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DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

BY

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VOLUME I.

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TO THE CLASSES

FOR WHOM THIS THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM WAS PREPARED

AND WHOSE FAITHFUL ATTENTION TO ITS DELIVERY

WAS A CONSTANT ENCOURAGEMENT

IT IS RESPECTFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED

BY THE AUTHOR



PREFACE.

THE immediate preparation of this treatise began in 1870, when the author was called to give instruction for a year in the department of Systematic Theology, in Union Theological Seminary. The work was resumed in 1874, when he was elected to this professorship, and was prosecuted down to 1888. But some general preparation had been made for it, by previous studies and publications. The writer had composed a History of Christian Doctrine in the years 1854—1862, which was published in 1863; and also a volume of Theological Essays containing discussions on original sin and vicarious atonement, and a volume of Sermons to the Natural Man predominantly theological in their contents. The doctrinal system here presented will be found to be closely connected with these preceding investigations; and this will explain the somewhat frequent references to them as parts of one whole. The Dogmatic History is the natural introduction to the Dogmatic Theology.

The general type of doctrine is the Augustino-Calvinistic. Upon a few points, the elder Calvinism has been followed in preference to the later. This, probably, is the principal difference between this treatise and contemporary ones of the Calvinistic class.

Upon the subject of Adam's sin and its imputation, the author has been constrained to differ from some theologians for whom he has the highest respect, and with whom he has in general a hearty agreement. In adopting the traducian theory of the origin of the soul, in the interest of the immediate imputation of the first sin, he believes that he has the support of some of the most careful students of Scripture, and deepest thinkers in the history of the Church. This theory, however, even when adopted has not attained much explication. Some further development of it has been attempted; with what success, the reader must judge. The doctrine of the Trinity has been constructed upon the Nicene basis, but with more reference to the necessary conditions of personality and self-consciousness, and the objections to the personality of the Infinite introduced by modern pantheism. In respect to the ontological argument for the Divine Existence, the author is in sympathy with the a priori spirit of the old theology. The statement of the doctrine of Decrees, and of Regeneration, is founded upon the postulate, that all holiness has its source in the Infinite will, and all sin in the self-determination of the Finite.

It will be objected by some to this dogmatic system that it has been too much influenced by the patristic, mediaeval, and reformation periods, and too little by the so-called "progress" of modern theology. The charge of scholasticism, and perhaps of speculativeness, will be made. The author has no disposition to repel the charge. While acknowledging the excellences of the present period in respect to the practical application and spread of religion, he cannot regard it as pre-eminent above all others in scienti-

fic theology. It is his conviction, that there were some minds in the former ages of Christianity who were called by Providence to do a work that will never be outgrown and left behind by the Christian Church; some men who thought more deeply, and came nearer to the centre of truth, upon some subjects, than any modern minds. Non omnia possumus omnes. No one age, or church, is in advance of all other ages, or churches, in all things. It would be difficult to mention an intellect in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries whose reflection upon the metaphysical being and nature of God has been more profound than that of Anselm; whose thinking upon the Trinity has been more subtle and discriminating than that of Athanasius; whose contemplation of the great mystery of sin has been more comprehensive and searching than that of Augustine; whose apprehension of the doctrine of atonement has been more accurate than that formulated in the creeds of the Reformation.

In drawing from these earlier sources, the writer believes that systematic theology will be made both more truthful and more vital. Confinement to modern opinions tends to thinness and weakness. The latest intelligence is of more value in a newspaper than in a scientific treatise. If an author in any department gets into the eddies of his age, and whirls round and round in them, he knows little of the sweep of the vast stream of the ages which holds on its way forever and forevermore. If this treatise has any merits, they are due very much to daily and nightly communion with that noble army of theologians which is composed of the élite of the fathers, of the schoolmen, of the reformers, and of the seventeenth century divines of England and the

Continent. And let it not be supposed that this influence of the theologians is at the expense of that of the Scriptures. This is one of the vulgar errors. Scientific and contemplative theology is the child of Revelation. It is the very Word of God itself as this has been studied, collated, combined, and systematized by powerful, devout, and prayerful intellects.

In closing up the labors of forty years in theological research and meditation, the writer is naturally the subject of serious thoughts and feelings. The vastness and mystery of the science oppress him more than ever. But the evangelical irradiations of the Sun of righteousness out of the thick darkness and clouds that envelop the Infinite and Adorable God, are beams of intense brightness which pour the light of life and of hope into the utter gloom in which man must live here upon earth, if he rejects Divine Revelation. That this treatise may contribute to strengthen the believer's confidence in this revelation, and to incline the unbeliever to exercise faith in it, is the prayer of the author.

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ERRATA.

Page 61, line 2 from bottom, for βιβλον read βιβλιοῦ.

Line 19 from bottom, for 237-24 read 24-36.

Page 356, line 1 from bottom, for adoption read adaptation.

Page 137, line 4 from top, for announcing read denouncing.

THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

THE TRUE METHOD IN THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE.

THERE are a few topics that require to be discussed preparatory to the investigation of the several divisions in theological science. Some writers bring them under the head of Prolegomena, and others under the general title of Introduction.

The principal of these introductory topics are: 1. The true method in theological science. 2. The plan, divisions, and subdivisions. 3. The nature and definition of theological science.

1. The true method of investigation in any science is *natural*. It coincides with the structure of the object. The method in anatomy is a good example. It follows the veins, if veins are the subject-matter; the muscles, if muscles are; the nerves, if nerves are. It does not cross and recross, but pursues a straight-onward course. The natural method, consequently, is marked by ease and freedom. There is no effort to force a way through. "He winds into his subject like a serpent," said Goldsmith of Burke's oratorical method.

The natural method necessitates a thorough knowledge of the nature and structure of the object. It is therefore generally the result of much study, and perhaps of many

attempts. The first investigator is not so likely to strike upon the intrinsic constitution of a thing as the last one, because he has not the light of previous inquiries. Methods of investigation are continually undergoing correction and modification, and are thus brought closer to the organization of the object. Sometimes scientific genius hits by intuition immediately upon the method of nature. But such genius is rare. Ordinary talent must make many trials, and correct many errors of predecessors. The botanical method of Linnæus, excellent as it is, has been modified by Le Jussieu and De Candolle. Goethe adopted the theory that all the parts of a plant are varieties of the leaf—a theory that had been suggested by Linnæus himself, but rejected by that great naturalist. Oken, in physiology, advanced the view that all the parts of the skeleton are varieties of the vertebra. It is evident that the correctness of the methods of these investigators depends upon whether the view taken of the intrinsic nature and constitution of the plant or the skeleton is a correct one.

2. The true method of investigation is *logical*. Nature is always logical, because in nature one thing follows another according to a preconceived idea, and an established law. The inquirer, therefore, who perceives the natural structure and organization of an object will exhibit it in a logical order. Everything in the analysis will be sequacious, and the whole will be a true evolution.

Theological science, like others, presents some variety in its methods of investigation, though less than most sciences. In the Ancient, Mediæval, and Reformation periods the method commonly adopted was the *theological*. The Trinity was the basis. Beginning with the divine existence and trinal nature, the investigator then discussed the acts and works of God in creation, providence, and redemption. This is the method of John of Damascus, the Greek theologian of the seventh century, in his *Ἐκθεσις Πίστewς*; that of Lombard, Aquinas, and Bellarmin, in their elaborate sys-

tems; that of Melancthon, Calvin, and Turretin, and of Lutheran and Calvinistic divines generally. The system sometimes followed the order of an accepted creed; that of Calvin, the Apostles' Creed; that of Ursinus, the Heidelberg Catechism. Calvin's Institutes are a fine example of the theological method. No system exceeds it in comprehensiveness, precision, lucidity, and literary elegance. For an analysis of it, see the general syllabus in the Presbyterian Board's edition, pp. 41-44.

During the present century another method has been adopted by some theologians, namely, the *christological*. God incarnate is made the basis of theological science, and the work of redemption controls the investigation. This is virtually Schleiermacher's method. He derives the material of theological science from the Christian consciousness; and this is shaped by the feeling of dependence: (*a*) as related to God generally; (*b*) as related to the fact of sin; (*c*) as related to grace and redemption. Under the last two heads, most of Schleiermacher's system is to be found. Rothe's method is essentially christological. Those of Hase and Thomasius are formally so. Among English writers Chalmers employs the christological method. The American theologian, H. B. Smith, adopts it. Edwards's History of Redemption may be regarded as a system of theology of this class. See the preface to it by his son.

While this method is interesting because it makes sin and salvation the principal theme and brings Christ the Redeemer into the foreground, yet it is neither a natural nor a logical method. God incarnate is only a single person of the Godhead; redemption is only one of the works of God; and sin is an anomaly in the universe, not an original and necessary fact. The christological method, therefore, is fractional. It does not cover the whole ground. It is preferable to construct theological science upon the Trinity; to begin with the trinal nature and existence of the Godhead, and then come down to his acts in incarnation and

redemption. It is not logical or natural to build a science upon one of its divisions. Christology is a division in theology.

The true method of investigation in theological science being structural, the divisions in it will be suggested by the principal objects themselves. In theology the investigator has to do with God, Man, and the God-man. These are the beings who are concerned, and to whom the various topics refer. Theological themes relate sometimes to the divine being, sometimes to the human being, and sometimes to the divine-human. They bring to view sometimes the works and ways of the creator, sometimes the works and ways of the creature, and sometimes the works and ways of the redeemer.

In this threefold series man stands for the creature generally, including angels and the material world. Man is the head of the material creation, and a representative of the world of finite spirits. Angels and the material universe are neither God nor the God-man, and belong under the category of the finite and created, which man may very well stand for.

Besides the divisions and subdivisions which spring out of God, man, and the God-man, there are some that relate to the Scriptures, and come under the general head of Bibliology. Whether these should be discussed in connection with dogmatic theology is somewhat disputed. The Bible, as the source of man's knowledge of God, man, and the God-man, does not, strictly speaking, constitute one of the *objects* of theological investigation, and some, consequently, would separate bibliology entirely from theology. Since bibliology is concerned with demonstrating that the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures are the inspired word of God, leaving their contents to be explained by exegetical and dogmatic theology, it is contended that it should not constitute a division in theological science.

While there is some truth in this, it must be remembered

that it is impossible to demonstrate the inspiration of the Bible, without proving that its teachings are in harmony with the true idea of God, and present rational and credible views of his works and ways. Bibliology, consequently, cannot be wholly severed from theology and investigated separately and in isolation from it, like mathematics or physics. It is organically connected with the several divisions of theological science, and in some of its parts, certainly, is best discussed in connection with them.¹

We shall, therefore, regard Bibliology as an introductory division in a complete theological system. At the same time it is obvious that as such an introductory division, the topics belonging to it cannot be discussed in much detail. The examination of the several books of the Old and New Testaments, for example, for the purpose of demonstrating their canonicity or their authenticity, can be made only in the briefest manner. The bibliological topics that require most discussion by the dogmatic theologian are Revelation and Inspiration.

¹ Systems of theology since the Reformation generally include it. It is found in those of Calvin, Turretin, De Moor-Marek, Gerhard, Chemnitz, Quenstedt, Hntter, Hollaz, Buddeus, Döderlein, Baier, Bretschneider, Knapp, Ebrard, Schleiermacher, Twisten, Watson, Hill, Hodge, et alia.

CHAPTER II.

PLAN, DIVISIONS, AND SUBDIVISIONS.

DIVIDING, then, the topics that fall under the general title of Theological Science, in accordance with the four principal themes that have been mentioned, we have the following divisions: Bibliology, Theology (Doctrine of God), Anthropology, Christology, Soteriology, and Eschatology.

Bibliology (βιβλιοῦ λόγος) includes those subjects that relate to the Bible. 1. Revelation and Inspiration. 2. The Authenticity of the Scriptures. 3. Their Credibility. 4. Their Canonicity.

Theology (θεοῦ λόγος) as a division in Theological Science, is employed in a restricted signification. It denotes that branch of the general science of theology which discusses the divine being. It includes: 1. The Nature and Definition of God. 2. The Innate Idea of God. 3. The Arguments for his Existence. 4. His Trinitarian Existence. 5. His Attributes. 6. His Decrees. 7. His Works of Creation and Providence, and his Miraculous Works.

It is to be noticed that the doctrine of the trinity is an integrant part of theology, in the restricted signification of the term, because according to revelation trinality as necessarily marks the deity as unity. Here is one of the points of difference between Christianity and deism, or theism, as this term was used by Cudworth and Warburton. Deism discusses the divine nature as mere unity, by itself and alone, because it denies trinality in the divine constitution; but Christianity, following the revealed idea of God, discusses the divine unity only as triunity or trinity. Trini-

tarianism, according to Scripture, is not a subject separate from theology proper, but enters into it as a necessary constituent. The revealed idea of God as much implies his trinity as his eternity. The Socinian and the Mohammedan doctrine of God is deistical, in distinction from Christian. Each alike denies interior distinctions in the divine essence, and is anti-trinitarian.

This intrinsic and necessary connection of trinality with unity in God is indicated in the patristic use of the term "theologian," as the synonym of "trinitarian." In the patristic age, the apostle John was denominated *ὁ Θεόλογος*, because of the fulness with which he was inspired to teach the doctrine of the trinity. Gregory of Nazianzum also obtained the same designation by reason of the ability of his trinitarian treatises. In modern phrase it would have been St. John the trinitarian, and Gregory the trinitarian.

Anthropology (*ἄνθρωπου λόγος*) treats of man in his original, and in his fallen condition. It comprises the following subjects: 1. Man's Creation. 2. His Primitive State. 3. His Probation and Apostasy. 4. Original Sin: its nature, transmission, and effects. 5. Actual Transgression. This division is concerned mainly with the subject of moral evil. Man as a holy being has but a brief history, because his apostasy occurred at the beginning of his career. Hence, anthropology discusses sin principally,

Christology (*Χριστοῦ λόγος*) treats of the person of the Redeemer. The subjects under this head are: 1. Christ's Theanthropic Person. 2. His Divinity. 3. His Humanity. 4. His Unipersonality. 5. His Impeccability.

Soteriology (*σωτηρίας λόγος*) discusses the work of the Redeemer. It naturally follows Christology. Having investigated the complex person and characteristics of the redeemer, we are prepared to examine redemption itself. Since soteriology covers the whole field of the divine agency in the salvation of the human soul, it is abundant and varied in its contents. The work of Christ in atoning for sin, and

the application of this work to the individual by the Holy Spirit, both belong to soteriology. The entire process of redemption is included, from the foundation laid in the sacrifice of the Son of God, to the superstructure reared upon it by the operation of the Holy Ghost. And as the Holy Ghost in effectually applying the work of Christ makes use of instrumentalities, as well as employs his own immediate energy, the means of grace come under the head of soteriology.

Soteriology, then, comprises the following subdivisions :
 1. The Mediatorial Offices of Christ, as prophet, priest, and king. Since the second of these offices holds a prominent place in the economy of redemption, it naturally furnishes much material. The doctrine of atonement is central in soteriology. Hence we have, 2. Vicarious Atonement : its nature and extent. As this atoning work is made effectual in the case of the individual by the Holy Spirit, soteriology passes to : 3. Regeneration and its consequences, viz. : 4. Conversion ; 5. Justification ; 6. Sanctification. But as sanctification is a gradual process carried on by the Holy Ghost in the use of means, we have to consider : 7. The Means of grace, viz. : the word and the sacraments. And since these are employed only in connection with the Christian Church, this also comes into consideration with them. Some methods make a separate division of this last, under the title of Ecclesiology.

Eschatology (ἔσχατων λόγος) discusses the final issue and result of redemption in the winding up of human history. It treats of the last events in the great process, and embraces the following subjects : 1. The Intermediate State. 2. The Second Advent of Christ. 3. The Resurrection. 4. The Final Judgment. 5. Heaven. 6. Hell.

The proper mode of discussing any single theological topic is : 1. Exegetical. 2. Rational. The first step to be taken is, to deduce the doctrine itself from Scripture by careful exegesis ; and the second step is, to justify and defend this exegetical result upon grounds of reason.

Christian theology differs from every other branch of knowledge, by being the outcome of divine revelation. Consequently the interpretation of Scripture is the very first work of the theologian. When man constructs a system of philosophy, he must look into his own mind for the data; but when he constructs the Christian system he must look in the Bible for them. Hence the first procedure of the theologian is exegetical. The contents and meaning of inspiration are to be discovered. Christian dogmatics is what he finds, not what he originates.

The term "dogma" has two significations: 1. It denotes a doctrinal proposition that has been derived exegetically from the Scriptures. 2. It denotes a decree or decision of the Church. The authority of the dogma, in the first case, is divine; in the latter, it is human. Dogmatic theology, properly constructed, presents dogmas in the first sense; namely, as propositions formulated from inspired data. It is, therefore, biblical, not ecclesiastical in its substance. There is no difference between it and the so-called "biblical" theology in this respect. If a dogmatic system imports matter from uninspired sources—say a school of philosophy, or a theory in physics—and makes it of equal authority with what it gets from the Scriptures, it is a spurious system. No tenets can be incorporated into systematic theology any more than into exegetical, that are contrary to revelation. The only difference between "biblical" and dogmatic theology is in the form. The first examines the Bible part by part, writer by writer. The last examines it as a whole. Should "biblical" theology examine the Bible as a whole, it would become systematic theology. It would bring all the varieties under one scheme. The so-called "higher unity," to which the exegete endeavors to reduce the several "types" of "biblical" theology is really a dogmatic system embracing the entire Scriptures.

Dogmatic theology may be thoroughly biblical or unbiblical, evangelical or rationalistic; and so may "biblical"

theology. The systematic theology of Calvin's Institutes is exclusively biblical in its constituent elements and substance. Calvin borrows hardly anything from human philosophy, science, or literature. His appeal is made continually to the Scriptures alone. No theologian was ever less influenced by a school of philosophy, or by human science and literature, than the Genevan reformer. Dogmatic theology, as he constructed it, is as scriptural a theology as can be found in the ancient or modern church. "The first dogmatic works of the Reformers, Melancthon's *Loci*, Zwingli's *Fidei Ratio*, Calvin's Institutes, are in the proper sense biblical theology. They issued from the fresh, vital understanding of the Scriptures themselves." Schenkel: *On Biblical Theology, Studien und Kritiken*, 1852. On the other hand the Institutes of Wegscheider is rationalistic and unbiblical. This system, while appealing to the Scriptures, more or less, yet relies mainly upon the data of reason, and the principles of ethics and natural religion.

And the same remark is true of the so-called "biblical" theology. This method, like the systematic, may construct a biblical or an unbiblical book; an evangelical or a rationalistic treatise; a theistic or a pantheistic scheme. As matter of fact, all varieties of orthodoxy and of heterodoxy are to be found in this department. In Germany, in particular, where this method has been in vogue for the last half century, both the theist and the pantheist, the evangelical and the rationalist, have been fertile in the use of it. Under the pretence of producing an eminently scriptural theology, a class of theologians and critics like Baur and Strauss have subjected the Scriptures to a more capricious and torturing exegesis than they ever received before. They contend that the idea of Christ and of Christianity, as it is enunciated in dogmatic theology and the creeds, is erroneous; that the Gospels must be re-examined under higher critical principles, and the true conception of Christ and his religion be derived from the very text itself; that is, what

of the text is left after they have decided what is spurious and what is genuine. Baur was active and prolific in the department of "biblical" theology, as distinct from systematic. He composed a *Theology of the New Testament* (*Vorlesungen über neutestamentliche Theologie*), but it is biblical neither in substance nor spirit. Strauss's *Leben Jesu* professes to present the theology of the Gospels—the true biography, opinions, and religion of Jesus Christ according to a scientific exegesis. But it is an intensely anti-biblical treatise. The disciples of Baur, the so-called Tübingen school, have produced a body of "biblical theology" that is marked by great caprice in textual criticism, and ingenuity in interpretation, but is utterly antagonistic to what the Christian mind of all ages has found in the Bible. The school of Kuenen and Wellhausen have employed this method in the same general manner in interpreting the Old Testament.

But another class of German theologians and critics, like Neander, Tholuck, Ebrard, Weiss, and others, handle the "biblical" method very differently. The results to which they come in their *Lives of Christ*, and their study of John, Paul, Peter, and James, are drawn from an un mutilated text, and agree substantially with the historical faith of the church, and with systematic theology as contained in the creeds. As, therefore, we have to ask respecting systematic theology, *whose* system it is; so, also, in regard to "biblical" theology, we must ask *whose* "biblical" theology it is.

Systematic theology should balance and correct "biblical" theology, rather than vice versa, for the following reasons: 1. Because "biblical theology" is a deduction from only a part of Scripture. Its method is fractional. It examines portions of the Bible. It presents the theology of the Old Testament, apart from the New: e.g., Oehler's *Biblical Theology of the Old Testament*; of the New Testament apart from the Old: e.g., Schmid's *Biblical Theology of the New Testament*; of the Gospels apart from the Epistles;

of the Synoptists apart from John's gospel; the Petrine theology in distinction from that of the Pauline; the Pauline in distinction from that of James, etc. Now this method, while excellent as a careful analysis of materials, is not so favorable to a comprehensive and scientific view as the other. Science is a survey of the whole, not of a part. True theological science is to be found in the long series of dogmatic systems extending from Augustine's City of God to the present day. To confine the theologian to the fragmentary and incomplete view given in "biblical" theology, would be the destruction of theology as a science. 2. A second reason why "biblical" theology requires the balance and symmetry of systematic theology, is the fact that it is more easy to introduce subjective individual opinions into a part of the Bible, than into the whole of it. It is easier (we do not say easy) for Baur to prove that Christianity was originally Ebionitism, if he takes into view only the Gospels, and excludes the Epistles, than it is if he takes the entire New Testament into the account. It is easier to warp the four Gospels up to a preconceived idea of Christ and Christianity, than it is to warp the whole Bible. This is the danger to which all interpretation of Scripture is exposed, which does not use the light thrown by the interconnection and harmony of all the books of the Old and New Testaments; and perhaps this is the reason why the pantheistic and rationalistic critic is more inclined to compose a "biblical," than a systematic theology. The attempt to understand revelation piecemeal, is liable to fail. In every organic product—and the Bible is organized throughout—the whole explains the parts, because the parts exist for the whole, and have no meaning or use separate from it. The interpretation of Scripture should be "according to the proportion of faith" (*κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως*). Rom. 12: 6.

When the work of deriving doctrines from Scripture has been done, the theologian must defend them against attacks,

answering objections, and maintaining the reasonableness of revealed truth. The elder Protestant divines devoted great attention to this part of theological science, under the title of *Theologia Polemica*. Here is where religion and philosophy, faith and science meet. Human reason cannot reveal anything, but it can defend what has been revealed.

It is important to notice at this point, that in respect to the doctrines of Christianity the office of reason is discharged, if it be shown that they are self-consistent. A rational defence of the doctrine of the trinity, for example, consists in demonstrating that there is no contradiction between the several propositions in which it is stated. To require of the theologian a complete explanation of this truth in proof of its rationality, is more than is demanded of the chemist or the astronomer in physical science.

When the individual doctrines have been deduced, constructed, and defended by the exegetico-rational method, they are then to be systematized. Systematic theology aims to exhibit the logical order and connection of the truths of Revelation. Schleiermacher mentions as a rule that is to guide in the construction of a system of Christian doctrine, the exclusion of all *heretical* matter, and the retention of only what is *ecclesiastical*. Glaubenslehre, § 21. Only the historical and catholic faith belongs to the Christian system, because it is more probable that the one catholic Church has correctly understood and interpreted the Scriptures, than that the multitude of heretical schools and parties have. The substantial unity of the Church upon the cardinal doctrines of the trinity, the apostasy, the incarnation, and the redemption, can be expressed in one self-consistent system. But the diversity and contrariety of the numerous heretical sects cannot be.

CHAPTER III.

NATURE AND DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE.

THEOLOGICAL Introduction not only divides and arranges the parts of theological science, but also defines its general nature, and assigns it a place in the sum-total or encyclopædia of knowledge. The important point of definition belongs here, and also the connection of theology with other sciences. This brings us to consider the Nature and Definition of Theological Science.

Theology is a science that is concerned with both the Infinite and the Finite, with both God and the Universe. The material, therefore, which it includes is vaster than that of any other science. It is also the most necessary of all the sciences. "Divinity," says Coleridge (*Table-Talk*, March 14, 1833), "is essentially the first of the professions, because it is necessary for all men at all times; law and physics are only necessary for some men at some times."

Theology must not be identified with ethics. This is greatly to narrow it. Ethics, strictly, is the science of morals or duties, and is very limited compared with theology. It includes: 1. Duties toward God. 2. Duties toward man. Ethics is concerned only with the moral law in both tables. It does not properly include the gospel or redemption. Ethics is wholly legal. It is true that ethics is affected by Christian theology; so that Christian ethics differs greatly from pagan ethics. It is more comprehensive, because pagan ethics is confined to duties between man and man, while Christian ethics embraces duties toward God.

Christian ethics differs also from pagan in respect to the motive presented. In pagan ethics, the motive is legal and founded in fear; in Christian ethics, the motive is evangelical and founded in love. St. Paul indicates the motive in Christian ethics, in Rom. 12 : 1: "I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the *mercies* of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice; holy, acceptable to God." Also in 2 Cor. 7 : 1: "Having therefore these *promises*, dearly beloved, let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit." The motive for the discharge of Christian duty is the love of God in Christ towards the forgiven sinner. There is no such motive as this in pagan ethics.

Yet theology contains immensely more than belongs even to Christian ethics, because it includes the doctrines of the trinity, the incarnation, the apostasy, and redemption, together with those of eschatology. None of these divisions belong properly to ethics. Some of the systems of Christian ethics, like that of Rothe for example, are unscientific because they confuse and confound departments of science, erase the lines between law and gospel, morality and religion, and under the title of ethics discuss all the mysteries of revelation.

Theology (*θεῶν λογός*) is the science of God. The Supreme Being is the object and theme of theological investigation. The term as we have before remarked has a wide and a restricted signification. In the wide and common meaning in which we now employ it, theology includes not only the trinitarian nature and existence of God, but also the relations of man and the universe to him. It is thus inclusive of religion; and some define theology to be the science of religion. This definition has had considerable currency. It is defective however because it mentions God, the proper object of the science, only by implication and inference. But a technical definition ought to specify directly, not indirectly, the principal subject-matter.

Religio, according to Cicero, is derived from relego, and

signifies a careful reflection or meditation of the mind. "Qui autem omnia quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent diligenter retractarent, et tanquam relegerent, sunt dicti religiosi, ex relegendo; ut elegantes ex eligendo, a diligendo diligentes, ex intelligendo intelligentes." De natura deorum, II. 28. According to this etymology, religion means reverence and worship. These result from reflection upon God and divine things. But Lactantius disputes this etymology, and derives religio from religo. "Hoc vinculo obstricti deo et religati sumus: unde ipsa religio nomen recepit, non ut Cicero interpretatus est, a relegendo." Institutiones, IV. 28. According to this etymology, religion denotes duty, or the obligation of the creature towards the Creator. Man is bound or tied back to God. In this sense, Shakespeare speaks of "religion to the gods." Timon, IV. i. Lactantius asserts, further, that mere meditation would not distinguish religion from superstition; the true God from false gods. Hence the notion of obligation afforded by religo is necessary. Augustine takes the same view with Lactantius. City of God, X. iii.

But whichever etymology be adopted, only the *relations* of man to God, not God himself, are indicated by the word "religion." To derive the definition of theology from this term, is to define a science from one of its parts or phases, rather than from its subject-matter or principal object of investigation. Religion, strictly, would discuss only the relations of man to the deity; but theology treats first of the deity himself, and then inferentially of the relations of the creature to him.

Augustine (City of God, VIII. i.) defines theology to be "rational discussion respecting the deity;" de divinitate rationem sive sermonem. Turretin (I. v. 1) defines the object of any science to be "that which is principally treated of, and to which all the conclusions refer," and affirms that the object of theology is God and divine things. He argues that this is so from the names of the science, *θεολογία* and

θεοσέβεια, and from the fact that the Scriptures, which are the fountain-head of the science, treat principally of God. The Westminster catechism (Q. 5) also favors this definition of theology, in its statement that the "Scriptures principally teach what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man." Here, the nature and attributes of God are regarded as the primary matter, and man's relations and duty to him the secondary. Aquinas also adopts this definition. "Omnia pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione dei, vel quia sunt ipse deus, vel quia habent ordinem ad deum ut ad principium, et finem. Unde sequitur quod deus vere sit subjectum hujus scientiæ." Summa, I. i. 7.

It has been objected by John of Damascus (De orthodoxa fide, III. xxiv.) that theology is not properly speaking the science of God, because it is impossible to say what God is. Aquinas (Summa, I. i. 7) replies to this objection, that "if the qualities and relations of an object are the subject matter of any science, it is proper to call it the science of this object." And it is certain that there could be no science of anything, if it is asserted that there must first be a perfect comprehension. There is no science of matter any more than of God, if by science be meant a knowledge that excludes all mystery. The ultimate elements in chemistry are as much beyond complete apprehension as the divine attributes.

Science is *profound* and *self-consistent* knowledge. Depth and logical coherence are the two characteristics of scientific in distinction from popular apprehension. If statements result from a superficial view, they are not scientific; and if they clash with one another, they are not science. The distinction between popular and scientific knowledge is founded upon this. The common mind oftentimes adopts errors and contradictions which the educated mind detects and rejects. Sometimes science itself is superficial, and unworthy of the name. Astronomy previous to Copernicus

was founded upon a superficial view of the heavens ; merely upon what every man's eyes saw when he looked abroad upon the surface of the earth, or above upon the surface of the sky. Space had no depth. It was only a plane surface. The result was a self-contradictory astronomy. New motions in the heavens were continually appearing that conflicted with the old, and when they were described upon the map of the heavens, it was, in Milton's phrase, "with cycle and epicycle scribbled o'er." Astronomical science was science falsely so called. But the mathematical studies combined with the more careful observations of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton, penetrated the abysses of space, introduced depth into astronomy, threw out these contradictions, and now the scientific astronomy is truly such.

Sometimes theories in physics pass for science for a generation or two, but are subsequently found to be superficial and self-contradictory. Examples of these are the theory of vortices invented by Des Cartes ; the theory of spontaneous generation advocated by Lamarck ; and the theory of pseudo-evolution which just now has taken the place of the rejected doctrine of spontaneous generation, and is popular with the materialistic school of physicists. These theories are denominated scientific by their authors ; but true scientific progress finally demonstrates their falsity.

The skeptical estimate of theology is unscientific, because it is founded upon a superficial knowledge of the sources and objects of the science. A few examples will show this. One of the most acute of modern skeptics was David Hume. His argument against miracles is the most ingenious of any that has been constructed, and is the arsenal from which modern infidelity obtains its keenest weapons. It was Hume's subtlety that awoke Kant's dogmatic slumbers, according to Kant's own statement. But Hume had no knowledge of Christianity that deserves the epithet scientific. He was not versed in the Hebrew and Greek

scriptures. According to Johnson (*Boswell's Life*, anno 1766), "Hume owned to a clergyman in the bishopric of Durham that he had never read the New Testament with attention." No one would respect a critical estimate of Brahminism by one who had never carefully examined the Vedas, and the body of Hindoo literature growing out of them. Nor was Hume skilled in doctrinal theology. He was unacquainted with the careful analysis and close reasoning of the Nicene trinitarianism, of the Chalcedon christology, of the schoolmen, and of the Protestant divines. The whole immense body of patristic, mediæval, and modern divinity was comparatively a terra incognita to him. His knowledge of the Christian religion did not go beyond what was floating in the atmosphere. He lived in a Christian country, among a theological people, and knew something of Christianity by absorption. But he never studied the documents and mastered the doctrines of the Christian religion as Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin studied and mastered them; as Cudworth studied pagan theology, and Schleiermacher studied Plato; as Schlegel and Coleridge studied Shakespeare. The language of Bentley, the first classical scholar of his century, to Collins, is applicable to Hume in substance. Collins had remarked that the Bible "is the most miscellaneous book in the world, and treats of the greatest variety of things: creation, deluge, chronology and laws, ecclesiastical institutions, nature, miracles, building, husbandry, sailing, physics, pharmacy, mathematics, metaphysics, and morals," and draws the inference from this fact that "free thinking" is necessary; "for to understand the matter of this book, and to be master of the whole, a man must be able to think justly in every science and art." "Very true!" says Bentley, in reply, "and yet all he has here said of his sciences is requisite, were the English Bible supposed to be the very original. Add, therefore, to all the requisites here enumerated a sufficient skill in the Hebrew and Greek languages. Now

pass your verdict on the man from his own evidence and confession. 'To understand the Bible,' says he, 'requires all sciences;' and *two languages* besides, say I. But it is plain from his book that he has condemned the whole Bible for a forgery and imposition. Did he do this without understanding the matter of it? This is too scandalous for him to own. We must take it then that he professes himself accomplished in all sciences and arts, according to his own rule. But where has he, or any of his sect, shown any tolerable skill in science? What dark passages of Scripture have they cleared? Or of any book whatever? Nay, to remit him to his 'sciences' and 'arts,' what have they done in the languages, the shell and surface of Scripture? A great master of the whole Bible, indeed, that can scarce step three lines in the easiest classic authors cited by himself without a notorious blunder."¹ Hume was not more learned than Collins in Christian theology, and these remarks of Bentley hold true of him in all essential points.

Another illustration of the superficial knowledge of the skeptic in the province of Christian theology is seen in Gibbon. Few writers have been more conscientious in their scholarship than the historian of the Decline and Fall. He had read with great thoroughness all the Greek and Latin pagan writers who treat of the period with which he was concerned. His quotations from the Byzantine historians are never second-hand. But when he derives historical material from the Christian fathers, he is not so conscientious. He obtains much of his information in this instance from Tillemont: a very trustworthy authority, it is true, but still a secondary source. Gibbon's study of the Greek of Athanasius, and the Latin of Augustine, was not so thorough as his reading of Zosimus and Marcellinus. And the reason lay in his contempt for the former, as ecclesiastical writers. A church father; though subtle like Athanasius, and pro-

¹ Bentley: On Free Thinking, VIII. See Bp. Newton's exposure of the mistakes of Bolingbroke. Prophecies, Dissertation I.

found like Augustine ; though among the finest intellects of the race, and so reckoned in literary history ; was, in his view, a superstitious man, and therefore his writings did not deserve continuous and complete perusal, but might be examined cursorily, and through the eyes of others.¹

These remarks apply with equal force to the skepticism of this generation ; for there are no names in it superior to those of Hume and Gibbon, whether regard be had to learning or mental power. Such products as the survey of Modern Civilization by Buckle, and of the Intellectual Development of Europe by Draper, are specimens of superficial information and thinking concerning theological and metaphysical science. Almost exclusive attention is devoted to the material and physical aspects of civilization, the moral and religious elements in modern culture are overlooked, and the great problems of philosophy and theology are either unnoticed or else denied to be problems at all. The judgment passed upon either doctrinal or practical Christianity from this point of view, is neither profound nor self-consistent.²

As an example of the ignorance of a literary man in scientific theology, consider the following from Froude (Short Studies, 3d Series, 115). "To represent man as an automaton sinning by the necessity of his nature, and yet as guilty of his sins ; to represent God as having ordained all things, yet as angry with the actions of the puppets whom he has created as they are ; is to insist on the acceptance of contradictory propositions from which reason recoils, and to make Christianity itself incredible by a travesty of Christian truth." Froude believes this to be a true account of Protestant theology as formulated by Luther

¹ A writer in the Quarterly Review for Oct. 1838 shows that Gibbon's account of Gnosticism is superficial, and sometimes positively erroneous. The knowledge of Gnosticism must be derived from the Christian fathers.

² See a searching criticism of Draper, by Smith : Faith and Philosophy, 337-357.

and Calvin. But it is pure misrepresentation; not intentional, but the misrepresentation of ignorance. A writer versed in the history of opinions would not have attributed such views to Calvin, and the creeds of the Reformation. An erudite skeptic like Baur, for example, does not so describe systematic Augustinianism and Calvinism.

And when we pass to the infidelity of the masses, the truth of our assertion is still more evident. In no quarter is there so little scientific knowledge of the most powerful and beneficent religion on earth, as in the popular infidelity represented not by the treatise, but by the magazine and newspaper. The unbeliever of this grade may be moderately versed, perhaps, in some sections of natural science, and in the lighter parts of literature, but he is unacquainted with the loftier products in secular letters, and wholly ignorant of the systematic literature of the Christian Church.

The skeptical estimate of Christian theology, consequently, is an unscientific one. A profound and accurate judgment must come from experts. As the scientific comprehension of law is expected from jurists and not from laymen, so that of theology must be sought among philosophers and divines, and not among physicists and littérateurs whose studies are devoted to very different branches of knowledge from ethics and theology, and who make guerilla incursions into this field merely for the purpose of attack. Every branch of knowledge has its recondite and abstract side, and hence, as in the case of law and medicine, the popular and superficial judgment must be corrected by the professional and scientific. "No one," says Winckelmann (*History of Art*, I. i.), "can form a correct judgment of Greek art, or of Greek literature, without having read repeatedly everything in the latter, and without having seen and examined if possible all the remains of the former." Such thoroughness is eminently requisite in order to a just estimate of theological science, because it extends

over all spheres of being, and includes the deepest problems and mysteries of existence.

Theology, then, as the science of God, aims to obtain a knowledge of him that is free from contradictions, and is as profound as is possible, considering the nature of the subject and the limitations of the human mind. If therefore it makes a statement of an abstruse doctrine like the trinity, it continues true to science. It does not affirm and deny one and the same thing. It asserts that God is one in respect to essence, and is three in respect to personal distinctions. These two propositions do not clash, because the idea of essence is different from that of person. Could it be proved that essence and person are identical conceptions, trinitarianism would be shown to be self-contradictory and therefore unscientific. Again, the theological statements respecting the decree of God and the liberty of man are scientific, so far as self-consistence constitutes science. The theologian does not affirm that one and the same future event is necessitated for God and free for man, or free for God and necessitated for man. But he affirms, that one and the same future event may be certain for God and uncertain for man; and that for both God and man it may be a free event, like the decision of the human will, or for both God and man a necessitated event, like the fall of a stone to the ground. Such is the creed statement. "Although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of *God*, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet by the same providence he ordereth them to fall out according to the nature of *second causes*; either necessarily, or freely and contingently." Westminster Confession, V. ii. That is to say; when the second cause is a free cause, such as the human will, then the future act, which is free for both God and man, is uncertain for man and certain for God; and when the second cause is a necessary cause, such as the force of gravity, then the future event, which is necessitated for both God and man, is certain for God and uncer-

tain for man. Whether I shall exert a particular volition to-morrow is uncertain to me, but not to God. But if exerted, it is for both God and me alike a free act. Whether a particular stone shall fall to-morrow is uncertain to me, but not to God. But if it fall, it is for both God and me alike a necessitated event. There is no clashing or contradiction in these statements, and they contain the essential truth respecting divine sovereignty and human liberty.

When theology is denominated the science of God, it is not meant that God is completely comprehended. There may be science without omniscience. Otherwise, science would be impossible for any but the Infinite Intelligence. Yet the tendency of science is to explain exhaustively and completely. The longer a science is pursued, the more is known of the subject. The aim and endeavor is to reach a final and perfect comprehension. In theology, which embraces the infinite as well as the finite, the goal can never be reached, either in this world or the next; but more and more will be known, and the progress of the science will be onward forever and forever-more. "The nature of a thing," says Aristotle (Politics, I. ii.), "is judged by its tendency." The tendency and aim of science towards a complete view evinces that it is profound in its nature. The superficial view is not rested in. Consider, for illustration, the anthropomorphic and materializing conception of God. This is unscientific. The descriptions of the deity borrowed from some resemblance to visible things, are taken literally by the anthropomorphist. But the theologian goes behind them to the real truth. "Thus, when the scriptures speak of God, and ascribe hands, eyes, and feet, to him, it is not designed that we should believe that he has any of these members according to the literal signification; but the meaning is, that he has a *power* to execute all those acts, to the effecting of which these parts in us are instrumental: that is, he can converse with men as well as if he had a tongue or a mouth; he can discern all that we do or say as

perfectly as if he had eyes and ears; he can reach us as well as if he had hands and feet; he has as true and substantial a being as if he had a body; and he is as truly present everywhere as if that body were infinitely extended." King: On Foreknowledge, 468.

1. In defining the nature of theology, we remark in the first place, that it is *absolute* science, in contradistinction to relative knowledge. Theological doctrine is not true merely or only for the human intellect, but for all rational intelligence. The cognition, it is true, does not extend to the uttermost limits of the object, but so far as it does extend, and so far as the formulated statement is categorical and positive, it is conformed to the real nature and truth of the object. Man's conception of matter may be very different from that of the angel; but man's conception of the divine holiness is the same in kind with that of the angel, and of God himself, though different in degree. The word "holy" conveyed the same idea to St. Paul that it would to the seraphim; and it conveys the same idea to us that it did to him. It is erroneous to assert that what man calls righteousness in God might be unrighteousness for the angels; and that what the angels call wickedness in Satan might be moral excellence for man. The ideas of right and wrong are the same in kind in all rational intelligence. Two diverse and contradictory conceptions of sin and holiness are impossible. There may be diverse and contradictory judgments as to whether a particular action is sinful or holy, but not as to whether sin is wrong and holiness is right. All rational beings have common principles of intelligence respecting moral truth, and this species of truth, if known at all, must be known absolutely. Relative knowledge is sufficient in the sphere of time and matter, but not of morals and eternity. There is too much at stake in the latter sphere. Whether man's knowledge of matter is accurate or not is of little consequence, taking the whole of his endless existence into account; but if his knowledge of

God and morals is erroneous, his immortality is ruined.¹ The cognition, consequently, in such an important province as that of ethics and religion, must be absolute, not relative. "A relative notion of a thing," says Reid (Essay II. xviii.), "is, strictly speaking, no notion of the *thing* at all, but only of some relation which it bears to something else."

There is no science so rightly entitled to be denominated absolute, and metaphysically certain as theology. It is the assertion of materialistic schools in every age, that the science of matter and physical nature alone is certain, and that the science of mind and of God is not science in the strict sense. But the fact is exactly the contrary; and this because of the nature of the objects in each province. "That knowledge," says Milton (Reason of Church Government, II.), "that rests in the contemplation of natural causes and dimensions, must needs be a lower wisdom as the object is low." It is clear that no science can be any more a priori and necessary than its subject-matter. If an edifice rests upon the solid ground, it must be stationary; if it rests upon the waves, it must fluctuate. An a priori science like geometry retracts no positions, and is immutable, because its data are mental axioms and the logical conclusions from them. An a posteriori science like geology is continually altering its positions, because it derives its data from the notices of the senses, and new notices show that old deductions were errors. Whether, therefore, the science of physical nature and matter is as necessary and im-

¹ "Is a man," says Plutarch (On Superstition), "of opinion that indivisibles were the first origin of things? It is indeed a mistaken view, but makes no ulcer, no shooting searching pain. But is a man of opinion that wealth is his chief good? This error contains in it a canker; it preys upon a man's spirits, it suffers him not to sleep, it makes him horn-mad." Similarly Frank (Christian Certainty, 105) remarks, "that it is of slight importance for the person of the observer, whether this physical object which I see before me is in truth as I see it, or other than I see it. But the whole constancy and strength and worth of the personality depends upon the question whether this moral good which I experience as real, has an actual existence or not; the personality cannot free itself therefrom, without the innermost basis and supreme aim of its life being lost."

mutable as the science of God and the human mind, will depend upon whether physical nature and matter are as necessary and immutable, in their substance and properties, as God and the rational soul of man. Let us compare the two.

If there be anything fixed and uniform in the material world, it is the *laws* and *forces* that prevail there. These are sometimes denominated the necessary laws of matter. But when examined, the necessity of material laws is found to be only relative. They are necessary under the present arrangement, and in the existing system. Had the constitution of the material universe been different, they would have been different. There is no contradiction in the supposition, that there might be a different system of nature from the present one; that matter might have some different properties from what it now has, and that material laws might be other than they are. There is no escaping this, unless we adopt the position that matter is eternal. In this case, the properties and laws of matter have absolute, not relative necessity. But if we adopt the position of the theist, and concede that matter with its properties and laws was created *ex nihilo* by omnipotent power, then we can conceive, without self-contradiction, that the Creator could have constituted the material world upon a law of attraction operating inversely as the cube of the distance, as easily as he has made it upon the existing law operating inversely as the square. If he could not, then he is conditioned. There is something in the nature of matter, such as was supposed in the ancient $\epsilon\lambda\eta$, which compels him to establish and form the material universe in the manner he has. There is an insuperable limit set by nature and matter to the divine power, so that God is powerless in any other direction than the one actually taken. He is merely a Gnostic demiurge, not a Biblical creator.

The same is true of vegetable and animal types and forms. Granting that they are creations *ex nihilo*, there is

nothing to forbid the supposition that they might have been made upon a plan very different from the one actually employed by the Creator. It is absurd to suppose that the Omnipotent has exhausted his power in the existing universe, or that the Omniscient can have only one scheme within his ken.

These views of the sovereignty of God over the properties and laws of matter, and of his free power to constitute the system of nature differently from what he has, are adopted by the leading minds in physical science. Newton, at the close of his *Optics*, remarks, that "the motions of the planets are marked by certain small irregularities which appear to come from the mutual action of the planets and comets, and which will probably become greater and greater, in the course of time, until at last the system will again require its author to put it in order." Leibnitz (*Theodicée*, *Partie II.* 345) thus speaks concerning the laws of motion: "The laws of motion which are operative in nature, and are verified by experience and observation, are not absolutely demonstrable like a geometrical proposition. They do not spring from a principle of necessity, but from a principle of perfection and order; they are an effect of the will (*choix*) and wisdom of God. Hence these laws are a wonderful proof of the existence of an intelligent and free being, in opposition to the system of absolute and unreasoning (*brut*) necessity taught by Strato and Spinoza."¹

Similarly, Whewell (*Astronomy and General Physics*, I. iii.) remarks that "the force of gravity, so far as we can judge, might have been different from what it now is. It depends upon the mass of the earth; and this mass is one of the elements of the solar system which is not determined by any cosmical necessity of which we are aware. We cannot see anything which would have prevented either the

¹ Strato, B.C. 289, maintained that "there is inherent in nature an eternal and necessary principle of motion, or force, without intelligence, which is the only cause of the production or dissolution of bodies."

size or the density of the earth from being different, to a very great extent, from what they are. We can very easily conceive the solar system so adjusted that the year should be longer or shorter than it actually is. If the earth were removed toward the solar centre by about one-eighth of its distance, the year would be shortened by about a month." After saying that the vegetable world has been adjusted to the year as it now is, Whewell adds, that the length of either the solar or the vegetable year "might have been different from what it is, according to any grounds of necessity which we can perceive." Only, if one were altered, the other would be adjusted accordingly.¹

Statements to the same effect are made by a writer in the London Quarterly Review for July, 1876. "The law of the inverse square is but the mathematical expression of a property which has been imposed on matter from the creation. It is no inherent quality, so far as we know. It is quite conceivable that the central law might have been different from what it is. There is no reason why the mathematical law should be what it is, except the will of the Being who imposed the law. Any other proportion would equally well be expressed mathematically, and its results calculated. As an instance of what would occur if any other proportion than the inverse square were substituted as the attractive force of gravity, suppose at distances 1, 2, 3, the attractive force had varied as 1, 2, 3, instead of the squares of these numbers. Under such a law any number of planets might revolve in the most regular and orderly manner. But under this law, the weight of bodies at the earth's surface would cease to exist; nothing would fall or weigh downwards. The greater action of the distant sun and planets would exactly neutralize the attractive force of the earth. A ball thrown from the hand, however gently, would immediately become a satellite of the earth, and

¹ See, especially, Whewell's recapitulation, I. xviii.

would for the future accompany its course, revolving about it for the space of one year. All terrestrial things would obey the general law of the system, but would acknowledge no particular relation to the earth." Again, to take an illustration from optics. If the undulatory theory of light be adopted, there does not appear to be any eternal and absolute necessity that exactly 458 million millions of vibrations, in a second, of the supposed ether, should produce the sensation of violet color for the human eye, and 727 million millions should produce the sensation of crimson. The Will that created the eye, and established these numbers and proportions, could have created a different eye, and established different proportions.

If these positions of Newton, Leibnitz, and Whewell are correct, it follows that absoluteness cannot characterize physical science, because the subject-matter of cognition within this province is not itself a priori and necessary. Knowledge, speaking generally, is the cognition of entity. Nonentity cannot be the subject-matter of human investigation. A substance, or real being of some kind, is requisite for this. It is evident, therefore, that the absoluteness and certainty of a science will depend upon that of its subject-matter. If the subject-matter of a science has no necessity and absoluteness, the science will have none. Knowledge, then, that has physical and material substance and its properties for its basis must be marked by contingency and relativity. For since matter and its laws might have been different, or might not have been at all, the knowledge of them is the knowledge of the contingent, the conditioned, and the mutable. When the subject-matter has a priori necessity, cognition acquires absolute certainty from it. This is the case with geometry. The data here are the intuitions of the mind, and the necessary conclusions from them. Geometry does not deal with matter and its phenomena, but with ideal points, lines, and surfaces. It is absolutely necessary that the radii of a circle should be

equal, but not that there should be a circular body like the sun. The laws of matter are not derived intuitively from the mind, like geometrical axioms, and then attributed to matter, but they are derived from matter, and then impressed upon the mind. Physical laws, as formulated, are deduced from the outer world, and have only relative necessity and certainty, because the outer world has only such. Axioms, on the contrary, are derived from the mind itself, and have a kind of certainty that cannot attach to a generalization drawn from the observation of material phenomena.

Ethics and pure mathematics have this in common, that they deal with ideas, not with substances. Right and wrong, like a mathematical point and line, are not objective beings. Physics, on the contrary, deals with physical substances. The former, consequently, are more certain sciences than the latter ; because there is no dispute about the nature of an intuitive idea, but there is about the nature of a physical substance. There cannot be two different views of a triangle, or of right and wrong ; but there can be of a piece of protoplasm, or a bit of granite.

When we pass from the world of matter to that of mind and of morals, we find more than a relative necessity in the object of cognition. Unextended, incorporeal, spiritual substance is the entity in this case. The Divine mind and the human are the subject-matter of theological and metaphysical science. But mind is reason, and reason is marked by necessary and immutable properties. It differs from matter in this respect. Matter, conceivably, may be of an indefinite variety ; but we can conceive of only one species of reason. When God creates a rational being, he makes him after his own image ; but when he creates a physical substance, he does not create it after his own image, but as he pleases. This makes reason to be one and invariable in its essential properties, while matter is variable. We cannot conceive of God's creating two diverse kinds of rational mind, but we can conceive of his creating many kinds of

matter. All finite reason must resemble the infinite reason in kind. When God creates a rational spirit, he must, from the nature of the case, make it after his own likeness, and after no other pattern. But when he creates physical substance, he is not thus restricted. God is immaterial, a pure spirit, without body parts or passions; therefore when he creates physical substance, he creates something that has no resemblance whatever to himself. Matter, consequently, has nothing a priori, or intrinsically necessary, in its properties. Even gravity, says Whewell (*General Physics*, II. x.), "is a property which we have no right to call *necessary* to matter, but have every reason to suppose is universal." Not being made after any original and eternal pattern drawn from the Divine essence, it may be made as God pleases, in an indefinite number of modes. But when finite mind and reason are created, they are made after the Divine image, and therefore can be of only one species and quality.

Accordingly, the *laws* of mind have more of necessity in them than the laws of material nature have. The laws of thought, as enunciated in logic, are more immutable than physical laws. Logic is a priori in its regulative principles. Mathematics is necessary and absolute in its axioms and conclusions. We cannot conceive of a different species of logic or mathematics; but we can conceive of a different astronomy, chemistry, and geology—a different physics generally. The movements of the planets might, conceivably, have been different; but the movement of the human intellect in logical and mathematical processes could not have been otherwise.

This is true also of moral law, as well as of mental. When we pass from the world of physics to the world of ethics, and examine the laws that rule and regulate in this realm, we find more than a relative necessity. Take the decalogue as summed up by our Lord: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself." This is for the rational universe what the law of

gravitation is for the physical. And it is necessary and absolute for all intelligences. We cannot conceive that it might have been different from what it is; that the command might have run thus: "Thou shalt hate the Lord thy God and thy neighbor." Neither can we conceive of such a modification of it, as to allow an equal degree of love toward the Creator and the creature. The golden rule, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them," is absolutely necessary. Neither the contrary, nor any modification of it, is conceivable. No other rule for the conduct of finite rational beings could have been laid down by the Supreme Reason.

Testing, then, the entity or substance which is the object of cognition in physics and metaphysics, respectively, by the properties and laws belonging to each, it is clear that absolute scientific certainty is to be claimed for the latter, not for the former.

1. There are three reasons, in particular, why physical science is relative knowledge. In the first place, it is to a great extent empirical or experimental. It is founded upon the observations of the five senses. But the senses never teach any a priori or absolute truth. They show what may be, and what actually is, but not what must be. They disclose what occurs under certain actual circumstances, but not under all conceivable circumstances. By the senses, we know as a present fact that the sun rises in the east once in every twenty-four hours; but the senses do not teach that this could not possibly be otherwise, and that the sun must of necessity rise in the east from eternity to eternity. Says Hume (*Inquiry V.*): "The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with equal facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will rise to-morrow, is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmative that it will rise. Similarly, Leibnitz (*Nouveaux Essais, Avant-*

propos) remarks: "Though the senses are necessary in order to the knowledge of actual facts, yet they are not sufficient in order to knowledge of all kinds; since the senses give only present examples and instances, and teach only particular and individual truths. No matter how great the number of examples may be that establish a particular truth, they are insufficient to demonstrate the universal necessity of this truth; because it does not follow that since a thing has uniformly occurred up to this moment, it will continue to occur forever. The Greeks and Romans noticed that in twenty-four hours, day uniformly turned into night, and night into day. But they would have erred, had they concluded that this fact is necessary and universal; since it is not a fact in Nova Zembla. And it would be a yet more mistaken judgment, to conclude that this alternation of day and night is absolutely necessary at least within the temperate zone; because it is possible for both the earth and the sun to cease to exist."

2. Secondly, the judgments of the senses are relative and variable, from the nature of the sensuous organs themselves. Tested mathematically and absolutely, no two persons see the same-sized object. The tree is taller for one man than for another. The shade of red is deeper for one eye than for another; and not red at all for the color-blind. Pascal, perhaps the most metaphysical of mathematicians, speaking of the effect of magnifying glasses, asks: "After all, who is to take upon himself to affirm that these glasses have really altered the natural dimensions of the objects in question, but that, on the contrary, they may not have had the effect of restoring them to their original proportions, which our eyes had altered and contracted, in the same way that is done by the action of diminishing glasses." The Geometrical Spirit. The following experiment, from a treatise on heat, illustrates the relativity of sensuous perceptions. Plunge the right hand into a vessel of tepid water, and the left hand into one of iced water. Then put both

into water of ordinary temperature. The latter will now seem to be cold, if we decide according to the sensation experienced by the right hand ; but warm, if we judge by the left. Hence, says the author, it appears that there is no difference between heat and cold when we abstract our sensations, and consider only the body that impresses us.

Thus it is evident that the sensuous data which enter so largely into natural and physical science are wholly subjective. They depend upon the structure and condition of the organ. Size and figure are all in the eye. Sound is in the ear. If human eyes and ears had been made upon one plan, Lilliput would have been the actual world. If they had been made upon another, Brobdingnag would have been. "Sensation," says Cudworth, "is not science or intellection, because the soul by sense does not perceive the things themselves, or the absolute natures of them, but only her own passions from them. Were sensation knowledge and understanding, then he that sees light and colors, and feels heat and cold, would understand light and colors, heat and cold ; and the like of all sensible things."¹

"All that the optic nerve reports to us," says Helmholtz, "it reports under the form of a sensation of light, whether it be the beaming of the sun, or a blow on the eye, or an electric current in the eye. The acoustic nerve, again, transforms everything into phenomena of sound ; the nerve of the skin transforms all things into sensations of temperature or touch. The same electric current, whose existence the optic nerve reports as a flash of light, which the nerve of taste reports as an acid, awakens in the nerve of the skin the feeling of burning. The same sunbeam, which we call light when it falls upon the eye, we call heat when it strikes the skin." This shows the relativity of sensuous perception. A material object appears to us only in accordance with the

¹ Epicurus, on the contrary, carried the doctrine that the senses are the only measure of truth so far as to affirm, that the sun is no larger than it appears. Des Cartes : Preface to Principles of Philosophy.

sensuous organ which transmits the impression, and not as an immutable object independent of the organ of sensation. But it is altogether different in the instance of a spiritual object like God, or the soul. God makes only one and the same impression of holiness, or wisdom, or omnipotence, if any is made at all; and the very same qualities are attributed to him by all intelligence that is not abnormal and vitiated. The list of the Divine attributes is one and invariable. The same is true of the human soul as an object of knowledge, and of its qualities. The human spirit has only one conceivable set of properties, and these are the same for all who are self-conscious and make an accurate report of self-consciousness.

3. Thirdly, the inferences from sensible phenomena, in physical science, are relative and uncertain, because all the phenomena have not been seen. The material universe is too vast for all of it to come under the notice of men's senses. Though perhaps improbable, yet it is possible that some established and accepted generalizations, in the existing physics, may be overthrown by future observations and new phenomena. The following facts illustrate the uncertainty of which we are speaking. Water in cooling contracts down to forty degrees of Fahrenheit; then if it continues to cool it begins to expand, and at thirty-two degrees freezes, which is very great expansion. Nature here reverses herself, and contradicts herself. The first part of her process would yield the generalization, that cold contracts substances; the second, that cold expands substances. He who should have observed only the phenomena above forty degrees, would have deduced the general law, that water *invariably* contracts in cooling; and were he of a certain school of physicists, he would add to this, that it *necessarily* contracts. If upon this planet there were no natural or artificial temperature below forty degrees, the law that cold uniformly contracts substances would be regarded as well established and indisputable as the law of gravitation.

It is for this reason, that theories in physics are so uncertain and changing. Geology furnishes abundant examples. Dr. Arnold (*Life by Stanley, I. 142*), speaking of the discussions of the British Association in 1839, says that "Murchison convinced Greenough and De La Beche that they must recolor their geological maps; for what were called the Greywackes of North Devon, he maintains to be equivalent to the coal formation; and the limestones on which they rest are equivalent to the Old Red Sandstone which now is to be sandstone no more, but is to be called the Devonian system." Agassiz, in his eulogy upon Humboldt, remarks that "Humboldt's work upon the position of the rocks in the two hemispheres tells the history of that formation as it could be told in 1823, and is of course full of anachronisms." But what absolute certainty is there that the statements of any geologist in 1880, respecting the rocks of the globe, may not likewise be full of anachronisms? There would be more approach to scientific certainty in these empirical departments of knowledge which depend upon tentative experiments, and repeated observations, if all the facts could be observed, or even a majority of them. But the conclusions of the physicist are drawn from only a small, oftentimes infinitesimal portion of the phenomena. Only the testimony of an eye-witness, an actual observer with instruments, is regarded as of the first rate. But how little of such testimony enters into geological theories generally. What observer was on the ground when the coal-beds were forming? We may grant that inferences that are plausible, and even probable, may be drawn from what is seen in a coal-mine to-day, as to what was being done in that spot ten million years ago, but absolute certainty is impossible. A convulsion by earthquake, a fusion by fire, a deposit by flood; in other words, some sudden catastrophe of nature; might so dislocate strata, and melt up materials, and overlay with sediment, as entirely to alter a previous plan upon which nature had

been working for a million of years. But the observer of the present day sees only the shattered debris, scoriæ, mud or gravel, of the earth-quake, the fire, and the deluge, and knows nothing at all of that preexistent plan which lay behind them, and which was entirely obliterated by them. Yet he assumes that he is beholding the very first and original plan of all, and upon the strength of what he sees at this moment lays down a theory respecting the very creation and beginning of the globe.

For these reasons, a theory in physics cannot have the completeness and certainty of a theory in ethics. There is no eternal and immutable physics, as there is an eternal and immutable morality. The principles that should govern the action of all moral agents throughout the universe are necessary; but the principles that rule the material world are contingent. In this reference, the remark of Coleridge is correct. "The use of a theory in physical sciences is, to help the investigator to a complete view of all the hitherto discovered facts relating to the science in question. It is a collected view, *Ἰεωρία*, of all he knows, in one survey. Of course, so long as any pertinent facts remain unknown, no physical theory can be exactly true, because every new fact must necessarily, to a greater or less degree, displace the relation of all the others. The only necessarily true theories are those of geometry; because in geometry all the premises are necessarily true and unalterable. But to suppose that in our present exceedingly imperfect acquaintance with the facts, any theory in chemistry or geology is necessarily correct, is absurd." Table Talk, June 29th, 1833. Compare Herschel: Discourse, § 183.

The skeptical attitude, then, which Hume asserted to be the proper one towards religion, is far more appropriate in reference to physical science, founded as it is upon the observations of the senses and deductions from them. "The whole subject of religion," he remarks, "is a riddle and an inexplicable mystery; doubt, uncertainty, and suspension of judg-

ment are the sole result of our closest examination." The way and manner in which the material universe arose from nonentity, and in which it is upheld from millennium to millennium, "is a riddle and an inexplicable mystery" to physical science. The deep and learned minds in this province acknowledge this. To the question, "How did man originate? Quatrefages (*Human Species*, I. xi.) answers: "I do not know." It is impossible to explain either the origin or the perpetuity of things by physical science. Neither self-motion nor perpetual motion belongs to matter. But the former is requisite in order to the origin, and the latter in order to the perpetuity of anything in nature. Respecting the mode in which the material universe came into existence, the question of God to Job (38 : 4, 16-21) is conclusive: "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? Hast thou entered into the springs of the sea? or hast thou walked in the search of the depth? Have the gates of death been opened to thee? Hast thou perceived the breadth of the earth? Where is the way where light dwelleth? And as for darkness, where is the place thereof? Knowest thou it because thou wast then born? or because the number of thy days is great?" Compared with the sum-total of phenomena in universal space and time, only a little is known of matter and its laws, and if the exclusive claim to an absolute cognition is set up for physical science, then it is proper to subject it to a skeptical criticism, and compel it to bring forth its proofs. Especially is this proper, when the theory is novel, and contradicts the historical physics. "I am a skeptic in physics," said one to an enthusiastic "scientist" who was endeavoring to convince him that life is an evolution from the lifeless. Extremes produce extremes; and if the fanciful biology of Haeckel shall succeed in driving out the sober biology of Agassiz, there will be more of scientific than there is of religious skepticism.

But skepticism in the bad sense of the term is an error

both in science and religion. If anything in the great domain of material nature has been demonstrated by valid reasoning, the human mind will accept it as truth. There is much of this in the higher departments of physical science, such for example as astronomy. Copernicus, Kepler, and Newton have conclusively established truths and facts within this province. Astronomy contains much of certain knowledge, because it contains much that is mathematical. "The apparent motions of the sun, moon and stars," says Whewell, "have been more completely reduced to their causes and laws, than any other class of phenomena." And it should be observed, that in this instance more has been accomplished by mental and metaphysical processes, than by sensuous and physical. Mathematical calculation has enabled the astronomer to solve astronomical problems which the senses, even aided by instruments, could not have solved. Le Verrier discovered Neptune by the calculus, not by the naked or the armed eye. Fresnel, by mathematical calculation, established certain facts respecting refraction which contradicted the results of previous experiment; and certain other facts that had escaped experiment and observation. An eminent geometer demonstrated by mathematical optics, that the centre of the shadow made by a small circular plate of metal in a beam of light coming through an aperture is in fact no shadow, but an illumination precisely as bright as if the metal plate were away. This is utterly contrary to what appears to the eye of the observer. Herschel: Discourse, §§ 23, 24. But as we descend to lower departments in natural science, like geology for example, we find nothing of this mathematical certainty, and much doubtful theorizing built upon sensible experiments and observations. Astronomy, moreover, is a comparatively certain science, not only because it employs the calculus, but because it confines itself to *existing* facts and phenomena. Its aim is to ascertain the present structure and motions of the solar system. Geology is un-

certain, because it proposes to describe a past state of things. It attempts to tell what existed millions of years ago, and even how the worlds were originally made; which involves agencies and phenomena that occurred in "the dark backward and abysm of time," and which may have been totally different from what the present phenomena and agencies would imply as interpreted by the theorist.

Still another reason for the greater certainty of astronomical science is found in the fact of its greater simplicity. It is confined to its own problems, and does not attempt those of other sciences. Says Herschel (Discourse, § 183), "it can hardly be pressed forcibly enough on the attention of the student of nature, that there is scarcely any natural phenomenon which can be fully and completely explained without a union of several, perhaps all, of the sciences. The great phenomena of astronomy, indeed, may be considered exceptions; but this is merely because their scale is so vast that one only of the most widely extended forces of nature takes the lead, and all those agents whose sphere of action is limited to narrower bounds, and which determine the production of phenomena nearer at hand, are thrown into the background, and become merged and lost in comparative insignificance. But in the more intimate phenomena which surround us, it is far otherwise. Into what a complication of different branches of science are we led by the consideration of such a phenomenon as rain, for instance, or flame, or a thousand others which are constantly going on before our eyes." By reason of this simplicity and comparative freedom from complication with other sciences, astronomy enables the investigator to be more certain in his conclusions than does chemistry or geology. It does not, like these latter, burden him with a multitude of particulars, or tempt him to solve the difficulties arising from fanciful hypotheses and conjectures.

It is worthy of notice that astronomy generally speaking has been believing, while geology has often been skeptical.

The Keplers and Newtons were reverent minds, and the main current of astronomical science has corroborated both natural and revealed religion. It is also noticeable that none of the great discoveries in physics, like the laws of planetary motion, and the law of gravitation, have been made by materialists and atheists. Skeptical sections in the history of physics are barren sections, so far as original discovery is concerned. This is conceded by Lange, in his *History of Materialism* (I. i. 4). The inventive and powerful intellects who discover laws, and make a positive addition to the knowledge of material nature, express their faith and worship in the language of Kepler: "Father of the universe, what moved thee to raise a little feeble creature of earth so high as to make him a king, and almost a God, in thinking thy thoughts after thee? I thank thee, Lord and Creator of all, that thou hast filled me with rapture over the works of thy hand, and hast enabled me to disclose to men the glory of thy creation, so far as a finite mind can comprehend thy infinity." The skeptical naturalists, on the other hand, belong to the second and third class of investigators, and have made few original contributions to science. The identification of matter and mind by the materialist blinds the human intelligence, so that its generalizations are false. The materialist may be an accurate observer of phenomena, but his conclusions from them are erroneous. The theories of spontaneous generation and the origin of species by natural selection are examples. Their authors were minute examiners of nature with both the naked and the armed eye, but little more. The report of what they saw is trustworthy; but what they inferred is not. This inferiority is explained by Whewell's distinction between inductive and deductive habits of mind. *Astronomy and General Physics*, III. vi. Investigators of the first rank, by induction discover hitherto unknown laws, and then those of the second rate by deduction draw conclusions, and construct schemes from them. The Newton or the Kepler, when the law of

gravitation or of planetary motion bursts upon his view with "the rapturous *ἔνρηκα*," is impressed with the idea of God as the author of it. But the investigator of a secondary grade, who merely uses the discovery and applies it, is sometimes a disbeliever in a personal creator, a preconceived purpose, and a final end, because he regards the law itself as the eternal first cause.¹ He converts the law which has been discovered by his predecessors in science into a God; as the African savages worshipped the plough which produced such wonderful effects in comparison with their rude mattock. The inventor of the plough never would have thought of deifying it.

It appears then, after this examination of the materials and subject-matter of physical and theological science respectively, that in point of absolute validity and certainty the superiority is with the latter. Tested rigorously, the sphere of natural science is a region of only relative knowledge and certainty. There is nothing absolutely and eternally necessary in the laws and phenomena of matter. There is no absolute knowledge within this domain, because there is no absolute *object* to be known. Kant was correct in his celebrated but sometimes misapprehended position, that all cognition within the province of the natural and sensuous—within the region which falls to the understanding, in his nomenclature—is unaxiomatic and conditional, and that only within the domain of the moral and spiritual is there an absolutely certain intuition. What the practical reason perceives to be true, is true for all intelligence. The metaphysical ideas of God and the soul, of free will and immortality, of right and wrong, are absolute; and all science that is founded upon them is of the same nature. But physical sensations and perceptions are individual, subjec-

¹ "Him the Maker, we behold not; calm
 He veils himself in everlasting laws,
 Which and not Him, the skeptic seeing, exclaims,
 'Wherefore a God? The world itself is God.'" SCHILLER: Don Carlos.

tive, and relative. Even the conceptions of space and time are only forms of the finite understanding, under which these sensations are massed and unified. The finite mind when cognizing sensible phenomena must cognize them as successive in time, and located in space, and its cognition of them is consequently gradual and incomplete. But the Infinite Mind is untrammelled by this gradual and sequential mode of apprehension in time and space, and beholds all phenomena in the simultaneous and complete intuition of omniscience. Successive sensuous cognition is relative knowledge. It is true for man's senses, but not for the Divine reason. Material and sensible things, which are the subject-matter of physical science, are in continual flux and change. And even in regard to the invisible principles or forces beneath them; even in regard to the laws of nature themselves; we have seen that we cannot ascribe to them such a necessary and immutable quality as we must to spiritual and metaphysical realities. For they are creations from nonentity, and are only one of the many various manners in which the Divine Mind can express itself in a material universe. But the mental and moral universe has no such conceivable variety. Reason is one and simple; matter is manifold and complex. The whole domain of physical nature is only a means to an end. It was created to be subservient to mind. It cannot, therefore, like the domain of the moral and spiritual, which is an end in and of itself, have absolute and immutable characteristics, and therefore cannot be the object of an absolutely certain knowledge.¹ "Moral certainty," says Frank (*Christian Certainty*, 104), "in distinction from natural certainty, is characterized by a firmness which in the latter case has its equal at most only as regards mathematical and logical certainty. A man may doubt the reality of the objects which he sees with bodily eyes and hears with physical ears, and still he does

¹ Shedd : *Literary Essays*, p. 301-305. On the inferiority of natural science to moral, see Plato : *Phaedo*, 96-100.

not on that account doubt the reality of the moral world, of which he is conscious. That is the abiding truth of the Kantian philosophy, which in the moral domain sets limits to the skepticism regarding objective realities; the truth also of Fichte's doctrine of the moral order of the world, the validity of which is not affected by the idealism in other respects."

2. A second characteristic of theology is, that it is *positive* science in contradistinction to negative knowledge. This ground is taken by theologians, in the affirmation that faith is intelligent, and not the blind and ignorant credulity of superstition. There is some real and true knowledge of the object of faith, although the object is still a mystery in many respects. Some of its properties and relations are known, but not all of them. For example, man knows that God is spirit, and not matter. This is a positive and absolutely true knowledge. Man also knows that spiritual substance is intelligent, and immortal, that is, incapable of dissolution by material causes. This also is a positive and absolutely true knowledge. But how the intelligence of God is eternal and omniscient, comprehending all things simultaneously and without succession, and how his omnipresence is the presence of the whole deity at every point of space, and a multitude of other similar particulars—of these, he is ignorant. Man knows God "in part" with a true and valid knowledge; but being also ignorant "in part," and by far the greater part, God is a mystery for him. But it would be absurd to say that because man knows only in part, therefore he does not know at all; that because he does not know everything, he knows nothing. Faith, therefore, though relating to the mysteries of God and the universe, is yet an intelligent act. It is denominated, in Eph. 3 : 18, 19, a "comprehension" of the "breadth and length, and depth and height" of revealed truth; a "knowledge" of "the love of Christ which passeth knowledge." Faith is defined, in Heb. 12 : 1, as the "evidence" of unseen things.

The word ἔλεγχος in this passage denotes a mental conviction; and a conviction is both intelligent and positive. Christian faith is a rational and confident conviction of the mind.

Accordingly, Calvin (Institutes, III. ii. 14, 15) defines faith to be "a solid constancy of persuasion, and a certain and steady knowledge;" and adds, that "the knowledge of faith consists more in certainty than in comprehension. When we call it knowledge, we intend not such a comprehension as men commonly have of those things which fall under the notice of their senses. The mind which attains to faith does not perfectly comprehend what it perceives, but, being persuaded of that which it cannot comprehend, it understands (intelligit) more by the certainty of this persuasion, than it would comprehend (perspiciret) of any human object by the exercise of its natural capacity." In this last statement, Calvin implies that a believer knows more certainly concerning some of the qualities of God, than he does concerning any of the properties of matter; that religious cognition is closer to absolute truth than sensuous cognition is. It is more certain that God is holy and omnipotent, than that light is the undulation of an ether, and not a separate substance by itself. With this, the eminent schoolman Hales agrees. "If we compare," he says, "the way in which the relation of faith, or conviction, to knowledge, is determined in theology, with the way in which it is in the other sciences, we shall find that the order is a reverse one. In the other sciences, conviction is brought about by the activity of reason, or mediated by thought, and scientific knowledge precedes conviction; while the reverse holds true of religious matters. It is not till we have appropriated them by faith, that we can attain to a knowledge of them conformable to reason. These things can be understood only by those who are of a pure heart; and we get this purity by keeping God's commandments." Hales "distinguishes," says Neander (IV. 427), "a certainty of specula-

tion, and a certainty of experience; a certainty grounded in the intellectual agency, and another grounded in the feelings. Of the latter kind is the certainty of faith; and with reference to this kind of certainty, theology is superior to the other sciences."

The term "positive" signifies that something is laid down (positum) respecting an object or idea. An affirmation is made that it is thus and so; and not a mere denial that it is thus and so. To say that water is *not fire*, conveys no information as to what water really is. But to say that water is a fluid resulting from the union of oxygen and hydrogen gas, imparts some real knowledge of the nature of water, though it does not explain all the mystery connected with it. This is a positive statement springing out of a positive yet not exhaustive cognition. Water really is a fluid, and really consists of two gases. Taking Aquinas's definition of science, as the knowledge of the qualities and relations of an object, it is evident that there may be positive without perfect comprehension. An object has, we will say, fifty qualities or properties. I know twenty of them, and do not know the remaining thirty. My knowledge is valid and positive, so far. It is not merely negative and invalid in respect to the twenty known qualities. Again an object, we will assume, has twenty relations to other objects. I know ten of them. My knowledge to this extent is positive. I have so much true information upon the subject. To illustrate from the science of optics. The properties of transmission, reflection, and refraction of light were known before those of double refraction and polarization. Suppose that the latter were not known at all, at the present time. It would not follow that the knowledge of light, so far as the properties of transmission, reflection, and refraction are concerned, is merely negative, and not real and true cognition. The knowledge conforms, so far, to the real nature of light. Again, the final cause, or use, of these latter properties of light, is still unknown. They are

not needed in order that the eye may see the outer world of forms and colors. "So far as has yet been discovered," says Whewell (*Astronomy and General Physics*, I. xvi.), "these latter properties and laws exert no agency whatever, and have no purpose in the general economy of nature." But the fact that the final cause and use of these properties and laws of diffraction and polarization is still unknown, does not prove that the existing knowledge which the physicist has of light is a mere negation.

A negation may be employed after an affirmation has been made, in order to define an object or idea more carefully. Negative statements are of little value prior to affirmative. After affirming of God what is excellent in the creation, we may then remove from the affirmation any defect by the negative method: as when it is said, that reason in God is the same in kind with reason in man, but not in degree. After saying that God is immanent in the universe, we may say negatively, in order to guard against a pantheistic interpretation of the term immanent, that God is not identical with the universe. And after saying that God is distinct from the world, we may add that he is not separate from it, in order to avoid a deistical interpretation of the term distinct.

The denial that theology is positive science, and that knowledge in morals and theology is positive cognition, is a skeptical position. Hobbes took this ground, and was combated by Cudworth. *Intellectual System*, Ch. V. i. The theologian Buddaeus, in his *Theses de atheismo et superstitione*, opposed Hobbes, "because he denied a positive conception of the Infinite and allowed only a negative one." The theologian Huet, after having defended Christianity in the vigor of his life in his *Demonstratio Evangelica*, at the age of ninety wrote his treatise *De la Faiblesse de l'Esprit Humain*, to prove that before we affirm anything of an object we must perfectly comprehend it; and that therefore we have less right to affirm anything respect-

ing the Supreme Being, because we have a less perfect knowledge of him than of any other subject. This view has been run out to its logical result in the recent agnosticism, which contends that we know nothing concerning God, and therefore can affirm nothing concerning him.

Theology has been denied to be a positive science by some of its friends, as well as by its foes. The views of Hamilton and Mansel convert theology into a science of negations. In asserting that man has no positive cognition of the Infinite Being, and especially in contending that the human mind cannot logically think of the Infinite Being either as a person or a cause, because these conceptions are said to be contradictory to infinity, these philosophers, without intending it, lay the foundation for the same skepticism that Hobbes and Huet maintained. And their speculations have undoubtedly strengthened the hands of the present generation of agnostics. If all that can be said by the theologian respecting God is, that he is *not* this or that, then the mind has in fact no object before it, and no cognition whatever. It may not affirm anything whatever respecting such a Being. It cannot assert either that he is holy or unholy; mighty or weak; wise or foolish. The deity becomes the Unknown and the Unknowable: a position that cuts up religion by the root, and introduces atheism in theory and practice.

Mansel would save the mind from skepticism, by the remark that the contradiction which he finds between the conception of the Infinite and that of personality and causation is only relative. It is a contradiction for the human but not for the Divine mind. Hence man can *believe* in the existence of an Infinite Being who is also personal and a cause, though it is self-contradictory to human intelligence. "It is true," he says (Religious Thought, p. 106), "that we cannot reconcile these two representations with each other; as our conception of personality involves attributes *apparently* contradictory to the notion of Infinity. But it does not follow that this contradiction exists anywhere but in our own

minds; it does not follow that it implies any impossibility in the absolute nature of God." But this reasoning implies that a man can believe what appears to him to be self-contradictory. This is impossible. It also implies that a contradiction for the human mind may be rational and logical for the Divine mind. This makes reason in man to differ in kind from reason in God; so that what is logical and mathematical for one would be illogical and unmathematical for the other. If this be so, man was not created in the image of God.¹

Let us test this theory of negative knowledge by some particulars. Theology defines God to be a spirit. The idea which the human mind has of "spirit" is not exhausted, when it is said that spirit is not matter, or substance occupying space. This would not distinguish it from a mathematical point; or from a thought; or from a volition. We have over and above this negative definition a positive notion, which we proceed to enunciate by specifying certain definite properties of spirit, such as intelligence and self-determination; and certain qualities, such as benevolence, justice, and veracity. These properties and qualities are as positively conceived as are the properties of matter; hardness, color, shape, and the like. That our knowledge of spirit is not all expressed in the statement that spirit is not matter, is also proved by the fact, that if it should be asserted that spirit is something semi-material we should deny it. This evinces that we have a notion in our minds of the real nature of spirit which throws out an imperfect and inadequate definition like this.

Consider, again, the eternity of God. Of this, it is contended we have only a negative apprehension. All that the human intellect can know, it is said, is that eternity is not time. But that our idea of eternity is not exhausted by this

¹ On Hamilton's and Mansel's views, see Smith: *Faith and Philosophy*, 297-336; Porter: *Human Intellect*, 681-697; Hodge: *Theology*, I 346-365; Müller: *Science of Language*, 2d Series, 596-600.

negation is proved by the fact that we are not content to stop with it, but go beyond it, and endeavor to convey some further notion of eternity, by specifying positive characteristics. We define it as duration; as duration without beginning or end; and as duration without succession. We thus differentiate eternity from time; which is conceived of as duration beginning and ending, as a series of sequences, and as measured by the successive motions of the heavenly bodies. Again we define eternity as stationary; time as flowing. These are figures it is true, but they are employed to illustrate a positive idea in the mind. If we were content with a negative definition; with merely saying that eternity is not time; we should not make use of any metaphors at all, because we should not attempt any further enunciation of our idea of eternity. On the theory of a negative knowledge, time might be as well defined by saying that it is not eternity, as eternity would be by saying that it is not time; and matter would be as well defined by saying that it is not mind, as mind would be by saying that it is not matter. But man's knowledge of either of these contraries, though imperfect in the sense of not exhaustive, is yet more than these negations express.

The doctrine of a merely negative knowledge of spiritual objects and ideas originates in a tendency to materialism. The theorist is prone to regard nothing as positive and real in human conceptions that cannot be *imaged* to the senses. Mansel defines a conception to be a "representative image;" and an image implies sensuous imagination. According to this view, positive knowledge is sensuous knowledge. But this is an error. Consider the common definition of God, as "an essence absolutely perfect, infinitely good, wise, powerful, necessarily existent, and the cause of all other beings." There is not a word in this definition that is unintelligible, or that does not convey a positive notion, and yet there is no sensible idea, no idea that can be imaged to the senses, answering to any one of these words. "We have,"

says Cudworth (System, I. v.), "intelligible notions, or ideas, which have no phantasms [sensible images] belonging to them. Of which, whosoever doubts may easily be satisfied and convinced, by reading a sentence or two that he understands in any book almost that shall come to his hand; and reflexively examining himself whether he have a phantasm, or sensible idea, belonging to every word, or no. For whoever is ingenuous will quickly be forced to confess that he meets with many words which, though they have a meaning or intelligible notion, yet have no phantasm [image] belonging to them. And we have known some who were confidently engaged in the other opinion, being put to read the beginning of Tully's Offices, presently nonplussed and confounded in the first word *quanquam*: they being neither able to deny that there was a meaning belonging to it, nor yet to affirm that they had any phantasm thereof, save only of the sound or letters." Cudworth then gives the definition of God which we have just cited, in further proof of his position, and then adds that "it is nothing but want of meditation, together with a fond and sottish dotage upon corporeal sense, which hath so far imposed upon some, as to make them believe that they have not the least cognition of anything not subject to corporeal sense; or that there is nothing in human understanding or conception which was not first in bodily sense: a doctrine highly favorable to atheism. But since it is certain, on the contrary, that we have many thoughts not subject to sense, it is manifest that what falls not under external sense is not therefore inconceivable and nothing. Which whosoever asserts, must needs affirm life and cogitation itself, knowledge or understanding, reason and memory, volition and appetite, things of the greatest moment and reality, to be nothing but mere words without any signification."

It is indeed true that these positive definitions of eternity, of spirit, and kindred ideas, do not exhaust the subjects and leave them free from mystery. In the recent controversy

respecting the knowledge of the Infinite and the Unconditioned, which was stimulated into life by the views of Hamilton, there was not sufficient care taken upon either side to distinguish a positive from a perfect and complete conception. It seemed to be taken for granted by both parties, that man's knowledge of the Finite is superior to his knowledge of the Infinite, in respect to exhaustiveness and absoluteness. But man's cognition of matter and sensible phenomena has limits and imperfection, as well as his cognition of God and the soul. "If anyone," says Jacobi (*Fliegende Blätter*), "will tell me what sense is, I will tell him what spirit is. We talk more easily about sense than about spirit, because there are at least five senses and only one spirit." The blade of grass which the naturalist picks up in his fingers and subjects to the microscope and chemical analysis, contains an ultimate mystery which he can no more clear away than he can the mystery of the Divine eternity or trinity. For the constitution of the smallest atom involves such baffling questions as, What is matter? and, How does it originate? Everything, be it finite or infinite, matter or mind, runs out into mystery. Speaking of law in material nature, Hooker (*Polity*, I. iii.), remarks that it "hath in it more than men have as yet attained to know, or perhaps ever shall attain; seeing the travail of wading herein is given of God to the sons of men, that perceiving how much the least thing in the world hath in it more than the wisest are able to reach unto, they may by this means learn humility." The natural philosopher Boyle entitles one of his essays thus: "Of man's great ignorance of the uses of natural things: or, that there is no one thing in nature whereof the uses to human life are yet thoroughly understood." Much advance has been made in the knowledge of physical nature since Boyle's day, but the title to his essay is still suited to all physical treatises. "What in fact," says Frederick Schlegel (*Philosophy of Life*, Lect. IV.), "is all our knowledge of nature considered

as a whole, and in its inmost essence, but a mere speculative conjecture, and guess upon guess? What is it but an endless series of tentative experiments, by which we are continually hoping to succeed in unveiling the secret of life, to seize the wonderful Proteus and to hold him fast in the chains of science?"

There is as much reason for asserting that man's conception of matter is merely negative because there is an unsolved mystery in it, as there is for asserting the same respecting spirit and the supernatural. Perfect definitions are as difficult in one case as in the other. It is no easier to define time than to define eternity. "I know what time is," said Augustine, "when you do not ask me." That is to say, he had an intuitive notion of time that is trustworthy and valid, but not clear of all obscurity, and which he found it difficult to enunciate. The same is true of the definition of space. Is it a real object? Or only a form of thought, a scheme under which the understanding masses and unifies phenomena? If by a positive conception be meant a cognition that is in accordance with the real nature of the object so far as the cognition extends; if the term "positive" be understood to refer to the *quality* not the quantity of the knowledge; then man's knowledge of the Infinite, or of spirit, is no more a negation than his knowledge of the Finite, or of matter. But it is the quality not the quantity of an idea, or a cognition, that determines its validity and trustworthiness; that is, its conformity to the real nature of the object. Man's knowledge of God is like his knowledge of the ocean. He does not perfectly comprehend the ocean, but this does not render what knowledge he has of the ocean a merely negative knowledge. "When we affirm," says Cudworth (System, Book I. Ch. v.), "that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect minds cannot have such a conception of his nature as doth perfectly master, conquer, and subdue that vast object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the

same, as that it doth every way match and equalize it. Now, it doth not at all follow from hence, because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow understandings, he is utterly inconceivable [unthinkable] by them, so that they cannot frame any idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a nonentity. For it is certain that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we cannot have such an adequate and comprehensive knowledge of the essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. Though we cannot fully comprehend the deity, nor exhaust the infiniteness of his perfection, yet we may have an idea or conception of a Being absolutely perfect; as we may approach near a mountain, and touch it with our hands, though we cannot encompass it all round, and enclasp it in our arms. Whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely inconceivable is nothing; but not whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by our imperfect understanding."

But while the deity is in one sense the most mysterious of all objects of knowledge, in another sense he is the most luminous. No idea so impresses universal man as the idea of God. Neither space nor time, neither matter nor mind, neither life nor death, not sun, moon or stars, so influence the immediate consciousness of man in every clime, and in all his generations, as does that "Presence" which, in Wordsworth's phrase, "is not to be put by." This idea of ideas overhangs human existence like the firmament, and though clouds and darkness obscure it in many zones, while in others it is crystalline and clear, all human beings must live beneath it, and cannot possibly get from under its all-embracing arch. The very denial of the Divine Existence evinces by its eagerness and effort, the firmness with which the idea of God is intrenched in man's constitution. A chimaera or a nonentity would never evoke such a passionate antagonism as is expressed in the reasonings of atheism. Were there no God, absolute indifference towards the notion

would be the mood of all mankind, and no arguments either for or against it would be constructed.

In this reference, the striking remark of Cudworth (*System*, I. v.) applies. "It is indeed true, that the deity is more incomprehensible to us than anything else whatever; which proceeds from the fulness of his being and perfection, and from the transcendency of his brightness; but for this very same reason may it be said also, in some sense, that he is more knowable and conceivable than anything else. As the sun, though by reason of its excessive splendor it dazzle our weak sight, yet is notwithstanding far more visible, also, than any of the *nebulosae stellae*, the small misty stars. Where there is more of light there is more of visibility; so where there is more of entity, reality, and perfection, there is more of conceptibility and cognoscibility; such an object filling up the mind more, and acting more strongly upon it. Nevertheless, because our weak and imperfect minds are lost in the vast immensity and redundancy of the deity, and overcome with its transcendent light and dazzling brightness, therefore hath it to us an appearance of darkness and incomprehensibility."

BIBLIOLOGY.

BIBLIOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION.

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BIBLIOLOGY (*βιβλιοῦ λόγος*) includes all the topics relating to the written revelation of God : namely, the Inspiration,

Authenticity, Credibility, and Canonicity of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. As has already been observed, this division is not so strictly necessary as are the others to the integrity of a theological system, yet since theological science depends for its validity and credibility upon the contents of the Bible, it is requisite in order to comprehensiveness to devote some preliminary attention to the authority of these contents. The subject of Inspiration, in particular, cannot well be omitted.

The Scriptures are entitled a revelation, and hence it is necessary first of all to define this term. It is employed in two senses : 1. General, or unwritten revelation ; 2. Special, or written revelation.

Revelation in its general and wide signification is any species of knowledge of which God is the ultimate source and cause. In this sense, all that man knows intuitively is revealed to him ; for even his axiomatic knowledge does not originate from himself independently and apart from his Creator. All that he knows in this manner, he knows through his intellect, and this intellect is the workmanship of God. Man cognizes in accordance with the laws of human intelligence, and these laws are established by his Maker.

General or unwritten revelation, consequently, includes all that belongs to ethics and natural religion. In Scripture, that moral and religious truth which man perceives immediately by reason of his mental constitution is called a "revelation." For example, the knowledge of future retribution possessed by the pagan is so denominated. "The wrath of God," says St. Paul, "is revealed (*ἀποκαλύπτεται*) from heaven," Rom. 1 : 18 ; and this wrath is subsequently described as operating in the workings of an accusing conscience, Rom. 2 : 15. The pagan's knowledge of the unity of God, and of such attributes as eternity, omnipotence, and sovereignty (*θειότης*) is also represented as a Divine teaching. "That which may be known of God [in this intuitive

manner] is manifest in them ; for God hath showed it unto them," Rom. 1 : 19, 20. This inward knowledge is also denominated a "law written in the heart," Rom. 2 : 15 ; which has led to its being called an unwritten law. Turretin (II. 1, 6) denominates it "revelatio naturalis."

Unwritten or general revelation, then, is a particular form of human consciousness that is ultimately referable to God. It is denominated by English writers the "moral" or "religious" consciousness ; by which is meant, a mode of consciousness that relates to moral and religious objects and truths, and is determined by them. The Germans call it the "God-consciousness ;" meaning thereby a form of consciousness of which God is the object. As the "sense-consciousness" denotes the sum-total of all the inward experience that results from the impression made upon man by the material world, so the God-consciousness denotes the inward experience resulting from the impression made by God upon the human spirit. This mode of man's consciousness not only has God for the object of it, but for the cause of it. And this in two ways : 1. First, the object generally is the cause of the subjective impression, by reason of the correlation between subject and object. The objective coal of fire is the cause of the subjective sensation. The consciousness of physical pain is not produced by an act of will. The man is not the author of the sensation, but the object that causes it is. In like manner, man's consciousness of God is not produced by man's volition, but by God as an object that impresses him.

2. Secondly, God is not only the object of knowledge, but he is also a personal and active *agent* who operates on the human mind so that it shall have this knowledge of Himself. In the phrase of St. Paul, God "reveals" and "manifests" his being and attributes within the human spirit. The coal of fire is the cause of the sense-consciousness, by the mere correlation between itself and the physical sense. But God is the cause of man's knowledge of

God not merely by the correlation between the two beings, but also by a direct energy operating upon man. An irrational object like a stone or a planet exerts no direct efficiency upon the cognizing mind of man ; and neither does a rational object like a human person. Sensation and cognition, in these instances, result from a passive impression made by the object. But in the God-consciousness, the object actively assists in the cognition. God causes the human mind to know God by an inward and immediate efficiency, in addition to the correlation which he has established between the finite and Infinite Spirit. In St. Paul's phrase, he "shows," "reveals," and "manifests" himself.

The Scriptures go yet further than this, and refer all the operations of reason to the Author of the human intellect. Nothing in human consciousness is independent of God, and isolated. God is the "Father of lights," of every kind. James 1 : 17. God "shows" whatever is known by virtue of the human constitution. Even human reason, which in the intuitions of mathematics and in the laws of logic seems to be a self-sufficient faculty, is represented in Scripture as dependent. Man is able to perceive intuitively, only because the Supreme Reason illumines him. "The Logos," says St. John (1 : 4, 9), "is the light of men, and coming into the world enlightens every man." "There is a spirit in man," says Elihu who in this instance speaks truly, "and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding," Job 32 : 8.

Human knowledge, then, considered from this point of view, is an unwritten revelation because it is not aboriginal and self-subsistent, but derived. It issues ultimately from a higher source than the finite intelligence. Human reason has the ground of its authority in the Supreme Reason. This is seen particularly in that form of reason which Kant denominates "practical," and whose judgments are given in conscience. This faculty has an authority for man that cannot be accounted for, except by its being the voice of God.

If conscience were entirely isolated from the Deity, and were independent of Him, it could not make the solemn and sometimes terrible impression it does. No man would be afraid of himself, if the self were not connected with a higher Being than self. Of the judgments of conscience, it may be said literally, that God reveals his own holy judgment through them. "Whence comes the restraint of conscience?" asks Selden (Table Talk). "From a higher Power; nothing else can bind. I cannot bind myself, for I may untie myself again; an equal cannot bind me, for we may untie one another. It must be a superior Power, even God Almighty."¹

The wide use of the term revelation was more common in the Patristic church than it has been since. The first defenders of Christianity were called to vindicate it against polytheism. They would naturally, therefore, select for defence such of its truths as were more particularly combated by paganism, such as the unity of God, and the first principles of natural religion generally. This led them to point out the grounds of these first truths of morals and religion in the human constitution; so that the distinction between natural and revealed religion though recognized was not emphasized. All religious knowledge was represented as a revelation from God, partly through the light of nature, and partly in a supernatural manner. The first Apology of Justin Martyr is an example of this. See chapters viii., xviii., lvii. But when polytheism ceased to be the great foe of Christianity, and deism took its place, it became necessary to lay special stress upon the distinction between the unwritten and the written revelation. When the skeptic himself defended the claims of natural religion, and asserted the needlessness of the gospel, then the Christian apologist was compelled to discriminate carefully between that knowledge which comes to man in the structure of his mind, and that

¹ See Twisten: Dogmatik, II. 146; Shedd: Theological Essays, 303, 304; Neander: Apostel-Geschichte, Abschnitt Sechster (Versöhnung).

which he receives through a supernatural source, and in a written word, in order to show the insufficiency of the former to meet the wants of man as a *sinner*.

General or unwritten revelation, though *trustworthy*, is *not infallible*. This differentiates it from the special or written revelation.

1. In the first place, the ethical and religious teaching of God through the structure of the human mind is vitiated more or less by human depravity. (a). Sin darkens the intellect, so that there is not that clear perception which characterizes the angelic intuition, and which was possessed by the unfallen Adam. (b). Sin gives a bias to the will against the truth, so that even when there is an accurate perception, there is an endeavor to get rid of it. Men know God to be holy, but do not like to retain this knowledge. Rom. 1 : 28. (c). Sin weakens the power of intuition itself. Vice debilitates the spiritual and rational faculty, by strengthening the sensuous nature. (d). It is a part of the punishment of sin, that God withdraws for a time his common grace, so that there is little or no intuitive perception of moral truth. The human mind is left to sin. God "gave up to uncleanness those who changed the truth of God into a lie," Rom. 1 : 24. God "gave them over to a reprobate mind," Rom. 1 : 28.

2. Secondly, infallibility cannot be attributed to the unwritten revelation, because of the limitations of the finite mind. Natural religion cannot be any more trustworthy than the human intellect itself is.¹ But the human intellect cannot be infallible, unless it is preserved from all error by an extraordinary exertion of Divine power. That ordinary operation of God in the human mind which is seen in ethics and natural religion, though sometimes reaching a high degree of certainty and validity, never reaches the point of absolute infallibility. Even when the unwritten revelation is rectified by the written revelation, we cannot attribute to it the absolute authority of the latter, because

¹ See Conybeare : Reply to Tindal, in Shedd : History of Doctrine, I. 208.

the rectification is more or less imperfect. The purest form of ethics and natural religion is to be found in Christendom, not in Paganism. The ethical system of Plato is not as correct as that of Butler. But infallibility cannot be attributed to either, as it is to the ethics of the decalogue, and the sermon on the mount. See Ursinus: Christian Religion, Question 92.

3. Thirdly, the unwritten revelation is inadequate to the needs of man as a sinner, because it does not include those truths which relate to redemption. Its doctrines are sufficient only for a sinless being. Natural religion is silent respecting the exercise of mercy. It reveals only law and justice: *δργη* not *ἀγάπη*. St. Paul affirms that the wrath, not the compassion of God, is taught to men in the workings of conscience. This is the fatal lack in all the natural religions of mankind. Many current treatises on Comparative Religion are erroneous and misleading here. It is frequently contended that Boodhism and Confucianism are co-ordinate religions with Christianity, because they teach the golden rule, and other principles of ethics. But this does not prove the point. The distinguishing characteristic of Christianity is not the teaching of sound ethics, but the offer of mercy through a Divine mediator, and a radical change of human character. Christianity is gospel, not law; but Confucianism and Boodhism, so far as they contain truth, are law, not gospel. If it can be shown that Boodhism and Confucianism actually secure the forgiveness and extirpation of human sin, then they may be classed with Christianity. But there is no pardon and no regeneration in any religion but that of Jesus Christ. "Who is he that forgiveth sins, but God only?" Hence the modern Christian, like the primitive, cannot concede that Christianity is merely one among several religions; merely one of the *religiones licitae*. Christianity is an exclusive religion for man, because it is the only redemptive religion for him. Shedd: Theological Essays, 374-376.

In the common use of the term, revelation is employed in the restricted signification, and signifies the written word of God. The contents of the *written revelation* are as follows:

1. Scripture includes among its teachings those of unwritten revelation: namely the first truths of ethics and natural religion. It assumes the validity of the doctrines of the divine existence, the unity of God, the immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will, and future reward and punishment.

But these doctrines as taught in Scripture differ from the same doctrines as taught in Plato, for example: (*a*). By stronger evidence, and greater certainty. Immortality in the *Phaedo* is a hope and aspiration. In the gospel of John, it is the absolute assurance of personal knowledge and experience. Christ is an eye-witness, in respect to the other world and the other life. The Son of man speaks that which he knows, and testifies that which he has seen, John 3:11. (*b*). By freedom from erroneous elements. Morality in the decalogue, and in the sermon on the mount, is not mixed with false ethics. In Plato and Aristotle it is: e.g., the destruction of sick infants and the community of wives (*Republic*, V.); and the justifying of slavery (*Ethics*, I. 4-8), and of abortion, and the destruction of feeble offspring (*Ethics*, VIII. 16). Natural religion in the unwritten form is vitiated by its connection with the impure reason of man; in the written form, it is the pure reason of God. The Bible gives an inspired statement of natural religion; Plato gives an uninspired statement. The first is infallible; the second is more or less trustworthy, but not free from error. Whether polygamy is intrinsically immoral, cannot perhaps be determined by natural religion as deduced from the human mind alone; but natural religion as enunciated by Christ makes polygamy to be wrong. "From the beginning it was not so," Matt. 19:8. Christ teaches that monogamy is founded in the created nature and constitution of man. Again, the monotheism of the Bible is without

error; that of natural religion is more or less vitiated: either in teaching too much severity in God, as in Paganism; or too much indulgence in Him, as in the deistical schools of Christendom.

2. The written revelation contains many truths and facts that result from human observation and reflection. All that is *historical*, in both the Old Testament and the New, is of this kind. The narrative, for example, of the journeyings of the children of Israel, is the record of eye-witnesses. The history of the rise of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah, as recorded in the books of Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles, is an account drawn from contemporary sources. All that is *geographical* is of this kind; and all that is *chronological*. The *natural history* of the Scriptures is also the product of man's observation.

But all this Biblical history, chronology, and geography, differs from corresponding matter in uninspired literature, by being unmixed with error. Biblical history is not legendary like that of early Greece and Rome. Biblical chronology is not extravagant like that of Egypt, as reported to Herodotus by the priests. Here the influence of inspiration is very apparent. Moses was guided in collecting and composing the historical narratives in the Pentateuch. Herodotus was not thus preserved from error in gathering and writing his accounts of the Egyptians, Persians and Greeks. "Many of the sacred writers," says Hodge (I. 155), "although inspired, received no revelation. This was probably the fact with the authors of the historical books of the Old Testament. The evangelist Luke does not refer his knowledge of the events which he records to revelation, but says he derived it from those 'who from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word,' Luke 1:2. It is immaterial to us where Moses obtained his knowledge of the events recorded in the book of Genesis; whether from early documents, from tradition; or from direct revelation. If the sacred writers had sufficient knowledge in themselves, or in

those about them, there is no need to assume any direct revelation. It is enough for us, that they were rendered infallible as teachers.”

3. The written word, besides the truths of natural religion, and the facts and truths that come within the ken of the ordinary human intelligence, contains a series of truths that are altogether different from these. These are the most important part of the contents of Scripture, and constitute the most strictly supernatural element in the written word. Speaking generally, they are those truths and facts that relate to man's salvation from sin: viz., the trinity; the creation and apostasy of man; the incarnation; and redemption. The doctrine of sin, though a fact of consciousness, and thus belonging also to natural religion, has in the Scriptures certain features that imply special teaching, since human consciousness unassisted could not discover them: viz., the account of the temptation by Satan, and the fall in Adam; and a profound analysis and delineation of sin itself, such as is given in the seventh and eighth chapters of Romans. The doctrine of sacrificial atonement for sin is also a truth of natural religion; but the Mosaic system of sacrifices, so peculiar in its features, was given by the teaching of the Holy Spirit. “The Holy Ghost signified this, that the way into the holiest of all was not yet made manifest, while the first tabernacle was yet standing,” Heb. 9: 8.

This twofold variety in the contents of the Bible necessitates two varieties or modes of Divine operation upon the human mind: 1. Inspiration; 2. Revelation (proper). The distinction between these two is important, and the neglect of it has led to confusion.

Inspiration is like Revelation, in that it is a superhuman influence upon the particular person selected to be the organ of the Divine mind. But inspiration goes no further than to insure freedom from error in presenting that truth which has been obtained in the ordinary ways in which men ob-

tain truth ; while revelation discloses new truth that is inaccessible to the ordinary human mind. A man may be inspired, and yet not reveal anything. Much of the Bible is of this kind. But a man to whom a revelation is communicated, is also inspired to express and record it. Inspiration is more of the nature of superintendence ; revelation is more of the nature of instruction and information.

The distinction between inspiration and revelation is an old one. Edwards (*Mysteries of Scripture*) marks the distinction in the following manner. " We ought to distinguish between those things which were written in the sacred books by the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and those which were only committed to writing by the direction of the Holy Spirit. To the former class belong all the mysteries of salvation, or all those things which respect the means of our deliverance taught in the gospel, which could not be known from the principles of reason, and therefore must be revealed. But to the other class those things belong, which either are already known from natural religion, but are of service to inculcate duty on man, and to demonstrate the necessity of a revelation of the means of salvation ; or all histories, useful to illustrate and assure us of the doctrines revealed, and which point out the various degrees of revelation, the different dispensations of salvation, and the various modes of governing the church of God ; all of which are necessary to be known in the further explanation of mysteries."

Claude Frassen, a Franciscan monk and theologian of the 17th century, assumed three kinds of inspiration : 1. *Inspiratio antecedens*, or the revelation of things before unknown. This is revelation proper. 2. *Inspiratio concomitans*, or the security against error in the statement of truths or facts known in the ordinary way. This is inspiration in distinction from revelation. 3. *Inspiratio consequens*, or the divine authority stamped by inspired men upon writings composed without inspiration ; e.g., the gospels of Mark

and Luke approved by Peter and Paul. See Knapp : Theology (Introduction).

Lee, in his work on Inspiration has made the distinction with care. But he errs in contending that it is not found in the older writers. Citing Quenstedt as one who holds the "mechanical" theory, he quotes the following from him: "res quae in scriptura continentur, non solum per assistentiam et directionem divinam infallibilem literis consignatae sunt, sed singulari Spiritus Sancti suggestioni, inspirationi, et dictamini, acceptae ferendae sunt." Lecture I. Here, evidently, "suggestio" denotes "revelation," and "inspiratio" denotes "inspiration." In the same connection, Quenstedt speaks of: "res sanctis scriptoribus naturaliter prorsus incognitae; naturaliter quidem cognoscibiles, actu tamen incognitae; non tantum naturaliter cognoscibiles, sed etiam actu ipso notae," and brings them all under the head of inspiration.

Marking this distinction, the first position to be taken respecting the Bible is, that it is all of it *inspired*. The original autograph-volume of inspiration was free from error. This does not mean that every sentence or proposition in Scripture contains a truth. The words of Satan to Eve (Gen. 3 : 4) were a falsehood. But those words were actually spoken, and they are recorded with infallible accuracy. Some of the reasonings and inferences of Job's friends were false, but they occurred as they are related by the inspired penman.

This theory of *plenary inspiration* has been the generally received doctrine of the Church. The following statement of Turretin (II. iv. 5) contains it: "The sacred writers were so moved and inspired by the Holy Ghost, both in respect to thought (*res ipsas*) and language, that they were kept from all error, and their writings are truly authentic and divine." Quenstedt defines in a similar manner. "Scripture is infallible truth, free from all error; each and everything contained in it is absolute truth (*veris-*

sima); be it doctrine, morals, history, chronology, topography, proper names." Similarly Hollaz remarks, that "matters of genealogy, of astronomy, of politics, though the knowledge of them is not necessary to salvation, are yet divinely revealed [inspired], because they serve to interpret and illustrate the truths that are necessary to salvation." Hase: Hutterus, § 44. These theologians, in these affirmations, have reference to the original autograph. The statement, be it doctrinal, historical, chronological, or geographical, as it came from the inspired person himself, was accurate. But they concede that some minor errors have subsequently come into the scripture manuscripts, from copyists and translators, and that some have been introduced by critics and exegetes.

The Westminster Confession (I. ii. vi.) teaches that "all the books of the Old and New Testament are given by inspiration of God, to be the rule of faith and life;" and that "our full persuasion and assurance of the *infallible* truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts." The Scripture proofs of the authority and infallibility of the scriptures are: 2 Tim. 3: 16, "All scripture is given by inspiration of God." Heb. 1: 1, 2, "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners, spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son." 1. Cor. 2: 13, "Which things we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth." 2. Pet. 1: 21, "Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." John 5: 39, "Search the scriptures." Rom. 3: 2, "Unto them were committed the oracles of God." Isa. 8: 20, "Look ye to the law and to the testimony."

The theory of plenary inspiration prevailed in the Patristic, Mediæval, and Reformation periods. Luther has sometimes been cited as adopting a different view, because of his

opinion respecting the authority of the Apocalypse and the Epistle of James. But he questioned the canonicity of these portions of scripture. All scripture that he conceded to be canonical, he held to be infallible.

The Christian fathers are sometimes said to have held a loose view of inspiration. But the view of Augustine was certainly a strict one, and it had high authority in the patristic and mediæval churches. In his *De Consensu Evangelistarum* (I. xxxv.), he says: "Christ is the head and his apostles are the members. Whatever he wished us to read concerning his words and deeds, he ordered to be written down as if with his own hands; and he who reads the narratives of the evangelists will believe them as if he saw Christ himself writing by their hands and pens."

Calixtus (1650), in Germany, introduced a less strict middle theory; according to which the sacred writers were preserved from all error in regard to doctrine necessary to salvation, but not in regard to subjects that have no such importance. His view found few advocates in his own day. Baumgarten (1725) reaffirmed it, maintaining that the Divine influence preserved the sacred writers from error only so far as the purpose of a revelation required, which is the salvation of the soul from sin; this purpose, he said, would not be frustrated by unimportant errors in chronology, history, topography, etc. This view, during this century, has gained ground particularly in Germany. Such evangelical theologians as Tholuck, Twisten, and Müller adopt it. Dörner accepts it in part. "There are historical matters which stand in essential connection with the meaning and spirit of revelation. In this case, inspiration does not apply merely to non-historic eternal truths." *Christian Doctrine*, § 59. The theory is presented eloquently by Coleridge in his *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*. For a criticism, see Shedd: *Literary Essays*, 336-342.

The objections to this middle theory of inspiration are the following: 1. The primary and the secondary matter in

Scripture, such as doctrine and history, are so indissolubly connected with each other, that uncertainty in respect to the latter casts uncertainty upon the former. If for example the history of the residence of the Israelites in Egypt, and of their exodus and wanderings, is mythical and exaggerated like the early history of Assyria and Babylon, this throws discredit upon the decalogue as having been received from the lips of God on Sinai. If the history, geography, and chronology, in the midst of which the doctrinal elements of the Pentateuch are embedded, contain fictions and contradictions, these doctrinal elements will not be accepted as an infallible revelation from God.

The same reasoning applies to the history and chronology of the New Testament. If the narrative by the four evangelists of the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ is more or less legendary, it will be impossible to secure for the doctrines of Christ that undoubting belief which the church in every age has exercised in regard to them. This is clearly perceived by the skeptic. Strauss well knew that if he could succeed in proving the mythical character of the New Testament history, he would have little difficulty in destroying human confidence in the New Testament dogmas.

To say that if the doctrines of Scripture are held to be infallible, it is of no consequence whether the history and geography of Scripture are free from error, is like Schenkel's assertion that if the spirit of Christ is with the church, it is of no consequence whether his body rose from the grave or not. It would be impossible for the church to believe that the spirit of Christ dwells and operates in his people, if the church at the same time were denying or doubting that Christ rose from the tomb. The primary and the secondary, the doctrinal and the historical elements of Scripture stand or fall together. This is illustrated by a fact in the history of rationalistic criticism. Graf "assigned a post-exilian origin to the great body of legislation found in Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers. The historical portion of this

Grundschrift, he still maintained to be the oldest part of the Pentateuch. But here, as Kuenen said, was the Achilles heel of his theory. Hence Riehm and others insisted that he had no right to separate the legislative from the historical portions, unless he renounced the leading principles of analysis as hitherto employed. Graf then yielded, and announced his conviction that the whole of the first Elohist, *history* as well as laws, is post-exilian. This view was afterwards elaborated by Wellhausen." Chambers: Pentateuchal Criticism. Essay I. 14.

2. It is improbable that God would reveal a fact or doctrine to the human mind, and do nothing towards securing an accurate statement of it. This is particularly the case, when the doctrine is one of the mysteries of religion. Such profound truths as the trinity, the incarnation, vicarious atonement, etc., require the superintendence and guidance of an infallible Spirit to secure an enunciation that shall not be misleading. Hence it is more natural to suppose that a prophet or an apostle who has received directly from God a profound and mysterious truth inaccessible to the human intellect, will not be left to his own unassisted powers in imparting what he has received. Especially is it improbable that communications from the deity would be veiled in extravagant and legendary costume.

3. The middle theory of a partial inspiration is more difficult to be maintained, than is the theory of plenary inspiration. Because if only a part of Scripture is infallible, it becomes necessary to point out which part it is. If any one asserts that there are errors in the Bible, he must demonstrate them. This is an arduous task. It is more difficult to prove that the narratives of the Pentateuch are forgeries of later writers, than to prove that they were composed by Moses. No one can demonstrate that the history of the exodus is legendary. The evidence for it as history is much greater than against it as fable. The arguments in favor of the scripture chronology are stronger than those against it.

If they were not, the chronology would long ago have been rejected by the majority of students of the Bible; the number of believers would have been as small as the existing number of skeptics.

It must be remembered that unsolved difficulties are not equivalent to a proof of the falsity of Scripture. Because a particular link in the chain of Biblical chronology, for example, cannot now be put in, it does not follow that this chronology as a whole is erroneous. The mere absence of complete proof of the affirmative is not a proof of the negative. When there is a strong body of proof for a proposition, the mere fact that at a certain point the proof is weak, or lacking, is not sufficient to discredit the demonstrative force of this body of proof. The fact that the skeptic can ask a question which the believer cannot answer, is not a proof that the skeptic's own position is the truth, or that the believer's position is false. The unsolved difficulties respecting inspiration have often been palmed off as positive arguments for his own position, by the unbeliever.

In maintaining the plenary inspiration of the Bible, we shall consider it first as containing matter that is *revealed*, in distinction from inspired. All such revealed truth is infallible, that is, free from error.

Revelation in the restricted sense, we have seen, denotes the communication of truth or facts hitherto unknown to man, and incapable of being deduced from the structure of the human intellect, or derived through the ordinary channels of human information. It is generally indicated in the Old Testament by such phraseology as the following: "The vision of Isaiah which he saw concerning Judah and Jerusalem," Isaiah 1:1. "The burden of Tyre," Isa. 23:1. "The word of the Lord that came to Jeremiah, concerning the dearth," Jer. 14:1. "Then was the secret revealed to Daniel, in a night vision," Dan. 2:19; 10:1. "Thus saith Jehovah, Call unto me, and I will answer thee, and shew great and mighty things which thou knowest not," Jer.

33 : 2, 3. In the New Testament, St. Paul describes a revelation as a species of divine communication. "What shall I profit you, except I shall speak either by revelation (*ἐν ἀποκάλυψει*), or by knowledge," 1 Cor. 14 : 6. "When ye come together, every one of you hath a doctrine, hath a revelation. (*ἀποκάλυψιν*), hath an interpretation," 1 Cor. 14 : 26. "I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord," 2 Cor. 12 : 1. The product of a revelation is denominated a "mystery." "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery," 1 Cor. 2 : 7. "Let a man so account of us as stewards of the mysteries of God," 1 Cor. 4 : 1. "Behold I show you a mystery," 1 Cor. 15 : 51. A mystery is a truth or fact revealed without an explanation of it. The trinity is such. Oftentimes when a proof of a revealed truth is demanded, it is really an explanation that is asked for. The objector requires that the fact or truth be made clear to his mind ; in which case, the mystery is at an end.

As an example of a revelation, consider 2 Thess. 2 : 3. St. Paul here informs the Thessalonian church of a fact that had been divulged to him from God : viz., that the second advent of Christ to the final judgment will not occur, until after a great apostasy in Christendom has taken place. He could not have obtained the knowledge from any human source. It was a secret which God disclosed to him. And it was infallible information. The future history of the world will evince that it is. Other examples of revelation are seen in the account of the resurrection of the body, in 1 Cor. 15 : 35-55 ; of the cessation of the work of redemption, in 1 Cor. 15 : 24-28 ; and of the conversion of the Jews after the conversion of the Gentiles, in Rom. 11 : 25. The account, in Gen. 1, of the order and succession of events in the creation of the world, is a revelation. This is a history which is both revealed and inspired. In this respect it differs from the history of the exodus of the Israelites, and similar histories in Scripture, which are inspired but not revealed. There was no human observer to witness the pro-

cess of creation, and to compose an account of it. The information of what was done in the six days must have been imparted by the Creator himself, who was the only actor and the only spectator. It could not have been derived from human records, or human science. Again the doctrine of the trinity is a truth not deducible by rational reflection, and therefore it is a revelation. In this respect, it differs from the doctrine of the unity of God. This latter is a truth capable of being inferred by the human intellect, as St. Paul (Rom. 1 : 19) teaches, from a contemplation of the works of creation outwardly and the operations of the human soul inwardly. The trinity is a part of the written revelation ; but the divine unity is a truth of natural religion, or unwritten revelation. The doctrine of the trinity as stated in the Bible is both revealed and inspired ; the doctrine of the divine unity as stated in the Bible is inspired but not revealed.

Again, the doctrine of *vicarious* atonement is a revelation. The doctrine of personal atonement, namely, that the transgressor must himself suffer, is a truth of natural religion ; but that another competent person may and will suffer for him is a truth only of revealed religion. "The soul that sinneth it shall die" (Ezek. 18 : 4), is natural religion. Christ "was made a curse for us" (Gal. 3 : 13); Christ "is the propitiation for our sins" (1 John 2 : 2); is revelation. Whether God will pardon sin, and in what way he will do it, can no more be determined by a priori reasoning, than it can be determined by a priori reasoning whether another poet like Shakespeare will appear. It is a question of fact and of intention on the part of God ; and a fact must be known either by history, or by prophecy, which is history beforehand. And the only historical statement respecting the fact that God will forgive sin, is that of God himself in the written revelation. There may be conjectures and hopes in regard to the Divine mercy, but no certain knowledge except by a word from the Divine lips. The exercise of justice being necessary, the fact that it will be exercised

is a part of the unwritten revelation. The wrath of God is revealed in the human conscience, Rom. 1:18. But the exercise of mercy being optional, and contingent upon the Divine will, the fact that it will be exercised is a part of the written revelation only.

To determine then how much of the Bible is revelation proper, and how much is only inspiration, we have but to examine its contents. Anything in its pages that may indisputably be deduced by human reasoning, or be drawn from human sources of information, is not revealed. But everything else is. The genealogical tables in Matthew and Luke are not revelation. Much of the historical narrative in the Old Testament and New Testament is not revelation. Geographical and statistical data are no part of revelation in distinction from inspiration.

Revelation in the restricted and technical use of the term is not human education and development. When the human mind unfolds its own powers and manifests its own internal resources, the product is human. Philosophy, ethics, and natural theology are not an extraordinary communication from the Supreme Reason. They are the evolution of finite reason, and the product of human inquiry and investigation. It is true that inasmuch as the human intellect is the workmanship of God, and its laws of thinking are imposed by its author, the result may be denominated a revelation in the wide sense of the term. But while it is an unwritten revelation, it is also a natural operation of the human mind. It has the characteristics of the human mind, and is associated with the darkness and error of the fallen human mind. For apostasy has hindered the pure development of the finite reason, so that while the unwritten revelation is sufficiently valid and trustworthy to render man inexcusable for his polytheism and sensuality, it is not an infallible and unerring light.

The theory of Lessing, in his tract entitled *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*, that revelation, meaning by it the

Christian system, is education or human development, is exactly wrong. He regards the Scriptures as only anticipating what the human mind could find out for itself, only more slowly and much later. But the distinguishing truths of the Christian Scriptures are of such a nature that they cannot be deduced from premises furnished by man's intellect. They are historical, not a priori. They must be made known by testimony, not by reasoning. The mathematician by mathematical calculation cannot discover in what order the different species of creatures were made. The a priori method can do nothing here. If any man had happened to be present, and witnessed the creative work, he could have reported what he had seen. But no man can in an a priori manner discover the way and manner in which the world was created. Similarly, no man can deduce in an a priori manner from the nature and structure of the human mind, the doctrines of the trinity, the incarnation, the vicarious atonement, and redemption. These are not an evolution of the human mind, but a disclosure from the Divine mind.

For the same reason, revelation is not the product of *national* education and development. The Old Testament is not Hebrew literature, in the sense that the Iliad and Greek Drama are Greek literature. The whole Hebrew nation was not inspired by the Holy Spirit, but only a chosen few individuals in it. The merely natural and national development of the Hebrew mind produced the Targums and Talmud, and the Rabbinic literature generally, not the Old Testament scriptures. The latter were the work of Moses, Samuel, David, Isaiah and others—a small circle of Hebrews who were selected out of the Hebrew nation, and supernaturally taught in order that they might instruct their own people, and through them all other peoples. The sacred writers claim this for themselves, and it was conceded by the nation. See Josephus: *Contra Apionem*, I. 8. That the Old Testament scriptures are merely one of the literatures of the world, the work of the Hebrew nation and not a special reve-

lation, is the postulate and foundation of all rationalistic criticism. "The Old Testament," says Maurice (*Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*, Ch. I.), "is not the history of men's thoughts about God, or desires after God, or affections towards him. It professes to be a history of God's unveiling of himself to men. If it is not that, it is nothing; it is false from beginning to end. To make it the history of the speculations of a certain tribe about God, we must deny the very root of any speculations which that tribe ever had. For this root is the belief that they could not think of him, unless he had first thought of them; that they could not speak of him, unless he were speaking to them."

An error of the same general nature is found in some evangelical critics, such as Weiss, for example. In his *Biblical Theology of the New Testament*, he assumes that the Gospels, primarily, were the product of the Primitive church as a whole, not of the Apostolic circle exclusively. In its first form, the Life of Christ was a narrative floating about in the first Christian brotherhood, and not a narrative composed directly or indirectly by four apostles under the guidance of inspiration. The primitive account of Christ's words and deeds was very fragmentary, and was subsequently supplemented and worked over into the four Gospels as the church now has them. There was an original Mark, from which the present Mark was derived, and that original came from the oral tradition of the first Christian brotherhood. "Our synoptic Gospels in their present form are probably of later origin than most of the other books of the New Testament, and it is possible that many sayings of Jesus have been taken up into them which were either altogether, or at least in their present shape, foreign to the earliest tradition. The Johannean tradition is altogether excluded from the earliest tradition." Weiss: *Theology of N. T.* § 10, 11. This view makes the Life of Christ to be the product not of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, but of the Primitive church; and this requires this church to have been divinely guided in de-

scribing the life and actions of Christ, if the description is an infallible one. Accordingly, the advocates of this view do not claim that the biography of our Lord is free from error, though truthful in the main.

But the fact in the case is, that the first Christian brotherhood obtained all the knowledge it had of the life of Christ from its instructors and guides, the Apostles. The Christian brotherhood came into existence only because the Apostles related what they had seen and heard during their discipleship and intercourse with the ascended Redeemer. The twelve apostles were expressly commissioned by their Master to *prepare an account* of his life and teachings, and were promised divine aid and guidance in doing it. Matt. 10:5-20; John 14:25, 26; 15:13-15. This important work was not left to the random method of an early ecclesiastical tradition—a method that would inevitably have mingled legend with true history, as is seen in the apocryphal Gospels. This theory of Weiss and others, is exposed to the same objection that the Protestant urges against the Romish view of ecclesiastical tradition. To go back to a fallible tradition of the first Christian brotherhood for the life of Christ, which is the foundation of Christianity and of Christendom, is like going back to the fallible tradition of the Romish church for Christian doctrine and polity.

That the Gospels had an apostolical not an ecclesiastical origin, is proved by the fact that there was a *διδαχή τῶν ἀποστόλων*, in which the first brotherhood “continued.” Acts 2:42. This was the common narrative of the Twelve Apostles respecting the life, teachings, and miracles of their Lord. This common oral account given by the Twelve, “which from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word,” Luke 1:2, some of the brotherhood attempted to commit to writing (*ἀνατάξασθαι διήγησιν*, Luke 1:1); and to prevent the errors that would inevitably creep into the life of Christ by this method, Luke under the superintendence of Paul writes the third Gospel. In order

that the original number of eye-witnesses might be kept full after the death of Judas, a twelfth apostle was chosen out of those who had "compained with them all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among them." Matthias was chosen and ordained as an apostle, "to be a witness of Christ's resurrection," Acts 1:22. This testimony "with great power gave the apostles" in witnessing "of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus," Acts 4:33. This *διδασχὴ τῶν ἀποστόλων* was committed to writing by those four of the Twelve Apostles to whom the four canonical Gospels have been attributed by the church for nearly twenty centuries. These four Evangelists put into a fixed form the oral gospel which the Twelve had been teaching in their missionary work. The four were the agents of the Apostolic college, in doing what Christ commanded them to do when he promised "to bring all things to their remembrance whatsoever he had said unto them." Justin Martyr, as early as 160, expresses the common belief of the church on this point, when he says that "the Apostles in the memoirs composed by them, which are called Gospels, have thus delivered unto us what was enjoined upon them." Apology I. lxvi. See Presbyterian Review, Jan. 1887, 164-167.

That the Bible as containing *revealed* truths and facts is infallible, is allowed by those who hold the middle theory of inspiration. All truths and doctrines of Scripture that are necessary to salvation are certainly without mixture of error, and are the infallible rule of faith and practice. It is not therefore the fact of infallible revelation that is disputed, but the fact of infallible *inspiration*. We turn to the consideration of this, which is the more difficult part of the general subject.

1. Inspiration is not sanctification. It is the operation of the Holy Spirit upon the human mind, for the purpose of conveying religious truth to mankind. It has therefore a certain resemblance to regeneration, in having a Divine

author and source. But it differs from it, in that the aim is not to impart holiness but information. Inspiration is intellectual, while regeneration is spiritual. When the Holy Spirit inspires a person, he does not necessarily sanctify him; he only instructs him and conveys truth by him. Balaam was inspired temporarily upon a certain occasion: "The Lord put words into his mouth," Num. 23:5. And all that he said while under the influence of the Lord was free from error. Caiaphas also was temporarily inspired: "This he spake not of himself, but prophesied" (John 11:51); and the prophecy was fulfilled. Nay more, even a dumb animal may be employed as the organ through which God conveys truth to men, as was the case with Balaam's ass. "The Lord opened the mouth of the ass" (Num. 22:28); and her expostulation was full of sense and truth. The ass made no mistake in anything she said to Balaam. The Divine message through her, as an instrument, was infallible. In the same manner, even a piece of unconscious matter like the pillar of cloud, or the burning bush, may be employed as the medium of a theophany and of divine instruction through symbols.

This shows that inspiration is only intellectual illumination, and is entirely distinct from sanctification. If inspiration involved sanctification, the degree of each must be equal, and infallibility in knowledge would require sinlessness in character. Most of the organs of inspiration were in point of fact good men. "Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." None of them however were sinless and perfect men, and yet they were infallible. They had a perfect knowledge on the points respecting which they were inspired, but they had not a perfect character. Peter was inspired, but he was defective in character, and was rebuked by Paul for his inconsistency in conduct. If we compare the result of the Apostolic council related in Acts 15, with the individual action subsequently of Peter spoken of in Gal. 2:11-13, we see that the same person

may as an imperfectly sanctified man recede from a position which he had taken previously as an inspired man. The decision of the council respecting the Mosaic ceremonial law was the teaching of the Holy Ghost; but the weak yielding of Peter to the demands of Jewish Christians was the working of sinful imperfection—of which Peter subsequently repented under the fraternal rebuke of Paul. Solomon was inspired to teach a certain class of truths, mainly ethical in distinction from evangelical, but his religious character, particularly in his old age, has led some to doubt his salvation.

The fact that inspiration is instruction, not sanctification, and that revelation is an objective information from God which does not depend on subjective characteristics in the person chosen as the medium of communication, explains how it is that a volume containing the most profound views of God and man that have yet been published on earth, could have been produced amongst a people comparatively low in knowledge, civilization, and culture. The Hebrews were inferior to the Greeks and Romans, in merely humanistic characteristics; inferior in literature, art, and science. They produced very little in these provinces. But nothing in Greek or Roman theology and ethics will compare with the Scriptures of the Old Testament. The decalogue is the highest of moral codes; but Moses was the leader and head of a half civilized and degraded body of Egyptian slaves. Had his theological and religious knowledge been only that which his own environment in Egypt at the court of Pharaoh would have furnished, he could no more have composed the decalogue, or the account of the creation in the opening of Genesis, than he could have composed Hamlet or the Principia. The immense disparity between the Old Testament as a book and the Hebrew people as a nation, shows that the knowledge of God and divine things contained in the former, but wanting in the latter, came *ab extra*. It was communicated from on high.

2. Inspiration is not omniscience.¹ The operation of the Holy Spirit does not impart all truth to the inspired mind, but only a portion of it. And it is religious truth that is principally conveyed. The Holy Spirit communicates secular truth only so far as this is necessary to the imparting of religious truth. "The scriptures *principally* teach what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man." Westminster L. C. 5. They teach secular and scientific truth only in subserviency to this.

Again, the knowledge of one inspired man may be less than that of another. There is a gradation in imparting religious truth. In the beginning of the Old economy, the Holy Ghost disclosed the doctrine of the incarnation only to that extent in which it is seen in the promise respecting the "Seed of the woman." The doctrine continues to be divulged with increasing details, until in Isaiah it is greatly widened and enlarged. In the New Testament, the doctrine is as fully revealed as it will be, until the vision of the church by faith becomes the vision face to face. The apostle John knew more than Moses, respecting the pre-existence, incarnation, and death of the Son of God. Yet the latter was infallibly inspired upon all points respecting which he has said anything. But he has not spoken upon as many points as St. John has.

3. Inspired truth is not necessarily completely comprehensible. A doctrine or fact may be infallible, and yet mysterious. Because the Bible is not level to human intelligence in all its teachings, it does not follow that it is not free from error. In 1 Pet. 1:10, 11, the Old Testament prophets themselves are described as "inquiring and

¹ Immer, *Hermeneutics* p. 18, argues against the infallibility of St. Paul, because of the failure of his memory in regard to a certain particular. 1 Cor. 14:16. Because the apostle could not remember how many persons he had baptized, therefore his teaching in 1 Cor. 15 respecting the resurrection is fallible! Upon the same principle, he should deny St. Paul's infallibility because he was ignorant of the steam engine and telegraph.

searching" into the meaning of the prophecies taught them by the Holy Spirit. The "sufferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow" are points that are mentioned.

Defining inspiration positively, it may be described as the influence of the Holy Spirit upon a human person, whereby he is infallibly moved and guided in all his statements while under this influence. The general notion is that of an *afflatus*. There is an imbreading of the Holy Spirit upon the human spirit. The epithet employed by St. Paul (2 Tim. 3:16) is *θεόπνευστος*. The consequence is an inward impulse and actuation of the mind. "Holy men of God spake as they were moved (carried along, *φερομένοι*) by the Holy Spirit," 2 Pet. 1:21.

Analyzing, there is: (*a*). Suggestion of matter, both as to thought and language; aiding the memory is included in this (John 14:26);¹ (*b*). Impulse to speak or write; (*c*). Direction, by which the mind is preserved from error. We are aided in conceiving of the operation of the Holy Spirit in inspiration, by its analogy with his operation in regeneration. (*a*). It violates no laws of thought. (*b*). It leaves the individual peculiarities as it finds them. (*c*). It is thorough and all-pervading. Hence it affects the language as well as the thought.

At this point, there is a difference of opinion among those who hold to plenary inspiration; some affirming, and some denying the doctrine of *verbal* inspiration, in connec-

¹ "In his extreme old age, the elder Adams was asked for an analysis of James Otis's speech in 1761 on the acts of the Board of Trade, which was five hours long. He answered that no man could have written the argument from memory 'the day after it was spoken,' much less 'after a lapse of fifty-seven years.' Adams then proceeded to compose a series of Letters on the subject filling thirty-three closely printed pages. Comparing these letters with letters written at or near the time, I am obliged to think that the venerable man blended together his recollections of the totality of the influence and doctrines of Otis during the years 1761-6. I own that I have had embarrassment in adjusting the authorities." Bancroft: History, IV. 416. If St. John did not compose and write his Gospel until A. D. 80, or 90, he certainly would have needed supernatural assistance in reporting so minutely and fully as he has the last discourse of Christ, some fifty or more years after its delivery.

tion with it. Everything depends, in settling this question, upon the view taken of the connection between thought and language. If words are merely arbitrary signs of ideas, like the algebraic symbols plus and minus,—mere marks, having no affinity with the ideas, and not prompted by them—then an idea might be suggested by inspiration without any prompting or suggestion of a word to express it. Thought and language in this case are wholly diverse and disconnected, and if words are given to the prophet by which to exhibit the *wordless* thoughts that have been started in his mind, it must be by dictation. Dictation is the standing objection to verbal inspiration. Upon this theory of language, it is assumed that the two processes of thinking and expressing thought can each go on by itself independently of the other, and that the thought does not naturally and inevitably prompt the word. When an author dictates to a scribe, the scribe does not go through the mental process along with the author; any more than does the type-setter in setting up type; any more than does the parrot in repeating human words. The scribe does not think the author's thoughts along with him, but mechanically writes down what he hears with his ear. In this instance, the ideas and the words, for the scribe, are entirely separated from each other. If this be the true theory of the relation of language to thought, then verbal inspiration would be dictation.

But if it be held that there is a natural affinity and a necessary connection between thought and language, then whatever prompts thought prompts language, and an influence upon one is an influence upon the other. The suggestion of ideas inevitably involves the suggestion of words. Thought and language upon this theory are inseparable, so that when the Holy Spirit inspires a prophet, the mind of the prophet is so moved that he not merely thinks, but utters his thinking in language that is suitable and simultaneously imbreathed and prompted along with the thought. Both alike are theopneus-

tic.¹ This is wholly different from dictation. Dictation separates thought and language; verbal inspiration unites them. Verbal inspiration is the truth, if thought is prior to and suggests language; but not if language is prior to and suggests thought. The inspired writer in this latter case does not have the thought until he has had the word, and the word is dictated to him by the Spirit, not prompted in him by the inspired thought in his own mind.

That words are not arbitrary signs of ideas, having no natural connection and affinity with the ideas expressed by them, is proved: 1. By Scripture. According to the Bible, an idea and its word are the same thing essentially. They are human thought in two different modes or forms. When a thought is in the mind, or unuttered, it is an idea. When that same thought is out of the mind, or uttered, it is a word. An idea is an internal word; and a word is an external idea. To speak, is to think externally; and to think, is to speak internally. Accordingly, the Scriptures denominate thinking internal speaking. "The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God," Ps. 14: 1. "Begin not to say within yourselves," Luke 3: 8. "Afterwards he said within himself," Luke 18: 4. In these instances, thinking is mental speaking, and consequently speaking is vocal thinking. With this agrees our own modern usage. In common parlance, when men utter their thoughts in words, they are said to "think aloud." In Greek, *λόγος* signifies both reason and word. Reason is internal thought (*λόγος ἐνδιάθετος*); word is external thought (*λόγος προφορικός*).

2. By comparing the sounds of human language with

¹ Says Philippi (Glaubenslehre, Zweiter Kapitel), "While we maintain verbal inspiration (Wortinspiration), we do not mean the inspiration of each word separately and by itself (Wörterinspiration)." As he explains his meaning, it seems to be, that an apostle, or prophet, under the impulse of the Divine Spirit, originated a product that as a unity and a whole was inspired both in matter and form, thought and language. But each particular word, one by one, was not mechanically and separately suggested to him. The process of inspiration was dynamical, continuous, and flowing.

other sounds. Human language is not mere unmeaning noise, like the sounds in material nature, such as that of falling water, or of thunder. These sounds have no sense or signification for the human reason. Nor is human language like the cries of animals, or the singing of birds. These sounds, though approaching nearer to human speech than do the sounds of material nature, yet contain no intellectual ideas or conceptions. They are thoughtless inarticulate cries, not language proper. But the sounds of every human language are thoughtful, and waken thought. They are not mere sounds, but sounds filled with sense and meaning for the human mind. See Torrey: *Theory of Fine Art*, 236.

3. By the fact that shades of an idea suggest varieties of words. This explains the origin of synonyms. The author of *Proverbs* denominates the second trinitarian person Wisdom; St. John denominates him Reason. The two phases of the revealed idea suggest the two different terms for it.

4. By the fact that men think in words. (a). If an Englishman reads or speaks the French language, his thinking is connected with English words alone, unless he has made the French language as familiar as his own, and can think in it. Before he can grasp the idea, he must transfer it from the French word to the corresponding English one. Not until this process has been gone through, is he master of the thought. Here, thought is necessarily connected with language. The following from a work of fiction illustrates this. "Madame de Lalouve spoke very good English indeed, and her accent, especially, was all but faultless, but she had the defect of thinking in French, and translating afterwards into our vernacular, and hence her speech occasionally lapsed into Gallic idioms and turns of language. It was quite otherwise with that other linguist whose nickname was Chinese Jack. He was one of those polyglot talkers who are possessed of the rare gift of thinking in any articulate tongue, from Hebrew to Japanese, and therefore of ex-

pressing his thoughts as a Malay, or a Persian, or a Spaniard would do, and not as a scholar with an elaborate acquaintance with the language would do." (b). Intense thinking often causes audible wording or phrasing of the thought; for example, whispering, or speaking aloud to one's self. (c). The dumb person, *attempts* to utter his thoughts in an inarticulate murmur or sound of some kind. His ideas struggle for utterance, implying that an idea is incomplete without its word. (d). A tribe of men without an articulate language, if such could be found, would be without human ideas. Their range of consciousness would be like that of the brutes. Sometimes a particular word is found to be wanting in a language, and it is also found that the particular idea is wanting also. The missionary Riggs reports that the Dakota language contained no word for one quarter, or one eighth, and so on, because the people had no idea of such fractions. They stopped with the notion of one half, in their calculations, and went no further mentally. "Only one word," he says, "exists—*hankay*, half. We missionaries in writing out and improving the language can say *hankay-hankay*, the half of a half; but the tribe do not. Besides *hankay*, there is nothing but the word for a piece. But this is an indefinite word, and not suited for the certainties of mathematics. The poverty of the language has been a great obstacle in teaching arithmetic. But the poor-ness of the language shows their poverty of thought in the same line."

5. By the fact that a peculiar kind of thought expresses itself spontaneously in a particular kind of phraseology. Poetic thought suggests and prompts poetic forms of language; philosophic thought suggests and prompts philosophic forms, etc.¹

¹ On the necessary connection of thought and language, compare Müller: *Science of Language*, First Series, Lectures I. II. IX.; *Science of Thought*, I. 284, sq. Westcott: *Study of the Gospels* (Introduction). Shedd: *Literary Essays*, 149-168.

Scripture itself asserts verbal inspiration. Jer. 1:9, "I have put words in thy mouth;" Luke 21:12-15, "I will give you a mouth and wisdom"—both language and thought; Matt. 10:20, "It is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you;" Acts 2:4, "They spake as the Spirit gave them utterance;" 2 Peter 1:21, "Holy men spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." Words are carefully selected by the inspired mind, under divine guidance. In John 10:35, stress is laid upon the use of the word "gods" as applied to prophets and magistrates; and in Gal. 3:16, upon the use of the singular "seed," not the plural "seeds." The neuter is employed instead of the masculine, when the idea of the impersonal becomes of great consequence; e.g.: Luke 1:35, τὸ γεννώμενον ἅγιον; John 10:30, ἐν instead of ἔς. In Phil. 2:6, μορφή Θεοῦ is used instead of ὁυσία Θεοῦ, because the idea is that of a particular trinitarian person, not of the divine essence simply. In John 17:24, the Receptus reads οὓς δέδωκας, and the uncials read ὁ δέδωκας. If the idea in the mind of the inspired writer was that of the church as a collective unity, the thought suggested the word ὁ. If it was that of particular individuals, the thought suggested the word οὓς.

The objections urged against the plenary inspiration of the Bible are the following:

1. There are discrepancies and errors in the history, geography, and chronology. In replying to this objection, it is to be remarked in the outset, that the correction of a book by itself is different from its correction by other books. There is only apparent error in the first case; in the second there is real error. If the witness himself while upon the stand explains satisfactorily certain variations in his own testimony, this does not invalidate his testimony. But if another witness contradicts or corrects him, this awakens doubt and may invalidate.

Now it is a fact that many of the difficulties of which we

are speaking do not arise from a discrepancy between the Bible and other books, but between parts of the Bible itself. For example, 2. Kings 8 : 26 asserts that Ahaziah was twenty-two years old when he began to reign, and 2 Chron. 22 : 2 asserts that he was forty-two years old at that time. One of these must be corrected by the other. Again, Luke relates that one of the malefactors reviled Christ, and the other did not; Mark says that "they that were crucified with him reviled him;" and Matthew that "the thieves also which were crucified with him" insulted him. These variations can be shown to be consistent with one another, by comparing scripture with scripture, as is done in the ordinary Harmonies of the Gospels. It is plain, in reference to such seeming discrepancies, that inasmuch as each sacred writer knew what had been said by his predecessors, what appears to be contradiction to a modern reader must have been none for the original author. He evidently was not aware of any real discrepancy. For had he been, he would either have referred to it and harmonized it with his own, or else would have avoided it altogether by verbally conforming his own statement to that of his predecessor.

The Bible then is self-rectifying. The book furnishes the materials for its own verification. This is wholly different from rectification from human sources, such as profane literature. When scripture explains or if need be corrects scripture, the divine explains and verifies the divine; inspiration explains inspiration; spiritual things are compared with spiritual, 1 Cor. 2 : 13. But if scripture requires to be explained and corrected by human authorities, then the divine is rectified by the human. In the first case, the error is only seeming; in the last, it is real.

Another preliminary remark is, that minor and unessential variations are positive proofs of truthfulness in a witness. Had the Gospels been forged, there would not have been even seeming discrepancies, because pains would have

been taken to avoid them. Discrepancies of a certain kind, are sure proof of an absence of collusion and previous agreement between the evangelists. Variations are not necessarily contradictions. The testimony of witnesses in court who agree in the general, is not rejected because of some unessential diversity. If each witness exactly and parrot-like repeated the other's testimony, he would be suspected for the very reason of exact similarity. There may be too much agreement between witnesses, as well as too little.

Minor variations, consequently, are not inconsistent with plenary inspiration. As they are compatible with a true account, they are also compatible with an infallible account. In saying that the Holy Spirit inspired both Matthew and John in writing a memoir of Christ, it is not meant that he guided them in such a way that each related the very same incidents in the very same manner, and in the very same words; that he inspired them to produce two *fac-similes*. But the meaning is, that he guided each in such a manner that the individuality of each writer was preserved in the choice of incidents, in their arrangement, and in the phraseology; and yet in such a manner that neither writer attributes to Christ a parable which he did not teach, a miracle which he did not work, or describes him as concerned in occurrences with which he really had nothing to do. Luke's order differs in some particulars from that of Matthew, but this does not prove that there is historical error in either of them. A biographer may know the actual and true order, and yet alter it for logical or rhetorical reasons. He may, for such reasons, throw together in one group a series of parables or miracles which were spoken or wrought at different times, and still his account of the parables and miracles cannot be charged with mistake, because the grouping is apparent on the face of his narrative.

Four different persons may be inspired to relate the biography of Christ, and may produce four narratives that are infallible, or free from error, without mentioning the

very same incidents, in the very same order, in the same degree of detail, and in the same phraseology. The object or oftentimes seems to suppose that infallibility means not only freedom from error, but such an identity of statement as would amount to a fac-simile. The inscription on the cross is an example. Matthew reports that it was, "This is Jesus, the King of the Jews." Mark, that it was, "The King of the Jews." Luke, that it was, "This is the King of the Jews." John, that it was, "Jesus of Nazareth the King of the Jews." Now if infallibility means freedom from error in the statement actually made, and not the exclusion of every kind of variety in the manner of stating a fact, and so the production of a mere fac-simile, these four reports are infallible. Mark is not in error when he says that the inscription was, "The King of the Jews." These words were in the inscription, as the other reports show. He states the truth, though not the whole truth. Had he said in addition that these were the *ipsisima verba*, and were *all* the words, he would have stated an error.

From the list therefore of alleged discrepancies and errors, must be deducted all such as scripture itself enables the reader to correct. To these belong: (*a*). Errors of copyists. 2 Kings 8:26, "Ahaziah was two and twenty years old when he began to reign," compared with 2 Chron. 22:2, "Forty and two years old when he began to reign." According to 1 Sam. 6:19, 50070 men were slain for looking into the ark; seventy men probably being the number. Speaker's Commentary in loco. Says Rawlinson (Introduction to Chronicles), "The condition of the text of Chronicles is far from satisfactory. Various readings are frequent, particularly the names of persons and places which occur in different forms not likely to have been used by the same writer. Numerous omissions are found, especially in the genealogies, where sometimes important names have dropt out; and sometimes the names which remain do not

agree with the numerical statement attached to them. But the most important corruptions are in the numbers in Samuel or Kings, sometimes unreasonably large, and therefore justly suspected. Other defects are a derangement in the order of the words, and the substitution of a more familiar term for one less known."

(b). Errors in translation.

(c). Discrepancies which greater fulness of detail in the narrative would remove. "Brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio," says Horace. A harmony of the four Gospels that removes every difficulty without exception is probably not possible, because of the sketch-like nature of the narrative. The Gospels are memorabilia, and were called ἀπομνημονεύματα at first. A series of memoranda, though agreeing in principal features, are generally difficult to reconcile in all particulars. The conciseness and brevity of one evangelist at a particular point, sometimes makes it difficult or even impossible to show his agreement in this particular with another evangelist who is fuller at this point. But no evangelist ever differs so greatly from the others as to destroy his own historical credibility, or that of the others. Differences sometimes arise from silence on the part of a writer, and these are alleged to be contradictions. Mark and John give no account of the miraculous conception of Christ by the Holy Ghost, yet both of them imply it. He is a supernatural and divine person for them both. There is nothing in Mark and John that contradicts the miraculous conception. John gives no account of the institution of the Lord's Supper, but he records conversations of Christ that involve the fact. See John 6: 48-58. Two inspired narratives may be each infallible, and yet one contain more information than the other. Had Matthew, for example, related two of Christ's temptations in the desert, and omitted the third, while Luke related all three, both accounts would have been inerrant, provided that Matthew had not positively asserted that there were *only* two temptations. There would be no just ground for

saying that the two accounts contradicted each other. It is not necessary that an inspired person should know all things, or even report all that he does know; but only that what he does report should be true. The evangelists were permitted and thus inspired to omit some incidents in Christ's life; for it is improbable that the contents of the four Gospels contain all that the four evangelists knew concerning him. "There are also many other things which Jesus did, the which, if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written," John 21:25.

(d). Discrepancies arising from a general statement by one witness, and a particular statement by another, and sometimes by one and the same witness. Matthew (27:44), and Mark (15:32), say that the thieves crucified with Christ reviled him. The reference here is to a class of men. Luke (23:39-43) says that one of them reviled him, and the other did not. He enters into detail, as the other evangelists do not. According to Acts 9:7, the companions of Saul heard the heavenly voice but "saw no man;" according to Acts 22:9, they saw the light, but "heard not the voice." The very same person, namely Luke, who made the first statement made the last, and was not aware of any contradiction between the two. In the first passage, an indistinct sound from heaven is intended, as in Matt. 24:31 (*σάλπιγγος φωνή*); in the last passage, articulate words are meant. The companions of Saul saw the light, but not a human form; they heard a sound, but not intelligible language.

(e). Difficulties arising from an incorrect interpretation of scripture. The explanation of the word "day" in Genesis 1, is a marked instance. Exegetes for many years interpreted it to mean a day of twenty-four hours, thereby bringing Genesis and geology into collision. But so far as the text is concerned, there is full right and reason to explain it as a period. This was the first interpretation, because it

was the most natural one. The patristic exegetes so understood the word. "The meaning," says Whewell (*Inductive Sciences*, I. 286), "which any generation puts upon the phrases of scripture, depends more than is at first sight supposed upon the received philosophy of the time. Hence while men imagine that they are contending for revelation, they are in fact contending for their own interpretation of revelation. At the present day, we can hardly conceive how reasonable men should have imagined that religious reflections in scripture respecting the stability of the earth, and the beauty and use of the luminaries which revolve around it, would be interfered with by the acknowledgment that this rest and motion are apparent only."

(*f*). Difficulties in Biblical chronology arise from the fact that the sacred writer does not give a full list of all the names in a series, but only a selected list. Sometimes he omits the name of the son and passes to that of the grandson, or great-grandson, whom he calls a "son." In Gen. 46: 16-18, three generations, sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons, are all called the "sons" of Zilpah. The genealogical tables of the Jews were drawn up artificially. That of our Lord by Matthew is an example. Fourteen names are selected in each of the three periods mentioned. But it would be a great error to infer that Matthew intended to teach that there were exactly fourteen generations, no more and no less, in each of these periods, and should calculate the time accordingly. Gardiner: *Harmony*, Pt. I. 39. The evangelist took the catalogue of names given in the temple records, and modified it to suit his purpose. This method makes it impossible for one living many centuries later, to construct a Biblical chronology that shall be mathematically precise down to a year, or a score of years. Only an approximation was intended by the writer himself, and the Holy Spirit who guided him. Sometimes, in quoting, a round number is given instead of the exact. Stephen says 400 for 430, in Acts 7: 6. Speaker's Commentary in loco.

In addition to this, there is the difference between the Hebrew text from which the modern versions have been made, and that from which the Septuagint version was made. There is a difference of 1500 years. Which is the original text? Only the original is the inspired text.

But while the Biblical chronology is only approximately, not mathematically accurate, it does not follow that it is erroneous. There can be no mathematically exact chronology. The Scripture chronology is free from the fatally damaging error which characterizes all the early ethnical chronology—namely, of attributing an immense antiquity to man and nations. The inspired writers bring all human history within a period of six or eight thousand years. In so doing, they teach no error. This chronology is confirmed by the monuments and records of Assyria, Babylon, and Egypt. Speaker's Commentary: Introduction to Kings and Hosea. Beecher: Presbyterian Review, July, 1881.

(g). Difficulties arising from attributing to the sacred writer statements that are not his, but which he merely records. These make a large list, and furnish some of the most specious objections to the doctrine of plenary inspiration. It is objected, for example, that the discourse of Stephen, in Acts 7, contains chronological and other errors. Even if this can be made out, these errors are not imputable to Luke who reports the discourse. Stephen is indeed said to have been "full of the Holy Ghost," Acts 6:5; and so is Barnabas, Acts 11:24. But neither of them belonged to the apostolic college of infallible teachers of the Church. This is one of a multitude of statements in Scripture, both of fact and of opinion, whose *authorship* is not referable to the inspired writers who merely report them.

(h). Variations in citations from the Old Testament in the New. These are neither errors nor contradictions, because the variation is *intended* by the New Testament writer. The statement of Davidson in the earlier edition of his *Hermeneutics* expresses the catholic opinion. "Every

mode of quotation has been employed, from the exactest to the loose; from the strictly verbal method to the widest paraphrase; but in no case is violence done to the meaning of the original." In the later editions of his work, Davidson recedes from this position, and agrees with the rationalist, who affirms that the meaning of an Old Testament passage is sometimes wrested in quotation by St. Paul. Immer (Hermeneutics) so asserts. That a New Testament writer quotes an Old Testament passage by way of accommodation, does not disprove his inspiration. He may be divinely guided to do this, as well as to quote strictly. The passage which he cites, even if not taken in its first and strictest sense, is yet suited to teach the particular truth which he is inspired to convey. An apostle may adapt a text to his present purpose, as a preacher may, provided the text as so adapted aids him in imparting truth, not error. The same remark holds respecting verbal variation in quoting. That a New Testament writer quotes Moses *ad sensum* and not *ad verbum*, does not prove that he is uninspired and fallible upon the subject which he is presenting.

Respecting the difficulties in Scripture that are still unsettled, it is to be noticed that there is no alleged error in doctrine, history, chronology, and physics, that has been demonstrated to be such so irrefragably that it is absurd to attempt a reply. There is no list of conceded errors in scripture. There are perplexities remaining, but while there is not an instance in which the controversy with the skeptic has resulted in establishing the fact of undoubted error in revelation, there are many instances in which it has resulted in demonstrating its truth and accuracy. The skeptical criticism to which the canon has been subjected for a period of nineteen centuries has strengthened, not weakened, the doctrine of plenary inspiration. The discoveries in Nineveh, Babylon, and Egypt, in particular, evince this.

The infallibility of Scripture is denied upon the ground

that it contains a human element. The human is fallible and liable to error. If therefore the Bible has a human element in it, as is conceded, it cannot be free from all error. This is one of the principal arguments urged by those who assert the fallibility of Scripture.

This objection overlooks the fact, that the human element in the Bible is so *modified* by the divine element with which it is blended, as to differ from the merely ordinary human. The written Word is indeed Divine-human, like the incarnate Word. But the human element in Scripture, like the human nature in our Lord, is preserved from the defects of the common human, and becomes the pure and ideal human. The human mind alone and by itself is fallible, but when inspired and moved by the Holy Spirit becomes infallible, because it is no longer alone and by itself. The written word, in this respect, is analogous to the incarnate Word. The humanity of Christ, by reason of its assumption into personal union with the eternal Logos, while remaining really and truly human, is yet not the ordinary sinful humanity. It is perfectly sanctified humanity, free from sin. Similarly, when the Holy Spirit inspires a human mind, though this human mind is not freed from all sin, because inspiration is not sanctification, yet it is freed from all error on the points involved. It is no longer the fallibly human, but is infallible upon all subjects respecting which it is inspired to teach. The inspired human differs from the uninspired human, similarly as the human nature that is united with the second trinitarian person differs from the human nature that is found in an ordinary man. Christ's human soul thought and felt like a real man, but without sin. The Divine-human, in this instance, is sinless. Isaiah's human mind when under inspiration thought and perceived like a real man, but without error. He was not without sin; for inspiration does not sanctify. But he was infallible; for inspiration enlightens without any mixture of untruth.

The "human element" in Scripture means, that an inspired man in perceiving and conveying truth employs his own human mind, his own native language, the common figures of speech, and exhibits his own individual peculiarities, but without misconception and error upon the *subject* of which he treats, because his human mind is actuated and guided by the Divine Mind. The doctrine, both ethical and evangelical, which the human mind under this super-human influence teaches, is infallible. The history which it relates is according to facts, and unmixed with legend. The physics which it sets forth contains no pantheism or polytheism. The chronology which it presents has no immense and fabulous antiquity, like that of Egypt and India.

Those who contend that the Bible is fallible because it contains a human element commit the same error, in kind, with those who assert that Jesus Christ was sinful because he had a human nature in his complex person. Both alike overlook the fact that when the human is supernaturally brought into connection with the divine, it is greatly modified and improved, and obtains some characteristics that do not belong to it of and by itself alone. When the Logos would assume a human nature into union with himself, this nature was first *prepared* for the union by being perfectly sanctified by the Holy Spirit in the miraculous conception. And when the Holy Spirit selects a particular person—Moses, Samuel, David, Isaiah, John, Paul—as his organ for communicating religious truth to mankind, he first makes him infallible, though he does not make him sinless. Consequently, the human element in the prophecy, or the history, or the dogma, which this inspired person gives to the Church, is not a fallible element, because it is blended with the divine element of inspiration and kept free from human error.

2. A second objection urged against the doctrine of plenary inspiration is, that there is a conflict between the Bib-

lical physics and natural science.¹ Upon this subject, the following is to be remarked :

1. The inspired writers were permitted to employ the astronomy and physics of the people and age to which they themselves belonged, because the true astronomy and physics would have been unintelligible. If the account of the miracle of Joshua had been related in the terms of the Copernican astronomy ; if Joshua had said, "Earth stand thou still," instead of, "Sun stand thou still" ; it could not have been understood. The modern astronomer himself describes the sun as rising and setting.

2. If the inspired writers had distinctly and formally represented the popular physics of their day to be the absolute and scientific physics for all time, as they represent the gospel to be the absolute and final religion for all time ; if they had endorsed and defended the Ptolemaic astronomy ; this would have proved them to be fallible and uninspired. But this they never do. Except in a few places which we shall specify, the Bible does not commit itself to any system of physics. The purpose of the scriptures, says Baronius, is "to teach man how to go to heaven, and not how the heavens go." The sacred writers employ the geocentric physics in their descriptions of natural phenomena, as Kepler and Newton do when they speak of sunrise and sunset, but they nowhere set forth this popular physics as revealed and infallible truth. Because the sacred writer (Josh. 10 : 12-14) describes the sun as standing still, it does not follow that he taught the Ptolemaic astronomy. He had no particular astronomical system whatever in view. Kepler so understood him. "The only thing which Joshua prayed for, was that the mountains might not intercept the sun from him. It had been very unreasonable at that time to think of astronomy, or of the errors of sight and sense ; for if any one had told him that the sun could not really move on

¹ See Whewell: *Inductive Sciences*, V. iii. 4 (The Copernican System opposed on theological grounds).

the valley of Ajalon except only in reference to sense, would not Joshua have answered that his desire was that the day might be prolonged, so it were by any means whatever." Kepler: *On Rash Citations from Scripture*. Stanley: *Jewish Church*, 1st Series, 277.

Lord Bacon, alluding to "the school of Paracelsus and some others that have pretended to find the truth of all natural philosophy in scripture," remarks that in so doing "they do not give honor to the scriptures as they suppose, but much embase them. For to seek heaven and earth, in the word of God, whereof it is said 'heaven and earth shall pass away, but my word shall not pass,' is to seek temporary things amongst eternal; and as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek the living amongst the dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek the dead amongst the living; neither are the pots or lavers, whose place was in the outward part of the temple, to be sought in the holiest place of all, where the ark of the testimony was seated. The scope or purpose of the Spirit of God is not to express matters of nature in the scriptures otherwise than in passage, and for application to man's capacity, and to matters moral or divine." *Advancement of Learning*, II. (sub. fine).

3. At the same time, physical science is to some extent taught by revelation and recorded by inspiration. It is erroneous to say that the Bible commits itself to no physics whatever. Certain truths and facts in regard to the material universe were revealed to some of the writers of the Bible, and these have infallibility. Most of these disclosures relating to physics are made in the beginning of the scriptures. The book of Genesis contains the principal of them. The Holy Spirit having revealed as much respecting the material world as seemed good to him, preparatory to his revelations respecting the spiritual world, is afterwards silent. Christ himself, "by whom all things were made, and without whom was not anything made that was

made," makes no further disclosures than those which were granted to Moses.

The positive and distinct teachings of revelation, in the opening of Genesis, respecting the physical universe, differ remarkably from the popular physics of the ancient world. Moses does not present a cosmogony like that of Assyria, or Egypt, or India, or Greece and Rome. His idea of the relation which matter sustains to God is wholly different from that of even as deep a thinker as Plato.

Among the peculiarities that distinguish the revealed physics are the following :

1. The doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*; in sharp contrast : (a). To the eternity of matter, in atheism; (b). To emanation from the deity, in pantheism; (c). To fanciful fabrications by a multitude of gods, in polytheism. If the sacred writers had been left to themselves, their physics would have been tinctured with one or all of these. But there is nothing of these theories in the Bible. The doctrine of creation from nothing appears everywhere. "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," Gen. 1:1. "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting thou art God," Ps. 90:2. "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old, or ever the earth was. When there were no depths I was brought forth. Before the mountains were settled, before the hills, was I brought forth: while as yet he had not made the earth, and the highest part of the dust of the world. When he prepared the heavens I was there, when he set a compass upon the face of the earth, when he gave the sea his decree, then I was by him as one brought up with him," Proverbs 8:23-30. "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?" Job 38:4. "All things were made by him," John 1:3. "God calleth those things which be not, as though they were," Rom. 4:17. "By him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth,

visible and invisible," Col. 1:10. Mosheim, in a learned dissertation annexed to his translation of Cudworth (Ed. Tegg, III. 144), shows that none of the heathen philosophers taught that the world was created *ex nihilo*.

2. The absolute independence of God in relation to the universe. He is before all things, and by him all things exist. This is in marked contrast to the common view in the ancient physics, and in the skeptical schools in modern physics. In the physics of Plato and Aristotle, the deity is conditioned by the *ἔλῃ*, though a comparatively lofty and spiritual view of the deity is held. In the cruder physics of Lucretius, mind is wholly subject to matter. The deity is not a free and independent being, so far as the material universe is concerned. Material law rules everything, so that a supernatural act is impossible.

3. The absolute omnipotence of God in relation to the universe. Forces and laws of nature are under his entire control. They can be originated, or altered, or suspended by their Creator. This feature is also utterly antagonistic to the natural science of the ancient world. See Isaiah 40: 12, 15, 22; Ps. 104.

4. In the opening chapters of Genesis, the order of creation that is given is wholly different from that in the heathen cosmogonies. The Mosaic account begins with the origin of light. Had man been left to conjecture whether the principle of life was originated before that of light, he would have been in doubt which to place first in the order. Moses places it second. Even when the Mosaic account is adopted, there is a propensity to alter it. Coleridge (Table Talk, Apr. 30, 1823), after remarking that the Zendavesta must have been copied in parts from the writings of Moses, says that "in the description of creation, the first chapter of Genesis is taken almost literally, except that the sun is created *before* the light, and then the herbs and the plants after the sun: which are precisely the two points they did not understand, and therefore altered as errors." A theorist

having only the ordinary data would unquestionably have placed the sun in the heavens, before he placed grass, herbs, and trees, upon the earth. Moses would naturally have done the same, if his information had been merely human. God revealed the fact to him as it actually was. And physical science now finds a geological period of warm-water oceans, dense mists, and high temperature, extremely favorable to vegetable life and growth, long before the sun was able to penetrate the thick and dark vapor with its rays. Again, a theorist might very naturally have placed the creation of marine life on the third day, in connection with the gathering together of the waters, and the formation of the seas and oceans. The element in which fishes and reptiles live would suggest their origination. But Moses places it on the fifth day, in connection with the creation of air animals and man. The order and succession of creative acts as represented by Moses evinces its originality. It is not copied from human schemes, but often runs counter to them. But this difference and contrariety proves that the Biblical account of the creation proceeded from a different source from that of the Egyptian, or the Hindoo, or the Greek and Roman cosmogony.

The Scriptures, then, as an inspired sum-total, are to be referred to God as their author. They are not a national literature, like that of Greece, Rome, or England. This view, ably presented by Ewald, makes the Bible merely the development of a national mind; in which case, infallibility and authority could no more belong to it than to any other national literature. But the Bible was not produced by the Hebrew nation. It was the product of a select number chosen from time to time out of the nation, and specially informed and inspired by God. The Old and New Testaments were composed by a college of prophets and apostles, not by the people of Israel. Inspiration belongs to an inspired circle of Hebrews, not to the Hebrews generally. Moses, and Samuel, and David, and Isaiah, and their inspired associ-

ates, were enlightened by the Holy Spirit, in order that they might impart to the people to which they belonged a knowledge that was otherwise inaccessible to that people, and to all peoples. It is true that the Bible is tinged with Hebrew coloring. It is not a Latin or an English book. And this, because the inspired persons through whose instrumentality it was originated were Hebrews. But this does not prove that the truths and facts which it contains, were derived merely from the operation of the common national mind.

The infallibility and authority which distinguish the Scriptures from all other books, are due to the Divine authorship. But God employed various modes in this authorship. This is taught in Hebrews 1:1, 2. "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners (*πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως*) spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son." Here, the prophets of the Old Testament, and Christ, the subject of the revelation, are mentioned as the media through whom the Divine Mind was communicated. To these, must be added the apostles of the New Testament.

The "divers manners," in which God made the communications now included in the Bible, are the following:

1. By a theophany or personal appearance of God. (*a*). God appears in a form, and directly speaks words to an individual in his waking and ordinary condition. Gen. 18:1-17; Ex. 3:4; 19:20. (*b*). God appears in a form, and directly speaks to an individual in a dream. Gen. 28:12. (*c*). God appears in a form, and directly speaks to an individual in an extatic vision. Ezek. 8:1. It is the second person of the trinity who appears in these theophanies, and speaks words to an individual. It is in this reference that he is called the Word, John 1:1; and the "image of the invisible God," Col. 1:15; and the "express image of the Father's person," Heb. 1:3. Compare Edwards: Work of

Redemption, I. i. Owen: Holy Spirit in Prayer, II. Martensen: Dogmatics, § 125.

2. Without any theophany or personal appearance of God. (a). By the high-priest with Urim and Thummim. Ex. 28:30; 1 Sam. 28:6. (b). By the prophets under an *afflatus*. 2 Kings 21:10; Rom. 1:2; 1 Peter 1:11, 12; 2 Peter 1:21; 1 Cor. 2:13. (c). By the apostles under an *afflatus*. 1 Cor. 2:13; Gal. 1:12; Eph. 3:3; 1 Thess. 2:13.

3. By the incarnation. Christ's communications of truth, in their manner, were like the direct utterances of God in the theophanies of the Old Testament, and not like those indirect communications which were made through the prophets and apostles. The Jehovah in the theophany was the same trinitarian person who is in the incarnation. The theophany was the harbinger of the incarnation. God in the form of angel, bush, or dove, prepared for God in a human form. Christ differed from the prophets and apostles, in that he did not speak under an *afflatus*, but from the divine nature itself. The eternal Word is the infinite fullness of all knowledge. "That was the true Light," John 1:9. "God giveth not the Spirit by measure unto him," John 3:34. As Christ wrought miracles not as an agent, but as deity itself, so he spake truth from himself, and not as an inspired man receiving it from God.

CHAPTER II.

AUTHENTICITY OF THE SCRIPTURES.

Marsh : Lectures on Divinity, XXIII.-XXXIV. Graves : On the Pentateuch. Macdonald : On the Pentateuch. Hengstenberg : Authenticity of the Pentateuch. Keil and Delitzsch : Commentary on Old Testament. Bible Commentary : Introductions to the several books of Scripture. Lange : Commentary. Faber : *Horæ Mosaicæ*. Havernick : Introduction to Pentateuch. Norton : Genuineness of the Gospels. Westcott : New Testament Canon. Lightfoot : Examination of "Supernatural Religion." Ebrard : On the Gospel History, Pt. II. Div. ii. Green : Hebrew Feasts ; Pentateuch Vindicated ; Moses and the Prophets. Curtiss : Levitical Priests. Bissell : Origin of the Pentateuch. Sanday : The Gospels in the Second Century. Bleek, J. : Introduction to the Old Testament. Bleek, F. : Introduction to the New Testament. Watts : The Newer Criticism. Fisher : Supernatural Origin of Christianity. Bartlett : Sources of History in the Pentateuch. Mill : Pantheistic Principles of Interpretation. Essays : On Pentateuchal Criticism.

THE authenticity of a book is its genuineness.¹ A written composition is authentic, if it is the product of the person to whom it is attributed. The Apostles' Creed lacks authenticity, because it was not composed by the Apostles, to whom it is attributed ; the Epistle to the Romans is authentic, because it can be proved to be the composition of St. Paul.

The credibility of a book is distinguishable from its au-

¹ Watson (Apology, Letter II.) defines "an authentic book" as one "that relates matters of fact as they really happened." This is credibility, and is the earlier use of the term. The later usage makes authenticity to mean genuineness. Compare Shakespeare's use with that of Addison and Burke, in Richardson's Dictionary, sub voce.

thenticity. Gulliver's Travels is authentic, being the genuine product of Swift, but its contents are fictitious. In the case of human products, there may be authenticity without credibility. But in the case of a Divine product, the fact of authenticity establishes the fact of credibility. If it be proved that God is the author of the Bible, the Bible must be credible. Hence in reference to the Scriptures, the two topics of authenticity and credibility are inseparable, and must be discussed in connection with each other.

In establishing the authenticity of the Scriptures, the natural method is first to prove the authenticity of the New Testament, and then to employ the New Testament in demonstrating that of the Old.

1. The first evidence that the writings of the New Testament are genuine is found in the Language. It is Hellenistic Greek, which was the dialect in use at the time when the books of the New Testament purport to have been written; and it is this dialect modified both by the Hebrew cast of thought, and by Hebrew idioms. This accords with the personal traits and peculiarities of the Evangelists and Apostles. Were the New Testament written in the classical Greek of Plato, this would be sufficient to throw doubt upon its authenticity.

2. The second proof of the genuineness of the New Testament writings is found in the testimony of the Ecclesiastical writers of the first three centuries, from Ignatius to Origen. Eusebius collected this testimony as early as 325. It is given in his History (III. xxv.; VII. xxv.); and in his *Demonstratio Evangelica*. A thorough investigation of this argument was made by Lardner, in his *Credibility of the Gospel History*. The Introductions of Michaelis, Guericke, Bleek, Reuss, and others, present the subject in a condensed form and with reference to modern attacks.

3. A third argument is found in the testimony of Heretical writers of the first three centuries. The Gnostic theorists in particular rejected some of the fundamental doctrines

of the New Testament, while they conceded the genuineness of the writings in which they were contained. This was the case with Marcion, who altered the gospel of St. Luke to make it agree with his view. The Epistles of Paul were also subjected to attack and alteration, particularly with regard to the doctrine of atonement. In these instances, the authenticity was conceded, but the authority and credibility disputed.

4. A fourth argument for the genuineness of the New Testament is found in the testimony of pagan Skeptics of the first three centuries. Celsus, Porphyry, and Lucian do not dispute the authenticity of the New Testament, but its credibility and authority.

5. A fifth argument is found in the early Versions of the New Testament. The Peshito Syriac translation was made about A.D. 175, and the Old Latin (Itala) about the same time. The two Egyptian versions were made about A.D. 250; and the Aethiopic about A.D. 350. It is incredible that these translations should have been made, if the belief had not been universal in the Church in the years 200 and 300, that the books of the New Testament were the genuine writings of the evangelists and apostles. The first translations of Dante's Divine Comedy were not made until four or five hundred years after its composition, but these versions will always constitute a strong proof of the genuineness of that poem.

6. A sixth argument is found in the doubts that were expressed by some portions of the Church respecting some parts of the New Testament. The so-called Antilegomena (James, Jude, 2d Peter, 2d and 3d John, Hebrews, and Revelation) were critically examined in reference to their authenticity, and were finally accepted by the whole church. This shows that there was more or less of a critical spirit in the Primitive church, which became satisfied by investigation. As the incredulity of Thomas resulted in the strengthening of the evidence of Christ's resurrection, so the doubts

of a portion of the Primitive church resulted in establishing the authenticity of the Antilegomena.

The authenticity of the Old Testament, unlike that of the New, obtains little support from the testimony of those who lived near the time of its origin. Its greater antiquity prevents this. The proof is of a more indirect and general nature; the strongest part of it being the testimony of Christ and his Apostles as given in the New Testament. We shall therefore consider it under the heads of Credibility and Canonicity.

CHAPTER III.

CREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES.

Grotius: *De Veritate Religionis Christianae*; Translated by Clarke. Neander: *Life of Christ*. Christlieb: *Modern Doubt*, Lectures VI.-VIII. Paley: *Evidences of Christianity*. Ebrard: *Gospel History*, Pt. II. Div. i. Norton: *Internal Evidences of Christianity*. Edersheim: *Life of Jesus*. Ellicott: *Life of Christ*. Blunt: *Coincidences of O. T. and N. T.* Lardner: *Credibility of N. T.* Robinson: *Harmony of the Gospels*. Gardiner: *Harmony of the Gospels*. Wieseler: *Synopsis of the Gospels*. Greswell: *Dissertations on the Harmony of the Gospels*. Rawlinson: *Historical Evidences*. Lange: *Life of Christ*. Keim: *Life of Jesus of Nazareth*. Weiss: *Theology of the New Testament*. Strauss: *Life of Jesus*. Streat: *Seeming Contradictions in Scripture*, London, 1654.

THE proofs of the credibility of the New Testament are the following: 1. The excellence of the doctrines taught in it. The ethics of the New Testament is greatly superior to that of Greece and Rome in elevation and spirituality. Had the early Christians possessed gunpowder, the steam engine, and the telegraph, while no others had them, their superiority in science would be undisputed. They possessed a doctrine of morals as much superior to that of paganism, as modern inventions are to ancient. The moral character produced by New Testament Christianity is higher than that produced by other religions. The Vedas, the Koran, and the still better writings of Plato and Aristotle, do not transform human nature as do the Scriptures.

Among the doctrines of Christianity is that of endless suffering for sin. If the apostles testified falsely, and the

New Testament is merely their fiction, they were liable according to their own statement to eternal perdition. . At the same time, great temporal suffering was the consequence of teaching the gospel. If they were deceivers, they suffered for their deception in this life, and were to suffer eternally in the next. A falsehood under such circumstances is improbable; for there was nothing to gain by it, either here or hereafter.

2. The character of Jesus Christ is an argument for the credibility of the New Testament. He is implicated in these writings in such a manner that if they are false, he is an impostor. Whatever be the kind of the falsehood, it cleaves to him. If the writings were forged designedly, he was an accomplice. If they are erroneous by reason of ignorance and superstition, he shares in this ignorance and superstition. But he claims all knowledge upon the subjects discussed in the New Testament. In this lies the absurdity of Renan's portraiture of Christ. According to Renan, Christ was self-deluded and superstitious and yet the ideal man.

3. The effects of the New Testament in the history of the world are an argument for its credibility. Christendom proves the truth of Christianity. That the best part of human history rests upon a falsehood, is incredible. The rule, "By their fruits ye shall know them," applies here. As grapes cannot be gathered from a thorn bush, so the philosophy, the poetry, the science, the art, the morality, and the civilization of the Christian in distinction from the heathen world could not have sprung from imposture and delusion. The Koran has not produced such effects in human history, nor have the Vedas. The Koran did not make its way by its intrinsic moral force, but by the sword. If it had been left like the New Testament to its own unassisted qualities, it would not have made converts beyond the family of Mohammed. The spread of Mormonism is an illustration. There is no sword to force it into sway, and

therefore it remains a small local sect in Utah. Christianity, though greatly helped, does not depend upon earthly victory at critical points in its history. Had Charles Martel been defeated by the Saracens at Poitiers, this would not have annihilated the Christian religion; any more than the ten persecutions did.

4. The miracles of the New Testament prove the credibility of its doctrines. This supposes that the truthfulness of the miracle has previously been established. If it be conceded that Jesus Christ really did raise Lazarus from the dead by his own power, he must have had creative power. This evinces him to have been a divine being; and if divine, of course a being of absolute truth. If it be conceded that the apostles of Christ did really perform miracles by the power of Jesus Christ imparted to them, then they must have been in communication with him, and his credibility attaches to them as his agents and instruments. For it is incredible that miraculous power should originally belong to an evil being, though it may be delegated to him. The intuitive judgment is expressed in John 9:16, 33; 10:21, "Can a devil open the eyes of the blind? How can a man that is a sinner do such miracles? If this man were not of God, he could do nothing [miraculous]." A miracle therefore, if an actual historical fact, is a proof of the divine origin of the truths attested by it.

The historical reality of a miracle is proved in the same manner that any historical event is proved; namely, by human testimony. Testimony is another man's memory. We trust our own memory as we trust our own senses, because memory is a remembered sensation, or consciousness. If therefore another person is honest and possesses as good senses as ourselves, there is no more reason for disbelieving his remembered sensations than for disbelieving our own. We prove that miracles were wrought by Christ and his apostles, by the testimony, or remembered experience of honest men, not of inspired men. This is to be carefully

noticed. The resurrection of Lazarus is established by the same kind of evidence as that by which the assassination of Julius Cæsar is proved; namely, that of capable and truthful eye-witnesses. Inspiration is not brought in to strengthen the testimony, in one case any more than in the other. It is the common human testimony, such as is accepted in a court of law, that is relied upon to establish the historical reality of a miracle. Those Jews who saw Lazarus come forth from the tomb, and those Jews who afterwards saw him alive, were none of them inspired men at the time when the miracle was performed. A few of them were afterwards inspired, but this inspiration added nothing to their honesty, or to their capacity as witnesses; for inspiration is not sanctification.

The argument from miracles is therefore no argument in a circle. We do not prove that certain miracles were performed because certain inspired men saw them, and then proceed to prove that these men were inspired because they wrought miracles. But we prove that certain miracles were performed, because certain truthful men saw them, and then proceed to prove that some of the truthful men were also inspired men. And among the proofs of their inspiration, is the fact that they were empowered by God to work miracles in attestation of their inspiration but not of their honesty.

That they were honest witnesses is all that the apostles claim for themselves, when they give their testimony to miracles. They say nothing in this connection about their inspiration. St. Peter affirms: "We have not followed cunningly devised fables, when we made known to you the power and coming of the Lord Jesus Christ, but were eye-witnesses of his majesty," 2 Pet. 1:16. St. Paul does the same. "I delivered unto you, how that Christ died for our sins; and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day; and that he was seen of Cephas, then of the twelve; after that he was seen of above five hundred breth-

ren at once; after that he was seen of James; then of all the apostles. And last of all he was seen of me also," 1 Cor. 15:3-8. Inspiration is not requisite in order to honesty. The "five hundred brethren" who saw Christ after his resurrection are to be regarded as capable and upright witnesses, unless the contrary can be proved. Their veracity alone is sufficient to prove the fact that he who was crucified on mount Calvary before thousands of spectators was alive again upon the earth.¹

And here it is important to observe, that the number of eye-witnesses to the gospel miracles is not to be estimated by the number of Christ's personal friends and disciples. The Jewish people generally, of that generation, were spectators of those miraculous events that accompanied the public life of Jesus Christ in Palestine, and virtually acknowledged that they were. Because the apostles in the very beginning of their preaching, and ever afterwards, boldly assert that the Jews themselves saw these miraculous events. Peter, on the day of Pentecost, addressing the "men of Israel," describes Jesus of Nazareth as "a man approved of God *among you*, by miracles and wonders and signs which God did by him *in the midst of you*, as ye yourselves know," Acts 2:22. This appeal to the whole mass of the Jewish population of that day for the truth of Christ's miracles, was not contradicted by the Jews; as it unquestionably would have been, had these miracles been the invention of a few followers of Christ. Such a bold and unblushing summoning of a whole nation as witnesses of what had never happened among them, would have been immediately repelled with scorn, and its falsehood exposed; and such a contradiction and exposure of the narratives of the first preachers of Christianity by the Jews generally, on the very spot where

¹ See South: On Christ's resurrection. Sermons, III. 91. Also Christlieb's summing up of the ten appearances of Christ after his resurrection. Modern Doubt, Lecture VII.

the miracles were asserted to have taken place, would have been a fatal obstacle to their spread among other peoples. The Jews had every motive to flatly contradict the assertion of St. Peter, that Christ's miracles had been wrought in the midst of the Jewish people, and that the Jewish people knew that they had. But they did not contradict it. The Gospel narratives continued to be repeated among the Jews, and were believed more and more widely, because no one of that generation denied that the events had occurred. It was reserved for a later generation to do this. Silence gives consent. The Jewish people of that generation, by making no objection to the testimony of the apostles, commit themselves to it. They involuntarily fall into the number of eye-witnesses for the Gospel miracles.

The force of an indirect national testimony is very great ; in some respects even greater than the direct testimony of an individual. The following remarks of Channing (*Evidences of Christianity*), respecting the testimony of a printed book compared with that of its author will apply here. "A book may be a better witness than its author. Suppose that a man claiming to be an eye-witness should relate to me the events of the three memorable days of July, in which the last revolution of France was achieved ; suppose, next, that a book, a history of that revolution, published and received as true in France, should be sent to me from that country. Which is the best evidence of the facts? I say, the last. A single witness may deceive ; but that a writer should publish in France the history of a revolution that never occurred there, or which differed from the true one, is in the highest degree improbable ; and that such a history should obtain currency, that it should not instantly be branded as a lie, is utterly impossible. A history received by a people as true, not only gives us the testimony of the writer, but the testimony of the nation among whom it obtains credit. It is a concentration of thousands of voices, of many thousands of witnesses. I say, then, that

the writings of the first teachers of Christianity, received as they were by the multitudes of Christians in their own times and in those that immediately followed, are the testimony of that multitude, as well as of the writers. Thousands nearest to the events join in bearing testimony to the Christian miracles."

While however the testimony for a miracle is the same in kind with that for any common historical event, it is stronger in degree. The world believes that Julius Cæsar was assassinated by Brutus in the Capitol, on the testimony of those who saw the deed as recorded by contemporary and succeeding historians. The credibility of this event is not disputed. But it would be possible to dispute it. Had there been any strong motive for so doing, such as obtains with some men in the instance of the Christian religion, it would have been disputed. The evidence for the assassination of Julius Cæsar is historical, not mathematical. It is assailable. And yet it goes into history, and is universally accepted as a fact of history.

The evidence for the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ is yet stronger, by reason of what may be denominated a *monumental* testimony added to the personal. Besides the testimony of those who saw these events and the record of it in the writings of the New Testament, and the few references to the death of Christ by others like Josephus and Tacitus, there is the fact of an institution like the Christian Church with its sacraments and worship, which greatly strengthens the testimony of the personal witnesses. If the assassination of Julius Cæsar had been commemorated down to the present time by a society formed in his honor, and bearing his name, the proof of his assassination would have been strengthened just so much more as this is fitted to strengthen testimony.

Now comparing the facts connected with Christianity with the facts of secular history, we see that the former have a superiority over the latter, in respect to this kind of

evidence. No event in secular history is so much supported by monumental evidence, as is the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. It is literally the centre of human history. Everything groups around it. The epoch *anno domini* from which everything is dated, Sunday with its public worship, the Church organization, the sacrament of the Supper, the feasts and fasts of Christendom, all imply the actual historical existence of Jesus Christ as he is described in the Gospels, and generally the truth of the New Testament.

It is here that one of the differences between Christianity and infidelity is apparent. Infidelity does not embody itself in institutions, and therefore has no monumental evidence. No great organization is founded upon its principles; and it is not incorporated into the structure of human society. It not only builds no churches, but it builds no hospitals. Doing nothing towards the religious welfare of man, it does nothing even for his physical wellbeing. It is not found in heathenism. It lives only in the midst of Christendom; upon which it feeds as the canker-worm does upon the vegetation which it destroys.

The miracles of the New Testament being thus supported, first, by a human testimony as strong at least as that by which the best established facts of secular history are supported, and, secondly, by an additional evidence from institutions and monuments, become a proof of the credibility of the doctrines of Christianity. For these doctrines were promulgated in connection with these miracles; so that if it be true that no one but God could have wrought the miracles, no one but God could have promulgated the doctrines.

The principal theories antagonistic to the credibility of the New Testament are the following: 1. The four Gospels are the productions of impostors, who designedly attempted to deceive. Celsus took this position. He conceded the authenticity of the gospels, but denied their credibility. They were written by Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, but

with the intention to palm off miracles as real events. Reimarus, the author of the Wolfenbüttel Fragments, adopted this view.

Generally speaking, this form of infidelity has not prevailed among learned skeptics. It is current mostly among the uneducated opponents of Christianity. It is the infidelity of the masses, so far as the masses have been infidel. It is true that this view appears somewhat among the English deists and French atheists of the 18th century. But these cannot be classed with the erudite skeptics of the present century. This is evinced by the estimate which the skepticism of this age puts upon them. Baur would not think of referring to the Philosophical Dictionary of Voltaire, as authority for his own positions. Strauss would not strengthen his statements, by such Biblical criticism as that of Toland and Collins. This species of attack, which charges downright imposture upon the Founder of Christianity and forgery and deception upon his apostles, may therefore be disregarded in the general estimate of skepticism. It does not influence the educated unbeliever. It works among the illiterate. The chorus in Burns's "Jolly Beggars" gives voice to it:

" A fig for those by law protected!
 Liberty's a glorious feast!
 Courts for cowards were erected,
 Churches built to please the priest."

2. A second and more plausible theory antagonistic to the credibility of the New Testament is the so-called mythical theory. This does not charge intentional deception, and downright imposture, upon Christ and his apostles, but would account for the narratives and teachings of the Gospels, by the unconscious and gradual self-deception of superstitious and enthusiastic men. The biography of Christ as related by the four evangelists, according to this theory, resembles that of a Roman Catholic saint as related in the

Acta Sanctorum. A devout monk dies, and one hundred years after his death the traditions respecting him are recorded by some enthusiastic admirer. Some striking events in his life are magnified into wonders. Some uncommon acts of piety and devotion are exaggerated into miracles. The biographer is not a cool and calculating deceiver, but he is self-deceived. He accepts the mass of historical matter that has floated down to him, and in common with his fellow monks and religionists gives it a blind credence. In this way a legend is related as actual history. There is a kernel of truth and fact in it. There was such a monk, and some of the events related actually occurred. But there is also much that is not historical, and must be thrown out by the critic.

A myth differs from a legend, as a nation differs from a community. It is a national legend. This unconscious process of exaggeration which goes on in a monastery and a community of monks, goes on upon a large scale in a nation, and through a whole people or race. The early history of Rome illustrates this. The narratives respecting the founding of Rome, the early accounts of Romulus and Numa, the descriptions of the battles and combats between Romans and Sabines, Horatii and Curiatii, were the slow formation of ages and periods when the imagination was active, and traditions were not scrutinized. There is a basis of truth, but all is not veritable history. What is true of Rome is true of Greece, of Egypt, of India. Each has its mythical age.

The same is true of Christianity, according to the theory which we are considering. At its first beginning, there was an individual named Jesus Christ, of marked traits and of remarkable life. But the admiration and affection of adherents gradually exaggerated these traits and life into the supernatural, the miraculous, and finally the Divine. While no deliberate and intentional deception is to be charged either upon the principal personage, or his adhe-

rents, any more than in the instance of the Roman myth or the mediæval legend, a full historical credibility can no more be conceded to the one than to the others.

The objections to the mythical theory of the origin of Christianity are the following: 1. The character, claims, and teachings of Jesus Christ, as represented in the New Testament, contradict the national feeling of the Jews at the time of the Advent and ever since. But it is of the nature of a myth, to be in entire harmony with the spirit of the people among whom it arises. The national legends of early Rome do not offend and affront the Roman pride, but favor it. The mythical stories connected with king Arthur and the knights of the Round Table harmonize with the temper and spirit of the early Britons. The myth always aggrandizes the nation itself, and the heroes of the nation, because it is a spontaneous outgrowth of the national imagination.

But the character, and claims, and doctrines of Jesus Christ were an utter offence to the feeling of the people among whom he was born, and by whom he was crucified. He was the farthest possible from a national hero, or a popular idol. The Jewish imagination, if employed in the construction of exaggerated accounts of a Jewish Messiah, would not have selected Jesus the Nazarene. The Jewish Messiah, according to the common national feeling at the time, would not have been the son of a Nazarene ("shall Christ come out of Galilee," John 7: 41, 52; 1: 46), nor would he have been born in a stable.

It is therefore impossible to account for the character and teachings of Christ, by the theory of mythical development. He could not have been the merely natural outgrowth of Judaism, as Judaism was in the beginning of the first century, any more than Shakespeare could have been the outgrowth of the Pictish period in English history. The utter contrariety between the New Testament and the carnal Judaism, between the spirit of Christ and that of

the unspiritual people of whom he was born, is fatal to the mythical theory.

If it be said that the biography of Christ in the Gospels is not a national product, but that of a few individuals of a nation, and therefore this answer does not apply to the case, the reply is, that these few individuals were Jews, and thoroughly imbued with the views and traditions of their people, and of the time in which they lived. They were expecting a temporal prince in the Jewish Messiah, and it required three years of personal instruction by Christ, and finally the inspiration at Pentecost, to disabuse them of their error. If therefore this biography was the work of their own imagination, either in part or wholly, it would inevitably have had the national characteristics. An earthly reign and an earthly splendor would have been attributed to their hero.¹ Neither can the person of Christ be explained as the natural product of human development generally. Says Neander (Life of Christ, 4, Ed. Bohn), "the image of perfection presented in Jesus of Nazareth stands in manifold contradiction to the tendencies of humanity in that period; no one of them, no combination of them, could account for it." "Christianity," says Channing (Evidences of Christianity), "was not the growth of any of the circumstances, principles, or feelings of the age in which it appeared. In truth, one of the great distinctions of the gospel is that it did not *grow*. The conception which filled the mind of Jesus, of a religion more spiritual, generous, comprehensive, and unworldly than Judaism, and destined to take its place, was not of gradual formation. We detect no signs of it, and no efforts to realize it, before his time; nor is there an appearance of its having been *gradually matured* by Jesus himself. Christianity was delivered from the first in its full proportions, in a style of singular freedom and boldness, and without a mark of pain-

¹ Edersheim (Life of Jesus, III. i.) observes that the temptation of Christ, in the Gospels, is not found in the Rabbinical representation of the Messiah.

ful elaboration. This suddenness with which this religion broke forth, this maturity of the system at the very moment of its birth, this absence of gradual development, seems to me a strong mark of its Divine original.”¹

2. Secondly, the mythical period in the history of a people is in the beginning, not at the close of its career. No myths were originated respecting Roman demigods and heroes in the days of the Empire. When a people have reached their culminating point and begin to decline, the national imagination is not active in producing exaggerated accounts of either men or events. This period is the day of criticism and skepticism, when the myths that were produced in the childhood of the nation are sifted, doubted, and rejected.

What now was the case with Judea at the time of the Advent? The nation was drawing near its downfall. It was virtually a part of the Roman Empire, though the sceptre had not formally and actually departed from Judah. Everything was effete. The morning freshness of the early faith was entirely dried up. The Jewish people, excepting a small minority represented by Simeon and Anna who were “waiting for the consolation of Israel,” were either hypocritical formalists like the Pharisees, or skeptical disbelievers like the Sadducees. More than this, they were under the iron heel of that powerful despotism which had subjugated the world, and all national hope and aspiration was dead within them. This consequently was no time for the play of that innocent and unquestioning fancy by which the myth and the ballad are invented. To suppose that a body of legendary narrative and teaching could spring up in such surroundings as these, would be like supposing that

¹ While this remark of Channing disconnects the New Testament too much from the Old, and separates Christianity too much from the *spiritual* Judaism that prepared for it, it is nevertheless correct in regard to the originality of Christ's doctrines, and is the more significant as it comes from one who denied his deity.

the most delicate forms of poetry—those of Keats and Tennyson for example—could have originated in a community of miners or day laborers. When Shakespeare makes Hector quote Aristotle, it is an anachronism that may be pardoned, because there is no anachronism in the human nature which he depicts. But when men are represented by the theorist as inventing the most fanciful and childlike forms of literature, in the wearied and skeptical old age of a nation; when the time of the Cæsars is selected as the period for the upspringing of a series of myths and legends, this is an anachronism that admits of no excuse or justification. Arnold speaks in amazement of Strauss's "idea of men's writing mythic history between the time of Livy and Tacitus, and of St. Paul mistaking such for realities!" Stanley: *Life of Arnold*, II. 51.

3. The mythical theory supposes superstition, and a propensity to believe in the wondrous and superhuman. But the Jews were never at any time specially liable to this charge. Their rigorous monotheism was unfavorable to legends and fictions respecting the deity, and his operations. The Jews at the time of the Advent were, on the whole, disinclined to believe in the miraculous. This is proved by the fact, that they endeavored to explain away the reality of Christ's miracles by attributing them to sorcery and a league with Satan: "This fellow doth not cast out devils, but by Beelzebub, the prince of the devils," Matt. 12 : 24. The account of the man born blind whose sight Christ restored, betrays great unwillingness to believe that this miracle had actually been performed. "Is this your son that was born blind; how then doth he now see? What did he unto thee? How opened he thine eyes?" All that portion of the Jewish people who were Sadducean in their opinions, certainly, were not inclined to superstition but to skepticism. "Though Christ had done so many miracles before them, yet they believed not on him," John 12 : 37.

4. The myth is polytheistic, not monotheistic. It de-

scribes the adventures and actions of a multitude of divinities among themselves. A single deity affords no play for the imagination. As Guizot remarks (*Meditations*, 1st. Series, 192), "the God of the Bible has no biography, neither has he any personal adventures." The Babylonian and Assyrian legends respecting the creation, fall, and deluge, differ wholly from the Biblical narratives of which they are the corruption, by the introduction of many gods. They also differ in being sensual, in parts. See the narrative of the amours of Istar (Venus) and Izdubar (Nimrod), in Sayce-Smith's *Genesis*, Ch. XIV.

This fact must be considered, in settling the important question respecting the use of earlier materials by an inspired writer. When it is acknowledged that Moses used ancient traditions and documents in composing the first part of *Genesis*, the vital question is, Whether he used sacred or secular traditions, ecclesiastical or national; whether he employed documents derived from the line of Seth and the antediluvian church—the "sons of God," as they are denominated in *Gen.* 6 : 2—or whether he worked over those which have come down in the annals of Assyria, Babylon, and Egypt. In the former case, the document is an integral part of the primitive revelation to Adam and the patriarchal church. It is monotheistic and free from error. In the latter case, the document is a part of ethnic religion, and is vitiated like all ethnic religion by polytheistic and pantheistic fables.

If it be said that the national legend is sanctified and freed from its false and corrupting elements, before it is incorporated by the inspired writer into his work, the reply, in the first place, is, that little or nothing would be left in this case. The pantheism, polytheism, and sensuality, are so thoroughly wrought into the fabric of the myth that they could be extirpated only by the annihilation of the whole thing. But, secondly, the antagonism between Infinite Holiness and human impurity is too great to permit of such

borrowing on the part of God. In the Old Testament, the chosen people are forbidden, under the severest penalties, to make any use whatever of the religious rites and ceremonies of the idolaters around them. Is it probable that the Holy Spirit would have contradicted his own teachings, and employed the idolatrous myths of Babylon and Nineveh in constructing revealed religion? When the Israelites had made a golden calf, and had attempted to introduce an idolatrous cultus, Moses was commanded not merely to break the idol in pieces, but to pulverize it, and mingling it with water compel the people to drink it down. Gen. 32 : 20. This vehement and abhorrent temper of the Bible towards idolatry in all its forms, is utterly inconsistent with the supposition that the Holy Spirit would permit his inspired organs to depend, in the least, upon the fables of an idolatrous mythology for their instruction. The sanctification of polytheistic myths for the service of monotheism, and their adoption into revelation, would be like the alleged consecration of heathen statues of Jupiter and Apollo by the Romish church, and their conversion into statues of St. Peter and St. Paul.

But while there is this amount and kind of evidence for the credibility of the New Testament, it must be noticed that it can produce only a *historical* faith. It cannot produce saving faith; that higher species of confidence which accompanies salvation.¹ The scripture applies here, "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned," 1 Cor. 2 : 14. In accordance with this statement, the Westminster confession (I. v.), after asserting that "we may be moved to a high and reverent esteem of scripture, by the testimony of the church, the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the

¹ On the distinction between historic faith (*fides humana*), and saving faith (*fides divina*), see Dorner : *Christian Doctrine*, I. 98-113.

parts, and the scope of the whole," adds that "our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts." Similarly, Calvin (Inst. I. viii. 13) remarks that "the scripture will be effectual to produce the saving knowledge of God, only where the certainty of it shall be founded on the internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit. Those persons betray great folly who wish it to be demonstrated to infidels that the scripture is the word of God, which cannot be known without faith."

The reasons for this are the following: 1. Christianity is moral and historical truth, not axiomatic and mathematical. Consequently it demands the assent of faith, in distinction from assent to a self-evident proposition. Its founder said, "Repent ye and believe the gospel," Mark 1:15. This command implies that Christianity can be disbelieved. Axiomatic or self-evident truth cannot be disbelieved, and neither can it be believed. Geometry is not a matter of faith. It is improper to say that we believe that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts, or that two and two make four. We perceive these truths, but do not believe them. They do not rest upon testimony, and are not accepted on account of testimony, like historical truth.

The assent of faith is therefore different from the assent of intuitive perception. We do not intuitively perceive that Christ rose from the dead, or that the Logos was born of a virgin, any more than we do that Alfred the Great was king of England. Intuitive knowledge is direct perception either by the senses, or by the reason. There is no possibility of doubting a sensuous impression, or a mathematical intuition. Each is self-evident. But for moral and historical truth, there is not the certainty of self-evidence but of probability, more or less. Consequently, in history and in morals, there are degrees of certainty, but not in mathematics. In moral and historical truth, there is a sufficient reason for

believing the truth or the fact, though not such a reason as renders disbelief impossible. We may therefore doubt or disbelieve in regard to religious truth, because, while it is credible by reason of testimony and other kinds of evidence, it is not self-evident like an axiom or a physical sensation. Faith is reasonable, in case there are more reasons for believing than for disbelieving. It is not necessary that there should be such evidence as overwhelms all objections and renders them absurd, in order to evince the rationality of faith. The preponderance of evidence justifies the act of faith, and condemns that of unbelief. A criminal is sentenced to death in a court of justice, not by reason of an absolute demonstration that admits of no possibility of the contrary, but by reason of a preponderance of testimony which conceivably might be erroneous.

2. The belief of Christian truth is voluntary; the perception of mathematical truth is involuntary. A man "yields" to the evidence for moral and historical truth, which implies the possibility of resisting it. His will, that is, his inclination, coincides with his understanding in the act of faith. But a man assents to geometrical axioms without any concurrence of his will. This is the act of the understanding alone. He does not yield to evidence, but is compelled by it. "Moral truths," says Ullmann (*Sinlessness of Christ*, 50), "do not force themselves upon our mind with the indubitable certainty of sensible objects, or with the incontrovertible evidence of mathematical demonstration. Their reception into the mind is to some extent an act of self-determination." Faith therefore has a voluntary element in it. The doctrine of the Divine existence, for example, is not assented to passively and necessarily from the mere mechanic structure of the intellect as the axioms of geometry are, but actively and freely. Axioms are not matters of proof; the Divine existence is. The individual believes in the existence of God, partly because he inclines to believe it, and not because it is absolutely impossible to resist the evidence for

it, and to sophisticate himself into the disbelief of it. He *yields* to the proof presented for the doctrine. "A man's creed," says Byron (Life, IV. 225), "does not depend upon himself; who can say, 'I will believe this, that, or the other?'" But this depends upon the amount of evidence in the case. A man cannot say that he will believe Gulliver's travels; because there is not sufficient probability in them, and testimony for them. But he can say that he will believe Cæsar's Commentaries, because there is sufficient probability and testimony to warrant this decision. At the same time, there is not such a degree of evidence for the truth of Cæsar's Commentaries as to render disbelief impossible.

3. Faith being an act of the understanding and will in synthesis carries the whole man with it. Scientific assent being an act of the understanding alone carries only a part of the man; the head not the heart. Faith consequently affects the character, but axiomatic intuition does not.

4. The belief of Christian truth is an object of command; assent to self-evident truth is not. This follows from the fact that faith is voluntary. A command is addressed to the will. "Believe in Christ," is consistent language. "Believe Euclid," is absurd.

5. The belief of Christian truth is rewardable, perception of mathematical truth is not. The former is a virtue; the latter is not.

For these reasons it is impossible to produce by the historical and moral arguments for the truth of Christianity, such a conviction as is absolutely invincible to the objections of the skeptic, and what are still stronger, the doubts of a worldly and unspiritual mind. The human heart and will has such a part in the act of belief in the gospel, that any opposing bias in it is fatal to absolute mental certainty.

Saving faith is far more certain than historical faith. It is a mental certainty that is produced by the Holy Spirit. He originates an immediate *consciousness* of the truth of

the gospel; and wherever there is immediate consciousness, doubt is impossible. Saving faith implies a personal feeling of the truth in the heart; historical faith is destitute of feeling. This makes the former far more certain than the latter, and less assailable by counter arguments. When an inward sense and experience of the truth of the gospel is produced by the Divine Spirit in a human soul, as great a mental certainty exists in this instance as in those of sensuous impressions and axiomatic intuitions. A dying believer who is immediately conscious of the love of God in Christ Jesus, is as certain in regard to this great fact as he is that fire pains the flesh, or that two and two make four. When St. Paul said, "I am persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come; nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of Christ Jesus our Lord" (Rom. 8:38, 39), he was as sure of this as he was of his own existence. And this, because of his immediate consciousness of the redeeming love of God.¹

The credibility of the Old Testament is proved by the New Testament. Christ and his Apostles refer to it as divine revelation. John 5:39, "Search the scriptures." Luke 24:27, 44, "Beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the scriptures the things concerning himself. All things written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the psalms, must be fulfilled concerning me." Rom. 1:2, "The gospel of God was promised afore by his prophets in the holy scriptures." 2 Tim. 3:16, "All scripture is given by inspiration." 1 Pet. 1:10-12, 2 Pet. 1:20, 21, "Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

By the term "Scriptures" is meant that collection of writings known as the sacred books of the Jewish people.

¹ On the subject of Christian certainty, in distinction from natural certainty, see the thoughtful treatise of Frank.

They are referred to by Christ and his apostles, as the source of information respecting religion generally, and all matters pertaining to human salvation. It is clear that they received them as authoritative, and a final arbiter upon such subjects. But this implies the credibility of the Old Testament, if Christ and his apostles were not deceived in their opinion and judgment. That the reference of Christ, when he speaks of "the Scriptures," is to a well-known collection of inspired writings, is proved by Matt. 5 : 17. "Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets: I am not come to destroy but to fulfil." Our Lord here affirms that his mission will realize all that is promised in the Old Testament revelation. This revelation he denotes by the common Jewish designation: the Law and the Prophets, i.e. the Pentateuch and Prophetic-Historical books. There is the same reference to a collection of writings in John 7 : 19, 22, 23. "Did not Moses give you the law? Moses gave unto you circumcision. A man receiveth circumcision on the sabbath day, that the law of Moses should not be broken." Here, the ceremonial law is more particularly meant, and this law is not taught in one book, or part of a book, of the Pentateuch, but runs through Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy. In Luke 2 : 22, Mary was purified "according to the law of Moses." Moses is represented by Christ as "giving" law in these books. In like manner, in Acts 15 : 21, the word Moses denotes a collection of sacred writings. "Moses of old time hath in every city them that preach him, being read in the synagogues every sabbath day." The Jewish congregations at the time of the Advent had the Pentateuch read to them by a reader, as both Jewish and Christian congregations now do, believing that it had the inspired authority of Moses. In the walk to Emmaus with two of his disciples, Christ "beginning at Moses and all the prophets, expounded unto them in all the scriptures the things concerning himself," Luke 24 : 27. He recapitulated and explained all the

Messianic promises in the Old Testament; beginning with the "Seed of the woman" in Genesis, and ending with the "Messenger of the covenant" in Malachi. In Mark 12:26, Christ refers to the miracle of the burning bush as an actual fact, and denominates the book of Exodus in which the account of it is contained, "the book of Moses." In Matt. 22:32, Christ quotes Jehovah's words to Moses from the burning bush—making a second reference to this miracle. If it is objected, that Christ only accommodated himself to the ancient Jewish opinion that Moses was the author of the book of Exodus without believing or endorsing it, the reply is, that Christ is arguing to prove to the Sadducees that the resurrection of the body is a fact. Now unless Jehovah actually spoke to Moses those words, and Moses recorded them without error, so that Christ is correct in calling Exodus "the book of Moses," his argument fails. If Jehovah did not speak the words, Christ did not prove his point. If Jehovah did speak them but Moses did not record them, he did not prove it; because he refers to Moses as his authority. And if Jehovah did speak the words, but Moses did not record them infallibly, Christ's argument though having some validity would not be marked by infallibility. There may have been some error in the narrative. That Christ refers to a well-known collection, is also proved by his quotation from the Old Testament in Matt. 23:35. "Upon you shall come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias son of Barachias" (Barachias is wanting in Luke 11:51, and in \aleph^o). Here our Lord mentions an event in Genesis and in Chronicles (2 Ch. 24:21, 22); the first and almost last book of the canon. Between these two events, he speaks of a series of righteous men whose blood was spilled in martyrdom. Who can doubt that he had in mind the entire Old Testament, which contains the account of these martyred servants of Jehovah. The reference to the murder of Zacharias proves that Chronicles be-

de- longed to the canon, in Christ's opinion. To say that Christ accommodates himself to the popular view without adopting it himself, contradicts the connection of thought. Christ is announcing the judgment of God upon the Pharisees. This would be an idle threat if there were no such series of martyrs, and no true account of them in the Old Testament scriptures. In Matt. 12 : 39, Christ cites the miracle of Jonah as one which he believed, and his hearers also. But Jonah is comparatively a secondary book in the canon, and the miracle therein recorded more difficult to believe than most. According to Luke 4 : 17-21, Christ read and commented on the 61st chapter of Isaiah. This shows that he did not regard the later prophecies of Isaiah as spurious.

That the writings now received by the Christian church as the Old Testament canon were the same as those to which Christ and his apostles refer, is proved by the following arguments :

1. They are the same which were translated into Greek by the Seventy, 285 B.C. For two centuries preceding the Advent, they had been received among the Greek-speaking Jews as the inspired volume. As a collection, they were called "the Scriptures." It is objected, that in the Septuagint version the apocryphal books are found. But they did not belong to it originally. That they constituted no part of the work of the Seventy, is proved by the fact that Philo and Josephus do not mention them, though Sirach, one of the best of the apocryphal authors, wrote about 237 B.C. ; that Christ and his apostles never quote from them, though they quote from the Septuagint version of the Old Testament ; that some of the manuscripts of the Septuagint version do not contain the apocrypha ; and that the Palestinian Jews never regarded the apocrypha as canonical. The explanation of their presence in some of the manuscripts of the Septuagint is, that the Egyptian or Alexandrian Jews had a higher estimate of the apocrypha than the Palestine Jews had, and appended them to the Old Tes-

tament canon ; as, at a later date, some other apocryphal writings were appended to manuscripts of the New Testament, and obtained some currency in the Patristic church. The Sinaitic manuscript, for example, contains the Epistle of Barnabas and the Pastor of Hermas ; and the Alexandrine contains the first Epistle of Clement of Rome and the apocryphal psalms attributed to Solomon. Such uncanonical compositions were occasionally copied into the manuscripts of the New Testament, by those who highly esteemed them, and in this manner gradually acquired some authority. By being appended to the canonical Old Testament, the authority of the apocrypha increased, until finally it was declared to be canonical and inspired, by the council of Trent. The Patristic church, however, was not agreed concerning the apocrypha, and never adopted it in general council. Jerome (Prologus Galeatus) asserts that Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus do not belong to the canon. Melito, Origen, Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory Nazianzen, Athanasius, Amphilochius, and Epiphanius give lists that do not include the apocrypha. Clement of Alexandria and Irenæus placed it on an equality with the canonical books. The North African fathers took this view in the council of Hippo (393), and in the 3rd council of Carthage (397). These small local councils included the apocrypha "inter scripturas canonicas." That the apocrypha is canonical and inspired, is a Romish, not a Patristic decision. The Reformers rejected the Romish opinion, and denied the inspiration and canonicity of the apocrypha.

2. They are the same writings which Philo and Josephus recognize as the Jewish Scriptures. Philo, in the first century, cites from most of them. Josephus (*Contra Apionem*, I. 8) states that the Jews have "twenty-two books which are justly believed to be divine." It is not certain from the passage, which is somewhat obscure, whether Josephus included Chronicles, Ezra, Esther and Nehemiah ; though the probability is that he did. The fact that

these are contained in the Septuagint version would favor this.

3. The Targums go to show that the books received by the Christian church as the Old Testament canon are the same as those received by the Jews. That of Onkelos is a Chaldee translation of the Pentateuch. Onkelos wrote about the time of the Advent; others say in the 2nd century. The Targum of Jonathan contains in Chaldee, Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings, Isaiah, Jeremiah and the Minor Prophets.

4. The Samaritan Pentateuch supports the genuineness of the Old Testament Pentateuch. The Samaritans received it from the ten tribes, in all probability, and the ten tribes must have had it at the time of their separation from Judah, B. C. 975; for they would not subsequently have taken it from Judah.

5. The great care with which their sacred books were preserved by the Jews, makes it highly probable that the books now received as the inspired canon of the Old Testament are the same as those received by Ezra and Nehemiah. The Pentateuch by the command of Moses was deposited with the sacred things of the tabernacle, and provision was made for its public reading from time to time. Deut. 31 : 9-13. Josephus in his autobiography says that Titus gave him leave to take from the "ruins of his country" what he wished. He asked for the liberty of his own family, and the "holy books" of his people; which were granted to him.

6. The language evinces the genuineness of the received Old Testament canon. All the varieties of Hebrew, from the early forms in Genesis and Job to the later in the Chaldee of Ezra and Nehemiah, are found in it.

7. The discoveries in the antiquities of Assyria, Babylonia, and Egypt support the genuineness of the Old Testament.

8. The agreement in doctrine between the Old Testament

and the New supports the genuineness of the former. The same general system of justice and mercy; law and gospel; sin and redemption runs through both. "It is mere assertion, that fatherhood, filiation, and brotherhood are unrevealed in the Old covenant; the truth is, they are revealed, but in a limited and mediate typical manner. It is an equally vague assertion to affirm that the God of the New Testament is not an indignant God, full of majesty and power, and that Christians ceased in every sense to be servants." Nitzsch: *Christian Doctrine*, § 63.

CHAPTER IV.

THE CANONICITY OF SCRIPTURE.

Josephus: *Contra Apionem*, I. Du Pin: *On the Canon*. Cosin: *On the Canon*. Jones: *On the Canon*. Lardner: *Credibility of the New Testament*. Stuart: *On the Canon*. Alexander: *On the Canon*. Westcott: *On the N. T. Canon*. Credner: *Zur Geschichte des Kanons*. Horne-Tregelles: *Introduction*. Davidson: *Introduction*. Schaff-Herzog: *Encyclopædia*, Art. Canon. Kitto: *Encyclopædia*, Art. Canon. Charteris: *On the Canon*. Ladd: *Sacred Scripture*, Ch. IX. Reuss: *History of the Canon*, Tr. by Hunter. Bleek: *History of N. T. Canon* (Introduction to N. T.). Oehler: *Kanon des A. T.* (Herzog: *Encyclopædie*). Landerer: *Kanon des N. T.* (Herzog: *Encyclopædie*). Smith: *Dictionary*, Art. Canon. Chambers: *Canon of Scripture*.

THE canonicity of a book means its right to a place in the collection of inspired writings; and this depends upon the fact that it was composed by an inspired man, or under his direction. Canonicity therefore is very closely connected with authenticity or genuineness, and some would merge the two in one. If a book can be proved to be the genuine product of an evangelist or apostle, its canonicity is established. To determine whether a writing is canonical, is to determine whether it originated in the very restricted circle of inspired men, or in the very wide circle of ordinary men. In answering this question, some assistance is derivable from the nature and contents of the book. Absurdities and contradictions, sentiments contradicting the general tenor of revelation, and such like characteristics, would prove that a writing is not the product of inspiration, and

therefore not canonical. Thus the subject of canonicity is also connected with that of credibility. At the same time, the question, Who is the author of the book? is different from the question, Is the book credible? The former is the question when the subject of canonicity is under consideration.

The inquiry respecting the authorship of a writing is mainly *historical*. To answer it, requires the testimony of competent witnesses; and the most competent witnesses are those who lived nearest to the time of the alleged origin and authorship. An eye-witness is the best of all; and the next best witness is one who personally heard the testimony of an eye-witness, and so onward. Consequently, the Primitive church was better situated and qualified than the Modern church, to testify respecting the authorship of the Gospel of Luke or the Epistle to the Hebrews. More of documentary evidence, and more of personal testimony was accessible in the year 150 than in the year 1880. An Alexandrine scholiast had more data for determining which of the Platonic dialogues are spurious, than any English or German philologist of the 19th century. The generation of Americans who lived at the close of the 18th century had the best advantages of any, for settling the question whether Jefferson was the author of the Declaration of Independence.

The canonicity of a New Testament book is not settled by the *authority* of the Primitive church, but by its *testimony*. This mistake is frequently made. Coleridge (Table Talk, March 31, 1832) says that "we receive the books ascribed to John and Paul as their books, on the judgment of men for whom no miraculous discernment is pretended. Shall we give less credence to John and Paul themselves?" The Modern church does not receive John's Gospel and Paul's Epistles as canonical, on the "judgment," or decision, of the Primitive church respecting their contents, but on their testimony respecting their authorship. Testimony

respecting canonicity is like testimony respecting miracles. The Modern church does not rest its belief in the miracles of our Lord on the *authority* of the first Christians, but on their witness and attestation. The authority of the first Christians is no higher than that of any other Christians, but their testimony is.

Neither is the question of canonicity to be answered by the witness of the Holy Spirit in the consciousness of the believer. The teaching of the Holy Ghost, while indispensable to a saving apprehension of Biblical truth, is not available at this point. The Holy Spirit teaches in regard to the credibility, but not in regard to the canonicity of Scripture. The Divine Spirit does not inform any man, or class of men, who composed the book of Chronicles or of Joshua. This would be a revelation. God leaves the question respecting the authorship of particular books of Scripture to be settled chiefly by historical testimony; and, from the nature of the case, by the testimony of the earlier generations rather than of the later. The testimony to canonicity is in this respect like the testimony to miracles. It is not inspired and infallible, yet it is credible and trustworthy. We go to the very first Christians of all for the testimony to miracles; and we must go to the earlier Christians for the testimony to canonicity. And as the proof of miracles does not depend upon the inward teaching of the Holy Spirit, neither does the proof of canonicity. Says Dorner (*Doctrine*, I. 96), "The testimony of the Holy Spirit gives us no immediate information upon the historic origin of a book, upon its source in an inspired author. It gives us no divine certainty as to the manner and method in which certain writings have arisen in history, so that it will not do to found the certainty of the truth and divinity of Scripture upon the experience of the divinity of the *form* of Holy Writ." With this the Westminster Confession, I. v., agrees, in mentioning as the first of the grounds of a historical faith in the Scriptures, "the testimony of the

church," and making no mention at all of the inward teaching of the Spirit in this connection.

The history of the Old Testament canon is obscure, owing to its very great antiquity. Were it a modern product, as some assert, there would be more historical data.

That the books of Moses were collected and arranged before Samaria was taken and the ten tribes carried away by the Assyrians under Shalmanesar, B.C. 724, is evident from the fact that the Samaritans must have obtained the Pentateuch from the ten tribes and not from Judah. It is an ancient and widely current tradition, that Ezra made a complete collection of the books of the Old Testament, excepting those few which were written after his time. Another tradition, mentioned in 2 Maccabees 2: 13, attributes this work to Nehemiah. There is no good reason for doubting that upon the return from the Babylonian captivity, B.C. 536, the revision and collection of the Old Testament canon occurred. The same Divine guidance that brought about, in such an extraordinary manner, the return of the Jews from their long captivity in the heart of Asia, and the rebuilding of the temple under Ezra and Nehemiah, would naturally have led to their re-collecting and re-editing those sacred writings upon which the future prosperity of the chosen people, and the accomplishment of its mission in the world, absolutely depended. The Jewish church and state without the Old Testament canon, would have been a mere empty shell. In this redaction of the Old Testament canon, the ancient and previously acknowledged writings of Moses and the earlier prophets were of course accepted, and to these were now added the later writings up to the time of Ezra. The division was three-fold. 1. The Law. 2. The Prophets. 3. The Hagiographa. It is the same that Christ refers to in Luke 24: 44, under the names of the law, the prophets, and the psalms. By the "psalms" is meant the whole third part, or the Hagiographa. Josephus mentions this three-fold division. *Contra Apionem*, I. viii.

According to him, the Law contains the "five books of Moses": Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy; the Prophets comprise "thirteen books": Joshua, Judges with Ruth, Samuel, Kings, Isaiah, Jeremiah with Lamentations, Ezekiel, Daniel, the twelve Minor Prophets, Job, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther; the Hagiographa includes "four books of hymns to God": Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes and Solomon's Song. In all there are twenty-two books, equalling the number of the Hebrew alphabet. The Jews, following the Talmud, now make the Hagiographa to consist of eleven books: viz., Psalms, Proverbs, Job, Canticles, Ruth, Lamentations, Ecclesiastes, Esther, Daniel, Ezra, and Chronicles.

Prideaux (Connection, I. v.) is of the opinion that Malachi was written after the time of Ezra. He argues also that the genealogy of the sons of Zerubbabel in 1 Chron. 3: 19-24, being carried down to the time of Alexander the Great, 330 B.C., shows that this part of Chronicles was composed subsequently to Ezra. "It is most likely," he says, "that the two books of Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, and Malachi were added to the canon in the time of Simon the Just, 300 B.C., and that it was not until then that the Jewish canon of the Old Testament was fully completed. And indeed these last books seem very much to want the exactness and skill of Ezra in their publication, they falling far short of the correctness which is in the other parts of the Hebrew scriptures." Rawlinson, on the contrary (Bible Commentary, 1 Chron. 3: 19-24), regards Prideaux as in error in reckoning thirty years to a generation. He himself reckons only twenty, and attributes Chronicles to Ezra, who died about B.C. 435. "The style of Chronicles is like that of Ezra," says Rawlinson. Movers makes the date of Chronicles B.C. 400. Ewald assigns it to the time of Alexander the Great, B.C. 336-323.

More is known respecting the manner of collecting the New Testament canon, though no particular action in de-

fining and authorizing it can be mentioned until after it has become universally received in the church.

The four Gospels were from the first distinguished from the apocryphal. Justin Martyr (163) speaks of "memoirs" of Christ as the work of the evangelists. Irenæus (202) cites passages from all four of the canonical Gospels. Adv. Hæreses, II. xxii.-xxiv., et alia. Clement of Alexandria (220) and Tertullian (220) do the same. Tatian (175), and Ammonius (200), arrange harmonies of the four Gospels. Theodoret (457) found 200 copies of Tatian's harmony in the Syrian churches, which he took away from them, because of some heresies it contained. Neander supposes that Tatian mixed some things with the canonical Gospels from the apocryphal. Origen (250) writes a commentary on Matthew and John. These facts prove the general acceptance of four and only four Gospels as canonical, prior to A.D. 250. Yet there was no action of the church in a general council to this effect.

The Epistles began to be collected very early. Ignatius (Ad Philadelphenses, v.) speaks of the Gospels, and the "Apostolical writings." The Epistles were sent from church to church, either in the original or in transcript. In Col. 4: 16, Paul bids the Colossians to send the letter he had written to them, to the Laodiceans, and to obtain his letter to the Laodiceans and read it themselves. This custom would naturally lead to the multiplication of copies, and the collection by different churches of the whole series of Epistles, as fast as they were written.

The Vatican and Sinaitic manuscripts belong to the middle of the 4th century (A.D. 325-350). The former contains all the Gospels, and all the Epistles excepting Philemon, Titus, 1st and 2d Timothy, Hebrews, and the Apocalypse. The latter contains all the Gospels, all the Epistles, and the Apocalypse. The Muratorian canon (A.D. 150) is much older than these oldest uncials, and mentions as accepted and canonical, the four Gospels,

Acts, thirteen Epistles of Paul, two and perhaps three Epistles of John, Jude and Revelation. And it is possible that 1st Peter is mentioned (provided "tantum" is an error for "unam"). It mentions Hebrews, perhaps, under the title of the "Epistle to the Alexandrians." It omits 2d Peter and James.

The New Testament canon was thus collected and adopted by the custom and usage of the churches, not by conciliar action. The formation of a symbol was similar; for the Apostle's creed was not the work of the Apostolic college. The first conciliar action respecting the canon was by the council of Laodicea, in 360. This adopted the whole New Testament, excepting Revelation. It was a small council, and of little influence. The council of Hippo (393), and Carthage (397), established similar catalogues. But there was little call for this conciliar action, because the practice and usage of the church had already anticipated it.



THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).



THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

CHAPTER I.

NATURE AND DEFINITION OF GOD.

Aristotle: *Metaphysics*, XI. vi., vii. Plato: *Phaedo*; *Laws*, X. 894-899. Anselm: *Monologium*, i.-vi.; xvii.-xxviii. Charnocke: *Discourses* (God a Spirit). Cudworth: *Intellectual System*, I. ii.; V. iii. (Corporeal and unextended substance.) More: *Immortality of the Soul*, I. i.-x.¹ Smith: *Discourses* (Immortality of the Soul; Existence and nature of God). Bates: *Immortality of the Soul*. Nitzsch: *Christian Doctrine*, § 63. Ulrici: *God and Nature*. Christlieb: *Modern Doubt*, Lecture III. Müller: *Sin*, II. 113-139.

THE words of our Lord to the Samaritan woman, "God is a Spirit," John 4 : 24, although spoken for a practical purpose, are also a scientific definition. The original (*πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός*) by its emphatic collocation of *πνεῦμα*, and omission of the article, implies that God is spirit in the highest sense. He is not *a* spirit, but spirit itself, absolutely. The employment of the article in the English version is objec-

¹ More departed from the common opinion, in contending that spiritual substance has extension and the three dimensions, like material substance. It differs from matter in having self-motion, and in not having impenetrability. It is not moved *ab extra*, and its presence does not exclude that of material substance. He denied the schoolman's dictum, that the soul is all in every part of the body; because this is incompatible with the view that spiritual substance is extended.

tionable, because it places the deity in a class with other spiritual beings. But this is not the thought of Christ, who asserts that "no one knoweth the Father but the Son" (Matt. 11 : 27); thus claiming for himself a knowledge of the deity as the absolute and unconditioned spirit, who is not cognizable by the finite mind in the manner and degree that finite spirit is. Man knows the nature of finite spirit through his own self-consciousness, but he knows that of the Infinite spirit only analogically. Hence some of the characteristics of the Divine nature cannot be known by a finite intelligence. For example, how God can be independent of the limitations of time, and have an eternal mode of consciousness that is without succession, including all events simultaneously in one omniscient intuition, is inscrutable to man, because he himself has no such consciousness. The same is true of the omnipresence of God. How he can be all at every point in universal space, baffles human comprehension, though it has some light thrown upon it, by the fact that the human soul is all at every point in the body.

The Divine being is of an essence whose spirituality transcends that of all other spirits, human, angelic, or arch-angelic; even as his immortality transcends that of man or angel. God is said alone to have immortality (1 Tim. 6 : 16), because his immortality is a *parte ante*, as well as a *parte post*. His immortality is eternity. And in the same manner, when the spirituality of God is compared with that of his rational creatures, it might be said that he alone has spirituality.

The transcendent nature of the Divine spirituality is seen in the fact of its being formless and unembodied. "No man hath seen God at any time," John 1 : 18. "Ye saw no similitude," Deut. 4 : 12. The Infinite spirit cannot be so included in a form as not to exist outside of it. The finite spirit can be, and in all its grades is both embodied and limited by the body.

“That each, who seems a separate whole,
Should move his rounds, and, fusing all
The skirts of self again, should fall
Remerging in the general soul,

Is faith as vague as all unsweet :
Eternal *form* shall still divide
The eternal soul from all beside ;
And I shall know him when we meet.”—TENNYSON.

The seeming exception to this, in the instance of man between death and the resurrection, is not really such. The disembodiment of the spirit is only temporary. The completeness of the person requires the resurrection and reunion of the bodily form.

Hence in order to have communication with his embodied creature, man, the Supreme being assumes a form ; first in the theophanies of the Old Testament, and lastly in the incarnation of the New.¹ In his own original essence he is formless, and hence could not have any intercourse with a creature like man, who is conditioned in his perception by the limitations of finite form. For this reason, “the Word became flesh and dwelt among us full of grace and truth,” John 1 : 14. Uniting with a human soul and body, “the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath expounded (ἐξηγήσατο) him,” John 1 : 18. In Phil. 2 : 6, the trinitarian personality of the Logos is denominated a “form of God” (μορφή Θεοῦ). This does not mean a visible corporeal embodiment, for it describes the Logos before his incarnation. A distinction, or mode of the divine essence is intended by it. This begotten, or filial “form” of God is purely spiritual and incorporeal, and hence is compelled to assume a corporeal form ; namely, “the form of a servant” (μορφή, explained by σχῆμα,

¹ But in both of these modes of manifestation, the Infinite spirit though in a form is not shut up and confined in it. The Son of Man was also in heaven, at the same instant that he was on earth in a human body. Jehovah, though present in the form of the burning bush, was at the same moment omnipresent also.

ver. 8); in order to have society with man. Some have supposed that the incarnation is necessitated not only by man's sin, but by the needs of the angelic world, in order that there may be intercourse between God and the angels. That there is a provision for this latter, and that God manifested himself to the holy and happy angels prior to and irrespective of the incarnation of the Word, is clear from the Biblical representations concerning such an intercourse. Compare Ps. 104 : 4 ; 103 : 20 ; 1 Kings 22 : 19 ; 2 Chr. 18 : 18 ; Isa. 6 : 5 ; Luke 15 : 10 ; Heb. 1 : 7 ; 2 : 5. But the embodiment of God the Son in a perishable *human* form, involves humiliation and suffering for the special purpose of atonement and redemption, and hence it cannot have reference to the needs of the sinless angelic world. Moreover, there would be no reason for the adoption of man's nature and form, in order to a manifestation of God to the angels.

While the spiritual essence of God is incorporeal and formless, it is at the same time the most *real* substance of all. Mere body or form does not add to the reality of an essence, because the form itself derives its characteristics and its reality from the informing spirit. "The things which are seen were not made of things which do appear," Heb. 11 : 3. Visibles were not made of visibles, but of invisibles. The phenomenon, consequently, is less real than the noumenon ; the visible than the invisible. God's incorporeal and formless being is so intensely and eminently real, that all formed and corporeal being, in comparison, is unreal. "All nations before him are as nothing, and less than nothing, and vanity," Isa. 40 : 17. "Mine age is as nothing before thee," Ps. 39 : 5. "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, thou art God," Ps. 90 : 2. "The more unbodied," says Smith (Nature of God, 123), "anything is, the more unbounded also is it in its effective power: body and matter being the most sluggish, inert, and unwieldy thing that may be, having no power from itself, nor over itself; and there-

fore the purest mind must needs also be the most almighty life and spirit.”¹

The transcendent reality of the Divine essence appears also in the fact that it is a *necessary* essence. The objective reality cannot even in thought, still less in fact, be separated from the subjective idea, as it can be in the instance of contingent and created substance. We can conceive of the non-existence of the created and contingent being of whom we have an idea, but not of the uncreated and necessary being of whom we have an idea. A being that might be a nonentity does not correspond to our idea of a necessary being. A necessary being, consequently, has more of being than a contingent being has. He is further from nonentity. God, therefore, is more real than any of his creatures, be they material or immaterial. The Infinite spirit is more real than the finite spirit; and the finite spirit is more real than the body it inhabits, because it can exist without it.

While, however, there is this transcendence in the spirituality of God, there is also a *resemblance* between the Infinite and the finite spirit. The invisible, immortal, and intelligent mind of man is like in kind to the Divine nature, though infinitely below it in the degree of excellence. What the Arians erroneously asserted respecting the nature of the Son, would be true of the nature of man and angels, namely, that it is *ὁμοιούσιος* with God, but not *ὁμοούσιος*. Man's

¹ Claudienus of Vienne, in the 5th century, notes the following points of difference between soul and body: 1. Everything is incorporeal which does not occupy space. The soul occupies no space. 2. Reason, memory, and will occupy no space. 3. The body feels the impression of touch in the part touched; but the soul feels the impression as a whole, not in a part. 4. There is in all bodies a right and a left, an up and a down, a front and a back; but nothing of the kind in the soul. 5. The soul feels by visible organs, but feels invisibly. The eye is one thing, seeing is another; the ears are one thing, hearing is another; the hand is one thing, touching is another. We distinguish by the touch what is hot and what cold, but we do not touch the sensation of touch, which in itself is neither hot nor cold; the organ by which we feel is a different thing from the sensation. Guizot: *Civilization I.* 399, Ed. Bohm.

spiritual nature resembles that of the deity, but is not identical with it.

If the difference between God and man is exaggerated, then the Infinite and finite are so separated from one another, that religion becomes impossible. God is practically reduced to a nonentity, by being placed wholly outside the sphere of human apprehension. He is so different from his rational creatures, that no analogies can be found between them, and nothing can be positively and absolutely affirmed concerning him. From this extreme and error, spring deism and agnosticism in theory, and epicureanism in practice. Deism asserts the Divine existence, but with the fewest attributes possible. Bolingbroke denied that any of the moral attributes may be affirmed of God. Only power and adaptive intelligence as seen in physical nature, belong to the Supreme being. This is making the difference between the Infinite and finite so great, that the religious feelings of adoration, love, faith, and penitence are impossible. Hobbes taught agnosticism; maintaining that God is so totally different from man, that he is not only incomprehensible, but inconceivable, and not an object of thought. Cudworth, in opposition, maintained that God is conceivable, but not comprehensible; or, in modern phrase, is apprehensible, but not comprehensible. Although God is an inscrutable mystery, he is yet an object of thought. "By mysterious doctrines, we mean," says Conybeare (*On Scripture Mysteries*) "those concerning which our ideas are inadequate, or indeterminate. This supposes that of mysterious doctrines we have some ideas, though partial and incomplete. Indeed, when we can frame *no* ideas, we can strictly speaking give no assent. For what is assent, but a perception that the extremes, the subject and predicate of a proposition, do agree, or disagree? But when we have no manner of ideas of these extremes, we can have no such perception. And as no combination of terms actually without significance can make a real proposition, so no

combination of terms to us perfectly unintelligible can, with respect to us, be accounted a proposition. We maintain, therefore, that we have *some* ideas even of mysterious doctrines. There is a vast difference between unintelligible and incomprehensible. That is unintelligible, concerning which we can frame no ideas; and that is only incomprehensible, concerning which our ideas are imperfect."

On the other hand, if the resemblance between the Infinite and finite spirit is so exaggerated as to obliterate the distinction between the two, then materialistic theories in philosophy, and literalizing theories in theology arise. All the errors of gnosticism, of pantheism, and of anthropomorphism are the consequence. Gnosticism and pantheism attribute evolution and development to the Divine essence, and thus subject it to the conditions and limitations of finite growth and succession. Upon this theory, an immutable consciousness that is omniscient, simultaneous, and successionless, in other words, absolutely complete and perfect, cannot belong to the Supreme being. God's consciousness, according to the pantheist, is mutable, fractional, and increasing like that of man and angel. But this is anthropomorphism; God's mental processes are converted into those of man. Anthropomorphism sometimes exaggerates the resemblance between God and man, so far as even to attribute sensuous organs and emotions to God.

It is one of the few benefits in connection with the many evils that have been wrought by modern pantheism, that it has brought into view the *absoluteness* of the Deity; his transcendent perfection of being. It is true that what pantheism gives with one hand, it takes back again with the other. In identifying man and the universe with God, it obliterates the distinction between the finite and Infinite, and thus abolishes the transcendent perfection of the Deity which it had so emphatically asserted. But setting aside this self-contradiction, which is characteristic of all error, and considering simply the energy with which a pantheist

like Hegel, for example, insists upon the unconditioned nature of the Absolute spirit, we perceive that even fatal error may have an element of truth in it.

There are two *predicates* which are of fundamental importance in determining the idea of God as a spirit: 1. Substantiality; God is an essence or substance. 2. Personality; God is a self-conscious being. Predicates are distinguishable from attributes, as the base is from the superstructure. It is because God is a substance and a person, that he can possess and exert attributes.

1. In the first place, the idea of God as a spirit implies that of *substance* or *essence*, because that which has no substance of any kind is a nonentity. "Deus est quædam substantia; nam quod nulla substantia est, nihil omnino est. Substantia ergo, aliquid esse est." Augustine, on Ps. 68. God is ens: real actual being. He is not a mere idea, or construction of the mind, like a mathematical point or line. A mathematical point is not an entity; it has no substantial being; it exists only subjectively; it is merely a mental construction. The same is true of space and time. These are not two substances. They are not objective entities or beings. Neither are they, as Clarke affirmed in his a priori argument for the Divine existence, the *properties* of a substance or being; because properties are of the nature of the substance, and have the same kind of objective reality with it. Space and time cannot be classed with either material or spiritual substance. And there are only these two kinds. A substance possesses properties. But space has only one property, namely, extension. This is not sufficient to constitute it a material substance; and it is sufficient to show that it is not spiritual substance, because this is unextended. Time, again, has no one of the properties of matter, and thus is still further off from material substance than space is. And it certainly has none of the properties of mind.¹

¹ It should be noticed that it is not because space and time are *invisible* that they are not substances, or entities. An entity may be invisible. The forces of

Plato (Sophist. 247, 248) defines substance, or objective being, as "that which possesses any sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by another;" or "that which has the power of doing or suffering in relation to some other existing thing." Hence he says that "the definition of being or substance is simply, power." Now, whether substance be defined as entity having properties, or as entity having power, God is a substance. He has attributes which he manifests in his works of creation and providence; and he has power which he exerts in the universe of matter and mind. He makes an impression upon the human soul, as really as matter and its forces do upon the human body. "I remembered God and was troubled," Ps. 77:33. Terror in the soul because of God, is as vivid a form of consciousness as any physical sensation; and if the objective existence of matter is proved by external sensation, the objective existence of God is proved by internal consciousness. Man is not terrified by a nonentity. The Scriptures justify the application of the idea of substance to God, by denominating him "I am," Exod. 3:14; and "he who is," Rev.

nature are invisible, but they are entities, not abstract ideas or forms of thought. They make an impression upon substances. They are efficient powers. They answer to Plato's definition of substance. The force of gravity is like time in having none of the geometrical dimensions, but it cannot, like time in Kant's philosophy, be explained as a mere form of the understanding, the mode in which the human mind conceives. Gravity is a *substantial* or *material* force, and constitutes a part of the material universe. It is *invisible matter*; matter without form, but not without entity. The same is true of all the other forces of inorganic nature.

Matter has an invisible and formless mode of existence in organic nature, as well as in inorganic. The principle of animal life is real entity, but it is without the geometrical dimensions, and is as invisible as the spirit of man, or of God. But it is matter, not spirit. The bodily life, the so-called animal soul of a dog is nothing but matter. It constitutes no part of the moral and spiritual world. It dies with the body which it inhabits and vitalizes. It was the overlooking of the distinction between matter as visible and invisible, that led Butler, Wesley, Agassiz and others, to favor the doctrine of animal immortality. Because the dog's soul is invisible like that of man, they concluded that it is immortal like his. But an invisible principle may be as perishable as a visible body; and must be, in case it is a material or physical principle; in case it belongs to the world of matter, not of spirit.

1 : 4 ; and by attributing to him "godhead" (*Θεότης*), Coloss. 2 : 9, and a "nature" (*φύσις*), Gal. 4 : 8 ; 2 Pet. 1 : 4. God, therefore, as the infinite and eternal spirit, is a real being, and not a mere idea of the human intellect. John of Damascus affirms that "entity is attributed to God in scripture in a higher sense (*κυριώτερον*) than it is to any creature." Nitzsch : *Christian Doctrine*, § 62. It is as proper to speak of the substance of God as of the substance of matter.

The two substances, matter and mind, are wholly diverse, and have nothing in common, except that each is the base of certain properties, and the ground of certain phenomena. These properties and phenomena being different in kind, prove that material substance and spiritual substance differ specifically and absolutely. Matter cannot think, and mind cannot be burned. Spiritual substance is known by its qualities and effects. In this respect it is like material substance, which is cognizable only by its properties and effects. Neither matter nor mind can be known apart from, and back of, its properties. That these are two substances, and that each has its own peculiarity, is a common belief of man which appears in the better pagan philosophy. "No origin of souls can be discovered in matter ; for there is nothing mixed or compounded in souls ; or anything that seems to be born or made from matter (*ex terra*). There is nothing of the nature of water, or air, or fire in them. For in such material elements, there is nothing that has the power of remembering, of perceiving, of thinking ; nothing that retains the past, foresees the future, and comprehends the present. These characteristics of the soul are divine, and it is impossible to perceive how man could have obtained them, except from God." Cicero : *Tusculan Questions*, I. 27, 28. Cicero cites this doctrine as Aristotle's ; and mentions with it Aristotle's opinion that since mind as distinguished from matter has these divine qualities, it must be eternal (*ob eamque rem, æternum sit necesse est*). Compare More : *On Immortality*, I. iii.

Spiritual substance in the instance of the Infinite being is not connected with a body, or a form in which it dwells. God as spirit is "without body, parts, or passions." Westminster Confession, II. i. He does not occupy space. But spiritual substance in the instance of finite being is embodied. Both man and angel have form, and are related to space. Yet it must be noticed that even in the case of man, mind is independent of matter. The soul may exist consciously in separation from the body. It does so exist between death and the resurrection. "The spirit returns to God who gave it." Eccl. 12:17. In dreams, there is consciousness without the use of the senses. In this case, the mind is the sole efficient. St. Paul's vision of the third heavens was independent of the body; because he could not determine whether he was embodied or disembodied. 2 Cor. 12:2, 3.

The truth that God is a substance or essence is important, first, in contradiction to that form of pantheism which defines him as the "absolute idea." An idea is not a being. It is not an objective entity, but a notion of the human mind. If God has no reality other than that of an idea, he is not real in the sense of a being or an essence that can affect other beings or essences. The theorist of this class would relieve the difficulty, by saying that the absolute idea gets essentiality or reality by "positing" itself in the world, or the finite. But this is to say that the finite, or the world, is the true essence of God, and that apart from the world God is not an entity. Secondly, the truth that God is a substance is important, in contradiction to the view that makes him to be the mere order of the universe, or "a power that makes for righteousness." This, too, is not a substance. Thirdly, the truth that God possesses essential being is important, in reference to that hyper-spirituality which transforms him into a mere influence or energy, a stream of tendency pervading the universe, having no constitutional being, and no foundation for natural and moral

attributes. The Primitive church was troubled with this false spiritualism in the Gnostic speculations, which led Tertullian to contend that God possesses "body." This vehement North African father, laboring with the inadequate Punic Latin to convey his thought, was probably contending for the truth, and intended no materialism; although Augustine (On the Soul, II. ix.) thought him to be obnoxious to this charge. Interpreted by what he says elsewhere, we think that Tertullian only meant to assert that God, though a spirit, is a substance or essence, and employed the word "corpus" to designate this. For he expressly declares that God "has not diversity of parts; he is altogether uniform." But a substance which is uncompounded and without parts, is not a material substance. It is not a body in the strict sense of the term, but an unextended and imponderable substance. Respecting the spirituality of God, Tertullian (Contra Praxeam, 16) affirms that "God holds the universe in his hand, like a nest. His throne is heaven, and his footstool is earth. In him, is all space (locus), and he is not in space; and he is the extreme limit of the universe." In the tract De anima (7), Tertullian asserts a "corporalitas animæ," which is other than the bodily corporeality, because it is found when the body is separated from the soul. The instances of Dives and Lazarus are cited. These were disembodied souls, and yet they were capable of suffering and enjoyment. Hence, says Tertullian, they could not be without corporality in the sense of substantiality. "Incorporalitas enim nihil patitur, non habens per quod pati possit; aut si habet, hoc erit corpus. In quantum enim omne corporale passibile est, in tantum quod passibile est, corporale est." Polanus (Syntagma V. 32) so understands Tertullian: "Tertulliano *corpus* generaliter significat substantiam vere subsistentem, sive sit visibilis, sive invisibilis. Hinc deum quoque corpus esse dixit. Sed præstat ejusmodi ἀκυρολογίας vitare." Lactantius (De ira dei, 2) combats those who "deny that God has any fig-

ure, and suppose that he is not moved by any feeling: qui aut figuram negant habere ullam deum, aut nullo affectu commoveri putant." By "figure" Lactantius means the definiteness of personality.

The pseudo-spirituality of the Gnostics led to these statements of Tertullian and Lactantius. Respecting them, Bentley (*Free Thinking*, X.) makes the following remark. "With a few of the fathers, the matter stands thus: They believed the attributes of God, his infinite power, wisdom, justice, and goodness, in the same extent that we do; but his essence, no more than we can now, they could not discover. The scriptures, they saw, called him *spiritus*, spirit; and the human soul *anima*, breath; both of which, in their primitive sense, mean aërial matter; and all the words that the Hebrew, Greek and Latin, of old, or any tongue now or hereafter can supply, to denote the substance of God or soul, must either be thus metaphysical, or else merely negative, as 'incorporeal' or 'immaterial.' What wonder, then, if, in those early times, some fathers believed that the divine substance was matter or body; especially while the notion of 'body' was undefined and unfixed, and was as extensive as 'thing.' Was this such a shame in a few fathers; while the Stoics maintained qualities and passions, virtues and vices, arts and sciences, nay syllogisms and solecisms, to be 'bodies'?" Voltaire (*Morals of Nations*) founds upon these statements of Tertullian and Lactantius the assertion, that "the greater part of the fathers of the church, Platonists as they were, considered the soul to be corporeal." Hallam (*Literature of Europe*, III. 94) has the same misconception, and asserts that "the fathers, with the exception, perhaps the single one, of Augustine, taught the corporeity of the thinking substance."

The Westminster Confession (II. 1) defines God to be "a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions." These qualifying clauses define, so far as is possible, the idea of spiritual substance. The invisibility of spirit, as pre-

viously remarked, would not of itself differentiate it from matter and material nature. The force of gravity, the chemical forces, electricity, magnetism, and the like, are as invisible as God himself, or the soul of man. Heat, according to the recent theory, is the invisible motion of invisible molecules. There is an invisible ground of the visible and tangible. Back of the world of ponderable physics, which we apprehend by the five senses, there is an unseen world which is natural still, not moral; physical still, not spiritual. Who ever saw, or ever will see, that principle of life of which outward and material nature is but the embodiment or manifestation? When we have stripped the visible world of its visibility and ponderability, and have resolved it into unseen forces and laws, we have not reached any higher sphere than that of nature and matter. He who worships the life of nature, or adores the force of gravity; nay, he who has no higher emotions than those of the pantheistic religionist, which are called forth by the beauty and splendor of visible nature, or the cloudy and mystic awfulness of invisible nature, is as really an idolater as is the most debased pagan who bows down before a visible and material idol. But when this definition of God was made, the invisible side of the material world was not the subject of natural science so much as it has been since. The "material" meant the visible and ponderable. Consequently the term "invisible" referred more particularly to the immaterial and spiritual.

In Scripture, this characteristic of invisibility is sometimes attributed to God in a relative sense. It denotes that God, even when he has assumed a form, as in a theophany, may be an object too dazzling and resplendent for the creature's eye to look upon. Jehovah says to Moses, "Thou canst not see my face; for there shall no man see me and live; thou shalt see my back parts." Ex. 33:20. The incarnate Son is denominated (Heb. 1:3) "the brightness (*ἀπαύγασμα*, the reflected splendor) of God's glory," upon

which man can look; but in the instance of the transfiguration, the vision was too resplendent for mortal man to behold. In this sense, God is invisible as the incandescent orb of the sun is invisible to the naked eye. It is impossible to fix the gaze upon it without being blinded by excess of light.

In saying that God, as a pure spirit, is "without body, parts or passions," a definite conception is conveyed by which spirit and matter are sharply distinguished. Matter may have bodily form, be divisible, and capable of passions: that is, of being wrought upon by other pieces of ponderable matter. None of these characteristics can belong to God, or to any spirit whatever. "Take ye, therefore, good heed unto yourselves (for ye saw no manner of similitude on the day that the Lord spake unto you in Horeb, out of the midst of the fire) lest ye corrupt yourselves, and make you a graven image, the similitude of any figure, the likeness of male or female," Deut. 4: 15, 16. Idolatry conceives of the deity as a form, and the Hebrews were warned against the error.

It is difficult for man, in his present condition, to think of substance, and yet not think of figure or parts. Augustine (Confessions, VII. i.) describes his own perplexity, when renouncing Manichæism, in the following manner. "Though not under the form of the human body, yet was I constrained to conceive of Thee as being in space, either infused into the world, or diffused infinitely outside of it. Because, whatsoever I conceived of as deprived of this space seemed to me nothing, yea, altogether nothing, not even a void; as, if a body were taken out of its place, and the place should remain empty of any body at all, yet would it remain a void place, as it were a spacious nothing." In Confessions, V. xiv., he says, "Could I once have conceived of a spiritual substance, all the strongholds of the Manichæans would have been beaten down and cast utterly out of mind. But I could not."

But that it is possible to think of unextended substance, is proved by the fact that we think of the human soul as without figure and parts, and yet as a real entity. In truth, it is easier to think of the reality and continued existence of the soul after death, than of the body. The body, as to its visible substance, is dissolved into dust, and blown to the four winds, and taken up into other forms of matter. But the soul being indissoluble and indivisible, has a subsistence of its own apart from and independent of the body. It is easier to realize and believe in, the present actual existence of the spiritual part of Alexander the Great, than of the material part of him. That the soul of Alexander the Great is this instant existing, and existing consciously, is not so difficult to believe, as it is to believe that his body is still existing. It is easier to answer the question, Where is the soul of a man who died a thousand years ago? than to answer the question, Where is the body of a man who died a thousand years ago? "The dust returns to the earth as it was, and the spirit returns to God who gave it," Eccl. 12: 7.

Nothing is more natural and common than to speak of our intellectual "nature" or "being," meaning thereby our immortal substance. In this case, "substance" denotes that entity which *stands under* agencies and phenomena as their supporting and efficient ground. We cannot conceive of the soul as only a series of exercises. There must be an agent in order to agency; a substantial being in order to exercises. To ask us to think away the substance of the soul, and then to conceive of its exercises, is like asking us to think away the earth around a hole, and then to conceive of the hole. The thoughts of the mind are distinguishable from the mind. "This perceiving, active being," says Berkeley (Principles of Knowledge, in initio), "is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them."

Hume (Understanding, IV. vi.) denied the reality of spiritual substance, contending that there is nothing but a series of sensuous "impressions," and remembered "ideas" of them. Mill copies Hume in rejecting the notion of a substance as the foundation of consciousness and the agencies of the human soul, and defining the soul to be "a permanent possibility of thought and feeling; a thread of consciousness." Examination of Hamilton, 254, 255. The American theologian Emmons was understood to hold that the soul is a series of exercises. Dwight seems to have had him in view, in his attack upon this theory. Smith: Faith and Philosophy, 241. Mill's definition of mind would not be accepted by the materialist, if applied to matter. The physicist would not grant that gunpowder is only "the permanent possibility of explosion." The term "possibility" does not denote entity; but the chemist affirms that gunpowder is entity. Compare Locke: On Substance.

That the idea of unextended spiritual substance is a rational idea, is proved by the fact that the human intellect naturally adopts it. Plato and Aristotle argued in defence of it, in opposition to the atheistic schools of their time, who contended that there is nothing objectively existent but matter or extended substance. The later Platonists also, like Plotinus and Simplicius, affirmed the validity of the idea. Plotinus maintained that "one and the selfsame numerical thing may be, all of it, entirely everywhere;" that "the deity is not part of it here, and part of it there;" that "God being not in space, is yet present to everything that is in space;" that "God is all of him indivisibly present to whatsoever he is present." Pythagoras and Plutarch took the same ground.

These philosophers endeavored to prove that there is another species of substance than that which has figure in space, and is divisible into parts. This is spiritual substance; the eternal essence of God, and the immortal essence of angel and man. "There are," says Cudworth (Sys-

tem, V. iii.), "two kinds of substances in nature: the first, extension or magnitude, really existing without the mind, which is a thing that hath no self-unity at all in it, but is infinite alterity and divisibility, as it were mere outside and outwardness, it having nothing within,¹ nor any other action belonging to it, but only locally to move when it is moved. The second, life and mind, or the self-active cogitative nature, an inside being, whose action is not local motion, but an internal energy, within the substance or essence of the thinker himself, or in the inside of him." Material substance is moved *ab extra*; spiritual substance is moved *ab intra*, that is, is self-moved. This is perhaps the most important point in the distinction between mind and matter. Mind moves voluntarily; matter is moved mechanically. That mind is a substance, though unextended and incorporeal, was strongly maintained by Plato and Aristotle. "The Peripatetics, though they expressly held the soul to be *ἀσώματος* or incorporeal, yet still spoke of a *νοῦς ὑλικός*, a material [substantial] mind or intellect. This, to modern ears, may possibly sound somewhat harshly. Yet if we translate the words by 'natural capacity,' and consider them as only denoting that original and native power of intellection which being prior to all human knowledge is yet necessary to its reception, there seems nothing then to remain that can give offence." Harris: *Hermes*, III. i.

Spinoza has done more than any other modern philosopher, to annihilate the distinction between incorporeal and corporeal substance, or between mind and matter, by attributing to his one infinite substance two heterogeneous and incompatible modes or properties: thought and extension.

¹ Similarly, Schelling (*Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre*, 240) remarks: "Nur eine in sich selbst zurückgehende Kraft schafft sich selbst ein *Innres*. Daher der Materie kein *Innres* zukommt." Coleridge adopts this in his *Biographia* (Harper's Ed. 242). Schubert says that "the farther we penetrate into matter, we find the minute and microscopic more and more; but the further we penetrate into mind, we discover the great and grand, more and more." *Ansichten*, 195.

Spinozism teaches : 1. There is only one substance, and this substance is God. 2. This substance thinks: "cogitatio attributum dei est, sive deus est res cogitans." 3. This substance is extended: "extensio attributum dei, sive deus est res extensa." Ethics, II. ii. But these two modes of Spinoza's one substance exclude each other. If one and the same substance is extended in space, and is also a thinking substance, it follows that matter thinks. To say that matter thinks is materialism, in the same way that to say that matter is God is atheism. This theory is revived in the recent attempt to explain thought by the molecular motion in the brain.¹

Plato (Sophist, 246) describes the conflict going on in his day respecting the definition of substance (*ὄντοια*). "Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven, and from the unseen, to earth, and seem determined to grasp in their hands rocks and oaks; of these they lay hold, and are obstinate in maintaining that only the things which can be touched and handled have being or essence, because they define being and body as one, and if anyone says that what is not a body exists, they altogether despise him, and will hear of nothing but body. And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously defend themselves from above, out of an unseen world, mightily contending that true essence consists of certain intelligible and incorporeal ideas; the bodies of the materialists which are maintained by them to be the very truth, they break up into little bits by their arguments, and affirm them to be generation and not essence. O Theatetus, there is an endless war which is always raging between these two armies on this ground."

The quantity of unextended and invisible substance is

¹ For a refutation of Spinoza, see Howe: Living Temple, Pt. II. ch. i. For a clear statement of Spinozism, see Ueberweg: History, II. 55 sq. Hobbes denied the existence of anything but body, and asserted that God is corporeal. Cudworth: System, Ch. V. Section iii. Berkeley (Principles of Knowledge) takes the other extreme, and maintains that mind is the only substance.

greater than of extended and visible substance. 1. God is unextended substance, and his immensity is vaster than that of the whole finite universe. 2. The unextended and invisible part of the finite universe is larger in amount than the ponderable, extended, and visible part of it: viz. (a) the spirits of men and angels; (b) invisible atoms, or molecules; (c) the invisible forces of nature. These constitute a sum total of existence that is greater and more important than the whole visibility that clothes them. The unseen universe is vaster than the seen. A man's soul is greater than his body. The invisible force of gravity is greater than all its visible effects. The invisible force of cohesion is the cause of all the visibility and ponderability of matter. Without it, there would be no extended and ponderable substance, for the atoms or molecules apart from its attraction would be infinitely separated and scattered.

In defining God to be "a most pure spirit without passions," it must be remembered that the term "passion" is used etymologically. It is derived from *pator*, to suffer. Passion implies passivity. It is the effect of an impression from without. The effervescence of an alkali under an acid illustrates the meaning of the term. One substance in nature works upon another, by virtue of a correlation and correspondence that is fixed. The one in reference to the other is passive and helpless. Ascending higher, passion in sentient existence, as in man or brute, arises from the impression upon a physical nature of the physical object that is correlated to it. Passion in man or brute is the working of mere appetite. In this sense, St. Paul speaks of the motions, or passions (*παθήματα*) of sins which are in the members. Rom. 7:5; Gal. 5:24. Locke (Essay, II. xxi. 4) distinguishes between "active and passive power." "From body [matter], we have no idea of the beginning of motion. A body at rest affords us no idea of active power to move; and when it is set in motion itself, that motion is rather a passion than an action:

for when the ball obeys the stroke of the billiard stick, it is not any action of the ball, but bare passion. "Passion" in the Westminster definition, is the same as Locke's "passive power."

God has no passions. He stands in no passive and organic relations to that which is not himself. He cannot be wrought upon, and impressed, by the universe of matter and mind which he has created from nothing. Creatures are passively correlated to each other, and are made to be affected by other creatures; but the Creator is self-subsistent and independent of creation, so that he is not passively correlated to anything external to himself. God, says Aquinas, has absolute, not merely relative existence, like a creature. "*Esse relativi est ad aliud se habere. Si igitur relatio sit ipsa divina essentia, sequitur quod esse divinae essentiae sit ad aliud se habere; quod repugnat perfectioni divino esse quod est maxime absolutum est et per se subsistens.*" Summa, I. iii. Men and angels are put into a certain relation to the world which they inhabit, and there is action and reaction between them and the external universe. This does not apply to God. He is not operated upon and moved from the outside, but all his activity is self-determined. All the movement in the Divine essence is internal and ab intra. Even when God is complacent towards a creature's holiness, and displacent towards a creature's sin, this is not the same as a passive impression upon a sensuous organism, from an outward sensible object, eliciting temporarily a sensation that previously was unfelt. Sin and holiness are not substances; and God's love and wrath are self-moved and unceasing energies of the Divine nature. He is voluntarily and eternally complacent towards good, and displacent towards evil.

The forces of nature do not make an impression upon the Divine essence. There is no organic action and reaction between the created universe of mind and matter, and the eternal being of God. "In God," says Newton (Scholium,

at the end of the Principia), "all things are contained and move, but without mutual passion. God is not acted upon by the motions of bodies; and they suffer no resistance from the omnipresence of God." Passions are liable to be excessive. Not being self-determined, but determined ab extra, their intensity depends upon what is outward. God has no passionate or exorbitant emotions. The doctrine that God has passions would imply that there is an *organic unity* between him and the universe, with action and reaction. But two such different beings as God and material nature, or God and man, cannot constitute one organic system of existence. In an organism, one part is as old as another, and as necessary as another. Organs are contemporaneous; having the same common nature and origin, and developing simultaneously. This cannot be true of the Infinite and finite spirit, and still less of the Infinite spirit and matter. See Presbyterian Review, Oct. 1880, 769, 770.

It is important to remember this signification of the term "passion," and the intention in employing it. Sometimes it has been understood to be synonymous with feeling or emotion, and the erroneous and demoralizing inference has been drawn, that the Divine nature is destitute of feeling altogether. "God," says Spinoza (Ethics, V. 17-19), "is free from all passions; he is not affected with joy and sadness; or with love and hatred. No one can hate God: and he who loves God cannot endeavor to cause God to love him, because God can neither love nor hate." Spinoza assumes that love and hatred involve alternations of happiness and misery in the being who has such emotions. Consequently God cannot have either love or hatred. Similarly, Hartmann (Krisis des Christenthums, 41) remarks that "die Liebe Gottes ist eine anthropopathische Vorstellung von ganz gleicher Ordnung mit der Persönlichkeit Gottes; sie steht und fällt mit dieser, und ist dem religiösen Bewusstseyn auf pantheistischer Basis ebenso entbehrlich wie diese." Such a statement reduces the Supreme Being to

mere intelligence, and to the lowest form of intelligence ; that, namely, which is disconnected with moral characteristics. It denudes God of those emotional qualities that necessarily enter into personality, and are requisite in order to love, worship, and obedience upon the part of the creature. But the error could not logically stop here. The intelligence of the deity could not long survive his moral feeling. If he is conceived to have the power of perceiving sin, for example, but no power of feeling displeasure towards it, such a weak and inefficient perception would be unworthy of notice, and would soon be theoretically, as well as practically denied. A theory that begins with affirming absolute indifference in God, and denying that he either loves the good, or hates the evil, must end ultimately in rejecting all moral attributes, and reducing him to blind force. It could not even concede happiness to the deity, because this is a species of feeling. "When," says Howe (Redeemer's Tears), "expressions that import anger or grief are used concerning God himself, we must sever in our conception everything of imperfection, and ascribe everything of real perfection. We are not to think that such expressions signify nothing, that they have no meaning, or that nothing at all is to be attributed to Him, under them. Nor are we, again, to think that they signify the same thing with what we find in ourselves, and are wont to express by these names. In the Divine nature, there may be real and yet most serene complacency and displacency ; viz., such as are unaccompanied with the least commotion, and import nothing of imperfection, but perfection rather, as it is a perfection to apprehend things suitably to what in themselves they are."

The Scriptures attribute feeling to God, and nearly all forms of feeling common to man. That all of these are not intended to be understood as belonging to the Divine nature is plain, because some of them are as incompatible with the idea of an infinite and perfect being as are the

material instruments of hands and feet attributed to him in Scripture. Such an emotion as fear, for example, which God is represented as experiencing (Gen. 3 : 22, 23 ; Ex. 13 : 17 ; Deut. 32 : 27), must be regarded as metaphorical. The same is true of jealousy (Deut. 32 : 21) ; of grieving and repenting (Gen. 6 : 6, 7 ; Ps. 95 : 10 ; Jer. 15 : 6).

The criterion for determining which [form of feeling is literally, and which is metaphorically attributable to God, is the divine *blessedness*. God cannot be the subject of any emotion that is intrinsically and necessarily an unhappy one. If he literally feared his foes, or were literally jealous of a rival, he would so far forth be miserable. Literal fear and literal jealousy cannot therefore be attributed to him. Tried by this test, it will be found that there are only two fundamental forms of feeling that are literally attributable to the Divine essence. These are love (*ἀγάπη*), and wrath (*ὄργη*). Hatred is a phase of displeasure or wrath. These two emotions are real and essential in God ; the one wakened by righteousness, and the other by sin. The existence of the one necessitates that of the other ; so that if there be no love of righteousness, there is no anger at sin, and, conversely, if there be no anger at sin, there is no love of righteousness. "He who loves the good," says Lactantius (*De ira*, 5), "by this very fact hates the evil ; and he who does not hate the evil, does not love the good ; because the love of goodness issues directly out of the hatred of evil, and the hatred of evil issues directly out of the love of goodness. No one can love life without abhorring death ; and no one can have an appetency for light, without an antipathy to darkness." The necessary coexistence of these opposite feelings towards moral contraries like righteousness and sin, is continually taught in Scripture. "All they that hate me love death," Prov. 8 : 36. "Ye that love the Lord, hate evil," Ps. 97 : 10.

Complacency towards righteousness and displacency towards sin are not *contraries*, but *opposites*, or *antitheses*.

They are the action of one and the same moral attribute, viz., holiness, towards the two contraries right and wrong. Consequently they are homogeneous feelings. The Divine wrath is the Divine holiness in one phase or mode of it; and the Divine love is the same Divine holiness in another phase or mode of it. One involves and supposes the other. But in the instance of contrary feelings, such for example as pleasure and pain, or contrary qualities like righteousness and sin, there is heterogeneity. Pain and pleasure are not two modes or phases of the same thing; and neither are righteousness and sin. These are not opposite antitheses which involve and imply each other. Each exists alone without the other. The one excludes the other, instead of supposing the other. The relation of opposites or antitheses is that of polarity. Moral love and moral wrath are like the two poles, north and south, of the same magnet, or the two manifestations, positive and negative, of the same electricity. Boreal magnetism is as really magnetism as austral; and positive electricity is as really electricity as negative. So, also, moral wrath is as truly holiness as moral love. "He who leaveth Thee," says Augustine, "whither goeth or fleeth he, but from Thee pleased, to Thee displeased." Accordingly, the two feelings of love of holiness and hatred of evil coexist in the character of God, the most perfect of beings, and in that of angels and redeemed men. Human character is worthless, in proportion as abhorrence of sin is lacking in it. It is related of Charles the Second, that "he felt no gratitude for benefits, and no resentment for wrongs. He did not love anyone, and hated no one." He was indifferent towards right and wrong, and "the only feeling he had was contempt." Green: *History of the English People*, IX.¹

These emotions of love and wrath are compatible with

¹ Upon the subject of the Divine anger, see Tertullian: *De ira dei*. Neander: *Apostel-Geschichte*, II. 616. (Reconciliation, in Rom. 4: 35; Phil. 2: 6). Shedd: *Theological Essays*, 269-285.

the Divine blessedness. To love righteousness is confessedly blessedness itself. To be displeased with and hate wickedness, at first sight, would seem to introduce commotion and unhappiness into the Divine mind. But this is because it is confounded with the passion of anger and hatred in the depraved human heart. This is an unlawful feeling; a man has no right to hate his fellow, or to be angry with him with this species of wrath. He is forbidden by the moral law to exercise such an emotion. It is the illegitimateness of the feeling that makes it a wretched one. But any emotion that is permitted, and still more that is commanded by the moral law, cannot cause mental distress. To suppose this, is to suppose that morality and misery are inseparably connected, and that to feel rightly and righteously is to be miserable.

There is a kind of wrath in the human soul that resembles the wrath of God, and constitutes its true analogue. It is the wrath of the human conscience, which is wholly different from that of the human heart. This kind of anger is commanded in the injunction, "Be ye angry and sin not," Eph. 4 : 26. Were this species of moral displeasure more often considered, and the Divine anger illustrated by it, there would be less of the common and unthinking opposition to the doctrine of the Divine wrath.

That this species of moral displeasure is compatible with blessedness, is plain from an examination of the nature of happiness. Aristotle (*Ethics*, X. 4) defines happiness or pleasurable emotion to be "the coincidence and harmony between a feeling and its correlative object." Bishop Butler gives the same definition, substantially, in his remark that "pleasure arises from a faculty's having its proper object." When the feeling of hunger, for illustration, is met by food, two things are brought into contact that are intended for each other, and the consequence is a pleasurable sensation. If the feeling of hunger were met by an innutritious fluid like water, there would be no coincidence and agreement

between them, and the result would be dissatisfaction and some degree of pain.

Now when the emotion of anger in a most pure spirit like God comes into contact with moral evil, there is harmony between the feeling and its object. It is a righteous feeling spent upon a wicked thing. When God hates what is hateful, and is angry at that which merits wrath, the true nature and fitness of things is observed, and he feels in himself that inward satisfaction which is the substance of happiness. Anger and hatred are associated in our minds with unhappiness, because we behold their exercise only in a sinful sphere, and in an illegitimate manner. In an apostate world, the proper and fitting coincidence between emotions and their objects has been disturbed and destroyed by sin. A sinner hates the holiness which he ought to love, and loves the sin which he ought to hate. The anger in his heart is selfish and passionate, not legitimate and calm. The love in his heart is illicit; and hence in scripture it is denominated "lust," or "concupiscence" (*ἐπιθυμία*). In a sinful world, the true relations and correlations are reversed. Love and hatred are expended upon exactly the wrong objects. But when these feelings are contemplated within the sphere of the Holy and the Eternal; when they are beheld in God, a most pure spirit, without body, parts, or passions, and exercised only upon their appropriate and deserving objects; when the wrath falls only upon the sin and uncleanness of hell, and burns up nothing but filth in its pure celestial flame; then the emotion is not merely right and legitimate, but it is beautiful with an august beauty, and no source of pain either to the Divine mind, or to any minds in sympathy with it.

It is here and thus, that we can explain the blessedness of God in connection with his omniscience and omnipresence. We know that sin and the punishment of sin are ever before him. The feeling of wrath against the wickedness of man and devils, is constantly in the Divine essence.

Yet God is supremely and constantly blessed. He can be so, only because there is a just and proper harmony between the wrath and the object upon which it falls; only because he hates that which is hateful, and condemns what is damnable. Hence he is called "God over *all* [hell as well as heaven] blessed forever." The Divine blessedness is not destroyed by the sin of his creatures, or by his own holy displeasure against it. And here, also, is seen the compatibility of some everlasting sin and misery with the Divine perfection. If the feeling of wrath against moral evil is right and rational, there is no impropriety in its exercise by the Supreme being, and its exercise by him is the substance of hell. If the feeling is proper for a single instant, it is so forever.

While therefore God as a most pure spirit has no passions, he has feelings and emotions. He is not passively wrought upon by the objective universe, so that he experiences physical impressions and organic appetites, as the creature does, but he is self-moved in all his feelings. God's moral love and wrath relate to the character and actions of free moral agents. He does not either love or hate inorganic matter. He has no physical appetite or antipathy. The emotions of love and wrath go forth not towards the *substance* of free agents, but towards the agency only. God does not hate the soul of a sinner, but only his sin; and he does not love with holy complacency the substance of the human mind, but its activity.

2. *Personality* is the second fundamental predicate of spirit. God is a personal Being. Personality is marked by two characteristics: (a) self-consciousness; (b) self-determination.¹

¹ One of the contradictions in Spinoza's system is, that while he denies to man self-determination, he concedes to him self-consciousness. But a theorist who could attribute to God the two contradictories, thought and extension, could attribute to man the two contradictories, personality and necessity. On these two factors in personality, see Müller: *Sin*, II. 113-142. Urwick's *Trans.*

Self-consciousness is, first, the power which a rational spirit has of making itself its own object, and, secondly, of knowing that it has done so. All consciousness implies a duality of subject and object; a subject to know, and an object to be known. If there be a subject but no object, consciousness is impossible. And if there be an object, but no subject, there can be no consciousness. Mere singleness is fatal to consciousness. I cannot be conscious of a thing, unless there is a thing to be conscious of. Take away all objects of thought, and I cannot think.

Consciousness is very different from self-consciousness, and the two must be carefully discriminated. In consciousness, the object is another substance than the subject; but in self-consciousness the object is the same substance as the subject. When I am conscious of a tree, the object is a different entity from my mind; but when I am conscious of myself, the object is the same entity with my mind. In consciousness, the duality required is in two things. In self-consciousness, the duality required is in one thing.

An animal has consciousness in the sense of sentiency, but not self-consciousness. It is impressed by external objects that are no part of its own substance, but it is never impressed by *itself*. It never duplicates its own unity, and contemplates itself. It is aware of heat and cold, of pleasure and pain, but it is never aware of the subject which experiences these sensations. It cannot refer any of its experiences back to itself as the *person* that experiences them. An animal is not a person, and cannot have the consciousness of a person; that is to say, it cannot have self-consciousness. "Why is it," says Christlieb (*Modern Doubt*, 153), "that the gorilla with a throat similar to that of man, can only howl or whine, and that man with a throat like the ape's can speak and sing? The answer is, that the beast cannot form an *objective notion* of his sensations and feelings, and therefore cannot reproduce them in language; it cannot distinguish between a personal ego and the mo-

mentary sensation. It is the power to do this, and not his organs of voice (for even the deaf and dumb make a language for themselves) which gives man the faculty of speech."

Man has both consciousness and self-consciousness. He has that inferior species, in which he only feels, but does not place his feeling in relation to himself as the ego. In the first place, he has the sensuous consciousness of the animal, and the blind agencies of physical appetite. This is mere sentiency, differing from that of the animal only in the fact that it is capable of being scrutinized and converted into self-consciousness. In the second place, there are the spontaneous workings of thought and feeling continually going on, which constitute a consciousness, but not necessarily a self-consciousness. The man thinks, but does not think of what he thinks. He feels, but does not scrutinize his feeling. His feeling is said to be "unconscious," in the sense of unreflecting, or not self-conscious. It is one of the effects of conviction by the Holy Spirit, to convert consciousness into self-consciousness. Conviction of sin is the consciousness of self as the guilty author of sin. It is forcing the man to say, "I know that *I* have thus felt, and thus thought, and thus acted." The truth and Spirit of God bring sinners to self-knowledge and self-consciousness, from out of a state of mere consciousness.

Self-consciousness is higher than consciousness. It is the highest and most perfect form of consciousness. It is the species that characterizes the Supreme Being. God does not like man have consciousness *separate* from self-consciousness. In the first place, he has no sentiency. He is not impressed and wrought upon by an external object, as creatures are, by virtue of a correlation between himself and it. He is without body, parts and passions. In the second place, there are no blind and unreflecting mental processes in God. He never comes to self-consciousness out of mere consciousness, as man does; but he is perpetually self-con-

templating, self-knowing, and self-communing. God is cognizant of the universe of matter which he created ex nihilo, and which consequently is no part of his own essence. But this cognition comes not through the medium of the senses, and is not an imperfect kind of knowledge like the sentiency of an animal, or the passive consciousness of the unreflecting man. The Divine consciousness of the universe, as an object, is always related to and accompanied with the Divine self-consciousness, which is immutable and eternal. In God, consciousness and self-consciousness are inseparable, but not in man. Man may be conscious, yet not self-conscious. God cannot be. Man passes from consciousness to self-consciousness, and back again. God does not. Consequently, God's self-consciousness is more perfect and of a higher grade than that of man or angel.

Self-consciousness is more mysterious and inexplicable than mere consciousness. It has been the problem of the philosophic mind in all ages. The pantheist asserts that the doctrine of the dualism of mind and matter renders cognition impossible, but that the doctrine of monism explains cognition. He maintains that if it can be shown that all consciousness is in reality self-consciousness, because all substance is one substance, then the problem of cognition is made clear. But in fact it is made darker. For mere sameness of substance does not account for cognition. One stone is identical in substance with another, but this does not go to prove that one stone knows or can know another stone. There is no reason, consequently, for asserting that mind cannot know matter, unless mind and matter are the same substance. In order to be conscious of a material object, it is not necessary to be a material subject. The only case in which it is necessary for the subject and object to be identical in substance, is that of *self*-consciousness. In this instance, the object known must be one in substance with the subject knowing. The identity of subject and object is true only in reference to the knowledge

which the individual person has of himself. The instant he passes to the knowledge of any other object than his own soul, he has another form of consciousness than self-consciousness. When I cognize a tree, I am conscious, but not self-conscious. When I know God, I am conscious, not self-conscious. The substance, or object, known in each of these instances, is not my substance, but that of another being, and my consciousness is not self-consciousness. I can indeed pass from consciousness to self-consciousness, by referring the consciousness of the tree to the self as the subject of it. But this is a second act additional to the first act of mere consciousness.

The truth is, that it is more difficult to explain self-consciousness than consciousness; to conceive how the subject can know *itself*, than how it can know something that is not itself. The act of simple consciousness, which is common to both man and brute, is comparatively plain and explicable. When we look at an object other than ourselves; when we behold a tree or the sky, for example; the act of cognition is easier to comprehend than is the act of *self*-knowledge. For there is something outside of us, in front of us, and another thing than we are, at which we look, and which we behold. But in this act of *self*-inspection, there is no second thing, external and extant to us, which we contemplate. That which is seen, is one and the same thing with that which sees. The act of cognition, which in all other instances requires the existence of two totally different entities—an entity that is known, and an entity that knows—in this instance, is performed with only one entity. It is the individual soul that perceives, and it is this identical individual soul that is perceived. It is the individual man that knows, and it is this very same man that is known. The eyeball looks at the eyeball. This latter act of cognition is much more mysterious than the former, so that nothing is gained by contending that all consciousness is really self-consciousness. Compare Augustine: Trinity, XIV. vi.

We have said that *all* consciousness implies a duality of subject and object. Self-consciousness, consequently, requires these. And the peculiarity and mystery is, that it obtains them both, in *one* being or substance. The human spirit, in the act of self-cognition, furnishes both the subject that perceives, and the object that is perceived. The soul duplicates its own unity, as it were, and sets itself to look at itself. It is this power which the rational spirit possesses of making itself its own object, that constitutes it a *personal* being. Take away from man this capacity of setting himself off over against himself, and of steadily eying himself, and whatever other capacities he might be endowed with, he would not be a person. Even if he should think, and feel, and act, he could not say, "I know that I think; I know that I feel; I know that I am acting."

God as personal, is self-conscious. Consequently he must make himself his own object of contemplation. Here the doctrine of the trinity, the deep and dark mystery of Christianity, pours a flood of light upon the mystery of the Divine self-consciousness. The pillar of cloud becomes the pillar of fire. The three distinctions in the one essence personalize it. God is personal because he is three persons: Father, Son, and Spirit.

Self-consciousness is (1), the power which a rational spirit, or mind, has of making itself its own object; and (2), of knowing that it has done so. If the first step is taken, and not the second, there is consciousness but not self-consciousness; because the subject would not, in this case, know that the object is the *self*. And the second step cannot be taken, if the first has not been. These two acts of a rational spirit, or mind, involve three distinctions in it, or modes of it. The whole mind as a subject contemplates the very same whole mind as an object. Here are two distinctions or modes of one mind. And the very same whole mind also perceives, that the contemplating subject and the contemplated object are one and the same essence or being. Here

are three modes of one mind, each distinct from the others, yet all three going to make up the one *self-conscious* spirit. Unless there were these two acts and the three resulting distinctions, there would be no self-knowledge. Mere singleness, a mere subject without an object, is incompatible with self-consciousness. And mere duality would yield only consciousness, not self-consciousness. Consciousness is dual; self-consciousness is trinal.

Revelation represents God as "blessed forever." This blessedness is independent of the universe which once did not exist, and which he created from nothing. God, therefore, must find all the conditions of blessedness within himself alone. He is "blessed forever" in his own self-contemplation and self-communion. He does not need the universe, in order that he may have an *object* which he can know, which he can love, and over which he can rejoice. "The Father knoweth the Son," from all eternity (Matt. 11 : 27); and "loveth the Son," from all eternity (John 3 : 35); and "glorifieth the Son," from all eternity (John 17 : 5). Prior to creation, the eternal Wisdom "was by him as one brought up with him, and was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him" (Prov. 8 : 30); and the eternal Word "was in the beginning with God" (John 1 : 2); and "the only begotten Son" (or God only begotten, as the uncials read) was eternally "in the bosom of the Father" (John 1 : 18). Here is society *within* the essence, and wholly *independent* of the created universe; and self-knowledge, self-communion, and blessedness resulting therefrom. But this is impossible to an essence destitute of these internal personal distinctions. Not the singular unit of the deist, but the plural unity of the trinitarian explains this. A subject without an object could not know. What is there to be known? Could not love. What is there to be loved? Could not rejoice. What is there to rejoice over? And the object cannot be the created universe. The *infinite* and *eternal* object of God's infinite and eternal knowledge, love, and joy, cannot

be his creation ; because this is neither eternal nor infinite. There was a time when the universe was not ; and if God's self-consciousness and blessedness depend upon the universe, there was a time when he was neither self-conscious nor blessed. The objective God for the subjective God, therefore, must be very God of very God, begotten not made, the eternal Son of the eternal Father.

At this point, the radical difference between the Christian trinity and that of the later pantheism appears. The later pantheism (not the earlier of Spinoza) constructs a kind of trinity, but it is dependent upon the universe. God distinguishes himself from the *world*, and thereby finds the object required for the subject. This is the view of Hegel. "As God is eternal personality, so he eternally produces his other self, namely, Nature, in order to self-consciousness." Michelet: *Geschichte der Philosophie*, II. 647. This conditions the Infinite by the finite. God makes use of the world in order to personality. To know himself as ego, he must know the universe as the non-ego. Without the world, therefore, he could not be self-conscious. There would be nothing from which to distinguish himself, and without such an act of distinction and contrast he would be impersonal. God is thus dependent upon the world for his personality. But by his idea, he cannot be dependent upon anything that is not himself. Consequently God and the world must ultimately be one and the same substance. God's personality is God's becoming conscious of himself in man and in nature. These latter are a phase or mode of the Infinite. The universe, consequently, must be coeval with God, because he cannot have any self-consciousness without it. Says Hartmann (*Krisis des Christenthums*, 42), "Ein Gegensatz von Selbstbewusstsein und Weltbewusstsein, von Ich und Nicht Ich, von Subject und Object in Gott, nicht denkbar ist. Vielmehr sein Selbstbewusstsein mit seiner intuitiven Weltbewusstsein eins ist. Das Absolute kann kein anderes Selbstbewusstsein haben als sein

intuitives Weltbewusstsein." See Kurtz: Sacred History, 23.

But this is not the way in which the self-consciousness of the Godhead is mediated and brought about, according to divine revelation. In the Christian scheme of the trinity, the media to self-consciousness are all *within the divine essence*, and are wholly separate from, and independent of, the finite universe of mind and matter. The divine nature has all the requisites to personality in its own trinal constitution. God makes use of his own eternal and primary essence, and not of the secondary substance of the world, as the object from which to distinguish himself, and thereby be self-knowing, and self-communing. God distinguishes himself from *himself*, not from something that is not himself. This latter would yield consciousness merely, not self-consciousness. God the Father distinguishes himself from God the Son, and in this way knows himself. "No man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son," Matt. 11:27. The divine self-contemplation is the beholding and loving of one divine person by another divine person, and not God's beholding of the universe, and loving and communing with it. "The Father loveth the Son, and sheweth him all things that himself doeth," John 5:20. "The first love of God the Father to the Son is that which we call *ad intra*, where the divine persons are objects of each other's actings. The Father knows the Son, and the Son knows the Father; the Father loves the Son, and the Son loves the Father; and so consequently of the Holy Ghost, the medium of all these actings." Owen: Sacramental Discourse, XXII.

The self-consciousness of God has an analogue in the self-consciousness of man, in that the latter also is brought about without the aid of any other substance, or object, than the mind itself. In the instance of the finite spirit of man, we have seen that in the act of self-consciousness, no use is made of the external world, or of the non-ego. The human

spirit in this act of *self*-contemplation duplicates its *own* unity, and finds an object for itself as a subject, in its *own* substance, and not, as in the act of mere consciousness, in the substance of the external world. If this is possible and necessary in reference to man, and finite personality, it is still more so in reference to God, and infinite personality. The Supreme being cannot be dependent upon another essence than his own, for the conditions of self-consciousness. He is self-sufficient in this central respect, as in all others, and finds in his own nature all that is requisite to self-knowledge, as well as to self-communion and blessedness. Were it not so, God would be dependent upon his creation, and the blasphemous language which Byron puts into the mouth of Lucifer would be true.

“ He is great,
 But, in his greatness, is no happier than
 We in our conflict.
 Let him
 Sit on his vast and solitary throne,
 Creating worlds, to make eternity
Less burthensome to his immense existence
 And *unparticipated solitude*.
 Let him crowd orb on orb : he is alone. . . .
 Could he but crush himself, 'twere the best boon
 He ever granted ; but let him reign on,
 And multiply himself in misery !
 He, so wretched in his height,
 So restless in his wretchedness, must still
Create, and recreate.”—CAIN, I. i.

The Biblical doctrine of three distinctions, in one essence, each of which possesses the entire undivided essence, shows how God's self-consciousness is independent of the universe. God makes himself his own object. The first act, in the natural order, is the distinguishing of himself from himself. This yields the first and second distinctions, or persons. The eternal Father beholds himself in the eternal Son ; his alter ego, or other self. The subject contemplating is different and distinct, as to form (*μορφή*, Phil. 2 : 6),

not as to essence (*ὄυσία*), from the object contemplated. God the Father is not the same person (*μορφή τοῦ Θεοῦ*) as God the Son, though he is the same substance or being (*ὄυσία τοῦ Θεοῦ*). But this is not the whole of the trinitarian process. There must be a second act, namely, the perception that the subject-ego and object-ego, arrived at in the first act, are one and the same essence; that the Father and the Son are not two beings but one. This second act of perception supposes a percipient; and the percipient is a third distinction or mode of the divine essence, the Holy Spirit, who is different as to form (*μορφή*) from the first and second, because he recognizes both their distinctness of person and their unity and identity of nature. The circle of the divine self-consciousness is now complete. By the two acts of perception, and the three resulting distinctions, the eternal Being has made himself his own object, and has perceived that he has done so. And there is real trinity in the unity. For the subject-ego is not the object-ego; the first "form of God" is not the second "form of God." And the third distinction who reunites these two in the perception of their identity of essence, is neither the subject-ego nor the object-ego; the third "form of God" is not the first or the second form, and yet is consubstantial with them both. The third distinction does not, like the first, posit an object, but only perceives the act of positing. There is, consequently, no second *object* that requires to be reunited in the unity of essence. Hence the two acts and the three resulting distinctions are sufficient to complete the circle of self-consciousness.¹

¹ For a fuller development of this subject upon this line, see note in Shedd: *History of Doctrine*, I. 365-368; *Introduction to Augustine on the Trinity*, pp. 8, 9. Also Augustine: *Trinity*, XIV. vi.-viii. Guericke: *Church History*, 203. Müller: *On Sin*, II. 136 sq. Billroth: *Religions-Philosophie*, § 89, 90. Wilberforce: *Incarnation*, III. Kidd: *On the Trinity (Eternal Sonship)*; with Candlish's *Introduction*. Candlish: *Fatherhood of God*. Dorner: *Christian Doctrine*, I. 412-462. Kurtz: *Sacred History*, § 2. Christlieb: *Modern Doubt*, Lect. III. Passavant: *Wille*, p. 4.

Thus the Divine personality, in the light thrown upon it by the revealed doctrine of the trinity, is seen to be wholly independent of the finite. God does not struggle out into self-consciousness by the help of the external universe. Before that universe was created, and in the solitude of his own eternity and self-sufficiency, he had within his own essence all the conditions of self-consciousness. And after the worlds were called into being, the divine personality remained the same immutable self-knowledge, unaffected by anything in his handiwork.

“ Oh Light Eterne, sole in thyself that dwellest,
Sole knowest thyself, and known unto thyself,
And knowing, lovest and smilest on thyself ! ”

DANTE : Paradise, xxxiii. 125.

This analysis shows that self-consciousness is trinal, while mere consciousness is only dual. The former implies three distinctions ; the latter only two. When I am conscious of a tree, there is first, a subject, namely, my mind ; and secondly, an object, namely, the tree. This is all there is in the process of consciousness. But when I am conscious of myself, there is first, a subject, namely, my mind as a contemplating mind ; there is, secondly, an object, namely, my mind as a contemplated mind ; and, thirdly, there is still another subject, namely, my mind as perceiving that these two prior distinctions are one and the same mind. In this trinal process of self-consciousness, there is much more than in the dual process of simple consciousness.

The earlier pantheism of Spinoza differs from the later of Hegel, in combating the doctrine of the divine personality altogether, and in any form whatsoever. Hegel, as has been previously noticed, would obtain a kind of personality for the Infinite through the medium of the world, but Spinoza maintains that the Infinite, from the very idea of it, cannot be personal. If it should become so, it would cease to be infinite. He condensed his view in the dictum :

“omnis determinatio est negatio;” all limitation is negation. A person in order to be such, must distinguish himself from something that is not himself. If God is personal, he must therefore be able to say that he is not the world. In personally defining himself, he sets limits to himself; and if he sets limits, he is not unlimited, and if not unlimited, not infinite. If God and the universe, says Spinoza, are two different substances, and exclude each other in the way the theist maintains, then God is not the All, and therefore not the Infinite. God plus the universe would be greater than God minus the universe.

This reasoning proceeds upon a false idea and definition of the Infinite. It confounds the Infinite with the All. The two are wholly diverse. In the first place, the Infinite is the perfect. Consequently, it excludes all modes of existence that are imperfect. But the All includes these. Secondly, infinite qualities of necessity exclude finite qualities; but the All does not. One and the same being cannot be both infinite and finite. But the fact that a being is not finite and in *this* sense limited, does not make him finite. This is the obvious fallacy in the pantheistic position, that if God can distinguish himself as other than the world, and as not the world, he is not infinite. A limitation of this kind is *necessary* in order that he may be the Infinite. To say that a being is *not* finite; to “determine” him by this “negative” (using Spinoza’s dictum), is the very way to say that he is infinite. An infinite power cannot be a finite power; an infinite knowledge cannot be a finite knowledge. A physical force able to lift one hundred pounds cannot be a force able to lift *only* fifty pounds, any more than one hundred can be only fifty. The Infinite, therefore, does not like the All, comprise all varieties of being, possible and actual, limited and unlimited, good and evil, perfect and imperfect, matter and mind. The Infinite can create the finite, but cannot be the finite. Thirdly, the Infinite is simple; the All is complex. Everything in the former is

homogeneous. The contents of the latter are heterogeneous. Fourthly, the Infinite is without parts, and indivisible; the All is made up of parts, and is divisible.

The All, consequently, is a pseudo-Infinite, and to assert that it is greater than the simple Infinite is the same error that is committed in mathematics, when it is asserted that an infinite number plus a vast finite number is greater than the simple infinite. Mathematical infinity is neither increased nor diminished by the addition or subtraction of millions of units. In like manner, it is no increase of infinite and absolute perfection, to add a certain amount of finite imperfection to it. God's essence, for example, is eternal, immutable, and necessary; the substance of the finite universe is temporal, mutable, and contingent. The former *must* be, and cannot be conceived of as non-existent; the latter may or may not be. Now, to add such an inferior and secondary species of being to the absolutely perfect and eternal essence of God, and regard it as increasing his eternity and immensity, or to subtract it and assert that it diminishes his eternity and immensity, is irrational. God's power again is infinite. This omnipotence would not be made more mighty, by endowing it with that infinitely less degree of power which resides in a man or an angel. The same is true of infinite knowledge. God's omniscience would not be made greater, by the addition of a narrow finite intelligence. To add contingent being to necessary being, does not make the latter any more necessary. To add imperfect being to perfect being, does not make the latter any more perfect. "God," says Müller (Sin, I. 14), "is a universe in himself, whether the world exist or not."

The error of confounding the Infinite with the All has been committed by writers who are far from pantheism, in their intention. The phraseology of Edwards is sometimes open to objection, in that he appears to combine God with the universe in one system of being, thereby making him a

part of the All, and obliterating the distinction between Infinite and finite existence. "If the deity," he says (Nature of Virtue), "is to be looked upon as within that system of beings which properly terminates our benevolence, or belonging to that whole, certainly he is to be regarded as the *head* of the system, and the *chief* part of it; if it be proper to call him a *part* who is infinitely more than all the rest, and in comparison of whom, and without whom, all the rest are nothing, either as to beauty or existence." This qualification of his remark, shows that Edwards had doubts whether it is proper to speak of one universal system of being; what he elsewhere calls "being in general;" of which God is a part.¹ In another place (End in Creation), he speaks still more unguardedly, when he says that "the first Being, the eternal and infinite Being, is in effect Being in general, and comprehends universal existence." This, if found in Spinoza, would mean that God is the All. A similar confounding of God with the All is found in Edwards on the Will (I. iii.), where he remarks that "there is a great absurdity in supposing that there should be no God, or in denying being in general." Here, "God" and "being in general" are convertible terms. Andrew Fuller (Calvinism and Socinianism, Letter VII.) says that "God must be allowed to form the far greater proportion, if I may so speak, of the whole system of being." He probably borrowed this from Edwards. This is the same error that appears in the Greek pantheism, which regarded τὸ εἶν as τὸ πᾶν.

Dorner (Christian Doctrine, I. 319) falls into the same error. "We have previously regarded God as the infinite original Being or Essence—indeed as the original All of

¹ It is also to be observed, that God cannot properly be denominated an object of benevolence or benevolent regard. Only a created being can be such. We bless God in the sense of adoring him, but not in the sense of bestowing a blessing upon him. We do not wish him well, as we do or should all creatures. God is above this. To wish a being well, implies the possibility of his not being

being. God is originally the totality of being, and therefore a universality attaches to him, inasmuch as somehow all being must originally be included in him." Cudworth (Int. Syst., IV. xvii.) finds the doctrine that God is All, in the Orphic poetry, but would interpret it in an allowable sense; referring to such texts as 1 Cor. 15 : 28, "God is all in all;" Acts 17 : 28, "In him we have our being." But he thinks that the Stoics, and some others, held the doctrine in a "gross" pantheistic sense: there being "Spinozism before Spinoza." Hamilton and Mansel confound the Infinite with the All, and employ this spurious idea in proving the position that the personal Infinite involves limitation and self-contradiction. If God distinguishes himself from the universe, then God minus the universe is less than God plus the universe. Hamilton, in his letter to Calderwood, explicitly defines the Infinite as τὸ ἔν καὶ πᾶν. He also confounds the Infinite with the Indefinite or Unlimited. See his list of antinomies, in Bowen's Hamilton, p. 522.

The personality of the Essence or Godhead, must be distinguished from that of a Person in the Essence or Godhead. The existence of three divine persons in the divine essence results in the self-consciousness of the essence. This general self-consciousness of the triune Godhead must not be confounded with the particular individual consciousness of the Father as Father, of the Son as Son, of the Spirit as Spirit. The personality of the trinity is not the same as that of one of its persons. The personality of a trinitarian person consists in the fatherhood, or the sonship, or the procession, as the case may be. But the personality of the trinity consists not in any one of these individual peculiarities, but in the *result* of all three. The three hypostatical consciousnesses make one self-consciousness, as the three persons constitute one essence.

The personality of one of the persons, the Greek trinitarians denominated ἰδιότης (individuality); that peculiarity which distinguishes him from the others. The personality

of the Son, is his sonship; of the Father, his paternity; of the Spirit, his procession. In this reference, it is preferable to speak of the *personality* of the essence, rather than of the *person* of the essence; because the essence is not one person, but three persons. The personality of the Divine essence, or of God in the abstract, is his self-consciousness, which, as we have seen, results from the subsistence of three persons in the essence and the corresponding trinal consciousness. From this point of view, it is less liable to misconception, to say that God is personal, than to say that God is a person. The latter statement, unless explained, conflicts with the statement that God is three persons; the former does not.

The Divine essence cannot be at once three persons and one person, if "person" is employed in one signification; but it can be at once three persons and one personal Being. The Divine essence, by reason of the three distinctions in it, is self-contemplative, self-cognitive, and self-communing. If there were only a single subject, this would be impossible. Consequently, that personal characteristic by which the trinitarian persons differ from each other cannot be the personal characteristic of the essence, or the entire Godhead. The fatherhood of the first person is not the fatherhood of the Trinity. The sonship of the second person is not the sonship of the Trinity. The procession of the third person is not the procession of the Trinity. If, however, the distinction is marked between a single trinitarian person, such as the Father, or the Son, or the Spirit, and a triune person such as the Godhead, it would not be self-contradictory to say that God is three persons and one person; because the term "person" is employed in two senses. In one instance, it denotes the hypostatical personality, in the other, the tripersonality; in one case, it denotes a consciousness that is single, in the other a consciousness that is trinal; in one case the consciousness is simple, in the other, complex.

CHAPTER II.

THE INNATE IDEA AND KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

Augustine : City of God, IV. xxiv. xxv. xxxi ; VII. vi. ; VIII. i.-xii. Clement of Alexandria : Miscellanies, V. xiv. Cicero : De Natura Deorum, III. 16-25. Calvin : Institutes, I. iii. iv. x. Cudworth : System, IV. i.-xxviii. More : Antidote to Atheism. Howe : Living Temple, I. ii. Stillingfleet : Natural and Revealed Religion, I. i. Charnocke : Discourses, I. II. Lowman : Hebrew Ritual, I. ii. Bolton : Evidences of Christianity from Christian Apologists. Christlieb : Modern Doubt, II. Buchanan : Modern Atheism. Flint : Theism ; Antitheistic Theories. Harris : Theism. Mommsen : Rome, I. ii. xii. Curtius : Greece, I. ii. Thirlwall : Greece, XXII. Naville : Modern Atheism. Thompson : Christian Theism. Nagelsbach : Homerische Theologie. Gladstone : Homer, II. 1 seq. Müller : Science of Language, 2d series, IX. X. Bowen : Modern Philosophy, III. Shedd : History of Doctrine, I. 51-74 ; 103-130. Gillett : God in Human Thought. Rawlinson : Egypt, X. Quatrefages : Human Species, XXXV. Fisher : Theistic and Christian Belief.

THE term "being," when applied to God, refers to his nature and constitution : *quid sit* ; in opposition to materialistic and pantheistic conceptions of him. The term "existence," when applied to God, refers to the question whether there is any such being : *quod sit* ; in opposition to atheism. We analyze and define God's being ; we demonstrate his existence.

The Scriptures contain no formal or syllogistical argument for the Divine existence. The opening sentence : "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," supposes that the reader has the idea of God in his mind, and

recognizes its validity. The only form of atheism combated in the Bible, is practical atheism. The "fool" says there is no God, Ps. 14:1. In Eph. 2:12, the ἄθεοι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ are the same as the ξένοι τῶν διάθικῶν. The Westminster Larger Catechism (105) mentions forty-six sins as varieties of atheism; such as "ignorance of God, forgetfulness, disbelief, carnality, lukewarmness," etc. Milton (*Samson Agonistes*, 296) describes practical atheism:

"For of such doctrine, never was there school
But the heart of the fool,
And no man therein doctor, but himself."

The reason why the Scriptures make no provision against speculative atheism by syllogistic reasoning is, that syllogistic reasoning starts from a premise that is more obvious and certain than the conclusion drawn from it, and they do not concede that any premise necessary to be laid down in order to draw the conclusion that there is a Supreme being, is more intuitively certain than the conclusion itself. To prove is, "e re certa incerta confirmare." "An argument is something clearer than the proposition to be maintained," says Charnocke. But the judgment, "There is a God," is as universal, natural, and intuitive as the judgment, "There is a cause." The latter judgment has been combated (by Hume, e.g.), as well as the former. And the principal motive for combating the latter is, the invalidation of the former. Men deny the reality of a cause, only for the purpose of disproving the reality of a First Cause.

Another reason for the absence of a syllogistical argument for the Divine existence in scripture, is suggested by Stillingfleet (*Origines Sacrae*, III. i.). He remarks that in the early ages of the world, the being of God was more universally acknowledged by reason of the proximity in time to the beginning of the world, and to such events as the flood, and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. Hence Moses found little atheism to contend with. Fur-

thermore, the miracles connected with Moses's own mission rendered arguments for the divine existence unnecessary. Under Sinai, God proved his existence by his miraculous presence to the senses.

The evidence relied upon in the scriptures for the Divine existence is derived from the immediate and universal consciousness of the human soul, as this is awakened and developed by the works of creation and providence. St. Paul has given the fullest account of the subject, of any inspired writer, in Rom. 1 : 19, 20, compared with Acts 17 : 24-28 ; 14 : 16, 17. The positions which he lays down are the following :

1. The pagan possesses a knowledge of God as invisible (*τὰ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ*) ; as eternal (*ἀτῆδιος δύναμις*) ; as omnipotent (*ἀτῆδιος δύναμις*) ; as supreme (*Θειότης*)—sovereignty not godhead (A. V.), which would require *Θεότης* as in Col. 2 : 9 ; as holy in revealing wrath (*οργή*) against sin ; as one God—there being only one almighty, supreme, and eternal being ; as benevolent : Acts 17 : 25 ; 14 : 16 ; Rom. 2 : 4. Only the more general unanalyzed idea of God is attributed to the pagan, because there are degrees of knowledge, and his is the lowest. The unity, invisibility, omnipotence, eternity, retributive justice, and benevolence of the Divine being are represented by St. Paul as knowable by man as man, and as actually known by him in greater or less degree.

2. The pagan, though having an imperfect, yet has a valid and trustworthy knowledge of God. It is denominated *ἀλήθειαν*, Rom. 1 : 18. It is sufficient to constitute a foundation for responsibility, and the imputation of sin. Idolatry is charged against the pagan as guilt, because in practising it he is acting against his better knowledge, Rom. 1 : 20. Sensuality is guilt for the same reason, Rom. 1 : 32. Unthankfulness is guilt, Rom. 1 : 21. Failure to worship the true God is guilt, Rom. 1 : 21. Accordingly, the Westminster Confession (I. i.) affirms that "the light of nature

and the works of creation and providence do so far manifest the goodness, wisdom, and power of God, as to leave man inexcusable." Sin is chargeable upon the heathen, because they have not lived up to the light of nature. Any man is guilty who knows more than he performs. The Divine estimate of human duty, and the Divine requirement, proceeds upon the created capacities of the human soul, not upon the use that man makes of them. Because the pagan was originally endowed with the idea of one God, supreme, almighty, and holy, he is said by St. Paul to know God, and is consequently obligated to love and serve him so far as he knows him. The fact that the pagan's sin has vitiated this original idea, does not release him from this obligation, or prove that he is destitute of the idea, any more than the vice of man in Christendom, and the moral ignorance that ensues from it, release him from obligation.

The foundation for these statements of St. Paul is the fact that the idea of God is *natural* to the human mind, like the ideas of space and time, and the mathematical ideas of a point, a line, a circle, etc. These latter ideas are always assumed as more or less present and valid in human intelligence. The degree of their development in consciousness varies in different races and civilizations; but, in some degree, they are universal ideas. An "innate" idea is one that results from the constitution of the mind. It is not a fixed quantity in human consciousness, but varies with the mental development.

The idea of God is rational in its source. It is a product of the reason, not of the sense. In this respect, it is like the mathematical ideas. It is an intuition of the mind, not a deduction or conclusion from an impression upon the senses by an external object. St. Paul describes the nature of the perception by the participle *νοούμενα*, which denotes the direct and immediate intuition of reason. The invisible attributes of God, which are not objects of the senses, and are not cognizable by them, are clearly seen by the mind

(*νοῦς*), says St. Paul. The reason is stimulated to act by the notices of the senses; but when thus stimulated, it perceives by its own operation truths and facts which the senses themselves never perceive. The earth and sky make the same sensible impression upon the organs of a brute that they do upon those of a man; but the brute never discerns the "invisible things" of God; the "eternal power and godhood."

There must always be something innate and subjective, in order that the objective may be efficient. The objects of sense themselves would make no *conscious* impression, if there were not five senses in man upon which to impress themselves. They make no conscious impression upon a rock. In like manner, the order, design, and unity of external nature would not suggest the idea of a Supreme being, if that idea were not subjective to man. "Unless education and culture were preceded by an innate consciousness of God, as an operative predisposition, there would be nothing for education and culture to work upon." Nitzsch: *Christian Doctrine*, § 7.

Turretin (III. ii. 5) asserts that even speculative atheism is only apparent and seeming, because there is in man "an innate knowledge of God, and consciousness of divinity (*sensus divinitatis*) which can no more be wanting in him, than a rational intellect; and which he can no more get rid of than he can get rid of himself." Calvin (*Inst.*, I. iii.) argues "that the human mind is naturally endowed with the knowledge of God." Compare Charnocke: *Discourse I.* (in initio). Pearson (*Creed*, Art. I.) remarks that "we shall always find all nations of the world more prone to idolatry than to atheism, and readier to multiply than to deny the deity." Socrates (*Republic*, II. 378) would not have the mythological narratives concerning the gods made known to the young, because of their tendency to destroy the natural belief in the deity. "Neither if we mean our future guardians of the state to regard the habit of quarrelling as dishonorable,

should anything be said of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, which are quite untrue." The second book of the Republic enunciates very clearly the view of Socrates concerning the Divine nature, and shows that he regarded the knowledge of God as natural to man. See especially, II. 379-383. St. Paul indicates the subjective and innate quality of the idea of God, by employing the verbs *ἀποκαλύπτω* and *φανερωῶ* respecting it. These imply that the source of the perception is internal, not external. It is a revelation in the human consciousness, and through the constitutional structure of the human intellect. Such verbs as these are never employed to describe the outward impressions of the senses.

The teaching of St. Paul respecting the innate idea is confirmed by that of the pagan philosophers themselves. Cudworth has discussed the heathen theology, as represented by Greece and Rome, with immense learning and great candor. He proves by abundant quotations, 1, That many of the pagan philosophers were "theists," that is, monotheists, and acknowledged one supreme God. 2, That the multiplicity of gods, of which they speak, does not denote many eternal and self-existent deities, but only inferior divinities produced by the Supreme being, and subject to him: the word "gods" being employed by them somewhat as it is in Scripture, to signify angels, princes and magistrates. Intellectual System, I. 370 sq. 417 sq. Ed. Tegg.

The Greek and Roman monotheism is well expressed in the following remark of Cicero (*De Legibus*, I. 8). "There is no animal excepting man that has any notion of God; and among men there is no tribe so uncivilized and savage (*fera*) which, even if it does not know what kind of a god (*qualem deum*) it ought to have, does not know that it ought to have one." Thirlwall (*History*, XXII.) says that "Socrates acknowledged one Supreme being as the framer and preserver of the universe; used the singular and plural number indiscriminately concerning the object of his adora-

tion; and when he endeavored to reclaim one of his friends who had scoffed at sacrifices and divinations, it was, according to Xenophon, by an argument drawn exclusively from the works of one creator."

1. The natural monotheism of the pagan is proved by the names given to the Supreme being. The term for God is identical in languages of the same family. Says Müller (Science of Language, 2d series, X.), "Zeus, the most sacred name in Greek mythology, is the same word as Dyaus in Sanscrit, Jovis or Ju in Jupiter, in Latin, Tiw in Anglo-Saxon, preserved in Tiwsdaeg, Tuesday, the day of the Eddic god Tyr, and Zio in Old-High German. This word was framed once and once only; it was not borrowed by the Greek from the Hindus, nor by the Romans and Germans from the Greeks. It must have existed before the ancestors of those primeval races became separate in language and religion; before they left their common pastures to migrate to the right hand and to the left." Says De Vere (Studies in English, p. 10), "the term for God is identical in all the Indo-European languages—the Indic, Iranic, Celtic, Hellenic, Italic, Teutonic, and Slavonic." Grimm and Curtius (Griechische Etymologie, § 269) give this etymology of Zeus. When the name for the Supreme being is different, because the language is of another family, the same attribute or characteristic of superiority and supremacy over inferior divinities is indicated by it. The same deity whom the Greeks and Romans called Zeus or Jupiter, the Babylonians denominated Belus and Bel, the Egyptians Ammon, the Persians Mithras, the North American Indian the Great Spirit. See Studien und Kritiken, 1849.

2. This natural monotheism is proved by the title in the singular number given to the Supreme divinity. Solon (Herodotus, I. 32) denominates him *ὁ Θεός, τὸ Θεῖον*. Sophocles speaks of *ὁ μέγας Θεός*. Plato often denominates him *ὁ Θεός*. Other titles are, *ὁ δημιουργός, ὁ ἡγεμῶν, ὁ πρῶτος Θεός, ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, ὁ ὑπάτος κρείοντων* (Homer), *ἡ προνοία*

(Plutarch). Horace (Carm., I. xii.) describes the Supreme deity as the universal Father, to whom there is nothing "simile aut secundum." "The name of one Supreme God," says Calvin (Inst., I. x.), "has been universally known and celebrated. For those who used to worship a multitude of deities, whenever they spake according to the genuine sense of nature, used simply the name of God in the singular number, as though they were contented with one God."

The early christian Apologists universally maintained the position, that the human mind is naturally and by creation monotheistic. Tertullian (Apologeticus, 17) says, "God proves himself to be God, and the one only God, by the fact that he is known to all nations. The consciousness of God is the original dowry of the soul; the same in Egypt, in Syria, and in Pontus. For the God of the Jews is the one whom the *souls* of men call their God. The Christians worship one God, the one whom ye pagans naturally know; at whose lightnings and thunders ye tremble, at whose benefits ye rejoice. We prove the divine existence by the witness of the soul itself, which, although confined in the prison of the body, although enervated by lusts and passions, although made the servant of false goods, yet when it recovers itself as from a surfeit or a slumber, and is in its proper sober condition, calls God by this name [deus, not Jupiter, Apollo, etc.] because it is the proper name of the true God. 'Great God,' 'Good God,' and 'God grant,' are words in every mouth. Finally, in pronouncing these words, it looks not to the Roman capital, but to heaven; for it knows the dwelling-place of the true God, because from him and from thence it descended." Clement of Alexandria, by numerous quotations from pagan writers, proves that there is much monotheism in them; which he denominates "Greek plagiarism from the Hebrews." Stromata, V. xiv. Lactantius (Institutions, I. 5) quotes the Orphic poets, Hesiod, Virgil, and Ovid, in proof that the heathen poets knew the unity of God. He then cites Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, and

Seneca, to show that the pagan philosophers had the doctrine. Augustine (*De Civitate*, IV. xxiv.-xxxii. ; VII. vi. ; VIII. i.-xii.) takes the same view of pagan theology. "Varro," says Augustine, "while reprobating the popular belief in many divinities, thought that worship should be confined to one God ; although he calls this one God the soul of the world." Varro states that the Romans for more than one hundred and seventy years worshipped without images. Minucius Felix (*Octavius*, 18) argues in a manner like that of Tertullian. "Audio vulgus, cum ad caelum manus tendunt nihil aliud quam deum dicunt, et: 'Deus magnus est,' et; 'Deus verus est,' et; 'Si deus dederit.' Vulgi iste naturalis sermo est, an christiani confitentis oratio? Et qui Jovem principem volunt, falluntur in nomine, sed de una potestate consentiunt." Eusebius (*Praeparatio Evangelica*, XI. 13) quotes from the *Timaeus*, to prove that Plato agrees with Moses in teaching the unity of God. In the *Praeparatio Evangelica* (XI. 1), Eusebius maintains that "Platonis philosophiam, in iis quae omnium maxime necessaria sunt cum illa Hebraeorum convenire." Modern authorities agree with the Christian apologist. "Among all nations," says Kant (*Pure Reason*, p. 363), "through the darkest polytheism, glimmer some faint sparks of monotheism, to which these idolaters have been led, not from reflection and profound thought, but by the study and natural progress of the human understanding."

That monotheism prevailed somewhat in Abraham's time in races other than the Hebrew, and in countries other than Palestine, is evident from the following Biblical data. Hagar, the Egyptian, "called the name of the Lord that spake unto her, Thou God seest me," Gen. 16:13. Jehovah appears to Abimelech, the Philistine king, and Abimelech said, "Lord, wilt thou slay also a righteous nation?" Gen. 20:3-8. Pharaoh, the Egyptian, speaks of Joseph as "a man in whom the spirit of God is," Gen. 41:38. Jethro, the priest of Midian, gives to Moses his son-in-law,

the counsel of a god-fearing man. Ex. 18:9-12, 19-23. Balaam, in Mesopotamia, enunciates the doctrine of one God the sovereign ruler of all. Numbers 24:16. Ruth, a Moabitess, speaks of God the Lord. Ruth 1:16, 17. It is true that in some instances, as in those of Hagar and Ruth, this knowledge of God might have been received from those with whom they associated, but after subtracting these, it is still evident that considerable monotheism was current, particularly among the races descending from Shem.

The Persian religion contains many monotheistic elements. Cudworth (Vol. I. 471) remarks that upon the authority of Eubulus, cited by Porphyry, "we may conclude that notwithstanding the sun was generally worshipped by the Persians as a god, yet Zoroaster and the ancient Magi, who were best initiated in the Mithraic mysteries, asserted another deity superior to the sun, for the true Mithras, such as was *πάντων ποιητής, καὶ πατήρ*, the maker and father of all things, or of the whole world, whereof the sun is a part." Similarly, Prideaux (Connection, I. iv.) says that Zoroaster reformed the Magian religion, by introducing a principle superior to the two Magian principles of good and evil, namely "one supreme God who created both light and darkness." Prideaux thinks that Zoroaster obtained the suggestion from Isa. 45:5-7. Herodotus (I. 131) asserts that the Persians have no images of the gods, no temples, no altars, and consider the use of them a sign of folly. Compare Rawlinson: Herodotus I. v. A writer in the Princeton Review, Oct. 1869, affirms that the countrymen of Cyrus and Darius were not polytheists, and did not worship fire, or any other idol, but one almighty God. The Persian monotheism was undoubtedly owing in part to Biblical influences. The captivity of Judah, and the residence of the Jews at Babylon, must have brought the Hebrew religion into contact with those of Assyria, Babylonia, and Persia. Jewish communities also flourished at

several great centres in central Asia, subsequent to the captivity. See Merivale: Roman History, LIV. But while this element of tradition is conceded, it does not explain the entire fact. The natural monotheism of the human mind remains a great and underlying factor in the problem.

According to John 1 : 4, there is a natural apprehension of God ; and according to John 1 : 5, there is a sinful misapprehension of him. The Logos was "the light of men," and "the darkness comprehended not" this light. The first statement relates to the innate idea of God given by creation ; the second, to the innate idea as vitiated by sin.

The vitiation of an idea is not the eradication of it. If the idea of God were absolutely extinct in the human spirit, religion would be impossible. But man in all the varieties of his condition, has a religion of some kind in which a superior being is recognized. Hence, St. Paul does not except any portion of the human family from his description of human nature as furnished with religious ideas. His statement is sweeping and universal, that "when men knew God they glorified him not as God," and therefore are without excuse.

It has been objected to this, that some tribes of men have been discovered destitute of the idea of God. But when the alleged fact has been investigated, it has been found that a very low grade of knowledge has been mistaken for blank ignorance. In some instances, the statement is that of an ignorant witness, and is contradicted by an intelligent one. Ben Ali, Livingstone's guide, told Livingstone that the Makondi "had no idea of a deity ; that they knew nothing of a deity, or a future state ; had no religion except a belief in medicine ; and prayed to their mothers when in distress or dying." But Livingstone, on going among the Makondi, found them saying that "in digging for gum-copal, none may be found on one day, but God (Mungu) may give it to

us the next." "This showed me," he says, "that the consciousness of God's existence was present to their minds." Livingstone's Last Journals, p. 38. Respecting the African races generally, Macdonald (*Africana*, I. 67) remarks: "We should say that their religion and its worship is practically polytheism. Beyond their polytheism, their language contains a few expressions that remind us of pantheism, and a great many that speak of monotheism." Says Quatrefages (*Human Species*, XXXV.), "the result of my investigations is exactly the opposite to that to which Lubbock and St. Hilaire have arrived. Obligated in the course of my investigation to review all human races, I have sought atheism in the lowest as well as the highest. I have nowhere met it except in individuals, or in more or less limited schools, such as those which existed in Europe in the last century, or which may still be seen at the present day."

The existence of an idea in the mental constitution, and its development in consciousness, must be distinguished from each other. The idea of God is not so fully developed in one man or nation, as it is in another. No two men even in a Christian land are exactly alike in this respect. But their mental constitution is the same. One man has a more impressive sense of the divine justice than another; another has a deeper consciousness of the divine mercy; another of the divine wisdom. The idea of God has immense contents, and the varieties of its unfolding are innumerable. Apostasy from God and sin hinder the evolution of the innate idea. They also confuse and corrupt its development in consciousness, so that a deeply immoral individual or nation, will exhibit less of a true knowledge of the deity than a comparatively moral individual or nation. The difference in the amount of moral intelligence shown in the history of the human family, consequently, is not due to any original difference in the structure of the human spirit, or in the constitutional provision which the Creator has made for a knowledge of himself, but to the greater or less de-

gree of human depravity. In proportion as a people are hostile to the innate idea of God, and do not "like to retain" it in consciousness, they are given over to a reprobate mind, and the idea either slumbers, or is mutilated and altered. The "truth of God," that is, the true view and conception of God, is "changed into a lie;" that is, into polytheism, or pantheism, or atheism. Rom. 1:25, 28.

The imbruted condition of the idolatrous world does not disprove the existence of the innate idea of the deity. A fundamental idea in the human constitution may be greatly undeveloped, or vitiated, and still be a reality. No one will deny that the ideas of space and time belong as truly to the rational understanding of a Hottentot, as they did to that of Plato. But it would not follow, that because the Hottentot has not elicited the ideas of space and time by reflection upon their nature and bearings, they are extinct within his mind. The axioms of geometry are as much intuitive truths for the Esquimaux, as they were for Newton; but if they should be stated to the Esquimaux in words, his first look might be that of blank vacancy. In truth, it requires a longer time and more effort to bring the savage man to consciousness respecting geometrical truth, than it does to bring him to consciousness respecting the idea of God. The missionary, contrary to the view of those who assert that civilization must precede evangelization, finds that he can elicit the ideas of God, the soul, of sin and guilt, sooner and easier than he can the ideas of mathematics and philosophy.

Socrates, in the Platonic dialogue entitled Meno, takes a slave-boy who is utterly unacquainted with geometry, and by putting questions to him in his wonderful obstetric method, develops out of the boy's rational intelligence the geometrical proposition and demonstration, that the square of the diagonal contains twice the space of the square of the side. If the proposition had been stated to the boy in this form at first, he would have stared in utter ignorance.

But being led along step by step, he comes out into the conclusion with as clear a perception as that of Socrates himself. Compare Cicero: Tusculan Questions, I. 24. To affirm, by reason of the undeveloped condition of the geometrical ideas in this slave's mind, that he was destitute of them, would be as erroneous as it is to deny the existence of the idea of the deity in every human soul, because of the dormant state in which it is sometimes found. Reason is more spontaneously active in some minds than in others; but reason is alike the possession of every man. Pascal at the age of twelve discovered alone by himself, and without any mathematical instruction, the axioms and definitions of geometry, and actually worked out its theorems as far as the thirty-second proposition of Euclid.

The doctrine of an innate idea and knowledge of God does not conflict with that of human depravity, and cannot be adduced in proof of the position that there is some natural holiness in man. Natural religion, or the light of nature, is not of the nature of virtue or holiness. This for two reasons. 1. A rational being may know that there is one God, and that he ought to be obeyed and glorified, and yet render no obedience or worship. The lost angels are an example. "Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well, the devils also believe and tremble," James 2: 19. This natural knowledge of God is in the understanding only; not in the will and affections. It is consequently not an element in the moral character; but only a characteristic of the rational constitution.

2. Secondly, the idea of God is not man's product, but that of God. St. Paul employs the phrase *θεός ἐφανερώσει*, respecting it. The Creator is the author and cause of this knowledge in the creature. Whatever worth or merit, therefore, there may be in this mental possession, is due to God not to man. Some theologians have attempted to overthrow the doctrine of depravity, and establish that of natural virtue and merit, upon the ground of the lofty ideas

of God, freedom, and immortality, in the human spirit.¹ Were these ideas self-originated; did man, being at first a *tabula rasa*, come by them through a laborious reasoning of his own, there would be some ground for the view. But the idea of God is a gift of God, as truly as any other gift proceeding from the divine hand. "That which may be known of God;" all the religious knowledge which the human spirit possesses by virtue of its constitution; is a manifestation or revelation, for God has "showed" it unto man. That mode of human consciousness by which man is immediately and intuitively aware of his Maker, is as really the product of God, as is the breath in the nostrils. "Unser Gottesbewusstsein ist immer, wenn es ein wahres ist, auch ein von Gott bewirktes," says Twisten. All egotism, therefore, all merit in view of the lofty ideas in human nature, is excluded by the doctrine of creation and providence, as much as it is by the doctrine of justification by grace. A man might as rationally claim that his faculty for perceiving geometrical truths is due to himself, and is of the nature of virtue, and rewardable, as to claim that his intuitive idea of God is a product of his agency for which he deserves the rewards of the future life.

The assertion that the idea of the deity is the product of education, and not innate, is disproved by the following considerations.

1. The savage races have no education in this reference, but they have the idea. 2. If theism could be taught by priests and interested parties, then atheism could be taught by skeptics. But it has been found impossible to educate any considerable portion of the human family into disbelief of the divine existence. Atheism is sporadic, never general, or even local. 3. The terror before God which man feels as a transgressor, is a strong motive for him to banish the idea from his mind, if it could be done; and it could be

¹ Channing is one of the ablest, and most eloquent of them. See his sermon on *Likeness to God*.

done, if its existence depended merely upon instruction. Cease to instruct, and it would cease to exist.

The more profoundly and carefully the forms of human consciousness are investigated, the stronger becomes the evidence for the Divine existence. Atheism is refuted by an accurate and exhaustive psychology. This is apparent from an examination of both consciousness and self-consciousness.

1. In the first place, a proof of the Divine existence is found in man's *God-consciousness*, considered as a universal and abiding form of human consciousness. Consciousness implies a real object that is correlative to it. There cannot be a universal and abiding consciousness of a non-entity. Sensuous consciousness proves the existence of a sensuous object, namely, matter. The shadow implies the substance. The same is true of that particular mode of human consciousness denominated the *God-consciousness*. If there were no God, this form of consciousness would be inexplicable, except upon the supposition of a mental mockery, or hallucination. There would be consciousness, without an object of consciousness. But it is too universal and constant, to be accounted for by imagination and self-delusion. Consciousness is always upon the side of theism, never upon that of atheism. Multitudes of men have been conscious that there is a God; but not a single individual was ever conscious that there is not a God. Says La Bruyère (*Les Caractères*, c. 16), "Je sens qu'il y a un dieu, et je ne sens pas qu'il n'y en ait point."

2. In the second place, a proof of the Divine existence is found in man's *self-consciousness*. This, also, like man's *God-consciousness*, logically implies God's objective existence. The reality of man as a finite ego involves that of an infinite ego. When I speak the word "I," I certainly distinguish between my own substance and that of the material world around me, and thereby imply that there is such a world. It would be absurd to distinguish myself from mere non-entity. Now, as in the sense-consciousness

the existence of the outer world is necessarily implied, so in the self-consciousness the existence of God is implied. The consciousness of diversity and of alterity, in both cases, supposes the equal reality of the subject that cognizes and the object cognized. If the human spirit, by immediate self-consciousness, knows that it is a distinct individual self, and is not God, this proves not only that it has the idea of God, but that this idea has objective validity; precisely as when the human spirit is immediately conscious that it is another thing than the external world, this proves not only that it possesses the idea of the external world, but that this idea has objective validity.

Self-consciousness, therefore, leads inevitably to the belief in the being of God. If I am conscious of myself as a self, it follows that I must be conscious of God as another self. The evolution of the self-consciousness runs parallel, and keeps even pace with the evolution of the God-consciousness. If the former is narrow and meagre, the latter will be so likewise. If self-consciousness and self-knowledge are deep and comprehensive, the consciousness and knowledge of God will agree with them. "Noverim me, noverim te," says Bernard. "If I knew myself better, I should know God better," might be truly said by every human being, from Plato down to the most degraded fetish worshipper. Just as soon as any man can intelligently say, "*I am*," he can and logically must say, "*God is*." Just as soon as he can intelligently say, "*I am evil*," he can and logically must say, "*God is holy*." The antithesis and contrast is felt immediately, in both cases; and an antithetic contrast implies two antithetic and contrasted objects. The logical implication of the consciousness of a sinful self, is the consciousness of a holy God. He who knows darkness knows light, and he who has the idea of wrong necessarily has the idea of right. The imbruted pagan who is cited to disprove the view we are upholding, has as little knowledge of *himself* as he has of the deity. His self-consciousness is

as slightly developed as his God-consciousness. If a low grade of a particular form of human consciousness may be instanced to prove the non-entity of the object correlated to it, then the low form, and often the temporary absence of self-consciousness in the savage, would prove that he is not an ego. Compare Calvin's remarks upon "the connection between a knowledge of God, and the knowledge of ourselves." Instit., I. i.

It follows, therefore, that man has the same kind of evidence for the Divine existence, that he has for his own personal existence: that of immediate consciousness. But this is the most convincing and invincible species of evidence. We have a stronger proof that we ourselves exist, than that the world of matter around us exists; of the existence of the ego than of the non-ego. A man's own existence is the most certain of all things. Berkeley denied that matter is a real entity, but not that his own mind is such. Locke, who was by no means inclined to undervalue the force of arguments derived from matter and sensuous impressions, nevertheless places the evidence of self-consciousness at the highest point in the scale. "The real existence of other things without us can be evidenced to us only by our senses; but our *own* existence is known to us by a certainty yet higher than our senses can give us of the existence of other things; and this is internal perception, or self-consciousness, or intuition." Locke: Des Cartes' proof of the being of God. Life and Letters, Bohn's Ed., p. 316. In like manner, Smith (Immortality, VI.) contends that "we know a thousand times more distinctly what our souls are, than what our bodies are. For the former we know by an immediate converse with ourselves, and a distinct sense of their operations; whereas all our knowledge of the body is little better than merely historical, which we gather up by scraps and piecemeal from doubtful and uncertain experiments which we make of them. But the notions which we have of a mind, that is, of something that *thinks, apprehends, reasons,* and

discourses, are so clear and distinct from all those notions which we can fasten upon a body, that we can easily conceive that if all body-being in the world were destroyed, we might then as well subsist as we do now."

Why then, it will be asked, has the Divine existence been disputed and denied? Men, it is objected, do not dispute or deny their own self-existence. To this we reply, that they do. The reality of an absolutely personal existence for the human spirit not only can be disputed and denied, but has been. Pantheism concedes only a phenomenal and transient reality to the individual ego. The individual man, it is asserted, exists only relatively and apparently, not absolutely and metaphysically. He has no substantial being different from that of the Infinite, but is only a modification of the eternal substance. His experiences; his thoughts and feelings, hopes and fears; in other words, his self-consciousness, is phenomenal, and from the philosophic point of view an illusion. It lasts only seventy years. The individual is not immortal; he is absorbed in the infinite substance of which he is only one out of millions of modes. Now this is really a denial of self-consciousness, and it has been maintained by a dialectics even more acute, and a ratiocination even more concatenated than any that has been employed by atheism in the effort to disprove the Divine existence. Spinoza and Hegel have defended this theory, with an energy of abstraction, and a concentration of mental power, unequalled in the annals of human error. That the denial of a true and real self-consciousness for man has been comparatively an esoteric doctrine, and has not had so much currency as the atheistic doctrine, arises from the fact that man has not so strong a motive for disputing his own existence, as he has for disputing that of the deity. Men are not so afraid of themselves as they are of their Maker, and Judge—although if they were fully aware of the solemn implications of a personal and responsible existence, they would find little to

choose between denying their own existence and that of God.

Monotheism was the original form of religion; pantheism and polytheism were subsequent forms. This is proved by the Bible, and the earliest secular records. According to Genesis, man was created a monotheist. His first estate was his best estate. He lapsed from a higher to a lower grade of both character and knowledge.¹ Cicero (Tusculan Questions) remarks that “quo proprius homo aberat ab ortu et divina progenie, hoc melius ea fortasse quae essent vera cernebat.” The statements of the early poets and philosophers respecting a golden age, express the belief that the primitive condition of man was a high, not a low one. The earlier Greek poetry is more monotheistic than the later. There is less polytheism in the Homeric theology than in that of Greece at the time of St. Paul. The number of inferior deities is greater in the last age of mythology, than in its first period. Müller (Literature of Greece, II. 1-3) affirms that “the Homeric poems, though belonging to the first period of Greek poetry, do not, nevertheless exhibit the first form of the Greek religion. The conception of the gods as expressed in the Homeric poems suits a time when war was the occupation of the people, and the age was that of heroes. Prior to this, the nation had been pastoral, and the religion then was that earlier form which was founded upon the same ideas as the deep religions of the East. It was a nature-worship that placed one deity, as the highest of all, at the head of the entire system, viz., the God of *heaven* and of *light*; for this is the meaning of Zeus in Greek, and of Diu in Sanscrit.” Prideaux (Connection, I. iii.) derives idolatry from a corruption of the doctrine of a *mediator*, which is contained in the religion of Noah and Abraham. The nations regarded the sun, moon, and stars, as the habitations of intelligences

¹ Upon this subject see Van Oosterzee: Dogmatics, XXV.; Hardwick: Christ and other Masters; Stillingfleet: Origines, III V.

who were secondary divinities or mediator gods. This was the first stage in the process. As the planets were visible only in the night, they invented images to represent them. This produced image-worship; Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Apollo, etc. This was the second and final stage in the process. The religion of the Vedas, puerile as it is in many respects, is superior to the popular religion of India at the present time; showing that there has been a lapse from a higher and better knowledge. The earlier Varuna-Vedic literature is more spiritual and truthful than the later Indra-Vedic. See Cook: *Origins of Religion*, Essay I. Rawlinson (*Egypt*, X.) maintains that the "primary doctrine of the esoteric religion of Egypt undoubtedly was, the real essential unity of the Divine nature. The gods of the popular mythology were understood, in the esoteric religion, to be either personified attributes of the Deity, or parts of nature which he had created considered as informed and inspired by him."

The first step in the corruption of the primitive monotheism, is pantheism. Here the unity of God is still retained, but the difference in essence between him and the universe is denied. The fact that the idea of the Divine unity is preserved proves that this idea is natural to the human mind. The second step in the decline from the primitive monotheism, is polytheism. Here, the unity or the one substance of pantheism is subdivided, and the subdivisions are personified; showing an endeavor to regain the personality of God, which has been lost in pantheism. Pantheism is too abstract and destitute of elements that appeal to man's feelings, to be a popular religion. It is the idolatry or false worship of the philosopher; while polytheism is that of the common mind. For an account of the modification of monotheism outside of revelation, see Guizot: *Meditations*, First Series, VII.

It is an error to represent, as Schelling does in his *Philosophy of Mythology*, the various mythological systems as

the normal and necessary action of the human mind working its way up from a lower to a higher form of the religious consciousness. This makes idolatry to be a regular and legitimate step, ordained by the Creator himself, in the progress of the human race toward a perfect religion. St. Paul takes the contrary view. According to him, the human mind is monotheistic by creation and in its structure, and pantheism and polytheism are a progress downward, not upward. Idolatry is sin. But according to Schelling, idolatry is innocent, because it is a necessary movement of the human intellect. The theory taught by Hume in his *History of Religion*, that polytheism was the primitive religion, and that monotheism is the result of human progress, is part of that general theory of man which holds that he was created low down the scale of existence, perhaps descended from the animal tribes, and through vast ages of time slowly struggles upward of and by himself.

The relics of monotheism found outside of the pale of revelation, in the various countries and civilizations, are traceable to two sources. 1. To the monotheistic structure of the human mind, in the way that has been described. This is the subjective and fundamental requisite. 2. To the influence of the primitive revelation from God, made in the line of Seth, fragments of which have floated down among the races of mankind.¹ Both of these sources and causes of monotheism should be recognized. If only the first is acknowledged, justice is not done to traditional records and data. If only the second is acknowledged, and all the monotheism in human history is referred to a special revelation in early times, justice is not done to the constitution of the human mind. It conflicts, moreover, with St. Paul's representations in Rom. 1.

After this examination of the monotheistic structure of

¹ Upon the influence of the patriarchal revelation, see Bolton: *Evidences*, II.; Stillington: *Origines Sacrae*, III. v.; Gale: *Court of the Gentiles*.

the human spirit, considered as the foundation of natural religion, it is important to observe that natural religion is insufficient for human needs. The position of the deist, that the teachings of the human reason concerning the being and attributes of God are adequate, and that revealed religion is superfluous, is untenable because there is nothing *redemptive* in them. Natural religion manifests the justice of God, but not his mercy. The *ὄργη τοῦ Θεοῦ* is revealed in the common human consciousness, but not the *ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ*. The God-consciousness includes the Divine holiness, but not the Divine compassion. Natural religion inspires fear, but not hope and trust. The monotheistic idea of the deity contains only such moral attributes as justice, veracity, and immaculate purity. In St. Paul's analysis, mention is made of omnipotence, sovereignty, unity, and retributive displeasure; but no mention is made of the attribute of mercy. The Divine benevolence is indeed displayed to the pagan, in the rain from heaven, and the fruitful seasons, Acts 14 : 7; but providential benevolence is not pardoning mercy. The lost man and even the lost angel experiences the benevolence of God. He maketh his sun to shine alike upon the evil and the good. Natural religion, consequently, is not an adequate religion for man, unless it can be proved that he does not need the mercy of God.

The utmost that human reason can say respecting the exercise of Divine mercy is, that it is a *possibility*. There is no self-contradiction in the proposition that God may show mercy to the guilty. Says Witsius (Apostles' Creed, Dissertation XXV.), "if one carefully consider the all-sufficiency of the Divine perfections, according to that idea of the Supreme being which is impressed by nature upon our minds, we will possibly conclude, or at least conjecture, that it is not altogether beyond the range of possibility, that a just and holy God may be reconciled to a sinner."

But it may be objected that inasmuch as the attribute of mercy necessarily belongs to the Divine nature, a careful

analysis of the innate idea of God would yield this attribute to the heathen mind, and in this way the heathen might come to the knowledge that God shows mercy, and so find a redemptive element in natural religion. This objection overlooks the distinction between the *existence* of an attribute, and its *exercise*. Some of the Divine attributes are attributes of nature only, and some are attributes of both nature and will. In the former case, an attribute not only necessarily exists in the Divine essence, but it must necessarily be exercised. Truth, or veracity, is an example. God of necessity possesses this quality, and he must of necessity manifest it at all times. Its exercise does not depend upon his sovereign will and pleasure. He may not be truthful or not, as he pleases. The same is true of the Divine justice. But the attribute of mercy is not an attribute of nature only, it is also an attribute of will. Though mercy is an eternal and necessary quality of the Divine nature, and is logically contained in the idea of God as a being possessing all perfections, yet the *exercise* of it is optional, not necessary. Because God is a merciful being, it does not follow that he must *show* mercy to every object without exception, without any choice or will of his own. He says, "I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy," Rom. 9 : 15. The exercise of this attribute depends upon the Divine good pleasure. It might have existed as an immanent and eternal attribute in God, and yet not have been extended to a single man. Because God has not shown mercy to Satan and his angels, it does not follow that he is destitute of the attribute. To deny the freeness of mercy, is to annihilate mercy. If mercy is a matter of debt, and God is obliged to show mercy, as he is obliged to be truthful and just, then mercy is no more mercy and grace is no more grace, Rom. 11 : 16.¹ God's mercy, in this respect, is like God's omnipo-

¹ It is no reply to say, that although God does not owe the exercise of mercy to the sinner, he owes it to *himself*. For if God owes it to his own attributes and perfection of character, to pardon sin, a neglect or refusal to do so in a sin-

tence. God necessarily has the power to create, but is under no necessity of exerting this power. If he had never created anything at all, he would still have been an omnipotent being. And so, too, if he had never pardoned a single sinner, he would still have been a merciful being in his own nature.

Now it is because the exercise of mercy, unlike that of truth and justice, is *optional* with God, that the heathen cannot be certain that mercy will be exercised toward him. In thinking of the subject of sin, his own reason perceives intuitively that God must of necessity punish transgression; and it perceives with equal intuitiveness that there is no corresponding necessity that he should pardon it. He can say with emphasis, "God must be just;" but he can not say, "God must be merciful." Mercy is an attribute whose exercise is sovereign and optional, and therefore man cannot determine by any a priori method whether it will be extended to him. He knows nothing upon this point, until he hears the assurance from the lips of God himself. When God opens the heavens, and speaks to the human creature saying, "I will forgive your iniquity," then, and not till then, does he know the fact. Shedd: *Natural Man*, Sermon XVIII. Hence the religion of mercy and redemption is *historical* and *promissory* in its nature. It contains a testimony respecting God's actual decision and purpose concerning the exercise of compassion. It is a record authenticated and certified of what God has decided and covenanted to do in a given case; and not a deduction from an a priori principle of what he must do of necessity. Natural religion, on the other hand, is neither historical nor promissory. It is not a historical narrative like the Old and New Testament; and it contains no promise or covenant made by God with man. Natural religion is not a series of facts and events, but of truths only.

gle instance would be a dereliction of duty to himself, and a spot on his character. Mercy, on this supposition, as well as on the other, is not grace but debt.

Consequently, natural religion, or the religion of justice, can be constructed in an a priori manner out of the ideas and laws of human intelligence; but the gospel, or the religion of mercy and redemption, can be constructed only out of a special revelation from God. Conscience can give the heathen a punitive, but not a pardoning deity. Man's natural monotheism does not include a knowledge of the Divine mercy, but only of the Divine holiness and displeasure at sin. It is sufficient for man as created and sinless; but not for man as apostate and sinful. It is because the heathen is a "stranger from the covenants of promise," that he "has no hope." Eph. 2: 12.

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE DIVINE EXISTENCE.

Gangauf : *Psychologie des Augustinus*, 82 sq. Anselm : *Monologium* ; *Proslogium*. Tr. in *Bib. Sacra*, 1851. Hasse : *Anselm*, II. 233-286. Calvin : *Institutes*, I. i. iii. Des Cartes : *Method*, IV. ; *Meditations*, III. V. ; *Principles of Philosophy*, I. 14, 15. Tr. by Veitch. Leibnitz : *De la demonstration Cartésienne*. Witsius : *Apostles' Creed* ; *Dissertation*, IV. v. More : *Antidote to Atheism*, I. viii. Stillingfleet : *Origines Sacrae*, III. i. 14, 15. Smith : *Discourses (Existence of God)*. Charnocke : *Discourses*, I. II. Cudworth : *Intellectual System (Final Causes)*, II. 608-625. Ed. Tegg. Howe : *Living Temple*, I. ii. Clarke : *Demonstration* ; *Answer to Letter VII*. Bates : *Existence of God*. Locke : *Understanding*, IV. x. King : *Life of Locke*, 313. Ed. Bohn. Kant : *Pure Reason*, p. 359-370. Tr. by Meiklejohn. Billroth : *Religions-philosophie*, § 33 sq. Chalybäus : *History of Philosophy*, *Lecture III*. Ueberweg : *History of Philosophy*, I. 383 sq. Hallam : *Literature of Europe*, II. iii. Paley : *Natural Theology. The Bridgewater Treatises*. Janet : *Final Causes*. Martensen : *Dogmatics*, § 38-43. Dorner : *Christian Doctrine*, I. 212 sq. Christlieb : *Modern Doubt*, II. Hodge : *Theology*, I. 204-237. Shedd : *History of Doctrine*, I. 231-238. Harris : *Theism*. Martineau : *Study of Religion*.

ALTHOUGH the evidence for the Divine Existence which is most relied upon in Scripture, and which is common to all men, is that of immediate consciousness, yet certain syllogistic arguments have been constructed which have the following uses :

1. They assist the development of the idea of God, and contain a scientific analysis of man's natural consciousness of the deity. These arguments all derive their force from the innate idea, and the constitutional structure of man.

Hence some theologians deny that they are proofs properly so called, and disparage them. Says Rosenkranz (Encyclopadie, 6), "there are already in geometry, a hundred demonstrations of the Pythagorean proposition, all of which do what they promise. There are also numberless proofs of the being of God, none of which perform what they promise. God is not a right-angled triangle, and for his existence neither many nor convincing proofs can be discovered. There is only one argument for God's existence, and that he furnishes himself." Hamann remarks that if he who denies the Divine existence is a fool, he who would demonstrate it is a still greater one. Hägenbach (Encyclopadie, 291) says that the *seeking* after proofs of the Divine existence is proof enough. The human mind does not irrepressibly, and perpetually search for the evidence that a non-entity exists. 2. Secondly, these arguments reply to the counter-arguments of materialism and atheism. Of them, the principal are: The ontological, the cosmological, the teleological, the moral, and the historical.

The *Ontological Argument* for the Divine Existence has fallen into disrepute for the last century or more. It is now very commonly regarded as involving a sophism. Kant declares it to be sophistical, as also he declares all the a posteriori arguments to be. Historians of philosophy, like Ueberweg, analyze it not only to give an account of it, but to refute it. In the current treatises in apologetics, it is rare to find an appeal to it as a conclusive demonstration.

This is a different view from that entertained in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and by the most powerful reasoners among the fathers and schoolmen. While, owing to the subtlety and geometrical nicety of the form of the argument, its cogency was not always acknowledged, and there was some dispute concerning its logical force, yet on the whole both the philosophers and theologians of those centuries regarded it as a valid argument, and fit to be employed in the defence of theism. The English theologians

made much use of it; especially those who were deeply versed in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Cudworth, Stillingfleet, Howe, Bates, John Smith, and Henry More depend greatly upon it in their contest with the atheism of Hobbes and others. Des Cartes restated it in a modified form, and considered it to be a demonstration; and Des Cartes is the father of all modern philosophy that is founded in consciousness.

The germ of the argument is found in the remark of Augustine (Trinity, VII. iv.) that "God is more truly *thought* than he is described, and *exists* more truly than he is thought." This is one of those pregnant propositions, so characteristic of the Latin father, which compress a theory into a nut-shell. The meaning of it is, that while man's idea of God is truer to the reality than his description of him is, yet his idea is less true and credible than the reality itself. God's existence is more real than even our conception of him is for our own mind; and our conception, confessedly, is a reality in our consciousness. The subjective idea of God, instead of being more real than God, is less real. The "thing," in this instance, has more of existence than the "thought" of it has. This is exactly contrary to the postulate that underlies all the reasoning against the ontological argument; namely, that in *no* case is the object so real as the idea of it, and that therefore the existence of no object whatever can be inferred from the mere idea. Every subjective conception, it is contended, more certainly *is*, than its objective correspondent. Consequently, no mere thought, of any kind, can demonstrate the existence of a thing.

This position, we may remark in passing, that the objective can never be so certainly real as the subjective, is fatal not only to the ontological argument for the Divine existence, but to the argument for all existence. It conducts to idealism immediately. If, for example, from the subjective sensation we cannot infer the objective existence of

matter, the certainty of the material world is gone. The sensation is the only reality, and the "thing" is at best only a contingency. Possibly it exists, but there is no absolute certainty that it does. The assertion that because we have the mere idea of God there is no certainty of a correspondent Being, is essentially the same as the assertion that because we have the mere sensation of matter there is no certainty of a correspondent substance. If the subjective cannot prove the objective in the former case, it cannot in the latter.

The acute and powerful intellect of Anselm was the first to construct the ontological argument in a syllogistical form. And it will appear, we think, that its first form is its best. All the subsequent modifications have weakened rather than strengthened it. The metaphysical intuition that saw the heart of the doctrine of the atonement, saw also the heart of the doctrine of the Divine existence.

The argument is derived, as the etymology (*τοῦ ὄντος λόγος*) denotes, from the idea of *absolute* and *perfect* in distinction from relative and imperfect being. It runs as follows. The human mind possesses the idea of an absolutely perfect Being; that is, of a Being than whom a more perfect cannot be conceived. But such perfection as this implies *necessary* existence; and necessary existence implies *actual* existence: because if a thing must be, of course it is. If the absolutely perfect Being of whom we have the idea does not exist of necessity, we can conceive of a being who does so exist, and he would be more perfect than the former. For a contingent being who may or may not exist, is not the most perfect conceivable; is not the absolutely perfect. In having, therefore, as the human mind unquestionably has, the idea of an absolutely perfect in distinction from a relatively perfect being, it has the idea of a being who exists of necessity; as in having the idea of a triangle, the mind has the idea of a figure with three sides. *Necessity* of being, therefore, belongs to perfection of being.

The strength of Anselm's argument lies in two facts. 1. That necessity of existence is an attribute of being, and a perfection in it. 2. That necessity of existence is an attribute and perfection that belongs only to absolute and infinite being, not to relative and finite being.

1. It is clear, in the first place, that necessity of existence is an *attribute*. It can be affirmed of one being, and denied of another. God has this characteristic quality, and angels and men have it not. Both necessity and contingency are attributes of being. And necessity is a higher characteristic than contingency of existence. That which must be, is superior to that which may or may not be. That which cannot without logical contradiction be conceived not to be, is more perfect than that which can be so conceived. Hence there are grades of being. One species of being may be nearer to nonentity than another. The infinite and absolutely perfect is at an infinite remove from non-existence; the finite and relatively perfect is at only a finite distance from nonentity. We can conceive of the annihilation of the finite; but the annihilation of the infinite is an absurdity. "It is truly said," remarks Howe (*Vanity of Man as Mortal*), "of all created things, that their non esse is more than their esse; that is, they have more no-being than being. It is only some limited portion [degree] of being that they have; but there is an infinitude [infinite degree] of being which they have not. And so coming infinitely nearer to nothingness than to fulness of being, they may well enough wear the name of 'nothing.' 'All nations before him are as nothing, and they are counted to him less than nothing,' Isa. 40 : 17. Wherefore the First and Fountain-Being justly appropriates to himself the name I Am, yea tells us, He is, and there is none besides him; thereby leaving no other name than that of 'nothing' unto creatures."

2. And, in the second place, necessity of existence is an attribute and perfection that is *unique* and *solitary*. It

cannot be ascribed to a finite created thing, any more than eternity of existence, or immensity of existence, or immutability of existence can be. The idea of the absolutely perfect differs from that of the relatively perfect, or the imperfect, in implying necessity and excluding contingency. The two ideas are totally diverse in this particular, so that the analysis of the one will give a result wholly different from that of the other. Because the idea of a stone, or a man, or of any finite thing, will not yield real entity or existence as the logical outcome, it does not follow that the idea of the infinite God will not.

The nature of the ontological argument will be seen still more clearly, by examining the objections that have been urged against it, and also the modifications of it since the time of Anselm.

1. A contemporary of Anselm, the monk Gaunilo, in his tract entitled *Liber pro Insipiente*, or *Plea for the Fool*, raised the objection which has been repeated over and over again, that the idea of an object does not involve its existence. We have the idea of a tree, but it does not follow that there is an actual tree. We have the idea of a winged lion, but it does not follow that such a creature actually exists.

The reply is, that the ideas compared are not analogous in respect to the vital point of *necessary* existence, but are wholly diverse. One idea is that of perfect and necessary being; the other that of imperfect and contingent being. What is true of the latter idea is untrue of the former, and vice versa. The idea of a tree implies contingency, that it may or may not exist; that of the absolutely perfect Being implies necessity, that he must exist. From the idea of the tree, we cannot prove actual objective reality, because of the element of contingency; but we can from the idea of God, because of the element of necessity. If the idea of a thing implies that it may or may not exist, it does not follow from the idea that the thing does exist. But if the idea of a thing

implies that it must exist, it does follow from the idea that the thing does exist. This objection, therefore, to the ontological argument breaks down, because the analogy brought in to support it is a spurious one. It is an example of the Aristotelian *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*. Analogical reasoning is valid between things of the same species; but invalid if carried across into another species. Gaunilo, arguing against Anselm, urged that the idea of the "lost island" does not imply that there is such a thing. Anselm replies, that if Gaunilo will show that the idea of the "lost island" implies its *necessary* existence, he will find the island for him, and will guarantee that it shall never be a "lost island" again.¹

Gaunilo's objection overlooks the difference in kind between infinite necessary and perfect being, and finite contingent and imperfect being; between primary and secondary substance; between uncreated and created being, or between God and the universe. We are so accustomed in the case of finite beings and things to abstract necessity of existence from them, that we unthinkingly transfer this to God. Because we can logically conceive of the non-existence of the finite, we suppose that we can of the infinite. But the two species of being differ *toto genere*. Respecting all finite beings or things, nothing more can be inferred from their nature and idea than *possibility* and perhaps *probability* of existence. Necessity and certainty of existence cannot be inferred. But respecting infinite being, mere possibility and probability of existence are excluded by the very nature and idea of it. Possibility and contingency of existence are directly contradictory to the idea of perfect and infinite substance. In this instance, we cannot, as we can in the other, conceptually separate necessity of existence

¹ Another flaw in Gaunilo's counter-argument is, that he starts from the conception of a Being "greater than all things else that *exist*," but Anselm starts from the conception of a Being "greater than all things else that can be *conceived*." The latter implies a greater perfection than the former. From the former conception, Anselm would not attempt to prove actual existence. The ideal may be more perfect than the actual.

from substance. Infinite being, *ex vi termini*, is necessary being.

Necessity, as a logical term, denotes so firm a connection between the subject and predicate, that it is impossible that they should be separated. If therefore substance and necessity of existence cannot be separated from each other, even in thought or logical conception, in the instance of "the most perfect Being conceivable," it follows that the denial that such a Being exists is not only moral but logical "folly." The atheist is guilty not only of sin, but of unreason. For it is a contradiction to suppose that the most perfect Being conceivable, that is, a necessarily existing Being, was non-existent a million of years ago, because this would make him a contingent and imperfect being. It is equally contradictory, for the same reason, to suppose that the most perfect Being conceivable will cease to exist at some future time. But there is no contradiction in supposing that the angel Gabriel had no existence a million years ago, or that he will have none a million years hence, because he is not the most perfect being conceivable. And there is no contradiction in supposing that the entire material universe was a nonentity a million years ago, unless it can be shown that it is the most perfect being conceivable.

The impossibility of separating necessity of being from absolute and perfect being, may be illustrated by the necessary connection between extension and matter. The idea of extension is inseparable from that of matter. To ask me to think of matter without extension is absurd. In like manner, to ask me to think of absolute perfection of being without necessity of being is absurd; as absurd as to ask me to think of absolute perfection of being without eternity of being, or infinity of being. The being is not absolutely perfect, if it may be non-existent; just as a substance is not material, if it is unextended. To conceive of the most perfect being conceivable as a contingent being, or a non-ex-

istent being, is impossible. Says Anselm (Proslogium, XXII.), "That which begins from non-existence, and can be conceived of as non-existing, and which unless it subsist through something else must return to non-existence, does not exist in the highest and absolute sense."

Kant commits the same error with Gaunilo, in employing a spurious analogy. Objecting to the ontological argument, he remarks (Pure Reason, 365, Meiklejohn's Tr.) that "it is indeed necessary that a triangle have three angles if it exist, but there is nothing in the idea of a triangle that necessitates its existence." Very true; and therefore the example is not pertinent. The idea of a triangle *lacks* the very element and attribute, contained in the idea of the most perfect being conceivable, upon which the whole force of the ontological argument depends—namely, *necessity* of existence. The predicate, "if it exist," connected with the subject, "a triangle," implies contingency. Kant's objection is in fact even weaker than that of Gaunilo. To attempt to invalidate the ontological argument by employing the idea of a purely *mental construction* like the idea of a triangle, is even more illegitimate than to employ the idea of a real, though non-absolute and contingent object like a tree or a man. The idea of a triangle, like that of a mathematical point or line, is purely imaginary. There is no objective substance in any mathematical figure whatever. Angles, lines, surfaces, and points are not things. The idea of a triangle does not imply that it is *being* of any kind, still less that it is necessary being. A triangle is not an entity. It cannot be brought under the category of substance; consequently it is a nonentity. It is a purely ideal construction, to which there is and can be no objective correspondent. It cannot be said to objectively *exist*, either contingently or necessarily. Kant's analogy, consequently, is even more spurious than that of Gaunilo; for a tree or a man, though not having necessarily-real, yet has contingently-real existence.

Kant endeavors to prove that the ontological argument is a synthetical, not an analytical judgment; that the conclusion is not deduced from the premise, but imported into it. There is no better expositor of Kant than Kuno Fischer, and he gives the following account of Kant's refutation, as he regards it, of the ontological argument. "Kant affirms that the propositions asserting existence are synthetical judgments; in other words, that existence is no logical attribute which we can find by analyzing a concept. This position completely destroys all ontology; for it removes the possibility of concluding from the concept of a thing, its existence. If existence belongs to the attributes of a concept, the ontological proof is quite valid. If it be a logical attribute, it follows immediately from the concept by mere dissection, and the ontological proof is an analytical judgment; an immediate syllogism of the understanding. If existence be a logical attribute, it must stand in the same relation to the concept that other logical attributes do. The content of the concept must be diminished if I subtract existence, increased if I add it. The concept of a triangle, for example, is not changed, whether I merely represent it to myself, or whether it exist without me. The attributes which make a triangle to be such are entirely the same in both cases. It is the same with any other concept; that of the deity."¹

We place the finger upon the last assertion in this extract, and deny that what is said of the concept of the triangle is true of the concept of the deity—assuming it to be conceded, that the deity is the equivalent of Anselm's "most perfect Being conceivable." For if from the concept of the deity, or the absolutely perfect Being, the attribute of existence be subtracted, the concept *is* changed. It is no longer the concept of the most perfect Being conceivable. The concept of an *existing* Being is, certainly,

¹ Mahaffy : Translation of Kuno Fischer on Kant, pp. 125, 258, 259.

not the same as the concept of an *imaginary* Being. Take the characteristic of actual existence out of the concept of the deity, and it becomes the concept of an unreal or imaginary being; and an unreal or imaginary being is not the most perfect Being conceivable. The content of the concept is changed in respect to both quantity and quality. It loses the attribute of objective existence, which diminishes the quantity of the content. And the same loss injures the quality; for imaginary being is nonentity, instead of perfect being. If one should say, "I have the conception of a triangle, but it does not include tri-laterality," the contradiction is plain. Or should he assert that the attribute of tri-laterality can be subtracted from the concept of a triangle without altering the content, the error is patent. But it is the same contradiction, to affirm that the idea of God as a perfect being does not include real objective being, or that this characteristic can be subtracted from it without diminishing its contents. The rejector of the ontological argument affirms such propositions as the following: "I have the idea of the most perfect Being conceivable; but it is the idea of a nonentity; in other words, it is only an idea." "I have the idea of the most perfect Being conceivable; but it is the idea of an imaginary being; that is, it is merely a figment of my mind." This contradiction is well described by a French writer (Franck: Dictionnaire, Art. Anselme). "He who rejects the belief of the Divine Existence conceives, nevertheless, of a Being to whom a superior cannot be conceived. Only he affirms that this Being does not exist. But by this affirmation he contradicts himself, inasmuch as that Being to whom he attributes all these perfections, yet to whom he at the same time denies existence, is found to be inferior to another being, who, to all his other perfections, joins that of existence. He is thus forced by his very conception of the most perfect being to admit that such a Being exists, inasmuch as existence makes a necessary part of that perfection which he conceives of."

It is overlooked by Kant and Fischer, and by all who reason upon this line of analogy, that the idea of God, or the absolutely Perfect, is unique and solitary. God is not only unus but *unicus*. There is no parallel to him. No true analogue can be found. "To whom then will ye liken God? or what likeness will ye compare unto him?" Isa. 40:18. To employ analogical reasoning in a case where all analogies fail, was the error of Gaunilo, and has been repeated from his day to this.¹

2. A second objection to the argument of Anselm is that it amounts only to this: "If there be an absolutely perfect Being, he is a necessarily existent Being. One *idea* implies the other *idea*. It is only a matter of subjective notions, and not of objective existence. The absolutely perfect Being may not exist at all; but if he exist, he exists necessarily." Ueberweg (History of Philosophy, I. 384) employs this objection.

This objection, likewise, is self-contradictory, as is shown by the analysis of the proposition, "If the absolutely Perfect exist, he exists necessarily." There is inconsistency between the protasis and apodosis. The word "if" in the former denotes contingency, and the word "necessarily" in the latter excludes contingency. The absolutely perfect Being is described in the protasis as one respecting whose existence it is proper to use a hypothetical term, and in the apodosis as one respecting whose existence it is improper to use it. This conditional proposition implies that the most perfect Being conceivable is both contingent and necessary.

Coleridge (Works, IV. 408, Ed. Harper) urges this objection, in the following terms: "The Cartesian syllogism

¹ In this criticism, we have assumed, as Kant and Fischer do, that "existence" may be regarded as an attribute, and have argued from their point of view. As will be seen further on, existence is not strictly an attribute. But if "necessity of existence," be substituted for "existence," the argument still holds good. Certainly if from the concept of the absolutely perfect Being, the attribute of *necessity* of existence be subtracted, the concept itself is changed.

ought to stand thus: The *idea* of God comprises the *idea* of all attributes that belong to perfection. But the *idea* of existence is such; therefore the idea of his existence is included in the idea of God. Now, existence is no idea, but a *fact*; and though we had an *idea* of existence, still the proof of a correspondence to a *reality* would be wanting; that is, the very point would be wanting which it was the purpose of the demonstration to supply. The *idea* of the fact is not the fact itself." This objection holds against the Cartesian form of the argument, but not against the Anselmic. The idea of "existence," it is true, is one to which there may be no corresponding reality or fact. But the idea of "necessary existence" is not. "Existence" is ambiguous, and may mean contingent existence, as well as necessary; in which case, the idea does not logically involve the reality or fact. But "necessary existence" has only one meaning, and logically involves a corresponding fact or reality. To say that a necessary being has no existence, or may have none, is, of course, a contradiction in terms. And to say that the *idea* of necessary existence does not imply the idea of actual existence, is equally contradictory. But in reasoning analytically from an idea, the reasoner is entitled to all that the idea contains.

Coleridge, like Kant and others, brings the idea of the infinite and finite, the uncreated and created, God and the universe, under one and the same category, and contends that what is true of one idea is of the other. As the idea of a tree, in Coleridge's phrase, is "the mere *supposition* of a *logical* subject, necessarily presumed in order to the conceivableness of the qualities, properties, or attributes" of the tree, so is the idea of God. The idea in both instances is a mere *hypothesis*, to which there may be no corresponding fact or reality. It is only "a mere ens logicum, the result of the thinker's own unity of consciousness, and no less contained in the conception of a *plant* or of a *chimera*, than in the idea of the *Supreme Being*." Works,

IV. 409. This implies that the idea of a plant or a chimaera is a true analogue to that of the most perfect Being conceivable.

3. A third objection to Anselm's argument is that made by Leibnitz; namely, that the argument supposes the *possibility* of the existence of the most perfect Being. This he thinks needs first to be demonstrated. And yet he adds, that "any and every being should be regarded as possible until its impossibility is proved." Leibnitz remarks that he "stands midway between those who think Anselm's argument to be a sophism, and those who think it to be a demonstration," and that if the possibility of the existence of the most perfect Being were demonstrated, he should regard Anselm's argument as "geometrically a priori." *De la Démonstration Cartésienne*, 177. Ed. Erdmann.

The reply to this half-way objection of Leibnitz is, that there is no greater necessity of proving that the most perfect Being is possible, than of proving that any being whatever is possible. That being of some kind is possible, is indisputable. That something exists is self-evident. To assert that there is nothing, is absurd. The premise with which Clarke begins his construction of the a priori argument; namely, "something exists;" is axiomatic, and must be granted by atheist and theist alike. The idea of "being" is certainly one that implies an objective correspondent. If I say, "I have the idea of being, but it is only an idea, there really is no being," I perceive the absurdity immediately. "The very words," says Coleridge (*Works*, II. 464. Ed. Harper), "there is nothing, or, there was a time when there was nothing, are self-contradictory. There is that within us which repels the position with as full and instantaneous a light as if it bore evidence against it in the right of its own eternity." But if the mind does not perceive any necessity of proving the possibility of being in the abstract, even of relative and contingent being, still less does it perceive a necessity of demonstrating the possibility of the

most perfect being conceivable. On the contrary, there is more need of proving the possibility of a contingent than of a necessary being. That which may or may not exist is less likely to exist, than that which must exist and cannot be conceived of as non-existent.

4. A fourth objection to the ontological argument is, that it makes existence an attribute of a Being, when in fact it is being itself. The subject is converted into its own predicate. To assert that a Being possesses being, is tautology. This is a valid objection against one form of Des Cartes' statement of the ontological argument, but not against Anselm's. Des Cartes shortened the argument, by deriving *actual* being directly from the idea of absolute perfection of being, instead of first deriving, as Anselm did, *necessity* of being from absolute perfection of being, and then deriving actuality from necessity. The spread of Cartesianism gave currency to this form of the argument; and it is this form of it which most commonly appears in modern speculation. The English divines of the seventeenth century very generally employ this mode. In Kant's polemic, the argument is stated in the Cartesian manner, not in the Anselmic. The following is an example: "Having formed an a priori conception of a thing, the content of which was made to embrace *existence*, we believed ourselves safe in concluding that reality belongs to the object of the conception merely because existence has been cogitated in the conception."¹ If in this extract "necessity of existence" be substituted for

¹ *Reine Vernunft*, 463. Ed. Rosenkranz. Ueberweg (Vol. II. 50) notices the difference between the two forms of the argument in the following remark: "The Cartesian form of the ontological proof has a defect from which the Anselmic is free; namely, that the premise, 'being is a perfection,' involves a very questionable conception of 'being' as a predicate among other predicates, while Anselm has indicated a definite kind of being, namely, being not merely in our minds but also outside of them, as that in which superior perfection is involved." But this misses the true point of difference. Anselm's "definite kind of being" is, *necessity* of being, "not being outside of our minds." This latter is objective being, and is the same as Des Cartes' "existence." If this is all the difference between Anselm and Des Cartes, there is none at all.

“existence,” the “illusion” which Kant charges upon the a priori reasoner disappears.

Necessity of existence, as we have before remarked, is a true predicate, like eternity of existence, and immensity of existence, and all the other attributes that describe absolute being and differentiate it from relative and finite being. And from *this* predicate, the objective actual existence of that to which it belongs can be inferred. In omitting it, and attempting to make a predicate out of “existence” instead of “necessity of existence,” Des Cartes lost an indispensable term of the syllogism, jumped directly from the premise to the conclusion, and exposed the argument to a valid objection.¹

But while Des Cartes' form of the argument is vicious reasoning, it suggests a profound truth. It directs attention to the difference in kind between *primary* and *secondary* being, and to the important fact already alluded to, that existence cannot even conceptually be separated from substance in the instance of the absolute and perfect, as it can in that of the relative and imperfect. The finite may exist only in thought and imagination; the infinite cannot. There may be no imperfect and contingent being; there must be perfect and necessary being. The universe may be non-existent, but God cannot. And this, because absolute perfection of being excludes *unreality* of every kind. Consequently, it excludes imaginary being, which is no being at all. And it excludes contingent and temporary being, because these are relative and imperfect grades. None of these are “the most perfect being conceivable.” The absolute Being, therefore, is the only strictly real. All

¹ Des Cartes seems to have been aware of the defect in this form of stating the argument. He more commonly employs “existence” in the *Method*, and the *Meditations*. But he uses “necessity of existence,” in the *Method*, p. 79; *Meditations*, p. 67, 68; *Principles of Philosophy*, p. 119, 189, 190, 191. Veitoh's *Trans.* Ueberweg (*History*, II. 42, 49, 51); Schwegler (*History*, 175); and Locke (*King's Life of*, 314) represent Des Cartes as stating the argument in the Anselmic form.

else, in comparison, is a shadow. Existence cannot be abstracted from substance of this kind, without changing its grade. To attribute non-existence to the infinite, is to convert it into the finite. But existence can be abstracted conceptually from secondary and contingent substance without changing the species. In fact, it is substance of a secondary species for the very reason that it can be conceived of as non-existent.

Des Cartes not only adopted Anselm's ontological argument with a modification, but added another feature to it. His addition is the following. We have the idea of the most perfect Being. It does not come through the senses, because such a Being is not sensible. It is not a fiction or fancy of the mind; this we know from our own consciousness. It is therefore, an innate idea, and must have been inlaid in our constitution by the most perfect Being himself. This is an a posteriori addition to the ontological argument. It is of the same nature with the cosmological argument. From the effect, the cause is inferred. The idea is a product which has God for its author. But to mix the a priori with the a posteriori argument is not to improve either.

Locke (*King's Life*, p. 315 sq.) objects to Des Cartes' argument, that it does not demonstrate anything more than the existence of the eternal matter of atheism. In this, he implies that eternity of being belongs to the idea of matter. But this is an error, because eternal being supposes necessary being, and necessary being supposes absolute perfection of being. But matter is not the most perfect being conceivable. Consequently, it is contingent, not necessary being. "Reason can annihilate matter in thought, always and without self-contradiction." Kant: *Pure Reason*. Meiklejohn's *Trans.* p. 379.¹

¹ See Locke, *Understanding*, IV. x., for the arguments for the Divine existence. In this part of his work, he really admits the doctrine of innate ideas in the sense in which Plato taught them, though not in the mistaken sense in which he himself combats them.

Stillingfleet (Origines Sacrae, III. i.) stated the ontological argument as follows. The perfectly clear perception of the mind is the strongest evidence we can have of the truth of anything. This postulate he borrowed from Des Cartes. We have a perfectly clear perception that necessary existence belongs to the essence of God; and if necessary existence belongs to God's essence, it follows that actual existence does. This clearness of the perception, it is to be noticed, shows that the idea of God is an idea of the reason, not of the imagination. It is accompanied with the conviction that it is a true idea, and not a mere invention of the fancy, like the idea of a winged horse, for example.

Samuel Clarke stated the ontological argument as follows: It is certain that something has existed from all eternity. Absolute nonentity is inconceivable. Whatever has eternally existed is self-existent, and whatever is self-existent, is necessarily existent, and whatever is necessarily existent cannot be conceived as non-existent. The material world cannot be the "something" that has eternally existed, because we can conceive of its nonentity. Therefore the "something" which has eternally existed is God. Furthermore, infinite space and time cannot be conceived of as non-existent; yet they are not substances or beings of themselves. They must therefore be properties of some substance or being. God is this substance or being.

Clarke's construction of the ontological argument is inferior to that of Anselm, for two reasons. 1. The "something" which eternally exists may be confounded with the pantheistic ground of all things; the "substance" of Spinoza. An eternal "something" does not necessarily suggest intelligence and morality in the "something." Anselm's "most perfect Being conceivable" does. 2. Space and time are not properties of any substance whatever. They are not properties of material substance; nor of finite spiritual substance; nor of infinite spiritual substance. They

are not properties of matter, nor of the human spirit, nor of the angelic spirit, nor of God.

Edwards (Will, Pt. II. Sect. iii.) shows a hesitation concerning the ontological argument similar to that of Leibnitz. He asserts that if man had "sufficient strength and extent of mind," he would "intuitively see the absurdity of supposing God not to be;" but adds, that "we have not this strength and extent of mind to know this certainty, in this intuitive, independent manner." This is saying that the human mind is not strong enough to perceive an absurdity. Yet Edwards adds, that "he will not affirm that there is in the nature of things no foundation for the knowledge of the being of God, without any evidence of it from his works," and that he thinks that "there is a great absurdity in the nature of things simply considered in supposing that there should be no God, or in denying Being in general." But, certainly, the human mind has sufficient "strength and extent," to perceive what is "absurd in the nature of things."

The ontological argument has the endorsement of inspiration. The Hebrew Jehovah, in Ex. 3 : 13, denotes necessity of existence. "This term, as applied to God, intimates that *to be* is his peculiar characteristic; that he *is*, in a sense in which no other being is; that he is self-existent, and cannot but be. In the opinion that in this lies the significance of the name, the ancient Jews and most scholars of eminence have concurred."¹ To give a name, in both the Hebrew and the Greek intuition, is to describe the inmost and real nature of the thing. Plato, in the *Cratylus* (390), represents Socrates as saying that "the right imposition of names is no easy matter, and belongs not to any and everybody, but to him only who has an insight into the nature of

¹ Alexander: *Kitto's Encyclopædia*, Art. Jehovah. Maimonides, the Rabbi of the 12th century, so explains Jehovah. See Lowman: *Hebrew Ritual*, p. 270. Delitzsch (*Old Testament History of Redemption*, § 5S) says that "the name Jehovah denotes the One whose nature consists in being (*Seyn*), which continually manifests itself as existence (*Daseyn*); the eternal, and eternally living One.

things." The nomenclature given by the unfallen man to the objects of nature (Gen. 2 : 19, 20) implies a deep knowledge of nature. And when the deity chooses before all others the name I Am, or Jehovah, for himself, the reference is to his absoluteness and perfection of being. The ethnic names in distinction from the revealed name of the deity imply attributes, not essence. The Teutonic "God" indicates that the deity is good. The Greek and Latin world employed a term (*θεός*, *deus*) that lays emphasis upon that attribute whereby he orders and governs the universe. But Moses, divinely taught upon this point, chose a term which does not refer to any particular attribute, but to the very being and essence of God, and teaches that the deity must be, and cannot be conceived of as non-existent. He was not bidden to explain or justify the name, but only to announce it. This shows that the idea of a necessarily existent being is one which the human mind readily accepts.

The sweeping assertion is sometimes made that no idea whatever implies an external object corresponding to it. There is certainly one idea that does. It is that of being itself. If I say, "I have the idea of being, but it is only an idea : there is really no being," I perceive the absurdity immediately. It is the same as saying, "There is nothing." The postulate in Clarke's argument : "Something exists," must be granted by the atheist as well as by the theist. But if this be true of the idea of being, it is still more so of the idea of *necessary* being. If the general idea of being implies objective being corresponding to it, the special idea of necessary being certainly does.

The ontological argument is of uncommon importance in an age tending to materialism, and to physical science. For it turns the human intellect in upon itself, and thereby contributes to convince it of the reality of mind as a different substance from matter. The recent neglect of a priori methods, and over-valuation of a posteriori, is one of the reasons why matter has so much more reality for many

men than mind. If an object is not looked at, it gradually ceases to be regarded as an object at all. When theorists cease to contemplate mental and moral phenomena, they cease to believe that there are any. The gaze of the physicist is intent upon the physical solely. Consequently, the metaphysical, or spiritual becomes a non-entity. Out of sight, it is out of mind, and out of existence, for him. Analyzing and observing matter alone, he converts everything into matter. The brain is the soul, and molecular motion is thought. What he needs is, to cultivate metaphysical in connection with physical studies; a priori, in connection with a posteriori methods; to look at mind as well as matter. In this way he gets a consciousness of mind, in distinction from the consciousness of matter.

Consciousness is consciousness, however it be obtained. If it be the result of a purely mental process, it is as truly consciousness as if it resulted from a purely sensuous process. When I am conscious of the agencies of my soul by introspection, this mode or form of consciousness is as real and trustworthy, as when I am conscious of the agencies of my body by sensation. It is of no consequence how consciousness arises, provided it does arise. Those a priori methods, consequently, which dispense with sensation and sensuous observation, and depend upon purely intellectual and spiritual operations, are best adapted to convince of the reality of an invisible and immaterial substance like the human soul. Some men tell us that they want a philosophy of common things. The soul of man is a very common thing; and if the physicist would spend as many hours in observing the phenomena of his soul, as he does in observing the phenomena of an oyster, he would have as much consciousness of his soul as he has of the oyster. We acquire consciousness of an object by busying the mind about it. And if, after sufficient effort, the materialist should fail to obtain any consciousness of his mind, in distinction from his body, he would indeed have to conclude that he has none.

The *Cosmological Argument* is derived from the existence of the universe (*κοσμοῦ λόγος*). It is implied in Heb. 3: 4, "Every house is builded by some man, but he who built all things is God." Its force depends upon the axiom that an effect supposes a cause. Aquinas (*Summa*, I. ii. 3) states the argument as follows: 1. Motion in the universe implies a prime mover who is not moved; and this is God. This form of the argument is valuable in reference to the mechanical physics, which resolves all existence into the movements of molecules or atoms. These atoms must either be self-moved, or moved by a prime mover other than the atoms. 2. Effects, generally, imply an efficient. 3. That which is contingent; which might not be, and once was not; implies that which is necessary, or that which always was and must be.

Kant (*Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn, 374,) objects, that the concept of causality cannot be pressed beyond the domain of sensuous existence, and therefore the first cause given by the cosmological argument would not be intelligent. But the world of finite mind is a part of the universe. The existence of the rational universe implies that of a rational first cause. Clarke (*Answer to Letter VII.*) makes the objection, that the argument from causality will not prove the eternity, infinity, immensity, and unity of God. The temporal phenomena of nature prove that there has been from the beginning of the phenomena, a Being of power and wisdom sufficient to produce them. But that this Being has existed from eternity, and will exist to eternity, cannot be proved from these temporal phenomena. It is necessary, therefore, says Clarke, to fall back upon the necessity of the existence of God that is given in the rational idea of him. The same reasoning applies to the infinity of God. The universe is not known as infinite, or even as unlimited, because it is not completely known. We are, therefore, arguing from only a finite effect, which would yield only a finite cause.

Clarke's objection overlooks the fact, that every finite object implies original non-existence, and therefore *creative* power in the cause. Hence the quantity of being in the effect, is not the measure of the quantity of being in the cause. A grain of sand, even an infinitesimal atom of matter, if it be granted that it is not eternal but came into being from non-entity, would prove infinite power, equally with the immensity of the universe, because finite power cannot create *ex nihilo*. The absolute origination of the least amount of finite being requires omnipotence, equally with the greatest amount. The other objection of Clarke, viz: That the temporal phenomena of nature would prove only a temporal author of them, falls to the ground, when it is considered that it is inconceivable that the cause and the effect should begin to exist *simultaneously*. The cause must be older than the effect, from the nature of the case. Creation from nothing, in this case too, as in the previous one, implies that the cause of the phenomena in time must be prior to time. In John 1 : 1, it is said that the Logos was already in being "in the beginning" of time; which proves that he existed in eternity. In like manner, God as the efficient cause of events in time must have existed before time, in order to be capable of such action at the very beginning of time.

Hume objects to the cosmological argument, that it is a *petitio principii*. Cause and effect, he says, are relative terms, so that one implies the other. But whether the phenomenon is an *effect*, is the very question. Hume denies that it is, asserting that it is only a consequent that follows an antecedent. There is no necessary connection between the two related phenomena. It is only the habit of seeing one succeed the other, that leads to the expectation that they will invariably do so. Hume requires proof that any event is an *effect*, proper; for if this be granted, it follows of course that there is a cause. Father and son are relative terms. In constructing an argument to prove

that Napoleon Buonaparte had a father, it would not be allowable to begin by assuming that Napoleon Buonaparte was a *son*. This objection of Hume is the same as that of the ancient Pyrrhonist, as stated by Diogenes Laertius. "Causation, the Pyrrhonists take away thus: A cause is only so in relation to an effect. But what is relative is merely conceived, and does not exist. Therefore, cause is a mere conception." Mackintosh: History of Ethical Philosophy. Note 2.

The reply to this is the following: (*a*) Hume's view of the connection of one event with another, as being merely that of antecedent and consequent, is founded upon sensation merely, not upon the action of reason. A brute's eye sees that one event precedes another, and this is all that the brute sees and knows. And, according to Hume's theory, this is all that the man should see and know. But the fact is, that the man knows much more than this. In his consciousness there are additional elements, that form no part of the animal's consciousness. A man not only sensuously *sees* that the one event precedes another, but rationally *perceives* that the one invariably and necessarily precedes the other. These two characteristics of invariability and necessity in the sequence are not given by the sense; but they are by the reason. The animal does not perceive them. The real question, consequently, between Hume and his opponents is, whether animal sensation or human reason shall decide the case. A man's mind, unlike the brute's eye, perceives not merely the sequence, but the *manner* of the sequence. (*b*) All phenomena, without exception, either precede or succeed each other, and therefore, according to Hume's theory, all phenomena ought to be either causes or effects. But we do not so regard them. The light of day invariably succeeds the darkness of the night, but we do not deem the former to be the effect of the latter. It is only of a *particular class* of antecedents and consequents, that we assert that one is the cause and the other is the ef-

fect. The mark of this class is not merely ocular antecedence, but *efficient* and *necessary* antecedence. (c) In mere succession, the antecedent and consequent may change places. The day may be either the antecedent or the consequent of the night. But in causation, the places of cause and effect cannot be so reversed. The cause must always be prior to the effect. (d) If the certainty of the connection between one event and another is the effect of custom, and not an intuitive perception, this certainty should increase in proportion to the number of instances. A man should be more certain that the explosion of gunpowder is the effect of its ignition, in the hundredth instance in which he witnesses it, than in the tenth instance. But he is not.

The *Teleological Argument*¹ is derived from a particular characteristic of the world: namely, the marks of design and adaptation to an end (τέλος) which appear in it. It is stated in Ps. 94: 9. "He that planted the ear shall he not hear? and he that formed the eye, shall he not see?" The evident adaptedness of the eye for vision proves an intelligent designer of the eye. This form of the argument for the Divine existence is the most popularly effective of any. It is an ancient argument. Cicero (Tusculan Questions, I. 23) states it in an eloquent manner, borrowing from Socrates and Plato. Xenophon presents it in the Memorabilia. Galen (De usu partium, V. v.) employs it in opposition to Aselepiades. The Bridgewater Treatises contain it in the fullest form. Paley's statement of it is marked by his usual lucidity and force.²

¹ Janet: Final Causes. Bell: The Hand. Kirby: History and Habits of Animals.

² Final causes are more easily discovered in a narrow than in a wide sphere; in biology than in astronomy. When it is asked: Why do the planets revolve around the sun? the efficient cause is commonly meant. The inquirer asks for the particular force that *causes* the revolution. But when it is asked: Why do the motor nerves run along the limbs? the final cause is commonly meant. The inquirer asks for the *purpose* of this arrangement.

The teleological argument, like the cosmological, must not be confined to the material world, but extended to the intellectual; as in Ps. 95:10, "He that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he know?" The marks of design in the constitution of the human soul infer an infinite designing mind who created it. The human will is intended for volition, not for perception. The human imagination is made for picturing, not for reasoning. The human understanding is designed for perception, not for volition.

Chemistry furnishes some fine materials for this argument. Elementary substances cannot be combined in any proportion at pleasure. The ratio in every instance is predetermined; the amounts are weighed out by the Author of nature with a nicety which no art can attain. For example, twenty-three ounces of sodium will exactly unite with thirty-five and five-tenth ounces of chlorine, and make table salt. But if 23.5 ounces of sodium are put together with 35.5 ounces of chlorine, nature will put the extra half ounce of sodium on one side, and the remainder will unite. Cooke: Religion in Chemistry, p. 288. Crystallography, also, affords examples of symmetrical arrangement of particles, in which geometrical proportions are invariable. The crystal is a petrified geometry.

An objection similar to that urged against the cosmological argument, has been made to the teleological. There is *adaptation*, it is said, but not *design*; as there is sequence but not causality. Certain things are adapted *to* certain uses, but not made *for* certain uses. The eye is adapted to vision, but has no designing author. When it is asked, how this striking adaptation is to be accounted for apart from design, the answer is: either by the operation of law, or by chance. To the latter explanation, there is a fatal objection in the mathematical doctrine of probabilities. The chance of matter's acting in this manner is not one in millions. Natural adaptation, upon this theory, would be as infrequent a phenomenon as a miracle. And yet adapta-

tion to an end is one of the most common facts in nature ; occurring in innumerable instances. The other explanation, by law, is equivalent to the acknowledgment of a designing author, or else it is mere tautology. A law implies a law-giver ; because it merely denotes an invariable course of action, or a universal fact in nature. The law of gravitation is only a name for a general fact, namely, that matter attracts inversely as the square of the distance. The law is merely the rule of action in the case. To say, therefore, that the law of gravitation is the cause of gravitation, is to say that the fact itself is the cause of the fact ; that a general fact produces particular facts. There is nothing causative in the law, any more than there is in the fact or facts which are its equivalent. Consequently, a law requires to be accounted for, as much as do the phenomena under it ; and this carries the mind back to a creative author of law.

Bacon objects to the inquiry for final causes, as leading to unfounded explanations and conjectures, thus hindering the progress of science. But Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood, in endeavoring to find out the design and use of the multitude of valves in the veins. And, generally, the search after the purpose in nature has been the stimulus in physical science. That some of the conjectures regarding final causes should prove to be erroneous, is unavoidable to a finite intelligence. Aristotle (*Metaphysics*, I. ii.) contends that if the end or final cause cannot be found, science is impossible. There would be endless progression in inquiry, with no terminus or goal. Scientific investigation would have no result.

The *Moral Argument* is stated in two modes : 1 Conscience testifies to the fact of obedience, or of disobedience, of a moral law. This implies a law-giver. This is God. Calvin, Melancthon, and Turretin employ this mode. 2. We observe an inequality between the happiness of good and bad men, here upon earth. This requires an adjust-

ment hereafter. This implies a righteous arbiter and judge.

The *Historical Argument* is derived from the historical fact, that all the nations have had the belief that there is a Supreme Being. Aristotle employs it, *Metaphysics*, XI. viii. Cicero, also, *De Legibus*, I. viii. ; and Grotius, *Christian Religion*, I. 12.

CHAPTER IV.

TRINITY IN UNITY.

Athanasius : *Contra Arianos* ; *De Decretis Synodi Nicaenae* (Oxford Library, Tr.). Augustine : *De Trinitate* ; *De Civitate*, XI. x. (Nicene Library, Tr.). Anselm : *De Fide Trinitatis* ; *De Processione Spiritus*. Hasse : Anselm, II. 287 sq. Aquinas : *Summa*, Pars I. Quest. xxvii.-xliii. Calvin : *Institutes*, I. xiii. 5. Ursinus : *Christian Religion*, Quest. 25. Witsius : *Covenants*, I. ii. 5-7 ; *Apostles' Creed*, Dis. VI. VII. XII. XXIII. Turretin : *Institutio*, III. xxiii.-xxxi. Hooker : *Polity*, V. li.-lvi. Stillingfleet : *Trinity and Transubstantiation compared*. Bull : *Defensio Fidei Nicaenae* (Oxford Library, Tr.). Pearson : *Creed*, I. II. VII. Usher : *On the Incarnation*. Waterland : *First and Second Defences ; Importance of Doctrine of the Trinity*. Howe : *Calm Discourse of the Trinity ; Trinity of Persons*. Owen : *Brief Declaration ; Saints' Fellowship with the Trinity ; Vindiciae Evangelicae ; Person of Christ*. Leighton : *Theological Lectures* (VII.). Cudworth : *Intellectual System*, II. 311-433 (*Pagan Trinity*). Edwards : *Observations on the Trinity*. Horsley : *Belief of First Ages ; Tracts*. Smith : *Scripture Testimony*. Magee : *On Atonement*. Wardlaw : *Reply to Yates*. Wilberforce : *On the Incarnation*. Kidd : *On the Trinity*. Trefrey : *The Trinity*. Smeaton : *On the Holy Spirit*. Neander : *History*, II. 403-477. Dorner : *Christology* (Nicene Trinity) ; *Christian Doctrine*, § 28-32. Baur : *Dreieinigkeitslehre*, I. 395-470. Frank : *Christian Certainty*, § 33, 36. Billroth : *Religions-Philosophie*, § 89, 90. Müller : *On Sin*, II. 136 (*Urwick's Tr.*). Nitzsch : *Christian Doctrine*, § 81-84. Martensen : *Dogmatics*, § 52-58, 181-184. T. Maurice : *Oriental Trinities*. Morgan : *Trinity of Plato and Philo*. Christlieb : *Modern doubt*, IV. Schaff : *History*, III. 600-689. Shedd : *History of Doctrine*, I. 243-391 ; *Introduction to Augustine on the Trinity*.

It has been remarked, in the investigation of the Divine Nature, that the doctrine of the Trinity, though not dis-

coverable by human reason, is susceptible of a rational defence when revealed. This should not be lost sight of, notwithstanding the warning of the keen Dr. South (Sermon XLIII.), that "as he that denies this fundamental article of the Christian religion may lose his soul, so he that much strives to understand it may lose his wits."

It is a noticeable fact, that the earlier forms of Trinitarianism are among the most metaphysical and speculative of any in dogmatic history. The controversy with the Arian and the Semi-Arian brought out a statement and defence of the truth, not only upon scriptural but ontological grounds. Such a powerful dialectician as Athanasius, while thoroughly and intensely scriptural; while starting from the text of scripture, and subjecting it to a rigorous exegesis; did not hesitate to pursue the Arian and Semi-Arian dialectics to its subtlest fallacy in its most recondite recesses. If anyone doubts this, let him read the four Orations of Athanasius, and his defence of the Nicene Decrees. In some sections of Christendom, it has been contended that the doctrine of the Trinity should be received without any attempt at all to establish its rationality and intrinsic necessity. In this case, the tenets of eternal generation and procession have been regarded as going beyond the scripture data, and if not positively rejected, have been thought to hinder rather than assist faith in three divine persons and one God. But the history of opinions shows that such sections of the church have not proved to be the strongest defenders of the scripture statement, or the most successful in keeping clear of the Sabellian, Arian, or even Socinian departure from it. Those churches which have followed scripture most implicitly, and have most feared human speculation, are the very churches which have inserted into their creeds the most highly analytic statement that has yet been made of the doctrine of the Trinity. The Nicene Trinitarianism is incorporated into nearly all the symbols of modern Christendom; and this specifies, particularly,

the tenets of eternal generation and procession with their corollaries. The English church, to whose great divines, Hooker, Bull, Pearson, and Waterland, scientific Trinitarianism owes a very lucid and careful statement, has added the Athanasian creed to the Nicene. The Presbyterian churches, distinguished for the closeness of their adherence to the simple scripture, yet call upon their membership to confess, that "in the unity of the Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity: God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. The Father is of none, neither begotten nor proceeding; the Son is eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son." Westminster Confession, II. iii.

In discussing the subject of the personality of God (183, sq.), we have seen that this involves three distinctions in the Infinite Essence. God cannot be self-contemplating, self-cognitive, and self-communing, unless he is trinal in his constitution. The subject must know itself as an object, and also perceive that it does. This implies, not three distinct substances, but three distinct modes of one substance. Consequently, the Divine unity must be a kind of unity that is compatible with a kind of plurality. The unity of the Infinite being, is tri-unity, or trinity. God is a plural unit.

The attempt, therefore, of the deist and the Socinian to construct the doctrine of the Divine unity is a failure, because it fails to construct the doctrine of the Divine *personality*. Deism, with Socinianism and Mohammedanism, while asserting that God is personal, denies that he is three persons in one essence. It contends, by implication, that God can be self-knowing as a single subject merely without an object; without the distinctions involved in the subject contemplating, the object contemplated, and the perception of the identity of both. The controversy, consequently, is as much between the deist and the psychologist, as it is be-

tween him and the theologian. It is as much a question whether his theory of personality and self-consciousness is correct, as whether his interpretation of scripture is. For the dispute involves the necessary conditions of personality. If a true psychology does not require trinality in a spiritual essence in order to its own self-contemplation, self-knowledge, and self-communion, then the deist is correct; but if it does, then he is in error. "That view of the Divine nature," says Smith (Faith and Philosophy, 191), "which makes it inconsistent with the incarnation and trinity, is philosophically imperfect, as well as scripturally incorrect."

In speaking of the Divine unity, therefore, a peculiar kind of unity is intended, namely, a unity that is trinal. And when the Divine trinality is spoken of, a peculiar kind of trinality is intended, namely, a trinality that constitutes only one essence or Being. As a unity which excludes trinality is not meant, so a trinality which excludes unity is not meant. "Cum dico unum, non me trinitatis turbat numerus, qui essentiam non multiplicat, non variat, nec partitur. Rursum, cum dico tria, non me arguit intuitus unitatis, quae illa quaecumque tria, seu illos tres, nec in confusionem cogit, nec in singularitatem redegit." Bernard: De Consideratione, V. 8.

Consequently, in reference to God, we may not discuss mere and simple unity, nor mere and simple trinality; but we must discuss unity *in* trinality, and trinality *in* unity. See Athanasius: Contra Arianos, IV. 13 sq. We may not think of a monad which originally, and in the order of nature, is not trinal, but becomes so. The instant there is a monad there is a triad. Neither may we think of a triad which originally, and in the order of nature, is not a monad, but becomes so. The instant there is a triad, there is a monad.

Ἕν μὲν σε μονάς, Ἕν μὲν σε τριάς.

Μονάς ἔστι τριάς ὧν, Τριάς ἔστι μονάς ὧν.—SYNESIUS.

The Christian trinity is not that of Sabellius and Pythagoras: namely, an original untrinal monad that subsequently, either in time or in the order of nature, becomes a triad: whereby four elementary and constituent factors are introduced into the problem; namely, one essence, and three additional persons. God is not one *and* three, but one *in* three. There is no primary monad, as such, and without trinality, to which the three distinctions are adjuncts. There are only three constituent factors in the problem. For the essence has no existence outside of and apart from the three persons, so as to constitute a fourth factor in addition to these three. The monad, that is, the essence, never exists in and by itself untrinalized, as in the Sabellian theory, and in the Pythagorean scheme of the tetractys, adopted by Coleridge (Works, V. 18, 19, 404). It exists only as in the persons; only as trinalized. The essence, consequently, is not prior, either in the order of nature or of time, to the persons, nor subsequent to them, but simultaneous with them. Hence, the essence is not one constituent factor by itself, apart from the persons, any more than the persons are three constituent factors by themselves, apart from the essence. The one essence is simultaneously three persons, and the three persons are one essence. The trinity is not a composition of one essence with three persons. It is not an essence without distinctions united with three distinctions, so as to make a complex. The trinity is simple and incomplex. "If," says Twisten (Dogmatik, II. 229), "we distinguish between the clearness of light and the different degrees of clearness, we do not imply that light is composed of clearness and degrees of clearness." Neither is God composed of one untrinal essence and three persons.

It follows, consequently, that we cannot discuss the Divine unity by itself, exclusive of trinality, as the deist and the Socinian endeavor to do. Trinality belongs as necessarily and intrinsically to the Divine unity, as eternity does to

the Divine essence, "If," says Athanasius (Oration I. 17), "there was not a Blessed Trinity from eternity, but only a unity existed first, which at length became and grew to be a Trinity, it follows that the Holy Trinity must have been at one time imperfect, and at another time entire; imperfect until the Son came to be created, as the Arians maintain, and then entire afterwards."

The necessary connection between the Divine unity and trinality, is like that between the Divine essence and attributes. God's essence is not prior to and separate from his attributes. He is never an essence without attributes. The essence and its attributes are simultaneous and inseparable. God cannot be conceived of as developing from an essence without attributes, into an essence with attributes. He is not essence *and* attributes, but essence *in* attributes. The whole essence is in each attribute; and the whole essence is also in each trinitarian person. As we cannot logically conceive of and discuss the Divine essence apart from the Divine attributes, so we cannot logically conceive of and discuss the Divine unity apart from the Divine trinality.

The unity of God is *unique*. It is the only unity of the kind. An individual man is one; and any individual creature, or thing, is one. But there are others like it, each of which is likewise numerically one. God is not merely one, but the *only* one; not merely unus, but unicus. He is not one of a species, or one in contrast with another of the same kind. God is one God, and the only God. The notion of the unique must be associated with that of unity, in the instance of the Supreme Being.

God is not a *unit*, but a *unity*. A unit, like a stone, or a stick, is marked by mere singleness. It admits of no interior distinctions, and is incapable of that inherent trinality which is necessary to self-knowledge, and self-consciousness. Mere singleness is incompatible with society, and therefore incompatible with the Divine communion and

blessedness. God is blessed only as he is self-knowing and self-communing. A subject without an object could not experience either love or joy. Love and joy are social. They imply more than a single person.

The Scripture doctrine of the Divine *plenitude* favors distinctions in the Divine essence. Fulness of being implies variety of existence. A finite unit has no plurality or manifoldness. It is destitute of modes of subsistence. Meagreness and barrenness mark a unit; opulence and fruitfulness mark a unity. This *πλήρωμα*, or, plenitude of the Divine essence, is spoken of in Eph. 3 : 19, "Filled with all the fulness of God ;" in Colos. 1 : 19 ; 2 : 9, "The fulness of the Godhead." Ambrose (De Fide, V. i.) marks the distinction as follows: "Singularitas ad personam pertinet, unitas ad naturam." Says Twesten (Dogmatik, II. 228), "so far as plurality lies in the idea of the trinity, it is not contradictory to the unity belonging to the Divine essence, but only to that *solitariness* which cannot be harmonized with the living plenitude and blessedness which are ascribed to God in revelation, and which God possesses in himself, and independently of the finite." Owen (Doctrine of the Trinity Vindicated) remarks that "it may be true, that in one essence there can be but one person, when the essence is finite and limited, but not when the essence is infinite." The following from Lessing (Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, § 73) is remarkable, as coming from one who would not be supposed to have devoted much study to metaphysical trinitarianism. "What if this doctrine [the trinity] should bring us to see that God cannot possibly be one in the sense in which finite things are one ; that his unity must be a transcendental unity that does not exclude a kind of plurality (Mehrheit)? Must not God have, at least, an absolutely *perfect* idea (Vorstellung) of himself ; that is, an idea in which is contained *all* that is in himself? But would *all* that is in himself be contained in this idea, if it included merely the *notion*, or bare *possibil-*

ity of his necessary and actual existence, as well as of his attributes? Possibility might exhaust the nature of his attributes, but does it that of his necessary and actual existence? It seems to me that it would not. Consequently, God must either have no *perfect* idea or image of himself, or else this perfect idea is as necessarily *actual*, [that is, objectively real] as he himself is. The image or representation of myself in a mirror, it is true, is nothing but an empty and unreal image of me, because it has in it only so much of me as is reflected by the rays of light falling upon the mirror. But if this image contained *all*—all without exception—which I myself contain, would it then be a mere empty and unreal representation; or not rather a true duplication of myself? If, now, I affirm a similar self-duplication in God, I get perhaps as near to the truth as the imperfection of human language permits. And it is unquestionable, that those who would make this idea which God has of himself level to the popular apprehension, could not express it more appropriately and clearly than by denominating it a *Son* whom God generates from eternity.”

The argument for the truth and reality of the Trinity from the characteristics of the Christian experience, is conclusive. There must be trinality in the Divine unity, in order to the exercise of the peculiar affections in the Christian consciousness. The Christian experience as portrayed in the New Testament, and as expressed in St. Paul's case, for example, is both impossible and inexplicable, without the three persons in the one God. St. Paul is continually alluding, in his hopes and joys, to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Abstract the Father, Son, and Spirit, and leave merely a bare untrinal substance as the object of love, hope, and worship, and St. Paul's religious experience cannot be accounted for. If, from the common Christian consciousness, those elements should be eliminated which result from the intuition of the Divine being as Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, little would remain. Let any

one think away all of his religious experience that relates to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and retain only what relates to the Divine essence as a monad and untrinalized, and he will perceive how very much of his best religious experience grows out of trinitarianism, and cannot grow out of unitarianism. Men cannot and do not love, pray to, and adore a mere abstract infinite nature. They love, address, and worship certain persons in that nature. Upon this point, Frank (System of Christian Certainty, § 33) remarks as follows: "God is the unity, the one Being, who is the originating author and agent in the Christian experience. But this unity has trinality in relation to this experience. God in judgment causes the sense of sin and guilt; God in atonement expiates sin and guilt; God in regeneration and conversion removes sin and guilt. Here are three modes or forms of God. Yet it is one absolute personal God, to whom the Christian owes all this. In such way, and to this extent, the Christian is assured, by means of redemption and the objects of faith implied in it, of God as the triune God."

Although trinal, the Divine essence is *simple*, not compound. In this respect, the unity of the finite spirit resembles that of the Infinite. The spirit of man is not composed of two substances. It is homogeneous. It is all spirit. A material unity is complex, being composed of a variety of elementary substances. Hence, there are varieties of matter, but not of spirit. By reason of its incompleteness and simplicity, the Divine essence is indivisible. Not being made up, as matter is, of diverse parts or properties, it cannot be divided or analyzed into them. "The nature of the Trinity is denominated simple, because it has not anything which it can lose, and because it is not one thing and its contents another, as a cup and the liquor, or a body and its color, or the air and the light and heat of it." Augustine: City of God, XI. x.

The doctrine of the Divine unity, in opposition to poly-

theism, is taught in the Scriptures. Deut. 6 : 4, "The Lord our God, is one Lord." 1 Kings 8 : 60, "The Lord is God, and there is none else." Isa. 44 : 6, "Beside me there is no God." Mark 12 : 29, "The Lord our God is one Lord. John 10 : 30, "I and my Father are one" (*ἐν*). 1 Cor. 8 : 4, "There is none other God but one." Eph. 4 : 6, "One Lord, one God and Father of all." Gal. 3 : 20, "God is one." No sin is more severely prohibited and threatened than the worship of idols.

The rational proofs of the Divine unity are the following: 1. Unity is implied in the idea of God as the most perfect Being. Each of his infinite perfections excludes a second of the kind. There cannot be two eternal beings; or two omnipotent; or two supreme; or two self-existent; etc. "Hence," says Aquinas (*Summa*, I. xi. 3), "the ancient philosophers, as if compelled by the truth, in postulating an infinite principle (*principium*), postulated only one such principle." Turretin (*III. iii. 7*) cites Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Epictetus, and Seneca as teaching the unity of the Supreme being; *pater hominum deorumque*. 2. The unity and harmony apparent in the created universe demonstrate the Divine unity. There would be two conflicting plans, had there been two creating architects.

The doctrine of the Trinity is one of revelation, not of natural religion, and therefore the first work to be done respecting it, is to deduce it from the language of Scripture. It is not directly formulated, as an affirmative proposition, in any single text; if 1 John 5 : 7 is spurious. But it is indirectly formulated in some texts, and taught part by part in many others. To collect, collate, and combine these, is to construct the dogma biblically.

There are two general classes of Trinitarian texts: 1. Those which mention all of the three persons of the Godhead. 2. Those which teach the deity of one or another of the persons singly.

1. Texts of the first class are the following: The account of the baptism of Christ, in Matt. 3 : 16, 17, mentions three persons. A person speaks from heaven, saying : "This is my beloved Son." The person who is spoken of in this address is the "beloved Son," and another than the person speaking. The "Spirit of God" who descended like a dove, alighting upon the Son, is still a third person, differing from the other two. The person who speaks is not seen. The person spoken of is seen, and stands in the waters of Jordan. A third person is also seen, but, in the form of a dove, descending from heaven. It was a saying current in the days of the Arian controversy : "Go to the Jordan, O Arian, and thou wilt see the Trinity." The term "Spirit," in this instance, does not denote some property or influence of God, because to descend from heaven in a personal form, and to take a personal attitude, is never attributed in Scripture, or anywhere else, to an impersonal influence or attribute.

The formula which Christ gave his apostles for administering baptism to believers mentions the three persons of the Trinity, and thereby indirectly formulates the doctrine. Matt. 28 : 19, "Teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." The three are here represented as equal in dignity and authority. Whatever be the significance of baptism, no discrimination is made between the relation which the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost sustain to it. But that baptism is the recognition of the divinity of the person in whose name it is administered, is self-evident. Paul asks in amazement, if the Corinthians were baptized in the name of Paul ? 1 Cor. 1 : 13. When it is said that the Israelites "were all baptized unto Moses" (*ἔτις τὸν Μωϋσῆν*), 1 Cor. 10 : 2, the meaning is not that they were baptized unto the *name* (*ἔτις τὸ ὄνομα*) of Moses, but with reference to (*ἔτις*) the Mosaic doctrines and ritual ; as persons were said to be baptized "unto John's baptism" (Acts 19 : 3), in confirma-

tion of their belief in John the Baptist's mission and preaching.

The Apostolic benediction mentions all three persons. 2 Cor. 13 : 14, "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost be with you all." Here, the apostle expresses the desire, that favor to the guilty through Christ as the mediator, from God the Father's love, may be made effectual by the Holy Ghost. Each person performs an office peculiar to himself. Three persons are mentioned in Eph. 4 : 4-6, "There is one Spirit, one Lord, one God and Father of all ;" and in 1 Peter 1 : 2, "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ."

There are, also, passages in which three persons are spoken of, who are distinguished from each other by certain acts which each performs, and which could not be performed by a creature. John 15 : 26, "But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me." John 14 : 16, "And I will pray (*ἑρωτήσω*) the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you forever, even the Spirit of truth." In the first of these, mention is made of the Comforter who is sent, of the Son who sends him, and of the Father from whom he proceeds. In the second, the same persons are mentioned, but the Father sends the Comforter. This is explained by the identity of essence in each person, whereby, in scripture the same act is sometimes referred to more than one person. 1 Cor. 12 : 4-6, "There are diversities of [spiritual] gifts (*χαρισμάτα*), but the same Spirit. And there are differences of [ecclesiastical] administrations, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of [miraculous] operations (*ἔνεργημάτων*), but it is the same God which worketh all in all." Here, the gifts, administrations, and operations are such as could not proceed from

a creature ; and the three persons mentioned stand in the same relation to one another, and to the gifts, administrations, and operations. Eph. 2 : 18, "For through him, we both have access, by one Spirit, to the Father." Jude 20 : 21, "Praying in the Holy Ghost, keep yourselves in the love of God, looking for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ." Rev. 1 : 4, 5, "Grace be unto you from him which is, and was, and is to come, and from the seven spirits which are before his throne, and from Jesus Christ." The "seven spirits" are the Holy Spirit designated by the Jewish sacred number, denoting infinite perfection.

2. The passages of the second general class, in which only a single trinitarian person is spoken of, will be presented under the heads of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

That the doctrine of the Trinity was taught in the Old Testament was generally maintained by the fathers, schoolmen, and divines of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The language of Quenstedt expresses the common view of these authorities. "As the mystery of the Holy Trinity is proposed with sufficient clearness in the books of the Old Testament, so likewise from them alone the divinity of Christ, and of the Holy Spirit, and thus the whole mystery of the Trinity can be demonstrated against any opponents who concede the inspiration of the Old Testament." Hase: Hutterus, p. 168. Calixtus questioned this position, in 1645, and was answered by Calovius. For the exegesis of the Fathers upon this point, see Irenaeus: IV. x. xi.; Augustine: City of God, XVI. vi.; Confessions, XIII. v. Speaker's Commentary: Gen. 1:26; Isa. 32:1, 2. Augustine contended that man was made in the image of the *triune* God, the God of revelation; not in that of the God of natural religion, or the *untriune* deity of the nations. Consequently it was to be expected that a trinitarian analogue can be found in his mental constitution, which he attempted to point out. All acknowledge that the Divine

unity has its correspondent in that of the human mind. But Augustine and the fathers generally go further than this. This, in their view, is not the whole of the Divine image. When God says, "Let us make man in *our* image, after *our* likeness," they understood these words to have been spoken *by* the Trinity, and *of* the Trinity; by and of the true God of revelation: the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, one God. How far Moses *comprehended* the full meaning of the Divine teaching in these words, is one thing. *Who* it really was that taught, is another. The apostle Peter asserts that the Old Testament inspiration was a Trinitarian inspiration, when he says that "the prophets who prophesied of the grace that should come, searched what the Spirit of *Christ* which was in them did signify, when it testified beforehand of the sufferings of Christ." 1 Pet. 1 : 10, 11.

The doctrine of the Trinity is revealed in the Old Testament, in the same degree that the other truths of Christianity are; not with the clearness and fulness of the New Testament, yet really and plainly. God is trinal in the Old Testament; but with more vagueness than in the New. In the Old economy, only the *general doctrine* of three persons in the essence is taught. In the New dispensation, the *characteristic differences* between the three are specified. The New Testament formula of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, together with the other data connected with this, yields the peculiarities of generation and spiration, of filiation and procession; constituting a further development of the truth found germinally in the earlier revelation.¹ "The trinitarian conception of God," says Delitzsch (Old Testament History of Redemption, 178, Curtis's Ed.), "is not a product of philosophical speculation, but the reflex, not only of the New Testament, but also even of the Old Testament facts of revelation. God and the Spirit of

¹ Compare Witsius : Covenants, I. ii. 5-7. Leighton : Theological Lectures, VII. Lee : Inspiration, Lecture III. p. 123. Dorner : Christian Doctrine, § 28.

God are already distinguished upon the first page of the Holy Scriptures, and between both, the Angel of God stands as the mediator of the covenant, according to Gen. 16; and as the leader of Israel, according to Ex. 14:19. The angel of his presence, according to Isa. 63:9, is the saviour of his people."

The passages in the Old Testament which imply the doctrine of the Trinity are: 1. Those in which God speaks in the plural number. Even if no weight be attached to the pluralis excellentiæ in the name אֱלֹהִים, yet when God himself employs the plural number in speaking of himself and his agency, it evidently supports the doctrine of personal distinctions in the essence. Gen. 1:26, "God said, Let *us* make man after *our* image." Gen. 3:22, "God said, Behold the man is become as one of *us*." Gen. 11:7, "The Lord said, Let *us* go down, and there confound their language." Isa. 7:8, "Whom shall I send, and who will go for *us*." The exegete would shrink from substituting "me" for "us," in these passages; as he would from substituting "I" for "we," and "my," for "our," in the sentence, "We will come unto him and made our abode with him," John 14:23. And yet it would be proper to do so, if there really is only a single person in the Supreme Being. "We might have supposed," says Augustine (City of God, XVI. vi.), "that the words uttered at the creation of man, 'Let us,' not Let me, 'make man,' were addressed to the angels, had he not added, 'in our image;' but as we cannot believe that man was made in the image of the angels, or that the image of God is the same as that of angels, it is better to refer this expression to the plurality of the trinity." This remark of Augustine contradicts the explanation of Philo and Maimonides, who say that God addressed the angels, associating them with himself. Justin Martyr (Trypho, LXII.) finds the trinity in this passage. Compare, Introduction to Augustine on the Trinity. Nicene Library, III. 5.

2. Of less logical value in themselves, yet having a demonstrative force in connection with other proofs, are the trisagion in Isa. 6 : 3, "Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord of hosts ;" and the threefold address in Numbers 6 : 24-26, "The Lord bless thee, and keep thee ; the Lord make his face to shine upon thee ; the Lord lift up his countenance upon thee." "This formula of benediction," says Kurtz (Sacred History, § 46), "already contains the whole mystery of the divine Trinity, and of the redemption which was to be accomplished by it, in an undeveloped form, or like a germ. It was designed to aid in connecting with the religious knowledge of the people a certain view, to be afterward rendered more distinct, of the personality of the one God unfolded in three persons, and operating in a threefold manner in the work of human salvation."

3. Still more important than either of the two preceding classes of texts, are those in which God is expressly distinguished from God, as subject and object. The theophanies of the Old Testament, like the incarnation of the Son, are trinitarian in their implication and bearing. The narrative relating to Jehovah and Hagar, in Gen. 16 : 7-13, is an example. Here, the person who is styled in verses 7, 9, 10, 11, the "angel (אֱלֹהֵי) of the Lord," is addressed in verse 13 as almighty God (אֱלֹהִים): "Thou God seest me." God is thus a person who sends ("of the Lord"), and a person who is sent ("angel"). The theophany of Jehovah to Abraham, described in Gen. 18 : 1-19, is another example. Here, one of the "three men" spoken of in verse 2 is denominated Lord (אֱלֹהִים), in verse 3, and Jehovah in verse 13 ; and is described by Abraham as the "judge of all the earth" in verse 25, before whom he himself is but "dust and ashes" (verse 27). In verse 14, this Jehovah-angel distinguishes himself from "the Lord" (אֱלֹהִים) by asking, "Is any thing too hard for the Lord?" This could not be exchanged for: "Is anything too hard for me?" The "men" in 18 : 22 are only *two* of the three. These two

went toward Sodom, leaving Abraham standing before the third, who is called Jehovah. In 19:1, these two angels come to Sodom. The theophany of Jehovah to Lot, in Gen. 19, is another example of the trinitarian distinctions. In verse 1, "two angels" (literally, "*the* two angels": see 18:22) are sent by "Jehovah" (verse 13) to destroy Sodom. In verse 18, one of these angels is addressed as "Lord" (אֲדֹנָי). The Masorites have the note, *Kadesh*, i.e., "holy," to signify that "Lord" is employed in the divine sense, not the "profane" or human, as in 19:2 ("my lords"). The context favors the Masorite view; because Lot's words to the Lord, in 19:18-12, and the Lord's words to Lot, imply the deity of the angel; e.g., "*I* will overthrow the city." It is uncertain whether the "Jehovah" who "went his way as soon as he had left communing with Abraham" (Gen. 18:33) joins "the two angels" that "came to Sodom at even" (Gen. 19:1); or whether one of these "two angels" is Jehovah himself. One or the other supposition must be made. The interchange of the singular and plural in the narrative is striking. "It came to pass when *they* had brought them forth abroad that *he* said, Escape for thy life. And Lot said unto *them*, Oh not so my *Lord*: behold now thy servant hath found grace in *thy* sight. And *he* said unto him, See, *I* have accepted thee; *I* will not overthrow the city of which thou hast spoken," Gen. 18:17-21. The theophany of Jehovah to Moses, in Exodus 3, is another instance of the subjective and the objective God. The person described in verse 2 as "the angel of the Lord," is denominated God (אֱלֹהִים) in verse 4, and "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," in verse 6.

4. There are passages in the Old Testament that speak of three persons in the Supreme Being. Isa. 48:16, "The Lord God, and his Spirit have sent me" (the Messiah). In Haggai 2:4, 5, 7, three persons are mentioned: "The Lord of hosts," his "Spirit," and the "Desire of all nations." If קְדֻמָּה (ver. 7) is rendered τὰ ἐκλεκτά (Sept.),

still two divine persons are mentioned. This would prove distinctions in the Divine unity. There are three persons who bring Israel out of Egypt: God; the "angel" of God; (Ex. 3:2,4; 23:20; 32:34); and the "Spirit" of God, Isa. 63:7-14.

5. All those passages in the Old Testament, which ascribe divine names and works to the Messiah, and divine operations to the Holy Spirit, establish the doctrine of the trinity, by implication. These will be mentioned under the topics of the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Edersheim (*Life of Jesus*, Appendix IX.), by quotations from the Targums, Talmuds, and older Midrashim, shows that there are 456 passages in the O. T. (75 from the Pentateuch, 243 from the Prophets, and 138 from the Hagiographa) that are applied by the Rabbins to the Messiah. Among them are 2 Sam. 7:14; "I will be his Father and he shall be my Son;" Ps. 2:7, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee." Compare Heb. 1:5, 6.

The Jews learned from the Old Testament that the Holy Spirit is a person. When John the Baptist tells the Pharisees and Sadducees, that one would soon appear among them who would baptize them with the Holy Ghost (Matt. 3:7-11), he did not explain who the Holy Ghost is. He spoke of an agent known to them. So also in the instance of Christ's promise to his disciples, that he would send them the Comforter, the Holy Spirit, John 14:26; 15:13, 14. But this knowledge which is presupposed, must have been a common and current knowledge, derived from the Old Testament representations of God.

Augustine (*Confessions*, XIII. 5) finds the trinity in Gen. 1:1, 2. The "beginning," he understands to be an agent, as in Rev. 3:14. "In principio" means, "by the Beginning;" that is, by means of him who causes to begin, or originates. "Thou, O Father, didst create heaven and earth in him who is the Beginning of our wisdom, which is thy Wisdom, of thyself, equal unto thee and coeternal, that

is, thy Son." Dorner (Christian Doctrine, I. 346) quotes Deut. 32 : 39, in comparison with Exod. 3 : 14. The same Being who says "I am I," also says "I am He."

The technical term "trinity" is not found in Scripture ; and neither is the term "unity." The earliest use of the word is in Theophilus of Antioch († 181, or 188), who remarks that "the three days which were before the luminaries are types of the trinity." Ad Autolyicum, II. 15. The term triad is employed by Plotinus († 270), and Proclus († 485). Tertullian († 220) employs the term trinitas. Origen († 250) uses *τρίας* twice. Rufinus, in translating Origen, employs trinitas. In the fourth century triunitas appears. The schoolmen discuss the triplicitas of the divine nature, in connection with the simplicitas. Baumgarten-Crusius: Dogmengeschichte, II. 120. Trinity is the abbreviation of tri-unity.

God is trinal (trinum), not triple (triplex). Compare Augustine: Trinity, VI. vii. That which is triple is complex ; it is composed of three different substances. That which is trinal is incomplex ; it denotes one simple substance, having a threefold modification. "We may speak of the trinal, but not of the triple deity." Hollaz, in Hase's Hutterus, 172. The German Dreieinigkeit is more accurate than Dreifaltigkeit ; and the English tri-unity than threefoldness, or triplicity. Dreieinheit comes still nearer to trinitas, than Dreieinigkeit. This latter leans toward tritheism, in denoting a unity of will and affection, rather than of nature. Dreiheit denotes trinality only.

The term "person" does not denote an attribute of the essence, but a mode of the essence ; that is, a particular "form" of its existence, according to the term used by St. Paul, Phil. 2 : 6. It is proper to speak of a trinitarian mode, but not of a trinitarian attribute. A trinitarian person is sometimes defined as a "relation" of the essence. "Respondeo, dicendum quod relationes quaedam sunt in divinis realiter." Aquinas: Summa, I. xxviii. 1. By a

“relation,” here, is not meant an external relation of God to the finite universe; as when the essence is contemplated in relation to space and time, and the attributes of immensity and eternity are the result; but an internal relation of the divine essence towards *itself*. It is the essence in a certain mode, e.g., the Father, as related to this same essence in a certain other mode, e.g., the Son.

The clue to the right construction of the doctrine of the Trinity, lies in the accurate distinction and definition of Essence and Person. The doctrine is logically consistent, because it affirms that God is one in another sense than he is three; and three in another sense than he is one. If it affirmed unity in the same respect that it affirms trinity, the doctrine would be self-contradictory. “To assert,” says Conybeare (On Miracles), “that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three distinct infinite Beings, and yet but *one* Being, is an express contradiction. To assert that they are three distinct Beings, of which two are *inferior*, and yet each is God, is either to use the term God equivocally in this case, or else is an express contradiction. But to assert, that there is but one divine *nature* or *essence*; that this undivided essence is common to three *persons*; that by person when applied to God we do not mean the same as when applied to man, but only somewhat analogous to it; that we have no adequate idea of what is meant by the word person when applied to God, and use it only because distinct personal attributes and actions are ascribed to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in Scripture, is no contradiction. We do not assert [without qualification, and abstractly] that one is three, and three are one; but only that what are three in one respect may be one only in another. We do not assert that three beings are one being; that three persons are one person; or that three intelligent beings are one intelligent being (as the word person signifies when applied to men); but only, that in the same *undivided nature*, there are three *differences*

analogous to *personal* differences amongst men ; and though we cannot precisely determine what those differences are, we have no more reason to conclude them impossible, than a blind man hath to conclude the impossibility of colors because he cannot see them." Athanasius (Cont. Ar., IV. 10) states the matter thus: "We assert the unity of the Godhead as expressly and strenuously as the distinction and diversity of the persons. We believe the Father and the Son to be two, perfectly distinct from one another in their relative and personal characters ; but withal we believe these two to be one God, one infinite essence or nature, the Son or Word begotten of the Father, united with him and inseparable from him in essence. And that illustration which we have so often made use of before, serves very well to explain our meaning, though by no means to explain the thing itself. Fire and light are truly distinct. The one is a body differently modified from the other, as is evident from their acting differently upon us. And yet they are one as to substance and general properties. For light is the issue of fire, and cannot subsist separate from it."

The first proposition in the formulated statement of the doctrine of the Trinity is, that *God is one in respect to Essence*. The Greek terms that denote the essence are, *οὐσία, φύσις, τό ὄν*. The Latin are, *essentia, substantia, natura, ens, res*. The English are, *essence, substance, nature, being*. The schoolmen and elder Protestant divines preferred the term *essence* to *substance*, because the latter logically implies accidents or unessential properties : a distinction inapplicable to the Divine nature. Augustine (Trinity, V. ii.) asserts that accidents are not predicable of it. Another objection to the term *substance* was, that in the Latin church *substantia* was used to translate *ὑπόστασις*, as well as *οὐσία*, and thus became ambiguous. The phraseology of the Nicene creed contributed to this ambiguity. This creed condemns those who assert that the Son is *ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας*. The question is, whether the two are

synonymous. Petavius maintains the affirmative, and asserts that the two terms were not discriminated technically until the council of Alexandria, in 362. According to him, the Nicene creed condemns only one heresy, that of the Arians. Bull, on the other hand, maintains that the Nicene council employed *οὐσία* to denote the essence, and *ὑπόστασις*, the person; and that the creed condemns two heresies: that of the Arians, who denied that the Son is from either the Father's essence or the Father's person; and that of the Semi-Arians, who denied that he is from the Father's essence, but conceded that he is from the Father's person. The Semi-Arians did not directly say, as the Arians did, that the Son was a creation *ex nihilo*, but affirmed that he was derived from the Father's person in a peculiar manner, so as to resemble him in essence, but not to be identical. He was *ὁμοιούσιος*, but not *ὁμοούσιος*. Athanasius employs both terms interchangeably. "Hypostasis (*ὑπόστασις*) is substance (*οὐσία*), and means nothing but simply being."

In the Latin church, *substantia* was employed to translate *ὑπόστασις*, and also, together with *essentia*, to translate *οὐσία*. "That which must be understood of persons, according to our usage, is to be understood of substances, according to the Greek usage: for they say three substances (*ὑπόστασεις*), one essence, in the same way as we say three persons, one essence, or substance, (*essentiam vel substantiam*).” Augustine: *Trinity*, VII. iv. "As from *sapere* comes *sapientia*, so from *esse* comes *essentia*; a new word indeed, which the old Latin writers did not use, but which is naturalized in our day, that our language may not want an equivalent for the Greek *οὐσία*." *City of God*, XII. ii. The same double use of *substantia*, to denote either the person or the essence, appears in the following statement of Anselm (*Monologium*, *Prefatio*): "Quod enim dixi summam trinitatem posse dici tres substantias, Graecos secutus sum, qui confitentur tres substantias in una essentia, eadem fide qua nos tres personas in una substantia. Nam hoc sig-

nificant in deo per substantiam quod nos per personam." Calvin (Inst., I. xiii. 5.) remarks upon this ambiguity as follows: "When the Latins would translate the word *ἁμοούσιος*, they called it consubstantial, signifying the substance of the Father and the Son to be one, thus using substance for essence. Whence also Jerome, writing to Damasus, pronounces it to be sacrilege to say that there are three substances in God; yet, that there are three substances in God, you will find asserted in Hilary more than a hundred times."

Essence is derived from *esse*, to be, and denotes energetic being. (Augustine: Trinity, V. ii). Substance is from *substantia*, and denotes the latent potentiality of being. Reinhard defines thus: "Substantia divina est ea natura, in qua inest vis agendi infinita; essentia est complexus omnium perfectorum infinitorum." Similarly, Anselm (Monologium, 16) defines the term essence: "Illa igitur est summa justitia, summa sapientia, summa veritas, summa bonitas, summa beatitudo, summa eternitas, potestas, unitas; quod non est aliud quam summe ens, summe vivens; et alia similiter." The term essence describes God as a sum-total of infinite perfections; the term substance describes him as the underlying ground of infinite activities. The first is, comparatively, an active word: the last, a passive. The first is comparatively a spiritual, the last, a material term. We speak of a material substance rather than of a material essence.

The term substance, in and of itself, is *impersonal*. It signifies bare and mere being. Whether it is self-conscious being, must be determined by other considerations. Hence the doctrine of an infinite substance without that of three distinctions in it, yields only the deity of pantheism. Infinite substance must be trinalized, and exist as personal *subsistences*, in order to personality. Trinitarianism is the surest support of the doctrine of the Divine self-consciousness. Says Nitzsch (Christian Doctrine, § 81), "so long as

theism merely distinguishes God from the world, and does not distinguish God from God, it is constantly exposed to a relapse and transition into pantheism, or some other denial of the absolute Being. It is the doctrine of the trinity alone that affords a perfect protection against atheism, polytheism, pantheism, and dualism. For the absolute distinction between the Divine essence and the world, is more securely and firmly maintained by those who worship the trinity, than by those who do not. It is precisely those systems of monotheism which have in the highest degree excluded the doctrine of the trinity, and have prided themselves on this very account, the [pseudo] Jewish and Mohammedan, for example, that have led to the grossest pantheism, on account of their barrenness and vacuity."

Spiritual substance, both infinite and finite, requires to be *personalized*. In the instance of the infinite essence of God, this is done by the *opera ad intra*; the eternal generation and spiration. Without these eternal acts and processes, there would be only an impersonal monad; the *substantia una* of Spinoza. That immanent and necessary activity within the Divine essence, whereby the Father begets the Son, and the Father and the Son spirate the Spirit, makes it to be self-contemplating, self-knowing, and self-communing. Destitute of this activity and these distinctions, the essence would be destitute of personality. In the instance of the finite nature or substance of man, this is personalized by *temporal* generation. The original unity, the one common nature in Adam, is divided, and made to become millions of individual persons by this division and distribution. The original human nature, though having personal properties, such as immortality, rationality, and voluntariness, is nevertheless impersonal viewed as mere substance in Adam. Only as it is formed into distinct individuals by propagation, is it personalized. In saying that the human nature in Adam is impersonal, the term is used comparatively. It is rational, spiritual, and volun-

tary substance: human nature, not brute nature, or inorganic nature. It is capable of personality, and thus is *potentially* personal; but it is not strictly and actually personal, until by temporal generation it has become individual men.

It is an incommunicable characteristic of the Divine essence, that it can subsist *wholly* and *indivisibly* in more persons than one. This distinguishes the Divine nature from the human. The latter can exist in more persons than one, but not as an *indivisible whole*. It is divided into thousands and millions of individual persons, no one of whom has the whole undivided substance. A trinitarian person is the entire Divine nature subsisting in a particular manner: viz., as Father, or as Son, or as Holy Spirit. A human person is a fractional part of the entire human nature subsisting in a particular manner: viz., as Peter, or as James, or as John.

The second proposition in the formulated statement of the doctrine of the Trinity is, that *God is three, in respect to Persons*. This side of the doctrine is the most difficult to apprehend, because analogies from the finite are difficult to find, and if found are exceedingly recondite and abstruse. The human mind quite readily grasps the notion of substance and attributes. But the doctrine of "subsistences" in the substance, of "distinctions" in the essence, brings to view a species of existence so anomalous and singular that little aid can be derived from analogy. The distinction between the subject and object ego, in human self-consciousness, is probably the closest analogue, but this itself is exceedingly difficult of comprehension, and is inadequate to fully explain the Divine self-consciousness.

The difficulty in apprehending the idea of a personal subsistence is evinced by the inadequacy, and ambiguity of the terms employed to denote it. The Greek trinitarians denominated a divine person, *ὑπόστασις, τὸ ὑποκειμένον, πρόσωπον*. The first is found in Heb. 1:13, "the exact

image of his person" (*χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ*). The last is found in Luke 12: 56, "face of the sky" (*πρόσωπον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*). It was the term for the mask worn by an actor. The Sabellians employed it to denote a secondary and assumed phase of the Supreme One, in the economical trinity which they asserted. It was never a favorite term with the catholic trinitarians, but whenever used by them denoted a primary and eternal mode of the essence. The Latin trinitarians employed the word *persona*. Sometimes *substantia* was employed. The ambiguity caused by the use of this latter word for person might have been avoided, had they coined, as the schoolmen did, the term "subsistentia." The English terms are: hypostasis, subsistence, distinction, person, relation, and mode.

St. Paul (Phil. 2: 6) defines a trinitarian person to be "a form of God." The rendering, "*the* form of God" (A. V. and R. V.), is inaccurate, as *μορφή* is anarthrous. There are three "forms" of God. The whole Divine essence (*οὐσία*) subsisting (*ὑπάρχων*, not *ὄν*) in the Paternal form (*μορφή*), is the first person; in the Filial form, is the second person; in the spirated or Spirit form, is the third person. The one undivided essence subsists in these three "forms" simultaneously and eternally, and has no existence other than this trinal one. One of these original and eternal "forms" of God, namely, the Son, took "a form of a servant," still retaining his original Divine form; and this form of a servant was "a likeness of men;" and this likeness of men involved a "fashion" or bodily form (*σχήμα*) of a man. According to this representation of the apostle, a trinitarian person is an *invisible* form or mode of the Divine essence. It is not a material and bodily form, because it required to be incarnated in order to this. The Son of God while subsisting only as a particular eternal form of the Divine essence, was as incorporeal and invisible as the other "forms," the Father and the Spirit.

The simultaneous existence of one and the same Divine

essence in three forms is possible, because it is spiritual substance. In the instance of matter, three simultaneous forms necessarily imply three different things or substances. One and the same piece of clay cannot have three forms simultaneously. It can have them only successively. In order that there may be three different forms of clay simultaneously, there must be three different *pieces* of clay. But in the instance of mind, or immaterial substance, three simultaneous forms or modes do not necessarily imply three different minds or substances. One and the same entire mind may remember, understand, and will simultaneously. Memory, understanding, and will are three simultaneous forms, or modes of one and the same mind or spirit. In self-consciousness, also, one and the same mind may be subject, object, and subject-percipient simultaneously.

As previously remarked (p. 253), the Divine essence has no existence out of and apart from the Divine persons, or forms. We are not to conceive of it as existing first, in the order either of nature or of time, without trinality, and of three personal distinctions or forms being added to it. Neither are we to conceive of it as being transformed from an untrinalized, to a trinalized state. From eternity, the Divine essence subsists in a trinal manner. The instant that it is one essence, it is three persons. To conceive of it as a mere monad, marked by singleness, is erroneous.

Again, when it is said, that there are three persons in one essence, it is not meant that the essence is a fourth thing, *within* which the three persons exist. This is precluded by the antithetic statement, that the one essence is *all* in each of the three persons. Neither may we think of a trinitarian person as a *part* of the Divine essence existing in a peculiar mode. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each, and simultaneously, the *whole* divine essence; so that while there are three persons, there is but one essence. The reason of this is, that eternal generation and spiration do not

create *new* essences, but only modify an existing one. When the Father generates the Son, he causes the whole of his infinite and eternal essence to be the essence of the Son. He does not cause a new and different essence from his own, to be the Son's essence. And the same is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of the spiration of the Spirit by the Father and Son. This is imperfectly illustrated in the process of human self-consciousness. In self-contemplation, the subject-ego posits as the object-ego, the one whole and undivided human spirit. In so doing, it does not create a second spirit, but only modifies the existing spirit. The substance of the object-ego is numerically and identically the same as that of the subject-ego. The first ego, in the act of self-beholding, may in a certain sense be said to communicate to, or make common with, the second ego, the entire substance of the human spirit. One and the same human spirit now "subsists" in these two modes or distinctions. There are now two distinctions in one human mind.¹

An eternal essence can be communicated, or made common to two divine persons, without being created; even as an eternal attribute can be communicated without being created. Our Lord affirms, that "as the Father hath life in himself; so hath he *given* to the Son to have life in himself," John 5:26. The attribute of self-existence is here represented as "given," or communicated; not as created. The Father makes self-existing life a common quality between himself and his beloved Son, in order "that all men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father," John 5:23.

¹ The defect in the ternary of subject, object, and subject-percipient, like that in the ternary of memory, understanding, and will, employed by Augustine and the patristic trinitarians, is, that neither of them are so objective to each other as the three persons of the Trinity are. The personal pronouns cannot be employed respecting them; neither can personal actions and affections be ascribed to them. They illustrate the trinity of the one Divine essence, but not the substantiality of the three persons. The subject-ego cannot send the object-ego on a mission. The memory cannot address the understanding as a distinct person.

Accordingly, all trinitarian creeds are careful to affirm that the Divine essence is communicated in its *entirety*, and that there is no *division* of it by the eternal generation and procession. A trinitarian person is not a fractional part of the essence. The Augsburg Confession (I. i) says, that "the churches use the name person in that signification in which the fathers have used it, to signify, not a part or quality in another, but that which properly subsists by itself." "A divine person," says Fisher (Westminster Catechism, 6), "is a complete, intelligent, and individual subsistence in the one undivided essence of God, which is neither a part of any other subsistence, nor sustained by any other subsistence, and is distinguished from other subsistences by an incommunicable property." A brief and convenient definition of a Divine person is that of Hooker: "The persons of the trinity are not three particular substances, to whom one general nature [property] is common, but three [persons] that subsist by one substance, which itself is particular: yet they all three have it, and their several *ways* of having it are that which maketh their personal distinction." Polity, V. lvi. Says Owen (Trinity Vindicated, X. 504), "a divine person is nothing but the divine essence, upon the account of an especial property, subsisting in an especial manner. In the person of the Father, there is the divine essence and being, with its property of begetting the Son, subsisting in an especial manner as the Father." The elder Protestant theologians and symbols defined a divine person to be, a *mode of subsistence* marked by a certain peculiar characteristic: *modus subsistendi*, τρόπος ὑπάρξεως. The divine essence with the characteristic which Scripture denominates generating, is the Father; the same numerical essence with the characteristic called filiation is the Son; the same numerical essence with the characteristic called procession, is the Spirit. This peculiarity, which is called technically the "hypostatical character," constitutes the personality of a trinitarian per-

son ; that which distinguishes him from the others. And this personality of a trinitarian person must not be confounded with that of the essence. The paternity of the Father, or the sonship of the Son, is not the same thing as the personality of the Godhead. The hypostatical character is incommunicable. The Father cannot have filiation. The Son cannot have generation. And neither of them can have procession. The divine persons cannot exchange their modes of subsistence. The first person cannot be or become the third, nor the second the first. The most enigmatical part of the doctrine of the Trinity is in the hypostatical character. What is this paternity of the Father? and this filiation of the Son? and this being spirated, or procession of the Spirit? Since revelation has given only the terms, Father, Son, and Spirit, with the involved ideas of paternity, filiation, and procession, the human intellect can go no further towards a metaphysical explanation than these terms and ideas will yield materials. And this is not far.

A divine person differs from a human person in the following respects. 1. The substance of a human person is not the *identical* and *numerical* substance of another human person. Two human persons have the same *kind* of substance, because they are constituted of fractional parts of one specific human substance or nature; but they do not have the same substance identically and numerically. That part of human nature which, by temporal generation, has been separated from the common nature and formed into the individual James, is not the same identical and numerical thing as that other part of human nature which, by temporal generation, has been formed into the individual John. But the substance of one Divine person is the substance of the others, both numerically and identically. In this instance, there is no division of substance. The whole undivided Divine nature is in each Divine person simultaneously and eternally. The modifying of the Divine nature by eternal generation and spiration does not *divide* the nature, as tem-

poral generation does, but leaves it whole and entire, so that the substance of the begotten Son and the spirated Spirit is numerically and identically that of the unbegotten and unspirated Father. 2. One human person exists externally to another, and separate from him; but one Divine person exists in another, and inseparably from him. "The Son can do nothing of himself [separate and in isolation], but what he seeth the Father do: for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise," John 5:19. 3. One human person can exist without another; but one Divine person cannot.

Revelation clearly teaches that these personal characteristics are so marked and peculiar, that the three Divine persons are *objective* to each other. God the Father and God the Son are so distinct from each other, that some actions which can be ascribed to the one cannot be ascribed to the other. The Father "sends" the Son; this act of sending the Son cannot be attributed to the Son. The Father "loves" the Son; this act of loving the Son cannot be ascribed to the Son. An examination of the Scriptures gives the following series of twelve actions and relations of the three trinitarian persons, which prove that they are objective to one another; that one may do or experience something that is personal to himself, and is not personal to the others. One divine person loves another, John 3:35; dwells in another, John 14:10, 11; suffers from another, Zach. 13:7; knows another, Matt. 11:27; addresses another, Heb. 1:8; is the way to another, John 14:6; speaks of another, Luke 3:22; glorifies another, John 17:5; confers with another, Gen. 1:26, 11:7; plans with another, Isa. 9:6; sends another, Gen. 16:7, John 14:26; rewards another, Phil. 2:5-11; Heb. 2:9. Here are twelve different actions and relations which demonstrate that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not one and the same person.

Such inspired representations involve more than official distinctions; as when one and the same person is a father,

a citizen, and a magistrate. They imply that there are three in the Godhead, who are so objective to each other that each can say "I," and may be addressed as "Thou." The words of Christ, in John 17:5, teach this: "Now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self, with the glory which I had with thee before the world was." "The difference," says Turretin, III. xxvii. 8, "between one divine person and another, is greater than the difference between the person and the essence. For the essence may be predicated of each and all the persons, but the personal characteristic cannot be predicated of any person except the one to whom it belongs. The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Spirit is God; but the Father is not the Son, or the Son the Father." A trinitarian person is not so comprehensive as the Godhead, because he does not possess the personal characteristics belonging to the other two persons. He is the essence with one personal peculiarity; while the Godhead is the essence with three personal peculiarities. A trinitarian person includes all that is in the unity, but not all that is in the trinity of God; all that is in the essence, but not all that is in the three modes of the essence.

The trinitarian persons are not so real as to constitute three essences, or beings. This is the error of tritheism. If "real," which is derived from *res*, be taken in its etymological signification, then the distinction is to be called modal, not real. A trinitarian person is a mode of a thing (*res*), and not another separate thing. To guard against the tritheistic inference from the etymological meaning of "real," the catholic trinitarian affirms that there are not three different entities or things, but only one entity or thing in three modes of subsistence. "*Persona differre dicitur ab essentia, non realiter, id est essentialiter, ut res et res; sed modaliter, ut modus a re.*" Turretin III. xxvii. 3.

But here, again, it is necessary to guard against the error of Sabellianism, which may result from a false inference from the term "mode." A mode, in the strict use of the

term, is only a form of some *part* of a substance or "thing." Diamond, for illustration, is one mode of carbon; charcoal is another mode. Here is a substance in two modes. But the particles that constitute the bit of charcoal are not the particles that constitute the bit of diamond. Using the term in this sense, it would be an error to say that a Divine person is a mode of the essence. For a mode, in this case, contains only a fraction of the common substance. The whole substance of all the carbon in the universe is not in any one piece of charcoal, or of diamond, but only a portion of it. But the whole Divine essence is in each trinitarian person or "mode" of the essence.

Whether, consequently, the distinctions in the Godhead shall be called "real" or "modal," depends upon the error that is to be excluded by the term. As against Sabellianism, the distinctions are real and *essential*; that is, in and of the essence, and not merely economical and official. For Sabellianism regards essence and person as identical, and concedes no difference between them. "Sabellius," says Athanasius (Oration IV. 9, 25), "maintained that the Father and Son are one person; are personally one, appellatively two; are one essence with two names to it (τὸ ἓν διώνυμον). This made it impossible that either of them should be a person at all, unless the Father could be his own Son, and the Son, his own Father. Had the Father and Son not been two persons, the Son would not have said, 'I and the Father are one,' but 'am one.'" "The declaration of the Son's unity with the Father, the Jews mistook, as Sabellius did afterwards, for a declaration of his being the Father, the person of the Father himself." Oration IV. 17. Similarly Augustine (Trinity, V. ix) remarks that the Sabellians must read the text thus: "I and my Father *is* one," instead of "are one." According to the Sabellian scheme, the Divine essence is unipersonal; single, not trinal. There is only one Divine essence, and only one Divine person. This essence-person viewed in a certain reference, and acting in a certain econom-

ical manner, is the Father; in another, is the Son; in another, is the Spirit. The quasi-persons of Father, Son, and Spirit, are only the single untrinal monad discharging three functions. The Sabellian trinity is economical, that is, one of offices; as one and the same human person may be a citizen, a magistrate, and a parent. It is not an intrinsic, and immanent trinity, but one of manifestation only. It is not grounded in the Divine *constitution*, but is assumed for the purposes of creation, redemption, and sanctification. God is not trinal per se, but only with reference to the creation. Originally, the Divine essence is untrinal, and becomes trinal through its offices and functions. "Sabellius's trinity," says Neander (I. 598), "is transitory. When the purposes of its formation are accomplished, the triad is resolved again into the monad."

In opposition to this, the Scriptures teach that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three persons independently and irrespective of creation, redemption, and sanctification. If God had never created the universe, but had existed alone from all eternity, he would be triune. And the three persons are so real and distinct from each other, that each possesses a *hypostatical* or trinitarian consciousness different from that of the others. The second person is conscious that he is the Son, and not the Father, when he says, "O Father, glorify thou me," John 17: 5. The first person is conscious that he is the Father and not the Son, when he says, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee," Heb. 1: 5. The third person is conscious that he is the Spirit, and neither the Father nor the Son, when he says, "Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them," Acts 13: 2. These three hypostatical consciousnesses constitute the one *self*-consciousness of the Divine essence. By reason of, and as the result of these three forms of consciousness, the Divine essence is self-contemplative, self-cognitive, and self-communing. Though there are three forms of consciousness, there are not three

essences, or three understandings, or three wills, in the Godhead; because, a consciousness is not an essence, or an understanding, or a will. There is only one essence, having one understanding, and one will. But this unity of essence, understanding, and will, has three different forms of consciousness: namely, the Paternal, the Filial, and the Spiritual; because it has three different forms of subsistence: namely, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. If it had only one form of subsistence, as in the Sabellian scheme, it would have only one form of consciousness. It would exist only as a single subject, and would have only a corresponding consciousness. But this would not be a full and true *self*-consciousness, because this requires the three distinctions of subject, object, and percipient-subject, which are not given in the Sabellian triad.

It must be noticed that the Divine self-consciousness is not a fourth consciousness *additional* to the three hypostatical consciousnesses, but is the *resultant* of these three. The three hypostatical consciousnesses are the one Divine self-consciousness, and the one Divine self-consciousness is the three hypostatical consciousnesses. The three hypostatical consciousnesses in their combination and unity constitute the one self-consciousness. The essence in being trinally conscious as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is self-conscious. As the one Divine essence is the same thing with the three persons, and not a fourth different thing by itself, so the one Divine self-consciousness is the same thing with the three hypostatical consciousnesses, and not a fourth different thing by itself. In this way, it is evident that the three hypostatical consciousnesses are consistent with a single self-consciousness, as the three hypostases themselves are consistent with a single essence. There are three persons, but only one essence; and three hypostatical consciousnesses, but only one self-consciousness.

Accordingly, having respect to the Sabellian heresy, the catholic trinitarian affirms that the distinctions in the

Trinity are essential, not modal. They are in and of the essence, in such a manner as to trinalize it. When, however, the heresy is at the other extreme, and tritheism maintains that the distinctions are "real" in the sense of constituting three separate things (res) or entities, the catholic trinitarian denies this, and affirms that a trinitarian person is not a second separate thing, but a "mode" of one and the same thing. But as a mode, it is the *whole* thing, not a fraction of it.

The word "God" sometimes denotes the trinity, the entire godhead; as in John 4: 24, *πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός*; and in 1 Cor. 15: 28, *ἵνα ἡ ὁ Θεός τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν*. The reference in these passages is not to one person in particular, but to the Supreme Being as conceived of in revelation; that is, as the triune God. In such texts, the term, God, "is not to be considered *ὑποστατικῶς*, as peculiarly expressive of any one person, but as *οὐσιωδῶς*, comprehending the whole deity." Owen: *Communion with the Trinity*, I. ii. There is the same use of the word "God" for the Trinity in the line, "Praise God from whom all blessings flow." The line following, "Praise Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," explains who "God" is. The article is employed with *Θεός*, in John 4: 24, to denote the true God, in distinction from a falsely conceived God, who is supposed to be local and to be worshipped at a particular point. Sometimes the term "God" denotes "deity," the abstract Divine nature or essence, without reference either to the trinity or to any particular person, as in John 1: 1, *Θεός ἦν ὁ λόγος*: "the Word was deity." St. John does not, here, say that the Logos was the godhead or the trinity, but that he was divine. Hence, *Θεός* is anarthrous; first, to denote the Divine nature in the abstract (compare *πνεῦμα* anarthrous in John 4: 24); secondly, in order not to confound the person of the Logos with that of the Father, who in the preceding clause is designated by *Θεόν* with the article. When the Father, or Son, or Spirit, is denominated *Θεός*, the word is used in the

sense of deity, not of trinity. For a careful examination as to whether "God" denotes, in Scripture, the Trinity, or the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit, see Augustine: Trinity, Books II. III.

There are two classes of characteristics by which the trinitarian Persons are discriminated. 1. Internal, or *notae internae*; 2. External, or *notae externae*.

The *internal characteristics* are those acts, or activities of the Supreme Being which are within the essence, and are confined to it. They are denominated *opera ad intra*, because they are not emanent or transitive acts, that go out of and beyond the Divine essence, and produce external results—such as the creation of a new substance from nothing, like that of the finite universe. "The internal works or actions of God are those which the persons perform and exercise one towards another." Ursinus: Christian Religion, Quest. 25. The Nicene use of the term "act," applied to the generation of the Son, denotes a *constitutional* and *necessary* agency, and a consequent emanation of the essence, similarly, "as the sun is supposed to act in generating rays, fountains to act in generating streams, mind to act in generating thoughts, trees to act in generating branches, bodies to act in generating effluvia." Waterland: Second Defence. The term "activity" is preferable to "act," to designate the eternal generation and spiration, because the latter more naturally denotes something that comes to an end, while the former denotes something continuous and unceasing.

This immanent and constitutional activity belongs to the Divine essence, because it is *spirit*. Spirit, by its very nature, and especially the infinite and eternal Spirit, is active. Matter is dead; but mind is living. Spirit is energetic and self-moving; but matter is inert and moved. Hence God is frequently called in Scripture, the *living* God. Jer. 4:2; Job 19:25; John 6:57. God swears by himself as the living One, Num. 14:21; Isa. 49:18; Jer. 22:24;

Ezek. 5 : 11. Previous to creation, and entirely irrespective of it, the deity is active in himself. God must not be conceived of, as in the pantheistic systems of India and Germany, as inert and slumbering prior to the work of creation; but from everlasting to everlasting he is inherently and intrinsically energetic. There is nothing dead and immobile in the Godhead. Neither is there anything latent and requiring to be developed, as there is in the imperfect spirit of man. In the scholastic phrase, "deus est actus purissimus, sine ulla potentialitate." God is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, Heb. 13 : 8. He is without variableness, or parallax, James 1 : 17. And this is true of the immanent and constitutional activity of the Divine essence, in generation and spiration. These opera ad intra are an eternal and unceasing energizing and trinalizing of the essence, in and by those two acts whereby the Father communicates the essence with the Son, and the Father and Son communicate it with the Spirit.

This constitutional and inherent activity of the Divine essence has for its resultant, the trinitarian distinctions. The Divine nature energizes internally from eternity to eternity in two distinct manners, and thereby is simultaneously and eternally three distinct persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; God Unbegotten, Begotten, and Proceeding. The Westminster Confession (II. iii.) defines this internal activity in the terms of the Athanasian creed. "In the unity of the Godhead, there are three persons of one substance, power, and eternity; God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. The Father is of none, neither begotten nor proceeding; the Son is eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son." This marks off the persons. He who begets is a different person from him who is begotten. He who proceeds is different from those from whom the procession issues.

According to this statement, there are two internal marks

or characteristics, by which the Divine persons are distinguished from one another: viz. generation and spiration; or filiation and procession; according to the point of view that is adopted. Generation and spiration are subjective and active in signification. They denote the acts of a Divine person or persons, as related to another Divine person. Filiation and procession are objective and passive in signification. They denote the results of the acts, that is, the eternal processes consequent upon them. The first person subjectively and actively generates the second person, and eternal filiation is objectively and passively the result, or process, ensuing from it. The first and second persons subjectively and actively spirate the third person, and eternal procession is objectively and passively the result. That internal energizing, or *opus ad intra*, which Scripture denominates "begetting," modifies the Divine essence in a particular manner, and this resulting mode of the essence is denominated the Son of God. That other internal energizing, or *opus ad intra*, which is called "spiration," modifies the Divine essence in still another manner, and this resulting mode of the essence is denominated the Holy Spirit. The theological term "spiration" comes from the Biblical term "Spirit," appropriated to the third person. It is applied to him technically, with reference to the manner in which he has the essence: *spiritus, quia spiratus*. He is no more spiritual in substance than the Father or Son. But the essence is *communicated* to him by spiration, or outbreathing (*πνεῦμα* = *spiritus* = breath).

The following particulars are to be carefully noticed. 1. These internal acts or activities of generation and spiration, in the Divine essence, are *not creative* acts. They originate nothing external to God, and other than God. They do not make a new essence, but only modify an existing one. When the Father generates the Son, he does not call another substance into existence from non-entity, as he does when he makes the universe. This is

marked in the Nicene creed, by the clause, "begotten, not made."

2. These internal activities are not temporal and transient, but *eternal* and *unceasing*. They have neither beginning, nor ending, nor cessation. Neither of them is before the other, in time. All are eternal, and therefore simultaneous. The first person is not the eternal Father, before the second person is the eternal Son. An eternal Father cannot exist before an eternal Son; if so, there would be a time when he is not the *eternal* Father. A Divine person who has no son is not a father; ἄμα πατήρ, ἄμα υἱός (Athanasius). "In hac trinitate nihil prius aut posterius, nihil majus aut minus, sed tota tres personae coaeternae sibi sunt, et coaequales." Symb. Ath. 24. On account of the eternity and immutability of the Divine paternity and sonship, Athanasius (Oration, I. 21) argues that these are the truest and most proper paternity and sonship; of which human paternity and sonship are only finite and imperfect copies. For these relations, in the case of God, are necessarily and immutably distinct from each other; while in the case of man, they are not. A human person may be both a father and a son at the same time; but a Divine person cannot be. A human person may be a son and not a father, and subsequently may become a father. But in the case of a Divine person, no such change as this is possible. If a trinitarian person is a father, he is so eternally and immutably. If he is a son, he is so eternally and immutably. God the Father is never other than a father, and God the Son is never other than a son.

Again, the three trinitarian persons, unlike three human persons, suppose each other, and cannot be conceived of as subsisting independently and separately from each other. Three human persons exist side by side, separately and independently, so that if one or two of them are subtracted, the remaining person or persons are the same as before the subtraction. The personality of each is unaffected by that

of the others. But in the instance of the three trinitarian persons, each is what he is, in reference to the others, and if one be subtracted, the others disappear also. Abstract God the Father, and there is no God the Son left; abstract God the Son, and there is no God the Father left. And the same is true of God the Spirit.

3. They are *necessary* activities. It is as necessary, that is, it is as fixed in the nature and constitution of the Godhead, that from all eternity the Father should generate the Son, as that he should be omnipresent, or omnipotent. "What madness," says Athanasius (Oration III. 63), "is it to represent the Supreme Being as considering and consulting with himself, whether he shall provide and furnish himself with his own Reason and Intelligence. The Son of God is no mere voluntary or arbitrary effect of God's power, but the necessary issue of his nature, and the Son of his substance." Says Hooker, V. liv., "Whatsoever Christ hath common unto him with his heavenly Father, the same of necessity must be *given* him, but *naturally* and *eternally* given; not bestowed by way of benevolence and favor." The same is true of the spiration of the Spirit by the Father and Son. This, also, is a necessary and constitutional activity of the Divine essence. It is optional with God to energize externally, but not internally. The opera ad extra, in creation and providence, depend upon sovereign will. God might or might not create the universe; may or may not uphold it. But we cannot say that he may or may not be triune. That immanent and eternal activity which trinalizes the essence, and results in the three trinitarian persons, being grounded in the very nature and constitution of the Supreme Being, *must* be. And yet this necessity is not that of external compulsion. It is like that of the Divine existence. It is not optional with God to exist. He *must* be. Yet he is not compelled to exist by external necessity. He exists willingly. And such is the necessity of the eternal generation of the Son, and spiration

of the Spirit. The Father, says Turretin (III. xxix. 22), generates the Son, "non libertate indifferentiae, sed spontaneitatis."¹

The difference between the relation of generation and spiration to the essence, and to the persons, respectively, is important. The generation and spiration are *out of* or *from* (ἐκ) the essence, *by* (διὰ) the persons. The Son, though generated by the Father, issues from the essence. He is a form or mode of the essence, not a form or mode of the Father. The first person generates the second person not out of his own *personal* characteristic of paternity, but out of the essence itself. In generation, the first person does not communicate his *hypostatical* character, namely, his fatherhood, to the Son, but the whole undivided essence. The Son is θεὸς ἐκ θεοῦ; the essence in the Filial form or mode emanating from the essence in the Paternal form or mode.

Again, the Spirit, though spirated *by* the Father and Son, yet proceeds not from the Father and Son as *persons* but from the Divine essence. His procession is *from* one, namely, the essence; while his spiration is *by* two, namely, two persons. The Father and Son are not two essences, and therefore do not spirate the Spirit from two essences. Yet they are two persons, and as two persons having one numerical essence spirate from *it* the third form or mode of the essence—the Holy Spirit: their two personal acts of spiration concurring in one single procession of the Spirit. There are two spirations, because the Father and Son are two persons; but there is only one resulting procession. See Turretin, III. xxxi. 6. According to the Greek view

¹ The objections made by the English Arians and Semiarians (Clarke, Whiston, etc.) to the Athanasian doctrine were: "That generation implies division of essence, and necessary generation implies outward coaction; that generation is an act, and every act implies choice; that necessary agents are no agents, and necessary causes are no causes; that three persons must be three intelligent agents, and three agents cannot be one being, one substance, one God." Waterland: Second Defence, p. 4.

of the procession of the Spirit, there is only one act of spiration, that of the Father; so that there is one spiration and one procession.

The Biblical proof of these internal activities of the Divine essence is found:

1. In those passages which denominate the first person the Father, the second person the Son, and the third person the Spirit. Ps. 2:7; Matt. 3:17; 28:19; John 1:14; Acts 13:33; Rom. 1:4; Heb. 1:8; 1 John 5:20. The terms father and son suppose generation. The terms are correlative, and must be taken in the same sense. If "father" and "son" are literal, so is "generation." If "generation" is metaphorical, so are "father" and "son." Whoever affirms that the second person of the trinity is literally and really the son of the first person, must, if he would not contradict himself, also affirm that the second person is literally and really begotten by the first. There is literally a communication of the Divine essence in the generation and filiation.

2. In those passages which denominate the Son "only" begotten, "own" son, and "dear" son. John 1:14, 18; 3:16, 18; 1 John 4:9; Coloss. 1:15; Heb. 1:6; Rom. 8:3, 32; Col. 1:13; Matt. 3:17; Eph. 1:6; 2 Peter 1:17. The second person in his original trinitarian status is denominated *υἱός*; in his estate of humiliation as mediator, he is sometimes called *παῖς*. This latter term means "servant," and is never used of the unincarnate Word. In Acts 3:13; Matt. 12:18; the phrase *παῖς μου* denotes the same as "my servant," in Isa. 42:1. The Sept. renders עֶבֶד by *παῖς*. See Nitzsch: Christian Doctrine, § 13; Bengel, on Matt. 12:18.

3. In those passages which technically denominate the third person the Spirit; and those which speak of his procession. "Spirit," in the technical trinitarian use, signifies that the third person is spirated or outbreathed by the Father and Son. The Hebrew *רוּחַ* and the Greek *πνεῦμα*

denote a breath, or breathing. Gen. 1:2; Num. 27:18; Ps. 51:11; Isa. 63:11; Hos. 9:7 (Gesenius in voce); Matt. 3:16; Luke 1:35; John 1:32, 33; 3:5, 6; Acts 2:4, et alia. Christ "breathed on his disciples, and said unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost," John 20:22. This spiration of the Spirit in time, was symbolical of the eternal spiration in the Godhead. The third person is also described as "proceeding" from the Father, John 15:26. Though in this text it is not said that he proceeds from the Son also, yet there are texts that imply this. He is called the "Spirit of the Son," Gal. 4:6; the "Spirit of Christ," Rom. 8:9; the "Spirit of Jesus Christ," Phil. 1:19. The genitive in these passages denotes the source. It is noteworthy, that in the New Testament the third person is nowhere denominated the "Spirit of the Father." Furthermore, the Holy Spirit is "received from" Christ, John 16:14, 15; is "sent by" Christ, John 15:26; is "sent in the name of" Christ, John 16:26. The "mission" and "reception" of the third person from the second person, and in his name, favors the Latin doctrine of his spiration by and procession from him.

Some trinitarians have attempted to hold the doctrine of the Trinity, while denying eternal generation, spiration, and procession. They concede that there are three eternal persons in the Godhead, denominated in Scripture, Father, Son, and Spirit, but contend that to go beyond this, and affirm such acts in the Godhead as generation and spiration, is to go beyond the record. They reject, or at least doubt, this feature in the Nicene Trinitarianism.

But this is inconsistent. These trinal names, Father, Son, and Spirit, given to God in Scripture, force upon the theologian the ideas of paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession. He cannot reflect upon the implication of these names without forming these ideas, and finding himself necessitated to concede their literal validity and objective reality. He cannot say with Scripture that the first person

is the Father, and then deny or doubt that he "begets." He cannot say that the second person is the Son, and then deny or doubt that he is "begotten." He cannot say that the third person is the Spirit, and then deny or doubt that he "proceeds" by "spiration" (*Spiritus quia spiratus*) from the Father and Son. Whoever accepts the nouns, Father, Son, and Spirit, as conveying absolute truth, must accept also the corresponding adjectives and predicates, beget and begotten, spirate and proceed, as conveying absolute truth.

Recapitulating, then, we have the following internal marks (*notae internae*) or personal peculiarities, by which to distinguish the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit from each other. 1. The Father generates the Son, and spirates the Spirit. Generation and spiration are the eternal acts, the *opera ad intra*, that characterize the first Person. The first Person is distinguished by two acts, and no process. 2. The Son is generated by the Father, and together with him spirates the Spirit. Filiation is an internal process and spiration an internal act that characterize the second Person. The second Person is distinguished by one act, and one process. 3. The Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son. Procession is the internal process that marks the third Person. There is no internal act of the Holy Spirit; but his external activity, especially in redemption, is more marked than that of the first and second Persons. The third Person is distinguished by a process, and no act.

Respecting the meaning of the terms generation and spiration, filiation and procession, little can be said, because inspiration has given but few data. The catholic trinitarianism defines generation and spiration, as those eternal acts in the Godhead by which one person *communicates the essence* to, or rather *with*, another. The term "communicate" must be taken etymologically. By generation, the Father makes the eternal essence *common* (*κοινωνεῖν*) to himself and the Son. The Son does not first exist, and the essence is then communicated *to* him. "The Father," says Turretin

(III. xxix. 21), "does not generate the Son either as *previously existing*, for in this case there would be no need of generation; nor as *not yet existing*, for in this case the Son would not be eternal; but as *coexisting*, because he is from eternity in the Godhead." "When the Son says, 'As the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself,' the meaning is not that the Father gave life to the Son already existing without life, but that he so begat him, apart from time, that the life which the Father gave to the Son by begetting him is co-eternal with the life of the Father who gave it." Augustine: Trinity, XV. xxvi. 47. The same statement and reasoning apply to the act of spiration. By spiration, the Father and Son make the eternal essence common to themselves and the Spirit. They are not two persons that exist prior to the third, but eternally co-exist with him. The co-existence, in both generation and spiration, follows from the fact that it is one and the same numerical essence which is communicated and constitutes the substance of each person; and this essence cannot be any older in one person than in another.

The results of these two eternal, constitutional, and necessary activities of generation and spiration in the Divine essence, are two distinct and personal *emanations* of the essence. There is no creation of a new essence, but a modification of an existing one; and this modification is a kind of *issue*, or efflux. God the Son is the offspring of God the Father; "very God of very God," (*ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*). God the Spirit "proceeds" from the Father and the Son. The common statements in the patristic trinitarianism respecting this emanation of the essence are the following: The Son is from the Father, not as an effect from a cause; not as an inferior from a superior; not as created finite substance from uncreated infinite substance; but as intelligence is from intellect, the river from the spring, the ray from the sun. These illustrations were employed by the early trinitarians,

to denote the sameness of essence between the first and second persons, and the emanation of the latter from the former. This internal emanation was taught as early as Theophilus. "The word being God, and being naturally produced from God" (ἐκ Θεοῦ πεφυκώς). Ad Autolyceum, 22. Pareus (Corpus doctrinae Christianae, XXV.) says: "Filius est genitus, spiritus sanctus procedit, sive emanat, a patre." The term "emanat" is explanatory of both "genitus" and "procedit," in this proposition; because Pareus held to the procession of the Spirit from both Father and Son. Pareus, in his notes on the Athanasian creed (Art. VII.), says "that procession or emanation is the ineffable communication of the Divine essence, by which the third person of the trinity receives from the Father and the Son the same entire essence which the Father and the Son have." Quenstedt enunciates the catholic view in the following manner: "Eternal generation is not by derivation, as in the instance of human generation; nor by transfusion; nor by any action that begins and ends. It is by an unceasing emanation, to which there is nothing similar in rerum natura." Hase: Hutterus, 174. Similarly, Turretin (III. xxxi. 1) describes the procession of the Spirit, as an "emanatio a patre et filio, distinctam a filii generatione." Bull defines as follows: "Patrem esse principium Filii et Spiritus Sancti, et utrumque ab ipso propagari *interiore productione*, non *externa*: unde fit, ut non modo *ex* Patre, sed *in ipso* sint, et Pater in ipsis; neque in sacra Triade altera persona ab altera separari possit, sicut tres humanae personae ab invicem disterminantur." Defensio IV. iv. 9.

The term "emanation" is inapplicable to an opus ad extra, like creation, but not to the opera ad intra. When God creates the universe of matter and mind, he makes a new substance from nothing. The universe is not an efflux or emanation of the Divine essence. But when the Father generates the Son, this is an eternal emanation and outflow of the Divine essence. An emanation is of the same sub-

stance with that from which the emanation issues; a creation is a new and different substance from that of the creator.

The phrase "communication of essence," is preferable to "derivation of essence;" though the latter is sometimes employed by orthodox trinitarians. The term derivation is better suited to human than to Divine generation, because it denotes *division* and *distribution* of a substance. When the Divine nature is communicated, it is communicated or "made common," as a *whole undivided* essence. In eternal generation, the entire Divine nature is caused to be the nature of the second person. But when finite human nature is derived, it is only a portion of human nature that is derived. In human generation, an absceded part of human substance is separated from the common mass, and is made to become a distinct and separate human individual. Hence, it cannot be said, that the *whole* human nature is in each human person, as it can be that the whole Divine nature is in each Divine person. Human derivation is the transmission of a separate fraction; eternal generation is the communication of an undivided whole. "The generation of the Son of God is not like that of a man, which requires a separation and division of substance." Athanasius: Oration, I. 14.

It has already been noticed that it is the characteristic of the Divine essence, that it can subsist *indivisibly* and *totally* in more persons than one. These adjectives are important. For the human nature can also subsist in more persons than one; but not indivisibly and totally. An individual man, a human person, is only a part, and a very small part of the whole human nature or species. But the first, second, or third person of the Godhead is the entire Divine nature, in a particular mode of subsistence. All of the Divine substance is in each Divine person; but not all of the human substance is in each human person.

The whole of the Divine essence subsisting in a certain

mode constitutes God the Father, or God the Son, or God the Holy Spirit; a part of the human substance, or specific nature, separated from the remainder of it by human generation, constitutes the individual Peter, James, or John. A Divine person is denominated a subsistence *in* the essence; a human person is denominated an individual *of* (not *in*) the species. The preposition "of" denotes division and separation of substance; the preposition "in" excludes this. Says Ursinus (Christian Religion, Q. 25), "in persons created, he that begetteth and generateth doth not communicate his *whole* substance to him that is begotten, for then he would cease himself to be a man; but only a *part*, which being allotted and severed out of the substance of him that begetteth is conveyed or derived unto him that is begotten, and so is made to be the substance of another individual or person, distinct from the substance of the individual who begetteth. But in uncreated trinitarian persons, he that begetteth, or spirateth, communicates his whole essence to him that is begotten or proceeds; yet so, that he who communicates doth retain the same essence, and that entire. The reason of this difference between a divine and a human person is, that the substance of man is finite and divisible; but that of God is infinite and indivisible. And, therefore, the Divine essence, being the same numerically, and whole or entire, may be both communicated and retained simultaneously."

The great mystery of the Trinity is, that one and the very same substance, can subsist as an undivided whole in three persons *simultaneously*. That a substance can be divided up, and distributed, so as to constitute a million or a billion of individuals, as in the instance of the human nature or species, is comparatively easy to comprehend. But that a substance without any division, or distribution, can at the same instant constitute three distinct persons, baffles the human understanding. In the sphere of matter, this would not only be incomprehensible, but absurd. A pint of water

could not possibly be contained in three different pint cups at one and the same instant. But spirit is not subject to the conditions of matter; and as the whole human soul may *all* of it be in every part, and every point of the body, at one and the same instant, so the Divine essence may *all* of it be in each of the three Divine persons simultaneously. It is no contradiction, taking the nature of unextended spiritual substance into view, to say that the one numerical Divine essence is indivisibly and wholly present at a million points of space at the same time, without making it a million of essences. If so, it is no contradiction to say that the one numerical Divine essence subsists indivisibly and wholly in three modes or persons at the same instant, without making it three essences. If the plurality of points at which the Divine omnipresence is found does not multiply the essence in the first case, the trinity of the persons in which the Divine existence is found does not multiply the essence in the second case.

It is here that the error of a specific, instead of a numerical unity of the Divine essence, is apparent. In the case of specific unity, or the unity of a race, the one substance or nature is *divided* and distributed. The individuals are fractional parts of it. If the three persons of the Godhead constitute a Divine species, or a specific unity, as the millions of human persons constitute a human species, then no single trinitarian person possesses the *whole* divine nature, any more than any single human person possesses the whole human nature. For to possess a *property* of the human nature, like rationality, or immortality (the whole of which property may be in each human person), is not to possess the whole *substance* of the human nature. If, then, the trinal unity is a specific or race-unity, no one of the three Divine persons is whole deity, any more than a single human person is whole humanity.

The clause *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*, and the epithet *ὁμοουσιος*, might, of themselves, suggest a specific unity. The preposition *ἐκ*

may be partitive in its signification, and so may the adjective *ὁμός*, and the Latin con in "consubstantial." But if God the Son is "out of" or "from" the Divine nature in the same partitive manner that the individual Socrates is "out of" or "from" the human nature, and is "consubstantial" with the Divine Father in the same way that a human son is consubstantial with a human father, by having a *portion* only of the same nature with him, then the whole Divine essence is not in God the Son. And if so, no one of the Divine attributes, and still less all of them, can be in God the Son. For a Divine attribute cannot belong to a fraction of the essence. Consequently the Nicene Trinitarians uniformly explain and guard the statement that the Son of God is "of" the essence, and is "consubstantial" with the Father, by saying that the eternal generation differs from the human, by communicating the entire essence, and that each Divine person possesses the one Divine nature numerically and totally, not specifically and fractionally.¹

The simultaneous existence of the undivided and total nature in each of the three persons, the Nicene trinitarians endeavored to illustrate by the figure of *circum-incession* (*περιχώρησις*, *circulatio*). There is a continual inbeing and indwelling of one person in another. This is taught in John 14 : 10, 11 ; 17 : 21, 23 : "Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? Believe me, that I am in the Father, and the Father in me. I pray that they all may be one, as thou Father art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us."² This, the Nicene

¹ The English Arians : Clarke, Whiston, Whitby, and others, denied that consubstantiality means one numerical substance possessed by each of the three persons. Hunt : *Religious Thought in England*, III. 23.

² Athanasius (Oration III. 21) remarks that Christ prays here that the disciples "may imitate the trinitarian unity of nature, in their unity of affection. Had it been possible for the disciples to be in the nature of the Father as the Son is, he would have prayed 'that they may be one in thee,' instead of 'one in us.'"

writers described metaphorically as an unceasing circulation of the essence, whereby there is an eternal intercommunion and interaction of being in the Godhead, so that each person coinheres in the others, and the others in each. "Each [person] is in each [person], and all [three persons] are in each [person], and each [person] is in all [three persons], and all [three persons] are one [being]." Augustine: Trinity, VI. 10. "The community of nature between the Son and the Father is like that between brightness and light, between the stream and the fountain. The Son is in the substance of the Father, as having his subsistence communicated to him out of that substance; and again, the Father is in the Son, as communicating his substance to the Son, as the nature of the solar substance is in the rays, as intelligence is in the rational soul, and as the very substance of the fountain is in the waters of the river. The brightness of the sun is coeval with its substance or body. It is not a flame kindled or borrowed from it, but the offspring and issue of its substance or body. The sunbeams cannot be separated from that great fund of light. They cannot be supposed to subsist, after their communication with the planet itself is cut off. And yet the sun and the brightness that flows from it are not one and the same thing." Athanasius, Oration III. 3, 4. "In trinitate maxime propria est et perfectissima περιχώρησις, siquidem personae sese mutuo continent; ita ut ubicunque una persona est, ibi reliquae duae existant, hoc est ubique omnes sint." Bull: Defensio, IV. iv. 14.¹

The terms first, second, and third, applied to the persons, are terms of *order* and *relationship* only. They imply no priority of nature, substance, existence, or excellence.

¹ The Platonists employed this figure of circulatory movement, to explain the self-reflecting and self-communing nature of the human mind. "It is not possible for us to know what our souls are, but only by their κινήσεις κυκλικαί, their circular and reflex motions, and converse with themselves, which only can steal from them their own secrets." Smith: Discourses (Immortality, II.).

Hence, the Son is sometimes named before the Father, 2 Cor. 13 : 14 ; Gal. 1 : 1. Sometimes, the Spirit before the Son, Rev. 1 : 4, 5. The term "father" does not denote a higher grade of being, but exactly the same grade that the term "son" does. A human son is as truly man, as a human father. He is constituted of human nature as fully and entirely as his father is. Augustine (Sermo 140, § 5) remarks that "if the Son were not equal to the Father, he would not be the *son* of God." The substance or constitutional nature determines the grade of being. A person having a human nature is ipso facto human ; whether he comes by it by the act of creation, as Adam and Eve did, or by propagation, as Cain and Abel did. So a person who possesses the Divine nature is ipso facto divine, whether possessing it by paternity, or filiation, or procession. Christ asserts that "as the Father hath life in himself, so he hath given to the Son to have life in himself," John 5 : 26. But "life in himself" is self-existence. As the Father has self-existence, so he has given to the Son to have self-existence. The difference in the manner in which self-existence is possessed by the Father and Son, makes no difference with the fact. The Son has self-existence by communication of that essence of which self-existence is an attribute. The Father has self-existence without communication of it, because he has the essence without communication of it.

While there is this absolute equality among the Divine persons in respect to the grade of being to which they belong, and all are alike infinite and uncreated in nature and essence, there is at the same time a kind of subordination among them. It is *trinitarian*, or *filial* subordination ; that is, subordination in respect to order and relationship. As a relation, sonship is subordinate to fatherhood. In the order, a father, whether divine or human, is the first, and a son is the second. Hence the phrases "filial subordination" and "trinitarian subordination" are common in trini-

tarian writers. The fourth section of Bull's Defence of the Nicene Faith is devoted to the proof of the subordination of the Son to the Father, in respect to his *personal* peculiarity of sonship; the second and third sections having been devoted to the proof of his consubstantiality and co-eternity with the Father, in respect to his *essence*.

The trinitarian subordination of person, not of essence, must not be confounded with the *Arian* and *Semi-Arian* subordination, which is a subordination of essence as well as of person. Neither must it be confounded with the *theanthropic* or *mediatorial* subordination. This latter involves condescension and humiliation; but the trinitarian subordination does not. It is no humiliation or condescension for a son to be the son of his father. That the second trinitarian person is God the Son, and not God the Father, does not imply that his essence is inferior to that of the Father, and that he is of a lower grade of being, but only that his sonship is subordinate to the Father's paternity. The Son of God is an eternal, not a temporal son; and an eternal son must have an eternal nature in order to be eternal. In the theanthropic or mediatorial sonship, there is an humbling, though no degrading of the eternal Son, because of the assumption into union with the Divine nature of an inferior human nature. But in the Arian or Semi-Arian subordination, there is not only humiliation, but degradation. The Son of God, upon this theory, is of a lower grade of being than the Father, because he is of a different essence or nature.

The following résumé, condensed from the Dogmatics of Twisten (Theil II. § 42), presents the subject of the *notae internae* in a clear light.

“The internal characteristics include the *order* according to which the Father is immutably the first, the Son immutably the second, the Spirit immutably the third person of the Trinity, and the *ground* or *foundation* of this order in certain constitutional and necessary acts in the Divine es-

sence. Since God is pure life and act (*actus purissimus*); and since by virtue of his absolute independence and spontaneity there is nothing in him inert or lifeless, nothing given independent of his act and nothing outwardly necessary; those characteristics whereby the Divine persons are distinguished from each other must rest upon the Divine energizing; namely, upon two eternally immanent acts, generation and spiration. These acts are internal, because they have nothing but the Divine essence itself for an object. They terminate upon the Divine essence as modifying it, not upon the universe as creating it. And they are personal acts, because it is not the Divine essence as common to the three persons, but as it subsists modified in particular persons, that is the subject or agent in the case. Hence it follows, that these acts of generation and spiration are not to be regarded as the common action of all three persons, but as the particular action of one or more distinct persons—that of generation being the act of the first person, and that of spiration the act of the first and second.

“But if the Father is unbegotten, does it not follow that he alone is the *absolute* Being? and is not this Arianism? Not so. For one and the same numerical essence subsists whole and undivided in him who is generated, as well as in him who generates; in him who is spirated, as well as in those two who spirate. There can therefore be no inequality of essence caused by these acts of generation and spiration. There may be, and there is an inequality in the several modes in which one and the same eternal essence subsists by virtue of these acts. The essence in the begotten mode or ‘form’ of the Son, is second and subordinate to the essence in the unbegotten mode or ‘form’ of the Father. But this inequality of mode or ‘form’ does not relate to *time*, for the essence in the Son is as old as the essence in the Father; nor to *nature* or constitutional being, for this is the same thing in both. It relates only to the personal characteristics of paternity, filiation, and proces-

sion. Hence the Athanasian symbol can assert that 'in trinitate, nihil prius aut posterius [tempore], nihil majus aut minus [natura], sed tota tres personas coeternas sibi esse et coequales,' and yet an inequality of relationship may be granted, if by this is meant merely that the Father is the generative source of the Son, and the Father and Son the spirative source of the Spirit; or, in other terms, that the Son's *person* is grounded in that of the Father, and the Spirit's *person* is grounded in those of the Father and Son, while yet the one eternal *essence* itself, which is identical in each, has no source and no ground."

The *external characteristics*, *notae externae*, of the three persons, are transitive acts, *opera ad extra*. They are activities and effects by which the Trinity is manifested outwardly. They are the following: 1. Creation, preservation, and government of the universe. 2. Redemption. 3. Inspiration, regeneration, and sanctification. The first belongs officially and eminently to the Father; the second to the Son; the third to the Holy Spirit. The Father creates, yet by and through the Son: Ps. 33:6; Prov. 3:19; 30:4; John 5:17; Acts 4:24, 27. The Son redeems, yet commissioned by the Father: Rom. 3:24; 5:11; Gal. 3:13; Rev. 5:9. The Spirit inspires and sanctifies, yet as sent by the Father and Son. He inspires the prophets: 2 Sam. 23:2, 19; 2 Peter 1:21; and sanctifies the elect: 1 Pet. 1:2.

These works are occasionally attributed to another person. The Son creates: Col. 1:16; Heb. 1:3; Is. 44:24. The name Saviour is given to the Father: 1 Tim. 1:1; Jude 25. The Father sanctifies: John 17:17. Commonly, the Father raises Christ from the dead: Acts 13:30. But Christ "has power to take his life again:" John 10:18; and rises from the dead: Rom. 14:9; Acts 10:41; 1 Cor. 15:4. The Father "judgeth without respect of persons," 1 Pet. 1:17; and yet "all judgment is given to the Son," John 5:22; Mat. 25:31. This is explained by the unity of the essence. In every external operation of a person,

the whole essence operates, because the whole essence is in each person. The operation, consequently, while peculiar to a person, is at the same time, essential ; that is, is wrought by that one Divine essence which is also and alike in the other persons. An official personal act cannot, therefore, be the *exclusive* act of a person, in the sense that the others have no participation in it. "There is no such division in the external operations of God, that any one of them should be the act of one person without the concurrence of the others." Owen : Holy Spirit, II. iii. At the same time, an act like creation for example, which is common to all the persons of the trinity by virtue of a common participation in the essence, yet stands in a nearer relation to the essence as subsisting in the Father than it does to the essence as subsisting in the Son, or the Spirit. The same reasoning applies to redemption and the second person ; to sanctification and the third person. Power, wisdom, and love are attributes common to the Divine essence, and to each of the persons ; but both Scripture and theology appropriate power in a special way to the Father, wisdom to the Son or Logos, and love to the Holy Spirit, because each of these attributes stands in a closer relation to the particular person to whom it is ascribed, than to the others.

The internal activities, on the other hand, unlike the external, are attributed to one person *exclusively* of the other two, or else to two persons *exclusively* of the other one. Generation is the act of the Father only, the Son and Spirit having no share in it. Spiration is the act of the Father and Son, the Spirit having no participation in it. Filiation belongs to the Son alone. Procession belongs to the Spirit alone. According to the Greek, in distinction from the Latin doctrine of the third person, spiration is exclusively the Father's opus ad intra. The same remark respecting exclusiveness is true of the incarnation. It is the second person exclusively, not the first or the third, who unites with human nature.

The *Deity of God the Father* is undisputed, and hence there is less need of presenting the proof of it. The Divine names, attributes, works and adorableness, are ascribed to him.

The term "Father" denotes an immanent and eternal relation of the first trinitarian person. God, in himself, and irrespective of any reference to the created universe, is a father: the Father of the Son. Were God primarily the Father because of his relation to men and angels, and not because of his relation to the second person in the Godhead, his fatherhood would begin in time, and might consequently end in time. If there was once a time when God was not the Father of the Son, there may be a time when he will cease to be so. "It is the greatest impiety," says Cyril of Jerusalem (Catacheses, XI. 8), "to say that after deliberation held in time God became a Father. For God was not at first without a Son, and afterwards in time became a Father."

The *hypostatical* or *trinitarian* paternity of God the Father as related to the Son, must not be confounded with the *providential* paternity of God the Trinity as related to the creation. Only one of the Divine persons is the trinitarian Father; but the three persons in one essence constitute the providential and universal Father. The Triune God is generally the Father of men and angels by creation, and specially of the elect by redemption. Hence, the term Father applied to God has two significations. It may denote the Divine essence in all three modes, or in only one mode. The first clause in the Lord's prayer is an example of the former. When men say, "Our Father who art in heaven," they do not address the first person of the Godhead to the exclusion of the second and third. They address, not the untriune God of deism and natural religion, but the God of revelation, who is triune, and as such the providential Father of all men, and the redemptive Father of believers. If a man deliberately and consciously intends in his suppli-

cation to exclude from his worship the Son and the Holy Spirit, his petition is not acceptable. "He that honoreth not the Son, honoreth not the Father," John 5:23. A man may not have the three persons distinctly and formally in his mind, when he utters this petition, and in this case he does not intentionally exclude any trinitarian person or persons; but the petition, nevertheless, ascends to the Divine Three, not to a single person exclusively; and the answer returns to him from the Triune God, not from any solitary person exclusively. "It is a doctrine," says Witsius (Lord's Prayer, Diss. VII.), "firmly maintained by all orthodox divines, that the Father cannot be invoked in a proper manner, without at the same time invoking the Son and Holy Spirit, because they are one in nature and in honor. Nor can it, I think, be denied that, laying out of view the distinction of persons and looking only at what is common to all three persons in the Godhead, God may be denominated our Father. Yet I cheerfully concur with those interpreters who maintain that the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is particularly addressed in the first petition." Says Augustine (Trinity, V. ii.), "That which is written, 'Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God is one Lord,' ought not to be understood as if the Son were excepted, or the Holy Spirit were excepted. This one Lord our God, we rightly call, also, our Father."

The term Father denotes the Trinity in John 4:21, 23, 24. "The hour cometh when ye shall neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father. The true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth." Here the term Father is synonymous with "God" who "is a Spirit;" the true object of worship. But Christ, in mentioning the object of worship, had in his mind the God of *revelation*, not of deism; trinal as he is in Scripture, not single as he is in natural religion; the very same God in whose trinal name and being he commanded all men to believe and be baptized. Christ's idea of God as the univer-

sal Father was trinitarian, not deistic. In his intuition, and theology, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, and the Heavenly Father of angels and men. "The appellation Father, descriptive of the connection between God and his creatures, is true of every one of the Divine persons, and of the three Divine persons, one God. The [paternal] relation to the creatures is as true of the Son and Holy Ghost as of the Father, in respect to the Divine nature; for all these persons are respectively, and in union, the Father of the universe; the Father in creation, in government, and in protection. The Son as Messiah is foretold in his protecting kindness and mercy as 'a Father to the fatherless.'" Ps. 68: 5, 6; Isa. 9: 6. Kidd: Eternal Sonship, Ch. XIII.

A believer in the Trinity, in using the first petition of the Lord's prayer, may have the first person particularly in his mind, and may address him; but this does not make his prayer antitrinitarian. He addresses that person as the representative of the Trinity. And the same is true whenever he particularly addresses the Son, or the Spirit. If he addresses God the Son, God the Son implies God the Father. Each Divine person supposes and suggests the others. Each represents the others. Consequently, to pray to any one of the Divine Three is by implication and virtually to pray to all Three. No man can honor the Son without honoring the Father also. Says Christ, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father also," John 14: 9. In like manner, he that prays to the Son prays to the Father also. Says Turretin (III. xxv. 27), "The mind of the worshipper will not be distracted by the consideration that there are three Divine persons, if he remembers that the whole Divine essence is in each of the persons, so that if he worships one he worships all. With Gregory of Nazianzum, he may say: 'I cannot think of the one Supreme Being without being encompassed with the glory of the three persons; and I cannot discern

the three persons without recurring to the unity of the essence.' ”

The hypostatical or trinitarian paternity of God, in distinction from the providential, is mentioned in John 17 : 5. “ Now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self.” Here, Christ addresses the Father alone ; the first person of the Godhead exclusively. He did not address the Trinity, for he did not address himself, or the Holy Spirit. Respecting this trinitarian fatherhood, the Son says, “ my Father,” not “ our Father.” John 14 : 27 ; 15 : 1, 8, et alia.

The baptismal formula, and the doxologies indisputably prove that paternity is an immanent and eternal relation of God. The rite that initiates into the kingdom of God would not be administered in three names denoting only certain temporal and assumed attitudes of the Supreme Being. Neither would a Divine blessing be invoked through three titles signifying only these. Baptism and invocation are acts of worship, and worship relates to the essential and eternal being of God.

The hypostatical or trinitarian character of the first person is, that he possesses the essence “ originally,” in the sense that it is not communicated to him by one of the other persons. Augustine (Trinity, II. i.) thus speaks of the “ original ” or unbegotten possession of the essence by the Father. “ We call the Son, God *of* God ; but the Father, God only, not *of* God. Whence it is plain that the Son has another *of* whom he is, and to whom he is Son ; but the Father has not a Son *of* whom he is, but only to whom he is Father. For every son is what he is, *of* his father, and is son to his father ; but no father is what he is, *of* his son, but is father to his son.” A common term applied to God, in the patristic age, to denote this peculiarity was, “ unbegotten.” “ Next to God, we worship and love the Word, who is from the unbegotten and ineffable God.” “ We have the unbegotten and ineffable God.” “ We have

dedicated ourselves to the unbegotten and impassible God." "He is the first-born of the unbegotten God." Justin Martyr: Apology I. xxv., liii. ; II. xii., xiii. "There are also some dissertations concerning the unbegotten God." Rufinus: Preface to the Clementine Recognitions. In the writings of Athanasius, the Father is denominated *ἀγεννητός*, ingenerate or unbegotten, and the Son *γεννητός*, generate or begotten.

The phrase "Unbegotten God" implies and suggests the phrase "Begotten God." This denotes no more than the phrase "God the Son;" the latter containing the substantive, the former the adjective. Clement of Alexandria (Stromata, V. xii.) remarks that "John the apostle says, no man hath seen God at any time. The only begotten God who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." Irenaeus (Adv. Haereses, IV. xx. 11) quotes this text in the same form: "The only begotten God which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." This patristic employment of the phrase "Begotten God" strongly supports the reading *μονόγενης Θεός* in John 1:18, which has the support of \aleph BCL, Peshito, Coptic, Aethiopic; and respecting which Tischendorf (Ed. 8) says, "dubitari nequit quin testimoniorum pondere valeat." Westcott and Hort adopt this reading.

In the controversy between the English Trinitarians and Arians, conducted by Waterland and Samuel Clarke, in the beginning of the eighteenth century, a distinction was made by the former between "necessary existence" and "self-existence" that is liable to misconception and requires notice. The Father, says Waterland, is both necessarily existent and self-existent. The Son is necessarily existent, but not self-existent. In this use of terms, which is uncommon, the term self-existent was employed not with reference to the essence, as is usually the case, but to the person only. In this sense, "self-existent" denotes what the Nicene trinitarians meant by "unbegotten" or "ingenerate." The

Father is self-existent, in Waterland's sense, because the Divine essence is not communicated to or with him. He has it of himself. The Son is not self-existent in Waterland's sense, because the Divine essence is communicated. He has it not from himself, but from the Father. But the Son is necessarily existent, says Waterland, because he possesses an essence that is necessarily existent. The fact that the essence is communicated by eternal generation does not make it any the less an infinite, eternal, and unchangeable essence. In brief, according to Waterland, the Son is necessarily existent because the Divine essence is his essence; but he is not self-existent, because his personal characteristic of filiation, his peculiar "self," is not from himself but from another person.

If no distinction be made between necessary existence and self-existence, as is the case in the Nicene statements, Waterland would attribute both necessary existence and self-existence to the Son. He would concede self-existence in the sense in which it is attributed to the Son in John 5 : 26 : "As the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself." Here, "life in himself" denotes the self-existence of the Divine essence, which is also necessary existence. The Father has this uncommunicated. The Son has it communicated or "given" from the Father, by eternal generation.

The Father was sometimes denominated *πηγή τῆς θεότητος*; *ρίζα πάσης θεότητος*. This phraseology is used with qualification, by accurate trinitarians. Some orthodox writers employ the phrase, "fons trinitatis," to denote the hypostatical character of the Father, which is better than "fons deitatis." "If," says Howe (Trinity, Lecture XIV.), "we do suppose the Son and the Holy Ghost to be from the Father by a necessity of nature, an eternal necessity of nature, and not by a dependence upon his will, they will not be creatures, because nothing is creature but what depends upon the will and pleasure of the Creator. And if

they be not creatures, what are they then? Then, they must be God, and yet both of them from the Father, too; for all that do assert the trinity do acknowledge the Father to be fons trinitatis, the fountain of the Trinity: and if from this fountain the Son be in one way, and the Holy Ghost be in another way, both from the Father; that is, the Son from the Father immediately, and the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, and this not by choice, but by an eternal necessity of nature, here is this doctrine as easily conceivable as any that I know of whatsoever, that lies not within the compass of our manifest demonstration." Turretin (Inst. III. xxx. 1) says that the Father is fons deitatis, "si modus subsistendi spectatur." Owen (Saints' Communion, III.) remarks that "the Father is the fountain of the deity." Hooker (Polity, V. liv.) quotes Augustine as saying that "pater est πηγαία θεότητος." In these cases, deitas is loosely put for trinitas. Strictly speaking, however, deity denotes the Divine essence; and the first person is not the Father of the essence. But trinity denotes the essence personalized by trinalizing. In this reference, the first person is the father and fountain. "We teach," says Calvin (Inst., I. xiii. 23, 25), "according to the Scriptures, that there is essentially but one God; and therefore that the *essence* of both the Son and the Spirit is *unbegotten*. But since the Father is first in order, and hath himself begotten his Wisdom, therefore as has before been observed, he is justly esteemed the original and fountain of the whole Divinity" [Trinity].

The *Deity of God the Son* was the subject of one of the greatest controversies in the Patristic church. But the work that was done then in investigating the Scriptures did not require to be repeated. Christendom since the Nicene age, as well as before, has believed in the Divine nature of the Son of God.

The denomination "Son," given to the second trinitarian person, denotes an immanent and eternal relation of the

essence, not a temporally assumed one. This is proved: (a) By the antithetic term "Father" applied to the first person. Both terms must be taken in the same signification. If one person is eternal, so is the other; if one denotes a temporal relation, so does the other. Arius contended that God was not always a Father, and that the Son was not always a Son. The Nicene trinitarians maintained the contrary. Compare Socrates: History I. vi.; Athanasius: Contra Arianos, I. §§ 5, 9. Gangauf: Augustin's Trinitatslehre, p. 311 sq. (b) By the epithets "eternal," "own" (*ιδιος*), and "only begotten," which qualify the sonship of the second person, and discriminate it from that of angels and men. (c) By the use of the term in the baptismal formula and the benedictions.

The deity of the Son of God is abundantly proved in Scripture. The general impression made by the New Testament favors the deity of Christ. If the evangelists and apostles intended to teach to the world the doctrine that Christ is only a man, or an exalted angel, they have certainly employed phraseology that is ill-suited to convey such a truth. Says John Quincy Adams (Diary, VII. 229), "No argument that I have ever heard can satisfy my judgment, that the doctrine of the divinity of Christ is not countenanced by the New Testament. As little can I say, that it is clearly revealed. It is often obscurely intimated; sometimes directly, and sometimes indirectly asserted; but left on the whole in a debatable state, never to be either demonstrated or refuted until another revelation shall clear it up." This is the testimony of a Unitarian of learning and judgment. The criticism, however, occurs to a reader, that if a doctrine is "sometimes directly, and sometimes indirectly asserted" in the New Testament, it should be accepted by a believer in revelation, however great the difficulties connected with it.

By "deity" more is meant than "divinity," as this latter term is employed by different classes of Anti-Trinitarians.

The Arians and Semi-Arians taught the "divinity" of the Son, in the sense of a similarity of nature between him and the Father. This resemblance is greater and closer than that of any other being, man or angel, but is not identity of essence. Socinus and the Polish Unitarians also taught the "divinity" of Christ, in the sense of similarity of essence, but in a lower degree than the Arians and Semi-Arians held the tenet. Socinus says: "Dicimus concedere nos Christum esse naturalem Dei Filium." Smalcius affirms: "Filiū personam esse non diffitemur, eamque divinam." Turretin: *Institutio*, III. xxviii. 1. By the phrase "natural Son of God," Socinus meant a miraculous generation of Jesus Christ in time by the Holy Spirit, but not an eternal and necessary generation out of the Divine essence.

The crucial term is "coessential," or "consubstantial" (*ὁμοουσιος*). Neither the Semi-Arian, nor the Arian, nor the Socinian, would concede that the essence of the Son is the very identical essence of the Father. It is like it, but it is not it. The Son has "divinity" but not "deity;" the term divinity being used in the loose sense, as when writers speak of the "divinity in man," meaning his resemblance to God. No one would speak of the "deity in man," unless he were a pantheist.

1. The deity of the Son is proved by the application of the *name* God to him. Ps. 45: 6, 8, "Thy throne, O God (אֱלֹהִים) is forever and ever." This is quoted and thus reaffirmed in Heb. 1: 8, 9, "Unto the Son, he saith, thy throne, O God, is forever and ever." Isa. 9: 6, "A child is born unto us, and his name shall be called the mighty God" (אֱלֹהֵי גִבּוֹר). In Jer. 23: 5, 6, the "Branch" of David is called "The Lord (יְהוָה) our Righteousness." The same is said of Messiah in Jer. 33: 15-17. Here, Jerusalem = the Church = Christ (1 Cor. 12: 12; Gal. 3: 16.) Speaker's Com. on Jer. 33: 16. In Isa. 7: 14, Messiah is called "God with us," and the prophecy here recorded is said, in Matt. 1: 23, to be fulfilled in the birth of Jesus Christ.

In Malachi 3 : 1, the Messenger (*ἄγγελον*, Sept.) about to come to *his own* temple (*ναὸν ἑαυτοῦ*, Sept.) is called Lord (*יְהוָה*); and Mark (1 : 2) and Luke (1 : 76) teach that this is Jesus Christ. The day of the coming of this Messenger is called the "great and dreadful day of the Lord" (*יְהוָה*), Mal. 4 : 5.

In the New Testament, there are passages in which what is said in the Old Testament concerning Jehovah is applied to Jesus Christ. Compare Numbers 14 : 2 ; 21 : 5, 6 ; Ps. 95 : 9, with 1 Cor. 10 : 9. Here the tempting of Jehovah is the tempting of Christ. The Receptus, Itala, Peshito, Vulgate with DEF, read *Χριστόν* in 1 Cor. 10 : 9. Lachmann, Tischendorf, Hort, with NBC, read *κύριον*. The Alexandrine codex reads *θεόν*. In Heb. 1 : 10, 11, what is attributed to Jehovah in Ps. 102 : 26, is attributed to Christ. In John 12 : 40, 41, it is asserted that the language of Isaiah (6 : 9, 10,) concerning Jehovah refers to Jesus Christ. Isa. 45 : 23, compared with Rom. 14 : 10, 11 (Receptus), shows that the judgment-seat of God is the judgment-seat of Christ: Lachmann, Tischendorf, Hort, Peshito, Vulgate, with ABCD, read *θεοῦ* in Rom. 14 : 10. Joel 2 : 32 compared with Rom. 10 : 13, proves that the name of Jehovah is the name of Christ. In Eph. 4 : 8, 9, Christ gives the gifts that in Ps. 68 : 18 are given by Jehovah.

John 1 : 1 contains absolute proof of the deity of the Son of God: *θεός ἦν ὁ λόγος*. The omission of the article with *θεός* converts the word into the abstract, denoting the species, "deity." Compare *πνεῦμα*, anarthrous, in John 4 : 24: *πνεῦμα ὁ θεός*. The use of *ἦν* implies uncreated being, in distinction from created; which, in verse 3, is denoted by *ἐγένετο*. The distinct personal existence of the Logos is also denoted by *πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, which is quite different from *σὺν τῷ θεῷ*. The former preposition with the accusative implies coexistence, along with another. The latter preposition with the dative blends in one substance, so as to exclude distinct individuality. 1 John 5 : 20, *οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ*

ἀληθινὸς θεός. Here, οὗτός most naturally refers to Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ. "Eternal life" is never appropriated to the Father by St. John, but is very often to the Son. Compare John 1: 4; 11: 25; 14: 6; 1 John 1: 2; 5: 11, 12. Christ is called θεός in Rom. 9: 5. The conversion of the passage into a doxology, by punctuation, by some modern editors of the text, in opposition to the almost universal understanding of the ancient, mediæval, and modern church, is a striking instance of an attempt to bring Scripture into harmony with the Arian view of Christ's person. Christ is clearly the antecedent—no other person having been spoken of in several verses preceding; ὁ ὢν is a relative clause, not beginning a new proposition but continuing one that has been commenced; and the words τὸ κατὰ σάρκα, referring to the human nature of Christ, require an antithesis referring to the divine nature, as in Rom. 1: 3. See Shedd: on Rom. 9: 5. Christ is called θεός, in Titus 2: 13: "Looking for the blessed hope and appearing of the glory of our great God and Saviour, Jesus Christ" (R. V.). That θεοῦ and σωτήρος denote one and the same person, is proved by these facts: (a) That ἐπιφάνειαν is never applied to the Father, and that Christ's "appearing" is the thing hoped for. (b) The next clause speaks of the great God and Saviour as "giving himself." (c) That μεγάλου would seem uncalled for, if applied to the Father, since no one disputed the propriety of this epithet in reference to the first person. Usteri: Lehre, p. 325. The exclamation of Thomas, John 20: 28, ὁ κύριος μου καὶ ὁ θεός μου, proves the deity of Christ. It was addressed to Christ: εἶπεν αὐτῷ. The use of the article ὁ, instead of the interjection ὦ, shows that it is not an exclamation of surprise. Acts 20: 28, "The church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood." The reading θεοῦ is found in B⁸, Peshito, Vulgate, and adopted by Receptus, Mill, Knapp, Scholz, Alford, Hort. The reading κυριοῦ is found in ACD, and adopted by Griesbach, Wetstein, Lachmann, Tischendorf. 1 Tim.

3: 16, "God was manifest in the flesh." The reading θεός is supported by D³K L, most minuscules, Receptus, Mill, Scholz; ὁς is supported by ⲚAC', Coptic, Sahidic, Gothic, Lachmann, Tischendorf, Tregelles, Alford, Hort. The reading ὁς refers to Christ indisputably, and there are such predicates attributed to him as belong to no creature. Philippians 2: 6 proves Christ's divinity. Christ could not be in a "form" of God without the nature of God; the "form" of a servant implies the nature of a servant. And he was in a form of God previous to being in the form of a servant. It was no robbery of honor (ἀρπαγμόν) for Christ to claim equality with God. The proposed rendering: "To be held on upon," would require ἀρπαγμά. The plural, "gods," is sometimes applied to creatures: to angels, and magistrates; but the singular, "God," never is. The application of the singular to Christ proves his deity.

2. Divine *attributes* are ascribed to the Son of God.

(a) Eternity, Prov. 8: 22, 23. The personal Wisdom (חֵכֶם) "was set up from everlasting." That this is not a personified attribute is proved, 1. By the length of the description, and the large number of details. Personification is brief, and does not go into particulars. 2. By the ascription of personal actions, and a personal utterance of them: "I was by him; I was daily his delight; when he prepared the heavens, I was there; my delights were with the sons of men; now therefore hearken unto me, O ye children; blessed is the man that heareth me." A personification occurs, generally, in the midst of a narrative. But this occurs in the midst of maxims and didactic utterances. "In this passage," says Nitzsch, "we have an unmistakable germ of the ontological self-distinction of the Godhead."¹ Micah 5: 2, "From Bethlehem Ephratah, shall come forth

¹ Upon the connection of the Wisdom of the Old Testament with the Logos of John, see Bleek: Introduction to the New Testament, § 81; Luthardt: Authenticity of the Fourth Gospel; Godet: Commentary on John; Dorner: Person of Christ, I.

he whose goings forth [emanation] have been from old;" literally, "from the days of eternity." Compare Matt. 2: 6. In Isa. 9: 6, the Messiah is called the "everlasting Father;" literally, "the Father of eternity." Heb. 7: 3, "The Son of God" has "neither beginning of days nor end of life." In Rev. 1: 8; 22: 13, the "Son of man" says of himself, "I am Alpha and Omega." In John 8: 28, Christ says of himself, "Before Abraham was I am;" where the use of *ἐμὶ* is in contrast with that of *γενέσθαι*. Compare with this the contrast between *ἦν* and *ἐγένετο* in John 1: 1, 3. In John 17: 7, Christ affirms his existence with the Father, "before the world was." (b) Im-mensity and Omnipresence. Matt. 18: 20, "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." Mat. 28: 20, "I am with you al-ways." John 3: 13, "The Son of man who is in heaven," and on earth, simultaneously. Socinus explains *ὁ ὢν*, here, by *fuisse*. (c) Omnipotence. Rev. 1: 8; "I am the Al-mighty." John 5: 19, " whatsoever things the Father doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise." Heb. 1: 3, The Son "upholdeth all things by the word of his power." Mat. 18: 18, "All power is given unto me in heaven and on earth." This latter text refers to the mediatorial commission, it is true; but it must be remembered that a mere creature could not take such a commission, if it were offered to him. In interpreting those passages in which omnipotence and divine exaltation (Phil. 2: 9) are said to be "given" to the incarnate Son, it must be recollected that it requires an in-finite nature to *receive* and *wield* such infinite gifts. A created nature would be crushed by them, as Tarpeia was by the shields of the Sabine soldiers. They are communi-cable only to an infinite person. (d) Omniscience is as-cribed to the Son. John 21: 17, "Lord thou knowest all things." John 16: 30, "We are sure that thou knowest all things." John 2: 24, 25, "Jesus knew what was in man." John 1: 49, "When thou wast under the fig-tree, I saw

thee." Rev. 2:23, "I am he which searcheth the reins and hearts." Compare with 1 Kings 8:29, "Thou only knowest the hearts of all the children of men." In Mark 13:32, Christ is said to be ignorant of the day of judgment. This is explained, by many, by a reference to his human nature. He was ignorant in respect to his humanity. But there is another explanation which refers it to the total theanthropic person. An *official* ignorance is meant. Augustine so explains. "Christ as the Mediator was not authorized, at that time, to give information respecting the time of the final judgment, and this is called 'ignorance' upon his part; as a ditch is sometimes called 'blind' because it is hidden from the eyes of men, and not because it is really so." Macknight interprets in the same way. This use of "know" for "making known," is frequent in Scripture. Gen. 22:12, "Now I know that thou fearest God, seeing that thou has not withheld thine only son from me." In 1 Cor. 2:2, St. Paul says, "I determined not to know anything among you, save Jesus Christ." To "know" means to "make known," in Mat. 11:27. "No one knoweth the Son but the Father, neither knoweth any one the Father but the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will *reveal* him." Compare John 1:18, "The only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." A particular trinitarian person is officially the one to reveal another, and in this reference the others do not officially reveal, and so are officially "ignorant." Paul (Gal. 1:16) says that "it pleased God the Father to reveal his Son in him." This explanation of the "ignorance," spoken of in Mark 13:32, as official, agrees better than the other with other statements of Scripture. When it is said that "the Father only" knows the time of the day of judgment, this must be harmonized with the truth that the Holy Spirit is omniscient, and "searcheth the deep things of God," 1 Cor. 2:10. The Holy Spirit is not ignorant of the time of the day of judgment, but like

the incarnate Son he is not commissioned to reveal the time. Again, it is not supposable that Christ now seated on the mediatorial throne is ignorant, even in respect to his human nature, of the time of the day of judgment, though he is not authorized to officially make it known to his church. (e) Immutability. Heb. 1 : 11, 12, "The heavens shall perish, but thou remainest." The immutability of Jehovah, in Ps. 102 : 26, is here ascribed to the Son. Heb. 13 : 8, "Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever." (f) The Divine "plenitude," that is, the Divine essence and attributes, is attributed to Christ in Coloss. 2 : 9, "In him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily." (g) Self-existence, or "life in himself," is attributed to the incarnate Son. John 5 : 26. That this is "given," or "communicated," to the Son by the Father, does not imply inequality of being. Self-existing life is ipso facto Divine. The mode in which it is possessed does not change the nature of the possession. In communicating the Divine essence to the Son, the Father communicates all its properties.

3. Divine *works* are attributed to the Son of God. (a) Creation. Prov. 8 : 27, "When he prepared the heavens, I was there." John 1 : 3, "All things were made by him." Coloss. 1 : 16, 17, "By him were all things created, visible and invisible." Heb. 1 : 2, "By whom he made the worlds." Heb. 1 : 10, "Thou Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth." (b) Preservation. Heb. 1 : 3, "Upholding all things by the word of his power." Coloss. 1 : 17, "By him all things consist." John 5 : 17, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." (c) Miracles performed by Christ in person, or through his apostles; especially the resurrection of the dead. John 5 : 21, "As the Father raiseth up the dead, so the Son quickeneth whom he will." John 6 : 40, "I will raise him up at the last day." Christ appeals to these miracles in proof of his divinity. John 5 : 36, "The works that I do, bear witness of me."

Socinus asserted that the creation ascribed to Christ is the secondary spiritual creation. This is not so, because: (a) St. John (1:3) speaks absolutely, without any qualification; which would have been necessary, if a particular kind of creation were intended. (b) The universal creation without exception (*οὐδὲ ἓν*) is expressly mentioned. (c) It is not exclusively the spiritual creation, namely, the church, because (ver. 10) that part of the world who "knew him not" was created by him. (d) St. Paul (Coloss. 1:16) extends the creation by Christ to all creatures, visible and invisible; to angels, as well as men; and speaks of the second spiritual creation afterwards (ver. 18). Socinus also asserted that Christ's agency in creation is instrumental (*δι' αὐτοῦ*, John 1:3). The reply is: (a) That there cannot be instrumental agency in such a work as creation *ex nihilo*. An instrument must have materials to work upon, but there are none in creation. (b) The same preposition (*δι' αὐτοῦ*) is applied to God. Rom. 11:36, "And through him, are all things;" Gal. 1:1, "An apostle not of men, but by Jesus Christ, and God the Father." (c) The creation is not only *δι' αὐτοῦ* (Coloss. 1:16), but *εἰς αὐτόν* (Coloss. 1:16). Christ is the final end, as well as first cause. (d) The creation is not only *δι' αὐτοῦ*, but *ἐν αὐτῷ*, Coloss. 1:17. The universe has its supporting ground in Christ (*ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκε*), as man is said to live in God, Acts 17:38. When creation is peculiarly ascribed to the Father, the Son is not excluded, any more than when redemption is peculiarly ascribed to the Son, the Father is excluded.

It is asserted that Christ's power to work miracles was official, like that of the apostles and prophets. This is an error, because (a) Miraculous power emanated from him as from the original source. Luke 6:19; 8:46; Matt. 9:28, "Believe ye that *I* am able to do this?" (b) The apostles affirm that they do not work miracles in their own name, but in the name of Christ. Acts 9:34, "Jesus Christ maketh thee whole;" Acts 3:16, "His name, through faith in

his name hath made this man strong ;” Acts 4 : 10, “ By the name of Jesus Christ doth this man stand here before you, whole.” Compare Matt. 14 : 33, “ They worshipped him,” with Acts 14 : 15, “ Why do ye these things ?” When Christ (John 11 : 41) thanks the Father for hearing his prayer, it is to be noticed that it is a prayer in his office of mediator ; and that he offers it in order that the people may have a proof of his Divine mission (ver. 42). It was not that he felt himself unable to work the miracle, and needed to be empowered for the act ; but he wished that the spectators, “ the people which stood by,” should know that he and the Father were one and the same Being in all acts and words. If the spectators had seen Lazarus raised from the dead with no allusion to the eternal Father, and no uplifting of the Filial eye, they would have been apt to separate Christ from the Father, as a kind of separate and independent God. Respecting this prayer, Christ says, “ I know that thou hearest me always,” implying that his prayer is not like that of a mere man, which may or may not be heard, according as God shall see best. (d) The work of salvation in its several parts is ascribed to Christ : Redemption, Acts 20 : 28. Election, John 13 : 18. Effectual calling, John 10 : 16 ; Matt. 9 : 13. Sanctification, Eph. 5 : 26. Mission of the Spirit, John 16 : 7, 14 ; 15 : 26. Defence against enemies, John 10 : 10. Gift of eternal life, John 10 : 28. Resurrection of the body, John 5 : 21. Final Judgment, John 5 : 22 ; Acts 17 : 31. Christ is called the Lord of the Church, Eph. 4 : 5 ; and the Husband of the Church, Eph. 5 : 25, which latter is the title given to Jehovah in reference to Israel (Isa. 54 : 5).

4. Religious *worship* in its various acts is rendered to the Son of God, namely : Faith. John 14 : 1, “ Believe also in me.” Hope. Ps. 2 : 12, “ Blessed are all they that put their trust in him (the Son) ;” but “ cursed is the man that trusteth in man,” Jer. 17 : 5. Adoration. Heb. 1 : 6, “ Let all the angels of God worship him ;” Ps. 2 : 12, “ Kiss

(a mark of homage and adoration, 1 Sam. 10 : 1) the Son ;” John 5 : 23, “The Father hath given all judgment to the Son, that all men should honor the Son even as they honor the Father ;” Phil. 2 : 9, 10, “At the name of Jesus, every knee should bow.” Invocation of blessing. Grace, mercy, and peace are implored from Christ, not less than from the Father. Believers are described as those “who call on the name of the Lord Jesus Christ,” 1 Cor. 1 : 2 ; Acts 9 : 14. Stephen calls upon Christ to receive his spirit at death, Acts 7 : 59. Glory and honor are invoked for Christ, in connection with the Father “who sitteth upon the throne,” Rev. 5 : 13. Examples of doxology to Christ are, 1 Pet. 4 : 11 ; 2 Tim. 4 : 18 ; Rev. 1 : 6 ; 2 Pet. 3 : 18. Says Athanasius (Orat. III. 12), “‘May God and his angel Gabriel, or Michael, grant you,’ would be a new and extraordinary sort of prayer. But ‘God the Father, and his Son Jesus Christ grant you,’ is perfectly agreeable to Scripture.”

5. The deity of the Son is proved by his *trinitarian position and relations*. (a) By the equality of the Son with the Father. John 5 : 17, 18, “Saying that God was his Father, he made himself equal with God.” This equality, Christ proved to the Jews by asserting his self-existence, or “life in himself,” John 5 : 26 ; and equality in honor, “All men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father,” John 5 : 23. When Christ says (John 5 : 19) that “the Son can do nothing of himself” (*ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ*), he means that he cannot work in isolation or separation from the Father, as if he were another Being. Hence, he adds, “What things soever the Father doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise.” The same truth is taught in John 8 : 28, “I do nothing of myself, but as my Father hath taught me, I speak these things.” When Christ said (John 14 : 28), “My Father is greater than I,” he was comparing his then existing state of humiliation with the glorious state of the Father. If the disciples understood this, they would re-

joyce "because I said I go unto the Father," since it would be a return to "the glory which Christ had with the Father, before the world was," John 17 : 5. See Luthardt on John 14 : 28. (b) By the unity of the Son with the Father. John 10 : 30, "I and my Father are one being" (ἐν).¹ The Jews understood this to be a claim to unity of essence; and to be "blasphemy, because that thou being a man maketh thyself God," (ver. 33). Christ reiterates and proves his claim, by reference to the use of the word "gods" (not God) applied to the prophets and magistrates of the Old economy. Ps. 82 : 6; Ex. 21 : 6; 22 : 8, 9, 28 (שֹׁפְטִים = "judges"). It is an argument from the less to the greater. If magistrates may be called gods, then the commissioned Messiah may be called the Son of God; and the Son of God he had previously asserted to be one with the Father (John 10 : 30). This, the Jews regarded as "making himself God" (ver. 33). The Jews understood the "Son of God" to be God, as is proved by Matt. 26 : 63-65.

6. The deity of the Son is proved by the office of *mediator* which he discharges. (a) A mediator must be the equal of either of the two parties between whom he mediates; "a daysman who can lay his hand upon both," Job 9 : 3. "A mediator is not of one [party]," Gal. 3 : 20. (b) He must be a prophet who can inwardly enlighten, and not merely teach by words externally; a king who can protect his kingdom; and a priest who can make atonement to justice for his people. These functions cannot be discharged by a finite Being.

7. The deity of the Son is proved by the fact that he is *revealed* and *manifested*. This implies that primarily he is the unrevealed deity. Compare Gal. 1 : 15, 16, "To reveal

¹ Athanasius (Cont. Arianos, IV. 9) remarks that there are three ways in which these words can be understood. 1. That which is one thing in one respect, is two in another. 2. That which is one thing, is two by having two names. 3. That which is one thing, is two by being divided into two parts. The first is Nicene trinitarianism. The second is Sabellianism.

his Son in me;" 1 John 3 : 8, "The Son of God was manifested." A created being is never said to be revealed or manifested. When it is said (Acts 2 : 36) "that God hath made that same Jesus whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ," the reference is not to his essential but his economical or official dominion as the God-man and Messiah. When Christ is called (Rev. 3 : 14) "the beginning (*ἀρχή*) of the creation of God," it is in the active sense of the word *ἀρχή*; as in Rev. 1 : 1, 8, where Receptus, Vulgate, Coptic, *Ⲛ*, have *ἀρχή καὶ τὸ τέλος*. He causes the creature to begin. He is the "beginning," in the sense of origin, or source. It corresponds to the Alpha, in Rev. 1 : 8. Origen employs the term in an active signification, in his treatise *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*, De Principiis: concerning first originating principles. The *ἀρχή* of Plato and Aristotle is the term for the cause of the origin or genesis of anything. Plato (Phaedo) quotes Anaxagoras as teaching that *νοῦς* is *ἡ ἀρχή τῆς κίνησεως*. Aristotle (Eth., III. i.) says that a man is blamed or praised for that *οὐ ἡ ἀρχή ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ*. In Ethics, III. i., the same idea is conveyed by the two phrases: *οὐ ἡ ἀρχή ἐξωθεν*, and *ὅπου ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτος*.

8. The deity of the Son is proved by the fact that he is *eternally generated*, not created in time. This is established by those texts which teach the unique and solitary nature of his sonship. The Son is *μονογενής*: "The only begotten of the Father," John 1 : 14; "the only begotten Son" (uncials, "only begotten God"), John 1 : 18; 3 : 16, 18; 1 John 4 : 9. The Son is *πρωτότοκος*: "When he bringeth the first begotten into the world," Heb. 1 : 6. The Son is *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*: "Begotten before all creation," Col. 1 : 15. The context show that the genitive, here, is not partitive, but is governed by *πρωτός* in composition; "for by him were all things created," Col. 1 : 16. Compare *πρωτός μου ἦν*, John 1 : 30. This is the exegesis of Tertulian (De Trinitate); of Ambrose (De Fide, I. iv.); of Atha-

nasius (Cont. Arianos, II. 63); of Eusebius (Dem. Evang., V.); and of Chrysostom. Had St. Paul wished to say that the Son is a *part* of creation, he would have written, *πρωτότοκος ἐκ πάσης κτίσεως*. Compare *ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν*, Col. 1:18. The Son is *ἀγαπητός*: "This is my beloved Son," Matt. 3:17; 17:5. The Son is *ἴδιος*: "He said that God is his own Father" (*πατέρα ἴδιον*), John 5:18; God "sent his own Son" (*τὸν ἑαυτοῦ υἱόν*), Rom. 8:3, 32.

That the generation of the Son of God is in eternity, and not a temporal emanation, is proved by Micah 5:2. The "goings forth" (issuing, *אֵצֶיֶת*) of the Ruler of Israel who is to be born in Bethlehem are "from everlasting." The Hebrew denotes an emanation, as in Ps. 65:8. "The outgoings of the morning," are the beams of sunrise. Compare Hosea 6:3. That he is Son in the sense of a Divine person, is proved by the fact that the angels are not called Son in this sense. "Unto which of the angels said He at any time, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee? And again, I will be to him a Father, and he shall be to me a Son," Heb. 1:5. It is also proved by the fact, that he is to have the uttermost parts of the earth for his possession, Ps. 2:8; that he is to overthrow the sinful kings of earth, Ps. 2:9; and that the kings of the earth are commanded to worship him, Ps. 2:12.

The passage, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee" (Ps. 2:7), teaches the eternal generation of the second trinitarian person. That it relates to the Messiah, is proved by Acts 4:25, 26; 13:33; Heb. 1:5. The earlier Rabbins referred this text to the Messiah; the later Rabbins, in order to invalidate the doctrine of the deity of Christ, have many of them referred it to David. Mohammed, in the Koran, alters it to, "Thou art my prophet, I have educated thee." Respecting the meaning of "begotten," in this passage, there are three explanations: (α) The begetting is the eternal generation. The words, "this day," denote the universal present, the everlasting Now, which

is put for eternity. This view is taken by Origen, Athanasius, Basil, Augustine, elder Lutherans, Turretin. (b) The begetting is the miraculous conception, or the incarnation of the eternal Son. The words, "this day," are equivalent to, "when he bringeth in the first begotten into the world," Heb. 1: 6. This view is held by Chrysostom, Theodoret, Kuinöel, Hoffmann. (c) The begetting is the resurrection and exaltation of Christ. This view is taken by Hilary, Ambrose, Calvin, Grotius. But this explanation rests upon a misapprehension of St. Paul in Acts 13: 32-35. The apostle does not quote (verse 33) the passage in the second psalm, "Thou art my Son," etc., in order to prove the *resurrection* of Christ, but his *incarnation*; or the fulfilment of the Messianic promise, made to the fathers (verse 32). The "raising up" (R. V.; not "again," as in A. V.) of Jesus, spoken of in verse 33, is the bringing of the Messiah into the world for his mediatorial work. Compare Rom. 9: 17, "For this same purpose have I raised thee up" (ἐξήγειρά σε). This incarnation of the Son, St. Paul says was promised in "the second psalm." He then proceeds (Acts 13: 34) to prove the fulfilment of the promise that the Messiah should be *raised from the dead*, by quoting from Isa. 55: 3, and from the sixteenth psalm (ver. 10): "And as concerning that he raised him up from the dead, he said on this wise, I will give you the sure mercies of David; and in another psalm, Thou wilt not suffer thine Holy One to see corruption." The choice, therefore, lies between the first and second explanations; and the deity of the son is proved by Ps. 2: 7, in either case. It is directly taught by the first explanation; and impliedly by the second. Because, the incarnation of the Son supposes his prior unincarnate existence and position.

Augustine (Trinity, II. i.) classifies the texts referring to the Son in the following manner: 1. Texts teaching the unity and equality of substance between the Father and Son: such as, "I and my Father are one," John 10: 30;

“Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God,” Phil. 2:6. 2. Texts teaching the inferiority of the Son on account of his having taken the form of a servant: such as, “My Father is greater than I,” John 14:28; “The Father hath given Him authority to execute judgment, because He is the Son of man,” John 5:27. 3. Texts teaching neither equality nor inferiority, but only that the Son is *of* the Father: such as, “For as the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself,” and, “The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do,” John 5:20, 19.

Before proceeding to prove the *Deity of God the Holy Spirit*, it is necessary to notice the technical use of “Spirit,” and of “Holy” in this connection. The third person in the Godhead is denominated the Spirit with reference to his person, not his essence. He is no more spiritual as to his substance than is the Father or the Son. He is denominated the Spirit, because of the mode in which the essence is *communicated* to him; namely, by spiration: Spiritus, quia spiratus. “The Father is spirit and the Son is spirit, but the Holy Ghost is emphatically *the* Spirit. Not that he is spirit in any higher, or any different sense of the word spirit, but upon other accounts, the name of Spirit is emphatically and more peculiarly attributed to him.” Waterland: Second Defence, Qu. II. Neither is he denominated the “Holy” Spirit because holiness is any more peculiar to him than to the first and second persons; but because he is the *author* of holiness in creatures. The epithet “Holy,” also, relates to the person, not the essence.

Socinians deny the distinct personality of the Holy Spirit; they concede eternity, because they regard the Spirit as the influence or effluence of the eternal God. That the Holy Spirit is a *Person*, is certain: 1. Because he speaks of himself in the first person. Acts 10:19, “I have sent them.” Acts 13:2, “Separate for me Barnabas and Saul,

for the work whereunto I have called them." 2. Because personal acts are attributed to him. (a) Teaching, John 14:26. (b) Witnessing, John 15:26; Rom. 8:16. (c) Revealing future events, 1 Tim. 4:1. (d) Searching the depths of God, 1 Cor. 2:10. (e) Setting apart and sending persons for the ministry, Is. 61:1; Acts 13:2; 20:28. (f) Creating, Gen. 1:2. (g) The miraculous conception, Luke 1:35. (h) Ordinary and extraordinary gifts are bestowed, 1 Cor. 12:11. 3. Because he is described as personally distinct from the Father and Son, being sent by them. John 14:16; 15:26; 16:7. This separate and personal distinctness is marked by the use of the masculine pronoun with the neuter article and noun. John 16:13: ὅταν ἐλθῇ ἐκεῖνος τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας; Eph. 1:13: Believers are sealed τῷ πνεύματι, ὃς ἐστὶν ἄρραβὼν, etc. 4. Because he co-operates with equal power and authority with the Father and the Son, in conferring and sealing blessings to the church. This is proved by the baptismal formula, Matt. 28:19; the apostolic benediction, 2 Cor. 13:14; the witnessing respecting redemption in Christ, 1 John 5:7: "There are three that bear record, the Spirit, the water, and the blood, and these three agree in one." 5. Because he appears in theophanies. In the form of a dove, Matt. 3:16; in the form of a tongue of flame, Acts 2:3, 4. 6. Because sin is committed against the Holy Spirit. Is. 63:10, "They rebelled and vexed his Holy Spirit." Matt. 12:31, 32, The unpardonable sin. Acts 5:3, Ananias and Sapphira lied against the Holy Ghost. 7. Because the Spirit is distinguished from the gifts of the Spirit, 1 Cor. 12:4, 8, 11; and from the energy (δύναμις) of the Spirit, Luke 4:14; Luke 1:35.

That the Holy Spirit is a *Divine* Person is clear: 1. Because the *Divine name* is given to him. In Isaiah 6:9, Jehovah speaks, and in Acts 28:25 the Holy Ghost is said to speak the same words. In 2 Sam. 23:2, 3, "The Spirit of the Lord spake; and he is called the God of Israel."

The lie of Ananias against the Holy Spirit was a lie against God, Acts 5 : 3. The believer's body is the temple of God, because the Holy Spirit dwells in it, 1 Cor. 3 : 16 ; 6 : 19. The indwelling of the Holy Spirit, is the indwelling of God. "We know that we dwell in God, and God dwelleth in us, because he hath given us of his Spirit," 1 John 4 : 13.

2. Because the Divine *attributes* are ascribed to him. (a) Eternity. Gen. 1 : 2. (b) Omnipresence. Ps. 139 : 7, 8, "Whither shall I flee from thy Spirit?" 1 Cor. 3 : 16, "The Holy Spirit dwelleth in you." (c) Omniscience. 1 Cor. 2 : 10, "The Spirit searcheth the deep things of God." John 16 : 13, "He shall guide you unto all truth, and show you things to come." 2 Peter 1 : 21, "Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." (d) Omnipotence. Luke 1 : 35, "The power of the Highest" is the power of the Holy Ghost. Romans 8 : 11, "He shall quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit which dwelleth in you."

3. Because Divine *works* are attributed to him. (a) Creation, Gen. 1 : 2 ; Ps. 33 : 6. (b) Preservation and government, Ps. 104 : 30. (c) Miracles, Matt. 12 : 28 ; 1 Cor. 12 : 4 ; Luke 1 : 35. (d) The unction and mission of the Messiah, Isa. 61 : 1. (e) Remission of sin and regeneration, 1 Cor. 6 : 11 ; John 3 : 5. (f) Government of the Church, Acts 13 : 2 ; 15 : 28 ; 20 : 28. (g) Prediction of future events, John 16 : 13 ; Acts 11 : 28. (h) Charismata, 1 Cor. 12 : 7-11. (i) Illumination, Eph. 1 : 17, 18. (j) Sanctification, 2 Thess. 2 : 13 ; 1 Pet. 1 : 2. (k) Resurrection of the dead, Rom. 8 : 11.

4. Because Divine *worship* is rendered to him : In the baptismal formula, Matt. 28 : 19. In the apostolic benediction, 2 Cor. 13 : 14 ; Rev. 1 : 4. In this last passage, the "seven spirits," are the Holy Spirit ; who is so called, because of the variety of his gifts ; because it is the perfect number in the Jewish idea ; and because of an allusion to

the seven churches addressed.¹ 1 Cor. 6 : 20, "Glorify God in your body, which is God's;" but it is the Holy Spirit who dwells in the body as his temple, (verse 19). Acts 4 : 24, 25, "Lord thou art God, who by the mouth of thy servant David hast said, Why do the heathen rage?" But David spake by the Holy Spirit, so that this act of worship on the part of the disciples terminated on the Holy Spirit.

The reason why less is said in Scripture respecting the adoration and worship of the third person than of the others is, that in the economy of redemption it is the office of the Spirit to awaken feelings of worship, and naturally, therefore, he appears more as the author than the object of worship. But a person who by an internal operation can awaken feelings of worship is ipso facto God.

The deity of the Holy Spirit is proved by the nature of his spiration and procession. It is marked by the same characteristics with those of the generation of the Son. It is eternal; never beginning and never ending. It is necessary; not dependent upon the optional will of either the first or second persons. And it is an emanation out of the one eternal essence; not the creation of a new substance from nothing. The procession of the Holy Spirit is not that temporal and external afflatus which terminates upon creatures, in inspiration, regeneration, and sanctification; but that eternal and internal spiration whereby a subsistence in the Divine essence results.

How procession differs from generation, it is impossible to explain. "That there is a difference between generation and procession, we have taught, but what is the manner of the difference, we do not at all pretend to teach." John of Damascus: *De Orthodoxa Fide*, IV. x. "There is a differ-

¹ In Rev. 5 : 6, "The seven spirits of God sent forth into all the earth," are the "seven eyes of the Lamb." In the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs, "seven spirits" of error are described who stand for Satan the archspirit of evil. Grabe: *Spicilegium*, I. 146.

ence between generation and procession, but I do not know how to distinguish them, because both are ineffable." Augustine: *Contra Maximinum*, XIX. Some of the schoolmen attempted to explain the difference, by saying that the generation of the Son is by the mode of the understanding and intellect, and hence the Son is called Wisdom and Word; but the procession of the Spirit is by the mode of the will and affections, and hence the Spirit is called Love. Turretin (III. xxi. 3) distinguishes the difference by the following particulars: 1. In respect to the source. Generation is from the Father alone; procession is from the Father and Son. 2. In respect to the effects. Generation not only results in a hypostatical personality, but in resemblance. The Son is the "image" of the Father; but the Spirit is not the image of the Father and Son. An image is a representation of one, not of two persons. Generation, again, is accompanied with the power to communicate the essence; procession is not. 3. In respect to the order of relationship. Filiation is second, and procession is third. In the order of nature, not of time, spiration is after generation. The Father and Son spirate the Spirit, not as two different essences, in each of whom resides a spirative energy—which would result in two processions—but as two personal subsistences of one essence, who concur in one resulting procession. There are two spirations, but only one procession. Turretin, III. xxxi. 6.

The Latin church objected to the Greek insertion of *μόνου* in article 7 of the Athanasian Symbol: *ἀπό τοῦ (μόνου) πατρὸς*; and the Greek church blamed the Latin for adding Filioque to the Nicene Symbol, at the Council of Toledo, in 589. At the Council of Florence, in 1439, a compromise was made, whereby it was decided that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father by (per) the Son. But the Greeks receded from this, and stood upon their first position. The use of per implies instrumental agency, which is inaccurate.

Says Turretin (III. xxxi. 5), "Although the Greeks ought not to be regarded as heretics for their opinion, neither ought the schism between the West and East to have arisen upon this ground, yet the opinion of the Latins is more in accordance with Scriptures, and there is more reason for retaining it than for rejecting it: Because: 1. The Spirit is sent not less by the Son than by the Father, John 16:7; but he could not be sent by the Son, unless he proceeded from him. 2. The Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son, not less than of the Father, Gal. 4:6; Rom. 8:9; Phil. 1:19. 3. Whatever the Spirit has, he has not less from the Son than from the Father, John 16:13-15; and as the Son is said to be from the Father because he does not speak of himself, but from the Father, from whom he has all things, so the Spirit ought to be said to proceed from the Son, because he hears and speaks from him. 4. Christ breathed the Spirit upon his disciples (John 20:22), and this temporal spiration implies an eternal."

CHAPTER V.

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

Charnocke : On the Attributes. Howe : Oracles of God, Lectures XVII.-XXV. Schleiermacher : Glaubenslehre, § 50-56 ; 79-85. Twisten : Dogmatik, II. ii. Nitzsch : Christian Doctrine, § 65-75. Hodge : Theology, I. 368-439. Van Oosterzee : Dogmatics, I. 251-272. Martensen : Dogmatics, § 46-51. Strong : Theology, IV. i.

THE Divine Attributes are modes either of the relation, or of the operation of the Divine essence. They are, consequently, an analytical and closer description of the essence. "Every divine attribute," says Nitzsch (Doctrine, § 67), "is a conception of the idea of God." The terms "conception" and "idea" are here employed as in the philosophy of Schelling. As the general and undefined idea is reduced to the form of the particular and definite conception, so the general Divine essence is contemplated in the particular attribute. The attributes are not parts of the essence, of which this latter is composed. The whole essence is in each attribute, and the attribute in the essence. We must not conceive of the essence as existing by itself, and prior to the attributes, and of the attributes as an addition to it. God is not essence *and* attributes, but *in* attributes. The attributes are essential qualities of God. Hence Augustine, the Schoolmen, Calvin and Melancthon say that "*divinae virtutes sunt ipsa essentia.*" Turretin (III. v. 7) remarks that "*attributa dei non possunt realiter differre ab essentia, vel inter se tanquam res et res.*"

The Divine attributes are of two classes, according as they

denote a passive relation of the essence, or an active operation of it. 1. The essence considered as passively related to itself, is self-existent and simple; as passively related to duration, is eternal; to space, is immense; to number, is one. Self-existence, simplicity, eternity, immensity, and unity are not active operations of the Divine essence, but inactive relationships of it. Eternity, immensity, unity, and simplicity, and the like, are not modes of energizing but of existing. 2. The essence considered as in action yields attributes of a second class. When, for example, the Divine essence is contemplated as simply energizing, this is omnipotence; as cognizing, this is omniscience; as adapting means to ends, this is wisdom; as energizing benevolently or kindly, this is goodness. These attributes are the Divine essence, whole and entire, contemplated in a particular mode of external operation.

The Divine attributes are objective and real, and not merely man's subjective mode of conception. We cannot say that we conceive of God as omnipotent, omnipresent, wise, good, and just, but that in fact he is not so. These attributes are objectively real, because the entire Divine essence is in them. The essence is not phenomenal and unreal, consequently the attributes are not. In proportion as speculation has been engaged with the Divine essence while neglecting or denying the Divine attributes, it has been pantheistic; because it has occupied itself with a subject without predicates, a substance without properties. The Monad of gnosticism and the Absolute of pantheism are examples. These are mere mental abstractions, like the unknown quantity of algebra.

The difference between a Divine attribute and a Divine person is, that the person is a mode of the *existence* of the essence; while the attribute is a mode either of the *relation*, or of the external *operation* of the essence. The qualifying adjective "external" is important; because the internal operation of the essence describes a trinitarian person.

When the Divine essence energizes ad intra, the operation is generation, or spiration, and the essence so energizing is the Father, or the Son; but when the Divine essence energizes ad extra, the operation is omnipotence, or omniscience, or benevolence, etc. A trinitarian person is a mode of the essence; a divine attribute is a phase of the essence.

Several attributes may be grouped under a general term. Wisdom and omniscience fall under the head of the understanding. They are cognitive attributes, involving perception only. Goodness and mercy fall under the head of the will. They are voluntary attributes, in the sense that their exercise is sovereign and optional. Such attributes, consequently, are phases of the Divine understanding and will. In Scripture, all the attributes are sometimes summed up under the term "glory" (*δόξα*). "The heavens declare the glory of God," Ps. 19: 1. Sometimes, however, the context shows that a particular attribute is meant, as in Rom. 6: 4, where Christ is said to be "raised by the glory of the Father." "Glory" here denotes the divine omnipotence. Compare John 2: 11.

The number and classification of the Divine attributes is attended with some difficulty, and has led to considerable difference of opinion among theologians. Some reckon self-existence, immensity, simplicity, eternity, and the like, among the Divine attributes; others do not. Nitzsch (*Christian Doctrine*, § 66) denies that infinity, eternity, and immutability, are properly denominated attributes.

The Divine attributes have been classified as incommunicable and communicable; natural and moral; immanent or intransitive, and emanent or transitive; positive and negative; absolute and relative; active and passive. The incommunicable attributes are those that belong to God exclusively, so that there is nothing resembling them in a created spirit. They admit of no degrees, but are Divine by their very nature. Such are self-existence, simplicity, infinity, eternity, immutability. The communicable attri-

butes are those which are possessed in a finite degree, more or less, by men and angels. Such are wisdom, benevolence, holiness, justice, compassion, truth. It is with reference to these, that man is said to be created in the image of God, Gen. 1 : 27; and to be made partaker, by regeneration, of a divine nature, 2 Pet. 1 : 4; and is commanded to imitate God: "Be ye holy, for I am holy," 1 Pet. 1 : 16. That they cannot be in a creature in an infinite degree is proved by Matt. 19 : 17: "There is none [infinitely] good but one." The natural attributes belong to the constitutional nature, as distinguished from the will of God. Such are self-existence, simplicity, infinity, eternity, immutability, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence. Wisdom is sometimes assigned to the natural, and sometimes to the moral. The moral attributes are truth, goodness, holiness, justice, mercy, etc. The immanent or intransitive attributes are those which do not go forth and operate outside of the Divine essence, but remain internal. Such are immensity, eternity, simplicity, self-existence, etc. The emanent or transitive attributes issue forth and produce effects external to God. Such are omnipotence, benevolence, justice, etc. The positive attributes are those which belong in a finite degree to the creature. The negative are those from which all finite imperfection is negatived or removed. The absolute attributes express the relation of God to himself; the relative attributes express his relation to the world. Among the former are simplicity, self-existence, unity, eternity. Among the latter are omnipotence, omniscience, etc. The active attributes involve the idea of action: for example, omnipotence, justice, benevolence. The passive attributes involve the idea of rest: for example, self-existence, immensity, eternity, etc.

We adopt the classification of incommunicable and communicable attributes. The Westminster Shorter Catechism, Q. 4, favors this arrangement, by mentioning first, three of the incommunicable attributes; which are followed by

communicable attributes that are qualified by the former: "God is a spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth."

The Self-existence of God (*aseitas*) denotes that the ground of his being is in himself. In this reference, it is sometimes said that God is his own cause. But this is objectionable language. God is the uncaused Being, and in this respect differs from all other beings. The category of cause and effect is inapplicable to the existence of a necessary and eternal Being.

The Simplicity of God denotes that his being is uncompounded, incomplex, and indivisible: "a most pure spirit, without parts." Simplicity does not belong to angels and men. They are complex, being composed of soul and body: two substances, not one. They are not unembodied and mere spirit. The angels, like the redeemed after the resurrection, have a spiritual body, which does not mean a body made of spirit, but one adapted to a spiritual world. A spiritual body belongs to the world of extended form, not of unextended mind. The simplicity of the Divine being is not contradictory to the trinity of his essence, because trinity does not denote three different essences, but one essence subsisting in three modes. The trinitarian distinctions no more conflict with the simplicity of the essence, than do the attributes. The essence is not divided into either hypostases, or attributes. The whole essence is in each person, and in each attribute. The theory of external emanation is incompatible with the simplicity of the Divine essence. A substance which by efflux of particles can flow out into new forms, like rays from the sun, is compounded and complex. When it is said, in Rom. 11:36, that "all things are of him" (*ἐξ αὐτοῦ*), it is not meant that the universe is an effluent portion of the Divine essence, but that it originates from him as its creator. When it is said, in Acts 17:28, that man is the offspring

(*γένος*) of God, it is not meant that man participates in the Divine essence, but possesses a nature similar to that of God.

The Infinity of God is the Divine essence viewed as having no bounds, or limits. And since limitation implies imperfection, the infinity of God implies that he is perfect in every respect in which he is infinite. If knowledge in any being has bounds, it is imperfect knowledge; if holiness has degrees or limits in any rational spirit, it is imperfect holiness. Yet finite holiness is real excellence, and limited knowledge is real knowledge. The finiteness of holiness does not convert it into sin; neither does the limitedness of knowledge convert it into error, or untruth. The imperfection or limitation of the finite relates not to *quality*, but to quantity. Infinity is a general term denoting a characteristic belonging to all the communicable attributes of God. His power, his knowledge, his veracity is infinite. It also characterizes the being of God, as well as his attributes. His essence is infinite. In this respect, infinity is like eternity and immutability. These latter, like the former, pervade the essence and all the communicable attributes. The Westminster Shorter Catechism, Q. 4, defines God to be a Spirit who is "infinite, eternal, and unchangeable," first in his essential "being," then in his "wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." The Divine infinity is taught in Job 11 : 7-9. "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection? It is as high as heaven, what canst thou do? deeper than hell, what canst thou know? The measure thereof is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea."

The Immensity (in mensum) of God is his essence as related to space. The Divine essence is not measurable, because not included in any limits of place. "The heaven of heavens cannot contain thee," 1 Kings 8 : 27; 2 Chron. 2 : 6; Jer. 23 : 24. God's immensity is spiritual, having no extension of substance.

By virtue of God's immensity, he is Omnipresent. Immensity and omnipresence are thus inseparably connected, and are best considered in reference to each other. Omnipresence has respect to the universe of created beings and things; to space as filled. Immensity has reference to this, and to what is beyond; to space as void: the "extra flam-mantia moenia mundi," of Lucretius (*De Natura*, I. 74). God is said to be beyond the universe (*extra mundum*), not in the sense that there are spaces beyond the universe which he fills by extension of substance, but in the sense that the universe does not exhaust his immensity, or is equal to it. "God's immensity," says Schleiermacher (*Glaubenslehre*, § 53), "is almighty immensity which determines or conditions space itself, and all that exists in space."

The presence of mind is wholly different from that of matter. Spiritual substance is present, wherever it is present, as a complete *whole* at every point. The human soul, for example, is present as a unity and totality at every point of the body. It is not present as the body is, partitively, or by division of substance. God, also, as the infinite Spirit, is present at every point of space as a totality. He is not present in the universe by division of substance, but as a unity, simple and undivided. This is taught in the dicta: "The soul is all in every part;" "God is a circle whose centre is everywhere, and circumference nowhere." Omnipresence is taught in Ps. 139 : 7 sq., "Whither shall I go from thy presence?"; Jer. 23 : 23 sq.; Is. 61 : 1; Acts 17 : 24.

The Divine omnipresence means rather the presence of all things to God, than God's presence to all things. They are in his presence, but he is not in their presence. When it is said, Jer. 23 : 24, "Do not I fill heaven and earth, saith the Lord," the language is tropical. If God were literally contained in the universe, the universe would be more immense than he is. "Nothing contains thee, but thou containest all things," says Anselm (*Proslogium* 19). (a)

omnipresence of God is not like the presence of a material body in a locality. This excludes the presence of another body ; but God's presence does not exclude that of matter. "God," says Augustine (*De diversis quaestionibus*, I. 20), "is not at some particular place (*alicubi*). For what is at some particular place is contained in space ; and what is contained in some space is body. And yet because God exists and is not in space, all things are in him. Yet not so in him, as if he himself were a place in which they are."

(*b*) The Divine omnipresence is not like the presence of a finite spirit embodied in a material form. The soul of man, though not standing in the same relation to space that matter does, is yet not everywhere present, but is confined to a certain place ; namely, the circumference of the body. "*In quo loco est animus? credo equidem in capite: et cur credam, afferre possum: sed alias: nunc ubi sit animus, certe quidem inte est.*" Cicero, *Tusc. Quaest.* I. 3. (*c*) The omnipresence of God is not by extension, multiplication, or division of essence. He is *all* in every place, similarly as the soul is *all* in every part of the body. The whole essence of God is here, is there, and everywhere.

God is said to be "in heaven," "in believers," "in hell," etc., because of a special manifestation of his glory, or his grace, or his retribution. In this reference, sinners are said to be "away" from God, and God from them. Some theologians have taught a "*specialis aproximatio essentiae divinae ad substantiam credentium,*" upon the strength of John 14:23: "We will come unto him and make our abode with him." But this is unnecessary. "The essential presence of God is the same everywhere ; the influxive declarative presence of God is special, and otherwise in one place than another." Bates: *On Heaven*.

Some Socinian and deistical writers deny God's omnipresence as to essence, and assert only a presence by operation from a distance. Newton seems to refer to this in a scholium at the end of the *Principia*: "God is one and the

same God always and everywhere. He is omnipresent, not by means of his energy (virtus) alone, but also by his substance; for energy cannot subsist without substance." The pagan acknowledged the Divine omnipresence. "Jovis omnia esse plena," says Aratus. Virgil remarks that "deum ire per omnes terras tractusque maris, coelumque profundum." Compare also Seneca: *De Benevolentia*, I. 8.

The Eternity of God is his essence as related to duration. It is duration without beginning, without end, and without succession. Gen. 21 : 33, "The eternal God." Is. 57 : 15, "The One that inhabiteth eternity." Ps. 90 : 2, "From eternity to eternity, thou art God." Ps. 102 : 26-28 ; Is. 41 : 4 ; 1 Tim. 1 : 17, "The King eternal." 1 Tim. 6 : 16, "The Lord of lords who only hath immortality." Rev. 1 : 8, "I am Alpha and Omega." The French version of the Scriptures renders Jehovah by l'Éternel.

Eternity is different from immortality, or simple endlessness. The schoolmen denominated the latter sempiternitas and aeviternitas. This is duration with succession, and has a beginning, but no end. Eternity considered as without beginning is described as a parte ante ; as without ending, as a parte post. But the terms "before" and "after," in this description, are tropical. They bring in the notion of time and succession, by which to explain ; so that this definition is by quantity, not by quality. Locke's definition of eternity as "infinite time, without beginning and ending," is inadequate, because it makes eternity to be a species of time. The omission of successionlessness, in this definition, is fatal to accuracy. Eternity with succession is like immensity with extension, and omniscience with contingency. Some have defined eternity as the "timeless," the "supra-temporal," in order to distinguish it in kind from time. Says Schleiermacher (*Glaubenslehre*, § 52), "we must negative from God, not only all limits of time, but time itself."

That clause in the definition of eternity which represents

it as without sequences and succession, defines it according to quality. The schoolmen explain by saying that God, by reason of his eternity, has a *simultaneous* possession of his total duration. The creature comes into possession of his total duration *gradually*, and piecemeal. The whole of the Divine knowledge and experience is ever before the Divine being, so that there are not parts succeeding parts. The image that represents eternity is the ocean; that which represents time is the river. "The eternity of God's existence," says Edwards (Will, IV. viii.), "is nothing else but his immediate, perfect, and invariable possession of the whole of his unlimited life, together and at once. It is equally improper to talk of months and years of the Divine existence, and mile-squares of deity." Says Aquinas (Summa, I. x. 4), "eternitas est tota simul; in tempore, autem, est prius et posterius. Ergo tempus et eternitas non sunt idem." Says Boethius (De Consolatione, V. iv.), "eternitas est mensura esse permanentis, tempus vero est mensura motus." Says Hooker (Pol., V. lxix.), "only God hath true immortality or eternity, that is to say, continuance wherein groweth no difference by addition of hereafter unto now." Says Smith (Existence of God), "an infinitely comprehensive mind hath a simultaneous possession of its own never-flitting life; and because it finds no succession in its own immutable understanding, therefore it cannot find anything to measure out its own duration. And therefore the Platonists were wont to attribute *αἰών* or eternity, to God; not so much because he had neither beginning nor end of days, but because of his immutable and uniform nature." Compare King: Origin of Evil, I. iii.; Locke: Understanding, II. xiv. 10; Anselm: Proslogium, 19.

In Scripture, the eternity of God is denoted by the term "to-day." Ps. 2:7, "To-day have I begotten thee." The eternal generation of the second trinitarian person is here described by the present alone, to the exclusion of the past

and the future. This is the particular element in time which is best fitted to express the nature of the successionless, and the unchangeable. The instant is a point of time, and has no sequences. Hence eternity has been defined as an "eternal Now," or an "universal Present." Kant regards time as a form of the understanding; that is, as the manner in which the finite mind thinks, by reason of its finiteness. Similarly, Berkeley (*Principles of Knowledge*, § 98) defines time to be the succession of thoughts in the human mind. If this definition be accepted, then there is no time for God, because there is no succession of thoughts in his mind. The form and manner of God's consciousness is totally different in respect to succession, from that of man's consciousness. He does not think sequaciously as man and angel do. "My thoughts are not as your thoughts," Is. 55 : 8.

The instantaneous vision, and successionless unchanging consciousness of the Divine omniscience, in comparison with the gradual view and successive increasing knowledge of the creature, have been thus illustrated. A person stands at a street corner, and sees a procession passing, whose component parts he does not know beforehand. He first sees white men, then black men, and lastly red men. When the last man has passed, he knows that the procession was composed of Europeans, Africans, and Indians. Now suppose that from a church tower he should see at one glance of the eye, the whole procession. Suppose that he saw no one part of it before the other, but that the total view was instantaneous. His knowledge of the procession would be all-comprehending, and without succession. He would not come into the knowledge of the components of the procession, as he did in the former case, gradually and part by part. And yet the procession would have its own movement still, and would be made up of parts that follow each other. Though the vision and knowledge of the procession, in this instance, is instantaneous, the procession it-

self is gradual. In like manner, the vast sequences of human history, and the still vaster sequences of physical history, appear all at once, and without any consciousness of succession, to the Divine observer. This is implied in the assertion that God "declareth the end from the beginning," Is. 46 : 10 ; and that "known unto God are all things from the beginning of the world," Acts 15 : 18. Both extremes of that unlimited series which make up the history of the created universe, together with all the intermediates, are seen at once, by the eternal Creator of the universe. Says Charnocke (Eternity of God), "though there be a succession and order of things as they *exist*, there is no succession in God in regard to his *knowledge* of them. God knows the things that shall be wrought, and the order of them in their being brought upon the stage of the world ; yet both the things and the order, he knows by *one* act [of knowledge]. The death of Christ was to precede his resurrection in the order of time ; there is a succession in this ; both at once are known by God ; yet the [one] act of his knowledge is not exercised about Christ as dying and rising at the same moment ; so that there is a succession in things, when there is no succession in God's knowledge of things." Man knows a succession successively ; God knows a succession instantaneously, and simultaneously. God sees the end from the beginning, and hence for him there is no interval nor sequence between the end and the beginning. Man sees the end from the end, not from the beginning, and hence there is an interval and sequence, for him, between the two.

Not only is God's act of knowledge eternal and successionless, but his act of power is so likewise. God creates all things from eternity by one act of power, as he knows all things from eternity by one act of knowledge, and as he decrees all things from eternity by one act of will. As we must employ the singular, not the plural, when we speak of the eternal decree, so we must when we speak of the eternal causation. There is one eternal all-comprehending decree,

and one eternal all-creating cause. For God, there is no series in his action any more than in his cognition, or in his purpose. God's energy as the *cause* of the creation is one and successionless, like his decree; the creation itself, as the *effect* of this eternal cause, is a successive series. The cause is one; the effect is many. The cause is eternal; the effect is temporal. For the Divine consciousness, the creation of the world is not in the past, and the destruction of the world is not in the future. God is not conscious of an interval of thousands of years between the act by which he created the heaven and the earth "in the beginning" (Gen. 1:1), and the act by which he created man on "the sixth day" (Gen. 1:26), because, in this case, one would be older than the other, and thus only one of them would be an eternal act. God's causative energizing in both instances was eternal, and therefore simultaneous; but the effects of it were successive and temporal. It is impossible for the human mind to comprehend, or even to conceive of this. But it is necessary to postulate it, in order to maintain the Divine immutability and omniscience. Neither of these attributes can be established, if it be held that God's consciousness respecting his exertion of power is successive like that of man or angel. Should we define God's eternal causation as an endless succession of creative volitions, then God's consciousness of his future creative volitions is in the future, like that of man and angel. This is fatal to omniscience, when the consciousness relates to cognition; and fatal to immutability, when the consciousness relates to action. If the Divine will, like the human, energized successively through the six days of creation, so that in the Divine consciousness the Divine willing on the first day preceded the Divine willing on the second, and the Divine willing upon the third followed that upon the second, then God, like man and angel, is conscious that two days are longer than one, and three days longer than two; which is contrary to the statement that "one day is with the Lord as a thousand

years, and a thousand years as one day," 2 Pet. 3 : 8 ; and to the affirmation that " a thousand years in his sight are but as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night," Ps. 90 : 4. The volition by which God created " the heaven and the earth " (Gen. 1 : 1) is eternal, but the heaven and the earth are not eternal. If the matter of the earth was originated *ex nihilo* (say) twenty million years ago, this matter is now exactly twenty million years old. But the Divine volition that originated it is not exactly twenty million years old. The created effect can be measured by days and years, but the creative cause cannot be.

Eternity implies perfection and completeness ; time implies imperfection and incompleteness. An eternal being, and an eternal consciousness, never improve and never deteriorate ; a temporal being and consciousness is continually experiencing one or the other. A creature increases in knowledge in certain directions, and loses knowledge in others. He acquires information and he forgets. The Creator has infinite knowledge at every instant, and neither learns nor forgets. " The duration of everything must of necessity be agreeable to its nature ; and, therefore, as that whose imperfect nature is ever flowing like a river, and consists in continual motion and changes one after another, must needs have accordingly a successive and flowing duration, sliding perpetually from present into past, and always posting on toward the future, expecting something of itself which is not yet in being, but to come ; so must that whose perfect nature is essentially immutable, and always the same, and necessarily existent, have a permanent duration, never losing anything of itself once present, as sliding away from it, nor yet running forward to meet something of itself before, which is not yet in being." Cudworth : Intellectual System, I. v. It follows, therefore, that there is no *evolution*, or *development* in an eternal essence and consciousness. Evolution is change, by the very definition.

Development is a transition from one mode of existence and experience to another. If there be evolution in a consciousness, then the consciousness is mutable, successive, fractional, and incomplete; if there be no evolution in a consciousness, and it is without succession, then the consciousness is immutable, simultaneous, omniscient, and complete.

This characteristic of an eternal being and consciousness is enunciated in the scholastic dictum: "Deus est actus purissimus sine ulla potentialitate." There is nothing potential or latent in the deity, as there always is in created and finite natures. "Necesse est id quod primum ens, esse in actu, et nullo modo in potentia," says Aquinas, *Summa*, I. iii. 1. One fatal error in the pantheistic conception of God is, that it attributes potentiality to him. It maintains that God is capable of evolution, and that he is endlessly passing through a process of development. This obliterates the distinction between the Infinite and the finite, by ascribing to the former a characteristic that belongs only to the latter. The Infinite cannot be the perfect, if the pantheistic postulate be true. For if the Infinite being is passing from lower to higher modes of existence and of consciousness, as finite being is, absolute and immutable perfection cannot be attributed to him. Moreover, since evolution may be from the more perfect to the less perfect, as well as from the less perfect to the more perfect, it follows from the pantheistic theory, that the Infinite being may tend downward, and become evil. See Shedd: *Theological Essays*, 134.

The all-comprehending and unchanging consciousness of God excludes *memory*. This can belong only to the finite mind. As there is nothing past in the consciousness of God, there can be no such act in him as that of recalling the past to mind. He neither remembers nor forgets, in the literal sense, because the *whole* of his knowledge is simultaneously and perpetually present. And this whole, or sum total, of

omniscience, includes all that which for the creature is included in past, present, and future time.

The term "eternity" is sometimes employed in a secondary signification, to denote the future world in distinction from this; as when it is said that a deceased man has gone into eternity. In this case, eternity does not denote successionless existence, but the spiritual existence of the next life. Men and angels cannot have the unchanging eternal consciousness of God. Every finite mind must think, feel, and act in time. Time is the necessary form of the finite understanding. This is one of the elements of difference between the Infinite and the finite.

"Immediate are the acts of God, more swift
Than time, or motion; but to human ears
Cannot without process of speech be told,
So told as earthly notion can receive."—MILTON.

Augustine upon this point errs, in attributing a successionless intuition to the beatific vision of the saints and angels. In the heaven of heavens, "the inhabitants," he says (Confessions, XII. xiii.), "know all at once, not in part, not darkly, not through a glass, but as a whole, in manifestation, face to face, not this thing now, and that thing anon, but all at once, without succession of times." God understands the finite form of cognition, though it is not the form of cognition for him. He knows that for the creature there is an interval between events, but this does not imply that for him there is an interval. He perfectly comprehends man's knowledge by sensation, but this does not prove that he himself has sensation. "He knoweth our frame, and remembereth that we are dust," but he has no such personal consciousness of frailty.

The idea of an existence and consciousness without sequences and succession is difficult even to entertain, much less to comprehend. There is nothing analogous to it in human consciousness, which is wholly successive. Hence

the idea of the Divine eternity as without evolution, and change, is even more baffling to human intelligence than is the idea of triunity. The former is a greater mystery than the latter. The notions of paternity, filiation, and procession, enable the human mind to seize upon the doctrine of the trinity, but there are no corresponding points of contact in the doctrine of the Divine eternity. For this reason, some theologians define eternity as infinite time, and deny that it is without succession. They assert that there are sequences and intervals in God's consciousness, as there are in that of men and angels. This was the opinion of Clericus. But greater difficulties follow from the denial, than from the affirmation of a consciousness without succession in God. It is certain that God is omniscient and immutable; but he can be neither, if his mind is subject to the same categories of time and space with the created mind. For both are associated. A creature of time is also a creature of space. A finite spirit cannot be omnipresent. It is embodied, and therefore must exist in a locality. "The eternity of God," says Schleiermacher (*Glaubenslehre*, § 52, 54), "is to be conceived as omnipotent eternity, that is, as that which in God determines and conditions time itself, with all that is temporal. God is *βασίλευς τῶν αἰώνων*, 1 Tim. 1:17." Similarly, Augustine (*Confessions*, XI. xiii.) denominates God "fabricator temporum." Schleiermacher objects to the separation of the attribute of eternity from that of omnipotence, when it is defined as merely the relation of God to duration; in that it represents him as merely existing passively, whereas he is intrinsically active and energizing. The remark that there is nothing analogous in human consciousness to the successionless consciousness of the Supreme being, perhaps needs some qualification. Those who have been brought to the brink of the grave, and then brought back, speak of a seemingly instantaneous survey of their whole past life. The following from Frances Kemble Butler's *Records of Later Life* is striking. She is describing

her experience during a fearful storm at sea. "As the vessel reeled under a tremendous shock, the conviction of our impending destruction became so intense in my mind, that my imagination suddenly presented to me the death-vision, so to speak, of my whole existence. I should find it impossible adequately to describe the vividness with which my whole past life presented itself to my perception; not as a procession of events, filling up a succession of years, but as a whole—a total—suddenly held up to me as in a mirror, indescribably awful, combined with the simultaneous, acute, and almost despairing sense of *loss*, of *waste*, so to speak, by which it was accompanied. This instantaneous involuntary retrospect was followed by a keen and rapid survey of the religious belief in which I had been trained, and which then seemed to me my only important concern." In all this, however, there is really a succession and a series; only it is so exceedingly rapid as to seem simultaneous.

The Immutability of God is the unchangeableness of his essence, attributes, purposes, and consciousness. Immutability results from eternity, as omnipresence does from immensity. That which has no evolution and no succession, is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. Malachi 3 : 6, "I am Jehovah, I change not;" Ps. 102 : 26, "The heavens shall perish, but thou shalt endure;" James 1 : 17, "With whom is no variableness (*παράλλαγη*), neither shadow of turning." Immutability belongs to the Divine essence; God can have no new attributes. It belongs also to the Divine will; his decrees are unalterable. The Socinians Crellius and Vorstius deny this latter; asserting that God can will what he once nilled, and nill what he once willed. This is contradicted by Scripture. Numbers 23 : 19, "God is not a man that he should lie; nor the son of man that he should repent;" Is. 46 : 10, "My counsel shall stand;" Ps. 33 : 11, "The counsel of the Lord standeth forever;" Ps. 110 : 4, "The Lord hath sworn and will not repent;" 1 Sam. 15 : 29, "The Strength of Israel will not lie nor repent;" Heb. 6 :

17, "Whereby, God, willing to show the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath." Immutability also characterizes the Divine consciousness. Nothing new is added to it, and nothing old is subtracted from it. Infinite knowledge is a fixed quantity, and so is an infinite experience. God is immutable because: (a) His being is from himself, and not from another. (b) He cannot change for the better, nor for the worse. (c) All causes and reasons for change are wanting, viz.: dependence upon another, error of mind, inconstancy of will and purpose. The act of creation *ex nihilo* made no change in God. It did not affect his own eternal essence; and his will and power to create were the same from eternity. Emanation *ad extra* would make a change in the essence. This is the outward effluence of substance, and diminishes the mass from which it issues. Incarnation made no change in God. The Divine essence was not transmuted into a human nature, but assumed a human nature into union with itself.

God is said to repent. Gen. 6 : 6, "It repented the Lord that he had made man upon the earth;" Jonah 3 : 10, "God repented of the evil that he had said that he would do unto them." This means no change in his attributes and character, but only in his manner of treating men. "Repentance in God is not a change of will, but a will to change." If God had treated the Ninevites after their repentance, as he had threatened to treat them before their repentance, this would have proved him to be mutable. It would have showed him to be at one time displeased with impenitence, and at another with penitence. Charnocke (*Immutability of God*) remarks that "the unchangeableness of God, when considered in relation to the exercise of his attributes in the government of the world, consists not in always acting in the same manner, however cases and circumstances may alter; but in always doing what is right, and in adapting his treatment of his intelligent creatures to the variation of their actions and characters. When the

devils, now fallen, stood as glorious angels, they were the objects of God's love, necessarily; when they fell, they were the objects of God's hatred, because impure. The same reason which made him love them while they were pure, made him hate them when they were criminal." It is one thing for God to will a change in created things external to himself, and another thing for him to change in his own nature and character. God can will a change in the affairs of men; such as the abrogation of the Levitical priesthood and ceremonial; and yet his own will remain immutable, because he had from eternity willed and decreed the change. In like manner, promises and threatenings that are made conditionally, and suppose a change in man, imply no change in the essence or attributes of God. "If that nation against whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I thought to do unto them," Jer. 18: 7-10. No change is made in God, as there is in the creature, by his knowledge. A creature increases his knowledge, and experiences a change intellectually. But God's knowledge is a fixed quantity, because it is infinite. He knows everything from everlasting to everlasting, and at each instant, and there is no more than everything. He knew before it came to pass, that Christ would be crucified upon Calvary. When that event occurred, it made no change in his knowledge. He was no better informed than he was before. He was no more certain of the crucifixion after the event, than he was before it, because he had decreed that it should take place. He could not have foreknown that it would take place, unless he had predetermined that it should. If God does not first decide that an event shall happen, he must wait and see whether it happens in order to any certain knowledge; and this would make a change in his knowledge.

God is an intelligent being, and knowledge is one of his communicable attributes. "God created man after his own image, in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness." Shorter

Catechism, Q. 10. The Divine essence considered as cognizing gives the attribute of Omniscience. 1 John 3:20, "God is greater than our hearts, and knoweth all things;" John 21:17, "Lord thou knowest all things;" Acts 15:18, "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world;" Heb. 4:13, "All things are naked and opened (*τετραχρηλισμένα*) unto the eye of him with whom we have to do;" Rom. 11:33; Matt. 6:32; 1 Kings 8:39; Ps. 139:1-16; Isa. 46:10; Ezek. 11:5.

The Divine knowledge is (*a*) Intuitive, as opposed to demonstrative or discursive; it is not obtained by comparing one thing with another, or deducing one truth from another; it is a direct vision. (*b*) Simultaneous, as opposed to successive; it is not received gradually into the mind, and by parts; the perception is total, and instantaneous. (*c*) Complete and certain, as opposed to incomplete and uncertain. The Divine knowledge excludes knowledge by the senses, gradual acquisition of knowledge, forgetting of knowledge, and recollection of knowledge.

God's omniscience, from the creature's point of view, is foreknowledge; but it is not foreknowledge from God's point of view. The Infinite mind comprehends all things in one simultaneous intuition, and, consequently, there is for it no "before," or "after." Says Charnocke (God's Knowledge), "God considers all things in his own simple knowledge as if they were now acted; and therefore some have chosen to call the knowledge of things to come, not prescience, or foreknowledge, but knowledge; because God sees all things at one instant." Says Owen (*Vindiciae*, V.), "God knows all things as they are; and in that order wherein they stand. Things that are past, as to the order of the creatures, he knows as past; not by remembrance, however, as we do; but by the same act of knowledge wherewith he knew them from all eternity, even before they were." But this knowledge of everything simultaneously and at once, is for the *finite* mind equivalent to

knowing before the event. Foreknowledge, strictly taken, implies an interval between the knowledge and the event. Had the Ninevites not repented, Nineveh would have been destroyed in accordance with the prophecy of Jonah. Forty days would have elapsed between Jonah's foreknowledge of the event, and the event itself. A series of occurrences and experiences would have intervened, and become gradually known by Jonah. But this is not true of the Divine mind. God is not conscious of an interval of several thousand years, between his knowledge of Christ's crucifixion and the occurrence of the crucifixion. For God, Christ was crucified from eternity, and the event was known and real to him from all eternity. Omniscience excludes both foreknowledge and subsequent knowledge. In this reference, Augustine (*De diversis quaestionibus*, II. ii. 2) says: "What is foreknowledge but the knowledge of the future. But what is future to God? For, if the divine knowledge includes all things at one instant, all things are present to him, and there is nothing future; and his knowledge is knowledge, and not foreknowledge." Says Charnocke (*God's Knowledge*), "the knowledge of one thing is not, in God, before another; one act of knowledge doth not beget another. In regard of the objects themselves, one thing is before another; one year before another; one generation of men before another; one is the cause, and the other is the effect; in the creature's mind there is such a succession, and God knows there will be such a succession; but there is no such order in God's knowledge; for he knows all those successions by one glance, without any succession of knowledge in himself."

God has a knowledge of all things that are possible, in distinction from things actual. He knows all that he can do. This is denominated *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*. It is knowledge that is confined to the Divine understanding, and never causes an act of the will. The things that are possible and known as such, are never made real. Char-

nocke (God's Knowledge) explains it as the knowledge not only of the possible, but as speculative in distinction from practical knowledge. "God knows evil not with a practical knowledge, so as to be the author of it, but with a speculative knowledge so as to understand the sinfulness of it; or a knowledge simplicis intelligentiae, of simple intelligence, as he permits it, not positively wills it." God has a knowledge of what is conditionally possible, that is, of those events which have never come to pass, but which might have occurred under certain possible conditions. This is denominated *scientia media*, or *conditionata*. For example, God knows that if a certain person should live to middle life, he would become exceedingly vicious and wicked. He prevents this by an early death of the person. Biblical instances are, Matt. 11: 21-23 (the repentance of Tyre and Sidon; of Sodom and Gomorrah); 1 Sam. 23: 5-14; Jer. 38: 17-20.

The doctrine of *scientia media* has been employed to explain the imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity. This sin is imputed because God foreknew that each one of the posterity would have committed it, if he had been placed in Adam's circumstances. But upon this theory, any man might be charged with any sin whatsoever; for God knows that there is no sin which he would not commit, if strongly tempted and not kept by divine grace. Furthermore, upon this theory, sin is imputed, in the order of nature, before it is committed. Socinus denies that God has foreknowledge of man's free acts. Owen: *Vindiciae*, V. Cicero (*De divinatione*) contends that prescience and free will are incompatible; and since free will is necessary to responsibility, this must be retained and foreknowledge given up. Augustine examines Cicero's views, in *De Civitate*, V. ix.

Wisdom is a particular aspect of the Divine knowledge. 1 Tim. 1: 17, "God only wise." It is the intelligence of God as manifested in the adoption of means to ends. The

adaptation

Hebrew חָכָם, and the Greek σοφός, primarily signify skilful, expert. It is seen: 1. In creation. Ps. 19:1-7; "The heavens declare the glory of God;" Ps. 104:1-34, "O Lord, how manifold are thy works; in wisdom hast thou made them all;" Job 38:5, "Who hath laid the measures thereof?" 2. In providence. Ps. 33:10, 11, "The Lord brought the counsel of the heathen to nought;" Rom. 8:28, "All things work together for good." 3. In redemption. 1 Cor. 2:7; Rom. 11:33, "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and the knowledge of God!" Eph. 3:10, "The manifold (πολυποίκιλος) wisdom of God." The wisdom of God is called "the foolishness of God" (1 Cor. 1:25), in order to exhibit its infinite superiority to human wisdom. The lowest degree of Divine wisdom, so low as to be called folly in comparison with the highest degree, is wiser than men. Wisdom is represented as a trinitarian person, in Prov. 8, and is the same as the Logos of John 1:1.

Wisdom implies a final end, to which all secondary ends are subordinate. This end is the glory of God. Rom. 11:36, "To him are all things." Says Leighton, "As God could swear by no greater, he swears by himself; so as he could propose no greater end, he proposed himself." The glory of God means such a manifestation of the Divine perfections as leads creatures to worship and adore. Adoration is the highest act of a creature, and the revealed excellence of the Creator is the object that elicits it. The essential glory of God, that is, his glory as it exists per se, is not intended in this definition. This is the same, whether there be a creation or not; whether there be worship or not.

The happiness of the creature cannot be the final end of God's action. There would be no wisdom in this case, because the superior would be subordinated to the inferior. This would be folly, not wisdom. It would be a mal-adaptation of means to ends. The end would be made the means,

and the means the end. The infinite would exist for the finite. Moreover, happiness from its very nature cannot be an ultimate end, because to seek it is to fail of getting it. "He that finds his life shall lose it." To seek holiness as an ultimate end is to attain it. To seek holiness results in happiness, but not vice versa. Happiness is the effect, and holiness is the cause. Hence the command is, "Be ye holy," not, "Be ye happy." Another proof that happiness is not an ultimate end like holiness, is the fact that there are many kinds of happiness, but only one kind of holiness. Happiness depends upon the attainment of an object that is different from itself; and the objects are various: such as wealth, pleasure, fame, in the lower eudaemonism; and knowledge, culture, and virtue, in the higher. But holiness does not depend upon securing an object different from itself. A man is happy, only when he has obtained wealth, or fame, or culture, or something that is other than happiness itself. But a man is holy, not by obtaining wealth, fame, or culture, or something other than holiness, but by obtaining holiness itself. Consequently, holiness can be an ultimate end, but happiness cannot be. Yet, the moral perfection of the creature cannot be regarded as the final end of *God's* action, though this is a higher view than the preceding. The creature in *any* aspect cannot be regarded as the last end, any more than the first cause of all things. The finite will cannot be an ultimate end for the infinite will. The creature must say, "Not my will, but thine be done." Similarly, a finite nature or being cannot be an ultimate end for the infinite being.

The Power of God is the Divine essence energizing, and producing outward effects. It is the Divine activity *ad extra*. The immanent activity of the essence *ad intra*, as seen in the trinal distinctions and their intercommunion, does not come under the category of the Divine power. For this is necessary and constitutional activity. It is not optional with God to be triune. Eternal generation and

spiration are not, like creation, providence, and redemption, acts of power, in the sense that if God so please they need not be performed. The Divine power is optional in its exercise. God need not have created anything. And after creation, he may annihilate. Only when he has bound himself by promise, as in the instance of faith in Christ, does his action cease to be optional. It cannot be said that God may keep his promises, or not, as he pleases.

The Divine power is Omnipotence. Ps. 115 : 3, "Our God is in the heavens ; he hath done whatsoever he hath pleased ;" Rev. 4 : 8, "Holy Lord God Almighty ;" Gen. 17 : 1, "I am the Almighty God." Omnipotence is called the "word" or "command" of God. Ps. 33 : 6, "By the word of the Lord the heavens were made. He commanded and it stood fast." This denotes the greatness of the power. Creation requires only God's fiat. The Divine power is not to be measured merely by what God has actually effected. Omnipotence is manifested in the works of the actual creation, but it is not exhausted by them. God could create more than he has, if he pleased. He can do more than he has done, should it be his will. He could have raised up children to Abraham from the stones in the bed of Jordan ; he could have sent in aid of the suffering Redeemer twelve legions of angels.

The Divine power is limited only by the absurd and self-contradictory. God can do anything that does not imply a logical impossibility. A logical impossibility means that the predicate is contradictory to the subject ; for example, a material spirit, a corporeal deity, a sensitive stone, an irrational man, a body without parts or extension, a square triangle. These are not objects of power, and therefore it is really no limitation of the Divine omnipotence to say that it cannot create them. They involve the absurdity that a thing can be and not be at the same time. A logical impossibility is, in truth, a nonentity ; and to say that God

cannot create a nonentity, is not a limitation or denial of power. For power is the ability to create entity.

Again, God cannot do anything inconsistent with the perfection of the Divine nature. Under this category, fall the instances mentioned in Heb. 6:18, "It is impossible for God to lie;" and 2 Tim. 2:13, "He cannot deny himself;" and James 1:13, "God cannot be tempted." God cannot sin: (a) Because sin is imperfection, and it is contradictory to say that a necessarily perfect Being may be imperfect. (b) God cannot sin, because he cannot be tempted to sin, and sinning without temptation or motive to sin, is impossible. God cannot be tempted, because temptation implies a desire for some good that is supposed to be greater than what is already possessed. But God cannot see anything more desirable than what he already has; and his understanding is infallible, so that he cannot mistake an apparent for a real good. All such cases, when analyzed, will be found to imply something contradictory to the idea and definition of God. If it could be supposed that God is capable to be tempted and to sin, it would prove that he is not infinite. God is not able to die, to see corruption (Acts 2:27), to become non-existent. This would be finite weakness, not almighty power. Says Augustine (*De Symbolo*, I. i.), "God is omnipotent, and yet he cannot die, he cannot lie, he cannot deny himself. How is he omnipotent then? He is omnipotent for the very reason that he cannot do these things. For if he could die, he would not be omnipotent." Again he remarks (*De Civitate*, V. x.) that "the power of God is not diminished when it is said that he cannot die, and cannot sin; for if he could do these things, his power would be less. A being is rightly called omnipotent, from doing what he wills, and not from suffering what he does not will."

A question arose among the schoolmen in regard to the Divine omnipotence, and some of them asserted the absolute omnipotence of God, in the sense that he could do

whatever could be conceived of, either logically or illogically; whether good or evil; whether self-contradictory or not.¹ They separated the natural from the moral attributes, and asserted the possibility of a conflict between them. Their view of God implied that his natural attributes are more central and ultimate than his moral and ethical attributes; that might in the deity is more fundamental and absolute than right. But the moral attributes are as central and controlling in God as the natural, and it is impossible to conceive that in his most perfect being, bare power can be divorced from wisdom and holiness, and trample them under. Shedd : History of Doctrine, II. 301-304.

The manifestations of the Divine power are seen: 1. In Creation. The peculiar characteristic of this exertion of power is, that it originates *ex nihilo*. The miraculous is the same kind of exercise of omnipotence. The miracle is creative from nothing. Rom. 4:17, "God calleth those things which be not, as though they were." Isa. 44:24; Gen. 1:1. 2. In Providence; by which what has been created is preserved, evolved, and controlled. Heb. 1:3, "Upholding all things by the word of his power." The omnipotence of God exerted in the act of creation is denominated *potentia absoluta*. In this instance, there is no use made of anything that is in existence. It is the operation of the First cause alone. The Divine omnipotence exerted in providence is called *potentia ordinata*. In this instance, there is use made of existing things. God in providence em-

¹ Des Cartes asserts this. "God did not will that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles because he knew it could not possibly be otherwise. But because he willed that the three angles of a triangle should be necessarily equal to two right angles, therefore this is now true; and so on of other things. Nor is there any need to inquire how God from eternity could have made it true that twice four should not be eight, for I confess that this cannot be understood by us." Des Cartes : Responsiones, § 6. In other places, however, Des Cartes "reasoned more correctly," says Cudworth, II. 532. Tegg's Ed.

loys the constitution and laws of nature which he created for this very purpose. The First cause uses second causes previously originated *ex nihilo*. God causes the warmth of the atmosphere by the rays of the sun, and not by an exertion of absolute omnipotence. All evolution belongs to the province of God's *potentia ordinata*. 3. In Redemption. 1 Cor. 1 : 24, "Christ is the power of God." Rom. 1 : 16, The gospel is "the power of God." Is. 53 : 1, "Messiah is the arm of the Lord." Ps. 80 : 17, Messiah is "the man of thy right hand."

The Holiness of God is the perfect rectitude of his will. The divine will is in absolute harmony with the divine nature. Isa. 6 : 3, "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts." Isa. 57 : 15; Ex. 15 : 11; Ps. 89 : 35; 145 : 17; Amos 4 : 2; Rev. 4 : 8; 15 : 4. God's word is holy, Rom. 1 : 2. His promise is holy, Ps. 105 : 42. His sabbath is holy, Isa. 58 : 13. His people are holy, Isa. 62 : 12. His residence is holy, Isa. 57 : 15. His angels are holy, Rev. 14 : 10.

Holiness in God cannot be defined in the same terms in which holiness in man or angel is defined, namely, as conformity to the moral law. The moral law supposes a superior being whose love and service are obligatory upon the inferior. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself," is no law for God. The moral law is the rule of conduct only for finite beings, who are subjects of the divine government. The words, "thou shalt," and "thou shalt not," are inapplicable to the Infinite One. Holiness in God must, consequently, be defined as conformity to his own perfect nature. The only rule for the divine will is the divine reason; and the divine reason prescribes everything that it is befitting an Infinite being to do. God is not under law, nor above law. He is law. He is righteous by nature and of necessity. The trisagion teaches this truth. God is the source and author of law for all other beings.

The Divine holiness is expressed: 1. By law given to man; 2. By feelings in the Divine nature.

1. God's holiness is manifested: (*a*) In the moral law. (*b*) In physical laws, which appear in the course and constitution of nature, and secure happiness to virtue, and connect misery with vice. (*c*) In mental laws. Peace of conscience, upon obedience, is the most exquisite enjoyment; remorse of conscience, upon disobedience, is the most exquisite torture. (*d*) In positive laws. These spring not from the constitution of nature, or of the human mind, but are enactments by the arbitrary will of God. Such are the law of the Sabbath, and the Levitical law.

The moral law is the most important and clearest of the expressions of the Divine holiness. It is drawn out analytically in the ten commandments. These contain two divisions or tables, relating to man's duty to God, primarily, and to his fellow-man, secondarily. The sermon on the mount is a revised edition of the decalogue, and constitutes the legal basis of the new covenant, as the decalogue did of the old. Christ in the sermon interprets and spiritualizes the ten commandments. This progress in the revelation of the moral law explains the temporary allowance, under the old economy, of some evils that were prohibited and abolished under the new; such as slavery and polygamy. These were tolerated among the chosen people, "because of the hardness of their hearts" (Matt. 19:8); that is, because the existing condition and circumstances of the people made their immediate abolition impossible. Toleration is not approval, but the very contrary. It implies that the thing endured is intrinsically wrong. No one tolerates what is intrinsically right. Slavery and polygamy were not legalized and sanctioned by the decalogue, though they were permitted temporarily under the theocracy.

2. Holiness is expressed in the Divine feelings respecting right and wrong. The elder theologians describe it as an

attribute of will, in this reference. Turretin (III. xiv. 1) says: "To the will of God pertain those attributes (virtutes) which denote his perfection in disposition and action." They are comprised under justice and benevolence. God as delighting in purity is holy. Ps. 11:7, "The righteous Lord loveth righteousness." Ps. 35:5, "The Lord loveth righteousness." Ps. 37:28; 99:4. God as abhorring evil is holy. Jer. 44:4, "O do not this abominable thing which I hate." Heb. 1:13.

Holiness occupies a place second to none among the communicable attributes. "If any," says Charnocke, "this attribute hath an excellency above the other perfections of God. There are some attributes of God which we prefer because of our interest in them, and the relation they bear to us: as we esteem his goodness before his power, and his mercy whereby he relieves us, before his justice whereby he punisheth us; so there are some that God delights to honor because of their excellency. Where do you find any other attribute trebled in the praise of it? 'Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts.'" Holiness is the quality which man is most particularly commanded to possess: Lev. 19:2, "Ye shall be holy, for I am holy." Compare 1 Pet. 1:14-16. It is the attribute which God singles out to swear by. Ps. 89:35, "Once have I sworn by my holiness, that I will not lie to David."

Holiness is a general term denoting that quality in God whereby he is right (rectus) in himself, and in all his actions. This is implied in the Hebrew צַדִּיק, which means straight; and the Greek δίκαιος, which means exactly right (aequus). But right is determined in its manifestation, by the character of the person towards whom it is manifested. What would be right towards an obedient creature, would be wrong towards a disobedient one. This brings to view the attribute of Justice, as a mode of holiness.¹ In the

¹ Owen: On Divine Justice. Edwards: Satisfaction for Sin, II.

Westminster Larger Catechism, Q. 7. after describing God as "most holy," it is added "most just."

Justice is that phase of God's holiness which is seen in his treatment of the obedient and the disobedient subjects of his government. It is that attribute whereby he gives to everyone what is due him. The notion of *debt* or *obligation* necessarily enters into that of justice. Sin is indebtedness to law. Matt. 6:12, "Forgive us our debts." Cicero (De Finibus, 23) defines justice as "animi affectus suum cuique tribuens." The element of indebtedness, together with that of retribution and penalty, is eliminated from the attribute in the Socinian soteriology. Justice, in this theory, is employed in the loose and general sense of moral excellence. "There is," says Socinus (Prelectiones Theologicae, c. 16), "no such justice in God as requires absolutely and inexorably that sin be punished. There is, indeed, a perpetual, and constant justice in God, but this is nothing but his moral equity and rectitude, by virtue of which there is no depravity or iniquity in any of his works."

The attribute of justice is abundantly taught in Scripture. Deut. 32:4, "All his ways are judgment, a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is he." Ex. 20:5, "I am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children." Ex. 34:7, "The Lord God will by no means clear the guilty." Job 8:3; 34:12; Ps. 145:17; Dan. 9:14; Matt. 10:28; Rom. 2:6-10.

Rectoral justice is God's rectitude as a ruler, over both the good and the evil. It relates to legislation, or the imposition of law. God, both in rewarding and punishing, lays down a just law. The reward and the penalty are exactly suited to the actions. Job 34:23, "For he will not lay upon man more than right." Ps. 89:14, "Justice and judgment are the habitation of thy throne." Distributive justice is God's rectitude in the execution of law, both in reference to the good and the evil. It relates to the distribution of rewards and punishments. Rom. 2:6,

God "will render to every man according to his deeds." 1 Pet. 1:17, "The Father without respect of persons judgeth according to every man's work." Isa. 3:10, 11, "Say ye to the righteous that it shall be well with him. Woe unto the wicked! it shall be ill with him." Distributive justice is twofold: (a) remunerative justice; (b) retributive justice. 1. Remunerative justice is the distribution of rewards both to men and angels. Ps. 58:11, "Verily there is a reward for the righteous." Deut. 7:9, 12, 13; 2 Chron. 6:15, "Thou hast kept with thy servant David my father, that which thou hast promised him." Micah 7:20; Matt. 25:21, "Because thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler over many things." Matt. 25:34; Rom. 2:7; Heb. 11:26; Jude 6.

Remunerative justice is the expression of the divine love (*ἀγάπη*), as retributive justice is of the divine wrath (*ὀργή*). It proceeds upon the ground of relative merit only. The creature cannot establish an absolute merit before the creator. This is taught by our Lord in Luke 17:10, "When ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants;" and by St. Paul in 1 Cor. 4:7, "What hast thou that thou didst not receive; why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it?" and by God to Job, 41:11, "Who hath prevented me, that I should repay him? Whatsoever is under the whole heaven is mine." Accordingly, the Westminster Confession, VII. i., affirms that "the distance between God and the creature is so great, that although reasonable creatures do owe obedience unto him as their creator, yet they could never have any fruition of him as their blessedness and reward, but by some voluntary condescension on God's part, which he hath been pleased to express by way of covenant."

Absolute merit, as distinguished from relative, supposes an independent relation and agency between two parties, like that between man and man. One man does not create and uphold another man, while the one is serving and obey-

ing the other. But this is the state of the case, when man serves and obeys God. Creation, preservation, and redemption all preclude that independent agency by which one party brings another under obligations to him, and establishes an absolute merit or indebtedness. Consequently, the exercise of remunerative justice by God is pactional and gracious. It results from a previous covenant upon his part. The reward of a creature's obedience is in consequence of a Divine promise. No primary and original obligation rests upon the Creator to recompense for services rendered by a creature whom he has made from nothing, and continually upholds in existence. A soul that is created holy cannot demand from its maker, at the instant of creation, a reward for being holy upon the ground of an absolute indebtedness on the part of its maker. Because God has originated the powers and capacities of a creature from nothing, he is entitled to all the agency of these faculties without paying for it; as the artificer of a watch is entitled to all the motion of the watch, without coming under obligation to the watch. Even this comparison is inadequate; for the maker of the watch did not create the materials out of which it is made. But God creates the very substance itself out of which man's faculties of mind and body are made. All that strict justice would require on the part of God, in case a creature should continue in the holiness in which he is created is, that he should not cause him to suffer. That he should go further than this, and positively reward him for being and continuing holy, is gracious treatment. If the creature's holiness were self-originated and self-sustained, instead of concreated and sustained by God, then the merit would be absolute, and God would owe the reward by an original and uncovenanted obligation. Not only are the being and faculties, by which the obedience is rendered, created and upheld by God, but the disposition rightly to employ them is due to the Holy Spirit. David expresses this truth in 1 Chron. 29 : 14, "But who am I, and

what is my people, that we should be able to offer so willingly after this sort? For all things come of thee, and of thine own have we given thee."

But though no primary and original obligation rests upon the Creator, to reward a creature made from nothing, and continually upheld and helped in the service which he renders, yet he can constitute a secondary and relative obligation. He can promise to reward the creature's service; and having bound himself to reward obedience, his own word establishes a species of claim. Obedient man, or angel, may plead the Divine promise as the ground of reward. God desires to be reminded of his promise, and is honored when the creature trusts in it implicitly. And "if we believe not, yet he abideth faithful: he cannot deny himself," 2 Tim. 2:13. In the words of Witsius (Covenants, I. i. iv.), "God by his promise, has made himself a debtor to men. Or, to speak in a manner more becoming God, he was pleased to make his performance of his promise a debt due to himself. To this purpose, Augustine, Sermo 16, speaks well: 'God became our debtor, not by receiving anything, but by promising what he pleased. For it was of his own bounty that he vouchsafed to make himself a debtor.'" The Scripture representations agree with this. In Rom. 6:23, the recompense of obedience is denominated a "gift" (*χάρισμα*); while that of disobedience is called "wages" (*ὀψώνια*). Sin is the solitary action of the will unassisted by grace; but holiness is the action of the will wrought upon by God. Again, the reward of obedience is denominated an "inheritance:" Acts 20:32, "To give you an inheritance among all them which are sanctified." Eph. 1:11, 14, "We have obtained an inheritance." Col. 1:2, "The Father hath made us meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light." But an inheritance is not the payment of a debt, in the strict sense of the word. It results from the parental and filial relations, and not from those of creditor and debtor. Yet, as an inheritance may

be called the reward of filial obedience, so the blessedness of the future state may be and is called the reward of Christian obedience here upon earth.

Since God and redeemed man are two distinct agents, there is a personal quality in man's obedience whereby it is truly rewardable. When God rewards a believer for his severe struggle with a bosom-sin, he does not reward God's struggle, but man's. Though the struggle was started, helped and made successful by the Holy Spirit, yet it was, after all, a human, not a divine conflict with sin. This is rewardable, and when God rewards it, he does not reward himself but his creature. Paul teaches this in saying, "I live." There is a personal and human quality in the holiness and the obedience. But that this may not be so exaggerated as to imply that the personal and the human has been independent and self-sustaining in the holiness and obedience, and that God has thus been brought under the absolute obligation of a debtor to a creditor, he adds, "Yet not I, but Christ which liveth in me." That the reward of obedience is gracious is still more true in the case of redeemed man. Here, there has been positive disobedience and ill-desert. The gospel promise of reward, in this case, is made not only to a creature, but to a sinful creature.

The rewards for obedience are: 1. Natural. God so constitutes man and nature that virtue has happy consequences: (a) Peace of conscience: 1 Pet. 3: 21, "The answer of a good conscience;" (b) Worldly prosperity: 1 Tim. 4: 8, "Godliness hath the promise of the life that now is." 2. Positive. These are the rewards bestowed in the future life, which far exceed the merely natural operations of conscience, and earthly good. They consist principally in a special manifestation of the Divine love and approbation. John 14: 23; Matt. 25: 34-40; Ps. 16: 11, "In thy presence is fulness of joy." Ps. 17: 15, "I shall be satisfied when I awake in thy likeness."

Retributive justice (sometimes denominated punitive,

vindicative, or, in the older English, vindictive, avenging, or revenging, L. C. 77) is that part of distributive justice which relates to the infliction of penalty. It is the expression of the divine *ὀργή*. In a sinless world, there would be no place for its exercise, and it would be comparatively an unimportant aspect of the general attribute of justice. But in a sinful world, retribution must hold a prominent place; and hence in the Christian religion, which is a religion for a fallen race of beings, retributive justice comes continually into view. Hence when justice is spoken of without any qualifying word to show that some other aspect of the attribute is meant, punitive justice is intended. Passages of Scripture which present it are: "Rom. 1:32, "The judgment of God is, that they which do such things are worthy of death." Rom. 2:8, "Who will visit tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doeth evil." 2 Thess. 1:8, "The Lord Jesus shall be revealed in flaming fire, taking vengeance (*ἐκδίκησιν*) on them that know not God." Acts 28:4, "Vengeance (*δίκη*) suffereth not to live." Rom. 12:19, "Vengeance (*ἐκδίκησις*) is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord."

Retributive justice is expressed: 1. In the commandment that is given with a penalty attached to it. Gen. 2:17, "Thou shalt not eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge; in the day that thou eatest thou shalt surely die." Gal. 3:10, "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the law to do them." Deut. 27:26. Ezek. 18:4, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." Rom. 6:23, "The wages of sin is death." The moral law expresses the mind and intention of the lawgiver. 2. In the actual infliction of the penalty threatened. Both are requisite. The former without the latter would evince want of veracity; want of power; or vacillation.

There is an important difference between remunerative and retributive merit, or between the merit of holiness and the demerit of sin. While the former is relative, the latter

is absolute. If a disobedient creature were disposed to do so, he could demand the recompense due to his transgression of the moral law, as something that is strictly due to him. Divine justice is originally and necessarily obliged to requite disobedience, but not to reward obedience. God does not covenant to punish sin, as he does to recompense holiness. The requital in the case of transgression is not pactional and by promise, but necessary. The reason of this is, that sin has the creature for its ultimate and sole efficient. Unlike holiness, sin does not run back to God as its author. When obedience takes place, the Infinite will works in the finite will, both to will and to do. But when disobedience takes place, the finite will works alone. In the act of sin, man is an original and unassisted, though not unsupported author. He performs an act that is analogous to the Divine act of creation *ex nihilo*. It is true that the faculties of the creature by which sin is committed are created and upheld by the creator. God sustains the *being* of man or angel, in and during the very acting of sin. But the wrong *agency* is the creature's alone. God does not cooperate in the act of transgression, and hence its demerit is absolute and not relative.

At this point we notice the doctrine of the Divine *concursus*. A distinction has been made between an action and the viciousness of an action. The first is called the "material" part of the action, and the latter the "formal" part. God, it is said, concurs in the material, but not in the formal part of sin. "Every action is good by a physical goodness, as it is an act of the mind or hand, which have a natural goodness by creation; but every action is not morally good: the physical goodness of the action depends on God, the moral evil on the creature." Charnocke: On Holiness, 499. The objection to this distinction between a "material" and a "formal" part of sin is, that the material part of it is not sinful. Sin is a compound of guilt and innocence, according to this analysis and definition. But sin is simple,

not compound in its nature. It is evil and only evil. To define it as a composition of that which is good in itself with that which is evil, is illogical. The following illustration which Charnocke (*Holiness*, p. 500) gives, will illustrate this. "Two judges are in joint commission for the trial of a malefactor, and both upon proof of his guilt condemn him. This action in both, considered as an action, is good; for it is adjudging a man to death whose crime deserves such a punishment. But this same act, which is but one joint act of both, may be morally good in one judge, and morally evil in the other: morally good in him that condemns him out of an unbiassed consideration of the demerit of the crime; and morally evil in the other who hath not respect to this consideration, but is moved by some private animosity against the prisoner, and a desire of revenge for some private injury he has received from him. The act in itself is the same materially in both; but in one it is an act of justice, and in the other an act of murder, as it respects the principle and motive of it in the two judges."

Upon examining this case, it will be found that what is called the "formal" part of sin is in reality the essence of it; and what is called the "material" part of sin is no part of it at all. The sin in the instance of the sinful judge, as Charnocke says, is in the principle and motive of his act of passing sentence. This principle and motive is the selfish disposition of the man; which is simply the inclination or self-determination of his will. This inclination, and this alone, is the viciousness and guilt in the case. Whether the judge actually passed the sentence verbally or not, would make no difference with the fact of his selfishness and sin in the sight of God. This internal action of the will, seen in the self-moving inclination and disposition, is the wickedness of the man. To add to it the action of the physical faculty of the tongue in speaking the sentence, is to add nothing that essentially belongs to the idea and definition of sin. To distinguish, therefore, this bodily and

physical part of man's agency, in which God confessedly concurs, as evidence that God concurs in the act of *sin* itself, is not to the purpose. The real question is, whether God concurs and co-operates in that *internal* action of the will which is the real malignity and wickedness in the case supposed. Did God work in the revengeful judge to *will*, is the question. Did he "concur" in his malignant disposition? The answer to this question must be in the negative.

Retributive justice is an attribute whose exercise is necessary, in case there be transgression of the moral law. God cannot lay down a law, affix a penalty, and threaten its infliction, and proceed no further, in case of disobedience. The divine veracity forbids this. He has solemnly declared that "he will by no means clear the guilty," Ex. 34:7. If the penalty is not inflicted, it is not "impossible for God to lie," Heb. 6:18; and it is untrue that "the Lord hath sworn and will not repent," Ps. 110:4. Hence, in every instance of transgression, the penalty of law must be inflicted, either personally or vicariously; either upon the transgressor or upon his substitute. The remission of penalty under the Divine administration is not absolute, but relative. It may be omitted in respect to the real criminal, but, if so, it must be inflicted upon some one in his place.

At this point, the possibility of the vicarious satisfaction of retributive justice requires a brief notice. The full discussion of the topic belongs to the doctrine of Atonement. See Vol. II., p. 451. The exercise of justice, while necessary in respect to *sin*, is free and sovereign in respect to the *sinner*. Justice necessarily demands that sin be punished, but not necessarily in the person of the sinner. Justice may allow of the substitution of one person for another, provided that in the substitution no injustice is done to the rights of any of the parties interested. This principle was expressed by the schoolmen in the statement, "impersonaliter poenam necessario infligi omni peccato, sed non personaliter omni peccatori." In the words of

Turretin (III. xix. 4), "duplex jus oritur circa poenae infictionem; aliud necessarium et indispensabile respectu peccati ipsius, aliud vero liberum et positivum respectu peccatoris."

This agrees with the intuitive convictions of man. "The profound and awful idea of substitution meets us in the religion of the early Romans. When the gods of the community were angry, and nobody could be laid hold of as definitely guilty, they might be appeased by one who voluntarily gave himself up (*devovere se*). Noxious chasms in the ground were closed, and battles half-lost were converted into victories, when a brave citizen threw himself as an expiatory offering into the abyss, or upon the foe." Mommsen: Rome, I. xii. Mommsen adds that the *compulsory* substitution of the innocent for the guilty, human sacrifice by force, was not allowed in the early Roman commonwealth. There was, moreover, no formal provision for this substitution in the legislation of the Romans. This substitution was the action of popular impulse, and of the voluntary decision of the individual. Some assert that the substitution of penalty is impossible, and cite in proof the passages: Gen 2:17, "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die;" and Ezek. 18:4, 20, "The soul that sinneth it shall die." In these passages, the verb, not the pronoun, is the emphatic word. They teach the same truth with Rom. 6:23: "The wages of sin is death." If, in these texts, the emphasis is to be laid upon the pronouns "it" and "thou," so as to make the Divine declaration to be, that every individual who transgresses shall himself suffer the penalty of transgression, and that no other person shall suffer it vicariously for him, then the salvation of a sinner is impossible. For nothing could occur but the execution of penalty upon the actual transgressor. No exercise of mercy could take place in the universe of God. Such an interpretation admits of no alternative, and every soul that sinned would die. But that this cannot be the expla-

nation intended to be put upon these threatenings, is proved by the fact that not every soul that has sinned does suffer the penalty threatened. The implied meaning of these texts, therefore, is, that "in the day thou eatest thereof, thou or thy redeemer shalt die; the soul that sinneth, it, or its surety shall die." Sin must be punished personally, or else vicariously. "It may be objected," says Edwards (God's Sovereignty), "that God said, If thou eatest thou shalt die; as though the same person that sinned must suffer; and, therefore, Why does not God's truth oblige him to that? I answer, that the word then was not intended to be restrained to him that in his own person sinned. Adam probably understood that his posterity were included, whether they sinned in their own person or not. If they sinned in Adam, their surety, those words, 'If thou eatest,' meant, 'If thou eatest in thyself, or in thy surety.' And therefore, the latter words, 'Thou shalt die,' do also fairly allow of such a construction as, 'Thou shalt die, in thyself, or in thy surety.'"

The demand of retributive justice is, that *sin* be punished to the full measure and degree announced in the law. "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all *ungodliness* and *unrighteousness* of men," Rom. 1:8. The Divine displeasure expressed in punitive justice is not aimed against the *person* as such, and distinct from his sin. "God," says Charnocke (Holiness, 473), "is not displeased with the nature of man as man, for that was derived from him; but with the nature of man as sinful, which is derived from the sinner himself. God hates only the sin, not the sinner; he desires only the destruction of the one, not the misery of the other." God loves the person as such. The immortal nature of man is precious in his sight. Divine justice has no angry spite against anyone's person. Consequently, if its claims can be satisfied by a suffering endured by another person, properly qualified, there is no feeling of animosity against the sinner's person, to prevent the substi-

tution. It is true that justice is not obliged to accept a substitute. It can insist, if it pleases, upon the infliction of the penalty upon the actual criminal. But neither is it obliged to refuse a substitute. Justice is not tied up, by anything in its own nature, to the infliction of the law's penalty upon the identical person of the sinner, to the exclusion of any other person whatsoever.

In the sphere of human life, a refusal to admit a substitution of one person for another, in the only case in which substitution is allowable, viz., in commercial law, would look like malice, and would require explanation. Should a creditor refuse to receive the complete vicarious payment of a debt from a friend of the debtor (though this would involve no difficulty for the debtor, who could of course take his friend's money and pay it in person, yet), it would evince a malignant and spiteful feeling of the creditor towards the *person* of the debtor. It would look as if, besides obtaining the full satisfaction of his claims, he desired to injure him, or in some way to vex and worry him.¹ But in the Divine sphere, the suspicion of personal animosity, in case of a refusal to permit a vicarious satisfaction of justice, could not arise, because of the absolute perfection of God. "As for God, his way is perfect," Ps. 18 : 30. And had the Supreme Judge permitted no substitute for man the guilty, it would be necessary to assume that there were good reasons for the procedure. The reasons might be unknown, and perhaps unknowable. But the reason certainly could not be, that the Eternal Judge feels hatred towards the body and soul of a man, as that particular man. There is no malignant feeling in God towards the person of even the most wicked and devilish transgressor. God is not a respecter of persons in any sense. He has no prejudice for, or grudge against, any one of his creatures; and if the complete satisfaction of justice can be secured by a vicarious

¹ Compare what Cicero (*De Officiis*, Lib. I. 10) says concerning a "malicious interpretation" of law.

endurance of penalty, he has no such ill-will towards the sinner's person, in distinction from his sin, as would prevent him from accepting it, in case there were no reasons in his own mind why he should not. On the contrary, he loves the person, the immortal spirit, of the transgressor; as he has abundantly evinced in the gospel method of mercy. It is, however, to be carefully noticed, in case there be substitution of penalty: 1. That the substituted penalty must be a strict and full equivalent. Justice is inexorable upon this point. Here, the necessary nature of the attribute appears. 2. That the person substituted be able to render complete satisfaction, and be himself no debtor to law and justice.

The sovereignty and freedom of God in respect to justice, therefore, relates not to the *abolition*, nor to the *relaxation*, but to the *substitution* of punishment. It does not consist in any power to violate or waive legal claims. These must be maintained in any event. "Fiat justitia ruat coelum" is an intuitive conviction. The exercise of the other attributes of God is regulated and conditioned by that of justice. God cannot exert omnipotence unjustly, or benevolence, or mercy. The question, "Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?" (Gen. 18:25), must be answered affirmatively. It follows, then, that the sovereignty of God in respect to retributive justice, consists in his power and right to satisfy its claims in more than one way. He has a choice of methods. He may inflict the full amount of suffering due to sin, either upon the sinner, or upon a proper substitute. He may require the complete satisfaction of justice from the transgressor, or he may provide it for him vicariously. Divine justice may smite the guilty man, or it may smite the man who is God's "fellow," Zech. 13:7. It is free to do either; but one or the other it must do. God is not obliged either to accept or to provide a substituted penalty, and in case he does either, it is grace and mercy towards the actual transgressor. These two particulars, of permit-

ting substitution, and providing the substitute, furnish the answer to the question, "Where is the mercy of God, in case justice is strictly satisfied by a vicarious person?" There is mercy in permitting another person to do for the sinner what the sinner is bound to do for himself; and still greater mercy in providing that person; and greater still, in becoming that person.

The Socinian view of retributive justice denies its necessary nature. "There is no such justice in God," says Socinus, "as requires absolutely and inexorably that sin be punished, and such as God himself cannot repudiate. There is indeed a perpetual and constant justice in God; but this is nothing but his moral equity and rectitude, by virtue of which there is no depravity or iniquity in any of his works." *Prelectiones Theologicae*, XVI. This makes retributive justice to be an effect of the Divine will; and not an immanent and necessary attribute. Indeed, Socinus (*De Servatore*, I.) expressly asserts that justice, in the popular (*vulgaris*) signification, as opposed to mercy, "*dei qualitas non est, sed tantum effectus voluntatis ipsius.*" It would follow from this, that the moral law together with its penalty is a positive statute, like the ceremonial law. And as God abrogated the latter, so he could abrogate the former, by an act of arbitrary will. Accordingly, in respect to the necessity of the satisfaction of justice, Socinus remarks: "*Divinae justitiae, per quam peccatores damnari meremur, pro peccatis nostris neque Christum satisfecisse, neque ut satisfaceret, opus fuisse, arbitror.*" But if justice is an attribute at all, of the Supreme being, it must be essential, like all the other attributes. It can no more be an effect of God's optional will, than his omnipotence can be. An effect or product need not be at all, provided the efficient or producer so pleases.

The history of doctrine shows a difference of opinion in respect to the absolute, or the relative necessity of retributive justice. The question was raised by some of the school-

men, whether the satisfaction which Christ makes to Divine justice for the sin of man is necessary per se, or only because God so willed it. Schoolmen like Hales, Bonaventura, and Aquinas, adopted the latter view, in opposition to Anselm's positions in his *Cur Deus homo?* These theologians took an erroneous view of the divine omnipotence, whereby this attribute is made superior to all others. "In contemplating the Divine power as absolute," remarks Hales, "we conceive of a certain energy (*virtus*) in the deity that is abstracted from the rest of his nature, and transcends all limitations; and with respect to this form, the divine power cannot have limits set to it (*non est determinare*)." But it is as impossible and inconceivable, for the divine power to act in isolation from all the other attributes, as it is for the divine omniscience, or for the divine benevolence to do so. Benevolence cannot act without power; and neither can power, in so perfect a being as God, act without wisdom or justice. This theory ultimately resolves the deity into mere blind force.

Still, the motive, in some instances, was a good one. There was fear of limiting the divine omnipotence. Twisse, the moderator of the Westminster Assembly, affirmed only the relative necessity of retributive justice, in opposition to the powerful reasoning of Owen, who maintained its absolute nature. Magee (*Atonement*, I. 191) adopts relative necessity. Respecting such instances, Turretin (III. xix. 9) remarks, that although both parties are agreed as against the tenets and positions of Socinus, yet the doctrine of the absolute necessity of justice is much the most consonant with the nature of God, and the language of Scripture, and more efficacious for the refutation of Socinianism (*ad haeresim illam pestilentissimam jugulandam*). The Remonstrants asserted the relative necessity of retributive justice. In their *Apologia* they say, that "to affirm that the avenging justice of God is so essential to his nature, that by virtue of it, God is obliged and necessitated to punish

sin, is very absurd and very unworthy of God." See Witsius: Apostles' Creed, Dissertation IX.

No one of the Divine attributes is supported by more or stronger evidences, than retributive justice. 1. The testimony from Scripture is abundant. To the passages already cited, may be added, as only a part of the great number of texts, Ex. 34:7, "God will by no means clear the guilty; visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children." Ps. 11:6, "Upon the wicked he shall rain snares, fire and brimstone, and an horrible tempest." Matt. 18:8, "It is better for thee to enter into life halt or maimed, than to be cast into hell-fire." Jude 7, "Suffering the vengeance of eternal fire." Luke 12:5, "Yea, I say unto you, fear him who hath power to cast into hell." 2 Thess. 1:6, "Seeing it is a righteous thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you." Heb. 2:2, "A just recompense of reward." 2. The testimony from the human conscience, and the consent of all nations alluded to in Rom. 2:14, 15, "Their conscience bearing witness, and their thoughts meanwhile accusing."¹ 3. Sacrifice among pagan nations, and the Jewish system of sacrifices, teach retributive justice. The first is universal, and implies that divine justice requires satisfaction by expiatory suffering. The second was an arrangement for eliciting the consciousness of guilt, and preannouncing its pacification through the suffering Messiah. Heb. 10:3, "In those sacrifices there is a remembrance of sins every year."² 4. The remarkable provision made in the gospel for the vicarious satisfaction of retributive justice, evinces the reality and importance of the attribute.

¹ See Plato: Republic, X. 614-621; Phaedo, 113, 114; Gorgias, 523-527. Tacitus: Annals, VI. vi.; XIV. x.; XV. xxvi. Lewis: Plato contra Atheos, Appendix LIX. Tholuck: On Heathenism. Owen: On Divine Justice. Shedd: Theological Essays, 284-293.

² Magee: Atonement (Human Sacrifices; Propitiation as held by Jews and Heathen; Universality of Sacrifice). Owen: On Divine Justice, IV. Smith: Christian Theology, 443-445.

Retributive justice is retrospective in its primary aim. It looks back at what has been done in the past. Its first object is requital. A man is hung for murder, principally and before all other reasons, because he has transgressed the law forbidding murder. He is not punished primarily from a prospective aim, such as his own moral improvement, or for the purpose of preventing him from committing another murder, or for the purpose of deterring others from committing murder. It is true that moral improvement may be the consequence of the infliction of the penalty. But the consequence must not be confounded with the purpose. *Cum hoc, non ergo propter hoc.* The criminal may come to see and confess that his crime deserves the punishment, and in genuine unselfish penitence may take sides with the law, and go into eternity relying upon that great atonement of Christ which satisfies retributive justice for his sin; but even this greatest benefit of all, is not what is aimed at in man's punishment of the crime of murder. For even if there should be no such personal benefit as this attending the infliction of human penalty, the one sufficient reason for inflicting it still holds good, viz., the fact that the law has been violated, and demands the punishment of the offender for this reason simply. Only upon this view of justice, is the true dignity of man maintained. When he is punished because, as a rational and free being, he has responsibly violated the law, there is a recognition of him as a person endowed with free will. But if he is seized and made to suffer for the benefit of others, he is treated like a chattel, or a thing that may be put to use. "The nature of ill-desert and punishableness," says Kant (*Practischer Vernunft*, 151, Ed. Rosenkranz), "is always involved in the idea of voluntary transgression; and the idea of punishment excludes that of happiness in all its forms. For although he who inflicts penalty may, it is true, also have a benevolent purpose to produce by the punishment a beneficial effect upon the criminal, yet the punishment itself must be justi-

fied first of all as pure and simple requital and retribution : that is, as a kind of suffering that is demanded by the law, without any reference to its prospective beneficial consequences ; so that even if no moral improvement and no personal advantage should accrue to the person from the punishment, he must acknowledge that righteousness has been done to him, and that his experience is exactly conformed to his conduct. In every punishment, as such, justice is the very first thing, and constitutes the essence of it. A benevolent purpose, it is true, may be conjoined with punishment ; but the criminal cannot claim this as his due, and he has no right to reckon upon it. All that he deserves, is punishment ; and this is all that he can expect from the law which he has violated." The same view is taken of the retrospective aim of justice by Müller, in his lucid discrimination between chastisement and punishment. *Doctrine of Sin*, I. 244 seq. The opposite view, that punishment is prospective in its primary purpose, and aims only at reformation, was maintained by the Greek sophists. Protagoras is represented by Plato as saying, that " no one punishes the evildoer under the notion, or for the reason that he has done wrong ; only the unreasonable fury of a tyrant acts in that way." Protagoras, 324. Plato (*Laws*, X. 904, 905) holds that punishment is retributive. Cicero (*De Legibus*, I. 14) contends that virtue has regard to justice, not to utility. Grotius defines penalty, as " the evil of suffering inflicted on account of the evil of doing." Coke, Bacon, Selden, and Blackstone explain punishment by crime not by expediency. Kant, Herbert, Stahl, Hartenstein, Rothe, and Woolsey (*Political Science*, II. viii), define punishment as requital. Beccaria and Bentham found punishment on utility and expediency. *Penny Cyclopædia*, Article, Beccaria. Paley notices the difference between human punishment and divine. In the former, there is a combination of the retributive with the protective and reformatory, but not in the latter. *Moral Philosophy*, VI. ix.

If the good of the public is the chief end of punishment, the criminal might be made to suffer more than his crime deserves. If he can be used like a thing, for the benefit of others, there is no limit to the degree in which he may be used. His personal desert and responsibility being left out of view, he may be made to suffer as much, or as little as the public welfare prescribes. It was this theory of penalty that led to the multiplication of capital crimes. The prevention of forgery, it was claimed in England, required that the forger should be executed; and upon the principle that punishment is for the public protection, and not for exact justice and strict retribution, the forger was hanged. But a merely civil crime against property, and not against human life, does not merit the death penalty. Upon this theory, the number of capital offences became very numerous, and the criminal code very bloody. So that, in the long run, nothing is kinder than exact justice. It prevents extremes in either direction: either that of indulgence, or that of cruelty. Shedd: *Endless Punishment*, pp. 118-140.

Commutative justice implies an exchange of values between two parties, wherein each gives and receives in return. This species has no place in reference to God; for "who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed to him again?" Rom. 11:35.

Public or general justice, is a distinction invented by Grotius, for the purpose of meeting certain Socinian objections to the Anselmic doctrine of strict satisfaction. It is a relaxed form of justice, by virtue of which God waives a full satisfaction of legal claims, and accepts a partial satisfaction in lieu thereof. Analyzed to its ultimate elements, "public justice" is benevolence, not justice. Justice is the *exact* distribution of reward or of punishment. Anything therefore that is inexact, is in so far unjust. Too much or too little suffering for a crime is not pure justice. Says the younger Edwards (*Against Chauncey*, ch. IV.), "general or public justice is an improper use of the word justice; be-

cause, to practise justice in this sense is no other than to act from public spirit, or from love to the community; and with respect to the universe, it is the very same with general benevolence." Grotius agreed with Socinus, and both of them agreed with Duns Scotus, in making punitive justice optional, not necessary. Grotius held that punishment could be waived and not inflicted, if God so decided. It is not necessary that sin be punished with such a punishment as strictly, and fully corresponds with the guilt. An inferior penalty may be inflicted, or even no penalty at all, if God so determine. What then was the difference between Grotius and Socinus? It was this. Socinus asserted that when God decides to waive legal claims, he need not do anything to guard against the evil consequences of so doing. He can release the sinner from all punishment, and let the matter drop there. Grotius, on the other hand, though agreeing with his opponent that God can dispense with penalty altogether, yet maintained that he cannot do it with safety to the universe, unless he gives some expression to his abhorrence of sin. This he does by the death of Christ. When God remits penalty by this method, he guards against the abuse of his benevolence; which abuse Socinus made no provision for in his system. According to Grotius, the substituted sufferings of Christ are not a strict equivalent for the penalty due to sin, but an accepted equivalent, as when a creditor agrees to take fifty cents for a dollar, in the settlement of a commercial debt.

Grotius applies the principles of commercial justice to the doctrine of Christ's atonement. He employs an illustration from the Roman commercial law, as presented in the *Pandects of Justinian*. Commercial justice can be satisfied by word of mouth. If a creditor calls a debt paid, it is paid; and the release is denominated "acceptilatio," or acquittance by word of mouth. Commercial justice has no further demands to make, when the creditor has said that the debt is paid. In like manner, if God will say that the moral law

is satisfied by an inferior penalty, it is satisfied ; and if he should say that it is satisfied with no penalty at all, it would be satisfied. There are no claims standing against the sinner, because the claims being of a positive, not a necessary nature ; being constituted by the optional will of God ; they can be abrogated by the same almighty will. Socinus (De Servatore, III. i.) argues "that God is our *creditor*. Our sins are debts which we have contracted towards him. But a creditor can by an act of will surrender his claim, without making any legal provision for so doing." This abolishes the distinction between commercial and moral indebtedness, and assumes that the claims of justice and government, like those of a pecuniary creditor, have no *necessary* quality, but are voidable by an act of will. A pecuniary creditor can abolish his claim by a volition, but a magistrate cannot so abolish a moral claim. Shedd : History of Doctrine, II. 347 sq.

The Goodness of God is the Divine essence viewed as energizing benevolently, and kindly, towards the creature. It is an emanent, or transitive attribute, issuing forth from the Divine nature, and aiming to promote the welfare and happiness of the universe. It is not that attribute by which God *is* good ; but by which he *does* good. As good in himself, God is holy ; as showing goodness to others, he is good or kind. The Septuagint renders צדיק by χρηστός = useful. "Good (χρηστός) art thou, O Lord, and thou doest good," Ps. 119 : 68. In Rom. 5 : 7, holiness is designated by δίκαιος, and kindness by ἀγαθός : "Scarcely for a righteous (δίκαιος) man will one die ; yet peradventure for a good (ἀγαθός) man, some would even dare to die." In Luke 18 : 19, the reference is to benevolence, not to holiness : "None is good (ἀγαθός), save one, that is God."

Goodness is a special attribute with varieties under it. 1. The first of these is Benevolence. This is the affection which the Creator feels towards the sentient and conscious creature, as such. Benevolence cannot be shown to insen-

tient existence ; to the rocks and mountains. It grows out of the fact that the creature is his workmanship. God is interested in everything which he has made. He cannot hate any of his own handiwork. The wrath of God is not excited by anything that took its origin from him. It falls only upon something that has been added to his own work. Sin is no part of creation, but a quality introduced into creation by the creature himself.

God's benevolent love towards his creatures, considered as creatures merely, is infinitely greater than any love of a creature towards a creature. No earthly father loves his child with a benevolence equal to that which the Heavenly Father feels towards his created offspring. Luke 6:35, "The Highest is kind (*χρηστός*) unto the unthankful and to the evil." Matt. 5:45, "Your Father which is in heaven maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust." Disobedience and ingratitude deaden and destroy the benevolent feeling of man towards man, but not that of God towards his creatures. Sinful men are the objects of God's providential care, as well as renewed men. Even Satan and the fallen angels are treated with all the benevolence which their enmity to God will admit of. God feels no malevolence towards them.

The benevolent interest which God as a creator takes in the sentient creature, as the product of his omnipotent power, is illustrated by the following from Aristotle. "The benefactor loves him whom he has benefited, more than he who has been benefited loves the benefactor. The workman loves his own work, more than the work loves the workman. All men feel greater love for what they have acquired with labor ; as those who have earned their money love it more than those who have inherited it. Mothers are more fond of their children than fathers are ; for the bringing them forth is painful. Parents have greater love for their children, than children have for their parents."

Ethics, IX. vii. Upon this principle, the benevolent affection of God towards his creatures is greater than that of creatures towards each other. God's compassionate love is more tender than that of an earthly father or mother. Ps. 27 : 10, "When my father and mother forsake me, then the Lord will take me up." Men are commanded to imitate the Divine benevolence as the highest form of this affection. Matt. 5 : 44 : "Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you ; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven. Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect." Compare Plato : Republic, I. 33. Montaigne : Essays, VI. viii. (Of the Affection of Fathers).

God's benevolent interest in the sentient creature, and his care for its welfare, is proportioned and suited to the nature and circumstances of the creature. (*a*) It extends to the animals : Ps. 145 : 16, "Thou openest thine hand, and suppliest the desire of every living thing." Ps. 104 : 21, "The young lions roar after their prey, and seek their meat from God." Compare the whole psalm. Job 38 : 41, "Who provideth for the raven his food ?" Matt. 6 : 26, "Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not, yet your heavenly Father feedeth them." Ps. 36 : 6, "Thou preservest man and beast." (*b*) It extends to man. Acts 14 : 17, "He left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven." (*c*) It extends to sinful man. Matt. 5 : 45, "He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good." Acts 14 : 17, "He suffered all nations to walk in their own ways, nevertheless, filling their hearts with food and gladness." Neh. 9 : 17, "But thou art a God slow to anger, and of great kindness, and forsookest them not."

The Divine benevolence varies in its degrees, in accordance with the capacity of the object to receive it. The brute experiences all of it that he is capable of. As he is physical only, he can receive from his creator only physi-

cal good. Man is both physical and mental; and receives both physical and mental good. Sinful man is deprived of a full manifestation of the Divine benevolence, only by reason of his sin. God manifests to the sinner all the benevolence that he is qualified to receive. He sends him physical and temporal good: rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling his heart with food and gladness; but he cannot bestow upon a sinful and hostile man his approving love, and fill him with heavenly peace and joy. The Divine benevolence, therefore, is infinite. It is not limited in its manifestation by anything in itself, but only by the capacity and characteristics of the creature.

The chief objections to the doctrine of the Divine benevolence are the following: 1. The permission of sin. 2. The existence of suffering here upon earth. 3. The slow progress of redemption. Respecting the first, it is to be observed that the permission of sin has cost God more than it has man. No sacrifice and suffering on account of sin has been undergone by any man, that is equal to that which has been endured by incarnate God. This shows that God is not acting selfishly, in permitting sin. At the very time that he permits it, he knows that it will result in an infinite sacrifice on his part. Respecting the second, it is to be said, that the suffering of both animals and man is often greatly exaggerated. The "struggle for existence" in the animal world is not so great as Darwin and others represent. The majority, certainly, survive. If they did not, the species would diminish, and gradually become extinct. But the fact is, that generally they are steadily increasing. And in the human world, there is no struggle at all for existence. Men do not feed upon one another. The amount of enjoyment, in both the animal and the human world, is greater than the amount of suffering. "The earth is full of the goodness of the Lord," Ps. 35: 5. "After all, it is a happy world," said Paley. See his proof, in his *Natural Theology*, XXVI. "It is manifest," says King (*Fore-*

knowledge, II.), "that though good be much mixed with evil in this life, yet there is much more good than evil in nature, and every animal provides for its own preservation by instinct or reason, which it would never do, if it did not think or feel its life, with all the evils annexed, to be much preferable to non-existence. This is a proof of the wisdom, goodness, and power of God, who could thus temper a world infested with so many miseries, that nothing should continue in it which was not in some measure pleased with its existence, and which would not endeavor by all possible means to preserve it." Furthermore, it must be remembered that in the human world suffering is the effect of sin. Most of the suffering among mankind comes from poverty and disease; and these are due very greatly to the two vices of intemperance and sensuality. And finally, pain is not an absolute evil for man, unless it is hell-pain. All suffering except that of eternal remorse and despair may be a means of good to him. Respecting the third objection, the success of redemption must be estimated at the end of the process, not at the beginning, or in the middle of it. Thus estimated, the great majority of the human family are redeemed by Christ.

2. Mercy is a second variety of the Divine Goodness. It is the benevolent compassion of God towards man as a sinner. This attribute, though logically implied in the idea of God as a being possessed of all conceivable perfections, is free and sovereign in its *exercise*. Consequently, it requires a special revelation in order to establish the fact that it will be exercised. As omnipotence is a necessary attribute of God, and yet its exercise in the creation of the universe is not necessary but optional, so, though mercy is a necessary attribute, its exercise is not also necessary. "The goodness of the Deity is infinite," says Charnocke (Goodness of God), "and circumscribed by no limits; but the exercise of his goodness may be limited by himself. God is necessarily good in his nature; but free in his communication of it.

He is not necessarily communicative of his goodness, as the sun of its light; which chooses not its objects, but enlightens all indifferently. This were to make God of no more understanding than the sun, which shines not where it pleases but where it must. He is an understanding agent, and hath a sovereign right to choose his own subjects. It would not be a supreme, if it were not a voluntary goodness."

Accordingly, the fact that the attribute of mercy will be exercised towards sinful man is taught only in the written revelation. Indeed, this constitutes the most important and principal part of the teaching of inspiration. In the very first communication made to the fallen pair, there was a promise on the part of God, to show mercy in and by the "Seed of the woman:" the Son of man, the incarnate God, Gen. 3:15. And in the yet more explicit revelation made to Moses on the mount, in connection with the giving of the law, "Jehovah passed by before him, and proclaimed, The Lord, The Lord God, merciful (רחום, tender, compassionate), and gracious (רחמן, showing kindness), long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin," Ex. 34:6, 7. To quote all the proof-texts for this attribute, would be to quote the bulk of both the Old and the New Testament.

Grace is an aspect of mercy. It differs from mercy, in that it has reference to sinful man as guilty, while mercy has respect to sinful man as miserable. The one refers to the culpability of sin, and the other to its wretchedness. The two terms, however, in common use are interchangeable. Grace, like mercy, is a variety of the Divine goodness.

Both mercy and grace are exercised in a general manner, towards those who are not the objects of their special manifestation. All blessings bestowed upon the natural man are mercy, in so far as they succor his distress, and grace,

so far as they are bestowed upon the undeserving. Matt. 5 : 45, "He maketh his sun to rise upon the evil." Ps. 145 : 9, "The Lord is good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works." Ps. 145 : 15, 16, "The eyes of all wait upon thee."

This general manifestation of mercy and grace is in and by the works of creation and providence. It is also seen in one aspect of the work of redemption. Men who are not actually saved by the Divine mercy, yet obtain some blessings from it. (a) The delay of punishment is one; namely, the pretermission (*πάρεσις*) of sin, in distinction from its remission (*ἀφεσις*). Rom. 3 : 25. God's forbearance and long-suffering with a sinner who abuses this by persistence in sin, is a phase of mercy. This is "through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." It is made possible by it. Without Christ's work, there would have been instantaneous punishment, and no long-suffering. This is also taught in 1 Pet. 3 : 20, "The long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah." (b) The common influences of the Holy Spirit are another manifestation of mercy in its general form.

Special grace and mercy are exercised only in redemption, and towards those whom God is pleased to fix upon. Eph. 1 : 4-6, "According as he hath chosen us in him, having predestinated us unto the adoption of children to the praise of the glory of his grace, wherein he hath made us accepted (*ἐχαρίτωσεν*) in the Beloved." Rom. 9 : 15, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion."

The Truth or veracity of God, is that attribute of his nature by virtue of which he performs what he has said. Num. 23 : 19, "God is not a man, that he should lie." It is seen : 1. In revelation. 1 Pet. 1 : 25, "The word of the Lord endureth forever." Ps. 100 : 5, "His truth endureth to all generations." Matt. 5 : 18, "One jot or tittle shall not pass from the law till all be fulfilled." 2. In redemption. Heb. 10 : 23, "He is faithful that promised." Heb. 6 : 17,

“ God willing [desiring] more abundantly to shew unto the heirs of promise the immutability of his council, confirmed it by an oath.” 1 Cor. 1 : 9, “ God is faithful, by whom ye were called.” 2 Tim. 2 : 13, “ He abideth faithful ; he cannot deny himself.” 3. In retribution. Heb. 3 : 11, “ So, I swear in my wrath, They shall not enter into my rest.” Compare with Heb. 4 : 1 seq.

CHAPTER VI.

THE DIVINE DECREES.

Augustine: De predestinatione; Epistola CXCIV., Ad Sixtum. Anselm: Concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis. Calvin: Institutes, I. xxi.-xxiv. Zanchius: On Predestination. Tr. by Toplady. Ursinus: Christian Religion, Qu. 54. Howe: On Decrees, Oracles, Pt. II.; Prescience and sincerity reconciled. Witsius: Covenants, II. Turretin: Institutio, IV. i.-xviii.; VI. v.-viii. Edwards: Decrees and Election; On the Will, sub fine. Dabney: Theology, Lectures XX.-XXII. Strong: Theology, IV. iii. Cunningham: Historical Theology, XXV. Arminius: Works, III. (Discussion with Junius). Tr. by Nichols. Episcopius: Institutiones, IV. iv. Watson: Institutes, II. xxv.-xxxviii. Mozley: Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination. King: On Foreknowledge.

THE consideration of the Divine Decrees naturally follows that of the divine attributes, because the decrees regulate the operation of the attributes. God's acts agree with God's determination. Hence the Westminster Shorter Catechism, Q. 7, defines the decrees of God to be "his eternal purpose according to the counsel of his own will, whereby he hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." God does not act until he has decided to act, and his decision is free and voluntary. Hence, the actions of God can no more be separated from the decrees of God, than the actions of a man can be from his decisions.

The Divine decree relates only to God's opera ad extra, or transitive acts. It does not include those immanent activities which occur within the essence, and result in the three trinitarian distinctions. All this part of the Divine

activity is excluded from the Divine decree, because it is necessary and not optional. God the Father did not decree the eternal generation of the Son, nor did the Father and Son decree the spiration of the Holy Spirit. The triune God could no more decide after the counsel of his own will to be triune, than he could decide in the same manner to be omnipotent, or omniscient. The Divine decree, consequently, comprehends only those events that occur in time. God foreordains, "whatsoever comes to pass" in space and time. That which comes to pass in the eternity of the uncreated essence, forms no part of the contents of God's decree.

The Divine decree is formed in eternity, but executed in time. There are sequences in the execution, but not in the formation of God's eternal purpose. In his own mind and consciousness, God *simultaneously* because eternally decrees all that occurs in space and time; but the effects and results corresponding to the decree occur successively, not simultaneously. There were thirty-three years between the actual incarnation and the actual crucifixion, but not between the decree that the Logos should be incarnate and the decree that he should be crucified. In the Divine decree, Christ was simultaneously because eternally incarnate and crucified. "The Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world," Rev. 14: 8. Hence the Divine decrees, in reference to God, are one single act only. The singular number is employed in Scripture, when the Divine mind and nature are considered. "All things work together for good to them who are called according to his purpose (*πρόθεσιν*)," Rom. 8: 28. "According to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ," Eph. 3: 11.

God's consciousness differs from that of his rational creatures, in that there is no succession in it. This is one of the differentia between the Infinite and the finite mind. For God there is no series of decrees each separated from the others by an interval of time. God is omniscient,

possessing the whole of his plans and purposes simultaneously. "All things are naked and opened" to his view, in one intuition. God is immutable, and therefore there are no sequences and changes of experience in him. Consequently the determinations of his will, as well as the thoughts of his understanding, are simultaneous, not successive. In the formation of the Divine decree, there are no intervals; but only in the execution of it. Christ, the atoning lamb, "was *foreordained* before the foundation of the world, but was *manifested* in these last times," 1 Pet. 1: 20. The decree that Christ should die for sin was eternal; the actual death of Christ was in time. There was an interval of four thousand years between the creation of Adam, and the birth of Christ; but there was no such interval between the decree to create Adam, and the decree that Christ should be born in Bethlehem. Both decrees are simultaneous, because both are eternal decisions of the Divine will. "We speak of the Divine decrees as many, because of the many objects which the decreeing act of God respects. The things decreed are many, but the act decreeing is but one only." Fisher: On the Catechism, Q. 7. The things decreed come to pass in time, and in a successive series; but they constitute one great system which as one *whole*, and a *unity*, was comprehended in the one eternal purpose of God. Augustine (Confess., XII. xv.) says, "God willeth not one thing now, and another anon; but once, and at once, and always, he willeth all things that he willeth; not again and again, nor now this, now that; nor willeth afterwards, what before he willed not, nor willeth not, what before he willed; because such a will is mutable; and no mutable thing is eternal."

The Divine decree is a Divine idea or thought, and it is peculiar to a Divine thought, that it is equal to the thing produced by it. This earthly globe was decreed from eternity, but it did not actually exist from eternity. It was from eternity a Divine thought, but not a historical thing.

But this Divine thought, unlike a human thought, is not in any particular inferior to the thing. Hence, though the thing is not yet actually created, and is only an idea, yet God is not for this reason ignorant in respect to the thing, as man is in respect to a plan which he has not yet executed. A man knows more about his work after he has finished it, than he did before. But God knows no more about the planet earth when his decree to create it is executed, than he did prior to its execution. In the case of the finite mind, the thought is always unequal to the thing; but in the case of the Infinite intelligence, the thought is always coequal with the thing. "Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being imperfect; and in thy book all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned when as yet there was none of them," Ps. 139 : 16. God knew what would be created before it was actually created. This knowledge was perfect. The actual creation did not add anything to it. God knew the whole universe in his eternal decree before it was an actual universe in time, with the same perfect omniscience with which he knew it after the decree was executed in space and time. "Did not God know what would be created by him, before it was created by him? Did he create he knew not what, and knew not beforehand what he should create? Was he ignorant before he acted, and in his acting, what his operation would tend to? or did he not know the nature of things, and the ends of them, till he had produced them, and saw them in being? Creatures must be known by God before they were made, and not known because they were made; he knew them to make them, and did not make them to know them. By the same reason that he knew what creatures should be before they were, he knew still what creatures shall be before they are." Charnocke: *God's Knowledge*, 276.

The Divine decree is the necessary condition of the Divine foreknowledge. If God does not first decide what shall

come to pass, he cannot know what will come to pass. An event must be made certain, before it can be known as a certain event. In order that a man may foreknow an act of his own will, he must first have decided to perform it. So long as he is undecided about a particular volition, he cannot foreknow this volition. Unless God had determined to create a world, he could not know that there would be one. For the world cannot create itself, and there is but one being who can create it. If therefore this being has not decided to create a world, there is no certainty that a world will come into existence; and if there is no certainty of a world, there can be no certain foreknowledge of a world. So long as anything remains undecreed, it is contingent and fortuitous. It may or may not happen. In this state of things, there cannot be knowledge of any kind. If a man had the power to cause an eclipse of the sun, and had decided to do this, he could then foreknow that the event would occur. But if he lacks the power, or if having the power, he has not formed the purpose, he can have no knowledge of any kind respecting the imagined event. He has neither knowledge nor foreknowledge, because there is nothing to be known. Blank ignorance is the mental condition. See Smith: Theology, 119 (Note).

In respect to this point, the Socinian is more logical than the Arminian. Both agree that God does not decree those events which result from the action of the human will. Voluntary acts are not predetermined, but depend solely upon human will. Whether they shall occur rests ultimately upon man's decision, not upon God's. Hence human volitions are uncertainties for God, in the same way that an event which does not depend upon a man's decision is an uncertainty for him. The inference which the Socinian drew from this was, that foreknowledge of such events as human volitions is impossible to God. God cannot foreknow a thing that may or may not be a thing; an event that may or may not be an event. The Arminian, shrinking

from this limitation of the divine omniscience, asserts that God can foreknow an *uncertainty*; that is, that he can have foreknowledge, without foreordination. But in this case, there is in reality nothing to be foreknown; there is no *object* of foreknowledge. If the question be asked, *What* does God foreknow? and the answer be, that he foreknows that a particular volition will be a holy one; the reply is, that so far as the Divine decree is concerned, the volition may prove to be a sinful one. In this case, God's foreknowledge is a conjecture only, not knowledge. It is like a man's guess. If, on the contrary, the answer be, that God foreknows that the volition will be a sinful one, the reply is, that it may prove to be a holy one. In this case, also, God's foreknowledge is only a conjecture. To know, or to foreknow an uncertainty, is a solecism. For in order to either knowledge or foreknowledge, there must be only one actual thing to be known, or foreknown. But in the supposed case of contingency and uncertainty, there are two possible things, either of which may turn out to be an object of knowledge, but neither of which is the one certain and definite object required. There is, therefore, nothing knowable in the case. To know, or foreknow an uncertainty, is to know or foreknow a non-entity. If it be objected, that since God, as eternal, decrees all things simultaneously, and consequently there is really no *foreordination* for him, it is still true that in the *logical* order an event must be a certainty before it can be known as such. Though there be no order of time and succession, yet in the order of nature, a physical event or a human volition must be decreed and certain for God, that it may be cognized by him as an event or a volition.

The most important aspect of the Divine decree is, that it brings all things that come to pass in space and time into a *plan*. There can be no system of the universe, if there be no one Divine purpose that systematizes it. Schemes in theology which reject the doctrine of the Divine decree,

necessarily present a fractional and disconnected view of God, man, and nature.

The following characteristics mark the Divine decree: 1. The Divine decree is founded in wisdom. This is implied in saying that God's purpose is "according to the counsel (*βουλήν*) of his will," Eph. 1:11. There is nothing irrational or capricious in God's determination. There may be much in it that passes human comprehension, and is inexplicable to the finite mind, because the Divine decree covers infinite space and everlasting time; but it all springs out of infinite wisdom. The "counsel" of the Divine mind does not mean any reception of knowledge *ab extra*, by observation, or comparison, or advisement with others; but it denotes God's wise insight and knowledge, in the light of which he forms his determination. It is possible, also, that there is a reference in the language, to the intercommunion and correspondence of the three persons in the Godhead. Ps. 33:11, "The counsel of the Lord standeth forever." Job 12:13, "With him is wisdom and strength; he hath counsel and understanding." Prov. 19:21, "The counsel of the Lord, that shall stand." Mark 7:37, "He hath done all things well." Gen. 1:31, "God saw everything that he had made, and behold it was very good."

2. The Divine decree is eternal. Acts 15:18, "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning." Matt. 25:34, "The kingdom was prepared from the foundation of the world." Eph. 1:4, "He hath chosen us in him, before the foundation of the world." 2 Thess. 2:13, "God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation." 2 Tim. 1:9; 1 Cor. 2:7. Rev. 13:8, "The Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world." 1 Pet. 1:20, Christ as a sacrifice "was foreordained before the foundation of the world." This characteristic has been defined, in what has been said under the Attributes, respecting the simultaneousness and successionlessness of the eternal, as distinguished from the gradations and sequences of the temporal.

3. The Divine decree is universal. It includes "whatsoever comes to pass," be it physical or moral, good or evil. Eph. 1 : 10, 11, "He worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." Acts 15 : 18, "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning." Prov. 16 : 33. Dan. 4 : 34, 35. Matt. 10 : 29, 30. Acts 17 : 26. Job 14 : 5. Is. 46 : 10.

(a) The good actions of men. Eph. 2 : 10, "Created unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them." (b) The wicked actions of men. Acts 2 : 23, "Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have crucified and slain." Acts 4 : 27, 28. Ps. 76 : 10. Prov. 16 : 4. (c) So-called accidental events. Prov. 16 : 33, "The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord." Gen. 45 : 8 ; 50 : 20. John 20 : 36, "A bone of him shall not be broken." Ps. 34 : 20 ; Ex. 12 : 46. Numbers 9 : 12. (d) The means as well as the end. 2 Thess. 2 : 13, "God hath chosen you to salvation, through sanctification (*ἐν ἁγιασμῷ*) of the Spirit." Eph. 1 : 4, "He hath chosen us that we should be holy." 1 Pet. 1 : 2, "Elect through sanctification of the Spirit." Acts 27 : 24, 31, "The same divine purpose which determines any event, determines that event as produced by its causes, promoted by its means, depending on its conditions, and followed by its results. Things do not come to pass in a state of isolation ; neither were they predetermined so to come to pass. In other words, God's purpose embraces the means along with the end, the cause along with the effect, the condition along with the result or issue suspended upon it ; the order, relations and dependences of all events, as no less essential to the divine plan than the events themselves. With reference to the salvation of the elect, the purpose of God is, not only that they shall be saved, but that they shall believe, repent, and persevere in faith and holiness in order to salvation." Crawford : Fatherhood of God, p. 426. (e) The time of every man's death. Job 14 : 5, "His days are determined." Ps. 39 : 4, "The measure of my days." John 7 :

30, The Jews could not kill Christ, "because his hour was not yet come." It is objected that fifteen years were added to Hezekiah's life after the prophet had said, "Set thine house in order, for thou shalt die and not live," Is. 38 : 1, 5. But this assertion of the prophet was not a statement of the Divine decree, but of the nature of his disease, which was mortal had not God miraculously interposed.

4. The Divine decree is immutable. There is no defect in God, in knowledge, power, and veracity. His decree cannot therefore be changed because of a mistake of ignorance, or of inability to carry out his decree, or of unfaithfulness to his purpose. Job 23 : 13, "He is in one mind, and who shall turn him?" Is. 46 : 10, "My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." The immutability of the Divine decree is consistent with the liberty of man's will. "God ordains whatsoever comes to pass; yet *so* as thereby neither is God the author of sin; nor is violence offered to the will of the creature; nor is the liberty, or contingency, of second causes taken away, but rather established." Westminster Confession, III. i. This is the doctrine of Christ. He asserts that his own crucifixion was a voluntary act of man, and also decreed by God. "They have done unto Elias whatsoever they listed (*ὅσα ἠθέλησαν*): likewise shall the Son of man suffer of them," Matt. 17 : 12. "The Son of man goeth as it was determined (*ἀρισμένον*), but woe unto that man by whom he is betrayed," Luke 22 : 22. In Acts 2 : 23, it is said, that Christ was "delivered by the determinate counsel of God," and "by *wicked* hands was crucified and slain."

Respecting the alleged contradiction between the Divine decree and human freedom, the following particulars are to be noticed : (a) The inspired writers are not conscious of a contradiction, because they do not allude to any, or make any attempt to harmonize the two things. If a self-contradiction does not press upon them, it must be because there is no real contradiction. Revelation presents that view of

truth which is afforded from a higher point of view than that occupied by the finite mind. Revealed truth is truth as perceived by the Infinite intelligence. If no contradiction is perceived by God in a given case, there really is none. The mind of Christ evidently saw no conflict between his assertion that he was to be crucified in accordance with the Divine decree, and his assertion that Judas was a free and guilty agent in fulfilling this decree. (b) There is no contradiction between the Divine decree and human liberty, provided the difference between an Infinite and a finite being is steadily kept in mind. There would be a contradiction, if it were asserted that an event is both certain and uncertain for the same being. But to say that it is certain for one being, and uncertain for another, is no contradiction. The difference between the omniscience of an Infinite being, and the fractional knowledge of a finite being, explains this. For the Divine mind, there is, in reality, no future event, because all events are simultaneous, owing to that peculiarity in the cognition of an eternal being whereby there is no succession in it. All events thus being present to him are of course all of them certain events. But for a finite mind, events come before it in a series. Hence there are future events for the finite mind; and all that is future is uncertain. Again, it would be self-contradictory, to say that an act of the human will is free for man, and necessitated for God. But this is not said by the predestinarian. He asserts that an act of human will is free for both the Divine and the human mind, but certain for the former and uncertain for the latter. God as well as man knows that the human will is self-moved, and not forced from without. But this knowledge is accompanied with an *additional* knowledge on the part of God, that is wanting upon the part of man. God, while knowing that the human will is free in every act, knows the whole series of its free acts in *one* intuition. Man does not. This additional element in the Divine knowledge, arises from that peculiarity in the

Divine consciousness just alluded to. All events within the sphere of human freedom, as well as that of physical necessity, are simultaneous to God. Man's voluntary acts are not a series for the Divine mind, but are all present at once, and therefore are all of them certain to God. From the view-point of the Divine eternity and omniscience, there is no *foreknowledge* of human volitions. There is simply knowledge of all of them, at once. (c) The alleged contradiction arises from assuming that there is only one way in which the Divine omnipotence can make an event certain. The predestinarian maintains that the certainty of all events has a relation to the Divine omnipotence, as well as to the Divine omniscience. God not only knows all events, but he decrees them. He makes them certain by an exercise of power; but not by the same *kind* of power in every case. God makes some events certain by physical power; and some he makes certain by moral and spiritual power. Within the physical sphere, the Divine decree makes certain by necessitating; within the moral sphere, the Divine decree makes certain without necessitating. To decree, is to bring within a plan. There is nothing in the idea of planning that necessarily implies compulsion. The operations of mind, as well as those of matter, may constitute parts of one great system, without ceasing to be mental operations. God decrees phenomena in conformity with the nature and qualities which he has himself given to creatures and things. God's decrees do not unmake God's creation. He decrees that phenomena in the material world shall occur in accordance with material properties and laws; and phenomena in the moral world, in accordance with moral faculties and properties. Within the sphere of matter, he decrees necessitated facts; within the sphere of mind, he decrees self-determined acts; and both alike are certain for God. The Westminster Confession (III. i.) affirms, that "the liberty or contingency of second causes is not taken away, but rather *established*" by the Divine decree. If God

has decreed men's actions to be free actions, and as free actions, then it is impossible that they should be necessitated actions. His decree makes the thing certain in this case, as well as in every other. The question how God does this, cannot be answered by man, because the mode of the Divine agency is a mystery to him. The notion of a decree is not contradictory to that of free agency, unless decree is defined as *compulsion*, and it be assumed that God executes all his decrees by physical means and methods. No one can demonstrate that it is beyond the power of God to make a voluntary act of man an absolutely certain event. If he could, he would disprove the Divine omnipotence. "God, the first cause, ordereth all things to come to pass according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, or freely and contingently." Westminster Confession, V. ii. Turretin: Institutio, VI. vi. 6. The self-determination of the human will is the action of a free second cause. It is therefore decreed self-determination. In the instance of holiness, the certainty of the self-determination is explicable by the fact that God works in man "to will and to do." In the instance of sin, the certainty of the self-determination is inexplicable, because we cannot say in this case that God works in man "to will and to do."

5. The Divine decree is unconditional, or absolute. This means, that its execution does not depend upon anything that has not itself been decreed. The Divine decree may require means or conditions in order to its execution, but these means or conditions are included in the decree. For illustration, God decreed the redemption of sinners through the death of Jesus Christ. If he had not also decreed the manner of that death, the time of its occurrence, and the particular persons who were to bring it about, but had left all these means of attaining the end he had proposed to an undecreed act of man that was uncertain for Himself, then the success of his purpose of redemption would have depended upon other beings than himself, and upon

other wills than his own. Consequently, his decree of redemption included the means as well as the end, and Jesus Christ was "by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, taken, and by wicked hands crucified and slain," Acts 2:23. Again, God decrees the salvation of a particular sinner. One of the means or conditions of salvation is faith in Christ's atonement. This faith is decreed. "Elected unto sprinkling of the blood of Christ," 1 Peter 1:1. "The faith of God's elect," Tit. 1:1. "Faith is the gift of God," Eph. 2:8. But if faith depends upon the undecreed action of the sinner's will, the Divine predestination to faith is dependent for success upon the sinner's uncertain action, and is conditioned by it. The means to the decreed end, in this case, are left outside of the decree. The same remark applies to prayer, as a means of obtaining a decreed end, like the forgiveness of sins. If the forgiveness of his sins has been decreed to a person, his prayer for forgiveness has also been decreed.

The reasons why the Divine decree is independent of everything finite are the following: (a) It is eternal, and therefore cannot depend upon anything in time; but everything finite is in time. (b) The decree depends upon God's good pleasure (*ἐὐδοκία*), Matt. 11:26; Eph. 1:5; Rom. 9:11. Therefore it does not depend upon the creature's good pleasure. (c) The Divine decree is immutable, Is. 46:10; Rom. 9:11. But a decree conditioned upon the decision of the finite will must be mutable, because the finite will is mutable. (d) A conditional decree is incompatible with the Divine foreknowledge. God cannot foreknow an event unless it is certain, and it cannot be certain if it ultimately depends upon finite will.

The Divine decrees are divided into efficacious and permissive. Compare Turretin III. xii. 21-25.

1. The efficacious decree determines the event: (a) By physical and material causes. Such events are the motions of the heavenly bodies, and the phenomena of the material

world generally. Job 28 : 26, "He made a decree for the rain, and a way for the lightning of the thunder." (b) By an immediate spiritual agency of God upon the finite will, in the origin and continuance of holiness. Philippians 2 : 13, "For it is God, which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure." Eph. 2 : 8, "Faith is the gift of God." 2 Tim. 2 : 25, "If God peradventure will give them repentance." Eph. 2 : 10, "Created in Christ Jesus unto good works." Eph. 4 : 24, "The new man is created in righteousness."

2. The permissive decree relates only to moral evil. Sin is the sole and solitary object of this species of decree. It renders the event infallibly certain, but not by immediately acting upon and in the finite will, as in the case of the efficacious decree. God does not work in man or angel "to will and to do," when man or angel wills and acts antagonistically to Him. Acts 14 : 16, "Who in times past suffered (*ἔϊασε*) all nations to walk in their own ways." Acts 17 : 30, "The times of this ignorance God overlooked" (*ὑπεριδὼν*). Ps. 78 : 18, "He gave them their own desire." Ps. 106 : 15, "He gave them their own request." Shedd : History of Doctrine, II. 135-138. As sin constitutes only a small sphere in comparison with the whole universe, the scope of the permissive decree is very limited compared with that of the efficient decree. Sin is an endless evil, but fills only a corner of the universe. Hell (*Hölle*) is a hole or "pit." It is deep, but not wide ; bottomless, but not boundless.

The permissive decree is a decree : (a) Not to hinder the sinful self-determination of the finite will. (b) To regulate and control the result of the sinful self-determination. "God's permissive will," says Howe (*Decrees, Lecture I.*), "is his will to permit whatsoever he thinks fit to permit, or, not to hinder ; while what he so wills or determines so to permit, he intends also to regulate, and not to behold as an idle unconcerned spectator, but to dispose all

those permissa unto wise and great ends of his own." It should be observed that in permitting sin, God permits what he forbids. The permissive decree is not indicative of what God approves and is pleasing to him. God decrees what he hates and abhors, when he brings sin within the scope of his universal plan. Calvin: Inst. I. xviii. 3, 4. The "good pleasure" (*ἔνδοκία*), in accordance with which God permits sin, must not be confounded with the pleasure or complacency (*ἀγάπη*) in accordance with which he promulgates the moral law forbidding sin. The term "good pleasure" has the meaning of "pleasure" in the phrase, "Be pleased, or please to do me this favor." What is asked for, is a *decision* to do the favor. The performance of the favor may involve pain, not pleasure; it may require a sacrifice of pleasure on the part of the one who is to "be pleased" to do it. Again, when the permissive decree is denominated the Divine will, the term "will" is employed in the narrow sense of volition, not in the wide sense of inclination. The will of God, in this case, is only a particular decision, in order to some ulterior end. This particular decision, considered in itself, may be contrary to the abiding inclination and desire of God as founded in his holy nature; as when a man by a volition decides to perform a particular act which in itself is unpleasant, in order to attain an ulterior end that is agreeable. Again, in saying that sin is in accordance with the Divine will, the term "will" implies "control." As when we say of a physician, "the disease is wholly at his will." This does not mean that the physician takes pleasure in willing the disease, but that he can cure it.

This brings to notice the principal practical value of the doctrine that God decrees sin. It establishes the Divine sovereignty over the entire universe. By reason of his permissive decree, God has absolute control over moral evil, while yet he is not the author of it, and forbids it. Unless he permitted sin, it could not come to pass. Should he de-

cide to preserve the will of the holy angel, or the holy man, from lapsing, the man or the angel would persevere in holiness. Sin is preventable by almighty God, and therefore he is sovereign over sin and hell, as well as over holiness and heaven. This is the truth which God taught to Cyrus, to contradict the Persian dualism: "I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil. I, the Lord, do all these things," Isa. 45:7. Compare Amos 3:6, "Shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done it?" Gen. 20:6, "I withheld thee from sinning against me." To deny this truth, logically leads to the doctrine of the independence of evil, and the doctrine of the independence of evil is dualism, and irreconcilable with monotheism. Evil becomes like the $\epsilon\lambda\eta$ in the ancient physics, a limitation of the Infinite being. The truth respecting the efficacious and the permissive decree is finely expressed in the verse of George Herbert.

" We all acknowledge both thy power and love
 To be exact, transcendent, and divine ;
 Who dost so strongly and so sweetly move,
 While all things have their will—yet none but thine.

For either thy *command*, or thy *permission*
 Lays hands on all ; they are thy right and left.
 The first puts on with speed and expedition ;
 The other curbs sin's stealing pace and theft.

Nothing escapes them both ; all must appear,
 And be disposed, and dressed, and tuned by thee,
 Who sweetly temper'st all. If we could hear
 Thy skill and art, what music it would be."

In purposing to permit sin, God purposes to overrule it for good. Ps. 76:10, "Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee; the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain." Gen. 45:8, "Ye thought evil against me, but God meant it unto good." This part of the doctrine of the permissive decree may be overlooked or denied, and an inadequate

statement result. The Council of Trent asserted that sin arises from the "mere permission" of God. The Reformers were not satisfied with this phraseology, because they understood it to mean that in respect to the fall of angels and men, God is an idle spectator (*deo otioso spectante*), and that sin came into the universe because he cannot prevent it, and has no control over it. This kind of permission is referred to in the Westminster Confession (V. iv.). "The almighty power, wisdom, and goodness of God extendeth even to the sins of angels and men; and this not by a bare permission, but such as hath joined with it a most wise and powerful bounding, and otherwise ordering and governing of them, in a manifold dispensation, to his own holy ends; yet so that the sinfulness thereof proceedeth only from the creature, and not from God."¹ Anselm

¹ Calvin is sometimes represented as differing from Augustine, and teaching that God decrees sin as he does holiness by an *efficacious* decree. Möhler so asserts in his *Symbolics*, but Baur (*Gegensatz*, 744 sq.) shows that this is a mistake. Modern Lutheran theologians often make the same assertion. Fisher (*Reformation*, 202) says that in his *Institutes*, Calvin "makes the primal transgression the object of an efficient decree," but "in the *Consensus Genevensis* confines himself to the assertion of a permissive decree in the case of the first sin." But in the *Institutes* (III. xxiii. 8), Calvin affirms that "the perdition of the wicked depends upon the divine predestination in such a manner that the cause and matter of it are found in themselves. Man falls according to the appointment of divine providence, but he falls by his own fault (*suo vitio cadit*)."
In *Institutes*, II. iv. 3-5, Calvin, it is true, asserts that "prescience or permission" is not the whole truth respecting God's relation to sin, because he is said in Scripture "to blind and harden the reprobate, and to turn, incline, and influence their hearts." But the accompanying explanation shows that he has in mind the notion of permission in the case of an idle spectator, who cannot prevent an action, and can do nothing towards controlling it after it has occurred—the same notion that is alluded to in the Westminster Confession, and other Calvinistic creeds. The "blinding, hardening, turning," etc., Calvin describes as the consequence of the Divine *desertion*, not causation. Some of his phraseology in this place is harsh, but should be interpreted in harmony with his explicit teaching in *Institutes*, III. xxiii. 8. One proof that Calvinism does not differ from Augustinianism on the subject of the origin of sin under the Divine decree, is the fact that the Dort canons, which are a very strict statement of Calvinism, reject supralapsarianism, and assert infralapsarianism. This means that the relation of God to the origin of sin is not efficacious, but permissive; which was Augustine's view.

(Cur deus homo, I. xv.) illustrates this truth in the following manner. "If those things which are held together in the circuit of the heavens should desire to be elsewhere than under the heavens, or to be further removed from the heavens, there is no place where they can be, but under the heavens; nor can they fly from the heavens without also approaching them. For whence, and whither, and in what way they go, they still are under the heavens; and if they are at a greater distance from one part of them, they are only so much nearer to the opposite part. And so, though man or evil angel refuse to submit to the Divine will and appointment, yet he cannot escape it; for if he wishes to fly from a will that commands, he falls into the power of a will that punishes."

Man may not permit sin, because he is under a command that forbids him to commit it, either in himself or in others. But God is not thus obliged by the command of a superior, to hinder the created will from self-determining to evil. He was bound by his own justice and equity to render it *possible* that man should not self-determine to evil; and he did this in creating man in holiness, and with plenary power to continue holy. But he was not bound in justice and equity to make it infallibly *certain* that man would not self-determine to evil. He was obliged by his own perfection to give man so much spiritual power that he might stand if he would, but not obliged to give so much additional power as to prevent him from falling by his own decision. Mutable perfection in a creature was all that justice required. Immutable perfection was something more. Compare Charnocke: Holiness of God, 496. We cannot infer that because it is the duty of a man to keep his fellow-man from sinning, if he can, it is also the duty of God to keep man from sinning. A man is bound to exert every influence in his power to prevent the free will of his fellow-creature from disobeying God, only because God has commanded him to do so, not because the fellow-man is *entitled*

to it. A criminal cannot demand upon the ground of justice, that his fellow-man keep him from the commission of crime; and still less can he make this demand upon God. The criminal cannot say to one who could have prevented him from the transgression, but did not: "You are to blame for this crime, because you did not prevent me from perpetrating it." Non-prevention of crime is not the authorship of crime. No free agent can demand as something due to him, that another free agent exert an influence to prevent the wrong use of his own free agency. The only reason, therefore, why one is obligated to prevent another from sinning, is the command of one who is superior to them both. God has made every man his "brother's keeper." And if God were man's fellow-creature, he also would be his "brother's keeper," and would be obligated to prevent sin. In creating man holy, and giving him plenary power to persevere in holiness, God has done all that equity requires, in reference to the prevention of sin in a moral agent.

How the permissive decree can make the origin of sin a certainty, is an inscrutable mystery. God is not the author of sin, and hence, if its origination is a certainty for him, it must be by a method that does not involve his *causation*. There are several attempts at explanation, but they are inadequate. 1. God exerts positive efficiency upon the finite will, as he does in the origination of holiness. He makes sin certain by causing it. But this contradicts James 1 : 13 : "Neither tempteth he any man;" 1 John 1 : 5, "God is light, and in him is no darkness at all;" Eccl. 7 : 29, "God made man upright, but they have sought out many inventions." It also contradicts the Christian consciousness. In the instance of holiness, the soul says, "Not unto me, but unto thee be the glory;" but in the instance of sin, it says, "Not unto thee, but unto me be the guilt and shame." "By the grace of God, I am what I am," in respect to holiness; "by the fault of free will, I am what I am," in respect to sin. 2. God places the creature in such circum-

stances as render his sinning certain. But the will of the creature is not subject to circumstances. It can resist them. Circumstances act only *ab extra*. The conversion of the will cannot be accounted for by circumstances, and neither can its apostasy. 3. God presents motives to the will. But a motive derives its motive power from the existing inclination or bias of the will. There is no certainty of action in view of a motive, unless the previous inclination of the will agrees with the motive; and the motive cannot produce this inclination or bias. 4. God decides not to bestow that special degree of grace which prevents apostasy. But this does not make apostasy certain, because holy Adam had power to stand with that degree of grace with which his Creator had already endowed him. It was, indeed, not certain that he would stand; but neither was it certain that he would fall, if reference be had only to the degree of grace given in creation. When God decides not to hinder a holy being from sinning, he is inactive in this reference; and inaction is not causative. 5. God causes the "matter" but not the "form" of sin. There is a difference between the act, and the viciousness of the act. The act of casting stones when Achan was slain was the same act materially as when Stephen was martyred; but the formal element, namely, the intention, was totally different. God concurs with the act and causes it, but not with the intent or viciousness of the act. But the "form" or "viciousness" of the act is the whole of the *sin*; and God's concursus does not extend to this. Compare upon the Divine concursus, Charnocke, on the Holiness of God. Charnocke regards it as a valid explanation of the permissive decree.¹

The Divine decree differs from the heathen fate.² (*a*) Decree is the determination of a personal Being; fate is

¹ Alexander, in the Princeton Repertory, 1831, makes the same objection as above, to the doctrine of the concursus.

² On fate as presented in the pagan writers, see the appendix to Toplady's translation of Zanchius, On Predestination.

merely the connection (nexus) of impersonal causes and effects. The Divine decree includes causes, effects, and their nexus. (b) The Divine decree has respect to the nature of beings and things, bringing about a physical event by physical means, and a moral event by moral means; fate brings about all events in the same way. (c) The Divine decree proceeds from a wise insight and knowledge. It adapts means to ends. Fate is fortuitous. It is only another word for chance, and there is no insight, or foresight, or adaptive intelligence, in mere chance. (d) God, according to the heathen view, is subject to fate: *τὴν πεπερωμένην μοιρὰν ἀδυνάτον ἐστὶ ἀποφυγεῖν καὶ θεῶ.* Herodotus, I. Says Plato (Laws, V. 741), "Even God is said not to be able to fight against necessity." But the Divine decree is subject to God.

"Necessity and chance

Approach not me, and what I will is fate."—MILTON.

To predestinate voluntary action is, to *make it certain*. If it meant, as it is sometimes asserted, to *force* voluntary action, it would be a self-contradiction. To make certain is not the same as to compel, or necessitate, because there are different ways of making certain, but only one way of necessitating. An event in the material world is made certain by physical force; this is compulsory. An event in the moral world is made certain by spiritual operation; this is voluntary and free. The lines of Pope express this: God

"Binding nature fast in fate,
Left free the human will."

The distinction between compulsion and certainty is a real one, and if observed prevents the misrepresentation of the doctrine of predestination.¹

¹ On this point, see Clarke: Demonstration. Proposition X. sub fine. Clarke, however, contends only that *foreknowledge* does not necessitate, not that *foreordination* does not. He is Arminian upon the subject of decrees.

The following objection is made against certainty, namely, that it is equivalent to necessity. "Si praescita sunt omnia futura, hoc ordine venient, quo ventura esse praescita sunt. Et si hoc ordine venient, certus est ordo rerum praescienti deo. Et si est certus ordo rerum, est certus ordo causarum; non enim aliquid fieri potest, quod non aliqua efficiens causa praecesserit. Si autem certus est ordo causarum quo fit omne quod fit, fato fiunt omnia quae fiunt. Quod si ita est, nihil est in nostra potestate." There is something like this in Cicero, *De Fato*, xiv. But it is not the opinion of Cicero, but of certain philosophers whose views he criticises. He mentions two theories: 1. That all things happen by fate or necessity, and attributes this view to Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Aristotle. 2. That the voluntary movements of the human soul do not happen by fate or necessity. Cicero favors the latter theory. *De Fato*, xvii. xviii. His view of the relation of human actions to the Divine will, was what would now be called the general providence of God. He did not maintain particular providence. "Magna dii curant, parva negligunt." *De natura deorum*. II. lxvi. The fallacy in the above extract consists in assuming that a "certain and fixed order" is identical with fate. This depends upon *how* the order is "fixed." If it is "fixed" in accordance with physical laws, it would be fate; but if "fixed" in accordance with the nature of mind and free will, it is not fate, but certainty only.

Certainty may or may not denote necessity. It denotes necessity when a physical event is spoken of; as when it is said that it is certain that a stone unsupported will fall to the ground. It does not denote necessity, when a mental or voluntary act is said to be certain. "If a man should be informed by prophecy, that he would certainly kill a fellow-creature the next day or year, and that in perpetrating this act he would be actuated by malice, it would not enter his mind that he would not be guilty of any crime because the act was certain before it was committed. But if the terms

were changed, and he were informed that he would be *necessitated* to commit the act, it would enter his mind." Princeton Repertory, 1831, p. 159.

Predestination is the Divine decree or purpose (*πρόθεσις*, Rom. 8 : 28) so far as it relates to moral agents, viz. angels and men. The world of matter and irrational existence is more properly the object of the Divine decree, than of the Divine predestination. God decreed rather than predestinated the existence of the material universe. Again a decree relates to a thing or fact; predestination to a person. Sin is decreed; the sinner is predestinated. In 1 Cor. 2 : 7, however, the gospel is described as predestinated: "The hidden wisdom which God foreordained (*προώρισεν*) unto our glory." This is explained by the fact that the gospel relates eminently to persons, not to things.

Predestination is denoted in the New Testament, by two words: *προορίζειν* and *προγινώσκειν*. The former signifies "to circumscribe, or limit beforehand." The word *ορίζειν* is transferred in the English "horizon," which denotes the dividing line that separates the earth from the sky. *Προορίζειν* occurs in Acts 4 : 28, "To do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before (*προώρισε*) to be done." Pilate, and the Gentiles, and the people of Israel were the agents under this predestination. This is predestination to sin. Examples of predestination to holiness are: Rom. 8 : 29, "Whom he did foreknow (*προέγνω*), he also did predestinate (*προώρισε*) to be conformed to the image of his son." Rom. 8 : 30, "Whom he did predestinate (*προώρισεν*), them he also called." Eph. 1 : 5, "Having predestinated (*προορίσας*) us unto the adoption of children." Eph. 1 : 11, Being predestinated (*προορισθέντες*) according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." 1 Cor. 2 : 7, "The hidden wisdom which God ordained before (*προώρισεν*) unto our glory."

The word *προγινώσκειν*, "to foreknow," occurs in Rom. 8 : 29. "Whom he did foreknow (*προέγνω*), he also did

predestinate." Rom. 11:2, "God hath not cast away his people, whom he foreknew (*προέγνω*). 1 Pet. 1:20, Christ "verily was foreknown (*προεγνωσμένος*) before the foundation of the world." The noun *πρόγνωσις* occurs in Acts 2:23, "Delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God." 1 Pet. 1:2, "Elect, according to the foreknowledge of God." The terms "foreknow" and "predestinate" denote two aspects of the same thing. Rom. 11:2, might read, "God hath not cast away his people whom he predestinated." When one is distinguished from the other, as in Rom. 8:29, to "foreknow" means, to "choose," or "single out," for the purpose of predestinating. Foreknowledge, in this use of the word, is election. It is the first part of the total act of predestinating. The word "know," in this connection, has the Hebraistic not the classical signification. To "know," in the Hebrew sense, means to regard with favor; denoting not mere intellectual cognition, but some kind of interested feeling or affection toward the object. Compare Gen. 18:19; Ps. 1:6; 36:10; 144:3; Hosea 8:4; Amos 3:2; Nahum 1:7; Matt. 7:23; John 10:14; 1 Cor. 8:3; 16:18; 2 Tim. 2:19; 1 Thess. 5:12. Shedd: On Romans 7:15. Traces of this use of *γινώσκω* are seen in the earlier Greek usage: *γνωτός* = *γνωστός* signifies a kinsman or a friend. Iliad, XV. 350; Aeschylus, Choeph. 702. With this signification, may be compared still another Hebraistic use of the word "to know;" namely, "to make known." Gen. 22:12, "Now I know that thou fearest God." 1 Cor. 2:2, "I determined not to know anything among you, save Jesus Christ."

It is to be carefully observed, that foreknowledge in the Hebraistic sense of "election" means a foreknowledge of the *person* simply; not of the *actions* of the person. "Whom he foreknew," Rom. 8:29, does not mean "Whose acts he foreknew," but, "Whose person he foreknew." It signifies that God fixes his eye upon a particular sinful

man, and selects him as an individual to be predestinated to holiness in effectual calling. This is proved by the remainder of the verse: "Whom he foreknew, he also did predestinate *to be conformed to the image of his Son.*" The holy actions of the elect are the effect, not the cause, of their being foreknown and predestinated. In 1 Peter 1:2, believers are "elected unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Christ;" that is, unto justification and sanctification. In 2 Tim. 1:9, "God hath called us, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began;" and certainly, therefore, before any obedience, either partial or total, could be rendered to be the ground of the calling. In Rom. 11:2, St. Paul affirms that "God hath not cast away his people whom he foreknew." It would be nonsense, even to suppose that God has cast away a people whom he foreknew would keep his commandments. This, therefore, cannot be the sense of *προέγνω*. The ground of predestination, is God's foreknowledge; and this foreknowledge is not a foresight that a particular individual will believe and repent, but a simple pre-recognition of him as a person to whom God in his sovereign mercy has determined to "give repentance," 2 Tim. 2:25; and to give faith, since "faith is the gift of God," Eph. 2:8, and since "as many as were ordained to eternal life believed," Acts 13:48. In making the choice, God acts "according to the good pleasure (*ἐνδοκίαν*) of his will," Eph. 1:5, and not according to any good action of the creature, so "that the purpose of God according to election might stand not of works, but of him that calleth," Rom. 9:11.

Foreknowledge, in the Hebraistic use of the word, is prior in the order to predestination, because it means electing compassion, and persons are referred to; but foreknowledge in the classical sense is subsequent in the order to decree, because it denotes cognition, and events are referred to. God "foreknows," that is, elects those persons whom

he predestinates to life. God decrees the creation of the world, and thereby foreknows with certainty the fact.

Predestination makes the number of the predestinated "so certain and definite, that it cannot be either increased or diminished." Westminster Confession, III. 4. 2 Tim. 2:19, "The Lord knoweth them that are his." John 13:18, "I know whom I have chosen." Ex. 33:17, "I know thee by name." Luke 10:20, "Your names are written in heaven." Jer. 1:5, "Before thou camest forth out of the womb, I sanctified thee, and I ordained thee a prophet unto the nations." Gal. 1:15, "God separated me from my mother's womb, and called me by his grace." John 10:14, "I know my sheep."

The decree of predestination is divided into the decrees of election and reprobation. God's decree of election respects angels. 1 Tim. 5:21, "I charge thee before God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, and the elect angels." Jude 6, "The angels which kept not their first estate." It is not, in this case, a decree to deliver from sin, but to preserve from sinning. Those whom God determined to keep from apostasy, by bestowing upon them an additional degree of grace above what had been given them in creating them in holiness, are the elect angels. Those whom he determined to leave to their own will, and thus to decide the question of apostasy for themselves with that degree of grace with which they were endowed by creation, are the non-elect or reprobate angels. A non-elect angel is one who is holy by creation, and has ample power to remain holy, but is not kept by extraordinary grace from an act of sinful self-determination. The perseverance of the non-elect angel is left to himself; that of the elect angel is not. "The first object of the permissive will of God was to leave non-elect angels to their own liberty, and the use of their free-will, which was natural to them, not adding that supernatural grace which was necessary, not that they should not sin, but that they should *infallibly* not sin. They had a strength

sufficient to avoid sin, but not sufficient infallibly to avoid sin; a grace sufficient to preserve them, but not sufficient to confirm them." Charnocke: Holiness of God.

Reprobation in the case of an unfallen angel does not suppose sin, but in the case of fallen man it does. A holy angel is non-elect or reprobate, in respect to *persevering* grace, and the consequence is that he may or may not persevere in holiness. He may continue holy, or he may apostatize. The decision is left wholly to himself. This is not the case with the elect angel. He is kept from falling. A sinful man, on the other hand, is non-elect or reprobate in respect to *regenerating* grace. It is not bestowed upon him, and his voluntariness in sin continues.

Election in reference to the angels implies: (a) Mutable holiness. Angelic holiness is not self-originated, hence not self-subsistent and unchangeable. Job 4: 18, "Behold he put no trust in his servants, and his angels he charged with folly." (b) It implies the operation of the Holy Spirit upon the finite will in all grades of being; and this in different degrees of efficiency. (c) It implies that a part, only, of the angels were placed upon probation. The perseverance in holiness of the elect angels was secured to them by electing grace.

The fall of the angels is the very first beginning of sin, and presents a difficulty not found in the subsequent fall of man; namely, a fall without an external tempter. This has been discussed in the profound treatise of Anselm, *De casu diaboli*. So far as God is concerned, the clue to the fall of a holy angel is in his decree not to hinder the exercise of angelic self-determination to evil. This, however, does not fully account for the origin of angelic sin. When God placed some of the holy angels upon probation, and decided not to prevent their apostasy by extraordinary grace, they might, nevertheless, have continued in holiness, had they so willed. The origin of their sin is not, therefore, fully accounted for by the merely negative permission of

God. A positive act of angelic self-determination is requisite ; and how this is made *certain* by God, is the difficulty. For it must be remembered, that in permitting some of the angels to fall, God did not withdraw from them any power or grace which was bestowed in *creation*. Nothing that was given in creation was withdrawn from Satan until *after* he had transgressed. This remark is true also of holy Adam, and his apostasy. How the fall of a holy will can be made a certainty by a merely permissive decree of God is inexplicable, as has already been observed. Neither temptation, nor the circumstances in which the creature is placed, make the event of apostasy infallibly certain. The will of the holy angel or man can resist both temptation and circumstances, and is commanded by God to do so. Nothing but the spontaneity of will can produce the sin ; and God does not work in the will to cause evil spontaneity. The certainty of sin by a permissive decree, is an insoluble mystery for the finite mind. The certainty of holiness in the elect by an efficacious decree, is easily explicable. God, in this case, works in the elect "to will and to do." The efficient decree realizes itself by positive action upon the creature ; but the permissive decree does not realize itself in this manner. God is the efficient author of holiness, but not of sin. The conviction that God is not the author of sin, is innate and irrepressible. Socrates gives expression to it in the Republic, II. 377. But he does so, somewhat from the view-point of dualism. While evil in his view, does not originate in God, and is punished by God, it is not, as in Revelation, under the absolute control of God, in such sense that it could be prevented by him.

The power to prevent sin is implied in its permission. No one can be said to permit what he cannot prevent. Sin is preventable, by the exercise of a greater degree of that same spiritual efficiency by which the will was inclined to holiness in creation. God did not please to exert this degree in the instance of the fallen angels and man, and thus

sin was possible. God's power to prevent sin without forcing the will, is illustrated by the Christian experience. The mind can be so illuminated and filled with a sense of divine things by the Holy Spirit, as to deaden lust and temptation. Compare the temptability of such believers as Leighton and Baxter, with that of an ordinary Christian. Afflictions sometimes cause the common temptations of life to lose almost all their force. Now, carry this mental illumination and this co-operation of the Divine Spirit with the human spirit to an extraordinary degree, and it is easy to see how God can keep a soul already holy from falling, and yet the process be, and be felt to be, spontaneous and willing. Only the First cause can work internally and directly upon the finite will. Second causes cannot so operate. No man can incline another man; but God the Holy Spirit can incline any man to good, however wickedly inclined he may already be. This is a revealed truth, not a psychological one. It could not be discovered by the examination of the self-consciousness, for this does not give a report of a Divine agent as distinct from the human. Hence the doctrine of spiritual operation in the soul is not found in natural religion. The "demon" of Socrates is the only thing resembling it; but this, probably, was only the personification of conscience.

The reason for the permission of sin was the manifestation of certain Divine attributes which could not have been manifested otherwise. These attributes are mercy and compassion, with their cognates. The suffering of God incarnate, and vicarious atonement, with all their manifestation of the Divine glory, would be impossible in a sinless universe. The "intent" was, "that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known by the church the manifold wisdom of God," Eph. 3:10. The attributes of justice and holiness, also, though exhibited in natural religion, yet obtain a far more impressive display in the method of redemption. The glory of God, not

the happiness of the creature, is the true theodicy of sin. As the mineral kingdom is for the vegetable, the vegetable for the animal, and the animal for man, so all are for God. The inferior grade of being, in each instance, justifies the subservience. This is not egotism or selfishness, because of the superior dignity in each case.

The position that sin is necessary to the best possible universe is objectionable, unless by the best possible universe be meant the universe best adapted to manifest the Divine attributes. If the happiness of the creature be the criterion of the best possible universe, then sin is not necessary to the best possible world. Sin brings misery, and the best possible world, looking at the happiness of the creature alone, would have no sin in it. Sin is very limited in comparison with holiness, in the universe of God. The earth is a mote in astronomy. The number of the lost angels and men is small compared with the whole number of rational creatures. Sin is a speck upon the infinite azure of eternity. Hell is a corner of the universe; it is a hole or "pit," not an ocean. It is "bottomless," but not boundless. The dualistic and gnostic theory, which makes God and Satan or the Demiurge nearly equal in sway, is not that of revelation. Because holiness and sin have thus far been so nearly balanced here on earth, it is not to be inferred that this will be the final proportion at the end of human history, or that it is the same throughout the universe. That sin is the exception, and not the rule, in the rational universe, is evinced by the fact that the angelic world was not created by species. Apostasy there is individual, not universal. The Scriptures denominate the good the heavenly "host," and allude to it as vast beyond computation; but no such description is given of the evil.

God's decree of election respects man. John 15:16, "Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you." 1 Cor. 1:27, 28, "God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise." Eph. 1:4, "According as

he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world." James 2:5, "Hath not God chosen the poor of this world, rich in faith." Matt. 13:11; 20:23; 22:14; 24:22, 40; 25:34; Mark 4:11; Luke 10:20; 12:32; 17:34; John 6:37; Acts 13:48; Rom. 8:28-33; Romans, chapters 9-11; Gal. 1:15; Eph. ch. 1; 2 Thess. 2:13; 2 Tim. 1:9; Isa. 42:1; 45:4; 65:9, 22. Human election differs from angelic, in that it is election to holiness from a state of sin, not to perseverance in a state of holiness. It supposes the fall of man. Men are chosen out of a state of sin. "They who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ." Westminster Confession, III. 6. Human election is both national and individual. National election relates to the means of grace; namely, the revealed word, and the ministry of the word. Individual election relates to grace itself; namely, the bestowment of the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit. National election is the outward call; "many are called," Matt. 20:16. Individual election is the inward or effectual call; "few are chosen." This statement of our Lord that "few" are individually elected, in comparison with the "many" who are nationally elected, refers to the state of things at the time of his speaking. Christ was rejected by the majority of that generation to which he himself belonged, but this does not mean that he will prove to have been rejected by the majority of all the generations of mankind.

The following characteristics of the decree of election are to be noticed. 1. God's decree of election originates in compassion, not complacency; in pity for the sinner's soul, not delight in the sinner's character and conduct. Election does not spring out of the Divine love (*ἀγάπη*) spoken of in John 14:23; but out of the Divine goodness and kindness (*χρηστότης*) spoken of in Rom. 11:22. God sees no holiness in either the elect or the non-elect, and hence feels no *complacent* love towards either; yet compassion towards both. He has a benevolent and merciful feeling towards

the fallen human spirit. (a) Because it is his own handiwork. Job 14 : 15, "Thou wilt have a desire to the work of thine hands." Jonah 4 : 11, "Should I not spare Nineveh, that great city, wherein are more than six score thousand persons that cannot discern between their right hand and their left hand?" Ezek. 33 : 11, "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but that the wicked turn from his way and live." Ps. 145 : 8, "The Lord is full of compassion; slow to anger, and of great mercy." Ps. 103 : 8; 86 : 15; Micah 7 : 18, "God delighteth in mercy." Ex. 34 : 6, "The Lord passed by and proclaimed, The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin." (b) Because of its capacity for holiness and worship. Towards the non-elect, this compassionate feeling exists in the Divine mind, because they, like the elect, are the creatures of God, and have the same capacities; but the *expression* of this compassion is restrained for reasons sufficient for God, and unknown to the creature. It appears strange that God should feel benevolent compassion towards the souls of all men alike, and yet not manifest *saving* compassion to all of them; that he should convert Paul, and leave Judas in sin. Yet there is no contradiction or impossibility in it. We can conceive of the existence of pity, without its actual exercise in some instances. We can conceive that there may be some men whose persistence in sin, and obstinate resistance of common grace, God decides for reasons sufficient to him not to overcome by the internal operation of his Spirit, while yet his feeling towards them as his creatures is that of profound and infinite compassion. Why he does not overcome their self-will by the actual exercise of his compassion, as he does that of others equally or perhaps even more impenitent and obstinate, is unknown, and perhaps unknowable. "Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in

thy sight" (Matt. 11 : 26), is all the reason which our Lord assigns.

2. God's decree of election is not chargeable with partiality, because this can obtain only when one party has a claim upon another. If God owed forgiveness and salvation to all mankind, it would be partiality should he save some and not others. Partiality is injustice. A parent is partial and unjust, if he disregards the equal rights and claims of all his children. A debtor is partial and unjust, if in the payment of his creditors he favors some at the expense of others. In these instances, one party has a claim upon the other. But it is impossible for God to show partiality in the bestowment of salvation from sin, because the sinner has no right or claim to it. "There is," says Aquinas (*Summa*, II. lxiii. 1), "a twofold giving: the one a matter of justice, whereby a man is paid what is due to him. Here, it is possible to act partially, and with respect of persons. There is a second kind of giving, which is a branch of mere bounty or liberality, by which something is bestowed that is not due. Such are the gifts of grace, whereby sinners are received of God. In this case, respect of persons, or partiality, is absolutely out of the question, because any one, without the least shadow of injustice, may give of his own as he will, and to whom he will: according to Matt. 20 : 14, 15, 'Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?'"

A man cannot be charged with unjust partiality in the bestowment of alms, because giving alms is not paying a debt. He may give to one beggar and not to another, without any imputation upon his justice, because he owes nothing to either of them. In like manner, God may overcome the resisting will of one man and not of another, without being chargeable with unjust partiality, because he does not owe this mercy to either of them. This truth is taught in Rom. 9 : 14, 15. "What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid. For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy

on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion." Although feeling compassion toward all sinners in the universe because they are his creatures, God does not save all sinners in the universe. He does not redeem any of the fallen angels; and he does not redeem all of fallen mankind. He deals justly with both fallen angels and lost men; and justice cannot be charged with partiality. "Behold therefore the goodness (*χρηστότητα*) and severity (*ἀποτομίαν*) of God; on them which fell, severity (strict justice); but towards thee, goodness (mercy)," Rom. 11:22. Under an economy of grace, there can be, from the nature of the case, no partiality. Only under an economy of justice, and of legal claims, is it possible. The charge of partiality might with as much reason be made against the gifts of providence, as against the gifts of grace. Health, wealth, and high intellectual power, are not due to men from God. They are given to some and denied to others; but God is not therefore partial in his providence. The assertion that God is bound, either in this life or the next, to tender a pardon of sin through Christ to every man, not only has no support in Scripture, but is contrary to reason; for it transforms grace into debt, and involves the absurdity, that if the judge does not offer to pardon the criminal whom he has sentenced he does not treat him equitably.

3. The decree of election is immutable, and the salvation of the elect is certain, because God realizes his decree, in this instance, by direct efficiency. He purposes that a certain individual shall believe and persevere to the end, and secures this result by an immediate operation upon him. The conversion of St. Paul is an example. "The gifts and calling of God are without repentance," Rom. 11:29. "Whom he predestinated them he glorified," Rom. 8:30. "Let us not imagine," says St. Augustine, on Ps. 68, "that God puts down any man in his book, and then erases him; for if Pilate could say 'What I have written, I have written,'

how can it be thought that the great God would write a person's name in the book of life, and then blot it out again?" The elect are not saved in sin, but from sin. Sanctification is as much an effect of the purpose of election, as justification. Christians are "elect unto obedience, and sprinkling of the blood of Christ," 1 Pet. 1 : 2. This accords with the previous statement, that the Divine decree is universal, including the means as well as the end. Says Milton,

" Prediction, still,
In all things and all men, supposes means ;
Without means used, what it predicts, revokes."

PARADISE REGAINED, III. 364.

They who are predestinated to life are predestinated to the means and conditions. Acts 13 : 48, "As many as were ordained to eternal life, believed." Eph. 1 : 4, "He hath chosen us in Him, that we should be holy." Eph. 2 : 10, "We are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath foreordained that we should walk in them." Says Augustine (*De correptione*, VII. xiii.), "those who are made the objects of divine grace, are caused to hear the gospel, and when heard to believe it, and are made to endure to the end in faith that works by love ; and should they at any time go astray, they are recovered." Says Luther (*Preface to Romans*), "God's decree of predestination is firm and certain ; and the necessity resulting from it is in like manner immovable, and cannot but take place. For we ourselves are so feeble, that if the matter were left in our hands, very few, or rather none, would be saved ; but Satan would overcome us all."

4. The grace of God manifested in the purpose of election is irresistible ; not in the sense that it cannot be opposed in any degree, but in the sense that it cannot be overcome. In the same sense, the power of God is irresistible ; a man may resist omnipotence, but he cannot conquer it. The army of Napoleon at Austerlitz was irresistible, though

fiercely attacked. God can exert such an agency upon the human spirit as to incline or make willing. Ps. 110 : 3, "Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power." Phil. 2 : 13, "It is God which worketh in you to will and to do of his good pleasure." The doctrine of the internal operation of the Holy Ghost is the clue to this. The finite will cannot be made willing, or inclined: (a) By external force. (b) By human instruction. (c) By human persuasion. But it can be, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit, upon the human will as spirit. This Divine agency is described in John 3 : 8. Because this action of the Infinite Spirit upon the finite spirit is in accordance with the voluntary nature of spirit, it is not compulsory. The creature is spontaneous and free in every act performed under the actuation of God, because God is the creator of the will, and never works in a manner contrary to its created qualities. God never undoes in one mode of his agency, what he has done in another mode. Having made the human spirit voluntary and self-moving, he never influences it in a manner that destroys its voluntariness. "God," says Howe, (Oracles, I. xx), "knows how to govern his creatures according to their natures, and changes the hearts of men according to that natural way wherein the human faculties are wont to work; a thing that all the power of the whole world could not do."

5. The decree of election is unconditional. It depends upon the sovereign pleasure of God, not upon the foreseen faith or works of the individual. Rom. 9 : 11 asserts "that the purpose of God according to election does not stand of works, but of him that calleth." Rom. 9 : 11, 12 teaches that the election of Jacob and rejection of Esau was not founded upon the works of either. "The children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, it was said, the elder shall serve the younger." 1 Pet. 1 : 2 asserts that believers are "elected unto obedience," consequently, not because of obedience. 2 Tim.

1 : 9 affirms that "God hath called us, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose." Rom. 8 : 29 teaches that "whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his son." If God foreknew these persons as conformed to the image of his Son, he would have no need to predestinate them to this conformity. Acts 13 : 48 declares that "as many as were ordained to eternal life, believed." This shows that faith is the result, not the reason of foreordination.

If it be objected that election does not "stand of works," but that it stands of faith, the reply is that: (a) Faith is an inward work. John 6 : 29, "This is the work of God, that ye believe." Consequently election not does rest upon faith as a foreseen inward work, any more than upon a foreseen outward work. (b) Faith is a gift of God to man (Eph. 1 : 8); therefore it cannot first be a gift of man to God, as the ground and reason of his electing act. (c) If election depends upon foreseen faith, God does not first choose man, but man first chooses God; which is contrary to John 15 : 16. (d) If election depends upon foreseen faith, there would be no reason for the objection in Rom. 9 : 19 : "Thou wilt say then, Why doth he yet find fault?" or for the exclamation, "O the depth!" Rom. 11 : 33. If it be said that election depends upon the right use of common grace by the sinner, this would make "the purpose of God according to election" to stand *partly* of works, and not solely "of him that calleth." Faith in this case is partly "the gift of God," and partly the product of the sinful will. This is contrary to those scriptures which represent God as the alone author of election, regeneration, faith, and repentance. Rom. 9 : 16 ; 8 : 7 ; John 1 : 12, 13 ; 3 : 5 ; 6 : 44, 65.¹

Reprobation is the antithesis to election, and necessarily follows from it. If God does not elect a person, he rejects him. If God decides not to convert a sinner into a saint,

¹ On this point, see Hodge : Theology, II. 639-710 ; Dabney : Theology, 580, 581 ; Watson : Institutes, II. 395 sq.

he decides to let him remain a sinner. If God decides not to work in a man to will and to do according to God's will, he decides to leave the man to will and to do according to his own will. If God purposes not to influence a particular human will to good, he purposes to allow that will to have its own way. When God effectually operates upon the human will, it is election. When God does not effectually operate upon the human will, it is reprobation. And he must do either the one or the other. The logical and necessary connection between election and reprobation is seen also, by considering the two divine attributes concerned in each. Election is the expression of the divine mercy; reprobation of the divine justice. God must manifest one or the other of these two attributes towards a transgressor. St. Paul teaches this in Rom. 11:22: "Behold the goodness and severity of God (the divine compassion, and the divine justice); on them which fell, severity; but towards thee goodness."

Consequently, whoever holds the doctrine of election, must hold the antithetic doctrine of reprobation. A creed that contains the former logically contains the latter, even when it is not verbally expressed. Such creeds are the Augsburg Confession, Part 1, Article 5; the First Helvetic, Article IX.; the Heidelberg Catechism, Q. 54. Ursinus, who drew up the Heidelberg Catechism, discusses reprobation in his system of theology founded upon it. The thirty-nine Articles mention election, and not reprobation. The following Reformed creeds mention both doctrines: Second Helvetic (1566), X. 4. "Et quamvis deus norit qui sunt sui, et alicubi mentio fiat paucitatis electorum, bene sperandum est tamen de omnibus, neque temere *reprobis* quisquam est adnumerandus." X. 6. "Alii dicunt: si vero sum de *reproborum* numero," etc. French Confession (1559), XII. "Nous croyons que de cette condamnation, Dieu retire ceux lesquels il a élus, *lais-sant* les autres," etc. Belgic Confession (1561), XVI. "Nous croyons que Dieu s'est démontré tel qu'il est; savoir miséricordieux et juste: miséricordieux, en retirant et sauvant ceux

qu'en son conseil éternel il a élus ; juste, en *laissant* les autres en leur ruine et trébuchement où ils se sont précipités." Scotch Confession (1560), VIII. "And for this cause, ar we not affrayed to cal God our Father, not sa meikle because he hes created us, quhilk we have common with the *reprobate*." Irish Articles (1615). "By the same eternal counsel, God hath predestinated some unto life, and *reprobated* some unto death." Lambeth Articles (1595). "God from eternity hath predestinated certain men unto life; certain men he hath reprobated." Dort Canons (1619), I. 15. "Scriptura Sacra testatur non omnes homines esse electos, sed quosdam non electos, sive in aeterna dei electione *praeteritos*, quos scilicet deus ex liberrimo, justissimo, irreprehensibili, et immutabilimi beneplacito decrevit in communi miseria, in quam se sua culpa praecipitarunt, *relinquere*." Westminster Confession (1647), III. 3. "By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others fore-ordained to everlasting death."¹

Reprobation relates to *regenerating* grace, not to common grace. It is an error to suppose that the reprobate are entirely destitute of grace. All mankind enjoy common grace. There are no elect or reprobate in this reference. Every

¹ The Formula Concordiae (1576-1584) teaches that foreknowledge extends to both good and evil ; that predestination extends to good only. The Waldensian Confession (1655) teaches inability, election, and preterition. It is an abridgment of the Gallican Confession, and is "highly prized" by the modern Waldensians. The Articles of the Congregational Union of England and Wales (1833) teach election. The creed of the Free Church of Geneva (1848) teaches inability and election. The Free Italian Church (1870) teaches inability. The Methodist Articles drawn up by Wesley (1784) teach inability; the sinner "cannot turn and prepare himself to faith." The Five Arminian Articles (Remonstratia), 1610, teach impotence, and that "God by an eternal purpose hath determined to save those who believe and persevere." Niemeyer excludes this from his collection of "Reformed" Confessions. The Cumberland Presbyterian Confession (1813-1829) teaches inability, and that "God's sovereign electing love is as extensive as the legal condemnation or reprobation, in which all men are by nature. But in a particular and saving sense, none can be properly called God's elect till they be justified and united to Christ. None are justified from eternity. God has reprobated none from eternity." Schaff: Creeds, III. 772.

human being experiences some degree of the ordinary influences of the Spirit of God. St. Paul teaches that God strives with man universally. He convicts him of sin, and urges him to repent of it, and forsake it. Rom. 1 : 19, 20; 2 : 3, 4; Acts 17 : 24-31. "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who hold the truth in unrighteousness, so that they are without excuse. And thinkest thou, O man, that thou shalt escape the judgment of God? Or despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance, and long suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance. God hath made of one blood all nations of men, and appointed the bounds of their habitation, that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him and find him : for in him we live and move and have our being."

The reprobate resist and nullify common grace; and so do the elect. The obstinate selfishness and enmity of the human heart defeats the Divine mercy as shown in the ordinary influences of the Holy Spirit, in both the elect and non-elect. Acts 7 : 51, "Ye stiff-necked, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost." The difference between the two cases is, that in the instance of the elect, God follows up the common grace which has been resisted, with the regenerating grace which overcomes the resistance; while in the instance of the reprobate, he does not. It is in respect to the bestowment of this higher degree of grace, that St. Paul affirms that God "hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth" [i.e. does not soften]. "It is," says Bates (Eternal Judgment, II.), "from the perverseness of the will and the love of sin, that men do not obey the gospel. For the Holy Spirit never withdraws his gracious assistance, till *resisted*, *grieved*, and *quenched* by them. It will be no excuse, that Divine grace is not conferred in the same *eminent* degree upon some as upon others that are converted; for the impenitent shall not be condemned for want of that singular powerful grace that was the privilege of the

elect, but for receiving *in vain* that measure of common grace that they had. If he that received one talent had faithfully improved it, he had been rewarded with more; but upon the slothful and ungrateful neglect of his duty, he was justly deprived of it, and cast into a dungeon of horror, the emblem of hell."

Reprobation comprises preterition, and condemnation or damnation. It is defined in the Westminster Confession, III. 7, as a twofold purpose: (a) "To pass by" some men in the bestowment of regenerating grace; and (b) "To ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin." The first is preterition; the last is condemnation, or damnation. Preterition must not be confounded with condemnation. This is done by Baier, Compendium, III. xii. 27. Much of the attack upon the general tenet of reprobation arises from overlooking this distinction. The following characteristics mark the difference between the two. (a) Preterition is a sovereign act; condemnation is a judicial act. God passes by, or omits an individual in the bestowment of regenerating grace, because of his sovereign good pleasure (*ἔυδοκία*). But he condemns this individual to punishment, not because of his sovereign good pleasure, but because this individual is a sinner. To say that God condemns a man to punishment because he pleases, is erroneous; but to say that God omits to regenerate a man because he pleases, is true. (b) The reason of condemnation is known; sin is the reason. The reason of preterition is unknown. It is not sin, because the elect are as sinful as the non-elect. (c) In preterition, God's action is permissive; inaction rather than action. In condemnation, God's action is efficient and positive.

1. The decree of preterition, or omission, is a branch of the permissive decree. As God decided to permit man to use his self-determining power and originate sin, so he decided to permit some men to *continue* to use their self-determining power and persevere in sin. Preterition is no more exposed to objection than is the decree to permit sin at first. "It is

no blemish," says Howe (Decrees, Lect. III.), "when things are thus and so connected in themselves naturally and morally, to let things in many instances stand just as in themselves they are." Preterition is "letting things stand" as they are. To omit or pretermit is to leave, or let alone. The idea is found in Luke 17 : 34. "The one shall be taken, the other shall be left." God sometimes temporarily leaves one of his own children to his own self-will. This is a temporary reprobation. Such was the case of Hezekiah. "In the business of the ambassadors of the princes of Babylon, God *left* him, to try him, that he might know all that was in his heart," 2 Chron. 32 : 31. Compare Ps. 81 : 12, 13; and David's temporary reprobation in the matter of Uriah. Preterition in the bestowment of regenerating (not common) grace, is plainly taught in Scripture. Isa. 6 : 9, 10; Matt. 11 : 25, 26; 13 : 11; 22 : 14; Luke 17 : 34; John 10 : 26; 12 : 39; Acts 1 : 16; 2 Thess. 2 : 11, 12; 2 Tim. 2 : 20; 1 Pet. 2 : 8; Rom. 9 : 17, 18, 21, 22; Jude 4. The passage in Isa. 6 : 9, 10 is quoted more often in the New Testament, than any other Old Testament text. It occurs six times in the Gospels (in every instance, in the discourse of our Lord), once in Acts, and once in Romans. Shedd : Romans 9 : 18, 23, 33.

The decree of preterition may relate either to the outward means of grace, or to inward regenerating grace. The former is national, the latter is individual preterition. In bestowing a written revelation, and the promise of a redeemer, upon the Jews, under the Old economy, God omitted or passed by all other nations. Deut. 7 : 10, "The Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be a special people unto himself : not because ye were more in number, for ye were the fewest." Until the appointed time had come, Christ himself forbade his disciples to preach the gospel indiscriminately to Jews and Gentiles. Matt. 10 : 5, 6. After his resurrection, national preterition ceased. Mark 16 : 15; Luke 24 : 47. All nations are now elected to the outward

means of salvation, viz., the Scriptures and the ministry of the word, so far as the command of God is concerned; though practically many are still reprobated, owing to the unfaithfulness of the Christian Church. St. Paul teaches this, when he asks and answers: "Have they [Gentiles] not heard? Yes, verily, their sound [of the preachers] went into all the earth, and their words to the end of the world," Rom. 10:18. The proclamation of the gospel is universal, not national.

2. There may be individual preterition in connection with national election. Some of the Jews were individually and inwardly reprobated; but all of them were nationally and outwardly elected. Rom. 9:27; 11:7, "Israel [the nation] hath not obtained that which he seeketh for, but the election hath obtained it, and the rest [of the nation] were blinded." Matt. 10:16, "Many be [outwardly] called, but few [inwardly] chosen;" Isa. 10:22, 23. Some in Christendom will in the last day prove to have been passed by, in the bestowment of regenerating grace. "All that hear the gospel, and live in the visible church, are not saved; but they only who are true members of the church invisible," Westminster S. C., 61. Reprobated persons are striven with by the Holy Spirit, and are convicted of sin, but they resist these strivings, and the Holy Spirit proceeds no further with them. In his sovereignty, he decides not to overcome their resistance of common grace. The non-elect are the subjects of common grace, to which they oppose a strenuous and successful determination of their own will. Every sinner is stronger than common grace, but not stronger than regenerating grace. The non-elect "may be and often are outwardly called by the ministry of the word, and have some common operations of the Spirit, who for their wilful neglect and contempt of the grace offered to them, being justly left in their unbelief, do never truly come to Jesus Christ." Westminster S. C., 68. Isa. 6:9, 10, "Go and tell this people, Hear ye indeed, but perceive not. Make

the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and convert and be healed." The resistance and abuse of common grace is followed by *desertion* of God; which negative desertion is, in this passage of the evangelical prophet, called, Hebraistically, a positive stupefying, hardening and deafening.

Preterition is not inconsistent with the doctrine of the Divine mercy. A man who has had common grace has been the subject of mercy to this degree. If he resists it, he cannot complain because God does not bestow upon him still greater mercy, in the form of regenerating grace. A sinner who has quenched the convicting influence of the Holy Spirit cannot call God unmerciful, because he does not afterwards grant him the converting influence. A beggar who contemptuously rejects the five dollars offered by a benevolent man cannot charge stinginess upon him, because, after this rejection of the five dollars, he does not give him ten. A sinner who has repulsed the mercy of God in common grace, and demands that God grant a yet larger degree, virtually says to the Infinite One: "Thou hast tried once to convert me from sin; now try again, and try harder."

3. There may be individual election in connection with national preterition. Some men may be saved in unevangelized nations. That God has his elect among the heathen, is taught in Calvinistic creeds. The Westminster Confession (X. 3.), after saying that "elect infants dying in infancy are regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh, when, and where, and how, he pleaseth," adds; "so also are all other elect persons [regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit], who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the word." This is not to be referred solely to idiots and insane persons, but also to such of the pagan world as God pleases to regenerate without the written word. The Second Helvetic Confession (I. 7.), one of the most important of the Reformed creeds, after saying

that the ordinary mode of salvation is by the instrumentality of the written word, adds, "agnoscimus interim, deum illuminare posse homines etiam sine externo ministerio, quo et quando velit: id quod ejus potentiae est." Zanchius (Predestination, I.) says that "national reprobation does not imply that every individual person who lives in an unevangelized country, must therefore unavoidably perish forever: any more than that every individual who lives in a land called Christian is therefore in a state of salvation. There are no doubt elect persons among the former; as well as reprobate ones among the latter." Again (IV.), after remarking that many nations have never had the privilege of hearing the word preached, he says, that "it is not indeed improbable that some individuals in these unenlightened countries, may belong to the secret election of grace, and the *habit* of faith may be wrought in them." By the term "habit" (*habitus*), the elder divines meant an inward disposition of the heart and will. The "habit of faith" is the believing mind, or disposition of soul. And this implies penitence for sin, and the longing for deliverance from it. The habit of faith is the broken and contrite heart which expresses itself in the publican's prayer: "God be merciful to me a sinner." It is evident that the Holy Ghost, by an immediate operation can, if he please, produce such a disposition and frame of mind in a pagan, without employing as he commonly does the preaching of the written word. That there can be a disposition to believe in Christ before Christ is personally known, is proved by the case of the blind man in John 9: 36-38: "Jesus saith unto him, Dost thou believe on the Son of God? He answered and said, Who is he Lord, that I might believe on him? And Jesus said unto him, Thou hast both seen him, and it is he that talketh with thee. And he said, Lord, I believe. And he worshipped him." The case of the Ethiopian eunuch (Acts 8: 27 sq.) is a similar instance of a penitent sense of sin, and a desire

for deliverance from it, before the Great Deliverer himself is actually set before the mind. Calvin (Inst. IV. xvi. 19) remarks that "when the apostle makes hearing the source of faith, he only describes the ordinary economy and dispensation of the Lord, which he generally observes in the calling of his people; but does not prescribe a perpetual rule for him, precluding his employment of any other method; which he has certainly employed in the calling of many to whom he has given the true knowledge of himself in an internal manner, by the illumination of his spirit, without the intervention of any preaching." Calvin is speaking of infants in this connection; but the possibility of the regeneration of an infant without the written word, proves the same possibility in the instance of an adult. In Inst. III. xvii. 4, he describes Cornelius as having been "illuminated and sanctified by the Spirit," prior to Peter's preaching to him. Augustine (Letter to Deogratias, CII.) teaches that some are saved outside of the circle of special revelation. "Seeing that in the sacred Hebrew books some are mentioned, even from Abraham's time, not belonging to his natural posterity nor to the people of Israel, and not proselytes added to that people, who were nevertheless partakers of this holy mystery, why may we not believe that in other nations also, here and there, some names were found, although we do not read their names in these authoritative records?" In his *Retractions* (II. xxxi.), Augustine remarks upon this passage, that the salvation in such cases was not on the ground of personal virtue and merit, but by the grace of God in regenerating the heart, and working true repentance for sin in it. "This I said, not meaning that anyone could be worthy through his own merit, but in the same sense as the apostle said, 'Not of works, but of him that calleth'—a calling which he affirms to pertain to the purpose of God." *Nicene Fathers*, I. 418.

That the Holy Spirit saves some of the unevangelized heathen by the regeneration of the soul, and the production

of the penitent and believing habit or disposition, is favored by Scripture; though from the nature of the case, the data are not numerous. The Bible teaches that the ordinary method of salvation is through the instrumentality of the word: "How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher?" Rom. 10:14. But it also teaches that the Divine Spirit sometimes operates in an extraordinary manner, and goes before the preacher of the word. The case of Cornelius, which is one of a class, warrants the belief that the Holy Spirit sometimes works in the individual heart, and produces a sense of sin and a believing disposition, prior to the actual presentation of Christ, the object of faith. Cornelius, before Peter is sent to preach Christ to him, is described as "a just man" who "feared God," Acts 10:22. This does not mean that he was a "virtuous pagan" who claimed to have lived up to the light he had, and who upon this ground esteemed himself to be acceptable to God; but it means that he was a *convicted sinner*, who was seriously inquiring the way of salvation from sin. This is evident from the fact that Peter preached to this "just man who feared God," the forgiveness of sin through Christ's blood, and that this "just man" believed and was baptized. Acts 10:44-47. Again, it is said, in Matt. 8:11, "Many shall come from the east and the west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven, but the children of the kingdom shall be cast out." The individually and spiritually elect from outside of Israel, are here contrasted with the individually and spiritually reprobated from within Israel. Again, the universality of the gospel for the Gentiles as well as the Jews, taught in the promise to Abraham and in the prophecies of Isaiah, makes it probable that the Divine Spirit does not invariably, and without any exceptions, wait for the tardy action of the unfaithful church in preaching the written word, before he exerts his omnipotent grace in regeneration. Peter supposes the exertion of

prevenient grace, when he says, "Whosoever among you feareth God, to you is this word of salvation sent," Acts 13:26. The phrase "feareth God," here, as in Acts 10:22, denotes a sense of sin, and a predisposition of mind to receive the remission of sins produced by the Holy Spirit. The apostles seem to have found such a class of persons in their missionary tours among the unevangelized populations. The assertion of Christ (Matt. 13:17), that "many prophets and righteous men have desired to see" the Messiah, though referring primarily to the Old Testament prophets and righteous persons, may have a secondary reference to inquiring persons among the Gentiles, and to Christ as the "Desire of all nations."

Whether any of the heathen are saved outside of Christian missions depends, therefore, upon whether any of them are "regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit." The pagan cannot be saved by good works, or human morality, any more than the nominal Christian can be. Pagan morality, like all human morality, is imperfect; and nothing but perfection can justify. Hence, the Westminster Larger Catechism, Q. 60, affirms that pagans "cannot be saved, be they never so diligent to frame their lives according to the light of nature." The fathers of the English Church also deny "that every man shall be saved by the law or sect which he professeth, so that he be diligent to frame his life according to that law, and the light of nature." Farrar: St. Paul, I. 280. The utmost diligence and effort of a pagan fails perfectly to obey the law of God written on the heart; and only perfect obedience is free from condemnation. The most virtuous heathen has an accusing conscience at times, and must acknowledge that he has come short of his duty. Rom. 2:15. Yet missionary annals furnish instances of a preparation of heart to welcome the Redeemer, when he is offered. Pagans have been found with a serious and humble sense of sin, and a

desire for salvation from it.¹ Baxter, in his *Personal Narrative*, says: "I am not so much inclined to pass a peremptory sentence of damnation upon all that never heard the gospel: having some more reason than I knew of before, to think that God's dealing with such is unknown to us; and therefore, the ungodly here among us Christians are in a far more worse case than they."

4. The decree of preterition supposes the free fall of man, and his responsibility for the existence of sin. See Edwards: *Decrees and Salvation*, § 58. Man is already guilty, and deserving perdition, and the reprobating decree of God simply leaves him where he already is by an act of his own self-determination. The *infra*- or *sub*-lapsarian theory is the correct one: *infra* or *sub* being used logically, not temporally. The sublapsarian order of the Divine decrees is this: 1. The decree to create man in holiness and blessedness. 2. The decree to permit man to fall by the self-determination of his own will. 3. The decree to save a definite number out of this guilty aggregate. 4. The decree to leave the remainder to their self-determination in sin, and to the righteous punishment which sin deserves. Sublapsarianism is taught by the synod of Dort: *Decrees*, Art. 7; and by Turretin: *Institutio*, IV. ix. 5.

¹ The case of the Indian described in Edward's *Life of Brainerd* is sometimes cited, but it is not so clear and satisfactory as some others. Brainerd describes the Indian as one who "had formerly been like the rest of the Indians, until about four or five years previously. Then, he said, his heart was very much distressed. At length God comforted his heart and showed him what he should do." Brainerd adds: "I must say that there was something in his temper and disposition which looked more like true religion than anything I ever observed amongst other heathens." But Brainerd does not say that this Indian *believed* and *trusted* in Christ, when Christ was *presented* to him as the Saviour from sin: yet had he done so, he would certainly have mentioned it. On the contrary, Brainerd remarks that the Indian "disliked extremely" some of his teaching. He also continued to practise the tricks of a conjurer in connection with idolatrous worship. The evidence and criterion of a true sense of sin, and of a genuine work of the Holy Spirit in a heathen heart, is that readiness to welcome and believe in Christ, when preached, which was exhibited by Cornelius and the eunuch.

The supralapsarian theory places, in the order of decrees, the decree of election and preterition before the fall, instead of after it. It supposes that God begins by decreeing that a certain number of men shall be elected, and reprobated. This decree is prior even to that of creation, in the logical order. The supralapsarian order of decrees is as follows: 1. The decree to elect some men to salvation, and to leave some to perdition, for the divine glory. 2. The decree to create the men thus elected and reprobated. 3. The decree to permit them to fall. 4. The decree to justify the elect, and to condemn the non-elect. The objections to this view are the following: (a) The decree of election and preterition has reference to a non-entity. Man is contemplated as creatable, not as created. Consequently, the decree of election and preterition has no real object. "Homo creabilis et labilis non est objectum predestinationis, sed creatus et lapsus." Turretin: *Institutio*, IV. ix. 5. Man is only ideally existent, an abstract conception; and therefore any divine determination concerning him, is a determination concerning non-entity. But God's decrees of election and reprobation suppose some actually created beings, from which to select and reject. "On *whom* (*ὅν*) he will, he hath mercy; and *whom* he will, he hardeneth," Rom. 9:18. The first decree, in the order of nature, must therefore be a decree to create. God must bring man into being, before he can decide what man shall do or experience. It is no reply to say, that man is created in the Divine idea, though not in reality, when the decree of predestination is made. It is equally true that he is fallen in the Divine idea, when this decree is made. And the question is, What is the logical order, *in the divine idea*, of the creation and the fall? (b) The Scriptures represent the elect and non-elect, respectively, as taken out of an existing aggregate of beings. John 15:19, "I have chosen you out of (*ἐκ*) the world." (c) The elect are chosen to justification and sanctification. Eph. 1:4-6; 1 Pet. 1:2. They must therefore have been

already fallen, and consequently created. God justifies "the ungodly," Rom. 4:5; and sanctifies the unholy. (d) The supralapsarian reprobation is a Divine act that cannot presuppose sin, because it does not presuppose existence. But the Scriptures represent the non-elect as sinful creatures. In Jude 4, the men who were "of old ordained to this condemnation" are "ungodly men, turning the grace of God into lasciviousness." Accordingly, the Westminster Confession (III. 7) affirms that God passes by the non-elect, and "ordains them to dishonor and wrath for their *sin*, to the praise of his glorious justice."

The supralapsarian quotes Rom. 9:11, in proof of his assertion that election and preterition are prior to the creation of man. "The children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil," Jacob was chosen and Esau was left. This is an erroneous interpretation. Birth is not synonymous with creation. Parents are not the creators of their children. Man exists before he is born into the world.¹ He exists in the womb; and he existed in Adam. Accordingly, in Rom. 9:10, 12, it is said that "when Rebecca had *conceived*, it was said to her, The elder shall serve the younger." The election and preterition related to the embryonic existence. Jacob and Esau had real being in their mother, according to Ps. 139:15, 16: "My substance was not hid from thee, when I was made in secret and curiously wrought in the lowest parts of the earth. Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being unperfect; and in thy book all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned when as yet there was none of them." St. Paul (Gal. 1:15) says that he was "separated and called from his mother's womb." God says to Jeremiah (1:5), "Before thou camest out of the womb I sanctified thee." In saying

¹ Says Haeckel (Evolution of Man, II. 3), "the human embryo passes through the whole course of its development in the space of forty weeks. Each man is really older, by this period, than is usually assumed. When, for example, a child is said to be 9¼ years old, he is really 10 years old."

that they had not "done any good or evil" at the moment of their election and preterition, actual transgression after birth is meant. Original sin, or corruption of nature, characterized them both; otherwise, it would be absurd to speak of electing one of them to mercy, and leaving the other to justice. Absolute innocence can neither be elected nor rejected, saved or lost. Eph. 3:9, 10 is explained by the supralapsarian, to teach that creation is subsequent in the order to redemption. But the clause, "who created all things by Jesus Christ," is parenthetical, not the principal clause. The clause *ἵνα γνωρισθῆ*, etc., depends on *εὐαγγελίσασθαι* and *φωτίσαι* in ver. 8, 9. See Olshausen and Hodge, in loco.

5. The decree of preterition does not necessitate perdition, though it makes it certain. Because: (a) It has no effect at all, in the order of decrees, until after the free will of man has originated sin. The decree of preterition supposes the voluntary fall of man. It succeeds, in the order of nature, the decree to permit Adam's sin. Preterition, consequently, has to do only with a creature who is already guilty by his own act, and justly "condemned already," John 3:18. (b) It is a permissive not an efficient act on the part of God, that is exerted in preterition. In respect to regeneration, God decides to do nothing, in the case of a non-elect sinner. He leaves him severely alone. He permits him to have his already existing self-determination, his own voluntary inclination. This is not compulsion, but the farthest possible from it. Compulsion might with more color of reason be charged upon election, than upon preterition. For in this case, God works in the human will "to will."

The efficient and blameworthy cause of the perdition of the non-elect is not the decree of preterition, but the self-determined apostasy and sin of the non-elect. Mere permission is not causation. "Ubi nuda est permissio, ibi locum non habet causalitas." Quenstedt, II. ii. 2. The

non-elect is not condemned and lost because God did not elect him, but because he "sinned and came short of the glory of God," Rom. 3:23. "Well; because of unbelief, they were broken off," Rom. 11:20.

The sentence of the last day will not be founded upon God's negative act of not saving, but upon the sinner's positive act of sinning. Christ will not say to the impenitent, "Depart, because I did not save thee," but, "Depart, because thou hast sinned, and hast no sorrow for it." Should John Doe throw himself into the water and be drowned, while Richard Roe stood upon the bank and did nothing, the verdict would be that the act was suicide, not homicide: "Drowned, not because Richard Roe did not pull him out, but because John Doe threw himself in." It is true that Richard Roe, in this instance, would be guilty of a neglect of duty towards *God*, in not saving the life of John Doe, but he would not be guilty of the murder of John Doe. Richard Roe's non-performance of his duty towards God, would not transfer the guilt of John Doe's act of self-murder to him. Were God under an obligation to save the sinner, the decree of preterition would be unjustifiable. It would be a neglect of duty. But salvation is grace, not debt; and therefore the decision not to bestow it, is an act of justice without mercy. "On them that fell, severity," or exact justice, is inflicted. Rom. 11:22.

While, then, election is the efficient cause of salvation, preterition is not the efficient cause of perdition. If I hold up a stone in my hand, my holding it up is the efficient cause of its not falling; but if I let it go, my letting it go is not the efficient cause of its falling. The efficient cause, in this case, is the force of gravity. Non-prevention is inaction, and inaction is not causation. On the side of election, the efficient cause of salvation is the Holy Spirit in regeneration; but on the side of reprobation, the efficient cause of perdition is the self-determination of the human will. See South: Sermon on Deut. 29:4. Bunyan (Rep-

robation Asserted, XI.) lays down the following propositions: 1. Eternal reprobation makes no man a sinner. 2. The foreknowledge of God that the reprobate will perish, makes no man a sinner. 3. God's infallible determining upon the damnation of him that perisheth, makes no man a sinner. 4. God's patience and forbearance until the reprobate fits himself for eternal destruction, makes no man a sinner.

6. The decree of preterition makes perdition certain, because the bondage of the sinner's will to evil prevents self-recovery. There are but two agents who can be conceived of, as capable of converting the human will from sin to holiness: namely, the will itself, and God. If owing to its own action the human will is unable to incline itself to holiness, and God purposes not to incline it, everlasting sin follows, and this is everlasting perdition. The certainty of the perdition of the non-elect arises from his inability to recover himself from the consequences of his own free agency, and the decision of God to leave him "to eat of the fruit of his own way, and to be filled with his own devices," Prov. 1:31.

7. The reason for preterition, or not bestowing regenerating grace, is secret and unknown to man. It supposes sin, but not a greater degree of sin than in the elect. This is taught in Rom. 9:11: "The children not having done any good or evil, in order that the purpose of God might stand, not of works, it was said, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated." Election also supposes sin, but not a less degree of sin than in the non-elect. Saul of Tarsus was a violent and bitter enemy of the gospel, but was "a chosen vessel." This is the sovereignty of God in election and preterition, taught in Rom. 9:18: "He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." The meaning of "harden," here, is, "not to soften."¹

¹ "Pharaoh was hardened, because God with his Spirit and grace hindered not his ungodly proceedings, but suffered him to go on and have his way. Why God did not hinder or restrain him we ought not to inquire." Luther: Table Talk, 49, Ed. Bogue.

The meaning of "hate" in Rom. 9:11, is, "not to love." This text is equivalent to Luke 17:34: "The one shall be taken, the other shall be left." The word *ἐμίσησα* is employed Hebraistically, not classically. It does not denote the positive emotion of hatred against sin, because it is expressly said that in election and preterition reference is not had to holiness and sin. A man is not elected because he is holy, or omitted because he is sinful. "Hatred," here, denotes the withholding of regenerating mercy. It is the same Hebraistic use of the word "hate" with that of Christ, in Luke 14:26 compared with Matt. 10:37. To "hate" father and mother is the same as to "love less," in comparison. Compare also the Hebraistic use of "hide," to denote, "not to reveal," in Matt. 12:25. The popular signification of "reprobate" denotes an uncommonly wicked person. In this, it differs from the scriptural and theological signification, which denotes mere non-election, with no reference to degrees of sin. A similar Hebrew idiom is seen in Ps. 141:4: "Incline not my heart to any evil thing." The negative permission to incline himself, the Psalmist calls a positive inclining by God. He asks God to keep him from his own inclination to evil. This idiom is found in the Turkish language. To "let fall," and "to cause to fall," are the same word. "I missed my steamer," in Turkish, is, literally, "I caused my steamer to run away." In the Oriental languages, the imperative form often expresses permission, instead of command. Herrick: *Bib. Sacra*, Oct. 1885.

Again, preterition, while supposing existing sin and unbelief, does not rest upon foreseen *perseverance* in sin and unbelief. God did not omit Esau in the bestowment of regenerating grace, because he foreknew that he would continue to do wrong in the future. He was passed by, "not having done any evil:" that is, without reference either to past or future transgressions. A reference to these, would have been a reason for passing by Jacob, as well as Esau. Perseverance in sin is the consequence of preterition, not

the cause of it. God decides not to overcome the sinner's resistance and obstinacy, and the result is, that he persists in his wilful course. Hence, future perseverance in sin is not the reason why God does not bestow regenerating grace upon the non-elect.

8. The final end of both election and reprobation is the Divine glory, in the manifestation of certain attributes. It is no more true that God creates any "merely to damn them," than that he creates them merely to save them. The ultimate end of all of God's acts is in himself. Rom. 11 : 36, "For of him, and through him, and to him are all things." When God elects and saves a sinner, the attribute of mercy is glorified. When he leaves a sinner in sin and punishes him, the attribute of justice is glorified. Neither salvation nor damnation are ultimate ends, but means to an ultimate end: namely, the manifested glory of the triune God. To exhibit justice is honorable to God, as well as to exhibit mercy. "The ministration of death was glorious. The ministration of condemnation is glory," 2 Cor. 3 : 7, 9.

The two great systems of theology which divide evangelical Christendom, Calvinism and Arminianism, are marked by their difference respecting the doctrines of election and preterition. 1. In the Calvinistic system, election precedes faith, and preterition precedes perseverance in unbelief. God elects a sinner to the bestowment of regenerating grace, and faith in Christ is the consequence. God passes by a sinner in the bestowment of regenerating grace (though he may bestow all the grades of grace below this), and endless unbelief is the consequence. God is thus the efficient cause and author of faith, but not of unbelief. The electing decree is efficacious, and originates faith. The non-electing decree is permissive, and merely allows existing unbelief to continue. In the Arminian system, election is subsequent to faith, and preterition is subsequent to perseverance in unbelief. God elects an individual, because his faith is foreseen; and God omits to bestow regenerating

grace upon an individual, because his persistence in sin and unbelief is foreseen. For the Divine mind, the faith and the perseverance in unbelief have occurred, and the election and preterition follow after them, as their consequence. Consequently, in the Arminian scheme, the reasons for election and preterition are not secret but known. Man's faith is the reason for election; man's perseverance in unbelief is the reason for preterition.¹ 2. The Arminian election and preterition are judicial, not sovereign acts of God. They are of the nature of reward and punishment. Because a man believes in Christ, he is elected: this is his reward. Because he persists in sin and unbelief, he is passed by: this is his punishment. The Calvinistic election and preterition are sovereign, not judicial acts. A man is elected, because of God's good pleasure (*κατὰ ἐνδοκίαν*), not because of faith; and a man is passed by, because of God's good pleasure, not because of persistence in sin. 3. Since the Arminian election succeeds saving faith, in the logical order, it must in the same order succeed death. Inasmuch as in the Arminian scheme the believer may at any time before death fall from faith, and therefore it cannot be determined until after death who has saving faith, it follows that a man cannot be elected until after he is dead. In the order of events, death is prior to election. 4.

¹ Respecting election, Watson (*Institutes*, II. 338) remarks as follows: "To be elected is, to be separated from the world ('I have chosen you out of the world'), and to be sanctified by the Spirit ('elect unto obedience'). It follows, then, that election is not only an act of God in *time*, but also that it is *subsequent* to the administration of the means of salvation. Actual election cannot be eternal, for from eternity the elect were not actually chosen out of the world, and could not be actually sanctified unto obedience." This explanation makes election to be sanctification itself, instead of its cause. "To be elected, is to be separated from the world, and to be sanctified." The term "separate" is used here by Watson not as St. Paul uses it to denote election, when he says that God "separated him from his mother's womb" (Gal. 1:15); but in the sense of sanctification, as St. Paul employs it in 2 Cor. 6:17, "Be ye separate, and touch not the unclean thing." By this interpretation, election is made to be the same thing as sanctification, instead of being an act of God that produces it; as is taught in Eph. 1:4, "He hath chosen us that we should be holy," and in 1 Pet. 1:2, "Elect unto obedience."

The Arminian election and preterition are the election and preterition of qualities: namely, of faith and persevering unbelief. The Calvinistic election and preterition are those of persons: namely, Peter, James, and John. 5. The Arminian election is inconsistent with a part of the Arminian statement respecting inability.¹ If God elects a sinner because he foresees that he will believe and repent, it follows that the sinner has power to believe and repent. If election is conditioned by the act of the human will in believing, this act must be within the sinner's ability. But in the 17th chapter of the Declaration of the Remonstrants, the following statement is found: "Man has not saving faith from himself, neither is he regenerated or converted by the force of his own free will; since in the state of sin he is not able of and by himself, to think, will, or do any good thing—any good thing that is saving in its nature, particularly conversion and saving faith." If this were all that is said in the Arminian Articles respecting ability, it would be impossible to harmonize it with conditional election. Unconditional election alone is consistent with it. But in connection with this statement of inability, a view of *grace* is presented that modifies and really retracts this assertion of utter inability, and is consistent with conditional election. Though it is said that man by apostasy "is not able of and by himself to think, will, or do any good thing that is saving in its nature," yet, it is also said that "the Holy Spirit confers, or at least is ready to confer, upon all and each to whom the word of faith is preached, as much grace as is sufficient for generating faith, and carrying forward their conversion in its successive stages." Every man, therefore, that hears the gospel receives a degree of grace that is sufficient for regeneration, provided that he rightly uses it. If therefore he is not regenerated, it must be from the lack of

¹ Baur (Gegensatz, 216) shows that the same inconsistency, in first asserting and then denying inability, appears in the Lutheran doctrine of regeneration as stated in the Formula Concordiae.

his human efficiency in co-operation with the Divine. The difference, consequently, between the believer and unbeliever, the elect and non-elect, is referable not wholly to God's electing grace, but partly to the right use made of grace by the man himself. Dependence upon regenerating grace in the Arminian scheme is *partial*, not total; and the Arminian election depends partly upon the act of the human will, and not wholly upon the will of God.

It is objected to the doctrine of preterition, that God cannot be sincere in the universal offer of the gospel in Mark 16:15. 1. The first reply is: That sincerity depends upon the intrinsic nature of the thing desired, not upon the result of endeavors to attain it. A parent sincerely desires the reformation of a child, because his reformation is a good thing in itself. He may have little or no expectation of accomplishing it, but this does not weaken his longing, or impair the sincerity of his efforts. A miser upon his death-bed desires wealth as a species of good, as sincerely as ever, but he knows that he can no longer have it. In like manner, God, by reason of his inherent compassion, may sincerely desire the conversion of a sinner, as the sinner's highest good, though he knows that it will never take place. The Arminian theory has no advantage over the Calvinistic at this point. God, says the Arminian, sincerely desires the sinner's repentance, although he foreknows infallibly that his desire will not be gratified by the action of the sinner. 2. The decree of God is not always expressive of his desire, but sometimes may be contrary to it. God decreed sin, and yet prohibited it. A man's decision, which is his decree in a particular case, is frequently contrary to his natural inclination. He decides to suffer pain in the amputation of a limb, though he is utterly averse to pain. His natural spontaneous desire is to escape physical pain, but in this particular instance he decides not to escape it. If there are sufficient reasons for it, a man's particular decision may be not only no index of his general desire, but directly con-

trary to it. The same is true of God. The natural spontaneous desire of God towards all men, the non-elect as well as the elect, is expressed in Ezekiel 33 : 11 ; 18 : 32. "As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure (γρη¹ = to desire) in the death of the wicked ; but that the wicked turn from his evil way and live. I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord ; wherefore turn yourselves and live ye." This Divine desire is constitutional. It springs from the compassionate love of the Creator towards the soul of the creature, and is founded in the essential benevolence of the Divine nature. But this general and abiding desire is distinguishable from the realization or gratification of it by a particular decision in a particular instance. It is conceivable that God may sincerely desire that Judas Iscariot would believe on Christ, and repent of sin, and yet for some sufficient reason decide not to overcome his opposition, and incline him to the act of faith. God desires that there should be no physical pain in his creation. He takes no delight in physical distress. But in particular instances, he decides not to realize this desire by a special act of his own in preventing or removing pain. The purpose of God, in distinction from his desire, towards the non-elect, is expressed in Exodus 9 : 16, "For this cause have I raised thee up, for to show in thee my power, and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth ;" and in Rom. 9 : 18, "Whom he will, he hardeneth." The purpose spoken of here, was the decision of God not to interfere with the will of Pharaoh. God desired that Pharaoh would spontaneously and of his own accord let the people go. Exodus 9 : 1, "Let my people go." But he decided not to overcome the unwillingness of Pharaoh to let the people go. Ex. 9 : 12, "God hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened not." This "hardening" was the not softening of his al-

¹ The Septuagint, contrary to New Testament usage, incorrectly renders this by βούλωμαι instead of θέλω.

ready hard heart. God sent Moses to persuade Pharaoh. This indicated the divine desire. But God at the same time informed Moses that his persuasion would fail. Ex. 7:1-4. This indicated the divine purpose not to conquer Pharaoh's obstinacy. Christ, in deep sincerity and in tears, said: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee; how often would I have gathered thy children together, as a hen doth gather her brood under her wings, and ye would not," Luke 13:34; 19:41. He unquestionably desired that the inhabitants of Jerusalem would yield to that degree of common grace with which they had been blest, and would repent and believe on him; and he unquestionably could have exerted upon them that degree of uncommon grace, by which he is "the author and finisher of faith," Heb. 12:2; and by which he demonstrates that "all power is given unto him in heaven and in earth," Matt. 28:18. Yet he did not exert his power to overcome the obstinacy and resistance of the human will in this instance. Those inhabitants of Jerusalem over whom he had wept were passed by in the bestowment of regenerating grace, but not of common.

One class of Scripture texts teaches that the benevolent desire of God is, that all men should turn from sin. Another class teaches that for reasons unknown to man, but sufficient for God, God determines in some instances not to gratify his own desire. There is nothing self-contradictory in this; for it finds a parallel in human action. It is indeed strange to human view, that an Omnipotent Being should, in even a single instance, forbear to bring about what he sincerely desires. But if there be a sufficient reason for it in the Divine mind, there is nothing intrinsically contradictory in the procedure, and there is certainly nothing unjust to the sinner in it. Says Turretin (*Institutio*, IV. xvii. 33), "God delights in the conversion and eternal life of the sinner, as a thing pleasing in itself, and congru-

ous with his own infinitely compassionate nature, rather than in his perdition ; and therefore demands from man, as an act *due from him*, to turn if he would live. But although he does not will, in the sense of delighting in, the death of the sinner, he at the same time wills, in the sense of decreeing, the death of the sinner for the display of his justice. Even as an upright magistrate, though he does not delight in and desire the death of the criminal, yet determines to inflict the just penalty of the law."

God desires that the non-elect would turn of himself, by the spontaneous action of his own will under the operation of common grace. He would rejoice in such a conversion. The entreaty, "Turn ye, why will ye die," springs out of this desire. That this entreaty of God fails in this case is owing to the sinner, and therefore does not prove that God is insincere in his desire. Sincerity, we have seen, is independent of the result. If the failure of this entreaty were due to God's own action, then, indeed, insincerity might be charged. If God, at the time when he is entreating a man to turn, were at work to prevent him from turning, the entreaty would be hypocritical. But God, instead of hindering the sinner, is helping him with that degree of grace which is called "common." The reason why the Divine entreaty thus accompanied with common grace is unsuccessful, is the resistance of the sinner. Surely, the fact that God does not think proper to add a second degree of grace in order to overcome the sinner's resistance of the first degree of grace, does not prove that God is insincere in his desire for the sinner's conversion under the first degree of grace. If a man offer a beggar a small sum and it is rejected, it would be absurd to say that because he does not now offer him a large sum, he was insincere in the first offer. A parent wills the payment of a son's debts, in the sense of desiring that his son would by industry and economy pay the debts which he has contracted ; but he may not will the payment of these debts in the

sense of deciding to pay them for him; the reason being, that should he pay them he would do injustice to the other members of his family.

A certain class of objections to election and reprobation rests upon the assumption that God is not merciful, unless he shows *special* mercy, and not sincere, unless he does *all that he possibly can* to save sinners. This is a fallacy. Sincerity in extending an invitation, does not involve an obligation to give a disposition to accept it. God is merciful in bestowing the gifts of providence and of common grace, though he go no farther than this; and he is sincere in doing what he does in common grace, though he does not exert saving grace. Says Richard Baxter, "If God please to stop Jordan and dry up the Red Sea for the passage of the Israelites, and to cause the sun to stand still for Joshua, must he do so for every man in the world, or else be accounted unmerciful? Suppose a king knew his subjects to be so wicked that they have everyone a design to poison themselves with something that is enticing by its sweetness: the king not only makes a law strictly charging them all to forbear to touch that poison; but sendeth special messengers to entreat them, and tell them the danger. If these men will not hear him, but wilfully poison themselves, is he therefore unmerciful? But suppose that he hath three or four of his sons that are infected with the same wickedness, and he will not only command and entreat them, but he will lock them up, or keep the poison from them, or feed them by violence with better food, is he unmerciful unless he will do so by all the rest of his kingdom?" If common grace should prevail over the sinner's resistance, it would be saving grace. This is not the same as saying, that the sinner by a *right use* of common grace makes it saving grace. In this latter case, there is a *co-operation* of the sinner with God in regeneration. The sinner by working concurrently with common grace renders it effectual. This is synergistic regeneration, and involves conditional election.

But if without any right concurrent working of the sinner's will, common grace should overcome the sinner's *resistance* and do the whole work, the regeneration would be due to God alone. To overcome the sinful will, is not the same as to assist it.¹

The difference between the Divine desire and the Divine purpose or decree, is the same as between the *revealed* and the *secret* will of God, mentioned in Deut. 29 : 29. God's desire in reference to sin and salvation is expressed in all that he has revealed: (a) In the moral law. (b) In the plan of redemption. Everything in the law and the gospel implies that God does not take pleasure in sin, or in the death of the sinner. But there is nothing in the revealed will of God, as made known in the law and gospel, that indicates what he has decided to do towards actually converting particular persons from their sins. This decision is altogether different from his desire, and it is a secret with himself.

The phrase, "God's will," is ambiguous. It may mean what he is pleased with, loves, and desires. An example of this is, Heb. 13 : 20, 21. "Now the God of peace, make you perfect to do his will (*Θέλημα*), working in you that which is well-pleasing (*εὐάρεστον*) in his sight." Here, God's "will" is something which he desires and delights in. An example of the secret will is found in Rom. 9 : 19. "Who hath resisted his will?" Here, God's "will" is his purpose or decree to "harden," or not soften, and is designated by *βούλημα*. What he "wills," i.e. decrees, in this instance, is the sinner's remaining in sin, which certainly is not well-pleasing in his sight. In the holy actions of elect men, the secret and the revealed will agree. God, in this case, decrees what he loves. In the sinful actions of non-elect men, the two wills do not agree. God, in this case,

¹ Compare Edwards : On Decrees and Election, §§ 59-62 ; Howe : Reconcilableness of God's Prescience with his Sincerity ; Baxter : Directions for Spiritual Peace and Comfort. Bacon's Ed., I. 252.

decrees what he hates.¹ This distinction is sometimes designated by the terms, legislative, and decretive will; sometimes by will of complacency (*complacentiæ*), and of good pleasure (*beneplaciti*): in which latter case, "good-pleasure" must not be confounded with "pleasure." The schoolmen employ the terms *voluntas signi* (signified), and *voluntas beneplaciti*. The Greeks speak of the will *ἐναρστίας*, and *ἐνδοκίας*.

The universal offer of the gospel is consistent with the Divine purpose of predestination, because: 1. Christ's atonement is a sufficient satisfaction for the sins of all men. 2. God sincerely desires that every man to whom the atonement is offered would trust in it. His sincerity is evinced by the fact, that, in addition to his offer, he encourages and assists man to believe by the aids of his providence; such as the written and spoken word, parental teaching and example, favoring social influences, etc.; and by the operation of the common grace of the Holy Spirit. The fact that God does not in the case of the non-elect bestow special grace, to overcome the resisting self-will that renders the gifts of providence and common grace ineffectual, does not prove that he is insincere in his desire that man would believe under the influence of common grace; any more than the fact that a benevolent man declines to double the amount of his gift, after the gift already offered has been spurned, proves that he did not sincerely desire that the person would take the sum first offered. For a fuller statement upon this subject, see *Soteriology*, p. 482 sq.

The relation of the decree of election to that of redemption is important. The statement in the Westminster

¹ Augustine (*Enchiridion*, 101) shows how one man in doing right, may agree with the revealed will of God, and disagree with the secret will; and another in doing wrong, may disagree with the revealed will, and agree with the secret. A sick father has two sons. One of them is godly, and desires and prays for his father's recovery. The other is wicked, and desires and prays for his father's death. God purposes that the father shall die, and he does die. See Owen: *Arminianism*, V.

Shorter Catechism, Q. 20, is as follows: "God having elected some to everlasting life, did enter into a covenant of grace to deliver them by a Redeemer." According to this statement, the decree to provide redemption succeeds the decree of election. God first decides to save certain individuals from sin and death, and an atoning Redeemer is the means of carrying out this design. This order is favored by the fact that Scripture speaks of a *covenant* between the Father and Son, respecting the redemption of men. Isa. 53:10, "When thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed." Ps. 2:8, "I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance." Christ stipulates to suffer, provided actual not merely possible salvation shall be the result. He volunteers to die, not only for the purpose of removing legal obstacles to salvation, but also with the view of actually delivering an immense multitude of particular persons from condemnation. Who these persons are, is determined by a previous election. Christ did not covenant with the Father merely to atone for human sin in the abstract. He covenants for more than this; because this of itself would not secure the salvation of a single individual, since the result would depend upon the hostile will of man. In this case, Christ would have died in vain, and would receive no reward for his incarnation, humiliation, and crucifixion. The Arminian order reverses the Calvinistic, in making the decree to provide redemption precede that of election. It is as follows: 1. The decree to appoint Christ as mediator. 2. The decree to make faith and perseverance on the part of man, the condition of salvation. 3. The decree appointing the means to faith and perseverance; namely, the scriptures, sacraments, and the influence of the Holy Spirit. 4. The decree to elect those whom God foresaw would employ the means, and to condemn those who would not. In this scheme, the success of Christ's atonement depends partly upon the action of the human will, and not wholly as

in the Calvinistic scheme upon the Divine will, and efficiency.

The school of Saumur advanced a theory called Hypothetic Universalism, which begins with Arminianism and ends with Calvinism. It is as follows: 1. God decreed to provide a redeemer for all men indiscriminately, without electing any to faith, but leaving wholly to man the act of faith in the provided redeemer. In this way, God has a general will or purpose that all men shall be saved, but its success is conditioned upon the act of man. 2. Foreseeing that no man will believe upon the provided redeemer, God then elects some in whom he works faith and secures perseverance. See Turretin: *Institutio*, IV. xvii. The first part of this theory is Arminian; the second part is Calvinistic.

The objections to this theory are: 1. The decree of redemption is made to depend upon human action. Its success is therefore uncertain. But a divine decree is an independent and infallibly successful act of God. This doctrine therefore conflicts with the idea of a Divine decree. 2. This theory implies that one Divine decree may fail, and be replaced by another. The decree of redemption does not succeed in saving any of mankind, owing to their unbelief, and God supplements it with a successful decree of election. 3. The decree of redemption, in this theory, does not, as it professes, include all men indiscriminately. Large masses of mankind in heathenism have had no opportunity of deciding whether they will believe in Christ. 4. This theory implies that men are elected and saved after they have rejected Christ's atonement. But the Scripture teaches that there is no salvation, but, on the contrary, eternal death, in case there has been a rejection of Christ. Heb. 6:4-6; 10:26.

The doctrines of election and reprobation belong to the higher ranges of revealed truth. This is implied in 2 Pet. 3:15, 16. Among the "things hard to be understood," are St. Paul's dogmatic teachings respecting the Divine decrees.

And those who are "unlearned" in the Christian system, and "unstable" in the Christian experience, "wrest" them out of their true import. They are truths for the well-instructed, and somewhat matured Christian. And this, because they *combine* and *systematize* all the other truths of the gospel. These doctrines are the outline and scheme under which the doctrines of grace and redemption are embraced. A man may trust in the atonement of Christ, and yet not be able to state accurately the relation of his act of faith to God's sovereignty and universal dominion. He may drink in the sincere milk of the word, while yet the strong meat belongeth not to him; because he is unskilful in the word of righteousness; because he is a minor and not of full age; and because he has not his senses exercised, by reason of use, to discriminate between truth and error. Heb. 5:13, 14.

Consequently, the doctrines of election and reprobation are not to be preached "out of season," or taught out of the logical order in the system. They are not to be preached to babes in Christ, but to those who are of full age. They suppose some ripeness and maturity of the Christian experience. In teaching geometry, an instructor does not put a beginner upon the 47th proposition. He leads him up to it, through the axioms and the preparatory theorems. He tells him that the 47th proposition is as certainly true as the axioms, and that he will see it to be so in the end. But he forbids him to perplex himself about it at first. Similarly, the beginner in religion, and still more the unregenerate man, is not to be instructed first of all in the doctrine of the Divine decrees. This is to be reserved for a later period in his mental history. The statement upon this point in the seventeenth of the Thirty-nine Articles is excellent. "As the godly consideration of predestination and our election in Christ, is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as feel in themselves the workings of the Spirit of Christ, so for

sinner and carnal persons lacking the Spirit of Christ to have continually before their eyes the sentence of God's predestination, is a most dangerous downfall, whereby the devil doth thrust them either into desperation, or into recklessness of most unclean living, no less perilous than desperation." Says Selden, in his *Table Talk*, "They that talk nothing but predestination, and will not proceed in the way of heaven till they be satisfied in that point, do as a man that would not come to London unless at his first step he might set his foot upon the top of Paul's." Says Bengel, "Man must not attempt to look at God behind the scenes." But in all discussion of the subject of predestination, it should never be forgotten that the Scriptures teach a large, not a narrow decree of election. God's elect are "a multitude which no man can number." Redemption by election includes the vast majority of mankind, if the whole history of man is considered.

The doctrine of election and irresistible grace is more encouraging to the preacher of the word, than the opposite theory. It is more probable that an individual sinner will believe and repent, if faith and repentance depend wholly upon the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit, than if they depend partly upon the energy of the sinner's will; and still more probable, if they depend wholly upon it. The Christian knows that if his faith and repentance had been left either partly or wholly, to his own separate agency, he would not have believed and repented, because he was strongly inclined to sin, loved its pleasure, and disliked humbling confession of sin and steady struggle against it.

On the same principle, it is more probable that the world of sinful men will come to faith and repentance, if this great event depends wholly upon God, and not wholly or partly upon the lethargic, fickle, and hostile will of man. If the success of the Holy Spirit depends upon the assistance of the sinner, He may not succeed. But if His suc-

cess depends wholly upon Himself, He is certain to succeed. It is better to trust God for such an immense good as the salvation of the great mass of mankind, than to trust mankind themselves, either entirely or in part. The biographies of successful ministers and missionaries show, that the longer they preach, and the more successful their preaching, the less do they rely upon the will of the sinner for success. "Not by [human] might, nor by [human] power, but by my Spirit, saith the Lord of Hosts," Zech. 4:6. "We shall not walk in an even course, but still reeling and staggering, till faith be set *wholly* upon its own basis, the proper foundation of it; not set betwixt two, upon one strong prop and another that is rotten; partly on God and partly on creature helps and encouragements, or our own strength. That is the way to fall off. Our only safe and happy way is, in humble obedience, in God's own strength, to follow his appointments without standing and questioning the matter, and to resign the conduct of all to his wisdom and love; to put the rudder of our life into his hand, to steer the course of it as seemeth him good, resting quietly on his word of promise for our safety. Lord, whither thou wilt, and which way thou wilt, be thou my guide, and it sufficeth." Leighton; On 1 Pet. 3:19-21.

CHAPTER VII.

CREATION.

Augustine: *City of God*, XI. Gangauf: *Psychologie des Augustinus*, I. i. Anselm: *Monologium*, VIII. IX. Turretin: *Institutio*, V. i.-vii. Witsius: *Apostles' Creed*, *Dissertation VIII.* Howe: *Oracles*, II. ix.-xii. Pearson: *Creed*, Art. I. Cudworth: *System*, III. 79-220. Ed. Tegg. Clarke: *Demonstration*, Prop. X. Wiseman: *Science and Revelation*. Herschel: *Discourse on Natural Philosophy*. Agassiz: *Structure of Animal Life*. Dawson: *Earth and Man; Origin of the World*. Guyot: *Creation*. Dana: *Creation*. Ulrici: *Gott und Natur*. Twisten: *Dogmatik*, Th. II. § 36. Schleiermacher: *Glaubenslehre*, § 40, 41. Quatrefages: *Human Species*. Argyll: *Primaeval Man*. Lewis: *Six Days of Creation; Lange's Genesis*, p. 314 sq. Mivart: *Man and Ape; Evolution and its Consequences*. Southall: *Recent Origin of Man*. Haeckel: *Evolution of Man; History of Creation*. Cabell: *Unity of Mankind*. Lyell: *Antiquity of Man*. Cook: *Religion in Chemistry; Credentials of Science*. Maudsley: *Physiology of Mind*. Fraser: *Blinding Lights*. Shedd: *Evolution defined and applied (Theological Essays)*. Beale: *Protoplasm*. Sterling: *Protoplasm*. Calderwood: *Science and Religion*. Hodge: *Darwinism*.

IN the Westminster Shorter Catechism, Q. 8, it is said that "God executes his decrees in the works of creation and providence." The decree itself, we have seen, is immanent in the Divine being, is formed in eternity, and is one single act which simultaneously includes all that comes to pass in all space and time. But as emanent and transitive, it passes into execution by a gradual and endless succession of events and phenomena. The two general modes in which the Divine decree is executed are: 1. Creation.

2. Providence. It might at first sight seem as if Redemption should constitute a third mode; but theologians have commonly included this under the head of Providence, as the special manner in which God provides for the needs of men as sinners.

Creation, in the proper sense of origination *ex nihilo*, is the very first work that God does *ad extra*. Nothing precedes it, except that eternal activity in the Divine essence which results in the trinitarian Persons. These latter are not creations, but emanations. Hence creation is called "the beginning of God's way," Prov. 8:22; and God is said to have created the heaven and earth "in the beginning," Gen. 1:1. The doctrine of creation is taught in Gen. 1:1; Nehemiah 9:6; Job 26:3; Ps. 19:1; 104:30; 124:8; 146:6; John 1:3; Acts 17:24; Rom. 11:36; 1 Cor. 8:6; 2 Cor. 4:6; Coloss. 1:16; Heb. 3:4; 4:4; 11:3. The peculiar characteristic in creation, namely, the origination of entity from non-entity, is mentioned in Heb. 11:3, "The worlds were framed so that things which are seen were not made of things that do appear;" also in 2 Cor. 4:6, "God commanded the light to shine out of darkness;" and also in Coloss. 1:16, "By him were all things created, visible and invisible."

Creation *ex nihilo* is peculiar to the Scriptures. It is not found even in the most rational and spiritual of the ancient cosmogonies. Even when an intelligent architect of the universe is affirmed, as in the systems of Plato and Aristotle, an eternal *ἕλη*, or chaotic matter, is postulated, out of which it is formed. Philo (*On The World*) takes the same view. In the Platonic writings, God is rather a demiurge than a creator. Plutarch (*Procreation of the Soul*) describes Plato's view as follows: "The creation was not out of nothing, but out of matter wanting beauty and perfection, like the rude materials of a house lying first in a confused heap." Ranke (*Universal History*, I. 22) marks the difference between the Mosaic and the Egyptian and Assyrian

cosmogonies, as "an express counter-statement. With the Egyptians and Babylonians, everything is developed from the inherent powers of the sun, the stars, and the earth itself. Jehovah, on the other hand, appears as the creator of heaven and earth; as both the originator and the orderer of the world. The conception of a chaos is not excluded, but this conception itself rested on the idea of a previous creation."

In Scripture, the term creation is sometimes employed in a secondary sense. "Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created," Ps. 104 : 30. "I create evil," Isa. 45 : 7. "The Lord hath created a new thing in the earth," Jer. 31 : 22. "Create in me a clean heart," Ps. 51 : 10. "I create new heavens and a new earth," Is. 65 : 17. Rev. 21 : 1, et alia. In these instances, the Divine agency operating by means of second causes is intended. Creatures are propagated under laws established by the Creator; sin is permitted and controlled by God employing the human will; an extraordinary event in history is brought about by Divine providence; the regeneration and sanctification of the human soul is a secondary creation.

Under the head of Creation, we have to do only with the primary and strict signification of the term, as denoting origination from nothing: *de*, or *ex nihilo*. The poverty and inadequateness of human language is very apparent, in respect to this idea. Words are more or less pictorial in their roots and elements. But the creation of entity from non-entity utterly forbids any picturing or imaging. For this reason, more or less of qualification or explanation must be employed, in all languages, in connection with the words that are used to denote this purely abstract and inexplicable conception.

The Hebrew word employed to denote the idea of creation is בָּרָא. According to Gesenius (in voce) it signifies: "1. To cut, to carve; 2. To form, create, produce. In Gen. 2 : 3, is read בָּרָא לַעֲשׂוֹת; which he created in mak-

ing: that is, which he made in creating something new." Says Delitzsch, on Gen. 1:1, quoted in Lange on Gen. 1:1, "כָּרַךְ in the Piel signifies to cut, hew, form; but in the Kal, it is employed to denote divine products, new and not previously existing in the sphere of nature and history (Ex. 34:10; Num. 16:30, and frequently in the prophets), or in the sphere of spirit (Ps. 51:10). In the Kal, it never denotes human productions, and is never used with the accusative of the material." In Ex. 5, 16, יָצַק is used with the accusative of material: "Make brick." Dillmann, On Gen. 18:21, agrees with Delitzsch. Oehler, Theology of the Old Testament, I. 169, takes the same view. Dorner, Christian Doctrine, II. 23, endorses it. The Patristic, Mediaeval, and Reformation exegesis adopts this interpretation.

The clause *ex nihilo* is explanatory of the term "creation," and is necessary to define it, and guard it from misuse. Unless it be employed, creation may be used to signify "evolution" or "development," which is a wholly different conception. *Ex nihilo* denotes that a created thing is not produced out of existing matter of any kind whatever: "ex, non designat sed excludit materiam." Creation of entity from non-entity is expressed in Rom. 4:17, "God calleth those things which be not, as though they were:" τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα. The same idea is suggested in 2 Cor. 4:6, "God who commanded the light to shine out of darkness." It is not meant that darkness is the material of which light is made, but the state or condition of things in which light is made to begin by a *fiat*. The passage in Heb. 11:3, in which it is said that "things which are seen were not made of things that do appear," teaches that there is an invisible cause for all visibles; and Coloss. 1:16, in which it is said that "all things visible and invisible" were created, (ἐκτελοῦν) by the First Begotten, teaches that God creates the invisible forces of matter, as well as the invisible spirits of angels and men. In the apocryphal book 2 Mac-

cabees 7 : 28, it is said that "God made the heaven and earth of things that are not: ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων." Creation ex nihilo has its human analogies. The understanding originates thoughts from nothing; and the will originates volitions from nothing. Thoughts and volitions, however, are not entities or substances, and here the analogy fails. But they are ex nihilo. One thought is not made out of another thought; nor is a volition made out of another volition. Here the analogy holds good.

The maxim ex nihilo nihil fit is true, in the sense that nothing comes from nothing: (a) By finite power; (b) As the material out of which something is produced; (c) By the mode of emanation, generation, or evolution; because this supposes existing matter. Lucretius (I. 151), lays down the position: "nullam rem e nihilo gigni divinitus unquam." The reason which he gives why even by divine power (divinitus) nothing can be produced from nothing is, that in this case there would be no need of a seed or egg; and that, consequently, everything might be produced out of everything; men could be originated out of the sea, and fishes and birds out of the earth. Lucretius does not conceive of the seed or egg as created, but as eternal. His reasoning is valid against pseudo-evolution, or evolution defined as "the transmutation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous." Everything may be originated out of everything, upon this theory. The homogeneous vegetable may develop into the heterogeneous animal; the homogeneous animal into the heterogeneous man. And the process may be downward as well as upward; because either process is alike the transmutation of a homogeneous substance into a heterogeneous one. If it were possible by the operation of merely natural law, to convert the inorganic mineral into the organic vegetable, it would be possible by the same method to convert the organic vegetable into the inorganic mineral. The rule would work in both ways. As plausible an argument might be constructed out of the deterioration and degradation of

some of the human family, to prove that man may be evolved downward into an anthropoid ape, as that which has been constructed to prove that he has been evolved upward from one.

Spinoza's definition of "substance" was intended to exclude the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*. He defines substance as "that which exists of itself; that is, the conception of which does not require the conception of anything else." Ethics, I. iii. But the conception of a creature, is the conception of a substance that requires another substance to account for it. A *created* substance, consequently, is precluded by Spinoza's definition of substance. There cannot be any such thing. Des Cartes had previously defined the *absolute* and *primary* substance, as "that which so exists that it needs nothing else for its existence;" and Aquinas (I. xxix. 2) so defines a trinitarian subsistence or person. But Des Cartes added a definition of *created* or *secondary* substance, as "that which requires the concurrence (*concursus*) of God, for its existence." Spinoza in his early life made an abstract of Des Cartes' philosophy, for the use of a pupil (*De principiis philosophiae Renati Des Cartes*). His editor, De Meyer, remarks that Spinoza must not be understood to agree with Des Cartes, and mentions that he rejected Des Cartes' distinction between intellect and will, but says nothing about the distinction between primary and secondary substance. Bruder's Spinoza, I. 89. Subsequently, when Spinoza published his own system, he rejected the distinction between primary and secondary substance, and gave no definition of any substance but the "*substantia una et unica*," of which everything is a modification. By this *petitio principii*, or postulate of one substance only, he excludes created substance, and lays the foundation of pantheism.¹ This

¹ A similar *petitio principii* is seen in Von Baer's definition of evolution, adopted by Spencer, as the "transformation [transmutation] of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous." That a homogeneous substance (say, vegetable) can be transmuted into a heterogeneous substance (say, animal or mineral), is the

theory of the universe energetically rejects creation ex nihilo, and maintains emanation. Fichte says that "the assumption of a creation is the fundamental error of all false metaphysics and philosophy." Hegel explains the universe of matter and spirit as an immanent process of God; a material efflux out from the Absolute which is retracted again as immaterial spirit. Strauss expresses the same idea in the statement that "trinity and creation are, speculatively considered, one and the same thing; only the former is the rational, and the latter the empirical aspect." Kant, on the contrary, asserts that "the proposition that God, as the universal first cause, is the cause of the existence of substance, can never be given up, without at the same time giving up the notion of God as the Being of all beings, and thereby giving up his all-sufficiency, on which everything in theology depends." *Practischer Vernunft*, 232 (*Abbott's Trans.* 279).

The maxim "ex nihilo nihil fit" is false in reference to the supernatural and omnipotent power of God. The Supreme being can originate entity from non-entity.¹ The fol-

point in dispute, but is quietly assumed in the definition. And, in order to give plausibility to this *petitio*, a false definition of the "homogeneous" is introduced. It is defined as "that which is without organs," the heterogeneous being "that which has organs." *Carpenter: Physiology*, 888. But the presence or absence of organs is not a mark of a difference in *substance*; which is what is requisite in order to heterogeneity. Vegetable protoplasm before the differentiation into organs begins, is as really vegetable substance as afterwards. Animal protoplasm is as really animal matter, before the organs appear as after. There is nothing heterogeneous in either instance.

Another *petitio principii* of the same kind appears in the agnostic definition of knowledge, as "classification." According to this definition, nothing can be known unless it can be brought under a class; and a class implies several individuals of the same species. "The first cause, the Infinite, in order to be known must be classed," says Spencer (*First Principles*, p. 81). But as the Infinite is the only one of the species, he cannot be put into a class, and therefore he is utterly unknowable. The point in dispute is, whether all knowledge is classification, and is quietly assumed by the agnostic in his definition of knowledge. Even in regard to those objects which can be classified, the *whole* of our knowledge does not consist merely in knowing the class to which they belong. Classification is only one of several elements in cognition.

¹ Upon this dogma of creation ex nihilo, so vital to theism, ethics, and religion, see *Cudworth: System*. Ch. V. *Pearson: Creed*, Art. I. *Clarke: Dem-*

lowing are the characteristics of creation from nothing: 1. Creation has a beginning. It is not the eternal emanation of an eternal substance, or the eternal evolution of an eternal germ. This is taught in Gen. 1 : 1, by the clause "in the beginning;" and in the phrase, "before the foundation of the world," frequently employed to denote eternity. Origen held that God is eternally creating; otherwise he would have nothing to do, and would be mutable in deciding to create. Schleiermacher: *Dogmatik*, I. 197. The *opera ad intra* meet the first objection. The eternal generation and spiration are Divine activities prior to the creation of the universe, and independent of it. Boethius asserted that God is eternal, and the world is perpetual. Rothe (*Ethik*, § 40) affirms eternal creation. Defective trinitarian or positively antitrinitarian theories logically tend either to the dogma of an eternal creation, or else of emanation, in order that the deity may have an *object* for himself as a subject. True trinitarianism finds this object within the Godhead. God the Son is God the Father's object. If creation is eternal, the universe is as old as the creator. It could be said of it, as the Nicenes said of the Son of God: *οὐκ ἦν πότε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*. 2. Creation is optional, not necessary, for God. It proceeds from free will, and is expressed by fiat. "He hath stretched out the heavens by his discretion," Jer. 10 : 2. Emanation is necessary and constitutional, like the generation of the Son and spiration of the Spirit. 3. Creation originates another new substance; but emanation and evolution produce only modifications of an old and existing substance.

The conception of creation from nothing is purely intellectual, like that of a mathematical point, line, or surface. These latter cannot be explained or even illustrated by sensuous images, and are held as valid conceptions by a purely

onstratation, 76. Augustine: *Confessions*, Books XI. and XII. Ambrose: *Hexaemeron*, Lib. II. ch. 1. 2. Shedd: *History of Doctrine*, I. 7-15; *Theological Essays*, 133-135; 154-159.

rational act of the mind unassisted by sensation. The atheistic mathematician who denies the being of God and creation *ex nihilo*, because he cannot image them, should upon the same principle deny the validity of the mathematical conceptions of a point, line, and surface. Owing to man's strong propensity to image his knowledge, and explain conceptions by a sensuous method, he attempts to account for the universe by postulating an eternal substance of some ethereal kind, out of which it is made. Hence even Plato and Aristotle suppose an *ἄλη*, which is formed into the cosmos by the Supreme architect. Müller (*Literature of Greece*, 87, 88) asserts that the idea of creation from nothing is wanting in the Greek conception of the deity, and is found in the Eastern nations. But the only Eastern people who had the idea were the Hebrews. The Persian cosmogony is dualistic; and the Indian is pantheistic. "It is," says Augustine (*City of God*, XI. ii.), "a great and very rare thing for a man, after he has contemplated the whole creation, corporeal and incorporeal, and has discerned its mutability, to pass beyond it, and by the continued soaring of his mind to attain to this unchangeable substance of God, and, in that height of contemplation to learn from God himself that none but he made all that is not of the divine essence." Mosheim, in a note to Cudworth (III. p. 140), proves by a survey of ancient philosophy and theology, that the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* is found only in Scripture.

The first verse of Genesis mentions the first of the opera ad extra of the triune God; namely, the creation of the present universe. The clause, "heaven and earth" denotes all that is not God; namely, the worlds of matter and of finite mind, or the sensible and intelligible worlds. "Heaven and earth" means the universe; as when one says of another: "He would move heaven and earth to accomplish his purpose." The sacred writer begins with an all-comprehending proposition: God created all finite beings and things. The same truth is taught in Coloss. 1:16.

“By him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible.” Here, the creation of the universe is referred to the second trinitarian person. A portion of the universe is spiritual in its substance, and is denoted by “heaven;” and a portion is physical, and is denoted by “earth.” The spirits of angels and men constitute the spiritual part of the universe, and matter constitutes the physical part of it. From Job 37 : 7, it appears that the angels were created before the six days’ work; and from Gen. 1 : 26, that men were created on the sixth day.

This is the old patristic interpretation of Gen. 1 : 1. Says Augustine (Confessions, XII. vii.), “Thou createdst heaven and earth : things of two kinds ; one near to thee, the other near to nothing.” By this latter, Augustine means the rarefied matter of chaos. Again (Confess., XII. vii.) he says, “Thou createdst heaven and earth ; not out of thyself, for so they should have been equal to thine only begotten Son, and thereby equal to thee also.”¹

The created universe of mind and matter, denominated “heaven and earth” in Gen. 1 : 1, is diverse from God : that is, is another substance. It is not God, nor a part of God ; because God created it from non-entity. God and the universe are not one substance, but two substances ; one primary and the other secondary, one necessary and the other contingent. God and the universe do not constitute one system of being, but two distinct and different systems ; for a system implies that all the parts are of one nature, and coequal in dignity and duration. Some theists, like Edwards for example, under the phrase “Being in general,” have unintentionally taught Spinozism. This phrase brings

¹ See also, *City of God*, XI. ix. ; *Gen. ad lit.* I. ix. 15 ; Gangauf : *Augustinus*, p. 100. Howe (*Oracles* II. ix.) takes the same view. So also does Pearson : *Creed*, Art. I. Delitzsch (*Old Testament History of Redemption*, 12) says that “the account of the creation begins with an all-comprehending statement, Gen. 1 : 1. The creation which is here intended is the very first beginning, which was not preceded by any other, and hence embraces the heaven of heavens. That which follows in the second verse is confined to the earth and its heavens.”

God and the universe into a single system, and makes God a part of it. Whatever is really one system of being is a numerical unity, and is of one and the same essence. The three trinitarian persons, for example, constitute one system of Divine being, and they are numerically one substance. The universe is not infinite, but finite, and therefore cannot belong to the system of the Infinite. The term "infinite," in the proper sense, is applicable only to God. For that which is strictly infinite is also eternal and necessary. But neither eternity of being, nor necessity of being, belongs to the "heaven and earth" that was created "in the beginning" of time. The universe is the Finite, and God is the Infinite. See Howe: Oracles, II. ix. The universe is unlimited, in distinction from infinite. The unlimited is capable of increase, diminution, and division, the Infinite is not. Space, time, and matter are unlimited; they can be added to, subtracted from, and divided. God is infinite, and incapable of addition, of subtraction, or of division. The finite spirit is also unlimited, not infinite. It is capable of increase and diminution; not by addition and subtraction of substance, but by development of latent properties, or suppression of them. "World" is sometimes put for "universe." In this case, "world" denotes all being that is not God. Coleridge's formula illustrates this. "World — God = 0. God — World = Reality absolute. The World without God is non-entity. God without the World is, in and of himself, absolute Being, and infinite Perfection." Marsh: Remains, 162. The use of "world" as the antithesis of "God," and the equivalent of "universe," is more common in philosophy than in literature. In literature, "world" more generally denotes a part of the universe. Milton uses the term to denote the visible universe of matter:

"How this world
Of heaven and earth conspicuous first began."

PAR. LOST, VII. 62.

In the second verse of the first chapter of Genesis, Moses proceeds to speak of the first state and condition of the "earth," in distinction from the "heaven:" "And the earth was without form and void." He describes the "earth" (excluding the "heaven") as a mass of chaotic matter which had been created *ex nihilo*, in that "beginning" spoken of in verse first. By the "earth," in verse second, is not meant merely the planet earth, but the whole material system connected with it; both solar and stellar. The ensuing description of God's work upon that part of the universe called "earth" shows that the sun, moon, and stars belong to it. Says Matthew Henry, on Gen. 1:2: "A chaos was the first matter. It is here called the 'earth' (though the earth in the sense of the dry land was not made until the third day), because it did most resemble that which afterwards was called earth, mere earth, an unwieldy mass. It is also called the 'deep,' both for its vastness, and because the waters which were afterwards separated from the earth were now mixed with it. This mighty bulk of matter was it, from which all bodies even the firmament and visible heavens were afterward produced by the power of the eternal Word."

Between the single comprehensive act of the creation of the angels and of chaotic matter, mentioned in Gen. 1:1, and the series of Divine acts in the six days, described in Gen. 1:3-31, an interval of time elapsed. This is the old patristic interpretation. The very common assertion, that the church has altered its exegesis, under the compulsion of modern geology, is one of the errors of ignorance. The doctrine of an immense time, prior to the six creative days, was a common view among the fathers and schoolmen. So also was the doctrine of the rarefied and chaotic nature of matter in its first form, a patristic tenet. Kant's gaseous chaos filling the universe, adopted by La Place and Herschel, was taught, for substance, by Augustine, in the following positions

taken in Confessions, XII. viii. 1. God created a chaotic matter that was "next to nothing;" that is, the most tenuous and imponderable form of matter. 2. This chaotic matter was made from nothing "before all days;" that is, in that prior period marked by the words "in the beginning." 3. This chaotic unformed matter was subsequently formed and arranged, in the six days that are spoken of after Gen. 1:1.

Augustine's exegesis of the first chapter of Genesis is substantially this: In the beginning, that is, in a time prior to the six days, God created *ex nihilo*, the angelic world, or "the heaven," and chaotic inorganic matter, or "the earth." Then in the six days he formed (not created) chaotic inorganic matter into a cosmical system, solar, stellar, and planetary, and upon the planet earth created (not formed) the organic vegetable, animal, and human species. This was the interpretation generally accepted in the patristic and middle ages. Lombard adopts Augustine's views. *Sententiarum*, Lib. II. *Distinctio* xii. David Kimchi, the learned Rabbi of the 12th century, respecting whom the Jews said, "No Kimchi, no understanding of the Scriptures," explained Gen. 1, in the following manner. "First of all, God created the 'heaven,' that is the highest heaven with the angels; then the 'earth,' the first appearance and condition of which are described in the second verse, and out of which the other creatures are subsequently formed. And it is called without 'form and void,' in opposition to heaven; which was immediately carried to its full perfection and replenished with inhabitants." Witsius: *Creed*, *Dissertation* VIII.

Respecting the length of the six creative days, speaking generally, for there was some difference of views, the patristic and mediaeval exegesis makes them to be long periods, not days of twenty-four hours. The latter interpretation has prevailed only in the modern church. Augustine teaches (*De Genesi ad literam*, IV. xxvii.) that the length of

the six days is not to be determined by the length of our week-days. Our seven days, he says, resemble the seven days of the account in Genesis, in being a series, and in having the vicissitudes of morning and evening, but they are "multum impares." In Lib. IV. i, he says that it is difficult to say what "day" means. In Lib. V. i, he calls attention to the fact that the "six or seven days may be, and are called one day," Gen. 2:4. In Lib. II. xiv, he calls the six days, "God-divided days," in distinction from "sun-divided days." See Lewis: Lange's Genesis, p. 131. Gangauf (Augustine, p. 111, note) cites numerous passages to the same effect. Anselm (Cur deus, I. 18) remarks that there was a difference of opinion in his time, as to whether the six days of Moses "are to be understood like days of ours," as a successive creation, or whether "the whole creation took place at once." He says it is "the opinion of the majority" that man and angels were created at the same time, because we read: "He who liveth forever, created all things at once."

There is nothing in the use of the word "day," by Moses, that requires it to be explained as invariably denoting a period of twenty-four hours; but much to forbid it. The following facts prove this. 1. Day means daylight, in distinction from darkness. Gen. 1:5, 16, 18. 2. Day means daylight and darkness together. Gen. 1:5. 3. Day means the six days together. Gen. 2:4. The first day (Gen. 1:5) could not have been measured by the revolution of the sun around the earth, because this was not yet visible. The same variety in signification, is seen in the Mosaic use of the word "earth." 1. Earth means the entire material universe. Gen. 1:1. 2. Earth means the solar, stellar, and planetary system. Gen. 1:2. 3. Earth means the dry land of the planet earth. Gen. 1:10. 4. Earth means the whole of the planet earth. Gen. 1:15, 17. The ten commandments were called by the Jews the "ten words." The term "word" here denotes a truth or proposition,

not a single word. Similarly, a period of time having its beginning and ending, its evening and morning, may naturally be called a "day."

The seven days of the human week are copies of the seven days of the Divine week. The "sun-divided days" are images of the "God-divided days." This agrees with the Biblical representation generally. The human is the copy of the Divine; not the Divine of the human. Human fatherhood and sonship are finite copies of the trinitarian fatherhood and sonship. Human justice, benevolence, holiness, mercy, etc., are imitations of corresponding Divine qualities. The reason given for man's rest upon the seventh solar day is, that God rested upon the seventh creative day. Ex. 20:11. But this does not prove that the Divine rest was only twenty-four hours in duration; any more than the fact that human sonship is a copy of the Divine, proves that the latter is sexual.

Respecting the harmony between physical science and revelation, it is to be observed in the first place, that physical science is not infallible; so that an actual conflict between science and revelation would not necessarily be fatal to revelation. It might be fatal to science. In the seventeenth century, the physics of Des Cartes had great authority, and much was made by the skeptics of that day of the fact that the Mosaic physics did not square with the Cartesian physics. Says Howe (Oracles II. xxi.), "Some are sick of the history of the creation, because they cannot reconcile the literal account thereof, in the beginning of Genesis, with the philosophy of their Des Cartes: as if his reputation were a thing more studiously to be preserved than that of Moses; though yet, more might be said than hath been, to reconcile with natural principles even the whole history of the creation." The "vortices" of the Cartesian physics are to-day an exploded and rejected "science;" and the most skeptical physicist of this generation would not dream of alleging a conflict between

science and religion, because Moses does not agree with Des Cartes.

Again, in the second place, physical science is not one and invariable in its contents. There have been a multitude of scientific theories that cannot be reconciled with each other. The Ptolemaic and the Copernican astronomies are examples. For centuries, the Ptolemaic system was undisputed; and the skeptic of those centuries endeavored to show that the Bible did not agree with it, and the believer of those centuries endeavored with equal strenuousness to show that it did. Herschel: Discourse, § 336. Christianity, on the other hand, has had substantial invariability. For the differences between Christian believers, even upon the more recondite doctrines, are by no means so great as those between the ancient Greek and the modern Englishman, upon the nature and laws of matter. The difference between the Augustinian and the Semi-Pelagian, or between the Calvinist and the Arminian, is not at all equal to that between Ptolemy and Copernicus. The doctrines of the trinity, the incarnation, the apostasy, and the redemption, have always constituted the essential substance of the Christian faith. But no such substantial invariability as this appears in the history of physical science. Even, therefore, if it could not be shown that revelation is in harmony with a science that confessedly is not infallible, and actually is not invariable, it would not be a very serious matter for revelation. The error might be upon the side of science.

After this preliminary observation, we remark, in the first place, that the Biblical physics does not conflict with the heliocentric Copernican theory. Nothing at all is said in the opening of Genesis, respecting the motion of the earth in relation to the sun; and the phraseology in other parts of Scripture is popular, and to be explained as it is when the modern astronomer himself speaks of the rising and setting of the sun. In the second place, the order of creation as given in Genesis is corroborated by the best settled re-

sults of modern physics. The whole field cannot of course be gone over. Let us test the matter by referring to geology, in respect to which science the conflict has been the most severe.¹

The now generally accepted facts in geology remarkably coincide with the series of events, as they are related in Genesis. The sequence of the creative periods is substantially the same in both. Physical science may be regarded as having established with considerable certainty, the following positions: 1. The planet earth, at first, was a chaotic mass in a state of fusion, and enveloped in a totally dark atmosphere of vapor. This agrees with the statement in Gen. 1:2: "The earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep." 2. By the cooling caused by the radiation of heat, a crust was formed over the molten interior, and the atmospheric vapor was condensed into an ocean of water which covered the superficial crust. This *primaeval* ocean is mentioned in Gen. 1:2: "The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." The creative work under these two heads is not a part of the six days' work. It occurred before the first day, and belongs to the immense duration between "the beginning" and the six days' work. 3. The condensation of vapor did not make the earth's atmosphere clear and translucent immediately. But in course of time it so cleared it, that the light, which had been generated by the heat, could penetrate it with some obscurity. Light as a luminous haze could now be distinguished from darkness. This agrees with Gen. 1:3, 4: God said, "Let there be light; and God divided the light from the darkness."

The appearance of light before the appearance of the sun, is one of the strongest proofs that the author of this narrative was instructed upon this point. Such a fact as this must have been revealed to him. Previous to modern

¹ For a lucid statement of the teachings of geology concerning the order of creation, see Dana: *Creation*.

physical investigations, this apparent misplacement of light before the sun was regarded as singular by the believer, and absurd by the skeptic. The fact, moreover, that the sun and moon do not appear until the fourth day, and that the vegetable kingdom was created on the third day and was growing without a sun visible in the sky, greatly increased the difficulty. But the theory of the modern geologist removes the difficulty, and corroborates Moses. According to geology, there was a long period when the primaeval oceans were tepid water, when the atmosphere was a gloaming, and was as moist, warm, and germinating as that of the rainy season in the tropics.

“ Over all the face of earth
Main ocean flowed, not idle, but, with warm
Prolific humor softening all her globe
Fermented the great mother to conceive,
Sate with genial moisture.”—MILTON.

The consequence was that rank growth of succulent, fern-like vegetation, of which the coal-beds are now the exponent.

4. As the inorganic process of radiation of heat and condensation of vapor went on, the earth's atmosphere became less and less vaporous, and more and more luminous, until the space around the planet assumed the appearance of the empty, hollow arch of heaven. Previously, this space had been so much filled with vapor, that no distinction between earth and sky was possible. This formation of the atmospheric welkin, or dome, is described in Gen. 1 : 6-8. “ And God said, Let there be a firmament [expanse], and let it divide the waters which are under the firmament from the waters which are above the firmament. And God called the firmament Heaven.” A similar atmospheric process is continually occurring on a smaller scale, in the clearing up of a storm or fog. It is thus described by Shelley in “ The Cloud.”

“ For after the rain, when with never a stain,
 The pavilion of heaven is bare,
 Then the winds and sunbeams with their convex gleams
 Build up the blue dome of the air.”

5. By the contact of water with the lava beneath the earth's crust, steam and gases were generated, causing earthquakes and convulsions which lifted the crust, forming the mountain ranges, elevated table-lands, lagoons, and ocean beds. This process having taken place, the planet is fitted to support the first and lowest form of organized matter: namely, the vegetable. Up to this point in the Mosaic account, there is no *life* of any kind in that part of the created universe designated by the term “earth” in Gen. 1: 2. Everything is inorganic and lifeless, and the only forces in operation are mechanical and chemical. Now the plant as a *living* species, which could not be originated by any of the mechanical and chemical forces that had previously been in action, is created *ex nihilo*, and the vegetable kingdom is established on the earth. Geology finds no evidences of vegetable life in the igneous rocks, and corroborates the teaching of Moses in Gen. 1: 9-12: “And God said, Let the waters under the heavens be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry land appear. And God called the dry land Earth, and the gathering together of the waters called he Seas. And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after his kind.” With this, is to be compared 2 Pet. 3: 5 (R. V.). “By the word of God, there were heavens from of old, and an earth compacted (*συνεστῶσα*) out of water (*ἐξ ὕδατος*), and amidst (or through) water (*δι' ὕδατος*).” This teaching of St. Peter seems to agree with the geological view, that the earth got its solid consistence “out of” and above the water, by means of the convulsions that lifted it up, and “amidst” and under the water, by means of the deposit of rocky strata.

In saying “Let the earth bring forth (*נָשַׁטַּ = to sprout*)

grass," Gen. 1 : 11, it is not meant that the inorganic earth or mineral develops into the organic vegetable, and thus that vegetable life is an evolution from the lifeless clod ; because it is also said that God "created every plant of the field *before* it was in the earth, and every herb of the field *before* it grew," Gen. 2 : 5.¹ The words, "Let the *earth* bring forth," mean that the earth furnishes the non-vital material elements that constitute the visible form of a plant, which are vitalized and assimilated by an invisible principle of vegetable life—which invisible principle was a creation *ex nihilo*.² The creation of *this* is the creation of the species vegetable. This interpretation is evidently the true one, not only because it agrees with Gen. 2 : 5, but because the earth, in verse 24, is said to bring forth animals also. If there be no intervening creative energy, and the earth is the sole cause, then evolution produces out of the very same lifeless elements both vegetable and animal life. But even the evolutionist has not yet claimed that the animal comes *directly* from the mineral. The vegetable is the link between the two. The mineral first becomes a vegetable, and then the vegetable becomes an animal, according to the materialistic physics. Our Lord's words in Mark 4 : 28 : "The earth bringeth forth fruit of herself (*αὐτομάτη*), first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear," explain the words, "Let the earth bring forth grass." The earth, to-day, "brings forth fruit *spontaneously* of itself," only because of the seed planted in it. And on the third crea-

¹ This is the rendering of the Septuagint, Vulgate, and A. V. But even if that of the Targums, Syraic, Gesenius, and many modern Hebraists, whom the R. V. follows, be adopted, it still appears from the narrative that there was a time when "no plant of the field was yet in the earth, and no herb of the field had yet sprung up." In this state of things, it is plain that the earth could not "bring forth" what was not "in the earth," except by the intervention of a creative act.

² Philo (Questions on Genesis) so explains. "Moses here (Gen. 2 : 5) intimates, in enigmatical expressions, the *incorporeal species* which were created first, in accordance with the intellectual nature which those things which are upon the earth perceptible to the outward senses were to imitate."

tive day, the earth "brought forth grass spontaneously," only because of the new vegetable species then created by God "before it was in the earth, and before it grew." Gen. 2: 5.

6. The sun and moon now appear in the vault of heaven, that is, in the atmosphere entirely cleared of the primæval vapor. The seasons are now arranged, since the sun can exert its power, and the vegetable world in its higher as well as its lower forms is developed. This agrees with Gen. 1: 14-19.

7. Animal life, in the waters, and in the air, is then created. Gen. 1: 20-23. It is acknowledged that marine life is the oldest of all animal life. The coral formations of the Florida reefs are the work of living creatures. Agassiz (Graham Lectures, 68) thinks that they are "hundreds of thousands of years old." This distinguished naturalist, in his Fossil Fishes, shows, that of the vertebrate animals fishes alone existed at first; that amphibious animals came later; and that birds and mammals appeared still later; the lower orders first, and the higher afterwards. Hæckel (Creation, I. 68) concedes that Agassiz has shown this. The fiat "Let the *waters* bring forth," is to be explained like, "Let the earth bring forth." A specific animal principle is created ex nihilo, which builds up out of the vegetable and other elements now in the waters, a particular form of fish or bird. "The causality of 'the swarming of the swarm,' cannot lie in the water itself." Lange's Gen. p. 171. Philo: Works, IV. 284. Ed. Bohn.

8. Animal life on the land is then created: (a) irrational animals; (b) man. Gen. 1: 24-31. Geology shows that man is latest in the series.

The six days of Gen. 1 are six creative periods; each having its evening and morning; and each one of these marked by a particular manifestation of Divine power: some more distinctly than others, but all really so marked. This is indicated in the Hebrew: "There was [an] evening,

and there was [a] morning: one day." The first, second, and fourth days exhibit the Creator operating through those mechanical laws, and chemical properties of matter, which he established "in the beginning" spoken of in Gen. 1:1. The effects in these three days are brought about by radiation of heat, condensation of vapor, chemical affinity and repulsion, attraction of cohesion, gravitation, etc. The third, fifth and sixth days are periods during which life, vegetable, animal, and mental, is originated *ex nihilo* by creative energy. Neither of these forms of life can be accounted for, by the operation of those laws and properties of matter which were employed on the first, second, and fourth days. The first, second, and fourth are *inorganic* days; during which nothing vital is originated. The third, fifth, and sixth are *organic* days, during which the vegetable, animal, and rational kingdoms are originated.

The Mosaic record mentions four, and perhaps five creative fiats, by which the living species in the organic world were originated *ex nihilo*. The first fiat creates the vegetable species (Gen. 1:11, 12). The second creates the animal species in its lower forms; namely, fishes, reptiles, and birds (Gen. 1:20-22). The third creates the animal in the higher form of the quadruped (Gen. 1:24, 25). The fourth creates man (Gen. 1:26-28). It is somewhat uncertain whether the bird is included under the same fiat with the fish and reptile, because the Hebrew reads, "Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life, and *let* fowl fly above the earth in the open firmament of heaven" (R. V.). In this case, the "fowl" are not necessarily the product of the "waters." The authorized rendering: "And fowl that may fly," represents the "waters" as bringing forth the "fowl." St. Paul teaches the doctrine of distinct living species, when he says, "All flesh is not the same flesh; but there is one kind of flesh of man, another of fishes, and another of birds," 1 Cor. 15:39.

These several fiat establish and fix the limits that separate the vegetable from the animal kingdom, and the several species in the animal kingdom, from each other. The result of each fiat is distinct from that of the others. The fiat that created the vegetable did not create the fish. The fiat that created the quadruped did not create man. No mere evolution of that which was created by the first fiat will yield that which was created by the second ; in other words, no one of these distinct species can be transmuted into another by merely natural causes. The supernatural power of God must intervene, in order to account for an absolutely new species. God must say : "Fiat." The theory of evolution, as presented either by Haeckel in its extreme form, or by Darwin in its more moderate form, unquestionably contradicts the Mosaic physics. "The Divine word of power creates not merely a force in general ; each new and distinct creative word introduces a new and distinct principle into the already existing sphere of nature—a principle which hitherto had not been present in it." Lange: On Genesis 1 : 9–13. Agassiz (Graham Lectures, p. 13) comes to the same conclusion, from considering the diversities of structure in the kingdom of animal life. "It must be mind acting among these material elements, making them subservient to its purpose, and *not the elements themselves* working out higher combinations of structure."

At the same time, the Mosaic physics does not needlessly multiply the miracle, but admits of the evolution of varieties under a species. If but one fiat is intended in Gen. 1 : 11, 12, and no subdivisions are implied under it, then, all the innumerable varieties of plants in the vegetable kingdom have been evolved by propagation from one original vegetable principle. Vegetable protoplasm, in this case, has developed into the endless variety of plants. The mention, however, of "kinds" of grass, herb, and tree, looks like subdivisions, under the general fiat. So, likewise, if only a single fiat without subdivisions is mentioned in Gen.

1 : 20, 21, it would not contradict the Mosaic physics to concede that reptiles have developed from fishes, and even birds from reptiles. But the mention of "kinds" (Gen. 1 : 21) appears rather to imply subdivisions under the general fiat. Again, if in Gen. 1 : 24, 25, but a single fiat without subdivisions is intended by the sacred writer, then the species quadruped originated on the sixth day has developed, under the law of propagation, and by the influences of environment, into the innumerable varieties that now fill the earth. The fact, however, that the quadruped is produced "after its kind," would seem to indicate particular creative acts under the general.

While there is this amount of indefiniteness and flexibility in the Mosaic account, respecting the *breadth* of a species, there is the strictest definiteness and inflexibility respecting the *fact*. While, according to Moses, the vegetable may evolve from the vegetable, and the animal from the animal, it would utterly contradict the Mosaic physics to concede that fishes, reptiles, and birds have evolved from the plant or vegetable ; that quadrupeds have evolved from fish, reptile, and bird ; that man has developed from irrational biped or quadruped. The products of two general fiats cannot be brought under a single one. The species man, originated by a distinct fiat on the sixth day, has developed under the law of propagation and by the influence of environment, into the several varieties or races of men. This fiat is distinguished from all the others, in that God addresses *himself*, not the earth or the waters. It is certain, also, that no subdivisions under it are implied, as in the case of the others, because man is not said to have been produced "after his kind."

This creation and fixedness of species is corroborated by the observations of the physicist. There are botanical and zoological provinces and groups, on the globe. Each species has its own centre, and is propagated from it. Plants, fishes, reptiles, birds, and quadrupeds, have their own hab-

itat. The lion is not found in every zone ; nor the horse. Neither is the pine, nor the palm. Man differs in this respect from all other species. He is found in all zones ; and this, because he has a higher grade of intelligence found in no other species, by which he can supplement nature and counteract what is unfavorable or deadly in his environment. He can build a fire—a thing no other animal can do. He can sow and reap grain—which no other animal can do. He can make clothing, to protect himself from cold ; can build a house ; can cook food.

The first theory antagonistic to creation *ex nihilo* is that of the *eternity of matter*. One or the other doctrine must be adopted. Something is now, and has been from eternity. “The very words, There is nothing, or There was a time when there was nothing, are self-contradictory. There is that within us which repels the proposition with as full and instantaneous a light, as if it bore evidence against it in the light of its own eternity.” Coleridge : *Friend*. Works, II. 464. If this “something” is not mind, then it is matter. The objections to the eternity of matter are the following :

1. The idea of matter does not imply *absolute perfection*. Matter is not the most perfect substance or being that we can conceive of. The idea of matter does not include all kinds of perfection. Rational intelligence is a quality of which matter is destitute. So, also, is free will.
2. The idea of matter does not imply *necessary* existence. This follows from its not being the absolutely perfect. Matter is contingent being. The supposition of the non-existence of matter, is not in conflict with the proposition that something is from eternity. We could still suppose the eternal existence of mind, and account for the temporal existence of matter, as its created product. But the converse is not supposable. For should we suppose the primary non-existence of mind, and its subsequent creation by matter, this would imply that the non-intelligent originates the intelli-

gent, which is as difficult to believe as that non-entity originates entity. 3. The idea of matter does not imply *eternal* existence, because it does not imply perfection and necessity of existence. The three conceptions stand or fall together. 4. If matter is eternal it must be the first cause; but matter cannot be the first cause, since this must be self-moving and perpetually moving. Matter is marked by the *vis inertiae*. It must be moved *ab extra*; and its motion diminishes if not perpetuated *ab extra*. The burden of proof lies upon him who denies this. The Newtonian physics and mathematics are inseparable from one another, and both must stand, until they are refuted by a materialistic physics and mathematics. If therefore there was a time when there was nothing but matter, there could be no beginning of motion because there is nothing self-moving, and if there be no beginning of motion there can be no causation. Matter cannot therefore originate anything. Locke (Understanding, IV. x. 10) argues that inert matter, having no self-motion, can no more produce motion than non-entity can produce entity. If, in reply, the materialist should postulate an eternal motion along with an eternal matter, Locke replies, that even if his postulate should be conceded, matter and material motion could no more produce mind, and mental motion, or thought and will, than nothing could produce something. Incogitative being, he says, cannot originate cogitative being. Matter cannot create mind. Locke sums up the whole in the following sentence: "If we suppose nothing to be eternal, *matter* can never begin to be; if we suppose bare matter without motion to be eternal, *motion* can never begin to be; if we suppose only matter and motion to be eternal, *thought* can never begin to be." Says Henry More (Immortality, I. vii.) "If matter as matter had motion, that is, were self-moved, nothing would hold together; but flints, adamant, brass, iron, yea this whole earth would suddenly melt into a thinner substance than the subtile air, or rather, it would never

have been condensated together to this consistency we find it."

That self-motion is the characteristic of mind, and its contrary, *vis inertiae*, is the characteristic of matter, has been the historical opinion. Plato (*Phaedo*) maintains that intellect is the only cause, in the strict meaning of the word. Matter is only apparently a cause. A material cause has another cause back of it, and so backward indefinitely. We get no *real* cause, until we get to a mind which is self-moved. Here we have real beginning, and a true cause. Plato approves of, and defends the dictum of Anaxagoras, that *νοῦς ἔστι ἀρχὴ τῆς κίνησεως*. Berkeley has reproduced this view with great clearness and elegance. Cicero (*Somnium Scipionis*) says: "That which is ever moving is eternal; that which communicates to another object a motion which it received elsewhere must necessarily cease to live, as soon as its motion is at an end. The being which is self-moving is the only being that is eternal, because it is never abandoned by its own properties, neither is this self-motion ever at an end."

"Newton's first axiom in the beginning of his *Principia* is: *Corpus omne perseverare in statu quo quiescendi vel movendi uniformiter in directum, nisi quatenus illud, a viribus impressis, cogitur statum suum mutare.*" All matter uniformly remains in *statu quo*, either of motion or of rest, unless it is made to change its state by external causes. The entire structure of the historical physics is built upon this foundation. That the distance between motion and rest is as great as between existence and non-existence, has from the first been the dictum of all physics that has a support in mathematics. "Matter has no inherent power, either of beginning to move when at rest, or of arresting its progress when in motion. Its indifference to either state has been expressed by the term *vis inertiae*." Turner: *Chemistry*, p. 1. The recent materialistic physics is anti-Newtonian, in denying the *vis inertiae*, and in postulating

self-motion for matter. "Body and mind," says Haeckel (Creation, II. 360), "can in fact never be considered as distinct. As Goethe has clearly expressed it: 'Matter never can exist and act without mind, and mind never without matter.'" The first part of Goethe's remark is true, but not the last part. Goethe was a Spinozist, and Spinoza asserted one substance with the contradictory properties of thought and extension. Says Maudsley (Physiology of Mind, p. 148), "We must get rid of the notion of matter as inert. Matter is not inert."

The hypothesis of the eternity of matter has been recently revived in that of molecular motion. This assumes that the ultimate atoms of matter have self-motion. A motive force is inherent in matter per se. The theorist postulates intrinsic motion along with his molecule. And he must, because he denies that there is any mental or intelligent source of motion. One molecule must impinge upon another molecule by its own motivity, or not at all. The doctrine of self-motion is thus applied to atoms of matter. This is carried to its extreme, in the so-called "natural selection" attributed to matter. Haeckel maintains that inorganic matter, by varying its molecular motion, becomes organic matter. Vegetable and animal life result from mechanical changes in dead matter, and these changes are "selected" and self-caused. Haeckel (Creation, I. 18,) quotes with approbation the following from Virchow: "Life is only a complicated kind of mechanics. A part of the sum total of matter emerges, from time to time, out of the usual course of its motions, into special chemico-organic combinations, and after having for a time continued therein, returns again to general modes of inorganic action." Here, both self-motion and choice are ascribed to inorganic matter. Certain molecules, by their own election, pass or "emerge" from one kind of motion into a different kind, and then go back or "return" to the first kind. Darwin confines this theory to organic matter. Only living proto-

plasm can effect such changes by its own motivity. Natural selection, according to him, is restricted to the molecules of living matter. A primitive protoplasm being supposed, all the varieties of vegetable, animal and rational life can then be accounted for, by natural selection—that is, by protoplasmic molecules altering their own motion. Huxley goes further, and contends that the organic sprang from the inorganic. “What are called second causes produce all the phenomena of the universe.” *Man’s Place in Nature*, Essay II.

Upon the theory of Haeckel and Huxley, there is no need of an intelligent and personal Mind, in order to account for the phenomena of the universe.¹ Self-motion and natural selection in the molecules of matter are sufficient to explain all. The difference in the direction, and velocity, with which molecules choose to move is the key. When molecules elect to move in one way, the product is a mineral; inorganic and lifeless. When they elect to move in another way, the product is a vegetable; in still another way, is an animal; in still another way, is a human soul. “The soul of man,” says Haeckel (*Creation*, I. 179, 237), “just like the soul of animals, is a purely mechanical activity, the sum of the molecular phenomena of motion in the particles of the brain. The will is the habit of molecular motion. The will is never free. It depends upon the material processes in the nervous system.”

Lamarck, in his *Philosophie Zoologique*, published in 1809, anticipated this theory in these terms: “All the phenomena of life depend upon mechanical, physical, and chemical causes which are inherent in the nature of matter itself. The simplest animals, and the simplest plants, which stand at the lowest point in the scale of organization, have originated, and still do, by spontaneous generation. All

¹ Darwin’s theory of evolution requires a creator to account for the primitive protoplasm, though no creator subsequently.

animate natural bodies or organisms are subject to the same laws as inanimate natural bodies. The ideas and activities of the understanding are the motional phenomena of the central nervous system. The will is in truth never free. Reason is only a higher degree of the development and combination of [sensuous] judgments." Lamarck's opinion that infusoria are vegetable, and not animal, was refuted by Ehrenberg and Spallanzani, the eminent microscopists. Kirby: *On Animals*, 80, 81. Lamarck, however, extended the theory no further than Darwin does. He derived organized beings from the microscopically organic, not from the inorganic. In so doing, he is inconsistent with his theory that "all the phenomena of life depend upon the mechanical, physical, and chemical causes which are inherent in the nature of matter."

As we have before remarked, the materialistic physics is anti-Newtonian. If it be the truth, the physics of the *Principia*, of Copernicus and Kepler, is exploded. Matter has the properties of mind: namely, self-motion and self-direction. If the molecular force, in the words of Virchow, "emerges out of the usual course of its motion into special chemico-organic combinations, and, after having for a time continued therein, returns again to the general modes of inorganic motion," this is a self-motion and self-direction as real as any act of the human will. And what is still more important than this anti-historical attitude, this physics has and can have no mathematics to support it. It is wholly disconnected from the calculus. Yet it ought to have a mathematical basis, if it be indeed true that vital and voluntary forces are mechanical. Whatever is mechanical, is subject to laws that can be expressed mathematically. But no vital or voluntary force can be formulated algebraically. The vital action of a plant or an animal, the volitions of the human will, the feelings of the human heart, the thoughts of the human intellect, cannot like the fall of an apple, or the rise of a fluid in a vacuum, be expressed in mathemat-

ical terms. The absence of a mathematics for the materialistic physics demonstrates its spuriousness.¹

1. The first objection to this theory is, that mechanical motion obeys an invariable law, and is incompatible with such *varieties* of motion as the theory requires. All observation shows that a material force, left to itself, never varies in any particular. Gravity never alters its direction, sidewise or upwards. It is forever downward. And it never alters the rate of its velocity. Matter is marked in its motion by fixed necessity and immutability. To attribute a power of selection and of variability to it, is to introduce imagination into science. The materialistic physics is as fanciful as that of the middle ages, which explained phenomena by the action of fairies and spirits. What is the difference between saying that a molecule moves of itself, and "selects" the velocity and direction of its own motion, and saying that the molecules of a gas rise and float on a sylph of the air, and those of a mineral fall and sink in a gnome of the mine. The machinery of the Haeckel-Huxley physics is as fanciful as that of Pope's Rape of the Lock.²

Theorists of this school feel the difficulty, and invent expedients for explaining how "selected" changes and varie-

¹ "The progress of science is incalculably promoted by the existence of a body of men, trained to the study of the higher mathematics, who are prepared when an abstruse theory comes before the world, to appreciate its evidence, to take steady hold of its principles, to pursue its calculations, and convert it into a portion of the permanent science of the world." Whewell: *Inductive Sciences*, II. 130. Pseudo-evolution has had no endorsement of this kind.

² The theory that thought is nothing but cerebration, and that all mental phenomena result from the motion of the molecules of the brain, was taught in the university of Laputa, according to Swift. Among the various methods of instruction employed in that wonderful institution, Mr. Lemuel Gulliver mentions the following. "I was at the mathematical school, where the master taught his pupils after a method scarce imaginable to us in Europe. The proposition and demonstration were fairly written on a thin wafer, with ink composed of a *cephalic* tincture. This, the student was to swallow upon a fasting stomach, and for three days following eat nothing but bread and water. As the wafer digested, the tincture mounted to his *brain*, bearing the proposition along with it." *Gulliver's Travels*, V.

ties can occur within an immutable sphere like that of matter. Strauss, for example (Old and New Faith, 199), suggests that an adequate cause for such peculiar modes of motion amongst atoms "might exist in the conditions, the temperature, the atmospheric combinations of primaeval times, so utterly different from ours." But these themselves are all material causes. "Atmospheric combinations" are combinations of molecules, and why the "primaeval" combinations should be "so utterly different from ours," is one of the difficulties to be explained, and cannot therefore be introduced to explain a difficulty.

2. Another objection to the theory that explains all phenomena by matter and mechanical motion is, that material motion is *not perpetual*. It gradually and surely exhausts itself. If observation and experiment have settled anything in physics, it is that the perpetual motion of matter by reason of a force inherent in matter is impossible. Friction finally brings moving matter to a rest. It may require millions of years to do it, but it will certainly be done. The motion of the bodies in the solar system approaches as nearly as anything does to perpetual motion. But the planets, says Newton, are marked by certain "small irregularities which appear to come from the mutual action of the planets and comets, and which will probably become greater and greater in the course of time, until at last the system will again require its Author to put it in order." Penny Cyclopaedia: Solar System. Whewell: Astronomy and Physics, II. vii.-xii. It is true that these irregularities caused by planetary and cometary attraction are very slight, because the great attraction of the vast mass of the sun overmasters and nullifies to a great extent. Still there is a disturbing element after all. Lagrange and Poisson have mathematically demonstrated the great stability of the solar system, but not its endless immutability. Foreign Quarterly Review, III. 138.

But this is not the whole difficulty. There is a positive

resistance to the motion of the heavenly masses, from the medium through which they pass. If this medium were as dense as atmospheric air, the motion would soon come to an end, unless reinforced *ab extra*. It is not atmospheric air, but the so-called ether. "It has become highly probable," says a writer in the *Penny Cyclopaedia* (*Solar System*), "that an external cause does exist which must, unless there be a counteracting force of which we know nothing, in time cause the destruction of the solar system. If the planets move in any medium which resists these motions, however little, the consequence must be a gradual diminution of their mean distances from the sun, and a gradual increase of their velocities, ending in their absolutely falling into the sun."¹

The doctrine of the "correlation of forces" does not relieve the difficulty, in respect to perpetual motion. The forces of nature may be correlated to each other, that is, convertible into one another, and yet be diminishing in amount. That all material forces may be found, ultimately, to be but one material force, is not incredible. Physical investigations tend to this view. But this fact, even if established, would not prove that the sum-total of this one material force is suffering no loss from millennium to millennium. Five forms of anything might be demonstrated to be but one and the same thing, but this would not prove anything respecting the quantity of being at any one time

¹ The following facts go to prove the comparatively recent origin of the solar system. 1. The earth is cooling slowly, yet at such a rate as to make it impossible that it should have existed many millions of years. It would have been stone cold clear through, in that case. 2. There is reason to believe that the earth is not rotating on her axis with the same rapidity as in former ages, and inasmuch as her shape would have been different if, at the same time she was in a molten state, she had been rotating more rapidly than now, it follows that she has not been rotating so long as has been supposed. 3. The sun is parting with caloric at such a rate, as to make it certain that it could not have continued to radiate heat at the same rate for more than a few millions of years. 4. The changes in the earth's crust, stupendous and varied as they are, could be and probably were accomplished in shorter periods than some geologists consider possible. *Quarterly Review*, 1876.

in this thing. This fact seems to be seen by the theorist, and an attempt is made to conceal it, by calling the "correlation of forces," the "conservation of force," or energy. Conservation is a different conception from correlation, and a stronger term. The "conservation of energy" may mean that in the transmutation of one force into another, the *whole* of the primary form is conserved in the second form; or it may mean that only a *part* of it is conserved. Which of the two is the fact, is the question in dispute.

The "correlation of forces" really amounts only to the *analysis* of force. Whether the sum-total of material force in the universe be greater or smaller, cannot be determined, unless the analysis demonstrates that the quantity remains unchanged, under all the different forms which material force assumes. The motion of a cannon-ball is preceded by a certain amount of heat from ignited gunpowder, and is followed by a certain amount of heat in the iron plate which it strikes. But no experiment thus far made, has demonstrated that the amount of heat is mathematically the same in the second instance, that it was in the first; that the heat in the iron plate is exactly equal to the heat in the gunpowder. Heat is converted into motion; and motion reconverted into heat. Here is correlation of forces. One force is convertible into another. And here also is conservation of force. But *how much* conservation is the question. How much of the heat in the powder is conserved in the heat of the iron plate remains to be shown. Before we can say that there has been absolutely no loss of material force in these transmutations, it must be demonstrated mathematically. No experiment is nice or delicate enough to establish it. At this point the calculus should come in; as it always has in the historical physics at points when sensible experiments fail.¹ But, as yet, there is no

¹ It is claimed that the same amount of heat produced by the combustion of the carbon in a man's dinner, would be produced by the same amount of carbon if burnt out of the body. But no experiment has proved that the vital heat, in

mathematics for the new physics. A German investigator, Clausius, claims to have proved mathematically that motion when converted into heat is a mathematical equivalent; but that heat when converted into motion, is not. There is, he says, some loss of motion in every instance in which heat is converted into motion. The final result, consequently, if there is no interference *ab extra*, will be, that motion will gradually diminish in the universe and finally cease; and heat, or temperature, will be uniform. Gardiner: *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Jan. 1881.

This lack of demonstration is acknowledged by Balfour Stewart. He remarks (*Conservation of Energy*, p. 8) that "we have the strongest possible evidence for the assertion, that all the various energies in the universe are a constant quantity, *which the nature of the case admits of*. The assertion is, in truth, a peculiar one; peculiar in its magnitude, in its universality, in the subtle nature of the agents with which it deals. If true, its truth certainly *cannot be proved* after the manner in which we prove a proposition in Euclid. Nor does it admit of a proof so rigid as that of the somewhat analogous principle of the conservation of matter; for in chemistry we may confine the products of our chemical combination so as to completely prove, beyond a doubt, that no heavy matter passes out of existence." Stewart then gives some indirect proofs, which, he contends, make the position *probable*.

3. Another objection to the theory that mechanical and vital forces are identical, is the fact that mechanical forces never originate varieties, while the vegetable and animal kingdoms are full of them. In inorganic nature, there is no deviation from the typical form. Crystals are rigorously confined to their order. No new varieties arise. Gold and copper always crystallize in a cube; bismuth and antimony in a hexagon; iodine and sulphur in a rhomb. But flowers

this instance, is equivalent mathematically to the chemical heat, or that the two are identical in kind.

are not thus rigorously confined to their type. A white flower, in some individuals, shows a reddish tint. This is a so-called "accidental" variety. If seeds be taken from it, its offspring will be redder yet. In this way, a new variety is artificially produced. But this cannot be done with a crystal. The geometrical form here is produced by a mechanical and inorganic, not a vital force; and it is unchangeable. There is no "accidental variety" of a crystal. No such alterations of typical form can be artificially produced in this inorganic province. A crystal can be produced artificially by chemical action, as well as by the natural action of mechanical forces. But in this case too, there can be no variation from the type. This proves a difference in kind between the inorganic and organic; the chemical and the vital.

4. A fourth objection to the hypothesis of the variation of mechanical motion, is found in the immutability of the molecule. Maxwell, professor of Physics at Cambridge, in an address before the British Association, remarked as follows: "A molecule of hydrogen, whether on earth, in Sirius or Arcturus, executes its vibrations in the same time. No theory of evolution can be formed to account for this identity of molecules; for evolution implies continual change, and the molecule is incapable of growth or decay, of generation or destruction. None of the processes of nature have produced the slightest difference in the properties of any molecule. We are, therefore, unable to ascribe either the existence of the molecules, or the identity of their properties, to any of the causes we call natural. On the other hand, the exact equality of each molecule to all others of the same kind gives it, as Sir John Herschel has well said, the essential character of a manufactured article, and precludes the notion of its being eternal and self-existent. Though in the course of ages catastrophes have occurred, and may yet occur, in the heavens; though ancient systems may be dissolved, and new ones constructed out of their ruins, the

molecules out of which these systems are built, the foundation-stones of the material universe, remain unbroken and unworn. They continue this day as they were created, perfect in number, and measure, and weight; and from the ineffaceable characters impressed upon them, we may learn that those aspirations after accuracy in measurement, and justice in action, which we reckon among our noblest attributes as men, are ours because they are the essential qualities of Him who, in the beginning created not only the heaven and earth, but the materials of which heaven and earth consist."

The second theory antagonistic to the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* is that of *pseudo-evolution*. There is a true and a false theory of evolution. The former defines evolution to be simply "the transformation of the homogeneous;" the latter defines it to be the "transformation [transmutation] of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous." This is Spencer's definition adopted from Von Baer. The two definitions and the two theories are direct contraries and contradictories. An evolution, in the historical physics of Linnaeus, Cuvier, Hunter, Blumenbach, and Agassiz, wholly excludes the heterogeneous. It is the same substance in kind under new forms. A vegetable seed evolves or develops into a root and stalk; but the root and stalk are still vegetable. They are still homogeneous with the seed. A vegetable bud, again, becomes a flower, and the flower becomes fruit; but both flower and fruit are still homogeneous with the vegetable substance of the bud; they are vegetable. If anything mineral or animal, anything heterogeneous, should appear in this evolution of the seed and the bud, this would prove that it was no evolution. But pseudo-evolution postulates what true evolution denies: namely, that homogeneous substance transmutes itself into heterogeneous. It asserts that a homogeneous mineral, by intrinsic force, slowly, by infinitesimal degrees, converts itself into a heterogeneous vegetable. Evolution is thus not

a mere change of *form*, but of *matter*. As this assertion is not supported by proof, it is surreptitiously introduced into a preliminary definition which the opposing party is expected to accept. But this is begging the question in dispute. The question is, whether homogeneous substance ever does or can change itself into heterogeneous substance. Shedd: *Theological Essays*, 133-137; 154-167.

According to this theory of evolution, all the kingdoms of nature issue out of each other without any intervening creative agency. The fiats in the Mosaic account are denied. The homogeneous mineral develops into the heterogeneous vegetable; the homogeneous vegetable into the heterogeneous animal; the homogeneous animal into the heterogeneous man. The doctrine is applied through the entire scale of existence. Vegetable life issues from the lifeless mineral. Sentient and conscious life evolves from the insentient and unconscious plant. Rational and moral life develops from an animal and brutal life that is utterly destitute of reason and morality. This accounts for, and explains the universe of being. In each of these instances, the homogeneous substance is transmuted into the heterogeneous, by purely material laws and causes. There is no rational act of an intelligent and personal creator, when the animal kingdom supervenes upon the vegetable, or when the rational kingdom supervenes upon the animal. Impersonal, unintelligent, and unconscious evolution accounts for all varieties of being.

Several methods of explanation have been proposed. Lamarck explained by habit. The giraffe at first had a short neck. The habit of reaching up for the leaves of trees, when the grass failed, lengthened the neck. The frog's foot, and that of the goose, was at first without web. The attempt to swim finally produced it. When the long neck and the web-foot were thus produced, they were propagated, and a new species was the result. St. Hilaire explained by circumstances. Somehow or other the atmos-

phere lost carbon, and the proportion of oxygen was increased. This made the breathing quicker; this heated the blood; this made the nerves and muscles more active; this changed the scales of reptiles into feathers, and thus the reptile was transformed into the bird. This scheme, just now, is revived in that of "creation by environment."

1. The first objection to the theory of pseudo-evolution is, that it is contradicted by the whole course of scientific observation and experiment. It is a theory in the face of the facts. "Darwinism," says Agassiz (*On Classification*), "is an a priori conception," and "a burlesque of facts." It "shuts out almost the whole mass of acquired knowledge, in order to retain and use only that which may serve its purpose." Quatrefages (*Human Species*, I. i.) asserts that "to attempt, under any pretext whatever, to confound the inorganic with the organic, is to go in direct opposition to all the progress made for more than a century, and especially during the last few years, in physics, chemistry, and physiology. It is inexplicable to me that some men, whose merits I otherwise acknowledge, should have recently again compared crystals to the simplest living forms: to the sarcodic organisms, as they are called by Du Jardin who discovered them. A change of name is useless; the things remain the same, and protoplasm has the same properties as sarcode. The animals whose entire substance they seem to form have not altered their nature; whether monera or amoebae, these forms are the antipodes of the crystal from every point of view." "No conceivable combinations," says Roget (*Physiology*, II. 582), "of mechanical or of chemical powers, bear the slightest resemblance, or the most remote analogy to organic reproduction, or can afford the least clue to the solution of this dark enigma." *Foreign Quarterly Review*, III. 189-196.

No naturalist has ever discovered an instance of the transmutation of species. Varieties under a species have been seen to be changed into other varieties. Darwin shows

how pigeons may be made to vary from pigeons, but not how pigeons can be evolved into the horse. No observer has furnished even a scintilla of proof that the vital develops from the non-vital. It is an axiom older than Aristotle, and always accepted in the historical physics, that *omne animal ex ovo est*. Life supposes life. The living individual issues only from the living germ. A material molecule never transmutes itself into a vegetable germ. A mustard-seed is never changed into the egg of animal life. A grain of wheat may be kept in a mummy for three thousand years, and upon being cast into the ground, it will begin to sprout. A true evolution of this vegetable seed immediately begins. But no natural or artificial force can cause a diamond to bud and blossom: can transmute this homogeneous mineral into a heterogeneous vegetable. The vast geological ages which the theorist brings in, do not help his theory. A force of nature is no stronger in a million of years, than it is in a hundred. What gravitation cannot do in a century, it cannot do in a hundred centuries. A mechanical force is fixed. It does not increase with the lapse of time. Rousseau (*Dictionnaire Botanique*) thus speaks of the "nouvelle physique" of his day, which confounded the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms, and maintained that "minerals live, and vegetables feel:" "I have often seen a tree die which before had been full of life; but the death of a stone is an idea that would never enter my mind. I see exquisite feeling in a dog, but never saw it in a cabbage. The paradoxes of Jean-Jacques are very celebrated, but I never advanced anything so absurd as this."

The experimental and scientific evidence for the transmutation of substance is so deficient, that only enthusiasts like Haeckel, Huxley, and Maudsley, venture to maintain the evolution of the organic from the inorganic. Darwin confines the transmutation of substance to the organic world. He postulates life, primarily given by the Creator.

"I imagine," he says, in phraseology that is curiously unscientific: "I *imagine* that *probably* all organic beings that ever lived on this earth descended from some primitive form, which was first called into being by the Creator." In the "Origin of Species," p. 577, he speaks of "the breathing of life, by the Creator, into a few forms, or into one." He does not assert that the mollusc can be developed from inorganic molecules; though he maintains that man may be evolved from the mollusc. While he bridges by evolution the chasm between the oyster and man, he lets it stand between the mineral and the oyster. His work upon insectivorous animals looks like an attempt to prove that animal life can be developed from vegetable, but he makes no distinct statement to this effect.

That this spurious theory of evolution is contradicted by the general course of physical experiment and observation, is proved by its failure to obtain general currency. Lamarck did not supersede Linnaeus. Eminent microscopists like Ehrenberg and Spallanzani demonstrated that the infusoria which Lamarck asserted to be vegetable, were animal. Kirby: On Animals, I. iv. St. Hilaire made no impression upon the established zoölogy of Cuvier, so that to this day French physics is even more unanimous than either German or English, in affirming an impassable limit between the kingdoms of nature. In Germany, Kepler, Leibnitz, Kant, Haller, and Blumenbach are greater names in physical science than Goethe, Oken, Haeckel and Büchner. In England, the physics of Newton, Linnaeus, Hunter, Cuvier, Faraday, Whewell, Herschel, Agassiz, Guyot, and Dana, influences the educated and disciplined intellect of the nation far more than do the speculations of Darwin, Huxley, and Tyndall. Haeckel (Creation, I. 34) mentions it as a discouraging sign, that the views of Linnaeus, Cuvier, and Agassiz are adopted by "the great majority of both scientific and unscientific men;" and that "the majority of French naturalists are the blind followers

of Cuvier." He adds, that "in no country has Darwin's doctrine had so little effect as in France."

The opinions of Kant are entitled to great respect; for he began his remarkable philosophical career with the metaphysics of mathematics. He investigated inorganic nature before he investigated mind, and his attitude is firm in reference to theism, and the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. In his Critique of the Judgment (§ 74-79), while maintaining that the inorganic world is explainable by mechanical forces and laws, he is explicit in saying that these forces and laws themselves have a teleological character. They imply a designing mind beyond them. He holds that theism and creation ex nihilo are the truth, and rejects the hylozoism of Spinoza and of atheism. Respecting the possibility of the evolution of the organic from the inorganic, he remarks that "it is absurd even to think of explaining organized creatures and their potentialities by purely mechanical principles, or to expect that a Newton will one day arise who will be able to explain the production of a blade of grass, according to a law ordained by no designing intelligence." "Give me," he said, "inorganic matter, and I will explain the formation of an inorganic world." But he denied that it can be said, "Give me inorganic matter, and I will explain the production of a caterpillar." This latter remark is quoted by Strauss: Old Faith, 196.

Physical science can perhaps explain the *formation* of the solar system by the nebular hypothesis, but not the *creation* of it. For this hypothesis supposes a nebulous matter with its inherent force of gravity, and other forces, to be already in existence. Unless this postulate of fire-mist, and the attraction of gravitation, cohesion, etc., is granted, it cannot account for the solar system. The question immediately arises, Whence is this fire-mist, with its properties? If this is the origin of the solar system, what is the origin of this origin? If this is the explanation of the material universe, what is the explanation of this explanation?

The nebular hypothesis may be a correct generalization from observed facts, and have its place in the system of physics, but it cannot be a substitute for the First Cause. The words of Whewell, respecting the nebular hypothesis, are true and forcible: "Let it be supposed that the point to which this hypothesis leads us is the ultimate point of physical science; that the farthest glimpse we can obtain of the material universe by our natural faculties, shows it to us as occupied by a boundless abyss of luminous matter; still we ask, how space came to be thus occupied, how matter came to be thus luminous? If we establish by physical proofs, that the first fact which can be traced in the history of the world is, that 'there was light,' we shall still be led, even by our natural reason, to suppose that before this could occur, 'God said, Let there be light.'" Astronomy and General Physics, II. vii.

Since there is no proof of the theory of pseudo-evolution from the past results of scientific inquiry, its advocates when called upon for the demonstration betake themselves either to an a priori method, or else to prophecy. Haeckel, for example (Creation, I. 169), replies in the following manner to the assertion of the opponent that the theory is a hypothesis which is yet to be proved: "That this assertion is completely unfounded, may be perceived even from the outlines of the doctrine of selection." But the "outlines of a doctrine" are the doctrine itself; and the doctrine itself cannot be the proof of the doctrine, unless it be a priori and axiomatic in its nature. And this characteristic Haeckel actually claims for his theory of evolution, in the following terms: "The origin of new species by natural selection, by the interaction of inheritance and adaptation, is a *mathematical necessity* of nature which needs no further proof. Whoever, in spite of the present state of our knowledge, still seeks for proofs of the theory of selection, only shows that he does not thoroughly understand the theory." Haeckel, here, makes short work with the whole

subject, by claiming an a priori necessity for the theory of pseudo-evolution. Of course, if this be so, experiment and observed facts are not to be demanded. But such a claim for a science that professes to rest upon experiment and observation, and not upon a priori grounds, is of a piece with Haeckel's assertion (Creation, II.) that a posteriori knowledge, by means of use and habit, can be transmuted into a priori knowledge; in other words, that a truth of experience becomes axiomatic when the experience is long continued—a notion similar to that mentioned by Coleridge, "that a weathercock may form a habit of turning to the east, from the wind having been a long time in that quarter." Works, III. 227.

Respecting spontaneous generation, Haeckel (Creation, I. 340, 341) remarks that "experiments on autogeny have furnished no certain and positive results. Yet we must protest against the notion that these experiments have proved the impossibility of spontaneous generation. The impossibility of such a process can, in fact, never be proved. For how can we know that in remote primaevial times there did not exist conditions quite different from those at present obtaining, which may have rendered spontaneous generation possible?" By such reasoning as this, any hypothesis whatever may be proved. Haeckel (Creation, I. 335) explains vital growth by chemical action thus: "A crystal grows by the apposition of particle upon particle; a plant grows by the intussusception of particle into particle. The fluidity of the albuminous carbon, in the instance of the plant, permits of this penetration, so that the addition is not mere accretion upon the outside, or addition of surface to surface." But why does a chemical force act so differently from a vital one? A salt in solution is as much a fluid as the albumen; but it yields a crystal instead of a plant. If the chemical and the vital are really one and the same mechanical force, why this diversity? A really mechanical force acts in only one way. The force of gravity

does not sometimes lift bodies, and sometimes cause them to fall.

As an example of the employment of prophecy in support of the theory of pseudo-evolution, consider the following remark of Haeckel (Creation, I. 32) respecting the production of albumen by a chemical process—thus far found to be impossible: “At some future time, we shall succeed in discovering, in the composition of albuminous matter, certain molecular relations as the remoter causes of these phenomena of life.” There is no logic against prophecy. Seers and soothsayers have an advantage over ordinary investigators, who have nothing but their understandings to work with.¹

2. Secondly, the examples adduced by the advocate of pseudo-evolution do not prove that species develops from species, but only that varieties develop from species—which no one denies.² Haeckel shows that many varieties of

¹ The hopefulness of the evolutionist is expressed in the words of Wagner, in the second part of Goethe's Faust, Act II.

“ Look yonder ! see the flashes from the hearth !
 Hope for the world dawns there, that, having laid
 The stuff together of which man is made,
 The hundredfold ingredients mixing, blending,
 (For upon mixture is the whole depending),
 If then in a retort we slowly mull it,
 Next to a philosophic temper dull it,
 Distil and re-distil, at leisure thin it,
 All will come right, in silence, to a minute.

Turning again to the hearth.

'Tis forming—every second brings it nearer—
 And my conviction becomes stronger, clearer.
 What nature veils in mystery, I expect
 Through the plain understanding to effect ;
 What was *organization* will at last
 Be with the art of making crystals classed.”

² The loose use of the term “species” covers up much sophistical reasoning of the evolutionists. Quatrefages (Human Species, 96) says: “Darwin has formed no clear conception of the sense which he gave to the word ‘species ;’ I have been unable to find in any of his works a single precise statement on this point.” Darwin remarks that “it seems probable that allied species are descended from a common ancestor.” The connection in which this is said, shows that by “allied species” he means only varieties of pigeons, dogs, etc.

sponges spring from the one species *Olychnus*. But the difference between sponge and sponge is not the same as that between mineral and plant, or between plant and animal. When one kind of sponge is transformed into another kind of sponge, this is not the transmutation of a homogeneous substance into a heterogeneous. This does not answer to Spencer's definition of evolution, if the definition is to be taken as it reads. If the sponge should develop into the rose, or the rose into the worm, this would answer the definition. But nothing approaching to such a mortal leap as this is seen in nature. Darwin makes it seem probable that all varieties of pigeons may have sprung from one original pair of pigeons—say the blue-rock pigeon; but this does not prove that the pigeon sprang from a fish, still less from a cabbage, and still less from a bit of granite.

Virchow, in an address at Munich, said that two doctrines are not yet proved, but are hypotheses still: namely, 1. Spontaneous generation of living from inorganic matter. 2. The descent of man from some non-human vertebrate animal. We may expect, he says, that these will hereafter be proved, but meanwhile must not teach them as scientific facts. *Nineteenth Century*, April, 1878. Gray, though accepting the Darwinian theory of evolution as "fairly probable," asserts that it is a "complex and loose hypothesis, less probable than the nebular hypothesis, or the kinetic theory of gases." *New York Times*, Feb. 6, 7, 1880.

3. Thirdly, if the doctrine of pseudo-evolution be true, it should be supported, like that of gravitation, by a multitude of undisputed facts and phenomena. A law of nature—and this kind of evolution is claimed to be such, even the *lex legum*—is a uniform and universal thing. The hypothesis of gravitation is not supported by a few doubtful and disputed facts, like those which are cited in proof of spontaneous generation. If there were really such a transition by development, from the inorganic to the organic, from the vegetable to the animal, and from the animal to

the rational, as is asserted, the process ought to be going on all the time, and all around us in nature, and before the eyes of everyone. A real and actual law of nature cannot be put under a bushel. The theorist should have millions of examples to show. But as yet he has not a single example. Darwin's pigeons, after all his efforts to transform them into another species, are pigeons still. Said Ambrose (Hexäameron, III. 10), "When wheat degenerates, it does not cease to be wheat; there is no alteration of species: Non ad translationem generis, sed ad aegritudinem quendam seminis, videtur esse referendum."

4. Fourthly, the well-known fact that hybrids between real species are infertile, proves that there is no transmutation of species. A hybrid is an artificial, not a natural product. When man attempts to originate a new species by crossing breeds, as in the case of the horse and ass, he is working against nature, and fails. "Domestication," says Agassiz (Animal Life, 51), "never produces forms which are self-perpetuating, and is therefore in no way an index of the process by which species are produced." Quatrefages (Human Species, I. vi.-ix.) takes the same view. Haeckel (Creation, I. 45) mentions as hybrids that can be propagated, some between hares and rabbits, and between different varieties of dog. Also, of plants, the willow, the thistle, and the mullein, he says, are hybrids. But hares and rabbits are varieties of the same species; and, as Macbeth says, "hounds and greyhounds, mongrels, spaniels, curs, shoughs, water-rugs, and demi-wolves, are cleped all by the name of dogs." A true species is self-perpetuating. Says Dana, "When individuals multiply from generation to generation, it is but a repetition of the primordial type-idea, and the true notion of the species is not in the resulting group, but in the *idea* or *potential* element which is the basis of every individual of the group." Bib. Sacra, 1857, p. 861.

5. Fifthly, this theory of evolution, conflicting as it does with the invariability of nature in the several kingdoms,

conflicts also with the certainty of natural science. There can be no fixed laws of operation, upon this scheme. Anything may originate out of anything. There is no certainty that mineral substance will always be mineral, for it may become vegetable substance. It is not certain that a vegetable species will always remain vegetable, for it may be transmuted into an animal species. Chance rules in nature, not invariable law. And the transmutation of substance may descend as well as ascend. Man may evolve into ape, as well as ape into man. As an example of the hap-hazard that is introduced into physical science by this theory, take its explanation of the origin of the eye, as an organ of vision. Once there was no such organ in existence. It came into being, in the following manner. A certain piece of nervous tissue happened in the lapse of ages to become sensitive to light; then, after another lapse of time, a transparent tissue happened to be formed over it; then, after other ages, a fluid happened to be formed which increased in density and adaptedness to vision; and thus changes at hap-hazard take place, and finally we have the eye of an animal.¹ The Duke of Argyll exposes the capriciousness of this kind of physics, in the following terms: "Under the modes of applying the theory of evolution which have become commonplace, it is very easy to account for everything. We have only to assume some condition opposite to that which now exists, and then to explain the change by showing that the existing conditions are useful and adapted to existing needs. Do we wish, for example, to explain why the female pheasant is dull colored? We have only to assume that once she was gayly colored, and became dull by the gaudier hens being killed off when setting on eggs, and by the duller hens being saved. Do we wish, on the con-

¹ This supposes that in nature an eye can be found in isolation, by itself, separate from the body of which it is the eye. But nature never forms organs in this way. They are found only in connection with the organization and growth of the entire body.

trary, to explain the brilliant coloring of the male pheasant? We have only to make the reverse assumption—that once they were all dull colored, and that accidental dandies were preserved by the admiration and the consequent selection of the ladies. In like manner, the migration of birds is explained by assuming that once upon a time there were no migratory birds, although there must always have been the same changing seasons. Then a few birds came to travel a little way, and then a little farther, and so at last they came to go a great way, and finally the habit, ‘organized in the race,’ became the migratory instinct. It is curious that in this and all similar explanations of what are admitted to be now pure instincts, the theory demands that the earliest beginnings were more rational than the last developments; the commencements were more in the nature of intelligent perception than the final results, which have become the mere mechanical effect of hereditary habits.”

According to the theory of pseudo-evolution, there is no preconceived plan and design, by which the origin of living and organized objects in nature is accounted for. They come wholly by chance. Those varieties from which new species are claimed to spring are denominated “accidental.” If a piece of nervous tissue happens to become sensitive to light, the first step towards the production of the eye of animal life is taken; otherwise not. And so with the second step, by which a film is drawn over the sensitive tissue; and so with all the steps. The processes of nature are entirely fortuitous, upon this scheme, and there is nothing possible, but the calculation of chances. No invariable and uniform order of nature is possible, and therefore no science of nature is possible. Haeckel (*Creation*, I. 167,) would parry this objection, by the following self-stultifying remark: “The difference between the two forms of selection is this: In artificial selection, the will of man makes the selection according to a plan, whereas in natural selection, the struggle for life (that universal inter-relation of

organisms) acts without a plan, but produces quite the same result, namely, a selection of a particular kind of individual for propagation." This is saying that nature's acting by chance will produce "the same result" that man's acting by plan does; and that nature would have the same regularity and order, by the method of chance, as by the method of design.

6. Some evolutionists, for example, Darwin, Wallace, and Huxley, try to adopt a middle theory. They say that a species may be originated either by selection, or by creation. But the alternative is impossible. One idea excludes the other, necessarily. If a particular being is *intrinsically* such that creation ex nihilo accounts for it, then molecular motion and natural selection *cannot*, and vice versa. If a thing is intrinsically such that it may be equal to four, it must be. It may not be equal to five. The ideas of creation and evolution are as incompatible with each other, as four and five are. Both cannot be true.

7. The abundant proof of design in nature overthrows the theory of evolution. This design is executed even in an extreme manner. The mammae on man's breast, and the web-feet of the upland goose, and the frigate bird, show that the plan of structure is carried out with persistence, even when in particular circumstances there is no use for the organ itself. The symmetry of the species is preserved. Nature is punctilious in respect to design. Even in the deformed and irregular products of nature, the same respect for plan is observed. There is design in these. In a misgrowth of a vegetable, matter is organized methodically. It is not thrown together at hap-hazard, as in a kaleidoscope. Holberg's (Memoirs, p. 196) anecdote of the priest and the humpback will apply here. The priest had said in his sermon, that everything which God makes is well-made. "Look at me," said a humpback, "Am I well-made?" The priest looked at him, and replied that he was well-made for a humpbacked man. The priest was wiser than

he knew, and his answer had truth in it, as well as wit. The humpback was built upon the plan of a man, not of a dog.

The theory of development is valid, when properly applied. Take, for example, Linnaeus's arrangement of the genus felis: *Felis domestica* (common cat); *felis catus* (wild cat); *felis pardus* (leopard); *felis onca* (jaguar); *felis tigris* (tiger); *felis leo* (lion). These six species of the one genus, as Linnaeus uses terms, may be developed from one original type. The same may be said also of the seven species of the one genus pinus, in the vegetable kingdom. But according to Linnaeus, felis could not develop from equus; nor pinus from pirus.

Species should not be multiplied, or the creative act be introduced extravagantly often. The Biblical phraseology, "Let the earth bring forth," and "Let the waters bring forth," implies that within the several kingdoms, *after they have been established by creative power*, much may then have been done in the production of varieties (not species) by the law of evolution impressed upon each kingdom. There is no objection to tracing all varieties of pigeon to one original, say the blue-rock pigeon, as Darwin does; or all varieties of rabbit to one original type. John Hunter held that "the true distinction between different species of animals, must ultimately be gathered from their incapacity of propagating with each other an offspring capable again of continuing itself by subsequent propagation." Hunter wrote a tract entitled, "Observations tending to show that the Wolf, Jackal, and Dog are all of the same Species."

It should be understood, moreover, how terms are employed. If "genus" is the base, then "species" are the divisions. If "species" is the base, then "varieties" are the divisions. In the first case, species can come from species; in the second, not. Quatrefages: Human Species, I. iii. Dana defines a species as the "unit" in the organic

world. Morton defines it as a "primordial organic form." The criteria of a species are: 1. Permanent fecundity. 2. Sameness of external form. Animals with teeth for eating flesh belong to a different species from those having teeth for eating vegetable food. Animals with webbed feet are not of the same species with those having feet without a web. 3. Sameness of internal structure, shown in habits and instincts. Of these three, the first is the surest criterion. The other two are less certain. Two animals of great similarity in external structure may be of wholly different species—for example, the ape and man. Hence all three criteria must be combined.

A plausible argument for the development of man from lower animals, is derived from a comparison of the embryo of man at four weeks, with that of the chick; or at eight weeks, with that of the dog. There is a great similarity. The evolutionist asks: "Is it any more improbable that man should develop from the ape, than that a Plato, or a Shakspeare should develop from an embryo so like the dog's embryo?" It certainly is not any more improbable, upon the supposition that the human embryo contains *nothing* but what is in that of the chick or the dog. But if the human embryo contains, over and above the physical elements, a rational and spiritual principle; if this embryo be a synthesis of mind and matter, and not mere matter; then it is more probable that a Plato will come from it, than from the canine embryo. This kind of argument proves too much. For not only the embryo, but the new-born babe itself has little more in its external appearance to suggest the career of a Newton, or an Aristotle, than a new-born dog has. The wailing unconsciousness of the one is as far from science and philosophy, as the yelping unconsciousness of the other. But the babe possesses, along with physical qualities, the "image of God," namely, a rational soul; while the dog has only an animal soul. There is an invisible rational principle in one, that is not in the other.

The maxim, "Judge not by the outward appearance," has full force here.

Resemblance in corporeal form has been overestimated. Similarity in the visible and material structure, does not necessarily prove similarity in the invisible and mental structure. It is conceivable that a creature might be produced whose anatomy might be entirely like that of man, and yet have no human as distinguished from brutal traits. The idiot is an example. A human body with only an animal soul would look like a man, but would be as far from man as is an ox. The gorilla is nearer to man in physical structure than is a dog; but he is not so near to man in respect to sagacity, affection, and other manlike traits. The monkey species is not so intelligent as the canine species. The elephant is nearer to man in respect to mental traits than is the gorilla, but his anatomy is farther off. The ant and bee have more intelligence than many animals have, yet are entirely destitute of brain. Naturalists notice that the period of infancy in man is much longer than in the brute. This is because there is a rational soul in the one, and not in the other, which unfolds more slowly than a physical organism does. The animal takes care of itself in infancy; but the infant man must be taken care of. For example, the young calf, of itself, finds its nourishment from the dam; but the babe must be put to the breast of the mother. The latter, if left to itself would die; but the former would not.

Respecting the time when man was created, and his antiquity, the narrative in Genesis teaches that he is the last in the series of creations, and that the Creator rested from creation *ex nihilo* after the origination of the human species.¹ While minerals, vegetables, and irrational animals,

¹ Lewis: On the Early Populations of the Globe, in Lange's Genesis, p. 314 sq. Southall: Recent Origin of Man. Pouchet: The Universe, p. 609. Fraser: Blinding Lights. Lyell: Antiquity of Man. Quatrefages: Human Species, III. xii. xiii. British Quar. Rev.: 1863 (Review of Lyell). Cabell: Unity of Mankind.

according to Genesis, may be referred back to a long duration in the first five days, man cannot be referred to any but the sixth day, and to the "morning" or last part of that. From six to eight thousand years is the period during which the human species has existed. The Septuagint gives fifteen hundred years more of time, from the creation of man, than the Hebrew text. The Christian fathers generally adopted the Septuagint chronology. Theophilus of Antioch (*Ad Autolyicum*, 24, 25, 28) makes the Scriptures to give 5,698 years from the creation of man, to the death of the emperor Aurelius Verus, A.D. 69. Julius Africanus (230), the earliest Christian chronologist, dates the creation, 5,499 B.C. Eusebius, Jerome, and Bede reckon 2,242 years between Adam and the deluge—following the Septuagint. The Hebrew text gives 1,656 years. Augustine (*City of God*, XV. 20) says: "From Adam to the deluge, there are reckoned according to our copies of the Scripture, 2,262 years, and according to the Hebrew text, 1,656 years." Compare *City of God*, XX. vii. Hales (*Chronology*, I. 273–303) and Clinton (*Fasti Hellenici*, I. 283–301) defend the Septuagint chronology. See Introduction to Jeremiah, Speaker's Commentary, p. 323–326, where Payne Smith favors the Septuagint recension. Murphy (*On Genesis*, p. 196) defends the Hebrew chronology. The Samaritan text gives only 1,307 years between the creation and the deluge. Desvignoles, in the preface to his *Chronology*, says that he has collected above two hundred calculations, of which the longest makes the time between the creation and the incarnation to have been 6,984 years, and the shortest 3,483 years.

Extravagant statements respecting the great antiquity of man are not found in the Greek and Roman literatures. Plato (*Laws*, II. 656; III. 676) speaks of "ten thousand years ago," and "thousands and thousands of cities." But this is indefinite description; and the first instance relates to Egypt. Mythical and fabulous representations appear

in the Egyptian and Hindoo traditions. The Egyptian priests told Herodotus that they possessed a history going back 11,340 years; and they also told him that during this period the sun had four times altered his regular course, having been twice observed to rise in the west and to set in the east. Compare Spenser's *Faery Queen*, V. (Introduction). The zodiac of Denderah, according to Dupuis, went back 15,000 years. The astronomer Delambre thought it to be later than the time of Alexander; and Biot demonstrated that it represented the state of the heavens in the year 700 B.C. Furthermore, it was discovered in an Egyptian temple that proved to have been built during Roman rule. Pouchet: *Universe*, 610. The conclusions of Lepsius from the monuments of Egypt make that civilization 20,000 years old. But the dates on the Babylonian and Assyrian tablets disprove this chronology. Even if it be conceded that Egypt is older than Assyria, it cannot be so immensely older.

Smith (*Assyrian Discoveries*, 51) gives 1850 B.C. as the date for Assur, the first capital of Assyria; and 1350 B.C. for Nineveh, the second capital. He makes Babylon "the capital of the whole country," in the sixteenth century, B.C. "The enormous reigns ascribed by Berosus of Babylon to his ten kings, making a total of 432,000 years force us to discard the idea that the details are historical." Smith: *Chaldean Genesis*, 307. This scholar thinks the representation of ancient authors, that the walls of Babylon were from forty to sixty miles in circumference, to be an exaggeration; and infers from the ruins, that they were "about eight miles around, making Babylon nearly the same size with Nineveh." He believes that the Babylonian records "reach to the 24th century B.C.;" adding, that "some scholars are of opinion that they stretch nearly 2000 years beyond that time." The oldest date assigned by Smith, is 2500 B.C. He places the early Babylonian monarchy B.C. 2500-1500; and refers the Izdubar (Nimrod) legends to

2000 B.C. Assyrian Discoveries, 166, 167. By the Septuagint reckoning, according to Theophilus, there would be 887 years from the deluge to 2500 B.C.; and from the creation to the deluge, 2242 years. Speaker's Commentary: Introduction to Kings, § 8, and to Hosea. Conder: Syrian Stone-Lore.

The Vedas, according to Max Müller (Origin of Religion, 147), go back to 1000 B.C.: how much earlier is uncertain. Whitney (Oriental Studies, 21) places them between 1500 and 2000 B.C. The Brahmins asserted that the astronomical tables of India were compiled more than 20,000,000 years ago. But Laplace proved that the calculations had been made after the alleged events; and moreover, that they were incorrect. Pouchet: Universe, 610.

Had man existed 20,000 years upon the globe, its population would be immensely greater than it is. Remains of ancient cities would be found all over the planet. But there are only twelve or fourteen hundred millions of men now on the globe, and remains of cities are found mostly around the Mediterranean, and in Asia. If we go back to the beginning of profane history (say to 1000 B.C.), we find most of the globe uninhabited by man. All of the Western hemisphere, all of middle and northern Europe, all of northern Asia, all of Africa south of Sahara, and all of Australia and the islands of the sea, were without human population. At the time of the Advent, the majority of the population of the globe was still gathered about the Mediterranean sea. Probably there were not more than 100,000,000 people on the globe, at that date. Man is very recent upon the American continents. South America has only about 30,000,000 inhabitants. North America at the time of its discovery had but a handful of men, compared with the vast extent of territory. We cannot assume an extravagant antiquity for man, because by this time the globe would be overrunning with population; as we cannot assume an extravagant antiquity even for the material globe,

because by this time it would have parted with all its caloric, and would be stone-cold at the centre. The small number of human bones that have been found, compared with the large number of the bones of animals, shows that man was of late origin. Were the earth now to be subjected to earthquake and deluge, human bones would be the most numerous of any in some of the strata that would be opened a thousand years hence. Few fossil human bones have been discovered; but there are multitudes of animal and vegetable fossils.

Even if the shorter Biblical chronology be adopted, Manetho's Egyptian chronology might possibly be harmonized with it. The following is one explanation of it. Placing the flood 2348 B.C., according to Usher's reckoning, there are 450 years between the flood and the call of Abraham, B.C. 1900. The first twelve dynasties (1-12) of Manetho (280 B.C.) can be placed here, giving 37 years to each dynasty. This would be the Old empire of Menes and his successors. The pyramids of Gizeh were built in this age. There is, however, great difference of opinion. Mariette Bey makes the Old empire a period of 2,700 years; Brugsch Bey says 2400 years; Bunsen 1076 years (making its beginning B.C. 3059); Wilkinson and Poole say 650 years, beginning B.C. 2700. The second period from Abraham to Joseph, B.C. 1900-1637, is that of the Middle empire and the Shepherd kings; embracing five dynasties of 52 years each (13-17, of Manetho). According to the Bible, Egypt during this period had a settled government. Abraham comes into contact with its king, Pharaoh, for the first time. Gen. 12. Rawlinson (*Ancient Egypt*, II. 22) regards the Middle empire as beginning about B.C. 1840, and terminating about B.C. 1640. The third period, B.C. 1637-1117, includes Egyptian history from Joseph downward, in which the remaining thirteen out of the total thirty dynasties of Manetho may be placed. This is the New empire, commencing with the eighteenth dynasty (18-30). This period

includes the ascendancy of Joseph, and of all the Pharaohs mentioned in Scripture, excepting the one contemporary with Abraham. Gen. 12. The 520 years of this period would give forty years to each dynasty.

The alleged great antiquity of Egypt must be found, if at all, in the first period of the Old empire. The data here are in utter obscurity. "For times anterior to 700 B.C., Egypt has no fixed chronology." Kitto: Article Manetho. De Rougé says that "les textes de Manéthon sont profondément altérés, et la série des dates monumentales est très incomplète." Rawlinson (Ancient Egypt II. 9, 21), says that "the chronological riddle in respect to early Egypt is insoluble. Manetho's general scheme, being so differently reported, is in reality unknown to us; its details, being frequently contradicted by the monuments, are untrustworthy; and the method of the scheme, the general principles upon which it was constructed, was so faulty, that even if we had it before us in its entirety, we could derive from it no exact or satisfactory chronology."

The repopulation of the globe after the deluge presents no serious difficulty. Population is rapid. According to Malthus, the increase of the means of subsistence is in arithmetical proportion; that of population is in geometrical.¹ "Every man," says Blackstone (Commentaries, II. xiv.), "has above one million lineal ancestors, if he reckons back to the twentieth generation." Blackstone's table gives 1,048,576 descendants from a single pair in the twentieth generation, or 660 years, supposing only two children to each pair. But supposing four children to each pair, the twentieth generation would yield 2,097,152 descendants. Petavius, taking only 700 years of the 1,600 between the creation and the deluge, and supposing that 700 years is the average of patriarchal life, and that twenty children are

¹ Hume: Populousness of Ancient Nations. Penny Cyclopaedia: Article, Population. Wallace: Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind. Petavius: Computation in Sir Thomas Brown's Pseudodoxia, vi. 6.

born to a single pair in each century, makes the total product 1,347,368,420. The increase is very great in the last century. The sixth century has 64,000,000, the seventh has twenty times this: viz. 1,347,368,420. But in every generation, this total number of descendants is diminished by death. Supposing, continues Petavius, that Noah and his wife and his three sons and their wives had six children (Gen. 10 mentions sixteen children of Shem, Ham, and Japhet) to each pair, and that this ratio continues, this would give 12,937,284 descendants in fourteen generations of thirty-three years each, or 462 years. But six children is a low estimate, in view of the longevity of man in this period, and the easiness of subsistence in the simplicity of the East, and of early civilization. The United States census shows that in 250 years, the 20,000 Puritans who emigrated from England between 1620 and 1640 have now 13,000,000 descendants.

The objections to the Biblical account of the origin of man drawn from varieties of color and of race are not serious. Climatic influence is very great, especially in a state of barbarism. When man is not protected from the sun and the elements by the appliances of civilization, when he is a savage, changes go on very rapidly. See *Quatrefages: Human Species*, VII. "The Portuguese during a 300 years' residence in India have become as black as Caffres, yet they form connections among themselves alone, or if they can, with Europeans." Heber: *Indian Journal*, 53-55. *Quar. Rev.*, vol. XXXVII. 100. See *Carpenter: Physiology*, XVII.

The argument from languages is strong for the unity of the race. The oldest form of Sanscrit, the Vedic, strikingly resembles its next neighbors to the westward: the language of the Avesta called the Zend, and that of the Persian inscriptions. The later form of the Sanscrit has less resemblance. Whitney: *Oriental Studies*, VIII. "The mutual agreement of the Indo-Germanic or Aryan lan-

guages is complete enough to justify the conclusion, that all the nations of this family of languages are only branches of one great nation, which was settled in Upper Asia, and included the ancestors of the Indians, Persians, Greeks, Italicans, Germans, Slaves, and Celts." Curtius: Greece, I. i.

The opinions of scientific zoölogists favor the recent origin of man. "Cuvier does not date the appearance of man farther back than tradition. According to this illustrious zoölogist, the history of the human race attests that man has not ruled over the surface of the globe for more than a limited number of years." Pouchet: Universe, 609. "Man," says Quatrefages (Human Species: II. xii. xiii.), "was most certainly in existence during the quaternary period; has in all probability seen miocene (middle tertiary) times, and, consequently, the entire pliocene (later tertiary) epoch." As to the question whether man was earlier than this, Quatrefages says it is possible: "Man is a mammal, and the conditions of existence sufficient for mammals ought to have been sufficient for him. Man is intelligent, and can protect himself against cold. There is nothing then impossible in the idea that he should have survived other species of the same class. But this is a question to be proved by facts. Before we can even suppose it to be so, we must wait for information from observation." pp. 152, 153. "The discoveries of Bourgeois testify, in my opinion, to the existence of a tertiary man. But everything seems to show that, as yet, his representatives were few in number. The quaternary population, on the contrary, were, at least in distribution, quite as numerous as the life of the hunter permitted." p. 177. "Tertiary man is known to us only from a few faint traces of his industry. Of tertiary man himself, we know nothing. Portions of his skeleton have been discovered, it has been thought, in France, Switzerland, and especially in Italy. Closer study has, however, always forced us to refer to a comparatively much later

period these human remains, which at first sight, were regarded as tertiary." p. 286. Arcelin makes the age of quaternary clay 6,750 years. Quatrefages thinks this rather too low, and says that the present geological period goes much farther back than seven to eight thousand years. p. 140. "No facts have as yet been discovered which authorize us to place the cradle of the human race otherwise than in Asia." p. 178.

The discovery of human bones and implements in situations, and connections that seem to imply a great antiquity for man, is not a sufficient reason for rejecting the Biblical account, owing to the uncertainty of the data. Human bones found in juxtaposition with the bones of the cave bear, and the elephant are not conclusive. (a) They may not have been deposited contemporaneously. The action of floods and of violent convulsions, makes it very difficult to say with certainty when deposits were made, or to tell the order in which they occurred. The bear may have laid his bones in the cave hundreds of years before the man laid his, and yet the two now be found side by side. When the bones of extinct animals and stone implements are found together in a gravel bed, who can be certain whether the gravel was deposited upon them, or whether they were deposited upon the gravel, and subsequently mingled and buried under it by earthquakes and inundations. (b) The now extinct animal may not have been extinct four or five thousand years ago. He and early man may have been contemporaneous. The elephant has been found encased in ice in Siberia, during this century. It had long hair, and was adapted to a cold climate. This specimen could not have been many thousands of years old. See Agassiz' Life, pp. 708-710.

Agassiz found in the deep waters of the West Indies "three characteristic genera of sponges from the secondary formation, till now supposed to be extinct." He also caught in his dredge "three specimens of the genus micrestor of

the cretaceous formation, of which no living species had been previously found."

Antiquity is fabricated for things that are recent. The so-called "lake dwellings" are an instance. Gibbon (Rome, XLII.) relates that the Bulgarians in the time of Justinian, A.D. 525, lived in lacustrine structures. It is probable that no remains of them are earlier than the time of Julius Cæsar. Herodotus (V. in initio) speaks of lake dwellings among a people in Asia Minor, B.C. 450. Robert Gray, an English traveller, speaks of seeing them in 1794 on the borders of Lake Wallenstadt. The skeleton discovered at Mentone has all the characteristic marks of the Ligurian Gaul, who was a man of large skeleton, according to Livy's account of the Gauls. Livingstone (Last Journal, 442) says that he never found a single flint arrow-head, or any other flint implement in Africa. No flint exists south of the equator, but quartz might have been used. Iron, he says, was smelted in the remotest ages in Africa. According to this, the iron age was the earliest.

There is great uncertainty in the conclusions drawn from the varieties of implements used by men in past ages. Three kinds have been discovered: (a) Rude stone implements; (b) Finished stone implements; (c) Bronze and iron implements. Some theorists give this as the natural order. Geikie, however (Ice Age, p. 405), remarks that the difference between the rude flint arrow-heads and axes of the palaeolithic men, and the polished and finely finished tools of the neolithic men, is too great to have no intermediate. And yet, no intermediate, he says, has been found. But may not the bronze implements be this intermediate? In the history of arts, the cutting of gems did not begin until after much skill had been acquired in the use of metals; and the finish of the "elegantly shaped" stone implements is more like that of gem cutting, than like that of the rude palaeolithic implements.

May not the order, consequently be: 1, palaeolithic; 2, bronze; 3, neolithic; instead, as the geologist claims, of: 1, palaeolithic; 2, neolithic; 3, bronze. It is difficult to suppose that the polished stone implement could have been made by the rude stone implement. It requires iron tools.

Again, the use of rude stone implements is no proof of the great antiquity of a people. There are tribes of men now on the globe who are using them. Should these tribes become extinct, and their implements be discovered one thousand years hence, it would be a false inference to assert that they belonged to a race that lived before Adam. The stone implement is an index of a particular period in the history of a nation's civilization, rather than of its antiquity. A nation may be in its barbarous state, and its stone age, at almost any time in the history of the world. "Neo-barbarism," says Mahaffy (Greece, p. 16), "means the occurrence in later times of the manners and customs which generally mark very old and primitive times. Some few things of the kind survive everywhere; thus in the Irish Island of Arran, a group of famous savants mistook a stone donkey-shed of two years' standing for the building of an extinct race of great antiquity. As a matter of fact, the construction had not changed from the oldest type." Says Turner (Anglo-Saxons, I. 10), "we even now, at this late age, see the Esquimau, the wild Indian, the Backsettler, and the cultivated Philadelphian existing at the same time in North America; so did the Egyptian, the Scythian, and the Greek; so did high polish and rude barbarism at all times appear in disparted but coeval existence." A contributor to the public press remarks, that "scientific teachers who hold to the succession of stone, bronze and iron ages, in the development of early civilization, have found a peculiarly incorrigible scholar in Dr. Schliemann. From a very careful study of the store of stone and bronze weapons and implements treasured in the pre-historic por-

tion of the museum in Leyden, he has become convinced that the distinction between the different stone, bronze, and iron ages, is purely artificial and imaginary, and concludes that there never was a time, when the earliest inhabitants of Denmark (from whence the proofs were derived), were totally unacquainted with bronze, or used only unpolished, rude stone weapons and implements."

CHAPTER VIII.

PROVIDENCE.

“God’s works of providence are his most holy, wise, and powerful, preserving and governing all his creatures, and all their actions.” Westminster Larger Catechism, 18. Preservation and government are the two functions in the eternal providence of God. They presuppose creation. 1. Preservation is described in Heb. 1:3, as an “upholding.” The Son of God “upholds all things by the word of his power.” Nothing that is created *ex nihilo* is self-sustaining. Consequently it must be sustained in being. It would not require a positive act of omnipotence, antithetic to that exerted in creation from nothing, in order to annihilate created existences. Simple cessation to uphold would result in annihilation. For to suppose that matter, for example, could persist in being after the withdrawal of God’s preserving power, with such an intensity as to necessitate a direct act of omnipotence to annihilate it, would imply that matter has self-existence, and self-continuance. But this is an attribute that is incommunicable to the creature. This is true of finite mind, as well as of matter. Created spiritual substance is not immortal because it has self-subsistence imparted to it by the Creator, but because he intends to uphold and sustain it in being forever. “When we speak of the soul as created naturally immortal, we mean that it is by the divine pleasure created such a substance as not having in itself any composition, or other particles of corruption, will naturally, or of itself, continue forever; that is, will not by any natural decay, or by any power of

nature, be dissolved or destroyed ; but yet nevertheless depends continually upon God, who has power to destroy or annihilate it if he should think fit." Clarke : Letter to Dodwell.

Preservation is more than merely imparting to matter certain properties, and placing it under certain invariable laws. This is the *deistical* view of providence. God is not immediately present ; nor does he operate directly, but only at a distance. This amounts to communicating self-subsistence to the creature. God so constitutes the creation, that it can continue to exist and move by means of its own inherent properties and laws. But the elements and laws of matter are only another name for matter itself ; another aspect or mode of matter. The deistical theory, consequently, implies that matter, after its creation, is self-sustaining and self-governing. But self-subsistence and self-sustentation are incommunicable properties. They can characterize only the Creator. Neither is preservation the immediate presence and operation of God, as the soul of the world. This is the *pantheistic* view of providence. According to this theory, God is the informing life, the plastic force in mind and matter. God is the only agent in this case ; as he is the only substance, of which his life is the life. This allows of no secondary substance, and no second causes.

According to the Scriptures, preservation is the immediate operation of God as a distinct and different Being, upon, in, and with the creature as a different and distinct being, and always in accordance with the nature of the creature. In the material world, God immediately works in and through material properties and laws. In the mental world, God immediately works in and through the properties and faculties of mind. Preservation never runs counter to creation. God does not violate in providence what he has established in creation. The Creator, if we may so say, adjusts and accommodates himself to his creature, in his prov-

idental operation. "Deus," says cardinal Toletus, "concurrit cum causis secundis juxta ipsarum naturam; cum liberis libere, cum necessariis necessario, cum debilibus debilitate, cum fortibus fortitur, pro sua suavissima dispositione universali operando." The best illustration of the mode in which God operates in providence, is found in the action of the human soul upon the body. The soul is immediately present to, and with the body, yet a different essence from it. The mental force that moves a muscle is not physical, but different in kind from physical force. The soul is not the mere animal vitality which inheres in the muscle, and in the body generally. If it were, it would not be mental force. If the human soul moved the human body, not voluntarily, but in the same way that the vegetable life moves the atoms of the plant, or the animal life moves the molecules of animal protoplasm, it would be only a plastic and informing force that would die with the plant or the animal. It would not be a distinct and different subject, or substance, from the body. The soul as an ego, and a whole, exists in every part of the body, and operates immediately at every point of the body; yet as an entity other than the body, and controlling it. It is present at every point where there is bodily sensation, and works at every point where there is bodily motion. So, also, in the instance of God and the created universe, there are two beings of different substance and nature, one of which is immediately present with the other, directly operating in and upon it, upholding and governing. The immediate operation of God in his providence is taught in Acts 17:28. "In him we live, and move, and have our being (*καὶ ἔσμεν*)." God preserves (a) The being, that is, the substance, both mental and material, of the creature; (b) The inherent properties and qualities of the substance, given in creation; (c) The properties and qualities acquired by use, development, and habit.

This providential agency relates: (a) To physical nature

generally. Ps. 104:14, "He causeth grass to grow;" Ps. 135:5-7, "He causeth vapors to ascend;" Ps. 147:8-15; Job 9:5-9, "He removeth the mountains, and shaketh the earth out of her place." Acts 14:17, "He giveth rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons." (b) To the animal creation. Ps. 104:21-29; 147:9; Matt. 6:26; 10:29, "Not a sparrow falleth to the ground without your father." (c) To the events of human history. 1 Chron. 16:31; Ps. 47:7; Prov. 21:1; Job 12:23; Isa. 10:12-15; Dan. 2:21. (d) To individual life. 1 Sam. 2:6; Ps. 18:30; Prov. 16:9; Isa. 45:5; James 4:13-14. (e) To so-called fortuitous events. Ex. 21:13; Ps. 75:6, 7; Job 5:6, "Trouble doth not spring out of the ground;" Prov. 16:33, "The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord."

"All nature is but art unknown to thee,
And chance direction which thou canst not see."—POPE.

(f) To particulars as well as universals. Matt. 10:29; 10:20, "The hairs of your head are all numbered." Universal providence logically implies particular providence, because the universal is composed of particulars and depends upon them more or less. Moreover, in reference to the Infinite being, great and small are alike. The pagan view of providence made it universal only. "Magna dii curant, parva negligunt." Cicero: De natura deorum, II. 66. (g) To the free actions of men. Ex. 12:36; 1 Sam. 24:9-15; Prov. 16:1; 19:21; 20:24; Jer. 10:23; Phil. 2:13. (h) To the sinful actions of men. 2 Sam. 16:10; 24:1; Ps. 76:10; Rom. 11:32; Acts 4:27, 28.

2. The second part of providence is government. This follows from creation and preservation. He who originates a substance or being from nothing, and upholds it, must have absolute control over it. Ps. 103:19, "His kingdom ruleth over all." The government of God in the physical universe is administered by means of physical laws. A law

of nature is the manner in which the material elements invariably act and react upon each other, under the present arrangement of Divine providence. The law of gravitation, for example, is the fact that matter, as man now knows it, attracts matter inversely as the square of the distance.

The following particulars are to be noticed in respect to all the laws of nature, in distinction from mental and moral laws. (a) A law of nature is a positive statute; as much so as the statute of circumcision, or the law of the Sabbath. Physical laws have no a priori necessity. They might have been otherwise than they are, had the Creator of them so determined. God could have originated from nonentity a kind of matter that should have attracted directly as the distance, or inversely as the cube of the distance. He might have established the law of chemical affinity upon a different numerical basis from the present. Supposing certain gases to combine with others in the proportion of 1, 3, 5, 7, etc., God might have created instead of them, gases that combine with others in the proportions of 1, 2, 4, 6, etc. This follows from the fact that creation is *ex nihilo*, and consequently is absolutely untrammelled by any pre-existing substance which necessitates the qualities of the thing created. He who creates matter from non-entity has the most absolute and arbitrary power conceivable, in respect to the properties which matter shall possess. A demiurge who merely moulds an existing $\psi\lambda\eta$ has no such option and freedom as this. He must take the properties of the $\psi\lambda\eta$ into consideration. But a creator is not thus conditioned. Galileo, in his Dialogues on the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems, says, through Simplicio, "It is not to be denied that the heavens may surpass in bigness the capacity of our imaginations, nor that God might have created them a thousand times larger than they are." *Private Life of Galileo*, 237. Whewell remarks that "some writers have treated the laws of motion as self-evident, and necessarily flowing from the nature of our conceptions. We

conceive that this is an erroneous view, and that these laws are known to us to be what they are, by experience only; that the laws of motion might, so far as we can discover, have been any others." Astronomy and General Physics, II. ii. See ante; p. 29 seq.

(*b*) It follows from this, that the so-called invariableness of natural laws is relative, not absolute. They are invariable under the present constitution of matter, and arrangement of the material system. Suppose another constitution and arrangement, and they would be different from what they are. And such a supposition is possible, unless we assume that he who creates something from non-entity is limited and conditioned by non-entity. And surely those who can conceive that there may be a world in which two and two do not make five, can conceive of more than one constitution of matter and course of nature.

The government of God in the mental world is administered: (*a*) Mediate, through the properties and laws of mind, and (*b*) Immediate, by the direct operation of the Holy Spirit. Moral agents are governed and controlled by all the varieties of moral influence, such as circumstances, motives, instruction, persuasion, and example, and also by the personal efficiency of the Holy Ghost upon the heart and will.

CHAPTER IX.

MIRACLES.

Augustine : *City of God*, X. viii.-xii. ; XXI. ii.-viii. ; Trinity, III. ii.-ix. Hume : *On Miracles*. Campbell : *Reply to Hume*. Conybeare : *On Miracles*. Mozley : *On Miracles*. Neander : *Life of Christ*, Book IV. Trench : *The Gospel Miracles*. Channing : *Evidences of Revealed Religion*. Christlieb : *Modern Doubt*, Lecture V. Fisher : *Theistic Belief*, IV.-VI. Twisten : *Dogmatik*, § 24. Shedd : *History of Doctrine*, I. 164 sq. Dörner : *Christian Doctrine*, §§ 53-56. Steinmeyer : *Miracles of Christ*. Penny *Cyclopaedia* : Art. *Miracles*. Bruce : *Miraculous Element in the Gospels*. Müller : *Sin*, IV. iii., iv. Nietzsche : *Dogmatics*, 107.

THE government of God is occasionally administered by means of miracles. The miracle is an extraordinary act of God. It does not differ from the ordinary course of nature, because it requires a greater exertion of Divine power, but because it requires a different exertion of it. To cause the sun to rise, and to cause Lazarus to rise, both alike demand omnipotence ; but the manner in which omnipotence works in one instance is unlike the manner in the other. The possibility of the miracle rests upon the fact mentioned in the Westminster Confession (V. iii.), that "the Creator is free to work without means, above means, and against means, at his pleasure."

Whenever the ordinary method by natural means is inadequate to accomplish the Divine purpose in the government of the universe, or any part of it, God employs the extraordinary method by miracle. The rule which Horace

lays down for introducing the supernatural into poetry, applies to its introduction into theology :

“Nec deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus
Inciderit.”

The miracle occurs only when there is an occasion requiring it. When, for example, it became necessary, on account of its great wickedness, to destroy the world of mankind more suddenly and swiftly than was possible by natural causes, God miraculously opened the fountains of the great deep, and the flood destroyed them all. The miraculous judgments recorded in the Old Testament were sent for the purpose of controlling, and “governing human creatures, and all their actions.” The birth of Jesus Christ, the promised Redeemer of man, a God-man, was impossible by the method of ordinary generation ; hence, the miraculous conception. In the future history of the world, certain events are to be brought about miraculously, because they cannot be by ordinary physical laws. The resurrection of the bodies of all men is one of them. The sudden dissolution and reconstruction of this material world at the end of the redemptive economy (1 Cor. 15 : 24 ; Matt. 25 : 31-46), cannot be effected by the present slow and gradual operation of natural laws. There must, therefore, be a miraculous interference similar to that by which the world was first created, and by which it was whelmed in the waters of the deluge.

The miracle, consequently, is to be expected under the government of an intelligent and wise God. Says Channing (*Evidences of Revealed Religion*), “To a man whose belief in God is strong and practical, a miracle will appear as possible as any other effect, as the most common event in life ; and the argument against miracles drawn from the uniformity of nature will weigh with him, only as far as this uniformity is a pledge and proof of the Creator’s disposition to accomplish his purposes by a fixed order, or mode

of operation. Now it is freely granted, that the Creator's regard or attachment to such an order may be inferred from the steadiness with which he observes it; and a strong presumption lies against any violation of it on slight occasions, or for purposes to which the established laws of nature are adequate. But this is the utmost which the order of nature authorizes us to infer, respecting its Author. It forms no presumption against miracles universally, in all imaginable cases; but may even furnish a presumption in their favor. We are never to forget that God's adherence to the order of the universe is not necessary and mechanical, but intelligent and voluntary. He adheres to it, not for its own sake, or because it has a sacredness which compels him to respect it, but because it is most suited to accomplish his purposes. It is a means, and not an end; and like all other means must give way when the end can best be promoted without it. It is the mark of a weak mind to make an idol of order and method; to cling to established forms of business when they clog, instead of advancing it. If, then, the great purposes of the universe can best be accomplished by departing from its established laws, these laws will undoubtedly be suspended; and though broken in the letter, they will be observed in their spirit, for the ends for which they were first instituted will be advanced by their suspension."

Miracles are not unnatural events; they are natural to God. The miracles of Christ wear no appearance of magic and artifice, like the tricks of a juggler. They are not whimsical and extravagant, like the miracles attributed to him in the apocryphal gospels; or like the ecclesiastical miracles of the Papal church. "A miracle," says Feltham (Resolves, xxxiii.), "when God pleases, is as easy to him as a natural cause. For it was at first by miracle, that even that cause was natural. And all the miracles that we have heard of in the world are less a miracle than the world itself." Says Richter, "Miracles upon earth are nature in heaven."

Miracles are natural to a personal deity, but unnatural and impossible to an impersonal. All the arguments against them by Spinoza, Baur, and Strauss proceed upon the pantheistic assumption that the Infinite is impersonal, and that everything occurs through the operation of an impersonal system of natural law. But if the existence of a personal Infinite is conceded, it would be strange and unnatural, if there were never any extraordinary exertion of his omnipotence. Miracles are tokens of a Person who can modify his plans, and make new arrangements in space and time. They are the natural accompaniments of personality and free will. If a human person should never by the exercise of will enter upon a new course of action, but should pursue through his whole existence one unvarying tenor like an animal led by instinct, or a machine propelled mechanically, we should doubt his personality. He would come under the suspicion of being only a brute or a machine.

Miracles, as Paley argues, are to be *expected* in connection with a revelation from God. "Mr. Hume states the case of miracles to be a contest of opposite improbabilities; that is to say, a question whether it be more improbable that the miracle should be true, or the testimony false. But in describing the improbability of miracles, he suppresses all those circumstances of extenuation [favoring circumstances] which result from our knowledge of the existence, power, and disposition of the Deity. As Mr. Hume has represented the question, miracles are alike incredible to him who is previously assured of the constant agency of a Divine Being, and to him who believes that no such Being exists. This, surely, cannot be a correct statement." Paley: *Evidences* (Preface).

The laws of nature are being continually modified in their action, by the interference of the human will. A stone falls to the ground in a perpendicular line by the operation of gravity. Taking this material force, only, into

view, there is and can be no variation from this. But a stone can be made to fall in a curve, by human volition. In this case, there is still the operation of the force of gravity, but with this an accompanying voluntary force that deflects the stone from the perpendicular. If there were only a single solitary instance of such an alteration of nature by will, it would be regarded as supernatural.

The laws of nature are also being continually modified in their action, by the intervention of the Divine will. The striking differences in the seasons are examples. This winter of 1885 is remarkably different from that of 1884. But there is the same system of nature and of natural laws, and these in themselves considered, apart from any influence of a personal will, are invariable in their operation. On the hypothesis that there is no Creator and no God, one physical year should be a *fac-simile* of another. Why this difference between two winters, unless an element of personal will be combined with that of impersonal laws? Physical properties and laws, in themselves, are invariable in their operation. The occasional variety, therefore, that is witnessed in the general uniformity of natural phenomena, implies Divine volition modifying the general system.

Consider, as another example of the modifying influence of the Divine will upon natural properties and laws, the difference in the longevity of individuals. A person of feeble constitution lives to old age; one with a vigorous constitution dies in early manhood. If nothing but physical properties and laws determines the event, the former person must necessarily die before the latter. But if the personal will of the Author of nature can modify the action of nature, then the former may outlive the latter. The race will not be to the swift, nor the battle to the strong.

Physical nature is full of examples that go to prove the presence of a personal will, in impersonal nature and matter. Cut off a snail's head, and it will grow out again; but cut off a crab's head, and it will not grow out again. Cut

off a crab's claw, and it will grow out again ; cut off a dog's leg, and it will not grow out again. Roget : Physiology, II. 587. Why this difference in the operation of the very same properties and laws of animal substance ? The properties and laws themselves will not account for it. The modifying power of a *will* above them explains it. Molecules of matter in atmospheric air are very elastic. If pressure is removed, they recede from each other indefinitely. Air in an air-pump becomes extremely rarefied. Molecules of matter in a fluid are less elastic. If pressure is removed, they recede from each other, but much less than in the case of air, or a gas. Molecules of matter in a solid are still less elastic than those of a fluid. The removal of pressure makes very little change. Herschel : Preliminary Discourse, §§ 239-243. Why should molecules of matter have these different degrees of elasticity, but from the *will* which created them from nothing ?

The reality of miracles implies the superiority of mind to matter. The denial of a power above material laws and phenomena is materialism. It is equivalent to asserting that matter controls mind. He who denies the supernatural, affirms that nature and matter are the ultimate basis of the universe. The conflict consequently between the believer and the disbeliever, is a conflict between the spiritual and the material, the intellectual and the sensual. It is therefore a conflict between civilization and barbarism.

The position of the materialist is, that matter moves mind, and that material motion explains mental phenomena. This is incompatible with the miracle. The position of the spiritualist is, that mind moves matter, and that mental motion, or volition, explains material phenomena. This is compatible with the miracle. That the latter position is the truth, is proved by the following facts : 1. Thinking tires the body ; but digging does not tire the mind. 2. Feeling in the mind causes the molecular change in the brain, not vice versa. Shame causes the blush, not the

blush shame. 3. The human tear in its purely physical or healthy state is insipid ; in its morbid state, as affected by grief, is salt, pungent, and corrosive. 4. The saliva when affected by gluttonous appetite, that is, by a mental desire, is greatly increased in quantity, compared with the secretion from mere hunger. 5. Teasing bees in a hive generates heat in the swarm. Kirby and Spence: Entomology, II. 214. Bees have adaptive intelligence, and the irritation of this affects their material organism.

The assertion that the miracle is impossible proceeds upon the hypothesis, that nothing can happen but what is now happening. The present is the norm for all the past, and all the future. The local is the rule for universal space. The skeptic assumes that the phenomena which he now witnesses are the only phenomena that are possible. This implies that his experience is the only criterion. It not only makes man the measure of all things, but a class of men. For the experience of even a great majority of mankind, does not constitute universal experience. There is nothing in the structure of the human intellect that supports this assumption. On the contrary, the mind repels the proposition, that the experience of certain generations of men is an infallible index of all that is possible in all time, and throughout the vast universe of being. "All reasoning from analogy or similitude, is from the habitual association of ideas, and consequently can amount to no more than this: That the thing appears so to us, because it always has appeared so, and we know of no instance to the contrary. I have seen the sun set to-night, and conclude that it will rise again to-morrow; because my own experience and the tradition received from others have taught me to associate the idea of its rising again, after a certain number of hours, with that of its setting; and habit has rendered these ideas inseparable. But, nevertheless, I can give no demonstrative reason from the nature of things why it should rise again; or why the Creator

and Governor of the universe may not launch it, as a comet, to wander forever through the boundless vacuity of space. I only know that during the short period, and within the narrow sphere, which bound my knowledge of this universe, he hath displayed no such irregular exertions of power: but still that period, and that sphere, shrink into nothing in the scale of eternity and infinity; and what can man know of the laws of God or nature, that can enable him to prescribe rules for Omnipotence?" Knight: On Taste, II. iii.

The miracle is a suspension of a law of nature, in a particular instance. Hume defines the miracle to be "a violation of the laws of nature;" "a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the deity." Essay on Miracles, Pt. I. This is incorrect. When our Lord raised Lazarus from the dead, he merely suspended in that particular instance, and *in that only*, the operation of the chemical action by which putrefaction goes on. He did not violate the law. This would have required that he should cause the same chemical action that was putrefying the flesh, to stop the putrefaction. Christ in working this miracle did not undo, or revolutionize any law of nature. The general course of nature was undisturbed. Another corpse lying beside that of Lazarus, like all the other corpses in the world, would have continued to putrefy by chemical decomposition.

But the mere suspension of a law of nature in a particular instance, is not sufficient to account for the miracle. Christ, by virtue of the control which he had over natural law, might have arrested the process of decomposition, and yet Lazarus would not have come forth from the tomb, any more than he would if he had been embalmed or petrified. Over and above this power to suspend existing natural laws, there must have been the exertion of a positively reanimating power. Christ must have been able to create or originate physical life itself. Lazarus was made alive from the dead,

by the exertion of an energy of the same kind by which the first man was made on the sixth day ; that is, by the operation of mere mind itself, apart from matter and its laws.

The explanation that a miracle is the effect of an unknown law of nature, higher than the ordinary law, is untenable, because: (a) It supposes two systems of nature that are contrary to each other. If the iron axe of Elijah's pupil was made to swim, not by the suspension of the law of gravity in that instance, but by the operation of another natural law, it is plain, that this latter law is exactly contrary to the law of gravity. But this would imply two systems of nature ; one in which gravity of matter is the law, and one in which levity of matter is the law. This destroys the unity of the material universe. (b) The miracle could not be accounted for upon this theory, except by supposing that one of these two systems of nature is superior to the other. If the two systems were equal in force, the result of their collision would be an equilibrium, and nothing would occur. But if one is superior to the other, the latter must be overcome and disappear. The higher system would annihilate the lower, and finally all nature would become miraculous (so-called). If it be said that the two systems are kept apart, and do not come into collision ; that each system is a distinct circle, having its own centre ; then it is impossible that a miracle could happen at all. Everything in the circle where gravity is the natural law must occur accordingly. The iron must sink in every instance. And everything in the circle when a force contrary to gravity prevails must occur accordingly. The iron must swim in every instance. If it be said, that there is no system or circle where such a higher natural law prevails, but that this force is originated in each instance for the particular purpose of working a miracle, there are these objections: First, it is improper to denominate a few exceptional instances a "law." Secondly, it is unnatural to suppose that the Creator would call a new

material force into being, to bring about what he might accomplish by the simple suspension of an existing force, and by the exertion of a single volition of his own. (c) A miracle, by the very definition, must be exceptional, solitary, and sporadic. It is the effect of a single volition. Miracles are disconnected from one another. They do not evolve out of each other, but are wrought, one at a time. Consequently, a miracle cannot occur by a *law*; because this implies a connected series, and an endless series so long as the law remains in existence. Miracles would be as numerous and constant, if there were a law of miracles, as the phenomena of gravitation. When God made the hand of Moses leprous (Ex. 4: 6, 7), he did it by an omnipotent volition. This, from the human point of view, was a single separate act of the Divine will. And when he healed the leprosy, this was a second volition. Neither miracle was effected by a force operating continuously like a law of nature.

The argument of Hume against the credibility of miracles begins with asserting, that a miracle "contradicts uniform experience." This is begging the point. The question between the disputants is this: *Does* the miracle contradict the uniform experience of mankind? By the word "uniform," Hume must mean "universal;" otherwise his argument would fail. A single experience of a miracle would be as good as a thousand, in logical respects. Mill so understood his use of the term. He states it thus: "Whatever is contrary to a complete induction is incredible." But a complete induction would embrace all the particular facts. If one were omitted, it would be incomplete. "Uniform experience," consequently, would involve an experience covering all the phenomena upon earth from the beginning of human history. It must be more than the experience of the majority of men. It must include that of the minority. In this case as in politics, the minority have rights which the majority are bound to respect. The miracle cannot be decided by a majority vote. That a miracle contradicts the expe-

rience of all men in the eighteenth century, is not sufficient to prove that it contradicted the experience of all men in the first century. The induction of particulars must be absolutely complete, in order to evince incredibility. It is not enough to show merely that the miracle contradicts the experience of the disbeliever and of his contemporaries.

There is nothing in physical science that justifies the position, that there never has been and never will be a miraculous event in all space and all time, because there is nothing in physical science to prove the necessary and eternal immutability of nature. That things have been as they are for a million of years, does not prove that they will be the same for a billion of years, and forevermore. All that physics teaches, is, that there is nothing in *nature* and natural forces that can work a miracle. This, the theologian is as ready to say as any one. But by what right is it inferred, that because in matter and nature there is no power able to raise the dead, there is no power anywhere? Physics has examined only physical nature. It may affirm with reference to this, but not beyond this. And to deny that there is anything beyond this is begging the question. To infer respecting the supernatural power of God and the probability of its exercise, from the experience of only a portion of mankind—even though it be the greater portion thus far—is unwarranted. In the future, the experience of the greater part of mankind, or of the entire whole, may be reversed, for all that the objector knows. It is a general law, that substances contract by cold. Water contracts by cold down to 39° Fahrenheit; at which point it begins to expand, and and on reaching 32° it freezes—which is a great expansion. This law is reversed, Hume might say “violated,” at 39°. Suppose that the whole human race had never been in a climate below 40°, and had known nothing of a chemistry by which artificial cold can be produced. If they should infer a so-called necessary law of nature from “experi-

ence," in this instance, as Hume has in that of miracles, they would assert it to be impossible that water should expand by cold. And the testimony of fifty witnesses living eighteen centuries before Hume's day and generation, to the effect that they had seen the law of contraction by cold actually reversed, would be liable to the same species of objection as that which now seeks to invalidate the testimony of the twelve apostles and others, that a man was raised from the dead eighteen centuries ago. It might be said that the fifty witnesses of the expansion of a substance by cold were more likely to be deceived, than that a phenomenon so contrary to the present universal experience of mankind should have occurred. Locke (*Understanding*, IV. xv.) relates that "a Dutch ambassador entertaining the king of Siam with the particularities of Holland which he was inquisitive after, amongst other things told him that the water in his country would sometimes in cold weather be so hard that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant if he were there; to which the king replied, 'Hitherto, I have believed the strange things you have told me, because I look upon you as a sober, fair man, but now I am sure you lie.'"

Hume concedes the *possibility*, that is, the conceivability of a miracle. *Inquiry*, IV. "The contrary of every matter of fact, is still possible." But he denies the *demonstrability* of a miracle. In order to establish this denial, he *defines* a miracle so as to exclude all testimony to it. His definition of a miracle is, that it is an event that never has been seen by an eye-witness. His language is as follows: "It is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life, because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be an uniform [invariable] experience against any miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation." *Inquiry*, Section X. That is to say, if an event was once an object of the senses, this takes it out of the category of the miraculous; for a

miracle, by the definition, is something that "never has been observed," never was the object of the senses. It is impossible, consequently, to prove a miracle; for the proof of the miracle would be the destruction of the miracle. If the event was seen, it was not miraculous. The sophism in this argument of Hume is so patent, that it is strange that it should have acquired so much reputation as it has. The point in dispute, namely, whether a miracle has ever been an object of the senses, is settled in favor of the skeptic, by this definition of a miracle.

There are two observations to be made respecting Hume's position that a miracle is possible, but undemonstrable. 1. The admission that a miracle is possible amounts to nothing, if a miracle is incapable of being proved. A thing that is possible, but indemonstrable, is practically equivalent to an impossibility. 2. It is logically inconsistent, to assert the possibility and deny the demonstrability of an event. Anything that is conceivably possible is conceivably demonstrable. If there is nothing in the nature of an event to prevent our conceiving that it might happen, there is nothing in its nature to prevent our conceiving that it might be observed to happen. If there be no absurdity in supposing that an event might occur, there is certainly none in supposing that it has occurred; and if it has occurred, there is no absurdity in supposing that it has been seen.

The miracle is a part of a great whole which is supernatural: namely, the person of the Redeemer, and the work of redemption. If there is no incarnation, and no redemption, there is no need of the miracle. But if there is, then the miracle is necessary and natural. Hence the person of Christ, his incarnation and resurrection, is the real battleground. The Old Testament miracles are connected with the Jehovah-Angel, or the redeeming God. Those of the New Testament are connected with the Jehovah-Logos, or Jesus Christ. Here is the point from which both faith and

unbelief take their departure. He who believes that God incarnate has appeared on earth to save man from sin, will have no difficulty with the miracle. He who disbelieves this, cannot accept it. It is the first step that costs. If the human mind does not stumble over that Divine-human Person who is "set for the fall and rising again of many," it will not stumble over the supernaturalism that is naturally associated with Him.

