is depending on the solidity of this position; as the whole project must prove abortive, unless it can be shown that the decisions of the proposed tribunal would probably be observed; and as the showing of this would insure its success; we can hardly dwell too minutely on each point tending to throw light on this part of our subject. Consider we then, for a few moments, the mighty efficiency of public opinion.

It is public opinion that regulates all the concerns of this great world of ours. This it is that forms men into communities, and institutes the necessary regulations for the public weal; that decides what shall be the form of government, making one country a republic, and another a monarchy; and that regulates manners and customs, perpetuating or changing them to suit itself. How pervading its influence! How tremendous its power! 'Tis the lever of Archimedes! 'Tis the thunderbolt of Jupiter! 'Tis the tornado! the deluge!

the earthquake ! the volcano ! Nought of earth can resist its might. It is stronger than law, violating it at will ; stronger than constitutions, changing them at pleasure ; stronger than kings, deposing them at a breath ; stronger even than Truth, prostrating her oft-times in the dust. Men can but “ *ride* this whirlwind, and *direct* this storm : ” in vain would they attempt to *resist* it. The mightiest potentates of earth do it obeisance. Napoleon ever appealed to it in all his wars ; and ultimately it overthrew *him*. It is public opinion that gives to slander her scorpion sting, and to vice its infamy ; that enables a solitary individual, on the side of right, to triumph over an opposing multitude ; and that holds absurdity in check, and puts a whip in satire’s hand, to scourge it to the quick. ’Tis this that regulates those details of society which no laws can reach, chastising with its scorn and indignation the unmanly and the vile. To gain its approbation and applause, the student trims the midnight lamp, and pores o’er ponderous tomes of lore. For this the poet wakes his noblest strains, and rolls his boldest numbers ; the orator thunders in the forum, and the warrior in the field ; and nations rear their proudest monuments, and conquerors overrun the world. ’Tis this, alas ! that oft diverts frail man from duty’s path ; that makes the duellist take the life of his friend, and the suicide his own ; that makes men sacrifice peace, conscience, every thing, and set heaven and earth at defiance. Its frown is more terrible than death itself. The hero who never wavered in the day of battle,

who could march up to the cannon's mouth undaunted, quails before it, and seeks a shelter from its fearful severity in self-destruction. Nations, too, as well as individuals, are subject to its sway. Note their reference to it in all their public documents; their appeals to it for the justice of their cause in war; their tenacity of the point of honor; their national pride, their national vanity, their national ambition. Note their regard to the Law of Nations *as it is*, under all its unfavorable circumstances. The fact of the case is, that nations may safely be said to pay far greater regard to public opinion, than do citizens in their individual capacity. And being under its influence, it is but to enlighten that opinion on the subject of war, when it will cease. It is but to shew, that there is no other necessity for it than rulers by their mismanagement create, and therefore that it is avoidable and inexpedient, and then will it be tolerated no longer. Nor is its *inexpediency* all that will influence the public mind. There is among men a degree of *moral principle*. This is evinced in various ways;—in the keeping of one's word, when there is no evidence of his having pledged it; in the forbearance to inflict injury when it can be inflicted with impunity, and when provocation has been given; and in ways almost innumerable; but especially, in the abhorrence with which mankind regard individual or national injustice. It is not, then, expediency alone that will incline public opinion to peace; but whatever there is of moral principle among men, will come to the aid of expe-

diency. And even the very principle of *selfishness*, which, under present circumstances, is the moving cause of war, will, when enlightened, become a most powerful auxiliary in the cause of peace. Convince men that war is detrimental to their real interests, and they will not have it. Say ye then, that nations will not adopt our scheme because they are selfish? We reply: They *will* adopt it because they are selfish—just as soon as their selfishness becomes enlightened.

We rely then on these three causes, viz: expediency, justice and selfishness, to give to public opinion, when duly enlightened, an inclination to peace. And I think it has been demonstrated, that whatever public opinion decrees, it is in vain for rulers to think of resisting. And here I perceive an all-sufficient sanction for the decisions of a Congress of Nations—a surety both for justice and peace.

It should be observed, that nations are not isolated, like the heavenly bodies, but are connected together by the ties of a kindred nature, as likewise by those of commercial intercourse and general intercommunication, whereby they come into contact with one another. Hence arise certain obligations, moral and social. These obligations, as has already been seen, are acknowledged by nations themselves. Now if such obligations exist, they need, in order to prevent dispute, to be specified in a regular, authorized code. But to form a *code*, it is requisite that a *tribunal* be convoked—and equally necessary that a similar tribunal explain and apply it. For there can be no

greater absurdity, than to commit the enacting, expounding, and applying of it to each of the parties for itself. So clear is the case, that when it shall be fairly considered by mankind, they will, I am fully persuaded, either deny international obligation, and discard what is now denominated the Law of Nations, or else establish a tribunal of the kind we propose.

There is what men call the law of nature, or a natural perception of right and wrong. But notwithstanding this, they deem it necessary, in society, to have conventional or enacted law, in consequence of the diversity of views taken by different individuals relative to various points, and their proneness, when swayed by interest, blinded by prejudice, inflated with pride, and inflamed by passion, to explain right and wrong to their own liking. For the same reason precisely, should there be a conventional law of nations.

It is customary for nations, prior to their engaging in war, to resort to negotiation, for the avowed purpose of adjusting their disputes without recourse to arms. With equal facility, and with far greater prospect of a successful issue, might they refer their disputes to our proposed tribunal, reserving to themselves the right of resorting to arms, in case the decision of said tribunal should prove unsatisfactory—and obtaining the additional and most momentous advantage, of being able, without a violation of truth, to denominate war their last resort, which under present circumstances they cannot do. Is it not even so? Cannot nations just as easily bring a dispute before a

third party prior to war, as to negotiate respecting it? Would it not be more likely to be impartially examined by such a party? And could war be denominated the last resort in any other way?

But not only would our Congress be more likely to effect an amicable adjustment of the cases of dispute which might be brought before them: the existence of such a tribunal would tend to diminish their number. All their disputes of *minor* consequence, nations would no doubt contrive to adjust in one way or another between themselves. There would be little danger of their permitting their "bucket" cases to come up for grave discussion in so solemn and august a tribunal, before the eyes of the whole world. And here it occurs, that it would not be cases of this kind alone that would be settled without arbitration, but those also where one of the parties might be conscious of the injustice of its cause. It is pretty evident that no such subject as the partitioning of Poland would ever be presented to the consideration of such a tribunal. Thus would our Congress *indirectly* prevent many wars, *by the mere circumstance of its existence.*

The establishment of an international tribunal would not preclude *negotiation* between nations relative to their disputes. They might in this respect pursue the same course as if no such tribunal existed. They might settle between themselves all the disputes they could; and after having found the remainder too stubborn to yield to their every art of diplomacy, (which remainder would, *under the circumstances, no*

doubt be very few, if any,) then let them, instead of appealing to arms, resort to our expedient. Thus would war be still longer prevented, by which means time would be gained for such a change of circumstances as would perhaps remove the cause of difficulty, or so modify it as to render it an insufficient ground of serious complaint. An ambitious monarch might be removed by death ; a nation might see its way clear to rescind an offensive measure ; or one change or another out of the ten thousand mutations of this ever-changing world might occur, during the period thus gained, by which the cause of difficulty would cease.

War at the best is but a wretched system for the adjustment of international disputes. In the first place, it puts justice to the hazard, and renders the injured party liable to be injured a vast deal more. In the second place, it is a hard way to obtain justice, even if obtained at all, being acquired at a prodigious sacrifice of all that is valuable on earth, either in a physical or moral point of view. Thirdly, it is a deplorable concern, this same fighting and killing, most dreadfully so, for both parties. And lastly, it is a degradation to human nature. How undignified do two individuals appear, when engaged in the infliction of violence on each other. How do they degrade one another, how disgrace themselves. What *do* they but to show, that in the estimation of each other, they are wretches ; and to show also, that they are insensible to their own proper dignity, and destitute of every noble, benevolent feeling ? And is not this degrading ?

And is not international violence of the same nature? Now, as war is thus irrational and debasing, we have reason to hope that it will become unpopular, just in proportion to the progress of knowledge and refinement. And we are unwilling to believe, that the present generation is sufficiently barbarous to continue the custom, if a practicable way of avoiding it can be pointed out. We firmly believe, that the only reason why the war system is not yet abandoned, is, because no feasible scheme has hitherto been devised, whereby nations can otherwise be secured in their rights. Hence, if we are so fortunate as to succeed in devising such a scheme, we have every confidence that it will be adopted. We believe the age sufficiently enlightened for the measure, the existence of the present war system to the contrary notwithstanding. That system owes its continuance to existing circumstances. Change these circumstances, and a corresponding change would follow with regard to war.

These new circumstances would not only furnish mankind with an opportunity to abandon the war system, but would prevent the ambitious and unprincipled from embarking in war with the facility they do. Hitherto, they have been able to pursue their mad career, because no circumstances existed to prevent it. They could frame their plausible manifestos, and induce their people to sustain them in war. But under the circumstances which we propose to throw around them, they could issue no such manifestos. War would be an *up-hill* undertaking. Their ambi-

tious schemes would be stripped of their deceptive covering, and exposed to the view of mankind, by the investigation of our tribunal. The sympathies of the whole world would be enlisted on the side of the injured against the aggressor, animating the former and disheartening the latter. And what is still more important, the very subjects of those ambitious sovereigns would, to no small extent, be found, in opinion at least, against them. They would query, whether an impartial tribunal of the great and wise philanthropists of earth, would not be more likely to make a correct decision, than would interested, ambitious monarchs. They would respectfully consider the *reasons* assigned by that tribunal for the decisions by them made ; which reasons, emanating from such a body, standing in such a relation to mankind, would undoubtedly be good and conclusive. Those reasons would produce their legitimate effect ; they would carry conviction to the bosom of all ; and the ambitious despots who keep the world in agitation, would find themselves unsustained both at home and abroad. Such a tribunal would have checked the career of Napoleon, ere he attained that fearful ascendancy which placed him for a time above all control. Nay, it would have prevented the very wars which elicited the military genius of that wonderful man, and the world had then never known him as Napoleon the Conqueror ; but his mighty mind would have been turned into a different channel, whose overflowing would have irrigated and fertilized the world with re-

freshing rills and streams, instead of deluging it with tears and blood !

We have seen that the most probable way of ascertaining the merits of an international dispute, would be, to refer it to our tribunal,—far more so than to refer it to the sword. Hence the nation actually conscious of being in the right, would be desirous of such a reference, and the more so for the reason, that justice would not only be more likely in this way to be obtained, but also at a much easier rate, than by war. Now, as both the parties to a dispute profess to believe themselves in the right, and as this is the most probable and the most easy way of obtaining justice, no nation, whether in the right or wrong in reality, could *consistently* decline the reference proposed. The reason, therefore, which nations assign for war, viz. the justice of their cause, is the reason why they should avoid it, and refer that cause to the arbitration of a third party. And any nation declining thus to do, would evince its insincerity, and wage war with an ill grace indeed.

It is unnatural for men to desire their own harm. On the contrary, they make great sacrifices for the sake of avoiding it. In their social capacity, they submit to many restrictions and burthens, for the sake of the benefits derivable from the social state. That they may be protected in the enjoyment of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” they surrender to society their personal sovereignty, assume the burthens incident to the existence of civil government, and place

themselves in a condition even to be *compelled* to do as society requires. Still more to our purpose: they are constantly endeavoring, by means of various modifications, to render war itself less afflictive and intolerable. How evident is it, then, that beings so tenacious of happiness, and so adverse to wretchedness, will avail themselves of a practicable means of avoiding so great an evil as war, when fairly laid before them.

The case of the duellist has already been brought into view, and it has been seen, that if nations will not establish an international tribunal, they cannot with any degree of consistency proscribe duelling. I now go further and say, that war is far worse than duelling. The duellist fights his own battle; and if he falls, he is but one man, and merits his fate besides—because he *voluntarily* fights, if for *no other* reason. But war slaughters its victims *by thousands*—victims *forced* into its service against their own will—and spreads abroad wretchedness and desolation, vice and crime, unknown in the annals of personal combat. Bad, then, as we readily admit the business of duelling to be, it is—I had almost said goodness itself, compared with war.

I have said, that I should, in this Essay, waive the consideration of the *lawfulness* of war *as the last resort*. But there are several particulars relative to this point which merit our most serious attention. Under the Christian dispensation, wars are to cease. The Messiah himself is denominated the Prince of Peace. The spirit of his religion is the very reverse of the spirit of

war. And it is matter of historical record, that at least the generality of the primitive Christians refused to bear arms, alledging as the reason, that war was incompatible with their religion. Taking all these considerations into view, it is evident that Christendom, in adhering to the war system, is not fulfilling her high vocation, but is thwarting the benovolent design of the religion which she professes to make her rule of action. I do not say, that one Christian nation should, for the sake of peace, surrender its rights to another. I waive that point here. But this I say : that the *nations of Christendom* are bound by their religion to preserve, *in one way or another*, the *peace* of Christendom ; and that their war policy is unchristian, and unworthy of the holy name by which they are called. Now, if the means hitherto used have been found inadequate to the preservation of peace, let them make trial of other means. Let them make trial of our expedient, which bids so fair to accomplish the object. And who can tell but this will prove to be the very measure that will lead to the fulfilment of the prediction relative to the peaceful reign of the Messiah ? It is evident that something must be done which *has not been done*, to prevent war. And what can it be ? What can be done in the case of Christendom, that receives the Christian religion already, and yet continues her wars as if she were still heathen ? What, but to present her with a feasible scheme for abolishing war without sacrificing right, and then to demand of her, in the name of her Lord, to adopt it ?

War is not only unchristian : it is unworthy of civilized men. -And for this assertion, we have very high authority. "What is war?" said Napoleon, when contemplating the sanguinary scenes of Borodino. "What is war?" said he. "A trade of *barbarians* ! the whole art of which consists in being the strongest on a given point." As civilization, then, increases, war must decrease. And as it becomes less honorable, it will offer less inducement to ambition. Even now, it is sufficiently unpopular to render it a dull business to the soldier of fortune ; and it needs only that a practicable substitute be provided, to induce him to relinquish it as a forlorn hope, after the failure of a Napoleon. It is too late in the day, mankind have become too enlightened, the fireside too comfortable, society too well regulated and refined, for war to be any longer a welcome visitant. The warrior begins to be viewed in his true light. He begins to be regarded as a destroyer of human happiness ; while the philanthropist, whose aim is the benefit of mankind, is taking precedence of him in public opinion. These things augur well for the future hopes of our race. They portend a coming era of tranquility—that golden age chaunted by poets and foretold by seers, when nation shall not lift up sword against nation, nor learn war any more. And is it not possible that we are even now just on the eve of that period? May it not be, that we have fallen on the very expedient that will usher it in, now that the world, for the first time perhaps, seems prepared to adopt it. We trust in Heaven 'tis even so.

“Truth is powerful, and will prevail ;” and we *must* therefore believe, that our plan will so commend itself to the good sense of the world in the present age of light, as to render it completely successful. True it is, that its origin is humble ; but we rely on its own intrinsic merits, with the blessing of Heaven, for its success. Twelve humble men propagated Christianity throughout the known world. One mere monk shook the throne of the mightiest Pontiff that ever wore the triple crown. And Heaven grant, that this effort of an humble individual may at least *aid* in transforming this Golgotha world into one immense Eden, which angels would delight to perambulate. The infant obscurity of a cause is frequently its infant protection. It rouses not the powerful opposition which a more conspicuous origin would not fail to excite, and which in its infancy it is so ill-fitted to endure. Fortunate, then, it *may* prove to be for the cause of peace, that in its infantile period, it makes but little noise in the world, disturbing not the slumbering lions of war, till it shall have gained sufficient strength to chain them in their lair !

There are but few crimes in society punishable with death ; and to inflict it for a crime not thus punishable, would be viewed in no other light than that of murder. One individual may receive actual injury from another, for which the latter would deserve a certain degree of punishment. But though he would be guilty, and deserve punishment, it would not follow that he would deserve the punishment of death. And should the

injured party inflict death upon him undeservedly, he would be deemed a murderer. If, in addition to this, he were to take the lives of some of his opponent's family, and injure the rest of them as much as possible, at the risk, and perhaps the loss, of his own life, and the lives of some of his family, he would be regarded as a demon in human form. To apply this argument to the case of nations. One nation may actually injure another. But the injury may be trivial, deserving but a small degree of punishment. Probably it would not be deemed of sufficient importance in a civil point of view, to cost the life of a single citizen. Yet for this small offence, the injured nation declares war, and sacrifices the lives of thousands and thousands of the enemy, and those too who are perfectly innocent of the crime—and sacrifices also as many more of its own citizens! Now we ask most solemnly, by what name this vast sacrifice of life, under these circumstances, can be called, but downright, wholesale murder. There is no proportion between the crime and the punishment. Life is sacrificed without a sufficient reason—sacrificed by wholesale for a fault which deserves not a single death. And in addition to this, there is all the long train of evils incident to war, to be taken into the account. Really, the more we investigate this subject, the more unjustifiable and horrid does war appear. It professes to redress injury, but inflicts a thousand fold greater, both on the aggressor and the injured. In meteing out justice, it becomes itself an instrument of injustice, by inflicting more

punishment than is due. It is an *unjust* punishment for *injustice*, and far worse than the evil it is designed to remedy. Before a nation can be justified in engaging in it, the injury received must not only be clearly ascertained *to be* an injury, but to be one of sufficient magnitude to justify the destruction of *thousands of innocent human beings*. How many of the wars that have ever been waged, would pass an ordeal like this! How long will it be ere nations awake to the awful guilt involved in their war system, and adopt a more appropriate and a more justifiable remedy for international wrong! After all the wars that have ever been waged, what has justice gained? what have nations gained? Rather, what have they not lost? How different an aspect would this globe present, had it never been desolated by war. The war system occasioned more evil to mankind during the last half century, than all the good it ever obtained for them since the world began. Justice truly! When will men be rational? When will they follow the instinct of their own nature even, which shrinks from harm, and studies its own safety? When will they act worthy of human beings, worthy of rational creatures, and not like madmen and wild beasts.

As war is a concern of nations, its abolition requires the concurrence of nations. It is not an evil that can be diminished by piecemeal, like intemperance and other evils of a kindred character. The conversion of one advocate of war to the principles of peace, does not diminish the number of wars, as the conver-

sion of one individual from intemperance to temperance, diminishes the amount of that evil. Yet, if it has its disadvantages in this respect, it has its advantages in another. While, on the one hand, every member of society, every individual of the human race, must be temperate, in order utterly to abolish the evil of intemperance, on the other, it is only requisite to win a majority of mankind to the side of peace, in order to abolish war. The majority in a nation acts for the whole. Give us then but a majority in each nation, and we will have peace without waiting to proselyte all to our principles. And when we take this view of the subject, we find our confidence greatly strengthened in the ultimate and *speedy* success of our project. Indeed, we are led to believe, that long ere the complete triumph over intemperance and its kindred vices, war will be known no more.

The members of society are required by their rulers to settle their disputes by reference to third parties. In calling on rulers, therefore, to settle international disputes in the same manner, we ask them to do no more than they require of us. The requisition being thus mutual, no good reason exists why the compliance with it should not be the same. And the people will be reckless of their own claims, unless they insist on this compliance on the part of their rulers.

The fact has already been noticed, that men in their civil capacity, as members of the community, make many sacrifices for the sake of the general good and their own. In this relation, man not only submits to

the necessary rules and regulations, but consents to their being *enforced* upon him ; thus descending from absolute freedom, to absolute subjection—a far greater descent than for nations, composed of individuals thus subjected to law, to refer their international disputes to the *mere investigation* of an impartial tribunal, without recognizing its right to enforce its decisions. Nor is the case of *individuals* the only one of the foregoing description. The feudal governments relinquished their supremacy to that of the nation, in the same manner. And what is more, *nations themselves* have submitted their disputes to tribunals empowered to *enforce* their decisions. Yes, *nations*, possessing every attribute of sovereignty, have not only done all that we now propose to nations to do, but have actually consented, for the sake of preserving peace, to the enforcing of the decisions of impartial tribunals upon themselves, in case they should prove refractory.

In ages long gone by, ere Homer warbled his lay, or Orpheus strung his lyre, a tribunal was established denominated the Amphyctionic Council. Of this Council, Rollin says, “It was in a manner the holding of a general assembly of the states of Greece. They had full power to discuss and determine all differences which might arise between the Amphyctionic cities.” This confederacy originally consisted of twelve *independent* states or cities, and was afterwards increased to thirty-one. The decisions of the Council were treated with the highest respect, and held inviolable. It ceased not to exist, till after the reign of Augustus Cesar.

The next instance was the Achæan League, composed likewise of independent Grecian cities. "So great was their character for justice and probity, that the Greek cities of Italy referred their disputes to their arbitration. The Lacedemonians and Thebans referred to them an interesting matter of dissension between them." Polybius observes, that the Achæans so far gained the esteem and confidence of all the Europeans, that their name became common to all that country. This League were in a good measure successful in preserving peace among themselves, and thereby attained to an unusual degree of prosperity. But being less careful to preserve peace abroad, they were at length overthrown, A. C. 146.

The German Confederation is another sample. It is composed of independent sovereignties. Before the formation of this Confederation, there occurred between the different states the most barbarous wars, which have been entirely terminated by this measure.

The Hanscatic League, composed of independent German cities, is another case in point. "It was confirmed and established in 1226 and 1234, and an extraordinary general assembly was held every ten years, in which they solemnly renewed their League, admitted new members, and expelled old ones, if they proved refractory. It commenced by a league between the cities of Lubec and Hamburg, and afterwards consisted of 12 towns, situated near the Baltic. They first formed a system of commercial, international laws, enacted in their general assemblies. The League afterwards extended to 70 or 80 cities and

towns." This League preserved peace among themselves ; but engaging after a while in foreign wars, they were by degrees reduced ; so that they comprise at present but three cities ; viz. Lubec, Hamburg, and Bremen.

The Helvetic Union, or Swiss Confederacy, next presents itself. The Swiss Cantons are sovereign and independent, and have different religions, and different forms of government. Yet, by their mode of referring their disputes with one another to arbiters appointed for the purpose, they have been perfectly successful in preserving peace for 400 years.

Our own Union, though not the same kind of sample as the foregoing, is one quite as important in another point of view. For, though the States composing it are not sovereign, having ceded the prime attributes of sovereignty to the General Government, such as the right to make war and peace, to make treaties, to coin money, to lay imposts on commerce, and to do various other acts indispensable to *nationality* ; yet the very fact, that they *have* ceded these rights, for the sake of the greater benefit resulting from the Union, shows how much communities can be induced to do in this respect, by the presentation to them of suitable motives, and is one of the most encouraging circumstances to the friends of peace that could be adduced ; giving grounds to believe, that, for the attainment of so great a good as universal peace, those *great* communities denominated nations can be induced to concede the *absurd* right, of sitting as *judges* in cases where they are *parties*.

By the foregoing samples we perceive, that something similar, in many respects, to the plan we propose, has actually been long known, and successfully practised, on a small scale. The objector who was not previously aware of this, or who, being aware of it, did not sufficiently consider it, may possibly begin to look upon our scheme as not quite so visionary as he had before supposed. If *small* sovereignties can be induced to refer their disputes to an impartial tribunal, and if, by this means, war is prevented among them, why cannot the same be done by *large* sovereignties? It will be said, that force was recognized in the former cases, to carry decisions into effect, by which means the object was secured. So much the greater the probability that our scheme, which requires not this sacrifice of sovereignty, will be adopted—and, leaving the observance of the decisions to honor, that it will prove efficacious. And I think it has been demonstrated, that no compulsion, no penalty, no pledge even, would be necessary, to enforce these decisions. And this I conceive to be more compatible with the dignity of nations. These great bodies of rational beings ought more to respect themselves and one another, than, by assenting to a penalty, to recognize their liability so to violate their *honor* as to disregard the decisions of an impartial tribunal to which they might appeal. Besides, their recognition of force to carry those decisions into effect, would be a surrendering of their national sovereignty into the hands of one great, central, universal Government, which, however good it might be,

would denationalize themselves. No wonder, then, that the scheme of Henry IV. of France for a Congress of Nations, based on this coercive principle, did not succeed. Nations cannot be expected thus to denationalize themselves. They are the radical divisions of mankind, whose distinctive lines have been traced by the finger of the Almighty ; nor is it reasonable to expect them to blend in one general mass, till those lines shall be obliterated by the same Omnipotent Hand that drew them. But they can, without this amalgamation, without the sacrifice of their nationality, without the surrender of their sovereignty, refer their disputes to a tribunal clothed with no authority to *enforce* their decisions.

But why this doubt in the case of nations, when they have, in part, virtually adopted our scheme already ? There has for a long time existed a Congress of Nations, which has holden its sessions at various periods, and regulated the great international concerns of Christendom. By this tribunal, the boundaries of the different states have been fixed, and various other regulations made. And it is the general understanding, that a violation of these regulations by any nation must not be permitted, and that a balance of power must be preserved. We may note, as one of the *sessions* of this Congress, the convocation of the Powers at Westphalia, in 1650, by which the boundaries of the states of Europe were established, and other important concerns, civil and religious, settled on a firm basis. We might likewise note the

Congress of Utrecht, in 1713 ; that of Aix la Chapelle, in 1748 ; that of Paris, in 1763 ; that of Amiens, in 1802 ; and that of Vienna, in 1814–15 ; by which the general concerns of Europe were regulated according to the exigencies of those various periods. Nor should the recent Conference of London be omitted in this enumeration, this being another convocation of the same great international tribunal. And though a Holland occasioned some trouble, this is a rare exception to the peaceable acquiescence of nations in the decisions of this tribunal, and goes no more towards disproving its *general* utility and efficiency, than does the occasional resistance to the laws of society by particular individuals, towards proving the inutility and inefficacy of them. Nor can even this be urged against *our* scheme ; for, as we propose no compulsion, there would of course be no bloodshed in this way ; and as to compliance with the decisions which might be made, it does not follow, that a nation would not *voluntarily* submit to a decision which she would not be *compelled* to do ;—especially if it should chance to be a *righteous* one. Nations are not fond of having it said of them, that they are intimidated by mere threats and military demonstrations. Even your “man of honor” will not make a *just* concession to an *absolute demand*, when, at the same time, he would readily yield it to the judgment of a *board of honor*. How then can it be expected that a *nation*, so much more dignified, and standing so much more upon its honor, will be dragooned into a measure by threats of coer-

cion on the part of another nation or two? Had all Europe, therefore, been set in a blaze by the Holland and Belgium question, this could not have been made an objection to our scheme: ours would have prevented the conflagration—and been more likely to secure *justice* besides.

We have surveyed the existing state of things, and have seen that there is already a Law of Nations, and a Congress of Nations, both of which are open to important objections, which lie not against our plan. Ours is an improvement (and a very great one) on the present international system. It is better adapted to the genius, the dignity, and the sovereignty of nations. It presents itself in a harmless, unexceptionable form, proposing no penalties, no entangling alliances, no intrusion on national sovereignty, no sacrifice of national dignity, but affording each nation an honorable way of avoiding war, and holding out the fairest prospects for the security of justice. Will not nations adopt it? Will *honorable* nations decline the adoption of this plan, which appeals so directly to their *honor*? Will *Christian* nations reject so *Christian* a *project*? Let them go, then, and take a lesson, on this point of their religion, from the heathen—from a Numa Pompilius, or an Antonius Pius; from the Chinese, or the Islanders of Loo Choo; yea, from the infidels among themselves; from that prince of infidels, Voltaire. Let them cast their eyes across the deserts of Namaqualand, and behold an Africaner standing forth in all the sublimity of moral greatness,

expressing the deepest regret for the blood he had shed, and inviting his brother Chiefs to co-operate with him in putting AN END TO WAR, and in establishing A GENERAL PEACE. Will *Christendom* in very deed reject this project? Then let her renounce her Christian name, and no longer subject the religion of the Prince of Peace to the taunts of unbelievers. Let her no longer give the Jew occasion to inquire, "Where is the promise of the peaceful kingdom of your Messiah?" nor a Chinese Emperor to charge Christianity with "whitening all the countries where it obtains footing with human bones." But *Christendom* will adopt our scheme. "Mankind *have* sense enough, in general, to know what is useful to them," when it is clearly pointed out, "and fortitude enough to embrace the means of their own happiness." "Why should not nations adopt a plan to settle their disputes, without first cutting one another's throats?" "These truths are palpable, and must, in the progress of time, have their influence on the minds and conduct of nations."

Needs it that the subject be pursued? What objection remains? Shall we be told, that our tribunal might not always be unanimous in opinion. And is this not the case with other tribunals? Will it be objected, that it might be equally divided on a question, and thus come to no decision? Let the presiding officer, in such a case, give the casting vote, as is done in other tribunals. But rare indeed, in so sage a tribunal as this, would such cases occur, and even unan-

imity might be generally expected. In all plain cases, decisions would undoubtedly be unanimous; and in those which might be so doubtful as equally to divide such a tribunal, there would be too much uncertainty relative to the right side, to justify either party in war; and the Congress might perhaps in such cases recommend a compromise. Yet, better would it be to have *every* question decided by the casting vote of so venerable a sage as would naturally be called to preside in the Court of the World, than by barbarous, capricious war. That justice would be *more likely* to be done by the former than by the latter, there cannot be a doubt. It is also beyond all question, that *some* wars would be prevented by this tribunal. What then, though it might not prevent *all*? If it would prevent *any*, if it would prevent *one*, what excuse can rulers, can nations have, for refusing to establish it? Surely, the horrors of *a single war* are a calamity which ought to be sufficient to call forth the united efforts of the human race to avert it. We are informed, that the first public thanksgiving ever decreed by the warlike Romans to any civilian, was decreed to Cicero, because, in addition to preserving the city from conflagration, and the citizens from massacre, he had saved Italy from a war. Allowing, then, that our tribunal would prevent a single war, or even have *a tendency* to prevent one, it ought to be established. And it cannot be doubted that it would have this tendency. How then can rulers frame an excuse sufficiently plausible, to enable them, with any

color of justification, to decline the adoption of the plan we propose ? One government perhaps will say, that *the others* will not accede to the measure. Propose it then, and see. Surely, the object is too important not even to be proposed. Let no nation, therefore, feel exonerated on this point, short of proposing the measure to the rest, or of closing with it if proposed by another. And O ! my country, be thine the imperishable glory, of sending forth this blessed invitation to mankind. Be thine the high destiny, to call the world to peace. Let the invitation extend to earth's remotest bounds ; to Turk, to Persian, to Hindoo, and Chinese ; to all people, nations, kindreds, tongues, that dwell on the whole earth. And think ye it would be given in vain ? Assuredly no ! All heaven would smile on the immortal deed, and the assenting response of nations the most distant would come pealing back, like the roar of mighty waters, "praising God and saying, Glory to God in highest, and on earth *peace ; good will to men.*"

These anticipations may appear visionary and extravagant to some ; and for argument's sake, admit them to be so. Admit, that the scheme might be considered visionary by other nations ; still let the proposal be made, and let war no longer be called the last resort, till recourse shall have been had to this one. But should a Congress be convened, and no effect produced, at the least no harm would be done, and nations would thereby have manifested some disposition to put an end to this horrid evil. But until they

will make an *attempt* of the kind, they may as well talk no more of their unwillingness to engage in war. They may as well cease to appeal to Heaven and earth for the justice of their cause ; as well cease to insult the Majesty on high with their hypocritical supplications for his blessing on their arms. Let them know, that till they will make trial of this remedy for war, they will manifest no sincere desire to avoid it, and will be guilty of the most abominable hypocrisy in pretending to deprecate it—and the most horrid guilt in embarking in it. And of this hypocrisy, this guilt, will every individual be a partaker, who justifies war under these circumstances. War, if allowable at all, is so only when made the last resort in reality. But to leave any probable means of avoiding it untried, and to engage in it under such circumstances, is *not* to make it the last resort. Our plan, if adopted, would *probably* be the means of preventing *some* war, as the most sceptical must acknowledge. From these plain and undeniable premises, follows the unavoidable conclusion, that if nations will not make trial of this expedient, war will not be their last resort, but will be nothing more nor less than **WHOLESALE MURDER!** a heavy charge indeed, but one from which there is no possibility of escape. Let nations, let rulers, let individuals, see to it ; for all are concerned. Nations have no right to *permit* rulers to involve them in *such* wars. Rulers have no right to *do* it. And individuals have no right to *aid* them in doing it. Far better might rulers require us to commit *individual* murder,

than this murder of *nations*. Yet, should they require the former, how quickly should we revolt against the diabolical requisition. Shall we then, at their bidding, go forth and murder thousands in the field, which, for aught they would ascertain to the contrary, might have been spared ?

There is a very prevalent idea, that nations are not bound by the same moral rules which are obligatory on individuals, and that it is therefore lawful for individuals, when required by rulers, to violate those rules which govern them in private life. Never was there a more fallacious and a more pernicious idea. The eternal rule of rectitude is founded in the nature of things, which neither time nor circumstance can change or modify. A nation has no more right to do an act of injustice, or to sacrifice human happiness and life in a wanton manner, than has an individual. What is a nation but an aggregation of individuals, each one of whom is under certain moral obligations ? And if, in one's individual capacity, he has no right to do or to require an unjust thing, why has he this right as a member of the community ? *I* feel that *I* have no such right. And if *I* have not, *another* has not. And if *neither* of us has separately, *both* of us together have not. And upon the same principle, three, four, ten, a thousand, a whole nation would not have. Who then is this *nation* of which we hear so much, that requires of *its citizens* acts of injustice which they have no right to commit or to require themselves ? An ideality, an imaginary abstraction, a moral monster,

possessing all the attributes of personality save one—conscience. We hear of national dignity, national honor, national vengeance, national magnanimity, national spirit, and so on ; and 'tis no difficult matter to find claimants for these. Rulers and people are all fond of their full share. But let the subject of national conscience be broached, and lo ! the phantom nation vanishes, leaving not a trace of its identity behind ! 'Tis individuality all ! The scape-goat abstraction has fled, bearing all the blame into the far distant wilderness, the *individuals* who once composed the same nation being left denationalized and faultless ! Ask each of those individuals where the guilt lies, and he will say, not in him, but in *the nation*. Thus would they make the nation something separate from themselves. Suppose ye that Justice is to be defrauded thus, in the day when inquisition shall be made for blood ? Think ye the All-scrutinizing Eye will recognize this flimsy casuistry ? human attributes without human conscience ? without moral volition ? moral responsibility ? No ! Nations *have* conscience, have moral volition, moral responsibility—and have *guilt* too, guilt of enormous magnitude, and of the deepest die.

Let us now sum up our subject by a brief recapitulation.

We have seen, that our proposed tribunal would be a better umpire than war, or than either of the parties ; that nations are not absolutely supreme ; that they are under moral obligation, under obligation one to another, and to the meanest of their citizens ; that

they recognise and regard a kind of international law ; that they do not consider it derogatory to their honor, even now, to refer their disputes to third parties ; that great improvements have been made in civil jurisprudence, and therefore, that it is not unreasonable to expect some to be made in the jurisprudence of nations ; that, in recognizing international law, they do what would be equivalent to the adoption of an international tribunal, seeing no consistent objection can be made against the existence of a *tribunal*, by those who admit the propriety of *law* ; that impartiality might be expected of such a tribunal, if of any under heaven, and therefore, that men might quite as well object to civil tribunals, as to this—especially when the *penalties* of the former are considered ; that men do many things, and make many sacrifices, for the general good and their own, which, is a source of encouragement, to lead us to hope, that whatever may be the cause, the same cause may lead them, with improved views, to act still more for the general good, by the abolition of war ; and that absurd and cruel customs of long standing have been abolished, and hence, that it is not unreasonable to hope for the abolition of this.

We have not proposed the adoption of the principle of national non-resistance, but a measure similar to that which is adopted for the settlement of individual disputes. We have seen that it has been conceded, by some who deem the plan of a Congress of Nations impracticable, that “it is well supported by argument,

and fully sustained by scripture ; that it would eminently benefit the human race ; that, for the accomplishment of the object, the religious man and the philanthropist must equally pray ;” that men can as easily send delegates to a Congress of Nations, as elsewhere—and as easily abide by its decisions, as by the decisions of other tribunals ; that there is therefore no *real* impracticability in the case ; that mankind barely tolerate war, on account of its supposed necessity ; that there is no other necessity for it than that occasioned by the deception of unprincipled rulers ; that as war decides questions by might, and not by right, justice would have a better chance for herself before our tribunal, which would impartially investigate questions, and decide according to their apparent merits ; that the *justice* of their cause should prevent their *risking* it by war ; that the nation that would not adopt this measure, would manifest an unwillingness to come to a fair investigation ; that the general state of things is tending towards the very measure under consideration ; that its propriety is recognized, and its practicability demonstrated, by actual reference of international disputes in certain cases ; that the necessity of general peace is admitted on all hands ; that the Great Powers seem determined to preserve it, and have, even now, an international Conference for the purpose ; and that the precise plan we recommend is at this very moment occupying a portion of the public attention in several countries besides our own.

It has likewise still further been seen, that it begins to be conceded, that our scheme is not a mere reverie of good men, but that it would be the greatest earthly blessing conceivable ; that many distinguished individuals have been decidedly of the opinion, that something of the kind would inevitably be adopted ; that the rapid increase of knowledge is another circumstance favorable to it, inasmuch as it is but to *enlighten* even the *selfishness* of men, to make them favorable to it ; that it is unnecessary to wait for all nations to coincide in it before commencing it, seeing two or three nations can make a beginning for themselves ; that, whatever other nations might do, no nation is excusable short of proposing the measure, or acceding to the proposition if made by another ; that, if such a proposition were to be made by a respectable nation, there is reason to believe it would be hailed with general acclamation ; that it is only to push the measure by the various proper means, to induce this country to make it ; that the magnitude of the evil of war is a reason why it may be expected that men will, on becoming more enlightened on the subject, abolish it ; and that, as moral improvements are continually made, as many evil customs have been abolished, as war itself has been modified, from the massacre of prisoners, to occasional reference, and occasional Congresses of Nations, it would seem even unreasonable to suppose, that nations will not take one step more in the march of improvement, by adopting the measure proposed.

It has been seen, that it might have been objected in the cases of all the obsolete, barbarous customs, previous to their abrogation, just as is now objected in that of war, that had there been any practicable mode by which they could be abrogated, it would not have escaped the sagacity of so many wise men, but would long before now have been adopted ; that the power of rulers in modern days has been greatly diminished ; that the interests of the people are gaining the ascendancy ; that our non-coercion scheme, though at first thought a seeming objection to the efficacy of the project, proves, on thorough investigation, to be the very reason why it *would be* efficacious, removing, as it does, the plea of the point of honor with regard to coercion ; that the causes of many wars are so trivial in themselves, that the decisions of our tribunal, by rendering it no point of honor to contend for them, would thus remove the plea for war in this respect ; and that the kind of war manifesto which rulers must issue under these circumstances, would be of such a nature, that no nation would tolerate it, no government put it forth.

We have taken into consideration the mighty influence of public opinion, and have found it to be an all-sufficient sanction for the decisions of an international tribunal, there being no desperado nations, no nations that are not vulnerable to its tremendous power ; from which considerations it follows, that it is but to enlighten this opinion on the subject of war, when it must cease. We have likewise seen, that

public opinion measurably secures the observance of the present Law of Nations, and would much more readily secure that of an *improved* one, issuing from the Grand Court of Nations ; that public opinion is governed by expediency, justice, and selfishness, all of which would be brought to bear on an *enlightened* public opinion decidedly in favor of our scheme ; that public opinion includes that of each nation, so that rulers, in undertaking war in opposition to it, would not only act contrary to the opinion of other nations, but of their own ; that international law, without an international tribunal, is a gross absurdity ; that such law, as well as civil law, should be conventional ; that nations can as well refer their disputes to a third party, as to negotiate respecting them ; that such reference is infinitely better than war, even after negotiation ; that the existence of an international tribunal would tend to lessen *the number* of cases of dispute, and, by protracting, to prevent war in cases that might exist ; that war is a bad business altogether, and degrading besides ; that it is a barbarous custom, and must in an enlightened age give place to something better as a substitute, whenever that can be devised ; that an international tribunal would operate as a check upon the ambitious ; that neither of the parties to a dispute could consistently decline its arbitration, both professing to believe themselves in the right ; that men sacrifice much for the sake of the greater good ; that war is vastly worse than duelling ; that Christendom is

bound by her religion to abandon her war policy, and adopt our scheme ; that war is a far greater evil than the one it is designed to remedy ; that a majority only is requisite to its abolition ; that the people should require their rulers to settle international disputes in an amicable manner, as rulers require them to settle theirs ; that there is already a Congress of Nations of a certain description ; that even among the heathen, pacific sentiments sometimes predominate ; that no one can doubt that justice would be as likely to be secured by an international tribunal as by war ; that some wars would be prevented by the establishment of our tribunal, or, at the least, that its establishment would *tend* to the prevention of war ; and that there can therefore be no fair excuse on the part of nations for its non-establishment, or, at all events, that they cannot be excused short of making the trial, and seeing whether it would be beneficial or not. The result of all which is, that, when these considerations come to be viewed in their proper light, nations will not only be *induced* to adopt our plan, but, for want of the shadow of an excuse to decline it, they will be *compelled* to adopt it.

And now I ask the reader, if, after all this collection and concentration of evidences on the point, he can any longer consider the project of a Congress of Nations impracticable. Nay, can he suppose that it will be practicable for nations much longer to *avoid* the establishment of one ? They talk of vis-

ionary and Utopian schemes. *Who* are the visionaries? Those who believe, that, in the progress of the human mind, nations, after having done so much for the improvement of their condition, will still do more; that after having taken so many steps, they will take one more of greater consequence than any they *have* taken: or those who suppose that, amid constantly increasing light, ruin will still be permitted to “drive his ploughshare o’er creation,” because the united wisdom of mankind will fail to perceive and adopt a preventive, when plainly laid before them? *Who*, I ask again, are the visionaries? Is it visionary to expect, that rational beings will yet discover and promote their own true interest in a plain and an important case? Utopian! What is Utopian? What can be more so, than to suppose that nations, after having abolished so many barbarous customs, will continue much longer to cling to this one; a custom more barbarous, more horrid than all others combined; a custom better befitting beasts than men, better suited to maniacs than to rational beings? *Such* a custom to stand the test in this age of light? Still to continue? To keep pace with human improvement? To march with it up to the summit of its perfection? Utopian! ’Tis *more* than Utopian to *expect it to continue*. The marvel is, that it has continued so long—that it was not the first, as it was the worst, relic of barbarianism to be discarded. Aye! ’tis strange, ’tis passing strange, that beings so tenacious of their

happiness as men, did not meet this evil on the threshold ; that, when the first armies were marshalled in battle array, when first the earth was drenched with human gore, and severed limbs and mangled frames lay scattered o'er the plain, they did not with one accord declare, that it should rage no more.— Yea, 'tis a marvel of marvels, that so irrational, so brutal, so horrid a custom, should ever have been adopted at all, or even have been conceived, by barbarians themselves !

But admit our project to be Utopian. Admit that a proposition for a tribunal of the kind would be disregarded. Still it is the duty of a nation *to make the proposition*, ere it can plead innocence in relation to war. No nation, *short of proposing* the measure, and having it actually rejected, can lawfully engage in war henceforth and forever ! But should the proposition be made and acceded to, and a Congress of Nations be convoked, and its decisions even be disregarded by the parties to whom they might be adverse ; in that improbable event would the state of things be no worse than it is now. For suppose the parties to go to war ; pray is there not war *without* such a tribunal ? And notwithstanding, as we have seen, our tribunal would have no Executive to *enforce* its decisions, but would leave nations as much at liberty to wage war as before ; yet, if it did not tie the hands of the aggressor, neither would it tie those of the injured, nor of the spectator nations. It would not bid those spectator nations exe-

cute its will, nor would it bid them *not* do it. It would declare what was right, and leave nations to take such a course as they might choose.

And now to apply the subject, and draw to a close.

To check evil, to relieve wretchedness, to reform vice, to heal the physical and moral maladies that afflict mankind; these are great and glorious achievements. While the sun and the moon shall endure, the glorious memory of a Howard shall be graven on every heart, and proclaimed by every tongue. It shall be but another name for philanthropy, and all nations shall call him blessed. But great and glorious as it is to *correct* evil and *relieve* wretchedness, how much greater, how much more glorious must it be, to *prevent* these evils. Blessed it is to reform the wretched sot, and to recover him from his misery, and degradation, and sin; but far more blessed had it been, to *keep* him *from* those evils, by keeping him in the path of temperance. How much woe, how much suffering, how much sin, would have been *prevented*. How vast, how immense, then, the field spread out before us, in the case which we have been considering, for the exertions of benevolence. To recover a nation from the crippled state in which war leaves her, is a work of many years. Nor can we *ever* assuage past grief, or alleviate past misery, or restore to life the slain. 'Tis done!—the afflictive, bloody work! The dread account is closed, to be unrolled in the great and final

day of doom ! And yet, 'tis joyous to restore the survivors to their former prosperity. 'Tis glorious to recover a nation from the *remediable* effects of war. Thrice glorious, thrice glorious then must it be, to *prevent* war ; to *prevent* those sighs, and groans, and tears, and woes, and vices, and crimes, and horrors, and murders.

We call, then, on all the friends of humanity, on all that are worthy of the name of man, to lend their aid in this momentous, this mighty undertaking ; an undertaking whose object and whose *prospect* are, the pacification of the world. To all such would we say :—If you value human life ; if you value human happiness ; if you regard your country's prosperity ; if you deprecate vice, crime, and barbarianism ; if you love justice ; if you are friends of law and order ; if you prize the rights of conscience ; if you care for the pleasures of home, and the good of society ; if you respect uprightness in dealing ; if you pity the poor ; if your hearts expand with philanthropy towards the human race ; if you love your country ; if you care for the bodies and souls of your fellow men :—then, aid us in the suppression of war. Ye have your societies for this object, that, and the other. Ye spend a vast amount of time and treasure in promoting the *details* of benevolence. Abolish war, and in that *single* act you will *prevent* more evil of every description, than all the wealth of the Indies and all the exertions of the whole world could *remedy*, to the end of time. What a blessed

opening is here for the doing of good ! Who will decline to avail himself of the opportunity. If you wish to promote one good object particularly, combine your efforts with those who are engaged in the promotion of that object. But if you would promote every good object at once, and that in the most efficient way, namely, by the *prevention* of evil, of every description, unite your efforts with ours in the great cause of Peace. No wonder that the Messiah is called the Prince of Peace. No wonder that it was predicted, as the distinguishing blessing that was to signalize his reign, that "nations should learn war no more." How could the benign character of his religion be better represented, than by showing that it was calculated to overthrow this hydra evil ? Thrice blessed Gospel ! by whose hallowed influence all these commotions, all these heart-burnings, all these divisions and contentions shall forever end ; man stand erect in the enjoyment of his unshackled rights, and roam unrestricted to the ends of the earth, in the pursuit of his avocations ; nation co-mingle with nation, divested of jealousy, rivalry, and prejudice, their interests no longer conflicting ; and the whole race of men constitute one general brotherhood, one immense, and mighty, and happy community.

Shall these blessed anticipations be realized ? What prevents ? Where is the friend of human kind that will not do what in him lies, to produce this glorious consummation ? And where the wretch who for pelf or

fame, for obstinacy or revenge, would throw obstacles in the way? Breathes there so vile a recreant the air of heaven? Or if indeed such wretches can be found, will men *permit* them thus to do?

“War is a game
Which, were the people wise,
Kings would not play at.”

Heaven knows it to be a wanton, wicked waste of human life. Heaven knows, that, unless made the last resort in reality, it is murder—wholesale murder. And Heaven too knows, that it cannot be called the last resort, till the plan which we propose shall at least have been proved impracticable, by a fair and an honest trial.

Ye nations of the world! Ye rulers and people! Ye individual men! *Will* you, *dare* you, still pursue the work of death under these circumstances? still pursue it when you *know*, that all has not been attempted which *should* be, for the preservation of peace? Plead you the justice of your cause? 'Tis *unjust* then for you to hazard it by war, till every other expedient shall have failed. The all-wise Being who regulates the world, has not so arranged affairs, that all this destruction of his rational creatures by the hands of one another is unavoidable. 'Twere an impeachment of his character to suppose he has. No. There is a way by which it may be avoided, or, at least, which you have not *ascertained* to be an impracticable scheme. Refusing to make trial of it, you do, by embarking in war, take the life of your fellow beings before you *know* it to be

necessary. If this is not murder, nothing is so. By all then that is awful in murder, stay your hand. If there is a God in existence, and that God is a God of justice, he will surely, *surely*, execute judgment for the blood thus shed ;—not merely a national judgment, which falls on the innocent as well as the guilty, while some of the latter escape, but an individual judgment, and such a one as he has in store for the murderer, whether it be here or hereafter. Say not, ye people, that you must obey your rulers in a case like this—a case of wholesale murder. You have no right *to permit them to declare* such war. Say not, ye rulers, that you are not acting for yourselves, but for the people. You have *no right* to act thus for them. Think not to escape responsibility thus. Not responsible indeed ! when you claim the obedience of millions, and when for this very reason they think to transfer all their responsibility to your shoulders ! Yes, ye are responsible, most fearfully so. Men may denominate this wholesale murder heroism, but God will pronounce it murder, just as he will the destruction of the life of one man by another in a private quarrel, occasioned by non-reference of their dispute to a third party ; just as he will the deed of the duellist, who, deeming a court of justice insufficient, sacrifices the life of his antagonist, and perhaps his own, to false honor ?

Are these things really so ? Are they *not* so ? Is it possible to come to any other conclusion ? 'Tis absolutely impossible. Avoidable war, war that is not *really* the last resort, is positive, is wholesale murder. And

while an expedient is untried, it is *not* the last resort.

Hear then, ye nations, ye rulers and ruled, ye individuals of the human race, one and all, who sanction *such* war. Whenever you declare war, you utter a deliberate falsehood in the face of the whole universe, by denominating it your last resort. Whenever you march to the scene of action, you go to the work of *murder*. Whenever you fire a gun, you let fly the lead of the *murderer*. Whenever you smite with the sword, you deal the blow of the *murderer*. Whenever you make use, in any manner, of the implements of destruction, you wield the weapons of the *murderer*. Disguise the subject as you may; call your deeds by what name soever you please; flourish your trumpets, and wave your banners, and glitter in lace as you may; still the blood of *murder* stains your hands, and the guilt of *murder* pollutes your souls: and there indelible shall they remain, though the trump of fame should blazon your deeds to the boundaries of the universe, and the archives of history transmit your names from generation to generation, till time shall be no more!

ERRATA.

- Page 11, line 2, read *Hetius*, instead of *Actius*.
 “ 13, “ 3, “ *Oder* instead of *Odee*.
 “ 15, “ 3, “ 850,000, instead of 8,150,000.
 “ 16, “ 4, from the bottom, read *Philanthropy's*, instead of *Philanthropist's*.
 “ 40, “ 10, “ *Denon*, instead of *Decon*.

Several additional errors of minor consequence have crept into the work, which can easily be corrected by the reader.

Handwritten text, possibly a signature or date, located in the center of the page. The text is extremely faint and illegible.



Layers in the

the

the

the

the

the

the

the



FL 7-1-49

PLEASE ~~DO~~ NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY

JX
1949
D58

Dissertation on the
subject of a congress
of nations

