


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EARLY CIVILIZATION
AN INTRODUCTION TO ANTHROPOLOGY

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III

EARLY CIVILIZATION

AN INTRODUCTION TO ANTHROPOLOGY

By

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V.

TO MY FATHER



PREFACE

THOSE whose common preoccupation is with ideas are wont to cherish the illusion of originality. But if the history of mental contents were disclosed we should find that most of what we know and think is derived from others.

My more clearly discernible obligations are due to many. It is hard to express the extent of my indebtedness to Professor Franz Boas, of Columbia, whose glowing enthusiasm and colossal knowledge have for many years served as guidance and inspiration. Of the many intellectual companions of my academic years I want to single out four whose ideas and criticisms have aided in the formation and shaping of my own thoughts: Professors Robert H. Lowie and A. L. Kroeber, of Berkeley, Doctor Edward Sapir, of the Victoria Museum, Ottawa, and Paul Radin, of everywhere and nowhere.

My gratitude is due to my friend and colleague, James Harvey Robinson and to Mrs. Etta Stuart Sohier, of Los Angeles, for reading and criticising the first version of this book. Their suggestions proved so valuable that the original plan of revising the first draft was abandoned and a new book written. I want to thank my old chum and companion, Samuel Joseph, for reading the page proof.

I also want to express my obligation to my classes in anthropology at Columbia and The New School for Social Research, for without the experience gained in the preparation and delivery of these lectures, the book could not have been written. My final obligation is due to my secretary, Miss Anne V. Cooper, who has fulfilled the enormous task of typing and retyping the manuscript, has read the proofs and made innumerable suggestions as to the form and content of the pages that follow.

ALEXANDER A. GOLDENWEISER

New York, December 16, 1921.

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1.

**INTRODUCTION:
MAN AND CIVILIZATION**



THE UNITY OF MAN

Truth comes hard. The recognition of man's animal descent has been a slow growth. When Darwin wrote, over half a century ago, the evidence in favor of our animal ancestry began to be irresistible. This did not prevent a storm of protest from breaking over the head of the great biologist when in his "Origin of Species" he began to prepare the ground for the new doctrine. In "The Descent of Man" his position became categorical. But it remained for the more uncompromising and temperamental Haeckel to sweep man's pedigree clean of all traces of supernaturalism and to popularize the idea of man's natural evolution among wide circles of the educated and semi-educated laity.

Though similar to the animal in many ways, man differs markedly from even the highest animals, including his closest known relatives, the anthropoid apes. Erect gait, shape of the cranium, size of the brain, position of the head, development of the hand; and with these, the use of tools, articulate language, and the gift of abstract thought—such are some of the traits that set off man as an unique achievement of biological evolution, as a super-animal, immeasurably removed from all his precursors.

In this connection, the claim is sometimes made that some races are closer to the animal than others. The prognathic jaws of the Negro, the prominent supra-orbital ridges of the Australian, the dark skin color of most primitive men, are a few of the features pointed to as suggestive of animal traits. A somewhat more careful glance at the facts, however, at once introduces distracting complications. The ape-like character of the Negro's jaws cannot be denied, but his very jaws are fitted out with a pair of lips that remove him as far from the animal as the jaws bring him near it. For developed external lips are a specifically human trait, and in this particular the Negro represents "man physical"

more distinctly than any other race. Again, the prominent supra-orbital ridges of the Australian carry an unmistakable animalistic suggestion, and one might be inclined to add to this another trait, namely, the great hairiness of the Australian, if not for the disturbing thought that in the latter respect the white man is his worthy rival, while the other races are much less hairy. And the same applies to other features.

Is it not clear, then, that the races, with their complexes of more or less characteristic traits, cannot be arranged in an ascending series from the animal upward? In particular instances, one race may prove to be an offshoot of another, the American Indians, for example, of the Mongolians; but if all structural peculiarities of each racial stock are taken into consideration, the races, all animal and all human though they are, must be regarded as anatomical varieties specialized in different directions.

Prompted by motives partly scientific in their nature and partly otherwise, the advocates of white man's supremacy have utilized another set of facts. In this case the evidence adduced referred to the size and weight of the brain and to the macroscopic as well as microscopic structure of this organ.

White man's claim to psycho-physical superiority receives but little support from a consideration of brain size and weight. It must, of course, be admitted that the physical evolution of the vertebrates was accompanied by a progressive development in the relative size and weight of the nervous system and, in particular, of the central organ of nervous control, the brain. In the case of man, the brain has indeed reached unprecedented dimensions. In proportion to the bulk of his body, man's brain is much larger and heavier than is that of any other animal, including our closest known precursor, the anthropoid ape. And with the increased bulk of the brain, there went an unmistakable rise in intelligence.

It is, however, by no means easy to apply the insight thus reached to the human level itself. First of all, bulk of body

again comes in as a factor. All in all, large people have large brains. But bulk of body is not discernibly related to intelligence. Hence, doubt arises whether among modern white men any connection obtains between brain size and weight and intelligence. The evidence gleaned from post mortem examinations of brains is equally inconclusive. In one series of brains of great men, for example, it was found that Turgenev's brain was extraordinarily large and heavy, while that of Gambetta, also a man of no mean mental capacity, scarcely reached the average. As the case stands to date, it seems not improbable that the brains of a selected group of eminent men when compared with those of a non-selected group of men, would not show any significant differences in size and weight.

It follows from this that any inferences in regard to intelligence based on comparisons of brain size and weight must be drawn with great caution. But are there such differences between the white race and other races and, if so, what is their nature? Students of the subject tell us that if a sufficiently large set of white man's brains were compared with a similar one representing another race, the vast majority of the brains of the two sets would be strictly comparable in point of size and weight. The only difference would be this: a small number of white man's brains would be heavier and larger than any brains in the other set, while a small number of brains in that set would be smaller and lighter than any brains of white man.

Would it not be hazardous, then, to base any conclusions as to racial capacity on differences that are so tenuous, particularly in view of the highly dubious relation between brain size and weight and intelligence?

With the brain structure the case stands somewhat differently. In addition to the data on white man's brains, we have the results of Professor Bean's painstaking investigations of a large set of Negro brains. These investigations have disclosed the presence of distinctive structural peculiarities which must be recognized as racial. There is,

however, no indication that the revealed differences between white and Negro brains stand for potential intellectual inferiority on the part of the Negro. Those who desire to see such inferiority demonstrated will naturally tend to interpret Professor Bean's results in this sense; the sober student, on the other hand, will reserve judgment,¹ pending further research, which, he may well expect, will disclose peculiarities of racial psychology correlated with the observed differences in brain structure. In what direction these peculiarities will lie cannot at this time be foreseen.

The foregoing examination of the biological and neurological evidence leaves us very near where we were at the beginning of our inquiry. No proof has been forthcoming of the inferiority of the other racial stocks to the white.

But what is the tenor of the direct evidence of psychology? Here we are confronted by the time honored allegation that the senses of the "savage," his vision, hearing, smell, are more acute than are those of white man, and that this very superiority bespeaks his closeness to the animal. In the power of abstract thought, on the other hand, in the capacity for sustained labor, the ability to endure pain, he is supposed to lag far behind the standards established by white man.

Old travelers' accounts abound in references to the amazing sense acuity of the "savage." Scarcely audible sounds, we are told, are perceived by him and interpreted as a warning of danger. He observes the tracks of animals and of man under conditions that seem impossible to his white companions. From the appearance of a bush in the thicket or the grass under foot, he infers what kind of animals have

¹That apart from interpretation, Professor Bean's concrete results are not above criticism may be gathered from the constructive and critical essay by F. P. Mall ("On Several Anatomical Characters of the Human Brain, etc.," *American Journal of Anatomy*, Vol. IX, pp. 1-32). See particularly p. 11, where Mall compares his results with those of Bean, derived from the measurement of the same set of brains.

been there and may even roughly guess their number. He possesses a complete inventory of the sounds produced by the beasts and birds of his habitat and is able, moreover, to reproduce many of them with striking fidelity.

Accounts such as these were eagerly sought by the advocates of white man's superiority. The "savage," it was held, is like the animal in the sharpness of his senses. White man, with his higher intelligence, has passed beyond that stage. He is no longer in need of such extraordinary keenness of the lower faculties, for nose, eye or ear could never serve his vital needs as effectively as does his mind, with its superior acumen and resourcefulness.

Whatever may be said of these interpretations, the facts themselves, when examined with an open mind, do not imply any inborn superiority of the "savage" in sense perception. It must be remembered that aboriginal man lives in close and constant contact with nature, its forces and its dangers. His natural economy requires a very delicate adjustment to the peculiarities of his environment. If he is to live, he must learn to use his senses as well or nearly as well as do the animals and birds of his wild habitat. All this, however, is merely a matter of habituation. If transferred to an unaccustomed environment, the master of the woods and the prairie would promptly lose his superior sense capacity. A Bushman or Australian, suddenly removed to Broadway, would succumb to the natural dangers of his new milieu even before he had realized the inadequacy of his equipment for dealing with the changed situation. White man, on the other hand, has more than once shown his ability to develop the very qualities of the senses which are so necessary in a primitive setting. The frontiersman and the settler, the trapper and the agent of the Hudson's Bay Company, excelled in the very characteristics that were thought to constitute an innate peculiarity of the American Indian, and any of these, including the Indian, would undoubtedly meet their peer if not their master in psychic

equipment in a member of the mounted police of the Canadian Northwest.

The very high degree to which the sharpness of the senses can be developed by constant application is attested by the experiences of modern civilization. Our experts on cloth and tapestry, on tea, tobacco and wine, achieve after some years of practise, a power of delicate sense discrimination which to the uninitiated seems wellnigh incredible. Equally remarkable is the high sensitiveness of touch acquired by the professional typist, and the even greater delicacy of that sense as well as of the sense of hearing possessed by the accomplished violinist and cellist.

The recent development of experimental psychology has provided a tool by means of which the psychological equipment of the "savage" could be tested with greater exactitude. In a number of instances opportunity presented itself to apply the procedure of the experimental laboratory to the native populations. Doctor W. H. R. Rivers, as a member of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits, subjected the natives of these islands to an extended series of psychological tests; Mr. Richard Thurnwald applied somewhat similar methods in the course of his expedition to the Solomon Islands; while Professor R. S. Woodworth, of Columbia University, was fortunate enough to find himself in a position to experiment with representatives of a variety of primitive tribes gathered for purposes of exhibition at the St. Louis Fair. The verdict of the above investigations is unanimous and unmistakable: the senses and the elementary mental reactions of aboriginal man are strictly comparable to those of his white brethren. No disparity whatsoever has appeared that would suggest congenital racial differences of superiority or inferiority of sense equipment, although some interesting facts that could not have been foreseen have come to light, such as the prevailing yellow-blue color blindness of some Melanesian natives, which contrasts with the red-green color blind-

ness of white man, and may prove to be a sub-racial characteristic.

It is easy to show that the alleged inferiority of early man in the higher mental functions is also based on deficient knowledge and an erroneous point of view. Followers of Herbert Spencer are wont to say that the "savage" is lacking in capacity for sustained labor. But are the reports from which such generalizations are derived based on a fair view of the primitive laborer? Certainly not. The evidence gleaned from plantation conditions, for example, cannot be expected to throw much light on the natural capabilities of the native worker. Recent studies, such as those of J. A. Hobson, Carleton Parker and Miss Marot, have done much to popularize the information we now possess about the effects of the worker's psychic state on his efficiency. The striking results of the reputed "Saturdayings" and "Sundayings" of Soviet Russia bring, perhaps, the most recent evidence of what labor can do under stimulating psychological conditions. And the reverse is, of course, equally patent. If the experiences of housewives with their domestic help were available as comparative data, would not the standing of white men and women as exemplars of efficiency in sustained labor receive a decided setback?

Those who have had the opportunity of studying native man in his normal setting were often impressed by the apparently limitless care and assiduity with which he devoted himself to those tasks of industry or art which to him were of prime concern and emotional value. Primitive industries, in particular, often call for intense and persistent application extending over days and weeks, and these requirements are faithfully fulfilled by the natives without visible signs of distress or any necessity for social compulsion.

Similarly ill-founded is the alleged inability of primitive man to endure pain. The statements responsible for this judgment were, of course, based on those many instances

where, as slave, forced laborer, or hired soldier, primitive man had displayed but slight disposition to withstand pain or suffering. Here again, familiarity with native life cannot but dispel the illusion that any congenital disability is involved. The tortures of the Sun Dance are stoically endured by the Indian youths of the American Plains. The native boys of the Australian bush show equal stolidity during the protracted initiation ceremonies, in the course of which the old men subject them to trying and often painful manipulations. Maori tattooing provides another example. In the case of a chief this process occupies weeks and months, and in the course of the daily seances, the subject must endure almost continuous pain. The arduous task of the artist presents equally striking evidence of native capacity for sustained labor. A rite of initiation widespread in Africa and Australia involves the knocking out of teeth or the filing of teeth into triangular shape. The common requirement thereby is that the excruciating pain must be borne without whimpering. If records of such performances were collected and compared with others that might be supplied by our dentists, would the results be likely to support the belief that aboriginal man is our inferior in his capacity for withstanding pain?

Among the higher functions of the mind with which early man was thought to be but inadequately endowed, mathematics and language have figured most prominently. It is quite true, as alleged, that many tribes—those of central Australia, for example—are unable to count further than four or five. But are they really unable to do so because of psychic incapacity? Nothing could be further from the truth than this inference, and ethnologists have repeatedly made the experience that the learning of our numerical system with its corollaries presents but little difficulty to the average native. Whenever such deficient numerical systems occur, they merely represent a peculiarity of the civilizational setting, and not at all a psychical disability. Among tribes where no medium of exchange has developed, where

exact measurement is unknown and ideas of property remain relatively undefined, there is little need for numerical expression and computation, and progress in this domain is likely to be slow.

The case of language is equally instructive. That primitive languages consist of a scant collection of words, that the very phonetic elements of these languages tend to fluctuate, that they are practically devoid of grammatical structure—all such generalizations have long since been relegated to the rubbish heap of discarded dogmas. In the course of the last fifteen or twenty years, the languages of the American Indians have been studied in great detail, while only less systematic work has been accomplished in other regions, especially in Africa. As a result of these researches, our ideas of early languages have been thoroughly revolutionized. It is now known that the vocabularies of more than one Indian tongue comprise several thousands of words and possess phonetic characteristics comparable in fixity and complexity to those of the ancient and modern languages. But most important of all are the grammars of these native tongues, the reconstruction of which we owe to the ingenuity and untiring labors of the ethnological linguists. For these grammars are always definite and often elaborate, and while displaying certain characteristics common to all grammars, also possess many individualized peculiarities.¹

It is, of course, true that the linguistic processes underlying grammatical structure are wholly unconscious. They are, nevertheless, psychological; and the evidence of classification, generalization and abstraction involved in the categories of these native grammars may not be disregarded in any attempt to understand the workings of primitive mentality. When the Kwakiutl distinguishes by an instrumental suffix all verbs designating an action performed by a sharp

¹For a highly interesting as well as original presentation of linguistic facts, in which full justice is done to primitive languages, see Edward Sapir's recent book, "Language" (Harcourt, Brace and Company).

object, the category involved implies generalization and abstraction, and this particular language has a whole series of such instrumental suffixes. When the Algonquin languages classify all nouns into animate and inanimate, a generalization is once more implied. The very existence of categories in grammar—and what is grammar but a set of categories?—is evidence of classification, generalization and abstraction.

That the conditions of aboriginal life do not foster a persistent occupation with ideas is true enough, but we shall have more than one occasion to show that our own wonted predilection for abstract thought has been greatly overestimated.

Enough has been said to indicate that the evidence of biology, neurology and psychology fails to supply any data on the basis of which could be inferred either a primitive superiority in sense development or an inferiority of early man in his capacity for abstract thought and in other achievements supposedly peculiar to white man.

To all this the objection may well be urged that we do not judge of civilization indirectly, through the biological or psychological traits of the individuals who represent it. We judge of civilization directly, on its own merits. Now, if primitive, ancient and modern societies are juxtaposed, is it not patent that the achievements of the modern civilization of white man, surpass beyond comparison all that has been attained before in history or pre-history? How can this superlative excellence be explained except through some advantage in congenital capacity?

Unanswerable though it may seem at first glance, this criticism greatly overstates the case. For is the superiority of our own civilization really so obvious and demonstrable all along the line? That this is not so is readily revealed by a more careful survey. It is undeniable that in the mass of accumulated knowledge we loom far above all our predecessors. The same is true of the application of knowledge to abstract thought: the domain of thought based on con-

crete and verifiable data is vaster today than ever before, and in many instances this experientially-controlled thought process is both highly elaborate and equally exact. This applies to the abstract domains of science, philosophy and social and political ideology in some of its aspects. The high degree to which knowledge is utilized in practical activity is equally peculiar to present day civilization. It may well be, in fact, that this aspect is more characteristically modern than any of the others. The application of biology to medicine and bacteriology, of chemistry to industry, agriculture and sanitation, of psychology to education, criminology and business, of the theory of probability and other branches of mathematics to life insurance and statistics, are distinctively modern phenomena incalculable in their bearings on civilization.

So far, then, white man's cultural achievement stands supreme, lending at least a *prima facie* justification to his claim of innate superiority. It must, however, be remembered, that in his command of knowledge with its theoretical and practical adjuncts, modern white man is superior not only to the Australian bushman, to the Indian of America, to the African Negro or to the Mongol of Eastern Asia; but in all of these respects he also towers above the ancient Babylonians and Egyptians, the Greeks and the Romans, nay even over our most immediate precursors in the history of Europe. Go back five hundred years and nothing is left of modern civilization; go back two hundred years and some of its most distinctive traits are still absent; go back one hundred years and you find a civilization lacking in most of the things we feel to be of the essence of our own cultural life. The aeroplane and the wireless, the telephone and the telegraph, and the very use of electricity; railroads and steamships and automobiles; scientific agriculture and industrial chemistry; the doctrine of evolution and the very natural sciences with their highly precise measurements and methods; trusts and trade unions and the very essentials of machine production and of capitalism; all of this, his-

torically speaking, dates of yesterday. And further: do these represent typical developments that have taken place again and again in civilizations born of white man? Far from it. This complex of achievements must rather be regarded as an unique excrescence of the historic process, as a singular historic twist that has favored our civilization. Who can tell whether a similar precipitation in cultural growth might not have occurred in the case of another people and race, or may not occur in the future; or whether, if the historic process were to begin anew, white man would prove equally successful?

But the case does not stand as favorably for white man as would appear from this presentation. Knowledge, theoretical and applied, is not the whole of civilization. Now, in art, religion and ethics, or in social and political organization, our superiority over the peoples of antiquity, or even over those of pre-history, is not by any means as definite nor as indisputable. While a detailed consideration of the comparative aspect of the problem falls outside the scope of this book, it will be well to keep in mind that our superiority in any of these respects can only be established in the light of special and highly subjective standards. The problem, in other words, passes from the domain of measurement to that of value, from that of objectivity to that of taste and opinion.

Enough has been said to show that the view still generally held of the relation between race and civilization may well be reversed. According to the prevailing view, man is many and civilization one, meaning by this that the races differ significantly in potential ability and that only one, the white race, could have and actually has achieved civilization. The reverse view, forced upon the ethnologist and the historian by a more critical and open-minded survey of the facts, reads thus: *man is one, civilizations are many*, meaning by this that the races do not differ significantly in psychological endowment, that the variety of possible civilizations is great and of actual ones, considerable, and that

many civilizations other than ours have achieved things of genuine and unique worth.

With this as a background, we may proceed to examine somewhat more closely what it is that is called civilization. To this problem the next section is devoted.

THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATION

What, then, is civilization?

Our attitudes, beliefs and ideas, our judgments and values; our institutions, political and legal, religious and economic; our ethical code and our code of etiquette; our books and machines, our sciences, philosophies and philosophers—all of these and many other things and beings, both in themselves and in their multiform inter-relations, constitute our civilization. In many of these things it differs from the civilizations of antiquity and from those other remoter ones of pre-history.

It is characteristic of civilization that it persists; a large part of it, most of it, in fact, is passed on from generation to generation. But also, it changes: at no two points in time is it quite the same, and the differences in the civilization of two succeeding generations are often perceptible and at times striking.

It takes but little thought to realize that the changes in civilization are each and all due to the emergence of new things, inventions, ideas, which, in the last analysis, are always emanations of the minds of individuals. Whether the change is in a mechanical device, or a detail of social organization; in a new scientific idea or ethical value; in a method of simplifying or improving economic production or distribution; in a new play, or a novel form of stage art; in an article of use, comfort or luxury, a new word, a witticism, a proverb—all of these things originate in individual minds and there is no other place where they can originate. Nor is this generalization in the least affected

by whatever view one may hold as to the relative importance of the individual and society in the production of civilization. Even though the individual were wholly determined by the social setting, all of the civilizational changes just referred to, including those in material things, would remain psychological in their derivation and, as such they could only originate in individual minds, for there are no other minds but those of individuals. Thus the whole of civilization, if followed backward step by step, would ultimately be found resolvable, without residue, into bits of ideas in the minds of individuals.

But civilization also persists and accumulates. Some elements carry over from generation to generation through the sheer objective continuity of material existence. Most of the paraphernalia of our complicated mechanical equipment, the roads, vehicles and houses, the books in our libraries, the specimens in the museums, persist in as crass and material a way as does man's physical environment. The institutions, those crystallized depositories of attitudes, ideas and actions, persist in a less objectified form, for they are only in part represented by material or mechanical arrangements, such as fixed organizations, recorded codes and archives, in whose prolonged existence the change of generations appears as but an incident. But there is still another and more important mechanism through which civilization is passed on from fathers to sons. This mechanism, more dynamic and plastic than the others, is education. Through education, in the home, at school, in society, the past molds the present and sets a pattern for the future.

Here it is important to remember that civilization, psychological and individual though it may be when resolved into a chronological series, is not at all the outgrowth of the minds of individuals of any particular generation. On the contrary. It comes to them from without, it molds them, it forces itself upon them through the material persistence of its objective elements, through its codes and institutions, and through the deep cutting tools of education.

A large part of the educational process strikes the mind of the individual during the years of highest receptivity and plasticity. Without accepting the extreme verdict of psychoanalysis on this matter, it suffices to realize that what is deposited in the mind during the early years of childhood, persists throughout later life with often but slight modification.

Not only is man at the mercy of civilization, but he generally remains either partly or wholly unaware of what he is thus forced to accept.

While we regard the language in which we think and express our ideas as very particularly our own, the grammatical structure of that language rests in the unconscious. The complicated system of classifications, categories and nuances, which make up grammar, are used by the individual without the least realization of their presence. In primitive communities, where writing is unknown, individuals are totally unaware of the very existence of a grammar underlying the language they daily use. The situation is not so very different today, for the fact that grammar is taught does not prevent us from absorbing the structure of our mother tongue without the least reference to whatever conscious knowledge we may acquire of its grammatical principles. Only at the cost of a deliberate and persistent effort can the mind be brought to deal analytically with the elements of the grammar it constantly employs in thinking.

The same is almost equally true of art, particularly of music. The theoretical structure of our musical system is known to but few. Many of those who appreciate music or even produce it by singing or playing an instrument, may remain almost wholly unconscious of the basic principles with which they operate. And, again, in primitive society or among the peasant populations of Europe or among the singing and banjo-playing masses of our cities, the theoretical foundations of the music they enjoy, use and abuse, remain altogether unknown. What applies so drastically to language and art is only to a slighter degree true

of other elements of civilization. Rules of etiquette, religious dogma, political convictions, and to a great extent the specialized outlook of a social or professional class, become fixed in the mind of the individual before he is quite aware of what is taking place./

Then, when self-consciousness comes—and to many of us it never comes—we discover ourselves fitted out with all the paraphernalia of a world view, with a code of morality, behavior and belief. Then we may indulge in a deliberate effort to change these ideas and attitudes or, more commonly, to provide for them an exculpating background of explanations and justifications. Many of our theories of education, of criminology or of etiquette, for example, consist of nothing but such accumulated afterthoughts, invented with greater or less ingenuity to render our unconsciously acquired habits, attitudes and convictions, more congenial to ourselves and better prepared to hold their own in the face of criticism or attack.

It appears from the above that the individual and the group have their share both in the persistence and the originality of civilization. The individual is responsible for the creation of the new, society provides it with a background and the occasion. For the new is never more than a slight ripple on the deep foundation of the old and established. The conservative dead-weight of society opposes the new, but should it appear, molds it to its pattern by prescribing the direction it is to take as well as by limiting the range of its departure from the old. This is most clearly seen in inventions and artistic creations. The talent of an Edison is a congenital gift. Even though born in early pre-history, he would have been Edison, but could not have invented the incandescent lamp. Instead, he might have originated one of the early methods of making fire. Raphael, if brought to life in a Bushman family, would have drawn curiously realistic cattle on the walls of caves as well as steatopygous Bushman women. Had Beethoven been a Chinaman, he would have composed some of those delight-

fully cacophonous melodic which the seeker for the quaint and unusual pretends to enjoy in Chinatown.

Stability and persistence, on the other hand, are mainly brought about by social factors. Apart from the historic persistence of the material substratum of the group, the institutional forms and the directing pressure of public opinion, custom and law, are functions of the social setting. But these factors alone would be powerless to achieve stability in the absence of the inertia of the individual mind, with its readiness to adhere to once established conceptions and its predilection for the beaten path.

A civilization in its unique individuality is fascinating to behold and to study. This charm of specific cultural values eluded the eye of the evolutionist of a generation ago, whose interest centered in the task of reconstructing the antecedents of modern society. To him the civilizations of antiquity and to an ever greater degree those of pre-history, were but stepping-stones on the road to modern civilization, but stages in an ascending series of development. The modern student, whether historian, sociologist or anthropologist, having freed himself from the dogmatic preconceptions of the evolutionary approach, is seized with renewed zeal toward a better understanding and deeper penetration of the total range of human civilization. But the data for his study are limited. Beneath manifold differences, a level of great uniformity underlies all modern civilizations. A comparison of the latter with those of antiquity contributes a wider range of contrasting colors, but the number of such ancient civilizations is small, and on analysis, they also display many common elements with our own. Pre-history, as it stands revealed by the researches of the ethnographer, belongs to a totally different plane. Each one of its civilizations is individual and unique, is carried by relatively few individuals and covers but slight territory. Of such highly individualized civilizations, pre-history reveals a great variety, even though the list be made to include only those tribes whose cultural possessions have been studied with

care and in detail. Primitive North America alone comprises a greater number of well authenticated civilizations than can be found in the whole range of modern and ancient history.

The early world, then, presents an ideal field for the study of the achievements of man, for the extension of our understanding of cultural problems and our appreciation of the great range of civilization.

THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY: AN EXPOSITION AND A CRITICISM.

Evolution is an old idea. If one comes to think of the past at all—and most men do—there is a limited number of ways in which one can think of it. Persistence is one way in which the past can be visualized: things always were as they are today, history is a self-reproducing continuum. The Eskimo affect this attitude toward their cultural past: on the evidence of their mythology, their customs, beliefs and ideas always were what they are today. Another way to interpret the past is through creation: things have come to be as they are through the will of a supernatural being. Before that, if they existed at all, they were ideas in the mind of their creator. Origins by creation are not peculiar to the recent historic past; they are common in primitive society. The supernatural culture heroes of North America are the creators or the introducers of the arts and crafts. The All Father of Australian mythology is held responsible for the creation of the world, with the sole exception of man, who is supposed to have existed from the beginning in the form of half-finished creatures. These creatures were completed and transformed into men by two supernatural beings who traveled about the earth. The idea of creation is also known to the authors of Polynesian mythologies. Another way of accounting for the past is through transformation, some sort of evolution of things from one state

into another. This idea is deeply rooted in the mythologies of Polynesia, and in more recent times it was congenial to the Greeks and the Romans (*vide* H. F. Osborne's book "From the Greeks to Darwin"). The philosopher Kant has been shown by Professor Lovejoy to have been an evolutionist in some of his conceptions; and Hegel's dialectic trilogy contains an evolutionary theory *in nuce*. The potential evolutionism of Hegel's philosophy did not come into its own, however, until one of his disciples, Karl Marx, translated Hegel's spiritualistic ideology in terms of matter, thus laying the foundation for an economic interpretation of history with its definitely fixed stages of economic development.


Strictly modern evolutionism dates from Herbert Spencer. His ideas took shape under the stimulating influence of Malthus' law of population, the evolutionary geology of Charles Lyell, the embryological generalizations of von Baer, who first drew the parallel between ontogenetic and phylogenetic development, and the biological evolutionism of Charles Darwin. The relatively scant data marshalled by Spencer in his "Biology" and "Psychology" were sufficient to provide him with the groundwork of his evolutionary system. When approaching the social field, he was confronted with more serious difficulties. His ideas were, of course, fashioned beforehand, as may be seen from the early publication of a skeletal outline of his philosophy. In its bearing on social phenomena, the theory of evolution was to comprise the three following principles of development: evolution is uniform, gradual and progressive,⁷ meaning by this that social forms and institutions pass everywhere and always through the same stages of development; that the transformations which they undergo are gradual, not sudden or cataclysmic; and that the changes implied in these transformations point in the direction of improvement from less perfect to more perfect adjustments, from lower to higher forms.

^ Spencer was aware of the necessity of an extensive colla-

tion of data to demonstrate his theory. He also realized that he could not himself cover any fraction of the necessary reading. He was, moreover, a very poor reader. Hence, he engaged the services of a number of assistants who did his reading for him. His evolutionary stages were all worked out in considerable detail before this reading process had begun, and what his assistants were expected to do was to find illustrations for the stages of development comprised in the philosopher's scheme. This they did by covering a tremendous literature of unequal worth and without attempting to study in a systematic way the ideas and customs of any particular tribe.

The method thus ushered in by Herbert Spencer into the study of society presently became known as the comparative method of anthropology, and for a generation it remained in undisputed possession of the field. It has since been shown, however, that this method, if used uncritically, could be made to yield proof of any theory of social development whatsoever.¹

¹The essential principle of the comparative method can be illustrated by the following diagram:



Suppose I, II, . . . represent tribes in different parts of the world, and 1, 2, . . . , stages in the development of an institution or form of society or religion; vertical lines stand for the presence, horizontal ones for the absence, of a stage in a particular tribe. Now suppose stage 1 is illustrated by an example from tribe I, stage 2 by one from tribe II, etc. What the classical evolutionist did was to connect stages 1, 2, . . . 6, each exemplified in one of the six tribes, into a chronologically successive series of stages. Thus, he claimed, the evolutionary theory stood vindicated. As a matter of fact, however, each one of the stages belongs to a different historic series, that, namely, of the tribe in which it was found. What then would be the only possible justification for the evolutionist's procedure? It would con-

Although Spencer speaks in unmistakable terms of civilization at large as evolving uniformly, gradually and progressively, his better insight, without being deliberately expressed, is revealed in the formal subdivisions of his sociology. He does not there attempt to trace a scheme of social development in its entirety, but subdivides his treatise into distinct studies of the development of industrial, political, military, professional and other institutions. Nor does he even supplement this separatistic treatment of the different phases of civilization by any attempt to correlate the diverse strands of development.¹

A brilliant galaxy of works followed in the wake of Spencer's comparative studies. In the field of religion one⁷ may note the writings of Grant Allen, Frazer, Lang, Hartland and Jevons; in that of art, the books by Haddon and Balfour; in social organization, the researches of Bachofen, McLennan and Morgan, who became the epigoni of an era of social investigation and hypothetical reconstruction, and

sist in the assumption that the stages of development in the six tribes are identical. If so much is taken for granted then the particular stages of development in the six tribes are interchangeable and it becomes possible to construct a chronologically successive series out of the bits of evidence unearthed by the evolutionist. But is not the assumption of the identity of developmental stages in different tribes one of the fundamental principles of social evolution? Thus the theory of evolution must be accepted as a postulate before the comparative method can be used. It follows that the results of this method cannot be regarded as proof but merely as a series of illustrations of a postulated evolutionary theory.

¹While this is so with reference to Spencer and while most other evolutionists followed a similar procedure, it must, nevertheless, be remembered, as a matter of historic interest, that the classical formulation of the evolutionary theory referred to civilization as a whole, over and above its separate aspects.

"A common misconception of the principle involved in the evolutionary method may be noticed," writes Marett in his book on "Psychology and Folk Lore." "According to this version, or rather perversion, of its meaning, it would run as follows: while the evolution of culture has taken place independently in a number of different areas, the process as a whole has repeated itself more or less exactly; so that we either may treat any one development as typical of all, or, if no one complete history be available, may patch together a representative account out of fragments taken indifferently from any of the particular areas concerned." pp. 80-81.

What Marett here calls a common misconception of the evolutionary method must, nevertheless, be reaffirmed to be the classical form of it. The services of the early evolutionists to the science of human civilization are undeniable and conspicuous, nor does it seem necessary to whitewash the record of their achievement by befogging the historic perspective.

the somewhat later studies of Westermarck which are pervaded by a more critical spirit; in the domain of material culture, finally, there is once more the work of Morgan, that of Buecher, as well as the superficial writings of Letourneau, who combined the convictions of a dogmatic evolutionist with the literary form of a careless popularizer, thus representing classical evolutionism at its worst.

A few illustrations will make clear the contrast between the reconstructions of classical evolutionism and those of the modern ethnologists. In the development of social organization the series of stages posited by the evolutionist was as follows: promiscuity, that is, a chaotic state of society without any structure whatsoever and characterized by unregulated sex intercourse; followed by group marriage, in which groups of women, related or not, were regarded as the wives of groups of men, related or not; followed by the clan, a much more clearly defined form of social organization, in which a tribe was divided into hereditary social units, clans, which comprised blood relatives as well as unrelated persons and were based on the maternal principle, children belonging to the clans of their mothers; followed by the gens, which was like the clan except that the children belonged to the gentes of their fathers; followed by a state of society in which the individual family and the local group or village became the basic forms of organization. This scheme was regarded as an universally applicable outline of social development, through which all tribes inevitably passed.

Now, what is the verdict of modern ethnology on this generalization?

The conclusions derivable from more critical investigations are, in brief, as follows: There seems to be no evidence that a stage of promiscuity ever existed; again, the condition of group marriage, far from being an universal antecedent of individual marriage, seems to constitute, in the rare instances where it occurs, an outgrowth of a pre-existing state of individual marriage. The family and local

group are universal forms of social organization, extending to the very beginning. In some tribes the clan organization never develops. In others the clan follows the family-village organization. In still others, the gens follows directly upon this early organization. The development of the gens out of the clan has apparently occurred only in a few instances. It must, moreover, be remembered that the family-village grouping persists through all the other forms of organization.

In the domain of art the evolutionist claimed that realistic designs were uniformly the earliest. From these, geometric designs developed through a series of transformations which represented ever higher degrees of conventionalization. This scheme also was regarded as universally applicable. In the light of further study the priority of realistic art can no longer be sustained. Geometric and realistic designs and carvings are equally basic and primitive. The process of conventionalization which figured so prominently in the evolutionist's reconstruction, does represent a frequently occurring phenomenon, but this process is neither necessary nor universal, nor is it by any means always gradual. Moreover, the reverse process of the development of realistic designs from geometric ones also occurs.

In material culture, the evolutionist, basing his conclusions upon the archeological reconstruction of European pre-history, posited the three stages: stone, bronze and iron. But in the only other culture area where the use of iron was known, namely, that of Negro Africa, the stage of iron followed directly upon that of stone, omitting the bronze stage.

In the domain of economic pursuits the evolutionist is responsible for the famous triad: hunting, pastoral life, agriculture. But we know today that while hunting belongs without question to one of the earliest economic pursuits, it persists through all subsequent stages; that agriculture was practiced by many tribes that had never passed through a pastoral stage, nor kept domesticated animals, excepting

the dog, a condition exemplified by many tribes of North America. Again, in Negro Africa, agriculture and pastoral life are pursued on an equally wide scale. Historic agriculture, moreover, which involves the domestication of animals as well as the cultivation of plants, insofar as animals are used for agricultural purposes, represents a much later cultural phenomenon, to be clearly distinguished from earlier agriculture in which the domestic animal and the plow were unknown and the hoe was the only agricultural implement.

In the light of better historic insight, another error of the evolutionary approach must fall to the ground. Following biological precedent, the evolutionist conceived of historic transformations as gradual, as consisting of slight, slowly accumulating changes. While it is true that slow changes in attitudes, knowledge or mechanical accomplishments are actual processes with which history makes us familiar, this should not obscure the equally conspicuous presence of relatively sudden, cataclysmic changes ushered in by social or political revolutions, great wars, important inventions. The history of modern art, science, philosophy and literature, abounds in examples of periods of precipitated change due to the emergence of great ideas or of dominant personalities, followed by protracted periods of relative stability, mere imitativeness, stagnation, or even regression.

The third principle of evolution is equally at fault. Progress is no more constant a characteristic of cultural change than is uniformity or gradual development. Progress must be regarded as but one among several types of change characteristic of the historic process. The idea of progress, moreover, cannot be applied with equal success to all phases of civilization.

Another vital defect of the evolutionary approach consisted in the evolutionist's failure to appraise at their true worth the processes of cultural diffusion in the course of historic contact between tribes. Whether Professor Thorndike is right or not in his assertion that the relation of

indigenous to borrowed traits in any civilization is as one to ten, the fact is undeniable that the borrowing, adoption and assimilation of imported commodities and ideas is an ever present and culturally significant phenomenon, equally conspicuous in modern as well as in primitive society. The evolutionist was, of course, aware of the presence of this aspect of the historic process, but he tried to justify his disregard of it by affecting a cynical attitude toward diffusion: the phenomena of inner growth were organic, regular, explanatory; those of diffusion or borrowing, were irregular, accidental, disturbing. How artificial and unreal does this approach appear to any one who views history with a clear eye and an open mind! For is it not patent that historic borrowing is as constant and basic a process as growth from within? The civilizational rôle of borrowing is fundamental. The importation of foreign products and ideas enables a group, whether modern or primitive, to profit by the cultural opportunities of its neighbors. The juxtaposition, moreover, of varying and contrasting attitudes, ideas and customs ever tends to break down traditional rut and to stimulate change. Culture contact thus appears as the veritable yeast of history, and to disregard it is to develop a blind-spot in one's historic vision, which cannot but prove fatal to any theory of historic development.



PART I
EARLY CIVILIZATIONS ILLUSTRATED



INTRODUCTION

In this part of the book our primary concern is with civilization. Civilization is a continuum and cannot be understood unless justice is done to all its aspects. This is true even though some of these or perhaps only one may rise to extraordinary importance in particular instances. No adequate idea could be given of Tsarist Russia by describing its agricultural activities alone, nor of ante-war Germany by sketching only its political structure, nor of France by presenting a picture of its artistic attainments. The different aspects of civilization interlock and intertwine, presenting—in a word—a continuum, which must be studied as an organic unit. This applies to modern society and even more emphatically to primitive society.

That is why the realities of early life remain wholly foreign to a reader, well versed though he may be in history and sociology, as long as his only sources of information are books like E. B. Tylor's "Primitive Culture" or N. W. Thomas' "The Native Tribes of Australia." Tylor's is a very great book, but early civilization appears in it in the form of disjointed fragments of custom, thought and belief, and the task of rearranging these fragments into a picture of primitive culture is wholly beyond the powers of a non-professional reader. Thomas' book is of a very different order: he deals with only one continent and attempts to cover all aspects of civilization. But Australia is the home of many tribes, and their cultures comprise many differences. Thus, the meshes of Thomas' descriptive network must be spread so wide that concrete reality, once more, slips through them.

The only way, then, to know early civilization is to study it in the wholeness of its local manifestations. This task will be attempted in the following five chapters. But first two possible queries must be answered: to what extent do the

brief sketches here presented deserve to pass as descriptions of early civilizations? and, what determined the selection of the tribes to be described?

A detailed description of one of the better known tribes or tribal groups readily assumes considerable bulk. Before one has adequately dealt with the mythology, the minutiae of ceremonial life, the wellnigh interminable odds and ends of material culture, several volumes barely suffice to cover the accumulated mass of data. The individual sketches presented here, on the other hand, do not exceed some twenty or twenty-five pages. To achieve this, the data had to be selected, and the selection had to be based on one's judgment of the indispensable, the typical, the significant. Such judgments are bound to be subjective, to a degree, and the responsibility rests with the one who selects.

Over and above this general sifting of data, one aspect of civilization has been chosen in each case for somewhat more careful treatment, the choice having been determined by the suggestiveness or theoretical importance of that aspect. Thus, decorative art is given prominence in dealing with the Tlingit and Haida of Northwest America; economic and industrial adjustments to environmental conditions are emphasized in the Eskimo sketch; among Iroquois traits, their socio-political system is treated somewhat more minutely, with especial emphasis on the great prominence of women in this group; similarly, in the description of the Australian tribes their magical beliefs and practices are stressed, while the African Baganda are represented as a type of Negro state organization.

It must not be imagined, however, that the cultural traits thus given prominence in our discussion would loom as high in the estimation of the natives themselves. To assume this, in fact, would be introducing a distinct bias into one's cultural vision of these people. The Australian, for example, might well express surprise that his magic had been made so much of rather than his hunting, his loving or his playing; while the Eskimo might object, with equal justice, that his

domestic habits, his visiting and story telling constituted as essential a part of his life as the kayak, sledge, drill and harpoon.

Why, finally, the particular selection? Why just the Tlingit, Haida, Eskimo, Baganda and Arunta? The answer is simple and I hope sufficient. In view of the treatment here adopted, a thorough knowledge of the tribes described was an indispensable prerequisite. Therefore, I selected the tribes I knew best, restricting the number and the length of the sketches in accordance with the space available. It seemed desirable to use the American tribes as the backbone of the descriptive section; therefore three of the groups belong to this continent. The comparison with one African and one Australian civilization serves to bring into relief the similarities and differences of the American groups as well as to emphasize the continental contrasts. It must be remembered, then, that the Zuñi, Omaha or Thompson would have served just as well for America, the Bushongo, Yoruba, Massai or Zulu for Africa, and for Australia the Dieri or Wotjabuluk. Thus, whatever general conclusions may be reached on the basis of the descriptive sketches in this section, will have to be regarded as correlated with the particular five tribes selected only in an incidental, not in a specific way.

CHAPTER I

THE ESKIMO: A CASE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ADJUSTMENT

The Eskimo, like the American Indians, represent an offshoot of the great Mongolian stock, but the physical characteristics as well as the cultural peculiarities of the Eskimo are so distinct that it is customary to speak of this curious people as separate from the Indian. The Eskimo tribes inhabit in America the entire Arctic littoral from Greenland to Alaska. Their habitations, consisting of small clusters of snow houses, prefer the neighborhood of the coast and but seldom extend far into the interior.

In this remote and detached environment, almost out of reach of foreign civilizations, and under the stress of exceedingly hard climatic and topographical conditions, the Eskimo have worked out their salvation with a very remarkable degree of ingenuity and success.

In their stories and myths the Eskimo display a peculiar lack of imaginativeness. They are not given to speculation nor do they show much concern for the origins of things and the development of the present order. In nature as in the affairs of man things always were much as they are now. The pictures of Eskimo life represented in the myths faithfully reflect their life of today. Attempts at explaining the peculiarities of animals or the origin of the animals themselves, a common feature of early mythologies, occur but seldom among the Eskimo, and when that is the case, the themes are treated lightly and without much detail or embellishment. Their stories, however, do tell of encounters with giants and dwarfs. The giants, very large but stupid, fall an easy prey to Eskimo skill and wits, while the dwarfs, diminutive in size but exceedingly strong, are in the end also overcome by the Eskimo. A wide-spread theme is the story of an orphan boy who lives among strangers, being ill-

treated in all sorts of ways. He endures everything in silence, until one day he encounters a wolf or some semi-supernatural creature, from whom, in a variety of ways (according to the version of the myth), he acquires superhuman powers. On his way home he performs miraculous feats of strength, such as picking up rocks and tossing them about. At home he hides the fact of his great strength from his associates and pretends to be meek and submissive as before. After a while, some untoward accident happens, such as an attack by a polar bear. Then the orphan rises to the occasion, seizes the bear by the hind legs, and whirling him through the air, smashes his head against a rock. The people are overcome with gratitude and prepared to do him homage for his valor, but he will have none of it; and usually the story ends by his humiliating them or even putting them all to death.

The myth which is most current among the different Eskimo tribes and plays a conspicuous part in their mythology and religion is the story of Sedna, the goddess of the winds and the sea mammals. Sedna was living with her husband, the dog, until one day, in the absence of the dog, she was kidnapped by a hostile petrel. When the dog returned and found her gone, he started out in pursuit in his kayak accompanied by Sedna's father. They reached the home of the abductor and, in his absence, recaptured Sedna and started back across the sea. After a while the wind rose, waves began to shake the kayak, threatening to upset it. Then Sedna's father, realizing the approach of the petrel, seizes his daughter and throws her into the sea. She clings to the gunwale with the first joints of her fingers. The father chops them off. The joints fall into the sea and are transformed into killer whales. She clings on with her second joints. They also are chopped off and are transformed into ground seals. She clings to the boat with her third joints, which, when chopped off, become transformed into seals. She still clings on with the stumps of her wrists. Then her father hits her on the head with a club. She lets

go of the boat, sinks and drowns. The father and the dog reach the shore safely, and the old man falls asleep on the beach in front of his tent. Then the sea rises and overwhelms him. Since then, Sedna lives at the bottom of the sea, with her father. Sedna, the great goddess, is believed to be in control of the sea-mammals as well as of the weather; and when angered she shows her ire by sending storms and famine.

Many versions of the Sedna myth occur among the different Eskimo tribes.

Next to Sedna the most important beings of Eskimo cosmology are the *inua*, supernatural creatures who may become the helpers and protectors of man. Then they are known as *tornaq*. While most men can thus acquire *tornaq*, the ones that are most favored by the supernatural helpers are the *angakut* or magicians. The three most powerful *tornaq* are conceived as a person, a bear and a stone. The human *tornaq* is a woman with one eye in the middle of her forehead. Another human *tornaq* that is deemed very powerful is the so-called "Master of the Dancing House"; this creature is shaped like a bandy-legged man with his knees bent outward and forward. The bear *tornaq* is a huge creature without hair, except on the points of the ears and of the tail and about the mouth. The stone *tornaq* is shaped somewhat like an irregular boulder, has no legs, but goes about wobbling on the ground.

The *tornaq* are in the habit of bestowing presents upon their favorites in the form of amulets, which bring to their owners various forms of good fortune. Some of these amulets may also be inherited from individual to individual. Among the most common amulets are a feather of an owl, a bear's tooth, a chip of some rare mineral, or a bit of a child's first garment. Great snow structures, the so-called singing or dancing houses, are built to some of the more important *tornaq*; in these houses ceremonies are performed. The arrangement of the ceremonial participants in one of the singing houses can be seen from the drawing.




FIG. 1
(Boas, "The Central Eskimo," p. 600)

It has been seen that the sea mammals are conceived as having originated from Sedna's fingers. Therefore, atonement must be made for every animal killed. When a seal is brought in, all work must be stopped until it is cut open. When the animal killed is a ground seal, a walrus or a whale, there is an enforced rest lasting three days. There are some exceptions to this. Thus, seal skin articles may be made over during this period, but nothing new can be made. No deer skin obtained in the summer may be touched until the first seal is caught with the harpoon. Later, when the first walrus is caught, the work on deer must stop once more.

The last few regulations represent aspects of a general cycle of taboos which separate the activities centering around the deer, on the one hand, and the sea mammals, on the other; the two sets of functions must be kept strictly apart, and in some localities even dogs are not allowed to gnaw deer bones during the seal season and *vice versa*. Again, deer bones must not be broken while walrus are hunted; and so on.

Special sets of taboos are imposed upon women during certain periods. They are not permitted to eat raw meat, must cook in separate pots, must not join in festivals. In the nature of the case, some of these taboos are occasionally transgressed. In this connection certain peculiar customs have developed.

According to Eskimo ideas, the transgression of a taboo takes the form of a black object which attaches itself to the culprit, an object invisible to humans, but which can be seen by the animals as well as by the *angakut* or medicine-men. When a hunter transgresses a taboo, the animals frightened by the black object will avoid him, and he will not be able to kill them. Thus, a famine may be threatened. To forestall so great a calamity, the culprit is expected to make a public confession, whereupon his guilt is regarded as wiped out and normal conditions are restored. Should confession be withheld, however, famine or disease will ensue.

Here the *angakok* steps in. One of his principal functions is to save the situation in grave predicaments such as this. When the crisis has become acute and no confession is made by any one, the *angakok* summons a public gathering and by magical means detects the culprit, who, when thus identified, stands in serious danger of his or her life. When the transgression has been confessed or brought to light by the *angakok*, the danger of famine or sickness is regarded as passed and normal conditions are restored.

In their artistic activities the Eskimo display singular skill. Their women, who cut and sew the fur garments, also embellish them with very simple geometrical designs in embroidery or appliqué, while the men decorate the bone objects with etched designs and carve the characteristic Eskimo bone figurines, diminutive in size, like the etchings, but skillfully fashioned in the shape of sea mammals, reindeer, human beings, or objects of Eskimo material culture. In the etched designs the forms are always indicated in outline only, and with very few lines, but by a clever manipulation of the position of arms, legs and body, the Eskimo contrive to convey a suggestion of motion, and even of emotional expression. The skill with which the Eskimo portray action in a medium which lends itself but poorly for that function brings to mind a similar tendency in the much more elaborate art of China and Japan.

The social organization of the Eskimo is simple. They

live in families, and a small number of families occupying several snow houses constitute a village. There are no chiefs, the only permanently influential individuals being the *angakut* who, as described before, have considerable prestige with the people. Outside of these, the leaders are men who have distinguished themselves by their skill in any of the important economic pursuits and are, therefore, selected as leaders of hunting and fishing expeditions, and the like. The status of these leaders is, however, a purely individual matter, their position is never inherited, nor is their reputation such as to command obedience, except in those situations where, through their special competence, they find themselves in temporary control.

Sex morality among the Eskimo has often been designated as loose, on account of the apparent laxity in the relations of the sexes both before and after marriage. The alleged "looseness" of these relations is, however, a misnomer, for here as everywhere else, there exist definite standards and regulations of sex behavior. These standards, which, of course, differ from our own, are adhered to by the Eskimo. Whatever sex contact may take place between a married woman and a man other than her husband, is subject to the husband's control; should a wife indulge in any sexual irregularities without his knowledge, she suffers for it severely if detected. There is, in particular, one Eskimo custom, which has quite unjustly been criticized as revealing their immorality. This is the so-called prostitution of hospitality, in accordance with which it is customary for a husband to offer his wife for the night to a visiting stranger. A rejection of this offer is resented and regarded as an insult both to the woman and the host.

The Eskimo are a peace-loving people. Barring the blood-curdling combats of their mythologic tales, they fight but seldom. Outside of the sway of the custom of blood revenge, which is found here as well as practically everywhere in the primitive world, they are also remarkably mild in the matter of punishment. A not uncommon way of dealing

with offenses is for the aggrieved party to challenge the offender to a satirical song contest. Challenger and challenged compose satirical songs about each other, which in due time they deliver, surrounded and supported by their friends. The man whose song receives the greater acclaim on the part of the audience, wins and temporarily gains in social prestige, while the position of his rival is correspondingly debased.

The element of Eskimo civilization in which their environmental adjustment is most conspicuous is their material culture: their tools, weapons, conveyances and habitations. Many of these represent remarkable examples of ingenuity and skill.

During the larger part of the year these people live in snow houses, semi-spherical structures made of slabs of snow, which are cut by means of the so-called snow knives from the snow drifts always to be found in an Eskimo neighborhood.

In the drawing, Fig 3 is the ground plan of a house, while Fig. 2 represents an outside view with a cross section of passageway (*c*).

The section *a* in front of the entrance is protected by a semi-circular turn in the wall which prevents the wind and snow



FIG. 2

(Boas, "The Central Eskimo," pp. 541-542)




FIG. 3

from blowing directly into the house. *b* is formed by a small dome about six feet in height, while the two doors are about two and one-half feet in height. Equally high is the passage *c* formed by an elliptical vault. The door to the main room is about three feet high, while the floor of the latter is about nine inches above the floor of the passage, so that any moisture accumulated on the floor of the main room will flow off into the passage, but the opposite will not occur. The small compartments *d* are formed by vaults and may be entered either through small doors from the main room or the passage, or by the removal of one of the snow slabs from the outside. The compartments are used for storing clothing, harness, meat and blubber. Over the entrance to the main room a window is cut through the wall, which is either square or more often arched. This window is covered with the intestines of ground seals, neatly sewed together, the seams extending vertically. In the center of the window is a hole for looking out, into which a piece of fresh water ice is sometimes inserted.

In the main room, on both sides (*h*) of the door and in the back of the room (*g*) a bank of snow two and one-half feet high is raised, leaving a passage five feet wide and six feet long (*e*). The rear part is the bed (*g*) while on the two sides (*h*) the lamps (*f*) are placed and meat and refuse are heaped.

Before the bed is arranged and the house furnished, the vault is lined with skins, often the cover of the summer hut. The skin lining is fastened to the roof by small ropes which are kept in position by toggles outside of the wall (Fig. 4) :



FIG. 4

(Boas, "The Central Eskimo," p. 542)

The flat roof in the upper part of the lining extends two or three feet below the top of the vault; this prevents the warm air in the house from melting the snow roof, as there is always some colder air between the skins and the roof. Near the top of the building a small hole is cut in the roof for ventilation; this also provides the draught necessary for the lamps: the cold air enters through the door, fills the passage, is warmed, rises to the lamps and escapes through the skin lining and the hole.

Space does not permit to dwell on any further details of the snow house. We must now turn to the equally interesting contrivances used by the Eskimo as means of transportation: the kayak and the sledge.



FIG. 5



FIG. 6


Kayak and framework

(Boas, "The Central Eskimo," pp. 486-7)

A variety of kayaks occur, one of which is represented here. When the framework is ready, the whole frame is covered with skins tightly sewed together and almost waterproof. When put upon the frame, the skin covering is wetted thoroughly and then stretched until it fits tightly; it is tied by thongs to the rim of the hole. The thongs sewed to the skin in several places (as visible in the sketch) are used to keep in position the kayak implements, which consist of a large harpoon and its line, with the seal skin float

attached, a receptacle for the line, a bird spear with throwing board, and two lances.

The harpoon is one of the most remarkable contrivances of the Eskimo. It consists of four parts, as indicated in the drawing:



(Boas, "The Central Eskimo," pp. 488-489)

The shaft (a) consists of a stout pole, from one-half to five feet long; to its lower end an ivory knob (g) is fastened. At the center of gravity of the shaft a small piece of ivory (e) is attached which supports the hand when the weapon is thrown; at right angles to knob e another small ivory knob (f) is inserted in the shaft, which holds the harpoon

line. The ivory head (*b*) is fitted upon the shaft so snugly that no other devices are used to insure its remaining in place. The walrus tusk (*c*) articulates with *b* by means of a ball and socket joint. The point of *c*, finally, fits into the lower end of the harpoon point (*d*), as may be seen in Fig. 7. The walrus tusk is attached by thongs to the shaft, which transforms the latter, the ivory knob and the tuck into a firm unit (Fig. 10). As seen in Fig. 12, the harpoon line is attached to the point (*d*) and then another little contrivance (*h*) which is attached to the line is pulled over the ivory knob (*f*). The line between the point and *h* is just long enough for *h* to reach to *f*, and so long as the tusk (*e*) remains in position, the shaft and point are thus firmly held together. When the harpoon is thrown and the animal is struck, the tusk moves laterally in the ball and socket joint; this diminishes the distance between the point *d* and the knob *f* (as in *b*), *h* slips off, thus disengaging the line and harpoon point from the shaft (as in *c*). Thus the precious point, which is often made with great care, is saved to the hunter.




FIG. 12

In connection with the bird spear (Fig. 13) a throwing board is used, as shown in the drawing (Fig. 14).




FIG. 13

FIG. 14

(Boas, "The Central Eskimo," p. 496)

The ivory knob (*c*) at the end of the spear shaft has a small hole, into which the spike (*d*) at the end of the groove in the throwing board is inserted when the spear is in position for throwing. When in use, the board is held firmly in the right hand, the first finger passing through hole *e*, and the thumb claspings the notch *f*, while the points of the other fingers hold on to the notches on the opposite side of the board (*g*). The spear is violently thrust forward by the spike and attains considerable velocity.

When the harpoon is used on powerful animals such as whales, a contrivance is sometimes inserted some distance from the seal-skin float. It consists of a wooden hoop with a seal or deer skin stretched over it. Three or four thongs of equal length are fastened to the hoop at equal distances and bound together. At the point of union they are at-

tached to the line. In the drawing (Fig 15) this contrivance is represented in action in conjunction with five seal-skin floats.




FIG. 15
(Boas, "The Central Eskimo," p. 500)

As soon as the animal is struck, it begins to swim away. Then the hoop assumes a position at right angles to the line. Thus a strong resistance comes into play, the speed of the animal is reduced, and its strength soon exhausted. The buoyancy of the float prevents the animal's escape; moreover, it is unable to dive and is thus forced to remain within sight of the hunter.

While the kayak is used for hunting, it is evidently too slight a conveyance for the transportation by water of either men or things. For that purpose another kind of boat is used, much larger, heavier and clumsier than the kayak. It is also a skin boat over a wooden frame, with the difference that the top of the boat remains uncovered. It is propelled by means of two single-bladed oars—three or four women generally working at each oar—while a double-bladed paddle is always used with the kayak.

What the kayak and the "woman's boat" are for navigation, the sledge (Fig. 16) is for transportation and travel on land. Among the tribes where driftwood is plentiful (Hudson Straits and Davis Straits) the best sledges are made with long wooden runners. The sledges have two runners from five to fifteen feet long and twenty inches to two and one-half feet apart. They are connected by cross bars of wood or bone (*a*) and the back is formed by deer's antlers

(*b*) with the skull attached. This back is used for steering, for attaching the lashing when a load is carried and for hanging the snow knife and the harpoon line upon it. The bottom of the runners is shod with whalebone, ivory or the jaw bones of a whale (*c*). In long sledges the shoeing is made broadest at the head. When traveling over soft snow, this proves of value, as the snow is pressed down by the broad surfaces of the runners at the head, and the sledge glides over it without sinking in very deeply.

The shoe is either tied or riveted to the runner. In the former case, the lashing passes through sunken drill holes,




FIG. 16

(Boas, "The Central Eskimo," p. 529)

to prevent friction when moving over the snow. The right and left sides of a whale's jaw are often used for shoes, as they are of the right size, thus providing excellent one-piece shoes. The exposed points of the runners are frequently protected with bone also on the upper side.

The cross bars (*a*) are lashed to the runners by thongs which pass through two pairs of holes in each bar and corresponding ones in the runners. The bars extend beyond the runners on each side, a sort of neck being formed in the projecting parts by notches on the two sides of the bar (see drawing). When a load is lashed onto the sledge, the thongs are fastened to these necks.

Under the foremost cross bar there is a hole in each runner through which a very stout thong passes, which is pre-

vented by a button from slipping through. One thong ends in a loop (*e*), to the other a clasp (*d*) is tied, which, when in use, passes through the loop at the end of the other thong. Upon this line the dogs' traces are strung by means of a small implement with a large and small eyelet: to one the trace is tied, the other is used for stringing the implement upon the stout thong.¹

¹ Professor Boas' remarks on the treatment of Eskimo dogs and on their behavior are so interesting that they deserve to be quoted verbatim (pp. 533-4):

"The strongest and most spirited dog has the longest trace and is allowed to run a few feet in advance of the rest as a leader; its sex is indifferent, the choice being made chiefly with regard to strength. Next to the leader follow two or three strong dogs with traces of equal length, and the weaker and less manageable the dogs the nearer they run to the sledge. A team is almost unmanageable if the dogs are not accustomed to one another. They must know their leader, who brings them to terms whenever there is a quarrel. In a good team the leader must be the acknowledged chief, else the rest will fall into disorder and refuse to follow him. His authority is almost unlimited. When the dogs are fed, he takes the choice morsels; when two of them quarrel, he bites both and thus brings them to terms.

"Generally there is a second dog which is inferior only to the leader, but





FIG. 17. Dog in Harness
(Boas, "The Central Eskimo," p. 432)

The list of Eskimo weapons is incomplete if no mention is made of the bow. Two general types occur, one of wood, the other of reindeer antlers; several varieties of



Wooden bow



The three parts of the bow



Lower surface of bow, showing the sinew lashing

FIG. 18

(Stefansson, *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History*, vol. XIV, Part I, p. 86)

each occur in different localities. The wooden bow consists of one piece of wood, or of several pieces joined together (see drawing). In either case the bow is

is feared by all the others. Though the authority of the leader is not disputed by his own team, dogs of another team will not submit to him. But when two teams are accustomed to travel in company the dogs in each will have some regard for the leader of the other, though continuous rivalry and quarrels go on between the two leaders. Almost any dog which is harnessed into a strange team will at first be unwilling to draw, and it is only when he is thoroughly accustomed to all his neighbors and has found out his friends and his enemies that he will do his work satisfactorily. Some dogs when put into a strange team will throw themselves down and struggle and howl. They will endure the severest lashing and allow themselves to be dragged along over rough ice without being induced to rise and run along with the others. Particularly if their own team is in sight will they turn back and try to get to it. Others, again, are quite willing to work with strange dogs.

"Partly on this account and partly from attachment to their masters, dogs sold out of one team frequently return to their old homes, and I know of instances in which they even ran from thirty to sixty miles to reach it. Sometimes they do so when a sledge is traveling for a few days from one settlement to another, the dogs not having left home for a long time before. In such cases when the Eskimo go to harness their team in the morning they find that some of them have run away, particularly those which were lent from another team for the journey. In order to prevent this the left fore leg is sometimes tied up by a loop which passes over the neck. When one is on a journey it is well to do so every night, as some of the dogs are rather unwilling to be harnessed in the morning, thus causing a great loss of time before they are caught. In fact such animals are customarily tied up at night, while the others are allowed to run loose.

reinforced by numerous lines of sinew, the result being a very powerful weapon. Of antler bows two kinds are represented here.




FIG. 19




FIG. 20

(Boas, "The Central Eskimo," p. 503)

In both cases the bow consists of three pieces of antler. In Fig. 19 there is a stout central piece (*a*) slanted at both ends, to which the other two pieces (*b*) are riveted. The bow is reinforced by sinews, like the wooden variety, and the joints are secured by strong strings (*c*) wound around them. In Fig 20 the central piece (*d*) is not slanted but cut off straight. The joint on either side is secured by two additional pieces of bone, a short stout one outside (*e*), which prevents the sections from breaking apart, and a long thin one inside (*f*), which provides the needed resiliency.

Before the introduction of fire arms, the bow and arrow

"Sometimes the harnesses are not taken off at night. As some dogs are in the habit of stripping off their harness, it is fastened by tying the trace around the body. Though all these peculiarities of the dogs give a great deal of trouble to the driver, he must take care not to punish them too severely, as they will then become frightened and for fear of the whip will not work at all."

(P. 537) "If two persons are on the sledge—and usually two join for a long drive—they must not speak to each other, for as soon as the dogs hear them they will stop, turn around, sit down, and listen to the conversation."

"If any dog of the team is lazy the driver calls out his name and he is lashed, but it is necessary to hit the dog called, for if another is struck he feels wronged and will turn upon the dog whose name has been called; the leader enters into the quarrel, and soon the whole pack is huddled up in one howling and biting mass, and no amount of lashing and beating will separate the fighting team. The only thing one can do is to wait until their wrath has abated and to clear the traces."

These paragraphs from dog pedagogy seem to be as instructive as they are entertaining.

were indispensable in hunting the reindeer, musk ox and polar bear, and they are still used by many tribes.

An important tool for ivory and bone work next deserves attention: the drill (Fig. 21). This implement is of especial interest, as it is also used for making fire.

The drill consists of three parts: the shaft made of iron (since the introduction of this metal by the whites), the mouthpiece (*b*), made of wood or bone, and the bow (*c*), made of bone. When the drill is in use the mouthpiece (*b*) is taken between the teeth and held firmly, then the point of the drill is set against the place to be perforated, and the bow is moved to and fro by both hands; as one string winds, the other automatically unwinds. Thus a continuous revolution of the point is secured, and the hole is quickly made. When the drill is used for making fire, hard wood (ground willow) is substituted for the iron shaft (*a*), which is made to revolve against a piece of driftwood




FIG. 21

(Boas, "The Central Eskimo," p. 526)

(d). Presently the driftwood begins to glow. Against the glowing wood a little moss is next applied, which after some gentle blowing begins to burn.

Such, then, are the economic conditions of the Eskimo and some of their industrial achievements.

It will be admitted that the Eskimo have solved their environmental problem in masterly fashion. When the first Eskimo tribes struck the forbidding conditions of the arctic the struggle must have been intense. For a long time survival itself must have wavered in the balance. Why these original tribes should have remained, why they did not move on until milder surroundings were found, we cannot say. The fact is, they did remain. Menace after menace was met in turn: the cold, the snow and storm, the darkness, the paucity of materials. When the victory of mind over nature was achieved, a civilization had been brought into being which had few rivals as an adjustment. Having solved its problem so successfully, it remained duly conservative, strangely immune to foreign influences, and remarkably uniform throughout the enormous range of Eskimo tribes. They have moved along the frozen shores, penetrating but little into the interior, apparently preferring to remain in an environment where their hard won successes continued to serve them well and no basic readjustments were required.

CHAPTER II

THE TLINGIT AND HAIDA OF NORTHWEST AMERICA

The Indian tribes inhabiting the shores of British Columbia, Vancouver Island, Queen Charlotte Islands, the Prince of Wales Islands and southern Alaska, have developed a distinctive set of civilizational features. This entire region is classed by American ethnologists as a separate culture area designated as the Northwest Coast. This culture is most clearly represented by the Tlingit and Haida. They share almost all of their cultural traits with their Tsimshian speaking neighbors, while the Kwakiutl, further south, having developed from a common cultural stratum, display a number of individualized traits.

The Tlingit and Haida speaking tribes are hunters and fishermen. While the men are devoted to these pursuits, the women gather a variety of wild berries. The men hunt the land animals as well as the mammals of the sea, such as the whale, killer-whale, and seal, and they catch the fish along the shores of the ocean and in the rivers. The fishing methods employed are many and varied. The bow and arrow are commonly used for striking the fish while they shoot through the water. A great variety of nets, wicker baskets and hedges are employed for catching fish in the streams, and when the salmon go up the rivers in huge shoals, their quantity is so great that they can be caught with baskets.

There is no pottery made in this region nor is there any agriculture, except in the form of garden culture among the Kwakiutl, whose women cultivate patches of clover, without, however, using the seed of the plant for sowing. Barring the dog, domestic animals are unknown. The Haida and the tribes further south are not proficient at basketry,

and little of it is made. The Tlingit, on the other hand, make excellent twine baskets. Work in shell and mountain-goat horn occurs in abundance, the Haida spoons made out of the latter material having reached a high degree of perfection in technique and elaboration. Clothing of skin is worn as well as a large basket hat. The feet are usually bare, although leggings and moccasins of skin are also known. One of the Tlingit tribes, the Chilkat, weave a blanket of soft cedar bark and mountain-goat wool. When at work on these blankets, the women use no loom, but do the weaving with their fingers. Small sections of a blanket are finished separately and are then sewed together.

The principal industry of the entire Northwest is wood work, and the trees used more than any others are the red and yellow cedar. These are used for the walls of their large gable-roofed houses, the walls consisting of perpendicular planks. In view of the great difficulty involved in felling large trees with the stone axes employed, these planks, at least in olden times, were split from the standing tree by means of a somewhat complicated method requiring the use of wedges. Whole trunks of cedar are used for the great hunting and war canoes, the inside of the trunk being partly hollowed out with axes and partly burnt. In place of pots, cedar boxes are used, the four walls of a box being fashioned out of one piece of wood bent into the shape required, while the solitary juncture is sewn together with bark string, the so-called disappearing stitch being often employed. Dishes, large and small, settees, masks, ladles and cradles are also made of wood, as well as great carved totem poles and memorial columns. The soft inner bark of the cedar is worked into mats which are sometimes used for clothing; ceremonial paraphernalia and forehead bands are also made of this material. It has been said, with justice, that a great part of the economic life and industry of these people centers around the cedar and the salmon: wood is as important in Northwest industry as salmon is in their diet.

The population of the Northwest Coast is divided into

three classes, the nobles, commoners and slaves. The commoners constitute the main body of the people. Through personal distinction in war or by giving one or more great feasts, a commoner may gain access to the nobility. The class of nobles furnishes the chiefs, whose office is usually hereditary for at least several generations. The slaves, most of whom are prisoners of war, do not form part of the social organization proper. While the master has absolute right of life and death over his slave, the economic position and daily life of the latter does not greatly differ from that of his owner. The slaves live in the houses with the other people, they eat with them, work, hunt and make war on a par with the others. It is only on occasions where social prestige and ceremonial prerogatives are involved that the disabilities of the slave become conspicuous. In ancient days there was a custom of sacrificing a slave at the erection of a house. The slave was buried alive under one of the supporting poles of the new structure, and to commemorate this event, an inverted figure of a man was represented as being devoured by one of the animals carved on the pole.

The social organization proper is identical in principle among the Tlingit and the Haida, and the former may be used as an example. There are two main social divisions or phratries, the Raven and the Wolf, whose main function is to control intermarriage—no marriage being permitted within a phratry. There is also a third social division, a much smaller one, represented in only one locality, with which both of the phratries may intermarry. Descent is maternal, the children belonging to the phratry of the mother. The phratries are further subdivided into clans, of which the Raven phratry contains twenty-eight and the Wolf phratry, twenty-six. These clans have local names, and there can be no doubt that originally the clans constituted local divisions or villages. Even today the local character of these social units is pronounced; thus, of the Wolf clans, one is prominently represented in four local divisions or villages, two clans in three villages, and one in two.

The remaining twenty-one clans are largely restricted to one village. Of the Raven clans, one is prominent in four villages, one in three and one in two, while the remaining twenty-five clans are in the main restricted to one village.

In addition to controlling intermarriage, the major divisions or phratries have certain functions which may be designated as reciprocal; thus, the members of the two phratries assist each other at burials of their members and at the building of houses, while among the Tlingit the principal feast, or potlatch, of the year is given by individuals or groups of one phratry to those of the other.¹

As a consequence of the exogamic functions of the phratry, the clans, which are its subdivisions, are also exogamous, that is, no two members of a clan may intermarry. Strictly speaking, however, these matrimonial concerns are the business not of the clan, but of the phratry. The clan, on the other hand, is in the main a ceremonial unit, distinguished by a variety of partly hereditary prerogatives. Every clan owns its special ceremonial features, including dances and cries and ritualistic paraphernalia. But the most cherished prerogative of a clan is the right to use as its crest a particular animal, bird or supernatural creature; most of the Haida clans use several of these. The crest or crests may then be carved on the totem poles and memorial columns owned by the families or individuals comprised in the clan. Crests, in whole or in part, are also carved on boxes and ladles, or painted on the sides of canoes, the front walls of houses, as well as on the faces of individual clan members. Members of each clan tell a story of how a human ancestor of the clan came into inti-

¹It is interesting to note the differentiation in custom between these two neighboring tribes so intimately related in culture. Among the Haida a potlatch may be given to a member or group of the opposite phratry, but the main potlatch of the year is always given to members of the same phratry. Among the Tlingit, on the other hand, a potlatch is an inter-phratry affair. The Tlingit, in fact, feel very keenly on this subject. To have a potlatch given to one is to be placed under very serious obligation, argue the Tlingit; it is, therefore, distinctly in bad taste to inflict such a feast upon members of one's own phratry, most of whom are close relatives of the giver of the feast.

mate association with the animal, bird or supernatural creature which thenceforth became the crest of the clan.

Thus, the people of a Tlingit clan with the frog as its crest, tell of an ancestral individual who kicked a frog over on its back. Presently he fell into a swoon and his body was carried into the house. Meanwhile, his soul was taken by the frogs to Frog-town (arranged after the manner of human towns). There the man's soul was brought into the presence of Chief Frightful-Face. The chief said to the man: "We belong to your clan and it is a shame that you should treat your own people as you have done. You better go to your own village. You have disgraced yourself as well as us, for this woman belongs to your own clan." After this the man left Frog-town and at the same time his body at home came to. He told the people of his adventure. All the people of his clan were listening to what this man said, and it is because the frog himself said that he was a member of that clan that they claim the frog.

Another Tlingit clan that owns the grizzly bear crest tells the story of a hunter who was caught in a bear's den. He found favor with the bear's wife, whereupon the male bear left and the man married the she-bear and had children by her. Finally, he is discovered by his younger brother to whose entreaties that he return home, he replies: "Stand right there! Don't do any harm. I am here. Although I am with this wild animal, I am living well. Don't worry about me any more." When he was first taken to the den, it looked like a den and nothing more; but that night he thought he was in a fine house with people all about eating supper, and his wife looked to him like a human being. Later he returns to the village, but abstains from all contact with his human wife, spending his time hunting, at which he is very successful. During one of the hunts he meets his bear children to whom he gives the seals he has caught. Henceforth he feeds them regularly. His human wife detects this and protests against his feeding the bear cubs rather than her little ones. He submits and begins to feed her children.

But presently he goes hunting again and once more takes some seals to his cubs. As he approaches them in his boat, he notes that they do not act as usual. Instead, they lie flat on the ground with their ears erect. Then he lands, but when he comes near them they kill him. It is on this account that the people of his clan claim the grizzly bear as their crest.

Although the clans are maternal as well as the phratries, the position of women in these communities is not high. They are deprived of most ceremonial prerogatives and figure but inconspicuously in the important series of customs clustering about the belief in guardian spirits.¹

Passing to the economic ideas of the Northwest, we find them as well developed as are the principles underlying their social organization. Property, both of material and spiritual kind, abounds. Individuals, families and clans own tools, garments, ceremonial paraphernalia, songs, stories, cries and crests. Many of these may be, and often are passed down by inheritance, either as a clan or family prerogative or as a possession of an individual, willed to his or her heirs.

Interesting are the developments of communal property rights. Strips of shore along the ocean front as well as along the course of rivers are owned by families and clans as fishing properties. The same is true of localities in the hills and valleys in which mountain-goats are hunted. The

¹Further details about these interesting customs will be found in the section on "The Guardian Spirit in American Indian Religion," pp. 184-193.

It is of interest to note in this connection that the relatively inferior position of woman is here associated with the maternal organization of descent and of the inheritance of property. This fact contrasts strikingly with the conditions obtaining among the Iroquoian speaking tribes of the East, among whom the female tracing of descent and the equitable position of woman in connection with the ownership and inheritance of property is associated with a very high degree of social and political prominence of woman. When in very recent times the custom of blood revenge among the Indian tribes was checked and a fine substituted, this difference of valuation of woman on the part of the two groups of tribes did not fail to express itself, for among the tribes of the Northwest, the penalty for the killing of a woman was only one-half in amount of that imposed for the killing of a man, whereas among the Iroquoian tribes, the reverse was the case—the penalty for killing a woman was double of that exacted for the killing of a man.

Kwakiutl employ the following method to define a fishing territory. From two prominent points along the shore, imaginary lines are drawn to an island some distance from the mainland. Within the space thus enclosed by the two lines and the shore, a clan claims fishing privileges.

It must not be imagined, however, that this development of proprietary ideas stands for distinction of economic status among individuals. There is but the dimmest foreshadowing of a possible division into rich and poor. All live in about the same way. The noble and the commoner, the slave and his master, share in the same work and enjoy approximately the same comforts and pleasures. As will presently be seen, huge amounts of property do often accumulate in the hands of an individual or in a family or clan. This property, however, is not valuable in itself as riches, nor does it buy comforts, luxuries, or the services of other men. Its value is in the social prestige that goes with it.

The clearest expression of this form of socio-economic valuation may be seen in the institution of the potlatch. The potlatch is a feast given by an individual to another individual, or by one family or clan to another. On the occasion of these feasts, which are often attended by an impressive gathering of people, the feast giver presents his guests with blankets, canoes, oil and other valuables. Also, a great deal of property is destroyed outright on these occasions. Huge quantities of the precious seal oil, for example, are burned. The more sumptuous the presents given away, the more lavish the destruction of property, the greater is the feast and the higher the esteem that accrues to the feast giver, while the rival to whom the feast is given is correspondingly debased in social status. To regain popular favor, the latter must give a feast in return, in which case he may or may not be supported by his friends and relatives. The presents given away on the occasion of the first feast must now be returned with interest, which, if the return feast has been delayed for a long time, may amount to one hundred per cent, or even more. The amount of property

destroyed must be correspondingly large. After this is achieved, the giver of the return feast not only regains his social prestige, but greatly enhances it at the expense of his rival.

In connection with the potlatch, the so-called "coppers" have come into use. A copper is hammered out of native copper, or a sheet of the metal left by an agent of the Hudson's Bay Company may be used for the purpose. It looks like this:



FIG. 22

(Boas, "The Social Organization and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians," Report, U. S. National Museum, 1895.)

The intrinsic value of a copper is *nil*, its symbolic value may rise very high. These coppers are given away at feasts and the value of the copper is rated in proportion to the munificence of the feast at which it figures. When, in the course of time, it is returned to the original owner at another feast, its value rises in proportion. Thus it comes about that some of the coppers are worth hundreds or even thousands of blankets (a blanket passes as the unit of value amounting to about fifty cents). The coppers are distinguished by names corresponding to their high ceremonial significance, such as "All-Other-Coppers-Are-Ashamed-to-Look-At-It" (this specimen was worth seventy-five hundred blankets), "Steel-head-Salmon" (six thousand blankets), "Making-the-House-Empty-of-Blankets" (five thousand blankets), and so on. A broken copper is more valuable than a whole one. Thus, as a copper passes from hand to hand, certain parts of it are broken off and given away with the rest of the copper, until only the T-shaped section is left, which is its most valuable part, amounting to about two-thirds of its value. A chief may break a copper and present it to his rival at a feast. Then the challenged chief may take his own copper, break it, and return both

broken coppers to the original owner at the ensuing feast, thereby regaining his prestige. Instead, he may throw the pieces of both broken coppers into the ocean. Then he is esteemed a truly great man, for no possible returns can be expected from this process, whereas the original chief might well have counted on the return of the broken coppers.¹

The essence of social position among these people rests on these feasts. "Rivals fight with property alone," says the Kwakiutl, and the best way to humiliate a rival is to "flatten him out" by means of a sumptuous feast.²

It must be remembered that even a prominent chief can but seldom afford to give a potlatch alone, on account of the vast quantities of property involved, but he is assisted by his family or clan or friends. It may thus occur that the greater amount of the property of a clan may change hands on occasion of a great feast. Property here is in a constant flux. It is given away and destroyed in astounding quantities, and as property goes, the social prestige of the giver rises, and so on *ad infinitum*. The value of property is estimated in terms of social prestige which comes to the owner when he gives away his property.³

¹This illustration as well as the examples of copper names are taken from the Kwakiutl.

²Strange as these ideas may appear to the modern mind, they are not by any means foreign to our socio-economic life. While the economic distinctions current in our society are unknown among these Indian tribes, the "conspicuous waste" (to speak with Mr. Veblen) attendant upon expenditure of property among our rich, presents a close parallel to the potlatch psychology of the Haida and Tlingit.

³The marriage institution among the Kwakiutl well illustrates the influence that one aspect of civilization may exercise upon another. When a man wants to marry a girl, he gives his father-in-law a considerable amount of property, in return for which he expects to receive not only his wife, but many privileges of her clan, including the crest itself. The wife is thus regarded as the first instalment of the return payment on the part of the father-in-law. Then, as children are born to the couple, further payments are made by the father-in-law and the more children, the higher the interest on these payments; for one child, two hundred per cent interest is paid, for two or more children, three hundred per cent. After this, the wife's father has redeemed his daughter and the marriage is regarded as annulled. Thenceforth, she may return to her parents. If, however, she continues to stay with her husband, she does so of her own free will; she is "staying in the house for nothing," say the Kwakiutl. The husband is usually unwilling to stake the continuance of his matrimonial relationship on the disposition of his wife, and makes another payment to his father-

The religious and cosmological ideas of the Coast people are elaborate but can only be touched upon briefly here.¹

The Haida believe that the earth is flat and has a circular outline. Above it, like an inverted bowl, hangs the solid firmament, on the top of which is the sky country in which some of the supernatural beings reside. There are five such sky countries, one above the other, but they play but a slight part in Haida religious beliefs, in contrast to what is true among the Salish speaking Bella Coola of the coast, for among the latter the several sky countries are clearly defined and greatly elaborated in their mythology.² On the lower side of the firmament, the sun, moon, stars and clouds are fastened. Beneath the firmament stretches the sea and upon it lie two islands, the Inland-Country or Haida-Land, and the Seaward-Country or Mainland. The Haida country, although floating upon the sea, is also supported by a great supernatural being, The-Sacred-One-Standing-and-Moving. This supernatural being rests upon a copper box, which is itself supported in some undefined way.

The highest of all deities is Power-of-the-Shining-Heavens. Just as human beings receive "power" from lower supernatural beings, and these receive theirs from higher ones, so the latter obtain their power from Power-of-the-Shining-Heavens.³

Suspended in the air, hang several abodes of supernatural beings. In one of these, called Shaman's House, live the Above-People. They are thought by some to be no taller than a man's hand and wrist. Although kindly and help-

in-law to have a further claim upon her. This peculiar mode of treating marriage, while incomprehensible if taken alone, becomes clarified in the light of potlatch psychology.

¹The statements in the following section on religion refer more specifically to the Haida, unless the contrary is stated.

²See p. 207 *sq.*

³Swanton, who has spent considerable time among the Haida, expresses his surprise at the lofty conception underlying this deity. Although those of the Indians who have heard of the Christian God are wont to compare the supreme divinity of white man with Power-of-the-Shining-Heavens, Swanton holds the opinion that the latter conception is not due to missionary influence. One thinks in this connection of the All Father of Australian mythology, and of other similar notions (compare p. 211).

ful, they are not very powerful on account of their small size, and often fail in their attempts to help man. The Above-People have no chief of their own, but Wigít (probably identical with the Raven), who occupies an abode of his own, has authority over them. Wigít keeps an account of all the people in the islands. In his house he has a collection of sticks and when a child is born, he turns around and pulls one from a bundle behind him. If the stick is short, so will be the life of the child, and *vice versa*. The cry of every new born child is heard in the corner of Wigít's house.

Among the most important supernatural creatures with whom the Háida were in constant rapport were the Ocean-People. Every animal was or might be the embodiment of a supernatural being who could assume human form. Thus animals and birds were, on the one hand, hunted and used as food by man; on the other, they were embodiments of supernatural beings who went by the name of those animals, assumed human form at will, lived in towns of their own, and could inter-marry with humans, help or harm them. Among the supernatural Ocean-People were the Devil-Fish-People, the Porpoise-People, the Salmon-People; but the most important of all were the Killer-Whales. They lived in villages, scattered along the shore, beneath it. The Killer-Whales had chiefs of their own and they gathered to give sumptuous potlatches. Like all supernatural beings they were divided into two phratries: the Raven and the Eagle. Thus, Raven Killer-Whales were black all over, while the Eagles had a white patch around the base of the dorsal fin. As the Ocean-People were in control of a great part of the food supply of the Indians, they were held in high esteem and were appealed to for help. The rarer kinds of grease, tobacco, and flicker feathers were offered to them, water and fire being the most common media of transmission.

Among the most important Land beings were the so-called Creek-Women, also called Women-at-the-Head, or

Daughters-of-the-River. One of these lived at the head of each creek and owned all the fish in it. Like the Ocean people, the Land animals have a double aspect. On the one hand, they appear as animals, on the other, as supernatural creatures with animal names, who may appear in human form. Thus there were the Grizzly-Bear-People, the Black-Bear-People, the Weasel-People, and so on. Among the supernatural animals, the Land Otters, who hurt man in many ways, were greatly feared. One of their favorite pursuits was to transform men into monster-like creatures with bony faces, full of fish and sea-egg spines, with wide nostrils turned so high up as to point almost straight forward, and naked bodies covered with Land Otter hair.

Other deities were connected with human interests and industries. Uppermost among these was the bird Skill (usual word for "property"), which was never seen, but he who heard its bell-like voice became wealthy. Then there was Property-Woman, who brought wealth in various ways. Almost as prominent as Property-Woman were the Master-Carpenter and Master-Canoe-Builder, guardian deities of these crafts. Then there were other divinities, Pestilence, Death-by-Violence, whose groans were heard by those about to be killed, and The-Slave-Power, whose presence was felt by those whose doom it was to become enslaved. There were also The-Spirit-of-Theft, The-Strength-Spirit, The-Fishing-Spirit, and The-Medicine-Spirit.

No sketch of Northwest civilization is complete without reference to their art, a cultural element that has become associated with almost all other aspects of the life of these people. Although slate, bone and mountain-goat horn appear as industrial materials in addition to wood, the main elements of Northwest Coast art have developed in conjunction with their wood industry. As will presently be shown, even the woven technique of the Chilkat blanket has failed to produce an art of its own, but follows patterns provided by the wood technique.

The principal processes employed in the art of wood,

bone, slate and horn, are those of painting and carving, both in low and high relief. Carving is applied to totem poles and memorial columns, to dishes, boxes, and spoons, to ceremonial bâtons and dancing masks; while painting, in addition to being used on most of the carved objects, also appears on flat surfaces, such as the front walls of houses, the sides of the gigantic war canoes and the rims of ceremonial hats.

Animals and birds are most frequently represented in this art, plants appear only sporadically, while the sun and moon, in conventionalized form, also occur. Of the animals and fish, the beaver, bear, killer-whale and shark are constantly seen, while of the birds, the raven, eagle, hawk and flicker are equally common.

It is a general characteristic of Northwest art, especially in its application to totem poles, that a large part or even the whole of the decorated object is covered by the carving. At the same time, an attempt is made to represent as much of the particular creature used for decoration as is technically possible.

It must be noted that the identity of the animal or bird used must never be lost sight of, as these carvings or crests are of great religious significance to the people. In this connection a system of symbolism has developed by means of which each animal or bird can be easily identified. Thus the eagle has a beak with a point directed straight downward, the beak of the hawk is curved inward, often reaching back to the mouth, while the beak of the raven is straight and very long. The beaver is symbolized by one or all of the following three features: a cross-hatched tail, two or four large incisors and a stick held in the front paws. The shark has a tall pointed forehead with three crescent-like shapes carved or painted on it and a double row of large triangular teeth. The claws of the bear are long, curved at the ends and pointed. The killer-whale has the typical bifurcated tail of this species and a large dorsal

fin, which appears on the back in a slanting position, sometimes crossed by one or more painted bands.

In addition to all these representations, faces of varying sizes, apparently human, appear on totem poles and memorial columns in all sorts of positions: between two animals, or on the back or tail of one. These faces seem to have no place in the general symbolism of the poles and columns; they are there merely to fill in spaces which would otherwise have remained undecorated.

The carving on the totem poles and memorial columns is done in high or in bas relief, the different animals and birds being represented one on top of the other or interlocking in a variety of ways. A common method of combining two creatures is to represent one as hugging the other or as swallowing it, part of one creature protruding from the other's mouth. Small animals, such as frogs, are used either to fill in undecorated spaces or as a purely decorative motif repeated several times in a certain portion of the design.

The faces of animals and birds which appear on the totem poles and memorial columns are all very uniform and apparently human in type; in many instances a face could not be identified as belonging to a particular animal, nor could an animal face be distinguished from a human one were it not for the presence of the symbols. Another characteristic of animal faces refers to the position of the ears, which are always placed on top of the head, while in human faces they appear at the two sides.

While many of the figures on the totem poles and memorial columns as well as the diminutive carvings on the Haida spoons and the somewhat larger ones on the masks and ladles are often fairly realistic, with only traces of conventional transformation, some figures appear on all of these objects which are distinctly conventionalized. This conventionalization is carried much further in the carvings and paintings on the sides of boxes and in the paintings on the fronts of houses and the sides of canoes. Here the

geometrical elements of the design often become so pronounced that the recognition of the animal represented would be impossible if not for the symbol. When finally the symbol itself becomes conventionalized, as is the case with the Chilkat blankets and with some of the boxes, the interpretation of the design becomes impossible unless one happens to know that a design in the particular instance is meant to represent a certain animal or bird.

Two elements are characteristic of this aspect of Northwest art: the way the animal body is treated with reference to conventionalization and the way the representations of the separate animals on totem poles and memorial columns are combined into a unified carving. The conventionalization of the animal form is conceived in such a way that the entire animal is not regarded as one pattern to be treated as a whole, but rather as a set of separate parts, head, legs, body, wings, and so on, each one of which becomes transformed independently, the unity of the animal being preserved in the spacial relation to each other of the different conventionalized parts. This treatment of the animal form makes the designs especially well adapted to the decoration of surfaces of different shapes. Thus, one usually finds one conventionalized animal represented on such an apparently unwieldy object as a ceremonial bâton, or again, on the four sides of a box.

Of the many minuter features which might be analyzed in a more detailed treatise, one deserves mention here: it is an eye-like figure commonly used when the eye is to be represented. But even a cursory glance at one of these conventional designs suffices to reveal the fact that this figure frequently occurs when no representation of an eye is intended. On inspection it appears that the eye-like design is used wherever a joint is to be represented. As these "eyes" are often fairly large, leaving an undecorated space inside, the imagination of the Northwest artist is further stimulated to decorate the inside of the "eye" with a rough

indication of two eyes, a nose and a mouth, or in some cases, with a more fully developed representation of a face.

All these paintings and carvings constitute the accomplishments of men. All men were able to paint and carve to a degree, but experts were not unknown, and some individuals who were renowned for their skill also accepted work for others. It was mentioned before that the weaving of the Chilkat blankets was woman's work, but that the designs represented on these blankets were faithful copies of the men-made patterns of the wood technique. Part of a pattern was painted by a man on a board, which the woman used as her guide in weaving a blanket. The fact that the weaving was done in small sections which were afterwards sewn together, enabled her to follow the painted design with great accuracy, and the change of technique in this case has exercised no visible effect on the character of the design.

Apart from its distinctive features as a decorative technique, the art of the Northwest Coast appears as an inherent element of many other phases of Northwest civilization. It is intimately connected with the leading industry, the wood technique, and reaches over to the work on bone, slate and horn, as well as to the woven blankets. As the carving and painting of certain animals, birds and supernatural creatures constitutes a prerogative of particular individuals, families and clans, the art is ushered into the innermost recesses of the social organization of these people. And insofar as carved objects and coppers with representations of crests figure prominently at potlatches, the art is also drawn into this most characteristic aspect of the life of the Coast. The creatures represented in the art are in themselves merely of economic significance, for the natives do not show any regard or religious concern for these animals and birds; but their representations in the art having assumed the form of crests, become symbols of great sanctity, emblems of rank, of social status and of supernatural powers. The representation of crests on cere-

monial objects, finally, introduces these artistic creations into the elaborate and emotionally significant rituals of the Indians. In the course of the long winter months, the natives spend many hours and days surrounded by the artfully transformed objects and breathing the throbbing atmosphere of sanctity created by them.

When envisaged from this standpoint, the art of this region appears not as art alone but as a many-sided cultural symbol, most intimately associated with almost every aspect of the life of the people. It might almost be said that the civilization of the Northwest could be reconstructed on the basis of the direct and indirect suggestions carried by its art.

CHAPTER III

THE IROQUOIS MATRIARCHATE

The Iroquois speaking tribes of northwestern New York and southeastern Canada, whose original provenience remains somewhat doubtful, occupied at the time of the discovery of America the area of the Great Lakes and some adjoining regions. The tribes particularly under discussion were five in number, the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga and Seneca. To these must be added the Tuscarora, who joined the League of the Iroquois in the beginning of the Eighteenth Century.

As in all Indian tribes, Iroquois men were mighty hunters, while the women engaged in the gathering of wild fruit, berries and barks. First and foremost, however, the Iroquois were agriculturists. Toward the middle of the Sixteenth Century, at the time of the occupation of their territory by Jesuit missionaries, the Iroquois were already found in the possession of considerable skill in agricultural methods. These tribes lived in villages consisting of a limited number of Long Houses built of bark over wooden frames. These houses were of imposing proportions, often harboring as many as one hundred or more individuals. Bark was used by the Iroquois for many other purposes. Their canoes were made of this material as well as dishes, cradles, spoons and articles of ceremonial apparel. Later, wood partly replaced the bark in industry. The Iroquois made good pots and wove mats and other articles out of cornhusk. Bone work was also on a high level.

In the line of art, there was a sharp division between men and women. While men were responsible for all the carving in wood which usually consisted of rather crude, some-

what realistic representations of animals and birds, the women engaged in embroidery of porcupine quill, later of wampum beads, which they applied to shirts and moccasins. This technique, in which Iroquois women reached a very high degree of proficiency, was characterized by the prevalence of motifs from the vegetable kingdom, branches, leaves and flowers in different stages of development being the dominant patterns. Similar curvilinear designs were made and similar patterns followed in their embroidery by many neighboring Algonquin speaking tribes.

The ceremonial life of the Iroquois centered in a number of great tribal feasts, which divided the year into regularly recurring periods of ceremonial performance. These ceremonies were closely associated with the economic pursuits of the people. Thus, in early spring came the Strawberry Festival, more or less adjusted to the period when these berries were ripe. This was followed somewhat later by the Bean and the Raspberry Festivals. In the fall came a more prolonged period of festivities, the Corn Festival, falling at the time of the ripening of the maize. And toward the end of January, or the beginning of February, the great Mid-Winter Festival took place, at which a white dog was sacrificed by strangulation.

The general character of these festivals was very uniform. They started out with a prayer to the Great Spirit and a giving of thanks for their past favors to the Corn, Bean and Squash, the "Three Sisters" of Iroquoian mythology, "Our Mothers." Then came prayers for the continuation of similar favors in the future. Followed performances by the religious societies. The festivals were closed by a less formal period, lasting one or two days, when the young men and women indulged in semi-ceremonial games and dances.

The religious societies just referred to played an important part in the social and ceremonial life of the Iroquois. A number of them are recorded, such as the False Face Society, the Bear, Buffalo, Eagle, and Dark Dance or Pigmy Societies, the last one consisting solely of women, excepting

only the two singers, who were always men. In addition to these, each one of the five tribes of the League had a Medicine Society. The principal function of all these organizations was medicinal and among the requirements for joining them were sickness and dreaming. A man afflicted with some disease might dream of an animal associated with one of the societies. Thereupon he consulted a "prophet" or "prophetess," and the interpretation of the dream thus secured invariably resulted in the admonition to join one or another of the societies, the members of which were presently called upon to visit the patient. He was successfully cured by their magical rites, and henceforth became one of their number.

Undisputed preëminence among the societies was held by the False Faces. The principal ceremonial regalia of the False Faces consisted of grotesque wooden masks, elaborately carved and painted, which symbolized the bodyless, headless Faces, spirits which, according to Iroquois belief, haunted their forests. These Faces were originally hostile to human beings, but were subsequently appeased by the rites of the False Faces, the society having been organized, according to tradition, for the particular purpose of dealing with the Faces.

The economic life of the Iroquois centered around their agricultural activities in which women played a leading part. The ancient Iroquois, original occupants of this wooded country, had to prepare clearings before agriculture could be attempted. With nothing but crude stone axes as tools, this was by no means an easy undertaking. The following process was commonly employed. A deep ring was cut into the bark, encircling the trunk. By the following season the tree was dead and partly dried up. Then fire was used to reduce the surface to charcoal, and thus facilitate the felling of the tree by means of axes.

This part of the work was done largely by men, the women merely assisting by bringing pails of water which was thrown at the upper section of the tree to prevent it

from catching fire. With the work in the fields woman's undisputed domain was ushered in. The superficial turning of the soil by means of a crude hoe, planting, harvesting and storing of the different produce, as well as the preparation of the food for later consumption, was the work of women. In the fields the women worked in so-called "bees," under the supervision of overseers who were also women. The fields connected with a village were thus cultivated one by one, most of the women of the village participating in the work on all of the fields. There were also certain fields not associated with the individual households but claimed by the village as a whole. Communism, to a degree, was practised in these early Iroquoian communities, the excess supplies of more favored families being frequently divided among the needy members of the village. The produce of the communal village fields was also utilized for this purpose, as well as for the preparation of the foods required at the periodic tribal festivals, at which huge quantities of edibles were wont to be consumed.

While the economic activities of the women were of cardinal importance among these people and largely responsible for their exalted social status, it is woman's social and political functions that are of particular interest.

In order to facilitate the understanding of woman's share in the social functions of the clans, the phratries and the League, a brief sketch will now be given of the various social units comprised in the Iroquois Confederacy.

In the Iroquois Confederacy, including the Tuscarora, each tribe was divided into two phratries; each phratry comprised four or more clans, and the clans were again subdivided into a number of maternal families. The maternal family, the smallest unit in Iroquois society, consisted of a head woman or matron, her immediate male and female descendants, the male and female descendants of her female descendants, and so on. Some maternal families, consisting of individuals of three or four generations living at one

time, numbered fifty or less members, while others had as many as one hundred and fifty or even two hundred.¹

The maternal family in early times had certain ceremonial functions as well as hereditary prerogatives, such as the possession of the *ganōda*, a magical medicine of extraordinary potency associated with the rites of the Little Water or Medicine Societies. But the principal function of the maternal family was in connection with the election and succession of chiefs.

Two or usually more maternal families constituted a clan. The clans were named after animals and birds. For instance, those of the Seneca were named and arranged as follows:

PHRATRY I

Turtle—Bear—Wolf—Ball

PHRATRY II

Deer—Hawk—Great Snipe
— Little Snipe

¹The structure of a maternal family may be illustrated by the following diagram.




FIG. 23

All individuals represented as ● or ▲ belong to this maternal family.

●○ women
▲△ men
= married

— lateral relationship (such as brothers and sisters)
| descended from

The clans were not co-extensive with villages—although it is not improbable that such was the earliest condition—members of one clan living in more than one village. Each clan was more or less closely associated with one or more Long Houses, and the majority of individuals in such Long Houses probably belonged to that clan.

Unlike many "totemic" peoples, the Iroquois showed no regard whatsoever for the animals and birds from which the clans took their names. These animals and birds were not looked upon as the ancestors of the clan mates, nor were they worshipped. In fact, no special relations whatsoever obtained between the individuals of a clan and their eponymous animal. While it is not quite certain that the clans exercised proprietary rights over one or more fields, positive evidence exists to the effect that each clan had its own cemetery where the members of the clan were buried.

Each clan possessed the right to use for its members certain individual names, which were the property of the particular clan; no other clan was supposed to use these names, nor could two living individuals of one clan bear the same name at one time. These names were semi-ceremonial in character and were but seldom used for purposes of appellation or reference, relationship terms being employed for that purpose. A prominent feature of a clan was its exogamous function: no member of a clan was permitted to marry a woman of the same clan. This prohibition extended to all clans of the same name, no matter to what tribe they belonged, so that a Seneca Wolf man, for example, was not merely prohibited from marrying a Seneca Wolf woman, but the same prohibition debarred him from marrying Onondaga or Cayuga Wolf women, and so on.

The two phratries into which each tribe was divided were mainly ceremonial units, most of the ceremonies of the Iroquois being so arranged that one phratry was conceived as giving it to the other, individuals belonging to the two phratries occupying opposite ends of the ceremonial Long House.

The phratries also had the curious obligation of burying each other's members, while the mourners belonged to the phratry of the deceased member. As will presently appear, the phratry also had an important political function.

The next higher units, the tribes, lost much of their former independence after the formation of the League. The tribes were organized with reference to the League somewhat after the nature of the arrangement of phratries in each tribe. When the chiefs of the League met for ceremonial purposes, they were arranged in groups representing the separate tribes and divided into two tribal phratries, like this:

Onondaga Chiefs	Cayuga Chiefs
Mohawk Chiefs	Oneida Chiefs
Seneca Chiefs	

On administrative occasions, on the other hand, when war or peace were to be decreed, and in some other instances, the tribal chiefs were arranged in three groups, like this:

Onondaga Chiefs	
Mohawk Chiefs	Cayuga Chiefs
Seneca Chiefs	Oneida Chiefs

There were, in all, fifty chiefs, nine each from the Mohawk and Oneida, fourteen from the Onondaga, ten from the Cayuga and eight from the Seneca. It is important to remember that, although each chieftainship was connected with a clan and a maternal family, these chiefs were neither clan nor family chiefs, and that some clans and many maternal families had no chiefs representing them in the League. The fifty chiefs were federal officials and whatever authority they possessed they wielded equally over all individuals of the League, without distinction as to tribe or clan. The Tuscarora also had a number of chiefs who were per-

mitted to sit at the Councils of the League. They participated in the discussions but had no voice in the decisions.¹

The official functions of the chiefs were not numerous. They decided, as mentioned above, upon peace and war, intertribal agreements and alliances, passed judgment on rare occasions on the behavior of particularly recalcitrant individuals and, in more recent times, sat as a body of judges in disputes over the ownership of land. But the principal functions of chiefs were individual. A chief was supposed to be wise, serious ("not a joker"), and imperturbable. A chief, taught the Iroquois elders, never loses his temper, for "his skin is seven thumbs thick." Each of the fifty chieftainships was known by an hereditary name, which was assumed by a chief when entering office and, upon his decease or removal, was passed on to his successor.

When a chief died a messenger was sent out, who ran through the villages, screaming, "Gwa—á! . . . gwa—á! . . ." Then the people knew that a chief was dead. At once, the matron of the maternal family to which the chief had belonged, determined upon his successor, usually a maternal nephew or younger brother of the deceased chief, but in all cases a member of the same maternal family. Having thus made up her mind, the matron would call a meeting of the members of her maternal family for the ratification of her decision. To this meeting other members of the same clan were admitted, but the members of the particular maternal family were "in control." In ancient conditions, the matron of the maternal family almost invariably had her own way at these meetings. Later records present occasional evidence of differences between related women that would arise on such occasions. However that may be, a candidate was proposed and approved at the gathering.

The matron of the maternal family was then constituted

¹The Iroquois are wont to refer to the traditional reason for this discrimination against the Tuscarora. The mythological symbol for the League is a Long House, and the Iroquois claim that instead of entering the Long House through the door, as was proper, the Tuscarora entered by breaking through the bark wall. Hence their partial disenfranchisement.

a delegate in order to communicate the name of the candidate to the chiefs of the Brother clans, the ones, that is, of the same phratry to which the dead chief belonged. They could either veto the nomination or approve of it. The latter was usually the case; whereupon the matron delegate proceeded to call upon the chiefs of the Cousin clans, belonging to the opposite phratry. After ratification by these chiefs the name of the candidate was presented to the Council of the Chiefs of the League, who again were at liberty either to accept or reject the proposed candidate. In the latter eventuality the candidate's name was once more presented to the maternal family. This, however, occurred but seldom. In the overwhelming majority of cases the League Council sanctioned the choice of the candidate's own people. Whereupon the League chiefs proceeded to set a date for the ceremonial "raising" of the new chief. This was a great intertribal festival which was attended by all the chiefs of the League who were able to be present, and to which all the people were invited. Prayers were recited, the names of the chiefs enumerated; the duties of chieftainship were once more called to the minds of the people, and a new chief entered the League.

It must, however, not be assumed that the chief was henceforth free from any further supervision on the part of his electors. The matron of his maternal family continued to keep careful watch over his activities. Should the new chief prove neglectful of his duties, should he reveal an evil temper, or a tendency towards prevarication or intemperance, or, worst of all, should his behavior with reference to the enemies of the people, such as the Sioux or Algonquin, fall short of what was to be expected of a patriotic Iroquois, the matron would not long delay in calling such facts to his attention. She would visit the chief and in a semi-ceremonial address recall to his mind his objectionable activities. She would then solemnly warn him that unless he desisted from his evil practises, his very chieftainship would be en-

dangered. The chief thus addressed was not expected to reply to her remarks.

If the chief persisted in his evil ways, the matron called on him for the second time and the same procedure was repeated. She warned him, however, that in case of further offenses she would call on him once more, accompanied by a warrior chief¹ and proceed to divest him of his office. Unless the chief reformed, the matron called upon him for the third time, accompanied by the warrior chief. The latter then delivered the following speech: "I will now admonish you for the last time and if you continue to resist to accede to and obey this request, then your duties as chief of our family and clan will cease, and I shall take the deer's horns from off your head, and with a broad-edged stone axe I shall cut the tree down," (meaning that he shall be deposed from his position as chief of the Confederacy). Then the warrior chief "handed back the deer's horns" to the matron.

Thus the chief was deposed. The matron then notified the chiefs of the League of what had occurred. In such cases the regular procedure followed in the election of chiefs was not gone through. Instead, the chiefs themselves met in Council and elected a successor.

It will thus be seen of what transcendent importance the women were in the Iroquois body politic. Although the

¹The warrior chiefs are to be distinguished from the fifty hereditary civil chiefs or "sachems," as Morgan called them. The warrior chiefs were not hereditary but elective. Originally, these chiefs owed their office to the recognition of their military prowess, but, as a group, they enjoyed but little prestige or power among the people; in the course of time, however, they grew in number and influence. During the Revolutionary War they had risen to a position of great prominence and often rivalled the sachems themselves.

Morgan and others have noted the interesting fact that of the Iroquois who have achieved historic fame practically all belonged to the class of warrior chiefs, not to that of sachems. While this was primarily due to the fact that fame came with military achievement, a prerogative of the warrior chiefs, it was due secondarily to the elective character of these chiefs. The standard of availability for chieftainship may have been a narrow one, but within these limits merit alone counted; whereas the inheritance of sachemships in maternal families frequently reduced the choice to but a few individuals not necessarily of great ability.

office of hereditary chief was denied them, this office was largely in their control. Once in a while it would occur that a woman who had gained the grateful recognition of her people by acts of unusual heroism or patriotism, was made a chief, but in such a case it was an honorary chieftainship, a so-called Pine Tree chieftainship (the recipient of the honor being conceived straight as a pine). This was a purely individual office not transmissible by inheritance.

Women constituted the public opinion of the Iroquois. To them the chief was responsible for his actions. Moreover, the matron of a maternal family in whose hands it was to make and unmake chiefs, often knew beforehand who the new chief was likely to be, this fact again being known to the prospective candidate. Such knowledge, of course, could not but affect the behavior of the young man. He felt himself under the watchful eye of a censor and a judge, on whom depended the future of his career.

To this must be added that women also played a prominent part in ceremonial matters, for of the six ceremonial officials which each clan was wont to elect for the purposes of arranging and supervising ceremonial procedure, three were men and three women.¹ It was the duty of these ceremonial officials to determine upon the period when the great tribal festivals were to be held and to make all necessary preparations, such as the setting aside of the not inconsiderable quantities of food required, the selection of a number of men and women who were expected to officiate at the festival and the appropriate rehauling of the ceremonial Long House.

When the important economic functions and prerogatives of women are kept in mind, it appears that their economic, social and political position among the Iroquois was fully equal to that of men, and in some respects was superior to theirs.²

¹The number of ceremonial officials elected by each clan varied somewhat in the course of Iroquois history.

²The extent to which the prestige of Iroquois women survives to this day,

To this interpretation of Iroquois society it might possibly be objected that whatever the prominence of women in the League economy and politics, they are after all not eligible to chieftainship, that the main executive power is lodged in the persons of men and that it is therefore incorrect to designate the social system of the Iroquois as a matriarchate. This stricture is in part justifiable insofar as chieftainship does represent the principal executive authority, and the chiefs among the Iroquois are men. On the other hand, the women are the ones who make and unmake chiefs. The fitness or unfitness of an individual for chieftainship is, then, a condition dependent on their judgment. They are thus truly the power behind the throne. This becomes particularly apparent when the situation among the Iroquois is compared with that of Africa, where women become queens, a station formally more exalted than that occupied by any Iroquois woman, but where this high status of certain individual women does in no way

may be brought home by two recent instances of which I was a personal witness. On one occasion I was about to photograph some of the ceremonial rites of the Iroquois, due permission from a number of chiefs having previously been secured. Just as the ceremony was about to begin and after I had already entered the ceremonial Long House, a chief appeared and in somewhat officious tones notified me that I was wanted outside. I followed him at once and found myself facing a small gathering, with one of the leading women of the tribe as the center. As she did not speak English, the chief explained to me rather curtly that the woman had objected to my photographing the proceedings. There was nothing to be done but to submit. Should I have persisted, my prospects as an ethnologist among this tribe of Iroquois would have been permanently handicapped.

On another occasion a woman who belonged to the Wolf clan of the Cayuga was pointed out to me as a great expert on Cayuga names. She was the Keeper of such names, whose duty it was to keep track of all names of her clan in use at a given time, and also of the names available for use. Mothers in need of names for their new-born babes were wont to consult her, and had implicit faith in her knowledge. In a highly hopeful mood I proceeded to call upon the woman, whose three husky sons shared my eagerness to see the names recorded and preserved—the idea of having the individual names of their clan thus saved for posterity rather flattered the vanity of these sophisticated Indians. But we had counted without the master. The woman received me with a quizzical smile, dictated to me a few of the names which the least informed Iroquois could have recalled, then pleaded failure of memory due to old age. No amount of persuasion, not even the prospect of a handsome remuneration, had the least effect. Thus, this large set of individual names would have remained unrecorded if not for the happy chance that Chief John Gibson, my main informant and a great student of all matters Iroquoian, was familiar with most of the names, and dictated them to me without hesitation.

represent the general position of women in the community, which is decidedly inferior.¹

¹Another parallel may be seen in modern society, where governments, whether imperial or democratic, are controlled by those who own or manipulate the material resources of the country, although these individuals themselves do not figure in the highest executive positions.

CHAPTER IV

UGANDA, AN AFRICAN STATE

The Baganda people inhabiting the Uganda country are situated west of Lake Victoria Nyanza. The economic life of this tribe, like that of their Bantu speaking neighbors, is complex and diversified. They are cattle breeders and herders on a large scale, and also keep flocks of goats and sheep. The care of the herds is in the hands of men who form a somewhat distinct group in Baganda society.

The cultivation of plants has progressed equally far. Maize is perhaps the principal staple food, but plantain trees are also cultivated on a large scale and, to a lesser extent, coffee trees. The multifarious cares involved in the processes of agriculture and tree culture are in the hands of women, barring only the assistance offered by men in the initial clearing of the ground of grass and trees in preparation for cultivation.

The prevalence of these occupations does not impair the importance of hunting, which is carried on by individuals as well as groups, communal buffalo and elephant hunting being especially highly developed.

Baganda industries do not reach the high technical perfection found among some other African tribes, but they are many and specialized. There are potters and bark cloth makers, basket makers and leather workers, there are ironsmiths and experts in ivory carving, while the art of building canoes is also in the hands of experienced craftsmen.

Before passing to the social and political organization of the Baganda, one further feature of their economic life must be noted which is characteristic for large areas in Africa, but perhaps unknown in all other primitive com-

munities. This feature is the large scale on which certain kinds of work are carried on. The building of houses in the capital and of the many principal and subsidiary enclosures surrounding the capital and groups of houses within, involved the co-operation of hundreds of workers, who were expected to furnish the building materials and whose task required continuous application for weeks and months at a time. The making of roads which connected the different districts of Uganda with the capital and other principal towns, was an even more laborious undertaking, involving still larger numbers of workingmen, who were furnished by the local communities. Barring the architectural accomplishments of Mexico and Peru, the primitive world of America, Australia, the South Seas or Siberia, knows of no industrial enterprises of equally vast scale.

The Baganda are divided into thirty-six gentes or *kika*. Each gens has two totems, while one or two gentes seem to have even three, all of which are sacred to the members of the gentes and are not eaten or killed. All the members of a gens are supposed to have descended from one human ancestor. The gentes are exogamous, there being no intermarriage within the gentes, with the exception of the Lung-Fish gens, which comprises two branches differentiated by their second totems. These two branches are permitted to intermarry. When a Baganda woman marries, she preserves her own totem—a perfectly regular procedure for a gentile people—but in addition she adopts her husband's totem. Mothers will at times attempt to impart a respect for their totem to the children, but in this they usually fail.¹

Each gens is sub-divided into a number of local divisions or *siga*, which are situated in different districts, in often

¹The fact noted in the text that the wife adopted her husband's totem must, no doubt, be ascribed to the weakened condition of the gentile principle among the Baganda. No orthodox totemic, or for that matter, non-totemic but gentile community would ever sanction such an overlapping of totems in the family. Facts such as this offer clear evidence that the totemic gentes among the Baganda, as in many another Bantu tribe, are in a state of transformation into a new order of society, under the cumulative stress of an increasingly dense population, and of the requirements of a centralized political system.

widely separated parts of Uganda. Each *siga*, again, is divided into a number of further minor units or *enda*.

Each gens owns a number of such estates or *siga*, which are often situated on hills covered by gardens, extending down into the valley. These estates are in charge of chiefs responsible to the gentile chief for the conduct of the members of their *siga*. The gentes have their own gods, but many gentes also take charge of one of the national gods, in which case the temple is situated on the estate where the chief of the gens resides, who then officiates in the temple as priest.

In addition to these lands, the gentes also have certain free lands, sections of territory in which three or four generations of a branch of a gens have buried their members; after this the land is regarded as belonging to the gens. Advantage is often taken of this custom in order to appropriate desirable garden land; therefore chiefs are on the lookout against such localized burials, for if the members of a gens once succeed in securing the right to a plot of land, even the king would hesitate to intervene, fearing the wrath of the gentile ghosts. Each gens has a set of individual names, which no other gens is permitted to use. While these names are bestowed on each member of the gens, they are seldom actually employed, other names being used instead. There is, in fact, a general reluctance on the part of individuals to admit their gentile allegiance unless there is definite necessity to do so.

The local subdivisions of the *siga*, called *enda*, also have their petty chiefs, who are responsible for the behavior of the members of their local group. All of these chiefs, those of the gens, the *siga* and the *enda*, bear fixed hereditary titles, which they assume in taking office. The titles are all traced back to the traditional original holders of these offices, and the various chiefs are in the habit of identifying themselves with those original holders to the extent of referring to their travels and other exploits as having been undertaken by themselves.

There are, in all, thirty-six gentes, each with at least two totems. Thus the Leopard gens also has the Genet as its totem, the Lion has the Eagle, the Otter also has the Genet, the Grasshopper has the Locust, the Elephant the Hippopotamus, and so on.

Some illustrations will now be given of the political functions of the gentes and of other customs associated with each gens. The Leopard gens is not permitted to eat the meat of animals that have been scratched or torn by wild beasts. The members of this gens have no service duties to perform in connection with the royal household. The gens takes care of a temple situated on Magonga Hill, where the mythological king Kintu first lived. No member of this gens can become an heir to the throne. The daughters of a Leopard man are permitted to marry the king, but their sons must be strangled. This gens has four estates in one of the districts of Uganda, nine in another, two in still another and one each in three further districts. The gens supplies the king with his chief butler, also with the man in charge of the king's drinking water, who is put to death when the king dies.

The members of the Otter gens make bark cloth for the king. They also supply one of the king's wives, whose duty it is to make his bed. This duty is hereditary in the gens. After the king's death this wife is expected to go to his temple and stay there for the rest of her life. On Nsoke Hill there stands a temple dedicated to the deified ghost of the Father, the mythological ancestor of this gens, and the priest associated with this temple must belong to the gens.

The Elephant gens people have fifty-one estates. They are the chief herdsmen to the king and also supply the royal household with a favorite variety of fish as well as a particular kind of bark cloth, manufactured by members of the gens. The butter used in the embalming ceremony, after the king's death, is also prepared and supplied by this gens.

The Lung Fish gens, which was subdivided into two

branches, which claimed to be descended from one Father but could intermarry, has as many as seventy estates in different sections of Uganda.

The Mushroom gens has the Snail as its second totem and a small ivory disc as a third. This gens is overburdened with duties referring to the royal household. In charge of the gens is the temple of Nende, the second god of war. The gens also takes care of the royal drum, it being the duty of a member of the gens to carry the drum daily to the royal enclosure and back again. The royal stool is also taken care of by this gens. The members of the gens supply the gate makers for the king, as well as the keepers of the gates. The chief gate keeper, a highly important personage, belongs to this gens. This individual has free access to all parts of the royal enclosure, which enables him to keep watch on the gate keepers. When, on the accession of a new king, the Elephant gens people drive twenty cows into the royal enclosure, the gate keeper captures ten of these. He also appropriates one third of the first lot of tribute delivered to the king. When the first chiefs come to pay their respects to the new king, he captures one of these and redeems him only after exacting from him a payment of ten women to the king. The king's gourd, or drinking cup, is taken care of by this gens. It supplies the gate keepers to the queen, to the king's mother and to two of the highest chiefs. From this gens is also taken one of the king's wives, whose duty it is to dig the first sod for the royal garden, whereupon the other wives are free to take up the cultivation.

Other gentes have similar totems, restrictions, temples and duties with reference to the royal household.

The supreme power in Uganda is centered in the king, who is permitted to marry only a Muganda. No woman is permitted to ascend the royal throne, nor any person not of royal blood. Thus the sons and grandsons of a king are his successors. On the other hand, the king's sons, or princes, take their mother's totem while the royal totems,

Lion, Leopard and Eagle, are seldom mentioned. Next to the king, the most exalted personages in the kingdom are his sister and his mother. Princesses are not permitted to marry or to have children; princes, on the other hand, are encouraged to marry in order that the supply of heirs may not become exhausted. When sons are born to the king, the king's brothers surrender to his sons their principal estates situated in different parts of the country, and are given other smaller estates in their stead. The brothers of the king who have surrendered their estates are still eligible to the throne, but their sons are debarred.

The king and all the chiefs own individual drums which are distinguished by their beats. The eldest son of the king may not reign but must take care of his brothers. Princes were feared and many of them were put to death as soon as a successor to the throne was assured. The princes are represented by their own chiefs in the districts where their estates are situated.

Although the king expresses his wishes with reference to the succession of the throne, the chiefs are the ones to decide.

When a king dies the prospective heirs are brought to the capital by certain chiefs. As rivalries among the royal aspirants are not uncommon, the chiefs and their adherents come prepared to fight. One of the chiefs faces the princes who stand in a row, and pointing at the one who is expected to reign, he says: "So and so is king," and then adds, "those who wish to fight, let them do so now." If, after this, any other aspirants come to the fore, spears are passed around and a fight ensues between the rival princes and their supporters. It continues until one of the princes is either wounded or killed. The victor becomes king. One of the king's sisters is chosen queen on this occasion.

After the ceremony the king and his queen undertake a pilgrimage to the hills of Budo, the fetich, guarded by three chiefs, who live in houses without fences, for these might be used as a hiding place by one of the rival princes. Before the king is admitted to the temple, a sham battle is enacted.

While the dead king's body is being embalmed—a procedure attended by much ceremony—the new king goes into mourning. This usually takes some six months, during which time a temporary residence near Budo is erected for the King; and there he lives, surrounded by the residences of thousands of chiefs, many of whom are soon to be deposed and replaced.

At some time during this period, the queen and the king's mother take possession of their hereditary estates, which up to that time were occupied by the late king's sister and mother, who now receive other somewhat smaller estates.

When the period of mourning comes to an end, the king beats his drum to make this fact known. Presently a gazelle is brought to the king's enclosure by the chief of the Grasshopper gens. The king chases and kills the animal. Then two men captured on the public roads wearing their bark cloth tied in a roll and slung over the left shoulder, are brought to the royal enclosure. One of these men is spared, while the other is strangled and his body thrown in the river under papyrus roots so it can never be found. After this the king selects his permanent residence. To quote from Roscoe's picturesque description of a royal enclosure in the making:

"The workmen were soon busy erecting houses on the site chosen by the king; each District Chief had the duty of providing for his royal master some special house which had its particular place inside the enclosure. Each District Chief had also to build some portion of the high fence which enclosed the royal residence. There was one plan followed, which had been used by the kings for years without variation. The enclosure was oval shaped, a mile in length and half a mile wide, and the capital extended five or six miles in front, and two miles on either side. The part which was called the back was reserved for the king's wives, who had large estates there for the cultivation of plantain trees. The king also had his private road to the lake through these estates through which he might escape in case of danger

from sudden rebellion or in case of war; several canoes were also kept in readiness, in case of emergency, for flight to the islands of the lake, where he could form his plans and restore order. The top of the Hill was reserved for the king's own residence; the chiefs built dwellings around the royal enclosure, according to their rank and the part of the country to which they belonged. There was one principal entrance, with a wide gateway and a house to guard it, and eight other small gateways, on various sides of the enclosure, which latter were private for the use of either the king or his wives. Each gate had its guard houses, both inside and outside; the gates were kept fastened, and were only opened to those who had the right to pass them. The interior of the enclosure was divided up into large blocks of houses, with wide roads between them, with gates and gate keepers to guard each block, so that even within the enclosure it was impossible for the women to pay visits to one another without permission, or for other visitors to pass in or out without special leave. . . . On the road from the main entrance to the council chamber were the best houses and there the strongest guards were stationed. The roads were lined with retainers, who guarded the king and were ready for any emergency. These retainers lived in tents made from cow hide, as less inflammable than grass, in order to diminish the risks of fire in the royal houses, which were entirely constructed of reeds and grass, so that when once a fire broke out, it was a serious question whether any of the buildings could be saved. The chiefs who were acting as guards to the king had to provide their own tents during the months that they were in office. The sovereign's retainers wore a special dress of antelope skins, slung over the right shoulder, passed under the left arm, and tied round the waist with a plaintain fibre girdle; their wants were supplied from the king's own lands . . . ; they were on duty in relays for months at a time. As there were no lamps or candles for night work, torches were made from dry reeds; the manufacture of these reed torches became quite an industry and

enabled the king to have the forts lighted up every night. Bark cloth trees were planted near the main entrance by the priests of each principal deity, at the time when the king's houses were built, and offerings were placed under each of them for each particular god; the trees were carefully guarded and tended, because it was believed that as they grew and flourished so the king's life and powers would increase."

The enclosures of the queen and the king's mother were situated at some distance from the royal residence, separated from it by a stream of running water, for it was said that "two kings could not live on the same hill." The royal residence was connected with these enclosures of the queen and the queen's mother, by straight roads lined on both sides with homes of important chiefs, so that communication could always be maintained without fear of attack by wild animals.

"The King sent presents to each of the important deities; female slaves, animals, cowry-shells and bark cloth. He returned the royal spear to Budo and sent with it an offering of nine women, nine cows, nine goats, nine loads of cowry-shells and nine loads of bark cloth, together with one of the widows who was to be the wife of the god Budo; this woman was given the title *Nakato*, the name of Budo's first wife, who when she gave birth to a child caused the sacred well *Nansove* to spring forth on Budo Hill."

A vast army of cooks was always busy at the royal enclosure. They were mostly women servants and slaves, who worked under one of the king's wives. Baskets of food for the entire retinue were placed before the King for inspection twice a day. He himself ate alone, served by one of his wives, who, however, was not permitted to see him while he was engaged in eating. "The Lion eats alone," said the people. If any one happened to come in and overtake the King in the process of eating, he was promptly speared to death by the latter, and the people said: "The Lion when eating killed so and so." What the king left could not be

touched by any one but was given to his favorite dogs. In the course of this early period of the king's reign, a number of other ceremonies were performed, in connection with one of which some unsuspecting passersby were seized on the high road and put to death—to invigorate the king.

When the rightful heir was a minor or was for some other reason unacceptable to the chiefs, the prime minister appointed a regent, a post always filled by a man, as a woman would not be tolerated on the throne, even temporarily. If the king had no son, the king's brother ruled, but if, in the meantime, the king had a son born to him, he became the heir, not one of the king's brothers' sons.

The Uganda country was divided into ten districts presided over by ten chiefs. Among these two of the biggest chiefs were not included, namely, Katikiro, who was prime minister and chief justice, and Kimbugwe, who had charge of the king's umbilical cord. These two chiefs had no districts of their own, but like the king himself, they owned estates in the different districts. These administrative subdivisions of Uganda were so arranged as to have the boundaries marked by some natural feature: a stream of water, a small wood, and the like. In addition to the divisions of Uganda proper, certain tributary countries must be mentioned which were in part subject to the Baganda. In the north lived the Bosoga, from whom a regular tribute of goats, cows and slaves was expected. The country to the southwest of Budu belonged to the people of Koki, who paid tribute in iron hoes and cowry-shells. These people had a king of their own, but they could not withstand the raids of the Baganda. To the west were the Ankole, who kept peace with the Baganda at the cost of periodic contributions of herds of cattle. The Kiziba, finally, who occupied the district south of Budu, sent tribute of cowry-shells and trade goods which they themselves obtained from tribes living further south.

The Katikiro, in his capacity of chief justice, settled the cases which were beyond the competence of the other chiefs.

His decisions were not regarded as final, however, until confirmed by the King. The enclosure, in which Katikiro held his residence, resembled the royal enclosure, with its courts and gate keepers, so that only friends, important chiefs and specially privileged individuals could reach him freely.

The chiefs spent a large part of their time at the capital, nor were they at liberty to leave for their own districts without the king's permission. In their absence, their administrative duties were performed by temporary officials.

All the land belonged to the King, excepting only the freehold estates of the gentes, over which the King had no direct control. Contributions to the state in taxes and labor were, however, expected from these estates. The king had the right to depose a chief at will. When a chief was turned out of his estate, but no offense could be shown against him, he was permitted to take his wives and cattle along with him; if, on the other hand, he was guilty of some misdeed, the cattle as well as the wives were taken by the king, provided he was able to find them. In the minor estates the sub-chiefs were masters and within the range of the local affairs their control was absolute; in all matters appertaining to state work, however, they were expected to consult the district chiefs.

Each district chief had to maintain a road about four yards wide, leading from the capital to his district, and the sub-chiefs had to do the same with the roads connecting their sections with the residence of the district chief. In cases where these roads led over swamps the builder's task required a tremendous amount of labor. Not infrequently bridges were erected over streams. If the stream was too wide for a bridge, and the detour to a bridgeable place was too great, papyrus stems were broken over their roots, and in this way a precarious crossing was secured. If, in crossing such a bridge any one slipped, he was doomed. No attempt was made to rescue him as it was believed that he had been claimed by the spirits of the river, whose vengeance was feared in case a rescue was attempted.

In the capital itself roads about twenty yards wide were maintained. The labor required for the erection of residences, enclosures, fences, roads, had to be supplied by the entire country, and it was the duty of the prime minister to see to it that this was done expeditiously. Every household called upon for workers was also expected to furnish twenty-five cowry-shells. Of the large quantity of shells thus amassed, the king took two-thirds and the Katikiro one-third, which he divided as follows: one-third was given to the chiefs who supplied the laborers, one-third to the overseers, and one-third the prime minister kept for himself. When work was being done on a road, any passerby could be stopped and forced to help for a while, before being permitted to proceed.

To defray the cost of various state enterprises, taxes were imposed by the king, a process described by Roscoe in the following words:

"When the time to collect the taxes was drawing near, the King, the Katikiro and the Kimbugwe fixed the exact date, and it was then announced in the council that the taxes would be collected on such and such a date. The king appointed the special tax collector for each district; to these district collectors, the Katikiro, the Kimbugwe, the Queen and the King's mother, each added their own representatives, and the district chief also added a representative. These six men who were appointed to a district went to each part of it; the principal sub-chiefs were first visited by them in person, but they chose and sent other messengers to each of the less important chiefs. The King's tax collector and his associates returned to the district chief's enclosure, where they were entertained while the work was being carried out by their men. The first thing to be done was to count the houses in each sub-district, and to ascertain the number of the inhabitants; the tax collector would then settle with each chief what amount he was expected to send to the King. One cowry-shell was brought by the collector's assistants to represent each cow, and after these had been

counted, the assistants went back to collect the tax. The amount usually demanded was a fixed number of cattle from each sub-chief, and a fixed number of bark cloth and one hundred cowry-shells from each peasant; of the smaller chiefs each paid a number of goats and also a few hoes. It frequently took two months, or more, to collect the taxes, because the bark cloth and hoes had to be made, and the cattle had to be collected. When this was accomplished, each servant took his amount on the appointed day to the district chief; the cowry-shells and bark cloth were counted and tied up in bundles, while the cattle were sent on ahead to travel slowly to the capitol. The King's tax collector took the whole amount to the Katikiro, who had to examine it, and to hear the details as to the number of houses and people in each sub-district, and as to how many bark cloths and cowry-shells had been collected from them. If the amount was correct, the Katikiro took the whole to the King; if it was wrong, the tax collector was required to return to the district and to gather what was missing, according to instructions which he received from the Katikiro. The chief of a district received a portion of the taxes for himself and for his sub-chiefs; the King took half for himself, while the Katikiro, the Kimbugwe, the Queen and the King's mother also had their portions. Each sub-chief was given a small portion of the amount which came from his own district; the King, the Queen, the King's mother, the Katikiro and the Kimbugwe, kept the whole of what came from their own estates, in addition to the portion which they received from the taxes of the entire country. The tributary states paid their tribute through the chiefs under whom they were placed, making their payments with cattle, slaves, ivory, cowry-shells, salt, hoes, etc."

For minor services the king was wont to secure young boys and girls from people in different parts of the country. The relevant statistics were obtained by a representative of the king, who would induce people to supply information about their neighbors and acquaintances. Then an arrange-

ment was made with the district chief, and the children were furnished. The king would keep for himself the boys and girls he liked best, turning the others over to his mother, the Queen, the Katikiro and the Kimbugwe.

A great many individuals throughout the land lived on the private estates of chiefs, working, and on occasion fighting for them in compensation for the tenure.

A considerable variety of crimes were recognized before the courts held by the sub-chiefs, the chiefs, the prime minister and the king. Distinction was made between murder and homicide, murder involving malicious intent. For homicide the fine was twenty cows, twenty goats, twenty bark cloths and twenty women. The whole fine was never paid, but only a part, while the rest remained unpaid for years, until a debt was incurred by the creditor gens—for these were gentile matters—whereupon the two debts were cancelled.

The Baganda believe in spirit and ghosts, fetiches and amulets. There is also a pantheon of higher deities. The main national deities are in the king's charge. Their temples are situated upon the chiefs' estates in the different districts of Uganda, the owner of an estate usually officiating as the priest in the local temple. With him, one or more mediums are associated, who have the power of communicating directly with the god. The spot occupied by a temple is sacred, so is the person of the priest; sacred are also his robes, all ceremonial paraphernalia, and the like. Persons become mediums accidentally. If a man or a woman acts as if possessed by a spirit, this is interpreted as a call from the god, and the person is sent to the temple.

Before entering into communication with the deity, the medium takes a smoke of tobacco and drinks a cup of beer, after which a frenzied condition sets in, during which communication with the god is established. After the performance, all memory of the incidents of the trance disappears from the medium's mind. A medium is usually a man, but

women mediums are not unknown, in which case the woman is called the wife of the god.

When a woman asks a god for girls and the request is granted, the girls are dedicated to the god, and when weaned, they are taken to the temple. These girls take care of the sacred fire as well as of the grass floor covering, and guard the sacred pipes and tobacco. This continues until maturity is reached, when they are permitted to leave the temple and marry.

Priests and mediums are not the only religious officials, for medicine-men are also known who, in some respects, are regarded as more powerful than the priests. They make amulets and fetiches, an accomplishment they share with no one else, cure sickness and act as surgeons, particularly when the need arises to stop the flow of blood after a wound has been inflicted in battle, or a limb has been amputated in punishment for an offense. If not for the medicine-man's assistance, such individuals would be likely to bleed to death. Medicine-men also exorcise ghosts.

One of the principal gods was Mukasa, the god of plenty, who sent food, cattle and children. A much less important deity was Nulwanga, Mukasa's chief wife, who assisted childless women to become mothers. When war was waged by the Baganda, Kibuka, the god of war, was served by as many as forty mediums, but at other times only one of these was in attendance. Then there was Kaumpuli, the god of the plague, and Katonda, the creator, called the "Father of the Gods," who was believed to have created all things; outside of that, little was known about him and but slight respect was shown him. Finally, there was Walumbe, the god of death.

The belief in ghosts was general and they were greatly feared. In their habits and wants, ghosts were like men. They were, moreover, shaped like their former owners, so that, when a limb was amputated in punishment for an offense, the ghost of the culprit was similarly afflicted: hence the general dread of such amputations. Ghosts were wont

to play about the graves as well as among the trees in the glowing sunshine of midday, and children were warned against them at these times. Ghosts clung with a special tenacity to the lower jawbone, and if this was removed, the ghosts would follow it anywhere, hence the jawbones of kings were preserved for many generations and their power was great.

The king was expected to visit the temple of his predecessor, which was in charge of the dowager queen. When about to leave, the king would suddenly give an order that all persons who had not passed a certain spot arbitrarily named by him, should be seized. This order was at once carried out by his bodyguard, and the persons seized were bound and gagged. Then they were sacrificed to the ghost of the dead king, so that their ghosts might administer to his.

Lions, leopards, crocodiles, buffaloes and other animals had ghosts of their own. A special fear was aroused by the ghosts of light colored persons, of persons born feet first, of those who were strangled at birth, and of suicides. The bodies of such persons were buried at cross-roads, and grass was thrown on their graves by passersby to appease the ghosts. If a suicide was committed in a house, the house was destroyed, or if a man hanged himself on a tree, the tree was uprooted and burned with the body.

There were also water and forest spirits, some of whom had priests as well as temples.

Great powers were ascribed to certain artificial objects, usually of portable size, made from definite substances combined in a fixed way. These were the fetiches, the preparation of which was a secret art, usually known to no one but the medicine-men. One of these was Mbajwe, the king's main fetich, to which were attached a temple, a priest and a female medium. This fetich was made of rope in the likeness of a serpent, with a head formed of clay and fashioned like that of a serpent. A number of individuals, each belonging to a particular gens, had duties associated with

this fetich. In addition to all of these deities and sacred spots, there were thirteen sacrificial places, at which human sacrifices were made. These were controlled by certain gods, who, it was thought, informed the king how many victims were required. Each sacrificial spot was in charge of a custodian, while the more important ones had their own temples with attendant priests. A large number of human victims was demanded for some of these sacrificial ceremonies.

CHAPTER V

CENTRAL AUSTRALIA, A MAGIC RIDDEN COMMUNITY

The material civilization of Central Australia and of Australia as a whole is very crude. The negatives predominate. There is no pottery, only very crude basketry. Agriculture does not occur, not even in the early form of garden culture, which is characteristic of wide areas in Melanesia and Polynesia. Domestication appears only in the case of the dingo, an Australian variety of wolf, which, caught young and brought up under the care of a boy or a woman, develops into a fairly manageable dog. Some animals, such as the cassawary, are kept as pets, but these are not infrequently permitted to starve from neglect.

Thus the life preserving activities are few and simple. The women gather yams, roots and berries; the men hunt; while fishing is once more in the hands of women, who use crudely woven baskets with which they catch the fish. In cases where a creek is narrow and shallow, a hedge is built nearly across it, and the congestion of fish thus brought about often makes it possible to catch it with the bare hands. The yams are dug by means of a pointed stick with a charred end; in case of necessity, the same contrivance is also used as a weapon. It is reported that in the fights between groups of men and groups of women which occur in some sections of Australia, the latter, armed with digging sticks are able to hold their own against the men who wield their clubs.

Animals in the open are often hunted by means of a surround. The whole tribe participates, including the old men, women and children. A wide circle is formed, the participants making as much noise as possible. As the circle gradually narrows, the animals inside the circle be-

come aroused, and as they jump from the grass and run to and fro, they are slaughtered without great difficulty.

The kangaroo is hunted in more individual fashion. In chasing one, a man may want the assistance of a woman and one or more children, or he may follow it all alone. When a kangaroo is sighted the hunter follows it, trying hard not to arouse its attention. If the kangaroo becomes suspicious, the hunter stops short and remains motionless. After a while the animal regains its calm and the chase is resumed. If the man succeeds in coming near enough to throw a club or a large boomerang or spear, he does so. Usually, however, the hunter fails to bring the animal down without a prolonged chase. Often he follows it for hours, a feat requiring great endurance. During the last stage of the chase, the kangaroo is wont to rise on its haunches, and with its back against a large tree, await the approaching hunter. The latter must be careful to avoid the dangerous hind legs of the animal; outside of this, no difficulty is experienced in clubbing it to death. To bring down a kangaroo thus single-handed is no small feat, and a man who succeeds in doing so is greatly esteemed by the natives.

The habitations of these natives are of the crudest kind: there are no huts of any sort, the only protection against inclement weather consisting of a windshield made of longitudinal pieces of bark supported in a slanting position by a number of poles. When in use, the shield is turned about so as to offer protection against the wind.

Navigation is very little developed. Australia is a land of few rivers. A large number of these are so-called creeks which have the distracting habit of losing their way to the ocean. Soon after the beginning of the dry season they become transformed into elongated pools and finally dry out altogether.

The only canoes reported from Australia are two bark varieties, both crudely made. One is cut whole from the bark of a large tree, the ends then being tied together with bark strings. The other is made of several pieces of bark

sewed together as a canoe. Even these canoes may represent but a local adaptation derived from the neighboring Melanesians.

The list of weapons is fairly extensive but reveals one interesting gap: the bow and arrow, which are almost universal in early communities, do not occur in Australia. A stone knife, on the other hand, is ubiquitous here. Then there are two varieties of spears, a long one and a shorter variety, the so-called javelin; two varieties of shields, an assortment of clubs, and the boomerang. The spears are either thrown directly by the hand or a spear-thrower is used, an ingenious contrivance which occurs also in New Guinea, as well as in a region far removed from the South Seas, namely, as was shown before, among the Eskimo of arctic America. Of the two varieties of shields the wider is used for protection against spears, while the narrower shields are employed against clubs. The latter variety of shields represents but a slightly transformed club with a handle in the middle, and there can be little doubt that this shield has actually evolved from a club.

As to the boomerang, several varieties of this curious weapon are in use. The larger ones, with or without a thickening at one end, are often used as clubs in fighting men or large animals; while the smaller ones are flat elongated boards, straight or curved in the shape of a banana. When used by the natives for hunting small animals they are thrown with remarkable accuracy and power. A very small straight boomerang is employed for killing birds. The so-called returning boomerang, a variety responsible for the world-wide repute of this device, consists of a curved board with a double twist, one end having a twist in one direction, the other in the opposite one. When this contrivance is thrown in a certain prescribed way, it encounters complicated aerial resistances in its flight, due to the twists. As a result, it performs curious manoeuvres in the air before falling to the ground, and may, on occasion, return to the very spot from which it was thrown. This type of boomerang,

however, is not used for fighting or hunting, but only for target practise and like tests of skill.

It appears from all this that the Australian has not advanced very far in material accomplishments. There are, nevertheless, certain features in his economic life which bespeak lengthy historic development, and therefore deserve special notice. It has been reported, especially by the older writers, that in various districts of aboriginal Australia occasional markets are held, to which different commodities are brought for barter. There is, however, no medium of exchange—no “money” of any sort—so that the transactions of necessity take the form of an exchange of one commodity for another. It appears, on such occasions, that inhabitants of particular localities are known for their skill in preparing this or that tool or weapon, and that their products are sought in return for others, in which another local group specializes to a similar extent. The period for holding a market having been agreed upon by the old men of a local group, the decision is announced to neighboring tribes by messengers, who carry with them little sticks in which sets of notches are used as mnemonic devices for memorizing the message.¹ Another curious feature is the following: the tribes living south of the central area and east of Lake Eyre, have a great fondness for a certain root, *pituri*, which they chew. This root does not grow in the area where it is in such demand. It is secured by an expedition of young and mature men, heavily armed, who fight their way through hostile territory until a certain locality in central Queensland is reached, where the root is found in large quantity. Huge amounts of it are usually gathered, notwithstanding the opposition of the local residents, and then the expedition returns, trading off part of their booty on the way and furnishing the remainder to their own group, where part of the supply is consumed, while quantities are passed on to tribes further south. Similar expeditions are undertaken to the

¹For further particulars about trading and messengers see pp. 277 *sq.*

southern coast in search of red and yellow ochre, a mineral substance, which is used by the natives for coloring purposes at their ceremonies.

The decorative art is also quite simple. It consists, in the main, of rectilinear or curvilinear figures, etched or painted on flat wooden boards, the so-called *churinga*. The principal decorative patterns consist of concentric circles, spirals, parallel lines and dots; here and there a footprint of an emu appears as the only representative of realism. In addition to these decorations, designs are made on the ground on ceremonial occasions by means of the application of ochre and bird down, the patterns in these designs being almost without exception purely geometrical. Realistic representations are apparently foreign to Australia, unless one accepts as indigenous certain figures of men and animals which were discovered in caves in certain districts. It is, however, almost certain that these figures are of foreign origin.

As if to compensate for the unimpressive development of decorative art, the natives have reached wellnigh artistic perfection in mimicking the voices and motions of birds and animals. These dramatizations occur as one phase of the totemic ceremonies as well as during hunting expeditions, when the kangaroo, emu or some other creature misled by the clever mimicry of the hunter, permits him to approach within striking distance. Australian children can often be seen absorbed in games in which these dramatizations of the grown-ups are early acquired and perfected.

The religious and magical beliefs and practices are multi-form and play a most conspicuous part in the lives of the people. A general animism prevails, which here takes the form of a belief in mostly evil spirits who frighten the natives, especially the women, by their occasional appearance, or merely by the sounds they are supposed to produce. There is also a belief in a superior deity of semi-animal semi-human shape and large size, who is supposed to have created all things in nature with the exception of man, but whose

activities have ceased at an early period, after which his contact with humans also came to a close. He is not prayed or sacrificed to, and is thought to be indifferent toward human affairs; nevertheless, he continues to be regarded as the supreme divinity. Whether this peculiar superior being is altogether the product of the native imagination or represents but a transformation of the God of the missionaries, must for the present remain undecided.¹

Magic is practiced constantly and by every one. Most diseases and almost all cases of death are ascribed to hostile magic. Every Australian can use magical means for such purposes, while curative magic seems to be restricted, at least in some localities, to the medicine-men. A particularly common method of exorcising a spell consists in the so-called "pointing." A short stick or bone is sharpened at one end; then, while an incantation is sung over it, it is buried in the ground often in view of the victim, who is seen sitting in camp quite ignorant of the procedure. As a result of this magic act the victim is expected to fall ill, or, in some cases, even to die. The practice of bone "pointing" is restricted to men; women have magical facilities of their own. Just as the prospective victim leaves the camp, a woman will blow on her fingers and then claw in the air, moving her hand up and down with little jerks. The victim, who may be a man or perhaps a younger wife of her husband, is seriously afflicted after this and may die. Or a woman may take her yam stick into the bush, sing over it and go through a series of motions, as if she were pulling something toward her. The effect of this procedure is fatal. The woman's head-ring is an excellent cure for headache if worn on the head by the husband. In case of abdominal pain it may be worn as a belt with a similarly salutary effect. Numerous ills are produced by quartz crystals being projected into a person's body. The magician stands at some distance from his

¹A detailed discussion of this "All Father" idea, the presence of which has also been reported from districts other than Australia, will be found in Father W. Schmidt's book, "L'origine de l'idée de Dieu." See also p. 211.

enemy, holding a number of crystals in one or both hands; these he pretends to throw in the direction of the victim. The crystals disappear and are supposed to have entered the body of the unfortunate individual, who may become seriously ill or die, unless a medicine-man intervenes in time and removes the crystals. A somewhat elaborate performance is undertaken to deprive a man of his kidney fat by means of a special strangling cord, so the natives believe. The cord is thrown over the head of the man overtaken while asleep; thus temporarily reduced to unconsciousness, he is carried to the bush and cut open; then his kidney fat is removed. On awakening he believes he has had a bad dream. Before long, however, he falls sick and is bound to die unless a powerful medicine-man comes to his rescue.¹

A medicine-man, whose power is usually believed to reside in huge quantities of quartz crystals or other sacred stones which fill his body, is himself subjected to various restricting rules of behavior. He must, for example, not eat too much fat, nor allow a big ant to bite him, for should he do so, the stones would leave his body. Also, he must not drink anything hot. It is recorded that a medicine-man who drank a cup of hot tea given to him by some white man, lost his power.

Medicine-men among the Arunta in Central Australia are made in two ways, by spirits and by other medicine-men, the former method being regarded as the more powerful. Initiation by spirits is believed by the natives to take place in the following way. A man is first taken away into the bush or to a cave where a spirit resides. The latter then throws a spear at the man, which pierces his neck and tongue and passes out through the mouth, leaving a hole in the tongue. Then another spear is thrown which pierces his head from ear to ear. After this the man remains unconscious. His body is opened by the spirit, all the

¹Instances such as this are especially instructive insofar as light is thrown on the relation of magical beliefs to experience, for in cases like the above no experience whatsoever can be held responsible for the formation of the belief.

insides are removed and others put in their place together with a large quantity of sacred stones. When the man returns to camp he is for a while demented. When he finally comes to, it is understood that a new medicine-man has been made, provided the hole in his tongue remains open; should it disappear, the initiation is not recognized as valid.

When the initiation is in the hands of other medicine-men, the principal processes involved consist in the rubbing of the arms and legs as well as of the abdomen of the candidate with stones. Considerable pressure is applied so that blood is drawn. Then stones are pressed against the scalp of the initiate, with similar effect. Then some hair string is tied around the middle joint of the first finger of the right hand and a pointed stick is pressed under the nail and into the flesh forming a hole, whereupon the pretense is made of pressing stones into this hole. Quartz crystals are also thrown at the candidate from a distance. When this process is completed, the medicine-man is made.

One of the important functions of a medicine-man consists in discovering who is responsible for the sickness or death of an individual. The belief in the efficacy of these magical devices is absolute, and the natives who really have a most remarkable resistance against wounds, have been known to die from relatively slight injuries when they believed the weapons that had caused the wound to have been charmed or sung over. An universally practiced method of curing a variety of diseases consists in the sucking of the afflicted spot by a medicine-man. Then one or more quartz crystals are produced, which are believed to be extracted from the patient's body; whereupon a cure ensues. Should there be failure, it is attributed without hesitation to the hostile workings of a more powerful magician, or to the fact that a vital organ has been affected. It must be noted in this connection that the medicine-man who must, of course, be aware of the sleight-of-hand involved in all such cases, will, when himself afflicted, not hesitate to ap-

peal to another medicine-man for assistance, not infrequently with satisfactory results.¹

The social and ceremonial organization of these people stands in strange contrast to the crudeness of their material arts. Each tribe is divided into a large number of clans or gentes, uniformly named after animals or birds. The individuals of a clan are not segregated in one locality, but are often distributed over a number of widely separated local groups. The members of each clan regard themselves as spiritually associated with a number of ancestors, half-human half-animal creatures, who lived in the mythological period, the *alcheringa*. These ancestors travelled about the country performing magical ceremonies; or, in other versions of the myth, they were persecuted by hunters. At certain places they stopped, exhausted, and disappeared into the ground; whereupon there arose on the spot a sacred tree, rock, or water hole. These sacred spots, or *oknanikilla*, are ever since haunted by the spiritual descendants of the distant semi-human semi-animal ancestors. Among the central Australians there is a belief that women passing by these charmed localities will be entered into by the spirit children or *ratapa*, and that the child subsequently born will be a spiritual descendant of a mythological creature who had entered the ground at that particular spot.

Another belief current in this area is in the magic power of the *churinga*, sacred wooden or stone slabs, two of which are owned by each individual, one large and one smaller one. Women as well as men have such *churinga*, but a woman may never see hers. The *churinga* are strictly guarded in particular localities; and the old men see to it

¹This mixture of sleight-of-hand with a *bona fide* belief in the powers of magic, must be noted as an interesting feature characteristic of such phenomena in their primitive as well as in their modern setting. Thus, Eusapia Palladino, the renowned Italian medium, always admitted that she practiced sleight-of-hand whenever possible, by way of improving her business, taking especial delight therein when the victims of her deceit were erudite professors; at the same time, she had a firm belief in the genuineness of her supernatural powers.

that no woman ever approaches these secret places. The sacred objects are produced only at totemic rites and some other ceremonial occasions, and are always handled with great circumspection. A *churinga* is supposed to represent the second body, or as some believe, one of the souls of an individual.

The members of a clan treat the animal after which the clan is named with consideration and respect. They are forbidden to kill or eat it. Their attitude, however, cannot be designated as one of veneration. Instead, there is an emphatic recognition that the animal or bird is a relative, an intimate of the clanmates. Each clan has the power of increasing the supply of its sacred animal, the totem, by means of a magical ceremony, the *intichiuma*. In the course of an *intichiuma*, the male members of a clan—for women are never admitted—properly decorated with bird down and ochre, dramatize the actions and cries of a particular animal or bird. There is some blood letting; the blood drawn from the arms of the participants by means of sharp stones, is permitted to flow over the ceremonial ground and is then spilled over the surrounding rocks. All this is supposed to precipitate the multiplication of the particular totemic animal. On this occasion, one representative of the species is killed and, having been first tasted by the head man of the clan, the *alatunja*, is then partaken of sparingly by the other members. This, however, is the only occasion on which clanmates may eat of their totemic animal. The *churinga* are produced in the course of the ceremony.

Protracted series of such ceremonies are performed by the natives at the end of the long period of desiccation and immediately preceding the season of torrential rains, as a consequence of which, as has often been described, the faunal and floral aspects of a Central Australian landscape become transfigured as if by magic. In this case, then, the natives have good experiential grounds for preserving their faith in the potency of magical rites.

The totem of each clan stands in a certain relation to

a number of other animals and birds, the so-called "associated totems," which, while not as important as the main totem, have a sacredness of their own. In the mythological tales current among the people, these animals always figure together with the totem as participants in the plot.

It will be seen that the clans of this region have come to function as magic working associations. As to the control of marriage, it is here connected with social units of an entirely different order, the so-called phratries, classes and sub-classes.

The matrimonial systems of Central, Eastern and Southern Australia fall into three main types. Type one is represented by such tribes as the Dieri and other tribes further south, and is characterized by the presence of two phratries subdivided into clans or gentes. Here the phratries control intermarriage. Type two is represented by such tribes as the Kamilaroi and other eastern tribes, where the two phratries with their clans are further subdivided into two classes each. Here the classes control intermarriage. Type three, finally, is represented by tribes such as the War-ramunga and other tribes of the Center and North, among whom the classes are once more subdivided into two sub-classes each. The latter units here control intermarriage.¹

¹The conditions obtaining in the three types of cases may be visualized as follows, assuming for simplicity that the phratry throughout consists of three clans. The actual number of clans or gentes in a phratry is always much greater.

	TYPE I (Dieri, etc.)	
Phratries	I	II
Clans	<i>a</i>	<i>d</i>
(Gentes)	<i>b</i>	<i>e</i>
	<i>c</i>	<i>f</i>
	I marries II and <i>vice versa</i>	

Here the children follow the phratry and clan of the mother (or the gens of the father).

	TYPE II (Kamilaroi, etc.)			
Phratries	I		II	
Classes	A	B	C	D
Clans	$a = a_1 + a_2$		$d_1 + d_2 = d$	
	$b = b_1 + b_2$		$e_1 + e_2 = e$	
	$c = c_1 + c_2$		$f_1 + f_2 = f$	

It seems that classes and sub-classes have no other functions except to control intermarriage. Phratries, on the other hand, while always exogamous, insofar as no marriages ever occur within a phratry, also have certain ceremonial functions. Thus, when the period at which the totemic rites are performed is about to begin, the members of each clan expect to be notified by certain members of the opposite phratry ^{whom} with their *intichiuma* is to take place. The ^{when} decoration of the participants is another function of certain members of the opposite phratry.

In addition to belonging to a particular gens and matrimonial class, a central Australian, before he becomes a full-fledged member of the community, also passes through a series of stages marked by initiation ceremonies. As one after another of these stages is left behind, there opens up before the boy an ever widening range of tribal functions, ceremonial activities and other forms of participation in the esoteric knowledge and practices of the male members of the

It will be seen that the phratries (I and II) are so subdivided into classes, on the one hand, and clans, on the other, that each class, A, B, C or D, contains part of the members of several clans, while each clan contains members of two classes. Class A, for example, contains members a_1 , b_1 , and c_1 , of clans a , b , and c , while clan a contains members a_1 (class A) and a_2 (class B), and so on.

The intermarriages and descent of the children as to class can be represented as follows (the children always belonging to the phratry and clan of the mother):




FIG. 24

That is, A marries D, children are C; C marries B, children are A; and D marries A, children are B; B marries C, children are D.

tribe. He starts life under a heavy pressure of eating taboos, most of the available foods being forbidden to him. As the boy approaches maturity, these prohibitions are gradually lightened; but only the old men are wholly or almost wholly free from all food restrictions.

TYPE III (Warramunga, etc.)

	I				II				
Phratries									
Classes	A		B			C		D	
Sub-classes	1	2	3	4		5	6	7	8
Gentes	$a = a_1 + a_2 + a_3 + a_4$					$d_1 + d_2 + d_3 + d_4 = d$			
	$b = b_1 + b_2 + b_3 + b_4$					$e_1 + e_2 + e_3 + e_4 = e$			
	$c = c_1 + c_2 + c_3 + c_4$					$f_1 + f_2 + f_3 + f_4 = f$			

Here, then, the condition obtaining in type two is further complicated in such a way that each sub-class contains parts of the members of all the gentes of one phratry, while each gens comprises members of all the sub-classes of one phratry. Thus, sub-class 1 contains members a_1 , (gens a), b_1 (gens b), and c_1 (gens c), etc., while gens a contains members a_1 (subclass 1), a_2 (s.-c. 2), a_3 (s.-c. 3) and a_4 (s.-c. 4), and so on. The marriages and descent of children as to class, sub-class and phratry can be represented as follows, (as a rule, the children here belong to the gens of the father, but in some central tribes the gentes are not hereditary, so that membership becomes irregular):




FIG. 25

That is, 1 marries 5, children are 2; 2 marries 6, children are 1; 5 marries 1, children are 8; 8 marries 4, children are 5; and 3 marries 7, children are 4; 4 marries 8, children are 3; 7 marries 3, children are 6; 6 marries 2, children are 7.

It will thus be seen how indirectly the clan or gens in Australia is connected with exogamy in its positive aspect, for among the tribes of type III each gens contains four groups of men and women whose matrimonial proscriptions and prescriptions are quite different; among the tribes of type II each clan contains two such groups of men and women; while even among the tribes of type I it is clearly not the clans or gentes, a, b, d, f , etc., which define the matrimonial rules on the negative or the positive side, but the phratries: no marriage in your own phratry, always marry into the opposite phratry, is the law.

The most important of the initiation ceremonies after which the ceremonial cycle is completed, is the *Engwura*, an elaborate series of rites, usually participated in by more than one tribe. The central rites performed on this occasion are those of initiation, but in addition, the totemic ceremonies and other important rituals are gone over, as if in rehearsal, by the novitiates, under the guidance of the elders, in order that the young men may become thoroughly versed in the often complicated technique of these performances. The initiates, on such occasions, are profusely decorated with ochre and bird down, just as are the participants in the magical ceremonies described above. There is, however, this difference, that in the *Engwura* ceremony no relation whatsoever exists between the totem of an individual and the designs used in his decoration. In other words, the ceremony is a tribal one and has no reference to the totems, the accepted totemic symbols being here used in a purely decorative capacity.

Throughout the width and breadth of the life of these Australian tribes, the prominence of the old men is most conspicuous, while their functions and privileges are numerous. They alone are relatively free from food taboos. They are at liberty to marry the most desirable young women of the group, and use and abuse this privilege at the expense of the younger men. They set the periods for the ceremonial performances and are the leading figures at these important occasions. They instruct the boys before and during the initiation ceremonies. They decide on the proper time for the holding of markets and dispatch messengers announcing their decision. On the latter occasions, they fulfill a double educative function: on the one hand, they instruct the youths in the customs and traditions of the tribe, on the other, they take advantage of the presence of individuals from other tribes in order to borrow from them new rituals, songs, or objects of material culture, which they presently introduce among their own people.

The importance of magic in Australia looms prominent

✓ in this description. Not only can numerous desires be fulfilled by magic, beginning with the securing of food and ending with the infliction of sickness, but death as well as birth are attributed to magic, the latter in the case of the Central Australians, whose belief in the magical impregnation of women by means of the *ratapa* spirits is described in the preceding pages. Magic pervades the entire cycle of totemic relations, that of the totem to the individual and *vice versa*, that of the individual to his *churinga*, and that of the *churinga*, the totem animal and the individual to the mythological ancestors in the *alcheringa*. All of these relations are held together by magical threads. Yet even here, in Australia, magical idiosyncrasy is not all-pervasive. There is no miracle, no magic, in the economic activities involved in the hunting, fishing and gathering of wild plants. The industrial processes, however crude, comprised in the making of nets, baskets, weapons, wind-shields and canoes, are based on purely matter-of-fact observation, on knowledge and skill. The social regulations connected with the matrimonial organization and the functions of chiefs, of the old men and of medicine-men, belong to still another level. These aspects of Australian civilization form no part of the magical cycle of relations and activities nor do they belong to the realm of pure knowledge and of matter-of-fact attitudes—they constitute a level of their own, where social usage is determining and self-sufficient. ✓

CHAPTER VI

REFLECTIONS ON PART I

Five examples of early civilizations have been passed in review. Are there any general conclusions to be derived from this survey, over and above the intimacy of understanding that comes with the absorption of concrete data?

First, then, one truth may well be emphasized, trite perhaps, yet not devoid of significance. In these five primitive communities we encounter all of the aspects that characterize human civilization, including our own. Religion, art, social and political organization, industries, economic pursuits and ideas, all of these elements are represented. Thus, from the very start it must be recognized that *common humanity*, not only in matters psychological but also in civilization, is revealed in all of the cases here analyzed.

It has been claimed by some that the most backward among primitive peoples possessed no religion, or again, no political organization. But attitudes such as these can only be maintained by a highly artificial definition of these aspects of civilization. If religion is belief in one supreme deity and political organization the centralized state, then indeed, both are missing from most primitive tribes. This procedure is, however, patently unjustifiable. As soon as the definitions are made broad enough to embrace, as they should, a great variety of disparate yet similar phenomena, the homogeneity of all civilizations with reference to their principal constituent elements becomes apparent.

Another important conclusion is this: is it not clear that the civilization of the Eskimo or those of the Haida, Iroquois, Baganda, or Arunta, are no more to be regarded as direct reflections of the psychology of the peoples that carry these civilizations than could modern civilization with reference to its own psychology? All of these civilizations are

old historic growths in which the vast majority of cultural elements, as they appear in the life of each generation, come from the past as part of the cumulative traditional background.

A further misconception of primitive society can now be disposed of. The idea, namely, that in early conditions the borrowing and diffusion of cultural traits counts for little, that each local group depends for its cultural growth upon its own psychic and historic resources. It is evident enough that in each one of our test tribes new elements have been added to civilization by the creativeness of the constituent individuals. The transformation of designs on the Northwest Coast, which can be followed for some time back, reveals a constant development along the line of the style peculiar to that area and must be ascribed to the creative imagination of its artists. The relation of the Iroquois Confederacy to the surrounding Indian tribes leaves no room for doubt that the cardinal principles of the highly elaborate socio-political system of the League must be ascribed to tendencies lodged among the Iroquois themselves. The magical ceremonies characteristic of Central Australia, insofar at least as they are totemic, clearly represent the result of local growth.

But it is equally patent that suggestions derived from neighboring tribes have contributed to the civilizational growth in all of the above cases. The Iroquois share the patterns of their embroidery designs with many neighboring Algonquin tribes. The Haida and Tlingit have religious societies that are in their general character and in many of their details so much like the societies of the Kwakiutl that common historic origin cannot be doubted. The very cultural similarity of the many Eskimo tribes of the Arctic suggests a constant repercussion of cultural elements from tribe to tribe. The Baganda share with their immediate neighbors and with many remoter Bantu speaking tribes such elements as the manufacture of iron objects, cattle breeding, elaborate legal procedure, centralized state organization. The tribes

of Central Australia are in many of the elements of their material, social and ceremonial culture like their neighbors of the east and the north and the remoter tribes of the western coast. In some of these instances the five test tribes may have been the originators rather than the borrowers, but that this was not so in all the cases is obvious without further analysis. Thus, these five primitive civilizations bring irrefutable evidence that culture, whether modern or primitive, derives stimulation for growth and development both from within itself and from other cultures with which it comes in contact.

These few points may suffice to show that our five early civilizations are first and foremost human civilizations, displaying the static and dynamic characteristics which are encountered in every organized human society.

Another set of traits which claim our attention are peculiar to the five tribes insofar as they are *primitive*. With the exception of the African Baganda, the local units comprised in the test tribes are small, the number of individuals involved seldom rising above several hundred; and even among the Baganda, where the populational proportions are different and towns with several thousands of inhabitants are not unknown, the typical villages are not unlike those of the other tribes. These local groups are relatively isolated. Nowhere do we find the constant, regular and regulated inter-communication that is so characteristic of modern society. And the result of this is that the local cultures are relatively peculiar unto themselves, much more individual and specialized than is the case later in history. Again, in all of the tribes, in this case including the Baganda, written language is unknown, which means that the past is brought to the present through the only two remaining channels: the physical persistence of the material things and the transfer of ideas, attitudes and modes of behavior by tradition, from generation to generation.

Further, the five groups represent characteristic folk civilizations, meaning by this that the cultural traits of each

group, in the form of knowledge, attitudes and functions, are much more evenly distributed among the individual members of the group than is ever the case in modern society. Not that professional specialization or esoteric knowledge are wholly absent. On the contrary, it was shown that due attention must be paid to these elements. There is the esoteric knowledge of the religious society member, the sex division in industry and art and other forms of division of labor. But all in all, when compared with modern society, the relative civilizational homogeneity, the evenness, one might say, of the civilizational layer throughout its length and breadth, is decidedly characteristic of the tribes reviewed.

The folk character of these civilizations carries with it the further corollary that the individual is nowhere so free from social pressure and public opinion, from the rule and custom of the group, as to figure as a conspicuous unit in civilizational growth. Of course, new things, ideas, attitudes, bits of knowledge, do arise, and whenever that is the case, the new comes through the channel of individual minds; but in its originality, in its departure from the old, in its uniqueness, these increments of newness do not measure up to those conspicuous changes which are ushered into modern civilization through the channels of individual creativeness.

One further element: knowledge remains unsystematized. There is no deliberate synthesizing of experience, no method of inquiry, no accurate measurement. There is, in other words, no science. Knowledge therefore remains crudely experiential in its derivation and purely traditional in its mode of transfer from generation to generation. That is no less true of the Baganda than it is of the other test tribes.

But when it is said that the civilization of our test tribes is universally human and typically primitive, not all is said. There are *traits* in each which are not only human and primitive, but also *characteristic of certain wide geographic*

areas. Thus the tribes of America, though differing from each other in scores of cultural peculiarities, are fundamentally alike in others. These common traits are characteristically American or North American, either because such traits are peculiar to North America alone or because they are at least common to all or most tribes of this continent.

Thus, in no one of the three test tribes is there any domestication of animals with the sole exception of the dog, of which the Eskimo, it may be noted, make more distinctive use than the other tribes. Then there is the limitation in the power of the chief, a characteristic trait of North America. In this connection the similarity of the three groups is especially conspicuous, in view of the vast difference in their socio-political organizations and the equally marked difference in the functions of chiefs in the three cases. Among the Eskimo there are scarcely any chiefs, in the narrower sense of the word. Their place is taken by temporary leaders whose leadership is based on special qualifications for particular tasks. Among the Tlingit and Haida a variety of chiefs occur—clan chiefs, family chiefs, town chiefs. Their prestige is high. They vie with each other in potlatching, war exploits, and the possession of powers supernaturally derived. But they are neither administrators nor legislators, nor do they sit as judges in adjudicating disputes among the people. The daily life of a chief, moreover, is not markedly different from that of a commoner or even that of a slave. Among the Iroquois, finally, there are the fifty semi-hereditary chieftainships. These chiefs are federal officials. In their councils they decide upon peace and war. They make pacts with other nations. As individuals, they admonish the young to follow tradition and precedent; here and there, individually or in joint council, they may sit as judges in the adjustment of rival claims to land and the like. The chief, nevertheless, is but a model Iroquois. His powers are strictly limited. His prestige, although great, is always subject to the limitation of his deserts. He may not command obedience to his

whims, and should he deviate from the path deemed proper by those who make chiefs, the Iroquois women, he is deposed and forgotten.

How different then the position of the chief among the Eskimo, the Tlingit and Haida, and the Iroquois! Yet, there is this common element, that the power of the leader or chief is strictly limited, that in no case is he permitted to exercise actual control over the actions of his people—barring such drastic situations as war¹ or other temporary exploits—and that in his daily life he is scarcely distinguishable from any of his subjects. This limitation of the chief's power is characteristic of North America.

Then there is the cult of the guardian spirit. Individualized or socialized in societies among the Iroquois, elaborated and transformed among the Tlingit and Haida by means of a graded system of supernatural powers, among the Eskimo restricted in its use to the *angakut* or magicians, this cult is common to the three groups insofar as it comprises the idea of a guardian spirit, the seeking and securing of supernatural powers by individuals, and the personal experiences that are associated with the acquisition of such powers. In its constituent elements this cult contains nothing but what occurs elsewhere in the religions of primitive peoples; but taken integrally, it is characteristically North American.

In the industrial field lies another, somewhat more elusive element of the same nature. While the Eskimo are expert carvers in bone, the Haida and Tlingit excel in their woodwork, and the Iroquois, at least in the more ancient period, were highly proficient in the bark industry, a common element is implied in these very contrasts. For it is typical of North American industry that in each of the major areas, some one, or at best a very small number of industries are highly developed, while others are neglected or absent. While the Southwest, with its basketry, pottery, weaving, architecture and mosaic work, stands out as a con-

¹*Cf.* here what is said about the warrior chiefs of the Iroquois on p. 79, note.

spicuous exception, all in all, the exclusive specialization of industries in local areas must be regarded as an American trait.

Similarly, the Australian test tribe displays characteristics that are common to most Australian tribes. The lack of agriculture and domestication, barring the dingo, the absence of the bow and arrow, the occurrence of the boomerang, the crudeness of the industries, the complexity of the social organization, the emergence of the so-called "classes," the great influence wielded by the old men, the drastic discrimination against women in all matters religious and ceremonial, all of these traits are shared by the Central Australians with most other Australian tribes, and some of the traits, such as the "classes," are unique in Australia.

The Baganda, finally, can be recognized as African on the basis of a whole series of cultural peculiarities. The iron industry, cattle raising on a large scale, markets, roads, organized judicial procedure, including the institution of witnesses, the centralized state with a king at the head, the association with the king of two queens, his mother and sister, these are some of the features shared by the Baganda with many African and most Bantu speaking tribes.

Thus the civilizations of our test tribes are revealed as common-human, primitive and North American, African or Australian. There are still other traits which further particularize the civilizations of these tribes. In North America, the Tlingit and Haida are differentiated from the Eskimo and the Iroquois by a whole series of cultural peculiarities. The potlatch, the prominence of rank in all matters social and ceremonial, three social classes—nobles, commoners and slaves—great elaboration of woodwork, and with it a distinctive art born within the wood industry, all of these traits are known to ethnologists as characteristic Northwest Coast features.

Similarly, among the Iroquois, there is the high development of bark work, the plant patterns in embroidery, the high position of woman in economics, society, politics and

ceremonialism, and finally, the League itself. Some of these traits are characteristically Iroquoian, others, like the plant patterns in embroidery, are shared by them with their more immediate neighbors, the Algonquin, but not with the other American tribes.

Again, in the Australian test tribe a number of features are peculiarly Central Australian. The *intichiuma* ceremonies for the multiplication of totemic animals, stone *churinga*, the utilization of *churinga* in connection with totemic ceremonies, a quadruple series of initiation rights, as well as certain peculiarities in the rights themselves, are traits not merely Australian, but Central Australian.

Nor is the limit of local specialization reached here. The numerous tribes of the Eskimo are differentiated from one another by peculiarities in the structure of the bow, by the kinds of stone lamps used, by certain details in the making of harpoons, by the types of harness for dogs, by the shape of kayaks, by the versions of widespread myths. Similarly, in the Northwest area, the Tlingit and Haida differ from the Kwakiutl in a number of features. The decorative art of the Kwakiutl, while similar in type to that of the northern tribes, is much cruder. The dual divisions of the Tlingit and Haida are not found among the Kwakiutl. Also, the maternal organization of society is much more pronounced in the north than it is in the south. The relation between religious societies and the potlatch is different in the two groups: whereas among the Kwakiutl the potlatch appears on the whole as an adjunct of the performances of the religious societies, the societies themselves constitute among the Haida little more than a functional aspect of potlatching. The "trickster" of the northern mythologies is the raven, whereas among the Kwakiutl the mink takes its place.

And what is true of the Eskimo and the Northwest tribes applies to the Iroquois, the Baganda, and the Arunta.

The detailed information available on the tribes of the Northwest permits us to go even further, for the Tlingit and Haida, while strikingly similar in all of their major

cultural peculiarities, are far from identical. The artistic aspect of the woodwork has been carried a shade further by the Haida. The tendency to multiply crests in clans is marked among the Haida, weak among the Tlingit. The reciprocal functions of the phratries are more definitely fixed among the Tlingit. Individual names among the Tlingit are derived from animals and birds; among the Haida, the majority of the names of individuals suggest potlatch associations, referring in various ways to property. And so on.

In the final analysis, what we have found is this: *every local civilization is in certain respects like all civilizations, in certain others, like all primitive civilizations; then it is like the civilizations of certain very large geographical areas, continental in their sweep; it is further like the civilization of a more restricted area; and finally, it is like unto itself, in certain local peculiarities, individual and unique.*

Can anything be said in explanation of this curious situation?

It seems obvious that the common human aspects of civilization must rest on certain fundamental characteristics of man as a psychic individual, of his relations to his fellow men and of his relations to nature. It is not possible here to indulge in an analysis of these factors. It is sufficient to note that the universal characteristics of all civilization are not themselves derivable from any civilizational or historic factors, but rest on certain peculiarities of man and of his relations to other men and to nature. The peculiarities of civilization which make it primitive cannot be derived from any psychological traits of early man as an individual. Here certain historic conditions enter as a general background, among which may be mentioned the absence of professionally conducted inquiry and of the concomitant application of the knowledge thus gained to thought and practice, and the absence of the art of writing. Under these historic limitations, certain relations of man to na-

ture and of man to man develop which are characteristically primitive and have psychological and sociological bearings.¹

Historical factors enter even more prominently as a determinant of those cultural traits that are continental in their range without being universal. Here an explanation through human nature or human or environmental relations cannot suffice, for the absence of these traits in other areas would then remain unaccounted for. Hence, one must take recourse to special historic events. Moreover, it would obviously be unreasonable to assume that cultural traits that do not occur in wide areas should have originated many times in one area. The alternative and only possible assumption is that such traits have originated a very few times, or perhaps only once, in one particular locality, and have then spread from tribe to tribe in the course of historic contact.

The civilizational features which were found to be characteristic of Australia, Africa, North America, belong to this latter category.

The above argument applies also to the traits distributed over narrower geographical districts.

From this somewhat complex analysis two fundamental processes disengage themselves which alone can account for the distribution of civilizational features noted at the beginning of this chapter. The processes are: *the origination of cultural features in particular tribes and localities*—such features being ultimately due to individual creativeness—and *the spread of such features in the course of the historic contact of tribes*. These two processes are equally fundamental and omnipresent.²

¹This theme is further elaborated in the last chapter, dealing with "Early Life and Thought."

²The actual situation has been unduly simplified in this presentation. For the only cases of distribution of cultural features so far considered are the cases of continuous distribution, where a form of belief, an object of material culture, a type of social structure, are distributed over a more or less extended area of contiguous tribes. But such cases must be supplemented by others—and their number is legion—where distribution is discontinuous, where, moreover, the similarities between the cultural features involved are not categorical but dubious, allowing of more than one appraisal. It is the

The data relative to the five test tribes may be utilized from yet another standpoint, namely, with reference to the theory of evolution. This aspect of the problem may be discussed under three headings: the relation between the five civilizations taken as integral units; the relation between the different aspects of civilization in the five tribes, such as political organization, art, and so on; and the relation between the different aspects of civilization in each one of the tribes.

When the attempt is made to arrange the five civilizations in the form of an evolutionary series, numerous difficulties are at once encountered. The Tlingit and Haida are readily recognized as highest in decorative art, but it is equally plain that the Baganda must be regarded as most advanced in political organization, although the Iroquois, in their own way, have reached a markedly different but perhaps equally advanced form of political integration. In the line of material culture and economics the Northwest tribes, the Eskimo and the Australians must be grouped together as having no pottery or agriculture, while from the standpoint of the absence of domestication, barring the dog, these three groups are at one with the Iroquois. In the case of Central Australia, one might be tempted to pronounce it as lowest in the scale from all standpoints, until one recollects the great elaboration of social organization found in this region. The Baganda, with their dense population and their highly developed and multiple industries, may claim priority in this respect, but in the technical and artistic finish of their industrial products they have scarcely anything to offer to compare with some of the better bone work of the Eskimo or the wood carvings of the Tlingit and Haida. And so it goes! There seems to be no way in which the civilizations of the five tribes could be arranged in

latter type of instances that have provided wellnigh inexhaustible stores of data for the acrimonious discussions of diffusion *versus* independent development in the history of civilization. We shall have occasion to return to this aspect of the subject in the "Reflections on Part II."

an ascending series. No sooner this is attempted, than the civilizations tend to break up into their constituent elements, each of which has undergone a distinctive development in each instance, both in degree and in kind.

Following this lead, one might next attempt to compare the separate aspects of the civilizations in the five test cases. In the domain of art, for instance, it is easily recognized that Australia stands lowest. But no light comes from the comparison of the artistic attainments of the other tribes. The art of the Northwest tribes cannot be considered as in any way derivative from that of the Eskimo nor *vice versa*; nor can one be regarded as superior to or further evolved than the other; and the plant pattern embroidery of the Iroquois cannot be placed in any developmental relation to the art of any of the other tribes.

Similarly, in political organization, the Baganda may perhaps be recognized as the highest; but the political structure of the Iroquois can certainly not be regarded as an antecedent of the Baganda form, the confederate type of political structure being quite foreign to Africa. Again, from the standpoint of the economic and industrial adjustment to environmental conditions, the Eskimo, while lacking many of the advanced features of African industry, have achieved so high a degree of balance with the needs of the situation that probably no other of the test tribes could stand comparison with them in this respect. As an apotheosis of survival Eskimo civilization has no peers.

The case does not appear any more favorable to our evolutionary attempts when the separate aspects of civilization in each tribe are compared. Among the Eskimo, as just indicated, the economic and industrial aspects of civilization are highly developed and so perfectly adjusted to requirements, that a sort of limit of possible achievement may be said to have been attained. Their social life, on the other hand, is exceedingly simple and amorphous. In art they do not cover a very wide range but stand high in their diminutive bone carvings and the equally slight but excellent etch-

ings on bone. In mythology again, they have evidently not gone as far as many other primitive tribes. Among the Northwest tribes the development of the wood industry with its associated art certainly outstrips all other phases of their civilization. And the same applies to the socio-political organization and ideology among the Iroquois. In Australia, finally, the economico-industrial phase is simple and crude, while the socio-ceremonial side is highly elaborated.

In view of such abortive attempts at squeezing our five civilizations into an evolutionary series from either of the three standpoints exemplified above, some conclusions force themselves upon the mind. While certain similarities in the historic development of the five test civilizations may be assumed to have occurred—and of this more anon—the historic fates of the five groups have evidently been individual and particular and have driven them in directions that may here and there have reached corresponding levels, without however lying along the same line of advance.

From the comparison of the separate aspects of the test civilizations it appears that these also have followed lines of development that were essentially disparate. While similarities in historic process in the several instances may here be assumed somewhat more readily, it is quite clear that distinct features have constantly arisen in the five developmental series, features which must be recognized as individualized and perhaps unique as well as fitting into distinct series of changes.

Again, there is no parallelism except of a most general sort between the different aspects of each civilization. They do not, as it were, keep pace with each other. Of course, it is clear enough that the density of population in Africa is correlated with certain phases of economic development, such as markets and roads, and that the latter are correlated with the development of the state (compare the functions of road building in the life history of Rome). Also, among the Northwest tribes, the art could not have reached its high state of elaboration and finish without an adequate com-

mand of the technique of wood work. But beyond such very general, fairly obvious and not very impressive correlations, the separate elements of civilization seem in each case to be driven forward by distinct determinants and to display most discrepant features of elaboration and advance.

PART II

INDUSTRY AND ART, RELIGION AND SOCIETY
OF EARLY MAN



INTRODUCTION

In Part I, primitive civilizations were treated in their historic wholeness, such as they appear in their territorial homes. In Part II, which follows, early civilization will be separated into its constituent aspects—economic conditions and industry, art, religion and society. We know how closely correlated are these constituents of civilization. It will, therefore, be understood that the singling out of the separate aspects is a highly artificial process; but it is essential for purposes of analysis. In the course of our treatment of each of the various aspects of civilization, however, it will often prove useful to throw side glances at the relations that obtain between a particular aspect and some of the others.

This comparative survey of early industry and art, religion and society, will also enable us to visualize more clearly those peculiarities of civilization which are characteristic of early conditions as well as the other phases in which the modern and the primitive represent but variants of the common-human.

CHAPTER VII

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND INDUSTRY

THE ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT

Man came into the world naked. He had no tools nor weapons. For shelter he had to use caves, or, if these were not available, trees; and when pressed by danger, he would climb these, for this without doubt he could do. His only means of transport on land were his two legs, and to cross streams he had to wade or swim, where that was possible. He knew no arts and his food he had to take where he found it. His diet was largely vegetarian, although supplemented here and there by whatever meat could be secured from dead animals upon which he might stumble, if lucky. Nature was not always kind to him, and he was the inferior of many wild creatures in size, in strength, in speed, in the sharpness of his senses and in the natural weapons of offence and defence.

But withal, he proved more than amply equipped to cope with the situation. His strength was considerable. In his hands he possessed an organ of great usefulness from the beginning, and of unlimited future potentialities. He had the power of speech, which proved of immense practical use and a source of great emotional satisfaction even before it developed into an incomparable organ for the expression and the moulding of thought. And, most important of all, his skull harbored a brain the like of which in complexity could not be found among the many creatures on land or in the sea. Also, in proportion to his size, his brain was much larger and heavier than that of any other animal, leaving far behind even the relatively large brain of the anthropoid apes. This amazing organ enabled him to gather up individual experiences with great rapidity and store them away for future reference. Moreover, his brain

soon revealed a capacity to generalize or abstract from individual experiences, and thus to make wonderful shortcuts through the infinite variety of necessary adjustments. To cap it all, man brought with him into the world a reasonable amount of inquisitiveness and originality.

Thus equipped by Nature, man provided two solutions to the problem of life. One solution was industry, the other, supernaturalism. Still far from controlling Nature, animate or inanimate, man achieved by means of industry specific adjustments to local environmental conditions. When these adjustments reached a certain degree of complexity and smoothness, they became stabilized, resulting in an equilibrium between natural conditions and the things and processes of industry. This equilibrium, while never wholly immobile, was on the whole remarkably stable, persisting, with slight variations, for long periods of time. The industrial adjustments to nature were, speaking generally, satisfactory, and brought a reasonable amount of security, comfort and happiness.

But industry left many desires unfulfilled, many questions unanswered, and Nature, after all, uncontrolled. Here supernaturalism stepped in. It placed man into an emotional rapport with Nature, it provided him with a system of interpreting phenomena, in other words, it gave him a world view, and it realized all his desires, for in the realm of supernaturalism the wish and the idea became objective realities.

Leaving supernaturalism for later consideration, we may now return to the industrial realm of objectivity and matter-of-factness.

After a more or less extended period of painful maladjustment, according to local conditions, man solved one by one all the basic problems of economic existence. He invented weapons and tools, traps, snares and nets. Thus hunting, fishing and the art of war were added to his equipment. Having discovered ways of making fire, he was able to warm himself in case of need, to keep away wild animals and to cook his food on hot coals placed in a hole in the

ground or by means of stones heated on the fire and then thrown into a vessel with water. Such vessels and other receptacles multiplied rapidly, some were of stone, some pots of clay, others were woven baskets or even boxes of wood. Man now lived in tents, wigwams, earth lodges, wooden or bark houses or houses made of snow. Transportation on water was effected by means of rafts, bull boats, canoes and boats. On land, man invented the sledge and the tra-vois long before he came to employ the services of animals, excepting only the dog. He alone very early became man's companion and was used as watchdog, as draught animal and as hunting companion. The furs and skins of animals came to be used for garments, the covering of tents and for other purposes.

But we must cut short the enumeration, for this composite picture of early economics, if carried out in detail, would fill the pages of this book.

In connection with the industrial life of early man a number of features are of special interest: the peculiarities of geographical distribution, the division of labor and the development of property. A few paragraphs are due to each of these.

A glance at the geographical distribution of industries and of the objects of material culture serves to reinforce the conclusions reached in the "Reflections to Part I." The making of the basic economic adjustments has everywhere led to the development of tools, weapons, garments, shelters, means of transportation, vessels. But as soon as one tries to particularize, the distribution of an object or device thus defined, narrows down. Some economic pursuits, objects, inventions, are then found distributed over vast continuous areas, others in less vast and discontinuous ones, while some things or processes prove indigenous to small districts.

To illustrate: the bow and arrow is found almost everywhere in the primitive world, excepting only Australia, but particular kinds of bows, shapes of arrow points, methods of attaching feathers to the arrow (if there are any), or

ways of releasing it, differ from district to district. Tents are found in many places, but the tipi, with its peculiar shape and construction, is at home in the Plains and some adjoining areas. Similarly, the bark house (as among the Iroquois), the earth lodge (as among the Omaha), the adobe pueblo of the Southwest, the gabled board house (as among the Northwest tribes), the snow house (of the Eskimo), the semi-subterranean house (as among the interior Salish of British Columbia), have each their areas of distribution, with considerable overlapping. Later we shall examine a map of African huts¹ revealing a similar situation. Some types of dwellings are rare and peculiar to restricted localities, as for example, the pile dwellings of northern Melanesia and New Guinea or the tree houses—houses built on the branches of trees—of some Philippine tribes or the African natives about Lake Tchad.

It is similar with water transportation. In North America we find the balsa of California, the bark canoe of the East and that of the West—two distinct types—the bull boat of the village Indians, the gigantic dugouts of the Northwest, the kayak and woman's boat of the Eskimo. And in the South Sea area there is the crude bark canoe of Australia, the dugout with one or two outriggers of Melanesia—distributed throughout Indonesia but not elsewhere—the dugout with built-up sides of boards of the Solomon Islands, and the gigantic and technically admirable war dugouts of the Polynesians.

If space permitted, equally impressive distributions could be shown for a multiplicity of other objects and processes of industry.²

As one surveys these geographical aspects of industry, the impression becomes irresistible that individual objects of material culture and even industrial processes travel from tribe to tribe as fairly independent units, concerning themselves very little with the behavior of the other aspects of

¹See p. 304.

²For notes on the distributions of pottery and agriculture and the forms of dress in North America and Africa, see pp. 302-305.

culture or even of other material objects. How else could the individualized distributions be explained?

At the same time, there is a noticeable tendency for things and ways of making or using things to become grouped in sets within certain limited areas. Thus, in North America, for example, the so-called culture areas are most clearly characterized by their material traits, whether objective or functional.¹

If we apply the idea of economic adjustment to this situation, it can be readily explained. When a tribe strikes a new physical environment, it works out an adjustment to the latter by means of a set of economic pursuits and of objects and processes of material culture. But this adjustment is always one of a number of possible ones; it is thus not by any means determined by the physical conditions. When an adjustment to the environment is made, an equilibrium established, it is not easily dislodged. The material culture of a tribe then develops a decided aversion to changes or even improvements, whether these originate within the group or are brought in from the outside. Also, an adjustment of this sort tends to spread to a wider area than that of its original home, following the lines of relatively similar environmental conditions. Beyond this its spread does not extend, except in the form of individual features which, as shown above, travel about with considerable freedom.²

An important cultural phenomenon which is equally prominent in all civilization, primitive or modern, and stands out with especial clearness in the domain of material culture, is the division of labor. It need not be discussed at this point, as illustrations have already been provided in the descriptive sketches of Part I, and the subject will be taken up again in later sections of this book.³

¹Cf. Wissler's suggestive descriptions of the material cultures of the areas in his "Material Cultures of the North American Indians," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. XVI, 1914, pp. 449-465. See also p. 312, note.

²Note the interesting formulation along similar lines by Wissler in his "Aboriginal Maize Culture as a Typical Culture-Complex," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXI, 1916, pp. 656-662.

³See the remarks on "The Disabilities of Women," pp. 259-264, and the discussion of Laufer's "The Potter's Wheel," pp. 317-319.

Material culture, again, is the birthplace of most ideas connected with property. It is regrettable that only a few paragraphs can be devoted here to this basic feature of civilization.¹

Contrary to a common assumption, both individual and communal property exist wherever man is found. Objects of wearing apparel, unless ceremonial in nature, tools and weapons, are everywhere owned by individuals. Frequently, although not invariably, they are also made by the owner. This obviously does not apply to clothes which, whether intended for men or women, are almost always made by the latter. Communal property usually extends to things of common use, as the agricultural fields in North America, the hunting and fishing territories of many peoples and places, and the like.

A point of greatest importance for the understanding of early civilization is this: in primitive life ideas of property are not restricted to material things but extend with the greatest facility to functional and spiritual matters. Myths, dances, prayers, songs, medicinal practices, guardian spirits, ceremonies, designs, cries, are "owned" in no less real a way than are material things. And here again both individual and communal ownership is encountered.

When a man (or woman) owns valuable material things or other prerogatives, he likes to feel that some, if not all of these precious possessions will remain in the hands of those close by, relatives or intimates. The close associates or blood relatives of individuals who own things, are equally eager to know that some day they will enjoy at least in part the advantages of these fortunate ones, which are for the time being out of their reach. Out of this psychological situation there arose a tendency for the inheritance of property and prerogatives, which in crude forms is found everywhere and assumes fixed as well as complicated aspects in many early communities, as for example, among the tribes of

¹An excellent recent sketch of early ideas about property will be found in Lowie's "Primitive Society," Chapter IX, "Property."

the Northwest Coast of America, the inhabitants of the Malay Archipelago and throughout the extent of the South Sea cultures. And, once more, property and prerogatives are inherited by individuals and by groups, such as families, clans and religious societies.¹

APPLIED KNOWLEDGE

Kwakiutl Industry

We have seen that woodwork is the great industry of the Northwest Coast. It is therefore not surprising to find that the Kwakiutl display much accurate knowledge and craftsmanship in the selection of materials, the making of tools, and the utilization of these for the manufacture of objects. One tool that is constantly used is the wedge. The making of wedges is described by Boas as follows:

"Wedges are made of yew-wood. One man bends a small yew-tree to the ground, and another one cuts it through at the bend with a gritstone which is kept wet. The tree generally snaps before it is cut half through. Then the branches are removed, and the tree is cut with gritstones into pieces of the desired length. The points of these pieces are next burned off to harden them, and are rubbed down with water on a large slab of sandstone. The burning of the wood prevents it from warping. When the point is ground down, the lower side of the wedge is given a steeper slant than the upper one; so that when driven into a horizontal log, the wedge stands slanting upward. In other cases the wedge is ground down on one side only, and the sides are flattened down by chopping with an adze or by grinding. The tip of the wedge also generally tapers down from the sides. The butt-end is tapered down slightly, and is then provided with a ring made of cedar-wiches. After the ring has been fastened on to the wedge, the butt-end is

¹As an illustration of how early property, however extensive, does not always mean what it means to us, see the discussion of the potlatch, pp. 59-61.

sometimes rubbed against a wetted gritstone until it is quite flat. Generally, however, it is battered down on a stone slab. Wedges for splitting boards are always made in sets of seven pieces, the longest of which is four spans long, while the others decrease in length to about two spans and a half or less. Other wedges are made for hollowing out canoes. These are made of crooked pieces of yew-wood, which are bent so as to conform to the inner curvature of the canoe. They are ground down to a point on the concave side."¹

The red cedar wood is used most frequently for making planks for houses, canoes and boxes. A moss covered trunk is usually selected because this generally contains the best wood. Before using the tree, the workman makes a small hole in it with a long-handled chisel. This process, called "feeling into the tree," is used to test its soundness. The wood of fallen trees is said to be softer and more easily split; it is therefore used for making boards and boxes. Roof beams are made of course-grained cedars because these do not catch fire easily. Fine-grained cedar, on the other hand, is used for canoes because it does not split easily. In olden times planks were cut from standing trees: "In the butt-end of the tree, on the side that has no branches, a hole was cut, in which a fire was started, and carefully guarded, that it should not spread upward. The charcoal was scraped out of the hole with a stick of hemlock-wood, and the wood above the hole was kept wet by means of a long stick wrapped with hemlock-branches. After this hole had been made at the butt-end the workman would climb the tree to a height of about three or four fathoms. There he would work, standing on the branches of a small tree that had been pulled over so that it leaned against the trunk of the large tree on which he was working. Two places about one cubit apart were cut out of the trunk of the tree with stone axes, and the intervening wood was wedged out. In this manner a deep cut was made. It is

¹Boas, "The Kwakiutl of Vancouver Island," p. 323.

said that sometimes this upper cut was also burnt out; but this was probably not done very often, because the fire makes the wood brittle. Then planks were split off with wedges between these two deep cuts."¹

At present the planks are cut from a felled tree by a somewhat different method, seven wedges of different length being used to split them off. During this process great care is taken to preserve the uniform thickness of the boards. A number of devices must be employed to achieve this end.

"After the top of the log has been split off, it is thrown down and laid flat side upward, the upper end resting on a log. Then the thickness of the first plank to be split off is marked on the end of the log. It is made three finger-widths thick. The plane of this plank never runs quite parallel to the first plane of splitting, because the stresses in the wood, owing to the change in its position, run nearly parallel with the surface of the first plank. Therefore the thickness of the second plank is marked only two finger-widths under the last line of division. If in splitting this plank the plane of separation should begin to dip downward, the upper surface of the log is loaded with logs and stones. Then the plane of separation rises again. If, on the other hand, it turns upward, the tree is turned over, and the weight of the wood changes the inner stresses so as to cause the plane to dip down again. The longest planks that are thus cut are three fathoms and a half long. When planks are split from a horizontal log, the split face of which lies upward, the outer margins of the planks always turn downward, so that the upper side of the plank is convex near its sides, while the lower side is concave."²




FIG. 26

Boas, "The Kwakiutl, etc.," p. 331

¹*Ibid.*, p. 328.

²*Ibid.*, p. 329.

Great skill is displayed in bending wood. Thus, the sides of boxes are made of one board which is bent over to form the corners (see Fig. 26). "A cut is made in the wood at right angles to the surface of the plank. Then the wood is shaved off from the right-hand side so that the surface slants down to the deep cut. After these have been made, a shallow groove is made on the opposite side of the plank. After these grooves have been made, the board is placed in hot water or steam and put between two level planks, which are weighted with stones. Thus it is left over night. When it is taken out on the following morning, the plank is perfectly level. When the wood is to be bent at the kerf, a little ditch as wide as the board is dug in the ground. Stones are heated and put into the ditch. Then fresh kelp is placed on the hot stones and is sprinkled with water. Then the board is placed across the kelp with the shallow groove downward. Sometimes the deeper kerf is covered with moss or soft cedar-bark, upon which hot water is dripped. Then that side of the plank which is to be bent up is grasped with a pair of tongs, while the other side is held down by a stick placed near the kerf. One man steps on this stick, while the other one, who holds the board in the tongs, bends it over slowly, so that the shallow groove forms the outer, convex side of the angle. The pressure on the stationary part of the board prevents the breaking of the outer fibres of the wood."¹

Another equally remarkable process characteristic of the entire area is sewing wood whenever two pieces are to be joined.²

The preparation of fish-hooks is also of great interest. The following is a close translation of the Indian text:

"When the fisherman gets ready, when he first goes to fish red cod, he takes a branch of driftwood of fir and splits it into four pieces. The length of each is one span of our fingers and four finger-widths. Then he shaves them so that

¹*Ibid*, p. 331.

²For a description of this interesting device see Boas, *ibid*, pp. 334-337.

they are thin and round. As soon as he has finished, he takes kelp and puts into it the split branches which are to be the four (branch) hooks for cod. He has also four pieces of kelp. When night comes, he digs a hole in the ashes of his fire and puts into it the four pieces of kelp in which the (branch) hooks for red cod are. Then he covers them over and leaves them the whole length of the night until morning. As soon as he finishes covering them over, he takes a short board and carves out a rounded mould the same thickness as the thickness of the (branch) hook for the red cod, and the carved mould has the same depth as the size of the hook that is to be made. After he has finished four of them, he puts them away.

“Now he is ready, when day comes the next morning. In the morning, as soon as day comes, he digs up what has been covered over, and he rips open the pieces of kelp while they are still warm, and he takes the round branches and bends them into the carved moulds in the short board, and he pushes them into it. He does so with all four of them. As soon as he has finished, he puts them away in a cool place in the house; and when they get cold, he takes his hooks and takes them out; and he takes tallow (of the deer) and chews it; and when it is soft, he heats the hooks by the fire; and he only stops heating them when they are scorched. Then he rubs them with the tallow, and he puts them back again into the place where they had been, into the carved moulds in the short board. The reason why he puts on tallow is that they become stiff and that they do not open again. The next day, when they are cold, he takes them out again from the carved moulds in the short board. Now the hooks are brittle.

“Then he takes the hollow-sided bone of the foreleg of the elk and breaks it in pieces, and he sharpens thin pieces. They become round, and one end is sharp. They are to be the bone barbs of the hooks. As soon as he has finished, he ties them on to the hooks. He has as his means of tying them split spruce-roots.

"When he has finished, he takes sea-weed from the beach, and spruce, and puts them into a small kettle. Then he pours salt water over them and puts it over the fire of the house. They boil for a long time, and then he takes them off. When the water gets cold, he takes his four branch hooks and puts them into the kettle. They stay in the kettle for four days. Then he takes them out and hangs them up in the corner of the house."¹

In their houses the Kwakiutl use heavy logs to support the wooden framework. The handling of these with their limited mechanical equipment is not an easy task, but the Kwakiutl have overcome the difficulties by a number of ingenious contrivances. When a house post is to be raised,




FIG. 27

Boas, "The Kwakiutl, etc.," p. 338

(see fig. 27) a hole is dug at the place where the post is to be erected, which extends in the form of a slanting ditch toward the center of the house. The outside of the hole where the post is to stand is protected by heavy planks driven into the ground. Then the post is shoved into the hole and is raised gradually, being supported by logs of increasing size as it is being raised.

For the raising of the long and heavy roof beam, another device is employed. The illustration (fig. 28) shows

¹*Ibid*, pp. 332-333.

the method employed. When force is applied to the end of lever *e*, beam *c* is raised. At the same time it is guided so as to slide along the slanting pole (*b*). Temporary support (*h*) is used to keep (*c*) in this position. Then the parts are readjusted and the process is repeated.




FIG. 28
Boas, "The Kwakiutl, etc.," p. 339

When the end of the beam approaches the top of post (*a*), a heavy plank is tied to the opposite side of the post extending above it so as to prevent beam (*c*) from rolling down on the other side. When beam (*c*) is in place, another plank is tied on the side of post (*a*) on which the beam was rolled up. The opposite side of the beam is raised in a similar way.

Another description of the making of one type of horn spoon is translated by Boas from the native text:

"Now I will talk about the making of the horn spoon, the black spoon. When the head of the mountain-goat is taken off, it is kept in the corner of the house for four days, and it is placed not far from the side of the fire of the house; and when the heat of the fire strikes it, the spoon-maker turns the head over all the time; and when it gets warm, he places it nearer the fire. He watches it all the time so that it does not get burnt. When he thinks it is warm through and through, he takes hold of the head and tries to pull the hair off. When it gets loose, he knows that the horns are also loosened. He takes hold of the horn with his right hand, and with his left hand he holds the nose of the head. Then he twists the horn a little and pulls it off. Now the horn has been blown off by the steam.

He also does the same with the other one. When he has them off, he takes his hand-adze and a block of wood and he adzes it. He adzes it at the concave side of the horn, placing the thick end on the block of wood, in this manner:



FIG. 29

As soon as he has it off, he adzes off the 'mouth' of the spoon so that it is round, in this manner:



FIG. 30

After he has done so, he measures three finger-widths, beginning at the top of the horn, and he adzes it so that it is notched in this place, and it is in this way when he has finished it:



FIG. 31

"He puts away his hand-adze and takes his straight-knife. In former times the people rubbed them down with rough sandstone when they were making black horn spoons. Now there is water in a dish, and the man puts it down at his left-hand side while he is rubbing the horn. He puts the thick end into the water, and he holds it by the small end with his left hand. With his right hand he holds a rough sandstone and rubs the horn. Nowadays the modern men adze it. They shave it down to smooth it after they just begin cutting it. After all this, he puts a small kettle half

full of water over the fire, and he takes two cedar-sticks, each one span long and half the thickness of a finger. He takes split cedar-bark and ties the ends of the cedar-sticks together with the cedar-bark. Then he gets another piece of cedar-bark ready to tie the other end after having put the spoon in between. Then it is this way:



FIG. 32

(That is, two straight sticks tied loosely together at one end.) When the kettle boils up on the fire, he takes the spoon and puts it in. He does not leave it in a long time before taking it out again. Then he puts the spoon near its 'mouth,' between the cedar-sticks, in this manner, and he takes the cedar-bark and ties it on near the end of the spoon-spreader into which the spoon is put. He bends back the point, and holds it by putting it into cold water, so that it sets. Then it does not bend back again, but is kept in position as it gets cold. Next he takes off the spoon-opener, and he takes dried dog-fish skin and rubs it all over it, so that it becomes very smooth inside and outside. When it is quite smooth, it is finished. Now the black horn spoon is finished after this."¹

The gathering, preparation and eating of eel-grass is described in the following passage:

"In springtime, when the winter is past, then all the women get ready to twist eel-grass The man's wife who is going to twist eel-grass first takes her eel-grass twisting paddle and her anchor-line of cedar-bark rope, and also her eel-grass twisting hat, for generally they wear a hat

¹Boas, "Ethnology of the Kwakiutl" (35th Report, Bureau of Ethnology, pp. 102-104).

when they twist eel-grass, because generally sea-water splashes into their faces when the women pull up the twisting-stick with the eel-grass twisted around its end. Then it splashes into their faces when they wash the eel-grass; and therefore (the woman) wears an eel-grass twisting hat. She carries down every thing as she goes down to the beach to her little old canoe for twisting eel-grass, and she also carries her bailer and her eel-grass twisting-stick. She launches her small old canoe, and puts into it what I have named. When it is all aboard, she sits in the stern of the small eel-grass twisting canoe. She takes up her eel-grass twisting paddle and paddles, and she goes to a place where she knows that there is thick eel-grass and that the eel-grass is growing in soft sand. When she arrives at the place where the eel-grass is, she takes the cedar-bark rope and ties the stone to its end and throws it into the water; and when it touches the bottom so that it is vertical, she ties it to the stern-seat. After doing so, she takes her twisting-stick and puts the tip into the water. She pushes it down into the sea-water and strikes the sandy bottom where there is much eel-grass. Then she begins to twist it. Then the eel-grass is twisted around the twisting-stick. When she cannot turn the twisting-stick any more, she pulls it up. The twisting woman pulls up the twisting-stick. As soon as the eel-grass comes in sight, she untwists it to get it off from her twisting-stick, and then the eel-grass comes off; and she squeezes one span around it, beginning at the head-end. That is what we refer to as the roots. She washes it in salt water, so that the sand comes off. When it is all off, she measures two spans from the upper end of the roots, and she breaks off the lower end. When it is all off, she puts it in front of herself, and she puts the twisting-stick back into the water, and she does the same as she did before. When she has much of it, the tide rises, for they only twist at spring tide. As soon as the tide comes up, she hauls up the anchor and goes home; and when she arrives at the beach of her house, she gets out of her old

canoe for twisting eel-grass. She takes out her anchor and carries it up; and when the anchor-line gets taut, she puts it down. Then she sends her husband to go and invite his tribe to come and peel eel-grass. The man immediately obeys his wife. He invites his tribe. When he comes back, he clears out his house, and spreads the mats around for those who are going to peel the eel-grass to sit down on. As soon as he has done so, he takes his oil-dishes and oil and brings them, so that they are ready. Then those who are to peel the eel-grass come in; and when they are all inside, the man asks the young men of his numaym¹ to go and carry up the eel-grass. Immediately the young men go and carry it up. They carry it into the house and put it down in front of those who are to peel it. The man takes the oil and pours it into the oil-dishes; and when the oil is in every one, (the young men) place them in front of those who are to peel the eel-grass, at the outer side. There are four men to each oil-dish. Then the eel-grass is scattered in front of those who are to peel it. When this is done, the men take up four pieces of eel-grass and pluck off the small roots. When they are all off, they peel off the leaves of the tail-end. They begin at the upper end of the thick root; and when they have peeled it as far as the soft part in the middle of the eel-grass, they do the same with the other three pieces. When this has been done with all of them, they put the roots together so that they are three finger-widths in length, and then they break them off; and they break them off again so that they are all the same length, in this manner:




FIG. 33

¹"Subdivision" of the tribe, *A. A. G.*

Then there are eight pieces in all. They tie them together with the leaves, in this manner :




FIG. 34

and they hold them at 1. Then they dip (the bundle) into the oil and eat it, and all the others do the same. After they have finished eating, they pick up what they did not eat and go out of the house; and they go into their houses and put down in front of their wives the eel-grass that they have taken along. They never drink water before they go out and when they go into their houses. That is the eel-grass peeling feast given to many tribes, for it is the food of the first people in the time of the first Indians of the mythical period. Therefore an eel-grass feast is a valuable feast given by a man. That is all that is to be said about eel-grass, for there is only one way of eating it and of getting it."¹

¹*Ibid.*, pp. 510-514.

CHAPTER VIII

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND INDUSTRY (Continued)

APPLIED KNOWLEDGE (*Continued*)

Hopi Pigments

Another example of applied experience and technical mastery is supplied by the Hopi handling of pigments. In their ceremonies the Hopi require a large set of colors, to which they ascribe symbolic significance. Colors are used for the costumes of the participants, the ceremonial paraphernalia, the bodily decoration of priests, and most of all, the designs in color on the sand and the painting of the *kacinas*, doll-like representations of supernatural beings.

Space does not permit to discuss here the elaborate and often beautiful designs made on the ground by permitting narrow streams of different colored sand to fall from the hand over the surface of the ground, thus forming designs.¹

Stephen enumerates some thirty odd pigments used by the Hopi for these various purposes. One pigment known as "green bread" is prepared in the following way:

"About ten ounces of pinon gum is put in an earthen pot and set on the fire, a very little water being poured in to keep it from burning and it is then allowed to roast. A large basin is set conveniently with about a gallon of water in it, and over this basin a yucca sieve is laid, and in the sieve a quantity of horse hair, or shredded yucca fibre. After the gum has melted and boiled for about ten minutes it is poured upon the hair lying in the sieve and allowed to strain through into the water, where it accumulates in a white mass. The operator then puts about three ounces

¹For illustrations of these sand designs see James Stevenson, "Navajo Ceremonial of Hasjelti Dailjis," Bureau of Ethnology, Eighth Report, plates CXX to CXXIII.

of fragments of blue and green copper carbonate into a small muller and rubs them into a pulp, then pours a little water in the muller and rubs the pulp into a liquid. He then turns to the gum, which is stiff but still pliable, and after kneading and stretching it back and forth, doubling and twisting and pulling, it becomes soft and of glistening whiteness. After manipulating the gum for about a quarter of an hour, he folds it up compactly, dips it lightly in the blue-pulp liquid, and puts it back in the roasting pot, which has been filled with water, and sets it on the fire to boil. As the water heats, the gum melts, and just before it comes to a boil he pours in all the blue-pulp liquid, then, as the mixture boils he maintains a constant stirring with a long rod. He dips up some of the mass from time to time on the rod to examine its color, and the longer it boils the darker it grows, and after about twenty minutes he takes the jar off the fire, pours off the hot water and pours in some cold. He then takes the blue-green mass out, and works it around in his hands, forming a cake of about eight ounces."¹

Another pigment called "bright yellow paint" is prepared by a priest, as follows :

"A small fire is made at any convenient court nook, or on the roof of a house, and two or three flat stones set on edge around it support an earthen pot of about two gallons capacity, and about half a gallon of water is poured into it. The expert then puts in about two ounces of Si-una, an impure almogen (alunogen?), rubbing it to a powder between his fingers, and in the same way adds about the same quantity of tu-wak-ta, a very fine, white calcareous sandstone. He stirs frequently with a gourd ladle, and as the mixture boils it foams violently, and having subsided, some more of the two substances is added, and then as much of the dried flowers of the *Bigelovia graveolens* as can be crowded into the vessel, and then enough water to fill it. The contents are allowed to boil for about half an hour, during which they are stirred as much as possible. A yucca sieve

¹A. M. Stephen, "Pigments in Ceremonials of the Hopi," p. 263.

is placed over a large basin and the contents of the pot strained through it, the flowers being squeezed dry and thrown away, and there is thus obtained about two quarts of a dull, yellow liquid. The process just described is repeated and the infusion is poured back into the pot, and as it again comes to a boil more of the earthy ingredients are added in small quantities from time to time.

"The tint of the liquid is tested on the skin occasionally; should it prove too pale, another vessel is put on the fire and another infusion obtained by the process first described, enough of which is added to the liquid in the first pot to bring it to the desired tint. Should the liquid be too dark, more of the mineral substances and water are added. The process occupies about four hours and the mixture has then boiled away to about a pint, of a bright yellow color and pasty consistency, which on drying forms a hard cake."¹

*Tewa Ethnobotany*¹

The way in which knowledge and superficial classification, accurate observation and erroneous interpretation are inextricably intermingled in early man's ideas of things in nature is well illustrated by the botany of the Tewa.

The Tewa say that the leaves make the plant grow; after the leaves have fallen, the plant stops growing. In the winter the tree is not dead, it has merely stopped growing because it has no leaves. It remains in this condition until the leaves come again. The real function of the root is not understood. The Tewa do not know that it takes up water, but they say, "The roots have to get wet or the plant dies." The tree is said to sit on its roots and the word for root is the same as for haunches, or the base, bottom or foot of inanimate objects. The bark protects the tree and the word for bark is the same as for skin. The

¹Stephen, *ibid*, p. 262.

²This brief sketch is based on the meritorious contribution of John P. Harrington and others, "Ethnobotany of the Tewa Indians," Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 55.

seed is believed to contain the little plant. "The plant is in the seed," said one informant, "but you cannot see it."

All nouns denoting plants and most nouns denoting parts of plants have vegetal gender. While plants are thus separated linguistically and conceptually from the rest of nature, some other things, for instance a mountain, also have vegetal gender. On the other hand, the Tewa observe very closely even minute differences in the plants of their region. They have, for example, a separate name for every one of the coniferous trees in that locality, the differences between which are so slight that the average white man readily overlooks them.

Some linguistic classifications tend to mislead the white student insofar as they might be taken to imply deeper insight than the Tewa really possess. Thus, one term is used by them for leaves, the petals of flowers and the needles of coniferous trees. There is a word for flower or flowering plant which is also used figuratively in the sense of pretty. Young men use it toward their sweethearts, meaning "my flower." Women and girls are often designated by this term. A cumulus cloud is called "white flower cloud." An eagle down is called "eagle flower." There is a word for bud which is used for any bud or young sprout, whether a flower, leaf or stem. Of a flower bud that has not burst, the Tewa say, "The flower is enveloped or covered," or "The flower has not yet burst," or "The flower is an egg."

Of all fruits which are green when unripe a term meaning green is used when they are in this condition. On the other hand, of gourds, squashes, pumpkins, muskmelons and watermelons, a term meaning hard is used to indicate ripeness and one meaning soft to indicate unripeness.¹

The interest taken in leaves is reflected in the terms used about them. Thus there is one term for leaf, another for

¹As the actual condition of these plants in the state of ripeness and unripeness is the reverse of that indicated, it seems that the investigator has in this case misunderstood the situation.

leaf surface, still another for leaf edge, as well as terms for leaf point, leaf vein (or fibre), leaf juice (or water) and leaf stem. Even more instructive as revealing the minute attention paid to leaves are the terms describing the surfaces of leaves, there being terms for smooth, shiny, rough, ridged, grooved, veined, hairy, course haired, downy or fluffy, prickly, thorny and sticky.

The words for color are white, black, red, yellow, blue, watery green, brown and grey, with the corresponding nouns, but there is no word meaning color. To find out the color of a man's horse, one asks, "How is your horse?" and if that is not definite enough, the question follows, "Is it red or is it white?"

There is a word for grass. It may be used for all true grasses and grasslike plants.¹

These descriptive sketches of Kwakiutl industry, of the preparation of Hopi pigments and of the botanical stock-in-trade of the Tewa, bring evidence of the possession and utilization of knowledge. These, however, are but disjointed fragments of what is in fact an incoherent and disorganized but, withal, enormous stock of concrete information amassed by early man in the course of his contact with things and utilized by him for his purposes.

Without devoting to this important aspect of the life of primitive man the space it deserves, we might roughly indicate the range of his command of objective data which the study of early civilization discloses. The pursuits of hunting, fishing and the gathering of the wild products of nature imply an ever increasing familiarity with the shapes, qualities and habits of animals and plants. The utilization of these animals and plants or of parts of them for food,

¹A similarly instructive sketch on "The Ethnozoology of the Tewa Indians" by the same author is available (Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 56).

for clothing, for shelter, involves further knowledge, revealed everywhere, of at least the principal anatomical elements of animals and of the properties of plants, such as durability, greater or less resistance to water, pliability, hardness, and the like. The familiarity with animal life often goes further than this, rules being passed against the killing of young animals, and periods of the hunt being adjusted to the seasons of the maximum availability of a particular species. It goes without saying that the two later achievements, the cultivation of plants and the domestication of animals, involve processes in the course of which this knowledge of the static and dynamic qualities of the representatives of the two great domains of nature becomes vastly extended.

Another important addition to knowledge, involving often detailed information utilized with minute care, is implied in the industrial field. The properties of the materials used become known and the knowledge is judiciously applied. Where wood is used for building, different qualities or ages of trees are selected for particular objects or parts of objects. In the making of baskets more pliable materials are utilized where needed, while at points where greater strength is required, such as the bottom or the edges, tougher materials are used. The scraping, tanning and sewing of skins, implies a multiplicity of detailed points of utilized knowledge. And the same, of course, applies to the processes of cooking, as revealed, for example, in Boas' impressive collection of recipes of the Kwakiutl cooking art. The same applies to the often elaborate processes involved in the chipping and flaking of stone, in weaving, spinning, carving and, as in Africa, smelting and casting of metals.

The art of the preparation of poisons is encountered among the lowest tribes, such as the Bushmen and the pygmies of Central Africa, who have for long been able to preserve the independence of their relatively low civilizations at the points of their poisoned arrows. The curative proper-

ties of certain plants have been discovered in early times, and everywhere the art of the doctor-magician is supplemented, not infrequently in the same person, by that of the practical pharmacologist.

Not the least conspicuous chapter in the primitive book of knowledge is that referring to man himself. Many unprejudiced travelers and all ethnologists have noted the very satisfactory understanding of human nature observable among primitive tribes. In war and in council, in the popular wisdom expressed in proverbs, as in Africa, in leadership—whether that of the chief or that of the priest—there is revealed the same shrewd understanding of man by man, false in part, but in part true, which is equally characteristic of modern life and is only raised to a higher power among those who make man a specialty, our great writers.

As one surveys this vast field of concrete, objective, matter-of-fact knowledge and performance, he is tempted to identify early man with his modern brother, thus discrediting, once and for all, the theory of the magic-ridden savage of primitive days.

At this point we must call halt to the over-sympathetic inquirer, for critical thought and a sober outlook upon things is quite foreign to early man. He sees straight and hears straight, with a sure hand he fashions his tools and applies them to the manufacture of articles of use and adornment, with much common sense and shrewdness and great physical adeptness he handles the plants, animals and humans of his environment. But *he does not think straight*; at least not when it comes to explanations and hypotheses. And what is a world view but a set of explanations and hypotheses? The world view of early man is supernaturalism. How did it come, then, that such vast stores of cold fact, that so much common sense and perspicacity and shrewdness should have left practically untouched that all-important aspect of primitive thought which refers to the interpretation of phenomena? The answer to this query cannot be fully given here. Briefly we shall deal with it in the last

paragraphs of this book. Here only a few additional remarks may be permitted.

In brief, then, the early system of knowledge is a highly pragmatic system.¹ It is semi-automatic, as it were, being translated in terms of behavior without becoming a field of contemplation on its own account. Thus, while there is knowledge there is no inquiry, while there is common sense, there is no critical thought, while there is expertness there is no professional addiction to investigation.² The art of drawing abstract conceptual inferences from a mass of comparable data is as yet unlearned, the habit of testing hypotheses as to their truth not their utility, as yet unformed.

Additional light can be thrown on this problem of early knowledge by a glance at invention as revealed in the products of industry.

INVENTION

There is one mental process, still practical to be sure, but distinctive in its nature, the operation of which is attested to by the material reviewed in the two preceding sections. It is invention. In the devices used for the hunting and ensnaring of animals and the catching of fish, in the conveyances employed for transportation by land and by water, in the building of houses, boats, canoes and rafts, in the making of pots and the weaving of baskets, in spinning and sewing and the tanning of skins, in the preparation and utilization of tools and weapons, there is abundant evidence of the inventive operation of the early mind.

¹A curious side light is thrown on some well-known tenets of the pragmatic philosophy by this intellectual insolvency of the primitive mind. Knowledge, when acquired and used mainly as a guide to conduct, not as valuable on its own account, does not bring forth those fruits of comprehension and enlightenment which are the prize of a more detached attitude.

²The only type of specialization in knowledge which primitive society reveals is exhibited in the individuals whom one might designate as professional gossips. They are the ones who make it a point to know all there is to be known of the traditions, myths, customs, and personal episodes of the group. The almost invariable presence of such individuals in primitive communities is a relatively recent discovery of ethnologists. To the enquiring student these human archives prove of the greatest use.

An invention, on its objective side, represents a novel combination of things and processes in such a way as to achieve a desired result. On its psychological side, an invention is the utilization in thought of the discovered properties of things and processes in such a way as to produce the objective invention.

The extent to which discoveries and the utilization of discoveries, which is invention, go hand in hand, especially in primitive society, is not always realized. To bring home this point it may prove useful to enumerate some features of primitive industry which one would class as inventions. The making of fire by means of friction is an invention. The friction may be produced by a sawing motion in which two pieces of wood are utilized, or by the revolution of a stick in a cavity in a board, the revolutions being produced by a rapid reciprocating motion of the two palms between which the stick is held. The pump drill of the Iroquois and of other tribes and the bow drill of the Eskimo involve additions to this in the form of further inventions, by means of which the continuity of the revolutions is secured and the speed increased. Numerous elements in a boat or a canoe are inventions: the long and narrow shape, the keel (if there is one), the attachment of the oars, as in the Eskimo woman's boat, the oar itself, or the paddle with its long handle and its broad blade by means of which the resistance of the water is translated into propelling motion, the principle of the sail which fulfills a similar function with reference to the air or wind. Further inventions are represented by the hook, which is used for catching fish in almost all areas where fishing is found; the barbs on arrows and spears; the spear thrower which adds a leverage to the arm and enhances the strength and accuracy of the thrust; the composite harpoon of the Eskimo with its ball and socket device and the detachable point; the composite bow of the same people, with its reinforcing bone attachments, some of which give greater strength, others greater elasticity to the weapon; the use of feathers on arrows and the spiral

attachment of these which is encountered in many tribes; the employment of the lever, two examples of which were cited from the Kwakiutl; the principle of release which is utilized in so many traps; the method of bending and of sewing wood which is current among the tribes of the Northwest Coast; the preparation of bark by beating, soaking and drying so as to fit it for the making of wearable materials; and so on, through the wellnigh endless series of primitive inventions. All of these refer to very primitive conditions, for no mention was made of those other numerous inventions implied in the domestication of animals, the cultivation of plants, the origination of the wheel, etc., etc.

The term invention is usually applied only to objects or devices, but it must be extended to cover processes even though these may be executed by the hands alone. The pot maker, the basket weaver, the wood carver, all employ certain sets of motions thus to achieve with speed and accuracy the desired technical results. These motions are often highly complicated and not by any means easily learned. Such complexes of motions, designated by Boas "motor habits," must be regarded as inventions, inventions in a purely dynamic level. If the hand and the object worked upon are conceived as a temporarily mobile mechanism, the movements of the hand represent the dynamic principle which make the mechanism work in order to achieve the desired result, namely, the transformation of the material into the finished article. This dynamic principle, the movements of the hand, always works poorly while the process is a new one. The development of a so-called technique consists in the establishment of motor habits which comprise a series of dynamic adjustments, discovered in the course of the process itself and deliberately or automatically utilized while the technique is being improved. These dynamic adjustments, when first made, are inventions. The same principle applies even when the *results* achieved are purely dynamic, as for example, in the wielding of a weapon or the paddling of a canoe.

Like everything else, motor habits become fixed and standardized, and are taught as elements of established techniques when the young are instructed in industrial pursuits by their elders. But it must also be remembered that every craftsman inevitably makes some individual adjustments, and that the expert craftsman becomes one largely by dint of such individual additions to the technical process, by dint, that is, of a new set of dynamic inventions which are incorporated in his motor habits.

Now all of these inventions, whether static or dynamic, either were discoveries or were preceded by discoveries. Heat or even fire must have been produced by friction accidentally before friction was utilized deliberately to produce fire, and most likely the accident of discovery also suggested the method used, such as rubbing one board against another with a sawing motion or revolving a stick in a cavity in a board. The shapes of boats and canoes represent, without doubt, a prolonged process of non-deliberate trial and error in the course of which certain shapes proved more satisfactory for the attainment of speed and safety. The composite harpoon never could have been originated except through accidental and repeated discoveries of the imperfect working of a spear under the required conditions, and what could have suggested the detachable point but the repeated and disastrous breaking of the spear? And so on with the other inventions. It can scarcely be doubted that other factors, some perhaps of a religious or magical nature, may have contributed to certain practical inventions or to the antecedent discoveries as, for example, in the case of the feathered arrow where, as Wundt suggests,¹ the analogy with the bird brought to mind by the flight of the arrow may have first led to the attaching of feathers. This is, of course, purely speculative, although psychologically feasible. The tendency to call upon such extraneous motives to account for discoveries or inventions can, however, be easily exaggerated, for the objective conditions of matter-of-fact

¹See p. 352.

procedure usually suffice to account for the discoveries made.

The preceding sketch reveals both the scope and the limitation of primitive invention. That the invention itself was always deliberate cannot be doubted, although in many instances it may have consisted in nothing but a deliberate reproduction of a discovery. In more complicated inventions a number of such inventions were combined to achieve the desired result, but such complicated inventions were doubtlessly made one by one, with perhaps considerable periods of time separating each succeeding improvement. However that may be, early man deserves credit for ingenuity and originality at least in the utilization and combination of discovered properties and processes.

At the same time, it is easy to exaggerate the amount and overestimate the worth of the mental effort involved in early inventions. For each new step of innovation is but a slight one. It is directly controlled by the disclosure of an error or imperfection or by an accidental discovery of a process or principle that might be introduced to enhance the effectiveness of a given device. There is no evidence that any individuals in early life devoted themselves professionally or exclusively to the making of such inventions, and although it must be assumed that men in these old days differed in inventive ability as they do now, the scope for the exercise of such ability was limited. It would therefore be incorrect to think in this connection of mental visions, of bold flights of the imagination, the presence of which allies the mental activities of some modern inventors to the creativeness of the philosopher, the scientist or the artist.¹

¹This distinction between invention in the narrower sense, that is, mechanical invention and creativeness, is not usually understood. Even today the vast majority of mechanical inventions imply a mental process that is highly pragmatic and involves a minimum of imaginative elements. The problem is to make a thing work, and this is achieved by the manipulation of established mechanical principles and on the background of other known mechanical devices for the accomplishment of the same or similar tasks. All such inventions are highly pragmatic in character and the fundamental processes involved are radically distinct from philosophic, scientific or artistic creativeness, which implies imaginative constructs, usually, even typically distinguished by their partial or even entire non-adjustment to established conditions, excepting those of their own making.

To return to the element of discovery in inventions, the contrast between the primitive and the modern is not as great in this particular as might offhand be supposed. Modern inventions—speaking primarily of mechanical ones—are also, in most instances, applied discoveries. The innovation is not the product of detached mental speculation, but is brought into being through the agency of discoveries made in the course of experimentation. The difference between the modern and the primitive situation lies in the nature of the experimental conditions. The modern inventor, in facing the problem of adding a new function to an already complicated machine, is in many ways admirably fitted for his task. He is trained in the theory of mechanics, which saves him the trouble of many vain attempts: he knows the limits within which he must operate. Further, he is familiar in minute detail with the nature of the machine he is about to improve and with many other similar machines of the past and the present. Again, he has a clear conception of the particular additional improvement that is required of him. And finally, he is furnished the tools of experimentation which make it possible for him to condense into a relatively short period a tremendous amount of trial and error. Under these conditions, the discoveries which lead to the invention are practically bound to occur with little delay. That this is so is attested by the financial status of such inventors, guaranteed them by their employers, men who are not usually notable for the appreciation of deferred results.

What modern science, industry and social organization make possible in this direction may be illustrated by an example from recent history.

When the aerial activities of the war suggested the desirability of a radical improvement in aeroplane motors, President Wilson charged his Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. McAdoo, with the accomplishment of this task. Mr. McAdoo, who had had previous experience in engineering enterprises, retained two consulting engineers, the brothers

X and Y, and placed them in a position where they could exercise a free hand in the solution of the problem. X and Y then summoned three experts, Messrs. A, B and C, each one of whom was associated in a consulting capacity with one of the great automobile concerns. A was an expert on carburetors, B—on gases, C—on machine designing. These gentlemen were made cognizant of the problem before them, the requirements to be met including the following specifications. The weight of the new motor was not to exceed $1\frac{1}{2}$ or $1\frac{3}{4}$ lbs. per h.p. This specification was to obtain even if the motor were fed with very low grade gasoline. The parts of the motor were to be standardized and made interchangeable, so that the motor could be disassembled and reassembled under most adverse conditions, and broken or otherwise disabled parts could be easily replaced. The standardization of the parts of the motor was required as a condition for economical mass production.

The required specifications having been indicated, the experts A, B, and C went into consultation in a room of a Washington hotel and remained there, their meals being served to them, until they had completed in every detail the designs for the new motor. For the mechanical requirements of the task a staff of trained designers was placed at their disposal.

When this was accomplished, the engineers X and Y "farmed out" the different parts of the motor to a number of machine manufacturing concerns, in accordance with their special facilities. The parts of the motor were brought to Washington and assembled. The motor was then subjected to the most exacting experimental tests, and more than fulfilled all expectations. Certain parts of the motor, however, were slightly altered in shape through the stresses and strains of the tests, a condition that is inevitable no matter how accurate or detailed the theoretical specifications. The parts of the motor, in the shape they had thus assumed, were then utilized as models for the building of tools to be employed in the manufacture of the motor.

After this was done orders were once more "farmed out" to concerns distributed far and wide over the entire country.¹

Achievements such as this are made possible by the scientific, technical and socio-economic status of modern society. As contrasted with this, the conditions for discovery and invention in early life are very imperfect. The early inventor faces his task, the nature of which he knows but imperfectly, in a setting that may be described as the very reverse of that pictured in the above example. His knowledge of appliances is limited, his theoretical understanding is *nil*, and the process of trial and error in the course of which he ultimately achieves his improvement, is irregular, adventitious and not deliberately controlled. Thus, the amount of relevant experience which in the case of the modern inventor is condensed into a few weeks of arduous experimentation in his laboratory, may, under the conditions of primitive life, be stretched out over centuries of effort, failure, disappointment, or partial success of hundreds of individuals, until a satisfactory adjustment is ultimately made in the form of a definitive invention.

¹This history of the "Liberty Motor" is given on the authority of my friend, Ralph A. Gleason, an engineer and inventor to whom I owe whatever insight I possess into the nature of the mental processes, often so mysterious to the layman, which result in inventions.

CHAPTER IX

ART¹

Art is co-extensive with man. Industrial art appears whenever a particular industry is highly developed.

We have commented on the skill displayed in the techniques of the potter and the basket maker, the wood carver and the worker in stone, bone and horn. It has often been observed that many of these objects of primitive industry are made much better than is necessary for practical purposes. In other words, the technical skill involved becomes itself a stimulant for the development of still higher skill, and when this is the case, the object is not merely well made, but also artistically made, for virtuosity and playfulness, when held within the bounds of more or less rigid form, are art. But technical skill and playing with the elements of technique are not the only sources of artistic inspiration in industry. The objects of industry present unrivalled opportunities for the application of design, color, and carved decoration. The flat, angular and curved surfaces of boxes, houses, boats and pots; the necks and handles of certain articles; the borders of garments and mats; the shafts of tools and weapons and the edges of all things, call for art. Granted the aesthetic impulse and the stimulus derived from the technical allurements of industry, it is inevitable that these formal peculiarities of industrial objects should be seized upon for purposes of artistic embellishment and expression.

¹The domain of art extends to many aspects of early life. There is singing and dancing and the mimicking of animals in semi-dramatic performances; there is poetry and literature, insofar as this name can be applied to unwritten stories, myths and traditions; there is also the realistic art of the cave in which the Bushmen of South Africa as well as the men of paleolithic Europe were such experts. For want of space I shall not deal with any of these aspects of art. The domain to which this chapter is restricted refers to the artistic work more or less closely connected with industry.

We say "expression" deliberately, for the primitive artist is not by any means as passive an imitator of traditional style or pattern as he or she is often represented to be. In those areas where careful studies of primitive art have been made, as for example, in North America, ethnologists constantly observe the great and typical variability of objects of art. Not that the tribal style is ever disregarded. The opposite is, in fact, invariably the case: the woman embroiderer of the Plains, the man carver of the Northwest Coast, the woman potter of the Southwest and embroiderer of the Iroquois and Algonquin, work along well established lines of technique and design pattern. But within these fixed limits there is infinite variation, often minute, at other times radical, which cannot be explained by mere inaccuracy of reproduction due to the absence of definite measurement, but can only be accounted for by the individual technical aptitude of the artist, the peculiarity of his idiosyncrasy or the direction of his playfulness. In the Plains, for example, the minute units of the embroidery designs are combined into a great variety of more complicated patterns. New patterns of this kind are constantly originated by the women who, in this case, dream the new designs. Of course, even these dreamed designs¹ always follow certain tribal principles of decoration and arrangement of design units. But there is room enough left for an unceasing variety of detail.

In the absence of psychological material due to the decay of most primitive art or to our inability to communicate freely with the artist, much of the psychological nature of primitive artcraft must be reconstructed by means of specu-

¹The experience of dreamed designs is not unfamiliar to modern artists and designers. This phenomenon seems especially common in those cases where the new design or artistic idea does not represent a radical departure or a highly individual expression, but consists in a new combination of fixed elements. The psychology of dream designs no doubt resolves itself into the dependence of the dream for its contents on the waking experience, and into the relative freedom of the dream process consequent upon the lifting of the controlling intervention of the conscious mind.

lative analysis; but not infrequently the suggestiveness of the material helps one to overcome this handicap. A mere inspection, for example, of a series of designs on Maori rafter patterns will convince one beyond the shadow of a doubt that the major elements of a whole series of these designs consist of combinations and re-combinations of a simple curvilinear element, not unlike a large comma, which appears in a variety of positions. Clearly the artist was deliberately experimenting and playing with the effects produced by combining and re-combining this unit design in different position.

Industrial art, which in part at least has grown out of materials and processes, never wholly loses its dependence upon these technical elements. Not that there are definite forms of objects and decoration associated with special materials. No, there is no absolute dependence. But the material does set certain limits to the form of the object and the character of the art. Pots and vessels made of stone do not lend themselves to that elaboration of form in curves, with the fine nuances that can be achieved in pots made of clay, where the very plasticity of the material, combined with its resistance, invite further elaboration. The larger objects made of stone, such as idols, or the architectural structures of Mexico or Peru, are markedly affected by the character of the material. Not only do the decorative elements rest against a ponderous background, but they themselves tend to partake of that ponderousness. Wood, again, allows of much greater delicacy of technique, including open work or filigree. Not that all wood work has this character. The skillful and highly finished art of the Northwest Coast, for example, lacks just this element of lightness and minute elaboration of detail. The delicate filigree work of Melanesia or of the Kamerun, could not be accomplished except in wood, at least not in an early civilization.¹

¹Among historic architectures, Moslem and Gothic have, of course, demonstrated what marvels of delicacy and technical minutiae can be achieved in spite of the material.

What is true of the material applies more markedly to the technique. The very elements of a technique often constitute at least a basis for decoration. The grooves left by the thumb-nails of the pot maker develop into a fixed decorative pattern. The rhythm, the angularity and the diagonal character of most basketry technique stamp these characteristics upon the design. In fact, these elements of themselves create designs which can be brought out, as is so often done, by the utilization of strands of different color.

It must be remembered, however, that the material and the technique are not the sole factors determining the design elements. More often than not, these media are utilized for the representation of a design, realistic or geometrical in nature, which pre-exists in the mind of the artist. In all such cases, the material, the technique or the form of the object are merely operative in affecting in varying degrees the nature of the design of which they are made the carriers. The basketry technique almost invariably lends a character of angularity to any design applied to it. The nature and distribution of curves on a pot also react upon the design, but less conspicuously so; while in stone, bone or wood work, the material, the technical process and the form of the object also leave a trace on the pattern applied. How varying the results can be in this interaction of design and object is well illustrated by a comparison between the art of the Northwest Coast and that of the Maori. In both cases wood is the predominant medium and the decorated objects display a great variety of forms. The Indian represents in his designs and carvings, various animals and birds in a semi-realistic or highly conventionalized form. A considerable set of features utilized in this process are firmly fixed and may serve as differentia of the art, as for example, the application of heavy lines encasing parts of the design or emphasizing the features of it, the eccentricity of the curves in the so-called eye ornament, and the like. But in his attempt to adjust the design to the object, the artist is here led to break up the representation into a large

number of parts which are distributed over the decorative surface, preserving only a formal unity of spatial arrangement. Certain elements of the design being, as was shown before, symptomatic of certain animals or birds, are always brought out, and if the space allowed is slight or of peculiar shape, these design elements will be distorted in a variety of ways. The Maori, on the other hand, while also adjusting the design to the character of the surface and to its shape, display a marked independence of these features. The decoration on many of their objects makes the impression that the artist was unwilling to permit the limitations of the decorated surface to affect the nature of the design, except to a slight degree; as a result of this, the design often seems to extend beyond the physical limits of the object, or to put it differently, only part of the design appears on the object. One consequence of this attitude is the disregard of proportions in the design in relation to the object. What can be represented is represented, the rest is cut off by the physical edge of the object.

Similar phenomena of technical influence appear when a design is transferred from one technique to another.¹

One aspect of primitive decorative art that has aroused a great deal of discussion is the fact that it may be realistic and geometric, or conventionalized. Quite apart from the rare instances of realistic representations of extraordinary

¹In modern days these phenomena can be conveniently studied in the domain of fashion. On the one hand, there is the nature of the material. Thus stiff materials, such as heavy silk or brocade, call for straight or angular lines, soft and thick materials, like velvet and plush, are utilized for heavy curves and the effects called "fullness" in the dressmakers' jargon. On the other hand, soft, thin and delicate materials, like muslin or crepe, are utilized for light and airy features. Again, the change of material works its usual effects. There may be a fashion for realistic decorations on hats. Animals or birds, fruit, leaves or vegetables appear on the lower and upper surfaces of hats with striking realism, striking enough to cause occasional uneasiness. In a subsequent wave of fashion, velvet or foulard or leather are substituted as a medium of representation of these elements of the animal and plant kingdoms. The realism promptly disappears, giving place to more conventional, angular or curvilinear shapes, which bear but remote resemblance to their proximate originals.

The technical origin of the design can often be detected in spite of the medium, as when a carpet design appears on a linoleum rug, or stone or marble carvings on a wall-paper pattern.

excellence, the design patterns on baskets, pots, rugs, walls of houses, sides of canoes and other objects, often suggest with varying degrees of realism, the forms of mammals, birds, snakes, crocodiles, occasionally plants, and less frequently, objects of human manufacture. On the other hand, numerous paintings, etchings and carvings are wholly devoid of any realistic suggestion, but must be described as purely geometrical, consisting of lines, straight or curved, and angular or curvilinear figures. Usually either the angular and straight-lined patterns or the curvilinear ones predominate, but the two tendencies may also appear in combination. In connection with the geometrical designs, it has often been noted that they are interpreted by their makers as representations of animals, birds or objects, the forms of which, however, they may resemble but remotely or not at all. In view of these facts and under the general suggestion of the evolutionary conception, there arose a theory of artistic development, in which the attempt was made to combine into a historical and logical sequence, these discrepant features of primitive art.

The theory, for example, which lies at the root of A. C. Haddon's "Evolution of Art," is this: the earliest form of art was realistic, but as generation succeeded generation, the influence of technique and other causes produced a tendency in the direction of more geometrical forms, so that in the course of time the designs altogether lost their one-time realistic outlines and became wholly geometrical. The symbolic meanings of geometrical designs, then, represent survivals in interpretation of the former realistic character of these designs. As a proof of this theory, such collections of data were presented as that adduced by Haddon, which comprises a considerable number of specimens of spear and arrow shafts with crocodile carvings. The carvings on some are unmistakably realistic, on others, one or more parts of the animal appear in conventionalized geometrical form, while on still others a purely geometrical carving is found which is merely classed as a crocodile by the

natives, while in some instances even this classification is omitted. Haddon conceived of this set of decorated objects as a chronological scale, his idea being that the realistic carvings were the original ones and that from this stage there was a steady progress through steps of increasing conventionalization to those carvings in which no trace of realism was left.

This attractive theory, while holding the field for a certain time, could not withstand the adverse criticism born of a more penetrating study of the material. It was pointed out that the very arrangement of a series such as Haddon's in a chronological sequence, was wholly arbitrary, no proof being forthcoming that the realistic specimens were really the earlier ones, nor that the specimens with varying degrees of conventionalization actually represented historically successive stages.

Other evidence indicated that the geometrical designs were in some instances later than the realistic meanings attached to them. The patterns in bead embroidery which abound among the Plains Indians, for example, are highly characteristic of this area and appear with only minor variations throughout a large number of tribes. The symbolic meanings of these patterns, on the other hand, vary greatly from locality to locality. Many of these meanings are realistic. Now it would be unreasonable to assume that identical or highly similar geometrical patterns developed among the different tribes from pre-existing and different realistic originals. The alternative hypothesis must therefore be accepted, namely, that the geometrical patterns are the older element and that discrepant realistic meanings were later read into them by the different tribes.

To this argument it was added that purely technical conditions, such as those present in basketry work, would naturally lead to the development of geometrical patterns. The appeal, moreover, of purely geometrical combinations, of straight or curved lines, of angular or rounded figures, is universal, in primitive as well as modern times. This

appeal must answer to a common-human aesthetic demand, and if this is so, there is no reason to doubt that decorated designs of a purely geometrical pattern have numerous times originated independently of any realistic antecedents.¹

In brief, the situation must be conceived somewhat as follows: realistic and geometrical designs have often originated independently and from different sources and technical conditions. The primary common cause of both types of decoration is the æsthetic appeal of realistic as well as geometrical forms in nature and the pleasure derived from realistic reproductions and geometric designs. The very same psychological cause, namely, the æsthetic value of the realistic as well as of the geometrical, is responsible for the further transformations. Realistic representations suggest geometrical relations and thus may become either partly or wholly conventionalized, with or without sufficient technical determinants. Geometrical designs, on the other hand, tend either to suggest or to become symbolically associated with realistic meanings, and as a result, realistic excrescences may come to be attached to such geometrical patterns, leading to partly geometrical, partly realistic designs. The process, finally, assumed by the evolutionary theory, namely, the survival of an originally realistic representation in the form of a symbolic meaning attached to a geometrical transforma-

¹An excellent theoretical argument bearing on this point and developed on the basis of an intensive study of concrete and strictly localized material will be found in Boas' "The Decorative Designs of Alaskan Needlecases," *Proceedings, U. S. National Museum*, 1908.

To transfer to modern conditions the theoretical point here raised in connection with early art, we may once more refer to what occurs in the domain of fashion: when a garment of a new type establishes itself as an accepted style, the resulting fashion never consists in a slavish reproduction of this one original pattern. What takes place is the appearance of a kaleidoscopic variety of individualized garments, all differing in detail but similar in certain points prescribed by the style. Out of these differences or through an extraneous suggestion, there soon arises the outline of a new style which, in its turn asserts itself, leading to a similar differentiation. Now, the large variety of individualized garments which fall between one style and the next could readily be conceived as actually intervening stages, constituting a chronological series of steps. But this interpretation would evidently be erroneous, for the variations in question are practically synchronous and must be regarded as expressions of individual taste and creative ingenuity, displaying themselves within the limits of an accepted style.

tion of the realistic design, also represents a plausible development, which must claim its place in the theoretical interpretation of decorative design, if only due allowance is made for the other processes here indicated.

Another common tendency in the study of primitive art is to compare it to that of our children. The old theory of the recapitulation of racial experience in the life of the individual is brought to bear to justify this idea. What is particularly emphasized is the crudeness and apparent helplessness of the realistic representations in children's art and in early art.

At this stage of our inquiry a conception such as the above seems so crude as scarcely to require refutation. It is true enough that technical difficulties involved in the handling of an unaccustomed tool or technique may introduce an element of similarity between the art of a learning child and the most primitive attempts at drawing or carving. But even at this stage the relevancy of the terms of comparison is more than questionable. What is usually represented as a child's art is nothing but an attempt on its part to follow an outline or figure drawn by an unskilled adult. In this process, the element of æsthetic appeal may play no part at all. On the other hand, the earliest attempts of primitive man in this direction are of course unknown to us. Again, when the investigator tries to test the capacity of a native by presenting to him an idea or an object, animate or inanimate, he sets before him an artificial problem which does not belong to the art of the native. But even under these conditions, while there is the crudeness referable to the causes mentioned above, there is evidence in the simplest designs of something else which changes the nature of the entire process. This something else is the existence among all tribes of a style or a number of styles of art. When a problem of drawing is presented to a native, he does not face it with a "free" psychology, but in the light of the stylistic convention of his tribe. Koch-Grünberg's collection of drawings by the natives of Brazil and Thurnwald's draw-

ings from the Bismarck and Solomon Islands, reveal with great clearness the presence of this stylistic factor in even the crudest designs.

This applies also to the realistic drawings and carvings, not only to the geometrical ones. Thus the beautiful Bushmen paintings and etchings on the walls of caves do not merely represent an attempt to portray reality, but the artist works within the limits of certain traditional conventions, which make it possible, for example, to diagnose this art as different from the cave drawings of paleolithic Europe, notwithstanding the many striking resemblances between the two arts. Again, the style of representation of the human figure in Bushmen art is quite different from that of animals. It can be identified at a glance by the treatment of the trunk as a triangle standing on its apex, and the equally distinctive representation of hips and calves in the form of bulging curves.¹

To say that an art object has a style is one thing, to define a style is another. The task is not an easy one and cannot be attempted here. Suffice it to say that the art products of every tribe, whether they lie in the domain of drawing or those of carving, painting, embroidery or weaving, are dominated by certain traditional ways of representation of things and of technical execution. When the artist faces his task, he may aim solely at the reproduction of the accepted pattern, which, according to his aptitude, he executes with greater or less excellence or accuracy. In other instances,

¹In addition to all this it must be noted that realistic art stands on a level of its own. This has not been sufficiently recognized in the study of primitive art work. Everything else apart, the realistic representation of things of the outside world requires certain qualities of perception and others of execution which are nowhere represented among more than a certain fraction of the population. It is therefore not surprising to find that among the peoples of the Northwest Coast, for example, with their highly distinctive style of decorative painting and carving, realistic, in fact, portrait-like representations of faces also occur, in which the prevailing style is barely perceptible, and the making of which must be credited to some specially talented individuals who set themselves the task of a realistic representation and solved it with great skill. Of course, the technical agility, acquired by these natives in response to the exacting demands of their wood industry, must be regarded as a helpful background for the possibility of such achievements of artistic realism.

more freedom is allowed him, as is, for example, the case in the Plains where new combinations of design units are originated by the woman embroiderer. But even in cases such as this, the limits of variation prescribed by convention greatly restrict the play of individual fancy. In view of the deficient subjectivism of primitive art, great transformations in style through the initiative of individuals have probably occurred but seldom, if at all.

But the most decisive argument against all attempts to compare primitive art with the so-called art of our children, is the not uncommon excellence of primitive craftsmanship, especially in the domain of geometrical art. The decorative carvings of the Maori and the Haida, the carved clubs of the Marquesas and the Tonga Islanders, the painted pots of the Pueblo Indians and those of the Chiriqui, the woven blankets of the Chilkat and the Navajo, and the spun materials of Peru, the bone carvings of the Eskimo and those of the Sudan, the bronze castings, finally, of Northwest Africa—all of these and many other artistic products of the primitive world cannot be passed over slightly as mere stepping-stones to something later, worthy of the term art. These things *are* art, conceived and carried out in line with general æsthetic principles, with a command of great technical skill and with sufficient individual variation to leave the stamp of artistic creativeness.

The few specimens of primitive art craft gathered on the plates are selected with the view of illustrating some of the fine things that early man has achieved in the line of art. An examination of the illustrations will also bring home the fact that apart from the specific problems which primitive art and the art of each tribe or group of tribes present, there are also common problems of æsthetics which unite modern and primitive art in the realm of the common-human. A few remarks about some of the illustrations will make this clear.

In the beaded Bagobo bag (plate I, fig. 35) the central section is flanked by broad horizontal strips, one above the

other below the central part. Each one of these is again subdivided into two symmetrical strips on the two sides of a darker central line with a light meandering design running through it. If the bag is placed so that it stands on its left side (from the point of view of the reader), it will be seen that the two complicated strips to the left and the right of this central line are opposite and symmetrical with reference to it, and that the two outward strips consisting of elongated sections with white dots separated by three dark and three light triangle-like shapes also balance each other in the vertical direction, the triangles in the strip nearest to the central section of the bag being open towards the top, those of the strip furthest from the central section being open toward the bottom. The entire broad strip at the bottom of the bag is symmetrical with the one above the central section and, once more, the strips with the triangular designs balance and complement each other. In the upper broad section, the triangles nearest to the center piece open toward the left, those furthest from it open toward the right. In the strip below the central piece, the triangles nearest to it open toward the right, those furthest from it, toward the left. It is only necessary to eliminate these balancing elements and substitute complete symmetry instead, to realize how much this feature adds to the attractiveness of the design.

In the embroidered shirt, on the same plate (fig. 36), a veritable jewel of delicate workmanship, the two sleeves, while apparently symmetrical and identical, differ in the minutiae of almost each one of the vertical embroidered strips of which they are composed. Both the similarities and the differences involved must, of course, be deliberate on the part of the artist, and those who are familiar with the effect of the same principle in Gothic art will welcome its vindication in this embroidered shirt of the Bagobo.

In the Chilkat blanket (plate II, fig. 37) attention may be drawn to a number of interesting points. The long flat curves of the general outline are remarkably consistent,

the five exceedingly flat curves of the upper rim being particularly notable. Then again, there is the separation of the white broad stripe encasing the central section from the outside black frame by a narrow white stripe between two black ones, the inside one being narrow, while the outside one is in this case formed by the edge of the broad black outward frame. The central section is similarly encased in a white stripe flanked by two black ones, both being narrow, except where the white stripe borders on a black section of the central design, in which case the edge of this takes the place of the narrow black stripe. It will be noted that many of the separate sections of the central design are similarly encased. Another feature are the broad black stripes which constitute both the background and the frame of the separate sections of the central design. The splendid contrasting of the dark and light sections thus produced is best seen if one looks at the design with half-shut eyes. There is also the pleasing contrast between the upper and lower halves of the central design, in the upper the black predominating, in the lower, the white.

Then come the two highly interesting memorial columns (plate II, figs. 38 and 39). One curious feature must be noted first—it is not a purely æsthetic one. The two columns, like most of the other memorial columns of the Haida, would be identified by a white man as memorial columns, on account of the fact that the lower sections are decorated, that these are topped by an undecorated section of column, and are finished off by a carved representation on the top. This presence of an undecorated section—a very rare feature in Northwest Coast art—contrasts especially with what one observes on the totem poles. It is thus curious that this particular form of column is used for memorial purposes among ourselves as well as among the Haida.

In the further elaboration of the decorative elements of the columns, the most remarkable point is this: while both columns become narrower toward the top—in fig. 38 much

less so than in fig. 39—the elements of the carved decorations in fig. 38 have a general vertical trend, while those of fig. 39 have a horizontal one. In fig. 38 this is emphatically brought out by the position of the claws of the fore-paws of the animal represented at the bottom of the column, the direction of its beak and the deep downward-pointing curve of the broad black eyebrow-like stripes over the eyes. Again, in the bird represented on the top of the column, the beak is pointed downward in a flat decisive curve, and the front edges of the wings are pointed straight downward even more drastically. In fig. 39, on the other hand, the claws of the front paws of the animal holding the pole, are practically horizontal, this character being clearly brought out by the contrast in color. The lips are equally horizontal; here, moreover, this feature is not contradicted by a downward pointing beak, as in the case of fig. 38, for the nose in fig. 39 has no downward pointing extension. The eyebrow-like stripes above the eyes are flat and the groove between them, while directed downward, is equally shallow, thus preserving the general horizontal direction of the eyebrows. A low, horizontally oriented pedestal connects the head of the animal with the bottom of the undecorated column (in fig. 38 the lower part of a corresponding pedestal below the small decorative faces is vertically striped). The bird, finally, in fig. 39 suggests the horizontal by the upper curvature of the wings, the beak and the general position of the head. A more carefully conceived and more delicately expressed stylistic feature can hardly be imagined, and it is not a feature that is in any way specifically Northwest Coast, but lies in the common level of artistic taste which unites the craftsman of the Indian with our own into a common æsthetic brotherhood. On fig. 38, finally, there are the small heads decoratively repeated above the head of the animal. Little though the diminutive monsters resemble cupids, their utilization here reminds one of Raphael's well known affectation of using the busts and heads of cupids for decorative effect, and Max Klinger has made a similar use

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Fig. 36

Philippine Embroidered Jacket

Fay-Cooper Cole, "The Wild Tribes of Davao District, Mindanao,"
(Field Museum of Natural History, Publication 170, Plate LVI)



Fig. 35

Philippine Beaded Bag

Fay-Cooper Cole, "The Wild Tribes of Davao District, Mindanao,"
(Field Museum of Natural History, Publication 170, Plate XXXIX).



PLATE II.




Fig. 37
G. T. Emmons, "The Chilkat Blanket," (Memoirs of American
Museum of Natural History, Vol. III, Part IV, Plate XXVI).



Fig. 38
Swanton, "Haida
Ethnology, etc.,"
Plate VIII.



Fig. 39
Swanton, "Haida
Ethnology, etc.,"
Plate VIII.




Fig. 40
Horn Spoon
Swanton, "Haida Ethnology, etc.," Plate XV^s.



PLATE III.



Fig. 41—Bushongo Wooden Cup
(British Museum, "Handbook, etc.," p. 218).



Fig. 42—West African Bronze Casting
(British Museum, "Handbook, etc.," p. 240).

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Fig. 43

Ceremonial Head-dress from New Ireland

A. B. Meyer, "Masken von New Guinea, etc." (K. Ethnographisches Museum zu Dresden, Vol. VII, Plate X).

176⁴






Fig. 44

Maori Door Lintel

(British Museum, "Handbook, etc.", p. 176).



Fig. 45

Hawaiian Cloak of Red and Yellow Feathers

(British Museum, "Handbook, etc." p. 151).



PLATE VI.



Fig. 46

Interior of Shallow Chalice

G. G. MacCurdy, "A Study of Chiriquian Antiquities,"
(Memoirs Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, Plate I).





Fig. 48 — Dixon, "Basketry Designs, etc.," Plate XXXII².



Fig. 49 — Dixon, "Basketry Designs, etc.," Plate XIII³.




Fig. 47 — Dixon, "Basketry Designs of the Indians of Northern California." (Bulletin, American Museum of Natural History, Plate XXVIII⁴).



PLATE VIII.




Fig. 50

Ground-drawing

Spencer and Gillen, "The Northern Tribes of Central Australia," p. 743



Fig. 51

Ground-drawing

Spencer and Gillen, "The Northern Tribes of Central Australia," p. 740



of this feature on the back of the huge bronze throne on which he has seated his famous statue of Beethoven.

In the carved wooden cup of the African Bushongo (plate III, fig. 41) there are several points of interest. The cup is divided into three sections, the stem, the central body and the neck, which in this case forms a unit with the top. These parts are again subdivided horizontally, the leg into three parts, the top into three parts, and the central section into two parts, the deep inward directed curvature of the body taking the place of the missing third section. Again, on the lowest section of the leg, there appear three oblong bulging verticals. The surface of the main part of the central body is decorated by three super-imposed designs consisting of a stripe which forms interlocking diamonds. This stripe is itself subdivided into three parallel longitudinal stripes. On the upper border of the central body appears a carved decoration consisting of three stripes, an upper and a lower one, which are identical in technique, and a third one between, which is itself subdivided into three stripes. The middle section of the neck or top, on both sides of a central piece, is again subdivided into three horizontal stripes of the same technique as the two stripes of the upper border of the central body of the cup, separated by two sections, each one of which is divided into three horizontal stripes.

There are other features of interest in the cup. The whole object is conceived as a spacious, heavily-set article and this characteristic is carried out in each one of the three parts by means of gradual, gently curved outlines, the curves being neither too deep, which would impart a character of lightness, nor too flat, which would make the cup appear clumsy. There are also a number of minor decorations, several of which appear on the side of the cup shown in the illustration: the two carvings on the neck, the animal representation in the middle of the central body, the two quadrilaterals on the central section of the leg, and the three bulging verticals referred to before, on the lowest part of the leg. The imaginary lines connecting these decorations

emphasize by compensation the above mentioned features of the outline of the cup. The workmanship of this cup is, of course, not perfect. It could not, for example, be compared to the best work of the Haida or of the Maori. This, however, does not apply to the leg, which is exquisite. The splendid modelling of the leg can be best seen if the cup is turned upside down.

The bronze casting (plate III, fig. 42) is, first of all, remarkable as representing a type of art in which the African Negro stands unique among primitive peoples. The face is admirable both as a face and as a Negro face. There is, moreover, an element of conventionalization in a not over-conspicuous emphasis of the outlines of the lips, the wings of the nose and the eye-lids. The head gear is notable for the general harmonization of its outlines with the contour of the face. This feature is best seen if the head is reversed. The wicker suggestion of the head gear speaks for itself and technically it is admirable. But perhaps most valuable stylistically is the rectilinear cut in the front of the head gear with which the straight edge extending towards the ear harmonizes. The stylistic effect thus achieved is greatly emphasized by the vertical pendants extending downward on both sides of the ear, which is itself assimilated to the character of the head gear and of the pendants by means of a most admirable bit of stylization. The vertical and rectilinear effect of these stylistic and decorative features is emphasized by the cicatrices on the forehead of the figure.¹

It will have been observed that in all of these remarks we were not concerned with those features of the carvings or designs which are distinctive of the art of the particular tribes. On the contrary, the traits were noted which are of interest from the standpoint of general æsthetics. The results indicate what might have been concluded *a priori*, namely, that individual peculiarities of tribal designs are a

¹Observations of a similar nature could be made on the Chiriqui pot design and on the bark carving of the decorative head dress from New Ireland. The relevant points are fairly obvious and their analysis may be left to the student.

matter of civilization and history and must be analyzed in that light, but that primitive art craft, when at its best, reveals the control of intuitively sensed æsthetic principles, thus bridging the gap separating the modern from the primitive in art, by bringing these artistic products of pre-history to a common level with the art of historic civilization.

It remains to refer, however briefly, to the subject of symbolism. Symbolism in primitive art is so ubiquitous and its ramifications in early civilization are so varied, that an at all adequate discussion of this topic would require a treatise all by itself.

A thing is a symbol insofar as it suggests something which it is not. In this sense language and, indeed, psychic life in general abound in symbolic connections, things and ideas constantly taking the place of one another and tending to evoke one another. Concrete objective things, even when non-artistic, lend themselves well for the function of symbols; if their emotional value and æsthetic appeal is, in addition, enhanced by æsthetic transformations, objective things become admirably suitable for symbolic service.

We have referred to the widespread realistic signification of geometrical characters. Some geometrical figures, such as the swastika, are distributed over immense geographical areas and have in different places become symbolically associated with a great variety of meanings. The realistic and other symbolism of the geometrical figures of Plains embroidery also varies greatly from tribe to tribe. On the Northwest Coast, again, the symptomatic features of different animals and birds have become symbols of the entire creature, and may therefore readily take its place. Among the Iroquois, geometrical and realistic figures on the wampum belts function as symbols of various treaty articles concluded between the Iroquois and other tribes. Among such tribes as the Plains Arapaho or the Hopi of the Pueblos, colors have become the carriers of symbolic significance. In Australia, the sacred wooden or stone slabs, the so-called *churinga*, are decorated by crude rectilinear

or curvilinear patterns. These simple etched or painted designs have complicated symbolic connotations. The symbolism, moreover, varies not merely from tribe to tribe but even from clan to clan, each clan interpreting the designs, which are throughout similar and identical, on the basis of its own totemic mythology.

Similar drawings are made on the ground on ceremonial occasions, yellow and red ochre and bird down being used for the purpose. Thus, the ground drawing on plate VIII (fig. 50) represents six mythological women, the concentric circles being the women sitting with their legs drawn up, the legs being represented by the double bands connecting the concentric circles. The other ground drawing (plate VIII, fig. 51) is associated with the totemic ceremony of the famous Wollunqua (the great magical snake) totem. This drawing is of a very considerable size, measuring eighteen feet in length. The long curved band represents the snake, the head being indicated by the wider part near the two bands adjoining the concentric circles. The latter themselves represent the place at which the snake is supposed to have dived into the ground, after the fashion of Australian totemic ancestors. Of the separate sets of concentric circles, the larger ones indicate "paper bark" trees, while the two smaller ones are bushes. In all of these, spirit children are supposed to have been left behind. A rare feature in this design are the tracks of a man who is represented as following the snake, being anxious for him to return; at the spot represented by the concentric circles in touch with the two semi-circular bands, the man is supposed to have caught up with the snake and here he struck him with great force in an attempt to make him dive down. The two footprints side by side, near the head of the snake, represent the man standing there, while the two semi-circular bands connected with the concentric circles are his arms lifted up to strike the snake.

Primitive religious ceremonialism abounds in decorations and other artistic objects which acquire symbolic significance.

The religious connotations serve to promote the preservation of such designs, as any deviation from the accepted patterns then becomes sacrilegious. Again, the religious conceptions associated with the symbols themselves become more definitely fixed and perpetuated.

This ceremonial function of artistic objects as symbols of religio-mythological and social values represents perhaps the most significant cultural aspect of primitive art. The attractiveness and suggestiveness of these symbols, their simultaneous presentation to a large number of devotees, the ease with which multifarious associations are absorbed by these objects, only to be reawakened and refreshed in the minds of the beholder, transform the symbolic art object into a veritable perpetuator of a large part of the culture of a tribe, that part of the culture, moreover, which is emotionally most valuable as well as most clearly representative of the collective ideas of the group.¹

¹*Cf.* p. 415.

CHAPTER X

RELIGION AND MAGIC

E. B. Tylor's classical discussion of animism¹ and J. G. Frazer's detailed description of magical belief and practice² have familiarized the general reader with these interesting aspects of early civilization. Rather than tread once more a path so often trodden, I propose to discuss the problems of early magic and religion according to a somewhat different plan. In the following section on the basic factors of religion, the guardian spirit beliefs of the American Indian will be analyzed and this will be followed by a section on modern magic and another on *mana*, or impersonal supernatural power. The succeeding section on anthropomorphization and the higher gods will deal with the supernaturalism of the Chukchee, the gods of the Bella Coola and the beliefs in the so-called All Father. The last section, finally, entitled "The Individual in Religion," will treat of medicine-men among the Chukchee and others, and of the Ghost Dance Religions of the American Indian. In the final pages of this discussion of religion I shall then attempt to present a general picture of early supernaturalism as a world view.

THE BASIC FACTORS OF RELIGION

The Guardian Spirit in American Indian Religion.

Of all religious phenomena in primitive North America, the most general as well as the most variegated are the beliefs and practices connected with the cult of the guardian spirit. In their essence these cults, which are common to practically all Indian tribes, are based on a faith in supernatural power, often of an impersonal sort.

¹In his "Primitive Culture."

²"The Golden Bough," Vols. I and II, "The Magic Art."

When a boy approaches maturity, when his voice begins to change—as some Indians put it—he repairs to the woods, where he builds for himself a crude hut or tent. Henceforth he lives in isolation, takes frequent purgatives and eats very sparingly. His mind is bent on the supernatural experience he is about to face. When he has reached a high state of purity, both physically and spiritually (“so that the spirits can look through him,” says the Indian), the desire of his soul is realized: the guardian spirit appears to him in a dream or vision. This supernatural personage may be a spirit animal, bird or human, or it may be one of those monster creatures so common in Indian mythologies. The guardian spirit bestows upon the novice one or more supernatural gifts and, having given him guidance as to the sort of life he should lead, disappears. Henceforth the young man stands in an intimate personal relation to that spirit, appeals to it for protection and expects it to warn him of impending dangers. If the protector is an animal or bird, the youth may have to abstain from eating or killing representatives of that species; this taboo, however, is not characteristic of all Indian tribes.¹

This generalized representation of the guardian spirit cult does but slight justice to the importance of this complex of beliefs and practices among North American Indians. It may be of interest, therefore, to dwell in greater detail on the particular forms assumed by the guardian spirit cult among several representative tribal groups.

The Southern Kwakiutl of the Northwest Coast are divided into a large number of clans, each of which traces its origin to a mythical ancestor, on whose adventures the

¹A most suggestive account of the acquisition of a guardian spirit will be found in Paul Radin's "An Autobiography of a Winnebago Indian," *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, 1913. In this case the supernatural protector is the Earth Spirit, with whom the somewhat sophisticated Indian repeatedly fails to enter into rapport. The entire account, while particularly representative of the transition between blind faith and mild scepticism characteristic of many modern Indians, bristles with touches of genuine Indian thought and emotional reaction.

crests and privileges of the clan depend. In the course of such adventures the ancestor meets the sacred creature of the clan and obtains from it supernatural powers and magical objects, such as the magic harpoon, which insures success in sea-water hunting, the water of life, which resuscitates the dead, and the like. He also secures a dance, a song, a distinctive cry—each spirit having a cry of its own—and the right to use certain carvings. The dance always consists of a dramatic presentation of the myth in which the ancestor acquires gifts from the spirit. Some of these spirits are animals, the bear, wolf, sea lion, killer-whale; others are fabulous monsters. To the latter class belongs Sisiutl, a mythic double-headed snake, which often assumes the shape of a fish. To eat it or see it means certain death: all joints of the culprit become dislocated and his head is turned backwards. Another monster is the cannibal woman, Dzonoqwa. Both Sisiutl and Dzonoqwa are highly dangerous when hostile, but when their good will is assured, they are most useful, and the powers they bestow are greatly sought after.

All of these spirits and the gifts they bestow are hereditary among the Kwakiutl. In some instances an individual may transmit these valuable privileges to his descendants; but more often, a set of guardian spirits with their gifts become a hereditary prerogative of a clan. Henceforth all individuals of that clan may obtain supernatural powers from such spirits. Some spirits figure only in the ancestral traditions, others can still be obtained by the Kwakiutl youths. Prominent among spirits of the latter class is Making-War-all-over-the-Earth. With the assistance of this spirit a youth may obtain three different powers: mastery over the Sisiutl, the capacity to catch the invisible Dream Spirit, and insensibility to pain and wounds. With the assistance of The-First-One-to-Eat-Man-at-the-Mouth-of-the-River, another spirit, nine powers may be obtained. The spirit Maden is a bird and gives the faculty of flying. Vari-

ous ghost spirits bestow the power to return to life after having been killed.

The spirits appear only in the winter, the season of the "secrets." During the winter ceremonial, which is performed during this season, the people are divided into two main bodies, the initiated ("Seals") and the uninitiated ("Sparrows"). The latter are divided into groups consisting of individuals who will be initiated at approximately the same time. There are ten such groups or societies—seven male and three female—and most of them bear animal names.

Throughout the ceremonies, the two groups are hostile to each other. The "Seals" attack and torment the "Sparrows," who try to reciprocate to the best of their ability. The object of part of the ceremonies performed by each society is to secure the return of the youth who has been taken away by a supernatural being, the spirit protector of the society. When the novice finally returns he is in a state of ecstasy; and ceremonies are performed to restore him to his senses.

Among the Haida the guardian spirit idea finds its clearest expression in the beliefs about shamans. When a supernatural being took possession of a man and spoke and acted through him, the man became a shaman. While the spirit was operating, the shaman lost his personal identity and became one with the spirit. He dressed as directed by the spirit and used its language. Thus, if a supernatural being from the Tlingit country took possession of a shaman, he spoke Tlingit, although otherwise ignorant of that tongue. The personal name also was discarded and the spirit's name substituted, and as the spirit changed the name was also changed.

The Tlingit shamans were even more powerful than those of the Haida. Whereas the Haida shaman usually owned but one spirit and no masks, his Tlingit colleague could boast of several spirits and masks. The representations of subsidiary spirits on masks were all designed to

strengthen certain faculties of the shaman. The shaman, as well as an ordinary individual, could increase their powers by obtaining the tongues of a variety of spirit animals, especially those of land otters, which were mixed with eagle claws and other articles and carefully stored away. Shamans often performed merely for display or, when desirous of demonstrating their superior powers, they engaged in imaginary battles with other shamans many miles away.

It will thus be seen how deeply the belief in guardian spirits has entered into the lives and thought of the people of British Columbia and of Southern Alaska; and the particular forms and applications of this belief are as varied as they are numerous. Reared on the fertile ground of a general animism, guardian spirits manifest themselves through the medium of many things and beings. By the means of art, the realm of magical potentialities becomes further extended: for when the representation of a spirit protector is carved on an implement, weapon, or ceremonial object, the thing itself becomes a carrier of supernatural power. Among the Kwakiutl, the guardian spirit idea stands in the center of a complex system of secret societies and initiation ceremonies. With the approach of winter, the guardian spirit, like a ghost of the past, emerges from its summer retirement and through the medium of names transforms the social organization of the people. Among the Haida and Tlingit, the belief in the magical powers of supernatural helpers has engendered a prolific growth of shamanistic practices. The type of clan and family legends prevalent on the entire coast, particularly among the Tsimshian, Haida and Tlingit, consists of an account of how the ancestor of the clan or family met his guardian spirit and obtained from it supernatural powers, a mythological motif which receives its dramatic embodiment in the dances of the secret societies. The guardian spirit idea also figures as one of the standards of rank found among these people. The vaster the powers of a supernatural

guardian, the greater respect does its owner command; while secret societies rank according to the powers of their members.

In the Plateau area, the guardian spirit phenomena have been studied with particular care among the Thompson River Indians, the Shuswap and the Lillooet. Among the Thompson River Indians, every person had a guardian spirit, which he acquired at puberty. Here the spirits were not inherited, excepting only the cases of a few exceptionally powerful shamans. All animals and objects possessed of magic qualities could become guardian spirits; the powers of such spirits had become differentiated so that certain groups of supernatural helpers were associated with definite social or professional classes. The shamans had their favorite spirits, among which were natural phenomena (night, fog, east, west), man or parts of the human body (woman, young girl, hands or feet of men, etc.), animals (bat), objects referring to death (land of souls, ghosts, dead man's hair, bones and teeth, etc.). Warriors had their set of spirits, so did hunters, fishermen, gamblers, runners, women. Each person partook of the qualities of his or her guardian spirit. Among the spirits peculiar to shamans, parts of animals or objects were not uncommon, such as the tail of a snake, the nipple of a gun, the left or right side of anything, and the like. Although the range of animals, natural phenomena, inanimate objects, which could become guardian spirits, embraced a large part of nature, certain animals that lacked magic power never figured as guardian spirits. Such were the mouse, chipmunk, squirrel, rat, butterfly, and some others. But few birds and scarcely any trees or herbs ever functioned as spirit protectors.

When the Shuswap lad began to dream of women, arrows and canoes, or when his voice began to change, his time had arrived for craving and obtaining a guardian spirit, similarly, the young men of the Lillooet acquired guardian spirits and, at the instigation of their elders, performed

a guardian spirit dance during which they imitated their supernatural protectors in motion, gesture and cry. In some of their clan dances, masks were used which sometimes referred to an incident in the clan myth. The dancer personified the ancestor himself, or his guardian spirit. Powerful guardian spirits enabled the shamans to perform wonderful feats. The weapons, implements, and other objects of the Lillooet were often decorated with designs representing guardian spirits. Similar figures were painted or tattooed on face and body.

Among these tribes the common people were divided into societies, membership in most of which was not strictly hereditary, while in others, such as the Black Bear, the hereditary character was more pronounced. Among the twenty-nine protectors of the societies, twenty were animals, while the rest included plants, natural phenomena, inanimate objects, as well as hunger and famine. Some of these societies were regarded as closely related, and the members of such societies were permitted to use each other's dances and songs; but as a rule, each society claimed its own distinctive garments, ornaments, dances and songs.

Some of the ceremonies could be performed at any time, but the winter was the favorite ceremonial season. During the dances, the moose, caribou, elk, deer, and other protective spirits were impersonated. The actors dressed in the skins of these animals, with the scalp part hanging over their heads and faces. Some had antlers attached to the head and neck. The dancers went through all the actions of the animal impersonated, imitating the incidents in the finding and fishing, hunting and snaring, chasing over lakes in canoes, and final capture or death of the animal.

In the Plains area, the form assumed by the guardian spirit incident is that of a transfer of a possession, material or spiritual, natural or supernatural, from one owner to another. The transfer may be from one man to another or from a guardian spirit to a novice. The medium of transfer is usually a dream. The pattern of the entire pro-

cedure has been developed to such a nicety that students find it difficult to distinguish between an original guardian spirit acquisition and an account of a transfer of a spirit from individual to individual. The materialization of the procedure has also been carried very far. Having secured a vision or dream, the initiate prepares a medicine bundle, which is nothing but a bag, often made of otter skin, filled with various small articles, such as pieces of skin, small pebbles, quartz, animal or vegetable matter, and the like. None of these objects possesses any intrinsic value, but in this context they acquire the significance of charms, of carriers of supernatural power. The medicine bundle may thus be likened to an electric battery charged with potential current, from which great quantities of dynamic force can be produced at will. Contrary to the customs of the Plateau area, but in line with those of the Northwest, medicine bundles and even guardian spirits tend to become hereditary among some Plains tribes. It must be noted, however, that this process of hereditary transfer when unaccompanied by a personal guardian spirit experience, may not be continued indefinitely without a consequent loss of power. It may go on for two generations, but at the third transfer the power gives out—the dynamo must be recharged by personal contact with a supernatural source, if it is to continue doing work along magical lines.

It is characteristic of the guardian spirit cult in the Plains that the supernatural vision is sought not at puberty, but by adults. But in details the cults differ greatly from tribe to tribe.¹

¹In an unpublished note kindly placed at my disposal by Mrs. Ruth Benedict, the following interesting summary of some of these tribal differentiations is presented.

The Arapaho use self-torture to induce the vision. All adult males seek it, and it depends wholly on the power given him at that time whether the suppliant becomes a shaman or a warrior. The Dakota, however, mark off the laity: shamans fast once to obtain a guardian spirit, a prescribed vision with a very complicated formula; the laity fast on every occasion, with extreme self-torture, not for a guardian spirit, but for help from the sun in some particular and immediate undertaking. The Crow, on the contrary, require a guardian spirit as a part of the equipment of every ambitious

Among the Winnebago, who, in their guardian spirit customs, resemble the typical Plains tribes, there is the peculiarity that the guardian spirits are believed to be localized. These spirits, which may be designated as guardian prototypes or originals (not unlike the "Ideas" of Plato), reside in definite places, in a valley or mountain fastness, or behind a certain rock. The guardian spirits which appear to the searchers for power are but reflections or spiritual representatives of these permanent reservoirs of magical potency. There is striking resemblance between this conception and the ideas of the Chukchee and Koryak of Northeastern Siberia, where a similar relationship obtains between the so-called supernatural "Masters" and their animal representatives on earth.

Among the Iroquois, guardian spirits, whether of animals, birds or objects, almost always appear in human form. This is in keeping with the highly anthropomorphised character of Iroquois religion, mythology and cosmology. A number of societies also occur here which are more or less clearly associated with supernatural protectors.

Thus, the guardian spirit beliefs of the North American Indians present an interesting illustration of a cultural feature, indigenous in an immense area and evidently of great antiquity, which in a multitude of forms and cultural associations appears in all of the major areas and probably

man; and the suppliant becomes a "child" of his vision-adopted "father." The formula is rigid and very distinctive for this tribe.

The Blackfoot use no torture except hunger and thirst to induce the vision. One idea in connection with these experiences has saturated their culture: these visions can be bought and sold. They make absolutely no distinction between the visions they have bought and the ones they have themselves fasted for. To invest in other men's visions is a necessary qualification for social prestige; and the "medicine bundles" which are the visible insignia of possession are the basis of their economic system.

The Hidatsa elaborated a different idea, the idea of inheritance. They respected the Blackfoot scheme of purchase sufficiently to require that payment be made for all such things inherited. And they agreed with general Plains theory sufficiently to insist that before one inherited, one must see the vision. Hence it became necessary for the head of the family to exercise supervision over the faster that the proper family spirit might appear to him. In spite of all difficulties, however, the tribal pattern required that the medicine bundle descend from father to son.

in every tribe of the vast continent. A possible exception are the Eskimo, but even here the spirit helpers of the *angakut* almost certainly belong to the same category of phenomena, on a par with the spirit assistants, messengers, and the like, of the shamans of Northeastern Siberia.

Guardian spirits are not unknown in Australia and cognate beliefs have been described in some of the island groups of Melanesia, as well as in the Malay Archipelago. In a somewhat wider sense, beliefs in guardian spirits or spirit protectors are common throughout Africa and among primitive tribes in general, but in North America these beliefs and their associated practices have entered into an extraordinary set of cultural associations, thus affecting the personal religion as well as the religious institutionalism, mythology, totemism and even some aspects of the social organization of the Indians. It seems, indeed, justifiable to designate the guardian spirit as one of the basic roots of North American religion.

Modern Magic

In the course of our survey, it has been shown more than once to what extent the world view of the "savage" is controlled by magical idiosyncrasy. It remains to inquire whether this phenomenon is peculiar to early mentality, or whether we are not facing in magic, as more than once before, a sample of the common-human. That the latter alternative corresponds to the facts becomes evident upon most superficial analysis.

The works of Frazer and Mannhardt abound in illustrations of so-called "superstitions" current among the peasantry of Europe. In the traditional beliefs of these people, spirits and demons, spooks, ghosts and apparitions, omens, dreams and visions, continue to hold undisputed sway, and the century-old teachings of Christianity seem quite powerless to dislodge these even more ancient and deep rooted beliefs. Even in the cities, amidst schools and

universities, the faith in charms persists unabated, no less than the belief in lucky and unlucky stones, and the evil eye. In the fold of institutionalized Christianity itself the attitude toward the objectified representations of divinity and holy persons is heavily wrought with magical connotations. So are the beliefs in other than natural healing, which are still so common, centering at the present time about certain holy places in Russia, France, Canada, and elsewhere.¹

Examples of similar attitudes are not lacking in the wholly secular experiences of our daily life. Thus the status of the physician in modern society is not by any means devoid of a certain magical flavor. To a degree, the standing of a physician depends on his professional competence, his knowledge and experience. But this is only one element, and perhaps not the determining one. For what counts with the public is success, and a few conspicuous cures, however accidental and unforeseeable, contribute more to the reputation of a practitioner than a prolonged period of efficient but drab medical practice. The successful physician walks in a halo which is not entirely natural in its substance. His appeal is, at least in part, that of a man whose powers are extraordinary, not reducible to mere knowledge and experience and beyond the reach of other individuals, including most other physicians.

To believe in dreams is no longer good form in our midst, but how many of us are quite free from the tendency to ascribe to dreams at least a measure of prognosticatory or telepathic significance? A woman dreams of her mother and on awakening finds the news of the mother's sickness

¹Note in this connection the following news items from the *New York Times* for August 25th, 1920: "Templemore, Ireland. An incessant stream of pilgrims from all parts of Ireland continues to pour into Templemore to visit the home of Thomas Divan, where it was recently asserted miraculous cures were being effected through the medium of sacred statues said to have shed blood mysteriously last week.

"The neighboring towns and villages are overflowing with people unable to get into Templemore. . . .

"Further remarkable cures were claimed today."

or death in her morning mail. She "had not thought of mother for days," had "no idea that she could be sick," and "why just the night before the letter came?" and "can it be only a coincidence?" And so it goes! Let only the "coincidences" multiply and the staunchest doubter begins to waver in his scepticism.

Among the examples of latter day supernaturalism, few are more striking than the persistent belief that the psychic experiences of a pregnant woman may exercise a specific effect on the child. We hear of children born during the French Revolution with the revolutionary emblem on their chests; or again, a mother frightened by a frog, gives birth to a child with a birthmark resembling a frog; another child, whose mother broke her wrist while in pregnancy, is born with a wrist broken or at least weakened in the same place; and so on indefinitely. In a book published not so long ago ("Sex Antagonism" by W. Heape), a considerable collection of such instances is brought before the reader as worthy of belief. The author of the book happens to be an animal breeder, member of a professional group whose daily experiences bring them in touch with facts which suggest interpretations through what Kroeber called "inheritance by magic." No more than Jacob could resist the temptation of interpreting by a mechanism such as the above the peculiar and varied coloration of his sheep, can the modern fencier overcome the suggestive influence of the many instances in his experience where an interpretation through pre-natal influence *may* be made, and he makes it forthwith. Many persons who would reject all such suggestions with a shrug of the shoulder, prove equally positive in their claim that should the expectant mother engage in voluminous reading, this might enhance the literary proclivities of her offspring, and should she frequent concerts, the musical gifts of the baby may be similarly stimulated. In principle, of course, there is no difference between these cases and those cited before. Add to this lucky and unlucky days, magic numbers, black cats, nuns, umbrellas opened indoors, or just

any untoward happening at a ceremony or other emotionally significant occasion, and the impression becomes irresistible that modern society is, after all, not so far removed from a belief in other than natural causation.

Not infrequently one may hear the remark: "I am superstitious." In this form sincere persons give expression to the fact that while rational in intention, they are unable to resist the temptation to react in some special way to those situations where superstition is traditionally sanctioned. We think of open penknives, three candles, knocking on wood, and what not. It would almost seem as if the proclivity of people to be superstitious in this sense were proportionate to the degree to which their profession or occupation is in the control of unforeseeable factors. Here the gambler ranks first. From day to day, from moment to moment, his future is uncertain. If expert in mathematics, he may be perfectly aware of the unreasonableness of such concepts as luck; yet, no sooner does he fall under the spell of the green table or the green lawn or the tape, than his psychology inevitably glides into the channel of complete subjection to luck magic. Today luck smiles on him, and there is no end to his daring; tomorrow cards turn against him, and he refuses to take any further chances, although experience and probability would dictate the opposite course. Next to the gambler comes the hunter. He may be an expert, but legion is the number of unforeseeable factors which at least co-determine his success. Hence, his acute sensitiveness toward omens, dreams, prognostications, well wishing and other like premonitions. Here also belongs the actor. Actors and actresses enjoy a deserved reputation for superstitious inclinations far above the average. Once more this tendency may be brought into relation with the indefiniteness of their careers. Apart from talent, training, and even former favors on the part of the public, the fate of the actor, of his contract, and ultimately of his dinner, depends from night to night on the appeal of a particular performance to the audience. Now, all actors and

actresses, no matter how successful, know the elusiveness of the taste or mood of audiences. They cannot bank on it, hence the constant suspense. Such being the case, the host of omens, of good and bad signs and with them the entire galaxy of magical odds and ends, have their free play.

Magic is no part of our institutionalized religion. It is indignantly rejected from a rational world view by all men and women who "think," but it is with us nevertheless, and who may tell for how long?

Mana or Impersonal Supernatural Power

Our analysis of religion and magic makes it clear that the idea of supernatural power is common to both and represents, in fact, the basic concept underlying the religio-magical world view. On the emotional side, an equally fundamental factor is the *religious thrill*.

The idea of supernatural power assumed the central position in the discussion of primitive religion with the introduction of the concept of *mana*. The emergence of this concept in the study of primitive religion and its subsequent career are so instructive as to invite a slight historical digression.

Mana was formally introduced to ethnologists by Codrington in his book on the Melanesians (1896). He there made clear that among the various tribes of the South Seas the idea designated by the term *mana* occupies an altogether distinctive position among other religious conceptions. It indicates power which is supernatural and impersonal. *Mana* itself is not an animal or human being, nor a ghost or spirit, it is just power, magical potency. Although impersonal *per se*, it manifests itself with equal facility through natural objects or beings, through man, spirits, or ghosts.¹

Quite independent of Codrington's researches, ideas simi-

¹It may be noted in passing that in this area the ideas of ghost and spirit are sharply distinguished. A ghost is always the spirit of a deceased individual, while a spirit is a spiritual entity which either exists in detached form or dwells in a thing or being.

lar to *mana* were discovered in North America. Two contributions stand out pre-eminent in this connection, William Jones' article on "The Algonquin Manitou"¹ and J. N. B. Hewitt's "Orenda, or a Definition of Religion."² It is worth noting that both of these students are of Indian descent, William Jones belonging to the Algonquin speaking Sawk and Fox Indians, while Hewitt is a Tuscarōra Iroquois. At the hand of ethnological and linguistic evidence, Jones shows with great clearness that the idea of *manitou* implies supernatural power in itself impersonal, which may or may not manifest itself through objects, beings and natural phenomena. The Algonquin term may appear either with or without the personal article, in accordance with the meaning intended. Hewitt's argument is based wholly on a linguistic reconstruction. He traces the root vowel of the term *orenda* in a multiplicity of terms referring to things, beings or actions connected with supernatural power. Taking this as a starting point, Hewitt constructs an ancient Iroquoian religion built upon the idea of *orenda*, impersonal supernatural power. While Hewitt's procedure is not wholly unobjectionable from a theoretical standpoint, ethnologists have come to recognize that the fundamental idea in such conceptions as the Algonquin *manitou*, the Iroquoian *orenda* and the Siouan *wakan*, is the same, and that there is an unmistakable similarity between this idea and the *mana* of the South Seas.

Presently, still another field was drawn into the discussion. The meritorious volume of Pechuel-Loesche,³ dealing with certain natives of the west coast of Africa, between the deltas of the Congo and the Niger, brings further evidence of a similar sort. This region is the home of fetichism, which ever since the classic discussion by Schurtz⁴ was defined as the religion of the fetich, a small, usually artificial object, through which an indwelling spirit is operating. Pechuel-

¹*Journal of American Folk-Lore*, 1905.

²*American Anthropologist*, 1892.

³"Die Loango Expedition," Vol. III, 1907.

⁴Cf. his "Der Fetichismus," 1877.

Loesche's painstaking researches, which included linguistic analysis, led him to depart radically from Schurtz's generalization. The author asserts that the conception underlying the fetichism of this area is not that of an indwelling spirit. To him a fetich is an artificial object made in a certain way or prepared in accordance with a certain recipe, which possesses certain definite powers, or perhaps only one power. If the shape of the object is changed or the recipe which determines its composition is not followed, the power or powers are lost or modified. The basic conception is that of power, in itself impersonal, definite qualities and quantities of which can be secured under certain highly specific conditions. Once again, then, the idea involved is similar to *mana*.

It is not unlikely that Pechuel-Loesche's position is somewhat one-sided. The idea of an indwelling spirit is so common in Africa and elsewhere, that there can scarcely be any doubt of its occurrence in these western regions of the continent.¹ There is, however, no ground to doubt the correctness of the author's generalization insofar as it refers to West African fetiches.

The generality of the *mana* idea was thus established on a fairly wide geographical basis. Theoretically inclined ethnologists and students of religion were prompt in utilizing this valuable addition to the basic concepts of early religion, as may be seen from the breezy critical discussions of the ideas of Tylor and Frazer by Andrew Lang in his "The Making of Religion" and "Magic and Religion." But this aspect of the problem derived its main stimulus from the work of Marett, who, in his essay on "Pre-animistic Religion,"² utilized the idea of *mana* as a foundation on which to build a world view earlier even than that of animism, Marett's argument being that the idea of impersonal supernatural power is in its very nature more simple and hence

¹For a careful summary of beliefs in souls and spirits in Africa, see Ankermann in *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, vol. 50, 1918, pp. 89-153.

²*Folk-Lore*, 1900.

more primitive than that of a power-wielding personal spirit. Marett's contribution came at a psychological moment and his little essay presently became the crystallization point for a new philosophy of primitive religion. At the Third International Congress of Religions, held at Oxford, in 1908, the subjects of *mana* and animatism—Marett's term for the pre-animistic religion—were the principal topics of discussion in the section devoted to primitive religion.

Presently, *mana* was identified with magic, and in this form its use became still further extended. Hubert and Mauss, two faithful students of Durkheim, made a sweeping application of the *mana* concept in their treatise on magic,¹ Preuss skillfully wove the *mana* idea into his analysis of the beginnings of religion and art,² while Durkheim in his great book on religion³ identified *mana* with the religious core of totemism.

Thus the dogma of animism, of a spirit infested world, was supplemented, in fact came near being replaced, by another dogma, a world swept by *mana*, impersonal magic power.

After a calm retrospect, the *mana* idea must be welcomed as a genuine addition to our understanding of early religion, nay of all religion. While there is no particular meaning in having *mana* and spirit pitted against each other with reference to their chronological priority, it is clear that the idea of spirit is only one part of the fundamental ideology of religion, the other being *mana*, power. The latter supplies the dynamic principle, whereas spirit in itself is but a concept of form or being. When Professor Shotwell defines religion as "a reaction of mankind to something which is apprehended but not comprehended,"⁴ he omits to state—a fatal omission indeed—that the something to which there is a reaction is in the religious situation not merely a form or

¹"Exquise d'une théorie générale de la Magie," *Année Sociologique*, VII, 1904.

²"Ursprung der Religion und der Kunst," *Globus*, 1904-1905.

³See pp. 361 sq.

⁴"The Religious Revolution of Today," p. 101.

a substance or a being, but a power. From this it follows that the idea of supernatural power—impersonal, formless, but withal, a power, and supernatural— must be coupled with spirit in all interpretations of religion. Indeed, if the signs of the times are to be trusted, may we not suggest that the more dynamic and vaguer idea will outlive its more precise and static companion?¹

¹A concise formulation of the relation of the idea of *mana* to religion, magic and animism, will be found in my article "Spirit, *mana* and the Religious Thrill," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. XII, 1915. There also an attempt is made to show that from a psychological and epistemological standpoint, *mana* must be regarded as a projection or objectivation of what, on the subjective side, is the religious thrill. Now, if the religious thrill is the fundamental emotional root of religion, then *mana*—not Melanesian *mana*, nor *manitou*, nor *orenda*, nor *wakan*, but a psychologically more basic *mana*, freed from all historic accretions—becomes the fundamental idea of religion, the pure idea of supernatural power, an idea which, in the very nature of the case, is more sensed than thought.

CHAPTER XI

RELIGION AND MAGIC (Continued)

ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND THE HIGHER GODS

Chukchee Supernaturalism

In the world view of the Chukchee all nature is animated. Every material object can act, speak and walk. Everything that exists has its own "voice" or "master." Reindeer skins have a "master" of their own. In the night-time they turn into reindeer and walk to and fro. The trees in the woods talk to one another. The very shadows on the wall live in tribes in their own country where they have huts and subsist by hunting.

Special beliefs are entertained about mushrooms and mushroom-men. Mushrooms, when they grow up, are so powerful that they split whole trees. These mushrooms appear to intoxicated men in the shape of human beings, resembling, however, their real shapes in some particular. Thus, one may have but one leg, another a very large head, and so on. The number of mushrooms that appear to a man varies in accordance with the number of mushrooms he has eaten. The mushroom-men lead the dreamer through the world and show him real and imaginary things. They take him to the places where the dead live, through which they travel along many intricate paths.

Wooden amulets in a bag become herdsmen and go out at night to protect the herd from wolves. Black and polar bears, eagles, small birds, sea mammals, all have countries of their own and live like humans. They can turn into human beings while preserving some of their own qualities. Mice people live in underground houses, using a certain root as their reindeer. They have sledges made of grass. Off and on they become transformed into real hunters with regular sledges and hunt polar bears.

According to one story, a dried skin of an ermine transformed itself into a real ermine, which later turned into a large polar bear.

Boulders are regarded as petrified creatures. They represent the first attempt of the Creator to make man. As they were very clumsy, he transformed them into stones. After this, animals and man were created.

Forests, rivers and lakes have their own "masters"; also, various classes of animals and of trees, which therefore cannot be handled without special precautions. The only exception among trees is the birch which men handle as their "equal." Sledges, shafts of spears, and the like are made of birch wood. Native sketches of spirits collected by Bogoras show that these resemble to a degree the animals to which they belong. Thus, the master of fish and of mountain brooks has a long thin body and a face covered with hair. | The master of the forest has a body of wood without arms or legs, his eyes are on the crown of his head and he rolls along like a log of wood.)

Pičvučín¹ is an especially important owner or master of wild reindeer and of all land game. He lives in deep ravines or stays near the forest border. He sends reindeer herds to the hunters; but when he is angry he withholds the supply. He demands strict performance of all ancient customs and sacrifices connected with the hunt. Any neglect of these angers him. In size he is represented not larger than a man's finger, while his footprints on the snow are like those of a mouse. According to the beliefs of the Maritime Chukchee, Pičvučín has power over sea-game also. Some times one may see him passing the door of a house in the shape of a small black pup, but an inspection of his footprints, which look like those of a mouse, will reveal his identity. As soon as this is discovered, the people offer him a sacrifice, believing that next year a large whale will be drifted to that part of the house. Pičvučín's sledge is very small and is made of grass. Instead of a reindeer, he

¹Č pronounced *tch*.

drives a mouse, or a certain small root. In fact, he himself is sometimes represented as that root, driving a mouse. The lemming is his polar bear. He kills it and loads it on his sledge. On the other hand, he is believed to be very strong, can wrestle with giants and, on occasion, he can load a real polar bear on his sledge. He takes no solid food, living on odors.

Three classes of spirits, called *kelet*, are especially prominent in Chukchee belief: 1, evil spirits that walk invisibly, bringing disease and death; they prey on human bodies and souls; 2, blood-thirsty cannibals who live on distant shores and fight Chukchee warriors; and 3, spirits that are at the call of shamans and help them in their magic.

Among the spirits of the first variety are the ground spirits. They have the forms of different creatures, such as fish, dog, bird, fox, insect, but are very small. In proportion to their size, they always have a very large mouth, set with many strong teeth. The *kelet* do not like to stay in their own villages. They prefer to visit human habitations, and are believed to be constantly wandering about in search of human prey. On the other hand, they live like human beings and are considered a tribe by themselves. They have villages and camps and travel about the country with reindeer and dogs. They marry and have children. Their young boys and girls go hunting and fishing while the old men sit at home and try to read the future by the aid of divining stones. They always hunt man, whom they call "a little seal." Their divining stone is a human skull, while men often use animal skulls for that purpose.

If the *kelet* can catch a human soul, they chop it to pieces, cook it in a kettle and feed it to their children. The *kelet* and the shamans are hostile to each other. In their encounters, victory does not always rest with the *kelet*. Animals of peculiar form are sacrificed to the *kelet*, such as reindeer with unusual antlers, white reindeer with black ear points, or new born fawns with misshapen mouths.

The Chukchee do not know of death by natural means. When a man dies, he is supposed to be killed either by spirits or by an evil shaman by means of charms.

The second variety of supernatural creatures are the giants, who live on earth but always far removed from human habitations. They are always represented as very poor. They can be fought with ordinary means.

The third variety of spirits are those that appear to shamans. At shamanistic performances they usually figure as the "spirit voices" of the shaman, which the latter produces by means of ventriloquism. As shamanistic spirits may appear wolves, reindeer, walrus, whales, birds, plants, icebergs, utensils, pots, needles and needle-cases. The shamanistic spirits are very mean to the shaman. They punish him for irregularities. On the other hand, if his behavior is unobjectionable, they are always at his call. Also: the shamanistic spirits constantly quarrel with each other and he has to reconcile them.

The Chukchee personify the "directions" of the compass, of which they recognize twenty-two, including the Zenith and Nadir. Of these, the Mid-day and the Dawn are the most important, and to them most of the sacrifices are made.

The sun, moon and stars are also conceived as men of different kinds.

The Chukchee believe in a number of indefinite beings whose character and shape are but vaguely defined. Among these are the Creator, the Upper Being, the World, the Merciful Being, the Life-giving Being and the Luck-giving Being.¹ The Zenith, the Mid-day, the Dawn, are also often considered identical with the creator of the world. Among the baptized Chukchee, the Christian God has a

¹Bogoras believes that these vague deities represent an indefinite transformation of the creative principle of the world and may be compared to the *manitou* or *wakan* of the American Indians. On the basis of Bogoras' own statements about these beings, this analogy seems doubtful. Thus the talented author's opinion is adduced here for what it is worth. It may be noted, in passing, that while Bogoras has but few peers as an observer, his interpretations, most of which are omitted here, are often arbitrary.

place assigned to him side by side with these vague superior beings.

A special group of spirits are the house spirits. They are regarded as permanently associated with the house, their very names being derived from a stem meaning "absence of motion." The house spirits live like the Chukchee themselves. They stay in pairs and have children. Their children get sick and die. When a spirit child dies, the spirit may make friends with another spirit and allow him to have relations with his wife, a custom current among the Chukchee.

Among the many charms of the Chukchee, those of the household are of especial interest, and among these, particularly the hearth itself. Bogoras' statement on this subject deserves to be quoted verbatim:

"The chief place among the sacred things of the household belongs to the hearth itself, to the fire of which a spark is added from each of the hereditary fire-tools at every ceremonial. Each family has a fire of its own, and interchange of fire is strictly prohibited. Families whose fires are derived from different lines of ancestors, even though living for years in the same camp, will carefully guard against any contact of their fires. To borrow a neighbor's fire is held to be one of the greatest sins. If a camp is pitched on the spot formerly occupied by another family, the Chukchee woman, in order to start a new fire, will not avail herself of the coal or wood that was left. Even when camped on the treeless tundra, she will break up the sledges for fire-wood rather than take a single splinter bearing marks of an alien fire. Interchange of household utensils connected with the hearth—like kettles, dishes, lamps, receptacles for meat, etc.—is also strictly forbidden. It is even considered sinful to warm at one hearth a piece of cold meat which has been boiled at another. All these restrictions, however, refer only to the "genuine fire," obtained for a native hearth by means of a wooden drill and the sacred fire-board."

Bella Coola Gods

The Bella Coola¹ believe that the cosmos consists of five worlds, situated one above the other. The central world is our own, above it is the first heaven and above that the second heaven. Below the earth lies the first underworld, and below this, the second underworld.

In the second or uppermost heaven resides the supreme deity of the Bella Coola, called "Our Woman" or "Afraid of Nothing." Although superior to all the other deities, she has relatively little to do with the fates of mankind. The heaven in which she resides is described as a prairie without any trees. In order to reach it, one must go up a river which is situated in the House of the Gods in the heaven below it. According to another tradition, the uppermost heaven is reached through a rent in the sky of the upper heaven. The house of "Our Woman" stands in the far east and a gale is continually blowing from the open country in front of it, driving everything towards the entrance of the house. But near the house itself there is a great calm. A post in the shape of a large winged monster stands in front of the house, which is entered through the monster's mouth. Outside the door there is gravel of three colors, blue, black and white. Behind the house stretches a salt water pond in which the goddess bathes. This is the dwelling place of Sisiutl, a magical snake which sometimes descends to the earth. Wherever it moves, the rocks burst asunder and slide down the sides of the mountain.

In the mythological period, "Our Woman," the great goddess, fought the mountains, which are conceived by the Bella Coola as having been people, giants of enormous size. "Our Woman" fought them successfully and reduced them to real mountains and their present proportions.

In the center of the first heaven stands the House of the

¹The Bella Coola speak a Salish language and it can be shown that they have migrated to the coast from the interior in relatively recent times. While their language has remained practically unaffected by their Kwakiutl neighbors, their culture has been deeply transformed by the incursions of Northwest Coast customs and ideas.

Gods. It is also known as "The House of Myths" or "Where Man Was Created." In front of it is a post painted with representations of various birds. In this house lives the Sun, the supreme deity below "Our Woman." The Sun is referred to as "Our Father" or "The Sacred One." He is the only deity to whom the Bella Coola pray. They say "Take care of us, father!" or "Wipe your face, father! that it may be fair weather," or "Make me happy, father! you have given me too much misfortune."

Offerings of food and other articles are brought to the Sun.

With the Sun is associated another deity of equal rank, and together they rule mankind. Although they are among the creators, they are represented as hostile to man and ever seeking to destroy him.

Under these supreme deities there are a number of assistant deities, some of whose functions are associated with the *kusiut*, the great ceremonial of the Bella Coola. One of the deities ordains the death of man and animals, another is charged with killing the transgressors of *kusiut* rules. Then there is a supernatural boy forever performing *kusiut* dances. Off and on he is sent down to earth with new dances. Two of the goddesses always try to intervene when the superior gods attempt to punish man.

Then there are other deities who are more directly concerned with the daily life and activities of man and of nature.

Although the Sun is the creator of human beings, another deity gives a child its individual features. Before the children are born, a goddess places them in a crude cradle and rocks them. Then she sends them down to earth to be born. She performs a similar function with reference to animals, as well as ordains that their skins and flesh shall serve as food and clothing for man.

Another female deity is called "Mother of Flowers" or "Going to the Right," the latter name having reference to the movement of the Sun. Every spring she gives birth to all the plants in the order of their appearance, being as-

sisted by two old women and by a shaman who is called in by them.

While the Sun and his supernatural companion are concerned with the fates of man, they do not themselves interfere with his activities. This is done by four brothers who live in an elevated room near the House of Myths. One of these is called "The One Who Finishes His Work by Chopping Once," the second is called "The One Who Finishes His Work by Rubbing Once," and the third one's name is "The One Who Finishes His Work by Cutting Once." The brothers are experts at carving and painting. They gave man the arts. They taught him to build canoes, boxes and houses, to carve wood and to paint. Also, they introduced the methods used in hunting, and some claim that they made the fish.

A goddess, daughter of the Sun, taught man the art of working cedar bark.

Besides these there are nine brothers and a sister who are in special charge of the *kusiut* ceremonial.

Curious ideas are entertained about the Sun and his relation to the sky. At sunset there stands an enormous post supporting the sky, which prevents the sun from falling into the lower world. The trail of the sun is conceived as a bridge which is as broad as the distance between the winter and the summer solstices. The Sun walks with his face towards the west. In the summer he walks on the right side of the bridge, in the winter, on the left side, the varying heights of the Sun thus being accounted for. The extreme right and left sides of the bridge are called "the place where he sits down." Each of these points is guarded by a supernatural being whose duty it is to see to it that the Sun does not remain too long at the solstice. If the Sun tarries too long at the winter solstice, the people say, "Salmon will be dried late this year." If he leaves without delay, they say, "Soon we shall dry salmon." Three guardians accompany the Sun, who dance around him all the time. The Sun's halo is called "The Cape of Our Father." A

sun-dog that appears west from the Sun is called "The Painted Face of Our Father." When he drops down to earth epidemics occur. Eclipses result from the Sun losing his torch.

There are twenty-four guardians whose duty it is to take care of the sky. The sky must be continually fed with fire wood. Once the guardians put too much fire wood into the sky and it burst. All the pieces except one fell down to the earth. The fragments hit the faces of the twenty-four guardians and distorted them. They tried to mend the sky but did not succeed; then they went down the river and came to the four brothers whose assistance they asked. These proved equal to the task. They gathered up the pieces and glued them together. The Sun, which up to that time had remained in the east, now began to move on his daily course. At that time also the four brothers built the bridge over which the Sun travels. They placed a wedge in the opening of the sky into which the twenty-four assistants have to put the fire wood. This opening is called "Mouth Kept Open by Means of a Wedge." "The sky shall not burst again," said the four brothers, "this wedge shall keep its mouth open."

The earth itself is conceived as an island floating upon the ocean. Below it is the first underworld, which is the country of the ghosts. This is a topsy turvy world. Ghostland stretches along the banks of a great river. Behind the village where the ghosts dwell there is a hill, the base of which is covered with sharp stones. When we have summer, it is winter in ghostland; when we have night, it is day there. The ghosts walk on their heads and their language is different from that spoken on earth. When the souls reach the lower world they receive new names. In their village, which is surrounded by a fence, there is a dancing house in which the ghosts perform the *kusiut*. The dancing house is very large and long and has four fires. The women sit on the floor of the house, while the men sit on an elevated platform. Although the houses

have doors, the ghosts who first reach the underworld enter through the smoke-hole by means of a ladder, at the foot of which two men stand. Those who have once entered the dancing house may not return to earth. Other souls are sent back to earth by the deities, to be born again as children in the same families from which they came. The souls who enjoy the life in ghostland die a second death, whereupon they sink to the second underworld, from which there is no return.

The All Father

During recent years certain primitive ideas have been reported from different fields of investigation which seem to differ not only from the generalized animistic beliefs, but also from the more or less highly anthropomorphised beings of early mythologies. These ideas have usually been discussed under the heading of the All Father belief. Thus, according to Strehlow, the Aranda of Central Australia believe in a great moral being, Aljira. He is eternal and is conceived as a very large, strong man with a red skin and light hair, which falls on his shoulders. His legs are like those of an emu. He is decorated with a white forehead band, a neck band and a bracelet. He also wears a hair loin-girdle. He has many wives, called "the beautiful ones," who have dogs' legs and are also red in color. He has many sons and daughters, the former having emu legs, the latter, dogs' legs. Handsome men and beautiful women frequent his neighborhood.

He lives in heaven, which has existed from the beginning. The Milky Way is a Great River with inexhaustible reservoirs of sweet water; tall trees, tasteful berries and fruits, abound here. Great flocks of birds enliven Aljira's domain and many animals such as kangaroos, wild cats, and the like, seek his enormous hunting grounds. While Aljira follows the game, his wives gather edible herbs and other

fruit which grow in abundance at all times of the year. The stars are the camp fires of Aljira.

Aljira is the great god of the Aranda. Women as well as men know him, but his reign is restricted to heaven. He has not created man nor is he concerned about him. No *churinga* are consecrated to him. The Aranda do not fear him nor do they love him, but they do fear that some day the heavens will collapse and kill them off. They believe that the sky rests upon piles or stone legs.¹

What Strehlow says about Aljira agrees fairly closely with the accounts about the All Father collected by Howitt among the different tribes of Southeastern Australia.

Thus, the Narrinyeri believe in a supreme being who is said to have made all things on earth and to have given man his weapons and taught him his ceremonies. When they are asked about the origin of any custom, they reply that the supreme being has instituted it. The Wotjobaluk as well as the Kulin speak of Bunjil, who is represented as an old man. He is the heavenly headman of the tribe and has two wives and a son, the rainbow, whose wife is the second rainbow, which is sometimes faintly visible. He is believed to have given the Kulin the arts and, according to at least one legend, he instituted the phratries and originated the law of exogamy. Howitt is careful to point out that the All Father among these tribes is endowed with distinctly human rather than animal traits.

Among the Kurnai the knowledge of the supreme being is almost entirely restricted to the initiated men, although the old women know at least of the existence of this being. The novices are told all about the All Father at the last and most sacred session of the initiation ceremonies. At this time they learn that he lived on earth long ago and taught the Kurnai how to make implements, nets, canoes and weapons. Individual names which the people have

¹This presentation of the Aljira belief is based on C. Strehlow's "Die Aranda- Und Loritjastämme in Zentral-Australien," Part I (Frankfurt am Main, 1907).

from their ancestors, were first given by the supreme being. He also instituted the secret ceremonies. When some one revealed the secret of these ceremonies to the women, the wrath of the supreme being was aroused and in revenge he sent down his fire, the *Aurora Australis*, which filled the whole space between the earth and the sky. Men went mad with fear and speared each other, brothers killing brothers, fathers their children and husbands their wives. Then the sea rushed over the land and nearly all mankind was drowned. Some of those who survived became the ancestors of the Kurnai, while some turned into animals, birds, reptiles and fish. Tundun, the son of the supreme being, and his wife became porpoises. Then the supreme being left the earth and ascended the sky, where he still resides.

All the tribes which attend the *kuringal* ceremonies of the Yuin people believe in the great being, Dara-Mulun, who once lived on earth with his mother. At first, the earth was bare, and "like the sky, as hard as a stone." The land extended over where the sea is now. There were as yet no men or women, but only animals, birds and reptiles. Dara-Mulun made the trees. Then he caused a great flood which covered the entire coast country, so that no people were left except some who crawled out of the water on to Mount Dromedary. Then Dara-Mulun went up to the sky where he still lives, watching the actions of men. He made the bull-roarer, the sound of which is still believed to be his voice. He also gave the Yuin their laws, which ever since have been handed down by the old men. When the spirits of dead men leave them, Dara-Mulun meets them and takes care of them.

Upon a rough inspection of these beliefs, it will occur to any one that missionary influence had something to do with their origination. Some features in connection with the flood, the moral character of the supreme being and other traits, strongly suggest the influence of white teachers. The problem, however, cannot be settled so easily, for beliefs in supreme beings such as here described occur also

among other tribes, for instance, among some of the Negro peoples of the Gold Coast of West Africa. The idea also seems to be present in Northwestern America and North-eastern Siberia. It is especially notable that the supreme being is often conceived as remote and detached from the affairs of men, although in some instances he is believed to have created them. Of all ideas about the All Father, the following two seem to be the most consistent, the fact that he or she is supreme, superior to other deities, and yet does not now actually participate in the affairs of man. The contact of primitive tribes with civilization has everywhere been sufficiently frequent or probable to render the interpretation of the All Father idea through borrowing a feasible one. But the very wide geographical distribution of these beliefs makes one pause before accepting such an interpretation. It is, after all, not psychologically impossible that a more or less vague idea of a superior being should have developed among primitive tribes fairly early on a par with animism, magic and other forms of early belief. The entire problem awaits further investigation.¹

THE INDIVIDUAL IN RELIGION

Medicine-men Among the Chukchee and Others²

Some family rituals of the Chukchee are in some respects like shamanism. Most Chukchee will from time to time

¹The problem of the All Father should not be confounded with that of early monotheism. It will have been noted that in all of the instances cited—and the same is true in many other cases—the All Father was not by any means the only supernatural being in the belief of the people. Thus the generalization of Father Schmidt with reference to the original monotheism of the Pygmy peoples (*Cf.* his work "Die Pygmäenvölker") must be placed on a distinct level from the discussions of the All Father. A systematic review of all relevant data, which is now slightly out of date, will be found in Schmidt's book "Die Entstehung der Gottesidee" (originally in French in the form of a series of articles on "L'origine de l'idée de dieu" in *Anthropos*, 1908-10). A critical discussion of the entire problem will also be found in Andrew Lang's "The Making of Religion."

²This account of Chukchee shamanism is based on Bogoras' "The Chukchee Religion," *Jesup North Pacific Expedition*, Vol. VII.

sit down in the outer room with the family drum and, while drumming energetically, sing songs and perhaps even try to commune with spirits. In this sense it can be said that many people act as shamans. The real shamanistic performances, however, always take place in the sleeping room at night and in the darkness.

Shamans among the Chukchee are essentially "those with spirits." Both men and women may be shamans. It is, in fact, probable that true shamanism is more common among women than among men, but the higher grades of shamanistic powers and performances are restricted to men. The bearing of children is believed to be bad for shamanistic power. Indeed, anything connected with birth has an evil effect on shamanism, and may thus affect also the powers of men. However, there is only one feature, ventriloquism, which is entirely beyond the reach of women shamans.

True shamans among the Chukchee, as in Northeastern Siberia generally, are people of a distinct psychic caste. "The shamans among the Chukchee with whom I conversed," writes Bogoras, "were as a rule extremely excitable, almost hysterical, and not a few of them were half crazy. Their cunning resembled the cunning of a lunatic."¹

The future shaman may be discerned at an early age. His gaze is directed into space, and his eyes are unusually bright. This is why, it is claimed, the shamans can see spirits in the dark. During the shamanistic performances, the shaman is extremely sensitive ("bashful"). He is afraid of strange people and things, shrinks from ridicule and criticism. The spirits themselves are also believed to be "bashful," unless the audience is such as to favor their appearance.

Bogoras states, in agreement with many of his predecessors in Siberian ethnology, that this hyper-sensitiveness is characteristic of the entire area. Even the Russian Creoles are not immune from it. Men of the latter class have been known to die when threatened or when their death was

¹*Ibid.*, p. 415.

foretold in a dream. While disharmony with the *kelet* may readily result in the death of a shaman, he is normally regarded as very tough. Thus the shaman under certain conditions is "soft to die," although he is otherwise "hard to kill."

When the call to shamanism comes to a young boy, spirits appear to him, strange objects lie across his path, of which he makes amulets, and the like. For a considerable time he may manifest great resistance, for persons do not usually want to become shamans.¹ When the youth has finally become a shaman and has practiced for a number of years, he may then discard his art without fear of angering the spirits.

The "gathering of shamanistic powers" is a prolonged and laborious task:

"For men, the preparatory stage of shamanistic inspiration is in most cases very painful, and extends over a long time. The call comes in an abrupt and obscure manner, leaving the young novice in much uncertainty regarding it. He feels 'bashful' and frightened; he doubts his own disposition and strength, as has been the case with all seers, from Moses down. Half unconsciously and half against his own will, his whole soul undergoes a strange and painful transformation. This period may last months, and sometimes even years. The young novice, the 'newly inspired' loses all interest in the ordinary affairs of life. He ceases to work, eats but little and without relishing the food, ceases to talk to people, and does not even answer their questions. The greater part of his time he spends in sleep.

"Some keep to the inner room and go out but rarely. Others wander about in the wilderness, under the pretext of hunting or of keeping watch over the herd, but often without taking along any arms or the lasso of the herdsman. A wanderer like this, however, must be closely watched, otherwise he might lie down on the open tundra and sleep for

¹This attitude contrasts strikingly with the frantic zeal displayed by the searchers for visions and guardian spirits in North America.

three or four days, incurring the danger, in winter, of being buried in drifting snow."¹

Hard as is the shamanistic initiation, it must at least in part be gone over again before each performance. Nor may the shaman resist the call; when the inspiration is upon him, he must practice. Should he resist, his suffering becomes acute. He may sweat blood, and his state becomes that of a madman, reminding one of epilepsy.

As shamanistic performances require considerable physical exertions, shamanism is on the whole a young man's profession, and when a man reaches the age of forty, he will usually lay down his art, sometimes by passing it on to another. This is achieved by blowing into the eyes or mouth of the novice or by stabbing oneself and then the latter with a knife. Whatever the novice wins in power is lost by the shaman, and this loss is irretrievable.

Even the beating of the drum, a constant accompaniment of every shamanistic performance, requires skill and physical endurance. The same applies to the capacity of passing rapidly from a state of frantic excitation to one of normal quiescence. All this can only be acquired through prolonged and persistent practice.

While the typical Chukchee shaman is a neurotic, shamans occur whose psychic mould is very different. Thus Bogoras refers to a shaman who was "a good-looking, well-proportioned man of rather quiet manners, though an ill-advised word might throw him into intense excitement. He excelled in shamanistic devices which apparently required great physical strength and dexterity. At the same time, however, he declared that he did not consider himself a shaman of a high order, and that his relations with the 'spirits' must not be taken very seriously. To explain this he said that when he was young he suffered severely from syphilis. To heal himself, he had recourse to spirits, and after two years, when he had become skillful in shamanistic practices, he was completely restored by their help. After

¹*Ibid.*, p. 420.

that he maintained intercourse with the *kelet* for several years, and was on the point of becoming a really great shaman. Then suddenly his luck was gone. One of his dogs bore two black pups; and when he saw them both sitting side by side on their haunches, looking into his face, he took it as a sign that the time had come for him to withdraw from shamanistic practices. He suffered a relapse of his illness, and his herd was visited by hoof-disease. Fearing that worse things might happen, he dropped all serious pursuits of shamanism, and practised only the tricks, which were completely harmless. As far as I could learn, he had been a magician employing especially the powers of evil, or practising the black art; and after the return of his disease, he abandoned those practices, considering them detrimental to his health and well-being."¹

That the shamans practice deceit in the course of their performances is obvious enough. Not infrequently, in fact, it is observed even by the native audience, but the general disposition to countenance and endorse shamanism, supported as it is by a traditional background, overcomes those occasional moments of scepticism. The shamans are always compensated for their services by presents of meat, thongs, skins, garments, living reindeer or "alien food." "Shamanistic advice or treatment," says the native practitioner, "when given gratuitously, amounts to nothing."²

The most common aims pursued at a shamanistic performance is the cure of a patient through the invocation of advice from spirits or the bringing back of a patient's soul abducted by hostile spirits, or the foretelling of future events after consultation with the same source.

The following is a description of a typical shamanistic performance:

"After the evening meal is finished and the kettles and

¹*Ibid.*, pp. 428-429.

²This reminds one of the attitude of modern psychoanalysts who insist on the therapeutic value of the financial sacrifice made by the patient. (N. B. This statement should not be misinterpreted, for there is a real psychological element involved.)

trays are removed to the outer tent, all the people who wish to be present at the seance enter the inner room, which is carefully closed for the night. Among the Reindeer Chukchee, the inner room is especially small, and its narrow space causes much inconvenience to the audience, which is packed together in a tight and most uncomfortable manner. The Maritime Chukchee have more room, and may listen to the voices of the spirits with more ease and freedom. The shaman sits on the 'master's place' near the back wall; and even in the most limited sleeping-room, some free space must be left around him. The drum is carefully looked over, its head tightened, and, if it is much shrunken, it is moistened with urine and hung up for a short time over the lamp to dry. The shaman sometimes occupies more than an hour in this process, before he is satisfied with the drum. To have more freedom in his movements, the shaman usually takes off his fur shirt, and remains quite naked down to the waist. He often removes also his shoes and stockings, which of course gives free play to his feet and toes.

"In olden times, shamans used no stimulants; but at present they often smoke a pipeful of strong tobacco without admixture of wood, which certainly works like a strong narcotic. This habit is copied from the Tungus shamans, who make great use of unmixed tobacco as a powerful stimulant.

"At last the light is put out and the shaman begins to operate. He beats the drum and sings his introductory tunes, at first in a low voice; then gradually his voice increases in volume, and soon it fills the small closed-up room with its violent clamor. The narrow walls resound in all directions.

"Moreover, the shaman uses his drum for modifying his voice, now placing it directly before his mouth, now turning it at an oblique angle, and all the time beating it violently. After a few minutes, all this noise begins to work strangely on the listeners, who are crouching down, squeezed together in a most uncomfortable position. They begin to lose the

power to locate the source of the sounds; and, almost without any effort of imagination, the song and the drum seem to shift from corner to corner, or even to move about without having any definite place at all.

"The shaman's songs have no words. Their music is mostly simple, and consists of one short phrase repeated again and again. After repeating it many times, the shaman breaks off, and utters a series of long-drawn, hysterical sighs, which sound something like 'Ah, ya, ka, ya, ka, ya, ka!' After that, he comes back to his songs. For this he draws his breath as deep as possible in order to have more air in his lungs, and to make the first note the longest.

"Some of the tunes, however, are more varied, and are not devoid of a certain grace. Not a few are improvised by the shaman on the spot; others are repeated from seance to seance. Each shaman has several songs of his own, which are well known to the people; so that if anybody uses one of them, for instance at a ceremonial, the listeners recognize it immediately, and say that such and such a man is using the particular song of such and such a shaman.

"There is no definite order for the succession of the songs, and the shaman changes them at will, sometimes even returning to the first one after a considerable interval has elapsed. This introductory singing lasts from a quarter of an hour to half an hour or more, after which the *kelet* make their first appearance."

While the shaman does all the singing, he expects some one from the audience to support him by means of a series of interjections. Without such "answering calls", "a Chukchee shaman considers himself unable to perform his calling in a proper way; therefore novices, while trying to learn the shamanistic practices, usually induce a brother or a sister to respond, thus encouraging the zeal of the performer. Some shamans also require those people who claim their advice or treatment to give them answering calls during the particular part of the performance which refers to their affairs. The story-tellers of the Chukchee also usually

claim the assistance of their listeners, who must call out the same exclamations.

"Among the Asiatic Eskimo, the wife and other members of the family form a kind of chorus, which from time to time catches up the tune and sings with the shaman. Among the Russianized Yukaghir of the lower Kolyma the wife is also the assistant of her shaman husband, and during the performance she gives him encouraging answers, and he addresses her as his 'supporting staff.'

"In most cases the *kelet* begin by entering the body of the shaman. This is marked with some change in his manner of beating the drum, which becomes faster and more violent; but the chief mark is a series of new sounds, supposed to be peculiar to the *kelet*. The shaman shakes his head violently, producing with his lips a peculiar chattering noise, not unlike a man who is shivering with cold. He shouts hysterically, and in a changed voice utters strange, prolonged shrieks, such as 'O to, to, to, to,' or 'I pi, pi, pi, pi' all of which are supposed to characterize the voice of the *kelet*. He often imitates the cries of various animals and birds which are supposed to be his particular assistants. If the shaman is only a 'single-bodied' one—that is, has no ventriloquistic power—the *kelet* will proceed to sing and beat the drum by means of his body. The only difference will be in the timbre of the voice, which will sound harsh and unnatural, as becomes supernatural beings."¹

The traits characteristic of Chukchee shamans are shared by them, often to a striking degree, with the Koryak, Kamchadal and Yukaghir. More remotely the Chukchee shaman is related culturally to the *angakut* of the Eskimo and the shamans of the Northwest Coast.

Medicine-men are, of course, ubiquitous in the primitive world, but in other localities their traits are only in part like those of the magic working practitioner of the peoples of Northeastern Siberia and of northwestern and northern North America. According to Koch-Grünberg, men and

¹*Ibid.*, pp. 433-435.

women practitioners occur among the Guana, Tuppi-Ymba and Yekuana. Among the Chiriguama and many other tribes studied by Nordenskiöld, both men and women practitioners have a "comrade" in the other world who helps them in their profession. The "comrades" of men are women, those of women, men. Both Dobrizhoffer and Hyades-Deniker state that old women are often held responsible for deaths. According to the same authors, definite separation does not always exist between the offices of chief and medicine-man, at least to the extent that some of the prominent chiefs were also known as medicine-men. In his work on the Arawak-speaking peoples, Max Schmidt refers to some traits on the basis of which boys were selected for the profession of medicine-men. Among others, he mentions epilepsy, various physical peculiarities, such as hemorrhages of the breast, and general nervousness. Payments for the services of medicine-men are referred to constantly. This trait thus seems to be as common as it is in Northeastern Siberia. In some instances, medicine-men belonging to a different tribe or even to a different village occupied by the same tribe are regarded as evil, whereas the practitioners of one tribe and village are thought helpful and benevolent.¹

In some South American tribes the profession of a medicine-man requires long preparation, sometimes extending over months or even years. Enforced fasting and various forms of self castigation are common characteristics of the period of apprenticeship. Some of the things the apprentice is expected to learn from his expert preceptors are monotonous singing, ventriloquism, imitation of animal voices, sucking out of poison, the habit of drinking narcotics and poisons, the swallowing of small animals, the swallowing and expectorating of small pebbles and pieces of wood. This

¹This psychologically plausible attitude occurs frequently in different parts of the world: magicians of other tribes are either regarded as evil or as more powerful. A number of such instances have been recorded in Australia, and in North America the Haida, at least, show an extraordinary respect for the shamans of the Tlingit.

list reminds one forcibly of the professional accomplishments of the shamans of Northeastern Siberia. It is, of course, clear that here also a modicum of deceit is an essential ingredient of the medicine-man's equipment. Thus, Von den Steinen states about the Bororo healers that when they have foretold the death of a sick child, they do not hesitate to help matters along by strangling it with a thread.

In Australia the medicinal functions of magicians are so characteristic that Howitt, in speaking of the southeastern district of the continent, defines the medicine-man as "one who causes or cures deaths by projecting into bodies or extracting from them, quartz crystals, bone, wood or other things." And he continues: "The belief in magic in its various forms—in dreams, omens and warnings—is so universal and mingles so intimately with the daily life of the aborigines that no one, not even those who practice deceit themselves, doubt the power of other medicine-men, or that if they failed to effect their magical purpose the failure is due to an error in the practice or to the superior skill or power of some adverse practitioner."¹

The *kunki* or magicians of the Dieri, hold intercourse with supernatural beings, and with their assistance interpret dreams and reveal to people the individuals who are responsible for deaths caused by magic. The author relates the case of a magician who revived a man who was near death. The magician went outside, caught the spirit of the man just as it was going toward *karalk* (other world), then, lying down on the half-dead man, put the spirit into him, and thus brought him back to life.

In other instances, knowledge rather than magic is operative, but the spirit in which such cures are taken by the natives is very much the same. Thus a woman who was bitten by a snake was cured by her husband, who was not even a regular magician, in the following way: he secured a cord, tied it above the knee of the bitten leg, twisting it tighter with a stick, then he picked up a quartz pebble,

¹Howitt, "Native Tribes of Southeast Australia," p. 356.

cracked it in two and with the sharp edge cut a circle right around the leg, severing the skin, the blood oozed out, and though the woman became drowsy and ill, she gradually recovered.

Among the Kurnai there is a separate variety of harmless magicians, who go up to the spirit world to learn songs and dances, then come back and teach them to the people.

While elements of somewhat marked similarity must have been noted between the magical practitioners of North-eastern Siberia, those of South America and those of Australia, it must be remembered that the general character of the individuals who engage in magical cures in these areas is not by any means the same. The shamans of Northeastern Siberia, as well as those of Arctic North America, are high-strung and often neurotic individuals. In South America this also seems to be the case, although by no means as regularly or as markedly. The magicians of Australia, on the other hand, are perfectly normal individuals, amply provided with commonsense and shrewdness. Their qualities are more like those of the chiefs and leaders in industrial pursuits. Together with the latter and the old men at large, they guide the younger generation by their example and their teaching.

The Ghost-Dance Religions of the North American Indians

While the psychological origin of religion can be made clear at least theoretically, we know next to nothing of the origins of religions as part of primitive history. The only mode of approach to the problem, therefore, is to study certain phenomena of relatively recent occurrence and project the insight thus gained into the night of the remote past. In view of this situation, the data available on the so-called Ghost-Dance Religions of the Indians are welcome indeed.

A common cause of these religious revivals is without

doubt to be sought in the abnormal conditions arising out of the contact of white man's civilization with the religious and ethical traditions of the American Indians. The mode of origin of the spirit revivals in the different tribes is strikingly similar, while the irresistible spread of the revivalist activities from tribe to tribe presents an astounding picture of religious receptiveness.

One or two examples will make clear just what took place in these revivals.

The great revivalist prophet, Smohalla, was a member of a small tribe related to the Nez Percé Indians. The date of his birth falls between 1815 and 1820. After having frequented a Catholic mission among the Yakima, the youth achieved considerable renown as a warrior and later as a medicine-man. As his professional fame grew, he became involved in an acrimonious dispute with Moses, a rival medicine-man and chief of a neighboring tribe. The affair came to an open fight in which Smohalla was worsted and nearly killed. However, he managed to drag himself to a boat and was carried down the current of the Columbia River until he was picked up by some white men.

His recovery was slow. When well once more, he was unwilling to return to his people among whom he knew he was regarded as dead, so he started on a prolonged period of wanderings. He made his way along the coast to Mexico, and from there he traveled back north through Arizona and Nevada. While on his trip he began to preach a new doctrine. He averred that he had been dead and had visited the spirit world and that now he was preaching by divine command. When he came among the tribes that had heard of him before his unlucky fight, he was believed, for he had been thought dead and it was known that his body had disappeared. His doctrine consisted in a prophecy that the early conditions of Indian life would return, that the buffalo would come back and white man withdraw from the land. There was much Catholic ritual in the accompanying ceremonies as well as a rigid ethical code which

had a remarkable effect on the tribes that fell under its sweep.

Smohalla knew well how to enhance his prestige by such little tricks as the foretelling of eclipses. He was enabled to do this with the help of an almanac and some accompanying explanations gleaned from a party of surveyors. This particular trick almost cost him his reputation, however, as he was not able to secure another almanac, and after the expiration of the year his astronomical predictions came to an abrupt conclusion.

It is clear that Smohalla was subject to cataleptic trances and his alleged supernatural revelations came to him while he was lying prostrate in this unconscious condition. The slightly naive remarks quoted by Mooney from MacMurray are of sufficient interest to be reproduced here:

"He falls into trances and lies rigid for considerable periods. Unbelievers have experimented by sticking needles through his flesh, cutting him with knives, and otherwise testing his sensibility to pain, without provoking any responsive action. It was asserted that he was surely dead, because blood did not flow from his wounds. These trances always excite great interest and often alarm, as he threatens to abandon his earthly body altogether because of the disobedience of his people, and on each occasion they are in a state of suspense as to whether the Saghalee Tyee will send his soul back to earth to reoccupy his body, or will, on the contrary, abandon and leave them without his guidance. It is this going into long trances, out of which he comes as from heavy sleep and almost immediately relates his experiences in the spirit land, that gave rise to the title of 'Dreamers,' or believers in dreams, commonly given to his followers by the neighboring whites. His actions are similar to those of a trance medium, and if self-hypnotization be practicable that would seem to explain it. I questioned him as to his trances and hoped to have him explain them to me, but he avoided the subject and was angered when I pressed him. He manifestly believes all he says of what

occurs to him in this trance state. As we have hundreds of thousands of educated white people who believe in similar fallacies, this is not more unlikely in an Indian subjected to such influences."¹

Further on, the same author continues to describe one of the ceremonial occasions on which Smohalla preached the new religion and made converts:

"Smohalla invited me," writes MacMurray, "to participate in what he considered a grand ceremonial service within the larger house. This house was built with a framework of stout logs placed upright in the ground and roofed over with brush, or with canvas in rainy weather. The sides consisted of bark and rush matting. It was about 75 feet long by 25 feet wide. Singing and drumming had been going on for some time when I arrived. The air resounded with the voices of hundreds of Indians, male and female, and the banging of drums. Within, the room was dimly lighted. Smoke curled from a fire on the floor at the farther end and pervaded the atmosphere. The ceiling was hung with hundreds of salmon, split and drying in the smoke.

"The scene was a strange one. On either side of the room was a row of twelve women standing erect with arms crossed and hands extended, with finger tips at the shoulders. They kept time to the drums and their voices by balancing on the balls of their feet and tapping with their heels on the floor, while they chanted with varying pitch and time. The excitement and persistent repetition wore them out, and I heard that others than Smohalla had seen visions in their trances, but I saw none who would admit it or explain anything of it. I fancied they feared their own action, and that real death might come to them in this simulated death.

"Those on the right hand were dressed in garments of a red color with an attempt at uniformity. Those on the left wore costumes of white buckskin, said to be very ancient ceremonial costumes, with red and blue trimmings. All wore large round silver plates or such other glittering orna-

¹Bureau of Ethnology, 14th Annual Report, pp. 719-720.

ments as they possessed. A canvas covered the floor and on it knelt the men and boys in lines of seven. Each seven, as a rule, had shirts of the same color. The tallest were in front, the size diminishing regularly to the rear. Children and ancient hags filled in any spare space. In front on a mattress knelt Smohalla, his left hand covering his heart. On his right was the boy bell ringer in similar posture."¹

Another great prophet or messiah was Wovoka, probably a Paiute Indian, born about 1856. It seems that his father had been a minor prophet, so that Wovoka grew up in an atmosphere that suggested his future calling. He received his great revelation at the early age of fourteen. "On this occasion 'the sun died'² . . . and he fell asleep in the daytime and was taken up to the other world. Here he saw God, with all the people who had died long ago engaged in their oldtime sports and occupations, all happy and forever young. It was a pleasant land and full of game. After showing him all, God told him he must go back and tell his people they must be good and love one another, have no quarreling, and live in peace with the whites; that they must work, and not lie or steal; that they must put away all the old practices that savored of war; that if they faithfully obeyed his instruction they would at last be reunited with their friends in this other world, where there would be no more death or sickness or old age. He was then given the dance which he was commanded to bring back to his people. By performing this dance at intervals, for five consecutive days each time, they would secure this happiness to themselves and hasten the event. Finally God gave him control over the elements so that he could make it rain or snow or be dry at will, and appointed him his deputy to take charge of affairs in the west, while 'Governor Harrison' would

¹*Ibid*, p. 726.

²The reference is to an eclipse, an event which always arouses great commotion in an Indian community. It seems that on this occasion the sickly youth experienced some sort of a fit, accompanied by a somewhat elaborate hallucination.

attend to matters in the east, and he, God, would look after the world above. He then returned to earth and began to preach as he was directed, convincing the people by exercising the wonderful powers that had been given him."¹

Wovoka was a powerful magician. He had five songs by means of which he could control rain and snow. The first song brought mists or clouds; the second, a snowfall; the third, a shower; the fourth, hard rain or storm; while the fifth brought clear weather. The ceremonial aspect of the dances introduced by Wovoka were of the usual kind, embracing frenzy, fits and visions.

The mythology of the doctrine can be briefly stated in the words of Mooney: "The dead are all arisen and the spirit hosts are advancing and have already arrived at the boundaries of this earth, led forward by the regenerator in shape of cloud-like indistinctness. The spirit captain of the dead is always represented under this shadowy semblance. The great change will be ushered in by a trembling of the earth, at which the faithful are exhorted to feel no alarm. The hope held out is the same that has inspired the Christian for nineteen centuries—a happy immortality in perpetual youth. As to fixing a date, the messiah is as cautious as his predecessor in prophecy, who declares that 'no man knoweth the time, not even the angels of God.'"²

The ethical code embraced such maxims as "do no harm to any one, do right always," "do not tell lies," "when your friends die you must not cry"—a reference to the elaborate, expensive and often cruel rites that used to accompany burials among these tribes. But the most prominent maxim was "you must not fight." The effect of this ethical code in the setting of a revivalist doctrine seems to have been remarkable, insofar as it fostered friendliness among tribes that had previously been almost perpetually at war.

A religious upheaval, similar to the Ghost-Dance Religions of the west, swept over the Iroquois tribes of the east

¹*Ibid.*, pp. 771-772.

²*Ibid.*, p. 782.

in the beginning of the Nineteenth Century. Here the prophet was Handsome-Lake, the brother of a great war chief. So far as recorded, his life up to the age of sixty was not an unusual one and if he achieved any distinction it was by his rather wild and disorderly habits. Then he fell sick and his ailment was pronounced hopeless. While on his death-bed he had an elaborate dream accompanied by a vision, usually designated as the vision of the four angels. In this dream and vision he claims to have received the outline of the new doctrine. Here the traces of Christian teaching are conspicuous: the doctrine was proclaimed by four angels and implied a belief in one supreme god, which was foreign to Indian religion. Handsome-Lake's teaching rejected many of the ancient beliefs and ceremonies of the Iroquois as heathen and evil. At the same time, it incorporated in its precepts an even larger number of the pre-existing beliefs and practices. Here also the religious doctrine had an ethical flavor; it prescribed peace, truthfulness and sobriety, and comprised certain educational maxims.

The doctrine of Handsome-Lake received wide acceptance among the Iroquois tribes, and to this day, in many of the Iroquoian reservations, some Indians belong to one or another Christian denomination, while others, not always the minority, are followers of Handsome-Lake or "deists," as they like to call themselves. There are still a number of men living who know the entire doctrine and preach it on the different reservations. This process, when accompanied by explanations, implies three hours preaching a day for five days. It is very remarkable and has often been noted that many of the older beliefs of the Iroquois have been almost wholly supplanted by this new religion.

The Ghost-Dance Religions of the western Indians and the doctrine of Handsome-Lake remind one of parallel and recent phenomena in civilization. The numerous Russian sects, which in the course of two or three centuries have split off from the Greek Catholic Church, present many features of striking resemblance to those reviewed above.

The conflicting interests and customs of the whites and the Indians, which provide the socio-psychological background for American Indian revivalism, have their analogue in the ruthless pressure exerted by the Orthodox Church of Greece upon the religious ideas of the ethnic conglomerate of the Russian plains. Here also recur the prophets, wonder-workers and messiahs, or earthly representatives of messiah. The new religions are ushered in by ceremonialism, often of a secret nature. There are visions and fits, and there is an ethical code with the usual drastic demands on the stolidity and altruism of the devotees.

The religious transformations of early society are veiled in darkness. It is doubtful whether we shall ever possess authentic material for this chapter of human history, but one might at least conjecture that religious revivals, when they have occurred, have come at periods of emotional stress and strain, perhaps precipitated by intertribal contact or conflict, and that in their nature, mechanism and progress they were not unlike the Ghost-Dance Religions of the American Indian and the heretical creeds of the Russian sectarians.

SUPERNATURALISM AS A WORLD VIEW

The first tenet of early supernaturalism is its *animistic faith*. To the world of matter is opposed the world of spirit. Great is the variety of the forms of individual spirits and equally varied are their functions. In their form the spirits must be regarded as derived either from the things of nature, animate and inanimate, or from transformed or distorted versions or combinations of these. Spirits in the form of inanimate things and plants are not unknown although not common, animal-shaped spirits everywhere predominate, while spirits in the shape of man early take the lead, and in numerous primitive civilizations just above the lowest, constitute the principal inhabitants of the supernatural realm. Various grotesque spirits must

be regarded as derived either from dreams or visions or to be the outgrowth of the free play of the imagination. Not infrequently, artificial objects or artistic conventions must have had an influence on the formal character of spirits. Thus, it is highly probable that the False Face spirits of the Iroquois are the projections into the spiritual world of the grotesque wooden masks worn by the members of the False Face Society, while the diminutive spirits of the Chukchee and Koryak may be nothing but spiritualizations of the fairly crude etchings of these people, always limited in size, owing to the nature of the objects to which they are applied.

As soon as higher deities appear, large, at times enormous, proportions are usually attributed to these spiritual beings. The qualities and functions of spirit beings are either descriptive of the functions of earthly creatures or of natural forces represented by these supernatural beings, or they are projections of the fears and desires of man.

The second tenet of early supernaturalism is its *magical faith*. Some so-called magical practices can scarcely be distinguished from matter-of-fact procedure and should really be classed with these. Thus, in the curative practices of the primitive medicine-man there is often no breach of continuity between the "magical" methods and those based on knowledge and common sense; but the typical magical act rests on the faith that certain desired results can be achieved or feared ones obviated by means of an established series of manipulations, rituals or incantations. While such acts performed by individuals or groups are characteristic of magical procedure, the magical faith extends to the operation of similar wills or powers throughout the domain of nature. A particularly conspicuous aspect of these magical operations is the power of transformation which is a constant ingredient of primitive supernaturalism. Inanimate things can turn into animate ones, plants into animals and *vice versa*, and all of these into man; man, again, may become transformed into a being or object of any description,

and spirits and gods may also assume the form of any of these or of man.

Again, what is achieved by magical acts are the objects of human desires and fears. Whether for good or evil, the magician achieves what matter-of-fact procedure cannot attain or what, at least at the time and place, is beyond the reach of natural processes. Thus, some things that magic brings, such as food, children or the destruction of an enemy, can at times be attained by other more secular processes; some achievements of magic, on the other hand, such as the power to resist wounds or to awake from the dead, or to see or hear things at a distance, remain prerogatives of magic alone.

Underlying both animism and magic is the *faith in power*. This is the third and most important tenet of supernaturalism. Spirits count only insofar as they can and do exercise powers for good or evil. And magic is but a system of powers, positive or negative, actual or potential. In many of their activities and manifestations, spirits, gods and magical powers merely duplicate what can be and is being done by other means in the workaday world, but it is characteristic of all spirits, magic powers and supernatural beings that they can do some things which are beyond the reach of the matter-of-fact.

The concrete living participation of the individual in this world of supernaturalism is through the experience of *the religious thrill*, which is characteristic of all live religions and magical situations, and through the exercise of his will in the performance of magical acts, which is comparable to the self-assertion of the individual who attains things by natural means, but is here transferred into the realm of that which lies beyond the natural.

Supernaturalism is ever fed and reinforced by two important institutional adjuncts: mythology and ceremonialism. In one of its important aspects, mythology fulfills the function of a primitive theology, it develops and systematizes the ideas and conceptual constructs which spring

from supernaturalism. In lighter moments it plays with supernatural elements, and always it mingles them with human episodes and adventures, thus adding to the magic of supernaturalism the charms of the plot and the drama. The functions fulfilled by mythology with reference to the intellectual or ideational aspects of supernaturalism are fulfilled by ceremonialism in the domain of emotion. Through the constant drive of ceremonialism, the reactions toward the supernatural assume fixed, crystallized forms. They become subject to the control and pressure of social sanction, they become diffused and magnified through the influence of the crowd psychological situation. The never-ceasing rhythm of ceremonialism ever feeds the sacred fire of supernaturalism. It does not permit the incandescent phantasmagoria of magic and spirit to cool, for there, in the greyness of a sober mind and placid emotion, supernaturalism may fall prey to the inroads of experience and reason.

Sooner or later it will fall prey to these, but not before man has learned, through measurement and inquiry and criticism and the detachment of the individual, to evade the pitfalls of myth and ritual, the shrewdness of the priest and the magician, and his own craving for the impossible.

CHAPTER XII

SOCIETY

THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIETY

Man is a political animal. No matter how far down we go in civilization some form of social organization is always there. In one sense, indeed, society antedates the individual; for some of the most distinctive attributes of man, such as speech and perhaps religion, could not have originated in the absence of a social setting. It goes without saying that the individual as a discrete unit, as a self-conscious individuality juxtaposed to society, is a later product of social evolution.

If there is a social organization, there must be a basis on which it rests. Some writers are wont to ascribe the institution of the fundamental forms of society to the deliberate thought and decision of wise and powerful men. There can be no doubt that the intervention of premeditated control by groups and individuals has played a conspicuous part in the history of social and political organization, but it is equally certain that the basic forms of society have arisen out of certain factors given in man's relation to his physical and social environment, and that the process was as spontaneous as it was unconscious. Whatever later transformations have occurred in society and politics, they were always rooted in these basic forms, some of which are as old as man and older than the self-conscious individual.

What, then, are the factors in early life that were utilized for purposes of social organization? The first is *locality*. Man has always lived somewhere. Perpetual vagrancy is not a primitive phenomenon. The unceasing migrations of modern gypsies seem to be correlated with the permanently fixed habitats of a higher civilization. The gypsy and the Wandering Jew do not belong to the beginning of history.

Whether in the snow-built villages of the Eskimo or the woody recesses of the Bushmen, in the cave dwellings of pre-historic Europe or the camp of the Australian with its crudely fashioned fireplace and windshield, man, however primitive, has always lived somewhere. There was some locality or a number of localities that he regarded as his home. He did not wander from place to place indefinitely, but returned periodically to a number of places, if there were more than one, within a more or less limited district.

A home is not merely a physical fact. It is also a psychological one. To have a home is to know one's physical environment, to foresee the habitual climatic changes, cold and heat, drought and storm. It is to know the animals and plants available in the neighborhood, to be familiar with their habits; to learn to avoid them as dangerous, to seek them as food, as friends. A home, moreover, comprises a human group, it implies common habitation, common adjustment, common knowledge, as well as familiarity with each other. People who live together know each other's behavior. They learn to understand each other's gestures and physiognomy; and in some cases, as in Central Australia, they can tell each other's footprints. There is a spirit of neighborhood. No matter what other forms of political or social organization may exist, there is always co-operation, some mutual helpfulness on the part of the members of a local group. And there is a readiness, if not an organization, for protection against climatic dangers as well as against the dangers from beasts and hostile men.

And human nature being always the same, to know about people is to want to know too much about them. Gossip is one of the universal institutions of mankind, and it is specifically associated with the local group; a circumstance from which many an ethnologist has greatly profited. For in conditions where the written word is absent and the spirit of systematic investigation as yet unborn, gossip is an important source of dissemination of knowledge, especially of

personal and intimate knowledge, and the professional gossip is the ethnologist's great friend.

One of the domains in primitive society in which both prescriptive and proscriptive regulations abound is marriage. As will presently be seen, the control of marriage is a function of more than one type of social grouping. Not infrequently the local group controls marriage, insofar as local exogamy prevails: no marriage within one's own village. This holds, for instance, for the American Blackfoot, a number of coastal tribes of Australia and numerous groups on the islands of Torres Straits and of Melanesia, where localized clans are the rule. From the standpoint of civilization, another point deserves emphasis here to which reference was made before: the local group is the smallest unit of cultural specialization. In slight details of custom and daily habits, of ceremony and perhaps of dialect, a local group is always to some extent different from every other local group. Moreover, civilizational changes are always rooted in local variants.¹

Another basis of social organization is *blood relationship*. The importance of blood ties in early life has long been understood. More than one kind of grouping based on blood must be distinguished. The most universal and uniform among these is the *family*. Contrary to a widespread notion for which anthropologists are in part responsible, the family, consisting of husband, wife and children, is found everywhere. There may be more than one wife, and here and there, more than one husband; the average duration of matrimonial ties may fall short of modern standards; the household, moreover, may embrace other related

¹It is scarcely necessary to add that the basic character of locality as a social classifier has never been transcended. Among the fixed groupings of modern society, local determinants loom large. State, city, village, quarter, street, block, are territorial units of physical as well as of psychological and sociological significance. And as ever, there liveth the spirit of the neighborhood with its grotesque twin, the spirit of gossip. It is interesting to note in this connection that in the most recent socio-political experiment on a gigantic scale, in Soviet Russia, the territorial group shares with the industrial one its place as the minor electoral unit.

individuals in addition to the immediate family; the fact remains: the family is there as a distinct unit. It is there, whatever other social units may co-exist with it; moreover, it antedates them: where no other social forms are found, the family can always be discerned. It has also been noted that among the most primitive tribes, monogamy is more generally the rule than is the case at somewhat later stages of social development.

The family controls the individual in a variety of ways. Its influence is especially pronounced during the earliest years of education and the somewhat later period of industrial apprenticeship. Even marriage, in its many varied forms—that ubiquitous and all-important social usage—is more often than not controlled by a member or members of the immediate family.

The family often functions as a ceremonial unit, especially on occasions connected with birth, death, burial and marriage.

An interesting and rare form of family organization has recently been described by Professor Speck among some Eastern Algonquin tribes. The tribe here is subdivided into a number of families, each including certain relatives in addition to the primal nucleus of parents and children. The preëminence of the father is marked. Associated with each family is a hunting territory of varying size in which its members claim exclusive hunting privileges, the latter being extended to strangers only by special arrangement. The boundaries of such hunting territories are marked at varying intervals by natural or artificial signposts. The Indians have a very clear idea of the extent and limits of their respective territories.¹

But the most significant and omnipresent function of the family is in that it serves as the principal point of transfer of

¹Professor Speck was able to secure from his informants a series of maps, drawn under his direction, on which the boundaries of the family territories are indicated (*cf.* for example, his "Family Hunting Territories and Social Life of Various Algonkian Bands of the Ottawa Valley," Geological Survey, Ottawa, Canada, Memoir 70).

civilization from one generation to another. It must be remembered that civilization consists in part of material things and in part of ideas, attitudes, customs, and so on. The latter set of phenomena make up by far the larger part of civilization. Now, even material things, as part of culture, are not passed along automatically: their uses must be explained, the implied techniques learned. As to spiritual culture, including language itself, there is no other way for it to be passed on, in a society without writing, except through verbal explanation and teaching and the direct observation by the learner of what is being said and done. It is evident that a large part of what the individual receives in this way, especially during the highly important formative years of early childhood, is brought to him through the medium of the family. There are other agencies through which he learns, but in the earliest years the influence of the family is overwhelmingly preponderant. The significance of *the family as a transfer point of civilization* cannot be overestimated. In the socio-psychological domain it serves as a bridge between the generations, between fathers and sons.

Truly organic, biological in its foundation, but with important psychological and sociological correlates, the family is thus seen to be an universal possession of mankind. On the other hand, the patriarchal family, centering about its male master, as among the Hebrews; the highly legalized family, becoming a minor cell in the elaborate economic-legal organism of the state, as in modern society; the sanctified family, serving as a point of application of institutional conservatism and a devout ancestor worship, as in China and Japan; these forms of the family are later products of the historic process, of which but germinal elements may be discerned in early life.

Another form of blood relationship bond is discovered in the amorphous *group of blood relations*, consisting of individuals, male and female, who are designated by different terms expressing kinship: mother, father, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, cousin, and so on. Such groups of blood kindred,

with corresponding kinship terms, exist among all peoples, primitive and modern.

In all discussions of this subject the group of blood relatives proper cannot be separated from another group, that of relatives by marriage, as the two kinds of kinship constantly intertwine, both sociologically and terminologically. Of this the primary family unit itself is an admirable illustration, as the children are related by blood both to the mother and to the father, whereas the parents may be related merely by marriage.

Primitive relationship terms are often designated by the somewhat misleading term "classificatory". By this is meant that a term is used to designate not merely individuals related in a certain definite way but also other individuals related in a different way. Thus the term "mother" will be used to designate one's own mother, but also the mother's sister and her first cousin and perhaps other women standing to the speaker in different degrees of relationship. The term for "father" may be used in a similar fashion to designate one's own father, the father's brother, his first cousin, and so on. Or, again, the mother's brother and the father's sister's husband will be covered by one term, or the father's sister and the mother's brother's wife. Or, one term may be used for father's sister, her daughter, her daughter's daughter. A great many such extensions in the uses of relationship terms are found throughout primitive terminologies of relationship. In contrasting these kinship systems with our own, for example the English, the term "classificatory" is justified for the former only insofar as the terms for the immediate family—father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter—are always used by us to designate a relative standing to the speaker in one particular degree of relationship, whereas just these terms are in primitive systems most frequently extended to cover different classes of relatives. On the other hand, such terms as "uncle" and "aunt" are used in a classificatory way by ourselves, to designate respectively father's and mother's brother,

father's and mother's sister, whereas in primitive terminologies "aunt" is often used to designate only father's sister, not mother's sister, while "uncle" is only used for mother's brother, not father's brother.

At the same time it is important to remember, as bearing upon the status of the family, that the terms used for the immediate members of the family are either distinguished from the same terms in their extended uses by the addition of some particle, or terms corresponding to "own" are used, or a distinction is implied in the context of the conversation. The family is the family, whatever the system of relationship and whatever the uses of terms.¹

It must not be imagined that these extensions in the uses of kinship terms and the kinship systems themselves represent but terminological issues. To assume this would be to seriously misconstrue primitive society. First of all, relationship terms are often employed in place of our personal names, the latter being reserved for special, generally ceremonial occasions. Then again, special rules of behavior, proscriptive and prescriptive, often apply to certain relatives. Apart from the multifarious functions of parents toward children and only less numerous ones of children toward parents, the mother's brother is a relative who occupies, particularly in maternally organized societies, a place of special prominence, often above that of the father, with reference to the inheritance and control of property, education and ceremonial duties. Again, the relations of son-in-law and mother-in-law are among many tribes strictly circumscribed, all familiarity and even conversation being forbidden between the two. Less common and less stringent regulations control not infrequently the relations of daughter-in-law and father-in-law. According to recent information from Melanesia, a connection between social behavior

¹An interesting illustration of this occurs among the Iroquois, where the nephew (sister's son) and the younger brother are the most common successors to a chief's office. Now, both these terms are used by the Iroquois in a classificatory sense. Still, in the vast majority of cases, it is the own sister's son or younger brother who succeeds a chief.

and particular relatives is there especially frequent and important. In Australia, again, the right, in fact almost the duty to marry, belongs to certain groups of related individuals within the phratry, class or sub-class limits, who are from birth on designated as "husbands" and "wives."

While in Australia the matrimonial correlates of relationship are exceptionally conspicuous, in view mainly of their prescriptive character, relatives of varying degrees are prohibited from intermarriage or sex contact among all peoples and at all times. Among these prohibitions, some stand out as particularly general and drastic: mother and son, father and daughter, brother and sister, in the order named, stand at the head of the list. Not one of these sex taboos, categorical though they are, has remained wholly free from infractions—outside the law and even, in certain wholly exceptional instances, within the law—but barring these exceptions, it must be said that these particular taboos are everywhere reinforced by the so-called "horror of incest", an emotional reaction of somewhat mysterious origin, which is by no means restricted in its range to the three primary sex taboos, but readily extends at least to the major sex prohibitions prevalent in a given community.¹

The two kinds of relationship groups so far discussed, different though they are, have certain elements in common: both are biological and bilateral. The individuals of a relationship group are united by actual ties of blood, and these ties branch out in both lateral directions, through the mother as well as the father of an individual. This represents in an extended form the basic fact that the family itself is bilateral, insofar as the parents are related to the children

¹It seems hardly fair to doubt that psychoanalysis will ultimately furnish a satisfactory psychological interpretation of this "horror of incest." It has been shown by Freud, all but conclusively, that incestuous tendencies represent one of the most deeply rooted impulses of the individual. If, then, civilization should develop a set of negative attitudes toward incestuous unions—and here further psychological and perhaps sociological sounding is required—it is to be expected that these attitudes would become reinforced by most formidable barriers imparted to the individual in the process of education, thus becoming crystallized in the form of a violent emotional reaction.

through actual bonds of blood and the children are related to each other through both parents.¹

On the other hand, the parents need not be related to one another except by marriage, although among those tribes where cross cousin marriage is general, or even obligatory (as typical in Australia), parents are also closely related by blood. In general it may be remarked that in small communities—if only the custom of exogamy does not force the man or woman or both to find their mates among individuals of distant local groups—all individuals of a local group soon become inter-related. Then, of course, all the marriages constitute a sort of inbreeding, married couples being, if only in a remote way, related by blood.

The blood groups now to be considered are of a different order. They are neither purely biological (with one exception) nor bilateral. These groups are: the clan, the gens, the dual division (or moiety), the maternal family and the class. From a biological standpoint it is justifiable to class all of these groups in the category of blood relationship, insofar as all of them contain nuclei of blood relatives, while the maternal family, as shown in our discussion of the Iroquois, comprises only actual blood relatives. There is, moreover, an additional reason for classing these social units in the relationship category. Psychologically, in the minds of the people themselves, the individuals in each one of them are relatives. This fact does not depend on the presence or absence of actual blood ties, but is a psychosociological fact: a legal fiction. These groups, with the exception of the maternal family, may thus be designated as

¹This is so in the natural family. In the case of step-fathers and step-mothers, the blood bond will, of course, apply to one side only. Situations will occur, moreover, where even this is not true. For example: a woman with a child born to her first husband by another woman may become united in marriage to a man with a child of his first wife by another man. In this case neither of the two children will be related by blood to either of the parents. Considering the shiftiness of marriages in early communities and the tendency on the part of both men and women to take over the care of children, whatever their source, cases like those described are probably more common than might be imagined. They are, nevertheless, exceptional, and in a general analysis of the family as a bilateral blood relationship group, must be treated as such.

pseudo-biological, insofar as they not only comprise nuclear bodies of actual blood relatives, but are conceived by the members themselves of the group as consisting solely of blood relatives.

Of the series of groups here enumerated the *clan* and the *gens* are by far the most important. A clan can be defined as follows: it comprises individuals partly related by blood and partly conceived as so related; it is hereditary (a person is born into a clan); it is unilateral (the children belonging to the clan of the mother); it has a name. The definition of a gens is the same as that of a clan with the difference that the children follow the gens of the father.

Clans and gentes have a tremendous distribution in the primitive world, and as one surveys these units in different geographical areas, scores of differences appear from the standpoints of size, number and functions. In North America, for example, the Iroquoian Mohawk and Oneida have only three clans each, while the other tribes of the League have at least eight each. The adjoining Algonquin Delaware have three clans, among the southern Siouan tribes the Omaha have ten gentes, while the other similarly organized tribes, like the Iowa, Kansas, Osage, and others, have more than ten but less than twenty-five. The Winnebago have twelve clans. As contrasted with this, the Tlingit and Haida have fifty or more clans each, while the southern Kwakiutl seem to have had considerably more than that. In the Southwest, the Hopi, the Zuñi, and other tribes have at least as many clans as the Tlingit and Haida and some have more, and the same applies to some tribes in the Southeast. In Africa, with the thirty odd Baganda gentes, some tribes have less than that while others more, without, however, reaching very high figures. In Australia, on the other hand, some tribes of the Center and East have many more than one hundred clans or gentes. Granted similar populational conditions, the multiplicity of these social units is of course correlated with a relative paucity of individuals in each. In Africa, where populational conditions are far

different from those obtaining in North America or in Australia, individual gentes may comprise thousands of members.

The variability in functions is equally conspicuous. In the first place, there is great difference in the part played by a clan or gentile system in the civilization of a group. There are all possible variations; among the Tlingit and Haida the clan system is inextricably interwoven with a large part of the civilization of the group; among the Iroquois the clans are the carriers of the all important socio-political functions of the League; the Zuñi clans, as Kroeber has recently emphasized, represent little more than a method of counting descent; in Africa, barring occasional industrial specialization of gentes, these units often represent but very wide and loose groups with a common name and a common taboo; the very numerous clans and gentes of Australia, finally, especially those of the central area, have become almost purely ceremonial in character; they are magic working associations, having never possessed other functions or having shed them.

When one compares clans of relatively proximate areas, the functional contrasts stand out even more strikingly. Thus, among the Iroquois, the members of a clan in addition to having a bird or animal name, control exogamy, own cemeteries,¹ elect ceremonial officials, play a definite part in the election of federal chiefs; whereas the clans of the Tlingit and Haida have local names and individual clan chiefs, own hunting and fishing territories, and are distinguished from each other by a series of ceremonial and mythological prerogatives: a clan myth, a clan carving or a set of carvings, clan ceremonial dances with accessories, a clan song or songs. The clans here are also exogamous, but merely as parts of the major units, the moieties, which control the matrimonial functions. But perhaps the greatest contrast between the Northwest Coast and the Iroquois

¹It is probable, although not certain, that cultivated fields among the Iroquois were also owned by clan units.

clan lies in the fact that in the former area the clans have different rank in accordance with the privileges and supernatural powers claimed by the component individuals; whereas among the Iroquois, a clan is a clan, no less and no more, notwithstanding the fact that only some of the clans comprise maternal families in which chieftainships are hereditary, while other clans do not. Different as the clans of the Haida and Tlingit may be from those of the Iroquois, the clans of both groups appear as relatively similar when contrasted with, say, the gentes of the Baganda, with their double totems and their caste-like specialization in industrial functions and services to the king, one gens comprising pot makers, another—basket weavers, still another—ironsmiths, while other individual gentes furnish the drum to the king, provide him with certain delicacies for his table or supply the wife that makes the king's bed.

Correlated with some of the differences in the functions of clans is the relation of a clan system to a family system in the same tribe; thus, among the Tlingit and Haida, once more, the family is divided against itself by the intrusion of the clan principle. The inheritance of property and privileges glides along the edge of the family, as it were, the main line of transfer being from maternal uncle to nephew or from father-in-law to son-in-law. Moreover, in the old days of clan feuds, clan allegiance here counted for more than family allegiance: fathers and sons met in deadly combat, prompted by bonds stronger than those of the family hearth. Among the Zuñi, on the other hand, the family is but little impressed by the clan division within its midst—for here also clan members do not intermarry—and attends to its many economic, educational and domestic functions almost wholly undisturbed by the presence of another social grouping.

A comparison of clans and gentes in different geographical areas thus discloses striking dissimilarities and even contrasts in the number of clan or gentile units in a tribe, in the number of individuals in each unit, in clan and gentile func-

tions, in their relative importance as carriers of the civilization of a group, in their relation, finally, to the family.

The impression might thus be conveyed that the clan (or gens) represents a wholly fictitious category corresponding to no consistent reality whatsoever: that it is but a term, a useless survival from the *alcheringa* of anthropology with its dogmatic, imaginative and ill-informed inhabitants.

This, however, would be pushing one's scepticism decidedly too far. Clans and gentes the world over have certain traits in common. First of all, the traits indicated in our definition: the fiction of blood relationship, the hereditary character, the unilateral aspect, and the name.

The characteristic of having a name might be found artificial and trivial: who or what in this world does not carry a name? And yet, there is significance in this characteristic. It will be noted that of the social groupings here enumerated only two almost always have a name: the local group and the clan (or gens).¹ Families are scarcely ever known by name (in early society), the maternal families of the Iroquois have no names, relationship groups are always nameless, so are, as a rule, age, generation and sex groups. Even dual divisions and phratries, while named at times, are often nameless. But the local group and the clan or gens have names. In the case of the two latter units, moreover, the name carries with it certain sociological consequences which are absent in the case of the local name. An individual from a named local group wanders off and marries elsewhere. His children may mention or at least know of his local provenience; but barring exceptional instances, his grandchildren and their children will have forgotten it: the imported local name disappears from the new locality. It is different with an individual member of a clan or gens. In the case of a clan, if a woman marries into another locality, the new clan will persist in that locality as long as women are born from descendants of the immigrant, it being

¹To this must be added those strictly Australian social units, the class and sub-class, which also have names.

taken for granted that the conditions of group descent are the same in the new locality, which is often so. In the case of a gens, the same applies to a man.

In addition, four cultural features deserve attention as linked in their geographical distribution with clans and gentes: blood revenge, adoption, exogamy and totemism. To discourage criticism from over-sensitive methodologists, it may be noted at once that not one of these traits is invariably linked with clans and gentes. There are clans and gentes that lack some or all of the traits, and each one of the latter occurs in association with other social units than clans and gentes. Nevertheless, an examination of the data would show that in all major areas these two customs—blood revenge as a function of the kin unit and the ceremonial adoption of strangers into the kin—are so frequently associated with clans and gentes that these social units and the two customs must be regarded as historically linked and as socio-psychologically related.

The association of clans and gentes with exogamy and totemism is much more striking. Exogamy is an all but universal associate, while totemism is an extraordinarily common one. Leaving the relation of totemism to clans and gentes for later consideration, some remarks must now be made about clan and gentile exogamy.

Clan and gentile exogamy—the rule to marry outside one's own kin unit—is so general a feature that it may here be assumed to be practically universal. But there is one difficulty. In the case of the thirteen Crow clans or that of the three Delaware ones, or that of the three or eight or more clans of an Iroquois League tribe, or in the many instances of Indian *gotras* or African gentes, the exogamous issue is clear. A clan or gentile member is prohibited from marrying in his or her own kin unit, but must look for a mate outside, in one of the other clans or gentes.

The situation becomes more complex when other tribes are considered. Among the Tlingit and Haida, for example, there is no marriage within the clan, but, on further inspec-

tion it appears that the exogamous rule really applies to the moiety: marry outside of your own moiety and into the other one. Each moiety, as was explained before, is subdivided into numerous clans; it follows that in observing moiety exogamy, individuals also follow clan exogamy. The situation is identical in tribes organized like the Australian Dieri.¹

In all such instances the moiety is the real exogamous unit, while the exogamy of the clans may be designated as *derivative*. This becomes clear when one considers that the same rule that prevents an individual from marrying in his or her own clan also prohibits marriage into a series of other clans, namely those belonging to the same moiety:

	<i>Moiety I</i>		<i>Moiety II</i>	
clans or gentes	{	<i>a</i> <i>b</i> <i>c</i> <i>d</i>	}	clans or gentes
		<i>u</i> <i>v</i> <i>w</i> <i>x</i>		

An *a* man may not marry an *a* woman, nor may he marry a *b* or *c* or *d* woman; he marries *any* woman of moiety II.

It is as if one were to say that in a football game a Harvard freshman is pitted against a Yale junior. Even though objectively correct, the statement would still be misleading, insofar as the groups pitted against each other are the *college teams*, whereas the classes do not figure as units, but merely indirectly as subdivisions of the colleges.

Further complications arise upon an analysis of tribes organized like the Australian Kamilaroi or Warramunga.² For here both the negative and the positive marriage regulations are drastically determined, and the clans or gentes do not appear as units in either connection: each clan (or gens) is subdivided into two (or four) groups, and the individuals to be avoided or sought in marriage are different in the case of each one of these groups.

From an examination of all such tribes—and their number is large—one might derive the impression that the al-

¹See p. 110.

²See pp. 110-112.

leged universality of clan or gentile exogamy represents but another superannuated dogma, that clans and gentes, while exogamous in many instances, have in others no connection whatsoever with matrimony.¹

This conclusion would be erroneous. Of the functional characteristics of clans and gentes exogamy must still be regarded as the most persistent. But how, it will be asked, can this proposition be reconciled with the complications outlined in the foregoing? A glance at the world picture of clan and gentile exogamy furnishes the answer. First there are the tribes where clans or gentes appear as exogamous units. Then come the other tribes where the presence of exogamous moieties or phratries prompts one to describe the exogamy of the minor units as derivative. Finally, there are still other tribes—primarily those of Australia—where each hereditary kin comprises a number of groups each with its own positive and negative matrimonial regulations. But one fact holds true throughout: *nowhere is intermarriage in the clan or gens permitted*. One is forced to conclude that in the absence of moieties, phratries and classes, the clan or gentile exogamy would still obtain, just as it does when these social units stand alone. In other words, it is in the nature of clans and gentes to function exogamously—in the negative sense of a taboo on intermarriage within the unit—and in all but a very few instances they do so.²

¹An attitude such as this could easily be derived from a perusal of the section on exogamy of my "Totemism, An Analytical Study" (*Journal of American Folk-Lore*, 1910). While characterized by an enthusiasm born of a successful destructive analysis, my attitude at the time suffered from the neglect of a broader historico-geographical standpoint.

²It must be noted here as of great interest that whereas the family and local group are as basic in modern as in primitive society, that while relationship groups and even age and sex groups persist in an attenuated form in modern civilization, clans, gentes, maternal families, moieties, phratries and classes are characteristic of early society alone. In other words, the unilateral hereditary principle, in the drastic form in which it operates in these groupings, is foreign to the spirit of our social life. The principle itself is, of course, present in connection with the inheritance of property and of the family name, but it does not figure as a basis for the formation of fixed hereditary groups into which an individual is born and to which he belongs until death and, in fact, beyond, in defiance of marriage ties and local residence; unless, indeed, a specific legal fiction is applied, in the form of cere-

Dual divisions or moieties, such as those of the Tlingit and Haida, Iroquois, Winnebago, Omaha, and numerous tribes of Australia, are like clans and gentes in many ways. They are hereditary and unilateral, either maternal or paternal. Usually but not always, they have names. They also comprise blood relatives as well as assumed blood relatives, although the sense of relationship is here weaker than in the minor kin unit. The moiety is a much more populous group; the very fact, moreover, that it is subdivided into minor units with strong relationship bonds, is apt to weaken this element in the moiety.¹

Functionally, moieties are no more uniform than are clans. It was seen that the Iroquois phratries—which in this case are also moieties—attend primarily to ceremonies, that on all festive occasions the people at the ceremonial Long House are divided into two locally separated phratric groups. Games, such as ball and lacrosse, are also played between the phratries. Then, the phratries have the obligation of burying each other's members. Also, the phratric groups of clan chiefs function as the two bodies to which the name of the candidate for chieftainship is submitted by the matron of a maternal family, before the name is passed on to the council of the League for final ratification.

Among the Tlingit and Haida the moiety plays a distinctly different rôle. There is a moiety chief—an official

monial adoption, as a result of which he is detached from the group of his birth and absorbed in another similarly constituted group.

Of these groups the clan and the gens are the ones having the widest geographical distribution. It is, therefore, not surprising that these social divisions should have been regarded as not only characteristic of early society but as universal, at least at certain of its stages. This, of course, is not the case.

¹From moieties such as this two other types of social divisions must be distinguished. Dual divisions have been described among the Yuchi Indians, but here these groups are purely ceremonial and instead of comprising clans, crosscut them, so that each clan contains members of both divisions. Dual divisions of this type have no connection with blood relationship.

Then there are phratries like the six phratries of the Crow or those of some of the Southwest tribes. These groups also comprise clans as subdivisions, but have once more no connection with blood relationship. Many such phratries, no doubt, represent secondary associations of clans, on a ceremonial, mythological, or some other basis.

unknown among the Iroquois; insofar as the moieties are named after birds and animals—Eagle and Raven among the Haida, Raven and Wolf among the Tlingit—the mythologies and traditions of the two halves of the people are very different. Among the Tlingit the moieties have one important ceremonial function, as the potlatches are here always given between the moieties, never in the same moiety. There is also, as among the Iroquois, reciprocal burial. But the principal function of the Northwest moieties is the control of marriage: they are rigorously exogamous.

In central Australia the moieties are connected with intermarriage, insofar as no unions are permitted within a phratry. They also figure as a basis of local grouping in camping. In preparation for the *intichiuma* ceremonies members of the opposite phratry announce the time at which a ceremonial series is to be performed; and, as part of the ceremonial routine itself, members of the opposite phratry are charged with the laborious task of painting the dancers and adorning them with bird down.

Not only are reciprocal functions common in moieties, but the dual division of the tribe seems to stimulate among the natives a tendency to emphasize contrasts with reference to the two moieties. One moiety is believed to be of local origin, the other to have come from elsewhere: or they are supposed to represent different physical types; or the names are contrasting, as, for example, in the case of the widespread Australian moiety names, Eaglehawk (white) and Crow (black). The infection occasionally spreads to the investigating ethnologist, who tends to take the local theories seriously or invents some similar ones of his own. In some instances, of course, the ethnologist and even the natives may be right.¹

¹It is curious how well a dual division lends itself to all occasions where games, conflicts, political issues are involved. It has often been remarked that in democracies there either are two parties or the rest tend to group themselves about the two leading ones, in connection with parliamentary debates, voting on important issues, elections. And the contending parties rarely fail to play the ancient black and white game of Eaglehawk and Crow, while to a disinterested beholder both may well appear as sparrows

Two further types of divisions belonging to the blood relationship group are the maternal family and the Australian classes. The former was analyzed in the chapter on the Iroquois, the latter in that on Australia. Some few additional remarks must be made here about these two kinds of social units.

It must have been observed that the *maternal family* occupies an intermediate position between the individual family and the clan. The maternal family is like the individual family in that it comprises only actual blood relatives. Also, it has no name. Therefore, there attaches to it that vagueness of outline as a social unit which is characteristic of all groups of blood based on remembered relationships. A name settles such difficulties with one stroke. Now the individual's status is fixed at birth, in fact in advance of birth, by the hereditary transmission of the group name, and with it as a tag, his membership in the group is both guaranteed and enforced.

The maternal family is like a clan insofar as it is unilateral. Thus among the League Iroquois—and up to the present, maternal families have been identified only among these people¹—this social unit represents the working prin-

—and grey (for a candid expression of this socio-psychological fact see Heine's *Dissertation*).

¹The closest approach to the maternal family among a non-Iroquois tribe seems to occur among the Hopi of the Southwest. According to Dr. Lowie's unpublished notes, a number of Hopi clans, as now constituted, can be shown on geneological analysis to represent maternal families in the sense that all of the individuals of such a clan are ultimately traceable to one line of female descent. In other clans, Dr. Lowie found two or three such groups of female descent. He suggests, therefore, that the Hopi clans may have developed out of maternal families.

Of course, there is a difference between a clan which is also a maternal family insofar as all of its members are related through a common line of blood descent, as objectively demonstrable, and a maternal family like that of the Iroquois, which, comprising four or at most five generations of individuals living contemporaneously, functions as a self-conscious and highly dynamic unit of a social system. Nevertheless, the case of the Hopi clans, if confirmed by further investigation, would provide an interesting extension to the sweep of the maternal family as a social unit. Dr. Lowie's speculations as to the origin of the Hopi clans out of maternal families is supported as a possibility by at least one instance in my Iroquois experience where a social unit, for all intents and purposes a clan, has developed within the last two generations out of a maternal family, originally a part of a clan.

ciple of a clan. For this reason it has often been identified and confused with it by investigators. After what was said it will be clear that the two units are distinct. It has been definitely established, moreover, that an Iroquois clan contained two, three or more maternal families, although here and there it would occur that a depleted clan was represented by only one surviving maternal family.

With reference to the Australian *classes*, we need not stop to consider the theories that have sprung up by the score about the origins of this curious kind of social unit.¹ But before leaving this topic, it is necessary to refer to a serious misconception that has crept into the discussion of this topic by Wundt (see his "Elements of Folk Psychology," pp. 140 *sq.*). Wundt correctly notes that the clans among the League Iroquois have no cult significance, whereas the animal and bird named groups of Australia are primarily cult associations. From this he proceeds to argue that the Australian classes are really clans (and he designates them as such forthwith); that the Iroquois clans once comprised cult associations like the Australian ones, which subsequently disappeared, leaving nothing but animal and bird named clans behind; and that the "principle of dual division" applies not to the Australian classes alone but also to the Iroquois who, Wundt argues, first had two phratries, which later broke up into two clans each, and the clans broke up once more into two, thus resulting in the standard Iroquoian eight clans. Wundt extends this into a general theory of clan multiplication based on the working of the "dual principle."

All this is quite wrong. The Australian classes and subclasses are not clans, as generally understood, but groups comprising certain categories of blood relatives and having no functions but to control intermarriage. While some in-

¹It may be noted, however, that the most feasible hypothesis is probably the one advanced some twenty-five years ago by Heinrich Cunow, the German sociologist. A brief statement of this theory will be found in a footnote of Boas' "Mind of Primitive Man," p. 221.

stances occur where classes comprise whole clans, in the majority of cases classes and clans crosscut each other.¹

The Australian clans with animal and bird names are like the clans in other areas—as here defined—although functionally they are, of course, largely religio-ceremonial units, especially among the Central Australians where owing to the lapse of gentile heredity the gentes become, for all practical purposes, pure cult associations.

The Iroquois clans never contained cult groups, nor—so far as our evidence goes—ever functioned as cult units. Moreover, Wundt's derivation of the eight clans by a double bifurcation of the phratries is purely imaginary. It is not unlikely, in fact, that the clans here were the original units, the phratries representing a later arrangement of the clans into two ceremonial groups. This theory is supported by the fact that whereas the Iroquois tribes comprise clans of the same names (the Mohawk and Oneida only having

¹The working of this arrangement may once more be illustrated by a diagram:




FIG. 52

For simplicity it is assumed here that each phratry, comprises only three clans. The diagram shows that the classes and clans intersect. Each class contains sections of all three clans and each clan comprises members of both classes.

$$\text{Thus } a = a_1 (\text{class A}) + a_2 (\text{class B}),$$

$$d = d_1 (\text{class C}) + d_2 (\text{class D}),$$

and so on; and

$$\text{Class A} = a_1 (\text{clan } a) + b_1 (\text{clan } b), + c_1 (\text{clan } c)$$

$$\text{Class C} = d_1 (\text{clan } d) + e_1 (\text{clan } e), + f_1 (\text{clan } f)$$

and so on.

three each!), the grouping of the clans into phratries is not the same.

Three further kinds of grouping are to be considered. They are of a different order from the preceding insofar as the limits of these groups cannot be fixed with the precision attainable in the case of the family or those of the clan, the gens, the local group or even a set of relatives united by blood bonds. These groupings are based on age, generation and sex.

In all primitive societies *age* is an important factor, in some it stands out very prominently. Generally speaking, the following rough classifications of individuals obtains practically everywhere. First come the infants or babies, who are important enough in their immediate families and in their relation to their mothers, but count for little, often for next to nothing, as members of the community. Especially before a name is ceremonially bestowed upon an infant, it is in many primitive groups practically outside the society. Its life counts for naught and its death is of little consequence. The next class is that of children. These count in many ways. They are subject to instruction in the affairs of the household, in the arts and crafts, the accomplishments of the hunt and the gathering of the products of wild nature. During this period, the child usually begins to participate in some at least of the ceremonial activities of the group. It is in general characteristic of primitive conditions that relatively young children, say of the age of eight or nine, have already absorbed most of the fundamental industrial accomplishments, a great deal of the ethics and much of the traditional lore of the group. The next class is that of young men and women, just before and through the period of puberty. At this time the girls become full-fledged active members of the household, while the boys may excel in the arts of the chase and of war and are emphatically subject to the political and religious teachings emanating from the old men, the chiefs and the medicine-men. At this time, also, the important initiatory ceremonies are performed, wher-

ever they are present, ushering the young people—and this applies more universally to men than to women—into at least the early stages of the ceremonial cycles of religious or secret societies. The class above this is that of mature men and women. They are full-fledged members of the group, participating in all industrial, religious, social, military and educational activities and forming the backbone of family life. The last and in some respects most influential group is that of old men and, in some communities, also old women. While these take a less active part in the everyday activities, their leadership in ceremonial and political matters is pronounced and they do everywhere constitute the great depositories of tradition, figuring as the mouthpiece, as it were, of the conservative *status quo*. They know the past, in fact they know all there is to be known, and they see to it that this knowledge is passed on without much loss as well as without much addition. They are the great stabilizing fly-wheel of the civilizational mechanism.¹

The rigidity with which these age classes are separated—and this separation is of course always flexible to a degree—varies among different tribes. Thus the old men are not by any means everywhere as influential, in fact all-powerful, as they are in Australia, nor are the infants always so unimportant and negligible as they seem to be among some of the Melanesian tribes.²

¹The rôle of the "fathers" in the conflict of the generations has been well brought out in the works of Mrs. Elsie Clews Parsons, who has dealt with this topic in a great many articles as well as in most of her books. Cf., for example, "The Old Fashioned Woman" and "Fear and Conventionality." Cf. also pp. 402-403.

²The exaggerated prestige of old age is one of the differentia of primitive civilization. While the life wisdom, sophistication and balanced outlook that come with ripening years continue to command their share of respect even in modern society, the prestige of old age has been shaken by the growing artificialities in the acquisition of knowledge and the ever-increasing demands which participation in social life makes upon the energy and vigor of its carriers. In a young, boisterous and hurried community, like that of the United States, age at times appears as being definitely outclassed, so that in many industrial and, not without regret be it said, educational and academic positions, young men receive decisive preference. In family life, also, the prestige of the highest age group is visibly on the decline.

It is curious to note that in villages and on farms, where life approaches in certain respects that of more primitive communities, the prerogatives of old age at once reassert themselves.

The principle of *generation* never appears with any great distinctness, but it might be described somewhat as follows: from the standpoint of the middle-aged men and women, they themselves represent the present generation, below this is the generation of the children, and below this, that of the grandchildren. Above the present generation is that of the mothers and fathers, and above this, that of the grandparents. This rough classification of the generations is especially noticeable in the study of relationships, where terms are often used to cover individuals of one or both sexes belonging to one generation. It has also been observed that the memory of informants in ethnological field work runs most naturally along generation lines. In obtaining information on the basis of genealogies, for example, it is usually preferable to first group the questions around individuals who belong to the same generation rather than to begin by following up each line of descent, upward and downward, to the limits of the informant's memory.

This principle obtains to a degree also in modern society. Men and women of the same generation share certain elements of knowledge, habit and attitude which create a bond and vaguely separate them from preceding and succeeding generations.

The one remaining grouping is that on the basis of *sex*. While this principle of classification has often been exaggerated—by Schurtz, for example, who builds upon it his entire theory of social organization—it is undeniable that the sex division gives rise to a set of formal and functional divisions in society, and that this is on the whole more emphatically true of primitive than of modern communities, although certain forms of discrimination against women, in particular, are characteristic of later rather than of earliest civilizations.

It might prove of interest to discuss this aspect of the subject under the heading of the disabilities of women.

The Disabilities of Women

It must have appeared from the foregoing discussion that with reference to the primary economic pursuits, a division of labor between men and women is practically universal. The division persists in the wider domain of economic life and industry, except that here the line is less sharply drawn. The case of the Iroquois will be recalled, where the making of clearings in the woods in preparation for agriculture, is largely the work of men, while the agricultural activities themselves fall wholly to the share of women. The erection of the bark houses, again, is a task in which the sexes cooperate. Among the tribes of the Plains, women tan the buffalo hides, make the tents, as well as erect and raise them when camp is made and broken. The preparation of clothing, whether by sewing or otherwise, is throughout North America in the hands of women, while men are, without exception, the wood workers and carvers of the Northwest Coast, and elsewhere in North America where wood industry occurs. That wood work is a man's art can, in fact, be stated as a general principle, for it applies everywhere in primitive society where there is work in wood.

Women are the basket makers of California and of the Plateau tribes and the potters of the Southwest. In Negro Africa as well as in India, wherever pots are fashioned by hand, the potters are generally, although not invariably, women. But in both these areas there are certain districts where pots are turned on the wheel; and here men are the potters. Again, it is commonly, although not uniformly, true that early agriculture is in the hands of women, and that this important series of activities passes into the domain of men only after the introduction of domesticated animals as helpmates in agriculture.

From the above presentation, which might be further extended, the economic division of labor in early society seems fairly equitable. It would, however, be an error to conclude that in primitive economy there is no woman's dis-

ability. An inspection of the important domain of property ownership would promptly dispel all such illusions. There are, without question, instances where the economic prerogatives of women are wholly on a par with those of men. Of this the American Iroquois and Zuñi and the Khasi of Assam may serve as examples. But these are exceptions. It has been pointed out that among many primitive tribes descent of group membership follows the mother. But inheritance of property is not always patterned after the descent of group membership; in Australia, for example, the general rule is that proprietary rights, including such features as ceremonial prerogatives, are inherited in the paternal line, without regard to whether descent is through the father or the mother.

Again, on the Northwest Coast of America there is both maternal descent and maternal inheritance of property and privileges, but much of the material and spiritual property thus passed on through the women, is not actually utilized or controlled by them, this right falling to the mother's brother or to some other maternal relative.

This androcentric trend of property and proprietary prerogatives, a trend only less characteristic of the present than it was of the past, has played an important part in history and pre-history. Everywhere and always, it has reflected as well as enhanced that systematic disenfranchisement of woman which constitutes one of the least pleasing aspects of human civilization.

In art, the division of labor between men and women prevails everywhere. As the plastic arts are in their origin and development closely related to industry, it is to be expected that the artistic embellishment of objects would fall to the lot of their makers. This is actually the case. Thus, among the Eskimo and the tribes of Northeastern Siberia, women are responsible for the relatively simple decorations in embroidery and appliqué on the fur garments, which they also cut and sew, while the men do all the carving and etching on bone for which these arctic tribes are noted. The

elaborate wood industry of the tribes of British Columbia and Southern Alaska is entirely in the control of men, including the intricate and in part highly finished carvings and paintings on totem poles and memorial columns, boxes, spoons and canoes. The famous blankets are, of course, woven by women, but in this case all æsthetic activities are so thoroughly swayed by the man-made art, that the highly conventionalized designs woven into the blankets are easily discerned to be but slavish reproductions of patterns borrowed from the wood technique, which are painted by men on wooden boards and copied by the women weavers.

The decorative patterns of Californian baskets and Pueblo pots are altogether the product of woman's imagination and skill. In the Plains, the embroidery in porcupine quill or beads on garments, moccasins, bags and sheaths, is always made by women, who also tan the skins, design and cut the patterns, and sew them together into various articles of wear and use. A point of interest in this connection is that the symbolism of the moccasin designs is often suggested by a man who asks a woman to make him a pair, but the design itself is originated and carried out by the woman. The paintings on the tents and shields of this area are made by men, but the style of these semi-decorative, semi-pictographic productions is entirely different from the art of women. There is a marked tendency toward realism and an almost complete absence of the highly characteristic geometrical designs of the woman-made articles.

Among the Iroquois, men execute the rather crude, mildly realistic carvings in wood or bone with which they adorn their houses, some household utensils and ceremonial articles. Men also make the wampum belts with their symbolic figures carried out in colored wampum beads. Men, finally, carve and paint the False Face masks, grotesque distortions of the human countenance, with a style all their own. Woman's art among these people is of a totally different order. It consists of embroidery in wampum or glass beads, on shirts, skirts and moccasins. The patterns used

in this embroidery are taken exclusively from the plant kingdom, and represent flowers and leaves in different stages of development, in a style which combines distinct features of conventionalization with suggestive touches of realism.

The conditions thus found prevailing in North America are equally typical of the art life of other primitive areas. In Melanesia and Polynesia, for example, the elaborate work in wood, shell and stone is carried out by men artists, while the manufacture and decoration of *tapa*, the famous Polynesian bark cloth, is an industry monopolized by women.

In early art, therefore, there is no woman's disability.

In religion woman is scarcely anywhere on a level of equality with man. It is true that some religious customs, such as the cult of the guardian spirit in North America, apply to women and men alike. Even here, however, there is some difference: as one examines tribe after tribe, the supernatural experiences seem to apply more regularly to men than they do to women; in other instances the cult is less elaborate when applied to women; in still others, the experiences of women are patently copied after those of men, as is the case, for example, among the Iroquois, as well as among some of the Salish speaking tribes of the interior of British Columbia. Religious societies are known to occur in North America to which only women are admitted, but these are rare. All in all, participation in these semi-esoteric brotherhoods is distinctly a man's privilege. This applies equally to the Pueblo and the Plains, the Woodland and the Northwest. Again, while medicine-women are not unknown among the Indians, the magic healers as well as the shamans of the northern continent are almost invariably men.

What is generally true in North America applies with almost unfailing rigor in Melanesia and Australia. The secret societies of Melanesia are men's societies, and the ceremonial edifices in which these organizations hold their sessions and performances are "Men's Houses." The

priests, who are important personages in Melanesia, are also men, never women. With reference to Australia, it was shown before that the power to work magic was not restricted to men; but apart from that, the religious disabilities of women are pronounced. In Central Australia, every woman owns her sacred slab or *churinga*, but she may never see it; even the spot where the *churinga* are hidden is supposed to remain unknown to the women. The entire cycle of totemic ceremonies, which constitute the very crucible of the religio-ceremonial life of these natives, is taboo to the women. Not only may they not participate, but they are forbidden even to witness the performances. The only public ceremonies to which women are admitted are the rites of initiation and some of the funeral rituals. The initiation ceremonies mark the passing of the young boys from the control of women, and it is here that the initiates are first told by the old men of some of those secrets the women are never to know, such as the real identity of Twanyirika, the mysterious spirit that is supposed to emit the weird sounds accompanying these ceremonies. Henceforth the boys are aware that the sounds are produced by a bull-roarer whirled about by an old man hidden in the bush, and by and by some of them learn to do it themselves.

On some islands of the Malay Archipelago, as well as in Negro Africa, the participation of women in religious life is more pronounced, especially in the capacities of mediums and of priestesses, but here also their prerogatives are far from attaining a common level with those of men.

It would, of course, be absurd to assert that woman is excluded from religious life. The limitation of her participation falls in the domains of privileges, of official representation, as well as of creativeness, such as is manifested in the rationalizing activities of priests and the visions of prophets, the originators of new religions. Women's passive part in religion was at all times at least equal to that of man; and if pre-history is to be judged by history, her rôle as

a recipient and tool of religion must have always been pronounced, perhaps more so than that of man.

The most categorical of woman's disabilities in early society are the political ones. In social life, the economic importance of primitive woman ever tends to raise her to a level of approximate equality with man. She is, for example, the mistress of the home, where her activities in the capacity of housekeeper, mother, nurse and wife are indispensable. The home is thus not only woman's place but her kingdom; the validity of this dictum, moreover, antedates the very existence of a home in any but a metaphorical sense.

Apart from a few highly exceptional cases, women are never chiefs in North America, and the same is true of the tribes of Northeastern Siberia.

In Australia the arbiters of the fates of the young are always the old men, never the old women. The powerful chiefs of Polynesia are males, and so are the relatively insignificant chiefs of Melanesia.

In Africa the situation is somewhat different. As was shown before, the king is here associated with two queens, his mother and his sister, personages of great prestige and considerable actual power. A woman, however, can never become the supreme ruler of the state, nor does the fact that some women become queens, in any way represent the political status of African women. In all matters pertaining to political office and functions, their disenfranchisement is complete, even as was that of European women under Queen Elizabeth, Catherine II, or Maria Theresa. The ministers serving an African king are always men, and so are all public officials down to the pettiest chief.¹

¹The impatient *why?* aroused by this enumeration of woman's disabilities cannot be answered here. It may be noted, however, that the basic politico-economic disenfranchisement of woman goes back, in the main, to a more primary fact, namely the monopolization by man of the weapons and acts of war. Thus the tragedy of woman symbolizes, in the last instance, the enslavement of the powers of peace by the powers of war.

CHAPTER XIII

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SOCIETY (*Continued*)

THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIETY (*Continued*)

In looking back upon the impressive array of social forms passed in review in the preceding chapter, one fact stands out with great clearness: *society has seized upon a large number, if not all possible, kinds of relation, spacial, temporal and organic, of man to nature and of man to man; and on the basis of these relations, social divisions have grown up.* First, there is the spacial relation, the territory occupied by the group. This is the foundation of local groups, villages, towns, tribal territories and states. Then there is the organic relation, which appears in two forms, actual blood relationship and assumed or fictitious blood relationship. Actual blood relationship is represented in the ties connecting children with their parents in a family,¹ or the members of an Iroquoian maternal family, or the individuals comprised in one of those loose groups covered by a system of relationship. Fictitious or assumed blood relationship is represented in such groups as the clan, the gens, the dual division (in many instances) and the Australian classes and sub-classes. Then there is the grouping based on sex. And finally come the two forms of temporal relation of man to man, as comprised in the principles of age and generation.

Now, the units based on these different principles all perform multifarious functions in society. In fact, the civilizational status of a social division is no more and no less than the sum total of its functional relations to society. As aforesaid, a social unit is what it does. For this reason

¹Of course, it must be remembered, as noted before, that only the relation of parents to children and *vice versa*, is strictly organic or biological. The relation of the parents to each other, on the other hand, unless they happen to be blood relatives, is a reciprocal functional relationship, such as is implied in the sex tie and the correlated psychological attitudes.

it has often been felt that it would be both scientifically justifiable and most convenient if social units could be defined by their functions. This, unfortunately, cannot be done, for the simple reason that the functions of the different social units constantly overlap. In fact, some functions occur in connection with all of the social units enumerated. Such, for example, are ceremonial rites. Economic functions are exercised by families, clans or gentes, local groups, sex groups. Political functions may be exercised by families, clans, phratries, tribes or groups of tribes. And so it goes, throughout the entire line of possible social functions. Thus, not only must the idea of terminological differentiation between social units, based on functional distinctions, be given up except in specific instances and places, but it also becomes clear that in their civilizational status the different kinds of social units may often be equivalent to one another. A clan in one tribe may stand for what a family represents in another, a local group here may mean the same that a phratry or dual division stands for there, a tribe or group of tribes may function in one place as a clan or a village or an age group function in another. One must be warned, therefore, against accepting this analytical presentation of social units too pedantically, as it were, for the lines of demarcation between the different units are not by any means always distinct, either when identical units are compared in different tribes or even when different units in one and the same tribe are juxtaposed. The analytical distinctions introduced are nevertheless of the greatest significance, insofar as they aid to present the principal forms of social units and insofar, also, as they disclose the basic natural roots of social structure.

This does not complete the survey of social units, for in all primitive society there are discernible still other groups which, in distinction from those enumerated above, are purely functional.

Among these groups those based on *industrial* lines may be mentioned first. It is, of course, true that in early times

industrial specialization was relatively inconspicuous, that each family resembled every other family in its industrial functioning, and that a large number of the individuals of a tribe could and did perform the same economic functions. This view, however, constitutes but an approximation of the truth, and is mainly valuable when a contrast is drawn between modern and primitive conditions. For industrial specialization is old indeed. Thus, one finds that in communities like the Haida and Tlingit, where all men pass as wood workers, or like the Zuñi and Hopi, where all women can qualify as pot makers, or like the Maidu, where the same may be said of the women basket workers, there is noticeable a distinction between those who are but average workers and those who have become experts, and to that extent there is an incipient specialization of an industrial group, over and above the sex specialization. Even in the much cruder industrial conditions of Australia, the specialization of the men of certain localities in the manufacture of one or another weapon, has been noted. In certain Australian tribes the messengers¹ constitute a class by themselves. In more advanced communities, such as the Negroes of Africa or the Polynesians, industrial differentiation has proceeded much further. Among many of the Bantu speaking Negro tribes, the agriculturists and the herdsmen are separated into veritable classes of society. There also one finds the salt diggers, the ironsmiths and the silversmiths and the merchants. In Polynesia, the boat makers constitute an ancient and honored class.

Another type of functional grouping is represented by the various kinds of *societies* or associations, *religious, military, medicinal*. Such societies are widely distributed in the primitive world. They thrive in northern Melanesia, in West Africa, among the Indians of Brazil, and in a number of wide tribal areas in North America. The societies may be purely male or purely female or mixed. Admission to membership may be based on age, guardian spirit initiation

¹See p. 277.

or payment by an individual or a group of individuals. The functions of the societies may be purely religious and ceremonial, which is most frequently the case, or medicinal in addition, as for example, among the Iroquois and the Zuñi, or military, as in certain well known Plains organizations, or juridical, as in Melanesia and West Africa. But what is characteristic of all of these instances is that the bond between the members of a society remains a purely functional one; remove the common functions, and the organization based upon these must also disappear.¹

Still other groups are based on the principles of *birth and inheritance of privileges*, and *birth and occupation*. An illustration of the birth and privilege grouping is found on the Northwest Coast, where the hereditary prerogative of chieftainship, with all its accruing distinctions, belongs to the class of nobles. The same is true of many groups in Polynesia. The reverse situation is found in the case of slaves. This institution is a much more widespread phenomenon in primitive society than has often been supposed, for it is common in Polynesia, Africa and North America. Barring those instances where a slave or a descendant of a slave may pass into another social class, a man born a slave dies a slave, and with this status there go the inevitable restrictions in social participation.

The best known instance of the birth and occupation principle are the Indian castes, where different occupational groupings have become hereditary, and with this occupational status there go the well known privileges and restrictions, social, ceremonial, matrimonial. Caste-like traits are also observed, for example, in the Baganda gentes, with their hereditary specialization in different industrial pursuits.

In connection with hereditary or acquired privileges, the principle of rank makes its appearance.² Rank may be

¹For a much more extended treatment of societies, the reader is referred to Dr. Lowie's "Primitive Society," Chapter X, "Associations."

²Here the reader is once more referred to Lowie's "Primitive Society," Chapter XII, "Rank."

static, as when different social classes are firmly fixed by birth and are kept apart with greater or less stringency. Rank may also be dynamic as, for example, in the graded societies of the American Plains or of Mota (one of the Banks Islands).

Again, *riches*—although perhaps without all of the strictly economic connotations of the modern idea—may become the mark of a group with somewhat fluctuating outlines, as is so commonly the case among the Bantu speaking herd owners of Africa and the reindeer breeding Chukchee, Koryak, or Tungus, of Northeastern Siberia.

In comparing these purely functional groupings of society with those based on spacial, temporal or organic factors, one may distinguish the two by designating the latter as groups of *status*, the former as groups of *function*. The groups of status are based on principles which flow directly from certain relations that obtain between man and Nature and man and man, and imply civilization only in a most general sense, the psychological proclivity of mankind to form groups on the basis of such lines of cleavage always being taken for granted. The groups of function, on the other hand, emphatically presuppose civilization, as these functions are really the dynamic aspects of civilization, and the groupings are built up into social units on the basis of common functional preoccupations.

In the concrete life of a tribe these distinctions between the two kinds of groupings are not by any means always marked. A clan that exercises a ceremonial function like that of a religious society in the same or in another tribe, is to that extent equivalent to that religious society. A family or local group which specializes in an industrial pursuit is equivalent to a corresponding industrial group in another tribe, the only bond of union of whose members is that of their industrial occupation. The blurring of the distinction between the groups of status and those of function is, moreover, precipitated by the fact that both kinds of groups tend to assume new functions, or, it may be, lose

some of the old ones. However that may be, the comparison of the two kinds of groups reveals an important sociological principle. It is this: *social divisions of whatever provenience ever tend to exercise cultural functions and to assume new ones; functions, on the other hand, ever tend to attach themselves to pre-existing social units or to create new ones.*

In concluding this survey of social units and their functions, it must also be noted that a member of a primitive tribe is usually subject to the simultaneous control of a considerable number of such units. He is a family man and a clansman, a member of a local group and of one or more grades of a society or of several societies; he functions as part of an age, sex, generation and relationship group, and he may also share in the privileges and obligations of an industrial or a hereditary rank group. Thus the intellectual and emotional participation of an individual becomes highly complex. On the general background of the mental disposition of early society, these multifarious participations carry with them much that is characteristic of the behavior, the emotional attitude and the intellectual outlook of early man.¹

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

In a sense, political organization is one phase of social organization. But there are historical as well as sociopsychological reasons for making a distinction, and in the history of the subject such a distinction has usually been made. Political organization proceeds from a tribe to intertribal relations and to the integration of tribes into higher political units. Social organization proceeds from a tribe or nation to the social subdivisions comprised in it. Speaking in general terms, political organization tends toward integration, social organization toward differentiation.²

¹*Cf.* pp. 414-415.

²It is not implied that this distinction is inherent and inevitable. Certain recent tendencies may serve as proof of the opposite. It is true that political integration still continues in the form of imperialistic expansion, alliances,

We have discussed the League of the Iroquois, as a high type of American tribal federation, and the state of the Baganda, as an example of African political integration. There remain many further problems of primitive politics which, for lack of space, can only be indicated here. The general political democracy of America and the prevailing limitation of the power of chiefs; the striking similarities of African states to those of ancient Asia and Europe, their growth by conquest and consequent territorial expansion, their dependence on edicts, roads, tribute, taxes and "graft"; the three types of states in Africa: the bureaucratic (Baganda), the type characterized by a religio-ceremonial exaltation of the king (Dahomey), and the military state (Zulu Kaffirs); the slight development of chieftainship and of political unity and control in Melanesia, where secret societies take over much of what in other places is the business of the state; the military chieftains of Polynesia, with their curiously exaggerated power of the imposition of taboo and their retinue of genealogising priests—all of these and many other interesting phases of the subject must be passed over in silence.

But before leaving the topic of political organization, we must supplement the two sketches of relatively higher organized political systems by a few remarks on the political organization of the tribes of Southeast Australia. Although politically amorphous, these tribes do not fail to present interesting illustrations of individual influence and prominence.

Among the Dieri, the oldest man of a totem is a *pinnaru* or headman. While he may occupy this position by dint of his age alone, he will not become the headman of a local division, embracing sections of many clans, or of a tribe,

and international tendencies, and that such minor groups as families or local communities still are and always will remain the basic elements of social organization. On the other hand, there is a marked tendency toward political differentiation in such principles as national self-determination and local autonomy, while elements of social organization, such as industries, societies, clubs and churches, display equally conspicuous leanings toward international expansion and integration.

unless he has achieved distinction as a fighting man, or medicine-man or orator. The headmen of a tribe, in a body, are the seat of political power.

Thus, while age alone is insufficient claim for supreme political prestige, it does count for a great deal, as is seen, for example, in the case of the Yaurorka headman cited by Howitt, who was almost childish from old age and had to be carried about, but whose prestige remained unshaken.

Together with the headmen, the old men in their leisure hours instructed the young men in the laws of the tribe and in the proprieties of conduct; and the old women instructed the young girls.

The prominence to which some of these headmen attain among their people is illustrated by the following quotation from Howitt, whose statement is based on the observations of S. Gason, an officer of the South Australian Mounted Police, and refers to Jalina-piramurana, who, in the early sixties was the head of the Kunaura totem and the recognized leader of the Dieri tribe: "He has described him to me as a man of persuasive eloquence, a skilful and brave fighting-man, and a powerful medicine-man. From his polished manner the whites called him 'the Frenchman.' He was greatly feared by his own and the neighboring tribes. Neither his brothers (both of them inferior to him in bravery and oratorical power) nor the elder men presumed to interfere with his will, or to dictate to the tribe, except in minor matters. He decided disputes, and his decisions were received without appeal. The neighboring tribes sent messengers to him with presents of bags, *Pitcheri*, red ochre, skins, and other things. He decided when and where the tribal ceremonies were to be held, and his messengers called together the tribe from a radius of a hundred miles to attend them, or to meet on inter-tribal matters.

"His wonderful oratorical powers made his hearers believe anything he told them, and always ready to execute his commands. He was not by nature cruel or treacherous, as were many of the Dieri, and when not excited was con-

siderate, patient, and very hospitable. No one spoke ill of Jalina-piramurana, but on the contrary, with respect and reverence. This is understood when Mr. Gason adds that he distributed the presents sent to him amongst his friends to prevent jealousy. He used to interfere to prevent fights, even chastising the offender, and being sometimes wounded in so doing. On such an occasion there would be great lamentation, and the person who had wounded him was not infrequently beaten by the others.

"As the superior Headman of the Dieri, he presided at the meetings of the *Pinnarus*, sent out messengers to the neighboring tribes, and even had the power of giving away young women, not related to him, in marriage, of separating men from their wives, when they could not agree, and of making fresh matrimonial arrangements.

"He periodically visited the various hordes of the Dieri tribe, from which he also periodically received presents. Tribes even at a distance of a hundred miles sent him presents, which were passed on to him from tribe to tribe.

"He was one of their great *Kunkis* or medicine-men, but would only practise his art on persons of note, such as heads of totems or his personal friends.

"He was the son of a previous Headman, who was living during Mr. Gason's residence in the country, and who, although too infirm to join in the ceremonies, gave advice to the old men. He boasted that he had the command of the tribe before his son acquired it. He was believed to be proof against magical practices, such as 'striking with the bone.'

"Jalina-piramurana had succeeded to and indeed eclipsed his father."¹

Among the Kamilaroi there were two or three headmen in each local division of a tribe. Their position depended on the valor of the respective individuals. Headship was not hereditary, but prominent warriors would become leaders and their sons were respected, and if deserving, might

¹Howitt, "Native Tribes of South-East Australia," pp. 297-299.

become leaders in turn. The oldest headman was the chief of the tribal council. His influence was often considerable and on occasion he could carry a measure by his own voice.

"When the Headman of a totem died," writes Howitt, all the totemites were called together by the man next in age, and not only the men of the totem, but everyone, men, women, boys and girls

"When all were assembled at the appointed place, they formed a ring, the old men with their wives in the front row, the younger men with their wives in the next, and outside were the young men and the girls to look on, but not to take any other part in the proceedings. These were commenced by one of the elders speaking, followed by other men; finally, the sense of the meeting was taken, and then the old men stated who should be the Headman. The choice being thus made, presents were given to the new head by the other Headmen, who had collected things from their people, such as opossum or other skin rugs or weapons."¹

At least among the Kurnai old women shared with the old men the confidence of their people. Such women were often consulted by the men and their authority in the tribe was great. Howitt refers in particular to two Kurnai women whom he knew, who together with the old men were great experts on the tribal legends and customs and the ever-watchful guardians over the stringent marriage rules, which play so important a part in the lives of these tribes.

The tribal councils of the Dieri consisted of the heads of local divisions, the medicine-men, the influential old men and the fighting men. From time to time they met in council, the deliberations being held secret; in fact, whosoever was guilty of revealing to an outsider the subject of a council's deliberations, was doomed to die. The usual topics of discussion at councils were death by magic, other forms of murder, breaches of the moral code, especially with refer-

¹*Ibid*, p. 305.

ence to the marriage regulations, and the revealing of council secrets to women or the uninitiated.

As mentioned before, most deaths were ascribed to magic. The punishment for this offence was usually administered by a *pinya* or avenging party. This procedure is described by Howitt, in the following passage: “. . . a man with several companions came to a camp near Lake Hope. A man had lately died at Perigundi, from whence they came, and in order that they might be received by the people at Lake Hope, they halted twenty yards from the camp and there gathered the spears and boomerangs that were thrown at them ceremonially by one of the Lake Hope men, they being as usual easily warded off. Then going nearer, they again halted and warded off the weapons thrown, and again moved on, until, being close together, the man from Perigundi and the man from Lake Hope should have taken hold of each other, and sat down together. But the former, not taking heed of the position of the sun and being dazzled by its rays, was unable to ward off the spear thrown at him, which entered his breast, and he died in the night. His companions fled to Perigundi and there formed a *Pinya* of a number of men, and returned to Lake Hope. The leader of this was a man called Mudla-kupa, who suddenly appearing one evening placed himself before him who had killed the Perigundi man, and seizing his hand announced his sentence of death. An elder brother of this man drew Mudla-kupa to one side, saying, ‘Don’t seize my *Ngatata*,¹ nor even me, for see, there sits our *Neyi*,¹ seize him.’ At the same time he threw a clod of earth in the direction in which the man was. Mudla-kupa now turned to him, seized him by the hand, and spoke the death sentence over him, which he received with stoical composure. Mudla-kupa led him to one side, when the second man of the *Pinya* came up, and as Mudla-kupa held the man out to him as the accused, he struck him with a *maru-wiri*² and split

¹*Ngatata* and *Neyi* are relationship terms.

²A weapon shaped like a great boomerang, which is used with both hands like a sword.

his head open. The whole *Pinya* then fell upon him with spears and boomerangs. In order that they should not hear how he was being killed, the other men, women, and children in the camp made a great rustling with boughs and broken-off bushes."¹

As the carrying out of a *pinya* involves considerable risk of life and limb to both parties concerned, the Dieri have elaborated a substitute method of settling the blood debt. This method is a peaceful one, consisting of an exchange of articles by barter.

Howitt tells of an instance of this sort which occurred after the death of a Lake Hope man in the year 1899. The debt of blood revenge or the initiation of a *pinya* expedition devolved upon the older brother of the Lake Hope man, who was much feared for his great strength. To avoid bloodshed, the blacks among whom the Lake Hope man had lived sent to his brother a cord known as *yut-yunto*. This cord, when tied around his neck, authorized him to collect articles for barter with the senders. These articles were secured from his blood relatives in the surrounding country. When a sufficient number were amassed, messengers were sent out, indicating the time and place of the meeting. The recipient of the cord, now called *yut-yunto-kana*, accompanied by a large following, proceeded to the appointed spot, receiving and sending messengers on the way. The two parties met as if prepared for combat. The men were all armed and painted as if about to carry out a *pinya*. Behind the armed men were the women, carrying the articles intended for barter. As the two parties stood facing each other, the *yut-yunto-kana* danced a war dance. Then the leader of the other party approached him, ceremonially seized the cord around his throat and breaking it, cast it into the fire. Then he addressed him, "How do you come? Do you come in enmity?" "Oh, no," was the response, "I come peacefully." "That being so," said the other, "we will exchange our things in peace." Then they embraced

¹*Ibid*, pp. 327-328.

each other and sat down amicably. Meanwhile a war dance was going on, executed by both parties. When the leaders had sat down, the men stopped dancing and gathered behind the two headmen. The women were crouching behind the men, carefully concealing the articles for barter from the eyes of the opposite party. Then an article, a shield or boomerang, was passed to the leader of one of the parties. This article was passed on from the last man to the first, the men all standing in a row, each one passing the object between the legs of the man in front of him, so it could not be seen until produced by the leader, who stood at the head of the line. Having received the article, the leader threw it down between the parties with an air of importance. Then one man from the other side threw on it some article in exchange. Thus the barter continued for some time, until one of the leaders finally asked, "Are you peaceable?" And the reply was, "Yes, we are well satisfied." Each man took the articles he had obtained by barter, and the parties separated in peace. Had the bartering failed in its purpose so that one or both parties had remained dissatisfied, there would have been an argument followed by a regulated combat between all men present.

In connection with the political organization of these tribes the institution of messengers is of interest. Messengers are used by the headmen, councils, and other groups or individuals to communicate to other individuals, groups, villages or tribes that a ceremony is to be held and when, that a meeting for barter is to take place, that a *pinya* party is on its way, or that the people are to gather for the purpose of a communal feast.

In some tribes messengers are specially selected on each occasion, in others there are definite men in each locality who are known in a wide district as messengers and who are permitted to pass unmolested through the territory of all tribes in that district, even though some of them may be at war with the senders of the messenger. Among the Kamilaroi each clan claimed its own messenger. When

messengers are to be sent to a hostile tribe and on other occasions where danger is involved, women are chosen for the commission. If possible, women are selected who have come from the tribe to which they are sent. Such a mission, if successful, is accompanied by a period of license, in which the members of the mission and the local tribesmen participate. No resentment is shown on such occasions on the part of the women of the recipient tribe. The tribe sending the messengers, at least in the case of the Dieri, is equally insistent that this period of license be observed. Should the women shirk this obligation, they do so at the risk of death on their return. What happens upon the return of such a mission of women has been described by Mr. Gason: "The Headman and the principal old men received them kindly, and congratulated them on their safe return, but appeared anxious, and clutched their spears in an excited manner. No one but the Headman spoke to the women immediately on their return; but when all the men were seated, they were questioned as to the result of their mission. The result was at once told to all the people in the camp, who rejoiced if it were favourable, but who became fearfully excited and seemed to lose all control over themselves if it had failed, rushing to and fro, yelling, throwing sand into the air, biting themselves, and brandishing their weapons in the wildest manner imaginable."¹

Among the Dieri, a messenger announcing a *pinya* wears a net on his head with a white band around it in which a feather is stuck. He is painted with yellow ochre and pipe clay and in the string girdle, at the point of his spine, a bunch of emu feathers is stuck. With him he carries part of the beard of the deceased or some balls of pipe clay taken from the heads of the mourners.

A messenger announcing a death is smeared all over with pipe clay. On his approach there is a great ceremonial display of grief on the part of the women. After the par-

¹*Ibid*, p. 683.

ticulars of the death have been made public to the camp, only the close relatives of the deceased weep. On the following morning they paint themselves all over with white pipe clay. Until this clay has worn off, widows and widowers are prohibited from speaking. They do not rub off the clay but permit it to wear off by itself and during this period they communicate with others in gesture language.

The messengers often carry messenger sticks, which are crude slabs of wood with notches cut in them to assist the messenger in remembering his message. Howitt, for example, refers to a communication from one of his informants, who in 1840 saw two young men of the Ngarigo tribe, one of whom was carrying two peeled sticks, each about two feet long, with notches cut into them. They were sent to the different branches of their tribe to announce a gathering on the Australian Alps. These gatherings took place about mid-summer on the highest ranges of the mountains, where as many as five to seven hundred natives often congregated in order to feast on roasted moths. The moths, great quantities of which filled the crevices of the rocks, were first stifled with smouldering brush. Then they were roasted on hot ashes, whereupon they shrivelled to about the size of a grain of wheat. Then they were eaten.

THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL FORMS

In the study of industries and art, certain geographical features appear with great clearness. These features are less readily discernible in a survey of religious phenomena, on account of the greater illusiveness of the religious content. In social organization the facts of distribution are once more clear cut and convincing. Certain forms of social organization are ubiquitous; others are distributed in wide areas, more or less continuous; still others represent purely local variants.

The local group, the family, the relationship group, some differentiations on the basis of sex, age and generation—all of these are found everywhere, and it is not devoid of interest to note once more that the universality of these social forms extends also to modern society. The emphasis, however, is changed: in our own civilization the family and the local group are more conspicuously developed, whereas in primitive society the relationship group and the differentiations on the basis of sex, age and generation are pre-eminent.

The sort of social organization usually designated as the family-village grouping—meaning by this that clans, gentes, phratries and the like are absent and the family and local group alone are found—is decidedly restricted in its distribution. In North America, for example, a line drawn from Greenland to the coast of southern California would roughly divide the continent into two triangles, the north-western being characterized by the family-village system, barring only the tribes of the Northwest Coast, the south-eastern, by the clan and gentile systems. In Africa, the more primitive tribes, such as the Hottentot and the Bushmen of the southern extremity of the continent and perhaps some of the Pygmy tribes in the great forests of the upper Congo, are organized on this basis of local group and family. In Australia, some relatively non-numerous tribes along the southern, southeastern and western coasts have the same type of organization.

The clan and gentile systems, while not as restricted in their distribution as the family-village type, are not found everywhere, as appears from what was said in the preceding paragraph. In addition to the areas in North America where clans and gentes prevail, and equally large although at present not as clearly defined areas in South America, gentes are widely distributed in the whole of Africa between the desert of Sahara in the North and that of Kalahari in the South, while clans occur here and there within this area. In Australia alone are clans and gentes wellnigh universal,

barring only the relatively few tribes noted above as having the family-village system.

Some other forms are much more restricted in their distribution. The Australian classes and sub-classes are not found anywhere else. The maternal family seems to occur only among the Iroquois, with the possible addition of one or two other tribes. Dual divisions are present in a large number of areas in North America, in the whole of Australia and in part of Melanesia, but are wholly absent in Africa and India.

Now, as soon as any functional specifications are added to these purely formal divisions, the area of distribution of each becomes more and more restricted. The clans of the Northwest Coast are not those of the Crow nor those of the Iroquois. The dual divisions of the latter are not those of the Omaha, nor those of the Tlingit and Haida, and all of these are markedly different from the dual divisions of Australia. Magical totemic ceremonies are an exclusive functional peculiarity of the gentes of the Aranda. Differentiation in the ways of cutting the hair of boys is peculiar to the gentes of the Omaha. Definite association of families with hunting territories is apparently nowhere as clearly developed as it is among some of the eastern Algonquin tribes. And so on, throughout the entire line of social divisions in their functional capacity.

Recent studies of relationship systems show a similar differentiation from locality to locality.

Again, in political organization, the geographical factor is definitely recognizable. First come the characteristics of wide continental areas, such as the presence of federated tribes and the slight development of chieftainship, in America; the centralized state and the high status of the king, in Africa; the relative vagueness of the political unit combined with the great prominence of the old men, in Australia. Within these wider geographical districts further subdivisions are discernible. In North America, a comparison of those groups characterized by relatively high political or-

ganization, such as the Zuñi, the Dakota, the Iroquois, discloses differences of structure and function. In Africa, the political organization of the Yoruba differs from that of the Herrero or the Zulu or the Masai or the Baganda, and these differ among themselves.

It will be seen, then, that certain forms of social organization belong to the common-human. Their distribution is universal; their congeniality to human society is such that no amount of historic caprice seems able to dislodge them. Other forms of social and political organization are widely distributed but are not by any means universal. While these forms must also be regarded as singularly well adapted to the purposes they fulfill, their uniform distribution in certain areas and their absence from others, strongly suggest the importance of diffusion through historic contact as an explanatory factor. More specialized forms of social units and the functional differentiations between corresponding units in different tribes have as a rule a limited distribution, while the more minute peculiarities are restricted to single groups. Here there can be only one interpretation: just as variants of industry, of art, of religion, arise in particular localities, so also does social organization become changed in minor details under the specialized conditions of individual tribes and local groups. Some of these specialized developments prove congenial to an ever widening circle of neighbors, and the new form or function may thus reach a wide distribution; other specialized developments remain characteristic of a narrow area or even of an individual tribe.

The principles laid down in the "Reflections to Part I" are thus once more vindicated.

TOTEMISM

Few primitive institutions have aroused such general interest as has totemism, few have provoked so many theories

and such heated controversies. Spencer, Frazer and Andrew Lang, Rivers and N. W. Thomas, Thurnwald, Graebner and Father Schmidt, van Gennep and Durkheim, Wundt and Freud, all of these and many others have contributed their share to the discussion of this wellnigh inexhaustible subject.

What, then, is totemism? What is its nature and its distribution in the primitive world?

One speaks of totemism when a tribe comprises a social organization mostly of the clan or gentile pattern, as well as a peculiar form of supernaturalism, consisting in the most typical cases of certain attitudes toward species of animals or plants or classes of natural objects. In totemism the social organization and the supernaturalism are combined in a distinctive way presently to be indicated.

The geographical distribution of totemic tribes is extraordinarily wide. In North America totemism occurs in the Northwest, among such tribes as the Tlingit and Haida; among the Zuñi, Hopi and related tribes of the Southwest; among large groups of tribes in the Southeast (Natchez, Creek, etc.), as well as among such Woodland tribes as the Algonquin Delaware and—to include an exceedingly attenuated form of totemism—among the Iroquois speaking tribes of the League. In the Plains, the so-called Southern Siouan tribes (the Omaha and others) have totemism. Our South American material is still full of gaps, but totemism has been described by Im Thurn in British Guiana, some of the native groups of Brazil certainly are totemic, and it does not seem unlikely that, after further investigation, totemism will be found as prevalent in the southern continent as it is in the North. In Africa the tribes of the Mediterranean littoral must be eliminated as belonging to a distinct cultural layer, nor is totemism found at the extreme southern end of the continent, among such tribes as the Bushmen and Hottentot. But in the enormous intervening area, among the Bantu and Sudanese speaking Negroes, totemism is very general if not universal. Anker-

mann's recent presentation, moreover, indicates that further totemic tribes are certain to be discovered in this region. In aboriginal India the more developed forms of totemism do not seem to occur, but many of the *gotras* or clan-like social groupings of that area have some form of totemism, while others seem to have had it in the past. Australia is the totemic continent *par excellence*. There all the tribes are totemic with some possible exceptions among the groups of the southeastern and northwestern shores, and even among some of these the evidence for former totemism is not unsatisfactory. Among the islanders of the Torres Straits and in Melanesia totemism is sporadic, but in the latter area it is in some cases highly developed. In Polynesia the evidence is doubtful but it is not improbable that some at least of the western island clusters had totemism in the past.

This enormous geographical distribution of totemism can only be interpreted in one way. An historic accident of singular origin followed by diffusion could not account for it. Totemism must have originated independently several, if not many times, and among those tribes to whom totemism was brought by their neighbors, there must have been a marked receptivity for this institution. In other words, the complex of ideas, attitudes and practices which is totemism, is congenial to early mentality and therefore characteristic of it.

As one analyzes totemic clans or gentes in a broad survey of the globe, a variety of beliefs and practices with reference to totems are observable. The totemites—members of a totemic group—trace their descent from an animal or bird or thing, or they regard themselves as in some other way related to the totem; the totem and the totemite share physical and psychic traits; the totem protects the totemite against danger; the totem is represented in art and figures as a sacred symbol at ceremonies; the totem is taboo—it may not be eaten or killed or seen or touched, or all of these; the totemic group is named after

the totem; ceremonies are performed by the totemites to multiply the supply of the totem animal—these are only some of the positive and negative rules observed by totemites with reference to their totems. In addition to this it must be noted that the totem is scarcely ever some one animal or plant or thing; no, it is an entire species or class of creatures or things that figure as totems. And, finally, the members of a totemic group may not intermarry—this rule is almost as wide as totemism itself.

It is, however, not quite satisfactory to thus characterize totemism by a number of features of belief and practice. For, if the question is asked whether these totemic features are found everywhere comprised in totemism or whether some appear in one tribe, others in another, the latter proves to be the case.

Discarding the differences between minor totemic districts, broad continental areas appear clearly differentiable from the standpoint of totemism. In North America the artistic side of totemism is often developed and among the tribes of the Northwest Coast this is highly marked. The totemic name is common but not universal, and the same is true of the totemic taboo. Where totemism is richly developed it becomes associated with the belief in guardian spirits. Then again, there are tribes like the League Iroquois and many tribes of the Southwest, where the only discernible features are clan exogamy and the animal or bird name of the clan—barely enough to justify the designation "totemic," and perhaps scarcely enough.

In Africa, the gentile totemic name—for here gentes prevail—is often absent and so are the artistic representations of the totem. Double totems occur, as among the Baganda, where most of the gentes have two totems. The idea of descent from the totem is very rare, instead a variety of stories are told among the different tribes to explain how the totems first made their appearance. But the most typical trait of African totemism is the taboo—the prohibition to eat or kill the totemic creature. The term for totem among

many Bantu speaking tribes means "that which is forbidden." The punishment for the transgression of this taboo is severe, the usual conception being that nature itself takes revenge upon the offender: he (or she) is afflicted with a skin disease, which is interpreted by the natives as at least a partial transformation of the culprit into the tabooed animal.

In Australia the number of totemic groups in a tribe is frequently very large—much larger than either in Africa or in North America—and the number of individuals in each totemic group is correspondingly small. The totemic clan or gentile name is universal and so is the taboo. The conception is common that the totemite and the totem are closely related. The idea that the totemites are in one way or another descended from the totem is general. Totemic art, where it occurs, is peculiar insofar as identical designs are used to represent their totems not only by different totemic groups of one tribe but even by totemic groups belonging to separate tribes. On the other hand, each totemic group interprets these designs in accordance with its own totemic ideas. In Central Australia individuals of one totem and locality perform magic ceremonies which are believed to bring about the multiplication of the totemic species.

This characterization of the three continental areas will suffice for our purpose. It will be seen that what might be called the "totemic complexes" of these areas differ considerably in the number as well as in the character of the totemic features they contain. There is further difference in the prominence accorded certain traits. Thus, in Central Australia the magical aspect predominates, in Africa it is the taboo aspect, in North America the guardian spirit aspect, and specifically on the Northwest Coast the art is the dominant feature.

If we cared to push our analysis still further, we might note that the degree to which the culture of different tribes is saturated with totemism is by no means always the same.

Thus, among the Northwest tribes almost every side of civilization is touched by a totemic flavor, religion and mythology, social organization, ceremonialism and economics, industry and art; while among the Omaha, material culture seems wholly free from totemic connection, and ceremonialism almost entirely so. Here totemism is relegated largely to the religious and mythological domains. In Africa, again, totemism is often little more than a system of food restrictions.

It is, however, possible to overemphasize these differences at the expense of equally fundamental similarities. In the first place, some features are much more common than others. For example: whereas magical ceremonies to multiply totems are performed only in central Australia and totemic art has nowhere developed so prolifically as on the Northwest Coast, other traits occur with fair uniformity in most or all of the major totemic areas. Among such widely diffused totemic attributes are totemic clan or gentile names, totemic taboos and the idea of some form of relationship with the totem. Nor is this all. Exogamy of the totemic unit is an almost universal trait of totemism. Whether one holds with some that exogamy is of the very essence of totemism, or with others that it is merely a clan or gentile attribute and enters into the totemic relationship secondarily, the fact remains that the prohibition to marry one's totem mate is almost co-extensive with totemism itself.¹ And now we come to still another trait which is even more characteristic of totemic communities than exogamy; this trait is a negative one: *totems are not worshipped*. Animal and plant worship and the deification of inanimate Nature, are not totemism. Almost everywhere, in fact, these forms of religion exist side by side with totemism.

This brings us to the kernel of the totemic situation. The most distinctive thing about this institution is not the vio-

¹That this negative aspect is not all there is to exogamy and that in a particular social system clan or gentile exogamy may be a secondary, not a primary feature, has been explained before (see pp. 249 sq.).

lence of the religious regard for the totem—that, as just noted, is not discernible—but the way totemic ideas and rites are interwoven with a social system.¹

It would be wholly satisfactory to regard this peculiar relation of an ideological and behavioristic supernaturalism to a social system as *the* most distinctive trait of totemism, if not for one circumstance which, at first sight, seems not a little disturbing: our diagram would serve as well to illustrate a tribal set of religious societies; for here also a tribal pattern of traits appears in a variety of concrete forms. It thus becomes necessary to stress with added emphasis the character of the social skeleton underlying a totemic complex. *The skeleton is always a social system.*

¹The following diagram may serve to illustrate how a totemic complex fits into a social organization:




FIG. 53

Here the segments I, II, III, . . . are social units (in totemism generally clans or gentes), while *a*, *b*, *c* and *d* are totemic features, say taboo (*a*), name (*b*), relationship (*c*), and artistic representation (*d*). Now $a+b+c+d$ is sufficient to characterize the totemic complex, if one notes in addition that in each segment these features appear in somewhat different form ($a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots, b_1, b_2, b_3, \text{etc.}$), for each totemic unit has a different animal or bird or plant or thing for its totem, and to that extent its taboo, its relationship, its artistic representation are different in their concrete aspects from the corresponding features in the other totemic units of the complex.

It may be a tribal set of families or of local groups, but in a surprisingly large majority of cases it is either a clan or a gentile system. The totemic complex may constitute the very flesh and spirit of that system, but if the totemic complex were conceivably removed, the skeleton would remain: there would still be a social system.

Thus it appears that neither the socio-psychological nature of totemism, nor its geographical distribution, nor its historic rôle can be understood without a proper appraisal of the underlying social skeleton. This, in a majority of cases, will be found to be a clan or a gentile system, although instances where families or villages appear as carriers of a totemic complex are not unknown. Socio-psychologically this means that there is some delicate correspondence between the supernaturalistic aspect of totemism and clan or gentile systems, some *fitness*¹ in their inter-relation. Geographically this means that wherever clans or gentes occur, there also totemism is likely to be (although there are exceptions). And historically this means that whatever elements of primitive life clans and gentes expressed, whatever elements they brought into it, totemism had its share in the process. For it must be remembered that whereas families and local groups are shared by early and modern civilization, clans and gentes are known to primitive life alone; they are equally foreign to earliest man and to historic man.

Before we leave the subject of totemism a further query must be met. Has totemism and all it stands for been left definitely behind? or can certain adumbrations of it be discerned in modern society? It can be shown that neither the supernaturalism involved in totemism nor the peculiar form of socialization implied in it, are wholly foreign to modern life.

While plants and inanimate things have long since been relegated to the realm of the matter-of-fact, animals still inhabit a region where fact and fancy are peacefully wedded

¹Cf. my article, "Form and Content in Totemism" (*American Anthropologist*, vol. 20, 1918, pp. 280-295).

together. As between the animal and its human master, verbal usage reveals a common range of physical and psychic qualities. One thinks of the eagle eye, the lionine heart, the dogged perseverance, the bull's neck. Current metaphor, half earnest half in jest, has introduced the fox and the beaver, the bear and the rabbit, the cat and the cow, the hog and the ass, the ape and the shark, as characters of the human scene. Some mothers treat their children with an affection we think ape-like, while others make children of apes, and of cats, dogs and parrots as well. And it is typical that psychic qualities—intellect, affection, understanding, sensitiveness—are wont to be ascribed to these creatures by their masters, who, curiously enough, often tend to deny these traits to man.

From the days of Lavater's physiognomics to those of Lombrosian criminology, note has been taken of animalistic suggestions in human countenances, and these were balanced, perhaps less commonly, by the reading of human features and expressions into the faces of animals. In that inimitable fragment of life, "Marie Claire," unique in its simplicity and directness, Marguerite Audou has given us a rich collection of such observations.

To those who love animals, live with them, learn their ways, the temptation to see them as what they are not is wellnigh irresistible. The "true" stories of most "nature fakers" are quite sincere, and the highly imaginative pages of Georgette Leblanc represent but a literary culmination of the opinions—about dogs—of many women and men.

To this must be added the often noted tendency on the part of equivalent social units to adopt as classifiers names, badges, pins, flags, tattoo marks, colors. One thinks of high-school and college classes, baseball and football teams, political parties, the degrees of the Elks and Masons and the regiments of our armies.

The names and things that are thus used as classifiers and symbols, habitually rest against a background of emotion. In the case of regimental banners, the emotions aroused

may reach great violence, while in the instance of animal and bird mascots there arises a complex of attitudes and rites so curiously exotic as to invite an exaggerated analogy with primitive totemism.

The fact remains that the supernaturalistic as well as the social tendencies of totemic days live on in modern society. But in our civilization these tendencies, in the absence of a crystallization point, remain in solution, whereas in primitive communities the same tendencies, clustering about the skeletons of clan and gentile systems, function as highly distinctive vehicles of culture.

CHAPTER XIV

REFLECTIONS ON PART II

CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT

Before us is a survey of many aspects of primitive civilization. In economics and industry, in art and religion, in social structure and political organization, early society presents a multiplicity of forms and functions. After an analysis of these features, one question naturally suggests itself. How can they be explained? Why so many differences? Are there any general conditions with which these differences can be correlated? It was hinted in the opening sections of this book that racial factors cannot be held responsible for the variety of civilizational forms. It would indeed be absurd to refer the civilizational peculiarities disclosed to racial or sub-racial factors, for a multiplicity of differences in all of the aspects of civilization reviewed have repeatedly appeared within the range of one physical type.

Another favorite explanation lies in the direction of physical environment. Granted the psychic unity of mankind, it is the environmental differences, climate, Flora, Fauna, geographical position, which are responsible for the differentiations of civilization. This type of explanation has often been attempted. Montesquieu must be counted among the early environmentalists. Taine once made a great stir by his attempts to interpret forms of civilization, especially in its artistic and literary aspects, by environmental conditions. And the staunch environmentalism of Buckle still has its charms for many of his readers. The whole subject was placed on a more scientific foundation by the German geographer-anthropologist, Friederich Ratzel. Ratzel was primarily interested in material culture, and being by training a geographer, he conceived of civilization

as a sort of an outgrowth of physical environment, a psychosociological culmination of the geological process. Among more modern writers, Miss Semple, the talented American interpreter and translator of Ratzel, must be classed as a non-compromising environmentalist, having embodied her creed in a brilliant discussion of American history and its geographic environment. But undoubtedly the most successful of modern environmentalists is Ellsworth Huntington, author of "The Pulse of Asia," whose work centers around the idea of a climatic rather than a general environmental interpretation of civilization.

Whether true or not, environmental interpretations of civilization are often accepted with favor on account of their apparent objectivity and definiteness. Culture and mind are evanescent and elusive; environment is definite, concrete, measurable. Hence the modern mind, ever eager for measurable results and mathematical formulations, is easily thrown off its guard by any at all ingenious attempt to reduce civilization to environmental determinants.

But let us glance at the facts. It is clear from the start that of all aspects of civilization, material culture is the one most closely allied with environmental factors. People eat, dress, build and move about in accordance with the requirements and by the use of the facilities and materials furnished by their physical environment. Industry is also clearly affected by the materials available and the uses suggested by the character of the physical milieu. That material culture should thus be found in close touch with the physical factors of Nature is indeed to be expected for is not material culture the physical environment itself, or part of it, transformed into civilization through the creativeness of man?

Plausible though all this seems, an inspection of the actual conditions at once introduces a variety of complicating factors. People do not use all that is offered them by their physical environment, and they often use things which can be obtained only with great effort or by transgressing

the narrow limits of the immediate physical surroundings. Thus the wood industry of the Northwest Coast would readily suggest an environmental interpretation. The great trees are there, and the wood industry, including the wonderful art, seem almost preordained by the very nature of the physical environment. But further south, along the Pacific slope, is a great region inhabited by the tribes of the California area, a region almost unique in the vastness of its forests. Now, in the culture of the California Indians this is in no way reflected, for among them wood industry has not developed.

The distribution of pottery in North America is another case in point. The clay necessary for this industry is available practically throughout the entire expanse of the continent, but pots are made only among certain tribes. Roughly speaking, a line drawn from the northeastern corner of the continent to the southwestern one would divide North America into a pot making district south and east of the line and one in which no pottery is made north and west of it. The fact that the tribes with pottery as well as those without, cluster in continuous geographical areas at once suggests that an entirely different factor is involved here, namely the diffusion of an industry from tribe to tribe.

The oft cited example of the Eskimo of arctic America and the Chukchee of Northeastern Siberia might once more be adduced here in view of its suggestiveness. What is more natural, exclaims the lusty environmentalist, than that the Eskimo should build snow houses! Are they not plentifully provided with this material almost the whole year round and does it not lend itself admirably for structural purposes, its use being, moreover, suggested by the natural forms assumed by the snow? Yes, for once the environmentalist seems to stand on firm ground—until a glance across Bering Strait reveals to one the cultural conditions of the Chukchee. Here is another arctic people, living under conditions practically identical with those of the Eskimo. The snow, in particular, is supplied by Siberian

Nature as generously as it is in the arctic of the New World. The Chukchee, however, do not build snow houses. Instead, they build their large clumsy tents of hide over heavy wooden supports and, in the face of considerable inconvenience, drag them along in their frequent migrations. Again, among the same two peoples reindeer are available in large quantities and both peoples do indeed make use of them. But in what way? When the Eskimo needs a reindeer whose meat he eats, whose hide he uses to line the outside of his kayak and the inside of his house, and whose horns form an essential part of his sledge, he goes out and kills one with his bow and arrow. To drive his sledge he uses dogs, but he has never domesticated the reindeer, a much faster and stronger animal. The Chukchee, on the other hand, have achieved this and use the reindeer to draw their sledges.

Evidently the environment is powerless to furnish an explanation of this important civilizational difference. The historico-geographical relations of the two peoples, on the other hand, readily supply an answer. The Eskimo represent the northern-most inhabitants of North America, where domestication, barring only the dog, is unknown. The Eskimo did not achieve domestication nor had they any one to learn it from. Thus, they never advanced beyond a relatively crude utilization of this important feature of their physical environment. The Chukchee, on the other hand, have lived in long historic proximity and association with the Tungus, a Turkish people, among whom the art of domesticating the horse had been known for generations. From them the Chukchee learned this useful technique, applying it to the animal available in their forbidding environment, the arctic reindeer.

It is clear, then, that not all the elements in the physical environment are culturally utilized by any given tribe. Also, that the use made of similar or identical features differs from tribe to tribe, thus resulting in a variety of cultural forms.

To this must now be added that elements not available in one's own physical environment are secured and culturally transformed. The Australian Dieri of the neighborhood of Lake Eyre, for example, send a yearly expedition to a region in Central Queensland in order to secure supplies of the pituri root, which they chew. As the country traversed by the expedition is inhabited by hostile tribes, the men must be numerous and well armed. When they reach their destination they encounter further opposition from the tribes inhabiting the district where the pituri root is found. However, they usually succeed in collecting and carrying off huge quantities of the desired commodity. The homeward journey proves a more peaceful one, as part of the supply of pituri is traded off on the way. The remainder is consumed at home or bartered to other tribes further south. Similar expeditions are sent to the southern coast to obtain ochre, a mineral utilized as a coloring substance for ceremonial designs on the ground and the decoration of the dancers.

The Todas of southern India are supplied by their neighbors, the Kota, with the earthenware indispensable in their dairies, as well as a variety of iron objects. Nor is this case exceptional, for such dependence on one's neighbors for important or even essential commodities is not uncommon among tribes in the South and Southeast of Asia.

All of these, moreover, are merely special instances of the inevitable dependence of any local civilization on other civilizations for numerous articles and appliances which are brought in through barter, war or accident, as well as for ideas, customs, ceremonies, myths, which percolate from individual to individual, from tribe to tribe, in all kinds of contact, whether regulated or non-regulated. It is true that this aspect of civilization does not play as conspicuous nor as regular a part in the cultural life of early societies as it does in modern civilization; but the factor is present nevertheless, and its importance can be easily underestimated.

In Africa, with its markets and regulated trade, and in Melanesia and Polynesia, with their orderly and frequent trading expeditions by sea, the relation of a tribe to its own physical environment is constantly and inevitably amplified by its relation to other tribes.

Still, all in all, it must be said that in early civilization every tribe utilizes in its material culture at least part of its physical environment, and also that it depends, as a rule, on its own physical environment more than on its contact with other tribes. In modern conditions all this is changed. The diffusion of labor between groups and within groups, local industrial specialization, the wellnigh unlimited sweep of modern means of transportation, the advent of large populational centers in the form of great cities, the highly developed system of credit, have completely revolutionized the environmental relations of civilization. Today, any hamlet may find itself in touch with the civilization and the physical environment of almost any spot in the world, while it may be free or almost free from any relation to its own physical environment.¹

But it is most important of all to realize that physical environment can at best but provide what Wissler called the "brick and mortar" of material civilization, it cannot determine the form. Now, while it is true that material culture must have some concrete things to operate with, which come from the physical environment, although not necessarily from that of the group itself, material culture, like all culture, is in the main a matter of form, shape, cut, pattern, fashion, style—these are the real characteristics of a culture. And as between these and the materials utilized, the latter are relatively negligible.

¹A stray example from the show window of a drug store: a bit of Gentian root from the mountains of Southern and Central Europe; some seeds of *Nux Vomica*, extracted from an orange-like fruit raised in Bombay, India; some roots of rhubarb, grown in Tartary in the interior of China; drops of aloes which flow from the cut base of a plant common in the Cape of Good Hope; a dose of peppermint herbs and bicarbonate of soda, native in the United States—all of these combined in proper proportions go to the making of certain digestive tablets.

Thus, if the material cultures of the primitive tribes of the world were classified from the standpoint of the materials used in their economic pursuits and industries, the result would be a very imperfect classification of the floral, faunal and mineral characteristics of the different regions—and to that extent the partial dependence of the different cultures on physical environment would be demonstrated—but hardly any idea could be derived, from this computation, of the material cultures of the different tribes.

Now, what is true of economic life and industry, of food and clothing, of habitat and the means of transportation, is more emphatically true of the other aspects of civilization, social and political organization, art and religion. In the case of religion and art the dependence on environmental factors is almost disappearingly small. It is true enough that the natural features, animals or plants of a region are more likely than not to figure in the religious conceptions of its inhabitants, although imported deities are not by any means uncommon. But then, in how far is this significant as a characterization of a religion? Surely what makes a difference, is not the particular mountain, river or tree, animal, fish or bird, figuring in a religion, but the way any of these are utilized or transformed by the religious ideology of a group. Similarly, it is undeniable that certain relations obtain between the substance of an object of art and its artistic elaboration: not all materials lend themselves equally well to the same processes. Nevertheless, the greatest variety of artistic styles and devices may rest against a uniform background of raw material, as is strikingly exemplified in Melanesia and Polynesia.

A word, finally, is due to social and political organization and to economic pursuits. Next to material culture these elements of civilization are evidently most closely involved here. Contrary to what one so often hears, neither social nor political structure seem to be significantly correlated with environmental factors. The fundamental forms of social

organization, such as the family, clan, phratry, and so on, are distributed over primitive areas without any regard to environmental peculiarities. And the same applies to forms of political organization. The confederated political unit, for example, is the highest form assumed by political aggregates in North America, while the centralized state reigns in a large part of Africa; and in both cases environmental differences are brushed aside in the geographical sweep of these institutions. It has sometimes been pointed out that the absence of relatively inaccessible physical boundaries favors the development of huge centralized empires, the great plains of Russia providing a favorite example. But history belies this generalization so conspicuously that it cannot be seriously considered. The transcontinental sweep of ancient Rome, the world empire of Holland, or that of France, or the imperial domains of Great Britain, held together in a grip of steel reaching out across the waters—all these and similar examples show clearly enough how little environmental factors contribute to the formation of political aggregates. Another striking example is provided by the island kingdoms of Polynesia, where hosts of relatively tiny bits of land are held together under the unified control of great chiefs or kings, notwithstanding the intervening expanse of ocean, the crossing of which, even for the seaworthy boats of the Polynesians, is at best a difficult and hazardous undertaking.

The same is true of economic life. Hunting, fishing, agriculture, the gathering of wild fruits and berries, all of these pursuits are possible only in the presence of certain environmental factors, but not one is definitely correlated with any type of environment. That physical environment is not to be disregarded in any historic study of a civilization is obvious enough, but no physical environment can in itself be held responsible for producing a definite type of civilization, nor can any environment, barring extremes, prevent a civilization from developing. "Do not talk to me about environmental determinants," the philosopher Hegel is re-

ported to have said: "where the Greeks once lived the Turks live now. That settles the matter!" In view of the preceding, it need occasion no surprise when different civilizations are found in similar environments, as is the case in continental Europe, and similar civilizations in different environments, as exemplified by England, the United States and Canada.

That this should be so is indeed obvious from a comparative analysis of civilization and of physical Nature. For all things considered, civilization is dynamic, a thing of growth and development; while environment is comparatively inert and static. It is sometimes asserted that this very stability of the environment enables it to become a powerful directing factor in civilization. But surely civilizational changes cannot be derived from the characteristics of an environment that does not change. Here comes the rejoinder that the environment does change, that the elements contributed to civilization by environment constantly shift, multiply, as civilization progresses. That this is so is, indeed, undeniable. But then, is the environment responsible for the changes? Another example: once the pre-Iroquoian Algonquin hunted in the forests on and about Manhattan; later the Iroquois cut the forests and cultivated the soil; still later the white settler applied more intensive agricultural methods to the same land; the modern population of the island, finally, erected on it and about it a great metropolis and utilized its remarkable facilities as a harbor. These different kinds of relation between culture and environment are evidently not derivable from any peculiarities of the environment, which all along remained the same, but from the fluctuating and developing interests and technical facilities of succeeding generations, facilities and interests which were history made and not environment made.

5
✓ The basic formative factors of all civilization are these: creativeness of the individual, which is responsible for the origination of cultural forms; psychological and sociological

inertia, which determines institutionalism and cultural stability; and the historic relations between human groups, which bring stimuli for change and determine the dissemination and exchange of ideas and commodities. It will be seen that these factors are psychological, sociological, historical, but not physical-environmental. Adjustment to environment is an important urge, especially in primitive society. But the necessity or desirability of such adjustment nowhere figures as an univocal determinant of cultural form. There is always more than one adjustment possible, and the particular solutions of the problem adopted by a given civilization can never be foreseen or derived from an inspection of the environmental factors alone.

DIFFUSION *versus* INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT IN EARLY CIVILIZATION

In our examination of the relation of civilization to physical environment, one factor constantly appears as a striking refutation of the very possibility of an exclusive dependence of any local civilization upon its own physical milieu. This factor is the presence in every civilization of imported elements, which appear in large numbers in every group, no matter how primitive. As these elements come from outside the group, they are evidently independent of its physical environment.

The phenomena of borrowing and diffusion as they appear in the preceding chapters amply support the conclusion reached in the "Reflections to Part I," for no matter what aspect of civilization is considered, certain elements representing this aspect are distributed everywhere (or nearly so), others cover wide continuous areas, while still others are restricted to narrowly localized civilizations.

In material culture, for example, some things are universal. Everywhere there is some form of habitation; some means of transportation is used, by land, by water, or both; some garments are worn, however scant; some tools, how-

ever crude, are employed for cutting and hammering; some weapons appear, and among these are those used in close combat, like stone knives and clubs, and those others that strike at a distance, like javelins and throwing boomerangs and the bow and arrow.

The reasons for the universally distributed features can



FIG. 54

Wissler, "The American Indian," p. 62.

not be doubted. They can be summarized under three heads: the general psychic unity of mankind, the identity of the primary needs of life and the general similarity of the physical conditions available for their satisfaction, allowance being made, moreover, for the limitation of the possible ways in which such primary adjustments can be achieved.

But as soon as any of these cultural features are specified more distinctly, the distributions begin to narrow down. From Wissler's map of the distribution of types of costumes in the two Americas, for example, it appears that tailored clothing cut to pattern, not unlike our own, is found in a wide area in the North; textile clothing is distributed from the North American Southwest, through Mexico and Central America and along the western districts of South America down to Peru; while robes are worn in the central area of North America and in the southern of South America.



FIG. 55

B. Ankermann, "Kulturkreise and Kulturschichten in Afrika,"
Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, Vol. 37, 1905, p. 62.

Or again, to follow Ankermann's African map: garments made of fur and hide occur practically throughout the entire expanse of Africa south of the Sahara and east of the western states of the Gulf of Guinea, excepting only a large area embracing most of the water-shed of the Congo and its tributaries; garments made of bark are worn in an area starting with a broad base on the Gulf of Guinea and around the lower Congo and extending eastward across the continent in a gradually narrowing wedge which reaches to the Island of Madagascar. Through part of this area the distribution of fur and hide garments, on the one hand, and of bark garments, on the other, overlap. Again,

clothes are also made of palm fibre in parts of the Congo area where fur and hide garments do not occur, as well as throughout Madagascar and in a few small districts in the west of the mainland.

Similarly, Ankermann's map of the distribution of types of huts in Africa shows more or less wide localization of certain types as well as an occasional overlapping.

Such features as pottery and agriculture, while extending beyond the limits of one continent, are far from universal in their distribution. Pottery is widely prevalent in Amer-




FIG. 56.

B. Ankermann, "Kulturkreise," etc., p. 56.

ica (Fig. 57); it is found throughout most of Africa south of the Sahara, except among the Bushmen in the South; it occurs throughout India, although some of the Indian tribes, like the Todas of the South, do not manufacture the pots themselves. In Australia there is no pottery nor is any made in Polynesia, while in Melanesia it occurs sporadically. Again, agriculture is distributed in America in an area considerably narrower than that of the distribution of pottery; it is carried on in Africa almost throughout the enormous expanse south of the Sahara and north of the desert of Kalahari, excepting only some large thickly wooded districts; it does not occur in Australia, and is

found only in the form of garden culture in Melanesia and Polynesia.

More particular features have a much narrower distribution, while details of technique and pattern, finally, are localized in small groups of tribes or even in individual




FIG. 57

Distribution of pottery (Wissler, "The American Indian," p. 68)

tribes. Wissler's study of Plains shirts, for example, shows a differentiation of pattern from tribe to tribe, and as indicated before, the guardian spirit cults in this area are similarly differentiated.

To take another illustration from the domain of art. The art work of Melanesia taken as a unit can be clearly differentiated from that of Polynesia. Although wood

industry is the predominant artistic pursuit in both areas, open work or filigree, which is characteristic of Melanesia, is almost unknown in Polynesia except among the Maori of New Zealand; the use of color is almost universal in Melanesia and absent in Polynesia, in this case, with the sole exception of the Maori; animal patterns are constantly used in Melanesia in fairly realistic or semi-conventionalized form, while in Polynesia only the human figure is used as a pattern and the conventionalization is almost always extreme; again, the polishing of art objects has reached a high degree of perfection in Polynesia, while almost unknown in Melanesia.

And once again, a more detailed study reveals unmistakable local differentiations. The pottery of Fiji, the shields and spear throwers of New Guinea, the wooden gongs of the New Hebrides, the open work totemic columns and masks of New Ireland, the clubs and wooden foot rests of the Marquesas, the spears set with shark teeth of the Gilbert Islands, the feather work of Hawaii, the great wooden idols of Easter Island, and the grotesque jade neck ornaments of New Zealand; all of these are unique, highly distinctive features, each one of which may serve to identify a particular locality.

lead
son Similar phenomena encounter one on all sides. Some social units, the conditions for which are given everywhere, are universal; such are the family and the local group, as well as one or another form of age, sex and relationship groups. Other social units—the clan, gens, dual division—are widely distributed in different continents, but not omnipresent. Other more specialized forms, like the class or the maternal family, have strictly limited distribution, the former as a typical Australian feature, the latter as a peculiarity of the Iroquois League. Again, as soon as the social functions of these units are considered, the distribution of those with uniform functions narrows down still further.

It is clear, then, that the generalization reached on the basis of the analysis of the five test tribes in Part I, is borne

out by a wider comparative material. What we find is an universal or nearly universal distribution of such cultural features as flow directly from man's psychic nature and his relation to his physical and social environment. Then come other features, some distributed in great continuous areas, others in ever narrowing districts, down to specific highly individualized traits characteristic of just a few localities or only one local group. As an interpretation of the distributions of the features that are not universal or near universal, we must repeat our former conclusion: they can only be explained by the constant origination, in particular localities, of new cultural peculiarities or of variations of old ones, and the subsequent spread of these from tribe to tribe, by diffusion. 11

At times certain very general historical conclusions can be derived from these distributions alone. Thus some cultural features are widely distributed in great continuous areas, but absent in others equally great. Apart from other evidence, this would suggest that the feature in question originated only a very few times or perhaps only once in the area of its distribution. This would apply, for example, to the wheel, found in the Old World alone, to the riddle, or to institutionalized legal procedure.

The most complicated and difficult aspects of the diffusion problem arise in cases different from the above, in those namely, where the geographical distribution of a trait is discontinuous.

In some cases of discontinuous distribution the geographical facts alone may furnish an answer to the problem. In the following map, for example, the distribution of totemism in Africa is represented. It is strikingly discontinuous. Now totemism, as we saw, is a widespread cultural phenomenon, not restricted to Africa, but common to many primitive areas. It must therefore be assumed that it has originated independently a number of times. It would, nevertheless, be against all probability to assume a separate origin of totemism for each one of the distribution areas of

Africa, especially on account of the highly comparable forms of totemism which occur here. It must therefore be assumed that historic contact has taken place at least between some of these areas, or that there were connecting links of totemic tribes among whom totemism has subsequently fallen into decay. The alternative or subsidiary hypothesis would be that the investigation of African tribes not being complete, cases of totemism have been overlooked.



FIG. 58

B. Ankermann, "Verbreitung und Formen des Totemismus in Afrika,"
Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, Vol. 47, 1915, p. 180.

There are innumerable other instances where an answer cannot be so readily provided. Religious societies, for example, occur in northern Melanesia, in West Africa, among some natives of Brazil, and in several areas in North America. Must historic contact be assumed here or a remote common historic origin, or are the societies in the several areas to be derived from disparate historic sources? Another case is provided by the art of New Ireland when compared with that of the Northwest Coast of America. In both areas the art objects in question consist of decorated poles. The carved decorations to which color is applied represent animals intertwined in various ways. In both localities, finally, these poles have a symbolic religious significance and figure in ceremonies. Such are the similarities. But there are differences. The totemic poles of New Ireland are small ceremonial objects, some

three to five feet high; the carved decoration is in the form of open work or filigree, the whole carving producing a light lace-like effect. The totem poles of the Northwest Coast, on the other hand, are gigantic posts looming far above the roofs of the houses, while the carving is in high or low relief, but not in open work, the total effect being ponderous and massive. Without pressing the parallel too closely, the New Ireland carvings might be likened to the Gothic, those of the Northwest Coast to the Egyptian styles of decoration. Now, under these conditions, should the similarities between the arts of the two areas be ascribed to historic contact or to independent origin?

Another illustration of a different type is provided by a special variety of panpipe, in which each closed pipe is coupled with an open one of approximately the same length which sounds the octave of the closed one. This musical instrument occurs only in two widely separated areas: in the Solomon Islands and western Polynesia, and again, in Peru and Bolivia. It was also found that a panpipe of Northwestern Brazil was built to produce a system of sounds which agreed very closely with the sound systems of some specimens from the South Sea area. The similarity is unquestionably a striking one, but the distance between the two areas is great and the probability of historic contact slight. Should the hypothesis of diffusion be adopted in the face of such difficulties, or is independent origin to be held responsible for the striking similarities in question, which, in this case, would have to be regarded as accidental? Numerous examples that have puzzled investigators and have led to acrimonious discussion, are provided by the domain of mythology. The so-called tale of the Magic Flight is one. This tale contains the following incidents: a flight from an ogre, objects thrown by the one pursued, forming obstacles to the ogre's advance: first a stone which turns into a mountain, then a comb which becomes a thicket, and finally a bottle of oil which changes into a body of water. This tale is widely but not continuously distributed

both in the Old and in the New Worlds. Can it be assumed that the above group of incidents as part of one tale originated independently in the several areas?

The classical evolutionist was not greatly troubled over examples such as this. To him all such instances attested the similarity of the human mind and the parallelism of cultural development. But we may not share the consoling faith of the evolutionist. The universality of the phenomena of diffusion amply attested to by the preceding discussion, does not permit one to stress the theory of independent development at the expense of the alternative possibility of explaining cultural similarities through a common ultimate origin or through historic diffusion from one tribe to another.

Now, one factor will always favor the hypothesis of diffusion: it is its demonstrability in specific instances; whereas independent origin must at best always remain problematic. Prompted by the historic ubiquity of diffusion as well as by its demonstrability, a number of modern students of cultural phenomena turned their backs upon the generalizations of the evolutionist, showing a decided tendency to interpret most or even all similarities of culture through historic contact or ultimate unity of origin. First among these students stands Ratzel, the geographer, to whom we had occasion to refer in connection with his environmentalism. He was primarily concerned with objects of material culture, having himself carried out several intensive investigations of the distribution of material objects, for example, of African bows, of a special variety of armor, and the like. His view was that the interpretation of similarities in this domain must lie in the direction of historic contact. In spiritual factors he was less interested, and here he allowed for the possibility of the independent origin of similarities.

More recently, F. Graebner, a young student of history, embraced the creed of Ratzel and developed it into a more systematic as well as dogmatic ideological structure, at the

foundation of which lies the theory of diffusion. Graebner rejects as unprovable all explanations of similarities through independent origin, pinning his faith on the possibility of proving historic connection in all such instances. Graebner is also primarily interested in material culture.

In still more recent years the theory of diffusion as a system of interpretation of cultural similarities received a fresh impetus through the work of Rivers, who in his two-volume book on "The History of Melanesian Society" has attempted a hypothetical historic reconstruction unprecedented in its complexity, with the theory of diffusion as his principal tool. Among his followers, Elliot Smith has achieved the questionable distinction of outdoing the dogmatism of the evolutionist by his reckless utilization of diffusion as an interpretation of widespread cultural similarities, supporting his theory by a comparative material apparently as inexhaustible in quantity and handled as uncritically as was the comparative material of the evolutionist.

The value of the last-named theory cannot be examined here. The idea of a Megalithic culture originated in the Eighth Century B. C., in Egypt, spreading thence through the Mediterranean region, over the southern areas of Asia and the island expanses of Melanesia and Polynesia to the remote countries of Mexico and Peru; this idea, however alluring, would require a delicate technique and categorical demonstration before it could claim serious attention. The methods used by Elliot Smith are, on the contrary, so loose that the entire speculative edifice erected by him can at best be regarded as another link in that chain of top-heavy hypotheses, born of uncontrolled flights of the imagination and unchecked by either patient research or a strict method of procedure.

The works of Graebner and Rivers stand on a different level. The fundamental principles of Graebner's position are these: the independent development of cultural similarities can be assumed only after all attempts to demon-

strate diffusion have failed. The criteria of similarity are two, one is qualitative in its nature, referring to the details of similarity in the compared objects, beliefs or institutions; the other criterion is a quantitative one, indicating how many items of similarity can be discerned between two areas or cultures, or separate aspects of such cultures. If an examination from these two standpoints reveals conspicuous similarities, diffusion must be assumed, however great the distance between the two areas in question and however difficult or improbable historic contact between them. On the basis of these assumptions Graebner builds his theory of cultural strata and of "culture areas"¹ into an examination of which we need not enter here.

Now, our discussion has shown that independent development of similarities must be assumed as a general postulate in connection with civilizational interpretations, although it is, of course, true that rigorous proof of independent development as against diffusion can but seldom be furnished. It will have been noted that Graebner regards cultural similarities as readily ascertained and evaluated. That, however, is by no means the case. Two simple objects of material culture, two stone knives, for instance, or two paddles, can be compared with little difficulty; but as soon as the elements compared reach a certain degree of complexity or comprise psychological or sociological factors, comparison becomes difficult and the concept of similarity itself, vague. In the instance of the religious societies referred to before, as well as in that of the decorative arts of New Ireland and the Northwest Coast, numerous differ-

¹Graebner's "culture areas" (*Kulturkreise*) must be sharply distinguished from the culture areas of American ethnology; for whereas the latter represent conceptualized descriptions of cultural complexes constituting actual geographical and historical units, Graebner's *Kulturkreise* are purely hypothetical reconstructions, inferred from the geographical distributions of separate elements of culture.

A detailed statement of Graebner's position will be found in his "Methode der Ethnologie," and brief expositions and criticisms, in Lowie ("The Concept of Convergence in Ethnology," *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, 1912) and Boas (review of Graebner's book in *Science*, 1911). For American culture area concept, see Wissler's "American Indian," Chapter XIV.

ences are combined with equally numerous similarities. Here the value of the qualitative and quantitative standards as tests of the similarities involved is limited, if any conclusions are to be drawn with reference to the probability of the independent development or of diffusion of such similarities. It is precisely this difficulty of establishing similarities and of appraising their extent and significance which forces the student to introduce the geographico-historical factor whenever questions of independent or derived origin of similarities are to be decided.¹

Rivers' contributions to the theory of diffusion are of especial interest, as this investigator deserves great credit for the introduction of a number of highly accurate and serviceable methods into the domain of ethnological study. He himself, moreover, regards his later works as distinct contributions to the theory and methodology of diffusion. There is, without question, a great difference between the approach of Graebner and that of Rivers. The latter evaluates psychological factors more justly than does Graebner, thus achieving a closer approach to cultural reality. Rivers insists, for example, that new cultural elements may appear as a result of culture contact, which were not present in either of the two civilizations before contact was achieved. A mere reference must suffice to his great work on "The History of Melanesian Society," the second volume of which represents a closely knit theoretical argument which stands alone in the entire domain of ethnology.² Two of the author's smaller contributions, however, readily

¹In explanation of Graebner's extreme diffusionism, it must be said that it reflects the outlook of a man who has dealt largely with material culture. All of Graebner's principles apply more readily to this domain of civilization than to any other. Diffusion, for example, is more easily demonstrable with reference to objects than it is with reference to social customs or religious ideas. Again, similarities between things are more readily detected, described and evaluated than similarities between ideas, faiths or forms of behavior. Also, material culture, if it persists at all, is more likely to persist in a relatively unchanged form than is spiritual culture, owing to the fact that material things are relatively immune against the transforming influences of psychological agencies.

²Unfortunately Rivers has not escaped the pitfalls of dogmatic diffusionism (*Cf.* my review of Rivers' book in *Science*, Vol. 44, pp. 824-828, 1916).

lend themselves to a brief critical examination. Both refer to Australia, and in both the author attempts to intercept certain peculiarities of Australian civilization by an argument designed to demonstrate its cultural complexity. In the article on "The Contact of Peoples,"¹ Rivers notes the contrast between the physical uniformity of the Australians and the general cultural homogeneity of the continent, and the strange diversity of the methods of disposal of the dead. As Rivers states, nearly every one of the known methods of disposal are practiced here: inhumation in the extended and contracted positions, preservation on platforms and trees and in caverns, a simple kind of embalming and also cremation.

It is next to impossible to assume, claims Rivers, that so great a variety of burial methods should have originated independently in the continent of Australia. They must have been brought from without. But how explain the fact that the people who bestowed these many varieties of the disposal of the dead upon the Australians did not similarly influence the other aspects of their civilization and left the physical type of the Australian untouched by intermarriage? Rivers' answer is this. As a guide to our interpretation we must assume the following postulates: 1, a profound influence may be exerted by a foreign civilization, although represented by but a few immigrants, if that civilization is sufficiently superior to that of the natives to impress them as great and wonderful; and 2, civilizational elements, even though useful, may disappear through a change in fashion or, if the elements are imported, through the non-adaptability of the recipient civilization.²

Now then, it must be assumed that an immigrant people with a superior civilization have found their way to Aus-

¹In "Essays and Studies Presented to William Ridgeway, 1913, pp. 474-59.

²In a previous article on "The Disappearance of Useful Arts" (Westermarck Anniversary Volume, 1912) Rivers has presented an argument for this position. As an instance, he utilized the case of Polynesia, where the once widespread bow and arrow has been relegated to the position of a weapon of sport, the club having taken its place as a weapon of more essential use.

tralia. Their number was small, but their civilization superior. The natives were impressed. Especially striking to the aborigines appeared the foreign funeral rites, and in the course of time the new method of disposal of the dead was adopted by the natives. The number of intruders having been small, they were subsequently absorbed by the native population without leaving any physical traces of their former presence. Most of the civilizational changes which they brought with them also disappeared, the crude culture of the Australians proving a non-receptive soil; but the new method of disposing of the dead persisted and remained. Then there came another immigration, similarly carried out by a few individuals representing a higher civilization. Once more, the same process was gone through, another method of burial being adopted by the natives among other civilizational peculiarities. This was followed by a second relapse, most of the newly imported cultural features being again lost, excepting only the new method of burial, which persisted. And as the number of the second immigrants was also small, they were similarly absorbed without any visible effect upon the native population. This process was repeated again and again, until all the methods of disposal of the dead now current in Australia were one by one imported and adopted by the natives.

Now, can a theory of this sort be seriously considered as an interpretation of a phase of Australian culture? The feasibility of Rivers' postulates taken in themselves cannot be denied, but the very number of hypothetical factors introduced into his theory renders it so highly artificial that even approximation to historic truth must in this case be regarded as outside the range of probability.

In his essay on "The Sociological Significance of Myths," Rivers argues that myths are made about the unusual. Now, social organization, being one of the basic elements of civilization, is, therefore, least likely to rise into consciousness and to become a subject of mythological speculation.

¹Folk-Lore, Vol. 23, 1912.

How is it, then, that myths in Central Australia are invented about the clans as well as about the dual divisions? The answer once more favors an interpretation through culture contact. The myths about the clans are readily explained, claims Rivers: these groups here are no longer mere units of social organization, rather have they become a ceremonio-religious institution, and, as such, they may be expected to stimulate the myth building imagination. As to the dual divisions, they must be regarded as of foreign origin, this being the only way in which the mythologies that have grown up about these divisions can be accounted for. A people with a clan organization must have encountered one with dual divisions, and having adopted the latter, invented myths about these strange social units with which they were formerly unacquainted.

Once more, the high artificiality of the theory must dispose of it as a serious attempt at cultural interpretation. For, what is the probability of the picture drawn by Rivers actually reflecting historic reality?

If space permitted we might have discussed here Wissler's comparative sketch of Blackfoot material culture, in which a minute comparison of traits between this tribe and other Plains tribes leads to the conclusion that the Blackfoot must have borrowed all of the fundamental elements of their material culture, having originated none. Or, we might have followed the same author in his careful historic reconstruction of the diffusion of horse culture in the Plains. The horse, originally of Spanish importation, gradually made its way northward, spreading from tribe to tribe. Wissler argues convincingly that the presence of the horse, which added nothing but itself to Plains civilization, nevertheless contributed to the cultural physiognomy of this area by precipitating intertribal intercourse and thereby stimulating the diffusion and interpenetration of cultural traits. Still another essay that would have deserved especial attention is Lowie's monograph on the Age Societies of the Plains Indians. In this historical and comparative sum-

mary, the tribal societies are subjected to a most minute analysis from the standpoint of the features which they comprise, and are, as a result of such an analysis, ultimately classified as originators, borrowers or transmitters of the various traits.

It must suffice here to merely refer to these meritorious contributions, while taking time to deal somewhat more carefully with Berthold Laufer's essay "The Potter's Wheel."¹ It is well known that among primitive tribes pots are made by hand, but among tribes on a higher civilizational level pots are often turned on the wheel, a much more expeditious and efficient method. Now the potter's wheel, argues Laufer, is distributed through a well defined area. It is found only in the Old World: in ancient Egypt, the Mediterranean and west Asiatic civilizations, Iran, India and China with her dependencies. In this area the distribution of the potter's wheel has remained practically unchanged for milleniums. On the other hand, primitive tribes do not seem to adopt it even when surrounded by more civilized groups who have it. Thus, the Vedda of Ceylon fashion pots by hand, while the neighboring Singalese use the wheel. The African Negroes, who might have learned the use of the wheel from the ancient Egyptians or later from the Arabs, never seem to have been acquainted with its use. The Yakut of Northeastern Siberia continue to produce pottery by hand, notwithstanding their intermarriages with the Russians and the fact that wheel-made Russian pottery is for sale at Yakutsk. Now, hand-made pottery, argues Laufer, is as a rule woman's work, the participation of men in this pursuit being always strictly localized and limited. The potter's wheel, on the other hand, is the creation of man. It must therefore be regarded as an entirely distinct invention which entered the field of pot-

¹In his monograph on the "Beginnings of Porcelain in China," *Field Museum of Natural History, Anthropological Series*, Vol. XV, No. 2, pp. 148-177.

tery from the outside, as it were, and when it came, man came with it and took over the pot-making industry.

This historic distinctness of the two methods of pottery making is reflected in the customs current in different countries. In India and China the division of ceramic labor sets apart the thrower or wheel potter and separates him from the molder. The potters of India who work on the wheel do not intermarry with those who do not. They form a caste by themselves. There is also a functional distinction between the two kinds of pots. And most important of all, wherever the potter's wheel is in use, it is manipulated by men, never by women.

Technically speaking, the potter's wheel is nothing but a primitive cart wheel turning on its axle. The existence of the potter's wheel therefore presupposes the existence of the wheel adapted to transportation. In accordance with this, it is found that in all of the civilizations with the potter's wheel, the cart wheel is also in use. Further, wherever the potter's wheel occurs, while the wheel cart does not, the former is known to have been introduced from a different culture. In Japan, for example, which had no cart, the potter's wheel has been introduced from Korea, while the Tibetans, who also lack wheel vehicles, received the potter's wheel from the Chinese, who still have the monopoly of its handling in Tibet. On the other hand, wherever there is no potter's wheel, there is also no wheeled cart. In other words, in all cases where original conditions have remained undisturbed, the wheel cart and the potter's wheel either do not exist or co-exist. It is thus clear, concludes Laufer, that the potter's wheel may not be conceived as an evolutionary stage in the development of pottery technique; that there is nothing in hand-made pottery to prepare such future development; that the potter's wheel, which by its technical aspect and geographic distribution is unmistakably identified with the cart wheel, belonged to a distinct and localized civilization, and, being

like the cart wheel man's invention, came into the industry of pot making from the outside, bringing man with it.

The critical acumen displayed throughout this essay, only fragments of which can be given here, is extraordinary and it carries conviction. The contribution of the great sinologist represents one of the most illuminating examples of the striking results that can be obtained when the theory of diffusion, instead of being used as a sweeping principle of interpretation, is applied with unceasing care and critical circumspection, at the hand of relevant comparisons and minute studies of local peculiarities.

Notwithstanding the methodological weakness of Rivers' handling of the problem of diffusion, he deserves credit for drawing attention to the multiplicity of psychological factors involved and for paving the way for their solution. Clearly, the conception that diffusion is a quasi-mechanical process of the physical transplantation of cultural traits from one tribe to another, cannot withstand serious criticism. It is not enough to realize that a cultural feature leaves its original home, travels and arrives in a foreign tribe. It is equally important to know how and why it departs, what fates befall it in its wanderings and what reception it receives in its new home.

A passage from another publication may prove illuminating in this connection:

"But even the most superficial analysis would suffice to show how little we know about a cultural situation when all we know about it is that a feature belonging to a culture has been borrowed by another culture. How often does such a feature remain a foreign body in its new cultural environment! Instance the *art nouveau* of western Europe, which, toward the end of the past century, spread through the domain of the plastic and decorative arts, and, from a modest beginning in its application to small decorative objects, rose to the level of a new artistic style, and all but created a novel form of architecture. Eventually the *art nouveau* crossed the Atlantic, but, in its new surroundings,

proved most ineffective. After languishing for a number of years in the show-windows of fashionable stationery and art stores, it vanished without leaving any apparent trace on any form of American art.

"A somewhat striking example of a cultural feature which, notwithstanding a prolonged objective association with a cultural medium, failed to be psychologically assimilated by that medium, is furnished by the history of classical education in the public schools of the Russian Empire. Engrafted upon the Russian school curriculum by an indiscriminative government, taught by teachers of foreign birth, radically at variance with the intellectual interests and the practical needs of the Russian educated classes, classicism in Russia never became an integral part either of the culture of the people or of their educational system.

"If further instances be sought, they may be readily found wherever 'civilized' nations have come in contact with primitive tribes, whether through colonization, trade, or scientific expeditions. In all such instances we find that our material culture, customs, habits of dress and behavior, even religious and moral notions, are often adopted by the nations in a formal way, as it were, without for long periods of time radically affecting the intellectual or emotional content of their culture, or even their essential habits of action.

"Instances of partial assimilation of borrowed cultural features can as readily be given. The American university with its college and schools is one. Modelled after mediaeval and more recent European patterns, the American university has to a large extent become assimilated and transformed by American life, with its peculiar ideals and requirements. The process, however, cannot be regarded as completed, and evidence is plentiful of the varied maladjustments of our universities and colleges to the practical, moral and intellectual requirements of today.

"The failure of the policy of Russianization in Poland and Finland is another case in point. Both Russian Poland and Finland have certainly absorbed much of Russian cul-

ture, but these acquired traits were but partly assimilated by the historic cultures of the two countries; and in both cases the well co-ordinated organism of an autonomous culture is but superficially hidden behind the outward guise of Russian institutions.

"Among the Kwakiutl of the Northwest Coast the institution of maternal descent, no doubt derived from the northern tribes, without becoming the dominant form, was assimilated by the prevailing institutions to a sufficient extent to result in a highly characteristic hybrid organization which combines features of maternal and paternal descent; in the ghost-dance religions of the American Indians one easily discerns partly transformed features of Christian belief and dogma; in Iroquoian and other cosmologies biblical incidents appear in transparent guise; in innumerable Indian stories and myths, elements of European folk-lore are but partly co-ordinated with the genuine Indian content.

"In other cases, perfect assimilation of imported elements has taken place. In modern civilization, numerous cultural traits originally belonging to disparate cultures have become so thoroughly acclimatized in their new media as to lay the foundation of that ever-progressing uniformity in many essentials of culture called 'internationalism.'

"The European horse has been made their own by the Plains Indians, even to the extent of becoming one of the most characteristic traits of their culture. The Salish Bella Coola have borrowed so much and so well of the social organization, religion, ceremonies, material culture, of the coast peoples, as to become practically identical, culturally, with those peoples.

"The mechanism and psychology of the borrowing processes exemplified above would, if properly understood, certainly reveal profound and significant differences. By embracing all of these processes in the general terms of diffusion or genetic relationship, no more is achieved than to suggest the initial direction for further research."

¹"The Principle of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Culture" (*The Journal of American Folk-Lore*, Vol. XXVI, 1913).

In many instances the undoubted presence of borrowed traits must be recognized, but to draw a sharp line between indigenous and borrowed features may nevertheless remain difficult. A large number of instances in point are provided by Paul Radin in his interesting sketch of the Peyote Cult of the Winnebago. "There are a number of cases," writes Radin, "where it is impossible to determine whether we are dealing with a re-interpretation or with a substitution. As this is an exceedingly important question, I will enumerate a few examples: baptism; the crook; confessions; and the story of the two roads.

"Dipping one's hand in water and drawing lines on the forehead of an individual sounds like the real Christian baptism, to be sure. Yet we know that painting the patient's face was a prominent feature in the shaman's treatment of disease; and that Rave speaks of it in connection with the conversion of his own wife. Are we then to regard the baptism here as a re-interpretation of the old Winnebago custom, or as a real substitution of Christian baptism? And if the later alternative is accepted, what influence are we to ascribe to the older Winnebago belief in suggesting Christian baptism? The same question will have to be answered in connection with the crook, confessions, and the story of the two roads. The bear clan had two ornamented sticks, of which Rave's family was the keeper. In general appearance there was not much difference between these and the Christian shepherd's crook. What is the relation of the two? In the ritualistic myth telling of the road to heaven, one finds the bifurcating road, one leading to Earth-maker, the other to the Bad Spirit. In the peyote cult we find the familiar biblical story of the two roads, one leading to Heaven, and the other to eternal damnation. Again, let us take the question of the confessions. In their present form they certainly seem Christian, with a strong suggestion of the early Methodists. Yet giving testimony to the magical virtues of herbs in order to prove that one has been blessed by certain spirits was characteristic of all Winne-

bagoes when first participating in a religious cult society. Granted even that all these things really are Christian elements, it is quite obvious that the fact that they were so readily accepted, suggests a relation between them and the older elements enumerated, and that just as in the case of ceremonial units, so here too there has been a selective borrowing, determined by the specific possessions of the recipient's cultural background."

The instances cited by Radin and other similar situations suggest a significant similarity between the phenomena of diffusion, on the one hand, and those of indigenous growth on the other.

It may be of use here to quote another passage from my article referred to before:

"In discussions of cultural origins, and in other connections, it is customary to contrast the processes within a culture conceived of as 'inner growth' with the processes involved in cultural contact. Now, in addition to the differences displayed by the two sets of phenomena, there are also fundamental psychological similarities. Ideas or customs that come from another culture may be totally rejected, or, as indicated before, they may either remain essentially foreign to the new medium or become partly or thoroughly assimilated. These ideas or customs are first introduced by individuals or groups of individuals, and spread through the cultural area by a more or less rapid process of diffusion. Now, all of these traits apply also to ideas or customs which spring up within the group. They also may be rejected, partly or wholly assimilated, and they spread in essentially the same way. The mechanism and psychology of the processes are strikingly similar. Of course, there is an important difference: the ideas and customs of indigenous origin are more likely to prove acceptable and become assimilated than those coming from without. This is obviously due to the fact that the ideas and customs that spring up within a culture are in part deter-

"A Sketch of the Peyote Cult of the Winnebago," *Journal of Religious Psychology*, Vol. VII, 1914, p. 22.

mined by that culture, while those that come from without are independent of the recipient cultural medium. The main difference, then, seems to lie, not in the processes of moulding and assimilation to which the two sets of ideas and customs are subjected in a cultural medium, but to the fact that the range and character of the two sets of ideas and customs are to a greater or less extent different. Clearly, also, this difference will be the less, the greater the similarity between the two cultures in contact.

"It thus appears that not only are the phenomena of diffusion replete with psychological problems, but the character of these problems is in many ways related to that of the problems arising in the study of concrete cultural complexes."¹

Before leaving these somewhat fragmentary remarks on the problems of the diffusion of civilization it remains to note the great importance of the diffusion of culture as a stimulant of civilization. Men like Ratzel, Graebner and, in part, Rivers, were greatly impressed by the rôle of diffusion as an objective constituent of human history. But Rivers, as was shown, also recognized the significance of diffusion as a condition of cultural growth and development.² In his recent "Processes of History," Professor Teggart practically identifies the very possibility of progress with cultural contact and conflict under special conditions. As against this we must reiterate our former position that the diffusion of civilization from tribe to tribe is but one of the basic factors in cultural advance, the other factor being human creativeness, resulting in the independent origination of new things and ideas.³

¹ "The Principle of Limited Possibilities, etc.," pp. 286-287.

² Cf., for example, his statement in the introduction to the second volume of his "History of Melanesian Society": "The general mode of treatment of this book holds a middle course between those of the evolutionary and historical schools because the principle underlying it is that the contact of peoples and the blending of their cultures act as the chief stimuli setting in action the forces which lead to human progress" (pp. 5-6).

³ Cf. my essay on "History, Psychology and Culture," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. XV, Section XII, "The Deterministic and the Accidental in History."

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PART III
THE IDEAS OF EARLY MAN



INTRODUCTION

The missing link of biology has its psychological analogue. There are, in fact, many such psychological missing links. Whether our ancestor was the anthropoid ape or his cousin, or a common relative of both and of man, the psychology of our closest known precursors is so far different from our own as to be scarcely commensurable with it. Nor is this all. If one attempts to picture, in abstraction, this psycho-physical missing link of a man, what are the symptoms of identification to be? Is it language, or the use of tools, or religion, or the art of living together with one's kind in some sort of regulated community? And in accordance with the symptom chosen, the being thus identified would be a different one.

To this a conceivable answer might be that the primitive man in question, the psychological missing link, would be like the man of today or of yesterday, minus civilization. But then, who is there to tell us where civilization ends and the original nature of man begins, or what would be left of man were civilization removed?

The difficulties besetting this problem marred the cogency of the numerous speculations about our psychological forerunner. Some, like Rousseau, conceived of him as of an apotheosized animal before the fall, peaceful, pure and beautifully adjusted to the social life about him; and, with him, of Eve, equally pure and peaceful. It is indeed fairly easy to find illustrations of such quasi-beatific conditions among early communities, and Spencer, who had his own anti-militaristic axe to grind, is fond of quoting such examples whenever required. The theologians of two and three generations ago felt themselves in accord with biblical tradition when they interpreted the civilizations of primitive man as now found on the surface of the globe as representing decaying remnants of once higher civilizations.

And here once more Herbert Spencer, the arch-evolutionist, is tempted to account by regression and decay for some surprisingly high civilizational "remnants" among primitive tribes.

Part of Spencer's psychological speculations refer, as we shall see, to that apocryphal individual, man without civilization. In this connection, one fact is certain: early man as we know him, the early man represented by the surviving tribes of American Indians, Negroes or Australians, is as far removed from the psychological missing link as we are ourselves. He has a historic past. His history is, in fact, as long as ours. It might indeed be deemed longer, if our history is to begin with a civilization at all like our own. Historic fates have driven him in directions differing vastly from that taken by modern civilization; but in his past, as in ours, there was historic cumulation of knowledge and tradition; there was invention and change; slow, gradual transformation and cataclysmic upheaval; and, perhaps at intervals, regression and decay. Where among these historically deposited civilizational layers are we to discern the original nature of man? Like the kernel of Peer Gynt's onion, it evades us:

What an enormous number of swathings!
 Isn't the kernel soon coming to light?
 I'm blest if it is! To the innermost centre it's nothing but swathings—
 each smaller and smaller—
 Nature is witty!

Yes, and tantalizingly obscure. The fact is that man, early as well as modern, lives by second nature. His original nature is an abstraction or at best but a reconstruction born of doubtful premises, swaying insecurely in the chronological vacuum of missing links. When we study early man, it is not this phantom-like creature that concerns us, but the concrete early man of history and of civilization, our brother in second nature.

Space does not permit to review here any large number of the theories promulgated about the mentality of primi-

tive man. But before we summarize our own conclusions, in which connection the data here presented will be found of use, it may be of interest to outline and briefly to criticize a few of the more prominent attempts to interpret primitive mentality.

The theories to be discussed are those of Spencer, Frazer, Wundt, Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl and Freud.

CHAPTER XV

THEORIES OF EARLY MENTALITY

SPENCER'S THEORIES

Like so many others, Spencer found that the most promising approach to primitive mentality was through religion. Hence the first part of the first volume of his *Sociology* is devoted to this subject. The following three elements of Spencer's theory have received wide attention: fear, as the emotional root of all religion; the idea of a ghost, derived in the main from the dream image; and ancestor worship, which in Spencer's system becomes the prototype of all religious ceremonialism.

On the general background of the idea of a double—which, as will be presently shown, Spencer derives from certain other experiences—the dream image comes upon the scene. Into the conceptual chaos of incipient animism the dream image brings order and unity. It reduces to a common denominator the at first discordant ideas of duality and spirituality. The spiritualized double, linked to man through the medium of the dream image, becomes, after death, the ghost. This, according to Spencer, is the cornerstone of early theology. The ghost, spirit of a departed man, becomes a general principle of interpretation of all puzzles in savage experience. The breath, the shadow, the echo, epileptic and cataleptic fits, and finally death itself, are now interpreted through the operation, intrusion or departure of ghosts. The feelings of fear and awe, which early become associated with these disquieting agents, provide the emotional root of the earliest religion, the propitiation of ancestors. From this all the rest follows. By means of a great collection of highly ingenious hypotheses Spencer tries to explain how animal, plant and

nature worship are ultimately derivable from this early cult of ancestors, and how the higher forms of religion, including the belief in one supreme personal deity, gradually arise out of the decay of some of these early ideas and the coalescence of others. The artificiality of Spencer's treatment in this part of his work is best illustrated by his once famous theory of the misinterpretation of nicknames introduced by the author as an attempt to furnish at least a partial explanation of animal worship.

This is the theory:

Primitive tribes are wont to designate individuals by animal names. Now suppose a man named Bear distinguishes himself as a warrior, chief, medicine-man or in some other way. His children will pride themselves on being known as the children of the Bear. So will their children, who may still have seen their grandfather alive and who know many individuals to whom his name has an emotional value. After this the identity of the ancestor rapidly fades. Moreover, in view of the tendency of primitive languages to confuse a name with a thing named (*sic!*), the idea will take root that the Bear's descendents were really the descendents of a bear, there being nothing extraordinary in this conception for primitive mentality. The respect, veneration, and perhaps worship accorded the eminent ancestor will now be centered on the bear. Thus bear worship will arise in the group.

The theory is so obviously far-fetched that no anthropological training is required to reject all serious consideration of it, but in its time it enjoyed considerable renown. Spencer, moreover, was not satisfied to leave it in this form, but pursued it further with that merciless "logic" characteristic of the philosopher. We also find in this phenomenon, argues Spencer, an explanation of the worship of those strange creatures whose very existence in primitive civilization has so often puzzled the investigator. Whence come the strange monsters, half animal, half human, half bird, half reptile, in the absence of all confirmatory experience? Why, the same process furnishes a ready explanation. The

remote descendents of a Lion man and an Eagle woman may come to regard their family line as having originated from a lion and an eagle. At first separated into two creatures, the ancestral couple will ultimately merge into one animalistic monster, a lion-eagle, a creature part lion, part eagle. Similarly, when the custom of animal names begins to give way before the later tendency of giving human names, the monster creatures will often assume the shape of a half human, half animal individual; until finally, animal names having meanwhile gone out of use, purely human ancestors will command in person the respect and worship which heretofore was accorded them in animal or half animal disguise.

A better instance of the rationalization of the historic process could scarcely be found than this derivation of animal worship from the misinterpretation of nicknames!

In the light of fuller knowledge and in the face of the demands of a critical method other elements of Spencer's theory prove equally fallacious. The very idea of a double as the first form of spirit is questionable, for multiplicity of spirits or souls of individuals is so commonly encountered among even the most primitive communities that it may well be assumed that in many instances, if not in all, a plurality of souls preceded one soul.¹ The derivation of all spirits from ghosts is no less artificial. No ground, in fact, can be advanced for this assertion save the philosopher's addiction to monogenetic derivations.² It is equally doubtful whether fear constituted the most conspicuous ingredient of the emotion at the root of earliest religion. The ethnographic evidence decidedly contradicts the assumption

¹Lévy-Bruhl is amply justified in insisting on this point. While Wundt's ideas of early animism differ from Lévy-Bruhl's in many ways, he is equally emphatic in his insistence on the multiplicity of "body souls"—souls connected with the separate organs of the body—which must have preceded the more generalized notion of a "free" detachable soul.

²In this as in a number of other points E. B. Tylor's derivation of animism is less objectionable than Spencer's. Instead of deriving the human spirit (ghost) alone from the experiences of the dream and then permitting the rest of Nature to become populated with ghosts, Tylor derives *all* spirits from dream experiences.

that ancestor worship was the earliest form of worship, for nowhere is the cult of ancestors found among most primitive tribes; while its more developed forms do not make their appearance until relatively high civilizations are reached, such as those of Polynesia and Melanesia. Full fledged ancestor worship, in fact, does not arise until a social basis is provided for it by that hypertrophy of the family instinct which lies at the root of the ancestral cult of ancient China and Japan. And it is, of course, quite obvious that religion seized upon man's relation to inanimate nature, to plants, and above all, to animals, without waiting until an obliging ghost appeared in animal, plant or other material disguise.

It would, however, be quite unfair to the philosopher to dismiss his speculations in this domain with the above condemnatory account of the theory of primitive religion, for in re-reading some earlier paragraphs and passages of the same volume, one discovers with some surprise unmistakable evidence of a penetrating insight and of critical discernment.

It will be remembered that the idea of a ghost, itself derived from the dream image, was utilized by Spencer as what he himself called an "unconscious hypothesis" on the part of the primitive mind, which reduced to a common denominator a host of similar ideas derived from a variety of observations.

What were these observations and in what way does Spencer deal with them?

The observations are made in the course of the savage's experience with a great variety of natural phenomena. The shadow, reflection, echo; the cloud, sun, moon and stars; the metamorphoses of plants, insects, birds and animals; even such relatively rare phenomena as petrified trees and the remains of trees, plants and animals in rocks; all of these contribute their share. The shadow is like a person, but also unlike it. It follows one about, moves when he moves and stops when he stops. But throughout it manifests certain peculiarities of its own. It assumes distorted

shapes, grows in size, or becomes shorter; finally, it may disappear altogether, becoming, as it were, merged in the person. The reflection behaves in a similar way. It is not so constant a companion as is the shadow; on the other hand, the presence of color makes its resemblance to the person more striking. The echo behaves in no less peculiar a fashion. It does not always put in an appearance, and when it does, it may either be distinct or scarcely audible. It may repeat whole words or even sentences or merely ends of words or syllables. It may do so once or many times in succession. The cloud gathers in the sky apparently out of nothing. It may stay there a short or a long while, and then disappear, as it came, into nothing. The sun, moon, stars appear in the sky, move along slowly but unmistakably, and vanish, to re-appear again after a certain period. The seed in the ground is nothing but a seed. But presently it turns into a flower or a bush or a tree. The egg becomes a bird or a snake; the caterpillar turns into a butterfly. That invisible agents may make their presence felt is brought home forcibly by the wind. It has no visible form, yet it can be heard and its presence is also attested to by the behavior of exposed objects and creatures as well as by the sense of pressure or resistance in the observing individual.

Now all of these experiences, argues Spencer, can only lead to one conclusion. Things may have a visible and an invisible form, an overt and an implied existence. And, as in the case of the shadow, or the echo, or the reflection, the original and its double exist side by side.

"He (the savage) is commonly pictured as theorizing about certain appearances;" writes Spencer in this connection, "whereas, in fact, the need for explanations of them does not occur to him" ¹ The savage does not theorize, he simply accepts the facts. In doing so he does not offend against logic. "The laws of thought," says Spencer,

¹"Principles of Sociology," Vol. I, Part 1, p. 89.

"are everywhere the same; . . . given the data as known to him, primitive man's inference is a reasonable inference."¹ It is indeed inevitable, reflects the philosopher, that the savage should thus be led into error: "The terms of relations are grouped (by the savage) with those which they conspicuously resemble, and the relations themselves are grouped in like manner. But this leads to error; since the most obvious traits are not always those by which things are really allied to one another, and the most obvious characters of relations are not always their essential characters."²

Spencer further observes that modern conditions provide plentiful illustrations of this tendency of the uninstructed or partly instructed mind to accept conclusions without question or criticism, even though these may only consist in a term. The plumber who asserts that the pump works by suction, or the layman who attributes certain effects to electricity may not have any idea of what is implied by these terms: "The mental tension is sufficiently relieved when, to the observed result, there is joined in thought this something with a name; but there is no notion what the something really is, nor the remotest idea how the result can be wrought by it. Having such results furnished by those around us, we shall have no difficulty in seeing how the savage, with fewer experiences, more vaguely grouped, adopts, as quite adequate, the first explanation which familiar associations suggest."³

Summarizing these conclusions in a later section of his book, Spencer writes: "We recognize in fact that the primitive mind does not distinguish natural from unnatural, possible from impossible;⁴ knows nothing of physical law, order, cause, etc.; and that while he shows neither rational surprise nor the curiosity which prompts examination, he

¹*Ibid.*, p. 100.

²*Ibid.*, pp. 100-101.

³*Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁴These two propositions are doubtful.

lacks fit words for carrying on inquiry, as well as the requisite power of continued thought;¹ we see that instead of being a speculator and maker of explanations, he is at first an almost passive recipient of conclusions forced on him. Further, we find that he is inevitably betrayed into an initial error; and that this originates an erroneous system of thought which elaborates as he advances.”

It is these conceptions of duality, of double existence, that are, according to Spencer, later reduced to a common denominator through the introduction of an “unconscious hypothesis” in the form of the dream image, which in its capacity of a ghost, leads to those further developments with which we dealt in the beginning of this section.

Now, we saw how one-sided and artificial were the alleged results traced by Spencer to the workings of this unconscious hypothesis; nor need we accept as relevant all of the data from which, according to Spencer, the early conception of duality was derived. The fact remains that Spencer visualizes this early situation in an eminently sober spirit. The savage accepts the facts which experience forces upon him; without conscious deliberation he reaches the implied conclusions which are, in view of his ignorance, reasonable, although in fact, erroneous. And presently there emerges a world view, reasonable in itself, but erroneous because the premises are faulty. In fairness to Spencer we might well emphasize the theoretical sanity of this part of his essay on primitive mentality and religion.³

¹The last three statements can only be accepted with reservations.

²*Ibid*, p. 424.

³In the same part of his *Sociology*, Spencer expresses certain ideas on evolution which could not offhand be identified as coming from the arch-evolutionist. To counterbalance our usually critical strictures on the philosopher, one or two of these edifying passages may be quoted here: “Evolution is commonly conceived to imply in everything an *intrinsic* tendency to become something higher. This is an erroneous conception of it.” Spencer proceeds to note that evolution in organisms proceeds until equilibration with environmental conditions is reached. After this “evolution practically ceases.” Then, if new conditions arise, there is further change, “but it by no means follows that this change constitutes a step in evolution.” What is true of biological organisms is true of society: “A social organism, like an individual organism, undergoes modifications until

FRAZER'S THEORIES

Frazer's contribution to the analysis of primitive mentality lies in two directions: he furnishes an interpretation of magic and its relation to religion and he suggests an origin for certain social divisions and correlated functions.

The basic source of magical ideology, argues Frazer, lies in the fundamental processes underlying the association of ideas. When a doll fashioned in the similitude of an enemy or just intended to represent one, is maltreated in the expectation that a similar fate will befall its original, it is the association by similarity that is operative. When harm is supposed to befall a person whose enemy has in his possession some of that person's hair or nail shavings or even a piece of wearing apparel, and may deal with these at his pleasure, it is the association by contiguity that is responsible for the complex of the ensuing beliefs. It is notable thereby, continues the author, that the results achieved by magic are supposed to follow automatically and inevitably whenever the prescribed conditions are fulfilled. That spirits and other supernatural agents are often involved in magical procedure, Frazer cannot deny. But he claims that "whenever sympathetic magic occurs in its pure unadulterated form, it assumes that in nature one event follows another necessarily and inevitably, without the intervention of any personal or spiritual agency. Thus its fundamental conception is identical with that of modern science; underlying the whole system is a faith, implicit but real and firm, in the order and uniformity of nature."¹

it comes into equilibrium with environing conditions; and thereupon continues without any further change of structure. When the conditions are changed meteorologically, or biologically, or by alterations in the Flora and Fauna, or by migration consequent on pressure of population, or by flight before usurping races, some change of social structure results. But this change does not necessarily imply advance." (*Ibid*, pp. 95-96.)

On the basis of such pronouncements as this, Spencer might have reached a working agreement with Ellsworth Huntington, J. Teggart, W. H. R. Rivers, and other modern ethnologists. Unfortunately, there is little evidence in the constructive elaboration of Spencer's system, of the insight and caution revealed in these passages.

¹ "The Golden Bough," "The Magic Art," Vol. I, p. 220.

It is true that this correspondence between science and magic is for the magician not avowed but implicit, but *that* it is. If only he fulfills the prescribed and traditional routine in the form of ritual, incantation or what not, the desired result may be confidently expected. We read: "Thus the analogy between the magical and the scientific conceptions of the world is close. In both of them the succession of events is perfectly regular and certain, being determined by immutable laws, the operation of which can be foreseen and calculated precisely; the elements of caprice, of chance, and of accident are banished from the course of nature. Both of them open up a seemingly boundless vista of possibilities to him who knows the causes of things and can touch the secret springs that set in motion the vast and intricate mechanism of the world. Hence the strong attraction which magic and science alike have exercised on the human mind; hence the powerful stimulus that both have given to the pursuit of knowledge. They lure the weary enquirer, the foot-sore seeker, on through the wilderness of disappointment in the present by their endless promises of the future: they take him up to the top of an exceeding high mountain and shew him, beyond the dark clouds and rolling mists at his feet, a vision of the celestial city, far off, it may be, but radiant with unearthly splendor, bathed in the light of dreams."

In a discourse on magical potency, literary spellbinding may be in place. We may be prompted to ask, however, in how far this picturesque phraseology furthers an insight into the world view of magic? But let us continue the exposition of the author's ideas.

Magic is related to religion as well as to science. In this connection Frazer defines religion as "a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life."² Thus, religion is opposed to magic as well as to

¹*Ibid*, p. 221.

²*Ibid*, p. 222.

science insofar as it systematically makes use of conscious personal agents. Science is never concerned with these, deliberately excluding them from its interpretations; while magic, whenever it makes use of them, employs such supernatural personages as mere transfer points of magic influence, thus depriving them of all spontaneity and freedom of decision.

Having defined religion in the way just indicated, the author proceeds to point out that in primitive Australia magic is rampant, whereas religion is practically absent. The author admits, however, that throughout the major part of the globe and wide periods of history, magic and religion are inextricably interwoven.

Returning once more to the subject of magic and religion in connection with the chronological priority of one or the other of the two systems of belief, the author finds grounds to assign such priority to magic. "Yet though magic is thus found to fuse and amalgamate with religion in many ages and in many lands," thus runs Frazer's argument, "there are some grounds for thinking that this fusion is not primitive, and that there was a time when man trusted to magic alone for the satisfaction of such wants as transcended his immediate animal cravings. In the first place a consideration of the fundamental notions of magic and religion may incline us to surmise that magic is older than religion in the history of humanity. We have seen that on the one hand magic is nothing but a mistaken application of the very simplest and most elementary processes of the mind, namely, the association of ideas by virtue of resemblance or contiguity; and that on the other hand religion assumes the operation of conscious or personal agents, superior to man, behind the visible screen of nature. Obviously, the conception of personal agents is more complex than a simple recognition of the similarity or contiguity of ideas; and a theory which assumes that the course of nature is determined by conscious agents is more abstruse and recondite, and requires for its apprehension a far higher degree of intelli-

gence and reflection than the view that things succeed each other simply by reason of their contiguity or resemblance. The very beasts associate the ideas of things that are like each other or that have been found together in their experience; and they could hardly survive for a day if they ceased to do so. But who attributes to the animals a belief that the phenomena of nature are worked by a multitude of invisible animals or by one enormous and prodigiously strong animal behind the scenes? It is probably no injustice to the brutes to assume that the honor of devising a theory of this latter sort must be reserved for human reason. Thus, if magic be deduced immediately from elementary processes of reasoning, and be, in fact, an error into which the mind falls almost spontaneously, while religion rests on conceptions which the merely animal intelligence can hardly be supposed to have yet attained to, it becomes probable that magic arose before religion in the evolution of our race, and that man essayed to bend nature to his wishes by the sheer force of spells and enchantments before he strove to coax and mollify a coy, capricious, or irascible deity by the soft insinuation of prayer and sacrifice."

Frazer's other contribution deals with the origin of exogamy specifically in its association with the Australian phratric and class divisions. "In the whole of history, . . ." exclaims Frazer, "it would hardly be possible to find another human institution on which the impress of deliberate thought and purpose has been stamped more plainly than on the exogamous systems of Australian aborigines."

In what peculiarity, then, of the exogamous system does the author find such unequivocal evidence of "deliberate thought and purpose"? It will be readily seen that the two moiety system, if associated with maternal descent, prevents the intermarriage of mothers and sons and of brothers and sisters; and when associated with paternal descent, it prevents the marriage of fathers and daughters

¹*Ibid.*, pp. 233-234.

²*Totemism and Exogamy*, Vol. IV, p. 121.

and, once more, of brothers and sisters. It must, however, be noted that the intermarriage of fathers and daughters is not made impossible by the first type of organization, while the second does not prevent the intermarriage of mothers and sons. In the four-class system, where each phratry or moiety is subdivided into two classes, no loophole is left for such incestuous unions. In the four-class systems, when the descent of the moiety is paternal, the marriage of father and daughter is, of course, impossible; so is the marriage of mother and son, as the children all belong to the complementary class of the father's phratry into which the mother may not marry. Similarly, with maternal descent of the phratry, the children belong to the complementary class of the mother's phratry, into which the father may not marry, which would thus prevent the marriage of father and daughter. It can also be shown that further extension of prohibited unions between relatives is achieved by the eight-class system.

Now Frazer holds that the bisection of the original group as well as the subsequent bisections resulting in the four- and eight-class systems, were conceived and carried out by "some inventive genius"—by this the powerful old men of Australian communities are meant—who instituted the system of exogamy "at once so complex and so regular" in order to prevent the intermarriages of near kin. To enhance the verisimilitude of his conjecture, the author refers to the opinion of those "who are best acquainted at first hand with the Australian savages"—such as Spencer and Gillen—that the Australian old men are "capable both of conceiving and of executing such social reformations as are implied in the institution of their present marriage system."

There is indeed evidence in Frazer's own work that the author was aware of the improbability of his sociological assumption. It is well known that Lewis H. Morgan attributed the institution of the Iroquoian clans to a deliberate

¹*Ibid.*, p. 280.

legislative act of a great leader, his opinion in this case being supported not by those who knew the Iroquois best but by the Iroquois themselves. Frazer rejects Morgan's theory: "It is no longer possible," he argues, "to attribute the institution of the totemic clans to the sagacity of savage law givers who devised and created them for the purpose of knitting together the various tribes by the ties of marriage and consanguinity. Yet that the subdivision of the whole community into clans had this effect is undeniable." But with reference to the Australian conditions Frazer himself advances an analogous hypothesis.

In criticising Frazer's position, we might deal first with his sociological theory. In fairness to the author it must be said that a painful search may reveal another passage, which, however contradictory to the theory just expounded, at least indicates that a sound theoretical view of the problem is not beyond the mental horizon of the author. "We may reasonably suppose," writes Frazer, "that all the marriages which are now formally interdicted by the various exogamous clan systems, were in like manner uniformly reprobated by public opinion before the cumbrous machinery of exogamy was put in operation against them. In other words, we may assume that a moral objection to such marriages always preceded, and was the cause of, their legal prohibition."² It is a far cry from this to an assumed feat of "some inventive genius" who instituted a system "at once so complex and so regular" in order to prevent the intermarriages of near kin.

Basic forms of social organization do not fall from heaven ready made, nor do they arise full-fledged—like Pallas Athena from the head of Zeus—from the minds of genial savage law givers. The time may come when man will learn to conceive of new forms of social, political or economic structure, and to fit them so well into the living organism of society as to insure their persistence and smooth

¹*Ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 3-10.

²*Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 346-347.

working. But the past knows no such examples. Only those forms of social grouping and functioning have so far shown a tendency to survive, which, if they were at all deliberately introduced, were at least based on pre-existing tendencies and habits.¹ Politicians and social students well know from the example of modern democracies how nearly impossible it is to create a new party (shades of the well-nigh defunct Bull Moose!) unless all the elements of such a party are already in existence, so that the creation really means but little more than the introduction of a formal organization, the assuming or accepting of a name, and the like.²

Nor is this all. Even if such a conscious origin of the phratries and classes were conceivable, more specific reasons can be assigned why the emergence of these divisions for the reasons given, namely, the prevention of unions between certain close relatives, is highly improbable. Surely, if the introduction of the phratries and classes were prompted by a desire to eliminate incestuous unions, those first taken care of would have been the unions between father and daughter and mother and son. Now, it was shown that in the two moiety system with maternal descent the intermarriage of mother and son is effectively barred, but not the marriage of father and daughter, the two belonging to

¹Here we might once more refer to the introduction by the Soviet government of Russia of the territorial and professional electoral units based on the village *mir* and the industrial *artel*, both ancient and natural institutions, which were already regarded as the proper foundations for a re-constituted Russian society by the pre-Marxian socialistic dreamers of the first and the beginning of the second quarters of the Nineteenth Century.

²It need not be implied that primitive organizers, such as the Australian chiefs or "old men," are unable to visualize a social mechanism or on occasion to polish off the rough edges of a clumsily working or imperfectly adjusted social system. That the opposite is true is no longer a subject of doubt to ethnologists. In Australia, for example, there are instances where intermarriages between tribes with discrepant social systems require such deliberate and thoughtful intervention on the part of the powers that be; and the situation is forthwith taken care of very effectively.

The point is too detailed to be treated here. But the curious reader is referred to Spencer and Gillen, "The Northern Tribes of Central Australia," pp. 116-132, where the authors show with great clearness that an inspection of the class divisions of the Mara, Anula, and Binbinga reveals a re-arrangement of classes to provide for inter-tribal marriages, a re-arrangement which must be recognized as deliberate.

opposite phratries. It might be argued that the tribes having this dual and maternal organization are in a stage of transition to the further subdivision into classes in which the father-daughter marriage would also be eliminated. But this conjecture could not possibly be sustained, for a large set of tribes organized on the maternal two phratry pattern is found in the southeast of Australia, and about an equally large number of tribes organized on the paternal phratry pattern. Clearly, these tribes were so organized for untold generations nor is there any indication of their incipient transformation into the four class pattern of organization. If what the savage law givers intended was to prevent incestuous unions, is it conceivable that they should have started so effectively and then stopped half way, leaving the road open to one of the two most objectionable unions?

But the case against Frazer's position is even stronger than this, for if it were asked whether these incestuous unions—the father-daughter marriage in the maternal two phratry tribes, the mother-son marriage in the paternal two phratry tribes—were of actual occurrence, the answer would be a categorical no. Like everywhere else in the world, with disappearingly few exceptions, these unions are here prohibited by special regulations *ad hoc*, nor are any instances on record of the infraction of such regulations. And to repeat, such unions are prohibited everywhere, whether the tribe is modern or primitive, and if the latter, whether it is organized on the basis of phratries or clans or of both or of neither.

We may now turn to Frazer's parallel between science and magic. A pregnant hypothesis indeed, if true, for the antecedents of science would thus be pushed back beyond the historic period and into the very earliest unconscious cravings of the human spirit. There is a certain superficial feasibility in the point, to the extent that workings of the magic act are supposed to be automatic, mechanical, as it were, and uniform, if the act remains the same. Here,

however, the parallel, if such it be, ends. Thus, the magician's expectation that a similar act will evoke identical results whenever repeated, does not involve the conception of uniformity in *Nature*, although this conception may readily be read into the situation. The alleged uniformities apply to magical acts. Now *Nature* and its functions are not identical with these. Does uniformity in magical acts and their results imply uniformity in *Nature*? The situation becomes clarified if one places the emphasis in the magical complex not on the uniformities involved but on the exercise of *power*. It is the possession of power by the magician, or, to express it differently, his command or control of the powers implied in certain substances or acts, which bring success. The entire magical performance, moreover, is in innumerable instances lodged in the supernatural level, something is achieved which at least at the time and place cannot be achieved by ordinary matter-of-fact procedure, such as is involved in industry or in the wielding of tools and weapons.

But even if we follow Frazer in considering the magic act alone rather than the magical universe, a most fundamental contrast at once appears between the magical method and the method of science. Scientific procedure is ever alive to the lessons of experience. Thus, in a scientifically controlled invention or experiment, the results, if unsatisfactory, at once react upon the procedure by means of which the results were attained. In the controlled trial and error situation which represents one aspect of scientific experimentation, the errors stand for experience, constantly influencing the trials, until the errors become successes. The same is true of the matter-of-fact procedure of industry, even the most primitive industry. Here, in the true birthplace of science, experience reacts constructively upon future efforts, thus leading to invention, improvement, adjustment to situations. All this is different in magic. The magical universe and the magical act are, to an almost inconceivable extent, proof against

experience. If the act fails, no change of technique results, for the failure receives a magical interpretation: some other agency, a more powerful magician, perhaps, prevented the success of the magical act. If the health or life of an enemy was the object sought, his own superior magical potency provides sufficient explanation of the failure of the hostile attempt. Thus there is no change, no improvement, no readjustment in the magical universe. The *perpetuum mobile* of supernaturalism is proof against experience.

This view of the magical act places it in its proper relation to the wider field of magical phenomena as well as to the still wider range of supernaturalism in general, for the magic act is only a part of magic. There is no breach of continuity between the performance of the magician and the phenomena of magical transformations and influences which pervade the ideology of the savage as it stands revealed, for example, in the mythologies of primitive tribes: the transformation of men into animals and of animals into men; the travelling to the sky by means of a cord made of arrows shot one into the other; the magic properties of amulets, charms and talismans, or the various magical powers bestowed by guardian spirits, such as the cures of various diseases, the power to resuscitate the dead, to recover from wounds; the strictly limited but often great powers of the West African fetiches, and so on through the endless range of similar phenomena. Throughout is present the idea of power, which, moreover, transcends the average limits of the workaday world. It is this notion of power which unites the act of the magician with the totality of the magical universe.

In their acceptance of supernaturalism magic and religion stand united. Both belong to a realm which transcends the matter-of-fact. It is for this reason that the typical magical and the typical religious situations are represented on their emotional side by what may be designated as the *religious thrill*, the subjective counterpart of supernaturalism.¹

¹It is true that both magic and religion, in line with other cultural

Thus magic and religion have in common the acceptance of the supernatural level and their association with the religious thrill. Moreover, both develop a ritualistic technique, with its frequent corollary of de-emotionalization or at least transformation of the emotions involved. On the other hand, the magical situation may be contrasted with the religious one by the element of constraint involved, the will or power of the magician dominating the situation, whereas in the religious setting the will of the devotee is at best but a will to believe, whereas the will of the god or other divine personage becomes the dominant determinant factor, bringing in its wake worship, supplication, prayer and the like.

From the above comparison and juxtaposition of magic and religion inevitably flows the attitude to be taken with reference to the alleged chronological priority of magic, such as is asserted by Frazer and other authors.¹ When the present and the historic period in general are envisaged, it is clear that institutionalized religion dominates the field of man's belief and ritual; whereas magic survives among the

phenomena, are subject to the influences of routine and convention and that the magical as well as the religious rituals, as they are passed on from generation to generation, often become mere ritualistic or ceremonial techniques: the original emotional content vanishes. This is the realm of Marett's "evaporated emotions." In a study of magic or religion as institutions, this aspect cannot be sufficiently emphasized; but if the two phenomena are envisaged as live psychological experiences, which in their essence they are or were, the supernatural mystic level to which they belong at once rises into prominence and with it, its emotional replica, the religious thrill.

Other authors than Frazer have contrasted magic and religion in various ways. It is claimed by some that religion represents the socialized, publicly accepted creed, while magic is individual, ostracized. It can not be denied that the later development of magic and religion gives color to this theory. The Black Magic of the Middle Ages or even the harmful magical activities of the African magician as contrasted with the supposedly socially beneficial activities of the priest, are instances in point. But in many other instances, as for example in Australia or Melanesia or in the Malay Archipelago, it is impossible to draw a line of demarcation between magic and religion on the basis of social sanction. Moreover, it must be remembered that even an ostracized magic is in a sense socially sanctioned insofar as its tenets are recognized as actual. Even Black Magic could not thrive in a magic-proof society.

¹Cf. for instance, the highly interesting, but with reference to this problem wholly unsatisfactory articles by T. H. Preuss on "The Origins of Religion and Art," in the now defunct German weekly, *The Globus*, for 1905-1906.

minor byways of civilization in the form of more individualized as well as more elusive attitudes and ideas. But one may also attempt to reconstruct the rise of magic and religion beginning at some point in the remote prehistoric past. Then the picture is a different one. Magic and religion are then seen taking root in partly common, partly disparate ideas and emotions, and then advancing through a series of further transformations. Intermingling and coalescing inextricably in the beginning, the two later separate in the form of ever more divergent strands, a more definitely socialized and legalized one, the strand of religion, and the other one, that of magic, leading a less pompous existence in the dusk of legality and social recognition. Also: the trend of religion, in one of its less definitely institutionalized aspects, is toward greater subjective elaboration of the religious experience, whereas the course of magic becomes divided into two main streams: one involving perfect ritualization, a pure technique, mechanical in method although supernatural in intent, the other embracing disjointed odds and ends of belief and attitude usually covered by the term "superstition."

WUNDT'S THEORIES¹

Wundt approached the problem of primitive mentality with a far broader and deeper equipment in scientific method than did Spencer, Tylor or Frazer. As a student of psychology he was proof against the allurements of a facile mode of interpretation of primitive thought, of which these authors are so often guilty. He discarded the crude ration-

¹Wundt's great work on folk psychology, the *Völkerpsychologie*, is unfortunately not available for English readers. But a careful perusal of his "Elements of Folk Psychology" will suffice to bring out the principal points of his theoretical attitude. Those who may want to acquaint themselves more thoroughly with Wundt's ideas in the domain of socio-psychological phenomena are referred to the somewhat difficult article by Herman K. Haerberlin, "The Theoretical Foundations of Wundt's Folk Psychology," *Psychological Review*, Vol. 23, 1916. A brief synthetic presentation of Wundt's contributions to science and philosophy will be found in my article "Wilhelm Wundt, 1832-1920," *The Freeman*, 1921. Cf., also Robert H. Lowie's discussion of Wundt's autobiography, *ibid.*, 1921.

alism of Spencer and Tylor. To him early man was not an intellectual individual facing nature as a problem or a set of questions to which animism or magic were deemed to have provided solutions. Wundt saw clearly that man's reactions to the world—and especially the earliest reactions—were least of all rational or deliberate, rather were they spontaneous and emotional. The associationism of Frazer also collapsed before Wundt's critical onslaught.

Again, Wundt realized that the psychological foundations of civilization cannot be sought in the isolated individual, but that the group always actively co-operated in the production of attitudes and ideas. With great erudition and an originality that has often been under-estimated, Wundt examined from this general standpoint the phenomena of language, art, religion and mythology, social organization and law.

Without adhering to the doctrine of a separate folk soul—a doctrine sponsored, for example, by such German philologists-philosophers as Steinthal and Lazarus—Wundt insisted that the co-existence and interrelation of many individuals with their experiences, their inter-communication and their creativeness, were essential to the production of the basic elements of civilization. Thus, without laying himself open to the accusation of over-emphasizing the social, a common weakness of the systems of Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl, Wundt joined the ranks of most modern sociologists and ethnologists in his realization that whatever may be the contributions of the individual to society, no valid interpretation of civilization can be achieved by separating the individual from his social and cultural setting.

It is especially instructive to find that Wundt introduces his discussion of myth and religion by a volume on what is in fact a history of art, a many-sided examination of the workings of the human imagination. He saw clearly that the entire domain of religion and mythology represented on its conceptual side but a projection into the external world of the ideas and fantasies of the mind of man. Without

reaching the striking formulation of Freud, Wundt established the psychological foundation of what the originator of psychoanalysis later called the "omnipotence of thought."

Thus Wundt is inevitably led to a non-compromisingly negative attitude toward all attempts of conceiving primitive magic as a sort of aboriginal science, after the fashion of Frazer. In a luminous passage Wundt disposes of the issue with finality. Thus there arises a paradoxical situation, he writes: on the one hand, science is extolled as the power that has destroyed mythology (or, in our terminology, supernaturalism); on the other, mythology itself is conceived as a primitive science. Now the destruction of mythology by science would only be feasible if the development of these two aspects of culture were regarded as radically distinct, whereas the identification of mythology with primitive science would presuppose a fundamental similarity of the two. The explanation of this apparent contradiction lies in the following: the experiences on the basis of which myths arise coincide with those which in time become the foundation of science, for in both cases these experiences consist or take the form of ideas and emotions, affects and tropisms or urges which are characteristic of the human psyche. But what differs are the processes of thought by means of which these common psychic elements are utilized and elaborated. These are radically distinct in science and mythology. Thus the mistake of the rationalistic theory consists in that it substitutes for the highly discrepant mental processes of science and mythology, the coincidence of the general empirical content of the psyche.¹

With justice Wundt proceeds to contrast the theoretical interest of science with the pragmatic or practical viewpoint of mythology. The author displays an equally penetrating vision when, in dealing with what he calls the era of primitive man, he gives a general estimate of primitive civilization and mentality. "It is characteristic of prim-

¹"Völkerpsychologie," Vol. II, Par. I (Art), p. 559. Cf. also "Elements of Folk Psychology," pp. 93-94.

itive culture," writes Wundt, "that it has failed to advance since immemorial times and this accounts for the uniformity prevalent in widely separated regions of the earth. This, however, does not at all imply that within the narrow sphere that constitutes his world the intelligence of primitive man is inferior to that of cultural man."¹ And again: "Primitive man merely exercises his ability in a more restricted world; his horizon is essentially narrower because of his contentment under these limitations. This, of course, does not deny that there may have been a time and, indeed, doubtless was one when man occupied a lower intellectual plane and approximated more nearly the animal state which preceded that of human beings. This earliest and lowest level of human development, however, is not accessible to us."²

In dealing with the tools and weapons of earliest man, Wundt definitely rejects the rationalism of early authors while laying due emphasis on accident and uncontrolled experience. In his attempt to trace the origin of the returning boomerang³ of the Australians, for example, Wundt projects the following picture: "The word is probably familiar to all, but the nature of the weapon is not so well known, especially its peculiarly characteristic form by virtue of which, if it fails to strike its object, it flies back to the one who hurled it. The boomerang, which possesses this useful characteristic, is, in the first place, a bent wooden missile, pointed at both ends. That this curved form has a greater range and strikes truer to aim than a straight spear, the Australian, of course, first learned from experience. The boomerang, however, will not return if it is very symmetrically constructed; on the contrary, it then falls to the ground, where it remains. Now it appears that the two halves of this missile are asymmetrical. One of the halves is twisted spirally, so that the weapon, if thrown forward obliquely, will, in accordance with the laws of

¹"Elements, etc.," p. 112.

²*Ibid.*, p. 113.

³*Cf.* pp. 102-103.

ballistics, describe a curve that returns upon itself. This asymmetry, likewise, was discovered accidentally. In this case, the discovery was all the more likely, for primitive weapons were never fashioned with exactitude. That this asymmetry serves a useful purpose, therefore, was first revealed by experience. As a result, however, primitive man began to copy as faithfully as possible those implements which most perfectly exhibited this characteristic. Thus, this missile is not a weapon that required exceptional inventive ability, though, of course, it demanded certain powers of observation. The characteristics, accordingly, that insured the survival of the boomerang were discovered accidentally and then fixed through an attentive regard to those qualities that had once been found advantageous."¹

A similar standpoint appears in the author's explanation of the feathered arrow. Writes Wundt: "The feathers are usually supposed to have been added to insure the accurate flight of the arrow. And this accuracy is, indeed, the resultant effect. As in the case of the boomerang, however, we must again raise the question: How did man come to foresee this effect, of whose mechanical conditions he had, of course, not the slightest knowledge? The solution of this problem probably lies in the fact of an association of the discharged arrow with a flying bird that pierces the air by the movement of its feathers. Thus, in the arrow, man copied the mode of movement of the bird. He certainly did not copy it, however, with the thought that he was causing movement in a mechanical way. We must bear in mind that for primitive man the image of a thing is in reality always equivalent to the thing itself. Just as he believes that his spirit resides in his picture, and is, therefore, frequently seized with fright when a painter draws his likeness and carries it away with him, so also does the feathered arrow become for him a bird. In his opinion, the qualities of the bird are transferred by force of magic to the arrow. In this

¹*Ibid*, pp. 27-28.

case, indeed, the magical motive is in harmony with the mechanical effect."¹

Whether this particular application of magical idiosyncrasy is true to the facts or not is, of course, impossible to say, but Wundt's hypothesis indicates without doubt a very common type of origin of useful appliances. It may be noted in this connection that among many tribes the arrow feathers are not attached parallel to the length of the shaft, but in a spiral. The screw-like effect of this device imparts to the flying arrow a revolving motion, the result of which is greater accuracy of aim and a more dangerous wound. Now the aboriginal bow-man was, of course, quite ignorant of the mechanical principles involved, but accidental discovery must have readily revealed to him the advantage of the arrow whose feathers were not quite parallel to the shaft. Once this discovery was made, the further evolution of the spiral attachment was merely a matter of time.

While we must give due credit to Wundt's perspicacity, certain reservations are in place here. It is true that professional inventors were unknown in early times, also that many devices bearing evidence of great ingenuity were in the main accidental and unpremeditated discoveries. Nevertheless, it is possible to underestimate the ingenuity of early man. While very little relevant material for a concrete examination of this topic is available, the analogy with the craftsman and mechanic of history cannot but suggest that his prehistoric colleague must have derived somewhat similar stimulation from his multiple experiences with materials, processes and situations. Such experiences, as is well known, stimulate the application of the trial and error method with its concomitant discoveries, inventions and improvements. It would thus be unwise to ascribe to the primitive mechanic merely a passive part in the origination of inventions. Many a happy thought must have crossed

¹*Ibid.*, p. 29.

his mind, nor was he wholly unfamiliar with the thrill that comes from an idea effective in action.

Wundt's position in regard to the theory of cultural evolution also differs markedly from those of his predecessors. He no longer believes in the universal uniformity of cultural advance, either in application to culture as a whole or to its separate aspects. Wundt often speaks of certain trends or principles of historic development which manifest themselves in multiple similarities, but he is not blind to the fact that in the complexity of historical incidents these principles scarcely ever appear except in greatly disguised form, and that uniqueness remains a characteristic of individual historic events or cultural forms.

Wundt's historic perspective is particularly enriched by his constant insistence on the multiplicity of motives and interpretations which characterize the development of cultural forms, and the constant tendency of such motives and interpretations to fluctuation and transformation. In this connection one notes with regret that in dealing with early processes, the so-called first origins, Wundt often abandons his own well tested principles and returns to the habit of classical anthropologists of accounting for cultural factors by singular origins and motives. Wundt's failure to do justice to this type of problem may be illustrated by a few examples.

The following extract illustrates the way in which Wundt deals with the origin of the domestication of the dog as well as with the first beginnings of art:

"Closely connected with the real dwelling of primitive man, the cave, are two further phenomena that date back to earliest culture. As his constant companion, primitive man has a single animal, the *dog*, doubtless the earliest of domestic animals. Of all domestic animals this is the one that has remained most faithful to man down to the present time. The inhabitant of the modern city still keeps a dog if he owns any domestic animal at all, and as early as primitive times the dog was man's faithful companion. The

origin of this first domestic animal remains obscure. The popular notion would seem to be that man felt the need of such a companion, and therefore domesticated the dog. But if one calls to mind the dogs that run wild in the streets of Constantinople, or the dog's nearest relative, the wolf, one can scarcely believe that men ever had a strong desire to make friends of these animals. According to another widely current view, it was man's need of the dog as a helper in the chase that led to its domestication. But this also is one of those rationalistic hypotheses based on the presupposition that man always acts in accordance with a preconceived plan, and thus knew in advance that the dog would prove a superior domestic animal, and one especially adapted to assist in the chase. Since the dog possessed these characteristics only after its domestication, they could not have been known until this had occurred, and the hypothesis is clearly untenable. How, then, did the dog and man come together in the earliest beginnings of society? The answer to this question, I believe, is to be found in the cave, the original place of shelter from rain and storm. Not only was the cave a refuge for man, but it was equally so for animals, and especially for the dog. Thus it brought its dwellers into companionship. Furthermore, the kindling of the fire, once man had learned the art, may have attracted the animal to its warmth. After the dog had thus become the companion of man, it accompanied him in his activities, including that of the chase. Here, of course, the nature of the carnivorous animal asserted itself; as man hunted, so also did the animal. The dog's training, therefore, did not at all consist in being taught to chase the game. It did this of itself, as may be observed in the case of dogs that are not specifically hunting dogs. The training consisted rather in breaking the dog of the habit of devouring the captured game. This was accomplished only through a consciously directed effort on the part of man, an effort to which he was driven by his own needs. Thus, it is the cave that accounts for the origin of the first domestic

animal, and also, probably, for the first attempt at training an animal. But there is still another gain for the beginnings of culture that may probably be attributed to the cave in its capacity of a permanent habitation. Among primitive peoples, some of whom are already advanced beyond the level here in question, it is especially in caves that artistic productions may be found. These consist of crude drawings of animals and, less frequently, of men. Among the Bushmen, such cave pictures are frequently preserved from destruction for a considerable period of time. Natural man, roaming at will through the forests, has neither time nor opportunity to exercise his imagination except upon relatively small objects or upon the adornment of his own body. But the semi-darkness of the cave tends, as do few other places, to stimulate the reproductive imagination. Undisturbed by external influences, and with brightnesses and colours enhanced by the darkness, the memory images of things seen in the open, particularly those of the animals of the primeval forest, rise to consciousness and impel the lonely and unoccupied inhabitant to project them upon the wall. Such activity is favoured by the fact, verifiable by personal introspection, that memory images are much more vivid in darkness and semi-darkness than in the light of day. Thus, it was in the cave, the first dwelling-place of man, that the transition was made, perhaps for the first time, from the beginnings of a graphic art, serving the purposes of adornment or magic, to an art unfettered except by memory. It was an art of memory in a twofold sense: it patterned its objects after the memory of things actually observed, and it sought to preserve to memory that which it created."¹

This discussion strikingly reveals Wundt's sanity as well as the limitations of his attitude. The derivation of the domestication of the dog from natural factors, from a common dwelling, common hunting habits, mutual benefit and a minimum of deliberate planning, must be recognized as admirably carried out. The psychological arguments advanced

¹Elements of Folk Psychology, pp. 22-24.

to explain the presence and, in part at least, the nature of the realistic art of the cave, are forceful. But in both instances Wundt fails to utilize his own idea of the multiplicity of motives which he has elsewhere employed with such admirable effect. The dog is found as the companion of man practically everywhere, including innumerable localities where no such fixed dwelling places as caves were provided by Nature. Would Wundt assume, then, that the domestication of the dog has originated exclusively where man lived in caves and spread by diffusion to the rest of mankind? No, this hypothesis he would surely reject. But then other motives must be provided for the origin of the institution compatible with the habits and circumstances of caveless man. The same principle can be utilized to censure his hypothesis with reference to primitive realistic art.

Another illustration of Wundt's failure to escape the allurements of monogenetic derivations is his hypothesis about the origin of primitive dress and ornament. It runs like this:

"In connection with the external culture of primitive man we have already noted his meagre dress, which frequently consisted merely of a cord of bast about the loins, with leaves suspended from it. What was the origin of this dress? In the tropical regions, where primitive man lives, it was surely not the result of need for protection; nor can we truthfully ascribe it to modesty, as is generally done on the ground that it is the genital parts that are most frequently covered. In estimating the causes, the questions of primary importance are rather those as to where the very first traces of dress appear and of what its most permanent parts consist. The answer to the latter question, however, is to be found not in the apron but in the *loin-cord*, which is occasionally girt about the hips without any further attempt at dress. Obviously this was not a means of protection against storm and cold; nor can modesty be said to have factored in the development of this article, which serves the purposes both of dress and of adornment. But what was

its real meaning? An incident from the life of the Veddahs may perhaps furnish the answer to this question. When the Veddah enters into marriage, he binds a cord about the loins of his prospective wife. Obviously this is nothing else than a form of the widely current 'cord-magic,' which plays a not inconsiderable role even in present-day superstition. Cord-magic aims to bring about certain results by means of a firmly fastened cord. This cord is not a symbol, but is, as all symbols originally were, a means of magic. When a cord is fastened about a diseased part of the body and then transferred to a tree, it is commonly believed that the sickness is magically transplanted into the tree. If the tree is regarded as representing an enemy, moreover, this act, by a further association, is believed to transfer sickness or death to the enemy through the agency of the tree. The cord-magic of the Veddah is obviously of a simpler nature than this. By means of the cord which he has himself fastened, the Veddah endeavors to secure the faithfulness of his wife. The further parts of primitive dress were developments of the loin-cord, and were worn suspended from it. Coincidentally with this, the original means of adornment make their appearance. Necklaces and bracelets, which have remained favourite articles of feminine adornment even within our present culture, and fillets about the head which, among some of the peoples of nature, are likewise worn chiefly by the women, are further developments of the loin-cord, transferred, as it were, to other parts of the body. And, as the first clothing was attached to the loin-cord, so also were the bracelet and fillet, and particularly the necklace, employed to carry other early means of protective magic, namely, amulets. Gradually the latter also developed into articles of adornment, preferably worn, even to-day, about the neck."¹

Here once more the artificiality of Wundt's position is apparent. Quite apart from the feasibility of the particular interpretation given—for in itself, the utilization of an

¹"Elements, etc.," pp. 85-86.

attractive charm, as implied by Wundt, is common enough—it is patently absurd to reduce the origin of garments and ornament to this one magical source. A loin-cord is not worn everywhere nor are parts of garments and ornament always attached to it in a way described by Wundt. Moreover, in numerous regions climatic conditions necessitate the wearing of garments other than those implied. As to ornament, its sources are of course multiform, quite apart from the adornment of the human figure, and if that is so, what is the justification for deriving human adornment from this one source?

We have noted Wundt's guarded attitude towards uniformitarian evolutionism. But this also breaks down more than once under the stress of attractive hypotheses. To mention only one instance: Wundt assumes that animal worship everywhere preceded human worship. Animals were worshipped as ancestors long before any human being or anthropomorphised gods became the subject of the same attitude. The worship of human ancestors, manism, as Wundt calls, thus remains as a final product of this evolution, when the animal cult has lost its power while the ideas of descent connected with it still remain. "The pure animal cult," writes Wundt, "can be recognized by that the living animals, but never living man or supernatural beings possessed of human qualities, become the subjects of worship. The cult of anthropomorphic gods, on the other hand, which remains after the decay of all other cult forms directed towards the animal, represents the other end of this series and between these two extremes—the pure animal cult and the pure human cult—all the other stages fit in as transitional links."¹

So much for Wundt's occasional lapses into drastic evolutionism. But withal Wundt's work marks a tremendous advance over the position of the classical English anthropologists with its rationalism, its individualism, and its unilinear evolutionism.

¹"Völkerpsychologie," 1906, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 236.

CHAPTER XVI

THEORIES OF EARLY MENTALITY (*Continued*)

DURKHEIM'S THEORIES¹

Durkheim's contribution to primitive mentality centers in a sociological interpretation of religion. In an introductory section to his latest work the author categorically rejects the theories of his predecessors, such as the animistic theory of Spencer and Tylor and the naturalistic hypothesis of Max Müller. Durkheim refuses to admit that nature itself has the power to arouse in the individual the religious emotion. He denies, moreover, that the idea of spiritual agents which stands in the center of all religions, could have been derived from illusions, such as dreams, or misinterpretations of echoes, reflections, shadows, or more or less striking states of the body, such as coma, disease, or death. "It is inadmissible," reflects Durkheim, "that systems of ideas like religions, which have held so considerable a place in history, and to which, in all times, men have come to receive the energy which they must have to live, should be made up of a tissue of illusions. To-day we are beginning to realize that law, morals and even scientific thought itself were

¹Most of Durkheim's sociological theories will be found expressed in his last book, "Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse," which appeared in 1912. A translation of this book under the title "The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life," by Joseph Ward Swain, is available. Mr. Swain's translation is literal, which robs it of almost all the brilliancy of the original text, but it is accurate. For a full understanding of Durkheim's position it is desirable to read at least his "Les règles de la méthode sociologique," of which there is no English translation. An exposition of Durkheim's argument as advanced in his book on religion will be found in my article on "The Views of Andrew Lang and J. G. Frazer and Emile Durkheim on Totemism" (*Anthropos*, Vol. X-XI, 1915-1916, pp. 961-970). Another exposition combined with a critique will be found in the *American Anthropologist*, Vol. XVII, 1915, pp. 719-735. A more detailed critique, finally, than will be possible in these pages is available in my article on "Religion and Society: A Critique of Emile Durkheim's Theory of the Origin and Nature of Religion" (*Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. XIV, 1917, pp. 113-124).

born of religion, were for a long time confounded with it, and have remained penetrated with its spirit. How could a vain fantasy have been able to fashion the human consciousness so strongly and so durably? Surely it ought to be a principle of the science of religions that religion expresses nothing which does not exist in nature; for there are sciences only of natural phenomena. The only question is to learn from what part of nature these realities come and what has been able to make men represent them under this singular form which is peculiar to religious thought."

Thus Durkheim's search is for the reality underlying religion. While preparing the way for his major argument, Durkheim establishes the proposition that the fundamental fact in all religion is a division between the sacred and the profane. Religion is a social, institutional phenomenon—"there is no religion without a church," says Durkheim—and wherever there is religion there is a division of things, beings and acts into sacred and profane ones. The quest for the origin of religion, then, resolves itself into a search for the sources from which the sacred has sprung.

The major part of Durkheim's book consists in an analysis of Australian totemism. Here he finds an appropriate setting for the origin of the sacred which he is seeking. His weighty conclusion is reached in the course of the following passage:

"The life of the Australian societies passes alternately through two distinct phases. Sometimes the population is broken up into little groups who wander about independently of one another, in their various occupations; each family lives by itself, hunting and fishing, and in a word, trying to procure its indispensable food by all the means in its power. Sometimes, on the contrary, the population concentrates and gathers at determined points for a length of time varying from several days to several months. This concentration takes place when a clan or a part of the tribe is summoned to the gathering, and on this occasion they

¹ "Elementary Forms of the Religious Life," pp. 69-70.

celebrate a religious ceremony, or else hold what is called a corrobbori in the usual ethnological language.

"These two phases are contrasted with each other in the sharpest way. In the first, economic activity is the preponderating one, and it is generally of a very mediocre intensity. Gathering the grains or herbs that are necessary for food, or hunting and fishing are not occupations to awaken very lively passions. The dispersed condition in which the society finds itself results in making its life uniform, languishing and dull. But when a corrobbori takes place, everything changes. Since the emotional and pas- sional faculties of the primitive are only imperfectly placed under the control of his reason and will, he easily loses control of himself. Any event of some importance puts him quite outside himself. Does he receive good news? There are at once transports of enthusiasm. In the contrary conditions, he is to be seen running here and there like a madman, giving himself up to all sorts of immoderate movements, crying, shrieking, rolling in the dust, throwing it in every direction, biting himself, brandishing his arms in a furious manner, etc. The very fact of the concentration acts as an exceptionally powerful stimulant. When they are once come together, a sort of electricity is formed by their collecting which quickly transports them to an extraordinary degree of exaltation. Every sentiment expressed finds a place without resistance in all the minds, which are very open to outside impressions; each re-echoes the others, and is re-echoed by the others. The initial impulse thus proceeds, growing as it goes, as an avalanche grows in its advance. And as such active passions so free from all control could not fail to burst out, on every side one sees nothing but violent gestures, cries, veritable howls, and deafening noises of every sort, which aid in intensifying still more the state of mind which they manifest. And since a collective sentiment cannot express itself collectively except on the condition of observing a certain order permitting co-operation and movements in unison, these gestures and cries

naturally tend to become rhythmic and regular; hence come songs and dances. But in taking a more regular form, they lose nothing of their natural violence; a regulated tumult remains tumult. The human voice is not sufficient for the task; it is reinforced by means of artificial processes: boomerangs are beaten against each other; bull-roarers are whirled. It is probable that these instruments, the use of which is so general in the Australian religious ceremonies, are used primarily to express in a more adequate fashion the agitation felt. But while they express it, they also strengthen it. This effervescence often reaches such a point that it causes unheard-of actions. The passions released are of such an impetuosity that they can be restrained by nothing. They are so far removed from their ordinary conditions of life, and they are so thoroughly conscious of it, that they feel that they must set themselves outside of and above their ordinary morals. The sexes unite contrarily to the rules governing sexual relations. Men exchange wives with each other. Sometimes even incestuous unions, which in normal times are thought abominable and are severely punished, are now contracted openly and with impunity. If we add to all this that the ceremonies generally take place at night in a darkness pierced here and there by the light of fires, we can easily imagine what effect such scenes ought to produce on the minds of those who participate. They produce such a violent super-excitation of the whole physical and mental life that it cannot be supported very long: the actor taking the principal part finally falls exhausted on the ground." . . .

. . . "One can readily conceive how, when arrived at this state of exaltation, a man does not recognize himself any longer. Feeling himself dominated and carried away by some sort of an external power which makes him think and act differently than in normal times, he naturally has the impression of being himself no longer. It seems to him that he has become a new being: the decorations he puts

¹*Ibid.*, pp. 214-216.

on and the masks that cover his face figure materially in this interior transformation, and to a still greater extent, they aid in determining its nature. And as at the same time all his companions feel themselves transformed in the same way and express this sentiment by their cries, their gestures and their general attitude, everything is just as though he really were transported into a special world, entirely different from the one where he ordinarily lives, and into an environment filled with exceptionally intense forces that take hold of him and metamorphose him. How could such experiences as these, especially when they are repeated every day for weeks, fail to leave in him the conviction that there really exist two heterogeneous and mutually incomparable worlds? One is that where his daily life drags wearily along; but he cannot penetrate into the other without at once entering into relations with extraordinary powers that excite him to the point of frenzy. The first is the profane world, the second, that of sacred things.

“So it is in the midst of these effervescent social environments and out of this effervescence itself that the religious idea seems to be born. The theory that this is really its origin is confirmed by the fact that in Australia the really religious activity is almost entirely confined to the moments when these assemblies are held. To be sure, there is no people among whom the great solemnities of the cult are not more or less periodic; but in the more advanced societies, there is not, so to speak, a day when some prayer or offering is not addressed to the gods and some ritual act is not performed. But in Australia, on the contrary, apart from the celebrations of the clan and tribe, the time is nearly all filled with lay and profane occupations. Of course there are prohibitions that should be and are preserved even during these periods of temporal activity; it is never permissible to kill or eat freely of the totemic animal, at least in those parts where the interdiction has retained its original vigour; but almost no positive rites are then celebrated, and there are no ceremonies of any importance. These take

place only in the midst of assembled groups. The religious life of the Australian passes through successive phases of complete lull and of super-excitation, and social life oscillates in the same rhythm. This puts clearly into evidence the bond uniting them to one another, but among the peoples called civilized, the relative continuity of the two blurs their relations. It might even be asked whether the violence of this contrast was not necessary to disengage the feeling of sacredness in its first form. By concentrating itself almost entirely in certain determined moments, the collective life has been able to attain its greatest intensity and efficacy, and consequently to give men a more active sentiment of the double existence they lead and of the double nature in which they participate."¹

Durkheim's book bristles with attempts to furnish interpretations of various psychological elements in religion in the terms of social or group determinants. His theory of the origin of the idea of survival and immortality of the soul may be adduced as an illustration of his habitual mode of procedure. Durkheim dwells on the fact that in central Australia children are believed to be reincarnations of ancestral individuals. From this he takes the cue for his hypothesis. "We have seen," writes Durkheim, "that the souls of new-born children are either emanations of the ancestral souls, or these souls themselves reincarnated. But in order that they may either reincarnate themselves, or periodically give off new emanations, they must have survived their first holders. So it seems as though they admitted the survival of the dead in order to explain the birth of the living. The primitive does not have the idea of an all-powerful god who creates souls out of nothing. It seems to him that souls cannot be made except out of souls. So those who are born can only be new forms of those who have been; consequently, it is necessary that these latter continue to exist in order that others may be born. In fine, the belief in the immortality of the soul is the only way in

¹*Ibid*, pp. 218-219.

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which men were able to explain a fact which could not fail to attract their attention; this fact is the perpetuity of the life of the group. Individuals die, but the clan survives. So the forces which give it life must have the same perpetuity. Now these forces are the souls which animate individual bodies; for it is in them and through them that the group is realized. For this reason, it is necessary that they endure. It is even necessary that in enduring, they remain always the same; for, as the clan always keeps its characteristic appearance, the spiritual substance out of which it is made must be thought of as qualitatively invariable. Since it is always the same clan with the same totemic principle, it is necessary that the souls be the same, for souls are only the totemic principle broken up and particularized. Thus there is something like a germinative plasm, of a mystic order, which is transmitted from generation to generation and which makes, or at least is believed to make, the spiritual unity of the clan through all time. And this belief, in spite of its symbolic character, is not without a certain objective truth. For though the group may not be immortal in the absolute sense of the word, still it is true that it endures longer than the individuals and that it is born and incarnated afresh in each new generation.”

A very striking illustration of Durkheim's behaviorism, insofar as attitudes are represented as growing out of actions rather than the reverse, is provided by his theory of mourning, which has also a bearing on certain aspects of the idea of the soul. He writes:

“When some one dies, the family group to which he belongs feels itself lessened and, to react against this loss, it assembles. A common misfortune has the same effects as the approach of a happy event: collective sentiments are renewed which then lead men to seek one another and to assemble together. We have even seen this need for concentration affirm itself with a particular energy: they embrace one another, put their arms round one another, and

¹*Ibid.*, pp. 268-269.

press as close as possible to one another. But the affective state in which the group then happens to be only reflects the circumstances through which it is passing. Not only do the relatives, who are affected the most directly, bring their own personal sorrow to the assembly, but the society exercises a moral pressure over its members, to put their sentiments in harmony with the situation. To allow them to remain indifferent to the blow which has fallen upon it and diminished it, would be equivalent to proclaiming that it does not hold the place in their hearts which is due it; it would be denying itself. A family which allows one of its members to die without being wept for shows by that very fact that it lacks moral unity and cohesion: it abdicates; it renounces its existence. An individual, in his turn, if he is strongly attached to the society of which he is a member, feels that he is morally held to participating in its sorrows and joys; not to be interested in them would be equivalent to breaking the bonds uniting him to the group; it would be renouncing all desire for it and contradicting himself. When the Christian, during the ceremonies commemorating the Passion, and the Jew, on the anniversary of the fall of Jerusalem, fast and mortify themselves, it is not in giving way to a sadness which they feel spontaneously. Under these circumstances, the internal state of the believer is out of all proportion to the severe abstinences to which they submit themselves. If he is sad, it is primarily because he consents to being sad, and he consents to it in order to affirm his faith. The attitude of the Australian during mourning is to be explained in the same way. If he weeps and groans, it is not merely to express an individual chagrin; it is to fulfil a duty of which the surrounding society does not fail to remind him.

“We have seen elsewhere how human sentiments are intensified when affirmed collectively. Sorrow, like joy, becomes exalted and amplified when leaping from mind to mind, and therefore expresses itself outwardly in the form of exuberant and violent movements. But these are no

longer expressive of the joyful agitation which we observed before; they are shrieks and cries of pain. Each is carried along by the others; a veritable panic of sorrow results. When pain reaches this degree of intensity, it is mixed with a sort of anger and exasperation. One feels the need of breaking something, of destroying something. He takes this out either upon himself or others. He beats himself, burns himself, wounds himself or else he falls upon others to beat, burn and wound them. Thus it became the custom to give one's self up to the veritable orgies of tortures during mourning. It seems very probable that blood-revenge and head-hunting have their origin in this. If every death is attributed to some magic charm, and for this reason it is believed that the dead man ought to be avenged, it is because men must find a victim at any price, upon whom the collective pain and anger may be discharged. Naturally this victim is sought outside the group; a stranger is a subject *minoris resistentiae*; as he is not protected by the sentiments of sympathy inspired by a relative or neighbor, there is nothing in him which subdues and neutralizes the evil and destructive sentiments aroused by the death. It is undoubtedly for this same reason that women serve more frequently than men as the passive objects of the cruellest rites of mourning; since they have a smaller social value, they are more obviously designated as scapegoats.

"We see that this explanation of mourning completely leaves aside all ideas of souls or spirits. The only forces which are really active are of a wholly impersonal nature: they are the emotions aroused in the group by the death of one of its members. But the primitive does not know the psychical mechanism from which these practices result. So when he tries to account for them, he is obliged to forge a wholly different explanation. All he knows is that he must painfully mortify himself. As every obligation suggests the notion of a will which obliges, he looks about him to see whence this constraint which he feels may come. Now, there is one moral power, of whose reality he is assured

and which seems designated for this rôle: this is the soul which the death had liberated. For what could have a greater interest than it in the effects which its own death has on the living? So they imagine that if these latter inflict an unnatural treatment upon themselves, it is to conform to its exigencies. It was thus that the idea of the soul must have intervened at a later date into the mythology of mourning. But also, since it is thus endowed with inhuman exigencies, it must be supposed that in leaving the body which it animated, the soul lays aside every human sentiment. Hence the metamorphosis which makes a dreaded enemy out of the relative of yesterday. This transformation is not the origin of mourning; it is rather its consequence. It translates a change which has come over the affective state of the group: men do not weep for the dead because they fear them; they fear them because they weep for them."

"But this change of the affective state can only be a temporary one, for while the ceremonies of mourning result from it, they also put an end to it. Little by little, they neutralize the very causes which have given rise to them. The foundation of mourning is the impression of a loss which the group feels when it loses one of its members. But this very impression results in bringing individuals together, in putting them into closer relations with one another, in associating them all in the same mental state, and therefore in disengaging a sensation of comfort which compensates the original loss. Since they weep together, they hold to one another and the group is not weakened, in spite of the blow which has fallen upon it. Of course they have only sad emotions in common, but communicating in sorrow is still communicating, and every communion of mind, in whatever form it may be made, raises the social vitality. The exceptional violence of the manifestations by which the common pain is necessarily and obligatorily

¹This is a curious sociological utilization of the once famous James-Lange hypothesis of the emotions.

expressed even testifies to the fact that at this moment, the society is more alive and active than ever. In fact, whenever the social sentiment is painfully wounded, it reacts with greater force than ordinarily: one never holds so closely to his family as when it has just suffered. This surplus energy effaces the more completely the effects of the interruption which was felt at first, and thus dissipates the feeling of coldness which death always brings with it. The group feels its strength gradually returning to it; it begins to hope and to live again. Presently one stops mourning, and he does so owing to the mourning itself. But as the idea formed of the soul reflects the moral state of the society, this idea should change as this state changes. When one is in the period of dejection and agony, he represents the soul with the traits of an evil being, whose sole occupation is to persecute men. But when he feels himself confident and secure once more, he must admit that it has retaken its former nature and its former sentiments of tenderness and solidarity. Thus we explain the very different ways in which it is conceived at different moments of its existence.

“Not only do the rites of mourning determine certain of the secondary characteristics attributed to the soul, but perhaps they are not foreign to the idea that it survives the body. If he is to understand the practices to which he submits on the death of a parent, a man is obliged to believe that these are not an indifferent matter for the deceased. The shedding of blood which is practised so freely during mourning is a veritable sacrifice offered to the dead man. So something of the dead man must survive, and as this is not the body, which is manifestly immobile and decomposed, it can only be the soul.¹ Of course it is impossible to say

¹It is interesting to compare this with Freud's position, who states that a projection of a psychic state is most likely to occur where opposing psychological trends make such a projection especially desirable. Now, the impression produced on man by the phenomenon of death, presents a favorable occasion of such an ambivalent condition, the opposite emotions of love and hate, tender regard and fear, being present. The negative emotions involved become objectified in the idea of an evil spirit or ghost. Freud notes his agreement with various authors in this particular, insisting, however, that in his version it is the emotional conflict involved in the situation which is

with any exactness what part these considerations have had in the origin of the idea of immortality. But it is probable that here the influence of the cult is the same as it is elsewhere. Rites are more easily explicable when one imagines that they are addressed to personal beings; so men have been induced to extend the influence of the mythical personalities in the religious life. In order to account for mourning, they have prolonged the existence of the soul beyond the tomb. This is one more example of the way in which rites react upon beliefs."¹

In analyzing Durkheim's theory of the origin of the Sacred, it is important to keep in mind the particular character of the social setting which he utilizes as the source from which the Sacred flows. As one reads Durkheim's picturesque description of Australian ceremonies, he realizes that the social setting with which the author deals is one usually designated as crowd-psychological. The emotional, ideational and behavioristic transformations which Durkheim describes as taking place in the individual are the transformations with which we are familiar from studies of crowd-psychology.

A criticism of this basic part of the author's theory may be reproduced from the article referred to before, with a few minor changes:

"Thus, the conception of the social, of society, in Durkheim's theory is strangely narrow. Notwithstanding the tremendous importance ascribed to it, society for Durkheim is but a sublimated crowd, while the social setting is the crowd-psychological situation. Society as a cultural, historical complex, society as the carrier of tradition, as the legislator, judge, as the standard of action, as public opinion; society in all of these varied and significant manifestations, which surely are of prime concern to the individual,

responsible for the creation of spirit, not the intellectual conflict (as is the case with Durkheim).

¹*Ibid.*, pp. 399-403.

does not figure in Durkheim's theory.¹ All the marvels of social control are achieved through the medium of the crowd-psychological situation. Durkheim's theory, then, is a crowd-psychological one; but is his crowd-psychology sound? The author will have us believe that the religious thrill, the sense of the sacred, arises from the reaction of the individual consciousness to social pressure, or rather from the ratiocination of that reaction. The elements involved in the situation utilized in the author's theory are still to be found in society, hence his contention is subject to verification by our modern experience. Now, how does the individual react to social pressure which overwhelms him in a crowd-psychological situation, and what construction does he place on his reaction? The reaction is very much as Durkheim has described it: in the theater, at a political meeting, in a mob, at a revival, in church, in a panic, the action of the group on the individual is characteristic and decisive. But how does he rationalize his participation in the group action or experience? Not by *contrasting* his daily life with the special crowd situation, nor by representing himself as actuated upon by a superior and external power—quite on the contrary: the individual *identifies* himself with the group, with the crowd; he represents himself as sharing in the power which is of the crowd, of the group. *We* thought, *we* felt, *we* did, is for him descriptive also of his own part in the proceedings. Social settings of this variety are so constant, so common an experience in the life of man, primitive or modern, that the average individual who is but moderately reflective, never thinks of contrasting these experiences with others, or of regarding his crowd or group self as transcending the self of his daily routine. On the contrary, the crowd or group self *is* the self *par excellence*, as well as the self at its best. Again, the crowd or group setting obviously does not create the

¹It is not to be inferred that the eminent sociologist has failed to recognize these fundamental aspects of society, or to appraise them in his system. All that is implied is that in Durkheim's theory of the origin of the Sacred, society functions merely as a crowd.

specific psychic state involved. The joyful ecstasy of a jubilant crowd remains a feeling of joy; a panic of fear is fear; the hatred of a lynching mob is hatred; the adoration of a religious gathering is adoration. In all of these instances, and innumerable others, *the specific emotion experienced is not of crowd derivation*. What is common in the above situations is the crowd psychology: through a summation of stimuli, and through imitation, the emotions become intensified; the higher mental processes, involving deliberation and intellectual concentration, become inhibited; the instinctive and reflexive responses, on the contrary, which have through past ages become attuned to the particular emotional state involved, rise into prominence. What results then is an intensified expression of a given emotion in terms of instinctive and reflexive reactions, reactions, that is, which belong to a relatively low level in the psychic constitution of man. But the specific emotion so expressed is not born of the crowd, and differs in different crowd-psychological situations. Thus, a series of corroborations does not make an *intichiuma*, nor do the secular dances of the North American Indians become identified with the religious dances. A crowd-psychological situation may intensify or even transform a religious thrill, but it can not create one.

"The author's theory, finally, runs counter to the verdict of experience, ancient and modern, in denying nature the power to impress, shock, and thrill man, thus engendering in his psyche the emotional nucleus of the religious sentiment. The author, moreover, fails to do justice to the contribution of the individual to religious experience. While the religious emotion, deeply rooted as it is in instinctive reactions reaching far back into human and possibly pre-human history, is to a marked degree amenable to the transformations conditioned by the crowd, the mob, and other more complex types of social setting, religious experience has also been enriched, elaborated, refined, by the spiritual contributions of individuals. These were either

individuals of average potentialities for religious experience, but placed in unusual circumstances, or they belonged to that group of exceptional individuals who, at all times and places, have shown uncommon proclivities for the religious life. The first category is exemplified by the Indian youth who, at the dawn of maturity, retires to a shanty in the woods, fasts and purifies himself, presently to behold a vision of a spiritual animal or object, from which he receives a supernatural revelation of certain powers which henceforth are his for life. To the second category of individuals belongs that limited group of men from which history has recruited her religious teachers and reformers, fanatics and miracle workers, revivalists, founders and destroyers of religions, prophets and saints.¹ Now, it is emphatically characteristic of both of these categories of men (and women) that, temporarily or permanently, they shun the crowd, they flee from the world, they live in solitude, they are proof against religious settings except those of their own making; in their psychic constitution lie infinite potentialities of religious experience and ecstasy. Their god is within them. The lives of such as they constitute a glaring refutation of Durkheim's theory."²

Durkheim's theory of the origin of the belief in immortality is a particularly instructive example of the author's tremendous exaggeration of the importance of social factors as contrasted with all others. That the perpetuity of the life of the group ("individuals die but the clan survives") should attract the attention of the people, as Durkheim claims it necessarily would, seems anything but plain. Where is the evidence that the attention of individuals in early communities is attracted by facts such as this? Moreover, the idea of survival is much more widespread than the belief in the particular form of reincarnation characteristic of central Australia. Thus, the idea of survival must have originated in other localities from sources other than the

¹Cf. pp. 224 sq.

²"Religion and Society, etc.," pp. 121-124.

Same thing as

necessity of providing a soul for reincarnation, and if that is so, one is prompted to pause before admitting that in Australia ideas of reincarnation were chronologically prior and psychologically causal to the idea of survival.

Durkheim's analysis of mourning is both brilliant and suggestive, but unless hypnotized by the flow of the author's presentation, who would follow him in his assertion that the idea of the soul of the deceased is introduced into the mourning situation as an afterthought, as it were, to account for the cruel treatment to which the participating individuals have subjected themselves? "When he tries to account for them" (those cruel tortures), writes Durkheim, "he is obliged to forge a wholly different explanation." But *does "he,"* the savage, *try* to account for them? Is there any direct evidence in Australia, or for that matter anywhere else, that attempts are made to account for ceremonial cruelties? If such an attempt at accounting were made, surely it would have to be deliberate and conscious. And unless the idea of the evil soul is brought by the natives into connection with these painful phenomena, their attempts to explain them would continue from generation to generation. But neither of the two assumptions is justified by the facts. The evil soul of the deceased is not held responsible for the mourning with its wild cruelties, nor are there any attempts made to explain these. Thus Durkheim's hypothesis contains the double error of an one-sided behaviorism with an one-sided rationalism. First, the act is introduced as a social phenomenon, while the individual attitudes are held in abeyance; then the individuals are re-introduced as pondering over the act and attempting to interpret it. But it is not made psychologically plausible why individual attitudes should thus be held in abeyance while the act of the group is taking place, nor that it is permissible to assume that after the act the individuals would ponder and reflect and reach conclusions and make interpretations.

In order to do full justice to Durkheim's contribution it

is necessary to refer to another daring generalization of the great sociologist which interests us here only insofar as it refers to the sources of certain ideas held by early man. Throughout Durkheim's volume we find dispersed certain hints and statements referring to the bearing of the religious and social phenomena analyzed by the author on the general problem of the origin of thought categories. Toward the end of the book Durkheim returns to this subject and summarizes briefly his conclusions. His idea is this: the sources for some of the fundamental categories of thought must be looked for in social conditions and determinants. Among these categories are force, causality, totality, space and time. Durkheim admits that these concepts are generalizations derived in part from the experiences of individuals with natural phenomena, but he insists that the constraining character of the categories cannot be derived from the same source. These fundamental concepts are both psychic and impersonal, insofar as their bearing transcends the individual. Only collective forces combine these two characteristics. Social constraint is both in us, thus being psychic, and outside of us, thus being impersonal and transcending the individual. It is not only actions, behavior, that are thus determined by society, but the fundamental forms of thought itself. As Durkheim crisply puts it: "The imperatives of thought are probably only another side of the imperatives of action."

The concepts enumerated are not merely enforced by society but they are actually derived from social forms and conditions. "The problem concerning them is more complex," writes Durkheim, "for they are social in another sense and, as it were, in the second degree. They not only come from society, but the things which they express are of a social nature. Not only is it society which has founded them, but their contents are the different aspects of the social being: the category of class was at first indistinguishable from the concept of the human group; it is the

¹ "Elementary Forms," etc. p. 369.

rhythm of social life which is at the basis of the category of time; the territory occupied by the society furnished the material for the category of space; it is the collective force which was the prototype of the concept of efficient force, an essential element in the category of causality. However, the categories are not made to be applied only to the social realm; they reach out to all reality."¹

Some of Durkheim's illustrations of the above principle invite a comparison with Frazer's idea of magic as a sort of primitive substitute for science; for example, when the author argues that when the Iroquois conceive of the life of Nature as the product of different intensities of *orenda* (a kind of *mana*) of things, they only express in their own way the modern idea that the world is a system of forces which limit and equilibrate one another.² As an illustration of the sort of social phenomena from which the idea of class is derived, Durkheim refers to certain classifications of objects in nature particularly common in Australia, as in those cases where animals, plants and natural objects are classified according to the two phratries of a tribe. Among the American Haida the gods are similarly classified according to the two phratries.³ The social derivation of the idea of space is illustrated by an example from the Zuñi, who conceived of space as divided into seven directions, to correspond with the seven quarters of their Pueblo, each distinguished by its symbolic color.

Collective ideas such as underlie the formation of the categories of thought are characteristic of all societies. Durkheim, therefore, takes exception to Lévy-Bruhl's position, who holds that collective representations are specifically characteristic of primitive mentality. Further: if ideas, even the most basic ones, are dependent upon social conditions, it is not surprising to find that each civilization has

¹*Ibid.*, p. 440.

²*Ibid.*, pp. 203-204.

³*Ibid.*, p. 141.

its own system of concepts which find expression in language.¹

It is impossible at this place to indulge in an extensive critique of these highly interesting speculations.² The considerations presented are, however, of such cardinal importance in their bearing upon epistemology and the theory of early mentality that some remarks become necessary if only to indicate the general character of the objections that can be raised against Durkheim's theory.

In the first place, then, Durkheim errs in disregarding or at least under-estimating the extent to which the experience of individuals with the objective phenomena of nature, is capable of engendering concepts. It is true that primitive philosophy pays little heed to the vast if often inaccurate information accumulated by man about the forms, properties and functions of objects and creatures amongst which he lives, moves and has his being. There is, however, inferential evidence to the effect that these aspects of experience do not by any means fall upon non-responsive senses or inert minds. The economic pursuits and industries of early man, his methods of hunting and fishing; his traps, snares and hooks; the varying techniques of making pots or of weaving baskets; the elaborate manipulations by means of

¹*Ibid*, p. 435. It is interesting to compare this section of Durkheim's work with what Teggart says in "The Processes of History" about the "idea systems" of different civilizations (see particularly pp. 106-123).

²Durkheim proposed to elaborate these fragmentary ideas on the sociological foundation of the basic categories of thought into a separate volume. But at the time of his death these ideas had not advanced beyond the stage in which they appear in the "Elementary Forms of the Religious Life."

Moreover, in justice to the author, it must be said that he does not regard his speculations as final, or as accounting in themselves for the concepts in question. In connection with his theory of the origin of the concept of causality, for example, he states: "It is to be borne in mind, moreover, that we have never dreamed of offering the preceding observations as a complete theory of the concept of causality. The question is too complex to be resolved thus. The principle of causality has been understood differently in different times and places; in a single society, it varies with the social environment and the kingdoms of nature to which it is applied. So it would be impossible to determine with sufficient precision the causes and conditions upon which it depends, after a consideration of only one of the forms which it has presented during the course of history. The views which we have set forth should be regarded as mere indications, which must be controlled and completed." (p. 369.)

which hide is tanned or bark reduced to a consistency which may be utilized as clothing; the handling of animal and vegetable tissues in connection with the preparation of food as well as for medicinal uses; all of these and innumerable other similar processes present, amongst errors and misconceptions, abundant evidence of concrete and often accurate observation, of the utilization of such observation for the purpose of mechanical adjustment and technical adeptness, and of the improvement through invention of the form and function of articles of use. All of these are mental accomplishments which imply classification, at least incipient generalization, learning from experience, and technical progress, however slow, through the method of trial and error. The mental process involved must in at least some of the above instances be conscious and deliberate. On the whole, however, this entire set of intellectual processes is strangely submerged, almost automatic, as it were, and contributes but little to the world view of early man. Why that should be so, why the valuable insight reached at the cost of much effort, danger and trying experience should play so small a part in the deliberate thought of early man is a question we shall attempt to answer, at least in part, in the next chapter.¹

Nevertheless, the part played by these generally unconscious processes in the discipline of the mind must have been tremendous. The antecedents of science, which from this angle is but systematized and sublimated common sense, are certainly to be looked for in this level of early experience. The categories of time and space, of force and causality, are all implied in matter-of-fact experience and its intellectual counterpart. When in the course of time the generalizations derived from socio-ceremonial and religious experience came into close quarters with the ideas derived from the realm of matter-of-fact, the above mental categories were represented not alone in the former but in the latter as well.

¹See pp. 406-407 and 410 *sq.*

Nor is this all. Durkheim is no doubt right in pointing out that in different societies and even within one society, differences are discernible between the more precise connotations given to the ideas of causality, force and the like. Nevertheless, all the concepts involved are basic and, differences apart, contain a sufficient number of common characters in all societies and among all men. That this should be so would be surprising and unaccountable if these categories of thought were derived from the varying socio-ceremonial and religious conditions which are encountered in different communities. By contrast with this, the matter-of-fact experience is everywhere essentially the same and is thus much better fitted to lay the common foundation for the fundamental elements of thought.

In confirmation of the thesis here maintained, an interesting study could be made of the grammars of primitive languages. It would then be found that in the recorded grammars of American Indian languages, for example, there is no evidence in the categories involved of either social structure or function or of supernaturalism. The categories encountered are those of singularity and plurality, of time and localization, of conditionality, inception and conclusion, of instrumentality, of form, of sex, of number, and the like. *All these categories imply the world of matter-of-fact experience.* It will also be seen that for all the evidence contained in the grammatical categories, these Indian communities might have socio-ceremonial and religious structures and ideas wholly different from those they actually display, for their effect on the fundamental categories of unconscious thought as expressed in grammatical structure, is *nil*.

LÉVY-BRUHL'S THEORIES

One of the most notable contributions to the theory of primitive thought made in recent years is that of Lévy-

Bruhl in his book on the mental functions of primitive man.¹

Professor Lévy-Bruhl represents the right wing, as it were, of the Durkheim school, but as will be presently seen, his own contribution is quite distinct. Frazer's associationism and the rationalistic approach of Spencerian and Tylorian animism do not impress the French philosopher. These theories, he argues, try to infuse a logical note into the primitive world view. They accept the postulate that the mind of early man operates as rationally in the elaboration and generalization of its experiences as does the modern mind. But this, claims Lévy-Bruhl, is not the case. With Durkheim, he insists that the phenomena which we encounter in studying primitive society are collective phenomena. Ceremonies, myths, rules of behavior, language, religion—all of these represent collective modes of action and reaction and they must be the expressions of a collective mentality. Now, different societies reveal great differences in the external elements of their civilizations. These elements are the moulders of the mentality of the several peoples, therefore the mentalities must be different. Thus the study of the primitive mind resolves itself into one of local types of mentality.

Having reached this stage in his reasoning, the investigator finds himself face to face with wellnigh insurmountable difficulties. The way to a study of such local types of mentality is not by any means clear; the preliminary concrete investigations are lacking. Nevertheless, it is possible by way of a preliminary survey to characterize these divergent types of mentality at least insofar as they may contain certain common elements which differentiate them from the "idea systems" of modern man.²

¹"Les fonctions mentales des sociétés inférieures," Paris, 1912. A German translation of the work has recently appeared and an English one is in preparation. An abstract of the contents will be found in my review of Lévy-Bruhl's book in *The American Anthropologist* for 1911.

²The term "idea systems" may be fittingly used here to suggest the resemblance between Lévy-Bruhl's conception and the corresponding ideas of Teggart, to which reference has been made before in connection with a similar thought in Durkheim's work.

The first point, then, to be noted in connection with these collective ideas is that they are not the product of the minds of individuals. On the contrary, with reference to individual mental processes, the collective ones must be regarded as pre-existing. They are there when the individual appears to receive them. Irresistibly they force themselves upon the individual mind, and they remain when the individual passes away.

The distinctive peculiarity of the collective ideas is that they are pre-logical or a-logical, meaning by this not that they necessarily contradict logic, but that logical processes are frequently and even typically disregarded in their formation. Thus, in the magical and animistic universe the past may also be the present, a person may be in one place and at the same time in another, or in a dream. A man, or animal, or thing, is not only similar to but is identical with its image or reflection or name. A Bororó (a South American tribe) is also an *arará* (a kind of cuckatoo or parrot), a Central Australian bushman is also his *churinga* or his reincarnated half human, half animal ancestor.

The comparison of objects and beings from the standpoint of their objective characteristics is outside the interest of this collective mentality. Its attention is centered on those variagated bonds which tie objects, beasts, men and actions into closely knit groups that have nothing to do with objective form and substance and are based solely on ceremonial, magical or other supernatural connections. The principle on the basis of which these connections are established, resulting in a rapport between the things and actions within each cycle of such mystic relations, Lévy-Bruhl designates as the principle of participation. The things, beings, persons, tied together by a mystic rapport into a common cycle of participation are to that extent *one*, and this oneness, this identity based on supernaturalistic connections, determines all the relations of such things and beings.

Nor is it correct to assert, claims Lévy-Bruhl, that the magical connections between things are established through

the operation of the law of association. In the collective mentality the "associations" are given as primary factors, and what the student observes is a gradual dissociation of such originally unified elements which takes place in the course of history.¹

In this connection Lévy-Bruhl's attention is directed toward those strange customs described so interestingly by Van Gennep in his book, "Les rites de passage." Primitive custom bristles with these rites of passage: initiation ceremonies which carry the boy or girl through different phases of ceremonial participation; the rites which usher the child into the membership of the tribe, or those that accompany the adoption of a new member into the clan; rites which attest the passage of an individual to the rank of chieftaincy or kingship; rites that usher the bride into matrimony; those that mark the inception of a hunting period or the return of a voyage; and then, those final rites which the soul or spiritual residue of a man must leave behind before it is permitted to break off relations with its earthly associates.

In particular, Lévy-Bruhl directs attention to what he designates as the cycle of life and death, a series of ceremonially sanctioned periods through which an individual is made to pass among different tribes of the Melanesian Archipelago. When a child is born, its social worth is next to zero; whence it may be readily eliminated, at least among some tribes. Only after the ceremonial and public imposition of a name does the tribal participation of the individual begin. In the course of his life he passes through a series of ritualistic periods, each introducing him to an ever widening circle of relations, functions, rights and restrictions. Then he dies. But the socio-ceremonial participation continues even after the first burial, and only after the second burial has been gone

¹It will be noted that in this point Lévy-Bruhl endorses by implication the idea of Wundt, whose concept of "mythological apperception" corresponds strictly to Lévy-Bruhl's original unity of these supernatural intuitions, as when the lightning is directly perceived as a snake by the primitive mind.

through are all bonds between the dead and the living broken, and then the break in participation may be only temporary, for the departed spirit may be reborn again in the body of a child, to start after the first public name giving upon its second cycle of socio-ceremonial participation.

Certain aspects of this cycle of participation illustrate, in the author's opinion, the disregard of the logical principle of contradiction, for the individual who is physically dead is yet socio-ceremonially alive, until the second burial. Thus he is both dead and alive; whereas the child, from birth to the ceremonial name giving, is physically alive but socio-ceremonially dead; thus it is both alive and dead.

Interesting comments on Lévy-Bruhl's cycle of life and death are made by Rivers in his article on "The Primitive Conception of Death." In the course of his own investigations in Melanesia, Rivers found ample occasion to verify Lévy-Bruhl's conception and to emphatically endorse it, without however, following all of Lévy-Bruhl's conclusions. During the early days of his acquaintance with the Melanesians, Rivers learned to associate the term *mate* with "dead" and *toa* with "alive" or "living." Before long, however, Rivers discovered that the connotations he had originally ascribed to these terms were not quite exact. In illustration he cites an instance recorded by a missionary. The latter relates how on one occasion he witnessed what he later discovered to be a burial ceremony. In the course of the preliminary procession his attention was drawn to an old woman who acted with striking vivacity. Presently, however, he became aware of the real purport of the ceremony and also realized, to his amazement, that the woman in question was the one to be buried. She was *mate*, that is dead, for all socio-ceremonial purposes, and as there is not much use in such persons, if they are not actually dead, they "ought to be," as Rivers puts it. Hence, with irreproachable if somewhat ruthless logic, the

¹*The Hibbert Journal*, January, 1912.

final rites are performed and the burial takes place, notwithstanding the protests and groans of the *mate*, for not all take their fate as cheerfully as the old lady in question.

So far Rivers is at one with Lévy-Bruhl, but he objects to the interpretation. No contradiction is involved, he claims, for the individual is not really dead and alive at the same time. For the natives he is dead, *mate*. The contradiction appears only if we combine our own attitude with that of the natives. But this, of course, we may not do. Rivers' own generalization is to the effect that the concept of death among these people is radically distinct from our own. "I must be content," concludes Rivers, "to have indicated the possibility that to the primitive mind death is not the unique and catastrophic event it seems to us, but merely a condition of passing from one existence to another, forming but one of a number of transitions, which began perhaps before his birth, and stand out as the chief memories of his life."

Now it seems that Rivers is right in his censure of Lévy-Bruhl's interpretation. Our psychological estimate of primitive ideas should not be marred by the infusion of our own. But Rivers' own generalization seems equally erroneous, and in the form which it takes in the above quotation it involves a decided misrepresentation of the primitive attitude toward death. The unnamed child may be for the time being *mate*, dead; the dead man, between the first and the second burial, may be *toa*, alive; but these classifications are not applicable to all conditions. The unnamed child, for instance, may be maliciously killed, the taking of its life falling under the concept of murder; but the ghost of the dead man, between the first and the second burial, can not be killed. Thus the concept of murder, of the unjustifiable taking of a life, is adjusted to the physical span of existence, in conformity with our own ideas and the objective facts of the case. The theoretical inference is this: ideas such as *mate* and *toa*—and these are merely samples of a multiplicity of primitive notions often differing from

our own—must be appraised as operative within a particular cycle of participation, in this case the socio-ceremonial cycle. Outside of this there may be other ideas perhaps conflicting with these or partly overlapping them, which belong to another cycle of participation, as is the case with the idea of murder.

That from a logical standpoint there may be contradiction between the ideas entertained by the same people or individuals is true enough, and this brings us back to Lévy-Bruhl's position. Are such contradictions and the non-objectivity of many of the underlying ideas, distinctive of primitive mentality as contrasted with our own, and is primitive mentality throughout characterized by the presence of such ideas?

Further reflection will show that the answer to both questions must be a negative one. Modern mentality is not characterized by the exclusive dominance of logic, when contrasted with primitive mentality, nor is the latter throughout a-logical.

What is the place of logical thought in modern society? It applies, we are told, in the solution of problems, in science, philosophy, mathematics, and we might add in applied science, and finally in that homely but highly useful form of thought known as common sense. In the case of this latter faculty, however, good psychology is often more conspicuous than good logic, in fact, it often is good psychology because it is poor logic. The conclusion is illogical, the reaction irrational, but this is the way people conclude and react nevertheless—so common sense with its psychological insight tells us.

Now this is significant, for a little further thought along the same line does not fail to disclose the fact—disheartening though it may seem to some—that logical thought plays but a strictly limited part in the totality of mental processes in our own society. And the closer we come to those levels of life which are thickly padded with emotion, the less conspicuously does logic figure in the thought process referring

to such levels. Tradition, family associations, educational setting, class consciousness, national sentiment, racial prejudice, religious dogma, the violent shock of personal experience, the suggestion of propaganda—whether through books, lectures, journals, newspapers or advertisements—these are the dominant influences which control our thought and reactions in matters economic, social, political, moral, religious.

But we must go even further. Logic without question is the ideal and model of scientific thought. The demonstrations of the theorems in Euclid are perfect specimens of logical coherence and finality, but these demonstrations do not represent the thought process by means of which the theorems were reached. What they really represent are artificially simplified and condensed verifications of such thought processes.

The most logical thinker does not for any length of time think in logically connected propositions. The logically coherent thought may be the final outcome of his mental process but it is not the process.¹

Pre-logical mentality, then, is not foreign to modern society. Our minds are also driven by collective thought. As to the principle of contradiction, it may represent an impregnable stronghold of abstract logic, but not of psychology. For in the psyche of man contradictory modes of thought, of attitude, of behavior, are as common today as they were yesterday or the day before. In fact, the very concept of contradiction is applicable to these psychic mani-

¹In illustration, a personal experience: a group of men and women, all with professional training, were on one occasion gathered about an eminent scientist and thinker who contributed the intellectual treat of the occasion by discussing the topic "How Do I Think?" The scientist presented at some length the scientific principles which guided his thought. When he had finished, one of the men present asked this question: "Now, Professor X, had an Indian chief given you this answer you would have told him, 'Well, my dear man, all this is very nice, but now tell me how you think.' We are all familiar with your scientific principles. For years they have been our inspiration and despair. What we wanted to hear about are your submerged hypotheses, your errors, your unpublished intuitions!" But the over-rationalized mind of the professor was unable to produce these.

festations only when they are rationalized. In actual experience, however, they are not rationalized but lived.

And again, is the mind of early man wholly submerged by pre-logical, irrational, collective ideas and attitudes? All who have come in contact with him know that this is by no means the case. Thus Durkheim speaks of the profane periods in the life of the Australian which contrast so strikingly with the periodical recurrence of sacred frenzy. Now, the profane period in primitive Australia as in modern society, is the abode of common sense, of reason, of logic. Durkheim calls this level in the Australian's experience grey and drab. That it is; and so is logic and reason. In his multitudinous industrial activities—crude though they may be—the Australian shows common sense in abundance. Even though he may not count further than five, he can put two and two together very effectively. Nor does his wisdom extend only to the domain of material things, for many are the evidences of his shrewdness in human contact, and shrewdness is logic applied to psychology. The medicine-man's art of curing or inducing disease is not merely evidence of black magic but also of black logic, the logic which enables a man to hold his own or more in dealing with another man, the same black logic which is one of the cornerstones of modern business methods.

Spencer, without question, goes too far when he claims that granting the savage his premises, his conclusions are the most rational that could be drawn. That they often are not, nor are ours, but *many* of his conclusions *are* rational, and the less chance there is for his magic-suffused psychology to intercept the processes of reason, the more likely are they to be rational. That is why the semi-automatic and often unconscious mental processes involved in industry and economic pursuits, give such frequent evidence of a bedrock of reason and common sense below the stream of collectively driven irrationality.

Lévy-Bruhl deserves great credit for bringing out with startling incisiveness the importance of the principle of

participation and of collectively driven thought in primitive mentality, but when he makes of these the differentia of primitive man-psychological, his vision is at fault. There is a dose of logic to several of irrationality in the make-up of early man; so there is in that of modern man. The functions of logic and of pre-logical mentality, their range and the depth of their reach, are not the same in the two instances. But that is another question. Had Lévy-Bruhl compared logic and its functions in modern man and in his early precursor, as well as collective mentality and its functions in the same two settings, his conclusions would have been different. To this aspect of the problem we may have occasion to return once more.

FREUD'S THEORIES¹

Psychoanalysis had its beginning as a new technique in the clinical treatment of certain nervous disorders. It arose out of observations made by Freud on patients subjected to hypnotic treatment and presently was transformed by him into a substitute technique in place of hypnotism. In the course of a few years of psychoanalytic practice on the part of Freud and his disciples, so many new facts of psychological import were brought to light that the ideology of psychoanalysis soon grew beyond the scope of conventional psychology, bringing into being what practically

¹In order to follow the argument of this section it is not necessary to have been either psychoanalyzed or to possess a technical knowledge of psychoanalysis, but a general familiarity with Freud's doctrine is a prerequisite. For this purpose Freud's own "A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis" is recommended, which will suffice for an elementary orientation. A clear although somewhat thin presentation of the bearing of psychoanalysis on the social sciences will be found in two articles by Rank and Sachs on "The Significance of Psychoanalysis for the Mental Sciences" in *The Psychoanalytic Review*, 1915. An interesting early attempt to correlate certain aspects of primitive ideology with individual psychic phenomena revealed by psychoanalysis is Abraham's "Dreams and Myth" (*Nervous and Mental Diseases Monograph Series*, 15, 1913). Freud's theory to which reference is made in this study will be found in his book, "Totem and Taboo," but the references here are to the original German articles in the *Imago*, 1912-1913. This journal, started in 1912 and edited by Freud, is devoted exclusively to the application of psychoanalysis to social science.

amounts to a new psychological system. Nor were the psychoanalysts satisfied to deal with the individual alone. At first hesitatingly, then with daring strides, psychoanalysis was applied to the interpretation of art, religion, philosophy, ethics, education, criminology and history. Relevant literature now numbers hundreds of titles, but for our purpose it will suffice to deal briefly with Freud's own attempts to illumine analytically certain correspondences in the psychic life of neurotic patients and of primitive man.

In dealing with animism and magic, Freud asserts that the fundamental basis of all magic lies in the mistaking of an ideal connection for a real one, a formulation which will earn the assent of most students of these phenomena. This is how a doll can be made to impersonate a distant enemy whose sickness or death may be brought about by maltreating the doll. A similar psychology underlies the process of so-called fertilizing magic, where various physical manipulations are believed to bring about rain. The similarity between the desired result and the performed act evokes, through its ideational reproduction of the former, the belief that the result has been attained. The moving principle in magic is man's desires which are realized by being psychically lived through and objectified.¹ The disregard of the limitations of time and space so characteristic of magical idiosyncrasy is nothing but a projection into objective reality of a similar disregard so characteristic of thought. The whole animistic world, the realm of supernaturalism, is permeated by the "omnipotence of thought." Now Freud insists that a similar substitution of ideas for things is a characteristic symptom of the neuroses. The frequently observed "guilty conscience" of the neurotic, for example, is rooted in naught else but his criminal thoughts which are by him objectified as criminal acts.

¹This projection and objectivation of psychic states as an important principle in the interpretation of magic and religion, has also been emphasized by Wundt and by Simmel (cf. his "Die Religion," p. 15).

Freud draws a parallel between the individual and the race, the stages of psychic development in the former and the transformation of attitudes in history. The sex life of the individual, at first characterized by a self-sufficient pre-occupation with the ego, is later centered in the parents, to find a final and matter-of-fact realization in the acceptance of normal adult sexuality. Similarly, early magic and animism are dominated by the omnipotence of thought in which man is all-powerful, for whatever he may desire he has, by desiring it; later there appears religion in which part of man's power is surrendered to supernatural beings; and last of all comes science in the name of which man accepts as his guiding principle the objectively verifiable realities of the world and learns to know his real power by accepting its limitations.¹

Returning once more to the idea of the omnipotence of thought as manifested in magic, Freud cites the following example familiar to most ethnologists. It is often observed, writes Freud, that when the men of a primitive tribe start out for a great hunt or war raid or to gather precious plants, the women at home are subjected to a great number of oppressive taboos. The observation of these taboos is regarded by the natives as a condition for the success of the enterprise. It requires little perspicacity to realize, adds the psychoanalyst, that this far-reaching force is nothing else but the thoughts of home of those who are far away, the homesickness of the distant ones, and that there lies hidden behind this ideological masquerade the good psychological insight that the men will do their best only when feeling quite sure as to the behavior of the women at home.

In dealing with the subject of taboos, Freud once more draws attention to the fact that in the case of the taboo as well as in those avoidances which are characteristic of the

¹Freud is also at one with Wundt in asserting that art has inherited from religion the substitution of mind for matter, for in art the ideal is the real, thought is its own objectivation.

neurotic afflictions, there is the common element of the unexplained source of these avoidances as well as the fear that some person or persons will suffer from the transgression. There is, in addition, the element of the infectiousness of the taboo, the belief that anything that comes in touch with the tabooed person or object or action, becomes itself taboo; just as in the case of the neurotic there are "impossible" things and persons and anything that comes in touch with such persons or things becomes itself "impossible." And in both situations there are certain ceremonials which can be gone through, such as purification by water and the like, by means of which the transgression of a taboo can be expiated.

Freud thus believes that some of the most widespread taboos, among which are the taboos on sex, are based on ancient and very deep rooted urges of which society is not aware, but which persist in the unconscious of individuals. Against these the taboos are directed and the infectiousness of the transgressor is based on the unconscious recognition that his example is attractive, attractive because he realizes the urge, hence he must be avoided.

Turning, finally, to his main topic, totemism, Freud once more emphasizes the analogy between the regard for animals characteristic of totemism and a similar attitude observable in certain psycho-neuroses. Freud cites the well-known case of the five-year-old boy analyzed by himself, with his fear of horses. Another instance is that of the boy *Arpàd*, analyzed by *Ferenczi*, who exhibited a mixed attitude of love and hate or fear, toward fowl. In these two as in all similar cases, psychoanalytic treatment reveals the presence of an ambivalent attitude toward the father, which is transferred to the animal against whom the attitude is avowedly directed.

With enviable courage Freud passes from these instances, dealing with the individual, to the group attitude toward the totem. If the totem animal, he argues, can be shown to be the father in disguise, then the two fundamental taboos of

totemism—not to kill the totem nor to marry a woman of the same totem—receive their common explanation. They correspond to the two crimes of Oedipus, who killed his father and married his mother, and to the two arch-desires of the child, the unsatisfactory repression of which, or the revival of which, probably constitute the root of all psycho-neuroses.

Then Freud proceeds to give some illustrations of totemic sacrifice, a subject which was made popular by the researches of Robertson Smith. He refers to the communal partaking of the sacred animal and the consequent feeling of guilt which finds its expression and resolution in the torture of a scapegoat.

Thus the basis is laid for a new interpretation of totemism. It is this:

In very early times, before there was any definite social organization or religion, man lived in so-called Cyclopean families in which all the sex rights were monopolized by the dominant old male, while the younger men, his sons, had to submit to the restrictions imposed by him or be killed or expelled. The great dominant male, the father, was revered by the others for his power and wisdom, but he was also hated on account of his monopolistic prerogatives. One day a great tragedy occurred in such a primitive community. The brothers banded together—encouraged perhaps, adds Freud, by the appearance of a new weapon—and dared to do together what each one had long desired in secret. They murdered the father. Then they consumed his body in the assurance of thus acquiring his prowess.¹

The patricidal act having been committed, the sons, tortured by remorse, reverted to a positive attitude toward the father. Seized by the desire to be obedient to him—*ex post facto*—they decided to continue the taboo the oppressive character of which had led to the murder, and to abstain from sex contact with the women of the group. The consciousness of common guilt became the root of the new social

¹*Imago*, No. 2, 1913, p. 392.

bond. Thus arose the clan of brothers, protected and reinforced by the taboo on killing a clan-mate, in order that the fate of the father might not befall any of the brothers. The totem of the clan is nothing but the transfigured reminiscence of the father, and the totemic sacrifice, an occasion both for joy and sorrow, is the dramatization of the remote tragedy in which the jubilant brothers murdered their despot father, and having accomplished the horrible deed, conscience-stricken, re-imposed upon themselves the oppressive taboo in the name of which the murder was committed.

Freud goes still further. In the central setting of the Greek tragedy he discovers another cultural symbolization of the gruesome event of earliest antiquity. The hero's part is to suffer, for he is but a dramatized memory of the murdered father. The sympathetic chorus are the patricidal brothers, but in this setting their part in the original tragedy is disguised under the cloak of a responsive and sympathetic attitude toward the hero, a psychological subterfuge with which, in the domain of the individual psyche, psychoanalytic technique has made us familiar.

Thus, four great institutions of mankind are ultimately reducible to one basic event, a common psycho-sociological source. Common guilt lay at the root of the new social system, the primitive Society, the clan. Consciousness of the guilt expressed itself in a regard for the totem father, the earliest Religion. In expiation of the crime there was self-imposed the rule of exogamy, the great sex taboo, the earliest revelation of Morality. In the domain of Art, finally, Greek tragedy re-enacted the ancient deed in an expiatory disguise.¹

¹To this Freud adds a footnote which is worth reproducing here, as typical of the great wizard of the new psychology for the strikingly ambivalent mixture of modesty and conceit. Says Freud: Accustomed to being misunderstood, I deem it useful to emphasize that the above theoretical deductions do not involve an underestimation of the complex nature of the phenomena involved. All that is intended is to add another factor to the known or as yet to be discovered sources of Religion, Morality and Society, a factor deducible from the demands of psychoanalysis. A final interpretative synthesis, I must leave to others. In this case, however, it lies in the nature of the new contribution that it will needs occupy a central position

It is impossible here to furnish a detailed critique of Freud's views—that would involve a systematic examination of the tenets of psychoanalysis—but we may at least indicate the direction in which such a critique would lie. Freud's formulation of the principle of the "omnipotence of thought" as underlying the magical universe, leaves little to be desired. It must be kept in mind, however, that the principle applies in modern society as well, as we had occasion to point out in discussing Lévy-Bruhl's position. If that is so, the analogy, in this respect, between the primitive man and the neurotic loses much of its force, except to the extent that the abnormal psyche is once more shown to be but an extreme and often one-sided variant of the normal psyche. The same comment can be made on Freud's treatment of taboo. As to the analogy between the three stages of sex development in the individual and the magic-religion-science series in history, the thought has at best but a metaphorical significance. Even were one to admit the general parallelism of social and individual development—an admission, however, that would have to be flanked with such formidable reservations that little semblance of parallelism would be left—it is not clear why magic and religion and science, as successive historic eras, should be likened to stages of sex development rather than to the corresponding ideological transformations of the individual.

But the part of Freud's system which concerns us most is his theory of totemism. There are a number of minor objections which in themselves negate the feasibility of the author's conception. Totemic sacrifice is a phenomenon practically unknown to ethnologists. Robertson Smith's "instances" were all based on reconstructed material. It is thus a highly arbitrary procedure on the part of Freud to accept speculative evidence merely because it meets the needs of his theoretical structure and in the face of the

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rejection of such evidence by those familiar with early institutions.

Further: the idea of a primitive Cyclopean family is itself a figment.¹ The nearest approach to it in the domain of early life is found in Australia with its sex and other prerogatives enjoyed by the old men. Rivers' Melanesian gerontocracy is once more a purely speculative conception. Moreover, it is a far cry from such sex prerogatives of the elders in a highly organized social system (as in Australia), to the monopolistic sex rights of a despot father in a Cyclopean family.

Again: the eating of the father by the patricidal brothers is a notion which doubtless would have met with derision in the aboriginal fraternity itself; therefore, it does not please the ethnologist. The probable extent of early cannibalism has often been exaggerated. Man has never used man as a regular article of diet. There has been some ceremonial eating of man, victims of a war raid were occasionally consumed (as in Polynesia), here and there human flesh was used in cases of severe famines. But *we do not hear of the eating of relatives*. To assume a condition which is psychologically improbable and remains unsupported by ethnographic data, is to transgress the bounds of permissible speculation.

But suppose, for the sake of argument, that all the objections here enumerated are waived or successfully disposed of by Freud. There still remains one vital criticism, which leaves the theory hanging in the air, as it were, without any foundation whatsoever in the known facts of history or biology. Suppose the original tragedy, the patricidal act of the brothers, had actually taken place, with all the immediate psychological consequences assumed by Freud. But

¹The Cyclopean family was introduced into ethnology by Atkinson (see his essay on "Tribal Law" in Lang's book "Social Origins"), who claimed Darwin as his authority. The latter refers to certain conditions obtaining among some of the higher anthropoids, on the basis of which Atkinson builds up his theory of the Cyclopean family. But even this idea was discredited by later zoologists.

by what means can these facts be brought into relation with those subsequent historic phenomena of society, religion, morality and art, the root of all of which Freud posits in that ancient enactment of the Oedipus complex in a tragic social setting? Freud does not utilize tradition, "social inheritance," as the link between the generations. What link, then, does he assume? That of a racial unconscious, propagated by inheritance from generation to generation and enriched on its way by the psychological and cultural experiences of its temporary human carriers. In this mechanism, which is but a revival of the theory of the inheritance of acquired characters, lies the dynamic principle of the racial unconscious, and with it stands or falls most of what psychoanalysts have contributed to the interpretation of social science.¹

But modern biology turns a deaf ear to the claims of use inheritance. In the light of what the biologist knows and does not know, this alleged process is naught but "inheritance by magic," to use Kroeber's phrase. For all we know or can convincingly assume, one generation receives nothing from its precursor beyond the general psycho-physical inheritance of the race, plus the accumulated civilizational

¹Freud himself is by no means unaware of the slippery ground he is treading. He writes, in substance: We have assumed throughout that there exists a group psyche in which psychic processes take place as they do in individuals. In particular, we assumed that the consciousness of guilt persists through thousands of years and remains potent in generations of men who know nothing of the original criminal deed. We assumed that emotional reactions which could have originated in generations of sons maltreated by their fathers, persisted through generations in which the father was eliminated and with him the source of the irritating tension. Freud proceeds to confess that these are serious commitments. He feels, however, that they are inevitable. Without the assumption of a group psyche—such is his categorical statement—and of the continuity of human emotions which make it possible to transcend the interruption of psychic processes through the passing away of individuals, there can be no folk psychology. If the psychic processes of one generation are not communicated to the next, if each generation must develop its own psychic adjustment to life, then there can be in this domain no progress nor development. This is the crux of the matter! *Is* there development, *is* there progress in the psychic life of individuals beyond that progress which is a reflection of cultural cumulation and advance? Perhaps most readers of these pages will agree this is more than doubtful.

possessions acquired through education and the other channels of cultural transfer.

The assumption of a psychic continuity between the generations is but an alluring fantasy and the willingness to accept it as true, in the face of contradictory historic and biologic evidence, may well be regarded as a curious example of that omnipotence of thought which Freud regards as characteristic of the psychic life of primitive man and of the neurotic.

CHAPTER XVII

EARLY LIFE AND THOUGHT

At this stage it will be well to turn once again to the subject of primitive mentality and attempt to weave into a whole the various strands of argument dispersed throughout this book.

In the course of our examination of early civilization, a number of attempts to explain its peculiarities were analyzed and rejected. Explanation through racial differences was one. The races may prove to be similar or equivalent in all fundamentals—an eventuality from which we need not shrink—but even were this not so, we know enough about racial characters to feel certain that the possible differences would not be such as to account either for the contrast between modern and primitive civilization or for the great variety of cultural types found within early civilization itself. Another factor often suggested as a determinant of cultural differences was shown to be physical environment. But on further examination this also had to be rejected. Not that it does not count, nor that adjustment to environmental conditions is of no significance in early civilization. Again and again we had occasion to see that the very reverse is true. But physical environment is powerless to account for those civilizational peculiarities which strike our eye and our sense of values when we compare one civilization with another. This holds whether the terms of comparison are between the modern and the primitive or are restricted to either one of these two levels. Nor are general psychological and sociological interpretations wholly adequate as a solution of our problem. General psychological, sociological and historical conditions account for man and culture everywhere insofar as the common elements are concerned, but they break down when the differentiations are the things one is interested in.

The very fact that civilization is found everywhere implies a general psychological similarity of mankind and a high comparability of the sociological and historical determinants of culture. Moreover, everywhere the major subdivisions of civilization are the same. There is religion, social and political organization, economic pursuits and industries and art; there is ceremonialism, and leadership and warfare; there is barter and a tendency toward inheritance of privileges and commodities. Nay, we can go even further. In each of these manifold aspects of civilization there are other subdivisions which also fall into the category of the common-human. In the economic pursuits and industries, there are habitations, means of communication and clothing; there are tools to work with and others to fight and hunt with; there are things to lie or sit upon, others, to carry substances or liquids in, still others, to cook things in. Similarly in religion, in addition to its basic aspects in the form of emotional experiences, ceremonialism and dogma, there are further common elements, such as prayer and the belief in the other world, which are wellnigh universal; spiritual agents, inmates of the supernatural world; projection of human social conditions into the supernatural realm, and religious symbolism. In all of these respects the modern and the primitive meet on a level of common humanity.

Even beyond the limits of individual civilizations, there are conspicuous similarities between the modern and the primitive. Intertribal relations, however irregular, and with them the infusion of foreign customs, ideas and inventions are present everywhere, and the effects of these processes, while differing in many ways in modern and primitive conditions, again display not unimportant similarities. The foreign, for example, elicits an attitude which with Freud we may call ambivalent: as foreign, it arouses suspicion, resentment, ridicule; as foreign also, it is attractive, valuable, stimulating, worthy of emulation. Here once more we can understand our early brother very well. So far, then, all we

have is common humanity. In this level general psychological, sociological and historical factors are sufficient as determinants.

But we have also become familiar with another set of cultural traits. Within the realm of the primitive, five different civilizations were passed in review. Later, in the course of a less detailed and no longer historical but comparative treatment, other varieties of early civilization have come to view, varieties touching upon all aspects of life, thought and activity. In the course of ethnological study, attempts have often been made to interpret these differences within early civilization by means of racial or sub-racial traits, environmental peculiarities or discrepant psychological tendencies. But it must have become clear in the course of our discussion that the differentia of individual civilizations cannot be accounted for in terms of any of these alleged determinants. The explanation of individuality must be sought not in biological type, nor in physical environment, nor again in psychological traits or general historical or sociological conditions, but in the specific historic fates of each local culture in its particular geographical and historical setting. The explanation here is identical with historic reconstruction, and to the extent to which this is faulty or incomplete, our knowledge and understanding of the particular civilizational differences involved will be the same.

In this chapter we will not be concerned with either common human traits or the peculiarities of local civilizations. Our task is to throw light on primitive civilization and mentality as they stand before us when compared and contrasted with the mind and culture of modern man.

What then, in summary, are the characteristics of early civilization?

The number of individuals leading a common cultural life in a local group or a few local groups is small. It may be counted by tens or by hundreds, but that is the limit. Even in Africa, where populational conditions are so dif-

ferent from other primitive areas and in many ways similar to those of modern life, the closely knit group of common cultural life is small.

Correlated with this numerical limitation of the early group is its relative local isolation. Not that there is complete cutting off of contact with other groups of differing civilizational cast. No, that condition is scarcely ever realized in human communities; generally speaking, intertribal contact is a constant civilizational phenomenon. Nevertheless, such contact in early conditions is relatively infrequent, irregular and non-productive of civilizational change.¹

This latter factor is based not merely on the infrequency and irregularity of intercourse, but also on the lack of plasticity in primitive civilization when compared with its modern counterpart. The mores and patterns of a primitive group are set in rigid frames. Primitive civilization is stiff-jointed, and the number and kind of movements and adjustments it can make at short notice are strictly limited.

In all prehistoric communities, those, that is, without written records, the continuity of cultural life from generation to generation is carried by two vehicles: on the one hand, by the objective continuity of material culture, on the other, by tradition, the knowledge of facts and events as carried in the minds of individuals and communicated by the spoken word from fathers to sons.²

The historic depth of such tradition is slight. It is communicated by fathers and grandfathers and it reaches back to their fathers and grandfathers; but beyond this span of some three or four generations, tradition does not extend with any

¹A sufficient vindication of this statement will be found in the marked individuality of local cultures in early society.

²The importance of the spoken word as a carrier of tradition in early communities deserves emphasis here. For the modern man, accustomed as he is to the highly complicated channels through which civilization perpetuates itself, it is wellnigh impossible to visualize the conditions of these prehistoric communities, in which the persistence of the material objects of culture was supplemented by tradition alone. The spoken word, language, here becomes the sole living vehicle of cultural perpetuation. The past comes to the present in the form of things and words, the rest vanishes. The student of early inventions, institutions and ideas, often stands perplexed and helpless before this self-obliteration of early civilization.

degree of accuracy. After this, moreover, the historic interest or inquisitiveness of an early group breaks down. The world of fathers, grandfathers, and great grandfathers is a world of the concrete and the significant. Then comes the *alcheringa*, the mythological period, good to play with and to dream about, but of little consequence for the realities of life.

The knowledge of facts and events, historically so shallow, is also closely limited geographically. The width of the cultural span is no less restricted than its depth. The group is thoroughly conversant with the human, animal and material factors of its immediate environment. Outside of this, a very fragmentary and unreliable set of data is available referring to the peoples and regions with which some sort of contact is maintained. But there the world of humanity ceases. Beyond is the void, the realm of imagination, with its grotesque creatures and fantastic happenings.

In a society where personal observation and the absorption of tradition are the only sources of knowledge and wisdom, age is a tremendous advantage. A man who has passed through the different age periods, and with due ceremonial initiation, has joined one by one all or most of the sacred societies of the group; who has been a bachelor, a married man, a father and father-in-law, a warrior and a leader in the chase; who as an elder has taken part in the deliberations over war, peace or internecine strife; who has composed songs and told and retold stories; who has experienced the tragic emergencies of primitive life, such as famine, pestilence, flood and drought; and above all, one who has had the time and the opportunity to talk with his own elders and pick up from their lips whatever knowledge and experience in fact and lore they themselves possessed—such a man comes to be an impersonation of the culture itself, an encyclopedia of knowledge, a record of events, a Jack-of-all-trades, a Who's Who and a Blue Book, all in

one. Him one reveres and admires, to him one turns for advice in doubt, in perplexity and in danger. Thus, everywhere in early society, the elders are in the saddle. It is the fathers' generation that rules, and the fathers' generation, here as always, is the bulwark of law and order, of established routine, of a cautious avoidance of the new, of a sagacious management and exploitation of the young.

This conservative trend is reinforced by other factors. While no primitive group reveals complete identity of knowledge, attitude and occupation throughout all its members, while there is division of labor, specialization of information and of skill along the lines of sex, age, locality, the primitive group is in the main strikingly homogeneous from a cultural standpoint. A great number of individuals within the group know and feel and do or can do the same things; and not a few activities and experiences are participated in by nearly all of the conscious individuals of the group. Under such conditions the control of public opinion, of customary routine, is wellnigh absolute. The individual is but a miniature reproduction of the group culture and the latter but the magnified version of the knowledge, behavior and attitudes of the individual. Any conspicuous digression on the part of the individual from the set norm of thought and action, is resented and repressed, not merely as a breach of custom, but as a flagrant violation of the very essence of the group culture, as an unnatural act, for which as a rule the punishment is administered by Nature herself in the form of that automatic chastisement, Marett's negative magic, which threatens any one who dares to transgress a taboo.

But this does not exhaust the factors that stand for conservatism.

Contrary to what is found under modern conditions, a primitive group lives in close communion with nature. We have learned either to control environment or to protect ourselves against the immediate consequences of deficient control, thus cherishing with relative impunity, the illusion

of an actual domination of natural forces by the artificial powers and rhythms of society. If heat or rain belie the prognostications of the weather man, nature is down for bad behavior; and if the sun refuses to conform with the regulation of Daylight Saving, the sun is in the wrong. How different in early conditions! Here every breath of communal life, in its matter-of-fact aspect and in its supernaturalism and ceremonialism as well, is dominated by natural rhythms and adjustments. Such adjustment to the physical environment constitutes a genuine and vital problem in every primitive group, and no stability is reached until it is achieved. After this there is little incentive for change in the economic and industrial life. An equilibrium with nature is reached which is felt to be satisfactory. There is, moreover, no conscious idea of progress. Owing to the lack of familiarity with other civilizations, comparative cultural material is slight. Thus, the economic adjustment is taken almost as a fact of nature. Many an accidental invention by a member of the group or an importation of a useful suggestion from a neighboring tribe, may be rejected in favor of the accustomed routine. However strenuous or really deficient, the solution of the economic problem is accepted as final.¹

Such, then, are the general conditions of primitive life. Under these conditions, economic pursuits and industry, religion, social structure and art, produce certain inevitable and drastic effects which account for the most conspicuous characteristics of primitive mentality.

In the course of economic and industrial life, much knowledge is accumulated, knowledge of the forms, habits and behavior of animals, of the properties of plants, of some of the more apparent and regular functions of the celestial bodies and of the powers of Nature, of heat and cold, drought and flood. This is often supplemented by a detailed know-

¹For an interesting presentation of these economic adjustments to environment and their ensuing effects, see Wissler's brief but thoughtful article on "The Maize Culture Complex," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1916.

ledge of materials, of their utilizability for industrial processes, and of the processes themselves with reference to ease or difficulty, brevity or extension in time, efficacy and technique. In this connection motor habits develop, which represent nothing but knowledge and technical experience rendered mechanical through habituation. Only less extended stores of data gradually accumulate about the psychological tendencies and the behavior of human individuals.

Now, at first sight there is in this field overwhelming evidence not only of knowledge, but of observation, inference, generalization, logic, common sense, invention. The latter, in fact, must be assumed to have often been conscious and deliberate. Not that there were professional inventors—for of this there is no evidence—but that at certain stages in the course of the invention there was deliberate effort toward the solution of a mechanical problem.¹

But aside from this it will be observed that the psychophysical processes involved are direct, pragmatic, teleological. There is in this domain some of the implied reason that is characteristic of animal adjustments, which also bear apparent evidence of intellectual acumen, the sort of adjustments so often noted in the industrial life of the bee, the ant, the spider, the beaver. The logic observed in early tools and weapons, traps and snares, pots, houses and boats, is the logic of nature itself, the logic of the objective relations of things, which through the medium of action, molds the mind so inevitably and smoothly as to be almost wholly unconscious. And if consciousness and ratiocination arise in the course of the industrial activity, they are presently submerged, the objective results alone being passed on to the following generation. As the aim in all of these pursuits is not to know but to do, not to understand but to achieve, the realm of matter-of-fact becomes a happy hunting ground for the pragmatist, not an abode for the pursuer of the "idle curiosity." There is satisfaction when the thing works and, barring accidents, no further changes are made.

¹For an analysis of invention see pp. 157 *seq.*

Henceforth, the mind accepts these condensed depositories of reason traditionally. They become part of the technical equipment of behavior, not of thought and understanding.

This explains, at least in part, why the matter-of-fact experience of early life fails to bring its full intellectual harvest. The observation, knowledge, invention, potential science of this realm, remain psychologically dormant, in solution, as it were, in the psycho-physical flow of behavior; until centuries later, under other conditions of life and inquiry, these precious fragments of the semi-unconscious mind become precipitated as clear-edged crystals of science and critical thought.

But this domain of early life has also other aspects.

It must now be noted that in industry as a technical pursuit and in other matter-of-fact activities, the individual is always alone with some aspect of physical nature. That is so even though he may be formally associated in his activities with other individuals of the group. In hunting and building, in agriculture and the manufacture of pots, there may be and frequently is, association, group labor, not uncommonly accompanied by one of those rhythms of communal work of which Buecher wrote so eloquently, and which, operating through psychological channels, greatly further the effectiveness and enjoyment of labor. But technically speaking, the individual remains alone with his task. Whether it is a pot, basket or blanket that is being manufactured, or the soil that is being tilled, or an animal that is being hunted or fought—in all of these matter-of-fact situations man faces an individual, technical task. In industry he must overcome the resistance of the material, master the mechanical processes involved; in war and the chase he must become expert in the great variety of movements and tricks by means of which the prey or the enemy are to be sought, captured or killed.¹

¹It deserves emphasis, in this connection, that it is this individual relationship to the physical situation which furthers the rational adjustment of which we have spoken.

To this there is an important corollary, both on the social and on the individual side. In all of these directions there is room for the development and exhibition of skill. In industry and the chase, in a seafaring expedition and a war raid, things can be done well and less well. Now, it must be remembered that in primitive conditions a great many individuals do and know the same things. Thus there is opportunity for a comparison of individual efforts, there is rivalry, in the face of the condemnation or approbation on the part of the group. The latter here functions as a community of experts, thus providing a setting in which the individual is spurred on to the utmost of his skill and ability. To make or do something in the presence of another or others who can pass competent judgment, is ever a powerful stimulant toward achievement. Therein we find one source of the conspicuous fact that in primitive industries things are so often well made. Among primitive tribes, including the lowest, many objects, appliances, tools, are fashioned with great skill, and in a way to fulfill their purpose most effectively, subject of course to certain limitations inherent in the complete theoretical naiveté of their makers.¹

Paradoxical though it may seem, there is in this realm also room for individualism. Once more, man and animal present an analogy. The animal, with its biological tradition, common to all members of a species, is driven by blind instinct, but acts individually in accordance with the heterogeneous requirements of special situations. It is similar with early man: in his economic and industrial activities

¹There is a great contrast here between primitive and modern handiwork. Apart from the articles made by highly skilled craftsmen, whose work is of course in many respects superior to the corresponding products of early man, many things in modern life are made or done very badly. One of the reasons for this lies in the fact that the individuals who make or do the things are surrounded by others who have no knowledge of the techniques involved. As a good illustration may serve the things made in the home, in the line of sewing, carpentry or even cooking, things which so often look "home made." And the most conspicuous example are the achievements of our domestic servants, who not knowing how to do the things that they are to do, also lack the stimulation they might derive from the competency of their masters. Thus, inefficient servants become efficient in the presence of a good housekeeper, while proving wholly impossible in association with a bad one.

as well as in the matter-of-fact aspects of social life, while operating within the rigid frame of traditional norm and routine, he also performs individually. The very fact of the absence of writing and of measurement makes the exact reproduction of events and of things impracticable. The exact reproduction of records which writing and printing make possible under modern conditions, and the exact reproduction of objects which results from tools themselves accurately made and from the application of measurement, are quite foreign to primitive life, and the ensuing variety of records, processes and things, has often been observed. Thus, civilization is forced to reproduce itself within very strict traditional bounds, to be sure, but with infinite minor fluctuations emanating from individuals.¹ This is so in industrial life as well as in hunting, fighting, dancing, singing, story-telling and the like. In all of these pursuits a wide range must be left for individual variation, skill and ability. After all, then, the individual, while serving as a perpetuator of culture, also expresses himself and derives therefrom a sense of personal achievement.

Turning once more to the matter-of-fact activities as so many opportunities for the exhibition of skill, one observes that skill and rivalry lead to vanity. With justice has the peacock theory of early man been emphasized, from Herbert Spencer to Robert H. Lowie. Primitive man is intensely vain. He delights in excelling in those pursuits which lie nearest to the hearts of his companions and to his own. Social approbation and prestige are his dearest rewards. And in proportion to his achievement or, at times, out of proportion to it, is his vanity. It so happens that men vary in their innate potentialities of skill and prowess. Thus similarity of opportunity and training does not lead to uniformity of results. Some will make and do things better

¹The impression is not intended that this technical condition for inaccurate reproduction constitutes the main or only reason for individual variation. It is only *one* reason. The others are explained in the paragraphs that follow.

than others, while the mark set by a few will for long remain unexcelled. All this furthers effort, rivalry, skill and vanity.

This phenomenon is not foreign to modern civilization wherever somewhat similar conditions obtain. Thus the hunter and the fisherman, the craftsman and the actor, the athlete and the soldier, varied though their pursuits may be, are at one in their rivalries, their pointed exhibitions of skill, their vanities and their bragging. And even in the domain of thought, the sensitiveness and vanity of the platform lecturer contrast strangely with the austerity and detachment of the closet philosopher.

Further evidence, powerful if indirect, of individualism in early industry, may be seen in the emergence of art from it; for important aspects of primitive art have not merely been applied to objects of industry, but were born within it. Technical skill, after it reaches a certain perfection, leads to virtuosity, to the enjoyment of delicate minutia, to play with technical processes. Thus the creative imagination is stimulated.

Now we must return to the main thesis of this section, namely, the remarkably slight extent to which the great achievements of primitive industry are translated into terms of rational thought. We have in part accounted for this result, but there are further contributory causes.

There exists in primitive society a system of attitudes and ideas about the world of nature and the things and beings in it, which is felt to be highly satisfactory and the presence of which obviates for a long time the necessity of any further analyses and interpretations. This is the system of supernaturalism. It is not the emotional side of it, such as the religious thrill and its corollaries, that is involved here, nor again, the behavior side which takes the form of ceremonialism. The aspect of supernaturalism with which we are for the present concerned is its dogmatic or intellectual side, the system of ideas or concepts comprised in it. Now we must recall that supernaturalism as a system of ideas is in

itself perfectly reasonable. When the limitation of knowledge and the theoretical naiveté of aboriginal man are taken into consideration, the unconscious conclusions or hypotheses reached by him with reference to the world of things and beings are wellnigh inevitable. It is quite safe here to endorse the very considerable body of relevant facts marshalled by Spencer and Tylor. The idea of spirit, of power, the transformation of substances and beings into each other, are natural conclusions to be drawn from certain experiences by an uninstructed mind. That this is so is amply attested by a similar tendency even today, often observed in those whose mental processes are not firmly buttressed by theoretical safeguards.

In the second place, we must insist that these ideas are not reached by a deliberate act of reason. They are not conclusions resulting from a conscious and rational attempt to answer questions or solve problems. Instead, they are direct and intuitive. Here we must endorse the opinion of Lévy-Bruhl and Wundt, who represent this position as against the cruder rationalistic associationism of Spencer, Tylor and Frazer. The intuitive adjustment which experience elicits here may be envisaged as an *instantaneous solution*. A puzzling psychological maladjustment, an ideational friction with facts, calls forth a direct and automatic response, and the adjustment is made. To investigate under the circumstances rather than to accept such an instantaneous solution, is a highly indirect procedure, impossible until much later in the advance of civilization. And finally, we accept the formulation best expressed by Freud, of the "omnipotence of thought," involving the ascription of objective reality to mental states and relations.

The basic differentia of supernaturalism thus appear to be the following: erroneous but superficially plausible associations and analogies are accepted as objectively true, leading to a world of spirits, powers, magical transformations; human desires and wants are projected into this supernatural

world as properties and functions of supernatural beings; and the human shape as well as human psychology and social relations, are projected into the realm of animals, natural forces and celestial bodies.

On this skeletal framework the systematizing thought of the priest weaves its elaborate and multi-colored fabric. Rapturously the story-teller plays with it; and in it human imagination, unchecked by criticism and objective reference, reaches marvelous heights of complexity and virtuosity. Myth making is a self fertilizing pursuit. It becomes an end in itself. Wundt is emphatically right in dwelling at length on the wondrous faculties of the myth building imagination. It is with singular propriety that he chose to introduce his treatise on "Religion and Myth" by a volume on the history of the human imagination.

Once these ideas are established, once this world view has been formed—and they are found everywhere where man is—why should they not persist? Under primitive conditions of life and knowledge there is no reason for rejecting any of the conclusions, theories or constructs of the myth building fancy. They are neither unreasonable nor unaesthetic nor uninteresting. On the contrary: the phantasmagoria of supernaturalism is aesthetically attractive, it has beauty of thought and of form and of movement, it abounds in delightful samples of logical coherence and it is full of fascination for the creator, the systematizer and the beholder.

Granted, the tenets of supernaturalism are not true—but what is truth? Shielded by the warm intimacy of psychological reality, supernaturalism may well dispense with the truth of objective verification.

In supernaturalism as in science, experience and imagination are wedded together. In supernaturalism imagination works upon experience accepted in faith and naiveté; in science, the experience utilized by imagination is critically sifted with reference to its objective verifiability. The way toward a world view adopted by supernaturalism is the

easier way, it follows the spontaneous tendencies of the mind, it operates with experience accepted without question,¹ with smoothly working associations, with projections and objectivations of mental states, with the play of fancy, with the constructs of an unencumbered imagination. The way toward a scientific world view, on the contrary, is devious and hard to tread. The spontaneous tendencies of the mind which here also are in operation, must now be constantly controlled to satisfy the demands of criticism, of merciless logic, of objective reference. For the fulfillment of these conditions primitive life lacks the necessary elements. Moreover, no attempts are made in this direction. For the time being, the riddles of the universe are solved without residue by supernaturalism.

But supernaturalism cannot altogether escape occasional conflicts with objective reality. From these it invariably emerges victorious, for it refers its failures to the same mechanism through which it achieves its successes. If magic fails, it is magic that is held responsible for the failure.¹

In the presence of this ideological adjustment to the world, an adjustment so effective and so stimulating, what chance was there for the timid admonitions toward reason and objectivity emanating from the realm of the matter-of-fact, to take firm root in the minds of men? Successful in the level of industry and certain other forms of behavior, reason capitulated in the domain of thought before the more direct, more brilliant and more sweeping conquests of supernaturalism.

The ideational contributions of social organization and of art still remain to be examined.

It has often been noted as characteristic of primitive

¹Here once more there is an analogy between the devices adopted for its self-preservation by supernaturalism and those used for the same purpose by Freudian psychoanalysis. When the reluctance to accept the tenets of psychoanalysis is ascribed by Freud to the mechanisms of repression and resistance, he applies psychoanalysis to explain—and explain away—the objections to it. Thus is the new psychology rendered unassailable.

thought that associations are formed between aspects of civilization which among ourselves are either wholly disparate or only loosely connected. Professor Boas, in particular, is wont to draw the attention of his students to this aspect of the subject. Such, for example, are the associations between art and religion, between supernaturalism and social organization, between proprietary and other privileges and definite social units. And there are many others of which Lévy-Bruhl has treated at length in his book. It is, moreover, characteristic of these associations that they rest against a strong or even violent emotional background.

The conditions of early social organization seem adequate to provide at least one far reaching explanation of the existence and emotional vigor of such associations.

It was shown before how great is the variety of principles on the basis of which social units are formed in primitive society. Blood relationship, actual and assumed, locality, age, sex, generation and occupation, all provide their share. One conspicuous way in which these social forms are reflected in another aspect of civilization was revealed in our analysis of supernaturalism. The social forms and functions of this world of humanity ever tend to be transferred to the inhabitants and conditions of the other world. But the social units exercise another more significant influence on the entire ideational cast of early civilization. Whether the social units are clans or villages, families or societies, they become points of attachment for features belonging to different aspects of civilization. At different times in our discussion of social organization, religion and art, we have noted how religious, artistic, economic, mythological, medicinal, features attach themselves to social units and are carried by them in the form of functions. Thus a level is provided for the formation of associations between the social organization and these other cultural features as well as between the latter themselves. We know with what tenacity the primitive mind clings to associations once formed, and with Lévy-Bruhl, we have seen how such associations are

solidified into cycles of participation, within which iron-cast rapports come to obtain between things, beings and acts.

The emotional background against which participations rest is further deepened by ceremonialism. On ceremonial occasions, when one or another kind of social group functions as a unit, the cultural associations of these units reach the acme of cohesion and interpenetration. In this crucible of psychic incandescence the cultural conglomerate carried by the social units is cast into a solid mass which thenceforth proves wellnigh indisruptible. Such ceremonial diversions, moreover, recur periodically. Thus there is no cooling of the ever glowing mass, no flagging of the emotions, no sinking of the cultural associations to the more precarious level of purely ideational connections. While brushing aside the exaggerations of Durkheim's great book, due credit must be given him for the emphatic recognition of the tremendous importance of ceremonialism.

A word, finally, is due to the similar function of art. It is the art object as a symbol, not as decoration, that counts in this connection. A symbol, from one angle, implies a refusal to reject or treat lightly a mental association once formed. This, as was shown, is typical of a civilization where the "omnipotence of thought" holds sway. Now, art objects, by their concreteness, suggestiveness and emotional appeal, lend themselves beautifully to the function of association carriers. Moreover, such objects can be produced or removed at will, they can be hidden away, and the very care and veneration with which they are handled enhances the sanctity of the associations that cling to them. And once more, on ceremonial occasions, when the symbolic insignia are produced, they become the radiation points of cultural suggestions. Thus, the art object as a symbol gives direction and lends new force to the emotional and ideational associations involved, while furnishing a powerful lever to the crowd-psychological atmosphere typical of such gatherings.

This brings the all too brief analysis to a close.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDE¹

INTRODUCTION: MAN AND CIVILIZATION

A discussion of racial differences, physical and psychic, and of the part played by heredity and environment in the determination of physical types, will be found in Franz Boas' "Mind of Primitive Man" (The Macmillan Co.), Chapters I, II, and III. Those who may be interested in the nature and difficulties of the anatomical and statistical work involved, are referred to R. B. Bean's "A Racial Peculiarity in the Brain of the Negro" (*American Journal of Anatomy*, Vol. IV, 1905). This should be supplemented by Fr. P. Mall's "Several Anatomical Characters of the Human Brain, etc." (*ibid*, Vol. IX) and by Carl Pearson's "The Relationship of Intelligence to Size and Shape of Head to Other Physical and Mental Characters" (*Biometrika*, Vol. V). The general nature of civilization is discussed by Boas in Chapters IV, V and VI of the same book; also by R. H. Lowie in the first four chapters of his "Culture and Ethnology" (Douglas C. McMurtrie and Boni and Liveright). A good idea of what is meant by culture, especially among anthropologists, can also be secured from R. R. Marett's "Anthropology" (Home University Library), and his "Psychology and Folk-Lore" (The Macmillan Co.), especially chapters I, IV, V, and VI. What culture stands for in modern society is stated with great lucidity and force in James Harvey Robinson's "The Mind in the Making" (Harper and Bros.).

The principles of classical evolutionism are best studied in a number of concrete works. Herbert Spencer's "Principles of Sociology" stands unique for closeness of argumentation and a wholly uncritical as well as sweeping utilization

¹This guide is not meant to be either exhaustive or systematic. It comprises a limited number of references, with comments, to competent works covering the subjects discussed in the chapters of this book.

of the comparative method. F. B. Jevons' "Introduction to the History of Religions" is notable for its persistent attempt to trace many lines of religious development down to one ultimate source; while Lewis H. Morgan's "Ancient Society" is recommended on account of its historical rôle, as well as for the roots contained in it of the doctrine of economic interpretation of history. Among more recent sociological works, Franklin H. Giddings' "The Principles of Sociology" (The Macmillan Co.) may be read in this connection. For a critical estimate of the evolutionary position see Chapter VII of Boas' book, Chapter IV of Lowie's book, as well as his "Primitive Society" (Boni and Liveright), especially Chapters I and XV.

PART I

EARLY CIVILIZATIONS ILLUSTRATED

Chapters I, II and III: The Eskimo, The Tlingit and Haida and The Iroquois.

As a general background of American ethnology, L. Far-
rand's "Basis of American History" (Harper and Bros.)
is the best elementary treatise. A work of a much higher
order, having the additional merit of embracing both North
and South America, is Clark Wissler's "The American
Indian" (Douglas C. McMurtie). Wissler's book is in
no sense elementary. The treatment in many sections is too
condensed and therefore dry; however, it is the first work
of such scope by a professional anthropologist and, as such,
of great value.

The best general treatise on the Eskimo is Boas' "The
Central Eskimo" (6th Report, Bureau of Ethnology). The
same author's "The Eskimo of Baffin Land and Hudson
Bay" (Bulletin XV of the American Museum of Natural
History) is equally valuable. See also J. Murdoch's "Eth-
nological Results of the Point Barrow Expedition" (9th
Report, Bureau of Ethnology), E. W. Nelson's "The Es-
kimo About Bering Strait" (18th Report, Bureau of Eth-

nology, Part I), V. Stefansson's "My Life with the Eskimo" (The Macmillan Co.) and Rink's "Eskimo Tales."

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The best general treatise on the Iroquois still remains Lewis H. Morgan's "The League of the Iroquois" (edited and annotated by Herbert M. Lloyd; Dodd, Mead and Co.) Horatio Hale's "The Iroquois Book of Rites" is somewhat too technical for the lay reader, but contains a very interesting account of the political ceremonialism of these tribes. A brief description of Iroquois societies is given in A. C. Parker's "Secret Medicine Societies of the Seneca" (*American Anthropologist*, New Series, Vol. II). The mythology of the Iroquois is discussed in the following publications by J. N. B. Hewitt: "Iroquoian Cosmology" (21st Report, Bureau of Ethnology), "The Iroquois Concept of the Soul" (*Journal of American Folk-Lore*, Vol. VIII), "Orenda and a Definition of Religion" (*American Anthropologist*, New Series, Vol. IV) and Jeremiah Curtin's and J. N. B. Hewitt's "Seneca Fiction, Legends and Myths" (32nd Report, Bureau of Ethnology).

Chapter IV: Uganda.

The only general treatment of African Ethnology in English will be found in F. Ratzel's "History of Mankind." A detailed, although technically not perfect, treatise on the

Baganda is J. Roscoe's "The Baganda" (Macmillan & Co.). This should be supplemented by the same author's "The Northern Bantu" (Macmillan & Co.). For a comparative apperçue of African conditions at least one or two other descriptive volumes should be read, such as R. E. Dennett's "At the Back of the Black Man's Mind" and Torday and Joyce's "The Bushongo."

Chapter V: Australia.

A simple elementary treatise is N. W. Thomas' "The Natives of Australia." The same author's "Kinship Organizations and Group Marriage in Australia" (Cambridge, 1906) is a much more difficult book but very useful, although now somewhat out of date. Spencer and Gillen's "The Native Tribes of Central Australia" (Macmillan & Co.) "The Northern Tribes of Central Australia" (*ibid*) and "The Native Tribes of the Northern Territory of Australia" (*ibid*) should be read. These works fall far short of the strict requirements of ethnological method, but are the only general and recent works in English available on the central and northern tribes. To complete the picture of Australian society these should be supplemented by Howitt's "The Native Tribes of Southeast Australia" (Macmillan & Co.) and W. E. Roth's "Ethnological Studies among the N. W. C. Aborigines of Queensland." The latter work, while concise and dry, is highly competent.

PART II

INDUSTRY AND ART, RELIGION AND SOCIETY

Chapters VII and VIII: Economic Conditions and Industry.

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can Anthropologist, 1914) as well as Chapters I to IV and VI to VIII of his "The American Indian." By far the best detailed accounts of early industrial processes are Boas' "The Kwakiutl of Vancouver Island" (Publications of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition, Vol. V, Part II) and "Ethnology of the Kwakiutl" (35th Report, Bureau of Ethnology), which, among other interesting features, contains an unique account of the primitive cooking art in the form of recipes of the Kwakiutl. Detailed treatises on Indian foods are A. C. Parker's "Iroquoian Uses of Maize and Other Food Plants" (Bulletin 144 of The New York State Museum) and F. W. Waugh's "Iroquois Foods and Food Preparation" (*Geological Survey, Canada, Memoir 86*). An elaborate account of Indian agriculture is given in G. L. Wilson's "Agriculture of the Hidatsa Indians, an Indian Interpretation" (University of Minnesota).

Chapter IX: Art.

Among older works representing the evolutionary position, see A. C. Haddon's "Evolution in Art," H. Balfour's "The Evolution of Decorative Art" and Y. Hirn's "Origins of Art, a Sociological and Psychological Enquiry." There is no general treatise on primitive art embodying the modern ethnological standpoint. Special monographs have to be consulted in this connection. The most excellent discussion is contained in Boas' "The Decorative Designs of Alaskan Needlecases" (Proceedings, U. S. National Museum, Vol. 34, 1908). See also Wissler's "The Decorative Designs of the Dakota Indians" and A. L. Kroeber's "The Arapaho" (Bulletin XVIII of the American Museum of Natural History). Hamilton's "Maori Art" is recommended as the only book available which gives an idea of the remarkable artistic productions of these people.

Chapters X and XI: Religion and Magic.

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Tylor's treatise, while out of date, presents an unrivalled picture of the animistic world of primitive man. These should be supplemented by Frazer's "The Golden Bough," Vols. I and II, "The Magic Art," and Andrew Lang's "Magic and Religion" and "The Making of Religion." R. R. Marett's "The Threshold of Religion" is a much more critical book, written in full cognizance of modern ethnological method. Among modern speculative works dealing at least in part with primitive religion, Wundt's "Elements of Folk Psychology" and Durkheim's "The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life" are equally interesting and original. Lévy-Bruhl's meritorious treatise on primitive mentality is unfortunately not as yet available in English.

There are many recent books and essays. Goldenweiser's articles in *The New International Encyclopedia* on "Ancestor Worship," "Animism," "Magic," "Nature Worship," "Polytheism" and "Totemism" represent briefly the present status of these topics. E. S. Hartland's "Myth and Ritual" discusses interestingly the relation between belief and behavior in primitive religion. A brief theoretical interpretation of the foundations of religion will be found in Goldenweiser's over-concise "Spirit, Mana and the Religious Thrill" (*Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 1915); see also the same author's "Religion and Society: a Critique of Emile Durkheim's Theories of the Origin and Nature of Religion" (*ibid*, 1917).

The recent work done in North America along the line of religion in all of its aspects is briefly and suggestively reviewed in Franz Boas' "Mythology and Folk Tales of North American Indians" (*Journal of American Folk-Lore*, 1914), Paul Radin's "Religion of the North American Indians" (*ibid*), and R. H. Lowie's "Ceremonialism in North America" (*American Anthropologist*, 1914).

Of the many concrete descriptions of primitive religions, the following are selected as particularly representative: W. Bogoras' "The Chukchee, Religion" (Publications of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition, Vol. VII, Part I),

J. Jochelson's "The Koryak, Religion and Myths" (*ibid*, Vol. VI, Part I), Callaway's "The Religious System of the Amazulu" and J. Codrington's "The Melanesians."

Chapters XII and XIII: Society.

Of the older works the following are still worth reading: Morgan's "Ancient Society," which is in many points incorrect and difficult, but with these reservations, distinctly worthwhile. Spencer's "Principles of Sociology," Vol. I and McLennan's two volumes of "Studies in Ancient History" have merely a historical interest. Westermarck's "The History of Human Marriage," third edition, in three volumes, is very valuable. Müller-Lyer's "The History of Social Development" (Alfred A. Knopf), while in part boldly hypothetical, is a very interesting, and, on the whole, in line with modern ethnological knowledge.

In the study of social organization a complete revolution has taken place in recent years, resulting in much new material, descriptive as well as theoretical. Of the theoretical works, W. H. R. Rivers' "Kinship and Social Organization" is recommended as setting forth clearly the problem of relationship terms. The so-called American standpoint is represented by J. R. Swanton's "The Social Organization of American Indians" (*American Anthropologist*, 1905), Goldenweiser's "The Social Organization of the Indians of North America" (*ibid*, 1914) and Lowie's "Social Organization" (*American Journal of Sociology*, 1914). Lowie's "Primitive Society" represents faithfully and clearly the standpoint of critical ethnology on most problems of early social organization. Hartland's book of the same name, on the other hand, is still oriented according to the lights of the now wellnigh defunct doctrines of classical evolutionism.

Of the descriptive works a few can be mentioned here: Swanton's "The Haida" is good. A very interesting descriptive and theoretical study is A. L. Kroeber's "Zuñi Kin and Clan" (*Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History*, Vol. XVIII, Part II). Bog-

oras' "The Chuckchee, Social Organization" (Publications of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition, Vol. VII, Part III) is exceptionally clear and replete with concrete data. African political organization is exemplified in Roscoe's "The Baganda" and Dennett's "The Religious and Political System of the Yoruba." The social organization of Australia will be found described in the works by Spencer and Gillen, Howitt and Roth, referred to before; while Melanesian social organization is briefly outlined in Rivers' "History of Melanesian Society." Interesting studies of special problems in social organization are made by Rivers in The Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits, Vols. V and VI.

The literature on the subject of totemism is enormous. For descriptive material J. G. Frazer's "Totemism and Exogamy" (Macmillan & Co.) is the most convenient source. Much of the theoretical discussion will be found summarized in Goldenweiser's "Totemism, an Analytical Study" (*Journal of American Folk-Lore*, 1910) and in his article on totemism in The New International Encyclopedia.

PART III

THE IDEAS OF EARLY MAN

Chapters XV and XVI:

Spencer's views on early mentality form part of his "Principles of Sociology," Vol. I; see especially the chapters devoted to primitive man—physical, primitive man—emotional, and primitive man—intellectual. Frazer's theories will be found in his work on magic referred to before. Wundt's theories are available to English readers only insofar as they are contained in his "Elements of Folk Psychology."

Most of Durkheim's sociological theories are comprised in his last book "The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life." For a critical discussion of Durkheim see Goldenweiser's article referred to before. An English translation

of Lévy-Bruhl's "Les fonctions mentales des sociétés inférieures" will soon be available; meanwhile, Goldenweiser's review in the *American Anthropologist* for 1911 may be consulted.

The theories of Freud discussed in this book are presented in his "Totem and Taboo" (Moffat, Yard and Company). The full understanding of his theories, however, presupposes familiarity with at least the elements of his psychoanalytic system. For this purpose Freud's "A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis" (Boni and Liveright) will suffice. The relation of psychoanalysis to social phenomena is the subject of a monograph by O. Rank and H. Sachs, "The Significance of Psychoanalysis for the Mental Sciences" (Nervous and Mental Diseases Monograph Series, No. 23).

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
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
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