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CONTENTS

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Fifty Years of Theology and Theological Education at Duke; Retrospect and Prospect

by Robert E. Cushman
Research Professor of Systematic Theology

I. Our Just Cause for Rejoicing

Let me say first—and especially to faculty, to students, and to alumnae and alumni—that I am sensible of exceptional privilege in addressing this company on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of our Divinity School. What, to me, is distinctly a gracious invitation is, at the same time, if not a dreadful, then an awesome responsibility. This latter is so because an anniversary such as this puts us in remembrance of a host of men and women: founders, administrators, faculty, staff, and students who labored here. To what, during a half-century, it has been given for this school to become, this company—visible and invisible—is a cloud of witnesses to a vision, to a faith, and to a hope for which very many, in divers roles and ways, have invested the substance of life itself. I know this is true; I have known the investors.

Fifty years is not a long time in the annals of theological education, even in this country. Yet in these fifty years I number nearly four score teachers—of varying tenure—whose learning and devotion to Christian enlightenment have enriched the minds and the lives of students and the Church itself. At the same time, I count approximately 3500 students, in the several degrees, who have enlarged their understanding of their faith and of their vocation and passed through these halls—the majority of them—to service of God and mankind, literally the world around. These graduates of the Divinity School—whether in the Southeast or northward, the mid or far West, or in far off Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Sweden, Austria, Greece, France, England, Scotland, Canada, Indonesia, India, Tonga, or Ghana, to remember only a few—these graduates are, likewise, a cloud of witnesses. They are witnesses to the outreaching vision of our founders but, more centrally, to the Lord of Life who is over all. As I see it, it is their testimony of word and deed—

quiet or renowned, in obscure or in focal places—that is very central to our celebration and its principal justification.

I think it was at the closing Divinity School service of worship in June 1958 that the late James Cannon III—and, as it proved, on the eve of his deanship—prayed over the assembled students and faculty somewhat as follows:

> We thank thee, O God, that thou has called us to serve thee in the work of this school. We remember with gratitude our fellows who labored here to advance the training of young ministers of Christ. We thank thee for the tasks we have been given to do in our time of passage, and the strength to do what we could. Establish thou the work of our hands, according to thy Word; and to thee shall be the praise. Amen.

As presiding minister that morning, I was struck by Dean Cannon's prayer. In retrospect, it seemed to me nothing could have been more appropriate. With terse eloquence it said: *Sic transit gloria mundi.* But, above all, it said: We are a cloud of witnesses in transit, and what it has been given us to invest looks beyond itself for its justification. So it is, "and thine shall be the praise world without end."

Something like this I take to be the real authorization of our Fiftieth Anniversary celebration. We signalize a corporate endeavor of a host of witnesses. Always we are debtors to a heritage bequeathed to us. We are stewards of riches to which we may add our small treasure, but the harvest is the Lord's.

But, now, what *is* a school? Is it not a place or, better, a community where light is kindled and nurtured *in the meeting of minds?* Of a Divinity School, however, it may also be said that it is a collective or corporate biography of faith in search of understanding. Here, St. Augustine's declaration is masterful: *Fides quaerens intellectum,* "faith seeking understanding." By this, Augustine meant to signalize not only a point-of-starting but a process, and the Divinity School or the seminary provides the auspices. It is the hope and expectation for such a school that, in the meeting of minds, the light of faith burns brighter—perhaps bright enough, by God's grace, for men and women to find their way to fulfilling service in the Kingdom of God. No other kind of school either expressly aspires or presumes to attempt so much!

As, now, we look back over a half-century, I venture to affirm we need not doubt that something like the lighting of the way has truly happened in the lives of very many. Accordingly, I believe we may justly celebrate these fruitions as a harvest of the years that

proves itself commensurate with the vision and the hope of the founders. And, in the measure this is so, I have no hesitancy in judging that at half-century Duke University Divinity School, as a corporate endeavor, has, so far, vindicated its reason for being. I know of no other significant criterion to judge such a school. Comparisons in externals are not only invidious; they are by reference to the primary goal finally irrelevant. In a Divinity School what counts is whether, in the meeting of minds, the light of faith burns brighter to illumine the way of those who venture into the dark night of this world in the Name of Him whose radiance "lighteth every man" coming into it. At half-century, it is these things, I believe, I have the awesome privilege of calling to our common remembrance, and, with you, to rejoice and give thanks that we can celebrate—and with a cloud of witnesses—the prospering of Christian enlightenment through the years 1926-1976.

II. What of Theology at Duke?

On this Fiftieth Anniversary these things are what I am most deeply moved to say on the subject of "theological education" at Duke. On this subject, however, I believe I have earned the right to be brief, since I am copiously—I hope not redundantly—on record in the Divinity School *Review*, or its predecessor, from 1945 until a final Alumni Address in 1971. Meanwhile, every opening Convocation Address in my years as dean (1958-1971) was devoted to aspects of theological education and is on record in the *Review*. Having reread the statement of 1945 and having glanced at others, I doubt that I would now retract much of anything I have hitherto said, but why must I repeat myself?

Accordingly, I would like to invite your attention to the other end of the stick I was expected to balance. With you I should like to reflect upon "fifty years of theology" at Duke. In a formal way little has ever been said about it. Undoubtedly the business is full of risk. The whole story is long, and our time is short. But I was asked. I will, therefore, accept the risk, but with the warning that what I shall have to say is subject to the limitations and biases of a chief participant over many years and, in that time, a wearer of different hats. Furthermore, I must warn in advance that the course over which we must needs travel is both long and various, sometimes colorful and exciting, but now and again tedious and, sometimes, hazardous as a minefield or studded with sandtraps—if, as is probable, you prefer golfing!

First, then, if we are to speak of theology at Duke, what may we mean by "theology"? Nowadays, this is not an idle question. The fact is that it has been in dispute for so long that there is today no little controversy among practitioners and, understandably, no little confusion among bystanders. In this situation I might show my colors and invite you to join me in taking our cue from John Wesley's *Plain Account of Genuine Christianity* (1749), except that, to my knowledge, hardly any Methodist theologian ever had the good sense to set us a precedent for doing so. We might ponder the subject by reference to the first paragraph of Calvin's *Institutes*. This might well be helpful, especially if we were also interested in going on to show how Schleiermacher laid the foundations of so-called "modern theology" by seizing upon one horn of the dilemma Calvin there seemingly propounds. But we have no time for elaborate historical recollections, and I will come quickly to the conception that, for me, alike describes both theology and the role of theological education.

It is that saying of Augustine's already quoted: *fides quaerens intellectum*. For me, whatever more it is, at rock bottom, Christian theology is "faith seeking understanding." And the *scandalon* is—as the Apostle Paul first saw and enforced upon the attention of the Corinthians—that appropriating Faith in "the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ," however alien to the wisdom of the world, is just exactly the kind of response suited to that unspeakable gift which passes all human understanding. For the Apostle faith is acceptance of the incomprehensible grace of God in Christ. Accordingly, St. Paul saw that it was indeed a God-given starting-point, *from* which, not *to* which, enlightenment proceeds.

This, too, is what John Wesley, at length, arrived at by way of a personal ordeal he found resolved under the auspices of the long-standing Pauline formula, then, lately rejuvenated: "justification by grace through faith." But what had been a tenet of doctrine among both the Continental and Anglican reformers became alive and recapitulated itself in Wesley's own experience, and the 18th century Evangelical Revival was born. For Wesley, as it were, the doctrinal map had all the while lain open before him, but it was a "dead letter" until Wesley himself actually made his own way over the road. This is what he conveys in his *Plain Account of Genuine Christianity*. Then, for him also, theology became "faith seeking understanding." And this meant new comprehension of the whole range of human experience—its depravity without Christ,

its radical promise of renovation through Christ—and this, both for the individual and for societal renewal.

III. Faith Seeking Understanding—A Corporate Endeavor

With this background we are, perhaps, in better position to understand the meaning of "theology" within the institutional context—that of the theological school, including this one. If indeed, theology—as also theological education—is, at bottom, "faith seeking understanding" as chief witnesses of the Faith declare, then, plainly, the indispensable prerequisite of any Christian theology is Christian faith. And this is more nearly a gift than a good work. It follows that this puts theology in a somewhat different position from other human inquiry, although not so different as is usually supposed in one respect, since all human inquiry starts, at last, either from naturally assumed premises or expressly formulated hypothetical ones. In any case, Christian theology, in so far as it is candid and not primarily apologetics, openly acknowledges its faith-premise as its reason for being and proceeds to inquire what this premise means, that is, how it illuminates the totality of human life in the world. This is interpretation and reaffirmation of the *given* Christian faith.

The exploration of this import through successive generations in changing contexts—which history always thrusts upon us—is, perhaps, a major differentia of systematic theology as distinguished from historical studies, whether Biblical or doctrinal. Yet we can hardly speak of theology in the institutional setting—that of a Divinity School—without acknowledging that this same theology is a corporate endeavor of the whole faculty, and, furthermore, in the context of serious faculty-student dialogue.

Space forbids discussion of the distinctive contribution of the several disciplines to the theological climate and standpoint of the school. It is apparent, however, that the curriculum of Biblical studies, the application of historical method to the Scriptures, to the interpretation of Christian origins and to the Apostolic and post-Apostolic witness, adopts standpoints having implicit doctrinal import. Yet, for all of these inquiries, it is still faith seeking understanding. Likewise church history, attending as it does to the unfolding of the tradition catholic—as the church discharges its vocation in the world and in interchange with it, for better or worse—is nerved also by faith pursuing enlarging self-understanding. Nor can pastoral theology and professional studies be ex-

cluded from this comprehensive inquiry, since the meaning and verity of Christian faith comes better into relief precisely in the granulating exchange which attends its communication and interaction with the resistant and resilient mind of the world. All of these disciplines, premised upon faith, pursue, in their several provinces, enlarging understanding.

When, therefore, we seek to take the measure of theology at Duke over the half-century since 1926 and ascertain its character and directions, we are immediately confronted by the fact that theology, here as elsewhere, is the many-sided *resultant* of a corporate endeavor of a company of teacher-scholars manning their distinctive disciplinary tasks in their own time and place. But there are, in addition, other very influential factors that have shaped theological emphasis and standpoints during the half-century of Duke Divinity School. These can be mentioned and some of them considered briefly.

IV. The Policy of the Founders: A Dialectic of Opposites

Let us, then, attend first of all to the intention of the founders. When we do so, we shall, I think, be persuaded that the presiding influence has been the inherited religious motivation and theological frame of reference of the founders, firmly rooted in the Methodist tradition. Yet it would be over-simple not to perceive that, granted this foundational commitment of the founders, their ends and aspirations for the school also reflected perspectives and a certain selectivity from the given tradition which seemed to them of central importance in setting forth the objectives of a university school of ministerial education. These objectives were, in fact, quickly implemented in the gathering and subsequent further staffing of the faculty. And, in this whole matter, William Preston Few was undoubtedly the original architect and builder as also, for many years, he continued to shepherd at close-hand the fledgling enterprise.

The two-fold principle that embraces *both* the received religious tradition of the founders *and* yet freedom to accent those essentials deemed suited to advance theological understanding in a university context is simply and candidly set forth under the title "School of Religion" in the first *Bulletin* or catalogue for 1926-1927. It reappears largely unaltered for several years and, in revised language, has persisted substantively to this time. Because of its formative significance I shall quote the concluding paragraph entire:

> Duke University retains the same close relationship which Trinity College always held to the Conferences in North Carolina of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. This legal relationship has always been broadly interpreted. Members of all other Christian denominations, as well as Methodist, will be made to feel welcome in the School of Religion and may be assured that the basis on which the work is conducted is broadly catholic and not narrowly denominational.[1]

No little exegesis and commentary upon the facets of this statement—which must, I believe, be referred to President Few himself primarily—might well occupy us. Concerning the original name of the school, Professor Emeritus Kenneth W. Clark, in his important account "Four Decades of the Divinity School," refers to the change of name from "School of Religion" to that of Divinity School as occurring in 1940.[2] The theological import of that change was far from negligible, as Professor Emeritus H. Shelton Smith is quite able to tell if he were inclined to do so. But I let this and other matters pass that we may focus upon the two facets of this declaration which are offered in dialectical juxtaposition so as to implicate, rather than negate, one another.

On the one hand, then, the status of the new school—as that of its parent institution, Duke University—stands in close, derivative, and even legal relationship with the then Methodist Episcopal Church, South; but, on the other hand, instruction in the theological disciplines is to be "broadly catholic and not narrowly denominational." On this latter basis, it is affirmed that "all other Christian denominations" are welcome. And on this basis, and from the very start, theological education at Duke was grounded on the ecumenical premise. This was immediately implemented by recruitment of an interdenominational faculty and, likewise, little by little, an interdenominational student enrollment. In the first two decades it was mainly Congregationalist and Baptist students who swelled the predominatingly Methodist core of the student body. Meanwhile, the second dean of the school was Elbert Russell, a Quaker.

The history of developments cannot here detain us. Yet the import of this candid and daring policy—combining in single amalgam Methodist derivation and grounding with ecumenical or

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1. *School of Religion—Duke University,* 1926-27, Announcements for 1927-28 (Durham, N. C., 1927), p. 18.

2. *The Divinity School Review,* Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring 1967), p. 172. The School *Bulletin,* Vol. 13, No. 6 (May 1941), supplied the official public notice of change of name.

"broadly catholic" commitment— not only makes the status of Duke University Divinity School, from its origin, all but unique among university divinity schools in this country but also, without much question, was the formative influence in pre-determining the tone and character of the theological enterprise at Duke during the past half-century.

This deliberate and clear-headed espousal by President Few— in collaboration, we may reasonably suppose, with Edmund D. Soper, the first dean—of a *dialectic of opposites* as foundational policy must be seen for what it was and still remains. On the one hand, it expressly grounded theological endeavor at Duke in one particular historical tradition of Reformation Christianity as channelled through the Wesleyan evangelical heritage. On the other hand, it explicitly claimed a place for the riches of the whole range of "catholic" Christian tradition as the rightful domain of responsible scholarship and unfettered theological teaching. But in this, too, it is not amiss to note that it was scarcely at variance with Wesley's notable sermon on *The Catholic Spirit* or with his equally famous *Letter to a Roman Catholic.*

V. Corollaries of the Founding Policy

There are two or three corollaries deriving, I believe, from this dialectic of opposites, which I should like to mention for the record. The first is that the founders did not suppose that legitimate theological reflection or teaching could proceed without reference to either a particular living church or to the Church universal. Theology without grounding in a living *consensus fidelium* would be, in the absence of this, rootless. The founders did not, therefore, confuse the scientific study of religion as a phenomenon of human culture, with the distinctive tasks of Christian theology. Such study, together with philosophy of religion, might well have place in the total University curriculum, but it was not the galvanizing center of Christian theological studies devoted to the Church's ministry.

Secondly, resident in the phrase "broadly catholic and not narrowly denominational" was the clear reaffirmation of both "the freedom of the Christian man" under God (Luther) or "the liberty of prophesying" (Jeremy Taylor). To both of these John Wesley, long since, had already consented. And here was the minimal statement of the "liberal creed" which the founders invoked. By this they meant to say that, however rootless theology is in abstraction

from a living church, yet it can never be in bondage to any one dogmatic rendering of the Christian Tradition. From these two corollaries in tandem a third quite properly followed: the founders were standing in the truly "catholic" tradition—whether of Augustine in the 5th or Wesley in the 18th century—namely, that theology if it is to be *Christian* theology is at the core "faith seeking understanding."

If we put the outcome of these three corollaries together, they come to this: There is to be, as an integral part of the University, a faculty of theology which—with the School it represents and whose defined tasks it discharges—relates itself positively to the *consensus fidelium* of the living Church as its primary and constant point of reference. From that reference, the standpoint of living faith, it proceeds to enlarging understanding of the on-going tradition and to the communication thereof as its reason for being. But it does so with liberty to explore the entirety of the Tradition and, furthermore, in the confidence that the tradition of faith itself is a *living* reality with, as we say, a growing edge or an expanding frontier. And, indeed, this frontier must expand if it is to be commensurate with its proper Subject-matter. And that is God, the Creator and Redeemer, in his dialogue with man in history.

VI. The Structural Basis of Christian Theology: the Curriculum

If I have treated at some length the intentions of the founders and commented upon their conception of the role and task of the faculty of theology in this Divinity School, it is because, at half-century, it seems timely to recall from what wells we have been dug and, by reference to these, calculate better how theology at Duke has fared in the interim. As, shortly, I turn to this theme, I would have you alert to factors I think essential to any reliable understanding of the unfolding shape of theology at Duke Divinity School over these years.

It must be seen that, whatever form or style "theology" has taken, as a resultant, it is, plainly, the outcome of the corporate endeavor of the entire Divinity School faculty. And we may add that, to this end, the unfolding of the curriculum over a half-century must be studied and interpreted for its important indications concerning the substance and character of theology at Duke. To put it in a word: the curriculum is the message, that is, the dominating theological emphases current over the years of our purview.

If the curriculum is, as it were, the message, then it is plain that it is the curriculum which may, in any era, be tested most easily by reference to the three basic principles I have described as inherent in the founding policy. Nor is the curriculum, therefore, indefinitely admissible of modification or rank growth to comply with the intellectual fashions of the times; rather must it remain accountable to basic principles as adjudged by the faculty and, finally, by arbitrament of the dean and the University. This I believe has prevailed at Duke Divinity School this first half-century. It is, however, to be observed that tendencies to blur the lines between the explicit mandates of a faculty of Divinity and those of a merely scientific and phenomenological study of religion have become marked in American universities for a quarter-century and are not without a presence among us today. Unless this is understood and the integrity of the Divinity School's curriculum conserved, an erosion of the intent and policy of the founders is a possibility and will always remain so. During this half-century the leadership of Duke University has been remarkable both for its understanding and its undergirding of the founding policies.

I wish there were space for some observations and generalizations respecting the curricular history of this first half-century. The barest mention must suffice. The curriculum from the start, but progressively, has been diligent to represent the whole spectrum of the Christian Tradition from its Biblical origins through the successive ages of the Church and of the Church's witness and worship. The Biblical languages have been taught with great distinction. The liturgy has been plumbed for both its doctrinal import and its vehicular power in the School's life of corporate worship.

Some twenty-five years past the curriculum, through specialized professional studies, began far more expressly to relate the message of faith to the corrugations of life in the world and, I think, with direct bearing and usefulness for the minister's task in an increasingly problematic and changing society. Important revisions of curriculum took place in 1948, 1959, and 1968—the last, perhaps overly responsive to the anti-institutional and anti-ecclesiological spirit of the time.

Yet it is, I think, fair to say that, on the whole, the curriculum has remained answerable to the *dialectic of opposites* expressed in the formative policy of the School, with the corollaries I have mentioned. These have indubitably fostered and encouraged the

character of theology at Duke all the way from appointment of faculty to the presiding emphases of the curriculum. The influence of the policy of a dialectic of opposites has been, at once, ecumenical and liberating; at the same time, it labors under no misunderstanding as to whether the theological faculty has as its controlling point of reference the on-going and living Church.

VII. Fifty Years of Theology at Duke in Résumé

Now, having fully insisted upon these fundamental considerations and principles as basic to the unfolding shape of theology at Duke, how, then, would one characterize the outcome over these fifty years? This is to raise the theological question head-on or, more exactly, the question of doctrine in the theological curriculum. This question is no longer concerned simply with what *has been witnessed,* historically considered, but what *must* be reaffirmed in fidelity to the essential Gospel as it bears upon human life in the world. But this, to be sure, is always being done according to the light and understanding of its delegated professors at a given time in history. So we ask, what is the doctrinal profile of the School during these years? Can we, or ought we, label it, and with what tag or tags? Or are tags both dangerous and superfluous in evaluating the doctrinal contribution of the School to its students, the Church, or the world?

Now, at this point, the dreadful privilege to which I referred at the start becomes pressing indeed. To address myself to this latter question requires, it would seem, the naming of names of justly revered teachers and the omission of others, both living and departed, whose express and implied Christian witness has been doctrinally formative through these years. In addition, I find myself in a peculiarly delicate not to say treacherous position, since for well-nigh thirty-two years, for better or worse, I have been by title a teacher of systematic theology and for thirteen years—likewise for better or worse—I administered policy as dean. In short, I am, as they say nowadays, "involved"! Accordingly, I must avoid at all costs a course which John Henry Newman—and however laudable in his case—found unavoidable, namely, an *apologia pro vita mea!*

Fortunately, both of these hazards can be circumvented in some measure if we may take careful note of the conception of systematic or doctrinal theology twice referred to already in this paper. The latest mention was the implied definition of this kind of theology

as what must be or *ought to be reaffirmed* in fidelity to the essential Gospel as the latter bears upon human life in the world in the considered judgment of its delegated professors. Here I use the word "professor" in its classical as well as in its etymological meaning. But, more importantly, I intend to differentiate systematic from other theological disciplines by two considerations: first, it takes explicit responsibility for what *ought to be reaffirmed* of the received catholic Tradition, and, secondly, it does so, in part, by reference to the pressing issues enforced upon it by sundry problems of man's life in the world as currently understood, and, in turn, as these reflect back upon the Christian message itself.

Do not confuse this description of the doctrinal task with the late Paul Tillich's much patronized "method of correlation" in theology. Rather, is the description I give, as it were, the more general case of which his, in my view, is a very dubious derivative. The intentions here are very nearly the reverse of one another. Tillich would find what is still luminous in the Faith by submitting it to the "spot-light," as it were, of the world's ultimate concerns. Mine would be to illuminate the human world with the light of the Gospel and, *in the process,* recover and further discover the inherent luminosity of the Faith itself. In this way Faith not only seeks but finds understanding, indeed, acquires enriching discoveries respecting its own essence.

But, now, this conception of the task of theology is useful for deciphering the character of theology at Duke these fifty years. In short, one may get significant leads respecting Duke theology (or any Protestant theology of the recent past) by taking one's bearings—much as the sextant serves the sea captain—by reference to the prevailing "problematics" acknowledged and faced by theologians at given periods.

Accordingly, in fifty years of theological reaffirmation at Duke there have been, I judge, at least three quite distinguishable periods of doctrinal response to the circumambient environment punctuated, at intervals, by World War II, the civil rights movement, and the prolonged and adversely influential Viet Nam national debacle. It is this surrounding environment of issues—as understood, of course, by theologians—that stimulates the response of faith and greatly contributes to the shape of theology or doctrinal expression anywhere. This has most surely been the case at Duke. Here, this generalization applies provided we do not forget that theology is a corporate product and that, at Duke, it has developed

under the aegis of what has been described as the "dialectic of opposites."

The three periods to which I refer—each distinguishable by presiding concerns, problems, and diagnoses—are the following: There is, first, the liberation of preaching and doctrine from both Scriptural fundamentalism and provincial and denominational traditionalism. There is, second, the powerful thrust of the World Ecumenical Movement toward recovery of a united Christendom—attended, at the same time, by a truly vast reassessment and critical reappropriation of doctrinal riches of the Church Universal. There is, thirdly, the current period—world-wide in scope and presupposing, likewise, the so-called "third-world"—which, taken at large, is bewilderingly diversified in concerns and aspirations. It manifests a reactionary temper toward the previous period in persistent ambivalence toward confessional theology and the Church catholic. Its prevailing standpoint is "contextual," which means *either* that it measures the truth of Christian faith by its *relevance* to the ubiquitous human problem, *or* that it lays the churches under judgment—in some few instances, truly, the judgment of God in Christ.

About each of these eras and how they are reflected in theology at Duke only a few words can be said in the allotted space.

(1) Concerning the first era: when Gilbert T. Rowe accepted appointment at Duke for the fall of 1928, the catalogue had already for two years carried six hours of "Christian Doctrine" as required work but with no surname in the space prefixed by the word "professor." When Dr. Rowe—whose colleagueship I was privileged to share for three years prior to 1948—took up teaching duties, he was already a pastor and noted preacher of the Western North Carolina Conference with a record of rather meteoric rise to church-wide recognition and veteran experience. Furthermore, he had come to Duke from the important position of Book Editor for the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and was the highly admired if somewhat controversial editor of the *Methodist Quarterly Review*. The persistence with which he was courted by Drs. Few and Soper, albeit with near failure, to occupy the chair of Christian Doctrine has now been revealed by Reverend O. Lester Brown in his valuable biography of Dr. Rowe.[3]

Among the interesting statements of the reported correspon-

3. *Gilbert T. Rowe: Churchman Extraordinary* (Greensboro, N.C.: Piedmont Press, 1971), pp. 74-90.

dence is Dr. Rowe's written comment to Dr. Soper, which gives us a glimpse both of the context for doctrinal revision as Dr. Rowe conceived it then, and of the message he deemed suitable to the hour. In 1927 he wrote: "It seems to me that Duke has a very great opportunity and responsibility in the matter of helping the preachers get in touch with the last [latest?] thought and life of the age and at the same time to be genuinely evangelical in their ministry. . . ."[4] In his subsequent teaching of Christian theology he recurrently used as textbook D. C. Macintosh's *Theology as an Empirical Science.* This he commented upon with extensive elaborations of his own in a style inimitable, picturesque, whimsical, but also trenchant. As one who studied under Professor Macintosh —indeed as his first successor at Yale as also, curiously, Dr. Rowe's successor at Duke—I believe I understand something of Dr. Rowe's theological interests and prepossessions. Both men—Rowe and Macintosh—were, in their distinctive ways, spokesmen for an "evangelical liberalism" that accepted the findings of Biblical criticism and the import of the biological and physical sciences as these related to God's work in creation, and yet strongly affirmed both the experiential basis of Christian faith and its consequential compelling and lofty moral vocation.

Much, much more there is to say were there space to say it, and as it should be said. The *Resolution* of the faculty on the occasion of Dr. Rowe's retirement in 1948—written by very knowledgeable colleagues—underscores the point of special bearing upon the question before us. Among other things, it states: ". . . the South owes him much for the transition which he assisted it to make from an older uncritical orthodoxy to a more *timely* grasp upon the eternal gospel."[5] As one studies Dr. Rowe's article on "Present Tendencies in Religious Thought" in *The Divinity School Bulletin* of 1936, one has clear glimpses into the theological premises from which he worked.[6] His final word on the work of the new school, after just over two decades, was this: "Without pressure from any source all the members of the faculty were gradually drawn together into an essential unity, and Duke Divinity School is now well known as an institution characterized by evangelical liberalism."[7] Although we have but scratched the surface, this general characterization of

4. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
5. *Divinity School Bulletin,* Vol. 14, No. 2 (May, 1949), p. 20. Italics are mine.
6. *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May, 1936), pp. 29-35.
7. *Divinity School Bulletin* (May, 1949), p. 19.

theology at Duke in the earlier days, I am content to leave standing, coming as it does from a chief expositor.

(2) Chronologically, the second period at Duke overlaps with the first, extending, let us say, from 1940—or prior to the Second World War—into the mid-sixties. I take, for objective reference, the close of the Second Vatican Council (1965) as the approximate terminus as, likewise, it was the summit point of the World Ecumenical Movement. This movement, together with its accompanying theological renaissance, undoubtedly provided the living *milieu* for theological endeavor and doctrinal reformulation at Duke as elsewhere during this second period. Not merely regional but even national boundaries of earlier American theological preoccupation, animus, and debate acquired a span, certainly as wide as the Western Christian world.

The theological faculty began to re-think long-standing impasses between conflicting confessional viewpoints as refracted by species of Protestant "liberalism"—either historicism, on the one hand, or ethicism on the other. It did so in the enlarging consciousness, sometimes half-articulate, that Christian faith and devotion, after all, do antedate the 16th century Reformation. Especially did trends in Biblical study at Duke as well as in Church History both reflect and contribute to the emergence of an expanding context for doctrinal restructuring and emphasis.

The marks of this change of perspective at Duke cannot all be enumerated here. One such mark was the manuscript and textual researches of Kenneth Clark, that made him a respected and trusted New Testament scholar of the West with leading representatives of Orthodoxy in the eastern Mediterranean world and led to unprecedented textual studies and findings at St. Catherine's monastery, Sinai, at Athos, in Palestine, and elsewhere. One of them was Ray C. Petry's extraordinary unfolding of the rich Medieval inheritance. Another, surely, the flowering of studies in the hitherto obscure and neglected but rich heritage of our own American Christianity in the notable work of H. Shelton Smith. Still another sign is the enormous undertaking represented by the Wesley Works Editorial Project, now incorporated. Begun in 1959—and still far, too far, from completion—it is committed to the publication of the *Oxford Edition* of the Works of John Wesley. Of this, Frank Baker is the incomparable Editor-in-Chief. The collaboration required has been international. In this enterprise the Divinity School has been principal investor and so continues.

Other marks there are of the thrust toward recapture of the great tradition—such as Stinespring's studies in Near Eastern history and Cleland's quarter-century of preaching and teaching in Duke Chapel. One would miss the main point, however, unless he sees that the ecumenical movement, not only fostered unprecedented international theological exchange across long and rather firmly closed denominational frontiers, but that it nurtured exploration and recovery of the entire range of the Christian Tradition in depth.

It is in *this* perspective, primarily, that Karl Barth's or Emil Brunner's resurgent neo-Reformation theology received the attention it in fact commanded in those days. Today, it is doubtful that such system-building is possible, were it in all respects desirable. A principal reason, I believe, is that there is today no comparable "rising curve of Christian affirmation" in the churches to support it. The emerging but unfinished *consensus fidelium* that attended the high-tide of the ecumenical movement has fallen silent—not so much exhausted, I think, as overwhelmed by other insistent cares in an era of world-wide and profoundly resident anxiety. In our time the word salvation, therefore, has largely been redefined by the twin-concept: security and social mobility.

If, then, I am to characterize the second period of doctrinal ferment at Duke, I might venture to describe it as the inaugural era of exploratory ecumenical theology—as yet unfinished—and based upon a very considerable recovery of the Tradition catholic as contrasted with the traditions, plural, and featuring the twofold theme of the Third World Conference on Faith and Order, namely, "Christ and his Church."

(3) In the second period of the Divinity School's theological creativity, professional theology assayed its tasks in a consciousness of growing colleagueship with practicing churchmen and the larger fellowship of believers. In addition to enhancing general ecumenical vision, the now near-forgotten liturgical revival of the same period offered a common ground of the Spirit for both theological revision and common worship in a developing interdenominational forum. For historical reasons of baffling complexity and enormous scope, the succeeding third period of theological endeavor at Duke reflects more than a decade of widespread societal disassociation if not disintegration, although signs of healing may be appearing in the wings. As, perhaps, the disunion of Christendom was the central "problematic" of theology in the second

period, so, in the third, the self-conscious disunity of mankind becomes the focus.

A mark of this trend is that, viewed as a whole, theology in America has become predominantly either "free-lance" or emphatically "academic," and tends to be as remote from "Church dogmatics," in self-understanding and method, as the previous period was well advanced on the way towards it.[8] This is true especially of the American scene, and more emphatically, perhaps, than in Europe. American provinciality in theology, therefore, is already fully resurgent but in pluralized and multifarious shapes and platforms too numerous even for mention here. Meanwhile, the so-called "third world" viewpoints—representing more nearly socio-economic and ethnic concerns than geographic ones—are belatedly clamorous for their share in Christian doctrinal revision, especially as this bears upon *both* the social application of acknowledged Christian ethical norms to the plight of the oppressed of the earth and, also, the fidelity of the Church to its calling in the world.

Of the several species of so-called "renewal theology," which came forward with some very understandable incentives in the late sixties, two mottos, in particular, may sample aspects of the theological program of the time. As you may recall, one of them was: "Let the world provide the agenda." This was exhortation to the churches. The other was its complement, namely, J. C. Hoekendijk's injunction for the times: "The Church Inside Out." The corrective included the thesis that the whole business of Christianity *is* mission—indeed, it seems, is quite exhausted in mission. Explicit was the exhortation to "de-ghettoize" the church—which is, to be sure, always timely—but in particular Hoekendijk with others enjoined the need to quit making of the Church a refuge for private salvation and all cloistered virtues. For some representatives of the viewpoint, justification by faith considered as private salvation was totally expendable. Accordingly, a new evangelicalism was in the making! But it is not clear that it had a firm grasp upon the whole Gospel.

Further accounting of recent theological tendencies is excluded. On the whole—and taking a purview of the rather humorless, tactless, and joyless voices in "professional" theology of the im-

8. The word "academic" denotes more than institutional setting. It denotes also, as Dean James Laney makes clear in his Convocation address, a "guild" mentality among academicians who are more disposed to find their "identity" by reference to their "peer group" than to any fellowship of the community of believers, the Church.

mediate present—the preponderance of utterance seems to derive from three sources: the applied-ethics bureaucracy of the churches, religious journalism of many stamps, and the faculties of university departments of religion. Meantime, it is a good while since churchmen of the stature of Francis J. McConnell, Henry Sloan Coffin, William Temple, or a Gilbert T. Rowe of the South have entered the lists for anything like serious theological discussion.

Taken together, these circumstances are, I think, indicative of a pressing issue today respecting the sources and norms of Christian doctrine, namely: "Who speaks for the Church"—*anymore*? Shall the word spoken be primarily that of its critics, or, if its thoughtful communicants speak, will they have the currency of "paper-back" appeal and, hence, find a publisher? Here at the Divinity School, as elsewhere, the disciplined theologian experiences as his regular diet something not unlike a Sahara of sand in the midst of which he is intermittently buffeted by squalls of special interest, often abrasive, coming from the twelve points of the theological compass. What shall he do? Where shall he begin, and how shall he speak?

Under such circumstances it does get to be rather a matter of nicely calculated priorities, as Professor Herzog has quite lately urged, namely, as to which of the winds—and from what point of the compass—one faces into. Yet facing into the winds is much as any seagull, I have noticed, regularly does on the rock-bound coast of Maine. This goes even for Jonathan Livingston Seagull!

In his frequently misunderstood "liberation theology"—yet, I think, with a proven evangelical concern—Herzog has faced into winds blowing, probably, ever since the Barmen Declaration of the confessing Evangelical Church of Germany—with solitary courage in 1934—acknowledged in the face of the ill-wind of Hitler's National Socialism a treacherous temptation of the churches and reaffirmed the sovereignty of God over man's history and the fidelity of the Church to its calling before God in the world. Karl Barth later declared himself on this head in his *Rechtfertigung und Recht* (*Justification and Justice*, 1939), and one will not really understand "liberation theology" in Herzog's version, I believe, unless one sees that—in line with Barth, his teacher, before him—Herzog is urging that to take "justification by faith" seriously and to comprehend its full import requires the acknowledgement that salvation is not only a private transaction between Christ and the individual, but a public commitment of the justified community, the Church, to the purpose of God in the affairs of mankind.

I think I am not far afield in judging that "liberation theology" is a call to the Church and church people really to affirm their liberation, through Christ, from conformity and bondage to "the mind of the world." In addition to recalling the Apostle Paul to our attention in this way, Professor Herzog is underscoring what Luther was saying in the 16th century: Let God be God in the Church! In Herzog's view this is an urgently needed word for the hour among the established churches of the South. On this point, although I think we can be somewhat more inclusive, he can scarcely be wrong. Yet the insistence is as old as Amos' exhortation against "ease in Zion" and as recent as H. Richard Niebuhr's stress in the '40's on the pressing need of Christians to be converted to Christianity.

Anyone who has read even moderately in the writings of Wesley knows that the conversion of nominal Christians to Christianity was what Wesley's preaching and indefatigable labors of more than a half a century were all about, and, furthermore, that in contrast with very nearly the whole Continental Lutheran and Reformed theology Wesley made "Christian perfection"—with social outreach—the undoubted test of any private salvation worth mentioning. It does not follow, of course, that Wesley's succession has continued to hear him. It is, therefore, reassuring to know that the voice of authentic Wesleyan evangelicalism is timely among us. I believe it has promise of recovery of the great tradition. It is always healthy for Methodists, in particular, to be reminded of Wesley's later life *Thoughts Upon Methodism,* where he says: "I am not afraid that the people called Methodists should ever cease to exist either in Europe or America. But I am afraid, lest they should only exist as a dead sect, having the form of religion without the power."

What this means for us today Dr. W. P. Stephens touched upon in his first Gray Lecture in the stress that "conversion is political and social as well as personal." Unpopular as this has been among many evangelicals, it is plain enough that Wesley would be no stranger to the thought that authentic Christianity cannot be passed off for private fence-mending between God and the sinner. He was, of course, clear about man the sinner. But, in the hotly controverted *Conference Minutes* of 1770, Wesley scandalized the Calvinists of his day by declaring that "works meet for repentance" are the inescapable obligation and outcome of justification and, further, if absent, absent too is the "condition" of salvation. This

let loose probably the most formidable doctrinal debate of the 18th century, between John Fletcher, against antinomianism, and Augustus Toplady and others. In plain words, Wesley had flown in the face of Reformed theology simply to stand firm with the words of our Lord: "By their fruits ye shall know them." With Wesley "Christian perfection" was not optional. It was part of the doctrine with which the Methodists began and heedlessness to which might incur the sectarian deadness he feared most.

VIII. Conclusions

My account of theology at Duke these fifty years is now done. I have attempted, in brief compass, to recount and to interpret the story as faithfully as I am able. It cannot escape our notice how vastly expanded is the context and how multiplied the issues by reference to which doctrinal reaffirmation today must be undertaken as compared with the '20's and the '30's of this century. Nevertheless, I must register the judgment that any and all responsible theological reflection of the future at Duke will be well advised to keep before it the foundational guidelines embraced in the founders' conception that I have named "the dialectic of opposites." Authentic Christian theology must recognize that, from *faith,* it may *hope* to move onward to understanding—also that its primary point-of-reference is the faith of a living Church. Coordinately, on the other hand, this same theology is under mandate to go on probing the Scripture and the tradition of the Church catholic, always with a view to illuminating the darkness of the human world with the "light of the world," even Jesus Christ.

Finally, I see much in the story recounted to reassure us, as also the founders, and to justify no little rejoicing that, in truth, the Divinity School of Duke University has been, during this half-century, a real community for the meeting of minds whereby the light of faith has been nurtured and has burned brighter to illumine the way of those who, nerved by it, have ventured forth to discharge their given vocation in church and world. But the Psalmist has the final word for the past as also for any future in theology: "In thy light shall we see light."

Theological Education: Near Horizons

by James T. Laney
Dean, Candler School of Theology, Emory University

My assigned topic is "Theological Education: Near Horizons." Transposing that into my own idiom, I would entitle this talk "On Being the People of God in the University the Last Quarter of this Century." These reflections will draw on first-hand aquaintance, unfortunately not with Duke but with four other seminaries, two in the East and two in the South, all university-related. My thesis is simple and direct. It is this: the crucial element in theological education is who the faculty see themselves to be, i.e., their principal identity. This is based on the assumption that true education occurs in a context of sympathetic identification; that is, we are shaped in mind and spirit as we participate in and under the tutelage of others. Discipleship is the quintessence of that kind of education. If this is the case, our present confusion in curriculum and in program across the country is a reflection of contending identities among the faculty. Such a statement is intended in the first instance as an observation and not as an indictment. What is the basis for such an assertion? A brief historical overview may assist us here.

By the time Duke Divinity School was established, the major battles of fundamentalism had been fought, and modern critical historical scholarship had won an untrammeled right in the university. Princeton had survived a split, and while Vanderbilt had gone its own way apart from the Church, the Methodist Church in the South replaced it not by independent seminaries which the Church could control but by two new universities, one to the west and one to the east of the Mississippi River, indicating the continuing Methodist conviction that the training of the ministry should occur in a university setting. This was already the case in Boston. It was also the case in Evanston (with Garrett and Northwestern), in Denver (with Iliff and the University of Denver), and similarly in Los Angeles with Southern California, and subsequently in Durham, Atlanta, and Dallas. It has only been, interestingly enough, since the Second World War that the Methodists have sought to establish independent theological seminaries.

Now while this was true, the early days were not all roseate, because many people still had a suspicion that true religion could not survive so much learning. There's a story that Bishop Warren Candler, who was the chancellor of Emory University when it was first established, went to the dean of the Candler School of Theology and said, "We are having a lot of trouble over one of your New Testament professors who doesn't hold the Bible in enough respect. It might be wise if you got rid of him." The dean assured him that he would take this under serious consideration. After thinking it over he hit upon a solution. It turned out that Bishop Candler's son-in-law, a man named Sledd, also taught New Testament in the same seminary. The next time the dean saw Bishop Candler he went to him and said, "Bishop, I've decided you are right. We ought to get rid of Professor X. But if we get rid of him we have to be equitable and we'll have to also get rid of Professor Sledd. Both of them are two peas in a pod, believing in higher criticism." Bishop Candler went, "Harumph, well maybe we ought to think about it a little more." This to illustrate the creative use of nepotism in the early days of scholarship!

After these battles over ecclesiastical control of the seminaries subsided, there was a generation of teachers whose inner lives still evidenced the marks of piety. However sophisticated their language and thought, they were consciously a part of the people of God. There was a penumbra of piety, a recognizably religious quality to the lives of these memorable figures of the 1930's, 1940's and the early 1950's. Reinhold Niebuhr came out of a Detroit industrial parish. To his dying day he continued to be a preacher, albeit in dialectics, to the entire nation. Some of Tillich's best theology was preached in James Chapel at Union Seminary. Those who were at Yale during this period will never forget Richard Niebuhr's lectures, which invariably began with a simple but moving prayer. Among my most precious possessions is one such scribbled prayer on the back of a Just-Remember pad from the Presbyterian Ministers' Fund. Likewise in the practical disciplines people like Buttrick, Fosdick, Luccock, Sockman were churchmen and preachers. All of them, whether in research and reflection or practice and reflection, were grounded in and expressed a faith: their attempt at self-understanding of their world, however enlarged to include politics or church or national life. For themselves, there was no question of their identity with the people of God.

Now we have to resist romanticizing. These so-called giants were like that in part because theirs was an age when church and society and learning were still seen to be compatible if not congenial. Nor should we blink the many problems which they faced and the genuine faith questions they wrestled with. Nevertheless, they were still possessed of a stable identity. And that identity was an identification with the church. Those who were educated by them took some of their identity from them along with the church in the center. Duke and Emory had their counterparts to these men. Thus a student who attended seminary any time during those decades through the '50's might be challenged and pushed and pulled and tested. Some of their worlds would collapse and some of their worlds would explode. But for the most part there was an underlying confidence that those to whom they entrusted themselves were themselves faithful, that they had a clear identity and that identity was related to the people of God. That era is past. It is not just that the giants are gone. They are. But it is passed as an era. In their later years when Buttrick and Tillich went to Harvard they found a different situation, one which troubled them, not simply because Harvard was different, but because the times were changing and Harvard was only the harbinger of the change.

What changed? First of all the setting changed. The university is a different place from what it was in the '30's and '40's. The ethos, the dominant tone, the controlling spirit is different. Since Sputnik all so-called soft disciplines have felt intimidated by the hard disciplines. By soft disciplines I mean to include the humanities such as history, literature, philosophy, all of which have direct counterparts in the theological curriculum. An emphasis upon method, language analysis, modes of argumentation became dominant in a quest to find a firmer, less vulnerable basis for continuance in a modern university which was scientifically dominated.

Second, the self-understanding of theological disciplines itself has changed. A tighter focus, comparable to developments in methodology that occurred in literature and history and philosophy, has now occurred in their counterparts in the theological curriculum. For example, in most of the seminaries across the country use of the historical-critical method is a foregone conclusion. The question now is, given that emphasis, whether there is time left to attend to the literature of the scripture.

Third, much of the education which our present faculties have

received has itself changed as a result of these other two. We have to look at the socialization of the graduate students as they apprentice for teaching to appreciate what is going on in their lives, how their horizons have changed, how their identities have been shaped. That socialization has taken place within disciplines which ask their own questions, questions that are often prompted by other considerations than the life of faith. Those disciplines which tend toward phenomenology and objectivity have located in university departments of religion for the most part. Where theology faculties and departments of religion share in graduate instruction there have developed some very real strains as to what the dominant tone in graduate professional education should actually be. The result of much of this has been that the self-identity of the faculty has tended to move toward a discipline of peers independent of religion. The American Academy of Religion and the Society of Biblical Literature have become the arbiters not only of scholarship but of peer identity and recognition. Their remarkable growth in size and influence over the past several decades testifies to this. The practical fields have also organized into professional groups, with increased role-definition established by competencies to the point where the understanding of the ministry itself can be defined in terms of professionalism. The implications of these two developments, not only for theological education but for the church, are far-reaching. A scholar-theologian who once taught on a theological faculty and later went to a department of religion in a secular university has written poignantly about his pilgrimage through the kind of identity crisis I have just described: one who came out with a kind of neo-fundamentalist faith, went through graduate school, established peer relationships with scholars, and then found himself in a crisis of belief and now speaks about the morality of belief—the importance of being true and honest in what one can actually avow and affirm with integrity. Having gone through all this, he now states he wants to teach in a department of religion, but in one that is next door to a faculty of divinity. What this person is stating with courage and clarity, many others still on theology faculties feel vaguely or refuse to acknowledge. Similarly, many clergy find their identity more compatible with non-church related roles, such as counseling, social work or teaching.

There is, in short, a confusion in identity, and students who come to seminary and become identified with faculty are neces-

sarily plunged into that confusion. Now to be sure, there will be certain students who, regardless of what seminary they attend, won't make any identification with faculty. They will be defensive and guard their commitment like a treasure in danger of being plundered. They will not become educated; they will have simply survived the educational experience. It is not to protect such students that the issue of identity is raised. It is to say that we as faculty inevitably reflect the various and sometimes conflicting communities of our primary identification, with all the pressures and blandishments that those communities can hold forth. In a sense, our seminaries reflect the disruption and atomism of contemporary life as it is found in other areas of society. Thus our problem of identity is part of our time. One could suggest that the question of lifestyle in the ministry, so troubling to many of the Annual Conference—differing understandings of what is acceptable, whether we are talking about things to eat and drink or whether we are talking about clothing or whether we are talking about sexuality, divorce, etc.—expresses this tension in a most dramatic way. Lifestyle can be understood as the living out of one's primary identification. With whom do we seek to be identified, for what reasons, and are the people of God recognizably a part of that?

For the last ten to fifteen years seminaries have been trying to address this. We have all had the feeling, growing out of the 1950's, that there needed to be a new kind of relevance for academic discipline. We felt that students should have a broader experiential base, and we have tried all kinds of changes in curriculum, such as experiments in contextual education, teaching parishes, internships, supervised ministry programs, etc. These have had their value. They have indeed broadened the experiential base of the student. But what about the faculty? Unless faculty are also struggling to bring these disparate worlds into coherence, students are left without guidance and support at the critical juncture of their professional lives. But how can this be encouraged in a natural and unforced way?

We hit on one such way almost by accident at Emory several years ago. We established what is called Supervised Ministry to expand the world of the student beyond the strictly academic. Similar programs have been set up in seminaries around the country. From the outset, the faculty not only authorized this program but agreed to participate in it across the board. It took this shape.

Ten students and a faculty member meet two hours a week through the first year of seminary, with the students placed in supervised settings where they experience human need, whether it be aging and death, emergency rooms, or poverty. The student becomes aware of his or her limitations in dealing with these extreme or demanding situations, and they bring back to their reflection group the turmoil, distress, or sense of accomplishment derived from life situations. The unintentional benefit of this program has been that while the students gained a measure of clarity about who they were, their identity, it also expanded the world of the faculty. The faculty came to be perceived as colleagues with students in situations which raised issues of personal faith, the capacity to respond in certain situations, in short, questions of ministry. Through this the faculty became aware, and the students knew they were aware, of the struggle the students were going through, and this reflexively helped redefine and stimulate their classroom work.

More recently we have attempted to further enlarge the shared experiential base of faculty and students by having courses taught in local churches; not just practical courses, but Bible, theology, etc. The courses are jointly taught by faculty and pastors, and are attended by students and lay persons. The courses seek to address a "problematic" that church or some of its people are involved with. If Supervised Ministry deals with the existential commitment question that students press, these courses deal with questions of the people of God as they struggle to live and survive faithfully in the world. It happens that I taught a course last fall with a black minister in his church in downtown Atlanta. The course was "The Mission and Ministry of a Local Church." Our students and those lay people tried to understand what that church's own task should be in that particular setting. And of course the setting was black. It became clear that we were not providing adequate opportunity for our students to come to terms with the problem of racism, either within themselves, or within the institutional structure of the church and of society. What it did for me as an ethicist was to help me realize that there is no way of understanding the task of the church in today's society without a sense of complicity. Supervised Ministry challenges the students—and vicariously, the faculty—in our limitations. The urban setting threatens us because we feel implicated. Reflecting on this, I realized that this is the academic pay-off for me: that there can be no meaningful social ethics written today that does not have com-

plicity written into the heart of it, not as a cheap confession but as an appreciation of the corporateness which binds us one to another in hope and in guilt. This is possible only when there is a community of sufficient grace that allows us to be that threatened and yet not undone.

What does this mean? We attempt to place whatever "text" we're teaching in a different setting where it becomes enlarged as well as seen in a different context. That move allows a different set of questions to be asked with appropriateness.

The move back and forth in juxtaposition of the same text in different settings creates a new understanding of ourselves and of the "text." This process does not challenge the integrity of an academic discipline; it does not require a certain lifestyle for the faculty or students; it does not presuppose formal church ties. What it does do is to allow latent identities and identifications with the church to emerge freely, and, along with the students, to provide an occasion to recapture and reconfirm one's identity as a servant of Jesus Christ. To be sure, there are genuine resistances to this in all of us. The issue of identity is no longer just a student problem; it is also ours. It is also an exhausting process physically and logistically. It takes time and energy. But at least the confusion of identity that all of us are now sharing is being articulated, reflected upon, suggesting new ways of being bound together as the people of God. We continue to affirm that a seminary in a university is not an ecclesiastical agency; therefore the problem of identity cannot be resolved by ecclesiastical control or fiat. But while a divinity school is not the conventicle of the church, at the same time it is not just another graduate school. There is historic basis for this, the attempt to combine faith experience and parish involvement with theological reflection. We find it in Augustine, who was an active bishop, in Luther and Wesley and Edwards, as well as in many of the nineteenth-century theologians. This approach simply takes seriously the sociology of knowledge, but it turns it around. We are no longer only relativized by our setting. By placing ourselves in another setting than the strictly academic, we recognize that spiritual formation and identity require intention in a fragmented world. Theological education in this last quarter-century must assist in affirming our identification with the people of God in the common ground of the church. In that way students themselves may have their identity tested and confirmed as the people of God.

God and America's Future

by John K. Roth
Professor of Philosophy, Claremont Men's College

and Frederick Sontag
Professor of Philosophy, Pomona College

"Live as free men, yet without using your freedom as a pretext for evil; but live as servants of God."
—I Peter 2:16

I. A Theology of Liberation

One repeated American promise is to grant individual liberty. Often because of religious convictions, Americans have assumed that our task was not only to extend freedom at home but to crusade in making the world safe for democracy. This ideal of providing liberty for all of our citizens, even extended to aid self-determination in other lands, is so basic to American self-understanding that our national self-consciousness becomes confused when these hopes are thwarted, as they have been recently.

As Americans look to the future, some part of national identity lies in framing theologies of liberation which state how religion can fulfill promises for release. Then we can see better the limits we face, what falls to government to promote and what must be left to the individual. Conditions in much of the world are so unsympathetic to cries for liberation that there seems to be little use in battling for political and social change. However, where enthusiasm to achieve liberty does exist, it receives added impetus from a parallel religious drive to release the spirit. Since political idealism is partly the result of evangelical fervor, a theology of liberation keeps spiritual aspirations channeled toward liberating goals.

"With God all things are possible" (Mt. 19:26). One task for any theology of liberation is to take seriously the multiple implications in that Biblical claim. The assertion is a two-edged sword. It points out the demonic potentials of existence as well as our chances for a good life. Part of the enigmatic power which God allows to evil is its ability to take people unaware. Like Eve, beguiled by a serpent who convinced her that no harm would come

from eating forbidden fruit (see Gen. 3:1-24), we often take our safety, security, and happiness for granted. Millions of Jews, to name another case, turned into smoke in Nazi ovens without rebellion. Many could not believe the horrors produced by men and women—and allowed by God—until it was too late for effective resistance. No theology of liberation can offer naive optimism about the simple goodness of nature, man, or God.

No sane person seeks liberation from restrictions which he finds are necessary, and most people will not resist oppressions which are inescapable. Probably a majority of the world's people live under conditions of scarcity and tyranny; only small numbers ever gather the strength for rebellion. Due to God's reluctance to intervene directly to assure political victory, theologies should be cautious about urging open protest and rebellion where increased brutality and oppression are the likely results. Even taking the American experience into account, any historical evaluation of the "success" of revolutions is extremely ambiguous with respect to the liberation actually produced, e.g., the French Revolution. Most revolutionary warfare does not follow the relatively controlled American model. A sound theology of liberation, then, should warn that the paths of protest—from nonviolent resistance and civil disobedience to armed insurrection—are always treacherous, risky, and sometimes self-defeating.

American colonists did not step off their boats with a violent cry of "Revolution!" on their lips. By and large, they desired little more than peace with the established civil authorities in England. True, they did have a strong sense of individual autonomy and an inclination toward religious and social community patterns which encouraged liberation from authority imposed from outside. But even in religious circles they debated long and hard whether violent revolution was the only path open to them.

God seems to act on similar principles. The structure of the natural order does erupt in violence from time to time, but no singular revolutionary thrust against oppression is involved. In fact, the wreckage often falls most painfully on the weak and innocent rather than on those who tyrannize. According to religious accounts, God does intercede to lead people in rebellion and out of bondage. The same records, however, indicate that he does so only rarely and in special cases. Even if we use Jesus as the model, we must admit that God's performance in human flesh is quite restrained.

Reading the Biblical reports of Jesus' life leaves us with a mixed reaction. His potential power is overwhelming, but simultaneously one is struck by how sparing Jesus is in using it. For every miraculous healing, many continued to suffer hopelessly; for every Lazarus raised from death, thousands perished. Rebukes and judgments brought against religious and political corruption did not alter the fact that day-to-day life in Jerusalem went on much as usual. Jesus' driving of the money changers out of the temple and his flaunting of the religious establishment are trivial incidents compared to the reforms he might have guaranteed had he unleashed his full power.

The crucifixion and resurrection have sometimes been taken as a mandate for Christian revolutionary violence on the grounds that they reveal how violent acts and even death itself may be necessary to achieve God's goals. However, those early events certainly were much subdued in their immediate impact. Only a few felt the implications of Good Friday and Easter at first. The emerging understanding of God's newly revealed liberation does not seem to have been aimed primarily at producing armed outbursts against oppressive Roman authority. More characteristic was the conviction that "we should love one another" (I Jn. 3:11).

Jesus is indeed a strange liberator. To embody so much power and to use it with such restraint for the fragile aim of love—no wonder that many of his followers became confused and disillusioned. No wonder that the "good news" of Jesus remains foolishness and a stumbling block to many (see I Cor. 1:22-25). Yet, this same Jesus is the Christian's sign that, in the mode of future triumph, all things are possible with God.

The liberating theme which Jesus communicates is that death, and every destructive force that contributes to it, is ultimately under the control of a God who loves and cares enough for human life to save it. This puts God basically "on our side." Freedom from the final limitation of death does not guarantee us liberation from every other restriction that the world can produce, but it encourages work against any enslaving circumstances that do not have to be. If life is not necessarily ended by death, there is no reason why men and women should simply acquiesce before any other limitation in this life. Our successful liberation efforts, however, still rest on a judicious estimate of the odds and the best courses of action. Having promised people liberation in the ulti-

mate case, God essentially frees us to find our own way in the world, to use the powers we have as best we can.

God urges us to set aside every obstacle that thwarts us, but we are told not to use our freedom "as a pretext for evil" (I Pet. 2:16). He knows that we may reject his injunction as presumptuous, given the horrors he has unleashed in our path. But the challenge he throws out is for us to match his ultimate overcoming of evil with our own acts of care and mercy. God calls those who trust his love and eventual goodness to lend their hands as servants to free others from every misery and degradation of body, mind, and spirit in the present age.

Jesus raises another basic issue for a theology of liberation: Can God stimulate the desire for liberation and at the same time reconcile persons to each other? The answer is "yes," but the way is neither clear nor easy. On the one hand, Jesus can say, "Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth: it is not peace I have come to bring, but a sword" (Mt. 10:34, Jerusalem Bible). He realized that the liberating thrust of his ministry would have its divisive effects just because it opposes every form of selfishness, legalism, and tyranny. Wherever the appetite for freedom is whetted, disruptive protest, rebellion, and even violence are not easy to restrain. In most cases, the drive for liberation starts off with a further fragmentation of human relationships. Thus, it does not come with reconciliation as its most immediate and obvious quality. Certainly liberation implies reconciliation as an end product, since no one has much freedom when the world is dominated by hatred, fear, and guilt. Still, liberation and reconciliation become synonymous only far down the road of human action.

The aims of liberation may lead to the use of violence when any opposition refuses to yield to reasonable pressures to recognize individual or national rights. We may concur with early colonists that violence is even justified religiously if honest and prayerful deliberations convince us that more restrained courses of action only play into the hands of tyrannizing forces. Short of such considerations, however, armed force remains a questionable means from a Christian perspective. In no case is it an unambiguous instance of the works of love Jesus stressed.

James and John were ready to call down fire from heaven to destroy a Samaritan village that refused to welcome Jesus. But Jesus is hardly an enthusiastic advocate of violent revolution, and he rebuked those disciples (see Lk. 9:51-56). Human revolutions

often kill people in the name of liberating them. Jesus saw his mission differently. His aim was to save, not to destroy. He fed hungry bodies and gave sight to blind eyes to encourage new life. *The goal was to replace the waste of liberation-through-violence with the hope of liberation-through-love.* In this way God seeks to bring liberation and reconciliation together. Unfortunately, these fragile motives are left to work in a volatile and hate-filled world. Christians believe that "love never ends" (I Cor. 13:8), but no one can deny that many efforts to liberate and reconcile through love are trampled out of existence every day.

Such realities help to show the complexity of God's nature and the difficulty of the path he selected for this world. Although our optimistic hopes and religious beliefs tend to obscure the fact, God has many faces. One side of him leans toward violence and destruction, as we see from the sheer presence of evil in existence. Another suggests healing and a concern that refuses to allow us to be lost forever. Freedom and love find each other in God but not without struggle, since he refuses to reduce himself to any single quality. This is our dilemma too. We never have one simple identity. Freedom makes us pluralistic. Still, our task is that we must hold the many together as one or else face self-destruction.

Self-centered demands hinder reconciling love and threaten freedom. Thus, God does not frantically clutch at himself or simply demand that which pleases him immediately. He defines and establishes freedom and love by turning toward the world, although he does not choose to make the situation calm and idyllic. He opens himself to emotional involvement and suffering, and thus to being affected. Self-giving may be the ultimate route to self-liberation, but only he who gives himself can expect others to do so. Such action is a defining factor in God's nature, even as he chooses to allow opposing tendencies to operate within his life. God chooses to love in the situation where love means the most: namely, where his freedom and ours create horror and destruction which do not have to be and which threaten love at every turn. His saving care remains in control, but this happens only through his willed identification with Paul's injunction to us: "Make love your aim" (I Cor. 14:1).

Because man's powers are limited and his understanding slight, it is natural for him to think that liberation simply means to secure his own position. Thus, we require conversion before self-giving on any broad scale becomes possible. A loving God of liberation

is a constant subverter of the human tendency to seek our own security first. He liberates by helping us to accept our own uncertainty. Once we take a step in that direction, we can begin to offer aid to others in precarious conditions and thus further our own release by self-forgetting love. Just as God's freedom involves sharing his power and love with us, so one is released from self-enslavement if someone else becomes of greater concern. When it serves us well, religion moves people toward this revolutionizing discovery.

Ironically, religion all too often actually presses its own people into servitude rather than working for their release. This is not completely surprising, because forms of sacrifice and ritual intended as a means to free the spirit can in turn become obstacles when required and performed for their own sake. In such cases, religion does not feed the human desire for freedom. Exactly the opposite: it only becomes an added burden. Unless ecclesiastical communities can check their own tendency toward inflexible and worn-out patterns, they can never act as a spiritual source for social liberation.

Thus, even as we advocate religion as a source of incentive for liberation, we must remember its pluralistic character in America. Religious communities are unlikely ever to agree completely on political and social courses of action. Moreover, much religious life tends to respect established political authority, when others see it as corrupt and oppressive. In addition, every religious press for liberation concentrates first on the spirit, and it is no simple matter to say exactly what the human spirit requires as a necessary condition for freedom. Sometimes the soul seems free in adverse external conditions and most lost in easy surroundings.

II. God's Authority as a Sign for the Future

There is no question but that churches and the moral force of God once served as basic sources of authority in American life. There is also little question that this situation has changed substantially since the 'fifties. The authority which religious communities and God previously offered to underwrite our goals has largely dissolved. Of course, iconoclasm is not restricted to religion. Consciousness of pluralism and mass pressure for liberation challenge authority everywhere. Thus, if new visions of God are to have a part in our life together, we need to consider: How is it still possible to interpret and perceive God's authority?

God holds the many together as one. His existence involves no unity that destroys variety, but neither does plurality lead to his disintegration. God expresses his emotions and energies so that they achieve a controlled outlet. This creates a world more wild than we would choose for ourselves, but nonetheless our existence is a reflection of God's grappling with freedom. Insofar as men and women are created in God's image, they participate in these same tensions. Thus, our relation to God authorizes a human quest not only for freedom and liberation but for reconciliation as well. It infuses democracy with a mandate to assist the weak, since God finds a way to nourish variety wherever possible. True, God does not force anyone to live in ways that further human liberation and reconciliation. But the general outline of his creation, plus the fundamental qualities of his nature, link him closely with liberating and reconciling interests. To appeal to this authority does not guarantee success for our struggles, but it provides a sense of confidence and encouragement which may spell the difference between improvement or further decay.

Such an authoritative God is one who directs attention to freedom and majority decision, but who also stresses compassion and help for minority groups who suffer unjustly. This view of God demands a constant watchfulness to assist those unable to hold their own in an unchecked competition. At the same time, if this God controls evil up to a point in our present life, he does not eliminate it altogether. Thus, the organization of all humanitarian aims must make plans that take account of what will destroy and work against any utopian project.

Choices between "life and good, death and evil" (Deut. 30:15) face us perpetually. The most Americans can say is that, like God's activity in creation, we always choose some of each. We will never become a nation of pure and simple goodness. Our debauchery has gone too far; our Eden is permanently spoiled. In all Christian experience, however, the future is never completely closed, and God's sustained authority over existence is revealed by the fact that new opportunities remain available. What should this mean in the United States today? As far as work within the nation is concerned, God's authority points toward a primary emphasis on freedom, and particularly it involves a stress on ways to liberate people from enslaving dependence on either stimulants or luxuries, from narrow self-concern, from needless governmental intrusions into private life, and from physical miseries which will destroy

many in our population as well as in other lands. Release of the American spirit is needed so that it can flower in art and literature as well as in religion. *God's authority is located in pressure to keep the future open for diversity.* Without this, the present tends to close in—deadly and dead-ended. This has happened already for some lands and people, including many Americans. But we can escape that fate if a new sense of God's intentions is felt among us.

God's authoritative concern for freedom is incompatible with any narrow focus on our own self-fulfillment. He requires movement toward communal concern that promotes the broadest range of personal achievement. Thus, insofar as people are religiously motivated, they should feel the spirit of the Lord pressing an obligation to bring "good news to the poor" (Lk. 4:18; see also Isa. 61:1). This means offering immediate relief from suffering, even if pain and need cannot be eliminated. It means checking the spread of poverty, even if Jesus understood correctly when he said that "you have the poor with you always" (Mt. 26:11, Jerusalem Bible) "Release the captives" (Lk. 4:18; see also Isa. 61:1) is the special message for Americans to preach and act upon.

The oppressed are where you find them: in underdeveloped "third world" states, in despair-breeding ghettoes, or in the most fashionable suburbs. Americans who respond to a vision of God's authority will "proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord" (Lk. 4:19; see also Isa. 61:2). That is, they will work to heal the wounds of involuntary servitude, whether it is as a bondage to self or to others. We can do this even though we know that full freedom cannot be achieved in America or anywhere else on the face of this earth.

Every American who can hear God's voice has a mission for the days ahead. It is the call to open new land. Such "new land," however, will have to mean something less literal than it did in our nation's beginning. Thus, we must learn the necessity for inner renewal as a condition for breaking through inhibiting conditions. Whenever and wherever such need exists, we are called to meet it.

III. America, Land of Odyssey

The 1970s created a forced journey for many unwilling American adventurers. We would like to return to easier ways and simpler days, but we sometimes feel like "strangers and exiles on the earth" (Heb. 11:13) as we face trials not of our own choosing. We would like to feel the comforts of a homeland, but instead

events once again launch Americans on an odyssey, a painful and soul-testing voyage of self-discovery.

No one consciously desired the problems which recently have affected us all. Critics of the Vietnam War were sometimes paranoid, but few went to the extreme of claiming that the actual results of that involvement were planned or wanted. Even the most optimistic interpreters of the "drug culture" now admit that our high rates of addiction and personal disintegration were not quite what they had in mind. Environmental deterioration came in spite of an optimistic trust in science and technology. Violence on the educational scene was hardly the anticipated outcome of the billions spent on schooling. Economic upheavals, not to mention corruption in domestic politics, added still other unwelcomed pressures.

We thought we knew our homeland; now we are not so sure. Few Americans expected to become restless in the midst of success, and it is disturbing to find that many natives simply cannot settle down. This mood of restless wandering has a religious dimension, but even this seems strange to us, because we thought the era of roaming evangelists was over and done with. Early pilgrims entered unknown American territory in a spirit of adventure, and the opening of the West by migrants and refugees is still a tale with worldwide romantic attractions. It is just that once streets were paved and telephones installed, Americans tended to think that past history could not become present experience. We knew the early colonists often saw themselves as Israelites struggling toward a promised land. As we built on their accomplishments and found so many of our dreams fulfilled, we came to take success, prosperity, and power for granted.

Our wandering now occurs largely in labyrinths of the soul, even when it is coupled with a frantic pacing up and down the globe. But this spiritual dimension to our difficulties is not easily fathomed. For so long our struggles seemed to be primarily material and, what is more, overwhelmingly successful. Such physical obsessions leave people ill-prepared either to see or to accept a religious element placed into the national quest again. Even the religious life that sometimes accompanied our drive for power and wealth was so optimistic that it leaves us disoriented when our expectations are thwarted. When corruption and failure, disillusionment and restlessness set in again, we have no concept of God

that seems adequate to explain this. When we most need religious insight, it strangely seems difficult to find.

Religiously, a pilgrimage is more our model now than any restful contemplation, although thousands seek such escape from tension. Or at least our contemplation of God will have to be seen mainly as a seeking movement. Religious pilgrims have always been important in the romantic interpretation of American life, but now we have a chance to appreciate that role more profoundly. We seem destined always to be seekers in spite of all we found. As real pilgrims have always done, can we learn to die "in faith, not having received what was promised, but having seen it and greeted it from afar" (Heb. 11:13)?

Many Americans seem not to be "at home" with what we are or have become. The concept of *alienation* expresses this mood. Such feelings are not strange to one who understands the life of a pilgrim. To move out or to be forced away from "home" can be a necessary experience religiously. Moreover, he who seeks religiously to lose his life for others cannot expect to escape alienating experiences. Only in a purely secular context does alienation appear either as strange or as completely bad. Religiously alienation can be accepted; secularly it remains a puzzle to us.

Today luxury abounds. That much is different from the early situation of pilgrims in America, and it makes it difficult to see our present similarity with those pioneer times. It is there nonetheless. They struggled with little; we struggle with much. The spirit can be disoriented and remain in need as much in circumstances of light and plenty as in those of darkness and want. Because our appetites set no limit on us short of addiction, enslavement, or self-destruction, a luxury culture destroys human spirits as fast as any. It produces a restlessness of soul not unlike that prompted by the tyranny, poverty, and corruption which first forced early American pilgrims to set out on their voyages across the sea. The human spirit seems satisfied by neither too much nor too little. Can we learn that the religious dimension always retains some independence from any economic and cultural setting? If so, we are better prepared to meet spiritual need on its own terms and also to see our solidarity with people in every time and place.

Perhaps we thought that affluence and power had eliminated the need for religious pioneering. But if the harsh side of God's character drives us into spiritual wastelands exactly at the peak of material success, then the austere trials of the early American

pilgrims in seeking a new home will be repeated, not in exact detail but as an internal dimension of our own experience. To think that we have come of age as persons passed beyond God, therefore, only makes our need more intense and more difficult to satisfy because it goes unacknowledged.

A God who keeps us constantly in motion, blocking our attempts to rest and sending us off on strange journeys—this is a God of turmoil as well as of compassion. When we falter and fail, he offers liberation as a challenge. This God "is like a refiner's fire" (Mal. 3:2). To be confronted by him is to raise uncertainty to a new pitch, since we have no absolute assurance that he will find any of us worth saving. But perhaps this is the setting in which the Christian promise best comes to life. "You will have to suffer only for a little while: the God of all grace who called you to eternal glory in Christ will see that all is well again: he will confirm, strengthen and support you. His power lasts for ever and ever" (I Pet. 5:10, Jerusalem Bible). In these trials we feel the need not to lose sight of Jesus as the truth that makes us free (see Jn. 8:31-32). Perhaps we can see him more clearly as "the pioneer and perfecter of our faith" (Heb. 12:2), which is that ultimately "God is love" (I Jn. 4:8).

If God loves us now, he does so in a restless manner. That is, his concern for people takes the form of constant disturbance when we seem about to settle down to enjoy prosperity. This disturbance is reflected in American diversity, and it contributes to our odyssey. Since we agree on no single form of religion, some tend to reject or wander among them all. God seems to intend us to search for him in many ways and to find him satisfactorily in no one alone. God's ultimate aim may still be release and fulfillment, but now this comes more by complex means of adventure and dislocation, risk and loss, pain and death.

Responding to these realities, religion should teach a detachment from material possessions and develop an ability to travel light and to stay flexible. Worship, then, becomes a means for gathering strength to venture out. Prayer aims less at peace of mind and more at seeking God's strange ways within the disruptions of our plans. Religious communities should give the spiritual support all adventurers need if loneliness is not to destroy them in the desert. At least religion can still offer some "good news." A pilgrim should go out to spread it, announcing God's support even when our wanderings seem pointless at the time. To be lost from

home is not a condition we are likely to choose for ourselves. Given such a predicament, religion's function is to help us see how the longest distance between two points can be the most rewarding. The effort to survive, to improve life, and to "sing the Lord's song in a foreign land" (Ps. 137:4) is still at the center of faith.

The ancient concepts of odyssey and pilgrimage suggest the reality of a God more austere than we often expected or hoped to meet. He is a nomadic deity who has no fixed location and who forever claims his independence from simple assumptions about what he is or ought to be. This God can still be encountered and even experienced as good and loving, but we are faced with the fact that his presence shifts and his appearance changes. He may not be found a second time where he was before, and he can speak in unexpected forms and places, just as Christians claim he once did in Bethlehem. If these things are true of God, it is not surprising that our land is one of spiritual odyssey, one whose borders are no more fixed now than in our days of geographical expansion. To wander and seek is our lot because in God "we live and move and have our being" (Acts 17:28).

Responses

WALDO BEACH, Professor of Christian Ethics:

This reader's reaction to the piece on "God and America's Future" is largely one of bafflement. The experience of reading it was like swimming in the wake of a squid, as I recall some American review of a German theological work put it: "One can get the general direction, but the going is very murky." There are many insightful and jolting statements, certainly much that upsets conventional wisdom about the reaction of religion in American life, but on the whole this reviewer was not persuaded, if indeed he perceived the main drift of the argument.

The essay attempts to restate a theology of liberation that would show how "religion can fulfill promises for release." The description of God's nature and will makes use of highly anthropomorphic imagery. To be sure, anthropomorphic language is all there is to go by in describing the divine and the transcendent. But to speak so blithely and certainly of God as a "nomadic deity," who does not "clutch at himself," as having "many faces," as one who "opens himself to emotional involvement and suffering," may be quite too anthropomorphic. Moreover, there is a curious kind of theodicy in this essay. God "allows to evil" its "enigmatic power" to take people unaware. There are "horrors he has unleashed in our path." Is God then the active cause of the evils from which he calls mankind to be liberated?

The authors' Christology, too, is a curious one. Whatever may be one's views of the credibility of the miracles attributed to Jesus, the inference from this essay is that Jesus was a magic-worker, with infinite power, who was oddly sparing in his use of it. "Jesus's driving the money-changers out of the temple and his flaunting of the religious establishment are trivial incidents as compared to the reforms he might have guaranteed had he unleashed his full power." Well, then, might he have overthrown the oppressive Roman rule and liberated its Jewish victims, if he had really let loose?

The essay intends to relate liberation theology to the American experience and America's future. The American Revolution is cited, but its evidence gives doubtful support to a main point defended: that the liberating and protesting political actions taken against oppressors, ranging "from nonviolent resistance and civil

disobedience to armed insurrection are always treacherous, risky, and sometimes self-defeating." Yes, to be sure, but the major American experience of the Civil War (which is not mentioned) is evidence to the contrary. Would we have known liberation for the slave and reconciliation of the nation had we not gone to the tragic and cruel necessity of taking up arms and going to war?

The authors are more on target when they suggest what ethics or life-style should be derived from liberation theology. They point up, although not as sharply or cogently as they might, the two sides of freedom. In the classical Lutheran sense, as set forth in Martin Luther's "On Christian Liberty," Christian freedom is always freedom *from* and freedom *for*. In our own day, liberation theology has stressed the former: freedom from the oppressions of racism, colonial imperialism, and so forth. The authors are sensitive to the more subtle forms of tyranny from which America needs to be released. Possessed as we are by our possessions, Americans need liberation from "an enslaving dependence on stimulants and luxuries."

By and large, though, the connotation of the word "freedom" in Mr. Middle America's ears is only the negative one: freedom from. "I am a free man. Nobody can push me around." Yet, even as he pledges allegiance to one nation "with liberty and justice for all," he often neglects the obligatory side of freedom: one is freed from tyrannies in order to serve the neighbor in love, to secure justice. The Christian implication of liberation theology for America today, to this observer, is that God's call is both to a freedom from materialism and affluence so often rationalized in the rhetoric of "free enterprise," and, more importantly, to a freedom for action that closes the gap between our wealth and the Third World's poverty. If in 1776 a Declaration of Independence was a needed political expression of the ethics of liberation, in 1977 the most needful expression of that ethic is a Declaration of Interdependence, with actions, in both foreign and domestic policy, suited to that declaration.

HERBERT O. EDWARDS, Associate Professor of Black Church Studies:

This Bicentennial year has called forth a number of attempts to reinterpret America's past, to analyze our present situation, and to make projections concerning the future. No one questions the pervasive character of secularity in today's society, but all seem

agreed that, since America was founded by persons with some real sense of a Divine Presence, it is still legitimate and necessary to call attention to our religious heritage.

Indeed, Professors Roth and Sontag suggest that, more often than not, the projected American ideal of granting individual liberty for its citizens at home, and spreading the idea of individual liberty abroad, was informed by religious convictions. Given the fact that our hopes have been thwarted by powers beyond ourselves, and given the fact that there was such a close connection between our hopes and our religious convictions, theologies of liberation must help us today to understand the limits we face, what it falls to government to promote, and what must be left to the individual.

In the first place, we must recognize that a goodly part of the present problem is traceable to the nature of reality and of God. It may be that reality simply cannot be expected to accommodate "liberation for all," from "all unnecessary oppressive forms." Perhaps God will only support and crown with success limited kinds of revolutionary thrusts such as the American Revolution. If that is true, then theologians of liberation should exercise extreme caution in urging open protest and rebellion against oppression.

Further, only limited use should be made of the American Revolution as a liberating paradigm. The limits of that effort should be accepted; the methods chosen must not become normative, however. "We may concur with the early colonists that violence is even justified religiously if honest and prayerful deliberations convince us that more restrained courses of action only play into the hands of tyrannizing forces. Short of such considerations, however, armed force remains a questionable means from a Christian perspective" (xx).

Christians and Christian theologians need to understand that it is not possible to expect or to guarantee success in eliminating injustice. Our great expectations concerning liberation efforts, therefore, need to be tempered by the awareness of the ever-present character of evil, which can turn our noble dreams into ashes in our mouths.

Our people are not really bad. "No one consciously desired the problems which recently have affected us all" (xx). Part of the problem is that, "as we built on the accomplishments of the early founders of the country, and found so many dreams fulfilled, we came to take success, prosperity, and power for granted" (xx).

We are still wandering pilgrims but the West is closed; the open spaces are gone. Now "our wandering occurs largely in labyrinths of the soul."

"Today luxury abounds" (40). The early pilgrims struggled with little; we struggle with much. Someone has suggested that the present task of white theology is to help America's disappointed, disillusioned, and much distressed white middle class handle their grief in creative ways.

In sum and substance, it seems that Roth and Sontag have taken the position that those who are plagued by material success and prosperity and restlessness of soul can be encouraged to take heart by the knowledge that their plight is not unlike God's own.

Not only does God identify with them in their restless pilgrimage, He drives them on, beyond fixed borders, as He did their fathers. Indeed, God's authority is located in pressure that He applies to keep the future open for diversity. Inner renewal, spiritual renewal, is a necessary condition today for breaking through inhibiting conditions.

In the January, 1976, issue of *Interpretation,* Gardiner Taylor argued: "There is one great weakness in the American temper which is revealed from a reading of our past. It is the inability of the nation to sustain its energies and resources in the pursuit of a goal when that goal proves elusive and difficult to attain and when great cost, financial or psychological, is required and when prolonged individual sacrifice is demanded." ("Some Musing on a Nation 'Under God,'" p. 42).

There is another weakness in the white American temper which is exemplified by Roth and Sontag. When efforts fail to produce a closer degree of correspondence between the justice and equality to which we give lip service and the actual practice in the society, we are quite adept at shifting the responsibility to God.

It is clear that Roth and Sontag are not writing for the oppressed and the poor. For them luxury does not abound. For them, the restlessness in their souls does not come from a superfluity of goods. For them, the "new frontiers," the "future open spaces" to which God is calling them is to an alteration of the present structures to make them more just—for all.

Once again we see theologians coming to provide "aid and comfort" to unjust structures and their supporters. A genuine attempt on the part of liberation theology to begin with God's concern for the plight of the poor and oppressed is co-opted, or

at least tempered, by a "realism" which does not challenge and "God-talk" which does not disturb.

The use of the language of black and liberation theology—which emerges out of particular sociological settings, which carries perceptions, understandings, and aspirations which are integral to those settings—is illegitimate and imperialistic. The use of black and liberation theological language by white theologians without commitment to the structural changes commensurate with the demands of liberation theology is one of the worst possible forms of white racism's co-optative efforts. Such alleged praise is damning in the extreme.

What can be the possible motivation behind such efforts? To be all things to all persons? To reassure the victims of oppression that they have finally gotten their message across and they should consider that to be change enough in their situation? To reassure the community of oppressors that it is possible to incorporate what their victims are saying without any more substantive responses than confessions of *mea culpa* prior to going on with business as usual?

FREDERICK HERZOG, Professor of Systematic Theology:

The Bicentennial has brought all kinds of critical evaluations of the "basic sources of authority in American life" (36). This particular contribution works with the thesis that since the '50s the authority "religious communities and God previously offered to underwrite our goals has largely dissolved" (36). The authors see this nation caught in spiritual malaise: "Our wandering now occurs largely in labyrinths of the soul, even when it is coupled with a frantic pacing up and down the globe" (39).

If I understand the purpose of the essay rightly, *part* of the authors' intention is to develop a liberation theology for *God and America's Future*. But where is theology rooted? The essay hardly makes clear the vast difference between America and the Church. I am not suggesting that theology should not pay attention to the nation of which it is also a part. But under the auspices of which logic does it make sense? The logic used in the essay is frightening.

Let me make the point clear by juxtaposing two statements. a) "Every American who can hear God's voice has a mission for the days ahead" (38). b) "We sometimes feel like 'strangers and exiles on the earth' as we face trials not of our own choosing"

(38). What I find "scary" is the easy transition from the secular to the spiritual, from an appeal to every American to the "strangers and exiles on earth" (cf. Heb. 11:13), which, I thought, was first of all how the early Christians saw themselves. I believe the vast difference somehow calls for explicit acknowledgment. The authors in this part of the essay, with the "strangers and exiles" remark, refer to "the romantic interpretation of American life" (40). Is it unfair altogether to think also of the essay as *a romantic interpretation of American life*?

No one has a corner on any theology, also not on what is called liberation theology. But there could be some kind of mutual understanding as to how liberation theology basically has been functioning. The way liberation theology has been done thus far shows up the authors' use of the term as largely a misappropriation of its intention: "As Americans look to the future, some part of national identity lies in framing theologies of liberation which state how religion can fulfill promises for release" (31). For all practical purposes, this is a call for a national theology. Isn't it only another way of promoting a civil religion? And thus ultimately another national ideology?

It is a humbling experience to have to think all along as one works through an article of this type that, in a weak moment, one has promised to evaluate it. I can only hope that before long also the authors will be struggling for a more careful use of the term liberation theology. In any case, I will try to study modesty in offering a few counterproposals.

(1) Liberation theology in the South emerged as the *poor* found a voice. Those of us who are using the term today were taught by the poor what liberation is—those poor who had hardly any national identity to be proud of. They were searching for human identity as—with the Bible in their hands—they wrested also from our lips the joyous cry of liberation. Today it needs saying—for who still thinks back that far?—that the poor who did this for us were black.*

(2) From this context emerges for us whites a tremendous struggle over the character of the *Church* in history. As a generality, it is of course not beside the point to claim: "A sound theology of liberation, then, should warn that the paths of protest—from nonviolent resistance and civil disobedience to armed

*See my article on "Doing Liberation Theology In the South," *NICM: Southern Regional Newsletter,* 1:2 (January, 1976), pp. 6f.

insurrection—are always treacherous, risky, and sometimes self-defeating" (32). But the impression is here not avoided that liberation theology invites people "off the bat" to some general activism. Rather, the first thing we learned was that through God in Christ the poor found a measure of human identity in a certain form of Church praxis. Those who are on the side of the rich and the powerful need to go through some radical consciousness-altering before they will understand what is happening. Simply to claim that God is on our side without consciousness-altering for me creates an untenable theological condition: "The liberating theme which Jesus communicates is that death, and every destructive force that contributes to it, is ultimately under the control of a God who loves and cares enough for human life to save it. This puts God basically 'on our side'" (33). "God is on our side" has been the theme song of most white theologies of the West for God knows how long. Liberation theology emerged as a determined effort to break the back of this kind of universalizing ideology.

(3) This is all to say that liberation theology emerged as a particular kind of *praxis*. Right away to jump to the liberation kerygma for America as a whole without the agonizing social analysis that makes one aware of the Church's complicity in injustice means to short-circuit the fundamental struggle of liberation theology. Christian theology always had to struggle primarily with the question of truth and untruth in the Church. Today it centers around the issue of justice. Unless culture finds liberation changes in the Church providing for greater justice, it will continue to show deaf ears to some broad message of liberation. The suspicion that liberation theology might only be the new ideology of the oppressor Church has been with us for a goodly while.

(4) It would be ungrateful for me if I were to give the impression that there were no relevant insights in the essay. My objection pertains to the logic that ties them together. At several points the authors suggest a clarity of approach that I do not see existing in that form in the authority bases to which they appeal. Jesus apparently was involved in a messy *justice* struggle within the sociopolitical structures of his day. I don't think it is enough to say Jesus left many of his followers confused and disillusioned: "Jesus is indeed a strange liberator. To embody so much power and to use it with such restraint for the fragile aim of love—no wonder that many of his followers became confused and disil-

lusioned" (33). To put all of this back on love *pure and simple* is to leave the present followers of Jesus even more confused and disillusioned. It is clear to me that in a brief essay one cannot say everything. But some things do need more careful articulation before one hastens on to other things.

(5) The transition from Jesus and God to our own course of action is simply not carefully enough stated. Jesus' struggle for justice may well point to God's *revolution*. Before really trying to discover what God is doing in the world, the authors refer us to our own successes in liberation: "Our successful liberation efforts, however, still rest on a judicious estimate of the odds and the best courses of action. Having promised people liberation in the ultimate case, God essentially frees us to find our own way in the world, to use the powers we have as best we can" (33-34). However beautiful the sound, it lacks clear theological ground.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer spoke of "cheap grace." He did not mean to deny the significance of grace. Rather, he wanted to make grace all the more precious. Today we already are caught up in cheap liberation. The difficulties of grasping what God is doing in the world in terms of liberation are hardly seen in the essay. Sure, there are references to Jesus' remaining foolishness and a stumbling block. But this has to be prayed through theologically in regard to the tremendous price God is paying for liberation, and the price we have to pay for it—even if only in careful theological expression of the reasons for our participation in *God's* liberation.

JOHN ROTH and FREDERICK SONTAG:

Responses to "God and America's Future" generate heat. Fortunately, Professors Beach, Edwards, and Herzog also shed light on our thinking. We are grateful for their vigor and insight. Although time and space permit no lengthy replies here, a few comments may move the dialogue ahead.

Professor Beach reports "bafflement," and he finds many of our ideas "curious." We sympathize, because the essay is part of a larger work-in-progress. Sections before and after set a context that is lacking as the article stands. Nonetheless, Professor Beach senses one central point very well: namely, that theologies of liberation are authentic to the degree that they honestly assess the power of God and Jesus over against forces which enslave and

slaughter. That analysis also requires reflection on how God himself is implicated in injustice.

History hardly suggests constant progress for the causes of human liberation. Is God doing the best he can, but his power is simply insufficient to make equality, justice, and love prevail? Or is God's power more substantial and more subtle, capable of transforming history, but used in creation and in relationship to human freedom so that burdens of liberty really do belong to men and women? Many other options exist, but our experience and religious perception incline us toward the second. Following Camus' suggestion—"man is not entirely to blame; it was not he who started history; nor is he entirely innocent, since he continues it"—we believe that a theology of liberation will ultimately be misleading ideology unless its hope takes account of the *co-responsibility* of God and human persons where injustice is concerned. Less realism makes liberation theology into opium for the people—quite different from the religious brand that Marx found a century ago, but just as deceptive.

Professor Edwards suggests that we speak treason if not racism, by giving the enemy "aid and comfort" with "a 'realism' which does not challenge and 'God-talk' which does not disturb." Here we arrive at another collage of problems. One of them is this: What counts as challenge and disturbance? If experience leaves it unclear that God—let alone people—works directly for human liberation in every time and place, that realization may be profoundly upsetting. It may demythologize and demystify some liberation theologies; it may intensify distress over the difficulty of obstacles encountered. It may challenge us to rethink the nature of God's support for any human enterprise, and thus drive home that we are dealing with a God who really does set us free—but perhaps more to struggle on our own than to succeed with divine assurance.

Does such an outlook ignore the oppressed and lend aid and comfort to oppressors? Not at all, unless it is deemed indispensable to convince people that God is for one side and against another. Again, history renders such partisanship precarious and problematic. So much so, in fact, that the real culprits are likely to be theologies of liberation that promise more than they deliver by claiming that God favors specific political-economic causes. Indeed it may be that religious aid and comfort for oppressors is avoided only when we discern God's commitment to freedom as

one which desires and even commands justice, equality, and love, but which will not underwrite their reality in history for us. Understanding that God leaves current liberation struggles as essentially human issues, we are impelled to live without illusion. We must weigh hopes and the odds against them, and use freedom to determine the courses we should follow.

In American society such deliberations need to assess the fact that luxury does abound. True, want and need are no strangers to the United States, but the image of America as an island of affluence in a sea of poverty still holds good. God's word judges the rich and middle-class, even as it encourages the poor. In turn, God waits for all of us to act. The ways we move determine whether we shall have business as usual, increased destruction, or greater chances for liberation. Religiously and theologically, the problem that faces churches and individuals alike is to clarify the kinds of liberation that are possible today and to implement the forms of teaching, preaching, and serving that will support them best by combining hope and realism.

Professor Herzog finds "frightening" logic in the essay. Specifically, he worries that we blur the distinction between American and Christian, state and church, and that we promote national theology, civil religion, and "ultimately another national ideology." Probably Herzog's fears cannot be put to rest, but let us try.

We do take the American scene seriously, and we think that theologies of liberation may clarify its problems and possibilities. We assume that the nation will be healthy to the degree that healthy religious faith is widespread in the land. We hold, too, that the health of religion depends on non-interference by the state. Our particular motivation is Christian, and we expect that our ideas will find a home in that community if anywhere. At the same time, we do not rule out the possibility that people outside of churches and outside of Christianity can be touched by liberation theologies. More importantly, God's voice is heard where it is heard. We do not presume that our theories set any boundaries on it.

We endorse Herzog's proposition that "no one has a corner on any theology, also not on what is called liberation theology." Many theologies of liberation are possible, thus rendering largely beside the point arguments as to whether one version fits some norm stipulated or established by precedent, and allegations that the language of one view co-opts another. In America's pluralistic

setting every theology is fallible, and none will be acceptable to everyone. Therefore, we have no aspirations for a national theology, but only for trying to develop one version of liberation theology that takes domestic problems seriously. Our hope is to facilitate self-criticism in America as a means to a more responsible role for the United States in the world. Surely that objective is a far cry from promotion of the civil religion and national ideology that Herzog seems to abhor.

Our position is that God directly favors the United States no more and no less than any other country, even though many Americans have thought differently. Thus, when we claim that God is "basically 'on our side,' " the point is anything but nationalistic. Rather, it underscores belief that the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ reveal that God loves and cares enough for *human* life to redeem it from ultimate loss. We locate God's revolution in the promises communicated in Jesus. However, it strikes us that the complete fulfillment of them does not come in history, but only beyond death if at all. No doubt Professor Herzog will find this outlook inadequate: it is too universal and insufficiently occupied with "trying to discover what God is doing in the world."

What is God doing in the world? That is the question. People can give varied answers, but we see God's action in contemporary history as located primarily in disturbing challenges such as the one with which our article begins: "Live as free men, yet without using your freedom as a pretext for evil; but live as servants of God" (I Pet. 2:16). That word, grounded in Christmas and Good Friday, Easter and Pentecost, and spoken to Christian and non-Christian, American and non-American, keeps all of us in God's hands even as it lets us live and die.

Professor Herzog is correct: there is a lot of cheap liberation offered today. It is much in evidence where people are led to believe that God is directly supporting/doing the work that is really left for men and women alone, where God is equated so much with the true, the good, and the beautiful that people are blinded to his darker side. As outlined in "God and America's Future," liberation is anything but cheap. It may be so costly as to elude us all, but that possibility makes liberating aims all the more precious and the struggle for them all the more important.

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Book Reviews

The Old Testament and the World. Walther Zimmerli. Translated by John Scullion, S. J. John Knox. 1976. 172 pp.

This excellent little work contains eleven lectures originally delivered in 1970 to the general academic community of Göttingen University, where Prof. Zimmerli was rector for several years (he is now emeritus). It is a primer of Old Testament theology. Although the perspective is the "world," the fundamental data of biblical theology are treated: creation, the role of humans upon earth, the People, the Land, worship, death and Life, Israel's hope, and law and gospel.

Zimmerli rightly distinguishes between the Greek *cosmos* (ordered, and even esthetic—"*cosmos* is the word which describes a woman's make-up and dress," p. 12) and the Hebrew world. The latter is "heaven and earth" (Gen. 1:1), the totality of creation in which man is the climax. However, he points out that "order" is a key word that has become important in recent research into the wisdom literature (Proverbs, Job and Ecclesiastes). Thus Zimmerli writes that "belief in an established order in which the wise man takes his place is to be seen too in the sayings about the life of the individual and in the admonitions which direct it" (p. 47). The reviewer is uneasy about this use of the category of order; it seems to be rather a modern way of controlling the diversities in life. In previous works, Zimmerli has consistently underscored the freedom and incomprehensibility of God. This is shown particularly in Job and Ecclesiastes, where it is made clear that the Lord "always keeps the last word for himself" (p. 52). Zimmerli was the first modern theologian to characterize wisdom theology as creation theology—and the "worldliness" of the Old Testament is particularly manifest in the wisdom literature.

The emphasis of this book is welcome because of the Christian tendency to "spiritualize" the biblical message. The Old Testament emphasis on *this* world, the here and now in which a relationship with the Lord is to be formed, is a needed ballast to the facile eschatology and talk about "heaven," which characterizes much Christian discourse. Both worlds, this and the next, must be kept together and the tension between the two in the biblical message is important for our day.

The essays in this work express ideas which Zimmerli has developed elsewhere in learned articles and commentaries that have gained wide acceptance. Thus they represent the fruit of mature scholarship, now available to the lay reader. The title of ch. 5 on the table of contents should read, "The People and its Enemies," and there is a garbled text on p. 79.

Roland E. Murphy

Biblical Backgrounds of the Middle East Conflict. Georgia Harkness and Charles F. Kraft. Abingdon. 1976. 208 pp. $7.95.

The basic ideological factor in the Middle East conflict is not to be found in the Bible, but in the book *The Jewish State* published in German in 1897 by the non-religious Hungarian Jew, Theodor Herzl. Though having lost his religion, Herzl felt compelled

to remain a Jew; so he conceived of Judaism as a nationality requiring a state in Palestine or elsewhere, and thus is considered the founder of political Zionism. The idea of using the Bible for arguments supporting the political Zionist position was mainly an afterthought brought in by more religious Jews who joined the movement. And this argument has been sold to an unfortunately large number of Christians, who are thus willing to identify the modern Palestinians with the ancient Canaanites and to justify the expulsion or liquidation of the former to make way for the Jews as somehow the will of God.

The late Professor Harkness was to a certain extent a victim of this fallacy, but she held the idea in an enlightened way that precluded the liquidation of Palestine and the Palestinians. Unfortunately she passed away before the book was finished. Her former colleague, Charles Kraft, took over and contributed the last four chapters. The first two of these chapters, 7 and 8, simply bring this layman's version of Biblical history onward from the United Kingdom through the New Testament period.

It is in the last two chapters that Kraft, a trained Biblical scholar, makes his contribution and gives the reader a sense of grappling with the thorny Palestine Problem as it exists today. In chapter 9, on Jerusalem, he shows by historical methodology that Jerusalem is just as much a holy city to Christians and Muslims as to Jews, and that the rights of all three religions must be preserved in any future settlement; also that Jerusalem is truly a holy city and hence should not be used as a pawn in big-power politics.

In the 10th and concluding chapter he presents an excellent summary of the "vastly complex situation" of today, with only one error, namely that Arab leaders urged the Palestinians to flee in 1948; most Arab leaders urged them to stay (cf. E. B. Childers, "The Other Exodus," *The Spectator,* May 12, 1961). He attempts to present a fair-minded and Christian point of view with justice to both sides so far as that is possible. As an appendix he presents verbatim two resolutions on the subject by the Fifth Assembly of the World Council of Churches. These are excellent expressions of a truly peace-loving Christian consensus. Would that some of this spirit could be caught by the combatants and the great powers that are involved in the conflict!

W. F. Stinespring

The New Testament Environment. Eduard Lohse. Translated by John E. Steely. Abingdon. 1976. 300 pp. $12.95 cloth, $6.95 paper.

This book by now Bishop Eduard Lohse was translated from the German work of exactly the same title (*Umwelt das Neuen Testament*) first published in 1971 (revised in 1974) as a supplement to the German commentary series *Das Neue Testament Deutsch.* Another supplementary volume of this series, W. G. Kümmel's *Theology of the New Testament,* has also been translated by Steely and published by Abingdon.

The New Testament Environment is, as the title implies, an introduction to the world of the New Testament. Part I treats the history of Judaism in the Hellenistic period, its religious and intellectual movements, and Jewish life and belief at the time of Christian origins. Part II deals succintly with the Roman Empire and the Hellenistic intellectual and religious currents of late antiquity. Thus the subject matter is exactly what one would expect to find in such a work.

In this case, finding what one expects to find is not a disappointment, for the book is intended to introduce the reader to a vast field of knowledge and inquiry. This it does rather well, precisely because Lohse does not fall prey to the temptation to supply too much detail, while at the same time providing the reader with sufficient data to allow him to form a coherent

picture of the general character of the Mediterranean world at the beginning of the Christian era. Perhaps less detailed and full an account than Reiche's *The New Testament Era,* particularly on the Jewish side, Lohse may nevertheless prove to be a more serviceable book for the American student or reader. Reiche's work is more in the genre of the New Testament *Zeitgeschichte* (which is precisely its original, German title), which like the German *Einleitung* (Introduction) is less a textbook for beginners than a compendium of necessary information. Lohse patiently explains who Philo and Josephus were; he also names and briefly characterizes the Jewish apocalyptic books dating from the beginning of the Christian era, the Roman emperors, and the principal Qumran documents.

Naturally, experts will find points of inadequacy or disagreement. Yet most will agree that Lohse is generally judicious and balanced in his handling of mooted issues. For example, although he maintains the now venerable view that Gnosticism is pre-Christian in origin, he is cautious in his claims about the character of the pre-Christian phenomenon, declining to commit himself to the Redeemer Myth theory or to rely too much on the admittedly ambiguous Mandean evidence.

The price of the paperback book ($6.95) may be an embarrassment to the publisher; it is printed in slightly disguised code form (no dollar mark or decimal) on the back cover. But, given the inflation in book prices of the past several years, if the price does not make the book a steal, it is at least not a rip-off!

D. Moody Smith

Jesus Through Many Eyes: Introduction to the Theology of the New Testament. Stephen Neill. Fortress. 1976. 214 pp. $5.50 paper.

For those persons who have been searching for a readable New Testament theology which is not directed primarily toward the learned persons of the world, the wait is over. Bishop Stephen Neill has written a New Testament theology which is designed basically for students who have little background in critical study, persons who are attempting to deepen their own understanding of New Testament teaching for use in schools and the Church, and for laypersons who are eager (and willing to pay the price) to deepen their own understanding of the New Testament and thus their faith.

The author's basic idea is that the "whole of the New Testament is theology," (p. 1) and that theology revolves around Jesus of Nazareth. The books of the New Testament were written in an attempt to remember and interpret Jesus in ways that would reflect the "authentic echo of his voice" (p. 4). No one person could fathom the entire meaning of this Person; therefore what is preserved for us are fragments of the whole passed on to us by different persons in different settings. Bishop Neill in his presentation touches upon each and every New Testament book because he feels that each one in its own way reflects something positive and meaningful about this Person around whom New Testament theology revolves.

The position taken in this book is that history and theology are not separate entities but are to be held together. "Theology has all too often been written as though it was something that grew by some spontaneous and purely intellectual process, and not directly out of the hopes and fears of men; history has been presented as a mere record of external events, without reference to any inner dynamic by which they may be controlled. We shall succeed in our enterprise only to the extent that we are able to hold the two together" (p. 9). Neill further argues that the New Testament writers were interested in history as history, and, while recognizing that the witness of the New Testament comes

to us from the early disciples, he nevertheless stresses that there can be some value and success in pressing beyond that faith "to inquire what it was, or rather who it was, that brought that faith into being— . . ." (p. 13). One can easily ascertain that this book is a positive attempt to set forth an understanding of the New Testament which is balanced between the Charybdis of historical scepticism and the Scylla of arid historicism, and it may be added that the author has succeeded admirably.

The method pursued in this presentation is that of examining the New Testament writings in a somewhat chronological order as to their date of writing and to delay any discussion of the central issue, namely Jesus, until the last. The author begins with a short chapter dealing with the "Earliest Church," turns to the Pauline letters, then to Mark's gospel (and I Peter). At this point he examines the writings which relate basically to the area of Jewish influence, namely Matthew, James, Hebrews, and Revelation. Luke's writings are examined, followed by a discussion of the Johannine literature (minus Revelation, of course). The remainder of the New Testament documents (II Peter, Jude, and the Pastoral Epistles) are presented in a very positive way, the author finding very positive aspects to these often neglected epistles.

The final chapter then attempts to find an underlying unity in the streams of tradition that have come down to us in these groups of New Testament proclamations. That unity is to be sought in the "event" (namely Jesus) which has given rise to these writings. Neill emphasizes that the central question that every New Testament theology must ultimately face is essentially this: "How near can we come to seeing him [Jesus] not just through the eyes of many beholders but as he was in the simple majesty of his historical existence?" (p. 164). In this chapter the author discusses some of the views on this matter which have been advocated in scholarly circles in this century and came to the conclusion that in spite of all the problems a great deal can be known about "what Jesus actually taught and what he thought about himself" (p. 170). Bishop Neill understands that there is and can be "continuity within discontinuity" and "discontinuity within continuity," and the understanding of that concept is very important in seeking to comprehend the meaning in the relationship between the old covenant and the new and between the good news preached *by* Jesus and that preached *about* Jesus. Such an understanding presupposes a faith commitment on the part of the learner, however.

It is the opinion of this reviewer that Bishop Neill's book will be of great value and usefulness to pastors and lay persons. It is well-written, balanced, and positive in its approach to the topic. There is also included a useful bibliography for further study. Whether one will agree with Neill at every point should not detract from the very positive service he has performed for many persons in this presentation of New Testament theology.

James M. Efird

A Marxist Looks at Jesus. Milan Machoveč. Introduction by Peter Hebblethwaite. Fortress. 1976. 231 pp. $6.50 paper.

In his introduction Peter Hebblethwaite says that this book is a "minor but indispensable Marxist classic which will replace Kautsky as a study of Jesus." Van Harvey of the University of Pennsylvania has called it "an extraordinary book, as fine and sympathetic an overview of present-day scholarship about Jesus and the early church as any I know." Whether Machoveč's work deserves such accolades the reader should himself decide. It is a book to be read and pondered, and this review will not spare the reader the trouble, and the intellectual stimulation, of actually reading it.

Machoveč has taken pains to familiarize himself, not only with the gospels, but with the important relevant works of twentieth-century scholarship. He is particularly indebted to Schweitzer and Bultmann, although he by no means simply reproduces their work. Neither does he, by brute force or sleight of hand, present Jesus as a proto-Marxist. He also knows that Jesus was not a Zealot. He was forceful but abjured violence.

Machoveč is primarily concerned with understanding Jesus as a historical figure, and to that end has chapters on the sources (i.e., the gospels), Judaism before Jesus, the message of Jesus, and the development of Christology. He fully understands the character of the gospels as religious documents, but believes that it is possible to derive from them an historical picture of Jesus. Like most New Testament scholars he sees the kingdom of God as the central theme of Jesus' preaching. In the eschatological tension between present and future is found the key to the right understanding (or demythologizing) of Jesus' apocalyptic eschatology. The eschatological thrust of Jesus' message, with its determinative influence upon the present, constitutes a crucial central element common to him and to true Marxism. Jesus' view of the coming kingdom does not include a socialist revolution, but it does imply a revolutionary upheaval of the old order. Machoveč thinks Jesus understood the kingdom's coming as the redemption and renewal of history, not its end.

To the surprise of some readers, Machoveč does not accept the widely held view that Jesus did not think of himself as the Messiah or Messiah-designate. He is, of course, aware that a number of scholars have taken this position. He himself has some extremely interesting ideas about how Jesus may have come to accept a messianic self-understanding and the role his disciples, especially Peter, played in the process. To Peter is also ascribed a primary role in the rise of faith in the resurrection. The Gospel of John is accorded an important place in the development of Christology, and Machoveč regards it as historically irreconcilable with the synoptics. Yet unlike some historians rooted in the liberal Christian tradition, he does not regard the Fourth Gospel as simply a theological or mystical fabrication with no meaningful relation to the Jesus of history. In a certain sense it may be seen as a representation of him.

The English title fails to convey an important aspect of the author's intent conveyed by the title of the German version from which it was translated: *Jesus für Atheisten.* The book is written to present Jesus to a Marxist audience rather than to allow Christians a peek at Jesus through Marxist eyes. Machoveč in fact believes that Marxists, as Marxists, have something to learn from Jesus. Perhaps Christians too can learn something of value to them from this sympathetic, knowledgeable, and insightful treatment.

D. Moody Smith

Has the Ecumenical Movement a Future? Willem Visser 't Hooft. John Knox. 1974. 97 pp. $5.50.

No person living today better deserves the title of "Mr. Ecumenic" than Willem Visser 't Hooft. He has served as general secretary of the World's Y.M.C.A., of the World Student Christian Federation, and (from 1939 to 1966) of the World Council of Churches. This little volume thus reflects the international, interdenominational, world, conciliar perspective rather than the local scene. But it abounds in wisdom, moderation, proportion—and hope.

A brief historical sketch divides modern ecumenical developments into four periods: 1910-1934, "various groups in search of a theme"; 1934-1948, the challenge of political involvement and "theological renais-

sance"; 1948-1960, a time of organization and integration; 1960-the future, a diffusion of priorities within as well as outside the Church. The remainder of the book wrestles with three central questions: "Is the ecumenical movement suffering from institutional paralysis? Should we replace mission as it has been practised up till now by a dialogue with the other religions? Should the ecumenical movement follow the agenda of the Church—or the agenda of the world?"

Visser 't Hooft offers more questions than answers. But they are the right questions, the critical questions, the questions that arise from popular misconceptions of the World Council. By acknowledging the grounds for some complaints, by reformulating others, the author brings the contemporary ecumenical scene into sharp, succinct, and relevant focus. By defining dialogue in six ways, two positive and four unacceptable, he clears away much widespread confusion about syncretism, paganism, evangelism. By affirming the inseparability of theology and Christian action he not only sees a future for the ecumenical movement, but makes it challenging and vital.

Creighton Lacy

Salvation Tomorrow. Stephen Neill. Abingdon. 1976. 150 pp. $3.95 paper.

If Visser 't Hooft personifies the ecumenical movement today, Stephen Neill uniquely represents the world mission of the church. He has been a missionary bishop in India, an executive of the World Council of Churches, a professor (in very active retirement) at Hamburg and Nairobi, and author of almost as many books as Kenneth Scott Latourette. These writings range from a definitive one-volume history of missions to Biblical studies (see Professor Efird's review above), psychological treatises (*Creative Tension* and *A Genuinely Human Existence*), and interpretations of *Anglicanism* and *Christian Holiness* (two *different* books!).

The current volume, subtitled "The originality of Jesus Christ and the world's religions," consists of the Chavasse Lectures at Wycliffe Hall, Oxford, where the bishop now lives as Resident Scholar. These lectures move, concisely but incisively, from the perspectives of Edinburgh 1910 (the beginning of modern missions and ecumenics) to the central theological and methodological issues in proclaiming the gospel today and tomorrow. They keep clearly in mind "the careful distinction which Mott always drew between evangelization, the proclamation of the divine message, and conversion, the favourable response to man to that proclamation" (p. 1).

Precisely because he rejects neat labels and pigeon-holes, the bishop cannot be classified or typed. As this reviewer discovered from two delightful interviews in Nairobi (1971 and 1973), Neill shows persuasive streaks of theological and political conservatism. He has reservations about "reparations" based on guilt ("We can repent only of what we ourselves have done and of what we are"—p. 20); about crossing geographical or cultural lines without acknowledging the "covenant line" (which separates Christians from "those who have never been brought within the new covenant relationship between God and man established by Jesus Christ"—p. 62). He resents the demand that Christians alone should be tolerant when others (be they Muslims or Marxists) are not. He scorns fuzzy language and fuzzier thinking ("If everything is mission, nothing is mission"—p. 57). He questions whether all the positive contributions of colonialism need to be ignored in the rightful condemnation of subjugation and oppression. He asserts that a Black Theology which claims to be a remedy or substitute for "an alleged White Theology" may well be "as distorted and out of reality as that which it replaces" (p. 80). He suggests that much liberation theology

"seems to live in the world of the Old Testament rather than that of the New" (p. 81).

But when it comes to dialogue (carefully defined and explicated) and to other cultures, which he knows so deeply and so well, Neill sounds astonishingly "liberal"—though he sometimes masks—or contrasts—his own views by what is "generally accepted in ecumenical circles." "All religions bear witness at least in some measure to the presence and activity of God" (p. 28). "The Christian comes not to bring Christ but to find him" (p. 29). "A vertical ecumenism which does not find its outlet in active obedience becomes introverted and pietistic. A horizontal ecumenism which does not look upwards to its source becomes merely humanitarian without inspiration and without divine illumination" (p. 69). Yet when the chips are down, Stephen Neill moves gently to the "right": "Evangelization must accompany and not follow every step in the process of political and economic liberation" (p. 97), and "those who started out with the idea of social reform were singularly ineffective in bringing it about, and never got on to the preaching of the gospel. Those who started with a gospel of conversion, perhaps without intending it brought about a social revolution. . . ." (p. 84).

In short, this elder statesman of the Christian world is wise, moderate, temperate, faithful. In these few pages he sheds light not only on the critical field of missiology, but on the everlasting mission: "Every man has the *right* to have the gospel so presented to him that he may be able to understand it and in the light of that understanding accept or reject it" (p. 50).

Creighton Lacy

Christian Worship in Transition. James F. White. Abingdon. 1976. 160 pp. $6.75.

In a chapter entitled "Individuality and Liturgy" in *Christian Worship in Transition,* James White (Duke Ph.D., '60) notes that, "Most of the history of worship is anonymous." Unlike the history of doctrine, where theologies usually bear someone's name, liturgical developments most often occur anonymously and with intentional obscurity. Liturgy, the product of many hands, the work of the whole people of God, transcends individual contributors.

But when the history of post-war liturgical renewal is written, the name of James White will be there. Particularly for United Methodists, but also for the American Church as a whole, White has led the way with contributions to liturgical research and reform that are both scholarly and pastoral. In this book White surveys the decade of worship experimentation since Vatican II and speculates on where we should go from here.

Three of the book's eight essays appeared previously in various magazines. White is justifiably apologetic in his Preface for this duplication and makes the dubious claim that the book's chapters are more than a collection of unconnected essays and reworked articles. The essential coherence between the chapters is that they are all James White's work, that they are now available in one place, and that they are all of rather high quality.

The first chapter, "You Are Free—If," gave me the sneaking suspicion (reading between the lines) that White sensed that, in his encouragement of Protestant worship innovation, he had unintentionally created a monster. He seems to back off from some of his earlier enthusiasm for the unrestrained liturgical experimentation which he praised in *New Forms of Worship* (1970). Having given the permission to innovate, he now seems concerned that we use our freedom responsibly. "You are free (to experiment with the liturgy)—if you know what is essential and if you know what you are doing and why," he now says. After witnessing a flood of irresponsible experimentation, superficial

"celebrations," crudely worded "contemporary liturgies," and poorly structured services of worship which are little more than pep rallies for various causes, I think I know what White is concerned about. He seeks to give guidance in the use of our newly acquired freedom: "All that is required is a knowledge of the basic structure and the imagination to word it for our own situation." I am less optimistic than White about either the possession of sufficient "knowledge" or "imagination" on the part of the average local parish worship leaders. In his encouragement of continuing congregational worship experimentation, he does not take seriously enough the difficult task of successful ritual formation. While White gives us a masterful sketch of the essential elements in what he calls the "five basic types of Christian worship," I question whether the mere knowledge of these elements is enough to license congregational solo flights into the wild blue yonder of liturgical innovation. To recover a sense of historical continuity, theological substance, and linguistic clarity would be a radical innovation in the worship of most Protestant congregations, even if that recovery meant going back and singing the same song that the church used to sing before we forgot the old song and started writing new songs.

Chapter II, "Basics of Sacramental Theology," is a fine essay that interprets and builds upon the work of some of our best sacramental theologians even though his definition of a sacrament is a bit too broad and all encompassing for my tastes. If we call everything "sacramental," I suspect that we will end up with nothing being sacramental. Perhaps I am shell-shocked from recent encounters with that "irresponsible liturgical experimentation" that White bemoans.

Chapters II and IV were good when they appeared a year or so ago in worship periodicals and they are still excellent essays on the historical and cultural setting of Protestant worship. "Individuality and Liturgy," (Ch. V) is a quick romp through two thousand years of liturgical history with some worthwhile conclusions for today. Chapter VI, "Inside the Liturgical Establishment" consists of a newsy report on the work of denominational liturgical bureaucracies. "After Experimentation" (Ch. VII) extols the results of worship developments in the past decade in making us more "inclusive, imaginative, humanized, ecumenical, and socially responsible." I fear we have exchanged the "vague and lofty generalizations" that Dr. White criticizes in our older worship for these new vague and lofty generalizations which now plague contemporary worship. Unfortunately, this essay does not live up to its promise of suggesting, in any detailed way, what comes *after* experimentation.

The final chapter, "The Church Architecture of Change," is another reprint from a past article. White here defines the best architectural arrangement for the modern church as a "hollow cube" in which little is specified or stationary in order to insure maximum flexibility for changing worship settings. I agree with Robert Cushman's critical evaluation of this thesis when it first appeared. If the optimum architectural form for contemporary worship is indeed White's "hollow cube," then this is more an indictment of the vacuousness of our present faith dilemma than a cause for celebration.

The first four chapters of this book are required reading for my students at the Divinity School this semester. I mention this to underline the fact that this is a significant contribution to theological students and pastors who are concerned about worship. James White is to be recommended for his continuing interest in worship experimentation during this time of transition, even while many of us find ourselves more interested in conserving the essential values of our past which we fear a decade of worship

experimentation would too quickly and casually forget.

William Willimon

Word and Table: A Basic Pattern of Sunday Worship for United Methodists. Hoyt Hickman, ed. Abingdon. 1976. 80 pp. $2.50.

I doubt that it would be an overstatement for me to claim that *Word and Table* is the most significant liturgical event in the Methodist tradition since Wesley's *Sunday Service for Methodists in North America* in 1784. With the publication of this commentary on Sunday worship, United Methodist congregations have an opportunity to return to our rich heritage in worship, a heritage that is both Catholic and Evengelical. The services in our present *Book of Worship* (1965) merely revised the inherited forms (and problems) of the Reformation liturgies. *Word and Table* returns to a more inclusive reflection of early Christian patterns. Its emphasis is on a basic *pattern* (actions) for worship rather than authorized texts (words) for worship. Here is a new vision of a very old concept: that Christian worship is a corporate, sacramental action rather than a verbose clerical performance.

Word and Table briefly describes the biblical, historical and theological foundations of the new order of worship, noting its linking of word and sacrament, the differences between this new pattern and our former practices, and the practical problems of implementing this pattern in United Methodist congregations. Then we are given a step-by-step commentary on the service which succinctly describes what we are doing in each step, why we are doing it, and the many possible ways to do it. Any pastor who has backed away from liturgical reform because of a lack of liturgical knowledge will find a rich resource in this commentary. The book also contains a discussion of the Alternate Calendar and Lectionary (COCU) as well as the new ecumenical texts of the major liturgical readings and prayers (ICET).

The commentary may err in its failure to give more guidelines on the selection of materials and texts for the various parts of the pattern. It has a tendency to present the acts of the pattern as if they were isolated parts. I would have liked more attention given to the unity, direction, and movement of the total worship service. However, just by adhering to this basic pattern, most congregations will achieve more unity and direction in their worship than they have previously had.

I also regretted the exclusion of "The Lord's Supper: An Alternate Text," (1972) from *Word and Table.* While there is no need rigidly to adhere to the words of "The Alternate Text," it is the best example we United Methodists have of a full, well stated, unified service of worship within the *Word and Table* pattern. *Word and Table* should be read with a copy of "The Alternate Text" close at hand.

United Methodists owe a debt of thanks to the work of the Alternate Rituals Committee for the theologically and pastorally sound work that *Word and Table* represents. Its publication moves United Methodists firmly within the developing ecumenical consensus on the liturgy.

William Willimon

Ritual in a New Day: An Invitation. Hoyt Hickman, ed. Abingdon. 1976. 128 pp. $3.75.

In one sense, ritual (patterned, predictable, repetitious behavior) is "doing what comes naturally." As John Westerhoff often tells his classes in Liturgy and Education, "if you have to think about it while you are doing it, the ritual isn't helpful." That is true. The problem for us today is that many of our former rituals have broken down and we find ourselves plagued with the dis-ease of not hav-

ing adequate rituals to help us through the crises of contemporary life or to help express our faith. Changes in language, movement from a stable rural society to a mobile urban society, tensions on marriage, loneliness and isolation, crises of faith, have brought new tensions to old patterns. Therefore we find ourselves looking for new patterns, new rituals.

Ritual in a New Day: An Invitation is the latest production of the Alternate Rituals Project of the Section on Worship of the United Methodist Church. Its purpose is to provide alternate rituals that are more contemporary and ecumenical than those now available in *The Book of Worship* (1965). Here are rituals for Footwashing, Naming (at a Baptism, adoption or wedding), Dying (a counterpart to the old Last Rites), Divorce, and celebrations of Endings and Beginnings (Blessing a new home, installation of a new pastor, sending of a family to a different congregation).

I approached this book with some scepticism, having been disappointed by the shallowness of the *Ventures in Worship* (1970) variety of liturgical experimentation. *Ritual in a New Day* shows that we are learning from our earlier mistakes. While it asserts that our need for new rituals arises out of the nature of our contemporary cultural context, it does attempt to bring theological judgments to bear in its liturgical response to that context. The Introduction to the book leads one to believe that the only criterion for appropriate Christian ritual is the psychological and anthropological helpfulness of the ritual. But the discussions and forms of the rituals themselves show closer attention to theological and liturgical considerations. For instance, the Rituals With the Divorced, in spite of what you may suspect, show how a full liturgical act with kerygma, confession, forgiveness, oblation, etc., can be a helpful corrective to both our theological avoidance of the reality of divorce and our current misdirected "cheap grace" pastoral attempts to sustain divorced persons.

Ritual in a New Day is most successful in its discussions of the concrete pastoral problems that are encountered in using these new rites in local churches. The guidelines given for Footwashing and Ritual With the Dying show a keen pastoral sensivity that too many enthusiastic liturgical innovators have lacked. The tone of the book is not, "How can we think up some unusual new worship services?" but rather "How can we bring the resources of the Christian faith and its worship to bear upon the actual needs of people today?"

The service for the Introduction of a New Pastor is sorely needed by United Methodists and will be well received. The Footwashing service promises to be a popular worship resource for small groups, retreats, and special occasions in some churches. Before you turn off the idea of a Ritual With the Divorced (perhaps the most controversial part of the book), read the introductory discussion to the rite. You will see that this rite represents a far more important suggestion than just another ecclesiastical accommodation to the brokenness of contemporary culture. Fortunately, I think that statement holds true for the whole of *Ritual in a New Day* and its invitation to liturgical experimentation.

William Willimon

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CONTENTS

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Foreword

When people ask me, "What is happening in campus ministry?" I cannot respond without first limiting the context. Because different things are happening in the Roman Catholic community than in the mainline Protestant community. Evangelicals and Jews are in quite distinctive situations. Institutional chaplaincies, such as Duke, Yale, Vanderbilt, are in quite another boat.

So, after two years of work with the National Institute for Campus Ministries, I have at least learned to be leary of generalizations about campus ministry from those who do not specify the context of their remarks. For instance, to characterize the student Christian movement as "dead" ignores the remarkable vitality of both the Southern Baptist and Lutheran student movements, not to mention the stunning statistics of para-church groups such as Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship and Campus Crusade.

The patterns of ministry in higher education are very diverse. Forms of funding, staffing, ecclesial relationships, emphasis on students over faculty, are all handled differently according to tradition and the demands of the local situation. In general, funding sources for campus ministry have moved from the national and regional level to the immediate area, diocese, conference, and presbytery. Thus, the local parish has assumed a more direct role in campus ministry.

In inviting persons to participate in this issue of The Duke Divinity School Review I have tried to cover some of the gaps in our present understanding of the Church's presence in the arena of higher education. My own introductory piece tries to rehearse the brief history of campus ministry and suggest something of the problems left by the tumultuous sixties. My associate, Nancy Rosebaugh, contributes a survey of the role of women in campus ministry in the Southeast with some pointed clues for the future. My colleague in NICM, Bernard LaFayette, writes of what campus ministers can learn from the civil rights struggle and how we can keep the claims of justice on our agenda. J. R. (Randy) McSpadden, Presbyterian Chaplain at Winthrop College in South Carolina, wrestles with a problem too long ignored—the spiritual care of

those engaged in campus ministry. Marginality from the center of both the Church and the Academy demands that those who minister be centered and nurtured. Clyde O. Robinson, Chairperson of the Southeastern team for United Ministries, pursues the question of the church's strategy in dealing with a constantly changing higher education scene. Lastly, Peter Lee, Episcopal Rector of the Chapel of the Cross in Chapel Hill, probes the rationale for a local parish assuming prime responsibility in sponsoring staff and program focused on the life of our first state university.

Much is missing from this fresh look at the prospects for ministry in this specialized arena. Nonetheless, these contributions fill some of the major gaps evident in the Danforth-Underwood study of campus ministry (1969) and affirm directions for the future.

Since virtually every paper I have read in the past twenty-five years on the Church and education included Tertullian's quote: "What has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What the Academy with the Church?"—and this collection has not—let me close by noting the context of Tertullian's remarks, which is seldom given. It is significant that this African, non-Greek apologist, in exhorting the faithful regarding heresies and pagan gods, refused to accept "Christianism" as a philosophy. Tertullian was cognizant of the peril of the Christian life and community being absorbed into the framework of Greek, rational systems. The peril remains, though the Academy has moved from *paideia* to servicing the demands of a technocratic society. Tertullian's question still resonates with us today because he knew that Athens and Jerusalem meet honestly when they are communities of commitment rather than intellectual points of view. I believe these papers point toward such a meeting.

ROBERT L. JOHNSON, *Guest Editor*

Campus Ministry: The Next Step

by Robert L. Johnson

The enterprise known as campus ministry bears many names: "student work," "ministries in higher education" (now "postsecondary"), "fellowships," "foundations," "chapels," "Crusades," "movements," "Bible chairs," YM-YWCA's, and faculty roundtables. It embraces students, faculty, administrators, janitors, and secretaries. It is and has been a frail instrument, a changing means of relating Athens and Jerusalem.

From its emergence as an expression of the evangelical missionary impetus of the late 19th century to the present, the character of ministry in higher education has become more diffuse and less subject to a common pattern--theological *or* sociological! For example, many today would resist the term "campus ministry," since it suggests ministry to a residential *campus* whereas large urban institutions and community colleges in high rise settings scarcely occupy a campus, and students and faculty are dispersed. Hence, the slogans of the moment: "Ministry in a Learning Society," "networking," etc. (Ed Newman forgive us!)

From 1957 to 1975, I served as Methodist campus minister at Chapel Hill and found myself in and out of the many circles relating the Church and higher education: *motive* and the quadrennials at Lawrence and Urbana, the YMCA and the UCM, the Nashville bureaucracy and the Faculty Christian Fellowship, the National Campus Ministry Association and, finally, my current employer, the National Institute for Campus Ministries. Now, with over two years' distance from the front lines, I find myself mulling over our brief history and asking what the future holds.

Where We Come From

It is important to examine the morphology of campus ministry and to note those elements present in our early history which now appear to be re-asserting themselves. Let me quickly recapitulate four stages of that history as a means of suggesting the major forma-

tive elements in a span of roughly 100 years. Needless to say, my angle of vision is that of a mainline Protestant, educated in a liberal seminary (Union), of gender male, of race slightly pale, of region proudly Southern.

I see four periods that have distinctive focus and accent. The *first* would be a *Ministry of Committed Persons,* initially volunteers and then the paid professionals of the YMCA. These "secretaries" were heroes to several generations of college youth. They led the way to a student movement and an ecumenical Christian community through the leadership of charismatic individuals such as John R. Mott. I once visited Mott in Florida near his 90th birthday and he proudly pointed to framed pictures of J. E. K. Studd and Dwight Moody as the two most important influences on his life.

This evangelical rootage of campus ministry is forgotten, if ever known, by many contemporaries. As George Williams (the founder of the YMCA) was inspired by the Finney revivals, so did the Student Christian Movement in Britain have its beginnings in the Moody-Sankey revivals. There appeared to be no fatal conflict between ecumenical unity and evangelical purity for such as John R. Mott.

In the Southern region, the first collegiate YMCA appeared at Charlottesville, soon followed by one at Chapel Hill in the 1860's. These pioneering Y secretaries, often denigrated as Tom Swiftian advocates of "muscular Christianity," included the late Frank Porter Graham and left behind a program ranging from Bible study to sex education, from the first intramural athletics to work with international students. Evangelical, ecumenical, international, innovative: these were the marks of the first campus ministers. It is worth noting that these marks were also determinative of the Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship, which has its roots in the British student movement of the 1870's (chiefly at Cambridge) and is now an international body with a strong missionary commitment.[1]

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1. United Methodists may be startled to discover that the "purposes of the Methodist Student Movement" were defined in the 1960 *Discipline* as closely parallel to those of Inter-Varsity today. The Methodist statement of purpose:

a) To lead all members of the college and university community to accept the Christian faith in God according to the Scriptures, to live as true disciples of Jesus Christ, and to become members of Christ's Church.

b) To deepen, enrich, and mature the Christian faith of college and university men and women through commitment to Jesus Christ and his Church, and to prepare them for active lives of service and leadership in and through the Church during and after their student years.

c) To witness in the campus community to the mission, message, and life of the Church. (Par. 1369.2, 1960 *Discipline*)

The *second* phase saw the growth of the denominational structures as *ministry was focused in religious organizations and buildings.* The first Newman Club appeared in 1894 at the University of Pennsylvania, the first Wesley Foundation at the University of Illinois in 1913. In quick order there followed the Westminster Fellowship, the Baptist Student Union, the B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundations, and the Canterbury Club. Clarence Shedd of Yale chronicled this period in his book *The Church Follows Its Students.* This phase extended from roughly 1900 through the 1950's and saw the construction of impressive centers for worship, study and fellowship; the establishment of "Bible chairs" (especially in the South and Southwest), which were often the forerunners of departments of religion in state schools; the great quadrennial conferences which wrestled with the issues of pacifism, race, neo-orthodoxy, existentialism, and modern art. There was the enormous contribution of *motive* magazine under the United Methodists in bringing together aesthetic expression, theological insight and political probing. Unfortunately, these elements could not be held together through the 1960's, and *motive* died out of radical "ad hocracy" and theological anemia.

This period also saw the rise of the Church Society for College Work, originally under the initiative of the Protestant Episcopal Church but guided into a wider ecumenical character by leaders such as James Pike and later Myron Bloy. And the evangelicals began to appear as an almost "guerrilla" type operation in dormitories and classrooms, with Bill Bright's Campus Crusade for Christ out of U.C.L.A. and the Navigators out of Colorado. Recent college graduates with minimal theological training were employed with funding from local churches and area businessmen to nurture cells of prayer, Bible study and Christian witness, as evangelicals stressed the foundational elements and generally avoided the established structures of the mainline campus ministries.

My own memories of this period are the richest, as we were immersed in the theological renewal of the Niebuhrs, Barth and Tillich; and there was a lively, visible body known as "the University Christian Movement." While many would snipe at the denominational phase as "a home.away from home" ministry in retreat from the central issues of learning, I felt that the denominations were responsibly intent on moving away from mere celebration of piety on the fringes of the academic process.

Perhaps the next phase confirmed that as we found ourselves focusing on *a ministry of ideas in the academic marketplace.* Begun

by Arnold Nash's *The University and the Modern World* (1943) out of the British SCM and elaborated by Walter Moberly's *The Crisis in the University* (1949), the "University Question" exposed the pretensions of academic objectivity and asked Christians how the Christian faith could be presented as a viable option among the various worldviews represented in Western universities. Nash called for "a movement of lay theologians conscious of their aim and purpose as Christian intelligentsia to bring unity with freedom to an intellectual world which has gone adrift."[2]

The response was far-reaching. SCM study books and Hazen Foundation pamphlets explored the connections between religious commitment and the academic disciplines; the National Council of Churches sponsored the Faculty Christian Fellowship and published *The Christian Scholar*; faculties were employed by major state universities in religious studies; and the revival of neo-orthodox theology had its impact on many disciplines within the university.

It was a time of great ferment and achievement. I remember it as a time when Methodists were encouraged to move into ecumenical patterns of ministry, when our *Discipline* dropped the phrase "student work" in favor of "campus ministry," when theology could indeed facilitate interdisciplinary conversations. But it was also a deceptively quiet plateau that scarcely prepared us for the sixties.

The sixties initiated a new phase and completely re-shaped the form and direction of campus ministry. The focus was on *ministry in a secularized world through the People of God in dispersion.* That is awkwardly said, but it suggests the impetus of books like Peter Berger's *The Noise of Solemn Assemblies* (written for the last national assembly of mainline Protestant students) and Harvey Cox's *The Secular City.* The Ecumenical Institute of Chicago was another expression of this recovery of the laity and the drive to lay aside the banners of Christian particularity, embrace the world and its rhythms, and infiltrate the structures of society. The cognate fields of sociology, psychology and political theory became primary tools in ministry, and the basically pastoral image of campus ministry was shaken.

We learned to move beyond the individualistic care of the pastor in exploring systemic causes and solutions—whether dealing with problem pregnancies or draft-counseling. We were pushed to engage both priestly and prophetic energies in shaping public policy. Campus ministers were in the vanguard of the war resistance efforts

2. *The Intercollegian*, March, 1955, p. 15.

to our Indo-China policy. (Who will easily forget the contributions of Daniel Berrigan at Cornell or William Coffin at Yale?) Again and again, we found ourselves embroiled in our societal hurting points: racial justice, abortion counseling, working with organized labor in the state with the lowest industrial wage in the nation, initiating peace studies curricula, facing the ambiguities of homosexuals, helping women out of the *Kirche-Küche-Kinder* syndrome. The issues kept snowballing, and they always surfaced first on the campus, and the campus ministers were caught up in multiple pressures from parents, students and ecclesiastical superiors. The energy drain from the fractures of trust and the necessity of rearguard actions was enormous, as we had to justify our perilous pastoral-prophetic tightrope act.

In the middle of this cultural upheaval the Danforth Foundation came forth with a major study of campus ministry. It was shaped by Kenneth Underwood, a social ethicist trained under H. Richard Niebuhr. To capsule Underwood's conclusions, I would say that Underwood provided the historic and imaginative models for extricating us from a debilitating individualism. He called us to be politically responsible to the institutions before us and behind us (both University and Church) and to yoke a sophisticated understanding of the social sciences with a historic grounding in theology. He urged us to be conscious of the four historic modes of Christian ministry:

the pastoral (the capacity to listen, to work through conflict and mediate forgiveness)

the priestly (sharing the resources of the sacraments and the mythic-imaginative treasures of liturgy)

the prophetic (the necessity of solidarity with the oppressed and the powerless, the responsible questioning of the structures of power)

governance (making moral sense of managerial and administrative skills, knowing where we are grounded—both faithfully and politically).

While much of the data in the Underwood study was gathered before the sixties broke open (there's precious little there about Blacks or women and no serious critique of the university as but one more of the principalities and powers), campus ministers were given substantial aid in Underwood's use of the historic modes and his exhortation to pursue "prophetic inquiry" in social policy study and action. Unfortunately, some received "prophetic inquiry" as but the latest of a series of slogans informing the image of campus

ministry. Like the earlier slogans ("The Church follows its students," "Ministry of Presence," "Ministry to a Learning Society") this one did not provide an adequate grounding for the Church's mission in higher education.

So the sixties were our time of testing, and a lot of brothers and sisters got lost along the way. I have written elsewhere of the manifold temptations of that time and the false roles we assumed. *The Lone Ranger,* shooting from the hip, fighting the enemies of darkness singlehandedly with all the weapons of a modern Manichaeanism. Or *Peter Pan,* identifying at all costs with the young, fearful of betraying the least possibility that age might possess wisdom or that history might illumine the future. Or the worst kind of *cultural chameleons,* jumping on and off the cultural merry-go-round, from fun-and-games to existential theology to transactional analysis.

Let me make my point more boldly. For many campus ministers in the sixties, true community was found in those evanescent, *ad hoc,* task-oriented groups related to the issues of the moment. They were rich and potent communities. But as they evaporated one by one, many were left uncertain as to where home base was. Where *is* Square One? For some, it became yoga, personal growth groups, and Eastern religion. For others (notably the Roman Catholics and Southern Baptists) home base was in a visible, disciplined community rooted in worship.

The peril in having such a clear institutional, liturgical grounding is that the groups become turned in on themselves and scarcely aware of the university across the way. Their fellowship may be narcissistic; their mission may be only to get new recruits inside the nurturing circle. But the opposite peril is in having no sense of "center" in the classical marks of the Church. A loose kind of liberation or existential theology can justify a broad range of activities as "ministry" (reform politics, value clarification, TA groups, counseling), but they simply do not add up to the People of God in mission without a center. As Martin Buber knew, you cannot measure authentic community at the periphery but at the radius, the relation of the individuals in the community to a common center. Those of us in the mainline campus ministries in the last decade have not spoken convincingly about where that center is.

The evangelicals *have,* and the time is upon us when we must put away our defensive reactions to these para-church movements and be more discriminating in our judgments. Each of us can

rightly resist those elements that make a simplistic, imperialistic, obscurantist appeal. But there is no denying that these movements have filled a vacuum created by the demise of the mainline university student movement and are now channelling students into seminaries and mission programs that were once nurtured by the ecumenical church ministries.

In the last two years of work with a broad spectrum of campus ministry groups I have found it impossible to generalize about these evangelical movements. I have found Campus Crusade and Navigator workers who were as irenic and cooperative as any mainliner I know. (And I have often been put off by liberal fundamentalists with little sense of mission or theological discrimination!) All in all, I salute the evangelicals for bringing to campus ministry a sense of legitimating authority, a transforming experience that affords critical distance from the world, and a sustaining community.

One generalization I would risk is that the Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship impresses me as in the forefront of those groups that keep a careful tension between a critical Biblical commitment and a pursuit of social responsibility. Their Christmas conference in Urbana, '76, brought almost 18,000 students together to do a high level of Bible study along with reflection on the problems of hunger, poverty and racism. I know of no comparable movement in mainline campus ministries. The death of the University Christian Movement in 1967 marked the end of that possibility, although Lutherans and Southern Baptists have maintained a viable student movement up to the present. My strong suspicion is that large numbers of mainline students are being nurtured through the Inter-Varsity groups, and this probability will increase as Campus Crusade reduces its national campus staff by one-third in 1977. There are some moves underway to promote evangelical-ecumenical unity in national student conferences.

Where Are We Headed?

But what about the future? Given the emotional and financial back-lash against the sixties, the evangelical resurgence, the drive for accountability in Church and State, the burgeoning community college movement, and the threat to church-related colleges, what will be the next step in campus ministry? Will we seriously attempt to develop a ministry of the laity wherein faculty, administrators, and students are directly involved in leadership roles? Will we look to local parishes for ministry to the commuter schools virtually without a residential population? How equipped are we to pursue

specialized ministries to the professions—medicine, law, education, the arts?

My initial response is to back off a bit from these immediate decisions and ask the root question of the Church's presence in the realm of post-secondary education. Do we know why we are there and what we are about? In what way are we salt, light, leaven to the learning process? And why is it that mainline, liberal Protestants are so equivocal and disparate in their responses to these questions? Granted, we live in a time of shattering pluralism, but is there not some consensus out of which we move into a mission with clarity as to objectives, goals, and strategies?

If not, then all our slogans are pretentious cover-ups for a waste of the Church's shrinking dollars. We can no longer live with the luxury of being all things to all people, of shaping our ministry according to the reigning fashions. We need to be clear as to priorities for ministry to those populations within the learning institutions. Are students clearly first? (No doubt about this with the evangelicals and Southern Baptists!) Then how do we reach faculty, staff, and administrators? Do we have a strategy for using both local pastors, faculty in religious studies (often zealously anti-church), and theological faculty (in this regard, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin and Wesley were campus ministers)? These are only a few of the many questions presently unresolved in the mainline Protestant bodies, who spend an inordinate amount of time and energy wrestling with issues of survival and retreat. That preoccupation will not nurture the kind of fresh theological imagination that is necessary for a fresh venture in higher education ministries.

My own inclination would be to set forth a polemical slogan for the future. It would be something like "Confessing communities in mission to the learning communities." The key word here is communities—visible, disciplined and rooted in the historic memory and hope of Christian tradition. Out of a sure confessional identity, missional clarity can emerge and specialized ministries be supported.

Despite the projected decline in the populations of our academic institutions, the learning communities will continue to be the basic crucible within which the human future is shaped. A large part of our people will choose their vocations, their mates, their values in this setting. Social policy affecting the environment, medical ethics, the substance of law, the structure of family and government will be informed by the vitality of our learning institutions. So what

does it mean when churchpersons say they are more concerned about "evangelism" than about campus ministry? To turn our backs on this critical frontier of evangelism would leave the church without effective voice at those junctures where the moral use of knowledge will be determined.

Any next steps into future ministry in higher education must proceed on the basis of missional clarity. With that kind of soul-searching behind us, I believe we can once again put together:

> evangelical commitment and social responsibility,
> confessional integrity and pluralistic tolerance,
> ecumenical integrity and denominational nurture,
> critical intelligence and faithful passion.

This brings us almost full-circle, back to the point in 1949 when Sir Walter Moberly wrote *The Crisis in the University* and advised: "Our first task (in the post-Christian university) must be to become a community of Christians."[3] Like T. S. Eliot, Moberly knew that being a community of Christians was not the same thing as a "Christian community" or "Christian civilization." But the task is still before us.

3. *The Crisis in the University* (London: SCM Press, 1949), p. 261.

Women in Campus Ministry in the South: A Survey Report

by Nancy Rosebaugh

During the fall of 1975 and spring of 1976 the National Institute for Campus Ministries conducted a mail survey of women in campus ministry in the South with the intent of uncovering both women's reflections about their jobs (hiring process, responsibilities, handicaps) and attitudes of others toward women in ministry. (For a statistical profile of the respondent group, see Appendix.)

With 69 respondents from eight religious and denominational groups, the range of responses offers a sometimes bewildering variety. On the practical issues of employment opportunities and salary equity, however, there is a unified voice: women are underpaid, and there are too few women in the profession. Survival for women as persons in ministry depends to a great extent upon support systems, both personal and professional. This survey measured some areas of possible professional support and found several important gaps. A sense of what kind of personal support is available can be gathered from women's accounting of their own strengths and handicaps.

Financial Support and Equal Employment Opportunities

There was a resounding response to the survey question, "What would you like to see changed to improve the situation for women in campus ministry?": better salaries. The replies to this question were framed in a number of ways, but the message that women in campus ministry are underpaid did not vary. Many women see themselves doing essentially the same job as men and receiving less, sometimes considerably less, financial remuneration. There are a number of women who are unpaid volunteers—because there is no money to pay a full-time, or even part-time, person.

Several women who are working in campus ministries were originally hired for clerical jobs—the position was funded for secretarial staff—but employers wanted someone who also had counseling skills, or at least aptitude for counseling. Through her own initiative, or at the request of the campus minister, a

woman hired as secretary may become program assistant and counselor, in addition to doing clerical work. In these cases, pay is definitely not equitable for the work performed. One respondent suggested that her employers sought a woman for the job because they could not afford a full-time ordained man. Women religious may find themselves in a similar position; salaries for religious are lower than for priests anyway. Though the salary information is not precise, data from this survey indicate it may be considerably less expensive to have a woman on campus than to have a man in the same, or a similar, ministry position.

The situations described in responses to this survey suggest some important concerns. One is that more openings are needed for women who are professional ministers—not only in women's colleges—and not only as secretaries. One respondent suggested that the ministry on her campus could be improved by having another woman as professional minister and a man (or men) doing secretarial work to balance the present situation. Another need is that professional work be recognized and remunerated where it is found; employers whose salary scale depends solely on academic and ecclesiastic credentials may be discriminating against women who have acquired ministry skills in less formal ways.

A number of suggestions were made regarding the employment situation for women. The primary recommendation is that women be paid according to their abilities and experience, regardless of sex, marital status, ecclesiastical status, and suspected or expected term of employment.* Other recommendations include having more clearly defined job descriptions as one way to close the gap between work done and pay received. A job description flexible enough to be revised to match the actual work performed could be a bargaining tool for higher salary. Establishing a standard procedure for hiring and firing, with clear criteria for each, would prove beneficial, some respondents indicated.

Vocational Support Systems

It is not only financial support and job opportunities which are lacking. The women in campus ministry who responded to this survey are also concerned about inadequate support systems on the

* One notable exception to the feeling that job opportunities are limited by sex comes from respondents who work with Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship. They report that positions are offered to applicants on the basis of the person's abilities and gifts. Staff persons feel I.V. has a strong organization and the hiring process is a good one.

part of denominational or local church bodies, college and university administrators, and ministry colleagues.

A number of women include in their job responsibilities relating to a local church(es), and some are hired by committees of local pastors; many more are hired by regional denominational bodies. Yet many respondents feel that local churches and denominational offices fail to recognize campus ministry as an important and challenging work of the church. Evidence of this oversight is seen in different ways:

1) Financial support and other support services (such as secretary or office assistant) are often inadequate.
2) Few seminaries offer the courses in late adolescent development, programming with college students, and experimental (as well as traditional) modes of worship that are needed to prepare people of both sexes specifically for campus ministry.
3) There is a significant unmet need for in-service skills training (e.g., interpreting scripture and special counseling skills) and continuing education.

The need for continuing education could be somewhat alleviated by having encouragement from denominational bodies to continue study, financial aid for transportation to conferences, more skills-oriented and woman-oriented workshops in local areas, and more input (perhaps on a supervisory level?) from trained religious workers.

Another felt limitation in relation to church bodies is the restriction on ordination of women among Roman Catholics, which is a serious concern for women who minister on a campus, whether there are male colleagues in the area or not. In addition, one respondent listed as a major handicap in the employment of women in campus ministries "the unwillingness of denominations to allow a woman to be the only campus minister in a given situation; where there is only one, that person is almost always white male."

Though several respondents feel the lack of support from university administrators and faculty, there is little elaboration on that point in the survey results. It seems that the university seldom recognizes the importance of ministry on the campus, or is not interested in it.

Among their colleagues in ministry, women find too little professional recognition; there seems to be little respect for women's strengths on the part of the men with whom and for whom women are working. Men are often reluctant to accept a woman's leadership in any aspect of the job. One need that was mentioned re-

peatedly was consciousness-raising for the men, including some recognition in journals and other publications that women exist as campus ministers, e.g., not always referring to the campus minister as "he." Language that uses predominantly or only male pronouns and images and other forms of gender-based discrimination is a serious problem for many women in campus ministry. A related problem is ignorance and intolerance of religious traditions other than one's own, whether that be among Christian groups or between Christians and non-Christians. For instance, a woman who works as Hillel adviser finds that one of her most severe handicaps is the "lack of Jewish consciousness on the part of almost all of my potential community."

Approximately 62 per cent of the survey respondents work as part of a team, and approximately 45 per cent work alone (several people work in both kinds of circumstances). However, even among those who are part of a team, collegial support is often lacking. "It would be important to be able to work toward common strategies in ministry" with people on the same campus and with people on ministry staffs on other campuses, suggested one respondent. There is also a need for psychological and spiritual support—for people "to get together regularly to interact on and pray about common concerns."

Another need voiced by many of the survey respondents is for support systems related specifically to the disadvantages women face in campus ministry jobs and in society generally. The isolation many women feel could be addressed, to some extent, by "occasional woman-oriented workshops in the area." Support structures for women can be part of what happens at regional and national conferences—another reason for hiring bodies to provide financial assistance for travel to such events. There may be a need for some women to pursue assertiveness training for "skills in negotiating for financial contracts and structural changes in job descriptions." Other suggestions included an apprenticeship program for interns with women in campus ministry and an advocacy group, "which could do what AAUP does for its members when they are abused."

Strengths and Handicaps of Women in Campus Ministry

Responses on the question concerning the unique strengths and handicaps in being a woman campus minister varied widely. While some felt that a woman in ministry on a campus needs to maintain the image of friend, not mother, and may need to learn to keep a

professional distance, especially with male students, others felt that their strengths as women were in being a mother (or grandmother) image and providing students with a "home away from home" dimension to make adjustment to college life easier. Most respondents agreed that women do add sensitivity in human relationships to their ministry tasks, in listening, hearing, loving. They felt that women *tend* to be more compassionate than men, more understanding and patient, and may better enable students to discover their own gifts. One respondent described her strength as a woman and feminist as "my perspective on the importance of affective as well as task-oriented needs in individuals and groups." Those surveyed think that women tend to have greater endurance, finer attention to detail, and more flexibility in scheduling than men in the same type of job.

The survey respondents also described what they felt to be the unique strengths of women as counselors. In counseling situations where students live at home, are married, or are contemplating marriage, women may counsel with greater sensitivity to home situations and may be more open to helping students prepare for marriage. Women as counselors often relate more easily to both sexes; some respondents suggested that students and faculty and ministry colleagues seemed to be more comfortable with women than with men counselors, especially in talking about intimate situations.

> "[Men] respect me, solicit my aid readily and take confidence in my presence."
>
> "My relationship with the male students adds to their wholeness. There are times when the men come to get help in understanding the woman they date and/or love."
>
> "I can help men students to learn about male-female relationships without my being an emotional threat."

The uniqueness of women as campus ministers is sometimes expressed in terms of an approach which is complementary to males in campus ministry. The complementary approach may embody qualities such as those described above; it may be simply that a woman's presence among campus ministry counseling personnel offers an alternative, "so that persons can choose male or female, depending on their needs and preferences." Women may assert alternative ways of valuing—alternative to the prevailing styles of campus ministry and alternative to the culture. Women may also bring a broad range of experiences and a larger understanding of the tasks of ministry to the campus.

Another significant area in these reflections on the unique strengths of women in campus ministry is political sensitivity to changing roles of men and women and ways of relating to others which result from that sensitivity. The integration of this awareness was described by one respondent as "my commitment to surfacing the personal and political as inextricably intertwined." Some respondents find that being a woman has given them a base for ministry to minorities—a perspective from which to identify with oppressed groups. Some find that being a woman eases the way in coordinating activities with women's church groups and other community groups, and, for lay women, in relating to ministers in the community because there is no problem with clerical jealousy.

Many women see their position as important because they are independent women, female models in visible places to counteract societal models and to speak to other women (student and nonstudent), to men, to the university, and to the whole church. Women in campus ministry may be valuable because they understand women's needs, can work with women, and can serve as advocate for women within the university. They may also be instrumental in raising consciousness in both church and university and may be able to interpret what is happening in the woman movement to various groups and persons.

It seems the primary resistance women encounter in their ministries is that many people "still suffer from vestiges of the mentality that considers women second-rate citizens." This attitude is evident as women experience "not being taken seriously at times" and "skepticism about my place, capabilities, etc., as a woman campus staff member"; in addition, it is "difficult to be seen as a colleague by parish ministers (all male in this case) in the community."

Being treated as second-rate citizens is a serious hindrance for women in many business dealings ("people think men are the 'head' in all business matters") and in personal interactions within the university and among campus ministry staff. But this attitude has even more serious implications for women in ministry:

"Some people *refuse* to accept a woman as minister."

"Men don't tend to want to be led by a woman spiritually."

"Because I cannot be ordained, I can't offer mass or absolution."

Social-cultural conventions and expectations of women's roles, often reinforced by church structures (e.g., not admitting women to ordained ministry, inequitable salaries), prevent many women from

fully using their gifts in ministry, or make their work more difficult. "People expect women to make banners and play the guitar"—not lead worship.

In a male-dominated or male-clerical-dominated situation, as most universities and colleges are, a woman can easily be put on the defensive. She may be the only woman in her profession in the area and may be subjected to an "automatic discount"—women may have difficulty in being heard and in being considered of equal importance in groups of men.

> "The major [handicap] in my experience is [not] being able to command the kind of attention that is sometimes needed in order to get things done. I have come to believe that this is not a personal problem. . . . It is a difficult adjustment to have to deal with and one reason why I think many women are learning assertiveness training."

Another part of this assertiveness dynamic is a woman's learning to say "no" to demands placed on her—this may be a difficult process. In addition, there is often low awareness in local churches, among campus ministry boards, and in the university in general of attitudes and structures which limit women's full participation. This lack of understanding and lack of support often leads to a sense of being "outnumbered," a sense of isolation, or aloneness in the profession.

Women who are living out feminist convictions face having to deal with the tension between the weight of societal expectations and integrity of self-expression: "It saps energy to have to deal with stereotypes and assumptions about women and appropriate roles." Because women in campus ministry have greater visibility than men (women in all-male, or mostly male, groups), they are sometimes subject to greater criticism. One respondent said she felt as a handicap "the sense of needing to prove oneself"—the reverse side of accepting the responsibility to do as competent a job as possible in order to improve opportunities for women in the field. Several respondents reported as a handicap "the sexist comments one learns to endure," and some found it difficult to realize "that it is impossible not to compromise myself"—to be in a situation where the system does not accommodate readily to individuals' sensitivities and to the growing awareness of social injustice.

Other disadvantages of being a woman serving as campus minister involve dimensions of the job. If a single person has infrequent interaction with other staff members, it is easy to feel lonely. Even if she doesn't work alone, student work tends to be "demand-

ing for the single woman—emotionally, psychologically, and socially." Being single may be a disadvantage for participating in social events, especially married students' activities. Women who have another full-time job and volunteer their time for ministry activities experience that volunteer status and lack of time as a significant handicap.

Women in campus ministry in the South have shared a variety of concerns and reflections in this survey. We hope that this survey and others like it may facilitate communication about the problems and needs of both women and men in campus ministry, in order to encourage and provide focus for the work ahead.

POSTSCRIPT

One critical problem with this survey is that it, like channels of financial and vocational support, failed to recognize and reach a number of women in campus ministry in the South. The number is unknown because these women are seldom listed on anyone's payroll or directory. They are often black, often part-time, lay workers, primarily at small, rural-based, two-year colleges. The ministry these women do—and the problems they face—unfortunately cannot be reflected in this report.

APPENDIX — STATISTICAL PROFILE

Relig./Denom. Affiliation	S. Baptist	R.C.	U.Meth.	IVCF/ CCC	Presby. (PCUS)	UCC	Jewish	*Total*	*Percentage*
# *Respondents*	24	17	11	8	7	1	1	69	%
AGE									
Under 25	5	—	1	3	—	—	—	9	13
25-34	4	3	3	4	3	1	1	19	27
35-44	7	7	3	1	2	—	—	20	30
45-54	5	7	2	—	2	—	—	16	23
55 and over	3	—	2	—	—	—	—	5	7
DEGREE OF EDUCATION									
BA, BS	10	3	3	8	2	—	—	26	39
MA, MRE	9	10	3	—	2	—	1	25	36
MDiv, BD, MTh	1	2	4	—	2	1	—	10	15
PhD (EdD)	2	2	1	—	1	—	—	6	9
MARITAL STATUS									
Single	10	15	8	2	2	—	—	37	53
Married	14	2	3	6	5	1	1	32	47
ECCLESIASTICAL STATUS									
Ordained	2	—	4	—	2	1	—	9	13
Lay	20	4	5	8	3	—	1	41	59
Vowed Religious	—	13	—	—	—	—	—	13	19
Deacon (M-B) or Elder (P)	2	—	2	—	2	—	—	6	9
EMPLOYMENT STATUS									
Full-time	16	13	8	7	3	1	—	48	70
Part-time	5	4	3	—	3	—	1	16	23
Volunteer	3	—	—	1	1	—	—	5	7
NUMBER OF YEARS IN CAMPUS MINISTRY									
Less than 1	4	2	—	—	2	—	—	8	12
1-2 years	5	1	4	—	—	—	—	10	15
3-4 years	4	2	1	3	2	1	—	13	20
5-9 years	4	9	2	4	2	—	1	22	33
10 or more years	6	2	4	1	—	—	—	13	20
NUMBER OF YEARS IN PRESENT POSITION									
Less than 1	6	3	—	3	2	—	—	14	21
1-2 years	6	2	5	1	1	—	1	16	24
3-4 years	4	6	2	3	1	1	—	17	25
5-9 years	4	5	2	1	2	—	—	14	21
10 or more years	3	1	2	—	—	—	—	6	9

Campus Ministers and the Movement for Social Change

by Bernard LaFayette, Jr.

This article is focused on the problems of a select group of campus ministers and their dilemmas during the struggle for social change during the 60's and early 70's, and the impact of those dilemmas on ministry in higher education today. The content is based on my personal observation and feedback which I have gotten from a number of campus ministers serving campuses during this period. When this article refers to campus ministers, it should be understood to refer to this select group of campus ministers. This select group would be those campus ministers who experienced student unrest, student protests or revolts during the 60's and early 70's, especially those related to civil rights, anti-war and governance issues, and as a result of experienced disillusionment.

As a student during the 60's and a leader in the student protest movement, I can deeply appreciate the dilemmas of the campus ministers in such a traumatic period. However, I feel compelled to respond to the often-heard interpretation that it was a mistake for campus ministers to have become involved with movements for social change, because such involvement undermined their role and mission in higher education.

I hope this is a minority position; nevertheless, I have heard it stated often enough to feel the need to make a brief response.

The 60's and early 70's is a period often referred to as a time of great disillusionment for a significant number of campus ministers. As a result of this, some people feel that these campus ministers were victims of the times. Many observers claim that campus ministry lost its identity, and more than a few mainline campus ministers still remain unclearly focused on their role and mission in higher education.

The jolts of the civil rights campaigns, the anti-war protests, and the campus revolts related to governance issues, many times left campus ministers emotionally divided. Often there was sym-

pathy with the administration's and civil authority's call for law and order, on one hand, and the students' demands for racial justice, an end to an unpopular war, and the right to participate in decision making policies affecting campus life, on the other.

While on one hand campus ministers found it easier to share the sentiments of the students, on the other hand they were unsure, if not greatly disturbed by the methods students employed to dramatize their issues and demonstrate their discontent. The rock throwing at helmeted policemen, the burning and bombing of buildings, the trashing, "smoking" and choking on obscenities, made it difficult for "the cloth" to find a non-controversial position. Some stuck their collars out in hopes that their presence would temper the outraged spirits on either side, preventing further injury and bloodshed. Others sought a distant perch to gain a panoramic view of the paralyzing conflict, simply to collect data as passive observers.

It was not uncommon to find a campus minister caught in the eye of the human hurricane and left spent like rubble, scooped up and thrown into the can. Notable example, Ben Chavis of the Wilmington Ten. I suspect some brothers and sisters found untimely emergencies which carried them away from the embattled scene. Others found refuge in the security of their offices, where perhaps they pondered the following thoughts:

> What is the role of campus ministry in such a time as this? Why should I go out there in that riotous situation and risk my life? You never know what those students will do. You could get yourself killed out there with those radicals and militants. They don't care anything about the church anyhow. What good could I do in such a volatile situation? Is not *my* responsibility to the faithful students who regularly participate in my campus ministry program?

Deep down within, campus ministers know that, had it not been for the direct action campaigns and protest demonstrations during this period, important changes otherwise would not have taken place. Campus ministers felt that there were other ways for the students to make their point and accomplish their goals. But of course no one had taken any leadership in trying to help students learn about those "other ways." In fact, no one had thought about it until it was too late, or as the saying goes, "the die was cast."

In a desperate effort to be relevant some campus ministers went out and put themselves in the line of fire with the students. They wanted the students to have some adults in whom they had con-

fidence. They wanted to show the students that there were some people over thirty who could be trusted. Because in many cases the students were outraged with the national government, distrustful of the president of the college or university, and suspicious of older adults in general, including their parents in some cases, they conclusively isolated themselves in a youth ghetto. Under these circumstances campus ministers realized how important it was to maintain some kind of communication with the students, in spite of the risks involved. The risks to campus ministers were not simply physical, but perhaps more disturbing was the thought of being identified with a cause which was antithetical to his or her basic beliefs and orientation.

During this period students were outspokenly condemning the total society, and many times their claims were legitimate, but couched in the radical rhetoric of the "far left." Campus ministers in this situation did not feel comfortable publicly disagreeing with the rhetoric for fear that the students would attack them for being conservative or even reactionary. So they quietly went along, half-heartedly involved, while they pondered their own personal dilemma.

Another issue for campus ministers had to do with the question of power and leadership. After all, they represented spiritual, ethical and moral leadership on campuses; why shouldn't they be leading the movement? But of course to take leadership meant to take responsibility, sometimes full responsibility. It was not clear to many campus ministers whether they should be leaders or whether they should properly be followers, since it was in essence a student movement and therefore should be student led.

If campus ministers were ambiguous about what role they should play in the unfolding drama of the 60's and early 70's, many grass roots church leaders and some tree top leaders were more ambiguous about the role campus ministers should play.

During public demonstrations and protests TV and press cameras were careful to focus on the Roman collars and habits and the faces in them. When many fellow churchmen and women saw their church leaders in the midst of a demonstration (for them it was interpreted as a riot), they were stunned and angered. This precipitated thunder bolts of criticism and a wave of threats to withdraw support for their ministry.

Some people, including other campus ministers, questioned whether that type of involvement was *real* ministry or was actually the typical behavior of some publicity hound, off on the latest

political fad, marching under the church's banner, claiming some new-founded self-styled ministry. In a few cases this was probably true. It is also true that some campus ministers were naive about their involvement in social change movements, in that they were unaware of the sometimes heavy politics operating in the background.

Many of the campus ministers who got involved were aware of the possibility that they could be attacked by their peers and superiors in the church. But in spite of that knowledge they consciously chose to get involved.

When the movement of the 60's and early 70's is raised in campus ministry circles, more often than not one gets the feeling that that period was not a satisfying or fulfilling period for campus ministry. It was indeed a traumatic experience for many. I often hear campus ministers express regrets about their own involvement in movements for social change and casually blame the movement for the resulting pain they experienced.

From my observations I get the distinct impression that many of the campus ministers who leapt into the movements for social change left their theology behind. They temporarily abandoned their churches and became political activists rather than spiritual leaders. They were neither prophetic to the cause nor pastoral to those involved. They were embarrassed to be identified with Christ and the church because the church was so far behind on social issues. They often hid their identity to avoid taking criticism for the status quo racist practices of the church.

It was easier for campus ministers to disassociate themselves temporarily from church identity. In many cases they too shared the criticism of the students and joined in the wholesale condemnation of the church, but spent very little time patiently ministering to their church and helping it through this difficult period. Just as many students wrote off their parents and older adults, some campus ministers wrote off the church and its leaders. Here is where President Carter offers a better model for dealing with this kind of problem. As I recall, his position was that he realized that his church was not perfect, but it was his church. While he had a different opinion from some of the other members on the racial question, he was not yet prepared to condemn his church and abandon it. Instead he used his patience and persuasion to exert his moral position within his church community in hope that enough members of his spiritual community would either change their hearts or change their votes (or both).

Martin Luther King, Jr., was no doubt the best example of a Christian whose spirituality was rooted in the church and whose social action was rooted in his spirituality. King carried his theology with him into social action campaigns. He conducted prayer meetings on the streets of Albany, Georgia; he preached in the Birmingham jail; he held choir rehearsal on the highway between Selma and Montgomery. His mass meetings were not political rallies, they were church services. But not only did King take the church with him wherever he went, he also went to church.

The reason King was not leading the march across the Edmond Pettus Bridge in Selma on that infamous Bloody Sunday when the marchers were beaten and trampled with horses was that he was leading worship services at Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta. He was co-pastor with his father, Daddy King, and it was Martin, Jr.'s Sunday to preach. His congregation was a part of his Beloved Community. (He was in Selma the next day to continue the march.)

It is urgent to be involved in relevant action for social change, but it is important to be rooted deeply in a spiritual community if that involvement is to be sustained.

Myron Bloy writes in a recent issue of the *NICM Journal* on Community-Making, "Those whose drive is only for deepening the experience and enlarging the number of here-and-now faith communities as ends in themselves, who fail to recognize such proximate communities as signs of and gateways into deeper and broader dimensions of community, open themselves to despair . . ."[1] ". . . Those whose drive is only for the community of mankind, for Justice with a capital 'J,' who fail to recognize that the just imagination is necessarily rooted in the experience of historic and proximate community, open themselves to despair . . ."[2]

Our passion for a closer relationship with God must ultimately bring us to recognize that to understand God on the simplest level is to understand a divine love for all of God's children. To love God is to understand God's passion for justice, a concern for the poor, the hungry, the needy, "the least of these."

The problem today is not the threat of disillusionment on the part of campus ministers because of their involvement in social action movements; on the contrary, the campus ministers are being lulled to sleep by the peace and calm of the college campuses. It

1. Myron Bloy, "Community-Making as Ministry," *NICM Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter 1977), p. 9.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

would not be surprising to learn later that this calm is the "calm before the storm."

I can see from my many visits to college and university campuses that very little integration has resulted from desegregation. The polarization, isolation, and lack of communication between black and white students, the racism reported to me by black faculty, staff and administrators, all indicate that there is little or no honest dialogue taking place on campuses today.

Martin Luther King, Jr., spoke to this problem when he said, "Desegregation will break down the legal barriers and bring men together physically, but something must touch the hearts and souls of men so that they will come together spiritually because it is natural and right."[3]

In spite of the fact that blacks are on a majority of the predominantly white campuses and have been for the past nine years, white campus ministers still bemoan the problem that they don't know how to provide an effective ministry which includes blacks. Some campus ministers are so deeply involved in "spiritual development" and their "white" campus ministry program, they hardly know that there are blacks on campus. Spiritual indebtedness must not blind us to the urgent issues of black oppression, justice, hunger, capital punishment, disarmament, women's rights and the crisis of unconcernedness about the problems of the children, the elderly and poor in our nation.

Spiritual indebtedness must be that enlivening force which enlightens us to these problems and helps us find the way to make our ministries more prophetic, more open to God's calling, more open to the cries of the oppressed, more prepared to challenge evil in high places.

It must now be said that another key contributing factor to the disillusionment of many campus ministers during the 60's and early 70's was the lack of skill in dealing with the tough problems of organizing, of mediating, of managing conflict, analyzing disasters, and developing more effective strategies for social change. The will is no greater than the skill.

Campus ministers must be better prepared to cope with the unrest of the 80's than they were during the 60's and 70's. I predict that we are on the verge of massive social upheaval. The hundreds of young people recently arrested in New Hampshire signal the signs of the times, for they are a-changing.

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3. Martin Luther King, Jr., *Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community;* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 118.

The Spiritual Nurture of Campus Ministers

by J. R. McSpadden

I

For the past five or six years, it has bothered me that my colleagues and I have been unable to integrate spirituality or spiritual experience into our ministries of counseling, programming, and responding to campus and societal issues. Although our weekly gatherings forever begin and end with prayer, I do not think we have moved beyond a cosmetic piety which probably retards rather than expands our spiritual development. There is the annual May retreat when we evaluate our ministries, an occasion when a discussion of our inner lives could take place, but attempts at such are usually superficial as bodies begin to wiggle and eyes shift back and forth across the floor. Eventually faint sighs of relief are heard after our leader suggests that we "get on with the agenda."

Much of our anxiety about discussing spirituality—and by that I mean the phenomenon of being centered or grounded in the transformative possibilities of creation—seems to be similar to a general defensiveness we manifest when called upon to acknowledge those violent, sexual, and intimate feelings that influence our lived experience. These feelings create anxiety and conflict as we privately wonder if our most fundamental experiences are valid or "real," if they will be judged as immature or fanatical, or if our colleagues might "tell" our governing board members what we really think.

In addition to the mistrust associated with sharing this side of our personalities, an abundance of psychological literature suggests that the whole area of spiritual experience is simply another coping mechanism we use to squelch our instinctual or learned aggressive drives. Given this understanding of spirituality, many clinicians tend to reduce existential expressions of "emptiness" or feeling "lost" to diagnostic evidence signaling a "neurosis" or an "infantile reaction to stress."

On the one hand, we are silenced by the threat of our colleagues' misunderstanding, and on the other, we are encouraged to deny the validity of our basic human drive for connectedness and meaning because some practitioners of mental health think that existential expressions are symptoms of a personality disorder.

According to Gerald May, there is a deeper element in the ambivalence that emerges when we are faced with questions about our spiritual experience. This element is revealed by the embarrassment or shame that is sometimes felt when we catch ourselves praying (or maybe wishing) for something to happen. Perhaps we long for a friend's safe return from a trip or an end to the pain caused by divorce or death. May writes "there is a deep threat associated with spiritual experience no matter how mature or legitimate it may be. This threat involves the loss of ego boundaries, the loss of individual identity, the loss of control, and the possibility of being swallowed and consumed into infinity. Thus the threat is really that of loss of self or non-existence or death."[1]

Abraham Maslow has listed in his book *Religions, Values and Peak-Experiences* a number of egoless characteristics that are common to experiential peaks (moments of heightened spiritual awareness). Several of those characteristics are a sense of belonging, an experience of universality, a dissolution of subject-object relationships, and a recognition of one's uniqueness. These peaks or spiritual experiences are occasionally limited, however, by those of us who view such moments "as a kind of insanity, a complete loss of control, a sense of being overwhelmed by irrational emotions . . ."[2] The fear that we may lose ourselves accompanies moments of spiritual depth (or height), and our uneasiness is most evident when we attempt to examine our spiritual experience: ". . . we are threatened with dissolving ourselves in the great universal sea where subject and object are one, time is eternal, space infinite, and our own ego but a delusion, . . . such experience is just too close to death for comfort."[3]

II

One of the consequences of human self-consciousness is the need to protect one's self from loss. Anxiety heightens when we are con-

1. Gerald G. May, "The Psychodynamics of Spirituality," *The Journal of Pastoral Care*, 28 (1974), 87.

2. Abraham H. Maslow, *Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences* (New York: Viking Press, 1964), pp. 22-23.

3. May, p. 88.

fronted with the possibility of losing a fulfilling job, a beloved spouse, our health, or the position we have within a community. And it is the same fear of loss that precedes occasions of a profound spiritual experience, occasions when we are pushed out to the limits of our knowledge and understanding of this world and when we are forced to re-examine all of life's categories, priorities, and values. Although these experiences may not immediately render "a clean well-lighted place" for us to reorient ourselves, they provide a necessary position to begin looking beyond the boundaries of our particular horizon. Minimally, these moments of spiritual insight remind us that life is inherently ambiguous, that suffering and pain are permanent realities within our world, that loss of meaning and loss of identity must accompany the birth of a new understanding and a new self.

The Old and New Testament narratives are filled with accounts of spiritual experiences where the death of old habits of thinking and behaving is essential before space can be created for something new. "If anyone wants to be a follower of mine, let him renounce himself—for anyone who loses his life for my sake will find it" (Mt. 16:24-25) are terribly frightening words from Jesus. They call for an incredible level of trust, a venture into the "great universal sea" with no assurance that one will land on anything solid.

Father Jeffrey Sobosan describes this movement in spirituality as a growth from nothingness to being:

> Jesus the man reveals Jesus the God in that he does humanly what God does. Jesus does not impose meaning on or construe his life; but he allows his life to become. And in this sense the God present in Jesus can be seen as an autonomous creative force which lets life be what it is. In the way he lets his own life develop, therefore, Jesus becomes for the Christian the paradigm of the human being actively open to the creative power within him, which is God. Jesus' individual life can be seen as a way in which all individuals must pursue the search for their own meaning. Which is to say that the path which the individual life must take is one of growth from nothingness to being, by attempting first to understand that one's life situation is ambiguous; second, by opening oneself up to the creative God-power within oneself and waiting for its revelation, however gradually it may come; and third, by acting upon its discovery.[4]

How does one discover his or her being within the experience of loss? There may be a clue for us within the Gospel of Matthew.

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4. Jeffrey G. Sobosan, "Suffering, Innocence and Love," *The Christian Century* 91 (14, 1974).

Following Jesus' return from the wilderness and immediately before his entrance into a ministry of proclaiming the kingdom of God, he discovered that John the Baptist had been imprisoned. At that point Jesus took John's place—until he learned that the Baptist had been executed. According to the writer of Matthew, it seems that Jesus withdrew from his ministry after receiving this news. Was John's death so frightening that Jesus backed away from his plans to convert Israel? Perhaps. But whether or not this was the reality which Jesus saw, he must have realized quite clearly that his task was absurd. Yet, in the face of that absurdity, he chose to stay with his mission, continuing "to trust that there was a meaning beyond his perception, as death is necessarily beyond the perception of man. And that he died still teaching and still trusting in the darkness of this possible absurdity is clear: on the cross, we are told, he said: 'Into your hands I commend my spirit.' Only after his death is the man Jesus recognized as the 'Lord.' He saw darkness at the end of his life and trusted in it."[5]

III

Over the past three years I have found the following techniques to be helpful starting points in my spiritual development. Although they are not unprecedented, since contemplatives and religiously non-committed persons have practiced similar spiritual techniques for centuries, they are quite novel within my lived experience as I am able to stop, to back away from numerous quotidian rituals and responsibilities, and to identify those places where I have desensitized myself to what is distracting or unnecessary.

Sometimes following these exercises, I realize that a change in perspective has occurred when I decide to accept the limitations on my time and energy—realities I frequently avoid as the "what I should do" messages are blurred into the "what I want/can do" items during the course of a day. A second change that usually occurs is that many unconscious illusions of being a super-campus minister (Bill Coffin type), super-theologian (a David Tracy), super-preacher (another David C. Read), or super-therapist (an Eric Berne-Henri Nouwen combination) begin to surface, thus reducing my ambivalent and competitive feelings toward those colleagues who threaten the illusory "Coffin-Tracy-Read-Berne-Nouwen Super Star." And, occasionally, I am able to hear within myself and to see within the words and actions of those standing over against me

5. Sobosan, p. 398.

that I am acceptable and that that which accepts me transcends scientific and everyday categories of understanding.

Silence

Four years ago I entered my new campus ministry job full of energy and enthusiasm. I attended every meeting on campus and in presbytery, spoke to everyone I thought I should know, wrote letters and thank-you notes for all the dinner invitations that were extended to me, tried to appear at all the birthday gatherings with a freshly purchased present, led Bible study groups, introduced students to the B-1 Bomber issue, offered transactional analysis workshops, and filled all the empty places on my calendar with counseling appointments. My inability to say "no" to every request resulted in my being well-liked and accepted: but that approval was costing me my health because I was not sleeping, there was no time to read or study, and the "free" time I spent at home was filled with sermon or program preparation. My only retreat from the madness of each day was the five or ten minutes I stood in the shower every morning—a sanctuary without telephones, counseling appointments or seminars. I was not effective in my ministry, nor were my activities meaningful, because I was afraid to take the time to stop, to be alone, and to reflect on my life.

In the fall of 1974, about fifteen months after my arrival, I had the opportunity to read several books by Thomas Merton and Henri Nouwen. In response to their words, I began to set aside three hours every Tuesday morning to be alone. My one rule for the day was to avoid planning the morning's agenda and to keep it free of distracting telephone calls. I simply awakened to the day, opened my blinds, and allowed the morning to lead me to whatever I selected to read, reflect on, or maybe write about (as long as it was unrelated to my job).

Some mornings I could not clear my mind of those things that had taken place the day before or would occur later in the week; and I tried several Yoga exercises, concentrating as much as possible on my breathing and allowing whatever anxieties were immobilizing me to run their course. This did not always work, but when it did, my numerous self-created illusions lost some of their power. Nouwen's words were helpful:

> A life without a lonely place, that is, a life without a quiet center, easily becomes destructive. When we cling to the results of our actions as our only way of self-identification, then we become possessive and defensive and tend to look at our fellow

> human beings more as enemies to be kept at a distance than as friends with whom we share the gifts of life. In solitude we can listen to the voice of him who spoke to us before we could speak a word, who healed us before we could make any gesture to help, who set us free long before we could free others, and who loved us long before we could give love to anyone. It is in this solitude that we discover that being is more important than having, and that we are worth more than the result of our efforts. In solitude we discover that our life is not a possession to be defended, but a gift to be shared.[6]

Journal Keeping

One of the earliest learnings to emerge from these quiet Tuesday mornings was the recognition of two incapacitating forces within my personality. One side of my personality contained a well-supplied arsenal of omnipotent fantasies about being male, performing scholastically, and being professional. And not very far away from the "Super Star" arsenal, I discovered an equally well-armed rapid fire company of messengers who reminded me that I was basically weak, not so bright, somewhat lazy, and a bit fearful of new people and strange places. These two factions were always present, especially when it was time for a decision, e.g., whether or not to accept a new job offer; and they would cause indigestion, headaches, or maybe a twitch in my eyelid if I tried to ignore their presence. Sometimes the only way I was able to remove myself from their endless comments was to sleep, to eat too much chocolate ice cream, or to distract myself with the sounds of Johnny Carson's late-night voice.

Thomas Kelly has written:

> We are trying to be several selves at once, without all our selves being organized by a single, mastering life within us. Each of us tends to be not a single self, but a whole committee of selves. There is the civic self, the parental self, the financial self, the religious self, the society self, the professional self, the literary self. And each of our selves is in turn a rank individualist, not cooperative but shouting out his vote loudly for himself when the voting time comes. It is as if we have a chairman of our committee of the many selves within us, who does not integrate the many into one but who merely counts the votes at each decision and leaves disgruntled minorities. . . . We are not integrated. We are distraught.[7]

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6. Henri J. M. Nouwen, *Out of Solitude* (Notre Dame, Ind.: Ave Maria Press, 1974), pp. 21-22.

7. Thomas R. Kelly, *A Testament of Devotion* (New York: Harper & Row, 1941), pp. 116-117.

My vinyl-covered journal has been a better technique for resolving conflicts than were the habits of sleeping, watching television, and eating away the differences that were splitting my interior apart. By naming these two forces within my personality, acknowledging the contributions that each one has for me, and writing down what they are saying, I am at one level claiming fragments of my past and maybe my present that I have consciously ignored. While these conflicting energies or forces rarely reconcile their differences (even after ten long journal pages), my recognition of their presence reduces the fear that I will be swallowed up by one or the other. And on another level, I am reminding myself that good and evil are not simply words but concrete realities in my lived experience, that life does contain its negative moments of anger, jealousy, and greed—which tend to hoarding and protecting everything within my *Weltanschauung.* And at the same time, there are also moments of tenderness, acceptance, and love which lead to openness and availability . . . openness to the sounds of a quiet night, to the discovery of a new friend, or to a horizon of possibilities that I had never viewed before.

Community

It would be incorrect to assume from what I have expressed so far that I singularly possess all the necessary theological and psychological skills to understand and direct my spiritual development. Despite years of studying, analyzing, and using various therapeutic techniques, I have never been able to "get in touch" and "stay in touch" with myself for very long periods of time. Conclusions I consciously reach about my emotional life are seldom final and undergo the pain of repeated disintegration as I receive new information from colleagues and friends in my profession and the community where I work.

I have only begun to sift through the multitude of obstacles that inhibit my development of rich and fulfilling human relationships—obstacles like competitiveness, self-centeredness, illusions of omnipotence, as well as those of powerlessness. This process has only been possible through an association with individuals who are on a similar journey, who come together to read a book, to celebrate the Eucharist, or to plan a retreat. These friends are open and honest, allowing me to check my perception of them and the other relationships that matter most to me. They give me the opportunity to test my faith against the faith of the Judeo-Chrisian community, to express my doubts and my fears, and to examine my idols and

narrow self-interests. Without these friends, *my* spiritual development would be nothing more than an internal dialogue with myself.

Spirituality is a deeply layered reality involving fear, trust, loss, risk, silence, reflection and community; and it is a lifetime activity in which one both dreads and rejoices in the fact that there is always new and unfamiliar terrain ahead. Elaine Prevallet offers us a useful suggestion on the development of spirituality: "It is likelier to be one of those elusive things that can be sensed but not seen in a place or a group, that can be heard, but only as a short undertone, to ears explicitly attuned. We won't ever be able to grasp it and own it. Sort of like God. But on our journey, it may help, now and again, to remember where it is we want to go."[8]

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8. Elaine Prevallet, "Community and Spiritual Development in the Academic Setting," *The NICM Journal,* Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter 1977), p. 100.

The Ministry of the Whole Church to a Learning Society

by Clyde O. Robinson

Recently I received a brochure describing an event sponsored by a number of local churches surrounding a major state university. The opening paragraph of the brochure read as follows:

> The Ministry of the church with people and institutions of higher education is not the ministry of the campus minister or the board for campus ministry alone. It is an extension of the mission of the local church. For maximum effectiveness, local pastors and laity need to be involved.

The quotation does not represent a great new insight. It has always been true. For those of us who have connectional understandings of the nature of the church, the truth of that statement rests in the bedrock reality of the "church across the ages and around the world." Certainly for all Protestants it is a clear reflection of the doctrine of "the priesthood of all believers," one that carries with it substantial implications for the partnership of the several levels or courts through which the life and mission of the church are expressed.

In the past we have honored the notion of ministry in higher education as the "extension of the mission of the local church" by putting people from nearby congregations on campus ministry boards and by funding campus ministries with money that derives either immediately or ultimately from local church treasuries.

Past that—and other occasional efforts to get local congregations to help the professional campus clergyperson to do the ministry designed, controlled, and, in the main, carried out by him or her—far more energy has been expended to keep ministry in higher education and mission of the local church separate and apart than has been spent to bring them together. Many campus ministers have sought distance from local church life because they feared, sometimes correctly, that their ministry might be bound, restricted, and limited by a closer relationship. Many local churches, particularly

during the decade of the sixties, welcomed the separation lest they be embarrassed by some of the involvements of the campus ministers.

The insight, nevertheless, has always been there. It does, however, need to be viewed in a different context today, a context that demands much more direct, personal, and concrete involvement on the part of local congregations. Otherwise, the insight is likely to lose any relevant meaning, even as the church's impact on higher education is likely to continue to diminish.

Now let me quickly acknowledge that one piece of that context is money. Higher education expanded tremendously in the fifties and sixties. Today the "middle judicatories" of the churches (the conferences, dioceses, synods, presbyteries) can no longer afford to place a clergy person in a campus ministry center alongside every campus, as once they tried to do. New strategies have had to be found, and most of them call for the new and vital involvement of the people, priorities and resources of local congregations. The new regional design of the Synod of the Virginias emerged under the impetus of that dual increasing demand for ministry and declining financial capability.

There were other reasons for that new strategy for ministry in higher education in the Virginias, just as there are other, and, I think, far more important, dimensions to the context in which we may affirm the role of the local church in ministry in higher education. Money is a part of that picture, but there are theological and institutional factors that finally are much more significant for us.

Let me, then, try to describe some of the factors touching higher education and the church respectively, factors that have directly to do with the opportunity and responsibility of the local church for ministry in higher education.

1. *The Scene in Higher Education*

K. Patricia Cross, in her article, "Learning Society," (*The College Board Review*, No. 91, Spring, 1974), painted the following picture:

> Most people today grant that we are in the midst of shifting from higher education as a privilege to higher education as a right . . .
>
> (We are watching) . . . the change in the concept of college from exclusiveness to inclusiveness. Gradually at first, and now with increasing momentum, the barriers to college admission have come tumbling down. In the early days of private colleges, criteria for admission were social and financial. Those excluded

were primarily those who lacked money for tuition and expenses. With the advent of public colleges, we began the meritocratic phase of higher education in which those excluded were those who lacked the high school grades and the test scores to indicate academic promise. With the increasing social sophistication of the country, we realized that most barriers to further education were highly inter-related, operating to exclude quite consistently certain groups of people. With that realization, the national picture changed abruptly, and we found ourselves abolishing one barrier after another in rapid succession. The call for equality of educational opportunity brought the establishment of open-admissions community colleges at the rate of one a week throughout the late 1960's. Then we found ourselves actively recruiting previously excluded poor people, ethnic minorities, and women. Now we are looking for ways to abolish all other exclusionary practices including discrimination because of age, part-time student status, and geographical isolation.

Most people want to learn and they want society to provide the opportunities. In a national survey conducted by Educational Testing Service last year (1973), 80 per cent of the adults between the ages of 18 and 60 said that they were interested in learning more about some subject, and one third had actually engaged in some type of formal learning in the year prior to the study. The respect for learning is widespread; people believe in it, and given appropriate opportunity they practice it . . . In the short space of twenty years, we have moved from a national policy of exclusion to inclusion in college admissions.

A parallel and related factor is the decline in numbers of the traditional 18-24-year-old student. Stephen Dresch of Yale predicts that the enrollment of persons in that age group will decline by 40 per cent between 1980 and 1990. The average student age in some institutions is already approaching thirty, as older, non-traditional students from among the poor, the ethnic minorities, and women flock into post-secondary education. "Full Time Equivalent Fever" is driving to accomplish what inclusive, egalitarian, democratic, or even Christian impulses might never have.

There is now a new, much broader constituency for higher education than there has ever been before. That constituency, to be found in *every* part of the society, must be considered as the church plans its ministry.

In the second place, the current constituency of higher education is coming to think of *learning as a life-long activity* rather than something one does through college and graduate school before going to work. Post-secondary education is increasingly seen as on-going and oft-repeated as people prepare for career changes, as

they enhance their skills, or as they simply enrich their lives. Both community colleges and urban universities, as well as occasional private institutions, see themselves more and more as primary resources for people well beyond the traditional undergraduate age, people with much more sharply defined educational goals, people, once again, drawn from every sector of the community.

In turn and interrelated there is a third trend that Pat Cross calls "campus expansiveness." She says:

> Geographically, as well as conceptually, colleges are reaching out to include a broader community. Early in the history of higher education, colleges were deliberately located in small towns such as Ann Arbor, Ithaca, and Palo Alto away from the hustle of the city. Faculty lived around the campus and students lived on the campus, and college was a community unto itself—its geographical isolation a symbol of its removal from the worldly concerns of the masses.

Today things are quite different. Institutions of higher education are much less cloistered, isolated, controlled environments than they were in my college days. My *Alma Mater* advertised itself as "A Safe Place to Send Your Son." Many, including upper level institutions, either have no dormitories or are having trouble getting people to live in them. Parietal rules are virtually gone. The curricula are much more flexible. The face of the institutions, be it public or private, is increasingly turned outward toward the communities it serves rather than inward toward its own self-defined interests.

As the walls of isolation have come down, so has it become impossible to define institutions of higher education by proximate geographical boundaries. The new strategy is to take the colleges to the people and to identify, coordinate and make available to them the learning resources that are already in their midst. As Cross puts it:

> This new geography of college location reflects the change from exclusiveness to inclusiveness, but it reflects something even more fundamental to the learning society. It recognizes that universities no longer serve as the repositories of all knowledge. Great cities are conceded to have some of the finest educational resources available anywhere. Metropolitan libraries, museums, symphonies, and business offices combine with rich cultural diversity to provide learning experiences unparallelled on conventional college campuses.

Further, colleges and universities are using facilities (public schools, garages, churches, factories, stores) scattered all through

the community. Radio, television, audio-visual learning packages, and even mobile classrooms are means by which higher education has moved off campus into the community.

In summary, the limiting marks by which it was once possible to define and describe higher education are disappearing: Age, class, ethnic background, sex, preparation, discrete geography, and time in life are open-ended categories for the New Learner in our society. As Pat Cross says, "The learning society breaks loose from those boundaries, and learning pervades the entire community."

That is important information for local churches who care not only about ministry in higher education but much more fundamentally care about ministry that is relevant to people and the communities in which they live. The church cannot effectively provide pastoral care for people unless it understands the circumstance of the New Learner because *its people are New Learners.* The church cannot speak with power and effectiveness to its community unless it understands that community to be a *part of the Learning Society.* The church cannot fail to relate to the people and processes of higher education in 1977; the only questions are *how informed* and *how effective* that relationship will be.

II. *Some Facts About the Church*

The ecclesiastical scene has changed (and is still changing) since the time we developed the strategies for ministry in higher education that we are still using. Those strategies depend almost exclusively upon a strong middle judicatory funding base, a church-wide consensus about the purpose of ministry in higher education, and a high degree of denominational identity and cohesiveness. The circumstances are different today.

Today people do less out of denominational loyalty than once they did. They are much less inclined to use a particular educational curriculum "because our denomination produced or recommended it" than they once were. Similarly, they are slower to give to denominational programs out of loyalty than once they were. You cannot get support for programs just because they are Presbyterian or Episcopalian anymore; you have to convince people of the program's worth in terms of the values of those people.

It probably should not surprise us, then, to discover that money is staying closer home where people can see what is being done with it and can share in its use than was once the case. In the synods of the Presbyterian Church, the financial resources, whether devoted to campus ministries or to the support of church-related colleges,

have not kept pace with inflation, at least in part for the above reason. Many synods, consequently, are struggling to divide an ever diminishing financial pie, looking for funding partners among presbyteries, local churches, and other denominations, or giving over the responsibility for ministry in higher education to the lower courts.

Finally, and of the highest importance, there is a crisis in terms of the theological purpose for ministry in higher education, which, likely, is a reflection of the larger issue of the nature of ministry in general. There are not many among us who can speak compellingly and thoughtfully to the question: "Why ministry in higher education?" We are vulnerable in terms of our strategy and our performance when we lift up the "pastoral and priestly care of students" rationale (around which we once had consensus), are found wanting by its standards, and yet have articulated nothing to replace it. It is small wonder that the church often appears to be apathetic about the future of the colleges to which it has historically been related and that, as the priorities are emerging in a number of synods, campus ministry is found well down the list. Understanding and commitment are both logically and humanly prior to funding.

III. *Some Implications for the Church*

The implications of this educational and ecclesiastical context have to do with the whole life of the church at every level. I see rooting ministry in higher education at the local level in a much broader and more substantial way *positively*, largely because it has the promise of engaging so much more of the church in that ministry *and* of making the resources of higher education so much more available to the churches. Nevertheless, there are unique responsibilities for ministry at the middle judicatory and general church level that must be addressed if the implications we have discussed are to be taken seriously. We, therefore, are talking about the whole church.

A New Conceptualization

We need to think some new thoughts about ministry in higher education whether we are thinking about the local church, the middle judicatories, or the national church.

In the past we have been prone to think of ministry in higher education as something the church does *to* higher education, or, more likely, to the people to be found in educational institutions.

and feelings too quickly and too directly from the New Testament" (written in prison in 1943). It seems clear, from Kuske's study, that Bonhoeffer envisioned a completely Christocentric understanding of the Old Testament.

The presuppositions of this position can be stated briefly. First, "the God of the Old Testament is the Father of Jesus Christ." Second, all of Scripture belongs to the Church, and the Old Testament is the "book of Christ" for Bonhoeffer, who actually uses the phrase "Christ in the Old Testament." Light is one metaphor that explains this presence; the light goes out from Christ and illumines the Old Testament. Those who are aware of the typology which flourished among the Church Fathers and the Scholastics will recognize it in Bonhoeffer's exegesis, e.g., the relationship of David (especially as author of Psalms!) and Christ. A third presupposition can be put in Bonhoeffer's words: "The Old Testament must be read in the light of the incarnation and crucifixion, that is, the revelation which has taken place for us. Otherwise, we are left with the Jewish or heathen understanding of the Old Testament." This dilemma led to the general parallel which Bonhoeffer drew between the incarnate, crucified and risen Christ, and the accepting, judging, receiving Lord of the Old Testament. Particularly in the treatment of "ungodly passages" (such as the vengeance and violence in Ps. 58) Bonhoeffer elaborates a systematic theology that undergirds his interpretation: Jesus, the "crucified Godless One" bears the wrath of his Father.

Reasons of space allow only a quick reaction to these principles. A Christian can certainly agree that the God of the Old Testament is the Father of Jesus. It is the unpacking of this that will lead to differences of opinion. While Scripture is the book of the Church, the phrase "Christ in the Old Testament" snuffs out the legitimate self-understanding that Yahweh's "first-born," Israel, had of herself. I think that typology has to be controlled by the types of the New Testament, and not increased by the fertile imagination of the Fathers or Bonhoeffer. Finally, the dilemma between choosing a Christocentric or a Jewish/heathen understanding is a false one. There is such a thing as a Christian understanding of the Old Testament that sees it in continuity with the revelation of the Lord in Jesus Christ. This can be worked out along several lines, and certainly less rigidly than with the heavy systematic principles involved in Bonhoeffer's approach.

The great virtue of Bonhoeffer's grappling with the question is that it challenges every Christian reader to analyze just how he or she appropriates the Old Testament. For this reason, Kuske's analysis is thought-provoking, and to be recommended as an introduction of Bonhoeffer's vision of the "unity" of the Christian Bible.

Roland E. Murphy

Biblical Interpretations in Preaching. Gerhard von Rad. Abingdon. 1977. 125 pp. $5.95.

This is a collection of twenty-one "homiletical meditations" composed by the late Gerhard von Rad between 1946 and 1964, when he was at the height of his illustrious career as an Old Testament scholar. To these have been prefixed some rough-hewn notes "about exegesis and preaching" which were composed for a practical seminar (1965-66), directed by von Rad, G. Bornkamm and H. F. von Campenhausen. What a seminar that must have been!

Readers familiar with von Rad's *Old Testament Theology* and his studies on Genesis and Deuteronomy will recognize here the sure hand of the master. He does everything but write the sermon. That is to say, he provides solid exegesis of the Biblical passage, alerting the homilist to the theological thrusts in the text. Frequently he speaks of what the "sermon" should concentrate on, what

points should be called to the attention of the "congregation," and of the task of the "preacher." The passages commented on are taken from Genesis (6), Joshua (1), 1-2 Kings (2), 2 Chronicles (1), Job (1), Psalms (2), Deutero-Isaiah (2), Jeremiah (2), Haggai (1), and Malachi (1). One text is from the New Testament: Hebrews 4:1-11 (the pilgrim status of the people of God—on the theme of "rest," which was the subject of one of his scholarly essays).

Professor von Rad's words to his seminar students are challenging. They must do the preparatory work and come to the seminar "with an opinion already formed and take a stand." For him "there is no fundamental distinction between exegesis and preaching"—preaching is interpretation, only in a different form of speech. "The great discovery which all of you must make in preaching," he tells the students, "is that the texts themselves actually speak." Otherwise, "you are lost"!! He had the knack of getting to the heart of a text, and coming through it to the situation of the modern Christian. As is well known, he did not disdain typology, the correspondence between the OT and NT situation, but he never underplayed or underrated the OT message.

This is a delightful book, well translated by John E. Steely of Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary. It will help all of us to be better preachers.

Roland E. Murphy

The Historical-Critical Method. Edgar Krentz. Fortress. 1975. 88 pp. $2.75.

The Krentz volume is a part of the "Guides to Biblical Scholarship Series" of Fortress Press. Its purpose is to introduce "the college and seminary student and the interested layman to the chief methods used by scholars who work methodically at biblical interpretation. . . . The book describes the goals and techniques used by both secular and biblical scholars, showing that biblical scholars do indeed use historical methods that compare with those of secular historians."

After a brief introduction, Krentz describes the origin and development of historical criticism in the Reformation and subsequently. Following discussions of its aims, functioning, presuppositions, and achievements, he treats the debate over the legitimacy and limitations of historical criticism which has gone on since World War II. Here such names as Käsemann, Ebeling and Stuhlmacher loom large.

In accord with the purpose of the series, Krentz intends to break no new ground, but to tell a story and describe a discipline or cluster of disciplines well-known to professionals in the field. The proper critical question therefore is how well this task is accomplished. In my judgment an unambiguously positive answer cannot be given. Some complaints are technical and perhaps minor: secondary works are cited sometimes in footnotes, sometimes in in-text parentheses, but according to no apparent rationale. Occasionally a scholar's position is represented on the basis of a summary in another secondary source (p. 56, n.2). There are some infelicitous, if not questionable statements, e.g.: "Bultmann solved the problem [of the relation of faith and historical criticism] by making the theological function of historical criticism the demonstration that man's historicality lies in his need for authentic existence." This may be a defensible statement—although I am inclined to doubt that it is. But it certainly requires some unpacking. Actually, the entire book has a somewhat laconic, as well as abrupt, character. Many positions and figures are referred to, but sustained exposition of any one of them is rare. In part this is due to the necessarily limited scope of the work. Yet its character and intended audience actually invite, or even demand, fuller explanations than are often given.

Perhaps because the series contains other volumes on form, redaction, and literary criticism, Krentz devotes relatively little space to historical criticism

as an exegetical, interpretive method. Certainly in the present scene, however, this is a most important function. Much more space is devoted to questions of the nature of history, its indispensability to theology, and the possibility of divine intervention in it. While in a variety of ways Krentz asserts that a proper historical method will not exclude that possibility, he does not satisfactorily suggest how, in the case of specific texts or narrated events, historical criticism can allow for God's activity in history.

As historical criticism teaches, any document is in some measure the product of its author's historical milieu. This little book is no exception. Krentz, as a member of the faculty of Concordia Seminary in Exile, has doubtless endured much hardship in defense of the integrity and necessity of the historical method in the scholarship of the church. For those of us who are dedicated to it as a necessity for exegesis and theology, his book will provide absorbing reading. Moreover, knowledge of that background makes it more intelligible even as it reminds us of our debt to the author.

D. Moody Smith

The Johannine Circle. Oscar Cullmann. Translated by John Bowden. Westminster. 1976. 124 pp. $6.95.

For more than a decade we have been awaiting Cullmann's commentary on the Gospel of John. The commentary is yet to appear, but in this slim volume Cullmann has published the material originally intended for the introduction.

Cullmann does essentially two things: he judiciously articulates general hypotheses about the character and origin of the Fourth Gospel; he sets forth or reiterates and puts into an overall perspective his distinctive theories of Johannine origins. In the first chapter, on literary problems, Cullmann warns against placing too much confidence in theories of multiple redaction, sources, and rearrangement of the order of the text. Nevertheless, he accepts as probable a three-stage process of composition (primitive traditions, author, redaction) spread over a number of years. He then discusses the purpose of the Gospel, which he believes to be the strengthening of the faith of believers by showing the intrinsic connection between the events of the life of Jesus and the Johannine church. Although *ecclesia* does not occur in John, it is actually the most churchly of all the gospels in its interest and focus. The church John represents and addresses is somewhat off the beaten track, but not a heretical gnosticizing sect at odds with the main stream of Christianity (Käsemann). Rather than representing docetic Christology, John combats doceticism.

While the Gospel cannot be taken as purely historical in purpose, it contains a factual element which the exegete is bound to take seriously. Moreover, "the evangelist is evidently convinced that he is reporting facts" (p. 22), while at the same time, and quite obviously, making history serve his theological purpose. The theological intent of John is pervasive and formative of its basic content to an extent unprecedented in the other gospels.

Following a brief chapter on Johannine language and style, Cullmann discusses the non-Christian environment of the Gospel and what he calls the Johannine *circle* (rather than *school* or *church*) which produced it. The proximate environment was a heterodox, gnosticizing Judaism represented also in the Christian Pseudo-Clementine literature. This Judaism, indigenous to Palestine, was related to, although not identical with, the sectarianism of Qumran. It was also connected with baptizing movements, as the prominence of John the Baptist in the Gospel suggests. Moreover, the special relation of John to Samaria and distinctively Samaritan concepts cannot be overlooked.

The Gospel of John is not, however, simply the product of a syncretistic,

gnostic background, for it represents a distinctive form of early Christianity. As in some of his earlier writings, Cullmann draws lines of connection between heterodox Judaism, the Hellenists of Acts, and the Johannine circle: "There is a very close connection, if not complete identity, between the *Hellenists in Jerusalem and the Johannine group*" (p. 43). Both the Gospel of John and Stephen's speech (Acts 7) are rooted in heterodox Judaism, and especially Samaritan theology. Nevertheless, in John one can detect a variety of other heterodox Jewish elements: Qumran, the Mandaeans, the baptist movement, syncretism and gnostic Ebionitism. Aside from the Gospel this Johannine Christianity can be found in the New Testament in the Epistles of John and to a lesser extent in the Apocalypse of John and Hebrews. John's ambivalent attitude toward Peter and the Synoptic tradition indicates a certain distance from, but not hostility toward, the main stream of early Christianity. Traces of Johannine Christianity, or points of similarity and contact, may be found in the later Pseudo-Clementine literature, Ignatius of Antioch and, albeit in a distorted form, in certain circles of gnosticism.

Perhaps most likely to attract attention and spark debate is Cullmann's treatment of the question of authorship. He insists on taking seriously the Gospel's claim to stem from the testimony of an eyewitness. The external, late second-century testimony identifying the evangelist with John the Son of Zebedee is, however, scarcely correct. The attitude of John toward the Twelve indicates that the evangelist, whoever he was, did not belong to their number. Yet we may indeed see in the figure of the "beloved disciple," who is the same as the "other disciple" (1:35ff.; 18:10ff.), a surrogate for the evangelist. He was a former disciple of the Baptist (1:35ff.) and acquainted with the high priest (18:15ff.). He seems to have witnessed and followed Jesus in Judea, when Jesus was with the Baptist, and in Jerusalem during the Passion. He collected his own group of followers who could attest the validity of his witness (21:24). Probably he was an eyewitness to only a limited number of the events which he records. Whether this eyewitness was himself the original author or evangelist, as distinguished from an authority standing behind him, is impossible to say with certainty, but Cullmann is inclined to take at face value the statement of 21:24 that the witness was the author (the one who actually wrote), and not to multiply entities needlessly.

In conclusion Cullmann suggests that the Johannine circle is rooted not only in a witness and disciple of the historical Jesus, but in Jesus himself (p. 87): "We thus arrive at the following line, moving back in time: Johannine community—special Hellenist group in the early community in Jerusalem—Johannine circle of disciples—disciples of the Baptist—heterodox marginal Judaism. However, one link is missing between the Johannine circle of disciples and the Baptist's disciples . . . Jesus." Jesus himself was no stranger to the heterodox Judaism mirrored in the Fourth Gospel, and Cullmann boldly suggests that the speech of the Johannine Jesus, while obviously subject to a Christian theological development, has its origin in the way Jesus addressed the Johannine circle of disciples.

As to date and place of origin, in an appended chapter, Cullmann agrees with the now widely held opinion that the present form of the Gospel appeared near the end of the first century (although the early stages of its composition may antedate the fall of Jerusalem) and suggests that the place of publication was likely either Syria or Transjordania. The latter is favored for several reasons. It was, in Cullmann's opinion, a place of religious syncretism in which Christians, Qumranees, and perhaps disciples of the Baptist had settled after A.D. 70.

Brief as it is, this book touches upon almost all the fundamental issues of Johannine origins as they

are presently perceived. It is a coherent and, in considerable measure, persuasive statement of the circumstances within which Johannine Christianity and the Fourth Gospel appeared. Much of what Cullmann has to say, particularly about the nature of the Johannine "circle" and its relation to other forms of early Christianity represented in the New Testament, is in all probability correct. Certainly it is congenial with the view I outlined at about the same time ("Johannine Christianity: Some Reflections on its Delineation and Character," *New Testament Studies,* 21 (1975), 222-248). My own article was an attempt to assess critically where scholarship now stands, and therefore I can only be pleased to find that Professor Cullmann's work at so many points accords with that assessment. On certain matters where Cullmann sets forth his distinctive position in an effort to give specific historical coloration to the Johannine circle, there is bound to be continued questioning and debate. I refer to the trilateral connection with Samaritanism and the Hellenists of Acts, as well as to the effort to identify the evangelist and define his connection with the historical Jesus. On the latter point there will always be disagreement. Yet it is to Cullmann's credit that he not only takes seriously the Gospel's claim to be related to an eyewitness of Jesus, but, as a good historian, attempts to specify the nature of that relationship, difficult and uncertain as that task may be.

D. Moody Smith

Women, Men, and the Bible. Virginia Ramey Mollenkott. Abingdon. 1977. 142 pp. $3.95. Study Kit (cassette tapes, leader's guide, study book) $24.95.

Mutual submission in Christ—men to women and women to men—is the message of the Bible for the church today. Beginning with this bold affirmation, Dr. Mollenkott shows through careful examination of Scripture, looking especially at the teachings and behaviour of Jesus, that human equality was the intent of the creation of men and women "in the image of God" (Genesis 1:26-28).

This study kit includes tapes for six two-hour group or individual work sessions, a useful leader's guide, and the basic text. The sessions are arranged to give participants maximum opportunity to study the Biblical passages. Discussion questions and self-understanding quizzes help group members get in touch with their own feelings about Biblical interpretation and men/women relationships. Virginia Mollenkott, professor and department chairperson at William Patterson College in New Jersey, is a well-known author in the evangelical tradition. Her strong, warm voice and highly articulate presentations on the tapes make the book come alive for the reader.

First discussing the Christian way of relating, she guides a study of Eph. 5:21-31, Phil. 2:3-8, and I Pet. 3. These passages, which show that the submission of every Christian to every other Christian is the context in which wife to husband submission is set, form the foundations of the mutual submission model.

She contrasts this model with the dominance-submission model of relating espoused in books such as *The Total Woman* by Marabel Morgan and *The Christian Family* by Larry Christenson. The dominance-submission model, she holds, has been adopted by Christians not because it is Biblical but because it is accepted by the culture. Its serious danger for Christians lies in the fact that it encourages the idolatrous worship of the husband instead of the worship of God and teaches women to abdicate responsibility for their own salvation.

Mollenkott then (chapter 3) answers the question, "Is God masculine?" with a firm "no". Illustrating that the Bible describes God with both masculine and feminine images, she asks readers to consider the influences in

society and the church—especially sexist language—that have lead some Christians to the un-Biblical conclusion that God is masculine.

Through her analysis of many of the problematic passages concerning women in the Bible, Mollenkott illustrates how Christians must learn to de-absolutize the Biblical narratives, as is done with passages supporting kingship or slavery, in order to seek the word of God for this day.

In conclusion this book and study kit should have wide appeal to both men and women in the churches. May there be more contributions like this one which take the Bible seriously and hear clearly its call to live as one in Christ (Gal. 3-28).

Martha Montague Wilson

Far too often our thinking has had little reference to the educational task in which those people were involved or even less to the unique and critical role of those institutions in the society. We have been inclined to look at people in higher education, primarily students, as if they were no different from any other convenient collocation of warm bodies, ignoring the learning process in which they are engaged as well as the enormous impact, for good or ill, their institutions make upon all of us.

It might be more helpful for us to think of the church and higher education as two institutions or sets of institutions both of which stand in the same social context and are present within all our communities performing their respective functions.

The Church *proclaims* the Good News that God is victorious over the demonic and dehumanizing forces in our midst and calls us singly and corporately to wholeness and obedience; the Church *teaches* the living tradition, instructing the faithful about the events out of which the Good News grows; the Church offers the service of the people who have heard the proclamation and who respond with love for their neighbor and care for the created order; the Church lives as a *community* marked by self-giving love for one another and for all for whom Christ died, even for the world.

Higher education, through *research* (discovery) and *teaching* (propagation), conserves and transmits knowledge, skills, and values; creates new knowledge, new skills, and new valuing systems fit for a new day; and advocates a humane future out of a range of options it glimpses as possible.

What Can and Ought One to Have to Do with the Other?

First, each has something to GIVE the other:

Higher education can serve the church by helping it keep in touch with what is happening in the world and by providing it with the knowledge, skills, and sometimes even the humane values necessary to its mission lest it become obscurantist, sectarian, and unfaithful to its own calling and, therefore, irrelevant to the world for which Christ died.

The church can serve higher education by reminding it of its pretensions, by calling it to keep the life of the mind in the perspective of the wholeness of human personality, by raising value questions about its life and its activities, by calling it into the service of all those in the society, not just the élite, by helping it (in turn) to stay in touch with what is happening in the world, and by caring for its people.

The two institutions, celebrating as they do the wisdom of Athens and the transcendent perspective and ethical obedience

of Jerusalem respectively, serve each other well when they call each other to be faithful to the best that is resident in their own traditions. Either may be pretentious or obscurantist or élitist or uncaring or inhumane. The involvement of one with the other is good for both and for the society as long as the purpose or mission of each is kept in mind and the integrity of each is respected.

Second, they can become co-authors of responses to human need: The relation of co-authorships can express itself in a variety of ways. For example, the church, when it has identified a community need or problem such as the problem of the aging, can enlist higher education to research the problem and then use the findings of the research in its own ministry to the elderly. Or the church may assist in influencing public opinion in favor of projects, programs or policies through which higher education may more effectively respond to human need. I think immediately of the present need to keep the educational door open to the poor and disadvantaged, the first to go in a time of retrenchment. I remember how the Synod of North Carolina and the community colleges of that state have collaborated to meet the needs of children and families.

The Local Congregation

The implications of the educational and ecclesiastical context we have sketched call local churches to claim ministry in higher education as an integral part of their own ministry in which someone is sent somewhere else to act in their behalf. The people of the congregations are increasingly a part of higher education, and the institutions of higher education are more and more a part of the communities in which every church is set. Conversations about how each institution can serve the other with integrity and about how together they can serve the needs of the community need to be underway. The function of available professional staff should become an enabling one through which people in the congregations are helped to plan and carry out their ministry in relation to higher education. The ministry then is likely to be seen as integral and worth paying for, no longer a fringe concern, a luxury that churches expect distant agencies to provide for them.

The Middle Judicatories

Synods and presbyteries have historically seen their role to be the funding of local campus ministries. Our analysis suggests that there are some crucial dimensions of ministry that cannot be accomplished locally and that need to be emphasized *even* if the funding responsibility diminishes or is transferred.

The judicatories need to provide leadership for ministry in higher education. Local churches need help in thinking through the purpose of ministry in higher education and in devising strategies for engaging in that ministry. They need information that provides a realistic picture of higher education and of the needs of persons involved in its life. They need consultative support as they shape their response.

The leadership role of the judicatories includes identifying neglected areas of ministry in higher education and laying the challenge of that ministry before local churches. I think immediately of ministry in the community college context. Sometimes seed money and often advice and counsel are helpful contributions for the judicatory to make. The judicatory is also in a position to help local churches discover that higher education represents not only an area of mission but also a very helpful resource *for* mission.

Local churches individually and corporately need judicatory leadership if issues that emerge from the state and regional systems of higher education are to be seen and responded to. Advocacy in behalf of higher education that is open to the poor and the disenfranchised; the preservation and strengthening of the historically Black institutions; the fencing of higher education from the heavy interfering hand of the government bureaucrat or the state legislator—these are all concerns that the church needs to address in state, regional and national arenas. Ministry that ignores system-wide issues that heavily influence higher education is likely to be parochial and in some measure irrelevant.

Finally, if the middle judicatories are effectively to provide the services we have been talking about and if the church is to be present in some very important specialized areas such as medical and legal education, then synods, presbyteries, conferences and dioceses must continue to provide some professional staff. In most cases staff will need to think of themselves as enablers of the church's ministry rather than as those who carry out ministry in behalf of the church. Always they have the obligation to bridge the distance that all too often has separated them from the church and to see their work as rooted within the life of the church.

The National Church

Supporting the middle judicatories as they help local churches understand what has been happening and what will happen in higher education and as they develop their ministry in relation to

that changing scene is a very important function of the churches at the church-wide or national level. Good stewardship as well as commitment to the unity of the church argues strongly for offering that support through an ecumenical strategy as nine denominations have been doing through United Ministries in Higher Education.

If higher education is both a field of mission and a potential partner for the churches at every level, then it would seem to me to be very important that the national agencies of the denominations provide a forum in which both the church-related colleges and those involved in ministry in public higher education can deal with common concerns and consider important policy issues as together they try to lead the church in this area of ministry. Brokering the resources of higher education to the several thrusts of the church's mission; alerting the church to issues in higher education to which she should speak out of her understanding of the Gospel; providing the arenas in which the church nationally can gather to share and benefit from the experiences, the problems, and the insights of its several parts—these are functions the national agencies of the churches can helpfully provide.

Higher education lives not only through individual institutions, state systems, and regional agencies. Higher education also has a national dimension in which it is both possible and desirable for the church to press its mission, and which it is difficult for local churches and middle judicatories to address. For example, United Ministries in Higher Education works through the Society for Health and Human Values, an organization of medical educators, theologians and ministers in medical schools, to affect materially the curricula of many schools of medicine and to contribute significantly to the discussion of ethical issues that touch both medical research and medical practice. Again, through the Community College Program of United Ministries in Higher Education it has been possible to research and to share nationally models of ministry in the community college context as well as to initiate moral discourse in the national forums of the community college movement, particularly in the American Association of Junior and Community Colleges. We need to be at work in many other similar areas. The national guilds and organizations are the crossroads of higher education in which issues are aired, policies are developed, and the future begins to emerge. The church that cares about where our society is moving and what is happening to the people in it will be wise to carry its mission into those arenas.

Conclusion

Higher education has always had major social significance. It is the institutionalized process through which the knowledge, the skills and the values of our culture are conserved and passed on from generation to generation. It also, with an eye to the future, helps us imagine and prepare for the tomorrows that stretch before us. As leaders are trained, as citizens are developed, as careers are prepared for, as values are examined and claimed, as the heritage of the past provides the material for the invention of the future, we discover the enormous impact of higher education on all our lives. In a day when higher education is well on the way to being democratized and when we can reasonably speak of a "learning society," it is especially important for the whole church, as it participates in that society, to be engaged with higher education and to carry out its Gospel mandate to increase the love of God and neighbor.

The Sacrament of Particularity: University Ministry through the Local Parish

by Peter James Lee

A professor of *belle lettres* at the University of North Carolina in the 1820's and 1830's influenced religiously a handful of students and faculty members, and under his leadership they founded an Episcopal congregation in Chapel Hill. The Rev. William Mercer Green led them to lay the foundation for a chapel, completed in 1848, surrounded by the university campus, and still in use. The oral history of the congregation recalls that construction took six years because the bricks were made in a kiln in the rector's yard, and every chance he had to sell bricks to the University he stopped work on the chapel and made a little money to augment his university and churchly stipends.

Six years after the Chapel of the Cross was completed, a slave named Cornelia was baptized there. In February, 1977, her granddaughter, Pauli Murray, the first Black woman ordained an Episcopal priest, celebrated her first eucharist in the chapel where her slave grandmother was baptized. She read from a Bible from which her grandmother Cornelia read to her as a child—and the Bible rested on a lectern given in memory of the slaveholder who brought Cornelia to baptism.

In 1938, Pauli Murray was denied admission to the University of North Carolina because of her race. In 1977, she celebrated the eucharist and preached in the midst of the university community that once rejected her.

Ministry within the University of North Carolina must take seriously the particular history that shaped its particular community. The heritage of Southern racism with its ironic countertheme of deep personal ties among Southern whites and Blacks; the long policy of denial of admission to women until their junior year; the classic identity of Chapel Hill as an oasis of liberal culture and of

personal freedom; the sense of *noblesse oblige* inculcated after the Civil War and well into the mid-twentieth century among those few Southerners who could afford an education—all these and more are emblematic of the particularity of one university. The Chapel of the Cross, for better or for worse, has endured in the midst of the University. Its history and the history of the University interact. "University Ministry through the Local Church" is the subject I am invited to address in these pages. By definition, that cannot be done without reference to a particular community since that is what a local parish is: a sacrament of particularity.

People And Their Places

Southern readers will skim through the above introductory lines with conscious or unconscious awareness that understanding of persons is always mediated through their places. The land and the farm, place in community, place in the economy, place in family heritage, religious identity—all help mediate personhood from one to another, from one generation to the next, and, traditionally at least, Southerners have been especially sensitive to the structures of mediation. In 1977, freshmen students at Chapel Hill often continue to respond with identification of their counties of origin when asked, "Where are you from?" Not Henderson, but Vance County. Southern fascination with place is deep and abiding, and analogues to it are beginning to erupt throughout the country. Rekindled appreciation for ethnic heritages and ethnic communities and the popularity of "Roots" and its consequences among Blacks in search of heritage are symptomatic of a renewed regard for the infrastructure of institutions that make up "place."

The recent work of Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus, two prominent members of the liberal religious establishment for more than a decade, is directed towards refocussing public policy on support for what they call "mediating structures"—the neighborhood, the family, the church and the fraternal association.[1]

No longer can the mid-size, nongovernmental structures of place be dismissed as inherently oppressive nor can "parochial" remain a pejorative term.

Ministry in higher education obviously has continuing themes on campuses throughout the nation. But the vivid, concrete particularity of a specific university community requires the parallel particularity of a local parish for effective ministry in that com-

1. Reported in Kevin P. Phillips' column, King Features Syndicate, Feb. 22, 1977.

munity. The "place" in which persons exist is always particular. Ministry needs to regard seriously that particularity, that "place."

Particularity: The Biblical and Sacramental Heritage

A renewed celebration of particularity in communities of faith in universities is a recovery of foundational motifs in the Judeo-Christian heritage. The Bible is radically specific. Moses, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Ruth, Isaiah, Hosea, Amos, Micah: they are real persons in particular historical communities. The eschatological focus is not a generalized fraternity of mankind but the New Jerusalem. The land: its character, its physical riches and shortcomings, its clear lines, its lakes and rivers. The people: their kings and poets, their lusts and losses, their palpable humanity. These weave the particular fabric of Biblical faith.

Popular Protestant piety in the West has sometimes encouraged a non-Biblical, a-historical spirituality. Biblical faith, by contrast, is vitally concerned with history and the earth as they are. The "religious" questions of the human race, from the perspective of classical Biblical faith, are almost always framed as historical challenges. From the crucible of the civil rights struggles of the early 1960's, and continuing through the agony of Viet Nam, a renewed and refined Biblical faith has emerged more strongly in America, recovering the classic historical emphases and questions. Justice, for the person of Biblical faith, can never be isolated as an abstract ideal, but must be realized within particular circumstances.

The scandal of the Incarnation is always abrasive, and for those within Christian communities of faith that scandal must drive the faithful to the encounter with the Christ in the specific circumstances of the world where he promised he would be met.

Churches with strong sacramental traditions have within them the resources to respect the sacramentality of particularity—provided they do not trivialize their sacraments by divorcing them from the ambiguity and tension of their particular communities. But all faith communities, Jewish and Christian, share a heritage respectful of particularity and appreciative of history.

Catholicity and Particularity

The "local parish" is a redundant term. There is no parish except the local parish, insofar as a particular assembly of the faithful can be identified. Christian community identity includes a tension between catholicity and particularity, a tension sadly broken when it is structured into separate polities. A university chaplaincy

separated from the particular community in which it lives and identified more by its ties with similar chaplaincies of the same denomination on other campuses risks abandonment of the particularity essential to ministry in an historical faith community. At the same time, the local church that remains ignorant of or disobedient to its catholicity, to its self-understanding as part of the people of God throughout the world and continuous through history, is likely to fulfill the prophecies of prejudice and myopia so often raised against local congregations.

Christianity's worst moments have been times of abandonment of the tension between catholicity and particularity. Particularity is symbolized by the nature of those to whom the Epistles of Paul were addressed: specific churches in particular towns, specific persons in particular circumstances. The ancient custom in which bishops are identified by the names of their dioceses is a happy symbol of the tension between catholicity and particularity; a bishop is a symbol of catholicity, its continuity and universality, yet he is identified always by his particular see: Canterbury, Rome, Antioch, Raleigh, New York.

The catholicity-particularity tension is a significant context for ministry within universities. Students in universities may be described as persons searching among the universality of human wisdom to claim the particularity of their own identities. The process is dialectical. So is the church, when it embraces the tension of its identity.

Higher education in the United States is dominated by the universalism required by a technological culture. Parker J. Palmer made the point in *The NICM Journal* (Winter, 1977) that "Higher education's product is not teaching and learning but a credential, a credential to practice a trade, a credential to consume."[2] Technology requires standardization. Accreditation procedures are designed to assure standardization for the reliance on credentials. The passivity of current student populations on American campuses is interrupted only by the bizarre manifestations of individuality that appear as quaint relics of the not-much-lamented counter-culture of the early 1970's. The choices for current students are grim: passivity and standardization or radical, anarchic individualism. Most choose the former.

A local parish, an assembly of believers faithful to the catholicity-particularity tension, offers a genuine alternative. It demands

2. Parker J. Palmer, "Pastoral and Political Community: A Ministry to Higher Education," *The NICM Journal,* Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter 1977).

serious attention to what is given in a culture—in the particularity of the student's specific goals and strengths, in the particularity of what is offered to and demanded of him in the specific university discipline in which he lives. But the assembly will not permit the particularity of a university's demand to become a substitute for the catholicity of the church in which the student's value is not dependent on how well he fits the standardization demands of the culture. Particularity is fragile in a modern multi-university, and the faith community offers the strength of its enduring existence as the nourishing context for particular persons.

Nurture, of course, is a function of every assembly of believers. It is a legitimate, protective, and growth-enhancing process. Assemblies—local churches—that live faithfully in the tensions required of them will include nurture among their functions, but will not permit nurture to foster faith that is stultifying, dependent, or oppressive.

The local parish in a university community can be a paradigmatic community by its fidelity to the tension between catholicity and particularity. It can provide a model through which persons can experience life in a community that endures.

Structuring Tension

The key to an effective university ministry through the local parish is the parish's ability and willingness to provide a structure for the maintenance and management of tension. Structuring tension means the concurrent acceptance of the interests of diverse constituencies and management of those interests in such a way that none excludes others. A student group may wish the experience of an informal, experimental liturgy in a parish where normative liturgical patterns are highly traditional. Structuring tension means provision for the experimental liturgy and simultaneous maintenance of the traditional pattern. Negotiations will vary—whether such liturgies are alternated at the same hour, occur at different hours, or are incorporated into a single pattern. The negotiation will mean that those committed to each must encounter those who disagree and take them into account.

The local parish provides a structure for tension because its unifying system is non-ideological. Ministry to a homosexual caucus within the parish, for example, is possible and non-divisive, provided the parish is not required to define precisely whether such a ministry is advocacy of a particular ideology for sexual expression.

In the early 1970's the Chapel of the Cross included persons who were vigorous in their opposition to the Vietnamese War and who participated in local and national protest demonstrations. Active duty military personnel were also present in the congregation. No one quarreled with the Rector's right to speak clearly from the pulpit in opposition to the War, although some took issue openly with the substance of what was said. The Sunday after the cease fire, the intercessions at the eucharist were led by two persons—one, a student who had been active in anti-war demonstrations; the other, an Army major who had led troops in combat in Viet Nam. Among the specific persons prayed for then were two other parishioners—one in Viet Nam, the other in prison for violation of the draft law. Tension was recognized and divisions acknowledged.

What unites the local parish is not its ideology but its faith and liturgy. Its essential structure is inclusive and broad and permits diversity, conflict, and their consequences.

For about forty years, the Chapel of the Cross has experimented with several structures for the management of the tension between ministry to the university and parish ministry. The most frequent pattern has been the employment of a chaplain on the diocesan payroll and responsible, therefore, to the bishop, but whose ministry was based in the Chapel of the Cross. The rationale seemed to be that the chaplaincy needed protection from the narrow interests of the parish. Rarely has the system worked to the satisfaction of all parties. Less frequently, the chaplain was "independent." His office was elsewhere, and he had no altar. Much occurred through the ministry of the independent chaplain that was helpful to the community, but the symbols were awry since the chaplain was divorced from the particularity of the gathered people.

Now, the parish has approved in principle a pattern for university ministry that acknowledges ministry to the university as an essential and abiding element in the life of a university church and part of each person's ministry, clergy and lay. The pattern includes the development of an advisory and review board to set objectives for campus ministry and to evaluate performance. Students will dominate the board. Final authority, delegated normally to the board, rests with the normative ecclesiastical authority of the parish—in the Episcopal Church, that means Rector and Vestry.

Will it "work"? It has a chance because it is the first open acknowledgement in decades of a structure for tension within a

single community of faith. It implicitly acknowledges the need for what Sharon Parks calls "multiple community experiences during college years,"[3] a multiplicity which no single pattern can provide. But a local parish, because of its diversity and continuity, has resources for structuring tension that can offer that multiplicity.

The movement towards the local parish as the primary locus for campus ministry is a major shift in the operative assumptions behind much that has occurred in the name of campus ministry. Michael Novak's description can apply to some assumptions of campus ministry since World War II:

> The central idea of our foggy way of life . . . seems unambiguous enough. It is that life is solitary and brief, and that its aim is self-fulfillment. . . . Sanity, we think, consists in centering upon the only self one has. Surrender self-control, surrender happiness. And so we keep the other out. We then maintain our belief in our unselfishness by laboring for "humanity"—for women, the oppressed, the Third World, or some other needy group. The solitary self needs distant collectivities to witness to its altruism. It has a passionate need to love humankind. It cannot give itself to a spouse or children.[4]

Novak is writing about the family. He could well be speaking of other mediating structures, e.g., the local parish. Campus ministry divorced from the local parish has often stressed the need for self-fulfillment and advocated the "rights" of minorities. Mediating structures require less glamorous, more difficult, and, ultimately, far more fulfilling assumptions among those who live and work in them. Campus ministry exercised through a local church means that young and old will encounter one another—and, perhaps, enrich one another. It means that "issues" will be not only the trends of the campus but the maintenance issues of the congregation (fixing the organ and teaching the children). Distinctions like those between "true" and "false" community will not hold because in the tension between the community as vision and the community as praxis life will be *experienced* and not described abstractly. Structuring tension requires intentionality, in part, but it also requires recognition of the experience of the management of tension too many local churches discount. Most such communities have experience in tension they are unwilling to claim. It is a strength, a gift, and from it, members of the community can claim the diversity openly that often exists in fact but is unacknowledged.

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3. Sharon Parks, "Communities as Ministry," *Ibid.*
4. Michael Novak, "The Family Out of Favor," *Harper's,* April 1976.

The Sacrament of the Budget

The major financial element in the new design for university ministry at the Chapel of the Cross is the acknowledgement that, ultimately, the local parish has financial responsibility for ministry to the university. Judicatories have been the prime funding sources for many campus ministries. Diocesan and synodical budgets are notoriously unreliable for the maintenance of long-term funding. Traditional campus ministries, separated from local, self-supporting parishes, are dependent communities. Can dependent communities ever be healthy communities? The local parish, whatever its size, is responsible for its own life and mission. Mission strategy overseas increasingly recognizes that point. Mission strategy on campus needs a similar recognition.

"We can't afford a chaplain."

That is often the form for justifying the continuation of dependency. It is, therefore, understandable that the finances of dependency often issue in a dependent clericalism. "Chaplain," indeed, has a subtle ring of dependency to it, a suggestion that "campus ministry" requires someone provided by a superior authority. The ministry of the local parish in a university community, by contrast, assumes that ministry and mission are functions of the whole people and that the ordained clergy have no ministry separate from the assembly of believers. When ministry is understood as the enterprise of a particular community, issues of funding become secondary. The community engages in ministry with the available resources. If external funding is provided, it is negotiated by the community's representatives to assist and extend an existing ministry, not to establish an isolated chaplaincy. Specialized clergy are not essential to an assembly of believers that accepts ministry as the vocation of all. Budgets measure priorities. If the local parish has been successful in structuring tension into its life, the legitimate priorities for campus ministry will be examined by the community along with its priorities for self-preservation and other mission tasks.

Ministry in higher education through the local parish is an increasing reality because of the decline in financial support for independent campus ministries. What I have tried to suggest is that this development may not be the demise of freshness in campus ministry, but an occasion of beginning when a faithful community, gathered in a particular setting, intentionally accepts its ministry to the university in which it lives. In the Judeo-Christian heritage, beginnings are openings to the Spirit. Deliberate design of various

models and acknowledgement of the diversity inherent in particular faith communities—the local parishes—may offer to the university and its people mediating structures of vitality and promise. It is a beginning.

Contributors

Robert L. Johnson, solicitor and compiler of this issue, is Southern Regional Director for the National Institute for Campus Ministries with office in the Divinity School at Duke. He was United Methodist Chaplain at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill for eighteen years.

Nancy Rosebaugh is Administrative Associate in the Southern office of the National Institute for Campus Ministries and a former student at Duke Divinity School.

Bernard LaFayette is Central Regional Director for the National Institute for Campus Ministries with offices at Washington University in St. Louis. He was a founder of S.N.C.C. and worked with Dr. Martin L. King, Jr. in organizing the Selma campaign and serving as coordinator of the Poor People's Campaign.

J. R. McSpadden has been Presbyterian, U.S., Campus Minister at Winthrop College in Rock Hill, S. C., since 1973. He was a member of the Thomas Merton seminar at Pendle Hill last summer and is presently completing a Th.M. degree at Princeton Theological Seminary.

Clyde O. Robinson serves as Chairperson for the Southeastern team, United Ministries in Higher Education, working out of Charlotte. He is an ordained elder in the Presbyterian Church, U.S., and was formerly Presbyterian Chaplain at Duke.

Peter James Lee is Rector of the Episcopal Chapel of the Cross in Chapel Hill. Before coming to Chapel Hill, he was on the staff at St. John's Episcopal Church, Lafayette Square, Washington, D. C.

Book Reviews

Introduction to the Old Testament. J. Alberto Soggin. Westminster. 1976. 510 pp. $16.50.

This is a translation of the highly successful Italian *Introduzione* of 1967. One of the strengths of Soggin's *Introduction* is that, while he does not neglect German scholarship (no one can!), he is very much aware of the contributions of scholars from other countries and traditions. As is to be expected, Italian scholarship (Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant) is well represented. One is reminded of the half-joking, half-serious remark of an American scholar that he is now studying Italian—in view of the recent epoch-making discovery of over 15,000 cuneiform tablets at Ebla-Tell Mardikh by an Italian archeological team.

What are the other strengths of this *Introduction?* Prof. Soggin is a scholar of international repute, and his studies have always been marked by balanced judgment. The same quality attaches to his exposition of the several problems surrounding the various books of the Old Testament. To this he adds clarity of thought and felicitous expression. The work reads well (e.g., the history of Pentateuchal criticism); it is not just a computer machine of factual data. Moreover Soggin gives equal attention to the so-called deutero-canonical books, or Apocrypha, which have taken on ever-increasing importance since the Dead Sea Scroll discoveries at Qumran. Finally, there are two valuable appendices: one deals with the Palestinian inscriptions discovered during the past hundred years; the other, with the papyri (Elephantine, Samaria) that bear upon the post-exilic period.

When one considers the great extent of excellent information provided here, it seems ungracious to single out failings. Suffice it to say that the evaluation of the wisdom movement, and the treatment of individual wisdom books (esp. Ecclesiastes, Ben Sira, and Wisdom of Solomon), are not adequate. There still remains a basic prejudice against Israelite wisdom, which puts it in opposition to Yahwism, as reason is to faith. This is a misapprehension. However Soggin's book deserves commendation and welcome; everyone who is interested in the Bible will learn from it.

Roland E. Murphy

The Triumph of Faith in Habakkuk. Donald E. Gowan. John Knox Press. 1976. 94 pp. $5.95.

Resources for interpreting the difficult text and ground-breaking insights of the prophet Habakkuk are comparatively rare; hence any addition to the corpus should arouse the interest of scholar, preacher, and layperson. Gowan, Associate Professor of Old Testament at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, has produced a work primarily for the latter two categories of readers, and I would recommend it as a worthwhile investment for the church library. At the same time, scholars may read it with interest and with admiration for the ease and clarity with which the methodologies and results of Biblical criticism are explained.

The prophet's oracles are discussed according to literary unit-division, most broadly, 1:2-2:4; 2:5-20; 3:1-19. With respect to these and smaller

units the question of orderly progression of thought is helpfully discussed: regardless of whether the sequence resulted from author or editors, just why this particular order and how does it contribute to the overall progression of thought?

In addition to discussing what the oracles might have meant in their original setting (the advance of the Babylonian army near the beginning of the 6th century, B.C.), the author tries to demonstrate the importance of the prophet's thought for the Church in the present. Regardless of whether one agrees with him at all points in this regard, one may applaud his attempt to deal with exegesis as a theological task.

The central problem of the book (Habakkuk's and Gowan's) is theodicy: in Harry Emerson Fosdick's imaginative phrase, "How to believe in a good God in a world like this?" Hence, much discussion centers around the crucial but difficult 2:4, "The righteous shall live by his faith" (so RSV; footnote alternative: "faithfulness"). In Gowan's view, this means that God declares "to be right" the one who, in moments when God's justice and mercy are not evident, nonetheless continues to act faithfully, remembering a wider span of God's activity in the past and anticipating a future clarification. Rather than a rational explanation for the evil in the world, we are offered encouragement to continue as a faithful member of the Community in spite of the poverty of "answers" in the present.

Without detracting from the strengths of the book, two larger problems may be noted. (1) A greater unity of thought sometimes seems attributed to the Bible (and especially to the Old Testament) than may actually be the case. For example, Habakkuk is bracketed with Job and Ecclesiastes, without reminding the reader that they are far more radical in their questioning and "solutions" than he. Indeed, it has been argued that Job is a renunciation of all attempts at theodicy (Terrien)! (2) Christian reflection on theodicy is presented in subjectively evaluative terms: the solution is "far more clear" in the cross of Christ, although it is not shown precisely how this is so! It needs to be added that the New Testament (and some earlier apocalyptic thought) "solved" the problem of theodicy, in part, by reverting to pre-Yahwistic demonology, although in a severely modified and limited form. The result is that the severity with which the problem is perceived and the faith/faithfulness required in the "solution" are pale in comparison with the position of Habakkuk.

Lloyd R. Bailey

The Old Testament as the Book of Christ: An Appraisal of Bonhoeffer's Interpretation. Martin Kuske. Philadelphia. Westminster. 1976. $12.95.

The very title of this 1967 Rostock University dissertation states the bold claim that the noble Christian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, has made over the Old Testament. Kuske's work is entirely analytical, using all the published writings of Bonhoeffer, and further studies about his thought. While Kuske differs with some interpreters, the average reader has reason to believe that he gives an accurate presentation of Bonhoeffer's views. Only a few times does he have recourse to phrases such as, what Bonhoeffer "could have been thinking" about (p. 50).

But what about the substance of the book? Is Bonhoeffer's Christian appropriation of the Old Testament viable? The reviewer confesses to a mixed reaction in his past understanding of Bonhoeffer's position. The reading of *The Prayerbook of the Bible* a few years ago was a disillusionment; the approach to the Psalms did not allow these Old Testament prayers to speak on their own (inspired) level. On the other hand, there were always those striking words of Bonhoeffer: "In my opinion it is not Christian to want to take our thoughts



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CONTENTS

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New Trends in Theology

by José Míguez Bonino*

There is widespread talk about the crisis in present-day theological thinking. Let me begin with two incidents which symbolize the crisis.

Christianity and Crisis published in 1975 a series of articles under the title, "What Ever Happened to Theology?" As one of the editors explained to me, the idea for the title emerged in a conversation. New and exciting things were happening in other areas of human knowledge and research. But theology, which had once hit the front pages and preempted space in the media, had become silent. Thus, half mournfully, half cynically, the question was asked: "What ever happened to theology?" The question and the mood behind it came to me as a surprise. In my world (Latin America) theology was for the first time in history becoming an exciting thing. Theological articles, books, ideas aroused enthusiasm and opposition. A number of things, good and bad, could be said there about this theological production, but nobody would ever ask the question: "What ever happened to theology?"

We were preparing a Faith and Order Report on the unity of the Church for Nairobi at the Faith and Order Commission meeting in Accra (Ghana) in 1974. A draft came to the plenary. It had come out of a deeply moving and realistic discussion of unity and conflict in the Church (in particular relation to the situation in North Ireland). And the draft had the marks of the agony and passion of a search for that unity which God promises amidst the conflicts in which the Church is immersed. The draft received a violent criticism from the theological 'Fathers' of the Commission—with the final verdict of one of the old hands: "It doesn't measure up to the standards of a Faith and Order document." The incident has come back to my mind several times: What 'standards'? Who has defined the standards? Would a II Corinthians, or a I Timothy

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*The Reverend Dr. José Míguez Bonino is Dean of Postgraduate Studies at the Protestant Theological Seminary in Buenos Aires and a President of the World Council of Churches. His recent books in English include *Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation* (Fortress) and *Christians and Marxists* (Eerdmans). This lecture, which Dr. Bonino graciously consented to have published in the *Review*, was delivered at Iliff School of Theology on January 14, 1977 and at Duke Divinity School on March 14, 1977.

or the Letters of Ignatius 'measure up to standards'? Or perhaps they had nothing to say about the unity of the Church. Or perhaps they were not 'theological documents.'

Or perhaps our understanding of what is happening in theology should be both deeper and less pessimistic than is suggested by many critics today. I trust that you will not think that what I am going to say is the result of arrogance. But I am convinced that theology is at the threshold of a new and significant stage in its history. This means, of course, also that it is at the end of a stage. I want to suggest some of the reasons for this critical and promising situation as I see them.

I. A Longer View of the Theological Enterprise

In the first place, I think we need a longer and more encompassing view of the theological enterprise. I suspect that the discussion about 'what happened to theology' or the reference to the respectable 'standards' envisages *a theology* that has so completely dominated the field and dictated the criteria for the last two hundred years that we have come to believe that this is theology as such: *Theologie überhaupt!* In fact, it is *that* theology which emerged in Western Christendom, generally speaking, since the end of the great polemical theology of the Post-Reformation times. I shall refer to it as "modern theology."

1) The matrix of modern theology (again, with exceptions) has been the *academic* world—Tübingen, Erlangen, Paris, Oxford or the large seminaries and theological schools in this country—Yale, Harvard, Union, etc. Theology was created in the study, in the library, in the classroom, in the academic circle, at the meetings of theological societies, in the articles of the learned journals. This was a noble, profound and significant effort. Let me hasten to say that I have a deep respect and admiration for this great theological tradition. I have learned from it most of what I know (and I could have learned much more if I had been more diligent and intelligent!). And I don't want to renounce what I learned about persistent effort, concentration, disciplined intellectual honesty and painstaking research. But at the same time, there is a certain price that had to be paid.

This theology's encounter with human reality was necessarily second-hand, *mediated* basically through philosophical construction and through the philosophical presuppositions of historical sciences. It was the response to the interpretations of the world, history and human existence which at a certain time and in a certain place

seemed to constitute the most significant challenge—idealism, existentialism, process philosophy, logical positivism. In the nature of the case, the theologian was usually removed from a direct relation to the 'raw material' of human existence. His reflection was a *theoretical* effort which had little opportunity to draw from the direct experience of active participation or to test out its reflection in active specific commitments.

Such a situation obtained not only in relation to human life in general but even in relation to the Church. The theological faculty gained a certain autonomy which made it possible to free itself from the impositions of ecclesiastical politics. But at the same time it lost much of its explicit and immediate reference—faith as it is actually experienced, lived, acted out in the concrete life of the Christian communities. Certainly, this situation was much more pronounced in Europe than it was in America. But since American theology has depended so much on Europe, the problem carried over! American professors of theology went to church more frequently than their European colleagues—some were even involved in ecclesiastical activity. But Monday morning at the seminary, they taught 'respectable' academic theology!

This 'mediated' character was both demanded and reinforced by another unavoidable characteristic of modern academic theology: its *cumulative* character. The theologian enters a science which belongs to an academic community which slowly and painstakingly gathers the results of its research and reflection and creates a 'body of knowledge' which is presupposed in any individual work. This cumulative character of modern science requires at least two things. First, it needs an academic infrastructure: library, a team of people, research tools and assistants—an infrastructure which escalates continuously and can only be created in an academic center within a relatively developed and affluent economy. The second consequence of this cumulative nature of modern academic theology is specialization. No one can master the totality, so a branching-out is necessary. Thus 'theology' specializes in Biblical, historical, systematic, practical sciences—each one of which becomes more and more autonomous.

2) I think we hardly need to say that theology has not always been that way. These are neither the only patterns of theological reflection nor the only conditions of production of theology that the Church has known in its history.

Gustavo Gutierrez makes a distinction in his book, *A Theology of Liberation* (pp. 4ff.), between 'theology as wisdom' and 'theology

as rational knowledge.' This reminds us of the fact that in the early centuries theology was closely related to the 'development of spiritual life.' It consisted of meditation on Scripture meant to help the believer to deepen his apprehension of God's mystery. It was also a discussion of the practical problems that Christians met in their daily life (Tertullian's *De Spectaculis*, Augustine's *De Mendacio*, etc.). Much of Eastern theology has continued in that tradition for which holiness and learning were correlate terms. In the West, the classic form of *De sacra pagina* which dominated theological reflection until the XIIth century was meant to be a 'running' commentary on the Scripture in which the tradition was placed at the service of spiritual edification.

Needless to say, the theologian was not an 'academic,' but usually a pastor (recall the long tradition of 'episcopal theology' from Ignatius onwards) or a monk—a master of the spiritual life. As we know, this tradition corresponds also to the understanding of theological knowledge, for instance, in some oriental religions.

My point here is not to reject academic theology but to relativize it by relating it to other terms of reference and to a longer and richer history. Theology *need not be* this academic theology. The form and conditions of theological production need not necessarily be those of the specialized, cumulative, infrastructure-dependent modern theology. What I think is necessary is to break the monopoly and most of all the self-sufficiency of the academic pattern.

3) This is what is actually happening in several places in the Third World and in underprivileged groups everywhere: in the areas of the world, the classes of society, the races that Western society marginalized, instrumentalized and de-humanized in the process of its expansion. These people have begun to emerge from their captivity, rejecting the conditions, the structures and the ethos under which they were suppressed, and striving to create a new age for themselves and—unavoidably—also for their masters. Among them, not a few live this struggle and hope in the faith of Jesus Christ. They—blacks, Latin Americans, Africans, women—are forced to repossess their faith and tradition (the Scriptures, the creeds, etc.) in a new way, cleansing them from their servitude to the system and sensing the liberating and dynamizing motifs which have often been suppressed or distorted. Thus, a theology is being born.

Such theology emerges at different levels and in different forms. It is sometimes only a shout, a prayer or a hymn. It is a new solidarity which cuts across inherited patterns—institutional, liturgical,

devotional—expressing itself in new functions and gifts which are discovered or re-discovered. But it is also a systematic articulation which avails itself of the tools of sociopolitical analysis and critique and offers a coherent theory to the concrete commitment within the struggle.

Over against traditional academic theology, this theology has a 'first hand' contact with reality: its raw material is the living experience of this struggle. It certainly operates with theoretical categories in order to interpret this experience. But it is directly responsible, accountable, to the actual conditions of the struggle. One could call it a 'militant' in contrast to an 'academic' form of theologizing—in that sense much closer to Patristic or Reformation theology.

Two examples immediately come to my mind. The first is the emergence of 'black theology' in this country. Black theology is now present within 'the academy.' It has been responsibly elaborated by competent professional theologians. But it roots back in a concrete experience and a specific struggle. The singing, the marches, the sit-ins, the martyrs are the first form of that theology. It does not rest on a cumulative fund of research. It is not conceived as a solution to an intellectual problem. In a second moment it lays hands on such resources—but in a totally different relationship.

The second example comes from my continent. During the last ten years, Latin American Catholic bishops (and whole episcopal conferences), as well as some non-Catholics, have discovered a new exercise of their pastoral responsibility in the shepherding of human life: the protection of elemental human rights in the face of the repression unleashed by several governments under the ideology of 'national security.' They did not invent this function; they did not deduce it from some theological principle. It was forced upon them by the piles of letters coming every day, by the people queuing up at the door of the episcopal residence to present their case or to plead for a relative, by the anguished priests from shanty towns and student homes, on the verge of nervous breakdown under the weight of what they saw day after day—and even more, night after night—among their people. They began by timid and humble pleading before the authorities for this and that special case. And as events moved onwards, they had to raise their voice. They had to try to understand why their requests went unheard or unattended.

Of course, this 'subordinate' function which took more and more of their time and energy revealed itself as a true 'episcopal' function in the more profound and sacramental sense of the word. In a landscape of cruelty and death, of untold suffering, their modest work was "God's *episcope*," God's visitation and vigilance over human life. For some it has become a true imitation of the pastor who lays down his life for the flock.

This episcopal function, in turn, is demanding a theological explanation and undergirding. When they are attacked for stepping out of their 'spiritual' function, when they have to show the evangelical foundations of their protest, when they have to find the words to speak to the people or to the authorities, they begin to articulate a theology—a Christology, a doctrine of man and creation, a doctrine of the cross . . . (Comblin's articulation).

We are not speaking of a 'functional' theology, of a theological 'stop-gap' that we have to use for 'circumstantial' reasons until we can go back to normal and dedicate ourselves to 'true theology.' This is *theology*, just as the Book of Revelation, or John of Damascus' Letters, or Luther's "Appeal to the Christian Nobility." It is not functional over against systematic, or pastoral over against academic, or practical over against dogmatic theology. It has its own internal coherence, objectivity, rigor and excellence in relation to the Gospel and to the Church—just as any systematic treatise of a German *Herr Professor*.

II. The New Insights Into the Nature of Thinking and Language.

A second element for an understanding of our present theological situation is, I think, a recognition of the new insights on the nature of human thinking and language which have emerged during the last hundred years and which we can no longer ignore in theology.

1) From the time of the Greek Fathers, theology has operated on *idealistic* presuppositions which have assumed the existence of an autonomous realm of ideas which has a consistency, coherence and verifiability of its own. (I am not using 'idealism,' therefore, in a strict philosophical sense—although it has also been dominant in that sense—but as a designation of the autonomous character ascribed to human thought.) Thus, the history of dogma, or of doctrine, is usually a description of the development of ideas, their opposition, their interplay, mutual influences. Indeed, the history of doctrine has usually been taught even apart from the history of

the Church, as if doctrine were an autonomous realm which had its own reality and dynamics in itself.

Idealism meant also the belief that conceptual and verbal formulations are self-authenticating: I say what I want to say and any honest and intelligent person will understand what I am saying. Theological and ecclesiastical pronouncements, therefore, mean what they say. In evaluating them one has simply to pay attention to their conceptual content.

2) These idealistic presuppositions are now shattered, because during the last hundred years, particularly since Marx and Freud, we have evolved cultural instruments for establishing more objectively the actual nature and significance of what we do as collective entities—e.g., as churches—within the framework and the dynamics of society as a whole.

We can now know with a higher degree of precision *what happens* with the words we use, the alliances into which we enter, the ways in which we use our influence and resources. Specifically, in the area of language, we know that the words and expressions we use are not only—and not mainly—received in the context of our own discourse but in the framework of a code prevalent in society, in which they evoke certain connotations. Words, to say it more precisely, have a *performative* function which does not necessarily coincide with their conceptual contents or with our intention. More simply, what we say functions differently depending on whom we address and in what circumstances. A word is as ambivalent as a pat on the shoulder—sympathy, paternalism, congratulation, complicity!

What do we do theologically with this knowledge? Can we go on as before, checking concepts against concepts, taking refuge in our intention? Or shall we face the responsibility for the concrete historical performative significance of our theological discourse? Shall we go on saying that *love, reconciliation, freedom* are 'true no matter' who speaks these words to whom, when, and what for?

Moreover, we should by now be aware of the reality of ideology and its role in society. And this knowledge should affect our theological enterprise in several respects.

We know that ideas are not born from ideas in some sort of 'virginal conception,' but that they are begotten in the womb of social reality. If our churches are part and parcel of certain groups and sectors of society, the sociology of knowledge will tell us that our thinking will reflect—however modified, corrected or slanted—the values, the ethos, the collective representations of life and the

world of that sector. In other words, all thinking is ideological thinking because no one can think outside time and space—i.e., outside a specific social formation with all that it implies. The recognition of this fact has led to an exposure of the 'hidden ideological presuppositions' of much that passes for objective, purely analytical academic 'knowledge.' Theology cannot escape this examination.

Ideology has a masking function which is hidden even—perhaps precisely—from the group that uses it. To what extent are our Biblical exegesis and hermeneutics, our theological articulations caught in this predicament? (During the last few years, for example, a number of theologians—Metz, Moltmann, Duquoc among others —have called attention to the unconscious 'depoliticization' that the trial and death of Jesus has undergone at the hands of Biblical scholarship. Dorothe Sölle has beautifully shown the acute ideologization of the Biblical concept of obedience in theological thought! Juan L. Segundo has analyzed the ideological-political motifs at work in Western interpretations of the doctrine of the Trinity!)

An ideology is always an over-simplification of reality, a caricature. But it is also an instrument which a group fashions in order to mobilize itself in a united way for carrying out a common project. In that sense, theology cannot avoid the question about whom shall it serve—since it cannot be neutral. This does not mean that theology has to become an ideology, or place itself at the service of an ideology. But it does mean that it must be aware of the dynamics of ideological thinking and ideological conflict—a dynamics in which it becomes inevitably involved.

3) All of this requires a new level in theological reflection, for which we are neither accustomed nor prepared: a level, at which we do not stop at the analysis of 'pure thought' but push towards the conditions of the *production of* that thought and the historical *operation of it*. Who does theology, for whom, where, in what circumstances? Theologians cannot anymore avoid these questions.

This task requires a new set of instruments which do not belong to the traditional baggage of the theologian: the social and behavioural sciences which make possible an analysis of the dynamics of a given situation. A new way of theologizing is thus born which consciously sets itself within temporal-social conditions and aims at a *performative* effect that will truly represent the interpretation of the Gospel in that *context*.

To return again to an example already mentioned: the recent

documents of the Roman Catholic episcopal conferences of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay begin by an analysis of the national situation—living conditions, people's participation in the life of the country, ideological presuppositions of the national policy, procedures that are used in the economic, political and police areas. This analysis focuses the themes that must be analyzed theologically: for instance, the relation of State and Nation, the concept of development and the foundation for human rights in the Brazilian document. Again, traditional theological concepts have to be related to this situation: for instance, the traditional Christian notions of universal sin and universal grace are brought in by the Brazilian document in order to break the Manichean distinction between 'patriot' and 'subversive' on the basis of which the denial of human rights to the latter is 'justified.' What is pursued here is not a 'balanced' and exhaustive deployment of the totality of doctrine (is that possible anyway?) but a concrete exploration of the doctrinal resources of the Christian faith for the fulfillment of a Christian prophetic and priestly function in a particular time and place.

III. The Historical Predicament of the Western World

Finally, I think that an understanding of the present theological situation faces us with a very basic and comprehensive question: the historical predicament of the Western world (in fact, it may be more—but we confine ourselves to our immediate reference). The subject far exceeds both the time and my ability. We run the risks of all kinds of generalizations, unfounded judgments or self-dictated prophecies. But even so, I think we cannot avoid at least taking cognizance of this question.

1) I trust that you will not be scandalized if I say that there is not—and there has never been—a Christianity but rather Christiani*ties*. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Christianity is the process of the creation, crises and transformations of Christiani*ties* in the course of human history.

I am not denying the continuity of the faith or the Church. But I am saying that this continuity cannot be seen in any simple and naive way, but in the ambiguities and conflicts of history. What we can see in history is a Byzantine Christianity, a Western Christianity, a Palestinian Christianity, a North African Christianity, etc.

2) The last of such Christianities is what we call 'Western bourgeois, confessional Christianity' as it emerged—both in the

Roman Catholic and in the other Western churches—from the crisis of the XVI century and as it took shape in the XVII and XVIII centuries in continental Europe, Great Britain and the USA. Sometimes we are so hypnotized by the differences and conflicts of the several confessional families that we do not see that sociologically, functionally, ideologically, they belong together as one Christianity, i.e., as a Christianity related to the emergence of the modern, bourgeois, capitalist world.

This 'Christianity' has developed certain interpretations of the Christian faith in which basic human values found recognition, expression and empowerment. It created the conditions for intellectual pursuit which permitted the flourishing of the academic theology which we have already mentioned. It explored the realm of personal subjectivity, thus opening a new territory for the projection of the Gospel message: the understanding of the experience of a personal appropriation of the Gospel—faith as existential commitment. It established the theological basis of the infinite worth of the human person—a deepening of the implications of the doctrine of creation, providence, universal grace for the affirmation of human freedom and creativity. It discovered interpersonal relations as constitutive of our humanity—and therefore the meaning of fellowship (koinonia), thus enriching ecclesiology and overcoming a purely juridical conception so dominant in late scholastic theology.

3) But the crisis of the modern, bourgeois, capitalist world becomes clearer and clearer for anyone who musters the courage to open his eyes: A culture that fails to provide meaning for the life of persons and a sense of direction for human societies; a social organization that is not able to develop structures in which the major conflicts (social groups, developed and underdeveloped countries) can be dealt with creatively; a form of production that threatens to destroy the very basis of human subsistence while it fails at the same time to provide for the maintenance of the larger portion of mankind; a culture which does not succeed in challenging creativity in the solution of its own problems—as the apocalyptic or cynic mood of Western *intelligentsia* today attests—all these things together point to a failure both of nerve and of structural and systemic ability to face the challenge of contemporary history.

I think we need to look with appreciation and gratitude to this great creation of a sector of humanity, but also to recognize without bitterness that it has come to the end of its useful course. And the

end of the Western bourgeois, capitalist world means also necessarily the end of the form of Christianity and the theology that had accompanied, sustained—at times corrected—expressed, assisted this historical formation.

4) But this is not the end. If I see right, this is at the same time a moment of hope and *alumbramiento*. There is the possibility of a new world. It is my conviction—as I said before—that this new world is being born in the poor of the world and in the world of the poor, among the oppressed and marginalized sector of our humanity. I have already referred to this, so I don't need to elaborate. But I want to make three brief comments insofar as this refers to theology.

I am far from suggesting that the poor and oppressed are subjectively better, or more innocent, or purer in their motivations. But I would claim that there is what Assmann has called 'an epistemological privilege of the poor,' the possibility of seeing and understanding what the rich and powerful cannot see and understand. It is not the perfection of the sight, it is the *place where they stand* that makes the differences.

Power and wealth have a distorting effect—they freeze our view of reality. The standpoint of the poor, on the other hand, under the pricking of suffering and the attraction of hope, allows them to intuit the dawn of another reality. Because the poor suffer the weight of alienation, they can conceive a project of hope and provide the dynamism for a new organization of human life *for all*. This is certainly not automatic, but, trusting in God's faithfulness, we can venture to see the birth of a new world, and of a Christianity that will encourage, sustain, correct and express the hopes, the efforts and the pains of the birth of this new world. Theology will have to find the processes, the forms of expression for this new Christianity.

The language which I have used—particularly under the pressure of time—may have the sound of an utopian affirmation of a total, sudden and spectacular transformation. History does not move that way but in a painful and long dialectics of small and large changes, progress and regress. We can see the magnitude of the boulversement in retrospect. But we can only undertake today the small and minimal tasks that are within our possibilities. (Let no one think, therefore, that I am proclaiming the 'theology of liberation' as it has appeared in Latin America and elsewhere, as *the* theology of the new world, or the forerunner of a new Christianity. It is a simple, initial and ambivalent response to a dim

perception of a new task and a new responsibility. It is destined to die—may God grant that its life and death be fruitful!)

Sometimes this theology is perceived from Europe or the USA as strange and threatening. May I just remind us that this has always been so whenever a fundamental change begins to occur. If this theology is subversive, it is not so in the sense of being nihilistic or destructive, but perhaps in the etymological sense of being a sub-version: a version from below, a view of reality, an experience of faith, an appropriation of the Gospel from below, from another standpoint.

Such a new theology is not justified in itself. It stands under the judgment of the Word of God and it has to respond to the concrete demands of history. It has to prove that it is an interpretation of the Gospel. And it has to validate itself by its ability to serve the needs of all mankind. But certainly it does not have to justify itself before the theological standards of the academic theology of bourgeois Christianity!

The polemic and intransigent tone of some of these comments should not create undue concern. They are demanded by the brevity of our time. A more systematic analysis would require qualifications and nuances. There are scarcely such 'clean breaks' in history. The old and the new condition, interpenetrate and stimulate each other. But I think the basic point should be clear. Theologies are not born of theologies. Or rather, they are not synthesized *in vitro*. They are begotten in the intercourse of human life, thought, struggle—as these take place under the grip of faith and under the power of the Spirit. A new theology is born—or rather may be born—because and to the extent that a new Christianity is born in the struggle for a new human society for the whole of mankind.

Christology or Male-olatry?

by Madelon (Micki) Nunn
M.Div., May 1977

Recently the Vatican issued a Declaration[1] designed, no doubt, to dash the hopes of a growing number of Catholic women in seminaries who feel called to seek ordination to the priesthood. Jesus Christ was a "man," the statemen said; and the priest, representative of Christ, must bear a "natural resemblance" to Christ: the priest must be a "man." In this employment "man" is clearly not meant in any "generic" sense; the conclusion identifies "man" as *"male"—anēr* rather than *anthropos.* "Since" Jesus Christ was a male and chose male apostles, all priests for all time must, "therefore," be male.

There are a lot of issues floating around in this "negative solution" (as the Vatican termed it) to the question of the ordination of women. Even though the statement did not say anything new, it hit a lot of people, women and men, Catholics and Protestants alike, with a strong force. I suppose that in the wake of the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the US in Minneapolis hopes for new dialogue among Catholics on this issue were running high. But the time was not right and now I feel the necessity to examine some of the questions that have come to me as a result of the Vatican Declaration.

God became a human being, was incarnated, took on flesh, in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. This Jesus was a male; he had a penis and he did not have a vagina. Is this fact of Jesus' maleness an essential part of the Incarnation? (By "essence" I here mean "the property necessary to the nature of a thing"—Webster). The Vatican seems to be answering this question with a solid Yes. My first response to this answer was one of rage and disgust. But as I have been feeling and thinking about this issue, I am coming more

1. *The Ordination of Women: Declaration of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith* (Rome: October 15, 1976). The Declaration concludes: "In an audience granted to the Prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith October 15, 1976, the Supreme Pontiff Paul VI, Pope by divine providence, ratified and confirmed this declaration and ordered its promulgation." Thus, while the Declaration does not constitute an *ex cathedra* papal pronouncement, it is clear that the Declaration was prepared in consultation with the regnant Pope and conveys his full endorsement.

and more into agreement with the "yes" answer to this question, but for no doubt totally different reasons than those of the Vatican.

Being incarnate means being invested with bodily form (Webster again). God took on the body of a specific human being. Let's face it—if God was to be embodied there were only two choices: a male body or a female body. God chose a male body; and now the Vatican has restated strongly what has been said before, namely that the *maleness* of that body is very important. I let my mind do some travelling.

Jesus Christ, God incarnate, was in a male body. Jesus Christ redeemed all that he assumed, the Church Fathers told us. I am a female body. Was my femaleness assumed? Am I as a female body redeemed? In my head trip I began having grave doubts about my salvation. Maybe Mother Anne of the Shakers was right after all. A Messiah in a female body was needed to complete the work of redemption. Has she come yet? Did we miss her in the night? Did we send her to sweat boxes in the clothing factories? Did we see her burn at the stake somewhere in Europe or New England? Did she die in the pangs of childbirth in a slave cabin somewhere in the South? Or possibly she was raped as part of the spoils of victory during the march of the conquerors following any and every war in history.

Regardless of where my feelings might lead me, we as Christians confess that Jesus was in fact the Messiah. The Messiah was a male and not a female, and I as a Christian acknowledge this fact. I have at times wondered about God's choice; of course, such wonderings are fantasy but they are nonetheless interesting. For instance, if in the same time and place the Messiah came embodied in a female person, would anyone have noticed her? Most probably not—precisely because many of her activities would have been those culturally assigned to her as a woman. No one would notice anything unusual about a woman as a servant; a woman refusing to accept a position of authority, either military or as a political queen; a woman weeping over a city; a woman bending down to wash a friend's feet; a woman making the ultimate sacrifice for those she loved. *No one would have noticed.*

And so I come to the first point where I have to agree with the Vatican. Yes! The maleness of Jesus is of essential importance for the Incarnation. In order to bring a new word to the world the Messiah had to be a male. Servanthood was indigenous to the role of women in that culture; but a man speaking of being a servant in a radical way? *That* was new! A man refusing to accept

kingly authority and preferring instead to wash the dusty feet of his friends or to hold children in his lap—that was new. To the extent that only a man (male) could make this radical agapē message clear in a male dominated, patriarchal society—yes, the maleness of Jesus is essential for our understanding of the Incarnation.

Now back to the question of my salvation. I was questioning whether my female body is redeemed if we agree completely with the Vatican's interpretation about the importance of Jesus' maleness. Without question our bodies and the presence or absence of a vagina or penis determine in large part how we relate to the world as separate from our body and as part of our body. My view of reality is partially formed not only by my unique body but also by my female body. I have a space inside of me that waits for the possibility of holding and forming new life, the possibility of birthing, or creating. I am not able to forget these possibilities, for each month my entire system undergoes a massive hormonal shift and I bleed the blood of creative possibilities. The awareness of this interior possibility that is so much a part of my being puts me in touch with the God who is Creator, the one who birthed the universe and the fullness thereof. Certainly this awareness is not the only way I experience God. Nor am I trying to say with Thomas Aquinas and others that childbirth is my avenue to redemption as a woman. I am simply trying to say that in learning to be my female body I come in very close touch with the Creator God, Source of all Life.

I am all for a doctrine of Incarnation that recognizes the importance of bodiliness. It seems an incredible contradiction in terms that the tradition could so easily ignore "bodiliness" even in a doctrine of "Incarnation": *embodiment*. Nevertheless any small amount of study shows that this contradiction has been with us for lo these many years. And if the Vatican's recent Declaration can help us to recognize that Jesus had a body (albeit a male body) and the implications of his bodiliness, then I am glad the Vatican called our attention to this point.

But I still have not solved the question of my salvation. My mention of the tradition has sent me back to look at the early Christological discussions, especially the Council of Chalcedon. The task of this Council was to determine the relation of the human to the divine and of the divine to the human in the person of Jesus Christ. My question as I searched the proposals of Chalcedon was: Did *the Fathers* fight so hard with the various "heretics" to preserve

the conception of the *humanity* of Jesus Christ *or* did they fight to preserve the conception of the *male humanity* of Jesus Christ? Nowhere in the formulations do I find a mention of the importance of the maleness of Jesus Christ. The Fathers insisted on the full humanity of Jesus Christ, that he had a real body and a rational will, and that he "developed in time" just as all humans do. For whatever reasons (the work of the Holy Spirit, their Platonic essentialist views, or the fact that they were all males) the Fathers avoided defining the Person of Christ according to his divine and male attributes, but insisted on the divine and *human.*

It is clear, then, that *the Vatican* Declaration refers us back to medieval scholasticism rather than to patristic precedents. Aquinas wrote (following the example of Aristotle) that women are "misbegotten males," inferior to men because as women they are only partial humanity. Only a male can be an example of complete humanity. Suddenly the maleness of Jesus becomes very important, for only a male could fit the bill of Messiah, i.e., one who could assume all of humanity. I suppose I should take heart at this doctrine, for according to Aquinas, my femaleness *is* included in perfect, full, male humanity, and therefore I am redeemed. . . . Somehow I do not feel any better, for now I am redeemed, but I am not a whole person in and of myself.

There is a very important issue just under the surface here that warrants attention at this point. According to this view held by Thomas and presumably held today by the Vatican, perfect humanity was best expressed by a male person. Two questions: (1) what does this view say about God in and of Godself; and (2) what does this view say about God as Creator?

It has long been believed in Judeo-Christian faith that the one way for human creatures to speak of our *relationship* with God is in *personal* terms. In spite of relatively recent efforts to dissuade us from this way of speaking (e.g., Tillich, MacQuarrie), I still opt for speaking of my relationship to God in personal terms. In our experience human persons are either male or female in their bodily form; persons exhibit characteristics culturally assigned to women and men called feminine or masculine characteristics; female persons often exhibit some feminine and some masculine characteristics, and male persons exhibit some masculine and some feminine characteristics. To speak of God in personal terms brings these images to mind. Part of the dilemma is solved in that we can easily agree that God doesn't have a female or a male body. God is *not a male or a female.*

But what about *masculine* and *feminine* characteristics? I would "like" to follow a line of reasoning which I see *implicit* in the Vatican acceptance of the anthropology of Aquinas: *God contains within Godself full humanity.* This understanding would certainly be confirmed by Gen. 1:27: "So God created humanity[2] in his own image; . . . male and female he created them."

But I must face the fact that the line of reasoning *explicit* in the Vatican Declaration is apparently more like this: male/masculine humanity is more full/complete/whole than female/feminine humanity, and the reason must certainly be that *God is more male than female.* After all, Gen. 2:7, 21-23[3] "shows" this "fact" since God really created a *male* person *first* and then *later* took *part* of that male person and made a *female* person. Since it is "obvious" that God is more male than female, we appropriately call God "Him" and Scriptures naturally refer to God as "Father"—*not "Mother."* Lest the reader think this argument is purely tongue-in-cheek and no one could *really* believe this, let me assure you that this argument is very prevalent even today. See, for example, *Priest and Priestess,* by George Rutler.

As to my second question: What do my ruminations about the possibilities-for-creation that I am in my body have to say about God as Creator? Both males and females have the power of procreation, but women have a somewhat closer tie to creation because of our bodies. Using the kind of reasoning that I assumed in the

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2. The Hebrew word *'adam*—unlike *'ish,* which means "male" in distinction from "female" (*'ishshah*)—means "humanity," applying to both sexes. The Priestly creation story emphasizes here a corporate and complementary understanding of essential humanness: "male *and* female God created *them.* And God blessed *them.*" Male-dominant perspectives, such as those of the Vatican Declaration, ignore the significance of the fact that Jesus (in his "full humanity"!) appeals to *this part* of the Genesis creation stories (Mk. 10:2-6) as a scriptural basis for *nullifying* the authority of "Mosaic" tradition which allowed divorce as an exclusively *male* prerogative. (Deut. 24:1, 3: "If *he* find some fault in her"!)

3. A more appropriate understanding of the Yahwist paradise story would recognize that the real *significance* of Gen. 2:7 in relation to Gen. 2:21-24—beyond the typical Hebrew word-play on *'ishshah* as "from" *'ish*—is that "human creation is not *complete* until man and woman stand in *partnership* with each other" and that human "life is a *dialogue* between 'I and thou,' in relationship with God and in *partnership* with another human being" (Bernhard W. Anderson, *Understanding the Old Testament,* Third Edition, pp. 211, 212, emphasis mine). While this point may remain unrecognized by male-dominant perspectives, its significance *was* recognized by Jesus (in his "full humanity"!). Along with Gen. 1:27—Jesus invokes (Mk. 10:7-8) Gen. 2:24 and draws the conclusion which transcends the male-dominant "Mosaic" tradition: "So *they* are no longer two but *one embodiment.*"

last paragraph I can now say in light of this new evidence that God must surely be *more female than male.* After all, God is in *Her* most important role as Creator.

Now, this tug-of-war over which "part" of God—the masculine or feminine—takes precedence over which seems ridiculous in the light of objective, rational type thought. Nevertheless, these issues do tap something other than our objective, rational selves—otherwise people like theologians, who normally take care to be rational, orderly, and logical, would not go on at great length about such issues. It is obvious to me that a large number of us are so out of touch with our sexuality, our bodiliness, that we do not even know what we are arguing about. Deep-seated fears about the "opposite" sex and about "their" characteristics in ourselves cause us to project the whole argument onto God. And over the centuries this projection has led to what I call "male-olatry," the patterning of our talk and thought about God after the cultural phenomenon of male-domination.

The Vatican Declaration elevating the maleness of Christ is another link in the chain supporting this male-olatry. It is precisely for this reason that I have violent reaction to considering *Jesus' maleness as an essential part of the Incarnation in any way other than* the way I affirmed earlier: It is good that we recognize and admit that Jesus had a real body and that he had a male body and that he consequently related to the world in a particular way.

But let us also recognize the *essence* of Incarnation as being *embodiment to human form, a creature, one of God's own.* I would rather relegate Jesus' *maleness* to the category of *"scandal of particularity"* along with his Jewishness, his existence in a particular town at a particular time. We must not try to minimize this scandal or try to change the particularities; rather we should use them to help us understand more fully what it means to be human and what it means to have a body, as well as what it means when we affirm, "I have been crucified with Christ; it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me and the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me." (Gal. 2:20)

Life on the Boundary: The Paradoxical Models of Tillich and Pike

by John J. Carey
Chairman, Department of Religion, Florida State University

> "The man who stands on many boundaries experiences the unrest, insecurity and inner limitations of existence in many forms. He knows the impossibility of attaining serenity, security and perfection. This holds true in life as well as in thought . . ."
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> —Paul Tillich, *On the Boundary* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), pp. 97-8

> "We have this treasure in earthen vessels, to show that the transcendent power belongs to God and not to us."
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> —II Cor. 4:7, inscribed on the tombstone of James A. Pike in Jerusalem

In recent years, two different streams of religious thought have created special interest in the relationship between religious life and thought. The first is the "Religion and Autobiography" movement, which has insisted that in order to understand the thought of a given person, we need to know salient facts about his/her life, interests, friends, and life-style. The basic premise behind this movement is that no one's thought comes out of a vacuum, but is colored by his/her life experiences. The problems we see and the answers we give to different issues intertwine in our own personal pilgrimages. We have long recognized this intertwining of life and thought in a number of the leading thinkers of an earlier generation, e.g., Bonhoeffer and the German Church Struggle, Reinhold Niebuhr and his years in the parish ministry in Detroit, Rauschenbusch and his experience in Hell's Kitchen. Recently, however, the theme has been picked up by prominent thinkers of a younger generation. Harvey Cox's *Seduction of the Spirit,* Richard Rubenstein's *Power Struggle,* Sam Keen's *Telling Your Story* and Gregory Baum's *Journeys* are all books which illumine the life stories of some major thinkers, and demonstrate how their approaches to theology, ethics, and social problems are intertwined with their personal lives. These autobiographical statements do not, in the last analysis, help us adjudicate the validity of a given thinker's

position, but they do help us in some measure understand why theologians see what they see and write what they write. James McClendon's book, *Biography as Theology* (Abingdon, 1974) gives us life sketches of Martin Luther King, Jr., Dag Hammarskjold, Clarence and Charles Ives and also contributes to this stream of modern thought.

The second interesting stream in recent theological writing has been the "ethics of character" movement. The foremost spokesman for this movement has been Stanley Hauerwas of the University of Notre Dame. Hauerwas' book, *Character and Christian Life* (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1975), is a serious attempt to recover the central place of character in the Christian life. As opposed to situation ethics or any other "contextual" approaches to ethics (which stress the unique decisions of the self as the model for the Christian life), Hauerwas attempts to recover the notions of moral growth and personal virtue and thereby gain perspective on Christian character. It is possible, he maintains, to train ourselves to respond in consistent ways in diverse life situations; hence we can (and indeed need to) talk about the place of character in the style of the Christian life. Hauerwas gets strong support for this position by James McClendon in the volume cited above, with McClendon contending that we need to recover the notion of virtue as pivotal in the Christian life, and that we have some clues about this in the lives of prominent religious leaders.

These two streams together reinforce the idea of consistency of character and the harmony of public and private lives of religious leaders. As long as we take as our examples such giants of the faith as Bonhoeffer, Martin Luther King, Jr., Albert Schweitzer or Pope John XXIII, this intertwining of life, thought and character works fairly well. The theory becomes much more problematic, however, when we consider biographies of two distinguished thinkers and religious leaders who died less than a decade ago, Paul Tillich and James Pike. The long-awaited biography of Tillich was published in 1976 by Wilhelm and Marion Pauck, entitled *Paul Tillich: His Life and Thought, Volume I: Life* (New York: Harper and Row). Pike's definitive biography has been written by his close friends William Stringfellow and Anthony Towne, entitled *The Death and Life of Bishop Pike* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1976). The public careers of both of these men are so distinguished, and yet their lives as reflected in these biographies are so problematic by any conventional canons, that they raise for us some serious questions about the relationship of biographical

information to religious truth. In this article I shall review the salient facts in the lives of both of these men as reported in these recent biographies, and then consider the problems that these troubled lives pose for the study of ethics in our day. First, however, I must justify the yoking together of these two men and clarify the limitations of this essay.

Although I met both men, I did not know either of them well and I lay no claim for having first hand awareness of their lives. I served as Tillich's host while he visited the Florida State campus for three days in 1962, and I met Pike and heard him deliver a lecture at Florida Presbyterian College (now Eckerd College) in St. Petersburg in 1966. (His lectures there precipitated the heresy charges from the Bishop of South Florida.) They were both heroes to me, however: Tillich for opening new theological vistas, Pike for his courageous churchmenship. At a formative time in my own career, their causes were my causes and their enemies were my enemies.

At first blush, Tillich and Pike appear to be an odd couple, more characterized by differences than similarities. Tillich was Germanic, a philosophical theologian, heralded on two continents for his seminal thought; Pike was quintessentially a Californian, a preacher and churchman, a popularizer—a "forensic" theologian. Tillich awed people, in spite of Nels F. S. Ferre's admonitions that he was a "dangerous" thinker for Christendom. Pike shocked people, and was censured by the Episcopal Church for heresy. Tillich seldom surfaced in controversial political issues while in America; Pike, it seems, always did.

What Tillich and Pike had in common were interests in depth psychology, a way of coming at theology which affirmed the symbolic quality of language, creeds and liturgies, and approaches to ethics which stressed love, risk and situationalism. Pike studied under Tillich at Union Seminary in New York, dedicated a book to him, and even claimed to have communicated with Tillich's spirit. Although Tillich's American career spanned a longer period than did Pike's, they were both prominent in theological and ecclesiastical circles from c. 1950-1965. Although they differed in temperament, there is justification, I believe, for considering them together as "paradoxical" models of the religious life.

On literary grounds, both of the biographies cited in this article are richer and more informative than my limited use of them here implies. The Pauck volume, which received an unduly harsh review by Jerald Brauer in *The Christian Century* (November 19,

1976, pp. 1017-20), contains a wealth of information about Tillich, both in his German and American periods. The Stringfellow and Towne volume sparkles in literary style, and follows an unorthodox pattern of treating the events relating to Pike's death first before it provides a chronicle of Pike's life. I will leave unanswered here how many lives could gracefully bear the scrutiny which these books bring to bear, or whether in the case of Pike his friends have done him any service with the extraordinary candor of their writing. Keeping these matters in mind, let us now consider the relationship of life and thought in Paul Tillich.

I

The basic chronology of Tillich's career is well known and does not have to be treated in detail here. Born in Starzeddel, Germany, on August 20, 1886, son of a Lutheran pastor, he studied at Berlin, Tübingen and Halle, and in 1910 received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Breslau. He was ordained in the Evangelical Church of the Prussian Union and served for four years as a chaplain in the German army from 1914-1918. He began his teaching career at the University of Berlin in 1919 and spent some time at the Universities of Marburg and Leipzig before going to Frankfurt in 1929. He was suspended by the Nazis from his post in Frankfurt in 1933, and (primarily due to the assistance of Reinhold Niebuhr) was invited to join the faculty of Union Theological Seminary in New York City. He taught at Union from 1933 to 1955, and upon retirement there went to Harvard as a University Professor from 1955 to 1962. Upon his retirement from Harvard in 1962, he spent the last three years of his life as the Nuveen Professor of Theology at the University of Chicago Divinity School. He died on October 22, 1965. In his career he published over twenty books and several hundred articles, and was generally regarded (along with Karl Barth) as one of the two leading Protestant theologians of the twentieth century.

Tillich liked to describe himself as a boundary thinker, and in fact published two editions of an autobiographical essay entitled *On the Boundary* (1936 and 1963). He described himself as being shaped as a person and as a thinker by the boundaries between city and country; between social classes; between theory and practice; between theology and philosophy; between church and society; between religion and culture; between Lutheranism and Socialism and between Europe and America.

The first inklings that the general public had of Tillich's troubled private life came with the biography published by Rollo May entitled *Paulus* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973) and the stunning book by Tillich's widow, Hannah, entitled *From Time to Time* (New York: Stein and Day, 1973). These books together rocked the theological world; in fact, the Hannah Tillich book was deemed by Tillich's friends in Europe as being so defaming that they have to this day successfully blocked the translation and publication of her book in Germany. Basically, Hannah Tillich described her dead husband as a philanderer—a man who had life long interests and contacts with other women in ways which were fundamentally hurtful to her. Rollo May, while acknowledging Tillich's propensities in this direction, described Tillich more gently by saying that he had a great capacity for friendship with women, but that his interests were more "sensuous" than sexual. How many women were involved with Tillich, where, when, and for how long is discreetly passed over. It does seem, however, that Tillich kept in contact with a number of these women (as indeed he did with many male friends) and wrote letters of endearment to many of them.

The broader community of people who were influenced by Tillich waited several years after the Hannah Tillich-Rollo May impasse to learn what perspective the Paucks would have on Tillich's private life. On the whole the Paucks seem to side more with Hannah Tillich than with May as they assess Tillich's relationships with women. They point out that although Tillich clearly chose this life-style, the abundance of relationships in these years produced in him a sort of sickness:

> His guilt was double: he felt guilty in relation to each woman and thus never deserted a single one that he had come to know well; he felt guilty also in relation to the moral code, of which he never entirely rid himself and which continued to exert power over him. For a time he convinced himself that the dangers of paganism were less than the pangs of earlier confinement. Thus he chose the fascination of variety and freedom of expression over and against the single monogamous, bourgeoise condition. At the same time, the choice created in him a fear that if his chaotic existence continued too long, he would find neither rest nor resolution to his conflict. (p. 83)

Concerning Tillich's interest in women, the Paucks observe:

> On the one hand, he openly admired women—all women. It made no difference whether it was a waitress in a French restaurant or student in the classroom, the wife of a colleague or a sophisticated worldling who conducted a salon. He enjoyed talking with each one, admiring each one, having each respond to him, but did not become friends with them all.

> Indeed, some women were offended by his advances and quickly rejected him. Others wanted much more than he was ready or willing to give. The lasting friendships were with women who were intellectually stimulating, interesting, unusual, open to him, and with whom he felt comfortable himself. Their work, their state of mind, and their development were of genuine interest to him. He comforted them and sympathized in their days of sorrow, he celebrated their joys and successes, he advised them, encouraged them to fulfill themselves in their personal as well as their professional lives. He preached to them incessantly to avoid the pitfalls of compulsive self-giving, which he felt was the great danger implicit in the monogamous relationship. He urged them to remain open, even as he was, to the infinite experiences of life. (p. 89)

Several other things complicate an appraisal of Tillich's life. Clearly his marriage to Hannah was an unhappy marriage from the beginning; divorce was considered several times, but Tillich felt that divorce would be detrimental to his professional career. Hannah Tillich, in the meantime, embarked on a number of liaisons herself both with men and with women. Their total lifestyle would not fit neatly into the confines of middle-class America. One gets the impression, however, that Hannah's search for other relationships was a defensive reaction to her inability to sustain a monogamous relationship with Paulus. Hannah Tillich's final assessment about their life is a bitter one:

> Where did I come in? I had shared it, hated it, loved it, rebuked it. I had fought for survival, being submerged serving him, being aware when I was pressed between the leaves of a folder, cursing him for turning me into an abstraction. Every morning I was willing and glad to live again, every evening I felt shoved beneath a heap of stones. (*From Time to Time*, p. 242)

After she returned to their home in East Hampton, New York, after Tillich died in Chicago, she writes poignantly of burning his love letters and notes from his female admirers in their fireplace, being numb with sorrow yet feeling the loss of his presence.

The Paucks conclude that both Tillich's marriage and his personality remained paradoxical and mysterious, eluding final or complete definition. In his old age, the Paucks point out that Tillich felt that love was tragic and marriage sad, and his own self-doubt was great (p. 92). The great man, heralded so widely on two continents, appears to have suffered much guilt, unhappiness and anxiety in his personal life.

II

As a theologian, James Pike was less well known than Tillich, but he was clearly one of the most colorful and controversial clergy-

men of 20th century America. Born in Oklahoma City in 1923, he was raised in California, attending the Jesuit University of Santa Clara and also the University of California at Los Angeles for his undergraduate work. Although born into the Catholic faith he repudiated it in the course of his undergraduate studies and began a restless search for another viable church. This quest continued during his studies in law at the University of Southern California and subsequently at Yale. He earned a doctorate in law at Yale in 1938, moved to Washington, D. C., as an attorney with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and married Jane Alvies. (This marriage ended in divorce two years later.) He quickly made a name for himself in administrative law and became well known in Washington legal circles.

In the early 40's Pike remarried, joined the Episcopal Church and began to chart for himself a second career as a clergyman. He matriculated at Union Theological Seminary in New York City and finally earned his Bachelor of Divinity Degree in 1947. After an initial appointment at Christ Episcopal Church near Vassar College in Poughkeepsie, New York, and a three year stint (1949-52) as Chaplain and Chairman of the Religion Department at Columbia, Pike was appointed Dean of the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York City in 1952 and remained in that post for six years. It was from that highly visible position that he became a national celebrity.

In 1958 Pike was elected Episcopal Bishop of California and moved back to the West Coast to assume responsibilities at Grace Cathedral in San Francisco. After a stormy eight year tenure in that position he resigned as Bishop in May of 1966, and joined the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions as a Senior Fellow in Santa Barbara, California. He was affiliated with that Center until shortly before his death in 1969.

Unlike Tillich, Pike was essentially a churchman and preacher. Although he authored 14 books, he wrote more for the general public than did Tillich, and clearly understood himself as more of a popularizer than as a seminal religious thinker. He co-authored five other books, and it should be noted that his casebook in administrative law is still regarded as a standard reference work in that legal field. He was a person of extraordinary intellect, drive and creativity. To know him, some have said, was an event.

Pike became prominent in his career because of his colorful style, his hyperactivity and his willingness to be embroiled in public, social and theological controversies. While he was Dean of the

Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York City, he publicly and frequently tilted with Francis Cardinal Spellman, who saw himself as the major spokesman for the Roman Catholic community in New York City. Cardinal Spellman's conservative theological and political views are well known and do not need to be spelled out in detail here. Suffice it to say that Pike took upon himself the task of being a countervoice to Spellman over such issues as the stature and public image of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt (whom Spellman said was "unworthy of an American mother" because of her advocacy of planned parenthood); the moving picture *Baby Doll* (inasmuch as it raised the issue of obscenity and public morals); and the rebaptism (in 1965) of Luci Baines Johnson. Pike was also a fearless social crusader for civil rights, labor and the poor. He saw his ministry as extending to atheists, cynics and secularists as well as to growing persons of the faith. While at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine, he was noted for his dialogue sermons, for the creative way in which the Cathedral was engaged with the artistic community, and for his flair for celebrating the great festival occasions of the church year. For a number of years he had his own television show (called "The Dean Pike Show") which was conducted as a talk show, and on which he courageously addressed himself to practically every major theological, social and political issue of the day.

While Bishop of California, Pike alienated the wealthy elite of the Episcopal Church by being an outspoken person on political issues, and by lending his support for fair housing referenda, farm workers, racial justice and community organizers. He strongly supported the work of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Saul Alinsky, much to the delight of some persons of liberal persuasion and to the near apoplexy of his conservative constituency.

As a theologian, Pike tilted with the high church and triumphalist wings of the Episcopal Church. He had been deeply influenced by Tillich's concept of the symbolic nature of theological statements; he accordingly pressed beyond the creeds and doctrinal definitions of the Church's faith to illumine the deeper realities of the tradition. [See his *A Time for Christian Candor* (Harper and Row, 1964), *What Is This Treasure* (Harper and Row, 1966) and *If This Be Heresy* (Harper and Row, 1967).] He was a kindred spirit to John A. T. Robinson, and in fact dedicated *What Is This Treasure* to Robinson and Tillich. Pike felt that the modern age required new forms of theological discourse, and that doctrines and/or issues which were important for the church at earlier times

were no longer critical issues in the life of faith. (He liked to use the doctrine of the Trinity as an example of this.) He wanted the modern church to "travel light" in terms of doctrinal baggage. Pike was unfortunately somewhat flip about this posture, and advocated it in his TV show, in magazine interviews and in humorous lectures on college campuses. Had he been a theological professor he might have been tolerated by his Episcopal brethren, but as a Bishop of the church he evoked bitter antagonism.

Because of his showmanship and personality, Pike was never a conventional Bishop. He handled the pastoral and administrative responsibilities of his appointment adequately but seemed to chafe under the administrative load. It was, of course, the penchant for being a celebrity which finally led to ecclesiastical troubles for Pike. At three different times, groups of Episcopal clergymen brought forth heresy charges against him, the most substantive of these coming in 1966 from the Reverend Henry Loutitt, then Bishop of South Florida.[1] Loutitt had rounded up support from a number of other bishops and pressed heresy charges against Pike at the Episcopal Convention of Bishops in Wheeling, West Virginia, in 1966. A motion of censure for Pike was voted at that meeting, but Pike subsequently demanded a trial (much to the consternation of the Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church, who felt that such a trial would be a public embarrassment to the church). In typical administrative fashion, a committee was subsequently appointed to investigate the procedures of a heresy trial and to ensure due process should any such trial take place. That committee made a report in Seattle in 1967, which for all intents and purposes vindicated Pike from the heresy charges.

The controversial dimension of Pike's life, however, was far deeper than the professional resume implies. His marriage to his second wife Esther had been in serious trouble for a number of years, and prompted Pike to seek four years of psychoanalysis trying to deal with the tensions of that marriage. He finally moved out of the Bishop's residence in San Francisco in 1964 and thereafter (as Stringfellow and Towne suggest rather discreetly) "lived out of a suitcase." He and Esther were divorced in 1967. In and through those marital troubles, Pike was an alcoholic at least from 1952 to 1964; he joined Alcoholics Anonymous on June 30, 1964, and for the last five years of his life essentially solved that problem. In February of 1966 his son, Jim, Jr., who long had a problem with drugs, committed suicide with a high-powered rifle in a hotel room in New York City. In 1967 Pike's associate and mistress, Maren

Bergrud, committed suicide at Pike's apartment in Santa Barbara with an overdose of sleeping pills. Pike, embarrassed and confused by the circumstances, attempted to move her body (as well as some of the clothes which were in his apartment) to her own apartment, but the whole matter was discovered by investigating officers and was rather clumsily handled by Pike. In February of 1968 his daughter Connie attempted suicide, so Pike's life seems to have had an abundance of sadness and tragedy.

Stringfellow and Towne point out that Pike's marital troubles were compounded not only by his alcoholism, but by some of his infidelities. He had a private telephone installed in San Francisco where he could communicate with women; clearly there were a number of them in Pike's life. His associate and mistress was a public embarrassment in his life before his divorce from Esther became finalized. In addition to that, during the last three years of Pike's life following the suicide of his son Jim, Jr., Pike became openly interested in spiritualism, and on several occasions he publicly announced that he had communicated with the spirit of his deceased son. (He also claimed to have communicated with Tillich, which brought an indignant letter from Hannah Tillich.) He was engaged with mediums in this country, Canada, and in England, much to the bewilderment and consternation of many of his friends. (Stringfellow and Towne have a dubious view of this dimension of Pike's life.)

Even Pike's death was extraordinary. In 1969, after he had resigned his position with the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, he and his third wife Diane made a trip to Israel to pursue Pike's research interests in Christian origins. While there, they decided to explore the Judean desert, in part out of Pike's conviction that perhaps Jesus needed to be seen (in the heritage of John the Baptist) as being a figure from the wilderness. The Pikes rented a car, drove into the desert without a guide, and were deep into the desert when they lost their way and the car broke down. In the events that followed they apparently did everything wrong. They left their car and began to walk; Pike collapsed after several hours and his wife went on without him. By some miracle she found her way out of the desert and came to a small community of Arabs. Pike, in the meantime, wandered through the desert by himself, began to climb up the wall of the canyon, slipped and fell, and it took over a week for a team of searchers to find his broken and putrified body. He was buried in a modest grave in Jerusalem.

III

The question is, what shall we make of the life and thought of figures such as Tillich and Pike: people of great stature and ability, yet obviously persons with tragic, if not broken, personal lives. We are becoming accustomed to learning that our public leaders are often persons whose private lives show some marital indiscretions—witness the recent disclosures concerning Dwight Eisenhower, F. D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, as well as some of our congressional leaders—but somehow the problem seems more acute when we see it in religious leaders: those who would speak about and lead us toward the moral life or even divine disclosures. Let us face the hardest question first: Were they phonies? Did they preach one thing and live another? Is there a dramatic inconsistency between the religious insights which they shared with the public, and the ethical styles of their own lives? Tillich apparently worried about this, but Stringfellow and Towne suggest that Pike did not. Both Tillich and Pike published books on ethics, Tillich publishing *Morality and Beyond* (Harper and Row, 1963), and Pike publishing three books: *Beyond Anxiety* (Scribner's, 1953), *Doing the Truth: A Summary of Christian Ethics* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955) and *You and the New Morality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967). Tillich also published three volumes of sermons which dealt frequently with ethical themes, and in the latter part of his career, lectured widely on ethics even though many of those lectures did not find their way into print.

I have elsewhere explored the relationship of Tillich's ethics to his life.[2] In his ethics Tillich attempted to straddle the boundary between the philosophical theme of self-fulfillment and the religious theme of self-denial, but finally opted for an ethic of self-fulfillment. He was, in a broad sense, a situation ethicist because he believed that the norm of love was the basic ethical norm and that personhood could finally only be realized through risk. Tillich understood the wisdom of the conventional moral codes, but felt that in many circumstances such codes could be breaking to the human spirit.

In Tillich's sermons one finds repeated emphases on the problems of human sinfulness, brokenness and despair. He was interested in the phenomenon of "new being," healing and reconciliation. Tillich's basic theological premise was that our hope lies not in our getting any better as persons year after year, but rather in being touched by grace even when we feel most unworthy. In a

moving passage from his famous sermon, "You are Accepted," Tillich wrote:

> Grace strikes us when we are in great pain and restlessness. It strikes us when we walk through the dark valley of a meaningless and empty life. It strikes us when we feel that our separation is deeper than usual because we feel we have violated another life, a life which we have loved but from which we were estranged. It strikes us when disgust for our own being or indifference or weakness or hostility and our lack of direction and composure have become intolerable to us. It strikes us when year after year the longed for perfection of life does not appear. When the old compulsions reign within us as they have for decades, when the despair destroys all joy and courage. Sometimes at that moment a wave of light breaks into our darkness and it is as though a voice were saying you are accepted. Accepted by that which is greater than you and the name of which you do not know. Do not ask for the name now: perhaps you will find it later. Do not try to do anything now, perhaps later you will do much. Do not seek for anything; do not perform anything; do not intend anything. Simply accept the fact that you are accepted. (*The Shaking of the Foundations* [New York: Scribners, 1948] pp. 161-2.)

One might quarrel with Tillich's understanding of the human situation (he is, of course, quite close to Luther on this point), but one cannot say that Tillich was inconsistent or hypocritical in his approach to ethics and in how he lived his own life. It is closer to the mark to say that Tillich understood the elements of fear and guilt engendered in those persons who know that their lives are not conventional lives by middle-class standards. He refused to believe that such persons were beyond the realm of grace. In a strongly Protestant way Tillich affirmed that the good news of the gospel lies not in our own merit, but in our acceptance by God.

Pike's life and ethics likewise show some affinities. In his book *Beyond Anxiety* he took a basically Tillichian stance towards the human situation by affirming that God accepts us in spite of our brokenness and anxiety. He speaks in the indicative about God's grace rather than in the imperative about human obligations. In his book *You and the New Morality* (a case study of 74 different hypothetical situations) Pike denies that there is any "code ethic" which will clarify in advance how persons are to deal with complex situations. He encourages a "responsible" approach to all decisions, although he does not put much emphasis on matters of duty or obligation in his treatment of responsibility. Two other major clues to Pike's ethics include his valuing of *eros* love (not *agape*) ahead of all other human responses, and his affirmation of fulfillment as well as "service" as the normative style of life. Generally speaking, Pike felt any legalistic or code ethic could not deal with

unique circumstances or special occasions in life. In terms of classical ethics Pike felt that moral codes could describe the right but not always the good. Pike wrote, "To love and to be loved, to want and to know one is wanted—precisely at the right time—is not the most common thing in the world. There are times for spontaneous action as well as for lengthy deliberation." (*You and the New Morality*, p. 97).

Clearly Pike was a troubled and restless man during most of his adult life. His life was complicated by going through two divorces; combatting heresy charges within the Episcopal Church; being alienated from his second wife while he was a public figure as Bishop of California, and by being plagued by problems of alcoholism. It would appear, however, that Pike's stress on the "new morality" had a self-serving function to justify some of his liaisons with women, even while Bishop of California. To my knowledge Pike's sermons have not been published in any form which would let scholars review the persistent themes or motifs in his preaching. One might fault his life-style or find his life tragic, but the truth is that his life was not inconsistent with the way in which he approached ethics. One could certainly ask, however, as to whether Pike was responsible in terms of his public appearances with his mistress, and it is hard to condone his secretive sexual liaisons, given his public stature, even when his unhappy marital situation is taken into account.

Pike's personality, as described by Stringfellow and Towne, is not particularly winsome. Like many celebrities, Pike liked to hear himself talk and seldom showed sensitivity to other people's opinions. (Even the Archbishop of Canterbury had to tell Pike to "shut up.") The reader detects a narcissism in Pike that is not flattering. His friends apparently knew these things about him and loved him in spite of them.

IV

One must be careful in dealing with these biographies of Tillich and Pike lest the framework of morality be drawn too tightly into the arena of male-female relationships. Both men were impressive public figures. Tillich spent a great deal of time helping German refugees get settled in this country, communicating with the Jewish community, interpreting the impact of the war to the German people by weekly radio broadcasts, and he lent his voice and support to such important political causes as the establishing of the

United Nations, disarmament and limiting atomic testing. Pike was on the forefront of the racial struggle for civil rights, decent wages for farm workers and such heated matters as obscenity laws, birth control and abortion controversies, and focusing the church's energies on people rather than on buildings. Both men were prodigious stewards of time: they wrote insightfully, lectured extensively, traveled widely and influenced national opinion.

Were they "immoral" men, unworthy of the trust that their friends and followers put in them?—Not unless we tightly restrict what we mean by "morality." Morality surely also involves the struggle for justice, the opposition to oppression, and compassion for the needy. We have seen enough instances where persons lead conventional private lives but exploit or deceive the public (witness Richard Nixon and his entourage around Watergate) to recognize the complexities as to who or what is a moral person. We may note that Tillich and Pike appeared to lack integration of their public and private selves without concluding that they were fundamentally "immoral" men.

But let us press other complex questions. Do their life-styles follow inevitably from their theologies?—Not necessarily; here one has to deal with their own situations, personalities and needs. Both men, aware of human frailty, would undoubtedly maintain that whatever truth there might be in their theological insights must not be yoked to their own impeccable witness to it. Difficult marriages, national fame, temperament and even narcissism shaped their life-styles as much as their theologies. Can a person be liberal in theology and non-legalistic in ethics but still lead a responsible and disciplined life, both personally and professionally? Clearly so, as thousands of less well-known personalities bear modest testimony.

Perhaps the best thing to say about both Tillich and Pike is that they lived "on the boundaries" and their lives were paradoxes. They each lived on the boundary between the church and the world, between Christianity and secularity, between *eros* and *agape,* between theory and practice. Tillich appears to have been the gentler man, more modest and interested in other persons. Pike was the showman: nervous, hyperactive, intense, enjoying publicity and the public eye. They also need to be seen in the context of their times, and with some sensitivity as to what they were struggling against personally and professionally: Tillich clearly believing that there was a demonic dimension to middle-class morality, and Pike trying to present theological and ethical alternatives to

a church which was woodenly creedal, politically conservative and content with historic forms. (As Charles Davis has observed, it is the Episcopal Church that is the real tragedy in Bishop Pike's life.[3]) They were not models for an ethic of character; but they were impressive in energy, creativity and risk. They both showed a rare human capacity for the broken, needy, sick and unconventional people who never feel comfortable in the ranks of a middle-class church. Lest we attack their thought on an *ad hominum* basis, I would also stress that I do not think their theological insights are mitigated by the complex and tragic circumstances of their lives. To learn from them theologically or ethically does not mean that one need emulate their life-styles.

V

On broader theological fronts, the life models of Tillich and Pike illustrate the limitations of the "biography as theology" approach. Biographical information is interesting and illuminating in many ways, but it is not determinative in unlocking, let us say, Tillich's *Systematic Theology* or *System of the Sciences.* There are technical aspects of religious thought which go beyond personal data. I would not go so far as to say, however, (with one of my colleagues) that there is no place at all in the assessment of a theologian for any awareness of his/her life. When a thinker moves into the area of ethics and/or preaching, we are entitled to have consistency between life and thought, and a correlation between the public self and private self.

The study of these lives does suggest to me, however, that an important emerging frontier might be closer theological and psychological interpretations of selfhood. One might analyze Tillich and Pike as psychological types and note what characteristics tend to be associated with such persons. Just as William James once characterized the major distinctions of Western philosophy as growing out of two different psychological types (soft-minded and tough-minded), so we might consider approaching theology and ethics from the standpoint of personal temperaments. It is clear that people with different life experiences approach the problems of morality from different perspectives; this awareness might illumine much of the controversy in contemporary ethics.[4]

Perhaps those of us of more modest gifts would do well to recognize the insights of conventional wisdom, and understand that in most cases moral codes point to an accumulative prudence

about the human experience. There do seem to be limits in life which we break only with risk and peril. Persons in the professional fields of religious leadership (or even religious studies) might be reminded that laypeople look to them not just as orators but also as examples. The lives of Tillich and Pike remind us, however, that morality is a complex phenomenon, and that public witness as well as private sensitivities are a part of the moral calculus. I would conclude this analysis by saying that I believe there are serious deficiencies in the life-styles of both men; they seem to have more to teach us by their creative thought than by their examples. They are clearly not the only models we have for implications of situation ethics, but neither are they especially impressive exemplars of that mode of understanding and living the Christian life. St. Paul was right, and both Tillich and Pike knew it: any treasure we have is in earthen vessels, for the transcendent power belongs to God and not to us.

FOOTNOTES

1. The various circumstances leading to the heresy charges against Pike and the nature of the proceedings have been described by Stringfellow and Towne in *The Bishop Pike Affair* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967).

2. "Morality and Beyond: Tillich's Ethics in Life and in Death," in John J. Carey, ed., *Tillich Studies: 1975* (Tallahassee: The North American Paul Tillich Society, 1975), pp. 104-113.

3. *Commonweal*, Vol. CIV, No. 2 (January 21, 1977), pp. 53-4.

4. Carl Jung has already done some suggestive work in this area: see his "The Problem of Types in the History of Classical and Medieval Thought," *Collected Works* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), Vol. 6, pp. 36ff.

The Disappearance of God in American Literature

by Edwn W. Williams
Assistant Professor and Director of Humanities, East Tennessee State University

"That's what we care about," says Ivan Karamazov. "Young Russia is talking about nothing but the eternal questions now. Just when the old folks are all taken up with practical questions. Why have you been looking at me in expectation for the past three months? To ask me, 'what do you believe, or don't you believe at all?' . . . Masses, masses of the most original boys do nothing but talk of the eternal questions."[1] Dostoevsky's words in *The Brothers Karamazov* accurately describe nineteenth-century Russia, but they could as easily apply to the American writers who from the beginning of literature on this continent have never ceased to write about the eternal questions, the existence of God or the disappearance of God. God's existence and providence have been a standard theme and one that has been exhaustively explored, but the disappearance of God has not been treated so completely.

The disappearance of God is an interesting, if not surprising, development and it is certainly not confined to the literature of America, nor even to literature. An interesting example of this can be seen in the art of the late Middle Ages. It was, as Francis Schaeffer has observed, a shift from an emphasis on grace to nature, or the disappearance of God and the emergence of man. One miniature entitled *Grandes Heures de Rohan,* pained about 1415, depicts a miracle story of the flight of the Holy Family into Egypt. They pass a field where a man is sowing grain and miraculously, within an hour, the grain is ready for harvest. The pursuing soldiers ask the farmer: "How long ago did they pass by?" When he replies that it was while he was planting the seed, the soldiers turn back. It is not the story told by the miniature, however, which is of interest to us, but rather it is the arrangement of the picture. The figures of Mary, Joseph, and the baby are at the top and dominate the picture by their size. The soldiers and the farmer are at the bottom and are greatly reduced in size. Moreover, the Holy Family is outlined in gold. The picture, thus, represents the domination of the divine and the subjugation of the human.[2]

But notice what begins to take place. In 1410, at approximately the same time, Van Eyck was beginning to paint nature realistically, of value in and of itself, and not just as the realm in which God reveals Himself. One of Van Eyck's miniatures is on Jesus' baptism, but the subject takes up a small area in the center. The rest is dominated by a very real river, castle, houses, hills, etc. Another of Van Eyck's paintings is entitled *Madonna of the Chancellor Rolin*. Rolin, his patron, is shown facing Mary holding his hands in an attitude of prayer, but the significant thing is that he is the same size as Mary. Fillippo Lippi made still further a step. In his painting of the Madonna, Mary is no longer a spiritual being, a symbol of the divine, but she is a very beautiful Italian girl holding a baby in her arms. But even further, the girl who served as his model was his mistress, and all Florence knew she was his mistress. In effect, God was disappearing and man was taking his place.[3]

The movement in American literature exhibits a striking parallel. Apart from the early historical accounts of the colonies the earliest American writings were religious in nature like Thomas Hooker's *The Soul's Preparation* in 1632, or the *Bay Psalm Book* in 1640, the first book printed in America, or the extremely popular theological poem of Michael Wigglesworth, "Day of Doom."

It is not necessary to give a survey of colonial literature to show the important place that religion occupied to instruct the people, to resist heretical doctrines, and to keep before the people the absolute sovereignty of God and the base and corrupted nature of man. Jonathan Edwards will serve as a good example for this period. For Edwards and his Calvinistic audiences God is King, all-demanding and all-powerful. Man is a lowly worm deserving of damnation, but subject to the grace of God to elect him to salvation. Expressing this was Edwards' total concern as we can see by looking at the extent of his writings. Except for a few early scientific papers they were all either sermons, theological treatises, or narratives of his own religious experiences. Even his autobiography has been called "The Narrative of My Conversion," as often as it has been called "A Personal Narrative."

In Edwards God's place and man's are clearly defined with man occupying the diminutive, lower half of the picture. Man's worth is often called into question as Edwards refers to him as a worm, a spider, a loathsome insect, or chaff to be burned. God is not removed from the world, but instead He plays an active, dominant part within it. Man does not just happen to become sick, but as he writes in his autobiography, "it pleased God to seize me with

pleurisy." When he fell into sinful thoughts or acts, "God would not suffer me to go on with my quietness." Edwards' world view was one where God had created man, where God continually intervened in man's daily actions, and where God would finally stand to claim His elect.

This is one extreme on the continuum; the other is that of the transcendentalists, best exemplified by Ralph Waldo Emerson. Their basic premise is that man is the spiritual center of the universe and in man alone can one find the clue to nature, history, and the world itself. Rather than using God to explain man (i.e., a fallen creature of God) they prefer to explain man and his world as much as possible in terms of man himself. This emphasis, however, is not on man as an individual but on man as a universal. Emerson's American scholar is not an American student at Harvard, even though that was his initial audience, but the generic "Man thinking."

Despite this emphasis on man I would not call this an instance of the disappearance of God, but rather a redefinition of the meaning of God and a reexamination of God's relationship with man. Whereas Edwards saw God as a transcendent sovereign looking down upon man, his subject, Emerson saw God as immanent, living within man, and looking out from man's eyes. Emerson's great concern was God and he wrote about Him constantly, but the name of God was changed. It was no longer Jehovah, but the "Grand Mind," the "Oversoul," the "Realized Will," or simply God.

Transcendentalism, as Emerson formulated it, was a reaction against the Calvinistic view of the absolute sovereignty of a Jehovah standing outside man's history and against the Unitarian faith in which he had been reared and which was itself an answer to Edwards' Calvinism. Emerson believed that God was not outside man, nor was He only a "spark or light of God" within man's soul. For Emerson God was immanently present in man, coming to full realization in human life. In *Nature,* the book called the Bible of American transcendentalism, Emerson wrote: "The Supreme Being does not build up nature around us, but puts it forth through us, as the life of the tree puts forth new branches and leaves through the pores of the old. As a plant upon the earth, so a man rests upon the bosom of God."[4] He wrote later in the same work: "A man is a god in ruins. . . . Infancy is the perpetual Messiah, which comes into the arms of fallen men, and pleads with them to return to paradise."[5] Thus, returning to our analogy to

painting, Emerson would say that Filippo Lippi's mistress was not only a suitable model for the Virgin, but that she was a full incarnation of God.

When we consider the writings of Nathaniel Hawthorne, we begin, I think, to deal with the topic, the disappearance of God. Hawthorne is a figure who stands somewhere between Edwards and Emerson, but who draws from both. He is an Emersonian man of hope born into the time-burdened world of Edwards, and it is this bifurcated heritage that causes the presence of God to take a less dominant place in his writings. His early sympathy with Emerson would not allow him to accept Edwards' view of God, but at the same time his deep roots in Calvinism would not let him accept Emerson's immanence of God.

In Hawthorne we begin to see man becoming alienated. As R. W. B. Lewis has observed, Hawthorne's hero is "alone in a hostile, or at least a neutral universe. He is thrown back on himself and becomes isolated."[6] A part of this isolation is the retreat of God. Even though most of Hawthorne's novels and stories are about faith in God, God does not play a direct part. It is more man's struggle to find God, but man struggles alone with little help from the outside. Man knows he is not God, but he has to try to live in the world as if he were.

Sin is a central theme of his stories, but not as a theological problem. His treatment of this theme is instead the psychological effect of the conviction of sin on the lives of his characters. The setting of many of his stories is Puritan New England, and he depicts the Puritan's belief that sin is an awful reality which must be avoided to gain the promised salvation, but this is the view of the characters in the stories, not of the author. Hawthorne, the humanitarian heretic, sees sin as the admission to the brotherhood of man and as a result, he writes little about the reward in an afterlife. Man's search for God is really man's search to find a way to live with himself.

Hawthorne's treatment of the Puritan community shows that in spite of its religious framework God has become an anachronism. The faith in God which should quicken and make alive has deadened its believers into strict moralists, as illustrated by John Endicott and his Puritan followers in "The Maypole of Merry Mount" or Young Goodman Brown after his trial in the forest. This moralism, when carried to an extreme, becomes perfectionism, which is only the religious disguise of man's pretension to be God.

It is, as Gabriel Vahanian has observed, theism slipping into atheism.[7]

A classic case of such perfectionism is the short story "The Birthmark." Alymer lets his love for science overshadow even his love for his wife. He makes science his religion, and he as the scientist is his own god. It is his task to remove the earthly imperfections, in his case Georgiana's birthmark. As a scientist he must correct the faults that God has left, and, if successful, he will surpass God. The birthmark is to him "the visible mark of an earthly imperfection." Alymer sees it as a form of human sinfulness, and to eradicate it is a pious act. Religion says that man sins because he is finite, but Alymer reverses this to mean man is finite because he sins. Thus, if he removes the sign of sin he will become infinite.[8] Of course, Alymer's experiment fails: man cannot become God. For Hawthorne man has to acknowledge his sinfulness in order to gain admittance into the brotherhood of man. If man can do this he finds partial meaning in life and learns to live in the world without being destroyed.

A similar case could be made for Herman Melville who shared Hawthorne's power of blackness. It was no accident that he chose the name Ahab for his central character in *Moby Dick,* for it was the biblical Ahab who renounced the religion of Yahweh for the false God Baal, the god of his wife Jezebel. Melville's Ahab sets sail in defiance of his prophet, Elijah, on Christmas Day in his own attempt to destroy the white whale and deify himself. Melville, himself, has been called "a fugitive from God" because of his own search for some order in a chaotic world.[9]

It is an entirely different situation when we consider Stephen Crane, for as the first truly naturalistic writer in America, he had a highly ordered world, but it was a world without God. This can be seen by his views of nature, man, and God. Nature was for him not a reflection of God's order, as it was for Emerson, but it was, on the contrary, a purposeless machine, impossible to control. It was like the sea in his short story, "The Open Boat," vicious, but uncaring. Billy the oiler is the strongest member of the crew, but he is the only one who drowns. Man is a helpless victim in this mechanical world, having no control over it. His actions are completely determined by either external forces—the physical environment or social pressures—or internal forces—heredity or physiological needs. God is not denied, but the world He created is malignant and subject to sudden change. God is no longer in

control or even available. He absents Himself, either uncaring, asleep, or dead. One cryptic poem of Crane says:

> A man said to the universe:
> "Sir, I exist!"
> "However" replied the universe,
> "The fact has not created in me
> A sense of obligation."[10]

Another poem in the same vein tells of a man hanging onto a slim spar adrift in a merciless sea, until finally his strength gives out and his "pale hand" slides off the spar and he is drowned. Throughout the poem we have the refrain, "God is cold."

None of this philosophy seems to fit the strict religious upbringing of Crane's youth in a Methodist parsonage, yet he accepted this new naturalistic belief somewhat like a religion. Most of his stories are about a youth who faces life at one of its moments of crisis to see whether he could live through it and survive. It might be the testing of his courage by Henry Fleming in *The Red Badge of Courage* or it might be Maggie Johnson's ability to bear shame in *Maggie: A Girl of the Streets.* This initiation into life filled the need felt by religious men for acknowledgment of sin and rebirth. The correspondent in "The Open Boat" survives this initiation and is brought into the community of man. One point of this story, I think, is that alienation from God is inescapable, but the alienation from one's fellowman can be fatal. Human acceptance and co-operation must be achieved if man is not to be destroyed.

One might think that Crane's pessimistic naturalism is the outermost limit of the theme, the disappearance of God, but there is at least one further step, atheistic existentialism, as shown in the contemporary novel *The Floating Opera* by John Barth. It is well known that existentialism is a broad term embracing such different men as the Christians, Søren Kierkegaard and Gabriel Marcel, and yet extending to the atheistic belief of Jean Paul Sartre and Albert Camus. It is the influence of the latter two that we see in John Barth. Barth accepts the centrality of man—his concrete existence, his contingent nature, his personal freedom, and his consequent responsibility for what he does or makes himself to be. This is fundamental to all existentialism, but Barth goes further to accept Sartre's belief that there is no universally binding moral law and no absolute moral values. All values are relative to a man who is free and responsible only to himself. Because of this freedom and responsibility all man's alibis are unacceptable. There are no gods responsible for his condition, no original sin, no heredity or environ-

ment, no race or caste, no father or mother, no wrong-headed educator, no teacher, no complex or childhood trauma. Man is free, but his freedom makes him stand alone in the universe responsible for what he is, perhaps to remain in his lowly state or perhaps to rise above his highest dreams.[11]

This is the condition of Todd Andrews, the hero of *The Floating Opera,* who wakes up one morning and decides to kill himself. Albert Camus had written in his essay, "Absurdity and Suicide": "There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. . . ."[12] This is the question Todd asks and he decides life is not worth living. The novel shows us what Todd does on this day he thinks will be his last and what has brought him to this point.

Barth presents in his story of Todd Andrews almost a classic case of the development of existential man. First, Todd loses his idealism when he discovers only mirth in his first sexual encounter. He laughs at their likeness to animals and human love from then on is impossible. Next he discovers guilt when during the war he unnecessarily kills a German sergeant. Upon his discharge from the army the doctor tells him of a heart condition which brings on an awareness of imminent death. Next he rejects the world after a former friend, now a prostitute, tries to kill him with a broken bottle. The next step is the loss of communication when he returns home to find that his father, with whom he had just begun to communicate, had hanged himself. His final step is ultimate despair. One night in his hotel room all the masks he had used in the past crumble and he sees the futility of his life. Todd writes: "Futility gripped me by the throat; my head was tight. The impulse to raise my arms and eyes to heaven was almost overpowering—but there was no one for me to raise them to."[13] Since there is no God and since life has no value, he concludes there is no reason for living. The next morning he calmly begins to prepare for his suicide.

This, it would seem, is the logical boundary of our theme. God has not only disappeared, but life itself has lost all value and meaning. Although it is the outer boundary, there is one further movement that should be mentioned, for there are American writers, such as Flannery O'Connor, who have recognized this trend in life and literature, but who have not felt that this was the final word. They have noted that God's disappearance is more apparent than

real. If God is not seen in man's world, the fault does not lie with God's reality, but rather the fault is with man's vision.

Before turning to Flannery O'Connor, we may first note the development of this interpretive theme in T. S. Eliot. In the poems written before his conversion to Anglo-Catholicism no one wrote more profoundly of the absence of God from man's life. In "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock," "Gerontion," "The Hollow Men," and, most especially, in *The Waste Land* he recorded the shrunken state of the Western religious tradition and modern man's preoccupation with his own self-destruction.

The Waste Land is a concentrated summary of the sterile and barren world ours has become because man prefers to live with death rather than life. Throughout the poem Eliot uses the myths of the fertility gods who are buried to insure life the following spring, but in the modern waste land it is a sterile planting. Thus, April is the cruelest month for those who live without any hope of new life. As Cleanth Brooks has observed, the poem is based on the contrast between two kinds of life and two kinds of death. Life devoid of meaning is death, but sacrifice might be life-giving.[14] Those in the waste land can only accept the living death. For them life is reduced to the pursuit of comfort and the satisfaction of physical needs. God is present throughout, although He may appear as Osiris, Buddha, or Christ, but modern man does not recognize Him. In the final section the figure who begins to walk with them up the white road is hooded and they cannot recognize him, although the reader knows it is Christ on the road to Emmaus. For them, living in their death in life, God is still dead, and they cannot recognize that God has risen. The poem ends with a series of images of destruction. The rain which would bring the promise of life to the parched land has not come, but the thunder has spoken. At least one has heard and has begun to set his lands in order.

To most of those living in the waste land God is still unseen, but Eliot makes it quite clear that God is there if man will only open his eyes. The poems and plays written after this were Eliot's attempt to show man where to look.

Another writer who shares the same concern as Eliot is Flannery O'Connor. Although she was not born until three years after *The Waste Land* was written, she understood fully what Eliot had said about a world that chose to live as if God did not exist, and she made it her principal task to correct this imbalance. Her concern is primarily religious. Most of her novels and stories deal with the

question of belief in one form or another. For her Christianity is shocking, a scandal, in the sense that St. Paul used the word, and she shows this in story after story. In "A Good Man is Hard to Find" the Misfit, an escaped murderer who is about to murder the grandmother in the story, says, "[Jesus] thrown everything off balance." Mrs. Turpin, the nominal Christian in the story "Revelation," discovers in her vision beside the pig sty that Christ puts the bottom rail on top, or, as St. Matthew wrote: "Many that are first will be last, and the last first."

God's message to man is delivered in unorthodox ways. In a world that no longer believed in burning bushes, flaming chariots, or angels Miss O'Connor selected very unorthodox messengers: an escaped murderer, a fat, ugly girl with acne who goes to Wellesley, a hitchhiker, two guitar strumming farm boys, or even the plaster figure of a Negro boy, called the "Artificial Nigger." She felt that such unconventional messengers were necessary in a world that lived as if God did not exist. In her essay, "The Fiction Writer and His Country," she wrote:

> The novelist with Christian concerns will find in modern life distortions which are repugnant to him, and his problem will be to make these appear as distortions to an audience which is used to seeing them as natural; and he may well be forced to take ever more violent means to get his vision across to this hostile audience. When you can assume that your audience holds the same beliefs you do, you can relax a little and use more normal ways of talking to it; when you have to assume that it does not, then you have to make your own vision apparent by shock—to the hard of hearing you shout, and for the almost blind you draw large and startling figures.[15]

Her shock technique, her shouting, her large and startling figures were necessary, she felt, because the world had gone so far in denying God's relevance or existence. By showing her readers that their vision was distorted, she hoped to restore the meaning to life that had been lost by God's disappearance.

In conclusion, let me say that this treatment has not been exhaustive in its consideration of authors nor in the different developments within the theme, but I think it points out in a very general way one distinctive theme in American literature. One quotation from T. S. Eliot's "Choruses from *The Rock*" might serve as my most effective summary:

> But it seems that something has happened that has never happened before; though we know not just when, or why, or how, or where.
> Men have left God not for other gods, they say, but for no god; and this has never happened before.[16]

FOOTNOTES

1. Fedor M. Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, ed. Ralph E. Matlaw (New York, 1976), pp. 214-215.
2. Francis A. Schaeffer, *Escape from Reason* (Downers Grove, Illinois, 1968), pp. 13-14.
3. Schaeffer, pp. 14-16.
4. Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Nature* (New York, 1903), p. 64.
5. Emerson, p. 71.
6. R. W. B. Lewis, *The American Adam* (Chicago, 1955), p. 110.
7. Gabriel Vahanian, *Wait Without Idols* (New York, 1964), pp. 49-52.
8. Vahanian, p. 55.
9. Vahanian, p. 72.
10. Stephen Crane, *The Poems of Stephen Crane*, ed. Joseph Katz (New York, 1971), p. 102.
11. Walter Kaufmann, *Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre* (New York, 1956), pp. 46-47.
12. Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays* (New York, 1967), p. 3.
13. John Barth, *The Floating Opera* (New York, 1967), p. 222.
14. Cleanth Brooks, *Poetry and the Modern Tradition* (New York, 1965), p. 137.
15. Flannery O'Connor, "The Fiction Writer and His Country," in *Mystery and Manners* (New York, 1961), pp. 33-34.
16. T. S. Eliot, *The Complete Poems and Plays* (New York, 1971), p. 108.

Biblical Wisdom and Christian Ministry*

by Roland E. Murphy
Professor of Old Testament

> God of my fathers, Lord of mercy,
> you have made all things by your word, . . .
> Give me Wisdom, the attendant at your throne.
> (Wisdom of Solomon, 9:1, 4)

It may be somewhat late in the day to be reminded in a baccalaureate service of the example of Solomon praying for wisdom. Ruefully, one might say that it should have taken place three or four years ago. But no! One can maintain that such a request for wisdom remains a constant throughout life.

The Bible tells us that wisdom is a quest; it even warns us against thinking that we are wise:

> You see a man wise in his own eyes?
> There is more hope for a fool than for him.
> (Prov. 26:12)

And we read in Jeremiah (9:23): "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom." Wisdom is a fragile gift from God, so fragile that it is more a quest than a conquest, more an attitude toward living, than holding on to life. This is illustrated for us in Solomon's original prayer for wisdom in 1 Kgs 3:9: "Give your servant, therefore, a listening heart." A listening heart—*lēb shōmēa'*. That's what wisdom is about: listening to the lessons of daily experience communicated to us by the human beings to whom we minister, by our teachers, by our peers, and by God—listening to the traditions handed down by the wise who have gone before and who live among us. Your years of theological study are only the beginning of your quest for wisdom.

Biblical wisdom had many faces. The Book of Proverbs (1:6) tells us that the beginning of wisdom is "fear of the Lord," that awe before the mystery of a God who was beyond human wisdom (Prov 21:30), and yet the very one who bestowed it. On the other hand, wisdom's preoccupation was with human beings, their moral

*Baccalaureate sermon, May 7, 1977.

and spiritual formation, their relationships with each other, the kinds of qualities they should develop and those they should avoid.

This view of human growth was worked out on the basis of experience and traditional social values. The great ideals of the Ten Commandments were assumed, they were not legislated. In the same way, the specifically Israelite experiences of Exodus liberation, Sinai Covenant, the promises to the patriarchs, these are not even mentioned in the wisdom books, though they were taken for granted. It is on the level of creation theology that the sages of Israel moved: What have we to learn from the world in which the Lord God placed us? "Where were you when I founded the earth? . . . . Who determined its size; do you know? Who stretched out the measuring line for it?" (Job 38:4-5).

A frequent reaction of one who delves into the Book of Proverbs is a sense of recognition. One recognizes there many a saying that, in perhaps a varied form, one has heard in one's own culture, in one's own family. The biblical proverbs have enjoyed a considerable life in being handed down in one form or another in the Christian community. But one might be inclined to say that these sayings are all "old hat," so to speak. That is to say, the biblical proverbs tell us things we already know, things we have heard many times before. This very fact should indicate that the content of the sayings is important and to a certain extent timeless, if they have survived centuries of experience.

But there is another lesson here for the one who would cultivate wisdom: namely, that it is not so much the content as the method, the style, that matters. Like the sages of Israel, we must be ever alert to the lessons of experience, and especially to the antinomies, the contradictions, that experience reveals. The Israelite sages were particularly conscious of the confusing signals that reality sends out: What is the meaning of silence? A sign of maturity, or of indifference and folly? How is poverty to be viewed? As the result of personal laziness, or of social oppression? And so the sage attempted to analyze the meanings of the various facets of life in telling ways. Sometimes the lessons, the sayings, are not particularly profound. But that is not the issue here—it is the style, the constant questioning of experience, the trust in God and in one's own faculties to arrive at what Wisdom promised:

> The one who finds me finds life,
> and wins favor from the Lord.
> (Prov. 8:35)

A peculiar and lovable quality of Israelite wisdom is its ability to criticize itself. The author of Job and Ecclesiastes, the Preacher, saw to that. They both challenged wisdom when it became too complacent about the ways of God and the ways of humans: "Man is unable to find out all God's work that is done under the sun . . . and even if the wise man says that he knows, he is unable to find it out" (Eccles. 8:17). "Just as you know not how the breath of life fashions the human frame in the womb, so you know not the work of God which he is accomplishing in the universe" (Eccles. 11:5).

But let us stop here. This is not the time or the place to rehearse all the diverse aspects of biblical wisdom. Let us ask what the minister can profitably single out from wisdom's rich understanding of reality. Does Israel's growth in wisdom mirror your experience of the last few years in Divinity School? You have gained insights into the great Christian tradition, you have surveyed the theological interpretations that have succeeded one another in history, you have pondered how these might be inserted into human experience—knowing that in the end there remains God, or as Paul puts it in 1 Corinthians, "Christ . . . the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). Now there is forthcoming your adventure in Christian ministry. What choice would you make from the heritage of biblical wisdom? A choice is perhaps not unchangeable, because you know that you will change as you are shaped by the varieties of ministerial experience. But all of us will have reason to consider these points:

First, our readiness to learn and grow from our experience in the light of the tradition handed down to us; second, our ability to be self-critical, as the wisdom tradition was. Neither of these stands alone; both traits are part of the wisdom heritage, and both are important for Christian ministry.

Your teachers, your fellow students, your relatives and friends have been, for the most part, your field of ministry thus far. Your engagement with them has been an experiment in wisdom, and now your experience is to be widened to the Christian community the Church calls you to serve. Ask, as Solomon did, for that "listening heart," that in your ministry you may emulate him who was "meek and humble of heart."

The Need for Visions*

by Harmon L. Smith
Professor of Moral Theology

Can I tell you a very personal, and you may think earthy, story? Last spring a very good friend of mine, who happened also incidentally to be a very 'spikey' Episcopalian—'high church'—threw an embolus to his brain, completely without any sort of notice or warning. He lay there in a hospital bed, entirely immobilized, staring vacantly out into space, unable to speak, unable to move even his eyelids; paralyzed by the stroke. Circulation was so poor that his left foot, to the ankle, had to be amputated; he was incontinent of bowel and bladder; he was helpless to communicate and so far as anybody knew he was helpless to respond to anybody else's communication. I visited him several times. The last time I went to see him, which as it turned out was the afternoon before he died the next morning, I stood by his bedside as I had several times before, and I said to him something like this: "I know that you can't respond, Bill, but I think that you may be able to hear what I'm saying; and since I know that you care about the church, and that all your life long you have understood and intended yourself as a faithful and devout disciple of Jesus Christ, probably in a time like this, *in extremis,* you'd want the ministrations of a priest; so before I go, I'm going to sign you with the Cross." As I made the vertical mark on his forehead, he soiled himself in the bed; and it was quite apparent to his wife and to me, so I hesitated a moment before I made the horizontal mark across his forehead. And his wife said, "Oh, Dr. Smith, I'm so sorry that he did that while you were here." And I thought then, and I've thought since: What better time is there to be signed with the Cross, the symbol of our hope, than in a time when we are so completely and desperately helpless as to embarrass ourselves in the presence of people we love and care for? What better acknowledgement, I thought, of the reality of the grace of the Resurrection than the confession that Jesus, who was like as we are in all things save sin, who shared our humanity, who participated in our kinds of hurt, that Jesus

*Opening Convocation address, September 6, 1977.

accepts us just as we are, reclaims and reforms us, and commits to us that great treasure which is his gospel?

Since I was asked to take on this assignment—and reflecting on what I ought to say to you, or what you'd want to hear, or even what might be appropriate in this situation just now—my thoughts, like Maurice Ritchie's at the chapel service last week, have turned on the great wealth of opportunity and privilege which lies before us in this place and I have wondered about what, at the beginning of another year, we will make of it. You ought to know that this is more than idle rumination for me; and there are other reasons than a superb library and a learned faculty and all those other obvious assets that underlie those thoughts.

My father, for example—like many others who denied the "call to preach" until middle-age—didn't get to seminary; in lieu of that, he arose every morning at four o'clock to study—a regimen he began when he was "admitted on trial" to the North Mississippi Conference in 1945 and continued until his death in 1962; and he used to say, without I think the slightest exaggeration, even though he had gone to Ole Miss and Vanderbilt, that he'd gladly give his right arm to have been a Divinity student.

Beyond that kind of awareness, however, I've also talked with some recent graduates of this school—like Sam Mann, class of '66, now in a poverty-ridden inner city parish in Kansas City, and Martha Loyd, class of '71, now establishing a ministry to the victims of the Tug Valley flood in West Virginia—who say to me: "Beyond all that I got from my seminary days at Duke, I wish I had applied myself and gotten all that I could have gotten; I wish there had been some things to get that weren't there; and I also wish I could say this to the students there now, because lots of them—like myself—are going to miss too many opportunities that are irreplaceable in their preparation for ministry."

So thoughts of the beginning of a new year, and of unfulfilled destiny and unrealized promise, have insinuated themselves into my inclination to say some other things. I think that I know why this is how it is with me just now—it's because I have a vision of this place, of what it can be, of what it ought to be, of the kinds of things that should be happening here and the breed of students who come and go; that I think there is an urgency about how we use this time and opportunity because I believe that my friend Bill's situation last spring is paradigmatic on our condition—frail, tenuous, vulnerable; and that my vision, while it confirms the good

that we do, simultaneously keeps me dis-eased and discontented with anything less than its full realization in our common life.

Amos Wilder wrote, in 1972, that "It is at the level of the imagination that the fateful issues in our new world-experience must first be mastered. It is here," he said, "that culture and history are broken, and here that the church is polarized. Old words do not reach across the new gulfs, and it is only in vision and oracle that we can chart the unknown and new-name the creatures. Before the message there must be the vision, before the sermon the hymn, before the prose the poem. Before any new theologies, however secular and radical, there must be a contemporary theopoetic. The structures of faith and confession have always rested on hierophanies and images. But in each new age and climate the theopoetic of the church is reshaped in inseparable relation to the general imagination of the time."*

I believe that Wilder is eloquently correct, and I want us somehow to honor his gentle admonition.

My vision, in part, of this school is of a place where faith seeks understanding, where the intellectual love of God and a passionate zeal for social justice are inseparable; of a place where everything we undertake to do here coinheres—where Biblical and historical and theological and professional studies depend on each other, talk to each other, and by some miracle manage to coagulate, to move together in a coherent and decisive purpose; of a place where desks become altars and our common worship is something more grand than 20 minutes at daily chapel; of a place where all the ugly and profane constructs that categorize and separate persons are overcome and a sense of genuine community among us refuses to make labels—man/woman, black/white, faculty/student—definitive of who we are and why we are here. If I were asked, these are some of the ways I would begin to unpack the freight of my vision.

I also know, of course, that doubtless everybody here has a vision, too; and that I have no corner on that market. One of the most serious institutional weaknesses of this place, however, in both the University at large and this Divinity School, is that insufficient occasion is provided for serious and sustained sharing of the dreams and aspirations and hopes which different ones of us have. We celebrated our fiftieth anniversary as a school last year; and, as we embark on the second half of our first century, it would seem to

*Amos N. Wilder, *Grace Confounding: Poems* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973), p. ix.

me both highly desirable and entirely appropriate—indeed, I think it's ncessary—to invest the time and energy necessary to reassess the kind of theological education we propose to do here against the several visions that different ones of us have. With forty percent of our faculty having come here within the last ten years, a significant proportion of our classes populated by women and black students, dramatic changes in both the church and its environing society, and all the rest, we live—whether we like it or not—on that precarious edge between Martin Luther's "A mighty fortress is our God, a bulwark never failing" and Bob Dylan's "the times, they are a'changing." It is, to be sure, only my opinion; but I believe that we cannot fail to bring our several visions to consciousness, and display them in a forum of collegial mutuality, except at the most profound risk to our continuation as a school and to the stewardship with which we have been entrusted.

Surely those of you who are entering students have come here with a purpose, a dream, a prospect for who you want to become and what you want to do . . . a vision that may very well be chastened, or even despoiled of its innocence, during the next few years . . . but I desperately hope that you will manage somehow to hold onto it; and if not the vision with which you begin, then another and better one with which you can leave this place to live a useful and happy life.

Visions, however, are made of more durable stuff than self-serving expediency; and I want to remind you that they are always rooted in memory. Without a past, there is no present or future; and that means, at least in part, that our visions—yours and mine—are not autonomous . . . they are not entirely self-generated, nor are they radically private possessions. For those of us who understand and intend ourselves as Christians, they derive from and are presided over by God's intention for us and our determination to respond to that intention through faithful and obedient discipleship. For those of us who understand and intend ourselves as Christians, our visions also issue from the *communio sanctorum,* from that long and largely nameless company of men and women who, for two thousand years now, have preceded us in this way. These twin sources of our vision generate problems for us—that will become all-too-evident in the next few weeks—but they also allow us to have a distinctive identity . . . one which both ennobles and scandalizes us.

I have wondered, especially in recent years, what it is that makes the "academic study of religion" so attractive to so many. The

answers I most typically get allow as how this approach is more intellectually respectable than, say, a more confessional approach because it's dispassionate and objective—like Sgt. Friday on "Dragnet," all that's wanted are "the facts, m'am, just the facts." Fine! But who determines what the "facts" are, and who venturing to communicate them can avoid simultaneously a bit of interpretation? Bultmann's little essay, "Is Exegesis Without Presuppositions Possible?" ought to be required reading in every class which presumes to do *only* an academic study of religion; then it would be plain to everybody that nobody is immune to subjectivity, that intellectual inquiry is value-preferenced from catalogue-course-description to final examination, and that reason without sentiment is both a deception and a fraud.

Does this mean that we probably should not back away so readily from some kind of "orthodoxy," some kind of right and true opinion, in this place? I tend to think so; that this is not a place where "anything goes" and everybody is unencumbered in "doing their own thing"; and that a right and true opinion of ourselves and what we do is indispensable to our integrity and authenticity. Simultaneously, I'm far from certain about what kind of orthodoxy and how extensively it ought to permeate what we do here. In any case, the principal reason that this question is important is that the issue of orthodoxy is closely allied to the question of identity.

I increasingly believe that "identity" is our critical existential problem, very much as "authority" is the crucial theological problem of the 20th century. We have been so bombarded by the demand to be all things to all people—change-agents, counselors, preachers, exegetes, theologians, moralists, educators, mimeograph machine operators, an all-purpose balm in Gilead—that it's not unreasonable that we should sometimes have gut-wrenching questions about who we are and whether what we're about is our appropriate business. Indeed, private conversations with students and faculty alike convince me that these are agonizingly real questions for lots of us.

I came home from Dallas last spring with a genuine cowboy hat for our five-year-old son. And like any child with a new toy, he was initially obsessed with that hat, wore it constantly, and pretended to be a real cowboy himself. But a few days later, he came in to see me wearing his "Robin the boy wonder" outfit. He stood directly in front of me, waited patiently until I finally acknowledged that he was there, and asked "Who am I?" It's a

game we sometimes play, and I guessed several wrong answers—"You're a cowboy—you're Batman—you're the Cookie Monster." Finally, to counter his growing suspicion that his father is not terribly bright, I said, "You're Robin the Boy Wonder." "That's right," my son said, "you finally got it right." "But I thought you were a cowboy," I said. "I was," he said, "but that was yesterday." "Then do you just change your identity—from this to that to somebody else?" "Yes." "Then how do you know who you are?" Looking just a little annoyed, my son pointed to the letter "R" on his Robin costume: "You see this?" he said, "When you see this, I'm Robin." "But you can be so many different people," I said, "how can I ever be sure?" "Just look close," he said.

That admonition, like much of the wisdom from children and others not privileged to enjoy the sophistication and maturity we think we have achieved, is I believe right on target! But the tragedy of growing up—and I'm bound to think especially for folks like us whose self-identity is fully wrapped up in being faithful and obedient disciples of Jesus Christ—the tragedy of growing up is that lots of people continue to play that game and engage in an endless process of alternation. I know that I'd be more comfortable with myself if, when on an airplane or after a lecture somewhere away from here somebody asks, "What do you do?" I could say, "Just look close." But I also know that 'looking close' is often the last thing I'd want other people to do, because my understanding and intention of myself to be a faithful and obedient disciple of Jesus Christ couldn't stand up under that kind of scrutiny. I suspect that you know as much about yourself. All the same, it's not the kind of pious and precise imaging and etching of ourselves as being unambiguously this sort of person that worries me. I'm sufficiently committed to the doctrine of original sin, whether as "totally depraved" or "very far gone," to believe that the best we'll ever achieve in this life is an approximation; so a certain realism informs what I'm meaning to say. But it's exactly a satisfaction with nothing more than approximation that generates my dis-ease.

I was returning home after taking services a couple of years ago, and idly listening to the radio, when one of those ubiquitous Sunday afternoon religious programs caught my attention with its opening announcement. But I could not really comprehend what I thought I heard; so I decided to hear the program through in the hope of catching that announcement again. At the end, I wasn't disappointed. The evangelist repeated his offer: "We need your support in order to continue this radio ministry," he said,

"and if you will just send us a donation, we will send you a beautiful plastic tablecloth with a genuine simulated replica of Leonardo da Vinci's immortal painting of 'The Last Supper' imprinted in four colors in the center. Now listen to this carefully," he concluded, "This is not a cheap imitation; it's a genuine simulated replica of the real thing."

The more I contemplated that offer, the less novel I decided it was; because my imagination raced over all those goods and services, and sometimes people, that in my experience had already provided free of charge just what the evangelist offered: genuine simulated replicas of the real thing!

I chose the Old and New Testament lessons for tonight because they both speak of the need for visions, of how important it is for people to have rich and rhapsodic imaginations—and I also chose them because I hope that you burn with a great and creative vision that, in some way, this Divinity School can support and share and celebrate. If you haven't yet lived long enough to verify it by your own experience, you should know history well enough to appreciate the wisdom of Solomon: Where there is no vision, the people perish. And if you haven't yet been caught up in the ecstatic and transforming power of an insight, or a discernment, or even a peek into recondite truth and mystery, you have surely known others who have. In the face of such an experience, there are really only two choices: you can acknowledge the vision and be obedient to it, as St. Paul did on that Damascus road, or you can reject and disavow it—but at great peril to yourself and others.

Despite the toll which orientation and registration and all those other housekeeping details are bound to take in the early days of a new academic year, this place is full of wonder and possibility and promise. We are set in the midst of a great University, and there is plenty of opportunity for those who want it to test their fledgling theological wings in the rarefied atmosphere of other academic disciplines. We are a school which stands, by history and indenture, within the Christian tradition and which has its distinctive roots and lineage in the Methodist Church; but we are also a school which, from its inception, has been ecumenical in its aspiration, its faculty and students, and its practice; so there is the remarkable opportunity here, unlike some places, to be "truly catholic, truly evangelical, and truly reformed." When our students graduate, they are presented to the President of the University as persons who have been prepared for informed and discriminating discharge of the historic offices of the Christian church; which

suggests to me that before us lies ample occasion to acquire knowledge of this tradition, to enhance our own spirituality, to appropriate the discipline and piety which ought to make our vocation.

What you will make of it I do not know. But I cherish for all of us a vision of who, by God's grace, we can become. And I cherish for this school a way of doing, by God's grace, its work that roots deeply our personal and professional formation in that primitive confession, *kurios Iēsous*. I know, of course, that we bear this great treasure in a fragile, earthen vessel; and while it may have been the special obligation of Liberalism to emphasize the tenuous and breakable character of every historical container, I think that we may need now to re-accentuate the extraordinary richness of this treasure committed to our care.

When Karl Barth advised his students to carry the Bible in one hand and a newspaper in the other, there was no suggestion that either was optional. Since Reinhold Niebuhr popularized Barth's aphorism in this country, the tendency, however, has been to read and believe the newspaper but confine the Bible to OT 11 and NT 18. In subtle and insidious ways, our curriculum and the conduct of classes may reinforce that misanthropic notion. But part of the reason for challenging you to claim a vision of yourself and this place is to give you responsibility for your own education; you must, on occasion, do better than we teach you. Our problem is only in part that we don't know enough—much more serious is that we don't do as well as we know.

Our most pernicious temptation here is to be and act as though this were all there is, to lose sight of that reason for our being which transcends all the scut-work that ineluctably accompanies formal education, to let that love affair with the gospel which brought us here in the first place be transformed into dull domesticity by term papers and quizzes and lectures and book reports, to compartmentalize faith according to the major divisions of the curriculum.

Perhaps all this sounds too hortatory, and not sufficiently academic, for such a serene and august occasion as this. If it does, I would venture to remind you that graduate-professional education takes place within—indeed, at its best it acknowledges and embraces—a pair of paradoxical commitments. On the one hand (and fully conscious of what I said earlier about the "academic study of religion"), we are committed to disinterestedness, to objectivity, to truth wherever we find it and despite the threat it may pose to established and comfortable ways of perceiving ourselves and our

world. On the other hand, we engage in this quest and mount this enterprise in order to be involved in the existential processes of our times; we seek truth in order to be passionately engaged in its impact upon our common life. That paradox, of the interplay between disinterestedness and involvement, is the burden of folks like us. It is also the reason that just any old vision will not do, that our vision must be of a particular sort—disciplined, informed, discriminating, faithful, obedient—if it is to be worthy of our commitment to God and our service to neighbors.

I have told some of you already of my visit, now a little more than three years ago, to the site of the Nazi concentration camp at Dachau on a spectacularly beautiful Saturday afternoon. The sun was brilliant, and a lovely breeze swept over the Lagerstrasse which was lined with poplars the prisoners had planted. We entered the compound through a Carmelite convent, which is just outside the wall, at the end of the campsite where three memorial chapels—Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish—have now been erected. The Roman Catholic and Jewish memorials are not regularly staffed and are used only on special occasion; but the Protestant "Church of Reconciliation" has a resident chaplain, Pastor Christian Reger, who himself was an inmate in Dachau. Pastor Reger was then seventy years old, but more alert and active than some I've known who were half his age; and he provided me one of those landmark experiences in my life by talking with me for three hours. Two hundred thousand (200,000) men and women passed through Dachau as prisoners—that's one hundred (100) times Duke Chapel filled to standing room only capacity; thirty thousand (30,000) died in this camp alone—that's fifteen (15) times the Duke Chapel filled to standing room only capacity, two hundred (200) times this (York) Chapel filled to overflowing.

After we'd talked for a while, Pastor Reger sent me off to the two crematoria with a guide who had also been an inmate and a victim of the medical experiments conducted there. It was a grisly tour; and inside the smaller crematorium I could swear that I smelled burnt flesh. I went outside for fresh air, thinking that my imagination might be inducing that sensation; but even after going in and out four times, I could still smell it. So when I returned to Pastor Reger, I asked him whether it was possible—thirty (30) years after the fact—that my mind had tricked my olfactory senses. No, he said, it was a true sensation because the bricks were porous and had thoroughly absorbed the odor.

As I was preparing to leave, we were talking about how such a monstrous thing as National Socialism could have happened, how the evil vision of a Hitler could have achieved such eminence, how otherwise good and decent people could be seduced by a lust for power which resulted in a horror of such proportion as the world had not seen before. And Pastor Reger explained it to me, peering over his thick rimmed, national health service glasses: Hitler could not have risen to power, he said, apart from the indifference and carelessness of the German people; they permitted it, he said, because Hitler filled the vacuum created by the absence of vision.

The pertinence of Pastor Reger's assessment bears upon that paradox which I mentioned a moment ago. The German people in the '20's and '30's had committed themselves to one aspect of the paradox—disinterestedness—but they had neglected or rejected the other, equally important, feature—involvement. If it were within my power to do it, I would want you to understand that this is a temptation, a seduction, to which people like us are particularly susceptible. The power and status which our training and position vests in us easily turns to preoccupations with objectivity, dispassionate observation and analysis, busy-ness and insularity from any self-conscious regard or accountability for the humane dimensions of our work, insensitivity for and indifference toward the unlovely, the oppressed, the dispossessed. But I covet for you a vision, a prospect for the indispensability of passionate engagement in our common life which is rooted in the intellectual love of God.

At the end of our conversation, Pastor Reger leaned toward me—and in a voice barely larger than a whisper, said: "You know, Professor Schmidt, vere dere is no *vision,* dere is no *risk;* and vere dere is no *risk,* dere is no *witness;* and vere dere is no *witness,* dere is no *gospel;* and vere dere is no *gospel,* dere is no *hope.*"

When I left Dachau that day I was deeply moved by what I had seen and heard; and I vowed then never to take lightly my obligation as a teacher, nor to allow my students to treat their education frivolously, because I knew emphatically that what goes on here must make a profound difference. So when we exited through the Carmelite convent—"of the Precious Blood," it's called—I bought this cross, blood red enamel on bronze, to help me remember: Where there is no vision, there is no risk; where there is no risk, there is no witness; where there is no witness, there is no gospel; where there is no gospel, there is no hope.

Help for Churches in Transitional Communities

by Mark R. Sills
Greensboro Urban Ministry, Greensboro, N. C.

Cities are a fact of life. Not only are the cities growing at a rapid pace, but they also become more and more important to the total society as they grow. Even rural areas are identified by and influenced by the cities that lie nearby. The old saying that God created man and man created the city has never been more true than it is today. Indeed, it may be argued that cities are becoming the natural habitat of the human animal. Civilization is impossible without the city. Technology, the schizophrenic boon/bane of modern society would be totally impossible to develop or maintain without the city. Cities are more than streets and buildings and crowds of people. Cities are creations in themselves and they are essential to civilization. As Oswald Spengler has put it so well, "What his house is to the peasant, the city is to civilized man."[1]

Cities are natural manifestations of humankind's urge to create. Contrary to much popular thought, cities are not unnatural or plastic. Cities are, in fact, so much a part of the history and psychology of humankind that it could be argued that the social, mental and spiritual health of humankind depends in large measure upon the city. The modern fad of retreating to the countryside represents not a flight from the cities, but a failure to cope with the very real problems that infest our cities. If all of the cities were destroyed in some giant cataclysm, the very people who now flee the cities would immediately set about rebuilding them.

Cities are places of many things, but perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of cities, as of the individuals who live there, is change. Even in the early days of human civilization cities were places of change. Today, change is taking place at a pace that is hard to comprehend. Change is the most basic fact of life not only for the city and its institutions, but for the individuals who are, in themselves, the very agents of change.

In spite of the fact that the Church had its beginning in the heart of the city and has continued to be centrally organized around

1. Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, IV (Munich: 1922), p. 105.

cities, the Church has never fully come to terms with the city. Protestant churches especially have failed to understand or trust the city and have thus tended to remain essentially rural or small town in style of ministry and structure. It may be that the basis for this failure lies not in the size or the technology or even the complexity of the cities, but in the most basic fact of cities: transition. The Church has simply been unable to cope with the fact of steady and relentless change.

In 1876 the Washington Square Reformed Dutch Church in New York City voted to close "owing to the moving away of the class of population in this quarter whose needs are met by such a church."[2] Such closings, along with mergers, relocations, and the creation of commuter churches have continued until, today, it is a rare urban church that actually serves the community in which it is located. Many of the churches organized when the cities were first experiencing boom growth have now either closed or relocated outside the central urban areas. In fact, the problem of the churches in transitional communities may well be the paramount problem facing the Church in the United States today.

Even those churches which have managed to remain active and well-financed while continuing to occupy land in the central city often fail adequately to address the needs of the city. Many, if not most, have become what is commonly referred to as "cathedral" churches, whose members commute from the fringe areas around the city in order to attend a large, socially prestigious congregation. While some of these central city churches have organized missional thrusts into the immediate communities surrounding their buildings, these activities tend to be token at best. When real issues are addressed by such programs they tend to lose their funding. There are exceptions, of course, but all too often such "inner-city" programs represent less than serious attempts to minister to the persons and institutions of the central city. Those few churches which have accepted a ministry to the city are frequently under-staffed and poorly funded and their impact upon the city is thereby impaired.

Transition is rarely a simple phenomenon. More often than not the transition taking place in a given community is a complex mixture of ethnic change, economic and/or social change, and sometimes even basic theological change. For instance, in some Southeastern cities white, Protestant, middle-management persons are

2. Quoted by Howard Hageman, *The City Church* (New York: May-June, 1959), p. 2.

moving out from the central city to be replaced by Hispanic, Roman Catholic, blue-collar workers. Churches left in the midst of such a changing community face traumatic adjustment if they are to survive as an authentic presence and witness in that situation.

Within the Southeastern Jurisdiction of the United Methodist Church, a coalition of urban church clergy, community workers, and urban ministry professionals have joined forces to seek ways to address the special needs and problems of the urban church in transitional communities. This organization, known as the *Southeastern Jurisdiction Urban Workers Network* (SEJUWN) draws upon the experiences and special training of a large number of Christian professionals committed to the *strengthening of the local church within the context of the urban environment* in order to conduct workshops, training events and consultations for clergy and laity in churches facing transitional situations. A number of these events have been conducted throughout the Southeast in recent years. Perhaps the most significant recently occurred in Chattanooga, Tennessee, when eleven certified urban church consultants from throughout the Jurisdiction conducted a District-wide Consultation with 19 self-identified churches in transitional communities.

Chattanooga is a rapidly expanding city that exhibits the characteristics of any metropolitan community. The churches in Chattanooga are typical of the inner-city, city and suburban churches in most any major city. With the exception of one large, well staffed and socially prominent congregation in the midst of the central business district, most of the city churches are experiencing a gradual decline both in membership and attendance which can be dated back to the early or middle 1950's. As membership declines in the city churches, the suburban churches have grown. Even here, however, due to open housing and other changes in social customs, the problems of transitional communities are evident and are having an effect upon the churches. Thus the consultation included a number of suburban congregations facing the problem of ethnically and/or economically changing neighborhoods.

Perhaps the single most significant characteristic of the city churches in Chattanooga is the large number of commuting members. In several of the churches the number of commuting members totaled more than 75% of the active membership. A commuting member was defined as a person driving more than three miles to attend church. In at least one church, 76% of the active member-

ship drove more than five miles to attend services. One somewhat surprising discovery of the Consultation was that this commuting pattern is as much true of the Black congregations as it is of the White congregations. If one critical statement were to be made of the city churches in general, it would be that they are doing a poor job of relating their ministries to the people who live most directly adjacent to the location of their buildings.

The situation is not a great deal different with the suburban churches. While distances driven to church by active members is somewhat less than in city churches, suburban churches still tend to spend the overwhelming portion of their energies and financial resources upon their own membership and buildings. The church in direct ministry to the community is the exceptional church. Often, even the ministry to membership suffers due to the lack of careful planning and failure to establish realistic assumptions as a basis for planning.

The task of the *SEJUWN Consultation Teams* is (1) to assist local churches in the gathering and analysis of data concerning the kinds of transition that are taking place in their communities, (2) to analyze the membership characteristics of the church, (3) to assist the programming committee of the local church in development of realistic assumptions as a basis for planning, and (4) to provide tools for planning that hold promise for progress in the total life and ministry of the church. The process utilizes a variety of skills and tools including the gathering of demographic data from census tract studies; windshield surveys; analysis of age, occupational and commuting characteristics of the active membership; as well as the tools of strategic church planning and management by objectives. The consultants serve as facilitators who are able to direct a process of "self-study" for the congregation. Once the initial consultation is concluded, the participants should have developed sufficient skills to be able to continue the process without professional guidance in the future.

In the Chattanooga Consultation, the churches went through a two-day, intensive consultation designed primarily to check assumptions against realities. Planning was kept to a minimum due to the lack of time for going into long-range planning. However, the participants in each church were introduced to the tools necessary for sound church planning and some initial planning steps were taken in most situations.

It will be some time before the results of this District-wide Consultation for churches in transitional communities can be properly

evaluated. However, some initial responses from clergy and lay participants indicate something of the value of this process. According to one pastor, "My church has come alive this week. We are finally ready to become involved in an active ministry in a realistic fashion." Another pastor who had been so frustrated by his appointment that he had asked his District Superintendent for a move after less than a year told his Consultation Team that he was now ready to stay and work. He said that for the first time he realized that his people were "serious about being in mission and willing to face the kind of changes that this will require." Among the decisions his lay people made during the Consultation was one to try actively to recruit members from among the Black families moving into this community. He knows that his church has a long way to go, but he also feels that a first step has been taken and a commitment made. A group of lay persons in a church facing death in a matter of ten or fifteen years due to aging and declining membership decided that they could be in mission on their own through a "mission group" model. While most of the people in that church had resigned themselves to "business as usual with the church closing in a few years," these persons decided to become actively involved in a ministry to persons in their community. The pastor of this church, who had described his congregation as "hopeless" at the start of the Consultation, said that it had found "new life" by the end.

Among some of the plans made by churches participating in the Consultation were strategies for activating inactive members, developing programs of outreach to ethnic minorities in the immediate neighborhood around specific churches, special ministries to children, youth and adults, and planning for a cooperative approach to the special needs of the central city and its inhabitants.

If the Church is ever going to become effective in its ministry of presence and service in the city it is going to have to take seriously the problems of transitional communities and the need for careful analysis and systematic planning. If the *United Methodist Church* is going to reverse the recent trend toward declining membership it will be necessary for it to do much more than traditional evangelism. The *SEJUWN Consultation Teams* hope to be *one tool* for the *revitalization of the local church in the Southeastern Jurisdiction*.[3]

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3. Coordinator for the SEJUWN Consultation Teams is Dr. Bill Tyson, Director, Urban Action, Inc., 159 Forest Avenue, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30308.

Book Reviews

REDATING THE NEW TESTAMENT?*

by D. Moody Smith, Jr.

The blurb on the dust jacket announces: "Now—from the author of *Honest to God*—comes a book that may require the rewriting of New Testament histories, introductions, theologies, text books, references and resources." As the co-author of one of the textbooks and a contributor to one of the reference volumes in question, I can hardly be uninterested in this possibly epoch-making book, which may require such an effort of rewriting on my part!

As is well known, J. A. T. Robinson is a Bishop of the Church of England. He is presently fellow and Dean of Chapel of Trinity College, Cambridge, as well as Assistant Bishop of Southwark. His most recent previous work, *The Human Face of God*, I heard him deliver as a series of lectures at The Divinity School of Cambridge University. Never one to mince words or avoid harsh alternatives, Robinson in those lectures was bold enough to contemplate the possibility of Jesus' illegitimate human paternity and to consider the likelihood that his corpse long ago mouldered away in a Jerusalem grave. From such radical theological ventures one might conclude that Robinson periodically rocks the theological boat, or ark, usually by jumping out on the left side. Now he has done it again by taking a belly-whopper, so to speak, out the right side.

One might surmise that having previously heard from Robinson the left-leaning theologian we are now to hear from Robinson the conservative bishop. I prefer, however, to think that having previously heard the pastoral and theological insights of the bishop, concerned about the possibility and shape of faith in the modern world, we are now to hear from the Cambridge don. Robinson has tired of fuzzy-thinking chronologers and has decided to draw the attention of the scholarly world to the slim evidence on which the widely accepted dating of New Testament books is based. At the beginning of the book Robinson asks, "When was the New Testament written?" He goes on immediately to assert that datings which are commonly accepted are much less secure than the wide consensus of scholarly opinion would suggest. Among others, he sets forth the datings proposed by Harnack, H. von Soden, Kümmel, and Perrin. It is worth our noting that the dates proposed by Harnack in the 1890's are not so different from those presently favored by Kümmel, as a comparison of the first two columns from the left will show in the table on the following page.

The principal differences between Harnack and Kümmel involve Ephesians (if one takes it to be authentic), Matthew, which Kümmel is willing to date as much as twenty-five years later (but perhaps only five or so years later), James, which Harnack pust as much as 40 years later, and II Peter, which Harnack dates from twenty-five to thirty-five years later. On balance the dates of Kümmel are a bit earlier than those of Harnack, with only II Peter being certainly or significantly later than the turn of the century. For purposes of comparison, I have given the dates at which Robinson has arrived at the conclusion of his

**Redating the New Testament*, John A. T. Robinson. Westminster, 1976. 369 pp. $15.00.

Harnack		*Kümmel*		*Robinson*	
48–9	I & II Thessalonians	50–1	I & II Thessalonians	c.47–8	*James*
				50	I Thessalonians
53	I & II Corinthians, Galatians (?)	53–56	Galatians, Philippians, I & II Corinthians	50–1	II Thessalonians
				55	I Corinthians, *I Timothy*
53–4	Romans		Romans	56	II Corinthians, Galatians
57–9	Colossians, Philemon, Ephesians (if genuine) Philippians	56–8	Colossians, Philemon	57	Romans, *Titus*
				58	Philippians, Philemon, Colossians, Ephesians, *II Timothy*
[59–64	Pauline fragments of the Pastorals]				
65–70	Mark	c. 70	Mark	c.45–60	*Mark*
70–5	Matthew	70–90	Luke	c.40–60+	*Matthew*
				–57–60+(62)	*Luke* (–Acts)
79–93	Luke–Acts	80–90	Acts, Hebrews	61–2	*Jude, II Peter*
81–96	I Peter, Hebrews ("under Domitian")	80–100	Matthew, Ephesians	60–65	*II, III, and I John* (sic)
				65	*I Peter*
		90–95	I Peter, Revelation	–40–65+	*John*
80–110	John, I–III John			c.67	*Hebrews*
		90–100	John	68–70	*Revelation*
90–110	I & II Timothy, Titus	90–110	I–III John		
93–96	Revelation				
100–30	Jude	–100	James		
120–40	James	c. 100	Jude		
160–75	II Peter	100+	I and II Timothy and Titus		
		100–50	II Peter		

work in a third column on the right. Obviously they are much different from those of Kümmel and Harnack except for the uncontested Pauline letters, which are dated by Robinson at about the same time.

One notices that Robinson's dates are virtually all lower than A.D. 70, approximately the end of the so-called Apostolic Age. But that is not for Robinson the crucial consideration. Instead, the observation that nowhere in the New Testament is the fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 mentioned as a past fact becomes the keystone of his redating of the New Testament. It is, as Robinson acknowledges, mentioned in prophecy or prophetic statements, particularly in Mark 13:2, Matthew 22:7, and Luke 19:41-4; 21:20-4. While there is a division of opinion as to whether the famous prediction of Mark 13:2 ("Not one stone will be left upon another . . .") must be interpreted as a *vaticinium ex eventu* (prophecy after the event), it is widely agreed that references to the destruction in Matthew and Luke can only be understood as emanating from the time after the Roman War. From this widely held consensus Robinson strongly dissents (Chapter II), arguing that there is no compelling reason to think that the Matthean and Lucan passages could only have been composed after the event. Moreover, the Matthean and Lucan redactions of the Marcan Little Apocalypse do not reflect the post-70 knowledge of the destruction of the temple which one would have expected. They are difficult to interpret if they are taken to have been composed after the destruction of the temple.

In a long chapter on the Synoptic Gospels and Acts (IV), Robinson concentrates initially on the question of the date of Acts, whose historical validity he generally credits. Acts does not mention the fall of Jerusalem and, in fact, concludes with Paul under house arrest in Rome in the early 60's. The simplest and most natural inference from this data is that Acts, as well as Luke, was written before the destruction of the temple and before Paul's fate (i.e., death) had become known. In the remainder of the chapter Robinson sets forth his view of the development of the Synoptic tradition and Gospels in the light of the external, as well as internal, evidence. While Robinson seems unwilling simply to abandon the Marcan hypothesis in favor of Farmer, or Griesbach, he avers that he can no longer regard it as one of the assured results of criticism. The relationship among the Synoptics is too complex. The production of the Gospels, running on parallel, separate, but interconnected tracks, takes place between A.D. 30 and 60+, with the gradual commitment to writing occurring between 40 and 60+.

Robinson's treatment of Pauline chronology (III) is for the most part unexceptional. In fact, he does an exceedingly careful and painstaking job of assessing the relatively meager and ambiguous evidence of the epistles and relating it to the very few relevant known points of Roman and Jewish history. The only real surprise and novelty is Robinson's effort to incorporate the Pastorals into the lifetime of the Apostle Paul by placing them within the framework provided by Acts and the acknowledged letters. Apparently he is happier with this chronology than with the ascription of the Pastorals directly to Paul, for he proposes that they may be letters written on his instruction, but not actually penned or dictated by him.

In succession Robinson considers the Epistle of James (V), Peter and Jude (VI), and Hebrews (VII), contending in each case that nothing in them requires that they be dated after A.D. 70. Admittedly in most of these documents the absence of any mention of the fall of Jerusalem says little about their dates. The obvious exception is Hebrews, in which the argument about the supersession of the old covenant and sacrificial system by Jesus might have been admirably clinched by reference to the destruction and end of the Temple and its service. In its absence the logical inference is that the event had not yet occurred.

The Book of Revelation (VIII) is placed, not in the reign of Domitian as much ancient tradition and modern scholarship has it, but in the reign of Nero. Robinson finds in it no reference to the destruction of Jerusalem or its temple, although probably there is reference to the siege (ch. 11). Thus a date just before A.D. 70 appears appropriate. Moreover, this would fit the symbolism of the Roman emperors in Rev. 17:9-11, in which the "sixth king" (counting from Augustus), who is then reigning, is apparently Galba, who briefly succeeded Nero (d. 68). The most natural inference from such evidence is that Revelation was written ca. 68 and 70, just after the death of Nero, whose burning of Rome is reflected in Rev. 18, and just before the conquest of Jerusalem by Roman forces.

In a final major chapter on New Testament chronology (IX), Robinson argues for a pre-70 date for the Gospel and Epistles of John. In the case of the Gospel, at least, one would have expected some reference or hint of the catastrophe of A.D. 70 had it been written after that event, but there is even less hint of it in John than in the Synoptics. Over and beyond this, recent research has underscored the Jewishness of John, its relation to Palestinian sectarianism (Qumran), and the accuracy of many of its references to Palestinian customs and traditions, as well as geography. The wide agreement among modern scholars, as well as some ancients, that John was written late, or at least after the other gospels, is not really demanded by the evidence. On the contrary, the most relevant considerations point to a date just before, rather than after, A.D. 70. Robinson is strongly of the opinion that the Fourth Gospel is the work of the Apostle John, the son of Zebedee. A penultimate chapter (X) deals with the dates of the Didache, I Clement, the Shepherd of Hermas, and the Epistle of Barnabas; these Apostolic Fathers Robinson moves forward into the latter half of the first century. (The Didache may be as early as 40!)

In evaluating Robinson's work it is, of course, impossible to deal with it comprehensively in the relatively brief compass of this review. I shall confine myself to: (1) indicating areas of agreement or cases in which he seems to have called into serious question the commonly held dating of certain New Testament writings, and (2) reviewing crucial aspects of his arguments for an early date for Luke-Acts, the Pastorals and the Gospel of John.

I

In the case of Hebrews, I Peter and Revelation Robinson submits a strong case for their earlier, i.e., pre-70, dating. In each instance, as he himself makes very clear, the earlier dating represents a well-established alternative of contemporary criticism, albeit held by a minority of present-day scholars. I have long been uneasy with a post-70 dating of Hebrews, for exactly the reasons specified by Robinson. On the other hand, if the author was writing to Christians in Rome or elsewhere in the Gentile world in the year 90 and arguing solely on the basis of scripture, it is possible to conceive of his not mentioning the destruction of the temple. On the whole, however, I find Robinson's arguments cogent, and am not disposed to counter them..

The same may be said for his case for dating Revelation in 68-70. Here, however, I am less willing than Robinson to dismiss the possibility that earlier sources or visions—e.g., from Nero's reign—have been incorporated into a later work. I wonder also whether Irenaeus' testimony that the Apocalypse was written during the reign of Domitian would have been so quickly dismissed if it had been on the other side of the issue. Yet if the Book of Revelation is to be credited to Johannine circles, as I (with Robinson) suspect that it is, an earlier rather than a later date would comport better with any theory of development within such a school of thought.

The date and authorship of I Peter has long been a bone of contention among scholars. (Robinson carefully and rightly distinguishes questions of authorship from questions of date, although in this as in many other cases they cannot be separated.) In attributing I Peter to the apostle and dating it before 70 Robinson has the support of a sizable number, if not the majority, of English scholars. He seems to me quite right, however, in refusing to resolve the problem of how Peter, the rustic Galilean fisherman, could have written such good koine Greek by the phrase (5:12), "By Sylvanus . . . I have written. . . ." In any case we cannot be sure what is meant or implied by *dia Silouanou*. Is Sylvanus the amanuensis or only the deliverer of the letter? Probably most advocates of a later dating and of pseudonymity will not be convinced by Robinson. The letter is intelligible as an epistolary tract written at, or just before, the persecutions of Domitian or Trajan, and its general address (to Christians in Asia Minor) accords well with that theory, although it certainly does not prove it. (Robinson concedes that the Letter of Pliny to Trajan seems to describe conditions not unlike those anticipated in I Peter.) Perhaps not incidentally, Robinson tends to call into question the significance of the persecution of Christians under Domitian at the end of the first century in urging an earlier date for I Peter, Hebrews, and Revelation, favoring the evidence for a Neronic persecution in the sixties. It is worth remarking that the evidence for either is slim or ambiguous. While we do have the reliable testimony of the Roman historian Tacitus that Nero conducted a pogrom against Christians in the aftermath of the burning of Rome, I believe it is still regarded as unclear whether this was a widespread and systematic persecution of Christians as such. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that Robinson has ably stated a case for the early dating and authenticity of I Peter, and this is enough to give pause to anyone who has assumed that it belongs to the late first century (Domitian) or early second (Trajan).

To remark briefly on three other Catholic Epistles, I must say that in these instances Robinson is not so plausible or persuasive. It is not clear that the recent work of Sevenster (*Do You Know Greek?*) and others on Greek in first-century Palestine does more than make James' (the brother of the Lord) authorship of that Epistle conceivable, whereas to an earlier generation of scholars it seemed incredible that the Galilean Jew could have penned such excellent Greek. While it is quite possible that James, and Jesus, could get along in Greek, is it very likely that James could have written so well? Perhaps. But what if the epistolary greeting is secondary? There is no corresponding conclusion and no other indication that the author is writing to anyone. (Contrast I John 2:1, 7, 12, 26.) In that case there is also no reference to James, not to mention any hint of a personal relation to Jesus, in the letter. *Non liquet,* but Robinson has at least shown that a case for early authorship (47 or 48!) and authenticity can still be intelligently made. Somewhat by contrast, I feel that the author stretches our imagination, or invites credulity, in arguing for an early date (early 60's) and apostolic authorization, if not authorship, for II Peter and Jude. I am not sure whether, in this case the author has been led astray by his considerable powers of argumentation or whether having set out to prove that every New Testament book is early he has simply refused to cavil even before this unlikely prospect. In any event, his asides to the effect that at the beginning he would have found what now turns out to be his own proposal incredible leave me wondering whether he has fully convinced himself. His arguments that "this is now the second letter" (II Peter 3:1) does not have I Peter in view (II Peter is dated before I Peter!) and his efforts to persuade us that references to the (Christian) fathers having fallen asleep (3:4) and to all the letters of Paul (3:16), which are put on the same level as the "other scriptures," do not imply a late, or second-century, date I find quite unconvincing.

II

Doubtless very important for Robinson, and for us in determining the significance of the work, are his efforts to show that the Synoptics and John should be dated before the fall of Jerusalem. Also his attempt to date the Pastorals within Paul's life-time, if correct, would have serious implications for our understanding of the development of the early church. I shall leave out of account Robinson's arguments for a pre-70 dating of Mark, since there is by any accounting good reason to accept such a date.

Robinson carefully scrutinizes the texts and analyzes the relevant data in order to show that Luke-Acts is pre-70. In order to take this position he must, of course, demonstrate that the prophetic descriptions of the destruction of the city in Luke 19:41-44 and 21:20-24 (the Lucan version of the Little Apocalypse) are not *vaticinia ex eventu*, but are merely stereotypical formulations that would fit any siege or conquest. This it seems to me is a very big order, especially when one notes the positive correspondence between these Lucan passages and Josephus' lengthy description of the siege in the Jewish War. Luke's statements are brief and somewhat cryptic, as befits a prophecy, and it is difficult to argue that he knew Josephus' account. But I find it also difficult to believe that Luke did not write with knowledge and a visual image of the fall of Jerusalem at his disposal. The specificity of Luke on this point stands in some contrast to Mark. Whereas according to Mark the prophecy of the temple's destruction could have been fulfilled in some other way (e.g., an earthquake, the apocalyptic cataclysm), Luke appears to know how it actually took place, whether or not his language is stereotypical. The commonly held view that Luke edits the Marcan apocalypse in light of his knowledge of what actually took place still seems the most adequate explanation. If there remain historical anomalies in Luke 21:20-24, as Robinson thinks, they can be credited to the fact that Luke is working with traditional material over which he is reluctant to exercise an absolutely free hand.

Turning to Acts, Robinson understandably makes much of the point at which it ends, with Paul freely preaching the gospel in Rome. Acts also has no hint of the coming destruction of Jerusalem. (One might wonder, however, whether Paul's sharp denunciation of his people in 28:25-28 and his announcement that salvation *has been sent* to the Gentiles does not anticipate the catastrophe.) Yet because the latter part of the book is about Paul, and because the narrative stops without divulging his fate, that is surely the more basic problem with the conventional dating, and one of which Robinson makes a great deal. There is no denying the problem, but is it the case that Luke is unaware of Paul's fate? More than one commentator has seen in Paul's speech to the Ephesian elders (Acts 20:17-36) his valedictory address. Moreover, he announces (vs. 24-25): "But I do not account my life of any value nor as precious to myself, if only I may accomplish my course and the ministry which I received from the Lord Jesus, to testify to the gospel of the grace of God. And now, behold, I know that *all you among whom I have gone about preaching the kingdom of God will see my face no more*." (Italics mine.) At the end of the speech Paul gets a farewell whose finality Luke underscores (vss. 37f.): "And they all wept and embraced Paul and kissed him, sorrowing most of all because of the word he had spoken, that they should see his face no more." Did Paul at this time actually know his ministry was over? Romans 15:22ff., which following Robinson's own excellent presentation should be put at or about this same point in his career, gives no indication whatsoever that he did. In fact, it speaks altogether on the other side. What is the solution of this anomaly? Is it not simply that Luke, writing years afterward, knows Paul's fate, whereas Paul quite naturally did not?

Why then does Luke end his account where he does? One might guess facetiously that he follows the sound rule of not writing the history of anything within thirty years, or until a generation has passed. Thus Luke-Acts might be dated in 92. In fact, there are good and cogent, if not absolutely compelling, reasons for Luke's having ended his account where he did. He wants to show Christianity triumphant in its westward push. What better way to do this than to portray Paul at the end preaching the gospel and confuting opponents in the capital of the Roman Empire? To what advantage would he have told the story of Rome's, or Nero's, hostility and the death of the champion of the gospel? Clearly Luke wishes to demonstrate that Christianity was not a subversive cult within the Roman Empire. (We may recall that he changes the centurion's cry at Jesus' death to read, "Certainly this man was innocent"—Luke 23:47.) To have shown Romans executing the chief exponent of the gospel in the Eternal City would have scarcely advanced his purpose. Moreover, I Clement leads us to believe that Paul's (and Peter's) death was accompanied by division (if not betrayal) among Roman Christians (I Clement 5:1-6:1), something that Luke would not have wanted to recount. The simplest way of avoiding the necessity of depicting such things was to end the Acts narrative where he did.

For the Gospel of Matthew Robinson can make a somewhat stronger argument for a pre-70 date than for Luke. Matthew has nothing comparable either to Luke 20:20-24 or to Luke 19:41-44. In the view of most scholars Luke places his depiction of the fall of Jerusalem at what seems to him the proper point in the unfolding events of the apocalypse, which he drew from Mark. Matthew's apocalypse, however, contains no more explicit mention of the destruction of Jerusalem than does Mark's, and if one takes the "abomination of desolation" (24:15) to refer to the destruction, he must concede that Matthew misses the opportunity to describe it explicitly. Moreover, as Robinson points out, on that assumption "immediately after the tribulation of those days . . ." (24:29) must mean "immediately after the destruction of the city." This creates a problem, because it suggests that the coming of the Son of Man (vs. 30) is to follow immediately after the devastation of Jerusalem. Furthermore, the word "immediately" (*eutheōs*) is not found in Mark and has therefore presumably been added by Matthew. Therefore Matthew must have expected the parousia, and must have written, very soon after 70. In Robinson's view a post-70 date for Matthew therefore becomes difficult, for one must imagine him writing the Gospel just after the fall and while expecting the parousia at any moment. Isn't this improbable?

But what if it is not assumed that Matthew, even if he wrote after 70, must have interpreted Mark and written up the apocalypse as a prediction of the destruction of Jerusalem or the Temple? In fact, he gives the question of the disciples which opens the discourse as follows: "Tell us, when will this be and what will be the sign of your coming and of the close of the age" (Matt. 24:3). Matthew has introduced the references to the parousia and the close of the age, which are absent from Mark (and Luke), and has thus already shifted the focus of the discourse away from Jerusalem, if it was ever there. Possibly Matthew does not know how to fit the fall of Jerusalem into any apocalyptic scheme, and therefore does not wish to draw attention to it.

Robinson naturally does not concede that the reference to the king's destroying the city of those who refused his invitation to the marriage feast (22:1-10) is a *post factum* reference to the fall of Jerusalem. But just this seems even clearer here than in the Luke passages. The references to the sending of troops and the burning of a city are totally incongruous with the scenario of the parable unless one assumes that Matthew understands it as a parable of the Messianic Feast, which the Jewish contemporaries of Jesus refused to attend!

Then in the light of the destruction of Jerusalem his insertion of this sentence (22:7) becomes intelligible. The destruction of the city is the punishment of Judaism for rejecting Jesus. Other hints of the fall of Jerusalem may possibly be found in 23:34-39, esp. vs. 35f. ("That upon you may come all the righteous blood shed on earth . . .") and vs. 38, addressed to Jerusalem ("Behold, your house is forsaken and desolate.")

In conclusion, I cannot agree that Robinson has demonstrated that a pre-70 date for Matthew and Luke is more likely than a date between 70 or 75 and 100.

As to Pastorals, Robinson's view that they are basically Pauline and were composed during his lifetime is represented also by scholars such as Reicke, Kelly, and Jeremias. It can hardly be called eccentric or fundamentalist. More unusual is Robinson's effort to fit the Pastorals into the framework provided by Acts and the other epistles rather than positing a further period of activity after the house arrest described in Acts 28. In fact, most of the section dealing with the Pastorals (pp. 67-85) is devoted to arguing that the (earlier) dating of these letters within the chronological and geographical framework of Acts is preferable to dating them in a hypothetical later period of Paul's ministry. Thus he is in actuality debating with those who also accept the Pastorals as Pauline.

What Robinson does not do is debate seriously the question of whether the Pastorals can be considered the work of Paul at all. There are a handful of references to the work of P. N. Harrison, a bench mark in this discussion, but no effort is made to refute his linguistic and stylistic arguments against regarding the Pastorals, several sections or fragments excepted, as the work of the Apostle Paul. Robinson makes a perfunctory bow to such objections against Pauline authorship by suggesting (p. 83) that the Pastorals, unlike the other letters, are comparable to documents composed, or comissioned, by a modern missionary bishop in anticipation of an archidiaconal visit. Maybe so. Certainly it is difficult for one who can still recall the abrupt changes in language and syntax he encountered in the Pastorals as he first read straight through the Greek New Testament to agree that they were written or dictated by Paul.

But Robinson's dating of the Pastorals evokes further difficulties which go beyond matters of language and style. Conceivably Paul could have ordered the letters written on the basis of a general formulation of their content. (But the tone of the letters is quite personal, so that it is hard to imagine anyone other than Paul, or an imitator of Paul, having written them.) More important, however, is the question of whether the view of Christianity and the church represented by the Pastorals is construable as that of Paul or of the Apostolic Age. Robinson raises legitimate questions about the use of the concept of development in dating. But the discrepancies in perspective and emphasis between the Pastorals and the other Pauline letters which suggest they belong to different generations are considerable. These fall into roughly three areas: doctrine, ministry, and discipline.

The Pastorals do not contain *doctrine* not found in Paul, or contrary to Paul, so much as they seem to represent a stage in the development of doctrine beyond Paul. Faith is now not so much a relationship to God, the receptive pole of grace, as a deposit of doctrine (I Tim. 4:1, 6) or even a personal quality (II Tim. 3:10; I Tim. 1:5, 19). There is much concern in the Pastorals for right teaching and doctrine, as there is in Paul. What differentiates the Pastorals is their tendency to equate faith with right doctrine, so that being a faithful Christian comes to mean not so much awareness of standing in and under God's grace as possessing or affirming the correct and true doctrines which one has received from tradition (II Tim. 1:13f.; Cf. I Tim. 6:3, 20f.; Titus 1:13f.). It is perhaps characteristic of the Pastorals that faith is referred to as "the faith," i.e., the deposit of right doctrine (I Tim. 4:6). It follows that there is a great concern about heresy and its dire potential for corrupting the purity of the

faith. Thus I Timothy begins with a warning against certain wrong teachings (1:3ff.) and concludes (6:20) with an injunction to "avoid the godless chatter and contradictions of what is falsely called knowledge" (i.e., *gnosis*=Gnosticism). The mention of Gnosticism has itself been enough to lead some scholars to posit a second-century date for the Pastorals. Certainly Paul is concerned that a Christian's belief correspond with the truth of the gospel, but there is a subtle difference. He regards that truth to be a valid insight into the nature of the faith relationship to God through Christ, and its implications for life. He does not equate faith with believing right doctrine, a tendency we see beginning in the Pastorals.

Moreover, in the Pastorals those who are endangering the faith are not addressed directly. They have fallen out of any meaningful dialogue with the author and his hearers. The latter are regarded as "in" and only need protection from dangers and temptations emanating from without. Naturally Paul also speaks of dangers posed by those whom he is not addressing, or cannot address, in his letters. His letters, however, are not addressed to "pure and holy" churches who need protection from dangers lurking without, but to people who though justified are still sinners and need themselves to be reminded of the truth of the gospel. In other words, in Paul the concept of heretics who are beyond the pale and are simply to be shunned has not developed. When he can, Paul still addresses directly those who are falling away from the truth. In the Pastorals there has developed, or is clearly developing, the notion of the "ins" and the "outs," orthodoxy and heresy.

There is also a distinctive difference in that the Pastorals reflect the concept and reality of ordained *ministry* that is missing in the Paulines. One does find references to bishops and deacons in Phil. 1:1 (only instance in Paul). Yet it is a question whether they constitute an ordained ministry. In fact, there is no evidence that they do. Elsewhere Paul's letters indicate the existence of various functions and gifts within the Body of Christ (I Cor. 12) but no distinction between ordained clergy and laity. Just that distinction is, however, very evident in the Pastorals.

There are extensive instructions concerning the necessary qualifications of those who aspire to the office of bishop (I Tim. 3:1-7), elder (Tit. 1:5f.), and deacon (I Tim. 3.8-13). Timothy himself has been ordained by the elders (I Tim. 4:14), and by Paul (II Tim. 1:6). He is exhorted not to be hasty in granting ordination (I Tim. 5:22). Provision is made for the compensation of elders (I Tim. 5:17f.) by taking up the language and arguments Paul employed in defending the *apostle's* right to support from his churches (I Cor. 9). The very tone and tenor of the address to Timothy suggests a situation in which a ministry of ordained professionals is becoming well-established. Their duties and the congregations' expectations of them are generally accepted and widely known. This, I submit, is not the case in the other Pauline letters.

Together with the growth of ordained ministry goes a concern for church order and, especially, *discipline*. What conduct befits the Christian life and the Christian community? Not only are the necessary requirements of character and conduct for ordained clergy given, but expectations for the conduct of various groups are spelled out in detail: older men (I Tim. 5:1f.), widows (I Tim. 5:3-16); slaves (I Tim. 6:1-2); women generally (I Tim. 2:9-15). One has some such instructions in Paul, but there they are qualified by a lively sense of the Spirit's guidance and of the near end of the present world (i.e., eschatology). In the Pastorals, however, one has the impression that the church is settling down, becoming an institution with organization and rules, and necessarily so. The excitement and adventure which is so pervasive in the Pauline letters is missing. When Paul's own career is mentioned, it is largely in terms of past achievements (II Tim. 4:6-8). I am not suggesting that the Pastorals are therefore

inferior or of less value, but they bespeak a Christianity that has long since passed out of its infancy and into adulthood, if not middle age.

For this reason, unlike Robinson, most defenders of the authenticity of the Pastorals place them in a later period of Paul's career not described in Acts or reflected in the other letters. This is not just because of difficulties in fitting them into the earlier period. There are difficulties in any case. Rather it is to allow time for the developments in doctrine, ministry, and discipline to which they attest. It seems to me, however, that adequate time for such development is best gained by ascribing the Pastorals—or at least the present form of them—to a period well beyond the end of Paul's career.

Such a dating allows for the temporal span suggested by II Tim. 1:5, where we read of the faith "that dwelt first in your grandmother Lois and your mother Eunice and now, I am sure, dwells in you." It also comports well with the statement (II Tim. 3:14ff.) that Timothy *from childhood* has been acquainted with the sacred writings "which are able to instruct you for salvation through faith in Christ Jesus." True, in Acts 16:1 it is said that Timothy's mother was a believer and that Paul circumcised him to placate some Jews. But there is no hint that Timothy became a Christian in childhood. At the time we hear of him he is at least a young adult. The reference in II Timothy to his grandmother and mother, however, conveys the impression of a faith passed on from generation to generation. Moreover, if the reference to sacred writings (or scripture) in II Tim. 3:15 means distinctly Christian writings and not the Old Testament, we are in a period when the concept of a New Testament canon is beginning to emerge. Certainly the description of these writings as being "able to instruct you for salvation through faith in Jesus Christ" suggests they are distinctly Christian. In fact, I should say that this description fits the genuine letters of Paul remarkably well!

While I would not go so far as to claim absolute certainty for the view just expressed, although it is very widely held, it does, it seems to me, allow us to understand the Pastorals within the context of an intelligible framework of church history that is amply attested in the texts themselves. To regard them as the work of the Apostle himself, on the other hand, creates severe and unnecessary difficulties.

Robinson indicates at the beginning of his work that the impetus for it lay in his changing his opinion about the date of John. Yet he postpones the treatment of that Gospel until the end of the book (IX). It is clear that Robinson thinks that the earlier dating of the Fourth Gospel opens the way for putting all the New Testament books (aside from the uncontested Pauline letters) earlier.

After reviewing the external evidence for dating John relatively late, Robinson pronounces it mostly worthless. In this he may well be right, in that it is not based on independent historical information or traditions about the Gospel. He then traces the tendency of critical scholarship since F. C. Baur to date the Gospel earlier and earlier, so that there is now a wide consensus in favor of the last decade, or the last two decades, of the first century. The discovery of two early second-century papyrus fragments, one of the Gospel of John (P^{52}) and another from a gospel which employed John (Egerton Pap. 2), have rendered impossible a date very far into the second century and have made a first-century date appear quite likely. If a *terminus ad quem* at or just beyond the end of the century is well-established, the *terminus a quo* is not so clear. This is true especially if we can no longer assume that John used—and is later than—the Synoptics. In denying that John knew the Synoptic Gospels Robinson is in all probability correct, and he makes much of this. Moreover, he finds it incredible that this Gospel, addressed to Jews, should make no mention of the fall of Jerusalem if it was, in fact, written after A.D. 70.

(It should be noted that Robinson agrees with much recent scholarship in reading John against a Jewish background.)

One recently proposed *terminus a quo* for dating John is the twelfth benediction of the ancient Eighteen Benedictions of Jewish liturgical tradition, which experts date about A.D. 85. It pronounces a curse upon Nazarenes (Christians) and heretics, and was apparently intended to identify Christians, who could not recite it, so they could be rooted out of the synagogue. Correspondingly, in John 9:22, 12:42, and 16:2 it is said or implied that people are being put out of the synagogue for believing in or confessing Jesus. Robinson points out that there are ample indications of Christians getting rough treatment and being expelled from synagogues, far earlier than this. It happens repeatedly to Paul in Acts. Therefore, the Twelfth Benediction affords no basis for dating John. Yet it is not clear that in these earlier instances the reason for expulsion is specifically belief in Jesus as the Messiah. (When Paul goes back to Jerusalem, the leaders there are worried not about his belief that Jesus was the Messiah, but by his reputation for carelessness about the law.) In John, however, it seems to be, and this accords with the purpose of the post-Jamnian Twelfth Benediction. Following the same line of argument, Robinson rejects the view that John reflects the post-70 situation of Judaism, and not the situation that prevailed before the War, when there were various interests and sects. Yet the only Jewish party which figures in John's narrative is the Pharisees, and this is precisely the party that dominated post-70 and post-Jamnian Judaism. Furthermore, Pharisees and Jews are not sharply distinguished in John, so that he seems to regard them as one and the same.

The linchpin of Robinson's early dating is, however, the contention that the Gospel knows nothing of the fall of Jerusalem. Robinson dismisses the high priest's warning that if Jesus is allowed to continue performing his signs, "everyone will believe in him, and the Romans will come and destroy both our (holy) place and our nation" (11:48). His argument that this is an unfulfilled prophecy, inasmuch as they did not allow Jesus to continue but the Romans came anyhow, strikes me as somewhat lame. Why should Jesus' signs suggest the possibility of massive Roman retaliation against the temple and nation unless the war and destruction of the temple and city were already common knowledge, i.e., past historical events. It seems to me that this catastrophe makes an otherwise strange warning completely intelligible. John's characteristic irony is often expressed in such fashion. His statement appeals to a knowledge the Christian reader would possess, although the contemporaries of Jesus remain ignorant or do not know the real import of what they are saying or hearing. Moreover, to maintain, as Robinson does, that the Farewell Discourses could be expected to reflect knowledge of the fall, if it had already occurred is scarcely plausible. To argue, as he does, that every other feature of the Synoptic discourses is found there is to ignore the fact that precisely the apocalyptic element is missing from the Johannine discourses. Therefore, one would not expect to find in them a prediction of the fall of Jerusalem.

I mention briefly several other points at which I cannot follow Robinson. I am not convinced there is no presentiment of the destruction of the temple in John 2:19. Jesus says, "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up," to which the Jews respond, "it has taken forty-six years to build this temple, and will you raise it up in three days?" It is at least arguable that this version of the saying, which is distinctively Johannine, presupposes that the temple actually is in ruins, although this is not certain. In addition, I agree with Raymond Brown, against Robinson, that the best explanation of 21:23 ("The saying spread broad among the brethren that this disciple was not to die; yet Jesus did not say to him that he was not to die, but, 'If it is my will that he remain until I come, what is that to you?' ") is that the disciple in

question had died. Otherwise, the explanation loses its point. Brown also seems to me to read the passage correctly when he infers a considerable interval between the death of Peter (predicted in 21:18f.) and that of the other disciple. Finally, Robinson's affirmation of the ancient tradition which ascribes John to the Son of Zebedee ignores the evidence advanced by such scholars as Kümmel and Cullmann against the identification of the author, whoever he may have been and whenever he wrote, with the Son of Zebedee. For example, even if one grants that the Beloved Disciple is the author of the Gospel (21:24) in some sense, it is by no means clear that the Beloved Disciple is the same as John the Son of Zebedee. That identification is not made in the text. As Kümmel points out, none of the Synoptic incidents in which the sons of Zebedee figure are found in the Fourth Gospel. Moreover, the Son of Zebedee was a Galilean, while most of the action in John takes place in Judea; and the Beloved Disciple appears only in Judea until the resurrection scene of Chapter 21.

One could go on to argue on the basis of source or redaction theories, which Robinson admittedly regards as indecisive, that much of John's material is indeed early (pre-70) but that the present recension of the Gospel is later. This still seems more probable to me, although it perhaps cannot be said with absolute certainty that John was written after the fall of Jerusalem.

Not without reason Robinson rejects or sharply questions arguments for date based on alleged theological development. Paul's theology was in many ways remarkably developed. Nevertheless, John has seemed to many readers, ancient as well as modern, to represent an advanced stage in theological, especially eschatological and Christological, reflection which presupposes some considerable temporal distance from the events it describes. Moreover, the absence of apocalyptic eschatology from John—although motifs originating in apocalyptic thought appear—bespeaks a later date. I find Barrett's insight that John's abandonment of apocalyptic thinking is related to a general disenchantment with apocalyptic in Judaism and early Christianity after the Roman War quite persuasive (*The Gospel of John and Judaism*).

Perhaps sensing that the dating of the entire New Testament within the pre-70 period leaves very little Christian literature from the next thirty or forty years, Robinson moves Barnabas, The Shepherd of Hermas, and the Didache forward into the first century. I Clement is already generally thought to fall within it, and there has been some question as to whether the Didache belongs slightly before or slightly after 100. Whether Robinson's view that all are first-century and all are considerably earlier than generally thought (e.g., the Didache is placed between 40 and 60) is anything more than the consequence of his early dating of the New Testament others will have to judge.

Robinson begins by asking when "the New Testament" was written. I wonder whether this is the proper question. He frequently says or implies that the earlier dating of one document makes easier the case for an earlier dating of others. Especially the early dating of John opens the door for dating other writings early. This is not entirely untrue, for some of the same considerations apply in each case. Yet aside from the Synoptic Gospels and Paul (about whom there is no argument) the case for each document has to be made separately. There is no legitimate snowballing effect. By introducing the criterion of the fall of Jerusalem Robinson seeks to provide a universal solvent. It is certainly a relevant item, but was it necessarily as important for early Christianity everywhere as Robinson thinks? To ask that question is, however, to open up a whole range of problems which cannot be discussed here. But they merit further consideration.

In conclusion, I should say that Robinson has indeed shown that the evidence for a post-70 date of some New Testament books (Mark, Hebrews, Revelation) is very shaky. He has also called attention to the difficulty of dating

most of the New Testament documents, which contain few, if any, clear references to political or other dateable public events. I might add that he is not the first person to notice this! That he has succeeded in showing that his pre-70 dating of the Gospels and Acts is more likely than the conventional dating is another matter. He has advanced sophisticated arguments that will gladden the hearts of some folk who, on other grounds, have defended earlier dates. His views will be ascribed all the more weight, coming as they do from one identified with a radical theology. They may appear to lend scholarly certainty to opinions which some have previously held in faith. But the historian of New Testament and early Christianity has to deal with probabilities. Has Robinson shifted the balance of probability his way? In my judgment he has not.

C. S. Lewis: The Shape of His Faith and Thought. Paul L. Holmer. Harper & Row, 1976. 116 pp. $6.95 hardcover, $3.95 papercover.

When C. S. Lewis died in 1963, he left a rich legacy of some forty books, including works of literary criticism and history, children's fantasy, science fiction, poetry, theology and apologetics, and a few pieces not easily classified. Much of this corpus, especially the fiction and Christian writings, retains wide popularity. Besides being a major scholar of English literature, Lewis was the foremost apologist of his day, a time when many notable laymen took pen to defense of the faith.

It is noteworthy, then, that Professor Paul Holmer of Yale Divinity School has added a useful book to the growing literature about C. S. Lewis and his writings. This little book (one might wish it were longer) has met with instant popularity, going through several printings already. From his position of philosophical, theological, and literary expertise, Holmer provides insights frequently lacking in the literature about Lewis.

Holmer is not offering a summary of Lewis' thought, or an account of the "real" C. S. Lewis. Rather, he intends "to stress what seems again so important and to draw attention to what may be so easily overlooked." There is "a wisdom to be learned" in all of Lewis' pages. By pointing out the salient themes of this wisdom—aesthetic, moral, and religious—Holmer helps the less informed reader toward a full appreciation of Lewis' corpus.

In various ways, through fiction and polemic, Lewis attacked modern academic preoccupations which cloud the task of making sense of our lives. He wrote to help his audience understand literary, moral, and religious traditions, not to replace them. We do not need theories and explanations in these matters so much as we need reminders to guide our appreciation. With ample illustration, Holmer draws these themes out of Lewis' pages, to help our reading of Lewis and not to replace it.

Prof. Holmer's volume is in five chapters. The first is an overview of Lewis' literature, and introduces the themes later expanded. The second chapter deals with Lewis' literary criticism. Lewis did not repudiate the quest for knowledge, but thought experts were not needed in morals, religion, and aesthetics. For general theories do not explain the nature of human achievement in these areas. Literature, for example, shows us what the world and humanness are like by acquaintance with the possibilities for human living and seeing.

The third chapter discusses the traditional moral foundation which is implicit in all of Lewis' pages, and explicit in some of his writings. Lewis is not preachy about morality, but he is convinced that the tissue of life is moral. As a personal achievement, morality is the ground of living rationally, of making sense of our-

selves and the world by ordering our wants, wishes, desires, cares. For Lewis, the traditional virtues provided an irreplaceable vocabulary for the universal task of moral understanding and responsibility.

The fourth chapter describes Lewis' view of human nature, a fundamental aspect of his thought. Lewis did not offer a theory of man; instead, his work is a wide-ranging recognition that modern reductionist attempts to give an account of human nature are inadequate and misguided. Lewis had a high regard for the human consciousness, but he did not exalt raw individualism. Rather, he saw that individuality, selfhood, is an achievement by which one comes to know reality. What we know depends on who we are and what we have made of ourselves. Lewis' varied pages show the form of human life with its noble and ignoble possibilities. That portrayal of life draws us to his pages, and consequently to wisdom about what people are.

The final chapter of Holmer's book is "On Theology and God." Lewis was quite familiar with modern theology, but rejected most of it in a reassertion of what he called "mere Christianity." His religion was stringent and traditional, and he cast it in the language that Christian people speak naturally and spontaneously. As such, his writings are popular; they speak to all who would make religious sense in an age when even theologians seem to get in the way of that sense. Lewis did not think the gospel required accommodation to modernity; rather, the individual needs to be reshaped by fundamental Christian concepts. But Lewis was not a fundamentalist. Indeed, he belongs to no one theological camp, and is associated with no extremes. He asserts a Christian rationality that is available for every person, as a cogent way of Christianly knowing and talking about the world. Lewis' appealing picture, like the gospel itself, speaks to our deepest longings.

Holmer does an admirable job of displaying the constant wisdom of Lewis' literature and describing the modern contexts in which much of Lewis' writing has its polemical thrust. Only the final chapter leaves one feeling a bit short-changed: one could wish for a bit more detail on the scope and substance of Lewis' Christian pages. This criticism, of course, may be only a function of the present reviewer's own preoccupations. Occasional reference to thoughts of Søren Kierkegaard and Ludwig Wittgenstein clarify some of Lewis' themes, without complicating matters. Thus, Holmer brings a philosophical and theological sophistication to his pages, without limiting access by a wide audience. And this book does deserve a wide audience. For, unlike much of the literature on Lewis, it does not allow appreciation to preclude any appropriate criticism; and we get that along with the volume's other virtues, the primary one being a sure hold on just what C. S. Lewis was doing. Holmer writes in a clear, persuasive style, noticeably devoid of sexist language. Anyone with an interest in Lewis will find Holmer's book, then, both enlightening and a joy to read.

E. Dale Madren

Human Sexuality: New Directions in American Catholic Thought, Anthony Kosnik, et al. Paulist Press. 332 pp. 1977. $8.50.

Let me begin this review with the effusive generalization that reading this book and a follow-up study it stimulates could be a rewarding educational experience for Protestant ministers and teachers in an area of life that is characterized by controversy, confusion and emotional rhetoric. I hope to be more explicit regarding this evaluation in the latter part of the review.

The factor that prompted an elite Catholic group to initiate this book is clearly stated in the opening paragraph of the Preface: "Human sexu-

ality has become in recent years a subject of extensive study, research, reflection, and debate. Profound changes in sexual attitudes and behavior patterns in America and elsewhere *have led to serious questions regarding the adequacy of traditional Catholic formulations and pastoral responses to sexual matters.* (Italics mine.) In the fall of 1972, recognizing its responsibility to the American Catholic community and its pastors, the Board of Directors of the Catholic Theological Society of America commissioned the establishment of a committee to do a study on human sexuality in the hope of 'providing some helpful and illuminating guidelines in the present confusion'." The committee consisted of three priests, a nun, and one family man, representing training and experience in systematic and moral theology, the parish ministry, church history, medical and sexual ethics, and law. After several years of research and wide consultation that produced two preliminary drafts for distribution and criticism, and a preliminary report to the CTSA membership, the committee made its final report last fall. As stated in the Foreword, the CTSA Board "voted to 'receive' the report and to arrange for its publication." But it continues: "These actions imply neither the approval nor disapproval by the Society or its Board of Directors of the contents of the report. The publication is intended as a service to the membership of the Society and a wider public of interested persons by making available the results of this research." The publication has probably exceeded the expectations of its sponsor because, according to one prominent Catholic reviewer, "it is causing a sensation," with virtual battlelines readily constructed by caustic critics and enthusiastic supporters. But more of this later.

The book has a logical sequence in its development and impressive clarity in its literary style, reflecting long and intimate consultation of its writers. Indeed, a definite impression is its uniform composition which is unusual in a book with this many authors. The first two chapters provide an essential historical overview of the biblical foundation and Christian tradition regarding human sexuality with a special effort "to separate what is revealing and lasting" in both sources "from what is culturally conditioned and subject to change." The third chapter reviews pertinent empirical data from the social and behavioral sciences, with solid evidence that recognized authorities in these fields have been consulted on a variety of sensitive subjects in human sexuality "in order to take due note of new developments and information which recent studies have afforded." The fourth chapter, entitled "Toward a Theology of Human Sexuality," begins the core of the book because it "attempts to integrate the biblical, historical, and anthropological data into a theological synthesis" which provides the base for a definitive Christian view of human sexuality. Here it is claimed that "contemporary moral theology is challenged to attempt to articulate a theology of sexuality that is both consistent with Catholic tradition and yet sensitive to modern data." How well the authors achieve this challenge is at the epicenter of the stormy response they have created.

Having established their base the authors devote the bulk of the book (140 pp.) in its final chapter to presenting "pastoral guidelines for human sexuality under the following four major categories, three of these with significant specific subjects subsumed under the major topic: *Marital Sexuality* (emphasis mine)—call to responsible partnership, call to responsible parenthood with contraception, sterilization, artificial insemination, and child-free marriages treated as special problems and common law marriages, communal living, swinging and adultery described as "variant patterns"; *Non-Marital Sexuality*—sex relations outside marriage, dating and court-

ship, the single state, and celibate and virginal sexuality; *Homosexuality;* and *Special Questions*, about masturbation, sexual variants, sex clinics, transsexualism, pornography and obscenity, and programs of sex education. Such a wide swath of considerations allows only a brief treatment of a number of these and therefore invites the criticism of superficiality. The authors in a Postscript acknowledge this: "In retrospect, we recognize our undertaking to be so vast in its proportions and implications as to have been almost foolhardy. Yet we assumed the task—because our own pastoral experience indicated a critical need for it."

In this reviewer's estimate the most sensitive subjects are dealt with in an approximate in-depth manner. Furthermore, I found the typical treatment of these most controversial subjects both instructive and surprisingly consonant with a sound Protestant educational approach. Take for example "sex relations outside of marriage." First, pertinent scriptural references and the teachings of Catholic tradition are critically examined. Secondly, "current approaches to the morality of pre-marital sexuality" are described in terms of positions and possible options promulgated by various authorities with merits and objections succinctly stated. Thirdly, the authors identify their own position. Finally, from this base, they offer flexible guidelines for "pastoral reflection" and counselling, leaving the ultimate responsibility for decision-making to the informed conscience of the person seeking help.

And now the question which the reader has probably been impatiently expecting: Why is this book "causing a sensation?" Kenneth L. Woodward, general editor of the section on religion in *Newsweek*, presented in the July 11 issue an overview of reactions, mostly con, with the hierarchal warning from the chairman of the doctrinal committee of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, William Cardinal Baum, that many of the study's conclusions "are not in accordance with the teachings of the Church"; and a writer in *Commonweal* (Sept. 2) pointed to "the prompt assurance given by Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, as president of the U. S. Bishops Conference, that the hierarchy's theological commission would respond to the document." At this writing this response has not yet been published, but its predictability obviously conveys hierarchal concern, to say the least.

In my study of the book and a half-dozen reviews in Catholic publications, I have attempted to discern the fundamental causes for the book's basic rejection by its critics. Due to lack of space I shall have to point to these briefly and hence inadequately.

First, *Human Sexuality* has precipitated an open confrontation of a debate that has been going on "in private or in restricted professional circles." John G. Milhaven in the *National Catholic Reporter* (June 17) reveals that "most of the report's propositions now hotly criticized have been defended for some time by a good number of respected theologians and applied in pastoral guidance by a good number of respected pastors. . . . But none of them has brought as many propositions together for public discussion as this report does." I get the solid impression that the hierarchy of the Church and some moral theologians oppose this open confrontation.

This point leads to the storm's center, namely the book's definitive interpretation of human sexuality and its application to the pertinent subjects and problem areas enumerated above. Contending that their interpretation is grounded in the timeless insights into human sexuality found in the Scriptures and Church tradition and increasingly supported by empirical evidence, the writers formulate their view: "Wholesome human sexuality is that which fosters a creative growth toward integration. . . . This terminology seems to reflect more accurately the profound and radical understand-

ing . . . expressed in the Church's more recent documents. Vatican II's dynamic concept of personhood . . . provides the basis for this new approach further extended in the 1975 *Declaration of Sexual Ethics*. . . . Given this new concept of Christian personhood and proclaiming 'the nature of the human person and his acts' as the harmonizing principle, it is our contention that the older expression of procreative and unitive (as the purpose of marital sex) is too static and limiting to be of value in guiding the development of a theology of human sexuality. Such a formulation too narrowly restricts the meaning of sexuality to the context of marriage as has been the case throughout much of our tradition." (Pp. 86-87) The determining criteria for "creative growth toward integration" is whether or not sexual behavior is "self-liberating," "other-enriching," "honest," "faithful," "socially responsible," "life-serving," and "joyous." And to obviate the criticism that this personalistic approach is latent, if not explicit, humanism the authors repeat their claim "that all of these values must be enlightened and permeated by the core principle of Christian conduct, the Gospel law of love" (pp. 92-95).

As is apparent, this proclamation of the meaning and purpose of human sexuality not only reverses the priorities of the Church's official teaching but amplifies the unitive function primarily in personalistic terms. This radical subordination of the procreative function in marital sex makes morally licit, under certain circumstances, the use of most of the birth control methods currently prescribed and even endorses, again under certain circumstances, sterilization and intentional "child-free marriages," which also contravenes official teaching. Hence, the reader can anticipate "radical" departures in the treatment of other areas of sexual behavior which cannot be considered "intrinsically evil." This treatment "departs widely from the authoritative teachings of the magisterium," hence, is "next door to heresy," according to one critic.

Let me succinctly point to several other prominent criticisms, several of which are partially justified in my opinion, while others are not: The authors' claim that they base their pervasive thesis on scriptural and doctrinal teaching is not only "strained," according to one reviewer, but here is "distortion of relevant ecclesial documents"; according to another, "the fact that the authors are always 'open to further evidence' suggests the marshmallow character of their moral criteria"; "it is weak on social norms and naive about the tragic aspects of sexual relationship"; and finally, it is "a fatuous report by people who have no real scholarly standing"! (?)

But a keen observer and widely read author in this field, Eugene Kennedy, professor at Loyola University, while critical on several points, strikes an affirmative note: "One should be grateful that the book helps to articulate a major change in the relationship between contemporary men and women and institutionalized religion. It should be read with an awareness of the break in history which it documents" (*The Washington Post*, July 17).

Space restricts reference to only several significant values I see for Protestant ministers and teachers as they consider reading this book. First, any retention of the myth—if there is such after Vatican II—that Roman Catholicism is monolithic, lacking in freedom to debate and even promote radical dissent, should be disspelled once and forever. Secondly, any minister or teacher who regards himself or herself as a competent counsellor in problems of sexual behavior will become acutely aware of the complex nature of these problems and will exercise greater restraint in giving "expert advice." Thirdly, the book offers abundant resources for education or continuing education toward increasing competence and confidence in dealing with these matters, not

only because of the self-analysis it stimulates and its suggestive pastoral guidelines, some of which one can identify with, but also because of its rich biographical references in the footnotes and bibliography. Here is an invaluable resource for help in a critical area of life.

In essence, I see in this book an example of what is greatly needed in Protestant denominational circles. One may disagree vehemently with some of its conclusions on sensitive issues but one should only welcome the high level of dialogue and debate it stimulates with the hope that Protestant officialdom will do likewise in similar study publications. Several denominations have done so. The last General Conference of the United Methodist Church rejected such an opportunity—in this reviewer's estimate, a serious failure and loss to this Church's progress in these crucial considerations.

J. H. Phillips

Ministry and Imagination. Urban T. Holmes, III. Seabury, 1976. 279 pp. $10.95.

Ministry and Imagination may prove to be the most significant contribution to pastoral theology in this decade. Urban Holmes, Episcopal priest and Dean of the School of Theology at the University of the South, is among our leading Protestant-Roman Catholic pastoral theologians, and this is his finest work. By combining incarnational theology and the insights of anthropology with his own life of ministry and imagination, he has given the church a much needed, unique, insightful book.

For too long, pastoral theology has been restricted to the fields of pastoral care and counselling, just as for too long religious education has been restricted to concerns about schooling and instruction, and ministry to institutional administration and preaching. At the very minimum, we should be indebted to Dean Holmes for re-establishing the proper, inclusive, holistic field of pastoral theology. But there are more important reasons why we should be grateful, especially we who are concerned with catechesis as an aspect of pastoral ministry.

Catechesis includes all pastoral activities which make divine revelation known, which aim at awakening and developing faith and which equip persons for apostleship in the world. *Ministry and Imagination* speaks creatively to these very issues. Indeed, the main point of the book is that ministry needs to focus on the awareness of God's Word. Dean Holmes rightly insists that if a community of faith perceives God's presence in the world, our individual and corporate lives will be transformed. No one has ever made a better case for the unity of religious experiences and radical social action. More important, he has provided the insights necessary for the development of a liberating, transforming catechesis.

Ministry and Imagination is divided into three sections: "The Context of Ministry," "Toward A Contemporary Piety," and "Patterns in Ministry." Focusing on the need of congregations to be responsive to the presence of God in their midst *now*, the substance of the book is an exploration of the natural need and possibility of people living in an enchanted, God-filled world. Ministry, while concerned with the meaning and rooting in mystery, is *in* the world. Further, ministry is a shared communal transmission of and confrontation with the meaning of transcendent experiences as manifest in the ordinary world of daily life rather than something done to or for others by a professional. Drawing on his experience and knowledge as a priest, theologian and anthropologist Dean Holmes affirms the centrality of the church's *internal* life. Thus he returns piety to its proper understanding and place in the religious life. We humans are naturally pious, that is, created for the life of imagination. The truly radical life of the Christian in the world is only

possible for those whose imagination has been freed. Having the ability to be aware of and responsive to the Word of God in everyday life, a Christian congregation can truly understand and live in the freedom and joy of God's grace. Congregational life lived in the reality of transcendental experience will create a necessary productive tension between being a conserving-intimate and radical-innovative community.

Thus rather than shutting the church off from concern for the world, the life of true piety helps the community more clearly to appreciate and perceive God's actions in history, even as it stimulates the community to engage in creative action in the world. If the church is to become a community of Christian faith it needs more than leadership with a set of professional competencies; it needs a "mana-person, clown, storyteller, wagon master," for a priest and a congregation in search of spiritual depth. If the church, as a storytelling community, could once again learn to live a life of imagination rooted in mystery in a world seen as "enchanted," it would be able to break free from its ghetto existence and be led back "into the world as revolutionaries for the sake of the kingdom."

Our contemporary secular world suppresses and distorts our God-given piety, the ministry has become a profession of pastoral administrators, the church a ghetto mirroring the culture, and religious education has become instruction about religion. *Ministry and Imagination* with its focus on the Christian story-tradition, personal and corporate piety, ritual, religious experience, and action in the world provides a foundation for tranforming our understanding and ways. This is a rare book, worth more than its price. It is essential reading for all concerned Christians, clergy and laity alike, and it should be required reading for all seminarians and persons in the field of religious education.

Ministry and Imagination is the most significant contemporary work on the church's ministry, the most satisfactory, inspiring response to the present crisis in church and ministry. It is a rare contribution to both theory and practice—both a scholar's and practitioner's dream. If I were to name the one most influencial book I have read this year, *Ministry and Imagination* would be it. Needless to say, I unreservedly and enthusiastically recommend it.

John H. Westerhoff

One Hundred Years of Old Testament Interpretation. Ronald E. Clements. Westminster. 1976. 152 pp. $4.95.

It is entirely appropriate, given the fact that a century has passed since the publication of the formative works of the great German scholar Julius Wellhausen, that modern scholars seek to clarify the origins of their thought and to take stock of the ground that has been covered since that time. Clements' volume proposes only to sketch the main lines of development and to do so at a level which is comprehensible not only to the student but to the general reader as well.

The following topics are surveyed, comprising the chapter titles: Pentateuch, Historical Books, Prophets, Psalms, Wisdom Literature, and Old Testament Theology. There is a concluding section entitled "Retrospect and Prospect," plus an index of authors. Surprisingly, there is no treatment of apocalyptic literature, to which much energy has been devoted in very recent publications. Deliberately omitted are treatments of developments in the area of linguistics and archaeology (the latter being the only area in which Americans have played a predominant role).

Since few will question the accuracy of Clements' portrayal (he is a scholar of the first magnitude), and since he has attempted no more than a sketch of the major developments, there is little point in elaborating on the contents here. It is perhaps sufficient to stress that this is a volume of unusual clarity and admirable literary style,

which will likely replace such works as Herbert Hahn's *The Old Testament in Modern Research* (1954, expanded in 1966). It is recommended for any pastor who is concerned to understand "where things are" in a modern view of the Scriptures. And the price, it should be noted, is a bargain, and all the more so given the quality of the product.

Lloyd Bailey

Covenant and Promise. John Bright. Westminster. 1976. 207 pp. $10.00.

How does one explain the breadth and tension of opinion among the Biblical prophets about Israel's immediate future? On the one hand, Isaiah seems to argue that initial military setbacks, however severe, are not indicative of the final outcome: the city of Jerusalem will not, indeed cannot, be taken by an enemy (speaking specifically of the Assyrians in the seventh century, B.C.E.). On the other hand, Jeremiah will argue that the entire country, including the city of Jerusalem, will fall to the enemy: all resistance is futile, and one ought to surrender to the enemy (speaking specifically of the Babylonians in the sixth century, B.C.E.). Bright argues, quite properly, that the difference is not merely political opinion nor has it anything to do with changing historical circumstances (such that Isaiah might later have agreed with Jeremiah in his unique situation). Rather, enduring and canonical theological perspectives are reflected, perspectives grounded in Israel's ancient identity-forming traditions. First is the Mosaic (Sinaitic) Covenant, with its stress upon obedience in view of God's prior gracious deliverance (Exodus) and with its clear warnings of the consequences of disobedience (Deuteronomy). Second is the Davidic Covenant, with its stress upon God's gracious, eternal, unconditional promise to preserve the dynasty (2 Samuel 7) and the royal city (Psalm 78; 132). Bright traces the origins and various interpretations of these two covenantal self-understandings from their beginnings through the exilic period (sixth century), showing how elements of them can be complementary or how they can be pressed into utter tension.

The nucleus of the book was presented in the Currie Lectures at Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary in 1971, and thus to those current in their Biblical scholarship the issue and its solution will sound a bit dated. Still, it is the best introduction to the problem that I have seen: well organized, uncomplicated in syntax, devoid of the obscure terminology so dear to some writers in this field, succinct, and relatively well balanced in its conclusions. Although it is going beyond Bright's purpose in the volume, my suggestion is that the pastor will find in it helpful background for speaking to the contemporary sickness called "civil religion" (or perhaps the issue should be posed in terms of "establishment" vs. "non-establishment" theology).

At least two basic questions may be raised about Bright's perspectives on this issue.

1. He repeatedly stresses that in prophetic eschatology (a problematic term concerning which he gives a helpful discussion), while there is no suprahistorical terminus, there is the expectation of a new age in history "beyond which there was no need to look . . . it would endure forever" (p. 19; cf. pp. 82, 93). It has been argued, I think correctly, that the prophets were not quite that naive about human nature or about history: the devotion characteristic of the new age would endure for a while, then itself need renewal. History has shown such a perspective to be a correct one. (For brief remarks along these lines, see James Ward, *Hosea* [Harper, 1966], pp. 86f., 125f.)

2. Not everyone, including the reviewer, is quite so sure that the historical Isaiah proclaimed Jerusalem's inviolability, although temple rituals (e.g., Psalm 78; 132), popular religion (Jeremiah 26), and non-canonical

prophets (Jeremiah 28) certainly did so. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that not everyone is sure that the passages which seem to indicate that perspective (e.g., chapters 36-37) belong to the earliest Isaianic collection. Even when faced with explicit statements in unquestionably genuine material (e.g., 5:5-6) which contradict his interpretation, Bright merely says that "one might gain the (wrong) impression" (p. 103) and shunts the evidence aside without explanation. For a more cautious interpretation, see Th. Vriezen, "Essentials of the Theology of Isaiah," in *Israel's Prophetic Heritage,* B. Anderson, ed. (Harper, 1962), and for the position that Isaiah expected Jerusalem's destruction no less than other prophets such as Jeremiah, see James Ward, *Amos and Isaiah* (Abingdon, 1969). [The reviewer was amazed to find no reference in Bright's discussion either to Ward's volume or to the position which he ably represents; this is an imbalance quite uncharacteristic of the rest of Bright's volume.]

The scope of Bright's volume could have been expanded in an exciting way to include the so-called "false" prophets. They, no less than the so-called "true" (canonical) prophets, spoke from a theological perspective based upon Israel's ancient covenant traditions. For an introduction, see "Prophecy, False," in *The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible,* Supplementary Volume (Abingdon, 1976), pp. 701-702, and the bibliography cited there. For a more detailed treatment of the problem of conflicting religious voices, see Henri Mottu, "Jeremiah vs. Hananiah: Ideology and Truth in Old Testament Prophecy," *Radical Religion,* II, nos. 2-3 (1975), 58ff.

In conclusion: this is a basic volume for the pastor, and is recommended for the church library.

Lloyd Bailey

Micah: A Commentary. James Luther Mays. Westminster. 1976. 169 pp. $10.95.

As most of the readers of this *Review* already know, the Old Testament Library from Westminster Press includes some very sound and helpful volumes. The present book under review is no exception to the general over-all strength of the series.

Hopefully, most will remember that Professor Mays has already contributed two volumes to the segment dealing with the prophetic books, commentaries on Amos and Hosea. The present volume on Micah was sorely needed since so little has been done recently in English on this prophetic book.

Professor Mays contends that the book of Micah as it now stands contains prophetic material from the latter part of the eighth century B.C. all the way to the end of the sixth century B.C. He discusses the form of the book and suggests a history as to how it came to settle in its specific arrangement. Naturally this includes denying to Micah of the eighth century B.C. a goodly portion of the book as it now stands. Mays thinks that only the sayings in 1:3-5a, 8-15; 2:1-5; 2:6-11; 3:1-4; 3:5-8; 3:9-12 can be attributed to Micah, and that even these have been subjected to some additions and revisions.

The author begins his volume with a relatively brief but thorough introduction to the prophet and the book. This is followed by a verse by verse commentary which follows the order of the Biblical text.

The present reviewer encourages the reading of this book on a significant but often overlooked prophet. The present volume by Professor Mays does not seem to be as smoothly written as his volumes on Amos and Hosea, but this may reflect the complexity of the redaction process of the book and is not intended as a negative criticism. This book is a significant piece of work and is a volume worthy to be included in any pastor's library.

James M. Efird

Hebrews, James, 1 and 2 Peter, Jude, Revelation. Proclamation Commentaries. R. H. Fuller, G. S. Sloyan, G. Krodel, F. W. Danker, E. S. Fiorenza. Fortress. 1976. 122 pp. $3.50.

For those who are already familiar with the Fortress Press series, Proclamation Commentaries, the style and format of this particular volume can be anticipated. This series is designed primarily for pastors in order to keep them abreast of current interpretation of the books of the Bible and to offer suggestions for application of the message of the books for present and contemporary society. The Biblical books are presented topically and are not exegeted in a verse by verse format. The emphasis is upon attempting to relate the meaning of the original writings to the problems of the contemporary church and thereby to assist in the preaching ministry in the local setting. It is an attempt to assist the preacher with the "hermeneutical problem," to use the more common term in vogue today.

The present volume deals with six New Testament books which originated in what is sometimes referred to as the "post-apostolic" period. The authors generally have performed a commendable service by discussing the books in a way that is enlightening and helpful to the contemporary preacher.

It would be impossible in a short review to discuss each of the writers and the content of his/her contribution. Suffice it to say that over-all this book would be a good investment for the contemporary preacher, especially at today's book prices. Even though no one will agree with all the points made by the various authors, nevertheless there are many interesting and helpful comments contained in this short and concise presentation. There is also a short bibliography at the conclusion of the book which gives some direction for further study. The books which are listed are fine, but it would have been even more helpful if some additional volumes had been included as well.

James M. Efird

Truth and Method. Hans-Georg Gadamer. Seabury. 1975. 551 pp. $22.50.

It is cause for great satisfaction that this classic of hermeneutic analysis (first published in the German in 1960) is now also available in the English in this country and can be used by students and instructors alike in university and seminary classes. The translation is usually very readable. There are occasional blunders, though, for which the reader might want to gird himself beforehand. For example, on p. 378 we are told, "Incarnation is obviously not embodiment." What is said in the German is difficult to say in the English, since it lacks an exact equivalent. But the German text certainly does not imply that incarnation is not embodiment. The best I was able to come up with as translation was, *incarnation is not in-corporation (Einkörperung).* Gadamer in this section is speaking against the notion of the transmigration of the soul according to which the soul merely indwells the body. As over against this type of thing, Gadamer probably would very much want to say that incarnation *is* embodiment, excluding a view of incarnation that would intimate a mere indwelling (in-corporation) of the soul.

Since I am on the subject of translation, the reader needs to be forewarned that on p. 155 the second paragraph chops up a whole sentence of the original. In translation it should appear as: "Not only counter-reformation theology viewed it that way, but also Dilthey." And on p. 237 in the last paragraph at least a clause from the German got lost (". . . it cannot be a general expectation that what is stated in a text . . ."). According to p. 532 (note 123) R. Guardini's book on Rilke is supposed to have been mentioned on p. 333. No such

reference appears on that page. Since in the U. S. the Swabian Pietist Oetinger is so little known, the name index might have done well had it listed also pp. 441 and 502 where Oetinger is also mentioned. On p. 358 interpretation is misspelled, and perception on p. 406. But these are minor blemishes. They will not keep the reader from getting the message.

Why is the book important for theology? The development of thought from Rudolf Bultmann to Ernest Fuchs, today partly represented by Eberhard Jüngel, had a peculiar hermeneutical valency that turned theology almost into hermeneutic. Gadamer is very aware of this development: "Theology here almost becomes hermeneutics, since—following the development of modern biblical criticism—it does not take as its object the truth of revelation itself, but the truth of the statements or communications that are related to God's revelation. . . . Hence the chief category is that of communication" (p. 478). In some ways, in Gadamer's philosophy we have a more "original" representation of the milieu of the new hermeneutic than what theologians John B. Cobb and James M. Robinson could bring off in their second volume of the *New Frontiers in Theology* (1964).

The particular thrust of Gadamer's project focuses on the place of the tradition in human understanding. The "existential structure of Therebeing must find its expression in the understanding of historical tradition as well" (p. 234). There is no way in brief to summarize the richness implied in this stress on tradition, as there certainly is no way to offer the gist of the book in capsule form. The tradition stands for the fact that all of us are more influenced by our personal and collective histories than we are willing to admit. Perhaps in contrast to the more familiar views of hermeneutic, some derived from German romanticism, one might summarize Gadamer's position as *tradition vs. subjectivity*. In some respects Gadamer's great antipode turns out to be Dilthey: "Self-reflection and autobiography—Dilthey's starting-points—are not primary and are not an adequate basis for the hermeneutical problem, because through them history is made private once more. In fact history does not belong to us, but we belong to it. Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society and state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being" (p. 245).

Gadamer is aware of distortion in subjectivity. But how much is he willing to work with the distortions in the tradition and in the language which encompasses the tradition? The model on which he examines language is the philosophical dialogue or everyday conversation. He admits of the awareness of "the fundamental inexactness of all human knowledge" (p. 396) at certain points of the philosophical tradition. Yet what of the fact that society cannot be modeled only on dialogue? What about the factor of constant conflict in society? Is not language in the conflict often used to hide our thoughts? Does not a kind of language poisoning take place all the time in the concealment? And is not one of the reasons for the concealment the use of language for domination?

Gadamer is deeply aware of the problem of domination. Perhaps here criticism of Gadamer's position can be most fair. The principal domination criticized by Gadamer lies in the area of the natural sciences: "But the knowledge of all the natural sciences is knowledge for domination" (p. 409). One wonders, how about domination in politics and economics?

This is the crucial point raised by Gadamer's German colleague, Jürgen

Habermas. Language as tradition is itself dependent on societal processes. Language itself also functions as an instrument of domination and power. We cannot overlook the fact that language legitimates all kinds of relationships in organized power. To the extent that the legitimation process is not articulated in explicit terms language is *also* ideological.

Segregation in the South is a case in point. Language was used to legitimate the apartness of two people. It was said, "Separate, but equal." And it took more than language to change the previous language pattern of isolation between two races, even on university campuses. It took political clout. Today it is an issue of making the language catch up with the new power situation.

While Gadamer offers no help in locking horns with societal conflict, there is a basic contribution in regard to the relationship between philosophy and theology that represents a milestone. In spite of the social conflict blindspot, there is a step toward liberation in Gadamer (p. 433). With Heidegger one had to take over Heidegger as the *right* philosophy (*pace* Bultmann, or Macquarrie, or Ott). Gadamer one cannot take over even if one wanted to. Gadamer wants philosophy to do its business in paying attention to its tradition. Theology (by implication) is invited to do its job in terms of *its* tradition, to take seriously its own experience structure, and to make headway by turning first of all to its own root-metaphors. Theology cannot be apologetic anymore (as still in Macquarrie). But it also does not have to be *not* on speaking terms with philosophy (as in Barth). We are breathing a freer air.

If one remembers how much theology has been under the thumb of either the historical consciousness as an absolute or philosophy as an absolute one can quickly sense a few dimensions of what it means to breathe more freely in the Gadamer context. (1) We can approach Christian origins in a new way—as empowerment of contemporary Christian understanding. The conflict between the historical Jesus vs. the Christ of faith goes by the board as a primal issue. On the primal level language cannot be chopped up into language that yields objective data (historical Jesus) and language that expresses subjectivity (Christ of faith). In the heavily metaphorical language of Christian origins we have the real thing first of all. On the primal level it does not symbolically point beyond itself. It claims us in its uniqueness. Says Gadamer: "I must allow the validity of the claim made by tradition, not in the sense of simply acknowledging the past in its otherness, but in such a way that it has something to say to me. This too calls for a fundamental sort of openness. Someone who is open in this way to tradition sees that the historical consciousness is not really open at all, but rather, if it reads its texts 'historically' has always thoroughly smoothed them out beforehand, so that the criteria of our own knowledge can never be put in question by tradition" (pp. 324f.). Theology is challenged to give an account of the claim of its own tradition first of all in regard to the primal language of Christianity in Christian origins.

(2) What is hardly understood as yet is the hermeneutical shift as a seismic shift of sensibility. With the Enlightenment the old metaphysical consciousness collapsed and the historical consciousness came into being. Today the historical consciousness yields to the hermeneutical consciousness—as the Enlightenment passes over into the Liberation. This also entails a shift in the Reformation understanding of the Scriptures. We are no longer underscoring the *sola Scriptura*. What we are struggling with is the *prima Scriptura*. The originative language of the Christian community because of its primacy comes to us as claim. It is not the *story* as such that now overrides the creed. We are learning that the largely metaphorical character of the

originative language confronts us with a reality-gain. Some metaphors in the New Testament reflect God's struggle in history in a new way. Concepts, such as those of the creeds, grow out of metaphors. They are secondary. The metaphors reflect a new experience structure that lies at the root of the Christian tradition. The task of theology time and again is to recapture the character of this new experience structure.

The new approach delivers us from all kinds of dualisms or splits of thought. I shall mention only two examples. The split between self-giving love (Jesus' death on the cross) and justice (Jesus' life and teaching of the kingdom) is shown to be spurious. Language as the center from which we think encompasses both on the primal level. Only the historical consciousness creates the split. The same is true of the awesome split between the modern community of epistemology (what are the objective criteria?) and the community of the church (what is truth commitment?).

It has to be underscored that in the context of the growing hermeneutical consciousness theology, however, has to go its own way. We have stressed the new experience structure reflected in the originative language of the Christian faith. What Gadamer as a philosopher has to say of *every authentic experience* does not do justice to where theology needs to look: "As a genuine form of experience it must reflect the general structure of experience" (p. 321). The root-metaphors of the Christian faith do not fit into the general structure of experience, at least not in their most unique aspects. There are occasional overlappings. But basically the root-metaphors do not dovetail with what we otherwise know of reality. In a way Gadamer knows this too. But the book offers the strange spectacle of a philosopher honest enough not to deceive himself over the specificity of the Christian experience structure, and yet caught in the web of the traditional philosophical expectations of a universally accessible truth. Christian theology can only take the route of inquiring first into its own experience structure, without being derailed by expectations of universal truth.

Gadamer knows the uniqueness of the Christian tradition, and yet as a philosopher will not carry through consistently what it implies. For example, in regard to Christology Gadamer understands the specific experience structure it reflects rather well: "In the midst of the penetration of Christian theology by the Greek idea of logic something new is born: the center of language, in which the mediation of the incarnation event achieves its full truth. Christology prepares the way for a new philosophy of man, which mediates in a new way between the mind of man in its finitude and the divine infinity. This will become the real basis of what we have called the hermeneutical experience" (p. 388). It can become the real basis of the hermeneutical experience only if the history of Christian origins is adequately struggled with. Christian history is not just mediation between finitude and infinity. It is quite clear that the center of language in the church relates a solidarity of the infinite with the finite in the struggles for justice in history. The oppressed, the marginals, the poor are the center of language, not philosophers engaged in dialogue. Christian theology is compelled to relate God's involvement in the conflict. Gadamer does not take this route. But for once the philosopher does not block the way.

Frederick Herzog

What Is Structural Exegesis? Daniel Patte. Fortress. 1976. 90 pp. $2.95.

Structuralism has to do with the discovery of fundamental structures of narrative and myth which come to expression in concrete texts. Their existence, or subsistence, has been suggested on the one hand by advanced research in linguistics and on the other hand by cultural anthro-

pology. That such insights or discoveries should be relevant to the Bible and to biblical exegesis is certainly a resonable proposal and one worthy of serious and sustained investigation.

To the end that the insights and perspectives of structuralism might be made more accessible, this brief paperback has been issued as a volume in Fortress Press's useful "Guides to Biblical Scholarship Series." According to the advertising blurb on the back cover, we have in this boot "at last . . . an introduction to structuralism . . . which does not presuppose advance [sic] knowledge of linguistics or anthropology." Moreover, "through clear analytic explanations illustrated by application to specific texts, Professor Patte shows how structuralism and traditional scholarship must go hand in hand so that they can carry the exegetical task to its end. . . ."

These statements represent reasonable goals and expectations for the book, but regrettably this reviewer cannot agree that either has been entirely fulfilled. As one whose nascent interest in structuralism has not yet led to a mastery of the relevant works of Levi-Strauss or de Saussure, I can only confess that without such firsthand knowledge I found some of Patte's book to be profoundly opaque, particularly parts of chapters III and IV, where he deals with biblical texts. While such an incomplete knowledge of structuralism does not allow one the right to criticize the substance of Patte's presentation, which seems quite erudite, I must express disappointment that I myself found no greater help here. Furthermore, it is really misleading to claim, as the blurb does, that Patte shows how structuralist and traditional exegesis go hand in hand. He repeatedly insists that they may and should, but in the analysis of specific texts he does not actually show how they complement one another.

In all likelihood the problematic nature of this book bears testimony more than anything else, to the presently inchoate and burgeoning state of the subject matter. As I understand it, structuralism is itself an approach, perspective, or method that is still coming into being as the result of research and insights in various disciplines. An author who is asked to explain it to neophytes must therefore attempt to accomplish a synthesis that has not yet emerged in actual research and to describe a method that is not yet firmly established. No wonder then that Patte's prose seems awash in jargon and punctuated by recondite formulae.

Possibly the time for such a book as this on structural exegesis has not yet arrived. Let us wait five years or so. In the meantime, those of us who are interested and uninitiated should perhaps read Levi-Strauss and de Saussure!

D. Moody Smith, Jr.