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THE HISTORY

FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF

DURING HIS PARLIAMENTS

AND

1709 to 1716.

By JOHN HANCOCK.





THE DISPATCHES

OF

FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS

FROM

1799 TO 1818.

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“ Monumentum ære perennius.”

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THE DISPATCHES

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,


DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS

IN

INDIA, DENMARK, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, THE LOW  
COUNTRIES, AND FRANCE,

FROM

1799 TO 1818.



COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL AND AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS,

BY

LIEUT. COLONEL GURWOOD,

ESQUIRE TO HIS GRACE AS KNIGHT OF THE BATH.

VOLUME THE FIFTH.

A NEW EDITION.

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3.5.44

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

THE DISPATCHES


THE LIFE OF

KING MARSHAL

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON

DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS

INDIA, DENMARK, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, THE LOW  
COUNTRIES, AND FRANCE



LONDON:

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# THE DISPATCHES

OF

## FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON

IN

### THE PENINSULA,

IN

1809 AND 1810.

*To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, Deleytosa, 8th August, 1809.

‘ I INTENDED going to see you this day, but there are so many points to be arranged here, that I must defer my visit till to-morrow.

‘ The measures to be adopted at your post upon the Tagus depend so much upon our general situation, that it is impossible to enter upon them at all without explaining our whole situation with which I am about to trouble you.

‘ From all that I learn, the enemy have brought, or are bringing through the Puerto de Baños to Plasencia, all the troops they had in Castille. General Beresford, in a letter of the 4th, from Almeida, tells me that they have now none left in Castile, and that the number sent through amounts to 34,000 men. This would make the French force in this part of Spain about 70,000 men.

‘ They will either press us upon our right with this body, and force their way to Cordova; or they will try again the game of diversions, and detach a large corps into Portugal, in order to make us separate from the Spaniards.

‘ I do not think it likely that they will endeavour to force the passage of the Tagus. Indeed, success at any point above Almaraz would not be of much use to them, for they could not march an army by any road excepting that by which we have come, and which might be easily defended.

‘ That which we have to guard against then is,—first, a march into Portugal; secondly, an attempt upon the right of the Spaniards to force their way to Cordova.

‘ It might be hereafter convenient that we should re-establish the bridge at Almaraz, but that is out of the question at present. Even if a tempting opportunity of striking a blow were offered to us, we require rest and food for men and horses, before we could take advantage of it.

‘ In a view either to the march into Portugal, or to the defence of the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, my opinion is, that the following arrangements ought to be adopted :

‘ First, we ought to break up the bridge over the channel on the right bank, preserving the planks, and bringing them over to the left bank.

‘ Secondly, we ought to separate the boats of the bridge tied to this side. The boats might be removed to the dry creek just below the passage, and the beams and planks to the hill behind the passage.

‘ Thirdly, we ought to construct works upon those points of the ground which would best enable us to defend the passage.

‘ By the adoption of these measures, we should be enabled to defend the passage, if the enemy should attempt to force it; and on the other hand, if we should find that the enemy move towards Portugal, and that we are obliged to move that way, the Spanish division, which will be at Mesa de Ibor, will take your place in security, and we shall have it in our power to burn the materials of the bridges; or, if it should turn out to be expedient to cross the river, we can easily re-establish them.

‘ I am in hopes that, to-morrow, I shall be able to send you some guns. I shall, this afternoon, send you an Engineer and tools for the construction of such works as may be necessary. I understood that there were Spanish artillery at the batteries of the bridge; but I have been misinformed on this as well as on other subjects. I have written to General Cuesta, to desire that Spanish artillery of a heavy calibre may be sent to defend the passage at Almaraz.

‘ I have ordered provisions to be sent to you. I have hopes that after this day we shall receive our regular rations.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Brig. General R. Craufurd.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’



*To Don Martin de Garay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Deleytosa, 8th August, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving the letter which your Excellency did me the honor of writing to me on the 31st July, in which you have expressed the approbation of the Central Junta of the conduct of the British army under my command, in the action of the 29th of July.

‘ I am very sensible of the value of the approbation of the Central Junta, and I beg that you will convey to them my respectful acknowledgments.

‘ I am particularly flattered by the confidence they have reposed in me, in appointing me one of the Captains General of the Spanish armies; and I have this day written to His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State, to request him to lay before His Majesty this testimony of the approbation and confidence of the Central Junta, and to request His Majesty’s permission for me to accept the commission in the Spanish army with which the government are pleased to honor me.

‘ Until His Majesty’s answer shall be received, I shall be happy to render the Government every service that may be in my power.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Don Martin de Garay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Don Martin de Garay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Deleytosa, 8th August, 1809

‘ I have in a separate letter expressed my acknowledgments to the Government for the honor they have done me in appointing me a Captain General in the Spanish army, and I have now to return them my thanks for the horses which they have been pleased to present to me in the name of His Majesty King Ferdinand VII.

‘ In respect to the pay attached to the rank of Captain General, I hope the Government will excuse me if I decline to become a burden upon the finances of Spain during this contest for her independence.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Don Martin de Garay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Deleytosa, 8th August, 1809.

‘ I apprized your Lordship on the 1st instant of the advance of a French corps towards the Puerto de Baños, and of the probable embarrassment of the operations of the army, which its arrival at Plasencia would occasion; and these embarrassments having since existed to a degree so considerable as to oblige us to fall back, and to take up a defensive position on the Tagus, I am induced to trouble you more at length with an account of what has passed upon this subject.

‘ When I entered Spain, I had a communication with General Cuesta, through Sir Robert Wilson and Colonel Roche, respecting the occupation of the Puerto de Baños, and the Puerto de Perales; the former of which it was at last settled should be held by a corps to be formed under the Marques de la Reyna, to consist of two battalions from General Cuesta’s army, and two from Bejar; and that the Puerto de Perales was to be taken care of by the Duque del Parque, by detachments from the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo. I doubted the capacity of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo to make the detachment to the latter, but so little as to the effectual occupation of the former, that in writing to Marshal Beresford on the 17th July, on this subject, I desired him to look to the Puerto de Perales, but that I considered Baños secure, as appears by the extract of my letter, which I enclose.

‘ On the 30th intelligence was received at Talavera that 12,000 rations had been ordered at Fuente Roble for the 28th, and 24,000 at Los Santos for the same day, for a French corps, which it was believed was on its march towards the Puerto de Baños. General Cuesta expressed some anxiety respecting this post, and sent me a message, to propose that Sir Robert Wilson should be sent there with his corps. Sir Robert was on that day at Talavera, but his corps was in the mountains towards Escalona; and as he had already made himself very useful in that quarter, and had been near Madrid, with which city he had had a communication which I was desirous of keeping up, I proposed that a Spanish corps should be sent to Baños without loss of time. I could not prevail with General Cuesta, although he certainly admitted the necessity of a reinforcement when he proposed



that Sir Robert Wilson should be sent to Baños; and he was equally sensible with myself of the benefit to be derived to the cause from sending Sir Robert back to Escalona.

‘ At this time we had no further intelligence of the enemy’s advance, than that the rations were ordered; and I had hopes that the enemy might be deterred from advancing by the intelligence of our success on the 28th; and that the troops in the Puerto might make some defence; and that, under these circumstances, it was not desirable to divert Sir Robert from Escalona.

‘ On the 31st, however, I renewed my application to General Cuesta, to send there a Spanish division of sufficient strength, in a letter to General O’Donoju, of which I enclose a copy, but without effect; and he did not detach General Bassecourt till the morning of the 2nd, after we had heard that the enemy had entered Bejar; and it was obvious that the troops in the Puerto would make no defence.

‘ On the 2nd, we received accounts that the enemy had entered Plasencia in two columns. The Marques de la Reyna whose two battalions consisted only of 600 men, with only 20 rounds of ammunition each man, retired from the Puerto and from Plasencia, without firing a shot; and went to the bridge of Almaraz, which he declared that he intended to remove. The battalions of Bejar dispersed without making any resistance.

‘ General Cuesta called upon me on that day, and proposed that half of the army should move to the rear to oppose the enemy, while the other half should maintain the post at Talavera. My answer was, that if, by half the army, he meant half of each army, I could only answer, that I was ready either to go or to stay with the whole British army, but that I could not divide it. He then desired me to choose whether I would go or stay; and I preferred to go, from thinking that the British troops were most likely to do the business effectually, and without contest; and from being of opinion, that to open the communication through Plasencia was more important to us than to the Spanish army, although very important to them. With this decision General Cuesta appeared perfectly satisfied.

‘ The movements of the enemy in our front since the 1st had induced me to be of opinion that, despairing of forcing

us at Talavera, they intended to force a passage by Escalona, and thus to open a communication with the French corps coming from Plasencia.

‘ This suspicion was confirmed in the night of the 2nd by letters received from Sir Robert Wilson, of which I enclose copies; and before I quitted Talavera on the 3rd, I waited upon General O’Donoju, and conversed with him upon the whole of our situation, and pointed out to him the possibility that in the case of the enemy coming through Escalona, General Cuesta might find himself obliged to quit Talavera before I should be able to return to him; and I urged him to collect all the carts that could be got, in order to remove our hospital. At his desire, I put the purport of this conversation in writing, and sent him a letter to be laid before General Cuesta, of which I enclose a copy.

‘ The British army marched on the 3rd to Oropesa, General Bassecourt’s Spanish corps being at Centinello; where I desired that it might halt the next day, in order that I might be nearer it.

‘ About five o’clock in the evening I heard that the French had arrived from Plasencia at Navalморal, whereby they were between us and the bridge of Almaraz.

‘ About an hour afterwards, I received from General O’Donoju the letter and its enclosures, of which I enclose copies, announcing to me the intention of General Cuesta to march from Talavera in the evening, and to leave there my hospital, excepting such men as could be moved by the means he already had, on the grounds of his apprehension that I was not strong enough for the corps coming from Plasencia; and that the enemy was moving upon his flank, and had returned to S<sup>ta</sup> Olalla, in his front.

‘ I acknowledge that these reasons did not appear to me sufficient for giving up so important a post as Talavera, for exposing the combined armies to an attack in front and rear at the same time, and for abandoning my hospital, and I wrote the letter of which I enclose a copy.

‘ This unfortunately reached the General after he had marched; and he arrived at Oropesa shortly after daylight on the morning of the 4th.

‘ The question what was to be done was then to be considered. The enemy, stated to be 30,000 strong, but at all



events, consisting of the corps of Soult and Ney, either united, or not very distant from each other, and supposed by Joseph Buonaparte and Marshal Jourdan to be sufficiently strong to attack the British army stated to be 25,000 strong, were, on one side, in possession of the high road to the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, the bridge at which place we knew had been removed, although the boats still necessarily remained in the river. On the other side, we had reason to expect the advance of Victor's corps to Talavera, as soon as General Cuesta's march should be known; and after leaving 12,000 men to watch Venegas, and allowing from 10,000 to 11,000 killed and wounded in the late action, this corps would have amounted to 25,000. We could extricate ourselves from this difficult situation only by great celerity of movement, (to which the troops were unequal, as they had not had their allowance of provisions for several days,) and by success in two battles: if we were unsuccessful in either, we should have been without a retreat; and if Soult and Ney, avoiding an action, had retired before us, and had waited the arrival of Victor, we should have been exposed to a general action with 50,000 men equally without a retreat. We had reason to expect that as the Marques de la Reyna could not remove the boats from the river at Almaraz, Soult would have destroyed them.

‘ Our only retreat therefore was by the bridge of Arzobispo; and if we had moved on, the enemy, by breaking that bridge while the army should be engaged with Soult and Ney, would have deprived us of that only resource.

‘ We could not take up a position at Oropesa, as we thereby left open the road to the bridge of Arzobispo from Talavera by Calera; and after considering the whole subject maturely, I was of opinion, that it was advisable to retire to the bridge of Arzobispo, and to take up a defensive position upon the Tagus.

‘ I was induced to adopt this last opinion because the French have now at least 50,000 men disposable to oppose to the combined armies, and a corps of 12,000 to watch Venegas; and I was likewise of opinion that the sooner the defensive line should be taken up, the more likely were the troops to be able to defend it.

‘ Accordingly I marched on the 4th, and crossed the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo; and have continued my route

to this place, in which I am well situated to defend the passage of Almaraz, and the lower parts of the Tagus. General Cuesta crossed the river on the night of the 5th, and he is still at the bridge of Arzobispo.

‘ About 2000 of the wounded have been brought away from Talavera, the remaining 1500 are there; and I doubt whether, under any circumstances, it would have been possible or consistent with humanity, to attempt to remove any more of them. From the treatment some of the soldiers wounded on the 27th, and who fell into the hands of the enemy, experienced from them, and from the manner in which I have always taken care of their wounded who have fallen into my hands, I expect that these men will be well treated; and I have only to lament that a new concurrence of events, over which, from circumstances, I had and could have no control, should have placed the army in a situation to be obliged to leave any of them behind.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Deleytosa, 8th August, 1809.

‘ I have but little to add to my public dispatch of this date, which I hope will justify me from all blame in the eyes of His Majesty’s Ministers, excepting that of having trusted the Spanish General in any thing. We should have been safe, if I could have prevailed upon him to occupy Baños, as it ought to have been; and we should have avoided the disgrace of the loss of the hospital, if he had sent away General Bassecourt on the night of the 30th or on the morning of the 31st, or if he had maintained his post at Talavera.

‘ As it is, I really believe that I have saved the whole of both armies, by determining to retire to Arzobispo, and taking up the line of the Tagus, as soon as I found the enemy at Naval moral, and that General Cuesta had irrevocably quitted Talavera.

‘ We have now in Estremadura the whole host of Marshals, Soult, Ney, Mortier, Kellermann, Victor, and Sebastiani, and the King and 5,000 men from Suchet.

‘ Beresford writes me on the 4th from Almeida, that 34,000 men had gone by Baños to Plasencia, and that none but sick



remained in Castille. I have recommended to the Junta to set Romana, the Duque del Parque and the guerrillas to work towards Madrid.

‘ What will the French do, now that they have got together their force? They will either attack the right of the Spanish army under Venegas, and push forward by Cordova; or they will try another diversion, and invade Portugal by Castello Branco; or they will try and force the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, where alone the passage can be of any use to them.

‘ In any of these cases we have our retreat open; and in case of the invasion of Portugal by Castello Branco, I have ordered Beresford to move his corps to the right towards Castello Branco, while I shall move into Portugal, and cross the Tagus at Abrantes.

‘ I beg you will do what you think best with my dispatch and its enclosures: either publish the whole, or a part, keeping back the enclosures; or let a statement be drawn up from the dispatch. At all events I request you to show the whole dispatch and enclosures to my brothers Pole and Henry, and send a copy to the Duke of Richmond.

‘ I wish you to observe the statement of the French operations made by Jourdan to Soult; and see how accurately they were informed of all our movements and intentions. Observe particularly that Victor knew positively on the 23rd that we were to attack him on the 24th. He could have known this only by intelligence from our camp, because none of the troops moved preparatory to the attack till after dark, when Bassecourt’s division moved to Cardiel; and indeed Victor began his retreat that night, before Bassecourt commenced his movement from Talavera; and yet it is pretended that the French have no intelligence in Spain. Charles will tell you how much we are distressed for provisions.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Deleytosa, 8th August, 1809.

‘ I enclose my public and private letters to Lord Castlereagh, which will apprise you of the exact situation of affairs in this quarter.

‘ All is now safe, and I should feel no anxiety on any subject if we had provisions : but we are almost starving.

‘ I enclose a memorandum which I gave to Colonel Murray some days ago for a supply of articles to be brought from Lisbon. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire the Government to arrange with the Commissary General for the stages by which these articles are to be carried by the carts from Lisbon to Badajoz.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Deleytosa, 8th August, 1809.

‘ I have received your Excellency’s letter of the 31st, from Cadiz. I conclude that Mr. Frere will make your Excellency acquainted with the general situation of affairs in Spain.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a copy of my dispatch of this date to the Secretary of State, which will make you acquainted with the circumstances which have rendered it necessary for the armies to take up a defensive position behind the Tagus.

‘ I have already apprized Mr. Frere in a private letter of my opinion, that it would be necessary to put in motion the Marques de la Romana’s or the Duque del Parque’s force, or some other in the north of Spain, to induce the enemy to weaken his force in Estremadura, before the armies could resume offensive operations. In the mean time it is necessary that many arrangements should be adopted to enable the troops to take advantage of any success they may have in an offensive operation, or even to maintain their defensive positions.

‘ I shall endeavor to detail these in this dispatch, with my reasons for thinking them absolutely necessary.

‘ The first of these is the formation of magazines of provisions and forage, principally biscuit, cattle, and barley, at reasonable distances in the rear of the armies.

‘ This part of Spain is but thinly inhabited, and but ill cultivated in proportion to its extent and its fertility, and it is nearly exhausted. As now equipped, the armies, amounting to not less than 60,000 mouths, and 16,000 to 18,000 horses, depend entirely for their daily supply of provisions upon the



country, which does not contain a population in an extent of many square miles equal to the numbers of the army, and of course cannot produce a sufficiency for its subsistence. It is necessary, therefore, to send to great distances for supplies, which are procured with difficulty; consequently, the troops are ill fed, and not regularly; and very frequently receive no food at all.

‘ The next arrangement to be made is, to supply the armies with means of transport, not only to move forward the magazines when that may be necessary, which means should be specially attached to the magazines; but also means of transport to enable the army to communicate with the magazines, or to send to any part of the country for supplies of provisions or forage. 3000 or 4000 mules would effectually answer the first object; and I should consider the British army well supplied with what it would require, if it had 1500 mules and about 100 of the Valencian or Catalonian mule carts.

‘ These measures are equally necessary for the Spanish and the British armies. No troops can serve to any good purpose unless they are regularly fed; and it is an error to suppose that a Spaniard, or a man or animal of any country can make an exertion without food. In fact, the Spanish troops are more clamorous for their food, and more exhausted if they do not receive it regularly, than our own are.

‘ The other points to which I shall draw your attention are referrible to the state of the Spanish troops. My opinion is, that an exertion ought to be made immediately to clothe them in the national uniform. By the adoption of this measure, the practice which prevails, I am sorry to say, very generally, of throwing away their arms and accoutrements and running away, and pretending to be peasants, would be discontinued. Large bodies could not change their clothing or the distinctive marks of dress in a soldier; and it is probable that as they would not only find no security, but rather increase their danger by throwing away their arms and accoutrements in their flight, the State would not so frequently sustain the loss of these valuable articles.

‘ Another advantage which would result from the more general use of the national uniform is, that it would be in the power of the general to punish the troops who misbehave before the enemy, in the manner most likely to affect the

feelings of Spaniards, viz., by disgrace. When a number of peasants are collected together with arms in their hands, and in the garb of peasants, it is difficult to fix a mark upon those corps or individuals who have behaved ill, which shall point them out as objects of execration to the whole community: and yet it is acknowledged that a punishment of this description would have ten times the effect of that which was lately carried into execution in the Spanish army on account of the misbehavior of some corps in the battle of Talavera, viz., the putting to death every tenth man, of the number who ran away, and a third or fourth of the officers!

‘ If the whole army wore the national uniform, it would be possible to disgrace those who should misbehave, either by depriving them of it, or by affixing some mark to it, which would tend more effectually than any thing else to prevent a repetition of these misfortunes.

‘ It is difficult to describe to your Lordship the extent to which this practice prevails. Whole corps, officers and men, all run off upon the first appearance of danger; and I doubt not, if the truth could be ascertained, that the army of General Cuesta, which crossed the Tagus 36,000 or 38,000 strong, does not now consist of 30,000, although it has not lost 500 men in action with the enemy.

‘ The plan of operation which I should recommend for the Spanish nation is one generally of defence. They should avoid general actions, but should take advantage of the strong points in their country to defend themselves and to harass the enemy. Their principal army should be collected on the Tagus, if they can hold that river; or farther back if they cannot: and wherever they can form a body of troops, or the guerrillas of the country can be put in motion, they should be employed upon the enemy’s communications, and should be pushed on even to Madrid.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K. P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Deleytosa, 8th August, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a letter dated 3rd instant, from Mr. Frere. I shall be very much obliged to your Lordship if you will urge Don Martin de



Garay to adhere to the rule laid down for the government of my communications with the Spanish Ministers by his Majesty's commands; and on all future occasions to make known to me the wishes of the Spanish Government through the English Ambassador.

‘ I am aware that it is difficult, if not impossible, to drive the Spaniards from a false assertion, or a sophistical or bad argument; and I consider it but of little importance what remains in their own archives, if what they write is confined to them. But as those who have the honor of serving His Majesty are liable to misrepresentations and unfounded calumnies of every description, I am desirous of avoiding to give those who circulate these calumnies respecting my actions those grounds for them which they would find in Don Martin de Garay's dispatches to me, by requiring that he should adhere to the rule which His Majesty has laid down for my government.

‘ I am happy to find that the Junta have taken measures to supply the armies. Your Lordship will receive my sentiments, upon the permanent arrangements to be adopted for this purpose, by the courier who will deliver this letter. In the mean time I must inform your Excellency, that if the Government have not already made great exertions to supply us, and if we do not experience the immediate effects of these exertions, by receiving a plentiful supply of provisions and forage, we must move away in as many detachments as there are roads from hence to the frontiers of Portugal. I assure your Excellency, that, since the 3rd, the army has had no bread till yesterday, when about 4000 lbs. of biscuit were divided among 30,000 mouths.

‘ The army will be useless in Spain, and will be entirely lost, if this treatment is to continue; and I must say, that if any efficient measures for our relief had been adopted by the Government when they first received the accounts of our distresses from the want of provisions, we ought before now to have received the benefit of them. There is this day again no bread for the soldiers.

‘ I must, at the same time, do the late British Minister the justice to declare that I do not conceive that this deficiency of supplies for the army is at all to be attributed to any neglect or omission on his part. It is to be attributed to the

poverty and exhausted state of the country ; to the inactivity of the magistrates and people ; to their disinclination to take any trouble, excepting that of packing up their property and running away when they hear of the approach of a French patrolle ; and to their habits of insubordination and disobedience of, and to the want of power in, the Government and their officers.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Deleytosa, 8th August, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Don Martin de Garay, conveying to me the approbation of the Junta of the conduct of the British troops in the actions of the 27th and 28th July, and the information that the Junta had been pleased to appoint me a Captain General of the Spanish army.

‘ I conceive that I cannot with propriety accept this commission without the consent of His Majesty, and I have accordingly written a letter to Don Martin de Garay, by which I have made the acceptance of the commission conditional upon His Majesty’s pleasure.

‘ This, however, may be considered offensive to the Junta, or your Excellency may have reasons unknown to me, which might induce you to wish that I should not decline the acceptance till His Majesty’s pleasure should be known, although it is necessary that the offer should be considered as referrible to His Majesty.

‘ I have therefore written a second letter ; and I beg your Excellency to decide which of them you will send to Don Martin de Garay. I likewise enclose a third letter to Don Martin de Garay, in which I have accepted the horses presented to me by the Junta in the name of King Ferdinand VII., but have declined to accept the pay of a Captain General. I shall be obliged to your Excellency if you will send this letter also to Don Martin de Garay.

I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY DEAR WELLESLEY,

‘ Deleytosa, 8th August, 1809.

‘ The public dispatches which I transmit with this letter will give you a full and faithful picture of the state of affairs here. You have undertaken an Herculean task; and God knows that the chances of success are infinitely against you, particularly since the unfortunate turn which affairs have taken in Austria.

‘ I wish I could see you, or could send somebody to you; but we are in such a situation, that I cannot go to you myself, and I cannot spare the only one or two people, to converse with whom would be of any use to you. I think, therefore, that the best thing you can do is to send somebody to me as soon as you can; that is to say, if I remain in Spain, which I declare I believe to be almost impossible, notwithstanding that I see all the consequences of withdrawing. But a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose their discipline and their spirit. They plunder even in the presence of their officers. The officers are discontented, and are almost as bad as the men; and with the army which a fortnight ago beat double their numbers, I should now hesitate to meet a French corps of half their strength.

‘ Send somebody, however, by the road of Merida and Truxillo, at both of which places he must hear of me.

‘ Ever yours, most affectionately,

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Au Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Française.*

‘ MONSIEUR,

‘ Deleytosa, 9th August, 1809.

‘ Le sort de la guerre a mis dans vos mains un nombre d'officiers et de soldats Anglais qui sont blessés. Ils sont braves et ils meritent les attentions et les soins de tous ceux qui estiment la bravoure. J'ai l'honneur de vous les recommander; et je vous prie encore de me permettre d'envoyer à Talavera, pour en avoir soin, des officiers qui ne seront pas censés être prisonniers, et auxquels il sera permis de retourner quand les officiers et soldats blessés seront un peu rétablis.

‘ Je vous prie aussi de me permettre d'envoyer aux officiers

blessés des petites sommes d'argent, qui leur seront surement nécessaires.

‘ Je vous fais des réclamations au nom de l'humanité ; et j'ai encore des droits à les faire, ayant toujours bien soigné les soldats Français, que le sort de la guerre a mis dans mes mains, et même fourni de l'argent aux officiers.

‘ J'ai l'honneur, &c.

‘ *Le Commandant en Chef  
de l'Armée Française.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Général Kellermann.*

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘ Deleytosa, 9th August, 1809.

‘ Le sort de la guerre a mis dans les mains du Commandant en Chef de l'armée Française des officiers et des soldats blessés de l'armée Anglaise dans la bataille qui s'est donnée dernièrement à Talavera. J'écris au Commandant en Chef de l'armée Française, pour lui recommander ces soldats, et pour le prier de me permettre d'envoyer à Talavera pour en avoir soin des officiers, qui ne seront pas censés être prisonniers de guerre, et auxquels il sera permis de s'en retourner à l'armée quand les blessés seront rétablis. Je le prie aussi de me permettre d'envoyer des petites sommes d'argent aux officiers.

‘ Ayant l'honneur de vous connaître, j'ose réclamer vos bons offices auprès du Commandant en Chef de l'armée Française, et vous recommander mes blessés. Si c'est le Maréchal Soult qui commande, il me doit tous les soins qu'il peut donner à ces braves soldats, car j'ai sauvé les siens, que le sort de la guerre a mis dans mes mains, des fureurs de la populace Portugaise, et les ai bien soignés. D'ailleurs comme les deux nations sont toujours en guerre, nous nous devons réciproquement ces soins que je réclame pour mes blessés, et que j'ai donnés toujours à ceux que le sort a mis dans mes mains.

‘ J'ai l'honneur, &c.

‘ *Le Général Kellermann.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To General O'Donoju.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Deleytosa, 9th August, 1809.

‘ I am desirous of sending Lieut. Colonel Waters, who will deliver this letter to you, with a flag of truce to the head quarters of the French army, with letters to the Com-



mander in Chief, respecting the English wounded left at Talavera. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will apply to General Cuesta, that he may be permitted to pass the Spanish outposts and return again.

‘Colonel Waters will show you the letters with which he is charged.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*General O'Donoju.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To General O'Donoju.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Deleytosa, 9th August, 1809.

‘I have heard that the Spanish head quarters were yesterday at Peraleda de Garbin; that the enemy's cavalry passed the river by the ford of Azutan, but that General Bassecourt still held possession of the bridge of Arzobispo: and that the Spanish head quarters were to be moved last night to Mesa de Ibor.

‘I shall be very much obliged to you if you will make me acquainted with General Cuesta's movements, his present situation, and his future intentions. As it is impossible for us just at present to make use of the bridge of boats at Almaraz, I have desired General Craufurd to take the boats out of the water, and to remove them to a place where they will be protected from the effects of the enemy's fire.

‘The bridge over the little stream is left standing, as General Craufurd found the water so shallow, that it was a matter of indifference whether the bridge was there or not.

‘The pontoon carriages are at the river side, and it would probably be desirable that the mules should be sent there also, in order to move them with greater facility, if necessary, for the defence of the passage at Almaraz.

‘In respect to the bridge of Arzobispo, the only view in which I think it would be advisable to destroy it is, that you might prevent the enemy from bringing his artillery against your posts at Mesa de Ibor, and in the mountains, which I conclude you will continue to hold. But upon this point the first question is, whether the enemy can bring artillery from the bridge of Talavera, along the left bank to Arzobispo? the next, whether they can bring artillery across the ford at Azutan, or any other ford above Arzobispo? If they can, it is hardly worth while to destroy the bridge of Arzobispo.

If they cannot, it is an object of importance to the defence of your posts in the mountains that it should be destroyed.

‘It is very clear to me that there is no difficulty in moving artillery of any dimensions from Arzobispo to the Ibor; and that being the case, the destruction of the bridge would depend upon the possibility of moving the artillery on the left bank to Arzobispo. If you should be obliged to withdraw your posts from Arzobispo, I conclude that you will take care of your right flank, towards the Puerto de San Vicente.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘General O’Donoju.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘P.S. General Beresford, who is in the Puerto de Peralés, informs me that the Duque del Parque occupies the Puerto de Baños. The enemy have no troops in Castille, and have passed 34,000 men from thence through the Puerto de Baños. All were through by the 3rd instant; Soult, Ney, Mortier, and Kellermann command these corps; some of them returned yesterday to Plasencia.’

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Deleytosa, 9th August, 1809.

‘I have not received any communication from General Cuesta since the morning of the 6th, (when at Peraleda de Garbin I saw General O’Donoju,) until I received this morning from Lieut. Colonel Roche a letter, of which the enclosed is a copy. I did not even know that General Cuesta had moved his head quarters from the bridge of Arzobispo, much less that any disaster had happened to his troops, even to the limited extent stated by Lieut. Colonel Roche.

‘About three o’clock this day, however, the Duque de Alburquerque arrived here and informed me, that the French cavalry had surprised the Spanish outposts at the bridge of Arzobispo, by crossing the river at a ford immediately above the bridge, at half past one; that the Spanish troops had given way, and that the French had possession of the bridge, of the cannon destined to its defence, and of five pieces belonging to the Duque’s division which were left behind.

‘The Duque de Alburquerque states his belief that the French were in Peraleda de Garbin this morning, where your Excellency will have observed that General Cuesta’s head quarters were yesterday afternoon.



‘ General Cuesta has since sent me a message by one of his aides de camp and Colonel Roche, from whom I understand that the General had not, to the moment of their departure from Mesa de Ibor at ten o’clock in the morning, brought any of his artillery or of his carriages across the Ibor.

‘ On this side that river there is a high mountain, up which it is impossible to draw artillery, excepting by the assistance of men; and it is obvious that unless the General has saved Peraleda de Garbin and the positions between the Ibor and that village, the Spaniards must lose their artillery, although they may hold the position of the Mesa de Ibor.

‘ I enclose to your Lordship the copy of a letter which I wrote to General O’Donoju on the 7th, and of another which I have just dispatched to him; but I acknowledge that I am apprehensive that the Spanish army will lose, or rather has lost, its artillery before this time.

‘ I can do nothing to assist them; and indeed in any case it would have been impossible for me to do anything for their assistance, excepting by persuading General Cuesta to adopt early measures to pass his heavy artillery over the Ibor.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Brigadier General Robert Craufurd.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Deleytosa, 9th August, 1809.

‘ I have just received your letter, and conceive that you have done quite right in not destroying the little bridge. I have written to General Cuesta respecting mules to draw the pontoon carriages.

‘ I have not yet been able to send you guns, as our horses were so much fatigued by the passage of the defiles. I hope I shall be able to send you some this evening.

‘ I find that the Spanish head quarters were yesterday at Peraleda de Garbin, and I think it probable that they may have moved last night to Mesa de Ibor.

‘ The French cavalry had crossed yesterday at a ford at Azutan, above Arzobispo; but the Spanish division under Bassecourt still held the bridge. I intended going to see

you this morning, but I do not like to be out of the way till the Spanish army is landed somewhere.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Brigadier General Robert Craufurd.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Deleytosa, 9th August, 1809.

‘ The Spanish advanced guard was surprised yesterday at the bridge of Arzobispo, in the middle of the day, and gave way, leaving in the enemy’s hands the cannon for the defence of the bridge, and five pieces belonging to the Duque de Alburquerque’s division.

‘ Cuesta’s head quarters were then at Peraleda de Garbin, and he moved them last night to Mesa de Ibor. He has now his advanced guard on the high ground on the right bank of the Ibor, the main body on the left bank, and the enemy have not this day pressed the advanced guard. The artillery and carriages of the Spanish army were still at four this morning in the low ground on the Ibor; and it is not improbable that if the enemy should attack and drive in the advanced guard, they will take the whole of it. In this case I am convinced that the Spanish army will disband. If they would make any exertion to get their artillery out of the Ibor this night, they ought to be able to defend themselves on the Mesa de Ibor, and possibly will do so.

‘ If, however, I should find that they retire from that strong post, either by being beaten from it, or from any other cause, it will be very obvious to the whole world that they cannot fight for themselves. My intention is, in that case, to collect the British army at Jaraicejo; to send you orders to fall back upon that place; and then to march the whole to Truxillo, and thence by the high road to Badajos and Elvas.

‘ I think it will be desirable for you to have an eye upon the road by which you marched from Mesa de Ibor to Romangordo; as should the enemy carry the Mesa de Ibor, it is not impossible that they might push something that way, which would lay very awkwardly upon your flank as you would draw out of the Puerto.

‘ I have desired the Spaniards to occupy Val de Casas, as



part of their position at Mesa de Ibor, but I hardly expect they will. The guns will go to you in the morning.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain General Don Gregorio Cuesta.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Mesa de Ibor, noon, 10th August, 1809.

‘ Having been down to the Ibor, I observed, that although the whole of the artillery, and the carriages of your Excellency’s army, have crossed the river, they are not yet brought up the hill. Your Excellency will find the mules and horses quite incapable of drawing them up; and that to attempt it by their means will destroy them. I should therefore recommend to your Excellency to employ working parties of 300 or 400 men each, of the troops, who would complete the work in a few hours.

‘ It will also be necessary that your Excellency should send a battalion to the river at the bottom of the hill at Campillos, as there is on that hill, near the river, a turn in the road, at which all the guns must be unlimbered; and they can be drawn past that turn by hand only by the troops.

‘ I mention these circumstances, as, having passed through the defiles with the British artillery, I am acquainted with the mode in which the passages of your Excellency’s carriages will be facilitated.

‘ I conclude that your Excellency will occupy the right of the Ibor in strength, till your artillery shall have passed through the defiles; afterwards, I should conceive that one division of infantry, with the advanced guard at Mesa de Ibor, one division at Campillos, one division at Fresnedoso, and the main body with the cavalry at Deleytosa, would secure the right flank of the combined armies. By repairing the road from Deleytosa to the river at the bottom of the hill of Campillos, before referred to, and particularly by an alteration of the turn near the river, artillery may be employed in the defence of all these posts, with the certainty of being able to withdraw it, while the enemy can employ none in the attack.

‘ I propose to move the head quarters of the British army to-morrow morning to Jaraicejo, in order to make room for

the cavalry of your Excellency's army which has come through the defiles.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Captain General*  
*Don Gregorio Cuesta.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

' MY LORD, ' Deleytosa, 10th August, 1809, 6 P.M.

' I have been this day to General Cuesta's head quarters, at the Mesa de Ibor. The whole of his artillery and wheel carriages had crossed the Ibor; and about one half of the whole appeared to me to have been brought up the mountain on this side of the Ibor at twelve o'clock.

' The enemy's light troops were in Peraleda de Garbin, those of General Cuesta at Bohonal. The enemy has made no movement since yesterday morning.

' The General complained of his distress for provisions, which, indeed, is equally felt by all the troops. The horses of the British cavalry and artillery suffer much from the want of barley. We have lost many hundreds of the former, and above 200 of the latter, by the use of other grains, not having been able to procure barley (the only wholesome food for horses in this country) for the horses of the British cavalry and artillery, notwithstanding that the Spanish cavalry have been plentifully supplied.

' I have also to mention to your Excellency, in order to point out the description of assistance which is given to us in this country, that having applied for a remount of cavalry of only 100 mares, (which cannot be used by the Spanish cavalry, as they ride stallions,) I have not got one, or even an answer from the Government on the subject; and having asked General Cuesta, after the battle of Talavera, to assist me with 90 mules, to draw the British artillery, in lieu of those lost in the action, he refused to give me any, notwithstanding that there were hundreds in his army employed in drawing carts containing nothing. The consequence is, that I shall now be obliged to send back to Portugal one, if not two, brigades of artillery drawn by bullocks, if I should be able to procure these animals; if I should not, I must destroy them.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Marquis Wellesley.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



‘ P.S. In stating to your Excellency the wants of this army of draught for the artillery, and the means adopted to supply it, I beg to observe that I have endeavoured to purchase both horses and mules ; but I cannot procure them in sufficient numbers.

‘ I also wish to draw your Excellency’s notice to the fact, that General Cuesta has within these two days lost eleven, and, if I am rightly informed, twenty pieces of artillery, the mules and horses attached to which were not lost, for the Duque de Alburquerque offered to make over to me the mules attached to five pieces which he had lost ; but General Cuesta has taken them.’

*To Lieut. General Payne.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Jaraicejo, 11th August, 1809.

‘ I have just heard so melancholy a report of the state of the squadron which has been with General R. Craufurd, on the Tagus, that I request you to relieve the squadron there every day, and to send with them a day’s forage.

‘ You should recollect the artillery horses in your distributions of forage. If they are starved, we shall be knocked up more effectually than if the horses of the cavalry were so. Pray let them have a portion of your barley.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Payne.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Jaraicejo, 11th August, 1809.

‘ I have moved my head quarters to this place. The infantry of the army are in the wood behind it.

‘ The Spanish army, to which I paid a visit yesterday, were at Mesa de Ibor. All their guns and carriages were on this side of the Ibor, and about half of them up the first hill from the river.

‘ The French troops had not passed Peraleda. The Spanish light troops were at Bohonal.

‘ I have written to General Payne, to desire that he would relieve the squadron with you every day ; and I shall desire the Commanding Officer of artillery to do the same by the horses of the artillery. They shall take forage with them for the day they will stay with you.

‘ We have reports here of columns of the enemy’s troops marching towards Plasencia. Have you seen any thing of the kind? ’

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain General Don Gregorio Cuesta.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Deleytosa. 11th August, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 10th instant, and I am concerned that you should conceive that you have any reason to complain of the conduct of the British troops ; but when troops are starving, which those under my command have been, as I have repeatedly told your Excellency since I joined you on the 22nd of last month ; and particularly had no bread whatever from the 3rd to the 8th instant, it is not astonishing that they should go to the villages, and even to the mountains, and look for food where they think they can get it.

‘ The complaints of the inhabitants, however, should not have been confined to the conduct of the British troops : in this very village, I have seen the Spanish soldiers, who ought to have been elsewhere, take the doors off the houses which were locked up, in order that they might plunder the houses, and they afterwards burnt the doors.

‘ I absolutely and positively deny the assertion, that any thing going to the Spanish army has been stopped by the British troops or Commissaries.

‘ On the 7th, when the British troops were starving in the hills, I met a convoy of 350 mules, loaded with provisions for the Spanish army. I would not allow one of them to be touched, and they all passed on. General Sherbrooke, on the following day, the 8th, gave a written order to another convoy, addressed to all British Officers, to allow them to pass through the army unmolested. Yesterday I met on the road, and passed not less than 500 mules loaded with provisions for the Spanish army ; and no later than yesterday evening, Major Campbell, my aide de camp, gave an order to another large convoy, addressed to all British Officers and soldiers, not to impede its progress.

‘ I also declare to your Excellency most positively, on the honor of a gentleman, that the British army has received no provisions since it has been at Deleytosa, excepting some



sent from Truxillo, by Señor Lozano de Torres; and I call upon the gentleman, who has informed his friend that biscuit addressed to the Spanish army has been taken by my Commissaries, to prove the truth of his assertion.

‘ But this letter from your Excellency brings the question respecting provisions to a fair issue. I call upon your Excellency to state distinctly, whether it is understood by you that the Spanish army are to have not only all the provisions the country can afford, but all those which are sent from Seville, I believe, as much for the service of the one army as of the other.

‘ I beg you to let me know in reply to this letter, whether any magazines of provisions have been formed, and from whence the British troops are to draw their provisions.

‘ I hope that I shall receive satisfactory answers to these two questions to-morrow morning. If I should not, I beg that your Excellency will be prepared to occupy the post opposite Almaraz, as it will be impossible for me to remain any longer in a country in which no arrangement has been made for the supply of provisions for the troops; and in which, it is understood that all the provisions which are either found in the country, or are sent from Seville, as I have been informed, for the use of the British army, are to be applied solely and exclusively to the use of the Spanish troops.

‘ In regard to the assertion in your Excellency’s letter that the British troops sell their bread to the Spanish soldiers, it is beneath the dignity of your Excellency’s situation and character to notice such things, or for me to reply to them. I must observe, however, that the British troops could not sell that which they had not, and that the reverse of the statement of your Excellency upon this subject is the fact, at the time the armies were at Talavera; as I have myself witnessed frequently in the streets of that town.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain General*  
*Don Gregoria Cuesta.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I send Colonel O’Lalor with this letter, who knows the truth of the facts stated in it respecting the convoys which have been forwarded, and respecting the supplies received here from Truxillo.’





enclosed letter having been addressed to me, as well as to your Excellency, I have taken the liberty of opening it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain General*  
*Don Gregorio Cuesta.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM.

*Plan of Operations to be adopted in case the Enemy's Columns, now on their march towards Plasencia, should enter Portugal, sent to Mr. Villiers, Marshal Beresford, and Brigadier General —.*

‘ Jaraicejo, 12th August, 1809.

‘ 1. Marshal Beresford's corps is already ordered to fall back upon Castello Branco when necessary, where, or on the road to which place, he will probably find the British brigade under the command of Major General Lightburne. The Marshal will naturally take the road from Castello Branco by Sobreira Formosa, throwing a small corps by the road of Perdigão; the enemy probably will take the road by Fundão and by the tops of the hills, which comes into the other road at Cardigos. The Marshal will in this case have an opportunity of delaying the enemy at the ravine at Cardigos.

‘ 2. From Cardigos they may move direct upon Abrantes, or they may move by Villa de Rey, and across the Zezere upon Thomar. Here, therefore, we must have a fresh combination for our defence.

‘ 3. Brigadier General — has been ordered to halt at Abrantes, if his orders should find him there; at Niza, if they should find him south of the Tagus; or at Castello Branco, if north of the Tagus. He should be ordered to proceed to Abrantes, wherever he may be: if at Castello Branco, he should proceed by Villa Velha, and should destroy the flying bridge and all the boats at that place. This, however, must be done in communication with Marshal Beresford.

‘ 4. From Abrantes he should proceed to S. Domingo, and defend the passage of the Cades, in case the enemy should take the direct road to Abrantes from Cardigos, instead of that by Villa de Rey towards Thomar.

‘ 5. Marshal Beresford will in this case go to Villa de Rey, and defend the passage of the Zezere.

‘ 6. If General — should find himself obliged to retire,

he will throw himself into Abrantes, which place he will maintain at all events as long as possible; and with this view he will give immediate directions, and will take measures that a large quantity of provisions should be brought up the hill into the town.

‘7. It is possible that at this season of the year the Tagus may be fordable at Villa Velha, and the enemy, instead of turning to his right and taking the road by the hills, called the *Marquez d’Alorna’s*, may turn to his left and cross the Tagus at Villa Velha. In that case, Marshal Beresford and General —— will join their corps at Abrantes as soon as possible. They will take up the bridge at Abrantes, keeping the boats and the materials under the hill below the town.

‘8. It is to be observed, that the object of all these operations is only to gain a few days of time to enable the British army to return from Spanish Estremadura. Every day’s delay would therefore be of importance.

‘9. It would be very desirable that Marshal Beresford should reinforce Brig. General —— with a brigade of artillery, and a squadron of dragoons for patrols.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘ To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Jaraicejo, 12th August, 1809.

‘ I have put in the form of a memorandum nearly what I stated to Hardinge yesterday, of which I send you one copy, and another to ——: of course you will make such alterations in this plan, as may appear to you most expedient upon a view of the situation of affairs upon the spot; understanding always that I wish that General —— should join me at Abrantes, if the enemy should operate upon the north of the Tagus; and that I wish you and —— to be ready to throw yourselves upon his back, while I shall attack him in front, if he should cross at Villa Velha, and remain in Alentejo.

‘ I have not yet heard that they have passed Plasencia; as soon as I do I shall move, and shall not halt till I shall reach Abrantes. I understand that the three divisions which had passed to Plasencia are not strong, and I think are



composed of the troops of Soult and Ney's corps. Mortier is certainly still at Arzobispo.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Marshal Beresford.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSARY GENERAL.

'Jaraicejo, 12th August, 1809.

'1. The store at Abrantes, according to the return of it given to me yesterday, is much too large, particularly in biscuit and flour, and it ought forthwith to be reduced to the amount of 300,000 rations of flour.

'2. This should be done by sending down, in boats to Santarem or Valada, in the first instance, all the overplus.

'3. Orders should be forthwith sent to Abrantes to commence upon this operation without loss of time, care being taken that the boat people are paid, to secure the return of the boats.

'4. Boats should likewise be sent up from Lisbon, Santarem, and Valada, as soon as possible, to aid in the removal of the stores; and regular passports must be made to the boat people, in order to secure their regular service.

'5. After the flour and biscuit shall have been removed, the oats and barley should be reduced to a supply of six days for the horses, &c., of the army by the same means; and the salt meat to 90,000 lbs.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

*To Captain General Don Gregorio Cuesta.*

'SIR,

'Jaraicejo, 12th August, 1809.

'I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter which I received last night from Colonel Waters, whom I had sent with a flag of truce on the preceding day, the 10th. Your Excellency will observe that there are no troops nearer than the bridge of Arzobispo, and but few there.

'I have to inform your Excellency that I learnt last night from my posts upon the Tagus, that the enemy have been moving in corps of considerable strength for the last three days towards Plasencia. I do not know that any troops now remain at Navalmoral or at Almaraz.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Captain General*  
*Don Gregorio Cuesta.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

*To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Jaraicejo, 12th August, 1809.

‘ Since I wrote to Lord Castlereagh, on the 8th instant, letters which I sent for your perusal, the Spaniards have been surprised at the bridge of Arzobispo, which they lost, together with from ten to twenty pieces of cannon.

‘ They have since that day been employed in getting their army through the mountains, which they have not yet accomplished.

‘ We have occupied the bridge of Almaraz, with the army, first at Deleytosa, then at this place, in the rear of that point.

‘ Our wounded are gone to Truxillo, and I propose to move them from thence to Elvas, where I shall establish the hospital.

‘ The French have been moving since the 9th towards Plasencia. They have gone in three divisions, none of them of great strength, the first only about 4000 men. I have not yet received intelligence whether they have passed Plasencia, and I can therefore form no decided opinion respecting their intentions. I think, however, that if they meditated a serious attack upon Portugal, they would not have moved off by daylight in sight of our troops; and I therefore suspect that these movements are intended only as a feint to induce us to separate from the Spaniards, to secure that kingdom.

‘ In case, however, the intention to invade Portugal should be serious, I have drawn up a memorandum of the plan of defence to be adopted, of which I enclose you a copy. I have sent a copy to Marshal Beresford, and another to General — — through General Leite, by this messenger; but it is desirable that you should also send them copies of this paper, by a trusty person, without loss of time.

‘ I shall know this night whether the enemy have passed Plasencia; if they shall have done so, I shall march tomorrow, and I shall not halt until I reach Abrantes. I trust, therefore, that the Government will be under no alarm for the safety of Portugal.

‘ Our Commissary has collected at Abrantes an unreasonable quantity of provisions and stores. I have given him



directions to reduce the magazines there to a reasonable extent, by sending down the overplus by water. I shall be obliged to you to urge the Government to give him every assistance in boats of a light draught, to navigate the upper part of the river ; as I propose in the first instance, in order to make shorter work of it, to remove the overplus only as far as Santarem or Valada, from whence we can get it, when I please, either up or down the river.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will read the memorandum which is sent to Mr. Dunmore and Mr. Murray by the messenger who will go this night.

‘ In case the enemy should enter Portugal, I should wish the troops at Lisbon to remain at that station, till they shall receive orders from Marshal Beresford or me to move ; and I do not propose to move them, at all events, farther than Villa Franca.

‘ We are starving, and are ill treated by the Spaniards in every way : but more of this hereafter. There is not a man in the army who does not wish to return to Portugal.

‘ Believe me, &c.,

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Jaraicejo, 12th August, 1809, 8 A.M.

‘ I have the honor to enclose to you the copy of a letter which I received yesterday morning from General Cuesta, and a copy of my answer. I have not since heard from the General, but I transmitted to him yesterday afternoon a report which I received from Mr. Commissary Richardson, who was coming from Truxillo to the British army with bread and barley, and was stopped and deprived of all his barley and a small part of his bread, by a detachment of Spanish cavalry.

‘ I understand there was a firing of cannon and musketry in the neighbourhood of the Mesa de Ibor, yesterday morning at about eight o'clock. But I conclude that it was an affair of no consequence, and probably the Spanish posts firing at a French patrolle, as I learn from Lieut. Colonel Waters (whom I had sent in to the French Commander in Chief with a flag of truce relating to our sick and wounded), from Val de Casas on the 10th, that there were no French

troops on this side of the bridge of Arzobispo, excepting those immediately at the bridge.

‘ The enemy have been in motion for the last three days, viz., the 9th, 10th, and 11th, in large columns towards Plasencia, from which movement I conclude that they are either jealous of the position of the Duque del Parque’s troops or of those of General Beresford in the mountains of Baños and Perales; or that they propose to invade Portugal, in order to draw me out of Spain. In either case it is obvious that they do not intend to make a serious attack at present on the south of Spain. I shall know during this day which course they have taken from Plasencia; and if they have moved towards the frontiers of Portugal, I must follow them. Indeed the experience of every day shows the absolute necessity that the British army should withdraw from this country.

‘ It is useless to complain, but we are certainly not treated as friends, much less as the only prop on which the cause in Spain can depend. But besides this want of good will, which can easily be traced to the temper and disposition of the General commanding the Spanish army, and which ought to be borne with patience if there was any hope of doing good, there is such a want of resource in the country, and so little question of bringing forward what is to be found, that if the army were to remain here much longer it would become totally useless. The daily and increasing loss of horses in the cavalry and the artillery, from a deficiency and badness of the food, is really alarming; and the Spanish cavalry having begun to intercept the small supply of food for horses which we could procure, this evil must increase.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.,

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain General Don Gregorio Cuesta.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Jaraicejo, 13th August, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 11th.

‘ The plan which your Excellency proposes of placing all the supplies in a magazine, to be formed at Truxillo, and to divide them between the two armies in proportion to the strength of each, would answer perfectly if it were prac-



licable. But your Excellency must be aware that many articles of provisions are received by your Excellency's army which do not pass through Truxillo, and could not be brought there without great inconvenience and delay, and could never appear in the accounts of the magazines; and that other supplies could easily be turned off from Truxillo without my having any knowledge of the fact.

'The British army receive no provisions of which Sr. Lozano de Torres has not a knowledge; and your Excellency has it in your power to give him such orders as you may think proper, both as to the formation of the magazine, and the share which the British troops shall have of it.

'When the British army entered Spain I had reason to expect, and I expected, that a great effort would be made to afford us subsistence, at least for payment, and those means of transport and other aids, without which your Excellency is well aware no army can keep the field.

'Your Excellency also knows how these expectations have been fulfilled. Since I joined your army the troops have not received, upon an average, half a ration, and on some days nothing at all; and the cavalry no forage or grain, excepting what they could pick up in the fields, of an unwholesome description, by the use of which hundreds of horses have died.

'I can procure no means of transport, and your Excellency knows that I have been obliged to leave some ammunition in the mountains, of which you have possession; and if I now move, I must leave behind me two thirds of the small quantity of ammunition I have got, having been obliged to allot the Portuguese carts, which have moved it hitherto, to the purpose of removing the wounded soldiers.

'The fire of the enemy, and the badness and scarcity of food, have destroyed many of my artillery horses; and I have asked, but in vain, for some assistance of this description. The consequence is that I shall be obliged to destroy many guns when I shall move from hence.

'I have not received even an answer to the request I made to have a remount for the cavalry of only 100 mares, which would be entirely useless to the Spanish cavalry.

'Under all these circumstances, your Excellency cannot be surprised that I should think that the British army has been





act fairly by each other; but this is not to be expected; every Commissary will do the best he can for the troops to which he is attached, and many articles must be procured in the country which will not be brought to account in the magazine of Truxillo.

‘ In short, my Lord, it comes to this; either the British army must be fed and supplied with the necessaries which they require, or I shall march them back into Portugal, whether that kingdom is invaded or not by the French corps which has moved within these few days towards Plasencia.

‘ I have received Mr. Frere’s private letter of the 10th, in which he has enclosed the copies of a correspondence that he has had with Don Martin de Garay, on the subject of the evacuation of Talavera by General Cuesta.

‘ I observe from these papers, that General Cuesta had given the Junta reason to believe, that when I marched from Arzobispo, on the 5th, I intended to return to Portugal: and that he prevailed upon me to take up the position of Almaraz, by a message through General O’Donoju and Lord Macduff\*.

‘ I beg to inform your Excellency, that although General O’Donoju and Lord Macduff did come to me at Peraleda de Garbin on the 6th, General Cuesta knew, on the 4th, my opinion respecting our future operations, and my determination to secure as soon as possible the important points of the Mesa de Ibor and Campillos, which, if the enemy had seized on his arrival at Almaraz, the combined armies could not have extricated themselves from the mountains.

‘ I have also another observation to make upon this correspondence. My letters to Mr. Frere of the 3rd and 4th were given to the General to be sent to Arzobispo on the 4th; yet it appears that they were not transmitted till after the General had written, on the 6th, his account of the supposed success of the mission of General O’Donoju and Lord Macduff; and Mr. Frere did not receive them till the 10th.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I beg to mention to your Excellency, that the troops have received, this day and yesterday, only half an

\* The Earl of Fife, then serving in the Spanish Army.

allowance of bread, and the cavalry no forage excepting what they can pick up in the fields. The troops suffer considerably from want of salt, and neither officers nor soldiers have had any wine for the last fortnight.

‘ In case I should move, I must leave behind me two thirds of the small quantity of ammunition I have remaining, having been obliged to give all the Portuguese carts, which had hitherto carried the ammunition, to move the wounded, and not having been able to procure in this country means of transport for any thing. Surely, my Lord, the Junta have had time, since the 17th of last month, to supply the wants of the army with which they were then made acquainted.’

MEMORANDUM FOR \* \* \* \* \*

‘ Jaraicejo, 13th August, 1809.

‘ From the orders sent to —— yesterday, of which a copy is enclosed, he will see how important it is that an officer should strictly obey the orders which he receives ; and having obeyed them, that he should patiently wait for further orders.

‘ He could not suppose that he was forgotten ; or that the depôts at Castello Branco, or Abrantes, were forgotten ; or that any of those points respecting which he has taken upon himself to give orders, such as the march of the 11th regiment, and of the artillery from Lisbon, &c., had not been attended to at head quarters ; or that means did not exist for communicating the orders upon them which might be necessary.

‘ The orders given yesterday contain a detailed plan for the defence of Portugal, combined of the operations of different corps, and the whole founded upon a supposition that they were in certain situations ordered for them ; and that they would find, particularly Marshal Beresford’s corps, a depôt of provisions at Castello Branco, which would have supported it while at and in the neighbourhood of that place, and while passing through the mountains to the rear.

‘ In consequence of ——’s orders and arrangements, all this now becomes a matter of doubt ; and the enemy being in force at Plasencia, it is uncertain, not only whether there will be troops to oppose him in the stations supposed, if he should invade Portugal, but whether there will be magazines of pro-





right would certainly be very insecure, if all these troops were efficient; and if the French believe them to be efficient, the occupation of Plasencia is easily accounted for. But as I find the French perfectly informed of every thing, excepting, indeed, the amount of Sir Robert Wilson's corps, I should be inclined to believe that the occupation of Plasencia is founded upon some more solid view than one of defence for their right, against the enterprises of the troops on the different points on the frontier of Estremadura.

‘ At the same time, I do not think it certain that the corps assembled at Plasencia is intended to invade Portugal. In the first place, alone and unsupported, it is not in sufficient strength: in the next place, if an invasion of Portugal had been determined on as a measure of the campaign, they would not have marched in open day, in the presence of our troops.

‘ We know that the great object of the French, and that which has probably induced them to bring this large corps from the north of Spain, is to separate the English from the Spaniards; and I think it most probable that the principal object in the occupation of Plasencia is to distract our attention, and probably to induce us to withdraw. The object of keeping open the communication with Castille is not improbably connected with the above stated.

‘ The forces on both sides in Estremadura are now so equally balanced in point of numbers, being about 70,000 men on each side (including Venegas' and ours, and excluding your corps, &c.), that I do not think the French can look to any solid offensive operation in any quarter.

‘ On the other hand, if we should undertake any, they will again throw the corps occupying Plasencia on our backs, and take their chance of what might be done by the troops of the allies in different parts of the frontier of Estremadura.

‘ If they should undertake an offensive operation, it will probably be on the right upon Venegas, and in that view of their plan, the corps occupying Plasencia would be very inconveniently situated for any operation which we might undertake in this quarter by way of diversion in his favor.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I am inclined to think that Plasencia is occupied as the right of the French army in Estremadura, rather than as a point on the march towards Portugal.

‘ In whatever way it is occupied, I conceive that you cannot be better placed than at Zarza la Mayor. At Moralega you might be turned, and cut off by the cavalry and light infantry from Zarza, there being a road and a ford direct from Coria to Zarza, impracticable for artillery, good for light infantry, and bad for cavalry.

‘ As a military position, you would be in a better one on the other side of the river, which forms the boundary of the two kingdoms, and you might equally draw your provisions from Zarza la Mayor, which is a fertile country that has not been exhausted.

‘ Whether Portugal is to be invaded or not, my opinion is, and I wish, that General — should recross the Tagus, where he was ordered to halt. If Portugal is to be invaded, he will then be in his place according to the defensive plan proposed by me, of which one copy went to you by a messenger yesterday, and another the day before through General Leite: and as in that case you will only have to retire, your retreat would be more likely to be embarrassed, than aided, by this additional body of infantry.

‘ If Portugal is not to be invaded, I shall want General — to join me; and as he cannot cross the Tagus any where above Villa Velha, it is best that, in either view of the case, he should be sent there without loss of time. The 11th regiment must join him; and let him remain at Niza till he shall receive orders from me, or from you, supposing Portugal to be invaded. Let him get up the money and the other articles he was bringing with him to the army, to Niza.

‘ I have still to trouble you respecting various detachments of convalescents belonging to this army, who are marching about in different directions, and who have already acquired the name, as I doubt not they will soon the manners, of battalions of detachments. If any of these are at Zarza la Mayor, I beg you to send them across the Tagus at Alcantara, in detachments of such a size daily, as that they may get over the river in one day. Let them collect at Alcantara, and march from thence by the enclosed route to join the army.

‘ If you should find the enemy advancing, you will of course stop these detachments from passing the river, and

will send orders to those already passed to commence their march, and I shall take care of them afterwards. Those of them which shall not have passed must in this case retire into Portugal with you.

‘ All the detachments of convalescents which have not passed Castello Branco, must join General —, and pass the Tagus with him at Villa Velha.

‘ There is only one small boat at Alcantara ; I understand there are two at Alconeta, but this last place is nearer to Galisteo than it is to Zarza ; and the road to it is not absolutely impracticable for artillery.

‘ It would be desirable, therefore, to endeavour to remove the boats from Alconeta to Alcantara ; if only for the purpose of passing over our men. Indeed the boats ought to be removed from thence at all events. No carriage can cross at Alcantara, and only one horse at a time.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Conyngham Ellis, 40th Regiment, at Talavan.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Jaraicejo, 14th August, 1809.

‘ I have not heard from you since you left this, which I attribute to the deficiency of your means of communication. I request you to spare no expense either in procuring the earliest and most certain intelligence of the enemy’s movements, or in transmitting it to me in the speediest manner.

‘ Keep the bearer with you till you shall have occasion to send. He is a Portuguese messenger.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieutenant Ellis.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Señor Lozano de Torres.*

‘ MONSIEUR,

‘ Jaraicejo, le 14 Août, 1809.

‘ Le Colonel Waters, qui vous donnera cette lettre, vous montrera le précis d’une correspondance que j’ai eu avec les Généraux Cuesta et Eguia, sur les besoins de l’armée Anglaise, et sur les moyens que l’on a proposés pour y remédier. Je l’ai nommé avec M. Wemyss pour faire un arrangement avec des officiers nommées par le Commandant en Chef Espagnol de concert avec vous ; ils vous montreront les me-



morandums que je leur ai donnés, et je vous prie de les aider de vos conseils et de votre assistance.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Señor Lozano de Torres.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency General Eguia.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Jaraicejo, 14th August, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 13th, and I beg leave to congratulate you upon succeeding to the command of the Spanish army.

‘ I assure your Excellency that I have every desire to adopt any arrangement which can tend to facilitate the procuring and distribution of supplies to the combined armies; and I am fully convinced of your Excellency’s desire to relieve the wants and remove the inconvenience which the British army has already suffered during its operations in Spain.

‘ I must observe to your Excellency, however, that with every confidence in the good faith with which an arrangement made by you will be carried into effect on your part, I am apprehensive that from the nature of the proposed arrangement it is impracticable of execution. But at your Excellency’s desire, I have sent Lieut. Colonel Waters, of the Staff, and Mr. Wemyss, of the Commissary General’s department, to Truxillo, where they will meet any officers who may be appointed by you, and in concert with Señor Lozano de Torres, the Intendant employed by Government with the British army, will settle such an arrangement as may be practicable.

‘ These officers will likewise be charged to communicate to those whom you appoint, the particulars of the other wants of the British army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency  
General Eguia.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUT. COLONEL WATERS.

‘ Jaraicejo, 14th August, 1809.

‘ 1. The number of rations required daily by the British army is now 25,000 for men, and 6000 for horses, &c.

‘ 2. It appears to me that it will be difficult to settle any

plan by which the contents of any magazine could be issued to the two armies in proportion to their numbers, because both armies may, and the Spanish army certainly does, draw provisions and forage from some quarters besides the magazine which is formed at Truxillo. The British army now get their bread only from Truxillo; therefore, any arrangement which should throw all the bread baked at, or which may be brought to Truxillo, into a magazine to be divided in proportions between the two armies, would be unjust towards the British, and would probably starve it.

‘ 3. If, however, any arrangement can be adopted by which this difficulty can be got over, I shall have no objection to it in respect to bread; and no objection whatever in respect to barley.

‘ 4. In respect to meat, as that is to be got in all parts of the country, it would be best to leave the supply as it is, in the hands of the Commissaries of the different nations.

‘ 5. At least 1000 beasts of burthen are required for the British army.

‘ 6. 100 carts, each to carry 600 lbs., are required to carry the ammunition left at Deleytosa.

‘ 7. 100 good draught mules or horses are required to draw the British artillery.

‘ 8. 300 mares are required to remount the British cavalry.

‘ 9. Payment will be made on the spot for such of these animals as shall be purchased, and the regular and usual hire paid for those which shall be hired.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Jaraicejo, 14th August, 1809.

‘ I received yesterday, from General Cuesta, the letter of which I enclose your Excellency a copy, in which he informs me that he has resigned the command of the army, on account of his increasing infirmities.

‘ It appears that he had a paralytic stroke on the night of the 12th, which deprived him of the use of his left leg, and he cannot now walk.

‘ I likewise enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from, and of my answer to, General Eguia, the present commanding officer of the army. The letter to which

he refers, as having been written by me, is that addressed to General Cuesta, and of which I transmitted a copy to your Excellency yesterday.

‘ I have not yet heard that the enemy have made any alteration in their position at Plasencia. It appears that they have thrown their posts forward towards Baños by some accounts, as well as towards Coria and Galisteo.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency General Eguia.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Jaraicejo, 15th August, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 14th instant, relative to our future operations.

‘ The last accounts which I have received of the enemy state that, on the 12th, they attacked the Puerto de Baños with a large corps of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, where they were opposed by Sir Robert Wilson’s corps, which had retreated from Talavera to the hills, and had arrived at Baños on the 11th. The enemy carried the Puerto after a contest which lasted the whole day, and Sir Robert writes from Colmenar on the 12th, at night.

‘ My opinion is, that notwithstanding the strength of his reinforcements, the enemy is not strong enough to undertake any offensive operations ; but that if he should undertake any against the right of the combined armies, I mean the Spanish corps with General Venegas, the French corps at Plasencia, supposing it to remain there, will be well situated to impede any operations which we in this quarter might undertake, in order to make a diversion in his favor.

‘ The first object for our attention should be to get provisions for the men and horses of the army. The horses of the British army are now so much reduced from want of food, that they are scarcely able to march the distance which it is necessary they should march to relieve their outposts, much less to undertake any hostile or forward movement, while the arrangements for procuring food and collecting magazines are making.

‘ I have already stated to General Cuesta, in a letter of the 10th instant, which I understand has been communicated



to you, the defensive positions that, in my opinion, the armies ought to occupy in this quarter.

‘ When they may be prepared to carry on more active operations, my opinion is, that they ought to be directed on the right of the enemy, at Plasencia; and it might be possible to bring the corps of Marshal Beresford to co-operate in the plan. But I fear that nothing can be expected, either from the Duque del Parque, who is too weak, or from the Marques de la Romana, who appears to have been still at Coruña on the third of this month.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*General Eguia.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Jaraicejo, 15th August, 1809.

‘ I received from Marshal Beresford this morning a letter, stating that the enemy’s corps which had gone to Plasencia had, on the 12th, attacked and carried the Puerto de Baños. This point was defended by Sir Robert Wilson’s corps, and, I believe, by a detachment from the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo. Sir Robert Wilson had retired from the neighbourhood of Talavera by the hills of the Vera de Plasencia, and had arrived at the Puerto de Baños on the 11th. He writes from Colmenar on the 12th, at night.

‘ I do not understand that the enemy had made any movement from Plasencia since the 12th. His patrols were yesterday on the Tagus, in the neighbourhood of Talavan, and of the Puente del Cardenal. Marshal Beresford was yesterday between Moraleja and Zarza la Mayor.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I received yesterday from General Eguia, and the copy of my answer this day. I have just received your Excellency’s dispatch of the 13th. Your Excellency will observe from my letter to General Eguia, that the Marques de la Romana was still at Coruña on the 3rd August, and probably even at a later period. There is no chance, therefore, of a diversion being made by his army in favour of the operations of the troops in Estremadura; and your Excellency will observe that the attempt of the Duque del Parque to hold only the Puerto de Baños, although aided by Sir Robert Wilson’s

corps, the assistance of which he had no reason to expect, has entirely failed.

‘ I consider the answer of the Junta to the note of your Excellency, in respect to the supplies of provisions for the army, and to the means of transport required, to be very unsatisfactory. The army cannot exist in the shape of an army, unless those supplies and means are provided; and the Junta have been already informed by me, that if Spain, or rather that part of Spain under their government, which in fact now comprises the whole kingdom, excepting those parts of Estremadura, Castille, and Aragon, occupied by the enemy’s troops, cannot, or is unwilling, to make the exertion which is necessary in order to secure those supplies and means, Spain must do without the services of the British army.

‘ In respect to Marshal Beresford’s corps, which the Junta are so desirous should be brought forward, I have to observe, that the Marshal has equal reason with myself to complain of the deficiency of supplies of provisions and other assistance, since he has been in Spain. But this army is the only disposable force of Portuguese troops which exists, and is all that Portugal has to depend upon for its defence. It is not in a very efficient state for offensive purposes, as it wants cavalry, is but newly raised, and but imperfectly trained and disciplined.

‘ The object in collecting it upon the frontier was to train and discipline it, and at the same time to defend the frontiers of Portugal, and to give an *appui* to my left flank; and the government of Portugal willingly concurred in its quitting the frontier for these objects. But I doubt whether the government of Portugal would consent, or that I could recommend that they should consent, to the employment of this corps in an operation in Castille, giving up the defence of their own frontier, which is menaced with an attack, at the call of the government of Spain, who do not appear willing or capable of making any exertion for themselves. Accordingly your Excellency will observe, that in the different letters that I have written in which I have recommended movements towards Madrid, I have never mentioned Marshal Beresford’s corps, knowing that its services

could not be, at present, spared at a distance from the Portuguese frontier; and that the Portuguese government would not allow it to move to any distance.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY DEAR WELLESLEY,

‘ Jaraicejo, 15th August, 1809.

‘ I understand from one of our Commissaries, who was very near the bridge of Arzobispo on the day the Spaniards were surprised there, that vast numbers fled from thence, throwing away, as usual, their arms and clothing. I think that it would be desirable to take early measures to ascertain what the existing strength is of each of the armies, particularly that of Cuesta, for I suspect that by these desertions it is much weakened, although it has not lost 500 men in action.

‘ I think that the French have in Estremadura and Toledo about 70,000 men, and we (including Venegas and excluding Beresford) may have about the same number, if Cuesta is not reduced below 30,000 by desertion.

‘ I do not think the French are sufficiently strong, with these relative numbers, to undertake an offensive operation; and it is probable that things will remain as they are, unless I can strike a blow upon the right of their line, until their reinforcements shall arrive from France.

‘ There are advantages and disadvantages attending the positions of each of the armies. The French have the advantage of an early communication from their right at Plasencia, to their left in La Mancha, and they can collect their whole army without any difficulty at any one point. On the other hand, our defensive position is the easiest; and the possession of the bridge of Almaraz, and of the mountains between that point and the bridge of Arzobispo, protects the country behind the Tagus, from Toledo nearly to Abrantes, as the enemy cannot penetrate with cannon at any point between Almaraz and Toledo; and the passage of the river is nearly impracticable for an army between Almaraz and Abrantes, excepting, probably, at Villa Velha, in Portugal, and with difficulty at the ferry of Alconeta



‘ I believe also that Venega’s position in the mountains of the Sierra is so strong, that it cannot be attacked, excepting by a very superior force.

‘ We should still, however, be in a difficult position in respect to the corps at Plasencia, supposing it to remain there, should Venegas be attacked, and we were required to make a diversion in his favor in this quarter.

‘ In the expectation that we shall receive such a requisition at some time or other; or if by the arrival of food, &c., I should ever be enabled to make a forward movement, I am preparing to repair the Puente del Cardenal on the Tagus, between this and Plasencia, in order to be able to strike a blow there.

‘ Ever yours, most affectionately,

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS, ‘ Jaraicejo, 15th August, 1809.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will give directions to somebody to purchase and send us by a courier the medicines, and in the quantities enumerated in the enclosed letters. Let the Commissary General pay for them.

‘ There is nothing new. The French at Plasencia appear to have pushed towards the Puerto de Baños, where they beat Sir Robert Wilson, and I believe a corps of the Duque del Parque, on the 12th; Sir Robert had retired through the hills from Talavera, which is the reason that he was at Baños on the 12th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency General Eguia.*

‘ SIR, ‘ Jaraicejo, 16th August, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th, and I am much obliged to you for the intelligence contained in it. There is nothing new in this quarter.

‘ I enclose an extract of a letter\* from the Lieut. General

\* *Extract of a Letter from Lieut. Gen. Payne, commanding the British Cavalry.*

‘ Aldea del Obispo, 15th August, 1809.

‘ We have only received one day’s issue of barley since our arrival here, and that did not exceed four pounds per horse!’

commanding the British cavalry, in consequence of which I have been obliged to move the cavalry farther to the rear, towards Caceres, in order that they may be enabled to procure forage, no longer to be obtained in the neighbourhood of this place.

‘ I had the honor some time ago to beg of General Cuesta that he would send some guns of heavy calibre to occupy the batteries which have been thrown up at the Puente de Almaraz. These guns have not yet arrived, and I must beg leave again to renew my application, and to request that eight guns may be sent there as soon as possible.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*General Eguia.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Jaraicejo, 16th August, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a copy of a report which I received last night from the officer commanding the British cavalry, in consequence of which I have ordered him to move towards Caceres, to endeavor to procure food for the horses, but where he will be nearly thirty miles distant from the army.

‘ The enemy have made no movements of any importance in this quarter. They have had their patrols at the Puente del Cardenal, and the people of the country believed that they intended to attempt to repair that bridge. I had intended to repair the bridge myself, in case it should have been desirable to move upon the enemy’s right at Plasencia, and had given directions for the collection of materials for that purpose; but the report which I received last night of the want of forage for the cavalry, and the consequent necessity of moving them to a distance, has put that operation out of the question; and I have now ordered that the Puente del Cardenal may be effectually destroyed, so as to render its repair impossible.

‘ I received this morning, from General Eguia, the report of the defeat of General Venegas’ corps on the 11th.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency General Eguia.*

‘SIR,

‘Jaraicejo, 18th August, 1809.

‘I am sorry to have to inform your Excellency that the British army under my command have this day no bread, instead of receiving the plentiful supply of which your Excellency announced the arrival in the conversation which I had with you yesterday.

‘I trust that your Excellency will have taken measures to occupy, in this night, the posts in the neighbourhood of Almaraz.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*His Excellency*  
‘*General Eguia.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency General Eguia.*

‘SIR,

‘Jaraicejo, 18th August, 1809, 6½ P. M.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter and its enclosures of this day’s date, respecting the provisions in the magazine at Truxillo for the use of the British army; and as the soldiers have not received their provisions for this day, and there does not appear to me to be a sufficiency for the consumption of to-morrow, I shall, however unwillingly, carry into execution the intention I announced to you yesterday. I trust, therefore, that you will have ordered troops to relieve my outposts on the Tagus, if you still propose to hold that position.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*His Excellency*  
‘*General Eguia.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency General Eguia.*

‘SIR,

‘Jaraicejo, 18th August, 1809.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter in reply to mine of this morning.

‘I have frequently complained to the Government and to the late Commander in Chief, and, as I thought, to you, in conversation yesterday, that I must retire into Portugal to seek for food, if food should not be supplied to the British army in Spain; and I particularly specified to your Excel-



lency the number of rations of each description of food that the British army required.

‘ Your Excellency is much mistaken in supposing that I intended to remain in my position, if I should receive a portion of the supplies to be collected at Truxillo for the use of the armies, although I might be convinced that such portion would be allotted honorably and with good faith.

‘ That which obliges me to move into Portugal is a case of extreme necessity, viz., that description of necessity which an army feels when it has been starving for a month, when it wants every thing and can get nothing; and as I stated to your Excellency yesterday, this necessity has now become so urgent, that I must either move into Portugal, where I know I shall be supplied, or I must make up my mind to lose my army, unless I am made certain, not only of a portion of the supplies which may be sent to Truxillo, but of a sufficiency of bread and corn for the troops and horses daily.

‘ I hope, therefore, that your Excellency will occupy the posts on the Tagus this night. But if you should not do so, I can only say that my troops shall be withdrawn from them to-morrow night, whether relieved or not.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*General Eguia.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Jaraicejo, 18th August, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose different reports, which I received yesterday, of the measures taken by the Spanish officers and troops to prevent the British army from foraging.

‘ The foraging parties to which these reports relate were necessarily obliged to go to a distance of four and five leagues (from sixteen to twenty miles) in order to procure the forage they required; which, with the distance they would have to return, appears to be sufficient work for the parties and their horses: but when, having performed this work, they are deprived of the forage by the Spanish cavalry, it must be obvious that the equipments of the army must be ruined. I understand that similar outrages were committed on the

foraging parties yesterday, but I have not yet had the official reports of them.

‘ General Eguia did me the honor of calling upon me yesterday, when I communicated to him these reports, and he promised that the evils complained of should be redressed. I desired him, however, to prepare to occupy, in the course of the night, the posts in the neighbourhood of the bridge of Almaraz, as it was impossible for me to remain any longer in this part of the country, suffering as the army does, from wants of every description.

‘ In my last letter I apprized your Excellency of the wants of the cavalry, and of my having been obliged to remove them to the neighbourhood of Caceres to look for food. In my conversation yesterday with General Eguia, I found that the Spanish cavalry had every day received some barley, although not an entire ration. The enclosed reports will show to your Excellency in what manner this same cavalry, which occupies every village in the neighbourhood of this army, supplies itself with straw.

‘ The British army has no bread for this day, the troops receiving, in lieu of that necessary article, half a pound of flour, or one-third of their ration for each man; notwithstanding General Eguia told me yesterday that on this day, and always in future, arrangements would be made to supply both infantry and cavalry with their full rations of provisions and forage.

‘ More than a month has now elapsed since I informed General Cuesta that if the British army were not supplied with means of transport and with provisions, not only I would not co-operate in any forward movement beyond the Alberche, but that I could not remain at all in Spain; and the General informed me that he had sent a copy of my letter to the Supreme Central Junta; and indeed I sent a copy of it to Mr. Frere.

‘ In the course of this month, if proper measures, or indeed if any measures had been adopted, supplies might have been forwarded to us from the most distant parts of Andalusia; but we have not received a mule or a cart, or an article of provision of any description, under any order given or arrangement made by the Government: so that when I

march I shall be obliged to leave behind my ammunition, and six, and probably twelve pieces of cannon; and I assure your Excellency most solemnly, that since the 22nd of last month the horses of the cavalry and artillery have not received three regular deliveries of barley, and the infantry have not received ten days' bread.

' Under these circumstances, I can remain no longer in Spain; and I request you to give notice to the Government that I am about to withdraw into Portugal.

' I have no doubt but that the Government have given orders that we should be provided as we ought to be; but orders, I have to observe, are not sufficient. To carry on the contest with France to any good purpose, the labor and services of every man and of every beast in the country should be employed in the support of the armies; and these should be so classed and arranged as not only to secure obedience to the orders of the Government, but regularity and efficiency in the performance of the services required from them. Magazines might then with ease be formed and transported wherever circumstances might require that armies should be stationed.

' But as we are now situated, 50,000 men are collected upon a spot which cannot afford subsistence for 10,000 men, and there are no means of sending to a distance to make good the deficiency.

' The Junta have issued their orders to supply the deficiencies of means of transport as well as of provisions; but from want of arrangement there are no persons to obey their orders, and this army would perish, if I should remain, before the supplies could arrive.

' I hope your Excellency and the Government will believe that I have not determined to go till it has become absolutely necessary. I assure you that there is not a General Officer in this army who is not convinced of the necessity of my immediate departure.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Marquis Wellesley.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Jaraicejo, 19th August 1809.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 17th. The principle on which I have acted respecting General —, is this: neither he nor you, nor both joined, could do any thing effectual against the enemy, unless in co-operation with me.

‘ In co-operation with me, your force without General —’s, was fully sufficient to do any thing that might be required for it. There was, therefore, no reason whatever why General — should not be placed in the situation most convenient for the performance of those services that it was most probable would be required from him; which were, either to join me, or to be employed in the defence of Portugal, according to the plan proposed in my memorandum. But, in fact, it has for some time been very obvious to me, that I was unable to undertake any offensive operation of any description. The want of provisions and means of transport is so great, that I can move neither artillery nor ammunition, and the troops and horses having been starved for the last month, neither are equal to any exertion; and no means exist here of refreshing the one, or of giving even the necessary food to the other.

‘ Supposing, then, that General —’s assistance would have been necessary to you in any offensive operation which we might have undertaken in concert, which I think it would not, it was pretty obvious, from the state of this army, that such offensive operation would not be undertaken. Your line must have been to retire towards Portugal; and in this operation, General —, having only infantry, would in those plains have done you more harm than good. Besides this, General —’s disobedience of orders, although well intended, was positive, and committed with his eyes open; and as his corps was useless at Zarza la Mayor, and in your retreat might have embarrassed you, I was not sorry, by ordering him back to the position which he had quitted, to show him and the army that I must command and they must obey.

‘ I agree with you in thinking that the enemy will not now invade Portugal; and I also agree with you in thinking that it is desirable that your troops should have rest and leisure; and that a serious endeavor should be made to organize, dis-

cipline, and clothe them, for which, indeed, there has hardly yet been time. I concur with you also in the choice you have made of the position from Abrantes to Leyria, for your purpose: I should wish you, however, if possible, to leave Abrantes and the course of the Tagus to us, for the reasons which I am about to detail to you.

‘ After having made an effort to maintain myself here, I find it quite impossible. We are starving, our men falling sick, and we have nothing to give them in the way of comfort for their recovery; and our horses are dying by hundreds in the week. We have not had a full ration of provisions ever since the 22nd of the last month; and I am convinced that in that time the men have not received ten days’ bread, and the horses not three regular deliveries of barley. We have no means of transport, and I shall be obliged to leave my ammunition on the ground, on quitting this place. We now want 1800 horses to complete the cavalry !!! and 200 or 300 for the artillery.

‘ Under these circumstances, and seeing no prospect of an amelioration of our situation, which gets worse and worse every day, I have determined to withdraw towards the frontiers of Portugal, and I shall begin my march to-morrow. My intention is to put myself along the frontier, with the right towards Elvas; there are some large towns there, which will subsist us; and, at all events, there is a store at Abrantes, which will supply us for a great length of time.

‘ In order, however, that we may be able to draw our resources from this store, as well as what we want from Lisbon, it is necessary that we should have the command of all the resources in carriages, &c., which Alentejo and the banks of the Tagus can afford. Now if you should occupy Abrantes, we shall interfere with each other; and for this reason, I request you to put your right at Thomar.

‘ I have not been well for these three or four days, which is the reason why I have not written to you. But I now send De Souza\* with this.

‘ I think that the circumstances in which the world, and this peninsula in particular, will be placed in a short time, call upon you to report, at an early period, the actual progress

\* The Conde de Villa Real.

which has been made, and the prospects which exist of forming an army in Portugal. The desertion of the troops, the prospects of stopping that evil, the means and their efficiency of supplying the vacancies which it occasions, would be prominent points in such report.

‘ I think we owe this to Government, at an early period, in order to enable them to determine how far they will go in expense, and how much they will risk in an army to maintain Portugal in the existing situation of the world.

‘ A great deal has been done, and Government may be supposed to have acted rightly in sending their troops when they did, and in saving Portugal when the French were involved in the Austrian contest. But the question becomes one of a different description, that contest being finished; and I think that Government will be assisted in their decision very much by the prospect which you may be able to hold out of the existence of a Portuguese military force.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency General Eguia.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Jaraicejo, 19th August, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of this day’s date, and I feel much concerned that any thing should have occurred to induce your Excellency to express a doubt of the truth of what I have written to you. As, however, your Excellency entertains that doubt, any further correspondence between us appears unnecessary; and accordingly, this is the last letter which I shall have the honor of addressing to you.

‘ Although your Excellency has expressed a doubt of the truth of what I have written to you, I entertain none of what your Excellency has written to me; and I am well convinced that your Excellency has given orders, and that all the contents of the magazine at Truxillo will be given to the British troops, even though the Spanish troops should want food.

‘ But notwithstanding these orders, and an obedience to them, the British troops are still in want. Yesterday they received but one third of a ration, and that was in flour; this day they received only half a ration, likewise in flour;



and on neither of these days have the horses of the army received any thing.

‘ These deficiencies arise not from the want of orders by your Excellency, or of your faithful execution of your promises to me, but from the want of means in the country, and from the want of arrangement by the Government in the adoption of timely measures to supply the wants which they were informed long ago existed.

‘ But to whatever cause the deficiency of means of supplying the troops with provisions may be attributed, it is obvious that it exists.

‘ According to the return of the state of the magazine at Truxillo, sent to me by your Excellency yesterday, it did not contain a sufficiency to feed the British army even for one day. This being the case the wants of the army must continue; I must lose men and horses daily; and therefore, in order to save the army, I must remove to a country in which I know that I shall get food, and other assistance which I require.

‘ Whatever your Excellency may think of the truth or falsehood of my assertion, I repeat, that want, and the apprehension of its further consequences, are the only reasons for my quitting Spain.

‘ I have the honor to inform your Excellency, that besides the ammunition left at Deleytosa, I shall be obliged to leave here another large quantity, from the want of means of moving it. I shall send an officer to Deleytosa to-morrow, to deliver to the officer whom you may appoint to receive it, the ammunition which is there; and if you will send an officer here in the course of the day, he shall receive charge of the ammunition which will be left here, if your Excellency wishes to have these articles; if you should not wish to have them, I propose to destroy them, as I have no means of moving them from hence.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.,

‘ *His Excellency*  
*General Eguia.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I have just received your Excellency’s second letter of this date, enclosing one of the 16th from the Minister of War at Seville. The Minister has been entirely misinformed of the actual situation of the French armies. A large

corps has marched to Salamanca ; another is at Plasencia ; Marshal Mortier, with a part of Victor's corps, is at Talavera, Oropesa, and Arzobispo ; and the remainder of Victor's corps, with Sebastiani's, is in La Mancha.

‘ Marshal Beresford is on the frontiers of Portugal, near Salvaterra.

‘ Under these circumstances, there might be an opportunity of striking a blow with advantage ; although no permanent good could be produced, till the corps of the Marques de la Romana, or some other corps, could be brought forward.

‘ But the Minister of War forgets that we have no food ; that our cavalry, from want, are scarcely able to move from their ground ; that our artillery horses are not able to draw the guns ; that I have no means of moving ; and that I am actually obliged to leave here my ammunition from the want of means of moving it ; and, above all, that the soldiers are worn down by want and privations of every description.

‘ It is extraordinary that the Minister did not advert to these circumstances, which have been frequently laid before him ; or that, adverting to them, he should have proposed to me any operation of any description, to which he must have known that I was unequal : but his having omitted to advert to them sufficiently accounts for their continued existence.’

*To Señor Don Luis de Calvo.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Jaraicejo, 20th August, 1809, 8 A. M.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 19th from Truxillo, to which I write this reply, notwithstanding that I hope to have the pleasure of seeing you at Truxillo in the course of this morning.

‘ I must first beg leave to inform you, that I have no motive for withdrawing the British army from Spain, whether of a political or military nature, excepting that which I have stated to you in conversation, viz., a desire to relieve it from the privations of food which it has suffered since the 22nd of last month ; privations which have reduced its strength, have destroyed the health of the soldiers, and have rendered the army comparatively inefficient.

‘ You gave me assurances yesterday, which you have repeated in your letter, that these privations shall not continue ; that in three days there shall be plenty of provisions ; and that in the mean time we shall have all that the magazine at Truxillo contains.

‘ In answer, I have to observe to you, that I have received the same assurances from every Spanish Commissioner who has been employed with the British army ; each in his turn has disappointed me ; and although your rank is higher, and your powers are greater than those of the other Spanish officers who have been with me, I acknowledge, that, in a case so critical as that of a starving army, I feel no confidence in your assurances ; and I give no credit to the accounts of the existence of resources said to be upon the road, (in what place not known,) or of any others in the magazine at Truxillo.

‘ In respect to the magazine at Truxillo, according to the accounts of its contents yesterday evening, which I received last night, it does not contain enough to feed the British army one day only ; and the provisions for the Spanish army must be likewise drawn from it.

‘ You tell me that the British troops shall have every thing, and the Spanish nothing. To which I reply, that its execution is utterly and entirely impracticable, and is certainly very inconsistent with what has hitherto taken place. Till lately the Spanish troops have received their rations regularly, while the British troops were starving. I am not so well aware of the manner in which the Spanish troops have been lately supplied, but I know, from the best authority, (the Commander in Chief of the Spanish army,) that the Spanish cavalry were receiving at least half a ration of barley, while the British cavalry had none : and I imagine that they have been well supplied with other provisions, as I have in my possession a letter from yourself, stating that you had ordered to the Mesa de Ibor, for the use of the Spanish army, all the provisions required for the British army by Mr. Downie, the British Commissary, and provided by the town of Guadalupe and its neighbourhood.

‘ I cannot, therefore, give credit to the execution of any plan which shall go to give provisions to the British army, to the exclusion of the Spanish troops ; and I conceive the



proposal to have been made to me, only as an extreme and desperate measure to induce me to remain in Spain.

‘ But supposing the plan to be capable of execution, I could not give my sanction to it. The Spanish army must be fed as well as the British army, otherwise neither will be of much use in the positions which they have hitherto occupied.

‘ If the Spanish army is to be fed, (and it cannot be otherwise,) the magazine at Truxillo will be found not to be equal to one third of the demand of the British army for one day, according to the official return of its contents yesterday, which I received last night.

‘ But, besides provisions, the army requires other assistance, for which I have called in vain; and for the want of which I am now obliged to leave behind me my ammunition, and to deliver it to the Spanish Commander in Chief.

‘ I am fully aware of the consequences which may follow my departure from Spain: not that I apprehend those to which you have referred; for, in point of fact, there is now no enemy in our front.

‘ But I am not responsible for these consequences, whatever they may be. Those are responsible for them who, having been made acquainted with the wants of the British army more than a month ago, have taken no efficient measures to relieve them; who have allowed a brave army, that was rendering gratuitous services to Spain, that was able and willing to pay for every thing it received, to starve in the centre of their country, and to be reduced by want almost to a state of inefficiency; who refused or omitted to find carriages to remove the officers and soldiers who had been wounded in their service, and obliged me to give up the equipment of the army for the performance of this necessary duty of humanity.

‘ I have one more observation to make, in reply to your letter, in respect to the requisitions made by the British Commissaries for provisions in the villages. There is but one Commissary now so employed, and he is at Cáceres. Indeed, all the villages in this neighbourhood are occupied by the Spanish troops, and it would be useless to send a British Commissary to endeavor to procure any thing from them. But I shall be obliged to you to state where is this Commis-

sary? Supposing the report made to you to be founded in fact, surely while the British army is starving, it may be allowed to a Commissary to endeavor to obtain some relief for the troops for whom he is bound to provide, paying for what he receives.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Señor Don Luis de Calvo.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Señor Lozano de Torres.*

‘ MONSIEUR,

‘ Jaraicejo, le 20 Août, 1809.

‘ Je suis fâché d’avoir à vous annoncer que je me mettrai en marche demain pour la frontière de Portugal. Malgré les efforts que vous avez faits, malgré les représentations, que depuis un mois j’envoie au Gouvernement, mes soldats ne reçoivent pas leurs rations.

‘ Hier ils n’ont eu qu’une demie livre de farine, au jour-d’hui que trois quarts d’une livre, et les chevaux absolument rien. J’ai perdu dans la dernière semaine cent chevaux de la cavalerie et beaucoup de l’artillerie. On ne me donne point de moyens de transport, et je suis obligé de laisser ici et à Deleytosa, et de donner à l’armée Espagnole mes munitions. Je regrette cette nécessité, je l’ai évitée aussi longtemps que j’ai pu : vous avez fait tout ce qui était en votre pouvoir, j’ai fait des représentations au Gouvernement, et malgré tout, nous mourons de faim, et je ne peux plus rester. Je vous verrai demain à Truxillo.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Señor Lozano de Torres.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Truxillo, 21st August, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 15th, and I am very much obliged to you for the trouble you have taken respecting the army. I have written to Mr. Murray, to desire him to buy the mules and bullocks to be had in Barbary. But I should think it desirable that they should be landed at the mouth of the Guadiana, or probably at Lisbon, instead of Cadiz, in consequence of the change in our situation.

‘ Mr. Villiers will apprize you of the circumstances which oblige me to quit Spain.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for the trouble you have taken to explore the navigation of the Tagus for us.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*  
*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Truxillo, 21st August, 1809.

‘ I have received your letters of the 14th and 16th.

‘ The principle upon which I founded my calculation of one sixth of the supply we should receive, being allotted to the Portuguese government, was founded upon a comparison of your demand with the estimates of the whole expense of the army.

‘ Your demand was stated to be £40,000: the estimate of the total expense £240,000; of which sum, £40,000 was the sixth part; and I thought it fair that you should have the sixth of the supply, whatever that might be. You object to the calculation of the estimate; into which objection I cannot enter, as I have not seen the estimate, and only know that its total amount is £240,000 *per mensem*, calculating your demand at £40,000 *per mensem*.

‘ But as the demand of the Portuguese troops is only for their pay, and that for the British troops includes all extraordinaries, even ordnance, I am not surprised that the estimate for the whole expense of 30,000 men of the latter in the field should be £200,000, and the expense of the pay of the former only £40,000.

‘ It appears by a paper enclosed in your letter of the 14th, that the monthly expense will run nearer £50,000, than £40,000, taking the exchange at *par*, which is the fair way of calculating. This will increase the estimate of the monthly expense in Portugal to £250,000, of which your demand will be one fifth; and according to what I think the first principle on which I decided before, one fifth, instead of one sixth of the monthly supply, ought to be allotted to you.

‘ It appears, however, that you object not only to the calculation of the sixth, but also to that mode of supplying the Portuguese government the money they ought to have.

‘ I have to observe, that Government having undertaken



upon the Peninsula more than their funds will allow them to perform, we, who are to carry the services into execution, must either starve one service to feed the other; or we must allot to each service its due proportion of the funds in our power, calculated upon the amount of the demands of each.

‘I cannot suffer the British army to be starved, in order that the Portuguese army may be paid; nor is it proper that the engagement to the Portuguese Government should be violated in order that the expenses of the British army should be paid. The measure, therefore, which I have adopted, with the amendment of a fifth, instead of a sixth, appears to me, on the whole, to be the best. But if you should not approve of this measure, the only one to which I can give my consent is, that I should decide from time to time what sums of money can, with convenience, be allotted to the Portuguese Government. This, however, leaves that Government exposed to the inconvenience which must always result from the arbitrary decision of any individual.

‘I beg of you, however, to decide whether you will take a fifth of the supply, or leave the sum to be given at my discretion. In either case I shall give directions that you may be apprized, on the 15th and 30th of every month, of the sum disposable for the Portuguese Government; and you will give directions that it may be drawn in one sum from the military chest at Lisbon, and you will give your bills, for the sum you shall have received, upon the Secretary of State.

‘I mention this, because Mr. Murray has expressed a desire that his office may be freed from all accounts between Mr. Bell and individual officers, and the Paymaster General of the army.

‘I am much obliged to you for the trouble you have taken respecting the supplies to be sent to us to Elvas. You will see by the dispatches which I send with this, that I am going towards that quarter.

‘Any mules that can be got would be of great use to us: but as we shall run the province of Alentejo very hard in carriages for some time, it would be desirable not to push it too hard in mules at the same time.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Truxillo, 21st August, 1809.

‘ I did not march from Jaraicejo till yesterday, not having been able to arrange, till that moment, for the removal of the sick of the army, to remove whom has taken every carriage and every mule we had to carry the remainder of our reserve ammunition and the stores in the commissariat, and I have given over the ammunition to the Spanish General.

‘ We have not received any assistance of any description from the country, or from the agents of the Spanish Government.

‘ I have the honor to enclose to your Excellency copies of letters which I have received from General Eguia, and copies of my answers. Your Excellency will observe in General Eguia’s letter to me of the 19th instant a very injurious, improper, and unfounded assertion, that I made use of the want of provisions as a pretext for withdrawing from Spain; and that it was a false one, for that there were plenty of provisions for the army. I assure your Excellency, that on that very day the troops in my camp at Jaraicejo received only three quarters of a pound of flour, and the cavalry and the other horses of the army no forage excepting what they could pick up.

‘ Until this insulting assertion was withdrawn, it was impossible for me to continue any correspondence with General Eguia, after I should have replied to his letter, which I hope I did with the temper which became my situation and character.

‘ Your Excellency will observe, that in his reply to me he has either misunderstood or affected to misunderstand that part of his former letter to which I referred; and he has, in fact, left the charge of making use of a false pretext where it stood; and I have, therefore, not given him any reply upon that or any other subject on which he has addressed me.

‘ Your Excellency will likewise find an insinuation of the same kind in a letter from Don L. de Calvo, dated the 19th instant, of which and of my answer of the 20th I enclose copies. These letters contain nearly the substance of a conversation which I had with Don L. de Calvo on the evening



of the 19th; and I assure your Excellency that at the moment Don L. de Calvo was writing his letter from Truxillo, stating the contents of the magazine at that place, on which statement he founded his insinuation that I was withdrawing from Spain upon a false pretext, Lieut. Colonel Waters delivered to me a return of the contents of the magazine, made up to the evening of the 19th, from which it appeared that it did not contain a sufficiency to feed the British troops even for one day; and if the magazine had contained a sufficiency of food, there were no means of transport to remove it to the positions which the troops occupied.

‘Your Excellency will recollect, that in my correspondence with General Cuesta, and with General Eguia, I stated the difficulty of settling any arrangement for the division of the magazine to be formed at Truxillo, for the proportion of the strength of the two armies, because probably both armies, but certainly the Spanish army, would draw provisions from other quarters, which provisions would not go through the magazines; to which answers were given, calling upon me to rely upon the honor and good faith with which the arrangement to be made should be carried into execution.

‘I now beg to refer your Excellency to the enclosed copy of a letter, of which I have the original in my possession, from the Alcalde of Guadalupe to Mr. Commissary Downie, that he had received the directions of Don L. de Calvo, which he had obeyed, to send to Mesa de Ibor, the head quarters of the Spanish army, *the provisions which Mr. Downie had ordered, and which had been procured for the use of the British army, to be sent to the magazine at Truxillo!*

‘This is the honor and good faith with which the arrangement respecting the magazine at Truxillo was to be carried into execution! And this Don L. de Calvo is the gentleman in whose assurances I was to place confidence (as if I had not already gone far enough in confidence in the assurances of the agents of the Spanish Government!) that all the contents of the magazine at Truxillo should be given to the British troops to the exclusion of the Spanish army, and that every thing which the army required, of every description, was on the road from Seville.

I find that it is intended to justify the Spanish Govern-



ment for their neglect of us, by circulating a report that my complaints of want of supplies, of means of transport, and I might have added, of the common attention and even of acts of humanity towards the army, and particularly towards the wounded, were mere pretexts.

‘ This plan has been carried into execution so far as Señor Lozano de Torres, the Spanish superintendent attached to this army, declared publicly yesterday, that he could prove that the British army, instead of wanting food, had received double rations ever since it arrived in Spain ; and yet this same gentleman has expressed to me in the most indignant terms, more than once, the shame he felt, as a Spaniard, on account of the manner in which we had been treated, and the privations which we were made to endure ; which expressions he acknowledges this day.

‘ These reports and insinuations against me may do very well for the people of Seville : but the British army will not soon forget the treatment it has received ; and I know that there is not a General Officer in it, and I believe not an officer or soldier, who does not think that I should have neglected its interests, and even should have risked its existence, if I had delayed its departure for another day.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a copy of my dispatch of this date to the Secretary of State.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. By a letter from Marshal Beresford, I learn that he also has been distressed for provisions. He informs me that the Marques de la Romana was still at Coruña on the 5th instant.

‘ P.P.S. I beg to draw your Excellency’s attention to a fact which has occurred here this day. Your Excellency will observe that Don L. de Calvo boasted in his letter of the 19th instant, that he had here, at command, means of transport to carry provisions to the British army, and its detachments, not less than thirty miles from hence, and the quantity not less than 100,000lbs in weight daily. Some sick had been sent here from Jaraicejo who had not been considered in the arrangement made for the removal of the sick, and six carts to remove them were wanting, which were

required last night from Señor Lozano de Torres, another deputy from the Junta, and living with Don L. de Calvo. These six carts have not been given, and I have removed these sick in the best manner I could.

‘Just to show to your Excellency the difference of the manner in which we were treated in Portugal, I mention that General Leite, having heard by accident that our wounded were going to Elvas, prepared to receive them, and the preparations for the hospitals were actually made unsolicited, before the officer who was charged to make them arrived with my letter to General Leite, to communicate my wish to establish the hospital at Elvas.

‘In the same manner I must mention that stores, for which the orders did not reach Lisbon till the 12th, will be at Elvas on the 26th; and yet Lisbon is farther from the army than Seville is, and the means of transport in Portugal not half what they are in Spain.’

*To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Truxillo, 21st August, 1809.

‘When I marched from Talavera on the 3rd instant with a view to oppose the French corps, which we had heard had passed through the Puerto de Baños, and had arrived at Plasencia, Sir Robert Wilson was detached upon the left of the army towards Escalona; and before I marched on that morning I put him in communication with the Spanish General Cuesta, who, it had been settled, was to remain at Talavera. I understand that General Cuesta put Sir Robert in communication with his advanced guard, which retired from Talavera on the night of the 4th.

‘Sir Robert Wilson, however, did not arrive at Velada till the night of the 4th, having made a long march through the mountains, and as he was then six leagues from the bridge of Arzobispo, and had to cross the high road from Oropesa to Talavera, of which the enemy was in possession, he conceived that he was too late to retire to Arzobispo, and he determined to move by the Venta de San Julian and Centinello, towards the Tietar, and across that river towards the mountains which separate Castille from Estremadura.

‘ Some of Sir Robert Wilson’s dispatches having missed me, I am not aware by which of the passes he went through the mountains, but I believe by Tornavacas: he arrived, however, at Baños on the 11th, and on the 12th was attacked and defeated by the French corps of Marshal Ney, which, with that of Soult, returned to Plasencia on the 9th, 10th, and 11th; that of Ney having since gone on towards Salamanca.

‘ I enclose Sir Robert Wilson’s account of the action; he has been very active, intelligent, and useful, in the command of the Portuguese and Spanish corps, with which he was detached from this army. Before the battle of the 28th July he had pushed his parties almost to the gates of Madrid, with which city he was in communication, and he would have been in Madrid, if I had not thought it proper to call him in, in expectation of that general action which took place on the 28th of July. He afterwards alarmed the enemy on the right of his army; and throughout the service has shown himself to be an active and intelligent partisan, well acquainted with the country in which he was acting, and possessing the confidence of the troops which he commanded.

‘ Being persuaded that his retreat was not open by Arzobispo, he acted right in taking the road he did, with which he was well acquainted; and although unsuccessful in the action which he fought, which may be well accounted for by the superior numbers and description of the enemy’s troops, the action, in my opinion, does him great credit.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Truxillo, 21st August, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I received on the 4th instant, from Don Martin de Garay, the Spanish Secretary of State, conveying to me the intention of the Government to appoint me a Captain General in the Spanish service, with the pay of that rank; and presenting me with six Andalusian horses in the name of King Ferdinand the Seventh.

‘ My wish was to lay this mark of the approbation of the



Spanish Government before His Majesty, and to delay to accept it till His Majesty's pleasure should be known; but it occurred to me that this mode of proceeding might not be understood at Seville, and that the Spanish Government might be displeased at the temporary refusal of the honor they conferred upon me, that it might interfere with political objects, which the British Ambassador might have in view, at the same time that I make the acceptance referrible to the subsequent pleasure of His Majesty.

'I therefore wrote two answers to this part of Don Martin de Garay's letter (of which I enclose copies), leaving it to Lord Wellesley to deliver that which he thought proper, in a letter to his Lordship, of which I enclose a copy; and I enclose the copy of his Lordship's answer, stating that he had delivered the second letter. I accepted the horses which the Government intended to present to me in the name of King Ferdinand the Seventh; but declined to accept the pay of Captain General in another letter to Don Martin de Garay, of which I enclose a copy.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Viscount Castlereagh.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.*

'MY LORD,

'Truxillo, 21st August, 1809.

'I wrote some days ago a letter to the French Commander in Chief, which I sent to him by Lieut. Colonel Waters, to request his care and attention to the wounded officers and soldiers of the British army who had fallen into his hands, in return for the care and attention which I had paid to the French officers and soldiers who had fallen into my hands at different times; and that he would allow money to be sent to the officers; and that officers, who should not be deemed prisoners of war, might be sent to superintend and take care of the soldiers, till they should recover from their wounds, when these officers should be sent to join the British army.

'I received a very civil answer from Marshal Mortier, promising that every care should be taken, and every attention paid to the British officers and soldiers who were wounded; but stating that he could not answer upon the

other demands contained in my letter, having been obliged to refer them to the Commander in Chief.

‘ Since the receipt of this letter, Mr. Dillon, the Assistant Commissary, has arrived from Talavera, having been taken prisoner near Cevolla, on the 27th of July, previous to the action, and having been allowed to come away.

‘ He reports that the British officers and soldiers who were wounded are doing remarkably well; and are well fed and taken care of; indeed, he says, preferable to the French troops.

‘ I propose to send Lieut. Colonel Waters with another flag of truce to-morrow evening, and a letter to the Commander in Chief of the French army, requesting that a sum of money, which I shall send, may be given to the officers; and I shall endeavor to establish a cartel of exchange as soon as possible.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Truxillo, 21st August, 1809.

‘ General Cuesta moved his head quarters from the neighbourhood of the bridge of Arzobispo, on the night of the 7th instant, to Peraleda de Garbin, leaving an advanced guard consisting of two divisions of infantry, and the Duque de Alburquerque’s division of cavalry, for the defence of the passage of the Tagus at this point.

‘ The French cavalry passed the Tagus at a ford immediately above the bridge, at half past one in the afternoon of the 8th, and surprised this advanced guard, which retired, leaving behind them all their cannon, as well as those in the batteries constructed for the defence of the bridge.

‘ General Cuesta then moved his head quarters to the Mesa de Ibor on the evening of the 8th, having his advanced guard at Bohonal. He resigned the command of the army on the 12th, on account of the bad state of his health, and the command has devolved upon General Eguia. The head quarters of the Spanish army are now at Deleytosa.

‘ It appears that a detachment of Venegas’s army had some success against the enemy in an attack made upon it in

the neighbourhood of Aranjuez on the 5th instant : General Venegas was then at Ocaña, and he had determined to retire towards the Sierra Morena ; and after the 5th, he had moved in that direction. He returned, however, towards Toledo, with an intention of attacking the enemy on the 12th instant ; but on the 11th, the enemy attacked him with Sebastiani's corps, and two divisions of Victor's, in the neighbourhood of Almonacid. The action appears to have lasted some hours, but the French having at last gained an advantage on General Venegas's left, he was obliged to retire, and was about to resume his position in the mountains of the Sierra Morena.

‘ On the 9th, 10th, and 11th, large detachments of the French troops, which had come from Plasencia, returned to that quarter ; and on the 12th, they attacked and defeated Sir Robert Wilson in the Puerto de Baños, on their return to Salamanca.

‘ It appears now, that the French force in this part of Spain is distributed as follows. Marshal Victor's corps is divided between Talavera and La Mancha ; Sebastiani's is in La Mancha ; Marshal Mortier's at Oropesa, Arzobispo, and Naval moral ; Marshal Soult's at Plasencia ; and Marshal Ney's at Salamanca.

‘ From this distribution of their forces, it is obvious that they do not intend at present to undertake any offensive operation : if any, it will be upon the right in La Mancha ; at the same time that if the combined armies were in a situation to be enabled to undertake any thing, they would experience great difficulty in the operation, and might be exposed to the same misfortune as that which stopped them lately, and deprived them of the fruits of their victory at Talavera.

‘ But from what follows, your Lordship will observe, that the British part of the army, at least, is incapable of undertaking any thing ; and that the distress for want of provisions, and its effects, have at last obliged me to move towards the frontiers of Portugal, in order to refresh my troops.

‘ In my former dispatches, I have informed your Lordship of our distress for the want of provisions and means of transport. These wants, which were the first cause of the loss of many advantages after the 22nd of July, which were made known to the Government, and were actually known by them



on the 20th of last month, still exist in an aggravated degree, and have produced all the evil effects upon the health and efficiency of the army which might have been expected from them.

‘ Since the 22nd of last month, when the Spanish and British armies joined, the troops have not received ten days’ bread; on some days they have received nothing; and for many days together only meat, without salt: frequently flour instead of bread, and scarcely ever more than one-third, or at most half, of a ration. The cavalry and the horses of the army have not received, in the same time, three regular deliveries of forage, particularly of barley, the only wholesome subsistence for a horse in this country; and the horses have been kept alive by what they could pick up for themselves, for which they have frequently been obliged to go from twelve to twenty miles’ distance, particularly lately.

‘ During a great part of this time, at least till the 4th or 5th of this month, I know that the Spanish army received their regular rations daily: after they lost the bridge of Arzobispo, I believe they were in want for some days; but since they have come through the passes of the mountains, I know, from the best authority, that of General Eguia, that the Spanish cavalry have been supplied daily with at least half a ration of barley, and I believe the troops have received their regular allowance of bread.

‘ The consequence of these privations upon the British army has been the loss of many horses of the cavalry and artillery. We lost one hundred in the cavalry last week; and we now want 1000 horses to complete the six regiments of dragoons, besides about 700 that are sick, and will probably be fit for service only after a considerable period of rest and good food. The horses of the artillery are also much diminished in numbers, and are scarcely able to draw the guns.

‘ The sickness of the army, from the same cause, has increased considerably; particularly among the officers, who have fared no better than the soldiers; and have had nothing but water to drink, and frequently nothing but meat without salt to eat, and seldom any bread, for the last month.

‘ Indeed, there are few, if any, officers or soldiers of the

army who, although doing their duty, are not more or less affected by dysentery, and the whole lie out, and nothing can be got for them in this part of the country.

‘ To these circumstances I must add, that I have not been able to procure means of transport of any description since my arrival in Spain. I was obliged to employ the largest proportion of the carts in the army, whether they carried money or ammunition, to convey the wounded soldiers to the hospital at Elvas; and the ammunition which was laid down at Mesa de Ibor and Deleytosa was delivered to the Spanish General. The few carts which remained in the army were required to move the sick we have at present, and I have been obliged to leave behind me the remainder of the reserve ammunition, which I have also given to the Spanish troops; and if I had waited longer, I should not have been able to move at all without leaving the sick behind.

‘ Under these circumstances, I determined to break up on the 20th from Jaraicejo, where I had had my head quarters since the 11th, with the advanced posts on the Tagus, near the bridge of Almaraz, and to fall back upon the frontiers of Portugal; where I hope I shall be supplied with everything I want.

‘ I have given your Lordship only an outline of the distresses of the army. You will find the details of them in my correspondence with the British Ministers at Seville, copies of which, I conclude, they will send home to the Foreign Office.

‘ Your Lordship will observe, that from the dispersed situation of the French army, and the losses the enemy has sustained, the Spanish troops are not likely to suffer any inconvenience from our absence; but I assure your Lordship that if I had been certain that the enemy could and would attack the Spaniards on the day after my departure, I could not, with justice to the army, have remained any longer; and there is not a General Officer in the army who has not repeatedly represented the lamentable and neglected situation in which we were placed, and the absolute necessity which existed that I should withdraw from Spain altogether.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Truxillo, 21st August, 1809.

‘ My dispatches of this date will give you an unpleasant account of our situation in this country, than which nothing indeed can be worse; we want everything and can get nothing; and we are treated in no respect as we ought to be; and I might almost say not even as friends.

‘ However, I acknowledge that I go with regret, and I wish that I had been able to stay a little longer, not that I think I could have done much good, for I am convinced that we should not have been able to resume the offensive.

‘ Our own cavalry and artillery are very low indeed: Cuesta’s army is much weakened. I understand that it has lost 10,000 men since it crossed the Tagus, although not 500 in action; whole corps, officers and all, have disbanded and gone off.

‘ If we could have fed, and have got up the condition of our horses, we might probably, after some time, have struck a brilliant blow upon Soult at Plasencia; or upon Mortier in the centre; but till there should be a force in the centre of Spain capable of keeping in check Ney’s corps, and probably Soult’s, or of alarming Joseph for Madrid, or till we could put a force in Baños on which we could depend, we could not hope to make any progress with the offensive in this quarter.

‘ The Marques de la Romana, who alone has numbers, has neither cavalry nor artillery, and cannot venture to quit the mountains; and he, I understand, was still at Coruña on the 5th; and we could depend upon nothing excepting British to keep Ney, and eventually, Soult, out of Estremadura, after what I have seen of Spanish troops.

‘ I shall not now answer your letter respecting the discipline of the army, notwithstanding that I am more than ever convinced that something is necessary to be done.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Marshal Mortier, Duc de Treviso.*

‘ Au Quartier Général de l’Armée Anglaise,  
ce 22 Août, 1809.

‘ MONSIEUR,

‘ J’ai eu l’honneur de recevoir la lettre que vous m’avez écrite, et je vous suis bien obligé de la promesse que vous m’y faites d’avoir soin des blessés de l’armée Anglaise qui vous sont tombés dans les mains. Monsieur le Commissaire Dillon est aussi arrivé il y a quelques jours, et m’a fait grand plaisir en m’apprenant les bontés que vous avez pour ces braves officiers et soldats.

‘ Je vous envoie encore le Colonel Waters, à qui j’ai donné 139 onces d’Espagne ou 500 livres sterling ; et je vous serai bien obligé si vous voulez permettre que cette somme soit donnée au plus ancien des officiers Anglais, avec ordre de la distribuer parmi les autres officiers et les chirurgiens qui sont prisonniers. Je vous prie aussi de permettre qu’il m’envoie un mémoire, avec les noms de ceux auxquels il aura donné l’argent, et la somme qu’il a donnée à chacun. Je vous serai bien obligé si vous voulez laisser partir sur sa parole tout officier qui sera suffisamment rétabli ; et si vous voulez établir un échange, je m’engagerai à faire renvoyer en France autant du même rang d’officiers et de soldats que vous me renverrez, et vous nommerez ceux qui retourneront en France.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Maréchal Mortier.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Miajadas, 22nd August, 1809.

‘ I have this day had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s dispatch of the 20th instant. My former letters will have apprized your Excellency that I was aware that Marshal Ney’s corps was gone to Salamanca. In respect to the intelligence from General Venegas, it appears to me that the enemy have no intention to make any progress in that quarter beyond the foot of the mountains. If they entertained any intention of proceeding farther, they would have gone in greater strength.

‘ Whatever may be the enemy’s designs in that quarter,

my former dispatches must have convinced your Excellency that I was unable to co-operate in any movement in this quarter, which should have for its object to draw the enemy from La Mancha, or indeed in any movement of any description, excepting that which I am now making; having no provisions, no stores, no means of transport; being overloaded with sick; the horses of the cavalry being scarcely able to march, or those of the artillery to draw the guns; and the officers and soldiers being worn down by want of food, and privations of every description.

‘The Spanish Ministers cannot have adverted to what I have frequently repeated to them through different channels since the 17th of last month, viz.—that if I were not supplied with what I required, not only I could not co-operate in any forward movement, but must withdraw from Spain; or they could not give credit to the existence of the wants of the British army; or they must believe me to be so exceedingly desirous of serving them, that whatever might be the consequences to the army, I should make it march and fight so long as two men should remain together.

‘Nobody feels more disappointed and hurt than I do, that so little attention has been paid to the demands which I have frequently made; and whatever may be the consequence of the steps which I have been compelled to take, I am in no manner responsible for them.

‘I have now proceeded three marches to the rear from Jaraicejo since the 20th, and have not met a supply of any description on its way to the army; so that if I had remained at Jaraicejo so long, it would have been the 26th before the army would have received any of the supplies from Seville; and yet Don L. de Calvo undertook that the army should be fully supplied on every day after the 19th, and was much surprised that I had no confidence in his promises of the arrival of supplies, respecting the progress of which upon the road, or even of their quitting Seville, he had no information.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY DEAR WELLESLEY,

‘ Merida, 24th August, 1809.

‘ I have not lost a moment in replying to your dispatch which I received in the night. I think you will agree with me in opinion that it is best that I should have no more communication with the Spaniards, although it is by no means necessary, nor do I intend, to hurry into Portugal.

‘ I have just heard that the Junta have ordered General Eguia to move to the rear. I do not understand from his letters to Colonel O’Lalor whether that movement is to be made with or without my sanction; but I have desired Colonel O’Lalor to say that I have written to Seville to express my disagreement in opinion with the person who proposed the movement, and to recommend to General Eguia not to move till we hear further. If he should not think of commencing his movement till to-morrow, I shall be in time to stop him.

‘ I believe you were not aware how we stood with the Spaniards with respect to any agreement, when you wrote to me your private letter of the 22nd. In fact, we are under no agreement to furnish any troops.

‘ Ever yours, most affectionately,

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Merida, August 24, 1809.

‘ I had the honor of receiving last night, at Medellin, your Excellency’s dispatch, marked C, and dated the 22nd instant.

‘ From all that I have heard of the state of the Government of Seville, I am not surprised that they should have been astonished and alarmed, when they heard that I had at last determined to adopt the measure which I had so frequently informed them I should adopt.

‘ Although I was desirous to avoid, as long as possible, withdrawing into Portugal, and certainly remained in the position upon the Tagus so long as it was practicable, and longer probably than was consistent with the anxiety which



I have always felt for the welfare and comfort of the troops placed under my command, I am of opinion that, having been compelled to withdraw, it becomes a question for serious consideration, whether any circumstances should now induce me to remain in Spain, and to hold out hopes of further co-operation with the Spanish troops, to be decided on grounds very different from those which were to lead to a decision whether, being joined in co-operation with the Spanish army, I ought or ought not to separate from them.

‘ I beg to lay my ideas upon that point before your Excellency, and to request the aid of your superior judgment to enable me to decide upon it, in the manner which will be most beneficial to the national interests.

‘ When the two armies were joined, this implied engagement existed between them, that so long as the operations were conducted by mutual consent, they were to continue in co-operation; and I should not have considered myself justified in separating from the Spanish army, unless Portugal should evidently have required the protection of the British army; or unless the Spanish army should have been under the necessity of adopting a line of operation, to follow which would separate me from Portugal; or, unless driven, as I was, to separate by necessity; or, unless the Spanish army had again behaved so ill, as a military body, as it did in its shameful flight from the bridge of Arzobispo.

‘ I conceived this last case would have made it so notorious that it was necessary for me to separate, that I had determined that it should induce a separation equally with the occurrence of any of the other three; and I should have stated it broadly and fairly, as my reason for withdrawing the British army from all communication with a body endowed with qualities as soldiers in a degree so far inferior to themselves.

‘ Your Excellency will observe that my conduct in continuing with the Spanish army would have been guided by a fair view of our reciprocal situation, and by a consideration of what they might understand to be an engagement to act with them, so long as it was consistent with the orders I had received, “ to consider my army applicable to the defence of Portugal,” with which orders the Spanish Government are fully acquainted.

‘ At the present moment, however, I have been compelled to separate from the Spanish army; and the question now is, whether I shall place myself in co-operation with them again.

‘ The first point which I should wish your Excellency to consider is the difference of the reasoning by which the decision of this question must be guided, from that which I have above stated would have guided, and did in fact guide me in the decision of the other. In that case I considered the armies to be under an implied engagement to each other, not to separate excepting on certain defined or easily definable grounds; but in this case there is positively no engagement of any description. There is none in the treaty between His Majesty and the Spanish Government: there is none expressed or implied by me.

‘ Indeed, the argument would lead the other way: for His Majesty, having offered the Spanish Government the services of his army upon certain conditions, the conditions were refused; and it must have been understood that His Majesty would not give the aid of his army; and accordingly His Majesty has never ordered, but has only permitted me to carry on such operations in Spain as I might think proper, upon my own responsibility, and as were consistent with the safety of Portugal.

‘ The question then comes before me to be decided as a new one, whether I shall again join in co-operation with the Spanish army.

‘ I must here take into consideration, as I did upon the first occasion, the objects of such co-operation, the means which exist of attaining those objects, and the risks I shall incur of loss to my army, and of losing sight of Portugal; for the defence of which country the British army has been sent to the Peninsula.

‘ The object held out in your Excellency’s dispatch, and which I consider as only the first and immediate object (for I am convinced your Excellency must look to offensive operations as soon as the means shall be prepared for them), is the defence of the Guadiana.

‘ Upon this point I must inform your Excellency that, in my opinion, the Guadiana is not to be defended by a weaker army against a stronger. It is fordable in very many places,



and it affords no position that I know of; and the result of withdrawing the Spanish army from its present position to that which has been proposed to your Excellency for them, would be to expose them to be defeated before I could assist them.

‘ The Spanish army is at this moment in the best position in this part of the country, which they ought to hold against any force that can be brought against them, if they can hold any thing. As long as they continue in it, they cover effectually the passages of the Guadiana, which they would not cover by the adoption of any other position; and their retreat from it, in case of accident, must always be secure. There is no chance of their being attacked by superior numbers. I have reason to believe that Soult, as well as Ney, has passed through the mountains into Castille; and there remain only Mortier’s corps, and two divisions of Victor’s in Estremadura; the total of which force cannot amount to 25,000 men.

‘ The subsistence of the Spanish army in their present position, particularly now that we have withdrawn, cannot be very difficult.

‘ Upon the whole, then, I recommend that they should continue in their present position as long as possible, sending away to Badajoz the bridge of boats, which is still opposite to Almaraz.

‘ According to this reasoning, it does not appear to be necessary, and it is not very desirable, that the British army should be involved in the defence of the Guadiana.

‘ But it might be asked, Is there no chance of resuming the offensive?

‘ In answer, I have to observe, that at present I see none, and hereafter certainly none. Your Excellency is informed of the history of the causes which led to the late change in our operations, from the offensive, after a victory, to defensive. The same causes would certainly exist if we were to recommence our operations. The French have as many troops as we have; indeed I am not certain that they are not now superior to us in numbers, as they are certainly, at least to the Spanish army, in discipline and every military quality. Unless we could depend upon the troops employed to keep the passes of the mountains, we could not prevent the French corps in



Castille from coming upon our rear, while those in Estremadura and La Mancha would be in our front.

‘ But I certainly can never place any reliance upon the Spanish troops to defend a pass; and I could not venture to detach from the British army, British troops in sufficient numbers to defend the passes of Baños and Perales. Even if we could, however, by the defence of those passes, prevent the enemy from attacking us in the rear, we could not prevent him from penetrating by the passes of Guadarrama or Avila, and adding to the numbers in our front.

‘ To this add, that there are no troops in the north of Spain which could be employed to make a diversion. Blake has lost his army; the Marques de la Romana is still in Galicia; and he cannot venture to quit the mountains, having neither cavalry nor artillery; the Duque del Parque has very few troops; and, as he has shown lately, he does not like to risk them at a distance from Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ But I come now to another topic, which is one of serious consideration, and has considerable weight in my judgment upon this whole subject, and that is the frequent, I ought to say constant, and shameful misbehavior of the Spanish troops before the enemy. We in England never hear of their defeats and flights; but I have heard of Spanish officers telling of nineteen and twenty actions of the description of that at the bridge of Arzobispo, an account of which has, I believe, never been published.

‘ In the battle of Talavera, in which the Spanish army, with very trifling exceptions, was not engaged, whole corps threw away their arms, and ran off *in my presence*, when they were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack, but frightened, I believe, by their own fire.

‘ I refer your Excellency for evidence upon this subject to General Cuesta’s orders, in which, after extolling the gallantry of his army in general, he declares his intention to decimate the runaways, an intention which he afterwards carried into execution.

‘ When these dastardly soldiers run away, they plunder every thing they meet; and in their flight from Talavera, they plundered the baggage of the British army, which was at the moment bravely engaged in their cause.

‘ I can easily conceive the unwillingness of officers in com-

mand, or acting with troops, to report their misbehavior in presence of the enemy, for where the troops misbehave no honor can be acquired; and in this way I account for the numerous histories we have of the bravery of the Spanish troops.

‘ I have found, upon inquiry and from experience, the instances of the misbehavior of the Spanish troops to be so numerous, and those of their good behavior so few, that I must conclude that they are troops by no means to be depended upon; and then the question again arises, whether, being at liberty to join in co-operation with those troops or not, I ought again to risk the King’s army?

‘ There is no doubt whatever, but that every thing that is to be done must be done by us; and certainly the British army cannot be deemed sufficiently strong to be the only acting efficient military body to be opposed to a French army consisting of not less than 70,000 men.

‘ Upon every ground, therefore, of objects, means, and risks, it is my opinion that I ought to avoid entering into any further co-operation with the Spanish armies; and that, at all events, your Excellency should avoid holding out to the Government any hope that I would consent to remain within the Spanish frontier, with any intention of co-operating in future with the Spanish troops.

‘ At the same time I see the difficulty in which the Government may be placed. Their army may be seized with one of those panic terrors to which they are liable, and may run off and leave every thing exposed to instant loss. To which I answer, that I am in no hurry to withdraw from Spain. I want to give my troops food and refreshment, and I shall not withdraw into Portugal, at all events, till I shall have received your Excellency’s sentiment upon what I have submitted to your judgment.

‘ If I should withdraw into Portugal, I shall go no farther than the frontier (but to this I should not wish to engage); and I shall be so near, that the enemy will not like to venture across the Guadiana, unless he comes in very large force indeed, having me upon his flank and his rear.

‘ I shall, in effect therefore, be as useful to the Spanish Go-

vernment within the Portuguese frontier as I should be in the position which has been proposed to your Excellency ; and indeed more useful, as I expect that the nearer I shall move to Portugal, the more efficient I shall become ; at the same time that by going within the Portuguese frontier, I clear myself entirely of the Spanish army ; and shall have an opportunity hereafter of deciding whether I shall co-operate with them at all, in what manner, and to what extent, and under what conditions, according to the circumstances of the moment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. Since writing the above, Lieut. Colonel O’Lalor has received a letter from General Eguia, stating that he has received orders from the Government to retire upon Villa Nueva de la Serena, in consequence of the movement made by the troops under my command.

‘ If he should retire so far, it will be necessary that he should fall back still farther to Monasterio, having no position upon the Guadiana.

‘ I have also to observe to your Excellency, that even if I should remain in Spain, it will be impossible for me to take up the position which it has been proposed to your Excellency that I should take up ; as, in case of the further retreat of the Spanish army, I should find it difficult to get back into Portugal.

‘ Indeed, at all events, the best way for me to cover the Guadiana and Seville is by a position on the enemy’s flank.’

*To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Merida, 25th August, 1809.’

‘ I received by Mr. Hay, on the day before yesterday, your letter of the 4th August, and having for some time past turned my mind very seriously to the consideration of the points to which it relates, I am not unprepared to give you an opinion upon them.

‘ The information which I have acquired in the last two months has opened my eyes respecting the state of the war in the Peninsula ; and I shall just state a few facts which



will enable the King's ministers to form their own opinions upon it.

‘ I calculate the French force in the Peninsula now to consist of about 125,000 men : of this number, about 70,000 are in this part of Spain ; St. Cyr's corps, about 20,000 men, are engaged in the siege of Gerona ; Suchet's, about 14,000, in Aragon ; and the remainder are employed in different garrisons, such as Avila, &c., and in keeping up the communication with France : all of which, if necessary, are disposable for the field. These 125,000 men are exclusive of the garrisons of Pamplona, Barcelona, &c. &c.

‘ These troops, you will observe, are all in Spain ; and against this force the Spaniards have, under Venegas and Eguia, late Cuesta's army, about 50,000 men ; Romana, the Duque del Parque, and every thing to the northward, about 25,000 ; Blake may have gotten together again about 5000 or 6000 ; and I believe there is nothing in Aragon and Catalonia, excepting an armed population.

‘ Thus, the Spaniards have not, at the end of eighteen months nearly, after the commencement of the revolution, above 80,000 men, of which the composition and quality will be found still more defective than the numbers are deficient to carry on the contest with the French even in their present strength.

‘ To these numbers add all the troops we can bring into the field at present, which are about 25,000 men, and about 10,000 Portuguese, and you will see that the allies are at this moment inferior in point of numbers only to the enemy in the Peninsula. However, in this account of the troops of the allies, I do not reckon many garrisons and towns occupied by both Spaniards and Portuguese ; nor do I reckon the French garrisons. I count only those men on both sides who can be brought into the field to fight.

‘ In respect to the composition of these armies, we find the French well supplied with troops of the different descriptions and arms required : viz., infantry, artillery, and cavalry, heavy and light.

‘ Cuesta's army had about 7000 cavalry, Venegas' about 3000, and there may be about 2000 more cavalry distributed throughout Spain,

‘ The English have about 2500 cavalry left, and the Por-

tuguese army may have 500 or 600. Probably, if all this cavalry were efficient, and could be divided as it ought to be, it might be sufficient, and might be found more numerous than that of the French in the Peninsula: but you will observe that all the cavalry is now in the south, and Romana's army (which it is most important to bring forward, as unless it is brought forward the allies can never make any impression on the French to the southward) has neither cavalry nor artillery, and cannot quit the mountains; neither has the Duque del Parque more than one regiment, or Blake more than the same number.

‘ I come now to the description of the troops, and here I am sorry to say that our allies fail us still more than they do in numbers and composition.

‘ The Spanish cavalry are, I believe, nearly entirely without discipline. They are in general well clothed, armed, and accoutred, and remarkably well mounted, and their horses are in good condition; I mean those of Eguia's army, which I have seen. But I have never heard any body pretend that in any one instance they have behaved as soldiers ought to do in presence of an enemy. They make no scruple of running off, and after an action are to be found in every village, and every shady bottom within fifty miles of the field of battle.

‘ The Spanish artillery are, as far as I have seen of them, entirely unexceptionable, and the Portuguese artillery excellent.

‘ In respect to the great body of all armies, I mean the infantry, it is lamentable to see how bad that of the Spaniards is, and how unequal to a contest with the French. They are armed, I believe, well; they are badly accoutred, not having the means of saving their ammunition from the rain; not clothed in some instances at all, in others clothed in such a manner as to make them look like peasants, which ought of all things to be avoided; and their discipline appears to me to be confined to placing them in the ranks, three deep at very close order, and to the manual exercise.

‘ It is impossible to calculate upon any operation with these troops. It is said that sometimes they behave well; though I acknowledge that I have never seen them behave otherwise than ill. Bassecourt's corps, which was supposed to be the best in Cuesta's army, and was engaged on our left

in the mountains, at the battle of Talavera, was kept in check throughout the day by one French battalion: this corps has since run away from the bridge of Arzobispo, leaving its guns; and many of the men, according to the usual Spanish custom, throwing away their arms, accoutrements, and clothing. It is a curious circumstance respecting this affair at Arzobispo, (in which Soult writes that the French took thirty pieces of cannon,) that the Spaniards ran off in such a hurry, that they left their cannon loaded and unspiked; and that the French, although they drove the Spaniards from the bridge, did not think themselves strong enough to push after them; and Colonel Waters, whom I sent in with a flag of truce on the 10th, relating to our wounded, found the cannon on the road, abandoned by the one party, and not taken possession of, and probably not known of, by the other.

‘ This practice of running away, and throwing off arms, accoutrements, and clothing, is fatal to every thing, excepting a re-assembly of the men in a state of nature, who as regularly perform the same manœuvre the next time an occasion offers. Nearly 2000 ran off on the evening of the 27th from the battle of Talavera, (not 100 yards from the place where I was standing,) who were neither attacked, nor threatened with an attack, and who were frightened only by the noise of their own fire: they left their arms and accoutrements on the ground, their officers went with them; and they, and the fugitive cavalry, plundered the baggage of the British army which had been sent to the rear. Many others went whom I did not see.

‘ Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army; and it is extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this nation has, by the measures it has adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been made in any one branch of the military profession by any individual, and that the business of an army should be so little understood. They are really children in the art of war, and I cannot say that they do any thing as it ought to be done, with the exception of running away and assembling again in a state of nature.

‘ I really believe that much of this deficiency of numbers, composition, discipline, and efficiency, is to be attributed to



the existing government of Spain. They have attempted to govern the kingdom in a state of revolution, by an adherence to old rules and systems, and with the aid of what is called enthusiasm; and this last is, in fact, no aid to accomplish any thing, and is only an excuse for the irregularity with which every thing is done, and for the want of discipline and subordination of the armies.

‘ People are very apt to believe that enthusiasm carried the French through their revolution, and was the parent of those exertions which have nearly conquered the world; but if the subject is nicely examined, it will be found that enthusiasm was the name only, but that force was the instrument which brought forward those great resources under the system of terror which first stopped the allies; and that a perseverance in the same system of applying every individual and every description of property to the service of the army, by force, has since conquered Europe.

‘ After this statement, you will judge for yourselves, whether you will employ any, and what strength of army in support of the cause in Spain.

‘ Circumstances with which you are acquainted have obliged me to separate myself from the Spanish army, and I can only tell you that I feel no inclination to join in co-operation with them again, upon my own responsibility; and that I shall see my way very clearly before me indeed, before I do so; and I do not recommend you to have any thing to do with them in their present state.

‘ Before I quit this part of the subject, it may be satisfactory to you to know that I do not think matters would have been much better if you had sent your large expedition to Spain, instead of to the Scheldt. You could not have equipped it in Galicia, or any where in the north of Spain.

‘ If we had had 60,000 men instead of 20,000, in all probability we should not have got to Talavera to fight the battle, for want of means and provisions. But if we had got to Talavera, we could not have gone farther, and the armies would probably have separated for want of means of subsistence, probably without a battle; but certainly afterwards.

‘ Besides, you will observe that your 40,000 men, supposing them to be equipped and means to exist of feeding them, would not compensate for the deficiency of numbers,

of composition, and of efficiency in the Spanish armies; and that supposing they had been able to remove the French from Madrid, they could not have removed them from the Peninsula, even in the existing state of the French force.

‘ I now come to another branch of the subject, which is Portugal itself. I have not got from Beresford his report upon the present, and the probable future state of the Portuguese army; and therefore I should wish to be understood as writing, upon this part of the subject, liable to corrections from him.

‘ My opinion is, and always has been, that the mode of applying the services of the English officers to the Portuguese army has been erroneous. I think that Beresford ought to have had the temporary assistance of the ablest officers the British service could afford; that these officers ought not to have been posted to regiments in the Portuguese army, but under the title of Adjutants to the Field Marshal, or any other, they ought to have superintended discipline, military movements, and arrangements of all descriptions, wherever they might be: fewer officers would then have answered his purpose, and every one given to him would have been useful; whereas many (all in the inferior ranks) are, under existing arrangements, useless.

‘ Besides this, the selection of officers sent out to Portugal for this service has been unlucky, and the decision on the questions which I sent to England on the 7th of June, has been made without reference to circumstances, or to the feelings or opinions of the individuals on whom it was to operate; and just like every other decision I have ever seen from the same quarter, as if men were stocks and stones.

‘ To this, add that rank (Portuguese rank, I mean) has been given in the most capricious manner. In some instances, a man not in the army at all is made a Brigadier General; in others, another who was the senior of the Brigadier General when both were in the army, is a Lieut. Colonel; then a junior Lieut. Colonel is made a Brigadier General, his senior a Colonel, and his senior a junior Colonel; and there are instances of juniors being preferred to seniors in every rank; in short, the Prince Regent of Por-



tugal is a despotic prince, and his commissions have been given to British Officers and subjects in the most arbitrary manner at the Horse Guards; and the answer to all these complaints at the Horse Guards must be uniform, nobody has any right to complain; the Prince Regent has a right to give to any body any commission he pleases, bearing any date he chooses to assign to it. The officers of this army have to a man quitted the Portuguese service, as I said they would, and there is not an officer who has joined it from England who would not quit it if we would allow him; but here we keep them: so much for that arrangement.

‘The subject upon which particularly I wished Beresford to report, was the state of the Portuguese army in respect to its numbers. The troops have lately deserted to an alarming degree; and, in fact, none of the regiments are complete. The Portuguese army is recruited by conscription constitutionally, very much in the same manner with the French army; but then it must be recollected, that, for the last fifty years nearly, the troops have never left their province, and scarcely ever their native town; and their discipline, and the labors and exertion required from them, were nothing.

‘Things are much altered lately, and notwithstanding that the pay has been increased, I fear that the animal is not of the description to bear up against what is required of him; and he deserts most terribly.

‘The military forces stationed in the provinces enabled the civil government to carry into execution the conscription; but under present circumstances, the military force is upon principle, as well as necessity, removed to a distance. The civil government has been so frequently overthrown in all parts of Portugal, that it can hardly be said to exist; and there is another circumstance which I am afraid cramps its operations, particularly those operations which are to put a restraint upon the people, and that is, that they are all armed, and they defy the civil magistrate and the government who order them to march as conscripts, whose authority is unsupported by a sufficient military force: I am therefore very apprehensive that Beresford will find it impossible to fill his ranks: however, as I said before, I should wish Government to delay making their minds up on this



part of the subject till I shall be enabled to send them Beresford's report, for which I have called.

‘ The next point in this subject is, supposing the Portuguese army to be rendered efficient, what can be done with it and Portugal, if the French should obtain possession of the remainder of the Peninsula? My opinion is, that we ought to be able to hold Portugal, if the Portuguese army and militia are complete.

‘ The difficulty upon this sole question lies in the embarkation of the British army. There are so many entrances into Portugal, the whole country being frontier, that it would be very difficult to prevent the enemy from penetrating; and it is probable that we should be obliged to confine ourselves to the preservation of that which is most important—the capital.

‘ It is difficult, if not impossible, to bring the contest for the capital to extremities, and afterwards to embark the British army. You will see what I mean, by a reference to the map. Lisbon is so high up the Tagus that no army that we could collect would be able at the same time to secure the navigation of the river by the occupation of both banks, and the possession of the capital. One of the objects must, I fear, be given up, and that which the Portuguese would give up would be the navigation of the Tagus; and, of course, our means of embarkation. However, I have not entirely made up my mind upon this interesting point. I have a great deal of information upon it, but I should wish to have more before I can decide upon it.

‘ In the mean time, I think that Government should look to sending back at least the coppered transports, as soon as the grand expedition shall have done with them; and as they receive positive intelligence that Napoleon is reinforcing his armies in Spain: for you may depend upon it, that he and his Marshals must be desirous of revenging upon us the different blows we have given them; and that when they come into the Peninsula, their first and great object will be to get the English out.

‘ I think the first part of my letter will give you my opinion respecting one notion you entertained, viz., that the Spaniards might be induced to give the command of their armies to a British Commander in Chief.

‘ If such offer should be made to me, I shall decline to accept it till I shall receive His Majesty’s pleasure; and I strongly recommend to you, unless you mean to incur the risk of the loss of your army, not to have any thing to do with Spanish warfare on any ground whatever, in the existing state of things. In respect to Cadiz, the fact is this, that the jealousy of all the Spaniards, even of those most attached to us, respecting Cadiz, is so rooted, that even if the Government should cede that point (and in their present difficulties I should not be surprised if they were to cede it) to induce me to remain in Spain, I should not think any garrison which this army could spare to be safe in the place.

‘ If you should take Cadiz you must lay down Portugal, and take up Spain; you must occupy Cadiz with a garrison of from 15,000 to 20,000 men, and you must send from England an army to be employed in the field with the Spaniards, and make Cadiz your retreat instead of Lisbon.

‘ You ought, along with Cadiz, to insist upon the command of the armies of Spain. I think you would certainly be able in that case to get away your troops, secure the Spanish ships, &c. &c. &c.

‘ But you see from the facts in the commencement of this letter, how little prospect you have of bringing the contest to the conclusion for which we all wish.

‘ I shall be very glad if you will send us the remount horses, and any regiment of dragoons that is to come, as soon as possible; the best thing to do then, probably, would be to draft the horses of one of the regiments to complete the others, and send that regiment home dismounted. It would be very desirable also to send us 600 or 700 sets of horse appointments.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Merida, 26th August, 1809.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for the orders which you have given respecting the convalescents of the British army, and the stores belonging to the flying artillery, which you

found at Castello Branco. In respect to General Lightburne's brigade, if you do not want it, order him to go to Abrantes to occupy the huts in front of that town, and to report to head quarters.

‘ I have been for some time very anxious respecting the description of officers who have been sent to you from England. I have always been of opinion that the most advantageous mode of using the English officers, who should be sent to Portugal, would have been not as regimental officers, but as a description of staff, unknown, I believe, to all armies excepting the French. They should have been called Adjutants, or Adjutants General to the Field Marshal, and he should have placed them where he pleased, to superintend the discipline of individual corps, the movements or operations of armies, or any other operation, and their power should have been supreme, wherever he should think proper to employ them.

‘ The officers to be employed in this manner must have been the best the British service could afford, probably so like black swans, that the service could afford very few of them; but fewer would have been required, and the service of all would have been efficient; whereas I suspect that the service of many of those you have got is not worth the expense, and that as the Portuguese will have become acquainted with their ignorance and inefficiency, their respect for them will diminish.

‘ I recommend to you to turn this notion of mine in your mind, and see whether you could not engraft upon the present system, a system such as that which I have suggested to you. For instance, supposing that from among your officers of all ranks you were to select from twelve to twenty of the best to be employed, with any title you pleased, in the manner which I have proposed.

‘ Almost upon recollection, I could name twelve who might be so employed with advantage; some of whom are now of no use in the subordinate situations in which they are placed, and the use of the others is extremely limited.

‘ The great objection to this plan is, the jealousy it would create among the Portuguese military. I should doubt, however, whether that jealousy would be greater than it is under the existing arrangement; and I think in reason it



ought not to be so great: at all events, this system would have the advantage of being efficient, your eye and directions being everywhere; whereas the other, with the instruments you have to work with, cannot be so.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Merida, 27th August, 1809.

‘ As the army is about to return into Portugal, I wish you very much to turn your mind to the state of its conveyances, upon which I am about to give you my opinion.

‘ The lines with which it is most important it should communicate are the direct line from Elvas to Lisbon, and that from Elvas to Abrantes.

‘ I request you, therefore, as soon as possible, to communicate with the officers of the Portuguese Government respecting conveyances upon these roads, to be established upon the following principles:—

‘ First, That every carriage required should carry 600 lbs., and shall go a certain number of days’ journey, at a certain price, when it shall be invariably relieved and be allowed to go home.

‘ Secondly, That these stages shall be fixed in reference to the conveniences of the country in assembling the number of waggons required, and that whenever — days’ notice is given to the proper office at Lisbon or Abrantes respectively, that any number of waggons are wanted, they shall be ordered to be prepared, and shall be ready at the different stages upon the road.

‘ But besides these conveyances, which will be required to keep up the communication between the army and Abrantes, and Lisbon respectively, it will be necessary to have with and attached to the army from 300 to 400 waggons with bullocks.

‘ It appears to me that the best mode of procuring these last will be to contract for them with one of the great Portuguese contractors at Lisbon.

‘ The terms of this contract may either be to supply the drivers with provisions, and the cattle with forage, or not. But I should prefer the first; and you may engage to pay

for these carts once a fortnight, keeping them a fortnight in arrear. The contractor to keep a person with the army to manage these carts, and no cart to be paid for which is not furnished with a native driver.

‘ I wish you to communicate with Mr. Villiers on these points, and request his assistance in both objects.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.,*  
*Commissary General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Merida, 28th August, 1809.

‘ I am anxious to receive your Excellency’s sentiments on the points discussed in my dispatch of the 24th instant, No. 14, as it will be necessary that I should make early arrangements to draw out of Portugal the supplies of ammunition, stores, and necessaries for the troops, which I have reason to believe are already collected at Elvas.

‘ Having been able to separate the army, the troops have received their regular rations since the 25th instant, with the exception of the horses of the cavalry.

‘ I have to inform your Excellency, however, that none of the supplies, either of provisions or means of transport, which Don L. de Calvo informed me, and the Spanish ministers informed your Excellency, were so near the army, have yet reached Merida, which is at least four marches from Jaraijejo; and I entertain doubts whether any of them were even ordered, till your Excellency presented your first note to the ministers.

‘ The officers and troops are still very unhealthy, and I fear that I shall find it difficult to remove them from hence to Elvas, where the British hospital is established, for want of carriages, and I can get none here. The loss of horses also continues to be very great, on account of the necessity of giving them wheat instead of barley.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Merida, 30th August, 1809.

‘ I received yesterday your letter of the 27th. I know of no change of circumstances which ought to occasion an alteration of the plan you had fixed upon for your troops; and having once concurred in that plan, and having nothing to communicate to you from this quarter, I have not written to you for some days.

‘ I should like to have Sir Robert Wilson on this side the Tagus in our front. We must have somebody within the Spanish frontier; and we ought to have with this army some troops belonging to the country. Sir Robert is much liked here, and I should prefer him to any body else: I should wish you, therefore, if you can spare him, to send somebody else in front of the Portuguese army to Castello Branco and Penamacor; but if you wish to keep Sir Robert, I shall not ask for him.

‘ Upon trial, I rather think the Portuguese are better than the Spaniards; at all events, with their English officers. My plan now is to remain on the defensive, and not to enter into any plan of co-operation with the Spanish army of any description (unless ordered from England) till I shall see defined objects and corresponding means to effect them.

‘ As affairs are now settled, the French have more troops that they can bring into the field than we have, including Romana, who, from the want of artillery and cavalry, cannot quit the mountains. To this add, that the Spanish troops have no discipline, that they are not efficient, that they are defective even in the spirit of troops; that they cannot be depended upon for any operation of any description, and that they want means of all kinds; and I believe it will be admitted, that unless I undertake, with 25,000 British troops, to conquer Spain, I must either be satisfied with maintaining myself in Portugal as long as I can, or I must make up my mind to take upon my own shoulders the disgrace of the certain failure which must attend the military operations in Spain.

‘ You and I might make a very pretty little expedition into Castille, which we might concert with the military section of the Junta, and we should have the promise of all the



Generals for their hearty co-operation. The French would then put 10,000 men at Almaraz, 5000 at Arzobispo, and 5000 at Toledo, which would effectually keep in check the Spanish army, and they would collect about 50,000 men in Castille to oppose us. There would thus be an end to this expedition.

‘ You shall have Mr. Rawlings whenever you please, and any other assistance that I can give you in that line; but we have lost some commissaries, and others are sick; and we are much less efficient in that branch than we were when I gave you this assistance before, although the demand for the service of commissaries is greater, on account of the increased numbers of troops.

‘ In respect to the officers of cavalry, I can only say that when an officer applies to me to go into the Portuguese service, I must in such case inquire whether he can be spared from his regiment. We have lost many officers, and a very great proportion are sick, and if I were now called upon to answer, I should say that this army can spare none of any description; but I should wish to delay giving any answer till the request shall be made by any individual, when his particular case and the demands of his regiment will be considered.

‘ I think the complaints of B—— and C—— exceedingly unreasonable, ridiculous, and improper. I do not see any greater objection to making an officer of an English gentleman than to making an officer of a Portuguese gentleman. They could not object to the latter, and yet they do to the former. I am not quite certain whether —— is not the best appointment that has been made by the Horse Guards, and he is one of those I should recommend to you to use, as I pointed out in my last letter.

‘ As for ——, his conduct is more extraordinary and improper than that of the others, and whatever may be done respecting them, he cannot be allowed to quit the service, for he got a step of promotion in the King’s service to induce him to go into the Portuguese service.

‘ It would be a curious circumstance if he were to say, “Now that I am an English Lieut. Colonel and a Portuguese Colonel, the Portuguese Government shall not exercise the prerogative it has always exercised over the army, of making any gentlemen they pleased officers of any rank.”

‘ I think that we ought to have at Villa Velha a bridge instead of a flying bridge. The only operation that the French can undertake, which can do Portugal any permanent mischief, is the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and we must all move to prevent its success. The movement would be much accelerated by having a bridge there instead of a flying one. I should not be surprised if they undertook this operation, for they can really do nothing else.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Merida, 30th August, 1809.

‘ I received yesterday your letter of the 24th, and last night that of the 28th. All your couriers have either gone, or will go to you this day. I dispatch one whenever I have anything material to say to you; but when there is no alteration on my side the country, and none wished for on yours, I do not think it necessary or proper to put the public to the expense (no small one) of sending a courier. When you do not hear from me you may depend upon it there is no alteration since the last letter.

‘ I omitted in my letter of yesterday to recommend to keep your cavalry at Lisbon, or, at all events, somewhere upon the Tagus, or the Mondego, where they could draw their supplies from the sea, or from a distance. We must look to the operations which we may have to carry on in the advanced season of the year, to the necessity which may exist of assembling large bodies of troops between the Mondego and the Tagus; and we should take care of the resources in that part of the country, particularly the straw. I beg you, therefore, to keep your cavalry out of it; and if you have occasion to move them through it, let it be in small bodies, and by different routes.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I wish that you would make out for Government a report on the present state of the Portuguese army and militia, stating particularly the prospect which exists of keeping the former complete in numbers.’

*To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Merida, 30th August, 1809.

‘ I have received from England a copy of the orders from the Treasury to you of the 5th inst., relative to the disposal of 209,909 ounces of silver in bars, and of 17,948 ounces of gold coins, consigned to you by his Majesty’s ship *Fylla*\*.

‘ You will be so kind as to hold the silver above mentioned at the disposal of Mr. Villiers, for the purposes of the Portuguese Government, and you will not pay the sum of £15,000 on account of bills in the hands of that Government, which I directed you to pay, and you will discontinue all payments to Mr. Villiers until you shall receive further directions from me. I shall send directions respecting the gold coin upon a future occasion.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will make out, as soon as possible, the estimate directed to be sent in the last paragraph of the letter from the Treasury, and I request you will transmit it to me before you send it home.

‘ I am very desirous of knowing what progress has been made in paying for the supplies, &c., received by the army at Coimbra and in the north of Portugal; and what sum still remains due in that quarter or elsewhere, on account of the army under my command.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 12th, I have to inform you that I had settled with Mr. Villiers that Mr. Bell should draw upon you for a net sum, with the amount of which I would acquaint him on the 1st of every month. Mr. Bell’s drafts are, however, now entirely stopped, and there is no occasion for troubling you with detailed instructions upon that subject till the period at which they may be recommenced.

‘ I conclude that all the demands at Ciudad Rodrigo are not unsupported by vouchers, and it appears to me that Mr. Nelson ought to have been supplied with money to pay those which were regular and would have been admitted.

In answer to your letter of the 22nd, I have to inform you that I conceive it would be desirable to exchange the French

\* One of the ships of war taken at Copenhagen.



gold coins, referred to in the enclosure therein, for Portuguese gold coins.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.,*  
*Commissary General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To W. Huskisson, Esq., Secretary to the Treasury.*

‘ MY DEAR HUSKISSON,

‘ Merida, 30th August, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 6th instant. You will have learned with great satisfaction that the market for bills has been much more productive of money lately at Lisbon, as well as at Cadiz and Gibraltar, than we had found it, or had reason to expect it would be on my first arrival in Portugal; and I am convinced that we shall be able to go on without drawing any more specie from England, at least till you shall know the result of Mr. Cochrane Johnstone’s speculation.

‘ I shall take care that you shall have from Mr. Murray all the information you require respecting our demands.

‘ I believe the greater part of the world will lament that I was not detained a little longer at Abrantes, and they will not quarrel with me for waiting for money which I knew would alone procure the supplies which I have since found could not be procured even for ready money.

‘ I wish that the eyes of the people of England were open to the real state of affairs in Spain, as mine are; and I only hope, if they should not be so now, that they will not purchase the experience by the loss of an army.

‘ We have gained a great and glorious victory over more than double our numbers, which has proved to the French that they are not the first military nation in the world. But the want of common management in the Spaniards, and of the common assistance which every country gives to any army, and which this country gives most plentifully to the French, have deprived us of all the fruits of it.

‘ The Spaniards have neither numbers, efficiency, discipline, bravery, nor arrangement, to carry on the contest; and if I could consent to remain in Spain, its burthen and the disgrace of its failure would fall upon me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *W. Huskisson, Esq.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Merida, 30th August, 1809.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 26th, containing that which you forwarded from Pole\*.

‘ I had hoped that I had at last settled the share which the Portuguese Government were to have of all the supplies which we should receive; but the Government at home having interfered, as appears by the enclosed letters, we are as far from a settlement as ever.

‘ The object of this interference is certainly to prevail upon the Portuguese Government to take this silver in bars for more than it is worth in the market of Lisbon; for, with all our grandeur, we are not above turning a penny in an honest way when we can.

‘ I shall write to Mr. Murray, to desire that the silver in bars may be disposed of according to your orders; and I conclude that it will defray all the demands on account of the Portuguese troops till the end of September, and of course that you will not have occasion to make any demands upon us till the beginning of November. However, you will let me know if I am mistaken on the subject.

‘ I had ordered the £15,000 to be paid immediately, but I shall now of course countermand that order.

‘ I do not know what can be done to Oporto. It appears to me that it cannot be defended, excepting by an army in the field; and whether the army should be assembled for the defence of that place only, or for the defence of any other part of Portugal which may at the same time be threatened, must be a question to be determined by those who are to consider of the general defence of the country at the moment it is menaced. It is very obvious, however, that the lines at Oporto did more harm than good, and would do more harm than good again, if they were not to be defended by a good army.

‘ Those who are attached to Oporto, or to any other situation, may think that an army cannot be better employed than in the defence of that important city, or in that of the situation to which they are attached; and may be of opinion

\* The Hon. W. Wellesley Pole, now Lord Maryborough.



that a portion of the army ought to be allotted to defend the lines which ought to be immediately constructed. But I cannot agree in these opinions; and at all events Beresford, being in the command of the Portuguese army, must be consulted, and give his opinion upon this subject.

‘ A partizan like Baptiste may do a great deal of good; but, if my memory does not fail me, Baptiste is the most useless of that description of persons. He was upon the frontiers of Portugal when I was in pursuit of Soult; and he certainly not only did nothing, but kept out of the way, although he might have done much. At all events, there is now no enemy upon the Portuguese frontier, particularly north of the Douro, the scene with which Baptiste is best acquainted.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY DEAR WELLESLEY,

‘ Merida, 30th August, 1809.

‘ I enclose you a Gazette and a bulletin of the 11th, which I received last night. I have received no letters, excepting one from Pole, in which he informs me that it is understood in England that the Emperor did not approve of the armistice concluded by the Archduke, and that peace between Austria and France was not considered certain.

‘ He also tells me that my letter of the 24th July to the Secretary of State (of which I enclose a copy) had been received, and that the Government approved of my determination to quit Spain, if I should not be supplied as I ought to be.

‘ I am very anxious to receive your answer to my letter of the 24th. The troops which had marched by the road of Caceres had not, by some accident, received the notification of my intention to halt here; and being ill provided on that road, they have pushed on for the frontier of Portugal.

‘ The army is therefore, at this moment, separated at a greater distance than it ought to be under any circumstances, more particularly under the circumstances of the retreat of the Spanish army from their posts on the Tagus. I am not informed when that retreat is to be made, but I believe this



day; and if it should be so, I must either bring the British troops again out of Portugal, and have the army in a more collected state, or I must move those which I have detained here, waiting for your answer to my letter of the 24th, towards the frontiers of Portugal.

‘ Not having the benefit of your opinion, I shall adopt the latter, as being in conformity with my own, which has been strengthened by reflection since I wrote to you.

‘ Ever yours, most affectionately,

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Merida, 31st August, 1809.

‘ The Spanish Government having lately sent forward a large number of shirts and sheets, for which I had applied through Mr. Frere, for the use of the hospitals, I shall be very much obliged to your Excellency if you will give directions that I may be furnished with an account of the expense of these articles, stating to whom I shall order payment to be made for them.

‘ The persons who brought them have run away with their mules, and I am apprehensive that I shall be obliged to leave here the shirts and sheets; but that is no reason why the Spanish Government should not be paid for them.

‘ After I had written to your Excellency on the 28th instant, nine carts arrived here from Seville, loaded with biscuit for the use of the British army; and the carts are marked as intended for our service. It is very desirable that I should be informed by the Government on what terms these carts are to be received into the service, whether to be purchased or hired, and at what rates.

‘ I propose now to employ them in the removal of the men who have been lately taken ill, to the hospital at Elvas; but if the Spanish Government should be of opinion that when the British army shall be in Portugal, it ought not to enjoy the advantage of the means of transport which have been procured for it in Spain, these carts shall be sent back, notwithstanding that if the Government and people of Portugal had acted upon the same principle when the British army

entered Spain, the army could not have made one march within the Spanish territory.

‘ I am very anxious to receive your Excellency’s sentiments upon the points which I submitted to you in my letter of the 24th (No. 14). That part of the British army (the cavalry particularly) which had moved by the road of Caceres, having been pressed for provisions, and not having, by some accident, received the notification of my intention to halt here for some days, had marched on, and has actually arrived within the Portuguese frontier.

‘ In the mean time the Spanish army has, I understand, marched to take up its position behind the Guadiana, and will probably arrive at La Serena this day. This being the case, it is necessary that I should get the British army in a more collected state, either in Portugal or within the Spanish frontier; and as the opinions contained in my dispatch (No. 14) of the 24th instant are strengthened by reflection since I addressed it to you, I propose to commence moving towards Badajoz on the day after to-morrow, unless I should in the intermediate time receive from your Excellency a communication of your sentiments which shall occasion an alteration of my opinion.

‘ The pontoon bridge which had been on the Tagus, near Almaraz, arrived here last night on its way to Badajoz. I cannot avoid taking this opportunity of drawing your Excellency’s attention to the ease with which all the services of this description, required for the Spanish army, have been performed, at the same time that nothing could be done, in the most urgent requisitions of service, as well as of humanity, for the British army.

‘ When the guns were taken from the enemy in the battle of Talavera, there was no difficulty about drawing them off; when the British army laid down its ammunition for want of the means of conveying it, there was no difficulty about transporting it; and there has been none in providing the means to remove the pontoon bridge from the neighbourhood of the Tagus, at Almaraz, to Badajoz. Yet the application of these means, at any period, to the service of the British army, would have relieved many of the difficulties under which we laboured, and would certainly have pre-



vented the separation from the Spanish army at the moment at which it was made.

But I beg your Excellency to observe, that among all the offers which were pressed upon me to divide the contents of the magazine of provisions at Truxillo, to take what I pleased from it, nay, to take the whole, even at the risk of starving the Spanish army, offers of which I knew and explained, and have since been able to prove, the fallacy, not one was made to assist the British army with a cart or a mule, or any means of transport, which abounded in the Spanish army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Merida, 1st September, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency’s private letter of the 29th August, containing a copy of Don M. de Garay’s note of the 25th of August, and of your Excellency’s answer of the 28th, and of your dispatch (marked D), of the 30th, and of your dispatch (marked separate), of the same date.

‘ I am happy to find that your Excellency concurs with me in the opinions, which I laid before you on the 24th ult., and I propose on to-morrow to commence my movement from this place. I intend that the greatest part of the army shall remain within the Spanish frontier, if I should be able to maintain it in that position; and I shall apprise your Excellency of the exact positions which I shall occupy, and hereafter of any change that I may think it necessary to make.

‘ My reason for wishing not to engage to remain on the Portuguese frontier is, that the principal magazines of the British army are at Abrantes, Santarem and Lisbon; and notwithstanding the good will of the Portuguese Government, and the inclination of the people to give us every assistance in their power, Alentejo being a poor country, I might find it impossible to maintain the whole army at such a distance from the magazines, as the positions which they will occupy on the frontier.



‘ Besides, I think it is desirable that the Spanish Government should be induced to look into and acquire an accurate knowledge of their real situation, compared with that of the enemy; and that they should be induced to make such an exertion as should at least provide for their defence by their own means.

‘ On this account, and as I think I ought not to involve His Majesty’s army in any system of co-operation with the Spanish troops, for the reasons stated in my dispatch of the 24th ultimo, I beg to decline accepting the honor, which the Government have offered to confer upon me, of the command of the corps of 12,000 men, to be left in this part of the country. I could not have accepted this command under any circumstances, without His Majesty’s permission, excepting for the time that I should have considered myself authorized by the instructions of His Majesty’s Ministers, or should have been enabled by circumstances to continue in co-operation with the Spanish army; but having been obliged to separate from them, and considering it advisable that the British army should not at present enter upon any system of co-operation with them again, I cannot take upon myself the command of any Spanish corps whatever.

‘ In respect to offensive operations in future, it is desirable that the means, actually existing in Spain, of the French and of the allies, should be reviewed, and the advantages which each party possesses in the use of those means should be weighed.

‘ I estimate the French force in Spain, disposable for service in the field, to amount to 125,000 men, well provided with cavalry and artillery; in which number I do not include the garrisons of Pamplona, Barcelona, &c. &c. I include, however, the corps commanded by St. Cyr and Suchet, which I calculate to amount to 32,000 men, employed in Aragon and Catalonia; and the remainder, being above 90,000 men, are in Castille and Estremadura. Of this number 70,000 men are actually in the field, in the corps of Victor, Soult, Ney, Mortier, and Sebastiani; and the remainder are employed in garrisons, as at Madrid, el Escorial, Avila, Valladolid, &c., and in keeping up the communications with those places; every man of whom might be brought into the field if occasion required.

‘ In these numbers I do not include sick and wounded, but found my calculations upon what I knew were the numbers of the French army before the battle of Talavera, deducting a loss of 10,000 men in that battle.

‘ Your Excellency will observe that there are seven French corps in Spain. I believe there were originally eight, for Suchet’s is the 8th corps; and each corps composing in itself a complete army, ought to consist of from 30,000 to 40,000 men.

‘ Against this force the Spanish Government have about 50,000 men in the two corps of Eguia and Venegas; Blake may have collected again 6000 men; and the Marques de la Romana has 15,000, of which number 1500 have no arms. The Duque del Parque has 9000 men in the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, but he is unwilling to detach them. Besides these numbers, the British army may be reckoned from 20,000 to 25,000 men.

‘ I am aware that there are troops in Spain besides those which I have above enumerated, but they are not in any manner and cannot be considered disposable for the field. The plan of operations must be founded upon the relative numbers above stated.

‘ But besides considering the numbers, it is necessary to advert to the composition and to the state of efficiency of these different armies. The French corps are, as I have already stated, each a complete army, having, probably, a greater proportion of cavalry, and certainly of artillery, than they ought to have for the existing numbers of their infantry; and they are well disciplined, excellent troops.

‘ The Spanish corps of Venegas and Eguia have probably between them not less than 10,000 cavalry, which is more than their proportion, and they are well provided with artillery. But the corps of Romana has neither cavalry nor artillery, and, for want of those arms, is unable to quit the mountains of Galicia. The Duque del Parque is unable, if he were willing, to assist him with what he wants. Blake’s corps, I believe, consists only of infantry. Both infantry and cavalry are comparatively undisciplined; the cavalry are tolerably well clothed, well armed, accoutred, and mounted; but the infantry are not clothed or accoutred as they ought to be,



notwithstanding the large supplies of clothing and accoutrements sent out from England.

‘ With these relative numbers, and adverting to the state of discipline and efficiency of the different armies, it would appear impossible to undertake an offensive operation with any hope of success ; more particularly adverting to the local difficulties with which the allies would have to contend, and the advantages of the enemy.

‘ The enemy has it in his power to collect his whole force in Castille and Estremadura at any point north of the Tagus, and can dispose of the parts of it in the front or rear of the armies of the allies, as he may think proper.

‘ The allies must move upon the enemy in two distinct corps at least. There can be no military communication between the corps assembled in this part of Estremadura, and that which would advance from La Carolina through La Mancha, on account of the chain of mountains on the whole of the left bank of the Tagus, from the Puerto de Mirabete to the bridge of Toledo. The only communication which these two corps can have, is by the right bank of the river from Almaraz and by the bridge of Toledo, and it is obvious that a battle must be fought with the enemy’s whole force, and won by one of the two corps before that communication can be established.

‘ This consideration was the reason that, in the late operations, the march of Venegas was directed upon Ocaña and Fuentidueña and Arganda. It was impossible to join with Venegas before a battle should be fought with the enemy’s whole force by one of the armies ; and it was thought best to order Venegas to adopt such a line of march as should be most distant from the combined armies, in relation to which and the combined armies, the enemy could not have taken up a central position from which he could have had the choice of attacking either. The enemy would thus have been forced either to detach to oppose Venegas, or, if he had kept his whole force collected to fight the combined corps advancing from this side, he would have lost Madrid, and his retreat would have been cut off. Venegas did not, however, obey the orders he received, I believe in consequence of directions from the Junta. Instead of being at Arganda, close to



Madrid, on the 23rd, he did not approach the Tagus till the 28th, when he was kept in check at Toledo by 2000 men, while the enemy's whole army were engaged at Talavera.

‘ These circumstances will show your Excellency the difficulty which attends the position of the allies; and indeed ought to have some influence with the Spanish Government in the distribution of their troops at present.

‘ The French having 70,000 men disposable in Castille and Estremadura, may employ them either in opposing the advance of the allies from this side, who could not bring more than from 50,000 to 55,000 to oppose them; or they would detach 20,000 to oppose Venegas, and meet the allies with 50,000. The whole would thus be kept in check, even if it could be hoped that one or both corps would not be defeated.

‘ The Marques de la Romana, the Duque del Parque, Blake, &c., could afford no relief from their embarrassing circumstances, having no artillery nor cavalry to enable them to enter the plains of Castille.

‘ But even if these first difficulties could be overcome, and the French armies should retire to the northward, the numbers of the allies would be found still more unequal to those of the enemy. The corps of St. Cyr and Suchet would then take their places in the operations, and the Spanish armies would have no corresponding increase.

‘ These difficulties, however, are of a nature not to be overcome by the means at present in the power of the Spanish Government; they must increase their forces, and clothe, equip, and discipline their troops before they can reasonably attempt any offensive operation against the French; and in the mean time, it becomes a question how the troops ought to be disposed of.

‘ From what I have already stated, your Excellency must observe the importance of their having a strong Spanish corps in this part of Estremadura. The British army must necessarily be the foundation of any offensive operation the Spanish Government can undertake; and it is obvious that the place of this army must be on the left of the whole issuing from the frontiers of Portugal.

‘ If the Spanish corps, which is to act with the British

army, should be weak, their operations must be checked at an early period; and in that case I should apprehend that the operations of the large Spanish corps directed from La Carolina would not be very successful.

‘ But the prospect of these offensive operations may be considered too distant to render it reasonable to advert to them in a disposition of the Spanish army, which is about to be formed, and I should therefore suggest other grounds for recommending that the army in Estremadura should not, if possible, be weakened.

‘ Your Excellency has observed that Soult entertains a design of attacking Ciudad Rodrigo: which design, I understand, was discussed and recommended by a council of war held some time ago at Salamanca. The success of this enterprise would do more mischief than the French are capable of doing in any other manner. It would completely cut off the only communication the Spanish Government have with the northern provinces; would give the French the perpetual possession of Castille, and would most probably occasion the loss of the Portuguese fort of Almeida.

‘ I should be desirous of making every exertion to save Ciudad Rodrigo; but if Estremadura should be left with only 12,000 men, it must be obvious to your Excellency that Seville, as well as Portugal, will be exposed, while I should be removed from this part of the country.

‘ I am much afraid, from what I have seen of the proceedings of the Central Junta, that in the distributions of their forces they do not consider military defence and military operations, so much as they do political intrigue and the attainment of trifling political objects.

‘ They wish to strengthen the army of Venegas, not because it is necessary or desirable on military grounds; but because they think the army, as an instrument of mischief, is safer in his hands than in those of another; and they leave 12,000 men in Estremadura, not because more are not, or may not be deemed necessary in any military view of the question, but because they are averse to placing a large body under the Duque de Alburquerque, who I know that the Junta of Estremadura have insisted should be employed to command the army in this province,



‘ I cannot avoid observing these little views and objects and mentioning them to your Excellency ; at the same time that I lament that the attention of those who have to manage such great and important affairs as those are which are intrusted to the management of the Central Junta, should be diverted from great objects to others of trifling importance.

‘ I cannot conclude this letter without adverting to the mode in which Don Martin de Garay, in his note to your Excellency of the 25th ult., disposes of the Portuguese troops, without having had one word of communication with the Portuguese Government, or any body connected with it, respecting them.

‘ In fact those troops have been equally ill, indeed I might say, worse treated than the British troops, by the officers of the Spanish Government, and were at last obliged to quit Spain for want of food ; and I shall no more allow them than I shall the British troops to enter Spain again, unless I should have some solid ground for believing that they would be supplied as they ought to be.

‘ It is a curious circumstance respecting Marshal Beresford’s corps, that the Cabildo of Ciudad Rodrigo actually refused to allow them to have 30,000 of 100,000 lbs. of biscuit, which I had prepared there, in case the operations of the army should be directed to that quarter, and for which the British Commissary had paid ; and they seized the biscuit on the ground that debts due to the town of Ciudad Rodrigo by the British army under the command of the late Sir John Moore had not been paid ; although one of the objects of the mission of the same Commissary to Ciudad Rodrigo, was to settle the accounts and discharge those debts !

‘ Yet this same Cabildo will call for assistance as soon as they shall perceive the intention of the enemy to attack them ; having seized, and holding probably in their possession at the moment, the means which, if lodged as directed in the stores at Almeida, would enable me effectually to provide for their relief.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.





‘Keep me regularly informed of the enemy’s movements, and depend upon my not losing a moment in going to your assistance, and do not let Colonel Grant take up the flying bridge at Villa Velha till the last moment, making it certain, however, that he secures the boats for my passage. Keep the Spanish battalions upon your left till you shall hear further from me. I have ordered your guns to join you.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel*

*Sir Robert Wilson.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY

‘I send a duplicate of my letter of the 27th. I recollect your mentioning an intention of sending us some horses for the artillery, but we never received one. However, if you sent them, I shall pay for them, notwithstanding that I think it most probable they as well as other things fell into the hands of our worthy allies! The horses you say you have now sent have not arrived. When they do arrive, they shall likewise be paid for, if they should be deemed fit for the service of the artillery. Let me know the price of the first, and when you shall send them, that of the last.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Sir Robert Wilson.*

‘MY DEAR SIR ROBERT,

‘Badajoz, 3rd September, 1809.

‘I am afraid that I wrote to you more positively than I intended on the 27th to cross the Tagus. The fact is, that I imagined you would receive that letter long before you would reach Castello Branco. Indeed, I did not know that Beresford had ordered you there; and I intended that your further progress towards me should be very much guided by the directions you should receive from him, upon which I have written to him. I conclude, however, that you will have received my letter of yesterday this day, and that you will return to Castello Branco. But if you should have done so, I now beg you to return, as I consider the enemy’s movement north of the Tagus by far the most worthy of attention.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel*

*Sir Robert Wilson.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Roche.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 3rd September, 1809.

‘ I have received your letters of the 30th August and 1st instant. I beg that you will continue to communicate to me all the reports you may hear, and everything that occurs. It does not much signify whether they turn out to be true or false. I shall always be able to judge of their probable truth or falsehood from other accounts.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Roche.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Conde de Montijo.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 3rd September, 1809.

‘ I had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter this morning.

‘ I am much concerned that the Central Junta should conceive they have any reason to complain of your Excellency, and that your Excellency should have incurred their displeasure. Your Excellency must be aware that, being strangers in this country, and employed as allies of the Government, it is impossible for us to interfere in any manner between Government and individuals; or in any concern in the country, excepting that in which we are especially employed, viz., to carry on the war against the common enemy.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Conde de Montijo.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 3rd September, 1809.

‘ I have received from Lord Castlereagh copies of Mr. Secretary Canning’s dispatches to your Excellency, dated 12th August; and I have been directed by his Lordship to lay before your Excellency my opinion on the points referred to in those dispatches.

‘ The letters which I have had the honor of addressing to your Excellency on the 24th August and 1st September (Nos. 14 and 15) will have apprized you of my opinion on the first point referred to by Mr. Secretary Canning, viz., the



prospect of success in offensive operations against the enemy ; which opinion I should equally entertain, even though the British army could be increased to 40,000 instead of 30,000 men, as long as the Spanish armies shall continue of the limited numbers, in the undisciplined and inefficient state, and ill composed as they are at present.

‘ Your Excellency has before you in my dispatch of the 1st September (No. 17) the detailed information upon which I formed my opinion, upon which you may form your own, if the information should be found correct ; if it should be found materially erroneous, it may be corrected.

‘ In the existing state of the forces of the enemy and the allies in the Peninsula, it would be difficult for the British army, if not impossible, to connect the defence of Portugal with that of Spain ; and quite impossible, unless great improvements should be made in the mode of supplying armies in Spain.

‘ Hereafter, when it is probable that the existing relative numbers of the armies will be altered to the advantage of the enemy, it will be quite impossible for the British army to connect with the defence of Portugal that of the south of Spain.

‘ The British Government have determined to defend Portugal ; but if the army should be hereafter detained to defend the south of Spain, instead of Portugal, I conceive it will be absolutely necessary that the Commanding Officer of the British troops should have the command of the Spanish army ; that we should have a garrison in Cadiz ; and that the most efficient measures should be adopted to secure supplies and means of transport for the allied armies.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Don Miguel Forjaz.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 3rd September, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency’s letter of the 31st August, and I am very sensible of the kindness with which the Governors of the kingdom of Portugal have uniformly received every service which the troops under my command have been enabled to render to the common cause.

‘I request you to assure their Excellencies that whatever position I may take, or in whatever operation I may engage, I shall pay due attention to the interests of the Spanish nation, with which the safety of Portugal is so strongly united; and that I shall render such assistance to Spain as circumstances will permit me.

‘I am infinitely obliged to the Government for their kindness to the troops: the whole army acknowledge the uniform good treatment they have received from the Government and the people of Portugal, and I shall adopt some mode of acquainting the troops of the favor and goodwill of the Governors of the Kingdom towards them upon their return to Portugal; but I request the Governors of the Kingdom not to ask me to accept of the present which they have desired to make to the troops, which, at the same time that it would give a superfluity of provisions, would waste the resources of the country of which the army stands so much in need.

‘With the permission of the Governors of the Kingdom, I will settle with General Leite the mode in which I shall convey to the troops the approbation of their good conduct by the Governors of the Kingdom, of which I hope their Excellencies will approve.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Don Miguel Forjaz.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Badajoz, 3rd September, 1809.

‘I enclose to your Excellency the copy of a letter which I have received from Dom Miguel Forjaz, Secretary of State at Lisbon, and the copy of my answer. I beg to draw your Excellency’s attention to that part of the former in which it is desired that I should as far as possible extend the assistance of the British army to Spain.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Badajoz, 4th September, 1809.

‘You will have seen a copy of the intercepted letter from Soult, and I should not be surprised if the French were to

carry into execution the plan proposed by him, of attacking Ciudad Rodrigo. The success of this scheme would do them more good, and the allies more mischief, than any other they could attempt; and it is most likely of all others to be successful.

‘ I hear that they have withdrawn their troops from La Mancha, which is the first step towards any operation on this side, and that they are collecting provisions and means at Talavera. If this intelligence be true, they intend something against the Spaniards in this quarter, against Ciudad Rodrigo, or against us. The last is the least probable; the first not very likely. If they should show against Ciudad Rodrigo, we must strain every nerve to save it. I shall march from hence with all the troops, and we must have something upon the Tagus at Abrantes and lower down. What can you produce in the field upon my left from Thomar, Leyria, Coimbra, &c.? and what can you leave upon the Tagus?’

‘ I have ordered Sir Robert Wilson to stay north of the Tagus, and watch Soult’s movements closely.

‘ If I leave this to move upon the covering army of Ciudad Rodrigo, the enemy will most probably follow me from the Tagus into Portugal, leaving in this part of the country a corps to watch and keep in check the Spanish army. The troops which they may, in that case, send into Portugal, will not be very numerous, but still they may do mischief.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Brig. General R. Craufurd.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Badajoz, 4th September, 1809.

‘ I halted at Merida some days, in consequence of some letters which I received from Lord Wellesley, expressing a desire that I should remain within the Spanish frontier, at least for a time; with which desire I have complied so far as to place the right of the army at Talavera Real, Hill’s division at Montijo and La Calzada, and the heavy brigade of cavalry at Merida, where they will get forage.

‘ This alteration has induced me to change your situation to Campo Mayor. I should put you in front on the other



side, only that I think the movement we shall next make will probably be across the Tagus.

‘The enemy appear to entertain a design of attacking Ciudad Rodrigo. Soult proposes this operation in a letter to the King, which we have intercepted; and I think it not improbable that they may attempt it. If they should attempt it, we must make an effort to prevent its success; and I know of none that would have the effect, excepting a movement to that quarter.

‘If, however, I should be mistaken, and the enemy should come this way, we could put you in front before the army would be collected.

‘You will be better supplied at Campo Mayor than at Castello de Vide.

‘I have given directions that your Commissary should be supplied with money. His want of it, hitherto, is to be attributed entirely to the Deputy Commissary General, as there is more money with the army than we know what to do with; and we ought to pay in ready money for every thing we receive.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Brig. General*  
‘*R. Craufurd.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Badajoz, 4th September, 1809.

‘I cannot avoid taking this opportunity of urging you to join the army as soon as possible. I have not had the pleasure of seeing you, from causes which I am aware you could not control, and which I exceedingly regret, since the month of June last, at Coimbra; and the army has suffered the greatest inconvenience from your absence. Indeed, it is so great, that if I should find your absence is likely to be of much longer continuance, I shall consider myself obliged to make arrangements for doing the duty of the Commissariat, which shall be exempt from these inconveniences.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*J. Murray, Esq.,*  
‘*Commissary General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Brigadier General Alex. Campbell.*

‘ MY DEAR CAMPBELL, ‘ Badajoz, 4th September, 1809.

‘ I am very sorry indeed to lose you, and particularly so that the bad appearance of your wound obliges you to go; but that cannot be avoided, and you must do every thing in your power to re-establish your health entirely. I will give you any letter you please; but it will only subject you to the mortification of a disappointment, and me to that of making another request in vain in favor of a person who deserves the King’s favor.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig Gen. A. Campbell.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS, ‘ Badajoz, 4th September. 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 31st August. I am very much obliged to you for the pains you uniformly take to make, in England, a favorable impression of the measures and operations which I conduct.

‘ I now enclose you my dispatches of this date to the Secretary of State. You will see that I have received the copies of the dispatches to Lord Wellesley of the 12th, and these may be worth your perusal, as they will show you the view which I, and, I believe, he takes of the situation of affairs in the Peninsula.

‘ We are very anxious to hear of Lord Fitzroy’s arrival in England; and if the answer to the dispatches should arrive by an English messenger, pray forward them by a Portuguese or Spanish messenger, unless the English *gentleman* should engage to come as fast as the other. The last was four days on his road to this place, which another would have come in thirty hours at most.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.*

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Badajoz, 4th September, 1809.

‘ Having continued the march of the army from Truxillo, after I had written to you last, I was induced to halt for a few days at Merida, in consequence of a letter of the 22nd

August, which I received from Lord Wellesley, a copy of which will go to you by this occasion; and I have since occupied such positions with the troops as will enable them to subsist, and to get the necessary refreshments with ease; at the same time that I have it in my power to collect them in a short space of time.

‘ I have ordered Brigadier General Catlin Craufurd to join the army with the 11th and 57th, and four of the battalions arrived from Ireland; and that the horse artillery, and the horses for the artillery recently sent from Cork, should come up from Lisbon.

‘ The enemy have continued nearly in the same positions since I addressed your Lordship on the 21st August. Marshal Ney is at Salamanca; and there appears to be another French corps in Old Castille, which I believe is the 6th corps, under the command of General Kellermann. Marshal Soult is at Coria, with his advanced posts at Moraleja and Zarza la Mayor; but he has not with him more than from 6000 to 8000 men. Marshal Mortier is at Arzobispo; and two divisions of Victor’s corps are at Talavera, and the remainder in La Mancha with the 4th corps, hitherto called Sebastiani’s.

‘ I have heard that the French are again retiring from La Mancha; but I have no authentic account of that movement. If they should retire from thence, it is possible that they may make the attempt upon Ciudad Rodrigo, which Soult has recommended to the King, in a letter which has been intercepted; and as I consider success in this enterprise to be more likely to be mischievous to Portugal than any other they could undertake, and would prevent the future co-operation of the troops from Portugal with Spain, in case circumstances should hereafter render that co-operation possible, I propose to do every thing in my power to prevent the execution of this plan; and I shall move for that purpose as soon as I shall find, from the disposition of the enemy’s troops, that they really intend it.

‘ I have apprized the Duque del Parque that I propose to exert myself for his relief; and I have urged him to hold out as long as he can.

‘ The Spanish head quarters have been moved from Deleytosa to Truxillo, partly in consequence of their finding



it difficult to support their army in the exhausted country upon the left bank of the Tagus, and partly on account of orders received from the Junta to detach the greatest part of the army to La Carolina, leaving only 12,000 men in Estremadura.

‘ They still occupy La Mesa de Ibor and the Puerto de Mirabete, opposite Almaraz, in which last post they relieved our troops on the 20th.

‘ I have communicated to Lord Wellesley, as your Lordship will see, my opinion of the danger which may attend this disposition of their forces ; and I have urged the Government to make an exertion to maintain their strong position upon the Tagus, but I doubt whether my remonstrance will have any effect ; and I expect that if the enemy should make an attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo, he will possess himself of the Tagus, and probably of the Guadiana, nearly to this place, at the same time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 4th September, 1809.

‘ I have received your letters of the 12th, and I am happy to find that the King’s Ministers approved of my conduct up to the 24th of July. I hope that they will approve of my subsequent measures.

‘ I send you by this occasion a copy of a correspondence that I have had with Lord Wellesley, which will give the Government my opinion upon the points referred for his and mine in Mr. Canning’s dispatches of the 12th. They are nearly of the same purport with my last letter to you.

‘ There is only one point in that letter which I wish to alter, and that relates to the garrison required for Cadiz. Upon further inquiry, I find that there are means in Cadiz of putting in security from a *coup de main* by the inhabitants 4000 or 5000 men ; and I should think that number sufficient to give us a footing there, of which we might take further advantage by throwing in more troops, if we should find it expedient.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 4th September, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s letter of the 12th, in which you have enclosed a copy of Mr. Secretary Canning’s letters of the same date to Lord Wellesley; and I now enclose to your Lordship copies of a correspondence that I have lately had with Lord Wellesley upon the points to which Mr. Secretary Canning’s dispatches relate, which will give the King’s Ministers all the information that they wish to have.

‘ Lord Wellesley had before desired that I would send home copies of this correspondence.

‘ I have to request your Lordship’s attention to the offer which was made me of the command of a Spanish corps of 12,000 men, to be left in Estremadura, while the rest of the Spanish army should march to La Carolina. As this offer was necessarily connected not only with the renewal of the co-operation of His Majesty’s troops with the Spanish army, which your Lordship will see I did not deem expedient, but with that renewal in a defensive system, which could have answered no end, excepting again to involve the British army in the Spanish operations, I deemed it expedient to decline to accept it.

‘ I have but little doubt, however, that if circumstances should at any time render it advisable in the opinion of His Majesty’s Ministers to co-operate with the Spanish troops, either in offensive or defensive movements, not only the Government, but the army, will be desirous that the officer who shall be trusted by his Majesty to command his troops should command the whole.

‘ When I entered Spain, I had reason to believe that I should be joined by a Spanish army, in such a respectable state of discipline and efficiency as that it had kept in check, during nearly three months after a defeat, a French army, at one time superior in numbers, and at no time much inferior. The enclosed letters will show how the fact stands; and I can now account for the inactivity of the French army under Marshal Victor, after the defeat of the Spanish army at Medellin, only by attributing it to his desire to avoid risking an advance towards Seville, till Marshal Soult should have se-



cured his right by the conquest of Portugal, and the possession of Lisbon.

‘ I had likewise reason to believe that the French corps in the north of Spain were fully employed ; and although I had heard of the arrival of Marshal Soult at Zamora on the 29th June, with a view to equip the remains of his corps, which appeared to be in want of every thing, I did not think it possible that a French corps, consisting of 34,000 men, under three Marshals, could have been assembled at Salamanca without the knowledge of the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, or of the Junta of Castille ; that these corps could have been moved from their stations in Galicia, the Asturias, and Biscay, without setting free for general operations any Spanish troops which had been opposed to them ; or without any other inconvenience to the enemy than that of protracting to a later period the settlement of his government in those provinces ; and that they could have penetrated into Estremadura without a shot being fired at them by the troops deemed sufficient to defend the passes by the Spanish General.

‘ All these occurrences, however, with the diminished numbers of the Spanish troops in consequence of desertion, and their general relative inferiority to the enemy in point of numbers, in consequence of the occurrences before referred to, have made such an alteration in the state of affairs, that I conceive I shall be justified in having declined to co-operate again with the Spanish armies.

‘ I do not conceive that reinforcements which should increase this army to 40,000 men, or even to a larger amount, would make any material difference in the state of affairs in Spain.

‘ I believe that the estimate of the enemy’s force, which the enclosed letters contain, is nearly correct, as I conclude from what the enemy has done in respect to Galicia and Asturias, that he would weaken his force in Aragon and Catalonia, in proportion as he should find the allies, and particularly the British army, enabled to press him in this quarter ; at the same time that no benefit would result to the general cause from the enemy’s weakness in Catalonia and Aragon, excepting the repose which the people of those provinces would enjoy from the absence of the enemy’s troops, and the delay in the settlement of the enemy’s



government among them. But if the enemy should, contrary to my expectation, not remove the troops from Aragon and Catalonia, in case he should be pressed in this quarter, but should rather retire to the Ebro, I conceive that no force which Great Britain could afford, with all that Spain could bring forward, under existing arrangements, would be able to dislodge the enemy from that position.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. the Judge Advocate General.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 4th September, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the proceedings of a General Court Martial, of which Major General Tilson is President, on the trial of Mr. —, paymaster of the — regiment, upon which I am desirous of receiving His Majesty’s pleasure. I must at the same time inform you that Major General Tilson has communicated to me the wish of the General Court Martial that I should recommend Mr. — to His Majesty’s mercy.

‘ When I marched from Talavera on the 3rd August to oppose the progress of the French troops which had entered Estremadura from Castille, by Plasencia, the paymasters of several of the regiments remained at Talavera to supply with money the officers left in charge of the sick and wounded in the hospital, and they were to join their regiments at Oropesa in the evening. In the course of that day the Spanish general, Cuesta, determined to break up from Talavera, and having apprized the officer in charge of the British hospital of this intention, he gave notice of it to the British officers at Talavera, and made arrangements for moving across the Tagus at Arzobispo the sick and wounded that could be moved.

‘ The paymasters of several of the regiments belonging to this army, instead of joining their regiments at Oropesa on that evening, proceeded to Arzobispo with the sick and wounded, from whence they continued their progress till they reached Elvas, in Portugal, not waiting for the sick and wounded after they had crossed the Tagus.

‘ I conceived that there was so little ground for this conduct, because, in fact, the army was never in any manner

pressed in its movement across the Tagus; and as it is so reprehensible, even if the strongest grounds existed for apprehension that the retreat would have been pressed, I determined to bring to trial, before a General Court Martial, every paymaster who had so conducted himself.

‘As, however, these gentlemen are not educated in the military profession,—as it appears that Mr. — had a sum of money in his charge,—and as the apprehensions he entertained were equally felt by all the gentlemen in the same situation,—and, above all, as the Court Martial has recommended him, I beg leave to recommend Mr. — to His Majesty’s gracious mercy.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Right Hon.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*the Judge Advocate General.*’

*Observations on Mr. Secretary Canning’s Dispatch of the 12th August, to Marquis Wellesley.*

‘Badajoz, 5th September, 1809.

‘*In co-operation with the Spanish armies, or in conjunction with them.*

‘A British army of 30,000 men, or even of 40,000 men, would not be sufficient in co-operation, or in conjunction with the Spanish armies, to effect the deliverance of the whole of the Peninsula, by the expulsion of the French armies now in Spain. The foundation of this opinion is to be found in my dispatches of the 24th August, 1st and 3rd September.

‘How far a force of 30,000 or 40,000 men would be enabled to make head, or, in other words, to carry on defensive operations against the augmented force which Buonaparte may be enabled to direct against Spain, would depend upon the extent of that force, and upon the extent of the defensive system to be adopted. 30,000 or 40,000 men would not be able to defend both the south of Spain and Portugal.

‘In the existing state of the Spanish armies, I doubt whether a British army could defend the south of Spain against the attack which an augmented French force would make upon that country. It is certain, however, that 30,000 British troops, or even a smaller force, could get off from Cadiz or Gibraltar.

*'The separate defence of Portugal, and that Portugal will be best defended.*

'Portugal will certainly be best defended by confining the British force within the limits prescribed by my existing instructions.

*'With a reasonable prospect of success ; if he shall think that Portugal would be best defended in the end, &c.*

'In the present state of the Spanish and Portuguese armies, and adverting to the deficiency of supplies and means of transport in Spain, it would be difficult to connect the defence of Portugal with that of the south of Spain, with 30,000 or 40,000 British troops, even against the French force now in the Peninsula.

*'The next question which will then arise, &c.*

'In case the British Government should enter upon any plan of operations connected with the Spanish armies, they should insist: First, upon having a garrison in Cadiz: Secondly, upon having the command of the armies in the hand of the officer commanding the King's army: Thirdly, upon the adoption of a system throughout all the provinces under the government of the Junta, which would ensure to the armies all the supplies and means of transport which the country could produce.

'All horses, mules, asses, carts, &c., in every district, should be numbered and registered, with the owner's name, place where to be found, &c.; and all should be liable to be called for, and should be produced under a heavy penalty, when called for for the use of the army.

*'With a view to prevent the recurrence of these inconveniences, &c.*

'In the same manner wheat, barley, straw, flour, bullocks in every district, should be registered, and the owners should be obliged to produce the quantities registered for the service of the army when called for.

'This ought to be the law of the country, and should be extended to all districts from which the enemy's troops should withdraw.

'These arrangements, with the system proposed by Lord Wellesley for forming magazines, which these arrangements would enable the Government to carry into effect, would give the Government and the army the command of the supplies in the country.



‘ *Cadiz would be essentially important.*

‘ It is obvious that our operations in Spain must be defensive; that they cannot be connected with Portugal; that we must have a retreat upon Cadiz; and that that retreat cannot be secure, unless Cadiz is in our hands. I am convinced, however, that the Spanish Government will never cede Cadiz.

‘ *Sine quâ non. If the command is not to be in the British General.*

‘ I conceive this is a point not to be urged too soon. Let Government make up their mind definitively, whether they will defend Portugal or the south of Spain. I should not be surprised if the advantage of the possession of the fleets of Spain, and the certainty that the army could be embarked at Cadiz, which is not, in the Tagus, quite clear, should induce our Government to prefer the operation in the south of Spain to that in Portugal. If that should be the case, we might find it difficult to obtain the command for the British General, if a Generalissimo should have been appointed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 5th September, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 4th instant, marked E. I considered my dispatches of the 24th August, and 1st and 3rd instant, as containing my opinion upon all the points referred to in Mr. Secretary Canning’s dispatch to your Excellency of the 12th August; and accordingly I sent copies of those dispatches to England yesterday, with a letter to Lord Castlereagh, of which I enclose a copy.

‘ I have, however, now written in the margin of the copy which your Excellency has sent me of the dispatch of the 12th August, from Mr. Canning, answers upon those points on which I understand from Mr. Wellesley that your Excellency wishes for my opinion.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



time to time, of the sums you may have disbursed, stating the name of the soldier to whom given, his regiment, and the company to which he belongs.

‘We have suspected for some time past that the enemy intended to attack Ciudad Rodrigo, which we must strain every nerve to prevent. Send me the earliest intelligence by the quickest means of conveyance, of any of the movements in that quarter which may give you reason to believe that they really entertain, and are about to carry that design into execution. If they should move heavy artillery from Valladolid, Burgos, or Madrid, it may be considered certain.

‘Let me have all the information you can acquire of the roads leading from Castello Branco to Ciudad Rodrigo; and particularly whether it is possible to go with guns on any road without passing by Guarda between Guarda and the Puerto de Perales. Sir Robert Wilson is at Castello Branco, watching the enemy’s motions.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Brig. General Cox.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.*

‘SIR,

‘Badajoz, 7th September, 1809.

‘Since I wrote to you on the 30th August, having learned from Mr. Villiers that much time will elapse before the silver lately arrived from England can be coined, and that the Portuguese Government will suffer great inconvenience if he should not be able to make the usual payments on account of the subsidy, I request you will by return of post inform me what sum of money you have received at Lisbon between 1st and 31st August on account of bills on England, negotiated at Lisbon, Cadiz, or Gibraltar; and what sums you have received from England or elsewhere, exclusive of the bullion and gold coin lately arrived in the Fylla, in order that I may direct you what sum you are to pay to Mr. Villiers.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*J. Murray, Esq.,  
Commissary General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 7th September, 1809.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from Admiral Berkeley, regarding the mules purchased for the army at Tangier; and I beg that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will take the most efficient measures, not only to pay for the mules which may have been purchased at Tangier, but to have them received and taken care of at their landing place, and thence brought up to the army.

‘ I likewise enclose an extract of a letter from Admiral Berkeley, pointing out what he conceives would be a satisfactory mode of paying for these mules; upon which I have only to observe, that if you should adopt this mode, to which I see no objection, it is desirable that you should authorize your agent at Gibraltar to grant the bills in payment for the mules, instead of the paymaster at Gibraltar, with whom this army has no concern; and that as this is a business of some magnitude and expense to the public, I think it desirable that you should send somebody to Tangier more likely to be a good judge of a mule than the Agent of Transports, upon whose receipt the payment should be made. But it must be clearly understood that payment must be made for all mules received by the Agent of Transports before your agent shall have arrived at Tangier.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.,*  
*Commissary General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Roche.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 7th September, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 4th. I beg that you will tell General Eguia that I consider it as very irregular that any sealed letter should pass his front from the enemy to any body in this army; that those which have arrived lately related solely to the wounded officers and soldiers, and to a proposal which I had made to exchange them; and that I beg that, in future, he will be so kind as to open any letter which may come to his posts, and which may be sealed.

I should send for his perusal those which have come lately, only that I have been obliged to make a reference to Lord

Wellesley upon them, and have yet to answer them. Let me hear from you constantly, and all reports.

‘Do you want money for your messengers, or other purposes?’

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Roche.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘If you have any opportunity, you may tell M. Victor de Thevenon that I will inquire about his friend, M. Véron de Farincourt, and will let him know the result. I request you to mention to General Eguia that there are two battalions, one of Seville, the other of Merida, still with Sir Robert Wilson, who is employed watching the movements of the enemy towards Ciudad Rodrigo; and I shall be obliged to General Eguia if he will inform me what shall be done with them.

‘These two battalions are much in want of pay, having received none for some time; and if General Eguia wishes it, I shall order that some may be advanced to them.’

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘SIR,

‘Badajoz, 7th September, 1809.

‘I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency’s letter, and I am much obliged to you for your intentions to send a transport to convey to Lisbon the recovered men of the 27th regiment. As these men have been removed to Gibraltar, I conclude Admiral Purvis will not have had it in his power to send them round.

‘I have directed the Commissary General to adopt the most early and efficient measures to pay for the mules purchased for the army at Tangier, and have desired him to follow the mode proposed in your letter, with this difference, that his agent at Gibraltar is to give his own bills on the Lords of the Treasury on the production of the receipts of the Agent of Transports for the mules, instead of the bills of the Paymaster General at Gibraltar, who has no concern whatever with this army.

‘As this is a business of some magnitude, and likely to be expensive to the public, and is very important to the army, I have also thought it proper to desire the Commissary General to send an agent of his own to Tangier, in whose



judgment of a mule he can confide, upon whose receipts the payment may be made. I have thought it proper to give this direction, in order to avoid the complaints of the mules and references which I should hereafter have made to me; but I have directed that all the receipts of the Agent of Transports should be taken up, and the value of the mules paid at Gibraltar till the Commissary's Agent shall arrive.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Vice Admiral*  
' *the Hon. G. Berkeley.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

' SIR, ' Badajoz, 7th September, 1809.

' I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 1st instant, enclosing an extract of one from Mr. Secretary Canning, respecting the practicability of procuring at Lisbon certain articles of ordnance and military stores, required for the use of the Portuguese troops. You will observe that these articles were required by Marshal Beresford, who is now at Lisbon, and is more capable than I am of giving you accurate information of the urgency of the want of each article, and of the capacity of the city of Lisbon to supply any, and what part of the demand. I think it very desirable, however, that a part at least of the demand of each article should be supplied from England, as soon as the Ordnance can prepare it.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*' ' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

' MY DEAR VILLIERS, ' Badajoz, 7th September, 1809.

' Conceiving that, upon the receipt of the bullion, you would not require your fifth, I had desired Mr. Murray not to pay it to you; but I now write to him to desire that he will let me know how much you are entitled to for last month; and as soon as I shall receive his answer, I shall give orders that it may be paid to Mr. Bell. I shall inquire respecting the serjeant of the 43rd; but, from the complexion of the case, I suspect that it will not be possible to do any thing for him.

' Believe me, &c.

' *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'



*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Badajoz, 7th September, 1809.’

‘ I have the honor to enclose a memorandum stating the positions occupied by the British army, for your Excellency’s information.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Badajoz . . . . .	Head Quarters and the Artillery.
Merida . . . . .	} The brigade of Heavy Cavalry, and troop of Horse Artillery.
Montijo, Puebla de la Calzada	
Talavera Real . . . . .	} One division of Infantry, and a brigade of Artillery.
Near Badajoz . . . . .	
Campo Mayor . . . . .	One division of Infantry.
Alburquerque . . . . .	One
La Roca . . . . .	One
Montijo . . . . .	One
Talavera Real . . . . .	One
Badajoz . . . . .	One
Elvas . . . . .	One
Campo Mayor . . . . .	One
Olivença . . . . .	Two
Villa Viçosa . . . . .	Four

} squadrons of Cavalry.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Badajoz, 7th September, 1809.

‘ I wrote to the Commander in Chief of the French army some days ago, to propose that some of the wounded officers in the hospital at Talavera de la Reyna should be exchanged for French officers in our possession: in answer to which proposition I have received a letter from Marshal Soult, in which he proposes to exchange some of them for General Franceschi, Captain Antoine, and Lieut. Bernard, who were lately taken on the road from Zamora to Valladolid, and are now prisoners at Seville.

‘ I think it is not improbable that the Spanish Government, adverting to the manner in which the British officers in the hospital at Talavera have become prisoners of war, might not be disinclined to allow General Franceschi, and the other officers with him, to be at liberty in exchange for some, and to facilitate the general exchange of all the British officers ;

and I shall be very much obliged to your Excellency if you will exert your influence with the Spanish Government, in order that this arrangement may take effect.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY DEAR WELLESLEY,

‘ Badajoz, 7th September, 1809.

‘ I shall feel very much obliged to you if you will desire Armstrong or Forbes to send me copies of the accounts which the Government receive from Venegas; &c., and of the enemy’s movements and operations in their front, as from them I shall be able to judge in some degree what are their designs.

‘ At present I have no intelligence whatever, excepting the nonsense I receive occasionally from —, as the Spaniards have defeated all my attempts to obtain any, by stopping those whom I sent out to make inquiries.

‘ It is very desirable, however, that I should have the means of forming an early judgment on their designs, that I may move early to defeat them; and that I should know that they do not design any operation immediately, as it is desirable that I should go to Lisbon for a few days, if I can venture to quit the army; and I should wish also to go towards Seville to see you.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Badajoz, 8th September, 1809.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 3rd, and I am glad to find that you agree with me in opinion respecting the mode in which British officers might have been employed with the Portuguese army to the greatest advantage.

‘ It appears, however, that we differ in opinion on two points respecting these officers; one, that it would have been necessary in that case that all of them should have been of high rank; the other, that it would have been impossible to use any of them at present in the manner in which I had proposed.

‘ In respect to the first point, I have to observe, that



according to my notion, they would have derived all their authority from you, as the head of the army; and as being your adjutants, acquainted with your sentiments, conveying your orders, and representing your authority; and they would have required no rank to perform the duties of their situation.

‘ In respect to the use of them at present, I agree with you that Blunt or Campbell might be very much surprised and annoyed to see Douglas or Warre act as viceroy over them; but there is no occasion to send them to Blunt or Campbell.

‘ I should send them to govern Silveira, or Miranda, and people of that description; and I should employ the drills to superintend those like Machado and others, of whom you have many.

‘ The English officers employed regimentally, and who may be of more use than I supposed them to be, could have no objection to this employment of their juniors; not to command them, but to superintend the conduct of those who do and must command them.

‘ We are mistaken if we believe that what these Portuguese and Spanish armies require is discipline, properly so called. They want the habits and spirit of soldiers—the habits of command on one side, and of obedience on the other—mutual confidence between officers and men; and, above all, a determination in the superiors to obey the spirit of the orders they receive, let what will be the consequence, and the spirit to tell the true cause if they do not. In short, the fact is, there is so much trick in the Portuguese army, and the kind of subaltern character they have given you as officers is so little likely to check it, or to make you acquainted with the true state of things, that I despair of seeing matters upon a proper footing till you shall be able to superintend almost personally all branches of the service.

‘ I have sent you all the letters which I have received from England regarding the Portuguese service. Did you send me an official letter respecting the pay of the officers? I do not recollect it.

‘ I send you the regulation which we have received, and according to which I shall invariably act in respect to the issue of båt and forage money.

‘ I intended to leave to your decision whether Sir Robert



Wilson should remain north of the Tagus, or should come to this side, and I thought I had so expressed myself in my letter to him. But upon referring to my letter to him, I find that he might have considered what I stated as a wish that it might be practicable for him to come to this quarter as an order for him to come across the Tagus; and he marched accordingly. I stopped him, however, and he is gone back to Castello Branco.

‘I have ordered General Catlin Craufurd to join the army; the brigades and divisions of which I want to arrange preparatory to any fresh operations.

‘You shall have Captain White of the 27th. Do not you think Golegão high up for your cavalry? I think that before the winter is over we shall have to assemble between the Tagus and the Mondego the whole of the British and Portuguese army; and I want to save the resources of the country, particularly the straw, barley, and India corn, for that movement, which will decide the fate of Portugal.

‘I would eat up every thing at Lisbon, because we can always import or bring down by the river what we want, and preserve every thing at a distance. If we cannot use it or remove it, we can easily burn it.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘Badajoz, 8th September, 1809.

‘I have received your letter of the 5th, and I enclose a copy of the order which I have issued respecting the smuggling transactions at Lisbon.

‘We ought to pay for the couriers certainly, and I enclose a warrant for the money, addressed to the Commissary General at Lisbon, where it will be received.

‘It is an extraordinary circumstance that I cannot receive an answer from the 14th dragoons respecting the discharge of Kelly; I write, however, again.

‘The soldiers of the army have permission to go to mass, so far as this: they are forbidden to go into the churches during the performance of divine service, unless they go to assist in the performance of the service. I could not do

more, for in point of fact, soldiers cannot by law attend the celebration of mass, excepting in Ireland. The thing now stands exactly as it ought; any man may go to mass who chooses, and nobody makes any inquiry about it. The consequence is, that nobody goes to mass, and although we have whole regiments of Irishmen, and of course Roman Catholics, I have not seen one soldier perform any one act of religious worship in these Catholic countries, excepting making the sign of the cross to induce the people of the country to give them wine.

‘ Although, as you will observe, I have no objection, and they may go to mass if they choose it, I have great objections to the inquiries and interference of the priests of the country to induce them to go to mass. The orders were calculated to prevent all intrigue and interference of that description; and I was very certain, that when the Irish soldiers were left to themselves either to go or not, they would do as their comrades did, and not one of them would be seen in a church.

‘ I think it best that you should avoid having any further discussion with the priests on this subject; but if you should have any, it would be best that you should tell them what our law is, and what the order of this army. Prudence may then induce them to refrain from taking any steps to induce the Roman Catholic soldiers to attend mass; but if it should not, and their conduct should be guided by religious zeal, I acknowledge, that however indifferent I should have been at seeing the soldiers flock to the churches under my orders, I should not be very well satisfied to see them filled by the influence of the priests, taking advantage of the mildness and toleration which is the spirit of that order.

‘ I enclose a complaint from Dr. Forbes, of his servant, who is in custody, Colonel Walsh knows where. It is very desirable that some steps should be taken to punish this man. Although we have reason to be satisfied with the Portuguese nation in general, there are many individual instances of this kind of conduct, and it is very desirable that the people of the country should know that they cannot be guilty of it with impunity; probably they would send the delinquent to me to be disposed of as a follower of the army.

‘ In respect to the complaints you have sent me of the conduct of detachments, they are only a repetition of others which



I receive every day from all quarters of Spain and Portugal ; and I can only lament my inability to apply any remedy.

‘ In the first place, our law is not what it ought to be; and I cannot prevail upon Government even to look at a remedy.

‘ Secondly, our military courts having been established solely for the purpose of maintaining military discipline, with the same wisdom which has marked all our proceedings of late years, we have obliged the officers to swear to decide according to the evidence brought before them, and we have obliged the witnesses to give their evidence upon oath. The witnesses being almost in every instance common soldiers, whose conduct this tribunal was constituted to control, the consequence is, that perjury is almost as common a military offence as drunkenness and plunder ; and when the soldiers are brought before a General Court Martial upon serious questions, in which they formerly told the truth on their oath, (oaths, and the breaking of oaths, being so common,) the truth can never be ascertained.

‘ Thirdly, the people of Spain and Portugal, ready enough to complain, and in the first to claim payment for the outrages committed by the soldiers, and in the last to assign these outrages as an excuse for not doing what they are ordered, have invariably declined to prosecute, and have omitted to appear as evidence against the soldiers.

‘ Only two days ago, I was obliged to convey my sentiments in plain terms to the Governor of this place, and to General Leite ; the former of whom, having confined three soldiers for an outrage, respecting which he made a formal complaint, wanted me to excuse them from punishment ; and the latter having complained of, and indeed placed in confinement, an officer and a soldier who had attacked and disarmed a sentry at Elvas, wished that I should take no further notice of this outrage.

‘ I have made inquiries respecting the officer of the cavalry stated to have committed outrages at Thomar, but I am very well convinced that the person who has complained of him will not appear to substantiate the complaint when called upon, any more than the other gentleman will to substantiate the complaint against the Commissary or the Inspector of Hospitals.

‘ Under these circumstances, how can discipline be main-



tained? It is a curious circumstance, that notwithstanding I have been aware of the necessity, and have determined to execute any man found guilty or in the act of plunder, I have not yet executed one; although I really believe that more plunder and outrage have been committed by this army, than by any other that ever was in the field: to this add, that I have not less than seven or eight Provosts, other armies having usually two.

‘ I know nothing about Captain Chapman’s promise of stores from the Engineer department. I have been positively ordered not to give the British stores, and I must obey those orders, excepting in cases in which I shall see the necessity of giving them, and shall be convinced that they can be spared. Besides this, Beresford ought to make the application, if the stores are required.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Rt. Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ In respect to the complaints that the British soldiers have taken all the beasts off the road to Castello Branco, it is positively false; I passed that road in June last, before any of the troops passed, and there were neither men nor beasts upon it.’

*To Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 9th September, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to acquaint your Lordship that Mr. Dillon, an Assistant Commissary, was taken by the enemy on the 26th July. He was told that it was not the custom to consider either Surgeons or Commissaries as prisoners of war; but that, as the British troops in Calabria had taken and detained a Mons. Hebert, a French Commissary, he, Mr. Dillon, could only be allowed to return in exchange for that gentleman.

‘ I have herewith the honor to enclose the *Cartel d’Echange* which Mr. Dillon brought with him; and I beg to observe, that M. Hebert is called *Intendant Général de la Régie des Vivres*, and is therefore of a much higher rank than an Assistant Commissary.

‘ If, however, His Majesty’s Government chose to admit the principle of not considering either Surgeons or Com-

missaries as prisoners of war, M. Hebert should be sent back with a notification of the admission of this principle; otherwise I imagine they will not allow Mr. Dillon to be exchanged for a person of so much superior rank. In the mean time I have ordered Mr. Dillon to do his duty until I receive your Lordship's answer.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Viscount Castlereagh.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Brigadier General Alex. Campbell.*

' MY DEAR CAMPBELL,

' Badajoz, 10th September, 1809.

' I am concerned that it is necessary that you should go home, and I enclose you letters for Lord Castlereagh and Sir David Dundas, which I hope may be of use to you, but I fear will not be so.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Brig. Gen. A. Campbell.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General John Murray.*

' MY DEAR GENERAL,

' Badajoz, 10th September, 1809.

' I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 21st August. I do not know any thing of Mr. —; indeed I never heard his name; and I can scarcely believe that my brother Henry would have employed him or any body else, as Agent to me or the army, without informing me of it. I should suspect that Mr. — is a trading Prize Agent, who is very willing to interfere in any prize case which may offer itself to his attention, without any direct authority from any of the parties concerned in the prize.

' I considered well, when I was at Oporto, the whole question of the claim of the army to the property at Oporto, and I discussed it with the Admiral, and the result was a conviction on my mind that we have no claim whatever, either to prize or salvage. I should be glad to be convinced that we were mistaken, but I am pretty certain we were not so; indeed so certain, that I have never taken an opinion upon the subject, although I desired Colonel Trant to take an account of the property found at Oporto.

' The principles upon which prize questions rest, are,—



First, What is captured belongs originally to His Majesty. Secondly,—That by various Acts of Parliament, and his proclamation, His Majesty has granted to the navy and army, in certain shares, the property captured from an enemy. Thirdly,—This property must be condemned as prize in the Court of Admiralty.

‘ In the case of Oporto, we were acting as allies to the Government of Portugal, in the territories belonging to that Government, and a large property was taken from the enemy, which had been private, but which the enemy had converted into public. The territory was that of our ally, and the property was within it; and of course the property belonged to the power which possessed the territory. Neither the English acts of parliament, nor the King’s proclamations, could operate upon it; much less could the King’s courts, without a fresh act of violence, viz., that of removing the property from Oporto to England, make it the subject of their discussions and decisions.

‘ In respect to salvage for English vessels, and property taken from the enemy in the port of an ally, the question depends upon the wording of an act of parliament which I have not by me, but I understand that the claim can be successfully resisted.

‘ In respect to the relative claims of army and navy, the facts are as follows. The army attacked and beat the enemy out of Oporto, there being at that time off the port two of His Majesty’s ships, belonging to Admiral Berkeley’s squadron. The business was done by the army, but there is no doubt but those ships and the Admiral have a right to share in any benefit resulting from the capture; and on the other hand the army have a right to share with the navy.

‘ These are the facts, and my opinion upon them, but I may be wrong; and I should be sorry if the army were to lose any advantage to which they are entitled by any error of judgment of mine. I shall therefore be obliged to you, if in concert with Greenwood, you will take law opinions upon the different points contained in this letter; and if those opinions should be favorable to the right of the army, either to the property captured, (of which I desired Colonel Trant to take an account,) or salvage for the British



vessels and property recovered from the enemy, I shall further request you to employ some proper person to assert the right of the army, either in concert with the Agent employed by the navy, or otherwise, as you may think best.

‘ I shall also be obliged to you, if you will desire Greenwood to write to my brother Henry, and ascertain from him whether he employed Mr. — in any manner; I would write to him, but I do not know where he is; and it is as well that you and Greenwood should know how this matter stands, and what kind of man this Mr. — is, before you proceed any further.

‘ I regret that you were not with us at Talavera; your presence would have been most useful. You will be sorry for poor Langwerth.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General J. Murray.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Badajoz, 12th September, 1809.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 8th regarding the rations of your aides de camp, upon which I have only to reply, that doubtless you and your aides de camp are entitled to all allowances as a British Lieut. General and his aides de camp.

‘ In respect to forage, the invariable rule is, that no officer shall draw for more than he requires; and the application of that rule to yourself, to the case of yourself and your aides de camp, would bring it to this: that receiving forage from the Portuguese Commissariat, you ought not likewise to receive it from the British.

‘ I am, however, disposed to settle the matter in any way that may be agreeable to you and your aides de camp; but I think the best way of arranging the business would be, if the Portuguese Commissaries have no forage at Lisbon, or none of the description that you and your aides de camp require, that I should order the Commissary General to deliver from his stores at Lisbon to the Portuguese Commissary, certain quantities of forage, for which Mr. Villiers will pass his receipts, according to the Commissariat arrangement settled between you and me.

‘ It is impossible for me to attach to you an English Commissary to supply you and your aides de camp with forage, and I think it would be irregular that you or they should receive forage from our Commissaries when you are at Lisbon, and not at any other time: I think, therefore, that the arrangement above proposed would answer best. By the bye, writing about receipts reminds me that we ought to have receipts from Mr. Villiers for the provisions you received at Castello Branco.

‘ In respect to forage and provisions for all the other officers attached to the Portuguese army, excepting you and your aides de camp, I have no more to say to those concerns than I have to their pay.

‘ It is unfortunate that all these questions were not considered and decided when first the arrangement was made of bringing them to this country. I should think, however, that the best thing to do would be to settle with Mr. Villiers what rations of provisions each British officer shall receive, and you should get it from the Portuguese Commissariat. If you want those provisions from the British stores, you shall have them upon Mr. Villiers’s receipt: but I can much less undertake to find Commissaries to furnish with provisions each British officer serving with the Portuguese army, than I can to find a Commissary to supply you and your aides de camp with forage.

‘ You are mistaken in supposing that, because these officers pay for their rations, they are entitled to receive them from the British Commissariat. If they do pay, the sum is carried to account by the person who pays them, with whom we and our Commissariat have nothing to do. In respect to forage, they are no more entitled to it from the British Commissariat than any other Portuguese officer.

‘ I positively refused leave of absence to Colonel —, telling him that I could not interfere with any officer in the Portuguese service. He has gone, therefore, without leave. I shall write to Lord Wellesley about him; but I should think that he will find it impossible to force him to return to Portugal.

‘ I shall recommend your friend for an Ensigncy. Should you prefer a Cornetcy for him, I may be able to give him one.

‘ I have also received your letter of the 8th, respecting



Ciudad Rodrigo. I think that the French have not had, since they entered Spain, so good an opportunity of attacking Ciudad Rodrigo as at the present moment. The arrival of Romana's force, if it is good for any thing, may indeed make some difference; at all events it will give us an opportunity of collecting a very large force in that quarter, which may disturb them a little.

' I think, however, that things are so nearly balanced in this part of Spain between strength of position and numbers, that neither party can do the other much mischief just at present; and I believe the French are of the same opinion, which is the cause of their inactivity.

' I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire your Adjutant General to send me a copy of his last monthly return of all the troops in Portugal, including militia, with an additional column specifying where the corps are; likewise a copy of his general monthly return every month. And I request you also to desire D'Urban to write me a line to let me know when any of the corps are moved from the stations at which they appear to have been by the monthly return.

' I have sent you all the letters that I have received from England respecting officers to be sent out for the Portuguese army.

' I have likewise received your letter of the 8th, respecting Romana's movements. He is to be here on the day after to-morrow, when I shall know more of what his objects are. His movements now appear very unaccountable.

' I heard some time ago of the retrograde movements of the French; but on the next day there was a contradiction of them, which possibly had not reached Lisbon when you wrote. I think it very improbable that they will materially weaken their force in this part of Spain.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Marshal Beresford.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Peacocke.*

' SIR,

' Badajoz, 12th September, 1809.

' I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th instant, and its enclosures.



‘ I desire that the troops in Lisbon and Belem may receive salt provisions twice a week, till those provisions shall be consumed which have been reported as likely to become unfit for use if kept much longer.

‘ The women and children of the officers and soldiers of the army are entitled, the former each to half a ration, the latter to a quarter of a ration daily: and I see no objection to extending these allowances to the wives and children of clerks and others employed in the public departments, provided they are English born. If the clerk be Portuguese, it may be very necessary and proper to give him his rations, but it cannot be necessary to his wife and children, and I desire that this practice may be discontinued.

‘ I conclude that the rations drawn by the lady, to whom you refer, as an officer’s wife, are for the wives of other officers or soldiers, and if so they are perfectly regular, if not, they must be discontinued: and, at all events, forage must not be allowed to the horse of an officer’s lady residing at Lisbon.

‘ I beg that you will understand that I am desirous of giving to the wives of the officers and soldiers of the army every indulgence to the fullest extent allowed by His Majesty’s regulations; but I can suffer no abuse, and every appearance of abuse must be checked immediately.

‘ The officers of the army are allowed to draw rations in the field for servants not soldiers, paying for the same; and I conceive the same indulgence may be extended to their families residing at Lisbon for English servants, but not for Portuguese.

‘ I beg that you will communicate this letter to the Commissariat department.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 12th September, 1809.

‘ I have received your official letter of the 9th, relative to the Danish ships at Oporto, and the only official answer I can give is, that I have nothing to do with those ships.

‘ However, I must mention to you that I have desired that

a legal opinion might be taken in England respecting the right of the navy and army to the property captured at Oporto; and it would probably be desirable that we should not lose hold of these ships till we know what that opinion is.

‘ I have scarcely any doubt, however, for the reasons I have before stated to you, that we have no right to any of the property; and if you should be of the same opinion, I shall write you an official answer to your letter of the 9th, to the purport above stated.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 12th September, 1809.

‘ Before I left Lisbon, Madame da Silva gave me a list containing the names of persons who, she said, were detained in France, and who, I believe, were the Bishops and other deputies called out of Portugal by Buonaparte, under pretence of settling a government for that country; and she begged that if I had an opportunity I would interest myself in their favor, and have them sent back.

‘ Upon looking at the list, however, I found it contained the names of the Marquez d’Alorna and others who are certainly traitors; and I wrote to her to say that I could have nothing to do with them.

‘ Nearly at the same time a prisoner, who had made his escape, brought in two letters from the Marquez d’Alorna, which Sir Robert Wilson sent to me; and Senhor Sodr e having perused them, and told me that they were only common letters to his wife and to one of his friends, I sent them to Madame da Silva to be delivered to her; Madame da Silva had more sense than Sodr e, and discovered something in the letters which he had not perceived, and wrote me that she would not deliver them without hearing further from me. Upon which I wrote to her to beg to have the letters again, and I now enclose them to you with their translations.

‘ Beresford wrote to me some time ago to desire to have these letters; at that time they were in Madame da Silva’s



hands, and you are the most proper person to determine what is to be done with them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I have settled your money concerns as you wish, and only wait to hear from the Commissary General to let you know how much you may now draw for. I send this by an English messenger, and I wish him to be detained at Lisbon ready to sail, till my dispatches shall arrive, when he must go home. I propose to send by him duplicates of my dispatches of the 8th, as I fear that Stanhope, not having arrived in England on the 26th, has been taken. Can the enclosed direction be the Bishop of Castello Branco?’

*To the Duke of Portland, First Lord of the Treasury.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 12th September, 1809.

‘ I am very much obliged to your Grace for your kind letter of the 22nd August,\* and highly flattered by your good opinion.

‘ His Majesty’s most gracious acceptance of my services and his notice of the troops under my command, have been most gratifying to me; and I hope that I shall not prove myself undeserving of the honor which he has manifested a disposition to confer upon me at your Grace’s suggestion.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Duke of Portland.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

\* *The Duke of Portland, K.G., First Lord of the Treasury, to Lieut. General the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR ARTHUR,

‘ London, 22nd August, 1809.

‘ To congratulate you on your victories would be so feebly to express my sense of your services, that I must indulge, in the first instance, the gratitude which I feel to be due to you, and request your acceptance of my best thanks for the credit as well as the service you have done to your country, which I trust will make all the impression which it ought to do on the minds of all descriptions of persons in the kingdom.

‘ Nothing could be more gracious than the King’s acceptance of your services or more immediate and decisive than his approbation of the suggestion of creating you a Viscount. Long may you enjoy that honor, and be placed for the advantage and honor of your country in those situations which may enable you to add to your own.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General the Hon.*

‘ PORTLAND.

*Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*’



*To Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD, Badajoz, 12th September, 1809.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for your kind letter of the 20th of August, as well as for the mark of the King’s approbation, which your friendship for me has induced you to suggest to your colleagues to recommend to the King to confer upon me. I can only promise to do my best to prove myself not undeserving of the King’s favor and of the partiality of my friends.

‘ It has been most gratifying to me to read the proofs which you sent me, that the King’s mind corresponded with the wishes of my friends upon this occasion; and I have great hopes that he will not be dissatisfied with subsequent transactions in this country, although they are of a different nature from those of which he had marked his approbation in a manner so gracious towards me.

‘ I am more than ever convinced that if I had not taken the steps I did, as detailed in my dispatches of the 8th and 21st of August, I should have lost the army; whereas it is now acquiring strength daily.

‘ I send by this opportunity duplicates of the letters and dispatches sent on the 8th, as I fear that the Britannia, in which Stanhope went, who had charge of them, may have been taken, as he had not arrived in London on the 26th of August.

‘ We shall be glad to receive the 1st dragoons and the regiment for the cavalry. I am besides endeavoring to purchase horses here. The regiments conceive that they have more horses at the recruiting quarters than are to be sent out to them. The 4th dragoons, in particular, which will only receive forty five, have many more, as well as the 16th. I am also much obliged to you for the recruits.

‘ I wish very much that some measures could be adopted to get some recruits for the 29th regiment. It is the best regiment in this army, has an admirable internal system, and excellent noncommissioned officers; but for the want of a second battalion, and somebody to attend to its recruiting, it is much reduced in numbers, by losses in the action of Roliça and Vimeiro, in the expedition to the north of Portugal and at Talavera.

‘What shall I do with the horse transports now in the Tagus, and those coming?’

‘I am very much obliged to you for your kindness about Hill and other officers. Hill deserves everything that can be done for him, and I should be glad to see him honored as he deserves.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*’      ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘MY LORD,      ‘Badajoz, 12th September, 1809.’

‘I have received intimation from Marshal Beresford that Colonel —, of the Portuguese service, is now at Seville, being absent from his regiment without leave, and being indebted to the Portuguese Government in a large sum of money, of which he has given no account. I conclude that the usual means have been adopted by Marshal Beresford to induce Colonel — to return to his duty in Portugal; but as they have failed to produce their effect, and as this gentleman is one of His Majesty’s subjects, and in the service of his ally the Prince Regent, I request your Excellency to urge the Spanish Government to have him sent into Portugal without loss of time, or to my head quarters at this place.

‘I know that Colonel — is absent from his regiment without leave, as I refused to give him leave.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Marquis Wellesley.*’      ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Gordon, Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘Badajoz, 13th September, 1809.’

‘Accounts have been received, to which I give full credit, although they are not of a nature on which I can found an official report, that Lieut. Colonel Donellan, 48th regiment, is dead.

‘I cannot avoid, upon this occasion, again drawing the attention of the Commander in Chief to the claims of Major Middlemore\*. The 48th regiment distinguished itself at

\* Major-general Middlemore, Governor of St. Helena.

the battle of Talavera, particularly when the command devolved upon Major Middlemore ; and I hope that the claims of an officer senior to him, who is already a Brevet Lieut. Colonel, and to whom this commission can be no object, as he never joins his regiment, or does any duty with this army, will not be preferred to the substantial claims of Major Middlemore.

‘ I know nothing of Major Middlemore, excepting as a soldier on service ; and I should not recommend him if I did not believe that his promotion would give general satisfaction, and that he really deserves it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Gordon.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Junta of Estremadura.*

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Badajoz, 13th September, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th instant, enclosing one addressed to me by the inhabitants of Puebla la Calzada, in which they desire that I should remove the troops which are quartered in that town.

‘ In consequence of the desire expressed by the Central Junta to the British ambassador at Seville, I consented to allow the British army to remain within the Spanish frontier ; and I distributed it in such a manner as that the country should not find it difficult to feed the troops, and that I should have it in my power to assemble the army without loss of time, in case the movements of the enemy should render that measure necessary.

‘ Accordingly, three battalions have been quartered at La Calzada, because there is no wood in the neighbourhood in which the troops would find shelter, excepting olive or other fruit trees which I wished not to destroy ; but if there had been wood and water, I should have preferred to have huted the troops in the wood, as I have done at Talavera Real and in this neighbourhood.

‘ It appears, however, that the inhabitants of La Calzada, although with the most patriotic sentiments, and with the utmost devotion to the cause of their country, complain of the inconvenience which they feel from having these troops quartered upon them. They enumerate the provisions with



which the troops are supplied: but they have forgotten to state that they are regularly paid for every thing they give.

‘ In answer to this complaint of inconvenience, I must observe, that the inhabitants of this country, and Spaniards in general, have formed a very erroneous estimate of the nature of the contest in which they are engaged, if they suppose that it can be carried on without inconvenience to every individual in the country. Not only it cannot be carried on without personal inconvenience, but unless every individual shall devote himself, his property, and every thing he can command, not in words and professions only, but in fact, to do what government shall order, there can be no success; and the best combined operations must fail.

‘ Having made these observations, I must inform you, that I cannot easily alter the distribution which I have made of the troops; and either the town of La Calzada must continue to suffer the trifling personal inconvenience of having these troops within their town, or the Spanish nation and the province of Estremadura must suffer what the Central Junta will, I believe, consider a greater evil.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Junta of Estremadura.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Honorable John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 13th Sept., 1809.

‘ I beg that you will send off Mr. Shaw with the letters and dispatches sent down this night. Every thing appears so quiet that I may venture in a few days to go to Lisbon, where I want to look about me a little, and decide finally upon our plan of operations, in case Portugal should be invaded in the autumn or winter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 13th September, 1809.

‘ Affairs have remained nearly in the same state in which they were when I addressed you on the 4th instant. The enemy has not moved, and the Spanish head quarters still continue at Truxillo.

‘ General Venegas has, I understand, again moved forward into La Mancha, the enemy having retired towards Toledo.

‘ The army under the command of the Marques de la Romana has moved from Galicia through Portugal, and is arrived in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, where it is to be under the command of the Duque del Parque; the Marques de la Romana being on his way to Seville, and expected here to-morrow.

‘ I understand that this corps consist of about 13,000 men.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Roche.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 14th September, 1809.

‘ I received this day your letter of the 11th. The French Major has not yet made his appearance.

‘ General Eguia’s plan is rank nonsense.

‘ I send you the newspapers: you will see how General Cuesta is abused for nothing.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Roche.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 14th September, 1809.

‘ I enclose some letters which I have received from Mr. Phillips, a gentleman who has lately imported wheat and barley to Lisbon, the latter of which has been bought from him by the Commissary General; and the former, it appears, is wished for by the Portuguese Government; but they and Mr. Phillips cannot agree upon the mode of payment. Why should not the bills in the hands of the Portuguese Government be used for this purpose; Mr. Phillips taking them at par? or if the Portuguese Government prefer it, I will order Mr. Murray to give Mr. Phillips bills for the wheat; but in this case the Portuguese Government must give credit for these bills at the price of the day. In short, the wheat being wanted by the Portuguese Government, settle with Mr. Phillips for the payment of it in any manner you please, and I will carry into execution any thing for which

you may engage, and let Mr. Phillips go to England. I enclose a letter for him.

‘ Believe me, &c.  
‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.* ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ SIR, ‘ Badajoz, 15th September, 1809.

‘ I have the honor of acknowledging your letter of the 12th instant, relative to the mode of paying British officers attached to the Portuguese service, with Portuguese rank, in which you have enclosed a copy of your letter to me of the 12th July, a part of which related to the same subject. I transmitted that letter to the Commander in Chief in England, as soon as I received it, but have never received any decision on its contents, excepting that contained in his Excellency’s letter to me of the 15th, in answer to mine of the 7th June, from Thomar, of both of which you have copies.

‘ It is desirable, however, indeed necessary, that the mode of paying the British officers in the Portuguese service should be fixed; and I would suggest the mode detailed in this letter to your consideration, and that of Mr. Villiers; and that if you should approve of it, it should be immediately carried into execution.

‘ In the mean time I shall make a report on the subject to the Secretary of State; and if His Majesty’s Government should not approve of the arrangement which has been made, it can be altered, and any other adopted which they may direct; and it can be applied with ease to the payments which may have been made, under the arrangement which I now propose for your consideration.

‘ It appears that the principle on which His Majesty’s Government have proceeded, in the assistance which they have given to Portugal, is to consider the expense of each particular description of assistance in the light of a subsidy; and it has been accordingly settled, that those British officers serving with the Portuguese army, to whom British advanced rank has been granted, shall be paid by an officer employed under the directions of the Ambassador.

‘ The same principle must be applied to the payment of British officers serving with Portuguese rank.



‘ These officers have, generally, commissions in His Majesty’s service, of which they are to receive the pay : they are also to receive the ordinary British field allowances of their rank ; and they are to receive the Portuguese pay and allowances of their Portuguese commissions. Some of them, the brigadiers and major generals, are to receive the British staff pay and allowances of those ranks, besides their regimental pay.

‘ I think it probable that His Majesty’s Government would not consider the regimental pay or the half pay of any of these officers in the light of subsidy. They are lent from the ordinary establishment of the army to the Portuguese service ; and whether employed in this or any other manner, they must equally receive their pay.

‘ But that is a question which need not be decided at this moment. The Government will not have an opportunity of considering it, and may settle whether this expense should be considered as subsidy, or should be charged against the several regiments to which these officers belong.

‘ The field allowances to all ranks, and staff pay, must evidently be considered as subsidy, upon the principle which His Majesty’s Government have already settled in respect to British officers serving in Portugal holding advanced British rank.

‘ Whether the Portuguese pay to be given to these officers is to come from the British or Portuguese Government is, in my opinion, a question of trivial importance, and will at all events be open for the decision of the King’s Government. Till they shall decide it, and if it should be decided that the British Government are to defray this expense, it must be considered in the light of subsidy, in the same manner with the other heads of expense which I have before discussed.

‘ The measures, then, which I have to recommend to your consideration, and that of Mr. Villiers, are—

‘ 1st, To appoint Mr. Bell to be the Paymaster of the British officers serving with the Portuguese troops with Portuguese rank.

‘ 2ndly, That they should be directed to draw from him the British regimental or half pay to which they may be respectively entitled, according to the forms, and supported by the vouchers, required by His Majesty’s regulations : so

that, if it should be ultimately decided that these payments should be made by the ordinary channels, Mr. Bell will experience no difficulty in recovering from the agents of the several regiments to which the officers belong, and from the Paymaster of the half pay, respectively, the sums which he may have advanced.

‘ 3rdly, That Mr. Bell should pay these officers the British field allowances of their respective ranks, according to the custom of the army, and the orders lately issued ; and all staff pay in the same manner as he now pays the officers attached to the Portuguese service holding advanced British rank. In these regiments, the officers will of course give in separate abstracts.

‘ 4thly, That Mr. Bell should pay these officers their Portuguese pay of their respective rank, for which they must furnish him with the vouchers, &c., required by the Portuguese Government, in order that no difficulty may be experienced in recovering this money from the Portuguese Government, if it should be determined that they are to defray this expense.

‘ 5thly, That Mr. Bell should be directed to keep an account of the payments made to each officer, under these several heads.

‘ If you and Mr. Villiers should concur with me in what I have proposed for your consideration, you can give orders that it should be carried into immediate execution ; and I shall write upon the subject to the Secretary of State, in order to obtain the final decision of Government upon all points of doubt.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Badajoz, 15th September, 1809.

‘ I enclose applications from an officer for leave to be aide de camp to a general officer in the Portuguese service. I do not know what you have determined upon this subject. It appears to me, however, that it is desirable that a British general officer in the Portuguese service should have the assistance of Portuguese staff officers. An English ensign can be of little use to him, or to any body else.



‘ I hope that my official answer of this date will be satisfactory to you respecting the payment of your officers.

‘ I have received your private letters of the 11th and 12th. I shall speak to Mr. Murray respecting the assistance to be given to you in Commissariat officers.

‘ I shall take an opportunity of looking at the Portuguese troops at Elvas, while I am in this part of the world.

‘ I wish that you would speak to Villiers seriously about the augmentation of the pay of the officers in the Portuguese army. Time is going apace: in three months we may have to fight for Portugal; and Great Britain will be much disappointed if, notwithstanding the pains taken, and the expense incurred, the Portuguese army should do nothing.

‘ I think much depends upon this increase of pay. The King’s Ministers will say that we desired that the measure might be recommended to the Regency by our Ambassador, and it will not be known that no answer has ever been given upon a reference made upon this subject. Supposing, however, it should be known that this reference has been made, is it upon a point of such consequence in the case that a measure of vital importance at present should be any longer delayed for the answer to it?

‘ My opinion is, and always has been, not only that it is of no importance, but that upon principle the measure proposed by Villiers, viz.—that the King’s name should be used in the communication to be made to the Portuguese army is wrong. If this be true, Villiers takes upon himself a serious responsibility in delaying any longer to make the recommendation to the Portuguese Government; and although he does not mind responsibility in cases in which he can do good, he should consider that he takes it in this instance to delay a beneficial measure for an object of, at least, doubtful advantage. I wish that you would urge these topics with him, and beg him to let us have these points settled.

‘ I want to save the forage between the Tagus and the Mondego for our probable future operations. Cannot you get forage for your cavalry, and exercise ground about the south banks of the Tagus, at Aldea Galega, &c.



‘ You should write to Mr. Canning about the clothing sent out to you.

‘ The name of the French officer, respecting whom I wish you to inquire, is M. Véron de Farincourt, who was taken at Chaves by Silveira.

‘ I am a little annoyed about the situation of Romana’s troops. It is a great object with the French to destroy his corps; and I think it not improbable that they may make a dash at them. He will find no shelter in Ciudad Rodrigo, and he must consequently take to Portugal.

‘ How must he feed in that country? Where shall we find food for 40,000 or 50,000 men, that we shall have between the Tagus and the Mondego, if the French should make an attempt upon Ciudad Rodrigo? I have ordered magazines upon the Mondego and the Douro, but we must look a little after these cormorants of Romana, in case they should fly into Portugal.

‘ You ought to send somebody to Almeida, or authorise Cox, in case he finds them flying into Portugal, to fix upon the stations to which they are to go; and let the magistrates have orders to obey Cox’s directions to provide for their subsistence at those stations. As to payment for the same, I conclude that is out of the question.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S.—Unless Romana’s people cross the Douro immediately, or unless they have wings, they will not be able to pass over that river when followed by the French.’

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY DEAR WELLESLEY, ‘ Badajoz, 15th September, 1809.

‘ This letter will be delivered by the Marques de la Romana, whom I beg to introduce to you. You will find him more intelligent and reasonable upon Spanish affairs than most Spaniards; I have found him more so than any that I have seen.

‘ He is in some degree alarmed that the Junta should treat him ill, even arrest his person, on account of some conduct of his towards the Junta of Galicia and Asturias. I do not know the details of that conduct, but it cannot be

intended to do much mischief, for you see that he has quitted the country and brought away his army, of which he has given up the command. You are, however, aware of the connexion which he has with the Ministers and people in England; and on the whole I am convinced, that if you can prevent the Junta from laying violent hands upon him, at least till they shall have convicted him upon trial of evil intentions, you will do a good thing.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I do not take up my title till I receive the Gazette, or some notification of it which is authority\*.’

*To Monsieur Victor de Thévenon.*

‘ Au Quartier Général de l’Armée Anglaise,

‘ MONSIEUR,

ce 16 Septembre, 1809.

‘ Vous croirez à peine que quoique j’aie une communication journalière avec le Quartier Général de l’armée Espagnole, je n’ai su qu’aujourd’hui que vous y attendez la réponse de la lettre que vous m’avez apportée de la part du Commandant en Chef de l’armée Française.

‘ Je vous en fais mes excuses, et je vous prie de retourner à M. le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie, et de lui dire avec mes complimens que je suis bien fâché de ne pouvoir quant à présent lui donner réponse sur le compte du Général Franceschi qui est à Seville, parceque je n’ai pas reçu de réponse à la lettre que j’y ai écrite sur son compte, mais que j’aurai l’honneur de lui écrire aussitôt que je recevrai la réponse.

‘ Je n’ai pas reçu non plus la réponse que j’attendais à la lettre que j’ai écrite à Lisbonne sur le compte de M. Véron de Farincourt; mais je vous enverrai de ses nouvelles si je peux en avoir. Je vous prie encore d’excuser la peine que je vous ai donnée en vous faisant attendre si long-temps, et de croire que vraiment je ne savais pas que vous étiez au Quartier Général Espagnol; et je comptais renvoyer ma réponse par un officier Anglais.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *M. Victor de Thévenon.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

\* The notification of Sir Arthur Wellesley’s elevation to the Peerage was received on the 16th September; dated 26th August, 1809, by the titles of Baron Douro of Wellesley, and Viscount Wellington of Talavera.

*To Lieut. General Sherbrooke, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,                    ‘Badajoz, 16th September, 1809.’

‘Upon considering the charge against Ensign — of the — —, which is founded solely upon his having crossed the bridge at Merida; and the second charge, which is founded solely upon his writing the enclosed letters, I think them so frivolous, that I shall be very much obliged to you if you will call before you General —, the Commanding Officer of the regiment, and Ensign —, and inform them that I consider the first charge as frivolous, and the second as groundless; and, therefore that I have ordered Ensign — to be released from his arrest. At the same time, I beg you to point out to Ensign — that I will not allow him to disobey any order of his Commanding Officer, however trifling; and that the next time he errs, he shall certainly be brought to trial.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Gen. Sherbrooke.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘I understand that 8000 rations of biscuit are gone to you this day.’

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘SIR,    ‘Badajoz, 16th September, 1809.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 11th instant, and I have desired Mr. Murray to send an Agent to Tangier by the route pointed out by you.

‘I am concerned that so much difficulty is experienced in landing the mules at the mouth of the Guadiana; but if that difficulty should be found to be of a nature to prevent their being landed there, I would request that they might be brought to Lisbon, rather than be landed in any part of the Spanish territories, from the knowledge I have of the impossibility of procuring in Spain any means of taking care of the mules, or of bringing them to join the army.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral  
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS, ‘ Badajoz, 16th September, 1809.

‘ I enclose a correspondence which has passed between one of the Officers of the Commissariat and General Leite, respecting some biscuit which was left by the British troops at Elvas last year, and is now in Fort La Lippe. The most convenient way of settling for supplies received by the British troops would be to pay for them in money; and if stores are to be transferred by the British Commissariat to the Portuguese Government, they should be settled for as proposed by my Commissariat arrangement, approved by you and Beresford.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will inquire whether the account between the Junta de Viveres and our Commissariat has really been settled in the manner stated by General Leite; and if it has, whether it has been done by order of Government; whether any balance is due by us on the account, and, in short, how the account stands. If it has not, it would be desirable that, by way of example, this small store of biscuit should be given over to us; and we ought to settle the account immediately, and pay the balance.

‘ The sum of money received in the last month of August for bills, and in all modes, amounts to £158,000, of which sum the fifth, or about £32,000, are at your disposal, at the Commissary General’s office. Of this sum you have already, I understand, received a part. This sum of £158,000 is exclusive of the money arrived in the Fylla, amounting to £150,000 and more, the silver belonging, I understand, exclusively to the Portuguese Government.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ This is the first time I have signed my new name. Would the Regency give me leave to have a *Chasse* at Villa Viçosa?

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 16th September, 1809.

‘ I enclose an extract of a letter which I received yesterday from Colonel Roche, from the Spanish head quarters at Truxillo; and I beg to draw your Excellency’s attention to the cause stated for the movement of the troops, viz.—*the want of provisions*; notwithstanding that I was urged three weeks ago to remain with the British army, even in front of Truxillo, and was informed that there were provisions in sufficient quantities for both armies.

‘ I likewise enclose a letter which I have this day received from Lieut. General Sherbrooke, from Talavera Real, being the report made to him yesterday by the Commissary attached to his division of infantry.

‘ As long as the Spanish armies are suffered to continue in the state of indiscipline and disorder in which they are at present, it will be impossible to continue in their neighbourhood; as they not only consume the provisions of the country, but will not allow the villagers to supply to the British troops those provisions which they require, and which the Spanish troops do not want.

‘ I have communicated the enclosed letter to the Junta of Badajoz, and have requested them to adopt measures to supply Lieut. General Sherbrooke’s division from hence; and I beg your Excellency to inform the Spanish Government that if, in consequence of this new disposition, or the irregularities of the Spanish troops, and the failure of supplies from this town, I shall be obliged to move General Sherbrooke’s division of infantry into Portugal, I shall likewise move the whole army within the Portuguese frontier, as I cannot, with propriety, separate the different parts of it so much as they would be separated by leaving a part in Spain.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY DEAR WELLESLEY,

‘ Badajoz, 16th September, 1809.

‘ I enclose some Madrid newspapers, which I received from Colonel Roche, solely because he has desired I should send them, and not because I think they contain any thing



interesting, excepting that they afforded ground for belief that the armistice was not broken off, but rather was renewed; nor was peace signed at a late period in the month of August.

‘A packet has arrived at Lisbon, bringing accounts that the troops are returning from the Scheldt, without attacking Antwerp or the fleet, but retaining possession of Walcheren.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Junta of Estremadura.*

‘GENTLEMEN,

‘Badajoz, 17th September, 1809.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th instant, respecting the means of supplying the British army with bread; and I have requested the bearer of this letter, Mr. Murray, the Commissary General, to wait upon you to settle the quantities of flour which shall be furnished from the British magazines at Abrantes, the price which shall be paid for it, and the mode of paying the expense of its transport from Abrantes to Badajoz. Mr. Murray will then give you the orders on the storekeeper at Abrantes for the quantities of flour which it will be settled that you should have.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Junta of Estremadura.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘SIR,

‘Badajoz, 17th September, 1809.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 13th instant, respecting the losses of horses and baggage by British officers employed in the service of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal; and I beg to propose for your consideration, and that of Mr. Villiers, that the claims for losses by these individuals should be decided upon according to the mode pointed out in his Majesty’s regulations, under your directions; and that those claims reported to be well founded should be discharged by Mr. Bell, and the accounts for the disbursements on this account be made in the same manner as is pointed out in my letter of the 15th instant for the field allowances of the same description of persons.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Marshal Beresford.*’

‘WELLINGTON.



*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,                      ‘Badajoz, 17th September, 1809.

‘I think that you will be satisfied with my decision respecting the claims of your officers for losses.

‘I return your letter respecting the vacancies, to which I think you will do well to add a recommendation of the successors to each. This recommendation will not interfere with the grant of the request; at the same time that if it is granted, you will enjoy the benefit of it some months sooner than you would otherwise.

‘I thought I had written to you some time ago about Captain —; at all events, I stated in a late letter my opinion of the small degree of service which an English aide de camp would have it in his power to render to a General Officer employed with the Portuguese army.

‘In respect to *bât* and forage to officers who have not had the Commander in Chief’s leave to serve with the Portuguese army, the rule which I have laid down, and which is applicable to all extra aides de camp and staff without pay serving with this army is, that officers who have not had the Commander in Chief’s permission to join the army are not to have the *bât* and forage of the rank or situation in which they may be serving.

‘If this rule should be applied to Colonel Grant and Sir Mark Gerrard, it would decide against their claims. However, I do not see why it should.

‘It is an object to Government, and to the Commander in Chief, to persuade officers to serve in the Portuguese army; and, besides, as I am authorised to allow officers to serve with it, I conceive I may as well allow one on half pay as one on full pay. If I allow one to serve with the Portuguese army, with which it is an object to Government that he should serve, I may venture to relax a rule which I have made myself with regard to officers serving with this army without the leave of the Commander in Chief. I think, therefore, you may give Colonel Grant and Sir Mark Gerrard their *bât* and forage allowance.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal Beresford.*’

‘WELLINGTON.





Frenchman sent to Seville by Colonel Roche, tending, I rather think, to prove that this person cannot be depended upon.

‘ The estimate which I made of the French force in Spain included only effectives; if the sick and wounded are included it would amount to 30,000 or 40,000 more. In order to explain this point to you, I enclose an abstract of the return of Marshal Victor’s army for the month of May, of which you will see that the effectives were 29,321, and the sick 10,024, or rather more than one third; and rather less than one fourth of the total, which was 44,958. These proportions being taken for the whole, would give between 30,000 and 40,000 sick for the whole French army: and I must observe, that there must have been more than 12,000 sick in the hospital at Madrid, after the battle of Talavera, which certainly added 8,000 wounded to the number.

‘ Viewing the state of the French army in another light, I think I shall show the accuracy of my own estimate, and the probability that the sick amount to between 30,000 and 40,000 in addition.

‘ When the French army entered Spain, it consisted of eight corps, each of which consists generally of between 30,000 and 40,000 men. Victor’s, we see, was in May 45,000; and Soult’s and Ney’s were each, I know, between 32,000 and 35,000 men. Supposing the eight corps upon an average to have been 25,000, the total numbers would be 200,000; and, I believe, 220,000 is the number Buonaparte is supposed to have had in Spain last year. Of these he withdrew his Guards, but I believe nothing else.

‘ If this be true, let us see where the French have since lost any men. They lost some at Coruña, some in Portugal, and, accordingly, we find Ney’s corps about 14,000 or 16,000 men, and Soult’s about 8,000 or 10,000. They lost some at Zaragoza; some in different battles fought on their entrance into Spain, a few at Medellin and in La Mancha. But there has been no great catastrophe to carry off thousands; and it is going a great way to admit that they have lost, in killed, prisoners, and deserters, 50,000 men since they entered Spain last year.

‘ But admitting that they have lost between 40,000 and 50,000 men, there would still remain between 150,000 and 160,000 to be accounted for; and I should say that they have



125,000 effective, and between 30,000 and 40,000 sick and wounded, throughout Spain.

‘ I hear that Soult is collecting his corps at Plasencia, but I attribute this movement to the arrival of the Marques de la Romana’s troops at Ciudad Rodrigo, and their subsequent movements towards Perales and Baños.

‘ I do not find that the French are making any preparations for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and I cannot conceive what they are about. I am apprehensive, however, that the movement of the troops from this province into La Mancha will be fatal, if any circumstances shall occur to oblige me to move from hence.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I am very anxious to have an answer respecting the exchange of General Franceschi.’

*To Colonel Peacocke.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 20th September, 1809.

‘ I have this morning received your letter of the 15th, and having yesterday communicated to you, through the Adjutant General, my opinion respecting Lieut. Colonel Walsh’s situation, I might now save you the trouble of the perusal of a second letter upon the same subject; only that it appears to me that you have entirely mistaken the nature of Lieut. Colonel Walsh’s appointment and employment, as commanding the detachments and convalescents at and in the neighbourhood of Lisbon.

‘ There would be no reason for having at that place an officer in his situation, if there was not an infinite detail in drawing the pay, and the payment, and in keeping the accounts of the men of not less than fifty regiments, of which those detachments are composed.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Walsh was appointed to do this duty principally; and although it was and is intended that he should likewise superintend the conduct and the discipline of these men personally, the performance of that part of the duty by him is not so necessary as the accurate performance of that first mentioned; more particularly as there are other officers of the rank of Field Officer at Lisbon and Belem in a state

of convalescence, each of whom is obliged to assist in the performance of this duty.

‘ I consider that Lieut. Colonel Walsh, in his line, has rendered very essential services to the army; and I am so little disposed to allow him to be removed from either of his offices, of which he has, till you took the command, done the duty in a satisfactory manner, that if these complaints should continue, I shall be under the necessity of making an entirely new arrangement at Lisbon, however disagreeable it may be to me.

‘ The regulations do not allow you a Brigade Major, or an Aide de Camp, and I regret that I cannot allow you either. You have the assistance of a Town Major and a Town Adjutant, which must be deemed sufficient.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 20th September, 1809.

‘ You will have found that I had ordered your proportion of the money received in the month of August, to be issued to you as soon as I learned its amount. From your letter, however, I fear that the sum which will have been received by Mr. Bell will not have proved sufficient for your wants at the present moment; and if this should be the case, as we have now more money than we immediately want, you shall have as much more as you please, after I shall hear from you.

‘ I cannot yet fix the day for my departure for Lisbon; first, because I do not think the enemy’s movements sufficiently decided to enable me to say that I can go with safety; and, secondly, because I have not been well for above a month, and have still hanging upon me a low fever which I cannot shake off.

‘ Soult has, however, collected his corps at Plasencia, most probably because Romana’s army has come to Ciudad Rodrigo, and has spread into the mountains of Perales and Gata, and even, it is said, of Baños; and it is probable that in a day or two he must make a decided movement one way or the other.



‘ As soon as I shall ascertain what that is, if it does not require our interference, I shall set out, and I think it probable that the journey may do me good.

‘ The Portuguese head quarters must accommodate matters a little. I am willing to give every thing to the Portuguese army that our stores and means can afford; but it must be done in the way of subsidy to the Portuguese Government, according to the mode which I have repeatedly pointed out. Half the business of the world, particularly that of our country, is done by accommodation, and by the parties understanding each other; but when rights are claimed they must be resisted, if there are no grounds for them: when appeal must be made to higher powers there can be no accommodation, and much valuable time is lost in reference which ought to be spent in action.

‘ I have never refused any thing that has been asked for the Portuguese Government which our stores could afford; I have invariably given my time and attention to frame the modes in which all assistance could be given, and all difficulties occasioned by the orders under which we act could be overcome; but when, instead of adopting these modes, what is wanted is claimed as a right, I must resist every claim of that description, not founded upon the King’s regulations; or, if they are persisted in, I must appeal to England.

‘ I shall write to Madame da Silva to remove any uneasiness she may feel about the letters: she is either decidedly honest, or she is a terrible rogue.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Brigadier General the Hon. G. Anson, President of a General Court Martial.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 21st September, 1809.

‘ I have perused the proceedings of the General Court Martial, on the trial of —, Paymaster of the — regiment, which I am desirous that the Court should revise, as it appears to me that one very material point for their inquiry has not been investigated.

‘ It appears that Mr. — thought proper, for the secu-



riety of his money, to move from Talavera on the evening of the 3rd of August, with the sick and wounded, and that he considered it dangerous to endeavor to join the army and his regiment, which was at Oropesa, two leagues distant from Arzobispo, and that he knew the army was there.

‘ The point into which I conceive the General Court Martial ought to inquire is, whether Mr. — did really remain with the hospital. Did he put himself under the directions of Colonel Mackinnon? Did he ever ask information from him or from the superior officers of the army with the hospital respecting the position of his regiment? ’

‘ This inquiry will make it appear to the Court that, on the 5th of August, the hospital was within two miles of the — regiment, and that on the 7th of August it was with the head quarters at Deleytosa. ’

‘ The inquiring into these points may probably induce the Court to alter their sentence; but if it should not, I beg leave to suggest to them to revise it so far as to omit the word “ privately,” preceding the word “ reprimanded;” as I conceive that a private reprimand is so difficult to define or to execute, that the commanding officer, charged with the execution of the sentence, will require instructions upon the subject. I have also to observe that privacy is inconsistent with every just notion of punishment. ’

‘ I have the honor to be, &c. ’

‘ *Brig. General*  
*the Hon. G. Anson.* ’

‘ WELLINGTON. ’

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ SIR, ’

‘ Badajoz, 21st September, 1809. ’

‘ I have the honor to acquaint you that Lieut. Colonel Bathurst, the Military Secretary, has received an application from Captain Collins of the Royal Marines, claiming the allowance of *bât* and forage, as a field officer, for himself and that of Captain for the Adjutant. ’

‘ I beg leave to remark, that in consequence of the late regulations respecting the *bât* and forage allowance, these claims are totally inadmissible; but if you should consider Captain Collins as having been appointed Commandant of a battalion of seamen and marines, during the time he served

on shore, he might be entitled as such to two additional rations of forage; and if Mr. Paxton was considered as Adjutant, he might be entitled to £5 baggage money instead of £3 15s., which he received as a subaltern; but he could not draw in both situations. If you should be of opinion that they are entitled to these additional allowances, the warrant can be sent back to head quarters and altered.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*  
*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY DEAR WELLESLEY,

‘ Badajoz, 21st September, 1809.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 19th, and your dispatches, Nos. 4 and 5, and I sent forward the messenger with them to Lisbon.

‘ I do not know whether it is worth while to make the misrepresentation, by the Marques de Malespina, of what passed between him and me, the subject of a dispatch, of which you will judge from what follows.

‘ Malespina came to me with Lord Macduff, who has taken the Spanish cause under his protection, and they produced a letter from General Eguia, quoting one from Don A. de Cornel, stating that the British Ambassador had settled that a defensive position should be taken up on the Guadiana; and they desired me to arrange the positions to be occupied by the troops in concert with them. I answered, that I could not enter upon such an arrangement, as I did not conceive that the position was a good one. Lord Macduff then said, “ What! will you not carry into execution an arrangement settled by the British ambassador?” To which I answered, that the arrangement, as stated in Don A. de Cornel’s letter, was not that suggested by the British ambassador, of whose note I had a copy in my possession; that he had suggested that certain positions should be occupied on the Guadiana, by the two armies, if I consented to remain in Spain, and provided that certain arrangements were adopted to supply the troops with provisions, means of transport, &c.; that I did not think I could remain in Spain; and that the conditions regarding provisions and



means of transport had not been fulfilled; and therefore that the proposal, in respect to the position, must be considered as never having been made; and I recommended General Eguia to keep his army in its position on the Tagus as long as he could, but, at all events, until he should receive further orders.

‘ Although the Duque de Alburquerque is *proné* by many, among others by Whittingham and Frere, and is feared by the Junta, you will find him out. I think the Marques de la Romana the best I have seen of the Spaniards. I doubt his talents at the head of an army, but he is certainly a sensible man, and has seen much of the world.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 21st September, 1809.

‘ Since I addressed you on the 13th instant, Marshal Soult has collected his corps at Plasencia; but I have not heard that the enemy have made any movements in any other quarters. I conclude, therefore, that this assembly of Soult’s corps is to be attributed to the arrival of that lately under the command of the Marques de la Romana in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo; and to the subsequent movements which I understand it has made into the mountains of Perales and Gata, and even as far as Baños.

‘ General Eguia’s head quarters have been moved from Truxillo to La Serena, and I understand that the whole of the Spanish army, which has hitherto been in Estremadura, with the exception of 10,000 men, are to march to La Carolina. The 10,000 men are to remain in Estremadura under the command of the Duque de Alburquerque.

‘ I am apprehensive that this disposition of the Spanish forces may be attended by bad consequences, if the British army should be obliged to quit its present position.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘MY DEAR LORD, ‘Badajoz, 21st September, 1809.

‘I have nothing to add to my public letter of this date.

‘The 1st dragoons, nearly the whole of the remount for the cavalry, and the recruits for the infantry, are arrived at Lisbon.

‘I have ordered the battalions of detachments to Lisbon, having taken from them the men belonging to the regiments of which we have one battalion in this country, and I shall send the remainder to England.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To the Junta of Estremadura.*

‘GENTLEMEN, ‘Badajoz, 22nd September, 1809.

‘I am concerned to have to state to you that the supplies of bread for the British army, although much separated for the convenience of the country in furnishing it with subsistence, are very scanty and by no means regular. I conclude from these circumstances that the people of this part of Estremadura are either unable or unwilling to supply what is required for the troops under my command, notwithstanding that they are paid regularly, and in ready money, for every thing they furnish; but, from report, I am induced to apprehend that the failure on their part proceeds from want of inclination. Still, whatever may be the cause of deficiency, I now inform you that I propose to withdraw the army from Spain entirely, on the first day there may be any failure or deficiency in the supplies of provisions to the troops.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Junta of Estremadura.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘MY LORD, ‘Badajoz, 22nd September, 1809.

‘I have received intelligence from Almeida of the 18th, and from Castello Branco of the 21st, which gives me reason to apprehend that the Duque del Parque has risked an action with the enemy’s forces collected at Salamanca, of the result of which there can be no doubt.

‘ I do not think it follows that the enemy will undertake the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo because he has been successful in this action, unless he knew of the march of the Marques de la Romana’s corps, and its destination for that quarter, and has waited to commence his operations upon Ciudad Rodrigo, till he should have defeated and dispersed it.

‘ This has long been a favorite object of the enemy, which I am afraid he has at last been enabled to accomplish, by that fatal imprudence and presumption which induce Spanish officers to push forward their troops in situations in which they must be attacked ; and by the national pride which prevents them from making a timely retreat, when threatened by an attack from an enemy superior in numbers, as well as in every military quality.

‘ I should certainly move immediately, if my movement was not likely to expose the city of Seville to imminent danger, under existing arrangements. Therefore, although I am still determined to make an exertion to save Ciudad Rodrigo, I propose to delay my march till I shall be certain that the enemy intends to make an attack upon that place. As far as I can learn, it does not appear that he is equipped for such an enterprise.

‘ I have the honor to enclose to your Excellency copies of two letters which I have written, the first lately, and the last this day, to the Junta of Estremadura, from which you will observe that want may again oblige me to change my position.

‘ I propose, however, to remain upon this frontier of Portugal as long as it shall be in my power.

‘ I have given the Junta of Estremadura orders on the British magazines in Portugal, for a quantity of flour, very nearly equal to what the British army has consumed in this part of the province, and have agreed to pay for the carriage of it ; and yet the people are unable or unwilling to continue to furnish the necessaries to the troops.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘MY DEAR WELLESLEY,

‘Badajoz, 22nd September, 1809.

‘I am very uneasy respecting that part of your note to Don M. de Garay, and of your dispatch, No. 5, which recommended the assembly of the Cortes; not that I do not think the line which you have taken upon this question will give great satisfaction in England, but because I fear that the Cortes may be worse than any thing we have had yet.

‘I acknowledge that I have a great dislike to a new popular assembly. Even our own ancient one would be quite unmanageable, and, in these days, would ruin us, if the present generation had not before its eyes the example of the French revolution; and if there were not certain rules and orders for its guidance and government, the knowledge and use of which render safe, and successfully direct its proceedings.

‘But how will all this work in the Cortes, in the state in which Spain now is? I declare that if I were in Buona-parte’s situation, I should leave the English and the Cortes to settle Spain in the best manner they could; and I should entertain very little doubt but that in a very short space of time Spain must fall into the hands of France.

‘At the same time I must agree with you in thinking that affairs are now in so desperate a situation that they cannot be worse; that there is a real want of men of common capacity in Spain, in whose hands any form of government, intended for vigorous action, could be placed with any hope that their powers could be used to the public advantage; and that the Cortes, with all their faults, and the dangers attendant upon such an assembly, will have at least this advantage, that they will have the confidence of the country, and the prejudices of their countrymen of the lower class in our favor, and against France; your remark being perfectly well founded, that there is no prejudice or jealousy of us anywhere in Spain excepting by the Government.

‘But, in order to enjoy common safety under such an assembly as the Spanish Cortes, the rules and orders for their proceedings and internal government ought to be well



defined, and to be, if possible, a part of the constitution of the assembly. Great care should also be taken in their formation, to protect them from the effects of popular fury in the place of their sitting; but still, with all these precautions, I should prefer a wise Bourbon, if we could find one, for a Regent, to the Cortes.

‘I wish you would add to your note of the 8th September advice that the Junta, appointed to consider of calling the Cortes, should suggest rules for their proceedings, and to secure the freedom of their deliberations; as, in case of accidents, it will show that the rock upon which such a machine was likely to split was not unforeseen.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To W. Huskisson, Esq., Secretary to the Treasury.*]

‘SIR,

‘Badajoz, 22nd September, 1809.’

‘The recent promotion of Mr. Rawlings to be a Deputy Commissary has occasioned the enclosed application from Acting Deputy Commissary Boyes, whose services I am induced to rate very highly. In the campaign of 1808, in Portugal, as well as on the march of the troops into Spain last autumn, and in the operations in the north of Portugal in the spring of this year, and in the late service in Spain, the exertions of Mr. Boyes have been conspicuous, and I cannot but consider him most deserving of the promotion he solicits.

‘I have also to recommend to their Lordships that Assistant Commissary Aylmer and Assistant Commissary Gauntlett should be promoted to be Acting Deputy Commissaries, as being those of the Assisting Commissaries who have shown most ability and activity, and have given most satisfaction.

‘I observe that their Lordships have lately promoted Acting Assistant Commissary Coffin to be an Assistant Commissary, who, I have no doubt, will prove himself worthy of their Lordships’ favor; but he has hitherto been employed with the Commissary General, and has never done any duty

with the army. I therefore beg leave to recommend to their Lordships' favor, to be made Assistant Commissaries, Acting Assistant Commissary Haynes, Acting Assistant Commissary Downie, and Acting Assistant Commissary Wemyss. The first and last mentioned have performed their duty in a most satisfactory manner, and Mr. Downie has been employed on duties which belong to a Deputy Commissary rather than to an Acting Assistant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *W. Huskisson, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 23rd September, 1809.

‘ I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 19th, and for the information you gave me respecting the harbour of Faro ; and I shall therefore direct the Commissary General to make arrangements for receiving and forwarding to the army the mules which may be landed there.

‘ I am in daily expectation of the mules which were landed at the mouth of the Guadiana ; and when they arrive, I will let you know whether they are good

‘ I will also send an officer to examine and report upon the navigation of the Guadiana, from Badajoz to Mertola, and from Mertola to the mouth of the river ; but there is reason to believe that it is not navigable from Badajoz to Mertola.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

*To Viscount Castlereagh,*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 23rd September, 1809.

‘ I enclose an estimate of the expenses in Portugal for the months of September, October, and November ; and of our probable means, from which you will see that our finance is in a more flourishing state than it was some months ago. A copy of this paper will go to the Treasury.

‘ I also enclose a paper, marked No. 1, which I have ex-



tracted from the estimate, showing the real monthly expense of the army in Spain and Portugal, striking from the account the Portuguese subsidy, and the arrear of debt; the first of which cannot be called the expense of the army, nor the other a part of the monthly expense of this army. It is a claim upon our funds, occasioned partly by our own and partly by Sir John Moore's former poverty; and it is very properly included in the estimate, although rated rather highly. But it cannot be called a part of the expense occasioned by this army.

‘ I likewise enclose a paper marked No. 2, showing what I conceive would be the expense of this army if it were at home, from which you will observe that the difference is not much more than £500,000 per annum; and I really believe that if I could include all home expenses, it would not be so much. You will observe that I have not taken into the account the expense of transports, which, however, you are aware is now almost nothing; or of the provisions and forage which we have here. I have no account of the former, and these and the expense of the victuallers must be carried against the army in the field.

‘ In respect to the forage and provisions, however, you will observe that in the estimate for the expense for three months, the Commissary General estimates the full price of the provisions and forage which the army will consume; and if it should consume any of that in its own magazines, it will be a saving of so much upon the estimate.

‘ With the exception of salt meat, I believe that the expense of forage and provisions is nearly the same in this country as it is in England; and I therefore conceive that the estimate covers the expense of the purchase of these articles in England, and there remains to be charged only that of their transport to Lisbon.

‘ In this view of the subject, the forage and provisions, like the shoes and boots, and articles of that description, for which we should be obliged to pay here, may be considered in the light of so much money.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*Estimate of the probable demands on the Military Chest in Spain and Portugal, from the 25th August to the 24th November, 1809, inclusive.*

Service.	Amount Sterling.		
	£.	s.	d.
Ordinaries . . . . .	118,000	0	0
Ordnance . . . . .	18,150	0	0
Portuguese Subsidy . . . . .	150,000	0	0
EXTRAORDINARIES, viz.:—			
	£.	s.	d.
Arrears of Debt . . . . .	50,000	0	0
Provisions . . . . .	175,000	0	0
Forage . . . . .	55,000	0	0
Transport . . . . .	26,000	0	0
Purchase of Horses and Mules . . . . .	10,000	0	0
General Hospital . . . . .	3,000	0	0
Forage Money . . . . .	30,000	0	0
Staff and Commissariat Pay and Salaries . . . . .	12,900	0	0
Contingencies . . . . .	6,000	0	0
	367,900	0	0
Total	£654,050	0	0
Amount per Month, one third of the above, or	218,016	13	4
To which is to be added one third of the loss on Bills, as per Contra . . . . .	17,000	0	0
Total Expenditure per Month	£235,016	13	4

*Estimate of the probable means of providing for the Services stated in the preceding Estimate.*

Funds.	Amount Sterling.																	
	£.	s.	d.															
Balance remaining in the Military Chest on the 25th August, about . . . . .	250,000	0	0															
Amount of Bar Silver and Spanish Gold Coin received by H.M.S. Fylla, estimated at . . . . .	150,000	0	0															
Probable Amount of Bills to be negotiated	<table border="0" style="margin-left: 20px;"> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td>At Lisbon . . . . .</td> <td>345,000</td> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>Cadiz . . . . .</td> <td>75,000</td> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>Gibraltar . . . . .</td> <td>90,000</td> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> </table>			{	At Lisbon . . . . .	345,000	0	0		Cadiz . . . . .	75,000	0	0		Gibraltar . . . . .	90,000	0	0
{	At Lisbon . . . . .	345,000	0	0														
	Cadiz . . . . .	75,000	0	0														
	Gibraltar . . . . .	90,000	0	0														
Total	£510,000	0	0															
Subject to a loss which, computing the Dollar to be raised on an average at 5s. sterling, would amount to 10 per cent., or . . . . .	51,000	0	0															
	459,000	0	0															
Total	£859,000	0	0															

## No. 1.

*Estimate of the Real Expense of the British Army in Portugal for a Month, taken from the Estimate of all the Expenses in Portugal for the Months of September, October, and November.*

Service.	Amount Sterling.		
	£.	s.	d.
Ordinaries . . . . .	39,334	0	0
Ordnance . . . . .	6,050	0	0
<b>EXTRAORDINARIES, viz.</b>			
	£.	s.	d.
Provisions . . . . .	58,334	0	0
Forage . . . . .	18,334	0	0
Transport . . . . .	8,667	0	0
Purchase of Horses and Mules . . . . .	3,334	0	0
General Hospital . . . . .	1,000	0	0
Staff and Commissariat Salaries . . . . .	4,300	0	0
Bât and Forage Money . . . . .	5,000	0	0
Contingencies . . . . .	2,000	0	0
	100,969	0	0
Total for one Month	£146,353	0	0
Total for one Year	£1,756,236	0	0

## No. 2.

*Estimate of the Expense of the Army now in Spain and Portugal, if it were in England.*

Service.	Amount Sterling.		
	£.	s.	d.
Ordinaries, as by the Estimate for Spain and Portugal*	39,334	0	0
Difference of pay 6 <i>d.</i> per diem now stopped for provisions for 1,919 Serjeants. 728 Drummers. 33,602 R. and F. of Cavalry and Infantry.			
36,249 Men for 30½ days†	27,639	0	0
Carried forward	£66,973	0	0

\* In this sum are included some few expenses which would not be incurred in England, but on the other hand, sums are subtracted from the amount which would not be subtracted in England; such as stoppage for rations from the pay of Officers, stoppage for servants not soldiers, &c., into the detail of which I have not the means of entering; but I think the Ordinaries could not be far short of this amount.

† The calculations are all made for thirty days and a half, in order to bring out more nearly the expense for the year; the estimate of the expense in Portugal and Spain being calculated for ninety-two days, of which, in Paper No. 1, I have taken the third.

Service.	Amount Sterling.		
	£.	s.	d.
Brought forward	66,973	0	0
Forage for 2620 Horses of the Cavalry at 2s. a day, for 30½ days	7,991	0	0
Beer Money for 36,249 Men of the Cavalry and In- fantry for 30½ days	4,607	0	0
Difference of price of Bread and Meat for 36,249 Men for 30½ days, the former taken at ¾d., the latter at ½d. a day for each Man	4,607	0	0
Marching Money for 36,249 Men, supposing the whole to move 6 days in the year, or ½d. a day each month	830	0	0
Additional General and Staff Officers in England, when the Army would return, with forage for their Horses	2,000	0	0
Ordnance, as by the Estimate for Spain and Portugal	6,050	0	0
Difference of Pay for Serjeants	90		
Drummers	26		
Rank and File	2252		
Artificers	49		
	<hr/>		
2,417 at 6d. a day now stopped for provisions for 30½ days	1,842	0	0
Forage of 1148 Horses of the Artillery, at 2s. a day each Horse for 30½ days	3,502	0	0
Beer Money for 2417 Men of the Artillery for 30½ days	307	0	0
Difference of the price of Bread and Meat for the same	307	0	0
	<hr/>		
For one Month	99,016	0	0
	× 12		
	<hr/>		
For one Year	£1,188,192	0	0
	<hr/>		
<b>Add Barrack Allowances.</b>			
Allowance for cleaning arms, 2s. 9d. each man.			
Allowance for altering Clothing, 2s. 6d. each man not given abroad.			
Amount of the Expense of the British Army in Spain and Portugal for one year	1,756,236	0	0
Amount of the same in England	1,188,192	0	0
	<hr/>		
Difference by having the Army in the field	£568,044	0	0
	<hr/>		



*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Badajoz, 24th September, 1809.

‘ I have received two letters from you of the 19th, and two of the 22nd.

‘ I shall inquire of General Howorth whether any wheels can be given to you ; but I should think not, as we have been hard run ourselves. Would our wheels fit your axle-trees ?

‘ Shall I send to England a copy of my letter to you, regarding the payment of the English officers ?

‘ I have written to Villiers respecting the increase of pay for the Portuguese officers.

‘ I should not select the senior, but the officer most likely to be useful, in recommending for promotion.

‘ I shall certainly go down to Lisbon as soon as I can. I stay here only till I see the result of the collection of troops at Plasencia and Talavera.

‘ There never was any thing like the madness, the imprudence, and the presumption of the Spanish officers, in the way they risk their corps, knowing that the national vanity will prevent them from withdrawing them from a situation of danger, and that, if attacked, they must be totally destroyed. A retreat is the only chance of safety for the Duque del Parque’s corps ; but instead of making it, he calls upon you for cavalry.

‘ My opinion, founded upon Soult’s position, and the patroles and movements he has made, is, that he has collected his force at Plasencia, because he did not think it possible that the Duque del Parque would risk his corps as he has done, excepting in concert with some operation of mine, which Soult has certainly put himself in an attitude to resist. If this conjecture be correct, what must be the presumption of the Duque del Parque !

‘ I have ordered magazines to be prepared upon the Douro and Mondego, to assist in providing these vagabonds if they should retire into Portugal, which I hope they will do, as their only chance of salvation. This will give us an interval of decided tranquillity, and I shall then go to Lisbon.

Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 24th September, 1809.

‘ I desired Beresford to speak to you respecting the increase of pay to the Portuguese officers, because it appeared to me that you had adopted a decided opinion upon that subject, which it was not very likely I should shake by a letter. It appears from his answer that I entirely misunderstood your objection to recommend the increase of pay to the Portuguese officers; and I now find that, notwithstanding that I think the objection a very solid one, and that it is very probable that you will not succeed in obtaining the object, you are so kind as to say that you will propose it, if I should think it desirable that it should be proposed.

‘ I acknowledge that I think it ought to be proposed, and strenuously urged upon the Portuguese Government to increase the pay of their officers. How can it be expected that, in a country in which the expense of the necessaries of life is higher than in England, men will serve as officers upon the pay which our serjeants and even soldiers receive?

‘ Whatever may be eventually the fate of Spain, Portugal must be a military country; and it is certain that it cannot become so till the gentry of the country enter the army as officers, and this they will never do as long as the pay continues upon the existing footing.

‘ If we do not succeed in carrying the measure, the French will carry it for us; and on every ground, I believe, there is no doubt that it ought to be adopted.

‘ But all this is not exactly applicable to the question for consideration; which is, whether you should now propose the increase to the Portuguese Government, notwithstanding their repugnance to it, founded as it is upon their want of means?

‘ My opinion is, that we, who are charged with the defence of this country, should not be justifiable if we neglect to propose to the Portuguese Government, or to our own, any measures which we may think it advisable to adopt, with a view to the defence of Portugal; and that this is a most essential one no man can doubt. But I conceive that this proposition to the Portuguese Government is the first step to be taken to procure from the British Government the means to provide for the expense, at least for a time. The

British Government can have no official knowledge of the deficiency of the means in Portugal to provide for this essential expense, till the subject shall have been discussed with the Portuguese Government, and they shall have stated the deficiency ; and that will be the time to press the British Government to provide for this expense. Upon every ground, therefore, I should recommend to you to lose no time in urging the measure upon the Portuguese Government.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

‡ *To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 24th September, 1809.

‘ I heard some time ago that a detachment of Spanish cavalry under the Prince of Anglona, was to march through Portugal to Ciudad Rodrigo; and being aware of the manner in which the Spaniards are disposed to treat the Portuguese Government, I hinted to Colonel O’Lalor, who is employed here by the Spanish Commander in Chief, that it was desirable that I should be informed of the strength of this corps, otherwise that it might incur the risk of being but ill supplied.

‘ I enclose a letter which he has this day sent me, from which it appears that this cavalry was about to enter Portugal without giving notice to any body, and unprovided with a Commissary, and of course without money or means of any description. I have desired Colonel O’Lalor to tell the Prince that he must halt till I shall receive an answer from the Portuguese Government.

‘ I enclose a route, by which I propose that this corps of cavalry shall march in four divisions; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will explain to the Portuguese Government the circumstances of this march, and will desire them to give orders that means may be provided for them at the stages pointed out in this route. I request them also to let me know when the means will be provided, that I may then allow the Prince of Anglona to commence his march. I have given Colonel O’Lalor a hint about the necessity that this corps should have a Commissary.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To Brigadier General Cox, Governor of Almeida.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 25th September, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 18th and 21st instant, but not that of the 15th, which you state to have written.

‘ So long as the Duque del Parque continued his operations without requiring the assistance of the British or Portuguese troops, I considered it my duty to refrain from making any observations upon them; but as his Excellency has required the aid of Marshal Beresford, I request you to communicate to him the following observations, as the foundation of my determination to decline giving him the assistance which he has required.

‘ Upon a consideration of all the information which I have been able to acquire of the relative state of the armies of the enemy and of the allies in the two Castilles and Estremadura, I am convinced that the enemy are superior to the allies not only in numbers of men for service in the field, including even the corps which Marshal Beresford can bring forward; but, adverting to the composition of the Spanish armies—the want of cavalry by some, of artillery by others; the want of clothing, accoutrements, ammunition, and arms; and the want of discipline in all, the enemy must be considered as superior to the allies in efficiency, to a greater degree even than he is in numbers.

‘ These circumstances, and the absolute deficiency of means to enable us to continue our operations, were the causes of our being obliged to put ourselves on our defence, after we had gained a great victory at Talavera; and they have not altered for the better since that period.

‘ But, besides these advantages, I must observe that the enemy enjoys others, which bear particularly upon the operations proposed to be carried on by the Duque del Parque. The enemy, from the nature of the position of his troops, can draw a part or the whole of them to any quarter he pleases; whereas the operations of the different corps of the allies must necessarily be insulated, and each of them for a time must be exposed to be defeated. For instance, there is nothing to prevent the enemy from throwing upon the Duque del Parque’s corps, aided, I will suppose, by Marshal Beresford’s, the whole of the corps of Sault, Ney, and Keller-

mann; and even if I had the inclination, I have not the means, and could not possibly be in time to prevent their destruction.

‘ In the same manner this army, if I were to expose it in a forward position, would be liable to the same misfortune: and the Spanish army in La Mancha equally so. It follows, then, that if any operation is to be undertaken by any one of these corps, or if any one of these corps is to be placed in a position in which it is liable to be attacked by the enemy, all the other corps in Castille, Estremadura, and La Mancha should co-operate, otherwise the separate corps must be defeated; and upon this supposed general co-operation, I have already shown that the allies have neither numbers, nor efficient troops, nor means of carrying into execution any plan of co-operation.

‘ The consequence of undertaking such a plan would be, that after a battle or two, and some brilliant actions by some, and the defeat of others, and the loss of many valuable officers and soldiers, the allies would be obliged to resume again the defensive positions which they ought never to have quitted.

‘ Under these circumstances, I have determined that, although I shall make an effort to prevent the enemy from carrying into execution his design of obtaining possession of Ciudad Rodrigo, I shall not give any assistance to enable the Duque del Parque to maintain the forward position which he has taken up.

‘ I have already shown that the assistance of Marshal Beresford’s corps will not enable him to maintain it; and I am very well convinced that this is not the mode by which the enemy can be prevented from undertaking the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. The mode in which the Duque del Parque can most effectually prevent the enemy from undertaking that operation is to place his corps in such a situation as that the enemy cannot attack and defeat it without a long previous preparation, which will give time to other troops to come to his assistance, and cause a march in which the enemy himself may be exposed to defeat.

‘ The best mode of preventing an attack, or at all events the success of an attack of the enemy on Ciudad Rodrigo, is not to expose to defeat the troops which must ultimately co-operate in its defence, but to place that corps in such a posi-



tion, that it cannot be attacked without risk to the enemy, and from which it can with ease co-operate with other corps which must be put in motion, if Ciudad Rodrigo is to be saved.

‘ I shall not take upon me to say what position the Duque del Parque ought to take up; but I am very certain that his corps and Beresford’s joined would not prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces in Castille; that the consequence of this junction must be the defeat of the allies if they should remain in an advanced position, and the certain loss of Ciudad Rodrigo, and other misfortunes, none of which can occur under any other probable, or even possible concurrence of circumstances.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Cox.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 26th September, 1809.

‘ The two battalions of detachments from regiments now in England, which have been for some time doing duty with this army, are now on their march to Lisbon, and I wish to send them to England as soon as may be convenient after their arrival there.

‘ I have directed the Assistant Quarter Master General at Lisbon to wait upon your Secretary with a return of their numbers, as soon as he shall have received it; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions that tonnage may be allotted for the conveyance of these troops to England; and they shall embark, and sail as soon as you may think proper.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY DEAR WELLESLEY,

‘ Badajoz, 26th September, 1809.

‘ I am anxious to receive, if possible, the answers of the Junta respecting the payment for the shirts and sheets which they sent to us; also respecting the payment for the carts, and whether we are to keep the carts; and also respecting the exchange of General Franceschi.



‘ General Eguia has lately been guilty of a most unwarrantable act. I have had occasion to send different flags of truce on the subject of the wounded officers and soldiers; and the letters which I have written have invariably been opened, and have been submitted to the inspection of the Spanish Commander in Chief. The answers of the French officers have also been unsealed, and have been seen by the Spanish Commander in Chief; excepting two letters, one from Marshal Soult to me, proposing the exchange of General Franceschi; another from General Kellermann to General Stewart, which was, in fact, a private letter, and related to horses and other private concerns. General Eguia represented through Colonel Roche that these letters were sealed, and through the same channel I made him acquainted with their contents, and desired that if in future any sealed letters were sent into the Spanish lines from any French officer, they might be opened and read at the Spanish head quarters.

‘ Notwithstanding this explanation, with which I understood General Eguia was satisfied, he detained the officer who brought General Kellermann’s letter, under pretence of waiting for my answer, which I never intended to give, as in fact General Kellermann was not Commander in Chief, and it was of no use to write to him again.

‘ I heard of the detention of this officer on the 15th, from the Marques de la Romana, and immediately wrote him a letter to apologize for it, which I sent open to Colonel Roche, that General Eguia might see it. Notwithstanding this circumstance, I learn from Mr. Knight, who arrived here yesterday, that this officer is still detained at Deleytosa, and that they will not allow him to depart.

‘ The consequence of this conduct must be a cessation of all intercourse between me and the French on the subject of our prisoners, and the continuance and aggravation of their captivity. I shall be obliged to you if you will mention this circumstance to the Spanish Government. I would write to you an official dispatch, only that I think it is too bad to become the subject of a public dispatch; and that if it were to be known in England, it would create such an irritation against General Eguia and the Spaniards in general, that they would not easily remove it.

‘ I must mention, that, besides the two letters to which I

have above referred that came sealed through the hands of General Egua, there was another addressed to the Adjutant General of the army, from the Chef d'Etat Major of Victor's corps, which came sealed through the hands of Venegas, and was forwarded by you.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 26th September, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Brigadier General Cox, dated the 21st, and a copy of a letter which I wrote to that officer yesterday.

‘ I apprehend that the troops which reconnoitred the position of the Duque del Parque on the 18th, were only a small detachment from Ney's corps at Salamanca, and that if the Duque should have allowed his troops to continue at Villa Vieja, they would have been seriously attacked and defeated.

‘ The accounts which I have recently received of the state of the French force in Estremadura and New Castille, prove that I underrated it in the estimate which I made of it about a month ago, and communicated to your Excellency.

‘ It appears that the corps of Sault, Mortier, Victor, and Sebastiani consist of 65,000 men, and the King's guards, which are 1000. Besides these troops, there are in Old Castille the corps of Ney and Kellermann, which cannot be reckoned at less than 20,000.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 26th September, 1809.

‘ Some time ago Colonel Seymour, of the 23rd light dragoons, who is still very unwell, and who has obtained leave to go to England, sent me the enclosed letter, and the resignation of his commission, which I likewise enclose. I can easily conceive the feeling which induced Seymour to resign at the moment he did; and I should certainly wish that his



wife should enjoy all the advantage to be derived from this act; and I have acted in such a manner as to secure it to her. At the same time, I should consider it a great misfortune, in the event of Seymour's recovery, if he were to be lost to the service, in a view both to himself and the public; and I have always determined, if he should recover before he left Portugal, to give him the option again, whether he would retire or not. I understand that he is not yet so well as I expected he would be; but it is more than probable that his health will be considerably re-established before his arrival at Lisbon, or, at all events, before his embarkation.

‘I wish you, therefore, upon his arrival at Lisbon, to tell him that I am willing to give him an option then to receive back his resignation; but if you should think him so ill as that he might die on the passage, and his wife might lose the benefit of his resignation if he were now to take it back, I beg you will tell him that he shall have the option of recalling his resignation when he shall arrive in England, and that I will take no steps upon it till I shall have heard from him after his arrival.

‘If he should not take back his resignation, or if he should be so ill as that you think it proper to leave it to his option to have it back when he shall arrive in England, I beg you to return the enclosed papers.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘MY DEAR WELLESLEY,

‘Badajoz, 27th September, 1809.

‘I have received your letter of the 24th by Colonel Stopford\*, and I enclose a memorandum in answer to the notes of the Duque de Alburquerque and Don Martin de Garay.

‘I consider the mode in which they have been communicated as private, and therefore adopt this mode of replying to them; but it will be easy to turn this memorandum into a dispatch, if you should prefer to have them considered in that mode.

\* Lieut. General the Hon. Sir Edward Stopford, G.C.B., then of the 3rd regiment Foot Guards.



‘I shall write a dispatch respecting Malespina’s statement; but I should wish to have a copy of it, as well as of your note of the 8th September.

‘I do not doubt that the force left in Estremadura does not exceed 8000 infantry and 900 cavalry, and you have been made acquainted with the exact extent of it, because the Duque de Albuquerque, who is appointed to command it, is interested in making known the truth. But they have lied about the cavalry ordered to the Duque del Parque; instead of being 4000, there are only 1200 horses drawing rations, of which number it could not be expected that above 800 would appear in the field.’

‘Then they have sent this cavalry in such a manner: they never mentioned the intention of its march through Portugal to the Portuguese Government, to me, or to any body connected with them: I heard of it by accident, and desired that it might be recommended to the Prince of Anglona to make me acquainted with his march, in order that I might assist him; and I then found out his numbers, and that he had no Commissary with him, no money, and no means of any description.

‘Under these circumstances, I could not take upon me to order the Portuguese magistrates to supply him; and I sent an express to Lisbon, with a request that the Government would take measures that he might be supplied on his march.

‘The Spanish Government are really too bad! Surely troops are never sent into any foreign country without having some communication with the Government or officers of that country; or without a Commissary attending them, or money to pay for what they receive! Is the English General, or are the Portuguese magistrates to act as Commissaries to the Spanish troops? and to have the honor of paying for their supplies?

‘I had no doubt, that what has turned out would be the result of the expedition of the Scheldt.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*Marquis Wellesley.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘I have considered it best to write a dispatch on the notes of Don Martin de Garay, which I forward.’

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Badajoz, 27th September, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving the copy of the note addressed to your Excellency on the 23rd instant by Don Martin de Garay, enclosing the copy of a note from the Duque de Alburquerque, addressed to Don A. de Cornel, which your Excellency enclosed in your private letter of the 24th instant.

‘ Both these papers refer to the operations of the British army, each of them upon different principles; and I shall now endeavor to reply to both.

‘ The Duque de Alburquerque confines his demand to a requisition that I should engage to remain in the position at present occupied by the British army, or in some other which he proposes I should occupy on the Guadiana, but which he has not described, for twenty-five or thirty days, during which time he hopes to form an army capable, not only of defending the position on the Tagus, but of undertaking active operations against the enemy; or, in other words, that I should protect the formation of this army.

‘ In answer to this proposition, I have to observe, that I have no intention of quitting the position I at present occupy, unless obliged to do so by the want of food, or by some operation by the enemy which may endanger the safety of Portugal; or may expose the British army to a risk which I might not think it expedient that it should incur.

‘ My opinion is, that if the Duque del Parque does not expose his corps to be destroyed, which corps does not consist of 20,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, as is stated by Don Martin de Garay, but of about 10,000 infantry, armed and equipped for service, and 1000 cavalry, as I am informed by good authority, the enemy have not the power of undertaking any offensive operation without exposing some one or other of his corps to be defeated under very disadvantageous circumstances; and that if this misfortune is avoided, the season will pass over, the river Tagus will fill, and even the small corps left in Estremadura, will be found capable of defending its post; and no disadvantage will have resulted



from the gross error which has been committed in weakening the force in Estremadura in order to strengthen that in La Mancha.

‘ The Government have been repeatedly informed, that if any serious attempt were made by the enemy to obtain possession of Ciudad Rodrigo, I must make an effort to save that place, which would necessarily remove the troops under my command from this quarter: and they were told that it was probable that the attempt upon Ciudad Rodrigo would be accompanied by an attack upon the Tagus, and upon the Guadiana; on which ground I recommended that they should not weaken their force on the Tagus.

‘ The collection of troops at Talavera, if the account be well founded, of which I have received no information, looks very like the execution of the whole of the plan according to which the Government have been informed that the enemy would most probably proceed, if they really intended to attack Ciudad Rodrigo; and I now only request of them to consider the situation in which their affairs will stand, with their whole army collected in La Mancha, if, as is probable, the enemy should force not only the Tagus, but the Guadiana, and even the passes of Monasterio; thus placing himself between the main body of their army and the city of Seville.

‘ The Spanish Government do not like to hear of their weakness in comparison with the enemy; and in order to conceal it from themselves, I imagine, it is that they bring forward such propositions as that contained in Don Martin de Garay’s note of the 23rd instant.

‘ The communications formerly made to the Spanish Government of the intentions which I had, in respect to the employment of the British troops under my command, might have saved him the trouble of forwarding the note from the Duque de Alburquerque, as he must know that I should be unwilling, nay, that I could not enter into the engagement which the Duque required I should, as the condition on which he should assume the command of the army in Estremadura.

‘ But the propositions in Don Martin de Garay’s note are still more extraordinary than those contained in that received from the Duque de Alburquerque. He must be aware that



the Government have adopted no measures to support this army at Merida, or in any other part of Spain; that if I were now to collect it, even at this place, it must starve; and yet he proposes not only that I should collect it at Merida, but that I should move it forward into the Vera de Plasencia, in order to prevent Soult from falling upon the Duque del Parque, in a paper, in which he informs your Excellency that the enemy had collected his whole force at Talavera. Thus, the British army, unprovided with supplies or means of transport, and supported by only 8000 Spanish troops, is to move into the Vera de Plasencia, exposed to the attack of the whole French army, in order to save the Duque del Parque; who requires only prudent management on his own part, not only to save his own army, but to place affairs on such a footing, as to render it very improbable that the enemy will be able to undertake any thing of importance.

‘The mere statement of such a proposition is a sufficient answer to it, and I shall not trouble your Excellency by any further consideration of it.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Badajoz, 27th September, 1809.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s dispatch of the 24th, marked (G.) enclosing a note from Don Martin de Garay, regarding certain mares which have been supplied by the Spanish Government for the use of the British army; and I shall be much obliged to your Excellency if you will give directions that the 130 mares may be sent to this place, where they will be received and taken care of by British dragoons. It is desirable that I should be informed of the day on which they are likely to arrive here; that I should know the price to be paid for them, and to whom it is wished that the money should be paid.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 28th September, 1809.

‘ I write to tell you that the first detachment of mules is arrived, and that they are considered so good, that I have desired the Commissary General to purchase an additional number of 200 at the same place, for which I shall be obliged to you if you will afford him the same facilities.

‘ The cattle are not quite so good, and they are dear; and as we experience no difficulty in procuring cattle in Spain or Portugal, I think it will be better to discontinue the purchase in Africa, at least for the present.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*  
*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY DEAR WELLESLEY,

‘ Badajoz, 28th September, 1809.

‘ There is one part of the case which I had under consideration yesterday, to which I did not advert in either of my letters, because it is one of such real difficulty, that I did not know what to recommend; and that is, what line of operation shall be recommended for the troops assembled in La Mancha, in case the enemy should combine for an attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo, an attack upon the Tagus, the Guadiana, and the positions in the rear.

‘ If the Spanish troops were of the same description, or nearly of the same description with those opposed to them, I should, by all means, let them move direct upon Madrid. If the French should have broken the bridges at Toledo and Aranjuez, as I imagine that these bridges, any more than those at Almaraz and Alcantara, cannot be repaired, let them go by Ocaña, Fuentidueña, and Arganda.

‘ But, unfortunately, this assembled corps in La Mancha, which, I understand from Stopford, the Government call 60,000 men, would be stopped by Sebastiani’s corps of 12,000. I suspect that it does not consist of 30,000, from what I have heard from Roche, and from the accounts I have received from various quarters, of the number of soldiers met with on all the roads, quitting the army. But whether it consists of 30,000 or 60,000, no dependence can

be placed on its operations, if at all opposed by the French; and therefore, in playing for such a stake as Seville is, I should prefer the more certain game, and should recommend that if the enemy are decidedly and seriously determined to carry on the proposed operation, a part of the army assembled in La Mancha, that part of it which belonged to Estremadura, should be thrown into the passes of Monasterio.

‘ I think, however, that there is reason to doubt the truth of the intelligence received of the collection of troops at Talavera. You received the intelligence about the 23rd or 24th, and the French must have brought their troops there by the 20th. They could not remain at Talavera, as the country is completely exhausted, the town has been plundered, and the inhabitants have fled. They must have commenced their operations and have struck their blow immediately, and I must have heard of it before this time. I have heard of no movement of any description.

‘ If they really did move troops from Toledo to Talavera, I think it most probable that it was a defensive movement, of the same description with those which they appear to have made on the right of their line, between the 15th and 20th, which movements I attribute to a notion which they entertained, and in my opinion very justly, that the Duque del Parque could not have risked his corps in the manner he did, excepting in concert with me, and in expectation of my co-operation. Soult certainly collected his troops at Plasencia, and from the disposition of his outposts, I should imagine must have expected that I would endeavor to cross the Tagus above Alcantara, and he has made no movement since.

‘ It might be advisable, however, to frighten the gentlemen at Seville with their own false intelligence; and prevail upon them to re-enforce Estremadura, which, I am convinced, is the measure most likely to give a quiet autumn and winter; during which time, if the gentlemen should be overturned, any thing that succeeds may form an army capable of doing something in the spring; or, at all events, capable of defending themselves, and of making the final conquest of the country most difficult, if not impossible.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’



*To the Right Honorable the Commander in Chief.*

‘ SIR, ‘ Badajoz, 28th September, 1809.

‘ I beg leave to draw your attention to the enclosed letter from the Commissary General, relative to a claim made by certain officers to an allowance for shoeing mules employed in the carriage of camp kettles, Surgeons’ chests, and Paymasters’ books in this army, claimed under an order issued by the late Commander of the Forces, of which a copy is enclosed.

‘ This order appears to have been founded on the principle of the circular letter of the 11th of June, 1804, from the Secretary at War, pages 424 and 425 of the printed Regulations; but as the grant of the allowance appears inconsistent with the late regulations respecting *bât* and forage, and as I wish to have the attention of the Treasury drawn to that part of their late order, which prohibits the issue of preparation money, I think it best to adopt this opportunity of obtaining orders upon the whole subject of the mode of procuring carriage for camp kettles, &c., in Portugal and Spain.

‘ When the army landed in Portugal last year, the regiments having received the allowance called preparation money, including £20 *bât* money for each company, and £10 for the Surgeon; the Captains of Companies, Surgeons, and Paymasters were obliged to supply mules for the carriage of the camp kettles, medicine chests, and Paymasters’ books.

‘ When the army subsequently marched into Spain, the late Commander of the Forces, Lieut. General Sir John Moore, upon a representation of the Captains, that the mules which they had purchased were unequal to the performance of the service, directed the Commissary General to supply a mule for each company, one for the carriage of the Surgeon’s chest, one for the carriage of the Paymaster’s books, and one for the carriage of intrenching tools, under different orders, of which I enclose copies.

‘ The late Commander of the Forces in Portugal, Lieut. General Sir John Cradock, at the opening of the campaign in Portugal, likewise issued orders, of which I enclose copies, directing the Commissary General to supply the regiments

with mules for the carriage of camp kettles, medicine chests, Paymasters' books, and intrenching tools; but shortly after my arrival in Portugal, having found that this mode of supplying mules for the carriage of camp kettles, regimental medicine chests, and Paymasters' books of regiments of infantry, and for the medicine chest of the Veterinary Surgeon, for the Serjeant Armourer, and the Serjeant Saddler of regiments of cavalry, was not only a great expense to the public, but an intolerable burden and drain upon the means of equipment for the army, I reverted to what I conceived had been the original intention of Government; and considering the preparation money, including £20 *bât* money for companies, as the price the public allowed for the purchase of these mules, and £10 in the annual *bât* and forage money for each company, as the sum allowed for the keeping them up, I threw the whole expense of their purchase and of keeping them upon the Captains of troops and companies, the Surgeons and Regimental Paymasters; and gave £20 *bât* money to the Captains, Surgeons, and Paymasters of those regiments which had not received the preparation money.

'The preparation money has since been struck off, and the whole question respecting the mode of procuring carriage for the camp kettles, Surgeons' chests, and Paymasters' books is again at large; and indeed the measures which I had ordered require revision on other grounds.

'The camp kettles, Paymasters' books, Surgeons' chests, and intrenching tools in regiments of infantry, and the same articles and the medicine chest for the Veterinary Surgeon, and implements for the Serjeant Saddler, and the Serjeant Armourer in regiments of cavalry, are articles necessary for the troops, which must always be with them; the expense of carrying which the public must pay. The mode adopted under the system of preparation money, and enforced by me, has been of the nature of a contract with the Captains of troops and companies, Paymasters, and Surgeons; but I must observe that it is a contract in a manner forced upon those who enter into it, and which is highly disadvantageous in this country to the contractors.

'I have no reason to believe that those officers did not take care of the animals employed in the service by the Commissariat, under the orders of the late Commander of

the Forces, excepting the general reason that the officers seldom take such good care of that which does not, as of that which does, belong to them; and yet the losses of mules on this service, and the consequent demands for them, were so frequent and so heavy as to cramp the operations of the army, by diverting the means of equipment from other important objects, which was one reason why I altered the system.

‘ I have since found that the Captains of companies, in particular, have replaced the mules employed in carrying the camp kettles, many of them twice, and some of them three times, since the troops took the field in April.

‘ It is scarcely possible to purchase a mule capable of performing this service for a less sum than from £18 to £25; and I am conscientiously convinced that all have been losers already; and yet only a few months have elapsed of the four years which, according to the principle of the letter of the 11th of June, 1804, these animals ought to last. In fact, that order, as well as others relating to an army in the field, apply only to the state of the service in England, and not at all to that in foreign countries.

‘ I should therefore beg leave to recommend that for this army, at least, an allowance of £20 *bât* money should be made with each of the two issues of *bât* and forage money to the Captains of troops and companies, Surgeons, Paymasters, and others obliged to furnish mules for the public service, to enable them to purchase and keep up mules for the carriage of camp kettles, medicine chests, Paymasters’ books, Veterinary Surgeons’ chests, Serjeant Saddlers’, and Serjeant Armourers’ implements, and that an allowance of one dollar per month shall be made, to pay for shoeing these mules, for saddles, halters, &c., and that the £10 *bât* money allowed to Captains of troops and companies in the *bât* and forage allowance should be withdrawn.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*  
*the Commander in Chief.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To Brigadier General Robert Craufurd.*

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Badajoz, 29th September, 1809.

‘I have been for some time very anxious respecting a part of what forms the subject of your letter of the 26th; I mean the camp kettles; and I am much obliged to you for your opinions on the subject. Faulty as is the existing mode of carrying the camp kettles, it is more efficient than that of which it is the substitute in this country; and I have written a letter to England, which I hope will have the effect of making the allowance for keeping up the mules more equal to the object for which it was granted than it has been hitherto.

‘There is much to be said on both sides of the question respecting the description of kettle which the soldiers ought to have, and as the iron kettle is the best for cooking, and lasts longest, and moreover, as the use of that description and size of kettle requires the employment of fewest men in cooking, the choice between them resolves itself into this point, which is most likely to be carried with certainty, so as to give the soldier at all times the use of a kettle.

‘In deciding upon this question, much depends upon the care which officers take of their men, and the degree of minute attention which they give to their wants. In a regiment well looked after, it is certain that the tin kettles would answer best, as the officers would oblige the soldiers to take care of them, and regimental arrangements would be made to provide for the casual increase and diminution of numbers occasioned by men coming out of and going into hospital, returning from detachment, &c.; and in actions they would be prevented from throwing them away; and care would be taken that the carrier of the kettle should, above all other men, not straggle or stay behind his regiment till the hours for cooking should be past, or get drunk and lose the kettle. But in two thirds of the regiments of this army such care would not be taken; and whether the regiment would have kettles or not would depend upon that most thoughtless of animals, the soldier himself, and I should very soon hear that there were none.

‘According to the existing system, bad as it is, the care

of the camp kettles is not only the business of the bătman of the company, but of all the bătmen of the regiment and of the brigade. The officer of the baggage guard is particularly interested, as with the kettles he loses the mule; and the officers commanding the regiments and the brigade are not inattentive to the subject. I think also that the practical effect of this system must improve as the army becomes more experienced in the field.

‘Upon the whole, therefore, I prefer the iron kettles to the tin for general purposes; but I have no objection to try the latter in some of our best regiments, in order to see how the experiment may answer.

‘I agree with you about the expediency of allowing the Captains of companies to ride. The forage required for this purpose is no object, as forage for 200 or 300 mules cannot be very difficult to procure. The objection I think is the increased number of bătmen and servants which will be taken out of the ranks, which becomes an object of the greatest consequence.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Brig. General*  
*R. Craufurd.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘Badajoz, 29th September, 1809.

‘I received yesterday your letter of the 26th instant, and I instantly sent off to the Prince of Anglona to desire him to begin his march.

‘I am afraid I misunderstood you respecting the measures which you intended to adopt regarding the additional pay to the Portuguese officers. I thought that you did not propose to take any step whatever till you should be authorized to use the King’s name in the communications to be made to the Portuguese army upon the subject; notwithstanding that you had authority from England to go the full length of all the arrangements which were necessary in order to carry the measure into effect.

‘It appears, however, that you have no authority from England with respect to the expense, and you must be satisfied with empty remonstrances to the Portuguese Government, which I fear will not answer the purpose.

‘I have seen Lord Wellesley’s dispatches, Nos. 4 and 5, and forwarded them to you.

‘I have determined not to press for the convent of St. Benito, and shall be obliged to you if you will tell Colonel Peacocke that I desire he will take any other building which may be found convenient for the hospital. I shall write to him, but I request you to mention the subject, lest I should not have time to do so by this messenger.

‘That foolish fellow the ——— has been endeavoring to get his corps destroyed upon the frontier; but I find that he has retreated, and is now in safety, I hope. I have written to Cox a long letter to be communicated to him, in which I have given him my opinion, and explained my determination not to stir a foot to save him from the consequences of his own imprudence, although I will make every effort to save Ciudad Rodrigo, if the enemy should attack that place.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To Colonel Peacocke.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Badajoz, 29th September, 1809.

‘I have reason to believe that several men belonging to regiments of this army are detained at Lisbon very improperly, and I wish that, without loss of time, you would have an inspection of all the soldiers at Lisbon, and that you would send to the army those coming under the following descriptions.

‘1st. All soldiers attending physicians, or surgeons of the hospital, as servants or bätmen.

‘2nd. All recovered soldiers, excepting such as are absolutely necessary to attend the hospital as orderlies, after providing as many men of that description as can be got from among the convalescents not able to march, and other men who must from circumstances remain at Lisbon.

‘It is to be observed that the men of one regiment must not be employed as orderlies to men of other regiments in the hospital; and if there should not be a sufficient number of men of any particular regiment to attend the sick belong-



ing to it as orderlies in hospital, men must be supplied for that purpose by the troops in garrison, and not by convalescents or recovered men belonging to other regiments with the army.

‘3rd. All servants and bätmen belonging to officers at Lisbon, which officers did not bring their servants or bätmen with them by permission of the commanding officers of their regiments.

‘4th. Soldiers serving as servants or bätmen with officers’ wives who have not the permission of the commanding officer to detain them.

‘I beg that you will inform the Inspector of Hospitals at Lisbon that I do not propose to persist in the requisition to have the convent of St. Benito as an hospital; and that I desire that he will fix upon any other building which it may be convenient to the Portuguese Government to allow us to have.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Colonel Peacocke.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 29th September, 1809.

‘ I this day received a letter from Brigadier General Cox, at Almeida, stating that on the 23rd instant the Duque del Parque, having had reason to believe that the French intended to attack him at San Felices, where he had been since the 18th instant, had moved to Campillo and Ituero in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Marquis Wellesley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 29th September, 1809.

‘ The Duque del Parque having been appointed to command the corps lately under the orders of the Marques de la Romana, which within these few days had arrived through Portugal in the neighbourhood of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, immediately commenced offensive operations against

the French troops in Old Castille, and on the 16th and 17th had his advanced guard at Villa Vieja in front of San Felices; and on the 18th collected his corps at that place.

‘It appears that the enemy advanced from Salamanca and reconnoitred the Duque’s position on the 18th, and there was some skirmishing between the light troops, and on the 19th the Duque del Parque returned to San Felices, where he remained till the 23rd; on which day having heard that the enemy were in movement from Salamanca to attack him, the Duque retired to Campillo and Ituero in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, on the left of the Agueda.

‘In the mean time the Duque has urged us to give him the assistance of Portuguese or English troops; but as I did not perceive any benefit likely to result from his desultory but imprudent operations; and as it was obvious that he was risking the loss of his army and of any troops that might be sent to his assistance, without having any object, as long as the others of the allied armies were necessarily obliged to remain upon the defensive, I communicated to him my determination to give him no support in the position which he had assumed, although I should make every effort to save Ciudad Rodrigo, if the enemy should manifest a design to attack that place.

‘I cannot form an opinion whether the Duque del Parque’s corps is now in safety; but I am convinced that if it should be lost, and if the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo should be the consequence, these unfortunate events must be attributed to the presumption and imprudence with which the corps was risked, which, if it should be safe, must prevent the enemy from undertaking any thing against Ciudad Rodrigo, unless he should draw such a force from Estremadura as will allow me to cross the Tagus, without incurring the risk of losing great objects in this quarter during my absence.

‘The dispatch from Marshal Beresford of the 26th instant, which I forward by this occasion, will show your Lordship how important it is that the Portuguese troops should be kept in tranquillity for some time. The same circumstances render it desirable that the Spanish troops should also be kept in tranquillity, if the officers would take the same advantage which Marshal Beresford is disposed to take of the enemy’s inactivity.

‘ The movements which I reported in my last which had been made by Marshal Soult were evidently defensive ; and I conclude that he could not believe that the Duque del Parque would risk his corps in Old Castille, excepting in concert and in expectation of co-operation with me. I judge from the movements of his troops, and the positions of his advanced guards, that Soult expected that I should endeavor to cross the Tagus above Alcantara ; and yet the first certain intelligence I received of the Duque del Parque’s position was on the 25th, after the enemy had reconnoitred his position at Villa Vieja on the 18th.

‘ The other armies are nearly in the positions as reported in my last dispatch.

‘ It has been reported, I believe without foundation, that the enemy had collected a corps at Talavera about the 20th ; but as no movement has been made in that quarter, I conclude that if a corps was collected at Talavera, it was with the same defensive views with which I suppose Soult to have collected his corps at Plasencia.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 1st October, 1809.

‘ I received yesterday at Elvas your letter of the 28th, and one to Lord Wellesley, containing your dispatch of the 25th to Mr. Canning, which I forwarded by Mr. Geddes as soon as I had perused it.

‘ I can account for the arrangement of the Regency, as far as I am concerned, only by the desire manifested in the Government of Brazil to weaken the British influence over the army in this country, by a division of the authority placed over it. However, the persons who formed this arrangement appear to me to be entirely ignorant of the national character of Englishmen ; and particularly of the character of those who were the objects of this arrangement, in thinking that by such means they would effect their views.

‘ I cannot conceive what can have induced our Government to recommend the Marquez das Minas and the Marquez Monteiro Mor to the government of Brazil, particularly without your concurrence. I imagine they are both as inefficient



as I should certainly be; for I do not understand the internal politics of Portugal, nor do I see how I am to find time or opportunity to acquire a knowledge of them.

‘I have received a letter from the Prince Regent, appointing me the Marshal General of his army, with all the power and privileges held by the Duque de Alafões; and I believe that is what I had before, and it was certainly as much as was necessary, or as I could manage; and I do not see any reason for altering our arrangements and the practice under the old appointment, even though the new one may be different.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Badajoz, 1st October, 1809.

‘I enclose a letter and some papers which I have received from Don Alonzo de la Vera, which I request your Excellency to lay before the Spanish Government. This gentleman was Governor of Merida when the head quarters of the British army were at that place (to which situation he had been appointed by General Cuesta), and I must add that he took more pains to supply the wants of the British army than any other officer in the Spanish service with whom I have yet met; and I therefore wrote to him a letter from Merida, upon the movement of the troops, to acknowledge his exertions.

‘The Government have, however, since appointed another person to command at Merida, from whom the same assistance has not been received, and by whom the same exertions have not been made, as I am informed by General Fane, whose brigade of cavalry has continued there.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Badajoz, 3rd October, 1809.

‘I have received your letter of the 29th September, regarding Brigadier General ——. I do not know what you can do respecting him; I conclude that he must go; but you

should make a strong representation on his conduct to the Horse Guards.

‘ In respect to Colonel —, I will state to you what I have done with officers of the British army going home on their private affairs. I have invariably obliged them to declare what their business was, and have fixed the period of their return; and if they do not return in time, I propose to bring them to a Court Martial for being absent without leave.

‘ In respect to officers who are sick, their sickness is first certified by a surgeon, and the certificate is sent to head quarters; a Medical Board is then ordered upon them, which board reports whether such officer is so ill as to require leave of absence, and whether it is necessary that he should quit Portugal. By these means I have detained many in the country, and I shall have their services as soon as they are tired of Elvas, Caldas, &c.

‘ I think the French are as much disposed to remain in tranquillity as we are to allow them to remain so; and I shall certainly go to Lisbon in a few days.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘ Badajoz, 5th October, 1809.

‘ I received last night a letter, of which I enclose a copy, containing the King’s commands to invest you with the Order of the Bath, which I shall carry into execution with great pleasure, either to-morrow or next day, if you will come over here.

‘ Let me know which day will be convenient to you, that I may make arrangements to do the business in a suitable manner.

‘ Send me over the insignia and any papers you may have received with them. Bring with you the General Officers and staff of your division, and the commanding officers of the battalions of Guards.

‘ I forwarded your letter to Captain Boothby, and will do all in my power to have him set at liberty; but the Spaniards

are behaving so ill upon this, as well as other subjects, as I will explain to you when we meet, that I am not certain I shall be able to effect any thing.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Badajoz, 5th October, 1809.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 2nd, and I propose to set out for Lisbon on Sunday, being obliged to stay till that day, in order to invest General Sherbrooke with the Order of the Bath on Saturday.

‘ I have not heard from the Portuguese Government respecting the changes in the government of Lisbon. As far as the military government is concerned, I do not think that the Prince’s letter has made any material alteration in the state of things; and I need not assure you, that as far as that letter or any other orders may have increased my powers, they shall be uniformly exerted to forward your views for the amelioration of the Portuguese service. You must only inform me in what manner I can do so, and you will find me disposed to do every thing in my power.

‘ I regret the departure of Villiers much. My brother will do every thing in his power; but we shall miss Villiers often, and particularly in our moments of difficulty.

‘ As I go with my own horses, I shall not be at Lisbon till Wednesday.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 5th October, 1809.

‘ On the 3rd September last, Marshal Mortier sent in to the Spanish advanced posts, opposite Almaraz, Captain Victor de Thévenon, aide de camp to General Brayer, charged with letters to me, relating to the wounded officers and soldiers belonging to the British army left at Talavera de la Reyna.

‘ It was impossible for me to reply to these letters, as they



related to a *cartel* for an exchange, upon which it was necessary that a reference should be made to the Spanish Government, to which they have to this day given no answer; and I had concluded that the French officer who had brought the letters had been sent back, as is usual in such cases, from the outposts.

‘ I was informed, however, on the 15th of September, that he was at the Spanish head quarters detained for an answer from me; and I immediately desired Colonel Roche, to inform General Eguia, that I was unable at that moment to return an answer to the proposition of the French Commander in Chief, and that I requested that Captain Thévenon might be allowed to depart forthwith. This request was made, but Captain Thévenon has been still detained; and I received yesterday a letter from Marshal Mortier, of which I enclose your Excellency a copy, in which he states that he has received information that Captain Thévenon has been removed to Seville; and he complains, with reason in my opinion, of this gross violation of the laws and customs of war among civilized nations.

‘ In consequence of the receipt of this letter, I have again written to General Bassecourt, by Captain A. Gordon, my aide de camp, to urge him to send back Captain Thévenon forthwith, if he should be with the Spanish army; and if he should have been sent to Seville, I request your Excellency to claim him, as being evidently under my protection as the officer commanding the British army, and to remonstrate against the measures which have been adopted respecting this officer, by those acting under the authority of the Spanish Government.

‘ The least of the evils which must result from them, if not now set right, must be to put an end to all communication between the commanding officer of the French army and me, respecting the British officers and soldiers who are in their hands, every one of whom is wounded: and if the Spanish Government will but consider the manner in which they received their wounds, the circumstances which have occasioned their captivity, the degree to which this misfortune may be aggravated, and the space of time during which it may be lengthened by this interruption to the communication between the Commanders in Chief of the French armies and

me, they will be probably disposed to discountenance the measures which have been adopted by the Spanish Commander in Chief; and if Captain Thévenon should have been sent to Seville, to order that he may be brought to me without loss of time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Bassecourt.*

‘ Au Quartier Général de l’ Armée Anglaise,  
ce 6 Octobre, 1809.

MONSIEUR,

‘ La lettre que vous m’avez envoyée de la part de M. le Maréchal Mortier contenait la demande que M. le Capitaine Thévenon, qui m’avait apporté une lettre des avant-postes Français le 3 du mois de Septembre, soit renvoyé tout de suite, et M. le Maréchal fait des remontrances bien fondées sur sa detention et sur son envoi à Seville, dont il a reçu des nouvelles.

‘ Je ne peux pas croire qu’il ait été envoyé à Seville, surtout quand j’avais prié, par l’entremise du Colonel Roche le 16 Septembre, qu’il fût renvoyé tout de suite à l’armée Française; et je suis étonné qu’on l’ait detenu un moment après que j’ai fait savoir par le Colonel Roche que j’enverrais la réponse à la lettre que le Capitaine Thévenon m’avait apportée par les mains d’un officier Anglais. Je vous prie, Monsieur, de renvoyer le Capitaine Thévenon avec le Capitaine Gordon, mon aide de camp, qui aura l’honneur de vous présenter cette lettre, s’il est toujours au quartier général de l’armée Espagnole; et s’il n’y est pas, je vous prie de faire savoir au Capitaine Gordon où il est, et pourquoi il est detenu, afin qu’il puisse faire cesser les inquiétudes de M. le Maréchal Mortier sur son compte.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *General Bassecourt.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Bassecourt.*

‘ Au Quartier Général de l’Armée Anglaise,  
ce 6 Oct., 1809.

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘ La detention du Capitaine Thévenon, dont je vous écris aujourd’hui, est vraiment une violation des lois de la guerre, qui peut avoir des suites très inconvenantes, et j’espère que

vous le renverrez tout de suite ; ou s'il n'est pas avec vous, que vous me ferez savoir où il est.

‘ Je serais bien aise d'avoir avec vous une communication constante, et je vous prie de me faire savoir dans quelle situation vous vous trouvez, quel nombre de troupes vous avez, et si je peux vous être utile à quelque chose. Le Capitaine Gordon vous montrera les lettres dont il est chargé pour le Maréchal Mortier et le Capitaine Thévenon, et je vous envoie ci-incluse une copie de celle que vous m'avez envoyée hier de la part du Maréchal Mortier.

‘ J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

‘ *General Bassecourt.*'

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Maréchal Mortier, Duc de Trévisé.*

‘ Au Quartier Général de l'Armée Anglaise,

‘ MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

ce 6 Octobre, 1809.

‘ Je viens d'avoir l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que vous m'avez adressée le 29 Septembre, et je suis, je vous assure, bien surpris et fâché d'entendre que M. le Capitaine Thévenon ne soit pas retourné à l'armée Française.

‘ J'ai entendu par hasard le 16 du mois de Septembre, qu'il attendait au Quartier Général de l'armée Espagnole la réponse d'une lettre qu'il m'avait apportée, que je croyais être de la part du Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie ; et je lui ai écrit ce jour là une lettre dont je vous envoie ci-incluse la copie ; et par l'entremise d'un officier Anglais, qui est auprès du Commandant en Chef de l'armée Espagnole, j'ai prié son Excellence qu'il fit partir M. le Capitaine Thévenon tout de suite, et j'ai cru qu'il était parti jusqu'à ce que j'aie reçu votre lettre du 27 Septembre.

‘ J'écris aujourd'hui une lettre au Commandant en Chef de l'armée Espagnole, dont je vous envoie la copie, pour renouveler mes instances que M. le Capitaine Thévenon soit renvoyé avec mon aide de camp le Capitaine Gordon, qui aura l'honneur de vous présenter cette lettre ; et j'écris encore une lettre au Capitaine Thévenon dont je vous envoie la copie.

‘ Je fais aussi des remontrances au Gouvernement Espagnol sur sa détention jusqu'à présent en cas qu'il soit envoyé à Seville, ce que je ne saurais croire ; et je vous assure, M. le Maréchal, que je ne cesserai mes efforts pour le faire



renvoyer que lorsque je saurai qu'il est arrivé à l'armée Française.

‘ J'envoie par le Capitaine Gordon quelques lettres pour les officiers Anglais qui sont blessés, et de l'argent, que je vous prie de leur faire remettre.

‘ J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

‘ *Le Maréchal Mortier,  
Duc de Trévise.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 6th October, 1809.

‘ Although I think your successor is well chosen, I regret exceedingly that we are to lose your assistance at this moment, in which it may be most important to Portugal that we should have it. I conclude that you will not go till Henry shall arrive, and we shall have time to talk over and settle many matters.

‘ I propose to leave this for Lisbon on Sunday, and I shall arrive there on Tuesday, if you can send two or three carriages or five or six horses to meet me early on that day at Pegões. I also request you to let me know at Monte Moró Novo on Monday, if possible, at what hour the tide will answer best, and at what hour *I must be* at Aldea Galega on Tuesday, in order to cross the Tagus to Lisbon, and I shall be obliged to you if you will order boats to Aldea Galega to take me over.

‘ I have looked over the estimate of the expenses of the British Government in Portugal, which I think for the next three months will be about £205,000, including £50,000 for you : you ought therefore to have one fourth of our receipts ; and as we received in September £183,728, I have ordered Mr. Murray to pay to Mr. Bell £45,932, which I beg you to desire him to receive for September.

‘ Stupidity must have been the cause of my misunderstanding you respecting the increase of pay for the Portuguese officers.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 6th October, 1809.

‘ Since I addressed your Excellency yesterday, I have received through Ciudad Rodrigo a letter from General Kellermann, in which he has requested that his aide de camp, M. de Turenne, who had been made prisoner by a Spanish patrol near Tordesillas, might be sent back to him in exchange for an English officer who has been allowed to return on his parole, and who will go back to the French army if the exchange should not be completed.

‘ I learn from Ciudad Rodrigo, that M. de Turenne is on his road to this place, in order that the Central Junta may signify their pleasure respecting him, as the Duque del Parque did not consider himself authorized to consent to this proposed exchange.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to your Excellency, if you will request the consent of the Government to place M. de Turenne at my disposal. I do not ask them to consent to the exchange of M. de Turenne for the British officer sent back by General Kellermann, as I do not consider that officer of equal rank with the French officer; but if the Spanish Government should consent to place him at my disposal, I hope to be able to liberate a British officer of equal rank, and thus to commence the work of setting free our prisoners.

‘ I cannot avoid taking the opportunity of drawing your Excellency’s attention to the inconvenience which is the result of the delay of Government giving answers to these requests. A month has elapsed since a proposition was laid before them to allow General Franceschi, &c., to be exchanged for British officers. An answer in the negative would have been preferable to the delay in giving any answer, as upon that negative I might have founded a negotiation for a *cartel* of exchange on other grounds; whereas, the delay in giving any answer has been, that the greater number of British officers taken in the hospital at Talavera, all those the state of whose wounds permitted their removal, or who are ever likely to be able to render any service again, have been sent to France, and it is well known that they will not be set at liberty during the war.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

Marquis Wellesley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. G. Canning.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 6th October, 1809.

‘ I received your letter of the 15th regarding the exchange of Major Fotheringham, and in case I should be able to settle a *cartel*, I shall not forget your wishes in favor of that officer.

‘ I had proposed a *cartel* to the French Commander in Chief, to which he agreed, and proposed that General Franceschi, who was taken by, and is in the possession of, the Spaniards, should be included in it. This proposition did not appear to me to be unreasonable, considering the circumstances under which it happens that the French have any officers of ours in their hands; and indeed, if the French officers in the power of the Spaniards were not to be included in the *cartel*, we should have none to exchange for ours, as we gave up to the Spaniards, and sent to Seville all the prisoners we took both previous to and during the battle of Talavera. I accordingly requested Lord Wellesley to ask the Spanish Government to allow General Franceschi to be exchanged; but although more than a month has elapsed since this request was made to them, he had not been able to obtain an answer. The whole business is therefore at a stand; and in the mean time, our officers are being moved off to France.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Rt. Hon. G. Canning.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 6th October, 1809.

‘ In consequence of the uniform good conduct of the 45th regiment since they have been under my command, I beg to recommend Lieut. Urquhart, the senior Lieut. of that regiment with this army, to the company in the 47th regiment, which the Commander in Chief has been pleased to appropriate for such Lieut. of this army as I should recommend. I beg also to recommend Ensign Ouseley, the senior Ensign, to be Lieut. *vice* Urquhart.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Military Secretary  
to the Commander in Chief.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 6th October, 1809.

‘ The French corps under Marshal Ney did not pursue the Spanish corps under the Duke del Parque in their movements related in my dispatch of the 29th September, but returned immediately towards Salamanca; and the Duque remains encamped in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ Marshal Soult moved his corps on the 1st instant from Plasencia towards Talavera, and I understand they have passed Navalmoral; so that no attack can be intended in this quarter.

‘ The Spanish corps which lately marched from Estremadura under General Eguia have arrived at La Mancha, and have joined the corps hitherto under the command of General Venegas; and the whole are now under the orders of General Eguia, with their head quarters at Daymiel. This collection of troops in La Mancha, combined probably with the distress for the want of provisions in Plasencia, may have occasioned Soult’s movement from that place.

‘ General Bassecourt continues to command the Spanish corps in this province, and has his head quarters at Deleytosa.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 6th October, 1809.

‘ I have received your letters of the 9th and 12th by Lord Fitzroy Somerset, and I am very much obliged to you for the care you take of me, and for all your kindness.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 12th, I think I can already tell you that there is no occasion for taking further precautions for the safety-of this army, at least till affairs shall be settled in Germany, and it shall be seen whether Buonaparte can turn his whole attention to the Peninsula, than to send to Lisbon that part of the coppered tonnage of the country which can be spared from service elsewhere.

‘ I think it desirable that that tonnage should be kept in the Tagus, if not inconvenient to the service, for these reasons: First, it gives confidence to our own officers and troops: Secondly, whenever it does become necessary seriously to think of embarking, this country will not be alarmed by seeing the collection at Lisbon of a large fleet of transports. They will have become accustomed to the sight of the ships; the arrival of a few more will, if noticed at all, make no impression upon them, and the operations of the native troops will be carried on, and the exertions of the people made, without the suspicion that we intend to leave them to their fate.

‘ I do not mean to say that we ought, in any case, to deceive them; on the contrary, they ought to be distinctly apprized that the King would not risk the loss of his army by capture by the enemy, but that we should not quit them until the last moment; and that the period would depend very much upon their own exertions. Still, however, the lower orders would suspect our intentions; and the arrival of a large fleet of transports at the moment of danger and exertion would excite their suspicions, and probably paralyze their exertions in their own defence.

‘ At the same time, all these reasons for keeping the coppered transports in the Tagus are worth nothing, if they are wanted elsewhere, or if any expense or inconvenience would be occasioned by the measure.

‘ I am going to Lisbon on Sunday, all being quiet; and I hope in a short time to be able to make a report on the defence of Portugal which will be satisfactory to Government.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 7th October, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to report to your Lordship that I have ordered the two battalions of detachments to embark and to proceed to England as soon as transports shall be furnished for their reception, with the exception of the detachments be-

longing to regiments of which one battalion is serving in this country, which I have directed to join and to be incorporated in such battalion.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Captain Thévenon, A.D.C.*

‘ MONSIEUR,

‘ Ce 8 Octobre, 1809.

‘ Je viens de recevoir une lettre du Maréchal Mortier, Duc de Trévise, par laquelle j’apprends que malgré les instances que j’avais faites au Commandant en Chef de l’armée d’Estremadure le 16 Septembre, quand je vous ai écrit la dernière fois, vous êtes toujours détenu aux postes Espagnols; et même Monsieur le Maréchal m’informe que l’on vous a envoyé à Séville. Je ne connais pas pourquoi on vous a détenu, et comme je ne crois pas qu’on vous ait envoyé à Seville, je vous écris cette lettre pour vous faire savoir que j’ai renouvelé mes instances auprès du Commandant en Chef de l’armée d’Estremadure, pour qu’il vous fasse partir tout de suite; et que j’envoie aujourd’hui au Gouvernement Espagnol des remontrances sur votre détention jusqu’à présent.

‘ J’envoie cette lettre et le duplicat à celle que je vous ai écrite le 16 Septembre, par mon aide de camp, le Capitaine Gordon, et je vous prie de me faire savoir s’il vous faut quelque chose, en quoi je puis vous être utile.

‘ Je vous prévient que votre ami Monsieur de Farincourt existe, et se porte bien. Il est dans les mains de la Régence de Portugal, et je suis bien assuré qu’il est bien traité. Mais comme vous vous intéressez à son sort je tâcherai de le faire renvoyer à l’armée Française en échange pour un officier Anglais ou Portugais, et en attendant je lui ferai donner de l’argent et tout ce qu’il lui faut.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Le Capitaine Thévenon, A.D.C.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Lisbon, 11th October, 1809.

‘ I observe that the regiments have seized upon the Seville carts, which they are using for private purposes, and in



all probability we shall lose their services from hard and bad usage. I have this day given an order upon the subject, which I hope will have the effect of putting a stop to this pernicious practice; and in the mean time I beg you to give orders to your commissaries to get possession of these carts, and not to allow them to be used excepting for public purposes.

‘The carting business appears to go on with tolerable regularity upon the road, but you must take care to keep your commissaries at Estremoz, Monte Moró Novo and Aldea Galega, supplied with money. I think it would be an improvement of our system, and indeed would be but fair towards the Estremoz cart owners, to hire carts at Badajoz to relieve there those from Estremoz, and to carry to the regiments which are beyond Badajoz whatever might be brought up for them.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*J. Murray, Esq.,*  
*Commissary General.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Payne.*

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Lisbon, 11th October, 1809.

‘I arrived here yesterday, and I saw the 1st dragoons, in the streets, and I think that in my life I have never seen a finer regiment. They were very strong, the horses in very good condition, and the regiment apparently in high order.

‘I met upon the road at Arrayolos a cart belonging to the Commissariat, one of those hired at Seville, and marked as belonging to the army, and drawn by four mules, and escorted by a dragoon, and upon inquiry from him I found that “it was a cart belonging to the — light dragoons, which was drawing Major ——’s baggage.”

‘First, I do not know what business the — light dragoons have with a cart belonging to them, after the repeated orders which have been given upon the subject, and particularly with one of those Seville mule carts, which I had taken much pains to procure for the army, and am endeavoring to retain in our service.

‘In the second place, if a regiment has a cart, it must not

be employed in carrying the baggage of an officer, and particularly must not be sent 100 miles from the regiment in order to carry his baggage. Major —— must have known that he ought to provide means to carry his baggage himself, and not call upon his regiment to provide them for him, and send them to Lisbon.

‘Thirdly, I am surprised that Major —— should have stayed so long from his regiment since his arrival in Portugal, and that he should only now have joined it.

‘I wish you to notice these circumstances to the — light dragoons. I shall publish an order, and give directions to the Commissary General respecting carts.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General Payne.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘Lisbon, 11th October, 1809.

‘I arrived here last night, and I understand that a packet is come in, and if the report of its arrival be correct, this shall go to you to-night, with the contents of the packet for the army. I have not yet heard any news.

‘I send an order to be published relating to carts, which, notwithstanding all the orders upon the subject, the regiments still retain, much to the public inconvenience.

‘From what I have seen on the road, I should hope that all the clothing is gone from hence, and will be with the regiments before the end of the week, and that the blankets will soon follow. I conclude that the rain of Monday morning will have induced you to put the troops in quarters.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General

‘WELLINGTON.

*Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.’*

#### MEMORANDUM.

‘According to the desire expressed by Mr. Villiers, I proceed to give my opinion on the points referred to in his dispatch to the Secretary of State, dated 2nd October, 1809.

‘11th October, 1809.

‘Mr. Villiers is certainly misinformed respecting the state of the British army, a knowledge of which can be acquired from the returns better than from any reports.

‘ The measure of drawing it towards the Portuguese frontier, and of dispersing it in some degree, has answered completely in recruiting the strength of the cavalry and the artillery; and the reinforcements which have been sent of horses for the artillery, and the arrival of the 1st dragoons, have rendered both those branches equally efficient as when the army marched into Spain in June.

‘ Both officers and soldiers of the infantry have been sickly, as all persons are in these climates in the months of September and October, particularly an army which had previously suffered much from fatigue and privation.

‘ Many men have been and are still sick in some of the divisions; in others the men are not extraordinarily unhealthy, adverting to the season; and, upon the whole, the sick list, including wounded prisoners and others, does not exceed 7800 men out of 33,000.

‘ The infantry of the army are also stronger in numbers than when it entered Spain in June, from the arrival and junction of the reinforcements.

‘ The omission, then, “to take any further advantage of the present moment,” must not be attributed to “the loss, the fatigue, and the sickness of the troops,” but to the conviction of their General that the French were superior not only in discipline, efficiency, and composition, but in numbers for the field also, to the allies in the two Castilles and Estremadura.

‘ The grounds of this conviction are explained in two dispatches to the Ambassador at Seville, dated the 24th of August and 1st of September, and in a dispatch to the Secretary of State, of the 4th of September, the whole of which have been seen by Mr. Villiers.

‘ The mode in which the enemy would bring this superiority of numbers to bear upon the operations of the allies is likewise detailed in those dispatches; and, till I shall see a great alteration for the better in the situation of the allies, I must consider it certain that the result of any offensive operation on their part must be defeat of their plan, if not of one or more of their armies.

‘ I might refer to the same dispatches for an opinion regarding the effect which might be produced on the Peninsula by the introduction into operation of a corps of 20,000



fresh British troops. But it will save time and trouble to refer to the dispatch from the Secretary of State to Lord Wellesley, of the 12th of August, in which it will be seen that it is positively stated that that number of men could not be spared from the service in Great Britain and Ireland.

‘ In respect to the army and armament of the people in Spain and Portugal, there is no man more aware than I am of the advantage to be derived from those measures, and if I had not reflected well upon the subject, my experience of the war in Portugal and in Spain (in Portugal, where the people are in some degree armed and arrayed, and in Spain, where they are not) would have shown me the advantage which an army has against the enemy when the people are armed and arrayed, and are on its side in the contest.

‘ But reflection, and, above all, experience, have shown me the exact extent of this advantage in a military point of view ; and I only beg that those who have to contend with the French will not be diverted from the business of raising, arming, equipping, and training regular bodies, by any notion that the people, when armed and arrayed, will be of, I will not say any, but of much, use to them.

‘ The subject is too large for discussion in a paper of this description, but I can show hundreds of instances to prove the truth of as many reasons why exertions of this description ought not to be relied on.

‘ At all events, no officer can calculate upon an operation to be performed against the French by persons of this description ; and I believe that no officer will enter upon an operation against the French without calculating his means most anxiously.

‘ I rather believe Mr. Villiers is misinformed respecting the desertion of the German troops in the French service ; they do desert, certainly, when the British army is near them, and so do the French, but not in the numbers supposed. I believe, however, that they would desert in greater numbers if the Spanish peasants did not murder every thing in the shape of a French soldier found at any distance from the lines ; and General Cuesta had already adopted measures to encourage desertion, by preventing these murders, by offering and giving a reward for every soldier belonging to the enemy brought in alive.

‘ At the same time I must add, that although the German troops, in particular, had a good opportunity of deserting when the British army was at Talavera, very few of them availed themselves of it.

‘ With respect to the proposed increase to the armies of the allies, by raising independent legions, I most readily concur with such good authority, in recommending the adoption of any measure by the allies which will have the effect of giving them an army in a short space of time. Before, however, the measures now in progress are abandoned, it would be desirable to consider well whether those recommended will be more efficient, and particularly to ascertain the difference between them.

‘ The measures now in progress consist in raising and training regiments of infantry, cavalry and artillery, upon the old and understood establishment of Spain and Portugal; those recommended are to raise legions. A legion is, I understand, a corps consisting of one, two, or more battalions of infantry, and a proportion of cavalry and artillery; and these troops must be equally clothed, armed, organized, and trained with the others.

‘ I do not believe that any advantage will be gained by training the troops in a legion, instead of in a battalion or a brigade; and I am afraid that some inconvenience and delay would be experienced in raising legions instead of battalions and regiments, at least in Portugal, as the conscription for the latter is perfectly understood by the provinces, and it must be taught them for the former.

‘ If it should be thought that the number and composition of troops in a legion are convenient for the service, although both numbers and composition are undefined and perfectly arbitrary, I have to observe, that the mode of raising and training men by battalions and regiments now in use, affords equal or even greater facilities for the employment of any numbers of any composition upon any service, as there is nothing to do but to compose brigades and divisions of any numbers of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, that may be deemed expedient, and the object is attained.

‘ But the proposal to form legions, as contained in Mr. Villiers’s dispatch, does not apply solely to the mode of raising and training soldiers, or to the composition of bodies for



service, but affects also the employment of small bodies of troops rather than large bodies, against the enemy in the Peninsula.

‘ I entirely concur with Mr. Villiers that independent small bodies, operating upon the enemy, may be extremely useful, when those operations are connected and carried on in concert with those of a large body of troops, which at the moment occupy the whole of the enemy’s attention and the operations of all his troops. But when, from circumstances, the enemy is relieved from the pressure of the operations of the larger body, and can turn his attention to those of the legion or smaller body, the smaller body must discontinue its operations, or be destroyed. I should therefore doubt the expediency of the adoption of a military system, which must be attended with these effects.

‘ In Spain, and possibly in Portugal, officers might be found capable of commanding these small independent corps. In the Spanish service, in particular, there are officers very capable of commanding brigades, and divisions, and independent corps: where the Spaniards fail is in the lower ranks of their officers, and in their soldiers; but if there were ten legions in the service of the allies, instead of one legion, they would not effect any one of the objects which Mr. Villiers proposes for their operations, unless they should join together under one head, and become an army, like any other of equal numbers; or unless their operations were carried on in concert with, and were protected by, those of a larger body, capable by its numbers, its composition, and its efficiency, of taking up the attention of the enemy.

‘ The partial warfare which is the object of Mr. Villiers’s dispatch to recommend, and of the system of raising legions to carry it into execution, cannot be carried on against the enemy in the position occupied by him to the end of September, without the certain loss of the corps employed in carrying it on, having previously failed in attaining any one object.

‘ With respect to the British army acting in separate corps for the same object, the commander of each being independent of the other, it is inconsistent with the practice of all armies, and particularly the French army; and it is to be apprehended that, although the employment of 50,000





exciting feelings of disgust in others : these are not the feelings which ought to be excited by the recollection and mention of a sentence of honorable acquittal.

‘ I believe that there is no officer upon the General Court Martial who wishes to connect the term honor with the act of going to a brothel ; the common practice forbids it, and there is no man who unfortunately commits this act who does not endeavor to conceal it from the world and his friends. But the honorable acquittal of Lieut. —, as recorded in this sentence, which states that he was concerned in an affray, which is known to have originated in a brothel, will have the effect of connecting with the act of going to a brothel the honorable distinction which it is in the power of a Court Martial to bestow on those brought before them on charges of a very different nature, by the sentence which it may pass upon them.

‘ I therefore anxiously recommend to the General Court Martial to omit the word *honorably* in their sentence.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Siade.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘ Lisbon, 13th October, 1809.

‘ The packet arrived only this morning, and I now send the letters for the army by a messenger. There does not appear to be any news, but a change of the Ministry is probable.

‘ I shall mention what you wish in my dispatch to the Secretary of State.

‘ You have done quite right, and what I expected about the troops. I send to the Adjutant General some orders, Courts Martial, &c., and answers upon the applications for leave.

‘ I am very anxious to throw as many impediments in the way of people leaving the army as is possible, and therefore I have ordered the certificates, medical boards, &c. &c. ; but if you know any body who really requires change of air, do not hesitate about letting him go.

‘ I intended that Pakenham should command Campbell’s brigade during his absence, till Cole should arrive ; he now

wishes for another arrangement, however, about which I write to him. I intended that Kemmis should remain at Badajoz with the 27th and the 40th, and Pakenham would, as senior officer, have been in command of Olivença as well as of Campbell's brigade.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Payne.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Lisbon, 13th October, 1809.

‘ I have received orders to draft the horses of the 23rd dragoons into the other regiments, and send the men home; which measure I propose to carry into execution as soon as I shall join the army.

‘ I beg you to turn your mind to the arrangements to be adopted in order to carry this measure into execution. That which I think of is, to bring the whole of the 23rd to Villa Viçosa, there to divide and allot the horses to the different regiments, and let the regiments have at Villa Viçosa a certain number of dismounted men to take charge of the horses they shall receive.

‘ I conclude that we must transfer with the horses some of the appointments belonging to the 20th dragoons. Let me have all this arrangement cut and dried by the time I shall return. Could you not contrive to give some of the horses of the 23rd to the heavy cavalry? I enclose a bit of a letter of the 23rd from Lady Liverpool.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Payne.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To his Excellency Dom Miguel Forjaz.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Lisbon, 15th October, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th instant, conveying to me, by desire of the Regents of the Kingdom, the copy of a memorial from Don Evaristo Perez de Castro, on the part of the Spanish Government, in which he desires the co-operation of the Portuguese corps on the frontiers of Castille, with the Spanish corps under the command of the Duque del Parque.



‘ From the numbers and position of the enemy in Castille and Estremadura, and from the superior discipline, composition, and efficiency of their troops, compared with those of Spain, I have long been of opinion that the operations of the war must necessarily be defensive on the part of the allies; and that Portugal at least, if not Spain, ought to endeavor to avail herself of the period during which the enemy was likely to leave this country in tranquillity to organize, discipline, and equip her army.

‘ These objects, which are most essential, cannot be accomplished unless the troops are kept for some time longer in a state of tranquillity; and I conceive they are much more important to the cause, not only of Portugal, but of the allies, than success in any desultory expedition against the French corps stationed at Salamanca.

‘ But success against this corps would not be certain, even if the Portuguese troops were to co-operate in the expedition; and, at all events, if the troops of the allies should be successful, their success must be confined to the few days which might elapse before the French corps would be reinforced; when the allied troops must retire, having failed in their object, having incurred some loss of men, and, above all, having lost time which may and ought to be usefully employed in equipping, and in the formation of the troops.

‘ On these grounds I do not recommend to the Government of the kingdom to give the assistance required on the present occasion.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Dom Miguel Forjaz.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Lisbon, 15th October, 1809.

‘ I apprized your Excellency in my letter of the 5th that I had sent my aide de camp, Captain A. Gordon, to General Bassecourt to urge him to send back forthwith to the French head quarters Captain Thévenon, the officer respecting whom I wrote to you on the 5th, and I now have the honor

to enclose the answer to my request which I have received from General Bassecourt, and Captain Gordon's report of his mission.

‘ After the request which I made to the Spanish Government through your Excellency, I acknowledge that the refusal to consent to my request, coming from the Minister of the War department, surprised me, as I imagined that I had some claims to the favorable consideration of any request of mine to the Spanish Government. But when I consider that this officer came into the Spanish lines under my protection, to bring me a letter on a subject equally interesting to the Spanish Government as to myself, and as I have a right to claim him, unless it should be established as a principle that the commanding officer of the British forces is not to hold any communication with the French Commander in Chief, relating to the officers and soldiers who are prisoners of war, I am still more astonished that the refusal to allow this officer to depart, upon my request, should have proceeded from the Government.

‘ The pretences for detaining him, as stated in General Bassecourt's letter, are as idle as the detention of him is improper and ungracious towards me personally. It is said that he crossed the river by swimming; upon which I have to observe that it was probable he could not cross the river in any other manner opposite the Spanish posts. He was sent with a letter to me by his commanding officer; and the Spanish troops being on one side of the river, and the French on the other, he could deliver the letter only by crossing the river, and it is probable at that place he was obliged to swim. But if his passage was irregular, he might have been sent back, and might have been ordered to bring his letter to the place at which the Spanish Commander in Chief chose to receive it; or if there had been any thing irregular in his conduct, it might and ought to have been mentioned when he first arrived at the Spanish head quarters.

‘ But not a word is said against the mode in which this officer entered the Spanish lines, nor is any complaint made of his conduct in answer to two different requests made by me that he should be sent back to the French head quarters; and these objections to his return are discovered at Seville by the Minister in the War department, six weeks after

this officer had arrived, and had been detained in the Spanish lines.

‘ The other objection to his return is that, during his residence at the Spanish head quarters, he may have acquired a knowledge of the positions of the Spanish army, and that it was therefore imprudent to allow him to return to his own army.

‘ This objection is equally futile with the other, for in point of fact this gentleman has been in confinement ever since his arrival at the Spanish head quarters, and can have obtained no knowledge of any thing of importance. But it is a curious circumstance that the arrival of the French officer at the Spanish head quarters, which is to be attributed to the ignorance of duty in the officer at the Spanish outposts; and his detention there, which is to be attributed to the injustice of the Spanish Commander in Chief, and of the Spanish Government, should now be stated as reasons for a further detention, for continued injustice and violation of the laws and customs of war, and for a continuation of an indignity upon the commanding officer of the British forces in Spain.

‘ The objection to the knowledge acquired by this officer of the nature of the positions of the Spanish army is futile in another point of view, and cannot apply to his being delivered over to me. Reasons might exist why he should not be sent back by the way he came, or even by the way of Arzobispo; but none can exist for refusing to deliver him to me, and to allow me to send him to the French lines by some other road.

‘ I beg to draw your Excellency’s attention to this subject, which is of importance, not only because the conduct of the Spanish Government upon this occasion may put an end to all communication between the French officers and me, regarding the British officers who are prisoners of war; and may be the cause of their detention in captivity throughout the war between Great Britain and France, unalleviated by any communication with their friends, or by the receipt of money or other assistance or comforts, but on account of the principles which this conduct would establish, and the temper which it shows now exists in the Spanish councils.

‘ I believe that when the armies of two powers are acting in concert, it has never been understood that the Commander



in Chief of the one could prevent the correspondence of the Commander in Chief of the other with the enemy, upon subjects not only not inconsistent with the objects of their co-operation, but upon one equally interesting to both parties.

‘ In respect to the subject of this correspondence, I have to inform your Excellency that no suspicion could have been entertained, as I desired the Spanish Commander in Chief to open and read all the letters which passed through his posts, whether sealed or otherwise.

‘ If this principle is to be adopted; if barbarities such as are committed by both sides, in the warfare between the Spanish and French nations, are to be extended to the British troops; and if our prisoners are to be treated in the manner in which it appears from Captain Gordon’s letter that the French prisoners in the hands of the Spaniards are to be treated, it will become still more difficult than it is for a British army to give any assistance to the cause of Spain.

‘ The temper which the refusal to liberate this officer has manifested may be perhaps only personal towards me, although I had hoped that I had established some claim for consideration by the Spanish Government. At all events, I cannot believe that the Government is favorably inclined to the British army in thus throwing impediments in the way of the release of wounded officers and soldiers from captivity, who were wounded in the service of Spain, and who were made prisoners only in consequence of a movement made by the Spanish army.

‘ I entreat your Excellency to make a representation on this subject to the Spanish Government; and if it should not be successful, I shall be under the necessity of making a report upon it to the Secretary of State, to be laid before the King.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I beg to call your Excellency’s attention to Captain Gordon’s report of the Spanish army, which was stated to your Excellency to consist of 12,000 men.’

*To Lieut. General Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘ Lisbon, 16th October, 1809.

‘ As I am sending a dispatch to Lord Wellesley on the extraordinary conduct of the Spanish Government in respect to Captain Thévenon, I avail myself of the opportunity to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th. I shall write to England respecting Captain Christie’s exchange, but I must have the original cartel given to him by the French officer. I hope to be at Badajoz next Sunday, as I intend to leave this on Friday.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Lisbon, 16th October, 1809.

‘ I return you the papers you had left me. The whole of the demands of which they are the vouchers ought to be paid; those which I have approved of ought to be charged to the public, and a list should be made of those of which I have not approved, and the individuals whose names appear to the vouchers ought to be called upon to account for having signed these receipts; and it ought particularly to be inquired into, whether they could have received the articles from the Commissariat or any officer belonging to it; or whether, under the orders in their route, their provisions for that day were not already supplied. I think it probable that the result will be that the whole ought to be charged to the public; but in the mean time the inquiry will prevent further irregularities.

‘ I observe that many of these irregular receipts are signed by Commissaries, and others in the Commissariat Department; and I beg that you will let these gentlemen know that if they should give receipts irregularly drawn, or improperly signed, in future, the articles shall be paid for, but the amount shall be charged to their private account.

‘ The objection I have to allowing payments to be made to others, excepting to the parties who supplied the articles for which payment is required, is, that it is probable that the vouchers have been sold; and the consequence of this sys-

tem must be to raise the price of all articles upon the public. I am therefore very averse to encourage the practice of the purchase and sale of vouchers for the supply of articles for the British army, although I am well aware of the convenience that would result as well to the parties as to the service, if the agents and assignees of the parties could be paid for the supplies at Lisbon, instead of on the spot where the supplies are furnished.

‘ I am however disposed to adopt your recommendation, and will authorize the payment for supplies to the assignees of the party who has furnished them, in every case in which it shall appear to you that the transaction is a fair one, and that the assignee is the real agent of the party claiming the debt, and not the purchaser of a voucher or vouchers at a low price, from the person who furnished the supplies.

‘ There is one mode in which you will be able to form a judgment upon this subject, and that is, by the party having only a few or many debts assigned to him: if only one or a few, it is probable that he may be a real agent; if many debts, he is certainly a purchaser of vouchers.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ J. Murray, Esq.,  
Commissary General.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘ Lisbon, 19th October, 1809.

‘ I received yesterday your letters of the 10th, 15th, and 16th. Mr. ——— has not behaved very well to you, for he should have told you that I had already refused him leave to establish himself, or to go to Lisbon. However, you did quite right in allowing him to go.

‘ The regiments have all of them required so many carts to carry clothing and baggage, much of which I am persuaded they cannot want, and I shall be obliged to carry back again to Lisbon, that the country cannot produce carts sufficient to carry up other articles wanted by the army. They will go, however, in time; and I give orders that the medicines, at all events, shall be sent up to the army forthwith. These medical gentlemen should, however, give us some more notice, and not come and report that their medi-



cines are expended, the first time they notice the probability of a want.

‘ Desire Mr. Hancock to state what induced him to separate from the sick to go to Lisbon. I send answers upon the different points referred to in yours of the 15th, to the Adjutant General.

‘ I dread a removal of the sick to Lisbon: the last cost us many men, and they must go on bullock carts: the next will cost us more in consequence of bad weather.

‘ Desire Colonel de Lancey \* to take a ride over to Estremoz, and see whether he could find accommodation for any at that place or Evora. If he cannot, we must send them to Lisbon, but we had better wait till the ten days’ rain shall be over.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Lisbon, 19th October, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 15th instant. The carts which will be hired to attend upon the army ought not to be employed on the road of communication between Lisbon and Badajoz, but should do the business with the army itself, the means adopted for the communication with Lisbon being very likely to answer perfectly.

‘ I think there are objections to Mr. Ogilvie’s arrangement. The difference of rates for working days and halting days, and for carts with and without rations, opens the door for disputes, which must protract the settlements of accounts, and in the end, the public will pay the highest rate. It would be much better at once to give rations, and to fix a price, whether they work or not, and pay that price once a week.

‘ I am concerned to observe from Mr. Ogilvie’s letters that his operations are cramped; nay, that the price of articles is increased from his want of money.

‘ In respect to the supplies at Portalegre, you must expect that the General officers will interfere with your magazines and arrangements until your officers are so diligent and ex-

\* Assistant Quarter Master General. He was mortally wounded at Waterloo.

pert in the performance of their duty, as to make it certain that the troops and horses shall get their food regularly, if it is to be got in the country.

‘ If the General officers (General Payne particularly) had not exerted themselves, in the late campaigns in Spain and Portugal, the troops and horses must have died of want, and I doubt not that ascertained want at Villa Viçosa, or apprehension of want, is the cause of General Payne’s order upon Portalegre.

‘ You will recollect that your contractor drew all the supplies from Villa Viçosa for the troops, &c. at Elvas.

‘ I enclose a letter which has been put into my hands by Mr. Villiers, and I request you to adopt immediate measures for the settlement of this account, and the payment of the debt to the Junta de Viveres.

‘ I beg you also to desire Mr. Dunmore to take up from the Portuguese Government bills given to them by Mr. Erskine for 15,000*l.*, according to the directions I before gave you upon that subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ J. Murray, Esq.,  
Commissary General.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To his Excellency Dom Miguel Forjaz.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Lisbon, 19th October, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 17th instant, in which you enclose, by desire of the Governors of the kingdom, a letter from Don Evaristo Perez de Castro, Chargé d’Affaires of Spain.

‘ The object of this note is to obtain from their Excellencies, on the part of his Royal Highness, a positive and definite answer, at what time the troops of Portugal shall co-operate with those of Spain, within the Spanish territory, against the common enemy in the Peninsula; and the Governors of the kingdom have been pleased to desire to have my opinion before they order that an answer should be sent to this note.

‘ In the letter which I had the honor of addressing your Excellency on the 15th instant, I informed you of the circumstances which render it unadvisable, in my opinion, to enter upon any operation with the Portuguese troops at

present ; and it would be difficult for me, or for any person, to point out the precise period at which an alteration of those circumstances will take place.

‘ Besides this alteration of circumstances, as referrible to the state of the Portuguese troops, and to the state and position of the enemy’s troops in Castille and Estremadura, I have to observe that it is desirable that other objects should be accomplished, and other arrangements made, before the Portuguese troops can enter with propriety upon operations in Spain.

‘ First, it is desirable that it should have an army with which it can co-operate, on some defined plan of operations, which all parties will have means, and will engage to carry into execution, as far at least as any person can engage to carry into execution any particular military operation.

‘ Secondly, it is desirable, nay, it is necessary, that some means should be pointed out, and fixed, by which the Portuguese troops are to be subsisted while they shall remain in Spain, so that they may not starve, as they did when they were in that country lately, and may not be obliged by want of food to retire.

‘ When decided answers shall be given upon these points, I have no doubt that I shall be enabled to tell their Excellencies, the Governors of the kingdom, that they have an army in a state to be sent into Spain.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*  
*Dom Miguel Forjaz.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Véron de Farincourt.*

‘ Au Quartier Général de l’Armée Anglaise,  
ce 20 Octobre, 1809.

‘ MONSIEUR,

‘ Je vous envoie une lettre de la part de votre ami le Capitaine Thévenon, à qui j’avais donné connaissance de votre sort, quoique vous ne soyez pas sous ma charge. Je vous envoie aussi quarante piastres pour lesquels je vous prie de m’envoyer votre reçu, et je vous préviens que le Gouvernement Portugais m’a fait la grâce de consentir à la prière que je lui ai faite de vous laisser retourner à l’Armée Française en échange pour un officier Anglais qui a été renvoyé par le Général Kellermann. Comme il n’est pas possible que vous



passiez ou par le Portugal ou par l'Espagne sans escorte, le Maréchal Beresford vous prévendra quand l'escorte sera prête, et vous donnera la lettre que je lui ai envoyée pour le Général Kellermann et votre cartel d'échange.

‘ J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Véron de Farincourt.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Kellermann.*

‘ Au Quartier Général de l'Armée Anglaise,

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL, ce 20 Octobre, 1809.

‘ J'ai reçu les deux lettres que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire, et je suis bien sensible aux bontés que vous avez eues pour les officiers Anglais qui ont passé par votre quartier général. Je suis fâché que vous croyez avoir à vous plaindre de quelques uns d'entre eux ; mais si vous examinez l'action qu'ils ont commise, vous verrez qu'ils n'ont pas tant tort que vous l'imaginez.

‘ Les officiers Anglais qui ont donné leur parole, et qui jouissent en conséquence d'un peu de liberté et de l'aisance que les loix et coutumes de la guerre donnaient autrefois aux prisonniers de guerre, ne violeront jamais la parole qu'ils ont donnée ; et je puis vous assurer que s'il y en avait un dans le cas d'avoir commis cette action, je le renverrais tout de suite à l'ennemi, s'il osait m'approcher. Mais ceux que vous gardez prisonniers sous les gardes, qui n'ont aucune perspective qu'une longue captivité, s'échapperont quand ils pourront, malgré que vous les traitiez avec des égards. Soyez sur, Monsieur le Général, qu'il vaudrait bien mieux leur donner la parole à tous, et que l'honneur d'un officier Anglais vaut bien mieux que tous les gardes et sentinelles au monde.

‘ Votre aide de camp, M. de Turenne, est prisonnier du Commandant en Chef de l'armée Espagnole en Castille, et il a été envoyé à Séville. Il a passé avant que j'aie su qu'il était prisonnier ; mais j'ai eu de ses nouvelles, et il se porte bien. J'ai fait la demande au Gouvernement Espagnol de me faire la grâce de consentir à son retour à l'armée Française, en échange pour le Lieut. Cameron, mais je n'ai pas encore reçu de réponse. Vous pouvez être sur que je ferai tout en mon pouvoir pour vous rendre le Lieut. de Turenne,

et que si je n'ai pas de succès dans cet objet-là, je tâcherai au moins d'adoucir son sort. En attendant que je reçoive la réponse du Gouvernement Espagnol, je renvoie le Lieut. Louis Véron de Farincourt en échange pour le Lieut. Cameron, et je renverrai le Lieut. de Turenne en échange pour quelqu'autre, aussitôt que j'aurai la réponse du Gouvernement Espagnol.

‘ J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

‘ *M. le Général Kellermann.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

#### CARTEL OF EXCHANGE.

‘ Head quarters of the British Army,  
20th October, 1809.

‘ Cartel of exchange between Lieut. Cameron of the 79th regiment, taken by the French army at Talavera, (and sent in to the British army, on a cartel of exchange with Lieut. de Turenne, aide de camp to General Kellermann,) and Lieut. Louis Vernon de Farincourt of the 2nd Light Infantry of the French army, taken by the Portuguese army at Chaves, and now in confinement at Lisbon.

‘ The above mentioned exchange with Lieut. de Turenne not taking effect, Lieut. Cameron of the 79th is exchanged for Lieut. Louis Vernon de Farincourt. In consequence thereof, Lieut. Louis Vernon de Farincourt is authorized to join the French army; and all officers commanding English, Portuguese, and Spanish troops, are requested to allow him to pass to the French army without molestation.

‘ Lieut. Vernon de Farincourt will show this cartel of exchange to the Commander in Chief of the French army.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

#### MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUT. COLONEL FLETCHER, COMMANDING ROYAL ENGINEERS\*.

‘ Lisbon, 20th October, 1809.

‘ In the existing relative state of the Allied and French

\* The plan was altered after this memorandum was written, as it was found that the plain of Castanheira could not be occupied with advantage; the right was therefore thrown back on Alhandra. But this memorandum is the foundation on which the whole work was commenced and completed. It was written after a detailed reconnaissance of the ground, and a personal visit to every part of it.

armies in the Peninsula, it does not appear probable that the enemy have it in their power to make an attack upon Portugal. They must wait for their reinforcements; and as the arrival of these may be expected, it remains to be considered what plan of defence shall be adopted for this country.

‘ The great object in Portugal is the possession of Lisbon and the Tagus, and all our measures must be directed to this object. There is another also connected with that first object, to which we must likewise attend, viz.—the embarkation of the British troops in case of reverse.

‘ In whatever season the enemy may enter Portugal, he will probably make his attack by two distinct lines, the one north, the other south of the Tagus; and the system of defence to be adopted must be founded upon this general basis.

‘ In the winter season the river Tagus will be full, and will be a barrier to the enemy’s enterprises with his left attack, not very difficult to be secured. In the summer season, however, the Tagus being fordable in many places between Abrantes and Salvaterra, and even lower than Salvaterra, care must be taken that the enemy does not, by his attack directed from the south of the Tagus, and by the passage of that river, cut off from Lisbon the British army engaged in operations to the northward of the Tagus.

‘ The object of the allies should be to oblige the enemy as much as possible to make his attack with concentrated corps. They should stand in every position which the country could afford, such a length of time as would enable the people of the country to evacuate the towns and villages, carrying with them or destroying all articles of provisions and carriages, not necessary for the allied army; each corps taking care to preserve its communication with the others, and its relative distance from the point of junction.

‘ In whatever season the enemy’s attack may be made, the whole allied army, after providing for the garrisons of Elvas, Almeida, Abrantes, and Valença, should be divided into three corps, to be posted as follows—one corps to be in Beira; another in Alentejo; and the third, consisting of the Lusitanian legion, eight battalions of caçadores, and two of militia, in the mountains of Castello Branco.



‘ In the winter, the corps in Beira should consist of two thirds of the whole numbers of the operating army. In the summer, the corps in Beira, and Alentejo should be nearly of equal numbers.

‘ I shall point out in another memorandum the plan of operations to be adopted by the corps north and south of the Tagus in the winter months.

‘ In the summer, it is probable, as I have above stated, that the enemy will make his attack in two principal corps, and that he will also push one through the mountains of Castello Branco and Abrantes. His object will be, by means of his corps south of the Tagus, to turn the positions which might be taken up in his front on the north of that river; to cut off from Lisbon the corps opposed to him; and to destroy it by an attack in front and rear at the same time. This can be avoided only by the retreat of the right centre, and left of the allies, and their junction at a point at which, from the state of the river, they cannot be turned by the passage of the Tagus by the enemy’s left.

‘ The first point of defence which presents itself below that at which the Tagus ceases to be fordable is the river of Castanheira, and here the army should be posted as follows:— 10,000 men, including all the cavalry, in the plain between the Tagus and the Hills; 5000 infantry on the left of the plain; and the remainder of the army, with the exception of the following detachments, on the height in front, and on the right of Cadafoes.

‘ In order to prevent the enemy from turning, by their left, the positions which the allies may take up for the defence of the high road to Lisbon by the Tagus, Torres Vedras should be occupied by a corps of 5000 men; the height in the rear of Sobral de Monte agração by 4000 men; and Arruda by 2000 men.

‘ There should be a small corps on the height east by south of the height of Sobral, to prevent the enemy from marching from Sobral to Arruda; and there should be another small corps on the height of Ajuda, between Sobral and Bucellas.

‘ In case the enemy should succeed in forcing the corps at Torres Vedras, or Sobral de Monte agração, or Arruda; if the first, it must fall back gradually to Cabeça de Monta-

chique, occupying every defensible point on the road : if the second, it must fall back upon Bucellas, destroying the road after the height of Ajuda : if the third, it must fall back upon Alhandra, disputing the road particularly at a point one league in front of that town.

‘ In case any one of these three positions should be forced, the army must fall back from its position as before pointed out, and must occupy one as follows :

‘ 5000 men, principally light infantry, on the hill behind Alhandra ; the main body of the army on the Serra or Ser-ves, with its right on that part of the Serra which is near the Casal de Portella, and is immediately above the road which crosses the Serra from Bucellas to Alverca ; and its left extending to the pass of Bucellas. The entrance of the pass of Bucellas to be occupied by the troops retired from Sobral de Monte agrão, &c., and Cabeça de Montachique, by the corps retired from Torres Vedras.

‘ In order to strengthen these several positions, it is necessary that different works should be constructed immediately, and that arrangements and preparations should be made for the construction of others.

‘ Accordingly, I beg Colonel Fletcher, as soon as possible, to review these several positions.

‘ 1st. He will examine particularly the effect of damming up the mouth of the Castanheira river ; how far it will render that river a barrier, and to what extent it will fill.

‘ 2nd. He will calculate the labor required for that work, and the time it will take, as well as the means of destroying the bridge over the river, and of constructing such redoubts as might be necessary on the plain, and on the hill on the left of the road, effectually to defend the plain. He will state particularly what means should be prepared for these works. He will also consider of the means and time required, and the effect which might be produced by sloping the banks of the river.

‘ 3rd. He will make the same calculations for the works to be executed on the hill in front, and on the right of Cadafoes, particularly on the left of that hill, to shut the entry of the valley of Cadafoes.

‘ 4th. He will examine and report upon the means of

making a good road of communication from the plain across the hills into the valley of Cadafoés, and to the left of the proposed position, and calculate the time and labor it will take.

‘ 5th. He will examine the road from Otta by Abregada, Labrugeira to Merciana, and thence to Torres Vedras; and also from Merciana to Sobral de Monte agração. He will also examine and report upon the road from Alemquer to Sobral de Monte agração.

‘ 6th. He will entrench a post at Torres Vedras for 5000 men. He will examine the road from Torres Vedras to Cabeça de Montachique; and fix upon the spots at which to break it up as might stop or delay the enemy; and if there should be advantageous ground at such spots, he will entrench a position for 400 men to cover the retreat of the corps from Torres Vedras.

‘ 7th. He will examine the position at Cabeça de Montachique, and determine upon its line of defence, and upon the works to be constructed for its defence, by a corps of 5000 men; of which he will estimate the time and the labor.

‘ 8th. He will entrench a position for 4000 men on the two heights which command the road from Sobral de Monte agração to Bucellas.

‘ 9th. He will entrench a position for 400 men on the height of Ajuda, between Sobral and Bucellas, to cover the retreat of the corps from Sobral to Bucellas; and he will calculate the means and the time it will take to destroy the road at that spot.

‘ 10th. He will construct a redoubt for 200 men and three guns at the windmill on the height of Sobral de Monte agração, which guns will bear upon the road from Sobral to Arruda.

‘ 11. He will ascertain the points at which and the means by which the road from Sobral to Arruda can be destroyed.

‘ 12th. He will ascertain the labor and time required to entrench a position which he will fix upon for 2000 men to defend the road coming out of Arruda towards Villa Franca and Alhandra, and he will fix upon the spot at which the road from Arruda to Alhandra can be destroyed with advantage.

‘ 13th. He will construct a redoubt on the hill which com-



mands the road from Arruda, about one league in front of Alhandra.

‘ 14th. He will examine the æstuaries at Alhandra, and see whether, by damming them up at the mouths, he could increase the difficulties of a passage by that place; and he will ascertain the time and labor and means which this work will require.

‘ 15th. He will fix upon the spots, and ascertain the time and labor required to construct redoubts upon the hill of Alhandra on the right, to prevent the passage of the enemy by the high road; and on the left, and in the rear, to prevent by their fire the occupation of the mountains towards Alverca.

‘ 16th. He will determine upon the works to be constructed on the right of the position upon the Serra de Ser-ves, as above pointed out, to prevent the enemy from forcing that point; and he will calculate the means and the time required to execute them. He will likewise examine the pass of Bucellas, and fix upon the works to be constructed for its defence, and calculate the means, time, and labor required for the execution.

‘ 17th. He will calculate the means, time, and labor required to construct a work upon the hill upon which the windmill stands, at the southern entrance at the pass of Bucellas.

‘ 18th. He will fix upon spots on which signal posts can be erected upon these hills, to communicate from one part of the position to the other.

‘ 19th. It is very desirable that we should have an accurate plan of the ground.

‘ 20th. Examine the island in the river opposite to Alhandra, and fix upon the spot, and calculate the means and time required to construct batteries upon it to play upon the approach to Alhandra.

‘ 21st. Examine the effect of damming up the river which runs by Loures, and calculate the time and means required to break up the bridge at Loures.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Lisbon, 20th October, 1809.

‘ I enclose a letter from Marshal Beresford, dated the 11th instant, containing an application from Lieut. Colonel Cox, who is acting as a Brigadier General in the Portuguese service, to be permitted by His Majesty to accept the commission of Brigadier General in Spain, to which the Central Junta have promoted him from that of Colonel, which he had before accepted by His Majesty’s permission, and I request your Lordship to recommend the application of Brigadier General Cox to His Majesty’s approbation.

‘ I likewise enclose a letter, of the 11th instant, from Marshal Beresford, relative to the wish felt by many British officers, who have been appointed to serve with the Portuguese army, to return to England to join their regiments, the gratification of which wish has hitherto been resisted here on the ground that the officers having voluntarily accepted employment in a service on which they were consequently ordered by His Majesty, they could not be permitted to relinquish it without His Majesty’s orders.

‘ If this principle should be approved of, there will still remain for consideration the case of Lieut. Colonel M<sup>c</sup>Donell of the 78th\*, and other officers promoted in His Majesty’s service, after they had received orders to serve and had arrived in Portugal. His Majesty might have thought it fit to allow Major M<sup>c</sup>Donell to serve in Portugal, but when that officer is promoted to be a Lieut. Colonel, and the command of a British regiment would probably devolve upon him, it might be inconvenient to His Majesty’s service to allow him to remain in Portugal. I therefore request to be made acquainted with the wishes of His Majesty’s Government upon cases of this description.

‘ I likewise enclose a letter from Marshal Beresford, of the 19th instant, relative to Brigadier General — and Colonel —, who have absented themselves from the Portuguese service without leave, and who, it appears, cannot be punished for this misconduct, as they are not in His Majesty’s service.

\* Major General M<sup>c</sup>Donell, late of the Coldstream Guards.

‘ I beg leave to recommend that, in future, persons of this description may not be sent to serve in Portugal, for reasons referrible to the sensations which the employment of them creates in the Portuguese service; as well as because no means exist of punishing the military disorders and irregularities of which they may be guilty, of the kind committed by Brigadier General — and Colonel —. In respect to these gentlemen, I should also beg leave to suggest, that they may not in future be employed in England in the capacity of Inspecting Field Officers, &c.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Lisbon, 20th October, 1809.

‘ I enclose a letter from Marshal Beresford, of the 16th instant, in which he desires that Captain Trant, who is acting as a Colonel in the service of Portugal, may not lose his situation on the permanent Staff of the Quarter Master General, while so employed.

‘ If Captain Trant should be obliged to make the option, whether he would return to his duty at the Horse Guards or remain in Portugal, he must choose the former, and this country will lose the services of an officer who has made himself most useful, and who may hereafter be most usefully employed here.

‘ I hope, therefore, that this consideration, as well as the recollection of the engagement held out to officers to induce them to serve in Portugal, that their situation in the service of his Majesty should not be altered for the worse, will induce your Lordship to urge the Commander in Chief to allow Captain Trant to retain his appointment in the Quarter Master General’s department.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Lisbon, 20th October, 1809.

‘ I enclose a letter from Marshal Beresford, relative to the want of clothing and accoutrements by the Portuguese



troops, which I beg leave to urge may be sent out without loss of time.

‘ I also beg leave to recommend to his Majesty’s Government the adoption of the measures proposed by Marshal Beresford, to apprise the officers in this country to what extent and to what periods their requisitions will be complied with. It would also be advisable that the articles provided in England for the use of the Portuguese army should be submitted to the inspection of a board of officers previously to their being sent from England.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.* ’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Lisbon, 22nd October, 1809.

‘ I came here a few days ago, in order to be better enabled to form a judgment on the points referred to in your Lordship’s dispatch of the 14th of September, upon which I hope to be able to make a report in the course of a few days.

‘ Since I addressed your Lordship on the 6th instant, I have received accounts that the enemy have collected a corps upon the Tagus, near Toledo, supposed to consist of 30,000 men, with which they have invaded La Mancha.

‘ General Eguia, who commanded the Spanish troops in that quarter, consisting of his own corps, which had been in Estremadura, and of General Venegas’s, retired to La Serena, where he was on the 16th instant, and the enemy had not manifested any intention of attacking him.

‘ Soult’s corps was, by the last accounts, at Oropesa and Arzobispo, and Mortier’s at Talavera ; and I conclude that the movement of the whole to their left has been occasioned by the invasion of La Mancha.

‘ Ney’s corps is still at Salamanca, and the Duque del Parque is near Ciudad Rodrigo. He has lately been reinforced by about 800 cavalry, which had been detached from the army of Estremadura, and by the corps of Ballesteros, which had been in the Asturias, and consisting of about 7000 men. This corps attacked Zamora on its march southward, but was repulsed, and its march was then directed through Portugal.

‘ I imagine that the late invasion of La Mancha by the French has been occasioned solely by their desire to prevent the Spanish army under General Eguia from enjoying the resources of that province.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘ Lisbon, 25th October, 1809.

‘ I returned here yesterday, and this morning received yours of the 23rd. My horses are gone upon the road, and I shall certainly set out on Friday morning, and shall be at Badajoz on Sunday.

‘ You may depend upon my doing every thing in my power for Captain Boothby; but having no prisoners in our own hands, and not being able to prevail upon the Spanish Government even to give an answer relative to the different propositions made by the French Generals for cartels of exchange, I have it not in my power to do much. I think, however, that I may now be able to do something, as the Portuguese Government have given me the disposal of all the prisoners in their possession, respecting whom I shall write to Soult as soon as I reach Badajoz. Release Lieut. ——. I send an order to that gentleman.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Lisbon, 25th October, 1809.

‘ The Portuguese Government having placed at my disposal the French prisoners now in confinement in the castle of Lisbon, I request that you will be so kind as to convey the enclosed letter and sum of money to Lieut. Véron de Farincourt. I beg you also to send him under an escort to Almeida as soon as may be convenient to you, with the enclosed cartel of exchange, and the letter to General Kellermann; and desire Brigadier General Cox to forward him likewise under an escort to the head quarters of the Duque del Parque, and to request the Duque to have him sent to

the first French post with his letter, and his cartel of exchange.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY DEAR WELLESLEY,

‘ Lisbon, 25th October, 1809.

‘ I have not been able to quit this place yet ; but propose to set out on Friday, and I shall be at Badajoz on Sunday. It will afterwards take a day or two to post my horses on the road towards Seville, and I shall not be able most probably to set out for that place till Tuesday or Wednesday. I suspect that, in this case, I shall be too late to see you ; but if you should have been delayed at Seville so long, and if you will write me a line to Badajoz, which I shall receive on Sunday, I shall be happy to go to you. I shall expect to find the carriage at Fuente de Cantos.

‘ I have been prevented from answering your last dispatches by the business which I have had here.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Lisbon, 26th October, 1809.

‘ Colonel Fletcher writes to have a corps of militia consisting of 600 men at Torres Vedras, a corps consisting of 500 men at Sobral, and a corps consisting of 800 men at St. Julian, in order to furnish working parties to complete the works at these places respectively, and I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders accordingly.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Lisbon, 26th October, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from the Secretary of State, relative to the defence of this country, in the event of the enemy’s armies in Spain being reinforced to such a degree as to render the possession of Portugal doubtful.



‘In case the enemy should make a serious attack upon Portugal, his object, as well as that of the allies, would be the possession of the city of Lisbon. The British army would necessarily have another object, viz.—a secure embarkation, after the possession of the city of Lisbon should be evidently lost.

‘The line of frontier of Portugal is so long in proportion to the extent and means of the country, and the Tagus and the mountains separate the parts of it so effectually from each other, and it is so open in many parts, that it would be impossible for an army, acting upon the defensive, to carry on its operations upon the frontier without being cut off from the capital.

‘The scene of the operations of the army would therefore most probably be considerably within the frontier, whether their attack be made in winter or in summer; but if it should be made in summer, when the Tagus is fordable in many places, at least as low down as Salvaterra, the scene of the operations of the army would necessarily be lower down than that point.

‘It is probable, also, that in the event of the enemy being enabled to invade this country in force, he will make his principal attack by the right of the Tagus; but he will employ one corps upon the left of that river, with the immediate object of embarrassing, if not of preventing, the embarkation of the British army, and of precluding the use of its navigation by the allies.

‘I should wish, then, to be assisted with your opinion respecting the possibility of embarking the army in its transports, and bringing them away from the following places, in the event of a defeat by the enemy in the field which should oblige the British army to evacuate the country, and which of course supposes that they would be pressed by the enemy.

‘1st, Peniche.—I conceive that I should be able to hold this place during any length of time that might be necessary for an embarkation; but, from what I have above stated, you will observe that in the event of the attack being made between the months of June and November, when the Tagus is fordable, the operations of the army would be carried on in a part of the country which would be cut off from Peniche, and the retreat to that place would be impracticable.

‘2ndly, Paço d’Arcos on the Tagus.—I could not pretend to hold the high ground which commands Paço d’Arcos without occupying it with at least 20,000 men, which, in the circumstances stated, would possibly be the total amount to be embarked.

‘3rdly, The two bays to the eastward of St. Julian.—I could hold St. Julian and the Bugio for at least eight days, and could cover an embarkation to be made in these bays, particularly in that immediately under St. Julian, and protect the passage of the fleet out of the river.

‘In deciding upon all projects of embarkation in the Tagus, I beg of you to advert to the probability that the enemy, if in sufficient force, may and will occupy the ground on the left of the river from Almada to Trafaria; and that you will consider how far it will be practicable, if it should be necessary under these circumstances, to remain in the Tagus with the fleet of transports.

‘4thly, Setuval.—I could hold the ground which would cover the embarkation and protect the passage of the fleet out of Setuval for eight days: but it must be observed respecting this place of embarkation, that an enemy’s corps on the left of the Tagus might, if in sufficient strength, render it impracticable to reach it with a beaten army.

‘It is also to be observed, that if the army, after its defeat, should be able to embark in boats and cross the Tagus, to go to Setuval, it might equally embark in boats to go to the transports in the Tagus, and a long and fatiguing march would be avoided.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*  
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Peacocke.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Lisbon, 26th October, 1809.

‘I am concerned to be obliged to inform you, that it has been mentioned to me that the British officers who are in Lisbon are in the habit of going to the Theatres, where some of them conduct themselves in a very improper manner, much to the annoyance of the public, and to the injury of the proprietors and of the performers. I cannot conceive for what reason the officers of the British army should con-

duct themselves at Lisbon in a manner which would not be permitted in their own country, is contrary to rule and custom in this country, and is permitted in none where there is any regulation or decency of behaviour.

‘The officers commanding regiments, and the superior officers, must take measures to prevent a repetition of the conduct adverted to, and of the consequent complaints which I have received ; or I must take measures which shall effectually prevent the character of the army and of the British nation from suffering by the misconduct of a few.

‘The officers of the army can have nothing to do behind the scenes, and it is very improper that they should appear upon the stage during the performance. They must be aware that the English public would not bear either the one or the other, and I see no reason why the Portuguese public should be worse treated.

‘I have been concerned to see officers in uniform, with their hats on, upon the stage during the performance, and to hear of the riots and outrages which some of them have committed behind the scenes ; and I can only repeat, that if this conduct should be continued, I shall be under the necessity of adopting measures to prevent it, for the credit of the army and of the country.

‘I beg you to communicate this letter to the commanding officers of the regiments in the garrison of Lisbon, and to the commanding officer of the detachments of convalescents, and desire them to communicate its contents to the officers under their command respectively.

‘Indeed, officers who are absent from their duty on account of sickness might as well not go to the playhouse, or at all events upon the stage, and behind the scenes. I beg you also to take such measures as may appear to you to be necessary to prevent a repetition of this conduct.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Peacocke.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the  
Commander in Chief.*

‘MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘Lisbon, 26th October, 1809.

‘Lieut. Colonel Waters is proceeding to England by my leave, with Major General C. Stewart, who is going for the



recovery of his health; and I cannot allow him to depart without adopting this mode of recommending him, in the strongest manner, to the Commander in Chief.

‘Although attached to the Portuguese army, he has made himself extremely useful to the British army, by his knowledge of the languages of Spain and Portugal, by his intelligence and his activity. I have employed him in several important affairs, which he has always transacted in a manner satisfactory to me; and his knowledge of the language and customs of the country has induced me to send him generally with the patrols employed to ascertain the positions of the enemy, in which services he has acquitted himself most ably.

‘It would be most desirable to have Colonel Waters exchanged from the Portuguese service to the line, and to send him out here again on the establishment of the Adjutant or Quarter Master General, as the regulations do not allow of his being promoted.

‘I have come down here to arrange our future operations in Portugal, and I shall return to the army to-morrow.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Torrens.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Roche.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Estremoz, 28th October, 1809.

‘I am very much obliged to you for your letters of the 21st and 22nd instant, which I received this morning. I am now on my road from Lisbon to Badajoz, where I shall arrive to-morrow. The head quarters of the army are still there, and the army in, and in the neighbourhood of, that town.

‘I beg that you will tell General Arceyza that I congratulate him upon the prospect of his appointment to the command of the army of La Mancha; and that nothing will give me greater pleasure than to communicate with him, in the most unreserved manner, upon all points relating to the service. All that I can promise him is, my real opinion on all points on which he may require it; and I shall be most happy if I can be of any use to him.

‘I do not think the French are now strong enough to make a serious attempt upon the Sierra Morena, particularly if the

Spanish army is as strong as you suppose it is. If the French do make such an attempt, I trust the Spaniards in La Mancha will follow the example of those in Castille, and will maintain their position, and drive back the enemy. That is the mode of warfare for which they are best suited, and which I trust they will at last adopt. Large masses, in strong positions, which will give them an opportunity of acquiring a system of discipline, at the same time that the French can do them no harm, and will be exposed themselves to the attacks of the Spanish detachments, and of the guerrillas, which, under the protection of these masses, and while the enemy's attention would be taken up by them, might operate on their flanks and rear; this is the system which I have always recommended, for which the country and people are particularly well calculated.

‘Small detachments, operating alone, will not answer. It is a mistake to suppose that the French were beat out of Galicia by a force of this description: in fact, they beat themselves out of Galicia.

‘First, Soult invaded Portugal, where he lost the greatest part, and destroyed the efficiency of the remainder of his army; nearly about the same time Ney invaded Asturias with a great part of his army. The absence of these troops enabled the English navy and the Spaniards to form an establishment at Vigo, from which Ney was unable to dislodge them when he returned from Asturias; then he could not keep his army together without getting it re-equipped, and giving it some repose, and for these purposes he marched into Castille; and Romana's army having come out of the Asturias, and being reinforced by the troops collected at Vigo, and the insurrection being general, Ney was obliged to evacuate Galicia. That is the history of these operations. But if it were true that a partizan war, as it is called, had obliged the French to evacuate Galicia, it happens that Galicia is a country peculiarly favorable for the operations of that description of war, and others in Spain are not.

‘But, as I have above shown you, the evacuation of Galicia was occasioned by remote events, with which the partizan war in that country had no connexion; and was occasioned immediately by the collection in that country of a mass of troops superior in numbers to the French remaining in the

province, under the protection of which the partizan war may have been carried on to advantage.

‘I take the trouble of setting you right upon this point, because I must do you the justice to say that your opinions and reports, upon all points relating to the Spanish armies, have been much more correct than any others that I have seen or heard, most particularly those which you gave me before I joined General Cuesta’s army in July last; and I should be sorry that you were misled upon a point of this description.

‘I write to General O’Donoju by this occasion. I should be very glad if he would come to me, if circumstances should enable me again to enter Spain, particularly in co-operation with any Spanish corps; but, till that shall happen, I think he will do better to remain with the army, or at Seville.

‘In respect to your money affairs, I wish that you would send me an order upon the Treasury, drawn in favor of John Murray, Esq., Commissary General, for any sum that you may require, which shall be left for you at the British Ambassador’s at Seville. As you have the power of drawing upon the Treasury, it is more regular that you should receive your money upon your drafts, than that your name should appear in my contingent bill.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Roche.

‘WELLINGTON.

‘I observe, in one of your letters to Lord Wellesley a complaint of General Eguia, of my having sent Colonel Colborne\* to General Venegas. The answer is short and easy. When Colonel Colborne went to General Venegas, that General was in command of the army of La Mancha. It was never intended to send him to an officer when *not in command* of an army. He arrived at General Venegas’s head quarters before the army of Estremadura joined; and when that army joined, there was an end of his commission.’

\* Lieut. General Sir John Colborne, K.C.B.



*To Lord Burghersh.*

‘ MY DEAR BURGHESH,                      ‘ Estremoz, 28th October, 1809.

‘ I received this day your letter of the 18th instant, from Granada, and that in which you enclosed the paper to which you had referred in the former, and I am very much obliged to you for the interesting information which those letters contain.

‘ It is obvious that the longer and the more intimately we become acquainted with the affairs of Spain, the less prospect do they hold out of any thing like a glorious result. The great extent of the country, the natural difficulties which it opposes to an enemy, and the enmity of the people towards the French, may spin out the war into length, and at last the French may find it impossible to establish a Government in the country; but there is no prospect of a glorious termination to the contest.

‘ I have been at Lisbon to settle some business there, and am now on my return to Badajoz, where I shall arrive tomorrow. My head quarters have been there since the beginning of September, and there they are likely to remain.

‘ The French army in Estremadura and Castille is too strong for us to hope to make any impression upon it by any offensive operation, and we have only to wait till our allies shall be sufficiently strong and efficient to attack the enemy, or till the enemy shall attack them.

‘ There is a corps of 30,000 men now in La Mancha, which has forced Eguia’s and Venegas’s armies to retire to La Carolina. Soult and Mortier are at Talavera and at Oropesa, and Ney at Salamanca. The corps of the latter was defeated a few days ago by the Duque del Parque, in an attack which they made upon him in the position of Tamames, near Ciudad Rodrigo. The Spaniards took one piece of cannon, and killed and wounded some men, and drove off the French.

‘ I understand that Franceschi is confined in the Alhambra at Granada. I wish that you would try to see him, and tell him that I am endeavoring to prevail upon the Spanish Government to consent to his exchange; but hitherto I have had no success. Give him, however, any money he may want, and let me know what you give him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lord Burghersh.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General O'Donaju.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 30th October, 1809.

‘ I received the letters which you were so kind as to write to me some time ago, and I should have answered them before now, if I had had an opportunity of writing to you : but our communication with your part of the world is very difficult, and opportunities for it occur but seldom, or I should long ago have thanked you for your kindness.

‘ Colonel Roche has communicated to me a very flattering wish which you have expressed to join my head quarters ; and I assure you that I am fully aware of the benefit which I should derive from your assistance, and of the value of the sentiments towards me which have induced you to express that wish.

‘ Under existing circumstances, however, I conceive that it would be more advantageous for you not to come near me ; but if circumstances should ever enable me again to co-operate with a Spanish army, I shall hope for your assistance, and I shall call for it without any further ceremony.

‘ It will give me great pleasure to hear from you sometimes ; and I will let you know what passes in the quarter in which I may be, whenever an opportunity may offer.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General O'Donaju.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 30th October, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's dispatch (marked I) of the 17th instant, containing a copy of your note to Don M. de Garay, of the 8th September, and a copy of his note in answer to your Excellency of the 3rd of October.

‘ I am not surprised that Don M. de Garay should endeavor to attribute to the irregularities of the English Commissariat the deficiencies of supplies by means of transport experienced by the British army in its late service in Spain. I am not disposed to justify the English Commissaries where they deserve blame ; but I think it only justice to them to declare that the British army is indebted to their exertions for the scanty supplies it received.

‘ From some of the statements contained in Don M. de Garay’s note, it would appear that the British army had suffered no distress during the late service ; others have a tendency to prove that great distress was suffered by both armies at a very early period ; particularly the quotation of a letter from General Cuesta of the 1st of August, in answer to a complaint which I am supposed to have made, that the Spanish army and their prisoners were better supplied than the British army. The answer to all these statements is a reference to the fact that the army suffered great distress from want of provisions, forage, and means of equipment ; and although that distress might have been aggravated, it could not have been occasioned by the inexperience or the irregularity of the English Commissariat.

‘ I know nothing of the orders which Don M. de Garay states were sent by the Government to the different Provincial Juntas, to provide provisions and means of transport for the British army, on its passage through the different towns in the provinces. If such orders were sent, it is obvious that the Central Junta, as a Government, have no power or influence over the Provincial Juntas and magistrates to whom their orders were addressed, as they produced no effect ; and the supplies, such as they were, were procured only by the requisitions and exertions of the English Commissaries. But it is obvious from Don M. de Garay’s account of these orders, that the Central Junta had taken a very erroneous view of the operations to be carried on by the army, and of the provision to be made for the troops while engaged in those operations ; the Government provided by their orders for the troops only while on their passage through the towns ; relying upon their immediate success, and making no provision for the collection in one body of not less than 50,000 men, even for one day. At the same time that they were guilty of this unpardonable omission, which paralysed all our efforts, they rendered that success doubtful by countermanding the orders given to General Venegas by General Cuesta ; and thus exposing the combined armies to a general action with the enemy’s concentrated force. The effect of their orders will appear more fully in the following detail.



‘As soon as the line of my operations in Spain was decided, I sent a Commissary to Ciudad Rodrigo to endeavor to procure mules to attend the army, in concert with Señor Lozano de Torres; that city and its neighbourhood being the places in which the army commanded by the late Sir J. Moore had been most largely supplied. Don M. de Garay expresses the astonishment of the Government that the British army should have entered Spain unprovided with the means of transport, notwithstanding that a few paragraphs preceding this expression of astonishment, he informs your Excellency, in the name of the Government, that they had given orders to the Provincial Juntas of Badajoz and Castille (at Ciudad Rodrigo), and the magistrates, to supply and provide us with those means, which of course they must have been aware that we should require. No army can carry on its operations if unprovided with means of transport, and the British army was, from circumstances, particularly in want at that moment.

‘The means of transport commonly used in Portugal are carts drawn by bullocks, which are unable, without great distress, to move more than twelve miles in a day, a distance much shorter than that which the state of the country in which the army was to carry on its operations in Spain, and the nature of the country, would oblige the army to march. The number of carts which we had been able to bring from Portugal was not sufficient to draw our ammunition, and there were none to carry provisions.

‘Having failed in procuring at Ciudad Rodrigo and in the neighbourhood the means of transport which I required, I wrote to General O’Donoju on the 16th of July a letter, in which, after stating our wants, and the failure of the country in supplying them, I gave notice that if they were not supplied, I should discontinue my co-operation with General Cuesta after I should have performed my part in the first operation which we had concerted, namely, the removal of the enemy from the Alberche; and that if not supplied as I required, I should eventually withdraw from Spain altogether. From this letter of the 16th it will appear that I called for the supplies, and gave notice that I should withdraw from Spain if they were not furnished, not only long previous to

the retreat across the Tagus of the 4th August, but even previous to the commencement of the operations of the campaign.

‘ Notwithstanding that this letter of the 16th of July was communicated to the Central Junta both by Mr. Frere and General Cuesta, the British army has to this day received no assistance of this description from Spain, excepting 20 carts which joined at Merida, 10 on the 30th of August, and 10 on the 1st of September; and 300 mules of about 500 which were hired at Bejar, and joined at a subsequent period. None of the mules stated to have been hired and despatched to the army from Seville, or by Eguia or Cevallos, or the two brigades of 40 each, or the horses, have ever joined the British army; and I conclude they are with the Spanish army of Estremadura, as are the remainder of the ten brigades of carts (100), which were intended and are marked for the British army. But none of these mules or carts, supposing them to have been sent from Seville for our use, reached Estremadura till after the 21st of August, the day on which, after five weeks’ notice, I was obliged to separate from the Spanish army.

‘ It is not true, therefore, that my resolution to withdraw from Spain, as then carried into execution, “was sudden,” or ought to have surprised the Government, nor does it appear to have been “perilous,” from what has since occurred in this part of Spain. I ought probably on the 16th of July to have determined to suspend all operations till the army should be supplied with the means it required; but having on the 11th of July settled with General Cuesta a plan of operations to be carried into execution by the armies under the command of General Venegas, General Cuesta, and myself, respectively, I did not think it proper to disappoint General Cuesta. I believed that General Venegas would have carried into execution that part of the plan of operations allotted to his army, although I was afterwards disappointed in that expectation; and I preferred that the British army should suffer inconvenience rather than that General Venegas’s corps should be exposed alone to the attack of the enemy; and above all, I was induced to hope that I should be supplied.

‘ Accordingly I marched on the 18th of July from Plasencia,

the soldiers carrying on their backs the provisions to the 21st, on which day a junction was formed with General Cuesta's army; and from that day to the 24th of August the troops or their horses did not receive one regular ration. The irregularity and deficiency both in quality and quantity were so great, that I considered it a matter of justice to the troops to remit to them during that period half the sum usually stopped from their pay for rations.

‘The forage given to the horses was picked up for them by their riders, wherever they could find it, and was generally wheat or rye, which are considered unwholesome food; and the consequence was, that, exclusive of the loss by engaging with the enemy, the army lost in the short period of five weeks not less than 1500 horses.

‘I have no knowledge of what passed between General Cuesta and Señor Lozano de Torres and the Intendant of provisions of the Spanish army. I never saw the latter gentleman excepting twice; the first time on the 22nd of July, when he waited upon me to claim for the Spanish army 16,000 rations of bread, which had been brought into Talavera and had been sent to my quarters, and which were delivered over to him, notwithstanding that the British troops were in want; and the second time on the 25th of July, when he waited upon me also at Talavera to desire that the ovens of that town might be delivered over for the use of the Spanish army; they having moved to S<sup>ta</sup> Olalla, and the British army being still at Talavera. This request, which was not complied with, is an example of the preference which was given to the British troops while they were in Spain.

‘The orders stated to have been given by the Central to the Provincial Juntas and magistrates were not more effectual in procuring provisions than in procuring means of transport. In the interval between the 15th and 21st of July, the British Commissaries had made contracts with the magistrates of the different villages in the Vera de Plasencia, a country abounding in resources of every description, for the delivery at Talavera on different days before the 24th July, of 250,000 rations of provisions. These contracts were not performed; the British army was consequently unable to move in pursuit of the enemy when he retired on that day;



and I conclude that the French army have since subsisted on these resources.

‘The British army never received any salt meat, nor any of the rice or other articles stated to have been sent from Seville for their use, excepting to make up the miserable ration by which the men were only prevented from starving, during the period to which I have adverted; nor was it attended “by the troops of biscuit bakers;” nor did it enjoy any of the advantage of their labors; nor was the supposed magazine of 400,000lbs. of biscuit ever formed. These are notorious facts which cannot be disputed, to the truth of which every officer and soldier in the army can bear testimony.

‘I assure your Excellency, that not only have the supplies furnished to the army under my command been paid for, whenever the bills for them could be got in, but the old debts, due to the inhabitants for supplies furnished to the army under the command of the late Sir John Moore, have been discharged; and I have repeatedly desired the Spanish agents, and others acting with the army, and the different Juntas with which I have communicated, to let the people know, that all demands upon the British Government which could be substantiated, would be discharged.

‘I beg to refer your Excellency to my dispatches of the 21st August, No. 12, for an account of the state of the magazine at Truxillo, on the 20th of August; and of the state of the supplies of provisions and forage at that period.

‘Lieut. Colonel Waters had, by my desire, made an arrangement with the Spanish Commissariat for the division of the magazine at Truxillo between the two armies; and he, as well as I, was satisfied with the principle and detail of that arrangement. But if the British army received only one third of a ration on the 19th of August, and only one half of a ration on the 20th, not of bread, but of flour; if the horses of the army received nothing, and if the state of the magazine at Truxillo was such at that time as to hold out no hope, not of improvement, (for it was too late to wait for improvement) but of a full and regular supply of provisions and forage of all descriptions, I was justified in withdrawing from Spain. In point of fact, the magazine at Truxillo, which, under the arrangement made by Lieut. Colonel

Waters, was to be the sole source of the supply to both armies, did not contain, on the 20th of August, a sufficiency to supply one day's demand upon it.

‘But it is said that Don L. de Calvo promised and engaged to supply the British army; upon which I have only to observe, that I had trusted too long to the promises of Spanish agents; and that I had particular reason for want of confidence in Don L. de Calvo; as, at the moment he was assuring me that the British army should have all the provisions the country could afford, in preference to, and to the exclusion of, the Spanish army, I had in my possession an order from him, (of which your Excellency has a copy,) addressed to the magistrate of Guadalupe, directing him to send to the head quarters of the Spanish army provisions which a British Commissary had ordered to be prepared and sent to the magazine at Truxillo, to be divided between both armies, in conformity with the agreement entered into with the Spanish Commissaries by Lieut. Colonel Waters.

‘As the state of the magazine at Truxillo was the immediate cause (as far as the want of provisions went) of my withdrawing from Spain, I beg to observe to your Excellency, that I was not mistaken in my opinion of its insufficiency; as, if I am not misinformed, General Eguia's army suffered the greatest distress in the neighbourhood of Truxillo, even after that part of the country and the magazine at Truxillo had been relieved from the burthen of supporting the British army.

‘In respect to the conduct of the operations in Spain by the Spanish General Officers, many things were done of which I did not approve, some contrary to my expectations, and some contrary to positive agreement.

‘Don M. de Garay has stated that the orders to the Marques de la Romana were framed in conformity with suggestions from Marshal Beresford; and thence he infers that the operations of that corps were approved of by me.

‘The Marques de la Romana was still at Coruña on the 5th, and I believe as late as the 9th of August; and the armies of Estremadura retired across the Tagus on the 4th of August. This reference to dates shows that there was, and could have been, no connexion in the operations of those different armies. In fact, I knew nothing about the Marques

de la Romana's operations; and till I heard on the 3rd of August that Marshal Ney's corps had passed through the mountains of Estremadura at Baños, and was at Navalmoral, I did not believe that that part of the enemy's army had quitted Astorga; or that the Marques was at liberty, or had it in his power to quit Galicia.

‘ Marshal Beresford's corps was collected upon the frontiers of Portugal in the end of July, principally for the purpose of forming the troops; and it was hoped that he would keep in check the enemy's corps under Soult, which was at Zamora, and threatened Portugal; that he would act as a corps of observation in that quarter, and on the left of the British army; and I particularly requested Marshal Beresford to attend to the Puerto de Perales. But I never intended, and never held out any hope to the Spanish officers, that the corps under Marshal Beresford could effect any operation at that period of the campaign; and never was a party to any arrangement of an operation in which that corps was to be concerned.

‘ In the cases in which measures were carried on in a manner of which I did not approve, or which I did not expect, or contrary to positive agreement, those who acted contrary to my opinion may have been right; but still they acted in a manner of which they were aware I did not approve: and the assertion in the note that all operations were carried on with my concurrence, is unfounded.

‘ I expected from the communications I had with General Cuesta through Sir Robert Wilson and Colonel Roche, that the Puerto de Baños would have been effectually occupied and secured; and at all events, that the troops appointed to guard that point, upon which I was aware that all the operations, nay the security, of the army depended, would not have retired without firing a shot.

‘ It was agreed between General Cuesta and me, on the 11th of July, that General Venegas, who was under his command, should march by Tembleque, Ocaña, and Fuentidueña to Arganda, near Madrid; where he was to be on the 22nd and 23rd of July, when the combined armies should be at Talavera and Escalona. This agreement was not performed; and the consequence of its non-performance (which had been foreseen) occurred, viz., that the combined armies were



engaged with the enemy's concentrated force. I have heard that the cause of the non-performance of this agreement was, that the Central Junta had countermanded the orders which General Venegas had received from General Cuesta; of which countermand they gave us no notice. I shall make no observation upon this proceeding; excepting that the plan of operations, as agreed upon with me, was not carried into execution by General Venegas in this instance.

‘It was agreed by General Cuesta on the 2nd of August, that when I marched against Soult on the 3rd, he should remain at Talavera; that agreement was broken when he withdrew from Talavera, in my opinion without sufficient cause. And it is also my opinion, that he ought not to have withdrawn, particularly considering that he had the charge of my hospital, without my consent.

‘I do not conceive, that if General Cuesta had remained at Talavera, it would have made any difference in the result of the campaign. When Soult added 34,000 men to the numbers already opposed to the combined armies in Estremadura, the enemy were too strong for us; and it was necessary that we should retire across the Tagus. But if General Cuesta had held the post at Talavera according to agreement, I should have been able to remove my hospital; or at all events, to know the exact situation of every individual left there, and I think that other disadvantages might have been avoided in the retreat.

‘When adverting to this part of the subject, I cannot avoid observing upon the ambiguity of language used in the note respecting the assistance afforded by General Cuesta to remove the English hospital from Talavera; that assistance amounted to four carts on the 3rd of August at Talavera; and two carts on the 4th of August at Oropesa. In the subsequent removal of the wounded, and of those subsequently taken sick, we had absolutely no assistance from the Spanish army, or the country. We were obliged to lay down our ammunition, which was delivered over to the Spanish army, and to unload the treasure, and employ the carts in the removal of the wounded and sick. At Truxillo, in particular, assistance which could have been afforded was withheld on the 22nd and 23rd August; Don L. de Calvo and Señor Lozano de Torres being in the town.

‘In respect to the refusal to make movements recommended by me, I am of opinion, that if General Bassecourt had been detached towards Plasencia on the 30th July, when I recommended that movement, and if the troops had done their duty, Soult would have been stopped at the Tietar, at least for a sufficient length of time to enable me to secure the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz; and here again the hospital would have been saved. He was not detached, however, till the 2nd; and then, I understand from Don M. de Garay’s note, that it was General Cuesta’s opinion that the movement was useless.

‘It could not have been considered useless by General Cuesta on the 30th, because the proposition for making a detachment from the combined armies originated with himself on that day; and it could not have been considered useless even on the morning of the 2nd; as, till the evening of that day, we did not receive intelligence of the arrival of Soult at Plasencia. A reference to the date of the period at which the General considered this detachment as useless would have been desirable.

‘I cannot account for the surprise stated to have been felt by General Cuesta upon finding the British army at Oropesa on the morning of the 4th of August. The army had left Talavera on the morning of the 3rd, and had marched to Oropesa, six leagues, or twenty four miles on that day; which I conceive a sufficient distance for a body of men which had been starving for many days before. The accounts received on the evening of the 3rd, of the enemy’s position at Navalморal, and of his strength, and of General Cuesta’s intended march on that evening, leaving my hospital to its fate, were sufficient to induce me to pause and consider our situation; and at least not to move before daylight on the 4th; shortly after which time General Cuesta arrived at Oropesa.

‘Upon considering our situation at that time, it was evident to me that the combined armies must retire across the Tagus; and that every moment’s delay must expose them to the risk of being cut off from their only remaining point of retreat. A battle, even if it had been successful, could not have improved our situation: two battles, or possibly three, must have been fought and gained before our diffi-

culties, resulting from the increased strength of the enemy in Estremadura, could be removed. I did not consider the British army at least equal to such an exertion at that moment. It is unnecessary to make any observation upon the Spanish army; but the occurrences at Arzobispo a few days afterwards showed that they were not equal to any great contest.

‘Don M. de Garay complains of the alteration in the line of our operations, and of the sudden changes in the direction of our marches, to which he attributes the deficiency of supplies, which, in this part of the note, he is disposed to admit that the British army experienced. I know of but one alteration in the plan of operations, and in the direction of the march, which was occasioned by the circumstances to which I have just referred. When intelligence was first received of the arrival of the enemy at Plasencia, and of the retreat without resistance of the corps appointed to guard the Puerto de Baños, my intention was to move towards Plasencia, to attack the enemy’s corps which had passed through the Puerto. That intention was altered only when I heard of the numbers of which that corps consisted; and when I found that, by General Cuesta’s movement from Talavera, the rear of the army was not secure, that the only retreat was liable to be cut off, and that the enemy had it in their power, and at their option, to join, or to attack us in separate bodies. It could not be attributed to me that this large reinforcement was allowed to enter Estremadura, or that we had not earlier intelligence of their approach.

‘The Puerto de Baños was abandoned without firing a shot by the Spanish troops sent there to guard it; and the Junta of Castille, if they knew of the collection of the enemy’s troops at Salamanca, sent no notice of it; and no notice was in fact received till accounts came that the enemy had ordered rations at Fuente Roble and Los Santos; and they arrived on the following day. But when the enemy marched into Naval moral in Estremadura in such strength, and the post at Talavera was abandoned, the Central Junta will find it difficult to convince their country and the world that it was not expedient to alter the plan of our operations, and the direction of our march.

‘But this alteration, instead of aggravating the deficiency



of our supplies, ought to have alleviated our distresses, if any measures had been adopted at Seville to supply the British army in consequence of my letter of the 16th July. The alteration was from the offensive to the defensive; the march was retrograde; and if any supplies had been prepared and sent, the army must have met them on the road, and must have received them sooner. Accordingly, we did meet supplies on the road; but they were for the Spanish army; and, although our troops were starving at the time, they were forwarded untouched to their destination.

‘I have sent to Marshal Beresford a copy of that part of Don M. de Garay’s note which refers to the supplies for the Portuguese army under his command, upon which he will make his observations, which I propose to forward to your Excellency. I shall here, therefore, only repeat, that the want of magazines, and the apathy and disinclination of the magistrates and people in Spain to furnish supplies for the armies, even for payment, were the causes that the Portuguese army, as well as the British army, suffered great distress from want while within the Spanish frontier.

‘Till the evils, of which I think I have reason to complain, are remedied; till I shall see magazines established for the supply of the armies, and a regular system adopted for keeping them filled; and an army upon whose exertions I can depend, commanded by officers capable and willing to carry into execution the operations which may have been planned by mutual agreement, I cannot enter upon any system of co-operation with the Spanish armies.

‘I do not think it necessary now to enter into any calculations to show the fallacy of Don M. de Garay’s calculations of the relative numerical strength of the allies, and of the enemy in the Peninsula: if the fallacy were not so great, as I am certain it is, I should be of the same opinion respecting the expediency of co-operating with the Spanish troops. But if the British and the Portuguese armies should not actively co-operate with them, they will at least do them no injury: and if Don M. de Garay is not mistaken, as I believe he is, in his calculations of numbers; and if the Spanish armies are in the state of efficiency in which they are represented to be, and in which they ought to be to invite our co-operation, the deficiency of 36,000 men, which the British

and Portuguese armies might add to their numbers, can be no objection to their undertaking immediately those operations which Don M. de Garay is of opinion would give to his countrymen the early possession of those blessings for which we are contending.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 31st October, 1809.

‘ The Chief Engineer, Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, is desirous to have stores prepared, as stated in the enclosed papers, at the stations therein mentioned, to which I have annexed a memorandum, stating the places at which it will be most convenient to prepare them.

‘ I recommend that application should be made to Colonel Fletcher for a return of the different articles he requires.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.,  
Commissary General.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Stores required by the Chief Engineer  
from the Commissary General.*

*Memorandum.*

- |  |              |  |
|--|--------------|--|
| 1. 3000 palisades, to be provided<br>at Torres Vedras. | } at Sobral. | } Nos. 1 and 2 can be provided<br>easily at Torres Vedras, where there<br>is plenty of wood.   |
| 2. 1500 fascines, at Torres Vedras.                    |              |  |
| 3. 3000 palisades,                                     | } at Lisbon. | } Nos. 3 and 4 can be provided also<br>at Torres Vedras, and carried to<br>Sobral with ease.   |
| 4. 1500 fascines,                                      |              |  |
| 5. 13,000 palisades,                                   | } at Lisbon. | } Nos. 5 and 6 may be made in any<br>part of the course of the Tagus, or<br>of the coast of Portugal, which may<br>be found most convenient, and kept<br>in store at Lisbon, and to be sent<br>where the Engineers may want<br>them. |
| 6. 7,000 fascines,                                     |              |  |

*To Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, Commanding Royal Engineers.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 31st October, 1809.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the Commissary General upon the subject of your two memorandums respecting materials. You will see that the largest number of your articles will be collected at Lisbon, from

whence you can dispose of and distribute them as you please. The delay will only be one tide, which will be more than compensated for by leaving to the Commissary General the whole course of the Tagus and of the coast of Portugal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Fletcher.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Bassecourt.*

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL, ‘ Badajoz, 31 Octobre, 1809.

‘ Le Capitaine Gordon, mon aide de camp, vous montrera les lettres dont je l’ai chargé pour les Maréchaux Soult et Mortier; et je vous prie de le laisser passer par les avant postes Espagnols pour les délivrer.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Général Bassecourt.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Bassecourt.*

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL, ‘ Badajoz, 31 Octobre, 1809.

‘ J’ai reçu la lettre que vous m’avez fait l’honneur de m’adresser, à laquelle j’aurais répondu plutôt si je n’avais pas été à Lisbonne la semaine passée. Votre position est bien intéressante, et deviendra plus assurée tous les jours, surtout si on vous renforce comme l’importance de la position l’exige: en tout cas je vous prie de me donner constamment de vos nouvelles; et je vous assure que rien ne me donnerait plus de plaisir que de pouvoir vous être utile, en cas que vous fussiez attaqué par l’ennemi. Je partirai pour Seville demain matin; mais je serai de retour dans quelques jours.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Général Bassecourt.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ SIR, ‘ Badajoz, 31st October, 1809.

‘ When I was lately at Lisbon, I had some discussion with the Regency respecting the necessity of establishing magazines for the support of the Portuguese armies, and I found that the great difficulty which they would experience in doing so was the want of money.

‘ Among other plans to provide for this deficiency, the Government proposed that an advance should be made to them of the monthly sum they receive from Great Britain,



for the payment of 20,000 men : and as the maintenance of these men with provisions is included in the amount of the sum ; and as this is the season in which the provisions ought to be purchased, I beg leave to recommend to your consideration the expediency of making an advance to the Portuguese Government of the sum due to them on account of the expenses of 20,000 men, for the month of November, as soon as possible.

‘ I find upon inquiry that the Commissary General can, without inconvenience, advance the money for this payment ; and I have desired him to hold £50,000 at your disposal, besides the sum for October, if you should think proper to attend to this recommendation.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Rt. Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 31st October, 1809.

‘ I find, upon inquiry, that your share of our receipts for October is £47,000 ; and, besides this sum, I have desired Mr. Murray to pay Mr. Bell £50,000 for November, making a total of £97,000 ; and I wrote to you the public letter this day, suggesting that you should make an advance of one month’s subsidy for the purpose of purchasing magazines for the Portuguese army.

‘ I have also looked into the state of our affairs, in order to ascertain how far we could advance money on account of the bill to be drawn by the Government on Sr. de Souza for £100,000, on which subject you are to write to me ; and I find that I can allow of an advance on that account immediately for £50,000, and of the second £50,000 by the 20th November, provided the £80,000 coining at the mint are placed at the disposal of the Commissary General.

‘ I think that, as we shall now advance the full amount of the subsidy for November, at least £50,000 out of the £80,000 ought to be placed at our disposal. If this is not done, it may distress us to advance the second £50,000 on the 20th November.

‘ I enclose a letter respecting the effects of an officer which have been seized in the house of a person suspected of dis-

affection, and who has fled. Pray make the necessary applications, that Captain —— may have his effects again.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 31st October, 1809.

‘ The Spanish corps under the Duque del Parque was attacked on the 19th instant by a considerable part of the French corps (lately Ney’s) commanded by General Marchand, in a position which the Duque had taken up at Tamames near Ciudad Rodrigo. The French corps consisted of 10,000 infantry, and 1200 cavalry; and, after a very vigorous attack, they were repulsed with considerable loss, and retired upon Salamanca, leaving one piece of cannon in the hands of the Spaniards. The loss of the Spanish troops was about 200 killed, and 400 wounded: that of the enemy much more considerable.

‘ The Spanish infantry are stated to have conducted themselves well in this action, but the cavalry otherwise; and indeed they had lost in the commencement the Spanish flying artillery, which was afterwards recovered by the infantry.

‘ The post of Tamames is noted throughout the country for its strength; and I understand that it was well occupied by the Spanish troops, and that throughout the action the Duque del Parque distinguished himself. He was joined on the following day by the corps of Ballesteros; and he moved forward on the 25th, and took possession of Salamanca, which the enemy abandoned, retiring upon Toro and Zamora.

‘ The corps of General Eguia, which is under the temporary command of Areyzaga, who has lately come from Catalonia, has retired to La Carolina, and the French are in possession of the whole country to the foot of the mountains, but they have made no attack to force the passes.

‘ All has continued quiet in this quarter, and I have not heard that the enemy’s corps at Oropesa and Talavera have made any movement to their right, in consequence of the failure of General Marchand’s attack upon the Duque del Parque.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 31st October, 1809.

‘ Although I think it probable that you are out of office, I enclose you two interesting papers that I have lately received, which I think will give you some notion of the state of affairs in Spain, and the presumption of the Spanish character; and I beg you will give them to your successor. One is a letter from Lord Burghersh, whom I sent lately into the south-eastern provinces to see what they were doing—whether they were forming an army—whether they had one, &c. &c.: the other is from Captain Ruman, an officer employed to obtain intelligence from the frontier.

‘ Burghersh’s is an exact description of the state of affairs in nearly every province of Spain; Ruman’s shows what a Spanish General thinks and says, when he has had a little success. If he does not mind what he is about, this same gentleman will have Soult upon one side of him, through the Puerto de Baños, and Marchand and Kellermann on the side of the Douro. I have warned him of his danger, however, by Baños, and have urged him either to secure the Puerto, or to destroy the road effectually, and thus shut the door to all communication between Castille and Estremadura.

‘ Believe me, &amp;c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Maréchal Mortier, Duc de Trévise.*

‘ Au Quartier Général de l’Armée Anglaise,

‘ MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

ce 1 Novembre, 1809.

‘ Je vous prie d’avoir la bonté de permettre qu’on donne l’argent, que j’envoie par mon aide de camp, le Capitaine Gordon, aux officers Anglais, prisonniers de guerre, et les médecines aux officiers de santé.

‘ Je n’ai rien pu faire pour le Capitaine Thévenon; mais je vous assure que je n’omettrai nulle occasion de faire prévaloir auprès du Gouvernement Espagnol les droits de la guerre, et j’espère qu’avant peu de tems on vous le renverra.

‘ J’ai fait renvoyer le Lieut. de Farincourt, du 2<sup>e</sup> d’infanterie légère, en échange pour le Lieut. Cameron, renvoyé par le Général Kellermann. Il passe par la Vieille Castille.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &amp;c.

‘ *Le Maréchal Mortier,**Duc de Trévise.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To Maréchal Soult, Duc de Dalmatie.*

‘ Au Quartier Général de l’Armée Anglaise,  
‘ MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL, ce 1 Novembre, 1809.

‘ J’ai des excuses à vous faire de ce que votre lettre du 26 Août n’a pas encore reçu de reponse ; mais avant de vous en envoyer une je voulais faire tous mes efforts pour faire consentir le Gouvernement Espagnol à faire l’échange du Général Franceschi, en quoi je suis fâché de vous dire que je n’ai pas réussi.

‘ En attendant cependant je vous envoie une liste d’officiers Français que je pourrais vous renvoyer en échange pour ceux de l’armée Anglaise, dont je vous envoie une liste (No. 2) ; si ceux dont les noms sont dans cette dernière sont trop éloignés, je vous prie de m’en envoyer d’autres des mêmes rangs.

‘ Je me rappelle parfaitement la lettre que j’ai eu l’honneur de vous écrire au moment de votre départ d’Oporto ; et je crois vraiment que vous n’êtes pas au fait des circonstances dans lesquelles sont les officiers et soldats qui étaient vos prisonniers en ce moment-là. Après que j’ai eu reçu votre lettre du 26 Août, j’ai demandé compte de sa conduite à un de ces officiers, et je vous envoie la copie de la lettre qu’il m’a écrite, qui en même tems qu’elle le justifie entièrement, montre que votre confiance peut-être abusée, et que vous ne pouvez pas être sûr que les ordres bienfaisants que vous donnez pour le traitement de vos prisonniers sont obéis par ceux chargés de leur exécution. En lisant cette lettre, et connaissant les circonstances du moment, je dis que c’est la garde qui a quitté les prisonniers et non pas les prisonniers qui ont quitté la garde. Mais en tout cas, quand on met des officiers prisonniers sous la charge d’une garde, excepté pour leur sureté personnelle, on doit s’attendre qu’ils s’en iront quand ils pourront ; et si on ne leur a donné nulle liberté sur parole, on ne peut pas dire qu’ils ont oublié les lois de l’honneur en s’en allant. Je vous assure que le meilleur moyen de garder les officiers, c’est de leur accorder la parole, et je vous promets que si j’en trouve un qui l’ait oubliée je vous le renverrai.

‘ Pour ceux-ci la question est simplement si un officier ou soldat, une fois prisonnier, doit l’être toujours jusqu’à ce que

son échange soit fait, et si cette question est décidée dans la négative, selon l'usage de tous les jours, ces Messieurs ne peuvent plus être considérés comme prisonniers. Mais en tous cas, c'est à vous à décider ce que vous ferez, si jamais la sort de la guerre les place en vos mains, et je suis bien sûr que vous les traiterez comme vous le devez.

‘ J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

‘ *Le Maréchal Soult,*  
*Duc de Dalmatie.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Le Lieut. Veron de Farincourt du 2<sup>e</sup> regiment d'infanterie légère est renvoyé en échange pour le Lieut. Cameron, renvoyé par le Général Kellermann.’

*To Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 1st November, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose returns of the provisions and all kinds of stores, in charge of the Commissary General, for the use of the army under my command.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir John Sherbrooke, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘ Seville, 3rd November, 1809.

‘ I arrived here yesterday, and in the evening I received your letter, enclosing one from Colonel Donkin, to which I shall give an answer at another period. There is no news here, excepting that the French have retired from La Mancha, and again crossed the Tagus. I doubt the last part of this intelligence; if it is true, it is possible that this movement has been occasioned by the partial business of the Duque del Parque, in Castille, and his subsequent movement towards Salamanca.

‘ It is necessary, however, that we should be prepared for all events; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will desire the sick cases requiring carriages, in Hill's division and in the heavy brigade of cavalry, to be removed to Elvas without loss of time.

‘ I had desired the Commissary General to employ thirty carts in removing 200 of the sick of Hill's division, before I

quitted Badajoz ; and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire him to send the remainder of his covered carts to Merida, to remove the sick from thence ; and to continue the removal from the quarters of Hill's division, as long as there may be a man in them whose case is such that he could not march away, if we should be obliged to assemble the army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir John Sherbrooke, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘ Cadiz, 7th November, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2nd, and I shall be at Badajoz again on Sunday to dinner. I am obliged to you for reminding me to put in orders the leaves of absence given to different officers, which I will arrange as soon as I shall return to the army.

‘ In regard to General Cole's aide de camp, he must be put in orders whether he is on the establishment or supernumerary. If the latter, he will draw no pay, and no bāt and forage, unless the Commander in Chief should have given permission to General Cole to bring him to Portugal ; in which case he will have the bāt and forage only. But no Major General can draw pay for more than one aide de camp.

‘ I have been induced to come on here, partly to arrange money matters with Lord Wellesley, and partly by curiosity to see this place. I shall leave it on the day after to-morrow.

‘ One good has resulted from my journey, viz., that the Junta have given me an answer respecting the exchange of Franceschi and Turenne, and have released the officer they held in confinement at Deleytosa. So that we may now hope to get away some of our officers.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

*Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 13th November, 1809.

‘ I received on the 11th your letters of the 27th of October, and of the 5th and 8th of this month, and I now send you an



official answer to the first. In respect to the last, I am glad to find that you still remain with us, and I hope that you will determine to stay till your successor shall arrive.

‘ I left Lord Wellesley at Cadiz, on Thursday. He was to embark and sail on Friday; but I am not certain that he carried his intentions into execution. I returned here yesterday evening.

‘ It is best that it should be understood that the whole of the sum of £80,000, coining at the mint, should be paid to the Commissary General; and if you should hereafter require more than your fifth for the Portuguese troops, you must have what you require.

‘ The debts due to the Portuguese Government shall be paid as soon as they shall produce the vouchers. Of course you will take as much of the chest as you please.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 13th November, 1809.

‘ I had the honor of receiving on the 10th instant your letter of the 27th of October in which you have enclosed an extract of one from Sr. de Souza, the Prince Regent’s Minister in London, to the Patriarch, relative to a sum of £100,000 sterling in Sr. de Souza’s hands, for the use of the Government of Portugal. This resource was one of those mentioned to me by the Regency, when I was at Lisbon, as being applicable to the purpose of purchasing provisions, to be laid in magazines for the Portuguese army; and the only difficulty appeared to me to consist in realizing the money in Portugal. It was imagined that Sr. de Souza would experience equal if not greater difficulty than the Treasury had experienced in procuring specie to export to Portugal; and it was apprehended that the Government of Portugal would not be able to get money at Lisbon for their bills drawn upon Sr. de Souza.

‘ These difficulties are, I conclude, the reason for which you have desired that the Commissary General should advance money on the credit of the sum belonging to the Portuguese Government, in the hands of Sr. de Souza; and

having, in consequence of the conversations I had with you on this subject when at Lisbon, reviewed the state of the funds of the army, and considered the possibility of assisting the Portuguese Government to realise in Portugal the sum of £100,000 in the hands of Sr. de Souza, I have to inform you that the Commissary General can advance, without inconvenience, the whole or any part of the sum of £100,000, for which you may chance to call, for the use of the Portuguese Government; but that it is impossible for him, either himself to advance money for a bill drawn by the Portuguese Government or Sr. de Souza, or to lend the credit of his name and office to the bill drawn by the Portuguese Government, to enable them to get the money from other persons.

‘ I should imagine, however, that you will experience no difficulty in arranging the mode in which the Portuguese Government should repay in England the extent of the assistance which you may think proper to afford them on the credit of the sum of money in the hands of Sr. de Souza.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.\**

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Badajoz, 13th November, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose cartels of exchange which have been given to Captain Christie and Ensign Sandilands, of the Coldstream Guards, by the French Commander in Chief; and I request your Lordship to have the officers named in these papers sent to France; that is to say, Lieut. Casimir Maximilian Guiot, of the French navy, in exchange for Captain Christie, and Lieut. Achille Romilly Dorfemille, of the 11th regiment of infantry, in exchange for Ensign Sandilands.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

\* A change of Ministry had taken place, and the Earl of Liverpool had become Secretary of State for War and Colonies, *vice* Viscount Castlereagh.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 14th November, 1809.

‘ I delayed to reply to Lord Castlereagh’s dispatch of the 14th of September, till I should be able to go to Lisbon, and should have ascertained, on the ground, the possibility of defending the kingdom of Portugal, from which I was prevented till late in October by the movements of the armies in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo; and the report required by his Lordship has been further delayed by a necessary reference to the opinion of Admiral Berkeley on some of the points of the inquiry, and by my journey to the south of Spain to communicate personally with Lord Wellesley, previous to his departure for England.

‘ From all I have learned of the state of the enemy’s force at present in the Peninsula, I am of opinion, that unless the Spanish armies should meet with some great misfortune, the enemy could not make an attack upon Portugal; and if events in Spain should enable the enemy to make such an attack, the force at present in Portugal is able to defend that country.

‘ If in consequence of the peace in Germany the enemy’s army in the Peninsula should be largely reinforced, it is obvious that the enemy will acquire the means of attacking Portugal, not only in proportion to the extent of his reinforcements, but in proportion as the arrival of those reinforcements may have an effect upon the public mind in Spain, and may induce persons, now in hostility with the enemy, to submit to his usurpation, and thus enable him to employ troops in active operations which are at present employed only on the defensive, in keeping up the communication between his armies, or in guarding certain interesting and important points in the country.

‘ Even in this case, however, I conceive that till Spain shall have been conquered, and shall have submitted to the conqueror, the enemy will find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain possession of Portugal, if His Majesty should continue to employ an army in the defence of this country, and if the improvements in the Portuguese military service should be carried to the extent of which they are capable.



‘ The extent of the army which it would be necessary that His Majesty should employ in Portugal ought to be 50,000 effective men, in aid of the whole military establishment of Portugal, consisting of 3000 artillery, 3000 cavalry, 36,000 regular infantry, and 3000 caçadores and the militia.

‘ I have lately ascertained, as nearly as possible, the expense to Great Britain of this British army in Portugal, which I find amounts to £1,756,236 per annum.

‘ It must be observed, however, upon this point, that these troops, if employed elsewhere abroad, would cost an equal sum; and if employed in Great Britain or Ireland, would cost £1,188,192, or £568,044 less than they would in Portugal or Spain.

‘ In this calculation I have not included the expense of transports to attend upon this army. This is an expense which must be incurred for a British army employed on any service abroad, and in the circumstances now under consideration, must be incurred for the army employed in Portugal. But it is probable that the larger part, if not the whole of the transports, which it would be necessary to attach to the army in Portugal, would be on the public service, if the army were at home.

‘ In respect to the Portuguese army, the public now incur an expense of about £600,000 per annum, being the expenses of 20,000 Portuguese troops, and the pay of the British officers employed with the Portuguese army: but I conceive that other expenses must be incurred in order to put the Portuguese army in the state in which it ought to be for this impending contest.

‘ The expense which in my opinion must be incurred at present by Great Britain, in addition to that already incurred, is that of an increase of pay to the officers of the Portuguese army, without which it is vain to hope for much exertion from them.

‘ The officers of the Portuguese army have for many years done little or no duty. Their country having with trifling and short exceptions, been at peace since the year 1763, they were generally throughout their service employed in the same garrison, if they remained with their regiments; or they lived with their families at home. Besides these advantages, I believe that the abuses which had crept into the service,

afforded them others, of no small amount; and they were certainly enabled to maintain themselves upon this low pay, as officers ought, in a country in which all the necessaries of life are dearer than they are in England.

‘ It is scarcely necessary to point out the alteration in their situation produced by the appointment of Marshal Beresford to command the Portuguese army. All the abuses which existed in the service have been done away: and a regular system of discipline has been established, requiring the attention and attendance of all the officers with their regiments; and the situation of the country, and the duties required from the army, have necessarily removed the regiments from their fixed stations, and have increased to a very large amount the necessary expenses of the officers.

‘ Your Lordship will observe, from what I shall have to lay before you in a subsequent part of this dispatch, that it is absolutely impossible for the Portuguese Government to bear the expense of this augmentation of the pay of the officers of the army. As far as I have been able to learn their sentiments, they feel the necessity for it; but are unwilling to give orders that it should be carried into execution, till they shall be certain that they possess the means of defraying the expense.

‘ I enclose a paper stating the actual pay of each rank in the Portuguese service, with the proposed increase, the expense of which will amount to about £130,000 per annum.

‘ Adverting to the miserable situation in which those officers now are, compared with that of the British, the Spanish (whose pay has been very largely increased), and the French officers, with whom they are liable to meet on service; and the severe, but necessary discipline which has been introduced into their army; and to the service which will be required from them, I cannot avoid recommending that His Majesty should furnish the Portuguese Government with a sum sufficient to defray the expense of this augmentation of pay during the war.

‘ I am not aware of any other specific head of expense, the means of which it would be desirable that Great Britain should furnish, in order to enable the Portuguese Government to support the impending contest. I cannot avoid, however, drawing your Lordship’s attention to the general

state of the finances of this Government, of which I have obtained a knowledge, in consequence of the confidence reposed in me, with His Majesty's consent, by the Prince Regent.

'The estimated expense, civil and military, of the Government of Portugal for the year 1809 is 14,679,250 dollars. The estimated revenue is 8,447,500 dollars; thus leaving a deficiency of 6,221,750 dollars.

'The revenue, the heads of which we estimated, actually received and expected to be received by the end of the year, amounts to 7,031,927 dollars; and the sums have been received in this year, which cannot be expected in future, making a total receipt, in 1809, of 8,607,337 dollars, leaving a deficiency of 6,070,000 dollars.

'The public servants on the civil and judicial establishments, the interests of debts, and other necessary expenses of the Government, have been paid only in part; and the necessary expenses only, such as the army, and some civil expenses, equally necessary for the existence of the state, have been defrayed.

'The assistance afforded by Great Britain amounts to about £500,000 per annum; and the remainder, about £900,000, is a deficiency which cannot be made good in Portugal.

'It is obvious that it becomes more probable every day, that this deficiency of revenue will fall upon the means allotted for the support of the army. Very lately, His Majesty's servants and officers in this country were obliged to consider of means to be afforded immediately to enable the Portuguese Government to collect magazines for the support of their army; without which, they must have disbanded a part of their force, and the whole would have been in a state of inefficiency at the moment at which their services would be called for.

'It does not appear to me to be practicable to diminish the expenses, or to increase the revenue of the country, or to raise money by loans on its own credit.

'In respect to the revenue, I have to observe, that the country is so much impoverished by the events of late years, and by the emigration of the Court to the Brazils, that the



inhabitants are not able to pay the taxes already imposed upon them ; and the produce of the Customs, which was formerly the principal branch of the revenue, is almost reduced to nothing, owing to the transfer of the Brazil trade from Portugal to Great Britain.

‘ This transfer, if an advantage to Great Britain, as it is evidently and materially disadvantageous to Portugal, would appear to give to Portugal a claim for some assistance in this moment of difficulty, in addition to that which the policy of His Majesty has induced him to afford to the Government to support their military establishment. Probably a sum of £300,000 per annum, in addition to the expense of the increase of pay to the officers, to enable the Government to defray the expense of forming and maintaining the magazines, for the support of the Portuguese army ; or an engagement by the British Government to maintain 10,000 additional troops, which would cost about £250,000 per annum, leaving the expense of the magazines upon the Government, would enable them to get through the difficulties of the moment ; but I am convinced from what I have seen of the state of the Portuguese finances, that without some assistance of this description, the whole will sooner or later fail ; and all the trouble taken, and all the expense hitherto incurred, will have been thrown away.

‘ In respect to the embarkation of the British army in the event of failure, in the contest which we may expect in Portugal, I have the honor to enclose the copies of a correspondence which I have had with Admiral Berkeley upon that subject, and I have no doubt that we should be able in that case to embark, and bring away the British army, not including the horses of the cavalry and of the artillery.

‘ In respect to these, I would submit to your Lordship, that it should be decided that they should not be brought away from the Peninsula. In the event of an embarkation after a defeat, it would be impossible to bring them away ; and in any other event, if the transports which should be employed should be retained only three months in the service, their expense for each horse will amount to £30, after deducting the expense of transporting the man, for whom provision must still be made, whereas the original

purchase money of the horse would be only 25 guineas. It is true that many of the horses are worth more money; but others, after long service in this country, would be useless in England; and if the army should not be forced to embark by adverse circumstances, it is probable that the horses would be sold for more than it would cost to take them home.

‘ I would therefore recommend to the Government to provide transports only for the conveyance of the better horses belonging to officers, which could not be replaced without large expense to themselves, or to the public. In the event of the evacuation of Portugal by the British army, either at the present moment, or after a defeat, I am not aware of any measures which could be adopted, which would enable the Portuguese Government to continue to hold the country for the Prince Regent.

‘ Although I consider the Portuguese Government and army as the principals in the contests for their own independence, and that the success or failure must depend principally upon their own exertions, and the bravery of their army, (and I am sanguine in my expectations of both from them, when excited by the example of British officers and troops), I have no hope of either, if His Majesty should now withdraw his army from the Peninsula; or if it should be obliged to evacuate it by defeat. I have no doubt that the immediate consequence of withdrawing from the Peninsula would be the possession of Lisbon by the enemy, probably without contest, and that other consequences would follow, affecting the state of the war not only in Portugal, but in Spain.

‘ If, therefore, it should be thought advisable now to withdraw from Portugal; or if, eventually, the British army should be obliged to withdraw, I would recommend to His Majesty’s Government to consider of the means of carrying away such of the Portuguese officers and troops as should be desirous of emigrating, rather than to continue by their means the contest and the defence of Portugal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 14th November, 1809.

‘ I wrote to you an official letter this day, in answer to one from Lord Castlereagh of the 14th September, which will probably satisfy you upon all the points referred to by your Lordship in your private letter of the 20th October. However, as the arrangement of the questions\* contained in that letter may be more convenient to you than those in Lord Castlereagh’s dispatch, to which mine is an answer, which were of a general nature, and as every consideration of this interesting subject is desirable, I proceed to give you answers to the questions contained in your letter.

‘ In answer to the first question, my opinion is, that if the Spaniards are commonly prudent, if they do not adventure themselves too far forward to obtain possession of the capital before the enemy shall receive his reinforcements, and to gain a momentary popularity for the cause, it must be a very large reinforcement indeed which would give the enemy the military possession, much larger than which would lead to the complete subjugation of the country.

‘ In answer to your second question, my opinion is, that the enemy ought to make the possession of Portugal their first object, when their reinforcements shall arrive in Spain.

‘ I do not think they will succeed with an army of 70,000, or even of 80,000 men, if they do not make the attack for two or three months, which I believe now to be impossible. I conceive not only that they may, but will make the attack

\* Questions put to Lieut. General Viscount Wellington in Lord Liverpool’s private letter of the 20th October:—

‘ 1st. As there is every reason to believe that peace has been concluded between France and Austria, and that the whole military efforts of France will probably in a short time be directed in consequence of this event against Spain, what is the chance of these efforts proving successful;—I mean their leading, with partial exceptions, to the complete subjugation of the country?

‘ 2nd. Would the French be likely to make a serious attack upon Portugal before they had acquired a tolerably quiet possession of every part of Spain north of the Sierra Morena? Are they likely to be able to spare an army sufficient for this purpose, before the north and centre of Spain are subdued?

‘ 3rd. If a serious attack is made by the French upon Portugal, what is at present the prospect of successful resistance?

‘ 4th. If resistance is not likely to prove ultimately successful, how far would the British army be endangered, and its embarkation be likely to be prevented, by delaying to withdraw it till the French had penetrated in force into Portugal?’



before they will subdue the north of Spain. The centre of Spain, or Old Castille, is already subdued; and indeed that country, at all times, in all wars, has been in the possession of the army which was strongest, particularly in cavalry.

‘In answer to your third question, my opinion is, that the enemy have neither the means nor the intention of attacking Portugal at present, and that they would be successfully resisted. I am likewise of opinion that when they shall receive their reinforcements, they can be successfully resisted.

‘You will find a complete answer to your fourth question in my dispatch of this date. I am convinced we could embark after defeat.

‘I enclose the last weekly state of the army, which will show you its strength. Included in the sick and absent are the wounded at Talavera, about 1500 in number, and about 1700 convalescents at Lisbon and Elvas, which will reduce the number of sick to about 6000 men upon an army of about 30,000. We are now, as I believe the whole world is, very sickly; but in all times and places the sick list amounts to at least 10 men in the 100, or 3000 upon 30,000 men. In order, therefore, to give us an efficient operating army of 30,000 men, you should send us 3000 men soon. We ought also to have 1000 men to occupy the castle of Lisbon, and another 1000 to make up for the deficiency in the return, which will be occasioned by the departure of the 23rd light dragoons, and probable losses by death between this time and the period in which we shall have the contest, making in the whole 35,000 rank and file, besides the prisoners at Talavera, still in the return.

‘I would besides recommend a relief of our bad second battalions. There are really many in this army that are quite unfit for service in respect to composition and discipline; and they, as well as the old regiments, are made worse by the constant change of the officers. At this moment, there are not less than 60 officers quitting the battalions in this army, with which they have served and have acquired some experience, to join other battalions of the same regiment in some other part of the world. The worst of this arrangement is, that the officers who go are the oldest, and probably the best of their respective ranks; and they are replaced by others, without experience, who have no know-



*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,                      ‘ Badajoz, 15th November, 1809.

‘ I returned here on Sunday, and received yesterday your letters of the 9th, 10th, and 11th. I had before received that which you wrote to me on the 31st October.

‘ I have no doubt that Buonaparte has come to some kind of an arrangement with Austria; but I suspect, from the mode in which it has been announced, and from the speech of the Arch Chancellor to the Senate, on the 22nd of October; of which I have seen an extract, received through Catalonia, that the arrangement is not of a permanent nature; at all events we must go on with every thing as if it was permanent, and matters are so proceeding.

‘ I wish you could see a dispatch which I have written to Lord Liverpool, which I send to Mr. Villiers to be transmitted to England by the packet which ought to sail on Sunday.

‘ There is no doubt that you must have the power of approving the sentences of Courts Martial exclusively in your hands, and you should so settle before you quit Lisbon.

‘ I order Lieut. Pigot, 5th regiment, and Ensign Elgie of the 97th regiment, and Ensign Power, 97th regiment, to place themselves under your orders. I shall recommend Mr. J. Beresford Dunlop for an ensigncy.

‘ The rule in the British army is, that officers allowed by the Commander in Chief to serve with any General Officer as extra aides de camp receive båt and forage; those serving in that situation without his permission do not receive it. I have one of this description in my family. Is Captain — your aide de camp by permission of the Commander in Chief?

‘ I do not know what to say to Captain Arentschildt’s claim. According to the principle laid down, and the practice, he ought to receive his pay and British allowances, and the pay of his Portuguese rank, and no more. I suppose Sir John Cradock gave him 10s. a day when he employed him at Oporto, and I do not know how Captain Dickson comes to have received this allowance; but it is obvious that it is extra, and that it cannot be granted without a deviation from the principle fixed for all others.



‘ In respect to General Hamilton, his case is one deserving serious consideration ; and if you continue to wish to make him a Lieut. General, I must refer it home. I think that you have mistaken the case. A General Officer comes out appointed by the Commander in Chief in England to serve in Portugal with the Portuguese troops, in a certain rank, with the British pay and allowances of that rank. An Officer of the Line comes to serve with one step of Portuguese advanced rank, with the Portuguese pay of that advanced rank, and the British pay of his British commission. So far as to the pay ; if you promote General Hamilton to be Lieut. General in the Portuguese service, you must give him British Lieut. General’s pay and allowances, or you will deviate from the rule laid down for General Officers.

‘ But this is not the only objection that I have to your proposal. You do not appear to me to advert to the great difficulties under which we shall labor in consequence of the advanced rank of the British officers in the Portuguese service when the two armies shall come to act together, which must be done, if the Portuguese army is to render any service. You do not recollect the difficulty I had even with your own advanced rank, certainly occasioned by misconceptions and prejudices ; but still it existed, and will exist in a still stronger degree, at a most critical moment, in relation to General Hamilton’s rank, if he is now to be taken from the bottom of the list of Major Generals to be made a Portuguese Lieut. General, and in that capacity to command all the Major Generals in the British service serving with this, or in the same army. You also forget the motives which induced you and me to agree that I should recommend General Hamilton to be a Major General in Portugal, viz.—that he was at the top of the list of Colonels, and that there was nobody in this army who could object to his promotion. Pray look how many there are who will object to his promotion to be a Lieut. General.

‘ If, however, after perusing this letter, you should still be desirous that the promotion should be made, I will send it home to England, to have him appointed to be a Lieut. General to serve with the Portuguese troops, in the same manner as he was appointed a Major General to serve with

those troops ; but I must at the same time state my reasons for thinking the appointment inexpedient.

‘ I understand that the Duque del Parque has retired to the mountains, and had his head quarters at Bejar on the 8th.

‘ I have ordered a General Court Martial to assemble at Lisbon for the trial of your servant. You have not sent a crime against him, or his name, or the list of evidences ; but I shall endeavor to make out a crime, and to recollect his name, and the whole shall go up with this letter.

‘ Have you heard at Lisbon of a naval victory in the Mediterranean ? We hear of it from Catalonia, and I think the report is well founded. We also hear that the siege of Gerona is raised, which I believe to be true, and that this event is connected with the naval victory. The object of the French fleet was certainly to relieve Barcelona ; and it is probable that, having failed in that object, they think it preferable to employ Augereau’s army in the relief, even at the risk of losing the immediate possession of Gerona, to losing Barcelona.

‘ Ever yours, &c.

‘ *Murshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Madame Fortunati d’Elvas has begged me to apply to you to appoint her son, Antonio d’Aguilar, an officer ; he has been seven years a cadet in the 8th regiment of cavalry, and always doing duty with his regiment.’

*To the Junta of Estremadura.*

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Badajoz, 15th November, 1809.

‘ The Commissary General of the British army, Mr. Murray, has communicated to me a correspondence which he has had with you relating to supplies for the British army, and to orders which have been issued in the different villages to prevent the sale of supplies to the British Commissaries who have been sent to purchase ; copies of which orders have been communicated to you.

‘ I have already had occasion to explain to you my sentiments and intentions upon this subject. Spain is either unable or unwilling to furnish supplies of provisions and forage, on payment, for the armies necessary for her defence ;

and as in either case it is impossible for me to risk the existence of His Majesty's army, in a country so situated, I announce to you, therefore, my intention, upon the first failure of these supplies, which are necessary for them, to remove the troops into a country in which I know they will be supplied.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Junta of Estremadura.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To B. Frere, Esq.\**

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 15th November, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Marshal Beresford, in answer to that part of Don Martin de Garay's note of the 3rd October, which relates to the Portuguese troops, while lately in Spain. I beg leave to recommend that you should transmit this paper to Lord Wellesley.

‘ I have received information that orders have been given in the villages in this province, to prevent the sale of forage and provisions to the British Commissaries employed to purchase those articles for the use of the British army; and the Commissary General has informed me that he apprehends an immediate scarcity on this account, and that the Junta of Estremadura have omitted to adopt any of the measures which he has proposed, to prevent the evil effects of the orders to which I have above referred, or to relieve him from the apprehension which he entertains of a scarcity of supplies.

‘ I have therefore this day addressed a letter to the Junta, of which I enclose a copy, which I request you to lay before the Government, and to inform them that I shall be under the necessity of drawing nearer to my magazines, if there should be any failure of supplies in this part of the country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *B. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

\* On the departure of Marquis Wellesley, and previous to the arrival of his successor, the Hon. H. Wellesley, as Ambassador to the Court of Spain, Mr. Bart. Frere was appointed and acted as Minister Plenipotentiary.





*To the Right Hon. the Commander in Chief.*

‘SIR,

‘Badajoz, 16th November, 1809.

‘I have availed myself of the presence of Colonel Pakenham, of the 7th Fusiliers, in this country, to employ him as an assistant in the department of the Adjutant General; and he is now doing the duty of that department, in consequence of the absence of Brig. General the Hon. C. Stewart, for the recovery of his health. As the office of Deputy Adjutant General has never been filled up, and as Colonel Pakenham is the senior of all the officers doing duty in the department, and is well qualified for it, I beg leave to recommend him to be appointed Deputy Adjutant General.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Right Hon.*

‘WELLINGTON.

*the Commander in Chief.’*

*To the Right Hon. the Commander in Chief.*

‘SIR,

‘Badajoz, 16th November, 1809.

‘I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from the Inspector of Hospitals with this army, and a list of promotions in the Medical Department, which he has recommended, and of which I have approved.

‘I beg leave to observe, however, that although I believe these promotions are well merited, and that it is necessary to make them, that which this army wants, principally, is an additional number of Hospital mates. There is not a sufficient number of officers of this description to do the duties of the General Hospitals; the Regimental Surgeons and their Assistants are therefore necessarily employed in the General Hospitals; and the regiments are not attended as they ought to be at all times, but particularly at this season, on service, by the due and regular proportion of Regimental Medical Staff.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*To the Right Hon.*

‘WELLINGTON.

*the Commander in Chief.’*

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 16th November, 1809.

‘ Having received certain information of the death of Lieut. Colonel Donellan, of the 48th regiment, on the 1st of September, at Talavera, I have to request that you will again submit to the favorable consideration of the Commander in Chief my strongest recommendation of Major Middlemore to succeed to the Lieut. Colonelcy of the 48th regiment.

‘ I also beg leave to request that the promotion may be given in that regiment, as recommended in Major Middlemore’s letter, which I had the honor to transmit on the 26th of September. I also beg to recommend Martin Lima, Gent., to succeed to the vacant Ensigncy, from the date of Lieut. Colonel Donellan’s death, as Mr. Lima had been gazetted in the 61st regiment, which appointment was done away in consequence of the circumstances attending the death of Captain Scott, whose succession was not allowed to be given in the 61st regiment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Col. Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Adjutant General of the Forces.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 16th November, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd of October, announcing the arrival of remount horses for the cavalry in this country, and I shall make the best arrangements in my power to have men at Lisbon, belonging to each of the regiments, to take care of the horses on their arrival.

‘ So large a proportion of the men of the dragoons, however, are now sick, and so many of the horses of each of the regiments are still unfit for service, that I fear that I shall reduce the effective cavalry of the army lower than it ought to be, unless I should retain in Portugal, to take care of those horses on their arrival, a part, at least, of the 23rd dragoons.

‘ I propose, therefore, to detain a detachment of the 23rd dragoons, from which regiment the horses have been drafted,



according to the orders of the Commander in Chief; sending home the greater part of the officers and men of that regiment immediately; and I shall send home the remainder as soon as the other regiments of cavalry shall have so far recovered from the sickness which now prevails in the army, as to enable them, without reducing the numbers of effective cavalry, to take charge of them all.

‘I understand from Lieut. General Payne that there are many men in the 23rd dragoons who are desirous of volunteering their services into the other regiments, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know whether the Commander in Chief will permit me to allow them to be transferred to the regiments of cavalry with their own consent.

‘Lieut. General Payne has reported to me that all the regiments are in want of horse appointments; and I beg leave that the Colonels may be directed to send out fifty sets of horse appointments for each of the regiments without loss of time.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Adjutant General  
of the Forces.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Badajoz, 16th November, 1809.

‘I have the honor to transmit, for your Lordship’s information, the returns of the stores and provisions remaining in His Majesty’s magazines in Portugal on the 1st of November.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Badajoz, 16th November, 1809.

‘The corps which had been defeated by the Duque del Parque at Tamames having been joined by the corps under the command of General Kellermann, which had been for a considerable time at Valladolid, and other reinforcements having been sent from New Castille and Estremadura through the Puerto del Pico, the Duque del Parque retired

from Salamanca in the beginning of this month, and on the 8th his head quarters were at Bejar, at the entrance of the Puerto de Baños, which pass was occupied by the troops under his command.

‘The enemy’s troops in Old Castille, supposed to amount to 36,000 men, are under the command of Marshal Mortier.

‘Since I wrote to Lord Castlereagh on the 31st October, the Spanish army under General Areyzaga, which was at that time at La Carolina, has moved forward into La Mancha; and on the 10th instant, the date of the last accounts which I have received of their operations, their head quarters were at Los Barrios, not far from Ocaña, at which place there was a French corps under Sebastiani; and there was another French corps under Marshal Victor at Yevenes, between Toledo and Consuegra. The Spanish army under General Areyzaga will probably have fought a general action before this time.

‘The Spanish troops still remaining in Estremadura have been placed under the command of the Duque de Albuquerque.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.*

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Badajoz, 17th November, 1809.

‘I delayed answering your letters of the 3rd November till I should have an opportunity of considering with Murray our long list of officers in the Quarter Master General’s department; and the result of our consideration is, to tell you that I am happy to have it in my power to appoint Captain William Campbell to be an Assistant, and that he shall be attached to the 3rd division of infantry.

‘I have desired the Commissary General to provide the palliasses for the hospital, according to your desire. He has spoken to the Commissary of your division upon the subject this morning, and has directed him to pay for them. I shall be much obliged to you if you will give him every assistance in your power to get them made.

‘I had not time before I went to Lisbon to see the troops

of your division ; and if not inconvenient to you, I shall go over to-morrow to Campo Mayor for that purpose. I shall be there at nine o'clock. I must, however, return here to dinner.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*  
*R. Craufurd.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To B. Frere, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 17th November, 1809.

‘ I have received your letters of the 13th and 14th instant, for which I am much obliged to you.

‘ I do not understand the Duque’s retreat from his position. He never apprized me of it. It is very desirable that Alava, and Whittingham as soon as he is able, should be sent to the Duque de Alburquerque, who, although he does not want spirit, is deficient in other qualifications for a commander, which his confidence in those officers can alone supply.

‘ I am most anxious about Areyzaga’s corps, the fate of which must be decided before this time. If he should fail, the situation of the Duque del Parque will become critical. I have put Marshal Beresford upon his guard respecting the frontier of Portugal, into which, however, the enemy will not attempt to penetrate till he shall be reinforced.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *B. Frere, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you, when Colonel Elley shall pass through Seville, if you will use your influence with the Government that he may be allowed to look at the mares which I understand have been collected, 190 in number, for the British army.’

*To Lieutenant Colonel Roche.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 19th November, 1809.

‘ I have received your several letters to the 13th, and I am much obliged to you for them. Matters are in a critical situation in your quarter, and I wish that they may turn out well ; but that does not appear very probable.



‘ I do not understand how General Areyzaga could think that I was to co-operate with him. I can co-operate in nothing of which I have no knowledge, or, indeed, I might say, which is not concerted with me ; but not only was this plan not concerted with me (if there ever was any plan at all), but the whole system on which it is founded and proceeds is known to be directly contrary to my opinion, and the advice I have repeatedly given.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Roche.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To B. Frere, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 19th November, 1809.

‘ I have received your letters of the 15th and 17th. It appears to me, that Areyzaga’s corps is in a very critical situation. I fear it must be defeated, and if it should be defeated, the Duque del Parque and the Duque de Alburquerque will be lost. You will observe, that there is in Old Castille a superior enemy’s corps, which has obliged the Duque del Parque to retire to the mountains, and his head quarters were at Bejar on the 11th. The Government have now ordered him to move into the valley of the Tagus, there to join the Duque de Alburquerque, who is to cross the Tagus, and the united armies are to move to Talavera.

‘ It is not necessary to advert to the period in which this movement will be made, as a diversion in favor of Areyzaga ; but I beg you to observe, that the Duque del Parque when joined with the Duque de Alburquerque at Talavera, will be in relation to the enemy, and to Areyzaga, precisely in the situation in which the combined armies under Cuesta and myself were in the beginning of August, in relation to the enemy and to Venegas ; with this difference, that at that time Venegas could have crossed the Tagus at a ford at Fuentidueña, and Areyzaga, I am afraid, cannot do so now ; and the Duque del Parque has not gained a victory, and is not half so strong as we were.

‘ I think it possible, and indeed probable, that the enemy’s troops in Old Castille may pass through the mountains at the Puerto del Pico, instead of at the Puerto de Baños. If they do, the Duque del Parque may be able to retire with great difficulty by the bridge of Arzobispo.

‘ In a view of his retreat, which I consider inevitable, unless Areyzaga should defeat the enemy now opposed to him, and should obtain possession of Madrid, which is very improbable, I have spoken to the General here respecting the bridge of Almaraz. He tells me that they have no money, even to commence the equipment of it; that they want certain articles, such as rope, &c., which they can get only from Seville; that the Government are aware of these wants; and that if they had every thing required, a week would elapse before the bridge could be ready; and I know that it would take another week for the bridge to reach the point in the river at which it ought to be placed. I believe, however, that they have some six or eight boats in readiness, and I mean to urge the General to have them sent off, so that the Duque del Parque may have the means of constructing a flying bridge, and may have that road in some degree open to him, if he should have it in his power to take it.

‘ I consider the affairs of Spain to be at this moment in a worse situation than I have yet known them to be. The Duque del Parque is in the greatest danger; at all events, he will scarcely be able to return to Castille, but I believe that that is not intended. It is impossible for me to do any thing for their relief, supposing there were means of subsisting such bodies of troops as will be in the valley of the Tagus, and other circumstances should occur in inducing me to think it expedient to join the Duque del Parque and the Duque de Alburquerque. I have no means of crossing the Tagus excepting at Arzobispo; the road to which bridge, at this season of the year, is scarcely practicable for an army; and it is more than probable that, if I should attempt it, I should lose my equipment. If I were to move towards Truxillo in order to be at hand to give them assistance, I fear that I should embarrass them by the consumption of provisions, more than I should have it in my power to aid them. But even this movement to Truxillo is not provided for in any manner. Upon these points I shall write to you officially in answer to Don F. de Saavedra.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 15th, I have to observe, that I know of no reason that General Areyzaga had for saying that the British army would co-operate with him. I think it most probable, that on the 10th he began to discover

the difficulties of his situation, which could only be aggravated by his continuing to advance; that he therefore determined not to advance; and that he gave out to his army our expected co-operation as the reason for the discontinuance of his advance.

‘ I agree entirely in opinion with you, that it is desirable that we should have the means of knowing exactly what is passing in Catalonia; and that it is desirable that some English officers should be sent there without delay; and that you could not make a better selection than Major Campbell of the Artillery. But I would suggest to you that Catalonia is General Doyle’s station, and that it might interfere with Lord Wellesley’s plans and instructions, if you were to send another officer to that quarter. I would therefore recommend to you to send General Doyle, with such instructions as you may think proper to give him.

‘ These officers were formerly under my directions, having been sent out under orders from the Secretary of State for the War Department. But when Lord Wellesley arrived, he brought orders with him for them to report to him, and since that time I have had no communication with any of them, excepting Colonel Roche.

‘ I have had no letter whatever from the Duque de Alburquerque; but I hear that he has moved towards the bridge of Arzobispo.

‘ Since writing the above, I have received your second letter of the 15th by the hand of Captain Silvertop. I am convinced that the Marques de la Romana never gave any assurance to Areyzaga of the nature described in Colonel Roche’s letter of the 11th. Indeed, it appeared to me that the Marques de la Romana did not approve of Areyzaga’s movement more than I did.

‘ I do not know Colonel —, and cannot recommend him to the Government for employment. Generally speaking, it is desirable that the Spanish Government should not employ British officers without the consent of the King, and as (between ourselves) I have not heard a very good character of this Colonel, I consider it desirable that you should rather discourage them from employing him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ B. Frere, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To Bart. Frere, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 19th November, 1809.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 17th instant, containing the copy of Don F. de Saavedra’s note of the 16th, addressed to you, in which he has required the co-operation of the British army with the troops under the Duque del Parque, ordered on the same day to break up from Bejar, and to march into Estremadura to form a junction with those under the Duque de Alburquerque, likewise ordered to cross the Tagus; when both corps are to advance to Talavera de la Reyna, and there endeavor to create a diversion in favor of the Spanish corps under General Areyzaga, now in La Mancha.

‘ The intelligence received from La Mancha of as late a date as the 13th of this month, would tend to point out the inutility of these movements as a diversion in favor of General Areyzaga, who at that time was one fortnight at least in advance of the Duque del Parque. This officer cannot receive his orders until the 19th, and will not be at Talavera till the 25th or 26th. If at that moment General Areyzaga should have been defeated, or if he should have been thrown on the defensive, or if he should have been checked by the difficulty of crossing the Tagus at this season of the year, the corps assembled at Talavera, which it is reasonable to suppose will be followed from Old Castille by the enemy’s troops, that were already superior in that quarter, and were supposed by the Duque del Parque to amount to 36,000 men, will be in a situation of imminent danger, from which it can be extricated only by an immediate and well-concerted retreat across the Tagus.

‘ I should naturally wish to avoid being concerned in these operations, which not only have not originated in any plan concerted with me, but are decidedly contrary to the opinion I have invariably given since I was obliged to retire with the British army after a victory, from being involved in a situation nearly similar to that in which the Duque del Parque will find himself.

‘ These operations are, I believe, the result of no fixed plan, but the consequence of an operation imprudently commenced by one corps, to endeavor to extricate which corps from

its difficulties, the whole will now be in a state of imminent risk; and I feel so strongly the situation in which all these troops are involved, that if there were any means prepared to enable the army under my command to cross the Tagus; and if there was the most distant chance that I should be able to subsist the army while engaged in this expedition, I should immediately put it in motion to endeavor to save the troops of our allies. You are, however, aware of the difficulty which the Duque de Albuquerque, and before him General Bassecourt, experienced in procuring subsistence for a few thousand men on the left bank of the Tagus; and you will conceive how much the difficulty and distress will have been increased on the right bank, the country being exhausted in a still greater degree, the army being more numerous, and no arrangements whatever having been made to collect magazines for their support, or to supply the deficiencies of provisions in the country.

‘ I am at the same time convinced, that nothing that I could do could prevent the necessity of a retreat; and I beg to refer you to my dispatches to Lord Wellesley (No. 17), dated Merida, 1st September, for the detail of my opinion of all plans of co-operation between a corps in La Mancha and troops in Estremadura.

‘ These dispatches, and the accounts of the situation of the combined armies in the beginning of August, will point out to you more clearly the grounds of this conviction, which induces me to think that I should rather increase than diminish the embarrassments of the Spanish troops, if I were to approach them.

‘ I beg you, therefore, to inform Don F. de Saavedra that I do not think it expedient to move the British army upon this occasion.

‘ With respect to the blame that will be transferred to us for the misfortunes which there is reason to apprehend will be the result of these operations, I am too much accustomed to receive blame for the actions of others to feel much concern upon the subject, and I can only endeavor not to deserve any for my own.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Bart. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’





these two corps but a victory by Areyzaga, and the possession of Madrid; which are the most improbable of events.

‘ Thus you see how matters stand in Spain; the Government had literally no plan, excepting to urge or allow Areyzaga to “*buscar el enemigo*,” and then, when they found he was in a scrape, they go near to lose all, that they may say that they endeavored to save him.

‘ They have written to me to desire I will move, but they have no means prepared for me to cross the Tagus; no means of subsistence forward from thence; no magazine formed, or preparation made of any description. I would try to save the destruction of every thing if there were any means of subsistence forward; but there are none; and I should only add to their distress by the additional consumption of provisions.

‘ In whatever way these circumstances turn, whether the Duque del Parque be destroyed, or effect his retreat across the Tagus, it is very obvious we shall be much affected by them in Portugal.

‘ It is probable that as soon as the Duque’s corps are disposed of, the enemy will turn his attention to Ciudad Rodrigo, and the frontiers of Portugal. I intend, therefore, in a few days, that is to say, as soon as I can disembarass the advanced divisions of the army of their sick, which I have begun, to put the army in march to cross the Tagus.

‘ I think I shall leave one division upon the Tagus; for if the Duque del Parque and the Duque de Alburquerque are destroyed, which is not unlikely, and, indeed, is pretty certain, unless the enemy should enter Estremadura by the Puerto del Pico, instead of by the Puerto de Baños, we must expect that the enemy will immediately cross the Tagus, and we must make our arrangements for the defence of Portugal, according to the plan we settled when I was at Lisbon, to be adopted when the enemy’s reinforcements should arrive in Spain.

‘ In respect to the remainder of the army, I should put the right in Guarda, and the left towards Viseu, and your troops might be in second line behind us.

‘ Murray will write to D’Urban\* more fully, as well upon this disposition as upon the route that the army

\* Major General Sir Benjamin D’Urban, K.C.B., then the Quarter Master General of the Portuguese army.

will take, which it probably might be necessary to clear a little for us.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Pray make Villiers acquainted with the contents of this letter.’

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 20th November, 1809.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give directions that transports may be prepared to convey to England, as soon as they may be ready to be embarked, a detachment of the 23rd light dragoons, with officers, horses, &c.; of the exact strength of which, the Assistant Quarter Master General at Lisbon will acquaint your Secretary.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral  
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 20th November, 1809.

‘ The news which I sent to Mr. Villiers on Thursday, of which you probably may have received still further details, will have relieved you from the anxiety you felt respecting the Toulon fleet. But at all events, I am glad you have adverted to the state of the tower of Bugio, upon which I had already spoken to Colonel Fletcher, and which must be put in order.

‘ I am concerned that you should meet with any difficulties with the Portuguese officers in effecting any measures for the public service; but I hope when Dom Miguel Forjaz shall understand what is required, and for what object, that he will enforce your wishes.

‘ We must, however, have matters put on such a footing, as that we shall have no difficulties when the moment of contest shall arrive.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral  
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 20th November, 1809.

‘ In reference to the conversation which I had with you and Marshal Beresford, relative to the situations of Lieut. Colonel Cox and Lieut. Colonel Trant, and the expenses incurred by those officers in the command of Almeida and Oporto respectively, I beg leave to recommend that the staff pay of each should be made equal to that of a Brigadier General in the British service; and that you should pay each of them such a sum as, in addition to the pay they receive from the Portuguese Government, will make up the pay and allowances of a British Brigadier General.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 20th November, 1809.

‘ The enclosures in my dispatches to England, relative to the French fleet, will have relieved you from any anxiety respecting its operations. I understand that all which came out have either been taken or destroyed\*. I consider it very desirable, however, to put the Bugio in a proper state of repair; and I am very glad that this work has been thought of, and that the repairs will be effected. We must, however, have a small guard in the tower as soon as it shall be in a state of repair, upon which subject I shall write to Colonel Peacocke.

‘ I am concerned to hear that the rule respecting the packets cannot be adhered to. It is most convenient to the army and to my public business; and I acknowledge that I do not see the necessity of breaking through a rule to send off a packet every Sunday, if there should be one in the Tagus, because it is necessary at this moment to send away two or three together, in order that there may be packets on the other side of the water. However, it is no business of mine, and I shall accommodate myself to any plan that may be adopted.

\* Three sail of the line and a frigate were driven ashore between Cette and Frontignan, by the advanced squadron under Rear Admiral, now Sir George Martin, G.C.B., on the 23rd October, 1809.



‘ In respect to the Talavera Club, before I consent to belong to it, I must see who are the society; and possibly it might be well to look a little into the character of those who constituted it at Lisbon. If the officers who first went down to Lisbon from the army, they are people who ought not to be countenanced on any account, as they in fact deserted; and each of them, as he comes up, is in arrest, and he is obliged to give an account of himself.

‘ I do not know what to think of the Peace. At first, upon a misrepresentation, or rather a misconception, of the meaning of the *Moniteur* of the 22nd October, by a Spanish agent on the frontiers of France, I thought the account was not true. Upon seeing the paper in question, I do not think there is more reason to doubt of the peace with Austria, than there is to doubt the truth of any of the transactions mentioned in the *Moniteur*.

‘ Buonaparte may be sick, and it will certainly take some time before he can reinforce his armies in Spain to any large extent. I know there is great discontent in the French army, and I also know that if the officers choose to have any communication with us, means and opportunities are not wanting; and if they do not make use of them, I must be convinced that they do not choose to communicate upon that subject, and to touch upon it would only do more harm than good. If an opening should be made by them, you may depend upon it that I shall avail myself of it.

‘ I refer you to my letter of this date to Beresford for information on the state of the military operations.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Plan for Removing the Sick from the Out Stations of the Army to the Hospital Stations at Elvas and Estremoz, sent to Dr. Frank, Inspector of Hospitals, to the Commissary General, and to the Officers commanding at Elvas and Estremoz.*

‘ Badajoz, 20th November, 1809.

‘ Fifty men, of such cases as the medical gentlemen at Elvas shall conceive can be moved with least injury, to be sent to Estremoz every third day, till 250 shall have been sent.

‘ Fifty men to be sent to Elvas daily from the regimental

hospitals of the corps at Badajoz, Talavera, Lobon, and Montijo, till 400 shall have been sent.

‘ The sick at Talavera, Lobon, and Montijo, to be brought the first day to Badajoz, where preparations will be made for their reception, and the next day to Elvas.

‘ The Commissary General is to send ten covered carts to Elvas this day, to make the removal of the sick from thence.

‘ Ten covered carts to be employed at Badajoz to remove the sick from thence to Elvas.

‘ Five at Montijo, and five at Lobon and Talavera, to remove the men from those stations respectively to Badajoz.

‘ The Inspector of Hospitals will arrange that a medical gentleman shall accompany each convoy of sick; and the officers commanding stations will take care that a proper proportion of officers and non commissioned officers accompany them, according to the general order of the 13th June, 1809.

‘ The surgeons will of course return as soon as they shall have delivered over the sick to the person appointed to take charge of them at the hospital or elsewhere, according to the orders of the Medical Inspector.

‘ The officers commanding at Elvas and Estremoz respectively will determine whether the officers and non commissioned officers are to remain, according to the proportions of each which he has with the hospital, and which he may require.

‘ The Commissary General, the Inspector of Hospitals, and the officer commanding at the hospital at Elvas, will communicate upon the execution of this plan.

‘ A copy of this paper to be immediately sent to the Commissary General, the Inspector of Hospitals, and commanding officer at Elvas.

‘ The Inspector of Hospitals to give his directions for the removal of the sick from Talavera, Lobon, and Montijo to Badajoz, and from Badajoz to Elvas.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To the Secretary of the Treasury.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 20th November, 1809.

‘ I enclose a letter, received from the Commissary General, which has been laid before me by Lieut. Colonel Bathurst,

my military secretary, upon which I beg to be acquainted with the pleasure of the Lords of the Treasury.

‘It relates to the article in the instructions of the Commissary of Accounts, which requires that the signature to all receipts and vouchers passed by him should be testified by two witnesses; which article the Commissary of Accounts with this army has applied to the contingent accounts of staff officers.

‘I beg to know whether it is the intention of their Lordships that this article should be so applied. Upon this point I should observe to them, that it will be very inconvenient to staff officers to procure the signature of two witnesses to every payment they may make; and in very frequent instances I apprehend that it will be quite impossible.

‘But if it should be their Lordships’ pleasure that their rule should extend to these accounts, I would beg leave to submit that it cannot with justice or propriety be extended to those for expenses incurred before the rule was known.

‘The rule is not observed in the War Office, where the contingent accounts of staff officers serving in Great Britain are passed; and the officers who have made the payments, of which the vouchers are now considered imperfect, had no knowledge whatever that they would be required to produce the signature of two witnesses to the payments they had made, and it would be quite impossible at present to procure them.

‘It is very desirable that I should receive their Lordships’ decision upon this subject, as well as upon the letters which I have had the honor of addressing to them, of which the dates are in the margin.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Secretary of the Treasury.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Badajoz, 20th November, 1809.

‘Some time ago Mr. Villiers sent me the copy of a dispatch to Mr. Canning of the 2nd of October, on several military subjects on which he suggested that I should give my opinion to Government; and I wrote a memorandum upon the dispatch, which I did not send home, as, from the conver-



sation I had with Mr. Villiers, I doubted whether he had sent home his dispatch.

‘When I was afterwards at Seville with Lord Wellesley, he expressed a desire that I should send home the Memorandum, and I now enclose the dispatch and memorandum,\* in case Mr. Villiers should not have sent home the former. If he should have done so, it may be desirable that the latter should be in the office.

‘It occurs to me that you may not understand one part of my dispatch of the 14th, relative to the estimate of the expenses of the army. You will find it explained in a letter to Lord Castlereagh, of the 23rd of September, which you had better see, if you should not have already perused it.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Badajoz, 21st November, 1809.

‘I return your maps, excepting those of Toledo, La Mancha, and Madrid, which, with your permission, I shall detain for some time longer, as they are not in the collection which I got from Richard Wellesley.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Badajoz, 21st November, 1809.

‘I beg to draw your Lordship’s attention to the frequent paragraphs in the English newspapers, describing the position, the numbers, the objects, and the means of attaining them, possessed by the armies in Spain and Portugal.

‘In some instances the English newspapers have accurately stated, not only the regiments occupying a position, but the number of men fit for duty of which each regiment was composed; and this intelligence must have reached the enemy at the same time it did me, at a moment at which it was most important that he should not receive it.

\* See page 216.

‘The newspapers have recently published an account of the defensive positions occupied by the different English and Portuguese corps, which certainly conveyed to the enemy the first knowledge he had of them; and I enclose a paragraph recently published, describing the line of operation which I should follow in case of the occurrence of a certain event, the preparations which I had made for that operation, and where I had formed my magazines.

‘It is not necessary to inquire in what manner the newspapers acquire this description of information; but if the editors really feel an anxiety for the success of the military operations in the Peninsula, they will refrain from giving this information to the public, as they must know that their papers are read by the enemy, and that the information which they are desirous of conveying to their English readers is mischievous to the public, exactly in proportion as it is well founded and correct.

‘Your Lordship will be the best judge whether any and what measures ought to be adopted to prevent the publication of this description of intelligence. I can only assure you that it will increase materially the difficulty of all operations in this country.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘MY DEAR VILLIERS, ‘Elvas, 25th November, 1809.

‘I enclose dispatches for Lord Bathurst, which will show that I was not a false prophet, unfortunately. Pray send them home immediately.

‘I have been at Villa Viçosa since Wednesday, and do not understand the Duque del Parque being at Salamanca. He was ordered on the 16th to Talavera. If he is still in Castille I shall not be able to go to Beira till I shall know the final result of the dispersion of the Spanish army.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Roche.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Badajoz, 26th November, 1809.

‘I received last night at Elvas your letter of the 22nd, for which I am much obliged to you. I acknowledge that I have never expected any other result from the march of General Areyzaga, and I am not at all surprised at what has happened.\* The folly will appear in a still stronger light, if, after all that has occurred, the French should be unable to penetrate into Andalusia, which I really believe will be the case, if General Areyzaga should be able to collect any proportion of his scattered forces.

‘We are still here. The Duque de Alburquerque has been unable to carry into execution the orders sent to him by the Government, and he is at Arzobispo. The Duque del Parque moved from Bejar towards Salamanca, as soon as he found that the French corps which had reinforced Ney had marched to Madrid, and he did not receive the orders sent to him; so that these two corps are safe for the present.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Roche.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Badajoz, 26th November, 1809.

‘I received last night your letter of the 22nd, at Elvas, and as the orders of the Admiralty are positive, my opinion is, that you had better not send home the 23rd light dragoons till you shall hear further from England, and I can only assure you that there can be no inconvenience in the delay. I am certain, however, that the meaning of the order was only to put an end to the former order, which required that the transports should be sent home; and indeed it is obvious that you would not be wrong in employing the transports in carrying home troops, which must go home eventually, and which I have received orders to send home. However, as I said before, there is no inconvenience in their remaining for a short time; and obedience to an order is always right.

\* The army of La Mancha, under General Areyzaga, had been totally defeated at Ocaña on the 19th November.



‘I am much obliged to you for the account of the tonnage which you have sent me. It would be very desirable if the agent would transmit to Colonel Murray a list of the ships, with their marks, and the tonnage of each; and would apprize him from time to time of any alteration of their numbers, as it would enable us at any time to make the arrangements for embarking, so far as they may depend upon us.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*  
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Bart. Frere, Esq.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Badajoz, 26th November, 1809.

‘I received last night, at Elvas, your letters of the 23rd and 24th, and as I conceived it possible that your dispatches might arrive in time to go to England by the packet, which would sail from Lisbon this day, I forwarded them immediately by the Spanish messenger who brought them.

‘I have not yet received your letter of the 22nd. You are aware that I have expected the unfortunate result of General Areyzaga’s expedition which has occurred: it will be a strong proof of his folly, if the French should, after all, be unable to penetrate into Andalusia; and I am very well convinced that this will be the case, if General Areyzaga should be able to collect any proportion of his scattered forces. The destruction of this army, however, renders it most important that I should cross the Tagus.

‘If the enemy cannot penetrate into Andalusia, they may, at least, be very certain that the Spanish army of La Carolina cannot do them any harm for some time to come; and it is reasonable to suppose that they will now direct their efforts seriously to establish their government in Old Castille, in order that they may be prepared to take every advantage of their reinforcements, when they shall arrive, or that they may even push on their operations during the winter.

‘Nothing will contribute so much to check them as the British army upon the frontier, and indeed, at all events, the necessary defence of Portugal will oblige me to move to that quarter during the fine weather in the month of December.

‘ I wish, therefore, that you would urge the Government to make up the Duque de Alburquerque’s corps to 20,000 men as soon as possible, which might be done without inconvenience, by drawing to this quarter, from the Duque del Parque’s army, the number required during the time that I shall be in motion to the northward, or even before I shall commence my march.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Bart. Frere, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Since writing the above, I have received your letter of the 22nd.’

To \*\*\*\* \*.

MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 26th November, 1809.

‘ It always gives me great concern to be under the necessity of refusing compliance with a request made to me by an officer of the army under my command ; and I might have hoped to have been spared this concern by one who must know that I should be happy to gratify him if it were in my power ; and who must be aware that it is not only unusual, but absolutely without precedent, that any officer should ask, much less obtain leave of absence from the army while on foreign service on any account, excepting on that of sickness or of business, the neglect of which might be materially prejudicial to the officer who requests the leave.

‘ I repeat, that I cannot give leave to any officer whose health does not require his return to England, or who has not business to transact which cannot be done by another, and cannot be delayed. You cannot bring forward either of these pleas. Your health is good ; and as for your business, I know of none that can require your immediate return which would not have required that you should have remained in England when you left it six months ago.

‘ I trust that I shall be spared the pain of again refusing you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ \*\*\*\* \*.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieutenant Colonel —.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 27th November, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 19th November, and I should have great pleasure in recommending you to the Spanish Government for employment in the Spanish service, if I had the pleasure of your acquaintance, or if you had been recommended to me. Under existing circumstances, however, I must decline to recommend you to the Spanish Government.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel —.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Don Miguel de Alava\*.*

‘ MON CHER COLONEL,

‘ Badajoz, 27 Novembre, 1809.

‘ J’ai reçu hier votre lettre du 25; et je vous écris en Français, comme je n’entends pas l’Espagnol, ni vous l’Anglais.

‘ J’ai fait prier le Gouvernement de renforcer l’armée du Duque d’Albuquerque jusqu’au nombre de 20,000 hommes, et je lui conseille en tout cas d’occuper la position de Fresnedoso, la Mesa de Ibor, Roman Gordo, et las Casas del Puerto, dans laquelle l’ennemi ne peut pas le forcer, et ne voudra pas tenter de l’attaquer; et il pourrait mettre sa réserve à Deleytosa, et son quartier général, s’il le veut, à Truxillo.

‘ L’ennemi ne peut pas non plus le tourner, excepté par Ciudad Real, et il faudrait d’abord avoir les moyens de forcer non seulement les passages de Despeña Perros, &c., mais un corps assez nombreux pour soutenir l’attaque du Duque en dos pendant qu’ils auraient à pousser l’attaque par Monasterio en front. Ils ne tenteront pas cette manœuvre.

‘ L’avantage que le Duc gagnerait en occupant la position indiquée est qu’il conservera pendant l’hiver toute l’Estremadure qui serait envahie, s’il passe le Guadiana. D’ail-

\* Don Miguel de Alava was afterwards attached to the personal staff of Lord Wellington, on which he remained until the end of the war. He was Ambassador at the Court of St. James’s in 1835.



leurs, il ne pourrait pas tenir sa position sur cette rivière, et il serait obligé de se retirer à la Sierra Morena.

‘ Si l’ennemi fait la tentative de passer le Tage quand je serai en Estremadure, je communiquerai avec le Duc pour le battre ; mais je crois, selon le plan que j’ai proposé au gouvernement, que je passerai vers la frontière de la Vieille Castille, où la guerre va devenir plus vive après ce qui s’est passé dans la Manche.

‘ Toujours votre fidèle,

‘ *Don Miguel de Alava.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Duque de Alburquerque.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 27th November, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 24th instant, and I have to inform you that it is not in my power to enter into any arrangement with your Excellency to defend the banks of the Guadiana.

‘ I should rather recommend to your Excellency to defend the passage of the Tagus opposite Almaraz, and the passes in the mountains at the Mesa de Ibor, Fresnedoso, &c. ; and if the enemy should attempt to penetrate into Estremadura by that route, whilst I shall remain in this province, I shall be happy to have the honor of communicating with your Excellency respecting the means of attacking him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Duque de Alburquerque.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Brigadier General Robert Craufurd.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Badajoz, 27th November, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter relative to the advance of money for the Captains of companies, upon which subject I had intended to adopt a rule before I heard from you. There is no doubt but that a great part, if not the whole of the subsistence of each regiment ought to be issued in advance on the 25th of every month, to the Regimental Paymasters ; and it has not hitherto been issued, principally because it was inconvenient to the Regimental Paymasters and the Captains to receive it. It is, however, necessary to the regularity of accounts, and to the obedience to the orders

of the Paymasters General by their deputy, that the month's pay should be advanced to the Regimental Paymasters, and should be received by them; and I intend that it shall be so from this time forward.

‘ Captain Wells, 43rd, shall be paid the pay of a Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, while acting as Secretary to the Board of Claims, and he shall be notified as such in Orders to-morrow.

‘ I shall consider the case of General ——’s chargers, and shall send you an answer upon it when I shall have had time to look at the Regulations.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*  
*R. Craufurd.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Badajoz, 27th November, 1809.

‘ I enclose a memorandum which I have received from Brigadier General Victoria, who appears a good kind of a man; and I shall be obliged to you if you can make it convenient to promote his son, who appears to have been superseded by a British officer.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Badajoz, 27th November, 1809.

‘ I have received your letters of the 19th, 22nd, and 24th instant. Lieut. Bourke shall be put in orders to place himself under your command, and Arbuthnot may keep Serjeant Robinson.

‘ I can supply you with no blankets, indeed I have not as many as I wanted for my own troops. I enclose, however, a letter which I received from England last night, relative to the supplies of clothing, &c., which you have required.

‘ In respect to our meeting between the Mondego and the Estrella mountains, it would be best to defer it till the end of your northern tour; as I cannot well quit the army till I shall know what shape things will take after the defeat of the army in La Mancha.

‘ I think the French will carry the greatest part of their

force into Old Castille, and endeavor to settle their government in that province. To penetrate into Andalusia is, in my opinion, even now, not in their power.

‘ I never know to what regiment the Horse Guards will appoint an officer whom I recommend for a commission, and I am therefore unwilling to send Mr. Dunlop to any particular regiment, lest he should not be posted to it. You had better, therefore, keep him for a few days longer, in the course of which time I must receive an account of his appointment. I dislike to have any thing to do with — — ; but as you wish it, let an official application be sent from Captain Arentschildt to be put, in point of allowances, on the same footing as Captain Dickson.

‘ If you should make General Hamilton Inspector General of the Infantry, you will of course recommend for him such allowance as the officer filling that office has had and ought to have : but I am decidedly of opinion that he cannot receive more pay as a General Officer upon the Staff, whether Portuguese or British, than that fixed for him by the Commander in Chief, viz., that of a Major General.

‘ You will have heard, probably, that I had pressed upon the Government your proposition to add regimental staff to the regiments, to which they were not inclined ; and I enclose the translation of my letter upon that subject. It occurs to me that you might in some degree provide for the expense of this arrangement, by abolishing the color bearers ; and having the colors carried by Ensigns, as in the British service. I suggest this arrangement for your consideration.

‘ You will have seen that I have recommended that our Government should provide for the increase of pay to the officers, and should give even further pecuniary assistance, which I think will be complied with.

‘ In respect to our movement, you may depend upon it that I will disturb you as little as possible. All I shall ask is, probably, that some of your battalions should leave their cantonments on the high road and go into the villages in the neighbourhood, off the road, for a few days, while we shall be passing ; which will require neither time nor carriages, as your troops will return to their quarters when we shall have passed. Murray will write more particularly on this subject to Colonel D’Urban.



‘ I think that you will be full near enough to us in the positions you at present occupy. Indeed, it might be more convenient to all parties if you were more distant.

‘ I send an order to Colonel Fisher to give you 3000 stand of arms; I must send you the others from Elvas, unless you should wish to have them there. Let me know your wishes upon this point.

‘ Let me have an official report respecting the detention of M. Veron de Farincourt at Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ You did not enclose ——’s application to be appointed a Brigadier General. I do not understand what he means by it.

‘ The officers who have presented a memorial claiming an increase of pay have carried the principle, that words break no bones, as far as it is possible; and I must say that the greatest part of my time is taken up in resisting applications of this description. They have misstated the principle on which they were appointed to serve with the Portuguese army, and have omitted to give any one reason why the agreement under which they engaged to serve in the Portuguese army should be departed from, excepting that they wish to have a little more money in their pockets; which is equally applicable to the situation of every other officer in the army.

‘ I enclose you the copy of a dispatch of the 7th November, from Lord Liverpool, in answer to three of yours of the 11th and 19th October, and the copy of one of the 14th November, relative to Trant and Cox’s rank, to which you will observe, by another dispatch, that the King consents.

‘ I likewise enclose the extract of a letter of the 13th, from Sir D. Dundas, relative to the appointment of additional field officers to the Portuguese army. You will observe that Hawkshaw is to be promoted, *vice* Patrick. In respect to the other two, it does not appear quite clear, from the General’s letter, whether he means that I am to recommend them from the British army under my command exclusively, or to include officers serving with the Portuguese troops. I rather believe the latter; and if you are of the same opinion, I wish you would fix upon two now serving with the Portuguese troops, with Portuguese advanced rank and pay, either Captains or Majors, or one of each, to be promoted; and I

shall be glad if they should belong to the regiments in this army, in order that those regiments may have the benefit of the promotion in succession. However, you must be guided in this last point by your own views of what is right and fair to others.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 27th November, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s letter of the 2nd instant, in which you have enclosed the copy of one from Mr. Villiers; and in case I should have any opportunity of communicating with the German corps in the service of the enemy, I shall attend to your Lordship’s instructions.

‘ It is impossible for me to say what number of Germans were enlisted at Oporto and Ciudad Rodrigo from the enemy’s troops, because I did not command His Majesty’s troops in this country at the time; but I did in the months of July and August last, and I have no recollection of the arrival of any German deserters from the Escurial, much less of 160. Neither do I recollect the circumstance of a battalion being in treaty to join us, when the British army was in the neighbourhood of that of the enemy in July and August.

‘ The German troops were at and in the neighbourhood of Toledo, with few exceptions; some few then deserted, but not in such numbers as to deserve serious attention; and adverting to the encouragement they had from the Commander in Chief of the Spanish army, and to the facilities afforded to them by our neighbourhood and their own position, I was rather inclined to be of opinion that as a body, or even in very large numbers, they were not desirous of quitting the French service. At the same time, the commanding officers of the German regiments in the British service were not anxious to receive them as recruits, in which they were not wrong, as most of the few they did receive have since deserted from them; and, upon the whole, I did not think there was any ground for a belief that any measures which I might adopt to encourage or facilitate desertion

from the enemy's German troops would have an effect at all proportionate to the expense of them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

[*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 28th November, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter, which I have received from the Superintendent General of the Custom Houses of the province of Alentejo, relative to wine purchased in Portugal for the use of that part of the British army stationed in Spain.

‘ If the wine purchased for the consumption of that part of the British army stationed in Portugal is liable to the duty in question, it appears perfectly reasonable that the wine exported to Spain for the use of the army should not be exempt from the payment of the same; but if the wine consumed in Portugal should not pay duty, I hope that the Government will so far take into consideration the inconvenience which the troops who are in Spain will suffer, as to allow that which is exported for their use to be exported duty free.

‘ As it might be inconvenient to allow this wine to remain under sequestration until the answer to the references made shall arrive, I have written to the Superintendent of the Custom Houses in Alentejo to request him to allow the wine to pass into Spain, under the engagement which I have given to pay the duties, if the Government of Portugal should decide that they must be paid.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Badajoz, 28th November, 1809.

‘ We are much in want of boots, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give over to the Commissary General at Lisbon 500 pairs of the 2500 which were sent out for the Portuguese troops, and desire him to forward them to Badajoz without delay.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 28th November, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 1st instant, and I assure you that nothing can be more satisfactory to me than to renew my public communications with you. I am convinced that I shall always receive from you that fair protection, support and assistance to which an officer is entitled when he acts fairly by the public, and all the friendship and kindness which I have been accustomed to receive from you in another situation.

‘ I trust that my public and private letters on the subject of the war in the Peninsula, and of Portugal in particular, will have been satisfactory to you and to the Government. You see that I agree entirely in opinion with you, not only that we cannot in good policy give up the Peninsula, but that we may be able to continue the contest in Portugal with success, and that we shall finally bring off our army.

‘ During the continuance of this contest, which must necessarily be defensive on our part, in which there may be no brilliant events, and in which, after all, I may fail, I shall be most confoundedly abused, and in the end I may lose the little character I have gained; but I should not act fairly by the Government if I did not tell them my real opinion, which is, that they will betray the honor and interests of the country if they do not continue their efforts in the Peninsula, which, in my opinion, are by no means hopeless, notwithstanding the defeat of Areygaza.

‘ Lord Castlereagh’s misfortunes have given me the greatest concern. His kindness to me has been unbounded; and I shall always be happy to hear of any thing that can tend to his honor or satisfaction.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Bart Frere, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 29th November, 1809.

‘ Captain Silvertop, late of the 14th dragoons, has expressed a desire to serve with the Spanish army, and that I should recommend him to you for that purpose. Captain

Silvertop has been strongly recommended to me by the Commanding Officer of the 14th light dragoons, under whose command he served ; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will recommend him to the Government.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *B. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 29th November, 1809.

‘ We are much in want of the lower class of medical assistants with this army, such as assistant surgeons and hospital mates : so much so, that if I were obliged to move, I should not have with the regiments nearly a sufficient number to do the duty ; and those attached to the hospitals have more duty to perform than they can well manage, particularly now that the disorders are so violent. I shall be very glad if an effort can be made to send us some hospital mates. We should have at least thirty, to put us in this respect in the state in which we ought to be.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To his Excellency the Conde de la Villa Nueva de la Barca, Governor of Badajoz.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 29th November, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency’s letter to Lieut. General Sherbrooke of the 24th instant, relative to certain outrages committed by English soldiers, in resistance of the authority of a sentry. One of the soldiers principally concerned in this affray is wounded, and has not yet recovered from his wounds. There was also a non-commissioned officer with the men in question, whom I have ordered into confinement ; and they shall be tried for this offence as soon as the wounded man shall be sufficiently recovered to stand his trial, and punished according to the sentence of the Court Martial.

‘ I assure your Excellency that nothing gives me more concern than these outrages, which I invariably punish when they come to my knowledge. I consider a sentry as a deputy of the public authority at his station, and that all men,

however high in rank, are bound to obey the orders he has to give them.

‘ I think it proper, however, to inform your Excellency, that the orders given to the sentries in this garrison are not uniformly the same, or that care is not taken to make them understand their orders in the same manner, as I have myself experienced, particularly lately; and it is not astonishing that ignorant people, as soldiers are, should be disinclined to obey orders given by a sentry, which they may believe are dictated by caprice, and have not been received from superior authority.

‘ I do not mention this subject by way of excuse for these soldiers, whose conduct has been inexcusable, but to draw the attention of your Excellency to this fact.

‘ I have also to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency’s letter respecting the conduct of a person in the service of General Payne; and if your Excellency will do me the favor to send him to me, his conduct shall be inquired into, and he shall be punished.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Conde de la Villa Nueva*  
*Governor of Badajoz.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool,*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 30th November, 1809.

‘ The Spanish army in La Mancha, which I reported to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 16th November were on the 10th instant at Los Barrios, not far from Ocaña, moved on that night to attack a French corps which was in Ocaña.

‘ It appears that the Spanish Commander in Chief was not aware that the French corps in Ocaña consisted of 5000 infantry as well as of 800 cavalry: and he made his first attack with the Spanish cavalry only, supported by the infantry, which were repulsed with some loss of men, and, as I have understood, of two pieces of cannon. The French maintained their position in Ocaña till three in the morning, when they retired one league from the town towards Aranjuez; and at daylight they retired to that town, and the Spanish army took up its quarters again at Los Barrios. They remained there till the 13th, when they moved to their right to Santa Cruz de la Zarza; and on the 18th they re-



turned to Los Barrios, with an intention of attacking a French corps of about 25,000 men, including 5000 cavalry, which was advanced from Aranjuez towards Ocaña.

General Areyza found, however, that it was most probable that the enemy would attack him before he should be prepared to make his movement, and he formed his army in the plain in the rear of Ocaña to receive their attack on the morning of the 19th instant. The enemy advanced in three columns, with one of which they took possession of Ocaña; and having overthrown the Spanish cavalry on the right of their position, they broke the Spanish infantry of the right wing, which was thrown into confusion; and the left wing of the army, which was likewise threatened with an attack by the right column of the enemy, retired without firing a shot.

The loss of the Spanish army upon this occasion has been considerable. Not less, I understand, than fifty-five pieces of cannon have fallen into the enemy's hands, together with the military chest, the provisions, baggage, clothing, &c., of the army. The head quarters were, on the night of the 19th, at Tembleque, and on the 22nd at La Carolina. A corps of Spanish dragoons, consisting of 1000 men, under General Bernay, which had not been in the action at Ocaña, and which were ordered to Madridejos to cover the retreat of the fugitives from the battle, also dispersed on the 20th, on hearing of the advance of a detachment of the enemy's cavalry; and on the 24th, the date of the last accounts from La Carolina, only 500 cavalry of different regiments had assembled at Manzanares, and very few of the defeated army had arrived at La Carolina.

The advanced parties of the French cavalry had not passed Villarta as late as the 21st; and by the accounts from La Carolina of the 24th, it appears that the enemy had not advanced any farther.

It is supposed that the fugitives from the battle of Ocaña have gone generally into Murcia and Valencia.

Besides the corps consisting of 25,000 men, commanded by the King and Marshal Soult, with which General Areyza was engaged on the 19th instant, it is understood that another corps, under Victor and Sebastiani, was to cross the Tagus at Fuentidueña, and fall upon the right of the Spanish

army. The enemy also occupied Talavera de la Reyna with 10,000 men.

‘ It appears that, between the 12th and 14th, they withdrew from Old Castille the reinforcements which they had sent into that province from Estremadura, in consequence of the Duque del Parque’s success at Tamames; but I should doubt whether these troops were engaged in the operations against the Spanish army commanded by General Areyzaga.

‘ The Duque del Parque, who I reported to your Lordship in my letter of the 16th instant, had his head quarters at Bejar, continued in that situation till the 17th, when hearing of the evacuation of Castille by the reinforcements which had been sent from Estremadura, he advanced again; and I understand from the last accounts that a detachment from his corps was again in possession of Salamanca. This possession, however, can be but momentary, as it must be expected that the enemy will take advantage of the defeat of the army under General Areyzaga, to reinforce their troops in Old Castille to such an extent as to establish their government in that province.

‘ The corps under the Duque de Alburquerque, which had been directed to cross the Tagus at the bridge of Arzobispo, and to co-operate with the corps under the Duque del Parque, which had been ordered to pass through the mountains at Baños, and to proceed to Talavera de la Reyna, to create a diversion in favor of General Areyzaga, is at Peralda de Garbin, near the bridge of Arzobispo, which is occupied by the Duque de Alburquerque’s advanced guard.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copies and extracts of a correspondence which I have had with Mr. Frere, on the subject of the co-operation of the British army with the corps of the Duque de Alburquerque and the Duque del Parque, in this plan of diversion.

‘ Adverting to the opinions which I have given to His Majesty’s Ministers, and to the Ambassador at Seville, it will not be supposed that I could have encouraged the advance of General Areyzaga, or could have held out the prospect of any co-operation by the British army.

‘ The first official information which I had from the Government, of the movement made by General Areyzaga,

was on the 18th, the day before his defeat; and I gave the answer on the 19th, regarding the plan, of which I now enclose the copy.

‘ I was at Seville, however, when the General commenced his march from the Sierra Morena; and in more than one conversation with the Spanish Ministers and Members of the Junta, communicated to them my conviction that General Areyzaga would be defeated.

‘ The expectation, however, of success from this large army, stated to consist of 50,000 men, was so general and so sanguine, that the possibility of disappointment was not even contemplated; and, accordingly, your Lordship will find it was not until the 16th that the Government began to think it necessary to endeavor to make a diversion in favor of General Areyzaga; and it is probable that it was thought expedient to make this diversion only in consequence of the fall of the General’s own hopes, after his first trial with the enemy on the night of the 10th instant.

‘ It is impossible for me to express any opinion on the probable consequences of this defeat, till I shall know its exact extent, and in what numbers and in what state the Spanish troops will re-assemble.

‘ I am anxious to cross the Tagus with the British army, and to station it on the frontiers of Old Castille, from thinking that the point in which I can be of most use in preventing the enemy from effecting any important object, and which will best answer for my future operations in the defence of Portugal. With this view I have requested Mr. Frere to urge the Government to reinforce the Duque de Albuquerque’s corps, in order to secure the passage of the lower part of the Tagus: and although the state of the season would render it desirable that I should make the movement at an early period, I do not propose to make it till I shall see more clearly the consequences of the late defeat, and some prospect that the city of Seville will be secure after I shall move.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 30th November, 1809.

‘ In addition to the official documents which I have forwarded to you in my dispatch of this day, I enclose the copy of a private letter of the 19th to Mr. Frere, in which I have pointed out more in detail the consequences of the operations which had been proposed to me by the Government, and the difficulties which would attend, indeed I may say the impossibility of their execution.

‘ I understand that the people of Seville are informed of my opinions upon the late expedition; and that they have expressed an anxious desire that the Government should attend to what I should recommend to them in future.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 30th November, 1809.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter from the Admiralty to Admiral Berkeley; in consequence of which I have recommended to the Admiral not to send transports to England with that part of the 23rd light dragoons which I intended to send home immediately. I am convinced that the order could not be intended to prevent the use of the transports for the service of the army; and particularly not to transport troops to England, which in case of the evacuation must go thither. But as I have made a reference to the Commander in Chief respecting the 23rd light dragoons, I was not sorry to detain them a little longer.

‘ As I know the Admiralty are very quick in despatching orders, I was not sure what might have passed in the Cabinet to occasion this order; and upon the whole, I thought it best and safest, and liable to no inconvenience, to recommend an obedience to its letter. It is desirable, however, that, as soon as possible, we should have some latitude given to us respecting the disposal of the transports in the Tagus.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 30th November, 1809.

‘ I beg you to read my dispatches, which I have desired Captain Canning to deliver to you, and to refer you particularly to that which contains an answer to one from Lord Liverpool, on the subject of the German deserters, in which it appears you had written a dispatch to England.

‘ I wish that you had done me the favor to have referred the authority to me, on which you founded your report, before you sent it home, as I could have proved to you that it was incorrect, not only in those statements which related to transactions supposed to have taken place while I commanded the army, but that it was equally incorrect respecting the 500 Germans stated to have deserted upon a former occasion.

‘ Several people in England have given credit to this statement, supported as it now is by your authority; and it is supposed that I have neglected the important means pointed out of diminishing the strength of the enemy’s forces. Now, I must tell you a secret upon this subject, the truth of which can be proved by the inspection of our returns by any body who will take the trouble of looking at them, and that is,—Supposing the story of the desertion of the Germans to be true, and that 160 entered the British army without my knowing any thing about it, we have lost more Germans by desertion from our army than the French have from theirs.

‘ I have received your letter of the 26th, and I am much obliged to you for the packet arrangement.

‘ I was at Villa Viçosa last week, and did not write to you by the messenger who took the army letters to Lisbon.

‘ I have again spoken this day to the Commissary General respecting the French gold, and he will write to Mr. Dunmore respecting it. I think we ought not to send this coin to our officers at Madrid, as it is probable that they would experience as much difficulty or loss in passing it as we should here or at Lisbon; and I think the small sums we are permitted to send them ought to be in the coins which they could pass with the greatest advantage.

‘ I am afraid that it would be inconvenient to us to give to you the whole sum of £100,000 at once, as our supplies have lately failed us a little; but Mr. Murray has directions

to pay to your order £50,000 whenever you please; and £50,000 more you shall have in a fortnight afterwards.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ The death of Lord Lansdowne, which, if it has not already occurred, must occur, I understand, very shortly, is a political event of the greatest consequence, and I think very likely to have very extensive effects upon the affairs of the present moment.’

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Badajoz, 30th November, 1809.

‘ I have received your letters of the 26th and 29th.

‘ The Duque del Parque has advanced, because whatever may be the consequence, the Spaniards always think it necessary to advance when their front is clear of the enemy, whatever may be the ultimate consequences of their advance. He will retire again in a terrible hurry, as soon as he shall find that Areyzaga is destroyed, and that the French are again reinforcing Castille, and mean to destroy him.

‘ I wish I knew what was likely to be the final result of the action at Ocaña, and could cross the Tagus. The next important event will certainly occur in that quarter. You should warn your battalions on the frontier, that they may not be surprised.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I have begged Villiers to show you my dispatches.’

*To Major General the Hon. G. L. Cole.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 30th November, 1809.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have lately received from the Secretary at War, respecting certain accounts of the — regiment which have not been transmitted to the War Office, and a copy of a letter which has been written to the commanding officer of that regiment, by my desire, and of his answer.

‘ As the Secretary at War has directed that the cause of the non-transmission of these accounts may be particularly



inquired into, I beg that you will assemble a Court of Inquiry, to consist of yourself and three of the senior field officers of the 4th division, (not including any of the ——— regiment,) and that you will inquire into, and especially report on, the cause of deviation from established rule in the 1st battalion ——— regiment, noticed by the Secretary at War.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General*  
*the Hon. G. L. Cole.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 30th November, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd instant, and I have sent directions to the officer commanding at Lisbon, specifying those carriages belonging to the Waggon Train which are to be landed and received into store at Lisbon, as being likely to be of use to the army; and those which are to be sent back to England.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions that the last, thirty in number, may be embarked in an empty victualler, to be returned to England.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*  
*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. the Joint Paymasters General.*

‘ MY LORD AND SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 30th November, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 31st October, in which you have desired that, in the case mentioned in a letter to your Deputy with this army, a copy of which you have enclosed, I shall allow Mr. Deputy Paymaster General Hunter to return to England.

‘ As it is not probable that the army will be immediately concentrated in Portugal, and as the head quarters will certainly not be established at Lisbon, I do not propose to make the alterations which you had directed in the expectation of the occurrence of these events.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*  
*the Paymasters General.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*

SIR,

‘Badajoz, 30th November, 1809.

‘I have to request that you will submit the enclosed memorial to the favorable consideration of the Commander in Chief; and I beg leave to recommend Major Coghlan, 61st regiment,\* in the strongest manner, as an officer most deserving of the promotion he solicits.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To B. Frere, Esq.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Badajoz, 1st December, 1809.

‘I enclose some papers which have been put into my hands by the Commissary General of the British army.

‘A person, by the name of —, was employed as Commissary of the cavalry at Merida, and in consequence of some suspicion of the propriety of the charges in his accounts, the Commissary General went there and removed him from his situation. Upon further inquiry, it appeared, that among other improprieties, he had been guilty of receiving five per cent. from the dealers in different articles furnished to the troops on payment of their demands, and that the Junta had a knowledge of this circumstance; and yet it appears that after his dismissal from his situation at Merida by the Commissary General, the Junta wrote the letter to have him replaced, of which I enclose the copy.

‘I do not know whether the Government have any and

\* Major Coghlan had been wounded and left at Talavera, and had escaped from prison on his march towards France. He was soon afterwards promoted to be Lieut. Colonel of the 61st, in the command of which regiment he was shot through the heart at the battle of Toulouse, on the 10th April, 1814. He was buried, under fire, in a temporary grave, on the position captured from the enemy; but, on the 12th, was removed, by the Compiler, to the Protestant cemetery in Toulouse, where the Commander of the Forces, Major General the Hon. Edward Pakenham, Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the Hon. Alexander Gordon, Sir John Colborne, Lieut. Colonel George Napier, and all the officers of the army then in Toulouse paid the last tribute of respect to his remains. He lived, in person, mind, and conduct, the model of a British officer; and he died, where he had often distinguished himself, at the head of his regiment, in the moment of victory.

what authority over the Provincial or Municipal Juntas. If they have, it is obvious that this Junta of Merida is entirely undeserving of their confidence.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *B. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To B. Frere, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 2nd December, 1809.’

‘ The officer who will have the honor of delivering this letter to you is Sir William Myers,\* the Lieut. Colonel of the Fusiliers, who is going to Seville for a few days; and I beg leave to recommend him to your attention.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *B. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To B. Frere, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 2nd December, 1809.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 30th, and I shall forward your dispatches to Lisbon by the first opportunity.

‘ You did quite right to open the letter from Colonel Roche; and I beg that you will peruse any that he may send to you in future which may be addressed to me.

‘ A letter from Colonel Alava, of the 29th, informs me that the Duque’s army consists only of 10,000 infantry and 600 cavalry; and from the movements of the enemy, of which he has given me an account, I have no doubt but that they are about to reinforce their army in Castille, when they will certainly strike a blow of importance. I should not be surprised if they were to endeavor at the same time to amuse me in this quarter. The reinforcement of the Duque’s corps, therefore, becomes a measure of the greatest importance and urgency; and if it can be done in time, I should hope that the enemy will derive no substantial advantage from their late success in La Mancha, excepting that which they have already acquired in the defeat of so large a body of men.

‘ There are two battalions in this garrison, that of Merida, and that of Seville, which were brought from Portugal to

\* Afterwards killed at the battle of Albuera, on the 16th May, 1811, in command of the Fusilier brigade. He was an officer of great promise.



reinforce the Duque's army, but have been detained here, I believe, contrary to orders.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *B. Frere, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I do not know why the bridge of Arzobispo should not be destroyed: if that were done, every thing on this side of the Tagus would be in safety and tranquillity during the winter, as the enemy have no bridge, nor any means of moving one; time would be afforded to organize and discipline an army in Estremadura; and, at all events, I might commence my march across the Tagus immediately.’

*To Colonel Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Badajoz, 3rd December, 1809.

‘ I am very much obliged for your letter of the —, which I received about a month ago, and which I thought so interesting, and the sentiments it contained on the situation of affairs at Madras so well deserving the attention and consideration of the King's servants, that I sent it to Lord Harrowby, who was at that time President of the Board of Control. I have not received any answer from him, nor do I know what has been determined, particularly respecting the state of affairs at Madras. But I understood generally that Sir G. Barlow's conduct had been approved; but that it was not intended to confirm the suspension of all the officers who had been suspended by him.

‘ You cannot conceive how much I have felt for what has passed on the Madras Establishment. I scarcely recognise in those transactions the men for whom I entertained so much respect, and had so much regard, a few years back; and I can only lament that they, and the army, and the affairs of that Presidency in general, have been so much mismanaged. These transactions, and their causes, prove that it is not always the man who has the character of being the best natured, and one of the easiest disposition, who will agree best with those placed in authority over him, or those with whom he is to co-operate. They owe their origin to the disputes of the persons in authority in India, that is to say, between the Governor and the Commander in Chief. Both,

but principally the latter, looked for partizans and supporters; and these have ended by throwing off all subordination, by relinquishing all habits of obedience, and almost by open resistance. Nothing can be more absurd than the pretext for this conduct.

‘ Colonel Munro’s\* opinion might be erroneous, and might have been harsh towards his brother officers; but not only he ought not to have been brought to a Court Martial for giving that opinion, but he ought to have been brought to a Court Martial if he had refrained from giving it, when he was called upon by the Commander in Chief to make him a report on a subject referred to his official consideration. The officers of the army are equally wrong in the part they have taken in the subsequent part of the question, which is one between the Governor and the Commander in Chief, whether the former had a right to protect Colonel Munro from the acts of the latter, upon which question no man can have a doubt who has any knowledge of the Constitution of Great Britain, and particularly of that of the Indian Governments. I, who have arrived pretty nearly at the top of the tree, should be the last man to give up any point of military right or etiquette. But I have no doubt whatever, not only that it was the right, but that it was the duty of the Governor in Council to interfere to save Colonel Munro; and that if he had not done so, and the public had sustained any loss or inconvenience from his trial, or if the public attention had been drawn to the injustice of his trial, the Governor would have been severely responsible for the omission to perform his duty.

‘ So far for my opinion upon the main points of the question. As for the others, the conduct of officers upon the addresses, the orders issued, the resolutions entered into, the resignations of their offices, &c. &c., they are consequences of the first error; that is, of persons in authority making partizans of those placed under them, instead of making all obey the constituted authorities of the state. This conduct in the officers of the army would have been wrong even if the cause had been just, and the Commander in Chief had wished to screen Colonel Munro from the per-

\* Colonel John Munro.

secution of the Government : and it is really not worth while to take up my time in describing, or yours in perusing, a description of the folly, the inconsistency, or the breaches of discipline and subordination contained in all those documents. I have so much regard for the Madras army, to which I owe much, that I would sacrifice a great deal to have it in my power to restore them to that state of discipline, union, and respectability in which I left them in the year 1805; and I assure you that I shall rejoice most sincerely when I shall hear that their good sense and good temper have predominated over their feelings of party and their prejudices.

‘I am very much obliged to you for your account of Persian affairs. I understand that an ambassador has passed Gibraltar, on his way to England; but the question is, on what terms this concession on the part of Persia has been obtained. I am entirely ignorant of all this, and I only wish that you had been the instrument of making this arrangement.

‘You will have heard of all that has passed in this country, and I will not, therefore, trouble you with a repetition of the story. The battle of Talavera was certainly the hardest fought of modern days, and the most glorious in its result to our troops. Each side engaged lost a quarter of their numbers.

‘It is lamentable that, owing to the miserable inefficiency of the Spaniards, to their want of exertion, and the deficiency of numbers even of the allies, much more of discipline, and every other military quality, when compared with the enemy in the Peninsula, the glory of the action is the only benefit which we have derived from it. But that is a solid and substantial benefit, of which we have derived some good consequences already; for, strange to say, I have contrived, with the little British army, to keep every thing in check since the month of August last; and if the Spaniards had not contrived, by their own folly, and against my entreaties and remonstrances, to lose an army in La Mancha about a fortnight ago, I think we might have brought them through the contest. As it is, however, I do not despair. I have in hand a most difficult task, from which I may not extricate myself; but I must not shrink from it. I command *an*



*unanimous army*; I draw well with all the authorities in Spain and Portugal, and I believe I have the good wishes of the whole world. In such circumstances one may fail, but it would be dishonorable to shrink from the task.

‘Pray remember me kindly to all friends in the East Indies. I do not mention names, as I do not know whom you have with you; but I assure you that I have the most affectionate recollection of them all, and that nothing gives me greater pleasure than to hear of their prosperity.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Malcolm.

‘WELLINGTON.

‘You will have seen that your father in law\* distinguished himself in the battle of Talavera. He was wounded, and is gone to England; but he is now quite well, and I expect his early return to the army.’

*To B. Frere, Esq.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Badajoz, 5th December, 1809.

‘I write by desire of Mr. Dillon, to inform you that he is employed by contract with the Commissary General of the army, to make at Seville, and to forward to Elvas, for the use of the British, 400,000 lbs. of biscuit.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘B. Frere, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To B. Frere, Esq.*

‘SIR,

‘Badajoz, 6th December, 1809.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 2nd and 3rd, to which I had intended to reply by a detailed statement of my sentiments respecting the operations to be adopted by the corps of the Duque del Parque and the Duque de Alburquerque; but this morning has brought me accounts of the defeat of the former on the 28th November; and that the latter had withdrawn from his position on the 2nd instant, by order of Government; which order must have been sent at the time Don F. de Saavedra wrote the note to you of the 2nd.

\* Brig. General, afterwards Lieut. General Sir Alexander Campbell, K.C.B.

‘ It is useless for me, therefore, to trouble you with my ideas upon operations which can no longer be carried into execution. I must act according to my own views of what will be best for the general cause; and I propose, therefore, to commence my march to cross the Tagus without loss of time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *B. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To B. Frere, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 6th December, 1809.

‘ Six weeks have elapsed since the French General Kellermann released Lieut. Cameron, of the 79th regiment, on condition that Lieut. de Turenne, his aide de camp, who had been taken prisoner by the guerrillas in Castille, should be released in exchange. Lieut. Cameron had arrived at the British head quarters, and I applied to the Government through the Ambassador, Lord Wellesley, that Lieut. de Turenne might be placed at my disposal; to which application, after the delay of a considerable period of time, I received a refusal; and I then applied to the Portuguese Government, and received their consent to the release of Lieut. Veron de Farincourt in exchange for Lieut. Cameron.

‘ I directed Marshal Beresford to send that officer from Lisbon to the outposts of the Spanish army with his cartel of exchange; and I have now the honor to enclose a report which I have received from Marshal Beresford of the steps he had taken to carry my orders into execution, and of the circumstances which have prevented him from completing them; and I have further to inform you, that, from later accounts from Almeida, I understand that, notwithstanding Marshal Beresford’s remonstrance, Lieut. Veron de Farincourt, and the Portuguese officer in whose charge he was placed, are still detained at Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ It is scarcely necessary to animadvert upon the impropriety of this conduct, which has been so frequently repeated by different officers in different parts, that it is hardly possible to believe that it is not countenanced by the Government.

‘ I have hitherto omitted to make any representation to the Secretary of State upon this subject, from a desire to

avoid bringing under the view of His Majesty circumstances which are calculated to give him so much pain. But I can no longer omit to perform this duty, unless Lieut. Veron de Farincourt should be forthwith allowed to proceed from Ciudad Rodrigo, and reparation should be made for the insults to the Portuguese officer sent in charge of him.

‘ It must be obvious to the Government, that they cannot with propriety claim a right to prevent any of the allies from communicating with the General Officers in command of the enemy’s troops on the subject of the relief to be afforded to, and the exchange of, their prisoners; and that the result of this claim, and of the exercise of it in the manner in which it has been exercised, must be to increase the difficulty of giving them any aid, and to alter the disposition of the officers and soldiers of the army, and of all the people in England, to give their cause every assistance in their power.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *B. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To B. Frere, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 6th December, 1809.

‘ In reference to Lord Wellesley’s dispatch marked R, of the 10th November, in which he enclosed the account of sums due to the Spanish Government for certain shirts and sheets supplied for the use of the British hospitals, I have the honor to enclose the reports of the Commissary General, and of the Purveyor General of Hospitals of the British army. From these reports, it would appear that the first transmiss from Seville only reached the British army; and that the articles found in the bales did not correspond in number with the statement contained in the paper forwarded by Lord Wellesley, of which I enclose a copy.

‘ I conclude that the second transmiss was received by the Spanish army; but we certainly received only one.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know to whom I am to pay for the shirts and sheets which we have received.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *B. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To B. Frere, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 6th December, 1809.

‘ I shall not detain the messenger by any addition to my official letters of this day, excepting to lament that a cause which promised so well a few weeks ago should have been so completely lost by the ignorance, presumption, and mismanagement of those to whose direction it was intrusted.

‘ I declare that if they had preserved their two armies, or even one of them, the cause was safe. The French could have sent no reinforcements which could have been of any use; time would have been gained; the state of affairs would have improved daily; all the chances were in our favor; and in the first moment of weakness occasioned by any diversion on the continent, or by the growing discontent of the French themselves with the war, the French armies must have been driven out of Spain.

‘ But no! Nothing will answer excepting to fight great battles in plains, in which their defeat is as certain as is the commencement of the battle. They will not credit the accounts I have repeatedly given them of the superior number even of the French; they will seek them out, and they find them invariably in all parts in numbers superior to themselves.

‘ I am only afraid, now, that I shall be too late to save Ciudad Rodrigo; the loss of which will secure for the French Old Castille, and will cut off all communication with the northern provinces, and leave them to their fate.

‘ I wonder whether the Spanish officers ever read the history of the American war; or of their own war in the Dutch provinces; or of their own war in Portugal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *B. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 6th December, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 3rd, and I am much concerned that any thing I wrote in mine should have hurt you in the least. I am thoroughly convinced that you have uniformly acted towards me in the fairest and the kindest

manner, and if my letter to which you refer expressed any other sentiment, it contained that which I did not, and could not, mean to express.

‘ You certainly never communicated to me the information on which you founded your dispatch of the 2nd October, although you did the dispatch itself. This dispatch refers only to the general subject of the foreigners in the service of France, and expresses your opinion that much might be done to distress France, by inducing those foreigners to desert from the armies in Spain, without reference to any particular facts or information upon which the last part of the opinion was founded. If I had known at the time that the last part of your opinion was founded upon reports, I should have requested you not to send home those reports, as they would make an impression injurious to me upon false grounds, with the same freedom that I complained that this impression had been made certainly very unknowingly by you. You never could suspect that the whole of the report made to you was without foundation ; and you naturally imagined that the facts were known to me, and that, from an erroneous opinion of mine, I had neglected this mode of annoying the enemy.

‘ You were quite right in bringing that subject before the Government, and you were more in the right under the conception that I had neglected the subject entirely. But what I lamented was that I had not an opportunity of showing you that I had not neglected the subject, and that you were misinformed as to the facts, before you sent home.

‘ I agree entirely with you upon the whole of this subject ; and you may depend upon it that, whenever I shall have an opportunity, I shall encourage the desertion of the foreigners from the army as much as may be in my power.

‘ I am convinced that, in all your recommendations to Government, you act fairly upon your own opinions, and it gives me the greatest satisfaction at all times to concur with you. Men in your situation and in mine, however, must look at all questions with a very different view ; which difference of view is, I believe, the main cause of any difference of opinion which may appear to exist between us. In my situation, I am bound to consider not only what is expedient, but what is practicable, and no General Officer in these days can

venture, even in a confidential dispatch to a minister, to speculate upon advantages of any description which it is not practicable to accomplish. If he ventures upon such speculations, the tables are immediately turned upon him; and although none of the conditions or requisites of his speculation may have been performed, he is asked for what reason he did not acquire those advantages which he had described in his dispatches.

‘ Besides that, I conceive that acting as I do confidentially with Ministers, and acquainted as I am with their means, the employment for them, and the difficulties of all descriptions which in these days they have to contend with, I should not act fairly by them if I were to speculate in my dispatches upon advantages which would result if certain measures were adopted, which measures I know it to be out of their power to adopt.

‘ This principle applies strongly to the question of the increase of the force in this country. I am perfectly aware that 40,000 men are better than 30,000; and that the sickness of the army, and other circumstances, may prevent my having 30,000 men for the field, out of the number for which I have called. But upon this point I beg to refer you to Mr. Canning’s dispatch to Lord Wellesley of the 12th August, in which the whole question of the means of increasing the force in the Peninsula is fully canvassed, and the amount disposable for that purpose is decidedly stated.

‘ With the knowledge of these facts and opinions by the Government, would it be fair, or indeed honest, in me to call for a man more than I thought absolutely necessary for my purpose?

‘ In respect to the last part of your letter, I adverted to the subject of money for the Portuguese Government at all, only because the Secretary of State in his letter to me, to which mine is an answer, point by point, refers to the assistance of all descriptions required to be given to Portugal, and the expense of that assistance. I had already called for arms, clothing, &c. &c., in different dispatches, and in the last I stated money.

‘ If I have calculated the deficit in the Portuguese resources of the year 1809 erroneously, I have been misled by the papers which the Portuguese Government have given me;



and by a paper you gave me yourself at Abrantes, in which the deficit is stated at about £900,000.

‘ I never pretended to cover a deficit of £900,000 with a subsidy of £300,000, but having stated the totals of the receipt, and of the expenditure as given to me, I stated the deficit, and upon what branches of the service it fell, and was likely to fall hereafter, all as stated to me officially; and as a measure of relief (a *practicable measure*, in my opinion, for I never will recommend any other), I recommended that the King’s servants should assist them with £300,000.

‘ I said nothing of the extent of the relief this loan would afford, nor did I pretend any thing so absurd as that it would cover the deficit; all I hoped for was, that it would prevent the deficit from falling upon the military establishments, and those connected with them.

‘ If I had asked for £900,000, I should not have got a shilling, and I think it more than probable that I shall get the £300,000 besides the pay for the officers.

‘ In respect to the effect of the advance of this sum upon Portuguese finance, or upon other exertions, I acknowledge that I for one am not sanguine enough to believe that any exertion Portugal can make, under existing circumstances, can increase her resources in any great degree.

‘ The first step for any country in the situation of Portugal to take, is to collect in some reasonable degree the taxes already existing, before they add to the numbers of them; and I believe it will be very difficult for Portugal, with an enemy at the door, and having been in the possession of the French, and without a government, to pretend to make an efficient collection of the taxes already imposed on the people.

‘ The only resource that remains, then, is to prevail upon the English Ministers to assist Portugal—with what?—not the amount of the deficit, for that they cannot do, but with as large a sum as I think they have at their disposal, which, if it will not do every thing, will be of some use.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 7th December, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 3rd, regarding Colonel Handel, and I do not see any objection to his being sent here. I forward with this Mr. Frere’s and my dispatches, which I beg you to peruse, and send them to England by the packet.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I enclose a petition upon a matter in which I have no concern, to which I request you to have such an answer sent as you may think proper.’

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 7th December, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th November.

‘ Adverting to the orders you have received from the Admiralty, and to the opinion which I have communicated to you upon those orders, and to the detention of the 23rd light dragoons in consequence of them, I cannot request you to send to England an additional transport for the accommodation of the officers of the army returning for their health, much less for that of officers returning to England on account of their private affairs; however desirous I am to accommodate officers as far as the public service will allow.

‘ When transports or other vessels return to England or Ireland, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will allow accommodation to be afforded in them, in the first instance, to such officers as are obliged to return on account of their health; and next, to those who may go on their private affairs: but I cannot request that any vessel may be sent on purpose for their accommodation.

‘ I did not write to you or Mr. Villiers by the messenger to whom you refer.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Badajoz, 7th December, 1809.  
 ‘ I have answered by this opportunity your letter of the 30th November.  
 ‘ In case of necessity, I will take care of the boats upon the Tagus; but I have in contemplation an arrangement which I shall propose to the Government on this subject, which I hope will have the effect of securing all we wish for.  
 ‘ I am much obliged to you for your attention to the Bugio.  
 ‘ We shall have in readiness at Cadiz, by the 15th of the month, and at Gibraltar, at about the same time, sums of money, for which I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send a vessel. Probably she had best go first to Gibraltar; but that must depend very much upon the state of the wind.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*  
 ‘ *the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Leite.*

‘ SIR, ‘ Badajoz, 7th December, 1809.  
 ‘ I have for some time been desirous of having an opportunity of reviewing the corps in the garrison of Elvas, comprising the brigade of Brigadier General Victoria; and with your permission I shall be glad to see them at ten o’clock on Monday, at any place between this and Elvas which you may fix upon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Gen. Leite.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD, ‘ Badajoz, 7th December, 1809.  
 ‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will urge the transmission at an early period of the blankets, clothing, and other stores ordered for the Portuguese army; as upon their arrival will depend in a great measure the numbers of them which we shall have for duty, and their efficiency.  
 ‘ In your last letter upon this subject, you referred only to 10,000 suits of clothing; this was the last demand made, when it was supposed that 20,000 suits were coming out. But



as all these 20,000 were useless, and orders have now been given to send some of them elsewhere, I hope that you will have ordered out 20,000 suits in addition to the 10,000.

‘ I also hope your Lordship will have made an exertion to send us out hospital mates. You can have no idea of the difficulties to which I am reduced in moving the army from its present quarters, for want of medical assistance; and if, unfortunately, the troops should be sickly in their new quarters, or on their march, I do not know what is to become of them.

‘ It is very desirable that a few hospital ships should be attached to this army. I understand that there are some in the service in England, which might be sent out; and in case of the necessity for embarking, they would be exceedingly useful to us. I also hope that your Lordship will have your eye upon us; and if you should find that we are likely to be hard pressed in Portugal, that you will reinforce the squadron in the Tagus.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 7th December, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a return of stores, which I request your Lordship will be pleased to cause to be sent out to Lisbon as soon as possible, for the use of the army under my command.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM OF ARTICLES OF CAMP EQUIPAGE REQUIRED  
FROM ENGLAND.

Badajoz, 2nd December, 1809.

	Cavalry.	Number.
Sets of Forage Cords, four to a set . . . . .		1,500
Water Buckets . . . . .		500
Hair Nose Bags . . . . .		3,000
Picket {	Ropes . . . . .	500
	Poles . . . . .	1,500
	Mallets . . . . .	200
Three thousand Corn Sacks; these being no longer considered as regimental necessaries.		

GEO. MURRAY, Q.M.G.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Badajoz, 7th December, 1809.

‘ The Duque del Parque’s corps, which, in my dispatch of the 30th November, I informed your Lordship had moved forward from Bejar on the 17th, upon finding that the enemy’s troops in Old Castille had been weakened, had advanced as far as Alba de Tormes on the 21st, with his advanced posts between Carpio and Fresno.

‘ These were attacked at Carpio on the 23rd by a large corps of cavalry and infantry from Valladolid ; but the enemy was repulsed, notwithstanding that the Spanish cavalry behaved in the most dastardly manner.

‘ The Duque del Parque, after this affair, advanced as far as Fresno, from whence he retired again on the 26th, and I have no further authentic account of his operations, excepting what is contained in the enclosed extract of a letter from Mr. Frere, of the 6th instant.

‘ The accounts which I have received from Colonel Cox, at Almeida, state that the army was defeated on the evening of the 28th, and had dispersed ; but Colonel Cox communicated only the reports, usually exaggerated on these occasions, which he had received, but none of them from authentic sources.

‘ I enclose copies of letters which I wrote in the months of September and October, upon the plan of operations proposed for the Duque del Parque’s corps, which was reinforced by the junction of Ballesteros’s corps, of from 7000 to 10,000 men, after those letters were written, which will serve to point out the difficulty and risk to which any corps is exposed in operations in that country.

‘ The last accounts which I have received from La Carolina are dated the 1st instant, at which period but very few of the remains of the dispersed army had come in ; and many of those who had come in were without arms. I understand, however, that 8000 men had gone to Cuença, where General Echevarria had taken the command of them.

‘ The French had not continued the pursuit ; but many of their troops had re-crossed the Tagus at Toledo, and some of their corps had marched into Old Castille, and others had come to Talavera and Oropesa.

‘ I had urged the Spanish Government to augment the army of the Duque de Alburquerque to 20,000 men, in order that it might occupy, in a sufficient manner, the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, and the passes through the mountains leading from Arzobispo to Truxillo, in which position they would have covered effectually the province of Estremadura during the winter at least, and would have afforded time and leisure for preparations for further opposition to the enemy ; and I delayed the movement which I have long been desirous of making to the northward of the Tagus, till the reinforcements could be sent to the Duque de Alburquerque, which I had lately recommended should be drawn from the army of the Duque del Parque.

‘ During the discussions upon this subject, the Government have given orders to the Duque de Alburquerque to retire with his corps behind the Guadiana, to a position which he cannot maintain ; thus leaving open the road into Estremadura, and incurring the risk of the loss of that province, whenever the enemy choose to take possession of it.

‘ As it is very desirable that the British army should neither be involved in a contest for the security of Estremadura, nor should have the discredit of retiring from the province when it shall be attacked, I am obliged to commence immediately the movement which I had so long projected to the north of the Tagus.

‘ The defeat, dispersion, and almost annihilation, as an armed body, of the army of La Mancha, and the probable loss of arms by the army under the Duque del Parque, induce me to draw the attention of the King’s Ministers to this important subject. From all that I hear of the army in La Mancha, defeated on the 19th November, I believe that the greater number of the soldiers have returned to their homes ; but the war has drawn so little hitherto upon the population of Spain, that I have no doubt that the Government will be able again to collect men for a fresh army ; but they certainly have not in their possession, and cannot acquire without assistance from Great Britain, the means of arming them.

‘ His Majesty’s Ministers must be the best judges of the propriety of affording this assistance ; and I must observe that such is the nature of the Government and of the people of Spain, of the officers who command the armies, and of the



soldiers who serve in them, that I cannot be certain that the same misfortunes would not again occur, if the Government had the means of putting another army in the field; and I cannot devise means by which His Majesty might be secured against this improvident waste of the resources and assistance which he might still be disposed to supply to the Spaniards.

‘ I would venture to suggest, however, that if in the course of the winter the Spanish Government should so far get the better of the consequences of the late defeats as to be able to collect again the officers and men of an army, it would be a source of great regret if means of arming them were wanting at the moment in which they should be ready, and should be required to take the field; and it would be more particularly to be regretted, if recent events should have occasioned such an improvement of the Government as has been long wished for in this country; and if the situation of affairs in other parts of Europe should prevent the enemy from sending such a reinforcement to his armies in Spain as at once to put an end to the contest.

‘ I would therefore recommend that such a supply of arms as can be afforded should be sent out in the first instance to the Tagus, to be under the direction of His Majesty’s Minister at Seville, who should order them round to Cadiz, and dispose of them as he might deem best for His Majesty’s service.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Bar. Frere, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 9th December, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th instant, and I have since received accounts of the army in Old Castille to the 3rd instant; from which it appears that although the army under the Duque del Parque has suffered considerably, and was not on the 3rd in a state fit to perform any service, numbers of the troops still remain with it, and it may be re-established by care and attention to the wants of the troops, and rest.

‘ Recent events in La Mancha, as well as in Old Castille, must have shown the Spanish Government that it is desirable that they should avoid general actions in plains.

‘ Admitting that the Spanish infantry, in its present state, is able to contend on equal terms with the French, it is obvious that the cavalry is not so; and without that arm an army is incomplete, and enters upon every operation under very considerable disadvantages.

‘ It is not fair or just to the cavalry to attribute their conduct in the different actions which have been fought lately to want of spirit. They are people of the same description with the other soldiers of the army, and must partake of the same feelings. It is, in fact, want of discipline. Undisciplined cavalry have always conducted themselves in the same manner, in all countries; and in the first years of the revolutionary war, the French themselves suffered frequently the same disasters from the flight and misbehaviour of their cavalry.

‘ The want of discipline in the cavalry is an evil to which time alone can apply a remedy; and in the mean time it is probable that the experience of the whole war, and particularly of their recent misfortunes, will have pointed out to the Government the only system of war which their troops are at present capable of undertaking, and for which their country is well adapted.

‘ I would strongly recommend to them, if they should be able to collect their troops again, to form their armies in large masses, for the occupation and defence of the many strong and important positions which the country affords; to support these armies by magazines; and while they will draw the attention of the great bodies of the enemy, who are well aware, particularly from what occurred lately at Tamames, that the Spanish troops cannot be attacked with impunity, or with small numbers, in a strong position, the parties of guerrillas, &c., may carry on their operations upon the enemy’s communications, and upon his flanks.

‘ If this system should be adopted, the enemy must turn these positions, if he should not attack them: this must take time, must alter the nature of his operations, must oblige him to form magazines for the support of his army, and increase the difficulty of all he undertakes.

‘ I would now recommend to the Government to form a corps of 20,000 men, under the Duque de Alburquerque, and to place it at Truxillo, Deleytosa, &c., occupying the Mesa

de Ibor, and the other positions which defend the passes in the mountains between Arzobispo and Deleytosa. The bridge of Arzobispo ought also to be broken down, if in our power, as being entirely useless for an offensive operation by the allies, and only facilitating the attack of the Puerto de Mirabete, opposite Almaraz, by the enemy, if he should be in possession of that bridge, and should wish to force a passage that way. This will effectually secure the province of Estremadura.

‘ The remainder of the Duque del Parque’s troops should be collected in the mountains near Ciudad Rodrigo, and by degrees extend themselves as far as the Puerto del Pico, destroying all the roads through those mountains, and thus preventing the enemy from passing through them.

‘ I propose to collect the British and Portuguese armies between the Mondego and the Serra d’ Estrella, communicating by their right with the Duque del Parque, if this plan should be adopted.

‘ If, however, the Duque de Alburquerque should be withdrawn from Truxillo, &c., it is obvious that a part of the British and Portuguese army must be on the Tagus.

‘ According to this plan, we shall have a large force upon the left of the allied armies, capable at any time of extending into the plains of Castille, and upon the enemy’s communications; and before the enemy can venture to make a serious invasion of the south of Spain with any very large force, he must dislodge the force which we shall have upon the frontiers of Castille; unless indeed he should have in Spain a disposable force sufficiently large for both objects at the same time.

‘ I am not acquainted with the means which the Government have of reforming their armies, and particularly of arming their troops, who must now require large numbers of arms. But in case they should have it in their power to collect an army again, after their late defeats, the plan, of which I have above suggested the general outline and some of the details, appears the best calculated for the circumstances of the moment. It is founded upon experience of past misfortunes, and upon a general knowledge of the country. It will keep the contest in existence; and if successful, will prevent the enemy from extending himself. It will give



Spain the chance of accidents, and of a change in the affairs of Europe ; and if any circumstance should oblige the enemy to weaken his force in Spain, or should even prevent him from feeding its strength with reinforcements ; or if time should improve the military system and means of the Spanish nation, it may lead to the results for which we all wish.

‘ The British troops have begun their march this morning ; but some time will elapse before they are withdrawn from Merida, Montijo, &c.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *B. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

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#### MEMORANDUM OF OPERATIONS IN 1809.

(See letter to Lord Liverpool : Badajoz, 19th December, 1809.)

*The Notes to this Memorandum are in the Manuscript.*

‘ Badajoz, 9th December.

‘ The British army, intended for the service in Portugal and Spain, was complete in the end of April, with the exception of one brigade of infantry not arrived, and some troops expected from Gibraltar, when relieved by others to be sent from Portugal. Sir Arthur Wellesley landed at Lisbon on the 23rd of April.

‘ At that time the French had got possession of Zaragoza, Marshal Soult held Oporto and the northern provinces of Portugal. The battle of Medellin had been fought on the 29th of March ; and General Cuesta was endeavoring to recover from its effects, and to collect an army again at Monasterio, in the mountains of the Sierra Morena. The French, under Marshal Victor, were in possession of the Guadiana, and had their advanced posts as forward as Los Santos. Sebastiani was at Ciudad Real, and held in check the army of La Carolina, at that time under the command of General Venegas, consisting of about 12,000 men. Ney was in possession of Galicia ; Salamanca was held by a small detachment of French troops ; St. Cyr was in Catalonia with his corps of 25,000 men ; and Kellermann, who had succeeded to Bessières in the command of the 6th corps, was at Valladolid.

Mortier with his corps\*, and the Duc d'Abrantes, with the 8th corps, at Zaragoza.

‘The Portuguese army was totally disorganized, and nearly annihilated; and the Spanish troops were scarcely able to hold their positions in the Sierra Morena.

‘The Marques de la Romana, who had been with his corps on the frontiers of Portugal, near Chaves, from the period of the embarkation of the British army at Coruña, in the month of January, till the month of March, had moved from thence when Soult invaded Portugal by Chaves, and afterwards moved towards the Asturias with his army, and went himself into that province.

‘Sir John Cradock gave the command to Sir Arthur Wellesley on the 27th of April; and on the same day the orders were given for the collection and march of the troops, preparatory to the attack of Soult at Oporto.

‘Soult was driven from Oporto on the 12th of May, and on the 18th he entered Galicia, closely pursued by the British and Portuguese troops, having lost all his cannon, his military chest, many stands of arms, baggage, &c. &c., and bringing with him not more than 8000 men of his corps†.

‘In the meantime the following events had occurred in other parts. Ney, in conjunction with Kellermann, had invaded the Asturias, which province they entered on the beginning of May; the Marques de la Romana having escaped from Gijon in a sloop of war.

‘The inhabitants of Vigo, aided by Captain Mackinley of the Lively, had taken possession of that town; and in the absence of Ney and Soult from Galicia, had pushed their parties as far as Lugo, which town they had attacked.

‘Marshal Victor repossessed the Guadiana about the 12th or 13th of May, and detached a division across the Tagus at Alcantara on the 14th. This division retired again in a few days, probably as soon as it had heard of the success of the 12th against Soult; but Sir Arthur Wellesley having discontinued the further pursuit of Soult on the 18th of May, and having on the 19th received the accounts of the passage of the Tagus of this division, immediately gave

\* ‘I rather believe that Mortier had moved from Zaragoza; but some time elapsed before he arrived in Old Castille.’

† ‘See letters to the Secretary of State to the 18th May.’

orders for the return of the troops to the southward, and set out himself\*.

‘ The leading troops arrived at Coimbra, on the Mondego, on the 26th of May; but Sir Arthur Wellesley having in the meantime heard that the French division which had passed the Tagus at Alcantara had recrossed that river, discontinued the rapidity of the march which he had at first ordered, and the British troops did not arrive on the Tagus till between the 7th and 12th of June†.

‘ They halted here till the 27th of June, partly to receive supplies of money, and of shoes and other articles of equipment wanting, and to give rest to the men and horses after the rapid marches they had made to the frontier of Galicia and back again.

‘ It was also desirable to receive the reinforcements of the 48th and 61st regiments expected from Gibraltar, and the 23rd light dragoons arrived from England, before any further operations were entered upon.

‘ During this time the French brought Ney’s corps out of Asturias back into Galicia; and on the 6th of June they made an attempt, in conjunction with a detachment from Soult’s corps, to obtain possession of Vigo. In their attempt upon the bridge of San Payo they failed entirely; and Soult failed equally in all his endeavors to bring to action on the river Sill the corps of the Marques de la Romana, which had again in the beginning of the month of June assembled near Orense upon the frontiers of Portugal.

‘ The Marques de la Romana having retired from Orense towards Vigo, Soult determined to withdraw from Galicia altogether, leaving Ney’s corps alone in that province‡; and he marched in the end of June to Zamora, on the Duero, in order to re-equip and refit his army. Ney, finding himself too weak to maintain Galicia when alone, also evacuated that province in the middle of July, and posted himself at Astorga.§

\* ‘ See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 20th May.’

† ‘ See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 31st May.’

‡ ‘ See the letters from Soult to King Joseph intercepted upon General Franceschi.’

§ ‘ After the perusal of these details, and of Soult’s letter to King Joseph, can any man doubt that the evacuation of Galicia was occasioned by the opera-



‘ As soon as Victor found that the British army had arrived upon the Tagus, he began to retire from Estremadura on the 14th and 15th of June; and he finally crossed the Tagus at Almaraz on the 24th of June, two days before the British army broke up from Abrantes, &c., to march to Plasencia\*.

‘ Kellermann’s corps evacuated Asturias and Biscay, and returned to Valladolid; and Mortier’s corps was at Leon. Suchet, having defeated Blake at Belchite on the 18th June,

tions of the British troops in Portugal? Soult retired from Portugal in such a state that he could do nothing till he was re-equipped, for which purpose he went to Zamora, leaving Ney in Galicia, and directing him to hold the province. Ney finds himself too weak to hold his ground, and goes to Astorga, and the province remains in the possession of the Marques da la Romana (who had been too weak to engage Soult’s corps singly, even in its reduced and crippled state), and of the British seamen and others in the garrison of Vigo.’

\* ‘ One of the *cries* against Sir A. W. has been for delaying his march from Abrantes to so late a period, which was declared to be owing to some disputes with General Cuesta about command, or some other trifling object. During the halt at Abrantes, a discussion was carried on with General Cuesta, through Lieut. Colonel Bourke, not about command or any other trifling object, but about the future operations of the two armies. The whole correspondence went to Mr. Frere, and is probably in the Office of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. But I believe no man who knows what an army is—that the people and animals composing it are men and beasts like others, who require rest after great fatigues in a hot climate, and that carriages in an army, and other articles of equipment, require repair and to be replaced, after a long journey over bad roads, such as had been made from the Tagus to Galicia and back again in little more than a month—will believe that the halt upon the Tagus for one fortnight was too long. Besides, the army could not march without money. A supply reached Abrantes on the 25th; and the moment it was received the march was ordered, and commenced on the 27th.

‘ But the pith of this *cry* is, that in consequence of this delay upon the Tagus, Victor escaped from Estremadura. Let any man trace Victor’s operations from the middle of May till the end of June, when he finally crossed the Tagus, and he will see that they were guided by the intelligence he received of those of the British army. He sent a corps across the Tagus, and repassed the Guadiana himself, when he found the British army gone to Oporto to attack Soult; he withdrew that corps again when he heard of the result of the attack of Soult at Oporto; he began to retire across the Tagus on the 14th and 15th of June, when he found the British army arrived upon the Tagus at Abrantes; and he withdrew his troops from Merida, and completed the evacuation of the southern Estremadura, and crossed the Tagus on the 24th of June, when he found that the British army was about to march towards Plasencia. If these facts are all true, and they are all recorded in the official reports of the day, what difference could it have made in Victor’s situation if Sir A. W. had moved from Abrantes a few days sooner? Only that Victor would have retired across the Tagus a few days sooner than he did!!!’

had returned to Zaragoza; and the corps of St. Cyr was employed in the blockade of Gerona.

‘The Spanish army under General Cuesta, which had been reinforced with cavalry and infantry, and had been refitted with extraordinary celerity since the action of Medellin, had advanced from Monasterio in the middle of May, when Victor had crossed the Guadiana to support the division which he had detached over the bridge of Alcantara; and General Cuesta made an attack upon a fortified post which the enemy had left at Merida. In this attack he did not succeed; the enemy maintained their post at Merida, and General Cuesta had his head quarters at Fuente del Maestre till the end of June, when the enemy evacuated Estremadura, and passed the Tagus at Almaraz, upon hearing of the arrival of the British army upon that river at Abrantes.

‘In the end of June General Cuesta fixed his head quarters at the Puerto de Mirabete, opposite Almaraz, having a division of his army at Arzobispo.

‘Thus, then, in the end of June, the Spanish army under Cuesta was upon the Tagus; the French, under Victor, at Talavera de la Reyna; Sebastiana had retired from Ciudad Real, and had arrived near Toledo; and Venegas’s corps, which had likewise been reinforced, had advanced into La Mancha. The French had evacuated Galicia, with the exception of Ney’s corps, which left that province at a later period, and arrived at Astorga in the middle of July. Mortier was at Leon, Soult at Zamora, Kellermann at Valladolid, Suchet at Zaragoza, and St. Cyr engaged in the blockade of Gerona. The British army broke up from Abrantes, &c., on the 27th of June to march to Plasencia, in order to cooperate with the Spanish troops in an endeavor to drive the French from the south of Spain.

‘The Commanding Officer of the King’s troops in Portugal is alone responsible for this operation, for which the motives were various. First, adverting to the general state of the war in Spain, as well as in Germany, it appeared to be desirable to make an effort at that time in Spain. Secondly, the means appeared to be adequate to the object in view. General Cuesta had under his immediate command 38,000 men, and General Venegas 18,000; and the British army



was not less than 20,000 men, besides General Robert Craufurd's brigade, which had landed at Lisbon on the 28th of June, and was to commence its march to join the army immediately. Against these troops were to be opposed 28,000 men under Victor, and 12,000 under Sebastiani; and whatever the King could bring from the garrison of Madrid, and his guards.

‘ It was not known till the beginning of July that even Soult had evacuated Galicia, in a state, as appears by the intercepted letters taken on General Franceschi, very unfit for service; nor that Ney had quitted that province and gone to Astorga, till late in July\*; and Mortier and Kellermann were supposed still to be in the Asturias and Biscay.

‘ The difficulties of the operation were calculated; but it was supposed that the orders of the Spanish Government would furnish the means of transport and provisions that were or might be required, as they had expressed the greatest anxiety for the co-operation of the British troops. The means of transport were known to exist in the country, and the harvest about to be reaped, it was imagined, would have afforded an abundance of provisions.

‘ The troops which broke up from Abrantes and the neighbourhood on the 27th of June reached Plasencia between the 7th and 10th of July, on which day Sir A. Wellesley went over to the Puerto de Mirabete, to confer and concert a plan of operations with General Cuesta. The objects of the plan were to bring into operation upon the enemy, at the same time, the British army and the two Spanish corps, under Cuesta and Venegas, in such a manner as to prevent the enemy from bringing his concentrated force to bear upon either.

‘ It was impossible for the corps of Cuesta and Venegas, issuing from the defensive positions which they had occupied in Estremadura and La Mancha respectively, to join, or to have any military communication in this operation, excepting by Talavera and the bridge of Toledo †; and it was obvious that unless the enemy should be alarmed for the safety of

\* ‘ I do not think we were certain of Ney's evacuation of Galicia till he entered Estremadura, in August.’

† ‘ See dispatch to Lord Wellesley of the 24th August from Merida, describing the difficulty of such an operation.’



Madrid by one of the corps, he would fall with his whole collected strength upon the other. It was necessary to divide the attention of the enemy as much as possible, and to choose such a line of march for each corps as to prevent the enemy from opposing the march of either by natural obstacles, or by any thing excepting detachments from his own concentrated force.

‘ General Venegas was therefore ordered by Cuesta to direct his march by Tembleque, Tarancon, and Fuentidueña to Arganda, where he was to be on the 22nd of July, the day appointed for the arrival of the combined British and Spanish armies at Talavera. By passing by Fuentidueña, General Venegas could have crossed the Tagus at a ford, and nothing could have prevented his arrival at his station but the opposition of the enemy. This was all that was wished for;—at the same time that, if he had been opposed by a corps too strong for him, his retreat was always open to the mountains of Cuenca; and the enemy could not have followed him in strength, and could not have undertaken any operation against La Carolina, pressed as they would have been on the other flank by the combined armies.

‘ The only corps with which it was supposed that the combined armies would have had to engage, were the corps of Victor, Sebastiani, and the King. The other French corps in Spain were understood to be otherwise occupied; and at all events it was conceived that the occupation of the Puerto de Baños by General Cuesta’s detachment, and of the Puerto de Perales by the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and by the position of Marshal Beresford’s corps on the frontiers of Portugal, would have prevented the enemy from penetrating into Estremadura by the passes in the rear of the army\*.

‘ Sir Arthur Wellesley returned to Plasencia on the 12th, and found that the hopes were disappointed which he had formed of drawing from Ciudad Rodrigo, and other places in Castille, the means of transport which he had required †, and which had been supplied by those places in the preceding year to the army under Sir John Moore. He still con-

\* ‘ See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 8th August.’

† ‘ See letter to General O’Donoju of the 16th July, enclosed in dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 24th July.’

sidered it necessary, however, to carry into execution the plan of operations agreed upon with General Cuesta, as he was unwilling to disappoint that General; and as General Venegas' corps, which it was supposed would have commenced its operations, would have been exposed to risk; and, moreover, Sir A. W. expected that the army would have been supplied with provisions from the Vera de Plasencia till it should be supplied with means of transport from Seville, for which General Cuesta had written, or from La Mancha. Sir A. W., however, gave notice that he should co-operate only in the first operation\*, which should put General Cuesta in possession of the passage of the Alberche, and of the course of the Tagus, and should enable him to communicate with General Venegas, until the wants of the British army should be supplied.

‘A part of the British army, consisting of about 1000 Portuguese troops under Sir Robert Wilson, (and which corps had been reinforced by two Spanish battalions,) was to march according to the plan through the Vera de Plasencia, on the left of the combined armies, to Escalona, on the Alberche. This corps marched on the 15th of July, and the British army, according to the plan agreed upon, commenced its march on the 17th and 18th of July; the 23rd light dragoons and 48th regiment having joined the army while it was at Plasencia, and the 61st being expected to join on the 18th.

‘Sir Robert Wilson arrived at Escalona on the 22nd, and the combined armies at Talavera on the same day; and they drove in the enemy's outposts. On the 23rd† arrangements were made, and the British army had marched and was in

\* ‘See letter to General O'Donju of the 16th July.’

† ‘See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 24th July.’

‘All the discussions upon this subject, and the misrepresentations, show the difficulty of serving the British public, and the small degree of satisfaction which any foreign officer has in co-operating with the British troops. General Cuesta chose to delay the attack to the 24th, for which delay there were not wanting good and valid reasons; but no such reasons are conceived, or are allowed to exist. A lie is invented and circulated, viz.—that the 23rd was Sunday, and then Sir. A. W. is abused for being the author of the lie. There was, however, one curious circumstance attending this transaction, which shows the nature of the war in Spain, and the deficiency of intelligence by the Spanish General Officers, and that is—that although Sir A. W. suspected it on the evening of the 22nd, and made preparations accordingly, it was not positively



column near the Alberche to attack the French corps of Victor, posted on the heights beyond the river; but General Cuesta preferred to delay the attack till the following morning; and when the troops were formed on that morning at daylight, it was found that the enemy had withdrawn during the night.

‘ General Cuesta then continued his march in pursuit of them to S<sup>ta</sup> Olalla; but they had gone to Torrijos, and thence even farther, to Bargas. The main body of the British remained at Talavera; with a division of infantry at Cazalegas to keep up the communication with General Cuesta; and another at Cardiel, on the Alberche, to keep up the communication with Sir Robert Wilson at Escalona.

‘ The scarcity of provisions had been so great since the 20th, owing to the failure of the magistrates and inhabitants of the Vera de Plasencia to perform the contracts into which they had entered with a British Commissary, to supply at Talavera 240,000 rations before the 24th, that the British army was totally unable to move\*. The armies remained on the 25th in the positions taken up on the 24th, and the enemy collected all his force at Bargas.

‘ It appears that General Venegas had not obeyed the orders he had received, to direct his march upon Fuentidueña and Arganda †. The enemy therefore had no apprehension from his operations, and they collected their whole force to oppose the combined armies. They attacked Cuesta’s outposts at Torrijos on the morning of the 26th, and drove them in; and General Cuesta retired with his army on that day to the left bank of the Alberche, the British division still remaining at Cazalegas, the division at Cardiel having joined; and on the 27th General Cuesta crossed the Al-

ascertained till the morning of the 23rd that the whole French army was at Cazalegas; and yet the vedettes of the outposts were within shot of each other, and the narrow river of the Alberche alone divided the armies!!! The French must, in the night of the 23rd, have acquired from our army the knowledge of our intended attack.’

\* ‘ See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 24th July. There is no doubt that if these contracts had been performed the British army would have been at Madrid on the 27th July. Would matters have been improved by their going there, the French having at this time brought into that part of Spain all their troops, amounting to not less than 90,000 men?’

† ‘ This failure by General Venegas is to be attributed to orders which he had received from the Central Junta!’



berche, and took up his position near Talavera; and the British troops retired from Cazalegas, one division remaining as an outpost in the woods opposite the enemy's position on the Alberche, the other going to its position near Talavera.

‘ A general action being obviously to be expected on the 26th, Sir Robert Wilson was ordered from Escalona to join the army with his corps, through the mountains by Marrupe. The enemy attacked the outposts in the woods on the 27th, which retired to the position occupied by the army; and on that night, and on the 28th, followed the battle of Talavera\*.

‘ The enemy retired in the evening and during the night of the 28th, and took up a position, with a rear guard of 10,000 men, on the heights of Cazalegas, beyond the Alberche. The British army and Spanish armies, which had been joined on the evening of the 29th by General Robert Craufurd's brigade of infantry, remained on the field of battle of Talavera, with their advanced posts, consisting of General Craufurd's brigade, in the woods, nearly in the place in which they had been on the 27th.

‘ On the 29th, General Venegas went to Aranjuez, and made an attack upon a post of about 2000 men, which the enemy had left at Toledo. The King with the reserve, therefore, and Sebastiani's corps, went to oppose his advance, while Victor was left to watch the combined armies.

‘ On the 31st, Sir Robert Wilson's corps, which had been called to the army when the general action was expected, and had arrived at Marrupe, returned towards Escalona; and the enemy's rear guard at Cazalegas retired on the same night, and went to Maqueda.

‘ On the 30th, accounts had been received by General Cuesta that rations for a corps of 12,000 men had been ordered at Fuente Roble, north of the Puerto de Baños; and for 24,000 men at Los Santos, near the same place; supposed to be for the corps of Soult, which was known to have been at Zamora in the end of June, and for which equipments had been called for by Soult. It was expected, however, that the troops in the Puerto would make some resistance, and would stop their march; or that Soult might

\* ‘ See the dispatches to the Secretary of State of the 29th July, and of the 8th of August.’

have been induced to desist from it by the position of Marshal Beresford's corps, or by the accounts he would have received of the victory at Talavera on the 28th of July.

‘ It has already been stated that the Portuguese army in April was totally disorganized, and nearly annihilated; at the same time it had been necessary to employ the few men who were in the service in the expedition against Soult, and in the defensive measures adopted for the security of the western frontier, when the army marched on that expedition.

‘ When the British army was about to enter Spain in the end of June, there was no longer any danger for the north of Portugal; and it was desirable that advantage should be taken of the leisure which this security afforded, to collect in one camp the disposable part of the Portuguese army, in which Marshal Beresford should have an opportunity of forming and organizing the troops.

‘ A camp on the frontiers of Beira, between Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, was considered the best situation for this purpose; and it had this additional recommendation, that the Portuguese corps, to which a British brigade was to be added, principally for the purpose of example, would protect the only vulnerable part of the Portuguese frontier which was exposed to attack; added to the security of the left of the British army; and, above all, protected the passage into Estremadura by the Puerto de Perales. From this situation, also, this Portuguese corps could have been brought with advantage in a subsequent part of the campaign, when it was hoped that the troops would be formed; but it was neither intended nor expected that Marshal Beresford's corps should co-operate, except as above stated, in the first operations of the months of July and August.

‘ Notwithstanding the hopes entertained that Soult's march might have been stopped, or that he might have been induced to desist from it, it was desirable, as General Cuesta had not confidence in the exertions of the troops in the Puerto, that they should be reinforced; but he declined to reinforce them, and persisted in his refusal to do so till the morning of the 2nd of August, when he detached General Bassecourt with his division for that purpose. In the mean time the troops in the Puerto had retired without firing a



shot, and had gone to the bridge over the Tagus at Almaraz, which they took up; and Soult entered Plasencia unresisted on the 1st of August\*.

‘ It was then necessary to take decisive measures to re-establish the communication with Portugal, and for this purpose the British army marched on the morning of the 3rd to Oropesa, leaving General Cuesta’s division in charge of the post at Talavera, and of the hospital †. On that day, for the first time, General Cuesta received accounts, apprizing him of the real strength of the army which Soult had brought with him into Estremadura, which consisted of 34,000 men, and he imagined that the British corps was not equal to a contest with such numbers. He therefore immediately determined to withdraw from Talavera, and to join the British army at Oropesa; and thus he lost the hospital, and exposed the combined armies to be attacked in front and rear at the same time.

‘ Soult’s army arrived at Naval Moral on the evening of the 3rd; and in this position stood between the combined armies and the bridge of Almaraz, which it was supposed was removed, but most probably was, or it might have been, easily destroyed. The only retreat which remained was by the bridge of Arzobispo. There was a direct road to this bridge from Talavera de la Reyna, by Calera, and another direct from Naval Moral, each of them passing at not less than ten or twelve miles’ distance from Oropesa, the station at which the combined armies were assembled on the morning of the 4th instant.

‘ Besides these circumstances attending the only retreat the armies had, it was to be observed that the enemy had now collected in Estremadura all the disposable force which he had in Galicia and Castille, with the exception of the corps of Kellermann, which still remained at Valladolid: 34,000 men were known to be added to the force already opposed to the combined armies; and it was obvious that

\* ‘ See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 8th August.’

† ‘ It will scarcely be believed that the French were able to collect the three corps of Ney, Soult, and Mortier, at Salamanca, and to make preparations there for this march, and that the Junta of Old Castille, sitting at Ciudad Rodrigo, knew nothing about it! And yet this is a fact.’



they must retire across the Tagus, and take up a defensive position on that river.

‘ Accordingly, the British army having halted at Oropesa on the night of the 3rd, marched early on the 4th to Arzobispo, and immediately crossed the Tagus; and the Spanish army, which had marched from Talavera on the night of the 3rd, halted during the early part of the day of the 4th at Oropesa, and marched, and arrived at Arzobispo on the evening of the 4th.

‘ On the 5th, the British army continued its march, and the advanced guard was placed upon the Mesa de Ibor, to secure that passage; and on the 6th the army arrived at the Mesa de Ibor, and the advanced guard at the Casas del Puerto, on the Tagus, opposite Almaraz; and on the 7th the head of the column of the army arrived at Deleytosa, which place was reached on the 8th and 9th by the rear divisions\*.

‘ The Spanish army in the mean time crossed the Tagus on the 5th, and the head quarters were removed to Peraleda de Garbin on the 7th, leaving an advanced guard at the bridge of Arzobispo; which was surprised on the 8th, and lost many men, and 30 pieces of cannon†.

‘ On the 11th of August the head quarters of the British army were transferred to Jaraicejo, leaving Deleytosa open for the Spanish army, to which place their head quarters

\* ‘ This is the history of our giving up the *post of honor*, as the French call it, to the Spaniards. In fact, the British army was necessarily the left throughout the operations; and could not change that disposition without giving up the defence of Portugal. Besides that, all these operations, from the morning of the 4th, were carried on against the inclination of General Cuesta; and the retreat being necessary, Sir A. W. could not have made it, or have forced Cuesta to make it, if the British army had not begun it. Another circumstance is, that the bridge of Arzobispo was not reckoned the *post of honor*. The Mesa de Ibor, till the evening of the 5th, was the point, the loss of which was most apprehended.’

† ‘ See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 21st August.

‘ The French made much more of this affair than they ought. Nothing could behave worse than they did, excepting the Spaniards. They ought to have annihilated the Spanish army, but they were afraid to follow them, and did not even know that they had taken the greatest part of the cannon; they had not even patrolled the ground three days afterwards, when Colonel Waters went to Mortier with a flag of truce from me. See dispatch to Lord Wellesley of the 9th August, for the detail of this surprise; and of the state of the Spanish army afterwards.’

were removed on the 13th; General Cuesta having resigned the command of the army on the 12th.

‘ While this was going on on the left, General Venegas was attacked at Aranjuez by Sebastiani and the King on the 5th\* ; in which action he had some success. But he then resolved to retire to the Sierra Morena, and actually marched as far as Tembleque†. He then altered this resolution, and he returned to Almonacid on the 11th, where he was attacked and defeated, with the loss of 4000 men‡. He then retired into the mountains of the Sierra Morena.

‘ When the French evacuated Old Castille in the end of the month of July, to collect their armies in Estremadura, the Duque del Parque, the Commandant of Ciudad Rodrigo, sent a detachment from his garrison to take possession of Salamanca. This circumstance, and the probable early arrival of Romana’s corps in Old Castille from Galicia, and the certainty that the position taken up by the allied armies was of such a nature, that no effort which they could make would dislodge them from it, induced the enemy to march the corps of Soult and Ney to Plasencia on the 9th, 10th, and 11th; and to send the latter into Castille through the Puerto de Baños, on the 12th of August§. Ney there fell in with, and defeated Sir Robert Wilson’s detachment; which, after the combined armies had retired from Talavera and Oropesa to Arzobispo, had been unable to reach the latter place; and had marched through the Vera de Plasencia, and the Puerto de Tornavacas; and was on its march when Ney passed through the Puerto de Baños.

‘ Thus, in the middle of August, Ney was at Salamanca; Kellermann at Valladolid; Soult at Plasencia; Mortier at Oropesa and Arzobispo; Victor at Talavera and Toledo; and Sebastiani in La Mancha: while the British army was at Jaraicejo; General Eguia at Deleytosa (General Cuesta having resigned); and General Venegas at La Carolina, in the Sierra Morena.

‘ On the 20th of August, the British army having suffered from extreme distress of provisions, broke up from its posi-

\* ‘ See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 21st August.’

† ‘ See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 21st August.’

‡ ‘ See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 21st August.’

§ ‘ See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 21st August.’



tions at Jaraicejo and the Casas del Puerto\*, the latter of which was occupied by the Spanish troops; and it moved with its head quarters to Badajoz, on the 3rd of September, and occupied a position on the frontiers of Spain and Portugal, in which, while it would give protection to both countries, it would be enabled to subsist with ease; and it would be possible to give the troops the refreshments they required, as well as the clothing and equipments which they wanted; and it has remained in that position †.

‘The Portuguese army, under Marshal Beresford, also withdrew nearly about the same time within the Portuguese frontier, and went into cantonments ‡.

‘In the mean time the Spanish army of Estremadura was reduced to the number of 6000 men at Deleytosa; and General Eguia commenced his march with the remainder towards La Mancha in the middle of September. Nearly about the same period 13,000 men of the corps of the Marques de la Romana arrived in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, from Galicia; and the command was taken from the Marques

\* ‘See dispatches to the Secretary of State of the 21st August; and to Lord Wellesley of the 12th, 13th, 15th, 16th, 21st, and 22nd August.’

† ‘There never was a position better calculated than this was for the purposes of defending Spain and Portugal.

‘The French had from the end of August not less than from 70,000 to 90,000 men disposable; they have since destroyed two armies of Spaniards which it was thought proper to expose to their attack; and yet they have not been able to advance, or to gain any solid advantage beyond that of destroying the Spaniards.

‘The fact is, that the British army has saved Spain and Portugal during this year. The Spaniards have no army now that is complete, excepting 13,000 men under the Duque de Albuquerque, in Estremadura; and yet nothing can be done by the French after all their victories. What would have been the relative state of the two contending parties, if the Spaniards had been tolerably prudent, and had acted as they were advised to act?

‘The advantage of the position of Badajoz was, that the British army was centrally posted, in reference to all the objects which the enemy might have in view; and at any time, by a junction with a Spanish corps on its right, or a Portuguese or Spanish corps on its left, it could prevent the enemy from undertaking anything, excepting with a much larger force than they could allot to any one object.’

‡ ‘The Portuguese army would have been ruined if they had remained longer in the field; they wanted clothing, and every description of equipment; they were raw recruits, detested serving in Spain, where they were ill treated; and deserted in large numbers in the short time they were in that country. There are now good grounds for hope that something will be made of them.—See Marshal Beresford’s letter to Sir Arthur Wellesley, dated 26th September, included in a dispatch to the Secretary of State, dated the 29th September.’



and given to the Duque del Parque\*. The Duque immediately put himself at their head, and marched to Villa Vieja, and threatened the French posts towards Salamanca; but the enemy having reconnoitred him, and having drawn in all their detachments with a view to attack him, the Duque del Parque retired from Villa Vieja on the 23rd, to the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘The forward movement by the Duque del Parque, which the French conceived to be connected with a movement to be made by the British army, and with the march of General Eguia into La Mancha, induced Soult to abandon Plasencia on the 1st of October†; and he moved to Oropesa. The Duque del Parque then occupied the strong position of Tamames, on the Castille side of the Puerto de Baños; in which he was attacked on the 19th October by General Marchand, in the command of Ney’s corps‡, Ney having gone to France; and the French were defeated, with the loss of one piece of cannon. The Duque del Parque was joined on the following day by Ballesteros’ division of the Marques de la Romana’s corps; and he then marched forward, and took possession of Salamanca on the 25th, the enemy having retired towards the Duero.

‘These events in Old Castille induced the enemy|| to withdraw some of the troops from Estremadura; and an army was collected there, consisting of Ney’s, Kellermann’s, and a part of Mortier’s corps, amounting to 36,000 men, under the command of Marshal Mortier. The arrival of these troops in Old Castille obliged the Duque del Parque again to retire; and he arrived at Bejar, where he placed his head quarters on the 8th of November. The movements of General Eguia into La Mancha from Estremadura, in the middle of September, induced the French to move a large corps of 30,000 men under Victor, into that province;¶ when the Spaniards retired to the Sierra Morena, and the French again withdrew their troops to the Tagus.

\* ‘ See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 13th September.’

† ‘ See dispatches to the Secretary of State of the 21st and 29th September.’

‡ ‘ See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 6th October.’

§ ‘ See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 31st October.’

|| ‘ See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 16th November.’

¶ ‘ See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 22nd October.’

‘But the events which had occurred in Castille in October, particularly the battle at Tamames, induced the Spanish Government to believe that a favorable opportunity offered for obtaining possession of Madrid; and they directed General Areyzaga, who had, in October, taken the command of the army of La Mancha, to move forward and push for the possession of Madrid. He marched on the 3rd November, and reached Los Barrios, near Ocaña, on the 10th\*. He made an attack upon a French corps of 5000 men, which occupied that town on the night of the 10th†, in which he lost some men and horses; and the French made good their retreat. He then moved to S<sup>ta</sup> Cruz de la Zarza on the 13th, where he remained till the 18th; and having heard of an enemy’s corps in his front, at Arganda, which was about to pass the Tagus on his right at Fuentidueña, while there was another corps of 25,000 men at Aranjuez and Ocaña, he returned to Los Barrios, and prepared to attack the French corps in his front. He found, however, on the morning of the 19th, that the French were likely to anticipate his attack; and he formed his army, consisting of 50,000 men, in the rear of Ocaña. The French attacked him with 25,000 men, and completely defeated and dispersed the Spanish army, taking 55 pieces of cannon. The head quarters arrived at La Carolina on the 22nd; and very few men had been collected on the 28th. The French did not pursue farther than Villarta.

‘In the mean time, the Duque de Alburquerque, who had assumed the command of the army of Estremadura, in the beginning of November, marched to Arzobispo, when the French collected their troops on the Upper Tagus to oppose Areyzaga.

‘The French also, with the same view, drew out of Old Castille, on the 13th and 14th of November, a part of the troops which they had sent into that province to oppose the Duque del Parque. The Duque, upon finding Old Castille weakened, moved forward from Bejar on the 17th of November, and arrived at Alba de Tormes on the 28th‡, with his advanced guard at Carpio. It was there attacked by a

\* ‘See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 16th November.’

† ‘See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 30th November.’

‡ ‘See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 7th December.’



French corps assembled from Valladolid, &c., but the French were repulsed with some loss. The Duque then moved forward to Fresno; but retired again on the 26th, in consequence of orders from the Junta.

‘By this time, also, the French had reinforced again their corps in Old Castille; and the Duque was attacked on the 27th and 28th on his retreat, and at Alba de Tormes, and suffered considerably. He continued his retreat, however, towards Ciudad Rodrigo and the mountains; and on the 29th, when within two leagues of Tamames, the troops were alarmed by the appearance of 30 dragoons in their rear, and dispersed. There was no enemy, however, at hand to take advantage of this panic; and it was expected that they would be collected again. While this was going on in Old Castille, the Junta ordered the Duque de Alburquerque to fall back with his corps on the Guadiana; and thus to give up the position of the Puerto de Mirabete, on the Tagus, and the Mesa de Ibor\*.

‘These circumstances, and the necessity that the British army should be north of the Tagus, when the enemy’s reinforcements should arrive, induced Sir Arthur Wellesley to put the British army in motion to cross that river immediately. He had long had that movement in contemplation, and had given notice of it to the Junta†.

‘WELLINGTON.’

\* ‘This position is the most important in the country, to the province of Estremadura and the south of Portugal. If this position is held, the enemy cannot cross the Tagus to any efficient purpose, between the Bridge of Toledo and Villa Velha, in Portugal.

‘The position could not well be lost if the Spaniards would destroy the bridge of Arzobispo, as Sir Arthur Wellesley has frequently advised.’

† ‘The object in occupying this proposed position, is to be at the point of defence of Portugal; to divert the attention of the French from the south of Spain when they shall receive their reinforcements, and thus give time to the Spanish Government to repair their losses. The filling of the rivers, and the destruction of the roads, will, with a very few troops, be a sufficient defence in the winter for the south of Spain. The same events which might impede the march of the British army to the north of Portugal, if longer delayed, would be fatal to Portugal, and might be so to the British army, if the enemy were to be able to invade that kingdom during the winter. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, to cross the Tagus immediately; and it may be depended upon, that the enemy’s first effort upon receiving his reinforcements will be upon the troops north of the Tagus. The contents of this Memorandum must show the great use the British army has been to Spain and Portugal. Since they arrived in



*To Lieut. General Leite.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 13th December, 1809.

‘ I understand that the surgeons of the Portuguese military hospital at Elvas have no objection, and have it in their power, to take charge of 300 sick of the British army; and as it would be a material convenience to the army to have that number of patients taken care of by those gentlemen, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will give your permission to have them removed to the Portuguese hospital, and there accommodated and taken care of, upon the usual allowances, which the Purveyor General of the British army will pay.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Leite.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Bart. Frere, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 13th December, 1809.

‘ I have just now had the honor of receiving your letters of the 9th and 11th instant.

‘ Upon the destruction of the bridge at Arzobispo, I beg that you will observe to the Government that that bridge affords the only passage across the Tagus, and road for the invasion of the province of Estremadura, there being none for an army from the bridge of Talavera, from that of Puebla de Montalban, or from that of Toledo, excepting from the last, by the circuitous road by Ciudad Real.

‘ The road from Arzobispo to Deleytosa, it is true, is exceedingly bad, but still it is not impracticable; and the advantage of the destruction of the bridge would be, that in case the enemy should be desirous of forcing the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, and of establishing a bridge there, which is the best, and indeed the only good passage for an

April, the French have destroyed three Spanish armies,—Blake’s, Areyza’s, and Del Parque’s; and yet they can do nothing.

‘ They have been obliged to evacuate the north of Portugal, Galicia, South Estremadura, and they hold but part of La Mancha; and also to keep their force concentrated in Old Castille, and about Madrid.

‘ If the Spaniards had not lost two armies lately, we should keep up the ball for another year. But as it is!—but I won’t despair!

‘ W.’

army invading Estremadura, he could not have a corps of troops in the mountains of the Mesa de Ibor, &c., and upon the right flank of the corps employed in the defence of the Puerto de Mirabete, as he had last winter when General Cuesta was obliged, on that account only, to retire from the Puerto.

‘ If the enemy should by these means be prevented from forcing the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, there is no passage for an army till he would arrive at Villa Velha, in Portugal, a distance which it is probable that he would find it difficult to move his bridge.

‘ This bridge of Arzobispo, like that of Almaraz, Alcantara, del Cardenal, and del Conde, is so high, that if once effectually destroyed, it cannot be repaired by temporary means during the war; so that the security its destruction would give would be permanent, while the Tagus should continue full; and at all events the evils of war would be removed from a numerous class of people inhabiting the hills between Deleytosa and Talavera de la Reyna.

‘ I therefore most earnestly recommend the destruction of this bridge.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *B. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To Bart. Frere, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 13th December, 1809.

‘ I enclose a letter which I received last night from Mr. Villiers, upon which he has desired that I should communicate to you my opinion.

‘ I acknowledge that I am not sufficiently acquainted with the local situation of Galicia to be able to give any opinion upon the necessity or expediency of fortifying those posts at all, or in preference to others. There is no man better acquainted with that province than the Marques de la Romana, or who knows better than he does how important it is in the present state of affairs to keep the enemy out of it, or how to effect that object.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *B. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To Major Davy, Commanding 5th Battalion 60th Regiment.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 13th December, 1809.

‘ I have perused your letter of the 10th instant to Colonel Bathurst, relative to the charge exhibited by Lieut. — against Captain —; and I am glad to find, that although Captain — did return — — as Paymaster’s clerk from October, 1808, to March, 1809, and drew an allowance for him in that capacity, but neither employed him nor paid him as such, he did so with the knowledge and permission of his commanding officer, Major —, and that he paid the sum which he received in the name of — — to Serjeant —, who did the duty of Paymaster’s clerk.

‘ Captain — has therefore entirely cleared himself from any corrupt or improper motives in this transaction; and I shall certainly not gratify the malicious spirit by which Lieut. — appears to be actuated in bringing forward this charge, by submitting the conduct of Captain — to any further inquiry.

‘ I beg, however, to draw your attention, and that of Captain — and Major —, to the impropriety of the whole of this transaction, and to a reflection on the risk which every officer incurs who allows himself to be involved in such. It affects the foundation of every military return, and exposes His Majesty and the public to frauds of every description; and such a transaction must positively never be repeated.

‘ If it were necessary to employ and pay one man for the performance of the duties usually allotted to two, under the regulations of the Service, application should have been made to the Commander of the Forces, at the time, for permission so to do, but on no account ought his pay to have been drawn in the name of another.

‘ I have also read your letter to the Adjutant General of the 10th instant, and I desire that you will direct the Paymaster of the 5th batt. 60th regiment to pay out of the subsistence of Lieut. —, to Captain —, for the twelve pairs of shoes, the price of which has been awarded to him by the Court of Inquiry, of which Captain — was President, held on the 9th November, Lieut. — receiving the shoes, and disposing of them as he may think proper.

‘ I desire, also, that you will inform Lieut. — that I



will not order a Court Martial to be assembled for the trial of Lieut. —, on the charge exhibited against him by Lieut. — on the 10th instant; the subject of that charge having already been incidentally before the General Court Martial.

‘ I desire, however, that you will put Lieut. — in arrest, “ for unmilitary and unofficerlike conduct, in disturbing the peace and harmony which ought to subsist among the officers of the 5th batt. 60th regiment, contrary to the orders and warning given to him by the Commander of the Forces.” ’

‘ You will keep Lieut. — in arrest with the regiment, as I know enough of the character and past conduct of that officer to be suspicious that his late conduct is to be attributed to a desire to leave his regiment during the time it may be actively employed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Davy, 60th Regt.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 13th December, 1809.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 9th.

‘ I am obliged to measure the assistance which I give the Government by the state of our means and our own wants, and I am always sorry when it cannot be to the extent wished for by you, or by them. I cannot give the order for the second £50,000 for them, till I shall see my way through the difficulties of our own situation.

‘ We are now on our march towards the Mondego; and as the Government are at the same time forming their magazines, which ought to have been formed six weeks ago, when I consented to advance the money, it stands to reason that we shall get neither provisions nor means of transport, if we have not money to pay for them. The first money must be supplied to us, and they shall have their £50,000 in the second instance, paid to them in such manner as can be afforded from the military chest.

‘ I always feel much concern when any transaction of this kind cannot be carried into execution according to your wishes; but I have it not in my power to collect larger sums of money (particularly coin) than we have got, and are

getting daily, not only at Lisbon, but at Cadiz and Gibraltar; and you are mistaken if you suppose that the assurances which I have repeatedly given you to the same purport are not founded in fact.

‘ I write to Government upon this occasion to point out the necessity of some assistance in money, particularly if they intend to afford further assistance to the Portuguese Government.

‘ I forward by this occasion Mr. Frere’s and my dispatches for your perusal; and I shall send to Mr. Frere your letter in respect to Galicia. I should doubt, however, whether the Spanish Government have the means of defraying the expense of fortifying these posts; and if they have, whether they have the means of garrisoning them.

‘ I expect to leave this in a few days; but you may as well continue to send any communications you may have to make by the road of Elvas, as I can always turn them to the road of Abrantes.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 13th December, 1809.

‘ I beg that your Lordship will be so kind as to give directions that the £100,000 in specie, for the use of the British army, may be sent to Portugal as soon as possible, and another sum of £100,000 in the course of the month of January. Some difficulty has been experienced lately in procuring money for bills upon England at Lisbon, as well as at Gibraltar and Cadiz; and at the same time that the transmission of specie will relieve the inconvenience which otherwise would be felt from the want of money, it will probably have the effect of inducing persons to come forward again with their money for bills of exchange, and will probably lower in some degree the rate of exchange.

‘ I have also to inform your Lordship, that in case His Majesty’s Government should think it proper to give any pecuniary assistance to the Portuguese Government, in consequence of my dispatch of the 14th of November, it will be necessary that specie should be sent from England to the amount of such assistance.

‘ I am convinced that it would tend materially to increase the sums procured for bills in England, if the communication by the packets was more regular than it is. His Majesty’s Minister at Lisbon has lately fixed on a day in every week on which the packet shall be despatched; and it would be very \*desirable if the same arrangement were adopted at Gibraltar and Cadiz, and corresponding measures adopted in England, to secure the regular despatch, at fixed periods, of the packets for those places and Lisbon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 14th December, 1809.

‘ The enemy has not made any forward movement either in Old Castille or La Mancha since I addressed your Lordship on the 7th instant; but I understand that they are employed in reinforcing their corps in the former province.

‘ The Spanish Commanders in Chief are endeavoring to collect their dispersed troops again; with what success I am not enabled accurately to state; but I am apprehensive that the loss of arms and accoutrements by both the armies lately defeated will be found to be immense.

‘ The British army is on its march across the Tagus, and towards the frontiers of the province of Beira; and I shall move my head quarters as soon as the rear divisions shall arrive in this town.

‘ The number of sick in the army is still very large; but the diseases of the soldiers have not lately been so violent as they had been, nor so fatal; and I hope that the movement of the army will be beneficial to their health.

‘ I shall be obliged to your Lordship if you will give directions that at least 30 hospital mates may be sent to Portugal for the service of this army as soon as possible.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Badajoz, 17th December, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to transmit for your Lordship’s information, returns of the stores and provisions in the magazines in Portugal on the 1st December, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Badajoz, 17th December, 1809.

‘ I beg to draw your Lordship’s attention to His Majesty’s regulation which prohibits the issue of their subsistence to the officers and soldiers who may be made prisoners of war; and I have to request permission to allow the issue of their subsistence to those officers and soldiers who may escape from the enemy, or who may be exchanged in the Peninsula.

‘ The French General Officers have in general behaved remarkably well to the British officers and soldiers who fell into their hands in consequence of the march of the Spanish army from Talavera de la Reyna in the month of August last; and in many instances they have supplied the officers with money. I have also sent them sums amounting to £1200, of which I have the acknowledgments; and recently £500, but I have not received the detailed distribution either of those sums or of the sums which have been advanced to the British officers by the French General Officers.

‘ It is obvious that these last mentioned sums must be repaid; and I have lately requested, that the French General Officers will let me know where and in what manner they wish they should be repaid; and I request your Lordship to instruct me in what manner these sums, as well as those advanced by me to the British officers, prisoners of war, are to be charged to the public in the first instance; whether in the army extraordinaries, or to the Transport office.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Badajoz, 17th December, 1809.

‘ I enclose an application which I have received from an officer in the service of Spain, the Marques de España, to transfer the service of himself, and of the corps under his command, from the services of Spain to that of His Majesty, in case of the failure of the Spanish nation to effect the objects for which they are contending.

‘ From what I have heard of the Marques de España, I believe him to be one of the best of the Spanish officers; and I am desirous of receiving the directions of His Majesty’s Government respecting the answer to be given to his proposition.

‘ In the event of the failure expected in the enclosed letters, it is probable that I shall receive many offers of the same description with the enclosed; and I beg to receive the instructions of His Majesty’s Government regarding the answer to be given to those officers.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.*

‘ SIR, ‘ Badajoz, 17th December, 1809.

‘ Having considered the letter from Mr. Sampayo to you dated the 12th instant, enclosing copies of two letters from Mr. Rawlings to Mr. Sampayo, dated the 6th and 8th of April, it is obvious to me that the letters from Mr. Rawlings, who acted under the direct authority of the late Commander of the Forces, must be deemed to be contracts with Mr. Sampayo for the supply, at certain prices, of the articles therein mentioned for the service of the troops, into which contract Mr. Rawlings was fully competent to enter; and the army, when commanded by me, and when you were their Commissary General, enjoyed the advantage of them.

‘ Under these circumstances, it appears to me that you ought to pay Mr. Sampayo according to the prices fixed in Mr. Rawlings’s letters, as long as he continued to supply, under their authority, any of the articles to which they refer.

‘ Adverting to the circumstances of the country, at the time the letters in question were written by Mr. Rawlings, and to the fact that the army, although numerous, was but ill provided with Commissaries, and that it was therefore necessary to employ a contractor, it does not appear to me that the bargains were improvident, or that the prices are large; and they are certainly not so large as those paid by Mr. Erskine for the same articles.

‘ But I do not conceive that the largeness of price has any thing to do with the question. The letters from Mr. Rawlings being considered of the nature of a contract, of which his successor availed himself, the prices agreed to by that contract must be paid.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ J. Murray, Esq.,  
Commissary General.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Badajoz, 18th December, 1809.

‘ In the arrangements for the defence of Portugal, I shall form two principal corps, both consisting of British and Portuguese troops, the largest of which will be to the northward, and I shall command it myself; and the latter will be for the present upon the Tagus, and hereafter it may be moved forward into Alentejo, and I will not make any arrangement either as to the troops that are to compose it, or as to the officer who is to command it, without offering the command of it to you.

‘ At the same time I will not separate you from the army and from my own immediate command without consulting your wishes; and I shall be glad to hear from you upon this subject as soon as possible, as the arrangements for quartering and disposing of the troops depend upon your decision upon this point. You will therefore send back either a messenger, if you can get one, or an officer, with your answer as soon as possible.

‘ I send your letters, arrived by the English mail.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Lieut. General Hill.’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To Lieut. Colonel Carroll\*.*

‘SIR,

‘Badajoz, 18th December, 1809.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 4th instant, and I am much obliged to you for the details of the late events in Castille which it contains.

‘I had already received from Mr. Frere, and from other quarters, accounts of the proceedings of the army of Castille between the 17th and 29th of November, both inclusive; to which I had been induced to give credit, adverting to the authority from which they had reached me. These differ in some respects from your account, which I attribute to the difference of the view of the same transactions taken by different people; but they have stated one material fact which you have omitted, upon which I beg to have your report.

‘I have been informed that the army dispersed on the 29th, when within two leagues of Tamames, upon hearing a report that the French dragoons were following them, notwithstanding that in point of fact only thirty dragoons did make their appearance.

‘If this fact be true, it is desirable that you should have reported it; and indeed as the reports of officers, employed as you are, are the foundation of the measures adopted by His Majesty’s Government, and upon which I must found the operations of the army under my command, it is most desirable that they should be correct and full in every particular; and should give those who may read them an accurate notion of the events to which they relate.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Carroll.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Badajoz, 19th December, 1809.

‘I received yesterday morning your letter of the 13th instant. The greatest part of the army will be carried forward to the frontier of Castille; but some will remain upon the Tagus, to whom the boats you mention will be of use.

‘I am very much obliged to you for thinking of the transports at Salvaterra, which will be a great convenience to us,

\* Major General Sir W. P. Carroll, K.C.H., then in the service of Spain.

as well as the gun boats. Indeed, upon this last subject, I shall have to trouble you more at length, as soon as Colonel Fletcher and I shall have settled the defence of our positions to be taken up on the Tagus, in the event of the invasion of the country by the enemy.

‘ I have written to the Government respecting the boats on all the rivers, but particularly on the Tagus ; to which letter I have as yet received no answer. The plan which I have proposed to them is,—

‘ First : That the names of the owners of all boats, their sizes, &c., should be registered in the village or district in which the owners reside, and the boats numbered.

‘ Secondly : That the name of the owner of each boat, and of the village to which he belongs, and the boat’s number, should be marked on each boat.

‘ Thirdly : That the owners of boats should be made responsible, under a heavy penalty, to remove their boats to whatever point they should be directed by the magistrate of the village or district at a moment’s notice. The magistrate of the village or district would of course receive his orders from the Government or their officers.

‘ I have recommended an arrangement upon the same principle respecting the carts throughout the country.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I wait here to see the last of the troops out of Spain ; and then I shall move to the northward without stopping.’

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 19th December, 1809.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 21st November. I sent by the last post to Mr. Sydenham, for the use of Pole principally, and of Lord Wellesley, a narrative\* of the description you wish to have ; and I desired him to shew it to nobody else, lest it should get into print. I have now written to request him to let you have a copy of it ; and you will communicate it to whomsoever you please ; only I beg that it may not be printed. You will find it will answer your

\* See Memorandum of Operations in 1809 : Badajoz, 9th December, 1809.

purpose perfectly ; and I have referred in the margin to the official documents and authorities from which I drew it up.

‘ I am glad to find that the Government are getting on well.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 19th December, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s dispatch of the 22nd November, enclosing copies of the dispatch from Lord Bathurst to Mr. Villiers, No. 10, and of the separate dispatch, No. 1, regarding the payment of the Portuguese troops.

‘ I have no copy of the original instructions from Mr. Canning to Mr. Villiers upon this subject ; nor of the estimate of the expense of the Portuguese troops, upon which was founded the charge against the British Government for the payment first of 10,000, and latterly of 20,000 men.

‘ I have viewed this subject possibly erroneously, but I have always considered that it was the intention of His Majesty’s Government to afford certain assistance to Portugal ; the extent of which was to be measured by the exertions which Portugal should make in the cause ; and by the information which should be received of the wants of that country.

‘ Upon this principle I conceive it was, that the pecuniary assistance to be given to Portugal was made to depend first upon that country having 10,000 men, and afterwards upon having 20,000 men in her service.

‘ But the objects of His Majesty’s Government in Portugal were not confined to the 20,000 men, for the payment of which His Majesty was disposed to advance the means.

‘ The greatest anxiety was likewise felt and expressed for the re-establishment of the Portuguese army ; and with a view to attain this desirable object, His Majesty allowed one of his generals, General Beresford, to enter into the Portuguese service, to command the Portuguese army, and several of the officers of his army to serve in that of Portugal on various terms.

‘ His Majesty likewise allowed me to accept the commission of Marshal General from the Prince Regent, in order



that I might have the general superintendence over all the troops serving in Portugal.

‘ Under these circumstances, General Beresford and I (as far as I have had any concern with them) have not limited our attention solely to the 20,000 men (no further than to take care that there were 20,000 men actually in the service before His Majesty’s Government were called upon to pay for that number), but have considered the whole Portuguese army in all its parts to be equally objects of our attention.

‘ The mode in which the business is done is, the Ambassador pays a certain sum monthly, being the estimated expense of 20,000 men, to the Portuguese Government, and all the Portuguese troops without distinction are paid by the officers of the Portuguese Government.

‘ I do not believe that the sum paid by the Ambassador to the Portuguese Government is adequate to defray the expense of the 20,000 men; and it would be difficult to define accurately the amount of the expense of any particular number of men, being part of an army, the whole employed in the same country, some in garrison, and others in the field. There would besides be difficulties in paying this selected body, and arrangements must be made to provide for the exclusive command of these troops; and they must in fact be separated from the remainder of the Portuguese army, although the whole would serve in the same country, and possibly in the same operation.

‘ This selected body (supposing the Portuguese Government should be inclined to make such, into which part of the subject it is not my province to enter) would have no advantage in point of equipment or efficiency over other parts of the army; and indeed I believe in some respects would labor under disadvantages. The whole Portuguese army now receive the best assistance the means supplied by Great Britain and by Portugal can afford them. If that part of the army paid by Great Britain were alone to receive the assistance of equipments and other supplies furnished by Great Britain, it would want those which Portugal can afford, unless purchased for them at the expense of Great Britain; at the same time, that that part which would be at the charge of Portugal would want many articles which Great Britain alone can supply. The effect of the arrange-

ments, as far as regards equipments, would have been, that we should have had 20,000 equipped about as well as the whole army are at present; and the remainder very imperfectly equipped.

‘ Thus, upon the whole, the arrangement of separating 20,000 men of the Portuguese army, to be paid, equipped, &c., &c., by Great Britain, would, if it had been originally intended by His Majesty’s Government, have been impracticable; and even if it could have been successful, it would have given a smaller and a less efficient force for the general cause in the existing contest on the Peninsula than that which we have at present, and at a larger expense.

‘ But whatever might have been the consequences of adopting any other system than that upon which we have acted in Portugal, it is evidently impracticable now to alter that upon which we have been proceeding to the present moment.

‘ In respect to the expense of the system which has been adopted, I have no copy of the estimate which was transmitted by the Ambassador to the Secretary of State, and I am not enabled to state accurately its extent.

‘ It may be classed, however, under the following heads :

‘ First, the pay and provisions for 20,000 men; which I had, upon recollection of the estimate, considered to be £500,000 per annum, or something more than £20,000 per month for each 10,000 men.

‘ Secondly, the pay and allowances of the British officers in the Portuguese service, which I estimate will amount to £100,000 per annum.

‘ These officers are paid at different rates from the Portuguese officers, and upon principles settled by the Commander in Chief in England; and they have received their pay from Mr. Bell, who was appointed their paymaster by the Ambassador, with the consent of the Secretary of State.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I wrote some time ago to General Beresford, a copy of which has already been transmitted to England, which will explain the principles on which this part of the business is conducted.

‘ The third head of expense is that of ordnance and military stores, arms, ammunition, clothing, and equipments of all descriptions required by the Portuguese army, a part of

which has been furnished by Great Britain. I have no knowledge of the prices of these articles, and can furnish no estimate of the expense.

‘ In a dispatch which I addressed to your Lordship on the 14th of November, I stated to your Lordship the general situation of the finances of Portugal, and my opinion respecting the assistance which ought to be given to that country in order to provide for its defence, in answer to a dispatch which I had received from Lord Castlereagh upon that subject.

‘ It is obvious that the sum with which I proposed that Portugal should be assisted will not make good the deficiency in the revenues, but is that which may prevent the deficiency from falling upon the army; and I have further to observe, that if the whole of the sum which I proposed in that dispatch should be given to Portugal, it will not amount to that which Great Britain would probably have to pay upon a fair estimate of the expense of 20,000 men.

‘ Your Lordship may be convinced that I have not exaggerated the financial and other difficulties with which Portugal has to contend; and I must add, that if it be the policy of His Majesty’s Government to support the contest in the Peninsula, and to extend the assistance of Great Britain to Portugal, that country deserves that assistance, not only by the confidence reposed in His Majesty’s servants and officers, but by the exertions which the Government are disposed to make in their own cause; the whole of their revenue being employed in defraying the expenses of their troops, and of such establishments as are necessary for the support of the armies.

‘ But if Great Britain cannot afford this expense, and if the arms, clothing, and equipments required cannot be sent to Portugal, at least as soon as the enemy can send into the Peninsula the reinforcements to his armies, the contest must be carried on with manifest disadvantage.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’



*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Badajoz, 19th December, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 21st November, regarding the provinces of Aragon, and Catalonia, and Valencia, which I agree entirely with you in thinking very interesting, although we have but little information upon them. I had lately sent Lord Burghersh into that part of Spain, and I forwarded to Lord Castlereagh his report from Granada, which I desired him to communicate to his successor. I have lately received a letter from him from Valencia, an extract of which I enclose, but I have desired him to make me a more full report.

‘ The officers who had been employed in Spain by Lord Castlereagh were under the orders of the Commanding Officer in Spain and Portugal; but when Lord Wellesley arrived, he brought with him orders from Lord Castlereagh to place themselves under the directions of the Ambassador at Seville, and I have had nothing to say to them since. Lieut. Colonel Doyle\* was the officer stationed in Catalonia, and I believe that he had to be sent down by Blake to Seville upon some business, after the defeat of his army at Belchite, and he has not since returned; and I understand from Mr. Frere that he expects instructions from England. If, however, I should find that he does not return to that quarter, I shall send there an officer. But Colonel Bourke, who is certainly well qualified, is in England; and Sturgeon†, who is a clever fellow, and I should think also qualified for such a mission, cannot well be spared from the army.

‘ Generally speaking, these officers have not been of much use. In my opinion, they do not make accurate or useful reports of what passes in the quarters in which they are stationed, with the exception of Roche, of whom, I must say, that although he was the friend of Cuesta, his reports were from the beginning of a nature to discourage me from having any thing to do with him; and I found them upon experience to be perfectly well founded.

\* Major General Sir Charles Doyle, K.C.H.

† Lieut. Colonel Sturgeon, killed in an affair near Vic Bigorre, in the south of France, in March, 1814.

‘ I should doubt very much the expediency of having any thing to do with the war in Aragon and Catalonia, excepting by assistance of arms, ammunition, and money, and probably squadrons on the coast. The French authority is in a manner established in Aragon; there is no regular resistance to it, and all that is done is by partizans, who do a great deal of good; but their operations are of such a nature, that we could have no connexion with them, excepting probably by encouraging them with money.

‘ In Catalonia, the resistance is more general and regular; but still the people are of a description with which your armies could not co-operate with any prospect of success, or even of safety. You see what Burghersh says of the Somatenes\*; and it is notorious that the Catalans have at all times been the most irregular, and the least to be depended upon of any of the Spaniards.

‘ There is this to be added against any partial operation in Catalonia, such as the siege of Barcelona, or the co-operation in an attempt to relieve Gerona, that the seat of it is so near to France, and to the road by which reinforcements must come, that the British army or detachment would be in danger of being cut off, or at all events of being obliged to make an early and a hurried embarkation. In such a case, the army would suffer more by the disgrace of the failure and retreat than it could possibly gain even by the greatest success. If we had here a few thousand men to spare, it might be possible now to arrange with Blake (who is, I believe, the best of the Spanish officers) an expedition for the single object of relieving Gerona, which is a most interesting one to the whole Spanish nation. But the fall of Gerona must be decided, or the army engaged in the siege must be reinforced so as to render such an attempt hopeless, long before the men could arrive from England, supposing you could spare them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

\* The armed peasantry in Catalonia.

*To J. Murray, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 19th December, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury in the month of June last, in which I submitted to their Lordships the enclosed memorandum of an arrangement for conducting the duties of the British and the Portuguese Commissariats, as far as they were to be connected; to which letter I now enclose their Lordships’ answer.

‘ I beg that the duties of the British and Portuguese Commissariat may in future be conducted according to the tenor of this arrangement; and that you will consider the 30th article of your instructions, and the 35th article of the instructions to the Commissary of accounts from the Treasury as repealed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Roche.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 19th December, 1809.

‘ I have received your letters of the 12th and 14th. By this time the Seville Gazette will have acquainted you with the motives which I had for moving the British army across the Tagus. In fact, the first effort of the enemy, when he shall receive his reinforcements, must be to possess himself of the course of the Tagus; and he can never venture to push himself into the south of Spain till that object shall be accomplished.

‘ On this account, I had long determined to move to the frontiers of Castille in the fine weather in the month of December; and the army is now in march to that quarter, and I shall set out in three or four days, when I have seen the last of the troops out of Spain.

‘ The Spaniards ought to defend the Despeña Perros with the force they have; but they go to the plains to be beaten, and thus cow the troops who would otherwise defend themselves in the mountains.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Roche.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS, ‘ Badajoz, 21st December, 1809.

‘ I send you my dispatches to Lord Liverpool, open for your perusal, and those of Mr. Frere.

‘ I have given directions to the Commissary General this day to order Mr. Dunmore to pay you £20,000 of the remaining £50,000 for the Portuguese Government; and I hope that the state of our funds will enable me to advance the remainder of the money in a few days.

‘ I set out on the 25th; but I request you to allow the messengers to come as usual till I shall write to turn them off to Abrantes.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Rt. Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Badajoz, 21st December, 1809.

‘ The enemy have moved forward in force in La Mancha; and on the 15th they had a corps at S<sup>a</sup> Cruz, at the foot of the hills, with their advanced posts within a league of Despeña Perros, the principal pass through that part of the Sierra Morena.

‘ The French corps most advanced was Victor’s, supported by that of Mortier; and Sebastiani had marched on the left towards Cuenca, in order to disperse the Spanish corps which had collected there under General Echevarria, after the battle of Ocaña.

‘ The Spanish army had collected again at La Carolina to the amount of 24,000 infantry; besides the corps at Cuenca, said to amount to 8000, there were 6000 cavalry. Colonel Roche, from whom I have received the accounts, considers the estimate of 16,000 infantry with arms, and 3000 cavalry mounted, to be exaggerated; but I have seen other accounts, which state that larger numbers of infantry have their arms, and that the whole of the 6000 cavalry are mounted.

‘ This army ought certainly to be able to defend the passes of the Sierra Morena, if the enemy should attack them. I should imagine, however, from the delay of their attack, of

which I have heard nothing for the last two days, that they do not propose at present to effect more than to oblige the Spaniards to withdraw from the low country into the more unhealthy climate of the mountains.

‘By the last accounts from Old Castille, it appears that the enemy still remained upon the Tormes. They had collected a large corps in that part of the country, which was under the command of General Kellermann, with which they were watching the movements of the Duque del Parque.

‘The corps d’armée, which was Soult’s, is at and in the neighbourhood of Talavera de la Reyna.

‘The British army is still upon its march, and I expect that the leading divisions will arrive upon the Mondego in the course of three or four days. I propose to set out from hence on the 25th instant.

‘The weather has been remarkably fine, and I hope that it will continue till the army shall reach its new position.

‘The health of the troops is much improved; and there are now many convalescents in the hospitals at Elvas and Estremoz nearly sufficiently strong to join their corps.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Badajoz, 21st December, 1809.

‘I wish to draw your attention to the list of the General Officers of this army; and I believe you will admit that, with some exceptions, there never was an army so ill provided. I may say to you in confidence, that I think, if I succeed in executing the arduous task which has devolved upon me, I may fairly say that I had not the best instruments, in either officers or men, which the service could have afforded.

‘That, however, to which I wish principally to draw your attention is the state of health of Sir John Sherbrooke. He is at times quite incapable of doing any thing; and he very lately told me that he could not pretend to serve through another summer, and that he must go in April next at latest. The only officers I know of fit to succeed him are General Graham, General Oakes, or Sir George Prevost. I have put their names down as being all senior to General ——; but

if none of them should come, and General —— should be drawn home, there are then Lord W. Bentinck, General Paget, and Sir Brent Spencer.

‘ One great difficulty, however, in all arrangements of this description, arises from General Beresford’s rank in the Portuguese army. I have hitherto succeeded, and I hope I shall still succeed, in keeping down discussions on that subject; but still there is no denying that a Portuguese Marshal and Commander in Chief commands every body excepting the Commanding Officer of the British army, and *that* by stipulation; and although there is no senior officer excepting General Beresford who would have accepted, at the time he did, the charge which he has undertaken, his rank occasions heart-burnings, and may occasion difficulties in bringing officers to this army.

‘ But, besides an officer to fill General Sherbrooke’s place, we want others to command brigades and posts in the country. I must sometimes allow General Officers to go home for their health or on account of their private affairs; and we have not upon such an occasion one to spare. I wish, therefore, you could think of sending me some. Generals Dyott, Leith, Picton, Meade, Houstoun, Nightingall, I should like to have; but General Meade is employed, and I fear that Generals Houstoun and Nightingall would not like to come.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I beg you will observe that it will be very awkward to send any body here to supersede General Sir J. Sherbrooke before he should be ready to go. When you shall have fixed upon the person, therefore, and will let me know his name, I will consult General Sherbrooke again, and fix the time when his successor shall come out.’

*To Bart. Frere, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 22nd December, 1809.

‘ I was very much obliged to you for your letter of the 17th; and I forwarded your dispatch to Lord Bathurst to



Mr. Villiers, according to your desire. I have since heard that the French had again withdrawn from the position at the foot of the Sierra Morena ; which I always thought probable, particularly when they should hear of the movement of the British army towards the frontiers of Castille. Owing to the care of the Junta of Badajoz, and that of the Supreme Junta, in publishing my letter to the former, the enemy must have known of this movement at an early period.

‘ I shall go on Monday : I shall write to you whenever I have any thing interesting to communicate ; and I shall be glad to hear from you when convenient to you to write. I think it would be very desirable if the Spanish Government would establish a regular *parte*\* three times a week from Seville to the British army, as far as Elvas ; from which place I shall prevail on the Portuguese Government to provide for the carriage of the letters. The expense of sending messengers is enormous ; but I should have no objection to defray the expense of the *parte*. Will you endeavor to establish it ?

‘ I have received a letter from Lord Liverpool, in which he desires me to send an officer into Catalonia, in order that we may have some accurate knowledge of the state of affairs in that province. What have you done about Colonel Doyle in respect of this province ? I shall not send any body there till I shall hear again from you.

‘ From accounts which I have from Almeida, I am apprehensive that the War department have not sent orders to Ciudad Rodrigo that Lieut. de Farincourt may be released and sent forward. I shall be obliged to you if you will again mention the subject to Don F. de Saavedra.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ B. Frere, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General Whittingham.†*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 22nd December, 1809.

‘ I am concerned to hear that the state of your wound has obliged you to go to Gibraltar ; but I wish that while you

\* The Spanish and Portuguese term for *estafette* or post.

† Lieut. Colonel, now Lieut. General Sir S. Whittingham, K.C.B., was then a Major General in the service of Spain.

are in that part of the Peninsula, you would take an opportunity of seeing or writing to General Venegas on the subject of the defence of Cadiz. I hope that the enemy are still very far from being able to undertake the siege of that important post. If they should not be so, it is most satisfactory to the whole world to see the defence of it intrusted to such a man as Venegas; and although we ought all to have, and have the utmost confidence in his abilities, I know too much of these affairs not be certain that the defence of a place of this description is always vigorous and well conducted in proportion to the extent of the preparations made for it, and the length of time which the operations required have been foreseen and have been provided for.

‘ Although I am one of those who are of opinion that the English ought to have nothing to say to Cadiz, yet it cannot be denied that it is a point in the defence of which we are most materially interested, and in which we must co-operate at least with our Navy. Cadiz depends for many articles, and I believe some of the necessaries of life, upon its communication with the sea, in which the most material aid can be given by the British Navy; if, indeed, their co-operation is not deemed essentially necessary for the salvation of the place. Now we all know the length of time which a naval equipment of this description takes; which will not consist only in ships of war and armed craft, but in victuallers, water vessels, &c., &c., which must be fitted up for the purpose. I should, therefore, recommend to General Venegas, at an early period, to turn his mind to a calculation of his probable wants of this description, and to have them communicated to the British Government in time, in order that all the preparations may be made, and that the assistance required may be given at the moment it is wanted.

‘ I have every confidence, not only in the patriotism and honor, but in the military abilities of General Venegas; and I am convinced he will adopt every measure which prudence and skill can suggest for the defence of the place intrusted to his charge; but having lately visited this famous fortress, I took an opportunity of looking at it, although not so much as I could have wished, or as I should have done, if I had not known that some of the inhabitants might have felt a jealousy of my curiosity.



‘ It occurs to me, however, that it would be most important to Cadiz to finish the work which has been commenced on the isthmus between Cadiz and the Isla de Leon ; and I would even go farther, and would recommend the construction of another strong work at the Torre de Ercole, which would secure the communication with the Isla de Leon, and would much impede the advance of the enemy towards the main body of the place. The defence of and communication with the Isla de Leon is a most important consideration for any body who is to conduct the defence of Cadiz itself ; and the works constructed, and the troops employed in the defence of this Isla and the approaches to it, would be materially aided, and their retreat to Cadiz covered and secured, in case of accidents, by the construction of the proposed work at the Torre de Ercole.

‘ These are the points to which in particular I would draw the attention of General Venegas, if I were likely to see him ; but as that is not probable, I beg you either to see or write to him, and to communicate to him the sentiments which I have above written to you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Gen. Whittingham.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 22nd December, 1809.

‘ I am concerned to be obliged to make any complaint of a *protégé* of yours, but I must say that I think I have some cause to complain of Mr. —.

‘ He was appointed by me to the Commissariat in June, and on the 11th July he writes a letter to the Lords of the Treasury, in which he gives them to understand neither more nor less than that the Commissary General, and all his officers, as well as myself, are either knaves or fools ; and that he can save thousands upon thousands to the public, by some new mode he has discovered of supplying the troops with bread. He disclaims, at the same time, any intention of making a charge against any of us !

‘ Now, I must say that, if Mr. — has made any discovery upon this subject, it was his duty to apprise me of it ; and at least to try whether our failure to save the public these



thousands upon thousands was to be attributed to knavery or folly, before he wrote to the Treasury upon the subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To J. Murray, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 24th December, 1809.

‘ I beg that you will deliver over to the officers of the Spanish Commissariat, appointed by the Duque de Alburquerque, or by the Junta of Badajoz to receive it, all the wheat, flour and barley which you have purchased in this country, and which you have not the means of removing from Spain; and you will take the receipts of those officers for the quantities you will deliver to them, which I will forward to His Majesty’s Minister at Seville, in order that he may receive the value of these articles from the Spanish Government.

‘ It will be necessary that you should settle with the Junta of Badajoz the price which the Spanish Government shall pay for these articles; and I request you to take measures accordingly, in concert with Colonel Alava, who is employed here by the Duque de Alburquerque.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *To J. Murray, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Senate of Estremoz.*

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Elvas, 25th December, 1809.

‘ I have received your memorandum relative to the conduct of the British officers at Estremoz, which has given me much concern; and I wish that you had mentioned either the names of the officers who have conducted themselves in this shameful manner, or had described their persons, or the regiments to which they belong, or had even mentioned the days on which they passed through Estremoz.

‘ It is almost useless to complain of an injury if the name of the person behaving ill is not mentioned. However, I have given orders to the military commanding officer of the hospital to make arrangements upon this subject, which I hope will prevent complaints in future.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Senate of Estremoz.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To J. Murray, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Badajoz, 25th December, 1809.

‘ I have perused the agreement into which you entered yesterday with the Junta of Badajoz, by my desire, respecting the price to be paid for the wheat, flour, and barley, left in this country by the British army, viz.—52 reals for each fanega of wheat and flour, and 48 reals for each fanega of barley, in which I fully concur.

‘ These prices are not so large as those which you have paid in the country for the same articles; but it must be observed that this large price was probably occasioned by the large demand for the supply of the British army, and that the army having marched, and the demand having ceased, the price must fall.

‘ A larger price might possibly be got by the sale of the articles by auction: but this mode (if the Government were disposed to allow of it) would be objectionable at this moment, considering that all the supplies of the country are required for the armies, and that a part of those which we have purchased, the superabundance of which are now to be disposed of, have been procured by the influence of the Government.

‘ It is besides to be observed that if these articles were to be sold by auction, or in any manner by retail, it would be necessary to leave in the country, to superintend the sale, certain officers of the Commissariat, whose services cannot be spared from the army.

‘ I therefore sanction the arrangement which you have made.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Badajoz, 27th December, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 24th, and I am much concerned that you did not detain my dispatch relative to the Portuguese troops, which was written under a mistake. I understood the arrangement to be as I stated it; but this

mistake is one among many proofs that a man should never venture upon an official statement, upon any subject, without having official documents before him.

‘ I do not now understand how you check your payments, or whether you pay for 17,000 or 20,000 men. However, this is no business of mine; and I do not wish to have any concern in it, or in the office which you have chalked out for me. You had much better stay and see the game out yourself.

‘ I write to you now principally about your money concerns. The Portuguese Government wanted £150,000 from us at the end of October to make up a sum to lay in magazines for their army, which according to a plan suggested by Forjaz, was to be advanced as follows: the pay of 20,000 men for November in advance, and £100,000 on account of a draft on de Souza in London.

‘ This proposition was made when I was at Lisbon in October, and I would not give a positive answer to it till I arrived at Badajoz, and could see the Commissary General.

‘ I wrote to you a letter on the 31st October, in which I consented to advance the whole sum on account of November’s subsidy, and your fourth for October, making altogether £97,000, which you received; and also the £100,000 on account of the draft on de Souza in two payments, provided the £30,000 bar silver was placed at the disposal of the Commissary General. Refer to this letter. Thus you see you have had your subsidy for November, and £70,000 out of the £100,000. I think I shall be able to give you the other £30,000 in a few days. I should certainly have been able to give it, if the Mint had not been extraordinarily slow in coining the silver.

‘ I do not see any breach of engagement in all this transaction, excepting in the delay to pay the last £30,000, which may fairly be attributed to the delay in the coinage of the bar silver.

‘ I am glad to find that the Government are disposed to aid Portugal with money, but I have informed them that they must send out money; nothing else will answer.

‘ I believe that the Admiral has had the batteries armed. It does not signify one pinch of snuff; we can disarm them in five minutes.



‘ I made a dash at de Mello; and I am very glad to find that the Government have done upon this subject what they ought.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ As for Mr. —, I only beg that he will not write letters to the Treasury on subjects which he does not understand.’

*To Bart. Frere, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Gafete, 27th December, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter from Brig. General Cox, commanding at Almeida, to Marshal Beresford, together with the enclosures marked Nos. 8, 9, 10, relative to the return of Lieut. Veron de Farincourt to Almeida, after a detention in confinement at Ciudad Rodrigo for six weeks, ——— having received orders from the Spanish Government not to allow him to proceed to join the French army by that route.

‘ It is evident to me, that — had not received the orders which he states that he had received; or that the orders of the contrary tenor were not sent, which Don F. de Saavedra assured you had been sent, as mentioned to me in your letter of the 9th instant. The respect which I have for the character of Don F. de Saavedra induces me to hope that it may turn out that he has not deceived you.

‘ I consider that the feelings of His Majesty, and of the public in general, are so much interested in favor of the brave officers and soldiers who are in the hands of the enemy, only because they were wounded in fighting the battles of Spain, that I cannot any longer delay reporting for His Majesty’s information, the unusual difficulties which the Spanish Government and officers have thrown in the way of every communication between the French Generals and me which had for its object either the relief, or the exchange of these unfortunate persons.

‘ I must at the same time do the people of Spain the justice to say, that these difficulties are as inconsistent with their wishes as they are with their interests, or with humanity; as they have done every thing in their power to relieve these

officers and soldiers, and have assisted such of them who have escaped from captivity, as much as has been in their power in their passage through the country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Bart. Frere, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To his Excellency Dom Miguel Forjaz.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Gafete, 27th December, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th December, in which you have enclosed the copy of a letter from the Corregidor of Coimbra, and the copies of a correspondence between that magistrate and an assistant commissary of the British army.

‘ I am concerned to learn that there exists a scarcity of provisions in that part of the country in which the troops have not been collected since the last harvest; and I had hoped, and still hope, that the scarcity is not so great as that the measures which I have adopted in the British army for the regular settlement of accounts, and early payment for supplies received from time to time from the country, will have the effect of procuring for the troops that assistance in provisions which they may require, and which every country in which an army is obliged to act must afford.

‘ However, not relying solely upon the effect of these measures, magazines for the use of the British troops have been fixed on the Mondego and the Douro, to aid in the supply of the demand for provisions.

‘ The other points in your letter being referrible to His Majesty’s Government, I beg leave to request that you will communicate with His Majesty’s Minister at Lisbon upon them, from whom alone you can receive an answer.

‘ I beg leave to inform you, however, that you are mistaken in supposing that the measures which had been proposed when I was at Lisbon in October, with a view to assist the Portuguese Government in collecting magazines of provisions, have not been carried into execution, as far as the funds of the British army were to be employed in giving that assistance.

‘ The assistance to be given consisted in £150,000 sterling, of which £50,000 sterling were to be in advance on account of the pay, &c., of the 20,000 troops; and £100,000

on account of a sum of money expected from Sr de Souza in England.

‘ The first mentioned £50,000 were paid immediately ; that is, in the end of October. Of the £100,000, £50,000 were paid when the money was demanded, in the beginning of December, by Mr. Villiers ; and of the other £50,000, £20,000 have since been paid. The whole sum would have been paid on demand if the silver could have been coined at the Mint in time ; and if my expectation of receiving money on account of bills upon England had not been disappointed. But I have no doubt that I shall be enabled to order the issue of the remaining £30,000 on this account in a short time.

‘ As the Governors of the kingdom may be desirous of having my opinion on the points adverted to in your letter of the 20th instant, notwithstanding that they can receive from Mr. Villiers alone any decisive answer, I proceed to communicate it for their information.

‘ I have not the estimate of the expense of the troops on which is founded the calculation of the monthly sum to be paid by the British Government for the 20,000 men ; but I have always understood that the expense of provisions for these 20,000 men was included in the estimate. If my understanding on this subject be correct, the British Government will not be disposed to defray the expense of forming magazines for these troops, when they already pay the expense of their provisions in the monthly sum paid by His Majesty’s Minister at Lisbon to the Portuguese Government.

→ ‘ But although the British Government will not defray the expense of the formation of magazines for the Portuguese army, it may be thought that the state of the supplies of grain in Portugal may require the assistance of Great Britain. Upon this point I am concerned to add, that from what I see of the prices of provisions in England, and from what I have heard of the produce of the last harvest, I have reason to believe that Great Britain could not afford any considerable export of grain to Portugal, excepting what may be necessary for the British army, in addition to the magazines now in Portugal, in order to aid the supplies which the army must continue to receive from the country ; and it will be necessary that this country should look to a supply from the Western Islands, from the Mediterranean, and from America.

‘ I have no doubt that this supply can be procured with



money; and that His Majesty's Government will be disposed to exert their influence to procure for Portugal every assistance of this description.

‘ But it will be necessary that the importers of this grain should be certain of a sale; and that the purchase should not be refused by the Government, as in the late instance of the wheat imported into Lisbon by Mr. Phillips, of which the late Minister of Finance declined the purchase, notwithstanding the offer made by me to facilitate it as much as was in my power.

‘ This circumstance will appear still more extraordinary, now that it is stated that there exists a scarcity in the country, of which the Minister of Finance must have had a knowledge at the time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Dom Miguel Forjaz.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Gaviao, 28th December, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter respecting the boats, &c., and I have given directions to the Commissary General according to your suggestions.

‘ I omitted to answer a part of a former letter from you, which related to the period at which vessels should be sent to Cadiz and to Gibraltar for the money for the army, upon which I wished to have some discussion with the Commissary General before I gave you an answer. He says, what indeed I know to be true, that it is impossible for him to fix the periods at which his agents at those places will have money in their hands. This depends entirely upon the money market, and very much upon the periods of the sailing and of the arrival of the packets.

‘ I have written to England upon this subject, to endeavor to have regularity established in those communications, which will, I hope, tend to the relief of our pecuniary difficulties in some degree, as well as give us such a knowledge of the state of the money markets as to enable us to fix the periods at which vessels should be sent to bring our money away from Cadiz and Gibraltar.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral  
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Bart. Frere, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Gaviaõ, 28th December, 1809.

‘ I enclose a letter which Brigadier General Cox has written to Marshal Beresford, with its enclosures, being a proposition from the Duque del Parque, that a certain quantity of biscuit which he had heard was in the magazines at Almeida should be placed at his disposal, in order to provide, as he says, for any sudden movement which the army under his command might be obliged to make.

‘ I think this proposition rather extraordinary, particularly considering the person who makes it, who refused to allow Marshal Beresford to have a quantity of biscuit from Ciudad Rodrigo, although actually purchased and paid for by a British Commissary; and considering the whole of his conduct towards the British and Portuguese army.

‘ However, I am not disposed to consider offences of this description, when the safety of an army is at stake.

‘ The biscuit in question was lodged at Almeida by my direction, in order to enable me to draw the British army to that quarter, in case the enemy should have attacked Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ From the accounts which I have received of the state of the supplies in that part of Portugal, I have reason to believe that it will be very inconvenient to allow the Spanish army to have any part of this magazine; and if I should find this to be the case, it cannot be expected that I should allow the Duque del Parque to have it. Neither will I allow him to have it, in order to enable him to undertake an operation of the same description with that in which he lately nearly lost his army.

‘ But if I should find that the British or Portuguese army do not want the magazine, or if it can be replaced, I shall have no objection to afford the Spanish army the assistance which I can give them.

‘ The situation of the army under the Duque del Parque however, deserves the serious consideration of the Government. If they begin already to require the assistance of the British and Portuguese magazines, their distress will be very great before the winter is over, and some serious steps ought to be taken for their relief. With this view, I would

recommend to the Government to send money into Estremadura, without which it will be impossible for the Junta of that province to forward to the Duque del Parque the supplies of provisions which I know it has in its power, as the British army gave them a considerable quantity solely upon their receipts.

‘ I would also recommend that fast sailing and well equipped vessels should be sent from Cadiz to the mouth of the Mondego, loaded with biscuit, and whatever else this army may require.

‘ Unless the weather should be very bad, the cargoes can be landed at Buarcos, at about a league from Figueira, from whence the Mondego affords water carriage to within twenty leagues of Ciudad Rodrigo; and I should think there would be no difficulty in sending carriages from Ciudad Rodrigo to draw up the provisions from the landing place.

‘ I suggest this plan in case of want of money, or any other cause with which I am unacquainted, should prevent the Government from supplying this army from Estremadura.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Bart. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gaviaõ, 28th December, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Marshal Beresford relative to the refusal of His Majesty’s Government to supply the Portuguese cavalry with arms, and relative to the want of muskets and accoutrements in Portugal for the militia.

‘ I beg to refer your Lordship to my dispatch of the 14th November, upon the subject of the assistance which I expected from the whole Portuguese regular army and militia in the contest in which we are likely to be engaged in this country.

‘ I likewise enclose the translation of a letter which I have received from Dom Miguel Forjaz, the Secretary of State for the War Department of the Government of Portugal, upon the distress of this country for the want of provisions, and the copy of my answer. It is probable that Mr. Villiers will address His Majesty’s Ministers upon the subjects to which these letters relate.



‘ I believe that Portugal has never produced a sufficient quantity of grain for its consumption ; but from all the information I have received, I have no reason to believe that the harvest has failed this year ; and the part of the country in which the scarcity is stated to exist is among the most fertile and best cultivated in Portugal.

‘ I conceive, therefore, that the difficulty in procuring provisions, if it exists, is to be attributed to the want of money by the Government.

‘ In fact the Portuguese Government have, since the restoration, been in the habit of taking provisions from the inhabitants of the country without paying for them, or even settling accounts. The people now conceal their provisions, and refuse to continue to furnish supplies, and the troops are distressed ; and this concealment of the supplies of the country, and refusal to furnish them, and the distress for want of provisions suffered by the troops, will continue till the revenue shall be brought nearer to the necessary expenditure of the country.

‘ These statements will show your Lordship the difficulties of the situation of this country, which must be felt more or less by the British army employed in co-operating in its defence, and can be alleviated only by the prompt and efficacious assistance of His Majesty’s Government. Portugal has no expectation of pecuniary or other assistance from the Brazils, or from any of its foreign possessions ; there is no manufacture of arms in this country ; and it must depend for its means of defence upon the supplies which Great Britain will afford.

‘ His Majesty’s Government must be the best judges whether it is proper to continue the war in the Peninsula ; and whether the best mode of opposing the enemy in the Peninsula is by an exertion to create a military force in Portugal. But it is evident that we shall fail in producing the exertion of which this country is capable, and which the Government and inhabitants are certainly willing to make, for want of means, unless His Majesty’s Government should be able to assist Portugal with money as well as with arms, and the other equipments, for which I have sent to England requisitions at different times.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gaviaõ, 28th December, 1809.

‘ The enemy withdrew from La Mancha about the 18th instant, without having made any attempt to attack the passes of the Sierra Morena; and their object in their late expedition must have been to oblige the Spanish troops to withdraw from the plains into the more unhealthy climate of the hills.

‘ I think also that there is reason to believe that they had heard about that time of the march of the British army across the Tagus, as a letter from me to the Junta of Badajoz, apprizing them of this intended movement, and written in the beginning of December, had been very indiscreetly published, first in the Badajoz newspaper, and afterwards in that of Seville. It is probable that the receipt of this intelligence, and that of a serious insurrection in Biscay, had induced the French to withdraw their troops again from La Mancha.

‘ I have not heard that the troops in Castille have been reinforced, or have materially altered their position since I last addressed your Lordship.

‘ The Duque del Parque is still in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo; and I understand that his troops are suffering the greatest distress for the want of provisions.

‘ He has collected again a force amounting to 20,000 men.

‘ I have heard that Gerona has fallen, but not from authority on which I can place reliance.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gaviaõ, 28th December, 1809.

‘ I have to request that 1500 pickaxes and mattocks, and 300 felling axes, may be sent to Lisbon, for the use of the British army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Peacocke.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Gaviaõ, 23th December, 1809.

‘ I shall be to-morrow at Abrantes, on the 30th and 31st at Thomar, and on the 1st January at Leyria. You will send your messengers accordingly.

‘ Believe me, &amp;c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gaviaõ, 29th December, 1809.

‘ Since I closed my dispatch of yesterday, I have received intelligence on which I rely, stating that Gerona had surrendered on the 11th instant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &amp;c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Don Miguel Alava.*

‘ MON CHER COLONEL,

‘ Pombal, ce 2 Janvier, 1810.

‘ J’ai reçu à Abrantes le 29 du mois passé votre lettre du 27, pour laquelle je vous suis bien obligé.

‘ Par les nouvelles que nous venons de recevoir de Londres du 20 Dec., il paraît que c’est l’intention de Buonaparte de venir lui-même en Espagne. Il en a parlé dans son discours au Sénat; et Berthier est déjà nommé Major Général de l’armée de l’Espagne qu’on dit devait être renforcé de 100,000 hommes. Mais dans son discours au Sénat il ne parle plus de conquête en Espagne, mais des moyens sages et de la modération. Il ne viendra pas ici pour cela.

‘ Je vous serai bien obligé, si vous avez quelque chose à me communiquer que vous croyez pouvoir intéresser le corps d’armée que j’ai laissé sur le Tage à Abrantes, si vous voulez envoyer votre lettre sous cachet volant adressée au Général Hill à Abrantes; ou, si vous le préférez, d’avoir la bonté de lui écrire.

‘ L’armée du Duque del Parque est dans la Sierra de Gata. Il veut emprunter de la cavalerie Anglaise pour aller attaquer l’ennemi.

‘ Votre très fidèle, &amp;c.

‘ *Don Miguel Alava.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To B. Frere, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pombal, 2nd January, 1810.

‘ I received at Abrantes, on the 29th, your letters of the 26th, for which I am much obliged to you. I now send you some letters from England, which were enclosed to me.

‘ I have no news for you, excepting to tell you that I have received a letter from Colonel Carroll from Viseu, dated the 30th of December, in which he informs me that the Duque del Parque proposes to force his way into Galicia; and he has proposed that I should lend him 2000 cavalry, to enable him to act offensively against the enemy. His army was, on the 24th, in the Sierra de Gata; head quarters at San Martin de Trebejo.

‘ I think that General Doyle ought to go to Catalonia without loss of time, and to transmit to us every intelligence he can procure.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *B. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Pombal, 2nd January, 1810.

‘ I enclose a return of the number of artificers which Captain Patton requires at Abrantes, in order to enable him to complete the works at that place, which are very important in every point of view. I shall be obliged to you if you will assist him with as many (not exceeding the numbers of each description stated in the enclosed paper) as you can afford from the British troops under your command.

‘ I request you to read the enclosed letter to Lieut. Colonel Grant, of the Lusitanian legion, and desire the Magistrate at Abrantes to forward it to him to Castello Branco. I also request you to desire the messenger to leave the enclosed letter for General Payne at Portalegre, if he should not already have come from thence to Abrantes.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Payne.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Pombal, 2nd January, 1810.

‘ I am much concerned that you have been stopped on your march by so troublesome a companion as the gout, but I hope that you will soon recover.

‘ I shall make inquiry respecting the cause of the want of forage at Portalegre. Repeated starving, in the midst of plenty, is too bad.

‘ Among other reinforcements coming out are the 13th light dragoons, which will give us more cavalry in this country than we could feed with convenience, or than, according to present appearances, we shall require. However, there is no harm in having them at Lisbon, and there they shall remain for the present.

‘ You will see by the letters from the Horse Guards, of which I have requested Lieut. Col. Bathurst to transmit you copies, that there is no objection to our detaining, for the present, a part of the 23rd light dragoons, but that they must not be allowed to enlist with any other regiments. You will also observe what the Commander in Chief directs respecting the men of the 2nd hussars K.G.L.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Payne.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Pombal, 2nd January, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 25th and 26th; and I send by this messenger copies of the dispatch and letter which I received from the Secretary of State, respecting the additional subsidy to be paid to the Portuguese Government. I conclude that you will have received a counterpart from Lord Wellesley, or from Lord Bathurst; but lest you should not, I hope that you will make the necessary communication to the Portuguese Government, founded upon the enclosed dispatch.

‘ I have requested Beresford to send you a plan for the augmentation of the pay of the officers of the army, the expense of which will be defrayed by this subsidy of £130,000 sterling. I shall not write to the Portuguese Government

upon this or upon the other part of the subject, till I shall hear that you have communicated with them; and then only to urge and support the measure which you will propose.

‘ I have not seen the Commissary General since I received your letter, nor shall I see him till I shall be at Coimbra tomorrow; but I know that he can give the Portuguese Government provisions only in the way in which he can give them money, by depriving the British troops of them.

‘ I believe there never was any officer, but certainly never a British officer, placed in so difficult a situation as I am in. Every body looks for British assistance in every thing: money, stores, provisions, and all that keep an army together, are required by both Spaniards and Portuguese; and they and the British nation, and even the Government, conceive that I have all at my command, and that I have only to say the *word* to supply all their wants, and satisfy all their demands. The fact is, however, that I have not more than enough for my own army, and I have received the order of the Government to give nothing.

‘ I can suggest no means of procuring the money required to keep the armies together, excepting that Government should send money out. I have told them so repeatedly; and I have lately requested Lord Liverpool to send out £200,000. God knows whether it will arrive or not!

‘ As soon as I shall see the Commissary General, I will let you know what your proportion is of our receipts of December, and will give an order that it may be issued to you.

‘ You see the dash which the Common Council of the city of London have made at me! I act with a sword hanging over me, which will fall upon me whatever may be the result of affairs here; but they may do what they please, I shall not give up the game here as long as it can be played.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Pombal, 2nd January, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter respecting the transmission of the Weekly States, which shall go to you regularly. The



Horse Guards, however, might at any time have given the Government any information which they could want regarding the state of the army.

‘ I have lately had a return made out showing the total loss of the army in dead since I took the command in April last; which is only 4500 men, including the battle of Talavera, &c. Besides which, there are 1500 prisoners. This is about one third of the loss which the French compute that they suffered in about the same period of time.

‘ I see that the Common Council of the city of London have desired that my conduct should be inquired into; and I think it probable that the answer which the King will give to this Address will be consistent with the approbation which he has expressed of the acts which the gentlemen wish to make the subject of inquiry; and that they will not be well pleased. I cannot expect mercy at their hands, whether I succeed or fail; and if I should fail, they will not inquire whether the failure is owing to my own incapacity, to the blameless errors to which we are all liable, to the faults or mistakes of others, to the deficiency of our means, to the serious difficulties of our situation, or to the great power and abilities of our enemy. In any of these cases, I shall become their victim; but I am not to be alarmed by this additional risk, and whatever may be the consequences, I shall continue to do my best in this country.

‘ I wrote to you the other day about General Officers. I only beg you not to send me any violent party men. We must keep the spirit of party out of the army, or we shall be in a bad way indeed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 3rd January, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 26th December, and I really knew so little of the origin and progress of the enforcement of the claim of the army to the salvage of the British ships at Oporto, and particularly of the employment of Mr. ———, that I do not know what answer to give you.

‘ It appears, or rather Mr. ——— says, that my brother

Henry employed him to enforce the claim of the army, which I think very improbable, as he certainly has never said or written one word to me upon the subject; and Mr. Greenwood has written me no answer to the letter which I wrote to General Murray, and in which I required that he should find out what directions my brother had given.

‘ You have the copy of my letter to General Murray upon this subject, in which you will see how little I knew of Mr. —, and particularly what I thought of the claim of the navy. I have now had no answer to that letter which can satisfy me respecting Mr. —’s character, or respecting the propriety of my sending him any directions which might have the effect of sanctioning all his first proceedings, and the expenses which he will charge for them.

‘ I think, therefore, that I ought to begin to act for the army from the commencement, either in conjunction or in concert with you; but, before I take this step, I should wish to have an opportunity of talking over the subject with some of the General Officers interested in the case, whom I shall have an opportunity of seeing in a few days.

‘ My opinion is, that Mr. — has proceeded without any authority. If I know my brother well, I am convinced that he would not have authorised his proceedings without consulting or informing me of them, particularly in a case in which an army is concerned. General Murray is not in town, and has not had an opportunity of ascertaining this most important point.

‘ In respect to the Danish ships, I have written to Colonel Trant, to desire that he will not prevent their sailing whenever or wherever you may think proper to order them, taking from the captains security for the vessels and cargoes, in case they should be deemed prizes. You are already aware of my opinion upon this part of the question; and I much fear that the whole will be considered as property in a neutral port.

‘ If the Duke of Richmond has acted as you say he has, of which I know him to be very capable, he has behaved most handsomely towards Lord Wellesley.

‘ I am glad that you concur in the measures which were adopted respecting De Mello. I think that we have put an end to all the plans for resigning commissions by common

consent, &c. &c., and that we shall go on very quietly in future.

‘The Marquez das Minas is much mistaken if he supposes that any thing he can do can shake the English in Portugal. We have done, we continue to do, and I hope shall still do much good in Portugal; and the benefit of the King’s protection is too well appreciated by the Portuguese in general, and the general confidence in us too strong, to be shaken by any line he can take; and he had much better take care of himself, than attempt to injure Marshal Beresford, or the English interest.

‘I am much obliged to you for the offer of your boat. I could not quit Badajoz till the whole army had left Spain, and I was obliged to be in this quarter as soon as possible after they commenced arriving here; so that I had no time to go to Lisbon while the troops were on their march, which I should otherwise have wished to have done.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*  
*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir John Sherbrooke, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘Coimbra, 3rd January, 1810.

‘I arrived here this day, having been detained at Badajoz till the 25th, and having stopped one day at Thomar to see the Portuguese troops.

‘I received your letter of the 30th yesterday morning, at Leyria.

‘General Bacellar is not to collect at Viseu the recruits levied in Beira; but they are to go to Abrantes; the horses likewise.

‘I shall be with you in a few days; but I am obliged to stop here to settle all the affairs of our supplies, which I still hope will be sufficient.

‘The money for the army will be here to-morrow; and I wish you would order the paymasters of your division to come here as soon as they please, to receive the balance due on their estimates to the 24th December. I would send the money on, only that the Paymaster’s department have marched with me, and are in some degree knocked up.





‘ I shall be here for some days, in order that I may arrange every thing relating to our supplies ; and hereafter I shall fix my head quarters at Viseu, and shall go forward to pay you a visit.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*  
*R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S.—Do not work the hussars at Pinhel by sending them with letters. I should prefer to pay a messenger. General Sherbrooke’s division is at Viseu, and towards Celorico and Trancoso. The 4th division will be at Celorico, Guarda, and Pinhel.’

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Coimbra, 3rd January, 1810.

‘ Having communicated to the King’s Minister at Lisbon my dispatch to your Lordship of the 19th December, relative to the arrangements under which His Majesty pays for 20,000 Portuguese troops, I find that I so far misunderstood that arrangement, and misinformed your Lordship, as that

	there are certain regiments in the Portuguese service, as per margin, which are understood to be paid by Great Britain. But the money is paid to the Portuguese Government for the expenses of these regiments, and by the Portuguese Government through their officers to the troops. The Portuguese Government also defray all the expenses of the troops which the grant from his Majesty is intended to cover.
Effective strength.	
No. 1	1356
2	1355
3	857
4	1544
7	1261
10	1449
11	1535
13	1275
14	1252
15	1128
16	1515
19	1351
	<hr/>
	15,878

Chasseurs.	
No. 1	627
3	589
4	624
	<hr/>
	1,840

‘ This arrangement was made before I arrived in Portugal, and I never had any official information of it; and I knew only that the Portuguese Government received about £500,000 in payment of the expenses of 20,000 men, which resource is carried to account in the statement which I transmitted of their finance in my dispatch of the 14th November.

Total.	
	<hr/>
	17,718

‘ I have received your Lordship’s dispatch of the 15th December. I cannot with propriety make any communication to the Portuguese Go-

vernment on the part of His Majesty, and I have therefore sent to the King's Minister at Lisbon a copy of the dispatch, in order that he may make the necessary communications upon it to the Portuguese Government. He will, I doubt not, endeavour to make such an arrangement with the Portuguese Government for the distribution of the aid which His Majesty is pleased to give them as will be satisfactory to His Majesty's Government; and I shall do every thing in my power to prevail upon the Portuguese Government to adopt the arrangement which Mr. Villiers will propose, and to facilitate its execution.

‘ In my dispatch of the 14th November, I intended to state £500,000 (the pay, &c. of 20,000 men) as the whole pecuniary resource received by the Portuguese Government from Great Britain.

‘ Besides this sum, the expense of the pay and allowances to the British officers lent by His Majesty to the Portuguese Government, amounting to about £100,000, is paid by Great Britain, making in all an expense of £600,000, which His Majesty incurred in aid of Portugal at the time I wrote that dispatch.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To B. Frere, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 3rd January, 1810.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 29th December. The Marques de la Romana, and you, must be better judges of the wants of the respective provinces and armies of Spain for arms than I can be; and I concur entirely with you and him in the proposed distribution of the 10,000 stand expected from England,—viz., 6000 stand to the Duque de Alburquerque's army, and 4000 stand to Valencia and Catalonia.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *B. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To Colonel Peacocke.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 4th January, 1810.

‘ I have been informed by the Secretary of State to the Government of Portugal that certain officers in the garrison of Lisbon lately went in a masonic procession through the streets of the city, from the citadel to the British factory.

‘ I have no doubt but that this act was innocently committed by those concerned in it; but I have to inform you that the procession, the insignia, and the existence of Free Masonry, are contrary to the law in Portugal; and adverting to circumstances which have recently occurred at Lisbon, and to the reports in circulation of the causes of the confinement of different individuals by the Government, I should have believed it impossible that it was not already known that these proceedings were illegal, if the persons concerned in them were not British officers.

‘ I am informed that this procession was most offensive to many persons in Lisbon, who are at least equally attached to the laws of the country as we are to those of our own; and that nothing prevented the expression of the general indignation by a riot, excepting the respect for the British character, and the hope entertained by the majority of the people that the violation of the law was to be attributed to ignorance of its provisions.

‘ I beg of you to communicate the contents of this letter to the Commanding Officers of regiments, and principal officers of the army at Lisbon, and that you will state to them my wish that the meeting of the masonic lodges in their corps, and the wearing of all masonic emblems, and all masonic processions, may be discontinued during the time they may be in Portugal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Coimbra, 4th January, 1810.

‘ I enclose a representation of Colin Campbell’s case, which he has sent me; and I shall be obliged to you if you will lay it before the Commander in Chief.

‘ You are aware how much I am interested in his promotion; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will urge the Commander in Chief to promote him, either by brevet or otherwise, upon an early occasion.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Coimbra, 4th January, 1810.

‘ In my progress through Portugal to this place I have had opportunities of seeing fifteen regiments in the Portuguese service, and I have great pleasure in informing your Lordship that the progress of all of these troops in discipline is considerable; that some of the regiments are in very good order; and that I have no doubt but that the whole will prove a useful acquisition to the country.

‘ The troops are in general unhealthy, owing principally to the want of those articles of clothing and necessaries, without which all soldiers must suffer in the winter. But it is to be hoped that the early arrival of these articles from England will put a stop to this sickness.

‘ The pains taken by Marshal Beresford, and all the British officers serving under his command, to bring the Portuguese army to the state in which it now is, are highly deserving of his Majesty’s approbation.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Coimbra, 4th January, 1810.

‘ There has been no material alteration in the position either of the allied armies, or of the enemy, since I addressed you on the 28th of last month.

‘ It appears that the enemy had left 10,000 men in La Mancha to observe the Spanish corps in the Sierra Morena; and that a great part of the enemy’s force in that part of Spain had moved to the northward by the road of Guadaxara.

‘ General Areyzaga had, by the last accounts, collected 24,000 infantry, the whole of them armed. I cannot ascertain the number of mounted cavalry. I understand that he

had proposed to the Government another movement into the plains of La Mancha to attack the French.

‘ The Duque del Parque’s army is in the Sierra de Gata, much reduced in numbers, and in great distress for want of provisions.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Bart. Frere, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 6th January, 1810.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Colonel Carroll, expressing the desire of the Duque del Parque that I should lend him the British cavalry to aid in another offensive operation against the enemy in Castille; and expressing his Excellency’s intention to move his army to the frontiers of Galicia; to which I have returned the answer of which I enclose the copy.

‘ I also think it proper to communicate to you the copy of a letter written by the Duque del Parque to the Junta of Estremadura on the 24th of December, the day on which Colonel Carroll informed me of his Excellency’s intention to move towards Galicia, announcing to the Junta of Estremadura that he had taken a position in the Sierra de Gata, with a view to protect the province of Estremadura against the incursions of the enemy.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Bart. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Carroll.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 6th January, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 24th and 30th December, and 2nd January, to which I should have replied sooner, if I had not expected to have the pleasure of seeing you here; but as I am concerned to observe from your letter of the 2nd that you are indisposed, I now proceed to reply to the requests made by the Duque del Parque.

‘ It appears that his Excellency is desirous of undertaking another offensive operation against the enemy in Old Castille, for which purpose he requires the assistance of the British cavalry.

‘ I beg you to inform his Excellency that I remain at this



moment of the same opinion which I had the honor of communicating to him through Brigadier General Cox on the 25th of September last, regarding the proposed offensive operations, which opinion recent events in Castille and La Mancha have only tended to confirm; and that the British cavalry is only sufficient for the purposes of the British army, and that I cannot allow it to be employed with any other body of troops.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Carrol.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Don Miguel Alava.*

‘ MON CHER COLONEL,

‘ Coimbra, ce 6 Janvier, 1810.

‘ J’ai reçu seulement ce matin votre lettre du 29 Décembre. Je vous prie de dire au Duque de Alburquerque que je n’ai point d’armes dans ce pays-ci, mais qu’on en attend d’Angleterre à Cadiz tous les jours, et que j’ai écrit à Monsieur Frere pour le prier d’en donner six mille à l’armée du Duque de Alburquerque, ce qui est arrangé. Je n’ai rien de nouveau ici.

‘ Votre très fidèle, &c.

‘ *Don Miguel Alava.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Carroll.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 6th January, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2nd instant; and as you are employed with the Spanish army under the command of the Duque del Parque, principally with a view to make the Government, and His Majesty’s servants and officers employed in Spain and Portugal, acquainted with the operations of that army, I can but recommend to you to place yourself in such a situation upon all occasions, as that you may have the best opportunity of procuring information which will enable you to give those to whom you will report a correct idea of the transactions to which your reports relate.

‘ I am convinced that you will attribute this recommendation to my earnest desire that your reports may be of a nature to enable His Majesty’s Government, and his servants and officers in the Peninsula, to found their measures upon them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Carroll.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘Coimbra, 6th January, 1810.

‘I received in the night your several letters of the 1st and 3rd instant, and the Commissary General has shown me your letter to him, requiring £300,000 for the Portuguese Government. It is needless to tell you that we cannot give one dollar of the sum. It is very obvious to me that Great Britain has undertaken more than she can afford in this country.

‘I will not pledge the British Government to pay money for Portugal, which I am not certain that I shall be able to pay; nor will I allow a British Commissary to go into the market with a semblance of British credit, which is afterwards to be supported by Portuguese money. I have always said that we were going beyond our means in this country, and the truth is now discovered; and I must find out measures to bolster up the deficiency of money and of credit by the Portuguese Government. I have written to England for money, which is the only resource.

‘I have no objection to any gentleman dedicating to me his work; but I cannot give my formal sanction to his doing so without reading and considering the work, and seeing whether it is of a nature to deserve that recommendation to the public. I have not leisure for this, and I therefore return the gentleman’s paper.

‘The Government wrote to me respecting the masonic procession; and I enclose the copy of a letter to Colonel Peacocke, and of an order which I have issued upon that subject. I also enclose the copy of a letter which I have written upon it to Dom Miguel Forjaz. It is very irregular that he should write to me upon matters exclusively relating to the British troops. He ought to write to you upon these subjects.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Coimbra, 6th January, 1810.

‘Having observed a considerable difference in the reports transmitted by Colonel Carroll of recent events in Castille,

and those transmitted by others of the same events, I have the honor to enclose a correspondence which I have had with that officer on the subject.

‘ Although I have no longer any control over the officers thus employed to report the operations of the Spanish armies, I trust that my interference in this affair will be approved of; as it must be of the first importance to His Majesty that the information furnished to his Government, and his servants and officers in the Peninsula, should be accurately correct.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 9th January, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 4th instant, and I am much obliged to you for the measures you have adopted respecting the boats for Abrantes, and the transport to be anchored in the Tagus.

‘ Villa Nova is the point in the river used in the communication with the great body of the army, and probably it would be most convenient that the transport should be anchored there. The officers and couriers, however, who go by land, do not pass by Villa Nova.

‘ The Commissary General has already received my directions to make as much use as may be possible of the harbour of Figueira for the communication; and he has in the service a certain number of schooners for that purpose. Doubts are entertained in this part of the country, whether the harbour of Figueira can be used even by these schooners throughout the winter; but probably your Excellency has better information upon it than we can have. From all that I know, however, of the state of this harbour, I should doubt whether it would be possible at this season of the year to make use of it to remove the sick to Lisbon.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral  
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 9th January, 1810.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for your attention to our probable wants, and I will apply to you when we shall require your assistance.

‘ I fear it is now too late in the season to make use of any of the harbours for our communications, excepting so far as we have already got a depôt at the mouth of the Mondego.

‘ I fear that the couriers would lose much time by going to St. Martinho, which is at least eight leagues from the road, and no post horses on the line; the whole between Leyria and Lisbon being only twenty leagues, with post horses conveniently stationed; and there does not appear any prospect of our wanting to communicate with any of the posts on the coast.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral  
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Payne.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 9th January, 1810.

‘ Circumstances may render it necessary that Lieut. General Hill’s division of infantry, and other Portuguese troops, should move forward again to Portalegre: in which case, I should wish to have them joined and supported by Brigadier General Slade’s brigade of cavalry, and I accordingly request that you will order this brigade to march, if you should receive a requisition to do so from Lieut. General Hill.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Payne.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Murray, Quarter Master General.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 9th January, 1810.

‘ I have perused the letter which you have sent to me from Major Sturgeon, of the Staff Corps, relative to the means of procuring information at Ceclavim; and I beg that you will tell Major Sturgeon that I am willing to make the following arrangement for that purpose.

‘ First, To give — — — 100 dollars a month for all the information which he will give, so long as I shall find this

information to be at all founded on fact, or useful. If he should accept this offer, he shall receive the money on the 1st of every month from the commanding officer at Almeida, as long as I shall continue to pay it.

‘ Secondly, If he should bring any information of an important nature upon which I can rely, and I should find it to be true, I shall reward him in proportion to the value of the information.

‘ Thirdly, Besides the 100 dollars *per mensem* mentioned in the first article, four dollars shall be paid for every letter containing information sent either to Lieut. General Hill at Abrantes, or to Brigadier General Cox at Almeida.

‘ If ——— should accede to these propositions, Major Sturgeon will let me know it, in order that I may give the necessary directions to Lieut. General Hill to pay for the letters according to the third article. I should also wish ——— to send his letters to Lieut. General Hill at Abrantes, as well as those for me at Almeida.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Colonel Murray,  
Quarter Master General.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Lieut. General Hill knows that he may expect letters from this person, and I have desired him to pay 4 dollars for each letter.’

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 9th January, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose complaints which I have received of the conduct of Captain ——— of the Lusitanian Legion. If these complaints are well founded, Captain ——— is a very improper person to be employed as an officer in the Portuguese army; and if he has threatened or forced a British sentry on duty, in whatever character, I imagine that a General Court Martial will not deem him a fit person to be an officer in His Majesty’s service.

‘ I recommend to you, therefore, that, if you should see sufficient cause in the enclosed papers, you should advise the Regency to dismiss him from the Portuguese service, that you should order him into arrest, and to report himself to

Lieut. General Hill at Abrantes, who will have my directions respecting the disposal of him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 9th January, 1810.

‘ In case you should find that the enemy advance towards the Mesa de Ibor and Truxillo, and the Duque de Albuquerque should retire with the Spanish army under his command towards the Sierra Morena, I beg that you will move forward with the troops specified in the margin\* to Portalegre. You will issue your own orders to the Portuguese corps, who have directions to obey you; and you will, when you require the British cavalry, send the enclosed letter to Lieut. General Payne, at Santarem, who will give orders to General Slade’s brigade of dragoons to follow you.

‘ The object of this movement will be to enable you to check the enemy’s plans upon the frontiers of Portugal.

‘ The enclosed reports of the frontier, from the Guadiana to the Tagus, will show you that these plans must be confined between Arronches and Campo Mayor; or at all events, between Campo Mayor and Portalegre, and that in this line he will have the fortresses of Badajoz, Elvas, and Campo Mayor, which is to be occupied on one flank, while you will be in his front. The fort of Marvaõ, in front of Portalegre, is also to be occupied.

‘ In case, however, that you should find that the enemy is in too great strength for you, you will retire by the road of Gafete, and Gaviaõ, to Abrantes.

‘ Having the magazine at Abrantes, you will be in no want of provisions. Portalegre is also a large town, well supplied with provisions and forage.

‘ The Lusitanian legion (two battalions) and a brigade of Portuguese militia are at Castello Branco, and in that

\* The 2nd division of British infantry, Colonel Campbell’s brigade of Portuguese infantry from Thomar, Brigadier Fonseca’s from Torres Novas, one brigade of British artillery, two brigades of Portuguese artillery from Chamusca, General Slade’s brigade of British cavalry at Santarem, General Seddon’s of Portuguese cavalry at Salvaterra, and General Madden’s, still at Lisbon.



neighbourhood; and I beg that you will as soon as possible ascertain the mode in which the bridge at Villa Velha is taken care of; and if you should find it necessary to retire to Abrantes, you will take effectual measures to have that bridge taken up, and the boats either destroyed or removed below Abrantes.

‘ I shall hereafter take an opportunity of instructing you more fully regarding several points requiring your attention.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Leite.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 9th January, 1810.

‘ Marshal Beresford will write to you to request that you will make all the preparatory arrangements without loss of time for occupying the forts of Campo Mayor, Marvaõ, and Ouguela; and that you should place a garrison in each of those places as soon as you shall receive intelligence that the enemy have possession of the Mesa de Ibor and Truxillo. Lieut. General Hill, who commands the corps d’armée formed upon the Tagus, has directions to move with his corps to Portalegre as soon as he shall receive intelligence of the same event.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Gen. Leite.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To B. Frere, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 9th January, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 3rd instant, relative to the communication which you had had with Don A. de Cornel respecting the orders which he had sent to the Duque del Parque regarding Lieut. de Farincourt.

‘ I observe that you mention on the 1st of January to Don F. de Saavedra, that you had the preceding night received a letter from me (I conclude that of the 27th December), stating “ que le Lieut. de Farincourt, après avoir été détenu six semaines aux arrêts, avait été renvoyé de Ciudad Rodrigo à Almeida, sous prétexte que le Duque del Parque n’avait pas le pouvoir de le laisser passer.” If you will refer to the Duque del Parque’s letter to General Cox, enclosed in mine

of the 27th of December, you will see that the Duque del Parque not only had not the power, but that he had received orders not to allow any exchange to be made by that route.

‘ From what I have seen latterly of ——— ———’s mode of transacting public business, particularly from the letters which I sent you on the 6th of January, I am inclined to believe that the falsehood which is manifest in this transaction is his.

‘ It is obvious, also, that ——— ——— had deceived his own colleague.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *B. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General John Murray.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Viseu, 12th January, 1810.

‘ Since I wrote last, I have had a further correspondence with Admiral Berkeley, respecting the claims of the navy and army to the salvage of British vessels, and to the prize of other property found at Oporto when that place was captured, and the employment of ——— and ———; and as the interests of so many are concerned in the measures to be adopted on the subject, I thought it proper to ask the opinion of Sir John Sherbrooke before I answered the Admiral’s letter, or decided upon the subject to which it referred.

‘ For my part, I never entertained any doubt but that the claim of the navy employed in the blockade of the Douro was as good as that of the army, to any advantage resulting from the operations; and having communicated to Sir John Sherbrooke all that has passed upon this subject, he concurs with me in opinion, that it is not advisable, nor would it be proper, after all that has passed, to contest the right with the navy.

‘ I have accordingly written a letter, of which I enclose a copy to Admiral Berkeley, relative to that point, and the employment of ——— and ———, to which I wish to draw your attention.

‘ It is a most extraordinary circumstance that these gentlemen should have been employed in this case; and that I should not have received one line from my brother Henry or

Greenwood respecting their employment. But as it is, and as you approve of them, I certainly cannot consent to dismiss them and to employ the agents of the navy. As both parties, however, have the same object in view, it is reasonable, and will save expense, that they should act in conjunction.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*  
*John Murray.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 12th January, 1810.

‘ Since I wrote to you from Coimbra, I have had an opportunity of talking with General Sherbrooke respecting the state of the prize question at Oporto, and we are both agreed upon the following points :

‘ 1. That whatever may be the nature of the right of the army, either to salvage for the English vessels in the harbour at the time Oporto was taken, or to the prize of the remainder of the property, the right of the navy is equal ; and that it will not be proper for us to contest that right ; but on the contrary, by a concurrence with you, to facilitate the decision on the claims of both.

‘ 2. That as it appears that ——— and ——— have been employed to assert the claim of the army to salvage for the British vessels, and generally to the prize at Oporto, although without the direct authority of myself, or of any body authorised by me to employ them, it will not be reasonable or fair to discharge them from such employment in order to give it to others. Therefore we propose that ——— and ——— shall continue to be employed as the agents for the army, so long as they shall give satisfaction to Major General Murray, to act in conjunction and co-operation with your agents for the general good of the captors.

‘ I hope that what I have above stated will be satisfactory to you, and I beg you to forward the enclosed letters to General Murray, and to apprise him of the consideration which General Sir John Sherbrooke and I have given to this subject, and of our determination upon it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*  
*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Viseu, 13th January, 1810.

‘ I take advantage of a courier for you from Lisbon to transmit you copies of two letters which I have written to Mr. Villiers, containing propositions for the supply of provisions for the Portuguese army in future ; which, if they should be adopted, will, I hope, prevent all distress by the troops while they shall be within the Portuguese territory.

‘ I am anxious to receive from you the plan of the country between the Tagus and the Mondego.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Brigadier General Cox, Governor of Almeida.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 14th January, 1810.

‘ As I am going round the cantonments occupied by the British army, I propose to take that opportunity of seeing you at Almeida, where I think I shall be on Wednesday or Thursday next.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send to Captain Ruman at Bejar, and let him know that I am going to Almeida, and that I shall be glad to see him there on Wednesday or Thursday, if possible.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Cox.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Viseu, 14th January, 1810.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 9th, it occurs to me, that in case the rain should fall heavily, you may experience some difficulty in moving, in the event for which your instructions provide ; and as the enemy will also experience the same difficulty, probably even in a greater degree, I wish you to have constant information of the state of the roads from Abrantes towards Portalegre ; and if you should find them to be so bad as to render your movement difficult, you will postpone it till the return of the dry weather shall have improved them again.

‘ In the movement of the cavalry, it will be necessary to take care that they have stables, particularly if the weather should be bad, to which I beg you to advert. I believe there is stabling for a brigade at least, at Portalegre; but if there should not be enough at that place, you must separate your cavalry till you shall want them, as it will not answer to keep the horses out of doors in the wet season.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Sir David Dundas, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 14th January, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the list of officers entitled to receive medals, as being present in the battle of Talavera, according to the principles contained in your letter of the 20th November, 1809.

‘ I have included in the list Lieut. Colonels Framingham and Robe of the Royal Artillery, and Major Hartmann of the Royal Hanoverian Artillery, for the reasons stated in the enclosed letter from those officers; and I have added, at the bottom of the list, the names of officers commanding corps in the battle of rank inferior to Lieut. Colonel, as I have reason to believe that hopes were entertained, in consequence of the Secretary of State’s letter, a copy of which I have the honor to enclose, that this honorable distinction would be conferred upon all officers, of whatever rank, who had commanded corps upon that occasion.

‘ I have likewise the honor of enclosing letters which I have received upon this subject from Brigadier General Howorth, Colonel Robe, and Major Hartmann; and from Major Gwynn, of the 45th regiment; also from Brigadier General Howorth, with an enclosure from the Captains commanding brigades of artillery.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Sir D. Dundas, K.B.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S.—I have also the honor to enclose a letter from Lieut. General Sir J. C. Sherbrooke, stating the claim of Lord Aylmer, Assistant Adjutant General.’

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Viseu, 14th January, 1810.

‘ I have only this day received your letter of the 9th instant. No expression in any letter of mine ought to have, or can have, the effect of binding you in any manner ; and I only mean that what I write should bind myself.

‘ A proposition was made, that from the funds at the disposal of the Commissary General of the army, we should give £300,000 for the use of the Portuguese Government, in addition to the monthly payments called “ Aids.” I call all the money that can be raised by bills on England at Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar, and all that is sent from England, funds at the disposal of the Commissary General of the army ; and finding from experience of the past that the funds are not sufficient to answer the regular demands made upon them, and that those demands must increase, I cannot engage that the Commissary General shall give one dollar of the additional and extra demand of £300,000 now made upon him. I cannot engage that this money shall be paid in Portugal in two, or three, or any number of months, because I do not believe that the funds at the disposal of the Commissary General of the army will enable him to perform that engagement without distressing other services, which cannot bear delay in payment ; and as to its payment in England, I have nothing to say, and never had anything to say, to that part of the question.

‘ What I object to is, engaging to pay the money in Portugal now or at any future time, and giving bills to be negotiated at Lisbon, Cadiz, or Gibraltar, either now, or at any future time ; because both these modes of supplying the money must affect the funds at the disposal of the Commissary General for the support of the British army.

‘ I might, however, have saved myself the trouble of writing, and you that of reading this letter, as I think it probable that the propositions made to you in my letters of the 9th and 12th\* instant will have settled the whole question ; but lest they should not, I send this letter.

‘ I wish I could convince you that every shilling that can

\* The drafts and letters of the 9th and 12th January, 1810, are missing from the papers of the Duke of Wellington and of the Earl of Clarendon.



be raised in any manner is raised and applied for the public service in the best manner in my power. If it be true that we raise every shilling that can be got for a bill or any thing else; and if what we get is not sufficient for our ordinary demands, it must be obvious that we cannot promise to raise £300,000 for the Portuguese Government; or, what is the same thing, to pay them £300,000 in addition to the ordinary aids, without breaking our promise, or distressing other services.

‘ If we grant bills to be negotiated at a future period, we anticipate our funds; as we throw into the market bills which will certainly be negotiated, and will as certainly keep out of the market others which would be granted by the Commissary General in the usual course.

‘ I think that this discussion about money, that the distress which we have felt ever since I arrived here, and that the increasing demands upon the funds we have at our disposal, must tend to convince you that Great Britain has undertaken a larger concern in Portugal than she has the means of executing.

‘ I have no objection to communicate to you the return of the army, or to say, that in its present state it is not sufficient for the defence of Portugal; but the troops are recovering their health daily, the reinforcements from England are expected, and if I can bring 30,000 effective British troops into the field, I will fight a good battle for the possession of Portugal, and see whether that country cannot be saved from the general wreck. I do not mean to say that more troops would not be desirable; but it must be obvious to you, First, that the Government could not give more; and if I thought 30,000 men sufficient, I should not have acted honestly by them if I had not told them what I thought the lowest number that could do the business. Secondly, that we could neither feed nor pay more consistently with the performance of our engagements, without an increase of our pecuniary means from England; that is, an increase of coin sent out, which all my communications forbid me to expect to receive.

‘ You have seen all the dispatches that I have ever written to England, and know, as well as I do, how far they have confirmed what I wrote on the 14th November. Circumstances have certainly altered materially since that letter

was written ; but the question for me is, have they altered in such a manner as to induce me to think that with 30,000 men, which I have reason to believe I shall have in the course of a few weeks (together with the Portuguese army, which, by the bye, [is better than I ever expected it would be, and wants only to be equipped as it ought), I shall not be able to save Portugal, or, at all events, to sell the country dearly ?

‘ I think that if the Spanish armies had not been lost, and if the Spaniards had made good use of their time, very large reinforcements indeed would have been necessary to enable the French even to attack us. As it is, have we now no chance? Ought we to withdraw from the Peninsula, and give up the whole (for when we withdraw we shall give up the whole) an easy prey to the conqueror? Will 10,000 men more, which will distress our means, supposing that Great Britain can afford to supply them, compensate for the loss of these Spanish armies, and put us in the situation in which my dispatch of the 14th November supposed we ought and should stand ?

‘ I conceive that the honor and interests of the country require that we should hold our ground here as long as possible ; and, please God, I will maintain it as long as I can ; and I will neither endeavor to shift from my own shoulders on those of the Ministers the responsibility for the failure, by calling for means which I know they cannot give, and which, perhaps, would not add materially to the facility of attaining our object ; nor will I give to the Ministers, who are not strong, and who must feel the delicacy of their own situation, an excuse for withdrawing the army from a position which, in my opinion, the honor and interest of the country require they should maintain as long as possible.

‘ I think that if the Portuguese do their duty, I shall have enough to maintain it ; if they do not, nothing that Great Britain can afford can save the country ; and if from that cause I fail in saving it, and am obliged to go, I shall be able to carry away the British army.

‘ I am afraid that I cannot allow Cooke to remain with Mr. Casamajor, unless he should resign his situation on the staff.

‘ Believe me, &c.

: *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Viseu, 15th January, 1810.

‘In a dispatch which I lately received from England, Lord Liverpool desires me to make him acquainted with the state of the transports in Portugal; what number of men they will contain; and whether any additional number could be got in Portugal in the event of the army leaving this country.

‘It is probable that you will have received directions upon these subjects from the Admiralty, and will have reported upon them.

‘Colonel Murray received one return, signed by Mr. Fleetwood, of the number of transports, and of the number of men each could contain; but since that return was sent, I believe that other transports have arrived, of which we have no account; and it would be very desirable that Mr. Fleetwood should let us know, from time to time, any alteration that may occur in the number of transports, and their capacity for holding men, in order that I may be able to give answers upon these subjects, as well as for other reasons.

‘I shall be much obliged to you to let me know whether you think that any vessels could be procured in Portugal, in the event of an embarkation of the army. My opinion is, that in the event of our being obliged to withdraw, Government ought to endeavor to bring off as large a proportion of the Portuguese army as possible, which is becoming so good as to be worth the expense of removing them. They would be very useful at all events in South America; and probably all the vessels which could be procured in Portugal ought to be applied to their use. At all events, it is desirable that we should have some general idea of what this country could do in the way of shipping, in the event supposed of an evacuation either forced or otherwise.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral  
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.



*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Viseu, 15th January, 1810.  
 ‘ I conceive that it would be very desirable to call out that part of each regiment of militia which is armed, as soon as possible, placing at Almeida, Elvas, and Abrantes, and Valença, those destined to be the garrisons of those places respectively, and at some convenient place within their own district the other regiments.

‘ We shall call out the remainder of the men of each regiment of militia as soon as we shall get arms for them. Those regiments in the neighbourhood of Lisbon must continue to be employed in our works. I wish that you would write to the Government upon this subject without loss of time.

‘ I see that the head of the Duc d’Abrantes’ corps passed Paris for Spain in the middle of December; and as Portugal will be liable to attack as soon as they arrive in Spain, it would be the worst species of economy to delay to be so far prepared, as the militia can prepare us for the attack.

‘ I also beg you, without loss of time, to fix upon the troops with which we are to occupy the batteries on the Zezere; and to order them to the neighbourhood of their several posts.

‘ Do you propose to occupy Alfayates and Monsanto? I see that those places are armed, and I should think it desirable to occupy with militia every place of that description, giving to each place a good commandant, if possible. I am going round the cantonments of the British army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Viseu, 15th January, 1810.

‘ I have omitted to mention to you that I have ordered to Santarem £10,000 a week from Lisbon, for the use of your corps, and of the cavalry.

‘ We calculate that the pay of the troops will take £15,000 a month, and the remainder of the sum, or £25,000 a month, will be for the Commissary General’s department.

‘ Let me know if there is any spare musket ammunition

at Abrantes belonging to the Portuguese. There is plenty of gun and musket ammunition belonging to the army at Elvas.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Viseu, 15th January, 1810.

‘ The enemy have made no movement of importance since I addressed you on the 4th instant. I understand that they threaten an attack upon the kingdom of Valencia with their left; at the same time that the corps in La Mancha has been strengthened in some degree, as well as that at Toledo, and at Talavera de la Reyna.

‘ They are employed in fortifying the Retiro at Madrid, and the ancient castle of Toledo.

‘ I conclude that the movement of the troops to the northward by Guadalaxara was made with a view to the intended attack upon Valencia; and that they will still further strengthen their corps in that quarter, when they shall have completed their works at Toledo and Madrid.

‘ The enemy’s troops in Old Castille continue to occupy the same positions upon the Tormes, and have not been strengthened.

‘ The Spanish armies remain nearly in the same situation as when I addressed your Lordship on the 4th instant. The Duque del Parque has requested me to afford him the assistance of the British cavalry to commence an offensive operation upon the enemy in Old Castille, the object of which was to enable him to cross the upper Duero, and to remove the corps under his command to the frontiers of Galicia. I have had no intimation from the Government of their wish that the Duque del Parque should make this movement; and, at all events, I have declined to allow the British cavalry to co-operate in it, for the same reasons that I have uniformly objected to any partial offensive operation upon the enemy since they had collected their forces in the centre of Spain; as well as for others.

‘ As the Duque del Parque, however, has made preparations to cross the Douro at Torre de Moncorvo, within the Portuguese frontier, I imagine that he will move his corps

in that direction, whatever may be the wishes of the Government; and notwithstanding that in a letter which he wrote to the Junta of Badajoz on the same day that he desired my assistance to move to the frontiers of Galicia, he assured that body that he had taken a position on the frontiers of Estremadura with a view to defend that province.

‘The British army have arrived in their cantonments on the frontiers of Beira. We occupy Guarda, Pinhel, Celorico, and Viseu, with three divisions of infantry and a regiment of cavalry; General Hill’s division of infantry is at Abrantes, and the remainder of the British cavalry on the Tagus, between Abrantes and Santarem.

‘I have left them on the Tagus, on account of the want of forage, and of stables in this part of the country.

‘I have made this disposition of the army with a view to form of the whole British and Portuguese armies two principal corps; one for the defence of the provinces south of the Tagus, which will consist of General Hill’s division of British infantry, two brigades of Portuguese infantry, one brigade of British, and two brigades of Portuguese cavalry, one brigade of British, and two brigades of Portuguese artillery; and the other of three divisions of British infantry, and all the Portuguese infantry not employed in garrisons, and the British cavalry, and the British and Portuguese artillery.

‘The Portuguese troops are cantoned in the rear of the British troops, with which they are destined eventually to act.

‘The Lusitanian legion, and some Portuguese militia, occupy Castello Branco, and the mountains between the Tagus and the Mondego.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To Colonel Wilson\*.*

‘SIR,

‘Guarda, 17th January, 1810.

‘In case the enemy should enter Portugal by the route of

\* Then in the Portuguese service, now Major General Sir John Wilson, K.T.S., commanding in Ceylon.



Zarza la Mayor, I beg of you to attend to the following instructions.

‘ If the enemy should be in such force as to oblige you to withdraw from Castello Branco, you will do so gradually by the road of Sarzedas, Sobreira Formosa, Cortiçada, and Cardigos, occupying and maintaining every defensible post as long as it may be in your power. You will send one of the battalions of militia on your right by the road of Perdigão, and another on your left by the Estrada Nova; and you will give each of them the same directions, and endeavor to communicate with each on your retreat, observing always that the defence of the Estrada Nova is very important, as the enemy, by that road, may cut you off at Cardigos.

‘ Before you quit Castello Branco, you will take measures to send away or destroy the provisions, magazines, &c.

‘ I beg you will communicate to General Hill, commanding the troops in Abrantes, these instructions. You will also apply to him for provisions to support your troops in the mountains.

‘ You will apprise General Hill if the enemy should move in strength by the Estrada Nova, in order that he may take measures to occupy the batteries of the Zezere, between Villa de Rey and Thomar.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Wilson.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Guarda, 17th January, 1810.

‘ Colonel Wilson will communicate to you the instructions which I have sent him by this opportunity, applicable to the movements of the enemy towards Baños, and the possible invasion of Portugal by Castello Branco, or by the Estrada Nova.

‘ In case they should make this movement, it will be necessary that you should take measures to occupy the bridge, or Barca over the Zezere, between Villa de Rey and Thomar; and you can do this only by ordering there, in case it should be necessary, one or both of the regiments of Campbell’s brigade of Portuguese infantry from Thomar.

‘ However, before the necessity for occupying this post

will, I hope, occur, I shall put means in your power of occupying it, which will leave at your disposal this brigade of Campbell's for the other objects of your instructions of the 9th instant.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ If the enemy should enter by Castello Branco, you will of course have preparations made to destroy all the bridges on the Zezere, as soon as the troops in the mountains shall have passed, excepting that at Punhete, which you must keep for your own communications.’

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ *Viseu, 22nd January, 1810.*

‘ I have received your letter of the 13th instant, and I beg to assure you that I am at all times happy to be favored with your sentiments, or with any information which you think worthy of attention.

‘ Marshal Beresford has had some communication with the Government respecting the future treatment of Senhor de Mello, and he appeared to be rather of opinion that it was expedient that he should be released from his arrest, provided the Government would consent to publish all that had passed upon the subject.

‘ I am much concerned that you should imagine that measures are adopted for the supply of this army that occasion an useless expense which might be avoided. If ever there was an officer at the head of an army interested (personally I may say) in keeping down the expenses of the army, it is myself, for I am left wholly to my own resources, and am obliged to supply the wants of the allies, as well as of the British army, from what I can get; and if I fail, God will, I hope, have mercy upon me, for nobody else will.

‘ But besides economy in the expenditure of money, I must be certain of efficiency in the supply of necessaries for the troops; and it will not do for me to depend for what I want upon the navigation of the sea upon the coast of Portugal, during the winter, by victuallers and transports, or upon the passage of the bar of the Mondego by square rigged vessels, at a season when all the people of the country agree

in stating that the bar can scarcely be passed by a schooner drawing little water.

‘ When I landed there in the finest season of the year, in August, vessels drawing more than eight feet water could not pass the bar, and that at high water at spring tides. In the winter season, there is more difficulty in passing the bar ; and I conclude that vessels even of that draft of water cannot now enter the Mondego.

‘ For this reason I sanctioned the employment of the schooners. If, however, you are decidedly of opinion that they can enter the Mondego, I am sure nothing will give me greater satisfaction than to avail myself of your offer, to send these transports and victuallers ; and I desired the Commissary General to instruct his Deputy at Lisbon to make application to you to send some of the stores required for the army in its present station, by transports or victuallers.

‘ I beg you to observe that I am held severely responsible for all failures, as well of supplies as of every thing else ; and I have given the Commissary General these directions in the confidence that your information respecting the Mondego is authentic, and that transports and victuallers can enter that river with greater facility in winter, than I know from experience they can in summer.

‘ I have also received your letter of the 15th, respecting Mr. Phillips. This gentleman has been employed by the Treasury to purchase corn in the Mediterranean for the army ; and I have received orders to take his corn if it should be wanted, and he should be disposed to let us have it, at as cheap a rate as we can get it elsewhere, and not otherwise. Now, I do want Mr. Phillips’s corn, and he is disposed to let me have it at as cheap a rate as I can get it elsewhere, and moreover to receive payment for it in the manner most convenient for the public interests. I have accordingly directed that agreements may be made for the purchase, and I have made arrangements for the disposal of this corn, the disappointment of which will be inconvenient.

‘ Under these circumstances, you will probably think it proper to order that the embargo may be taken off the corn in question, and you will see that it is in Mr. Phillips’s power



to settle for the freight in a manner that will be satisfactory to you.

‘ I know nothing of this transaction of Mr. Phillips’s excepting what I have above stated to you : but from circumstances which have come to my knowledge, I believe that he has been confidentially and extensively employed by Government, on various occasions, in the same manner as at present.

‘ I have already troubled you at too much length, or I think I could account to your satisfaction for the offer of a quantity of wheat for sale in the market at Lisbon, which wheat Mr. Murray (and the Government of Portugal, strange to say !) had really declined to purchase, and for his drawing bills upon the produce of the expected sale of this wheat.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*  
*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 22nd January, 1810.

‘ I am much obliged to you for the information respecting the mules purchased at Tangier, and I have directed the Commissary General to be prepared to receive them at Lisbon.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*  
*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 22nd January, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the extract of a letter which I received yesterday from General Payne, by which I have the mortification to learn that, notwithstanding the sacrifices which I have made of the services of the cavalry, and the risks I incur in order to place them in a situation in which the horses might receive forage without difficulty, they have been worse supplied in their present quarters than they have yet been.

‘ I observe, from the last returns which I have of the state of the stores, that there were in store at Abrantes, on the 1st

December last, 89,000 lbs. of hay; at Santarem, 30,000 lbs.; and at Villa Nova, 852,000 lbs.

‘ The country on the banks of the Tagus, from Santarem to Punhete, has always been considered the most plentiful for cavalry; and the Portuguese Government had always a large body of cavalry at Santarem, as well as at Golegaõ. There has been no cavalry in that part of the country since the last harvest; and it is not to be believed that the country should have been so exhausted by the passage of the British army only through Punhete, as that it could no longer supply the wants of the horses of the cavalry.

‘ But if that country was exhausted for straw, that of the left bank of the Tagus, and the market of Lisbon, were not; and the stores at Lisbon contained, on the 1st December, 671,000 lbs. of hay.

‘ I should imagine that forage for the horses of the cavalry might have been procured by water carriage from any, or from some, of these quarters, by any arrangement, as well as from Abrantes, Santarem, or Villa Nova.

‘ You were informed, on the —, by the Quarter Master General, of the proposed distribution of the British cavalry; and you were a party to many conversations I had at Badajoz, about that time, with the Quarter Master General, relative to the necessity of placing the British cavalry in cantonments on the Tagus, with a view to the supply of forage, hay particularly, for the horses.

‘ I beg to know what orders you gave, and what arrangements you made, and on what dates, and to whom, to insure the accomplishment of these objects, or any supplies for the cavalry in their quarters.

‘ I also desire to know who gave Mr. — leave to go to Lisbon. He was informed by me on the 29th December, if he had not received information before, of the distribution of the cavalry, and of their want of hay particularly; and he ought to have made arrangements for their supply before he quitted his station, even if he had leave to do so.

‘ I make these inquiries, because the bad condition of the horses of the British cavalry is a serious evil at the present moment, which may lead to the most important and unfortunate consequences; and I am determined that the Government shall know how the public are served; and all the most

important arrangements and objects are disappointed by the inefficiency or neglect of the officers of the Commissariat.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

*J. Murray, Esq.,  
Commissary General.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Viseu, 23rd January, 1810.

‘ I returned yesterday from my tour of the quarters of the army.

‘ While at Guarda, I received intimation of the enemy’s movements in Old Castille towards the frontiers of Estremadura; and I judged it desirable to give instructions to Colonel Wilson respecting the measures to be adopted by him for the defence of the country between Belmonte and the Tagus, and for his retreat. I enclose the copy of his answer, from which I find that he has only 750 men, in two battalions of the Lusitanian legion, and no militia; although I conceived that the former were at least as strong as they are stated to be in the last return which I have of the Portuguese army, and that the latter were a good brigade of three battalions.

‘ We ought to have in those mountains at least 5000 men, with a brigade of artillery, of which 1700 or 1800 regular infantry, 200 or 300 cavalry, and the rest militia; and I wish you would make arrangements as soon as possible for that purpose. With that number we shall do there pretty well, particularly as I find that the Estrada Nova has batteries upon it, and that the use of it can be successfully impeded by breaking it up. I propose to have it broken up forthwith, as it can never be of any use to the country or to us, and may be very useful to the enemy.

‘ Besides this force in the mountains, I conceive that we ought to allot two regiments of infantry, and 3000 militia, and 200 or 300 cavalry, for the defence of the Zezere. With this force, that line, and the communication between Hill’s corps and the army, would be tolerably secure.

‘ The corps for the defence of the Zezere might be stationed at Thomar for the present; and I shall hereafter give the officer whom you will fix upon for the command of it detailed instructions for his guidance. Till you shall have fixed upon



the troops to occupy this line, I have desired Hill, in case he should find that the enemy make a movement towards Castello Branco or the mountains, not to move Campbell's brigade from Thomar, even though he should be induced, under his instructions, to move into Alentejo.

‘ I am sorry to tell you that I think you will be disappointed in your expectations from the garrison of Almeida. The 8th regiment have neither arms, accoutrements, clothing, discipline, nor numbers; the other two are not clothed and armed as they ought to be, their numbers are incomplete, and their discipline and appearance by no means equal to the others of the army that I have seen. It is evident to me that the 8th regiment will be of no use to Cox, or any body else, during this campaign; and it is also clear that he must have one good regiment with his militia. Probably the best plan would be to move the 8th regiment somewhere to the rear. It would also be necessary to move one of the other regiments from Almeida to make room for the militia, as Cox's garrison is already so full that he has not room for his troops. At the same time the regiment to be moved will be badly off for clothing, as Cox says that neither the 12th nor the 24th can be clothed for two months by any exertion he can make.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know how the camp kettles of your troops are to be carried in the field, and how they are now equipped for this purpose; likewise in what manner they are to be supplied with ammunition, and how carried.

‘ I also wish to know how the brigades with Hill are to be fed, if he should draw them out of their quarters. Have they Commissaries attached to them? Are these Commissaries supplied with money, or directions where to get provisions, or must we supply them from our magazines?

‘ Probably the best mode of providing for the defence of the Zezere, till we shall finally arrange every thing, would be to consider the five regiments of caçadores under Le Cor as applicable to that service, and to let Hill still have Campbell's brigade. When you can give two regiments for this service, we may take the caçadores for this corps of the army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ When shall you be back, and fix yourself in your quar-

ters? Since writing the above, General Bacellar has been here, and has informed me of his intention to move the militia to Almeida immediately. I have recommended him to halt them till further orders from you, as it is impossible for the place to hold them and the regiments of the line also; and you must determine what you will do about them after reading the account which this letter contains of their state.'

*To Major General John Murray.*

'MY DEAR GENERAL,

'Viseu, 23rd January, 1810.

'Since I wrote to you on the 12th instant, I have received a letter from Admiral Berkeley, which renders it desirable that I should trouble you again in respect to our claims, on account of the operations at Oporto.

'It is the determined intention of Sir John Sherbrooke and myself to forego all opposition to the claims of the navy to a share of the advantage resulting from those operations, and it follows therefore that the King's Proctor must be employed for the navy and army conjointly.

'We conceive, however, that although ——— and ——— have been employed without any direct authority from me, or any person authorised by me, they have acted for the best, and deserve remuneration. We therefore mean that they should be the agents for the army, and that they should have that remuneration which will belong to them in that character.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major General John Murray.'

'WELLINGTON.'

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Viseu, 23rd January, 1810.

'I have consulted Sir John Sherbrooke on the contents of your letter of the 15th, respecting the employment of ——— and ——— on the part of the army in their claim for salvage of the British vessels found at Oporto.

'I am perfectly aware of what you state, that Mr. Bishop must be the Proctor for both army and navy in their claims, either for salvage or prize, on account of their operations at Oporto; and accordingly you will observe that in my letter to Major General Murray, of the 12th instant, and to you of the same date, I mention ——— and ——— only as agents



for the army; and Mr. Bishop, being the King's Proctor, who must act as such for both; and Mr. Cooke being the agent for you. Mr. Greenwood is not the agent for the army. However, to obviate all difficulties, I enclose another letter for General Murray, of which I request your perusal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*  
*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Colonel Don Miguel Alava.*

‘ MON CHER COLONEL, ‘ Viseu, ce 23 Janvier, 1810.

‘ J’ai reçu vos lettres du 10, 12, et 13, pour lesquelles je vous suis très obligé. J’en aurais eu la reception plutôt si je n’avais pas été sur la frontière. Je ne sais pas ce qu’on va faire dans La Mancha; mais je ne crois pas qu’on eût rassemblé un si grand corps si on n’avait pas quelque dessein, et si on n’attendait pas les renforts tout de suite.

‘ Je vous envoie une lettre de la Payno; je vous prie de recommander son fils au Duque de Albuquerque. Dites lui en même tems que j’ai répondu à la Payno que je pensais que de recommander un officier à un général, pour être son aide de camp, était presque la même chose que de recommander une demoiselle à un homme pour être son épouse.

‘ Je suis content que le Marquis de la Romana a quitté la Junta. Elle ne peut pas durer.

‘ Votre très fidèle, &c.

‘ *Don Miguel Alava.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Bart. Frere, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Viseu, 23rd January, 1810.

‘ I received, on the day before yesterday, your letters of the 5th, 7th, 9th, 10th, and 14th January, for which I am very much obliged to you. I had been on a tour on the frontier, which is the cause of my not having received them sooner.

‘ If General La Buena should come here, I shall receive him with politeness, and hear what he has to say, and then refer him to you for his answer. If you and the Spanish Ministers had agreed that it was desirable to send an officer to me, to confer upon a general plan of operations, I should have entered upon such a conference; but as it is, I conceive



that I am precluded by the King's commands from having any communication with him, excepting to hear what he has to say to me, in the same manner as I should be obliged to receive and read any letter which the Spanish Ministers might write to me.

'The enemy have collected their troops in Old Castille, in the neighbourhood of Alverca, not far from Miranda del Castañar. They have some troops in Bejar; and I conceive that they have made this movement upon hearing of our arrival upon the frontier. I have not received any positive intelligence of the arrival of reinforcements; but I should think that some of them must have entered Spain, otherwise the enemy would not have ventured to collect so large a corps as it appears they have collected in La Mancha.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Bart. Frere, Esq.*

' WELLINGTON.

' I request you to let Colonel Roche know where we are. I have just received the report, of which I enclose a copy. This may be a part of the reinforcements expected from France. However, the Spaniards take such bad care of their posts, and have so little intelligence, that it is difficult to say by what troops this blow has been struck.'

*To Colonel Peacocke.*

' SIR,

' Viseu, 24th January, 1810.

' I have reason to believe that certain regiments, intended to reinforce this army, as well as recruits for several of the regiments already composing it, will shortly arrive at Lisbon; and I beg that you will convey to the officers commanding these regiments and detachments of recruits, respectively, the following orders for their guidance:—

' If they should be under the command of a General Officer, you will give him this letter, which he will consider in the same light as if addressed to himself.

' The baggage of these several regiments is to be left in one of the transports which have brought out the regiments, to be fixed upon by the Assistant Quarter Master General at Lisbon, in concert with the Agent of Transports. One non-commissioned officer, or steady man, belonging to each

regiment, must be left in this transport in charge of this baggage; and he must have a list of the packages or cases left in his charge.

‘ The regiments are to be landed immediately, and to be quartered in the most convenient manner in convents, barracks, or otherwise, in Lisbon or Belem; and the officers commanding regiments are, without loss of time, to direct the officers under their command to equip their companies and themselves for the carriage of their camp kettles, and the baggage of the officers.

‘ You will take care to give the Commanding Officers of the regiments copies of the general orders upon these several subjects.

‘ If the Paymasters of regiments should not have received in England the *bât* and forage, and if they should require money to make the necessary advances to the officers to purchase the mules, &c., which they will require, you will desire Mr. Hunter to make such advances on account as may appear to be necessary.

‘ The Commanding Officers of regiments will make the necessary requisition upon the Deputy Commissary General at Lisbon for the mules to carry the intrenching tools, to be under the charge of the Quarter Master; and upon the Assistant Quarter Master General for canteens, haversacks, bill hooks, &c., in the usual proportion and force; blanket for each man, according to the general order of the 30th October, 1809.

‘ The recruits for each regiment, under charge of the officers of the regiment who will probably have been sent out with them, are to remain at Lisbon till reports shall have been sent to, and orders received from, head quarters for their march. In the mean time they are to be equipped with canteens, haversacks, bill hooks, blankets, &c., and be prepared to march at short notice.

‘ The Deputy Commissary General must be required to supply carts for the conveyance of their camp kettles till they shall join their regiments to which they respectively belong, when the carts will be dismissed, and their camp kettles will be carried in the usual manner.

‘ The baggage brought out with these recruits is to be

placed in the stores of the regimental baggage of their respective corps.

‘ If any horses should arrive for the regiments already in Spain and Portugal, they are to be placed in charge of the officers and men who have come out with them, of the dragoons belonging to the several regiments who are already at Lisbon, and of the officers and men of the 23rd light dragoons, till the orders of the officers commanding the cavalry for their further disposal shall have been received. The baggage brought out with these horses is to be placed in store with the regimental baggage of the regiments for which the horses are destined.

‘ If a regiment of dragoons should arrive, it must be disembarked and placed in the barracks at Belem or Lisbon, leaving its baggage in one of the transports, according to the orders above given for the disposal of the baggage of regiments of infantry; and this regiment of dragoons must be equipped, according to the general orders on this subject, and prepared to move.

‘ Orders will be sent from head quarters for the movement of all these troops, when reports shall be received that they are equipped and ready to move.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 24th January, 1810.

‘ In view to the possible necessity of evacuating Portugal, I have for some time considered it desirable that the baggage of the army should be embarked in the transports which the Government had sent to the Tagus for their reception; and it has occurred to me that the moment at which this measure can be adopted, without being misunderstood by the public, and without creating alarm, is that at which the reinforcements for the army shall have arrived from England.

‘ I have accordingly desired the Quarter Master General to give directions that the baggage of the several regiments may be embarked as soon as the reinforcements shall arrive; and, in order that the baggage may be put in the ships in



which the regiments would be placed, in case they were to be embarked in reference to their strength, the number of officers, &c., I have desired the Quarter Master General to make out a list of the ships in which it is desirable that the baggage of the regiments should now be placed.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the arrangement, framed by the Quarter Master General from the list of transports which you transmitted to him; and I shall be obliged to you if you will give directions to the Agent of Transports to carry the proposed measure into execution, as therein proposed, in concert with the Assistant Quarter Master General at Lisbon.

‘ I have also to inform you that, with the same views, I have directed that the baggage belonging to the regiments expected from England should be left in one of the ships which have brought each from England, under an arrangement to be made by the Assistant Quarter Master General at Lisbon, and the Agent of Transports, which I request you to sanction.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions that one man may be victualled in each of the ships which will receive the baggage, in order that it may be properly taken care of.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*  
*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ *Viseu, 24th January, 1810.*

‘ I have received your letters of the 20th. General Leite, who writes to you, is the commanding officer of Elvas, and Colonel Brito de Mozinho is employed by the Portuguese Government at Badajoz to collect and transmit intelligence to them. They are both persons deserving of credit, and as far as their means of acquiring intelligence go, they may be depended upon. I desired them to write to you, as well as Colonel Alava and the Duque de Albuquerque, and the Superintendent of the Post Office at Badajoz, who has very frequently early intelligence of the enemy’s movements. Besides these persons, I should recommend to you to send to reside in some of the towns on the frontier some intelli-

gent officer, with directions to correspond with the magistrates of the towns in advance; to communicate to you the intelligence which he shall receive, and to come off to you himself, if he should find that the enemy cross the Tagus, or penetrate through the hills to Truxillo.

‘ I do not doubt that the Duque de Alburquerque has made the disposition of his force, which is stated in Brito’s paper of the 18th October, which I return to you; so that you see that the Spaniards do not propose to defend the Mesa de Ibor, and that their troops in Estremadura will retire to Badajoz if the French should advance in that quarter.

‘ The Portuguese corps ought to have a Commissariat attached to them, and I believe each brigade has a Commissary; but I believe they have no magazines, and no money to purchase supplies in the country. I have no doubt, therefore, that you will be obliged to assist them with provisions from the magazines at Abrantes, &c.; and I enclose you a paper, containing an arrangement under which these supplies are to be given to them, supposing that you should think it proper to give them.

‘ In respect to the bridges of Villa Velha, Abrantes, and Punhete, there is a Bridge Master at Abrantes who has charge of them all; and if you will speak to him, he will adopt measures to have them put and kept in complete repair; and if he should say that he cannot do so for want of money, you will advance him some for this purpose, letting me know the amount. I beg you to write to Colonel Wilson to desire him to post a guard at Villa Velha, over the bridge there, and to send an officer there yourself to ascertain the means of preserving it on the one hand, or of destroying and removing the boats on the other.

‘ The officers of the staff corps are already employed in very important duties, from which they cannot be diverted without great public inconvenience. I recommend that you should have a person whom you can trust at Montalvao, on the bank of the little river Sever, particularly if you should receive intelligence that the enemy have passed the Mesa de Ibor; as I think it not improbable that they might endeavor to push a party of cavalry along the Tagus, and across the Sever, however difficult the passage, in order to



surprise the guard at Villa Velha, and seize the bridge, of which it is of the utmost importance to them to deprive us, and to possess themselves.

‘ If you should employ an officer upon this or any other service out of the line of his duty, you will pay him, while so employed, three dollars per diem.

‘ Since I wrote to you from Guarda, I have heard of no further movements of the enemy in Castille, and I am pretty certain that they have their hands too full at present to be able to molest us. I find, however, that the three regiments of militia, which I thought were at Castello Branco, are not embodied (but one ordered out), and that the Lusitanian legion is much less efficient than I supposed it was; and upon the whole this part of the frontier is but very ill protected, and its defence but very ill provided for. It will soon be better, however.

‘ In the mean time, this state of things renders necessary an alteration in your instructions; and accordingly I beg that if you find that Colonel Wilson cannot maintain himself in the passes of the mountains, on account of the insufficiency of his force to defend them, you will not advance from Abrantes, even though the enemy should enter Estremadura; and if you should have advanced, and you should afterwards find that Colonel Wilson cannot maintain himself in the passes of the mountains, you will retire upon Abrantes, in the same manner as you are directed to do in your instructions of the 9th, in case you should think the enemy in Estremadura too strong for you.

‘ I do not recollect that there is any magazine of ours now at Portalegre, and certainly there ought to be none; but if there should be one, you will give orders that it may either be removed to Abrantes or Marvaõ, or be destroyed, if, when the time comes, you should determine either not to advance to Portalegre, or to retire from thence after having advanced.

‘ It is of the utmost importance that no magazine of ours should fall into the hands of the enemy, and indeed that all the provisions in the country should, if possible, be removed out of their reach.

‘ I believe I have now answered all the points in your several letters; and although this is written in a private



form, you will consider it in every respect as an official instruction and authority.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General Hill.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Viseu, 24th January, 1810.

‘I am not yet enabled to answer that part of your letter of the 15th December which relates to the transports in the Tagus, as I have not yet received from the Admiral the information which I must have to enable me to answer your questions. I rather believe, however, that the transports now in the Tagus will not hold more than 22,000 men; and if the army should embark, the remainder would be to be received by the men of war; the number of which last in the Tagus will, I conclude, be vastly increased whenever the moment comes at which we may be forced to evacuate Portugal.

‘I also wish to draw your attention, and that of the Government, to the possibility that a large proportion of the Portuguese army might be induced to evacuate the country with the British army. The Lusitanian legion were originally enlisted on the principle of serving in all parts of the world; but they have since been filled up by men taken in the usual manner by requisition. The subject is one of that delicate nature, that it is impossible to ascertain the sentiments of the soldiers in general on the subject of embarkation, so as to form any estimate of the numbers that would be likely to embark in the case supposed.

‘I understand, however, that in a late instance of the march of a brigade towards the coast, it was reported that the regiments composing it were about to embark, and no apprehension, or disapprobation was expressed by the soldiers; and it is generally believed by the English officers in the army, that if nothing occurs to shake the confidence in us as a military people, the majority of the officers and soldiers of the army will evacuate the country with us, if we should be fairly obliged to evacuate it.

‘I wish Government to turn their attention to this subject; and if they should determine to carry them off, to be prepared to a certain degree to carry that determination

into execution. They are certainly now in a state to be highly useful any where; and will not be useless to the enemy if left in Portugal. He will soon find French officers to officer them completely; and the discipline we have given them may yet be turned against us. I also conclude that if the contest should be at an end in the Peninsula, Government will not allow the colonies to pass into the hands of the French. These troops, if of no use elsewhere, will be of the greatest service on the continent of South America, for the general cause, as well as for the service of their own Prince.

‘ I cannot tell you what effect the King’s recent kindness, as communicated to me in your dispatch of the 15th December, has had on the Portuguese Government, because Mr. Villiers not having received any instructions on the subject from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, no communication has yet been made to the Portuguese Government; and thus one month has been lost. Indeed we have received no intelligence from England of any kind since the 20th of last month.

‘ It would be very desirable if the packets were despatched regularly from Falmouth, even though it should not be convenient to the Ministers to write. The newspapers at times contain intelligence which it is desirable we should have; and as I before informed your Lordship, the regularity of the despatch of the packets to and from England would contribute essentially to facilitate the raising of money by bills. This, our only resource, is become most important. The credit of the British Government has been stretched to the utmost; and notwithstanding that we have paid large sums on that account, many debts still remain due on account of Sir John Moore’s army.

‘ The people of Portugal and Spain are tired out by requisitions not paid for, of the British, Spanish, Portuguese, and French armies; and nothing can now be procured without ready money. I hope, therefore, not only that every facility will be given to our getting money by bills upon England, but that some money will be sent out according to the requests for it which I have made to your Lordship.

‘ It would also be very desirable if an early answer was sent to the requisitions sent home for supplies, whether for



the British or the Portuguese armies ; stating only whether they would be complied with in the whole, or to what extent, and in what probable period. This is desirable, particularly in the case of the recent requisitions of arms for the militia of Portugal. If we cannot have them, we should know it, in order that we may make other arrangements, and employ in another manner the men who will not be armed ; and narrow our system in proportion to the deficiency of our means in time. Corresponding communications ought upon every occasion to be made to the Ambassadors at Seville and Lisbon ; for your Lordship knows, that with my instructions I can have no communication with the Spanish or Portuguese Ministers excepting through the medium of His Majesty's Ministers at these courts respectively, unless upon subjects purely Portuguese, with the Portuguese Government.

‘ I also wish the Treasury to send me an early answer respecting a reference made to them many months ago regarding the mode of carrying the camp kettles of the army. The subject is trifling in comparison with others, but still it is of importance, and affects in many instances the efficiency of a most important branch of the equipment of the soldiers.

‘ I am concerned to tell you, that, notwithstanding the pains taken by the General and other officers of the army, the conduct of the soldiers is infamous. They behave well generally when with their regiments, and under the inspection of their officers, and the General officers of the army ; but when detached, and coming up from hospitals, although invariably under the command of an officer, and always well fed and taken care of, and received as children of the family by the housekeeper in Portugal, they commit every description of outrage. They have never brought up a convoy of money that they have not robbed the chest ; nor of shoes, or any other article that could be of use to them, or could produce money, that they do not steal something.

‘ I have never halted the army for two days that I have not been obliged to assemble a General Court Martial ; and a General Court Martial was assembled during the whole time the army was at Badajoz. At this moment there are three General Courts Martial sitting in Portugal for the



trial of soldiers guilty of wanton murders, (no less than four people have been killed by them since we returned to Portugal,) robberies, thefts, robbing convoys under their charge, &c., &c. I assure you that the military law is not sufficiently strong to keep them in order; and the people of this country have almost universally such an affection for the British nation, that they are unwilling to prosecute these unworthy soldiers in cold blood for the injuries they have received from them, at the distance of time which must elapse before the soldier can be brought to trial; although ready enough to complain and prosecute when smarting under the injury. Then the truth can never be got from themselves. Perjury is as common as robbery and murder; and the consequence of swearing them to tell truth before a Regimental Court Martial is, that they invariably commit perjury when examined before a General Court Martial, where formerly the sanction of an oath was seldom given to falsehood. But upon the whole of this important subject, I refer you to my letter to Lord Castlereagh of the 17th of June last.

‘ I certainly think the army are improved. They are a better army than they were some months ago. But still these terrible, continued outrages give me reason to apprehend that, notwithstanding all the precautions I have taken, and shall take, they will slip through my fingers, as they did through Sir John Moore’s, when I shall be involved in any nice operation with a powerful enemy in my front.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Viseu, 24th January, 1810.

‘ The enemy have continued to augment their corps in La Mancha, having assembled there, according to the last accounts which I have received, the whole of the corps of Soult, Mortier, Victor, and Sebastiani; and the reserve, which usually attends the King’s person, who has likewise himself gone into that province.

‘ They had left only a small detachment of Soult’s corps at Talavera de la Reyna, and the neighbourhood; and one

from Mortier's, at Toledo; and the left of their army, which had been at Cuença, and even at Teruel, in Valencia, had returned into La Mancha by El Bonillo. General Echevarria had made good his retreat from Cuença to Hellin.

'With this army, well provided with artillery, they threatened an attack on the passes of the Sierra Morena, from Montizon Almaden; but I have reason to believe that no attack was made so late as the 14th of this month.

'The Spanish troops under General Areyzaga were posted in the passes of the mountains for their defence; but Colonel Roche, from whom I have a letter of the 12th, did not expect that they would be able to maintain themselves.

'The French troops in Old Castille collected about the 15th of this month, and marched to the neighbourhood of Miranda del Castañar, with a division in Bejar. It is probable that the object of this movement was to keep the Duque del Parque's corps in check, in case he should attempt to move towards Talavera de la Reyna by Plasencia; and to provide for their own communication with the troops in La Mancha in the event of the British army making any offensive movement.

'This French corps consists of about 20,000 men. The Duque del Parque's corps is in the same situation as when I addressed your Lordship on the 15th instant.

'I have not heard of the arrival of any reinforcements from France; but I think it probable that some of the troops expected have passed the frontiers of Spain, otherwise the enemy would not venture to collect so large a part of his force in La Mancha.

'I have also received accounts that a small Spanish corps of about 500 men was surprised at Alcañizas, not far from Braganza, on the 15th instant, by a body of French cavalry, which it is probable had but lately entered Spain.

'Believe me, &c.

'*The Earl of Liverpool.*'

'WELLINGTON.'

*To Captain Ruman.*

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Viseu, 25th January, 1810.

'I am very much obliged to you for the pains which you have taken in procuring intelligence of the enemy's movements, which become every day more interesting to us.

‘ I request you in future to transmit your reports to Brigadier General Cox, at Almeida, who will forward them to me ; and I beg of you to adopt modes of transmitting them which you may be certain will be expeditious and sure.

‘ You will apply to General Cox at Almeida for any money that may be necessary to enable you to make these disbursements, as well as any others that you may think necessary to make in order to extend your means of early information.

‘ I think that you might be able to extend your correspondence even beyond the Douro, by disbursing money ; and I have no objections to pay for what is authentic, and comes at an early period.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Ruman.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Brigadier General Cox, Governor of Almeida.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 25th January, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 21st and 22nd, for which I am much obliged to you.

‘ I cannot conceive that the French would venture to draw all their troops to the south of the Tagus, if the reinforcements for the army had not passed the frontier. However, we shall know more upon that subject ; in the meantime I shall order up some of the British cavalry, and I will try if we cannot do something.

‘ I have ordered Captain Ellis to Almeida with instructions to assist you in procuring, arranging, and forwarding information of the enemy’s movements in Castille ; and I have directed two Spanish officers of the Quarter Master General’s department to place themselves under your directions, and to correspond with you, and I herewith enclose a letter for Captain Ruman upon the same subject, which I beg you to peruse and forward to him.

‘ I have likewise desired Lieut. Colonel Bathurst to send you £500 to be expended in procuring intelligence, of which sum I request you to keep a separate account.

‘ I request that you will direct these several officers in what channel to conduct their inquiries, and in what manner the most expeditious to communicate to you the result. You will supply them and Captain Ruman with such sums of money as they may require, and as you shall think reason-



able for both purposes of acquiring and conveying intelligence to you. Captain Ellis will assist you in arranging and forwarding this intelligence to General Craufurd, General Cole, and me; and in order to enable you to send it off in a certain and expeditious manner, I have ordered some hussars to Almeida and Pinhel, and there are detachments of guides at Celorico and Mangualde, as also between Celorico and Mangualde.

‘ The officers should extend their correspondence as far as possible along, and north of the Douro, and direct their inquiries to every object, the march of every detachment, the names of the officers commanding corps of troops, the formation of magazines, collection of depôts of ordnance and stores, fortifications of posts, &c. In case a man of ——— should write any letter to me, or to you at Almeida, give the bearer of it four dollars, and forward it to me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Cox.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Viseu, 25th January, 1810.

‘ While I was absent on the frontier, I received several letters from you which remain unanswered; and I have this morning received your letters of the 19th and 21st, that of the 20th having reached me two days ago.

‘ In respect to Captain Smyth, if he is in the 3rd batt. 95th regiment, he does not belong to the army in Portugal, and I cannot appoint him to the staff without the special permission of the Commander in Chief. I conceived it was Captain Smyth’s wish to return to England, and stretched a point to allow him to do so; for the evidence was by no means clear that he had been removed from the 11th regiment, which belongs to this army, to the 3rd batt. 95th, which does not.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 19th, I have only to repeat what I have said before, viz., that I know of no mode in which our funds can be increased, either at Lisbon, Cadiz, or Gibraltar; that every thing that I can conceive would raise a shilling has been resorted to; and the supplies from Gibraltar and Cadiz, as well as from Lisbon, are diminishing rather than increasing.

‘ You appear to be satisfied with the exertions which have been made at Lisbon, although you state that £50,000 might be procured on a loan, through the means of Mr. Sampayo. Your letter is the first intelligence I have received upon this subject; and I can only say, in answer to it, that I shall have inquiry made respecting this loan: and if I should find the transaction to be of a description that the Commissary General ought to enter into, I will authorize him to make the loan. But although you express a general satisfaction with the measures adopted at Lisbon, with which you are acquainted, you are not satisfied with those, and you desire “increased activity” at Cadiz and Gibraltar, although you have no knowledge of the measures which have been adopted there. Now, I, who have that knowledge, who have superintended these transactions from the commencement, am convinced that it is impossible to get another shilling for bills upon England at either place. These transactions are most judiciously managed at Cadiz by Mr. Duff, the Consul General. At Gibraltar there is some difficulty in getting money, as not only the army in Portugal, but the fleet in the Mediterranean, the army in Sicily, the officers of Malta and Gibraltar, are supplied with money for bills upon England, negotiated at the same place by different persons. The state of the money there also has some influence over that of Cadiz; and even if I could find reason to disapprove of the conduct of the Commissary General’s agent at Gibraltar, which I cannot, I do not see how I could increase the funds received from Gibraltar, by any arrangement I could make, or by any “increased activity.”

‘ In respect to the expenditure of the money received, I believe there is no man who doubts that the first and principal object of my attention, and of that of every British officer, must be the British army, and afterwards the allies whom His Majesty has bound himself to support.

‘ The nature and constitution of the British army absolutely requires that it should be regularly paid. It cannot plunder or take what it wants upon requisition like the French army, because it is not sufficiently numerous; and all the necessaries, and much of the food of the soldiers, depend upon their regular payment. I believe I have gone farther than any officer in withholding this payment, excepting Lord



Hutchinson in Egypt; but there it must be observed that the troops received a description of ration which they could, and did, barter with the natives for the other articles which they required. The British army in Portugal has been sometimes two months, and is invariably one month, in arrear, notwithstanding the King's orders and regulations, and the customs and necessities of the service; and at this moment I have not as much money as will supply the pay of the troops.

‘ Under these circumstances, it is useless to enter into the old discussion, whether we got £80,000 or you got £50,000, or under what head it was advanced. We agree that the British army must be the first object; and until the British Government, who have entered into all these arrangements upon a clear and distinct view of their expense, and upon information repeated over and over again of the inadequacy of the funds placed at my disposal to meet the expense, shall adopt efficient measures to increase those funds, the difficulties under which we labor must continue to exist, and must increase.

‘ The mention of “increased activity” in the supply of these funds has suggested to me the notion of taking the whole out of the hands of the Commissary General. Let the Minister at Lisbon or at Seville undertake the management of the money concerns of the Government in this part of the world; let them draw all bills; and let me have no more to do with the subject than to give in regular estimates of the funds required monthly for the army under my command, and receive the money, in the same manner as other officers who have been employed in similar situations.

‘ In answer to your official letter of the 15th, and to part of your letter of the 19th, and to that of the 21st, I have to inform you that, in concurrence with Marshal Beresford, I believe the Junta de Viveres, as a Commissary General, to be very inefficient; and I am also certain that a great part of the money which is placed at their disposal to pay for provisions is employed (perhaps necessarily) in paying salaries and establishments. I know from experience that the Portuguese army could not be in the distress which it suffers from the want of provisions, if only a part of the provisions it receives from the country were paid for; and the object of



my proposition was to ensure the disposal of the fund supplied by Great Britain to that purpose, and no other. If this proposition had been adopted through your interference, in the simple form in which it was made, I should have followed it up by another which I should have made and have pressed upon the Portuguese Government, viz., that they should allot a certain sum of money out of the revenues of the country, to be expended in provisions for the troops; and that this sum also should be placed at the disposal of Marshal Beresford monthly.

‘ I do not mean to say that, with these arrangements, they would have done every thing that was necessary to pay for the provisions of the troops, but at least they would have done something; one third, one half, or two thirds would have been paid for, and the country would have continued to supply what was wanted. But this proposition, instead of being adopted in the simple form in which it was made, is understood to be a design to overturn the Junta de Viveres, and substitute in its place a new system of Commissariat; a correspondence of volumes passes upon it; a fortnight has elapsed since it was made, and nothing is done; a proposition is made that I should take into the hands of the British Commissary General the supply of the provisions for 30,000 Portuguese troops, for which he has neither establishment, nor funds, nor any facilities to enable him to execute the task; and thus, fortnight after fortnight, month after month, passes in discussions, instead of in making efficient arrangements to resist the very serious attack with which this unfortunate country is threatened.

‘ My suggestion to you was simply this: that that portion of the money paid by Great Britain for provisioning 20,000 or 30,000 men should be placed at Marshal Beresford’s disposal, to be applied as he should think proper in the payment for provisions, through “*the Commissaries of the Portuguese army*,” that is to say, through the officers of the Junta de Viveres, or the Commissary General. Marshal Beresford would have selected the parts of the country which had been most pressed to make these payments; and the plan, if adopted, would have secured this object, viz., that every shilling would have been expended for provisions, instead of in salaries and establishments.

‘ As far as Marshal Beresford is concerned, the detail of business would have been trifling, and no more than we are all obliged to enter into ; and probably much less than that into which he is now obliged to enter, from the daily complaints of scarcity from non-payment, which he forwards to the Government. The Commissaries, to whom the Marshal would have ordered the issue of the money, would have been accountable to the Junta de Viveres for its due application, according to the Marshal’s orders. Their receipt for the money would have been the charge, and their account of the disposal their discharge with their masters, the Junta de Viveres ; and there is neither complication, confusion, nor competition in any part of the plan, but merely the substitution of Marshal Beresford for the Junta de Viveres in the selection of the places where the bills for provisions shall be paid, and where they shall not ; in the same manner as I make the same selection for my own army in almost every case.

‘ So much for one of my suggestions for the relief of the distress of the Portuguese army for want of provisions ; and now for the other, the formation of magazines.

‘ In order to effect this object, the Portuguese Government required money, I suppose, to buy provisions. I have twice offered to buy and pay for grain, and to lodge it in their stores ; once in September, and in my official letter to you of the 9th instant ; and this same Government, with a starving army, without a shilling in their treasury, and with the enemy upon their frontier, will not take it !

‘ It is convenient to me to buy Mr. Phillips’s grain (which, by the bye, he will sell at as cheap a rate as any other can be got), because he will take payment for it in bills upon the Treasury, which he engages not to negotiate at Lisbon, Cadiz, or Gibraltar ; and this grain is in fact tantamount to so much money introduced into the military chest. It will probably not be convenient to purchase the grain of another dealer, because he will come into the money market with his bills. But no ! after a fortnight’s consideration, this suggestion is not adopted ! But no other plan is adopted, or even proposed. The army is still starving ; no magazine of any kind is formed ; and as far as that goes, we are just where we stood in October last.

‘ However, I have done with the Portuguese Government.



I have performed my duty by them in suggesting practicable and efficient measures for the relief of the great distress under which they labor. My letters of the 9th and 12th of January will always relieve me from any blame for the misfortunes which must be the consequence of this mode of proceeding; and from this time forward I shall not write a line excepting in answer to those questions which may be put to me, or those propositions which may be forwarded for my consideration.

‘ After this explanation of the plan contained in my letter of the 12th January, which I conceive is fully developed in the letter itself, and which is misunderstood only because the Junta de Viveres and the Government choose not to understand it, it is scarcely necessary that I should give any further reply to your letter of the 21st. The Commissary General has neither establishment nor means to undertake to feed 30,000 Portuguese troops. I have made an arrangement under which we can assist, and do assist, the Portuguese troops and Commissariat with provisions and magazines when they require them; but I can do no more.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 20th, I have to inform you that Senhor Botelho is already employed under the Commissariat, in a manner in which we think he will be useful. We should suffer inconvenience if we were to remove him from that employment; and he could be of no use to us in that which he has chalked out for himself.

‘ There is also a letter from you that I have mislaid, relating to Mr. S——. I cannot give him leave of absence until he shall be relieved. Mr. A—— belongs to a division in the army, and must join it as soon as his health will permit.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To General Bacellar.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 26th January, 1810.

‘ With a view to the future operations of the allied armies, and to the communication between the different corps on this frontier, and on the Tagus, it is desirable that the road should be repaired from Ponte da Murcella to Espinhal by Venda Nova, St. Miguel, Foz d’Arouce, and Corvo; also,



that the road should be repaired from Ponte da Murcella to Almeida, by Lorouza, Galizes, and Pinhanços, to Celorico and Pinhel.

‘ I request you to give directions to the several magistrates that these roads may be repaired forthwith, and inform them that I shall send an officer along the road in the course of a short time to see what has been done in consequence of these directions, and that I hope I shall find that they will have obliged the inhabitants of the country to do their duty.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Bacellar.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ *Viseu, 26th January, 1810.*

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 20th instant, and I have desired Colonel Murray to write to Lieut. Fleetwood for any further information that may be necessary regarding the transports.

‘ I have already more than once stated to Government my opinion, that in case of our being hard pressed in this country, it was absolutely necessary that you should have a reinforcement.

‘ In respect to the use of Peniche in an embarkation of the army, I refer you to my letter written to you in October, from which you will observe, that the probable course of our operations will preclude the use of that port as one of embarkation for the British army. I think, however, we might maintain a garrison in Peniche for some time, even after we should have evacuated Portugal with the army: which would answer various purposes, as well for the fleet, which would of course be employed in the blockade of the Tagus, as for other objects which I have in contemplation.

‘ I do not know what to make of the Portuguese Government: I cannot bring my mind to doubt their good intentions; but you will scarcely believe, that, although their army is starving, and they have no money to buy provisions, they have hesitated and indeed refused to adopt two propositions made by me which would have relieved all their difficulties, and would have given them magazines. I have done with them.

‘It is very extraordinary that I have not the slightest recollection of the person who you say was arrested at Badajoz.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*  
*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To Lieut. General Payne.*

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Viseu, 27th January, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 13th, and I am equally surprised and annoyed at the failure of all our measures for the re-establishment of the heavy cavalry.

‘This failure is, however, to be attributed entirely to Mr. —, of whom I shall make a formal complaint to the Treasury, as soon as I shall receive the Commissary General’s report, and I shall suspend him from his office till their pleasure shall be known.

‘It is so inconvenient, and indeed the army is exposed to so much risk, having the cavalry at such a distance, that I cannot consent to the arrangement you propose for the dragoons, more particularly as, by a little exertion by the commissaries, we shall find no difficulty in feeding them in their present quarters; and I have ordered the direct road to be repaired, which, instead of placing them at the distance of seven or eight marches from the army, will bring them within three, of which only one will be forced.

‘If the cavalry had been in order, and had recovered as I had reason to expect they would, I might now strike a blow of essential importance. However, it cannot now be helped. Mr. — shall be punished, and I hope the next commissary will do his duty better.

‘I have great objections to the increase of the ration: in the first place, I strongly suspect foul play in those heavy regiments at the time the officers were sickly, and I have never heard any sufficient reason why the horses of the heavy dragoons, the — in particular, which never moved after August, should be in such bad condition, when all the other horses of the army were in such fine order, and most particularly the Hussars, K. G. L.

‘Besides, it would be ridiculous to order 12 lbs. of hay or

straw for a ration for horses, in answer to a report stating that they could not be provided with more than half of 10 lbs.

‘ Considering that the cavalry do no work, and that they are all in stables, and adverting to the very excellent condition in which the horses of the hussars are which have been most worked, and which I am sorry to say are now frequently fed upon rye, I cannot but be apprehensive that there is some deficiency of attention to stable duties. I should recommend to you, therefore, to call the attention of commanding officers of regiments to this subject, and to resume the use of the currycomb and brush universally, if they should not be able immediately to supply themselves with the hair gloves which you preferred.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will have all the spare appointments with the regiments sent to Lisbon, so that when the cavalry shall be able to move, it may move light.

‘ I rather think that I shall very shortly draw the 16th up to Coimbra.

‘ You will be sorry to hear that I lost three horses the other day, smothered in the stable, which had caught fire; two of which were my black and the chestnut.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Payne.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Duque del Parque.*

‘ SIR,

‘ *Viseu, 27th January, 1810.*

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter, in which you have informed me of your intention to move the army under your command across the Tagus, of the possibility that some of the divisions may pass through Portugal; and you have expressed a desire that the magistrates and others in authority in Portugal may be directed not to throw any impediment in the way of the march of those troops, but may assist them as much as may be in their power with provisions, &c., for which payment is to be made.

‘ I regret that your Excellency has not stated particularly the strength and composition of the divisions which will pass through Portugal, or the route which they will take, as the



country through which they will probably direct their march is one but ill provided with supplies, and has been much exhausted by the march of troops in the course of the last year; and although the directions have been given of which your Excellency was desirous, I am apprehensive, that unless further and more detailed arrangements are made for the supply of your troops on their march through Portugal, they will experience great distress for want of provisions.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Duque del Parque.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Viseu, 27th January, 1810.

‘ I enclose a letter to Colonel Wilson, which I request you to peruse and to have forwarded to him. You will observe that the Duque del Parque is about to move his army across the Tagus. It will be desirable, therefore, that you should have a post of observation at Alfayates, to watch the Sierra de Gata, &c.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General  
the Hon. L. Cole.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Viseu, 27th January, 1810.

‘ I send you the duplicate of a letter to Colonel Wilson, which I beg you to peruse and forward to him.

‘ I think, that in order to preserve order at the bridge of Villa Velha, it is desirable that you should send there a company of British infantry under the command of a steady officer. I have no doubt that the Duque del Parque means to cross the Tagus at that place with his whole army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Viseu, 27th January, 1810.

‘ I send home, by the vessel which will take this, Lieut. Veron de Farincourt, of the 2e regiment de l’infanterie legere of the French army, with a cartel of exchange for

Lieut. Cameron of the 79th regiment, who was taken prisoner by the French on the 27th July, and was sent into Portugal by General Kellermann from Valladolid.

‘ Upon the occasion of sending this officer to England, and of requesting that he may be sent to France as soon as may be practicable, I think it proper to explain the reasons which have induced me to send him by this mode of conveyance.

‘ I am concerned to have to inform your Lordship that since the British officers and soldiers were made prisoners in the hospital at Talavera, the Spanish Government have thrown every obstacle in their power in the way of their being exchanged, and of every communication between the enemy’s Generals and me, which had for its object either their exchange, or their relief by money or otherwise.

‘ As the French prisoners taken in the battle of Talavera, and during the operations in Spain, were given in charge to the Spanish General at the time they were taken, I had no prisoners in my power to exchange for the officers and soldiers taken in the hospital.

‘ Marshal Soult, however, proposed an exchange of prisoners, provided General Franceschi, who had been taken in Old Castille in June, should be included in the cartel. This proposition having been referred to the Spanish Government, they gave no answer to it for three months, and at length refused to agree to it.

‘ They then, in the month of September, detained Captain Thévenin, an aide de camp of Marshal Mortier, who had been sent into the Spanish posts with a letter for me, which was open : first, under pretence that it was necessary that he should wait for an answer ; and afterwards, when I remonstrated against his detention, and declared that the letter required no answer, they detained him under the pretence that he had passed the Tagus at Almaraz, where they did not choose to receive flags of truce, although he was received at this same place with his flag by the officer commanding the Spanish outposts. After repeated remonstrances, they at length, in November, allowed Captain Thévenin to return to the French army, having detained him in close confinement for nearly two months.

‘ In the month of September, General Kellermann sent

Lieut. Cameron of the 79th regiment into Portugal from Valladolid, with a cartel of exchange for Lieut. de Turenne, his aide de camp, who had just been made prisoner in Old Castille. I immediately requested the Spanish Government, through the Ambassador, to place Lieut. de Turenne at my disposal, which, after some delay, they refused; and I then prevailed upon the Portuguese Government to allow Lieut. Veron de Farincourt, who had been taken at Chaves, and was a prisoner at Lisbon, to be exchanged for Lieut. Cameron.

‘ In order to avoid the difficulties which I had experienced in communicating with the enemy’s Generals regarding the prisoners, by the frontier of Estremadura, I determined to send Lieut. de Farincourt at once into Old Castille, and he was attended by a Portuguese officer, Captain Gill, 24th regiment, who was to conduct him to the French outposts.

‘ On their arrival at Ciudad Rodrigo, however, both were stopped, and Lieut. de Farincourt was put in confinement, and Captain Gill was insulted and ill treated. Brigadier General Cox, who commanded at Almeida, remonstrated upon this conduct, but in vain; and at length when I was informed of it, on the 6th of December, I wrote to Mr. Frere to request that he would make remonstrances on the subject; to which letter I received a reply on the 9th, a copy of which I enclose, stating that the orders had been sent to Ciudad Rodrigo to permit Lieut. de Farincourt to proceed to the French outposts.

‘ I found, however, by a letter from Brigadier General Cox to Marshal Beresford, dated the 18th December, of which I enclose the copy, not only that these orders had not been sent, but that the Duque del Parque stated that he had received others of a contrary tenor, and that Lieut. de Farincourt and Captain Gill were sent back into Portugal.

‘ The correspondence then ensued between Mr. Frere and me, of which I enclose the copies, from which it is evident not only that the Duque del Parque had not received the orders under which he assured General Cox that he acted, but that Don A. de Cornel had deceived his colleague Don F. de Saavedra. The result of this conduct, however, is an impossibility of having any communication with the enemy’s Generals which has for its object either the relief or the



exchange of the British officers and soldiers who were made prisoners, only because they were wounded in fighting the battles of Spain.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Viseu, 28th January, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 23rd instant, to which I do not lose a moment in replying.

‘ Of course the Commissary General shall be directed to do whatever you desire him in the way of bills for you, and I expect to receive from you an official letter upon the subject. But I have already apprized you of the inconvenience to our finances of assisting the Portuguese Government with bills drawn upon British credit. Although the bills, which you now propose should be granted, are for such sums that they cannot be themselves converted into cash, yet the Government are to draw for smaller sums upon the holders of these English bills, which sums, if not disposed of in this way, would be in the market for the Commissary General's bills.

‘ However, having said thus much, and having frequently explained to you the inconvenience (which would now amount to an impossibility of remaining in the country) which must result from any interruption to our supplies of money, I have only to add that the bills shall be sent by return of the post, or of the messenger which shall bring an official letter from you, desiring that the Commissary General may grant them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To Colonel Peacocke.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 29th January, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the proceedings of the General Court Martial, on the trial of Edward Poole, camp follower, not a soldier, which I had thought proper to transmit to be laid before His Majesty for his confirmation; and a letter I have received from the Judge Advocate General,

from which it appears that it is necessary that the members of the General Court Martial should be re-assembled.

‘ I have issued orders that they may re-assemble at Lisbon on the 8th February ; when, if they should all have arrived, or as soon after as the members shall have arrived, you will communicate to the Court the letter from the Judge Advocate General, and desire them to revise their sentence upon the prisoner Edward Poole.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 30th January, 1810.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter received from the Secretary of State in Portugal, by which an arrangement is made to place the boats on the rivers Tagus, Mondego, and Douro, under the orders of certain officers in the different districts, with a view to their being registered, and to their being removed out of reach in case the enemy should invade the country.

‘ I also enclose a letter received from the same gentleman, in which he desires that all applications for boats on any of those rivers may be made to the officers of the districts respectively charged with the arrangement and management of them.

‘ I desire that in all cases boats, as well as carriages, may be procured for the service of the British army, by the sense of interest in the parties who may have them to hire, owing to the regularity of the payment of the hire of the boats and carriages. But if at any time, either owing to the pressing nature of the service, or to the large demand for boats or carriages, or to any other cause, it should be necessary to press or embargo boats or carriages, you will direct the officers of the Commissariat to make application for those which they require to the officer of the Portuguese Government charged with the management of the boats or carriages in the district in which they may be required.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Rev. S. Briscall, Chaplain to the Forces.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 30th January, 1810.

‘ I have perused the letter from the Secretary at War which you left with me, and I have great satisfaction in availing myself of this opportunity of testifying my sense of the assiduity, regularity, and propriety with which you have performed the duties of your situation, and with which you have conducted yourself since you have been attached to this army; and I hope that this certificate will have the effect of giving us the benefit of your continuance with us.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Rev. S. Briscall.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Viseu, 30th January, 1810. ]

‘ As I am going away for a few days upon a *reconnaissance* towards Torres Vedras, I wish to state in writing what I before told you in conversation when I saw you at Guarda.

‘ I do not wish to lose possession of the Coa, although I do not mean to contend for it, if the enemy should collect a large force evidently with the intention of making a serious invasion of Portugal. If that should be the case, and you should deem it necessary, you will in concert with General Craufurd withdraw from the Coa, and collect your division and the hussars from Guarda, Trancoso, &c., to Celorico, where also, in the case of necessity supposed, you will find General Craufurd’s division.

‘ If the same necessity should continue to exist, as I do not mean to defend the Mondego at Celorico, I should wish the troops to fall back gradually upon Pinhanços, where Sir J. Sherbrooke will be, in the case supposed, with his division and other troops.

‘ I conclude that you have posts upon the upper Coa, at Castello Bom, at Ponte de Sequeiros, at Rapoula de Coa, and also at Alfayates, in consequence of my last letter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*  
*the Hon. L. Cole.*’

‘ WELLINGTON



*To Brigadier General Cox, Governor of Almeida.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 30th January, 1810.

‘ I received last night yours of the 28th, and Colonel Grant’s letters of the 23rd and 24th.

‘ The enemy carried the Sierra Morena on the 20th, on which day their head quarters were at La Carolina.

‘ You may depend upon it that the whole of Ney’s and Kellermann’s corps are in Castille.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Cox.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To B. Frere, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 30th January, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your several letters of the 16th, 17th, 19th, 20th, and 21st, instant, for which I am much obliged to you. I had already received accounts of the enemy’s having obtained possession of the pass of La Carolina.

‘ I am perfectly aware of the advantage which the general cause would derive from the movement of the British army into Castille, if it be true that the enemy’s reinforcements have not yet entered Spain. I should doubt, however, the truth of the report, which states that only 8000 have arrived, both on account of the time which has elapsed since they passed Paris, and because the enemy has hitherto acted with so much caution, that I do not believe he would incur the risk of collecting at the Sierra Morena the large force which has lately been collected in that quarter, if the near approach and the expected early arrival in Castille of the reinforcements did not remove all chance of danger from this measure.

‘ But these conjectures respecting the probable period of the arrival of the reinforcements would not prevent me from making a movement into Castille if the enemy was not at the present moment in greater strength in that province than I can bring into the field. Their force consists of Ney and Kellermann; and although it extends from Zamora to Avila and Valladolid, and even to Burgos, there is no doubt

that they could collect it before I could make any impression upon any part of it.

‘The convalescents of the British army have only now commenced to join their regiments. The reinforcements have not yet arrived from England; and even if I should draw in the division placed upon the Tagus, which would expose the rear to some risk, particularly if the movement had the effect of relieving the southern provinces of Spain, I could not bring 20,000 men into the field.

‘The Portuguese army is well disciplined, and will soon, I hope, be a valuable addition to our force; but at present these troops are so sickly from the want of clothing and necessaries not yet arrived from England, and from the distress which they have suffered throughout the winter for provisions, owing to the deficiency of money to buy them, that the consequence of moving them from their quarters in this season would be the annihilation of that army, and would occasion the disappointment of all hopes of service from them, not only hereafter, but even in the operation which I should now undertake in the hope of their assistance. I have therefore, with great reluctance, given up all thoughts of moving at present.

‘The Duque del Parque has received his orders to cross the Tagus, and informed me on the 24th that he was about to carry them into execution.

‘I am afraid that the person charged with the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo is a very improper one, and not very likely to do his duty. As this place is a most important one, I shall be much obliged to you if you will make inquiry respecting this person’s character, and urge that he may be relieved by one more deserving of confidence on account of his talents and experience.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘B. Frere, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief.*

‘MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘Viseu, 30th January, 1810.

‘I shall esteem it a great favor if you will tell Sir David Dundas that I am very much obliged to him, but that I have



no wish to be removed from the 33rd regiment, of which I was major, and lieut. colonel, and then colonel\*.

‘I must say, however, that my friend, the late Secretary at War, made it the least profitable of all the regiments of the army, and, I believe, a losing concern, having reduced the establishment at once from 1200 to 800, when it consisted of above 750 men; and I had to pay the freight of the clothing to the East Indies, and its carriage to Hyderabad, about 500 miles from Madras. With all this, I have the reputation of having a *good thing* in a regiment in the East Indies!

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘Viseu, 30th January, 1810.

‘I have just received your letter of the 25th January, desiring that I will state to Dom Miguel Forjaz in what way I wish the Government to act in respect to provisions. I beg to refer you to many letters which I have written to you in respect to provisions for the Portuguese army, particularly to my official letters of the 9th and 12th of January.

‘In respect to the money concerns, and all the points on which I have ventured to give them advice, I beg to refer you to my dispatches to them; in which you will see that they have not adopted any one measure that I have recommended to them, either for the improvement of their financial concerns, or for the support of the efficiency and authority of their government, or for the efficiency of their army. I propose to send these last letters home, in order to show that I at least advised them as I ought.

‘It was impossible for Mr. Phillips, or any other dealer, to depend upon the changes of determination in the Portuguese Government; and I ordered the Commissary General to take his wheat, which I was very sure would be required sooner or later. I do not know what advantage the Junta de Viveres would derive from making the bargain themselves, more particularly as Mr. Phillips gives the wheat at the lowest price at which wheat of the same kind can be purchased. I have desired the Commissary General to give all that shall be purchased from Mr. Phillips to the person you will order to

\* An offer had been made to remove Lord Wellington to a regiment with two battalions.



receive it, upon getting your receipt, either for so much wheat, specifying the cost, according to the Commissariat arrangement, or for so much money, being the price to be paid to Mr. Phillips.

‘ In respect to the difficulty mentioned in your letter of the 26th, I hope that Admiral Berkeley will see the propriety of taking off the embargo he has laid upon the corn, as there is no doubt that the Commissary General can settle Mr. Phillips’s debt to the Transport Office in the mode pointed out by you. I certainly understood from Mr. Phillips that he had in the harbour of Lisbon as much as three million pounds of wheat, and some barley, which he engaged to give for bills upon England, not to be negotiated at Lisbon, Gibraltar, or Cadiz, excepting a small sum of money required at Lisbon for expenses incurred there. I imagine that Mr. Phillips has not deceived me.

‘ I have also received your letter of the 26th instant, stating your belief that more money might be obtained at Cadiz for bills; and I am happy to find that you propose to send a person there to see whether “greater activity and exertion” would not procure more money. It appears to me, that as Mr. Duff gets half per cent. for all he gets, he has as great a stimulus for “activity and exertion,” if these qualities could procure money for bills any where, as any agent can have. However, your secret agent will report to you the state of the case; and I trust that if you should find that we are not well served there, you will take the management of the whole money concern into your own hands.

‘ It is desirable, however, that, until you shall have been convinced by the inquiries of your secret agent, that Mr. Duff does not manage the business to advantage, our existing arrangements at Cadiz should not be disturbed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Viseu, 30th January, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a return of the transports in Lisbon on the 21st January, 1810.

‘ I will attend to your Lordship’s instructions of the 3rd instant, in case it should be necessary to embark the army

from Portugal. Your Lordship will observe, however, from the course of the enemy's recent operations, which will be reported to you by this occasion, the probability that he will proceed in the first instance to endeavor to complete the conquest of the south of Spain; and in the event of succeeding in that object, so far as to obtain possession of Cadiz, I conclude that it is not wished that I should, in case of the evacuation of Portugal, proceed with the army embarked in its transports off Cadiz.

' I also beg to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to a fact respecting the harbour of Cadiz which has been stated to me, and which deserves their attention, and further inquiry from the officers of the navy, as being likely to influence their measures respecting Cadiz, even supposing that place should hold out till after the time at which the British army should evacuate Portugal.

' I understand that the channel by which large ships are obliged to enter and go out of the port of Cadiz lies to the northward, and is protected and commanded by the fire of the batteries on that side of the harbour, and by no means by that of the fort of Cadiz itself. These batteries had not been destroyed, or even disarmed, when I was at Cadiz in November, and I have not heard that they have yet been disarmed, although I have suggested through a third person to General Venegas the expediency of disarming them, if he expected from the British navy any assistance in the defence of the place.

' Whether these batteries are destroyed and disarmed or not, it is obvious that if the only channel, which can be used by large ships, is on the north side of the entrance, the enemy will have the command of it during any operations which may be carried on at Cadiz.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Earl of Liverpool.*

' WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

' MY LORD,

' Viseu, 30th January, 1810.

' I have the honor to enclose the returns of stores in His Majesty's magazines in Portugal up to the 1st January, 1810.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Earl of Liverpool.*

' WELLINGTON.

Commissary General's Office,  
Viseu, 1st January, 1810.

*Return of Provisions, Wine, Spirits, and Forage remaining in His Majesty's Magazines in Portugal on the 1st January, 1810.*

Provisions, Wine, and Spirits.	}	Biscuit . . . . .	1,792,160	} Pounds.
		Flour . . . . .	1,099,134	
		Salt meat . . . . .	1,797,190	
		Wine . . . . .	26 Pipes.	
		Rum . . . . .	113,990 Gallons.	
Forage.	}	Oats . . . . .	1,444,640	} Pounds.
		Barley . . . . .	1,286,385	
		Wheat . . . . .	87,070	
		Indian corn . . . . .	212,551	
		Beans . . . . .	1,660	
		Bran . . . . .	5,100	
		Hay . . . . .	1,372,304	

J. MURRAY, Commissary General.'

Commissary General's Office,  
Viseu, 1st January, 1810.

*Return of Quarter Master General's Stores remaining in His Majesty's Magazines in Portugal.*

1900	Flanders tents	} Soldiers' tents.	626	Tin kettles.
1900	Flanders poles		335	Kettle bags.
1838	Iron collars . . . . .		604	Tin canteens.
6000	Mallets . . . . .		6699	Wood canteens.
124,600	Pins . . . . .	} Camp colours.	5286	Canteen straps.
724	Poles & cases		43	Felling axes.
431	Flags . . . . .	14,020	Havresacks.	
595	Powder bags.	2235	Blankets.	
1060	Drum cases.	542½	Sets of forage cords, 4 to a set.	
698	Hatchets.	106	Bundles of blankets.	
785	Bill hooks.	735	Picket poles.	
3493	Flanders kettles.	1	Knapsack.	
264	Picket Ropes.	618	Sets of bedding.	
5	Pickaxes.	5	Shovels.	
453	Hair nose bags.	5	Spades.	
461	Packsaddles with crook- ed haucums.	149	Casks of accoutrements.	
264	Bridles and chain collars.	2	Cases of nails.	
167	Ammunition boxes.	75	Mule halters.	
19	Medicine panniers.	34	French tent poles.	
16	Tarpaulins.	20	Small water casks.	
15½	Vals marq. tents	13	Cases of buttons.	
14½	Sets of poles . . . . .	} Hospi- tal.	9	Cases of officers' swords.
70	Bags of mallets and pins . . . . .		99,062	Pairs of shoes.
3	Reels and lines.	45	Bales of army clothing.	
200	Langrels.	10	Baskets.	
		400	Palliasses.	

J. MURRAY, Commissary General.'



*To Brigadier General Robert Craufurd.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Viseu, 31st January, 1810.

‘ I am going for a few days to look about me at Torres Vedras; but you will continue to direct every thing to me here, and General Sherbrooke will read and forward to me your communications.

‘ I do not think that the enemy is likely to molest us at present; but I am desirous of maintaining the Coa, unless he should collect a very large force, and obviously intends to set seriously to work on the invasion of Portugal. If that should be the case, I do not propose to maintain the Coa, or that you should risk any thing for that purpose; and I beg you to retire gradually to Celorico, where you will be joined by General Cole’s division. From Celorico I propose that you should retire gradually along the valley of the Mondego, upon Sir John Sherbrooke’s division, and other troops which will be there.

‘ If you should quit the Coa, bring the hussars with you.

‘ I mention this in writing in case of accidents during my absence, which, however, I do not think likely to occur.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Robert Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ If you should withdraw from the Coa, bring with you the 12th Portuguese regiment, which is in the villages on your right, having been sent out of the garrison of Almeida.’

*To Colonel M’Mahon\*.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 31st January, 1810.

‘ I received your letter of yesterday’s date. I had received directions from the Commander in Chief to give you leave of absence if you were indisposed, which I am happy to find is not the case; and you must be aware that the situation of affairs in Portugal will not allow of your absence at present.

‘ Marshal Beresford informed me that he intended to move your brigade from Lamego, but he did not state to what place; and I request of you, when you shall receive his orders, to make known to Lieut. General Sir J. C. Sher-

\* Major General Sir Thomas M’Mahon, Bart., K.C.B., then commanding a brigade of infantry in the Portuguese army.

brooke, who will be here, their purport, and at what time you will carry them into execution.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel M'Mahon,*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.*

‘ MY DEAR SHERBROOKE, . . . ‘ *Viseu, 31st January, 1810.*

‘ I enclose you a memorandum of the points to which I wish you to attend in case the enemy should collect in our front for the purpose of attacking us during my absence. I think that you had better not have any communication with General Bacellar, or any of the Portuguese officers, on the points in this memorandum previous to the time at which it will be necessary to execute them.

‘ I have desired Campbell to give you all letters for me from the front, which you will open and then forward to me by a messenger whom I have desired should be sent from Viseu every evening, if there should be any letters for him to carry.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.*

‘ Enclosed I send you my route as far as I have settled it :  
‘ Feb. 1, Coimbra ; 2, Leyria ; 3, Alcobaça ; 4, Obidos or Caldas ; 5. Torres Vedras.’

MEMORANDUM,

*Left with Lieut. General Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.*

‘ *Viseu, 31st January, 1810.*

‘ The object of the position at present occupied by the army is :

‘ First, to defend the entrance into Portugal at the probable point of attack by the enemy.

‘ Secondly, to be in the situation to act offensively for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, if the enemy should make an attack upon that place, and it should be deemed expedient to make any movement for its relief.

‘ Thirdly, to be in the situation to act offensively upon a

more extensive scale in Castille, by way of diversion for the allies, if the relative state of the forces of the enemy and of the allies should permit such an operation without risk to the British army.

‘ The third division, at Pinhel, occupies the lower part of the Coa, and the cavalry have posts of observation even upon the Agueda. The 4th division has a post at the bridge of Castello Bom, at Ponte de Sequeiros, and at Rapoula de Coa, the principal passages over the upper Coa.

‘ This position is perfectly secure from surprise, more particularly as General Cole has been directed to have another post of observation at Alfayates; the Duque del Parque’s army, which was in the Sierra de Gata, being ordered to cross the Tagus into Estremadura.

‘ It is desirable that we should not lose possession of the Coa, particularly to a small corps; but as I have no intention to maintain the possession of the Coa if the enemy should collect a large army in that quarter, General Cole and General Craufurd will retire with their divisions and the hussars, &c., if they should find that the enemy has collected a large army, and cross the Mondego to Celorico.

‘ When the enemy shall begin to collect for this operation, General Sherbrooke will cross the Mondego by Ponte de Fiães; the troops at Mangualde by Ponte de Palheiros, and the whole will proceed to Pinhanços, which is six leagues in rear of Celorico.

‘ If the enemy should continue to advance, General Cole and General Craufurd will retire gradually by the valley of the Mondego, as will General Sherbrooke, till the whole shall assemble at Ponte da Murcella, holding the height of Moita as an advanced post.

‘ When General Sherbrooke shall make his movement across the Mondego, he is to send orders to the Portuguese troops at Coimbra to march to Ponte da Murcella, or to the villages in the rear of the Serra de Saboga; to General Blunt, at Figueira, to march his brigade to Coimbra, and thence to Mealhada; or direct to Mealhada, if there should be a road, from whence he is to occupy the pass between Mealhada and Martagoa, near the convent of Busaco; to the Portuguese troops at Leyria to move up to Ponte da Murcella.



‘ General Blunt must have with him a Portuguese brigade of artillery from Condeixa, and the remainder of the Portuguese artillery must be ordered to the Ponte da Murcella.

‘ The 6 and 9 pounders in the British reserve artillery must be embarked in boats on the Mondego at Coimbra, and sent up to Foz d’Alva, and the horses will move direct to Ponte da Murcella.

‘ General Bacellar must be directed to order all the boats on the Mondego to go below Foz d’Alva; to have all the bridges on the Mondego broken up; viz., between Fornos and Junçal, Ponte Novo; near Villa Franca, Ponte de Cabra, Ponte de Palheiros, Ponte Novo; near Carvalhal, Ponte de Fiães; and to order out and collect the militia and the ordenanza, to move the former across the Criz, and to employ the latter in annoying the enemy in every situation in which it may be practicable; to destroy the bridge near Fail over the Viseu; also the Ponte Pedrinha, over the river d’Asno, and that at Ferreroz, over the same river.

‘ He should likewise direct the owners of carts and carriages in the country evacuated, of which he has the list, and the inhabitants, to move off with their property towards Oporto.

‘ The British magazine at Foz Daño, upon the Mondego, should be moved to Foz d’Alva, upon the same river.

‘ There is a brigade of Portuguese infantry at present at Lamego, under the command of Colonel M’Mahon, which, however, were to be moved farther to the rear, and I do not recollect to what station. If they should not be moved before the necessity of collecting the army should occur they must march from Lamego by Viseu, to the Ponte de Fiães, on the Mondego, where they will cross that river, and they are to be in the rear of General Sherbrooke’s division at Pinhanços. If they should have marched, they must receive directions, in the case supposed, to proceed by Coimbra to the villages in the rear of the Serra de Saboga. Colonel M’Mahon is directed to let General Sherbrooke know when he shall receive orders to march, and to what point.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Viseu, 31st January, 1810.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 29th instant. I had already, when I wrote to you, thought of sending some cavalry to Montalvão. But adverting to the difficulty of feeding them any where, and to the expediency of keeping the regiments collected, I preferred, in the first instance, that you should send to Montalvão only an officer. When the enemy shall pass the Tagus, or penetrate the mountains, however, it may be desirable to station some cavalry at Montalvão; and you will then send either British or Portuguese, as you may think proper.

‘ In respect to the bridge at Villa Velha, its preservation is important, either to enable me to cross the Tagus to you, by the shortest route, certainly, for some of my divisions; or to enable you to cross the Tagus by the shortest road to some stations in which I might require your assistance, and it might be consistent with other objects for you to give it to me. We know from experience, that but few troops could pass the river at a time by means of a flying bridge, and these only with great inconvenience.

‘ I am aware of the difficulty in removing the boats of that bridge, and of the probable chance of failure, and, therefore, I recommend that you should at once make up your mind to destroy them, when it shall be necessary; and that you should fill them with combustibles, or take such other measures as you may think necessary to insure that object in a short space of time. If the boats should be destroyed, I will of course pay for them.

‘ I am going to-morrow to make a reconnoissance towards Torres Vedras, &c., and I enclose my route, and request you to write to me to those places, if you should have any thing important to communicate. I will apprise you of my further movements.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Viseu, 31st January, 1810.’

‘ The enemy’s troops, which I informed you in my dispatch of the 24th instant had been collected in La Mancha, with the exception of Marshal Soult’s corps, which I have reason to believe has been detached to the left, obtained possession of the Despeña Perros, the principal pass in the Sierra Morena, on the 20th instant, on which night their head quarters were fixed at La Carolina.

‘ I have not yet received an account of the mode in which they effected this operation. They had made different movements along the whole front of the Sierra, from Montizon to Almaden, between the 14th and 20th, and had penetrated with their right as far as Hinojosa, and afterwards to Pozo Blanco. I have also reason to believe that they had gained ground on their left and in the centre, which it was important for the Spaniards to hold ; but that no opposition was given, or even a shot fired in all these operations, which have ended in the possession by the French of the passes of the Sierra Morena.

‘ Since the 20th, the French advance had been near Cordova, probably from their right at Pozo Blanco, but had retired again ; and I have not received intelligence of the movement of the head quarters from La Carolina.

‘ Neither have I heard of the movements of the Spanish army under General Areyzaga since he quitted La Carolina on the 20th.

‘ The Duque de Alburquerque, after leaving 4500 men on the Guadiana, destined to form the garrison of Badajoz, which troops entered Badajoz on the 26th instant, intended to interrupt the operations of the right of the French army, by making an attack upon them by Agudo. The French, however, having possession of that point, and having already pushed their patrols as far as Hinojosa through the mountains, he was apprehensive that he should be too late unless he passed them likewise ; and he went by Guadalcanal and Cantillana to Carmona, where he was on the 24th.

‘ The Duque del Parque was ordered by the Central Junta on the 21st to cross the Tagus, and move into Estremadura to join the Duque de Alburquerque’s corps.



‘ I learned from him, by a letter of the 24th, that he proposed to carry this order into execution ; but I have not yet heard that he had moved.

‘ My last accounts from Badajoz are of the 27th. The Central Junta had quitted Seville, and had gone to the Isla de Leon, and had given over to the Junta of Seville the charge of defending the province of Andalusia. This Junta had proposed to that of Badajoz to consider of the appointment of a regency, which subject they had immediately taken into their consideration.

‘ Your Lordship will have observed, from the movements and operations which I have above detailed to you, that it is the enemy’s intention to endeavor to obtain possession of the south of Spain ; and I have no doubt that in a short time they will be in possession of Seville, and the arsenals, magazines, and manufactures of arms, &c., which had been established in that city. The uncertainty which has attended all the operations of the war in the Peninsula, particularly those which have been carried on latterly, renders it impossible to form any opinion whether the Spanish armies will give the enemy any opposition in the execution of these plans, or to calculate upon the effect which any opposition they have in their power to give might produce.

‘ There is no doubt that if the enemy’s reinforcements have not yet entered Spain, and are not considerably advanced within the Spanish frontiers, the operation which they have undertaken is one of some risk ; and I have maturely considered of the means of making a diversion in favor of the allies, which might oblige the enemy to reduce his force in Andalusia, and would expose him to risk and loss in this quarter. But the circumstances which are detailed in the enclosed copy of a letter to Mr. Frere have obliged me to refrain from attempting this operation at present.

‘ I have not, however, given up all thoughts of it ; and I propose to carry it into execution hereafter, if circumstances should permit.

‘ The passes of the Sierra Morena being lost, and the defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies being the probable consequence of any action in which their imprudence or even necessity or expediency may involve them, I am desirous that His Majesty’s Government should consider, and should instruct me on the line to be adopted in Por-

tugal on the state of affairs which will then exist in the Peninsula.

‘It is probable that, although the armies may be lost, and the principal Juntas and authorities of the provinces may be dispersed, the war of partizans may continue. Cadiz may possibly still hold out, and the Central Junta may continue in existence in that town, although without authority, as the French armies will be in possession of the different provinces in which they will be stationed. In this supposed state of affairs, Portugal will have remained untouched; the enemy having evidently preferred the line of operations by the left of the Peninsula to that by the right, which I supposed in my letter of the 14th November he would adopt.

‘His Majesty’s Government are informed of the military situation and resources of Portugal. If arms can be supplied for the militia, there is no doubt that there will be in this country not less than a gross force of 90,000 men, regularly organized, besides the whole armed population of the country, and the British army.

‘Since the restoration of the Government by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, there is no doubt that much has been done, particularly in the last nine months, towards the enrolment, organization, and equipment of this large force; but much still remains to be done, with very insufficient means, to render that part of this force which consists of militia (being not less than 50,000 men) equal to a contest with the enemy for the possession of this country; and even if all that is required in this respect were accomplished, there would be wanting throughout this whole army military experience, and that confidence in themselves and in their officers which can result only from experience.

‘When the affairs of Spain shall be brought to the state which I have above described, and when all regular resistance shall cease, there will exist no probability of a renewal of the contest in that country on such a scale as to afford any chance of a successful result, notwithstanding that the possession of each of the parts of it may be precarious, and may depend upon the strength of the French armed force maintained within it; and that the possession of the whole may be a burden rather than an advantage to the French Government.

‘The question will then arise, whether the continuation of the contest will “afford any reasonable prospect of advantage



against the common enemy, or of benefit to His Majesty's allies."

' From what I have above stated, your Lordship will observe that it is impossible for me to calculate, upon any certain grounds, on the degree of assistance in the defence of this country which we shall receive from the Portuguese troops. We have done every thing for the regulars that discipline could do, which has been extended to the militia as far as the Government could afford the expense of keeping these corps embodied; and the regulars have been armed and equipped as far as the means of the country would go, the militia being in the state already known to your Lordship. There is no doubt also of their general detestation of the French Government, of their loyalty to their Prince, of their confidence in us, and of their determination, as individuals, to do the utmost in the cause.

' But still the operations of these troops cannot be calculated upon as they might be if more inured to war, and if they or their officers had any military experience, or if the majority of their officers were of a different description.

' Adverting, then, to the probability, in the case supposed likely to exist, that the whole or the greater part of the French army in Spain will be disposable to be thrown upon this country, I should be glad to know whether it is the wish of His Majesty's Government that an effort should be made to defend this country to the last; or whether, as soon as I shall find affairs in Spain in the state in which I have above described, I shall turn my mind seriously to the evacuation of the country, and to the embarkation of as large a body of people, military as well as others, as I can carry away.

' Whatever may be the decision of the Government upon this subject, and whatever may be the force with which the enemy shall invade Portugal, I am of opinion that in all events I shall be able to bring away the British army.

' There is another point also upon which I wish to have an explanation of the intentions of His Majesty's Government.

' In the instructions from Lord Castlereagh of the 3rd of April, I was ordered "to detach an adequate force," for the purpose of "making every effort to assist in the preservation of Cadiz, if Mr. Frere should at any time notify to me the actual consent of the Spanish Government to admit a British



garrison into that place." I still consider that paragraph of my original instructions to be in force, and I shall act accordingly, if the supposed case should occur; but I am desirous of having His Majesty's wishes upon that part of the subject at present.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

*The Earl of Liverpool.*

' WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

' MY LORD,

' Viseu, 31st January, 1810.

' Your Lordship will have observed, from my private communications, that I had already adverted to the subject referred to in your Lordship's dispatch of the 4th instant.

' I have no doubt that some, possibly a large proportion, of the Portuguese troops, will be desirous of withdrawing from Portugal at the time this country shall be evacuated by the British army; but it is impossible to devise any mode by which information can be acquired, or any estimate can be formed, of the numbers which would be likely to go. It may be expected, however, that these numbers would depend in some degree upon the objects held out to the troops for the future; and as they have generally a great objection to embarking in ships, upon the nature of the accommodation afforded to them.

' My dispatch of the 14th November, and its enclosures, will have pointed out to your Lordship the general nature of the operations which it is probable will be carried on by the enemy in Portugal.

' I have no doubt that he will have a corps on each side of the Tagus, and that he will occupy the left bank of that river from Almada to its mouth, at the same time that he will attack us on the right bank. Indeed, his recent operations in La Mancha show that he proposes to complete the conquest of the south of Spain, or at all events to insure it before he will commence his attack upon Portugal; and in that case it is probable that the principal attack will be made by Alentejo, although probably the operations, which must have for their object the possession of Lisbon, will end on the right bank, a large corps being still kept on the left of the river.

' If I should be right in this conjecture, it will be obvious

to your Lordship that it would be impossible for any proportion of the Portuguese troops to make their retreat into Algarve.

‘The Berlings would afford no provisions, or even water, for any number of men. Sir Charles Cotton was obliged to supply the marines stationed by him on those rocks with water from the fleet employed in the blockade of the Tagus; and I fear that the voyage from the Tagus to the Bayona Islands in craft would be considered too long, even for persons more accustomed than the Portuguese soldiers are to maritime expeditions, and under more pressing obligations to embark than they can be supposed to be.

‘I am convinced that the mode in which it will be possible to prevail upon the largest number of them to embark will be to have for their reception ships of the same description, supplied in the same manner with provisions, &c., as for the British army; and although from circumstances it may not be possible for His Majesty’s Government to station in the Tagus a sufficient number of transports for this purpose, it may be possible to station there, or to have there at the moment the embarkation of the army might become expedient, a large fleet of ships of the line.

‘There are several Portuguese ships in the Tagus, which might be applied to the purpose of receiving troops; but it would be impossible to employ them in this manner without considerable previous preparation, which would of course discover the object; and it would probably be entirely frustrated by early discovery. It is also probable that the members of the Government, and the principal families, and even many of the inhabitants of the country,—all at least who showed any active hostility against the French upon their departure from Lisbon, would wish to quit the country when the British army should withdraw from it; and all this description of persons would naturally look to the Portuguese ships as the means of their removal. Their application to the accommodation of the Portuguese army for their removal, which would deprive these persons not only of all hopes of getting away themselves, but of the means of making even tolerable terms with the French by capitulation, would of course be resisted by the whole of this class; and the equipment of the ships probably entirely prevented.



‘ I would therefore recommend to His Majesty’s Government to make their naval arrangements in such a manner as to have a large fleet of ships of the line in the Tagus at the period of the evacuation of Portugal.

‘ I would likewise recommend to them to authorize the British Minister at Lisbon to communicate confidentially with the Portuguese Government upon the possible necessity of evacuating Portugal, particularly in case resistance should cease in Spain ; and upon the measures to be adopted to put the ships in the Tagus in such a state as to carry off all those who should be desirous of quitting the country.

‘ As an additional measure, I propose to strengthen the works of Peniche and of Setuval, and to provision the former.

‘ It might be possible for a large number of persons to take shelter at Peniche, and to reach that place even in boats from the Tagus and other parts on the coasts ; and they could afterwards be embarked from Peniche without much difficulty, as occasion might offer.

‘ From what I have above stated, your Lordship will observe that I do not imagine that any large number of the troops would be induced to embark in craft, even to go to Peniche ; but some might, and many of the people of the country might avail themselves of this resource ; and I imagine that, without incurring much expense, the works of Peniche can be put in such a state as that that place could not be taken for a considerable length of time.

‘ Setuval could not be secured so easily or so effectually ; but it might for a time.

‘ It is very desirable that for these as for other objects the number of officers of engineers with the army should be increased, as we have not now more than a sufficient number to execute the works already ordered in the positions to be eventually taken up by the army, and we have none to spare for others.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Leyria, 3rd February, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 31st January, and I



can assure you that I have nothing more to say to Mr. Phillips, than to purchase from him his grain.

‘ It is not certain that I shall go to Lisbon, and if I do, it will be only for one night ; and I am afraid that there will not be much time for business. I shall therefore be much obliged to you if you will communicate to me your wishes, on the points on which you desire to speak to me, as soon as it shall be convenient to you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Leyria, 3rd February, 1810.

‘ I am afraid that the gentlemen of the Commissariat, on this road, either do not understand, or have not received your instructions in respect to the use of the covered carriages, English and Spanish ; as the carriages here and at Pombal are doing nothing ; and Mr. —, who is here, tells me that he has no instructions respecting the mode in which they are to be used.

‘ It is desirable that the plan of which I gave you a memorandum at Coimbra, about three weeks ago, for the use of these carriages, should be carried into execution without loss of time.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.,*

*Commissary General.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I have a letter from Mr. Villiers, in which he suggests, that as many persons, having money which they may be willing to give up for bills upon England, may be gone to Ayamonte, it would be desirable to send an intelligent person there to endeavor to get what may be got there. I wish that you would advert to this circumstance, and send somebody to Ayamonte for the purpose proposed. I also request you to have an account made out of all our receipts for bills and otherwise in December and January, in order that we may know what the Portuguese fourth will amount to, and that we may pay it.’

*To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Obidos, 4th February, 1810.

‘ I wrote to you a letter from Viseu on the 31st, which I have just heard has been stolen from the man who carried it, the purport of which was to apprize you of my intentions and wishes, in case the enemy should attack this country.

‘ As my views, in the position which the army now occupy, are to take the offensive in case of the occurrence of certain events, I wish not to lose the possession of the Coa; and I am anxious therefore that you and General Cole should maintain your positions upon that river, unless you should find that the enemy collect a force in Castille which is so formidable as to manifest a serious intention of invading Portugal; in which case it is not my intention to maintain the line of the Coa. In this case I wish that, if you find it necessary, you should retire gradually to Celorico, where you will be joined by the 4th division and the hussars; and both, when necessary, are to withdraw gradually by the valley of the Mondego towards Pinhanços, where they will find the 1st division, under Sir John Sherbrooke, and then to the Ponte da Murcella.

‘ If you should find it necessary to withdraw from the positions you now occupy upon the Coa, I beg of you to bring with you the 12th Portuguese regiment, which has been removed from the garrison of Almeida.

‘ I am not sure that this letter adverts to all the points mentioned in my last, which was written with my papers, &c. before me. As I have not the same advantage at present, I beg that in case of any difference between this letter and that which I wrote to you before, you will consider that which I wrote to you on the 31st of January, if you should receive it, as the guide for your conduct.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*  
*R. Craufurd.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I hope to be with the army again in a few days; but it is really necessary that you should have in writing the instructions which this letter contains, now that I am so far from you.’







respecting the embarkation of these troops; and I request you to direct that the troops lately arrived may have the transports which brought them out. I also request you to order a suitable convoy to proceed with these troops, and to direct that the transports may be left with them at Cadiz.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*  
‘ *the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Bart. Frere, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Torres Vedras, 5th February, 1810.

‘ Having come to this part of the country, I have just received from Lord Burghersh your letters of the 30th and 31st January; and I have sent orders that Major General the Hon. William Stewart, with two companies of artillery, the 79th, 94th, and 2nd batt. 87th regiments, which are the only troops at present at Lisbon, should embark as soon as possible, and proceed to Cadiz.

‘ If the place should actually be attacked, these troops will land immediately, and will co-operate in its defence. If the place should not be actually attacked, I am desirous that the following conditions should be made with the Government previous to their being landed; and at all events they must be stated to the Government as those on which I have detached them from the army.

‘ 1st. Although they will be under the orders of the Governor of Cadiz, they must be under the immediate and exclusive command of their own commanding officer, who must solely and exclusively determine on all points of their discipline, &c.

‘ 2ndly. With the exception of the artillery, which it may be necessary to detach to different points, the British troops are to act, as much as possible, in a body, although they are of course to take their turn in all garrison duties.

‘ 3rdly. They, as well as their officers, are to be relieved as often as may be deemed proper, by other troops, or withdrawn entirely.

‘ 4thly. These troops are not to be detached from Cadiz or the Isle of Leon.

‘ 5thly. They are to be fed from the Spanish stores, according to the ration given to the British troops, of which

the commanding officer will furnish the Governor of Cadiz with a return.

‘ 6thly. The commanding officer of these troops is to be allowed to have a free communication with the transports which have taken the troops to Cadiz, and which will remain at Cadiz.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Bart. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ *Mafra, 7th February, 1810.*

‘ I have just received your letter of the 6th instant. I had already given directions that an officer of the department of the Adjutant General and of the Quarter Master General respectively should be sent to Cadiz to place themselves under your orders; and I propose to send there an officer of the Commissariat, and of the Paymaster General’s department.

‘ I shall be happy to hear from you on any points on which you wish to have my instructions or my opinion.

‘ It does not appear to me to be necessary to instruct you on any point at present, excepting those referred to in my letter to Mr. Frere of the 5th instant, which I sent open for your perusal, and of which I request you to keep a copy, excepting in the possible case of the approaching reduction of Cadiz.

‘ From the local situation of Cadiz, it is impossible that the enemy should have it in his power to cut off the retreat of the British troops to their ships; and you will embark them before the place shall be surrendered.

‘ In case of the surrender of Cadiz, you will send the 2nd batt. 87th regiment, and one company of the artillery, to Gibraltar, and you will return with the remainder of the troops to Lisbon.

‘ I cannot sufficiently recommend to you to endeavor to keep up a good understanding with the Spanish officers. You will find General Castaños, who is at present at the head of the Regency, and General Venegas, who is the Governor of Cadiz, highly deserving your confidence; as well as General Whittingham, who is an English officer, and



who is, I understand, at present at Cadiz. I have received your letter of the — ; and I shall send your brother, Captain J. Stewart, to Cadiz as your Brigade Major.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General*  
*the Hon. W. Stewart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Mafra, 7th February, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 29th January, and 5th and 6th instant.

‘ I cannot agree to allow the Commissary General of the British army to take upon himself the responsibility of managing the Commissariat of the Portuguese troops, for many reasons, into which it is unnecessary to enter.

‘ The plan under which it is proposed that the business should be carried on affords one grand reason for refusing to agree to this proposition, viz., that it would impose upon Great Britain a large expense, which, under existing arrangements, is paid by Portugal.

‘ I do not think the mode proposed in the paper enclosed in your letter is the best by which the pay of the Portuguese officers can be increased. The increase of pay in proportion to the number of men is founded upon an erroneous notion that the officers have the power of keeping their regiments complete; and if it could operate at all, it would operate to prevent the diminution of numbers at the moment, when probably to risk the diminution of numbers would be important to the honor as well as to the interests of the country.

‘ Another objection to the proposed plan is its present expense beyond the sum estimated by Marshal Beresford, which His Majesty has engaged to supply, viz., £130,000 per annum. When the expense of the increased pay to the Generals and Staff shall be added to the sum stated in your estimate, it will far exceed £130,000.

‘ Marshal Beresford has spoken to me respecting the proportions of the money received by the Commissary General of the British army to be paid for the expenses of the Portuguese troops. Of course any money the King’s Minister chooses to call for he must have; but as far as depends upon my decision, I propose that as heretofore the Commissary



General should pay to your order such proportion of the sums received in each month, at the end of each month, as the amount of the expenses for the Portuguese troops to be paid by His Majesty shall bear to the expenses of the British and Portuguese armies united.

‘ I have also received your letter of the 3rd.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Lisbon, 9th February, 1810.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 7th, I have received your letter of the 6th, and I am happy to find that the departments at Lisbon have been able to supply you with the assistance which you required of Staff Officers.

‘ I propose to add to the number an officer of the Medical Staff, as soon as I can communicate with the Inspector General.

‘ The officers of the corps of engineers with this army are fully employed, and we have not a sufficient number for the duty. I am apprehensive also that you will find the Spanish commander at Cadiz by no means disposed to attend to the suggestions of a British engineer. If, however, you should on your arrival there find an officer of that corps to be useful or necessary to you, I beg you to write to General Campbell at Gibraltar, and to request him to send you one of those officers of engineers who have been already employed at Cadiz.

‘ I enclose you a copy of the instructions which I received from His Majesty’s Government on my taking the command in this country, to regulate my conduct in all communications with the Spanish and Portuguese Governments and their Ministers; and I earnestly recommend to you a strict attention to these instructions. These instructions, however, are not to prevent your communications with the Governor of Cadiz, General Venegas, under whose command you will act.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General  
the Hon. W. Stewart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.





this service, will be embarked, and will sail from hence immediately. They will likewise be under the command of Major General the Hon. W. Stewart, and are to serve in Cadiz under the same conditions as the British troops.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Bart. Frere, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S.—The strength of the 20th Portuguese regiment is 1300 rank and file.’

*To Bart. Frere, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Lisbon, 9th February, 1810.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 30th of January relative to the proposition which had been made to you by the late Spanish Government, that the British army should enter Old Castille, I have received a letter from Don F. de Saavedra, written upon the same subject, while he was President of the Junta of Estremadura, and sent by Colonel Alava. As Don F. de Saavedra is one of the members of the Regency, I request you to inform that body that I am disposed to do every thing in my power to create a diversion in favor of the Spanish nation; and that I considered circumstances to have altered so far since I wrote to you on the 30th of January, by the alteration of the Government, by the change of the command of the army in Old Castille, by the army remaining in that province, and by other circumstances, that I had ordered the British cavalry to commence its march; and if I should find it practicable and consistent with the instructions which I have received from His Majesty’s Government, I will endeavor to alarm the enemy in the centre of Spain.

‘ The Government, however, must not expect that I shall risk the British army to effect this object. It must be obvious to them that Spain can derive no great advantage from any temporary effect produced by such an operation, without great exertion on the part of the Government. They must also see clearly that, in the present situation of affairs, the occurrence of any misfortune to the British army would be fatal to the cause. I trust, therefore, that if I should find that circumstances will not permit me to undertake an operation which shall create a substantial diversion in their



favor, the Government will be satisfied that I refrain from it only because I am unable to undertake it with any reasonable prospect of advantage.

‘ I beg you likewise to inform them that the assistance which I have sent them to Cadiz, which is a diminution of the effective strength of the British army, takes away from the means which I had of undertaking this operation.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Bart. Frere, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Lisbon, 9th February, 1810.

‘ His Majesty’s Government will have received from Mr. Frere the accounts of the events which had occurred at Seville and Cadiz between the 24th and 31st of January, which have ended in the appointment by the Central Junta of General Castaños, Don F. de Saavedra, the Bishop of Orense, Don — Escano, and Don Estevan Fernandez to be Regents of Spain; and you will have learned that the seat of this Government is at Cadiz.

‘ I enclose copies of the letters which I have received from Mr. Frere upon these subjects. In consequence of these letters, and in conformity with what I understood to be His Majesty’s intentions, and from a conviction that I was doing what was best for the cause, I gave orders, immediately upon the receipt of Mr. Frere’s letter of the 31st January, that the 79th, 94th, and 2nd batt. 87th regiments, and two companies of artillery, being all the disposable troops then at Lisbon, should sail for Cadiz under the command of Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

‘ I enclose copies of the letters which I wrote to General Stewart upon that occasion and since, and to Mr. Frere upon the subject of this detachment.

‘ Since I made this detachment, I have received intelligence which I believe to be true, that the Duque de Alburquerque’s corps, which had been at Carmana on the 24th of January, and was supposed to have retired across the Guadalquivir, had retired upon Cadiz, and had actually arrived at Xerez on the 1st instant.

‘ The French had entered Seville on the 1st, and King Joseph arrived there on the 2nd.

‘ The Spanish corps, which had been posted for the defence of the Sierra Morena, under General Areyzaga, had separated ; a part of them, under the General himself, had retired upon Jaen, which had been fortified ; but they abandoned it, and the enemy are now in possession of that town, and this part of Areyzaga’s corps are in Granada. Another division retired across the Guadalquivir, and are at Monasterio in Estremadura ; and I believe a third division have crossed the Guadalquivir at Seville, and have gone towards the mouth of the Guadiana, with a design of embarking for Cadiz ; and a fourth have retired upon the Sierra de Ronda. I understand that it is the intention of the newly formed Spanish Government to endeavor to form armies upon each of these corps ; and that General Blake is appointed to command the principal corps, which is in Granada.

‘ The Marques de la Romana is appointed to command the army hitherto under the command of the Duque del Parque ; and he had proceeded on the 5th instant as far as Badajoz to take the command of it. It had not at that time commenced its march to cross the Tagus.

‘ The Spanish Government had, I understand, immediately upon their formation, removed the French and Spanish ships from the inner harbour to the outer roads of Cadiz, and had destroyed the forts and batteries on the northern shore, of the effect of which I informed your Lordship in a former dispatch. They also gave immediate orders for the complete destruction of the lines of San Roque. These measures were an additional inducement to me to lose no time in sending them the reinforcements which I had at my command, to which I shall add still further reinforcements, if I should find them to be necessary, including a Portuguese regiment of infantry which the Regency have offered, and I have accepted, for this service.

‘ Your Lordship will observe that this situation of affairs in Spain approaches to that which I thought it probable would soon exist in that country, when I addressed you on the 31st of January. There is, however, so far an improvement, that the Regency have manifested a greater degree of confidence and a more conciliatory spirit towards His Majesty’s Government, and a greater regard to His Majesty’s



interests, than the Central Junta. It is composed of persons of integrity, experienced in business, thoroughly acquainted with the existing situation of affairs in Spain, and possessing the confidence of the people. I am apprehensive that these persons have been called to the Government at too late a period to effect much good; but I am convinced that they are disposed to do every thing in their power.

‘ In the mean time we have not heard that the reinforcements of the French armies, to any large amount, have arrived in Spain. It would appear, from the accounts which I have received, that the corps of Victor, Mortier, and Sebastiani, and the King’s guards and the reserve, amounting in the whole to above 60,000 men, have passed the Sierra Morena; and that Soult’s corps is upon the Tagus, between Talavera and Toledo, and Ney’s and Kellermann’s in Old Castille. These three last are supposed to amount to about 40,000 men.

‘ It is obvious that there is nothing in this situation of the enemy which can affect the British army or this country, even if the Spanish corps remaining in Granada and in the Sierra de Ronda should be dispersed. The enemy could not be in a situation for a considerable length of time to attack this country; and although I am of opinion that the time may come when it may be doubtful whether a perseverance in the contest in Portugal will hold out “ any prospect of advantage against the common enemy, or of benefit to His Majesty’s allies,” I conceive that it is a question upon which it is difficult for His Majesty’s Government at this distance to decide. That it must depend upon events in Spain, upon which no calculation can be formed, as well as upon the existing spirit and the prospect of resistance by the people in this country, and in some measure upon the season of the year in which the attack will be made, and upon the preparation which the enemy will have made for it; and that adverting to the certainty that, in all events, the British army will be able to embark, and that its continuance on the Peninsula must be beneficial to His Majesty’s and the general interest, as it must draw the attention of the enemy, and must tend to His Majesty’s honor, it would probably be best to leave to the decision of the officer commanding the troops in this country



the period of the evacuation as a military question, after an explanation by His Majesty's Government of their objects in the continuance of the contest.

'It is desirable that the troops sent to Cadiz should be replaced in this country as soon as may be convenient.

'I have come to this part of the country to view the progress of the works which I had ordered to be constructed when here in October; and I propose to return to the army to-morrow.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Earl of Liverpool.*'

'WELLINGTON.'

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

'SIR,

'Villa Franca, 10th February, 1810.

'The Regency of Portugal having offered the 20th Portuguese regiment for service at Cadiz, I have to request that you will be so kind as to give directions that transports may be supplied to convey them thither, and a ship of war to convoy them. The regiment consists of 1300 rank and file; and the officer of the Quarter Master General's department will communicate with the Agent of Transports respecting the details of the embarkation.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Vice Admiral  
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*'

'WELLINGTON.'

*To Lieut. General Hill.*

'MY DEAR HILL,

'Santarem, 12th February, 1810. 10 A.M.'

'I received this morning the account of the enemy's probable arrival at Zafra; and at this moment your letter of this day, acquainting me that a detachment had been at Olivença on the 10th, and of the probability that they had got possession of that place this day.

'Their excursion to Zafra appears to me to be the consequence of their incursion into the province of Andalusia: and their existence in safety at Seville depends upon the tenure of the pass of Monasterio, in front of which they will continue to hold a detachment more or less advanced.

'If the enemy really intend any serious operation in Estremadura, a corps of their army must have crossed the Tagus, in addition to that which has come in by Monasterio;

and if no troops have crossed the Tagus, you may depend upon it that what has been done is of no consequence, and is not likely to be attended by any results.

‘ I should doubt the taking possession of Olivença in its present state without ordnance, or stores, or provisions. It is, however, a possible event; and if it be true, you must urge General Leite to take care of his place of Jurumenha; and that he and the Junta of Badajoz should prevent the French from collecting provisions at Olivença. It may be depended upon, that although the Spaniards do not know how to make use of that place, the French will, if they should be able to keep it.

‘ In respect to yourself, I wish you to move forward to Portalegre, attending to your instructions. The difficulty of forage, and the consequences to the cavalry which will result from a want of that necessary article, induce me to wish that, till you shall see more clearly the plans and intentions of the enemy, the 14th dragoons alone should be brought up to Portalegre, and the 1st Royals not farther than the old cantonments of the 16th. You will send them your own orders, as I do not know what your other arrangements will be. I shall only let them know that it is probable you will soon move them.

‘ You may move Colonel Campbell’s brigade from Thomar, as I have made other arrangements for the defence of the Zezere.

‘ In respect to the hospital, I beg that you will tell Colonel Lindsay that I think it desirable that, as soon as possible, he should send off to Abrantes all the convalescents able to march from any of the hospitals; and that he should collect in Elvas all the sick of the army.

‘ I shall be at Thomar to-morrow, where I hope to hear from you again.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I send with this letters for General Leite and the Marques de la Romana, which I beg of you to forward.

‘ General Madden’s brigade is still at Lisbon, and unable yet to move, but there are four squadrons of Portuguese dragoons at Chamusca and in the neighbourhood, which you may take instead of them.’



*To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Thomar, 14th February, 1810. 10 P.M.

‘ I have just received your letter of this day; and I do not propose to stop the march of the troops. You will be the best judge of the necessity of so doing, by your knowledge of the state of the roads, &c., forward.

‘ I think it would be desirable to make arrangements to move forward your cavalry rather quicker than one squadron each day. I should think that this object might be effected by moving some of the 3rd dragoon guards out of Golegão to Santarem during this march, and back again to Golegão when it shall be effected. I beg of you to communicate with General Payne upon this subject.

‘ In respect to money, I took an opportunity when at Lisbon of inquiring how far my orders upon that subject had been obeyed, and I find that £10,000 had been sent to Santarem regularly every week. Of this sum Mr. — ought to have taken care that a sufficiency was left to pay the troops. I shall now send orders that the money may be sent to Abrantes.

‘ In respect to Mr. —, I have more than one cause to complain of his conduct lately, and I shall take the whole into consideration when I shall return to head quarters, and I shall give orders respecting it.

‘ Take the artificers of the regiments with you; and tell the magistrates of Abrantes that I hold them responsible not only that you, but that Captain Patton shall have all the carts that may be required. Your regular supply, however, depends upon the regularity of Mr. —, and upon his acts, and not upon his talking.

‘ You will do well to communicate, at an early period, with the Spanish corps at Alburquerque.

‘ Let me hear from you constantly; and I beg of you particularly to attend to the movements of any corps north of the Tagus, to Castello Branco, and to the bridge of Villa Velha.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Do not forget to send the convalescents, artillery, horse



and foot, from Elvas, Estremoz, &c., as fast as they shall recover.'

*To Marshal Beresford.*

' MY DEAR BERESFORD, ' Thomar, 14th February, 1810.

' I just write to let you know, that in consequence of events at Badajoz, Hill is about to move forward with his whole corps. I am very anxious about the line of the Zezere, and I wish that you would order out immediately the regiments of militia which we allotted for this service; and the 13th regiment to Thomar, and General Widerhott to his station.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Marshal Beresford.*

' WELLINGTON.

*To Brigadier General Alex. Campbell.*

' MY DEAR CAMPBELL, ' Thomar, 14th February, 1810.

' I have received your letters of the 11th and 12th, and I am happy to hear of your arrival in good health. I beg you will join the army at Viseu as soon as may be convenient to you; your aide de camp shall be put in orders as you wish. Let me know by post to Viseu, whether you wish to have the 74th in your brigade instead of the 11th; the 11th is, however, the strongest regiment in the army.

' Give my tea, &c., to Colonel Peacocke, and request him to send them to head quarters occasionally by the messengers.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Brig. Gen. A. Campbell.*

' WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

' MY DEAR BERESFORD, ' Espinhal, 15th February, 1810.

' I conclude that you will have heard that the enemy had summoned Ciudad Rodrigo, as well as Badajoz, on the 12th. I cannot believe they are in earnest in intending to attack both these places at the same time. However, we shall see.

' I enclose a memorandum of the movements which I have ordered; and I think it would be desirable to order up General Madden's brigade of cavalry.

' I shall continue the movement of these troops forward, if I should find it necessary; and I wish you would come up as soon as you can. But I beg you to send your staff by dif-

ferent roads, so that the communication may not be cut off by their taking all the mules and horses.

‘ The attempt to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo is a measure deserving of serious consideration ; as, in effecting it, we must use the magazine in Almeida, and that place must then fall immediately.

‘ I have written to Dom Miguel Forjaz upon this subject, upon which I wish you would speak to him, as well as upon making a great exertion to feed the troops when they shall be collected.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I wish that you would make arrangements immediately—

‘ 1st. To call out all the militia for whom there are arms.

‘ 2ndly. To allot a good regiment of militia to garrison Peniche.

‘ 3rdly. To allot a regiment of militia to be posted at Obidos.’

*To Brigadier General Robert Craufurd.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Viseu, 18th February, 1810.

‘ I arrived here yesterday, and I have received all your letters respecting Ney’s march upon Ciudad Rodrigo, and your letter of the 1st instant, which reached me while I was near Lisbon.

‘ I do not understand Ney’s movement, coupled as it was with a movement upon Badajoz from the south of Spain. The French are certainly not sufficiently strong for two sieges at the same time, and I much doubt whether they are in a state even to undertake one.

‘ Since my arrival here I have received intelligence of Soult’s movement to Plasencia on the 12th ; and I conceive that his further movements will explain nearly what is their object, if they have any decided object at present, and will enable me to determine the line which I shall take.

‘ It is obvious that the enemy’s strength in Castille has been underrated. I was always convinced that the three corps of Ney and Kellermann in Castille, and Soult, who had joined them from Talavera, did not amount to less than 40,000 men, which, with the reinforcements expected from

France, some of which have certainly arrived, were too much for us. If Soult turns to his left from Plasencia, and crosses the Tagus, or if he should move upon Castello Branco, we are too forward on this flank. My opinion is that he will cross the Tagus at Alconeta, to give countenance to Mortier's operations against Badajoz.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 1st, I have only to assure you, that in every event I should have taken care to keep your command distinct, as I am convinced that you will be able to render most service in such a situation.

‘ You will have heard that General the Hon. W. Stewart is gone to Cadiz ; but General Picton is coming to the army, which will render necessary a new arrangement, and will oblige me to deprive you of Colonel Mackinnon's brigade. But I shall make up for you the best corps I can, including your own brigade, of which you shall continue to have the separate command.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Will you inform General Cox that I have returned, and that I am obliged to him for all his letters ? ’

*To J. Murray, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ *Viseu, 18th February, 1810.*

‘ As the works carrying on under Lieut. Colonel Fletcher may require the employment of persons in the country, and the use of materials, without waiting for the employment of those persons or the purchase of those materials by an officer of the Commissariat, I have to request that all orders for workmanship, labor, or materials, drawn by Lieut. Colonel Fletcher upon the Deputy Commissary General at Lisbon, may be paid, Lieut. Colonel Fletcher being accountable for the money.

‘ I have also to request that the Deputy Commissary General at Lisbon may be directed to supply Lieut. Colonel Fletcher with such numbers of fascines, palisades, and pickets as he may require at such stations as he may point out, without waiting for further orders from me.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



To Colonel Le Cor.

SIR,

Viseu, 18th February, 1810.

As there is reason to believe that the enemy will attack Portugal by the frontier of Beira, I have formed a corps on the side of Castello Branco, under the orders of Colonel Wilson, and another as a second line upon the Zezere, of which I have arranged with Marshal Beresford that you are to take the command.

This corps will at present consist of the 13th regiment of infantry, which has already marched from Leyria for those parts; and of three regiments of militia of Thomar, Leyria, and Santarem, which are under arms, and which will be placed under your orders.

You will, in the first place, take up your head quarters at Thomar, and you will dispose of the troops under your orders in the most suitable manner for defending the passage of the Zezere.

You will communicate with Colonel Wilson, who will be in front of your line; with General Hill, who commands a corps of the army which has entered the Alentejo; and also with me.

I believe that the 13th regiment of infantry has been ordered to Villa del Rey, because it was supposed there was no room at Thomar; but as the brigade under Colonel Campbell has marched, the 13th regiment may be stationed at Thomar.

I have the honor to be, &c.

Colonel Le Cor.

WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Wilson.

SIR,

Viseu, 18th February, 1810.

I beg that you will, on the receipt of this letter, take measures immediately to have the road called the Estrada Nova broken up at the points described in the enclosed papers, and will station parties at those points to prevent its repair by the enemy. This measure, if carried effectually into execution, will I understand close that road, and enable you to concentrate a larger part of your force on the main road from Castello Branco.

I beg that you will pay particular attention to the bridge

at Villa Velha, if you should find it necessary to retire from Castello Branco.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Wilson.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ *Viscu, 18th February, 1810.*

‘ I have received your letter of the 16th. I had already received from General Cole a copy of the information which Colonel Wilson had transmitted. I believe Soult's force is of the strength stated: the question is which way he will turn from Plasencia.

‘ The instructions you have already received are applicable to the possible case of his crossing the Tagus, which it is not improbable he may do at Alconeta. The enemy will then be too strong for you in Estremadura.

‘ If Soult should advance upon Castello Branco, which is another not improbable movement, your instructions provide for it, and you must retire upon Abrantes; and if you should find that Colonel Wilson is unable to maintain himself in the mountains beyond the Zezere, you must leave the Portuguese militia in garrison at Abrantes, and cross the Zezere at Punhete, and maintain the Zezere as long as you can.

‘ If Soult should turn towards the Puerto de Baños, which is not improbable, he will be out of your way entirely.

‘ I beg you to endeavor particularly to discover if the enemy, whether Soult, or Mortier, or any other, get a bridge up to them; and let me know it immediately.

‘ I enclose a duplicate of a letter which I have written to Colonel Wilson, of which, and its enclosures, I beg you to take a copy. Let Colonel Le Cor know where you are.

‘ Pray have an eye upon the bridge of Villa Velha, and take care that it does not fall into the possession of the enemy in any of the cases supposed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

*Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ You may depend upon it that all the money which I have stated to you has been sent, and it is probable that the Commissary has taken the largest share of it; but there is some money at Elvas, part of which I have desired may be sent to you.’

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ SIR, ‘ Viseu, 18th February, 1810.

‘ I have to request that four Portuguese engineers, who understand French, may be placed at the disposal of Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, chief engineer, with a view to their being employed in the destruction of roads when it may be necessary. If you will direct that these officers may be in readiness to attend Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, he will communicate with the chief engineer of the Portuguese army when he shall require their services.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS, ‘ Viseu, 18th February, 1810.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 22nd January, regarding Campbell’s claim for promotion, I have to remind you that H.R.H. the Duke of York promised Campbell, when he arrived in England with the accounts of the battles of Roliça and Vimeiro, that he should be made a Lieut. Colonel by brevet as soon as he should have it in his power to appoint him Major of a regiment, and that this promise would have been carried into execution if the regulation of March, 1809, had not been adopted.

‘ However, after all, the Commander in Chief must be the best judge of what he can do ; and I only submit this circumstance for his consideration.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Viseu, 19th February, 1810.

‘ Since I wrote to you last, you will have heard from General Campbell that I had countermanded the advance of the Portuguese troops, as I found that the enemy had withdrawn from Ciudad Rodrigo ; with the exception of Blunt’s brigade, and the light battalions, which I thought it best to have up to Coimbra.

‘ I have since received a letter from General Campbell, in



which he recommends that General Blunt should be ordered to remain at Monte Mor ó Velho; and that the light battalions should be moved forward. I have consented to the former; but I have deferred the latter till you shall have arrived.

‘ The accounts which I have of the enemy are, that Junot and Loison, with about 15,000 or 20,000 men, are about to attack the Spaniards at Astorga; Ney’s corps, upon drawing off from Ciudad Rodrigo, went towards Salamanca; Soult arrived at Plasencia on the 12th with 16,000 men; and Mortier had, on the 14th, withdrawn his advanced corps from Badajoz, which was all he had there, and had the whole at his head quarters at Talavera Real. I believe he patrolled up to Badajoz again on the 15th. Kellermann’s corps is, I believe, still at Valladolid.

‘ Soult’s next movement will point out nearly what the enemy’s intentions are; whether to attack Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz; but I should think Ciudad Rodrigo; and yet they are but little prepared for that operation.

‘ The Duque del Parque’s army has separated into three corps; one, under General O’Donnell, has crossed the Tagus at the Barca de Alconeta, and is to be at Alburquerque; another under Mendizabal, is come to Penamacor, and is to cross the Tagus at Villa Velha; a third under General Carrera, of 2000 or 2500 men, remains in the mountains. They are all in want of every thing.

‘ I have written to the Government respecting the mode in which the Governor of Estremadura has executed the work on the road from Thomar to Espinhal. It might be made the best, instead of being the worst, military road in Portugal; and it is really a most important line of communication, without which all our combinations for defence, and any offensive measures we may adopt, must be very imperfect. There is not a hill upon the road; it runs along a river; and there are materials close to it which might make it excellent.

‘ I enclose the instructions I have sent to Colonel Le Cor. Has the 13th regiment been ordered to Thomar? and the 12th to join Colonel Wilson?

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Charles Stuart, Esq.\**

‘ MY DEAR SIR, Viseu, 19th February, 1810.

‘ Since I saw you on the 14th, I received on the 15th, at Espinhal, the accounts that the French corps of Ney had appeared before Ciudad Rodrigo on the 12th; but it retired again on the 13th, and has since gone towards Salamanca. Soult on the same day arrived at Plasencia with 16,000 men, and you will recollect that the 12th was the day on which Mortier’s corps appeared at Badajoz. The Duc d’Abrantes and Loison have gone with their corps of 15,000 or 20,000 men north of the Duero; and I believe intend to attack the Spanish division under General Garcias at Astorga; and I believe Kellermann is still at Valladolid. I have accounts from that neighbourhood of as late a date as the 15th, which state that Soult had not moved from Plasencia: his next movement will show what are the enemy’s intentions.

‘ I wish that you should see a letter which I have written this day to Dom Miguel Forjaz, which will point out to you a fresh instance of the mode in which directions given to the Portuguese authorities are carried into execution, and the importance of the early and due execution of the work which I had ordered long ago to be performed on the road from Thomar to Espinhal. If it is not done, I must draw in from this frontier, as soon as Soult shall cross the Tagus, if he should cross that river from Plasencia; or I may lose my communication with Hill, or even with Lisbon. If that road were made as it ought to be, I should be at the distance of only three marches from the Tagus, of which one only forced—whereas, now, I cannot reach that river by making less than nine marches.

‘ I have desired the Commissary General to pay Mr. Bell £50,000 on account of aids, of about £100,000 which are due on that account. But we really have not at present more money; and I shall not be able to pay the troops this month; and I must put a stop to all the arrangements which had been made for applying them, founded upon the regular payments for provisions, &c.

‘ I apprized Government more than two months ago of our

\* Mr. Stuart (Lord Stuart de Rothsay, K.B.) had succeeded Mr. Villiers (the Earl of Clarendon) as His Majesty’s Minister at Lisbon.



probable want of money, and of the necessity that we should be supplied, not only with a large sum, but with a regular sum monthly, equal in amount to the increase of expense occasioned by the increased subsidy to the Portuguese Government, and by the increase of our own army. They have not attended to either of those demands; and I must write again. But I wish you would mention the subject in your letters to Lord Wellesley.

‘ I propose to despatch a messenger from hence on Wednesday with letters for England, to be despatched by the packet of Sunday.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ *Viseu, 20th February, 1810.*

‘ I have received your letters of the 17th and 18th.

‘ It is most difficult to form any judgment from the Spanish and Portuguese accounts of the strength of any French corps; and I generally form my estimates of their strength, not only from these accounts, but from intercepted letters, and from my knowledge of their strength at different periods. For this reason, I believed the corps under Soult at Plasencia to be 16,000 men, as reported; but if of this corps 6000 men have come into Estremadura by Arzobispo and Truxillo, it is obvious that there cannot well be 16,000 at Plasencia, unless Soult's corps has been largely reinforced, of which I have no report.

‘ Your position at Portalegre is a very strong one; it cannot be touched by its left or rear at all; or by its right or front, without your having early intelligence of the design. Adverting then to the importance which it is to all the places on the frontier, as well as to the province of Alentejo, that you should continue to hold it as long as may be practicable, I wish you to remain in it as long as you think you can do so with safety, even though the corps at Plasencia should cross the Tagus, which I think is probable, and join that stated to be at Caceres.

‘ There is another circumstance which induces me to wish you to stay as long as you can with safety, and that is the necessity of protecting the march of the convalescents from



Elvas, whom General Leite has taken upon himself to detain. They must positively come away immediately.

‘ The serious demonstrations, also, which the enemy are now making upon Badajoz will most probably soon become more so, as I understand that they have met with a check in an attack upon the Isla de Leon, and they must therefore confine their operations within more narrow bounds, and choose between Badajoz and the Isla de Leon. If compelled to make this choice, they will probably determine upon an attack upon Badajoz, and they will begin by bringing an army across the Guadiana, and thus cut off our communication with Elvas.

‘ The removal of the hospital from Elvas, and from Estremoz to Lisbon or Abrantes, becomes, therefore, an object of great importance, which will be much facilitated by your remaining at Portalegre as long as you can do so with safety to yourself. Major Lindsay was ordered on the 18th to take measures for that purpose, and a letter goes to him, and another to Captain Beresford this day, upon the same subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ You must not send any of your Portuguese troops to Elvas.’

*To Lieut. General Leite.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 20th February, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th instant, and I beg that you will allow Major Lindsay to carry into execution the orders which he has received, or may hereafter receive from me, for the disposal of the sick and convalescents, or other movements, &c., of the British army left at Elvas.

‘ Much time has elapsed since orders were given for the march of the troops to form the garrison of Elvas, the forts, and the other places which you were directed to occupy: if those who were to have obeyed these orders have disobeyed them, I cannot allow the deficiency of the troops in these places to be made good by leaving these convalescents of the British army. I beg, therefore, that whatever may be the

consequences to the forts in question, you will not interfere in the execution of my orders by Major Lindsay.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Leite.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Viseu, 21st February, 1810.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 18th instant. I take Soult to be stronger than you suppose, as it is now evident that large reinforcements have come into the Peninsula; and it is reported that the corps of troops at Plasencia is 10,000 men. The troops that passed by Truxillo could have been only cavalry and light infantry.

‘ I do not know what the French mean to do. They are certainly now too much separated to effect any object; at the same time they are so connected, that it is absolutely impossible that any movement we can make upon them of an offensive description can succeed.

‘ I think that you will do well to retain your cavalry either at or very near Lisbon. I do not care which of the brigades comes, when they shall move.

‘ In respect to Almeida, I imagine that salt provisions are not required there, as I never propose to use those which are in store.

‘ I ordered the arms from Elvas to Lisbon months ago; but I have sent for Framingham to know what has been done about them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Framingham says that he ordered the arms from Elvas on the 8th of February; and that he is almost certain that they are now on their way to Lisbon.’

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Viseu, 21st February, 1810.

‘ In my letter of the 13th December, I requested your Lordship to give directions that £100,000 in specie should be sent to Portugal as soon as possible; and another sum of £100,000 in January, and I explained to your Lordship



the probable future wants of the army. The Clyde, in which the Commissary in Chief had informed the Commissary General of the army that 1,000,000 of dollars were embarked, arrived at Lisbon a few days ago with 500,000 dollars only, the remainder of the sum having been disembarked at Portsmouth.

‘ I beg leave to refer your Lordship to the statement of our probable wants contained in my letter of the 13th December. At this moment the troops are one month in arrear, and I am unable to pay them; and money is required to procure supplies from the country, which cannot now be got excepting for ready money.

‘ The sums to be obtained for bills upon England have materially decreased lately; and the expense of raising money in this manner has increased, owing to the fall in the value of the Government paper; and this cause will increase in proportion with the probability of the invasion of the country by the enemy. At the same time, the expenses have increased by the additional subsidy to be paid to the Government of Portugal.

‘ I trust, therefore, that your Lordship, adverting to these circumstances, and to the fact that the difficulty of keeping the troops in order is materially increased by a failure in paying them regularly, and by the necessity of using force to draw supplies from the country, will adopt measures to supply the sums of money, as soon as possible, which I stated would be necessary in my dispatch of the 13th December.

‘ I have directed the Commissary General to address the Secretary of the Treasury upon this subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

¶ *To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Viseu, 21st February, 1810.’

‘ Immediately after the arrival of the French army at Seville on the 1st and 2nd of this month, Marshal Mortier was detached with his corps into Estremadura, through the pass of Monasterio, apparently to disperse the Spanish division of General Areyzaga’s corps, which had crossed the Guadalquivir when the enemy passed the Sierra Morena, and had



remained at Monasterio. This division went off by its right towards Ayamonte, sending its artillery to Badajoz; and Marshal Mortier continued to advance into Estremadura.

‘ On the 12th, his advanced guard appeared before Badajoz, and on the same day a small detachment took possession of Olivença, which town the Spanish Government had omitted to occupy or effectually to destroy its works.

‘ Marshal Mortier’s head quarters remained at Talavera Real on the 17th, the date of the last accounts I have received from that quarter, with his corps between that town and Olivença, and his advanced posts near Badajoz.

‘ On the 12th instant, Marshal Soult arrived at Plasencia from Talavera de la Reyna, with a corps stated to be 16,000 men; and a division of his corps had passed the Tagus at Arzobispo, and entered Lower Estremadura at Deleytosa, and arrived at Caceres by Truxillo on the 15th. This corps is stated to be 6000 men; but I should imagine that if these numbers are correct, the corps at Plasencia cannot be so strong as is stated.

‘ On the same day, the 12th instant, Marshal Ney summoned the town of Ciudad Rodrigo, with a corps stated to consist of 15,000 men. They opened a fire upon the town upon that evening, which having produced no effect, they retired on the morning of the 13th, and have resumed their position upon the Tormes; and a detachment has been sent to Zamora.

‘ At the same time a large corps, supposed to be under the command of the Duc d’Abrantes and General Loison, has marched towards the frontiers of Galicia; and on the 12th instant made an attack upon Astorga, in which they were repulsed.

‘ The French are in possession of the greater part of the Asturias, and they are certainly in considerable strength in the province of Leon. General Kellermann’s corps is at Valladolid.

‘ I have not received any accounts from Cadiz or the south of Spain since the 31st of last month, upon which I can rely. I understand, however, that the enemy had separated their army in that quarter, as well as in the north; Sebastian being at Granada; and Jaen, Cordova, Carmona, Ecija, and Seville being occupied by detachments from the corps of

Victor and Sebastiani. The King is at Seville with his guards, and a detachment from Victor's corps; and the reserve, under General Dessoles, at Puerto S<sup>ta</sup> Maria. It is likewise reported that this last corps made an attack on the 12th on the Isla de Leon, in which they were repulsed with considerable loss.

‘ From this statement it is obvious that the French must have received large reinforcements to their army; and, indeed, all the accounts now concur in stating, that the conscripts and the corps of the Duc d’Abrantes have arrived in Spain; and these troops must have been within the scope of the general operations of the army, when the expedition into the south of Spain was undertaken in the end of January.

‘ In the divided state of their army, it is probable that the French cannot accomplish any important military object; and either some additional reinforcement must arrive, or some of these corps must join, before they can expect to succeed in any of the objects which it appears they have undertaken, except possibly in the attack upon Galicia.

‘ From the position of the several corps, however, your Lordship will observe that they can unite with facility, and particularly those of Marshals Ney, Soult, and Mortier, and of General Kellermann.

‘ I have not received any positive intelligence respecting the fate of the only division of General Areyza's corps, which remained with him after he quitted Granada on his retreat to Malaga, leaving at Granada his cannon; nor of the other divisions of this corps.

‘ The Spanish corps which had been under the Duque del Parque, and had been ordered by the Junta to cross the Tagus in the last month, did not effect that operation. Only one division of infantry and 500 cavalry crossed the river about the 9th or 10th of this month, and is in the neighbourhood of Alburquerque, in Estremadura; another division under General Mendizabal, which was to cross at Villa Velha, in Portugal, was at Penamacor when I last heard of them; and about 2000 men, under General Carrera, are to remain in Castille. The Marques de la Romana, who now commands this corps, is still in Badajoz; and the Duque del Parque is gone to Lisbon to embark for Catalonia.

‘ General Hill has advanced with his corps to Portalegre,



in conformity with the instructions which I had given him ; and the other part of the British army remains in the position which it before occupied.

‘ The facility with which the enemy could unite their corps to co-operate in an attack upon this country, the strength which they have at present, and the probable early arrival of further reinforcements from France, induce me to wish that your Lordship may have carried into execution the intention announced in your dispatch of the 3rd of January, of increasing the transport tonnage in the Tagus to 45,000 tons ; and that His Majesty’s Government may have made arrangements to station in the Tagus a fleet of men of war. The returns which I send by this opportunity will show your Lordship the amount of the force which we should now have to oppose the enemy in the field.

‘ I also hope that your Lordship may have sent out the hospital ships, according to my request contained in my letter of the 7th of December ; and a proportion of horse ships, to remove the best of the horses of the army.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that the 20th Portuguese regiment, which is gone to Cadiz, embarked with the utmost cheerfulness, and that none were missing upon the embarkation of the regiment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Viseu, 22nd February, 1810.

‘ I omitted to desire that my letter to General Hill, by your aide de camp, might be sent open for your perusal. The purport of it was, to desire him to keep his position at Portalegre as long as he thought he could do so with safety, even though the French corps at Plasencia should cross the Tagus, and join that at Caceres. I understand from General Mendizabal, that that corps has withdrawn from Plasencia ; which, if it was intended to cross the Tagus, I conclude has been because the boats have all been taken off the river.

‘ If you have received Cox’s letter of the 19th, you will see that the French have been reinforced sufficiently to make Soult’s corps of the strength stated. The intelligence which



Cox received from Echevarria's messenger is confirmed by the accounts of the march of the French corps through Bayonne, received from England.

' You will see the arrangement which I have made of the divisions upon General Picton's joining the army, which I hope will be satisfactory to you.

' I have got two dozen of excellent port for you, which I do not know how to send you.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Major General*  
*the Hon. L. Cole,*

' WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

' MY DEAR SIR,

' Viseu, 22nd February, 1810.

' I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 19th instant.

' The baggage of the British army is always an embarrassment, which, like many others, is to be traced to its constitution. The fact is, that regiments come upon service with every thing belonging to every individual in the corps, instead of having a depôt fixed for the reception of the baggage and other incumbrances of the regiment, never wanted on service in the field, and which might be sent to them from the depôt when they should be in any fixed station.

' The care of this baggage then falls upon persons in my situation, who are obliged to provide for its preservation; and if any of it be lost, there is no end to the complaints upon the subject. Indeed, the loss is not cheap to the public, as they pay for it.

' For these reasons, and knowing that when we do embark we shall not have much time to spare, I wished to have the baggage out of the way; and as I knew that the embarkation of it, at the moment previous to the embarkation of the army, would create alarm and confusion, I thought it best to have the business done when the reinforcements should come out. Indeed, the desire to have it done at that moment, and the apprehension that the reinforcements might have arrived before my letter upon the subject could reach Lisbon, in-

duced me to desire the Quarter Master General to fix upon the transport for each regiment here, in order that there might be no more reference or correspondence.

‘The baggage, which would necessarily be separated among several transports, if embarked in the usual manner with the regiments, is now embarked in one transport for each regiment, of which, of course, it takes up much space. That is an evil which cannot be avoided, unless all the transports for each regiment could be immediately fixed upon, which I imagine cannot conveniently be done; or unless I should order a great proportion of the baggage to be destroyed, for which, if I give the order, either I or the public must pay.

‘I must, therefore, in this, as in every other case, make the best arrangement that circumstances will enable me to make, and be satisfied with something that falls infinitely short of perfection. I shall inquire respecting the quantity of Mr. P——’s baggage.

‘I am obliged to you for your intelligence respecting the means of communication with Cadiz.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*  
‘*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Viseu, 22nd February, 1810.

‘I received your letter of the 19th, and I agree in opinion with you that small duties upon the imports from England, and a more efficient collection of the taxes at present existing in Portugal, and the transmission of the balances in the hands of the collectors of the revenues of the crown to the treasury, or to the military chest, would go far to relieve the difficulties under which the Portuguese Government labor: but I understand that the first mentioned was the subject of a treaty between the Brazils and the King’s Ministers, and of course the Portuguese Government are unwilling to interfere in it; and in respect to the others, they require only the adoption of a more rigorous system of punishments in order to be carried into execution, as there is really no Go-



vernment in existence of which the regulations are better than those of Portugal.

‘ I doubt whether much can be done in the way of retrenchment. However, upon that point I have not had an opportunity of acquiring much information. I rather think that, adverting to the probability that we shall evacuate the country, and that it will be desirable to carry off as many people as may choose to go, and to have as many ships as may be possible to carry them off, it may be advisable not to put an end to all expense on account of the navy, although even in that view of the subject it would be desirable to draw in the squadron from the Mediterranean.

‘ I have desired the Commissary General to pay £50,000 on account of our debt to the 24th January, and I shall, to-morrow, order him to pay the balance of it to the same period.

‘ I hope to be able to-morrow to let you know what proportion of our receipts will be applicable in future to Portuguese aids. The increased proportion ought to be calculated from the 1st of January; and I shall have that calculation made here, and the amount shall be paid.

‘ I am obliged to you for the news, and for Sir Charles’s papers, of which I will take care; and they shall be returned to you as you desire.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Viseu, 22nd February, 1810.

‘ By accident I have omitted to send you the Weekly States according to your desire, which, however, I now enclose, with some remarks upon the last, which will show you nearly how we shall stand in the field.

‘ I likewise enclose an abstract of the last returns of the Portuguese army, which will show you how they will stand in the field. The cavalry in this number, although improved and improving, must not be reckoned for much; and if the whole were reckoned at 20,000 for the field, it would be as much as they would be. Besides these numbers, there are 29,191 militia armed, and 21,985 unarmed. Of the



armed, however, there are at least 10,000 whose arms are unfit for service.

‘The Ordenanza are generally unarmed.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Marshal Beresford.*

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Viseu, 23rd February, 1810.

‘In respect to the employment of the militia of Viseu and Tondella at Obidos and Peniche, do not you think that, adverting to the great strength which the enemy have thrown upon the north of Spain, which will eventually be turned upon the north of Portugal, it would be best to keep those corps for the defence of the northern provinces, and to throw into Peniche and Obidos some of those nearer to these places? I suggest this for your consideration.

‘I understand from Colonel Wilson that he has embodied only one battalion of each of his regiments of militia. My opinion is, that the whole of the militia in the country that have arms ought to be embodied. The corps, when embodied, may be left at their stations, with the exception of those absolutely required elsewhere; but they would acquire some discipline if embodied, as well as be in readiness to move at short notice, which is always worth the expense.

‘I wish you would let me know what orders you gave for the defence of the provinces of Tras os Montes and Minho.

‘I have no objection to Le Cor’s militia remaining in their stations for the present, but they must positively be embodied; and the 13th regiment must be at Thomar. I think Le Cor ought to have a brigade of artillery.

‘I send you a copy of the orders which I issued yesterday respecting the new organization of the British army, which I beg you to communicate to the parties concerned.

‘Have you given orders for the artillerymen to be collected for the occupation of our works in the hills? I have written to Fletcher to desire him to see that Rosa and Fisher settle definitively what posts shall be filled with our ordnance, and what by yours; and to have the guns sent to the posts forthwith.

‘I believe that we ought to take Fort St. Julian for ours,

as they are upon travelling carriages, which it might be very inconvenient to lose.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 23rd February, 1810.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have examined, with the Commissary General, the estimate of our expenses, which I find will amount to £190,000 a month. The annual amount of the Portuguese subsidy, and the expenses of the pay of the British officers, being taken at £980,000 per annum, comes to about £82,000 a month, making the total monthly expenditure in Portugal £272,000. As all the money received here, on account of his Majesty, passes through the hands of the Commissary General, and as it has frequently happened that the monthly supply has not been equal to the demands during the month, I had settled with Mr. Villiers that such a proportion of the monthly supply should be applicable to Portuguese aids, as the total Portuguese subsidy and expenses should bear to the whole of the British expense in Portugal.

‘ We find that the Portuguese expenses of £28,000 are something more than two-sevenths of the whole monthly expense, calculated at £272,000, and we have therefore settled that two-sevenths of the whole monthly supply shall be paid to Mr. Bell for Portuguese aids. As the increased expenses were to commence from the 1st of January, I have desired the Commissary General to pay the increased proportion of the supplies from the 25th of December; and he sends orders accordingly to Mr. Dunmore by this opportunity, and that the account may be cleared, and the balance paid to the 24th January. As soon as we shall get an account of our receipts to the 24th of February, the amount will be made up on the same principles, and the balance shall be paid to that period.

‘ It is obvious that these sums will fall short of those which His Majesty’s Government have engaged to supply to the Portuguese Government, but that is the fault of His Majesty’s Government in England; and they have been repeat-



edly informed that it was necessary that they should send out money. The funds for the expenses of the British army are insufficient in the same proportion; and all that I can do is to divide the deficiency in its due proportions between the two bodies which are to be supported by the funds at our disposal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Bart. Frere, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ *Viseu, 25th February, 1810.*

‘ I send herewith your brother’s three maps, which I had still kept; and I beg you to return them to him.

‘ I have not heard from you since the 31st of last month, not even of the arrival of the British and Portuguese troops. You will have heard of the enemy’s attempts upon Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and Astorga upon the same day, the 12th instant, all of which failed. They still remain at Talavera Real, with their left at Olivença, which the Spaniards had omitted to occupy, or effectually to destroy, and which will answer well for all the ulterior designs of the French, whatever they may be. When Ney retired from Ciudad Rodrigo, he went to Salamanca, and resumed his old position upon the Tormes, holding some troops at Zamora, I suppose to communicate with the corps under Loison and Junot, which had gone towards the frontiers of Galicia.

‘ By the last accounts of the 16th, they had not made any impression upon Astorga; but they were in strength in the Asturias, of which they appeared to have the whole, excepting Oviedo. They were also in strength about Benevente.

‘ Many of the reinforcements have certainly arrived. Indeed, the corps on the frontier of Galicia is entirely composed of the troops that have lately entered Spain, and I hear of more following them.

‘ General Hill’s corps has moved forward to Portalegre, and I shall join it with a reinforcement, if I should have reason to believe that it is desirable to make any movement for the relief of Badajoz.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *B. Frere, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.



‘ I see in a paper of the 9th that my brother\* had been driven back to Portsmouth on the 6th.’

*To the Corregidor of Aveiro.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 26th February, 1810.

‘ The Commissary General of the British army has informed me that, having called upon you to supply from the district under your charge certain quantities of straw for the use of the British army, you have refused to do so, stating that there is none in your district.

‘ I cannot avoid reminding you that last year the French cavalry found straw in your district for nearly two months; and that having had no troops in the district since the last harvest, there must now be in the district as much straw as there was this time last year.

‘ I now order you to draw to Coimbra, within ten days of the date of this letter, 50,000 rations of straw, to begin the delivery within five days after the date; and 50,000 additional rations within 20 days after the date of this letter, for which payment will be made.

‘ If you should fail in obeying this order you will repair to my head quarters, and I shall report you to the Government to be punished.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Corregidor of Aveiro.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Bart. Frere, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 27th February, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 10th instant, and I am glad that the reinforcements sent to Cadiz have given satisfaction. I have written to General Stewart upon the measures to be adopted there and at Minorca, to which letter I beg to refer you.

‘ Since I wrote to you last, I find that a French corps has arrived at Montijo from Arzobispo, Mortier’s corps still retaining its position. I have not heard from the Marques de la Romana since I sent his aide de camp, Captain O’Neil, to him with a communication of my opinion, that unless he

\* The Hon. H. Wellesley, who had been first named to succeed Mr. Villiers at Lisbon, but subsequently appointed Ambassador to the Court of Spain.

had reason to believe that Badajoz required an exertion for its momentary relief, in order to complete the provisions of the place, and was certain that he could effect his object in a short space of time, it was better that I should not collect a larger force south of the Tagus, as he might depend upon it that the consequence of my reinforcing my corps in that quarter would be that the French would reinforce theirs, probably from the southward, and we should be obliged to withdraw, leaving Badajoz in a worse state than we had found it. The same misfortune would occur by the junction of the enemy's reinforcements with their corps in Castille, which would equally oblige me to withdraw the reinforcements which I should now send across the Tagus. That the question would then arise whether any advantage would result to the cause, by inducing the enemy to weaken their corps to the southward, in order to concentrate near Badajoz; upon which I have only to observe that I can expect none, and that I conceive that the enemy cannot be in a situation in which they can do the allies less mischief than in that in which they are at present.

‘ All this reasoning depends, however, upon the question whether it is necessary to give Badajoz a little more time, and whether they can improve their situation in a few days. I think I can give them these few days, but no more.

‘ I have heard nothing positive from the northward since I wrote to you on the 25th; but there is a report in this town, stating that the French had entered Lugo. There is nothing new from Castille. Reinforcements have certainly entered Spain in large numbers; and it is said that some have joined Ney's corps.

‘ I do not know whether you have been apprized that a post has been established from Faro to Lisbon three times a week, and equally from Lisbon to Faro; and there are boats at Faro to carry the letters to Cadiz, by which means we might hear from you and General Stewart.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ B. Frere, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 27th February, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th instant. I approve entirely of your having adopted measures eventually to procure a supply of meat for the British troops ; and you will now direct your Commissary to carry those measures into execution. He will pay and charge for this meat in his accounts with the Commissary General of the army. It is desirable, however, that we should not depart from the reasonable principle that the Spanish Government should supply with provisions the British and Portuguese troops employed in the defence of Cadiz ; and you will accordingly furnish the King’s Minister with the accounts of the meat which the Commissary will have purchased, and leave him to apply for payment, at such time and in such manner as he may think proper.

‘ I expect to hear from you in case you should apprehend a want of any other article of provisions ; and you may depend upon their being sent to Cadiz without loss of time.

‘ I approve of your issuing wine to the troops in the same manner as to those composing the army in Portugal.

‘ You must be in every respect the best judge of detaching the troops under your command to any part of the limits in which they are to act ; and you will consider the second article of the conditions in my letter of the 5th instant as intended to strengthen you against the Governor of the garrison, in case he should wish to detach the troops under your command in a manner of which you should not approve. From the character and conduct, however, of the persons in authority in Cadiz, and from your disposition to conciliate them, I expect that you will not be pressed to adopt any measure which you will not think a proper one.

‘ I approve of your detaining Brigadier General Bowes\* : he is an officer with whom I am well acquainted, and is highly deserving of the confidence which you are disposed to place in him.

‘ I send herewith a warrant, authorizing you to convene General Courts Martial, and the warrant for the appoint-

\* Afterwards killed in the siege of the Forts at Salamanca, in 1812.



ment of a Deputy Judge Advocate, which you will fill up with the name of the officer whom you think proper to appoint to that office.

‘ The warrant under His Majesty’s sign manual does not authorize me to depute the power of confirming the sentences of General Courts Martial.

‘ In respect to a Provost, I am authorized by the King’s warrant to appoint only one Provost Marshal; but I have appointed several Assistant Provosts, who have the same authority, and you will appoint an Assistant Provost for the troops under your command.

‘ I enclose a copy of the orders which have been issued upon this subject, and I shall further desire the Adjutant General to send you a copy of all the general orders which have been issued in this army.

‘ I am much obliged to you for your account of events, and of the situation of affairs at Cadiz, which is very interesting. I had not heard from that quarter since the 31st of last month.

‘ I am apprehensive that you will find the Spanish troops in the field not much better than their appearance promises; and you cannot render a more important service to the cause than by precept and example to endeavor to induce the Spanish officers to clothe, discipline, feed, and pay their soldiers; and to establish some system of regimental regulation and economy, by which it may be hoped that the corps may be kept together and in order when on service in the field in the shape of armies. The cavalry in particular is lamentably deficient in discipline, and in every thing which can render that arm useful, or indeed anything but dangerous to those with whom they may act; and yet it would be difficult, if not impossible, for an army to keep the field in Spain, unless attended by a large body of well disciplined cavalry.

‘ I approve of your having reported your arrival at Cadiz to the Secretary of State.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General*  
*the Hon. W. Stewart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S.—Since writing the above, the Commissary General has communicated to me a letter from Mr. O’Meara, from

which I observe that he proposes to purchase American salt provisions. From the perusal of your letter, I imagined that you intended that he should purchase cattle from Barbary, to which the paragraph in the commencement of this letter refers. If you should require salt provisions, you will let me know it, and I will send some from Lisbon, where we have large quantities in store, which we cannot make use of. In the mean time, till the salt provisions shall arrive, after I shall receive your requisition for them, you may use the provisions in the transports, which must afterwards be replaced.'

*To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.*

MY DEAR SIR,

Viseu, 27th February, 1810.

I received yesterday your private letter of the 15th, as well as your dispatch, and I am glad to find that matters are going on at Cadiz to your satisfaction.

I am not acquainted with Venegas, but have always heard a good character of him; and his consent must certainly have been given to the measure of calling for our assistance. You must be a better judge of his conduct than I can be; and adverting to the fact that the seat of the Government is within the limit of his command, and that the Duque de Alburquerque, who commands the greater part of the troops, is a senior officer to Venegas, I think it very immaterial whether he does or does not entertain the opinions which O'Farrell's paper attributes to him. If he does entertain them, they are not unnatural opinions for a Spaniard to entertain, by no means uncommon even among the best of the Spaniards, or at all inconsistent with the performance of his duty against the French. I also think that his entertaining these opinions is not inconsistent with his consent to the measure of calling for our assistance to defend Cadiz at the moment the requisition was made; particularly recollecting a letter\* which I wrote to General Whittingham in December upon this subject, which I know was shown to Venegas, and which was certainly calculated to inspire confidence rather than mistrust of our designs in regard to Cadiz.

\* See p. 386.



‘ I wrote “the conditions” in my dispatch of the 5th instant to Mr. Frere in the same spirit, as I know that, however important it is to our interests that Cadiz should be defended and maintained, we can effect our object only by convincing the Spaniards that it is essentially their interest (as it really is) to maintain the place; and that we co-operate in its defence with a view to the importance of the preservation of the place for their cause particularly, as well as for the general and the British interests. Upon other points I wish that you and Mr. Frere would consider seriously of the defence of Cadiz, and of the general measures to be adopted in relation to the situation of affairs in Spain at present.

‘ The misfortune throughout the war has been that the Spaniards are of a disposition too sanguine. They have invariably expected only success in objects for the attainment of which they had adopted no measures. They have never looked to, nor prepared for, a lengthened contest; and all those, or nearly all, who have had anything to do with them, have imbibed the same spirit, and the same sentiments.

‘ Without adverting to the enormous armies which are daily pouring into Spain, in addition to those which were before in the country, and were already superior in number to the allies; or to the fact that there is now no army in the field excepting the British army, they are thinking of offensive operations from Cadiz; and they appear to me to hold the Isla de Leon more as the intrenched camp (and hardly even deserving that name) of an army, than as a fortified post, upon the possession of which every thing is to turn in future.

‘ I agree entirely with O’Farrell, that if the Isla de Leon is lost, the town of Cadiz will not, and probably cannot, hold out a week. The Spaniards and we should deceive ourselves if we could suppose that a most serious attack will not sooner or later be made upon this island, or upon the communications between the island and Cadiz, which it would be in vain to expect to resist, without having recourse to all the measures for the defence of these points which art can suggest. It is impossible to say whether the enemy will begin by making this great attack upon Cadiz, or will turn their atten-



tion to our situation in Portugal; but sooner or later all that force and art can do to obtain possession of the Isla de Leon will be done, and these efforts can be successfully resisted only by the adoption of similar measures.

‘ I would therefore suggest to you to get Captain Landmann to examine particularly the Isla de Leon, and the communication between the Isla and Cadiz, without loss of time; and to consider of the general principle and plan on which these important possessions ought to be defended. Let him then suggest the construction of the works which appear to him to be most necessary, working always upon the principle and the plan which he would first have laid down for the defence of the Isla, &c.; and supposing always, which he may be sure will be the case, that there will be a sufficient number of men to occupy and defend the works, the construction of which he shall recommend.

‘ When you shall be prepared with these plans, &c., I would suggest to you and Mr. Frere to recommend their adoption, and the immediate execution of the works, to the serious attention of the Government, and to press them to provide for the effectual defence of Cadiz, always in the spirit in which I wrote to General Whittingham and of “ the conditions.” General O’Farrell’s paper will afford topics in abundance by which this object may be urged; and in fact every man who knows anything of the state of Spain, and of the sentiments of the people of the country, must be certain that if Cadiz should hold out, and the Mediterranean islands continue in the possession of the patriots, and the colonies continue true to the cause, the Buonapartes may have the military possession of the country, but sooner or later they must lose it.

‘ In the same view I would earnestly urge the Government to send the fleet to Minorca, and to provide effectually for the defence of that and the other islands. The equipment of the fleet, which ought to be looked to, is a measure for future consideration.

‘ I refer you to my letters to Mr. Frere for information upon the state of affairs in this quarter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General  
the Hon. W. Stewart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Viseu, 27th February, 1810.

‘I received only yesterday your letter of the 22nd. I have communicated to the Marques de la Romana my opinion, that we should do Badajoz more harm than good, by attempting to remove the enemy to a distance at the present moment, and I shall see what he says in answer to my observations. It is now obvious, however, that your corps must be reinforced, before it can make any offensive movement against the enemy.

‘My opinion is, that the enemy will not make a serious attack upon Badajoz. Indeed, it would be useless to them to make this attack, as they have Olivença, which will answer all their purposes of attack upon Portugal equally with Badajoz, and they lose no time. This view of the subject induces me to instruct you respecting the bridge at Abrantes, in case you should retire for the Alentejo.

‘In this case you will be so kind as to have that bridge taken up, and the boats and all the materials brought over to this side of the river, to a spot where they will be under the fire of our works.

‘All the boats on the Tagus, from Villa Velha inclusive down to Villa Franca, excepting those of the bridge of Abrantes, above provided for, must be ordered down to Alhandra, two miles below Villa Franca, as soon as you shall cross the Tagus. I enclose a paper which will state to you to what persons you are to address yourself to have these boats removed; and you will give them every assistance in your power to effect the object.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘I wish likewise to inform you that arrangements have been made to remove out of the enemy’s way the carts, mules, and other means of conveyance, and the provisions, of which the enemy might make use in the invasion of the country. I recommend that you should communicate with General Leite upon this subject, who has the returns of the province of Alentejo in his hands, and settle with him the course which the carts, &c., of the province of Alentejo should take in the event supposed.’



‘ My opinion is, that those in the southern and eastern parts of the province, that could not collect about Elvas, should go off towards the kingdom of Algarve; and those to the northward to get into the hills about Niza, Portalegre, &c.

‘ You will recollect that part of the province of Portuguese Estremadura is south, or on the left of the Tagus; and if you should cross that river, you should immediately send to the commanding officer of the province of Estremadura, who resides at Lisbon, to desire him to remove from that part of the province which is on the left of the Tagus all carts, mules, &c., and the provisions which they can carry with them; and these should go to Setuval, and under the protection of the castle of Palmella.

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM.

*To Lieut. General Leite.*

‘ 28th February, 1810.

‘ You are aware of the situation of the frontiers of this kingdom, and of the necessity which may exist of leaving a part of the country exposed for a time, in order to concentrate our troops on other points of greater and more vital importance.

‘ In contemplation of this necessity, I had proposed to the Government some time ago that all the carts, means of transport, &c., in the different provinces should be registered and placed under the direction of the governors in different provinces, in order that they might be removed out of the reach of the enemy, in case it should be necessary at any time to draw the troops from the province.

‘ I have desired General Hill to communicate with you upon this subject in case it should be necessary for him to withdraw from Alentejo, of which, however, there does not appear to be any probability; and I wish you to determine in your own mind to what point the carriages and means of transport, with as much provision as they can carry away, in each Comarca in the province of Alentejo shall go, in case the allied army shall be obliged to withdraw with a view to further operations, and the enemy should be enabled to enter.



‘ It might probably be also desirable that you should give your usual instructions beforehand upon this subject to the heads of the different Comarcas, to be carried into execution when they should hear that the enemy are approaching their districts.

‘ While writing upon this subject, I think it proper also to mention to you that I expect that the Capitães Mor will be prepared with their several companies of Ordenanza to do the enemy all the mischief in their power if he should invade the country; not by assembling in large bodies, but by impeding his communications, by firing upon him from the mountains and strong passes with which the whole country abounds, and by annoying his foraging and other parties that he may send out. His cavalry cannot act in a great part of Alentejo; and by activity, much may be done by the Capitães Mor in the strong parts of the country.

‘ You must be the best judge upon all these points; and I can only tell you that I shall approve of the measure, if you should decide to admit the Marques de la Romana’s troops into Campo Mayor, after considering them.

‘ *Lieut. Gen. Leite.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ *Viseu, 28th February, 1810.*

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received your letter of the 25th. I do not believe that the French corps on the right of the Guadiana is so strong as Lieut. Hay\* reports it to be; but I should think the two corps put together, on both sides the Guadiana, are 24,000 men. However, I do not think they are in a state to meddle with you.

‘ I have written to General Leite on the arrangement on which I wrote to you yesterday, respecting the carts of the country. Respecting the boats on the Tagus, it occurs to me that you might also correspond immediately with the Governors of Santarem and Abrantes, and apprise them that circumstances may induce you to desire them to order the boats placed under their charge down the river; and desire them to be prepared to adopt measures to force all

\* Now Sir A. Leith Hay.

the boats to the place to which you will order them; but desire them not to adopt any measures till they shall receive their ulterior orders from you.

‘ I was afraid that you would be obliged to supply the Portuguese troops, which of course must be done, if they cannot supply themselves. In the mean time I have written to the Government upon this subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Brigadier General Robert Craufurd.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Viseu, 28th February, 1810.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 27th, 1½ A.M.; and, as I have not heard from you since, I conclude that the enemy’s advance to Barba de Puerco was only to feel us.

‘ Sout’s corps, as well as Mortier’s, are upon the Guadiana, so that Badajoz would rather appear to be their object. I rather believe, however, that their force is too much separated to effect any military object whatever.

‘ Our troops have been well received at Cadiz.

‘ I beg of you to use as much ammunition as you please, and replace it from Almeida; only give notice to your neighbours of what you are about.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Viseu, 28th February, 1810.

‘ Affairs have remained nearly in the same situation since I addressed you on the 21st instant. Marshal Ney’s corps remains upon the Tormes, with its advanced posts towards the Agueda. The French had not made any progress in taking Astorga as late as the 20th; and it was supposed that the corps in that quarter would unite with Ney’s corps for the attack of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ The corps called Marshal Sout’s had entered Lower Estremadura by the bridge of Arzobispo: that part of it which was at Plasencia, and was only an advanced guard, crossed the Tagus at the ferry of Serradilla, at which the



Spaniards had replaced the boat since the British army were in that neighbourhood in August.

‘The whole of this corps are now collected on the right of the Guadiana, about Montijo, while Mortier’s corps is on the left of that river, between Talavera Real and Olivença.

‘As the rains have not been heavy this winter, the Guadiana is still fordable.

‘The last accounts I received from Cadiz are of the 15th. The arrival of the British and Portuguese troops had given the greatest satisfaction; and as the Duque de Alburquerque’s corps, consisting of 11,000 men, was in the Island of Leon, and was likely to be reinforced by a division of Areyzaga’s army, which was embarked at Gibraltar, and by another division embarked at Ayamonte, it was expected that there would be 18,000 Spanish troops for the defence of Cadiz, besides the British and Portuguese corps, and the volunteers of the town.

‘The French occupied the country in the neighbourhood, from Rota to Chiclana, with 25,000 men; and Joseph was supposed to be there.

‘The Spanish corps, called the army of the left, has crossed the Tagus, with the exception of the division under General Carrera, which remains in Castille; and one division was at Alburquerque; the other at Castello de Vide, in Portugal, on the 25th instant, when I heard of them last.

‘There appears no doubt that large reinforcements for the enemy’s army have arrived in Spain; but I have not received any account upon which I can rely of their amount.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Viseu, 28th February, 1810.

‘I hope that you will have attended to my suggestion to send to the Tagus a fleet of ships of the line; a measure which I really think of the utmost importance. Besides the facility which their assistance will give us in embarking, if it should be necessary, I would wish to draw your Lordship’s attention to the possibility that the enemy might combine his attack upon the frontiers of Portugal with a movement of his fleet in the Mediterranean to the Tagus. If he should make



this movement, you will probably lose your army, in return for which you would probably blockade his fleet in the Tagus; and, if events should ever turn out favorably again in Spain and Portugal, you might capture it.

‘ However, your loss would be enormous in the mean time, as well as upon the ultimate balance of advantages; and it may be so easily prevented, that I cannot but hope that you will have adopted the measure I have suggested to you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I enclose the last Weekly State.’

*To the Secretary of the Treasury.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 28th February, 1810

‘ I am concerned to have to inform the Lords of the Treasury that a sum of money, amounting to £29,000, has been demanded by Deputy Commissary General —, and has been paid by Deputy Paymaster General — out of the military chest at Lisbon, without any warrant or authority from me, or any communication with me, or the Commissary General, or Deputy Paymaster General Boys, who is the head of the pay department of this army.

‘ The irregularity of this proceeding is so obvious, that I have declined to enter into any of the circumstances which have induced the parties to commit it, till the money should be replaced in the military chest. I understand, however, that Mr. — having been at the head of the Commissariat with the army in Portugal, till the end of the month of April, when Mr. Murray took charge of that department, conceives that he has a claim upon the pay department for a sum of money stopped from the pay of the troops who received rations; and he has taken this sum from the military chest in part of discharge of this claim, as I have above stated, without my warrant, or even communication with me.

‘ I must also observe that the stoppage from the pay of the troops, when they receive rations, is the property of the public; and being in the military chest, the amount ought not to have been taken out of the chest without my warrant. Mr. Murray having, since he took charge of the department, paid debts incurred by all his predecessors in office, I do not

exactly see what occasion Mr. — had to call for this sum of money; and at all events supposing the sum was required for a public purpose, application ought to have been made to me for my warrant for its issue.

‘ Although I have thought it proper to bring this subject under the consideration of the Lords of the Treasury, on account of its great irregularity, and because I find from the enclosed correspondence between Mr. Boys and Mr. — that I cannot get this sum of money replaced in the military chest, I beg that you will inform their Lordships that I have no reason to believe that there is any thing corrupt in the transaction, into which, however, I have refused to examine till the money should be replaced in the military chest.

‘ I have desired Mr. Murray to transmit, for their Lordships’ information, copies of the correspondence which he has had with Mr. — upon this subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Secretary  
to the Treasury.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM.

*For Lieut. General Bacellar, Governor of the Province of Beira.*

‘ 1st March, 1810.

‘ At the moment when the enemy may attack this province, the operations of the allied army may have led them to a distance from it, and the enemy may have it in his power to hold a temporary possession of it.

‘ It is desirable, therefore, that we should consider at an early moment of the mode of keeping the enemy out of the province as long as possible, supposing the province to be left, in great measure, to its own resources for its defence; secondly, of the mode of confining his operations within certain limits as much as possible, supposing that he should be able to penetrate the frontier; and, thirdly, of the mode of distressing him as much as possible for provisions and other resources, supposing that he should establish himself within certain districts in the country.

‘ The following suggestions are submitted to General Bacellar with a view to all these objects:—

‘ First, I recommend that the Capitães Mor of all the districts should be directed to have their companies in the



best order and prepared for service. These companies must act independently and separately, each in its own district; unless in cases where two or more companies joining can defend a point interesting to the districts to which both belong.

‘ In case it should be necessary, preparations and arrangements must be made for destroying the bridges over the Coa, between Pinhel and Villar Torpim, and at Castello Bom.

‘ The bridge at Almeida should also be destroyed eventually; but that measure involves more important consequences, and must not be adopted without orders from me.

‘ Whenever a bridge or road is destroyed, a party of the Ordenanza must be stationed to prevent the enemy from repairing it; and a party must, in the event of the British army quitting this part of the country, be stationed on this side of the bridge of Almeida.

‘ It will likewise be necessary to have parties of the Ordenanza at the several fords on the Coa, from Castello Bom to the junction with the Douro.

‘ The next point will be the river Mondego.

‘ If the enemy should penetrate by passing the Coa, it does not appear that it will be very easy to prevent him from entering the valley of the Mondego. The bridges on the Mondego, in the whole extent of its course from Celorico to Ponte da Murcella, ought to be broken, and arrangements should be made for that purpose, and for posting a party of the Ordenanza at each bridge, in order to prevent the enemy from repairing it, and from spreading to his right across the Mondego into the country north of that river; or if he should take the road north of that river, to prevent him from spreading into the valley south of it.

‘ The bridges upon the Alva, &c., ought likewise to be destroyed, and parties of Ordenanza placed at each of them, if the enemy should penetrate by the left of the Mondego: and those upon the Tavora, upon the Dão, the bridge at Fail, the Ponte da Pedrinha, the bridge at Santa Combadão, and the bridges of the Criz, if they should penetrate by the country north of the Mondego.

‘ All the bridges upon the Zezere should likewise be destroyed. By these measures, and by the occupation of the ground at the places where the passages shall have been de-



stroyed, if the enemy shall not be stopped, at least he will be confined in his operations, and will not be able to do so much mischief as he otherwise would.

‘ Preparatory measures ought to be adopted to destroy each of these bridges when the necessity of it may exist; and the bridge should be broken only when it appears probable that the enemy may intend to use it.

‘ Besides these measures, the Governor of the province should, at an early period, consider of the place to which the means of transport and the provisions in each Comarca of the province should be sent, in case the enemy should enter the province. Those in the neighbourhood of the Serra d’Estrella should be sent into the Serra; those in the neighbourhood of the Zezere, in the villages along that river; those north of the Mondego, into the Serra de Alcoba.

‘ The great object in the preparatory arrangements on this subject should be, that the Commanding Officer in the province should make up his mind to what part the means of transport and provisions existing in the different Comarcas in the province should remove, in case the enemy should enter the province by any of the different lines which he might take. He has the register of all the carriages and means of transport; and he would only have to give his orders, all previous arrangements being made, when he should hear of the enemy’s movements.

‘ *Lieut. General Bacellar.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 1st March, 1810.

‘ I sent off last night my dispatches, and the bag to go to England by the packet of last Sunday; and I now enclose a letter for Lord Liverpool, which I hope may be in time. If it should not be so, I will request you to send it by the first opportunity.

‘ You shall have the accounts made up to 1st of March, as soon as we can get an account of our receipts to that period.

‘ In respect to the Portuguese deficiency, I made it, in November, from official documents sent to me by the Regency, 6,070,000 dollars, for the year 1809. The revenue received, and expected to be received by the end of the year, was 8,607,337 dollars, and the estimated expenditure

was 14,679,250 dollars. From that deficiency was to be subtracted the sum of £500,000, then paid by Great Britain for the troops; and calculating the dollar at five shillings, it left a deficiency of about £900,000, which was the sum that I stated to Government. Supposing those numbers to be tolerably correct, and to represent the existing state of the Portuguese finance, there would now be to be subtracted from the deficiency the additional £250,000 subsidy; and the deficiency would remain at £650,000 sterling. I believe this to be a tolerably exact account of the deficiency; and I know that I extracted it from the official account with great pains.

‘ It would be most desirable to adopt the measure which you propose respecting the import of British manufactures. In respect to the other measure proposed by Redondo, I am not sufficiently aware of the mode of collecting the revenue, to be certain that they have sufficient checks to make the principle of the measure operate to produce a larger sum into the treasury. Of this, however, we may be certain, that the sum produced will not be smaller than it is, and therefore it might be tried.

‘ Since I wrote to you respecting the use to be made of the Portuguese fleet eventually, I have turned over in my mind the expediency of encouraging a general emigration from this country; and I acknowledge that, upon the whole, I am disposed to doubt it. I think that we ought, and I propose to endeavor, to carry off all the regular army, because we may be very certain, that all that we leave behind will very soon be made French soldiers; but I think that we ought to have in Portugal, and to encourage to remain here, all the gentlemen of the country, as a germ of insurrection, whenever circumstances shall afford them an opportunity to throw off the French yoke, which may be afforded by thousands of events in the Peninsula, in France, and in Europe. If we should encourage the party in general to withdraw, no advantage can be taken of these events hereafter; and we gain no advantage at present by withdrawing them, as they will be only a burden to us, or to the Government of the Brazils. At the same time I think we are bound to provide for the removal of all who have been concerned in carrying on the government, and who are now or hereafter may be conspicuously active against the French. Pray turn



this subject over in your mind, and let me know your opinion upon it.

‘ I believe that the news in Forjaz’s letter is nearly correct. I had not heard of the movement of the heavy artillery towards Badajoz from Seville, nor do I believe it.

‘ You have omitted to enclose the paper from Dom Miguel Forjaz respecting the hospital at the Rope Walk; and we cannot make out the name of the place which he had proposed for the hospital, as written in your letter.

‘ I shall always send my dispatches to you; those of yesterday went to you; and I still hope the enclosed will be in time.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Viseu, 1st March, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Lieut. Colonel Doyle, and upon which I have to request the decision of His Majesty’s Government.

‘ In the mean time, as I consider it an object of the utmost importance to encourage the desertion of the enemy’s troops, I have authorised the payment of 20 dollars to every man who may desert, and will enlist into His Majesty’s service; and I have directed Colonel Doyle to send such men as he shall agree with on these terms to Gibraltar, Cadiz, or Lisbon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Viseu, 1st March, 1810.

‘ I have just received your private letter of the 13th February, and I write an answer to it immediately, in order that this may reach Lisbon before the packet sails on Sunday.

‘ Your Lordship will have observed that I sent a detachment to Cadiz, as soon as I heard that the Spaniards were disposed to admit our troops into that garrison, which was as large as I could then make it, and as large as I thought they would be inclined to receive, from what I heard at the



time of the disposition of the party in the town. As General Campbell was about to send the 2nd bat. 88th regiment from Gibraltar, and as no desire has been expressed from Cadiz that more troops should be sent from hence, and, above all, as from the strength of the enemy's corps in the neighbourhood of Cadiz, there does not appear any intention, nor are there means, to make an attack upon the Isla de Leon, which the troops there would not be able to repulse, I have not thought it proper to weaken this army any further, by sending to Cadiz any additional reinforcement.

‘ I agree entirely with General Castaños, that the war has been hitherto carried on on erroneous principles; and I also agree with him that the French will find it most difficult to conquer the country; but I doubt whether any active effort will, or indeed can, be made within Spain itself.

‘ It appears to me to be most probable that, in a short time, there will be no resistance to the French troops in any part of Spain, excepting at Cadiz, and in any other of the forts and strongholds which may be able to hold out. But there will be no obedience, and there will remain an universal disposition to revolt, which will break out upon the first, and every opportunity, that will be afforded by the absence or the weakness of the detachments of French troops, which must usually be kept in all parts of the country for the ordinary purposes of government, and, in the end, the French yoke must be shaken off. This disposition of the people will be much encouraged by the continuance of the contest at Cadiz, by the possession by the loyal party of the islands in the Mediterranean and of the fleet, and by the continued loyalty of the colonies.

‘ We are much mistaken, however, if we suppose that the Isla de Leon (without the possession of which I do not think Cadiz would hold out a week) is now in a state to sustain the serious attack which will be made upon it, when the contest shall be brought to that state throughout the Peninsula, that there will be no opposition to the French, excepting at the Isla de Leon.

‘ I have written to General W. Stewart upon this subject, and have desired him to order Captain Landmann of the Engineers, who is there, to look at the island, and fix the principles and the plan on which it must be defended, and

the works which ought to be immediately constructed on those principles; and then to alarm the Regency by a representation of the nature of the attack which is likely to be made upon them, and of the inadequacy of their means of resistance at present. From what I hear of them, I think they are likely to attend to this representation, and to order the immediate construction of the works which are necessary for the defence of the island, against an attack in which we may be very certain that all the resources of the art will be resorted to; and I hope the place will be prepared to resist this attack before it can be made.

‘ This view of the question respecting Cadiz and the Isla has convinced me, as it probably will your Lordship, and indeed every view that I have taken of the British interest in the contest in the Peninsula has convinced me, that the British army ought to remain in the field in Portugal as long as may be practicable, and consistent with its safety.

‘ If we should withdraw from Portugal to go to Cadiz, in the first place, I do not think it quite clear that we should be received there, or that even the best friends of the British alliance would wish to receive us. In the next place, as soon as we shall withdraw from Portugal, the enemy will seize Lisbon on the next day; the fort of Ciudad Rodrigo cannot hold out a moment; Badajoz will not hold out long; and the reduction of these two would give the means of taking Elvas and Almeida, which could not be expected to hold out long after we should have withdrawn. Cadiz would then be to be attacked by the whole French army, probably before the Isla could be fortified as it ought to be; and even if we should be admitted to take a share in its defence, it might be in such a state as to render all our efforts hopeless.

‘ In a view, then, to the continuance of the contest at Cadiz, as well as in every other view that I have ever taken of the subject, I consider it highly desirable that we should maintain ourselves in Portugal as long as possible.

‘ Besides the measures for the defence of Cadiz, I have desired General W. Stewart and Mr. Frere to recommend to the Regency to remove the fleet to Mahon, and to provide effectually for the defence of Minorca, and of the other islands in the Mediterranean. Besides this, it is my opinion that we ought to endeavor to retain Peniche, in a view to the



continuance of the resistance to the French in the Peninsula. That place is already in such a state that it cannot be taken by a *coup de main*; and if I had engineers to spare, I could soon put it in such a state that it would be very difficult to take it. The possession of this place by the English and the loyal Portuguese, would have nearly the same effect in Portugal as the continuance of the contest at Cadiz would have in Spain; and there are not many days in the year in which the communication with it, by sea, could be prevented.

‘ It is worthy of the consideration of the Government whether they will continue to occupy this place. If they do, they must leave at least one British battalion in it, and some artillery; and they may depend upon it that their holding this place will be of use to Cadiz, and to the whole Peninsula.

‘ What I have already written is probably as extensive a consideration of the question respecting Cadiz, as is necessary in the existing situation of the contest in the Peninsula. I shall, however, go one step further, and suppose for a moment that it was possible to renew it with the aid of Spanish armies, &c. &c.; and knowing what I do of the country and of the disposition of the people, and of the state, and probable future state, of their army, I am decidedly of opinion that the largest British army which Great Britain can afford to supply would do better to carry on its operations through Portugal, and make Lisbon the point of its communication with England, than carry on its operations through the south of Spain, communicating with Cadiz and Gibraltar.

‘ It is useless to trouble you with a consideration of the different topics which bear upon this question. I shall only observe that we can advance with safety nearer to the centre of the scene of operations, and retire with greater ease; and, I hope, get away with equal safety from the Tagus; and that, as we now show, we can keep in check, as long as we can remain, a much larger force than we could oppose, if we were in the south of Spain, and it were brought against us.

‘ I can tell you no more than I have already told you about the embarkation of the Portuguese army. If you will let us have a large fleet of ships of war, and 45,000 disposable tons of transports, I shall try, and I think I shall bring them all



off; but I cannot be certain, until the time comes, that I shall be able to bring off a man.

‘ In respect to home politics, I acknowledge that I do not like them much, and I am convinced that the Government cannot last. I do not think that any Government can stand, after an inquiry into an important measure by a Committee of the House of Commons. However, I am of opinion that the King has a right, and must be supported in the exercise of the right, to choose his own servants, as long as he thinks it proper to persevere in retaining those whom he prefers in his service; and if no other advantage shall have been gained by the formation of the existing Government, it has at least drawn from Lord Grenville opinions which will render the employment of him not inconsistent with the King’s ease, if he should think proper to call him to his service.

‘ I assure you that what has passed in Parliament respecting me, has not given me one moment’s concern, as far as I am personally concerned; and indeed I rejoice at it, as it has given my friends an opportunity of setting the public right upon some points on which they had not been informed, and on others on which the misrepresentations had driven the truth from their memories. But I regret that men like Lord — and others should carry the spirit of party so far as to attack an officer in his absence, should take the ground of their attack from Cobbett and the *Moniteur*, and should at once blame him for circumstances and events over which he could have no control, and for faults which, if they were committed at all, were not committed by him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Visou, 2nd March, 1810.

‘ General Payne has informed me that he has given leave to his aide de camp, Fitzgibbon, to go home, on account of an accident which has happened to him, which renders it advisable that he should not ride for some time; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to ask

the Captain of any of the King's ships which may be returning to England to give him a passage.

'Have you heard any thing of a reinforcement coming for your own squadron? I have frequently urged the measure in official and private letters, as one of essential importance.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Vice Admiral*  
*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

'WELLINGTON.

'Your son is just arrived from Guarda, in very good health.'

*To the Corregidor of Aveiro.*

MEMORANDUM.

'Viseu, 3rd March, 1810.'

'Inform this gentleman, that as I am responsible for the officers under my command, so must he be, and he is responsible for the magistrates and others placed under his direction; and that if the straw is not produced in the period which I have required it, he must obey the orders which he has received, and repair to my head quarters, or I must be under the necessity of sending for him: that I know that he can afford to give what I have required, and he shall give it, the British Commissary paying for the same; and if he does not do so, I shall make it a particular request that he and the other magistrates of the country may be punished as they deserve for assisting the enemy last year, and for refusing the assistance required, for payment, to the defenders of the country in this year.

'*The Corregidor of Aveiro.*'

'WELLINGTON.'

*To Charles Stuart, Esq.*

'SIR,

'Viseu, 3rd March, 1810.'

'I enclose answers to the queries in the dispatch from the Marquis Wellesley, referred to in your letter of the 26th February, as far as the subject of them comes within my knowledge.

'The Commissary General has directions to furnish you with an account of the sums issued by him to the King's



Ministers at Lisbon; and the dates of the receipts of Mr. Bell, who was authorised by Mr. Villiers to receive those sums.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ *Viseu, 3rd March, 1810.*

‘ In respect to the Bishop of Tarbes, my opinion is that the Abbé Texeira ought to pay him his pension, subtracting from the account the direct taxes upon it payable to the state, provided the Abbé has paid them; and if he has not paid them, he ought to be made to pay, not only the proportion payable by the Bishop’s pension upon the revenue of the Abbaye, but those due by the Abbaye itself.

‘ If, however (as is probable), the Abbay was plundered by the French during the late invasion, it is reasonable that the Bishop of Tarbes should bear his share of the loss.

‘ I am positively certain that the Ministers will be unwilling to go to Parliament to ask for more money for Portugal, and that Parliament will not grant a larger sum, even if the Ministers should ask for it. The Portuguese Government are perfectly aware of this fact, having been apprized of it by me three months ago. It is almost useless, therefore, to discuss the mode in which any further grant to the Portuguese Government should be made to them.

‘ If, however, any further grant should be made, I am rather desirous that it should be made to the Government, in the same manner as that at present given to them. The truth is, that the British officers and departments are not equal to the management of the detail of a larger service than that which they at present conduct; and I am unwilling to charge them, or, in other words, myself, with the detail of the Portuguese army. Besides, I do not think there is any reason to suspect that the funds, already given to the Portuguese Government, have been misapplied in a manner that cannot be corrected by the measures which I have proposed. The fault is in the deficiency of funds, more than in their misapplication.

‘ Another objection which I have to the system proposed for any more grant is, that it does not go far enough. The



militia, which are a most important branch of the military of the country, for which the Government are now sending out arms, by which the northern provinces are to be exclusively defended, and which are to occupy many important posts in the country, are to continue under the *regie* of the Portuguese Government. If it be necessary to take the army under British management, it is equally necessary to take the militia; but I contend for it, that the Portuguese Government have paid both army and militia most regularly, more regularly, by far, than they would have been paid by our departments; and in respect to their provisions, all that it required is that the sum of money applicable out of British aids, or out of the general treasury, to pay for provisions, should be disposable under the directions of the person most capable, from his detailed knowledge of the demand for provisions, to dispose of it to advantage.

‘ I am positively certain, as I above stated, that Government will not give them another shilling; and I think you will do well to discourage the notion that they should get more. At the same time it will be necessary that you should transmit their application to England.

‘ The Portuguese Government, however, should be informed of the probability that the King will withdraw his assistance, both pecuniary and military, if they do not make an exertion to provide for their own defence: and I must say that they have not made any effort to make up the deficiency of their revenue; and that they might make it good without much difficulty, at least so far as to prevent it from falling upon the military, or upon the defence of the country.

‘ If you should think it can do any good, I have no objection to your communicating to the Government the substance of this letter as my opinion.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Charles Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Corregidor of Aveiro.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 4th March, 1810.

‘ I enclose the duplicate of a letter which I wrote to you ten days ago, to which you have returned no answer; and you have omitted to obey the orders which I gave you in a

former letter, either to supply straw to the Commissary at Coimbra, or to repair to my head quarters. I now send a messenger to bring you to my head quarters forthwith.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Corregidor of Aveiro.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Viseu, 5th March, 1810.

‘ I received, at Mangualde, on the night before last, your letter of the 2nd, mentioning the desertion of the two vedettes.

‘ It might be desirable to be stronger in cavalry in front of the Coa ; and in case you should think so, Colonel Murray has directed Colonel Arentschildt to have another troop of hussars at your disposition, which you will call for, if you think them necessary, and station where you may think proper.

‘ In case you should find forage scarce, in consequence of the advance of this second troop, take as much as you please from the magazine at Almeida ; and desire the Commissary there to let the Commissary General know how much you take, in order that he may adopt measures to keep up that magazine to its full amount.

‘ There is nothing new. The French have withdrawn from Talavera Real, Olivença, &c., near Badajoz, towards Merida, and they occupy Montijo and Puebla.

‘ I have no accounts from Cadiz of a later date than the 15th. Our troops and the Portuguese had been well received. The Duque de Albuquerque had there 11,000 men ; and about 7000 more were expected by sea, 2000 from Ayamonte, and 5000 from Gibraltar, where they had been embarked ; making in all 18,000 Spaniards, 4000 English and Portuguese, and 4500 volunteers of the town ; so that I think the Isle de Leon is pretty safe.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I beg you to send here the German deserters whom General Cox has sent to Pinhel.’

*To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Viseu, 5th March, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 1st and 2nd, and I am much obliged to you for the attention you have paid to the objects which I had recommended to your observation.

‘ If the French are really fitting out boats at Lobon and Puebla (which I should be inclined to doubt, as they would find materials and workmen, with greater facility, and with more convenience, at Merida), it must be with a view to keep up the communication between their corps on the two sides of the Guadiana, in case they should attack Badajoz. They would scarcely find it advantageous to use on the Tagus (where alone we have reason to apprehend the use of a bridge by them) pontoons made at Lobon.

‘ However, it is proper to attend to all this work, and to make me acquainted with every thing of the kind that is observed.

‘ It is surely impossible that they can have 7000 cavalry in the corps assembled upon the Guadiana!

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Tell Colonel Carroll that I am much obliged to him for his letter, and that I shall be glad to hear from him whenever he will favor me with a letter.’

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 6th March, 1810.

‘ I received only this morning your letters of the 1st and 2nd. I had heard of the refusal of the Emperor of Morocco to allow of the export of more than 80 mules, unless upon payment of 70 dollars duty for each. I have refused to pay this sum, as we are really not in want of mules at present.

‘ I hope the Government will send us some ships. I think they are mistaken in sending large ships to Cadiz. Not only they can do no good there, but they must quit Cadiz as soon as the French shall re-establish the battery at S<sup>ta</sup> Catalina, if what we have been told respecting the northern



channel being the only one that can be used for large ships be true.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for any suggestion that you will assist me with ; and I hope soon to receive a report from Colonel Fletcher upon the point to which you refer on the other side of the river. If the ground is what it has been reported to you, it will render our business much more easy than it was before. I passed over the ground, and recollect the swamp, but conceived that the dry ground was more extensive than you have described it to be.

‘ I write to you upon the subject of the guns, &c., in the Russian ships of war. I am much obliged to you for the further measures which you have adopted to expedite our correspondence with Cadiz by Faro. I have no news from Cadiz of a later date than the 15th of last month.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*  
*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 6th March, 1810.

‘ Having found, upon referring to the returns of the ordnance and ordnance carriages in possession of the Portuguese Government, that there are not a sufficient number of guns, with carriages, to arm the different works in front of Lisbon which are now constructing, and which it is intended to construct, to the northward of Lisbon, even with the addition of the heavy ordnance on travelling carriages embarked in the store ships in the Tagus, I shall be much obliged to you if you will place at my disposition the ordnance, the carriages, and the stores belonging to the Russian ships of war still in the Tagus.

‘ If you should consent to adopt this proposition I shall request you further to make them over to Colonel Fisher, the commanding officer of the British artillery at Lisbon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*  
*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘SIR,

‘Viseu, 6th March, 1810.

‘I have the honor to enclose a letter from Dom M. Forjaz, which Mr. Villiers transmitted to me shortly previous to his departure from this country, complaining of the conduct of the British soldiers in the neighbourhood of Alemquer, particularly of an occurrence at Villa Nova.

‘I enclose the report received from Colonel Peacocke on the occurrence at Villa Nova, into which he had been directed to inquire. The result of this inquiry is so different from the report forwarded by the Secretary of State to Mr. Villiers, that I am not satisfied with it; and if the Secretary of State will bring forward the persons who gave them the information, to prosecute at a General Court Martial the soldier who committed the act, I will order a General Court Martial to assemble for his trial; but if those persons are unwilling to substantiate upon oath, before a General Court Martial, the information which they have conveyed to the Minister of the Police, the inquiry which has been already made must be final; as it is obvious that there are no means in my power of convicting this soldier of a deliberate intention to murder the deceased, or even of proving that he committed the act, because the deceased refused to mend his boots.

‘It is unfortunately but too true that outrages of all descriptions are committed by the British soldiers in this country, notwithstanding the pains taken by me and the General and other superior officers of the army to prevent them, and to punish those who commit them.

‘It is useless to trouble you with a description of the causes of these evils, upon which I have written fully to the King’s Ministers. One of them undoubtedly is, the disinclination of the people of this country to substantiate upon oath, before a Court Martial, their complaints of the conduct of the soldiers, without which it is well known that it is impossible for me to punish them: the consequence is, that the criminals are tried, and acquitted for want of evidence; for it is vain to expect evidence of an outrage from the comrades of the soldier who has committed it.

‘The records of the embassy at Lisbon must be filled with



complaints of the same general nature as that which I now return to you, and with demands from me of evidence on the facts stated; the result of which has invariably been, that no evidence has been adduced to substantiate the complaints made, and those who have committed the outrages complained of have remained unpunished.

‘ I am concerned to add that I know of no means which have not already been adopted to endeavor to keep the British soldiers in order. Detachments are never allowed to march, excepting under the command of an officer; and the most strict orders have been given for the regulation of the conduct of the soldiers when so employed; and an officer of the Provost Marshal establishment is employed whenever the numbers of any detachment will justify such an appointment.

‘ But all has hitherto been in vain; the outrages complained of are still perpetrated, and they will continue until the Government and people see the necessity of doing their utmost to convict, before a Court Martial, those soldiers of the crimes of which I am sorry to say I am too well convinced they have reason to complain.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. the Speaker of the House of Commons.*

‘ SIR,

‘ *Viseu, 6th March, 1810.*

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2nd February, in which you enclosed the resolutions of the House of Commons of the 1st February, expressing the approbation of the House of my conduct, and that of the General officers, officers, and troops composing the army under my command in the battle fought at Talavera on the 27th and 28th July last.

‘ In obedience to the orders of the House, I have communicated to the General officers, officers, and troops, this honorable testimony of the approbation of the House; and I beg leave to adopt this mode of expressing to the House the high sense which I entertain of the honor which they have conferred upon me, and upon the army under my command, and to assure them that I shall endeavor to merit their approbation by a zealous discharge of my duty.



‘ I must likewise request you, Sir, to accept my thanks for the kindness towards me in the manner in which you have conveyed to me the pleasure of the House, a kindness of which I had already received repeated proofs during the period that I had the honor of being a member of the House of Commons.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. the  
Speaker of the House of Commons.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Viseu, 6th March, 1810.

‘ No material alteration has taken place in the position of the several armies in this part of Spain since I wrote to you on the 28th of February. The enemy’s corps on the Guadiana have concentrated in the neighbourhood of Merida, keeping only advanced posts to the westward of that town, on both sides of the Guadiana, which still continued fordable; it is probable, however, that the rain which has fallen during the last four days has filled that river.

‘ The enemy’s corps in Old Castille also still continues in the same position upon the Tormes and the Agueda; and I have no further intelligence of the progress of the enemy to the northward.

‘ A part of the Marques da la Romana’s corps has occupied Campo Mayor, its left still remaining at Alburquerque.

‘ I have received no intelligence from Cadiz of a later date than the 15th of February, notwithstanding that measures have been adopted to communicate with that town by Faro, in Algarve.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s dispatch of the 17th February, and I am happy to find that the measure which I had adopted in the beginning of February for the defence of Cadiz has been approved of by His Majesty; and your Lordship may depend upon my paying every attention to that object.

‘ I have not thought it necessary to send any further reinforcement from this army to Cadiz.

‘ Adverting to the general situation of the enemy’s armies,

I do not think that they have, at present, in the neighbourhood of Cadiz, such a force as could attack the Isla de Leon with any prospect of success against the troops occupying the Isla de Leon when the last accounts came away. To these, large reinforcements were expected, as well from Ayamonte as from Gibraltar; including another British battalion from the latter.

‘None of the authorities at Cadiz, whether Spanish or British, had expressed any desire to receive further reinforcements; or any apprehension that the force already in the place was not sufficient to defend it.

‘I understand that there is a party at Cadiz very adverse to receiving the assistance of the British troops in its defence; and, considering the troops already there sufficient for its defence against any attack which may now be reasonably expected, I did not deem it expedient to incur the risk of the refusal of the people of the town, instigated by this party, to admit any reinforcement of British troops which I might send.

‘I have likewise to observe, that the defence of Cadiz and its dependencies is materially aided by the maintenance of our position in Portugal.

‘Although the Isla de Leon, the possession of which I consider essentially necessary to the possession of Cadiz itself, is naturally a very strong position, and the number of troops now at Cadiz are sufficient to defend it against any body which might attempt to carry it by assault, I do not consider the Isla to be in a state of defence against the serious attack which will certainly be made upon it, sooner or later, directed and assisted by all the resources which art can furnish, and made by all the French troops which can be assembled from all parts of the Peninsula.

‘Time will be required to put the Island in a state of defence to stand against this attack; and I have written to General Stewart upon this subject, and have desired him to consider of and fix the principles and plan of the defence of the Isla; and immediately to represent to the Government the probability of their future danger, and to suggest and urge them to construct those works which are most likely to aid them in defeating the enemy in his attack.



‘ In the mean time, the British army in the Peninsula cannot be better employed, even with a view to prevent the enemy from obtaining possession of Cadiz, than in Portugal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Viseu, 8th March, 1810.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 6th, which I received last night. The fact is, that the line of cantonments which we took up, principally with a view to the accommodation of the troops during the winter, and to their subsistence on a point on which it was likely that it might be desirable to assemble the army, will not answer our purpose of assembling upon the Coa, if eventually that should be deemed an object. Neither does our position, as at present occupied, suit the existing organization of the army. For these reasons, I have long intended to alter our disposition, as soon as the season would permit the troops to occupy the smaller villages on the Coa, and as I should be able to bring up the Portuguese light troops of your division to the front.

‘ Since we took up the position which we now occupy, our outposts have come in contact with those of the French; and, although there is some distance between the two, still the arrangement of our outposts must be made on a better principle, and the whole of them must be in the hands of one person, who must be yourself. I propose, therefore, as soon as the weather shall allow of an alteration of the disposition of the advanced corps, that your division, with the hussars, which will be put under your orders, should occupy the whole line of the outposts; and, with this view, the Portuguese corps shall be brought up to the front, as soon as the state of the weather will allow them to march.

‘ I am desirous of being able to assemble the army upon the Coa if it should be necessary; at the same time that I am perfectly aware that, if the enemy should collect in any large numbers in Estremadura, we should be too forward for our communication with General Hill even here, much more so upon the Coa. But till they shall collect in Estre-



madura, and till we shall see more clearly than I can at present what reinforcements they have received, and what military object they have in view, and particularly in the existing disposition of their army, I am averse to withdrawing from a position so favorable as the Coa affords to enable us to collect our army to prevent the execution of any design upon Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I wish you, then, to consider of the posts to be occupied in front of and upon the Coa, to enable me to effect that object. The left should probably be Castel Rodrigo, and I believe you must have a post of observation as far as Alfayates on the right. However, you must be a better judge of the detail of this question than I can be; and I wish you to consider of it, in order to be able immediately to carry the plan into execution, when I shall send to you. In the mean time, the state of the weather, which, from all I can learn, is as bad everywhere as it is here, and the consequence of which must be to fill all the rivers, is no bad security against the effects which might result from the continuance of the existing system of outposts for a few days longer.

‘ I intend that the divisions of General Cole and General Picton should support you on the Coa, without waiting for orders from me, if it should be necessary; and they shall be directed accordingly.

‘ I have accounts from Cadiz as late as the 26th. The French had made no attack, and every thing was going on well and quietly. They have retired from the neighbourhood of Badajoz towards Merida, where they had their head quarters. They still threaten to attack Badajoz.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ *Viseu, 8th March, 1810.*

‘ I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 5th. I now enclose the report of Colonel Fletcher on the ground between Coia and the lake of Albufera, which I am afraid it would be difficult for us to occupy with advantage.

‘ I have very good accounts from General Stewart at

Cadiz. My opinion is, that we want the fleet at Lisbon more than they do at Cadiz.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

*To Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 8th March, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 3rd, but that from Dom Miguel Forjaz has not yet reached me. He knows that I have always considered it necessary to allow the enemy to have a momentary possession of the left bank of the Tagus, in order to concentrate our force to oppose the serious attack which will certainly be made by the right of that river.

‘ In fact, neither Lisbon, nor any thing else of consequence, can be injured by this measure: if we should succeed in maintaining our positions on the right of the river, the enemy on the left must retire; and if we should fail, the latter can do us no mischief, the boats being kept out of their way.

‘ They cannot prevent our embarking, and going out of the Tagus; neither can they prevent our using the river for the communications of the army above Lisbon; nor can they injure the town itself, unless they should have, and bring with them, mortars of the largest size, and for sea service.

‘ At the same time I am well convinced that, when the enemy shall make a serious attack upon Portugal, he will occupy the left bank of the Tagus from Almada to Trafaria.

‘ In respect to the 15,000 men, in addition to those which Government did propose to maintain in this country, I have only to say, that I do not care how many men they send here, provided they will supply us with proportionate means to feed and pay them. But I suspect that they will fall short of, rather than exceed, the 30,000 men. I must observe, however, that it would not become the Portuguese Government to call for an additional number of British troops, their own army wanting nearly 10,000 men to complete the establishment, by the last returns I have seen; many of those now in the ranks being untrained recruits, owing to their having omitted to complete their army till the last moment, contrary to my repeated advice and remonstrances. Besides this, they have no money to pay their militia, and no food to give







l'appeller ainsi) du Portugal ; mais aussi que, si l'ennemi ne peut pas nous forcer, ou nous faire rétrograder de cette position, il sera obligé de faire une retraite, dans laquelle il courra grand risque d'être perdu, et il sera forcé en tout cas d'abandonner tout le territoire Portugais.

‘ S'il nous force à abandonner cette position, nous aurons toujours les moyens de nous embarquer dans le Tage ; surtout s'il nous attaque (ce qui est vraisemblable) dans la belle saison.

‘ Mais pour soutenir cette attaque de l'ennemi, qui sera sûrement faite par des forces aussi grandes que l'ennemi peut supporter dans ce pays ci, il est nécessaire de concentrer nos forces, surtout l'infanterie, au point d'attaque principale. Ce point sera sûrement à la droite du Tage ; malgré que je m'attende qu'il y aura un corps de l'ennemi, probablement assez considérable, sur la rive gauche de la rivière, qui s'emparera des hauteurs qui s'étendent depuis Almada jusqu'à Traffaria.

‘ Je conviens que cette position de l'ennemi peut avoir des inconvéniens pour nous, le plus grand est celui dont vous faites mention ; qu'il sera dans le cas d'exciter des tumultes dans la ville de Lisbonne, ce qui donnerait de l'inquiétude pour les derrières de l'armée dans sa position sur la droite du Tage.

‘ Je ne crois pas qu'il puisse ou passer la rivière dans ces parties là, ou empêcher la navigation, ou faire du mal à la ville de Lisbonne, surtout si l'on ôte tous les canons de gros calibre, qui y sont. Mais il y aura toujours l'inconvénient et le risque dont vous faites mention.

‘ Je compte faire occuper le fort de St. Felipe à Setuval, et le fort de Palmela, surtout pour couvrir la retraite des provisions et des moyens de transport qu'on ôtera de la province d'Estremadure Portugaise ; mais je ne crois pas que tout ce que nous pouvons faire puisse apporter un remède aux inconvéniens dont vous faites mention. D'abord il faut que je vous dise, que, si l'armée Anglaise était au complet, comme elle ne l'est pas, à cause du détachement dernièrement envoyé à Cadiz, et parceque les autres renforts ne sont pas encore arrivés de l'Angleterre, l'armée Portugaise manque encore de plus de monde.

‘ Quand j'ai estimé qu'il y aurait 30,000 troupes Portu-

gaises pour la position sur la droite du Tage, j'ai compté sur une armée de 50,000 hommes, dont 10,000 seraient dans des garnisons, ou employés autre part ; 10,000 malades, et manquant au complet, et 30,000 pour le service. Sur les derniers états que j'ai vus ; il y avait 5000 malades et hors de service, et de 9000 ou 10,000 manquant au complet ; et je crois que je devrais compter sur 20,000, plutôt que sur 30,000 troupes Portugaises réglées dans les positions.

‘ Malgré ces défalcatons, je n'ai pas abandonné mon plan. Après que j'ai eu l'honneur de voir les Gouverneurs du Royaume à Lisbonne, j'ai changé un peu le plan des positions que j'avais arrangées, après avoir fait une reconnaissance plus exacte du terrain ; et les positions qu'on prépare à présent pourront être défendues par des troupes moins nombreuses. Mais il vaudrait mieux avoir 60,000 que de 40,000 à 50,000 pour ces positions ; et sûrement il n'y aura rien à donner à la rive gauche du Tage.

‘ Mais vous dites que l'Angleterre, qui est si intéressée (et de sa gloire et de sa politique) à supporter la lutte sur la Péninsule, devrait renforcer son armée encore de 10,000 à 15,000 hommes, non seulement pour tenir la rive gauche du Tage, mais aussi pour avoir en reserve un corps qui pourrait être jeté de l'un ou de l'autre côté de la rivière, comme il paraîtrait convenable.

‘ En vous écrivant en confidence, je n'ai pas de scrupule, à vous dire, que je ne crois pas que l'Angleterre ait les 10,000 ou 15,000 hommes qu'il faudrait avoir pour cet objet.

‘ Si elle les avait, vous connaissez aussi bien que moi, les difficultés qui existent, de finance et de subsistance, pour le maintien de l'armée que nous avons à présent en Portugal ; et pour donner au Gouvernement Portugais l'assistance qu'il lui faut. L'Angleterre n'a pas le numéraire qui est nécessaire pour le maintien d'une armée plus grande sur la Péninsule ; et vous savez aussi bien que moi, que tout le numéraire qui peut se trouver à Lisbonne et dans la Péninsule est appliqué aux dépenses des armées alliées Portugaises et Anglaises.

‘ Dans l'état d'épuisement où sont les ressources de subsistances du pays, nous ne pouvons pas tenter à augmenter nos armées, sans avoir les moyens de les payer, et de payer pour leurs subsistances.



‘ Je vous avouerais aussi qu’il me paraît n’être pas convenable de demander à sa Majesté d’augmenter ses forces en Portugal, quand en même tems je serais obligé de lui dire que l’armée Portugaise n’est pas au complet ; qu’une grande partie même de ces soldats qui sont dans les rangs, et sur lesquels il faut compter, ne sont que de nouvelles levées parceque les magistrats du pays n’ont fait que dernièrement les efforts qu’il fallait faire pour avoir des recrues pour l’armée, qui n’est même pas encore au complet.

‘ Cependant votre proposition mérite toute l’attention qui est due à vous-même, aussi bien qu’à l’importance de l’objet que vous avez en vue, et auquel nous sommes tous vraiment intéressés. Je vous conseille donc de donner la copie de votre lettre et de votre mémoire, et de cette lettre, à Monsieur Stuart, et de le prier de les envoyer en Angleterre.

‘ Je serais bien aise que les Ministres de sa Majesté vissent la vraie situation des affaires dans la Péninsule, comme elle est décrite par vous ; et la chance qu’il y a qu’elles pourraient encore se rétablir par les efforts et la bravoure des armées alliées auprès de Lisbonne.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Dom Miguel Forjaz.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Viseu, 8th March, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Marshal Beresford, on the subject of your Lordship’s dispatch of the 7th of February, relative to the arms for the Portugese troops, upon which I was desirous of having Marshal Beresford’s report.

‘ As I knew that no event had occurred to the Portuguese troops which could have occasioned the loss of arms, I could not conceive where the waste had occurred to which your Lordship refers in your dispatch. Marshal Beresford has accurately stated the amount of arms received from England in the year 1809, and their disposal. Of the 30,000 stand of arms which were sent with me from England in the year 1808, the Portuguese troops received only 8000 stand, and 3000 stand were delivered to Sir Robert Wilson, for the use of the Lusitanian Legion ; making a total issued in Portugal of 11,000 stand.

‘ The remainder were given, under the orders of the officers



who succeeded to the command of the army, to the Spanish troops released from confinement; a considerable number were sent round to Catalonia, and another proportion delivered to the army of Estremadura, under the command of General Galluzzo.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 9th March, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 25th and 26th of February, and I am much obliged to you for the details which it contains.

‘ I shall send a squadron of British cavalry to Cadiz as soon as it is in my power, by the arrival of the 13th dragoons at Lisbon.

‘ I have directed that a brigade of British light 6 pounder field ordnance, complete with carriages and ammunition, may be sent round to Cadiz without loss of time; together with the camp equipage and stores which you have required from the Quarter Master General, and any baggage, regimental stores, or recruits for the regiments at Cadiz, which may be at Lisbon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General  
the Hon. W. Stewart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 9th March, 1810.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions that transports may be furnished to receive on board a brigade of light 6 pounder field ordnance, some camp equipage, &c., for the troops at Cadiz, and to proceed there as soon as the articles shall be on board.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral  
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S.—Besides the articles above mentioned, I request that any recruits, or recovered men, that may be at Lisbon, belonging to the regiments under General Stewart’s command, may be sent by this opportunity to Cadiz.’

*To Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 10th March, 1810.

‘ I received yesterday, from Baron Tripp, your letter of the 5th instant, with its enclosures. I have never seen the papers enclosed in your dispatch to Lord Wellesley of the 4th, and marked A, B, and C.

‘ My letter of the 3rd will have pointed out to you the objections which I have to throw upon the British Commissariat the management of the civil concerns of the Portuguese army. I know of no English Commissary who is equal to the task of superintending such a concern. Those we now have are scarcely equal to the management of the concerns of the British army.

‘ Besides, the immense detail of business which the defective regulations of the British Commissariat throw upon the Commander in Chief of the British army, in order to apply a remedy to their defects, renders it quite impossible for him to undertake the management of a detail equally great for the Portuguese army; and yet the business can be conducted under one authority only.

‘ Another objection which I have to the alteration is, that it will put out of employment the whole of the civil branch of the Portuguese army, which, in my opinion, has conducted one branch of the service infinitely better, viz., the pay branch, than it could have been conducted by English officers. As for the other branch, the pecuniary difficulties of the Government have been the cause of failures in it, and the troops have suffered from the want of provisions; but if the same pecuniary difficulties were to embarrass the management of an English Commissariat, I know from experience that the troops would suffer equally, if not in a greater degree, from the want of provisions.

‘ There is another circumstance to be adverted to, and that is, that the Portuguese army are serving, and are likely to continue to serve, in their own country; and I cannot but think that the civil branch of the concerns of that army, connected as they are in some degree with the constitution of the country, in a greater degree with the property of the Prince, and with the collection of the revenue, would be better managed by native servants.

‘ I have also to add, that if the management of the civil concerns of the Portuguese army is to be undertaken by the British Commissariat, the detail of the command of the army must be altered likewise, at least if I am to continue in the command of the army.

‘ In respect to embarkation, we must consider a little the details of the subject, and you will then see—first, that Peniche and Setuval can be made use of only as places to receive those who may go to them by sea; secondly, that moveable and rich property can be embarked only by the adoption of previous and even early measures for that purpose; thirdly, that the means of embarkation, which we shall have in our power, will not do more than carry away the British, and probably a part of the Portuguese army, and that there will be no room for Spaniards.

‘ The line of operations which we are obliged to adopt for the defence of Lisbon, and for our own embarkation, necessarily throws us back as far as below Salvaterra on the Tagus, to which place, and I believe lower, the Tagus is fordable during the summer; and we should be liable to be turned and cut off from Lisbon and the Tagus, if we were to take our line of defence higher up the river. This circumstance obliges us to leave Peniche out of our line; and although I propose to occupy that place and improve its defence, as soon as I can get some engineers for the purpose, the communication can be kept up with it only by sea, after the army shall take up the position which it is deemed best that it should occupy, to bring the contest to a decision in this country.

‘ The necessity of concentrating all our force on the right of the Tagus equally obliges us to leave Setuval out of our line; but I propose to occupy Fort S. Philippe and Outaõ, at Setuval and Palmella, with which places also the communication must be kept up by sea, when the army shall take up its position.

‘ I enclose you the copy of a letter which I wrote to Admiral Berkeley\* in October last, which will give you a general idea, as well of the probable attack which will be made upon us, as of the proposed system of defence, and its connection with the different places of embarkation.

\* See p. 244.



‘ When we shall have taken up our position for the defence of Lisbon, the question whether we can hold it will depend upon relative means, and possibly upon the event of a battle. If we should not be able to hold it, I propose to embark the British army, and as many of the Portuguese army as I can bring to consent to embark, under cover of the works which have been, and will be, constructed at St. Julian.

‘ You will observe that one of the events which I consider probable in these operations will be, that the enemy will be in possession of the left bank of the Tagus. Under these circumstances, you will certainly be of opinion that there will be no time, nay, that it will be impossible to embark any quantity of moveable and rich property, unless previous and early measures are adopted for that purpose.

‘ The transports which Government have proposed to supply to carry away the British army is 45,000 tons, which would not be more than sufficient to carry away the British troops. However, with this tonnage, and with the assistance of the fleet of men of war which I expect we shall have, I can carry away both British and Portuguese armies for a short voyage; but I shall not have a single ton for a Spaniard. Government, in the consideration of this subject, have told me that they could not provide tonnage to carry away the Portuguese army, respecting which, however, they have expressed the greatest anxiety; and they have asked me what could be got at Lisbon, &c. &c. My answer has been, nothing at Lisbon; because I believe that although we may discourage a general emigration, we shall find but too many disposed to emigrate; and that every ship in the Tagus will be occupied by persons who will go, more particularly if it be true that early preparatory measures must be adopted with a view even to this partial emigration.

‘ I have already brought this subject under the consideration of Government. My opinion is, that the Portuguese Government, &c., ought to be prepared for this embarkation; that it ought to prepare<sup>\*</sup> at an early period, if any rich or valuable property is to be carried away, notwithstanding the inconveniences which may attend this system of preparation, in a view to the contest which we are likely to have;

and I expect that Government will signify their orders upon the subject.

‘ This being the case in regard to the tonnage, I cannot, as an honest man, encourage the Spanish armies to retire upon Portugal, however it may strengthen ourselves at the critical moment. If the Spanish, and even the Portuguese troops were like others, and I could reckon with entire confidence upon their exertions in the hour of trial, I should urge the Marques de la Romana to co-operate with us in the defence of our position, from being certain that we can lose it only from the deficiency of numbers of good troops to defend it. But if he should retire with us towards the Tagus, and if, as is probable, his troops should behave ill, and if consequently we should be obliged to embark, I should have treated him ungenerously and ill to leave him behind. I therefore propose to leave him upon the rear of the enemy, as I shall the greatest part of the Portuguese militia, and all those troops of the line which will be in garrisons, in forts, &c. &c.

‘ As for the advantage which the enemy will derive from finding at Lisbon rich and valuable property, I cannot put it in competition with that which they would derive from obtaining the services of a large, and, to a certain degree, disciplined army. To remove this instrument out of their way should be the first object of our attention, and afterwards any thing else of which it may be desirable to deprive them; and those persons and families whom it may be desirable to remove from their reach.

‘ The Spanish troops, you will see from the preceding statement, cannot be removed, from the want of means.

‘ If Captain Francesi is in the Quarter Master General’s department, I have reason to be satisfied with him. He is an Italian. We call him Franciozi, but it may be the same person. He is now at Oporto by my leave.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Charles, Stuart, Esq.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I have received Dom Miguel Forjaz’s letter and *mémoire*, to which I have written him an answer, which I have requested him to communicate to you.’



*To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 11th March, 1810.

‘ I have always been of opinion that the bât and forage being a sum of money given to officers of the army to enable them to defray certain extraordinary expenses imposed upon them while on service in the field, it was not the intention of the Legislature that the income tax should be deducted from it; but I gave up my opinion, however confirmed by reflection, upon finding that you had received one of a different tenor, although a verbal one, and therefore liable to be mistaken, from one of the Comptrollers of army accounts.

‘ I now find from the enclosed copy of a letter from the Under Secretary of State in the War Department to the Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Department, that the subject has lately been considered by the War Office, by the Lords of the Treasury, and by the Secretary of State; and that the result of their consideration of the subject has been an agreement with my opinion, “that no deduction (of income tax) is made from the allowance of bât and forage, or from other allowances granted specifically to cover certain expenses to which the officers may be supposed to be subjected.”

‘ The stoppage of income tax, which has heretofore been made from the bât and forage of the army, is therefore improper, and ought not to have been made, and must be restored to those from whom it was improperly made; and I beg you not to stop the income tax from the bât and forage now about to be issued to the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.,*  
*Commissary General.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Viseu, 11th March, 1810.

‘ I enclose a memorandum which is circulated to you, Generals Picton and Cole, to provide for the outposts, and for their support, without further reference to me, on the principles on which I wrote to you the other day.

‘ I have not yet heard from Coimbra respecting the light



battalions which are there, but I should think that they would be with you in a few days.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Brig. General R. Craufurd.’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*Memorandum for Major Generals Picton and Cole, and  
Brigadier General R. Craufurd.*

‘ Viseu, 11th March, 1810.

‘ The regiment of hussars are to be placed under the orders of Brigadier General R. Craufurd, who is to dispose of them, and his division of infantry, in such manner as to observe the enemy’s movements upon the Agueda, and between that river and the Coa.

‘ He will leave in the rear, in their present quarters, for the sake of forage, such of the hussars as he will not require in front. I beg General Cole to let General Craufurd know what posts of hussars he has in front of, or on, the Coa.

‘ I am desirous of being able to collect the army upon the Coa, in case the enemy should attack Ciudad Rodrigo, only in such force as to afford a prospect that I shall be able to relieve it.

‘ Major General Picton and Major General Cole are therefore to support Brigadier General Craufurd upon the Coa, in case the enemy should collect in force upon the Agueda, or on this side of that river.

‘ In case Brigadier General Craufurd should require assistance in infantry to occupy any posts upon the Coa, till the Portuguese brigade of light infantry shall have joined him, I wish Major General Cole to give it to him.

‘ I beg Brigadier General Craufurd to inform Major General Picton, and Major General Cole, as well as myself, of all that passes in front.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 11th March, 1810.

‘ I have given directions to the Commanding Officer of the artillery at Lisbon to embark in the ordnance store ships, from which the heavy ordnance and stores will have been disembarked, all the ordnance and military stores belonging

to the British army on shore at Lisbon; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will direct that such assistance as may be necessary may be given to him, to enable him to perform this service.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*  
‘ *the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Viseu, 12th March, 1810.

‘ As the Portuguese Government have in store but a small quantity of gunpowder, I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship that 2000 barrels of gunpowder may be sent to the Tagus, as soon as may be practicable.

‘ I am also desirous of having in the Tagus an additional quantity of 2,000,000 musket ball cartridges.

‘ The supply already in Portugal is large; but as I have been obliged to place it in deposits in different parts of the country, on account of the difficulties and uncertainty of conveyance, I am desirous of having in the Tagus this additional quantity.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Secretary to the Treasury.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 12th March, 1810.

‘ Mr. Francis Charles Philips, a merchant, had been employed by the Secretary of State to purchase grain in the Mediterranean for the use of His Majesty’s army, and of those of his allies employed in the Peninsula; and having purchased a large quantity of wheat and barley at Malta, Sir Alexander Ball, the late Governor of that island, permitted him to use the transports then stationed there to convey the wheat and barley to Portugal. The grain accordingly arrived in seven transports in two convoys: the first, consisting of four vessels, was about seven weeks; the other, consisting of three vessels, about four months on their passage.

‘ The agent of transports at Lisbon, acting under the orders of the Commander in Chief of His Majesty’s fleet in



the Tagus, has called upon Mr. Philips to pay for these transports, during the time they have been employed by him, the same sum which they have cost His Majesty, and he has paid the agent of transports £3422 for the use of 1083 tons, which imported the first cargoes of corn; and the Commissary General, who has purchased the grain from Mr. Philips, has retained in his hands the sum of £3725, to answer the demand of the Transport Board for 677 tons, which imported the second cargo.

‘ I enclose an affidavit sworn by Mr. Philips on this subject, from which it does not appear that any bargain had been made by Mr. Philips with Sir Alexander Ball respecting the freight of the transports; and it is probable that Captain Lambe, the agent of transports at Malta, is the only person who has a knowledge of Sir Alexander Ball’s intentions.

‘ Whether he intended to give Mr. Philips the use of the transports without payment of freight, from a view of the advantage which His Majesty’s service was likely to derive from the employment of them, or not, I think it almost certain that Sir Alexander Ball never could have proposed that he should pay, and that Mr. Philips never would have consented to pay, so high a price as the monthly tonnage of the transports paid by His Majesty.

‘ Mr. Philips was obliged to deliver the grain on the Peninsula at as cheap a rate as grain of the same quality and description could be purchased in the markets there; on no other terms could the Commissary General purchase it; and it is not probable that it could have been in the contemplation of Mr. Philips to sell grain at Lisbon at the market price of Portugal which was purchased at Malta, and for which freight was to be paid at the high rate paid by His Majesty for the vessels used as transports in his service.

‘ If I am correct in this conjecture, and if there is no evidence that Mr. Philips did engage to pay this high rate of freight, I beg leave to recommend to their Lordships to order the Commissioners of Transports to give directions to their agent at Lisbon to settle with Mr. Philips for the freight of this grain, according to the ordinary price of freight from Malta to Lisbon; and that the Commissary General should be directed to retain the sum thus settled as the price



of the freight, and to pay Mr. Philips the overplus of that sum out of the money now in his hands.

‘ It will still remain to be ascertained by inquiry from Captain Lambe and other authorities at Malta, whether the late Sir Alexander Ball made any engagement with Mr. Philips that he should have the transports without payment of freight.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Secretary  
to the Treasury.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Secretary to the Treasury.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 13th March, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 22nd January, in answer to mine of the 20th November, on the subject of the vouchers required to the accounts of Staff officers.

‘ I do not exactly understand whether it is the pleasure of their Lordships that the accounts of Staff officers, having been examined and certified by the Commissary of Accounts, subject to such observations and queries thereon as their deficiencies in point of vouchers may require, are to be paid by the Commissary General, or are to remain unpaid until the Auditors of Public Accounts, or ultimately the Board of Treasury, upon the statements of the officers, shall make such allowance for such deficient vouchers as shall appear to be just and equitable under the circumstances of the case.

‘ If the former should be the intention of their Lordships, I presume that they intend to suspend the 19th article of the Instructions to the Commissary General, which requires that all bills should be sent to the Commissary of Accounts, who is to certify that they are correct; and that their Lordships intend that the Commissary General should pay the bills of Staff officers, notwithstanding that they are not correct in vouchers, subject to the future decision of the Auditors of Public Accounts, or of their Lordships.

‘ I request to know whether I am correct in this construction of their Lordships’ intention in your letter of the 22nd January.

‘ I beg leave to submit to their Lordships, that instances daily occur of expenses incurred by Staff officers, for which

they cannot produce the voucher required by the Commissary of Accounts under his Instructions, viz., the receipt of the party, subscribed by a creditable witness; and it is a hardship upon these officers to oblige them to incur and pay these expenses for the public, and afterwards to prove, at a distance from the scene of action, and in years after the occurrence of the necessity for the payment, before persons entirely unacquainted with the nature of the service, that they could not procure the vouchers which the regulations required.

‘ If, however, it should not be the intention of their Lordships to suspend the 19th article of the Instructions to the Commissary General, it becomes still more unjust towards Staff officers to oblige them to incur expenses of this description, the amounts of which cannot be paid till the Auditors of Public Accounts, or their Lordships, shall have been convinced that the required voucher could not be obtained or produced.

‘ In my letter of the 20th November, I referred to their Lordships’ consideration two distinct classes of accountants, suffering under the operation of these Instructions to the Commissary of Accounts: Staff officers who had incurred expenses for the public before they knew that these additional vouchers would be required; and Staff officers who had, or who should incur expenses on account of the public, of which, from their nature, the requisite vouchers cannot be procured. Those first mentioned must be involved to the full amount of their demands upon the public under the operation of their Lordships’ orders, notwithstanding the apparent injustice of applying to these accounts rules of which the officers could have no knowledge, and which are not observed by the War Office in passing accounts of this description for expenses incurred in Great Britain.

‘ These last mentioned will be involved only in the amount of expenses for which it is impracticable to produce the required vouchers.

‘ I am desirous of knowing the pleasure of their Lordships, upon what is submitted in this letter, by an early opportunity.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Secretary  
to the Treasury.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’



*To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Viseu, 13th March, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th. In order to accelerate the communication between you and me, I have had post mules placed on the direct road from Thomar to Viseu. If, therefore, you should have occasion to send an officer, desire him to come from Thomar by the road of which I enclose the stages. It will save some leagues.

‘ Believe me, &amp;c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 13th March, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 7th and 10th. I have no means of employing the person whom you mention (——) excepting as a captain in the Corps of Guides, for which the requisite qualities are intelligence, some honesty, and a knowledge of the Spanish or Portuguese languages, and English or French. I should wish, however, not to employ him, as he would have opportunities of acquiring and conveying to the enemy much useful information.

‘ I would recommend to you to send him to England, apprizing the Government that I had no means of employing him.

‘ The case of Colonel —— was as follows. He deserted from the French service to the Marques de la Romana last spring; by whom he was sent to England with a letter of recommendation. Lord Castlereagh sent him to Portugal with directions to Marshal Beresford to employ him in the Portuguese service; Beresford would not employ him excepting in a subaltern situation; and he then came to me, who had no means whatever of employing him. I offered him a commission either in the British or Portuguese service, but he would not accept one of a lower rank than Colonel, which I could not give him; and I then supplied him with money to return to England, as he was apprehensive or unwilling to adopt the alternative proposed for him by Lord Castlereagh, of going into the Spanish service, if Marshal Beresford would not accept of his services in that of Portugal.

‘ We owe you above £120,000 on account of the Aids to the 24th of February, but we have no money to pay you.



The army is nearly two months in arrears. If the Ministers do not supply us with money from England, we cannot get on.

‘ Believe me, &c.

\* *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Viseu, 14th March, 1810.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I wrote many months ago\* to the Commander in Chief, on the subject of an important branch of the equipment of the army, which has, I understand, been brought under the consideration of the Treasury, and no answer has yet been returned.

‘ The inconveniences which are the consequence of this delay in giving an answer are increasing daily; and they will be most seriously and severely felt by the troops, if they should be engaged in operations with the enemy, before arrangements are made to provide for the essential object, the mode of providing for the carriage of their camp kettles, discussed in that letter.

‘ I beg only to mention, that the soldiers cannot cook their food unless they have camp kettles.

‘ I also beg again to draw your Lordship’s attention to the frequent applications which I have made for money from England, and which have been repeated to the Treasury by the Commissary General. It becomes every day more difficult to procure in this country the supplies and means required by the army without paying for them in ready money; and there is a monthly demand for the Portuguese Government amounting to £80,000, without the payment of which their army must disband.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Viseu, 14th March, 1810.

‘ The enemy’s armies have continued nearly in the same positions since I wrote to you last.

‘ Marshal Mortier has fixed his head quarters at Zafra, communicating by Almendralejo with the corps called Soult’s, which is at Merida.

\* 28th September, 1809.

‘ One of the divisions of the Spanish corps under the Marques de la Romana has gone to Xerez de los Cavalleros, with a view to alarm the French for their communication with Andalusia, and another division to Olivença. The left of this corps still continues at Alburquerque.

‘ My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 26th, at which time the 2nd batt. 88th regiment, and a detachment of artillery and some Spanish troops, had arrived from Gibraltar. The enemy had made no attack. Our troops had retaken possession of Fort Matagorda (which had at first been destroyed) with a view to protect the communication between the outer and inner harbour.

‘ The enemy had repaired Fort Catalina on the northern shore, but it has been discovered that the entrance to the harbour between the Diamond Rock and Los Puercos is equally practicable for large ships with that north of the Diamond.

‘ Nothing of importance has occurred in the north of Spain or in Old Castille.

‘ There is a report, to which, however, I do not give credit, that a Spanish corps from Valencia has entered the upper part of La Mancha, and has impeded the communication with Madrid through La Mancha.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Viseu, 15th March, 1810.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 12th, and directions have been sent to General Craufurd that you may be kept informed of what passes directly in your front by the hussars stationed there, as soon as possible.

‘ If you should find it necessary, and the weather should not be too bad, I have no objection to your making the disposition of your division which you propose; although I cannot tell you exactly when the Portuguese brigade will join you, as that depends upon their receipt of some articles of clothing and equipments.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General  
the Hon. L. Cole.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 15th March, 1810.

‘ I have sent to Colonel Fletcher your observation upon his report, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send with him the guide to look at the ground which has been described to you.

‘ I have also written to him about the telegraph, upon which I have requested him to speak to you.

‘ I have done every thing in my power to prevail upon them to send away the Spanish ships from Cadiz. If I can get them to Mahon, I think I shall do a great deal; and I have begged to secure that island, which is at present a most important object. The Spaniards will never consent to send the ships to Malta, and to propose it will only alarm the jealousy which has but lately been in some degree allayed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ We have embarked some men in the “Langley” transport, to be taken to the Tagus, when she can get out of the Mondego, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will send this vessel back again.’

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 15th March, 1810.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you, if you will give directions that a passage to England may be furnished to certain officers and non-commissioned officers of the 23rd dragoons, as well as to the men belonging to the depôt squadrons of the regiments of cavalry in this country, of which officers and men the Commandant at Lisbon will give the Agent of Transports the detail.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*the Hon. G. Berkeley.’*



*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD, ‘ Viseu, 15th March, 1810.

‘ I enclose the last weekly State. I had yesterday a conversation with General Sir J. C. Sherbrooke regarding the state of his health, and he is decidedly of opinion that he cannot last beyond the end of next month; and he is determined to go home at that time, or in the beginning of May.

‘ As your Lordship has settled with General Graham that he is to come out to succeed General Sherbrooke, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will arrange with him to be at Lisbon in the first week in May.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Viseu, 16th March, 1810.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 15th, enclosing Cornet Cordemann’s of the 14th, from Villar Mayor. I think that the enemy’s troops near Ciudad Rodrigo, to which Cornet Cordemann refers, are a detachment which went to Alverca on the 10th, whose object apparently was to cut off the Spanish General Carrera, who had pushed himself into the mountains to the eastward of Baños.

‘ We should certainly have heard of a collection at, or a movement from Salamanca, from some of the posts on the lower part of the Agueda before we should have heard of it from Villar Mayor; and all the intelligence which I have from Chaves of as late a date as the 8th, would tend to show that the enemy’s views were rather directed to that quarter than to this at present. Junot’s corps is positively stated to be at Leon; although Loison’s has moved towards Salamanca.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General  
the Hon. L. Cole.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 16th March, 1810.

‘ I have reason to believe that Mr. Commissary White will have procured 100,000 dollars at Coruña for bills upon England, which have been sent to him, by the time that a vessel will arrive there to receive that money; and I shall accordingly be much obliged to you, if you will dispatch to Coruña a vessel to bring to Lisbon that sum of money.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral  
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 17th March, 1810.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 14th and its enclosures.

‘ It is strange that I should have received no letters from Cadiz since the 26th February.

‘ I have desired the Quarter Master General to direct Captain Mackenzie to arrange with the Agent of Transports for the embarkation of the camp equipage in store. I shall be obliged to you if you will desire Lieut. Fleetwood to communicate with Captain Mackenzie on the subject. This will clear us of Portugal with every thing excepting what we have with the army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral  
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 17th March, 1810.

‘ I have received your two letters of the 13th. The Regency of Portugal having been appointed by orders from the Brazils, I do not conceive that any act of their own can legally put out any member, or admit one in the place of another who has absented himself from their meetings. Even if it were desirable that any particular person should belong to the Regency (and I acknowledge that I do not know of any person of a description to be of use to the Go-

vernment in any way), I should doubt the expediency of shaking the foundation of the authority of the Regency, which consists in the soundness of their appointment. My opinion is, therefore, that you ought to confine yourself to making observations on the continued absence of the Marquez das Minas from the Regency, and its supposed cause, and on the bad effects which such conduct must have, as well on the public interests as on the character of the Marquez himself; and to a recommendation that the Regency should suggest to the Prince to appoint a member instead of the Marquez das Minas.

‘ I am entirely ignorant of the general nature, as well as of the detail, of the arrangement made by Mr. Villiers for paying the money from the chest of the “aids” to the Portuguese Government; and it is impossible for me to give any opinion how far the system could be relaxed with propriety, so as to give the Government the use of the money at an earlier period. My opinion is, that the return signed by Marshal Beresford, on the 1st of March, of the number of men in the regiments supposed to be in the service of Great Britain in the month of February, might be a sufficient voucher to you to pay the Government for the troops for the month of February, as soon as you should have the money in the chest of the “aids” to enable you to pay them. I do not think you could pay them sooner with propriety; and it does not occur to me that any other check besides the Marshal’s return is necessary. However, I write with diffidence upon this part of the subject, as I am entirely ignorant of the principles, as well as of the detail of the system established by Mr. Villiers.

‘ My opinion is, that the 30,000 men to be paid should be either 30,000 rank and file, or 30,000 including officers and non-commissioned officers, according to the original estimate of the expense sent from this country to England, which I have not got, and which I never saw, excepting once, when reading Mr. Villiers’s dispatches in Mr. Canning’s office. It was according to this estimate that Great Britain engaged to pay for the 10,000 men, and then for the 20,000, and lastly for the 30,000; and as we oblige the Portuguese Government to abide by it, we are equally bound to abide by it in an instance in which it may not be quite so advan-



tageous to ourselves. I am the person who prevailed upon the British Government to grant to Portugal payment for the last 10,000 men, and the £130,000 for the officers; and I know that the payment for the last was asked for and was granted upon the same principle as the payment for the first was granted.

‘ I have no doubt that a great deal might be done to secure further means of embarking the army, and those it may be thought expedient to remove from the country, if timely measures are adopted. I have written to England upon this subject, and I hope that Government will have decided upon the line they will adopt, and will instruct us by the first packet.

‘ I have not yet returned the interesting papers which you sent me, as I am taking copies of some of them. Have you any plans with them?

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Viseu, 19th March, 1810.

‘ I received yesterday your two letters of the 17th, containing Cornet Cordemann’s reports of the 16th and 17th. I desired Captain Roveria to tell you that I had reason to believe that Cornet Cordemann’s report of the 14th was in some degree founded. There is no doubt that the enemy have, since the 12th, collected a large force on the left of the Tormes.

‘ My information from Chaves of the 9th stated that Junot, with another corps, was at Leon; and I conclude that the troops between the Tormes and the Agueda are the corps of Ney, Kellermann, and Loison.

‘ I think that the first operation will be to the northward. If they seriously intend to attack Ciudad Rodrigo, it is extraordinary that they should collect a force in the country from which they must draw their subsistence during the continuance of the siege, and keep it there for so many days.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General  
the Hon. L. Cole.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.*

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Viseu, 20th March, 1810.

‘I received last night your letter of the 17th. It is strange that the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo should have no intelligence of the enemy’s movements near his garrison, of which we have received so many accounts. I should believe them not to be true, and that no troops have moved towards the Sierra de Francia excepting those which were at St. Felices, and their movement was probably occasioned by that of Carrera.

‘Mr. Ogilvie and Mr. Drake have been sent to your division as Commissaries. Mr. Ogilvie bears an excellent character. I shall speak to the Commissary General about your wine; and I shall send you some shoes. We have, however, very few in this neighbourhood, as the vagabonds who come from the hospital sell every thing upon the road, and it is generally necessary to supply them with all the requisites for a soldier as they pass through this place. I have, however, ordered forward a large supply, of which you shall have your share.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Brig. General*  
*R. Craufurd.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.*

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Viseu, 21st March, 1810.

‘I write to let you know that 800 pairs of shoes are ordered to Celorico for the use of your troops; and the Commissary General tells me that your Commissary has 12,000 dollars. I have spoken to him about your wine.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Brig. General*  
*R. Craufurd.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P.S.—21st March. Since writing the above, I have received your letter of the 18th. I should be glad if I could spare our horses the duty of carrying letters, on which indeed they are employed in no instance excepting between you and Celorico.



‘ We have no Portuguese cavalry near this at present. It is useless to desire you to buy a few horses or mules purposely for the performance of this duty, when you complain of the want of money for other more essential purposes; and unless the 12,000 dollars already sent have reached you, and are sufficient for the present, we have no more which we can send you. I will see, however, if I cannot get from the Commissary General 8 or 10 tolerable mules to be employed on this duty. You should make the horses go very short stages.

‘ I hope that you will find the Caçadores better than you expect they will be. It is impossible to get Elder’s corps for you, otherwise you may depend upon it that I should have been happy to make your division so much stronger.’

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 20th March, 1810.

‘ I enclose a letter from Colonel Peacocke to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, containing one from Mr. Joseph Baron Crispin, of the 8th March, from Faro, from which it appears that that gentleman is not acquainted with the arrangements made by you for the conveyance of the letters for Cadiz from that place, as stated in your letter of the 19th February. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will give directions that he may be apprized of them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

*To Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 20th March, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 17th instant. The Commissary General draws for all money required for the service in Portugal, in consequence of orders from England which have been given; because it was supposed that the money which could be procured upon the Peninsula for bills would come into the military chest at a cheaper rate, if only one person, instead of many, should draw the bills upon England. The different departments, however, to which



the Commissary General advances money (the heads of which would come into the market with their bills, if it had not been settled that the Commissary General's bills alone should come into the market) ought to give the Commissary General a bill upon the head of the department in England for every sum of money which they receive here. The Commissary General would send these bills to the Treasury, and they would be settled with the heads of the departments respectively upon which the bills would have been drawn.

‘ This is the mode in which the Deputy Paymaster General of the army and the ordnance are supplied with money, and in which they settle for the advances made to them; and it is the mode in which it would be most regular and satisfactory, and indeed most safe, for the British Minister to settle for the sums paid into the chest of the “ aids.”

‘ After this statement, you will see that I can have no desire to alter the mode of proceeding hitherto adopted. That proposed by the Commissary General to you would be the most regular; but that hitherto in use answers our purposes, and gives us a voucher for the issue of the money, which is all I can require. I confess, however, that if I were in your situation, and feeling, as I do, that the Minister must in this, as he is in every other instance of a subsidy, be accountable, I should prefer to give bills for every sum received from the Commissary General, to allowing sums to be received from him by Mr. Bell, upon a general order and authority conveyed by a letter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Viseu, 20th March, 1810.

‘ I hope your Lordship will excuse me for drawing your attention again to the state of this army for the want of money.

‘ I have long been obliged to keep the pay of the troops one month in arrear, contrary to His Majesty's regulations, and the practice and necessities of the service, and we have not money enough to pay them at the end of this month;

and, by accounts from Lisbon, up to the 17th, there is no money there which can be sent.

‘Your Lordship is aware that all the money for the service in Portugal passes through the hands of the Commissary General, who pays to the order of His Majesty’s Minister at Lisbon such portion of the sums in his hands as may be applicable to Portuguese services.

‘The fairest and most proper mode of fixing the sums which should be applicable to Portuguese services in each month was, that that sum should be paid by the Commissary General to the King’s Minister, which should bear the proportion to the whole sum received by him during the month which the expense of the Portuguese services should bear to the whole expense incurred in the Peninsula, and paid by the Commissary General. On this principle the proportion to be paid for Portuguese services, in each month, of the sums passing through the Commissary General’s hands, has been fixed by me lately at two sevenths of the whole, which is about the proportion that the expense of the Portuguese services bears to the whole British expense in the Peninsula. Under this head, there is due to the British Minister upon an account closed to the 24th February, not less than £160,000, for the payment of which there are not sufficient funds in hand; and the close of another month is approaching. The same proportion of the receipts of this month ought to be allotted for the payment of these services.

‘It must be obvious to your Lordship that the King’s Minister cannot perform His Majesty’s engagements to the Portuguese Government unless money is supplied to him; and the accounts which have been transmitted to England from this country will have convinced His Majesty’s Government that it will be impossible to keep the Portuguese army together, if the Government is not assisted with money to pay it regularly.

‘The want of money to pay the British troops with regularity, and to discharge the demands for their provisions, forage, and means of transport, is also an evil which may be attended by the most serious consequences, in the critical situation in which the army may shortly be placed.

‘The constitution, and the whole system of the discipline, efficiency, and equipment of the British army, depend upon



regular payments. All the soldiers' necessaries, and much of their provisions, and the provisions, equipments, and comforts of the officers, are purchased and paid for out of their pay; and if these articles cannot be paid for, the soldiers will take them without payment, notwithstanding all the exertions of the officers to prevent them.

'The quantity of supplies drawn from Portugal for the use of the British and Portuguese armies has been so large, that it is most difficult now to procure any without payment. I have accounts from all quarters of the increasing difficulties in the supply of the troops; and it is reasonable to suppose that the inhabitants of the country are unwilling to part with their provisions, without payment in ready money, to an army which they must expect will, before long, evacuate the country.

'If not supplied with money in sufficient quantity to pay for the supplies required, the supplies must be taken from the country, without payment, by force. Detachments of the troops must be employed upon this service, instead of in opposing the invasion of the enemy; and fresh opportunities will be afforded for the disorders and outrages to which I have more than once drawn your Lordship's attention, at the moment at which every thing may depend upon the efficiency, discipline, and good order of the troops, and upon the good will of the inhabitants of the country.

'I beg to refer your Lordship to my former letters upon this subject, in which I apprized you of the sums which would be necessary by the month of February, and of my opinion that a monthly supply, equal in amount to the increased monthly subsidy to the Portuguese Government, ought to be sent to Portugal.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Earl of Liverpool.*'

'WELLINGTON.'

*To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Viseu, 21st March, 1810.

'I find, by a communication from Colonel Fisher, that after he shall have landed the heavy ordnance, and the necessary quantity of stores, and occupying the tonnage which these will vacate by placing in those ships the ordnance and military stores now on shore, which they will hold,



he will still require 2121 tons. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire the Agent of Transports to communicate with Colonel Fisher, and to arrange for the reception and embarkation of these stores.

‘I am very anxious to have every thing in such a state that we may either go or stay, according as it may be expedient, in view to the force by which we shall be attacked.

‘The Agent of Transports has mentioned to Colonel Murray that he wished to have back the transports from Cadiz. I was desirous that the transports should remain there when first the troops were detached, in order that General Stewart might have it in his power to withdraw when it should be necessary; and I now wish the transports to remain there, in order that we may have the assistance of the troops from Cadiz, if the French should withdraw from their position before Cadiz, when they shall attack Portugal, which I think not an improbable event.

‘However, you will of course give such orders for the transports as you may think best.

‘The arrangement for the embarkation made by Lieut. Fleetwood is very satisfactory; and the more we conclude upon this subject beforehand, the better shall we execute our business when it comes to the point. I mean, however, to try to prevail upon some, if not all, of the Portuguese infantry at least to evacuate with us, if we should be forced to adopt that measure; and in that case it would be best probably to put them in the transports, and the British troops in the men of war, of which I hope you will soon have a good fleet. We would leave the baggage of the British regiments in the transports, and put nothing but the officers and men in the ships of war, unless you should think it best to take the Portuguese troops into the ships of war.

‘I hope that Mr. Stuart will soon have directions from Government to settle with the Portuguese Government for the preparation of their ships for evacuation, in case it should be necessary.

‘I requested the Secretary of State long ago to send out six good hospital ships, which I hope will arrive when the weather permits.

‘The Secretary of State has consented to the measure which I proposed, of not bringing away more than the best

of the horses, principally those belonging to the officers of the army. I understood that they would have at Lisbon transports for 600 horses, which would be sufficient for every thing; but there ought to be tonnage for that number which we have in the army of valuable horses.

‘ I see that Lieut. Fleetwood talks of dismantling some of the horse ships, which, adverting to their utility, and the expense of fitting them up, it would probably be best to avoid till the last moment.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 21st March, 1810.

‘ I send some dispatches for England, and some for Cadiz, the last of which I request you to ask the Admiral to forward by a ship of war, as I apprehend that all those which I have sent by the communication which Admiral Berkeley had imagined was arranged between Faro and Cadiz have failed to reach their destination. If the Admiral should be unable to send these dispatches, I shall then request you to ask the Portuguese Government to send there one of their vessels.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Viseu, 21st March, 1810.

‘ I have heard of your arrival at Cadiz, though not from yourself, as I understand that the Captain of the ship which was dispatched from Cadiz, purposely to carry letters from you to Mr. Stuart and me, sailed without your letters. Neither have I heard from General Stewart since the 26th of February, or from Mr. Frere for a still longer period. I am apprehensive, also, that all my letters to General Stewart and Mr. Frere have miscarried, as I learned yesterday that the communication which Admiral Berkeley had considered certain between Faro and Cadiz had failed entirely. I therefore send to them duplicates by this opportunity.



‘ I have nothing new to tell you from this quarter. The French army is stationed as follows, as far as I can learn. There is a corps under General —, of 6000 or 7000 men, in the Asturias: they have possession of Oviedo, and have pushed forward as far as the Narcea. Junot’s corps, called by the Spaniards 12,000, but which I should imagine is nearer 20,000, is in the kingdom of Leon, threatening Astorga; upon which place, however, they had made no attack as late as the 13th of this month. Ney is upon the Tormes, and between that river and the Agueda, with his own corps, that of Loison, and that of Kellermann. He threatens Ciudad Rodrigo, upon which, however, he had made no attack as late as the 19th. Our advanced posts touch his upon the Agueda.

‘ Sout’s corps, and a part of Regnier’s reserve, are at Merida, and Mortier’s corps at Zafra. These threaten Badajoz, upon which they had made no attack as late as the 19th. They have in their front the Marques de la Romana’s corps, which has extended its right to Xerez de los Cavaleros, and has its left at Alburquerque. He is well situated for *la petite guerre*.

‘ The right wing of the British army is at Portalegre.

‘ The left division of Romana’s corps, under General O’Donnell, has lately had some success against a French detachment at Caceres. Romana has likewise a small detachment at Coria, on this side of the Tagus, under General Carrera.

‘ The corps of Victor and Sebastiani, the guards, and the reserve, which usually marches with the King, are in Andalusia; where, I do not know, as we have no intelligence of what is passing to the southward.

‘ I believe that all the reinforcements intended for Spain have arrived, with the exception of the Imperial Guards; and I conclude that operations will commence as soon as the weather holds up. My opinion is, that they will commence on our right and left in Estremadura and Galicia.

‘ It is very desirable that I should be constantly informed of what is passing in other parts of Spain, as far as may be possible; and I wish you would let me have all the intelligence received by the Government.



‘Some letters were intercepted lately, which I have reason to believe were interesting: among others one from Berthier to Soult. I should be very glad to have a copy of them.

‘It is reported that the French are about to withdraw from their position before Cadiz, which I think not unlikely, particularly if there should be any insurrection, or any opposition to them by the people in any part of Spain; or if they should have any reason to apprehend any thing from Blake’s corps, or the army said to be in Valencia, while they will be engaged in their operations in the west of the Peninsula. At all events, Cadiz has nothing to apprehend till we shall have been obliged to evacuate Portugal.

‘If the French should withdraw from their position before Cadiz, I wish you would consider, and let me know your opinion, whether it would be safe to let me have back in Portugal some, at least, of my troops. I am aware that the decision whether any of these troops should be allowed to quit Cadiz does not depend solely upon military considerations; and that much will depend upon the temper and spirit of the people, upon their determination to hold out, and upon the prospect that they will admit us again to their assistance, if we should fail in being able to maintain our ground in Portugal.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Viseu, 21st March, 1810.

‘I enclose the last weekly State.

‘There is nothing new. I have no intelligence from Cadiz, and I am apprehensive that the measures for keeping up the communication between that place and Faro, which Admiral Berkeley considered effectual, have entirely failed.

‘I understand, however, that there was a gale of wind at Cadiz in the beginning of the month, in which one Spanish three-decker, two Spanish and one Portuguese 74, were driven on the side of the harbour in possession of the enemy, and were lost. The men were all saved, and were taken out of the ships by the boats of our fleet.

‘Some merchantmen, American as well as English, and

one English transport, having on board 130 men of the 4th foot, were likewise lost: I hear that the men of the 4th foot were made prisoners by the enemy. This is the only advantage the enemy acquired from the effects of this gale, excepting a few boats, as I understand that they burnt all the ships that were cast so far on the shore that our seamen could not reach them.

‘ You cannot conceive how much the want of money distresses us; and I cannot imagine why the Treasury cannot purchase bullion in London, and send it to Lisbon, as well as the merchants, who make an enormous profit by the trade. The Government would save much if they could send us money. One of the causes of our distress at present is that the late gales have prevented the packets from arriving at Lisbon; and this consequence of the delay in their arrival, which is invariable, is one proof, among many others, that a most profitable trade is carried on in bullion between Fal-mouth and Lisbon.

‘ I understand, also, that my brother had arrived at Cadiz.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Viseu, 23rd March, 1810.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 20th, informing me of the attack on the post at Barba de Puerco, which I imagine ought to have been dated the 21st, and that the attack was made on the night of the 19th.

‘ I beg that you will assure Colonel Beckwith\*, and the officers and soldiers under his command, that their conduct in this affair has augmented the confidence which I have in the troops, when opposed to the enemy in any situation.

‘ If the wounded should be unable to march, you had better send them back to the hospital at Coimbra.

‘ I think that the enemy are not likely to disturb you again at present. They have withdrawn Mortier’s corps from its position at Zafra to Monasterio, at the entrance of

\* Of the 95th or Rifle brigade; afterwards Lieut. General Sir Sidney Beckwith, K.C.B., Commander in Chief at Bombay, where he died.



the Sierra Morena, and it is probable that the corps at Merida will not stay long where it is.

‘ Something (but I do not know what, as I have not received a letter from any authority at Cadiz since the 26th of last month) has occurred in Andalusia. We hear of an insurrection in the Sierra de Ronda, and of the collection of a large army under Blake in Murcia. However, it is very obvious, from this movement of Mortier’s, that the French are not now prepared for an attack upon this country, which, if they are to make it with any effect, must be made on both sides of the Tagus, and with very large force.

‘ I hope that you will find Mr. Downie, whom I propose to send to you, as useful as you expected to find Mr. Ogilvie. The latter has charge of a most important department, which cannot well be made over to another; and nothing but the urgency of the case could have induced the Commissary General to allow him to go to you. You will find Mr. Downie, however, very active and intelligent.

‘ I wish that I could send you some money, but we are in the greatest distress, and, what is worse, have no hopes of relief. The late gales have prevented the import of specie into Lisbon from Gibraltar and Cadiz, and the delay of the arrival of the packet as usual prevents the negotiation of bills at Lisbon. To this add that Government leave me to my own inventions in this, as well as in other respects. If the money were now at Lisbon, a fortnight would elapse before it could possibly reach the army. But I fear there is no chance.

‘ Is it true, as the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo informs General Cox, that the enemy have withdrawn from that neighbourhood towards Salamanca again?

‘ The 800 pairs of shoes are gone to Celorico for your division. The Caçadores will be at Celorico, I think, tomorrow. Ten mules are gone to Almeida, to enable you to mount hussars for the communication duty.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*  
*R. Craufurd.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 23rd March, 1810.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 18th instant, and I am much obliged to you for the opinions which you have communicated to me.

‘ In every case of the kind which you have discussed, I must consider not only what is desirable, but what is practicable; and I must first look a little at the facts of the case, and consider of the means in my power, or likely to be in my power, of their nature, and of the mode in which they will probably operate in the circumstances which will most probably exist.

‘ In case of the occurrence of a great disaster, it will be no justification for me to say that the plan was that of the Portuguese Government, and that I would not oppose it, or that you approved and urged it. In the existing temper of the times, and for *me particularly*, such a justification will not be allowed.

‘ It appears to me that we are all agreed that, although it is desirable, it is not essentially necessary, to hold the left bank of the Tagus; and indeed the great inconvenience which will result from the enemy having possession of that point is that stated in Dom Miguel Forjaz’s letter to me, viz., the facility which it will give them to excite, and the probability that they will succeed in exciting, disturbances in Lisbon.

‘ I acknowledge that I had not before contemplated this danger, to which I have given a good deal of thought since he drew my attention to it, and I hope that I shall find means of getting the better of it. It is desirable, however, that we should hold the left bank of the Tagus, and certainly, if possible, the communication between Lisbon and Setuval.

‘ You appear to agree in the statement contained in my letter to Dom Miguel Forjaz, that I have not the means of occupying that part of the country with regular troops; and that it is not expedient to ask, and that it is probable we should not receive, the assistance of more troops from England. But you think that this ground affords advantages, which, if properly improved, might enable the militia, and

other irregular force, to hold it against any attack which might probably be made upon it.

‘As far as I know of that ground, there are three positions upon it: one has its left behind the swamp which is in front of Aldea Galega, and its right at Palmella; or the left might be thrown farther back, probably to Coina. The other is that upon which Colonel Fletcher lately reported, and you have his report; and the third is with the right at Trafaria, and the left at Almada. Of these, the first only keeps the communication open with Setuval. There is, I understand, a space of between four and five miles of plain ground to be occupied in each of these positions, which ground affords no natural means of defence, such as rivers, swamps, mountains, &c.; and these deficiencies must be made good by the resources of art.

‘These are the facts as they relate to the ground; and I will now inform you of those which affect the means by which these positions are to be defended.

‘In the first place, Dom Miguel Forjaz has misinformed you respecting their description. He has no disposable militia in that quarter; and, in order to hold Palmella and S. Filippe at Setuval, we are obliged to detach a part of the militia from the north side of the river.

‘In the next place, he has misinformed you of the numbers of the Ordenanza in that part of Portuguese Estremadura. I doubt if there are 1000 instead of 10,000 armed. But if there were 10,000, even with the assistance of two or three corps of militia, they could not hold the ground, as it has been reported to me to be, even if strengthened by all the resources of art.

‘The consequence of attempting it would be, that they would be driven in confusion to the river, where there must be means prepared to give them a retreat across the river, a part of which means would inevitably fall into the hands of the enemy.

‘These considerations, and particularly the last, have created a conviction in my mind, that, if it were necessary (whereas it is only desirable) to occupy the left bank of the Tagus, the best mode of occupying it would be on the heights from Trafaria to Almada. The loss of one part of this line would not necessarily occasion the immediate loss of the



whole. The people employed to defend it would be more immediately under the eye of those capable of directing them, and timely measures might be adopted to withdraw those whose retreat might be necessary, without the risk that any of the boats would fall into the hands of the enemy. But even this measure is impracticable, on account of the want of men to occupy the ground.

‘ That which I proposed for this part of the country was to occupy Forts S. Filippe and Palmella, and Outaõ, and to make the country between these forts the retreat for the Ordenanza, means of transport, &c. &c., of Portuguese Estremadura, which should be ordered thither. They would then be in the rear of the enemy’s corps, which should occupy the ground from Almada to Trafaria; and, at all events, this corps would lose its communications, and would find no subsistence in the country, and could not be able to maintain its position for any length of time.

‘ I wish I could do more; but, upon a fair calculation of circumstances, probable events and means, I do not think I can, with propriety, undertake, or do otherwise than give my opinion against undertaking, more.

‘ I think it scandalous that the Portuguese regular army should not be 100,000 instead of 50,000 men; more scandalous that they should want near 10,000 men to complete to 50,000; still more scandalous that they have not means to support even the army which they have; and almost as bad as all the rest that Great Britain should not have been able to send arms and clothing for men as soon as the French have been able to send in their reinforcements of made soldiers, which are now upon our frontier.

‘ The means however being, as they are, deficient, I must not undertake what is not necessary with insufficient means.

‘ The French endeavored to surprise one of our posts upon the Agueda on the night of the 19th, occupied by four companies of the 95th under Colonel Beckwith; they were repulsed in fine style, with some loss. We lost Lieut. Mercer and three men killed, and seven wounded.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*  
*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.



*To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Visou, 24th March, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 22nd. I think you were quite right in occupying Barba de Puerco, under the circumstances in which you did occupy that place, and equally so in withdrawing the troops from thence on the night of the 22nd, when there was a prospect that they would be attacked by a very superior force.

‘ I also agree with you, and intended to write to apprise you of my opinion, that when the Agueda should become fordable, it would be useless and dangerous to occupy Barba de Puerco. These rains will probably keep the river full for some days longer, and in that case I doubt whether the enemy will remain in Barba de Puerco, even if they should have taken possession of the post when you have withdrawn from it.

‘ Adverting to the nature of the bridge at San Felices, they cannot consider it a very safe post for a small corps, and I should doubt their putting there permanently a large one. I am convinced that their object has been to retaliate the check of the night of the 19th.

‘ By accounts of the 21st from Badajoz, it appears Mortier has gone back even to S<sup>ta</sup> Olalla, and that Soult’s corps has retired from Merida to Truxillo, destroying the works they had commenced in the Conventual.

‘ Something has occurred in Andalusia. The French have also drawn in the troops which they had down at Ayamonte. We may depend upon it that they will do nothing in this quarter without threatening us at least also upon the left of the Tagus. They are bringing a battering train into Spain from France, which looks like an intention to go regularly to work.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*  
*R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Do you keep any cavalry in Barba de Puerco? It might be useful to be as near the French posts as possible, in order to encourage and facilitate desertion.’

*To Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 24th March, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 21st. Colonel — ought to have gone to England long ago. When I informed him, finally, that I could not give him employment in this country, I gave him money to pay his expenses to England. He is a very silly fellow, and would be entirely useless; and ought not to be suffered to remain at Lisbon.

‘ I do not think the Portuguese Government behave very fairly towards Beresford, in burthening him with the task of punishing those magistrates and others who neglect their duty; nor do I know how Beresford will find time to attend to this business, in such a manner as to perform it effectually, or with that justice which will be necessary for his own character and for that of the country. The alteration required is one of system, and ought to be extended not only to the superior magistrates, but to their inferiors, and even to the people. The latter should be made to understand that their salvation depends upon their obedience to the law and to the orders of their superiors; and that any the slightest disobedience of either would be severely punished, and some examples ought to be made.

‘ I am glad that Dom Miguel Forjaz is turning his mind to keeping the town in a state of tranquillity in this critical moment, as he may depend upon it that it is impossible, however desirable it may be, to occupy the left bank of the river. We shall be much pressed for numbers even on the right bank; and it would be the height of folly to extend our posts to the left bank, when it does not appear to be necessary.

‘ Till I received Dom Miguel Forjaz’s letter, I admit that I did not contemplate the probable insurrections in the town, which, whether on the right or the wrong side, would be equally fatal to us, and would probably oblige me to withdraw, even though pressed by no other military necessity. Thus the people would be the immediate cause of their own subjugation. I conceive, however, that it will be possible to establish in the town a very vigorous system of police, to be well weighed, considered, and arranged beforehand, to be carried into execution at the critical moment. The foundation



of this system should be the existing police, which I believe is very good. The town, if not already divided, might be divided into districts; in each district there should be a person employed under the Lieutenant de Police. A certain number of the married inhabitants of each district, not already belonging to any of the military establishments, should be enrolled to be police constables or soldiers, under the direction of this magistrate or officer, to keep the peace of their own district, in case there should be any disturbances in the town.

‘ These persons should be armed, but not paid, unless actually called out and employed under a proclamation by the Government. They might then, by patrolling the streets of their district constantly, at all hours of the day or night, prevent assemblies of people in the streets or coffee-houses, where all mischief commences. This is an outline upon which Dom Miguel Forjaz, who has more local knowledge and ability, might work, and bring out a perfect, and, I hope a simple and practicable system.

‘ The object and pretence for its establishment at present might be stated to be the movements of the French corps upon the frontier; the probability that Portugal would soon be attacked; and the danger and inconvenience which experience had demonstrated to result from popular commotions in all great towns, particularly in the Peninsula, at the moment the armies were engaged upon the frontiers.

‘ If the Government should be of opinion that a letter from me recommending a measure of this description to their consideration, would at all strengthen their hands in carrying it into execution, I will write such a one.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I have received a letter from the Portuguese Government about their money, in which I see they talk of receiving £980,000 sterling a year from the King. I observe they mention the same sum in their letter to you. Now the sum they are to receive in payment for 30,000 men, according to their estimate of the expense of 10,000 given to Mr. Villiers, which, as well as I recollect that estimate, amounts to about, but not quite £750,000 per annum; and



£130,000 per annum for the expense of increasing the pay of the officers of the army; making a total of £880,000 per annum. Besides this, there is a sum of £100,000 per annum for the pay and allowances of the British officers lent to Portugal, who are paid from the chest of the Aids. The Portuguese Government ought not to touch or to reckon upon this sum as a part of their resources, although Great Britain may fairly, and does reckon it as an aid to Portugal. The sum should remain in the chest of the Aids, to defray the charge of the pay and allowances of the British officers, for which it is given, and who are paid directly from the chest.

‘ I mention this error to you, lest you should not yourself have adverted to it.’

*To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Viseu, 26th March, 1810.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 23rd. By this time you will have been joined by the two battalions of the caçadores, and will be the best judge what to do with them. I believe that Beresford had attached to them Baron Eben, whom you will find a useful officer; but I am not quite certain whether it was to them or to two other battalions.

‘ You will find the officer who commands the first battalion a very respectable one. The second battalion is not so well commanded at present, but Beresford proposes to attach to it Major Nixon, of the 28th regiment, who has served in the light infantry, and who has been placed under his orders.

‘ I find, from intercepted letters, that the French are endeavoring to bring up from France, to some station in advance of Burgos (I suppose Valladolid), a battering train. If they should get up a train, they may as well, and, indeed, if I were in their situation, I should prefer to begin by an attack upon Almeida to one upon Ciudad Rodrigo? This deserves attention. In what state is Castel Rodrigo? Can Castello Bom be made a *tête de pont* for a short time?

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I should prefer horses to mules for the communication service. But unfortunately we have no money to buy horses at present.’

*To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Viseu, 27th March, 1810.

‘ Your letter of the 25th, which I have just received, renders it unnecessary that I should say much in answer to that of the 24th.

‘ Mr. Ogilvie has really business with the head quarters of the army which another could not perform for him ; and I am glad to find that you are pleased with the appointment of Mr. Downie. In order that he may be at the head of the department with your division, Mr. Drake is to be relieved by Mr. Purcell, of whom the Commissary General understands that you have a good opinion. Mr. Drake is the senior Assistant Commissary with the army.

The Portuguese troops have with them a Commissary, but I imagine that they will require assistance from Mr. Downie, upon which subject he will be instructed.

‘ In respect to the communication, I wish it to be as follows in future: viz., every thing to go from Almeida to Celorico, and from Celorico to Guarda, Trancoso, and head quarters respectively. Orders will go from the Adjutant General’s office upon this subject.

‘ I shall write by this dispatch to recommend Mr. M<sup>c</sup>Diar- mid for promotion.

‘ I have letters from Cadiz as late as the 17th : all quiet there ; but they had at that time no accounts of the insurrection in the Sierra de Ronda. They had made a sortie from one part of the Isla de Leon on the 15th, and had made demonstrations for a general attack upon the enemy’s posts on the same morning, which would have been made if the surf had not prevented General Stewart from embarking a part of his corps. I believe that this attack is the real cause of the detachments which have been made into Andalusia from the corps in Estremadura.

‘ Nothing has been done yet on the north of the Douro.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 27th March, 1810.

‘ I have had [the honor of receiving your letters of the 11th, and two of the 17th.

‘ When an officer is detached from the army in command of a body of troops on a particular service, he must be the best judge of the organization which will suit his purpose. I do not object, therefore, to the organization which you have detailed in your letter of the 11th; although, in general, I disapprove of detaching flank companies from the battalion to which they belong, and I have not allowed of such detachments in this army.

‘ A Brigade Major appears to me to be a necessary appointment in Cadiz, the troops under your command being in two bodies.

‘ Lord Fitzroy Somerset has written to the Assistant Adjutant General respecting the appointment of an officer to be your Secretary; but I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know in what manner, and for what purpose, the appointment is thought necessary by the Assistant Commissary, and by the Assistant Paymaster General detached with you.

‘ I refer you to my letter of the 27th February respecting payment for the fresh meat.

‘ I beg that you will draw a table allowance of thirty shillings a day while you command at Cadiz.

‘ The sum fixed in this army is nine pence per diem, to be stopped from the pay of the soldiers in general throughout the whole army, as you will observe by the enclosed letter from the War Office: it is necessary therefore that you should fix the stoppage at nine pence, in the detachment under your command.

‘ I am concerned to observe that the Spanish troops make no progress in their discipline; and that they are not better in that respect, or improved in efficiency since you went to Cadiz. I am afraid that much time will elapse before any considerable improvement will be made in the state of these troops, or before several other measures will be adopted by the Spanish Government, which are expedient and even necessary in the existing situation of their affairs. We must not be discouraged, however, by these untoward circumstances. I have but little doubt that the Spanish troops, bad as their appearance and discipline are, will do their duty in fortified positions; and even if they were worse than they are, and the difficulties of all kinds with which we have to



contend were greater than they are, the interests of Great Britain and the world are too deeply involved in this contest for us to recede one step from it, which may not be rendered absolutely necessary by circumstances.

‘The affairs of the Peninsula have invariably had the same appearance since I have known them; they have always appeared to be lost; means have always appeared inadequate to objects; and the sole dependence of the whole has apparently been upon us. The contest however still continues, and is in its third year; and we must continue it as long as we can with the means which the country affords, improving them as much as the people will allow us, as it is obvious that Great Britain cannot give us larger means than we have.

‘I beg leave to refer you to Mr. Wellesley for an account of the state of affairs in this quarter.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major General  
the Hon. W. Stewart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Viseu, 27th March, 1810.

‘Since I wrote to you on the 21st, I have received your letters of the 9th and 16th.

‘I was pretty well aware of the state of the Spanish army, but the account you give of the Government is not encouraging. However, they can scarcely lose Cadiz at present; and if the measures which I recommended in my letter to General Stewart, of the 27th of last month, are adopted, the French will never be able to get possession of that place.

‘Since my last, there has been no material alteration in the enemy’s position on this side of the Tagus. It is reported by the French that they have taken Astorga by storm, with great loss; but I have not heard of this event from any authority, and I have correspondents in that quarter.

‘The French corps on the Guadiana broke up on the 18th; and that under Mortier marched towards Monasterio, and Sta Olalla in the Sierra Morena; and the other corps which was at Merida retired towards Truxillo. The Marques de la Romana writes me that this movement was occasioned by a serious insurrection in the Sierra de Ronda; that the King,

being at Malaga, was surrounded by insurgents, and that he could extricate himself from this situation with difficulty. I should think that affairs could not be in this state in a part of Andalusia so near to Cadiz, without the knowledge of the Regency. Yet it appears from your letter of the 16th that nothing was known of this insurrection at Cadiz on that day.

‘ The Marques de la Romana has ordered the *Partidas* of Estremadura, and the right division of his army, under Ballesteros, to follow Mortier through the Sierra Morena, and to do him as much mischief as may be in their power.

‘ We hear also a great deal of Blake’s army in the Alpujarras, and of a corps from Valencia, operating upon the enemy’s communications with Madrid. But I conclude that there is as little foundation for this intelligence as for that relating to the insurrection in the Sierra de Ronda.

‘ When I heard of Mortier’s march to the southward I was in hopes that something had occurred in Andalusia. If nothing has occurred in that quarter, they are about to endeavor to press you more closely at Cadiz, or possibly they are desirous of dispersing Blake’s corps in the Alpujarras. Even with the addition of Mortier’s corps however to the force near Cadiz, they cannot hurt that place. I wish that I could be equally certain of the security of Blake.

‘ In the mean time the departure of the French troops from Estremadura has been a great relief to us in this quarter, and will give the people in Badajoz, and the Marques de la Romana, time for further preparations.

‘ I am clearly of opinion that we ought to remove from Cadiz in particular, and from the harbours in the Peninsula in general, every Spanish ship of war. I was of opinion that they ought to be sent to Mahon, and I recommended that Minorca in particular, of the Balearic Islands, should be secured.

‘ This opinion was founded upon a notion, first, that the Regency had some power, and some means at their disposal; secondly, that they would experience no difficulty in raising the men necessary to secure the Balearic Islands; and thirdly, that Minorca, in particular, could not be injured as long as we held the naval superiority in the Mediterranean.

‘ This opinion was in some degree shaken before I re-

ceived your letters, by learning accidentally that Lord Collingwood was adverse to sending the fleet to Minorca, although the reason was not stated; and I now recommend to you to get rid of fleet and prisoners as you can. Let them go where they please, but do not allow them to remain in Cadiz.

‘ I doubted of Mahon for the prisoners, as I was apprehensive that the garrison would not be sufficiently strong. The same objection would apply to Ceuta. England is the only safe place for the prisoners.

‘ Whether the fleet is, or is not sent to Minorca, the security of the Balearic Islands is a consideration of the utmost importance, which must not be lost sight of. You and I (I probably more than you) will be considered responsible for every thing that occurs, although we have no means in our power, and no power to enforce the execution of what is necessary.

‘ It is desirable that we should advert to every thing, and should recommend to the consideration of the Spanish Government those measures which appear to us to be necessary. Accordingly I suggest to you to pass a note to the Regency, recommending to their serious attention the security of the Balearic Islands, Minorca particularly: they should send there, in the first instance, the Viscomte de Gand’s corps which is now in Algarve: they should besides endeavor to raise men in Cadiz, where, by proper measures, they could get thousands.

‘ I shall write to the Marques de la Romana upon this subject, in which he is personally interested, and will suggest to him the expediency of sending two or three thousand men to these Islands; and I will engage to send these men from Lisbon to Cadiz, if means can be found at Cadiz for their farther progress.

‘ I should think that Blake’s army ought not if possible to be weakened. It is a great object to the general cause to preserve it.

‘ In respect to Cadiz itself, the object of the works, the plan and construction of which I recommended in my letter to General Stewart, is to give security to the Isla, employing in its defence a smaller body of men than would be necessary for its security if there were no works. It must



be obvious to every body that, if 25,000 men were required for the defence and security of the Isla, when not completely fortified, fewer would be necessary if good works should be constructed. But, in truth, when the Spaniards in the Isla shall be attacked in earnest, they will not be able to hold a moment, unless the troops are placed in good works.

‘ When I said that Captain Landmann might be sure of having a sufficient number of men to place in them, I adverted in my own mind to the probable period at which the attack would be made, and to the certainty that as many men as could be required might be raised at Cadiz. It is quite new to my mind that the Spaniards will not make the exertion which is necessary to enable them to defend this important place, with the assistance which I have been able to give them.

‘ In respect to further assistance, although ordered to secure Cadiz in a manner which makes me in a manner responsible for the safety of that place, as if nothing was required in Cadiz but British soldiers, I can send no more with propriety.

‘ Those who see the difficulties attending all communications with Spaniards and Portuguese, and are aware how little dependence can be placed upon them, and that they depend entirely upon us for every thing, will be astonished that, with so small a force as I have, I should have been able to maintain myself so long in this country. I certainly should not be able to stay if I were to weaken it any further; and yet, if I should go from this country, Cadiz would not hold out a month, even if I were to take there a great part of the British army. The French might and could collect there their whole force; and then the serious attack would be made, and the place would really be in danger.

‘ I do not think that General Stewart will be able to hold the Matagorda long; and I have always considered it probable that the enemy would have it in his power to command the communication between the inner and outer harbours, and to prevent us from using it. We ought therefore at once to provide for this event by the following measures:

‘ First; to prepare and establish in the inner harbour all the gun and other vessels which would be necessary for the operations of defence within it.

‘ Secondly; to secure the Puntales, and the landing places from the left of the Cortadura to the works of the town.

‘ Thirdly; to have a good road of communication from the right of the Cortadura along the Isthmus by the right of the existing road.

‘ If there should have been really an insurrection in the Sierra de la Ronda, and the French should have been obliged to quit their position before Cadiz, I hope that General Stewart will have seized the peninsula of Trocadero, and endeavored to secure that point by the time the French will return again.

‘ Long before the French passed the Sierra Morena, I desired General Whittingham\* to suggest to Venegas to consider of and let us know what naval assistance would be required from Great Britain, particularly of water vessels and of victuallers. This will become most important hereafter when Cadiz shall be seriously attacked. The French will then occupy every point upon the coast, and cut off the supply of provisions, which must be sent for to a great distance; and they will be supplied only by great exertions and arrangements, and by very extensive means. All these matters deserve your attention, and you should suggest them officially.

‘ In the existing temper of the times, the loss of this place will be set down to our account, however little is in our power; and we must forget nothing.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I omitted to tell you that the French attacked one of our posts on the Agueda, occupied by four companies of the 95th, on the night of the 19th, and were repulsed with loss. All has been quiet since.

‘ I am astonished at the conduct of the Regency towards —, who will always be the enemy of the English influence. But I conclude that what has been said, and even done, is only compliment; that they have been urged to it by his friend —; and that he will be without employment or influence. It is not worth while to notice this transaction.’

\* See page 386.



*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Viseu, 28th March, 1810.

‘ The enemy’s corps which I informed you, in my letter of the 14th instant, were in Estremadura, broke up on the 18th instant; and that commanded by Marshal Mortier went to the southward towards the pass of Monasterio and S<sup>ta</sup> Olalla in the Sierra Morena; and that of Soult which was at Merida retired upon Truxillo. The former was followed by the right divisions of the Marques de la Romana’s corps which had been posted at Xerez de los Cavalleros, at Olivença, and at Valverde. The left of this corps still continue at Campo Mayor and Alburquerque.

‘ This movement is supposed to have been occasioned by an insurrection in the Sierra de Ronda; and it has been reported that King Joseph was at Malaga, and all communication with him cut off by the insurgents. I have accounts from Cadiz however to as late a date as the 17th of this month, which do not notice these events.

‘ A gale of wind had done much mischief at Cadiz in the early part of this month, of which His Majesty’s Government will have received the details from His Majesty’s Minister.

‘ The enemy are not in great strength in the neighbourhood of Cadiz, and appear principally employed in strengthening their own positions, and in establishing themselves upon the peninsula of Trocadero with an intention to dispossess our troops of the fort of Matagorda, which is situated at the point of that peninsula, and the possession of which gives the command of the communication between the inner and outer harbour.

‘ Major General Stewart informs me that he had intended to endeavor to dislodge the enemy from their position on the peninsula on the 15th instant; and to destroy the means of attack upon Matagorda which they had prepared, and the buildings which had afforded them cover and facilities in pushing it forward. The surf in the western bay of Puntales had prevented him from embarking there, and a shoal in the eastern bay had delayed the passage over to the Trocadero for such a length of time, that it would have been imprudent to persevere in the attack, which he therefore relinquished.

‘ Other attacks were however to be made connected with,



and as a diversion of the enemy's attention from this ; among others one upon their posts at S<sup>t</sup> Petri, by some Spanish light troops and four companies of the 79th regiment under Major Sullivan. The enemy's outposts were driven in, in this quarter.

‘ I enclose the report of Major Sullivan to Major General Stewart, with the return of the loss upon this occasion.

‘ If there has been no insurrection in the Sierra de la Ronda, it is probable that these preparations and movements on the Isla de Leon and at Cadiz have been the cause of the march of the troops from Estremadura.

‘ The addition of Mortier's corps, however, to the enemy's troops already in the neighbourhood of Cadiz will not enable the enemy to make any serious attack upon the positions on the Isla ; and its removal from Estremadura relieves me for the present from all uneasiness respecting the fate of Bada-joz, and the other forts in that neighbourhood.

‘ The corps of the Duc d'Abrantes, which is supposed to be composed of about 20,000 men, is in the kingdom of Leon, and threatens Astorga, where there is a Spanish garrison. They had made no attack upon that place as late as the 18th.

‘ The French have also a division in the Asturias, which was in possession of Oviedo, Gijon, &c., and had pushed forward towards the frontiers of Galicia.

‘ The French corps under the command of Marshal Ney, and that under Loison, and Kellermann's corps, are in Old Castille, and in the same positions on the Tormes, with their advanced posts upon the Agueda. The advanced posts of the British army, under Brigadier General Craufurd, are likewise upon the Agueda, and between that river and the Coa.

‘ The French attacked the post at Barba de Puerco, which was occupied by four companies of the 95th regiment under Lieut. Colonel Beckwith on the night of the 19th instant.

‘ Immediately opposite to Barba de Puerco, on the other side of the river, is San Felices, and between these two villages the only bridge on the Agueda below Ciudad Rodrigo, and the recent fall of rain had filled the river, which was no where fordable.

‘ The enemy had collected a brigade of Infantry at San Felices ; and crossed the bridge with 600 men after dark, keeping the remainder on the other side. These followed

the piquet of the 95th up from the bridge and immediately made their attack; but they were repulsed with the loss of two officers and seven men killed, six prisoners, and thirty firelocks.

‘ I am sorry to add that Lieut. Mercer of the 95th and three men were killed, and ten were wounded, in this affair, which was highly creditable to Colonel Beckwith, and displayed the gallantry and discipline of the officers and troops under his command. The Adjutant, Lieut. Stewart, distinguished himself.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. the Commander in Chief.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 28th March, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose an extract of my dispatch of this date, to the Secretary of State, giving an account of an attack made by the enemy on the post of Barba de Puerco, occupied by four companies of the 95th regiment, under Lieut. Colonel Beckwith.

‘ I take the liberty of recommending Lieut. and Adjutant Stewart to your notice, who distinguished himself on this occasion. I also beg leave to recommend Lieut. M<sup>c</sup>Diarmid, the senior lieutenant, for promotion.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*the Commander in Chief.*’

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Viseu, 28th March, 1810.

‘ I have but little to add to my dispatch of this date.

‘ I have very bad accounts of the Regency at Cadiz, upon which subject, however, I conclude my brother will have sent to Government full intelligence.

‘ I enclose to you the copy of a letter which I have received from Colonel Roche, which contains a curious account of the flight and dispersion of Areyzaga’s army, and their consequences in the different parts of Spain through which he passed, and of the state of affairs at Cadiz. I must do Roche the justice to say that he has invariably transmitted to me

the most correct accounts of transactions; that his opinions have always been judicious; and he has been of no party.

‘The packets have not yet arrived, and our distress for money is very great.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.*

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Viseu, 30th March, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 26th and 27th.

‘I enclose a letter for General Carrera, in which I have requested him to communicate with you. I beg you to observe, however, that very little reliance can be placed on the report made to you by any Spanish General Officer at the head of a body of troops. They generally exaggerate on one side or the other, and make no scruple of communicating supposed intelligence, in order to induce those to whom they communicate it to adopt a certain line of conduct.

‘The movement of the French through the Puerto de Baños has been probably occasioned by their desire to oblige Carrera to fall back, and a wish to confine Ciudad Rodrigo on that side. They will find it difficult to cross the Alagon, or to make any impression on that side.

‘The communication from you to Celorico is very slow. I did not receive your letter of the 27th till last night. It ought to have reached me the night before, at which time only I received that of the 26th. We know that the letters are only eight hours from Celorico to Viseu, and that on this side of Celorico it is sufficiently regular. Will you be so kind as to have it arranged from Almeida to Celorico? It should go from Almeida at such an hour every morning as to arrive at Celorico by twelve o’clock.

‘You will see the news from England. The Ministers hold out still, but I think they cannot last long.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Brig. General R. Craufurd.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Viseu, 30th March, 1810.’

‘I have received your three letters of the 26th. I understand that you will send a packet on Sunday, April 1st, for



which I have already sent my letters; another on the 5th, for which I will send letters which shall be at Lisbon on Wednesday night; and a third on Monday, 9th April.

‘The want of provisions at Cadiz is very distressing, more particularly as the Spaniards have made no arrangement to procure a supply. I told Venegas, as long ago as last December, that he ought to advert to the probability that he would be attacked at an early period, and let us know in time what assistance would be required from us in victuallers, water vessels, and other naval means.

‘If they have money and ships to send for grain, Malta can supply their wants with ease.

‘I do not understand the arrangement which Government have made of the command of the troops there. I have hitherto considered them as part of this army, and from the arrangement I made with the Spanish Government, they cost us nothing but their pay; and all the money procured at Cadiz for bills was applicable to the service in this country. Their instructions to General Graham alter this entirely; and they have even gone so far as to desire him to take measures to supply the Spaniards with provisions from the Mediterranean, whereas I had insisted that they should feed, and they do actually feed our troops. The first consequence of this arrangement will be, that we shall have no more money from Cadiz. I had considered the troops at Cadiz so much a part of this army, that I had written, to my brother to desire to have his opinion whether, if the French withdrew from Cadiz when they should attack Portugal, he thought I might bring into Portugal at least those troops which I had sent there. But I consider this now to be out of the question.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘WELLINGTON.

‘I have desired that you may have at least half of the 500,000 dollars that came out.’

*To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Viseu, 30th March, 1810.

‘Since I wrote to you on the 27th, I have received accounts from England to the 15th instant, and I have heard

that General Graham\* is appointed to command at Cadiz. You will find General Graham a most able and active officer, who, I am convinced, will be very desirous to co-operate with you in every thing for the public service.

‘ I beg, however, that you will tell General Stewart that the arrangement which has been made for the command at Cadiz was not proposed by me.

‘ There is nothing new since I wrote to you last. I have heard from a person at Alcañizas that he had not been able to communicate with Astorga the day before. He does not, however, think that the place is closely invested, but rather that the person he had sent did not adopt the mode to communicate with the place in which he would have succeeded.

‘ The French have passed a division through the Puerto de Baños, by which they have obliged Carrera to retire from Coria across the Alagon.

‘ They talk of a part of Mortier’s corps, about 1,000 men, being caught between two of the streams in the Sierra Morena, which had swollen ; and being cut off by the guerrillas of Romana’s corps, which I do not believe. They also talk of the army of Valencia and Murcia being at Tarancon, in the neighbourhood of Madrid, which I equally discredit.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Visou, 30th March, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 20th February, conveying a copy of your instructions to General Graham, which I acknowledge I think likely to produce confusion at Cadiz, and some difficulties between this army and the corps at Cadiz, and much inconvenience here, unless the General should lay them aside entirely, and in the mean time act upon those which I have given to General W. Stewart.

‘ I enclose a memorandum, &c., upon the instructions, with the copy of them, with the paragraphs numbered, which will point out the questions that occur to me upon them. I request you to send me your answer to this memorandum ;

\* Lord Lynedoch, G.C.B.

and if I should find that the system which Genera Graham and I shall have followed is not inconsistent with your Lordship's intentions, I can either alter it or not, as may appear most beneficial to His Majesty's service.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Viseu, 30th March, 1810.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 28th, I have received your letters to the 13th.

‘ I am fully aware of the mutual hatred of the Spanish and Portuguese people towards each other ; and you may depend upon it that I adverted to that circumstance when I considered of the propriety of sending to Cadiz a Portuguese regiment. From experience of the manner in which the service of Portuguese troops was received in other Spanish garrisons, I did not consider it probable that this hatred was likely to affect the reception of the Portuguese regiment at Cadiz ; and having that regiment at my disposal at the moment a garrison was wanted for Cadiz, I did not think it proper to allow the consideration of the hatred of these nations towards each other to deprive the cause of this timely assistance.

‘ The enclosed letter from Mr. Duff, who generally participates in the feelings of the Spaniards, will show your Lordship that I was not mistaken upon this occasion ; and the publications of the day at Cadiz, if they can be supposed to speak the public sentiment, agree in the same opinion. Since that time, all the letters I have received from Cadiz mention the Portuguese troops in terms of praise ; but if General Graham should think it better to send them away, I shall be glad to have them again.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Viseu, 31st March, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 7th, and I am very much obliged to the Commander in Chief for the appointment of Pakenham, and for sending us the reinforcements



you have stated. I understand that the 9th and Royals have arrived at Lisbon.

‘ I am also much obliged to you for recollecting my wishes in favor of Campbell. I am very anxious for his promotion which the Duke of York certainly intended he should have.

‘ I can give you no news. The French threaten us on all points, and are most desirous to get rid of us. But they threaten upon too many points at a time to give me much uneasiness respecting any one in particular, and they shall not induce me to disconnect my army.


‘ I am in a situation in which no mischief can be done to the army, or to any part of it; I am prepared for all events; and if I am in a scrape, as appears to be the general belief in England, although certainly not my own, I’ll get out of it.

‘ Believe me, &c.


‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’


‘ WELLINGTON.’

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