










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THE  
EDINBURGH REVIEW

OR

*CRITICAL JOURNAL:*

FOR

JANUARY, 1909 . . . . APRIL, 1909

*TO BE CONTINUED QUARTERLY.*

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ART. I.—WHIGS AND RADICALS BEFORE THE  
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MR. WELLS has described in one of his books the kind of impression that the negligence and disorder of our civilisation would make upon a visitor from another planet, and the astonishment with which he would learn that a state of things which looked as if it must be the temporary result of a migration or upheaval was in truth accepted by many as the permanent lot of humanity. Mr. Wells is thinking of our conditions to-day, but his description applies very aptly to the conditions that would have met the eye of such a visitor a century ago. England was plunged in the consequences of

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an upheaval, not merely of the upheaval of the war, but of the upheaval that was transforming the villages and creating the industrial towns of to-day. It is when momentous changes such as these are remoulding the lives, habits, and surroundings of a nation, that vigilance and initiative are most imperatively needed in its government. At such a time the maladies of one generation become easily and almost unconsciously the diseases of the next. A nation has to repiece its life of law and custom to the pattern of its new circumstances, to grasp and control the new relationships that are suddenly created, to subdue and discipline the new forces that come into existence. Otherwise the weak and the poor are trampled down in the sudden revolutions of an hour.

In England the great economic changes to which we allude were complicated and in some directions accelerated by a great war. The feverish fluctuations of employment, the wild and vivid speculation natural to war, the risks and excitements of a paper currency, all the mischiefs and demoralisations of broken, spasmodic, and interrupted trade, combined to add to the distresses and confusions of the time. The National Debt, which stood at two hundred and sixty millions when the Revolutionary War began, had risen before the Napoleonic Wars were over to a thousand and forty millions. Taxation of course was overwhelming. Perhaps if an observer wanted to point to the two most significant illustrations of the general misery, he would have pointed to the rise in the poor rates from two millions in 1785 to eight millions in 1817, and to the horrors of the system of apprenticing parish children to distant manufacturers. Horner mentioned, in 1815, in supporting Sir Robert Peel's Factory Bill, that the committee of which he was a member had come across the case of an agreement between a London parish and a Lancashire manufacturer, in which it was stipulated that with every twenty sound children, one idiot should be taken. As to the decadence of village life, of which the poor rates give us the measure, it was no uncommon thing for Cobbett, in his 'Rural Rides,' to find men whom he had known as well-to-do and independent farmers breaking stones on the road as paupers.

There has been no time when provident government was more imperiously called for to prevent the impoverishment and degradation of English national life. Unhappily there has been no time when provident government has been more conspicuously lacking. The governing class, surveying the surrounding confusion and misery, looked on these conditions, tolerable only as moments in a crisis, as if they were the permanent

fate of society. Never have the functions of government been so narrowly conceived. Never have the sufferings of the poor been so little regarded. Macaulay once charged the politicians who resisted the beginnings of national education with thinking of the Government simply as a great hangman. 'Government ought to do nothing except by harsh and degraded means. The one business of Government is to handcuff, to lock up, and scourge, and shoot, and stab, and strangle.' Macaulay's language is hardly a travesty of the opinions of those who held power for the longest time in the dark period that seems rather to close the eighteenth than to open the nineteenth century. We know from their speeches and letters what was in the mind of a Sidmouth or an Eldon. The temper of the country gentlemen, who executed the law and had absorbed all the functions of local government, is reflected in the diary of Sir William Dyott, an undistinguished but typical member of that class, who thought that nothing but the terror of human suffering could avail to prevent crime, and was strong for spring guns and savage punishment. The sense of pity, shame for the neglect of a great and growing proletariat, dismay at the quick decline of the English village, sorrow and foreboding break out from time to time in the governing class; a Peel or a Whitbread makes his protest, but the governing class as a whole closes its ears and its conscience. That class pursues its intrigues, protects its sinecures, fosters its abuses with scarcely a thought for its great unsheltered poor.

The English oligarchy, which had shown itself in its day capable of great and generous enthusiasms, was, during the last chapter of its unqualified power, in the enslaving grip of a strong terror and a strong prejudice. Its dread of Parliamentary reform and its dislike of Catholic emancipation made it defend the vices of the constitution with a tenacity that in happier days had been displayed in defence of its virtues. The defence of that constitution, not as a system of free government, but as a system of inflexible police, as the Englishman's yoke rather than his charter, was the beginning and the end of its political creed. If we want to understand the limits within which the imagination of that class moved we need only look at such a career as that of Perceval. Perceval was a man of very great ability. Before Pitt fought his duel with Tierney, he was asked to suggest a successor, and he replied that Perceval was the best able of all his party to cope with Fox. That was more than ten years before Perceval became Prime Minister. His reputation in the House of Commons reposes on the testimony of opponents

as much as on the enthusiasm of friends. Grattan said of him : ' He is not a ship of the line, but he carries many guns, is tight ' built, and is out in all weathers.' Lord Holland, who said of him that he was a man of principle, integrity, and courage, added, ' his virtues and vices rendered him the most mischievous and dangerous man who had guided our councils ' for a century.' Of Perceval's great energy and talents there can be no question. To what ends were they directed ? Readers of Sir Spencer Walpole's sympathetic biography of his grandfather are struck by nothing so much as by the concentration of all this power on the task of obliging a King whose superstitions were a public danger, and by the incapacity to conceive of the larger purposes and necessities of society. The ends of government have rarely taken quite so limited and contracted a shape in the eyes of a politician of conspicuous abilities.

The special apprehensions of revolution and disorder, and the ruling anxieties of the hour, gave a particular colour to such interest as the rich took in the poor. A sombre religious gloom oppressed society. It was characteristic of the times that Perceval himself should have devoted a good deal of energy to the pursuit of speculations on the prophecies of Daniel, which seemed to him to have found their fulfilment in Napoleon's career. It is difficult for us to think ourselves into the atmosphere in which a man of Wilberforce's abilities believed that all contemporary issues were overshadowed by the danger that the reassembling of Parliament on a Monday might cause a great many members of Parliament to travel to London on a Sunday. His scruples prevailed, and he was able to record in his diary : ' House nobly put off by Perceval.' It is still more difficult to think ourselves into the atmosphere in which a man of his humane temper could reject a plea for mercy from the wretched publisher of Paine's ' Age of Reason,' himself a Christian, who had been tracked down to his garret with his destitute children in the agonies of smallpox. If religious zeal was one of the motives that prompted such philanthropic interventions as there were, it was unhappily responsible for some of the worst of the cruelties that stained a bad page of English history.

If such was the climate of thought in the governing class, the difficulties that beset all Liberal ideas in other directions were serious and almost insurmountable. In the very heart of these difficulties stood, of course, the Court. It has sometimes been urged that the great battle between the Whigs and the Court in 1782-4 was won by neither party, and that the Court, which called Pitt to its rescue, had to accept his direction



and to renounce its supremacy. That view will not survive any close study of the transactions that put an end to the life of the Whig Government in 1807. The King had, it is true, to allow the measures for the abolition of the slave trade to go through, but the methods by which he extinguished the Grenville Government have a very close affinity to those by which he extinguished the Government of 1784. The Grenville Government made some great mistakes, and was singularly unfortunate in some of its policies, but at least it died in defence of the great constitutional understanding on which Parliamentary government reposes. Of its successor, the Portland Government, it is equally true to say that it came into power by means of a conspiracy against that understanding, and that as long as the King had any wits left to him he was the master of his Governments. The madness of the King brought to the throne a Prince who was become as narrow and illiberal in his public views as his father, preserving of the traditions of his youth only his passion for vicious pleasures and his habit of treachery in every personal relationship. The death of the King plunged the whole nation in the repulsive quarrels of the new King and his wife. 'Strange, indeed,' said Lord Holland, 'that neither war nor peace, laws nor liberties, could excite so much anxiety in a free and civilised nation as the personal character and comfort of two individuals who had nothing about them but their rank to raise interest or even curiosity.' Even the odium which George IV. justly gained stimulated public interest in his vices from the compassion it excited for the woman who, if she did not deserve admiration or even respect, did not deserve the supreme misfortune of being married to him.

The intrigues of the Court were not the only disturbing element in the constitution of the governments of the day. There was further this very important fact, and it is a fact too often neglected in estimates of the characters of politicians, that no single Liberal idea could of itself command a majority in a Parliament subject to the special influences of this reactionary period. A Liberal, that is to say, could only give effect to any of his opinions in office by taking into partnership men of very different sympathies. The transactions of governments, the activities of ministers, are absorbed throughout these years to an extent now quite inconceivable in personal accommodations and in bargains between leaders who could put their domestic forces at each other's disposal. Almost every year somebody in Opposition is sounded by somebody in the Government. Almost every possible combination of persons is considered. No alliance is too great a paradox. The case of Sidmouth is a good illustra-

tion. Canning's remark of him that he was like the measles and everybody had him once, received an almost literal fulfilment; for there was scarcely a politician who was not at some time his colleague. Everybody will agree that Sidmouth's inclusion in the Government of All the Talents was its ruin. His illiberal and reactionary temper could not possibly run in harness with the tolerant and generous sympathies of the Whigs. Yet the choice lay between him and those followers of Pitt, who, far more enlightened than Sidmouth in their personal views, were committed to the defence of Melville, and therefore at direct issue with the Government on this capital point. The choice, we say, lay between these two courses, for Fox and Grenville only commanded between them 150 votes in the House of Commons. Fox and Grenville therefore allowed themselves to be drawn into this embarrassing and discrediting alliance. What is true of Fox is true in a lesser degree of Canning, who had later to accept Sidmouth as a colleague. There is a famous dictum that England does not love coalitions. It would be difficult to name a Government during the first quarter of the century that did not represent a coalition.

Now this atmosphere is extremely trying to the character of politicians. The difficulties of conscience for a politician, who even under modern conditions has often to steer his doubtful course from one second best to another, were bewildering and overwhelming in the perplexing combinations and alternations of those days. We can see how demoralising those conditions were by watching the conduct of a man whose name is justly and profoundly revered by both the great parties of the State. Can anyone acquit Canning's behaviour in the crisis of 1807 of the charge of factiousness? A man who was sincerely in favour not only of the small reform which the Whigs pressed on the King, but of the larger reform of which it was a part, did not scruple to come into office on the storm of Protestant prejudice, and to write a stanza in which he said of that very Government :

‘ Though they sleep with the devil, yet theirs is the hope  
On the downfall of Britain to rise with the Pope.’

Or if we trace Canning's dealings with Castlereagh, with Wellesley, with Eldon, we may not agree with Sir Spencer Walpole that he had no generosity in his disposition, and that he was ready to sacrifice even his friends and adherents; but we cannot deny that his conduct was sometimes equivocal and often difficult to defend. What again is to be said of the dealings of Perceval and Sidmouth, in 1807, when Sidmouth,

still a member of the Government, opened his heart to Perceval, its bitterest opponent, on the subject of the chief Government measure? It would be a little startling to find a modern leader of the Opposition writing to a member of the Government the letter which Perceval wrote to Sidmouth. 'It has given me unfeigned pleasure to find that you have taken so distinct and so decided a part in opposition to a measure which in my judgment is as ruinous as any that can be proposed.' The personal transactions of leading politicians during this period are not agreeable reading. There are, of course, exceptions, notably the conduct of Lord Holland and most of his party in relation to Canning's reforming efforts after 1822. It is justly observed in the volume of the 'Cambridge Modern History,' on 'The Restoration,' that their conduct during those years gave 'an example of disinterestedness and moderation almost unique in the annals of party warfare.' Those critics who are so ready to find the spirit of faction in everything done by the Whigs will not easily reconcile their censorious generalisations with a contrast between the Tory Opposition in 1807 and the Whig Opposition fifteen years later.

If all the external circumstances were adverse to the Whigs, their internal condition was a capital weakness. Neither party under the conditions of English life can keep its health and temper through a very long period of office or of opposition. If a minister is in power too long the sense that he is indispensable grows on him until it becomes a disease; if an opposition has in prospect a permanent exclusion from power, its natural contentiousness becomes morbid. The 'Creevey Papers' illustrate the predominance of this party spirit, captious and unforgiving. Its effects were seen in the attitude of many Whigs to the Peninsular struggle. Lord Holland himself, though he escaped that particular mistake, was not, in spite of his generous nature, quite free from the perversity which such conditions induce. But nobody whose party has not been in opposition for twenty-five years is entitled to be quite sure that he would himself have mastered those impulses that from time to time gave a wrong and fractious turn to the conduct of the Whigs. Further, the Whigs themselves were a coalition, and a coalition so constituted as to reduce to its minimum the force and the influence of its Liberal members. The Peninsular War, domestic freedom, the Corn Laws, almost every great issue of the day, with the exception of Catholic emancipation and the slave trade, found them divided. Grenville, whose honesty and directness and party loyalty scarcely compensated for the disadvantages of his family avarice, was at variance with the Foxite Whigs

on the most important question of the day, the defence of internal freedom. During the persecutions of 1794 the Whig party, if a very small party, was united; during the persecutions of Sidmouth and Castlereagh it was small and divided.

The small set of men who, as we hope to show, played in this crisis a great part in the rescue of English liberty, found, perhaps, their chief centre in Holland House. That famous institution was, of course, not exclusively political. The guests who faced Lady Holland's caustic hospitality were not all Whigs, nor, indeed, were they all politicians. They included Scott as well as Byron. The 'Anti-Jacobin' was represented there as well as the 'Rolliad,' and the scholarship, the art, and the culture of many schools and many races contributed to the glories of the great English salon. Mr. Lloyd Sanders, who gives us an interesting sketch of the rich and brilliant life of this circle, remarks that the success of a salon governed with Lady Holland's ruthless hand is a strong testimony to the charms of her husband. There were no doubt many who would have said with Ugo Foscolo that they would not go to Heaven with Lady Holland, but they would go to Hell with Lord Holland. Scott, who did not like Holland's politics, and had been bitterly wounded by Holland's protest against the pension bestowed by Lord Melville on his brother, told a friend 'that Lord Holland was the 'most agreeable man he had ever met, remarkable for his critical 'faculties, his knowledge of English authors, and his power 'of language, which adorned his thoughts as light streaming 'through coloured glass heightens the brilliancy of the objects 'it falls upon.' Moore thought him equal to any talker of his time, and Macaulay said that his kindness, generosity, and openness of heart were even more valuable than his fine accomplishments.

But the stories of Holland House are naturally more occupied with its mistress than with its master. Coke of Norfolk said to Creevey that he wondered so many people had been bullied by Lady Holland into letting her into their houses. The verb exactly describes the impression which Lady Holland made on her guests by her manners and her dictatorship. Sometimes her victims rebelled. On one occasion her conduct at a dinner-party produced a hostile combination for her suppression. Sydney Smith, when bidden to ring the bell, asked if he was also to sweep the carpet; and Count d'Orsay, getting tired of the amusement of constantly picking up her fan, suggested that he should remain permanently on the floor. Of course it was not only her tyrannical will and her sharp tongue that made Lady Holland enemies. There were many who never condoned the

circumstances of her marriage to Lord Holland. It may indeed be questioned whether the marriage tie was treated with greater disrespect by Lady Webster in breaking away from her husband, or by her parents and friends in marrying her when a child of fifteen to a man twenty-three years older than herself, in order to unite her fortune to his rank. Lady Holland's Journal shows how intensely unhappy her first marriage was. Husband and wife had no tastes in common. He liked the pleasures of the country gentleman and was a hardened gambler. She enjoyed travel, pictures, music. Sir Godfrey Webster consented to give up his country pursuits and take her abroad in 1791, and from that time to 1796, when she returned to England with Lord Holland, she was continually on the Continent. Her husband, whose temper seems to have grown steadily more difficult, left her from time to time to return to Battle. In 1793 this entry occurs in the Journal :

'Saturday was the last morning I spent in Naples. I quitted those scenes of tranquil pleasure and harmless gratification with unfeigned regret. But, ah me! what can please or cheer one who has no hope of happiness in life? Solitude and amusement from external objects is all I hope for; home is the abyss of misery!'

She was haunted by the thought of her ultimate return to Battle, and she was continually conscious of her loneliness in the world and of her desire to be dependent upon another for happiness.

It was under the influence of these emotions that she met Lord Holland at Florence in February 1794.

'Lord G. Leveson Gower and Lord Holland came here the day before yesterday. . . . Lord H. is not in the least handsome; he has on the contrary many personal defects, but his pleasingness of manner and his liveliness of conversation get over them speedily. . . . We all went to the Cocomero and returned here to supper. Lord H. quite delightful; his gaiety beyond anything I ever knew; full of good stories. He seems bent upon politics, and with his eagerness I think it is lucky he is out of the way of saying foolish, violent things.'

From that time Lord Holland was constantly in her company, until in 1796 they came back to England together. Next year Sir Godfrey Webster obtained a divorce. He insisted upon taking Lady Holland's fortune (7000*l.* a year), only allowing her 800*l.* a year. Three years later he blew his brains out in despair over his losses at play. The Hollands were married on July 6, 1797. Sir Gilbert Affleck, who had married Mrs. Vassall in 1796, gave her daughter away. Lady Holland was then twenty-six and Lord Holland twenty-three.

The Journal only goes down to 1811, and there are considerable interruptions. The four years from the summer of 1802 to the summer of 1806 pass without record. The Hollands were abroad for most of that time, but for the last year they were in England, and it was a time full of very special interests for Fox's nephew. The entertainments that made Holland House famous seem to have begun very soon after their marriage, and we come almost at once upon character sketches of the leading Whigs.

'Messrs. Grey, Tierney and Erskine dined here last week. Grey was placid in temper and pleasing in his manner, a contrast to the general state of both, as he is usually irritable and supercilious. His heart is warm and excellent, and those few who do not detest him love him with great affection, but he is universally unpopular from the offensiveness of his behaviour.'

The Journal shows that Lady Holland was a woman of wide interests, and it also reveals a more affectionate disposition than most people would have believed her to possess. Mr. Lloyd Sanders very rightly dwells in this connexion on her sincere and passionate grief at the death of Francis Horner. But the Journal also shows that her Whig principles were an acquired taste and that she did not take at all naturally to them. In 1799 Canning hinted a suggestion that she should try to influence her husband's opinions, 'but however I may wish I did not encourage it, as Lord H. is too firmly attached to the obsolete doctrine of Whiggism to be yet open to persuasion.' She held the revolutionary leaders and societies in great abhorrence, and refused to see Mackintosh because she had always dreaded her house becoming a *foyer* of Jacobinism.

Fortunately for the prospects of English freedom Lord Holland, if he resigned himself to Lady Holland's tyranny in many of the details of his life, declined to surrender an inch of his political sympathies. He took his principles from another source. Macaulay in his Essay contrasted the situation of Fox, who was educated by his father, with that of Lord Holland, who was educated by Fox. 'Under such a training such a man as Lord Holland was in no danger of falling into those faults which threw a dark shade over the whole career of his grandfather, and from which the youth of his uncle was not wholly free.' Whatever his opponents might say in criticism of Lord Holland's opinions, they could not question his loyalty to his principles or his sincerity and his courage. He never allowed the prejudices of his times or the interests of his class to blind or bewilder his sense of justice or his instinct for freedom.

Throughout a long and sombre period, of which Sydney Smith said that it was an awful time for those who had the misfortune to entertain Liberal opinions, he remained the inflexible enemy of cruelty, of violence, and of capricious law. Macaulay described him as, during forty years, the constant protector of all oppressed races and persecuted sects, the noble who in every great crisis cast in his lot with the commons, the planter who made manful war on the slave trade, the landowner whose whole heart was in the struggle against the Corn Laws.

We propose, keeping in mind all the special difficulties that weighed on Liberalism in the circumstances described in the early part of this paper, to try to estimate the importance and the character of Lord Holland's influence on his times. We do not propose to trace his career in all its details, or to discuss every opinion that he held and every protest that he made. His judgement was not always sure; in some directions he had not more insight than his contemporaries. We propose rather to show what he did, by marshalling the Liberal ideas and traditions on certain great issues, to contribute to the emancipation which was to release England from the long tyranny of the ideas of Sidmouth and Eldon.

One great weakness of Liberalism during this time was the spirit in which too many Whigs regarded the Peninsular War. Lord Russell, in his 'Recollections and Suggestions,' dwelt on the great error of policy of which the Whig party was guilty in failing to see that the war of 1808 was a great popular struggle closely linked with the cause of the independence of Europe. The scepticism of the incredulous and despondent Whigs is indeed easily understood. The war had so long been conducted by expensive subsidies, it had caused and revealed such a series of scandals and disasters, it seemed so interminable in its wastage, it produced even in this very instance such quick disenchantments, that men like Whitbread, who were in close contact with the life and misery of the poor, fell not unnaturally into pessimism and despair. There were Whigs, however, of sounder intuitions who saw that the very principles that had made Fox and his followers condemn the policy of mobilising the Courts against the Revolution ought to make them welcome the rising of the Spanish people. This group took its inspiration from Lord Holland, who brought to the question not only the generous principles in which he had been bred, but also the Spanish sympathies he had acquired by travel.

'It is time,' says Lord Russell in his *Reminiscences*, 'to explain how it was that I embraced with warmth the opinions of Lord Holland and Mr. Horner in reference to Spain, rather than those of

Lord Grenville and Lord Grey. In the autumn of 1808, when only sixteen years of age, I accompanied Lord and Lady Holland to Corunna and afterwards to Lisbon, Seville and Cadiz, returning by Lisbon to England in the summer of 1809. They were eager for the success of the Spanish cause, and I joined to sympathy for Spain a boyish hatred of Napoleon, who had treacherously obtained possession of an independent country by force and fraud—force of immense armies, and fraud of the worst kind.’

We know from Ward’s Letters how serious was the divergence between Holland and Grenville, and from Lord Holland’s Memoirs that he urged on Grenville the policy of supporting a vigorous prosecution of the Spanish War, and that Windham, who had declared in 1793 that the conquest of Great Britain by Louis XIV. would by no means have been a calamity equal to the propagation of French principles, was not a little uneasy about invoking democratic sympathies in the contest with Napoleon. Lord Holland made his own position clear from the first. In June 1808 he made an important speech in the House of Lords, urging the Government to promise to guarantee the integrity of the Spanish Empire, and to negotiate with any form of Government which the Spanish people were disposed to adopt. Next month he made another speech calling for a declaration to the Spaniards ‘stating in an open and manly way ‘our views with respect to Spain and our determination to ‘assist them without intermixing any selfish objects in the ‘recovery of their independence.’ It was in the autumn of that year that he went to Spain, taking the young Lord John Russell with him. In June 1810, supporting a motion for papers on the subject of the Spanish campaign, he said of the Spanish rising that ‘he never knew any event that created a ‘more lively interest in his mind, not excepting the dawn of the ‘French Revolution.’ When formally presenting a petition for peace, he said that no consideration ought to induce a consent to sacrifice the independence of Spain; and in December of 1813 he recapitulated his views.

‘I have been bred in a school of politics that deprecates any encroachment on national independence and the just liberty of mankind. Therefore if I rejoiced, and I certainly did rejoice, in the retreat of the Duke of Brunswick and the result of the battle of Jemappes, my joy must be still more pure upon the results of Dennevitze and Leipsic, upon the release of a great part of Europe from oppression by the assistance of British arms. A noble lord had well observed that the war was no longer that of courts and governments but the war of a whole people against oppression, and proportionably energetic. However, although a great part



of the happy results of this war may be justly attributed to a powerful popular impulse, and to that infatuation on the part of the enemy which thank God always attends the long abuse of power, yet it must be felt that a great deal of the merit is to be attributed to the Government of this country.'

Lord Holland based his support of the Peninsular War on fundamental Liberal principles and on a large and magnanimous view of European politics. The nephew of the first English statesman who gave a general application to the idea of national self-expression, he preserved throughout the bewildering phases of European disorder his sense for national freedom and his hatred of oppression. His chivalrous nature sometimes tempted him into an imprudence or an exaggeration. Most Liberals will feel with Macaulay that they could not have signed his protest against the detention of Napoleon, and that the dispersing of the plunder collected at the Louvre, which made him, as it made Hazlitt, indignant, was simple justice. But the main ideas of his foreign policy were the ideas that have given Canning his place and fame in English history. He went further than Canning in his estimate of English power when he protested in 1821 that the Government must not allow Austria to stamp out the revolution in Naples. His attacks on the settlements of Vienna anticipated, if in some respects they exaggerated, the view that history has taken of these arrangements and the view that Canning in practice enforced.

It is important in this connexion to distinguish his opinions about the fate of Spanish America from those of some of his party. The notion of liberating Spanish America had simmered in the minds of English statesmen for many years before the Grenville Government was formed. It possessed considerable attractions as an operation of war, and it opened up before the eyes of English politicians the kind of inviting prospect that France and Spain had welcomed in the American War of Independence. In 1805 Pitt took measures to give effect to this policy. Sir Home Popham was to assist Miranda, who had been nursing this project for twenty years, and Buenos Ayres was to be attacked. But in July Pitt suspended the project because he had hopes of detaching Spain from France. Pitt died in January and the Grenville Government came in. Events after this took a strange turn. Home Popham conducted an expedition on his own account to Spanish America, and when Buenos Ayres capitulated, Beresford, the commanding officer, instead of proclaiming independence, proclaimed himself Governor and took oaths of allegiance to the British Crown. The Grenville Government, which had forbidden and censured

the escapade, allowed itself at this point to be drawn into a policy which was open to some of the principal objections which had been urged against Pitt's handling of the Revolutionary War. The allurements of military hopes (a taste at that moment not too often satisfied) and the hope of great commercial advantages confused and overcame the sense and prudence of the Government. Grey himself was consistently against the policy of reinforcing the troops at Buenos Ayres. Grenville, Moira and Sidmouth were flattered by hopes of great commercial developments; Windham was intent on conquest. The net result of their deliberations was a policy which seemed to condone and to try to turn to profit a gross piece of misconduct which the Government had tried to prevent, and the policy did not look any the better in the light of its egregious catastrophe. Lady Holland's Journal gives us an interesting glimpse into Lord Holland's own opinions at the time.

'A Cabinet last night upon the subject of Buenos Ayres and South America; there is much difference of opinion on these questions. Ld. Howick and Mr. Grenville are averse to the diversion of any part of our force to such distant objects, and think every part should be employed in Europe. Ld. Grenville looks to conquest in S. America as useful to our trade in war and as objects of barter in making peace. He is therefore against the adoption of any system which would prevent us from reducing our conquests at the time of peace. Ld. H. objects to any attack upon S. America except for the purpose of revolutionising, but is very desirous some such system should be adopted.'

It is interesting to compare with this account of Lord Holland's views his speech in the House of Lords in June 1810. 'As to the fate of New Spain if Old Spain should not be liberated, his advice would be to promote the establishment of such a system of government in the former as good statesmen would alone approve in any country, viz. a system founded on the wishes and opinions of the people.' These extracts show that Lord Holland was quite consistent in preaching the principle on which Canning acted in 1825 when he called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old. The importance and value of his interventions in foreign policy was that, whether resisting the coercion of Norway or demanding that no small State should be disposed of at the Vienna Congress if it was not allowed to be represented at its discussion, he was the unfaltering champion of the right of a nation to be its own master, and the consistent enemy of that hateful but fashionable diplomacy which treated the liberties and destinies of peoples as matters of exchange and barter.

Lord Holland's opinions on foreign policy were an essential part of his Liberalism. But in this paper we are more particularly concerned with the part he and his friends played in the domestic development of their country: their share in the great consummation of 1832. All that they accomplished had to be done in opposition and under great difficulties. They could only take office by sacrificing their principles or accepting conditions that destroyed their freedom. The memory of 1807 was too vivid to allow them to put their heads or their principles into such a noose again. They were, in fact, a standing opposition within the oligarchy, and to appreciate what they did we must first realise the power of the oligarchy, and its state of mind.

Mr. Brougham Villiers says in his book on the history of Socialism that the poor have rarely counted for so little as in the eighteenth century, and he observes that this can be seen from a study of the temper of so humane a man as Fielding. We agree with Mr. Villiers as to the fact, though we do not agree with his analysis of the sympathies of the author of 'Tom Jones' and 'Joseph Andrews.' It is difficult to believe that the man who wrote the famous description of the reasoning of the different passengers in the coach when they were asked to admit the stripped and bleeding Joseph, ending with the admirable touch about the postillion, the only person who would lend his coat—'a lad who hath since been transported for robbing a henroost'—was quite content with the social morality of his day. But whether Fielding liked what he drew or whether he drew in the hope that others might not like it, at any rate he drew from life and his characters are actual types. There is nothing unreal about the young squire, the son of the lord of the manor, who gives orders that he will not allow a dog in the village and shoots all that he finds, or about the lawyer who, when consulted by Lady Booby, replies, 'The laws of this land are not so vulgar to permit a mean fellow to contend with one of your ladyship's fortune. We have one sure card, which is, to carry him before Justice Frolick, who, upon hearing your ladyship's name, will commit him without any farther questions.'

Fielding wrote in the middle of the eighteenth century. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the dependence and insignificance of the poor was even more striking. Mr. and Mrs. Webb have traced in their study of English local government the concentration of power in the hands of the justices of the peace, a power which was steadily growing all through the second half of the eighteenth century. Most of the earlier institutions of local government had recognised in some form

and degree the principle of popular representation, and publicity of discussion. But by the end of the century the popular vestries had either melted away or become entirely subject to the magistrates, and there had grown up under the J.P. system an organised local legislature and executive composed exclusively of magistrates and of persons consulted by them. The change which came over Quarter Sessions is a good example. Cobbett pointed out in 1822 that enactments vitally affecting poor relief were issued in the name of Hampshire Quarter Sessions by two squires and five parsons from behind the closed door of the green jury room. It has to be remembered that the exclusion of the mass of the nation from political rights at the time we are reviewing applied not only to Parliament but to all local life, and that in the case of the village there had taken place in the eighteenth century an actual loss or deprivation of these powers. The poor or small man was weaker at the end than at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

This oligarchy then, with Parliament and all the local machinery of government at its command, was confronted by the growing movement for reform. Its answer was the brutal one of fear. The penal laws of England had become steadily more savage and the governing classes relied on this ultimate weapon. Between the Restoration and the death of George IV. no fewer than 187 capital offences were added to the criminal code. In the first fifty years of the reign of George III. sixty-three Acts were passed, creating capital offences, and between 1810 and 1845, 1400 persons suffered death for crimes which after 1845 ceased to be capital. We get a glimpse of the temper in which magistrates administered justice in Mrs. Meinertzhagen's little volume, 'From Ploughshare to Parliament,' describing the history of the Potter family. Here is an extract from Richard Potter's diary :

'October 13th. (1813.) Manchester Quarter Sessions commence. I was attending to give evidence against a man. Afterwards two boys—John and Thomas Clough, aged twelve and ten years—were tried and found guilty of stealing some Irish linen out of Joseph Thorley's warehouse during the dinner hour. The Chairman sentenced them to seven years' transportation. On its being pronounced the mother of these unfortunate boys came to the Bar to her children, and with them was in great agony imploring mercy of the Bench. With difficulty the children were removed. The scene was so horrifying I could remain no longer in court.'

That the infliction of the death penalty on boys of this age was not unknown is shown by the Annual Register of 1791, which records the execution of boys of twelve and thirteen for

stealing. The increasing severity in the administration of the Game Laws was one of the symptoms of the rigorous spirit in which the governing class defended and maintained its special interests. The magistracy was becoming more and more exclusive, socially and politically, intent on maintaining not only the privileges of a class but the prejudices of a party. By 1835 the Benches were thoroughly Tory. The state of things that was possible under these conditions can be imagined from an incident mentioned by Mr. and Mrs. Webb. In 1822 the Duke of Buckingham tried and convicted a farmer of coursing on his estate. The trial took place in the Duke's kitchen; the witnesses were the Duke's keepers. If this was the way in which a farmer was treated, it is easy to believe that, as Brougham said, the magistrates regarded a poacher as *vera naturae*. Nor were the Game Laws the only weapon in the hands of the men who administered this shameless class justice. The Vagrancy Acts provided a further opportunity, which was not neglected, for oppressing the destitute and the poor.

If the social restlessness and discontent of the times were attacked by these methods, the demand for reform provoked a special series of oppressive Acts. The Habeas Corpus Act was suspended in 1817. In the same year Sidmouth issued his circular letter to the lord-lieutenants authorising magistrates to apprehend persons accused of libellous publications, a step that drove Cobbett out of the country. In 1819 came the Six Acts. We know something of the espionage by means of which the Government administered their Acts from the careers of Castles, Oliver and Edwards. Oliver made his way into the centres of social disturbance, incited the wretched artisans to rebellion by promising them a huge army of sympathisers from London, and then went into the witness box to swear away the lives of his miserable dupes. Edwards tried higher flights, choosing his victims from a more desperate society where the idea of assassination was not uncongenial. Lamb's little poem, 'The Three Graves,' gives us a picture of the hatred with which they were regarded:

'Close by the ever-burning brimstone beds  
Where Bedloe, Oates and Judas hide their heads  
I saw great Satan like a sexton stand,  
With his intolerable spade in hand,  
Digging three graves. . . .

I asked the fiend for whom these rites were meant.

" "These graves," quoth he, "when life's brief oil is spent,  
When the dark night comes and they're sinking bedwards,  
I mean for Castles, Oliver and Edwards." "

About the panics which were made the pretext for this oppression, Ward made a shrewd comment in a letter to the Bishop of Llandaff :

‘Pray tell me what you think of the state of public opinion and feeling at this moment. Is there a dangerous spirit abroad or is there not? Canning says there is. But an eloquent Minister is a bad authority upon such a subject. An *alarm* is the harvest of such a personage.’

The dominant opinions at this time, it must be remembered, were just as violent and extreme as those which permitted the savage repressions of 1794–5, although England was now at peace and the Jacobin spectre had disappeared. Lord Redesdale wrote to Lord Sidmouth in 1817 that ‘every meeting for radical reform was not merely a seditious attempt to undermine the existing constitution of Government by bringing it into hatred and contempt, but was an overt act of treasonable conspiracy against that constitution of Government including the King as its head.’ Cobbett dramatised the reasoning of the governing classes in a very amusing dialogue between Canning and a Judge. Canning has been saying that it is difficult to get proofs of the treasonable conduct of the Radicals, for they are so skilful in disguising their views :

‘JUDGE. Likely enough, Mr. Canning. But if they really have such intentions and if you know it, you can surely produce some circumstantial evidence of an intention entertained by so many men in such various stations in life.

‘MR. CANNING. Oh yes. Circumstances enough. Faith! Why, Sir, their evil intentions are so manifest that it has been found necessary to pass six Acts for the purpose of defeating their intentions. In the first place, they have been forbidden to meet out of doors, except in distinct parishes. These meetings, were they to take place, are put under the control of the magistrates who may disperse the meetings at their pleasure; and to prevent any resistance of the will of the magistrate, fine, imprisonment, transportation or death may according to the degree of the offence be inflicted on any persons attending the meetings. Then the same law provides that there shall be no meeting, even in a room, to debate or discuss matters of Church or State if money be paid for admittance, unless the room be licensed by a magistrate, and then he may attend and if he please take away the licence.

‘JUDGE. Did I rightly understand you, Sir? That Englishmen may not now meet even in a room to hear speeches or lectures on government or political economy, for instance, and pay for their admission without offending against the laws? In other words, that it is now a crime for an Englishman to take admission money to a lecture on Locke, Montesquieu or Blackstone?

‘MR. CANNING. Yes, you have precisely my meaning and the fact. All this I say shows what a nest of rebellious and impious villains these Radicals are. This is I think circumstantial proof enough of their wicked designs. But if you want more, look at the laws for binding printers and publishers, for abolishing cheap publications, for banishing the villains when they put forth anything even tending to bring Parliament into contempt. Look at these, and then doubt of their guilt if you can.’

Canning, whom Cobbett satirised in this clever dialogue, was destined a few years later to win the gratitude and support even of such uncompromising Radicals as Burdett and Sir Robert Wilson by the reforms which he forced on his party and the brilliant display he gave of Liberal ideas in his imaginative foreign policy. In estimating the conduct of the small group of Whigs to whom Holland belonged, we must not forget that they refused to allow old rancours or the resentments of party to weaken their enthusiasm for a life-long opponent, whose generous sympathies and intuitions had lifted England out of the entanglements of Vienna. But the main interest of the activities of that group lies outside the range of Canning's ideas. For the historical importance of Holland and his friends consists not in their relations with the liberalised Tories, which had as their result the financial reforms of the twenties, but in their relations with the uncompromising Radicals which had as their result the Parliamentary reform of 1832.

Now Holland and his friends, if they escaped the ferocious delusions of their order, were not of course revolutionary in their sympathies or plans. They accepted the rule of their class as a permanent institution. Hated and dreaded by Tories as violent, perverse and disloyal, they were despised by Radicals as lukewarm, timid and insincere. In one sense there seemed no place for them in politics, and no set of men have ever received more abuse or less gratitude from their contemporaries, or perhaps from posterity. Yet as we review, in the calm of distance, the political development of the century, two facts become plain to us: one, that if a beginning was to be made with the regeneration or we might say the reintegration of English society Parliamentary reform was a vital necessity, and it was essential to admit unenfranchised England to some share in central and local government: the other, that if Parliamentary reform was to come within a reasonable time or to come at all without civil war, some co-operation between men of the ruling class and the Radicals in the cold was indispensable. It was the function of Holland and his friends to make such co-operation possible. That co-operation became

possible because there was a small Whig party which fought the coercion of 1817 as courageously as Fox had fought the coercion of 1794. Holland and his friends could not have been more zealous in the defence of the freedom of Englishmen menaced by the aggressions of the class to which they themselves belonged, if those aggressions had menaced their own liberties and their own interests.

But it was not only in resisting this coercion that Holland tried to temper the despotism of his class and to alleviate the wrongs of the poor in the House of Lords. He was virtually the *πρόξενος* of the excluded classes. In 1807, when Whitbread introduced the first comprehensive Education Bill into the House of Commons, some of his own party, like Lord Henry Petty, declared that it was unnecessary. Holland took a larger view and was the sponsor of the Bill in the Lords. In 1818 he supported a motion to appoint a commission to inquire into abuses of charitable funds in the interests of the poor. In 1819 he strongly supported the motion to appoint a committee to inquire into the state of children employed in factories, a measure which some members of his party looked upon as economically unsound. The Game Laws he attacked as vigorously as Fox had done. He was continually appealing for the investigation of complaints into the state of prisons or the treatment of prisoners. His experience as a member of the committee that inquired into the circumstances of the death of a debtor in the Marshalsea prison, to which he called the attention of the House of Lords, turned his mind to this subject, and he made several attempts to improve the lot of insolvent debtors. His greatest distinction in this connexion was his association with the splendid name of Romilly; for the Bills which that eloquent friend of the oppressed carried through the Commons, to abolish the death penalty for various forms of stealing, were confided to his care in the less sympathetic House of Lords. A legal reform to which he constantly directed his energies was the revision of the proceedings in case of libel. The practice of attacking the Press by means of *ex-officio* informations for libel had become much more common. The yearly average of informations from the beginning of the reign of George III. to 1808 had been two; between 1808 and 1811 there were forty. Among the victims of the campaign waged during the next few years were Leigh Hunt and his brother. They were sentenced to two years' imprisonment after a summing-up from Ellenborough who declared that Brougham, the Hunts' counsel, was inoculated with all the poison of the libel. The most famous of these trials were the three trials of William Hone for publishing a blasphemous



mous parody. Hone, whose parodies were imitations of the Catechism and Litany, defended himself partly by the plea that his parody was not designed to bring the Catechism into contempt, but only the abuses which he had attacked by this medium, and partly by quoting other examples of parodies that had gone unpunished. Taking a hint from a very courageous speech of Lord Grey's in the House of Lords, he made great play with Canning's parody in the 'Anti-Jacobin':

- ' And ye five other wandering bards that move  
In sweet accord of harmony and love,  
Coleridge and Southey, Lloyd and Lamb and Co.,  
Tune all your mystic hearts to praise Lepaux.
- ' Priestley and Wakefield, humble holy men,  
Give praises to his name with tongue and pen.
- ' Thelwall and ye that lecture as ye go,  
And for your pains get pelted, praise Lepaux.
- ' Praise him each Jacobin or fool or knave,  
And your cropp'd heads in sign of worship wave.
- ' All creeping creatures venomous and low,  
Paine, Williams, Godwin, Holcroft, praise Lepaux.'

The Government strained every nerve to secure Hone's conviction. He was tried on three separate indictments. Ellenborough besought the jury to agree as Christians that Hone's parodies were a most infamous and profane libel. But Hone escaped and survived to spend a tranquil old age in sub-editing a religious journal.

Fox's Libel Act of 1792, which allowed juries to decide on the character and not merely on the authorship of a publication, had come just in time to prevent the absolute extinction of the liberties of the Press. Without that Act Hone's conviction would have been a matter of course. Writing to Brougham in 1810, Erskine said of that Act: ' I have often thought that if the alarms of the French Revolution had come upon us before the Press was established, it would have been beat down for ever.' But the power of the Attorney-General to lodge an *ex-officio* information and to keep this information hanging over his victim for several years, by simply omitting to bring him to trial, was a great public danger, and Holland tried hard to abolish it. In 1811 and in 1812 he moved in the House of Lords but was beaten on both occasions. However, as we know from his Memoirs, he did not expect success, and his main object was to pledge the Whigs to this reform. But in 1819 he contrived

to get some of the abuses of the system abolished by cleverly taking advantage of the introduction of one of the six Acts, and securing the addition of a clause which enabled the defendant to compel the Attorney-General to bring on the case within a year or to abandon the prosecution.

The actual achievements of the Whigs during the generation that ended with 1832 do not make a very rich or imposing record on paper. We have already explained that whatever they effected could be effected only in Opposition. The constructive contributions that an Opposition can make are slight, and apt to seem even slighter than they are. But it would in any case have been a great moral advantage to the country to possess a small band of men who combated with courage and constancy the besetting sins of the governing classes. A spacious tolerance was particularly valuable in a public man at a time when the Catholics were still excluded from elementary rights; a humane resistance to oppression was particularly valuable at a time when the lives and liberties of the poor counted for little in the fear and the prejudices of their masters. What gave its sovereign value and importance to the conduct of the little body of Whigs was that it created the conditions under which the Reform Bill of 1832 became possible.

The policy of co-operation between the Whigs and the Radicals had been advocated in the 'Edinburgh Review' twenty years before the Reform Bill in an article by Francis Jeffrey (January 1810):

'The dangers and the corruptions, and the prodigies of the times, have very nearly put an end to all neutrality and moderation in politics; and the great body of the nation appears to us to be divided into two violent and most pernicious factions—the courtiers, who are almost for arbitrary power, and the democrats, who are almost for revolution and republicanism. Between these stand a small, but most respectable band—the friends of liberty and of order—the old constitutional Whigs of England, with the best talents and the best intentions, but without power or popularity, calumniated and suspected by both parties, and looking on both with too visible a resentment, aversion and alarm. The two great divisions, in the meantime, are daily provoking each other to greater excesses, and recruiting their hostile ranks, as they advance, from the diminishing mass of the calm and the neutral. Every hour the rising tides are eating away the narrow isthmus upon which the adherents of the constitution are stationed; and every hour it becomes more necessary for them to oppose some barrier to their encroachment.

'If the two opposite parties are once permitted to shock together in open conflict, there is an end to the freedom, and almost to the

existence of the nation—whatever be the result—although that is not doubtful: and the only human means of preventing a consummation to which all things seem so obviously tending, is for the remaining friends of the constitution to unbend from their cold and repulsive neutrality, and to join themselves to the more respectable members of the party to which they have the greatest affinity; and thus, by the weight of their character, and the force of their talents, to temper its violence and moderate its excesses, till it can be guided in safety to the defence, and not to the destruction of our liberties. In the present crisis, we have no hesitation in saying, that it is to the popular side that the friends of the constitution must turn themselves; and that, if the Whig leaders do not first conciliate, and then restrain the people—if they do not save them from the leaders they are already choosing in their own body, and become themselves their leaders, by becoming their patrons, and their cordial, though authoritative advisers—they will in no long time sweep away the constitution itself, the Monarchy of England, and the Whig aristocracy, by which that Monarchy is controuled and confirmed, and exalted above all other forms of polity.’

Ward said about this article in one of his letters to Ivy that it was impossible for the Radicals to coalesce with the Whigs. That was a very natural view to take in 1810, or in 1820, or even later, and yet Parliamentary reform which Ward dreaded was carried by that very coalition.

The difficulties in the way of anything like a combination between the Whigs and the Radicals were almost overwhelming. There was to begin with a fundamental antithesis in their views on the Crown as well as in their views on democracy. Burdett and Cobbett both wanted to increase the power of the Crown, whereas the Whigs had been fighting for half a century to reduce it. It would have been natural and intelligible enough for the champions of a class which had suffered and shrunk at the hands of the oligarchy to wish to make the Crown more powerful if the Crown were likely to intervene in its defence. If George III. and George IV. had had the views or the sympathies on which Louis XIV. acted in the early years of his reign, when he continually upheld the rights of the peasants against the great seigneurs, the poor of England would have had good reason to desire the aggrandisement of their influence. But in point of fact the ideas of the kings of England on this subject were identical with the worst ideas of the oligarchy. The King’s message to Melville, regretting that he had lost his office ‘through inadvertence’ and looking forward to his return to power, was the measure of the help that Radicals like Burdett might expect from him. The Court, in point of fact, shielded abuses, increased corruption, fostered the most illiberal

views of the governing class, and inspired vindictive measures against popular liberty.

There was, secondly, of course a great discrepancy in their opinions on democracy. Many of the Whigs, it is true, had talked very sound Radical doctrine in their day. Both Fox and Grey had gone to considerable lengths in 1793 and 1797. But by 1811 the Whigs had rather abated their tone. For one thing, they had formed the alliance with the Grenvilles who were anti-Reformers. For another, the sweeping violence of the democrats had frightened them. The Whigs had always been afraid of abstractions, and throughout these times the general alarm that was excited by the French Revolution had roused a larger world than the governing class to shrink from anything that looked like a democratic principle. England was suffering from a sort of hydrophobia (to use an expressive metaphor that was invented by Fox for another situation), and the mere whisper of Jacobin was enough to destroy the mental balance of society. The effect of this condition of things was seen in Grey's speeches in 1810 and 1817. In 1810 Grey, who was a particularly straightforward and high-minded nature, said that he was free to confess that there was some difference between his present sentiments and his former impressions, though he had seen no reason to change his general opinion in favour of reform. In 1817 he went further, and said that he had originally favoured the enfranchisement of householders, but that he now thought this would be too sudden a change. In the same debate Holland, who in 1807 had said that he was in favour of triennial parliaments and not opposed even to annual parliaments, spoke strongly against universal suffrage and annual parliaments, adding that though he was in favour of Parliamentary reform he doubted whether the object was attainable at the moment owing to the differences among the reformers. There was thus a very wide division between the Whigs and the Radicals of the school of Burdett and Cobbett, and it was not until some ten years after that debate that Grey and Holland took up Parliamentary reform with ardour. The differences in the views of the two parties as to the scope reform should take were developed later in the battles between the 'Westminster Review,' the organ of the Philosophical Radicals, and the 'Edinburgh Review,' the organ of the reforming Whigs. It was in the course of this controversy that Macaulay laid down in 1829 and 1830 in this Review the principles of reform to which effect was given two years later in the Bill of 1832.

To these differences of opinion there were added incompatibilities of temper. The Whigs and Radicals wanted different

things. They had also different manners and different prejudices. All the conditions made it inevitable that the Radicals should wound the sensibilities of the Whigs. We can see that Cobbett's great power in the country depended on his success in rousing the poor against the rich. The great iconoclast of his time, he wanted to destroy the poor man's way of looking at the governing classes. A propagandist who was only concerned to envelope the governing class and its institutions in a general disesteem did not pause to weigh very nicely the justice of all his accusations. We know what Place, who had no weakness for the Whigs, thought of Cobbett's manners, and we cannot be surprised if those manners which affronted Romilly did not make it easy for less democratic Whigs to regard him as an ally. Cobbett, in truth, could only achieve his great purpose by methods that were bound to alienate a set of men who had been nursed and bred in the privileges that he held up to odium and ridicule.

Cobbett's deliberate intention of shocking society was only one of the difficulties that seemed to forbid any combined action between Whigs and Radicals. The personal quarrels of the governing class are managed and conducted more discreetly than those of men who have not learnt the habits of office. The reformers' world resounded with the recriminations of Hunt and Cobbett, or of Cobbett and Burdett. There was no tradition of decorum to put a veil over the jealousies and resentments of these eager and sincere politicians whose passions were unmistakably on the surface. And if there was in one sense too little art in their methods, in another sense there was too much. If the polite Whigs with their hatred of a scene were disgusted by the noisy quarrels of the Radicals, they were not attracted by incidents like Burdett's careful stage-management of his arrest with his little boy spelling out Magna Charta on his knee, or Cobbett's tour with the bones of Paine. Nor must we forget that the demands of the Radicals touched the Whigs very intimately. The Whigs were prepared to go some way in the direction of retrenchment and the abolition of sinecures; but they could not escape from the atmosphere in which office, with or without duties, was regarded as the natural property of the governing class. They had rooted up a good many abuses in 1782, but the large number that remained may be gathered from the report of the Finance Committee in 1810, which showed that sinecures absorbed a million and a half a year. To the men who saw a great part of England destitute and starving this seemed a wicked spoliation. To the class that had been bred in the ideas of the oligarchy, it seemed a recom-

pense, perhaps excessive, but still a recompense for general public services.

When Colonel Barré, to whom Pitt gave the Clerkship of the Pells (worth 3000*l.*), was dying, Dr. Goodenough wrote to Sidmouth, who had just made him Dean of Rochester : ‘ I understand that Colonel Barré is in a very precarious state. I hope you will have the fortitude to nominate Harry to be his successor.’ Harry was Sidmouth’s son and a boy at Winchester. The father’s fortitude was equal to the occasion. Fortitude of that kind was not an uncommon virtue.

The Whigs contributed to the agitation which resulted in 1817 in the abolition of a number of sinecures, but they were sufficiently steeped in the ideas of their class to believe that a political career should be associated with certain emoluments. It is interesting in this connexion to notice the exchange of views that passed between Holland and Francis Horner on this subject. Horner wrote from Pisa in December 1816 regretting that the Whigs had ever taken up the cry for the reduction of sinecures, but admitting that it was too late to arrest the movement.

‘ As long as the subject would bear discussion, I think the argument was much in favour of sinecures, under our form of government, and that their existence as a fund of distribution by statesmen among themselves (to put it in the plainest terms) was an additional security given to the democracy for the efficacy of what we justly reckon one of the best marks of our freedom, that a man may rise from the humblest rank to the highest office ; the democracy however have scouted all such argument, and I take the discussion to be at an end.’

Holland says in his reply :

‘ Retrenchment and economy which must include suppression of sinecures in future, and as far as the rights of property (established by legal decision) admit the reform of those now existing, as well as the reduction of many useless places miscalled the splendour of the Crown, are absolutely necessary to give any party who wishes to do good authority and weight with the people. They must go.’

These were the difficulties surrounding any hopes of reform that depended on an understanding between the Whigs and the Radicals. No wonder Ward thought them insuperable. Yet, as we know now, the fact that the great democratic movement did not suffer the fate of so many good movements in English history and scatter into thin air was due to the confidence

which the Radicals decided to repose in the Whigs. The forces that made the Reform of 1832 were partly the middle classes, representing largely the type of man of whose life we get a glimpse in Mrs. Meinertzhagen's pages, partly the working classes whose leader was Cobbett. All the echoes of the old quarrels of Whigs and Radicals were subdued for one moment and that moment was decisive. Of the 'political unions' that focussed popular opinion and enthusiasm, that of Birmingham took the lead, and it set itself to 'form a general political union between 'the lower and middle classes of the people.' When the Reform Bill appeared, if it gave more than many had expected from the Whigs, it gave less, a good deal, than the Radicals had asked for. But the Radicals led by Place and the political unions threw themselves with ardour into the defence of the Bill. Cobbett recalled the constancy of Grey and Holland to the great cause of Parliamentary reform, and gave the Bill the aid of his tremendous pen and his tremendous name. The agitation grew in fury as the excitement increased. There was talk of a general refusal to pay taxes. Great processions and great meetings gave voice to the popular determination for reform. But all this pressure was exerted on behalf of the moderate Bill which the Government had introduced and the middle classes approved. This miracle was due to the fortitude and perseverance with which a few men had maintained their Liberal faith. If Grey and Holland had been led by Grenville to desert the Press or the Radicals, or to support the suspension of the Habeas Corpus or the Six Acts; if those sympathies which Fox had left to his friends had found no refuge, the union of forces which carried the Reform Bill would have been impossible. In 1795 the London Corresponding Society passed a resolution thanking Fox for his resistance to the Treason and Sedition Bills. In 1817, when it was blowing up for another storm of coercion Acts, Cobbett and Hunt approached Grey and Holland. 'It has happened more than 'once in the course of my life,' said Holland in 'Further Memoirs 'of the Whig Party,' 'that the party called Jacobins, Levellers 'or Radical Reformers, after reviling the Whigs and strengthen- 'ing the High Church party by lowering their opponents, have 'sought in the hour of danger to shelter themselves under the 'party they have so traduced. The Whigs, and let it be spoken 'with pride, have on such occasions, though smarting from the 'recent ingratitude of their opponents, been ever ready from 'principle and generosity to stretch their protecting hands to 'persons calumniated or persecuted by power.' It has been the fashion in some quarters to sneer at the cult of Fox that was carried on at Holland House. It was just because there

was a cult somewhere in the governing classes of the tradition of Fox's championship of the oppressed and the persecuted, however little he might share their ideas, that it became possible for the cause of reform, in spite of vindictive memories and mutual suspicions, to mobilise an irresistible army in 1832. We may laugh at the moderation of the Whigs, their limited horizons, their cautious and fastidious ideas. But the zeal and resolution with which they stood out against the cruel *régime* of repression are only the more remarkable because the men whom they refused to see extinguished were preaching doctrines they dreaded. It was just because the Whig party had had statesmen like Grey and Holland, Brougham and Romilly, who had never been the accomplices of Sidmouth or Ellenborough, who had not shared the guilt of the Six Acts or condoned the bloodshed of Peterloo, that the political unions and Cobbett and Place could help to force the Reform Bill on the Lords. The Bill had thus the support of the popular agitation outside Parliament. But that agitation would not have been enough if the Whig Government had not been resolute in dealing with the Lords. In this situation it would have been easy for the Whigs to alienate the Radicals, or for the Whigs to scare the Radicals from the Bill. Neither of these things happened. The Whig Government stood firm, and Holland himself it must be noted was one of the stalwarts.

The credit for the Reform Bill of 1832 must be divided between a few Whig aristocrats, the great manufacturers, and the popular movement that began in the agitations of 1792 and 1793, languished under the first coercion, and was then brought by Cobbett to its full power. The actual changes made by the measure seemed moderate in comparison with the visions of the democrats; but the Bill itself marked the overthrow of an age and a world of prejudice, custom, and fear. 'For two centuries and a half,' says the 'Cambridge Modern History,' 'Parliamentary representation had been 'untouched, and to touch it was to break the charm.' The Bill which broke that charm was regarded as a revolution by the Duke of Wellington on the one side and by Cobbett on the other. When the Bill came it brought its disappointments, and Radicals found that many of their dreams had not come true. But at least it enabled England to begin to overtake the disorder and neglect in which her civilisation was buried, and to apply Radical remedies to evils which the governing classes had come to accept as the inevitable purgatory of the poor.



## ART. II.—HENRY IRVING.

1. *The Life of Henry Irving.* By AUSTIN BRERETON. Two volumes. London: Longmans and Co. 1908.
2. *Personal Reminiscences of Henry Irving.* By BRAM STOKER. London: Heinemann. 1907.
3. *The Story of My Life.* By ELLEN TERRY. London: Hutchinson and Co. 1908.
4. *Impressions of Henry Irving.* By WALTER HERRIES POLLOCK. London: Longmans and Co. 1908.

HENRY IRVING brought greatness back to the English stage. From 1851, when Macready bade farewell to the public in 'Macbeth,' to 1874, when Irving first appeared in 'Hamlet' before a London audience, no play of more than ephemeral fame had been performed in the capital in such a manner that a claim can be admitted for the production to rank with the great memories of our theatre. For the three years previous to this Irving was himself well known for the remarkable power of his acting, and there were not wanting those to hail him as an artist of the first order on the strength of his performances in such plays as 'The Bells,' 'Charles I.' and 'Richelieu.' But it was not until the production of 'Hamlet' that his art was brought to the touchstone of a tragic character and a great play. His performance was an instant success; the play ran for two hundred nights, and Irving at once stepped into the position of the leading, and the only, tragedian in England. From this he never receded, and when he died, thirty-one years later, there passed from the scene not only a striking personality who was known himself throughout England and America, and by his fame over all Europe, but a leader of the stage to whom thousands looked up with an almost idolatrous admiration.

Thanks to the straightforward, if somewhat pedestrian, industry of Mr. Austin Brereton, whom Irving's family have entrusted with his papers, we are now able to follow step by step and in the greatest detail the life of a man who at the least estimation was remarkable in a generation when remarkable men were not rare. In this instance we are more grateful for the early facts than in the case of many lives. For Irving was no heaven-born genius like Garrick, who sprang at a bound, no more than twenty-four years old, into the front rank of his profession and extorted from Pope the judgement: 'That young man never had a rival and never will have a rival.' On the contrary, he only raised himself to success after a long and

laborious apprenticeship. When he first played in London, in 1866, he had already been on the stage for ten years, and had during that time appeared in the astounding number of five hundred and eighty-eight parts. In the single play of 'Hamlet' he had undertaken at different times the parts of Guildenstern, Horatio, the King, the Priest, the Ghost, Osric, Laertes, and of Hamlet himself; and his experience ranged over tragedy, comedy, melodrama, farce, burlesque, and pantomime. It is perhaps natural for a biographer to lament in his subject's life a period untinged with the golden hues of triumph. Mr. Brereton would compare Irving's early years to the terrible struggle that robbed Edmund Kean of all but hope and genius; but the years spent in Edinburgh and Manchester were in truth a discipline most necessary to the actor's development, without which his latent powers might well have never come to the light. It was a discipline that extended him in every direction and, by forcing him to assume a range of characters perhaps unparalleled, taught him two secrets of inestimable value to an actor—familiarity with an audience under conditions of great variety, and mastery of the art of 'making-up.' By no other means could he conceivably have attained the flexibility he began by completely lacking. Nor did he even then want appreciation: the North Briton found him 'damned good,' as Claude Melnotte in 'The Lady of Lyons,' and applause was 'liberally bestowed on him'; and when he played Hamlet for the first time at Manchester in 1864 he received a highly encouraging reception. Though his monetary success was naturally moderate, he was laying during these years the foundations of a popularity in the provinces that was later to prove an unailing resource.

'Clairon and Molé,' says Diderot, naming the most celebrated actress and one of the finest actors in France in the eighteenth century, 'played when they first appeared like automata'; upon which the learned translator of '*Le Paradoxe sur le Comédien*' notes that Signor Mario, who ended by being an actor of consummate delicacy as well as the best singer in the world, began by being a stick. When Irving came to London he was twenty-eight, older by eight years than Molé when he first trod the boards of the *Comédie Française*; and he was still a stick. 'He was stiff with self-consciousness,' says Miss Ellen Terry, playing with him for the first time a year later; 'his eyes were dull and his face heavy. The piece we played was Garrick's 'boiled-down version of "*The Taming of the Shrew*," and he, 'as Petruchio, appreciated the humour and everything else far more than I did, as Katherine; yet he played badly, nearly

‘as badly as I did.’<sup>4</sup> The part was a hard one for him, totally unsuited to his capacity, but the incident is not therefore unfair to record; for if, according to a sage maxim, we are to judge talent at its best and character at its worst, we must still be prepared to judge talent at its worst if we wish to fathom and to understand it. Miss Terry, incomparable witness, whose brilliant shafts of criticism, fledged as they are with tenderness, do—thank heaven!—criticize, hints that Irving’s badness as *Petruchio* was due to want of technique—she herself having been saturated with theatrical experience from the age of eight. Doubtless up to a point it was; but the interesting fact for us is the peculiar nature of his badness. In after-years he was bad in not a few parts; but he was not a stick. Now his spirit was still imprisoned; he was successful more by his indomitable determination than by real skill in expressing the powerful feelings that were cramped by a harsh exterior. Yet good judges perceived the true mettle of him thus early in his career. ‘In twenty years he will be at the head of the English stage’ said G. H. Lewes; and George Eliot answered ‘He is there, I think, already.’

The man to whom this prophetic compliment was paid was far from the type of great actor—a *Sonnenthal* or a *Macready*, with strong, mobile features, well-formed limbs, and the imposing brow that *Tragedy* has brushed with her wing. He was tall and gaunt of frame, with hawk nose, chin slightly bulldog, sloping forehead, and smallish eyes; noticeable only—again Miss Terry helps us—for his profound melancholy.

‘He looked conceited, and almost savagely proud of the isolation in which he lived. There was touch of exaggeration in his appearance—a dash of *Werther*, a few flourishes of *Jingle!* Nervously sensitive to ridicule, self-conscious, suffering deeply from his inability to express himself through his art, Henry Irving in 1867 was a very different person from the Henry Irving who called on me . . . in 1878.’

Words could not give a clearer idea of a man.

‘*Roscius* deccas’d, each high aspiring Play’r  
Push’d all his int’rest for the vacant Chair:’

*Roscius* indeed was gone from out of England: Charles Kean, an actor often called ‘scholarly,’ devoid, in other words, of inspiration, had virtually disappeared in 1859; Samuel Phelps, a man of talent, but more important as manager than as actor, had in 1862 relinquished the *Sadler’s Wells* theatre after nearly twenty years there, and was in the decline of his powers; and few aspired to fill even their places. Alone among our actors

Irving nourished a high ambition and ceaselessly worked to attain it.

‘He thought of nothing else, cared for nothing else; worked day and night; went without his dinner to buy a book that might be helpful in studying, or a stage jewel it might be helpful to wear. . . . Once he bought a sword with a jewelled hilt, and hung it at the foot of his bed. All night he kept getting up and striking matches to see it, shifting its position, rapt in admiration of it.’

The chance for which Irving was preparing himself came when in 1871 Colonel Bateman, an enterprising American manager, took the Lyceum Theatre and offered him the place of leading actor in the company. The theatre had an unlucky reputation, that was not belied by the first venture of the new management, an adaptation from a German play based on George Sand’s story ‘*La Petite Fadette*.’ Irving, who since his arrival in London had earned a name as a fine stage villain by his performance of Bill Sikes in a version of ‘*Oliver Twist*’ and as the adventurer of comedy in Albery’s play ‘*The Two ‘Roses*,’ had a poor part. The piece was withdrawn after a month, only to be replaced by ‘*Pickwick*,’ another failure, in spite of Irving’s vivacious study in grotesque as Alfred Jingle; and Bateman, disgusted by his losses, had almost decided to return to America, where he offered Irving to continue his engagement. Irving was for going on, and pressed upon Bateman a translation of ‘*Le Juif Polonais*,’ by Erckmann and Chatrian. Bateman was doubtful of its success, but yielded; and ‘*The Bells*’ was produced on November 21. That evening changed the fortunes of the Lyceum, which became for thirty years the chief theatre in London. The town was fascinated by Irving’s performance of Mathias. Forty-one metropolitan newspapers published laudatory criticisms of it, and so enduring was its attraction that the play remained in Irving’s repertory until his death. He played the part in all over eight hundred times, and, says Mr. Bram Stoker in a significant phrase, ‘as years rolled on it became in ever greater demand.’

‘*The Bells*’ is far from being a first-rate play. Its original has dropped out of the French theatre, where good plays have a longer life than in England, and George Sand’s ‘*Claudie*’ can still be played with success. To what, then, was its enormous vogue due? We have no hesitation in answering: to what his friend and observant admirer, Mr. W. H. Pollock, well calls ‘the magnetic personality of Henry Irving.’ It was not the case of a play presented (for there is nothing in ‘*The Bells*’ but Mathias) by Irving; it was Irving presented in a play,

that thrilled and delighted the public. Essentially what the Germans call a 'Virtuosenstück,' Irving made it even more so. Played at the Français, 'Le Juif Polonais' was a study in realism: Mathias was a real burgomaster, a comfortable, undoubted Alsatian, terrified by the occurrence of real events which recalled his crime; and Got in the part was as real and impressive as were, no doubt, Talien and Coquelin before him. 'You a burgomaster!' Bateman had scoffed at Irving's suggestion; and he was right. Irving was not in the least a burgomaster, not at all Alsatian; he removed the action from the real to the romantic and supernatural; the visit in the original of another Polish Jew who unconsciously recalls his crime to the murderer gave place to a claptrap, if effective, vision of the crime itself; and Mathias' dream of the trial where he is forced by a mesmerist to confess his guilt, which was played by Got on a fully lighted stage, was at the Lyceum a scene of terrible mystery, in which the light fell on Irving alone and all the rest was darkness. The play ceased to be the history of anyone in particular; it became a vehicle for the display of Irving's histrionic art. It may indeed be doubted whether he ever had another so excellent for this one purpose. There were parts which showed one or another of his qualities in a more marked degree—Richard III. his fierce, sardonic humour; Shylock his dignity, so humble yet so majestic; King Lear his power to portray suffering; but Mathias gave room for the exercise of almost all. The terrible laugh, the sense of mental anguish, the foreboding of doom, the final physical collapse, worked here on Irving's audience the more completely because there was less to distract their attention from the actor. Above all, the communication of mystery, awful, compelling, unrelatable, which was his chief power, was effective in 'The Bells.' His acting of the hypnotised character hypnotised the spectator. The eeriness of it was enough to make

'Thy knotted and combined locks to part  
And each particular hair to stand on end.'

It was this that, though plays came and went, failed heavily or succeeded prodigiously, stood Irving in good stead to the end; this that became, as years rolled on, in ever greater demand: his personal magnetism.

It is not intended to suggest by this that Irving had no sense of character. Without that it would manifestly have been impossible for him to attack successfully the hundreds of parts that, as we have seen, helped to liberate his genius. But it is

not unjust to say that he had in far greater degree the sense of situation—the gift, that is, of realising and executing the stroke, by look or gesture, that is at each particular moment the most effective. His acting, besides, had a reflective quality that combined with this command of the moment to produce in the spectator a sensation of penetrating psychological insight, as though a man's mind were exposed before him, turned in upon itself and making public confession of its inmost thoughts. To change him from the man obsessed by himself that Miss Terry has sketched to the man that could thus obsess others needed time and the authority born of success; but throughout his maturity, prolonged nearly to the end of life by a will and frame 'compact of steel and whipcord,' as Mr. Stoker says, his method of mastery was the same. It was his power of execution that ripened, not his treatment of character that changed; from the first it was the same irony that cut, the same satanic domination that appalled, the same pathos that appealed, the same weird atmosphere that threatened while it charmed.

Since Diderot first\* propounded it, the question whether an actor experiences the feelings that he expresses in his stage character, has been often and keenly debated. On this Diderot himself probably comes nearest the truth when he says that an actor imagines an ideal type and then imitates it; meaning apparently thereby that the actor does experience his stage feelings, but in imagination alone—he is not 'sensible' to them in the moment of acting. This Diderot supports with numerous instances of actors who at moments of great passion on the stage have completely retained their wits and adjusted their garters or moved the furniture or made remarks to those playing with them totally disconnected from and even contrary to the feeling required by the scene. Most playgoers have witnessed examples of the same kind. A telling modern instance was when Ruy Blas in the play of the same name had to pick up from the ground and cover with kisses a handkerchief dropped by the queen. One evening, playing the part, Mounet-Sully, the greatest tragedian in France since Talma, reached this point; the tiny piece of lace dropped, but fluttered too far and in the glare of the footlights was lost from the actor's view. An instant's hesitation and the scene would have been spoiled; but he, palpitating with the emotion

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\* 'Le Paradoxe sur le Comédien' was written in 1773, revised about 1778, but was first published posthumously in 1830. It was, however, probably known in private to several persons before this date.

of his part, stooped, gathered, and passionately pressed to his heart—nothing! Now, had the emotion been a matter of actual, present experience this could not have been, for the cause of it, the sight and possession of the handkerchief, was absent, and no feeling would consequently have been aroused. Yet the feeling was expressed, and thus proves to us that the motive of it lay not in the reality of then and there, but in the type present in the actor's imagination. Irving himself, in considering this question, thought that an actor must be possessed of 'a double consciousness,' and his own career furnished good instances of its working. For us now, however, a more important question is how the actor's consciousness is directed towards a particular character in such a way that it gives the result we see. How is the imaginary type (taking that for a sufficient hypothesis) constructed? How is it that for the same part it differs so much in two actors?

The theatre, it was well said, is an iconoclast to those who hold theories of the drama. In the study much argument, and ingenious, may be brought to show that the 'Bacchæ' of Euripides was a satire on revivalism and Pentheus a tragic victim; on the stage it is undeniably melodrama and Pentheus a villain. The reason for this is that it is hardly possible in reading to grasp the whole movement of a play; the scope is too great, the action too complex. With the individual characters in a play the case is different; them we apprehend best on the undisturbed sofa. So that, whereas we test the merit of a play as play, solely by its effect on the stage, we test the merit of an actor's rendering of a character by our own solitary and intimate acquaintance with it. 'Mr. Dash's creation,' 'Mr. Blank's conception' of a part: these are the glib phrases for the process of the actor's rendering. 'It was truly a creation,' says Mr. Stoker of Irving as Digby Grant. 'He created Mathias,' says Mr. Brereton. But it is the author who conceives a character in a certain situation; the creation, in so far as the word is applicable at all, is his. Can there, then, be a conception of a conception? A creation of what is already in being? Our phrases, it would seem, advance us but little in the way of explanation.

An actor, it is evident, is in the same position with regard to a character in a play as anybody else who reads it. He apprehends it through the intelligence that is common to him and to us all; and it is then his further business to render the character by his special imaginative and mimetic powers as a living, speaking, moving figure. He has no more to go on in this than we in reading the written words by which the author has

expressed his conception. If the character is one conceived by a master-mind, a Sophocles or a Shakespeare, subtle, complex, and complete, it is probable that our ordinary minds will not at once or by themselves apprehend it truly; partial, or even wrong ideas of it may prevail and a full understanding may not be arrived at for a long time. But there is only one conception—that is, the poet's; and we do not multiply conceptions of the character by misapprehending it any more than in real life we endow a man with more than one character by taking different views of him. If our mental vision were perfect, there would be no two views of an imagined character: we should all apprehend from the poet's delineation what his conception was. But since our vision is usually very far from perfect, we get but an imperfect idea of the character, some sides of it touching perspective spots in our mind, while others are unheeded; and inherited traits, differences in training and environment, give us indefinitely varying powers of perception. All this is equally true of the actor. He does not neatly construct a theory of a character, as would seem to be implied by the term 'conception,' which he then puts into practice: he apprehends it, like the rest of us, with his limited faculties and then renders his apprehension according to his ability. It will not be real praise to say that he has a new conception, or a striking or an interesting conception of such and such a part: the execution may be excellent, his perception may add to the general appreciation of the character, but the newer and the more striking his 'conception' of the part, the worse will his performance be as a true rendering. For he will in reality be rendering, not the character conceived by the author, but one quite different; just as it was said of a musical virtuoso that he ought to be praised, not for giving a fresh rendering of a certain work by Beethoven, but for playing an original composition of his own, the notes of which happened to be precisely the same as those written in another work by Beethoven. The true praise to give an actor would be to declare him to have embodied the author's conception in all its fullness; it may not have been merited, but it was the highest praise possible when Pope said of Macklin in *Shylock*,

' This is the Jew  
That Shakespeare drew.'

To take an example from the present day is more dangerous; but who would commend Mr. Forbes-Robertson for his 'creation' or his striking 'conception' of *Hamlet*? His rendering of the character is the embodiment of Shakespeare's conception.



And as physiological differences give us powers of apprehension differing between man and man, so physical differences affect the power of execution among actors. Curiously enough, actors themselves and their admirers will violently dispute the importance of physique in acting. 'What makes a popular actor?' said Irving. 'Physique! What makes a great actor? Imagination and sensibility.' And Miss Terry rails at critics—'sharp of eye, yet how dull of vision!'—who think otherwise. Yet it is certain that bodily graces are of cardinal worth in a player. In this art the body is the instrument, and if the instrument be not of fine quality, the performance must assuredly suffer; and just as English orchestras are said to be superior to their foreign rivals because our musicians, contrary to Continental practice, use their best instruments for concert playing, so an actor finely gifted in his body will rise above one of equal mental attainments but poorer outward show. Eye, limb and voice will not of themselves suffice: nor is imagination, though alone it is worth more than them, unaided and unclothed, of power enough. To attain the topmost heights all these must be found together. What is it that people remember in Salvini? His immense and exquisite voice, fit to express every shade of passion, and his noble presence. What is most celebrated in Sarah Bernhardt? *La voix d'or*. For what is the name of Spranger Barry remembered? His 'silver tongue.' The best equipment of all for an actor will be that in which there are fewest idiosyncrasies, the type which in repose approaches most nearly the ideal statue and is always, even when most animated, in perfect proportion. A marked idiosyncrasy is bad, for it by so much cuts off the actor from the portrayal of a character to which it is inappropriate. Even a defect in physique by comparison with another may seriously injure a performance, and thus Garrick, who was not handsome, was surpassed on one occasion by Barry, an actor of otherwise inferior accomplishment, who was. 'Sir,' said a witness, 'Barry, Sir, was as much superior to Garrick in *Romeo*, as York Minster is to a Methodist chapel.' Yet Garrick's physique gifted him to portray a wider range of character than any actor before or after him: the lithe, well-shaped figure, fine head, and face that had no special characteristic beyond its intelligence, were equally suited to tragedy, pathos, high or low comedy, and farce. His face in ordinary life did not suggest an actor's; one would have taken him for a merchant, lawyer, or politician. And just by this reason he became supreme: there was nothing to hinder in him the expression of feeling consonant with the words of his

part. His countenance became the most sensitive man had ever looked on.

'Garrick,' says Diderot, who knew him, 'will put his head between two folding-doors, and in the course of five or six seconds his expression will change from wild delight to temperate pleasure, from this to tranquillity, from tranquillity to surprise, from that to sorrow, from sorrow to the air of one overwhelmed, from that to fright, from fright to horror, from horror to despair, and thence he will go up again to the point from which he started.'

Only the complete absence of native peculiarity could make this possible. Thus, too, in our own time Mounet-Sully has sustained with equal success the characters of *Œdipus*, *Hamlet* and *Othello*, of Victor Hugo's romantic heroes, of a gentleman in modern comedy, of Jupiter in Molière's '*Amphitryon*,' and of the old workman in Coppée's '*La Grève des Forgerons*.' Yet even Mounet-Sully, wonderfully endowed though he be with the body of an athlete, a voice that seemingly contains all notes of the organ, and the front of Jove himself, is limited in his playing by the very heroism and grandeur of his build, that could not be constrained to represent a tame or lowly personage.

Far different from the physical gifts of these two actors were those of Irving. At the height of his career he said to Miss Terry: 'I was thinking how strange it is that I should have made the reputation I have as an actor with nothing to help me—no equipment. My legs, my voice—everything has been against me. For an actor who can't walk, can't talk, and has no face to speak of, I've done pretty well.' It was only too true. His imagination, his great artistic intelligence, these had learnt to shine through the stubborn face, loosened the dogged jaw, given keenness to the eyes and expressiveness to the thin mouth; the brow had grown massive through their stress, the whole head ascetic and noble; but they could not mend his figure. Ungainly angles jutted from him, his leg dragged awkwardly behind him, he constantly stood with one knee bent and the other rigid, a posture anything but dignified. He knew that it was so, knew that he could not pronounce vowels and said 'Gud' for 'God,' for he once asked Miss Terry, and she could not escape admitting the truth. Again and again his biographer declares that he mastered these defects; but the truth is that they remained with him to the end and hampered his art as perhaps no other actor's art has been hampered. The comedian Delaunay, who had the most perfect voice in France, used to say that he had made it himself, for at the beginning he spoke like a crow. It is possible that Irving's was not strong enough to be susceptible of such an improvement by training, however

severe, for the parts he played were long and there almost always came a moment when the overtaxed voice gave way. At such times he seemed to cease to speak altogether and to produce a succession of hoarse grunts in which words were undistinguishable.

No one doubts that elocution is one of the chief parts of the art of acting. How, then, can we be justified in speaking of Irving as a great actor and in saying that he brought back greatness to our stage, when on his own showing he failed to master one essential of his business? A claim might perhaps be based on the extent of his success, which for the space of a generation kept him in the public eye, on the degree in which he raised his profession in general estimation, on the renewed and wider interest produced by his work in the plays of Shakespeare. But greatness does not verily lie in any of these things. It is a personal quality, to be found as much, and as rarely, in real life as on the stage, and depends in no way upon the amount of work done. We recognise it in a man or in his work simply by being made aware instinctively of its presence. It is an impression that is communicable but cannot be analysed, wrought by emotion of whatever sort, intense in degree and grand in scope. No one, for instance, doubts that Mirabeau, who accomplished little, was a great man, while none would so think of Sieyès, who did much; nor do we call Walpole great, who helped to transform England, though Cromwell, whose work was undone almost within his lifetime, takes us with him to the heights. Giorgione was great among painters, though we have little from his brush, and Keats among poets, though his works go into one small volume. Similarly, an actor impresses us by his greatness directly, no matter what his accomplishment or method may be; and these may be criticised, even condemned, apart, but cannot destroy, if it is in him, that power to radiate emotion that we call genius. Witness a recent description, by a writer of exceptional competence, of Fechter.

‘Indeed, the effect he produced was hardly dependent on the play. It rested rather upon something innately heroic in himself, something that left the spectator with a feeling of security from the first note struck by the actor, that the issue, however grave, and however perilous its intermediate passages, must leave him undefeated at the last.’

This prized power of victory was Irving’s: an atmosphere emanated from him that conquered his audience, heart and head; and they worshipped him for it. It was of a higher order than that of Fechter, who it is said could make tinsel seem gold, but when he touched gold made tinsel of it. He

could not stand the test of tragedy, but conquered only the realms of 'high-falutin' artifice. To Irving, on the other hand, tragedy was the goal. He leaped into fame, as we have seen, with 'The Bells,' and in the two succeeding years confirmed his success in Wills' miserably sentimental and unhistoric 'Charles I.' and in Lord Lytton's 'Richelieu'; but the seal was set on his talent by the performance of 'Hamlet.' The great emotions of tragedy did not destroy his spell, but, contrary again to his manager's expectation, enhanced its effect.

Hamlet was a good part for him in which to invade the highest kingdom of the stage, because it was the least unsuited to his physique. The fatiguing slowness of his movements was not here out of place, and there is no reason why Hamlet, though active, should be powerful and well-knit. His imagination was of the right temper to reproduce the depth of Hamlet's mind and the exasperation caused by his situation, while the *bizarrierie* of his voice and shape perhaps only increased the impression of distraction. His tenderness with Ophelia, his scorn for Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, were matchless; and he played with such restrained intensity that from beginning to end he seemed, as Hazlitt said of the character, to be 'thinking aloud.' Though there were complaints of his indistinct utterance, his mind was so bent on the thoughts to which he gave expression that the inner life of Hamlet, which is indeed all the play, was illumined before the spectators in the whiteness of its heat.

Nothing in the part of the scholar and prince was beyond Irving's powers, but there were unhappily few parts of first-rate importance of which this can be said. Whenever the necessity was forced on him of expressing physical violence, great bodily passion of whatever kind, the body betrayed him. The effort to get from the instrument more than it was capable of was tremendous, and by sheer force succeeded in persuading many of his admirers to forget how poor was the result compared with the true notes it could sound; but it was painful, shocking, inartistic often, but for its earnestness ludicrous. An able critic remarked of the Richelieu that though 'the actor's ardour evoked storms of applause' at the decisive moment, yet 'his vehemence has something more of deliriousness about it than the situation demands, involving a total loss of the cardinal's dignity.' Another tells us that at the end of the speech in which Richelieu launches the curse of Rome on his enemy,

'the pit rose and literally yelled for Mr. Irving. But what had been done? Voice, strength, and energy overtaxed; one of those whirlwinds of noise which created applause mainly owing to an irresistible, but still unhealthy, excitement.'

Declamation being foreign to him, and the grand gestures of force with which an actor can seem to sweep the stage (though, as we see, he did not shirk the task), Irving relied for large effects upon his masterly manipulation of the stage as a whole, to which the detail of his own acting made a vivid and telling contrast. The cumulative impression of rapid speech and action he could never attain; his finest moments were in launching a single phrase or a lurid motionless glance. How much his peculiar defects cost him a comparison with Van Dyck, the greatest actor on the operatic stage, will tell; for Van Dyck's defects, though many, are of the opposite nature. His round and moonlike face and short body encumbered with fat compose, one might think, the worst possible equipment for an actor. But he has a rapidity, which these cannot mar, and although in the Wagnerian roles no new 'business' is possible and each step is made according to Wagner's original direction, his pace and wealth of gesture and fire of declamation are such as to erase from the mind the efforts of other performers. Quickness of pace was impossible to Irving; and it is significant that once when he was taken ill during the run of 'King Lear' and another actor played his part at short notice, the chief difference remarked was that, with the usual intervals, the play was shorter than on the previous nights by some twenty minutes.

The strength and weakness of Irving's acting are perhaps best seen in taking a glance at the production in 1881 of 'Othello,' for which he generously invited the co-operation of the eminent American actor, Edwin Booth. The play was acted three nights a week, Booth appearing the first week as Othello to Irving's Iago and changing parts with him the next. In both cases the change was for the worse. As Iago Irving surpassed himself. His cool, charming exterior and the deadly intention it disclosed when the mask was cast aside won unanimous praise and made him, it is probable, the best representative of the part ever seen: 'daringly Italian, a true compatriot of 'the Borgias, or rather, better than Italian, that devil incarnate, 'an Englishman Italianate,' the cleverest of London critics described him. But his Othello was as bad as his Iago was good. The alertness, the fierce concentration, the tempestuous passion that he recognised in Booth, were beyond his powers of execution. As he played to Miss Terry's Desdemona, 'he 'screamed and raved and ranted—lost his voice, was slow 'where he should have been swift, incoherent where he should 'have been strong.' She thought his delivery of the speech to the Senate 'wonderful,' but for once she concurred in thinking the criticism of him justified and set his Othello down as a failure.

He knew it himself, and on the last night, stretching his arms with a great sigh of relief, said 'Never again!' Othello was a part for hardly anything in which his equipment fitted him; but even in parts that as a whole suited him well there were moments when incapacity seized him and made a mock of his intentions. Shylock undoubtedly was one of his finest impersonations (as well as one of the most popular, for he played it a thousand times), a monument of dignity, pathos, and racial antipathy; yet the great outburst in the scene with Salanio and Tubal (the first of Act III.) lost its point from Irving's deliberation. Not that he felt or desired to be deliberate, but, as he confessed to Miss Terry, he was hampered in the vehemence of passion: 'he had,' she justly says, 'to take refuge in speechless rage, when he would have liked to pour out his words in 'a torrent.' Broadly speaking, wherever the man of action emerged in a part this happened. His Macbeth, though he rightly understood the character, and with the perversity of artists thought it, perhaps for this reason, his finest impersonation, was weak, and at the end collapsed lamentably; for how could the contrast between Macbeth's prowess of body and impotence of will be shown when the actor lacked muscle and frame to counterfeit the person of a leader in war? He never could help showing that he was no swordsman. When he wore a sword, it would be put to any but its proper use: he treated it as a walking stick, or held it like a pickaxe over his shoulder. He held his sword like this even to be painted as Macbeth, and when he stood for his portrait in Lear, took it by the scabbard with the pommel pointing downwards, so that the blade if real would have risked falling out on the ground. Small wonder that his battle scenes were feeble, or that his Richard III., a portrait of malign humour and sinister brilliance contrived and carried out at the very top of his art, fell headlong at the end. To the intellectual relish of Irving's work in this part the impersonation by Ferdinand Bonn, one of the best known Richards in Germany since the decline of Lewinsky, offers a keen contrast—Bonn depicting only the cunning of a brute until his death in the last act brings into relief the gallantry of the warrior at bay as suddenly as Irving's Richard, up to then inspired and dominant, a prince of the gayest hypocrisy and measureless daring, became raving, and therefore tame. With King Lear the story was reversed. Here it was the earlier scenes that failed. Irving knew, says his biographer, that 'he could not shout and storm and 'stamp as Ernesto Rossi'; but, alas, he did. And indeed it is hard to see how this could be helped, for a character of such awful violence, set in so titanic a scheme, is surely to be played

violently or not at all. When Antoine played the part, so astonishing was the vehemence of temper under the shock of which the King's mind visibly broke to pieces, like a hulk upon the rocks, that one was almost forced to forget the literal harshness of a translation which left out all the poetry. Irving's violence served but to show the weakness of his resources, seemed wholly without meaning and like the gustiness of a mind already wrecked and reasonless; it was only from the point where Lear's shaken wits totter over the bounds of madness that he regained control and his imagination seized on what was within its scope. Then he was beautiful and drew from every heart the purest pity. Nothing more touching, it is safe to assert, has been seen on the stage than Irving's acting in the last two acts of 'King Lear,' nor were tears ever drawn from an audience by an art more exquisite and sincere.

In tragedy, then, Irving had great moments, and if he seldom achieved the complete impersonation of a tragic character, it was due not, as was sometimes said, to a want of sustained power, but to the nature of his gifts which though inappropriate to tragedy as a whole were yet wonderfully suited to portions of tragic and to the whole of melodramatic characters. In comedy he was no less unequal. Unable to attune his forcible personality to a sustained lightness, he turned Malvolio into a character of almost tragic depth. Slowness damaged his Benedick, which otherwise was a fine impersonation; and it was chiefly in heavier parts that the comic side of his acting shone by vivid touches of relief. Romance and melodrama—these were the kingdoms in which he supremely revelled; Mathias, Louis XI., Dubosc in 'The Lyons Mail,' Mephistopheles in Wills' travesty of 'Faust,' Landry in 'The Dead Heart,' Robespierre—such parts came to him by nature and never failed to thrill and delight his huge audiences. An actor of his physical disadvantages, it is worth noting, suffers much from playing in a large theatre. On a small stage, even though incapable of producing effects at once fine and large, he can yet do much by delicacy of detail and subtlety of expression. But on a large stage, these, essential as they are, can effect less by themselves. Betterton, for instance, the king of the Restoration theatre, who played on a small stage, scarcely better lit than the auditorium, produced a profound impression in 'Hamlet' when on seeing the ghost his face went as white as his neck-cloth; whereas though Irving—we have it on Miss Terry's authority—turned white in 'Mathias' and acted death with such intensity that 'his eyes would disappear upwards, his face 'grow grey, his limbs cold,' across the strong modern footlights

and to his more distant audience this similar stroke of imagination lost its power. Another very remarkable power at his command he never, strangely enough, trusted to its full. In our time no actor has been able to produce a sense of mystery and ghostliness in any way comparable with that evoked by Irving. He made one aware of the presence of a ghost, as if one saw it oneself. But the physical, actual stage ghost, with which he would not dispense, took the edge off the deadly fear he thus inspired. From this point of view the banquet scene in 'Macbeth' was ruined by an opaque blue ghost, who rose through the seat of a chair; in 'The Corsican Brothers' his touch was so weird that behind the figure of the stage ghost you might think a true and more dread phantom would arise; and in the prison scene of 'Robespierre' it was the filling of the stage with solid ghosts, solemn and silent though they were, that made Irving fall short of that terrific height reached by Talma in Hamlet's scene with the Queen just because no ghost appeared, and 'he,' so writes Haydon the painter, 'talking as if he saw what we did not, frightened us all.' It was not only terror that the expression of Irving's face could produce. 'Where did you get that Plantagenet look?' Tennyson said to him after seeing 'Richard III.' That look of innate, unalterable pride was much to him. It gave him a splendid dignity to fill the part of a great prelate, Wolsey or Tennyson's own Becket. It saved his inarticulate 'Coriolanus' from impotence. Taking it all in all, it was perhaps his finest possession. No one, said a critic with as much truth as wit, was ever as great as Irving looked.

A well-known historian of the London stage gives us his opinion that it was 'less to his ability as an actor than to other qualities that Mr. Irving owes his almost unprecedented success,' naming his social gifts and his power of projecting an idea on to the stage so as to give the sense of unity and perfect harmony even to a play in which he was himself bad; and takes as an instance the production of 'Romeo and Juliet,' where almost all the acting was poor but the general effect beautiful. This passage was written in 1889, six years before Irving received the honour of knighthood, which he was unofficially offered in 1883. The step was important, for it gave the sanction of courtly recognition to the betterment in the position of actors in which Irving's talent for interesting friendships was largely instrumental. While, however, his success socially was probably more the effect than a cause of his success with the public, this was no doubt largely due to his scenic imagination and general capacity as a manager. Bateman had died in 1874, but it was not until four years later that his widow retired



from the management of the Lyceum and the theatre came completely under Irving's sway. From 1878 to 1898 Irving was his own manager and one almost entirely successful. He produced during that time over forty plays. Eleven were Shakespeare's: 'Hamlet,' 'The Merchant of Venice,' 'Othello,' 'Romeo and Juliet,' 'Much Ado About Nothing,' 'Twelfth Night,' 'Macbeth,' 'Henry VIII.,' 'King Lear,' 'Richard III.' and 'Cymbeline.' Fourteen were old plays in which he had appeared either under the Bateman management or earlier: 'Eugene Aram,' 'Richelieu,' 'Louis XI.,' 'The Lyons Mail,' 'Charles I.,' 'The Bells,' 'The Lady of Lyons,' 'The Iron Chest,' 'The Corsican Brothers,' 'The Belle's Stratagem,' 'The Two Roses,' 'Olivia,' 'The Dead Heart,' and 'Robert Macaire.' Thirteen were new plays: 'Faust,' 'Werner,' 'Ravenswood,' 'Iolanthe,' 'The Cup,' 'The Amber Heart,' 'Becket,' 'King Arthur,' 'Peter the Great,' 'The Medicine Man,' 'Waterloo,' 'Nance Oldfield,' and 'Don Quixote.' Two, 'Madame Sans-Gêne' and 'Robespierre,' were translations. In addition to which, he produced 'Coriolanus' and 'Dante' after the Lyceum Theatre had passed out of his hands. This average of two productions a year constitutes an achievement that is the more remarkable for the fact, which Mr. Stoker, his business manager, relates, that he began management with no more capital than a private loan of fifteen hundred and an overdraft at his banker's of twelve thousand pounds. He also made eight tours in America and frequent visits to the large provincial towns of England. The expenses of running a great theatre were naturally very heavy, but Irving's takings were enormous. In London, from all sources, he took 1,221,281*l.* 10*s.* 11*d.*; in America 711,016*l.* 18*s.* 4*d.*; in the Provinces 329,339*l.* 10*s.* 10*d.*: in all a total of 2,261,637*l.* 10*s.* 1*d.* Against this, his working expenses over the whole period amounted to 1,877,028*l.* 0*s.* 6*d.*; the production account stood at 221,178*l.* 15*s.* 5*d.*; and close on 60,000*l.* were spent on the theatre itself. The total of the expenditure was 2,168,290*l.* 6*s.* 1*d.*; so that from the beginning of his management down to the end of the last season in London in 1905, which took place at the Drury Lane theatre, Irving made a net profit of 93,347*l.* 4*s.* 0*d.* These figures emphatically contradict the suggestion often made that the public did not respond sufficiently to Irving's efforts or that his management ruined him. The Lyceum was organised in a costly way, brilliant banquets on the stage frequently set off the success of its productions and enhanced its fame, its manager lived as a free-handed and much-loved sovereign; but he made it pay. Nearly one hundred thousand pounds, though not great among

fortunes, is yet a respectable sum to have made in an artistic profession in less than thirty years. It is hard to sympathise with a biographer who laments that the profit on a single year's touring came only to a little less than nine thousand pounds.

Incontestably, the happiest stroke in Irving's management was his engagement at its outset of Miss Ellen Terry as his leading lady. She was everything that he was not, all gaiety and silver-mouthed sweetness, an embodied deliciousness that infected, teased, and entranced her audience, the perfect Portia, Cordelia, Beatrice, and Mrs. Page; and the opposition in talent and temperament resulted in a combination that gave solidity to Irving's popularity and not a little increased his prestige. At their best the Lyceum companies would have been hard to beat at any theatre, as when William Terriss, Mr. Frank Cooper, and Mr. Haviland appeared together in 'King Lear'; Mr. Forbes-Robertson, Mr. Cooper, and Miss Geneviève Ward in 'King Arthur'; Mr. Forbes-Robertson, Terriss, and Miss Vanbrugh in 'Henry VIII.' It will be long before the exquisite performances of Mr. Forbes-Robertson as Buckingham in 'Henry VIII.' and of Mr. Haviland as the Fool in 'King Lear' are forgotten. The company shifted but there always remained in it a substratum composed of tried and steady actors who gave, with their chiefs, a greater sense of continuity to the enterprise than is now often found in London theatres. Nor did Irving neglect the 'supers' as a source of strength. He paid them *Gd.* a night above the standard wage, and so got the best men, and the best work from them.

With this support assured him, and with the high pitch to which the stage management rose by dint of his energy, Irving had little to fear for the representations as a whole. Nevertheless, he neglected no aid to success that money and organisation could command. Sometimes he was lavish in the extreme, as in the production of 'Henry VIII.,' which cost over 11,000*l.*, but he could recoup London losses in America and the provinces, and often enough his magnificence was justified from the start. Thus 'Faust,' which was very expensively staged, ran for three hundred and seventy-five nights with only the interval of the holidays, and brought in for this period a profit of over 40,000*l.* And what Irving set out to do in this department he did, by getting the right people to work for him, admirably. His staging was the wonder of the public and became the type of excellence for Continental playgoers. While other theatres proud of their equipment give you two or three scenes of splendour, the Lyceum gave six or seven, each carefully thought out and attuned to produce a desired effect. It is difficult, however,

to stifle a suspicion that had Irving adopted a policy less grandiose he might have done more for the development of the drama in England. Good plays suited to it were limited in number, and after the dozen of Shakespeare, the rest of the list wears a somewhat sorry aspect. 'Becket,' 'The Cup,' and 'Queen Mary' (produced near the end of the Bateman management) stand out in a little group of fine endeavour, as the one link that Irving helped to forge between literature and the stage. 'King Arthur' was a worthy treatment of its theme, though even in that Irving betrayed his taste by wanting Mr. Comyns Carr, its author, to dish up an old work by Wills, a successful stage hack in whom he had confidence. 'Waterloo,' by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, afforded a good opportunity for virtuoso acting; 'Peter the Great,' by Mr. Laurence Irving, and 'The Medicine Man,' by H. D. Traill and Robert Hichens—only to be mentioned by Mr. Brereton in a sneer at 'literary men'—were proper experiments. But Irving's method did not allow him to try experiments that might be failures; they were on too gigantic a scale, and this couple, unluckily conjoined with illness and accident, nearly ruined him. So he was driven more and more to rely on the old flimsy, the old shoddy, the old sensations, that had no life but what his personal genius infused into them. His was a life so busy and so self-centred (Miss Terry records how he took no interest in the art of other actors and actresses) that he probably had no suspicion of the flavour of musty antiquity exhaled by many of his plays towards the end of his career. For all it touched him, the spirit of life and reality that infected the stage in the last half century might never have come to birth.

Evidently, had he been eager to move, his path would have been difficult. But we would be grateful for one movement, if no more. He got Sir John Gilbert, Sir Lawrence Alma-Tadema, Tenniel, Burne-Jones, Mr. Abbey to work for the theatre. He raised the art of the scene-painter, the costumier, the stage-manager. We must look far before we find similar chances given to the author. Tennyson was the one exception. There were indeed negotiations with Mr. Pinero and Mr. Hall Caine. Yet during this period Browning, Swinburne, and Thomas Hardy, who in the last three years has shown a gift for great drama, were at the height of their fame, and might have been induced—it would have been difficult, but still possible, as it was with Tennyson—to write for the theatre; Mr. Henry James was there, brimming with dramatic lore; Mr. John Davidson was there; Mr. Bernard Shaw was rising into prominence. Irving had long before sounded Tennyson as to a play on Dante;

‘A fine subject!’ Tennyson had answered. ‘But where is the Dante to write it?’ The Dante to whom he had recourse was—Sardou, the Sardou, moreover, of his decline. In truth the trend of modernity escaped Irving’s notice. He at one time had in his possession Mr. Shaw’s one-act play ‘A Man of Destiny,’ and rejected it without apparently realising how admirable a chance it gave him. He rejected the ‘Macaire’ of Stevenson and Henley. The only fact to show that he had ever heard of the man who perfected dramatic form and transformed the modern stage is a sneer in a speech in 1897 at ‘the eccentric Mr. Ibsen.’

Irving died, as he lived, in the theatre, full of honours, social, professional, academic, and with the tumultuous applause of his last London audience almost ringing in his ears. It is too soon yet to estimate his influence upon the English stage, an influence bound to be considerable, but certain results of it are already evident. Among these the greater vogue of Shakespeare, the greater attention paid to correct equipment, the greater beauty of scenery, are noteworthy, and are seen on their worse side by the ever greater demand for sumptuous spectacles, the crippling expense of them, the swamping and distortion of the text by processions, tableaux, and tricks. Similarly his influence on acting, seen in many of our leading actors to-day, was both for good and for evil; on the one hand he taught it to be rich, reflective, clever, picturesque; on the other to be directed too much to the individual part and the individual scene, too little to the play as a whole, and to be deplorably halting and slow. He taught the public to forget that poetry is music, and to supply his deficiency in musical utterance accustomed them to the performance of instrumental music during the play that has become an ingrained habit with London managers. He gave currency to their vicious notion that parts and not plays are the sum of drama. Yet if the taste of the fruit is bad in our mouths, it must be remembered that Irving only planted the tree which others have fostered; and during his life his personal greatness could make us overlook much that in a lesser man is not to be forgiven. The age of great actors would seem to be passing; efficiency and cleverness displace grandeur of passion; in Germany the methods of Kainz have succeeded to those of Possart and Sonmenthal; Antoine, Guitry, and De Féraudy lead the stage where Mounet-Sully reigned; and it may be that Irving was the last among our great actors. When all is said, he was not the least of them. We may prize the memory of his genius without attempting to minimise his defects.

## ART. III.—THE VICTORIAN CHANCELLORS.

*The Victorian Chancellors.* By J. B. ATLAY, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. In two volumes. With Portraits. London : Smith, Elder and Co., 1908.

THE lives of the eminent men who filled the high office of Lord Chancellor of England during the reign of Queen Victoria are remarkably illustrative of the trend of the English legal system, and of its personal characteristics, during a period which is rapidly becoming from the historical point of view a well-defined epoch. The Victorian age has so many distinctly marked attributes extending over many years that it is now obviously a definite period, and it happens to coincide with the rule of a single sovereign. The lawyers who occupied the Woolsack during the reign of the late Queen differed remarkably in personal character, in mental qualities, and in legal attributes ; but these very differences tend to create a complete picture alike of the lawyers of the age and of the system under which they flourished. This is, in our opinion, the best reason for Mr. Atlay's work ; because it is impossible to regard new lives of Lord Lyndhurst, Lord Campbell, Lord Westbury, Lord Selborne, and Lord Hatherley as necessary, whilst the sketches of the other Chancellors are so short as to be mere outlines. It is, however, the aggregate of the lives in which we note the forces which influenced the course of English law and the facts which affected a number of careers which forms the real value of the work. We omit Lord Brougham altogether ; his was indeed a remarkable career, but he was not a Chancellor of Queen Victoria, and though the inclusion of his life in this work may make these volumes more interesting to the individual who is known as the 'general reader,' it does not add to the historical value of Mr. Atlay's readable and agreeable book. Mr. Atlay tells his story unaffectedly, impartially, and with adequate knowledge, and he leaves the reader to form his own conclusions on the legal and political achievements of the men whose lives are sketched in his book, and, considering his subject, his touch is pleasantly light.

The period over which these biographies extend is, so far as concerns the office of Lord Chancellor, to some extent one of transition. In England changes proceed so gradually that one is apt to overlook the effect of a slow transition ; but it is clear that the office of Lord Chancellor is at the commencement of the reign of Edward VII. less judicial and more administrative in its nature than it was at the beginning of the reign of Victoria.

The holder must now be more of a politician and less of a judge. Lord Cottenham during the last tenure of his Chancellorship 'devoted his time almost entirely to judicial work, seldom 'appearing in the Cabinet.' To-day a Chancellor who found his strength insufficient for judicial and political work would regard himself as bound to devote such vigour as he possessed to the service of the House of Lords in debate, and to the assistance of his colleagues in Council. The difference in the strain of political and administrative work in the last and present centuries is made more clear when we bear in mind that the Chancellor was not only a member of the House of Lords, and as such a member of the highest Court of Appeal, but that he was also an equity judge of first instance and a judge of appeal from the Vice-Chancellors. He had therefore at the beginning of the period to fulfil three judicial functions. That of a judge of first instance was considerably lightened when in 1842 two additional Vice-Chancellors, as the Chancery judges were called, were appointed during the last Chancellorship of Lyndhurst. But though the Lord Chancellor was relieved in regard to one part of his work to some extent—for the disappearance of the Chancellor as a judge of first instance was gradual—this increase in the number of primary Chancery judges at the same time increased his duties as a judge of appeal, and rendered sooner or later a new appellate tribunal inevitable. This body came into being under the Chancellorship of Lord Truro in 1851. Two new judges were created, who were styled Lords Justices of Appeal, and though the Chancellor from time to time sat in this Court, it gradually came to see little of his presence. Rolfe, afterwards Lord Cranworth, and Knight Bruce were the two first Lords Justices, and the former two years later became Chancellor on the formation of Lord Aberdeen's Government in 1852. Probably from his interest in the new court, Cranworth, though he was not an experienced equity lawyer, continued to attend its sittings, and thus gave an opportunity for one of Bethell's mordant remarks: 'I wonder,' someone said to him, 'why old Cranny always sits with the 'Lords Justices.' 'I take it to arise from a childish indisposition 'to be left in the dark,' was the characteristic reply. Bethell's criticisms on his contemporaries are tempting incidents to dwell on in Victorian legal history; but our object at this point is to show, however briefly, the manner in which the office of Lord Chancellor has changed during the years of the late reign.

We have so far seen it begin to cease to be that of a judge of first instance; then that of an intermediate judge of appeal. And when in 1876 two judges, known as Lords of

Appeal in Ordinary, were added to the House of Lords so as to strengthen it as the final appellate tribunal, the importance of the office of Lord Chancellor as a final judge of appeal was somewhat lessened. In that place a high legal capacity, whether in a Chancellor or in a Law Lord, necessarily gives a judicial supremacy. When Lord Westbury as Chancellor had for his colleagues Lords Chelmsford, Cranworth, and St. Leonards, his was obviously the master-mind. But the constant presence of judges who have always devoted their minds mainly to the study and exposition of the law, and who have leisure to consider cases out of court, must necessarily tend to diminish the weight of the judicial utterances of a hard-worked statesman who is also the president of the tribunal. More than half a century ago Lord Langdale proposed that the judicial and administrative functions of the Chancellor should be separated, and that the political functions 'should be discharged by a 'Keeper of the Great Seal, who was to hold no judicial office, 'but was to act as a Minister of Law and Justice.' The change, which Lord Langdale would have effected by legislation, has to a large extent come to pass by force of circumstances. Human capacity has definite limits, and so at the present time the Lord Chancellor, with his multifarious duties, occupies to some extent the position of the Keeper of the Great Seal under Lord Langdale's scheme. The Master of the Rolls, as he then was, saw some way into the future; but his scheme is now of little historical importance, though it indicates that some clear-sighted minds perceived the inevitable tendency of events—the changes which have since occurred in the nature of the office of Lord Chancellor. Be this as it may, they have come to pass contemporaneously with the increase in the official and political work of the Attorney- and of the Solicitor-General, so that at the present time all these three offices have become more administrative and less legal. To some extent this has had an undesirable and unforeseen effect, for in consequence the judicial bench, which owing to various causes is increased in size and is a somewhat unwieldy body, has become more independent of a central control at the very time when, owing to the fact that it forms part of one Supreme Court, it is desirable that it should be governed by a Chancellor who is at once in close touch with public requirements and with the legal profession.

Though the head of the legal system and responsible for its efficient working, the Chancellor has always held a curious and an anomalous position, which has emerged and taken shape almost imperceptibly. Though responsible, he has never had a free hand, and the mingled fortunes of legal and political life,

and the urgencies of political necessities have affected the personal equation in unexpected ways. Men possessed of opposite qualities, of divergent aims and ideals, have succeeded one another as the political system has brought one party up and another down; so that it is not surprising that though the Lord Chancellor has ever been the most prominent legal personage in the public eye, his influence on the body and system of English law has not equalled his public authority, and that that influence has been exercised spasmodically and irregularly.

If we take the period 1858-1868, from the commencement of Lord Derby's second Administration to the end of his third term of power, the interval being filled by the Premier-ships of Palmerston and Russell, we see the Woolsack occupied by Chelmsford, Campbell, Westbury, Cranworth, and for a second period by Chelmsford. Chelmsford was an able Common Law advocate, whose tact, common-sense, and agreeable manners allowed him to fill any place which was offered to him without discredit, but also without distinction. Campbell was a thorough all-round lawyer, whose robust brain and strong body enabled him to overcome difficulties and to be a thoroughly efficient advocate and judge. He was essentially the business lawyer—hard-headed, keen-sighted, and laborious, with the qualities which would have made an efficient railway manager or a capable archbishop. Westbury differed *toto cælo* from his two predecessors. A scholar and a jurist, his keen, clear intellect saw through mazes of fact; points of law sank to their proper dimensions before his grasp of legal principles; and he had the ardour of the clear mind for system, and therefore for legal codes. This desire for system is the basis of the desire for codification, and causes also the dislike of prolixity and obscurity, which is the vice of judge-made law. If he had lived in a bureaucratic country and had been Minister for Justice, Westbury would have left behind him monuments in the form of codes. It would not be easy to find a sharper contrast to him than Cranworth, one of those men whose careers form models for English youth, who succeeded him on his fall, and who had already occupied the Woolsack in the Governments of Aberdeen and Palmerston. The story runs that when he took the place of Westbury, some one said of, we may suppose, rather than to him: 'Well, Kingsley is right; it is better to be good than to 'be clever.' Cranworth was essentially a safe man; he was well versed in judicial decisions, so that he was guided by an abundant number of legal signposts; his temperate character prevented him from mistakes of conduct, and his kindly nature made him a universal friend. It was impossible not to congratu-



late him on his several successes ; yet he became a puisne judge because he had so little private practice that if he had ceased to be Solicitor-General he would have lived a life of enforced leisure, and he became Chancellor because he had been Solicitor-General, and because for the moment no lawyer of high calibre was available. Yet he was a dignified and a sensible Chancellor, who would never have made the fatal mistakes of administration which caused the downfall of his infinitely abler predecessor ; and he even carried some useful legal reforms in the true English fashion. Indeed, the comparatively small personal influence of the Chancellor is strikingly illustrated by the careers of Cranworth and Westbury ; for the latter had not only, as we have pointed out, the type of mind which appreciates the importance of legal reforms, but also a lifelong and unquenchable wish to effect changes which he regarded as necessary. A scientific education for lawyers is the corner-stone of a clear legal system. In 1846, when overwhelmed by an enormous practice, Bethell, as he then was, brought forward the subject in a letter to the Master of the Rolls. And he also

‘ unfolded the details of his scheme in a letter addressed to the Treasurer of the Inner Temple. He advocated founding four chairs for readers or lecturers on the subjects of real property law and conveyancing, constitutional and criminal law, personal property and commercial law, and equity as administered by the Court of Chancery, the compulsory attendance of all students at the lectures on real property law, as being of universal utility and necessity in all branches of the profession, and a compulsory examination with competition for honours and exhibitions. It was part of his plan that these readers should devote themselves not only to their separate duties, but to the general and public purpose of amending, improving, and digesting the law.’ \*

Bethell’s own Inn, the Middle Temple, appointed a lecturer in jurisprudence and civil law ; but it was long before the present more systematic but still imperfect measure of legal education was established. Again, in 1854, Bethell—he was then Solicitor-General—in a debate on the work of the Inns of Court,

‘ expressed his desire to see the Inns of Court erected into one great legal university, not only for the instruction of law students, but for the purpose of co-operating with the other universities in the education of the public at large. He contrasted the unfavourable position we then occupied with that of France, where the study of the law was systematically pursued, and lamented the want of instruction in original principles which was characteristic of English juriconsults.’

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\* Nash, ‘ Life of Westbury,’ vol. i. p. 93.

This orderly and clear legal education was, in Bethell's opinion, necessary not only from the point of view of the practising lawyer, but also 'because by the institutions of the country the people are invited to take a part in the administration of the law; and it is our bounden duty therefore to provide them with the means by which they may become qualified to do so, by obtaining a general knowledge of the principles of the law.' This idea of a great legal university in the Metropolis of England, based on the ancient Inns of Court, to which students not only from the Mother Country but from the dominions beyond the seas should resort, and where the legal training should be of the highest kind, is a noble project and of the first importance. It contains in itself the same elements which underlie the scheme of general education established by the late Mr. Rhodes, but it is more practical in its character, and would be likely to exercise a permanent influence on the relations of the British Empire, by tending to assimilate the law of the Empire, and to connect lawyers in all English countries by personal ties and common knowledge. Writing in 1867 to the late Mr. Henry Reeve, Lord Westbury, referring to this plan, stated that his proposal had in 1847 received no support; and then he added regretfully but optimistically 'It must be the work of the next generation.' More than one generation of lawyers has passed away since these words were written, and a plan which is in the highest sense imperial seems to be as distant now as when Lord Westbury was alive.

This has been something of a digression, but Lord Westbury's unvarying views on the necessity of a first-rate education in legal principles is illustrative of his trend of mind, and at the same time of the personal impotence of a Chancellor to carry out his views. This was still more clearly exemplified in the case of law reform. The Bankruptcy Bill, which, as Attorney-General, he had piloted through the Commons, he was, as Chancellor, unable to carry in the Lords without compromises, which, he said, reduced its utility in the same degree as if a watch had been deprived of its mainspring. This was a description given in a moment of irritation, but unquestionably the Bill was too much modified. Westbury also succeeded in passing a Registration of Title Act, which being, against his wish, non-compulsory, was almost a dead letter. In fact, far from being the successful author of a code even of any part of the case law of the country, or from establishing a Department of Justice, Westbury had to be satisfied with passing a modest Statute Law Revision Act, which covered the period from Magna Charta to the Revolution. Even this particular piece of legislation was no

more than a sequel to that initiated by Lord Campbell, who passed a similar Act dealing with the period 1770-1858.

The introduction of this Bill gave Lord Westbury an opportunity of stating his opinions on and desires for the codification of the case and statute law of England in a speech which has been regarded as the most successful he ever made in Parliament. 'He sketched the outlines of a scheme of revision of the case law,' and 'he proposed to get rid of enactments which were 'no longer in force, and to classify the remainder under proper heads.' But while this address remains a monument of Lord Westbury's large and scientific legal views—views, be it remembered, not of a professor, but of the man who was one of the most powerful advocates who ever made a fortune at the English Bar—it also continues to be a melancholy reminder of the powerlessness of a single lawyer, even if he be a Chancellor, to carry reforms which are theoretically desirable, but which are not supported by the necessary weight of a public opinion which has seldom existed on this subject. A most important measure of law reform was passed in 1852. The Common Law Procedure Act of that year was the beginning of a new era in Common Law procedure; it modernised the whole system and brought the practice into line with current ideas; and the Acts which abolished the Masters in Chancery and altered the procedure in the Chancery courts were primarily intended to prevent the delays for which they were notorious. But these and other contemporaneous improvements were the result of popular pressure. The country, said Lord Lyndhurst, when Lord Derby's Government came into office in the spring of 1852, was looking for law reform 'with eager and intense interest.' And Lord St. Leonards asserted that 'the cause of law reform was 'supported by the general opinion out-of-doors.' When the country has made up its mind that some law reform is required, a measure must be passed. But as to the details of it, the people are naturally careless. A Court of Criminal Appeal would never have been established by Lord Loreburn had there not been, in Lord St. Leonards' homely words, sufficient public opinion 'out-of-doors' to enable the Chancellor to pass the necessary legislation. For legal symmetry, or other legal ideals, the country cares not a jot. It is doubtful whether the Court of Criminal Appeal will have any real injustice to remedy. But public opinion demanded it as a safeguard for individual liberty, and it was created. A still more remarkable example is to be found in the modern County Courts, which date from the year 1846, and which are unquestionably the most beneficial fruits of the legal reforms which took place during the late reign. For

years before this date there had been a popular demand for courts in which the small litigation of the country could be conducted. This demand formed the reason for Brougham's Local Judicature Bill of 1833, which was mercilessly destroyed by Lyndhurst, by whom, by a strange irony, the County Court Act of 1846 was passed. If any Chancellor was the author of this reformation, to Brougham may be allotted the credit, though the Act was the Act of Lyndhurst, and Cranworth set it working. It is thus to public demands rather than to legal ideals that a Chancellor has to look who would make changes in the English legal system, and the novels of a Dickens may therefore be productive of more result than the addresses of a Westbury.

It thus came to pass that in the decade which, for the moment, we are considering, the Chancellor who unquestionably had the temperament and the intellect of a law reformer has left no larger results than were achieved by men who passed useful and modest measures of reform, which it was obvious were peremptorily demanded by public opinion. It is the penalty of democratic Government that measures, however desirable, such as those which Lord Westbury conceived, cannot be passed through a popular assembly or a Conservative upper chamber merely on their own intrinsic merits. They are jostled and put aside for matters which evoke more public interest, or which rouse less acutely professional alarm. To pass the Code Napoléon would have been impossible in France in the nineteenth century.

It is obvious that, from the point of view of the influence of the Chancellors as legislators on English law, Lord Selborne was more important than Lord Westbury, for Lord Selborne passed the Judicature Act of 1873, which for good or evil was the most noticeable work of any Chancellor during the reign of Queen Victoria. To have put an end to the lamentable conflict between the systems of law and equity, to have ended for ever the almost personal antagonism between the two sets of courts, to have improved the procedure of the Chancery Courts in trials of matters of fact, and to have lessened the technicality of Common Law procedure would in itself have been a memorable work. But the amalgamation into one Supreme Court of all the several independent jurisdictions, primary and appellate, excepting that of the House of Lords and of the Privy Council, was, when we remember that the existing courts were the results of the legal evolution of many centuries, an extraordinary achievement. Yet in the result it has been proved that symmetry, however desirable, may not have the practical usefulness of systems which, anomalous as

they may seem, have been gradually evolved and are suitable to the country. The absorption of the then Common Law Courts has often been discussed; it is sufficient here to quote and endorse Mr. Atlay's words :

'The amalgamation of the Exchequer and the Common Pleas with the Court of Queen's Bench was a sacrifice to the goddess of symmetry, the wisdom of which may reasonably be questioned. The three old courts with their three chiefs, each at the head of his band of puisnes, had much to commend them besides their antiquity. Their rivalry, their *esprit de corps*, and the sense of responsibility which is now distributed among the sixteen judges of the King's Bench Division, did much to maintain the high level of the Common Law Bench, which was never higher than in the "sixties" and "seventies."'

A single Supreme Court presupposes a single responsible head. The expression, 'the enthroning of the Chancellor on 'the necks of all of us,' which the late Lord Coleridge used in writing to Lord Lindley, while it contains some germs of truth, was and is incorrect, because the office of Lord Chief Justice creates to some extent, as regards the Common Law Divisions, a dual responsibility. Yet that of the Lord Chief Justice of England, who appears to the public eye to be supreme in his own division, is very anomalous, for he shares the work of the puisne judges, and he has not that personal authority which was possessed by the chiefs of the old Common Law Courts. The decadence into which the Commercial Court has fallen since it ceased to be presided over and managed by the late Lord Justice Mathew indicates the difficulties produced by divided and undecided responsibility. That court, which under the guidance of a great judge skilled in mercantile law formed an admirable tribunal for the efficient and quick dispatch of purely commercial business, has now, largely in consequence of not having one judge permanently attached to it and responsible for it, fallen almost to the position of an ordinary court. From this state of decadence this tribunal is not likely to emerge until it forms once for all a single division of the High Court, with the character of its work clearly defined by a rule of court. For its present condition, the anomalous position of the Chancellor, of the Lord Chief Justice, and of the puisne judges is chiefly answerable.

And if Lord Selborne has left his mark on the judicial procedure of the country, he and Lord Cairns will long be remembered for their influence on the body of domestic law. The Vendor and Purchaser Act of 1874 may be placed entirely to the

credit of Lord Cairns, the Conveyancing Acts of 1881 and 1882, the Married Woman's Property Act of 1882, and the Settled Land Act of 1882 must be regarded as the joint work of these two eminent lawyers, for if these latter statutes were conceived by Lord Cairns, they were carried into law by his successor. It is, therefore, not altogether unreasonable to regard Lord Selborne as the Chancellor who, during the last reign, has had the most personal influence as a legislator upon English law. To apporportion actual merit and the several services of the Chancellors when, to some extent at any rate, more than one personality has conduced to a reform, may tend to mislead, and to give false views of legal history. Yet, in any estimation of the Victorian Chancellors, it is of the highest interest to endeavour to ascertain the effect of the several personalities on English law, in the first place as legislators, in the second as judges, otherwise the story of their lives differs little from that of other eminent public servants, and the value of their careers is unassessed.

It has already been said that judicially the influence of the Lord Chancellor has under the force of circumstances steadily decreased. This is very marked in the extent of judicial decisions. Lord Truro was Chancellor only for a year and seven months (1850-52), yet one hundred and thirty of his decisions are preserved, and fill two substantial volumes in the Chancery Reports. In two years of Lord Halsbury's tenure of the Woolsack he gave judgement—during the years 1903 and 1904—in fifty-four appeals in the House of Lords, but in conjunction with other members of that tribunal. So that the judicial and individual influence of these judgements is not so great as if they had been delivered by a single judge. The influence of a judge on the body of English law is to some extent a question of time as well as of individual power. Lord Stowell and Lord Mansfield are memorable as judges, not only in consequence of the breadth and clearness of their judgements, but also because each was fortunate in the period during which he was a judge. Lord Stowell was partly able to mould the law of Prize and of the Admiralty Court because before his time judicial decisions had not been formally reported, and because he occupied the office of judge of the High Court of Admiralty at a time of a great maritime war and of a notable increase in maritime commerce. Lord Mansfield had also the opportunity of laying to a considerable extent the foundations of modern commercial law. Other names will not be forgotten—those of Willes, Blackburn, and Esher, in whose time much of the later body of commercial law was established, and on it these three judges have left their mark. But the tenure of office of the Chancellors is not suffi-

ciently long to allow a moulding effect to be produced, and their individual influence on English law cannot therefore be considerable, even when the mental character and training of a Chancellor had been such as to give his judgements the breadth and the vivid expression of elemental principles as applied to concrete facts, which alone enables them to have the distinction and guiding power to become landmarks in jurisprudence. Thus, numerous as were Lord Truro's decisions as a judge of appeal both from the decisions of the Vice-Chancellors and of the Masters of the Rolls, they are largely concerned with purely technical matters which are of little value beyond the immediate case in which they are raised. Lord Truro was a sound lawyer, though somewhat narrow in his outlook; in early life he had been an attorney much versed in the technicalities of his profession, so that he was without the training conducive to that habit of mind which seizes the opportunity to lay down luminous and interesting principles of law, and to give apt illustrations of their applicability to modern social and commercial conditions. In 1851—we take these cases almost at random as two illustrations of the failure to seize judicial opportunities—Lord Truro had to decide whether the Attorney-General, acting on behalf of the public, could file an information to restrain the group of undertakings which is now the Great Western Railway Company from opening what may be called their main line, until the branch to Stratford-on-Avon, for which parliamentary powers had been obtained, had been constructed. An important question—almost national in its far-reaching consequences—was here raised. Lord Truro was, however, content to deal with it in a judgment which occupies but a single page of the report. He was satisfied to state that he could not extract from 'the information' any grounds to warrant the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court. In another case an opportunity occurred of delivering a judgement of large social importance, which by means of a lucid statement of principles might have been a guide in many succeeding circumstances. The Chancellor set aside a family compromise as having been fraudulently obtained.

'I shall content myself,' he said, 'with stating the principle of law upon which my decision is founded and name two or three cases of, I conceive, undoubted authority in which the principle is recognised and acted upon. That principle is that to render a family compromise binding there must be an honest disclosure by each party to the other of all material facts known to them relative to the rights and title of each as are calculated to affect the judgement in the adoption of the compromise.'

Then Lord Truro cited four decisions which he regarded as establishing his statement of law. This decision, doubtless, effectually concluded the pending litigation, but it is so brief as to be of little use in regard to future cases.

In striking contrast to these judgements of Lord Truro are those delivered by Lord Westbury. It was only lack of opportunity which prevented him from being memorable as a judge. He possessed in a remarkable degree a large outlook and a grasp of main essentials, as well as a power of precise and pointed expression which has only been approached since by the late Lord Bowen, who had the same exquisiteness of taste and fastidious literary judgement, the result partly of an Oxford training. Four years is no long period in legal history, and it was impossible in that time for Lord Westbury to affect the growth of English law to any large extent, however peculiarly well suited to that end. The same hindrance is observable in the case of Lord Cairns. During the short Administration of Mr. Disraeli in 1868, he had little opportunity for the further development of the judicial qualities which he had shown as a Lord Justice of Appeal. But the six years of Mr. Disraeli's second Government, 1874-1880, gave Lord Cairns an opportunity of showing to the full remarkable judicial qualities, though even for these time was too short. Those judges who have in some degree moulded English law have had placed before them the same branch of law for a considerable period. To this cause eminent men—Stowell, Mansfield, Willes, Blackburn, and Esher, and to these names may be added Cresswell and Penzance—in no small degree owe the historical position which they now occupy. Lord Esher (Brett), for example, during a long judicial career, had to decide a large number of commercial cases. Early experience and some predilection for this branch of law gave him a special aptitude for dealing with it, which, though he had not otherwise distinguishing judicial characteristics, has enabled him to take a place among those who have individually affected the body of English law.

The judgements of Lord Cairns are remarkable for the ease with which long and complicated facts are marshalled into a comparatively short and almost an agreeable as well as lucid narrative, so that the principle of law appears to emerge from them ready for solution. Legal principles are thus enunciated with a simplicity and with an absence of judicial affectation which makes them extraordinarily clear, and the whole series of judgements constitute balanced masterpieces of judicial reasoning. But in spite of qualities which in the opinion of many cause Cairns to rank as the most eminent of the Victorian judges and Chancellors, he has, as has been said, failed to impress himself



on British jurisprudence, even though judicially and personally he may be regarded as the first of the Victorian Chancellors.

To Lord Westbury's power of testing cases by means of ground principles, Cairns added the judicial gifts of self-restraint and patience and a capacity for precise reasoning and a quick insight, and was less unwilling than Lord Westbury to give weight to previous judicial decisions. Of his judgements it has been said that

'they went straight to the vital principles on which the question turned, stated these in the most luminous way, and applied them with unerring exactitude to the particular facts. It is as a store-house of fundamental doctrines that his judgements are so valuable. They disclose less knowledge of case-law than do those of some other judges ; but Cairns was not one of the men who love cases for their own sake, and he never cared to draw upon, still less to display, more learning than was needed for the matter in hand. It was in the grasp of the principles involved, in the breadth of view which enabled him to see these principles in their relation to one another, in the precision of the logic which drew conclusions from the principles, in the perfectly lucid language in which the principles were expounded and applied, that his strength lay.'\*

It is undesirable to apportion judicial merit under the singularly varying circumstances of the several Chancellorships with nicety, but it is certain that the testimony of most competent critics appears to give Lord Cairns the first place as a judge among the Chancellors of the late reign. He had, in addition to other qualities, one supreme merit as a judge, that of silence, and Mr. Atlay relates a story which deserves to be remembered in every court in the land :

'As he was chary in interrupting counsel himself, so he was prompt to check it in others. Lord Blackburn, one of the first Lords of Appeal under the Judicature Act, had acquired in the Queen's Bench a somewhat unpleasant notoriety for his habit of extinguishing argument by deftly delivered "posers." His initial effort in this direction was checked, ere an answer could be given, by an icy voice from the Woolsack, "I think the House is desirous of hearing the arguments of counsel, and not of putting questions to him."'

To listen without interruption to the arguments of counsel is a rule now often more honoured in the breach than in the observance, though it is one which should be strictly observed, especially in cases of an appellate kind, since the constant interrogation of counsel by the Bench not only delays the progress of a cause, but detracts in no small degree from the dignity of the court.

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\* Bryce, 'Studies in Contemporary Biography,' p. 184.

Mr. Atlay relates several instances of a want of judicial self-control, a trait which is often to be observed in more than one of our higher courts. They are more amusing to read of than edifying to hear.

It was said at the commencement of this article that the careers of the Victorian Chancellors formed a striking picture of the lawyers of the age. Men of the most opposite gifts, of the most opposed qualities, with very different tastes, born in different circumstances, trained under varying systems, have become Chancellors. But though to some extent, and on some occasions, the holders of the high office have been indebted to a kind fortune, it is yet unquestionable that no man has attained it without remarkable qualities; and in every case the Woolsack has been the reward of unremitting labour and patience, and of the exercise of remarkable mental powers. If Lord James of Hereford had been willing to accept the Home Rule policy of Mr. Gladstone, Lord Herschell might never have attained the Woolsack; and if Lord Selborne had acquiesced in Mr. Gladstone's attack on the Irish Church, Sir Page Wood would never have become Lord Chancellor Hatherley. But no one would dream of regarding either Hatherley or Herschell as unfitted for the post to which a combination of circumstances and personal qualities carried them. Lord Herschell was barely fifty years of age when he attained office, and he would never have been, to use a popular phrase, 'in the running,' had he not shown unusual capacity both as a lawyer and a politician. Lord Hatherley, on the other hand, was approaching seventy when, much to his surprise, Mr. Gladstone offered him the seals, but he would never have received them had he not, in addition to the political virtue of being a sound Liberal, added to it the qualification of being admittedly an equally sound lawyer and a painstaking judge. In a word, the several careers of the Victorian Chancellors prove that there is no special road to the Woolsack. Natural ability cultivated very highly in a particular profession, united with a power of expression and unusual capacity for work added to an adaptability for politics, are the main features of these various lives. So long as mind and will were concentrated on the practice of the law, no hereditary gifts, no special early training were requisite. Indeed, the difference in these respects is noteworthy. If we take—by way of example—four Chancellors: St. Leonards, Cranworth, Chelmsford, and Westbury, we find that the first was the son of a barber, the second of a clergyman, the third of a merchant, and the fourth of a doctor. The first seems to have had the very slight and unsystematic education which was usual at the end of the eighteenth century,

to have become a clerk in a solicitor's office, and in that capacity to have attracted the attention of Mr. Duval, a well-known barrister, who took him as a pupil without a fee. Cranworth followed, as might be expected, a more normal course. From the Grammar School of Bury St. Edmunds he proceeded to Trinity College, Cambridge, and thence to the Bar. Chelmsford had a curious early career. Educated, if one may use the phrase, for the navy, with a short experience, yet he found himself in the West Indies, and having decided to become a member of the Bar in St. Vincent, he came to England to qualify himself for his future profession. When reading in the Temple he was persuaded by his master to relinquish the idea of a colonial life, and become a barrister in England. The last of the four men whose careers for the moment we are noting was educated at home, and then sent at the extraordinarily early age of fourteen to Wadham College, Oxford, and when called to the Bar he was only twenty-three. It would be interesting, if it were possible, to ascertain the actual quality which assured to each one of these men professional success. Lord St. Leonards at the very outset of his career published the now classical treatise on the law of vendors and purchasers. Lord Bowen once said that to write a law-book was to produce a work which redounded in time little to the credit of the author, because it was constantly being altered by changes in the law. But as the years advance the name of Lord St. Leonards will remain fixed and noteworthy in legal annals as an author as well as a judge. But other men have written books and have not become Lord Chancellors, and other men have had intellects as clear as Westbury's, and have never had one quarter of his professional success. A considerable combination of qualities united in a single personality may, however, be noted. Every Chancellor has been a lawyer of some eminence, an advocate of fair capacity, confident in himself and thus giving confidence to his clients. Common-sense and insight into men and their motives, so that the knowledge of law should be capable of application to the business of the world, have also been necessary adjuncts. How little, indeed, of the academic temperament there is in the English lawyer, how entirely unprofessorial he is, is well exemplified by the careers which we are now surveying. The salient qualities of the Englishman of the eighteenth century, his common-sense, his clear view of an objective, and his absence of imagination seem to be perceptible in all these eminent persons. In other words, they were typically English, they suited the English taste, as shown by that essentially English person, the solicitor with a practice. Perhaps Westbury was the most

un-English of the group, and it was his absence of common-sense which caused his downfall; indeed, a man less abnormally brilliant would never have had that want of the perception of the ordinary man's mind which Westbury constantly showed in his biting sarcasms. An intellectual arrogance had gained the mastery over him, which showed itself on the smallest provocation. 'Mr. Rolt, we must be careful how we make our quotations in the presence of that distinguished scholar, Mr. Bethell,' said Lord Justice Knight Bruce on one occasion, as he and Rolt were quoting passages against each other. 'I beg your lordship's pardon,' said Bethell, looking up, 'I thought my learned friend and yourself were quoting from some Welsh author.' But among the Victorian Chancellors Westbury was unquestionably pre-eminent for mental grasp and range, for a vivid interest in any subject which came within limit of his mind, and for his classical cultivation.\*

Our legal education may be unscientific, our jurisprudence informal, but nothing, as these careers indicate, can detract from the fact that the English Bench is as a whole the most meritorious in the world, because even in the case of the Chancellor, who must be a politician and must belong to the party in power, in every instance during the reign of the late Queen the lawyer who has been chosen by the Prime Minister for the time being for the office has arrived at the position which, by common consent alone, makes him eligible, by his individual exertions and by his intellectual capacity.

As a politician the Chancellor is but one among several members of a Cabinet, each of whom, even if, as happens to-day, there are among them men who have practised at the Bar, is primarily and solely a politician. A Chancellor therefore who can be claimed to be pre-eminent as a statesman and a debater

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\* A popular historian in commenting on the death of Lord Westbury has called him a 'failure,' and rhetorically pronounced 'the close of his career but a heap of ruins' (M'Carthy, 'History of Our Own Times,' iv. 378-9). This statement is an absurd exaggeration. Westbury, after a brilliant professional career, was Chancellor for several years. He left office under Parliamentary censure on a comparatively small administrative mistake, and he subsequently served with distinction as a judge both in the House of Lords and the Privy Council, and was strongly urged by Mr. Gladstone to accept the office of a Lord Justice of Appeal. It was generally recognised that his administrative error was caused by good-natured carelessness. Westbury's loss of office is chiefly remarkable as an example of the cleanliness of English official life—a small mistake cut short his official career.

must be of abnormal capacity. To be a useful politician and a capable lawyer—Lord Halsbury, for example, well answers this description—is not enough to cause a Lord Chancellor to be singled out for particular commemoration. Looking back over the lives of those who occupied the Woolsack during the late reign, two names only seem to satisfy the test which enables us to rank them as statesmen of weight and influence, those of Lyndhurst and Cairns. The influence of the former in the House of Lords was remarkable; in 1832 he nearly destroyed the great Reform Bill. His power arose from the fact that he was not only an orator and a debater but also united large general knowledge to much worldly shrewdness.

‘Lyndhurst,’ says his last biographer, ‘possessed an extensive and accurate store of knowledge on the minutiae of the Eastern question, and on the history of Austria and Prussia. Five years later, when in his eighty-eighth year, he took the opportunity, on July 5, 1859, of calling attention to the state of our national defences. It was the year of Solferino and Magenta, and its later months were marked by that extraordinary ebullition of Anglo-phobia on the part of the French colonels which evoked the Volunteer movement on this side of the Channel. In July there was no open sign of ill-feeling between the two nations, but Lyndhurst pointed out how vastly the invention of steam and the improvements of internal communications had increased the striking power of our old rival, as illustrated by her rapid mobilisation and triumphant campaign on the Mincio, and he proceeded to state to the House the measures which he deemed necessary for the safety of the country. Into these details we need not follow him further than to notice that he was emphatic in his insistence upon what is known as the “two-Power standard” recently raised by official acknowledgement to “two Powers and a margin.” If we wish to be in a state of security, if we wish to maintain our great interests, if we wish to maintain our honour, it is necessary that we should have a power measured by that of any two possible adversaries.’

And when Lord Palmerston was in doubt as to the person whom, when he came into office for the last time in 1859, he should create Lord Chancellor, it was to Lyndhurst that he applied to solve the difficulty, and it was on his advice that Campbell, then Chief Justice of the Queen’s Bench, was selected. ‘He had always belonged,’ said Lord Lyndhurst, ‘to the Liberal party, he was a sound lawyer, and would do no discredit to the Woolsack.’ When we remember the position and the character of Palmerston, it would be difficult to find a better illustration than this of the opinion that was held by his contemporaries of Lyndhurst’s sagacity and shrewdness. Yet his brilliant qualities

were sometimes in the zenith of his career marred by some irresponsibility and by an audacity which, whilst they often served him well in debate, inclined him to take risks which slower intellects would not have incurred. Still he remains among the Victorian Chancellors a striking and illustrious figure, connecting the mid-Victorian period with Eldon and the eighteenth century, at once a memorable Chancellor and a Parliamentarian of the first order.

It is singular that the man whom we couple with him was so dissimilar to him. The urbanity of Lyndhurst was in marked contrast to the austerity of Cairns. One passed his life in actual physical enjoyment, the other was always contending against ill-health. The one lived to a great age, the other was prematurely taken from his contemporaries. Yet each attained to a position of exceeding political influence by the sheer force of ability. But Cairns, if he was equal to Lyndhurst as a debater and a politician, was unquestionably superior as a judge, and it is for this pre-eminent combination of qualities that Cairns should probably be held to be the first of the Victorian Chancellors. No two men ever worked harder for their party; but Cairns was a Conservative by conviction, Lyndhurst by choice. It is remarkable, however, that whilst Lyndhurst would have involved the country in a formidable constitutional crisis over Lord Grey's Reform Bill, the more true-hearted party man, as Cairns was, negotiated the passing of the Irish Church Bill of 1869. It is too late in the day to enter into details of this episode. It is sufficient to say here that the Bill had passed through the House of Commons by a large majority, that in the Lords the second reading had also been carried, but that the measure was in danger of destruction in Committee. Mr. Gladstone was laid up in his house, and on Lord Granville lay the charge of the bill in the Lords. The events of July 22 are well summarised by Mr. Atlay :

‘ On the morning of the 22nd, Lord Granville received a note from Lord Cairns suggesting an interview and declaring that he was ready, “ as you know I have been throughout, to confer upon a mode by “ which, without sacrifice of principle or dignity upon either side, “ the remaining points of difficulty might be arranged.” ’

He then, after some details which it is unnecessary to state, goes on to say that Cairns

‘ had no time for a general consultation with his followers, but the conference which took place at the Colonial Office was suspended for an hour or two to enable him to consult with Archbishop Tait

and Lord Salisbury. Then, between four and five o'clock in the afternoon, he agreed to a compromise. Terms of capitulation were arranged with the same calmness and mastery of detail that he had been wont to display in drafting the minutes of a Chancery order. But as the disputants shook hands upon the bargain, Lord Granville could tell from the grasp, which trembled with nervousness, that his opponent had been stirred to the very depths. It was a responsibility from which anyone endowed with less reserve of strength and with the instinct of the statesman less highly developed might well have shrunk. When Cairns walked across from the Colonial Office to the House of Lords it was by no means certain that he would prevail upon the Peers, some of whom had already shown signs of chafing under his leadership. But he had a potent ally in Archbishop Tait, and his powers of exposition and persuasion carried the bulk of the party with him. There were many dissentients, however. The old Earl of Derby did not dissemble his indignation, and Bishop Magee, who had prayed that the Irish Church might be spared that "most ignominious and agonising of all deaths, asphyxiation by lawyers," wrote despairingly that the Church had been sacrificed to the Conservative party.'

This episode reveals to us a statesman of perspicuity and self-confidence, for, as seems clear, Cairns acted without the co-operation of the rest of the party. Lord Halifax said, 'I think we owe a good turn to Cairns, without whose decision on Thursday I hardly think the settlement would have been effected. Indeed, Derby's conduct proves what difficulty there would have been, if Cairns had not taken upon himself the responsibility of acting as he did.\* Cairns subsequently addressed the Conservative peers who supported his action in a letter in which occurs this sentence :

'It would have been an inexpressible relief to me had I then been able to consult with all, or even some, of those with whom I was acting; not only because I should thus have avoided a serious responsibility, but also because I could have pointed out in private what I could not do publicly, the material advantages which appeared to me to flow from these concessions as compared with a prolonged contest. To consult, however, or even to delay, was obviously impossible, and I had to choose between the alternatives of declining an arrangement which could not have been renewed after the debate had commenced, or of accepting terms which, while they secured more for the Church than I believe would ever again have been obtained, enabled us to put an end to what was a violent and was rapidly becoming a dangerous strain upon the constitutional relations of the two Houses.'

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\* Morley, 'Gladstone,' ii. 27-8.

The description of this important action on the part of Lord Cairns, summarised even as it is, may seem to fall out of the scheme of a general estimate of the several portions of the careers of the Victorian Chancellors. It was action which was not only a remarkable revelation of Cairns' character, but one which stamps him as a statesman of first-rate calibre, who combined boldness with caution, and it exemplifies the influence which he had attained over the Conservative party and shows the position which he attained as a statesman. Yet Cairns now seems a distant figure belonging to a quite departed generation. In later times, had Lord Herschell not prematurely died at Washington whilst engaged on an official mission to the United States on the Venezuelan boundary question, it is not impossible that he would have won fame as a statesman not less than that of Cairns. Herschell united in an unusual degree conspicuous merits as judge and statesman—perhaps in time he would have become more famous on the larger stage. To a mind of singular quickness he added sagacity and an insight into men, a self-reliance, and a self-control which fitted him more than most of his contemporaries for high political office. In 1886 he formed one of the famous Round Table Conference upon the Home Rule question, and in 1892 he was one of the Cabinet Committee which drafted the second Home Rule Bill. Of that Committee, Lord Spencer, Lord Morley, and Mr. Bryce are alone left, and this bare enumeration shows the position which, had fate been kinder, might now have been Herschell's in the councils of the nation. Though as a judge both learned and quick, the tendency of his mind was probably rather political than judicial. He was perhaps more supple than Lord Selborne in reconciling himself to the demands of party; and he was free also from the ecclesiastical idiosyncrasies which marked not only Selborne but Hatherley and Cairns. His mind was of a broad and tolerant cast, and he had been educated in a legal school more likely than the Court of Chancery to breed a statesman. Herschell is in many ways certainly not the least agreeable personal figure of this group of Chancellors, for he was full of varied interests, kindly, friendly, and courteous. Lord Selborne's gravity of manner rarely left him. Lord Cairns' austerity was almost chilling, and, like Mr. Gladstone, he had the old Covenanter's habit of seeing the finger of Providence in acts obviously due to his own volition. Lyndhurst was rather too pronouncedly a man of the world, and the kindly, smiling face of Cranworth, if always pleasing, was a little monotonous. In his life at the Bar and on the Northern Circuit Herschell had not only in his professional work a varied experience of legal



business, but on the social side he had been brought into contact with various sorts and conditions of men, and had had opportunities of enlarging his knowledge of different sides of human nature. The difference between the Common Law and Chancery Bars in their effect upon character is certainly obvious in the case of the Victorian Chancellors; and unquestionably more facility in handling men is apparent in those Chancellors whose professional life was passed at Westminster and not at Lincoln's Inn.

Some people, after considering the careers of the Victorian Chancellors, may be tempted to think that a lifelong legal training does not tend to make a man a statesman, and that the pursuit of politics does little good to law. It is, however, certain that the combination of law and politics has in every generation given us a group of men at once remarkable and interesting, the like of which is not to be found in any other country. And those who care to study individualities and powerful wills directed to the attainment of legitimate objects of civil ambition by the straightforward exercise of high attainments will find no more marked and admirable examples than in the Chancellors of the reign of Victoria.

## ART. IV.—TARIFF REVISION IN THE UNITED STATES.

1. *Tariff Revision. Vol. XXXII., No. 2, September 1908, of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.* Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science.
2. *Report of the Proceedings of the International Free Trade Congress, London, August 1908.* Cobden Club: Westminster, S.W.
3. *Hearings before the Merchant Marine Commission.* Washington: Government Printing Office.
4. *National Platforms of the Republican and Democratic Parties in the Presidential Campaign of 1908.*

CONGRESS at Washington, in the session that will begin in March 1909, will be chiefly engaged in the revision of the Dingley Act, the most protectionist tariff that has ever been on the statute book of the United States. The platform of the Republican party, adopted at the National Convention at Chicago, in June 1908, together with speeches made by Mr. Taft during the Presidential campaign, committed the party in the event of Mr. Taft's election to calling Congress in extra session for the revision of the tariff of 1907; and it is now settled that the first work of the Sixty-first Congress—the Congress elected in November 1908—will be a downward revision of the tariff. The session that is to begin in March is described as an extraordinary session, because had there been no urgent business the Congress elected in November would not be convened until December 1909.

The circumstances which have made tariff revision urgent are quite new in the history of American protectionist legislation. No fewer than seven political parties had candidates in the field at the last Presidential election, and each of these political parties by its national platform was committed to a downward revision of the Dingley Act. It was the first time since the Republican party came into existence in 1856 that the Republican party, the Democratic party, and all the minor political parties that in a Presidential year make newspaper readers aware of their existence, were committed to a downward revision of a protective tariff.

Equally remarkable with this unanimity was the movement which accounts for the general admission that the Dingley Act has now outlived its usefulness, so far as the manufacturing interests of the United States as a whole are concerned. In

other Presidential years, for instance in 1884 and 1892, the movement for lower duties began with consumers. It was to consumers that the late Mr. Cleveland and his colleagues of the Democratic party, who assailed the tariff in 1884, 1888, and 1892, made their appeal; and it was in response to this appeal that Mr. Cleveland was elected President for a second time in 1892, and that in 1894 the McKinley tariff of 1890 underwent an unsatisfactory but still a downward revision. From the Presidential election of 1884, at which the late Mr. Blaine was the candidate of the Republican party, until the enactment of the Wilson tariff in 1894, free traders in the United States were organised and active and had the aid of quite a number of newspapers in their propaganda. At this time the Democratic party was by tradition and also by its national platforms committed to the policy of a tariff for revenue only; and from 1884 to 1892 it was not difficult, as the Congressional elections of 1890 and Mr. Cleveland's election in 1892 adequately proved, to arouse consumers all over the country in hostility to a protectionist tariff conceived in the spirit of the McKinley Act of 1890—the Act carried through Congress in the summer of 1890, when the late Mr. McKinley was Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means in the House of Representatives—the committee in which all tariff legislation at Washington originates.

The movement which in the Presidential campaign of 1908 resulted in all the political parties being committed by their national platforms to a downward revision of the Dingley Act of 1897 began at the height of the era of unexampled prosperity in the United States which extended, with occasional brief intervals, from the autumn of 1898 to the financial crisis of October 1907. Ordinary consumers had no part in it—had no opportunity of any political part in it—until the Presidential and Congressional elections of November 1908. Even then they had a much less important part in this movement for revision than at the Congressional elections in 1890 and the Presidential elections of 1892; for then the tariff reformers had in the person of Mr. Cleveland a national leader whom they could trust, and the Democratic party had not then turned its back on the fiscal principles which it had so long advocated. It was when the Wilson Act was before Congress in 1894 that the Democratic party sold itself to the protected interests as openly as the Republican party had done in 1890, and as it did again in 1897, when Congress enacted the Dingley Act.

Consumers had no part in the revision movement until the preliminaries of the national conventions of 1908; and it may

be frankly stated that out-and-out free traders, or even advocates of a tariff for revenue only, which in the United States is quite a different proposition from free trade, had little or no influence in giving the movement for downward revision the weight and impetus which compelled the Republican party in national convention at Chicago in June 1908, to pledge itself to the enactment of a new and less protectionist tariff.

Free traders were sadly disheartened by the disloyalty to tariff reform of the small but influential group of Democrats who frustrated Mr. Cleveland's plans of tariff revision in 1894. The Dingley Act, with its enormities and its excessive protection to every industrial interest that had in the usual way ingratiated itself with the Republican leaders at Washington in 1897, further disheartened and disorganised the free traders; and during the recent era of widespread industrial prosperity in the United States, free traders seemed to regard it as useless to attempt any continuous propaganda on behalf of their doctrines. Less was heard from free trade assailants of the protective system between 1897 and 1908 than in any period of American political history since the Republican party, in 1860, committed itself to protective tariffs. Free traders were silent because it seemed useless to attempt a general propaganda in a period of abounding prosperity; and, moreover, the more observant of them, after the development of industrial trusts began with the advent of prosperity in 1898, were convinced that the Dingley tariff, with the aid of the promoters of these great trusts, must eventually fall of its own weight.

For the Democratic party the years that lie between the Wilson Act of 1894 and the Democratic national convention at Denver, in July 1908, were a period of adversity and almost of national uselessness. They failed miserably and discredibly with the magnificent opportunity that was given them of revising the McKinley tariff in 1894—the first full opportunity for putting into practice their fiscal principles that had come their way since the civil war. Mr. Cleveland, in 1894, was committed to tariff revision in accordance with the historic principles of the Democratic party; and under the most trying conditions he was steadfastly loyal to those principles, and to his pledges with regard to them of 1884, 1888, and 1892. The Democrats in 1894 were in a majority, both in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, but, as Mr. Cleveland bitterly complained, they gave themselves up to the 'communism of 'pelf,' and the Wilson Act was a triumph for the sugar trust and others of the great protected interests, a lasting disgrace to the Democratic party, and a keen disappointment to hundreds

of thousands of independent electors who in 1892 had voted for a Democratic President and Democratic Congressmen.

Before the betrayal of 1894 had even begun to fade out of public memory the Democrats threw themselves into the free silver movement of 1896, and as a national party they have been in the wilderness of weak and ineffectual opposition and internal disorganisation ever since Mr. Bryan's first candidature for the Presidency twelve years ago. During these years the unstable Mr. Bryan has been their only national leader; and from 1896 to 1908 there did not come into view at Washington a single leader of the Democratic party in the House of Representatives or in the Senate whose utterances on any political question were of sufficient weight to warrant even a summary of them being transmitted by cable from Washington to London. From the Wilson Act of 1894 to the preliminaries of the revision of the Dingley Act in the winter of 1908 is the most unprofitable and barren period in the history of the Democratic party. Mr. Bryan was not in Congress during these years. It is inconceivable that the Democratic position at Washington would have been improved had he been of the House or of the Senate; but in these years there was no national leader at Washington—not a single Senator or Representative who away from Washington was recognised as the leader of the Democratic party. The party at Washington recruited no new men of national measure between 1894 and 1908—not a single man of the importance which attached to Mr. Cleveland when, as Governor of New York State, he was nominated in 1884 as the Presidential candidate of the Democratic party.

Individual members of the party who were in Congress between 1894 and 1908 adhered to the old Democratic doctrine of a tariff for revenue only. They continued to enunciate this doctrine as opportunity offered in the House or in the Senate. But little or nothing was heard of the doctrine outside of Congress from 1894 to the national convention at Denver in July 1908, when the Democratic party once more announced its adherence to it, and thus fell into line with the Republican party and the minor political parties in the movement for a downward revision of the Dingley Act. From 1894 to 1908 the Democratic party had made no serious and general assault on the Dingley Act. It had practically accepted the position that the Dingley Act was unassailable; and it was, in fact, unassailable by a party which was without leaders popularly trusted, without policies popularly understood and endorsed—a party which had wantonly betrayed the popular confidence in its revision of the McKinley Act in 1894. The Dingley Act was obviously safe

for an indefinite period from any assault that could be made on it by the Democratic party as that party was constituted from 1894 to 1908.

If neither free traders nor advocates of a tariff for revenue only were responsible for the movement which has resulted in the calling of an extra session of Congress, it may be asked Where did the movement originate? The men responsible for its beginning are the promoters and financiers who, from 1898 onwards, were so profitably engaged in organising and floating the great industrial trusts—the Steel Trust and the scores of other trusts which came into existence within four or five years after the Dingley Act had opened out new and unprecedented opportunities for the men who in colloquial language are known as water-wagon financiers. These promoters and financiers, it need scarcely be added, have never assailed the Dingley Act. On the contrary, they will use all their influence to prevent a downward revision of the tariff of 1897 as soon as the Committee of Ways and Means of the House of Representatives of 1909–11 settles down to the work of framing the tariff bill that is to take the place of the Dingley Act

It was with the victims of these water-wagon financiers that the movement for revision began in 1906. It began with manufacturers who had been squeezed by the trusts, and by the nominally independent concerns which for the purpose of keeping up prices had long been closely allied with the trusts. In a word the movement for revision was the revolt of manufacturers who found themselves seriously hampered in buying their raw materials. Some of these manufacturers wanted free coal and free ore; others wanted free lumber, free hides, and free wool; but in the main the movement for the downward revision of the tariff began with manufacturers in the iron and steel industries, with manufacturers at the secondary stages who had found themselves hampered in the home trade as well as in their efforts to build up an export business by Dingley prices of raw materials.

One fact of much significance is that all these men who are now in revolt against the Dingley Act are protectionists, and nearly all of them are of the Republican party. Many of them since 1880 have repeatedly subscribed to the campaign funds of the Republican party, because it was the party of protection, and was willing to give these partisans for revenue only any measure of protection they demanded. Lawyers are usually the dominant members of the Committee of Ways and Means at Washington; and tariffs in the past have been made by men with not sufficient knowledge of the physical conditions

and outward aspects of industry to distinguish an open-hearth steel plant or a rail mill from a brewery. When the majority group of the Committee of Ways and Means was framing a tariff bill the consumer was never for a moment in mind. He was non-existent amid the clamour and pressure of the manufacturers, who had, in the usual way, established claims on the party in power; and it was not unusual for the Republican managers at Washington to permit the men with 'a pull' to write the tariff schedules which were designed for the protection of their industry.

The Dingley Act was the outcome of an orgy in which the interests that were demanding protection alone were considered—an orgy during which the interests of consumers were as absolutely ignored as though consumers were non-existent, and the protected interests were all that would be affected by the legislation in which Congress was engaged. The Congressional history of 1890, 1894, and 1897 is dismal reading. Each tariff revision was an orgy, but the worst of the three was that of which the Dingley Act was the outcome. That period in the history of the Republican party—the period when Mr. McKinley was President, and the late Senator Hanna was the dominant influence in the Republican party—was recalled in October 1908 by Senator Lodge, who in 1897, as now, was a Republican Senator at Washington.

'I want,' said Mr. Lodge, at Boston, on October 7, 'to say a word on the pledges of the National Republican Convention to carry out the policies known as the Roosevelt policies. I think when Mr. Roosevelt came to the Presidency a condition was growing up in this country which gave great cause for alarm to people who looked below the surface and who watched the trend of public opinion. I think there was growing up throughout the length and breadth of this land a great dread that the Government was passing into the hands of certain great moneyed interests, corporate and otherwise. The great body of the American people have no base envy of wealth honestly acquired and properly used; but they do not want to see privileges granted to corporations or persons which are not granted equally under the law to all, and they do not wish to see their government controlled by corporate or money interests. Now the great sober thinking mass of the American people, the people who work and earn and save, were beginning to be very restless and very uneasy, and there was to my mind a great and real danger lest the American people should be led off by the counsels of men who urged violence and destruction as remedies for evils which they were not willing to right by the processes of law. Into this situation President Roosevelt marched, and he has satisfied the American people in his term of office that the Government would see to it

so far as it could that unjust privileges should cease to exist and that the law should be enforced against all men and against all wrong-doers, be they high or low, rich or poor, great or small. While in Chicago I was talking one evening with a gentleman—it was a private conversation and I must not mention his name, but if I did it would be to you as a household word—a man who had large business interests. He said: “I am one of those who are greatly dissatisfied with President Roosevelt.” We had some discussion about it, and finally I said to him, “Do you not think we have effected something?” He said, “I will admit that the President has raised our moral tone of politics and of business more in the last five years than has been done in twenty-five years before, but I don’t like the way he has done it.”

Senator Lodge did not make these remarks *à propos* of the tariff legislation of 1897. He was defending Mr. Roosevelt’s administration of the interstate commerce laws and his policy of railway regulation of 1905. But they adequately describe the conditions as they existed when the Dingley Act was passed, when, as the New York *Evening Post* declared on August 11, 1908, ‘the protected interests bought and sold Representatives and Senators like cattle.’

Some of the manufacturers who are now of the movement for downward revision had their part in the protectionist orgy of 1897; but since the Dingley Act was passed the industrial trust has come into existence, and has become an enormously important economic factor. The trusts have squeezed the men at the secondary stages of industry in order to earn dividends on capitalisations that are outrageously watered. At the tariff revisions of 1890, 1894, and 1897, the men who went to Washington to intrigue for protection on the output of their plants and factories were the controlling owners of these enterprises. They were manufacturers skilled in their particular work. If they were not themselves the owners of the plants, the shareholders in the companies they represented were their neighbours. There was not much water in the stocks of these locally controlled companies, and comparatively little of what may be described as outside capital was embarked in the undertakings for which the manufacturers were seeking tariff protection. These men were not promoters or financiers: they were industrialists pure and simple, and it was because they were captains of industry that they were in charge of the enterprises whose political fortunes they so vigorously pushed whenever tariffs were revised. But after the Dingley Act these real captains of industry were pushed into the background by the promoter and the financier. Trusts and mergers became the



order of the day before the Dingley Act had been on the statute book for eighteen months, and whenever a promoter of the type brought into existence by the Dingley tariff merged a number of industrial plants and floated a new company, he never failed to capitalise the tariff concessions which had been made in 1897 by Congress to the industries he was manipulating.

The United States was the first country in which tariff protection was capitalised by the company promoter. But when it was seen how easily and successfully the tariff advantages of an industry could be capitalised—how ready optimistic small investors were to buy preferred and common stock which had no other basis of value than tariff concessions, plus trust control of an industry—American promoters began to exploit Canada, which is an even more favourable field for the capitalisation of Government largesse than the United States. It is more favourable because the Government of the Dominion bestows enormous easily earned bounties on a few favoured industries, and gives all industries tariff protection, while municipalities are usually ready to grant tax exemptions to any promoter of an industrial undertaking who asks special municipal favours. This Government largesse bestowed on the iron industry in Canada was capitalised chiefly, though not exclusively, by American company promoters, who had learned the art under the Dingley tariff.

The Dingley Act was the first United States tariff that was turned to full account in this way by the company promoter. He went on the theory that the high protectionist tariff enacted in 1897 was a permanent and unassailable American institution. This was the trust organiser's view of the Dingley tariff, and he has succeeded during the last ten years in persuading tens of thousands of small investors all over the country, with the usual proportion of clergymen and widows, to take this hopeful view of the legislation of 1897. Thus it came about that when one of these water-wagon financiers was organising a merger, and arranging for new issues of shares from the marketing of which he was to collect his pay in millions of dollars, his plan was to issue bonds, which represented about the cost of duplicating the industrial plants he was organising, and then to issue as many preferred and common shares as he thought that it would be possible to market.

Goodwill and tariff—mostly tariff—were all that was usually represented by these preferred and common shares. Financiers skilled and daring in the infusion of water into capitalisations handled most of the mergers between 1898 and 1908. They soon realised that the Dingley Act was redundant with oppor-

tunities for their particular skill, and the result is that the tariff concessions of 1897 have had shares issued against them to an extent undreamed of in 1890 and 1894, when the McKinley and Wilson tariffs, with their many favours to manufacturers, were enacted. The concessions of 1890 and 1894, with the notable exception of those to the Sugar Trust, went to manufacturers. They turned them to account, and in many instances made great fortunes by continuing their industrial activities. But after 1897 many men who owned or controlled large industrial plants soon realised that they could most easily and quickly obtain great fortunes and free themselves from the tie and the labour of overseeing their enterprises, by accepting the overtures of a promoter, who stood ready to give them a high price in bonds for the plants they controlled. The promoter then proceeded to organise these and other plants into a merger—if practicable into a trust—and in floating the new organisation he capitalised the plants, the goodwill, and the fifty or sixty per cent. of tariff protection afforded to the industry by the Dingley tariff.

The promoter's interest in the newly organised concern usually ceased as soon as he had marketed the shares which were his pay for his work. It often happened, also, that the former controlling owners, secure in the possession of their mortgage bonds, ceased their active interest in the business. New men came into control for the new owners—the holders of the bonds, the preferred and the common shares—and by these new managers, financial as well as industrial, endeavours had to be made to earn money to pay interest on the bonds and preferred and common stock of the merger or trust.

It was in the process of earning or attempting to earn dividends on stock that had been watered to an unconscionable extent, stock that so largely represented the audacious capitalisation of the tariff of 1897, that the protectionists now in revolt, the men engaged in the secondary industries, were continuously and often unmercifully squeezed. The trusts from which their raw materials must be bought, and the independent concerns that for price maintenance are in close alliance with the trusts, were always able to live up to the limit of their tariff protection. The men at the secondary stages have protection in the Dingley Act quite as ample as that accorded to men who control the price of their raw material; but these men were not able to live up to the full limit of their protection without impairing the volume of their business; and at times they had to look on while the men who punished them under the shelter of the tariff of 1897 sold the product of their plants abroad at

prices far below those secured in the home trade. The men who thus use the power conferred upon them by the Dingley Act—the power to extort a high price in the home market while they are willing and eager to sell at much lower prices for the export trade—have long ago ceased to deny that this is their practice, or that they are helped in this policy of two prices by the high protection afforded by the tariff.

Proof that they do sell abroad at prices far below those charged to the home trade has never been lacking. What may be regarded as official proof of the long standing of these practices is to be found in the reports of the hearings before the Merchant Marine Commission—the Federal Commission which was appointed to examine into the causes of the decay of the ocean-going merchant marine of the United States—which were issued from the Government printing office at Washington in 1904. At the session of the Commission held in New York, on May 23, 1904, Admiral Bowles, who for some years prior to November 1903 had been chief constructor of the United States Navy, was one of the witnesses examined. ‘Is the price of steel plates,’ he was asked by Congressman McDermott, ‘regulated by a pool whose members meet every quarter or every month, and who agree to reduce or maintain the price?’ ‘So I understand,’ answered Admiral Bowles. ‘The price of steel has not,’ asked Mr. McDermott, ‘followed the natural law of supply and demand.’ ‘It has not yet,’ was the answer of the witness, who at that time had retired from the Navy, and was at the head of the largest steel shipbuilding company in New England.

Mr. Lewis Nixon, who, like Admiral Bowles, was formerly of the United States Navy, and was long associated with the Bureau of Naval Construction, was also a witness at this New York session of the Merchant Marine Commission. Also, like Admiral Bowles, Mr. Nixon had retired from the Navy to become the president of a shipbuilding company. ‘Some years ago,’ said Senator Mallory, ‘American steel companies were shipping steel plates to the Clyde. We had some good evidence to that effect in Congress. Quite a large contract was made; and it was said that we were underselling the British steel-plate makers on their own ground. Do you remember whether or not that was correct? That was about four or five years ago.’ ‘I have no doubt,’ answered Mr. Nixon, ‘that some contracts were placed in this country. I merely had to take the statement as I saw it. Undoubtedly American material can be bought in England very much more cheaply than here at present.’ Many statements similar in effect to these by Mr.

Nixon are to be found in these reports of the sessions of the Merchant Marine Commission. The evidence of another witness—Mr. Edward Atkins, of Boston—threw further light on the practice of the iron and steel companies of selling raw material for export at lower prices than were demanded for the same material when it was to go into service in the United States. Said Mr. Atkins at the session of the Commission at Boston, on June 1, 1904 :

‘I buy a good deal of machinery—steel goods for export. Last fall I had occasion to place some orders, and I was astonished at the high price of steel in this country as compared with abroad. I placed quite an important order in Glasgow for heavy sugar machinery, twenty-two per cent. below the lowest bid I could get in this country from a number of bidders. After that machinery was delivered I met the seller. It was the first time I had met him. He is one of the largest manufacturers in Europe. He is a very well-known man. We were dining together, and incidentally we were speaking about the Chamberlain policy. He told me that while theoretically he favoured the policy of a discriminating duty against foreign goods, practically he was opposed to it; for, he said, “Mr. Atkins, as long as I can buy my raw material in the United States cheaper by many dollars per ton than your own manufacturers can get it, I can sell machinery to Cuba, I can sell machinery to all the South American States and British colonies at far below the cost of any of your manufacturers.” One of our best manufacturers in Boston, a man which whom I have dealt for years, solicited orders for steel goods from me. I told him that it was impossible to give him any orders owing to the difference in raw material, and that I must place those orders in Europe. He went to work on the matter, and the result is that to-day any manufacturer of steel or iron goods can buy his raw material to go into goods to be exported and get five dollars a ton drawback upon it, not from the Government, but from the foundries and the big corporations. Now when that duty on steel was established years ago it was necessary. I believed in it. But the day for that necessity has passed. The only excuse to-day for keeping this high tariff—this extremely high tariff—upon steel, is to enable the steel men to pay dividends on watered capital. There is no other reason.’

It is as notorious in the United States that the large iron and steel interests sell the output of their furnaces and rolling mills at lower prices abroad than they do in the United States as that the home prices for these materials—steel plates, steel rails, and structural material—are arranged by the trusts and the independent concerns in close alliance with the trusts in the manner described by Admiral Bowles in his evidence before the Commission on the Merchant Marine when it was holding its

inquiries in New York in May 1904. There has never been any concealment of this method of determining prices. The meetings of the 'interests' are announced beforehand. They are held, of course, behind closed doors; but on the day following, the price agreements that have been arrived at are as openly announced in the daily newspapers of New York as the weights which horses are to carry in a race at Epsom or Doncaster are made public in the sporting pages of the English daily papers.

In the period of American tariff history that lies between 1861 and 1897—in the days when the men who owned or controlled manufacturing plants appeared at Washington to demand protection—Mr. Andrew Carnegie and his associates in the iron and steel industry in the neighbourhood of Pittsburg were prominent in these movements for protection for infant industries.

'We are creatures of the tariff,' said Mr. Carnegie, in 1884, in speaking of the iron and steel companies as they were then organised and controlled, 'and if ever the steel manufacturers attempt to control or have any general understanding among them the tariff would not exist one session of Congress. The theory of protection is that home competition will soon reduce the price of the product so that it will yield only the usual profit. Any understanding among us would simply be an attempt to defeat this. There never has been or ever will be such an understanding.'

But what Mr. Carnegie in 1884 insisted could never come about without immediately endangering the iron and steel schedules of the tariff has now been in existence and in active operation for seven or eight years. It has been a factor in the making of prices both in a time of exceptional industrial prosperity and in a period of depression like that which has existed since October 1907. The existence of a general understanding among iron and steel manufacturers at the primary stage of the industry—an understanding between the Steel Trust and the outside concerns more or less closely allied with the Steel Trust—is as notorious as is the fact that it is the Dingley tariff and its abnormally high rates in the iron and steel schedules that make it possible for the manufacturing concerns which are parties to these understandings to squeeze the manufacturers at the secondary stages of the industry who are dependent on the steel trust and its powerful allies for their supplies of raw material.

Manufacturers at the secondary stages of the iron and steel industry have long been as well aware of the tariff situation as it affects them as was Mr. Atkins at the time he narrated his

experiences in the market for raw material to the Merchant Marine Commission at Boston. They have long been only too well aware of the fact that the 'New York Journal of Commerce' emphasised on October 2, 1908, when in discussing the part that the movement for tariff revision was having in the Presidential election it affirmed that 'four-fifths of the benefit of the tariff go ultimately to the material men who are not obliged to divide with anyone,' and also recalled the statement of many manufacturers before the Tariff Commission of 1882 'that they would ask no protection if they could get the duties off their raw material.' The men who have been of the movement for revision since 1906 do not go quite so far as the manufacturers of 1882. Most of them, as has been stated, are Protectionists and not even advocates of a tariff for revenue only. But they are willing to sacrifice half the protection that the Dingley schedules afford them if the protection to the trusts from whom they are compelled by the operation of the tariff to buy most of their raw material—lumber as well as iron and steel—is similarly cut down by one-half.

The movement for a revision of the Dingley Act on these lines, from its inception in 1906 to the preliminaries to the national conventions of the Republican and Democratic parties in the summer of 1908, was exclusively a manufacturers' movement. Politicians had no part in it; neither was there any discussion of free trade or of a tariff for revenue only. From the time that the movement assumed importance it was managed by the National Association of Manufacturers, which has its headquarters in New York, whence most of the literature of the propaganda has been issued. Federated with this association of manufacturers, which is national in its aims and its scope, are from twenty to twenty-five national organisations of various manufacturing industries or state associations representing mercantile interests which have been adversely affected by the high duties of the Dingley Act. The movement is thus in no sense academic, and it is political only in that the appeal for a downward revision had to be made to Congress. In every aspect the movement is practical in character. It is the most practical movement that has ever assailed an American protective tariff; for every manufacturer who takes part in it has been hampered in his business by the working of the tariff of 1897, and knows exactly what relief he can secure by a downward revision of the tariff.

Of the National Association of Manufacturers there is a tariff committee, which may be described as the executive committee of the revisionist movement; and of this committee Mr. Herbert

Miles, a manufacturer of farm implements and farm waggons at Racine, Wisconsin, is the chairman. Mr. Miles is also President of the National Association of Implement and Vehicle Manufacturers, an association that for this movement is federated with the National Association of Manufacturers. At an early stage of the movement, when the allied manufacturers were agitating (1) for the creation of a permanent tariff commission so that tariff questions at Washington might be dealt with by industrial experts instead of by lawyer-politicians who know little or nothing about manufacturing or the actual working of tariff schedules, and (2) for the downward revision of the tariff, Mr. Miles published a pamphlet which he entitled 'How the Tariff affects my Business.' It consists of a reprint of an article from the 'American Manufacturer,' the organ of the National Association; and it is as outspoken in character as was the speech which Mr. Miles made at the International Free Trade Congress, in London, in August 1908. Then he asserted that 'a very grievous wrong had been done the American people by the advantage taken by the trusts of the tariff;' that it was a tariff of abominations; and in describing the movement in which he had been engaged in the United States since 1906, assured the Free Trade Congress that 'it was the American manufacturers and not the consumers who in the last year or two had gone to Congress with a frank declaration that the American tariff was an unendurable one.' 'And the American manufacturer,' added the chairman of the tariff committee of the National Association of Manufacturers, 'has asked this of his Congress, and of his President, not on behalf of himself only, but on behalf of himself and of the consuming public, which, as we all know, is being robbed. We confess to the abominations of our tariff, to the advantages taken of it by the trusts, and with the utmost confidence we propose and expect to remedy them.'

At the time Mr. Miles made this address in London—August 6, 1908—the movement in which he had been the guiding spirit had achieved two distinct and remarkable successes. The 'stand-patters' on the tariff in the House and the Senate at Washington had given way and agreed to the reopening of the tariff question; and by August 6 all the political parties had committed themselves by the platforms adopted in their national conventions to a downward revision of the Dingley Act.

Little or nothing had been accomplished at Washington when Mr. Miles took the country into his confidence and explained how the tariff was affecting his business as a manufacturer of farm equipment. 'I have,' Mr. Miles then wrote, 'made money

‘every year out of the tariff graft. Not much, but still a little.’ He then went on to explain that while he had made some money out of the tariff, enormously more had been made and was still being made out of it by men at the primary stages of the iron and steel industry, from whom the Dingley tariff compelled him to buy his raw material. The men from whom he was thus compelled to buy, he complained, had formed trusts and combinations, and had raised their prices to him from 25 to 50 per cent.

‘The tariff barons [continued Mr. Miles] raised their prices fifty thousand dollars to me. I made a charge against the jobber of sixty thousand dollars; and I know that he charged more than seventy thousand dollars for the sixty thousand he paid me. Before reaching the consumer the seventy thousand dollars charge became about a hundred thousand dollars, to be paid by the agricultural consumer.’

Not the slightest heed would have been paid at Washington in 1907 and 1908 had the movement for revision originated with free traders or advocates of a tariff for revenue only. Free traders and advocates of a tariff for revenue only have never been of the Republican party; and the party in power at Washington, especially when it controls both the House and the Senate, recognises no claims that do not originate within the ranks of its political supporters. The movement for revision originated within the Republican party; but even with this important factor in its favour it made but slow progress. The movement has divided Republicans at Washington into two distinct groups—stand-patters and revisionists. In the House of Representatives the stand-patters centre about Mr. Joseph Cannon, who as Speaker is the leader of the Republican majority in the House. The Speaker at Washington is openly a partisan. He appoints all the committees; and as chairman of the Committee on Rules—the committee that arranges the order in which the business of the House shall be taken—it lies with him to say what measures shall pass their stages in the House and what measures shall be side-tracked or cushioned in committee. Mr. Cannon is from Illinois. He is a Republican of the old school: reactionary in his tendencies, always ready to favour and safeguard special interests, and in a word he belongs to the era in the history of the Republican party that was described by Senator Lodge in his speech at Boston on October 7, 1908. Mr. Cannon has never pretended to any sympathy with the upward movement in political morality at Washington since 1902, for which most of the credit has to be accorded to President



Roosevelt. His lack of grace and refinement stamps him as a backwoods politician. He is as free in his language as a backwoods politician of the Dred Scott decision era. His attitude towards the movement for tariff revision in its early days may be summed up in a phrase which, rightly or wrongly, has been attributed to him—a phrase that would be characteristic of him and his attitude towards any suggested reform. ‘This country is a hell of a success, and needs no change in the tariff.’

Stand-patters of the Cannon school were in control of the Committee of Ways and Means of the House of Representatives in 1907–8. Only men in full and docile agreement with Mr. Cannon could expect to be of the Republican majority of this committee; and in the Senate the representatives of the oil trust, the steel trust, the sugar trust, the coal interests, and the lumber trust, are as a matter of course of the stand-pat group of Republicans, and as such opposed to any changes in the tariff which would curb the rapacity of these trusts, or impair the stock market value of their shares.

The organisers of the movement for revision were anxious that the new tariff that is to give them relief should be passed by the sixtieth Congress—the Congress which will come to an end on March 3, 1909. The stand-patters in both the House and the Senate, however, stood in the way of any such immediate revision of the Dingley Act; and in the movement for immediate revision there was no help forthcoming from President Roosevelt, who from 1902 onward had taken the position that the evils arising from trust control of industry must be reached by other methods than tariff revision. This was the ground that Mr. Roosevelt took in a speech at Cincinnati in 1902; and he restated his position in a letter which he wrote at an early stage of the Congressional campaign of 1906.

‘The question of revising the tariff [Mr. Roosevelt then said] stands wholly apart from the question of dealing with the so-called trusts—that is, with the control of monopolies, and with the supervision of great wealth in business, especially in corporate forms. The only way in which it is possible to deal with these trusts and monopolies, and this great corporate wealth, is by action along the lines of the laws enacted by the present Congress and its immediate predecessors. The cry that the problem can be solved by any changes in the tariff represents, whether consciously or unconsciously, an effort to divert public attention from the only method of taking effective action.’

Obviously it was Mr. Roosevelt’s intention that tariff revision should go over into the term of his successor—that it should go

over to the sixty-first Congress. But while the National Association of Manufacturers at this stage of their movement got little help from Mr. Roosevelt, quite considerable help was afforded by Mr. Taft, who as early as the Congressional elections of 1906, and while still Secretary of War, declared in favour of a revision of the tariff of 1897. As early as the autumn of 1906, Mr. Taft was coming to be regarded as the logical successor of Mr. Roosevelt; and his speeches at this time carried the weight of a statesman who was easily in the lead in the running for the nomination as the Presidential candidate of the Republican party.

‘Speaking my individual opinion and for no one else [said Mr. Taft at Bath, Maine, on September 5, 1906], I believe that since the passage of the Dingley Bill there has been a change in the business conditions of the country, making it wise and just to revise the schedules of the existing tariff. The sentiment in favour of a revision of the tariff is growing in the Republican party; and in the near future the members of the party will doubtless be able to agree on a reasonable plan.’

Even before this speech at Bath, Mr. Taft had incurred the displeasure of the Republican stand-patters in Congress by his persistent and courageous but unavailing efforts to secure a preferential tariff for the Philippines. His speech at Bath, as Republican newspapers in New England favourable to tariff revision did not fail to note, at once lifted him out of the company of the stand-patters at Washington, and placed him squarely in the revisionist wing of the Republican party. He was thus on record as favourable to tariff revision before the long-drawn-out preliminaries to the national convention began in the early spring of 1908; and his position on revision and on the question of preferential rates in the United States for tobacco, sugar, and other natural products of the Philippine Islands undoubtedly had much to do with the opposition to his nomination from representatives of the various vested interests in the Senate and the House of Representatives.

These interests would have side-tracked Mr. Taft had it been possible. Their preference was for a politician of the type of Senator Foraker, who, as was proved by the Archbold letters, made public during the Presidential campaign, had long been a tool of the Standard Oil Company. The group of Republicans in the Senate who represent not the States which send them to Washington, but the coal oil interests, the steel trust, the lumber trust, the coal barons, and the railway and parcel-carrying companies, if it could have controlled the state conventions

at which delegates were elected to the Republican National Convention at Chicago in June 1908, would never have allowed Mr. Taft to have a majority in the convention. These politicians for revenue only had, to use an American phrase, 'no use' for Mr. Taft because his election was understood to mean a continuance of Mr. Roosevelt's policies towards the railway companies, and such corporations as control the oil, the coal, the sugar, and the tobacco industries, and also because of his known sympathy with the movement for the revision of the Dingley tariff, which had been begun in 1906 by manufacturers who must buy their raw materials from the trusts.

After the failure of the revisionists to obtain support for their plan of a permanent tariff commission composed of independent industrial experts, and also of their efforts for a revision of the tariff in 1908, they continued to press the Republican leaders in the House and the Senate for a re-opening of the tariff question, and for revision in the first session of the sixty-first Congress. By March 1908 they had made some headway. Congressman Tawney, of Minnesota, who is chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, and the floor leader of the Republican majority in the House, had become convinced that public sentiment in favour of tariff revision was so strong that unless the Republicans accorded it some recognition, they might fail to secure a majority at the election of the sixty-first Congress in November 1908, and 'the friends of the tariff,' as the Republicans are wont to describe themselves, would be deprived for some years to come of the opportunity to revise the tariff.

Influenced by this conviction, Mr. Tawney, towards the end of March, drew up a resolution empowering the Committee of Ways and Means to make preparations for tariff revision by holding public hearings during the recess of 1908. This meant that the Republican leaders in the House, Messrs. Cannon, Payne, Dalziel, Sherman, and Tawney, who are all stand-patters, were at last willing to reopen the tariff question—that they had realised that the position they had taken up in the early days of the movement of the manufacturers was no longer safe, in view of the approaching Presidential and Congressional elections. Congressman Dalziel, of Pennsylvania, who has been described as a 'stand-patter under all conditions,' was the only one of the Republican leaders in the House who was unconvinced up to March 24, when Mr. Tawney's resolution was drafted. By April 30, however, he had fallen into line, and the resolution which committed the House to the re-opening of the question secured the approval of the Committee on Rules,

which was then composed of Mr. Speaker Cannon, and Messrs. Dalziel and Sherman, representing the Republicans, and Messrs. Underwood and De Armond, the Democratic minority. Approval by the Committee on Rules was equivalent to acceptance by the House, and a few days later the resolution was adopted and the preliminaries to the revision of the Dingley Act had begun.

It was April 30 when Mr. Payne, of the Committee of Ways and Means, introduced this important resolution. The state conventions for the election of delegates to the Republican National Convention of June 1908 had then already begun; and before it was known that the stand-patters had receded from their position of hostility to any change in the Dingley tariff these Republican conventions were adopting platforms committing the party to a revision of the tariff. Tariff revision was thus a question on which the Republican party in the country had no lead from their members in the House of Representatives. On this question the local and state leaders went ahead of the politicians at Washington. The Republican state convention of Illinois, held at Springfield on March 26, urged the calling of an extra session of the sixty-first Congress for the revision of the tariff. A similar resolution was passed by the Republican convention of the state of Indiana on April 2; and on April 10 the Republicans of Massachusetts, where the manufacturers have long agitated for free coal, free hides, and free lumber, adopted a platform which declared for a 'wise revision' of the tariff of 1897, 'without abandoning the protective principle.'

There was scarcely a state convention of the Republican party held between February 1908 and the assembling of the National Convention in June, at which an early revision of the tariff was not demanded. Stand-patters—powerful as they are at Washington, where they are in control of the committees most concerned with the tariff—had no influence in framing the state platforms of the Republican party, and not much more influence in the National Convention at Chicago. It will be seen when the tariff resolution then adopted is quoted that there is much in it to which exception could be taken by the men who are now insisting on a downward revision, the men whose industrial prosperity depends on the elimination of some of the enormities of the tariff. But could the stand-patters in the House and Senate have controlled the Republican party, Mr. Taft would never have been the choice of the Chicago Convention for President; there would have been no demands for a revision of the tariff in the state platforms of the Repub-

lican party; and instead of the tariff plank in the national platform—the platform on which Mr. Taft was elected President—there would have been a resolution ‘pointing with pride’ to the unexampled prosperity of the years between 1897 and 1907, claiming that this prosperity was due to the Republican policy of protection, and declaring against any interference of any sort with the tariff of 1897.

Statesmen at Washington sometimes lead. Mr. Cleveland led, and Mr. Roosevelt has been pre-eminently a leader in the movement for higher morality in national life. Politicians never lead: they follow; and the men of the stand-pat type in the House and Senate are unmistakably politicians as distinct from statesmen. They followed rather than led in the movement for tariff revision; and they followed only when they realised that if they did not follow they might run some risk when they sought re-election to Congress.

Although each of the seven political parties that nominated Presidential candidates in 1908 was committed to a downward revision of the tariff, it is only necessary here to recall the tariff planks of the Republicans and the Democrats, for none of the other parties elected any members to the House of Representatives, and only Republicans and Democrats will be in Congress at the tariff revision of 1909. The tariff plank of the Democrats committed the party once more to a tariff for revenue only—put it back as regards fiscal principles to the platform on which it stood when Mr. Cleveland was the Presidential candidate of the party in 1884, 1888, and 1892. The Republican tariff plank must be quoted in full, for whatever revision of the tariff is made by the sixty-first Congress will be the work of the Republican party. The Republicans will control the House by a majority of forty-seven. They will control the Committee on Finance in the Senate to which the bill will go when it has been passed by the House; and they will control the Senate, which is all-powerful when tariffs are in making. Judging by the history of the McKinley and the Dingley Acts the Democratic minorities in the two Houses will have no more direct influence in the framing of the new tariff than the Kitchen and Refreshment Committee of the House of Commons at Westminster. Members of Congress are paid 7500 dollars a year. There are deductions for members who are absent without leave; but except for the loss of pay Democratic Senators and Congressmen might all be away from Washington when the tariff is being revised. Their aid and counsel are not required, and any amendment they might offer would be mechanically voted down by the majority acting under the leadership of the Speaker or

the Chairman of Committees of Ways and Means, who, when a tariff is being revised, is the actual leader of the House of Representatives. The Dingley Act was passed by the Republicans, and in its revision in 1909 the stand-pat group in the Republican party will be influenced only by the effect that honest or dishonest revision may have on the fortunes of the party in the Congressional elections of 1911.

The tariff plank adopted at the National Convention at Chicago is as follows :—

‘ The Republican party declares unequivocally for a revision of the tariff by a special session of Congress, immediately following the inauguration of the next President, and commends the steps already taken to this end in the work assigned to the appropriate committees of Congress, which are now investigating the operation and effect of existing schedules. In all tariff legislation the true principle of protection is best maintained by the imposition of such duties as will equal the difference between the cost of production at home and abroad, together with a reasonable profit to American industries. We favour the establishment of maximum and minimum rates, to be administered by the President, under limitations fixed in the law; the maximum to be available to meet discrimination by foreign countries against American goods entering their markets, and the minimum to represent the normal measure of protection at home, the aim and purpose of the Republican policy being not only to preserve without excessive duties that security against foreign competition to which American manufacturers, farmers, and producers are entitled, but also to maintain the high standard of living of the wage-earners of this country, who are the most direct beneficiaries of the protective system. Between the United States and the Philippines we believe in a free interchange of products, with such limitations as to sugar and tobacco as will afford adequate protection to domestic interests.’

The Congressional elections in November 1908 resulted in the return to the sixty-first Congress of Mr. Cannon and of all the stand-patters who are on the Committee on Rules and the Committee of Ways and Means in the House of Representatives. The revisionists and the supporters of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft would have welcomed the defeat of Mr. Cannon, for if he had failed to be re-elected there would have been a new Speaker, and the group of reactionaries who control the committees would have been broken up, and have been of much less influence in the new Congress. As it is, it is almost a certainty that Mr. Cannon will again be elected Speaker; and with him in the Chair for another two years the stand-patters will again control the Committees on Rules and on Ways and Means. These politicians may be relied upon to endeavour

to secure in the new tariff 'a reasonable profit to American 'industries,' especially to those controlled by the trusts. Senators for the trusts, whose alliance with the trusts is as well-known as the states from which they come, will work to the same end, just as some of them worked for special interests when the McKinley, the Wilson, and the Dingley Bills were in the Senate in 1890, 1894, and 1897. On any other occasion than tariff revision these trust representatives would declaim against the Socialism which affirms that it is the duty of Congress to legislate so that American manufacturers shall be guaranteed a 'reasonable profit.' But in the coming tariff revision this remarkable declaration will be treated as the expression of good business policy; and the representatives of the statute-entrenched special interests—interests to which Congress has delegated the power of taxation—will be careful that there are no awkward inquiries, when the committees of the House and Senate are framing the tariff schedules, into the capitalisations on which Congress is to guarantee a 'reasonable profit'—no embarrassing questions as to the floods of water that were poured into these capitalisations by the water-wagon financiers of national repute or notoriety, who between 1898 and 1907 floated the industrial trusts.

Regarded from a distance there may seem little in political conditions at Washington to warrant the expectation that there will be an honest downward revision of the tariff. Looking a little closer, however, and keeping in mind the fact that it was the independent voter who gave Mr. Taft his great majority, it can be realised that there are a number of factors in the political situation in the United States that will make for revision in the direction urged by the National Association of Manufacturers, whose movement has already made the stand-patters at Washington give way, and impelled a National Convention for the first time in the history of the Republican party to declare in favour of a downward revision of a protectionist tariff.

The protectionists in revolt—the men who will be content with duties no higher than twenty per cent. if the protection of the men from whom they buy their raw material is similarly curtailed—can rely on the bona-fides of Mr. Taft. Mr. Taft is a statesman: his whole public career, as a judge in the Federal Courts, as Governor of the Philippines, and as Secretary for War in Mr. Roosevelt's administration, warrants the fullest confidence in his attitude towards tariff revision. Mr. Taft risked much, especially in New England, which is overwhelmingly Republican, by his determined efforts to secure a preferential

tariff for the Philippines. He risked some loss of popularity when he made his tariff revision speech at Bath. Had he been afraid to give the country a lead he would neither have urged tariff reductions on tobacco and sugar from the Philippines, nor made the declaration in favour of tariff revision of September 5, 1906, when it was well known that he was a candidate for the Presidency. Mr. Taft has never lacked the courage of a statesman. He has seen in the case of Mr. Roosevelt that steadfastness of purpose and courage are assets of inestimable value; and, moreover, the general uplift in the morality of American politics, due to the firm stand that Mr. Roosevelt has taken towards powerful but lawless interests, will make it much easier for Mr. Taft to handle a downward revision of the tariff than it was for Mr. Cleveland to undertake a similar task in 1894.

The financial position of the Government will also help to make for a downward revision. The Treasury deficit on November 14, 1908, had reached 128,000,000 dollars. It was anticipated that by January 1, 1909, it would be not less than 200,000,000 dollars. Such a deficit can be made good only by an increase in the internal revenue duties, or by such a revision of the tariff as will bring in revenue. High duties tend to bring down the revenue collected at the customs houses; so that apart from the demands of the revisionists, the need for large additions to revenue will have to be kept in mind when the tariff is revised in 1909.

Political expediency will also come into play. The stand-patters may be put into the background even more than they were in the framing of the Republican tariff plank. The men who compelled the retreat of the stand-patters at Washington in April 1908 are not consumers in the ordinary sense of the term. Ordinary consumers are always unorganised. It is impracticable to organise them; and when the unorganised consumers are betrayed, as they were at the Democratic revision of the tariff in 1894, they are completely helpless, at least until the next Presidential or Congressional elections. Even when these elections came, in 1896, the consumers were helpless, because the Republicans were then committed to a higher tariff than that enacted by the Democrats.

The men who must go into the market for raw material—the men who have carried the revisionist movement to the point at which it stands to-day—are well organised. Moreover, they understand tariff schedules as consumers do not; and if the reactionary wing of the Republican party at Washington attempts any hocus-pocus at the coming revision these revolvers



within the protectionist and Republican party, strong in their organisation, will continue the fight and push it into the Congressional elections of 1910. Any such movement would divide the Republican party even more than it is divided to-day into stand-patters and reactionaries and revisionists and supporters of the Federal policies associated with the names of Messrs. Roosevelt and Taft. If Mr. Taft took the side of the revisionists, were he to come out with a message on the lines of Mr. Cleveland's letter to Congressman Catchings of 1894—the letter in which he denounced the 'communism of pelf' that had defeated his efforts for an honest revision of the McKinley tariff—independent voters might be expected to come to his aid, and make an end of the power of the stand-patters in the House of Representatives.

Still one other factor in the coming revision remains to be noted. The success which has already attended the revision movement cannot fail to have had its lesson for the powerful interests whose high tariff protection is now so vigorously assailed. It can hardly have failed to make these interests realise that they can gain nothing by pushing the tariff question into the Congress that will be elected in 1910. If they do this the general consumer will come into the revision movement, as a result of the popular education on the question that will go on during the sessions of 1909 and 1910; and with general consumers aroused, as they were in 1890 and 1892 over the McKinley Act, it will not be practicable for these interests to make as favourable terms with Congress as they might make to-day when the movement for revision is being pushed only by protectionist manufacturers, whose anxiety about the price of their raw material has committed a Republican administration and a Republican Congress to a reduction of the inordinate protection of the Dingley Act.

## ART. V.—A SCHOOL OF IRISH POETRY.

1. *Poems*, 1899–1905. By W. B. YEATS. London: A. H. Bullen. 1906. *Poems*. By W. B. YEATS. London: Fisher Unwin. 1908.
2. *Homeward Songs by the Way*. By A. E. London: John Lane. 1908. *The Divine Vision*. By A. E. London: Macmillan. 1904. *The Earth Breath*. By A. E. London: John Lane. 1901.
3. *Songs of the Glens of Antrim*. By MOIRA O'NEILL. Edinburgh: Blackwood. 1907.
4. *Wild Earth*. By PADRAIC COLUM. Dublin: Maunsel and Co. 1907. Etc. etc.

POSSIBLY greater demands are made upon a poet than upon any other of those artists of the beautiful who minister as creators or interpreters to the æsthetic senses of their fellow men. As a maker of books, in these days when civilisation sows books broadcast over the land, the poet has access numerically to a far larger public than either painter or musician. Music, more narrowly conditioned, can be heard only when combined circumstances admit of its hearing; a picture can only be viewed in certain places; the portable art of the poet requires nothing but a modicum of leisure on the part of his readers. The printed page ranges far and wide, the author and his audience are brought into direct contact of mind with mind with an ever-increasing facility; familiarity with a book grows as easily—it is merely a question of good will—as with a next-door neighbour.

For the open line of communication the poet pays a penalty. The spread of literature amongst the half-cultured classes has given birth to an immense mass of half-cultured criticism. In appraising a painting or listening to a musical composition none save the most unintelligently ignorant aspire, without some preliminary training, to pronounce sentence upon the technical merits of the work seen or heard. There are, however, few readers who hesitate to volunteer a decisive opinion upon the excellence or the shortcomings of a poet's verse. The reason is not far to seek. Colours, as the medium of the painter's art, are not in the daily use of each picture-seer; musical sounds, as the medium of the composer's art, are not hourly employed by the concert-goer; a consequent uncertainty as to what effects can legitimately be produced by paint or sound induces the diffidence in the statement of opinion which belongs to the more prudent amongst non-qualified lay critics.

Such diffidence rarely exists in the mind of the reader of

books. Words—the medium of the poet's art—are common property: they are in every man's service, and every man, to a certain extent, attains a degree of proficiency in the use of them. He may doubt his competency to gauge the exact intention and aim of a musician, he may distrust his judgement as to whether that intention has been successfully expressed. Equally he may divine that the painter's brush, the sculptor's hand, achieves many effects of which his eyes are only vaguely cognisant. But words are current coin, stamped each with its accepted worth, minted in metals of established values; moreover, poetry is an explicit art after a fashion foreign to music and in a lesser degree to painting. The poet's theme, sentimental, imaginative, descriptive or narrative, is definitely formulated; he announces for the most part what are the concrete impressions his verse is intended to embody and evoke. Hence an initial facility of comprehension gives rise to a body of incompetent criticism. If the emotional content leaves the reader unstirred by any sympathetic response, if the impressions it imparts are inconclusive, blurred or feeble, he is at no loss to account for his inability to apprehend the poet's aim, or for his incapacity to be stirred by the poet's emotion: he can lay his finger upon faults of diction and detect inadequacies or exaggerations of language lying at the root of poetic failure. It follows that the fame of a contemporary poet, unsupported as it is by the testimony of traditional renown, rests to a greater extent than that of other artists upon the suffrages of a half-ignorant multitude. Further, the voice of the many not seldom drowns the voice of those courts of trained criticism whose censure or applause, in other æsthetic regions, determines the rejection or recognition of genius and enforces its verdict, with sometimes the insolence of office, upon the passing generation.

Undoubtedly, to a certain extent, the reader of average education may be justified in his assumptions; he may be qualified to discriminate between good and bad so far as poetry consists in correctness of style, clearness of exposition, refinement and force of language, vividness of imaginative presentment, with the consequent appeal to sympathetic emotions. But in judging the more elusive gifts of the verse-writer lay criticism is apt to err. As an æsthetic achievement the employment of words is as complex a matter as the painting of a picture or the composition of a symphony. It is a triple art—an art of sound, an art of sense, and an art of structure; and if to weigh the wind requires a steady hand, to weigh the art of words requires more: it exacts an acutely sensitive ear, attentive to sound-values of consonant and vowel; a ready faculty for the appreciation of the suggestive

power of terms and of phrases, whose significance expands, as it were, to the inner eye; above all it implies the capacity to grasp the structural result, as a logical whole, of rhythmical cadences, where balance, recurrence or irregularities of accent are the life-breath of true poetic expression; and these critical qualities are unquestionably rare. Nevertheless, in spite of their rarity, in spite also of the proverbial fallacies of popular pronouncements, the force of literary criticism emanating from the general public is not wholly to be deprecated. The standards which have moulded it are high, the lines upon which it is launched were laid by the great poetic geniuses of a classic past. It is subject to human error; it swings from the pole of timid subservience to ancient models to that other pole where novelty as novelty is accepted as an equivalent or a substitute for æsthetic merit. It is swayed by temporary fashions where the poet who is, in Musset's phrase, 'le contemporain de son époque' is reckoned of more account because of the mere correspondence (implying no intrinsically superior poetic gift) of his talent with current taste. On the other hand, popular opinion is continually dominated, unconsciously it may be, by a strong human instinct of which the discernment if not infallible is yet seldom radically at fault. It is an instinct, blind indeed to the qualities of art as art, but quick to detect the presence or absence of that quality which alone gives true worth to all art: vitality. Without it irremediable correction of style and form win but the *succès d'estime* of a cool approval; with it the crudest essays of immature or distorted talent may obtain the ovation of the crowd, or, if their æsthetic delinquencies be too glaring, will pass muster as the grotesques and extravaganzas of errant genius.

Vitality itself is, nevertheless, an element in art of varying complexion, and while the instinct of the many leads to the recognition of poets whose work is animated by its cruder and more sensational evidences, the quieter pulses of life that give emotional and æsthetic value to poets of other schools may often chance to stand outside the range of popular appraisalment.

The Irish group of poets, represented by Mr. W. B. Yeats and his fellows, is characterised by qualities which a contemporary public is prone to overlook. Vitality is by no means lacking in their productions, but it is, for the most part, vitality of an order peculiar to themselves. It is, in the general drift, non-individualistic. Often the impersonality is like that of the leaves of the forest; its perennial springs lie rather in nature, in ideas and ideals, than in humanity. The self-consciousness of the unit, with the vehemence of individual passion, is on the one side—particularly in the verses of A. E.—effaced by a sense, heedfully

sustained, of semi-mystical affinities with a life universal at once elemental, profound and remote and of undecipherable issues. On the other hand it is obscured, as in Mr. Yeats's plays and lyrics, by the avowed endeavour of the confraternity of Celtic revivalists to give utterance to the distinctively national genius of their race and country. Actuality exists in their art—Mr. Colum's poems have a vivid pictorial and human veracity—but their poetic realism is an equivocal realism; a fine-spun film, the spiritual texture of their imagination, overlays it; an emotional atmosphere, charged with indefinite desires, bereft of human and personal passions—'La nature n'a fait 'que les désirs, c'est la société qui fait des passions'—broods over each scene portrayed, and *les choses vues* no less than *les choses vécues* pass by vaguely outlined, imperfectly discriminated, as landscapes seen through the coloured haze of floating mists.

Apart from the main features of what may be regarded as a literary school, each member of the group follows the bent of his own gifts. Mr. Yeats in his earlier works is peculiarly the poet of phantasies embodying the beliefs, the legends old and new, heroic and mythical, of a countryside where, as in all Celtic districts, clandestine faiths of ancient nature-worship linger amongst the Catholic traditions of later centuries. 'Christianity and the old nature faith have lain down side by side 'in the cottages, and I would proclaim that peace as loudly as 'I can among the kingdoms of poetry, where there is no peace 'that is not joyous, no battle that does not give life instead of 'death.\* The three small volumes of A. E.'s lyrics exhibit another aspect of the Celtic mood. If Mr. Yeats, when not engrossed with the hero-myths he has wrought into romance-dramas or epic narratives, is the lyrical dreamer, A. E. is the poet of mystical thought. Mr. Yeats sees the concrete visions of the Without, he follows the track of the red-sashed people in green, catches glimpses of red-gold hair and faces pale as 'water 'before dawn'; he haunts that square white door in the hillside—known in the fairy-land topography of all nations—which 'swings open at nightfall to loose the faery riders on the world,' on whose threshold full many pause though few enter. A. E.'s eyes gaze on the Within: his visions are immaterial—the visions of the soul who seeks in its own depths to grasp the imaged memories of stars which shone on it in a bygone, yet not wholly obliterated, eternity:

'As in the ancient hours ere we  
Forgot ourselves to men.'

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\* Preface to Poems, W. B. Yeats.

And his verses, singing of that transcendental sphere where is neither Jew nor Gentile, bond nor free, Celt nor Saxon, break through the restrictions every set purpose in art entails upon its votaries, whether it be, in Mr. Yeats's phrase, to 'write in the 'Irish'—or any other way. Mr. Colum—a later member of the Celtic fraternity—alone stands close to the earth. Many amongst his few published poems illustrate a new trend towards a species of pictorial and dramatic realism, and the lyrics placed in the mouth of now one character, now another, taken from the cabin hearth or the open roadway, have the ring of direct presentment and veracity. It is in these three sections: of imaginative fantasy, of idealistic mysticism, and of a realism strongly veined and tinted by an ideal of national race-feeling, that the Irish poetry of the present period would seem to have fixed a clearly accentuated, original and recognisable type.

Mr. Yeats, whose standing and avocation is that of a professional writer, has essayed many more varieties of verse-form than his fellows, gaining thereby a greater flexibility of both hand and invention in the treatment of his subject-matter. His works include, besides prose stories and essays, a considerable number of plays, intended for the 'Irish Theatre,'\* some epical fragments, a few ballads and several dramatic or semi-dramatic poems and scenes. These with a number of purely lyrical stanzas make up the present sum of his literary productions.

Regarded as the representative of a new school of lyric art it is, however, only in a section of his poetical writings that his gifts appear, to outside opinion, to find any very novel statement of distinctively Celtic tendencies. The poems on heroic themes: 'Fergus and the Druid,' 'The Old Age of Queen Meave,' 'The Death of Cuchulain,' and other kindred poetic narratives, strike no specially new note of treatment. They are highly cultured renderings (such as de Vere in an earlier period essayed †) of epic chronicles, handing down, as each generation must in its own language and fashion, the great national god- and hero-legends of the past. And, though beauty of diction and versification does not often fail the poet, in these, as in the long and involved romance of Oisín's wanderings (where the changes of rhythm and metre, unmotivated by corresponding changes of subject and sentiment, impair the sense of sequence), there is a paucity of the qualities

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\* 'Where there is Nothing,' 'The Hour-Glass,' &c. See collected works. A. Bullen. 1908.

† 'The Foray of Queen Meave and other Legends of Ireland's Heroic Age,' by Aubrey de Vere. London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Co. 1885.

that give to Mr. Yeats's writings 'in the Irish way' their spontaneous if carefully polished charm.

Nor is it primarily in his heroic and romantic dramas, despite Celtic nomenclature, legend, localisation of scene, that his æsthetic method presents any departure from the dramatic modes of other times and countries. The heroic-episode drama 'On Baile's Strand,'\* where Cuchulain slays ignorantly the son of his youth's passion, and dies, mastered by the waves he fights in the madness of his despair, is a scene of mythical epic tragedy, non-dramatic in scheme, the main action taking place off the stage, while much of the story is conveyed in narrative and descriptive dialogue between a Blind man and a Fool; and the couple, although no doubt we may accept them as true types of the human bystanders who play audience to great events—'Life drift between a Fool and a Blind man'—occupy a space in the poem out of all proportion to their importance in this quasi-realistic presentment of the slaying of a son by a father. Deirdre,† dying trapped with her young lover in the dark woodland lodge of the old king's palace precincts (the most dramatic of Mr. Yeats's tragedies), is a one-act romance tragedy of considerable beauty and emotional effect. Yet it is not here nor in the death scene of Cuchulain, but in the less exalted play of 'The King's Threshold,' with its conscious and voluntary exaggeration of sentiment, where seriousness and comedy are twin elements (as in his prose stage-play of 'Where there is Nothing'), that he has touched a fresh strain of feeling, depicting with singular success what he candidly defines as the 'vast and vague' extravagance of his fellow-countrymen's temperament. Still more, passing on to the fantastic drama of imaginative idealism, 'The Shadowy Waters,' Mr. Yeats's claim to participate in the creation of a distinctively national dramatic literature in Ireland is perceptibly justified. Of it the author has said happily, that 'it takes upon itself its true likeness of a Jack-o'-lantern among more natural 'and simple things.' So speaking the poet has given us the word that most nearly paints what may be regarded as his prerogative: he is the phantast among Irish dramatic writers. His romance is unsubstantial as *La Princesse Lointaine*; it has a portion, and not a small one, of the 'exotic morbid beauty of Maeterlinck's earlier dramas of destiny; it deals with actors, actions, and passions as vague in their suggestive symbolism as a grey glass splashed with vaporous colours by a blind hand;

\* 'On Baile's Strand,' by W. B. Yeats. A. Bullen. 1907.

† 'Deirdre,' by W. B. Yeats. A. Bullen. 1907.

it lures us into regions of mist ; unfolds vistas of dreams opening into blanknesses ; when the imagination demands foothold, it is landed in quicksands of shifting ideas. Nevertheless, for all its confused phantasmagoria of thought, its *feu follet* semblance, it has æsthetic unity of impression and illustrates in its undeniable beauties the working of Celtic fancy in a dream-tragedy of objectless passion and illusive vision.

It is, however, in his two best-known phantasies, the 'Countess Cathleen' and 'The Land of Heart's Desire,' that the distinction of touch is most apparent. The outline of these is sure, the colour translucent, the drift of action, the tenor of sentiment, follow coherently each upon the other, and the hand that writes is wholly enfranchised from those foreign inspirations of rhythm and feeling which elsewhere denote acquaintance (necessarily hampering to the intuitions of a younger artist) with the great English poets of the nineteenth century, Morris and Rossetti. The actors in Mr. Yeats's play, it is true, are merely shadowy impersonations, human and non-human, of a mystery-play, but the idea, whose 'essential antiquity' he unhesitatingly accepts, qualifying it in a prefatory note as 'one of the supreme parables of the 'world,' works out its human drama lucidly and logically and above all after a fashion of its own.

The story in Mr. Yeats's version—taken, he tells us, from the French prose of 'Les Matinées de Timothée Trimm,' illustrates the doctrine of a possible redemption of souls from the power of the Evil One by the substitution of an immaculate soul for the souls doomed to perdition. Perhaps the most curious popular interpretation of the same belief is given in a folk-tale told by an old woman of Les Côtes-du-Nord, and included by M. Lutzet in his 'Légendes Chrétiennes de la Basse Bretagne.\*' Here a boy and girl of the village of Guingamp, calumniated falsely by the slanderous tongues of their neighbours, seek the counsel of a holy recluse. He listens to their complaints, and then interrogates the unhappy couple. 'Qu'avez-vous vu sur 'votre chemin ?' They have seen nothing noteworthy save a flight of birds ; two white doves pursued by flocks of black crows, jays and other ill birds. Even so ; the crows are the slanderers, the doves the innocent victims ; the hermit expounds the spectacle. And as for those evil-tongued liars, 'ils seront tous 'damnés.' 'Quel malheur !' cry boy and girl—'for our sakes 'shall all the village be lost ?' So it must be, the hermit replies—so must it be of a certainty, 'à moins pourtant que vous ne leur 'donniez raison.' Struck with horror at the punishment

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\* Vol. ii. Cont. iii.



awaiting their enemies, and 'ne voulant pas damner tous les 'habitants de Guingamp, ils firent ce qu'il fallait pour les sauver.' Once more the two resort to the hermitage in the woods. 'Qu'avez-vous vu?' This time it is a flock of white crows driving forth two black doves. The villagers of Guingamp are saved: the sin of the innocent has justified their slander. 'Better that two perish,' is the hermit's philosophic commentary, 'than that a whole population be damned.'

Countess Cathleen's sacrifice of immortal felicity is effected after a more idealistic fashion. Through the famine-stricken land the two soul-buyers pass, with bags of gold tempting starved peasants to barter their salvation for the price of bread. The Countess Cathleen has given all her granaries contain, her treasury is exhausted, her goods destroyed by the conspiracy of the Demon-merchants. Love calls Cathleen, the young Aeel, poet, harper, lover and seer, has come to her, the messenger of the old gods and of the wisdom of the hills and waters and woods, to summon her to their sanctuary of calm—'where none 'of mortal creatures but the swan comes.'

CATHLEEN (*to Aeel*). . . And there you would pluck the harp . . .  
And talk about the rustling of the reeds.

But the Altar of Mary's Seven Sorrows calls louder yet, nor shall Aengus, god of the white birds, wake her heart to love which another God has summoned to pity and pain: 'I must 'go down, down, down, I know not where.' She must say a long farewell to Mary, queen of Heaven—whither she goes neither saint nor angel have their dwelling; she must go forth into the night of the unknown. For the cry of wailing comes from the poor and sin moves in strange guise amidst them.

In the cabin of Shemus Rua there is an auction of souls. There Cathleen accomplishes her purpose of redemption.

CATHLEEN (*entering*). And so you trade once more ?

FIRST MERCHANT.

In spite of you.

What brings you here, saint with the sapphire eyes ?

CATHLEEN. I come to barter a soul for a great price.

The people starve, therefore the people go

Thronging to you. . . .

And I would have five hundred thousand crowns

That I may feed them till the dearth go by.

The soul that I would barter is my soul.

The purchase-money is given, the parchment dear to every medieval Faust-legend is duly signed, and with her soul Cathleen

signs away her life: 'When she wrote her name, Her heart  
'began to break.' The old nurse holds a glass to the lips of her  
foster-child.

OONA.

O, she is dead.

A PEASANT WOMAN. She was the great white lily of the world.

ANOTHER PEASANT WOMAN. She was more beautiful than the  
pale stars.

One by one the roll-call of mourners fill the stage with passionate  
bemoaning for the price of their ransoming, while Aleel invokes  
curses from the darkening sky. Then, as the storm sweeps  
blackness across the heavens, the Angel of Vision tells the sequel.

ANGEL (*to Aleel*).

The light beats down; the gates of pearl are wide,  
And she is passing to the floor of peace,  
And Mary of the seven times wounded heart  
Has kissed her lips, and the long blessed hair  
Has fallen on her face: the Light of Lights  
Looks always on the motive, not the deed,  
The Shadow of Shadows on the deed alone.

The Countess Cathleen is one of Mr. Yeats's longest efforts.  
He has invested the grave theme, though in no wise divesting  
it of gravity, with the unsubstantial glamour, the dalliance of a  
fairy tale. Even the sinister spirits of evil blink on the cottage  
window-sill in the guise of grey horned owls before they enter  
the scene as human-visaged tempters. They fear the quicken  
bough no less than the sound of holy names and when they  
depart it is to 'leap, feathered, on the air.' It is in this blending  
of elements, of medieval faiths with the haunting survivals  
of elder cults, that a new note is struck, importing the fresh  
grace and imaginative invention of Celtic folk-tales into the  
culture-form of poetical drama.

Possibly the sustained four-act effort of 'Countess Cathleen'  
laid too long a strain, too heavy a pattern of gold and silver  
embroideries, upon the delicately wrought tissue of the play.  
The single-act phantasy of 'The Land of Heart's Desire' more  
nearly realises the ideal treatment of the themes dear to Irish  
poets, where a thread of simple peasant life and character is  
interwoven with an iridescent web of ethereal supernaturalism.  
Here, with a lightness of hand that clothes his thought in gossa-  
mer, Mr. Yeats has drawn his little picture of a century ago.  
The time is May-day Eve, when the ghosts of ancient customs,  
whose origins lie far back in the haze of past ages, walk abroad.  
On May Day, wells and springs are crowned with flowers, on  
May morning the yellowhammer drinks—in the strange old

phrase—three drops of ‘devil’s blood’; thorn blossoms bring death into the house; a green broom sweeps its head away, while the ‘May cat’ is proverbially the *porte-malheur* of the home. May precepts and prohibitions abound, fragments of old beliefs, to us—who catch but the single words of them—unintelligible, but many of them indicating a curious tendency of human instinct to gather up the general impressions of certain seasons, to incorporate the aggregate under certain definite symbols, and to choose some red-letter day of nature’s calender on which to commemorate her mysteries. On May Day folk-customs and rites celebrated the whole resurgent vitality of spring’s forces. The dews of the unfrozen winter earth, the fire of the sun, were invested with magic potencies, and the call of the free, the call of the earth and the wind and the water to the souls of men, bound in their small dull routine of daily habit and toil and narrow wisdom and sober affection, found its symbol in the May-night spells with which the gay, pleasure-loving outcasts of paradise, the green-clad children of Faëry, lured unwary mortals to the land of eternal play. In Mr. Yeats’s play *Maire Bruin* has listened to the call, her heart is bound in idle dreams; new-wedded wife though she be, she is netted fast in the cobweb of strange desiring. She fears and she longs, and longs yet fears. She has opened the door to the spirit world, has given the fatal May-gift of milk to the ‘little queer woman’ who knocked, the gift of fire to the ‘little queer old man’ who asked a burning sod to light his pipe. She has heard the singing voice without and caught the words of the song:

‘The wind blows out of the gates of day,  
The wind blows over the lonely of heart,  
And the lonely of heart is withered away  
While the faeries dance in a place apart.’

Discontent abides with her. ‘Father,’ she says to the priest, ‘I am right weary of four tongues.’ She is weary of the tongues of the old couple whose honest labour has built the ‘little warm house’; weary of old Bridget Bruin’s, ‘a tongue that is more bitter than the tide’; of Mauteen Bruin’s, ‘a tongue that is too crafty and too wise.’ Of Shawn Bruin himself she is weary, with his simple, deep tenderness for the wayward bride he has brought home. Nor is Father Hart’s wisdom itself more to her liking. These four are the human figures gathered that May Eve in the kitchen, with its turf fire and table laid for supper, where the scene is set. As the phantasy opens Maire stands amongst them, the spell upon her—a stranger and an alien in her new home. Her heart is divided between love of husband, hope of

children to lie at her breast, the peace of home-quietness, the warmth of the home-hearth, and that other craving for the wild hillside, the stars and streams of the Far-away, for the sound of rippling feet that dance in the sheen of the moonlight. They are living figures, these peasant folk, and the old priest, gentle and wise in the wisdom of God and the saints, is living too; their hearts beat warm and true and kind; yet when the beggar child cries without, and with red-gold hair and dew-chill feet enters to harbour itself awhile under the smoke-dark roof, their life passes, as it were, into the commonness of heavy materiality. And the child, capricious, caressing, fair and masterful and gay, wins her way with one and all. Bridget herself warms the small white feet in her toil-worn hands—feet that ‘have run from ‘where the winds are born,’ as the wanderer rests upon the old man’s knee, feasting gingerly on honey and milk.

Then comes that strife which is the motive of the drama, the strife for Maire’s soul.

THE CHILD. Put on my shoes, old mother,

For I would like to dance now I have eaten. . . .

[*She is about to dance, but suddenly sees the crucifix and shrinks and covers her eyes.*]

THE CHILD. What is that ugly thing on the black cross?

FR. HART. You cannot know how naughty your words are.

That is our Blessed Lord!

THE CHILD. The tortured thing!

Hide it away!

The child’s gaiety is gone: in a frenzy of terror she clamours for the covering of the holy symbol. With caresses and kisses she gains her will; benignly the old priest makes concession to her urgency. ‘Because you are so young and little a child, I will go take it ‘down.’

Henceforth the mastery lies on the ‘other side.’ A strange terror grows apace; Maire’s heart is filled with a dim expectation and dread. The very cottage, primrose-strewn, seems as though it were possessed by others than the old peasants: it is as a city surrendered to the enemy’s occupation. In vain Maire’s love for the ‘great tall fellow’ she has wedded; in vain her late repentance for wild dreams; and vain her prayer to the queen of angels—the dancing child is stronger than priest or angel or saint. An unseen crowd throngs the cabin. The spell has fallen: nor priest nor lover may loose Maire from those small child-arms that circle her neck as she lies trapped in a trance where the body wakes but the will sleeps.

SHAWN BRUIN.

Beloved, do not leave me!

Remember when I met you by the well  
And took your hand and spoke of love.



lated itself, without overt mannerism, into that fashion of verse best adapted to render it; while in two brief poems, 'A Piper' and 'A Fiddler,' Mr. O'Sullivan\* may represent the lyric of village realism transfused with the imaginative quality of Roumanian folk-song:

'All day long about the town,  
He had wandered up and down  
From street to street, from drink to drink;  
At evening he began to think,  
'Better, far better, to be dead  
Where no thought could find out my head;  
Lying in some green place apart  
No sorrow could find out my heart;  
Laid in the quiet there alone  
I should have all my dreams my own;  
For, though they know not when I play  
(These fools), I give my dreams away.'"

The themes are few. Singularly enough, the fount from which poets of other nations drew their strongest lyrical inspiration is here the source of what seems the weakest, and the love-song of personal feeling, where it occurs, has little individuality, originality or impulse. It is in those lyrics where the sentiment is imaginatively conceived and placed in the mouth of a fictitious personality, whose speech is that of folk-song, that the note of true emotion penetrates the verse. Among Mr. Yeats's poems where the poet speaks in his own person 'The Sorrow of 'Love' comes closest to the achievement of emotional effect:

'The quarrel of the sparrows in the eaves,  
The full round moon and the star-laden sky,  
And the loud song of the ever-singing leaves,  
Had hid away earth's old and weary cry.

And then you came with those red mournful lips,  
And with you came the whole of the world's tears,  
And all the trouble of her labouring ships,  
And all the trouble of her myriad years. . . . ?

Yet this with the best-known and most perfect of all Mr. Yeats's 'culture' lyrics, 'When you are old and grey and full of sleep,' lies, surely, rather on the borderland of fancy than at the core of actual feeling:

'How many loved your moments of glad grace  
And loved your beauty with false love or true;  
But one man loved the pilgrim soul in you  
And loved the sorrows of your changing face';

\* 'Verses, Sacred and Profane,' by Seumas O'Sullivan. Dublin: Maunsel and Co. 1908.

and neither approaches the power, nor induces the sense of an underlying spiritual fire, which places the finest of his lyrics, the 'Song of Red Hanrahan,' in the first rank of Irish art :

'The old brown thorn trees break in two high over Cummen Strand,  
Under a bitter black wind that blows from the left hand ;  
Our courage breaks like an old tree in a black wind and dies,  
But we have hidden in our hearts the flame out of the eyes  
Of Cathleen, the daughter of Houlihan.'

Even more truly it may be said of A. E.'s occasional love-lyrics that, wherever they do not verge upon the conventional and the commonplace, they are the outcome of pure transcendentalism :

'Do not ask for the hands of love or love's soft eyes :  
They give less than love who give all, giving what wanes' ; \*

or, as in 'The Morning Star,' where, after the prelude of one of the beautiful landscape-stanzas in which he excels, he deprecates the humanities of passion and finds his ideal in

'Love, a pearl-grey dawn in darkness, breathing peace without  
desire.' †

And still more explicitly he states the outlook of his cool mysticism in 'At One' :

'I would not have you near, for eyes and lips might mar  
The silence where we meet and star is lost in star.' ‡

For a poet to have lost the sense that spiritual passion embraces and includes material passion, that body and soul are—in love as in life—one, is not to have placed passion on a higher but on a lower plane, and to have lost touch with the clean-handed sanities and sanctities of nature's instincts. Such false idealisations are a profanation of earth's great sacramental scheme in which the temporal and the human remain the channel of the eternal and the divine. Forgael, the hero of 'The Shadowy Waters,' is an example of such idealism in action. His contempt for the love 'that is no more than a wine cup in the tasting, and 'as soon finished,' is controverted by the counter-materialism of his friend.

AIBRIC.

All that have ever loved

Have loved that way—there is no other way.

FORGAEL.

Yet never have two lovers kissed but they

Believed there was some other near at hand,

And almost wept because they could not find it.

\* The Message (The Divine Vision).

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

The whole passage defines the loss of that wider, braver, wholesom-er conception of earthly emotion ; of the heart of love made holy by the spirit of love ; of the soul of love in no wise diminished in its high estate by the body of love it aureoles.

A. E.'s love-poems are wholly based upon the transcendental conception. Morally they reflect, maybe unconsciously, the ascetic standpoint, misapplied, of centuries of Catholic traditions in their Manichean moods ; æsthetically they give the key to the emotional deficiencies of a poet whose genius is indeed at home in other provinces of thought and aspiration, but whose faith fails him when the hour of trial summons him to grasp the ideal not without but within the real. His loss is, to a modified extent, common to many, it might be said to most, of the writers whose talents correspond most closely to the genius of the race, in whose works, though exceptions exist, the intensity of personal passion is seldom felt. The contrast is curious when we pass to the expression of passion other than personal, in the peasant lyrics of Miss O'Neill and Mr. Colum, and in a minor degree in the verse of Ethna Carbery, where the accent that strong emotion, and it alone, can give to lyrical poetry, is unmistakable and abundant.

Miss O'Neill, the North Ireland singer of the Glens of Antrim—who, it may be observed, does not appear to be recognised as a fellow-poet by the confraternity of Celtic revivalists—is, with Ethna Carbery, pre-eminently the lyrist of peasant loves. The full current of impassioned feeling that many a folk-song possesses and many a culture-song misses, runs below the surface of Miss O'Neill's quiet reticence of sentimental statement, and lends to the directness and unexaggerated simplicity of her phraseology its pathetic force. The folk-tone echoes no less insistently among the best songs contained in Ethna Carbery's lengthier volume. Though with declensions to levels of rhetorical and sentimental expressions that seem—but are not, as much reading of poetry proves—incompatible with the exclusiveness of æsthetic taste, she has vividness of word and imagery, the grace of swaying rhythm, with a surface-current of wistful emotionalism, the special birthright of Celtic talent, which, like dry seashells, lacks lustre and iridescence unwashed by the brine of tears.

' I bared my heart to the winds, and my cry went after you—  
A brown west wind blew past, and the east my secret knew ;  
A red east wind blew far to the lonesome bogland's edge,  
And the little pools stirred sighing within their girlding sedge.'

And, as in the ' Glen Song,' in the ' Hills o' My Heart,' her verses



have the freshness, the sincerity and sweetness—and in her dirges the thread of true passion—belonging to a genuine lyric gift.

One short volume contains the whole of Miss O'Neill's published work. It is no easy task to analyse the how and the why of the permanent impression left by verses of which the first apparent qualities are a light-handed if mournful grace. They owe, no doubt, much to their melody, to the melancholy and haunting rhythms, the broken cadences, where the emphatic dependence of hurried and crowded syllables on sharply and significantly accentuated words arrests the ear, setting a drag on the measure or forcing a pause in the sound, as in the song of a girl and boy's love-making amongst the rushes on the hillside. It is a song of old-age remembrances of a low half-risen sun, of the morning thrushes, and the running brown stream and the dark bog-pool and the strong-stemmed reeds and the sheaf of gathered green :

*Young, still young!*—an' drenchin' wet the grass,  
Wet the golden honeysuckle hangin' sweetly down ;  
*Here, lad, here!* will ye follow where I pass,  
An' find me cuttin' rushes on the mountain ?

Yesterday, yesterday, or fifty years ago . . .

I waken out o' dreams when I hear the summer thrushes,  
Oh, that's the Brabla' burn, I can hear it sing an' flow.

For all that's fair, I'd sooner see a bunch o' green rushes.  
*Run, burn, run!* can ye mind when we were young ?

The honeysuckle hangs above, the pool is dark an' brown :  
*Sing, burn, sing!* can ye mind the song ye sung  
The day we cut the rushes on the mountain ?

The song is typical of her method. The picture, the scene, is always given : the living picture of the life of country folk whether within the cabin door or without on hill or seashore ; the words, so far as sentiment go, tell little enough, and yet it is always there :

'I knit beside the turf fire, I spin upon the wheel,  
Winter nights for thinkin' long, round runs the reel . . .  
But he never knew, he never knew, that here for him I'd kneel !'

'What about the May-time and him far away ?'—her songs are the cry of the absent heart, of hearts young with the youth of first loves, or of the passion—patient as the passion of lives lived close to Nature's great fatalities is wont to be—of the finalities of sorrow :

'*Where am I from ?*' From the green hills of Erin.

'*Have I no song then ?*' My songs are all sung.

'*What of my love ?*' 'Tis alone I am farin',

Old grows my heart, an' my voice yet is young.

“ *Where did she dwell ?* ” Where one’st I had my dwellin’.  
 “ *Who loved her best ?* ” There’s no one now will know.  
 “ *Where is she gone ?* ” Och, why would I be tellin’ ?  
 Where she is gone there I can never go.

Possibly this lyric has overrun the line of ingenuity in workmanship appropriate to peasant-song ; but if here Miss O’Neill has erred, the lament of the seawrack-gatherer, of which the force lies in an absolute barrenness of expressed emotion, betrays no trace of over-studied composition. The theme is the old story of a boat gone down ; the commonest tragedy of sea villages and the theme of Ethna Carbery’s two finest laments, ‘ *The Brown Wind of Connaught* ’ and ‘ *The Four Places of Sorrow.* ’ There is no uplifting of the hands against fate ; as one boat has sunk so have hundreds of boats, and each that has sailed, maybe, carried the joy of life from one hearth on the shore. It is the old conscious acceptance of fate. ‘ *Men must work and women must weep* ’ (not unfrequently one is reminded of Charles Kingsley’s countryside verses with their heart-beat of sympathy for the poor and the sad), though husband and lover steer never again homeward :

‘ *There’s a fire low upon the rocks to burn the wrack to kelp ;  
 There’s a boat gone down upon the Moyle, an’ sorra one to help !  
 Him beneath the salt sea, me upon the shore,  
 By sunlight or moonlight we’ll lift the wrack no more.* ’

All the dumbness of grief makes itself felt in the succinct narrative of the bare facts ; grief has found no word in which to tell of grief : it tells nothing save the ‘ *happening* ’ of it, and telling that all is said.

Miss O’Neill has a partner in her gift of emotional abbreviation. As a woman she writes her love-songs with the profound consciousness of the pity of it—of the pity that the measure of grief in the golden life-cup should be so great ; of the pity of it that every love life brings with it is but another hostage placed in the hands of destiny. Mr. Colum writes as a man writes. His love-songs tell of the strength and the passion of it, whether it be the strength of joy or the strength of pain :

‘ *Ah ! strange were the dim wide meadows,  
 And strange was the cloud-strewn sky,  
 And strange in the meadows the corncrakes,  
 And they making cry !*

*The hawthorn bloom was by us,  
 Around us the breath of the south,  
 White hawthorn, strange in the night-time—  
 His kiss on my mouth !* ’

So, too, in his lament of a woman forsaken, as she recounts the processes of her lover's forgetting :

‘ Out of the dream of me, into  
The round of labour he will grow ’ ;

and there is a curious nearness to the working of a woman's mind as she reckons up the details of daily toil in bog and field, by byre and barn and threshing-floor, which will efface her image from his heart troubled with the workaday cares, hopes and ambitions of a small farmer's many avocations. The last two stanzas seem to have drifted from their moorings to a false level where veracity and simplicity are obliterated from the portraiture, and an obscure thought is substituted for a direct sentiment, while the woman's absorption in the self-conscious contemplation of her own beauty effaces the sense of desolation the first verses conveyed. This sequel reads as an afterthought ; it is an evidence that Mr. Colum's æsthetic instinct has not yet (the poems are a first volume) learnt to submit itself to his critical instinct ; nor, so far, has he acquired the power of standing outside himself, and at a sufficient distance, to observe the discrepancies of atmosphere, the discordance and disjointedness of sentimental effect, that betray a young poet's work. No such disconnection of mood mars the vehement passion of the brief poem ‘ Dermott Donn MacMorna.’ Cast more or less in ballad form, it breaks new ground. The love of the childless wife for the lost lover who will come one day to her door, is a love that beats with fierce hands against the gate of joy barred to her heart ; and his name, ringing for ever in her ears, is repeated as a double refrain throughout the stanzas. It is the only sound she hears in the silent loneliness of the ‘ dark-doored ’ house :

‘ Lonesome, lonesome, the house of Hugh ;  
Dermott Donn MacMorna,  
No cradle rocks in the house of Hugh ;  
The list'ning fire has thought of you,  
.  
.  
.  
Out of this loneliness we will go . . .  
Together at last, we two will go  
Down a darkening road with a gleam below.  
*Ah, but the winds do bitter blow.*  
Dermott Donn MacMorna.’

In the fewness of the words employed, in the strength of the descriptive strokes that give sombre colour to the lines, Mr. Colum has written a true dramatic lyric. It belongs to the class of lyrical ballads, where a life is epitomised in the expression of

an hour's passion, of which the 'O Waly, Waly' ballad remains the lasting and perfect model.

Emotional sentiment does not confine itself amongst Irish poets to their love-songs.

' Hélas, je sais un chant d'amour  
Triste et gai tour à tour—'

and that song of the love of country, howsoever variously worded, is pre-eminently a song of the Celtic race. It is the æsthetic embodiment of a sentiment that, clinging to the aggregate of things inanimate, constitutes, apart from human relationships, the homeland of a man's affections; and it is based on the recognition of all those invisible ties which, when wrenched asunder, occasion physical and mental sickness: the nostalgia fatal often to primitive natures. Field, seashore, the sterile hillside, the soil itself, clinch their hold, unseen, upon lives spent in intimate contact with them. It would seem, in truth, as if something of a man's own being became absorbed into the growths, into the material surroundings, water, rock, bogland and pasture-meadows where his cattle feed; into woods of hazel, oak and birch where his axe rings; into the fields his plough furrows; became absorbed, too, by the walls of the 'little warm house'—

' O, to have a little house!  
To own the hearth and stool and all!'

—of peasant prosperity, with its turf fire, its roof of thatch, its pile of sods. Severance from such environments is in itself a malady to the peasant whose ears are not stung by talk of those El Dorados across the sea, for whose sake the Irish emigrant abandons 'the rainbows an' green woods an' rain' of the old country. Use, custom, the daily sights and sounds of years are crevices into which the living fibres of body and soul fit themselves; they serve, maybe, as coverings, sheaths to some mysterious nerve-centres of sense and brain, and deaden the shock when the inner self, the Ego, in its pygmy isolation, encounters the vast 'non-self,' appalling and cruel in its bleak immensities, of the material and immaterial universe encompassing it. Moreover, go where he may, something of himself is left behind by the exile in the familiar places, some Doppelgänger who refuses to be exorcised from the ancient haunts, of childhood, youth or manhood. When voices call from afar it is part of himself that cries for his returning; when he returns it is to seek something of himself that the wanderer sets foot on the roadway that leads home. In Breton sea-coast folk-lore, the very dead who

sleep below the waves rise to lie, if it be for one night only in all the year, under the sod of their native earth. In Irish myth the sight of a wing-tired starling from the old earth-home, falling to ground in the Island of Forgetfulness, awakens Oisín from his century-long dream in Niam's arms and recalls his heart to the Fenian shores of his ancient abiding.

It is a feeling modern education, with all the cosmopolitanism of a new age and a crude civilisation, blunts, and which even in uncultured natures has its counterpoise in the opposing passion of the rover—always ‘“ off to find my fortune,” sure he says, says he,’ and no less in the impulse of the born vagrant whose home is the highway and whose lodging is but a tent pitched for a night under moon and stars. Yet, though other instincts may outmaster it, none replace it, and where it survives in its primitive force, with all its imaginative sentimentality, its illusion and self-deceits, it constitutes one of the strongest, as also one of the most practically effective, influences in the development of national life.

Æsthetically it stands confessed in every lyric charged with the regret of exile or inspired by attachment to some special locality where the poet has been pleased to idealise every feature of the landscape. Mr. Yeats, in perhaps the most popular, as they are the most perfect, of his lyrical verses, ‘ I will arise and go now,’ has fixed the type of his school according to the often-quoted axiom, ‘ perfection fait école.’

‘ I will arise and go now, for always night and day  
I hear lake water lapping, with low sounds by the shore ;  
While I stand on the roadway, or on the pavements gray,  
I hear it in the deep heart's core.’

Miss O'Neill in song after song has sung the emigrant's complaint from over the sea :

‘ Wathers o' Moyle, I hear ye callin'  
Clearer for half o' the world between,  
Antrim hills an' the wet rain fallin'  
Whiles ye are nearer than snow-tops keen.  
Dreams o' the night an' a night wind callin'—  
What is the half o' the world between ? ’

and it is always the same cry, the same backward gaze, whether from the English fields where the haymaker is sick at heart for ‘ Corrymeela in the same soft rain ’ or from over the wide Atlantic :

‘ An' now we're quarely betther fixed,  
In troth ! there's nothin' wrong ;  
But me and mine, by rain or shine  
We do be thinkin' long,’

with the half-puzzled note of bewildered surprise that regret can survive when bread is for the buying and a sound roof overhead.

Ethna Carbery has added her voice to chronicle the everyday tragedy of expatriation in 'The Passing of the Gael':

*'Oh, the cabins long-deserted!—Olden memories awake—  
O, the pleasant, pleasant place! Hush! The blackbird in the  
brake!*

They are going, going, going, and we cannot bid them stay.  
The fields are now the strangers' where the strangers' cattle stray.  
*Oh, Kathalcen Ní Houlihan, your way's a thorny way!*'

With another accent and a totally changed mental atmosphere, where reality is included in the compass of imaginative idealism, Mr. Colum's poems tell, though often by implication only, of the same impassioned instinct for the precincts and dwellings, for the floor of earth or of cabin, trodden in the years of dearth and in the years of plenty. On every page the passion for the 'land' is written plain, the plougher's passion, the drover's:

*'To Meath of the pastures,  
From wet hills by the sea,  
Through Leitrim and Longford  
Go my cattle and me.*

*I will bring you my kine,  
Where there's grass to the knee,  
But you'll think of scant croppings  
Harsh with salt of the sea.'*

So, too, Mr. Colum has written the passion of the man whose face the boards of the coffin will soon cover. For him, though his wake be thronged:

*'For who would keep back the hundreds  
Who would touch my breast and face?'*

though

*'Between the hill and the sea,  
Three women come down the mountain  
Will raise the Keen over me,'*

he will die but half solaced. Old and young may mourn him; those other twilight figures, whose sorrow is the grief of the Land itself, may bewail the son whom death has taken from her; still, he dies uncomforted, because, though the living repeat

his praises, the dead are dead ; because, though the grass that shall grow over the grave be sprung from the soil :

‘ I will not hear,  
When the cuckoo cries in Glenart,  
That the wind that lifts when the sails are loosed,  
Will never lift my heart.’

This string of the harp, indeed, is so often struck that it would seem as though use must have frayed the cord and muted the tone, were it not that in the true singing of any deep-planted instinct or affection of humankind the note is ever fresh and ever sure, and, to all seeming, never fails to find some individual and novel emphasis to justify recurrence to the well-worn theme.

There is a wide gap between the lyrics of phantasy, of sentiment, and of folk-song transferred to a culture-basis of expression, and A. E.’s culture-lyrics of almost undiluted mysticism. They belong to a wholly different sphere of Celtic idealism. In a brief sketch, entitled ‘*A Visionary*,’\* Mr. Yeats has analysed, not without an appreciative severity, the drift and essence of the Irish mystic’s temperament and art. The MS. poems, submitted to his friend’s criticism by the young hill-wanderer, the confidant of peasant-dreamers, ‘half mad,’ and of other ‘queer and conscience-stricken persons,’ are in Mr. Yeats’s judgement, ‘all endeavours to capture some high, impalpable mood in a net of obscure images. . . . There are fine passages in all, but these will often be imbedded in thoughts which have evidently a special value to the writer’s mind, but are to other men merely the counters of an unknown coinage . . . so much brass or copper or tarnished silver at the best.’ The critic proceeds to cite the exclamation of one of the young man’s old peasant companions—a visionary he also, with brain half crazed by causeless sadness. “God possesses the heavens,” cried the old wanderer, “God possesses the heavens, but He covets the “world!”” That insatiable desire reversed is reflected in A. E.’s aspirations. ‘This old man always rises before me when I think of X. Both seek, one in wandering sentences, the other . . . in subtle allegoric poetry, to express a something that lies beyond the range of expression.’ Both have (to quote once again the phrase) within them, in Mr. Yeats’s sentence, ‘the vast and vague extravagance that lies at the bottom of the ‘Celtic heart.’

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\* ‘*The Celtic Twilight*.’ Lawrence and Bullen. 1893.

There is much truth in the strictures of the fellow-poet who was neither afraid to praise the gift of expression in the younger artist's still unpublished essays, nor to note the inevitable failures of a poet who on his part courageously ignores that there are thoughts language cannot translate, as there are likewise—what Novalis, the Master-Mystic, confesses none need fear to own—truths of the spirit's apprehension which evade the unuttered formulas of thought itself. But completely intelligible thought, though it is one attribute of all sane poetry—and in poetry of philosophic and intellectual schools it is an essential element—is not from a purely æsthetic point of view of primary moment in all poetry. The purpose of the lyric art is by a certain employment of words, of the sound of words and by the imagery and association of words, to induce a sense of beauty or to arouse an emotional response. So far as thought is concerned, it is rather at suggestion, inference and implication than at a literal and explicit verbal rendering of thought that the poet of true lyricism aims. The very brevity of a genuine song-lyric almost precludes the accurate presentment of any thought which is not as self-contained as a passion or as self-centred as a sensation. It is an open question whether the choice of theme should be restricted to the capacities of verbal expression. Undoubtedly to a given point the thought indicated must be apprehendable as a general groundwork. Yet poetry would gain little and lose much were the poet not permitted to use, as the background of some lucid image or some distinct emotional impression, thoughts and ideas he has neither space nor perhaps power to outline.

Part of the obscurity of A. E.'s poems arises from this very method and practice. Behind all images drawn from nature, all emotions experienced and portrayed, lies a complicated conception; the mystic doctrine of a life anterior to the present; of the present life lived solely in relationship to that half-forgotten pre-existence of the soul. The key to many, if not to all, the difficulties encountered in his verses is contained in the preface to them, where the poet sets forth his creed. 'I know I am a spirit, and that I went forth in old time from the Self-ancestral to labours yet unaccomplished; but, filled ever and again with home-sickness, I made these songs by the way.' The riddle of his songs unravels when we hold the clue, the thought-thread upon which they are strung.

Union with the moods and elements of Nature is his passport to the fount of primeval being; woods and waters, mountain heights, sunsets, dawns and the 'star villages' of night are trysting-places where the temporal earth-soul may re-enter its



ancient peace and view again a beauty 'our eyes could never see'; a glory of which the world presents but broken images :

'When the breath of twilight blows to flame the misty skies,  
All its vaporous sapphire, violet glow and silver gleam,  
With their magic flood me through the gateway of the eyes ;  
I am one with the twilight's dream.

Aye, and deep and deep and deeper let me drink and draw  
From the older fountain more than light or peace or dream,  
Such primæval being as o'erfills the heart with awe,  
Growing one with its silent stream.' \*

His descriptive verses give pictures that testify to the skill of a painter's eye and hand :

'Dusk wraps the village in its dim caress ;  
Each chimney's vapour, like a thin grey rod,  
Mounting aloft through miles of quietness,  
Pillars the skies of God' ;

while lines and sentences pregnant with meaning in their reticent condensation lend themselves to quotation and dwell in the memory. The phrase of a lover of twilight :

'Withers once more the old blue flower of day' ;

the half reproach, as though decadent man were to blame for the fatality that made him human, expressed in the lines where he mourns that

'Forgetfulness falls on earth's myriad races ;  
No image of the proud and morning stars  
Looks at us from their faces,'

and in a sentence of equally suggestive brevity he declares the doctrine that love itself is but an echo of a deeper being :

'We kiss, because God once for beauty sought  
Within a world of dreams.'

A. E.'s cadences have caught the sound of a dream's unfretted footfall ; he is a singer, if it may be said, of silences. Substance is to him only a thick layer of transparencies under which, the strata varying in density, the spiritual universe reveals itself to his vision, and seldom does a wholly human emotion speak from the pages of the two earlier volumes. Yet when, as in his melancholy dedication of the second volume, his thought runs on simple lines of sentiment, the spirituality of his profounder transcendentalism loses nothing of its ethereality,

\* Homeward Songs.

while the æsthetic value of the verse is enhanced by a perfect correspondence of idea and expression :

‘ I thought, beloved, to have brought to you  
A gift of quietness and ease and peace,  
Cooling your brow as with the mystic dew  
Dropping from twilight trees.

Homeward I go not yet ; the darkness grows ;  
Not mine the voice to still with peace divine ;  
From the first fount the stream of quiet flows  
Through other hearts than mine.

Yet of my night I give to you the stars,  
And of my sorrow here the sweetest gains,  
And out of hell, beyond its iron bars,  
My scorn of all its pains.’ \*

With A. E., with Mr. Colum—a later comer—with Mr. Yeats, the range of recent Irish poetry covers a wide area. Other developements may follow, but none will represent more faithfully the Celtic gifts of emotion, imagination and phantasy. To what degree each has gained as member of a fellowship and school of literature may be doubted. There is a feminine quality in the artist that seeks sympathy and ripens on a community of ideals. There is another element of genius which tends towards isolation where the single-handed strife for self-expression is faced in the free hardihood of unaccompanied intellectual solitudes. The spirit of fraternity belongs of right to the spheres of the moral life, to the political, social, commercial life. On an artist, although his sympathies as a man may lean this way or that, it lays a yoke of loyalty to a faith, it involves an allegiance to communal ideals, contrary to that spirit of absolute individualism, of entire self-dependence, inherent to the genius of art ; it creates an artificial atmosphere—such as that of the Hugo *cénacle* of French romanticism, or of the Emersonian group of New England literature—which, while its neophytes proclaim their emancipation, establishes conventions of its own and crystallises liberty itself into new formulas. Genius will emerge, as Musset from the *cénacle* ; but talent—and the world has need of many works of art that fall short of genius—is apt under such influences to become the pledged echo of a cramped and an ephemeral fashion, and to pass under the thralldom of a narrowly circumscribed audience.

\* The Earth Breath.

## ART. VI.—VENICE AND THE RENAISSANCE.

1. *The Venetian Republic : its Rise, its Growth, and its Fall.* By W. CAREW HAZLITT. London : A. and C. Black. 1900.
2. *Venice : its Individual Growth from the Earliest Beginnings to the Fall of the Republic.* By POMPEO MOLMENTI. Translated by HORATIO F. BROWN. London : John Murray. 1908.
3. *Study and Criticism of Italian Art.* By BERNHARD BERENSON. London : George Bell. 1901.
4. *Florentine Sculptors of the Renaissance.* By WILLIAM BODE. London : Methuen. 1908.

VENICE'S position in regard to the Renaissance is peculiar among the States of Italy. From the main current of Renaissance ideas, from the intellectualism of the age, she stood apart. She offered, indeed, to all men of letters, to all poets, students, and scholars, a ready and hospitable asylum. She welcomed them warmly and was proud of their sojourn in her midst. The security, the splendour and the repose of the floating city, moored near to, yet separated from, the mainland, rendered her a quite ideal asylum for honoured thinkers and writers. Hither came Uberti and the critical Erasmus, and Galileo and Sarpi and Petrarch and Giordano Bruno and Tasso. Here was established, but by foreigners, towards the end of the fifteenth century, the celebrated Aldine Press, the effect of which was to give solidity and consistency to the new learning. Venice through these years figures as a patroness of culture, but yet not one man of real intellectual eminence issued from the richest and most magnificent city of Italy. She was fond of entertaining men of genius but she never bred them. She never experienced that 'sacred thirst' with which the rest of Italy 'sucked at the flagon' of the new knowledge. We have to descend some way in the scale of intellectual achievement before we come to Venice's contributions, nor were these the fruit of minds that convey an inspiration and an impetus, minds whose fervent love of ideas and delight in their own powers of thinking infect others, and so point the way to wider researches and completer enlightenment. Very little, in truth, of the mental excitement, the inward quickening and stirring which led to what we call the 'intellectual awakening' of the Renaissance were felt in Venice. Lapped in a semi-Oriental luxury, a marvel and a show, the gorgeous city seems, as our imagination takes in the extent of the intellectual movement which was simmering and seething among the cities of the mainland, to be sunk in a

dream and almost to have lost touch with the thought of the age in the contemplation of her own splendour and beauty. 'Her attitude'—to quote an appreciative critic—'her attitude is 'the attitude of an indolent and gracious woman reclining in 'the shadow of lime trees on an August afternoon, eating 'apricots and listening to a dispute among scholars.'

Yet Venice, too, had her idea, had, so to speak, a philosophy of life of her own. Sensuous rather than intellectual, her character in many respects strikes one as more Oriental than Western. Her ties with the East must never be forgotten. There exists to this day a confident tradition, treated by many as an historical fact, that her population is descended from a colony of emigrants from Asia Minor. Mr. Hazlitt, we notice, in his excellent *History of the Republic*, countenances to some extent the theory. 'There seems,' he says, 'to be some plausibility 'in the suggestion that a colony, passing in the course of migration from their native soil to Asia Minor, proceeded thence, in 'process of time, to Northern Italy, on the shores of which 'they founded numerous settlements.' These colonists, Mr. Hazlitt adds, 'were called Tyrrhenians or Etruscans,' and from their settlements round the mouth of the Po the Venetian stock was ultimately derived. If there is truth in the tradition the Venetians were of the same blood as the merchants of Tyre and Carthage, an offshoot of that wonderful trading race whose operations embraced the Mediterranean and extended to our own coasts. Various scraps of evidence occur in support of such a suggestion. In all her instincts and phases of development Venice is true to type. She has commerce in the blood. One can imagine a second Tyre starting business again in the Adriatic. Again, the very look of her people, their fleshy forms and faces, their almond eyes, and those big noses of theirs which Molmenti insists upon as the feature which most distinguished them, all verify a Semitic origin. They had innate in them, moreover, that race's instinctive passion for gorgeousness, and probably the aspect of Babylon and Nineveh, as of Tyre and Sidon later, was of much the same ostentatiously sumptuous character as distinguished the splendour of Venice. We have always thought that Venice's spontaneous reaching out to and ready comprehension of the East is rendered the more intelligible by the supposition of racial affinity. We must remember that not only did the greatness and very existence of the city come to hang upon her Eastern trade, but that in all matters of taste and art and culture her ideas were prompted by Eastern example and Eastern teaching. All of us must be struck by the strange spectacle of this floating, lit-up city upon which,

all through the centuries called 'dark,' there rests so strong and mysterious a glow of light and colour. Poets have insisted on what there is fairy-like and magical in this appearance, and their view is natural; for the causes which wrought her splendour being unseen and remote their effects have almost an air of enchantment. Venice, indeed, does not belong to the West either in ideas or aspect. She still seems, even in her bleached decay, almost like a bit of the East that, detached, has floated hither. In her great days, to the eyes of Europe bent upon her as she lay out at sea, she may have seemed like some great fleet that, heaped with Eastern riches,

'Hangs in the air by equinoctial gales  
Close-sailing from Bengala.'

And when from what is spectacular we turn to what is essential in her life we are struck by the same deep Oriental tinge. Life for Venice was no subject to be reasoned over, explained, and analysed, but it was something to be savoured and enjoyed. If she did not search out the meaning of things she laid herself open to a sensuous impression of them. If she did not reason acutely she felt deeply. This emotional interpretation of life has ever been more characteristic of East than West, and for that reason, perhaps, is apt to be misunderstood by the West and unduly depreciated, as if the neglect of intellectual effort must of necessity imply a self-abandonment to mere lazy voluptuousness. Thus Mr. Howells in his 'Venetian Life,' of which we were glad the other day to see a reprint, tells us how, in spite of his interest in and love of Venice, the life there seemed to cut him off from all the recognised and natural incentives of his age and race.

'Old habits of work, old habits of hope made my endless sojourn irksome to me, and almost intolerable when I ascertained fairly and finally that in my desire to fulfil long-cherished but, after all, merely general designs of literary study, I had forsaken wholesome struggle in the currents where I felt the motion of the age, and had drifted into a lifeless eddy of the world remote from incentive and sensation.'

No doubt if we accept the Western philosophy of intellectualism in the spirit in which Mr. Howells accepts it, we shall agree that a city so out of the movement as Venice is cut off from real life. But Mr. Howells wrote this little book of his nearly fifty years ago, and a good deal of water has gone under the bridge in the interval. It is questionable if Europe is just as satisfied with her intellectualism as she was half a century ago,

or just as sure that it affords, or ever can afford, her a solution of life in which she can rest and be satisfied. It is even conceivable that the contrary philosophy, the philosophy of feeling and of a profoundly emotional apprehension of the nature of things, may find itself able by-and-by to get a word in. No one who has observed—and who can fail to have observed?—the strong interest and curiosity manifested nowadays by Europe in all phases of Eastern thought, will find this an extravagant conjecture, and, if this is so, Venice's point of view will be sure to gain in interest and significance for us. Let us endeavour, then, to discern more clearly what there was peculiar in this point of view, and in what manner its characteristics have found their expression in Venetian art.

Some few years ago there appeared an article in this Review ('*Edinburgh Review*,' October 1904, '*Byzantine Architecture*') in which an attempt was made to distinguish between the sensuous appeal of colour and the intellectual appeal of form. It was pointed out that, in those buildings in which the intention of the Greek architects seemed most fully developed, all prominent structural forms, such as architraves, cornices, pilasters, and so on, were done away with, and that there were substituted for them, as notes of the Byzantine style, rounded, flexible and indeterminate forms, such as apses, domes, and plain vaults. Further it was urged that the reasons for this substitution are to be sought in the processes of our own minds; that, as a sensuous and impressionable mood is broken and interrupted by the intrusion of intellectual definitions and arguments, so the sensuous effect of the rich colour scheme of, say, the interior of St. Mark's would be broken by the intrusion of those clear-cut features and forms, the structural purpose of which challenges intellectual appreciation and analysis. The reader, whatever he may think of these arguments, will probably admit some truth in the premises on which they are based. Colour obviously in its nature appears to be sensuous, for it has in itself no meaning of an intellectual kind whatever. We easily think of the emotional value of colour, but not of its intellectual significance. Passion is interpretable into terms of colour; much emotion we think of as full or rich coloured; lack of emotion as colourless. Thus feeling and passion and all the sensuous elements of our nature seem to express themselves at once in colour, but nothing intellectual so expresses itself. Envy may be green, passion red, jealousy yellow, but no one ever talks or thinks of red reasons, or yellow arguments, or green ideas. You cannot associate colour with intellectual operations as you associate it

with emotional operations. Intellectual operations are associated with form. We talk of ideas or plans conceived in the mind 'taking form,' or 'taking shape,' as they assume intellectual coherence and significance; and in the same way matter that is formless is matter that is void of intellectual significance, and it puts on intellectual significance and clothes itself in intelligible meaning just in so far as it assumes definite form. We readily describe all intellectual processes in terms of form. We speak of *exact* statements, *coherent* reasoning, *clear-cut* logic, and the like; 'exact,' 'coherent,' 'clear-cut' being all properties of form.

We need not dwell on an obvious distinction, but we may point out to the reader how in all natural sights and landscapes the same distinction may be traced, and how the emotional or intellectual impressions we derive from nature are always dependent on the degree to which the sense of the form of things is veiled or developed. We all know how the landscape that spreads round us, prosaic and matter of fact with all its features defined in the light of common day, becomes steeped in sentiment and feeling as soon as the shades of evening, or the mist rising along the valley, obscure its details. We have all, looking out at a moonlit garden, been arrested by a shock of surprise at the transformed scene, and felt how keenly in that altered guise it appealed to the emotional sense in us. These are among our constant experiences, but what do they mean? Why does Arnold, when he wants us to feel the sentiment and romance that cling to Oxford, speak of her as 'spreading her 'gardens in the moonlight'? Why does Scott tell us that, if we would lay ourselves open to the emotional suggestions of Melrose Abbey, we must visit its ruins 'by the pale moon-light'? Why is the moon so identified with sentiment and feeling, with the rhapsodies of poets and lovers? Why do ghosts walk by night and witches and goblins restrict their activity to the hours of darkness? Why is night the season of all vague terrors and alarms? In a word, why does obscurity let loose our fancies and so act upon the emotional side of our nature that it becomes sensible to the least suggestions?

Not because of any positive additions which obscurity introduces into the scene, for it introduces none such, but because it quiets and lays to rest our rational and intellectual faculties and so leaves our emotional nature free to act. And how does it lay to rest our rational and intellectual faculties? By blotting out or veiling those objects and appearances which it is the business of the intellectual faculties to attend to, and the presence of which keeps those faculties on the alert: in other

words by veiling the attribute of *form* in things. The instant that forms, with all their suggestions of definite meaning and uses, are seen the mind gets to work and the emotional mood is dispelled. Hence the obscuring of form is the invariable preliminary condition to the awakening of purely emotional sensibility. So much is this so, that all those natural influences which we recognise as emotional in their kind are obscuring influences. Night, dense shadows, the decaying touch of time, mist and fog, distance, all these are influences that lend enchantment, that stimulate the emotional side of us, and they all do it in the same way—namely, by toning down the exactitude of form and so hushing off to sleep, as it were, the faculty within us which takes note of form.

This, we say, is the indispensable *preliminary* to the awakening of emotional sensibility. But the quality and degree of emotional sensibility awakened depends upon the aid of a more positive influence than mere negation. And such an influence is forthcoming. For now we find that the emotional mood has a tremendous ally of its own in *colour* which with the obscuring of form assumes a rôle of hitherto unimagined importance. The depth and richness of the emotional suggestions conveyed become now its care. All scenes, no doubt, are endowed with colour of a sort; but since those natural influences which obscure form as a rule obscure colour too, the colour effect of such scenes is usually low in tone, as on damp, misty days, or almost negative, as at night. The emotional effect of such low-toned colour is of a like quality to itself: that is to say, it reaches for the most part only to a melancholy or pensive mood. Personally, though we acknowledge them to be of emotional origin, we yet hold that these almost colourless sensations are too anæmic and why-faced a crew quite to merit that so splendid a word as emotion should be applied to them. They are the weaklings of the breed and the word sentiment best perhaps describes them. The sentiment of misty winter woods, the sentiment of twilight and murky London streets—such seems the proper definition of those scenes. But when, as sometimes, in the heavy and shadowed bronze and gold of autumn woods, to dimness of form is added the utmost richness and splendour of colouring, then there is produced an emotional effect of corresponding power and intensity, an emotional effect which is able to steep our whole being in ecstasy and lift it to the highest point, perhaps, to be attained by man in the sphere of pure sensation.

It seems, then, as far as Byzantine architecture is concerned, that the Greeks in all their procedure were merely turning laws of nature into laws of art. For having it now as their object



to produce a profoundly emotional and sensuous effect—as formerly it had been their object in the Doric style to produce a clean-cut intellectual effect—they first proceeded rigorously to tone down and subdue the sense of form—which they did partly by discarding all such forms as are of clear and exact definition and substituting rounded and indeterminate ones for them, and partly by flooding the whole interior of their buildings with a dense chiaroscuro which wrapped it all in profound mystery—and having thus achieved their first object, the indispensable preliminary, as we have called it, to every strong emotional appeal, by quieting the intellectual suggestions of form, they then proceeded to add depth and richness to the emotional suggestion they had paved the way for by calling in the aid of colour. Moreover, the power of the sensuous impression being in proportion to the power of the colouring, they called in the aid of the richest colour possible, inventing a process to that end and enveloping the whole interior of their building in the deep tints and ruddy gold of mosaic work. All this is merely the working out on logical lines of natural effects. The perfection of the logic is Greek, and is not to be met with elsewhere. Nevertheless, if the distinction we have drawn is a true one, if form is indeed the true vehicle of intellectualism and colour the true vehicle of emotionalism, we shall be sure to find the conclusion sustained in a greater or less degree by the creative art of other ages and races. We shall find that the more distinctively life at any given time develops on intellectual lines, the more its art will develop on lines of form; while the more distinctively life develops on emotional lines, the more artistic development will be on the side of colour.

Now, as we know, the Renaissance was remarkable for two things: an outburst of intellectual activity and an outburst of artistic activity. Both these movements were focussed in Florence. It was in Florence that the first signs of the great 'intellectual awakening' occurred, and as long as the movement remained in charge of Italy it was Florence which presided over and controlled it. Her place in the Renaissance has often been compared to the place of Athens in classic thought. Take away Athens and there is no such thing as the Greek intellectual influence. Take away Florence and there is no such thing as the intellectual influence of the Renaissance. Athens and Florence are in a singular degree *sources* of intellectual vigour and inspiration. Many cities have possessed the intellectual character, and in particular, of course, the great university cities, which have made intellectual culture the aim of their existence, have possessed it. But there is a difference between

culture deliberately pursued and a spontaneous impulse in the direction of enlightenment and thought. Athens and Florence did not influence the world, as Padua and Bologna, or Paris and Oxford have influenced it, by teaching and turning out scholars. They influenced it by showing it how delightful and infinitely enjoyable a thing it is for man to exercise his intellectual faculties. Of the ultimate fruits of this kind of activity—of the discoveries, inventions, and researches of modern times—they knew nothing. Others in these times have excelled them. But these others have been inspired by their example, and to this day it revives within us the early delight in intellectual activity to turn back to the manifestations of that activity in the life of Athens and Florence. And, pre-eminent as sources of intellectual inspiration, Athens and Florence are pre-eminent in the arts of form. Classic art at its best and most representative is Athenian, is the art of the age of Pericles, and classic art is essentially an art of form. No visions of rich suffusions of colour, melting down the austerity of form and blending under the influence of chiaroscuro into great emotional effects cross the mind at the mention of classic art. There is nothing mystical in that art. Its aim is perfect definition. Those who have studied the delicate, the almost imperceptible inflections which pervade the form of a Doric temple will know to what lengths this love of perfect definition could carry the Greeks. But, more even than architecture, the art of form *par excellence* is sculpture, for sculpture is based on no utilitarian motive, but arises entirely out of the mental longing to define perfectly. In the enthusiasm with which it was prosecuted, no less than in the perfection which it attained, sculpture declares itself as the appropriate art-language of classical life. Clear-cut, exact, the sworn foe of the mystical and the indefinite, it bodies forth the classical ideal of thought and conduct. The success it achieved is due to its finding in the life of the period the exact nourishment it required. It is an example of the most intellectualised of the arts feeding on life at its most intellectualised moment.

That moment could never be quite reproduced. The Italian Renaissance might awaken again the old intellectual love of defining, analysing, comprehending, but it was beyond its power to repose upon and rest satisfied with its own definitions. There had been poured into life since the classic age ideas which intellect could not handle or control, which lent themselves to no intellectual definition; and these ideas, which were indefinable and yet refused to be cast out, are, in the sculpture of the Renaissance, a perpetually disturbing influence. Renaissance

sculpture is always more or less excited, always more or less capricious and experimental. It has lost the old calmness, serenity and certitude. Intellect has no longer the same sure control of life that it had. This in Renaissance sculpture as compared with classic is a source of weakness. But yet, in spite of these qualifications, the intellectual revival of the Renaissance was so perfectly genuine an affair, intellectualism was so truly the vital force of that age, that sculpture had, for the first time since the classic epoch, the power it needed behind it, and its own vitality was proportionate. Florence, naturally, being the centre and source of Renaissance intellectualism became the centre and source of Renaissance sculpture. Culture and the love of ideas were spread through Italy and Europe by Florentine thinkers, poets and men of letters. In the same way Professor Bode explains in his work on Florentine sculpture how that art was carried abroad by Florentine artists. After pointing out that 'Florence is the home of modern art,' and that 'in no branch of art has Florence so unqualified a claim to this pre-eminence as in sculpture,' he goes on to show that it was the superfluity of this kind of genius in Florence which nourished the rest of Europe, and that Florence 'could afford, out of her abundance, to supply not only Italy but the rest of the continent' with instruction in this department of art. Thus in Florence as in Athens, the outburst of delight in intellectual activity, in the intellectual exercise of analysing, defining and identifying, was the impulse which inevitably took effect on sculpture, and breathed life into that great art of form which feeds upon and expresses those mental processes.

If space allowed we could trace the similar development of mind and art. We could follow throughout the Florentine Renaissance an increase of intellectual vigour, lucidity, and power moving in step with a constantly increasing precision and certitude in the art of sculpture. And not only could we trace this development in sculpture, the art of form, but we could trace it very clearly in painting, into which form enters as an ingredient only. For the effect of the mental bias prevailing in Florence was immediately to bring this ingredient into prominence in painting and give it the ascendancy. In Florentine painting form is the governing factor: in other words, its motives are conceived as ideas. From the first definite forward movement as initiated by Giotto, the instinct of Florentine painting was to define, to say something definite. It is a painting backed up all along by fine intellectual conceptions. And here again it would be a study of no small interest to observe the stages by which, as the intellectual capacity for defining and realising

and comprehending grew and increased, so and by similar stages the art of painting, the capacity for representing things in their real forms, grew likewise, until the old Byzantine helplessness was entirely cleared away and man and nature appeared in their natural semblances. This was the process which gradually fitted Florentine painting to become the appropriate vehicle of intellectual ideas, and just as Europe put on Florentine ideas so it put on in due course the Florentine ideals of painting too. Mr. Berenson has drawn attention to the fact that it was Florentine painting only which was destined to expand and hand down a progressive tradition and that all schools which did not draw from this source had the mark of provinciality and were out of harmony with the mental development of Europe and so destined to be short-lived.

We are still living on Florentine traditions. The intellectual impulse started by Florence still controls life though it may not wholly absorb it, and, in consequence, we still 'find ourselves' in the Florentine intellectual conception of art. We may have lost the creative inspiration—that depends on a happy conjunction of many influences—but the Florentine point of view remains our point of view to this day.

Nor can we readily imagine any other. To represent definite ideas and recognisable aspects of nature, to be interpreted, in short, is the object of all modern art. 'Clever' is the word most commonly used to describe it. The modern artist, like the modern critic, looks at art exclusively from the intellectual standpoint. Nevertheless, another point of view there is. An art may exist, has indeed existed, not intellectual, not tending to express itself in terms of form, yet nevertheless possessing its own powerful and permanent attraction because based on something in human nature not less enduring than intellect. In his 'Florentine Painters' Mr. Berenson has pointed out the broad distinction between Florentine and Venetian painters. Bring the greatest names of both schools together and the difference, as he says, is striking. 'The significance of the Venetian names is exhausted with their significance as painters. Not so with the Florentines. Forget that they were painters, they remain great sculptors; forget that they were sculptors, and still they remain architects, poets, and even men of science.' Intellect is naturally versatile. A man of intellect brings to bear on all subjects the same faculties of comprehension which he exercises on any particular one. The versatility, therefore, of the essentially intellectual Florentine artists is not to be wondered at. But what are we to say of the Venetians? By contrast with their great rivals, their non-intellectual character is at once apparent. Not only are they

themselves lacking in intellectual versatility, but their work in their own particular line as painters is lacking in intellectual interest and power. By contrast with the fine and keen intelligence which is spread over Florentine canvases, Venetian pictures are stupid. And the more thoroughly Venetian they become the more stupid they become. Down to about the end of the fifteenth century, Venetian painting was governed entirely from the mainland. It was Italian, not Venetian, and its painters, Alvise Vivarini, Carpaccio, the Bellini, are intelligent in the intellectual sense. But directly we come to the great colourists this intellectual interest dies out. It would be odd, indeed, if it did not. For now painting becomes for the first time Venetian. It is nourished on Venetian life, and in Venetian life, by contrast with the vivid alertness and mental sensitiveness of Florentine life, we miss just the same quality which we miss in the art. We miss the eager, acute conversations, the give-and-take of wit and thought, the play of mind: in a word, the intellectualism which so pervades the life of the city on the Arno.

But if this goes out of Venetian art, what takes its place? If Venetian art is not intellectual, what is it, and to what is its strength due? The answer of course will be that Venetian art is an art of colour; its strength lies there; this it is that has taken the place of form. It has been observed that if you call a difficulty by a name it disappears, and that seems to be the case in the present instance. We call the attraction of Venetian art colour and think we have explained it. But of what nature is that attraction, to what faculties does it appeal and what was there particular and consummate in the Venetian use of it? We know how many-sided and various are the interests belonging to form; how full of meaning and subtle significance and keenly observed characteristics it can be; how infinitely suggestive in its interpretation. In Venetian art colour is the substitute for all this, and we are content to call it colour and have done with it. Might it not occur to us that an attraction which is capable of rivalling and, as some think, even eclipsing the great intellectual attraction in art, should itself be susceptible of some further explanation; that the appeal it makes to us and the effect it has upon us must be more or less intelligible? Everyone is familiar with Mr. Berenson's explanation of the influence of the arts of form. Mr. Berenson's own mental bias, let us note in passing, is essentially intellectual: he distinguishes and separates with a touch as fine as that of Mino da Fiesole. His theory of 'tactile values' as a test of excellence in painting is expressly based on the

recognition that it was 'upon form, and form alone, that the 'great Florentine masters concentrated their efforts.' It elaborates an explanation of the stimulating and life-enhancing effects of form in art, the importance of which, by German critics especially, has been more fully recognised than acknowledged. But where are we to find the corresponding explanation of the effects of colour ?

None the less, we believe the Venetian use of colour stands for a criticism of life every bit as forcible and definite as the Florentine use of form, only more difficult to formulate owing to the fact that the Venetian philosophy has so fallen into abeyance as to be hardly intelligible to us. We have grown so accustomed to living from the intellectual side of our nature that we scarcely understand what is meant by living from its sensuous side. We do not admit that sensuous impressions may be as valuable guides to truth as intellectual definitions, that feeling is often as illuminating as thinking. Our own hold upon truth being rational and intellectual, we are prone to conclude there is no other. The consequence is that when we come to deal with a subject of sensuous character we perpetually take hold of it by that which is accidental or superficial in it, and miss what is essential. Thus, in the case of Venice, we find Western writers constantly dwelling on the frivolous and corrupt aspects of the city's life, on her carnivals and carousals, the splendour of her pageants, her unrestrained and wanton luxury, and all the marks of that enervating voluptuousness which by degrees drained the vigour out of her, as though the whole history of the State for the last four hundred years of its existence were bound up in these extravagances. It is an error. Sensuality is the disease which attacks sensuousness, but it is not the same thing as sensuousness. Underneath Venetian sensuality, underneath all the symptoms of corruption and decay, there existed that which was being corrupted, that which was gradually decaying. This was her sensuous susceptibility, her capacity for deep feeling. Throughout Venetian history this is the factor which plays the chief part. And as it plays the chief part in her life, so it plays the chief part in her art.

We have called Venice Oriental. Now it is to be observed that, generally speaking, the whole system of discipline and control common to European States is lacking to Eastern ones. An enlightened government, popular liberty, representation, the franchise, parliament, the direction and control by the citizens of the legislative and executive functions, all these things, clearly the outcome of the practical intellectual faculty and which have come to seem to us inseparable conditions of the

health and vigour of society, are conditions which have always been wanting to Oriental States. From the earliest development of Western civilisation it has been dimly felt that the way of citizenship was the way of life. We watch our young English boroughs struggling for the free exercise of their rights as we watch an infant kicking out with its arms and legs. These are signs of vitality. Let the sense of the value of their rights and privileges be lost to our citizens and we can scarcely imagine but that all national vigour and social health must go with it. And yet Oriental States, somehow or other, with none of these preservatives, have been healthy and vigorous and long-lived. What gave Egypt and Assyria their national cohesion and kept the life in them fresh and strong? What constituted the social bond in those societies, and why did they not, lacking the ties which we rely on, dissolve into anarchy? And so too, what was the secret preservative of the strength of the old Indian principalities and how did they succeed in handing down from generation to generation a social unity unwasted and unimpaired?

Oriental communities have safeguards of their own. They may be non-intellectual, but they are as a rule intensely emotional. Careless of self-government they are liable, under the despotic oppression, to fits of furious passion which result commonly in the annihilation of the despot and his instruments, and which have the effect, like periodical thunderstorms, of clearing the air for the time being. But chiefly the strength of such societies consists in the instinctive susceptibility and responsiveness of all their members to every kind of natural appeal, claim, and tie. The claims of old age upon youth, the claims of children upon their parents, the claims of blood relationship, of race, the sacred claims of hospitality and of religious obligations, all these and others of the kind are profoundly felt and instantly admitted. They become the natural bond, therefore, of a society in character sensuous and emotional, and they take the place, and compensate for the absence of, those duties and civic responsibilities which intellectualised societies recognise and discharge. In all these respects the government of Venice inclines more to the Oriental than the European type. We call the Island State a Republic, but the name expresses rather the form than the spirit of her rule. There are to be found in Venetian history plenty of furious popular insurrections against tyranny and despotism; but these outbursts are followed up by no vindication of the rights of citizenship, by no provisions for the constitutional expression of the national will. The paroxysm of rage and resentment over, the people

relapse into immediate indifference. If the reader will follow rapidly, through the pages of Mr. Hazlitt's History, the changes and development of Venetian government he will be struck by the entire absence of what we may call the civic instinct on the part of the people. Already during the first four centuries of the life of the State, while yet political organisation was loose and each island practically ruled itself, we find everywhere the despotic habit asserting itself. Despite the theoretical rights of the public Assembly, each tribune was despot of his own island. 'Each aspired to absolute and undivided authority,' and they made such use of their opportunities that they 'seldom bequeathed to those who came after them anything beyond the task of perpetuating civil discord and public misery.' The institution of the Dogeship took place at the end of the seventh century, but though the popular Assembly possessed and sometimes exercised the right of election, no constitutional control was exerted over the Doge's authority, and he was, as Mr. Hazlitt points out, 'virtually, and in all material respects, Autocrat of Venice.' During the long period between the decline of the tribunes and the rise of the aristocratic power the symptoms of the decline of even the rude attempts at freedom which had characterised the early stages of the Republic's career are unmistakeable. There is apparent a constant tendency of the ducal office to pass into the hands of a few powerful families. The practice of associating son with father in the occupation of office is the common means of evading a popular election. As time elapses the guidance of the Venetian State slips from the control of a people indifferent to the idea of self-government and becomes the prize to be plotted, intrigued and fought for by a handful of patricians and their factions. In tracing the career of the ruling dynasties, as they may be called, of the Badoers, the Sanudi and others, we seem to be following the incidents of some of the Byzantine dynasties of Constantinople. There are the same poisonings and plottings among the various pretenders to the throne, the same indifference of a people excitable indeed yet lacking the political faculty. Such an episode as the massacre of Sanudo IV.—the vicious depravity of the man himself, the fickle fury of the mob, the flamelike insurrection, the trapped doge peering out from behind his palace mercenaries at the scene of rage and violence, the direction by a few cool heads of the aimless popular fury, the storming of the palace and the casting forth of the tyrant's body to the dogs—such an episode, and it is one among a hundred such, is in keeping in every detail with Oriental traditions. It is, of course, true that deeds of violence, insurrections,



massacres, and the like, are common to the early history of all European States and communities. But in these the violence is the outcome of the generally diffused struggle between popular liberty and feudal tyranny. It has an object, and is in a manner progressive. But in Venetian life the people seem to ignore altogether that profound impulse so operative in other European cities. As Mr. Hazlitt acutely remarks, 'even their occasional resistance to tyranny, marked by deeds of horrid and dark cruelty, left no deep or enduring traces behind it. It established no principle. It taught no lesson.' And this was in the centuries prior to the revolution of 1172 which definitely constituted the aristocracy 'the predominant element in the body politic.'

The suppression or decline of the old ineffective public assemblies and the institution of the first council, in which the chief Doge-supplying families had pooled their ambitions, and which rapidly passed under their exclusive influence, mark the moment of the almost explicit abandonment of the ideal of popular liberty as expressed in the government of the State. This revolution of the end of the twelfth century, worked by the aristocracy in its own interests, took place quietly and aroused no opposition. The people watched their chance of exercising direct control over their government pass from them without a murmur. It was a privilege they valued lightly, for they had never used it effectively. The steps and degrees by which the aristocracy confirmed and concentrated their power need not be followed here. They resulted, as the reader knows, in the concentration of all governing authority into the hands of a small and rigidly defined section of society; in the formation of secret and intricate tribunals deliberating with closed doors; in the elaboration of a whole system of silent espionage, which watched in all streets and sat at all tables, and overheard all conversations, and whispered its reports daily to its hidden organisers; which dealt its blows quietly and swiftly; which prompted the assassin's dagger and turned the key of secret dungeons. Briefly it resulted in the consolidation of a government Oriental to the core in all its methods and instincts.

Characteristics which appear but fitfully in individuals frequently loom large in the life of the State. We touch on these aspects of Venetian history because they teach us to appreciate the meaning of that history. They help us, that is to say, to realise the alienation of the city from the intellectual West, and her close approximation in thought and feeling to the sensuous and emotional East. For a corresponding set of facts in private life we might go to the pages of Molmenti's history, of which the last

volumes of Mr. Horatio Brown's translation have recently appeared, and where we should meet with racial characteristics which would constantly transport us from West to East. We are not thinking only, or mainly, of that passionate love of shows and pageants which strikes the eye so forcibly, and on which historians are so fond of enlarging. Rather we are thinking of, to name an example or two, such indications of temperament as the position of women in the State, or the type of female beauty universally admired. Molmenti describes the type thus: 'The hair is yellow like ripe corn, the eyes blue, the cheeks round and rosy, the lips full and moist, the breast snow-white. We may take it for certain,' he adds, 'that most of the models who sat to Venetian artists were women of the people, usually full-bodied and large-limbed; the Venetian temperament admired as the ideal of female beauty the slow movement, the abundant flanks, the full breasts of the noble matrons;' with much more to the same effect. That obviously is a quite Oriental estimate of womanhood. Quite Oriental, too, or almost quite, is the position filled by women and the training and education of girls. There are no Catherine d'Estes and Vittoria Colonnas in Venice. 'The ladies of noble families, who, like Oriental women, lived much at home and appeared in public only on great occasions to display their jewels and brocades, had but few opportunities of meeting strangers.' The attachment of men to women 'was not disturbed by sentimentality, but went straight to its mark, the enjoyment of physical beauty.' Of Venetian girls we are told, 'they grow up in wearisome idleness, relieved only by needlework.' They were 'rarely allowed to leave the house, not even to go to church, and on the few occasions when they appeared in the street they were attended by armed servants and wore great veils of white silk which covered the head and breast.' What a difference between such a type of womanhood, unintelligent, uneducated, totally uninterested in the questions of the day, whether political or literary and artistic, scented and painted and jewelled, with abundant flanks and all the rest of it, presiding contentedly in the retirement of the harem over the emotional resources of the establishment: what a contrast between such a one and the typical Florentine woman, so alert in mind, so keen yet so receptive, so sensitive to the finest shades of meaning, so fond of brilliant society, and so well qualified by tact and flexibility of intelligence to guide and control its conversation. Consider the two carefully, and is it not evident that they emerge out of a life different in its very composition? The Venetian woman represents a national character in which

what is sensuous preponderates. The Florentine woman represents a national character in which what is intellectual preponderates. But the two are not Venetian and Florentine only; they are Eastern and Western. Every trait distinctive of Venetian womanhood is an Oriental trait, and, like the political facts already cited, illustrates her inveterate leaning towards Eastern habits of thinking and feeling.

What, then, we would emphasise is that in considering Venice and the Venetian character we must set aside our Western ideals, and regard the Venetians as in many respects more allied to the East in thought and feeling than to the West; the main feature of this difference being a strong tendency to a sensuous and emotional interpretation of life, and a strong repugnance to an intellectual interpretation of life; and we have dwelt on this distinction at some length because, art being always an expression of life, if the difference in life is clearly grasped, the difference, and the significance of that difference, in art will be readily appreciated. Explain the life, and the art will explain itself.

With this thought, then, in our minds, of a race of people sensuous and emotional, not intellectual, let us turn back for a moment to the characteristic Venetian painting. Down to the appearance of Giorgione Venetian art, as we have seen, was governed from the mainland, but with Giorgione there arises within Venice herself a school of art different in character from any hitherto known, a school which we recognise as Venice's especial contribution to art, and to which it is understood that we refer when we use the phrase 'Venetian Art.' The enthusiasm, amounting to a kind of creative ecstasy, with which the new style was welcomed and developed, sufficiently attests its genuinely national character. Giorgione, Titian, Palma, Lotto, Bonifazio, Tintoretto, Pordenone, Veronese, Paris Bordone, Catena, Ceriani, Jacopo Bassano, the names as the fifteenth century closes in come thick and fast as the big, hot drops of a thunderstorm. And, separated though they may be by different degrees of genius, these men are all alike. They all speak the Venetian language in painting. In their handiwork, and for the first time, a people sensuous and emotional but not intellectual, utters itself in art. What is there singular in its mode of expressing itself?

All Venetian painters, big and little, have this characteristic in common: they all subordinate form to colour, instead of subordinating colour to form. We were observing just now that form is in its own nature intellectual, colour in its own nature emotional. Now where the characteristics of form,

its precision and clear-cut definite statements, are kept to the front and vigorously insisted on, its colour, whatever that may happen to be, becomes merely one of its several attributes. It is a property of form, a means of explaining and defining it, and its value as colour is subordinate to the effectiveness with which it performs that office. This is the decorative use of colour. But let the characteristics of form be blurred and kept in abeyance, and colour at once assumes a different value. It is now no longer a mere property of form ; it is no longer used to express form. We think of and feel only the sensuous effect of the colour itself. This is the emotional use of colour. From this it follows that the amount of colour-effect attained by any given painting will be found to depend in the first place, not on the amount of colour used, but on which of the two ways just specified it is used in. The least touch of emotional colour has more power, strikes a deeper chord in us, than any amount of decorative colour ; nor will the multiplying of the most emphatic hues ever make decorative colour emotional. So long as the ascendancy of form is insisted on, you may load on the scarlet and crimson without ever getting beyond the same limit. Coloured objects you will attain to, not colour. In this respect we are constantly led into quite absurd misapprehensions as to the amount of colour which pictures contain ; for as a little emotional colouring goes further than a great deal of decorative colouring we are apt always to think of it as more in itself. Really, it is the way it is used that makes it seem more. It is greater in effect but not in amount. Thus most of us certainly think the Venetian school of painting as singular in the amount and richness of the colour it employs. By great colourists we mean, or think we mean, men who use a great deal of colour. But as a matter of fact the majority of Venetian pictures are actually rather colourless. No school contains so large a percentage of black and dark brown to the square foot. Tintoretto—who may perhaps be taken as the central representative of the school, for Titian, the only personality at all comparable to him in scope and power, is of too intellectual a cast of mind to be quite typical of its spirit—Tintoretto, one of the greatest of colourists, is singularly sparing of vivid tints, and the general tenor of his colouring is dark almost to gloom. There is ten times as much show and brilliance of tint in any average half-dozen pre-Raphaelite pictures, nay, there is ten times as much show and brilliance of tint in the majority of pictures in any year's Royal Academy exhibition as is to be found in a representative half-dozen of Tintoretto's pictures. How easy it is to call to mind in any modern exhibi-

tion landscapes of brilliant yellow foliage and blue sky, azure sea with strip of golden sand, portraits of soldiers or hunting men in vivid scarlet tunics and coats. Tintoretto never used colour with anything approaching this prodigality. No, the difference is not in amount but in kind. The painters we have named, the pre-Raphaelites and the Royal Academicians, use colour to define form. Sea or sand, the features of the landscape, the scarlet coat of the soldier, tell for what they are. Their colour is a mere means to help one to realise their intellectual attribute of form. But Tintoretto's colouring is not of this kind. His pictures are for the most part dark and heavily shadowed. There are no clear-cut lines. The shapes of things are suggested rather than revealed. Under these conditions the colour employed seems not so much to define objects as to be imparted to the whole composition. Smouldering in the heart of the picture it communicates a glow which is felt even in the depths of the darkest shadows.

Not much colour, then, but suffused colour is the note of the Venetian school. And if we ask by what technical means this suffusion is obtained the answer is, by the use of a powerful scheme of *chiaroscuro*. For as it is the constant endeavour of form to restrict colour to its own dimensions, to use it decoratively, that is to say, so there exists but one agent, which, mightier than form and able to blend, unite, or obscure all forms at its own pleasure, can set colour free of its thralldom. That agent is *chiaroscuro*, and hence it is that all really great colourists are past-masters in the use of light and shade, and by this are most unmistakeably recognised. It is their business, and instinctively they know it, if they would secure the emotional and sensuous effects of colour, to soften down and obscure by the use of *chiaroscuro* this intellectual appeal of form. Tintoretto, whom we have instanced as the typical Venetian painter, is most typical in this. All the Venetians have the gift, it is the trade mark of their guild, but Tintoretto's mastery of it has in it something unique. Every subject and kind of composition is ordered and disposed by Tintoretto wholly in terms of light and shade. He has no need to use, as the more intellectual Titian and the less profoundly emotional Veronese so often have to use, the masses and outlines of architecture to map out and control the composition of his larger canvases. The immensity of the 'Paradiso,' with its monotonous array of countless figures, is handled by him with the facility of an easel picture, and that solely by an arrangement of *chiaroscuro*. It is this mastery of *chiaroscuro* which constitutes Tintoretto the greatest exponent of emotional painting that has yet lived.

His pre-eminence over his great rival in this respect is indicated by the briefest comparison of their two renderings of the 'Presentation in the Temple.' Titian's picture is arranged by the help of the buildings in the background and the strongly defined flight of steps up which the Virgin mounts in the foreground. Tintoretto's is not arranged at all, at least not structurally, for the sombre figures that rudely frame the stairway tell only as dark masses against the paler background. Chiaroscuro only governs it, and chiaroscuro only invests it with its almost awful depth of emotion. Without attempting to summarise the merits of two such works it may be said with confidence that, as regards the force and directness of its emotional appeal, Titian's interpretation is cold compared to Tintoretto's, and that the latter's superiority in this respect consists in his greater mastery over chiaroscuro, his greater mastery over that tremendous agent whose function it is to tone down the uncompromisingly intellectual characteristics of form. There are critics, we know, who find in Tintoretto something turgid and melodramatic. This is partly due, perhaps, to the fact that in modern art criticism has arrived at that stage of intellectual dryness which has a natural suspicion of anything like strong feeling; but apart from that it may be conceded that Tintoretto was, on some occasions, and when dealing with certain subjects, liable to those kinds of excesses. They are the defects of the temperament he possessed. At his best, however, he paints in the perfect manner of a great colourist, letting loose without effort the utmost sensuous resources of his medium. In Titian's works the chief colour notes, however effective, appear almost always to be calculated and arbitrarily introduced; with Tintoretto they are inevitable and seem to be there of their own accord, for they are part of the emotion of the whole picture. Tintoretto's procedure seems to have been something like this: He chose to begin with, if possible, a subject charged with emotion. He then proceeded to treat it according to its nature, that is to say he toned down and obscured the outlines of form, and mapped out the subject instead in pale or sombre masses of light and shade. Under the control of this powerful scheme of chiaroscuro the colouring of the composition was placed, but its own character, its degree of richness or sobriety, was determined by the kind of emotion belonging to the subject. To use colour in this way, not with emotional force only but with emotional truth, is to use it to perform one of the greatest functions that art can perform. It is to use it to open up the very heart of the meaning of a subject. We would instance 'The Crucifixion' as a case in point.

In the several groups of figures and faces there is nothing significant whatever. The picture lends itself to no intellectual estimate; all that may be dismissed. But yet so powerful and, above all, so terribly significant in its deep mystery and livid terror is the mighty scheme of chiaroscuro in which the scene is muffled, and so profoundly true to the emotions of the occasion are the dim and solemn hues which pervade the gloom, that all other renderings of this event seem, compared with this, to be beside the mark.

This is what is singular in the Venetian use of colour; and this system, on which the Venetian colourists worked, of creating an emotional atmosphere by the use of chiaroscuro and then charging it with colour, was precisely the system elaborated on a still grander scale by Byzantine architects. These drew their inspiration from the same source as the Venetians. Their object was to express the sensuous Oriental temperament in terms of its own proper medium, colour; and forthwith they deliberately and systematically set to work to mitigate and tone down all those exactitudes of form which convey its intellectual appeal and stimulate the intellectual mood in the observer, and then, subduing the light they admitted into the building a dark and powerful chiaroscuro under the supreme control and handling of which the whole tremendous colour-scheme of the interior was placed. The effects attained by the St. Mark's mosaics are attained by precisely the same expedients as those of Venetian colourists, only the architecture attains the desired end more surely and completely, for it must be admitted that not even Tintoretto, in the application of the æsthetic principles common to both, can vie with the Greek simplicity and singleness of aim.

But further, this mode of interpreting emotion is not solely a matter of art at all. We have already seen how Nature herself, when she appeals to the emotional mood in us, employs a scheme of chiaroscuro, derived from twilight, or mist, or the heavy shade of foliage, to soften down and dim the outlines of forms; and, indeed, the interior of some dense autumnal beech-grove, which we instanced as the most emotional of colour-effects in English scenery, exhibits just the same principles, the same melting depths of shadow and suffusion of rich colour, as characterise the schools of Venetian and Byzantine art. This is so even in the West, but the same causes are far more apparent in the East. The very words 'tropics' and 'tropical' are, as it were, heavy and loaded with sensuous suggestion; and, just as was the case with Venetian painting, many people are no doubt under the impression that this sensuousness of tropical

scenery is the result of an unusual display of vivid and brilliant colour. But this is far from being the case. There is a great deal more vividness and brilliance of tint in an English spring wood paved thick with bluebells, or in great golden buttercup fields framed in hedgerows of May, or in English shrubberies with their wealth of lilacs and laburnums, or in many views along, for instance, the South Devon coast, where dark red cliffs meet a dark blue sea, and the slopes above are encrusted with the rich yellow of gorse in full bloom, than are ever to be met with in a tropical jungle. To what, then, is the superior sensuous effect of the latter due? It is due to the usual two causes, to the obliteration of the sense of form and the presence of an extraordinarily powerful scheme of chiaroscuro. The growth of Western woods is always distinct; the trees preserve their individuality and shape; an ample flood of light is admitted between them; even in summer time there are sufficient indications of knotty, angular branches to preserve the sense of structure. But the flexible, climbing creepers and lianas of a tropical forest are tangled together and involved in a dense canopy in which all sense of individual form is swallowed up and lost. There recur to the writer memories of days passed in the jungles of the Ceylon low-country; and these memories are all similar: memories of mysterious twilight spaces full of dim and sinuous lines, rising slantingly or hanging in loops, thickening the matted roof among the tree-tops, but fulfilling no distinct structural purpose. Nourished by a rank soil and stimulated by a blazing sun, tropical vegetation shoots up with a rapidity, a zest, almost a fury, of which in colder climates it exhibits no trace. From the moment of leaving the earth the struggle is for the light, and plants and parasites start off upon an upward race of which the goal is the roof overhead and the light which shines upon it. It is wonderful to observe how all plants are equipped with speed to aid them in this race. Canes and bamboos, hollow-stalked and long-jointed, of which the growth is almost visible to the eye, abound; but still more common are the various creepers which ascend the trunks of trees with snake-like rapidity until they feel the sunlight above, when they spread themselves out in waves of foliage or blossom, sometimes hanging down in pendulous wreaths and festoons, at others enveloping and blotting out the tops of trees in their close embrace; using their long stems, let down through the gloom, as hoses through which to suck moisture from the soil while their real life is lived in the leafy roof far overhead under the constant hot beams of the sun. Inevitably the result of such a struggle as this is the formation of a dense canopy spread over



the jungle, formed of myriads of twisting and twining tendrils and wrought into so thick a covert that even the rays of a tropical sun can rarely penetrate it; so that, as Humboldt has pointed out of the Brazil forests—and the same holds good of all tropical forests—‘there reigns continually a kind of dim day-light, a peculiar sort of obscurity, of which our forests of pines, oaks, and beech trees convey no idea.’ This peculiar obscurity is the chief and most inalienable characteristic of tropical scenery, and that from which the word tropical derives the main part of its sensuous significance. Traversed by occasional floods of misty light, that break through the chinks in the roof or the larger gaps left by fallen trees, and die out by degrees in the murky depths of the forest, it constitutes a scheme of *chiaroscuro* of unrivalled mellowness and richness and power, embedded in which some few occasional gleams of purple or red from high-hanging bunches of orchids or drooping tendrils of creeper stain the gloom, almost like the beams of coloured light that shine through the dusky windows of Chartres. In their own line of the purely emotional and sensuous these effects are the most potent probably that exist in Nature; yet the means whereby they are produced are identical with the means adopted by the Byzantine architect and the Venetian painters, and we have but to think out and formulate the causes of the fascination of tropical colouring to be in possession of the principles of Byzantine and Venetian colouring.

The truth is that these principles are permanent and reliable because they are reflected processes of the mind. The emotional mood, the mood of passive receptivity in which insight is an integral part of feeling, is not only different from the rational and intellectual mood, but is itself dispelled by rational and intellectual definitions in just the same way as emotional effects of colour are dispelled by the intrusion of rigidly defined forms.

Insist upon form, develop form, place form in command of the composition, and instantly the depth, richness, power, the emotional value of colour as we call it, dies out of it. But this is only a reflection, or image rendered to the eye, of a corresponding change within the mind. Insist upon intellectual culture, develop intellect, place intellect in absolute command over the mind, and as sure as fate the emotional faculty will dry up within us, the capacity for feeling will diminish, the power of insight, of an intuitive realisation of the essential nature of things, will leave us, and we shall be left at last in presence of a collection of dry definitions from which all meaning of any importance has departed.

And this brings us to the last consideration we will trouble

our readers with—namely, the consideration of what there may be in the Venetian estimate of life and art which has a bearing on present needs. In the foregoing pages we have endeavoured to distinguish between the strongly intellectual art of Florence and the strongly sensuous art of Venice. Europe, taking the ply from Florence, has for the last three hundred years developed its life and thought on intellectual lines, and the result has been a certain atrophy and decay of its sensuous faculties. In that charming book, ‘*Hampshire Days*,’ Mr. Hudson tells the story of a young cuckoo which, reared in a nest of robins, succeeded in pitching its foster-brethren one by one out of the nest until it remained in solitary and undisputed possession. It has been so with the intellectual faculty in the European mind. This too, pampered and stimulated, has grown to such dimensions that it has ousted all rivals and taken over sole charge of the mind’s enlightenment. But such a state of things as this does not make for true happiness or true understanding. When Wordsworth addressed his studious friend in the words,

‘Close up those barren leaves ;  
Come forth and bring with you a heart  
That watches and receives,’

he was thinking of the illuminating effect upon the mind of that passive intuition which is born, not of any intellectual striving, but of pure feeling, and of which, indeed, all that is best in his own poetry is the direct outcome. The enlightenment which feeling, which a sensuous apprehension of things, brings, though not so exact and definite, is more profound than that which an intellectual apprehension brings. Moreover, if the mere intellectual analysis be pursued indefinitely, there comes a time when the mind hardens, a time when, the thing itself ceasing to give pleasure, the study of the thing ceases to give pleasure also. This state of weariness is apt to overtake and has overtaken, as we know from their own statements, many scientific thinkers—many men, that is to say, who, cultivating their intellectual faculties to excess, allow their sensuous faculties to atrophy from disuse. But it attacks not only individuals, it attacks epochs as well. The mind of society as a whole is subject to these fits of onesided development, and after one of these fits it feels the effects of the reaction. The intensity with which, for a long time past, the mind of Europe has been set on intellectual culture is to-day working out its inevitable effects. Let the reader look around in any direction he likes, and he will see those effects plainly enough. We have been talking of pictures. What are the gifts manifested in modern

painting? Do we find in modern exhibitions pictures painted out of an unquestioning emotion of joy and delight, and communicating that emotion to others; or do we find works in which the chief merits are often a wonderfully skilful technique, keen faculties of observation and analysis, an interesting or ingenious interpretation of scenes or events, and feats of execution so weirdly clever that they have almost the air of conjuring tricks? Are not both the merits and defects of such works their cleverness and coldness, intellectual merits and defects? Again, take art criticism. Is the general tendency and effect of it to make us feel that pictures are pre-eminently a source of joy, or to make us feel that pictures are things to be understood, and that the questions of most interest concerning them are who painted them, what mixture of 'influences' is apparent in them, and whence and by what route each motive found its way to the place it occupies? In fine, is not the estimate proposed by modern criticism entirely an intellectual one? Or let us for an instant turn to literature. That branch of literature which is most dependent on the gift of sensuous apprehension is fiction. What is the note of modern fiction? Do we find in it the spontaneous and warm vitality which arises from an intuitive realisation of character, or do we find characters carefully analysed, treated not as personalities but as assemblages of qualities, moving through the preordained mass of a plot evidently carefully thought out and deliberately constructed beforehand? It must, we think, strike anyone who attentively considers the plight of modern art and modern literature that what both are suffering from is the effect of the decay of the emotional faculties. Moreover, art and literature being expressions of life, we must expect to find evidence of the same decay in the life around us. And everywhere such evidence is to be met with. It is to be met with, for instance, in the quality of the religious thought of the age; for certainly what most strongly characterises this is the hankering it exhibits to deal with religion in some way or other by means of the intellectual faculty, to make religion intelligible, to 'translate it,' to use the common phrase, into 'terms of modern thought.' We have become so thoroughly intellectualised that the idea of having something among us not amenable to intellectual standards is intolerable. Is it not indeed the root of our spiritual *malaise* that we can only bring ourselves to accept a religion that intellect is able to grasp, while the religion intellect is able to grasp always turns out not to be a religion at all? But, finally, and not to dwell unduly on these hints, let us ask the reader to consider at large the aspect of the lives of men and women of all classes. Does it

not strike him that, while intellectual activity and ingenuity have on all sides wonderfully improved the conditions of life, yet somehow happiness and the capacity for feeling have by no means kept pace with that improvement? Consider the labourers whom one meets in the country trudging from their work, or the artisans that crowd the third-class compartments of evening suburban trains. Are they happier than formerly? They have better wages and cleaner cottages, is the answer, and, these being causes of happiness, they must be happier. But these are not the causes of happiness; or they can only act as such, at least, through the sensibility of our powers of feeling. If our powers of feeling be decayed and atrophied, wages and cottages may be as high and as clean as you will, but we shall get no real happiness out of them.

It is the same in all classes of life. The intense restlessness of wealthy people, their darting and rushing about, the 'high pressure,' as it is called, at which life nowadays is lived—what is it but a hunting and seeking after a happiness which somehow is not attained? We shall be happy to-morrow, or a mile further on; but we are not happy now and here. We live in constant expectation of happiness, we adopt every kind of expedient for achieving it, but of how many people could we say that they live in the assured and tranquil possession of it? Happiness is an emotion, and if the emotional faculties, if the capacity for feeling, be dried up within ourselves, reasons for being happy may be proposed without end and yet bring us no nearer the desired result.

In art and literature, then, in criticism, in religion, in all the ordinary aspects of life, both of poor and rich, there may easily be traced signs of the one-sided development we spoke of. Everywhere we see traces of intellectual activity, ingenuity, and vitality, but nowhere do we find any corresponding traces of emotional development; on the contrary, we detect on every side evidences of emotional decadence. Modern life thinks, reasons, analyses with great assiduity and wonderful results, but it does not feel deeply, and consequently it is unable to distil from its intellectual achievements and improved circumstances the stores of happiness with which they seem to be laden. Fortunately, however, these lopsided developments sooner or later right themselves. Mankind finds out its mistake and casts back instinctively for the line it has overrun. We are in such a crisis at the present moment. We still have our hard-and-fast intellectualists, but they have a much smaller body of conviction behind them than, till recently, was the case, and the breed consequently has very much fallen off and diminished sadly in growth and

stature. On the other hand, mysticism, spiritual consciousness, the philosophy of feeling are subjects that draw to themselves day by day an increasing share of attention. The aged East, the home of all such secrets, once more begins to attract our regard, and all voices that can in any way interpret her point of view to us are sure to be listened to. In this way it is that the times we live in are favouring the art of Venice. It is no doubt true that neither Venetian art nor Venetian life is a very adequate witness of what is most valuable in Oriental thought. Still, it is also true that Venetian art and Venetian life are essentially an art and a life of feeling. In this they are genuinely Oriental and pass on in an intelligible medium the message of the East to the West. In Venetian painting we have a testimony to the supreme value of a sensuous apprehension of things. It is by the cultivation of the sensuous faculties, that painting seems to assure us, that happiness and joy are realised. But, more than that, it is by the cultivation of the sensuous faculties, so Venetian art at its greatest whispers to us, that true knowledge and insight are to be attained. The philosophy of feeling receives at the hands of the Venetian colourists an interpretation always attractive and sometimes profound; and if in the Renaissance of the intellectual faculties Florence took the lead, perhaps in the Renaissance of the sensuous faculties, of which we would seem to be on the eve, Venice will take the lead. To Florence—Florence the intellectual, Florence of the clean-cut definitions and exact forms—we turned that we might learn to think. To Venice—Venice the sensuous, Venice of the heavy shadows and rich colours and profound emotions—we must turn now that we may learn to feel. Or, if this be an overestimate of the rôle she is destined to play, if it is rather from the East herself that, in exchange for our own practical and intellectual suggestions which to-day she is so eagerly imbibing, we may hope to receive the emotional refreshment it has ever been her wont to bestow, at least we may surmise that, in such interchange, Venice will be an active agent and, in the new traffic of ideas as in the old traffic of merchandise, will, to the measure of her capacity, act as intermediary between East and West.

## ART. VII.—'NIMROD.'

1. *Memoirs of the Life of the late John Mytton, Esq., of Halston, Shropshire.* By NIMROD. With a Memoir of Nimrod by R. S. SURTEES. London: Denny and Co., Ltd. 1899.
2. *Nimrod's Hunting Tours.* London: M. A. Pittman. 1835.
3. *The Chase, the Turf, and the Road.* By NIMROD. Edited by Sir Herbert Maxwell, Bart. London: Edward Arnold. 1898.
4. *The Condition of Hunters: their Choice and Management.* By NIMROD. Edited by Frank Townend Barton, Esq., V.S. London: John Lane. 1908.

WE are told in the Life and Literary Remains of Mrs. Piozzi that Dr. Johnson once or twice tried hunting on an old horse of Mr. Thrale's, and that he acquitted himself so well one day that a prominent member of the hunt shouted out 'Why, Johnson rides as well, for aught I see, as the most illiterate fellow in England!'

Dr. Johnson was much flattered, and we have it on the authority of both Mrs. Thrale and Murphy that he often reverted to the incident with pride and pleasure. It is difficult to say what the moralist would have thought of Nimrod; but so many people hunt now, or have relations who hunt—hunting, like golf, or the House of Lords, is so manifestly one of our institutions—that no apology appears necessary for an article devoted exclusively to 'the gibberish of hunting studs'—we quote an Edinburgh Reviewer of the period.

Let us begin by reminding ourselves and our readers of who and what Nimrod was—a course which he would most certainly have himself approved. Charles James Apperley was born at Plas-Gronow, near Wrexham, in 1778, the second son of a gentleman of rather encumbered property, but of such literary attainments as to correspond with Dr. Johnson and to read Greek before breakfast. 'My father,' he tells us himself, 'was a better judge of books than of horses, and condition was a stranger to his stables.' Mr. Apperley was educated at Rugby, and on leaving school strenuous efforts were made by his relations to push him into business as a wholesale clothier, but to no purpose. Speaking in one of his books of the elevating pleasures of the chase, he says 'I have no hesitation in adding that the best introduction for a young man of fortune and fashion of the present day is to be found at Billesdon Coplow or Oadby Toll-bar.' With these views, after holding

a commission in Sir Watkin Wynn's Ancient British Fencibles, he married and settled down to hunt and deal at Bilton, near Rugby. He lived at Bilton for about twenty years, and then moved to Beaurepaire, near Basingstoke. Here he took to farming, rented a couple of farms on the Beaurepaire estate, commenced author at the ripe age of forty-four, and entered into a literary engagement with the proprietors of the 'Sporting Magazine.' His writings under the name of Nimrod soon became famous in the sporting world, and his 'Tours' of most of the principal hunting counties of England appear to have been conducted in a thoroughly agreeable way; servants and all incidental expenses being found by the magazine at an average cost, for the six seasons during which this arrangement held good, of 1500*l.* a year. But Mr. Apperley then fell out with the proprietors of the magazine and found himself in straitened circumstances, which led to his leaving Beaurepaire and settling at Calais, a resort much frequented by gentlemen who had outrun the constable. Here he was shortly joined by the celebrated Mr. Mytton, of Halston, who had also found it convenient to cross the Channel, and the pair found other old friends both at Calais and in the neighbouring Boulogne driven to this sea-board by the same stress. While in France Apperley, at the instance of Lockhart, wrote the anonymous articles in the 'Quarterly Review,' in which he is held to have reached his high-water mark as a writer. These were afterwards published in one volume as 'The Chase, the Turf, and the Road,' and 'The Chase' certainly deserves the commendation passed upon the writer's ability by the gifted author of 'Mr. Sponge's 'Sporting Tour.' He contributed during this period to numberless periodicals, and inevitably repeated himself and his stories of others a good deal in this operation. But his writings are always in their way entertaining not so much for the matter as for the manner and for a personal colour and flavour which give them distinction. Thus it is him we get to know and to see, not the dim but unusually magnificent people he tells us about.

His exile at Calais was mitigated by a hunting expedition to Scotland, the Lord Kintore of the day being so pleased to find himself included in an alphabetical list of 'Crack Riders' that he invited the scribe to visit him, undertook to pass him on from notable to notable in Scotland, and so became responsible for the record of a great deal of hospitality from the nobility and gentry in that part of Britain, and of a little indifferent foxhunting. All this has passed into our sporting literature as the 'Northern Tour.' Subsequent to his return from Scotland

Mr. Apperley's engagements were various and unsettled. He quarrelled first with one and then with another of the periodicals he wrote in, and he was in the middle of a quarrel with the 'New Sporting Magazine' when he died suddenly on May 19, 1834, at the house of his son in Pimlico.

As Mr. Surtees tells us in the memoir he contributed to the Life of John Mytton, Nimrod's 'English Hunting Tours and 'Reminiscences,' written in the fullness of his vigour, did most to establish the celebrity of his name, but to our mind 'The Condition of Hunters' stands out from the rest of his writings as a work of equal authority and instruction, resting upon entertaining and practical experiences and refreshed by all kinds of suggestions and anecdotes.

Sir A. Lyall once remarked to the writer of this article that a really good book never dies; years pass, its disappearance seems to be complete, its seclusion to be inviolable, but the day comes when its merits or opportuneness are remembered. It comes to life again only too often caparisoned with a foreword and overcrowded with footnotes. Many persons on reading the serio-comic, serio-romantic account of Mr. Mytton's follies will be inclined to think that the converse may be equally true, and that some shiftless books are recalled to an unprofitable existence. Be that as it may, this can never be said or thought of 'The Condition of Hunters.' No doubt, as chapter after chapter proceeds on its lucid and accurate course, we may experience a slight sense of fatigue and satiety, yet, edited as it is by an eminent veterinary surgeon of the present day, one cannot but be struck by the little he has to say by way of revision or correction. The book mercifully needs, as it were, no bringing up to date. Mr. Barton's comments are uniformly of a 'Ditto to Mr. Burke' character. Thus anybody who knows or cares about horses and stables will agree, in 1908, with Mr. Surtees, writing in 1851, that Nimrod's counsels contribute as much now as then 'to the comfort and advantage of that noble 'animal the horse.'

Nothing of this kind, however, can be urged in favour of the recent republication of the Life of John Mytton.

In spite of Ackermann, Alken, the Classics, and the fluent memoir by Mr. Surtees, the Life of John Mytton is heavyish reading. It may, by force of example, tend to the edification of foolish young gentlemen of Mr. Mytton's 'animal 'faculties'—to quote its author—if any such there be in these tamer days; but upon the whole this kind of thing should not be republished. And yet, perhaps, we are a little hard upon it. The book was written when Nimrod himself was in



very straitened circumstances. His desire to write something of his friend which might prove an invitation for pardon and peace—his wish 'to do the living a service and rescue the character of the dead'—was at once natural and sincere, and thanks to a certain candour which often emerges unexpectedly throughout all his writings, the *Life of John Mytton* is a creditable book enough. Upon the whole Mytton's biographer writes with some sense of proportion, and he comes pretty handsomely out of a difficult task, or, as he would himself have said, gets over a difficult country very fairly well.

The friendship which existed between these two very opposite characters must have been sincere. Evidently in his friend's company, during the palmy days of their intercourse, Nimrod—a rather precise and particular man—went in fear of his life of the practical jokes—or, as a local journal happily put it, the 'eccentric gaieties'—which made Mr. Mytton a most formidable host and a questionable guest; and—in print at all events—he manfully disapproves of Mytton's extravagance, of many of the barbarous exploits of his youth and middle age, and of the way he over-faced his horses and over-taxed his constitution. But the closing chapters, if a trifle stilted and trite, are not devoid of simplicity and eloquence, and, having regard to the subject, seem to leave little to be desired. Mr. Apperley appears to have acted with true and constant kindness towards his old friend under exceedingly uncomfortable circumstances of all kinds, from the time Mr. Mytton turns up unexpectedly at Calais in 1831, and to have nursed him back to reason and a measure of health with devotion and resource. This is what happened :

'On the 5th of November 1831, during my residence in the town of Calais, I was surprised by a violent knocking at my door, and so unlike what I had ever heard before in that quiet town, that being at hand I was induced to open the door myself, when, to my no little astonishment, there stood John Mytton. "In God's name," said I, "what has brought you to France?" "Why," he replied, "just what brought yourself to France"—parodying the old song—"three couple of bailiffs were close at my brush." But what did I see before me—the active, vigorous, well-shapen John Mytton whom I had left some years back in Shropshire? Oh, no! Compared with him 'twas a reed broken by the wind. There stood before me a round-shouldered, decrepit, tottering, old-young man—if I may be allowed such a term—and so bloated by drink that I might have exclaimed with Ovid, "Accedant capiti cornua Bacchus eris,"

and he goes on to say—

'It may be easily imagined that the arrival of my old friend at Calais in the state in which he then appeared was anything but what

I could have desired. My pen was at that time employed on a very interesting subject, and I knew from past experience how many times in the day I should be interrupted by him. But I had shared his prosperity, and I was not going to desert him in his adversity. He did not, however, want for society at Calais. He gave dinners at his hotel, and, as Epicurus' wise men would cultivate friendship for what it produces, there were plenty such wise men to be found in Calais.'

However, we are glad to find from a footnote that the toadies aroused something in the virility of the Mr. Mytton of happier days. 'Here,' his friend tells us, 'the character of the man appears in his true colour. One gentleman, previously unknown to him, borrowed his coat with the Anson Hunt button on it—rather unceremoniously, as he said—to go to a ball. He ordered his valet to line the gentleman's own coat-sleeves with fish-hooks against he called for it the next day.'

Soon after his arrival at Calais Mr. Mytton set fire to himself to frighten away the hiccoughs which had beset him as he was going to bed, rather the worse for liquor. This, though very severely burned, he declared he had succeeded in doing to the two friends—Bow Street runners, as it happened—who helped to put him out and to get him to bed. But he was in a very critical state the next morning, and his valet came to inform Nimrod of what had occurred, suggesting that he should go round and see the sufferer at once.

"What doctor have you got?" said I. "None," replied the man. "Send for Dr. Souville immediately," added I, "and I will come and see your master as soon as I am dressed."

'Shall I ever forget the scene this morning presented? There lay Mr. Mytton, not only shirtless, but sheetless, with the skin of his breast, shoulders, and knees of the same colour as that of a new singed bacon hog. He saluted me, as usual, with a "view-halloa," but I told him that was no time for joking, and asked him *why* he committed so silly an act, and one that might very probably be the cause of his death. He answer was the answer of a madman—that he wished to show me how he could bear pain.'

After the burning Mr. Mytton's mind became deranged, but Nimrod sticks to his friend, and Mr. Mytton gradually got better both in mind and body. After courteously declining a suggestion that he should see the Rev. Mr. Liptrott, he one day asked Nimrod to write something at his dictation. 'I did so,' he tells us, 'and it consisted of the following lines:

'Condemned in youth to meet the grave,  
I hope to be received above,  
Render my soul to Him who gave,  
My latest breath to you, my love.'

'He then requested that these lines might be placed in his view on the door of his chamber, where they remained for a considerable time, and he said, "When I die I trust to your sending them to my wife."' 'I told him,' says Nimrod, 'I would do so, and had he died at that time I should certainly have complied with his request.'

Certainly Mr. Mytton in many ways was no ordinary man, as we shall presently learn from the following passage :

'The effects of education on first-rate talent shine forth when little expected, as was the case with Mr. Mytton, even when his mental aberrations were nearly at their height. In one of his paroxysms he talked for eight and forty hours without ceasing ; and, as it may be supposed, under such violent excitement a recollection of last year's clouds would not be more difficult than a record of the unconnected jargon which he had at that time uttered. But, in his calmer moments, when he saw me by his bedside, he would quote Greek and Latin authors with surprising readiness, and when he found he was incorrect he would pause until he recovered the text. In several of those quotations it was beyond doubt apparent that the bereavement of his family and the desolation at Halston were present to his mind, for in some particular instances I could not be mistaken. In giving that beautiful passage from Sophocles, wherein Edipus recommends his children to the care of Creon, I am quite certain he was applying it in his mind to the first-named calamity ; and the epigram from the Greek Anthologia on the Fall of Troy and the Death of Hector, which he would very often repeat, had a sympathetic allusion to the ruin at Halston and his own fall.'

The last tribute to his friend may be quoted in evidence of the simplicity and eloquence we have just alluded to. It is conceived and written in the taste of the preceding century, but is none the worse for that. Mr. Mytton died in the King's Bench Prison, trusting, as his biographer thinks it may be said, 'too much to the delusive support of a deathbed repentance' ; but, faithful to his task, he goes on to say of his friend—

'Let no man venture to pronounce sentence here, but leave it to that bar at which justice will be tempered with mercy ; where, unless I form a very erroneous opinion of the late Mr. Mytton—and who had a much more intimate knowledge of him than myself ?—and a still more mistaken one of the attributes of Him by whom he will be judged, he will find acceptance before many who have carried a much fairer face to the world. Few receive the white garment and carry it without a stain before the Judgement Seat. John Mytton certainly did not ; it was soiled and stained with the impurities of our nature, with even more than can be placed to that account ; the world has no proof that they were attempted to be

washed out by his tears ; but I appeal to my own experience of him, to that of his brother prisoner and friend who attended him in his last days—in the hour, indeed, when a heart knows no guile, and in which the tongue seldom hazards an untruth—whether he did not then own to man what he had previously only owned to his God.'

These examples of Mr. John Mytton's *ingenium*, unconnected with his Euthanasia or with any of his more violent escapades, may be taken from the text.

Mytton liked to do his thinking for himself. Nimrod was once asked to urge him to be content to live on 6000*l.* a year for the next six years in order to save the fine estates which had been for many years in his family. But this flattering proposition was not well received. Mr. Mytton, who was lolling back in his carriage, which was going at its usual pace, uttered not a syllable for the space of some minutes. Then, as if roused from a deep reverie, he exclaimed with vehemence, 'You may tell Longueville' (his agent and solicitor) 'to keep his advice to himself, for I would not give a damn to live on 6000*l.* a year.' Nimrod adds, 'Knowing his regard and esteem for that worthy gentleman I failed to enter into the subject further.'

Here is another and rather a good trait of the same kind. A near relation was trying to dissuade Mr. Mytton from parting with a small estate of his on the score of it having been so long in the family. 'How long?' inquired Mr. Mytton. 'About 500 years,' was the reply. 'The devil it has!' he returned. 'Then it is high time it should go out of it.'

And here is a little *résumé* of his housekeeping, which was conducted, as we are told, 'with a perfect contempt for the splendour of cold-hearted opulence. Mr. Mytton lived very much like a gentleman at Halston, where everything was in keeping with his fortune and station in life. There was no unnecessary display, two men-servants out of livery and two in livery being the full complement at the dinner-table. Nor did he indulge in the luxury of a man cook.' What Nimrod thinks ruined him was not his establishment, but a 'largeness of heart, even as the sand that is on the seashore, that Solomon possessed, but unaccompanied by his means as well as by his wisdom.' Of course this combination is often unfortunate.

But now to return to Nimrod himself. The many readers of 'Handley Cross' will recall the 'Pomponious Ego' day and the description of that gentleman's moral and intellectual peculiarities. Whether or not the likeness is overdrawn by Surtees is no present concern of ours. It would, indeed, be almost impossible now to ascertain. However, on making due allowance for that insistence upon characteristics which results in

parody and caricature, there is good reason for thinking that Mr. Ego, who visits Handley Cross, and the Nimrod of the Hunting Tours, resemble each other pretty closely. We have already noticed Nimrod's partiality for the classics; they are at his constant beck and call, and are certainly not more elderly or conventional than other people's. Thus, when Mr. Ego accepts Mr. Jorrocks' invitation to visit his territories and immortalise his hounds, he begins by telling Mr. Jorrocks that he reminds him of Catullus, and goes on to bespeak 'a bedroom with a southern aspect—feathers above the mattress—wax candles and Eau de Cologne.' To point things even still more sharply, in a P.S. he asks what Mr. Jorrocks would like to appear in—the 'Q.R.' ('Quarterly Review'), 'Fraser,' 'Blackwood,' 'The New Monthly Encyclopædia,' 'Life,' 'The Field,' 'The Era,' or what. All this is quite 'dans la note' of Nimrod's habits and ideas.

It is this partiality for the purple and fine linen of life which leads to Nimrod writing with such unflinching approval of despotic nobles, pervading squires, and absentee rectors, and with such bare condescension of a middle and lower class which existed indeed, but did not count in his philosophy. It has to be done sometimes, but, like Montauban dancing with Roubigné's tenants, 'much of his native loftiness remained in the execution.'

His hunting operations took place and his experience was formed under many social and material conditions which differ widely from our own. Yet disgusted as Nimrod would be were you to show him a board school or a suffragette or plunge him into a party election, or take him to a golf-links or a grouse-drive, as a matter of fact and practice he would find things going on very much in the same way in all essentials with the Quorn or the Garth Hounds as when he first visited Melton and tasted the 'Cimmerian darkness' and other inconveniences of November hunting with Sir John Cope.

A writer, presumably of some experience, lays it down that in this country less than one hundred years have 'revolutionised'—speaking broadly—our horses, our hounds, our methods, and 'our hunting fashions—least of all, perhaps, our hunting dress.'\* The author is mindful perhaps of the advertisement of an eminent firm near the Marble Arch to the effect that the boot which has survived all changes of fashion is the top-boot. But, except about dress, this is surely all wrong. No doubt a Nimrod Redivivus would observe many changes in local conditions and in the material framework of hunting—better drained land,

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\* The Queen's Hounds.

more stock, more grass in the provinces, more game, larger crowds everywhere, and a general prevalence of barbed wire. We can imagine the sort of things he would have to say about wire, probably ushered in by a 'Scandit fatalis machina muros.' He would indeed consort with fewer of the Alcibiades breed, and have to put up with more of the humbler sort; he would encounter innumerable huntresses both chaste and fair, and find the Stock Exchange and the manufacturers represented on long-tailed horses in the best grass countries to an extent which he would have held highly objectionable; in short, birth, race, creed, wealth, and sex promiscuously mixed in a way which would have made him feel grave. But in England—even with the hundred-odd years we can place to its credit—hunting is a comparatively modern affair. It cannot compare in antiquity, for instance, with hunting in France when the early sixteenth century formed the grand style of *Vénerie*, and where a Bourbon prince and over 400 packs of hounds still hunt stag, hare, boar, and roe-deer according to the ideas laid down by Gaston Phebus in 1390, and systematised by Du Fouilloux in 1560.

Up till well into the nineteenth century hunting in England was much in the hands of the Squire Westerns and Tony Lumpkins. In the latter years of the eighteenth century hounds were kept at Badminton and Brocklesby and Goodwood and Belvoir, but it is very doubtful whether the same sort of people hunted then and devoted their leisure and, indeed, their whole time to hunting as in the days when Nimrod began to write. Earlier in the century they certainly did not. Pope, writing from Bracknell about the hunting men of that district, describes them as 'a sort of modest, inoffensive people, who neither have any sense nor pretend to any, but enjoy a jovial sort of dulness.' That is not the sort of thing which Mr. Alfred Austin would write in these days of Lord Spencer or of the late Lord Leconfield. Lord Chesterfield, who had no sympathy with fox-hunters, warns his son against getting into their ways: a fox-hunter, he says, may be 'intentionally civil,' but at the best he can only mean well; whilst Dr. Warner—George Selwyn's chaplain—is quite disgusted at their 'no-brain' appearance and habits, and especially when he hears 'a well-fancied oath from the mint of the metropolis' robbed of all its grace by their provincial pronunciation.

But from the earlier years of the nineteenth century onwards fox-hunting settled down into its present routine and conventional conditions. As a matter of fact, our habits and methods, even our dress and our prejudices about dress, have changed less in the hunting-field and in the stable than anywhere else, and a careful perusal of Nimrod's writings leads to the conclusion that there

are no such differences as one would expect to find in the hunting England of William IV. and the hunting England of Edward VII. ; between the sort of things Lord Darlington and Sir Bellingham Graham said about their horses and hounds then, and the sort of things the Duke of Beaufort and Lord Lonsdale say now. It is only when we come to consider what their respective stud-grooms would do and not do to keep their hacks and hunters up to the mark that we find Nimrod, writing in the early years of the nineteenth century, urging views and changes of management and conditions which were quite novel in those days, and at that time were considered by many persons mischievous and outlandish.

We have already dwelt upon the individuality of Nimrod's style, and there can be no question that his style, the manner in which he pushes his point, the way he recounts his anecdotes, the classical burnish by which he seeks to adorn his meditations, are all quite his own. This is largely due, as has been said, to the staunchness with which he insists upon himself. At the same time, the unflinching regard which he pays to this observance has the tendency of making his works, taken as a whole, a trifle tame and 'genteel.' This, in its turn, is partly due to a candid preference for great people: to a flattered gratitude for their hospitalities—a gratitude which, as he himself would have said, wells up like *Bandusia's* fountain. Yet even so it is only fair to say that there occur observations of 'candour'—a very favourite word with him—which cannot have been altogether pleasing to these personages, or have tended to secure him a second invitation to their serene domains. Where this was not the case it is to the credit of both parties. But, all said and done, Nimrod could not write about hunting like Surtees or Whyte Melville, or incidentally like Anthony Trollope. Even the quarterly run from Ashby pastures, by Ranksborough, to Woodwell Head, good as it is, pointed by felicitous epigrams, many of which have become classic, heralded by the novelty of the treatment, describing the performances and personalities of well-known individuals, will not do if we compare it with some of the hunting runs in which Mr. Sponge and Mr. Facey Romford, Mr. Crasher, or the Market Harborough Majors take conspicuous parts.

His powers of observation, accurate and particular as they were, are limited. He likes, understands, and notices horses, grooms, and men of title and of property. Here and there a military man, an occasional parson, still more rarely a farmer, comes in for notice of some kind, but of all the setting of hunting, of the weather, the landscape, the look of a country,

the inns, the flymen, the countrymen, and the panorama of the whole thing, with rare exceptions he tells us little or nothing.

A careful writer, impressed by and jealous of the importance of his task and message, proud of his practice and experience, loyal throughout to standards of considerable literary excellence and distinction—as certain of everything—to quote Lord Melbourne—as Tom Macaulay, Nimrod certainly was. Yet, setting aside this—that is, the excellence and the care of the actual writing—most of his experiences and reminiscences do not give one the right *feel*; any more than a foxhunting run, with no expense spared and a real water-jump, would give one this emotion at Olympia or the London Hippodrome.

'What is time? The effusion of life zoophytic  
 In dreary pursuit of position or gain.  
 What is life? The absorption of vapours mephitic,  
 The bursting of sunlight on senses and brain.  
 Such a life has been mine, though so speedily over,  
 Condensing the joys of a century's course  
 From the find, till they ate him near Woodwell Head Covert  
 In thirty bright minutes from Ranksborough Gorse.'

One must not come to Nimrod for anything like this, written by Mr. Bromley-Davenport in and out of a hot bath, with dirty leathers and tops and a bashed-in top-hat lying about the room, and a bare twenty minutes to dress for dinner in.

On the other hand, the grave way in which he relates some of his 'oratio directa' anecdotes gives them a dry flavour quite their own. Of themselves his stories are seldom of a kind to afford great opportunities. Some are better than others, but some, on the other hand, are much worse. Yet, bad or good, they differ little: the telling is so uniform and predominant.

'The Condition of Hunters' is, as Bacon said of politics, too immersed in matter to permit of more than a cursory review in these pages. To repeat what we have already said, 'Nimrod,' like other lofty spirits, was in advance of his times, and he preached with an in-and-out-of-season fervour a new gospel concerning the summering and condition of hunters, about clipping, about physis, about bleeding and firing and blistering. Allowing for a little over-statement—or, to put it in a fairer way, allowing for a tendency to rest a general argument on an exceptional case—it is a matter of common knowledge that 'Nimrod's' writings and their influences in the sporting world led up to the present practice, preferred by the large majority of hunting men, of keeping their horses 'up' in summer with gentle, or quite as often without, exercise, and practically



on hard keep, as against turning them out to grass, more or less indiscriminately, to take their chance and make the best or worst of it. Here is one of the many personal experiences by which he supports his main thesis ; though not in any sense open to the frailty of over-statement of which we will presently give an instance or two.

Attracted by a fine pair of long-tailed coach horses, the arms on the panel of the carriage designating them to be the property of a rich old maid, a friend of Nimrod's congratulated the coachman on their appearance and fine condition.

"I suppose," he said, "they have been much indulged?" "Not they, indeed, sir," said coachee. "They work as hard as anybody's horses on these London stones, and my mistress goes all over England with them to watering places in the summer. As for grass, they have never tasted it since we had them, for she says she is sure it would give them the bellyache."

Nimrod highly commends this old lady.

On the other hand, by way of an instance of over-stating a strong case, well presented and well reasoned, being over-stimulated by its illustration, the following may be selected from many others. Nimrod is denouncing the practice of turning out to grass, and summons no less a person than St. Paul to his assistance. St. Paul, he reminds us, observes in a cogent passage that 'the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together'; and by a transition so adroit as to be almost natural he brings us from the Epistle to the Ephesians within ear-shot of the zimb whose distant hum strikes terror into the rhinoceros and the elephant. One does not quite know what is to happen next, but from the zimb to the flies of a well-shaded and watered Northamptonshire pasture on a midsummer's day is a mere step, and he describes to us the behaviour of two of his own brood mares and some young stock one fine morning under these conditions. First he sees them stamp, then go through what, without exaggeration, he can only compare to the more intricate figures of the quadrille, and finally gallop wildly from end to end of the field; as it turns out under the maddening persecutions of œstrus (the Northamptonshire zimb) and of an agonised sympathy. Here is another, a different and preferable sort. Nimrod is talking to a friend's groom, insidiously, as was his custom, about his friend's horses, which have been summered at grass, and which have come up as fat as bacon pigs; the fat in his opinion, being of the very worst quality. The stableman, an old friend—and as a rule his grooms are capital company—and he are surveying these animals in

the stable, and Nimrod goes up to one of them in his stall. "In good order to begin the season with, Bob," said I, "full of old oats, I understand?" "No, nor new oats neither," replied Bob, "unless they found them in the park."

Speaking for our own part, given the right sort of land and the right sort of grass, with shade and water, spare of rank, lushy herbage, but with the sweet close sort to be had for the looking for, we approve of turning horses out, as it were, consciously—that is, not as a Yorkshire dealer friend of mine used to advise, putting them out of your mind. Here and there an individual horse is better summered, and should be summered, in a box; but most horses gain in many ways by the contrast and the freedom of outdoor life. It puts back a little nature into them and makes them more independent and sensible. Nothing can be so impoverishing as the idle, vacant seclusion of a summer box where a horse often neither sees nor even hears his companions. No doubt a lot of horses together run risks of getting kicked, or of exciting each other to gallop about to the detriment of their legs; but with all these contingencies the balance of benefit seems to us upon the side of a discretionary spell of outdoor and, as it were, club life. On the other hand, the qualifications we have just cited as to individual animals, selected pastures, and defined periods bring us practically into agreement with Nimrod's own views; at all events, we will not labour the matter further or, in Milton's line, 'be over-quisite to scan the fashion of uncertain evils.' Who runs may read, and people who are in doubt about this still often-mooted question—that is, summering 'up' as against 'out,' given that both processes are carried out on the best possible principles—will, at all events, get their ideas cleared up in an agreeable way.

As to other matters of veterinary science and practice, we are quite ready to agree with Mr. Barton that many of our author's conclusions, even with advancing knowledge, are as sound to-day as when given to the public in the pages of 'The Condition of Hunters.' No doubt, to repeat ourselves, even when Nimrod began to write—that is, somewhere about 1830—the modern school of hunting was in quite general vogue in England. He speaks of it himself not as a new departure, but as an established state of things which had come to stay. He tells us the hour of the meet was seldom before eleven; the 'find' generally quick and certain, horses seldom more than five or six hours out of their stables, second horses in general use by the swells (the only people whom he considered), and, though the whole thing went faster, little ground was covered com-

pared with the slow walking a fox to death runs of former days, though it is difficult to say how or why he arrived at this conclusion. As the work horses did, he himself only brought his horses out once a week (too seldom for a good horse at his best, to our mind), and on the fifth and sixth day after hunting he treated them to a 'brushing gallop' and to a sweat which was quite as careful a business as a Turkish bath, though a trifle less elaborate than the same ceremonies which took place regularly on the fifteenth day of every August. This August process was at once both thorough and delicate, parts of it being carried out watch in hand, and the sweat being so cleverly coaxed as finally to run off the subject like rain-water. In the matter of physic, he combats the habit of the pitiless doses of his day, and quotes Dr. Abernethy with effect, in favour of gentle and discretioned doses of physic and as little of it as possible. 'I do not like,' said the doctor, 'to bully the organs into health'; and in this connexion he tells us a story of the ancient farriery on the authority of a clergyman (Eton and Oxford). This rev. gentleman called in the local farrier to a mare suffering from inflammation of the lungs. After diagnosing the case the leech administered three pounds of shot and two ounces of gunpowder in a pint of milk. Five minutes after the mare staggered a few paces and fell down dead. Nimrod pointed out to his friend, 'a prudent man,' the economic impropriety of this treatment, as one-twentieth of the material comprised would have achieved the same result. We agree with all he says in favour of warm as against cold stables. He certainly carries his point far, for he declares that, so far from having ever witnessed ill effects from a hot stable, he never saw a hunter in good condition come out of a cold one; and he goes on to say that even if Sir Humphry Davy proved to demonstration the impropriety of horses breathing over-oxygenated air, he would still say to his groom 'Don't mind what the philosopher says: sixty-three degrees is the desideratum, in his opinion, for the temperature of a hunter's stable.' Again, we agree generally, and we would rather be knocked down over this with Nimrod than be right with Sir Humphry Davy.

On the other hand, he gives the wise counsel not to put an overdone or beaten horse into a warm stable when he first comes in, instancing the demise of one of Lord Derby's best horses after a severe run with a second deer. On this occasion the warmth of the stable was increased by every servant in the house coming to inquire after and to be with a very favourite old horse in his distress.

But these were the stupid, or even worse, days of firing for anything or nothing, of blistering horses every spring 'all round' to keep them quiet and to save helpers' wages; of relentless docking of cart-horses especially close up to their quarters, because it was supposed to strengthen their spines. Tremendous physicking, however, was not confined to horses. A tincture of rhubarb carried in his flask was the only refreshment the great Mr. Meynell permitted himself out hunting. We are told of a Captain Bridges whom Nimrod meets out hunting with the Hambleton, and with whom he is much pleased. The captain had been severely attacked by gout at three A.M. that same morning, but determined to go hunting. He had therefore taken two strong calomel pills, sixty drops of colchicum, and topped all this up with a glass of hot gin and water on his way to the meet. 'Although,' Nimrod goes on to tell us, 'Captain Bridges resides at a "Hermitage," he is anything but a hermit, and is "a jolly good fellow," and there is every reason to believe that in those shady groves the nightingales oftener hear the captain than the captain hears the nightingales.' This is rather obscure, but it sounds all right.

As may be expected from one who prefers Polybius to Livy and practice to precept, and who quotes Darius—'a pretty straightforward one, I believe'—as an intelligent reformer, Nimrod is not averse to tradition and history. Coleridge denied any special interest to the Pass of Thermopylae, but our author speaks approvingly of the house at which Shakespeare was born at Stratford-on-Avon as a 'pleasing feature in ancient history,' and he is reminded that Alexander the Great destroyed the town of Thebes but spared the house of the immortal Pindar. But Stratford-on-Avon affects him in a different and almost Hohenlinden-ish way when he has to record how the kennels and stables built by Lord Middleton had given place to the school buildings of a young ladies' seminary; and he is saddened to find cottages of a dismal appearance occupying the site where 'his lordship's hunters soiled in summer'—'sic transit gloria mundi,' he adds.

At times his brief descriptions of scenery are vivid enough—they strike one by their terseness and their rarity. This is surely good of the Craven country in Berks and Wilts. 'It is a cold hollow country, almost all ploughed, distressing to horses, and cheerless to hounds,' or this on the appearance of high Leicestershire. 'No more sign of the plough than the wilds of Siberia.' But in a general way he cares as little for scenery as Dr. Johnson, who became much irritated by Mrs. Thrale's elegant transports over the shifting beauties of the

landscape when they went on a driving tour together. This passage on the difficulty of getting away, and then of getting a start, is in a different order of description. The scene is Glen Gorse in the Quorn country, and it is all as true to-day as the day it was written :

'After a good deal of badgering, our fox broke gallantly. As I tally-ho'd him away two fields from the Gorse, of course, I got a fair start; but having been so long in the provincials I was only half awake, and instead of going away, as about a dozen of the leading men did, with only six couple of leading hounds, I pulled up my horse with the hope of seeing them "get together" a little, as we provincials call it; but my hopes, I found, were vain. Away went the élite, and I one field behind them, in company with the body of the hounds, about 100 horsemen on the right and on the left, and a whipper-in endeavouring first by rating, then by cheering, to get his hounds up. It was, however, altogether a beautiful sight. To see the pace these men went; to see the pace at which they rode at their fences, so different to all other counties; to see them charge a wide and awkward brook without deigning to look at it; to see some horses in, some turning round, not liking it, and about a dozen well over and going by the side of, if not a little before, the hounds, up one of those large grass fields—is, I repeat, a beautiful sight, and one that only Leicestershire can show.'

This, to our mind, taken from 'The Tours' is as good as anything in the 'Quarterly Run.'

The relation of foxhunting to Church and State falls very naturally under Mr. Apperley's observation. He seems to have been generally favourable to the bishops and clergy—'bishops,' he says somewhere, 'are men'—and, indeed, of church-going in moderation; on one occasion narrowly escaping being pushed into an icy cold pond by his friend Mr. Mytton when on this pious expedition. He doubtless regarded these matters much as Major Pendennis did, who, it may be remembered, advised his nephew to go to church of a Sunday morning and to join in the responses, instancing the 'monstrous fine effect' produced under similar circumstances by a valued Duke of his acquaintance who carried these things even further by joining audibly in the hymn from his place in the family pew. He is the author, in the manner of Paley, of the distinction between the hunting parson and the parson who hunts, and he would probably have disapproved as much as Arthur Young of the divine who advertised for a living in a good sporting country, where the duty was light and the neighbourhood convivial; but he claims that 'The exercise of a privilege to which in

'lay brethren' is to the general advantage; and in one passage he urges those divines who have an inclination to go hunting to 'spurn the affectation of a sanctity neither called for nor appreciated by nine-tenths of mankind.' But if he respects the clergy, he reveres a huntsman. Speaking of Tom Oldaker, a great luminary in his day, he says 'Were I to see a man and be told he was the son of an archbishop, I would look at him as I should look at any other man, but anything got by old Tom Oldaker must demand superior respect from me.'

A more solemn note sounds when he examines the interests of the commonwealth in the maintenance and integrity of fox-hunting.

As one would expect, our author is not behindhand in affirming the national importance of foxhunting. He is quite as uncomfortable about its future and the disasters to the people at large which would result if anything went wrong with hunting in this country as the patriots of to-day who subscribe to Sports Defence Leagues and kindred Societies. He wonders whether foxhunting will last the time of the rising generation, of which there must be doubts in all reflecting minds, and he speaks very gloomily of the combined effects of railroads, stag-hunting, and 'that abominable, cruel, and cock-tail practice of steeplechasing.' Reminiscent, perhaps, of something the Duke of Wellington is supposed to have said to the effect that his best officers in the Peninsula were foxhunters, he tells us in the 'Quarterly Run,' and possibly with justice, that not even Bonaparte's Old Guard '*at its best*' would have stopped such men as the aristocrats he describes in those stirring incidents by flood and field. In another fine passage he declares hunting to be 'one of the lion supporters of the Crown,' and he shrewdly suspects the Duke of Buccleuch, who had recently been very civil to him, of being of the same opinion. After such an ominous discovery it was a relief to turn to the hunting escapades of the two Mr. Burtons, who appear to have been genial if rather foolish creatures. This is an old story. Mrs. Thrale, writing towards the end of the eighteenth century to the Rev. Daniel Lysons, avers that the dog-tax and the repeal of the Game Laws will have a bad effect on the country, 'when gentlemen will want inducements to remain when hunting and coursing and shooting are at an end—horses will lower in price and little oats will be grown at all'; and Cobbett some years later, on one of his rural rides, laments the decline of Newbury, where he finds only one pack of foxhounds and some questionable harriers, though some years ago fifteen packs of hounds flourished to the great benefit of the neighbourhood.

This is what he says, writing from Burghclere on November 21, 1821: 'As an instance of the change which rural customs have undergone since the hellish paper-system has been so furiously at work, I need only mention the fact that forty years ago there were five packs of foxhounds and ten packs of harriers kept within ten miles of Newbury, and that now there is one of the former and none of the latter, &c. &c. . . .

"So much the better," says the shallow fool, who cannot duly estimate the difference between a resident native gentry, attached to the soil, known to every farmer and labourer from their childhood, mixing with them in those pursuits where all artificial distinctions are lost, and so on. Instead of these desirable people, Mr. Cobbett finds nabobs, negro-drivers, generals, admirals, governors, sinecurists, loan-jobbers, bankers, stock-jobbers settling down into the shoes of better men.

Our own impression is—passing for a moment with a sense of relief, which will be shared by our readers, from hunting and its weights and measures—that country life, in a sense, has never been so vigorous as now. This is largely due to the passion for gardening which animates countless gentle and many sterner breasts. Indeed, many ladies of intelligence have given up reading anything but nurserymen's catalogues—not, perhaps, to the culture of their minds, but certainly to the embellishment of our garden grounds and to the occupation of their time. Gardening is becoming what a City promoter would call a 'big thing,' and in alliance with the greater efficiency and cheapness of motor-cars and the consequently increased facilities for getting to London or catching a fast train to take one there, country life—simple or complicated—appears to be just now in a high state of preservation.

But throughout his writings Nimrod is the upholder of the prerogatives of the landed gentry. These he considers to be so conducive to all good things that he approves of their being enforced with some rigour and solemnity. This is what he has to tell us about the Shropshire gentry:

'They are not, perhaps, wholly free from that species of pride which common consent has allowed to them, but it consists more in dignity than in haughtiness; indeed, it is a question in these levelling times whether this does not tend to encourage, rather than impede, the exercise of those social virtues which ameliorate the condition of the people.'

This is a very capital sentence, if not a very easy question to answer. At the same time, as we have already remarked, we are often refreshed by the candour of some of his comments even

on great people, and about that most sensitive plant their horsemanship. He describes Lord Anson as 'a very indifferent 'horseman with but a small share of nerve.' No one would like to see this in cold print. Lord Middleton, who succeeded Mr. Corbet in Warwickshire, he thinks regrettably haughty in contrast to the 'mild and gentleman-like carriage' of his predecessor; but worse is to follow, for we are told that his lordship ruined Warwickshire as a hunting country and destroyed the club at Stratford-on-Avon. Mr. Corbet himself, in spite of his pleasant manners, we hear 'did not shine as a rider to hounds. 'He was afraid of fences.' However, in other ways—possibly with his legs under the mahogany—Mr. Corbet was 'game to the 'backbone,' and 'the well-bred gentleman was never under any 'circumstances laid aside.'

We have not been able to make out whether or not Nimrod was himself a very forward rider, or even an accomplished horseman. Sir Bellingham Graham, one of his trump cards, was by no means averse to the deferential breed, and liked the turned compliments paid to his riding, his science, and his character in print. Possibly in return for such an encomium as this—'a downright, straightforward, honest good 'fellow'—Sir Bellingham always declared him in public to be a most agreeable man. But he spoke of him in confidence as a 'sad tailor.'

His looks and manners must have been at all events greatly in his favour.

'Nimrod—says a contemporary—was one of the most fascinating persons I ever saw: his figure perfect, light, and active; his features handsome, his complexion clear and glowing with health; . . . he was truly a sunny person, full of harmless fun and humour; much readiness in conversation, with observation of character, and the sort of descriptive power which has since been recognised in his writings.'

The 'Hunting Tours and Reminiscences' are studded with gems of more or less lustre in the way of anecdotes. Luckily most of these anecdotes are short, and, in their way, to the point—to 'a' point, at all events; but some are certainly much worse than others, and those relating to great personages are almost invariably insipid. What can be poorer than this of Lord Maynard?

Somebody in Lord Maynard's hearing is talking of a horse which would be likely to carry a lady well. 'Whose horse is 'that?' Lord Maynard asks. 'I'll give 200 guineas for him 'to-morrow, for if he will carry a woman well, he will carry me



'better.' 'His lordship,' Nimrod adds, 'was the delight of the society in which he moved.' Or this of a filial Colonel Lowther and Sir J. Musgrave :

'Hounds have killed their fox handsomely. "The cream of everything in the shape of foxhunting," observes Sir James, looking at his watch and saying the usual things. "You are right," says Colonel Lowther; "they are perfect. I wish my father had seen them do their work to-day."'

Or this of Sir Francis Burdett. After introducing Sir Francis, very properly, to his readers as a public character and statesman, Nimrod observes that no man rides harder over a country. This he proceeds to prove. The scene is a large dinner-party at Melton, and the conversation is proceeding on the accustomed and simple lines of Melton after-dinner conversation. This is what Nimrod heard. "Has any man," asked one, "seen Sir Francis Burdett refuse a fence which any other man rode at or over?" The answer was in the negative. Another question was put. "Have we not all of us seen Sir Francis Burdett frequently ride at fences which other hard-riding men have refused?" The answer was in the affirmative. One feels that it is lucky Meltonians have, presumably, plenty of spare time for this kind of investigation. But Sir Francis comes out much better in the 'Quarterly Run.' Hounds have settled to their fox, only thirteen out of over two hundred really with them.

"Worth a dozen Reform Bills," shouts Sir Francis, sitting erect upon Sampson, and putting his head straight at a yawner. Sampson, a contemporary footnote (1826) tells us, was a favourite hunter of the baronet's, which he once honoured by coming all the way from London to Melton to ride *one day* with hounds!

However, they all have the stamp of fact about them, and much of the gumption frequently noted and admired by 'Blackwood' at the time of their first appearance. This may be exemplified by an extract from his correspondence. Nimrod has become the owner of a violent, hard-pulling mare, and after two or three most disagreeable rides decides to try her in a special bit, favoured by a Mr. Lindow, a great rider of the day. When prompt action is required he is a man of few words, and on returning from hunting, after being nearly brained against a wall through not being able to stop his mare, he sits down to write to his saddler. This is all he says: 'Brown mare versus Nimrod; you know what I mean,' and in due course down comes the Lindow bit. This was a formidable engine, the cheek being nine inches, the port two and a half inches, and equipped with three flanges 'to keep the mouth alive.' How-

ever, it turns out a complete success, though we are not surprised to hear that the rider requires light hands or 'danger would attend the use of it at the fences.' Here and there his turn of phrase is admirable. Cub-hunting, for instance, he calls a 'melancholy recreation'; he comments on the 'captivating qualities of condition'—precisely the right adjective, as anyone well in for a good run will admit after you have been going thirty minutes, and hounds look like running on over wide enclosures and black-looking fences—always the sign of a scent—swelling with assured, if gentle, determination up to the still distant hills; and we have already noticed the celebrity as classics secured by some of the sentences in the 'Quarterly Run.'

But just as his grooms are better company than his grandes, so we prefer his commoners to his peers. What, for instance, are we to make of this? Nimrod is on his first visit to Raby, and, like most people, is impressed with its imposing effect and approaches. After some persiflage with the groom of the chambers he gets dressed with a 'squeak'—in time for dinner at six o'clock to the second.

'I found the Marquis and his family in good health and spirits, a small select party as his guests, and everything as I expected to find it at Raby Castle; but amidst the glitter of affluence which is so conspicuous here, there is nothing to chill into awe those who move in a lower sphere of life. If rank and wealth were his boast, the Marquis of Cleveland—like Nebuchadnezzar the king—could bask in the sunshine on the battlements of his palace.'

And so on and so on. After a good deal of this kind of thing we are brought to the conclusion of the whole matter, which is given in italics. 'The Marquis of Cleveland is passionately fond of hunting and everything pertaining to the noble science.'

We breathe a less oppressive atmosphere in the company of Lord Mountsandford, a handsome young Irishman, with no vestige of a brogue, and whom Nimrod finds 'just in the right trim' to receive him, having 'already taken his bottle of champagne and ditto of claret, and in the act of lighting a cigar.' A glass of gin-punch graces an hour's gossip, and Lord Mountsandford is handed down to posterity as 'what we call a very good fellow.' His simpler habits are certainly more convincing than the Marquis of Cleveland's.

On the other hand 'Miser' Elwes is a man one would like to have known, though not perhaps have served. Mr. Elwes kept one servant, who had been with him for years, and who was valet, groom, butler, gardener, minded the cow, and acted as housemaid, but of whom Mr. Elwes always spoke as a 'd——d

'idle rascal'; and there is much to like and admire in the sang-froid of Mr. Thomas Shafto, a conspicuous rider with Mr. Lambton's hounds. Nimrod relates this anecdote in evidence of his nerve. It occurs in a shipwreck, or nearly a shipwreck. Mr. Shafto, then a captain of Militia, and his friend, Captain Johnson, were in their cabin when the captain of the packet thought proper to apprise his passengers that he had 'no hopes of saving them from a watery grave.' (This is all in the favoured italics.) 'Captain Johnson fell on his knees and began to implore the Throne of Grace.' Not so Captain Shafto :

'On this trying occasion Lord Darlington and his foxhounds and his friend Ralph Lambton flitted across his fancy ; for in the agony of the moment he did not exclaim with the jailor in the Bible "What shall I do to be saved ?" But sitting up in his bunk, and heaving a deep sigh, he addressed his brother officer in the following words : "I say, Bob, no more Uckenby Whin." \* Surely this was the ruling passion strong in death !'

On another and subsequent occasion—as, after all, they were not shipwrecked—the oratorical powers of some of the leading statesmen of the day were under discussion. 'Earl Grey's name was mentioned. "A good speaker," observed Tom, "but he can't ride over Stanley pastures."'

But, all said and done, given a comfortable easy-chair, a winter evening, and winter's intimate delights of a bright lamp, a clear fire, and curtained windows, Nimrod's writings, taken as a whole and outside hunting *per se*, do very well. The slight tendency to doze they may encourage in the circumstances stipulated above must not be argued too hardly against them. With Jack Mytton we can be barbarous or eccentric, with Nimrod and his swells we can live freely and ride hard, with his hunt-servants we can be scientific, and with his stablemen we can be amused. So now for a final tribute to the Manes of our author. 'Non cujusvis est adire Corinthum'—to bring his public, as Nimrod is still able to bring his, into communion with the past Olympians of the Chase, and to a less intimate degree of the Turf and of the Road. Under his auspices we can still visit them in their homes, observe their habits, mark their words, share their pursuits, and—at a respectful distance where Mr. Mytton is concerned—their pleasures and their pains. We recommend others to take advantage of these opportunities ; it can be all done without any of those vicissitudes of parenthesis or eclipse which bewilder human affairs. Those who do so will find it a serene and inexpensive expedition.

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\* Still a sure find in a good country near Catterick Bridge.

## ART. VIII.—GRÆCO-ROMAN AND ROMAN SCULPTURE.

1. *Roman Art : Some of its Principles and their Application to Early Christian Painting.* By FRANZ WICKHOFF. Translated and Edited by Mrs. ARTHUR STRONG. London: Heinemann. 1900.
2. *Roman Sculpture from Augustus to Constantine.* By Mrs. ARTHUR STRONG. London: Duckworth. 1907.
3. *Herculaneum : Past, Present, and Future.* By CHARLES WALDSTEIN and LEONARD SHOBRIDGE. London: Macmillan. 1908.

EARLY in the eighteenth century Emanuel Maurice, Prince d'Elbœuf, a soldier who had entered the Imperial service in 1706 and subsequently held a command in the Neapolitan army, began to build himself a villa at Granatello, on the eastern shore of the Bay of Naples. To obtain building material or decorative antiquities, his workmen were trying the ground at the neighbouring Resina when they happened to break in upon the theatre of the buried city of Herculaneum. Following up this discovery, although, it would seem, without ever recognising the identity of the site, the Prince excavated with great success. Some of the marbles which he extracted are now at Naples, while three others, the most famous, found their way to Dresden, where they now stand in the Herculaneum Room. That was the beginning of the spasmodic, unscientific, but nevertheless extraordinarily fruitful excavations which have been conducted at Herculaneum during the last two centuries. Even the archæologist, who has always been aware that much of the best of what is called 'Pompeian' comes from Herculaneum, may own to a little surprise at the wealth of the illustrations with which Professor Waldstein and Mr. Shobridge have been able to fit out their book.

Of the three 'Herculancerinnen' at Dresden, one represents a lady, richly draped, with her mantle drawn over her head so as to veil the back of it. Pose and expression are dignified and aristocratic, but the figure is something more than the mere stately presentation of a noble matron. What that something is can best be understood with the help of a contrast. In the Naples Museum stands an outwardly similar figure, the portrait statue of a lady named Viciria Arcas. But though in pose and cast of drapery she closely resembles the 'Matron of Herculaneum,' as the Dresden statue is usually called, there is from every other point

of view a world of difference between them. Viciria's features are strongly individualised, but suggest at the same time the traditional Roman dame; while the nameless Dresden lady has an ideal beauty of countenance which leads the mind back at once to the forms and ideas of Greek art. Equally marked is the difference between the handling, as distinct from the general disposition, of the drapery. In the Dresden figure we can see the hand, if not of a great master, yet of a man who realised that drapery should be carved so as to suggest the forms which it conceals, and knew how to make the most of the strong transverse folds of the upper and the beautiful vertical lines of the lower garment. But Viciria's portrait-sculptor knew nothing of modelling, and his drapery is lumpy where it is not flat. The expression of character in the face of his sitter was his only care; nor did he understand that to the sculptor the figure is no less important than the face.

It is now some years since the Dresden statue was recognised as a reproduction of some type dating, in its origin, as far back as the fourth century before the Christian era. The balance of opinion inclines to find the original in a lost work of the school of Praxiteles, or actually from his hand; although, as is often the case with types of this period, the claims of Lysippus receive a good measure of support. Our knowledge of such matters is gradually acquiring greater precision in some directions, thanks to the discovery and classification of the Greek originals; but work of this kind does not equally tend to clarify our ideas of the style of particular artists. Based, as they too often are, on a faulty literary tradition, these ideas are constantly requiring readjustment in the light of the actual monuments. Very often we have to be content with attaining greater definition as to the origin and date of the type which we are studying, without being able to reconcile our results and fit them in with the style, as we conceive it, of any one of the great masters.

The latest addition to the group to which the Matron of Herculaneum belongs is a statue which was recently acquired by the Trustees of the British Museum at the sale of the Duke of Sutherland's collection at Trentham.\* Exposure to the air of the Potteries has for ever ruined the surface of the marble, so that it is difficult without close examination to recognise even the difference between the Parian of the head and the Pentelic of the body—for these seem to be the materials employed.

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\* Published and fully illustrated by Mr. Cecil Smith in the 'Burlington Magazine' for March 1908, and by Professor E. A. Gardner in the 'Journal of Hellenic Studies,' vol. xxviii.

But the beauty of the figure is untouched, except where a clumsy restoration has distorted the left hand. Although the edges of the fold of the drapery are blunted and chipped, the suggestion of the form below it is as subtle, as delicate as in any but the greatest masterpieces of Greek sculpture. The 'Mourning Lady' is a tomb-statue, an idealised but singularly touching and human monument of grief. She moves slowly forward, her head slightly bent. Her cloak is wrapped closely round her, covering both arms; part of it is drawn up to veil the back of her head, and one end, passing over her left shoulder, hangs perpendicularly, combining with the gentle forward movement of the limbs to give the suggestion of decent and graceful motion. The form may not be grand, but it is in no sense of the word small. If we are occasionally reminded of the Tanagra statuettes, it is only of that class which, small and charming as they are, retain something of the largeness of style of the best marble sculpture. The face, in spite of the way in which the marble has suffered, is extraordinarily appealing in its expression of restrained and quiet mourning. There is no lack of thoughtfulness in the conception and the rendering of the whole work; yet in no point does it verge on the study of effect for effect's sake. We have, in fact, to do with a statue of all but the first rank, as much superior to the Matron of Herculaneum, with which in scheme and composition it has to be compared, as the Matron is superior to the statue of Viciria. The more familiar it becomes, the more convincingly does the figure impress itself on the mind as an original of the fourth century, even if the head is, as some have thought, from the hand of a Roman restorer. Yet on its base it bears an inscription showing that it was used on the tomb of a Roman lady named Maximina. There is no doubt that this is one of the 'false inscriptions on borrowed statues' of which Cicero expressed his disapproval in a letter to Atticus. The figure must have been torn from its original Attic tomb and carried off to Italy to decorate the monument of Maximina.

Here, then, we have three figures illustrating three different phases of ancient sculpture in connexion with one another: first, a Greek original; second, a close Roman copy of a Greek original; third, a free Roman rendering of the scheme of a Greek original. We could, it is true, go further; for the history of the type which we have been considering does not end here. It is one of the most persistent ever invented by a sculptor. The influence of Praxiteles, if he it was, is distinctly traceable in the thirteenth-century statuary of the cathedral at Reims, in the group of the Visitation; and again in the work of an almost contemporary German,

who, inspired by French influence, made the noble figures of a similar group at Bamberg.

A few years ago most writers on sculpture would have been content to regard Roman sculpture as adequately represented by the *Matron of Herculaneum* and the portrait of *Viciria Arcas*, with the addition perhaps of a series of Imperial portrait-busts. Roman sculpture, it seemed, was either a direct copy or a free rendering of Greek. An independent school of art was not recognised. What of good and permanent there was in Roman sculpture in relief was due to Greek inspiration. To the excellence of Roman portraiture a somewhat grudging tribute was paid; it was so far, indeed, admitted to the highest rank, that some of the finest Greek portraits were called Roman. Thus the magnificent head of *Antiochus the Great* in the Louvre was identified as a portrait of *Julius Cæsar*, to whom it bears a superficial resemblance. Perhaps the chief merit of Roman sculpture was thought to lie in the supposed fact that it served as a vehicle for the transmission of Greek influence to the sculptors of the Renaissance.

Recent criticism, chiefly the work of one or two German archæologists, who have met with opposition in their own country and apathy outside it, has done something to awaken interest in Roman art, and to alter the somewhat distorted notion which has hitherto prevailed as to its nature. That is not to say that Roman art is so great as *Wickhoff* would have us believe, or that his attempt to set it on a pinnacle, as a serious rival to the sculpture of ancient Greece or Italy of the Renaissance, has won or is likely to win general acceptance. But, thanks to his work, we can come to a juster estimate of those technical qualities of Roman sculpture which entitle it to be considered as something other than a mere offshoot from the Greek stem. Now, if technical dexterity entitles to rank among the great schools of the world, the right of the Romans so to rank cannot be disputed. There will, however, always be a number of lovers of art and students of its history who, old-fashioned as they may be deemed, will continue to recognise imagination as the touchstone of excellence: a test which, applied to Roman sculpture, gives it a place behind Greek, behind Italian, and behind the thirteenth-century 'Gothic' of France.

This, however, is to anticipate our conclusion. What is it that recent research has done in the way of justifying the claims of Roman sculpture to stand as one of the supreme achievements in the art? The characteristics on which those claims are based can be reduced to two. In the first place, Roman artists, if

they did not invent, at least developed from its infancy and perfected what is known as the 'continuous' method of narrative-sculpture. Secondly, they also carried to a high pitch of excellence the method of presentation called 'illusionist.' It is unfortunate that the English language possesses no less ungainly word to describe a style which, in the opinion of Wickhoff, is common to the Roman sculpture of the Flavian period and the painting of the greatest masters of the seventeenth century—of a Rubens, a Hals, a Velasquez.

To explain. The sculptor or the painter who wishes to tell a story may adopt one of three methods. He may take from that story various striking episodes, and make a separate composition of each. This process of 'isolation' is by modern canons the only fit method. It is quite unnecessary to give examples. Or he may employ the 'complementary' method. However many scenes may go to his story, he represents or suggests them all without the repetition of any one figure. Although this method—since it is rare, if not unknown, in any western art except that of early Greece—does not strictly concern our present purpose, it is interesting to see how it illustrates the artistic principle that false economy of material leads to failure. The vase-painter Clitias—to take the admirable instance adduced by Wickhoff—attempts to tell the story of the death of Troilus by this method, but never succeeds in coming to the real point. He gives us the fountain to which Troilus went to water his horses; then Achilles rushing out to attack him, in the presence of Thetis, Hermes, and Athena; then he shows Polyxena and Antenor running to tell Priam of the tragedy, and Hector and Polites going forth to avenge the crime. But the murder itself is omitted! It is not that his sense of fitness requires the murder to be done 'off'; no one familiar with Greek vase-painting can suppose that such squeamishness was probable. It is simply that his method does not allow of the duplication of his figures.

Thirdly, without exercising that selection which is necessary to the isolating process, or the false economy of the complementary process, the artist may adopt a continuous relation of the events. In Wickhoff's words:

'It is not a case in which chosen pictures of striking, epoch-making moments combine in a cycle, in order to emulate the fluent continuous recital of the ancient myths, but as the text flows on the heroes of the narrative accompany it in a continuous series of related circumstances, passing, smoothly and unbroken, one into another, just as during a river voyage the landscape of the banks seems to glide before our eyes.'



In other words, the observer is left to do his own selection and combination, to disentangle the episodes. The Giustiniani sarcophagus represents the vengeance of Orestes. In the middle is Orestes, still brandishing the sword which has laid low Aegisthus and Clytemnestra, between whose corpses he stands. On the left are seated the three Furies, slumbering; the connexion between them and the middle scene is given by the Nurse, who looks at them, but stretches out her hand towards Orestes. On the immediate right of Orestes we see two of the same Furies coming forward to claim their due of him; still farther to the right the third Fury slumbers at the foot of the statue of Apollo in the temple at Delphi, while Orestes, appearing again, steps stealthily over her as he makes for safety. There are other figures which we need not mention; they do not increase the clearness of the representation. This is the continuous method in its fullest—we do not say its most artistic—development. It may be doubted whether a Greek would have described the representation (composition it can hardly be called) as anything but a jumble. Other instances of the continuous method have a certain attractiveness, due to the quaintly primitive way in which the flow of events is conceived. Such is the picture of the Fall in that Vienna Genesis manuscript which first inspired Wickhoff's researches into the methods of Roman art. Here we have, all in one picture, from left to right, first Eve tempting Adam; then the two guilty ones hastening away in shame, while the hand of God appears above them; finally, the two hiding themselves among the bushes. The background is uniformly filled with fruit trees—chiefly pears and apples—and there is no attempt to mark off the scenes one from the other.

But the triumph of the continuous method is seen not in minor works like these so much as in the great reliefs of the period of Trajan: the frieze which once decorated the walls of his Forum, and is now mainly represented by four slabs on the Arch of Constantine, and the better-known reliefs of the famous Column of Trajan. In Mrs. Strong's enthusiastic and extremely able apology for Roman sculpture these works naturally bulk more largely than anything else. Of the frieze she writes:

‘It is not so much the single parts that compel attention, though there are beautiful and striking individual motives, as the rush and swirl of the composition, which almost overpowers us by its tumultuous vehemence, while yet commanding our attention and respect through the magnificent sense of ordered pattern. A severe design is combined with an animation unknown to previous art. The lion-hunt on the sarcophagus of Alexander is broken up into

overlapping groups with only a material interconnection; the battle of the mosaic at Naples gives only one episode out of many (though the central and most splendid); but the reliefs assemble a series of groups and episodes in one indivisible artistic unity. The eye travels from end to end, pausing to fathom individual beauties but never because of a break in the composition.'

And again :

' This frieze and the reliefs from the Column of Trajan are rightly regarded as the two most perfect examples of the continuous method. I have begun with the frieze not only because it probably comes first in point of time, but because it presents the method raised, so to speak, to its highest power. It is sometimes asserted that the method consists in giving a continuous background to successive but disconnected scenes. This definition holds good, in a measure, of parts of the Trajan column, but in the large frieze the continuous style is evolved out of the forceful groupings of the main subject itself—is the result of the skilful overlapping of the lines—so that it is really impossible to separate the groups without dislocating the whole. It is, in fact, the grandest expression attained by the Roman system of accumulating masses in order to produce a sense of crowding, or of turmoil.'

All this is true. It is also in a sense true that, as Mrs. Strong points out, whatever may be said of the realistic character of Roman sculpture, both time and space are treated in what may be called an ideal fashion. A little consideration, however, shows that the idealism is dictated not by the artistic conception, but by the subject. The artist of the frieze from Trajan's Forum was told to represent certain exploits of the Emperor, culminating in victory. He sets to work in the most matter-of-fact way to depict at one end of his reliefs a battle in Dacia, at the other the Emperor returned to Rome, standing between the personifications of the City and Victory. The transitions between the intervening scenes may be managed, the gaps in time and space bridged over, with some skill; but the cohesion thus achieved is purely mechanical. Of any idea, beyond the banalities dictated by the order of his imperial master, the artist shows no sign. He reveals to us nothing that is spiritually new. This is, indeed, the continuous treatment, but it is not a composition in the proper sense of the term. Again, the reliefs of the Column of Trajan, in spite of the reminiscences of a nobler art which they occasionally throw out, will always attract chiefly because of their historical, and not because of their artistic, interest. It ought not to be necessary for critics to dwell on the initial mistake of decorating a column with spiral reliefs. 'The profoundly decorative effect of the sculptured

‘spiral, the wonderful variety of the pattern, its mobility under the varying light, the perennial novelty of its interest’ are there; but what of ‘its grave subordination to the architectural effect’? Mrs. Strong continues: ‘Nothing can emphasise so well as a spiral band the purpose of a column; the encircling seems to impart additional strength, while the steady upward movement of the spiral contributes to the soaring effect of the pillar.’ If she is right, why is the spiral column, as an architectural element, absent from all the finest Roman buildings, and associated in all ages, when it does occur, with anything but the grand style in architecture?

But apart from this question, which answers itself, the key to the true appreciation of Trajanic sculpture in relief is given by a comparison—a double-edged comparison—of the significance of which those who quote it with admiration seem to be unaware. Such relief is described as the counterpart of Roman historic prose. That is very true and to the point, so long as we do not forget that prose is not the only literary art, and if Roman sculpture is to take the high place claimed for it, it must be informed also with the element that distinguishes poetry from prose. Without imagination the artist can achieve nothing to distinguish him essentially from the sign-painter. Roman historical prose, with all its impressive movement, as of the tramp of legions, never rises to the imaginative height of a Thucydides. For the same reason both Roman relief and Roman literary narrative will always be popular; they tell their story directly and well, and, as everyone who frequents galleries can testify, the public requires nothing more than to be able to identify the persons in a picture and to know what is happening. From this point of view the cinematograph is the culmination of art. Had Wickhoff been writing his description of the continuous method a few years later than 1895, he might have found in the cinematograph an analogy even more apt than the one he has chosen; we may even say, not a mere analogy, but a lineal descendant and a logical development.

The clumsiness of the Roman method has been felt by its apologists, and in justification they have sought for instances in the work of the great masters of modern times. Thus in pictures by or after Michelangelo, representing Christ on the Mount of Olives, Christ appears twice, once in prayer by Himself, and again turning round to awaken the sleeping disciples. Plenty of other instances can be found, but the fact to be noticed is that in no case does the beauty of the work depend on the feature to which so much importance is attached. Regarded from the point of view of the significance of the

various figures, the duplication of the figure of Christ only disturbs us; in order to appreciate the meaning of the picture we have to perform the isolating process ourselves, and divide it into two parts. It is, of course, possible to ignore the meaning of the figures, and simply consider the picture without reference to the story it tells. But if it then seems worthy of praise, it obviously cannot be because of the employment of the continuous method. Now, many of the artists of the Renaissance, great as well as small, recognised the faultiness of this kind of art. But, especially in the Quattrocento, they retained the passion, characteristic of the childhood of art as of human beings, for telling and hearing the whole of a story. So they often solved the problem by a pleasant compromise. They represented the chief episode, or the episode which happened to interest them especially, as a central composition; and the preceding and following episodes were relegated to subordinate places and rendered on a small scale. Masaccio, in his noble fresco of the Tribute Money in the Carmine at Florence, still has two out of the three episodes represented on the same scale; but the taking of the piece of money out of the mouth of the fish is on a smaller scale, and that not merely because it is supposed to take place in the distance. Typical, however, of the method in question are some of the frescoes by Masolino da Panicale in the Chapel of St. Catherine in San Clemente in Rome. In one fresco the saint disputes with the philosophers, the Emperor presiding; but through a window we see, in the distance, the philosophers roasting in the flames, and Catherine profiting by the opportunity to exhort them. In another picture she is beheaded before a troop of soldiers; but in the far background, on the lofty summit of Mount Sinai, two angels place her body in the tomb, while a third bears her soul away to heaven. By such means the Italian primitives could satisfy their desire to omit no episode in a story; and so they prepared the way for a more sophisticated art in which the mere subject of the narrative became of less importance than the manner of its telling.

The complementary method fails from false economy, which produces gaps in the sequence of the events represented, so that there is unity neither of time nor of space nor of subject. The continuous method leaves no gaps, and leaves nothing to the imagination. The unities which it provides are, however, fictitious, and can only be called ideal in a superficial sense. Both methods employ juxtaposition, not significant composition. That is only possible with the method which, somewhat inadequately, is called the method of isolation. If this method

isolates, it does so only by gathering up, at some critical moment, the threads which run through, connecting the preceding and following episodes in the story. This isolated episode is of value only in so far as it excites the imagination to supply the others.

If the elaboration of the continuous method thus turns out, on analysis, to have less value as an artistic achievement than is claimed for it, there yet remains to be considered the other contribution of Roman sculptors to the development of technique.

‘Who has not seen,’ asks Wickhoff, ‘in collections of antiques, heads of the period from Vespasian to Trajan, whose striking lifelikeness and apparently superficial technique, adopted for a distinct purpose, put one in mind of the best portraits of Velasquez and of Franz Hals? Who has not realised as the processions of the Arch of Titus appear to glide by him, or as the battle from the Forum of Trajan surges before his eyes, that he is standing before products of a new art, which at the most has only a loose connection with that of Greece? . . . Not only is there a resemblance in these reliefs and statues and busts to pictures by Rubens, Hals, and Velasquez, but the style is actually the same and the same means of expression are employed in both cases. It is that *illusionist* style which reached in the second and third centuries A.D. its first highest embodiment, such as it was not to find again before the seventeenth century.’

The major premiss on which Wickhoff bases his argument in favour of Roman sculpture is that ‘the purpose of all art is to produce illusion and that all that the naïve spectator observes, from the earliest attempts to the highest perfection of art, is the illusionist copy of reality.’ The difference between modern and ancient art appears to him to be that ‘the more ancient strives to obtain its effect through the rendering of what is organic and essential in the person or object represented,’ while ‘modern art selects out of the mass of reality only those elements which are suited to convey the lifelike impression of an appearance at a given moment.’ These two methods ‘are distinguished not only by the means they employ, but also by a radical difference in the conception of art.’

Wickhoff is, of course, even at this time of day, not alone in his naïve belief that the purpose of all art is illusion, as though such a purpose could in itself sum up the creative aspirations of the human mind throughout the ages! Were such a theory baldly true, the unspeakable vulgarities of the Musée Wiertz would represent the culmination of human artistic endeavour. The artist’s aim is not imitation, surely, but selective reconstruction, a revelation of the ideal truth which underlies the

forms with which he has to deal. His object, though very often he may not know it, is not to reproduce exactly what anyone can see, but to make you see, with his eyes, those forms and still more those ideas of which it is his privilege to have the vision. If the aim of modern art is illusion apart from the essential idea, then so much the worse for modern art. But it is unnecessary, surely, to dwell on what is, or ought to be, a commonplace of æsthetic theory, the proper appreciation of which should save a critic from lumping together Hals and Velasquez, or supposing that what may be, from one point of view, admirable in painting, is necessarily the supreme virtue in sculpture. When once the purpose of art is understood to be not to deceive the spectator, but to suggest to his mind a truth more permanent than the apparent reality of 'nature,' then and then only have we a criterion for distinguishing the superficially brilliant from good metal. Obviously the critic who takes the production of illusion to be the aim of art will estimate most highly those artists who, regardless of the medium in which they are working, or of the constructional relations of their particular piece of work, can attain most nearly to the deception of the eye. The object of a portrait is, he thinks, attained if the spectator is for a moment surprised out of himself by the vividness of the presentation, and receives the impression that he is before an actual person. But the intimate revelation of character, the penetration below the surface, which has always been the aim of portrait-painters of the type of Titian and Rembrandt, as contrasted with Hals, can only come with prolonged study on the part of the painter as well as on the part of us who look at his painting. It is not too sweeping a statement to say that all pictures in which the production of illusion has been made the first charge on the painter's ability run risk of bankruptcy in the more permanent and valuable quality, the expression of character. The frantic search for what is wrongly supposed to be individuality of expression, while it is really nothing more than a glimpse of the individual in the passing light of an accidental situation, produces many a brilliant picture. But it is essential to remember that in such works the situation is all that matters; the human element has no moral value, since of its permanent, enduring qualities, of its *ethos*, we are given no revelation.

Now, the greatest Roman portrait-busts rise above the level of that art which has for its object the production of mere illusion. The best Roman sculptors, almost as much as Donatello, saw the type in the individual. We may admire the Florentine's head of Niccolò da Uzzano for the extraordinary

way in which the momentary expression is captured. But that is only our first impression. The portrait does not stamp itself on our memory merely because of its alertness, but because of the profoundly intimate revelation which it makes to us, not only of the character of the man who is portrayed, but also of the artist's idea. It gives us a real type. A cavalier of Hals, on the other hand, we remember merely as a brilliant piece of painting; it has no other, deeper interest; it reveals to us neither the sitter nor the artist.

The method characteristic of Roman art as distinct from Greek may be illustrated in several aspects. One of the most interesting products of Roman sculpture is the so-called 'Rose-pillar' in the Lateran. Its charm is beyond question.

'The *impression* intended,' writes Wickhoff, 'was that conveyed by a rose-bush growing round a vase and covered with buds, blossoms, and leaves quivering in the air. The whole success of the design depends on the *impression* of a graceful twining plant, stirred by the wind and alive with opening buds and fragrant blossoms. Therefore, the individual twigs and leaves do not closely follow the natural model . . . but emphasis is laid on whatever would heighten the desired effect of movement and bloom, while any detail likely to disturb it is suppressed. The sculptor who carried out the design had not even full-blown roses before him to look at, else he surely would have given them five petals. . . . But although for the full-blown rose he used a stock convention—and an incorrect one, too—he had carefully studied the buds on a rose-tree in bloom and had noticed how they looked at different stages of growth before they opened out. . . . In his naïveté, wherever he thought he possessed a complete artistic idea, as in the case of the full-blown rose, he left it unaltered, but where there was no accepted memory-image to refer to, he created a new one by accurate observation of natural forms. Having provided himself thus with all the forms he needed, he knew how to arrange the twigs in a free design round the slender vase, and by the subtlest artistic means to conjure up the illusion of a rose-bush in bloom. . . . The illusion, however, does not degenerate into a clumsy deception. . . . Nowhere do we find any dull imitation of actuality, but everywhere a free play of symmetry and pleasing design, composed of motives not conventional but illusionist in effect, selected and arranged with artistic intention.'

In this passage, to which, perhaps, even the lengthy extracts given barely do justice, a distinction is drawn between 'deception' and 'illusion,' which is not upheld consistently throughout the book. In fact, it would seem that, out of tenderness to the artist of the charming rose-pillar, a positive merit is made of the practice of giving four petals instead of five to

the roses, and suspending the vase in the air instead of resting it on the ground. In so far as the artist, by his skill, prevents us from noticing at first the absurdity of such things, 'deception' is surely the right word. It is useless to call it immoral, because morality is not admitted as a ground of argument by the apologists of art for the artist's sake. But it is easy to show that the 'illusion' or 'deception,' call it what you will, is pointless. For, surely, the only object of such a *tour de force* should be to succeed. And how can you succeed for more than a moment when you make your roses with four petals? You cannot urge that they are more beautiful than when they have five. And you have not, in such work, the excuse of an heraldic convention, such as might be urged for the so-called roses used at Rimini by sculptors in the service of Sigismondo Malatesta. The artist of the naturalistic school goes to work in a different way, honestly endeavouring to reproduce natural objects with fidelity. There is, for instance, something praiseworthy in the way in which the 'Monk of Hyères,' at the time of the naturalistic revival at the beginning of the fifteenth century, illuminates his pages with marvellously faithful pictures of beetles and butterflies. It is not high art, but it is honest and attains its object. The sculptor of the rose-pillar charms us until we discover that he has played us a trick. Then we begin to analyse his motives, and we find that, being wholly given up (consciously or unconsciously) to the production of illusion, he has forgotten another vital element of good art, the relation of ornament to the object ornamented. That, again, makes his work meaningless. On this pillar the huge vase, carved in relief with the roses clambering round it, rests on fragile cherry twigs bearing ripe fruit, yet its weight has not the slightest effect! Now, criticism like this would be reasonably condemned as captious if the work did not pretend to illusion; but if it does so pretend, and its apologists are right in their explanation of its principles, then the artist must take the risks of his method. It would, of course, be absurd to deny the superficial charm of the work as a piece of decoration; but it seems necessary to protest against its exaltation into a model to be copied. The Renaissance sculptors who frankly recognised the limitations of their material, and confined themselves to conventional arabesques, which, however, left them free to indulge their fancy in the treatment of line, light, and shade, often came nearer to perfection as decorators.

The rose-pillar is said to be part of the decoration of the tomb of the Haterii, but no other portion of those fragments of this remarkable monument of the Flavian period, which are pre-



served in the Lateran Museum, shows quite the same treatment. Many of the fragments, intensely interesting as they are to the archæologist, have no more artistic value than a village sign-painting. There are, however, a couple of busts, portraits of a physician and a lady, doubtless members of the family to whom the tomb belonged, which have great merit. Of the man's bust Mrs. Strong remarks :

‘ The wrinkled neck, the hair on the breast, and the worn socket of the eye are rendered as faithfully as the wart on the face of the shoemaker ’ (Gaius Julius Helius, whose bust is in the Palazzo dei Conservatori). ‘ It is a finely observed study of age ; as often, however, in the antique, the artist shirks baldness, and bestows upon this ancient personage a generous head of hair.’

Let that pass, although only someone personally acquainted with the man in question would be justified in saying that the amount of hair is excessive. The chief interest of this pair of portraits is that they express something characteristically Roman in idea as well as in technique. They are entirely void of pretence, but as keenly observed as a portrait by Moretto or Moroni. Although they belong to the period when the method of illusion was most flourishing, they exhibit none of its excesses. The comparison with the painters just mentioned may be carried further without straining ; these busts have just that combination of simple taste with quiet dignity which makes the Brescian painters so admirably successful with sitters of what we should now call the professional class. The intense imagination, the intellectual intimacy of the greatest portrait-painters, we do not look for in them, and we should be disturbed if we found it there. Other Roman portraits of the time show the characteristics of the school of illusion. Such is the Vespasian of the Terme Museum, instanced by Mrs. Strong.

‘ The fine Vespasian of the Terme, with its massive structure, square jaw and homely, rustic expression, is treated almost in an impressionist manner ; there is less attention to linear effects than in the Augustan period ; the modelling becomes still rounder, and the planes pass into one another by the softest transitions. The design appears to emerge from the block, as does the relief from the background, or the figures in a picture from the plane surface.’

From portrait-busts let us pass to sculpture in relief. The great panels from the Arch of Titus representing the triumphal procession after the Fall of Jerusalem have always been famous for the interest of their subject. But it remained for Wickhoff to discover, first, that we are here face to face with something that had never been done before in technique ; second, that this

achievement stands on the same level as the achievement of Velasquez. The first of his conclusions no one will dispute. The old uniform background, the flat surface against which, in Greek relief, the figures stand out in silhouette, has, in more than one sense of the phrase, vanished into thin air. Instead of remaining content with the convention which that background embodied, the Roman artist employs every artifice known to him to make the spectator think that there is no stone background, in exactly the same spirit as inspires the scene-painter who gives us a view at the back of the stage. Greek relief ignored shadow.

‘ An art like that of the Greeks intent upon the type could, even in the case of relief, afford to ignore the effects of shadow. It could entirely disregard the cast shadow which had no power to disturb illusion where none was intended. But the case was different when relief began to aim at pictorial effect, and consequently had to take into account that important factor in painting, the cast shadow. The frieze of Pergamon with the “ Battle of the Giants ” is just at this stage. The composition was condensed, the background disappeared, and the shadows cast by the projecting parts of the figures, which, though worked only in one layer, have considerable depth, fall either on the figure itself or on the one facing it, thus emphasising the perspective; in fact, the shadows become an essential factor in the pictorial effect.’

But this Pergamene relief is far from attempting an illusion of reality. In a brilliant and convincing analysis, Wickhoff traces the developement of technique from these Pergamene sculptures, through reliefs such as those of the Augustan *Ara Pacis*, to the triumph of the method (such triumph as could be won with a deficient knowledge of perspective) in the reliefs of the Arch of Titus.

The secret of the Augustan style, of which the Augustus of Prima Porta and the *Ara Pacis* are the supreme examples, lies, as he shows, in the use of the clay model.

‘ In the case of all, or, at any rate, of all carefully executed works of this kind, be it for copies of famous statues, for portraits or for reliefs, carefully executed clay models were set up, which, through being slavishly copied, obscured the intrinsic peculiarities of sculpture in stone.’

But the dissolution of the background has already begun. The artist

‘ allowed the figures in high relief of the front row to cast their shadows on a back row of figures, which were worked so flat on the ground that they could no longer cast any shadows, but stood like

silhouettes against the sky. Suppose the two rows of figures to have been variously coloured and the ground blue, a pictorial effect could not but ensue. The background would appear to recede, and the second row of figures would look as if they were casting a shadow on the earth behind them where it could not be seen.'

When we come to the Arch of Titus we find that this method is carried to its highest form, and the influence of the clay model has disappeared.

'The reliefs are worked in real stone style out of blocks.' The relief 'exhibits a subtle variation of depth from the figures of the front plane to the flatly worked heads of the lowest layer on their vanishing background. . . . All relation of the separate groups and figures to the architecture, such as is maintained in the Pergamene sculptures, is here ignored, or, more exactly, purposely avoided. A frame is simply thrown open, and through it we look at the march past of the triumphal procession. We are to believe that the people are moving there before our eyes; we are no longer to be reminded of pictures; rather the plastic art tries to attain by its own methods the same effect as would a highly developed art of painting—the impression of complete illusion. Beauty of line, symmetry of parts, such as a conventional art demands, are no longer sought for. Everything is concentrated on the one aim of producing an impression of continuous motion. Air, light and shade are all pressed into the service and must help to conjure up reality. The relief has "Respirazion" like the pictures of Velasquez. But as it is the real and not painted air that filters in between the figures, it follows that all the master's art is brought to bear on such a skilful arrangement of groups as, in spite of the compression, may allow air to pass between, above and around the figures, thus helping to supplement the modelling even as the sunlight, which, when it breaks in, awakens these figures to magic life. To allow natural illumination to contribute to the perfecting of the artistic effect was one of the boldest innovations.'

But this is not all. It is clear from certain details that the reliefs must have been coloured; nay, it is probable that the sacred vessels carried in the procession were gilded: 'we might be startled if we were suddenly confronted with the perfect work in all the brilliant shimmer of its original hues.' Students of ancient sculpture have long ago discarded the once prevalent notion that Greek sculpture depended for its effect entirely on form. That colour was used effectively and artistically was proved beyond all possibility of doubt by the so-called 'Sarcophagus of Alexander' found at Sidon and now at Constantinople. But the effect intended was not realistic; it was purely decorative, sometimes even fanciful, although of course never grotesque, like the effect of the archaic limestone sculptures of the Athenian

Acropolis. Wickhoff compares this kind of painting with the glass-painting of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; for each aims

‘first of all at a fine variety of colour without any regard to local tints, reserves the flesh in the pale hue of the material, and treats the background so as to give to the whole design decorative unity, though not as yet the perspective spatial unity produced by the representation of landscape or interior.’

The comparison is suggestive, reminding us that the finest sculpture of the Middle Ages, as exhibited, for instance, at Amiens and Reims, comes nearer than any other to the Greek, in its aristocratic idea and in the noble simplicity of its convention. But in the Flavian period painting had reached a stage in which local colours are observed and rendered. Wickhoff argues that Flavian sculpture therefore must have been coloured, not conventionally, like the Greek, but naturalistically. He is doubtless right; for the Romans were an intensely logical race, and the secret of the development of their art lies in the mechanically logical application of principles, with a somewhat ruthless disregard of circumstances. But it is dangerous to transfer such an argument to Greek ground. Wickhoff converts the argument, and, because the Sidon sarcophagus shows no attempt at realistic colouring, maintains that the Greek painters were still,

‘from the point of view of colouring, at that stage which ignores alike the unity attained by spatial effect and the authority of local tints—that is to say, painting, as understood by the modern art-lover, had not so much as come into existence in the time of Apelles.’

The one thing of which we may be certain is this, that supposing painting ‘in the modern sense’ had existed, the Greeks, with their extraordinary understanding of medium and material, would have thought many times before applying its principles wholesale to the art of sculpture in relief. Quite recently the materials for the study of Greek painting have been suddenly and marvellously increased by the discovery on the site of a small Thessalian city of a great number of painted tomb-stones. So far as we can judge from the very scanty information yet available, they show that even in the comparatively remote Pagasæ the ordinary funeral artist used a full range of colours, with some knowledge of gradation. He was even beginning to attempt something in the way of representation of interiors. And we must remember that he was presumably far behind the great painters of his time in most points of technique.

But we are not directly concerned with Greek painting of the

fourth and third centuries before Christ ; and we may admit with Wickhoff that the colouring of the Roman reliefs made a close approach to realism. This was, as we have said, the outcome of the hard, logical tendency of the Roman mind. The artist doubtless said to himself :

‘ This relief is intended to represent a triumphal procession ; in order to attain my object, which, according to the tradition that has always been handed down by theorists, is imitation of the reality, I am justified in employing any artifices which may help to create the illusion of a procession. I shall therefore use all my knowledge of painting to eke out any deficiencies inherent in the medium in which I am working, that is to say, marble.’

The Roman sculptor may not have formulated his idea thus baldly, but some such principle inspired him and guided his hand. Without going into the question of the right use of material, we may notice that, as Wickhoff himself allows, the Roman artist utterly ignored all relation between the piece of carving on which he was at work and the building which it was supposed to adorn. To so tragic an end does the reckless pursuit of any one-sided artistic ideal conduct us : any ideal, that is, which is not conceived in the light of sympathy and imagination. The saying ‘ there is but one art ’ has been sadly abused in support of the contention that methods lawful in one medium may be employed in any other. It is only true in the sense that any form of art, when employed in conjunction with another, must be employed with a due consciousness of the relation between the two. Decorative sculpture must be made to subserve the purposes, to harmonise with the construction, of the building on which it is placed. That frame through which, as through a window, we seem to see the triumphal procession of Titus, does really frame, artistically speaking, a hole in the wall by which the constructional unity of the arch is weakened. The Roman architect cared nothing and knew less about the constructional value of sculptural decoration ; we have already dwelt on the mistaken principle of the decoration of Trajan’s Column. Small wonder, then, that the sculptor went his own way, producing, so to speak, easel-reliefs, and plaquing them on to walls without any care of their appropriateness.

Thus the pursuit of the chimæra of realistic or impressionist sculpture brings about insubordination on the part of the decorative element which should be subservient. Something analogous is seen in the work of the greatest of Renaissance sculptors. The most remarkable instance is probably to be found in the Medici tombs in San Lorenzo, where Michelangelo has treated the

architectural problems involved with something like contempt. Nemesis has followed in his steps, in the humiliating fact that the criticisms which spring to the lips of the most Philistine of spectators are indisputably true. It cannot be denied that those recumbent figures could never keep their positions, or that the seated 'portrait' figures would knock their heads if they arose. This lack of consideration of the way in which decoration and construction should be interrelated was, in Michelangelo, not a little due to the 'pictorial' tendency of his sculpture, and to his neglect of the limitations imposed by his medium. Nor can we forget that the *débâcle* which followed in Italian art was assisted by his reckless uprooting of the foundations of sculpture; only his genius could by its own strength support the construction for a time. Just so the decline of Roman sculpture necessarily began immediately after the Flavian artists had developed to its logical extreme what they considered to be the true method of working marble.

In the history of art, as of politics, it is as fascinating as it is idle to speculate on the course which development might have taken if some one factor had been different. Suppose, for instance, that the Romans had not brought colouring to the aid of carving in their pursuit of illusion. It is just conceivable that they would have gone farther on the road towards the discovery of linear perspective, and that Ghiberti's gates, at once the perfection and the condemnation of pictorial sculpture, might have been anticipated by thirteen centuries. As it is, we can only regret that so much ingenuity was displayed in so wasteful a way. The student familiar with the sculpture of ancient Greece, of thirteenth-century France, of Renaissance Italy, admires throughout the supremacy of the idea, the ruling imagination which atones for mistakes of every kind. In Roman sculpture extraordinary craftsmanship, virtuosity, and artifice in no way avail to hide what has been called the native brutality of the Romans. Sometimes, as in the Augustan age, Greek artists, working under the inspiration of Roman themes, produced works of singular dignity.

'If we study,' writes Wickhoff of the *Ara Pacis*, 'these trains of priests and officials, of proud youths, of beautiful women and well-bred children, who walk behind the Emperor in long rows, or come forward to welcome him, we must confess that there are few works of art which could have rendered with equal success the consciousness of high worth combined with elegance of bearing.'

But, as Wickhoff is at pains to prove, this is not typical Roman art. The colouring which lent its aid to Roman sculpture has

disappeared. If we seek for something which may give us an idea of what Roman art was aiming at, we must come down, not necessarily to the great painters of the seventeenth century, but rather to the coloured sculpture of Gaudenzio Ferrari and his school. In the chapels of the Sacro Monte at Varallo we may see the legitimate development of the Roman method.

The Greeks, in their treatment of relief, deliberately adhered to certain conventions, of which the uniform background was the chief. The Roman experiment was to prove, even if the Greeks did not know, that any attempt to do away with conventions imposed by the materials, and, therefore, not in the ordinary sense artificial, would lead to disaster. The mind of the spectator, when confronted by such a conventional treatment of a subject, is obliged to exert itself constantly, to translate the representation into some approximation to reality. This exercise stimulates the imagination, and is the most valuable form of artistic education. The Greeks, thanks to their supreme sense of moderation, kept their conventions within limits. They did not often, like the Germans of the Renaissance, wander off into calligraphic drawing—although a few vase-painters show a curious tendency in this direction—or fantastic symbolism. Thus their imagination was kept in an ideally healthy condition. Now a nation which has a natural endowment of this kind does not require a realistic art. Only the people in whom imagination is deficient or dormant demand realistic pictures. That is why the Romans, whose Muse, in spite of some fine flights, was naturally pedestrian, called for and found a realistic art to supplement the deficiency of their imagination.

We have recognised in the portrait-busts the one form of Roman sculpture in which highest rank, within the limits of the subject, is reached. The best of these busts express individual character; that is to say, they do not merely show the individual in the light of accidental circumstances, nor yet merely as one of a class or type, but they combine the two factors in a right proportion. We have a few Greek portraits which go back to the fourth century (such as the Sophocles of the Lateran), or even to the fifth (such as the Pericles after Cresilas). But these, although they do not fail to convey the impression of individuality, are at the same time, and in a much greater degree, type-portraits; we see in them the typical Athenian statesman or poet of fine aristocratic mould. (It is an open question whether such race-portraits, if so we may call them, are not a more valuable possession for the world than the

individual portraits of a later age.) Even the Alexander portraits and such masterpieces as the Antiochus of the Louvre, or some of the splendid heads of rulers on Hellenistic coins, are with few exceptions idealised and shorn of those accidental qualities which are used by clever artists to enforce the impression of individuality. The sense of race is dominant. We cannot imagine that a likeness of the shoemaker, Gaius Julius Helius, respectable as he doubtless was, would have held its own amongst the portraits of Greek rulers, had he lived in the third century before Christ instead of in the Flavian age. But, living when he did, he hardly needed to fear comparison, in respect of aristocratic refinement, with the occupants of the imperial throne. Here, then, in Roman portraiture of the best period, we have supreme examples of direct and not too highly imaginative presentation of character. In the third century, when Roman art was far on its way to decline, we find works, like the Naples Caracalla, in which the power to capture a momentary expression is combined with a wholly brutal realism. The subject, of course, was particularly unpleasant; but even if the artist had had a noble subject to render he would still, thanks to the method which by that time was traditional, have paid more attention to the accidental situation, the passing phase, than to the intimate character. Among the great Italians, in the age of universal geniuses, we find all the various methods of portraiture employed. But it would lead us far from our subject to discuss the styles of the great Italian portrait-sculptors.

The Antinous-type, the creation of which Mrs. Strong describes as the 'supreme and most characteristic achievement of the 'Hadrianic period,' negatively confirms the judgement as to the character of Roman art which we have endeavoured to establish. Of its originality there can be no doubt; for, although probably every one of the elements which go to its making can be tracked down to some older source, for the most part in Greek art, yet it has a unity and makes a definite impression of its own. The finest example of the type is undoubtedly the Mondragone head, of flesh-coloured marble, in the Louvre. Extraordinary sullenness of expression and heaviness of features and body characterise another equally famous rendering of the subject, the Albani relief, to an almost repulsive degree, making it hard to understand how not only Winckelmann but many another critic can contemplate it with enthusiasm. But in the Mondragone head the sculptor has known how to express the sensuous quality of his subject by much more subtle means. There is not a line or a surface that is unrefined, and yet the face is entirely



lacking in intellectual value. Furtwängler, as Mrs. Strong reminds us, noticed the influence of the Pheidian type of Athena on the artist who made this head. The words used by the great German critic are perfectly just and adequate: the artist 'attempted to bring some of the charm and beauty of the 'Lemnia into the face of the Emperor's favourite.' There can be no objection to so moderate a statement. But Mrs. Strong's enthusiasm carries her into a curious contradiction when it causes her to write:

'If, in order to create the statuary type of Antinous, artists borrowed the austere features of Athena or the lithe, virile outline of Hermes, they also invested these with a new meaning. Satiety and sensuous melancholy are the dominating traits.'

But satiety and sensuous melancholy are incompatible with austerity and lithe virility. In other words, the forms which, in the Greek originals, adequately expressed an intellectual idea, have been more or less unintelligently adapted to something quite incongruous. It is partly this strange artistic contradiction that gives the Mondragone Antinous its curious fascination, as of some strange, uncanny hot-house growth. How much of that fascination is due to the morbid attraction of the legend of the Emperor's favourite we may leave to students of moral pathology to discover; whether the legend was true or a scandalous invention matters little for our present purpose. The point which concerns the student of Roman art is that the Antinous-type is an exotic. Some of the artists who had to realise the conception of this new Hero may have been Romans, although, since statues of the dead youth were set up all over the empire, most of them must have been Greeks. But in any case, Roman art as such offered these artists no possible help, and they were obliged to borrow Greek forms, which they adapted with astonishing dexterity. But the combination was unnatural. Numerous as are the examples of the type, they are to be explained by the fact that these figures were ordered to be set up, and the cultus of the Hero Antinous established in countless places. They are not the fruit of artistic or popular appreciation of a beautiful and satisfying type, which leads to the multiplication of replicas, and the gradual modification and development of an original idea. So far as we can tell, they were all made during the brief interval between the death of Antinous in 130 and the death of Hadrian eight years later, when the cult seems very naturally to have come to an end. Because the Antinous-type was an exotic and a hybrid it had no descendants. We do not know who invented it, and if we

assume that it was a Greek we shall doubtless be classed among those who are unwilling to admit that a Roman type can have either originality or beauty. But we may plead that Wickhoff himself seems to have realised that it was strictly foreign to Roman art, and that it shows few of the characteristics of the peculiar Roman style which had been elaborated during the previous generation; otherwise he would have made more than a passing reference in his work to this 'supreme and characteristic achievement of the Hadrianic period.'

The final stage of Roman sculpture is admirably summed up by Mrs. Strong :

'In sculpture in relief the "continuous" Roman style remained in vogue, and gained new power and effectiveness from being combined with a novel method of conveying spatial content, by so working away the background that there arises in its place a dark niche within which the figures are moulded by the surrounding "complementary shadow." This treatment of light and shade had a splendid colouristic quality, of which the influence may be traced, as we shall see, in the development of portraiture also. The exclusive stress now laid on these optic effects, joined to a certain flagging of interest in the subjects of Roman official and religious art, brings back sculpture to a purely decorative phase. Thus groups are loosened, and figures are placed more apart, till in the friezes of the Arch of Constantine sculpture attains that "cubic isolation" in space which closely resembles the "frontal" presentment of figures in archaic art.'

In other words, sculpture was no longer intelligently concerned with the human form, with that form the adequate rendering of which has always been the chief aim of sculptors in all periods of great art. No sooner does the sculptor lose sight of this ideal than his art degenerates. In modern times man has discovered a new source of artistic inspiration in what he calls external nature; but although the modern art of landscape painting has grown out of this discovery, nothing has yet replaced or supplemented the human form as the object of the sculptor's art.

Roman art, as we indicated at the outset, has traditionally been regarded as lacking independence, and supported at either end by the two great arts of Greece and the Italian Renaissance, which it served to link together. This conception, thanks partly to the better understanding of the art of the Middle Ages which we now possess, thanks also to the exposition of the technical achievements of Roman sculptors which we owe chiefly to Wickhoff, can no longer be regarded as accurate. In the sense that Italian sculpture would have been a very different thing had

not the artists of the Renaissance been familiar with the motives of Roman art, the debt of the new to the old may be admitted. But that debt has always been estimated in the first instance on the basis of the work of Niccolò Pisano and his school, whose borrowings from late Roman sarcophagi are so patent to the eye. Yet the Roman inspiration by itself was insufficient to nourish a new art. It is unnecessary here to do more than allude to the various channels through which, as it were underground, the stream of artistic development continued to flow for so many centuries, rising but occasionally to the surface. In the East, the Byzantine Renaissance of the tenth century was an earnest of what was to come. The influence of Syria, of which our knowledge is still vague and indefinite, seems to have been exerted from the third century onwards, not only in the East but in the West. We now realise that in originality and nobility of conception the French sculptors of the thirteenth century rank higher than their contemporaries south of the Alps. The great naturalistic revival of the early fifteenth century, although some of its most remarkable results, thanks partly to the sudden development of the science of perspective, were seen in Italy, began a generation earlier in France and Burgundy. In all these phases, save for the occasional loan of a motive, Rome has no essential part; and the spirit of the Pisan school, stiffening as it did into a lifeless tradition, required to be vivified by the breath of fresh northern air. Side by side with the rise of naturalism in art we see in Italy a new intellectual and moral ideal taking shape, in the conception of *virtù*, of individual character and personal force, whether for good or evil. If individual character was the most potent factor in the political and social history of the Italian States; if, when we think of the Renaissance, we think of Sigismondo Malatesta, Federigo of Urbino, Cesare Borgia, or Baldassare Castiglione, it was also the keynote of Italian art. This new spiritual ideal, combining with or guiding the naturalistic movement, made a living art possible. It is such a high and definite spiritual ideal which seems to be lacking in Roman art during the period of its most remarkable development.

Rightly or wrongly, the great mass of cultivated people will continue to prefer an art which gives spiritual as well as sensuous satisfaction. That is recognised by Wickhoff in a passage which seems to indicate his ideal of art, although it fails to express adequately the ideal of those who differ from him :

‘ Again, the majority of the public (the learned public included, and perhaps that more particularly) will turn away from works of

which the subjects can neither form a topic of discussion nor be adequately described in words; they are naturally more attracted to those periods of culture when poetry and art supply each other's deficiencies, and the interest lies in a comparison of their treatment of the same material by different methods. Clever and learned criticism fills up the gaps in the extant poetical literature by means of works of art, or the gaps in the extant series of monuments by examining the poetic content of the lost work. This proceeding becomes meaningless as soon as art, whether painting or sculpture, rises to the point of development where it rejects with disdain all sources of extraneous interest, such as religion or poetry, and, sufficient to itself, becomes in its last stage an art only for artists, which scarcely heeds the applause of the multitude, but, like Dante's "Rachel," sits the whole day before the mirror, "de' suoi begli occhi veder vaga."

What is it that Leah says in the passage from which the last words are taken?

' Sappia qualunque il mio nome dimanda  
Ch' io mi son Lia, e vo movendo intorno  
Le belle mani a farmi una ghirlanda.  
Per piacermi allo specchio qui m' adorno;  
Ma mia suora Rachel mai non si smaga  
Dal suo miraglio, e siede tutto giorno.  
Ell' è de' suoi begli occhi veder vaga,  
Com' io dell' adornarmi con le mani;  
Lei lo vedere, e me l' ovrare appaga.'

Dante's lines are intended to contrast the contemplative and the active life. The story of Leah and Rachel may remind us that these two will always be at war, but out of their strife proceed ultimately fruitfulness and prosperity. Out of the attempt to exalt self-sufficient contemplation into the sole ideal, in art as in life, can only come disease and decay.

## ART. IX—BIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY.

1. *The Evolution Theory*. By DR. AUGUST WEISMANN, Professor of Zoology in the University of Freiburg im Breisgau. Translated with the author's co-operation by J. ARTHUR THOMSON, Regius Professor of Natural History in the University of Aberdeen, and MARGARET R. THOMSON. 2 Vols. London: Edward Arnold. 1904
2. *Species and Varieties: their Origin by Mutation*. By HUGO DE VRIES, Professor of Botany in the University of Amsterdam. Edited by DANIEL TREMBLY MACDOUGAL, Assistant Director of the New York Botanical Garden. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1905.
3. *Recent Progress in the Study of Variation, Heredity, and Evolution*. By ROBERT HEATH LOCK, M.A., Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. London: Murray. 1906.
4. *Heredity*. By J. ARTHUR THOMSON, M.A., Regius Professor of Natural History in the University of Aberdeen. London: Murray. 1908.
5. *Essays on Evolution, 1889-1907*. By EDWARD BAGNALL POULTON, F.R.S., &c., Hope Professor of Zoology in the University of Oxford. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1908.

THE new year upon which we have just entered marks a memorable period in the history of biology; for it is the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of the 'Origin of Species,' a book which has probably exercised a deeper influence on scientific thought than any other single work of last century. In it the plausibility of the doctrine of organic evolution, upon which the whole science of biology now rests, was first satisfactorily demonstrated. Naturally, therefore, the question suggests itself: How far have the views set forth by Charles Darwin been accepted as true; what change has half a century wrought in his theory of evolution; does the extraordinary increase of knowledge during the last fifty years require us to modify our belief in the principle of natural selection; does it disclose to us any class of facts which that principle cannot explain, and for which some other principle must be invoked? The fact has been brought prominently before the public that Darwin's views have latterly been assailed by a certain school of

biologists, and we shall endeavour to set forth the new ideas which have arisen and examine their validity, as against the older ideas of the 'Origin of Species.'

First, it is necessary to emphasise the fact that the theory of evolution itself is no longer disputed. Half a century ago the question at issue was between the doctrine of evolution and the doctrine of the special creation of species. Now the doctrine of evolution is universally accepted; special creation has been swept away, never to return; and the question round which controversy rages is no longer *whether* evolution takes place, but *how* it takes place. The special association of Darwin's name with the theory of evolution is, in truth, something of a popular fallacy. A belief in the mutability of species has long been held by isolated naturalists, from Aristotle downwards; and with the writings of Lamarck at the beginning of last century began to carry some weight. Lamarck, who first published his views in 1801, believed in a law of progressive development; but the theory which is more particularly identified with his name is that of the inheritance of acquired characters—a theory to which we shall have occasion to advert hereafter at some length. Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire likewise believed in the modifiability of species. The famous 'Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation' set forth a similar view. And Herbert Spencer, in 1852, energetically defended the theory of evolution, founded solely on the factor of inheritance of acquired characters. While, therefore, it is erroneous to attribute to Darwin any exclusive credit for the doctrine of organic evolution, it is none the less true that he was the first to render that doctrine plausible. In his principle of natural selection he produced a *vera causa* of evolution. He proved that, given modifiability of species, some sort of progressive evolution must take place. He brought the theory out of the region of speculation into the region of science. But the champion of evolution, irrespective of the factors which may have caused it, must be looked for in Spencer, rather than in Darwin.

The 'Origin of Species' was published in November 1859\*, and was met with a storm of hostile criticism. But gradually the views which it contained made way. The stimulus which it gave to thought, and to the search for facts which might throw light on the new doctrine, soon disclosed abundance of evidence which all converged in the same direction. The arguments from embryology, from morphology, and from distribu-

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\* Not in 1858, as is several times asserted in Weismann's 'Evolution Theory.'

tion in space, all combined to heighten the conviction that organic evolution was a true theory. Yet one difficulty remained. The time that would be required for the evolution of the highest types of organism now existing greatly exceeded the age of the habitable earth, as calculated by physicists. Lord Kelvin held that the earth could not have existed in a form habitable by living things for a longer period than a hundred million years, a time which biologists considered altogether insufficient, in view of the extremely slow nature of the evolutionary process. The suggestion that life in a comparatively advanced form might have been introduced on to the earth on a meteorite was too fantastic and speculative to merit serious consideration. Darwin was much troubled by this obstacle in the way of the acceptance of his views, and great stress was laid upon it by Lord Salisbury in his Presidential address to the British Association in 1894. He was answered by Professor Poulton in 1896, and it was shown that the earth might have existed for a very much longer time than that calculated at first by Lord Kelvin. But a further difficulty presented itself. Sir George Darwin and Lord Kelvin both agreed that the sun could not have existed for more than five hundred million years. Without the light and heat of the sun, life could not have existed on the earth, and, though, as Professor Poulton observed, a great deal may happen in five hundred million years, yet it seemed very doubtful whether it was sufficient to admit of the development of the higher forms of life. Only within the last three years has this final difficulty in the way of the evolution theory been removed. Among the many philosophic and scientific problems which have been illuminated by the discovery of radium, there is, perhaps, none more important than the alteration which it has caused in the calculations of the physicists as to the age of the earth. Those calculations had in all cases assumed that no other form of energy was present in the sun than that which was due to its contraction and the mutual gravitation of its parts. The presence of radium in the sun introduces a new factor into the problem, whereby the probable life of that luminary may be extended by an almost indefinite period. Mr. Strutt's calculations as to the amount of radium in the rocks of the earth have also made it apparent that the time limit assigned by the physicists for the age of the earth must be enormously multiplied in consideration of the newly discovered source of energy. In his very interesting 'Essays on Evolution,' Professor Poulton is able to quote Professor Perry to the effect that 'We are now in a position 'to say that the physicist can make no calculation either as to

'the probable or possible age of life on the earth.' The final argument against evolution, upon which Lord Salisbury laid so much stress in his address to the British Association in 1894, has now been completely disposed of, and the way is clear for concentrating all attention on the mode in which evolution has taken place.

The factor to which Darwin assigned predominant importance, and with which his name will ever be associated, is the factor of natural selection. Although, as Darwin himself tells us, he was anticipated in the enunciation of this principle by various writers, by W. C. Wells in 1813, by Patrick Matthew in 1831, and by Herbert Spencer in 1852, yet he and his co-discoverer, Mr. A. R. Wallace, were the first to perceive its fundamental importance in the evolution of species. Natural selection follows necessarily from the concomitant operation of three natural laws, heredity, variation, and the struggle for existence. In the first place, all organisms, however nearly allied they may be, are found to exhibit certain differentiating characters, so that no one is precisely similar to another. This is the phenomenon of variation. In the second place, the various characters tend to be handed down from generation to generation. This is the phenomenon of heredity. And in the third place, a great many more individuals are born into the world than there is room for. The conditions of their natural environment strictly limit the numbers of a species, and a struggle for existence takes place, involving the death of the individuals which are the least fitted to cope with their environment. Few people recognise the extraordinary keenness of the struggle for existence. Darwin and Weismann have both given instances of the incredibly large mortality which prevails among animals; and we may supplement their instances by another which will come home to all. The common housefly is said\* to lay eggs in batches of 120-150 at a time, and may deposit five or six batches during its life. In very hot weather a generation extends to about three weeks; that is to say, a newly laid egg develops into a fly, which itself is laying eggs within a period of three weeks. Now if we suppose that every egg laid develops into a perfect fly, that half the total number of flies are females, that every female fly lays the normal number of eggs, and that there are six generations of flies in a summer, a simple calculation shows us that at the end of the summer the progeny of a single pair of houseflies reaches such an enormous figure that if they were all to be pressed together into a solid mass they would occupy

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\* Quarterly Journal of Microscopical Science, October 1908.



a space of something like a quarter of a million cubic feet.\* But we have no reason to think that the number of houseflies is on the increase. It hence follows that out of these myriads of potential insects, there will be at the end of the summer only two individuals who have survived to reproductive age. All the rest that are born die an 'unnatural' death. No further statement is necessary to show how great must be the force which tends to destroy all that are not adapted in some very special manner for survival. In this way, Darwin showed, Nature selects those animals and plants whose variations bring them into greater harmony with their surroundings; these fortunate individuals are able to survive and bear offspring, who inherit the favourable variations of their parents. The species is thus slowly moulded into harmony with its environment. In the course of many generations the favourable variations accumulate to such a degree that the organism is entirely altered in structure, and a true step in evolution has taken place.

Is natural selection alone sufficient to account for the whole of organic evolution? Very many biologists, conspicuous among whom are Mr. A. R. Wallace, Sir Ray Lankester and Professor Weismann, think that it is. Darwin himself thought it was not. He thought that in addition to this indirect action of the environment upon the shapes of organisms, evolution was also promoted by a direct action of the environment. It is plain that during the lifetime of each individual the conditions of its existence produce considerable modifications in its structure. Are these acquired modifications inherited? Does the child of a blacksmith come into the world with larger arm-muscles than other children? Are the changes which take place in Alpine plants when they are transferred to a southern garden transmitted to their offspring? It is evident that if these questions are to be answered in the affirmative a powerful factor in causing evolution is disclosed. But there is great doubt whether such modifications are inherited. Before dealing with this subject, however, it will be well to examine the various criticisms which have been passed upon the theory of natural selection.

It is to be noted that the variations upon which natural selection mainly operates are congenital variations; that is to say, they occur in the germ-cell of the organism before development commences. They need not necessarily appear till comparatively late in the life of the organism, but their potentiality exists in the germ. The variations arise in fact entirely out of relation to surrounding conditions, and are not of the kind

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\* Assuming 200,000 flies to the cubic foot.

produced by external causes after development has commenced. That these germinal variations are inherited there is no doubt whatever.

Great attention has been given of late years to the subject of variation. Darwin and Wallace assumed that the successive steps in the evolution of a species were accomplished by the incorporation into the race of variations, which took the form of very *minute* increments of structure. They regarded evolution as a slow and gradual process, so that each generation should be scarcely distinguishable from the next, and many generations would be required before the changes in structure became manifest. This view was questioned in 1894 by Professor Bateson in his book, 'Materials for the Study of Variation.' Bateson divides variation into two kinds, which he calls continuous and discontinuous. By continuous variation he designates those minute fluctuations which Darwin regarded as the material upon which natural selection worked, while by discontinuous variation he signifies structural alterations of a larger and more conspicuous character. He considers that continuous variations are of no importance in the production of new species, and that the material upon which natural selection operates is entirely confined to discontinuous variations. His conception of the evolutionary process differs from Darwin's in that he regards it not as a gradual and even movement, but as consisting of a succession of jerks taking place at intervals, and separated by periods during which no progress takes place. Lately Professor De Vries, of Amsterdam, has promulgated closely similar views. Professor De Vries holds that small variations, which he calls fluctuations, are impotent in the production of new races; and that large and sudden variations, which he calls mutations, are alone instrumental in causing evolution. These mutations are supposed to occur at long intervals, during which the species remains constant and unaltered.

The study of continuous variation has passed largely into the hands of mathematicians, and is included in the region of science known as Biometry. It is unnecessary to carry the reader into the intricacies and byways of this highly abstruse subject, but we may indicate briefly the principle underlying it. It was first shown by Quetelet\* in 1846 that variation followed the law of frequency of error, whose

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\* Lettres à S.A.R. le Duc régnant de Saxe-Cobourg et Gotha sur la Théorie des Probabilités appliquée aux Sciences Morales et Politiques. Brussels, 1846.

mathematical expression was discovered by Gauss. If a large number of individuals are examined with respect to some particular character, such as their stature, and are arranged in classes according to their possession of this character, it is found that the classes vary greatly as to the number of individuals which they contain. The largest class will be that of which the height is the mean height of the race. And the classes become progressively smaller as their height diverges more and more from the mean, whether in the direction of increase or decrease. Moreover, the degrees of diminution in the size of the classes can be co-ordinated by a mathematical law, known as the law of frequency of error. The matter will be made clearer by using the illustration which was originally employed by Sir John Herschel in reviewing Quetelet's work in the *EDINBURGH REVIEW* for July 1850. The case was there taken of a rifleman aiming at a target; and it was pointed out that, irrespective of the skill of the rifleman, the shots, after a large number of trials, would be aggregated most thickly about the centre of the target, and would be more and more thinly scattered the farther the distance became from the centre of the target. The only difference between the targets of a good and of a bad rifleman is that in the former case the total area which contains all the shots would be smaller than in the latter case. But in each case, the centre of the area would coincide with the centre of the target, and the distribution of shots within the areas would be similar. The explanation of this result rests upon the circumstance that each time the rifleman takes aim a number of factors come into operation tending to disturb the correctness of the alignment of the rifle. But as these factors act with equal frequency in every direction, it follows that the point of thickest distribution of the shots will still remain at the centre of the target. Now variation is found to follow precisely the same law. If measurements of some character are taken in a large number of individuals, it is found that there is a mean measurement in the neighbourhood of which the individuals are most thickly clustered, and that the farther the distance from the mean, the fewer are the individuals represented. The analogy goes yet farther: for just as in the case of the good and bad riflemen, we found the shots to be in close juxtaposition or more widely scattered, so in the case of variation, it is found that the divergences from the mean are in some cases far more accentuated than in other cases; that is to say, the degree of constancy or variation in different organs is very different. But in all cases the variation can be represented by a geometrical curve, the ordinates of which are proportional

to the terms in the expansion of the binomial  $(a + b)^n$ . Occasionally the individuals are found to cluster round two or more points of thickest distribution, and it is then inferred that they belong to two or more different races.

Darwin supposed that the minute variations or 'fluctuations' which we have been considering form the material for natural selection. He showed how the various domestic breeds of pigeon have all been derived from the wild rockdove; and that breeders can in a few years produce almost any specified new character, merely by selecting for breeding purposes those birds which show the greatest tendency to vary in the required direction. The question now arises as to how far the varieties produced by accumulations of minute variations remain stable on the cessation of selection. Mr. Francis Galton's study of human stature may be taken as an instance. The mean height of the offspring of parents who are taller than the average of the race is greater than the mean height of the race. But the mean height of the offspring does not diverge as widely from the mean height of the race as does the height of their parents; that is to say, the offspring inherit the variation of their parents, but show it to a lesser extent than their parents did; a 'regression' takes place towards the mean of the race. It is true that there may be some among the offspring whose height is greater than that of their parents; but the *mean* height of the offspring is nearer to the mean height of the race than in their parents' case. By continued selection and breeding from the tallest individuals a tall progeny may be obtained; but the tallness does not maintain itself when selection ceases; there is a rapid regression to the average height of the race.

A further difficulty in the way of the Darwinian hypothesis is seen when we attempt to figure to ourselves the first step in the history of any particular organ. Take, for instance, the origin of vertebrate limbs. It is easy to understand how, when once a limb came into existence, in however imperfect a form, natural selection acting on minute variations could mould it into a fin or a leg highly adapted to its conditions. But how is the first bud-like projection from the body to be accounted for? It does not appear to possess any survival-value until it has reached a certain magnitude; and its development up to this minimum point seems more easily explained by assuming a sudden large variation than an accumulation of selected small variations.

It is on considerations such as these that De Vries has founded his attacks upon the Darwinian doctrine. He lays great stress upon the fact that the difference between large and small

variations is not merely a quantitative difference, but also a qualitative difference. He believes that the minor differences between individuals of the same species are due to small variations or fluctuations, which may, indeed, maintain themselves so long as they are favoured by selection, but which never become part of the constitution of the organism, or have any stability when selection ceases. Species,\* on the other hand, he holds to be produced by sudden large mutations from some pre-existing species; the mutation in all cases breeding true, and showing no signs whatever of regressing to the mean of the race from which it sprung. De Vries reverts, in a great degree, to the old idea of the fixity of species. He believes that, during many generations, plants (for his observations do not extend to animals) remain unaltered, save for the ordinary small fluctuations which leave no permanent traces, but that at long intervals periods of mutability set in, during which new forms are thrown off in all directions, originating a number of new species; that these new forms breed true and remain constant for an indefinite period before a further epoch of mutability sets in, and a further step in evolution is made. De Vries sums up his conclusions on page 699 of his 'Species and Varieties,' as follows:

'We may assert that species remain unchanged for indefinite periods, while at times they are in the alternative condition. Then at once they produce new forms often in large numbers, giving rise to swarms of sub-species. All facts point to the conclusion that these periods of stability and mutability alternate more or less regularly with one another. Of course a direct proof of this view cannot, as yet, be given. . . .'

The idea that the entire structure of an organism has been built up by a succession of mutational steps of definite magnitude has inspired De Vries to formulate the belief that the creature finally evolved is entirely composed of 'unit-characters' of quite limited number. He supposes that even the most highly evolved organism would not consist of more than 4000 such unit-characters. If each mutation permanently adds a new character to the species, and if the mutations occur (as he imagines) at intervals of about 4000 years, it follows that 16 million years are sufficient to account for the evolution of the most complex organisms. And on p. 712 of his 'Species and Varieties,' he observes: 'It seems evident that the duration

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\* By species De Vries does not mean Linnæan species, but a lower subdivision which he calls 'elementary species' and regards as the true taxonomic unit.

‘ of life does not comply with the demands of the conception of ‘ very slow and continuous evolution. Now it is easily seen ‘ that the idea of successive mutations is quite independent of ‘ this difficulty.’ As we have already shown, the difficulty is now removed, and this particular argument in favour of the mutation theory is knocked on the head.

Passing now to the objections which may be urged against the theory, we find that they fall into three categories. There is, firstly, the extreme tenuity of the evidence in favour of it ; there is, secondly, the great mass of evidence supporting the opposite belief ; and there is, thirdly, the extreme improbability that Nature should periodically take the sudden leaps which are supposed, or that the leaps, if taken, would be just those required for securing adaptation to environment. Dealing first with the latter objections, we may observe that Linnæus’ maxim *Natura non facit saltus*, though not possessing the rank of a scientific law, yet rests upon such a large foundation of experience as to set up a strong presumption against any theory which conflicts with it. Mankind have always found it easier to explain the origin of things by postulating catastrophes and sudden creations than slow and gradual processes. In the early days of geology, the students of that science were divided into a number of opposing factions, whose sole point of agreement has since been shown to be the one point on which they were totally wrong. For they all attempted to account for the structure of the earth’s crust by supposing that at long intervals sudden catastrophes had taken place which instantaneously gave rise to formations that were entirely new. We now know that the evolution of the earth’s crust was an excessively slow and gradual process ; sudden changes are no longer believed in ; and what may be called the ‘ mutational ’ theory of geology is altogether discarded. A similar alteration of beliefs has attended the conception of species formation. The production of a new species offered a problem of the utmost complexity. Before Darwin’s time, the large majority of thinking people were content to accept, as a satisfactory explanation, the view that they were brought suddenly into existence by the Creator’s *fiat* on the pattern of a preconceived archetype. Nowadays this vicious mode of thought assumes a more refined form, and it is no longer denied that evolution presents a complete solution, without any need for catastrophic hypotheses. But it is found that the origin of the various characters which make up an individual is a question of much difficulty. And forthwith there arises a school of biologists which affirms that these characters jumped suddenly into

existence ; and declares that if only we accept this hypothesis all further difficulties will be cleared away. It may be so ; but the comforting simplicity of the explanation itself raises a suspicion that it may after all turn out to be unfounded. No information is vouchsafed to us as to what causes the mutations, or how the remarkable fact of their alleged permanence is to be accounted for, or how it should happen that a large variation in an adaptive direction should occur with sufficient frequency to fulfil the ends of evolution.

That this latter difficulty is extremely formidable, an instance will show. In the minute water animals called copepods, the males have their anterior antennæ modified into long whip-like structures which they use as a lasso to throw over the heads of the females, and so catch them as they take flight. The advantage of this structure for securing survival is obvious. Those males which were most adept in catching females would give rise to a large progeny inheriting the peculiarity of their parent, while the males who had no contrivance of this nature would have but few offspring and would soon be swamped out. How is this structure to be accounted for on the mutation theory ? The supposition that it arose by chance at a single step defies altogether the laws of probability. But it is easy to understand how the antennæ may have been very gradually modified from their primitive to their final form under the operation of natural selection. For each slight improvement in the antennæ which facilitated the task of holding the female would give the male an advantage in reproducing over males which had no such favourable variation. The small variations would thus certainly become fixed, and evolution would continue to follow the line along which it had started. Professor Poulton mentions protective resemblance and mimicry as cases in which it is impossible to conceive how sudden mutations can have been at work. 'It is as unlikely that a key could be made to fit a complicated lock by a number of chance blows upon a blank piece of metal, as that the elaborate pattern on the wings of a butterfly should have been reproduced on those of its mimic by mutation.'

Another weighty objection to the mutation theory lies in the fact that it is wholly inconsistent with the close correlation of the parts of a highly developed animal or plant. It is assumed that a new structure can suddenly spring into existence without any modification in other parts of the organism. This difficulty was originally urged by Herbert Spencer, arguing in defence of the Lamarckian hypothesis against the Darwinian theory of evolution by small variations ; but it tells with tenfold force

against the theory of evolution by large variations. The example selected by Spencer\* is the evolution of the horns in the extinct Irish elk. The male of this species has enormous horns weighing over a hundredweight.

‘That these horns may be of use in fighting, the supporting bones and muscles must be strong enough, not simply to carry them, but to put them in motion with the rapidity needed for giving blows. . . . That horns may become better weapons, the whole apparatus concerned in moving them must be so strengthened as to impress more force on them, and to bear the more violent reactions of the blows given. The bones of the skull on which the horns are seated must be thickened, otherwise they will break. The vertebræ of the neck must be further developed; and unless the ligaments which hold together these vertebræ, and the muscles which move them, are also enlarged, nothing will be gained. Again, the upper dorsal vertebræ and their spines must be strengthened, that they may withstand the stronger contractions of the neck-muscles; and like changes must be made on the scapular arch. Still more must there be required a simultaneous development of the bones and muscles of the forelegs, since these extra growths in the horns, in the skull, in the neck, in the shoulders, add to the burden they have to bear; and without they are strengthened the creature will not only suffer from loss of speed but will fail in fight. Hence to make larger horns of use, additional sizes must be acquired by numerous bones, muscles, and ligaments, as well as by the blood-vessels and nerves on which their actions depend.’

If, then, we are to suppose that the horns of the Irish elk arose by successive mutational steps, we are committed to the belief that, simultaneously with each step, there happened to occur corresponding mutational steps in all the other various parts correlated with the horns. If even one of these parts failed to mutate in the right manner and at the right moment the original variation of the horns would be rendered useless and would be lost. That a mutation, entirely due to chance, should happen to be accompanied by suitable mutations (similarly due to chance) in the large number of other parts concerned, is a preposterous assumption. Yet upon that assumption the validity of the mutation theory rests. The view that an organism consists of a definite collection of unit-characters, all independent of one another, commits its holders to manifest absurdities when thus brought in contact with the facts.

We are inclined therefore to approach the evidence in favour of the mutation theory with considerable mistrust. The mistrust is heightened by observations of a more direct character.

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\* *Principles of Biology*, vol. i. p. 537.



A study of distribution, for instance, shows that species shade into one another by minute differences, and do not present the large contrasts which the mutation theory would lead us to expect.

Although the presumption set up by such facts as these against the views of Professor De Vries is very strong, yet it is not sufficient entirely to close our minds to the reception of the evidence which he has to offer. If we were to meet with a large body of facts pointing conclusively towards the truth of the theory, we should be bound to accept it however great its initial improbability may have appeared. We inquire, therefore, upon what evidence from Nature the theory rests, and find the bulk of it to be comprised, not in many facts drawn from all groups of animal and plant life, but in a few solitary instances of the evening-primrose (*Oenothera Lamarckiana*) discovered by De Vries in a field near Amsterdam in what he calls a mutating condition, and throwing off new species in all directions! And even this case is not satisfactory. For this particular evening-primrose has never been found wild in any part of the world, except where it is known to have escaped from botanic gardens. There is, therefore, strong reason for believing that it may not be a natural species at all, but a hybrid produced by crossing various forms of another plant. In accordance with the laws of Mendelism, to be described later, the ancestral characters would be liable to appear at any time in a variety of combinations, thus giving the appearance of a number of new species. The new characters which arise, and which are described by De Vries as mutations, are much more simply explained by supposing them to have remained latent for several generations, and then to have burst forth into activity as required by Mendelian theory.

Mr. R. H. Lock, whose book 'Recent Progress in the Study of Variation, Heredity, and Evolution' gives an interesting sketch of modern theories, seeks to defend the mutation theory by an analogy from social evolution. His method is excellent; social science has thrown much light on biological science in the past, and will doubtless continue to do so in the future; but we venture to think that Mr. Lock's analogy supports the opposite conclusion to that for which he invokes it. History shows that the sudden changes and violent commotions which occasionally convulse the social organism leave highly unstable effects, and have small power to alter permanently the condition of the people. Many countries have passed through revolution after revolution without any noticeable change in the true state of the community. One of the most important lessons that

history has to teach is that permanent alteration follows on slow and gradual progress, and not upon revolutions or sudden mutations. Even among human beings it is a matter of common observation that opinions hastily formed are hastily dropped; that sudden resolutions are quickly broken; that improvement depends upon the operation of slowly-working and unseen factors, not upon rapid and obvious factors.

The particular instance of a social mutation which Mr. Lock gives, is the rapid displacement of horse-drawn traffic by motor traffic. Superficially there appears to be a sudden introduction of a novel character, comparable to a mutation in animal or plant life. But the appearance is only superficial. The motor-car is a product of slow and gradual evolution. From time to time small improvements were added, until finally the machine exceeded the horse in efficiency. The new character then leapt quickly into visibility; but it is not a sudden creation; it is a product of evolution as slow and gradual as any other product, and affords no analogy to support the mutation theory.

With regard to De Vries' objection to Darwin's theory, viz. that fluctuating variations do not maintain themselves when selection ceases, it may be replied, firstly, that the continued action of selection through long periods probably induces a far higher degree of stability than happens in those cases to which our experience extends, in which selection has only been in action for short periods; secondly, that, in point of fact, no character does appear to be stable when selection definitely ceases to maintain it. When organs cease to be of use, as in the case of the legs of whales, they dwindle and disappear, following the laws described by Weismann as Panmixia and germinal selection.

A further observation recorded by De Vries concerning his *Oenothera Lamarckiana* is that 'the same new species are produced in a large number of individuals.' And he goes on to observe that 'this is a very curious fact.' It is very curious; and surely goes far towards confirming our suspicion that hybridism is at the bottom of the mystery. How else should the same forms come suddenly into existence, independently of one another?

We arrive, then, at the conclusion that no case has been made out in favour of discontinuous evolution, but that the slow and gradual development of species assumed by Darwin and Wallace represents the actual course of evolution.

The next division of biological inquiry which we have to consider concerns the group of facts known by the name of Mendelism. A good account of these curious discoveries

is given in Mr. Lock's 'Variation, Heredity, and Evolution,' and also in Professor J. A. Thomson's 'Heredity.' This latter volume, in spite of many defects of literary form, constitutes a valuable compilation of all the facts and theories bearing upon the difficult problem of heredity.

In 1866, Gregor Mendel, abbot of Brunn, published the results of a series of experiments on crossing varieties of the edible pea (*Pisum sativum*); and formulated a law of inheritance inductively derived from the facts he had discovered. The attention of the biological world being fixed at the time on the far more important question of evolution, little notice was taken of the abbot's researches. But in 1900 the botanists De Vries, Correns, and Tschermak arrived independently at conclusions very similar to those of Mendel; and since that time the phenomena in question have occupied a very prominent position in the discussions of biologists. Mendel's experiments consisted in crossing varieties which differed in respect of certain well-defined characters, and observing to what extent these differentiating characters appeared in the offspring. He took, for example, two varieties of pea which differed from one another in that the seeds of one were yellow and the seeds of the other green. On crossing these two varieties, the first generation showed nothing but yellow-seeded plants; the green-seeded element appeared to have been lost. On self-fertilising the individuals of this first generation, a second generation was obtained, in which a very curious result was observed. For, of the individuals of this second generation, only three-quarters were found to be yellow-seeded, while the remaining quarter was found to be green-seeded. On taking these green-seeded individuals and crossing them among themselves, their offspring was found to consist entirely of green-seeded individuals, and throughout all subsequent generations none but green-seeded individuals were produced. The yellow-seeded variety was entirely eliminated. On taking the yellow-seeded individuals of the second generation and self-fertilising them, one-third was found to breed absolutely true to the yellow-seeded character, while two-thirds were found to give offspring in which three-quarters were yellow-seeded and one quarter green-seeded. The facts may be summed up as follows: on crossing yellow-seeded and green-seeded varieties of pea, there never appears any intermixture of these two characters in the offspring, or in any succeeding generations. The individuals are always either wholly yellow-seeded or wholly green-seeded. Where pure yellow-seeded are crossed with pure green-seeded plants, the green-seeded element is latent in the offspring, and none but

the yellow-seeded character is seen. This is expressed by describing the yellow-seeded variety as dominant and the green-seeded variety as recessive. When a plant displays the recessive character, it is known for certain that it will breed true when self-fertilised; for, the very fact of the recessive character making its appearance, shows that the dominant character has been entirely removed from its constitution. A plant showing the dominant character, however, may or may not breed true; a simple inspection cannot tell us; and accordingly we get the two classes of pure dominants and impure dominants, the former of which breeds wholly true, while the latter contains some of the recessive character, which will come out in succeeding generations. Mendel's experiments on yellow-seeded and green-seeded peas show that, on crossing the pure yellow and pure green, a generation is obtained consisting of yellow-seeded plants, which are impure dominants. These impure dominants give rise in the second generation to a number of individuals, of which one quarter are pure dominants, one quarter are pure recessives, and the remaining half are impure dominants. Breeding again from the impure dominants, precisely the same result occurs: that is, the offspring are one quarter pure dominant, one quarter pure recessive, and one half impure dominant. The impure dominants are invariably found to produce offspring which are segregated in these constant proportions.

The law thus obtained has frequently been shown to hold good when two varieties are crossed which differ in respect of some definite character. A somewhat simpler case than the foregoing is found on crossing the black and white varieties of Andalusian fowl. The offspring of the cross are blue, the blue colour corresponding to the impure dominants. On crossing the blue Andalusian fowls there is invariably obtained a progeny of which one quarter is white, one quarter black, and the remaining half blue like their parents. The black and white invariably breed true; the blue never breed true, the blue colour turning up only in fowls in which both black and white strains are present.

What is the explanation of these facts? The suggestion put forward by Mendel is founded on the hypothesis of the segregation of the gametes. The act of crossing consists in the fusion of the two sex-cells, which are called gametes. Mendel supposed that, when two varieties possessing differentiating characters were crossed, the hybrid race produced had gametes, in each of which only one of the opposing characters appeared. He assumed that one gamete could not carry more than one of the characters. Now, on crossing yellow-seeded with green-

seeded peas, there arises, as has been already explained, a generation of yellow-seeded plants, which are in reality impure dominants. The gametes of this generation are assumed one half to carry the yellow-seeded strain, and the other half to carry the green-seeded strain. Now, when individuals of this generation are crossed together, the gametes may fuse in various different ways. A yellow-seeded gamete may either meet with another yellow-seeded gamete or it may meet with a green-seeded gamete. In the former case an individual will be produced which contains none of the green-seeded element, and which therefore breeds completely true to the yellow-seeded character. It would in fact be a pure dominant. But if the yellow-seeded gamete meets with a green-seeded gamete, the individual produced will be a hybrid, showing the dominant character—*i.e.* an impure dominant. Likewise if a green-seeded gamete meets with another green-seeded gamete, the individual produced will be a pure recessive, breeding true in future generations. Now, it follows from the laws of chance that when the gametes bearing the different characters are equal in number, a yellow-seeded gamete will meet with another yellow-seeded gamete just as often as a green-seeded gamete meets with another green-seeded gamete, and that therefore in the individuals of the subsequent generation the number of pure dominants and recessives will be equal. Moreover, a yellow-seeded will meet with a green-seeded gamete, issuing in a heterozygote or impure dominant form, the same number of times that a homozygote or pure form (dominant and recessive) arises. And thus there will result the very proportion of pure and impure forms which we have shown actually does arise when two varieties are crossed: that is to say, half the individuals will be hybrids, and the remaining half will be equally divided into pure dominant and pure recessive forms.

It is needless to go farther into the complexities of this somewhat intricate subject. It will suffice to mention some of the results obtained. The facts, of which it is necessary to get a firm hold, are, that when two varieties differing in respect of a certain character are crossed, the hybrids produced do not display any intermingling of the opposite characters, but that in every generation each character is segregated out in all its original purity in a definite proportion of the individuals, such proportion being one that can be foretold with certainty before the commencement of the experiments. This ability to foretell results by means of the hypothesis of gametic purity gives great support to that hypothesis. It derives further support from the fact that when the crosses are made in different ways, as for instance

between a pure and impure dominant form, the proportion of pure dominants, impure dominants, and recessives in the offspring is just that which the hypothesis would lead us to expect.

A further elaboration of the Mendelian theory arises when we have to do not with a single pair of opposing characters, but with several pairs. In studying the different forms of peas, Mendel found seven pairs of characters which acted in the manner already described. Thus the tallness or shortness of the stem constituted an opposing pair; the position of the flowers, whether axial or terminal; the colour of the unripe pods; the form of the ripe pods, &c. These pairs of characters were never found to mix when crossed, and in the successive generations the pure characters bred out in the proportion required by the hypothesis of gametic purity. Moreover, when several of these pairs of characters were present they all acted independently of one another. Thus, if a tall green-seeded plant were crossed with a dwarfish yellow-seeded plant, the first generation would show nothing but tall yellow-seeded plants, since these two characters are dominant over their respective pairs. But the second generation would show plants of great diversity of kind: tall yellow-seeded, tall green-seeded, dwarfish yellow-seeded, and dwarfish green-seeded. Some of these would breed true, others would split up again in future generations; but the proportion of each kind is found to be precisely that which we should be led to expect, on the hypothesis that a single gamete can only carry one member of an opposing pair. A further result of considerable importance is disclosed in the example just given. We started by crossing two varieties, one tall with green seeds, one dwarfish with yellow seeds. We obtained in the second generation a certain number of plants which were dwarfish, with green seeds; and since both these characters are recessive, the dominant element has been completely eliminated, and these plants will breed true. But they represent a totally novel combination of characters; that is to say, an entirely new and constant type has been produced by artificial means.

We are now in a position to appreciate the nature of the claims advanced by the more enthusiastic among students of the Mendelian theory. It is represented, in the first instance, that the theory affords support to the mutation theory, in that it appears to indicate the existence of definite unit-characters, which behave as single entities, and can, as it were, be bodily transferred from one variety to another. In reply to this it may be noted that the fact of a character acting as a definite unit *now*, affords no ground for believing that it must originally have come into existence at a single step. Moreover,

nothing as yet is known as to the behaviour of the various characters when animals or plants of the same variety are crossed. Hitherto the Mendelian law has only been applied in cases of hybrid fertilisations, and not in cases of normal fertilisations.

It is claimed that the practical utility of experiments on Mendelian inheritance consists in the prospect afforded of producing new varieties, better suited to human needs than any varieties found in nature. As a rule, the natural varieties of any given plant, such as wheat, possess characters some of which are valuable and some detrimental for human purposes. The hope is held out to us that by judicious intercrossing of several varieties new pure strains may be obtained which combine the favourable characters of all the varieties, and which are free from the unfavourable characters. Thus certain kinds of wheat suffer from a fungoid disease called 'rust'; other kinds are immune. On crossing immune individuals with those which are not immune, it has been found that the character of immunity acts as a Mendelian recessive to the character of non-immunity. It is therefore possible to obtain a pure strain of wheat which possesses the advantageous characters of the non-immune varieties, and is in addition immune.

From the point of view of evolution, the importance of Mendelism resides in the fact that it offers a possible explanation why new variations, when they occur, are not quickly swamped out by intercrossing with individuals which do not possess the same variation. If blended inheritance invariably resulted when two varieties were crossed, it would be difficult to see how a solitary new variation could maintain itself for long.

Professor Poulton, in his 'Essays on Evolution,' enters a very strong protest against what he considers to be the undue importance attached by many biologists to the Mendelian theory. And when we read in Mr. Lock's 'Variation, Heredity, and Evolution' the statement that 'the discovery made by Mendel was of an importance little inferior to those of a Newton or a Dalton,' we confess that we do not think Professor Poulton's strictures at all too severe. As a law of inheritance, when blending does not take place, it is interesting and instructive; but to compare it in importance with the law of gravitation or with the atomic theory implies a singular limitation of vision. Scarcely anything is yet known as to what extent Mendelism is really operative among animals and plants in natural conditions; and the tendency to hasty generalisation, so common among the uninstructed, is far too much in evidence in this branch of biological inquiry.

Leaving this part of the subject, we must now revert to the important question of the factors of organic evolution. We have seen that the environment acts indirectly in modifying the organism, by selecting for survival those individuals who chanced to have variations of a suitable nature. We have yet to inquire whether the environment does not act more directly in modifying organisms; whether, that is to say, the directly induced modifications of an individual can be handed down to its offspring. Scientific opinion is, for the most part, entirely hostile to this form of inheritance. The usual objections urged against it are, firstly, that there is extremely little evidence in its favour; and, secondly, that it is impossible to conceive any process by which such directly induced modifications could be inherited. It will therefore be a useful preliminary to the discussion to try to figure roughly to ourselves the actual working of the hereditary process. The data upon which we have to proceed are, unfortunately, few, and the speculations are, unfortunately, many. The facts, in so far as the microscope can reveal them, are as follows. In all the higher animals and plants the development of a new individual is started by the union of two cells, the male and female gametes. These cells are in most cases extremely minute, altogether invisible to the naked eye, and showing under the microscope very little structure or differentiation of parts. The female gamete is usually the larger, being swollen out by albumen or other food-material, and is comparatively immobile; the male gamete contains a minimal quantity of substance, and is highly mobile. It often possesses a flagellate tail by whose vibrations it rapidly progresses; and is sometimes endowed with a pointed or corkscrew head, which enables it to bore into the larger female gamete as soon as it comes in contact with it. In these barely visible specks of protoplasm the entire inheritance of all former generations is conveyed. Though they look so much alike in widely contrasted forms of animals, yet each one bears the potentiality of the structure of the race from which they spring, down to the minutest details; such, for instance, as the tendency to develop a particular disease after very many years have passed by, at an advanced age in the life of the new individual. A further examination of the gametes shows that within each is contained a nucleus which alone bears the hereditary qualities, the remainder of the cell taking no share in this function. And still more recently there have been discovered within the nucleus certain remarkable bodies, which have been called chromosomes, and which are now believed to possess exclusively the function of carrying heredity. It is observed under high powers



of the microscope that the process of cell-division, by which all organisms develop from a single cell, is not the simple constriction of one cell into two that was formerly supposed. It is found that at each cell-division there occurs within the cell a very complicated series of changes, to which the name of karyokinesis has been given. In all cases the effect of this karyokinetic division is that the chromosomes are exactly divided into two equal halves, one of which goes to each of the daughter-cells. The chromosomes within the nucleus are constant in number for every individual of the same species, but differ in different species. According to Professor Thomson, this number in the case of some sharks is thirty-six; in certain gastropods, thirty-two; in mice, salamanders, trout, and lilies, twenty-four; in men and onions, sixteen.

The above is a statement of the facts of the process of heredity, as far as they can be seen by the eye; we now come to the speculations as to what processes occur below the level of visibility. The three most important theories are those of Darwin, Weismann, and Herbert Spencer, and to each of these we must devote a short examination.

Darwin's theory, known as the theory of Pangenesis, was explicitly put forward by him as a provisional hypothesis; and the greater knowledge of the facts which we now possess shows clearly that the hypothesis is untenable. He supposed that every cell in the mature body throws off characteristic gemmules—minute samples, as it were, of the part of the body from which it comes. He imagined that these gemmules became specially concentrated in the reproductive elements; and that the germ-cells were thus merely collections of samples from all parts of the body, which owing to their small size could be contained in a very minute portion of matter. He assumed that the gemmules could multiply by fission, and that they could fuse with the corresponding gemmules of another individual, so that when the development of a new individual was about to commence, the gemmules segregated and, multiplying rapidly, each kind formed afresh that portion of the body of which it was a sample. Many difficulties were immediately pointed out in the way of accepting this view. It is well known, for instance, that mutilations are not inherited; yet, on the hypothesis of Pangenesis, we should be led to expect that when a limb is lost, and therefore gives off no gemmules, the offspring would show a deficiency in that part of the body whose formative gemmules were absent. But the final blow was given to the theory of Pangenesis when Weismann discovered the fact of germinal continuity. This brings us directly to the more important theory of Weismann.

Weismann asserts that the chromosomes, which have already been described as the bearers of the hereditary qualities, are divided into parts which he calls 'ids.' He regards an id as possessing in itself all the potentiality of a complete individual. In nearly all cases the ids are below the limit of visibility, and their existence therefore rests upon speculation. The ids are assumed by Weismann to consist of a group of yet smaller units, which he calls determinants. The determinants are supposed to function in a similar sort of way to Darwin's gemmules; that is to say, each determinant guides the development of a single minute portion of the body. They differ, however, from Darwin's gemmules in that they are not regarded as having emanated from the cells of a mature individual, but as having been already existent in the germ-plasm. The determinants are divided into an immense number of different kinds, for Professor Weismann says: 'There must be as many of them as there are regions in the fully formed organism capable of independent and transmissible variation, including all the stages of development.' The determinants again are divided by Weismann into yet smaller subdivisions, which he calls 'biophors,' and regards as the lowest vital unit. Weismann admits that his theory is the modern development of the preformationist theory. This theory, elaborated by Bonnet in the eighteenth century, assumed that in the germ of an animal was contained its perfectly formed offspring in miniature. All that development effected was increase in size. In the germ of the miniature again there was supposed to exist in yet more minute form the second generation with their parts perfectly developed, and so on *ad infinitum*. Crude as this theory seems to us now, it has considerable resemblance to the modern views of Weismann. In 'The Evolution Theory' Weismann says: 'Each determinant has from the very beginning its definite position in relation to the rest, and the germ-plasm therefore is not a mere loose aggregate of determinants, but it possesses a structure, an architecture, in which the individual determinants have each their definite place.' Various difficulties lie in the way of accepting Weismann's theory. How, for instance, can the vast number of determinants, which are assumed, all be contained in an 'id' which is itself too small to be seen under the highest powers of the microscope? The theory, moreover, is founded, not upon facts, but upon deductive reasoning. The very existence of ids, determinants, and biophors is purely hypothetical; still more the functions assigned to them. When a theory so highly complicated and speculative is founded upon such narrow premisses it must be admitted that there is so much room

for error that the likelihood of its future verification is very slight.

We pass now to the third theory of heredity, namely, that of Herbert Spencer. Spencer's theory differs from Darwin's and from Weismann's in that he regards the units of the germ-plasm as being homogeneous, and not divided into diverse kinds destined to produce the diverse parts of the mature individual. He imagined, indeed, in common with most others who have speculated on the subject, that there exist certain vital units, which he called 'constitutional units.'\* But he did not imagine that in any one individual there was more than one kind of constitutional unit. He did not assume that there were different sets of units predestined to develop into particular parts of the mature individual. He regarded the development into a certain shape as being in some ways analogous to crystal-formation. When an inorganic substance, such as sodium chloride, is deposited from solution in water, it takes the form of crystals of a definite shape. This is otherwise expressed by saying that the molecules have a certain 'polarity' which causes them to arrange themselves in this constant manner. Now an organic molecule contains many more atoms than an inorganic molecule; and constitutional units were regarded by Spencer as being highly complex combinations of organic molecules. Spencer was thus able to credit them with a polarity, or proclivity to arrange themselves into a particular form, such form being more complex than that of a crystal, in proportion as the constitutional unit is more complex than an inorganic molecule.

One great advantage of this theory is its extreme simplicity; and it may be adopted as a working hypothesis, enabling us to visualise the processes of heredity. Its vagueness, moreover, is a point in its favour. There are many who think that unless a theory can supply us with a detailed and sharply defined explanation of the facts, it is worthless. To such the hypothesis of constitutional units will appeal but little. We, on the contrary, believe that where the facts which we have to go upon are vague it is well that the theories should be vague also. As the facts become more numerous and certain, so will the theories become more definite and clear. But a highly definite theory, resting upon extremely indefinite facts, is very unlikely to be a true theory. We may therefore provisionally accept the view that

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\* In the earlier editions of the *Principles of Biology* he called them 'physiological units.' Professor Thomson, who seems to have taken his account from the first edition of the *Biology*, perpetuates this name; by which, in fact, they are still generally known.

there are definite hereditary units, intermediate in size between the chemical unit, or molecule, and the biological unit, or cell ; that these constitutional units are all alike in any one individual ; and that they possess a specific polarity which causes them to arrange themselves into a shape similar to that of ancestral individuals. Carrying with us this rough conception of the hereditary process, we come now to the important question as to whether acquired characters are or are not inherited.

The differences observable between a parent and its offspring are of two entirely different kinds. There are, on the one hand, the variations which originate in the germ, so that even though they may not become visible till late in life, they were predestined at the commencement of development ; and there are, on the other hand, the modifications produced in the individual during its lifetime by the direct action of the environment upon it, such, for instance, as the tanning of the skin in a hot country. These latter modifications are termed acquired characters. That congenital variations are inherited is a well-known fact. Whether acquired characters are also inherited has been one of the most vexed questions of biology during the last half century. Acquired characters are of two main kinds : those in which the organism is passive, and a physical effect is wrought upon it by the environment ; and those in which the organism actively reacts to its environment, a change in its structure being caused by constant use or disuse of some special part, as, for instance, in the increase of brain-power which follows intellectual exercise. Until biology had reached a fairly advanced stage, scarcely anyone questioned the inheritance of acquired characters. Lamarek at the beginning of last century held it to be an important factor in evolution. Herbert Spencer, before the 'Origin of Species' was published, regarded it as the sole factor. Darwin himself named it as one of the factors of evolution, though he assigned to it comparatively small importance. At the present day belief in inheritance of acquired characters is almost universal among those who have no special knowledge of biology. Yet a very cursory glance at the facts is sufficient to show that the belief in its crude form, as held by Lamarek, or by the unscientific public of to-day, is untenable. The reasons for disbelieving in it are twofold : firstly, the absence of direct evidence in favour of it ; and, secondly, the difficulty of seeing by what process acquirements could possibly be transmitted. With regard to the absence of direct evidence, it has to be noted that nearly all the cases supposed to afford instances have been shown to be equally well explained by the theory of natural or artificial selection. It is said, for instance,

that young pointer dogs sometimes 'point' without having been taught; and that this is an example of inheritance of a habit originally acquired by its ancestors. But the fact admits of another explanation. Among the many congenital variations which dogs are liable to, there are certain to be some which find expression by the dog's pausing and pointing for a moment before pouncing upon its quarry. This inborn variation will make the dog an apt learner, and finally an efficient pointer; and it will be selected for breeding purposes by the keeper. Its progeny, though retaining nothing of what their parent acquired, will inherit the original congenital variation, some of them, perhaps, to a greater, and some to a lesser, extent. By breeding again from those possessing the variation in the most extreme form, pups are produced which may show a considerable capacity for pointing without any tuition; and it is clear that it is unnecessary to invoke inheritance of acquired modifications to reach this result. The many misunderstandings connected with this subject are well set forth in Professor Thomson's 'Heredity.' Often modifications impressed on the organism by its environment seem to be transmitted to the offspring; as, for instance, when the Alpine plants brought by Nägeli to the botanical garden at Munich acquired many new characters which appeared to be inherited in subsequent generations. But in all such cases the true explanation is to be found in the fact that the modifications are re-impressed by the environment on each subsequent generation. Again, alcoholism in parents is known to affect children, but this is due to direct alcoholic infection of the germ-plasm, and is not a case of inheritance at all. Most interesting among the phenomena, which were supposed to be explained by transmission of acquired modifications, is the origin of instincts in animals. It is well known that a series of actions, originally very laborious, may, through constant repetition, come to be performed with the greatest ease. Learning to play a particular tune on the piano is at first a very difficult acquisition; but after continual practice it can be rapidly gone through, even when the thoughts are engaged on other matters. The formation of habits in the individual were supposed by G. H. Lewes and George Romanes to be analogous to the formation of instincts in the race. They believed that instincts in animals are merely race-habits, which had their origin in intellectual acquisitions. An animal having learnt by experience in the course of its life to go through certain definite actions upon a certain definite stimulus, it was supposed that the habit thus acquired could be to some extent inherited; so that after many generations

the progeny would be able to go through those actions in response to the stimulus, without any previous experience, by instinct alone. Simple and seductive as this theory seems, it has been conclusively overthrown. No refutation could be more overwhelming than that which Weismann and Poulton have provided in the case of the instincts of insects. Take, for instance, the cocoon-making instinct, where the larva spins its cocoon in such positions that, although freely exposed, it is almost indistinguishable from its surroundings. That ancestral experience should have taught it what positions to choose is out of the question, for one insect spins a cocoon only once in its life, and has no possibility of learning by experience. Another example may be taken from the facts of mimicry. Ants, which form a very aggressive and well-defended group, are much mimicked by other insects, and especially by certain species of spiders. Spiders are largely utilised by various kinds of wasps as food for the wasp-larvæ. Ants are never taken for this purpose. It would therefore be highly advantageous to spiders if they could acquire an external resemblance to ants. Now spiders have eight legs and no antennæ, whereas ants have antennæ and only six legs. The spiders, therefore, which mimic ants possess the habit, when sitting still, of holding their front pair of legs out in front of them, which not only gives the appearance of antennæ, but reduces the number of their legs to six. Are we to suppose that this extraordinary instinct arose through conscious intellectual processes on the part of the spider? Such a supposition would involve the belief that spiders began by watching ants and observing how their defensive apparatus secured them from attack by wasps. The spider would then be struck by the bright idea that if only he could make himself look like an ant, he also would be immune from attacks. Thereupon he would notice that it was necessary for him to make a reduction in the number of his legs, and to provide himself with a pair of antennæ; and by a final act of intelligence he would lift up two of his legs and hold them out in front, thus killing two birds with one stone. So successful would he find his ruse to be, that this difficult action would become a confirmed habit, and would be handed down to his offspring as an instinct through future generations!

No better example could be taken of the absurdity of supposing that in these cases instinct arises from lapsed intelligence. And if it is certain that in many cases inheritance of acquirements cannot explain instinct, there seems no necessity for invoking that factor to explain instincts in any cases.

The second important argument against the inheritance of acquired characters is founded upon the doctrine of the continuity of the germ-plasm formulated by Weismann. It has already been mentioned that animals and plants are derived from a single cell by continual process of cell-division. In various cases it has been ascertained by Weismann that, either at the first, or at some very early division, the embryo is differentiated into two parts, of which one gives rise entirely to germ-cells, and the other entirely to body-cells. In other words, when the germ-plasm is about to develop into a new individual a little bit of it is set aside at once to form the germ-cells of the new individual, and takes no part in the somatic development. The germ-plasm is, therefore, continuous from generation to generation. The function of the body is to act as trustee of the germ-plasm. It may, indeed, be regarded as a growth or excrescence upon the germ-plasm, or as a case or box in which the germ-plasm is safely carried; and when this function has been fulfilled for a time, there is no further use for the body, which withers away like a husk, giving rise to the phenomena known to us as decay and death. This theory of the continuity of the germ-plasm is now widely held, and it creates a formidable obstacle in the way of belief in inheritance of acquired characters. For if the somatic cells are completely set apart from the germ-cells, it is impossible to understand how somatic modifications could call into existence corresponding germinal modifications. We must consider the individual as a child of the race, not as a child of his parent. The germ-plasm of the race gives rise equally to the parent and the child; the body of the parent plays no further part in the business than that of conserving the germ-plasm for one generation.

It is arguments such as these that have led the great majority of men of science emphatically to deny any possibility of inheritance of acquired characters. Yet, while admitting the full force of the arguments, we think a protest should be entered against dogmatizing too rigidly on the subject. The argument—drawn from the continuity of the germ-plasm—that the process of use-inheritance is impossible to conceive, does not appear to us to be as weighty as it is considered to be by many. The central fact of heredity—the bearing of the entire hereditary qualities of the race in a microscopic particle of protoplasm—would seem just as inconceivable, if we did not know it to be a fact. Over and over again in the history of science has it happened that things which appeared to be inconceivable are found to be actual facts. Not very many years ago no one would for a moment have believed that it would ever be possible to

see through solid matter, or to hold a conversation with someone living in another continent. Yet both these eventualities are now so common that they have ceased to excite wonder. A still closer analogy is to be found in the law of gravitation. Nothing is more hopeless than to attempt to conceive by what process the sun can affect the movements of the earth. That two bodies separated by many millions of miles of apparently empty space should yet control each other's movements under a perfectly definite law, would certainly not be credited, did we not know it empirically to be a fact. The difficulty of figuring to ourselves any process which explains gravitation far exceeds the difficulty which meets us in the case of inheritance of acquired characters. Weismann himself admits that the argument of inconceivability would have to give way if any definite positive evidence were adduced.

Is it not possible that inheritance of acquired characters, few signs of it though we now see, may yet have been a factor in organic evolution? So long as we remain, as at present, in profound ignorance as to the causes of variation, it seems premature to state in too dogmatic a fashion that somatic modifications are qualitatively different from variations. They may simply be variations which make their appearance very late in the development of the organism. It is true that they are produced directly by the action of the environment, whereas germinal variations are supposed to arise spontaneously. But when the matter is looked at closely, it is seen that the environment must at bottom be the cause of all variation, however early it makes its appearance. For the very fact of variation implies that some new force has come into existence which caused the variation; and since, by hypothesis, this force is not included in the polarity of the constitutional units, it is some external force; that is to say, some direct action of the environment, using the word environment in a wide sense. There seems, then, considerable reason for believing that the variations, which we know to be inherited, differ from acquired modifications only in being produced at a very much earlier stage of development.

Now, in adult animals, we must assume a very high degree of stability of the constitution. We may take it for granted that an organism is entirely the product of environmental forces, which have acted, whether directly or indirectly, upon it and its ancestors from the earliest protozoan stage upwards. The shape of an organism is the expression of the sum-total of those forces. In highly developed animals, which are adapted to react to forces of great quantity and variety, the proclivity



of the constitutional units to arrange themselves in a particular manner must be very strong and difficult to alter. The introduction of a new force at a comparatively late stage of development may cause a bodily alteration in the individual; but the effect it will produce upon the highly stable constitutional units can only be so slight that its effect on the offspring will be immeasurably small. The units, whose specific polarity has been caused entirely by the action of environmental forces in the past, will, indeed, be changed to some slight extent by the new environmental force brought to bear upon it; but in proportion as this new force is insignificant as compared with the sum-total of the old, so will the change wrought in the polarity of the constitutional units also be insignificant. If this view be accepted as a provisional hypothesis, it will be found to be in harmony with many classes of facts, not coordinated by any other theory. We can see, for instance, why it is that germinal variations are inherited. For, knowing that the development of each individual recapitulates the development of the race, we see that a change effected in the germ is equivalent to a force which has come into action at a very early period in evolution, and, therefore, has greater influence upon the constitutional units.

That the constitutions of higher animals are very stable is shown by many facts. There are, first, the facts of regression; when a variation does affect the constitutional units, they show a strong tendency to recover their normal polarity after a few generations. Even where the outward appearance of change is very great, as in the domestic breeds of pigeons, the constitutional alteration must be very small, as is evidenced by the fact that it has been impossible to make the different breeds sterile *inter se*. If long-continued selection of germinal variations fails to alter permanently the constitution of a breed, how is it to be expected that somatic modifications should have any visible result? Acquired modifications, doubtless, are extremely superficial. Mr. Galton has shown that 'identical' twins, brought up in wholly different conditions of life, yet retain the utmost resemblance into old age. As Professor Poulton remarks: 'Nearly everything which is characteristic of an individual is blastogenic.' The predominance of 'nature' over 'nurture' is paramount. If acquired characters have so little root even in the individual, is it reasonable to be surprised that they have no apparent effect upon the offspring?

It is none the less possible that transmission of functional modifications may have been a factor in organic evolution in spite of the fact that so little evidence in favour of it can at

present be found. If the main obstacle to such transmission lies in the stability of the constitutional units, we should expect that, in plants and in the lower animals, where we may suppose the constitution to be less fixed, the evidence in favour of it would be more visible. And we are at once reminded that most botanists do believe in it. There is also the fact that unicellular animals appear to show it.

The importance of arriving at a sure conclusion on the inheritance of acquired characters can scarcely be exaggerated. Social science hangs upon biological science, and the validity of many social theories is altogether dependent upon the truth of particular biological theories.

In October 1902 we had occasion to point out the grave biological results which were sure to accrue from certain kinds of legislation. That warning it is necessary now to repeat with even greater emphasis. The root-idea of much of modern legislation is to remove the hardships and evils to which different classes of the people are subjected by their natural environment. It is often alleged, and particularly by persons desirous of making out a case for socialism, that hard conditions of life injure the constitution of the individual, and that the injury is inherited by posterity, causing a general deterioration of the race. Nothing can be farther from the truth. There is not the smallest particle of evidence to show that the children of a parent, whose constitution has been weakened by excessive labour, are born any poorer in physique than the children of wealthy parents. There is not a single fact which goes to show that the children of people who have lived all their lives in unhealthy slums in great towns are any less sound in constitution than the children of people who have lived all their lives in the healthiest conditions in the country. The great majority of zoologists are radically opposed to any such opinion. The recently issued Report of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-minded fully bears out the view of men of science. In §550 the Report says: 'Many races have been exposed to one or other of all the ill conditions which have been alleged as causes of filial deterioration. In every case the only apparent effect has been to render these races capable of dwelling comparatively unharmed under such conditions.' And it goes on to observe that in this way the race is 'not weakened, but strengthened' by these alleged causes of deterioration. Again, in §553, the Report says: 'Both on the grounds of fact and of theory there is the highest degree of probability that "feeble-mindedness" is usually spontaneous in origin—that is, not due to influences acting on the

'parent.' It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the effect of hard conditions of life is to improve the race, and not to injure it. Deterioration is consequent, not upon strenuous conditions of life, but upon easy conditions. Where the conditions are strenuous, those who are congenitally weak are killed off, leaving the race to be carried on by those who are congenitally strong. The children of these suffer in no way for the hardships of their parents. Where, on the other hand, the conditions are easy, the weak are able to survive and bear offspring, and the degeneracy spreads in future generations. The increase of insanity and other forms of deterioration are to be ascribed to the easy conditions of life which allow those persons to survive and propagate who in former times would have died out. Can anything bring home more forcibly the folly of humanitarian legislation, which aims at abolishing every test of fitness that Nature provides? The object of humanitarians is to secure the survival of the individual, however unfit he may be. In so far as they are successful they strike so deadly a blow at the quality of future generations, that all the science in the world may be powerless to save the race from extinction. There is a fundamental opposition between the interests of the individual and the interests of society. As we pointed out in January 1908, the humanitarian Socialist considers exclusively the interests of the individual, and neglects altogether the interests of society as a whole. Under his *régime* the individual may be saved, but the community will be destroyed.

While it is true that the neglect of biological principles in social affairs has consequences of extraordinary gravity, it is equally true that these principles are sometimes invoked by persons who only half understand them, for the purpose of supporting views to which in reality they afford no support whatever. Of such cases, the attempt to defend war, on the ground that it aids the survival of the fittest, is one. Indeed, so obvious is it that war does not lead to the survival of the fittest, that one is almost tempted to think that those who use the argument utter it as a parrot-like formula, without ever inquiring into the meaning of their words. In the first place those killed out during a war are not the diseased, the weak, and the useless, but the young and vigorous; persons who have passed a certain medical standard of physical efficiency. There is thus excluded any possibility of the elimination of the unfit by a war. The result of a war is inevitably a general deterioration of the race, consequent on the destruction of the physically strong. In the second place, it is no longer true, as it once was, that the standard of fitness is set by military

efficiency. Fighting forms, at the most, an extremely small part of the business of the average citizen ; and to select individuals or nations according to their prowess in battle is to select them by a standard which is of comparatively little use to them. It is of immense importance that they should be selected to withstand the conditions of life in which they are placed, not to withstand conditions in which they are not placed. Resistance to disease, to strenuous labour, to the artificial evils of town-life, are the standards by which we want natural selection to work. So far from affording support to the doctrine that war is beneficial to the race, biology shows in the clearest possible manner that war is highly detrimental to the race.

Let us, then, recognise the manifold evils likely to arise when the country is governed by men who are ignorant of the most elementary principles of the science of life. Let us profit by the knowledge of our times, and humbly recognise that there are great natural laws to which all nations must submit, and which no government can defy. Let us shake off our impudent assumption of omnipotence—our belief that the State can do anything, and remove all social evils by legislative enactments. Unless the humility which Science teaches can be quickly infused into the people, Nature will lightly sweep us off the face of the earth as an obdurate and disobedient race.

ART. X.—SCOTLAND IN THE EIGHTEENTH  
CENTURY.

1. *The Social Life of Scotland in the Eighteenth Century.* By HENRY GREY GRAHAM. London: A. and C. Black. 1906.
2. *Scottish Men of Letters in the Eighteenth Century.* By HENRY GREY GRAHAM. London: A. and C. Black. 1908.
3. *A Group of Scottish Women.* By HARRY GRAHAM. London: Methuen. 1908.

THE estimation in which Scotland and Scotsmen have been held south of the Tweed has varied, and its variations reflect the history of the two countries. There were generations of active and almost incessant hostilities, during which, slowly but surely, the greater wealth and numbers of the English asserted themselves. In these hostilities the northern Scots, or Highlanders, took little or no part. The small, scattered Lowland population was pitted against the might of the southern kingdom, and in the long run the issue could not be doubtful; the wonder is that the conflict should have been as protracted and as chequered as it was. It was brought to an end, in a manner flattering alike to the sentiment and the self-esteem of the smaller nation, by the accession of James VI. to the English throne. From this period dates the picture of the Scottish adventurer, poor, proud, and penurious, familiar to us in 'The Fortunes of Nigel.' Needy courtiers and would-be courtiers followed the King—who, it must be admitted, showed no great wish for their company—southward. The polished Elizabethans resented at once their intrusion and their rapacity, and sneered at their uncouth manners and language: their native kings forgot their own people and their fathers' house. The Stewarts did not bear transplanting; the English succession was a giftless gift. The deterioration of the stock was rapid. On its native soil it had flourished. Of the unfortunate Mary we are told that she had 'ever a man's courage'; her ancestors were kings, statesmen, and soldiers born. Was the old Edinburgh taunt, 'Jamie Davidson,' without foundation? It is certain that it was with James VI. that the weakness, which became the note of the race, set in. A pedant, an egotist, a schemer, and a fanatic wore in succession the crown of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth. The hereditary taint common to the four was insincerity; no one dared trust their word. Hence the downfall of the dynasty; the English hate a lie.

The country was not safe with such rulers. Patriotism was unknown to them; they regarded the throne as a private possession, not a public trust. Their affection for Scotland was a vanishing quantity; they remembered their country only to violate the liberties and outrage the convictions of their countrymen. English national sentiment they never acquired. The feeling entertained for them by their first subjects was mixed, and pathetic in its mixture. Public duty contended with personal and family attachment; devotion was chilled by treachery, loyalty by ingratitude, and over all hung the shadow of an inevitable destiny. 'What, sir, has your family done,' Lord George Murray asked the Prince in the dark days that followed the retreat from Derby, 'to call down upon it the persistent 'curse of God?'

The Revolution of 1688, while it relieved the northern kingdom from civil and religious tyranny, was a blow to its pride and to not a few of its interests; never had such distress been known as that of the 'Ill,' or 'Hungry Years,' 1696-1703. Jacobitism was fostered not by sentiment only, but by those social and economic causes without whose co-operation no large movement of men is possible. The Highland clans, following each its tribal policy, were divided. Were the Campbells Whig, the Macdonalds and Murrays were Tory; were the Grants for King William, the Gordons and Frasers were for King James. Discontent was rife not only among the Catholics and Episcopalians, who were placed under legal disabilities, but among the Cameronians, whose hand was stayed by the moderation of the new sovereign. To his credit be it said, William refused to be made a persecutor or a partisan; he had come, he said, to secure the liberties of the nation, not to bring about the domination of a sect. A further disturbing element was the poverty, and consequent disaffection, of the common people, who, forgetting too easily the misgovernment of the past, were keenly sensible of the pressure of the existing order, to whose shortcomings they ascribed those evils from which no human society, however wisely organised, is exempt. The Union, by which in the near future Scotland was to profit so greatly, was at first a source of legitimate mortification and material loss; the 'auld song,' whose end it symbolised, was dear to men of all creeds and parties. The net result of these various causes was that the northern half of the island came to be regarded by English statesmen as a permanently possible centre of rebellion, a view which the risings of '15 and '45 confirmed. The cruelties which accompanied the suppression of the latter were as calculated a piece of policy as the pacification of the Highlands

which followed them ; the recurrence of civil war must be prevented, it was felt, at all costs.

The Bute influence in the household of the Princess Dowager and in the early counsels of George III. rekindled English suspicion. The case of Johnson is typical. Tory and semi-Jacobite as he was, he disliked Scotsmen heartily. Why ? They were found in every department of life, and in all they came to the front ; their frugality, their capacity for work, their clannishness gave them an advantage which they were quick to recognise and eager to retain. The slower-witted Englishman, distanced in the race by a competitor whose inferiority he had taken for granted, was puzzled and angry ; his indignation vented itself in clumsy witticisms at the expense of the barrenness of his rival's country, its poverty, the parochialism of its culture, and the like. Not till the Wizard of the North waved his magic wand over the 'land of brown heath and shaggy wood' was its charm disclosed to others than its children ; not till 'Waverley' and 'The Lady of the Lake' had taken their place in the literature of the language common to the two countries was

' the old romance that, lingering, dies  
By northern seas '

revealed.

The century that gave birth to Scott saw the end of the old order and the opening of the new. His genius caught the former in the act of passing and depicted its characteristic features, marking the survivals, the transitions, the points of contact and departure between the two. If, however, it was his to create the legend, others before and after him filled in the outlines and supplied the detail. The names of Dr. Carlyle, Professor Wilson, Lord Cockburn, Dean Ramsay, etc., are familiar ; and in our own time Mr. H. G. Graham and Mr. Harry Graham stand out among the competent and sympathetic writers who have made the Scotland of an older generation familiar to Scotsmen of a later day. It was a work worth the doing ; and even now much remains to be done. In family archives, in the letters, the diaries, the homely memoranda of many a household the material lies ready to hand. How much light may yet be thrown upon the past ! in how new a perspective familiar events may be seen ! As an example one may point to 'Allan Macaulay's' fine historical novel—the finest since Scott, in the judgement of not a few critics—'Poor Sons of a Day.'

It was a vigorous, a crowded, and an intensely national life that was led in and about the long street that rose from Holyrood to the Castle by the citizens of every class and calling who

thronged it. Edinburgh was at once the capital of the Lothians, the most prosperous and civilised district of Scotland, and the metropolis, the centre of political, social, and literary life. There, not in London, at the beginning of the century practically a foreign city, the great nobles had their town houses; it was the meeting-place of men separated for the greater part of the year by impassable roads and, in the then state of communication, impossible distances; there the General Assembly of the Church deliberated; there the permanent courts of law sat. It was on a small scale, for Scotland was a small kingdom, and even in 1801 the population of the whole country was little over a million and a half. But size is a poor test of spirit, of significance, or of the promise of the future:

‘Admiranda tibi levium spectacula rerum  
Magnanimosque duces totiusque ordine gentis  
Mores et studia et populos et proelia dicam.’\*

It was a society of strong contrasts. Nowhere was ancestry more highly esteemed, yet nowhere was there a kindlier intercourse between gentle and simple. If pride of birth was strong, pride of wealth was non-existent, and would have been unintelligible; nowhere were the lines of social demarcation less measured by material standards than here. In certain respects, indeed, they were drawn with decision: the famous Miss ‘Nicky’ Murray was ruthless in excluding those whose claims she judged insufficient for admission to the august gatherings in the Assembly Rooms, over which she presided so autocratically.† On the other hand, Lord Kirkcudbright, the peer-haberdasher, sold gloves at the door. The prejudice of the landed gentry against mercantile pursuits was of later origin: Allan Ramsay, wigmaker as he was, traced his descent to the house of Dalhousie; it was no uncommon thing for the younger sons of good families to set up in trade, or even to follow humbler callings—that of a carpenter, a flax-dresser, etc. This did not apply to the Highlands; a Highlander in similar circumstances took a farm or kept an inn. Poverty, though the chief, was not the only cause of these vicissitudes; it must be remembered that the Army, the Bar, and in general the public service were closed to those Jacobites—and they were many—whose conscience scrupled at the oath of allegiance. Want of money was universal; rents were paid half, or more than half, in kind. But, if means were small, prices were low: Dr. Carlyle lived four days at an inn for 3s. 6d.; in 1773 the tavern ordinary was only fourpence, and good claret

\* Georgic iv. 3-5.

† A Group of Scottish Women, p. 160.



could be had for a shilling a quart. An average rent for a gentleman's residence in Edinburgh, a flat opening on to a common staircase, was from 8*l.* to 10*l.* A judge's salary since the Union was 500*l.*; before that date it had been 200*l.*, or, in the case of five out of the fifteen, 300*l.*; that of a city minister or university professor ran to 100*l.* or 130*l.* A landed proprietor was wealthy on 500*l.*, rich on 200*l.* to 300*l.*, well-to-do with 100*l.* or even 80*l.*; many a man of good birth and position lived on 50*l.* or less. The wages of women servants were from 15*s.* to 20*s.*; in great houses the cook and the footman received 2*l.*, the housekeeper and the chaplain 5*l.* Bread was a luxury, the staple food being oat cake or barley bannocks; only in summer and autumn could fresh meat be had. At Martinmas, the November term, each household killed and salted the provision that was to last it till May. The monotony of the food was intolerable, and gave rise to skin and other diseases; neither fruit nor vegetables were in common use. Turnips, introduced in 1716, were served at dessert; it was a not unnatural consequence that a generation later they were not tolerated on the table, and were regarded as food rather for sheep than for men. Strong ale was cheap, tea dear; it was commonly 'laced' with brandy, and sold for 25*s.* or 30*s.*, coffee at 7*s.* 6*d.*, loaf-sugar at 1*s.* 6*d.* the pound. Whisky, till the middle of the century little used in the Lowlands, cost in 1700 10*d.* a quart. By 1790 it had gone up to 1*s.* 8*d.*; but, in spite of the rise in price, the consumption increased rapidly, and that of the old-fashioned 'twopenny' ale fell off. In 1708, 28,000 barrels of this, in 1794 9700 only, were brewed.

The older mansion houses—Stobhall, near Perth, is an example—were small, and, though picturesque, incommodious; there were neither pleasure-grounds nor avenues; the gate, or door, opened upon ploughed land. The farm buildings—barns, byres, stables, etc.—formed two sides of the courtyard, in the centre of which the 'middens' at once attracted the eye and assailed the nose. The rooms were low; the close-shut windows without sash or pulley; box-beds, dark and airless, stood in the deep recesses of the walls. Even in the 'mid-chamber,' or drawing-room, such accommodation was usual. This was the case at Cawdor in 1716; and at Inverness in 1745 there was only one house, that in which the Prince lodged, which possessed a room without a bed. The public rooms were used only on occasions of ceremony; it was in the bedroom of the laird and his lady that the family lived.

'There they took their meals, there they saw their friends, there at night the family gathered round the hearth, with its high polished

brass grate, which stood detached from the back and sides of the fireplace ornamented with tiles. There the girls spun and lads learned the rules of Despauter's "Latin Grammar"; and only after "family exercises" did the household disperse, and the heads of the family were left to rest and to sleep in the exhausted air.\*

Such habits were the more insanitary because for half the year the climate made outdoor life difficult; the home at least of the women and children was the 'fireside clime.' When this was what it was, sunless, airless, malodorous, what wonder that disease was rampant, that small-pox, typhus, consumption went their way unchecked? While, to descend to minor ailments, ladies were the constant prey of vapours and megrims; nor was either sex or social distinction a preservative against the itch.

Farming was incredibly bad; it was to this rather than to the climate that the chronic distress of the people was due. There were no enclosures; only the 'infield' was manured, and that in the most primitive fashion, the use of lime being unknown till 1730; the larger 'outfield,' after three years of scanty oat crops, lay fallow for another three years, and was rack-rented, says Fletcher of Saltoun, at half-a-crown or even a shilling an acre. The lower slopes of the mountains, as on Schiehallion, were ploughed, not, as has been supposed, from any extraordinary energy on the part of the cultivators, but because the level land, undrained and uncleared, was a hopeless swamp. What was known as 'run-rig,' a survival of prehistoric agriculture, was universal.

'The fields were divided into separate "rigs," or ridges, which were cultivated by different tenants. One small field might be divided into an occupancy of from four to eight persons, and a farm with a combined rent of 50*l.* might have eighteen tenants, amongst whom the land was redivided by lot each year and put up for auction. The tenants had their cottages clustered together, forming what was called the farm "town." The quarrels and misunderstandings between these men were violent and incessant. As no operation could begin without mutual help with horses and oxen, and common arrangement as to crops, they required all to be agreed as to the day and hour of beginning labour, the times and modes of ploughing, sowing, reaping. But, as each had his own obstinate opinion on each of these matters, the bickering might cause the lapse of weeks before all consented to work together. . . . Only the crown of the "rig," which was full of stones, was ploughed; and half the width of the ridges, and the ground between them, was taken up with huge "baulks," or open spaces, filled with briars, nettles, stones, and water. How could

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\* Social Life in Scotland, p. 8.

any waste land be reclaimed under such a system? If one man dared to cultivate a neglected bit of ground, the others denounced him for infringing on their right of grazing on the outfields. How could he begin the growing of any new crop? The others, viewing every innovation with the contempt which comes from that feeling of superiority which ignorance and stupidity produce, would refuse to join him. Having no lease, he had no motive to improve land which next year might be in the hands of another man. He could not store hay for the cattle, because the instant the harvest was over the whole land became open pasturage for the township. Yet, in spite of its absurdity, the people were so devoted to their "run-rig," or "stuck-run-way" plan, that, if twenty fields were allotted to twenty farmers, they would rather have a twentieth share in twenty fields than have one field each to himself.\*

In 1803 Hogg found this system existing in the Hebrides, where it had assumed a still more complicated form :

' Their rights in their farms are so confused and interwoven that it is almost impossible to determine what share belongs to each. Supposing, what is common enough, ten tenants possessing a farm, and every "shot" or division of their arable land to consist of ten or more "beds" or ridges, they do not take ridge about and exchange yearly, nor yet part the produce, but every ridge is parted into as many sub-divisions as there are tenants—into tenths, twentieths, fourths, fifths, etc.—every one managing and reaping his share; so that it would take a man to be a master of fractions to be a tenant in Lewis.' †

It was not till the middle of the century that an improvement was brought about. Tenancies were combined, leases granted, conditions as to liming, the use of artificial grasses, and the proper rotation of crops, imposed. Machinery was introduced, better appliances devised; 'new implements, intelligent methods' of farming, better grain and more prolific cereals revolutionised 'agricultural life.' For the Highlands the '45 was the turning-point. Lochiel, Adam Smith tells us, though he could bring 800 fighting men into the field, had a rent-roll of 500*l.*: within a generation a new world had set in.

Politics and legislation apart, economical causes were at work whose inevitable operation was destructive to this old order. 'When I was young,' said a Highland gentleman at the end of the century, 'one asked about a man of rank, How many men lived on his estate? then, How many bullocks? Now, How many sheep?' The traditions of the past were splendid.

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\* Social Life in Scotland, pp. 156-8.

† Hogg's 'Tour in the Highlands,' p. 107.

But it had gone beyond recall. And the question was not Should it go? but Should men recognise that it had gone?—that, for better or worse, a new Scotland had taken the place of the old?

Its pioneers suffered; the work of a generation cannot be crowded into a day. Methods suitable to the South of England were attempted, with disastrous results, in the different soil and under the different climatic conditions of the Highlands; even in Stirlingshire and the Lothians the crops were necessarily later than in Surrey and Kent. Tenants too poor to embark on experiments, or too wedded to old methods to take up easily with new, were evicted in numbers; over-enthusiastic proprietors became bankrupt; but the prosperity of the country increased steadily and quickly. English farmers had revolutionised Scottish methods of cultivation. Now the order was reversed: the Lothian farming became the model of agricultural reformers, and Scottish bailiffs and tenants were in demand in the South. In one Perthshire parish—Fortingal—the rents 'in 1750 were not much above 1500*l.*, and the people 'were starving; now (1793) they pay 4600*l.*, and there is fulness 'of bread.' The rental of land in Scotland in 1748 was estimated at 822,857*l.* In 1813 it was 6,285,500*l.* It will not be pretended that these changes were effected without the inconvenience and even distress inseparable from the transfer of labour from its accustomed channels. But the inconvenience and the distress were temporary, and not confined to the poorer class. Statistics which cannot be got over disprove the legend of the depopulation of the northern counties, the displacement of men for sheep and deer. In Argyll, Ross, and Inverness, where sheep-walks and large farms were introduced, the population between 1755 and 1795 increased by some 30,000; in Elgin, Banff, and Aberdeen (exclusive of the city), where the small tenants held their own, it decreased by 9000. Those who idealise the old world forget that the material conditions under which the people lived previously to the changes of tenure were wretched in the extreme. Hence a wholesale sacrifice of child life. It is not uncommon, says Adam Smith, for a Highland mother to have borne twenty children, and not to have one living. Yet, in spite of this natural check, there was not work for more than half the able-bodied men.

'When we find that a locality with a rental of 700*l.* had no fewer than 700 women, for half of whom there was no occupation, when we know that the parishes between 1753 and 1763 were able to furnish, without interference with the labour of their crofts and farms, no less than 400 recruits for the regiments in America, it

becomes obvious that the removal of surplus inhabitants was a blessing.\*

The old system had simply broken down. Its breakdown was part of a larger change. By the end of the century civilisation was diffused. Cottages replaced hovels; the country house, as we know it, came into existence; the comforts, the refinements, and even the luxuries of life were introduced. In Edinburgh the migration from the Old Town to the New had been effected by 1780, rents rising from 10*l.* and 20*l.* to 100*l.* in the process; the increased prosperity of the country showed itself in every class and on every hand. Gardens and shrubberies were laid out; forestry became a passion; improved roads encouraged improved means of communication; the stage-coach replaced the waggon and the packhorse; the journey between Edinburgh and London occupied sixty hours instead of sixteen days. The Scotland of the old world became a memory: the face of the country, the minds of the people, their lives, their tongue, their manners—all were new.

Politically, after the Union, the Jacobite risings of 1715 and 1745 were the events of the century. Of the Union, unpopular with all parties, political and religious, all that can be said is that it was the least of all possible evils. As Thiers said of the French Republic: 'C'est ce qui nous divise le moins.' It was the inevitable consequence of the relation between the two countries, and was 'formed,' in Defoe's words, 'by the nature of things.' It increased rather than lessened the independence of Scotland, which, since the accession of the Stewarts to the English crown, had been nominal rather than real; but it was a grievous blow to national sentiment. Never were the prospects of a Jacobite restoration more favourable than at the Forbin expedition, 1708. The affair miscarried. James, who was on board the admiral's ship, caught the measles; George, the pilot, was drunk. The romance that attaches to a lost cause has obscured the forces at work and the issues involved in the various movements in favour of the exiled family, the character of which was less romantic and more material and economic than is generally supposed. Neither belief in the Divine right of kings nor attachment to the Stewarts was the decisive factor in Jacobitism, which, like the Fronde, was a centre to which the various elements of disaffection in the community gravitated, a Cave of Adullam whither 'every one that was in distress, and everyone that was in debt, and everyone that was discontented' instinctively turned. Hence

\* *Social Life in Scotland*, p. 225.

its ineffectiveness and want of cohesion. It was a negation ; there was no common tie or interest to unite its adherents, who fell apart under the slightest strain. It was as if to-day Socialists and Tariff Reformers, Suffragists and Passive Resisters, Home Rulers and the Trade, combined against the Government. It is conceivable that they might by a snap vote overthrow a Ministry ; it is certain that they could not construct one. An aggregate is not a combination. The Jacobites could not act together because a principle of union was wanting to them ; their association broke up under the pressure of an interior contradiction, because its members were united by an artificial, not a natural, tie. Personally, neither James II. nor his son possessed qualities calculated to rouse enthusiasm ; theirs was not the stuff of which leaders are made. The former is characterised by Mr. Andrew Lang, with a vigour worthy of Macaulay, as 'a false poltroon, on whose word no man could rely, in whose mercy none dared trust.\*' His apologists—they are few—plead that he was conscientious. He was certainly phenomenally stupid : in his later days he took to piety, and was venerated posthumously as a saint. His son was in every respect a finer character ; Thackeray's portrait of him in 'Esmond' is a caricature which has not the merit of an even distant resemblance to the truth. In understanding he was not below the average of men of his station ; he was amiable and high-minded ; he was, perhaps, just a trifle dull. Ill-fortune pursued him persistently ; whatever he took in hand miscarried. Bishop Forbes's name for him, 'Old Mr. Misfortunate,' is speaking ; he was 'the futile leader of a forlorn hope.' Charles Edward had the magnetism which his father lacked ; and the element of the adventurous in which he moved during the epic of his youth still surrounds him. Like the unhappy Queen, his ancestress, he is one of the figures in history which it is difficult to judge dispassionately, to see in a dry light. Courage, gaiety, a high and generous temper, the qualities which make up the indefinable but potent gift of charm—all these he possessed. Grave men fell under his spell. When Lochiel, the wisest and best man in the Highlands, would have dissuaded him from his ill-omened enterprise, against which it needed no prophetic vision to see that the stars in their courses fought, 'Do not see this 'Prince,' his brother warned him. 'I know you better than you know yourself ; he will persuade you against your knowledge and judgement.' He went ; he saw ; he was conquered. When head and heart come into conflict, they are not wholly

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\* History of Scotland, iv. 21.

to be pitied in whom the heart prevails. The Prince has been judged deficient in solidity of character; he could more easily have recovered than retained power. Conjectures of this kind perhaps reflect unconsciously the tragedy of his later years. His golden youth were the truer measure. In happier circumstances he might have been the idol of the nation, as he was of the Highlanders; at the worst he compares favourably, man with man, with the Hanoverian kings. The religious difficulty, natural as it was that it should be felt, could have been overcome. The Old Chevalier was a sincere, though, it seems, not a bigoted, Catholic; Charles, whose religion 'was to seek,' as Lord Elcho has it, was not a Catholic at all. In his later life, acting probably on the 'Paris vaut bien une messe' of Henri IV., he formally joined the English Church. Had his father been willing to do this under Anne there is little doubt that the restoration would have been effected. He was too conscientious to dissimulate; and Charles's secession came too late.

The '15 was put down severely, though not with the barbarities that followed Culloden. Argyll, indeed, was indisposed to follow up his success with more vigour than was necessary for his purpose; but the German and English troops were less merciful; desolation reigned from Stirling to Inverness. George I. was personally element. When told of Lord Nithsdale's escape from the Tower, 'it was the wisest thing he could do,' he said; 'and pray, Mr. Lieutenant, be not too diligent in searching for him; I desire no man's blood.' Reasons of State, however, were paramount; a Government has the right and, in the interests of the community at large, the duty of self-defence. The leaders were executed, those who escaped lingering out years of exile in France or Holland; the clansmen were transported in numbers; 'a great many Roman Catholics turn Protestant,' wrote Menzies to Fr. Innes. It was felt that the game had been played to the end and lost. Unfortunately, there were those in whose interest it was that this should be forgotten; and forgotten it too soon was. The Chevalier's mimic Court at Rome was the happy hunting-ground of the schemer and the conspirator, the adventurer and the twice-bought spy. Lovat, Balhaldie, and, later, Glengarry, identified by Mr. Lang with 'Pickle the Spy'—such were the men who insinuated themselves into the counsels of the too credulous Prince, and pulled the wires to which their betters danced away fortune, liberty, and life. A network of intrigue as futile as it was involved covered Scotland; in 'Poor Sons of a Day' its intricacy, its fascination, and its hopelessness are sketched by a master hand. The interests involved were too great to

be trifled with; if the '15 was a fiasco, the '45 must be pronounced a political crime. On the eve of the ill-fated enterprise James urged his son to 'avoid precipitate and dangerous measures, some rash or ill-conceived projects which would end in your ruin and that of all those who would join you in them.' Charles, never open with his father, took his own way; the Irish soldiers of fortune who surrounded him fell in with his humour; he confided in their judgement and saw through their eyes. From the first the undertaking was desperate. France promised much but did nothing; the English Jacobites, better across country or over a bottle than in the field, were half-hearted; they waited for a general rising, which never came. In Scotland, those who were most the Prince's friends were least desirous of his presence. Things were settling down; a rising, they saw, was an anachronism, Jacobitism a lost cause.

'Of trusty men, hardy and resolute soldiers, Charles had not more than 2000 at the first—Lochiel's Camerons, the Macdonells of Glengarry, Keppoch, Clanranald, and the Appin Stewarts. Sleat's Macdonalds were held back by their chief; the delays of Lovat paralysed the Frasers; the chief of the Mackintoshes was of the party of Government; the Macleans had lost their chief; Cluny, with the Macphersons, was trammelled by his commission; Seaforth would not bring out the Mackenzies; the Munroes and Mackays were Whigs; and Macleod deserted the cause. The gentry of the south were powerless; they had no following. Yet—it is the unexpected that happens—the Prince shook the throne.\*

Of the atrocities perpetrated on the conquered—the slaughter and burning of the wounded, the torture of prisoners, the indiscriminate massacre of unarmed peasants—this is not the place to speak. The princes of the reigning house turned from Cumberland in horror; Smollett's 'Tears of Scotland' is written in letters of blood. But the spirit of the Highlanders was exasperated rather than subdued. Disarmed, their dress proscribed, it needed some ten years, the degeneration of the Prince, the treachery of his intimates, and the long inaction of France to break the clans. Economic causes did what force could not do. The forfeiture of the rebel estates 'threw into the market and into the hands of energetic men lands which had been for centuries ill-governed, impoverished petty kingdoms, whose chief reigned over hordes of lazy, half starved subjects.' The abolition of the hereditary jurisdictions and their replacement by the ordinary processes of law completed the pacification of

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\* A. Lang, 'History of Scotland,' iv. 453.



the country. This change would have come about, rebellion or no rebellion; and the compensation of over 152,000*l.* was a substantial benefit both to the dispossessed superiors and to the land. The ties of blood were replaced by those of interest; the clansmen became tenants, the chiefs lairds. But the realm of ideas is immortal; there transformed and purified, the thoughts, the memories of the past survive. Many a staunch Whig and Presbyterian of later days has felt with the Ettrick Shepherd—no very romantic figure—

‘While traversing the scenes where the patient sufferings of the one party and the cruelties of the other were so affectingly displayed, I could not help being a bit of a Jacobite in my heart, and blessing myself that in those days I did not exist, or I should certainly have been hanged.’\*

The Church of Scotland in the eighteenth century played a leading part in national life. It was not till the Reformation that ecclesiastical and theological questions assumed the perhaps excessive prominence which they retained in the minds of Scotsmen for generations. On no people did Protestantism take so strong a hold. It fell in with the independent strain in the national character, and its birth coincided with, perhaps in part produced, that vigorous development of the understanding by which the *perfervidum ingenium* of the race was balanced and restrained. Bitter as was their antagonism, the issue between Episcopacy and Presbyterianism was political, not religious. The question was, Was Scotland to be a theocracy, ruled by ministers whose claims were as exorbitant and less modified by tradition than those of the Catholic priesthood, or a commonwealth in which the civil power was paramount and the law supreme? That the former conception made in the long run for liberty must not blind us to the spiritual tyranny with which in fact and in theory it was identified; that the latter was associated with the misgovernment of the later Stewarts must not lead us to forget that the idea which underlies it was that on which the theory of the modern State rests.

The Episcopacy established at the Restoration bore no resemblance to modern or even to contemporary Anglicanism; the ecclesiasticism of Laud was a foreign importation and struck no root. Sharp and his brother-bishops were consecrated in England, but they made no attempt to re-ordain their clergy; the question of Episcopacy as a doctrine was not raised. Presby-

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\* Tour in the Highlands, p. 43.

terianism stood for the supremacy of the spiritual, Episcopacy for that of the civil power; the Government opposed the former not because its ministrations were invalid or schismatical, but because it was believed to be a danger to the public peace. The differences between the two forms of worship were slight. The prayers in both were extempore; the use of the Book of Common Prayer was exceptional—in Aberdeen, a centre of Episcopalianism, it did not become universal till 1735, and even then, Bishop Forbes tells us, with many excisions and alterations. The Communion was received sitting, forms being placed at a long table and the elements passed from hand to hand. With the occasional exception of Christmas the festivals were not observed. Presbyteries, synods, the bishop acting as moderator, and kirk sessions, in which elders took part, were common to the two systems. The use of the surplice was unknown; at Auchterarder, then as in 1843 a storm-centre, in 1711 an Episcopal minister who wore the black gown at a funeral was mobbed by his own flock. The charges brought against the curates by the godly was not of Popery, either in doctrine or observance, but of drinking, dicing, and secular conversation. They, on the other hand, taxed their opponents not with heresy but with schism. It was on this ground that, going back to St. Cyprian's high-handed usage, they re-baptised those who, like the elder Skinner, had been 'sprinkled in the 'Schism'; the taint of rebellion was on Presbyterianism, and rebellion was the unpardonable sin. John Skinner's life is typical of that of many a pastor of the Church of which he was an ornament. His home at Linshart, in Buchan, was a two-roomed cottage; his stipend, for many years 15*l.*, never exceeded 30*l.* Twelve elders helped him in his work among his flock, of whom he spoke as his 'family.' He was happy in his sixty years of married life; on his narrow means he exercised a ready if modest hospitality, and brought up a bevy of children, one of whom became Bishop of Aberdeen. He was not exempt from the political troubles of the time: in 1746 his little chapel was burnt—in the eyes of the Government Episcopacy meant Jacobitism; and seven years later, though he had taken the oath of allegiance, he was imprisoned for the offence of exercising orders derived from a non-juring bishop. Quieter days came; but the question of the lawfulness of this oath led often enough to high words among the clergy. It was after a discussion of this moot point, in which the zeal of the disputants outran their discretion, that Skinner wrote his famous words to the old tune of 'Tullochgorum,' 'Let Whig and Tory all 'agree.' 'The best Scotch song Scotland ever saw,' was Burns's

emphatic praise. To the kindly temper of this good man sectarianism, political or religious, was foreign; he breathed a serener air. A pleasant story is told of his passing a seceding congregation at worship, and reverently lifting his hat. 'I did not know,' said his companions, 'that you had so much respect for the 'Seceders.' 'I lift my hat not to Seceders,' was the fine answer, 'but wherever my fellow-countrymen are engaged in the worship of God.' 'Well done, old Tullochgorum!' comments Dean Ramsay, a man of like spirit; 'thy name shall be held 'in honour by every liberal-minded Scotsman.'

The Jacobitism of the Episcopalian body led it to gravitate rather to the English non-jurors than to the southern establishment; and when, after the '45, the political question ceased to be burning, the controversy regarding the so-called 'Usages' ran high. These innovations, which were of English, not of native origin, were never widely adopted; and though they disturbed the peace of the little community, the more so because they were incidentally associated with the question of patronage, then as before and since a fertile source of division, the dispute soon died down. As intercourse between the two countries increased, Episcopalianism became more and more identified with what to the great mass of the people was a foreign communion. To-day, a matter of custom and taste rather than of principle, it ministers to those to whom its time-honoured Liturgy is congenial, and whom the simpler worship of the National Church leaves cold.

The Revolution of 1688 marks the definite triumph of the secular over the theocratic idea. The Presbyterianism then established by law was not that of the 'persecuted remnant.' Some of that sect, amongst others the author of the 'Hind 'Let Loose,' were reconciled to it, and became the spiritual ancestors of the Highfliers, or Evangelicals of a later date; but the majority of the Assembly of 1690 were men who, like Milwood, in 'Old Mortality,' had 'nae objection to a moderate 'Episcopacy,' which, with him, they probably considered 'a mair 'frugal establishment for the country,' and had no intention of giving a free hand to fanaticism or fanatics. Charteris, a friend of Leighton, when a day of fasting for 'defections' was appointed, said plainly that 'the defections had not been from 'the truth or from the fundamental articles of the Christian 'faith, but from the life of God and the power of the Gospel.' Episcopacy was no defection; defection lay in a 'factious, 'schismatical, and uncharitable temper.' The Cameronians would have none of such fellowship. They denounced the new sovereigns roundly as being 'now become the head of the

‘ Malignants, Prelatics, Indulged, Toleratists, and Sectarians ‘ in these lands.’ The new establishment succeeded in uniting men of moderate opinions : the survivors of the ousted ministers of 1660, the ‘ Sixty Bishops,’ as they were called, were in a minority, both in the Assembly and in the Church. But the power of a minority for mischief is disproportionate to its numbers ; these sincere but narrow-minded and intolerant men sowed seeds of evil whose fruit—the disruption of the Free from the United Free Church of Scotland is an example—has survived to our own day.

The theology of the Westminster ‘ Confession was that of Calvin ; in itself harsh and repelling, when popularised it became grotesque. The destinies of mankind and the mysteries of redemption were discussed in legal jargon ; mankind were ‘ dyvours,’ or bankrupts ; Christ was their ‘ cautioner ’ ; Adam their ‘ Federal Head.’ ‘ A motion was made in the Council of ‘ Three-in-One,’ and ‘ the aforesaid motion was agreed to,’ says the ingenious Dr. Blackwell, attributing to the deliberations of the Trinity the procedure of the Presbytery of Aberdeen. The doctrine of the total corruption of human nature consequent on the Fall was unflinchingly argued out to its conclusions ; to no one did it occur to infer from the hideousness of the conclusions that the premises which led to them must be at fault. In hell were infants a span long : was the justice of this questioned, the answer was ready : ‘ Who can refuse ‘ that the cockatrice deserveth to be destroyed in the egg ? ’ In Boston’s ‘ Fourfold State ’ the word ‘ wrath ’ occurs so often that the printer, having used up every W in his type, falls back upon two V’s, the word appearing as VVrath. ‘ The godly husband shall say Amen to the damnation of her who lay in his ‘ bosom,’ we read in this famous book, which a generation back, if not now, was to be found in every cottage : ‘ the godly parents ‘ shall say Hallelujah to the passing of the sentence against ‘ their only child ; the godly child shall approve the damnation ‘ of his wicked parents—the father who begat and the mother ‘ that bore him.’ Well did Wesley say to Whitefield ‘ Your ‘ God is my Devil ! ’ Whitefield himself, however, was not Calvinist enough for Scottish orthodoxy ; he was denounced as ‘ an idolater, a limb of Antichrist, a boar, and a wild beast.’ Yet—so strange are human contrasts, so close yet so disconnected the contradictory lines of thought in the mind and feeling in the heart—nowhere is the diviner aspect of religion more exquisitely pictured than in that household word of old-time Scottish piety ‘ The Lord’s my Shepherd ’—the metrical version of the Twenty-third Psalm.

The reaction against this grim teaching gave an impulse to the mysticism of Antoinette Bourignon, a French Quietist, whose doctrines filtered through the Dutch Arminians into Scotland, and to the latitudinarianism of Professors Simson and Campbell—the latter the author of ‘Apostles no Enthusiasts’—tendencies which found permanent expression among the so-called ‘Moderates,’ who by the middle of the century were the most influential party in the Church. Robertson, Blair, Carlyle, were typical members of this school, cultured and accomplished men, sagacious rather than spiritual, lovers perhaps overmuch of ‘this present world.’ ‘Their ideal virtue was a sanctified common-sense, and they were sedatives to all enthusiasm. They taught from the pulpit solidly the duties of everyday honesty, charity, good neighbourhood, without stirring a pulse.’ This they ought to have done, and not left the other undone; there should be, there is, an enthusiasm for these things. Fordyce in his ‘Sermons Addressed to Young Women’—from which, it will be remembered, Mr. Collins, in ‘Pride and Prejudice,’ read aloud to the Bennet family—apostrophises his hearers almost on every page as ‘My fair ones.’ We do not wonder that Lydia interrupted her cousin, or that the backgammon board was preferred to the divine. Their rivals broke up into a variety of sects: patronage, that old bone of contention; the Barrier Act, the Burgess Oath, the orthodoxy of the happily forgotten ‘Marrow of Divinity,’ the most trivial subtleties of doctrine or details of observance—such were the rocks upon which Seceders and the Relief, Burghers and Anti-Burghers, Old Lights and New Lights, Lifters and Anti-Lifters, split.

The lay element, elsewhere a force for progress, was here resolute for the old paths. Scottish dissent was conservative: the same instinct which led the farmer to adhere to the ‘run-rig’ system led him to oppose theological and ecclesiastical change. Buckle represents the people as priest-ridden. It would be truer, remarks Mr. Graham, to represent the ministers as people-ridden. To this day the elder will face his embarrassed pastor with the open Bible. No appeal to interpretation is tolerated; ‘it’s no me that says it; it’s the Word o’ God.’ Buckle’s famous chapter is vitiated by a fundamental misconception:

‘In estimating the harshness and tyranny of the Church it is invariably forgotten, but should be remembered, that it was really a tyranny of the laity more than of the clergy; for a kirk session contained some six elders, representatives of the people, to one minister.’

Till the Disruption of 1843 the 'Men' were a power in Highland parishes. At that date they passed from the Established to the Free Church, in which from the first they formed an element of discord. If the second Disruption has eliminated the temper which they represented from the main body of that communion it has not been an unmixed loss.

The effect of Puritanism on national life was unhappy. Nature will out. The public penance enjoined on the continent gave rise to an appalling increase of infanticide; the prohibition of innocent recreations—fiddling, 'promisky' dancing, and the rustic plays by which the long winter evenings were beguiled—served only to accentuate the dangers which it was designed to exclude. The vernacular literature—ballads and chap books, of which some 200,000 copies were issued yearly—was as coarse as it was vigorous. Side by side with this animalism the profession, often the enthusiastic profession, of religion was found. Burns conducted family worship with his household; Lord Grange and his associates spent their nights in debauchery, and their days in prayer. They were sincere, Dr. Carlyle believed, in both moods. 'There is no doubt of their profligacy; and I have frequently seen them drowned in tears during the whole of a sacramental day, when, as far as my observation could reach, they could have no rational motive for acting a part.' It is in this way that people were affected who mistook their nerves for their conscience. The phenomenon is not peculiar to the eighteenth century, to Scotland, or to the Scottish Church.

Sunday was grievous beyond belief. The Church services averaged five hours in length, family and private devotions three. Attendance at public worship was compulsory. Elders patrolled the streets and searched the houses for defaulters; at Forfar in 1720 two men were brought before the kirk session for drinking ale, another for sitting with his coat off, a third for eating his dinner on the Lord's Day. The clergy were not exempt from the inquisition of these Church officers: in 1735 the minister of New Machar was libelled before his presbytery for powdering his wig. It says much for the genuinely religious temper of the people that it survived such discipline, and that the old ways gave place with comparatively little friction to the new. 'It's an awfu' way o' spending the Sabbath' was the criticism passed by an old Scottish servant on the English cathedral service. What would have been her feelings had she heard the Edinburgh Sunday concerts of to-day?

The Scottish law differed fundamentally from the English, being taken directly from Roman jurisprudence. Young men

preparing for the career of an advocate were sent, like Boswell, to Utrecht or Groningen to study the Pandects and feudal law in the text-books of Van Eck, Van Muyden, and Voet. They were, as a rule, of good family; the bench was recruited largely from the ranks of the landed gentry, the judges taking their titles from their paternal acres. Kames, Monboddo and Hailes were men of distinction apart from their professional fame. Cockburn, in his 'Memorials,' has given an inimitable picture of the legal celebrities of his younger days—Braxfield, Eskgrove, Hermand; the last famous for his potatoes and his piety—'I sucked in the being and attributes of God with my mother's milk' was a saying attributed to him in the Assembly; the first, immortalised in 'Weir of Hermiston,' for his brutality in the treason trials of 1793-4. 'Come awa', Maister Horner,' he exclaimed to a jurymen, 'and help us hang some o' thae dawmned scoondrels'; and, when Gerrald's counsel pleaded that the founder of Christianity had been a reformer, 'Muckle guid that did Him,' commented the judge; 'He was hangit.' He was as coarse in private as in public life. 'What would you have done without me?' said his wife, who was his partner in a rubber, on playing a judicious trump. 'Madam, I should have kept a concubine' was the unexpected reply. Kames's farewell to the Bench is unquotable: 'That's checkmate for you, Mattie,' was his remark when pronouncing the death sentence on a smuggler with whom he had been accustomed to play chess. Eskgrove's exhortation in similar circumstances was couched in a different vein. 'Whatever your persuasion may be, there are plenty of reverend gentlemen who will be happy for to show you the way to the yeternal life.'

The penal code was milder than in England, the number of capital offences smaller, the administration of the law more humane. Between 1773-93 the executions all over the country did not exceed six in the year; from 1767-82 only three took place in Edinburgh every two years. In England forty capital sentences at an assizes was no uncommon number, and ten or a dozen criminals would suffer on one day. The last execution for witchcraft took place in 1727 in Sutherland; nine years later the Act against 'trafficking with Satan' was repealed, and a more prosaic measure, punishing with imprisonment and the pillory those 'who pretend to tell fortunes and discover stolen goods' became law. Fletcher of Saltoun complains that in 1698 the country was infested by no fewer than 200,000 beggars. The number is probably exaggerated; but the 'randy beggars' and Egyptian sorners were a traditional danger, and when he proposed serfdom as a remedy he did but urge the enforcement

of the existing statute. In 1701 four men convicted of theft at Perth escaped death by accepting perpetual servitude; such persons wore a leathern collar on which, with their name, that of their owner and their offence were inscribed. Imprisonment was rare, probably because of the expense to the community which it involved; the jugs, or, in graver cases, the pillory to which the criminal's ear was nailed, was a common substitute; as was banishment from the town or county, sometimes even 'furth of Scotland,' a sentence which meant outlawry, and fed the ranks of the numerous 'thiggers or tinkers,' who form a class apart even in our own day.

In 'Kidnapped' Stevenson has taken as his subject an offence common enough, particularly in the Highlands, during the first half of the century. The case of Lady Grange is well known; and in 1758 the revelations of Peter Williamson, carried off to the plantations as a boy, called public attention to what can only be described as a slave-trade conducted in a civilised country with the connivance of the authorities.

'Between 1740 and 1746 a regular trade existed of supplying hands to the American settlements. Companies were formed to carry on the business, and year after year ships left the ports with bands of luckless youths, who had been inveigled or coerced into transportation—few ever returning to tell the story of their capture or their fate. So bold were some of these kidnappers that their pressgang passed along the village streets and country roads and seized boys whom they met. In the silence of the night lads were taken from their beds in remote cottages, and parents were afraid to let their children out of doors when darkness set in.\*'

Better means of communication and the abolition of feudal superiorities put an end to offences of this sort; by the end of the century the king's writ ran from the Solway to Cape Wrath.

The Modern Athens—this was the name given to the northern capital, not only on account of its unrivalled situation, which recalled that of the city of Cecrops, but even more because of the intellectual life of which it was the centre.

'How brilliant was Edinburgh in 1787!' exclaims Lord Rosebery. 'A race was growing up in your schools and in your Universities which was destined afterwards, through the means of the *Edinburgh Review*, to influence largely both the taste and the policy of these islands. . . . Dugald Stewart was lecturing not merely to Edinburgh but to the Kingdom, and almost to the world at large, and Edinburgh was the centre to which all the intellect of Great Britain might, without exaggeration, be said to have gravitated.' †

\* Social Life in Scotland, p. 499.

† The Duty of Public Service, p. 6.



At that time Scotland was less insular than England. The intercourse with the Continent, dropped in the southern half of the island since the accession of the House of Hanover, had been kept up in the northern; Scotsmen went in increasing numbers to study law, medicine, and even divinity, beyond the seas. When the staple products of Oxford and Cambridge were sound port and less sound syllogisms, a genuine revival of learning was taking place in the Scottish Universities; instead of repeating formulas men began to think for themselves.

Hutcheson (1694–1746) ‘set himself to study the mind with ‘its faculties and passions as a botanist examines a plant.’ He did not go below the surface, but he saw clearly and distinctly what was on the surface. The results of his studies reacted on current divinity. The much insisted-on total corruption of human nature was inconsistent with obvious facts. There was good as well as evil in man; weak and inconstant as he was, he possessed a moral sense which led him to approve and practise benevolence. Virtue consisted in the harmony of the passions; vice in their discord; the Utilitarian standard of the greatest happiness of the greatest number was taken from his ‘Inquiry’; he revolutionised theology by representing the Deity as benign. This was a novel, and to many a displeasing, view. The elders of his father’s Ulster parish rejected his ministrations.

‘Your silly son Frank has fashed a’ the congregation wi’ his idle cackle, for he has been babbling this ‘oor aboot a guid and benevolent God, and that the sauls o’ the heathen will gang to heaven if they follow the licht o’ their own conscience. Not a word did the lad say, ken, or speer aboot the guid auld comfortable doctrines o’ election, reprobation, original sin, and faith. Hoot, awa’ wi’ sic a fellow.’

A greater name in the history of philosophy is that of David Hume. The Scottish mind is metaphysical; and Hume’s mind was peculiarly Scottish. He united to a logical understanding a singular faculty of judging evidence and a power of grasping abstract ideas. The first led him to follow up Berkeley’s idealism to its necessary conclusions. The good bishop’s analysis of human knowledge was irrefragable as far as it went; but it did not go far enough. The existence of mind as a thing fell with that of matter; all that we know is a succession of impressions or ideas.

‘Whence they come, wherein they exist, whither they go, we cannot tell. Away, then, vanish body and soul, mind and matter, the world outside and personal identity within—for of the reality of these what evidence exists? We can no more go beyond our ideas than we can jump off our shadows.’\*

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\* Scottish Men of Letters, p. 37.

How far was reasoning of this sort a *tour de force*? a *reductio ad absurdum* of Berkeley's teaching? In certain moods Hume treated it as no more than this: in either case the gauntlet was thrown down to speculative thinkers, and taken up in Scotland by the common-sense school of Reid and Dugald Stewart, in Germany by the critical philosophy of Kant, himself not remotely of Scottish origin. Thus did Scottish thought at once demonstrate the bankruptcy of the old philosophy and give birth to the new. It is probable that in the 'Essay on Miracles' we get nearer the real Hume than in the 'Treatise on Human Nature.' In his youth he had observed the growth of miracle and legend in the wonders alleged to have taken place at the tomb of the Abbé Paris at St. Médard; he applied the lesson to other places and times. It was to this that the charge of 'Atheism' brought against him by the orthodox amounted. He emphatically, and no doubt sincerely, repudiated it. 'As for Atheists, I do not believe that one ever existed; I have never seen one,' he said to Holbach. Of his kindly temper many stories are told. On leaving Dr. Jardine's rooms he fell in the darkness. The minister ran for a candle, saying humorously 'Davie, I've often tell't ye that "natural licht" is no' sufficient.' When he lay dying, a little girl, a relation, visited him daily. Morning and night he made the child say her prayers aloud by him, desiring her to repeat often the Lord's Prayer.

Reid and Dugald Stewart carried on the tradition of Hutcheson, which passed from them into the official French school of Jouffroy and Victor Cousin. If it transferred the controversy to another ground—'Common Sense knows nothing of Philosophy. Let my soul dwell with Common Sense'—its view of metaphysics is one from which metaphysicians themselves are at times not far. Is a metaphysical proposition more than a way, one of many possible ways, of putting things? 'It is a good thing to have read Hegel' said Jowett to a pupil who had been studying the works of that philosopher; 'but now go and forget all about him.' Valuable as a mental training, the progressiveness of the science is doubtful. Has not a cynic described a metaphysician as a blind man looking in a dark room for a black cat—which is not there?

To turn from philosophy to literature, Burns re-made the Scots tongue. He found it a dialect; he left it a language, in which great thoughts were expressed, strong emotions depicted, and lyrics of matchless melody sung. He was the greatest songwriter who ever lived. With others to emend was to disfigure; with him it was to transmute—the rough ore became polished gold. He took the homely ballads of the countryside—a word,

a touch, and they came out gems exquisite in form and colour, reflecting the purest passion, the most subtle emotion. No one but he could have done it. The Ayrshire ploughman was a supreme artist, a master of his craft. He had what would now be called the artistic temperament, but without the mental and moral invertebrateness which we associate with it; he was through and through a man. He interpreted—and who will question his judgment?—the act by the motive.

‘The heart’s aye the part aye  
That mak’s us richt or wrang.’

But the ‘Cottar’s Saturday Night’ is not the work of a moral weakling; with all his personal lapses, his mind was wholesome and his soul clean. ‘*Video meliora, proboque.*’ The domestic virtues were scarcely his—happier for him had it been otherwise! Yet who, perhaps for this very reason, more fully recognised their place in character?

‘To make a happy fireside clime  
For weans and wife,  
Is the true pathos and sublime  
Of human life.’

No one felt the narrowness of the Church more than he, yet no one was more sensible of her place in the history and the heart of the nation:

‘The Solemn League and Covenant  
Cost Scotland blood—cost Scotland tears;  
But it sealed Freedom’s sacred cause—  
If thou’rt a slave, indulge thy sneers!’

He was too highly strung for happiness. In his nature too many and too various elements strove for the mastery; he could not control the plunging, struggling steeds. But, had he been other than he was, his work would have been of a different quality; it is by his aspirations that he must be judged. His sufferings were greater than his wrong. Light lie the earth upon him! The living stream of his minstrelsy renewed Scottish life.

Scott, though half of his life falls into the eighteenth century, belongs to the nineteenth. His work dealt with the past; hence its charm: that of sunsets and half lights. The colours of the present are more garish; ‘the owls of Minerva do not start on their flight till evening shadows fall.’ Those who lived in the old world which he pictures were probably unconscious of the element of romance in it which impresses us. ‘Always ‘thirsty and unwashed’ is Cockburn’s description of the Edinburgh of his boyhood: who would return to the interminable

sermons, the prolonged drinking bouts, the 'Gardez-loo'? Yet 'Hæc olim meminisse juvabit'; these things were the shadows in a picture which we would not willingly let die. We shall not see again either the eccentricities or the originality of that old generation of Scotsmen: 'true originality can scarcely exist 'but in the backwaters of life. The great ocean of life smooths 'and rolls its pebbles to too much the same shape and texture.'\* The world is more one than it was; there is a universal market, a universal education, a universal point of view from which we regard life. The result is a less rugged but a more colourless world, in which we tend to become machine-made copies each of his fellow; to echo what those about us say, to think what others think, or what we think that they think or ought to think, rather than what commends itself to our conscience and mind.

Against this dull uniformity family and local ties, the sense of class, of native county, town, or village, above all of nationality, is a safeguard. There is no more undesirable feature in modern life than the growth of a large class of the community, including many persons of large and generally newly acquired fortune, without the traditions, associations, and engagements which root men in the soil and to their fellows. Place and environment, kinship and neighbourhood, are essential to soundness; the *ἀπολις*—and such the Citizen of the World is— is a centre of social disruption and disease. M. Maurice Barrès pictures this vividly in 'Les Déracinés'; cosmopolitanism is a phase, ugly and, it is to be hoped, transient, through which society is passing to-day.

From this cosmopolitanism, and the dangers that attract to it, Scotsmen are, at least comparatively, free. The strength and tenacity of their national feeling, their sentiment of the past, their sense of descent and kinship make in the opposite direction. The misty hills rising out of the grey northern sea draw their sons to them by a closer tie than that of sunnier lands. 'Let 'me see the heather before I die' said Scott as they hurried him across Europe. 'Ille terrarum'—his native Border lay near his heart. Nor is this local patriotism inconsistent with the larger tie that binds the citizens of the Empire into a harmonious and closely welded whole. For Englishmen and Scotsmen alike the narrower patriotism gives force to the larger, the larger breadth to the narrower: the two flow together in one current to one sea. For both mould our future: the union between the two countries enjoined by Nature means a vocation and destiny common to the two.

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\* Lord Rosebery, 'The Duty of Public Service,' p. 7.

## ART. XI.—THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN EUROPE.

WHEN Harriet Martineau published her book on 'The History of England during the Thirty Years' Peace' (1815-46) no war had broken out among the great Powers of Western and Central Europe during that period. Immediately afterwards came a time of revolutionary disturbances, followed, somewhat later, by international hostilities. It was through the appearance on the stage of Western Europe of three extraordinary men, widely differing in character and calibre—Louis Napoleon, Cavour, and Bismarck—that the old order of the Continent was permanently changed, that the frontiers of more than one kingdom were violently altered, and that the settlement made in 1815 by the Congress of Vienna was finally set aside. Since 1871 there has again been peace among the great Powers for nearly forty years, although, as has been observed in a previous article, European armies have been constantly fighting against Asiatic or African adversaries: in Turkey, Afghanistan, China and Japan, in Abyssinia, and, lastly, in Morocco.

While none of these wars brought the nations of Christian Europe into armed collision, on two occasions the manifest peril of a rupture was only staved off by diplomatic intervention. The quarrel between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, when England threatened to strike in, was adjusted by the Congress of Berlin; the Convention of Algeiras effected an arrangement between France and Morocco. In the former instance Germany acted as peacemaker; in the latter her attitude was scarcely that of a pacific mediator; but in both cases the united authority of the leading States succeeded in quieting claims, disputes, and mutual jealousies that, directly or indirectly, threatened the peace of the whole Continent. Unfortunately, it cannot be said that in either case the European fire-engine that was turned upon these burning questions has succeeded in extinguishing them. In Morocco the embers still smoulder, and can be stirred up to some purpose, as has been recently seen, by design or by some unforeseen accident; while the Ottoman Empire may be likened to a somnolent volcano, liable to chronic eruptions that shake the whole fabric and spread agitation throughout a vast area.

It is one remarkable feature, indeed, of the situation in Europe at the present time that the influence of Asiatic complications upon European politics is increasing, and that the general unrest in Eastern countries is connected with a growing impatience

of Western ascendancy or dominion over them. Not long ago it was generally anticipated that the kingdoms of Asia were too weak or effete to resist the forces, moral and material, of the West, and that it only remained with the powerful Governments of Europe to agree among themselves upon questions of control or even of territorial partition. But it now appears that Western civilisation, authoritatively imposed upon Asia, has defeated its own ends, so far as it was expected to secure European predominance. For while European Cabinets were disputing and arguing, the Asiatic peoples have been taking lessons in the arts of war and peace: they have been arming and educating themselves; they have been importing machinery, industrial and military, from our workshops; they have learnt the effective value of organised administration; and they desire, rather prematurely, to be rid of their masterful teachers. At one extremity of Asia the Russians have realised, to their cost, the consequence of these movements; at the other we have seen, to our astonishment, a revolution in Turkey which is discarding a barbarous despotism whose misrule provoked foreign interference and was endangering the integrity of the empire. Eastward of Turkey the Persians are making a bold attempt to introduce representative institutions; and even in India the British rulers are confronted by the difficulties which invariably encompass a Government that undertakes radical reforms. In short the Asiatic peoples, who have been copying and importing the inventions, ideas, and methods of the West, are departing from their ancient ways, and setting out upon new paths under inexperienced leaders. We have yet to see whether the conceptions of citizenship in a State, of nationalities united by patriotism, which lie at the foundation of firm political architecture in Europe, are sufficiently advanced in Asia to overcome the obstacles presented by infinite divisions of race and religion.

However this may be, it seems more than probable that we have to expect a vast transformation of Asia during the twentieth century which will surely multiply and complicate political problems in Europe. Already the ease and rapidity of communication by sea and land across the world, effected by European energy and capital, have thrown down the barriers that had kept the four continents apart for centuries, and have let loose upon America and the British Colonies a flood of Asiatic migration. Hitherto the broad waters of the Pacific Ocean had separated the half-peopled lands of the Far West from the overcrowded countries of the Far East; but now, when on one side there is a necessary demand for labour and on the other an inexhaustible supply, the natural antipathy of different races is

sharpened by a conflict of interests. And if the time is near when the policy of Asiatic States will be supported by organised armies, when Chinese and Japanese navies will ride in Eastern waters, all international relations will need readjustment to a much more intricate calculation of the balance of the world's power. The leading native Government in Asia, in administrative and military organisation, is, beyond comparison, Japan. This country has been preserved by its geographical situation from the subjection to European ascendancy which had been gradually overshadowing the Asiatic mainland, and was threatening the independence of other kingdoms. Japan has now concluded two engagements: one with Great Britain, the other, just published, with the United States of America. The former treaty has indirectly aided the Japanese in their resistance to the advance of Russia toward their frontier; the latter agreement, which includes a reciprocal guarantee of China's territorial integrity, provides for the free and peaceful developement of the commerce of both nations in the Pacific. It marks an important departure of America from the traditional system of that Government; for it signalises the entry of America on the stage of Asiatic diplomacy, and connects the Western continent with the ravelled politics of the Eastern world. The electric chain which transmits all round the earth any vibration of jarring interests or disquieting incidents is now complete.

The great and manifold interests of the British Empire in these movements and changes, its possessions beyond sea and its supreme concern with commerce everywhere, render our Government peculiarly sensitive to the interaction and repercussion of events in distant countries. The treaty between England and Japan proclaimed an alliance between two States geographically separated by the breadth of a whole hemisphere. No two capitals are farther apart on the map than London and Tokio, yet in certain contingencies English and Japanese policy is identical. We have here a notable instance of the extent to which the earth has become one large field for strategic and diplomatic manœuvres. The disasters of Russia in the war with Japan, which followed immediately after our treaty, were so heavy and unexpected that the result was not only to check sharply the expansion of Russia in the Far East, but also to shake the equilibrium of power among European States. The military calamities of Russia abroad encouraged an outbreak of anarchy at home, and the Czar's Government was weakened by internal convulsions. In the midst of all these troubles a maladroit and indefensible blunder committed by the Russian naval commanders, when their fleet fired upon British trawlers in

the North Sea, enraged for the moment the British nation. The British Cabinet very nearly fell into the worse, because more portentous, blunder of taking measures that would have brought on hostilities with Russia, and would have made an incurable breach between the two countries. The consequence would have been to drive both Governments clean out of their right line of policy, and to pervert the whole current of subsequent events. Russia's misfortunes gave Germany her opportunity: when Russia was crippled by Manchurian defeats the Germans raised their tone in their altercation with France over Morocco. Thereupon the wheel of diplomacy took a fresh turn, to run a certain length in the reverse direction; for England and Russia made up their differences and promulgated the formal terms of a friendly understanding upon Asiatic affairs. In an article of this Review for July 1906 we sketched in outline the political situation of Asia, laying stress upon the risks and burdens imposed upon both Governments by the ambiguous attitude of both Powers on the Persian and Afghan frontiers, and urging the desirability of seeking a *modus vivendi* for the two European empires in Asia. Not much more than a year later it was actually found; although in the Japanese war we had given Russia's antagonist indirect yet important assistance. And it is no ordinary proof of the close interconnexion of politics now prevailing throughout the world that this Anglo-Russian convention and the result of the Algeciras Conference, which both dealt with affairs outside Europe, produced an immediate and salutary effect upon the relations of the European Governments *inter se*; they drew France, Russia, and England nearer together and tightened the bonds of reciprocal amity.

On the other hand, it is no matter for surprise that one consequence of this *rapprochement* of three powerful kingdoms has been to create some uneasiness in Germany, whose position between France and Russia, with England's navy on her flank commanding the narrow waterways, naturally stimulates in that Government a watchful attention to the proceedings of its neighbours. In Europe the neighbours of Germany, excepting Austria, have, as we have seen, been drawing together; in Asia France, Russia, England, and, lastly, America have contracted diplomatic agreements, of one kind or another, with Japan. The general effect may have been to impress on the German Cabinet a sense of intentional exclusion, and of the need to stand in with Austria for mutual support. Yet Germany can hardly take umbrage at precautionary measures of a kind which her own policy may be said to have brought into fashion; nor can it



be denied that they are justified by the events and transactions of recent history. During the last fifty years, since Napoleon III. planned with Cavour his descent upon the Austrians in Lombardy, the system of concealing hostile or defensive preparations, of concerting plans for making or warding off a sudden attack, has been very generally practised. Before the war of 1870 the Emperor Napoleon and Prince Bismarck were both engaged in forming hidden combinations and securing confederates with warlike intentions on either side; they were manœuvring like generals on a battlefield. And since that great uprooting of European landmarks it has been mainly due to the astute provisions of Prince Bismarck that Central Europe has become enveloped in a network of alliances, formed by treaties more or less secret, or by personal understandings which are still only partially revealed to public knowledge, supplemented in some cases by privy conferences between emperors or their ministers. Readers of Mr. J. Holland Rose's valuable book on 'The Development of the European Nations' will find, in a chapter headed 'The Triple and Dual Alliances,' a very interesting account of the great Chancellor's aims and objects, and of the methods that he employed for weaving his diplomatic web. In 1872 a league of the three Emperors was arranged at Berlin, but, according to Mr. Rose, it was dissolved not long afterwards by the discovery at St. Petersburg of a separate secret compact between Austria and Germany, when it was agreed that Austria should be supported in compensating herself for her loss of territory in Italy by acquisitions in the Balkan peninsula, as she was subsequently permitted to do by the Congress of Berlin. Again, in 1876, the Emperors of Austria and Russia met at Reichstadt, when the Russo-Turkish war was imminent, and it is said (though not by Mr. Rose) that the Czar there pledged himself to give Austria a free hand in the matter of the two Balkan provinces. This arrangement, which was confirmed some years later by a formal treaty, portended danger to France; but Russia did not desire that France should be again weakened, so after the Berlin Congress overtures were made from St. Petersburg toward a Franco-Russian alliance. In 1882, again, when the occupation of Tunis by the French disconcerted Italian projects, the Italian Government was induced by Prince Bismarck to join Austria and Germany in a Triple Alliance, which has never yet been made public. This turn of events gradually brought French and Russian interests into closer approximation, until in 1895 a treaty of alliance, the exact terms of which have not yet been disclosed, was concluded.

¶ We cannot attempt to guide our readers through this labyrinth of crossing engagements to any clear issue or distinct outcome upon the present situation. It has grown out of a system of checks and counter-checks, resembling the moves of chess-players who are bringing their pieces into position for attack and defence, but whose game is not yet developed. Until quite recently Great Britain had taken little part in this game, partly through adherence to the English tradition of holding aloof from implication with Continental liabilities, and principally by reason of her insular detachment. But her support of France at Algeiras and the convention with Russia upon Asiatic affairs have led to an excellent understanding between England and these two States, and have so far put an end to England's isolation. The general result, therefore, is discernible in the formation of two groups, each of them united by a community of views and by a certain apprehension of not impossible designs on the other side. The triple alliance formed by Prince Bismarck has brought Russia, France, and England into agreement on the general lines of their policy. And it is no wonder that the effect has been to extend the spread of uncertainty and distrust which underlies the calm surface of European politics, so that every Government, while professing an earnest desire for the preservation of peace, maintains large armies on a war footing, while navies are ready, or preparing, for instant action. The indifferent success of the Hague Conference in 1907 in their effort to provide for the reference of international disputes to arbitration was a significant indication of misgivings and presentiments in the background.

It is, of course, no new thing in history that international relations should be tainted with suspicion, that diplomatic professions should provide a doubtful clue to covert designs, or that statesmen should not choose to divulge secret compacts to the world at large. But we have already endeavoured to point out that in the present day the area of unceasing competition, political and commercial, among European nations has been materially widened, that the points of clashing interests have consequently increased; so that the conduct of foreign affairs requires more than ever a complete and accurate appreciation of the circumstances, the acts and motives, of established Governments in all the lands between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, and particular attention to the prevailing temper or aspirations of their people. All these elements are now so intermixed that a very slight shock runs along the whole line, producing disturbance in quarters where it was neither intended nor foreseen, while rumours spread curiosity and excite speculation. By the indefatigable

enterprise of the English Press, which in this respect has no equal in Europe, London has become the great centre of information from the uttermost parts of the earth. Nevertheless, since newspapers are expected to supply instantaneous explanations of remote incidents, it is not surprising that the ablest editors occasionally lead their readers astray. In Persia, for example, the violent and unwarranted intrusion of a Russian officer who backed up the Shah's resistance to the Constitutionals was at first hastily believed to have been instigated from St. Petersburg. Articles in the daily papers, and even in reviews, protested against such a violation of the Anglo-Russian Agreement—which bound both parties not to interfere with internal Persian affairs—and deplored this fresh example of Russia's inveterate duplicity. Very soon, however, the cool and careful statements of Sir Edward Grey in Parliament proved that the Russian officer had acted without orders, and that the Russian Government was behaving with remarkable self-restraint under stress of considerable provocation. The Persian Nationalists had been alarmed and displeased by the Agreement, which was supposed to threaten their country's independence, though, in fact, it was greatly to their benefit. For the fighting in and around Tabriz had disturbed the Russian border, and had placed in jeopardy the lives and property of Russian subjects, so that the Russians might very probably have sent troops across the frontier, and might have found a fair pretext for occupying the north-western districts, at least until the restoration of order, if the Agreement had not existed. The Persians can now work out their own political salvation without foreign help or hindrance; though whether liberal principles will triumph in that country is another question. The people are ignorant; their leaders have no political experience; and we have to remember that even in Europe, during the nineteenth century, constitutions have been set up and thrown down; and that ancient despotisms, like old trees, have deep roots in the soil, and often need trenchant methods to extirpate them.

A similar and apparently more successful revolution has almost simultaneously taken place at Constantinople, with consequences that exemplify still more forcibly the close interdependence of political relations and their liability to sudden dislocation. Austria and Bulgaria have renounced the Sultan's suzerainty over three provinces, though it was formally allotted to him by the Berlin Congress, leaving the other European Governments to patch up as they can the rents thus made in the Berlin Treaty, and to determine how this may be done without some awkward straining of that network

of public or private engagements in which all are more or less involved. The Balkan peninsula has long been a hot-bed for the propagation of social and religious animosities; yet no sooner have the new Turkish administrators proposed measures of reform and reconciliation than they have become entangled in the meshes of the controversy among the great Powers, and the animosity between the Slave and the German races has revived on a much larger scale. Each successive turn in the course of Turkish affairs arouses the rivalries of the great European Powers. They have never been able to agree upon measures for suppressing chronic disorder and intolerable mismanagement. Now that, for the first time, the Government of the Ottoman Empire has been assumed by the party of union and progress, determined to carry out reforms, and apparently able to enforce them, European jealousies reappear in a new form. The Young Turk has evidently yet much to learn on the subject of treaties. Treaties are devised to register terms of peace or to provide for the contingency of war; but as instruments of pacification they have this disadvantage, that, as Prince Bismarck has said in his 'Reminiscences,' all treaties in the world are provisional, and hold good only for a time, the condition *rebus sic stantibus* being tacitly understood in all treaties requiring performance. Appeals to the sanctity of treaties have seldom obtained much attention from parties who have resolved to disregard them. When, in 1859, France and Piedmont attacked Austria, Lord Malmesbury protested in vain against this infringement of the Treaty of Vienna, which was again upset in 1871 by the German annexation of French territory, when everyone saw that another protest of that kind would be treated with derision. Moreover, since all the parties concerned are very seldom prepared to agree on the terms of revising a treaty, the attempt is quite as likely to lead to a rupture as to procure a resettlement on the basis of altered circumstances. The legitimate procedure would be to reassemble a Congress for considering amendments required or demanded. But a powerful State will not submit its acts or claims to the judgement of an international tribunal, except with a previous assurance that they will be confirmed; and if this point is uncertain it may prefer to anticipate unfavourable conclusions by some masterful proceeding, setting might against right, and leaving those who object to choose between condonation or a declaration of war. It is now well known that at the Berlin Congress the assignment of the Balkan provinces to Austria had been arranged beforehand between Austria and England, and that the protests of the Turkish plenipotentiaries, who had no kind of warning that such a blow

was impending, were peremptorily overruled. Even the representative of Italy, to whom the extension of Austrian jurisdiction so close to the Adriatic could not fail to be disagreeable, was rather unceremoniously silenced when he attempted to remonstrate. At the present moment, when a Conference has been proposed for revising the Berlin Treaty, the signatory Powers are stipulating that the main points at issue must be determined beforehand. In a Congress each assessor has his own private plan or understanding with others, and the stronger members settle disputed questions at the cost of the weaker. On these considerations it is intelligible that the Turkish Government should be preferring a direct agreement with their adversaries to the alternative of being haled before judges who are more or less parties to the suit.

Now it will be generally admitted that in this complex and shifting condition of the world's affairs, when small rifts may widen into ruptures, when the thrones of Asiatic monarchs are quaking and the balance of heavily armed Powers in the West is unsteady, the state of England's relations with the German Empire is a matter of high importance. During the wars of the eighteenth and the early nineteenth century Prussia was England's ally, for the most part, against France. In the Seven Years' War, while Frederick II. was defeating French armies on the land, the British Navy was dispersing French fleets on the sea; and the result was very advantageous to both countries, especially to our own. Frederick came triumphantly out of a desperate conflict with a coalition of enemies: he kept Silesia, which has ever since been a Prussian province; England drove France out of Canada, and laid the foundation of an empire in India. In the great uprising of Germany against Napoleon, toward the end of his career, the confederate armies were largely supported by British subsidies; and we all know that in the final decisive victory of 1815 Prussia and England fought side by side. Their armies have never yet been arrayed against each other on the war-field. But in the latter years of the nineteenth century, from the time when France was struck down and the German Empire arose, various causes and circumstances have altered the direction of German policy, producing a divergence of sympathies and interests. After the war of 1871 the rapid increase of wealth and population of Germany naturally gave a sharp spur to commercial and industrial enterprise, and German statesmen looked about anxiously for trade outlets and colonial expansion. But such enterprises depend for their support and security on a navy, and, conversely, a mercantile marine provides a naval reserve. The commercial pre-eminence of England and her

colonial possessions have been gained by England's long undisputed command of the sea. When, in the great French war at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Napoleon had shut out England from the European continent, and had closed against her all the seaports by the Berlin decree, he was involuntarily building up and fortifying British dominion outside Europe. For while he was upsetting kingdom after kingdom on the land, he and his unwilling allies, Spain and Holland, were losing everything beyond the sea; and all the most valuable islands, harbours, naval stations, and colonies—with the whole external trade—passed easily into our hands. Such a complete division of land power and sea power between hostile empires was unprecedented in history, and is never likely to recur. The result has been to place the British Empire in a position that naturally excites the envy of other nations whenever some outlet for surplus produce or population becomes for them a pressing necessity, as they find England established on so many points of vantage along all the main waterways, and in most of the lands where the climate makes European colonisation practicable. From this position it is hardly possible to dislodge her; but commerce is open to all; and since the keen competition of German trade and industry is directly encouraged by German finance, it has followed as a logical consequence that the policy of strengthening their navy has been adopted by German statesmen. The English blood that runs in the veins of their reigning Emperor may have quickened his ambition for adventures on the sea. On the other hand, it is universally agreed in Great Britain that our naval preponderance must be maintained at all costs and hazards; and our present Ministry has formally declared that the force of British fleets must always be superior to that of any other two Powers. Any report of an intention to challenge that superiority attracts earnest attention and stirs the heart of the English people, giving instructive and timely warning to our Ministers, of whatever party, that there must be no trifling with vital national interests, and that no insurance is too heavy for their protection. Our island fortress lies entrenched, as might be said, behind the surrounding seas; but these are narrow open spaces across which an army can be carried with greater speed than by land, and with better chances of evading resistance during its passage.

Nevertheless, although we must be forewarned and forearmed in every way, one may yet doubt the wisdom or necessity of insisting unceasingly on these perils and possibilities, and of assuming that an invasion of our shores is deliberately contemplated by an enemy. To debate publicly and repeatedly upon

such an assumption, even though it may be well founded, is hardly politic, for prophecies draw toward their own fulfilment, and the national dignity suffers by sounding urgent alarms in the ears of a grim and taciturn rival. Lord Roberts is honoured and trusted by his countrymen as the foremost of their experienced soldiers; they accord him full credit for his vigilant and active patriotism. Yet his speech in the House of Lords on November 24 last left us with the feeling that, while his urgent representations of the state of our army were impressive and of great value, he might have refrained from accentuating so directly and positively his apprehensions that our invaders will be German. He declared that his reference to that country implied neither fear nor hostility, yet that his words will not be interpreted in both senses by the Germans is most difficult to believe. And the speech has been commented upon by the European Press from various points of view. In France it is observed this clear demonstration of England's military weakness naturally diminishes the value of her alliance for the purposes of combined action, because, while we are fairly protected by our navy, we could lend no substantial aid to the French in the event of a sudden attack to which they are much more exposed, and which they regard as much more probable, than an invasion of England. The German Press remarked that if the English could put themselves on a respectable war footing they would be less liable to panics, and disclaimed aggressive intentions with an air of somewhat supercilious composure. The Austrians deprecated these anticipations of war at a critical moment, when peace was indispensable to the settlement of complicated questions.

Now it will be generally admitted that the action of Austria in South-Eastern Europe, when she deliberately overstepped the provisions of the Berlin Treaty, has troubled with a wave of uneasiness the still waters of Europe. Austria may have found these waters deeper than she anticipated when she announced that her provisional tenure of lands already in her possession would henceforward be made permanent; but having put down her foot she cannot now draw it back. She may have calculated that any opposition from the insignificant States of Servia and Montenegro would be easily overawed by the transcendent military preponderance of the Dual Monarchy. But Austria may have under-estimated the far-reaching susceptibilities of race and religion; for the passionate outcry of Servia has found an echo among the kindred Slavonic populations of the North. And the consequence has been that a dispute of small intrinsic importance has alarmed all the governments of Europe, who are measuring one another's strength and suspecting one another's

designs. England cannot stand apart, for various reasons. In the first place her signature is attached to the Berlin Treaty, and she not only sanctioned but proposed the particular arrangement which Austria has now set aside. Secondly, the rights of the Ottoman Empire are primarily concerned, and whenever, for nearly one hundred years past, the English have been forced to take an active part, by arms or diplomacy, in Continental quarrels, it has always been for the protection of Turkey. Our position in Asia, and the fact that no other Government in the world has so many Mahomedan subjects, have imperatively compelled us to interpose. And, finally, our recent engagements or undertakings have virtually superseded the old policy of isolation. When in October 1870 France and Prussia were locked in furious strife, an article in this Review, by a great statesman, congratulated England on the happy dispensation of Providence which had cut her off by a streak of silver sea from the dangers and temptations that beset her neighbours on the mainland. 'While everything,' he said, 'combines to make us safe, everything also combines to make us harmless; for "maritime supremacy has become the proud, perhaps the indefectible, inheritance of England," and, on the other hand, "the relative share of maritime force in aggressive warfare is "dwindling." But not even the most experienced statesman can foresee the course of events; and at this moment our people are losing confidence in the impregnability of their defences precisely because in England the force of sea power for aggression is believed to be rapidly increasing, and our maritime supremacy to be no longer unassailable.

In short, when England joined other Powers in the Berlin Treaty she became a partner in the business of preserving the peace of Europe; and in associations of this kind the liabilities are practically unlimited. To have acted otherwise in 1878 would have been to lower the national credit, which has been since further strengthened by the support given to France in Moroccan affairs, and by the convention for Asiatic affairs with Russia. But it is difficult to make friends without some risk of incurring enemies; nor can it be denied that latterly a certain degree of estrangement has been growing up between England and Germany, which has affected the temper of both nations. It cannot be said that the official relations between the two Governments are visibly strained; yet it is clear that in the present complex conjuncture of European affairs these relations need cautious and delicate handling by experts and responsible statesmen who are accustomed to use, in speech and action, the tact and discrimination required for avoiding unnecessary or accidental offence. In an atmosphere



of distrust and vague apprehensions, with rumours incessantly flashing along the telegraph wires, when any small cloud on the horizon is noted as the possible forerunner of a storm, calm judgement and a complete knowledge of the chart are essentially needed for navigation in a rising sea. Discretion, reserve, and discriminating tact are indispensable for avoiding unnecessary or unintentional offence, and particularly for retaining the confidence of foreign cabinets with whom our ministers may exchange private views and consultations. These are plain ordinary maxims of statesmanship from which no one dissents, yet there has been latterly a tendency to forget or ignore them. In all European and American countries, and in more than one country of Asia, the Press now exercises, for the most part through the multiplication of newspapers, but also through magazines and reviews, a great and manifold influence, much wider than formerly, because universal education has produced among the people an ingrained habit of desultory reading, and has sharply stimulated their appetite for a daily supply of savoury news. We need hardly add that the Press also renders high and most valuable service to civilised nations by its wonderful activity in the dissemination of intelligence, by its staff of correspondents in all the principal capitals of the world, and by the running commentary on passing events which the best journals and periodicals maintain with distinctive ability, to the substantial benefit of appreciative readers. Among the more cultivated classes of Western nations, especially in England, the articles of the Reviews on foreign affairs have a very considerable effect upon opinion.

That the style of journalistic criticism in a Press which competes freely for popular favour should be vivacious, unvarnished, and positive, is inevitable and in some respects advantageous. In England we have long been accustomed to very unceremonious discussion of our domestic affairs; it does excellent service to the commonwealth by pushing home the arguments and bringing out the true issues of a controversy. The writers in newspapers and reviews take opposite sides; correspondents join the fray; ministerial statements and speeches correct extravagant assertions; attacks are met by rejoinders; vigorous denunciation of prominent politicians is answered by glorification of their ability; invective, sarcasm, caricature are freely employed in party warfare. The public is in the position of a jury who listen to rival advocates, being ordinarily familiar with the matters in dispute and with the character of the disputants; and the judicious reader is quite capable of deducting a liberal percentage from rhetorical state-

ments. But in the discussion of foreign affairs the situation is very different. Here the controversy is between nations whose respective ideas, circumstances, and habits of mind are often very imperfectly understood on either side, who are intensely sensitive to unguarded language, and apt to misconstrue hasty words as signs and tokens of unfriendly intentions. In this case the Press is no longer the organ of a party; it claims to be the mouthpiece of a people, and to speak with representative authority. The claim is by no means indefeasible, for we believe that in every educated community there exists a considerable section of readers who form an independent judgement on the facts, and who look chiefly to the official declarations of responsible ministers, in parliament or elsewhere, for trustworthy indications of the course and significance of events. Yet the vast majority in every nation have no means or faculty of ascertaining the prevailing sentiments, the respective points of view, of a foreign people except through the Press; and it has now come to pass that the attitude and language of the national Press is very generally taken, on both sides, to be the authentic expression of the national mind. It has become difficult to persuade an Englishman or a German, when some unlucky or untoward incident raises a chorus of disapproval or derision in foreign newspapers, that mischief is not in the air, and that the relations of their Governments are not approaching a critical stage. High words fly to and fro across the sea; the telegrams compress ambiguous news into pungent phrases; active journalists, writing on the spur of the instant, are not concerned to mince matters; and neither Press can do less than brandish the standard of its country. The reader becomes first interested, then excited; the barometer of the Stock Exchange falls, the outlook becomes uncertain and perplexing. When individuals bring their private quarrels before the world, disputes or misunderstandings that might have been smoothed down by explanation are sure to be unreasonably exasperated by publicity; and in polemics between nations the effect is similar, with much more serious consequences.

These considerations may partly account for the unfriendly tone that has recently pervaded the Press of both England and Germany in the ventilation of grievances, and especially with regard to certain strangely characteristic incidents. In the latest of these incidents no charge of indiscretion lies primarily against the English Press; on the contrary, it was the German Emperor who sought publicity with the hope of influencing national opinion in this country. Our readers are well aware that the government of the German Empire is constituted in a form that allots

large independence to the Sovereign, who has the right of choosing his ministers without reference to the representative assemblies, and is not bound to consult his parliament in matters of high policy. The system was devised with the object of enabling the chief of federated States to deal swiftly and secretly with affairs, diplomatic or military, of extreme urgency; and for this purpose it is undoubtedly effective. But according to British principles it is an anomaly in constitutional government, which recent experience has brought out into extreme prominence. By any imprudent use of his irresponsible powers the Sovereign incurs grave responsibility; in speech or writing he is constitutionally uncontrolled, so that all the consequences of indiscretion or impulsiveness fall upon him personally; and rulers who can carry such a weight without stumbling have been few and far between. Parliamentary interference with high politics may sometimes have been inconsiderate and embarrassing; yet in these democratic days the authority of representative assemblies is irresistible, while it has always to be remembered that, in politics as in mechanics, without the power of resistance there is no power to support. During the Second French Empire Napoleon III. habitually reserved to himself the direction of foreign affairs; the negotiations with Italy for the joint attack upon Austria in 1859 were carried on by his secret interviews and correspondence with Cavour; he appointed ministers whom he consulted or not at his pleasure; and even under the liberal régime inaugurated toward the end of his reign he declared war upon Prussia without taking counsel with his First Minister, Ollivier. It may be affirmed that the whole series of blunders which gradually brought that empire during its last seven years to a precipitate fall was mainly due to the system under which the Sovereign's action in foreign affairs was not subject to the advice of a united Cabinet, or to the control of Chambers that were truly representative institutions. We are quite aware of the wide constitutional differences that can be pointed out between the Napoleonic empire that fell and the German empire that rose on its ruins; we do not overlook national distinctions of circumstance and national character; the sole point of comparison that may be worth attention refers to the position and prerogatives, in both cases, of the Sovereign.

The German Emperor impersonates the power of the State for energetic action in emergencies. He cannot actually declare war without the concurrence of the Federal Council, except when the territories or the coasts are attacked. But he has supreme command of the navy, and the whole land forces of the federated States form a single army which in peace and war

is under his orders ; he appoints all officers in both services, and all the civil officials, including the ambassadors. By the first important act of his reign, when he dismissed Prince Bismarck at brief notice, he proved a capacity for acting alone, boldly and independently. When the chief of a great and warlike nation wields such formidable authority, his words and behaviour are necessarily watched everywhere beyond his frontier with anxious attention, since it is assumed that he is himself aware of their importance. But it seems that to the singular qualities that have made the Emperor William II. the most remarkable and in many respects the most interesting figure among living sovereigns, the gift of reticence, of circumspection in words and acts, has not been added. From the time when, in January 1896, he telegraphed his congratulations to President Kruger upon the repulse of the disreputable Jameson Raid, his utterances have alternately irritated or mystified the British people. As the natural consequence of that message 'a bitter warfare of 'tongues and pens was raging unofficially between England and 'Germany during the final years of the nineteenth century';\* and since then other, though much less serious, imperial indiscretions have tried the patience and good-nature of our countrymen. National susceptibilities have been not unreasonably excited ; and the Press has been playing upon our nerves until the cool judgement which used to be a distinguishing element of English character has been losing its control. When the military correspondent of a leading newspaper, with a quick eye for effects, revealed to the public the appalling fact that the German Emperor had written a private letter to our First Lord of the Admiralty, it was announced that an attempt had been made to interfere with the administration of the British Navy ; and an outburst of patriotic indignation followed in the newspapers, flavoured with ridicule of both parties concerned. A trivial blunder, due mainly to the carelessness of the English minister, was treated in a style that must have annoyed the Emperor considerably, and that could hardly fail to irritate his people. It is certain that the tone of the Press in both countries has been latterly contentious, recriminating, rising sometimes to a sharp note of anger. The Emperor, whose moods we may venture, with due respect, to describe as wayward, appears to have been anxious, not without reason, to allay the increasing disquietude of the English nation with regard to his personal views and intentions, being probably conscious of some responsi-

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\* 'History of England, 1837-1901.' By Sidney Low and L. C. Sanders. 1907.

bility for it. Accordingly his Majesty took a course which at least proves a high estimate of the great influence exercised by the Press in England; and it may also be taken as a mark of his reliance on the British custom of hearing both sides of a case. At an interview with the agent of a well-known London newspaper, he vouchsafed a profuse explanation of his views, notions, and conduct; when, if the details of the incident have been correctly made known, it would seem that, as between the Emperor, the Imperial Chancellor, and the reporter, the last was the most circumspect of the three. For it has been said that the reporter did not despatch his note of the conversation without some hesitation, after obtaining positive assurance that it might be published. However this may be, the publication of this report at once brought out into vivid relief the perils and pitfalls that encompass personal irresponsibility, for what was intended to conciliate popular opinion and to restore tranquillity in England has produced an uproar in Europe; and in attempting to pacify the English the Emperor has gravely offended his own people.

Now we are not here concerned to scrutinise too closely the imperial professions of friendliness, or to inquire whether the Emperor's language, in respect to this country, has been invariably consistent. He is supposed to be singularly sensitive to the rattling volleys of unceremonious remarks and criticisms directed upon all prominent personages by journalistic sharpshooters, aided particularly by the fierce light that beats upon a throne. But it is fair to assume that this interview had been arranged for a purpose that was amicable; that his Majesty's desire was to find an outlet for explanations calculated to reassure the English people, to disarm suspicions, and to discredit rumours of sinister designs. Prince Bülow, in his explanation to the Reichstag, said that the Kaiser, precisely because he was conscious of having worked industriously and sincerely for an understanding with England, had felt hurt at attacks that misrepresented him. If our assumption be granted, then even those who are not convinced of the Emperor's sincerity, who are disposed to think that he protested too much, might reflect that to assert openly that these assurances are disingenuous and maladroit is, for England, a tactical error. The Germans may be incensed by their sovereign's imprudence, the Reichstag may debate wrathfully, Prince Bülow may tender his resignation; but these are domestic troubles which do not particularly concern England; and it is certainly not to our interest to chime in with the peals of loud disapproval that have been ringing through the German Press. The Emperor declared in

that famous interview that reasonable Germans did not agree with the intimations of national ill-will that might be construed into menaces by Englishmen. He admitted that the prevailing sentiment among large classes in Germany was not friendly to our country. But he affirmed that he did not share these feelings; he desired to persuade us that his own policy had been misunderstood throughout, and he even claimed credit for having disconcerted combinations against us proposed to him by other foreign Governments. Whatever we may think of these assurances, there was little wisdom or sagacity in receiving them with discourteous mistrust, which must have sharpened the mortification of the Emperor at the resentment provoked among his own people by his proceedings. If his Majesty has chosen to speak in the character of one who stands between England and the German war-party—supposing such a party to exist—we are by no means concerned to drive him into their arms. Yet English writers on current politics, with some notable exceptions, have discussed the incident in a tone of almost contemptuous incredulity; while some of the minor newspapers have indulged in humorous personal remarks, barely distinguishable from insolence, for the amusement of the man in the street. To look for the practice of diplomacy in journalism would be to expect too much; yet it must have occurred to intelligent bystanders that when a great foreign potentate spontaneously makes overtures that pledge him to friendly intentions, the right policy is to take him at his word. Public declarations have at least some binding force; and if the Emperor's subsequent action were found inconsistent with them, it might then have been worth while to remind him of what he had said. Whereas an ungracious reception of amicable advances will have liberated him from any future embarrassment of that kind.

Sir Edward Grey has given ample proof of a calm, penetrating insight into the intricate problems raised by the present conditions of foreign affairs, and of the steady eye with which he surveys them. As he has won the entire confidence of his countrymen in his judgement and ability, his advice always merits their serious attention. In a speech delivered at Scarborough in November last he remarked that so long as people do not believe in bad intentions even the worst difficulties may be disposed of without trouble. And he proceeded to say:—

‘ I sometimes think that half the difficulties of foreign policy arise from the exceeding ingenuity of different countries in attributing motives and intentions to the Governments of each other. As far as I can observe, the Press of various countries is much more fertile in inventing motives and intentions for the Governments of the

different countries than the Foreign Ministers of those countries are themselves. Foreign Governments and our own Government live from hand to mouth, and have fewer deep plans than people might suppose. There is the old warning that you should not spend too much time in looking at the dark cupboard for the black cat which is not there, and I think if sometimes we were a little less suspicious of deep design or motive that the affairs of the world would progress more smoothly.'

We may commend these remarks to the consideration of those who undertake to instruct a nation on foreign affairs, whether in newspapers or in Reviews. That the Emperor should have conceived the idea of conciliating the English Press is natural enough. There is probably no country in which an unanimous expression of national sentiments or sympathies has exercised so much influence on its foreign politics as England. In a recent article of the '*Revue des deux Mondes*' on the Berlin Congress M. Hanotaux, a very competent observer, has remarked that the British Cabinet can act, at certain moments, with greater force and effect than any Continental Government because the British ministers can rely upon and take advantage of an energetic manifestation of public opinion. He says that the Press and the Parliament unite to create a sort of atmospheric pressure that gives strong driving power to a ministry, and that has more than once enabled England to take a decisive lead in European affairs. There can be no doubt, at any rate, that when the public mind is excited the Press has great power; and therefore it should be used cautiously, not squandered inconsiderately, and above all it should not be misdirected.

For the time has not yet come when democracy can safely indulge its propensity to throw off the restraint of manners and moderation in intercourse with the great political society of Continental Europe, and the Comity of Nations is still a phrase that has meaning. We have yet to see whether Governments that are in reality popular and democratic, as in England, France, and America, are capable of the foresight in deliberate preparation and the energetic promptitude in action for which different administrative systems on the Continent have carefully provided. At the present time, in all the principal Asiatic kingdoms from China to Constantinople, we may notice a general movement toward the introduction in some form of representative institutions; and this novel tendency is evidently connected with the growing desire to shake off the incubus of foreign intervention. It has been stated that one article in the programme of the Chinese reformers is a demand for the restoration of territory ceded to foreigners. The leaders everywhere appear to have discovered

that the old-fashioned despotisms are incompetent to withstand the disintegrating pressure of European civilisation, while misrule and financial improvidence endanger the national independence. But parliamentary government on the British pattern, which only suits effectively a homogeneous people, is still more or less on its trial even in many European countries, and the experiment of transporting it into Asia is fraught with obvious difficulties. The modified type of constitutional government presented by the German Empire may not improbably serve as a better model, not only for Asiatic reformers, but for other nations exposed to the stress of war. Under this régime parliamentary interference is limited, and the supreme executive authority vested in the sovereign with his chosen councillors concentrates military power in his hands, whereby a mighty aggressive force can be let loose by a sharp and sudden decision. Personal government is thus adjusted to a constitutional apparatus, and the sovereign remains the arbiter of peace or war. If we compare an engine of this sort, driven by resolute and skilful men, with the machinery of party government by shifting majorities, we may reasonably ask that those who play upon the organs of public opinion in this country should take heed what they say and do. It is ill jesting with heavily armed and irascible neighbours; irony, mockery, veiled suggestions of duplicity—the polished edge-tools of clever writers—may score palpable hits, which, however, are possibly reckoned up in an account that may some day be repaid in a different coin; and since those who employ the pen are not usually called upon to handle the rifle, the fomenters of heat and friction should remember that these things may lead to consequences which others may have to face, and may accelerate the very events against which their warnings, otherwise salutary, are intended to put us on our guard. To keep our people awake and alert, to insist on the fatal risks of being caught half-armed and unready—these are the duties of a patriotic Press, and this is to render services that are truly national. Between nations, as between individuals, civility costs nothing, and may do some good; while incivility and personal slights may be very expensive, and can hardly fail to do harm. It is for writers on foreign politics to ponder these facts and considerations, and to bear in mind that they represent abroad the national character, and hold in trust the honour and reputation of their own people. Liberty of speech and of political discussion is an inestimable privilege; but we must not forget that it implies very serious obligations.

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№. CCCCXXVIII.

ART. I.—GERMAN IMPERIAL FINANCE.

1. *Foreign Office Report on the Finances of the German Empire for the Year 1905.* By MR. WHITEHEAD. [Cd. 2236-200.] July 1905.
2. *Foreign Office Report on the Finances of the German Empire for the Year 1907, with estimates for 1908.* By COUNT DE SALIS. [Cd. 3727-43.] February 1908.
3. *Die Reichsfinanznot und die Pflichten des deutschen Volks wie seiner politischen Parteien: ein Mahnwort eines alten Mannes.* Von PROFESSOR DR. ADOLPH WAGNER. Berlin: Verlag von Puttkammer and Mühlbrecht. 1908.
4. *Die nationale Bedeutung der Reichsfinanzreform.* Drei Reden gehalten in Berlin am 6. November 1908. Von GEH. JUSTIZRAT PROFESSOR DR. W. KAHL, GEH. REGIERUNGSRAT PROFESSOR DR. ADOLF WAGNER, GEH. PROFESSOR DR. K. LAMPRECHT. Berlin: Hermann Hillger Verlag. 1908.
5. *Die Finanzen der Grossmächte.* Von DR. FRIEDRICH ZAHN. Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag. 1908.
6. *The Evolution of Modern Germany.* By W. H. DAWSON. London: T. Fisher Unwin. 1908.

WHEN the German Empire sprang into being in 1871 its financial outlook was by no means disquieting. It was born without a debt, with substantial capital assets, and with the endowment of the War Indemnity of five milliards of francs due from, and promptly paid by, France. Its functions were

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defined by the Constitution, tolerably elastic resources were put at its disposal, and the federated States were in the background to supply it with advances of ready money, and in case of need with permanent assistance. It is asserted that Bismarck was well aware that the financial arrangements which he adopted were but a temporary makeshift and would soon need revision; but, like most makeshifts, they have been allowed to continue far beyond the time when they tolerably fulfilled their purpose; and, in spite of a period of unbroken peace (except for the military operations in China and South-West Africa, the first of which was costly to China only) and of unexampled progress in industry and commerce, the Empire has to-day a debt of over 210,000,000*l.*; while its credit is inferior to that of countries like Holland, Sweden, and Italy, and of such British municipalities as Bristol, Croydon, and Swansea.

France discharged her obligations so rapidly that Bismarck declared the money to be, for the moment, an acute embarrassment, but he paid it out almost as rapidly. Nearly the whole amount went, directly or indirectly, to the army—in round millions sterling, over 125 to making good the expenses of the war, 6 in 1872 for barracks in Alsace, nearly 11 in 1873 for fortifications, 6 to the war-chest in Spandau (used as a metallic basis for paper money), and 28 to the Reichs-Invaliden-Fonds for disabled soldiers, altogether 176 millions.

The last instalment of indemnity was received from France in 1875, and the Imperial Funded Debt dates from 1877. Its progress is shown in the following table\* :—

Total debt, March 31 (000's omitted) :

	£		£
1877 .. ..	3,534	1901 .. ..	117,261
1881 .. ..	13,107	1906 .. ..	173,445
1886 .. ..	21,537	1907 .. ..	186,446
1891 .. ..	64,503	Oct. 1, 1908 ..	208,504
1896 .. ..	104,026		

The charges for interest and management have risen from less than 300,000*l.* in 1880 to 7,622,000*l.* in 1908.

The total ordinary revenue from Imperial resources in 1908 † was estimated as follows :—

\* Converted at 1*l.* = 20·40 marks.

† Throughout this article the German custom is followed of designating the financial year (April 1–March 31) by the year in which it begins. Thus 1908 is used for 1908–9.

	£
Customs .. .. .	32,646,794
Excise .. .. .	19,752,642
Stamp duties .. .. .	7,047,430
Inheritance tax .. .. .	2,055,800
Railways .. .. .	6,144,493
Posts and Telegraphs .. .. .	31,527,494
Bank profits, fees, and miscellaneous matricular contributions .. .. .	15,662,889
Total .. .. .	£121,626,585

To which must be added extraordinary revenue amounting to 12,982,245*l.*, of which all but about 200,000*l.* is due to borrowing.

The main Excise items were :—

	£		£
Sugar .. .. .	6,922,956	Salt .. .. .	2,799,511
Beer .. .. .	2,705,140	Tobacco and	
Spirits .. .. .	5,716,951	cigarettes .	1,254,919
Wine .. .. .	267,141		

The Customs figures for 1908 are not available in detail, but the official returns give the actual receipts in former years and their incidence per head of population. The main items in 1907 were :—

	£	
Cereals .. .. .	13,000,000	=4·27 marks per head.
Coffee .. .. .	3,697,000	=1·21 " " "
Petroleum .. .. .	3,759,000	=1·23 " " "

These three alone made up 65 per cent. of the total Customs revenue.

The expenditure for 1908 was estimated as follows :—

	£
Army .. .. .	41,898,617
Navy .. .. .	16,603,444
Foreign Office .. .. .	877,630
Colonial Office .. .. .	3,259,173
Treasury and Audit Office .. .. .	15,221,541
Home Office (including infirmity pensions) .. .. .	5,252,208
Debt, service of .. .. .	7,193,932
Miscellaneous (Reichstag, Chancellor, &c.) .. .. .	578,332
Railways (Alsace-Lorraine and Luxembourg) .. .. .	5,957,777
Posts and Telegraphs .. .. .	30,367,295
Mint .. .. .	32,428
Imperial Press .. .. .	368,167
Superannuation and Imperial Invalids Fund .. .. .	6,998,286

£134,603,830

The precision of the balance is due to the device of counting as 'extraordinary revenue' the exact amount of the deficit (about 12½ millions) estimated to be raised by loan. A deficit of this kind has been a feature of every budget since 1897, and even with the assistance of loans the budget showed deficiencies in 1904, 1906, and 1907. The total revenue for the eight years 1900-1908 is officially stated to have fallen short of the total expenditure by nearly 80 millions sterling.

The following table compares the total income and expenditure in various years. The real position is, however, obscured by the inclusion of loans in the later years:—

(000's omitted)

Year	Income	Expenditure
	£	£
1872 .. .. .	74,732*	74,164*
1882 .. .. .	37,274	37,387
1892 .. .. .	68,637	73,909
1902 .. .. .	106,716	113,753
1905 .. .. .	117,363†	107,605
1906 .. .. .	116,573†	117,352
1907 .. .. .	123,423†	137,738

The German Estimates and Appropriation Accounts, like those of most other countries, show gross income and expenditure—that is to say, they include on the income side income from all sources, and on the expenditure side the expenses of working, not merely in the one case the net profits and in the other the net sum raised by the Empire in taxes. Taking these gross figures the estimated expenditure and income in 1908 is 2,784,000,000 marks, or 44·20 m. per head of population. But if we deduct the expenses of trading enterprises, such as the Post Office, and that part of their income which is needed to meet such expenses, the income and expenditure of special capital funds, like the Reichs-Invaliden-Fonds, the matricular contributions, and the equivalent assignments to the States, and finally loans and the expenditure out of loans on remunerative undertakings, we get a very different figure as the net budget.

\* 47,028,000*l.* war expenditure, 1870-1, provided for in this year out of corresponding 'income' from the French indemnity.

† Includes loans, 1905, 16,750,000*l.*; 1906, 12,660,000*l.*; 1907, 9,600,000*l.*

On this basis income in 1908 sinks to 1,417,000,000 marks or 22·50 per head of population; expenditure to 1,503,000,000, or 23·9 per head of population. These net figures have been worked out with great care in the German White Books, no doubt with a view to showing the exact burden on the taxpayer. But from this standpoint a net estimate is not very satisfactory. There are numerous debateable points as to what is a tax and what is not—how, for instance, railway receipts ought to be classed, and what is to be said of judicial fees. These are difficulties which meet every such attempt to classify revenue. But in the particular case of Germany there are further special objections to the net figures as showing the true burden on the taxpayer. To deduct the matricular contributions leaves out of account the fact that the taxpayer has to pay them just as much as he pays a Customs tax. That they go through the State Treasuries does not lessen his burden. If the assignments made to the States were equal to the contributions paid by them it might be argued that these sums are ultimately spent on State, not Imperial purposes, and are therefore not to be counted among Imperial resources. But, as in fact the assignments are now always less than the contributions, the difference between the two amounts at least is really Imperial taxation. Similarly loan expenditure is in default of taxation, and the debt charges ultimately fall on the taxpayer, so loans can hardly be entirely disregarded in the net budget. For our present purpose at least the gross budget is of the greater importance and interest.

The Constitution of 1871 required the Empire to provide for certain common or federal needs—national defence, foreign representation, Imperial finance (including debt), post office, telegraph, mint, and similar general expenses. Bavaria retained her own army and post office in return for special contributions. Education, justice, &c., were left to the individual States, together with their forests, railways (except in Alsace-Lorraine, where the railway was taken by the Empire) and 'domains' generally. Article 70 of the Constitution is thus worded :

'Towards defraying all common expenditure shall be used (1) any surplus of the preceding year, and the revenue derived from the Customs duties, the common excise duties, and the postal and telegraph systems, and (2) in so far as the expenditure is not covered by these revenues it shall be made up, so long as Imperial taxes are not introduced, by contributions of the Federal States according to population, which contributions shall be assigned by the Imperial Chancellor up to the amount required by the Budget.'

The matricular contributions, being in origin merely advances against revenue not yet collected, were to be repaid by assignments at a later date out of the produce of the Customs, the tobacco tax and the spirit tax, to which was added in 1881 the Imperial stamp tax. The States had a lien upon these taxes and, in effect, the security of all the tax revenue as distinct from railways, post office profits, and fees.

Under this system repayments were made in many years in which, though the taxes exceeded the matricular contributions, imperial expenditure exceeded the taxes, so that the assignments to the States meant deficits to be made good by Imperial loans. A series of such deficits in 1900-3 led to an amendment of the Constitution by the law of 1904, which abolished the liability of the Customs revenue and the tobacco tax, and assigned to the States instead the net produce of certain other taxes to be divided, as the matricular contribution is collected, per head of population. The taxes thus made over to the States were the spirit excise and the so-called 'mash-tub' tax, which is based upon the capacity of the vessel in which corn or potatoes are fermented in agricultural distilleries.

On May 14, 1904, Article 70 of the Constitution was amended to read thus:—

'The revenue common to all the States of the Empire which is derived from the Customs, from Imperial taxes, from the Imperial railways, posts, and telegraphs, and from Imperial administrative receipts shall in the first place serve to meet all common expenditure. In so far as the expenditure is not covered by the revenue derived from these sources it shall be met by contributions from the several States in proportion to population, such contributions being called for by the Imperial Chancellor up to the amount fixed by the Imperial Budget.'

Now follows the famous Frankenstein clause:

'In case the assignments [*i.e.* to the States from the assigned taxes] fall short of these contributions, the difference shall be refunded to the Federal States at the end of the financial year to the amount up to which the remaining ordinary revenue of the Empire exceeds its requirements. Any surplus from previous years shall, unless the Budget law provides otherwise, be employed to meet common extraordinary expenditure.'

As a result the Imperial Government retained in 1904 18,000,000*l.* from Customs and tobacco assigned in the original estimates for the repayment of matricular contributions, while the States received instead 700,000*l.* from the mash-tub tax, making with the usual payments from spirits and stamps a total assignment of 9½ millions in the place of an originally estimated

27 millions. On the other hand the Empire, being 17,000,000*l.* in pocket by this transaction, required only 11 millions of matricular contributions, instead of 28 millions, as originally estimated. The dislocation of the State finance due to having to provide heavy contributions was reduced, and the Empire could hope for greater security from deficits through gaining greater control over the Customs revenue. But though the amounts on each side of the account were reduced the relation between advances and repayments was not changed. There remained a margin of uncovered contributions.

The effort to prevent chronic deficits had proved ineffective ; and in 1906 an attempt was made to separate Imperial from State finances by fixing a definite limit to the uncovered matricular contributions. But the Reichstag could not be persuaded to accept the proposal, and the Act as passed (Finance Act, June 3, 1906) provided that the matricular contributions should be classified in three divisions : (1) those covered by the Customs and Excise duties ; (2) contributions to a maximum of 1,174,800*l.* per annum (=40 pfennigs, or 5*d.* per head of population) not so covered ; (3) deferred uncovered contributions exceeding the last-named sum and payable by the States only if found necessary on the final closing of the accounts in the third year after the date on which they were first claimed. The Act also (*a*) increased the brewing tax and the Imperial stamp duties, (*b*) put a special duty on cigarettes and cigarette paper, railway tickets, &c., and (*c*) imposed a uniform succession duty, two-thirds of the gross yield of which were to go to the Imperial Treasury and the balance to the States in which it was levied.

Annual deficits, issues of Treasury bills and short-term bonds, their renewals and ultimate conversion from floating to funded debt with new loans, have led to such frequent and embarrassing appearances of the Imperial Treasury in the Berlin money market as to cause widespread complaint. The Federated States and municipalities have to place their own considerable issue of loans in a glutted market. Stringency sets in on the Bourse. The rate of discount rises, to the loss and inconvenience of the mercantile and manufacturing interests ; the price of Consols falls, to the prejudice of the investor and the Government alike ; and the depreciation of Government credit is generally regarded as a grave national danger from a military standpoint.\*

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\* The Imperial 4 per cent. loans of April 1907 and April 1908 were issued to the public at 99 and 99½, but yielded to the Government 98 and 98·4 per cent. respectively.

The French indemnity, besides obviating permanent loans, had also provided in the early years of the Empire for temporary advances. But in 1877 power was taken to issue Treasury bills not exceeding a modest total of 1,200,000*l.* in circulation at the same time. Under pressure of circumstances the legal limit has gradually been raised. It reached 13½ millions in 1902, 17 millions in 1905, and finally 23 millions in 1908. Down to 1900 the actual use made of these powers was small; in some years they remained entirely dormant, but since 1900 they have been continuously employed.

The gross amounts current in the year have been as follows:—

							£
1879 (first year of issue)	..	..	..	..	..	..	150,000
1887	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,120,000
1899	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,600,000
1904	..	..	..	..	..	..	45,000,000
1905	..	..	..	..	..	..	42,000,000
1906	..	..	..	..	..	..	45,000,000
1907	..	..	..	..	..	..	51,000,000

The highest amount of concurrent bills reached 10,000,000*l.* in 1903; in 1907 the extremes were 2,450,000*l.* to 17,000,000*l.*; in 1908, 6,450,000*l.* to 18,000,000*l.* In 1907 the discount on the bills was no less than 600,000*l.*

Out of the proceeds of the 1903 loan outstanding bills were cancelled, *i.e.* added to the funded debt. But issues began again almost at once and have never since been entirely extinguished. In fact the floating debt, originally a mere advance for emergencies, has now become little more than a stage on the way to new funded debt.

Three special causes, apart from the general fact that expenditure has exceeded income, can be alleged in extenuation. The reforms of 1904 resulted in a reduction of the matricular contributions which had supplied the Government with means until the taxes came in, and the gap has had to be filled by bills. The further changes in 1906, introducing the system of 'deferred' contributions, have aggravated this evil. Finally the Imperial Post Office has to advance accident insurance money to claimants before the contributions have been collected from the unions of employers, which are ultimately liable. All these causes unite to reduce the working balance at the disposal of the Treasury and increase the need for bills. Once again the need for reform is pressing. More revenue and more balance in hand is essential. Unless the Government succeed in carrying their new taxes and their proposed reform of the matricular



contribution a return to moderation in the issues of Treasury bills seems impossible.

As we have seen, the Empire in 1871 became the heir of the Customs Union, and this implied leaving to the States most of the remaining source of income. From time immemorial the German States, hampered by no *doctrinaire* theories of State interference, had drawn considerable revenue from various State enterprises, such as mines, forests, domains; and these remained untouched by the erection of the Empire. It is a curious instance of the extent to which this principle was carried out that the forests of Alsace-Lorraine, which had belonged to the French Government, were assigned not to the German Imperial Government, but, on the analogy of the forests of Prussia and Bavaria, to the provincial Government of Alsace. As a result of this tendency, while the States are rich in non-tax revenue, the Empire is poor. The railways, for instance, are in most parts of Germany 'nationalised,' but the owner is Prussia, Hesse, or Bavaria, not the German Empire. If we take Prussia as an example we find her railways produced in 1908 a net profit of about 29,000,000*l.*, and their capital value is alone sufficient to cover all Prussian debt liabilities. For the sake of the railways the Government has become interested in coal mines, and about 14 per cent. of the total coal produce of Prussia comes from State mines. The State is the largest mineral proprietor in the kingdom, owning in 1906 thirty-five mines, twelve smelting works, five salt works, three stone quarries, and one amber works. It has over seven million acres of forest and about one million acres of farm land. Including railway profits it receives nearly 35,000,000*l.* a year net from its industrial enterprises.\*

The position of the Empire is very different. The revenue-producing undertakings which it directly controls are four in number—the Imperial post and telegraphs, assigned to it in 1871 (including all Germany except Bavaria and Württemberg †), the Imperial railways in Alsace-Lorraine (and latterly Luxemburg), the Imperial mint, and the Imperial printing press. The gross income from these four sources was estimated in 1908 at 38,000,000*l.*, and the expenditure on them at 32,000,000*l.*, leaving a net income of about 6,000,000*l.* In addition to these

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\* Prussia is exceptionally well off in revenue of this kind, but all the principal States receive substantial amounts from State enterprise, the grand total for all the States being about 50,000,000*l.*

† They paid a proportional contribution instead.

direct commercial interests the Government is indirectly concerned in various banks. The Reichsbank, for instance, nominally like the Bank of England a private company, pays to the Imperial Treasury three-fourths of any surplus remaining after paying  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. to its shareholders and a certain quota to its reserve fund, in addition to a tax on uncovered bank notes. In 1908 the revenue from these sources was over 1,000,000*l.* In addition about another 1,000,000*l.* was received in fees for various services—consular and patent fees, Baltic Sea Canal dues, seigniorage on coinage, &c.—making a total non-tax revenue of about 8,000,000*l.* a year.

Since 1871 the resources of taxation have not been developed to keep pace with increased requirements. A colonial empire has arisen, upon which 88,000,000*l.* is estimated to have been spent in the last twenty-two years. The navy, which cost on an average under two millions a year in 1872–5, cost over ten millions a year in 1901–5, and for the next ten years an outlay of nearly twenty-one millions annually is estimated. The army expenditure is one-third higher than in 1904; and a great system of social measures for the prevention of distress has been built up, with the result of heavy demands upon the Treasury. In 1883 compulsory insurance of workmen against sickness was introduced, in 1884 insurance against accidents by employers, in 1889 compulsory insurance of workmen by the workmen themselves against old age and infirmity, and in 1902 the so-called *Trimbornfonds* for the insurance of widows and orphans (amounting now to 2,600,000*l.*).

A cry for less expense arises from the Radical party. By resolution of last April they demand a simplification of administration, general economy, and the reduction of armaments 'in such a manner as will not endanger the international position of the German Empire.' But apart from the question of armaments the best organised government in the world is powerless to retrench beyond the extirpation of comparatively insignificant waste. If, with John Stuart Mill, we define civilisation as 'progressive desire' we must look the fact in the face that progressive expenditure is its necessary concomitant for nations as for individuals. The people demand more and more of the modern Government, sometimes a substitution of collective for individual expenditure, as in the case of education, sometimes a higher and more expensive standard, as in the case of public health and the regulation of industry, sometimes the assumption of new functions, as in the case of pensions for the old and infirm. The sphere of Government activity steadily expands. The audacious *mot* of Bastiat, '*L'Etat fait du mal quand même il fait*

'*du bien*,' and the thin wail of the ghost of Joseph Hume fall upon deaf ears or, if heard, provoke derision. A vague clamour for retrenchment in the abstract is a stultifying policy for Radical politicians, the essence of whose philosophy is the assurance that there is still much room for the State to devote its energies wisely to the performance of tasks which are less effectively discharged in the interests of the community by individuals, or are not performed at all.

Even in the matter of armaments the *doyen* and the most authoritative of financial writers, Professor Adolph Wagner of Berlin, stoutly maintains that Germany's expenditure on 'arms and bulwarks' (in which war ships are included) is in the true sense of the terms economic and reproductive, not only ensuring peace but tending to the development of foreign commerce by enhancing German prestige, and imposing respect for German enterprise and interests abroad. Prince Bülow has recently referred to the unfavourable strategic position of Germany upon the map of Europe. Her need of armed strength is felt by every citizen. The rising standard of comfort in the housing and feeding of troops, technical developments in the art of war and the efficacy of weapons, the demand for a strong Navy, compel new and increased expenditure. And the advocates of economy have not as yet indicated precisely any spot in the Budget to which the pruning-knife can properly be applied. Imperial expenditure has increased, is increasing, and must continue to increase. How is it to be met? The Bismarckian limitation of Imperial taxation to articles of consumption has tended in no small measure to produce the heavy and complicated tariff now in force. But a stage is reached sooner or later when revenue so raised becomes inelastic. A familiar principle of finance was exemplified after the Brussels Convention came into force (September 1, 1903) by the increased yield from reduced sugar duties in Germany,\* and the Customs tariff now offers little prospect of practicable amendment adequate to the needs of the Exchequer. The Zollverein, or Customs Union, paved the way to Federation. To revive internal customs is out of the question. The separate States, thus cut off from levying their own Customs and correlative Excise, are thrown back for the most part upon direct taxation: 52 per cent. of

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\* Significant also is the tax on railway tickets, graduated up to as much as 8s. on a first-class ticket of 50s., which caused such a falling-off of first-class passengers that the Prussian-Hessian Railway administration gave up running first-class carriages on many local lines last winter.

the State revenues are derived from income tax alone.\* Nor is it only the States which derive their main revenue from taxes on income. The local rates very largely consist of surtaxes on the State income tax; and the municipalities, like the States, would resent any interference by the Empire with their sources of revenue. According to the White Books, of the total local rates of Prussia 12,000,000*l.*, or rather over a third, is raised from a surtax on income; in Saxony the proportion is nearly three-eighths; in Hamburg, one-quarter; and so on. If we take individual towns the result is even more striking. In Prussia the local tax may not exceed 100 per cent. of the State tax except with special authority from the State administration, but the sanction has been not infrequently granted; 150 per cent. is regarded as a normal figure, and there are numerous cases in which the local income tax is more than double the State tax. Local financial burdens appear to the States almost unbearable, and they cling with desperation to their own resources. That the Empire should invade their sphere of direct taxation is, in their view, unconstitutional and inadmissible. They point to the Federal Constitutions of the United States and of Switzerland as examples of the wisdom of restraining the central Government from interference with the internal taxation of the unitary States; and their representatives in the Federal Council are unlikely to accept any scheme for altering the German Constitution to hamper their freedom in this respect. After much discussion whether inheritance duties are direct or indirect, there seems to be now a grudging assent to their being regarded as indirect taxation. The matricular contributions are in form an advance only from the separate States, to be repaid by the Imperial Government at the end of the year in so far as there is a surplus of revenue. The Empire, however, claims yearly from the States an excess. The States solemnly take note of the claim, without admitting it, and there is at the moment a considerable book debt claimed by the Empire, which seems destined to be ultimately funded as part of its dead-weight debt.

An increased quota or poll tax has been suggested, but is open to at least one obvious objection. It presses with unfair severity upon the poorer States and the poorer individuals. To provide

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\* Income tax is levied upon 'households' or families with 4*5*l. a year or over, whether householders or not. Other main sources of local taxation are taxes on land and buildings, trades or occupations, sales of real property, 'betterment,' dogs, entertainments, consumption of beer, etc.

for the needs of Empire by indirect taxation and a uniform poll tax is to place the heaviest burdens for Imperial purposes upon the weakest shoulders. Even if the Finance Minister of a State could so adjust the incidence of his internal taxation as to correct this inequality between the different classes of his community, it would still be true that the Imperial contribution from one State would be unduly high compared with that of a richer neighbour. Add to these difficulties the jealousies of urban and rural centres, of the industrial, manufacturing, mercantile, and agrarian interests, and the principles, prejudices, and passions of political parties, and we get the picture imagined by Wagner of the affrighted taxpayer praying, 'Dear Treasury! spare me! 'lay hold of my more tax-worthy neighbour!'

Strenuous efforts have been made to deal with the situation. Voluminous White Books laid before the Reichstag furnish a liberal education in German finance, its history and statistics, its local finance, the burden per State and per head, and a comparative study of the taxation of the United Kingdom, the U.S.A., France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Japan, designed to show that the German taxpayer is less heavily weighted than the foreigner. To examine this contention would take us too far. It can only be noted that the population of Germany is about 63 millions, the public debt of the Empire and the States together 848,000,000*l.*, and their annual expenditure about 409,000,000*l.* These figures exclude the municipalities and smaller local authorities, and take no account of assets or non-tax revenue.

In spite of the financial difficulties of the Empire no one seriously suggests that the taxable resources of the country are exhausted. The framework of its revenue was constructed before the great commercial and industrial expansion which has now become a commonplace. The machinery is rusty; but increased prosperity and population can certainly support increased taxes. It may be a matter of dispute whether the employer and the workman have shared equally in the prosperity, whether the better wages and improved factory conditions and industrial insurance—the latter largely paid for by workmen—are an adequate counterpoise to the rapid growth of commercial incomes. But that the general wealth has largely increased and the general standard of comfort risen are undeniable. Mr. Dawson quotes some striking trade statistics. In 1860 imports amounted to 53,750,000*l.* and exports to 70,000,000*l.*, or 1*l.* 12*s.* 8*d.* and 2*l.* 1*s.* 5*d.* respectively per head of population. In 1907 imports were 443,000,000*l.*, exports 356,000,000*l.*, or 7*l.* 2*s.* 10*d.* and 5*l.* 15*s.* per

head of population respectively. German merchant steamers have increased from 147 in 1871 to 1762 in 1906. The output of coal has increased from 29 million tons in 1871 to 138 million in 1906, of iron from 5 million tons in 1872 to 21 million in 1906. The production of pig iron has increased nearly tenfold; cotton imports have been trebled. Electrical works have increased in the ten years since 1894 from 148 to 1028, and so on with sugar, with paper, with chemical dyes—in fact, with almost every branch of industry.

With the growing economic expansion of the Empire the interest on Imperial loans declined from 4 per cent. in 1877 to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. in 1886, and, after some fluctuations, in 1895 to 3 per cent. But latterly the process has been reversed. The flotation of this large mass of debt, with which State and local debt kept pace, naturally affected the money market. The rate rose to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. in 1904, and to 4 per cent., where it still remains, in 1907. The rise has naturally depressed the inferior denominations. At the end of 1895 Three Per Cents stood at  $99\frac{3}{5}$ , Three and a Half Per Cents at  $105\frac{4}{5}$ . At the end of 1908 they stood at  $85\frac{1}{4}$  and  $94\frac{1}{2}$  respectively. Comparing stocks on a 3 per cent. basis, the best German stocks stood in 1908 at 83, English Consols at 103, and French Rentes at 96.

One-fifth of the debt is said to have been incurred for railways, Post Office, the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, and other revenue-producing undertakings. But for the remaining four-fifths there is little of permanent value to show. Of individual items army charges (chiefly fortifications), about 89,000,000*l.*, are easily the heaviest, followed by the navy with about 38,000,000*l.* German financiers have made repeated efforts to check the creation of unproductive debt, and in 1901 certain definite principles were laid down, forbidding the payment of current army and navy charges from loans, but these counsels of perfection have been eschewed in practice. It is useless to pay off debt if the necessary funds can only be obtained by borrowing at an equal or a higher rate.

The anxiety as to loan expenditure was the better founded because, apart from doubts as to the financial probity of military and naval loans, no practical provision was ever made for the redemption of debt. The general principle of Imperial finance as laid down in the Constitution is to apply surplus revenue to the reduction not of debt (which in 1871 did not exist), but of (1) next year's taxation, (2) matricular contributions. As a result debt redemption has only taken place in four years, the last of which was 1904, and only amounted in all to about 8,000,000*l.* Sinking fund there is none, except certain small

repayments from undertakings financed out of loans. The first attempt to create adequate machinery for redemption was made by the law of 1906, which enacted that from April 1, 1908, the estimates should provide for the extinction of at least  $\frac{3}{5}$  per cent. of the outstanding debt annually. This law has, however, remained a dead letter. The bill now before the Reichstag rests on a clear distinction between debt existing on September 30, 1909, and future debt, and further, as regards future debt between loans for remunerative and unremunerative undertakings. 'Old' debt is to be redeemed in forty-three years by a constant annuity of 1 per cent. of its amount, beginning with September 1909. Future debt is to be redeemed, as regards remunerative expenditure, at  $1\frac{9}{10}$ ths per cent. annually, *i.e.* in thirty years; as regards unremunerative expenditure, where such expenditure is to fall on loans at all, at 3 per cent. annually, *i.e.* in twenty-two years.

After allowing for stringent economy 'wherever possible' the Government estimate the annual amount of additional revenue needed to restore equilibrium to the imperial budgets at 500,000,000 marks (say 25,000,000*l.*) This large sum they propose to raise as follows:—

	Marks
Spirit monopoly .. .. .	100,000,000
Beer tax .. .. .	100,000,000
Wine .. .. .	20,000,000
Tobacco .. .. .	77,000,000
Electricity and gas .. .. .	50,000,000
Advertisements .. .. .	33,000,000
Death duties .. .. .	92,000,000
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In round figures .. .. .	475,000,000
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The balance is to be made up by doubling the uncovered matricular contributions, making them 80 pfennigs per head.

It will be seen that this programme attempts to keep within the traditional preserve of Imperial finance. Nothing of the nature of an imperial Income tax finds place in it. The doubling of the matricular contribution is of course a serious matter for the States, and no doubt ultimately means the taxation of income by them, but it has its compensations in leaving to them income, and in the fact that, owing to the proposed abolition of assignments and the fixing of the amount of the uncovered contributions, the uncertainty which under the old system ruined the State budgets is put an end to. From the point of view of the Imperial Treasury it is an advance to have got uncovered contributions recognised

as such, and it will, no doubt, be an advantage when faced by importunate demands for money to be able to plead that the amount at its disposal is fixed. The difficulties of the proposal are that politically it withdraws from the Reichstag the only tax over which it had annual control, and economically it leaves untouched the essential vice of the matricular contribution—its unequal incidence.

This fact adds fuel to the ardour of the Radical and Socialist parties, who (to some extent supported by the professional economists) attack the Government proposals on the ground that they increase the burden of indirect taxation. Of the 500,000,000 marks, 300,000,000 are to be derived from indirect taxation. The Empire has, it is urged, benefited the 'capitalistic' classes more than the working men. Insurance and similar benefits are mostly paid for by working men, and though it may be formally true, as Dr. Zahn and others contend, that indirect taxation is heavier in other countries, in practice the burden on the working man is heavier in Germany, where poorer men pay income tax than in England, and the average workman's income is smaller, while indirect taxation is on such necessaries as meat, corn, sugar, salt and petroleum, the average family to be supported is larger, and military service is compulsory for two years, with pay as a common soldier of about 4*d.* a day. Finally, it is often argued that the consumer pays far more than the revenue returns show, though this argument is used in favour of direct taxation rather than against the particular indirect taxes now proposed, of which that on beer alone (in Germany) can be called a tax on a staple article of consumption.

The specific proposals as regards indirect taxes are as follows:—

The existing spirit excise duties are to be abolished, and in their place the Empire alone will buy raw spirit from the distiller at a fixed price. This will be refined under the direction of a special board and sold for further manufacture and retail trade to private dealers. A slight increase in cost and general savings on centralisation are expected to produce the estimated amount of 100,000,000 marks a year for the State. Beer is to be subject to an increased excise tax of about 2*s.* to 2*s.* 6*d.* per hectolitre (say, 1*d.* per gallon), and still wines to a fixed tax of 1*s.* 2*d.* a bottle, with a tax graduated from 1*d.* to 3*s.* if the selling price exceeds 1*s.* a bottle; the duty on sparkling wines is also to be increased.

On tobacco, cigars, and cigarettes, an increased excise duty will be levied according to a graduated scale.

Beer, spirits, and tobacco were the 'popular favourites' for increased taxation, and no general outcry has been raised against



what was generally regarded as a foregone conclusion. The trades concerned are of course adverse. The South German Manufacturers' Union and the North German Brewers' Association have denounced the beer tax as an unfair burden on a tottering trade, just as Hesse and Baden repudiate the wine tax. But the general impression is that as long as the balance is held evenly between wine and beer the proposals will go through. In the already highly centralised condition of the spirit industry the proposed Government monopoly is not over revolutionary. The chief interest concerned—the agrarian potato-growers—will probably not offer a determined resistance to this part of the Government programme, or may not feel sufficiently affected to resist the appeal to patriotism and the needs of German policy, though the Chambers of Commerce have protested against it as a State invasion of private enterprise.

Revision of the beer duties is complicated by the fact that in Alsace-Lorraine, Baden, Bavaria, and Württemberg the Imperial brewing tax is not levied. These States tax their own beer, and a transit duty is charged upon it on export to other places beyond their own frontiers. The Imperial brewing duty is lower than the rate charged in South Germany,\* and much below the taxes levied in foreign countries. Tobacco also is lightly taxed. And there is undoubtedly room and (it is suggested) moral and hygienic reason for screwing up these duties in a country where so much beer and tobacco are consumed. But to touch beer involves revising the wine and spirit duties, and these arouse particularist objection from the provinces specially affected. We have our own problem of the financial relations of Great Britain and Ireland. But the German problem is much more intricate. The federated States have their own sovereigns, their own finances, and except for certain 'common' interests are autonomous. Apart from these political and geographical considerations the question of fairness between class and class is also serious. Custom-house statistics cannot solve it. A protective tariff with no corresponding excise duty masks its effects in higher prices for untaxed meat and corn produced at home. It was stated in the Reichstag on March 2, 1907, that, 'owing to the incidence of the duties on bread and meat alone, the Germans pay 1*l.* 10*s.* 6*d.* per head per annum, though the Customs returns, based on mere imports, only show a tax per head of 3*s.*' Professor Marshall observes in his memorandum upon the Fiscal Policy of International Trade that 'indiscriminating import duties, imposed to gratify power-

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\* The yield is about 5½ marks per head in Bavaria as against 80 pfennigs in North Germany.

'ful interests, and not needed to protect any nascent industry, 'have (partly, indeed, by strengthening cartels, or trade combinations) so raised prices against the consumer that the real wages of the German workmen have risen less rapidly than those of the English.' The rise of prices has been accompanied by a rise of wages. The Imperial and the States Governments have been compelled to increase considerably the wages of their numerous officials—25 millions of marks in Bavaria alone this year. Employers foresee the necessity of a further increase in the prices of manufactured articles and are apprehensive of the result upon their trade. So subtle and pervasive are the effects of tariff policy! The policy of Protection is, however, firmly rooted in Germany. The Empire depends largely upon Customs for its revenue. The import duties upon agricultural articles are fixed for twelve years to come, and the manufacturing interests are not to be persuaded that the agrarians alone should be 'protected.' On the other hand, to quote Professor Marshall again,

'Germany, like the United States, owes much of her strength to the large population within her borders, among whom there is absolute free trade.\* . . . The Zollverein, following an earlier Swiss, and a still earlier French, precedent, was the most important movement towards free trade that the world has ever seen, except the contemporary reform of the British fiscal system.'

Since the formation of the Zollverein the Empire has enmeshed itself deep in the web of Protection, and from this position it is, as is seen from the difficulties of tariff revision in the United States, not easy to effect even partial extrication. Free Trade may reckon among its advantages free finance—freedom from entanglement with partial interests.

The remaining taxes—electricity, advertisements, and death duties—provoke much criticism. Nearly all the industrial centres are in active opposition to the electricity tax. Many works use the power as well as the illuminant, and it is argued that industry will be crippled by such a tax, even though the law discriminates slightly in favour of power. Municipalities, such as Berlin, Munich, Frankfort, and Düsseldorf, own gas and electricity undertakings, and are urging their cause vigorously. Electricity is alleged to be really a necessity, not a luxury, so that to tax it means a retrograde step to less hygienic methods of lighting and in favour of petroleum, an imported product. Finally Bavaria, an agricultural country just about to develop the resources of her natural water power in the production of

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\* There is, as we have seen, a slight exception in the case of beer.

electrical power, resents the tax as a handicap in favour of the industrial Rhine districts and the large Westphalian coalfields. The Government is unlikely to hold out against the powerful antagonisms aroused, and the tax is generally regarded as doomed.

The advertisement tax, a graduated tax from 2 per cent. to 20 per cent. of the charge for advertisements on all printed business advertisements in newspapers or at advertising stations, is not a very large matter ; but it is naturally unpopular with the commercial classes. It is also regarded in some quarters as likely to encourage disguised puffs, and so to degrade the press.

The Imperial death duties have already been summarily rejected by the Budget Commission of the Reichstag, although the Government attach great importance to them. Under the existing law legacies to direct descendants are untaxed, though since 1906 distant relations pay a tax of which, as we have seen, one-third goes to the State and two-thirds to the Empire. The present proposal consists of two parts—first, that a graduated tax of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 3 per cent. shall be levied on all estates of over 1000*l.*, whatever the degree of kinship between the testator and the legatee may be ; and secondly that in the case of intestate estates inheritance shall be limited to husband and wife and to relatives of the first and second degree. In their default the estate falls to the Exchequer. Finally the share of the States in the death duties is to be reduced to one-quarter.

This proposal has been violently denounced in spite of the fact that Germany is almost the only country where such a tax does not exist. All the usual arguments against death duties have been advanced with extreme rancour, and notably that it means the end of German family life. The Conservative party in particular, in spite of the special concessions offered to East Prussian landowners, have not minced their language on the matter, and the Agrarian League recently treated Prof. Wagner, who attempted to argue the question before them, with some disrespect. Beneath a great deal of prejudice there is no doubt something in the argument that death duties menace seriously the heavily mortgaged East Prussian landlord. Economically the German Government is not prepared to abandon its chief corn-growers ; politically it is unwilling to break up the *bloc* ; and from a national point of view it cannot look with indifference on the interests of the country-party from which its army officers and its best recruits are very largely drawn. Politically and socially the Conservatives are very powerful, and it is hard to see how the Government can force them, if it cannot conciliate them. The Clericals are hardly less antagonistic to death duties, and it will

be almost impossible to make progress with the proposal while these lions are in the path.

The opponents of the Government offer no alternative. They content themselves with a mere *non possumus*. The official proposals hold the field. The permanent secretary to the Imperial Treasury has been entrusted with the unusual task of first introducing them to the country and of attempting to commend their necessity and their wisdom to the public by a signed article in the *Deutsche Rundschau* for October last. And Professor Wagner—Grand Old Man of Finance—by pamphlet and speech has fervidly appealed to the intellect and the patriotism of his countrymen. The new taxes on brandy, wine, beer, and tobacco will amount to eleven marks a head, instead of six. What, asks the Professor, of that? In the United States, the land of freedom, they yield fourteen and a half, in France seventeen to eighteen, in the United Kingdom, the land of political equality, twenty-four. The State takes one mark a head for the tax on petroleum, the light of the poor. A burden, yes! But how much more severe a burden is borne for the benefit of the Standard Oil Company! And how can we justify the luxury of our untaxed electric light while our poorer brethren use taxed petroleum? All classes must take their share in the common effort for the common good. The German working classes contribute heavily on necessary articles of food (including tea, cocoa, and coffee)—as much as ten marks a head; France only eight and a half, England six and a half, the United States three and a half. An estate duty does but redress the balance. We ask for two to three marks a head. In France it is four to five, in England eight. Invade the family? I have never known a tax which does not. Is our family spirit weaker than that of England, or of pure Germanic races like the German-Austrian, the Dutch, &c.? It was said by them of old time ‘Noblesse oblige’; nowadays ‘Richesse oblige.’ Are not our *nouveaux riches*, with their extravagant luxury, ashamed to cry out upon the taxes necessary to our national existence as ‘unbearable’? Remember that we have not only much individual wealth but are collectively better endowed than any nation with Government railways, mines, forests, and other property. Our great inheritance is built up by the taxes as well as the blood of our forerunners, and shall we commit waste upon it, mortgaging our future, by falling below the example of the smallest and poorest countries of Europe in failing to pay our way in times of peace? Increasing debt and diminishing credit are bad preparation for times of war. The Empire is in danger unless we broaden its basis of taxation. Let us lay aside grumbling and party strife and think a little more of duty to our Kaiser and our country!

This faint and free paraphrase ends upon a note not often heard in British finance. Our writers more often speak of taxation as a 'necessary evil,' and take pride in our 'wholesome impatience of taxation.' The contrary view is emphasised by Professor Cohn, of Göttingen, in his 'Science of Finance,' well known to English students through an American translation. We pay, he argues, our grocer and baker and our domestic servants without animosity, without exaggerated feelings of virtue, and surely we should pay with equal alacrity our debts to the State for services rendered, services indispensable and invaluable.

The views of the professors are of serious practical importance. The higher civil servants are required to undergo three years' university study of law and political sciences and to pass two examinations, the first in public and private law, the second in constitutional and administrative law, political economy, and the science of finance. Before this second examination they must have had two years' practical training with one of the higher courts, and two years with some administrative authority. They find in their professors men who are not content with a handful of general principles and a head full of musty research, but are keenly alive to new facts at home and abroad. The deservedly high esteem in which the professors of finance are held by their old pupils in Government circles gives their opinions great weight in financial policy.

A Yorkshire blacksmith once preached an effective lay sermon upon the text 'Those that have turned the world upside down are come hither.' 'From this,' he began, 'we learn three things—' first, the world is wrong side up; second, she's got to be righted; ' and third, we're the lads to do it!' Prince Bülow's financial sermon is not dissimilar. Whether it will carry conviction remains to be seen. It is a truism that finance depends on policy. But finance reacts on policy; and assuming as we do that the new resources will be obtained in some form or other, their recoil will impose a strain upon the nation which, how cheerfully soever it may be borne, will not be without importance in the industrial and political future of Germany. Confidence in the wisdom of the Government is a more robust article of faith with the professors than it is with the man in the street. Sacrifices are submitted to by people who are convinced of their necessity. But it must be expected that the necessity will be more and more closely questioned. The Kaiser is consecrated 'with a drop of democratic oil.' His power rests ultimately upon the taxes of the people. With the increase of those taxes the people will become increasingly critical of Imperial policy, until the power of the purse brings it finally within their effective control.

## ART. II.—HALLEY'S COMET.

1. *The Perturbations of Halley's Comet in the Past.* By P. H. COWELL, F.R.S., and A. C. D. CROMMELIN. Monthly notices of the Royal Astronomical Society. Vol. lxxviii., 1907-08.
2. *Halley's Comet: an evening discourse to the British Association at their meeting in Dublin.* By H. H. TURNER, F.R.S., Savilian Professor of Astronomy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1908.
3. *Observations of Comets from B.C. 611 to A.D. 1640. Extracted from the Chinese Annals.* By JOHN WILLIAMS. London: Printed for the Author. 1871.

[And other works].

A FAMOUS panel of the Bayeux tapestry shows Harold quaking on his throne, while his people huddle together with fingers pointed at a horrid comet in the sky, and the birds upon the roof-tree scream an alarm. 'Isti mirant stellā,' says the label above the heads of the people; below is the fleet of boats of the invaders whose coming was portended by the appearance of Halley's comet in the spring before the Norman conquest of England.

In the spring of this year the comet is approaching once more, on its eleventh return since the Conquest, and the world—for in these days the world is brought up by the newspapers to expect an immediate knowledge or even an anticipation of astronomical discoveries—the world is waiting for the news that the comet has been rediscovered upon a photographic plate. A few weeks, or at the worst, a few months will show how far success has attended upon the remarkable labour which has been devoted in England, within the last two years, to the prediction of all the circumstances of the coming return of the comet which is peculiarly English, and with which is bound up the history of one of the greatest events to the State and of the most splendid triumph of English science, the establishment of the universal law of gravitation. Meanwhile it is timely to look back at the history of the comet, and in particular to notice the very great extension backward that has been given to its history during the seventy-four years that have passed since its last return.

The student of chronology is familiar with the fact that several critical dates are determinable by the records of astronomical events, for the most part eclipses of the sun. And it has sometimes been remarked that such cases are more common

than they should be by the laws of chance. A total eclipse of the sun at any given place is a very rare event ; a decisive battle is a rare event. What, then, is the probability that a total eclipse shall coincide with a decisive battle, or more, shall render it decisive ? The eclipse predicted by Thales is said by Herodotus to have put an end to a battle between the Medes and the Lydians. Another total eclipse marked the advance of the army of Xerxes to Abydos. A third favoured the escape of the fleet of Agathocles from Syracuse. Recent years have seen a fierce renewal of the scientific battle over these eclipses, whether the accounts of the historians are so unimpeachable that it is safe to found upon them any certainty of conclusion which may supply a test of modern theories of the motion of the moon. It is hard to decide whether in this contest the credit of the historians or of the existing lunar theory has suffered greater damage. 'Apud Herodotum sunt innumerabiles fabulæ,' quotes Mr. Cowell when he wishes to throw overboard the historian's account of the eclipse of Thales. We may hope that this question of probabilities will be discussed some day after the manner of Monsieur Poincaré :

' Je joue à l'écarté avec un monsieur que je sais parfaitement honnête ; il va donner ; quelle est la probabilité pour qu'il tourne le roi ? C'est une huitième ; c'est là un problème des effets. Je joue avec un monsieur que je ne connais pas ; il a donné dix fois et il a tourné six fois le roi ; quelle est la probabilité pour que ce soit un grec ? C'est là un problème de probabilité des causes.\*

But making all allowance for the probability that the historian may be ' un grec ' in the worse sense, or at any rate may be over ready to amalgamate traditions of wonders in the sky with the history of stirring events upon land, there still seems to be a conjunction of historic eclipses with historic battles sufficiently remarkable to make us take a lenient view of the popular belief in omens, the superstition that dies so hard. Coincidences, indeed, dwell long in the memory ; the absence of a coincidence excites no remark. The apparent connexion of eclipses with battlefields may then, doubtless, be explained, upon the principle which Monsieur Poincaré uses in his treatment of *Rouge et Noir* :

' Quand la rouge est sortie, par exemple, six fois de suite, ils mettent sur la noire, croyant jouer à coup sûr ; parceque, disent-ils, il est bien rare que la rouge sort sept fois de suite. En réalité, leur probabilité de gain reste  $\frac{1}{2}$ . L'observation montre, il est vrai,

\* La Science et l'Hypothèse, p. 222.

que les séries de sept rouges consécutives sont très rares ; mais, les séries de six rouges suivies d'une noire sont tout aussi rares. Ils ont remarqué la rareté des séries de sept rouges ; s'ils n'ont pas remarqué la rareté des séries de six rouges et une noire, c'est uniquement parceque des pareilles séries frappent moins l'attention.'

It would be interesting to see the incidence of historic eclipses submitted to the calculus of probabilities.

The case of historic comets is different. A total eclipse of the sun is visible for a few minutes over a narrow belt on one side of the earth. A comet may be visible to the greater part of the world for weeks or months. Small wonder, then, that there are few poor comets without a catastrophe. The coincidences become striking only when great events in widely separated times are associated with the same comet.

In this respect Halley's comet is unique. Alone among the comets which belong to the sun's family and reappear in due season, Halley's comet is a conspicuous object. Unlike the insignificant though vastly interesting comets of Encke and Biela, Halley's comet has a history extending backwards many centuries before the invention of the telescope. The problem which has only in the last few months been completely solved, is the certain identification of its more remote appearances.

In the year 1704 Edmund Halley was appointed to one of the Savilian chairs at Oxford, and immediately he set to work to calculate the orbits of all comets which he could find sufficiently well observed.

'It does not seem probable,' says Professor Turner, 'that when he set out on this gigantic task, Halley had any expectation of the reward which he actually obtained ; he was moved simply by his enthusiasm for the great discovery of Newton, and by his joy in using it to some purpose in calculating orbits for those mysterious comets, which less than half a century before "all the world had been persuaded," according to M. Auzout, "could not be reduced to any laws."'

Of his twenty-four comets three, he found, moved in orbits which were very nearly the same. Could the comets which came to perihelion on 1531 August 24, 1607 October 16, and 1682 September 4, be the same comet making successive returns to the sun ? 'Twas a bold idea, for Newton only a few years before had scouted the possibility that the two appearances of the comet of 1680, before and after its passage through the glare of the sun's rays, might belong to one and the same body ; how much more improbable that a connexion might be traced between apparitions seventy-five years apart.



Against the identity of path was to be set the circumstance that the intervals between the supposed successive returns were unequal, by a difference of thirteen months. If the comet returned again and again, it must be in effect a planet of the solar system. But if it were, why did it not conform to the planetary laws and perform its revolutions in equal intervals of time? Halley's intelligence showed at its keenest in the answer which he gave to this riddle. Jupiter and Saturn, he said, disturb the motions of each other to the extent of a few days in their periodic times; much more easily might they disturb the motion of a comet in its sensitive eccentric path—sensitive because it would need but a small acceleration of the comet's motion to send it away altogether. So Halley staked his reputation upon a prediction, that the comet would return in 1758, and in the oft-quoted sentence expressed his faith: 'Hoc primum ab homine Anglo inventum fuisse non inficiabitur aequa posteritas.'

Before the epoch of that return the possibilities of calculating the action of the planets upon the comet had been so much improved in the hands of the French geometers that a delay in that return, foreseen but not evaluated by Halley, could be fairly explained as agreeing in the main with the theory. But so far were mathematicians from the goal which has, in fact, only just now been attained, that no one could say how great might be that variation in the time of its return which had been remarked already by Halley. All that was known was, that the comet returned about every seventy-five years. The magnitude of the uncertainty is shown in the complete failure of the early attempts to trace back into the remote past the history of the comet.

Seventy-four years ago a writer in this REVIEW reconstructed that history upon the basis of the seventy-five year period. The first recorded appearance of Halley's comet he placed in the year B.C. 131, when a comet is said to have signalled the birth of Mithridates the Great. After six periods of seventy-five and a-half years a comet appeared in the sign Virgo. Seventy-six years later there appeared a comet 'prodigosæ magnitudinis, horribilis aspectu, comam ad terram usque demittere visus.' After another interval of two periods a comet appeared at the time of the second capture of Rome by Totila, king of the Ostrogoths. Five revolutions later a comet is recorded in the year 930, and another in 1005. Three revolutions then pass unrecorded, and the comet makes its appearance in 1230. In 1305 it is supposed to have brought the Great Plague; in 1380 it appeared without disastrous consequences; and so

we come to its celebrated apparition in 1456, of which we shall speak later. The writer of 1835 very properly insists that the sole test of the identity of these comets with that of Halley is the coincidence of the times of their appearance, as nearly as historical records enable us to ascertain, with the epochs at which the comet of Halley might have been expected to appear. The criterion is the interval of seventy-five years. The value of this criterion may be judged from the fact that, with the exception of the last, all these identifications are wrong.

It is easy, in the light of our recent knowledge, to discover the cause of this error: the attractions of the planets can alter the period by a couple of years on either side of seventy-six. Working back from 1456 June, we find that the duration of the preceding revolution was seventy-seven and a half years, which brings us to 1378 November instead of to 1380. The preceding revolution again occupied seventy-seven years, which takes us back to 1301 instead of to the year of the Great Plague. And so by the increment of error our identifications come wider and wider from the truth. They were based only on a supposed knowledge of the average period of the comet, for before 1456 there were no observations recorded in Europe which could make it possible 'to trace even with the rudest degree of approximation the paths of those comets, the times of whose appearances raise a presumption of their identity with that of Halley.'

The chronicles of Europe give us an occasional rough date, but hardly ever even the vaguest account of the quarter of the heavens in which it appeared, of the way in which it moved, or of the length of time for which it was seen. We have just seen how much worse than useless are dates alone in tracing the history of Halley's comet. No real progress is possible until we can find some record of the comet's path. It is hopeless to look for such details in the annals of barbaric Europe, but they can be dug out of the histories of Chinese civilisation and the encyclopædia of the great Ma Twan Lin, who wrote a thousand years ago. The first step towards a definite solution of the problem was made, then, when Pingré in his '*Cométographie*' published two lists of Chinese comets, the one extracted from the Chinese history '*Tung Keen Kang Muh*,' the other apparently a concise summary of the list in the encyclopædia. It was not, however, until after the appearance of the comet in 1835 that any serious attempt was made to work the mine of information in Pingré and in the more extensive translations from the Chinese published in 1843 by M. Edouard Biot. In 1846, however, M. Laugier identified four ancient returns of

the comet by actually calculating orbits from the precise records of the Chinese historians. And in 1850 Mr. J. R. Hind contributed to the Royal Astronomical Society the remarkable paper which was until a few months ago the last word upon the subject.

Basing his work entirely on the Chinese annals, Mr. Hind succeeded in carrying back the history of Halley's comet with great appearance of probability to the date B.C. 11. He showed that it was probably the comet of the Norman Conquest; the comet of A.D. 684, whose picture in the Nuremberg Chronicle is the earliest known representation of a comet; the comet which appeared about the time of the battle at Châlons-sur-Marne, in 451, when Attila the Hun was defeated by the combined armies of the Romans and Goths. Going still further back, we have it on the authority of Hind that it was Halley's comet which was seen in Europe in the year 218, shortly before the death of the Emperor Opilius Macrinus; that it was the sign in the shape of a sword which hung over Jerusalem in the year A.D. 66, before the destruction of the city by Titus; and finally, that—

'one of the most certain apparitions of this body took place in the year B.C. 11, reckoning according to the manner of astronomers. It was observed, according to Dion Cassius, under the consulate of M. Messala Barbatus and P. Sulpicius Quirinus, before the death of Agrippa, and seemed as though it were suspended over the city of Rome.'

It is important to notice that the probability of the truth of this remarkable history rested in Hind's time upon the similarity of the paths, as deduced from the Chinese observations, combined with the tolerable regularity of the periods between the successive returns of the comet. We have seen that the latter condition is altogether insufficient by itself to carry the history very far, and that European records failed in the point which was of vital importance. Dion Cassius mentions the eclipse before the death of Agrippa; but to him the omen was the important matter; so long as the comet was to be seen its position in the sky was of no interest to him. The western records fail, in fact, precisely where the western astronomers failed for so many centuries; the astronomers did not observe, being content to theorise; the annalists had no reason to think that anyone could possibly be interested in the precise apparent position among the stars of the wandering bodies which were supposed to be at any rate in the sublunary spaces, if not always in the actual atmosphere. It may be well to show the contrast

by quoting the Chinese account of this comet of B.C. 11, as translated by Williams :

‘ In the first year of the epoch Yuen Yen, the seventh moon, day Sin Wei, there was a comet in the eastern part of Tsing. Its course was towards Woo Choo How. It appeared to the north of Ho Shoo, and advanced towards Heen Yuen and Tae Wei. It afterwards progressed at the rate of about six degrees in a day. In the morning it was seen in the east. On the thirtieth day in the evening it appeared in the west. It passed over Tsze Fe and other neighbouring stars. It afterwards went into Ta Ho Tang, in the middle of Tsze Kung. It then passed round Teen Ho, and having left the boundaries of — How it went to the south, and passed over Ta Keo and Che Te. It entered Teen She, and remained there during that lunation. It advanced slowly to the middle of Teen She, and afterwards left it to the west. On the fifty-sixth day it set with Tsang Lung.’ \*

This is not a solitary instance. The collection by Williams of 372 comets recorded in the Chinese annals between B.C. 611 and A.D. 1621 contains many such accounts. The mine has been fairly worked out for records of Halley's comet, but it is rash to suppose that there is not to be found in it evidence for others of the same periodic character. Moreover, there exist other Chinese collections more extensive than those of Ma Twan Lin ; greater than the great dynastic history which Williams (erroneously, we are informed) called the She Ke. It is to be hoped greatly that these records may be searched and translated without delay, for they may contain much of astronomical value besides the comets. The annals of the Near East have too often been found vague and unsatisfactory in the critical points of the account of an eclipse of the Sun : whether it was fully total and where it was observed. We can but hope that the ancient observations of the Far East may in the near future add fuel to the fire of controversy which rages around the interpretation of old eclipses whenever they are discussed.

We have seen what light the Chinese records throw on the history of Halley's comet. Briefly it amounts to this, that at intervals of from seventy-five to seventy-nine years, right back at least to the year B.C. 11, comets have appeared whose orbits have been similar to, but not identical with, the present orbit of our comet. The presumption is strong that all the apparitions belong to one and the same comet. But there can be no certainty on the matter until investigation has been made,

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\* The Encyclopædia of Ma Twan Lin.

whether the gravitational influence of the planets upon the motion of the comet can explain precisely the changes in the period and the variations in the shape and the place of the orbit. Halley's acuteness had enabled him to see in a general way that the action of Jupiter would retard the return of 1759. The French mathematicians who had the sagacity to break away from the methods of Newton—impracticable those methods were in any hands but his own—dealt fully and satisfactorily with the task of carrying forward the perturbations; but until two years ago no one had had the courage to face the much more formidable task of carrying them far backwards into antiquity. For more than forty years, indeed, no attention had been paid to the subject. Monsieur le Comte de Pontécoulant in 1864 predicted that the comet would return to perihelion on 1910, May 24, and there the matter had been allowed to rest until 1906, December, when Mr. Crommelin, of the Royal Observatory, Greenwich, communicated to the Royal Astronomical Society of London a short paper which inaugurates a new epoch in the history. He pointed out, in the first place, that there were some obvious numerical errors in the published account of Pontécoulant's work, and that it was difficult to know how far they might be vital to the success of his prediction. Moreover, there was in existence the material for a second prediction, which differed from the first by no less than two and three-quarter years. The second prediction was derived from a remarkable paper published in 1862 by Dr. J. A. Ångström, of Upsala. Accepting as accurate all Hind's identifications of the returns of the comet, Dr. Ångström showed that all the irregularities in the times of return could be represented fairly well by an empirical curve with two principal inequalities of long periods, which he supposed to be due to the action of Jupiter and Saturn. Nevertheless, in the main the curve was empirical; it depended on experience and not on theory; and everyone knows how often such curves go wrong in the most unexpected way directly they are used in forecasting. The discordance between the two predictions, moreover, was gross.

'Exact numerical computation,' said Mr. Crommelin, 'is entitled to far more weight than an empirical method. But it is difficult not to feel some slight uneasiness about the matter, when we consider the extreme length and intricacy of the calculations, and the possibility that some important numerical error may have escaped detection. . . . One can hardly imagine a greater loss of prestige to astronomy than that which would arise if there were a notable error in the prediction of this return of the comet, after the wonderful success achieved in 1759 and 1835.'

The danger of such a catastrophe was short-lived. At the very next meeting of the Society, a month later, it was announced that Messrs. Cowell and Crommelin had joined forces in undertaking to compute the perturbations of Halley's comet, and that already they were prepared to say that '1910 May is the correct date within a month for the next perihelion passage.' Pontécoulant, then, was essentially right; Ångström's curve failed utterly; and this suggested that perhaps many of Hind's earlier identifications, upon which the curve depended, might be wrong.

There is a point beyond which it becomes impossible to present the methods of astronomical research in untechnical language, and in such work as that under notice the point is passed almost at the outset. In such an extended enterprise, economy of labour was imperative. Mr. Cowell's masterly manner of deriving the maximum of result from the minimum of effort—and of expounding it in the absolute minimum of words—had been shown already in his discussion of the Greenwich observations of the moon's motion. He has applied to the problem of Halley's comet certain devices which facilitate the computation in a remarkable way; in particular he has shown how to avoid a great portion of the mechanical quadratures—an operation laborious in the extreme—by the use of a certain definite integral. But we have already passed the limit beyond which they speak no language but the mathematical, and we must be content with gathering up such fragments of our own tongue as are interspersed, rarely, in the splendid series of papers published last year by Messrs. Cowell and Crommelin.\*

De Pontécoulant had carried his calculations back to the apparition of 1531; the identity of the returns of 1456 and 1378 was universally admitted; but there was fair doubt about the appearance of 1301. In their first paper 'On the Perturbations of Halley's Comet in the Past,' our authors succeed in removing this doubt, and establish the authenticity of Hind's identification.

'The long discussion as to the identity of the comet of 1301 is thus happily ended. Dr. Galle, in his *Cometenbahnen*, says of the comet of 1378: "Die erste als sicher zu betrachtende Erscheinung des Halley'schen Cometen." We may now claim to have brought the "sicher" returns one revolution further back, and to have thus obtained a firm starting-point for further investigations, which have, in fact, already been commenced. . . . Hind rejected the European observations entirely, and showed that the Chinese ones

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\* Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society.

could be well represented by the Halley elements. Our result indicates that he was justified in this course; it is rather a curious reversal of the present relations of European and Chinese astronomy.'

With the energetic assistance of three volunteer computers, the reconnaissance was pushed forward rapidly into the past—the nationality of one of the investigators justifies this figure of speech—and we soon arrive at the comet of 1222, which was a splendid comet observed both in Europe and in China. At first there is some trouble with the Chinese account, and our authors are disposed to admit a juggling with the description, in the manner of those who deal with ancient eclipses—witness the treatment of the eclipse at Stiklastad during the battle at which Olaf the Fat was killed in the year 1030 \*—but in the end 'they are somewhat doubtful whether the [Chinese] date 'September 15 for the comet being in Yew She Te may not be 'right after all; if so, the European dates require alteration.' In any event, the year 1222 is certain, and Hind, who put the apparition in 1223, is wrong for the first time.

Two revolutions further back, Hind's identification of Halley's comet with the comet of the Norman Conquest is fully established—the computed date differing only four days from that derived by Hind from the Chinese records quoted above. And it is interesting to note that the conditions in 1145 and 1066 were not unlike those predicted for the return in 1910.

But we must cut short a long story. Messrs. Cowell and Crommelin have calculated the perturbations of the comet back to the year B.C. 87, one return earlier than Hind's earliest, at which remote date 'in the second year of the epoch How Yuen, 'the seventh moon, there was a comet in the East.' Beyond this is a probable return in B.C. 240, in the seventh year of the reign of Che Hwang; and a possible return in B.C. 467, when 'in the second year of the Emperor Ching Ting Wang a comet 'was seen.' Here the investigation is brought to a standstill by the absence of observational material. How much there may be in those untranslated encyclopædias which surpass that of Ma Twan Lin, we have yet to learn. But we are informed that before the year B.C. 800 Chinese dates begin to be somewhat uncertain, and that although, according to tradition, the introduction of astronomical observations is to be attributed to Shin Nung, whose reign commenced about B.C. 3253, there is only too much reason to fear that the early history of Halley's comet is irrecoverable.

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\* Monthly Notices, December 1906, p. 136.

The achievement of Messrs. Cowell and Crommelin is so recent that, while it is easy to realise its importance as a final contribution to the history of the comet, it is early to estimate its bearing upon a larger problem which is at present of immediate interest : the question whether the gravitation law of Newton is sufficient to explain all the motions of the solar system. It frequently happens that when a question has been for long shrouded in obscurity, the illumination, when it comes, comes simultaneously from several quarters. How the earth, solidifying from a spheroidal figure of revolution, had reached its present shape, had long been a puzzle. Almost at the same moment Professor Sollas published his conclusion that the earth had not solidified from a spheroid but from a pear-shaped figure ; and Professor Jeans showed how the pear-shaped figure arises naturally when one frees the ordinary theory of rotating fluid bodies from the unnatural, but mathematically easier, assumption that they are incompressible. For many years Mr. Osmond Fisher had contended that the crust of the earth was about forty miles thick, and rested or floated upon a liquid interior. Mathematicians of the heaviest calibre were unanimously against him. But simultaneously Mr. Strutt brought forward arguments to show that the composition of the earth must change at a depth of about forty miles, or the heat produced by its content of radium would melt it ; and Professor Milne showed with his seismographs that there is the appearance of a sudden change in the structure of the earth at precisely that depth of forty miles. In the same way, the question of the sufficiency of gravitational theory has suddenly been attacked from several sides at once. What is the matter with the moon, that she has celebrated the completion of the theory of her motion by an inexplicable departure from it ? What was it that happened to Encke's comet when on three separate occasions it suddenly altered that acceleration to its motion which is in itself the completest of mysteries ? Is there some matter or some force in space outside the range of our present knowledge ; and if so, does the motion of Halley's comet show any signs of it ? These are questions which are more easily asked than answered ; but the fact that they can be asked seriously, and without a suspicion of a paradoxical mind, is significant of the change which is rapidly coming over our conceptions of interplanetary space and of the forces which are acting in it.

During the few years that have passed of the present century the moon has been running away from the place that is predicted for her in the ' Nautical Almanac.' It is not the first time that she has done so ; from time to time the lunar tables have had to



be patched up with empirical corrections derived from observation. But it has always been possible to suppose that there might be errors in the confessedly imperfect theory of her motion that might account for the discordance. Within the last few years, however, the theory has been completed by Professor Brown, of Cambridge and Haverford; and it is admitted that the theory is complete in determining with precision the action of every known mass of matter upon the moon. Nevertheless the moon refuses to follow the path laid down for her. In a most interesting paper communicated to the Royal Astronomical Society at the beginning of the present year Professor Simon Newcomb declares that he regards these fluctuations as the most enigmatical phenomenon presented by the celestial motions. They are so difficult to account for by the action of any known causes, that we cannot but suspect them to arise from some action in Nature hitherto unknown—variability in the earth's speed of rotation, for example, producing an alteration in the length of the day and in our measure of time. It has, of course, long been recognised that a gradual shrinkage of the earth, due to cooling, would shorten the day; that the deposit of meteoric *débris* from without would lengthen it; and it is impossible to say which cause would preponderate. But in any case the action would be very slowly progressive, and not subject to sudden fluctuations, except in the event which has been examined quite recently by Professor Larmor. Two undergraduates in Cambridge computed one evening the change in the speed of rotation of the earth which was caused when they both stood up at the same moment. Professor Larmor's cause is more potent, but it works on the same principle. He points out that if the level of the bed of the ocean is raised or depressed by an extensive earthquake, the resulting flow of water to or from the polar regions must make a sudden alteration in the length of the day, and he shows that the effect might just become numerically sensible.

Or if we are not prepared to admit that our measure of time is irregular, why not, says Professor Newcomb, suppose that the attraction between the earth and the moon is changeable, that gravitation is mixed up in some way with the varying magnetic actions which are associated with the sunspot frequency? When one begins to be revolutionary it is difficult to know where to stop. It was Lord Kelvin who proposed to evade a certain difficulty by denying the axiom that two bodies cannot occupy the same space; the idea is hardly more inadmissible than the doctrines for which the physicists have in recent years compelled admission. If the old indivisible atom is now to be imagined a miniature solar system; if the energy which was com-

prehended in the old doctrine of its conservation is now to be reckoned infinitesimal compared with the stores of internal energy in the atom which may under certain circumstances be let loose ; then who can wonder if the beautiful, complete old dynamical theory of the planetary motions should be overwhelmed in the general upheaval of what was once taken for immovable truth ? The astronomer may no longer refine his theories in the confident expectation that there will be no unaccountable residuum. If we need demonstration of this remark, we have only to turn to the account of the motion of Encke's comet given recently by the President of the Royal Astronomical Society in presenting the gold medal of the Society to Dr. Oskar Backlund.

The unexplained acceleration in the motion of Encke's comet has long been one of the standing problems in astronomy. Before the last return of Halley's comet it was already known, and the pages of this REVIEW contained the speculation that the then forthcoming event might be accelerated by a like agency ; with a reference to the grim ideas of Newton on the effect of the resistance which produces the acceleration. Newton supposed that it must be the fate of every comet to fall into the sun, and that the outbursts of new stars must have proceeded from some such cause in other systems. His nephew, upon this, asked him, ' Why, when he stated in his writings that comets would fall into the sun, did he not also state those vast fires which they must produce, as he supposed they had done in the stars ? ' ' Because,' he replied, ' the conflagrations of the sun concern us ' a little more directly.'

The fate of Biela's comet has taught us that a comet dies by disintegration into a swarm of meteors after a life which passes quickly through its phases, and long before any resistance to its motion in space has made much progress in precipitating it upon the sun. The general resistance to the motion of all comets, which Newton imagined, seems indeed to have very little real existence. No trace of it has been detected in the motions of most of the comets which are well-observed members of the solar system, and it did not accelerate the return of Halley's comet in 1835 ; nor has it been possible, we understand, to discover any acceleration which may be attributed to resistance in space during that comet's long history of two thousand years. The immensely complicated effects of the attractions of the planets have been so far calculated by Messrs. Cowell and Crommelin that they are able to say with certainty of a recorded comet, whether it was Halley's or not. But the observations thus identified are made to serve as a starting-point for the journey back to the previous identification, and any cumulative effect,

such as that due to a resistance in space, is not allowed to accumulate, but is thrown away, so to speak, at every apparition of the comet. The whole of the circumstances make this, no doubt, the only possible procedure. But that very fact emphasizes the unique interest of the lifelong researches on the motion of Encke's comet which have been brought to a happy conclusion by Dr. Backlund within the last few months.

The comet of Pons, as Encke persisted in calling it—Encke's comet, as the rest of the world has called it for three generations—has been the cause of more computing than any body in the universe, excepting only the moon. Nature has placed that comet in a position of extreme delicacy. Sometimes approaching close to Jupiter at one extreme of its orbit, almost encountering the planet Mercury at the other, and endowed with a susceptibility to resistance in space which all other bodies seem to traverse unhindered, Encke's comet is subjected to a complexity of disturbances. Now that they are at last unravelled, it is easy to see why they have proved even more troublesome than was expected—the resistance to the motion of the comet is liable to sudden diminutions. In Encke's time it caused the comet to be three and a half hours early at each return to perihelion. But three times in the last half-century something has happened to the comet, or something has happened in space, which has diminished the resistance. It is now but a half what it was fifty years ago, and it would seem that should the comet survive disintegration for a few hundred years, it may become as regular a timekeeper as any in our system.

We could have no better illustration of the necessity for caution in supposing that all the little outstanding peculiarities in the motions of the planets and moons are necessarily explicable when the purely dynamical theory of those motions is at last perfected. We have already noticed that Professor Newcomb is driven to look for causes other than gravitation to account for the motion of the moon, and hazards the conjecture that gravitation itself may be variable, and that the variability of the magnetic forces residing in the sun may have something to do with it. It has come to be almost a jest among astronomers that every kind of variable can be fitted somehow or other on to the sunspot curve—the weather in Edinburgh, and the price of wheat, and the number of men in the first class of the mathematical tripos at Cambridge. Dynamical astronomers in particular must feel shy of admitting that the mysterious energy which manifests itself in sunspots, and controls the shape of the sun's corona, and produces the Aurora Borealis, and influences the magnets upon earth, and the electric currents within it, can

interfere with the strict control which gravitation exercises over the movements of bodies in their orbits round the Sun. It is distasteful, but nevertheless it must be admitted, that the unknown something which has happened to change the resistance to the motion of Encke's comet has happened just at times when the Sun has been especially disturbed and the hidden forces most active. Very regretfully, then, Dr. Backlund is compelled to acknowledge that the last word on the motion of the comet lies, not with the astronomers proper, but with the astro-physicists.

The admission admits us at once into a field of inquiry where questions are many and answers are few. Our fundamental difficulty is that we have really very little idea of the composition either of a comet or of its tail. It is known that comets are associated with meteor streams, for the earth encounters meteors which are found to be travelling in the same paths as known comets. It is commonly supposed that a comet is essentially a cluster of meteorites, and that it gradually disintegrates until it is no longer capable of showing as a comet, and can remain known to us only by the meteors which it may send into our atmosphere. It seems doubtful, however, if this conclusion rests upon a more substantial basis than the single observed fact that Biela's comet broke into two parts and eventually failed to return; and that afterwards the same orbit provided the same showers of Andromedid meteors which appeared in 1872 and 1885. The supposition that the nucleus of the comet itself is a cluster of meteors does not go very far towards explaining why a comet in space may shine with so brilliant a light, nor how it can produce a tail.

Reduced to its baldest form, the problem may be stated thus: A comet is supposed to consist of a few cartloads of meteoric stones and dust passing together through space, incoherent, of no solidity, each component behaving pretty nearly as an independent tiny planet. When this shoal of stones is still many millions of miles from the sun—at least as far away as the earth—it contrives to put forth a shining tail directed away from the sun. Further, it does not make this tail once for all; the tail is being continually renewed, as it continually streams away and is dissipated in space. Recent photographs have shown this process of streaming away in active operation; bright condensations have been traced from hour to hour moving along the tail with increasing speed, plainly subject to a continuous repulsion from the nucleus of the comet, or from the sun. Photography now makes it possible to examine the process in some detail, but the fact that the process was going on has been known at least since the celebrated apparition of the comet of 1881. That comet

passed so extremely close to the sun that it described 180 degrees of its orbit in three and a half hours. One morning the tail stretched a hundred million miles in one direction: the same evening it stretched a hundred million miles in a direction nearly opposite. It is inconceivable that the fragile tail can have made that immense sweep; within the space of half a day the comet must, without any possible doubt, have produced a new tail equal to the old, besides a continued succession of abortive tails which had no time to develop before the comet was whirled away from them in its wild rush round the sun.

Ten years ago it was permissible to think of interplanetary space as empty, save for stray meteors and cosmical dust playing the part of minute planets. At the same date only the commonplace static electric repulsion between charged bodies could be suggested as the cause of the repulsion to which comets' tails are subjected, and no one felt that the cause was adequate. Since then physics has been revolutionised. Ions and electrons; kathode rays and all the phenomena of radio-activity have been discovered; the pressure of light, which was discussed theoretically by Maxwell in 1873, has been demonstrated experimentally by Lebedew in Russia and by Hull and Nichols in America; and instead of no cause we have what Tartarin might describe as 'un marmalade des causes' from which to choose.

There is the pressure of light. On large bodies its effects are almost nothing, but on a small body of exactly the right size in diameter, one-third of the length of a light wave, or, say, a fifty-thousandth of an inch, the pressure of light may very easily overcome gravitation. There is no doubt that under the pressure of the sun's light enormous clouds of dust must be continually flying off from the sun, and penetrating space in all directions. Can it be to the pressure of light that we owe the phenomena of comets' tails?

Again, the particles of dust carried away from the sun by the radiation pressure will be highly charged with negative electricity, and moreover, they will carry along with them molecules of hydrogen and helium, of krypton perhaps, and of the other inert gases, and cyanogen and hydrocarbons. Have we in the bombardment of the meteoric stones by these electrified particles of dust and gas the cause of comets' tails?

These and a dozen equally interesting and difficult questions are asked, and to some extent answered, in an extraordinary book recently published.\*

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\* 'Worlds in the Making,' by Professor Svante Arrhenius. Translated into English by H. Borns. Harper. 1908.

Professor Arrhenius combines with a vast knowledge of cosmical physics a most fervid imagination, and his book is crammed with new material and with brilliant, if undigested, ideas. We cannot attempt to follow him into the new country from which the reconnaissance reports are but just now available; which is very far from being in a clean and orderly state of cultivation. We can but return to our original question—Why does a parcel of meteoric stones out in space shine with a bright light and grow a shining tail, when it is yet immensely distant from the sources of tremendous activity which reside in the sun? But we may suspect that the comet itself has comparatively little to do with it; that it acts merely as an irritant upon the radiant streams proceeding outwards; that the comet's tail is a sign of more activities in space than were dreamed of in the philosophy of yesterday.

It is clear, however, that the physicist is not quite ready to step in at the point where the dynamical astronomer confesses that he must stop, content perforce with his result that something, connected with the sun, happens sometimes to a comet and releases it from its obedience to the strict letter of Newton's gravitation laws. Halley's comet, then, is due to reappear at a most opportune time. All the fine comets of last century were wasted upon astronomers who had not a hundredth part of the equipment which is now lying in wait for Halley's. From a few third-rate comets great efforts have extracted the most surprising results; witness the series of photographs made last autumn at the Royal Observatory, Greenwich, when a very inferior comet was just visible to the naked eye.

We await, then, the return of Halley's comet with an interest which is intensified by the sporting chance that the prediction of Messrs. Cowell and Crommelin may after all be in error. They give April 8, 1910, as the date of perihelion passage, and deduce from their elements the prediction that in the early months of 1910 the comet will be an evening star. In March it will be lost in the sun's rays, after which it will reappear as a morning star in April, but will never travel very far from the sun, and will be unfavourably placed for observation in the Northern hemisphere. At the beginning of May it will return to the sun with great rapidity, will pass between us and the sun on May 12 at a distance of only seven and a half million miles, and will then for a week or two be a bright object in the West immediately after sunset. So much for the Greenwich prediction. It is proper to state that another calculation has been made public in which the circumstances are exceedingly different. We may express the hope in words modified a little from those of Halley,

that impartial posterity may have no occasion to deny that the Englishmen were right.

There is one other event that the reappearance of Halley's comet should bring to pass—the publication of an account of Halley himself, of whose life no adequate account exists. Rigaud made many years ago a great collection of the materials for a biography, but the materials remain in store at Oxford, and the biography is still unwritten. Yet there is no great man in the history of astronomy whose life was more full of interesting activity and picturesque incident. In command of one of His Majesty's ships he made long voyages to examine the variation of the compass, not without hope that a better knowledge of that element might provide the much-needed method of finding the longitude at sea. Later, in 1686, we read in 'Birch' that it was resolved by the Royal Society 'that the Treasurer, to encourage 'the measuring of a degree of the earth, do give to Mr. Halley '50*l.* or fifty copies of the "History of Fishes," when he shall 'have measured a degree to the satisfaction of Sir C. Wren, the 'President, and Sir John Hoskyns.' In the same month the Council had 'declared their satisfaction in the Society's choice 'of Mr. Halley [for the office of Secretary] notwithstanding his 'want of the fifth qualification'—a single man without children—and had undertaken to pay him 50*l.* a year, subsequently commuted to another fifty copies of the immortal 'History of Fishes.' And again in the same month it was ordered 'that Mr. Newton's 'book be printed, and that Mr. Halley undertake the business of 'looking after it, and printing it at his own charge, which he 'engaged to do.'

In particular is it necessary that a worthy account should be written of his life, that we may know how much of the practical credit of Newton's discovery really belongs to Halley. He urged the composition of the 'Principia' upon Newton; he printed it at his own expense; and he never abated his zeal for the propagation of the theory, though Newton could write to Flamsteed, 'I do not love to be printed upon every occasion, 'much less to be dunned and teased by foreigners about mathe- 'matical things, or to be thought by our own people to be 'trifling away my time about them, when I should be about 'the King's business.'

'Si Tycho fût resté dans son île,' wrote Delambre, 'nous 'ignorierions peut-être encore le véritable système du monde.' If Halley had not made his journey to Cambridge perhaps the secret of the law of gravitation would have died with the philosopher who 'trifled away his time' with it.

ART. III.—THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF  
LABOUR CO-PARTNERSHIP.

1. *Twenty-eight Years of Co-partnership at Guise.* Translated by ANEURIN WILLIAMS. London: Labour Co-partnership Association. 1908.
2. *A Brief Sketch of the 'Maison Leclaire' and its Founder.* By MARY H. HART. 1908.
3. *The Labour Co-partnership Association.* Twenty-third Report. 1907-8.
4. *Co-Partnership.* By Sir GEORGE LIVESEY. London: King, Sell, and Olding, Ltd.
5. *Industrial Peace and Industrial Efficiency.* By Sir CHRISTOPHER FURNESS, M.P. West Hartlepool: Alexander Salton, Ltd. 1908.
6. *Co-partnership in Housing.* By HENRY VIVIAN, M.P.  
And other pamphlets.

THE present age is peculiarly an age of political change and social reform. Never have the evils and sufferings which characterise the existing organisation of society been more vividly perceived than they are now. Never has the agitation for their removal and the demand for a happier condition of society been more ubiquitous or more clamorous than it is at present. And yet it is true that on almost every side a steady and even rapid improvement has been manifested throughout the last three-quarters of the nineteenth century. Drunkenness has diminished to an extraordinary extent, and according to statistics even appears to be in a fair way towards future extinction. Yet the laws which we pass, or try to pass, to eradicate the vice ever become more numerous and severe. So, too, there is less poverty now than there has ever been before, yet it is more and more becoming the main business of Parliament to mete out doles to the poor in a variety of different forms, and we have just initiated a great system of old-age pensions. The workers, who were formerly more or less at the mercy of the capitalists, are now protected by powerful trade unions, dictating terms to the employers, which the latter dare not refuse. Yet now that the workers are more than ever able to protect themselves, the Government steps in with eight-hour legislation and the like, striking a blow at an evil already evanescent. Unemployment, again, is a curse of far smaller magnitude than it once was, yet



the demand for remedial measures is more urgent than ever before.

What is the meaning of this strenuous demand for social betterment? It is the result of a far-reaching change in the character of the English people, by which they have become not only more intellectual but more sensitive to pain and suffering than they were. State education was instituted for the purpose of making the people more intellectual; in doing so it has also brought the traits of character which are allied to intellect. Among these are an extreme physical sensitiveness to pain, a general condition of 'nervousness,' and a high development of sympathy—intellectual sympathy as opposed to love, which is emotional. Anyone who has had the opportunity of watching uncivilised peoples must have observed how, along with their unintellectual state of mind, there goes a remarkable indifference to bodily pain and a total disregard of even extreme discomfort. It is this indifference to pain, combined with their unsympathetic (though often highly affectionate) dispositions, that makes possible their barbaric tortures and savage punishments, which have been extinct in England for some hundred years past.

The change in English character that has accompanied advancing intellect during the last half-century has probably been too rapid to be wholesome. Witness, for instance, the frantic hysteria and loss of self-control with which the people greeted their victories in the South African War. Witness, again, the general atmosphere of nervousness in our relations with foreign Powers. No longer strong, self-reliant, sure of ourselves, we are liable to sudden panics about German invasions; and we turn a ready ear to the outcries of country squires and retired Army officers, who would persuade us that the one aim and object of the foreigners, whom they dread so much, is to swallow us all up at the first available opportunity, and that we have no hope of salvation save in conscription and Tariff Reform. Tariff Reform affords a particularly pertinent instance. Formerly we were content to go our own way and do what was best for ourselves, letting the foreigner do what he liked. Now we are called upon to sacrifice the immense economic benefits of Free Trade, lest, forsooth, the terrible foreigner should come one day and cut off our supplies, and in order that we may have a 'weapon' for meeting hostile tariffs. This neurotic attitude on the one hand, and our occasional bursts of hysterical self-conceit on the other hand, are alike indications of a shallower, weaker temperament than marked our national character in the past. We look in vain for the self-reliant, deep-running characters of our

ancestors—but not quite in vain; for though the nation as a whole is changed, there still remain elements of high stability and excellence.

We have here, at all events, the explanation of the increasing demand for social reform which accompanies the diminution of social evils. Sensitiveness to pain, highly developed sympathy, make it more and more difficult to tolerate the thought of suffering in our midst. But while the existence of social evils is becoming so much more clearly recognised, the energy and determination by which alone they may be cured do not seem to be developing to a proportionate extent. For, instead of boldly facing the evil, the method commonly pursued is to start an agitation to force the Government to make laws which it is hoped may effect a cure. It is always easier, when one is hurt, to cry out for someone else to come and help, than to face and overcome the difficulty oneself. It is markedly characteristic of the present times, when the nation is extremely sensitive to pain and somewhat deficient in resolution and energy, to agitate for some State action in preference to setting to work personally to attack the evil itself.

The question immediately arises: What steps can individuals take for the purpose of promoting social welfare? How can poverty and the degrading subordination of class to class be relieved by individual effort? The main requirement is that the status of the working man should be improved. He should be encouraged to exert himself so that he may cease to be a mere 'wage-slave' and attain a more responsible and independent position. At present nearly all the modes of social reform which hold the field are to some extent socialistic; that is, they work by giving increased power to the State and diminished liberty to individuals. The plausibility of this method of procedure arises largely from the fact that no other methods have yet come into prominence. The choice has lain between socialistic reform and no reform at all. No one nowadays would deny that social reform is an urgent necessity; and our present purpose is to describe a scheme of reform which is *not* socialistic, but which may be recognised as an alternative to Socialism. There is a demand for a scheme by which the poorer classes may be raised without intervention by the State, without increase of taxation, and without curtailment of freedom. We believe that that demand may be met by an extended application of the principle of voluntary co-operation; and it is to an elucidation of this principle that we shall now turn our attention.

The chief classification of co-operative societies is into those which are distributive and those which are productive. The

distributive societies include the co-operative stores,\* and are organised entirely from the point of view of the consumer. They are simply associations of consumers, formed for the purpose of supplying themselves more cheaply or more effectively than they could do elsewhere. Co-operative stores have no social or ethical significance; their *raison d'être* is purely economic; and we shall therefore exclude them from consideration here. Productive societies are of various kinds. There are co-operative agricultural societies, co-operative banks, co-operative insurance societies, building societies, &c. But none of these have any direct effect on the social status of their members, and we therefore pass them by. There remain the co-operative workers' societies, and to these alone we shall confine our attention.

A typical co-operative workers' society consists of a community of workers engaged in some branch of production and owning or borrowing the whole of the capital sunk in the business. There is therefore no employer; or it would be more correct to say the members in their corporate capacity are their own employers. Each worker is a co-partner in the concern, his annual income rising or falling according to the fluctuations in the profits of the business. The society bears much the same relation to an ordinary private firm that a democratic or republican country bears to a monarchical country; and the advantages and drawbacks in the two cases are to some extent similar. In the Co-partnership society the workers are paid wages at the rates current in the district, and receive interest at some fixed percentage on the capital which they have invested. When this has been paid and depreciation, &c., provided for, the net profits which remain are divided among the workers in proportion to their wages, or to the amount of their capital, or by some other standard. The managers, foremen, and chief officials of the business are elected by the workers themselves in general assembly, or by a committee which the workers appoint to attend to their interests. As will be seen when we come to examine the various successful schemes of Co-partnership, not many have yet attained the full length of democratic management, but the above illustration will serve as a type to which Co-partnership associations approximate in varying degrees. Co-partnership, therefore, is a very different thing from mere profit-sharing. By 'profit-sharing' is meant the distribution among the workers of some proportion of the profits, though they neither own any of the capital in the business nor have any voice in its control; while

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\* Co-operative stores may be engaged in production, but the production is wholly subsidiary to the distribution.

by 'Co-partnership' is meant the ownership by the workers of all or some part of the capital, involving in addition a voice in the management as well as a share in the profits.

The fundamental advantage of the Co-partnership principle is the elevation which it brings about in the status of the worker. He no longer sells his labour for a fixed price to another man who becomes his master, and who can throw him out of employment for no cause whatever. He is his own master and his own employer; not a servant of someone else, but as good as any man he comes across. The feelings of self-respect and independence thus fostered have a highly beneficial effect upon the man's character—an effect which is likely to make itself felt in his work, in his family, and in his dealings with others. Moreover, independence ever brings in its train a sense of responsibility, the absence of which is so lamentable a feature of the lower classes in Great Britain. The man knows that the success of the business, and with it his own fortunes, are dependent entirely upon the efforts of himself and his associates, and upon the correctness of their judgement in electing managers and so forth. He learns wisdom by practical experience, and from being an irresponsible, shiftless, portionless wage-seeker becomes a valuable citizen with a definite stake in the country, qualified to give a sensible and useful vote in the Parliamentary elections.

But it is not on the ground of ethical superiority that the Co-partnership movement will stand or fall. Its success will depend almost entirely upon its economic superiority. However ethically perfect a social scheme may be, however much it may improve or educate the people, it has no chance of becoming part of the general social organisation unless it is also sound economically; that is to say, unless it can hold its own in industry and commerce without any adventitious aid whatever. To this inquiry we must therefore devote ourselves. In studying the question we find a number of factors to be at work, some of which make for increased efficiency in production and some for diminished efficiency. Of those making for increased efficiency the most powerful is the direct incentive offered to the worker to put his very best into his work. Under the fixed-wage system it is to the interest of the worker to put forth the minimum of exertion that will secure his wages to him. Under the profit-sharing system it is to his interest to promote, to the best of his ability, efficiency and economy in production, for his individual profits are thereby increased. There is no surer way of securing industrial efficiency than to identify the personal interests of every worker with the success of the business. There is no graver obstacle to success than to allow him to

be swayed by motives which are hostile or indifferent to that success.

A second favourable factor in Co-partnership is that it precludes the possibility of trade disputes, and brings about the abolition of strikes and lock-outs, the weapons with which such disputes are fought out. Disputes between employer and employed are one of the most serious defects of our ordinary industrial organisation. They lead to heavy losses or perhaps ruin to the masters, extreme privations to the men, increase of prices or deficiency of service to the general public. The only possible way by which this warfare can be prevented is by identifying the interests of capital and labour, either by distributing among the workers a definite share in the profits of the business, or, better still, by making them the actual owners of the capital concerned. It was this prospect of industrial peace which led Sir George Livesey and Sir Christopher Furness to take their employees into Co-partnership, as we shall shortly describe.

Against these advantages there have to be set sundry disadvantages. Enterprise is not likely to be displayed by a Co-partnership society. To strike out new lines, to forecast correctly some future public demand, call for qualities which a workers' society cannot possess. It involves taking heavy risks for the prospect of a large reward, risks which working men could not face. It involves also soundness of judgement, a vigorous mind, and a self-confidence in treading new paths—qualities which are found only in exceptional individuals, and which could not be looked for in associations which in the nature of things are not exceptional, but are faithful images of the average qualities of their members. For the same reason a trade in which there are rapid or extreme fluctuations is unsuitable for Co-partnership. A body of workers could not hold out against a long period of depression, even in the certain expectation of large profits hereafter. The capacity for doing this is one of the advantages of capital in a concentrated form which it is not easy to replace. Then, again, the starting of new businesses is almost an impossibility to working men. They have neither capital nor credit; nor have they the experience which enables them to find the right man to act as manager. Accordingly we find that all the great instances of successful Co-partnership are in cases where a business has been built up by private persons who have established the connexion, goodwill, etc., so as to insure a steady and regular profit, and who have then gradually transferred the business to their employees. Yet another practical difficulty in the way of Co-partnership is the fact that, when tried, it has so often proved unsuccessful. The movement which was initiated

in several countries of Europe about the middle of last century failed everywhere.

Doubtless further experience and an improved condition of the working classes will obviate some of these difficulties. That they have already been to some extent obviated is shown by the fact that the movement which recommenced towards the end of last century has been attended with a considerable measure of success. The difficulty which John Stuart Mill so insistently pressed against Socialism is that the working classes have too narrow an outlook and are not sufficiently disinterested to make Socialism a possibility. Precisely that difficulty was the cause of the failure of the Co-partnership experiments in the middle of last century. The efficiency of the Co-partnership society is no more and no less than the average efficiency of its members. Co-partnership calls for higher qualities in the working man than does mere wage-earning. As a wage-earner he has to do what he is told under the supervision of officials appointed to see that he does it. As a co-partner he is his own employer. He becomes jointly responsible for the general condition of discipline or slackness prevailing at his works. Unless he and his associates are men of formed character, indiscipline will supervene and the business will fail. It is not too much to state that the progress of Co-partnership in any country affords an accurate index of the honesty and intelligence of the working classes in that country.

Summing up this discussion of the general principles of Co-partnership, the conclusion at which we arrive is that socially Co-partnership represents a great advance upon the ordinary industrial system, while economically its superiority is more questionable. There can be little doubt, however, that as working men become more conscientious Co-partnership will come more and more to excel the ordinary system in economic efficiency. That it has already begun to do so in many trades is evidenced by the fact that experienced business men like Sir Christopher Furness have transformed their works to the Co-partnership plan, not from any philanthropic motive, but expressly for the purpose of securing increased efficiency of production.

We shall now proceed to a general survey of the Co-partnership movement at the present time, and the extent to which the principle has so far been applied. In Great Britain the movement sprang out of the abortive attempts of the Christian Socialists to carry on self-governing workshops in the middle of last century. Previous to 1884 Co-partnership met with scarcely any success whatever. In that year was formed what is now called the 'Labour Co-partnership Association' to promote the movement

and to assist working men in the initiation and management of productive societies ; and from that time forward considerable progress has been made. In France also the movement had a socialistic origin, commencing with the State workshop of 1848. But there too the movement was a failure, and did not revive for over thirty years. The modern movement in England and France has been accompanied by a corresponding movement in Italy, but in no other country have Co-partnership societies obtained any footing. For clearness of exposition it will be convenient to divide Co-partnership societies into two classes—those which have come into existence through the transformation of a business which had already been built up by private enterprise and capital, and those in which the business has been actually founded by the workers themselves. To the former class belong all the largest and most successful instances, and we shall therefore deal with it first. After describing the two branches of the labour Co-partnership movement we shall pass on to an account of housing Co-partnership, which, in its principles and the mode of their application, resembles labour Co-partnership so much as to make it desirable to treat the subjects together.

Of Co-partnership societies which have been formed out of private firms, probably the most successful instance in the world is that of Godin's iron-foundry at Guise in France. An excellent account of this business is given in Mr. Aneurin Williams' 'Twenty-eight Years of Co-partnership at Guise.' M. Godin was born in 1817, his father being a village smith. After wandering over France he set up in business for himself, at the age of twenty-three, with a capital of 160*l.*, which he received from his father. His ability, energy, and enterprise soon brought their just reward, and he made rapid headway against all competitors. The profound economic disturbances of 1848 all but ruined him, as it ruined so many others, but he just succeeded in keeping his feet ; and, in about twenty years from the time he had commenced business, he found himself one of the leading iron manufacturers of France. He was then in a position to give practical effect to the ideas of social amelioration which had taken deep hold of him as a young man. The suffering and destitution of the working classes had early caused him to resolve that he would do all in his power to effect an improvement in the condition of labour. He studied the socialistic theories of Saint-Simon, Owen, and Cabet ; but the remedies which they proposed appeared to him illusory. In his book 'Solutions Sociales' he wrote : 'The idea of Communism arises from resentment against the abuse of enjoyments, while others lack necessaries. It is the protest of labour angered by the unjust distribution

‘of the fruits of production. But the hatred of evil is not always the knowledge of good—there lies the defect of Communism.’

He was, however, greatly moved by Fourier’s ‘Theory of Universal Unity’: and from his study of that work emanated the plan for labour Co-partnership which he ultimately put into practice. He recognised, indeed, that the main obstacle to a successful Co-partnership scheme lay in the deficient moral and intellectual character of the average workman; and his first step therefore was to found the ‘Familière,’ on the lines of Fourier’s ‘Phalanstery,’ which he hoped would aid in bringing about the requisite improvement. The institutions of the ‘Familière’ included a collection of united dwellings, a group of co-operative shops, an educational service, together with an arrangement for mutual insurance, and a system of profit-sharing, to which attention is now more specially directed. The full Co-partnership scheme did not come into operation until 1880. The system then adopted is as follows: The workers are divided into four classes—*auxiliaires*, *participants*, *sociétaires*, and *associés*. The *auxiliaires* include all the new hands, as also the floating, impermanent population of the workshop. These benefit only to the extent of insurance against illness and accidents, and, under certain conditions, they may receive a pension. The second class, or *participants*, receive a share in the profits proportional to the amount of their wages. The third class, or *sociétaires*, receive likewise a share proportional to their wages; but in their case the share is 50 per cent. higher than in the case of the *participants*; that is to say, a *sociétaire* would receive in the division of profits one and a half times the amount that a *participant*, earning the same wages, would receive. The highest class, that of the *associés*, are alone in the position of true co-partners. They also receive a share in the profits apportioned to their wages, but the share is double what would be received by a *participant* of the same wage. The workers move from one class to another by seniority. The government of the society is ultimately vested altogether in the *associés*. They periodically come together in general meeting, and consider the main lines of the policy to be pursued by the society. They elect annually three members to the committee of management, the remaining members being composed of the heads of the chief departments. In addition they appoint the managing director, who is *ex-officio* chairman of the committee of management. It is possible for a worker who can read and write, and is of good behaviour, to become an *associé* after being with the society and living in its buildings five years.



Interest is paid at the rate of 5 per cent. on the capital invested, and, for the purposes of profit-sharing, the interest payable to the shareholders is regarded precisely as if it were wages paid to workers, so that the share in the profits apportioned to the owners of the capital is reckoned as though the interest which they receive were wages which they had earned. After deductions have been made from the gross profits on account of depreciation of buildings and plant, votes to the mutual insurance funds, cost of education, etc., the net profits are divided in the following manner: 4 per cent. to the managing director, 16 per cent. among the committee of management, 2 per cent. among the committee of supervision, 2 per cent. to reward useful inventions, 1 per cent. for maintenance of certain children in the Government schools, and the remaining 75 per cent. to the workers and shareholders in the proportion already described. By the rules of the society, the share of the profits which is apportioned to the workers is not paid in cash, but in share-capital, which they are not permitted to realize. Their annual income therefore does not include the profits which are assessed on the amount of their wages. It includes only, in addition to the wages, the interest on the share-capital which they possess—a sum which increases year by year as their capital increases—together with that portion of the profits which is allocated to capital and based upon the amount of interest payable. The effect of this rule—that the workers' share of the profits should be paid in capital only—was that the ownership of the establishment was gradually transferred from the hands of Godin into those of the workers themselves. The transference was concluded in the year 1894. Since the entire capital was then in the hands of the workers, and there was no further capital available in which to pay the share of the profits falling to the workers, and apportioned to their wages, the plan was devised of paying off the oldest shares in cash, so as to keep up a constant supply of new shares. In virtue of this arrangement it is secured that the ownership of the establishment remains constantly in the hands of the persons who are actually employed there. As Mr. Williams remarks: 'Each generation of workers are in turn owners of the establishment in proportion to the profits which they have been able to realise by their work.'

The success of the scheme is indicated by the following figures: In 1900 there were employed 1,650 persons; in 1908 the number had risen to 2,100. In 1900 the selling price of the products exceeded 180,000*l.*; in 1907 it was 280,000*l.* In 1900 the wages exceeded 80,000*l.*; in 1908 they exceeded

120,000*l.* From 1880 to 1907 the wages showed an average increase of 33 per cent.

Another famous instance of successful Co-partnership in France is the case of the 'Maison Leclaire.' Leclaire's early history and career have many points of resemblance to those of Godin. Like Godin, he started life in extreme poverty, and by industry and enterprise founded a huge and successful business. Like Godin, he felt acutely the wretchedness and poverty of the working classes, and, like him, introduced his Co-partnership experiment for the purpose of effecting an improvement in their status. He commenced his career as apprentice to a house-painter, where, in return for hard work, he received as wages a morsel of bread in the morning, one penny a day to provide his two meals, with supper, and a 'shakedown' at his master's. He ended his career as one of the leading captains of industry in France, employing many hundred workmen. What would be the feelings of our unemployed if they were set to work at wages similar to those at which Leclaire commenced? What would our modern sentimentalists say, with their rooted disbelief in self-help, if such a course were suggested? After some years Leclaire set up in business for himself as contractor, painter, and glazier, with a capital of 40*l.*, at a little shop in Paris; and in two or three years' time, he had, by his enterprise and the excellence of his work, made his fortune. Shortly afterwards he founded for his employees a mutual aid society, which derived its funds firstly by means of a monthly subscription from the members, but later by an annual grant out of the profits of the business. Twenty-five years after the establishment of the mutual aid society it was formally enrolled as a sleeping partner in the business, the members in their corporate capacity being thus associated with the partnership. This was the first step towards the full Co-partnership scheme which was inaugurated in 1869. Under the fully established scheme the government of the business is vested in a body called the 'noyau,' consisting of the best and ablest of the workmen. The executive is entirely in the hands of two managing partners; but these, as also the foremen, are elected by the 'noyau.' The 'noyau' also elects a 'court of conciliation,' whose duty it is to deal with cases of misconduct or insubordination, and to punish or dismiss offenders. The two managing partners each contribute a fixed sum towards the capital of the firm, while the remainder is supplied by the mutual aid society. Interest at 5 per cent. is paid on the capital so invested; and after the salaries of the managing partners and the wages of the men have been

paid the division of the net profits is fixed as follows: One quarter goes to the two managing partners jointly, the senior partner taking two-thirds and the junior partner one-third. One quarter goes to the mutual aid society. The remaining half is divided among the employees in proportion to the wages which they earn. The prosperity of the 'Maison Leclair' is indicated by the fact that during the eight years following the founder's death the volume of its business was doubled. On January 1, 1908, the capital of the mutual aid society amounted to over 140,000*l.*; and every member who had worked twenty years for the firm, and had reached the age of fifty, was entitled to a yearly pension of 60*l.* for life. It is interesting to note that Leclair himself attributed the success of his business to the working of the Co-partnership principle. 'I maintain,' he wrote, 'that if I had remained in the beaten track of routine I should not have arrived, even by fraudulent means, at a position comparable to that which I have made for myself.'

The most famous instance of successful Co-partnership in England is that of the South Metropolitan Gas Company. In this company Co-partnership was introduced by several steps, under the able guidance of the late Sir George Livesey, assisted by advice from the Labour Co-partnership Association. The first step was the introduction in 1889 of a system of simple profit-sharing. The officials and workmen were to receive 1 per cent. on their salaries and wages for every penny reduction in the price of gas below 2*s.* 8*d.* per 1,000 feet. There was thus established a powerful incentive to economy and efficiency; the lower the cost of producing gas, the higher were the annual bonuses paid to the workers. The men, moreover, were permitted, instead of withdrawing their bonus when it became due, to leave it on deposit at 4 per cent. interest. Some preferred to use it for purchasing the company's stock, and the germ of true Co-partnership was thus sown. The scheme was initiated in spite of the most strenuous opposition of the Gas Workers' Union. Started largely for the purpose of avoiding strikes, the scheme was met at its commencement by a week's notice from 2,000 stokers, acting under direction of the union. The men were beaten, the strikers taken back, but the secretary of the union publicly declared that next time no notice would be given. Sir George Livesey and the company were thus forced to take up a strongly antagonistic attitude to the trade union. It was intolerable that the consumers should run the risk of having their gas cut off at any moment, and accordingly the company responded by refusing to employ any member of the union. It is, however, a grave mistake to suppose that

Sir George Livesey was in any way opposed to the principle of trade unions, or that Co-partnership has any hostility towards them. It is true that co-partnership greatly reduces the necessity for trade unions. Trade unions exist for the purpose of protecting labour from the tyranny of capital; they substitute collective bargaining for individual bargaining; they assume an opposition of interest between capital and labour; and when this opposition no longer exists, they can be dispensed with. It is natural, however, that the trade union officials should resent any scheme which diminishes their own importance.

In 1894 the percentage on salaries and wages was increased by the company to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per penny reduction in the price of gas, with the provision that half the bonus payable to each man was to be invested in the company's ordinary stock at the market price. In 1901 a further revision was made. The standard price of gas was raised from 2s. 8d. to 3s. 1d. per 1,000 feet, and the men received  $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. on every penny reduction in the price of gas below this figure. The shareholders similarly received an additional dividend for each penny reduction below the standard price; but their interest was kept very much less than that of the workers, being only 2s. 8d. per cent. as against 15s. per cent. It is thus greatly to the interest not only of consumers, but of shareholders and workmen as well, to reduce the price of gas to the lowest possible point. The plan has worked admirably. The men soon found out the advantages they derived from the scheme, and the most amicable relations were forthwith established between employers and employed. No complaint was made when a reduction in the interest paid on the men's deposits was rendered necessary by an increase in the market value of the stock. When in 1898 the employees held 40,000l. of the company's stock they were empowered to elect representatives to the board of directors, and in that year two workmen for the first time took their places as directors—one stage further towards complete Co-partnership. In 1908 the number of employees who were included in the profit-sharing scheme was 5,146. The percentage that they received on their wages was  $7\frac{1}{2}$ , the total sum distributed being 36,426l., and the market value of the shares and deposits which they held in the company was 363,367l. They had also three representatives on the board of directors.

It is clear that the Co-partnership scheme of the South Metropolitan Gas Company has had a highly beneficial effect on the characters of the men. In June 1908 Sir George Livesey said: 'The great majority of the men have responded in

'the right spirit, their intelligence has been developed, their social position and prospects improved, and their characters strengthened.' The figures quoted above give an indication of their thrift. The quality of their work has been so greatly improved that the gain to the company in economy of production more than balances the amount of the bonus paid to the men.

Sir George Livesey was strongly of the opinion that profit-sharing had no moral effect on the men unless the sums due to them were paid in shares instead of cash. He considered that simple profit-sharing apart from Co-partnership was likely to fail. He held also that it was essential to success that none but good men should be permitted to participate.

Other gas companies have followed the example of the South Metropolitan. The South Suburban Gas Company adopted in 1894 a scheme very similar to that already described, and the employees now have two representatives on the board of directors. The Commercial Gas Company started in 1901, and on June 30 last year the amount of shares and deposits held by employees in the company reached nearly 39,000*l.* in market value. In this and other companies, however, the employees have no representatives on the board. In both the Commercial and South Suburban the share of the profits divided among the employees amounted last year to 5 per cent. on their wages. The Newport Gas Company started a scheme in 1900 and the Chester in 1901, and during 1908 Co-partnership and profit-sharing schemes were started by gas companies at Leamington, Rugby, Croydon, Walker and Wallsend, Wrexham, Tunbridge Wells, Tottenham, Gloucester, and Bournemouth. In January 1909 the Gas Light and Coke Co. (London) also adopted a Co-partnership scheme. These fifteen gas companies employ 20,000 men, and their total paid-up capital is 42,500,000*l.* out of a total paid-up capital of 86,500,000*l.* invested in gas companies in the United Kingdom.\*

We pass now to an account of the most recent experiment in the sphere of labour Co-partnership—namely, that initiated a few months ago by Sir Christopher Furness. This scheme, of which a full description has appeared in the 'Magazine of Commerce,' has attracted very wide attention in this country, and affects the fortunes of a large number of workers in the shipbuilding trade. It is not, however, as has been frequently stated in the newspapers, an entirely new departure, but has

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\* In 'The Times' of March 27, it was announced that the Cardiff Gas Company had instituted a Co-partnership scheme.

much resemblance to the arrangement which has been in existence for a number of years in the great firm of Sir William Armstrong, Whitworth and Company, Limited, of Newcastle, employing nearly 3,000 workmen. In this firm deposits are received from the workmen at a rate of interest fluctuating with the profits of the business, but with a fixed minimum of 4 per cent.

Sir Christopher Furness was impelled to formulate his Co-partnership scheme by the losses and vexations produced through the continuous antagonism between himself and the numerous trade unions to which his men belonged. In addressing his men at the initiation of his scheme on November 14, 1908, Sir Christopher said :

‘An employer of labour at all times, but much more so to-day than in the days of our fathers and grandfathers, goes into the market for orders much in the spirit of a general proceeding to capture the citadel of an enemy. . . . The case is bad, very bad ; . . . I assure you that, despite the exercise of the greatest vigilance and energy on the part of the management and myself, orders are not to be procured ; the people who are accustomed to order ships answering that for some years past, owing to the increased cost of working and maintaining ships, owing to the often absurd requirements of the law and the still more impracticable directions of too officious Government officials, the vast volume of tonnage available, and the competition of other countries, the amount of return in the way of dividend, and, in a number of cases, serious losses actually entailed, offer no encouragement to the investment of capital in shipping. . . . The truth is that money is in a temporary spasm of fright—it pleases it to imagine that property in this country is in danger.’

And Sir Christopher proceeded to dilate on the thesis that the best hope of overcoming the difficulties before them was in united action between himself and his men. So long as the opposition of interests continued, there appeared no prospect of the attainment of a very high degree of industrial efficiency, and accordingly Sir Christopher set to work to devise plans whereby the interests of the workmen should as far as possible be identified with the interests of their employers. At a conference of trade-union representatives convoked on October 7, 1908, he accordingly submitted two proposals. He offered, in the first place, to sell his shipyards at West Hartlepool outright to the trade unions. In the event of this proposal being rejected he made his second proposal, to the effect that the employees should become limited co-partners in the shipbuilding yards. The trade union delegates after several meetings deter-

mined to recommend the adoption of the second proposal; and, the matter being referred to the executive councils of the unions, it was decided by a composite vote of ten to one to accept the Co-partnership scheme. Soon afterwards the final details were arranged, and the agreement was put into practice. The outlines of the scheme are as follows: The employees become holders of special shares in the capital of the Shipbuilding Company owning the Middleton Shipbuilding Yard at Hartlepool and the Harbour Dockyard at West Hartlepool. They pay for these shares by submitting to a 5 per cent. deduction from their earnings until the total amount of their shares is covered. As interest on the special shares of which they thus become owners they receive 4 per cent. per annum, whether the company divide any surplus profit or not. The interest on the ordinary shares is fixed at 5 per cent. per annum. Whatever profits remain after this interest has been paid, and after the depreciation, reserve, and development funds have been provided, is divided among the holders of the ordinary shares and of the employees' shares in proportion to the amount of their holdings. After the division of profits has taken place, it will thus follow that the amount of the interest received by the employees will always be 1 per cent. less than the amount of the interest received by the holders of the ordinary shares. The employees, moreover, are guaranteed a minimum interest of 4 per cent. Sir Christopher Furness did not go so far as to place any representative of the employees on the board of directors of the company. But, in order to reduce the possibility of friction to a minimum, he set up a works council, composed of an equal number of representatives of the firm and of the employees. This works council has no administrative power—the government and administration of the business being in no way altered by the introduction of Co-partnership—but it serves as a channel of communication between the officials and the employees, by means of which differences of opinion may be discussed, and a better spirit preserved in their mutual dealings with one another. When the discussions in the works council fail to bring about agreement, it is arranged that the matter in dispute shall be submitted to a Court of Arbitration. In return for these benefits the employees renounce the right to strike, while the company also relinquishes its corresponding weapon—the lock-out. The essence of the whole scheme, which is now in full progress, is to remove the hostility between employer and employed by making their interests as far as possible identical.

As these lines are being written, a new scheme of Co-partner-

ship is announced. Mr. W. H. Lever, M.P., head of the soap-manufacturing firm of Lever Brothers, Limited, proposes to take into partnership all his employees who are over twenty-five years of age, are of good character, and have completed five years of satisfactory service with the company or any of the associated companies. It is intended to issue partnership certificates to the nominal amount of half a million sterling. No money is to be payable for the partnership certificates. They will, therefore, not rank as debentures, as in Sir Christopher Furness' scheme, where the men pay for their shares out of their wages. No interest at all will be paid on them until all dividends on the preference shares of the company have been paid, and 5 per cent. on the ordinary shares. After these charges have been met, the partnership certificates will rank *pari passu* with the ordinary shares for dividend. Mr. Lever indicated that the first annual distribution of certificates would probably be at the rate of 10 per cent. on the salaries and wages earned. A maximum limit is set to the amount of partnership certificates that can be held by one individual, this limit being proportionate to the salary or wages in each case. It is satisfactory to note that Mr. Lever laid down, as essential conditions of any successful scheme of profit-sharing, that it must not degenerate into charity or philanthropy; but that it must find its justification in increased success of the undertaking. The scheme was put to the shareholders at their annual general meeting on March 12, 1909, and was approved unanimously.

It is unnecessary to describe any further instances of a conversion of a business organized in the usual manner to Co-partnership. They none of them vary much from the types already set forth. The facility with which such conversions can be made was much increased by the Limited Partnerships Act, which came into force on January 1, 1908. Previous to that time, although it has always been open to limited liability companies to take their employees into full Co-partnership, this course was not open to private firms. Under that Act it is now legal to take a corporate body into limited partnership, though with no share in the management, while the other partners retain unlimited liability and the private character of the business remains unaltered. Advantage has already been taken of this law by Messrs. Gilbert Brothers, of Nantwich, who have started a scheme of Co-partnership under the guidance of the Labour Co-partnership Association.

We pass now to a brief account of those Co-partnership societies which have been formed by working men themselves, and not by conversion from businesses which had previously existed.



They are naturally small and unimportant as compared with those we have hitherto reviewed. The difficulties encountered by working men in founding a business are so colossal that there is cause for wonder, not that the successes are so few, but that there are any successes at all. The first to be noticed is the Walsall Locks and Cart Gear, Limited, established in 1873. It is now the largest padlock-making concern in the country, and has a well-equipped factory. The managing committee consist entirely of employees, and are elected by the shareholders, who are also mostly employed by the society. The wages paid are the best in the trade, and the division of profits adds from 5 to 10 per cent. to them. Their business, which is largely export, exceeded 27,000*l.* in 1907. In 1908, the general depression in trade affected them as severely as it affected other industries. Their business fell to 22,859*l.*, and their profit to 997*l.* Notwithstanding the adverse conditions, their sales in 1908 exceeded the sales of any previous year with the exception of 1907.

Another society of this kind is the Trade Union Sheep Shear Society of Sheffield, founded by operatives in the sheep shear trade near Sheffield. The latest figures published showed that their trade amounted in one year to 14,000*l.* They were able to pay themselves good wages and interest on capital and to distribute a profit of 10 per cent. upon their wages.

The above are instances of societies in which the capital is held entirely by individual shareholders. In many of the working men's societies, however, part of the capital is provided by co-operative store societies, which at the same time furnish a market for the produce. Of this variety the Kettering Clothing Society may be taken as an example. It was established in 1893 by clothing operatives at Kettering, and a number of co-operative stores throughout the country which were induced to become shareholders now constitute the market. In spite of the general trade depression, their trade and profit continued to increase in 1908. In that year, their trade exceeded 74,000*l.*; and their profit exceeded 5,500*l.*, as against 4,500*l.* in 1907. Out of this profit, education, provident, and reserve funds were provided, and the remainder was distributed to customers at 7*d.* in the £ on purchases, to workers at 1*s.* 4½*d.* in the £ on wages, and to share capital at 2½ per cent. over and above the interest of 5 per cent. The committee is elected at meetings of shareholders, consisting of delegates from the shareholding co-operative stores in addition to the individual shareholders, who are mainly employees.

Various other types of working men's societies exist which

possess peculiarities in minor details, but enough has been said to illustrate the general character of the Co-partnership movement among the working classes. It is scarcely to be expected that there will be any great development of this branch of co-operation in the near future. The odds against success are so great that even the assistance which the Labour Co-partnership Association always gives, by advice and a wide experience, is not likely to pull through more than a small proportion of those which are started. It is none the less true that, where success is attained, the social and moral improvement effected is far more real and lasting than would be attained by passing Bills through Parliament and multiplying regulations for limiting the activities of citizens. The ordinary method pursued by social reformers is to go whining to the House of Commons with entreaties to pass laws, appoint officials, and curtail individual liberty, in the hope that their trouble may thereby be remedied. The methods of Mr. Vivian and the Labour Co-partnership Association are very different. They do not attempt to attain their ends by worrying the Government to decree that the thing shall be done; they make no demand for diminishing freedom of others, that their own objects may be effected, but they set to work themselves to carry out their objects by their own efforts, only demanding from Parliament that even justice shall be done, and that they shall be in some degree protected from the vexatious and meaningless regulations with which minor governing bodies endeavour to thwart them. Surely those are the true social reformers who themselves work for social reform, and not those who merely agitate for the State to intervene.

During the last few years a movement in housing Co-partnership has sprung up on parallel principles to the movement in labour Co-partnership. It will therefore be convenient to give a brief sketch of the method pursued by Co-partnership tenant societies. Having been originally suggested by workers' societies they will perhaps serve to elucidate the general principle under examination. Moreover, the dozen-and-a-half tenants' societies now in existence have thriven and prospered to such a degree as to make it appear highly probable that the movement will in the course of a few years' time assume very large proportions. Co-partnership in housing is free from many of the obstacles which assail Co-partnership in labour. We venture to express the belief that the true solution of the housing problem is to be found in Co-partnership.

The methods pursued by tenants' societies are as follows: They acquire or erect substantially built houses, which they let to tenants at ordinary rents. After payment of interest on

capital, and provision for repairs, depreciation, etc., the surplus profits are distributed among the tenants in proportion to their rents. These profits, however, are not paid in cash, but in shares, so that after a time the 'garden village' which has been erected is owned mainly by the tenants residing there. But the ownership is collective; there is no individual ownership of the houses. A tenant may own shares equal in value to his house, but he cannot become the owner of the house itself. A Co-partnership tenant has by this arrangement a great advantage over a tenant in an ordinary building society. In the latter case the tenant becomes individual owner of his house, and if ever he finds it necessary to change his abode he is put to the expense of finding a tenant for it and collecting the rent, or else of selling his interest at a price considerably below what he gave for it. The Co-partnership tenant on the other hand can give up his house when he likes. He may either retain his shares and receive interest on them as before, or he may sell them for their full value. The cost of finding a new tenant is borne by the society as a whole. The Co-partnership tenants' society thus adds to the advantages of a building society the further advantage of insuring its members against risk of losses in the event of a change of residence becoming necessary. There can be no question that this is a very real benefit to working men, for they can by no means be sure of always obtaining work in the exact locality where they have elected to live. When, by accumulation of the profits he receives, a tenant has become the owner of shares equal to the value of the house in which he lives, he is thereafter permitted to take his proportion of profits in cash.

Other advantages to the tenant arising from Co-partnership are that he can obtain the capital necessary for acquiring a house at a lower rate of interest through the society than he could borrow it for himself. In all the transactions accompanying the acquisition of a house, he gets the advantage of wholesale prices. The plot of land will cost him less; the legal expenses, the survey fees, and the building itself will all be cheaper than under the individualist system, where everything is of necessity on a retail basis. While thus securing all the advantages of collective action, Co-partnership is free from the disadvantages which attend upon municipal action. In municipal building, the tenant has no interest in keeping up the value of the property. Being in no sense the owner of the property, his interests, if not opposed to those of his municipal landlord, are at any rate indifferent. In the case of Co-partnership the tenants own the whole or a large part of the property themselves; the lower they can reduce the cost of management, etc., the higher their indivi-

dual profits will be ; so that they have every incentive to keep up the value of the house property to the best of their ability. As in labour Co-partnership, the fundamental principle is to identify the personal interests of all concerned with economic and efficient management, and it bids fair to oust the rival principle under which persons are inspected or driven into acting in a manner opposed or indifferent to their private interests. The results are just what we are led to expect *à priori*. No better judge could be found than Mr. Henry Vivian, and he makes the assertion that 'In our large towns the active interest of the individual tenant in the economical administration of house property is worth about 1 per cent. per annum on the capital value.'

It only remains to give figures showing the progress made by a few of these tenant societies. The first to be registered was the Tenant Co-operators, Limited, established in 1888, with a capital of 500*l.* At the end of 1908, the value of its property was 28,680*l.* The Ealing Tenants, Limited, which came next, was established in 1901. It pays 5 per cent. on shares, 4 per cent. on loan stock, and is able to divide a fair profit. The value of its property at the end of 1908 exceeded 97,000*l.* The Garden City Tenants, Limited, commenced to build at Letchworth in 1905. The value of its property at the end of that year was 5,000*l.*, and in three years it had increased to 81,000*l.* Bourneville and Port Sunlight are instances of Co-partnership properties initiated by large employers for the benefit of their men. The most striking experiment of all is perhaps the Hampstead Tenants, Limited, founded in 1907. They leased a large area of land from the Hampstead Garden Suburb Trust, Limited, and during 1908 their property rose in value from 16,674*l.* to 65,672*l.* The Hampstead suburb is in every sense a true garden city. In its planning and building the æsthetic side has been kept prominently forward. We see here nothing of the parallel streets of ugly houses which constitute on most sides the environs of London. We have welcome relief from the usual suburban monotony—row upon row of dreary houses, all built on an identical pattern, depressing even to look at, and how much more melancholy to live in ! At Hampstead there is diversity everywhere. The planning is original and varied ; the houses are all different from one another. The site, moreover, is one of the finest in the neighbourhood of London. The Hampstead Tenants, Limited, have already a large number of houses occupied. In their rents, there are, or will be, wide differences. The smallest houses are now let at a weekly rental

of 6s., a lower figure than can be found elsewhere within ten miles of Charing Cross.

We have now completed our review of the Co-partnership movement, both as regards housing and as regards labour. The latter we conceive to be by far the more important of the two branches, though doubtless beset with the greater difficulties. Labour Co-partnership is not likely to progress so rapidly as Housing Co-partnership, but, in its bearings upon social reform and the improvement of humanity, it has stronger claims for consideration and support. We purpose concluding our survey by a comparison between Co-partnership and Socialism, and a study of the relations existing between them. They have this in common, that they are both forms of Collectivism. In each the central fact is that property is owned, not individually, but collectively by the classes known as the proletariat. There is the further fact that Co-partnership sprang from Socialism as its parent; the early experiments in Co-partnership both in England and France were made by Socialists. Half a century ago the two policies had scarcely begun to be differentiated, and the name Socialism was used to cover both. In John Stuart Mill's 'Political Economy' and in his 'Autobiography' we find him describing under Socialism schemes which we should now call labour Co-partnership, and much misapprehension has in consequence prevailed as to what Mill's views of Socialism actually were.

It not infrequently happens that social institutions which had a common origin develop into structures of widely divergent or even hostile natures. Priests and men of science are not accustomed to regard one another with any excessive comity, yet they are both descended from the primitive medicine-man of savage tribes. So is it with Socialism and Co-partnership. Originally parts of one doctrine, an opposition or rivalry has already commenced to develop between them. The friends of Co-partnership are not to be found among the Socialists; nor are the friends of Socialism to be looked for in a Co-partnership society.\* True, there has been no war declared yet. Suspicion and distrust are the attitudes assumed. The differentiation even is still incomplete; but the breach is widening and the parties are likely to become actively hostile before long. For there is a very fundamental difference between the two, the importance of which is gradually coming to be appreciated. The Socialist desires to effect his purpose through the intermediation of the State, while the co-operator makes no demand

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\* Though they may still not infrequently be found there.

upon the State, but merely wishes to combine forces with others to secure the advantages of concerted action. Socialism is a system of compulsory Collectivism ; Co-partnership a system of voluntary Collectivism. If Co-partnership succeeds, the ground will be cut from under the feet of Socialism ; for success will mean that capital will be held largely by the workers themselves. To that extent the means of production will be socialised, and the result will be attained without the bureaucratic government and hierarchy of inspectors which Socialists desiderate for the working of their principles.

The fact that Co-partnership does not aim at any sudden revolution, but merely at a gradual elevation of the working classes, is one of its best recommendations. It may appear slow and dull beside the quack remedy of too many social reformers. Arm-chair philanthropists are content with more facile methods. A social evil is discovered, Parliament passes a law for its removal, and lo ! the evil disappears. Nothing more is required to bring the millennium than a series of drastic legislative mandates. These we have in abundance. Whatever we may think of their results, we must emphatically subscribe to Mr. Vivian's words in one of his pamphlets on labour Co-partnership :

‘ There surely can be no doubt, whatever be our view of the future of industry, that it is desirable to put workmen, wherever possible, in the way of acquiring more material wealth by their own energy ; to encourage them in many cases to use that wealth, as far as their immediate economic wants will allow, in acquiring some share of the capital of the industry employing them, and, at the same time, educate them to work together for mutual gain and improvement. This may be thought a humdrum way of improving the workman's lot ; but if we look around on his life to-day, and consider what he owes on the economic and intellectual side to methods such as these, and what he owes to efforts at short cuts to the millennium, the value of these plodding and at times painfully slow methods is clearly seen.’

We have endeavoured to show that labour Co-partnership makes higher demands upon the character and integrity of the working classes than the ordinary system of fixed wages, and we have attributed the failure of the early self-governing workshops to that cause. The present moderate dimensions of the movement may be similarly accounted for. That measure of success which has attended modern experiments is to be correlated with a general improvement in the condition of the working classes. Now Socialism is equally dependent upon individual character. It is even more dependent. For in the case of Co-partnership the disadvantages which inevitably attach to

collective action are set off by the identification of the personal interest of each individual with his work. But in Socialism the powerful driving force of personal interest is not enlisted in this manner. In place of it officials and inspectors are established to enforce efficiency of labour. It is scarcely necessary to ask which system will have the best results. But let us waive this point altogether. Let us assume for the moment that Socialism and Co-partnership require similar amounts of intelligence and honesty in the workers. It still remains true that Co-partnership will succeed far better than Socialism, and for this reason—that Socialism is of universal application, while Co-partnership is limited to those who choose of their own free will to join a society. The position of affairs which faces us is that the bulk of the working classes are not sufficiently educated for either system of Collectivism. But a great and rapid improvement is in progress, so that year by year there is a larger proportion of persons capable of taking their places in a higher form of the organization of labour. The extent of the improvement is measured by the success of Co-partnership. But Co-partnership, being a free and natural growth, cannot progress more rapidly than the people themselves progress. Societies formed in advance of their times simply fail. Socialism, on the other hand, with its clumsy instrument of governmental action, cannot automatically follow social improvement in this way. It is applied arbitrarily from above, and affects the most backward equally with the most advanced of working men. It cannot hope to succeed until the lowest have all been brought to the level of those who are now our highest. If Socialism were to be introduced before this had been effected, general disaster would ensue. If, on the other hand, it is to be postponed till the working classes are fit for it, then we must drop our hopes of improvement in the condition of labour for an indefinite period. The failure of the self-governing workshops in the 'fifties was a failure for Socialism as much as for Co-partnership. If Socialism were applied prematurely, the entire State would fail as the workshops failed. If, on the other hand, it is postponed till the time is ripe, Co-partnership will already have spread so widely as to make Socialism unnecessary.

But now let us look far ahead. Let us suppose that the millennium has arrived, and that the working classes are capable of equally efficient production under either Socialism or Co-partnership. Which, then, will be the better? The main difference will be that in the case of Socialism a bureaucracy will exist, with a large army of inspectors for supervising and controlling industry; while in the case of Co-partnership, and its alliance with individual interest, these officials will be dispensed with.

In the former case a large proportion of the people is set aside for unproductive purposes. In the latter case the whole force of the nation can be employed in a productive manner. Not only will the production of the Co-partnership State be greater than that of the Socialist State—not only will it be a richer State—but the productive workers will not be burdened with taxation for the maintenance of unproductive workers. This is a point that Socialists very frequently overlook. They see clearly enough that the ‘idle rich’ are a deadweight upon the productive portion of the community; they fail to see that inspectors and officials would also be a deadweight.

Yet another advantage would the Co-partnership State possess. We have already made the admission that there are certain branches of industry to which Co-partnership is not suited, and probably never will be suited. They can, for instance, never equal an individual, with large capital behind him, in a sphere where great enterprise is required and heavy risks have to be undertaken. We do not therefore anticipate that Co-partnership can entirely take the place of the present organization of labour. We look to a time when the two forms will exist side by side, each being adopted in the trades most suitable to it, and the community profiting by the advantages of both. But in the Socialist State the individualist form of industry with all its special advantages would be lost, while the Collectivist form would by law be rendered universal. Left to free competition, labour Co-partnership will establish itself against individualist trading wherever it proves to be more efficient. More than that it does not ask for. We believe that it has before it a great future; but we no more suppose that it will supersede individual trading in all branches of industry than we suppose that the co-operative stores are going to supersede all private shops.

There is a wide difference of mind between Socialists and those who advocate Co-partnership. The former have their attention fixed mainly on the rich, whom they declare to be plunderers of the poor. Their proposals are accordingly framed more with the view of attacking capitalists than of assisting workers. Adherents of Co-partnership think only of elevating the status of the worker. The existence of great wealth in private hands leaves them unmoved. They wish to become rich, not by appropriating the wealth of others, but by creating new wealth through their own industry and exertions. Miss Mary Hart, in her biography of Leclaire, correctly draws the distinction when she says that Co-partnership ‘has for its end *not* the impoverishment of the rich, but the enrichment of the poor.’

But, after all, the deepest and most important difference between



Socialism and Co-partnership is that the one hampers individual liberty, while the other advances it. Opponents of Socialism have always insisted upon the destruction of liberty which Socialism would involve. The loss of liberty would be felt partly by the immense taxation which would be levied, restricting the power of the individual to spend the money he earns in the way he likes, and partly by the multitude of regulations which he would be compelled to observe, overseen throughout his work by innumerable grades of inspectors. No such charge can be brought against Co-partnership. If Co-partnership were general, industrial legislation would become superfluous for the same reason that trade unions would become superfluous. They both are founded on the assumption of an opposition of interest between employer and employed, in which the latter class have to be protected from the former. Once employer and employed are united in the same persons, all the social difficulties attendant upon economical production will vanish away.

Mazzini prophesied in 1858 that the labourer, originally a slave, then a serf, now a hireling, would become a partner. That prophecy is visibly nearer fulfilment at the present moment than it was when it was uttered. Surely no finer field could be found for the work of social reformers than that of assisting its fulfilment. Surely no worthier use could be given to capital than that of aiding working men to improve their status. But there is another reason for wishing well to the movement, which will appeal with greater force to many. The danger of Socialism is a great and menacing one. We do not refer to the Socialism of the Fabian Society nor of the Social Democratic Federation. We refer to the socialistic legislation passed by Liberal and Conservative Governments under the euphemistic appellation of social reform. Every session many measures are passed which are steps towards Socialism; the summation of a series of these steps will land us in Socialism unawares. The aim is to patch up the existing industrial organization and endeavour to soften its acerbities. Would it not be wiser to let it pass peacefully away and introduce a higher organization of industry? Even in those trades which remained individualist, the welfare of the worker would be secured; for employers could only obtain their labour by offering terms at least as favourable as prevailed in the Co-partnership societies. To the present times are still applicable the words with which Leclaire addressed his men at the outset of his scheme in 1869:

‘To-day, I may say, on all sides there is agitation; everywhere people are busy with social improvements. Turn a deaf ear—let us occupy ourselves with activity and perseverance in perfecting our organization.’

## ART. IV.—THE POETRY OF CARDUCCI.

1. *Poesie di Giosuè Carducci*; *MDCCL-MCM.* Quarta Edizione. Bologna: Zanichelli. 1905.
2. *Prose di Giosuè Carducci*; *MDCCLIX-MCIII.* Terza Edizione. Bologna: Zanichelli. 1907.
3. *Memorie della Vita di Giosuè Carducci (1835-1907).* Raccolte di un Amico (GIUSEPPE CHIARINI). Seconda Edizione. Firenze: Barbèra. 1907.
4. *Poems by Giosuè Carducci.* With an Introduction and Translations by MAUD HOLLAND. London: Fisher Unwin. 1907.

IT is never easy for any generation to be quite sure of the ultimate rank of its own contemporary poets. The sources of self-deception in these matters are too many, too obvious, too inextricably interwoven with all the conditions of life and thought. Yet here as elsewhere our judgement is part of ourselves, a faculty which we cannot help exercising, however conscious we may be of its frailties. And indeed it would be inhuman if, through any doubts of ultimate ratification, we denied ourselves the natural office of saluting our greatest as our greatest, whether in thought or art or action. So, in the case of this highest art of poetry, it may fairly be claimed that there is nothing unduly presumptuous in saying that when the long illness of Giosuè Carducci drew to its end in the middle days of February 1907, the thing that was taking place in the small bedroom at Bologna was in fact nothing less than the loss to the world of its greatest poet. The secrets of Fame are in her own keeping and she is often long in disclosing them. There may well be in Europe at this moment great poets whose very names are unknown except to a faithful few, whose voices never reach the great world's ear. But of the known poets of the world none seems, so far as can be judged, to be more sure of ultimate immortality than the poet of the 'Odi Barbare.' The most likely rival, we may be proud to think, is an Englishman who happily survives to inherit the mantle which many will think he might dispute with Carducci. And we may be sure there is none to whom Carducci would more gladly have resigned it than to the poet of 'Songs before Sunrise,' the most enthusiastic, the most eloquent, and the most naturally Latin, of all the Englishmen who gave their tongues and their pens to the cause of that new-born Italy in whose arduous and passionate service Carducci spent the whole of his laborious life.

But putting these difficult questions of primacy aside, what are the most striking characteristics of Carducci and of his poetry? Let us take the bare facts first. Carducci was born in 1835, the son of a country doctor whose political activities had conducted him to prison in 1831. The boy very early showed a great enthusiasm for the three things to which he gave his whole life—learning, poetry, and liberty. From his very schooldays he had the passion of erudition, and one who lived in daily intercourse with him in his sixteenth and seventeenth years speaks of the inspiration there was for those who saw it in that daily life of poverty and industry. The natural result of these tastes was his entry into the Scuola Normale of Pisa in 1853, where he was again conspicuous for wide reading, industry, and independence of character in a place which, so far as the power of the authorities went, was as narrow and clerical as it could be made. His classical and anti-Christian feeling was only strengthened by his scorn for the narrow outlook and petty tyrannies of the School. Already as a boy of eighteen the author of the ‘*Odi Barbare*’ was writing Italian Sapphics and Alcaics, and by the time he begins his teaching career at San Miniato he is bent on proving that the Greek and Roman metres can deal with modern subjects quite as effectively as the modern metres can. For him the fashionable Manzonianism of his day was a kind of weak sentimentalism, hanging, as he said, in eternal suspense between good and bad, between truth and convention, and expressing itself in a languid feebleness of style natural to an effete society. From all this he from the first, as in his early journalistic controversies at Florence, called his countrymen back to the virile simplicity of the ancients. The governing elements of his character which were to be seen as clearly in the boy of fourteen as in the veteran of seventy were, as his friend Chiarini says, an exuberant vitality which made him always a rebel against the ascetic teachings of the Church, an incorruptible sincerity, a fierce hatred of all oppression, a passion for learning, an unbounded pride in being the descendant of the ancient Italians, an unlimited shame in being an Italian of the nineteenth century. He himself said, in his old age, that the guiding principles of his life had always been the same. They were three: in politics, Italy before all things; in art, classical poetry before all things; in life, sincerity and strength before all things. And in his mouth this was no mere old man’s flourish of words. It was the exact truth. Every page of his life paints the same figure, the strong heart and head, the unquenchable love of Italy, the unsleeping consciousness that Italy is the living heir of Greece and Rome. One other charac-

teristic also appears very early, the high severity of his conception of style. Before he was twenty-six we find him complaining that his studies compel him to read so many ill-written books, some of them of an 'ignoble modernity,' which he fears will ruin the little sense of style and language which he had so far acquired. And a year later he says that he has his mind full of ideas for poetry but doubts whether he will write any more, for to write as he had hitherto written would no longer satisfy him. 'Is this pride?' he asks; and answers that it may be, but it is still more 'love of that art of the gods, in the study of which I mean to live and die, though I may never myself win the mastery of it.' Those doubts of the young poet were nobly falsified, and the modest vow as abundantly rewarded as it was nobly kept. The victory was already won when at forty-two he published the famous volume which opens with that defiant prelude 'Odio l' usata poesia' and is in its every poem and every line an embodiment of his disdain of the beauties that are to be won without years of labour, patience and pain.

That is the man as he was throughout. His life has no story, and may be told in a few words. Born, as we said, in 1835, he was only twenty-five when, after holding a few minor scholastic posts, he was appointed in 1860 to the Chair of Eloquence in the University of Bologna, where he remained for the rest of his life. The only events of biographical importance in this pre-Bolognese period were first the suicide in 1857 of his brother Dante, whom he lamented in the poem 'Alla Memoria di D. C.,' as well as in many later poems; and, second, his marriage, in 1859. His wife, Elvira Menicucci, became the mother of four children, three daughters and one son, also named Dante, who died at the age of three, but lives for Carducci's readers in many poems, especially 'Pianto Antico,' and the beautiful 'Funere mersit acerbo.' In the life of the man, as distinct from that of the author, there are no other events except the few in which he touched politics. But of them little need be said here, though he was twice a candidate for Parliament, accepted a seat on the Municipal Council of Bologna, and ultimately became an Italian Senator. It is true that this eager public spirit is an essential part of his greatness. Neither the scholar in him, nor the poet, could ever forget the Italian. But his only important political activity is, of course, to be looked for in the long series of his political poems from 'A Vittorio Emanuele' and 'Alla Croce di Savoia,' through the violent republican denunciations of his middle period, of which the famous 'la patria è vile' is almost the keynote, down to the final deliberate acceptance of the Monarchy which began with 'Alla Regina d'Italia' and 'Il liuto e la lira,' and finally

produced the noble tribute to Charles Albert in the 'Piemonte' of his last volume. It was an 'evolution,' as he said: and those who see facts, and move accordingly, are always unpopular with those who are blind and stand still; and, like Crispi, Carducci had to face a good deal of abuse from his old friends. But he lived long enough to survive misrepresentation, and when he died, all Italy, of all parties, united to honour the last survivor of her heroic age, not only the greatest poet left to her, but the greatest man.

His poetry, as he ultimately arranged it, is divided into six sections. Of the first, the 'Juvenilia,' not much need be said here. Like other poets, Carducci had to feel his way, and that is what he is doing in these pieces written between 1850 and 1860. The poet is in them as well as the patriot and the scholar, but he is a little overshadowed by his companions. The scholar especially is himself feeling his way, has hardly yet entirely escaped from the schoolmaster, or even the schoolboy, stage of development. Greek myth and Greek and Roman gods and heroes are omnipresent, and many of the poems are little more than an exceptionally gifted young don's imitations of the classical masters. But behind them there is a man in earnest. Even in the 'Juvenilia' Carducci is a literary and political revolutionary quite as visibly as a scholar. He set himself from the beginning to shame out of existence the mere academic elegance of emptiness which had been the growing bane of Italian literature ever since Pope and Emperor met at Bologna and throttled for three centuries the mental and political life of Italy. And, a more immediate task, he set himself to supersede the Romantics. Always in open opposition to the neo-Christian Romanticism of Chateaubriand and Manzoni, assailing it sometimes with rollicking satire, as in the 'Al Beato Giovanni della Pace,' and sometimes with a bitter anger of rebuke, as in the Sonnet to Metastasio, where he complains that all vices are taught and all virtues forgotten by

' Il secoletto vil che cristianeggia,'

he appealed for a stronger and manlier note in literature, in politics, and in life. In the spirit of Leopardi he cries—

' Al gener vostro ozio è la vita, scherno  
Ogni virtude; in questi avelli or vive,  
Qui solo, e in van, la patria nostra antiqua.'

But his physical and mental health were from the first too strongly built to allow him to sit by the wayside weeping splendid

tears like Leopardi. There is as much pride and anger as despair in his note. What he asks for himself is—

‘ il retto  
Non domabile ingegno, e l’ ira e il forte  
Spregio pe’ vili, e la parola franca.’

And he uses that ‘ parola franca ’ to call openly for

‘ Guerra a’ tedeschi, immensa eterna guerra,  
Tanto che niun rivegga i patrii tetti,  
E tomba a tutti sia l’ itala terra.’

For that great day of deliverance he sternly waits. He cannot follow his unhappy brother into suicide. Neither that nor any other form of escape from the duties and realities of life is for him. He is made, as he sadly says in the poem to his brother’s memory, of harder, more resisting stuff.

‘ Salve, o fratello, e mira  
I tristi giorni miei come van soli.  
Ben io vivrò : chè a me l’ anima avvinta  
Di più tenace creta ha la natura,  
E officio forse e carità il suade.’

He knew that he was not made for death, but for life and action. It was his to march on enduringly till that liberty for which he pined was won, and as the cause of free Italy advanced from strength to strength, so her greatest poet grew in power of thought and mastery of his noble art. There is scarcely a greater distance between the struggling Italy of 1859 and the united and completed Italy of 1877 than there is between the patriotic but rather obviously eloquent ‘ A Vittorio Emmanuele ’ and the magnificent ode, one of the stateliest in any language, in which some twenty years later he celebrated the glories, past, present and to come, of eternal Rome.

The final arrangement of the poems is not strictly chronological ; but we can hardly be wrong in supposing that the beautiful ‘ Congedo,’ which stands at the head of the next section, called ‘ Levia Gravia,’ refers to Carducci’s almost entire abstention from poetry during the years 1860 to 1863. Still these years were not lost years. Throughout them, the scholar was hard at work, becoming the master and not the slave of his scholarship ; and private sorrow and political disappointments were doing for him what no private or public successes could have done ; they were making him live by the heart as well as by the head. The new note of tenderness is struck at once in the ‘ Congedo.’ It tells of the reawakening in him of poetry,

without which he had felt, as he says in the finest of his few long similes, like the wandering Arab in the desert who sees the life-giving stream lose itself in the sand and the desert close limitless all round him. But, young as he is, he comes back to poetry with the feelings of the Goethe of the Dedication of 'Faust.' If poetry returns, for whom does it return? Not for the brother, whose love filled and strengthened his youth. To rise on the wings of poetry seems at first to call for courage and joy that are no longer his. But no; it is only the note that must change. The joyous ease of youth is gone for ever;

'Addio, serena etate,  
Che di forme e di suoni il cor s' appaga,  
O primavera de la vita, addio!  
Ad altri le beate  
Visiōni e la gloria, e a l' ombra vaga  
De' boschetti posare appresso il rio,  
E co' l' queto desio  
Far di sè specchio queto al mondo intero.'

The new call is that of sorrow;

'dovunque suona  
In voce di dolor l' umano accento  
Accuse in faccia del divin creato,  
E a l' uom l' uom non perdona:'

wherever there are suffering and wrong there are brothers and friends to take the place of the lost—

'Ivi gli amici nostri, ivi i fratelli.  
Intuona, o musa mia, gl' inni novelli.'

The same note of humanitarianism is sounded in two of the most striking poems of 'Levia Gravia'—the 'Carnevale' and the 'Per Raccolta in Morte di ricca e bella Signora.' These and a few political poems may be taken as the 'Gravia' of the volume. The 'Levia' are chiefly marriage poems of which there is one elaborate double chorus of young men and maidens after the manner of Catullus, and several sonnets, the most original of which is, perhaps, that 'Per le Nozze di un Geologo,' and the most beautiful the simpler and more obvious 'Per 'Nozze in Primavera.' Perhaps these pieces give the best occasion for a remark which may be made once for all. No poet was ever freer than Carducci from the fault which often makes decent people inclined to deny themselves the pleasure of reading the marvellous prose and fine verse of the most celebrated of his successors in Italian literature. He once had

occasion to say, in a reply to an attack, 'I, at any rate, materialist as you call me, have never so much as written indecent verses.' Certainly none such are to be found among his works. And, eagerly as he always defended the poet's birthright of freedom and plainness of speech, he had throughout nothing but scorn for the school of poets who, as he says, ask us to spend our time in watching them admire their own loveliness, or hearing them describe their real or imaginary erotic adventures. Such people make him cry out, 'In Heaven's name let us hear no more of Sappho, and let us give up pretending to go into ecstasies before every indecency of Catullus.' The poet of the 'Hymn to Satan' is the champion of a different paganism from that, of the virile and fruitful paganism that gave Rome the empire of the world, not of the sterile and decadent paganism which sowed the seeds of her decay. There was nothing in his life or work on which he had to turn his back when he sat down to write the many marriage poems which evidently came so willingly from him, not only for his own daughter or for Crispi's but for others less near to his heart. Marriage is for him the crown of the individual life, the hope and security of the life of the State:

<p>' Oh dolce oblio profondo De le lotte anelanti! Oh divisi dal mondo Susurri de gli amanti, Che l' aura pia diffonde Tra l' ombra e tra le fronde,</p>	<p>' Da i vostri amori, o prode Gioventú di mia terra, A la forza e a la frode Esca perenne guerra, Esca a l' italo sole Una robusta prole.'</p>
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So he prays in the poem on the marriage of Cesare Parenzo. And the long 'Le Nozze' in 'Levia Gravia' strikes the same note of motherhood as the goal and glory of marriage.

' Ma in cor ti siede impresso  
Ch' ogni piacer piú caro  
Ti tornerà in amaro  
Senza i baci e gli accenti  
De' pargoli innocenti—e il puro amplesso.'

In this as in other respects he had full right to say what he said to his students during the celebration of the Jubilee of his Professorial career: 'I have wished to inspire you to prefer everywhere in life realities to appearances, duty to pleasure; and in art to have high ideals, to care more for simplicity than for artifice, more for beauty than for trickery of style, more for strength than for splendour, more for truth and justice than for glory.'



Yet the man who spoke and lived in this spirit was the author of the 'Hymn to Satan' which follows the 'Levia Gravia.' That splendid lyric, perhaps the first poem of Carducci in which the inspiration entirely overmasters the preoccupation with form, is, however, in no real inconsistency with such language. Nietzsche and D' Annunzio may indeed have found in it the fountain head of their philosophy, but that only proves that Satan, who could himself misquote Scripture, is liable to be perverted in his turn. The truth is that Carducci's Satan is nearer to Mr. Meredith's Spirit of Earth than to anything any of the 'Satanic' schools of literature give us. The 'Satana' of the hymn is, it is true, the champion of paganism against Christianity. But it is not vice that he champions against virtue; it is freedom, truth, life, as he sees them, against slavery, falsehood and death. At the opening of the poem he is addressed as the very principle of existence, as at once matter and spirit, sense and reason; and in the course of it he in turn becomes the spirit of wine, of love, of poetry and art, the inspirer of the Greeks, the bringer back to the Middle Age of the joys, the learning, and the political ideals which Christianity had banished, the voice of rebellious truth that spoke through Huss and Wicliffe, through Luther and Savonarola, the voice of the modern spirit coursing in steam and fire over sea and land, the mighty rebel who is everywhere taking the long-delayed vengeance of the downtrodden human reason. The evolution of the poem is so continuous that it is difficult to quote any separate stanzas, but a few may be given in proof at any rate that Carducci's professorial learning was very far from extinguishing his force and vigour. The stanzas chase one another with the fury of a mountain torrent.

' Gittò la tonaca  
Martin Lutero :  
Gitta i tuoi vincoli,  
Uman pensiero,

' Corusco e fumido  
Come i vulcani,  
I monti supera,  
Divora i piani ;

' E splendi e folgora  
Di fiamme cinto ;  
Materia, inalzati ;  
Satana ha vinto.

' Sorvola i baratri ;  
Poi si nasconde  
Per antri incogniti,  
Per vie profonde ;

' Un bello e orribile  
Mostro si sferra,  
Corre gli oceani,  
Corre la terra :

' Ed esce ; e indomito  
Di lido in lido  
Come di turbine  
Manda il suo grido,

‘ Come di turbine  
L’ alito spande :  
Ei passa, o popoli,  
Satana il grande.

‘ Passa benefico  
Di loco in loco  
Su l’ infrenabile  
Carro del foco.

‘ Salute, o Satana,  
O ribellione,  
O forza vindice  
De la ragione !’

The next book, the ‘ *Giambi ed Epodi*,’ is of less interest, dealing mainly as it does with the passing political events of the day. Throughout it the poet fulfils the promise of his prologue—

‘ Tutto che questo mondo falso adora  
Col verso audace lo schiaffeggerò ;’

and the book is full of bitter attacks on Pio Nono, Napoleon III., and all those who either barred the way of Italy to perfect freedom and unity, or disgraced by their vices the partial freedom she had already won. Victor Hugo himself is never more savage than is Carducci in the terrible picture of the Pope gloating over the blood of his victims, Monti and Tognetti. This poem, as cruel as it is brilliant, drew a protest even from the poet’s friend Chiarini. The fact is that, nobly moved as Carducci was, and always by noble ideals, he could not rise above the party spirit of the hour. He spent his life in opposition to one thing or another, from the Manzonianism of his father and the clericalism of his teachers to the indifference, sloth, and compromising cowardice of official Italy. Like every other idealist who does not simply stand aside, he always found something to provoke his rebellious indignation. And it was never more active than in his republican phase after 1862. But indignation, as he himself complains, has not always got poetry at command, and invective, however high her flight for the moment, seldom succeeds in keeping up for long. She can produce telling epigrams such as

‘ Impronta Italia domandava Roma ;  
Bisanzio essi le han dato ;’

but much great poetry she cannot in the nature of things produce. There is a good deal of eloquent and even splendid anger in the ‘ *Giambi*’ ; but great poetry demands more than that, and Carducci’s anger is far too detailed, too particular, too personal to rise for a moment into the world of such things as Wordsworth’s *Sonnets* or Shelley’s *Ode*, still less into that of the sublime defiance which closes the ‘ *Prometheus*’ of Aeschylus. Perhaps

liberty was too young in Italy for her poet to be full grown ; and the words Carducci uses in the sonnet called ' Onomastico ' may in another sense be a criticism of himself :

' Intera libertà vuol l' uomo intero.'

Neither liberty nor man could be complete in those stormy youthful years of Italy. The poet cannot depict the storm, for he is inside it. In this way the best of the ' Giambi,' like the ' In Morte di Giovanni Cairoli,' owe their moving quality less to anything the poet says than to the tragic nature of the facts themselves. And even there the best-remembered line is its bitter last word

' La patria nostra è vile,'

which was naturally remembered against the poet when he stood before Italian electors in later years. But it is pleasant to see that the last poem in the volume strikes a happier note. By 1877 he has escaped for ever, not from his early convictions, for them he never lost, but from the temper with which he had held them. So that he can now speak kindly even of Pio Nono,

' Io maledissi al papa or son dieci anni,  
Oggi co 'l papa mi concilierei,'

and call for a general reconciliation—

' Noi troppo odiammo e sofferimmo. Amate.  
Il mondo è bello e santo è l'avvenir.'

The ' Giambi ' are followed by the long and difficult ' Inter-mezzo,' which is mainly remarkable for its brilliant satire of the Romantic poets, the ' Sublimi ammalati,' the

' gente finita  
Dal *pathos* ideale,  
Che riduceste a clinica la vita  
E il mondo a un ospedale,'

for whom he never varied in his contemptuous disgust. He was entirely of Goethe's famous opinion, ' I call the classic the healthy, ' the romantic the sickly,' and had an equal dislike of all the phases of what seemed to him a movement of moral, intellectual and physical disorder. Great as was his admiration for Leopardi, it did not prevent his saying in the preface to an Italian translation of Shelley's ' Prometheus,' ' After all, when it ' comes to the very end, Manzoni sends people to the confessional, Byron to the galleys, Leopardi to the hospital.' Shelley's

entire freedom from either the cynicism or the mysticism of reaction made Carducci rank him as in essence a classical spirit. No one indeed altogether escapes the *Zeitgeist*, and not only Shelley but Carducci himself is full of things which would never have been but for Byron and Chateaubriand and Victor Hugo and the all-pervading Romantic atmosphere. But Carducci's mind, character, and aesthetic sense were all definitely set the other way, so that everything connected with Romanticism was apt to incur suspicion in his eyes. It can hardly have been without some half-conscious feeling that rhyme was the watchword of the Romantics that he came in his later years more and more to avoid rhymed metres and go back to the Alcaics and Sapphics of Horace. And few will doubt that this was one of those instincts by which genius feels its way to its goal. Splendidly as he could use rhyme, the unique Carducci is less in the rhymed poems than in the unrhymed. Yet when he began to recognise himself as a rebel, it was in a torrent of magnificent rhyme that he announced his intention to be free. He never wrote anything more vigorous than the ode 'Alla Rima,' at the beginning of the 'Rime Nuove' which ends with the salutation :

<p>'Ave, o bella imperatrice, O felice Del latin metro reina ! Un ribelle ti saluta Combattuta, E a te libero s' inchina.</p>	<p>'Cura e onor de' padri miei, Tu mi sei Come lor sacra e diletta. Ave, o rima : e dammi un fiore Per l' amore, E per l' odio una saetta.'</p>
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But for the future these arrows of hate were to play an ever smaller part in his work. He himself wrote to Chiarini a little while before the appearance of 'Rime Nuove' that his violent animosities were yielding to the conquering light of reason, and that he felt that the time of storm was over. In saying that, he forgot a little his own poet's 'genus irritabile.' Storms were in his temperament, and were sure to occur from time to time. But they grew ever rarer and less violent, and they no longer issued in political poems. From henceforth he is a poet with life for his subject-matter and the art of rhythmical and metrical language for his instrument, and everything else is subordinate to that. Whatever he touches is passed through the fire of poetry and receives poetic transformation. He does not ignore politics ; they too are a part of life and a part which no free or brave man will care to disregard ; but when he returns to them in the later books his treatment of them, except in the 'Ça ira,' which he said was to be taken dramatically, has generally a healing and satisfying finality quite unknown to the

earlier poems. What a gulf separates such things as the beautiful 'Miramar' of the 'Odi Barbare' and the splendid 'Piemonte' of 'Rime e Ritmi' from even the finest of the earlier political poems! He has gone beyond a part here, and can give us the whole, the whole which includes the failures of the vanquished and the weaknesses of the weak as well as the triumphs of the victors and the strength of the strong. Now he tries to take all life for his province; and, as he describes it in the 'Congedo' of the 'Rime Nuove,' passes all through his trans-fusing furnace, only half knowing what its final shape will be:

'Che sia ciò, non lo so io;  
Lo sa Dio  
Che sorride al grande artiero.  
Ne le fiamme così ardenti  
Gli elementi  
De l' amore e del pensiero

'Picchia. E per la libertade  
Ecco spade,  
Ecco scudi di fortezza:  
Ecco serti di vittoria  
Per la gloria,  
E diademi a la bellezza.

'Egli gitta, e le memorie  
E le glorie  
De' suoi padri e di sua gente.  
Il passato e l' avvenire  
A fluire  
Va nel masso incandescente.

'Picchia. Ed ecco istoriati  
A i penati  
Tabernacoli ed al rito:  
Ecco tripodi ed altari,  
Ecco rari  
Fregi e vasi pe 'l convito.

'Ei l' afferra, e poi del maglio  
Co 'l travaglio  
Ei lo doma su l' incude.  
Picchia e canta. Il sole ascende  
E risplende  
Su la fronte e l' opra rude.

'Per sé il pover manuale  
Fa uno strale  
D' oro e il lancia contro 'l sole:  
Guarda come in alto ascenda  
E risplenda,  
Guarda e gode, e più non vuole.'

Poetry is in all things the escape of the essence from its accidents, the escape into light and form and utterance of that which lay obscure and shapeless and silent till it was awakened by the poet's touch. There is poetry everywhere, but it is only by the poet that it can be discovered and released. That is the work which from henceforth Carducci set himself to do in the field of Nature, in the field of human life, and among those memories of the past which, more perhaps in Italy than anywhere else and never more than to Carducci, unite the double tenderness that belongs to noble actions performed on the noblest of stages.

Perhaps nowhere in Carducci is this pure poetic work, this distilling of the essential significance and beauty of a thought or object, more perfectly accomplished than in the fine sonnets which make up the second book of 'Rime Nuove.' Few indeed are the poets in whose work are to be found twelve successive

sonnets of such perfection as the first twelve of these. The opening one on the Sonnet itself, the first of the three on Homer, the beautiful 'Di Notte,' the gloomy 'Notte d'inverno,' any of these would by itself be enough to make a poet's name, but the three finest of all are perhaps 'Il Bove,' 'Virgilio,' and 'Funere mersit acerbo.' The consoling quality in the poetry of Virgil has never received a finer tribute than in the second of these; but fine as that is, it is not so striking a proof of the poetic, which is properly, of course, the creative, gift as the wonderful 'Il Bove':

'T' amo o pio bove; e mite un sentimento  
Di vigore e di pace al cor m' infondi,  
O che solenne come un monumento  
Tu guardi i campi liberi e fecondi,

'O che al giogo inchinandoti contento  
L' agil opra de l' uom grave secondi:  
Ei t' esorta e ti punge, e tu co 'l lento  
Giro de' pazienti occhi rispondi.

'Da la larga narice umida e nera  
Fuma il tuo spirto, e come un inno lieto  
Il muggio nel sereno aer si perde;

'E del grave occhio glauco entro l' austera  
Dolcezza si rispecchia ampio e quieto  
Il divino del pian silenzio verde.'

Nowhere in Europe, so far as we are aware, did the last quarter of the nineteenth century produce a finer sonnet than this, with the possible exception of the best of 'Les Trophées.' Both in its note and in its workmanship it recalls the manner of Heredia; the last line in particular is one that he would have envied. But Carducci has more tenderness, more lyric quality in him than Heredia. Nowhere in 'Les Trophées' is there any such cry of the heart to be found as the 'Funere mersit acerbo,' in which Carducci poured out his grief for his dead son. 'O tu,' he breaks out to the brother, also named Dante, whom he lost thirteen years before:

'O tu che dormi là su la fiorita  
Collina tosca, e ti sta il padre a canto;  
Non hai tra l' erbe del sepolcro udita  
Pur ora una gentil voce di pianto?

'È il fanciulletto mio, che a la romita  
Tua porta batte: ei che nel grande e santo  
Nome te rinnovava, anch' ei la vita  
Fugge, o fratel, che a te fu amara tanto.

‘ Ah! no ! giocava per le pinte aiole,  
E arriso pur di vision leggiadre  
L’ ombra l’ avvolsse, ed a le fredde e sole

‘ Vostre rive lo spinse. Oh, giù ne l’ adre  
Sedi accogliilo tu, chè al dolce sole  
Ei volge il capo ed a chiamar la madre.’

It is a complete mistake to think, as has sometimes been thought, that in the case of Carducci the man disappeared in the artist. This Sonnet, and the ‘ Brindisi Funebre,’ and the noble ‘ Pianto Antico,’ all breathing the same sorrow, would alone be enough to show the utter falsity of any such notion. No intellectual labours, no poetic triumphs, could ever make him forget his brother or his child. His own sorrows and joys, and the joys and sorrows of his friends, fill a large place in his poems. And he is for ever turning back in poem after poem as in the ‘ Nostalgia,’ the ‘ Idillio ‘ Maremmano,’ and the ‘ Davanti San Guido ’ of this volume to the beloved country of his childhood which remained to the end the home of his memory and his heart.

The remainder of the ‘ Rime Nuove ’ must be passed over here, though it would be a pleasure to give that finely imagined Sonnet ‘ A un Asino,’ or the lovely little poem called ‘ Vignetta ’; or to quote from the beautiful Dawn on the Alps, so full of that accurate and delicate observation of the details of Nature which was the discovery of the nineteenth century; or again from the ‘ San ‘ Martino,’ another tiny masterpiece of the same order which might have come out of the ‘ Shorter Poems ’ of Mr. Robert Bridges; or again from the ‘ Brindisi d’ Aprile,’ with its swinging and rollicking praise of wine, itself a ‘ beaker full of the warm South ’; or from the ‘ Panteismo,’ which might be a lyric from the ‘ Buch ‘ der Lieder ’ and shows that from an environment so powerful as Romanticism not even a Carducci escapes; or from the ‘ Davanti ‘ una Cattedrale ’ with its directness of physical effect so that as one reads one does not merely think of the hot piazza outside and the cold tombs within, one feels them; or from the pretty paganism of the ‘ Primavera Elleniche;’ or from the ‘ Rimembranze di ‘ Scuola,’ a vivid picture of that thought of death which more often than grown-up people always remember comes suddenly crashing like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky on the irresponsible happiness of boyhood; or from ‘ Classicismo e Romanticismo,’ the one the beneficent warm and beautiful sun, rejoicing in the vineyard and the cornland, the other the cold and barren moon, the haunter of ruins and decay: or finally from the remarkable ‘ Davanti San Guido,’ where he goes back to his own country, and an ancient avenue of once familiar cypresses call on him to

leave the noisy world, and his fame, and the sorrows which they know are gnawing at his heart, and return to them, and the nightingales, the sun, and the sea ;

‘ A le querce ed a noi qui puoi cantare  
L’ umana tua tristezza e il vostro duol.  
Vedi come pacato e azzurro è il mare,  
Come ridente a lui discende il sol ! ’

But he cannot stay : he has a child, his Libertà, his Titti, whose ‘ crying is a cry for bread,’ and he is no popular poet to whom bread comes easily ; and though he listens with delight to his old grandmother as she comes at the call of the cypresses to make her appeal to him, and to tell him the old nursery tale in the country accent, and though he feels that it may be that the thing he has sought with such pain was really here at home and needed no seeking, yet he cannot quit the stir and doings of the world. He is like the colts which he sees there scampering eagerly after the train as it goes by their pasture, not like the wise ass who never once takes her eyes off her thistle.

We now come to the ‘ Odi Barbare.’ We have seen that as a very young man Carducci was already sure that the notion that the ancient metres were not suited to modern subjects was a complete delusion. By the time he published the ‘ Odi Barbare ’ he had gone further. He had become convinced that their extreme definiteness of form, far from being a hurt or hindrance to the poet, was, on the contrary, a great source of strength to him, fortifying his artistic powers and clarifying his ideas. The first words of the Prelude to the ‘ Odi Barbare ’ are ‘ Odio ’l usata ‘ poesia,’ and the reasons given for his hatred are that it is too soft and yielding, and that the Muse whom he prefers is a Muse for whom he must fight.

‘ A me la strofe vigile, balzante  
Co ’l plauso e ’l piede ritmico ne’ cori :  
Per l’ ala a volo io colgola, si volge  
Ella e repugna.’

And he places opposite to the opening poem ‘ Ideale ’ some lines from Platen which assert that the finer forms of verse have an advantage in the fact that they necessarily involve a high and serious subject-matter. The rubbish which would pass very well, Platen argues, in an inferior metre would be seen at once to be rubbish if it were put into a Sapphic ode. Whether this doctrine can be accepted entirely without reserve is a point open to question. It is probable, for instance, that in the Latin verses of a supremely accomplished modern scholar the perfection of the



form might simply conceal the poverty of thought. But it is difficult not to think that there is more truth than error in the view taken by Platen and Carducci. Adoption of a too easy metre, or a too easy handling of a difficult metre, does undoubtedly encourage flabbiness of thought. Could Keats have written the weaker parts of 'Endymion,' if he had limited himself by Pope's rules as to the heroic couplet? Could Wordsworth have written the prosaic passages of the 'Excursion,' if he had had such a conception as Milton's of the art of making blank verse? Would Walt Whitman's perpetual lapses into bathos have been possible under severer metrical limitations? It is easy to see how Carducci would have answered such questions. In any case, from whatever cause, it is certain that in the 'Odi Barbare' he is never prosaic, he is never slipshod, he never preaches and he never gushes. There is plenty of the warmth of tenderness, and plenty of the fire of enthusiasm, and still something of the old lightning of wrath; but a Roman sense of weight and majesty, a Greek sense of moderation and beauty, control them all, and save them from the too easy possibilities of degeneration. He had gone perilously near ranting about Rome and Italian unity in some of his early poems; but there is not a trace of anything of the kind here in the noble ode 'Nell' Annuale della Fondazione di Roma.' It is probably the finest national or political poem written since Shelley's 'Ode to Liberty' and it has a sustained perfection which even that cannot claim, and a disdain of superfluities which gives it an immense advantage over the splendid eloquence of such poets as Hugo or Mr. Swinburne. It may be given entire here, as the representative of the first book of the 'Odi Barbare' and as an amazing proof of what pulsing life, what intellectual and spiritual fire, can still breathe through these ancient forms, at least in their ancient home. It will be seen that Carducci's Alcaics are far from slavish reproductions of the metre of Horace. It is difficult to recognise

'Di gloria, di gloria, di gloria'

as the metrical equivalent of

'Silvae laborantes geluque,

or

'Riguardante su i selvaggi piani'

as that of

'Flumina constiterint acuto.'

It is obvious that these modern Sapphics and Alcaics are not quantitative at all like those of the ancient poets; nor do the accented syllables correspond at all exactly from verse to verse,

so far as a foreigner may venture to judge. Indeed he is altogether extremely free in his handling of the accents. The only rule that seems absolutely to bind him is that the number of unelided syllables must be strictly those allowed by the classical rules. Thus the line 'di gloria, di gloria, di gloria' exhibits the orthodox nine syllables, though to scan them in the old way, or to substitute accented for long syllables, would involve the necessity of treating the second 'gloria' as a spondee or double accent, to say nothing of other peculiarities. But we cannot here attempt to go into the difficult metrical controversy aroused by Carducci's experiments in the ancient metres. Those who wish to study it may be recommended to do so in Stampini's elaborate treatise, '*Le Odi Barbare di G. Carducci e la Metrica Latina,*' or in Chiarini's '*I critici italiani e la metrica delle Odi Barbare.*' These are, however, only two books out of a whole literature to follow which here would take us too far. And interesting as these questions of metre are, their importance may easily be exaggerated. After all, it is not the business of metrical science to judge poets but only to analyse their practice. The right of judgement lies with a higher and a larger court. And the poet who comes before it with this glorious ode in his hands can be in no fear of his reception, whether it be as a metrical artist that he invites a verdict or as a poet in the larger sense.

'Te redimito di fior purpurei  
 April te vide su 'l colle emergere  
 Da 'l solco di Romolo torva  
 Riguardante su i selvaggi piani :

'Te dopo tanta forza di secoli  
 Aprile irraggia, sublime, massima,  
 E il sole e l' Italia saluta  
 Te, Flora di nostra gente, o Roma.

'Se al Campidoglio non piú la vergine  
 Tacita sale dietro il pontefice  
 Né piú per Via Sacra il trionfo  
 Piega i quattro candidi cavalli,

'Questa del Foro tuo solitudine  
 Ogni rumore vince, ogni gloria ;  
 E tutto che al mondo è civile,  
 Grande, augusto, egli è romano ancora.

'Salve, dea Roma ! chi disconósceti  
 Cerchiato ha il senno di fredda tenebra,  
 E a lui nel reo cuore germoglia  
 Torpida la selva di barbarie.

- ‘ Salve, dea Roma ! Chinato a i ruderi  
Del Foro, io seguo con dolci lacrime  
E adoro i tuoi sparsi vestigi,  
patria, diva, santa genitrice.
- ‘ Son cittadino per te d’ Italia,  
Per te poeta, madre de i popoli,  
Che desti il tuo spirito al mondo,  
Che Italia improntasti di tua gloria.
- ‘ Ecco, a te questa, che tu di libere  
Genti facesti nome uno, Italia,  
Ritorna, e s’abbraccia al tuo petto,  
Affisa ne’ tuoi d’ aquila occhi.
- ‘ E tu dal colle fatal pe’ l tacito  
Foro le braccia porgi marmoree,  
A la figlia liberatrice  
Additando le colonne e gli archi :
- ‘ Gli archi che nuovi trionfi aspettano  
Non più di regi, non più di cesari,  
E non di catene attorcenti  
Braccia umane su gli eburnei carri ;
- ‘ Ma il tuo trionfo, popol d’ Italia,  
Su l’ età nera, su l’ età barbara,  
Sui mostri onde tu con serena  
Giustizia farai franche le genti.
- ‘ O Italia, o Roma ! quel giorno, placido  
Tonerà il cielo su ’l Foro, e cantici  
Di gloria, di gloria, di gloria  
Correran per l’ infinito azzurro.’

Everyone will feel that this is an Ode which will bear comparison with the finest of Horace’s great political Odes. It is their equal in sonorous stateliness of movement, and if it hardly claims to approach the most unapproachable of poets in felicity of phrase, it far surpasses the courtier of Augustus in its almost passionate sincerity. But its supreme distinction lies in that indefinable quality which belongs to great emotion united with great intellectual energy, the two perfectly moulded into one artistic whole. It is one of the poems which made a French critic, M. Pierre de Nolhac, say of Carducci: ‘ *Aucun poète italien ne me donne au même degré ce plaisir qui n’emprunte rien à la sensibilité vulgaire, fait tout entier de noble émotion intellectuelle.*’

But it is far from being the only very fine thing in this first book of ‘ *Odi Barbare.*’ There are also the famous ‘ *Alle fonti del Clitumno,*’ with its Virgilian feeling for the beginnings of Italy ;

the beautiful 'Su l'Adda'; the charming 'Sirmione,' which, however, charming as it is, lacks the concentrated perfection of the English poet's briefer tribute to the Catullan peninsula; the noble Ode on the death of the Prince Imperial, whom English readers will not at once recognise under the bare name of 'Napoleone Eugenio'; 'Miramar,' the poem about the unhappy Emperor Maximilian, tender as an elegy, full as a Chorus of the 'Agamemnon' of the sin and tragedy of a race; the famous 'Alla Regina d'Italia,' his first step towards accepting the Monarchy: the beautiful 'Courmayeur,' a tribute of gratitude to his Alpine summers:

'Salve, o pia Courmayeur, che l'ultimo riso d'Italia  
Al piè del gigante de l'Alpi  
Rechi soave! te, datrice di posa e di canti,  
Io reco nel verso d'Italia.

'Va su' tuoi verdi prati l'ombria de le nubi fuggenti,  
E va su' miei spirti la musa.  
Amo al lucido e freddo mattin da' tuoi sparsi casali  
Il fumo che ascende e s'avvolge

'Bigio al bianco vapor da l'are de' monti smarrito  
Nel cielo divino. Si perde  
L'anima in lento error; vien da le compiante memorie  
E attinge l'eterne speranze.'

It is these last words that give the key to the older Carducci, as he appears in the second book of the 'Odi Barbare,' a man full of tender memories, with the thought of death never far away. About half of the poems of the first book are still political: there are no political poems in the second. And though politics were to make a kind of reappearance in his final volume, 'Rime e Ritmi,' the historical note is more and more substituted for the polemical. Love and death, the beauty and the transitoriness of the world, come at the last to appear greater things even than Italy. Of the twenty-five poems of this book nearly half deal directly or indirectly with the thought of death; and it begins to be 'death the friend,' not death the cutter off of life and joy, that comes before him; so that the last word of all is very near Goethe's 'Warte nur, balde Ruhest du auch.'

'Lenta fiocca la neve pe'l cielo cinerëo: gridi,  
Suoni di vita più non salgon da la città,

'Non d'erbaiola il grido o corrente rumore di carro,  
Non d'amor la canzon ilare e di gioventù.

'Da la torre di piazza roche per l'aere le ore  
Gemon, come sospir d'un mondo lungi dal dí.

‘ Picchiano uccelli raminghi a’ vetri appannati : gli amici  
Spiriti reduci son, guardano e chiamano a me.

‘ In breve, o cari, in breve—tu calmati, indomito cuore—  
Giù al silenzio verrò, ne l’ ombra riposerò.’

The same sense of tears in human things is felt in the two beautiful poems on his daughter’s marriage. Here is the first, which he calls ‘ Colli Toscani ’ :

‘ Colli toscani e voi pacifiche selve d’ olivi  
A le cui ombre chete stetti in pensier d’amore,  
Tosca vendemmia e tu da’ grappi vermigli spumanti  
In faccia al sole tra giocondi strepiti,

‘ Sole de’ giovini anni ; ridete a la dolce fanciulla  
Che amor mi strappa e rende sposa al toscano cielo ;  
Voi le ridete, e quella che sempre negaronmi i fati  
Pace d’ affetti datele ne l’ anima.

‘ Colli, tacete, e voi non susurratele, olivi,  
Non dirle, o sol, per anche, tu onniveggente, pio,  
Ch’ oltre quel monte giaccion, lei forse aspettando, que’ miei  
Che visser tristi, che in dolor morirono.

‘ Ella ammirando guarda la cima, tremarsi nel cuore  
Sente la vita e un lieve spirto sfiorar le chiome,  
Mentre l’ aura montana, calando già il sole, d’ intorno  
Al giovin capo le agita il vel candido.’

And it is the same even in the gracious ‘ Primo Vere ’ :

‘ Ecco : di braccio al pigro verno sciogliesi  
Ed ancor trema nuda al rigid’ aere  
La primavera : il sol tra le sue lacrime  
Limpido brilla, o Lalage.

‘ Da lor culle di neve i fior si svegliano  
E curiosi al ciel gli occhietti levano :  
In quelli sguardi vagola una tremula  
Ombra di sogno, o Lalage.

‘ Nel sonno de l’ inverno sotto il candido  
Lenzuolo de la neve i fior sognarono ;  
Sognaron l’ albe roride ed i tepidi  
Soli e il tuo viso, o Lalage.

‘ Ne l’ addormito spirito che sognano  
I miei pensieri ? A tua bellezza candida  
Perchè mesta sorride tra le lacrime  
La primavera, o Lalage ? ’

Of this we have been bold enough to attempt a rendering in verse :

‘ Behold ! from sluggish winter’s arms  
 Spring lifts herself again ;  
 Naked before the steel-cold air  
 She shivers as in pain ;  
 Look, Lalage, is that a tear  
 In the sun’s eye that yet shines clear ?

‘ From beds of snow the flowers awake,  
 Lifting in deep amaze  
 To heaven their eager eyes : but yet  
 More in that wistful gaze  
 Than wonder lies : sure trembles there,  
 O Lalage, some memory fair,

‘ Some dream which ’neath the coverlet white  
 Of winter snow they dreamed,  
 Some sleeping sight of dewy dawns  
 And summer suns that gleamed,  
 And thy bright eyes, O Lalage ;  
 Was not the dream a prophecy ?

‘ To-day my spirit sleeps and dreams—  
 Where do my far thoughts fly ?  
 Close to thy beauty’s face we stand  
 And smile, the spring and I ;  
 Yet, Lalage, whence come those tears ?  
 Has spring, too, felt the doom of years ? ’

This and the even lovelier ‘ Vere Novo ’ which follows it are among the most exquisite things in the volume. The ‘ Primo Vere ’ in particular reminds us, as Carducci so often does, of an English poet who was like him a republican, a scholar, a master of style, an intellectual aristocrat, a sort of ‘ ultimus Romanorum,’ Walter Savage Landor. In this second part of the ‘ Odi Barbare ’ there are a whole series of poems—‘ Ruit Hora,’ ‘ Alla mensa ‘dell’ amico,’ ‘ Figurine vecchie,’ ‘ Sole d’ Inverno,’ ‘ Egle,’ the funeral ‘ Ave,’ and the ‘ Congedo ’ at the end—which are masterpieces of that classical grace and simplicity which in English poetry is especially associated with the name of Landor. Many of them strike a deeper note than Landor often attained, and indeed Carducci is undoubtedly a greater poet than Landor ; but the quietness, the distinction, the dignity, the tenderness, the unflinching sense of style, are exactly the qualities which Landor loved in others and himself possessed.

But it is another and very different English poet who is mentioned by name in the ‘ Odi Barbare.’ The title ‘ Presso l’ urna di ‘ Percy Bysshe Shelley ’ must necessarily catch every English eye at once. And seldom has any poet received a more splendid

tribute than this paid by Carducci to Shelley, the 'Spirito di 'Titano entro virginee forme' who is caught out of the waves by Sophocles and placed where no other modern poet may go, on the Blessed Island among the poets and heroes of the past :

' O cuor de' cuori, sopra quest' urna che freddo ti chiude  
 Odora e tepe e brilla la primavera in fiore.

' O cuor de' cuori, il sole divino padre ti avvolge  
 De' suoi raggianti amori, povero muto cuore.

' Fremono freschi i pini per l' aura grande di Roma :  
 Tu dove sei, poeta del liberato mondo ?

' Tu dove sei ? m'ascolti ? Lo sguardo mio umido fugge  
 Oltre l' aureliana cerchia su 'l mesto piano.'

Another thing which it is difficult to pass over altogether is the beautiful meditation on death, at once so very ancient and so very modern, which concludes 'Su Monte Mario'; but perhaps the most original though not the most perfect poem in the book, is the strange and bold 'Alla Stazione,' where the leaden autumn morning, the lamplights still shining in the mud, the shrieking train, the anxious hurrying passengers, even the ticket collectors and the workmen whose melancholy tapping tests the soundness of the brakes, all these and other details are brought into the picture of the parting from Lidia, and yet never for a moment get beyond the control of the imaginative emotion which inspires the poem. A novelist who wishes to make literature and yet indulge the modern craving for detail which likes to be called 'realism,' could not go to a better model than this poem.

This second book of the 'Odi Barbare' seems to exhibit Carducci at his very best. Almost everything in it would have to be included in a selection of his poetry. The same, or very nearly the same, may be said of the final volume, 'Rime e Ritmi.' If it carries the ascent no higher, it at least remains on the same level with the 'Odi Barbare' and the best of the 'Rime Nuove.' With many poets—the most obvious instance is, of course, Wordsworth—there is a great and fruitful early period followed by a long decay. In the case of Carducci it is just the reverse. The later volumes show us a man who has ripened and in ripening has mellowed, a poet who has deepened his outlook upon life, an artist who has at last perfected his control of a very difficult instrument. There is nothing in all the early work which approaches the airy grace of the first poem of 'Rime e Ritmi.'

' O piccola Maria,  
 Di versi a te che importa ?

‘Esce la poesia,  
O piccola Maria,  
Quando malinconia  
Batte del cor la porta.

‘O piccola Maria,  
Di versi a te che importa?’

Yet it strikes the same note, the note of sadness, now purged of all the early bitterness, which we found in the ‘*Odi Barbare*’ and find again throughout this volume. Memory, meditation, the sense of the mystery of things, have taken the place of the angry confidence of youth.

‘Tal su l’ audacie de gli anni giovani  
A me poeta passaro i cantici,  
Ed ora ne l’ animo chiuso  
Solitaria ne mormora l’eco.

‘Si come nubi, si come cantici  
Fuggon l’ etadi brevi de gli uomini:  
Dinanzi da gli occhi smarriti,  
Ombra informe, che vuol l’infinito?’

These last poems often remind one of the old Tennyson, for ever putting to himself just that question ‘*che vuol l’ infinito?*’ But though old age in Carducci, as in Hugo and Tennyson, can hardly avoid asking itself these questions, there is nothing in Carducci of Tennyson’s wistful looking for an answer in some light, new or old, of Christianity that was yet to dawn clear from the heavens. To his gain as well as to his loss, Tennyson never forgot that he was the son of an English clergyman. Even if he had held the same opinions as Carducci, he could never have expressed them as Carducci sometimes expresses them; for to do so would have given too much pain to most of those whom he loved best in the world. The attitude of the two men was, of course, fundamentally different, and even when Carducci is giving for once most sympathetically what may be called the poetry of Christianity, as in the plea for the preservation of the little church at Polenta, he uses language in one part of the poem which would probably have jarred on Tennyson’s ears. But no one would have rejoiced more than Tennyson in the beauty of the whole poem, no one would have chanted the last stanzas with more wonder and delight:

‘Salve, chiesetta del mio canto! A questa  
Madre vegliarda, o tu rinnovellata  
Itala gente da le molte vite,  
Rendi la voce



‘ De la preghiera ; la campana squilli  
Ammonitrice ; il campanil risorto  
Canti di clivo in clivo a la campagna  
Ave Maria.

‘ Ave Maria ! Quando su l’ aure corre  
L’ umil saluto, i piccoli mortali  
Scovrono il capo, curvano la fronte  
Dante ed Aroldo.

‘ Una di flauti lenta melodia  
Passa invisibil fra la terra e il cielo :  
Spiriti forse che furon, che sono,  
E che saranno ?

‘ Un oblio lene de la faticosa  
Vita, un pensoso sospirar quïete,  
Una soave volontà di pianto  
L’ anime invade.

‘ Taccion le fiere e gli uomini e le cose,  
Roseo ’l tramonto ne l’ azzurro sfuma,  
Mormoran gli alti vertici ondeggianti  
Ave Maria.’

But it was of course the historical, not the ecclesiastical or the religious, associations of a building in which Dante may have prayed that made Carducci anxious to save the little church. Indeed he is full of history in the ‘ Rime e Ritmi.’ ‘ Bicocca di ‘San Giacomo,’ ‘ Cadore,’ ‘ Alla città di Ferrara,’ and the noble ‘ Piemonte ’ are all long historical poems, and they fill about half the volume. This last is again one of these great political Odes which are at once true history and pure poetry. It recalls Virgil and Scott in the local patriotism of the opening stanzas, gathering together all the cities and all the memories of Piedmont ; but the part of it which will always be best remembered is the latter half, which is given to 1848 and the pathetic figure of Charles Albert, the

‘ Re a la morte nel pallor del viso  
Sacro e nel cuore,’

the

‘ Re per tant’ anni bestemmiato e pianto  
Che via passasti con la spada in pugno  
Ed il cilicio

Al cristian petto, italo Amleto.’

The Ode tells the brief story, the sound of the first Italian victory breaking on the young poet’s ear and heart, the melancholy king

seeing even in that moment of victory the shadow of the end and the far-off villa where he was to finish his days—the villa

‘ Che in faccia il grande Atlantico sonante  
A i lati ha il fiume fresco di camelie,  
E albergò ne la indifferente calma  
Tanto dolore ! ’

It concludes by picturing him dying there with Italy in his heart and a band of sainted spirits who had died, as he too was dying, for Italy, coming to take him to his rest ;

‘ Eccoti il re, Signore,  
Che ne disperse, il re che ne percosse.  
Ora, O Signore,

‘ Anch’ egli è morto, come noi morimmo,  
Dio, per l’ Italia. Rendine la patria.  
A i morti, a i vivi, pe’ l’ fumante sangue  
Da tutt’ i campi,

‘ Per il dolore che le regge agguaglia  
A le capanne, per la gloria, Dio,  
Che fu ne gli anni, pe’ l’ martirio, Dio,  
Che è ne l’ ora,

‘ A quella polve eroica fremente,  
A questa luce angelica esultante,  
Rendi la patria, Dio ; rendi l’ Italia  
A gl’ italiani.’

Neither this beautiful tribute to Charles Albert, nor, in a different way, the poem called ‘ Guerra,’ which is a tribute to the civilising and reforming influences of war, was at all to the taste of Carducci’s old republican friends. But in these cases as in that of the poems to the Queen, no charge of treachery made him shrink from saying what he had it in him to say. Under the healing influence of age he grew ever less and less of a mere party man, and when he touches politics it is now to unite and not to divide. Even his anger at the treatment of Crispi does not break out in any direct attack on those who traduced his friend : it only quickens his sympathy and expresses itself in a beautiful Ode on the marriage of the statesman’s daughter. The dominant note of this last volume is, in fact, of the ‘ years that bring the ‘ philosophic mind.’ The human heart and its joys and fears fill the poet’s vision. Though not old as age is now counted, he has gained the privilege of age, looking back with wistful longings on the hopes of youth, calmly expectant of the end, even gladly awaiting its peace. That is the burden especially of the lovely little lyrics

that are scattered through 'Rime e Ritmi,' from the six lines 'In Una Villa,' a picture of human affections dwelling together in ordered peace, lovely and serene as a Holy Family of Raphael—

' O tra i placidi olivi, tra i cedri e le palme sedente  
Bella Arenzano al riso de la ligure piaggia ;

' Operosa vecchiezza t' illustra, serena t' adorna  
Signoril grazia e il dolce di giovinezza lume ;

' Facil corre in te l' ora tra liete aspettative e ricordi  
Calmi, si come l' aura tra la collina e il mare '—

to the 'Sabato Santo,' a birthday greeting to a girl whose birth had been hailed by the bells of Easter Day, the bells which, like Tennyson's in 'In Memoriam,' are summoned by the poet to 'ring out the false, ring in the true.'

' Volgasi intorno al capo tuo giovin, deh, l' augure suono  
De le campane anc' oggi di primavera e pasqua !

' Cacci il verno ed il freddo, cacci l' odio tristo e l'accidia,  
Cacci tutte le forme de la discorde vita !'

The poem on the death of the Empress Elizabeth is, again, an act of peace towards the old Austrian enemy, as well as a prayer for the peace of the unhappiest of women ; and, for himself, 'Sant' Abbondio' strikes the same note :

' Laggiù che ride de la valle in fondo ?  
Pace, mio cuor ; pace, mio cuore. Oh tanto  
Breve la vita ed è sì bello il mondo !'

And the last words of all, the three lines of the 'Congedo,' are words of resignation :

' Fior tricolore,  
Tramontano le stelle in mezzo al mare  
E si spendono i canti entro il mio core.'

The poet's work was done. It is too early yet for any final judgement on it. Certainly no such judgement has been attempted here. His work is still comparatively little known in England, and when he was selected to receive the Nobel prize for literature, in 1906, his name probably came as a surprise to most English people. Very little has been written about him in English, the only book about him that has recently appeared being an excellent little selection of his poems with translations by Mrs. Francis

Holland. She has made a good many mistakes, some of them serious ones, in her translations, but she has sometimes overcome with considerable success the difficulties caused by her gallant attempt to retain the original metres ; and as her book opens with an interesting essay on the poet, and includes many of the very finest poems, it ought to prove a useful introduction to Carducci. The fact that it stands almost alone is, however, sufficient proof of how little interest Carducci has yet aroused in England. It is evident, therefore, that the time for attempting a considered estimate of his work is not yet. But a few things may fairly be said even now. Carducci is obviously not one of the poets of supreme and world-compelling genius. For that his range is too narrow, his energy too fitful and occasional. But it is certain that he has been the most powerful influence in Italian letters for the last half century, and scarcely anyone doubts that his influence has been a most salutary one. The principle of Italian nationality has, as he himself says in one of his lectures, always taken two forms, the learned and the popular. The one had issued in the academies of the Courts and in literary diletantism ; the other, while preserving a healthy energy, tended to an anarchy of dialects and to the break up of the national Italian language. The popular movements had too little sense of form to control their abundance of life, the academic coteries too little life to make a content for their perfected mould of form. Carducci united the strong points of both. A passionate believer in the great Roman and Italian classics, he despised the literary trifling which had so long usurped the name of classicism in Italy. A passionate patriot and a man of the people as opposed to the Courts, he was convinced that Italians would be committing literary suicide if they deserted the great tradition which had been the glory of their country from the days of Virgil to those of Tasso. He set himself to show, and he has triumphantly shown, that Italian poetry could be classical without being hollow and empty. Few people have so rarely written a meaningless or superfluous line. As Dr. Garnett well said : ' Carducci solved 'the problem which baffled the Renaissance of linking strength of thought to artifice of form.' Neither his power of personality nor his perfection of form can be questioned for a moment. He was from first to last a man fulfilled with vigour and conviction, and both thought and feeling vibrate in every line of his best work. The old Horatian metres are no mere scholar's exercise in his hands : they are once more the medium through which a true poet speaks and in speaking gives utterance, more perhaps than Horace ever did, to the heart and life of a people.

Of a people, yes ; but of the world ? That is another question. Horace was the spokesman in a sense of the whole of the old world, its sensualism tempered by prudence, its virtuous rationalism and reasonable virtue, the sober patriotism of Rome, the art and philosophy of Greece. But Carducci is much more narrowly Italian. Neither Christianity nor feudalism ever made, as he himself says, more than the most superficial conquest of Italy ; and he is as Italian in his limitations as in his strength. How much even feudalism, and how much more, of course, Christianity, have entered into the very being of the northern peoples ! How much a poet like Victor Hugo owes to both, repudiate them as he will ! To all that and to all that comes of it Carducci is a stranger. But the European world has been Christian for over fifteen hundred years and cannot, even if it will, escape that fact. The highest life of our time may still be said to be dominated by two things, Christianity and Greek philosophy. The questions which the present generation asks as persistently as ever are still to a very large extent the old Christian questions, the questions of Augustine, however commonly it may refuse the Augustinian or any Christian answer. Where they are not these, they are often the questions asked in Greek cities five or six hundred years before the birth of Christ. In neither case is there any appearance that Carducci so much as cares to ask them. To his Roman mind the mystic search of Christianity and the speculative curiosity of Greece were alike alien, and so far he is a stranger, where no great poet can be a stranger with impunity, in the spiritual life of his time.

But after all these deductions much still remains : a poet of the human affections, a poet of patriotism and liberty, a poet of loving and detailed insight into Nature, above all and in all, a master of language and incomparable artist. It is not for nothing that a man is the acknowledged voice of his country at the greatest moment of her national life. It is not for nothing that a man is the restorer of the greatest literary tradition in Europe. It is not for nothing that he does the thing that he has set out to do with such unassailable and impeccable perfection as Carducci did it in his finest work. No one but an artist of the very highest rank could have produced such a thing as the great Roman Ode or a hundred others of his poems named and unnamed here. It is true that he had the help of what is in some respects the most beautiful of languages. But a poet hardly gains more from the beauty of Italian than he is in danger of losing from its fatal facility. In none are pretty verses so easily made and in none do they so easily pass themselves off for poetry. That fact is one measure of the greatness of Carducci.

His poems are the very antipodes of these easy triumphs. His faith and method are those of Gautier's famous poem :

‘ Sculpte, lime, cisèle ;  
Que ton rêve flottant  
Se scelle  
Dans le bloc résistant ! ’

With him nothing is allowed to pass easily. Every word has to justify itself, to play its part in the rhythmical and metrical effect, to contribute its quota to the intellectual scheme of the poem. Nothing is superfluous, nothing is wasted. This severe conception of art is in Carducci the complement of what a French critic has well called the ‘ gravité puissante ’ of his personality. The two together, the combination of an emotional and artistic reserve, result in poems which it is not too much to say often recall the austere simplicity of the Greek Anthology. Here as there the grave emotion is never in danger of degenerating into sentiment, for the simple reason that it has too much mind in it. That is the sort of emotion that lives in literature when the poets of flowing pathos and obvious tears are forgotten or become unreadable. Carducci's achievement may be summed up as consisting in three things. To an age that is apt to associate mind either with mechanics or with mere erudition he showed it as a power of life. To an age that in weariness of conventions has been in danger of forgetting that form is of the essence of art, he showed once more, as Greek sculpture had long ago shown it, that thought and emotion are not less but more felt under the strictest severity of style. In the face of an age which squanders and forgets its tears he practised a stern economy of long-living emotion. These are great qualities, whatever deductions are to be set on the other side. If it is true that he did not see the whole of life, it is also true that to what he saw, and it is no small part, he brought the eye of a great artist, the heart and imagination of a great poet, a great man's virile and masterful sincerity and strength.

## ART. V.—PRAGMATISM.

1. *The Will to Believe, and other Essays in Popular Philosophy.* By WILLIAM JAMES. London: Longmans and Co. 1897.
2. *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking.* Popular Lectures on Philosophy, by WILLIAM JAMES. London: Longmans and Co. 1907.
3. *Humanism: Philosophical Essays.* By F. C. S. SCHILLER, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. London: Macmillan. 1903.
4. *Studies in Humanism.* By F. C. S. SCHILLER, M.A., D.Sc., Fellow and Senior Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. London: Macmillan. 1907.
5. *Studies in Logical Theory.* By JOHN DEWEY, Professor of Philosophy, with the co-operation of Members and Fellows of the Department of Philosophy. The Decennial Publications, Second Series, Volume XI. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1903.
6. *Essays, Philosophical and Psychological, in honor of William James, Professor in Harvard University.* By his Colleagues at Columbia University. London: Longmans and Co. 1908.

THE appearance in the world of a genuinely new philosophy is at all times an event of very great importance. More particularly is this the case when the new philosophy embodies the prevailing temper of the age better than any of its older rivals; for in that case it is likely to establish itself in popular favour, to colour the thoughts of the educated and half-educated public, and to strengthen those elements in the mental atmosphere to which it owes its success. It would be a mistake to suppose that new philosophies are always adapted to the age in which they appear; but when they are not, they fail to win wide acceptance whatever their other merits may be. Spinoza, for example, deserved success as well as Leibniz; yet his works were almost wholly neglected until more than a century after his death, because the political and intellectual *milieu* was not one in which they could thrive. Leibniz, on the contrary, gave scope to the love of calculation which men derived from the discoveries of his time, and represented the world as a hierarchy of systems, each exactly like the Holy Roman Empire; his system, therefore, ruled the German mind until the ferment which preceded the French Revolution set men's thoughts running in new channels.

The philosophy which is called *Pragmatism* or *Humanism*\* is genuinely new, and is singularly well-adapted to the predominant intellectual temper of our time. As regards its adaptation to the age, we shall have more to say when we have considered what it is. As regards novelty, its authors show a modesty which, in our opinion, is somewhat excessive. 'Pragmatism, ' a new name for some old ways of thinking,' Professor William James calls his book; and Dr. Schiller constantly asserts that his doctrines are those of Protagoras. As for Protagoras, we know sufficiently little about him to be able to read into him almost any doctrine we please; and the appeal to him may be regarded as mainly due to the desire to produce an ancestry which has acquired respectability by the lapse of time. With regard to more modern precursors, it must be admitted that many philosophers—as chief among whom we may mention Nietzsche—have paved the way for the new doctrines. Nevertheless, the cardinal point in the pragmatist philosophy, namely its theory of truth, is so new, and so necessary to the rest of the philosophy, even to those parts which had been previously maintained by others, that its inventors cannot be regarded as merely developing the thoughts of less explicit predecessors.

The name 'pragmatism' was first introduced into philosophy by Mr. C. S. Peirce, as long ago as 1878. It was applied by him to the doctrine that the significance of a thought lies in the actions to which it leads. In order to estimate the difference between two different beliefs about the same matter, he maintained, we ought to consider what difference in conduct would result according as we adopted the one belief or the other. If no difference would result, the two beliefs are not effectively different. Mr. Peirce's doctrine, however, remained unnoticed until it was taken up twenty years later by Professor James, who, while retaining the word 'pragmatism,' gave it a more sweeping significance. The full-fledged philosophy is to be attributed to him and Dr. Schiller jointly. Professor Dewey, of Columbia University, is also to be reckoned among the founders of pragmatism. His writings are more technical and less popular than those of James and Schiller, but on certain points his exposition is perhaps preferable to theirs.†

As an introduction to pragmatism, it is interesting to read

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\* These two names are distinguished by Professor James and Dr. Schiller in various ways at various times. For our purposes, it is unnecessary to consider these distinctions.

† Cf. especially an article on 'The Experimental Theory of Knowledge,' *Mind*, N.S., No. 59 (July 1906).



William James's essay on 'The Will to Believe,' first published in 1896, and reprinted in book form in the following year. In this essay, though the word 'pragmatism' does not appear, we find much that is characteristic of James's later views. The thesis he is advocating is that, in certain cases, it is right to believe whole-heartedly in one of two alternatives, even when there is no evidence as to which of them is true. These cases arise, he says, when we are compelled to choose between two hypotheses, each of which seems to us possible, and when it makes a great difference which we choose. The instances he has in mind are chiefly questions of morals and religion. In a moral perplexity we are compelled to come to some decision, since inaction is as much a decision as action. In regard to religion, also, we must act as though it were true or as though it were false; we are therefore practically compelled to choose. His contention is that, in such cases, it would be foolish to refuse to have faith merely on the ground that we do not find conclusive evidence on either side of the question. To quote his own words:

'Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, "Do not decide, but leave the question open," is itself a passional decision—just like deciding yes or no—and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.'

He proceeds to justify himself against the charge of insufficient regard for truth, not, as he would do now, by contending that, in the absence of other evidence, the answer which gives the greatest emotional satisfaction *is* true, but on a variety of grounds tending to show that there are no sufficient moral arguments against *thinking* it true. He points out, to begin with, that emotions and wishes, though often unable to alter our beliefs when these have become established, nevertheless play a great part in initially deciding what our beliefs are to be. He points out next that our duty in the matter of opinion has two branches: (1) We must know the truth; (2) we must avoid error. These two precepts, he says, have very different results. If, in cases where evidence is lacking, we abstain wholly from either belief, we are sure of not incurring error, but on the other hand we are sure of not knowing truth. If, however, we decide for one of the alternatives, we have an even chance of knowing the truth. It follows that those who urge us to abstain from belief in the absence of evidence consider it more important to avoid error than to believe truth. This 'horror of being duped' he represents as a somewhat contemptible form of cowardice; 'our

'errors,' he says, 'are not such awfully solemn things. In a world where we are so certain to incur them in spite of all our caution, a certain lightness of heart seems better than this excessive nervousness on their behalf.' The legitimate conclusion from this argument would be that, in such cases as William James has in mind, we ought to believe both alternatives; for in that case we are sure of 'knowing' the truth in the matter. If he replies that to believe both is a psychological impossibility, we would reply that, on the contrary, it is often done, and that those who cannot yet do it need only practise the 'will to believe' until they have learnt to believe that the law of contradiction is false—a feat which is by no means as difficult as it is often supposed to be.

William James proceeds to point out that, in the case of religion, the choice between believing and disbelieving possesses all the characteristics of the options which, according to him, ought to be decided by the emotions. He tacitly assumes that there is no evidence for or against religion, and he points out that by refusing either to believe or to disbelieve we lose the benefits of religion just as much as by deciding to disbelieve.

'Scepticism, then, is not avoidance of option; it is option of a certain particular kind of risk. *Better risk loss of truth than chance of error*—that is your faith-vetoer's exact position. He is actively playing his stake as much as the believer is; he is backing the field against the religious hypothesis, just as the believer is backing the religious hypothesis against the field. . . . It is not intellect against all passions, then; it is only intellect with one passion laying down its law. And by what, forsooth, is the supreme wisdom of this passion warranted? Dupery for dupery, what proof is there that dupery through hope is so much worse than dupery through fear?'

The conclusion is that, although there is no evidence in favour of religion, we ought nevertheless to believe it if we find satisfaction in so doing.

This essay on the will to believe is important, because it has been widely read and much criticised, both adversely and favourably, and because it affords a good introduction to the pragmatist temper of mind. Some practice in the will to believe is an almost indispensable preliminary to the acceptance of pragmatism; and conversely pragmatism, when once accepted, is found to give the full justification of the will to believe. We shall, therefore, before proceeding to pragmatism proper, consider briefly what there is to be said, on a common-sense basis, against the doctrines so persuasively set forth in this essay.

We may observe, to begin with, the agnostic hypothesis

upon which the whole argument rests. The hypothesis is, that no evidence for or against religion is at present known. Pragmatists pose as the friends of religion (except in Italy), and many religious people have accepted them as allies. It is therefore worth while to emphasise this underlying hypothesis, and to point out the very questionable wisdom of accepting it as the basis of a defence of orthodoxy. With the truth or falsehood of this hypothesis, however, we need not concern ourselves in this discussion; the question for us is whether, granting the hypothesis, we can accept the results which William James derives from it.

Let us observe, in the first place, a confusion which runs through the whole pragmatist account of knowledge, namely the confusion between acting on an hypothesis and believing it. In the cases which William James has in mind, the option between rival hypotheses is, he says, a 'forced' option; i.e. it is not avoidable:

'If I say, "Either accept this truth or go without it," I put on you a forced option, for there is no standing place outside of the alternative.'

This statement appears to us to be contrary to many of the plainest facts of daily life. If, in walking along a country road, I come to a fork where there is no signpost and no passer-by, I have, from the point of view of action, a 'forced' option. I must take one road or other if I am to have any chance of reaching my destination; and I may have no evidence whatever as to which is the right road. I then *act* on one or other of the two possible hypotheses, until I find some one of whom I can ask the way. But I do not *believe* either hypothesis. My action is either right or wrong, but my belief is neither, since I do not entertain either of the two possible beliefs. The pragmatist assumption that I believe the road I have chosen to be the right one is erroneous. To infer belief from action, in the crude way involved in the assumption that we must 'either accept this truth or go without it,' is to ignore the plain fact that our actions are constantly based upon probabilities, and that, in all such cases, we neither accept a truth nor go without it, but entertain it as an hypothesis. This applies, in particular, to the working hypotheses of science. A man of science who considers it worth while to devise experimental tests of an hypothesis, and to construct elaborate theories which use the hypothesis, is not on that account to be regarded as *believing* the hypothesis. Pragmatists tell us that, in such cases, the initial unverified *belief* is a necessary condition for the subsequent established theory,

and by so doing they make out a case for the usefulness of believing before we have evidence. This is, however, a mistaken analysis of the state of mind of a man who is testing an hypothesis. All that is required, and all that occurs among careful investigators, is the belief that the hypothesis has a greater or smaller chance of being true, and for this belief there is probably sufficient evidence. The actual belief that the hypothesis *is* true, when it occurs, is apt to be a hindrance, since it retards the abandonment of false hypotheses when the evidence goes against them, and if the belief is general, it makes people regard experimental verification as unnecessary. The Aristotelians who opposed Galileo and refused to give weight to his experiments had faithfully obeyed the precepts revived by William James.

The matter is, however, more complicated in such cases as religious beliefs, where the chief benefit is derived from the emotional satisfaction of the belief itself, not from the useful actions to which it directly prompts. But here, too, the anti-thesis of 'accepting' or 'going without' is far too crude; we may regard the belief as more or less probable, entertain a greater or less degree of hope that it may be true, and derive, accordingly, a greater or less proportion of the comfort we should derive from complete belief. In practice, to adopt the pragmatist's test, the effect of partial belief is very different from that of complete belief. Complete belief, if the issue is sufficiently momentous, will justify persecution—assuming, as history warrants us in doing, that the blood of Protestant martyrs is the seed of the Catholic Church. An incomplete belief, on the contrary, will not warrant the infliction of an indubitable evil for the sake of a gain which may possibly be illusory. This affords a pragmatic argument against conceding *full* belief in such cases as those with which William James is concerned. But if, as he assumes, there is a genuine possibility of the truth of an hypothesis, it is in accordance with all the strictest tenets of scientific veracity that we should bear the hypothesis in mind, and allow to it whatever influence over our emotions and actions corresponds to the degree of its probability.

We will next examine the argument that, in doubtful cases, the precept 'we must know the truth' should lead us to believe one hypothesis at a venture, since, if we believe neither, we certainly do not know the truth. This argument rests upon an ambiguity in the word 'know.' At first sight, it might be thought that if we believe what is in fact true, we must have knowledge. But this is not the sense in which the word is commonly used. Suppose, to take a trivial instance, that a man believed that the late Prime Minister's name began with a B, but believed this

because he thought Mr. Balfour was the late Prime Minister. What he believes is in fact true, yet no one would say that he 'knew' that the late Prime Minister's name began with a B. In this case, the true belief is based upon a false reason. But the case is similar when the true belief is based upon no reason (except, indeed, in the case of immediate data such as the facts of perception). Thus if, in the case of an option which we have no rational means of deciding, we believe one alternative at a venture, we cannot be said to *know*, even if, by good luck, we have chosen the alternative which in fact is true. The plain truth is that, in such cases, we cannot *know* the truth, though we may by chance *believe* it. Hence the precept 'we must 'know the truth,' which James invokes, is irrelevant to the issue. The usual antitheses of belief and disbelief, what is known and what is unknown, are not adequate to meet the situation. The true precept of veracity, which includes both the pursuit of truth and the avoidance of error, is this: 'We ought to give 'to every proposition which we consider as nearly as possible 'that degree of credence which is warranted by the probability 'it acquires from the evidence known to us.' The further questions what propositions to consider, and how much trouble to take to acquire knowledge of the evidence, depend of course upon our circumstances and the importance of the issue. But to go about the world believing everything in the hope that thereby we shall believe as much truth as possible is like practising polygamy in the hope that among so many we shall find some who will make us happy.

Another interesting point to observe in James's doctrine is the immense multiplicity of differing beliefs which it simultaneously justifies in different people. This arises from the condition that the option must be what he calls a 'living' option, that is, it must be one in which either alternative seems to us possible.

'If I say to you, "Be a theosophist or be a Mohammedan," it is probably a dead option, because for you neither hypothesis is likely to be alive. But if I say, "Be an agnostic or be a Christian," it is otherwise: trained as you are, each hypothesis makes some appeal, however small, to your belief.'

He points out that to different people different options are living. It follows that the beliefs which, on his principles, different men ought to adopt, are different, since the three conditions for adopting a belief without evidence are that the option should be *living*, *forced*, and *momentous*. One gathers (perhaps wrongly) from his instances that a Frenchman ought to believe in Catholicism, an American in the Monroe Doctrine, and an

Arab in the Mahdi (he wrote before the battle of Omdurman). It seems odd that, in view of this outcome, he should maintain that acceptance of his doctrine would diminish persecution; for an essential part of each of the above three creeds is that people who think otherwise must be taught their place.

To sum up our criticism of 'The Will to Believe': It ignores the distinction between believing and entertaining an hypothesis, and wrongly assumes that if we do not completely believe an hypothesis, we must either completely disbelieve it or wholly suspend judgment. Hence it is able to represent the option 'Either accept this truth or go without it' as one from which there is no escape, whereas all experiment, both in science and in daily life, implies a state of mind which accepts neither alternative. He assumes that we may be said to 'know' a truth when we believe it at a venture, without reasons, and that therefore, in order to maximise our knowledge, we have only to maximise our beliefs. And his doctrines lead to the conclusion that different people ought to have incompatible beliefs. These objections, we shall find, may also be urged against full-fledged pragmatism. But we must now approach somewhat more difficult topics than those which have concerned us hitherto, since pragmatism cannot be understood without examining its doctrine as to the nature of truth. To this doctrine, therefore, we will now turn our attention.

The pragmatic theory of truth takes credit to itself—rightly, as we think—for a due consideration of error. Most theories as to the nature of truth have tacitly assumed to begin with that all our beliefs are true, and have arrived at results incompatible with the existence of error. They have then had to add a post-script explaining that what we call error is really partial truth. If we think it is Tuesday when it is really Wednesday, we are at least right in thinking that 'it' is a day of the week. If we think America was discovered in 1066, we are at least right in thinking that something important happened in that year. If we think Charles I. died in his bed, we are at least so far right that, in view of the many people who do die in their beds, he probably had the potentiality of dying in his bed. And so on. Dr. Schiller rightly points to the 'Theaetetus' as showing the difficulties to which a theory of knowledge is reduced by neglecting to take due account of error from the beginning; and among more recent books, Mr. Joachim's 'The Nature of Truth' is used to point the same moral.

Pragmatism, then, emphasises from the start the fact that some of our beliefs turn out to be mistaken, and that the proper business of a theory of truth is to show how truth and falsehood

are distinguished. This might seem, to those not sophisticated by philosophy, to be an obvious truism ; but in fact philosophy has always regarded it as its business to prove (as far as possible) that everything is true, rather than to distinguish between truth and falsehood. Similarly in ethics philosophers have not sought to distinguish between the good and the bad, so much as to prove that everything is good. If little truth has been attained in philosophy, the reason is chiefly that few philosophers have wished to attain truth. Whether pragmatists are superior in this respect we shall not venture to pronounce ; but at any rate the peculiarity of their bias makes them willing to admit facts which other philosophers find inconvenient, and among such facts is the prevalence of error.

In order to discover the difference between truth and falsehood, pragmatism sets about a Socratic inductive inquiry as to the things we call ' true ' and ' false. ' These words, to begin with, are applied to beliefs, and are applied only when a question has arisen. Concerning the ordinary facts of perception, we do not ask questions until we have become philosophers ; we do not apply either of the words ' true ' and ' false ' to such unquestioned matters. But when once the question has arisen concerning some actual belief, ' Is it a true or a false belief ? ' how do we in fact decide the question ? The answer of pragmatism is that if the belief furthers the purpose which led us to ask the question, it is regarded as a ' true ' belief ; if it fails to further the purpose it is regarded as a ' false ' belief. This, therefore, according to pragmatism, is the meaning of the words ' true ' and ' false. ' ' True ' means ' furthering the purpose which led to the question. ' Or, more explicitly : When, in pursuing any purpose, a belief is entertained which is relevant to the purpose, the belief is ' true ' if it furthers the achievement of the purpose, and ' false ' if it does not do so.\*

A few quotations will serve to amplify and elucidate the above brief statement. After explaining recent changes in the methodology of science, James says :

' Riding now on the front of this wave of scientific logic, Messrs. Schiller and Dewey appear with their pragmatistic account of what truth signifies. Everywhere, these teachers say, " truth " in our ideas and beliefs means the same thing that it means in science. It means, they say, nothing but this, *that ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience.*' †

\* Cf. Schiller, ' Studies in Humanism, ' p. 154.

† ' Pragmatism, ' pp. 57, 58.

Again :

'I am well aware how odd it must seem to some of you to hear me say that an idea is "true" so long as to believe it is profitable to our lives. That it is *good*, for so much as it profits, you will gladly admit. . . . But is it not a strange misuse of the word "truth," you will say, to call ideas also "true" for this reason? . . . You touch here upon the very central point of Messrs. Schiller's and Dewey's and my own doctrine of truth. . . . Let me now only say this, that truth is *one species of good*, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it. *The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons.*' \*

The sixth of William James's lectures on pragmatism is concerned wholly with the notion of truth. He begins by assenting to the dictionary definition that 'truth' means the 'agreement' of our ideas with 'reality.' But, as he justly observes, this definition does not take us very far, unless we know what we mean by 'agreement' and what we mean by 'reality.' The pragmatist holds that different sorts of 'agreement' and different sorts of 'reality' are concerned in different cases. The popular notion that a true idea must copy its reality, holds good, he says, of sensible things, but goes wrong as soon as we come to abstractions. The idea of the elasticity of a spring, for example, cannot, according to him, be a copy of a reality—presumably on the ground that an elasticity is not an actually existing thing. The question is, then, what sort of agreement with reality is possible in such cases? 'The great assumption of the intellectualists,' he says, 'is that truth means essentially an inert static relation.' An *intellectualist*, by the way, is anyone who is not a pragmatist. He proceeds :

'Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks its usual question. "Grant an idea or belief to be true," it says, "what concrete difference will its being true make in any one's actual life? How will the truth be realised? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?"

'The moment pragmatism asks this question it sees the answer : *True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot.* . . .

'The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth *happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process : the process namely of its verifying itself, its *verification*. Its validity is the process of its *valid-ation*.' †

\* Pragmatism, pp. 75, 76.

† Ibid. pp. 200, 201.



Recurring to the definition of 'truth' as 'agreement with reality,' James sums up by distinguishing three kinds of reality, (1) concrete facts, (2) 'abstract kinds of thing and relations perceived intuitively between them,' (3) truths already in our possession. 'Agreement' he defines as follows :

'To "agree" in the widest sense with a reality *can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we disagreed*' (p. 212).

Two further quotations will complete the material required for understanding James's account of truth.

'*"The true," to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as "the right" is only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the whole of course*' (p. 222).

'Our account of truth is an account of truths in the plural, of processes of leading, realised *in rebus*, and having only this quality in common, that they *pay*' (p. 218).

Before proceeding further, it will be as well to clear up a misunderstanding, from which the pragmatists themselves appear not to be exempt. When it is said that truth is 'one species of good,' it is natural to suppose that ethical considerations are involved, and that logic will become dependent upon ethics. This view is, in fact, adopted in Dr. Schiller's essay\* on 'the ethical basis of metaphysics.' But a closer examination shows that pragmatists mean by the word 'good' whatever satisfies desire.† So far as we know, they have nowhere justified this use of the word, but that is not our present concern. What concerns us at present is to observe that, in virtue of this definition, only psychological considerations are relevant where, to judge from the language, ethical considerations might seem to be involved. In order to judge whether a belief is true, it is only necessary to discover whether it tends to the satisfaction of desire.‡ The nature of the desire to be satisfied is only relevant in so far as it may involve conflict with other desires. Thus

\* The first essay in his 'Humanism.'

† Schiller, 'Studies in Humanism,' p. 152: 'Good and bad also (in their wider and primary sense) have reference to purpose. "Good" is what conduces to, "bad" what thwarts, a purpose.'

‡ Schiller, 'Studies in Humanism,' p. 154: 'In all actual knowing the question whether an assertion is "true" or "false" is decided uniformly and very simply. It is decided, that is, by its consequences, by its bearing on the interest which prompted to the assertion, by its relation to the purpose which put the question.'

psychology is paramount, not only over logic and the theory of knowledge, but also over ethics. In order to discover what is good, we have only to inquire how people are to get what they want; and 'true' beliefs are those which help in this process. This is the pragmatist theory of truth; and its consequences, as might be supposed, are far-reaching.

Before considering the metaphysic which Dr. Schiller has deduced from the pragmatist theory of truth, let us examine the grounds upon which that theory is based. Most philosophies are determined by their initial questions, and by the facts which habitually fill the imagination of the philosopher. The initial question of pragmatism is: What characteristics of beliefs do in fact lead men to regard some as true, others as false? The answer to this question—so pragmatism assumes—will give us the meaning of truth and falsehood. The facts which fill the imaginations of pragmatists are psychical facts: where others might think of the starry heavens, pragmatists think of the perception of the starry heavens; where others might think of God, pragmatists think of the belief in God, and so on. In discussing the sciences, they never think, like scientific specialists, about the facts upon which scientific theories are based: they think about the theories themselves. Thus their initial question and their habitual imaginative background are both psychological. In order to arrive at an external world, they have to prove that the belief in an external world has the marks which (according to them) distinguish a true belief. Hence they infer that there is an external world. And a similar process is necessary as regards all other facts which transcend the Ego.

One of the approaches to pragmatism is through the consideration of induction and scientific method. The old inductive philosophy, as exemplified in Mill's logic, conceived the nature and scope of induction far too narrowly, and pragmatism deserves credit for having remedied this defect. Induction, though it cannot give complete certainty, underlies all the sciences, even pure mathematics. In any science, we have a collection of facts bound together (as far as possible) by general laws. The facts appear, in the formal exposition, as deductions from the laws; this, at least, holds for the most advanced sciences, such as mathematics and physics. But in reality the laws are

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To add to this that the consequences must be *good* is superfluous. For if and so far as an assertion satisfies or forwards the purpose of the inquiry to which it owes its being, it is so far "true"; if and so far as it thwarts or baffles it, it is unworkable, unserviceable, "false."

inductions from the facts. We cannot say that this or that fact proves this or that law: the whole body of facts proves (or, rather, renders probable) the whole body of laws. It might be thought that, in an *experimentum crucis*, a single fact establishes a single law; but this is only the case so long as the other laws of the science are taken for granted. If other facts should lead us to doubt the other laws, the interpretation of our *experimentum crucis* might be wholly changed. Thus the justification of a science is that it fits all the known facts, and that no alternative system of hypotheses is known which fits the facts equally well. We may therefore say truly that scientific theories are adopted simply because they *work*, i.e. because their consequences are satisfactory. Thus it would appear as though a right analysis of scientific induction led us straight to the pragmatic test of truth.

Certain objections to this conclusion, however, at once suggest themselves. In the first place, scientific induction assumes certain data, the 'facts' with which our theories have to agree. That the heavenly bodies have the apparent positions, in the sky, which we perceive them to have, is not proved by astronomy, but is assumed as the *datum* upon which astronomy proceeds. It would seem, therefore, that there are truths of fact which are prior to the whole inductive procedure, and that these truths of fact must be 'true' in some other sense than that the consequences of supposing them true are satisfactory. To this argument pragmatists reply that what really is 'fact' is neither true nor false, but prior to the whole antithesis of truth and falsehood. 'Day follows day, and its contents are simply added. The new contents themselves are not true, they simply *come and are*. Truth is *what we say about* them, and when we say 'that they have come, truth is satisfied by the plain additive formula.'\* Pragmatists contend, therefore, that the mere recognition of facts is the simplest case of the application of their formula. If all 'truth' were of this simple nature, the pragmatist doctrine would be unnecessary, though there would be nothing to show that it was false. But the 'truths' which do not consist in the mere recognition of facts cannot, according to pragmatism, be explained in this simple way; hence we are forced to adopt a theory of truth not derived from the exclusive consideration of this simplest case. For the moment let us allow this answer to pass. We shall return to the subject of 'facts' in connection with Dr. Schiller's doctrine of the making of reality.

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\* James, 'Pragmatism,' p. 62.

A more serious objection to the argument from the procedure of the sciences is derived from the ambiguity of the conception of 'working.' What science requires of a working hypothesis is that it shall work *theoretically*, i.e. that all its verifiable consequences shall be *true*, and none *false*. The law of gravitation enables us to calculate the motions of the heavenly bodies: so far as these motions can be observed, they are found to agree with our calculations. It is *true* that the heavenly bodies have such and such apparent positions at such and such times, and the law of gravitation agrees with this *truth*. This is what we mean when we say that the law 'works.' We do not mean that it gives us emotional satisfaction, that it satisfies our aspirations, that it is a help in navigation, or that it facilitates a virtuous life. Any or all of these may be true, but they are irrelevant; if they were all false, we should still say that the law 'works,' because it agrees with observed facts. Thus the kind of 'working' which science desiderates is a very different thing from the kind which pragmatism considers to be the essence of truth.

To this, as to our previous objection, pragmatists reply that the 'truth' concerned is a particular species of 'truth,' and that scientific working is a particular species of their general conception of working. Our purpose, they say, in asking the question to which the law of gravitation is an answer, is to be able to calculate the motions of the heavenly bodies. The law of gravitation furthers this purpose, and is therefore true in the pragmatic sense. This answer shows that the procedure of science, so far, has not been shown to *contradict* pragmatism; but it does not show that the procedure of science positively supports pragmatism. Where, as in science, our purpose is to discover truth, an answer which furthers our purpose will be true. But from this truism it cannot be inferred (as pragmatists pretend) that if we had had some quite different purpose, an answer which furthered it would still have been true.

Another objection to the argument from 'working hypotheses' is that by men of science these are explicitly contrasted with established truths. An hypothesis, as experience shows, may explain all known relevant facts admirably, and yet may at any moment be rendered inadequate by new facts. For this reason, prudent men give only a very provisional assent to a working hypothesis. Thus the cases from which pragmatism endeavours to discover the nature of truth are the very cases in which we have least assurance that truth is present at all. This is certainly a curious and not very hopeful mode of procedure. It may be said, however, that what leads us to feel doubtful

about a working hypothesis is merely that it has not yet been shown to work over a sufficiently wide field: the more it works, the more we believe in it. But to this again it may be rejoined that the more it works the less probability is there that any other hypothesis would also work. To pursue this topic, however, would require a discussion of the laws of probability, for which this is not the place.

From what has been said it results that the utmost that pragmatism can derive from science is that the scientific conception of working is not incompatible with the pragmatist conception, since the scientific working may be regarded as a species of the pragmatic working. It is, however, a species whose *differentia* adds just those elements which other philosophies declare to be necessary to truth, while pragmatism declares them to be unnecessary. The essential novelty of pragmatism is that it admits, as a ground of belief, *any kind* of satisfaction to be derived from entertaining the belief, not merely the theoretic satisfaction which is sought by science. For this contention no support whatever is to be found in science. Let us see whether any support is to be found elsewhere.

Pragmatists are never weary of inveighing against those who say that our beliefs *ought* not to be influenced by considerations which in fact do influence them. They point triumphantly to the influence of desire upon belief, and boast that their theory alone is based upon a true psychological account of how belief arises. With this account we have no quarrel; what we deny is its relevance to the question: What is meant by 'truth' and 'falsehood'? At first sight it might seem a perfectly proper inductive proceeding to inquire what properties a belief must have in order that we may call it *true*, and to infer that those properties constitute the meaning of 'truth.' There is, however, a fallacy in this method of inquiry; and this fallacy, in our opinion, is at the bottom of the whole pragmatist philosophy.

There is, in the first place, an ambiguity in the word 'meaning.' We may say 'that cloud means rain,' or we may say '*pluie* means rain.' It is obvious that these two senses of 'meaning' are wholly different. What they have in common is that in each case we have one thing which points to another. The cloud is a sign that rain is coming; the word *pluie* is a sign which signifies rain. But beyond this, the two senses of 'meaning' have little in common. In the first sense, one thing 'means' another when the existence (past, present, or future) of the other can be inferred from the one, i.e. when there is a causal connection between them. In the second sense, 'meaning' is confined to symbols, i.e. to words, and whatever other ways

may be employed for communicating our thoughts. It is this second sense of 'meaning' which we expect a dictionary to give us. When we ask 'what does such and such a word 'mean?' what we want to know is 'what is in the mind of a 'person using the word?' A confusion of the two senses of 'meaning' is not uncommon in philosophy; and, if we are not mistaken, pragmatism has confused them in its inquiry as to the 'meaning' of truth. It has discovered something which has a causal connection with our beliefs that things are true, and which, therefore, in the first sense of 'meaning,' may be taken to be what these beliefs 'mean.' It has then supposed that this is what is 'meant,' in the second sense, by 'truth,' i.e. what we have in mind (or should have in mind?) when we use the word 'truth.'

This confusion between the two senses of 'meaning' seems to be necessarily involved in the method adopted by pragmatists, namely the method which inquires into the causes of our judging things to be true, in the hope of thereby discovering what 'truth' means. Let us grant to the pragmatists, in order to avoid disputes concerning what is unimportant, that what causes people to judge that a belief, about which a doubt has arisen, is true, is the fact that this belief is found to further the purposes which led us to inquire into its truth. Then to judge that a belief is true 'means' that this belief furthers our purposes, in the sense in which the cloud 'means' rain, i.e. there is a causal connection between them. But truth is not the same thing as furthering our purposes any more than the cloud is the same thing as rain. When we say that a belief is true the thought we wish to convey is not the same thought as when we say that the belief furthers our purposes; thus 'true' does not mean 'furthering our purposes' in the sense in which '*pluie*' means rain. Thus pragmatism does not answer the question: What is in our minds when we judge that a certain belief is true?

We find pragmatists, when pressed, willing to admit this fact. Thus Dr. Schiller says: \*

'In a sense, therefore, the predications of "good" and "bad," "true" and "false," etc., may take rank with the experiences of "sweet," "red," "loud," "hard," etc., as ultimate facts which need be analysed no further.' To which he adds, in a footnote, 'The purport of this remark is to confute the notion, which seems dimly to underlie some intellectualist criticisms, that the specific character of the truth-predication is ignored in pragmatist quarters.'

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\* Studies in Humanism, p. 144.

This fundamental meaning of 'truth' is treated by Dr. Schiller as unimportant because it does not enable us to distinguish the cases in which we have rightly predicated truth from those in which we have done so wrongly. The pragmatist test, he maintains, enables us to distinguish the *truly* true from the *falsely* true. An untested predication of truth he calls 'truth as claim'; a predication which is subsequent to the application of the pragmatist test he calls 'truth validated.' The distinction between the two is treated at length in his essay on 'the ambiguity of truth.\*' This 'ambiguity' appears to us to be wholly non-existent. The distinction involved is the distinction between what *is* true and what is *thought to be* true. The reader who will, throughout this essay on the ambiguity of truth, substitute 'butter' for 'truth' and 'margarine' for 'falsehood,' will find that the point involved is one which has no special relevance to the nature of truth. There is 'butter as claim,' i.e. whatever the grocer calls butter; this, we will suppose, includes margarine. There is 'butter validated,' which is butter that, after the usual tests, has been found not to be margarine. But there is no ambiguity in the word 'butter.' When the grocer, pointing to the margarine, says 'this is butter' he means by 'butter' precisely what the customer means when he says 'this is not butter.' To argue from the grocer's language that 'butter' has two meanings, one of which includes margarine, while the other does not, would be obviously absurd. Similarly when the rash man, without applying any tests, affirms 'this belief is true,' while the prudent man, after applying suitable tests, judges 'this belief is not true,' the two men mean the same thing by the word 'true,' only one of them applies it wrongly. Thus Dr. Schiller's reasons for regarding 'the specific character of the truth-predication' as unimportant are not valid.

We must now return to the two senses of 'meaning,' and show how they are relevant to our problem. It is evident that, in the sense in which the meaning of a word is 'what is in our minds when we use the word,' the meaning of the word 'truth' is just that 'specific character of the truth-predication' which, as Dr. Schiller confesses, is something quite other than 'furthering our purposes.' His contention is that the beliefs of which we can predicate truth *truly* are those which further our purposes. And his reason for saying this is that the beliefs which further our purposes are those which we persist in calling true after reflection. But that only proves that these are the beliefs which we continue to *think* true, not that these are the beliefs

\* Studies in Humanism, pp. 141-162.

which *are* true. Owing, however, to confusion of the two senses of 'meaning,' he is led to argue that usefulness gives the *meaning* of truth, and that therefore when a belief is useful it must be true. All that really follows, if we grant the whole of the psychological argument, is that beliefs which are found to be useful will continue to be *thought* to be true. This is an entirely different proposition, and one which, by itself, throws no light whatever either upon the nature of truth or upon what beliefs are in fact true. It may well be that beliefs which fulfil certain purposes are true, while beliefs which fulfil others are not true; or, again, that there is no connection whatever between truth and usefulness. Dr. Schiller's argument (and Professor James's, for the two are practically identical on this point) involves a variety of the very assumption which he criticises in others, namely, the assumption that all our beliefs are true. In pragmatism the assumption is that the beliefs which we persist in holding must be true. It is then pointed out how very unreasonable our grounds often are for persisting in a belief, and this fact, instead of being used to throw doubt on the belief, is used to discredit reasonableness. Thus we are brought back to the standpoint of 'The Will to Believe,' and we find that the precepts of that essay really underlie the whole pragmatist theory of truth. But the superstructure is so vast that pragmatists appear to be no longer aware of the foundations upon which their edifice is reared.

We may now restate the pragmatist theory of truth in bald outline, giving due prominence to presuppositions of which pragmatists themselves are perhaps not fully conscious. Their major premiss is: Beliefs which persist after a doubt has been raised are true. Their minor premiss is: Beliefs which are found to be serviceable persist after a doubt has been raised. Hence it follows that such beliefs are true. The pragmatist then turns round and exhorts us to cherish such beliefs, on the ground that they are true. But if his psychology was right the exhortation is needless, since, by his minor premiss, we certainly shall cherish such beliefs. Their major premiss should be: 'Beliefs which *we* cherish after *you* have raised a doubt are true.' But those who have raised the doubt can hardly be expected to be much impressed by this premiss. The argument is a form of the old refutation of an opponent by the contention that the whole human race thinks as you do, which is a somewhat unsuccessful weapon against a human being who does not think as you do.

It is now time to turn our attention to the metaphysic which Dr. Schiller has based upon the pragmatist theory of truth. Pragmatism as such professes to be only a method; the meta-



physical doctrine which Dr. Schiller derives from it he calls *Humanism*. In regard to metaphysics, pragmatism professes to be a kind of universal provider, willing and able to suit all tastes. As William James puts it :

‘Against rationalism as a pretension and a method pragmatism is fully armed and militant. But, at the outset, at least, it stands for no particular results. It has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method. As the young Italian pragmatist Papini has well said, it lies in the midst of our theories, like a corridor in a hotel. Innumerable chambers open out of it. In one you may find a man writing an atheistic volume ; in the next some one on his knees praying for faith and strength ; in a third a chemist investigating a body’s properties. In a fourth a system of idealistic metaphysics is being excogitated ; in a fifth the impossibility of metaphysics is being shown. But they all own the corridor and all must pass through it if they want a practicable way of getting into or out of their respective rooms.’\*

In spite of this catholicity, however, we agree with Dr. Schiller in thinking that his metaphysic is the one which naturally results from pragmatism. It will be remembered that, in considering induction, we pointed to the dependence of inductive verification upon an appeal to ‘facts.’ Humanism, as a metaphysic, results from the application of the pragmatic method to the question : What is a ‘fact’ ? This subject has been treated by Dr. Schiller in his essay on ‘the making of reality.’†

The main purpose of humanist metaphysics is to emphasise the primacy of the Will. The Will, it is true, requires a datum of ‘fact’ to which to apply its operations, but this datum is itself the product of previous volitions, and although we cannot quite deny some original *ὑλη* which has been moulded by will, yet this is remote and unimportant, and has been transformed into genuine reality by the agency of human beings and other beings more or less resembling them. Nothing that can be known, nothing that can properly be called ‘real,’ is independent of the knower. There is no such thing as ‘mere’ knowing, in which we passively apprehend the nature of a merely ‘given’ object. All knowing is bound up with doing, and everything that we know has been in some degree altered by our agency. This, Dr. Schiller says, is obvious in the case of our acquaintances, who plainly are more or less affected by the fact that we are acquainted with them. When we say that something is ‘independent’ of our knowing, we mean, according to him, that the thing is not aware that we know it. But, as a matter of fact,

\* Pragmatism, p. 54. † Studies in Humanism, pp. 421-451.

everything we know, even a stone, is aware of us in its own way. To the charge that this is Hylozoism, Dr. Schiller replies by admitting it.

The grounds for these opinions are not set forth quite so clearly as could be wished, but we may gather them from a complimentary allusion to Hegel's dialectic at the beginning of the Essay. Imagine some 'fact' in regard to which we entertain a belief. The belief leads to action, and the action alters the 'fact.' If it alters it into harmony with our wishes the belief is proved to have been what pragmatists call 'true,' since it has proved successful in action. In this case, since the belief in the fact is true, it follows that the fact is real. Thus the belief has made the fact. But if the outcome of the belief is a 'fact' which, though in harmony with the wishes which originally led us to concern ourselves with the matter, is in conflict with others of our wishes, the belief is not 'true' as regards these other wishes; hence we shall have to change our belief, and take fresh action on the new belief, and so bring the 'fact' into harmony with these new wishes. In this way, so long as we have any unsatisfied wishes, we are led on in a cycle of beliefs and actions, the beliefs becoming gradually 'truer,' and the 'facts' with which the beliefs are concerned becoming gradually more 'real' as greater harmony is established between the 'facts' and our wishes. The motive power of this whole development is the pragmatic definition of truth. For if we believe A to be a fact, that belief is true if it is successful as a means to satisfying our wishes; hence so long as our wishes are not completely satisfied, the belief that A is a fact is not completely true, and therefore A is not completely a fact. Thus complete truth and complete reality go hand in hand, and both are only to be found at the end of the road which leads to the complete satisfaction of all our wishes.

The similarity of the above process to the Hegelian dialectic is emphasised by Dr. Schiller; with his inveterate love of a pun, he has christened his process 'trialectic.' He does not seem, however, to have observed that his process, like Hegel's, introduces a distinction between appearance and reality; that appearance embraces the whole of the world as we know it, and that it is only to reality that the pragmatic test of truth applies. The 'facts' which he can accept as real must be such as not to thwart our purposes; the 'facts' which appear are very often such as to thwart our purposes. If a fact is such as to thwart our purposes, the pragmatist test of truth is not fully applicable to it; for by believing that it will thwart our purposes, we do not prevent it from doing so, and our belief, though

possibly preferable pragmatically to any other, does not secure the satisfaction of our desires. If, on the other hand, we believe that the fact is *not* such as to thwart our purposes, we believe what, *ex hypothesi*, is not the case. Hence it follows that such facts cannot be real. Since many apparent facts thwart our purposes, we are led to distinguish between real and apparent facts. Hence it is not here on earth that pragmatism applies, but only in Dr. Schiller's heaven, just as it is only in Mr. Bradley's heaven that Mr. Bradley's metaphysic applies. The whole doctrine, therefore, reduces itself to the proposition that it would be heavenly to live in a world where one's philosophy was true, and this is a proposition which we have no desire to controvert.

The distinction between appearance and reality is one which Dr. Schiller is never weary of attacking; indeed, a very large proportion of his writings is directed against it. His complete reality, he holds, is being progressively realised, and is not, like the Absolute, something wholly unconnected with our actual world of appearance. But his only reason for supposing that his complete reality is being progressively realised is a tacit assumption of co-operation among the agents composing the universe. He assumes, that is, that the various desires which (according to him) form the motive power of all that occurs in the universe are not such as to counteract each other: the world's activities are not to be conceived as a tug-of-war. For this view there is, we fancy, no argument except the pragmatic argument, that it is pleasant and cannot be conclusively disproved.

Thus the whole humanist metaphysic rests upon the pragmatic theory of truth, and falls with that theory. Moreover, it introduces, in a slightly modified form, the old distinction of appearance and reality, of which the difficulties have been admirably set forth by Dr. Schiller himself. Since the distinction and, therefore, the difficulties, result inevitably from the pragmatic theory of truth, they afford a new argument against that theory; for they show that the theory is applicable, not to our actual world, but to an ideal world where all the hopes of pragmatists have been realised.

Although, for the reasons alleged above, we do not ourselves accept the pragmatist philosophy, we nevertheless believe that it is likely to achieve widespread popularity, because it embodies some of the main intellectual and political tendencies of our time. This aspect of pragmatism deserves consideration, since the influence of a doctrine (as pragmatists have very prudently pointed out) is by no means proportional to its intellectual value.

On the intellectual side, pragmatism embodies scepticism, evolution, and the new insight into the nature and scope of scientific induction. On the political side, it embodies democracy, the increased belief in human power which has come from the progress of mechanical invention, and the Bismarckian belief in force.

The scepticism embodied in pragmatism is that which says 'Since all beliefs are absurd, we may as well believe what is 'most convenient.' This is by no means a new contention; in England it has been popularised by Mr. Balfour's 'Foundations of Belief' and 'Notes on Insular Free Trade.' Scepticism is of the very essence of the pragmatic philosophy: nothing is certain, everything is liable to revision, and the attainment of any truth in which we can rest securely is impossible. It is, therefore, not worth while to trouble our heads about what really is true; what is *thought* to be true is all that need concern us. Instead of the old distinction between *true* and *false*, we adopt the more useful distinction between what we persist in thinking true, and what merely seems true at first sight. Later on, the old meanings of *true* and *false* may slip back unnoticed, and we may come to think that what is true in the pragmatic sense is true in the old sense also; this happens especially in regard to religion. But on pragmatist principles, there is no reason to regret this; for the 'true' is what it is useful to believe, and therefore it is useful to believe what pragmatism declares to be true. Scepticism, therefore, though necessary at the start, must be banished later on if we are to get the full benefits of pragmatism. In this there is no great psychological difficulty, since, as Hume confessed, the sceptical attitude is one not easily maintained in practice.

The philosophy of evolution has also had its share in generating the pragmatic tone of mind. It has led people to regard everything as fluid and in process of development, everything as passing by imperceptible gradations into everything else. Some biologists, it is true, have begun to regard development as discontinuous, proceeding by the sudden appearance of freaks; but philosophers and the general public have not been influenced by this change. Hence it has come to be felt that all sharp antitheses, such as that of *true* and *false*, must be blurred, and all finality must be avoided. We must always build a road by which everything can pass into everything else at a leisurely pace and with small steps. Instead of 'the true' we shall have 'the more true,' or 'the most true up to date.' And between different claimants for truth, we must provide a struggle for existence, leading to the survival of the

strongest. All this is admirably effected by the pragmatic theory of truth. M. Bergson, whom pragmatists claim as an ally, may be regarded as embodying this tendency.

The influence of modern theories of scientific induction has probably been more restricted, in point of numbers, than the influence of scepticism or of evolution, but the men influenced have been important by their scientific eminence. We may take as their protagonist M. Poincaré, who, while not extending the pragmatist doctrine to particular facts, has dealt in a thoroughly pragmatic spirit with the general hypothesis of logic, mathematics, and physics, showing that what leads to the acceptance of a scientific hypothesis is its *convenience*. Such general assumptions as causality, the existence of an external world, etc., cannot be supported by Mill's canons of induction, but require a far more comprehensive treatment of the whole organised body of accepted scientific doctrine. It is in such treatment that the pragmatic method is seen at its best; and among men of science, its apparent success in this direction has doubtless contributed greatly to its acceptance.

The influence of democracy in promoting pragmatism is visible in almost every page of William James's writing. There is an impatience of authority, an unwillingness to condemn wide-spread prejudices, a tendency to decide philosophical questions by putting them to the vote, which contrast curiously with the usual dictatorial tone of philosophic writings. Dr. Schiller at one time set to work to elucidate the question of a future life by taking a poll.\* William James claims for the pragmatist temper 'the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality, and the pretence of finality 'in truth.' A thing which simply *is* true, whether you like it or not, is to him as hateful as a Russian autocracy; he feels that he is escaping from a prison, made not by stone walls but by 'hard facts,' when he has humanised truth, and made it, like the police force in a democracy, the servant of the people instead of their master. The democratic temper pervades even the religion of the pragmatists: they have the religion they have chosen, and the traditional reverence is changed into satisfaction with their own handiwork. 'The prince of darkness,' James says, 'may be a gentleman, as we are told he is; but whatever the God of earth and heaven is, he can

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\* See his essay on "The Desire for Immortality" ('Humanism,' pp. 228-249). We do not, of course, suggest that he would have considered the result of the poll decisive, even if the electorate had been larger.

'surely be no gentleman.'\* He is rather, we should say, conceived by pragmatists as an elected president, to whom we give a respect which is really a tribute to the wisdom of our own choice. A government in which we have no voice is repugnant to the democratic temper. William James carries up to heaven the revolt of his New England ancestors: the Power to which he can yield respect must be a George Washington rather than a George III.

Closely connected with this democratic spirit is the belief in human power, which is one of the dominant notes of pragmatism. By the progress of mechanical invention, the possibilities of our command over nature have been shown to be much greater than they were formerly supposed to be, and no definite limits can be set to them. Hence has arisen—especially in America, where the economic conditions are favourable, and the chief concern of most people is with those matters in which recent advances have been greatest—a general feeling that by energy and hope all obstacles can be overcome, and that it is a mark of laziness or pusillanimity to admit that anything is impossible. The habit of mind which believes that there are no essential impossibilities has been fostered by the doctrine of evolution, with its literary corollary of the *Uebermensch*. Hence have arisen a self-confidence and a pride of life which in many ways remind one of the Renaissance, and establish some affinity between historical humanism and its modern namesake. For the modern humanism is essentially the philosophy which is appropriate, as Dr. Schiller himself has said, to 'the young, the strong, the virile.'† The inventor, the financier, the advertiser, the successful man of action generally, can find in pragmatism an expression of their instinctive view of the world. Such men, both for good and evil, expect the world to be malleable to their wishes, and in a greater or less degree find their expectation justified by success. Hence arises a disbelief in those 'hard facts' which pragmatists tend to deny, and a confidence of victory in contests with the outer world, whether these contests be cognitive or more directly practical. An Italian pragmatist has expressed this confidence in victory as follows:

'Dio è perfetto perchè è onnipossente. Sostituiamo dunque al misticismo della rinunzia, dell' *Imitazione di Cristo*, il misticismo della conquista, dell' *Imitazione di Dio*.'‡

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\* Pragmatism, p. 72.

† Humanism, p. viii.

‡ Leonardo, April 1905, 'L'Imitazione d'Iddio,' p. 64.

Other pragmatists have been less explicit than this modern Thomas à Kempis, but he has correctly expressed the spirit of their philosophy.

From the confidence of victory in contests, it is an easy passage to the love of contest. For this, pragmatism provides full scope. The many different 'truths as claim' must fight it out among themselves, and the victor will become 'truth validated.' Dr. Schiller on one occasion implicitly confesses that, with his theory of truth, persecution can actually make a doctrine true which would otherwise be false, since it can make a doctrine 'useful to our lives.'\* In the absence of any standard of truth other than success, it seems evident that the familiar methods of the struggle for existence must be applied to the elucidation of difficult questions, and that iron-clads and Maxim guns must be the ultimate arbiters of metaphysical truth.

The worship of force, as we find it in Nietzsche, is not to be found in the same form in William James, who, though he lauds the will and the life of action, does not wish action to be bellicose. Nevertheless, the excessive individualism of the pragmatic theory of truth is inherently connected with the appeal to force. If there is a non-human truth, which one man may know, while another does not, there is a standard outside the disputants, to which, we may urge, the dispute ought to be submitted; hence a pacific and judicial settlement of disputes is at least theoretically possible. If, on the contrary, the only way of discovering which of the disputants is in the right is to wait and see which of them is successful, there is no longer any principle except force by which the issue can be decided. It is true, of course, that in a private dispute the public opinion of the community, especially as embodied in the law, will usually compel a peaceful decision. But this public opinion is formed (at least in theory) upon an objective estimate of the rights and wrongs of the case; in place of this, if pragmatism were the accepted creed, public opinion would have to be guided by the interests of the community. To this there would be no objection if, as would commonly be done, the maintenance of justice could be taken as one of the ends which it is in the interest of the community to pursue. But in a pragmatist community, this would be impossible, since justice is derivative from the

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\* Humanism, p. 59: 'Delicate questions may arise out of the fact that not only does what works receive social recognition, but also that what receives social recognition for this very reason largely works.'

interests of the community, and not an independent constituent of those interests. In international matters, owing to the fact that the disputants are often strong enough to be independent of outside control, these considerations become more important. If the pragmatist urges that always and everywhere the only ultimate arbiter in a dispute *must* be force, the reply is that, although this is true at the actual moment of the battle, it is yet not true in a wider sense, since it ignores the motives which generate the force on either side. The hopes of international peace, like the achievement of internal peace, depend upon the creation of an effective force of public opinion formed upon an estimate of the rights and wrongs of disputes. Thus it would be misleading to say that the dispute is decided by force, without adding that force is dependent upon justice. But the possibility of such a public opinion depends upon the possibility of a standard of justice which is a cause, not an effect, of the wishes of the community; and such a standard of justice seems incompatible with the pragmatist philosophy. This philosophy, therefore, although it begins with liberty and toleration, develops, by inherent necessity, into the appeal to force and the arbitrament of the big battalions. By this development it become equally adapted to democracy at home and to imperialism abroad. Thus here again, it is more delicately adjusted to the requirements of the time than any other philosophy which has hitherto been invented.

To sum up: Pragmatism appeals to the temper of mind which finds on the surface of this planet the whole of its imaginative material; which feels confident of progress, and unaware of non-human limitations to human power; which loves battle, with all the attendant risks, because it has no real doubt that it will achieve victory; which desires religion, as it desires railways and electric light, as a comfort and a help in the affairs of this world, not as providing non-human objects to satisfy the hunger for perfection and for something to be worshipped without reserve. But for those who feel that life on this planet would be a life in prison, if it were not for the windows into a greater world beyond; for those to whom a belief in man's omnipotence seems arrogant, who desire rather the Stoic freedom that comes of mastery over the passions than the Napoleonic domination that sees the kingdoms of this world at its feet—in a word, to men who do not find Man an adequate object of their worship, the pragmatist's world will seem narrow and petty, robbing life of all that gives it value, and making Man himself smaller by depriving the universe which he contemplates of all its splendour.



## ART. VI.—THE ECONOMICS OF EMPIRE.

1. *Origins of the British Colonial System, 1578-1660.* By G. L. BEER. London: Macmillan. 1908.
2. *Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Government.* By EARL GREY. Edition of 1853.
3. *Journal of Royal United Service Institution for May 1900.* Paper by Lieut. CARLYON BELLAIRS.
4. *The Navy and the Empire.* Paper read at the Royal Colonial Institute, December 1904. By H. F. WYATT.
5. *Parliamentary Papers.*

WHEN Mr. Chamberlain started his campaign for binding the Empire together by a system of Imperial preferences, Free Traders retorted that no such sordid bonds were needed. The true bonds of Empire, they contended, were to be found in the union of hearts created by common racial origin, by common traditions, and by common allegiance to one sovereign. Probably, however, few of those who used this argument realised how extremely modern is this idealistic conception of the British Empire. It dates solely from the beginning of the Free Trade epoch. Up to the time when England formally adopted Free Trade as her commercial policy, the Empire was looked upon in the way in which Mr. Chamberlain would now have us again look upon it. Our less sentimental ancestors valued the over-sea possessions of England because of the material advantages which they believed that the Mother Country obtained therefrom, and they established a system of mutual preferences and restrictions in order to secure these material benefits. Incidentally this point is important in current controversy because so many prominent Protectionists and quasi-Protectionists, and notably Mr. Balfour himself, have spoken of Free Trade as an ancient shibboleth and a worm-eaten doctrine, whereas if we take only a moderately long view of the history of our country, Free Trade is very modern. It is the Protectionist doctrine which is ancient, though perhaps it would be discourteous to imitate the discourtesy of the Protectionists and call it also worm-eaten.

The beginnings of our Colonial Empire date from the latter end of the sixteenth century. At that period England was suffering from the results of an agricultural revolution which had led to the laying down of much plough land for pasture, and she was also suffering from the letting loose of troops of beggars,

who had previously existed upon the charity of the monasteries. Consequently there was a fairly widespread conviction that the country was over-populated, and colonisation was looked upon as a means of getting rid of the surplus population at home. This view did not long endure. The population of England adapted itself to the new economic and social conditions of the country, and before the seventeenth century was very far advanced the talk of over-population began to cease. In its place we find a totally different set of arguments put forward in favour of colonisation, and these arguments all resolve themselves into the one main proposition that colonies were desirable as a means of adding to the commercial prosperity of the Mother Country.

The argument is essentially the same as that used by Tariff Reformers of to-day, but the proposition was approached from a slightly different point of view. To-day the point on which those who advocate Colonial preferences lay most stress is the difficulty of finding an outlet for British manufactures in foreign countries. In the seventeenth century, on the other hand, the point most frequently insisted upon was the desirability of relieving England from her dependence upon foreign countries for the supply of materials needed by her people. Contemporary writers constantly insisted upon the difficulty of obtaining necessary supplies from intermittently hostile Powers, and this consideration was frequently put forward as a specific argument for various Colonial enterprises. Thus, for example, both in 1610 and in 1620 the company which had been formed for the colonisation of Virginia laid stress on the fact that England, instead of having to buy furs and cordage and caviare from Russia, masts, timber, pitch, tar, potash and hemp from Norway, Denmark, Poland, and Germany, wine, fruit, and salt from Spain and France, silk from Persia and Italy, could obtain all these products from Virginia.\* In the same way, pamphlets published in favour of the settlement of New England laid stress on the value of that country as a new source of supply of fish, timber, and naval stores.

This view of trade, it may be remarked in passing, is in many ways more intelligent than our latter-day developments, for it emphasises the fact that a country grows rich by what it receives and not by what it exports. In other respects several of the seventeenth-century writers on colonial expansion had a clearer grip of the workings of international commerce than some of the Imperialists of the twentieth century appear to possess. Thus, for example, in 1638, Sir Ferdinando Gorges wrote to

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\* Beer,<sup>5</sup>p. 69.

Secretary Windebank that the exports of fish and lumber from the American Colonies to Spain, Madeira and the Canaries, paid for commodities imported from these places into England.\* This clear conception of triangular trade contrasts very favourably with the foolish attempts now so frequently made to compare the direct interchange of commodities between England and some particular foreign country, and to assume that England loses because on that direct trade she buys more than she sells.

These seventeenth-century men, who saw so clearly the general working of international trade, naturally understood that if the Colonies became a source of supply to England they would also be a vent for English manufactures. It was, however, as already stated, the former point, as being ultimately the more important, on which they rightly laid most stress, and the direction which colonisation took was largely determined by the needs of the Mother Country for what may be called primary commodities. Thus the colonisation of the temperate regions of America was specially urged with a view to securing supplies of pitch, tar, and hemp, and it was only when the attempts of the early settlers to produce these commodities in sufficiently large quantities proved a failure that England turned her attention to the colonisation of the West Indies, whence she could obtain tropical products, not only for her own consumption but also for export to foreign countries, in payment for commodities which she still had to buy from abroad.

Starting from this assumption, that Colonies were required as a source of supply to the Mother Country, and consequentially as an outlet for her manufactures, it was natural to insist that the trade of the Colonies both outward and inward should be reserved for the metropolis. Further to develop these important new sources of supply, privileges of various sorts were constantly granted by the Government to settlers or to persons who were engaged in establishing Colonial trade. Among these privileges one of the most interesting was the exclusive right of producing tobacco. The whole tobacco question constitutes a curious page in the history of English industry, and we may also add of English morals. For on its first appearance tobacco was strongly condemned on moral grounds, and this moral objection only appears to have waned when it was realised that the exportation of tobacco from the Colonies might become a most valuable industry. Even after this point was reached, the persons who were interested in the Colonial trade were able

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\* Beer, p. 71.

very ingeniously to avail themselves of the still surviving moral objection to tobacco in order to execute their policy of suppressing the cultivation of tobacco in England so as to secure a monopoly for the Virginia planters.

The evidence is conclusive that the action of Parliament in suppressing the cultivation of tobacco in England was practically dictated by persons interested in Virginian plantations. Under the early Stuarts the planting of tobacco in England had been prohibited on moral grounds, but this prohibition had never been completely enforced, and during the Civil War fell into abeyance. In 1652 Parliament revived the prohibition on the appeal of English merchants interested in the Colonial trade.\* The following year a further petition was presented by Samuel Mathews, an agent for the colony of Virginia, and other merchants, who argued that the growth of tobacco in England would destroy the Colonial trade, and thus diminish the shipping of the Commonwealth. The petition prayed that all the tobacco planted in England should be destroyed. In 1654 Parliament appointed a special commission to execute the law prohibiting the growth of tobacco. Great opposition was encountered, especially in the neighbourhood of Winchcomb, where the people raised an armed force of 300 men to resist the destruction of their crops.† In face of this opposition proceedings had to be suspended, but the following year (1655) the Government instructed the officers of horse and foot in the counties of Worcester, Gloucester, and Hereford to render assistance in the destruction of the tobacco plants, and the local opposition was overcome.

The methods by which the Government of the Commonwealth was induced thus to destroy an English industry for the benefit of Colonial planters are indicated in a private communication addressed to the Governor and Council of Virginia by an agent of the colony in London.‡ The writer takes credit for the work which has been done 'in suppressing and destroying the greatest crop of English tobacco which hath yet been planted,' and he states that this was 'effected by continual solicitations, by collections of several sums of money, and by the hazard of some of our persons employed in the execution of the Laws and Acts of State in that behalf which was attempted but hindered by the insurrection and resistance of the country; and was afterwards upon our importunity and the dexterity of a gentleman who acted for us, reinforced by farther orders from his Highness and the Council; and by the access of a strong and united power of the

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\* Beer, p. 403.

† *Ibid.* p. 105.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 408.

‘sheriff and some troops of the army whereby the greatest part of this work was well carried on, though not without much disturbance and some bloodshed.’

This is a remarkable illustration of the lengths to which the Home Government was willing to go in order to encourage Colonial trade. In defence of Cromwell and his Council it must be admitted that they rightly attached the greatest importance to the development of a mercantile marine as a means of building up naval power. At that time the distinction, now so patent, between ships of commerce and ships of war was practically non-existent. It was absolutely necessary for merchant ships to carry some guns for their self-protection against pirates, and against the risk of capture by enemies’ ships in foreign waters. Consequently, with comparatively little change, almost every merchant vessel could be used as a fighting ship. Looked at from this point of view, there is a plausible excuse for the action of the Commonwealth Government in deliberately destroying a home industry for the sake of a Colonial industry in order to develop the sea-power of the metropolis.

Underlying this action and all similar privileges conferred upon the Colonies was always the idea that the Colonies were to be used to add to the material prosperity and strength of the Mother Country. There was, as far as can be traced, no sentiment about the matter. It was purely a question of business. Our ancestors said in effect: ‘By creating Colonies, by encouraging their growth, and by giving them privileges if necessary for that purpose, we can strengthen ourselves.’ This conception of colonisation continued for practically two hundred years without modification. During the whole period from the Commonwealth to the abolition of the Corn Laws, the large majority of Englishmen looked upon the Colonies as dependencies of the Mother Country, existing for her benefit, and only to be encouraged so far as they contributed to that end. In practice the encouragement given to the Colonies frequently injured the Mother Country, and it could probably be shown that in many cases this injury was actually greater than any benefit which could possibly be derived from Colonial expansion, even on the hypothesis that that expansion always contributed to the strength of the metropolis.

The final abandonment of the idea that the Colonies must be looked upon as plantations from the Mother Country, and that their commerce must be regulated in her interests, and hers modified to suit their convenience, was due to many causes, partly intellectual and partly material. The great intellectual influence which so profoundly modified the whole commercial

policy of the British Empire was the publication of Adam Smith's 'Wealth of Nations.' This marvellous book had the effect of compelling thoughtful Englishmen to reconsider the fundamental bases of their economic conceptions. It taught them that commercial prosperity was more likely to be secured by leaving individuals free to seek their own profit in their own way, than by entrusting the Government with the duty of regulating the commerce of the country in the supposed interests of the whole community. This new view of economics, which was itself a part of the general trend of thought in the direction of liberty, was largely adopted by Pitt, who by means of a treaty of commerce with France cleared away many of the pre-existing barriers to trade between England and her nearest neighbour. Unfortunately the Napoleonic Wars destroyed for a whole generation the work which Pitt, on the inspiration of Adam Smith, had attempted to carry out. But the idea of commercial liberty did not die. It was kept alive by later writers: it was acted upon by far-seeing politicians.

Among these, too little honour has been given to William Huskisson. This remarkable Tory Free Trader—if we may momentarily use modern nomenclature—seems principally to be known to fame from the fact that he was killed in the first railway accident. In reality, he accomplished a great work. As President of the Board of Trade he was responsible for numerous measures for the liberation of English trade from the thralldom which had been imposed upon it in previous generations. The Free Trade work accomplished between 1820 and 1830, largely at his instigation, was the basis upon which Sir Robert Peel was able to build his more sweeping reforms of 1842 and 1846.

With regard to the special question of preferential trading with the Colonies, it is very interesting to note that even in 1842, when Sir Robert Peel was abolishing or reducing no less than 700 duties upon imports, he proposed not merely to retain in many cases existing Colonial preferences, but even in some instances to extend them.\* In the original draft of his scheme as first submitted to the House of Commons, there were provisions for giving a new preference on tea and tobacco. Earl Grey, who was then a member of the House of Commons, opposed these new preferences, and argued, as any Free Trader to-day would argue, that if higher duties were imposed on foreign articles than on Colonial articles an undue burden would be placed upon the British consumer, while there would be a tendency to divert trade from its natural, and therefore most

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\* Grey, vol. i. p. 9.

productive, channels. Among the members of Parliament who then supported Sir Robert Peel was Mr. Gladstone, who argued that imports from the Colonies ought to be relieved from duty, because the Colonies ought to be considered 'as an integral part of the Empire.\*' To this argument Earl Grey retorted that, though the Colonies were an integral part of the Empire, it was

'from the nature of things impossible that they should be under the same fiscal system as ourselves, and unless they could be so—that is, unless they paid all the same taxes that we do, and these taxes included excise duties on all articles on which we raise a revenue, and which they produce—no special exemption from duty could be given to Colonial produce in our ports without incurring all the objectionable consequences of a system of protection.'

Earl Grey was clearly right, for at a time when England was deliberately turning her back upon Protection as a principle, and refusing to protect home industries, it was inconsistent to propose that she should actually increase the protection to Colonial industries. In referring to this incident in his letters on Colonial policy, Earl Grey anticipates current controversies by remarking that it does not appear to him inconsistent with the unity of the Empire that its several members should have different fiscal systems.

This was the view which ultimately prevailed. The policy of Colonial preferences was formally abandoned as a principle in 1846, and finally disappeared as a practice in 1860. At the same time the home Government, animated by a desire to give the greatest possible liberty of action to Colonial Governments, left them free to impose such duties as they chose not only on the goods of foreign countries but on those of the Mother Country. It is open to question whether the statesmen of that period, if they could have seen into the future, would have displayed so much generosity. They hoped that if the Colonies were left free they would voluntarily contribute to the defensive strength of the Empire. This is very clearly shown in Earl Grey's letters. After pointing out that the abandonment of the old preferential system had removed the necessity for such frequent interference in the internal affairs of the Colonies, he goes on to say :

'I think it will follow that when this country no longer attempts either to levy a commercial tribute from the Colonies by a system of restriction, nor to interfere needlessly in their internal affairs, it has a right to expect that they should take upon themselves a larger proportion than heretofore of the expenses incurred for their advantage.†

\* Grey, vol. i. p. 8.

† *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 18.

Experience so far has shown that the Colonies are unwilling to do this. Some of them are indeed prepared to spend money in building up certain local defensive forces, but, with the exception of Cape Colony and New Zealand, none of all the British Dominions across the sea has yet recognised any obligation to contribute to the cost of that great instrument of Imperial defence, the Royal Navy.

Their attitude in this matter will be considered more fully later on. For the moment it is only noticed in connexion with the question whether English statesmen of the 'forties and 'fifties would not have been wise to limit the taxing powers conferred upon the Colonies. It is beyond question that if we had insisted that the Colonies should impose no import duties on British goods, we should have secured a considerable advantage for the merchants and manufacturers of this country; for even if the Colonies, unable to tax British goods, had decided that they would not tax foreign goods, and would throw their ports open to the world, it would still have been an advantage to the home country to be certain of free entry into Colonial markets, because we should have obtained the opportunity of making many profitable exchanges which are now barred to us.

This advantage has always been recognised, and has in other cases been insisted upon. We went to war with China to compel that Empire to open her ports to our goods. In the same way, we have bound Turkey by treaties not to impose more than a limited duty upon British goods, and in the case of India we undoubtedly use our political control of that country to prevent the imposition of hostile duties on our manufactures. If these proceedings were and are justified, it would surely have been equally justifiable to limit the grant of self-government to our Colonies by the insertion of a provision that under no circumstances should British goods be taxed except at a limited rate for revenue purposes.

Had this been done, the Mother Country would have been secure of some commercial return from the Colonies, for whose defence she pays, and it would have been extremely difficult for any Colonial politician, however particularist his patriotism might be, to argue that the Colony lost by the bargain. Security against foreign invasion is the most valuable of all assets that a country can enjoy. Under the bargain here sketched out the Colonies would have obtained this security at the expense of the Mother Country, and all they would have sacrificed in return would have been the liberty to artificially encourage certain Colonial industries at the expense of their own consumers, as well as of home manufacturers. Their population



would have increased, their industries would have expanded at least as rapidly as under the artificial systems which they have built up at the bidding of interested individuals. The Mother Country would simultaneously have enjoyed a certain security for her export trade, which would have been a partial compensation for the expense in which she remained involved for the defence of the Colonies, and of the trade of the Empire.

Such an arrangement might, it is conceivable, have continued indefinitely with mutual satisfaction to both sides, for though the financial burden of empire would still have rested more heavily upon the taxpayers of the Mother Country than upon those of the Colonies, there would have been a further element of compensation which is often overlooked. Even if a Colony makes no direct contribution either to the commercial prosperity or to the military strength of the metropolis, it is still advantageous to a country whose population is expanding, to possess Colonies, because in them the surplus population of the Mother Country can find new homes without loss of its old allegiance. If England possessed no Colonies, her sons on leaving her shores would carry their brain and muscle and capital to other countries, which might be hostile to England.

We are fond of saying that blood is thicker than water, but there is no doubt that the Englishmen and Scotchmen who are settled in Canada are less likely to injure England than other Englishmen and Scotchmen who are settled in the United States. A war with the United States is at any rate conceivable, and if it were to occur, every man of British origin who has accepted United States citizenship would have to take sides against his former country. On the other hand, a war with Canada is impossible, unless on one side or the other there is a desire to break the existing partnership. Consequently that partnership is at any rate negatively valuable to us, even if the Canadians refuse to make it positively valuable either by contributing to the cost of defending the British Empire or by opening their ports to British commerce.

For these considerations, it is improbable that the impulse for the disunion of the Empire will ever come from the Mother Country unless one of two things happens: either that the Colonies refuse to accept British immigrants, or that their financial demands become so excessive as to produce a revolt on the part of the home taxpayer. The former danger is not quite so remote as some people may imagine. In Canada up to the present there has happily been little sign of any desire to exclude British subjects. On the contrary, Canadians feel that their great waste spaces need to be filled up as rapidly as possible, and

they are, as far as can be gathered, more anxious to fill them with British subjects than with men and women of any other allegiance. At the same time, it has unfortunately happened that a good many of the English folk sent out to Canada have not been of the highest type of efficiency, with the result that in some quarters there has arisen a prejudice against English immigrants.

There is some danger of that prejudice developing, for it must always be remembered that the Colony and the Mother Country necessarily look at the question of migration with different eyes. The metropolis wishes to get rid of its less efficient citizens: the Colony wishes to receive only those who are most efficient. Unless, then, there is some compromise, and the Colonies are willing to be content with our second best, colonisation can be no advantage whatever to the Mother Country. But as the Colonies develop and train up children of their own of the highest efficiency, they will no longer be content with our second best, and will strive by one method or another to close their doors against our emigrants.

Apart from this general possibility, there is a particular danger arising from the short economic views of Colonial working men. So far it is only in Australia that this danger has yet been experienced. There the situation is already serious. At the dictation of the Labour Party the Commonwealth Government has enacted laws gravely restricting the freedom of immigration, not only as regards coloured citizens of the Empire, but also as regards Britons born and bred.

The most striking instance of the application of this policy is the famous case of the six hatters, who were sent out from Lancashire to take up work in New South Wales, and were detained for a week before being allowed to land because they were under contract with their employers. Protests against the detention of these Englishmen were made by various sections of Colonial opinion, but, on the other hand, the comments of the Sydney 'Bulletin,' one of the most popular of Australian newspapers, proved that there was at any rate widespread sympathy with this policy of exclusion. The comment made by this paper was as follows:\*

'The right of Australia, in fact, has been once for all established definitely to keep out of this Continent English-born citizens, if, in her own interests, she so chooses. It is not here urged that the right so established should be exercised arbitrarily or offensively;

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\* Quoted from Sydney 'Bulletin' in 'British Australasian,' February 6, 1903.

It would not be advisable to at once set about the task of excluding the objectionable Englishman who comes out here with 100*l.*, his father's curse, and a rooted objection to labour, contract or otherwise. But what is important is the fact that Australia has proved her power to keep Australia for the Australians, and such immigrants as Australians choose to welcome, and has shown that an Englishman is not necessarily welcome because he is an Englishman. The six matters have made history.'

Since this date, all classes in Australia seem to have become more alive to the necessity of encouraging immigration, and there has been less desire to enforce restrictive legislation of this character. At the same time it is important to note that the spirit of what may best be called 'particularist nationalism' is very strong indeed in Australia, and is apparently growing.

On these grounds it is impossible to assume that either Australia or Canada will permanently be willing to be regarded as an outlet for the surplus population of Great Britain. As for South Africa, the opportunities for white immigration can never be very great, because the work of the country will more and more be done by the natives and coloured people. Thus, the present advantages which England enjoys by using certain Colonies as an outlet for her redundant population are likely to diminish very greatly in the future, and possibly to disappear altogether. If, in the interval, no new motive for maintaining the Imperial connexion is discovered, it is difficult to see how the Empire can continue to hold together.

This consideration may be regarded as the philosophic basis of Mr. Chamberlain's demand for a new system of Colonial preferences. Unfortunately, the advocates of this new preferentialism have failed altogether to grasp the essential fact that inter-Imperial preferences are only valuable to the Mother Country in so far as they strengthen her commercially, and partially recoup her for the expense she incurs in defending the Empire. As long as England maintained her dominance over her Colonies, she was able to insist, if she chose, on preferences of this character. That power no longer exists. The time has gone by for the establishment of any system of preferences which would be of value to the Mother Country. The Colonies have made it perfectly clear that they will only reserve for the manufacturers of the Mother Country such scraps of business as their own manufacturers are unable to deal with.

In particular instances a preference such as Canada now gives is undoubtedly beneficial to particular British manufacturers, because it enables them to compete on favourable terms in the

Canadian market with Germans and Americans. So far, however, as the Canadians develop their own manufactures, the advantage of the British preference necessarily disappears, and already Canadians have made it clear by amending the original Preference Act that they do not intend to permit English competition to hinder the expansion of any Colonial industry.

It is quite true that in spite of hostile Colonial tariffs the Colonies still buy per head more British manufactures than do foreign European countries. This, however, is but a poor consolation, first, because the heads are at present so few, and, secondly, because as the number of heads increases, so will the manufacturing efficiency of the Colonies also increase, thus making English competition more difficult. It is not sufficiently realised, though Adam Smith laid stress upon the point 130 years ago, that manufacturing efficiency very largely depends on the density of population. The Colonies at present are handicapped by the fact that their people are scattered over vast areas, whereas our people are concentrated into busy manufacturing districts. As the Colonial population increases, so will this relative advantage of the Mother Country decrease, with the result that in the future our commerce with Canada and Australia will not differ very greatly in character from our commerce with other highly developed countries such as Germany. We shall still trade with one another in spite of protective tariffs, but no one will be able to allege that the Colonial trade has any special advantage over the German or French trade. In a word, there is nothing that we can gain from the Colonies by making the reciprocal concessions proposed by the Tariff Reformers.

This was seen very clearly by Mr. Chamberlain himself in the early stages of his political campaign. Speaking at the Colonial Conference of 1902, he said :

‘ I think the very valuable experience, somewhat disappointing and discouraging as I have already pointed out, but the very valuable experience which we have derived from the history of the Canadian tariff, shows that while we may most readily and most gratefully accept from you any preference which you may be willing voluntarily to accord to us, we cannot bargain with you for it; we cannot pay for it unless you go much further, and enable us to enter your home market on terms of greater equality.’\*

Unfortunately, Mr. Chamberlain was led to depart from this sound proposition by two considerations. In the first place,

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\* Colonial Conference, 1902, Report, Cd. 1299, p. 8.

He was unwilling to accept the failure of his scheme which inevitably followed from the refusal of the Colonies to open their ports to British manufactures. He apparently argued to himself that, though it was impossible to induce the Colonies to make any sacrifice for the Imperial connexion, he might still succeed in maintaining that connexion by persuading the Mother Country to make even larger sacrifices than she already was making in order to retain the loyalty of her children.

The injustice of this suggestion would have been apparent but for the second consideration which forced itself upon Mr. Chamberlain's notice the moment he had launched his scheme. There had always been an under-current of Protectionist feeling in the Tory Party, and directly Mr. Chamberlain startled the world by advocating Imperial preferences the surviving Protectionists realised that their chance had come. They saw that by advocating preference for the Colonies they could secure protection for home industries. So important was this factor in the problem that in a very short time the Imperial aspect of Tariff Reform was relegated to a second place, and sheer Protectionism stepped into the front rank.

This change, while immensely strengthening the political power of the Tariff Reform movement, inevitably destroys its Imperial aspect. Already, indeed, Tariff Reformers have changed their programme. The original proposal made by Mr. Chamberlain was that duties should be levied on foreign produce, while Colonial produce should continue to come in free. The latter-day Tariff Reformer insists that the tariff must begin with a tax on Colonial produce, and that the only preference to be given to the Colonies is to consist in the imposition of a further duty upon foreign produce. In other words, England is to treat the Colonies as they treat her. She is to refuse to admit Colonial producers to her market on equal terms with home producers, but the theory of Imperialism is to be maintained on nominal preference on both sides against the foreigner. At the Colonial Conference have the representatives of the Colonies been consulted with regard to this new programme, and it may safely be prophesied that as soon as they are consulted they will reply that they prefer the open market which England now gives them to the partially closed market which is offered.

They would certainly be right in so deciding, for even if at the outset the barrier placed on Colonial imports into this country were a very slight one, it is certain that the concession of the principle that English producers might claim protection against Colonial producers would result in a progressive increase of anti-Colonial duties, unless the Protectionist party were altogether

defeated. Protection for home industries is in fact incompatible with the conception of strengthening the Empire by the encouragement of inter-Imperial trade. Thus by relying upon the Protectionists to assist him in his Imperial campaign Mr. Chamberlain cut away the whole economic and moral basis of his scheme.

Looked at from the Free Trade point of view, his programme will not bear examination. Already the Mother Country spends vast sums of money for the defence of Colonial shores and Colonial commerce, although her trade is handicapped by hostile Colonial duties. To ask her to go a step further and to handicap her export industries, as she must do by any system of import duties, is to ask more than Englishmen would permanently be prepared to give, even for the pride of empire. Under such conditions, England would obtain no advantage whatever from the possession of Colonies. They would furnish no certain market for her manufactures, no outlet for her surplus population. She would be entirely dependent upon her own strength. To diminish that strength by injuring her vital industries would be an act of supreme folly which could only be committed by a nation madly marching to its own ruin. Therefore, unless the Colonies abandon their protective policy, which is improbable, the continued maintenance of the Empire must become impossible except on a military basis.

Of the possibility of forming this basis, more will be said presently. Meanwhile, it is desirable to bring out certain financial facts not yet sufficiently appreciated by the bulk of English taxpayers, and almost universally ignored by Colonial politicians. The point which has to be emphasised is this—that England, in addition to providing for the defence of the whole Empire, has permitted herself to be dragged into numerous financial liabilities upon various pleas for Imperial expansion. She has subsidised steamship lines and submarine cables, she bolsters up Colonial industries, and she is constantly pressed by the advocates of Imperialism to embark on still larger schemes of the same character.

Among the projects of this character already completed, one of the most important, as illustrating the mental confusion which accompanies certain phases of Imperialism, is the Pacific Cable. The idea of this cable was first mooted at the Imperial Conference at Ottawa in 1894, and was endorsed at the Colonial Conference in London in 1897. Meanwhile the home Government had in 1896 appointed a committee to examine the feasibility of the project. The committee reported in 1899 in favour of the construction of a cable across the Pacific at the

joint expense of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in certain specified shares. The question of the route to be followed was necessarily examined by the committee, and they reported that :

‘ There would be a decided advantage in taking the cable *via* the Hawaiian Islands instead of *via* Fanning or Palmyra Island, as the section would in that case be shorter and therefore less costly for the same speed, or faster for the same cost, and some traffic would, if no line is laid from California, be obtained from Honolulu. But this route would involve a departure from the principle of using only British territory for landing stations, and as this principle has been formally endorsed by the Canadian and Australasian Governments at the Conferences at Ottawa and Sydney, the Committee consider that it should be adhered to, and that a departure from it would be a material change in the character of the scheme which was approved at those Conferences.’\*

Thus a less economical route was deliberately adopted in order to avoid touching foreign territory. No one in authority seems to have troubled to ask what was the precise disadvantage which would accrue to this country by utilising a foreign instead of a British island as an intermediate landing place for the cable. The public, hypnotised by a wave of Imperialism, assumed that an all-British cable must be infinitely superior to a mere commercial cable which took advantage of the geographical facts of the world. The general assumption was that if the cable avoided foreign territory it would be more easily defended in time of war. Few people ventured to challenge this assumption. It was, however, very ably challenged by Lieutenant Carlyon Bellairs in a paper read before the Royal United Service Institution in May 1900. In the course of this paper Lieutenant Bellairs pointed out that British enterprise by disregarding political frontiers had surrounded the world with a network of cables all controlled by British influences. He quoted in support of this statement the report of the French Budget Commission of 1896 to the following effect :

‘ An examination of these papers will show that a telegram despatched from any point of the globe cannot reach Europe excepting over the network of English cable ; that all the extra-European nations (and those of Europe also) pay tribute to England ; that the entire commerce of the world is taxed for her benefit—a tax which cannot be slight, as it suffices to remunerate her for the enormous capital of more than 32,000,000*l.* which represents the cost of this extensive system of cables.’

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\* Pacific Cable Committee Report. Cd. 9247, pp. 5, 6.

We need not pause to comment on the perverted view of commerce displayed in the last clause of this quotation. If a French merchant pays an English cable company for conveying a message to China, he is not paying a tax, he is buying a service which he cannot perform for himself, and which he would not buy unless he thought it was more valuable to him than the price paid for it. The fact that such a large capital has to be remunerated only demonstrates the magnitude of the service which English enterprise has rendered to mankind by girdling the earth with electric cables.

The point, however, with which we are here concerned is that the enterprise is English, and that a commercial and also a political advantage accrues to this country in consequence of its success. On the other hand, it is admitted that in the case of the Pacific Cable, commercial advantages were sacrificed for some supposed political gain. The only gain possible was increased security in time of war, and to the examination of this point the greater part of the paper above referred to was devoted. Lieutenant Bellairs showed that this supposed gain was an entire fiction. If the cable had been landed at Hawaii the United States would have been entitled, under international law, not only to prohibit the cutting of the cable within the territorial waters of that American possession, but also at any point in the whole length of the cable outside British territorial waters. Thus a Pacific Cable proceeding *via* Hawaii would have been vulnerable only for three miles at the Canadian end, and for three miles at the Australasian end, whereas a cable proceeding *via* Fanning Island is vulnerable throughout its whole length. This consideration covers the case of every war in which we might be engaged except a war with the United States; but in that case the Pacific Cable would be of little value to us, because the land lines across Canada running close to the American frontier would be liable to constant attack. In the course of the discussion which followed the reading of Lieutenant Bellairs' paper, Sir George Sydenham Clarke said:

' I think there is something unwholesomely fascinating about the term "strategic." You speak of a thing as "strategic" and people think there is nothing more to be said. You say you have a "strategic frontier," and nobody thinks of inquiring whether it is strategic or not. You speak of a "strategic" cable, and that seems to silence all objections. . . . The most important strategy to the British Empire is the strategy of commerce, and to that everything must yield. . . . To pass by Hawaii, as is proposed, and make a long and expensive connection with Fanning Island, would be not only an act of international discourtesy but a preposterous proceeding from the economical point of view.'



Sir John Colomb, as chairman, in summing up the discussion, urged that we should be very careful not to be 'carried away by phrases such as "All-British," "Imperial," and other terms which are very good in their way, but are not sufficient data on which to base a theory or practice for the defence of the Empire in war.'

These views are placed on record for the purpose of showing that in spite of the wave of Imperialism then passing over the country, there were some men capable of seeing clearly the weakness of the case for an 'All-British' cable. Their criticisms, however, were unheeded, and the 'All-British' route was adopted. It may perhaps be imagined that this route had the support of the Board of Admiralty. That is not the case. Some years after the completion of the cable, namely on August 27, 1907, the Secretary to the Board of Admiralty was specifically asked in the House of Commons 'whether the Admiralty at any time recommended on strategic grounds that the Pacific Cable should be landed at Fanning Island instead of Honolulu?' The reply was: 'The answer to the question is in the negative. No strategic value was attached to the landing of the cable either at Fanning or at Honolulu.' That answer finally disposes of the strategic fiction. It only remains to add that the phrase 'All-British' is itself deceptive, for half the messages intended for the Pacific Cable are sent across the Atlantic over the lines belonging to the Commercial Cable Company, which is an American company. \*

‡ The financial results of this scheme have been disastrous. The Pacific Cable Committee reported that the cable 'would become a paying concern during the fourth year of working.' † The expectations of the committee have not been justified by the results. A sum of 2,000,000*l.* was raised for the construction of the cable and entrusted to a Pacific Cable Board, which was required to pay back this capital sum by means of an annuity. The cable was opened for traffic in the financial year 1902-3. For some years the receipts did not cover the working expenses. The traffic has since improved and the working expenses are now covered, but there is still an annual deficit of almost the full amount of the annuity due for repayment of capital. In the year 1908-9 the estimated deficit is 69,566*l.*, of which five-eighths has to be paid by the United Kingdom, and the rest by Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

\* Answer to question in House of Commons, March 10, 1909.

† Pacific Cable Committee Report, Cd. 9247, p. 12.

In spite of this experience, a demand was put forward at the Colonial Conference of 1907 for the establishment of an All-British, or, to use the popular slang, an 'All-Red' steamship and railway route between the United Kingdom and Australasia. Several Cabinet Ministers expressed themselves in favour of this scheme, without apparently having taken the trouble to form even a preliminary estimate of what the cost was likely to be. The two Colonies which most desired the establishment of this route were New Zealand and Canada. The interest of Canada in the matter was obvious, for the route, if established, would have brought additional custom to Canadian railways. New Zealand apparently hoped to obtain a quicker service across the Pacific than she now enjoys *via* the Suez Canal. The Australians, on the other hand, were not much interested in the scheme, and have since declined to have anything to do with it, arguing that the Suez Canal route must be always shorter for them, and, in winter at any rate, much more comfortable. Little has been heard lately of this gigantic project, because as soon as it was examined from the commercial point of view, it was discovered that New Zealand could obtain no advantage over present services unless steamers of eighteen-knot capacity were placed upon the route, and the cost of running such steamers across the Pacific is prohibitive. At the same time the interest of the home Government in the matter has waned, partly because there is a little less talk about Imperialism, but more on account of the financial embarrassments in which recent legislation has involved the British Exchequer.

Although, however, this scheme may now be considered as dead, there is still in existence a form of All-Red route which is maintained at the cost of the taxpayer nominally for postal purposes. In the year 1889 a contract was made between the British Post Office and the Canadian Pacific Railway for the conveyance of mails from Liverpool to Hong-Kong. This contract would never have been entered into but for the suggestion put forward by the promoters of the scheme that it was desirable on naval and military considerations to establish an all-British route between England and Hong-Kong. Conditions were inserted in the contract providing that the company should carry troops and gun platforms if required. The Treasury, which has a useful habit of looking at all financial problems from a financial point of view, stated in a formal minute that the 'scheme is not justifiable upon postal reasons alone.' Yet the Post Office was charged with the bulk of the subsidy. The total subsidy paid to the Canadian Pacific Railway was 60,000*l.*, to which the Canadian Government contributed 15,000*l.*, the

British Admiralty 7312*l.*, the remainder of the subsidy being made up by the British Post Office.

The essence of the scheme was that a rapid through service should be established between England and the Far East, and when it was pointed out by the Treasury that there was no guarantee with regard to the Atlantic portion of the line, which was under the control of the Government of Canada, assurances were given by that Government that there should be an acceleration in the Atlantic service. Twelve years later the Treasury had to report that this acceleration had not been secured. In spite of this failure of the Canadian Government to give effect to its assurances the contract was renewed for another five years on the same terms, but it was not till just after the end of those five years—in 1906—that the fast Atlantic service, which had been stipulated for, began. Thus for seventeen years the Canadian Pacific Railway had been receiving a sum of 60,000*l.* a year on condition that a through fast service was established, and this condition had never been fulfilled.

The contract expired on April 11, 1906, and before the close of the financial year 1906-07 the Government applied to the House of Commons to authorise a renewal of the contract. Meanwhile the plea that this service was useful for military and naval purposes had been abandoned. The Admiralty refused any longer to pay any share of the subsidy, and the Treasury placed on record the fact that 'no recommendation in favour of this contract had been received from the War Office.' The Treasury minute went on to record that the use of this route for postal traffic has hitherto been comparatively small. That is not surprising in view of the fact that the service to Hong-Kong across Canada was only a monthly service, whereas there were no fewer than six services a month *via* the Suez Canal.

Under the renewed contract of 1906 the whole cost of the British contribution to the service, namely 45,000*l.*, was charged upon the Post Office, which had to make good the 7312*l.* previously paid by the Admiralty. The Postmaster-General, in defending his department for incurring this additional expenditure, explained that the contract had been improved because the contractors had now undertaken to bear the cost of conveyance of mails across the Atlantic, which had previously been borne by the Post Office. He admitted, however, that this cost was only about 650*l.* a year, so that he was paying 7312*l.* to save 650*l.*

Strong protest was made in the House of Commons against the renewal of the contract, and it was only renewed for two years. Since then a new contract has been made under which the

subsidy payable to the Canadian Pacific Railway by the Imperial Exchequer is reduced from 45,000*l.* to 20,000*l.* On the other hand, the Canadian Government increases its subsidy from 15,000*l.* to 25,000*l.*, the total subsidy being fixed at 45,000*l.* instead of 60,000*l.* as previously. At the same time the new contract provides that there shall be one service every three weeks during the summer season instead of one every four weeks each way. Thus, on the surface, it appears as if the British Government had made an improved bargain. When, however, the contract is further examined it is discovered that the time of transit allowed to the company has been greatly increased, namely from 708 hours to 818 hours if one route be taken, and from 732 hours to 853 hours if another route be taken. This large addition to the time of transit means of course a great economy for the company. At the same time it means that the Canadian Pacific route will be still less desirable for mail purposes. It is to be noted, too, that the company is empowered to call at an additional port in Japan, which may be taken to mean that the company wants to use this port for the purpose of ordinary goods traffic.

The intricacies of such a bargain are necessarily difficult to unravel except by an expert, but the general impression conveyed by the terms of the last contract is that the new subsidy, like the old one, is little more than a free gift from the taxpayers of Great Britain and of Canada to a commercial company to assist it in its ordinary commercial operations. It may be added that this last contract, which runs from April 7, 1908, to April 6, 1911, was rushed through the House of Commons at the end of the session of 1908 at a period of the night when it was practically impossible for anyone to discuss it. This is part of the price which the English public has to pay for the use of such question-begging epithets as 'All-Red' and 'All-British.'

Underlying this concession to the Canadian Pacific Railway Company is the assumption which constantly crops up in other instances, that it is the duty of the taxpayers of the Mother Country to contribute to commercial undertakings in the Colonies. A striking example of this practice is furnished by the treaty between England and France in 1904 for the settlement of many outstanding differences, including the difficulties arising in connexion with the Newfoundland fisheries. Under the Treaty of 1783 the French obtained certain rights over a portion of the Newfoundland coast, and it has for several generations been part of the policy of the Colony of Newfoundland to get rid of these French rights. The French Government was reluctant to abandon rights which its fishermen had so long enjoyed, and

which were secured to it by a solemn treaty. As a result, however, of continued agitation on the part of the Newfoundland colonists, the home Government pressed France to surrender these rights in return for territorial concessions elsewhere, and for a pecuniary compensation to the French fishermen who would lose their occupation. France agreed, and in return for the surrender of her Newfoundland rights, received valuable territorial concessions from us in West Africa. Thus the Empire as a whole had to pay in territory for an advantage conceded to one particular colony. The material value of this advantage was fully recognised by the Colonial Legislature. On April 27, 1904, the House of Assembly of Newfoundland passed the following resolution :

‘That this House is of opinion that the Convention entered into on the 8th of April, 1904, between His Majesty’s Government and the Republic of France in relation to the rights of French citizens on the Treaty Shore of Newfoundland is one which is, and will be, for the material advantage of the Colony.’\*

In view of this frank recognition of the advantages which the Colony was going to reap from the diplomacy and the sacrifices of the Mother Country, it might have been imagined that the Colonial Government would offer to pay the sum needed to compensate the French fishermen for their private losses. No such offer was made, and the taxpayers of the United Kingdom were called upon to provide a sum of 54,683*l.* in order to secure a commercial advantage for the inhabitants of Newfoundland. The lack of equity in such an arrangement can best be seen by assuming a similar difficulty on the coast of Ireland, and by asking how much any of our Colonies would have been willing to pay for the benefit of Irish fishermen.

A similar example of the manner in which the Colonies call upon the Mother Country to provide at her expense for their interests is furnished by the fact that the Canadian seal fisheries in the Pacific are patrolled by the Royal Navy. A special vessel, H.M.S. ‘Shearwater,’ is set aside for this duty, and the cost of her maintenance each season is about 2650*l.* No portion of this charge is refunded by the Canadian Government.†

Of all our Colonies, probably none have been so much favoured at the expense of the Mother Country as the West Indies. This is not so much due to any peculiarities in their geographical situation or in their strategic value, as to the fact that the commercial development of the West Indies has been largely

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\* Answer to question in the House of Commons, June 3, 1904.

† Answer to question in the House of Commons, May 5, 1908.

controlled by capitalists who live in this country, and who consequently are able to bring constant pressure to bear on the home Government. The private interests of these persons have been made to appear identical with the public interests of the Empire. This is a danger which always arises the moment that governments and parliaments begin to base their policy and their expenditure upon vague phrases instead of upon definite principles.

At different periods free grants have been made to various West Indian islands to meet emergencies such as hurricanes and earthquakes; and in addition huge sums have been lent to the Colonial Governments or to individual proprietors in the Colonies, and a large proportion of these loans has never been repaid. To Jamaica alone during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a sum of 747,000*l.* was granted on loan, much of which has not been repaid.\* In 1824 provision was made for charging upon the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom various sums for the maintenance of ecclesiastical establishments in the West Indies. Between that year and 1907 the aggregate sum paid on this account amounted to 1,126,960*l.*† In later years grants have been made to the West Indies to assist the sugar industry, the banana industry, and for the maintenance of steamship communication between the different islands. An agricultural department has also been established in the West Indies at the expense of the home taxpayer. With regard to the banana subsidy to the West Indies, an interesting protest was made at the annual meeting of the National Federation of Fruit and Potato Trades Associations at Leeds on March 31, 1908. One of the members of the Association complained that this subsidy adversely affected the English fruit trade. He said that when there was a big crop of strawberries or other home-grown fruit, the gigantic supplies of bananas did a great deal to spoil the market.

It is needless to give other examples of the manner in which the Mother Country is constantly being asked to provide cash for the commercial benefit of her Colonial subjects. In addition, she has to bear practically the whole cost of the naval defence of the Empire, and also in some cases the cost of military garrisons. In South Africa the garrison maintained at the expense of the Mother Country is estimated to cost in the current financial year 1,655,000*l.* No military contribution is paid by the South African Colonies. The garrison in Mauritius is main-

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\* Answer to question in the House of Commons, March 11, 1907.

† Answer to question in the House of Commons, May 5, 1908.

tained at an estimated cost for the current year of 171,000*l.*, towards which the Colony will contribute 22,000*l.*

Without further multiplying illustrations, let us now briefly consider whether it is possible to make any arrangements with the Colonies which will relieve the Mother Country of these incessant demands, and will strengthen the general defensive power of the Empire. As far as can be seen, it is out of the question to expect the self-governing Colonies to make any large financial contribution towards the upkeep either of the army or of the navy. New Zealand, it is true, has now agreed to pay 100,000*l.* a year towards the general expenditure of the Royal Navy, without attaching any conditions to that grant. The South African Colonies devote 50,000*l.* to the same service. Apart from these small grants, and from the grant of 100,000*l.* from India which cannot be regarded as altogether voluntary, the general cost of the navy is wholly borne by the taxpayers of the United Kingdom. Yet it is apparent to Colonial statesmen as well as to Englishmen that no local defences which the Colonies might create can be effective apart from the general defence which the supremacy of the British Navy provides. If the British Navy ceased to be available for the defence of Australia, there is nothing to prevent that island continent from being overrun, at any rate as far as regards the north and west, by Chinamen or Japanese. No naval force that Australia can build up with her own resources could ever be equal to the navy which Japan maintains, and if the Japanese chose to enter into alliance with the Chinese the fate of Australia would be sealed. Mr. H. F. Wyatt, who has devoted much energy to trying to arouse in the Colonies an appreciation of the importance of naval defence, describes in graphic language his own impressions after a journey from China to Australia :

‘ It is a transition from cities thronged and swarming with human beings, from narrow streets, crowded and seething, as at Canton, with multitudinous life, to coasts but a few days removed where human life is hardly found. Behind you myriads, and before you wastes. On one side four hundred millions of yellow people ; on the other, four millions of white.’

With regard to Canada the position is somewhat different, for the United States would be reluctant to allow any foreign Power to invade Canadian territory, and, consequently, if British protection were withdrawn, the American navy would probably still serve to defend Canada from invasion. In a word, Canada is defended by two navies, and pays for neither. It may be asked, Why should she pay ? For Canada to ask that question

is hardly dignified, but some Canadians evidently argue to themselves that their most serious risk is the risk of war with the United States, and in such a war it would be military not naval strength which they would need. The answer is that if such a war were to break out Canada would, under present conditions, look to England for help, and that help would be forthcoming. The Mother Country could send to Canada's defence an army of 150,000 men, and in addition could inflict some damage upon American commerce. Suppose, on the other hand, that England were attacked by a superior naval combination, Canada could do nothing to help her. Doubtless Canada would be willing to send troops, as she sent them to assist the Mother Country in the South African War, but the troops could not be sent unless the command of the sea had first been secured, and consequently if England's naval strength were unequal to that of her opponents, Canada, however great her willingness to help might be, would have to look on impotently while the enemy was striking at the heart of the Empire.

From a purely economic and from a purely strategic point of view undoubtedly the best aid the Colonies can give to the Empire is to contribute largely to the cost of maintaining one Imperial Navy. That ideal, however, cannot be attained. The principal Colonies have already made it clear that they will not contribute to a Navy which they do not control. The only important exception is New Zealand. This sea-girt State appreciates more fully than any of the more continental possessions of the British Crown the value of sea-power. During the recent naval scare New Zealand spontaneously offered to present one, or, if necessary, two, 'Dreadnoughts' as a free gift to the Royal Navy. The other Colonies have shown no inclination to depart from their previous attitude. The Australian Government has formally declared its preference for an Australian navy, and the Canadian Premier has in the same spirit declared that Canada must provide a navy of her own for her local needs. In defence of Australia and Canada, it must be admitted that few Englishmen would care to contribute largely to a navy over which they had no control. On the other hand, to give the Colonies a proportionate control of the Royal Navy would involve the creation of something in the nature of a federal government, and they are opposed to any steps in that direction because they realise that Imperial Federalism means a diminution of national independence. There is much to be said for their attitude. It is more than doubtful whether any form of federal government could ever be established which would work well over so wide an area as that comprised within the British Empire. It is equally doubtful



whether it is desirable to attempt to centralise the government of such an enormous population having such widely different local interests. The loss of individual spontaneity would probably far more than destroy any gain in collective strength which resulted from such centralisation.

This, then, is not the direction in which we must look for the strengthening of the British Empire. The model we should rather take is that accidentally furnished by the recent treaty between England and Japan for mutual aid in time of war. That treaty being negotiated with a foreign Power was necessarily of limited duration, and for limited purposes. Such limitations would not be needed in a corresponding understanding with the Colonies. The understanding would be that each self-governing portion of the Empire would maintain sufficient naval and military force for its own most urgent local needs, and that in addition it would maintain a margin of force, either naval or military, with which to assist other portions of the Empire in their time of need. On this basis each self-governing unit would secure its own independence, while the whole Empire would gain by the collective strength rendered available for collective needs.

ART. VII.—FRENCH LITERATURE  
FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE 'CLASSIC AGE.'

1. *The Essayes of Michael, Lord of Montaigne.* Done into English by JOHN FLORIO, with introduction by THOMAS SECCOMBE. London: Grant Richards. 1908-1909.
2. *Essais de Montaigne.* Publiés d'après l'exemplaire de Bordeaux par F. STROWSKI. Vol. I.: Sous les auspices de la Commission des Archives Municipales. Bordeaux: F. Peche et Cie. 1906.
3. *Les Sources et L'Évolution des Essais de Montaigne.* Par PIERRE VILLEY. Paris: Hachette. 1908.
4. *Montaigne.* Par F. STROWSKI. Félix Alcan. 1906.
5. *Pascal et ses Temps.* Par F. STROWSKI. Deuxième édition. Plon-Nourrit et Cie. 1907-1908.
6. *From Montaigne to Molière.* By ARTHUR TILLEY. London: John Murray. 1908.
7. *Racine.* Par JULES LEMAITRE. Calmann-Lévy. 1908.

THE strange judgements which the critics of one nation pass upon the poets of another bring home, more saliently than any patriotic quarrels, the mysterious barriers between race and race. This is pre-eminently true of the criticisms which have been passed in France and in England upon the poets, so expressive each of national genius, Racine and Shakespeare. We smile at Voltaire's complaint of the 'monstrous irregularities' of Shakespeare and, secure in our self-esteem, regard the judgement passed by Marmontel upon the English as a race admirable in practical capacity, but totally lacking in artistic sense, as mere foreign eccentricity of criticism. But we are ourselves equally blind, and deserve to evoke as superior a smile from our neighbours, when we interpret Racine's care for order and regularity of plot as thin formalism, and the restrained, concentrated passion of his verse as cold correctness; when, noting his accepted limitations, we fail to perceive the delicacy, variety and depth of observation within that restricted range.

At all times the British mind has proved singularly impervious to the beauties of Racine. Neither in the contemporary period of the Restoration when, with the return of Charles II., French influence and taste penetrated the English world of fashion, nor later in the English 'Augustan' age, although the authority of his constant friend and supporter, Boileau, was

paramount in England as in France, did the dramatist win due favour from critics or any place at all with the general public. He was barely paid even the compliment of imitation so freely accorded to Molière and Corneille, and indeed, in Restoration drama, to many a French dramatist now ignored on either side the Channel. A solitary instance of unacknowledged borrowing comes to mind, that of the 'Comtesse de Pimbesche' from 'Les Plaideurs,' adapted, in company with Molière's 'Misanthrope,' as the 'she Pettifogger,' Widow Blackacre, in Wycherley's 'Plain Dealer.' In the matter of translations, Johnny Crowne condescended 'to turn a ragged Frenchman's coat' when 'Andromaque' was still a novelty, but could not make the play go down in England—and his inability does not surprise us when we read his version. There were captious Frenchified critics at the time who laid the blame at his door, but he could not see what they had to complain of, for he gave them 'all the play 'and something more,' only in prose instead of rhyme. For the rest he had but revised the translation which was that of a young gentleman dabbling in literature. Philips had somewhat better luck early in the next century with his 'Distressed Mother,' and stirred the sympathies of 'Sir Roger de Coverley' at least by his version of a play that had moved all Paris to tears. But neither that nor other rare attempts to set Racine upon the English stage—neither the performance of 'Iphigénie,' which ran foul of a rival 'Iphigeneia' so that, as Dryden put it, 'both clashed together like two rotten ships that could not endure the shock,' nor 'Esther,' recommended to be played by 'the maids of our Queen's retinue,' as by all 'cheerfully virtuous families,' had any effect in popularising him. Nor indeed is this surprising, even apart from the intrinsic poverty of the translations, for Racine, writ in music and set to the emotional key of another language, is untranslatable.

Here, no doubt, in the difficulties of language, lies a main ground of our unintelligent depreciation of the French 'diamond of classic literature.'\* For the appeal is beyond the meaning to the sound, to the subtle music of the spoken word. Language with Racine has a direct emotional value, independent of its power to represent and call up ideas and images, in which symbolic character alone it is translatable. Not in the least, let us hasten to add—for it is sometimes said and is not true—that his language is colourless and lacking in images; it is, on the contrary, highly pictorial. But this symbolic property is only one element, and not the most essential, of its power. The magic works, not

\* Lemaître, 'Racine,' p. 310.

through ideas and imagery alone, but through the sharps and flats, the resonances and the intervals, of the human voice. In no other poet probably is the alliance between sound and sense so close, and certainly in no other dramatic writer. In Shakespeare ideas and imagery rather than sound, however great at times the sheer beauty of his lines, are the medium to convey emotion, and though he no doubt suffers even in the boasted translation of Schlegel, much of his spirit and the content of his plays can be transferred to another tongue—enough indeed, as we all know, to make the Germans more ardent worshippers at his shrine than we ourselves. Racine stands alone among dramatists for intimacy of union between sound and sense. The apparent accessibility of the meaning, the clear-cut exactitude of words and direct sequence of speech, is a snare and stumbling-block to English readers of the original—do we not give Racine as *corpus vile* to school children? For if the eye apprehends without conveying to the inner ear, an organ not as a rule highly developed among us, nine-tenths of the emotional content is lost. One need recall only the famous :

‘ Ariane, ma sœur, de quel amour blessée,  
Vous mourûtes aux bords où vous fûtes laissée,’

where the thought is borrowed simply from the Greek, but given new life in the pitying anguish of the voice; or the lines of Bérénice :

‘ Pour jamais ! Ah ! Seigneur, songez-vous en vous-même  
Combien ce mot cruel est affreux quand on aime.  
Dans un mois, dans un an, comment souffrirons-nous,  
Seigneur, que tant de mers me séparent de vous ?  
Que le jour recommence, et que le jour finisse,  
Sans que jamais Titus puisse voir Bérénice,  
Sans que de tout le jour je puisse voir Titus ? ’

where repetition of the words, with change in order, rings a like forlorn change with Tennyson’s ‘ He cometh not . . . . He ‘ will not come, she said.’

To this difficulty of language is added, of course, that of divergent dramatic ideal, which alone proved enough to keep Shakespeare despised in France for centuries. And yet again the supreme quality in Racine is, if we accept the view of M. Lemaître, one which we can have no hope of ever apprehending duly. M. Lemaître declares himself—

‘ tenté à croire qu’il y a une partie de Racine à jamais inaccessible aux étrangers et qui sait ? peut-être à tous ceux qui sont trop du

Midi comme à ceux qui sont trop du Nord. C'est un mystère. C'est ce par quoi Racine exprime ce que nous appellerons le génie de notre race : ordre, raison, sentiment mesuré et force sous la grâce. Les tragédies de Racine supposent une très-vieille patrie. Dans cette poésie, à la fois si ordonnée et si émouvante, c'est nous-mêmes que nous aimons ; c'est—comme chez La Fontaine et Molière, mais dans un exemplaire plus noble—notre sensibilité et notre esprit à leur moment le plus heureux' (p. 323).

Yet the thing is not impossible. In the matter of language, once recognising the need, we may attune our ears even to a foreign gamut or, more probable contingency perhaps, a second Rachel may reveal Racine to us, as Rachel did after all not to England alone in her brief visit, but to a France grown deaf, denying the 'force beneath the grace.' Since France can now overlook irregularity and breach of every rule, to see poetry and dramatic force in Shakespeare, we may hope to penetrate in time to the intensity of passion veiled in Racine by restraint and harmony. As for the final mystery of a people's genius, we may even here take courage, remembering that, if the distinctive quality imply an ancient race, it is itself of comparatively recent growth, blossoming indeed only in the age of Racine himself. What if it be no stamp of a distinct species but only the product of external circumstance, working upon a race not so very different, fundamentally, from ours ?

We look back barely a century, from the Classic Age to the close of the Renaissance in France, and, in place of Racine, Montaigne stands as representative of the French genius. Here in the matter of English sympathies we have a very different tale. The essayist was accommodated promptly with an English dress, comely if not absolutely close-fitting, sufficiently exact at least to preserve the general air. Florio's translation, of which we welcome to-day the latest reprint, was first published (1603) within a few years of the appearance of the 'Essais' in their fullest and final French form, in time to be food still for the mind of Shakespeare.

† There seems no serious ground to suppose, with M. Strowski, that Shakespeare 'read the "Essais," pencil in hand,' and 'saw in them a man, men ; all classic antiquity revealed 'in the picturesque detail, in the precise fact ; that in 'the "Essais" all antiquity appeared to him in distinct 'figures' ; or that for Shakespeare, Montaigne was 'le grand 'metteur en scène, non de drames, mais d'individus.\*' For

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\* Strowski, 'Montaigne,' p. 331.

the figures of antiquity he had no need to look beyond Amyot's 'Plutarch,' translated still earlier by North, a source from which he drew direct. But to the dramatist so given, as M. Strowski perhaps forgets, to exceed his strict dramatic function and muse or moralise, even as the essayist, upon the shifting scene of life, Montaigne may well have afforded other sustenance. Actual evidence of debt is confined, we believe, to parallel passages upon 'cannibals.'

Bacon knew and appreciated the 'Essais' before they passed into English. We question again here M. Strowski's assurance that what Bacon saw in the essayist was 'un fondateur de la 'philosophie positive.' But this is a thesis maintained also by M. Villey, and pending a still more exhaustive discussion promised in a parallel from his pen between 'Montaigne et Bacon,' the question may well rest in suspense. Presumably at least a point, or condition, of sympathy was Montaigne's 'positive' practical wisdom, his constant reference of matters to mere human judgement, with decrees of faith relegated to a distinctive sphere where they would neither meddle nor suffer injury. But reliance on reason, on observation of facts and human judgement, was not so rare in England during Elizabeth's reign as in itself to impress the seeker after a method which should embrace and unify all knowledge. If Montaigne gave a lead at all to Bacon, it was, we should suppose, pending always the further promised parallel, in setting graphically forth the problem Bacon faced. Montaigne exercised his reason constantly, as constantly to show the inadequacy of reason. No certainty under the sun; no consistency in human action; arguments on both sides of every question; something to be said for each party; diversity the one constant quality; this is his reading of the whole matter. And there he is content to rest; spectator simply, able to enjoy the spectacle though one of sheer disorder; preserving the zest of life, although he cannot say upon what logical basis. Bacon for his part was fully conscious that 'in 'this theatre of man's life. it is given only to God and to the 'angels to be lookers on,' and when he too treats of diversity it is to conclude that 'it is not good to look too long upon these 'turning wheels of Vicissitude, lest we become giddy.' While Montaigne delighted still to pile contrary on contrary, Bacon turned from contemplation of the colours of good and evil to his task of drawing nature out in likeness.

But if Bacon, first to borrow a title and to quote pithy sayings from the essayist, resembles him little in detachment of spirit, Montaigne has other genuine English offspring. The 'irregular 'head' of Sir Thomas Browne, loving, it is true, more than the

Frenchman's, to 'lose itself in an O Altitudo,' is yet one with it in detached view of life, all tolerance combined with zest. On a minor point too, though deep-rooted, their romantic force of friendship, there is likeness between the essayist and the author of 'Religio Medici,' and again in the more essential love of self-portraiture. Sterne's debts and his correspondence in humour to Montaigne scarce need recalling, nor how, desiring, like the Essayist, to die in an inn, he yet would not have it 'that inn' at Abbeville, but ordered the post-chaise to be round by four in the morning. Our prince of essayists, Charles Lamb, is too native-born to owe a debt to Montaigne, and his spirit, 'all 'over sophistication,' has subtleties besides, delicate veilings of emotion beneath paradox, quite foreign to the earlier writer. But the fundamental affinity is there: the same detached attitude towards life, as of a spectator merely; the same interest in human nature, its vagaries and its whims; like hatred of pedantry and of 'the solemn ass.' The 'essay' indeed, with the detached, discursive humour it befits, would seem acclimatised in England as not at all in France. Beyond these, and many another individual affinity that could be adduced, the general popularity of Montaigne with the English cultivated public is attested by the numerous editions of Florio's translation in the seventeenth century, and of his successor Cotton's later. It was in Cotton our grandfathers read him; we have returned to the fuller-blooded Florio, and the present reprint follows upon many another in the course of the last dozen years.

This singular contrast in English appreciation of the two great representatives of French literature at the close of the sixteenth and the latter end of the seventeenth century may be attributed in some measure no doubt to individual causes. Montaigne is a prose writer, Racine a poet; it is always harder to enter into the mind of a foreign poet than of a prose writer. Then that question of language. Montaigne, though difficult to translate, is not untranslatable. He is in his own way a stylist, matches expression carefully to thought; so much so that any change in the expression must impair the thought:

'Lorsqu'il pétrit la matière encore molle de sa phrase, il fait un travail d'analyste autant que d'artiste; c'est son idée qu'il réalise, qu'il dessine, qu'il rend vibrante et vivante. . . Vous ne pouvez pas chez Montaigne modifier l'expression sans toucher à l'idée; et à mesure que l'expression gagne en beauté à travers les diverses variantes, l'idée gagne d'autant en exactitude et en profondeur. C'est donc que l'art est en Montaigne gouverné par la pensée, a la pensée pour support, que la pensée est l'exécutive.' \*

\* Strowski, 'Montaigne,' p. 14.

But his language, so scrupulous a handmaid to his thought, is, for that very reason, translatable. It works by ideas and images, not by sound, and, though a changed expression may change the thought, the thought may be conveyed as well by the corresponding expression in another tongue. Only it requires an equal master of exactitude and imagery to do it, and it must be owned that neither Florio nor Cotton has invariably hit the mark. Not only do they misrender special passages, but to some extent they alter, Florio by over-fulness of colour, Cotton by undue pallor, the general tone of the 'Essais.' Still, there is enough likeness to prove identity and there is, in Florio especially, full preservation of life. Direct acquaintance with the original too is comparatively easy, for though the language is both foreign and antiquated, the main requirement is merely more knowledge, not nicety of ear. Moreover, there are curious affinities between that older French and English, so that it has been even thought easier of understanding by English than by modern French readers, as though, even in language, the true differentiation of the races came only later.

Greater accessibility of language and any personal grounds of popularity are, however, but secondary causes. Montaigne stood at the parting of the national ways in literature. From his time onwards began that differentiation of the French genius which appears to the eminent critic we have quoted to have set the seal of an almost occult quality upon his people, and to be a barrier against foreign understanding. It may be that the true essence of French character and intellect began now first to realise itself, and that even under like circumstances no other people would have developed on like lines; it may be, too, that we can never hope to penetrate the final secret; but at least we may come nearer to understanding it and may gain a more just appreciation of its value if we realise the productive causes, for such causes there unquestionably were. Study of Montaigne himself reveals them.

'Here, reader, is a book honestly purposed (un livre de bonne foy). It warns you on the threshold that I have proposed myself no other end than domestic and private: I have had in it no thought for thy service nor for my glory. . . . I have dedicated it to the particular commodity of my relatives and friends that, when they have lost me, they shall recover in it some traits of my conditions and humours. . . . I desire to be seen in it in my simple, natural and everyday manner, without study and without artifice: for it is I that I paint.'



Thus Montaigne. And so it is that we in England have for the most part read the essays, neither finding in them ulterior hidden purpose nor concerning ourselves overmuch about their influence, whether upon individuals or upon the current of the world's thought, or about their significance. We take him piecemeal, as he wrote his book, enjoy his tales, his sayings, the wise thoughts, his or the ancients', that fill his pages, and we ask neither from what sources come his thoughts and instances, nor whither do they tend. Such readers of the essays as of a book 'merely pleasant'—thus it was Montaigne himself read Rabelais—have, it may be presumed, the better part. Divine philosophy, which so eludes the scholar and ardent student, may settle gently if unperceived upon their heads, and insinuate into their spirit something of that happy stoicism, that valiant epicureanism, distinguishing the essayist. A stoicism that is not indifferent to the joys of life, an epicureanism that does not cling to them—only with like correctives and modifications can any 'isms' be ascribed to him. Insensibly they may imbibe, too, his liberty of spirit, unduly defined as 'scepticism,' but never so well described—we give the opinion of M. Strowski—as under that name, in English but by an American, Emerson :

'Let us have a robust, manly life, let us know what we know for certain. What we have, let it be solid and seasonable, and our own. . . . Let us have to do with real men and women, and not with skipping ghosts.'

'This is the right ground of the sceptic, this of considering, of self-containing ; not at all of unbelief, not at all of universal denying ; nor of universal doubting, doubting even that he doubts ; least of all, of scoffing, and profligate jeering at all that is stable and good. . . . The philosophy we want is one of fluxions and mobility. . . . The wise sceptic wishes to have a near view of the best game, and the chief players, what is best in the planet, art, and nature, places and events, but mainly men. . . . The terms of admission to this spectacle, are, that he have a certain solid and intelligible way of living of his own, some method of answering the inevitable needs of human nature, proof that he has evinced the temper, stoutness, and the range of qualities which, among his contemporaries and countrymen, entitle him to fellowship and trust. . . . Some wise limitation, as the modern phrase is ; some condition between the extremes, and having itself a positive quality ; some stark and sufficient man, who is not salt or sugar, and, at the same time, a vigorous and original thinker, whom cities cannot overawe, but who uses them, is the fit person to occupy this ground of speculation. These qualities meet in the character of Montaigne.' \*

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\* 'Representative Men,' *cit.* Strowski, pp. 341-2.

In general, it must be confessed, English critics have not seen Montaigne's detachment of spirit in so favourable a light. Though all agreed to love him, we must needs do it under protest, as it were, and condescendingly. Taking his confidences 'de bonne foy' indeed, as he gave them, we incline to select among them the least flattering to his character. Again, we construe with insistent harshness a single piece of outside evidence that the essayist paid heed to his personal safety. Mr. Seecombe recalls it in his introductory notice to the new 'Florio.' The simple fact was that Montaigne, at the expiration of his term of office as Mayor of Bordeaux, had returned to quiet country life at his château, and since the plague was ravaging the town, thought fit to decline an invitation to attend a meeting of the town councillors within it, 'seeing that his presence could import nothing to their 'deliberations.' His office had expired, the meeting was one of ceremony; but, ask the censors, would not a man of character have flown to the post of danger? Though he gives us again all the grounds for thinking poorly of the essayist, among others the undeniable fact that he was not Shakespeare—in which case, however, it is well, perhaps, to remember, he would not have been Montaigne—Mr. Seecombe yet wields with great skill the *distinguo*, so requisite to the subject, and reminds us of his merits besides. 'Whenever,' he observes, 'we hear Montaigne spoken of as an infidel and a fainéant, we must bear in mind the constant faith that he maintained in four last things, such as God, Fraternity, Heroism, and Human Life.'

M. Strowski for his part finds very sterling things as basis to the 'freedom' which he holds the only adequate term to apply to Montaigne. The word 'sceptic' is inadequate, 'mais il nous mène à la vraie formule, *Montaigne ou l'Homme libre*.' And the conditions of liberty he finds in a vigorous will, a religious soul, a keen spirit detached from its content, and finally a humane and tender heart; and all these he finds in Montaigne.\* 'The stoic,' indeed, rather than 'l'homme libre,' would seem the just epithet for Montaigne in M. Strowski's presentment. It is the vein of stoicism, in his thought and mental attitude at one time, and to the end in his moral bearing, that M. Strowski finds most characteristic of the man. In his book on Montaigne, he traces it from its growth in the early essays when their writer was all dipped in the philosophy of Seneca and of Plutarch, and fortified himself, thinks M. Strowski, quite in the manner of his contemporary Du Vair, with their largehearted utterances, against encompassing civil misery; through the *crise sceptique* indicated

\* Strowski. 'Montaigne,' pp. 342-45.

by the famous 'Apologie de Rémond Sebond'; to its external overlaying by the 'dilettante' epicureanism of old age. Even in that last estate, the impression Montaigne left upon his country neighbour, Florimond de Rémond, who was magistrate at Bordeaux as Montaigne had been, was, M. Strowski reminds us, stoic enough in character. In his singular work, 'Erreur populaire de la papesse Jane' (1594), after moralising upon death and vicissitudes, de Rémond reports: 'Il souloit accointer la mort d'un visage ordinaire, s'en apprivoiser et s'enjouer, philosophant entre les extrémités de la douleur, jusqu'à la mort, voir en la mort même.'

There enters into this presentiment by M. Strowski an element we are too little accustomed to find in estimates of Montaigne—the consideration, namely, of development and growth. M. Strowski, who is engaged upon the fine edition of the 'Essais,' now in process of publication at Bordeaux, where, for the first time, the successive stages of the essays are to be adequately indicated under one cover, brings to the study of the essayist an analytic apparatus that marks a fresh line of Montaigne criticism. Even though it is disconcerting to our preconceived ideas of Montaigne to think of him as deliberately setting himself to school with the Stoics, we might perhaps bow to the authority of superior knowledge. But now comes another critic, equally, perhaps even more elaborately, equipped, who takes a different view. M. Villey, simultaneously with M. Strowski, though independently of him, practises a like method, and, by an exhaustive study of allusions in the essays and, above all, of sources from which the essayist drew, has gone as far as can be conceived possible in laying bare, even within the successive editions, the chronology of the essays, grouping them in accordance with the conditions to which the writer was subject.

He again traces the 'Essais' from their earliest form, before they as yet deserved, or probably had received, the name; mere jottings from Montaigne's reading, curious instances juxtaposed under a descriptive or inclusive heading, with moral reflections interspersed; discourses differing in no essential from the work of obscure contemporaries. But soon they took on individuality, in the preference first—due, M. Villey suggests, to the essayist's poor memory—for moral reflexions over strange instances, and shortly, with the 'Essay on Friendship,' in the distinguishing 'personal' note. Even the 'Essay on Friendship,' famous monument to the unparalleled union with La Boétie, M. Villey thinks still largely *livresque*, a collection in the main of ancient instances to make a discourse, the warm rush of memory and feeling only accidentally, as it were, breaking in to animate

the whole with the touch which was at length to make the 'Essais' Montaigne's self-portraiture. Many, no doubt, will fancy that essay inspired, from choice of subject through all the cited cases, by the thought of La Boétie, and here at least the difference of opinion is one only of degree. M. Villey does not question the genuineness and depth of Montaigne's feeling for La Boétie. But as regards his stoicism it is another matter. This, which M. Strowski regards as giving the key to Montaigne, wears in the eyes of M. Villey an aspect of 'bookishness' pure and simple. The stoic sentiments, so marked in the earlier essays especially, are, he thinks, retailed from ancient authors, in all good faith, no doubt, but without ever becoming true flesh and blood of the borrower, delivered even, oh, shade of the essayist! with some purpose, or attitude, of 'preaching.' For his part, as already observed, M. Villey sees Montaigne a forerunner of Bacon, finds method in his medley, and the key to the 'Essais' in his 'rationalism.' By rationalism, it is unnecessary perhaps to observe to any reader of Montaigne, M. Villey does not mean a system of philosophy, nor yet confidence in the power of reason to solve the problems of the universe, but only the undeviating and constant exercise of the reasoning faculty, with reference of all matters to its sway, without bias whether from faith or from prejudice, and, more definitely besides, the deliberate application of reason to the conduct of life.

Not on this new road, then, lies unanimity; the close researches of MM. Villey and Strowski go but to swell the bulk of contributions to the unwritten essay, 'Of the Diversity of Human Judgements upon Montaigne.' Their interest remains great to every true lover of the essayist, who delights to surprise him in any fresh intimacy, even though the view be hazy. But the aspect of evolution and growth is, it must be admitted, not one recognised by Montaigne himself. The writing of the essays extended from first to last over some twenty years; they gathered in the fruit, not of varied reading only but of many a changing mood, of experiences ranging from health to sickness and stirring diversely the philosophic mind. The writer added constantly, but obliterated scarcely at all, and in final preparation for press took heed only to define his meaning by greater vigour and exactitude of word and phrase, never to bring diverging thought into line, or to distinguish new from old. The text of 1595, in which the 'Essais' have played their chief rôle in the world, though published only after his death, was edited with pious care by his disciple, Pierre de Brache, and his adopted daughter, Mlle. de Gournay, and is beyond question such in the main as it would have been had Montaigne lived to

correct the proofs. And there we have the complete view of him, exemplifying in his own person the incalculability of human judgement, the strange contradictions in human character, and making them, by that very lack of perspective in his view, only the more marked.

'Diversity,' most discouraging of conclusions to those who would gladly label and dismiss the matter or the man, seems indeed the last word with which the essayist intentionally left us. In his own character diversity, as witness the vain endeavours to find his dominant feature; incalculability and diversity in universal human nature, of which he serves as specimen; diversity above all, and conflict, in the whole spectacle of life and thought which, as disengaged spectator, he impartially reflects.

Self-portraiture is but one part or one aspect of the essays; they are, besides, the mirror of the times in which the writer moved, and, as his person stands for human nature, so his times stand for human life and thought. Yet it is the individual Montaigne for whose acquaintance we are eager, and in the history of thought and literature it is as a mirror of the actual times that the essays have their distinctive value, and so that they played their most effective part.

Montaigne could have taken no better means, had he wished it, to play a part in life that should echo down the ages than his retirement from the duties of a magistrate to spend his leisure in the easy, unfevered, but on the whole assiduous and faithful service of the Muses. He played, indeed, a complicated rôle; entering upon posterity's stage not with the comparatively uniform air of the essays of 1580, nor even of those of 1588, but with the final edition of 1595, where second thoughts, and further second thoughts and further still, with new and ever new details about his person, had been added and interpolated to the very last, obliterating earlier trace of form and sequence. In that final form, or formlessness, they provided favourite reading, and all variety of mental food for the generations that succeeded. The office of looker-on might be the essayist's choice, but neither for him did the Fates reserve that destiny, 'given only to God and the angels' in this theatre of man's life.

Their influence, as observed, and the part they played were various. However little we may follow M. Strowski in conceiving 'the stoic' to be Montaigne's 'master-form,' we must admit that his pages were among the channels which passed on acquaintance with the thought of Epictetus; with whatever scantiness of justice he can be definitely called a 'sceptic' or

'Epicurean,' there is no doubt that many seventeenth-century 'wits' saw him in that light, accentuated his congenial utterances and found him a convenient peg for attachment of licentiousness and cynicism. The essays, 'a very rendezvous,' as Mr. Secombe calls them, 'of ancient doctrines,' provided grist for every mill, perpetuating thus thoughts which the Renaissance had introduced.

Again, though we may fail to trace, with M. Villey, purpose and the experimental method in the very disorder of the essays—any more, that is, than is implicit in all exercise of the reasoning faculty—Montaigne no doubt served the cause of reason by his own constant exercise of sober discriminative judgement, unbiassed by superstition, prejudice or party-spirit. This judgement he displayed in his conviction that there are no witches and that torture should be abolished, thus, like Voltaire, yoking reason to humanity; but he also reached the conclusion that there are two sides at least to every question, that reason is itself a broken reed. He could not promote its cause with the logical or philosophic thinker, for he neither brought arguments in support nor presented it in an exalted light; but he promulgated its general usage by example, the more since he endowed its exercise with imaginative vigour and personal charm. Just so, and no otherwise, had antiquity taught the fearless use of human reason to Montaigne himself and his fellow-men of the Renaissance, and just so had antiquity led also to the direct study of nature. There again Montaigne transmitted the lesson, not in the sphere of physical nature—that was left to others, Bacon among them—but in the still more complicated field of human nature, over which he ranged insatiate. 'Nihil humani a me alienum puto' was his motto. Here lay his great positive bequest to the seventeenth century, for in this field he did more than transmit, he added. In deliberate, intentional self-portraiture, and portraiture in self of 'la forme entière de l'humaine condition,' lies the originality of Montaigne's design; in executing it he gave life and body to the mass of observation current already from ancient authors, adding to them besides his direct experience; he introduced to France, it may be claimed, the analytic and individual study of human nature. To quote M. Villey :

'Sa part dans le travail de la Renaissance est d'avoir appliqué la morale rationnelle des anciens à la pratique de la vie, et de l'avoir fait en ressuscitant non un système déterminé, mais la méthode psychologique qui est commune à tous les syst. mes. Par là il a préparé les voies à toute notre littérature du XVII. siècle' (vol. ii. p. 546).

But the difference is greater than the resemblance between French seventeenth century literature and sixteenth, as represented by the 'Essais.' The cause of this it is which we set out to seek, and still hope to find, by medium of Montaigne. We come surely upon its track in what to us seems more distinctive of the essayist than his undeviating use of reason, more distinctive even than his analytic interest in human nature, the aspect, namely, in which he set forth the spectacle of human nature and of human life and thought, the aspect of endless contrariety. In this, the culminating vision of the seventeenth century, he indicates the inevitable turn, the transition of the centuries.

Montaigne is son of the Renaissance in his direct study of nature, though it is that not of physical phenomena but of human; son of the Renaissance in the freedom with which he shakes off all the rules and shackles of a petty and 'as it were' scholastic prudence' in favour of the broad light of nature, the 'universal reason implanted in each man at birth'; son of the Renaissance, again, in his right royal enjoyment of life, his readiness to embrace life in all aspects, and death—since it comes in the natural course. By instinct, by the 'wholesome 'milk of his nurse,' Montaigne inherits the Renaissance vigour and alertness of interest. But the instinctive man in him is not borne out by the reasoning. This is the broad antinomy in a mind which, like all human minds, is full of lesser contrarieties. The freshness of interest has lost its logical basis. The closer scrutiny which Montaigne turns upon life reveals to him not its worth but its variety. The broad light of reason, more closely investigated, is seen to provide no adequate rule of life, much less insight into what lies beyond life. The fruits of the intelligence are endless diversity of opinion, infinite confusion of doctrine. And so, though he appeal to nature as his guide, and accept, without proposing to correct, the nature implanted in him at birth, it is without faith in broad rules of conduct, or even in that indefinite spur to well-doing that Rabelais thought adequate for the monks and nuns of Thelema.

The negative conclusion, though it ran counter to its ardent spirit, was the logical outcome of the Renaissance. There had met together upon one level plane the mingled knowledge of far-stretching ages, wide-extending lands. To one who, like Montaigne, preserved a cool head and could command the whole field of vision, the spectacle presented was one of endless diversity of thought, conflicting systems, clashing faiths and opposing scientific theories; of novel, unassimilated facts brought face to face with views they contradicted, of strange customs

familiarised with those of long establishment—all the product of human life and thought, from bygone civilisation and from the new world peopled with primitive races, from Christianity and from Paganism, brought simultaneously and indiscriminately upon that closing theatre of the Renaissance. So Montaigne reproduced it, in full confusion, arranging only to accentuate diversity. In doing so he posed a problem which reason had now to face, the problem to find a guide through all this maze. Thus set forth in company, or rather jostling in contraries, the opinions and beliefs, even the practices and customs, of humanity presented a challenge to the logical as to the fanatic mind. The spectacle might serve as ‘opiate,’ to borrow a phrase again from Bacon, ‘to stay and bridle not only the ‘vanity of curious speculation . . . but the fury of contro-‘versy’; Montaigne himself could rest in suspense of judgement, contemplating diversity without loss of zest as without giddiness. But such equilibrium could not be general. Mother Nature has provided happily here and there an illogical lover of life, if no other so complete an instance as Montaigne, whose sense of the uncertainties of things does not impair his vigour. Montaigne’s English offspring are witness. But in the long run zest demands a basis, the active mind seeks order. And so it is that the ‘Essais’ which were the summing-up of one period became the point of departure for a new; or rather, for in this it is hard to say what part the reproduction played and what the conditions reproduced, they mark for posterity the point of new departure.

With his vast indictment of reason Montaigne rang in an age that took reason for guide; his long display of the confusions and contrarities in human practice and thought heralded the reign of order and system. His *distinguo*, though it brought him no further, was the first step for the logical faculty about to assert in France its full rights. The very confusion and multiplicity of new ideas and fresh knowledge was a demand for rearrangement, while weariness at endless discrepancy invested with disproportionate value mere coherency. The need for order, the desire of the mind to repose upon the contemplation of unity and law, was a force more potent even than curiosity as to the individual secrets of nature. The scientific spirit, to which the study of the ancients had given birth, was not checked in its rise but, confronted with the problem where, amid all the variety of opinion, to find grounds of certainty, it was impelled to self-scrutiny, obliged to make good its claim, to search out a philosophic basis.

Why in France rather than in England, it will be pertinently



asked. So far as the philosophic thinker is concerned there is no reason why at that juncture the need for order should be stronger in the one country than in the other. The spectacle of inchoate variety in thought and knowledge and in habits of life, engendered by the Renaissance, was the same for one attempting a broad survey in England as in France. In England, as in France, the picture of disorder drawn by Montaigne was there to read. And accordingly in England Bacon strove after general reconstruction, conceived the vision of an orderly universe even as in France Descartes conceived it. As it chanced, the French thinker held a clue which Bacon lacked, for he had perceived in mathematics one thread of certainty in the maze of knowledge—it was, by the way, one of Montaigne's lapses of clear sight to overlook the difference in assurance between mathematical and other evidence—and with mathematics as guide and standard Descartes reconstructed an orderly vision of the universe in unbroken sequence of effect and cause more satisfying at the time than any conceived by Bacon. Descartes, besides, met the dilemma of knowledge more squarely, not turning aside from the contemplation of diversity but facing it till he found solid footing; mathematics first, from mathematics the criterion 'which should evoke law and order,' and then with that criterion, 'clearness and distinctness so great as to leave no room for doubt,' the step on to reality, to the certainty of the fact of doubt itself, that is, of 'consciousness.' But the greater success of the French thinker was not the cause of the more general rebound towards order in France than in England, of the higher value attached to it, although eventually no doubt it reinforced the impetus. Rather did the philosophy express and provide a basis for a need already urgent.

The cause, however, of the special welcome given in seventeenth century France to order, not in thought alone but in every sphere of life, is not far to seek, and it too may be found reflected in the 'Essais.' The logical deadlock was the same for either nation; but only in France was the spectacle of diversity in thought driven home, even to the most thoughtless, in civil warfare, and written upon the people in decades of political and religious conflict. Not even in that conflict were the issues clear-cut, personal ambitions availing themselves of fanatic feeling, parties and interests changing at caprice, disorder and confusion covering the face of France. 'Order' was her crying need on every hand at the close of the sixteenth century, and the urgency of the need exaggerated perhaps its value. So at least it is apt to seem to a nation never so pressed home by want of it, never by simultaneous want of it in every sphere, intellectual and

practical at once, and at a moment when the fresh sap of reawakened vigour ran full in her veins.

The Renaissance in France culminated in the 'Essais' of Montaigne, in England in the Shakespearian drama. Drama and 'Essais' alike are fruit of keen interest in the spectacle of life and human nature, but while the one dwells on the individual manifestations, the other is concerned with the universal aspect. The difference is not insignificant. In Shakespeare there was coincidence of the man and the moment; creative genius seeing human nature in concrete forms, handling them as, by some master-passion or pre-eminence of spirit, they stand distinct from, while yet exemplifying, the common nature; sustaining that genius, a nation expanding in prosperity, enjoying peace from religious as from political conflict, with unshackled vigour and with leisure to enjoy the spectacle of life—with leisure for the drama. In Montaigne, too, there was coincidence of the man and the moment, creative genius concerned with human nature, with concreteness of vision also, clothing even ideas in images, but interested above all in the universal aspect, attaching the individual to the common stock, dwelling on human instability and weakness, finding everywhere diversity in human life; justifying the turn taken by that genius, a nation torn by disunion, writing confusion and diversity in bloodshed. What wonder that, before the Renaissance interest in the spectacle of human nature could find in France expression in the drama, the need for order had first to be met?

Order, then, as opposed to the disorder and confusion of the latter part of the sixteenth, is the characteristic of the seventeenth century in France, and it reaches its height in the quarter of the century from 1659 or 1660 on, when the reign of Louis XIV was at its prime. There the establishment of order is complete; the intervening years are a tale of its growth, a history of 'construction,' to adopt a word which Mr. Tilley adopts, in every sphere of life:

'Finally, if we wish to find a synthesis for the various forces which ultimately united to produce the Classical Age, we cannot do better than borrow from M. Lemonnier ("L'Art français au temps de Richelieu et de Mazarin") the word "construction." The construction of the nation by Henry IV and Richelieu, of its religious life by Cardinal de Bérulle and Vincent de Paul, of a standard of literary taste by Malherbe and the Académie Française, of society by Mlle. de Rambouillet, of the classical drama by Corneille, and of a system of philosophy by Descartes, are all described by this single word.'\*

\* Tilley, 'From Montaigne to Molière,' p. 14.

Within limits of space which scarcely permit him to do full justice to so large a subject, Mr. Tilley describes the course of construction in these several spheres: the restoration of peace and order under Henri IV and the establishment of national unity by that monarch, with consequent centralisation in Paris and, as secondary effect, the rise in prominence of the *bourgeoisie*; Malherbe's criticism of language, with its insistence upon purity, clearness and precision; and then, third in order as he takes the list, the Catholic revival, with Saint François de Sales—whose 'Introduction à la Vie Dévote' was published as early as 1608—the pioneer, and a vast number of religious foundations signalling it throughout the first quarter of the century.

The chronological order, which Mr. Tilley observes as far as possible in his account, occasions a break before the most signal of all the religious movements of the century, so far as literature is concerned, can be dealt with. The movement of Jansenism, and Port Royal, which, by its influence upon Pascal, gave birth in a manner to 'modern' French prose, was somewhat later in date, rising in reaction against the compromising spirit of the Jesuits and producing the polemic masterpiece, the 'Lettres à un Provincial,' only after the middle of the century (1656). To this movement Mr. Tilley gives naturally a conspicuous place, and he insists generally, with justice, upon the revival of Christian feeling, in contrast to the paganism of sixteenth century humanists, as a marked feature of the seventeenth century in France—though it would perhaps be fairer to say that the Church recaptured, and utilised to fuller effect by her organising power, elements of feeling scattered previously in the Protestant camp and discredited by the religious conflicts. M. Strowski in his 'Pascal et son Temps,' a three-volume work which is itself but the second of three chapters in his 'Histoire du Sentiment Religieux en France au XVII<sup>e</sup> Siècle,' deals with it exclusively.

With Pascal and French prose Mr. Tilley brings his work to a close, after treating in intermediate chapters of the Hôtel de Rambouillet and the classic of society, 'l'Astrée,' with its brood of interminable romances—in this field the restraining hand of order was long in taking effect; of the Academy and the critical dictatorship of Chapelain, with the famous exercise of censorship upon Corneille's 'Cid'; of Corneille himself and the 'unities'; again of such comedy as preceded Molière—these treated all as parts of the onward constructive movement. He devotes a chapter to the backward wave, the 'reign of bad taste,' when criticism stiffened into pedantry, when vulgar burlesque flourished with Scarron, and *préciosité* was the outcome of social refinement—three forms of bad taste combated later by Boileau. Finally, in

conjunction with Port Royal and Pascal, Mr. Tilley treats of Descartes, whose philosophy was not indeed a productive cause—his ‘*Discours de la Méthode*’ did not appear until 1637—but a strong reinforcement of the general tendency towards constructive order.

Descartes and Pascal, and a third, Corneille, are the figures that stand out pre-eminent in this transition period. As mere prose, Descartes’ ‘*Discours de la Méthode*’ cannot, as Mr. Tilley very justly observes, bear comparison with the varied and incisive phrasing of the ‘*Lettres à un Provincial*,’ but as regards content it is a work that signally marks the change from the ‘*Essais*’ of Montaigne, in mental attitude and in structure of thought. The subject of ‘*Discours*’ and of ‘*Essais*’ may be called the same, the spectacle of all possible knowledge reflected in the writer’s mind, but in the ‘*Discours*’ the spectacle is drawn with unquestionable purpose, to exclusion of all superfluous matter as to definite passage from doubt to assurance. Both, again, are self-portraiture; but while the essayist conveys the impress of his personality, for all his precise personal details, only in the sum total and in whatever residue remains over and above the diversity insisted on, Descartes presents himself under the single aspect of thinker, in the orderly growth and development ignored by Montaigne, and leads the reader to his conclusions through the like successive stages he himself has passed. Sequence and arrangement have supplanted confusion and disarray.

Again, in his ‘*Passions de l’Ame*,’ a work to which M. Tilley calls special attention, Descartes entered, in the more orderly and conclusive manner proper to his century, upon that study of human nature where had lain the essayist’s quarry.

‘This treatise,’ says Mr. Tilley, ‘by its orderly arrangement, its careful analysis and its observation of physiological and psychological data, must have helped to stimulate and methodise the growing interest in psychological analysis. The advance from the psychology of “*Le Grand Cyrus*” and “*Clélie*” to that of Molière and La Rochefoucauld, of Bossuet, and Bourdaloue, though mainly the result of personal observation and experience, was in some measure due to the influence of the “*Traité des Passions*” and kindred works’ (p. 219).

In other words, it continued more systematically the work Montaigne had begun, since, as Mr. Tilley also observes, the essayist ‘introduced into French literature that habit of ‘psychological and moral observation’ which it has never since lost, and which Brunetière truly declares to be ‘one of the foundations of classicism’ (p. 89).

Descartes' study of the phenomena, however, was scarcely in the actual line that led to La Rochefoucauld, since it is marked by exaltation of the power of the will. He writes, Mr. Tilley himself observes, 'as a moralist as well as a psychologist'; and in this treatise, as also in letters with which the philosopher sought to fortify the soul of the young Princess Elizabeth, we come again upon that vein of stoicism which M. Strowski sees so essential an element in Montaigne but which the facts of life, as Montaigne saw them, did not justify. M. Strowski tracks the stoic philosophy of the sixteenth century on into the seventeenth, and notes its reasoned developement in Descartes, devoting the first volume of his 'Pascal et son Temps' to the rise and growth of this current, together with that of the stream of scepticism which also, as observed, found justification, even if unjustifiably, in the 'Essais.' The stoics and the free-thinkers (*les libertins*) of the seventeenth century were, observes M. Strowski, the inheritors of the humanism of the sixteenth. Descartes replied in his philosophy to the free-thinkers or sceptics, but joined hands with the stoics; against sceptic and stoic alike revived Christianity waged war. True, the prudent Jesuit spirit would have come to terms with the faith in human nature derived from the Renaissance, and offered a loophole for free-will in its doctrine, but the consequence was division in the Church and reinsistence upon the native depravity of man and his total dependence upon 'grace.' Thus religion rather than philosophy encouraged the study of human nature in all its weakness.

Literature profited by the disputes of the Church in Pascal's 'Lettres à un Provincial,' where French prose, with Montaigne so expressive and imaginative in individual phrase, became for the first time an instrument of equal expressive vigour in continuous use. As for imaginative faculty, that found in the 'Letters' a changed vent, no longer permeating the language and clothing, as Montaigne clothed, ideas in concrete form, but creating *dramatis personæ*. Here, where we should look for it least, is dramatic power akin to Molière's, and the whole controversy becomes a comedy played through the mouth of this Jesuit or that.

True, if Pascal could mock at idle or interested controversy under the forms of concrete personages, he could also, when he found it in place, exercise Montaigne's power of giving new life by imagery to ideas. His 'Pensées' are in their fragmentariness, due to the writer's premature death, more in the manner of Montaigne's disjointed reflexions than any other work of the age—more in the manner of the 'Essais,' too, because they absorbed and refashioned them. Metaphor, graphic with the essayist, is

traced by Pascal as with fire. Montaigne gives his philosophy of life in an image: 'Somme, il faut vivre entre les vivans, et 'laisser la rivière courre sous le pont sans notre soin, ou à tout 'le moins, sans notre alteration.' Pascal stamps in images his sense of life's emptiness:

'Nous voguons sur un milieu vaste, toujours incertains et flottants, poussés d'un bout vers l'autre. Quelque terme où nous pensions nous attacher et nous affermir, il branle et nous quitte; et, si nous le suivons, il échappe à nos prises, nous glisse, et fuit, d'une fuite éternelle. . . . Nous brûlons de désir de trouver une assiette ferme et une dernière base constante pour y édifier une tour, qui s'élève à l'infini, mais tout notre fondement craque, et la terre s'ouvre jusqu'aux abîmes.'

Yet even in the 'Pensées' as we have them, metaphor, if more weighted with deep feeling, is more sparingly used and less conspicuous than in the 'Essais,' and it would no doubt be less conspicuous still had the work been finished and rounded to a whole, with each 'Pensée' brought into place as link in a great persuasive argument. Not imagery, but lucidity, incisiveness and clear-cut point, were the distinctive features conferred by the seventeenth century upon French prose. Imagination was not indeed so despised as is sometimes said, even in prose, and Montaigne's merits in that respect were duly recognised. While Pascal assimilated his vivid language, a Jesuit, the esteemed critic le Père Bouhours, bore witness to his excellence, describing the true 'bon sens' as 'gai, vif, plein de feu, comme 'celuy qui paraît dans les Essais de Montaigne . . . .; il vient d'une intelligence droite et lumineuse, d'une imagination nette et agréable.'\*

But still, with clearness and precision as first requirements, the tendency in prose was to rest for effect more and more upon the quick turn of wit, the subtle differentiation of meaning, the incisive phrase; to be direct and keep the mind strictly upon the thought in hand. The 'Lettres à un Provincial' rather than the 'Pensées' exemplify the new prose, as they indicate besides, in their dramatic portraiture, the field where imagination was to find now its creative play. Yet the 'Pensées' also, though they do not turn to creation of characters, are in full line with 'the 'psychological and moral observation at the basis of French 'classical literature,' and Pascal, free from the blinding optimism of the 'humanist' or 'stoic,' lays human nature remorselessly bare in all its poverty. He has, we need scarcely call to mind,

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\* Entretiens d'Ariste et d'Eugène, iv.

both stoic and sceptic upon the hip ; confounding the pride of human nature with instances, drawn in great measure from Montaigne, of its poverty and instability ; then turning the tables upon those who, like Montaigne, can recognise man's vanity and yet enjoy life still, by reminder of the wretchedness of that estate.

Corneille, third in the trio of pre-eminent men, comes by chronological order before Pascal. Although his dramatic activity lasted on, with ever-dwindling success, through the classic age, his first masterpiece, 'Le Cid,' in 1636, coincided almost with Descartes' 'Discours de la Méthode.' In his drama, with its big-mouthed magnanimous heroes who subdue fate to their courage, we are again upon the track of stoicism, and the vein has been much insisted upon, to the obscuring perhaps of more realistic traits in his characters. It is beyond our limits to discuss that question here. But the vein was pronounced enough to militate against his popularity later, when men and women more closely modelled on nature were seen upon the stage.

But with Corneille we are upon ground more essential to our theme of the growth of order, since Corneille it was whose acceptance, somewhat grudging for the rest, of the dramatic unities, moulded French tragedy in careful form, setting it upon the line that led so far from English sympathies. To Corneille, who saw action as the essence of drama, and who liked besides, in tragedy, to go beyond nature, the inconvenience of the unities was palpable enough. Observance of that of time led him in the 'Cid' to a breach of probability more serious than extension of time in carrying out the action would have been. But in the main he gave his voice for the rules, as serving the cause of probability and making for singleness of effect. He continued, it is true, to demonstrate in his plays the difficulty of adapting them to elaborate action and a crowded stage, but the lesson he read to younger contemporaries, to Molière and to Racine, was not that the rules were unduly restrictive, but that, given the rules, action should be simplified and the non-essential rigidly shut out. Racine gives, as Mr. Tilley observes, the true theory of classical drama : ' a simple action, charged with little incident, must be the nature of an action which happens in a single day, and which, gradually progressing towards its end, is sustained only by the interests, the sentiments, and the passions of the characters.' And again, à propos of 'Bérénice' : ' true invention consists in 'making something out of nothing—attracting spectators for a 'whole five acts by a simple action, sustained by the violence of 'the emotions, the beauty of the sentiment and the elegance of the 'expression.' The unities drove classical drama in upon itself, so

to speak, from action to character, from external spectacle to inward feeling.

Above all, the insistence of the classic dramatists was upon truth to nature. Corneille, who alone, it will be remembered, of seventeenth century writers, found favour in the eyes of the 'Romantics,' looked to the startling and unexpected, to surprise, for much of his effect and, in tragedy, sought his subjects beyond the range of things 'probable.' Both Molière and Racine, in moments of exasperation with the older dramatist (who betrayed some jealousy of these rivals to his fame), flung at him the reproach that he substituted the extraordinary for the real, and both made truth to nature their own watchword.

'Et maintenant il ne faut pas  
Quitter la nature d'un pas,'

wrote La Fontaine after the performance of Molière's 'Les Fâcheux' at the fête given by Fouquet in 1661. Mr. Tilley cites the familiar lines. In respect of Racine we may be content to give one of many French criticisms to like effect: 'Racine représente plus que personne dans l'école de 1660 le retour au naturel . . . à la réalité . . . à la ressemblance avec la vie.'\*

With this judgement Mr. Tilley would seem, from his concluding words, to be in full accord. Leaving his subject upon the threshold of the classic age, with Molière and Racine its representatives, he ends: 'At last French writers had surprised the secret, 'not only of classical literature, but of all abiding literature and 'all abiding art: that it is founded upon two principles, truth 'to nature, and truth to the ideal of the individual artist.'

And yet, it must be owned, from the pen of Mr. Tilley, the conclusion comes as a surprise, almost as though the writer had changed his mind in mid-flight, or rather just before folding his wings to settle. For we can find little in the course of his work to lead up to so triumphal a close. Even in the remainder of the same concluding paragraph it is the loss to literature in the change of century that is dwelt upon, and in these terms:

'In the Classical Age we miss some qualities which were not to return for many a long year. Imagination and emotion were, of course, not wholly absent, for literature cannot exist without them; but reason held them in severe check. Especially do we miss that primary function of the imagination which consists in seeing images, in calling up at will the outward appearance of things. In a word, literature becomes abstract instead of concrete.'

\* Faguet, 'Études Littéraires,' xvii<sup>e</sup> Siècle.



Can there be dramatic representation of nature, true human nature; can there be any drama worth the name, with imagination and emotion, not indeed wholly extinct, but kept severely in the background?

To glance back over Mr. Tilley's sketch of the 'transition period.' So far we have followed it as it pleased ourselves, from the point of view of general growth in construction, or in 'order.' But Mr. Tilley gives still greater prominence to another, which is not, though he almost seems to imply it, at all identical. The change from the Renaissance in France to the Classical Age is, in this view, 'the change from a literature of imagination to a literature of reason,' similar to 'the change which came over English poetry between the death of Shakespeare and the appearance of Pope' (preface). The characteristics of the literature of the French classical age are that 'it is social, rational, careful of form, central'; 'the complete antithesis of the literature of the sixteenth century, which is individualistic, imaginative, careless of form, provincial' (p. 7).

The first and last of these notes are of secondary importance; suffice to comment that, although the antithesis in both cases seems slightly misleading, there can be no doubt as to the influence which both society and Paris as centre of culture exercised upon seventeenth century literature. The note of devotion to form is essential and obvious. That of rational *as opposed to* imaginative alone remains to dispute.

Montaigne is the example taken by Mr. Tilley to instance sixteenth century literature: 'Thinking habitually in images, Montaigne is, with Victor Hugo, the most imaginative writer of France. Regardless of form, &c.—it is the first point only that concerns us. But is 'thinking in images' the only form of imaginative literature? Is there not also that which is deliberately creative? which, holding a mirror up to nature, catches and combines in its selective lens the elements which form a new image, which reveal nature? Montaigne, representative of his age as 'imaginative,' heralded, Mr. Tilley says it, the next century in his freedom of judgement and in his clear use of reason, as also in his study of human nature in his own exemplar (p. 9). If it is characteristic of Montaigne to be 'rational' as well as imaginative, may it not be characteristic of classical literature to be imaginative as well as rational? Does not the antithesis fall to the ground? And when we recall that the English period described as a corresponding passage from imagination to reason, has drama for the point it leaves, while the French period arrives at drama as its supreme expression, does not the comparison appear on the face of it misleading? If imagination,

and emotion with it, truly yielded place then to reason, the seventeenth century drama surely failed, and the literature of the classic age stands condemned.

Reason, bringing order into thought, was taken by the seventeenth century undoubtedly as guide, yet not as tyrant. The lines of Boileau :

'Aimez donc la raison ; que toujours vos écrits  
Empruntent d'elle seule et leur lustre et leur prix' ;

are only too well known ; his complementary lines too much forgotten :

'Que dans tous vos discours la passion émue  
Aille chercher le cœur, l'échauffe et le remue.'

Certain debts which seventeenth century French literature owed to the tutorial hand of reason, are clear to all. If to France alone, taught by dire need, is reserved the higher vision of intellectual distinction, of some subtilised spirit of order, reason, and measured balance of strength with grace, we can all recognise with gratitude the lucidity that pervades her prose, and can all admire dexterity and point, elegance and wit. But, however divinised, intellectual qualities alone, or even in extreme ascendancy, cannot make great drama. On Mr. Tilley's premises we are landed in a conclusion which is not his, but is, if we are not mistaken, Mr. Saintsbury's\* : that French classical drama did *not* hold the mirror up to nature, and that Racine was no great dramatist.

But let us rather dismiss the premises, and with, we believe, the consensus of modern French critics, with M. Brunetière certainly, and M. Lanson, pass the reproach of 'rationality' on to the neo-classicists of the following century, to Voltaire or whom one will ; and let us call *them* 'abstract,' 'correct,' 'cold,' 'rhetorical,' so that we retain only an unprejudiced head to realise the delicate individualisation of 'Andromaque' and 'Iphigénie' to enter into the profundity of passion in 'Hermione,' 'Roxane,' or 'Phèdre,' to follow the birth of monstrosity in 'Nero.' Let us re-read 'Racine' rather with the judgement of M. Lemaître in mind : 'Il n'est pas de théâtre, je pense, qui contienne à la fois plus d'ordre et de mouvement intérieur, plus de vérité psychologique, et plus de poésie.'

\* Cf. History of French Literature, pp. 274 seq.

## ART. VIII.—THE POOR LAW REPORT OF 1909.

*Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress.* 1909.

JUST three-quarters of a century has passed since the nation last took a comprehensive survey of pauperism and remodelled its system of Poor Law relief. The years in passing have left behind them changes in our social and industrial life of a magnitude and importance which can hardly be over-estimated. The people have increased in number from 24 millions in 1831 to 41 millions in 1901, and, while increasing, have to a large extent changed their occupations and habits and conditions of life. From an agricultural nation it has become a nation of town-dwellers. The growth of the towns, which had already made considerable advance in 1831, has continued until the urban population is now more than twice as great as the rural, while its rate of growth in recent years has been three times as great as that in rural districts.\* Meanwhile the increase in wealth, as measured by the national income, has progressed far more rapidly than that of population; and this increase in wealth has affected all classes, including wage-earners about whom it is possible to obtain definite knowledge.

While the wage-earners have shared in the general prosperity through their higher wages, they have also been the special object of many legislative provisions designed to strengthen their position and improve the conditions under which they live and work. Vital statistics bear witness to a marked degree of success in this direction, for the annual death-rate has diminished from 21·4 per 1000 in the five years 1841-5, and 23·3 per 1000 in the five years 1846-50 to 16·0 per 1000 in the five years 1901-5.† At the same time the death-rate for phthisis, which is eminently a disease of poverty, has fallen from 2·7 per 1000 in 1857 to 1·14 per 1000 in 1906.

But the greatest effort which has been made to raise the standard of life for the people at large is that which has provided and made compulsory a system of elementary education at a steadily increasing cost, which now amounts to more than twenty millions a year. The question of education is of peculiar interest in connexion with the problem of pauperism or dependence. It was to education entirely that the Poor Law Commissioners of 1832 looked for a positive remedy to the evils they had encountered in their investigation. 'It will be

\* Part VI. Para. 9.

† Part II. Para. 149.

‘observed,’ they say in their Report, ‘that the measures which we have suggested are intended to produce rather negative than positive effects; rather to remove the debasing influences to which a large portion of the labouring population is now subject, than to afford new means of prosperity and virtue. We are perfectly aware that for the general diffusion of right principles and habits we are to look, not so much to economic arrangements and regulations as to the influence of a moral and religious education.’

What, we may now ask, has been the effect of our seventy-five years of increasing material prosperity, and our system of universal education, upon the pauperism of the country? The comprehensive survey just completed by the Royal Commission enables us to give an answer to this question. Once more we have taken stock of the situation, and once more it will be seen to present a very serious problem for the consideration of the nation.

We will first describe the situation as it is revealed in statistics. Taken broadly, they show a great advance since 1834.

‘Perhaps the best measure of the progress made towards independence during the last century is got by comparing the membership of friendly societies with the number of paupers. A Parliamentary Return in 1803 states the number of societies in England and Wales to be 9672 with 704,350 members, while the numbers relieved by the Poor Rate in the same year were 1,039,716. A similar Return in 1815 gives the membership of friendly societies as 925,439, which exceeded the number of paupers by 29,446.’ \*

On December 31, 1904, the number of members in the ordinary friendly societies, and societies having branches, was 5,700,000, while the total number of paupers of all classes on January 1, 1905, was 932,000—an excess of friendly society members over paupers of nearly five million. To get the total number of paupers throughout the year the numbers would have to be doubled, but even so the contrast is sufficiently striking.

But the fact which it is immediately important to ascertain is the present tendency of pauperism to diminish or increase; and for this purpose the Report lays stress more especially upon its movements within the last generation. Several reasons are adduced for taking the year 1871-2 as a starting-point in this consideration.† It was not until that year that complete Returns were received from the whole of England and Wales; it was in that year that the Poor Law Board was superseded by the Local Government Board and that there was a general revival

\* Part V. Para. 96.

† Part II. Para. 20.

of public interest in questions of Poor Law administration ; and it was in the preceding year 1870 that the system of national education was established under which the present generation of workers has grown up.

In the summary of changes since 1871 the years are arranged in cycles, in order to avoid misleading conclusions, which might be suggested by the figures of isolated years. During the first cycle, 1871-2 to 1879-80, the mean number of persons relieved was 747,936, or 31·2 per 1000 of the total population. The next cycle, 1881-2 to 1887-8, shows a large decrease both in actual numbers and in percentage, the mean number being 711,625, or 26·6 per 1000. The decrease is maintained, though at a diminished rate, in the cycle 1888-9 to 1895-6, when the mean number relieved is 694,094 and the rate per 1000 is 23·8. Then from 1896-7 to 1905-6 we get a rise in the mean number to 718,444 and a lessened decrease in the rate per 1000 of 22·2. Finally, in the year 1906-7 we have an increase both in actual numbers and in ratio, these being respectively 769,160 and 22·3.

‘ Some satisfaction may be derived from the reduction in the ratio of pauperism to population since the early seventies, but it should not be allowed to obscure the facts that the amount of the decrease is rapidly diminishing, that from 1901-2 to 1905-6 there was a continuous increase in the ratio, and that the number of persons relieved has considerably increased during the cycle of the last ten years.’\*

Taken from the side of expenditure, the figures are even more discouraging. Here we have statistics for over a century.† In 1833-4 the expenditure on Poor Law relief was 6,317,255*l.*, or 8*s.* 10*d.* per head of the estimated population. A considerable reduction then followed upon the introduction of the new Poor Law, but after a few years a rise set in, and by 1871-2 the cost had risen to over eight millions, or 7*s.* per head of population. Since then there has been an almost unchecked rise, until in 1905-6 the expenditure was over fourteen millions. The rate per head of population in that year was 8*s.* 2¼*d.*, only 7¼*d.* per head below that of 1833-4.

Thus the first and most obvious fact confronting the Commission was that of a heavy and rapidly increasing expenditure, accompanied by an increase not only in the actual number of paupers but also in the ratio of paupers to population. And this twofold increase occurs at the time when a large expenditure on education should be beginning to show its full effect.

\* Part II. Para. 23.

† Part II. Para. 44.

But the statistics of pauperism do not tell the whole tale. In order to make it complete we should add to those who have received Poor Law relief those of the unemployed who have received State aid through agencies outside the Poor Law—the municipalities and distress committees. It is the 'unemployed' town-dwellers of to-day who correspond most closely to the 'able-bodied' agricultural labourers who formed the chief difficulty in 1834; and it is they who make the problem of to-day so analogous to that of 1834. Unfortunately there are no complete statistics to show the total number of these; but we have a Return as to those among them who were assisted under the Unemployed Workmen Act in the year ending March 31, 1908. It appears that during that year over 90,000 persons made application to distress committees, of whom 54,613 were considered suitable for assistance under the Act. These 54,613 had 150,971 dependents. Work was provided for 37,092, and as this work has proved upon investigation for the most part to be relief under a very thin disguise, these numbers must be taken into account in estimating the magnitude of the class which is from time to time dependent for its maintenance upon the State.

Again, the figures of pauperism already quoted give a fair indication of what the movement has been over a series of years in the numbers of those assisted by the Poor Law. But they do not tell us what are the actual numbers relieved in the course of the year. They are based upon the day counts, and state the mean of the numbers relieved on January 1 and July 1 of each year. It has long been a disputed point by what number the result of the day count would have to be multiplied in order to give the total for the year; and with a view to ascertaining this, and other important particulars as to the constitution of the pauper population, the Local Government Board caused an exact account to be kept during the year ending September 1907 of all persons (excluding lunatics in asylums and casual paupers) receiving relief, and the periods for which they received relief. This Return, together with a census of paupers taken on March 31, 1906, forms a most valuable addition to our knowledge of the real extent of pauperism and the classes whom it most affects.

From the year's count we learn that the number of persons who have recourse to the Poor Law at some time during the year is more than twice as great as that shown by taking the mean of the day counts (2·15 is the multiplier). The actual number for 1907 (excluding one unimportant union which refused to make a return) was 1,709,436, a population almost equal to that of the three largest provincial cities—viz. Liverpool, Manchester,

and Birmingham.\* In relation to the population estimated to have been living in England and Wales during the year 1906-7 the rate of pauperism thus becomes 47 per 1000, as against 22·7 per 1000 shown by the day counts of the same year. In London the rate for the year was as high as 71 per 1000.

Many other important and interesting facts are brought out in the statistical survey which forms Part II. of the Report. Here it is sufficient to have indicated the broad grounds upon which the Commission hold not only that the problem of pauperism is one of very serious dimensions but that it is becoming more instead of less serious.

‘ While the rise in expenditure was accompanied by a diminution in pauperism it was possible to regard it with some degree of acquiescence. It is worth while to pay highly for the restoration of paupers to independence. But there are indications that the present administration has reached the limits of its remedial powers, and needs once more to be reinforced.’ †

The first object of the Commission was to ascertain as far as possible where the defects lie which are responsible for the persistence and growth of the evil. The critics who have blamed them for dwelling more upon the defects than upon the merits of the present system should have borne in mind that the duty laid upon them was to report what changes were desirable, and that this necessarily involved an exposition of the facts which made changes desirable. The Commissioners have not failed to express their admiration for much good work which they have seen, and in their recommendations they have endeavoured to secure that such good work may be continued.

To a large extent the primary causes of pauperism lie beyond the reach of the Poor Law administrator, and can be only indirectly touched by him. They are set out in some detail in chapter ix. of Part IV., and are fairly familiar to all who are experienced in the darker side of life. The sordid tragedies of drink and immorality contribute the largest share to the wreckage which finds a last refuge in the Poor Law; illness and old age are hostile forces which break down the resources of many who maintain their independence until beset by them. The widows and children who are deprived of their natural support form a large section of those who come to be dependent upon the public funds. But in addition to these more obvious and direct causes of pauperism, the Commission lay stress upon others which until now have received insufficient recognition. It

\* Part II. Para. 5.

† Part IV. Para. 584.

seems paradoxical to speak of education as a cause of pauperism ; according to all tradition and belief it should be the strongest defence against it. But how far it is from being entirely efficacious is witnessed by the statistics of pauperism already cited ; and if, as is seriously urged, our present system is unfitting boys and girls for industrial and domestic life, without fitting them for any other life of independence, then it is hardly too much to say that it is directly contributing to the pauperism of the country. The Commission comment on their evidence in this connexion as follows :

‘ Before we leave the subject of education we must refer to one criticism that has been made with almost absolute unanimity. There seems to be outside the circle of the teaching profession a very strong general feeling that the education of our children in elementary schools is not of the kind which is helpful to them in after life. . . . Clerical labour is a glut upon the market ; high-class artisans are, according to our evidence, at times obtained with difficulty. We doubt if the atmosphere of our school life is altogether congenial to a career of manual labour. We would suggest to the Board of Education the advisability of meeting these criticisms by a thorough reconsideration of the time-table and curriculum in our elementary schools as well as of the aims and ideals of elementary education. Though employers of labour may perhaps be apt to look at questions too much from their own standpoint, still, the unanimity of opinion that our school curriculum does not supply the right class of instruction and training for industrial purposes cannot lightly be put on one side.’ \*

In another passage the Commission note that our system of compulsory education has removed the children to a large extent from the discipline and training of the home.† It should therefore be specially adapted to replace whatever was valuable in that home-training. Its failure to do this is becoming painfully obvious in the case of the girls, whose incapacity to fulfil the most essential duties of housewives and mothers is making itself felt in all parts of the country, and is responsible for a large amount of waste and poverty.

Closely connected with the recommendations of the Commission that there should be a revision of our elementary education are their further recommendations as to the extension of school age. They are :

- ‘ 1. That boys should be kept at school until the age of 15.
2. That exemption below this age should be granted only for boys leaving to learn a skilled trade.

\* Part IX. Para. 128.

† Part VI. Para. 554.



3. That there should be school supervision till 16, and replacement in school of boys not properly employed.

We also believe that there is urgent need of improved facilities for technical education being offered to young people after the present age for leaving school.\*

Critics of the Report have suggested that in this matter the Commission have gone beyond their reference. The objection will not stand in face of the evidence as to boy labour, and when it has been realised that a steady stream of prospective pauperism is flowing out of our elementary schools through the channels of temporary unskilled work and casual work. A large proportion of the boys leaving school pass into unskilled occupations where they get no training and acquire no skill. After four or five years, when they begin to require men's wages, they are turned adrift, too old to learn a trade and unfitted for the rest of their lives for anything but unskilled labour. Too often also their employment as errand boys or van boys has given them a dislike for steady work, and they fall readily into the casual ways of the casual labourer. Unless some check can be placed upon this method of supplying the unskilled labour market, it is hopeless to seek for a solution to the 'unemployed problem.'

Granting that many of the primary causes of pauperism lie at present beyond the reach of Poor Law administrators, the question still remains whether they are making the best use of their present powers, and whether these powers could be advantageously enlarged. The nation cannot continue to acquiesce in a growth of pauperism if it is possible to initiate a more active policy of combating the evil.

The first step towards answering this question was obviously to study closely the practical working of the present administration and its success or failure in dealing with its problems. This involved of necessity a very laborious investigation. When things are going wrong in general the explanation must be sought in the particular; and to get down to the particular Board of Guardians, and from the particular Board of Guardians to the particular case, has been the aim of the Commissioners. No other method, they felt, could give them a completely trustworthy grasp of the situation. The evidence given by guardians and officials, invaluable as it has often been, was after all evidence about their own work, and they could hardly be expected to appreciate its defects. It is perhaps not unnatural that their criticisms have often been mainly directed against the restrictions placed upon their actions by the Local

\* Part IX. Para. 127.

Government Board. Witnesses from outside, again, have given valuable evidence as to the general estimation in which the Poor Law is held, but have often failed to have any intimate acquaintance with its actual working. These two sources of information the Commissioners have therefore supplemented by personal visits to over two hundred Unions, where they have attended board meetings and relief committees, have visited many institutions, and have seen and talked with many of the recipients of relief in their own homes. They have further supplemented their knowledge by means of special investigations, carried out for them by independent investigators, by the Local Government Board and by the Board of Trade.

It is difficult in the limited space of an article to summarise the results which have been thus obtained. Even in the Report, long as it is, the Commissioners may have failed to make real to the reader the effect of the accumulated impressions and experiences of the three years devoted to the work. Something will have to be taken on trust by those who cannot consult the many volumes of evidence which will follow the Report; those who do will find no reason to charge the Report itself with exaggeration.

In considering the recommendations of the Commission and the grounds upon which they are based, it is natural to begin with the two which have most attracted public attention—the abolition of general workhouses and of Boards of Guardians. These two institutions are to the general public the most obvious and imposing features of our present system; and although their abolition, or as it might be better termed their regeneration, is only a means to the end of more effective administration, it has seemed to the majority of the Commission an indispensable means.

To take first the question of the general workhouse; why and in what sense is it desired to abolish this? It has come to stand in our Poor Law system for a definite purpose, as the mark and instrument of a definite policy—the ‘deterrent’ policy of relief. Will it not mean the abandonment of the wisdom of 1834 and a reversion to pre-’34 folly if we abandon it? The answer is that at any rate of late years the workhouse has failed conspicuously to fulfil even the negative function of deterrence just where that function was most needed. That some such institution was a useful, perhaps indispensable, aid to the early Poor Law reformers in their work of checking a ruinous system of relief is indubitable; and that a substitute for it will be equally indispensable in the future is equally indubitable. But the *general* workhouse as we know it to-day was an institution not

contemplated by the Commissioners of 1834 in their original proposals.

‘ Their suggestion was that the paupers of a district should be properly classified, that certain classes might be accommodated temporarily in ordinary dwelling-houses, and that the “ poorhouse ” should be reserved for the able-bodied. Ultimately the different classes of paupers were to be distributed, one class to each house within an incorporated area. Stress is laid upon the economy to be effected by such an arrangement as compared with having all classes within one house, and their final recommendation is for classification *by* workhouses.’ \*

This recommendation was never carried out. A compromise was effected by classifying the inmates *within* each workhouse, with the result that the general workhouse of to-day contains men, women, and children of every age and every type of character, all under the management of one master. When, as happens in the large towns, there are as many as one, two, or even four thousand inmates, it is obvious how unlikely it is that this one master, however well supported by his staff, should be capable of handling each class in the right way, even if he had facilities for doing so. Nothing short of genius can succeed in doing more than maintain a routine discipline, and even discipline is apt to fail. The Commission rightly attached great weight on this point to the evidence of the workhouse Masters’ and Matrons’ Association. They say :

‘ With proper classification of, and in, workhouses, it would be possible to treat each class of inmates on its merits, in more detail, with the result that to the deserving an almshouse system would present itself, while the treatment of the undeserving would be deterrent.

‘ If you give us all classes to look after as we have at present, you want expert knowledge on every point and expert administration on every point, and it is impossible, in the one house, with the one staff of officials, to get it. That is one reason why we request so strongly classification by workhouses as well as in workhouses.’ †

We have said that of late years the workhouse has failed even in its negative function of deterrence. That it would be so was foreseen by that remarkable administrative genius Dr. Chalmers. In pleading against the introduction of a compulsory system of State relief into Scotland he maintained that to make an offer of State relief, and at the same time to make it deterrent, would in time create a class so brutalised as to accept any conditions,

\* Part IV. Para. 144.

† Part IV. Para. 167.

however degrading, which were attached to the relief. That class exists to-day, and is to be found in steadily increasing numbers in the town workhouses. It does not indeed include the whole of those classed as 'able-bodied' in the Returns. Many of these suffer from some mental or bodily defect which makes it difficult for them to work, still more difficult to find work. But on January 1, 1908, the number of able-bodied men *in health* in the workhouses was 11,413, and of women 9147. One of these may be practically a permanent inmate, only taking his discharge occasionally when the monotony of the life becomes irksome; or he may go in for the winter months; or he may be constantly 'in and out,' treating the workhouse as a temporary and gratuitous hotel—all alike are deliberately accepting the conditions of workhouse life in preference to maintaining themselves by work.

Striking evidence is quoted by the Commission to show how our present system is creating this class. One witness, speaking of a London workhouse, says:

'I do not think the present condition of things in the workhouse is satisfactory. The master tells me that associating in large numbers in the able-bodied blocks becomes an attraction; and it appears to me that some method of breaking up such associations, accompanied by systematic training under healthy conditions, would be advantageous. . . . The master feels very strongly that what the men require is to be given continuous work, which they are able to do, and to be separated the one from the other. He regards the workhouse as a kind of club-house, in which they put up with a certain amount of inconvenience, but have very pleasant evenings.\*'

Another witness who has been in close contact with this class for many years, says:

'The pauper in the workhouse intends to be there; he is either going to be there or in some other institution all the days of his life. My experience is that the average have been in from ten to twelve years, and some of them nineteen years, and they are young men now.

'The workhouse is no deterrent to any man. The workhouse simply harbours them, and as long as the workhouses exist, these men will exist.

'That is your experience, not only from Poplar, but from elsewhere?—That is my experience of fourteen years, not only in Poplar, but in the provinces, in large provincial towns.

'Would you say from your experience that that is one of the defects of the present system of Poor Law administration—that the workhouse is not a deterrent?—It is not. I say my experience is

that it does not matter whether trade is good or bad, it is immaterial. When trade was good, and there was the Boer War and the Coronation, we had the same class of men in the Poplar Workhouse; it makes no difference whether trade was good or bad, they were still there. It is simply a kind of thing that grows and gets into the bones, and it will take years to get it out; it wants a moral and mental instructor. It is like taking a child by the hand and teaching it to walk, to get those men to work properly and be independent.

The master of another London workhouse stated :

‘ This class of man is well-known to the master of every London workhouse as the able-bodied loafer. As a rule, he is a strong, healthy fellow, knowing no trade, evincing great dislike to work, and possessing all the attributes of the soft-shelled crab, willing to live upon the fruits of the labour of the worker, so long as he can avoid the sharing of responsibility himself.

‘ There is no doubt that the moment this class of man becomes an inmate, so surely does he deteriorate into a worse character still. Unless rigorously dealt with and made to work under strict supervision he has a fairly good time in the House, and after a month or so he has mastered every trick of the trade, and becomes a confirmed in and outer, taking his day’s pleasure by merely giving the necessary notice, returning the same evening more contented than ever with his lot in the House. Something for nothing is degrading the man, until all the manhood has left him and there remains for the rate-payers to keep an idle, dissolute remnant.’ \*

If it is asked why these men are not ‘ rigorously dealt with,’ the answer is that it is because the workhouse is a general workhouse, containing all classes of inmates of whom the men in question form only a small proportion.

‘ Particularly if it is an overcrowded workhouse, it is impossible to prevent the able-bodied class sharing in the comfort, and I may say luxuries, of the older ones; you cannot prevent that class finding the conditions of life in a mixed workhouse, such as, as a matter of fact, they are not entitled to, and which they ought not to share in.’

The effect is just as bad upon women as upon men. The following indictment of the system from a witness who had been twelve years chaplain at a London workhouse is borne out by much which the Commission have heard and seen in other quarters :

‘ After an experience of some twelve years there is,’ he says, ‘ no doubt in my mind that life in the workhouse deteriorates mentally,

morally, and physically the habitual inmates. Indeed, the life of these people is better described as more or less a miserable existence than a life. It must be admitted that the mental capacity of the average person who drifts into the workhouse is of a low order, but nevertheless, I have seen in countless instances a gradual deterioration of intellect owing to the lack of almost all incentive to use the brain. The inmate finds at very least the necessities of life, and in many places far more than the necessities of life, provided for him with scarcely any thought or effort on his part, and in the majority of cases the sole ideas that fill the mind are to get as much to eat and as much sleep, and as large an amount of immunity from even the lightest task as possible. A large number of cases has come under my notice of young persons of both sexes who on their first admission to the workhouse have felt their position and surroundings most keenly, and yet in a very short space of time have found the life so congenial and free from responsibility and need of exertion that they made no effort to leave it, and after their discharge return to it as soon as possible. I have also seen many young people admitted who were at first bright and willing to perform their light duties, but who, under the influence of their associates, soon grow lazy and unwilling to do anything, though physically well able to work. Then follow short sentences for refusing to perform their tasks, and soon they become incorrigible rogues and vagabonds, and the result is—the habitual criminal. Again, the ill-effect of the increasing tendency to make the life easier and to increase the dietary and general comfort of the inmate is shown in the increasing number of admissions of those who, earning wages for a portion of the year outside, place their money in safe keeping and enter the workhouse regularly for periods of rest at the ratepayers' expense. I have come across many such cases, such people easily learn to complain of mysterious weaknesses, aches and pains which are hard to disprove, the supposed possession of which entitles them to the best of fare and medical comforts which the institution has to offer.' In conclusion, 'the rapidly growing opinion among the poorer classes seems to be expressed by the remark of a man to me last week. "So long as I can get sixteen ounces of pie for my dinner and my two children kept for life, and they don't ask me to do any more than polish the stair bannisters, I'm not going to work."'\*

While the general workhouse thus fails as an instrument of deterrence, and proves rather a means of further degeneration for the able-bodied, it is hardly less a failure in many places with respect to the other classes resorting to it. For the children it is peculiarly unsuitable, even at its best; and this has been very generally recognised by both central and local authorities. Nevertheless, on January 1, 1908, 16,221 children were still being maintained in the workhouse, and many of these were found

\* Part IV. Para. 191.

by the Commissioners to be living under conditions which were obviously unsatisfactory.

For the aged, again, the general workhouse is often wholly unsuitable. Sometimes, indeed, in a small country workhouse, where there are a capable master and matron and few or no able-bodied inmates, the old people lead a quiet contented life, with many little duties and privileges to vary its monotony. But in the larger workhouses the conditions are altogether unsuitable for old people. Even where the buildings are most 'up to date,' and even extravagant in their equipment, the life in them is dreary in the extreme with its rigid routine and absence of interests. In some places 'classification' by merit has improved the lot of the select few, but the following notes made by Commissioners on their visits illustrate what may happen :—

1. 'The inmates, over 900 in number, were congregated in large rooms, without any attempt to employ their time or cheer their lives. There was a marked absence of any human interest, and though the superintendent and matron impressed us favourably it was impossible to avoid feeling that the lives of the inmates were not merely wanting in colour, but were aimless and listless. On more than one occasion there have been offers from outside to brighten the Sunday service, but they have been refused by the guardians owing to religious difficulties. It could not be better described than as a "human warehouse." The dormitories, which in some cases accommodated as many as sixty inmates, were so full of beds as to make it impossible to provide chairs, or to walk, except sideways, between them.'

2. 'The . . . "Home" which we visited in the afternoon seemed to us defective in every particular. It is rented by the . . . Union and used as an overflow house for the aged inmates from . . . The rooms were low, ill-lighted, and hopelessly overcrowded. The men were, in many cases, lounging in the bedrooms, there being no chairs except in the dining-hall, and there was a total absence of books or newspapers—as far as we saw—and it is impossible to conceive a more dismal and hopeless asylum for age. The administration consists of but two officers for 268 inmates. The officer in charge, however, stated that they had no difficulty in enforcing such discipline as was necessary. The only outdoor space available for the inmates was an asphalted roof-yard, some 35 feet by 25 feet, up so many flights of stairs that a large proportion of the inmates were unable to mount to it.' \*

Nor can it be urged in favour of the general workhouse that it has the advantage of cheapness, even as regards the aged. It is pointed out in the Report that at Kingston-upon-Hull cottage

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\* Part IV. Para. 329.

homes were provided for the old people at a cost of 30*l.* per bed, as compared with 286*l.* per bed in a newly built London workhouse; while at Woolwich a home for forty-two aged women has been provided at a cost of 51*l.* 10*s.* 11*d.* per bed, and the cost of salaries works out at 1*l.* 9*s.* 6*d.* per inmate per annum, as compared with 2*l.* 14*s.* 8*d.* at the workhouse of the same union.\* As an institution for the able-bodied, the unnecessary costliness of the general workhouse is even more marked.

‘It has been found, for instance, by the Poplar Guardians that the able-bodied pauper can be housed at a cost of 14*l.* per bed in their country workhouse at Laindon, as against 140*l.* per bed, which is the lowest sum at which a workhouse for the able-bodied can be provided in London.’ †

Another large class of inmates for whom the general workhouse has proved to be eminently unsuitable consists of the unmarried mothers who come in for their confinements. To the worst of these it serves to facilitate a career of profligacy and immorality; to the best it is a school of evil, where their teachers are the depraved women with whom they are associated. A very experienced witness stated:

‘A great deal has been said in favour of the classification of the aged poor and the withdrawal of children from workhouses and infirmaries, but nowhere is classification more needed than in the maternity wards. The unavoidable and close intercourse between the young girl, who often enters upon motherhood comparatively innocent, and the older woman who is lost to all sense of shame and who returns again and again to the maternity ward for the birth of her illegitimate children, constitutes a grave danger. Too often the older woman invites the friendless girl to share her home on leaving, and so leads her on to further ruin.’ ‡

There are other classes in the workhouse whom it is most desirable to have dealt with by experts in separate institutions, such as the feeble-minded and epileptic. It is a painful fact, *e.g.*, that in many workhouses sane epileptics are forced to live with imbeciles, and too often sink into imbecility themselves, when by proper care and treatment they might be largely if not completely cured.

Thus the case for breaking up the general workhouse, and assigning the various classes of inmates to institutions where they would receive appropriate treatment, is overwhelmingly strong. If objection is raised on the score of expense the answer is, that in certain cases it may be actually very much cheaper, while in

\* Part IV. Para. 354.

† Part IV. Para. 202.

‡ Part VIII. Para. 154.



others the extra expense would in a comparatively short time amply repay itself. To save the young unmarried mothers from further contamination and to restore them to self-respect and independence, would stop one of the most serious sources of pauperism. To check the threatening increase in able-bodied inmates, and to constrain those who cannot be restored to independence to earn at least a portion of their maintenance, will all tend to greater economy, and to complete the severance of the children from association with the workhouse will be to complete their severance from pauperism in the future.

But the change would, no doubt, involve greatly increased expenditure if it were proposed that in every union there should be a separate institution for each class. This would be an impossible policy. In many unions the number of able-bodied, *e.g.*, or of epileptics, is so small that it would be absurd to provide an institution for them alone. It is for this reason that the abolition of the general workhouse involves a further fundamental change, the change in the area of administration from the union to the county. It is proposed that in future the responsibility for all the functions connected with the maintenance and assistance of the destitute out of public funds should rest with a county authority, which would have control over all the institutions within the county which are at present under the guardians, and would further be charged with the duty of providing suitable institutions for each class. It would not be essential, nor even desirable, that all these institutions should be new buildings. The existing buildings would be utilised as far as possible, but assigned each to a special function. What would be essential would be the proper treatment of all according to their needs, a treatment conspicuously absent in the present workhouses.

It is at this point in the argument that the proposed abolition of the workhouse shows itself to be closely connected with the abolition of the guardians. It is natural to ask why the guardians themselves should not be left to carry out this reform, and to combine among themselves for the purpose of organising their institutions on the new basis. It would seem to be just as easy for them as for a new authority to do all that is required.

The only obstacle lies in the guardians themselves. Long experience has shown that they won't do it. For over thirty years the Local Government Board has been calling their attention to the necessity, and urging upon them to take action. In its third Report, 1873-4, it laid stress upon it :—

' We attach the utmost importance to this improvement of the classification of indoor paupers, which we believe to be a necessary

condition of the maintenance of that discipline which lies at the root of an effective administration of indoor relief.'

And it added that

'classification cannot be effected, except at an enormous and almost prohibitive cost, otherwise than by the combination of several Boards of Guardians for this purpose. Their existing workhouses would then become available for the separate accommodation of various classes of indoor paupers chargeable to the several combined areas.'\*

In the Poor Law Act of 1879 facilities were offered to Boards of Guardians to enter into combination 'for any purpose connected with the administration of the relief of the poor.' But the Act is permissive only, and has been used to a very small extent. One of the most experienced Poor Law inspectors says :

'There is nothing on which the average guardian is more sensitive than any change in his area. He looks upon it as his right, and he does not like to be mixed up with the neighbours at all. It is quite impossible, except by general legislation, to get over that prejudice' . . . 'I think it is one of those things, which, if it were left to the Local Government Board would not be done ; I mean to say, even if we had a recommendation in favour of it, I do not think we could do it.'†

Thus it seems worse than useless to wait any longer for the guardians to carry out the reform. It must be done by a new authority, removed from temptation to the petty exclusiveness which has so long stood in the way. But before entering further into the question of the guardians' failure, it is necessary to note a reservation which the majority of the Commission have been careful to make. Amongst other attempts made by the minority to discredit the Report of the majority is the accusation that the latter have been guilty of grave injustice to the merits of the guardians. To have allowed any consideration to have influenced them towards minimising the defects they have met with in certain unions would have been a serious dereliction of duty. But the Commission were aware of the danger that their description might be taken by the reader as of universal application, and were careful to guard themselves in the following passage :

'Such instances as these, numerous as they were, are not given as typical of the general way in which the work is done. In many unions the administration of relief is conducted in a very different way. Procedure is orderly, applicants are treated with courtesy and kindness, guardians weigh carefully the needs of those who come before them, and adapt their treatment to those needs. For

\* Part IV. Para. 162.

† Part IV. Para. 164.

proof of this we may refer to our printed evidence and to the reports of visits paid by ourselves. We welcome the opportunity of putting on record our high appreciation of the steadfastness and wisdom which have marked the work of such Boards. We earnestly hope that, if our recommendations take effect, every effort will be made to secure the continued services of such guardians. But there is at present no adequate means of raising the standard of work to this high level, nor of ensuring that the condition of things to be found in many unions shall be impossible for the future.\*

It was made clear to the Commission in many ways that the present system often fails to secure the services of the right people on Boards of Guardians. To the corruption and fraud recently exposed in certain London unions, the Report alludes only briefly; the circumstances are too fresh in the public mind to need recapitulation. Bad and careless administration may be even more serious in its effects than actual dishonesty, and is far more prevalent. The work calls for great discrimination, good judgement and impartiality, and in many places these qualities seem to have been wholly lacking. Many take up the work from a political point of view, and seem incapable of appreciating the important issues involved in it. One witness stated in evidence:

‘I have now been a guardian for twelve years, and have been through four triennial elections. In my opinion, each of the four Boards elected has been less good than the last. The men on it are proposed and elected without, as it seems to me, the slightest regard for the position and work of a guardian. They are chosen and elected (often avowedly so) in order to try the strength of the political party to which they belong, and to many of them one cannot help thinking that the chief idea in being a guardian is that it brings some notoriety, and may be the first step towards a seat in the City Council—a sort of practising ground for it. Every three years our whole Board goes out, and only about one-third returns. The new two-thirds come totally ignorant of everything to do with Poor Law, not content to wait to learn, not even waiting to understand what is going on in their particular union, much less what has been the history of the Poor Law, and of pauperism, for some years and centuries.’

Strikingly similar evidence comes from another town:

‘Many men simply become guardians as a stepping-stone to the Town Council; they wish to gain confidence in speaking, and use the Board room as a practising ground. . . . They are often ignorant and indifferent, and stand for other reasons than their knowledge of or interest in the poor.’

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\* Part IV. Para. 71.

To seek to gain election by promises of relief on easy terms is a common practice, and regarded even by honest persons as venial. Among the evidence will be found copies of electioneering placards which show the extremes to which this form of bribery is pushed. The evidence as to the unfitness of many guardians was further corroborated by the experiences of the Commissioners in many places visited by them. They quote in the Report passages from their notes describing the procedure they witnessed at meetings of the guardians—the confusion, the noise, the want of deliberation, the absence of knowledge about the cases, the lack of impartiality or judgement in dealing with them, the undue influence exercised by interested parties, and, above all, the frequent absence of any feeling of responsibility. This was most marked in their dealings with persons to whom they granted out-relief. The Local Government Board, through its inspectors, has insisted that the institutions and their administration should be kept up to a certain level; but within the limits of the general orders regulating out-relief the administration of this form of relief has been left entirely in the hands of the guardians without any central supervision. Hence we find the widest divergence prevailing amongst the different unions in this department of the work. The main defects noted by the Commissioners may be summed up under three heads.

First, the relief given is frequently inadequate to the need of the recipient. The custom which most frequently prevails is to give according to a predetermined scale, quite irrespective of the circumstances of the particular case. This scale varies very much in different places; in the case of old people it is sometimes as low as 1*s.* 6*d.* a week, sometimes as high as 5*s.* In the case of widows with children the variations are still greater. The following cases from different parts of the country illustrate this point\* :

1. 'Altogether seventeen cases were heard and the applicants seen. The majority of these cases were widows with children, the relief being on an unusually adequate scale. Thus a widow with three children dependent and earning 14*s.* a week and some food, was given 7*s.* a week relief, bringing her total weekly income up to 21*s.* and food. In another case a widow with four dependent children and one boy earning 15*s.* a week, with a total income to the family of 25*s.*, received 7*s.* a week, bringing their total income up to 32*s.* a week for six persons. The rents mentioned were high, varying from 4*s.* to 6*s.* There was no fixed scale of relief, but it seemed to average out very uniformly at 5*s.* 6*d.* a head, including the mother and children.

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\* Part IV. Para. 408.

2. 'The following cases illustrate the methods of the guardians—*c.g.*, a man and his wife, aged twenty-four and twenty-two with two small children; man broke his collar bone, and had been under treatment as out-patient in the general infirmary. Amount of relief which had been given during the previous month, 3s. and one loaf. The woman was looking after her husband and was earning nothing, and the rent was 2s. 6d. Thus leaving a family of four persons 6d. a week and a loaf to live upon.'

3. 'Woman aged thirty-three, with three children, aged respectively 7, 5, 2. Husband sent to Canada by public subscription six months ago. Earning 3s. Relief 2s. 6d. per week.'

4. 'Woman with five children, aged respectively 11, 9, 5, 2,  $\frac{1}{2}$ . Husband in prison (twenty-one days) for non-payment of rates. He had only been out of prison five weeks, having served twelve months for felony. Family relieved during that time with 4s. per week.'

5. 'We were told that there was no scale of relief, but we found that in practice a widow was supposed to keep herself and one child, and would receive 1s. 6d. a week relief for every child in addition to one.'

6. 'The scale as regards widows is 4s. for the mother, 2s. each for two children, and 1s. for the rest.'

The second defect is that relief is often given quite unnecessarily, and this frequently in the same unions which are giving inadequate relief. The allowance which may be insufficient in one case is superfluous in another. The following instances are typical of many others:—

1. 'Aged couple, three sons at home, earning 25s. 8d., 27s., 22s. 11d. respectively; total 3l. 13s. 7d. for five persons. Relief was continued.'

2. 'Couple, aged respectively 36 and 68, with two young children, 12 and 8. Son Edmund, not at home, earning 24s.

Son Llewellyn, 19, at home, earning . . .	s.	d.
Son B., 16, at home, earning . . .	34	9
Daughter, M. G., at home, earning . . .	8	6
	7	0
Total . . .	50	3

Relief, 7s. 6d.; rent, 12s. 6d. per month.\*

The third, and perhaps most serious, defect is that in many places 'out-relief is being given to subsidise dirt, disease, and immorality.' The following are some of the cases noted by the Commission in which 'the strictest enforcement of an

'indoor policy would have been far more humane, as well as 'wiser':

1. 'An old Irishwoman, moving feebly about a room crowded with dirty lumber, and herself in the last stages of dirt and decrepitude. She gets 3s. relief, pays 2s. 3d. rent, and has no other income except when she can get lodgers; she had two mill girls with her, one with a child, but the child was taken away with typhoid last week, and now she has no one. The place is hopelessly dirty and insanitary, and ought to be closed.'

2. 'Mrs. P., aged 60, lives with her daughter (about 35 years old), and receives 4s. per week; there is a room downstairs, dark and filthy, almost devoid of furniture, and one room upstairs. The daughter lives with a labourer, but is not married to him. The union has resulted in two wretched, ill-clad, dirty children, aged three and one.'

3. 'Mrs. W., a widow with five children, receives 10s. per week. She is a notorious drunkard, and has lately been turned out of a house in a street where drunkards abound, because her drunken habits disturbed the whole street. When we called she refused to open the door; the relieving officer concluded she was drunk.'

4. 'T., married, with three children, is partly paralysed, and seems mentally deficient. His wife is crippled by rheumatism. The guardians allow 6s. per week for man and wife, and 6s. for the children. The tenement consists of two rooms, and there are living in the house in addition to the foregoing, Mrs. T.'s mother, one male lodger about 40, and Mrs. T.'s sister with an illegitimate child. In these two rooms it will be observed there are five adults, three children and one baby. I was told by the relieving officer that the guardians do not attach importance either to cleanliness, sanitation, decency, or the ordinary standards of morality. And, as a result of my own observation, I am prepared to endorse this statement.'

5. 'Case of phthisis. Man been ill three years (56 years of age), been getting out-relief for three years. Has five children, youngest 8 months, another expected. Wife, aged 41, getting 12s. 6d. from parish. The children are made up as follows:—A girl, 20, out of work, living at home; a son, 17, working as a miner, earning 16s. a week; and three young children. The whole seven sleep in one filthy dirty room with a gabled roof, at the sides about 3 feet high, running up to 8 feet in the middle. The room was about 14 feet by 8 feet.\*'

The gravity of these conditions was felt so strongly by the Commission that some of the inspectors of the Local Government Board were asked to ascertain whether similar conditions prevailed in their districts. The results of their investigation show that, while such conditions are not typical of out-relief in general, they nevertheless 'occur with sufficient frequency to be a

\* Part IV. Para. 262.

‘ very potent influence in perpetuating pauperism and propagating disease.’ The following extract is from one of their Reports :

‘ This class (Class C.) contains those concerning whom the present inquiry is made. Too frequently they represent the most demoralised and diseased of the population. They include some epileptics, imbeciles and cripples of the lowest class. Their homes are nearly always to be found in the poorest quarters where population is densest. Cleanliness and ventilation are not considered of any account. The furniture is always of the most dilapidated kind. The beds generally consist of dirty palliasses or mattresses with very scanty covering. The atmosphere is offensive, even fetid, and the clothing of the individuals, old and young, is ragged and filthy. Bankrupt in pocket and character this class look to the rates to support them, and are never backward in making application. The children are neglected, furnish the complaints of the National Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children inspectors, and fill the homes of the guardians. The men are drunkards, gamblers, workshy, corner boys, and often criminals. The women are too often immoral, as well as unclean and neglectful. *Souteneurs* may be included in this class . . . it is impossible with the present powers to deal satisfactorily with the various subsections of it which come before the guardians and the sanitary authorities. The guardians feel forced to give relief to bad cases because of the children, and for fear of some allegation of want of consideration to destitute ruffians or drunkards.’\*

The result of these deficiencies in the administration of out-relief are perhaps most serious in the case of the children. The census taken on March 20, 1906, showed that 178,730 children were being wholly or partially maintained on outdoor relief; † and the special investigations instituted by the Commission into the condition of these children showed that many of them are being brought up in most unsatisfactory surroundings, and with very insufficient nourishment. It seems likely, in short, that amongst these children are many who will become paupers in the future.

If now we turn to consider the reason for this defective administration, we find it attributed to the irresponsible attitude of the guardians and their officials towards this branch of the work. This irresponsibility shows itself very frequently in their deliberate ignorance of the resources of the persons applying to them for relief. The guardians do not care to know the financial position of the applicants, and the relieving officers do not trouble to ascertain it. Hence the very basis of a wise decision in each case is lacking, and the result is either inadequacy or

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\* Part IV. Para. 104.

† Part II. Para. 104.

superfluity of relief. From the clerk of one large urban union we hear that the guardians

‘ consider that as long as they can salve their consciences by giving out-relief of some sort they have dealt with the case ; but whether that is satisfactory or not I think it is for others to decide. I consider there are numberless cases in the West Derby Union who ought to be receiving considerably more than they are receiving ; but it is very difficult to get guardians to understand that it is better to have 500 on outdoor relief at 7s. 6d. than 1500 at 2s. 6d.’ \*

This irresponsible attitude of the guardians is further shown by their indifference to the use which may be made of the relief after it has been granted :

‘ Potent factors towards producing such a state of things as that suggested by the Commissioners are the views taken by a not inconsiderable proportion of guardians : First, that the disposal of the relief granted by them is a matter for which not they but the recipients are responsible ; and, secondly, that however small the relief given to a person with little or no other apparent means of subsistence, it is no one’s business to inquire further if the applicant is satisfied.’ . . . . ‘ The first of these views . . . . is almost an incitement to a careless parent to waste on drink money which should be devoted to the nourishment and clothing of the children, while the second may mean a bargain between a parsimonious Board of Guardians and liberty or licence-loving paupers for the lowest terms on which they will keep out of the workhouse.’ †

These, then, are some of the reasons which have led the Commission to think that popular election has failed to give us the right type of administrator for the work. Whether if there were a more genuine and widespread interest in the subject better men and women might be elected it is difficult to say. At present the practical interest, as shown in guardians’ elections, is very small. In London in 1907 the proportion of the electorate which voted at guardians’ elections was only 28·1 per cent., and similar conditions seem to prevail in other parts of the country. It is fair to assume, therefore, that the public will not be greatly concerned to preserve the ‘ democratic ’ nature of the body, so far as it involves direct election.

The question thus arises, What system might reasonably be expected to give better results ? It is here that the two sections on the Commission part company, and have elaborated different schemes for the future. The Majority hold that under better administrators the work may be so broadened and improved

\* Part IV. Para. 256.

† Part IV. Para. 267.



as to give the best results attainable ; the Minority hold that it is the principle of the work which has been at fault, and not the administrators. The Majority believe that there must still be a special authority devoted to the work of maintaining and restoring to independence those who are thrown, or who throw themselves, upon public funds ; the Minority declare that no such special authority is needed, and that the work should be divided out amongst various committees performing specific services. They would, to summarise their scheme, hand the children to the Education Committee ; the sick and the permanently incapacitated, the infants under school age, and the aged needing institutional care to the Health Committee ; the mentally defective of all grades and ages to the Asylums Committee ; and the aged to whom pensions are awarded to the Pensions Committee of the county or county borough council respectively.\* These various committees would be responsible to and supervised by five departments of the National Government ; whilst yet another department, the Ministry of Labour, would deal with the able-bodied independently of local authorities. Finally, to co-ordinate and sanction the work of all the other authorities there would be yet another new authority—the Registrar of Public Assistance, appointed by the county or county borough council. It is this officer who is really to be the judge as to what is the proper treatment in any given case, to provide ‘ due consideration, not merely of the need in respect of treatment of any individual, but of the circumstances of the family as a whole.’† He is to decide, *e.g.* whether an admirable widow’s home is too insanitary to admit of out-relief ; or whether a feeble-minded girl may safely be maintained at home, or must be sent to an institution. He is to take into consideration all the circumstances—educational, moral, sanitary and economic—and sanction or reject the proposals of the various committees accordingly.‡ He is also to determine all questions of charge and recovery, and to adjudicate as national pension officer on applications for pensions. This last function would ‘ entail the concurrence of the Treasury in the appointment and dismissal, and thus secure in the least invidious manner that practical security of tenure which seems so desirable.’§ Finally, he is to be director of a receiving house, which sounds perilously like a revived general workhouse, to which all ‘ omitted cases ’ are to be sent until he comes to assign them to their appropriate institutions. In short, he is to be autocratic, ‘ entirely independent of the committees,’ and with a ‘ practical

\* P. 1032.

P. 1015.

‡ P. 1017.

§ P. 1018.

'security of tenure' which would make him independent of the county council itself.

The fundamental flaw in the scheme is the false assumption upon which it is based that 'destitution' constitutes no distinguishing feature in a case calling for special skill and knowledge and treatment; hence that to hand over the destitute children to the education authority and the destitute sick to the sanitary authority would add nothing to the duties they already perform. If children could really be brought up on education only, and the sick supported as well as cured by medical advice, the policy might be sound; as it is, it means that each committee would become a separate relief agency, and we should have not less than five—if we include the registrar, six—authorities applying public funds, not to 'special services' only, but to the maintenance of destitution.

Compared with this scheme, that of the Majority, based upon preserving one authority for the maintenance of the destitute while utilising the 'special services' of other authorities where needed, has the great advantage of comparative simplicity. It has the further advantage of being more democratic, in so far as that is an advantage. While withdrawing the administration from the sphere of direct popular election, the proposal of the Majority nevertheless leaves it in the hands of an authority appointed by a directly elected body, and provides that half of its members may be members of that directly elected body. The county or county borough council is to nominate a statutory committee to be the public assistance authority of the county (or county borough). This committee will be subject to periodical renewal, one-third of its members retiring annually. It would thus be as directly responsible to the ratepayers as any other committee of the council, and far more so than a registrar with practically permanent tenure.

The statutory committee will naturally and necessarily work partly through local committees of its own. This involves no complexity. It is the ordinary devolution of work practised by every public body. In appointing these committees it is to include a certain proportion of persons nominated by the urban or rural district councils, thus ensuring that local interests shall be represented. And the desire of the Commission to secure the services of past guardians of approved worth shows itself in the provision that the persons so nominated shall be experienced in the local administration of public assistance or other cognate work.

It is these local committees which will be directly responsible for dealing with particular cases of distress. They will work in

union areas, and will in some respects resemble the present Boards of Guardians. But it is hoped that they will set before them a different and higher ideal of work—an ideal which is expressed in the definite instructions that they shall ‘decide upon the best methods of assisting applicants with a view to removing the cause of distress.’ It has not been recognised in criticisms of the Report that it is this higher ideal which the Commission desire to express in giving to the new system the name of Public Assistance rather than Poor Law relief. It is a distinction based not upon mere sentiment, but upon a real difference of content. Poor Law relief, as at present understood, aims mainly at the maintenance of pauperism at the lowest level; Public Assistance would strike at the root of pauperism by attempting to deal so effectively with all dependent people as to raise them ultimately out of pauperism. In some departments of the work, and by some Boards of Guardians more than others, this policy of cure and of restoration already prevails. In dealing with those of the children for whom they have accepted full responsibility, and often in dealing with the sick, Guardians have kept in view the importance of restoration to independence. But the Commission are convinced that the administration must

‘extend its policy both of cure and of prevention still further, and it is in this sense that we have made our recommendations. More especially, it must extend its policy of making the giving of relief conditional upon the recipient accepting a way of life likely to restore him to independence. This is no new principle. It was the leading note of the 1834 administration, and has been so ever since, that one class—the able-bodied—should be relieved only under certain conditions. It is now necessary to apply the principle to other classes. It has proved, indeed, impossible to push a curative policy any further in its absence; sickness cannot be cured, either in institutions or at home, unless the patient will accept conditions; economic evils cannot be combated unless those who suffer from them will conform to conditions; moral weakness cannot be strengthened unless the authorities have power to impose conditions. And what those conditions are to be must become manifest through a careful and progressive study of the causes of pauperism.’

As an essential step towards enforcing conditions, the Commission have recommended that powers should be granted through the justices to detain certain classes of persons applying for or receiving public assistance for prolonged treatment. Persons, *e.g.*, who wilfully and persistently refuse to maintain themselves and their families should be sent to a detention colony, where they could be made to work; persons, again,

suffering from certain contagious diseases should be detained under treatment until they be no longer a source of danger to the community. At present there is no possibility of dealing effectively with these and analogous cases, owing to their liberty to come and go as they like; and without a curtailment of that liberty no advance can be made in dealing with the lowest and most noxious form of pauperism.

Perhaps there is no point on which a difference of principle asserts itself more strongly in the two Reports than in their treatment of the question of medical relief. The Minority would hand over the whole of the functions of medical relief, including provision for birth and infancy and institutional provision for the aged, to the local health authorities.\* They recognise, however, the incapacity of very many of these (*i.e.* those in non-county boroughs of less than 10,000 population, urban districts of less than 20,000 population, and rural sanitary districts 'whatever their size') to fulfil even their present duties; hence, in order to carry out their scheme an entire reorganisation of the sanitary service would be required. When reorganised, this service is to supersede not merely the medical service of the Poor Law, but also, it may be inferred, a large amount of medical work outside the Poor Law. For there is perhaps nothing more significant in this Report than its avowed hostility to all forms of medical insurance whereby the working classes make provision against times of sickness, as 'inimical alike to the medical profession and to the public health.'† The medical profession itself is not spared, but is accused more or less broadly of pandering to the medical superstitions of the sick, and seeking popularity by prescribing the wrong treatment.

The Majority, on the other hand, regard it as being of primary importance to encourage and organise voluntary institutions—both provident and charitable—to the fullest extent. They are characteristic and valuable developments; and the provident institutions more especially are full of promise as indicating the way to a complete independence of the working classes. A system which involved the disappearance, or even a check to the growth of these, would stand condemned for that cause alone.

Hence it is that in their scheme of medical reform the Majority aim at the encouragement and organisation of existing institutions, rather than their supersession. They fully recognise that at present there is much confusion and overlapping, that in some places there is a superabundance, in others a lack of

\* P. 1012.

† Pp. 871-2.

medical relief ; but they think that these defects may be largely overcome if there is some recognised authority, charged with the duty of co-ordinating and supplementing the various agencies. Moreover, they see no reason to distrust either the competency or the good faith of general practitioners in their treatment of the poor. They would, therefore, make it a part of the function of the County Public Assistance Authority, while providing medical assistance for those really unable to obtain it in any other way, both to co-ordinate as far as possible all existing agencies, and to promote a system of Provident Dispensaries throughout their area. To assist them in this important work they would ' appoint a committee from among ' their own number, to which shall be added representatives ' of the Health Committee of the County Council, or of the ' County Borough Council, and of the local branch or branches ' of the British Medical Association.' This committee would have power to co-opt ' representatives of local hospitals, county ' or county borough nursing associations, dispensaries, and ' registered friendly societies.'

In their preliminary treatment of the question of unemployment there is, perhaps, more substantial agreement between the two Reports than on the question of the Poor Law. Both agree in the condemnation of relief works as aggravating the evil ; both urge the necessity of striking at causes rather than applying panaceas to symptoms ; both advocate the establishment of Labour Exchanges and the revision of our elementary education. Both, again, propose the establishment of suitable institutions for the maintenance, training, and, if necessary, the detention of the adult unemployed ; and both favour (though in different degrees) the encouragement of out-of-work benefit, or insurance against unemployment. But the fundamental difference becomes apparent when we find that the Minority desire the creation of a new State Department, or Ministry of Labour, upon which should devolve ' the duty ' of so organising the National Labour Market as to prevent or ' to minimise unemployment,' and of maintaining and training the unemployed.\* This Ministry of Labour is to have no less than six distinct and separately organised divisions, each with its own assistant secretary. To facilitate the work of organising the labour market Government is to set aside every ten years forty millions to be employed in the lean years of the period ; and this ten years' programme is to include extensive works of afforestation, coast protection, and land reclamation.

\* P. 1215.

IN place of this imposing programme, the Majority, adhering to their principle of one authority to assist those who fail of self-maintenance, place the duty of assisting the unemployed upon the Public Assistance Authority, co-operating as far as possible with voluntary agencies, and dealing with individual cases according to the circumstances. They will have at their disposal all the resources of the 'Ministry of Labour,' except that of drawing upon the National Exchequer; and the country will be saved from the great danger of a Department of State which is to be held responsible for providing work when private employers fail to do so. That the State, acting through its present Departments, can do something to regularise employment, just as private employers can, the Majority also believe, and one of their recommendations is that 'Government Departments and local and public authorities should be enjoined (a) to regularise their work as far as possible; (b) to endeavour, as far as possible, to undertake their irregular work 'when the general demand for labour is slack.' But this is a very different matter from creating a Minister who would be responsible for preventing unemployment, and exposed to the greatest political pressure.

The question of unemployment is, of course, one of the most difficult with which the Commission had to deal. Nothing was brought out in evidence more clearly than the complete failure of most of the attempts to deal with it during the last quarter of a century. There is, indeed, strong reason to think that the policy initiated by Mr. Chamberlain in 1886, of throwing upon the municipalities the responsibility for finding work for the unemployed, has greatly aggravated the evil in large towns by increasing the numbers of those who think it every one's duty but their own to provide for the time of winter slackness. The preference for casual labour over steady employment has been encouraged by the widespread system of granting doles of work to the unemployed, and no one to-day seems to think of expecting that a man should make any provision for winter slackness, even though he should be in regular work for the greater part of the year. The distress committees established under the Unemployed Workmen Act were intended to introduce a better system, to select their cases more carefully among the high-class workmen suffering from exceptional circumstances, and assist them more thoroughly; but they, too, have failed. It is true that in a few places good work has been done in emigration and migration, and useful experiments have been made in farm colonies. But they have intensified the feeling that the easiest way out

of the difficulty is to throw the responsibility upon the State, and have added to the painful spectacle of individuals scrambling for doles of relief work that of local authorities scrambling for doles from the Exchequer. And all the while it is becoming more and more clear that the relief is going to subsidise and increase the class of casual irresponsible labour, and hardly at all to assist the endeavours of the steady workmen to preserve their independence.

The difficulties in the industrial situation which lead to unemployment are well brought out in the survey of industrial developments which forms the first chapter of Part VI. If the distress committees had done nothing else they would at least have served to show that 'unemployment' is of many kinds, and cannot be met by the simple idea of 'tiding over' slack times. The class for whom this remedy is primarily applicable, and for whose sake the distress committees were initiated, consists of those who suffer from the cyclical depressions of trade. These depressions occur with more or less regularity at varying periods, and bring with them unemployment and distress among the wage-earners. But it has become clear that in addition to these there are large numbers of men who are subject to what has been called 'under-employment.' Perhaps the most prominent of these are the casual workers, the men who are engaged from hour to hour, and day to day, and seldom get a full week's work. There is always a congestion of labour of this kind at the docks, and other industries are tending more and more to employ casual workers. In bad times the distress committees are swamped with men of this type, although the idea of 'tiding over' is incapable of affording a real remedy for the difficulties of their position.

Then there are the 'seasonal' workers, whose slack time comes round regularly every year, and who certainly ought not to be dependent upon charity at every recurrence. Some of these are men of two trades, *e.g.* gas-makers in winter and brick-makers in summer. Some employers will themselves organise their work so as to employ the same set of hands first at one and then at another branch of manufacture. To institute relief works on their behalf is 'subsidising certain industries, and encouraging employers to keep down their permanent staffs and trust to getting extra labour, whenever wanted, at the relief works.'

Finally, there are the so-called 'unemployable.'

'These are the people whom no ordinary employer would willingly employ, not necessarily because they are literally incapable of doing

work, but because they are not up to the standards required by the industries which they wish to enter or remain in. The word, unfortunately, has obtained a large extension of late years. It has come to mean not only the imbecile, the drunkard, the impotent, but also the person who cannot conform to the requirements of a highly artificial and exacting system of industry, or find an employer who can give the time and pains to find him a place where his services are worth a wage.'

It is a common and popular fallacy of the day to say that unemployment has nothing to do with character, that character only determines who shall be out of work when the condition of trade has determined that some one shall be. This is true only within very narrow limits. An employer only employs men because they are worth their wages to him; and in determining whether to take an extra hand he must decide according to whether the man can earn the wage or not. Within a narrow range differences of capacity will pass unnoticed until slack times come, and the least efficient are dismissed. But there are many whose inefficiency is such that they cannot find employment in the busiest times, and many whose character makes them such unprofitable servants that they are dismissed as soon as they are found out. And it is a well-known fact that the limits within which variations in character and capacity will be tolerated are becoming narrower every day. As employers carry on business at a smaller profit, it becomes more incumbent upon them to ensure that their instruments of production, whether human or mechanical, are of the highest efficiency. Just as the cultivation of a piece of soil depends upon whether it will pay its rent or not, so the employment of a man depends upon whether he can earn his wage or not. Character and efficiency have never been more important than they are now, and the problem of helping the inefficient and weak characters never more difficult.

In proportion as the problem becomes more clearly defined two points seem to stand out. The first is that our methods of dealing with distress due to unemployment must be very varied, that there is no one panacea, and that each family needs to be considered separately with a view to re-establishing it in independence.

The second point is, that unemployment is a risk incident to all employments, and capable of being met like other risks by insurance. The Majority consider that 'the establishment and promotion of unemployment insurance, especially among unskilled and unorganised labour, is of paramount importance in averting the distress arising from unemployment.' To a



large extent the trade unions already provide out-of-work benefit for their members; but it is, of course, much more difficult for less highly paid and highly organised workers to make such provision. The Commission think that the matter is of such national importance as to justify contribution from public funds, and recommend the appointment of a small Commission or Inter-Departmental Committee of experts and representatives of existing trade benefit organisations to frame a scheme.

The most original, perhaps the most important, feature of the scheme of the Majority is the inclusion of the voluntary charities into the general organisation of relief. Part VII. of their Report deals at length with the charities of the country, and presents a striking picture of the large funds available and the lack of purpose and organisation which often makes them of so little avail.

‘As in the case of Poor Law administration, and especially in the distribution of outdoor relief, we have found great varieties of practice and sometimes a slipshod and purposeless giving which was altogether wasteful and very injurious; so in the case of the charities we have found instances of quite useless and ineffective gifts. The charities, both endowed and voluntary, are often checked and hampered by regulation, tradition, and procedure in such a way as to render them, like the Boards of Guardians, self-centred and exclusive. They are not regarded and utilised as parts of a common organisation, though, however scattered and disconnected they appear, they have by intention been created to fulfil what is after all a common social purpose in many ways and subject to many differences.’ \*

The relation between the charities and the Poor Law is at present one of constant difficulty and cross-purposes. In regard to one large section, indeed, the endowed charities, the definite step has been taken by the Charity Commissioners of declaring that the recipients of Poor Law relief are not entitled to benefit from them. ‘It may be said to be both a rule of law and a settled policy that persons in receipt of Poor Law relief ought not to receive relief from endowed charities also.’ This gives a clear basis of co-operation, according to which the Poor Law deals with one set of cases, while another—the ‘second poor’—are assisted from charitable funds.

But the Charity Commissioners have no jurisdiction over the voluntary charities, and for the most part this basis of co-operation has been absent as between them and the Poor Law.

\* Part VII. Para. 2.

Very largely this has been the fault of the Guardians, who are apt to be jealous of what they consider the interference of voluntary workers, and refuse to recognise or co-operate with them. On the part of the voluntary workers also there is seldom any desire to consult with the Guardians, or to let it be known what cases they are helping. Hence they are constantly duplicating the work of the Guardians, while the 'second poor,' whom they could more appropriately help, are neglected altogether. One potent reason also why so much inadequate outdoor relief is given is that the charitable donors conceal their gifts lest the Guardians should lower their relief, and the Guardians lower their relief because they suspect the charitable donors of concealing their gifts.

The first step towards clearing up the confusion is complete frankness on either side, and this is best attained by a register being kept of all the cases dealt with by each agency. This is necessary even for the endowed charities, owing to the systematic absence of communication between the trustees and the Guardians. The investigators appointed by the Commission to enquire into the subject reported :

'It was our practice to submit lists of the recipients of the various endowed charities to the relieving officers, who marked the names of all those who were on their out-relief books. In every place, apart from these mentioned above, it was found that there were numerous cases in which people were being helped both by charities and the Poor Law.

'At York, when lists (not complete) of the recipients of the charities were submitted by us to the relieving officers, over sixty cases of people receiving out-relief were at once, much to their surprise, recognised by them.' \*

Mutual knowledge is an essential step towards reform, but something more will be needed if good work is to be substituted for the waste and harm which prevails in many places to-day. How great that waste and harm actually is has been made overwhelmingly clear, both by the reports of the special investigators and by the very interesting series of reports sent in from the clergy all over the country through the Diocesan Committees. The following extracts illustrate the point. One witness says of the small endowed charities :

'The benefit from them is received by persons who are not in need. As regards one of the charities, bread is only given to certain people who attend divine service on particular days. The consequence is

that persons who never enter a church on any other occasion flock to it at these times. The doles, therefore, partake of the nature of a bribe for taking part in religious worship, and certainly have anything but a good effect on the recipients, as far as religion is concerned. Once they [people who do not really need the gift] get on the list it is very difficult to strike them off, and it is also very difficult to refuse to give to other people in the same position. I have struck off some. For instance, there was a woman who was keeping a shop and who kept cows and had seven or eight acres of land, and she had benefit from these charities and these doles. In another case there was a widow who was paying 15*l.* a year for her holding, and had a pony and trap and kept cows. They had this charity, and they thought they ought to have it.'

The Ely Report contains some weighty sentences on the administration of endowed charities.

'Our imperfect statistics, which lack the particulars of almost a hundred small parishes, prove that the income of the endowed charities in the diocese exceeds 22,000*l.* Though not a large amount as compared with the funds of some other dioceses, it is large enough if efficiently administered to produce important results. Unhappily the documents before us tend to show that, under existing conditions, the administration neither is nor can be efficient. The mere fact that there are 935 separate trusts is a very serious obstacle. A separate organisation for managing every 20*l.* of the income! But even that is not the worst. A great number of these trusts have an income of from 3*l.* to 15*s.*, sums not large enough to effect any solid good, yet quite large enough to be the objects of intrigue, and the causes of much jealousy and ill-feeling. Only if the administrators are both entirely wise and entirely trusted by the people can the distribution of such funds be innocuous.'

There is also a widespread depreciation of the endowed charities of the small towns. Of the results of their administration at Beverley, one said :

'The dole charities are an absolute waste. The money is taken to the first public-house. They have a bad effect on character and independence. Before Christmas people get themselves up shabbily and touch their hats at street corners. They look on the church as a place out of which there is something to be got. Many of the people live on charity. Cadging is the order of the day. The charities deter people from improving their position.'

At York the incumbent of a city parish said :

'The people come in swarms to the schoolroom, and the gifts do them no good at all. There is no limit of age; people of thirty, and under, get the charity. Prostitutes take a room in the parish

before Christmas and try to get it. It is given to men earning good wages, for instance, a telegraph wire-man, earning 28s. to 30s. a week, with a drunken wife and three or four children. The charities destroy my spiritual position. When I visit the people, they say: "What has Mr.— brought?"'

It is lamentable that the funds which, under good administration, might be made a real succour in times of misfortune should be so often the cause of widespread demoralisation. If the trustees could be brought to agree among one another, and with other agencies, a complete transformation of the present system might easily be made. One witness, the Chairman of a Board of Guardians, suggested that the charities in a parish or town might be pooled to provide—

'A number of small pensions to carefully selected cases, and letting it be known that, unless forfeited by bad conduct, such pensions will be continued through life. In a former parish with which I was connected,' he said, 'a number of small charities, no one of which alone was of sufficient value to do any permanent good, when distributed among all the aged, or all the widows, or all the spinsters of the parish, by being pooled, produced an aggregate sum from which we were able to pay thirteen worn-out folk, all of the classes for which the charities were originally intended, a weekly pension of 3s. 6d. each. All these people must have, but for this charitable help, been on the outdoor relief list at, perhaps, from 2s. to 2s. 6d. each. They had no longer any fear of the money being withheld, provided they behaved themselves reasonably well—all the annoyance and quarrelling caused by frequent distribution of doles was done away with, and the poor rate was relieved to an appreciable extent.'

It seemed to the Commission that the only effective way of bringing about the desired co-operation between endowed and voluntary charities and the Public Assistance Authority, and to raise the work of the former to a higher level, was to give to the charities a recognised and responsible position parallel to that of Public Assistance. It is for this reason that they propose the establishment of Voluntary Aid Committees. 'The Committees would be specially concerned with relief and aid at the home, the personal help of those in distress, the prevention of distress, the visiting of cases of all kinds in connection with applications made to it directly, or in connection with public health or educational authorities.' Thus the Voluntary Aid Committee would include the idea of 'friendly "visiting"' or the "Elberfeld system." The Committees would work in small areas—probably the union area—and be

representative of all recognised institutions engaged in 'social work.' It would be appointed, like the Public Assistance Committee, by a county authority, which would be the Voluntary Aid Council.

'To set on foot the Voluntary Aid Council, we place the initiative on the Lord-Lieutenants, Chairmen of County Councils and Mayors of County Boroughs in each county or county borough. It will be incumbent on them in co-operation with managers of charitable societies, trustees of endowed charities, and members of the Public Assistance Authority to establish a Voluntary Aid Council consisting in part of trustees of endowed charities, of members of registered voluntary societies, of some members of the Public Assistance Authority, and of such persons as are members of friendly societies and of trade associations, and of other persons being co-opted persons.'\*

In addition to appointing the local committees, the councils would collect funds for distribution to them, and would exercise a general supervision over this work. It would also assist in promoting various charitable and philanthropic purposes having the county for their area, such as the county hospitals, the county nursing association, &c.

There would thus be a recognised and responsible organisation in which all charitable agencies and workers willing to accept a responsible position could take their place and carry on their work in harmony with others. They would work in the closest communication with the Public Assistance Authorities; and, while preserving all their freedom of initiative and experiment, would be guarded by their mutual knowledge and their acceptance of definite lines of policy and co-operation from the danger of degenerating into centres of demoralisation.

It will be seen that the Commission has aimed at an organisation which will bring into harmonious working all the various and manifold agencies which have for their common object the relief of distress. They believe that such an organisation would render the work of all greatly more effective, and that without it there is little hope of permanently reducing the mass of distress and dependence which their inquiries have shown to exist.

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\* Part VII. Para. 231.

## ART. IX.—TWO CANADIAN POETS : FRÉCHETTE AND DRUMMOND.

1. *Louis Fréchet : Poésies Choiesies.* Première Série, *La Légende d'un Peuple.* Deuxième Série, *Feuilles Volantes, Oiseaux de Neige.* Troisième Série, *Épaves Poétiques, Veronica.* Montreal : Librairie Beauchemin, Limité. 1908.
2. *The Great Fight.* By WILLIAM HENRY DRUMMOND. New York and London : S. P. Putnam's Sons. 1908.  
[And other works.]

MANY things have co-operated to bring Canada into the conspicuous position which she occupies to-day. Her magnificent natural resources, her great and fast increasing material progress, have excited interest and attention in rich and poor alike beyond her own boundaries. To the former, both English and American, she has become a playground; to the latter, a land of promise which for the industrious and the strenuous has assured rewards. And this remarkable land is at present dominated by a magnetic personality, the picturesque and fascinating figure of the Prime Minister, whose personal popularity and immense influence can hardly even yet be fully understood.

Not long ago the Quebec Tercentenary turned all eyes more especially on French Canada, and it seems a fitting time to consider the work and influence of two Canadian poets whom death has recently removed from among contemporary writers, the principal subject of whose work was the French Canadian.

Louis Honoré Fréchet and William Henry Drummond established reputations abroad—Drummond in England and especially in the United States, Fréchet in the United States and in France—and the place they occupy in a difficult literary art is sufficiently high to justify an estimate not only of their work, which was sincere and spontaneous, but of the influences which affected it. To appreciate it we must know something of that considerable people who inhabit the pretty broken country, the fertile meadow lands, the rocky fir-clad shores, of Lower Canada.

The province of Quebec has occupied and still occupies a singular, a unique position among colonies. The early settlers brought the language and laws, the traditions, religion, and literature of France into the wilderness, and to all of these they have clung and in them they have persisted, throughout wars, in spite of changes of rule and of the continuity of a more influential, if alien, neighbour. His language being preserved to

him by law, French is still, after about a century and a half of English rule, the speech of the Canadian of French descent. The Law Courts, the Parliaments, all branches of the public service, and business generally are equally administered in the two tongues. There are French newspapers and French periodicals. In many of the shops French only is spoken. The cultivated man of French descent understands English, as a matter of course, but it is almost obligatory, if you mingle at all in French Canadian society, to speak French. We say 'French Canadian,' in contradistinction to British Canadian, but each thinks and speaks of his particular race as Canadian and Canadian only, and resents the adjective when applied to himself; the other is French or British Canadian, as the case may be. This shows that though the later representatives of the Crown have done much toward bringing them together, the two races still hold aloof from one another, and he is doing the truest service to his country who, instead of differentiating between his fellow-citizens, does his best to unite them.

In politics the Canadian of French descent has been called a passive Imperialist, but he cannot be said to represent a solid party. He has never entirely forgotten his quarrel with the rival race whose dominant shadow, ever lengthening, ever threatens to obscure him. But the French Canadian is fully conscious of the great, the uncommon, measure of liberty that England has given him, and, in fact, believes himself to be the most liberally governed of men. The French Canadian of the upper classes, as of the lower, is pronouncedly democratic in his political sentiments; he is lacking in reverence towards his political superiors, and it is plainly to be seen that he does violence to his feelings when he is forced to bend the knee before the representative of monarchy. It would be far from his desire, however, to exchange English for French rule. He holds dear his motherland, but his regard is sentimental only, a predilection of the heart, not of the head, and the France to which he is so deeply attached is the France of the old régime, the France of Louis XIV, from which his ancestors sprung. Republican France, which quarrels with the Church, is hated by clerical French Canada, which made energetic attempts to exclude the French Government from participation in the Quebec festival. Happily, in ministerial circles, the French Canadian is more liberal, but he has to act prudently on account of the strong religious feeling among the proletariat, which is the most devout and submissive in the Roman Catholic hierarchy. The paramount influence of the priests has always to be considered, and the task of the minister is no easy one.

Neither has the French Canadian in general any political leanings towards the great neighbouring republic. He would probably in theory prefer independence, but he thinks, and rightly, that, practically, in this imperfect world he is unusually fortunate.

We have attempted to give an idea, however slight, of the political position, bias, and outlook of the French Canadian, of the rights and liberties, and of the contentment, which he enjoys. How have these affected his literature? Something has been said of his liberties, but little of his limitations.

To possess a literature purely its own a country must be independent politically, and it must have a language peculiar to it. Even a country derived from another, like the United States, or one employing the language of a neighbouring nation, as in the case of Belgium, must inevitably submit to the influence of the elder. The spur of necessity is wanting: a literature is already to be had. Intellectual Belgium is to all intents and purposes French, and the United States, after more than a century of separation from England, has but a small number of literary masterpieces, and depends largely on the English classics. This, of course, is true to a still greater degree of English-speaking Canada, while French-speaking Canada in the same way depends largely on the writers of France. Therefore it is not surprising that purely Canadian literature—a native product—is sparse, and that few Canadian writers have attracted attention outside their own broad Dominion. The leisure and tranquillity, too, required by the man of letters is wanting in the newer countries. If 'man shall not live by 'bread alone,' it is certain that he must have bread to live at all, and the best brains are for the most part engaged in discovering and developing natural resources, and in the practical arts; and then, as opportunities of gaining wealth increase, its quest becomes more seductive, and mental activity finds an outlet in money-making. But while this is true to a certain extent of Canada, as of all new countries, at the same time it possesses a history that is intensely romantic. The subjugation of the savage, and the fierce and long-continued conflict between the two most powerful white races, offer so many stirring, so many new, features, that imagination, if it exists at all, must be kindled, and the instinct of depicting events inherent in mankind must be quickened. Emotion has need of expression in concrete acts; new experiences call for portrayal, for art production; the thrilling story of the conquest of the wilderness and of the wild man seized upon the imagination of a Parkman and made his pages alive with feeling. Many of them read like an epic poem; even in Parkman's own life there is material for tragedy, outwardly cold, reserved, and restrained, without love



episode or stimulating objectivity of any description, an unconquerable fire burned within his heart. He was a boy when the romance of Canadian history first took hold of him, and he never gave up his allegiance to this passion of his youth. In the life of hardship which he then shared with the Indian to obtain his expert knowledge of Indian life and character he sacrificed his health; but the results of his sacrifices, of his toil and his constancy, were a series of historical works which are probably the most picturesque, realistic, and suggestive that have ever been written. And he was not a Canadian.

In Parkman's volumes may be found material of the quality to inspire a national poet, or, if one will go back to original records, one will find as interesting as ever were written in the almost incredible narrative of the 'Jesuit Relations'—printed in seventy-three volumes in 1901, and then first disclosed to public knowledge—which chronicle the toils, travels, and explorations of the Jesuit missionaries from 1610 to 1764, and which furnish an inexhaustible mine for realistic matter of the kind to interest the entire world. The feats of Radisson, the precursor of the Hudson's Bay Company, and the history of the great Company itself, is still another undeveloped field dealing with hardship, exploration, and adventure, the romance of the trader, which have yet to be adequately voiced. And finally, the greatest theme of all may be his—that of a country in travail; a country possessing, in the Indian, man still well-nigh in the primitive state, yet which is strenuously engaged in evoking and assimilating the latest expressions of multiform, multiplex, civilisation.

Critics have sometimes professed to be sick of repetitions on the maple leaf, but topics native to the country in the work of the Canadian poets are more interesting and more preferable than feeble reflections from the old world or weak imitations of the classics. The paddle of the voyageur dipped in waters still unknown, the whirl of the axe amid forests still primeval, scenes in the 'back' settlements, the winter carnival of sports, these are the subjects upon which Charles S. D. Roberts, Bliss Carmen, William Wilfred Campbell, and Archibald Lampman have dwelt in their happiest moments. Of these the first two, and best known, no longer live in Canada; as Mr. Roberts frankly owns in 'The Poet bidden to Manhattan Island,' they have gone where they can get more pay:

' You've piped at home, where none could pay,  
Till now, I trust, your wits are riper;  
Make no delay, but come this way  
And pipe for them that pay the piper !'

But their earlier verse, at least, may be claimed as purely Canadian, inspired by Canadian themes.

New men, too, are coming forward more or less followers of Kipling, and a virile and militant note has been added to British Canadian verse by Arthur Stringer, and also by Robert Service, writing from the Yukon.

But not only are the earliest writings in Canada in French, the French Canadian also has shown a greater literary activity than his British Canadian *confrère* since the British occupation. Besides Crémazie, who preceded Fréchet, there is a considerable group who were writing verse contemporaneously with both, among whom are Chauveau, Salte, Poisson, Beauchemin, Serin-Lajoie, Chapman, and Pamphile le May. Both Fréchet and Drummond in a measure brought the British and French Canadian together in, and by, their work, which is especially representative in Canadian literature, for they were both in the best sense national poets. Drummond in his verse boldly flung aside all dependence and struck a new and popular note. Though most of it is limited to the depiction of one phase of life—the lot of the humble habitant—it appealed to all that was best in human nature in all classes. His literary production was not large; he never, like Fréchet, undertook literature as a profession, and he died early. Fréchet occupied a wider field. A French Canadian, he wrote both in French and English, and verse as well as prose. Abroad he was distinguished by the French Academy, and his title of Poet Laureate proved his status at home. Drummond has been called the Poet Laureate of the habitant, though the French Canadians themselves were not at first wholly disposed to recognise his fitness for such a title. The nuances of form and feeling in a foreign tongue are never easy of perfect comprehension, and the Irish Canadian author was once unjustly suspected of caricature. The very thought wounded the sensitive writer: ‘I would rather cut off my right arm than speak disparagingly ‘of the French Canadian people!’ he exclaimed. The same adverse critics also feared that a false impression of the speech of French Canadians generally might be obtained from the dialect which Drummond puts in the mouth of his habitant. But Fréchet from the first appreciated Drummond’s aims and his genius. The two writers, indeed, were friends. Drummond’s name is mentioned by Fréchet in the dedication of one of his volumes, and he wrote an Introduction to Drummond’s first book in which the latter is described in Longfellow’s phrase of praise to himself as: ‘The pathfinder of a new world of ‘song.’

The two men had not a few points in common physically as well as mentally. Both were well built and powerful, and each took pride in his physical strength. A story has been told of Fréchette which relates a feat of strength undertaken in defence of that pride of race which has never altered in the French Canadian. At the time of the Franco-Prussian war Fréchette lived in Chicago, and every morning, in company with a compatriot, he hastened to the bulletin boards in search of the latest war news. Chicago has a large German colony, and the two here encountered numbers of Germans bent on the same errand, and German rejoicings and German innuendos becoming at last insupportable, the two decided at the next offensive allusion to seek satisfaction. The occasion soon offered, and at their first onslaught four Germans fell, the others fled, and the French Canadians and their cause were afterwards treated with more respect.

Politically Fréchette and Drummond differed, but they were both intensely patriotic, and they both did their country good service in bringing British and French Canadians to a better understanding of one another. To the Celtic strain which runs in the veins of each may be due some of their similar qualities. Each was warm-hearted, generous, sensitive and imaginative. Each found fruitful material in the French Canadian peasant, who is remarkable for his simplicity, his unartificial character, and who thus lends himself to poetry which, ever since the eighteenth century, has sought to be natural. In these days it is not easy to find the simple Wordsworthian nature, and though in the larger movements of an age there are always the materials for great poetry, yet the task in regard to it is, in most respects, much harder.

The more definitely we know a man's personality and character the better we shall understand his work, and we will now attempt to analyse the motives which guided Fréchette and Drummond, to discover, if we can, their rule of life.

Drummond, the younger of the two, was born in Ireland in 1854. His love of nature was natural and inbred. His father—an officer in the Royal Irish Constabulary—was a keen fisherman, and his eldest son, as soon as he was old enough, kept him company in his favourite sport. In Drummond's tenth year the family removed to Canada, the death of the father soon followed, and the boy's education was interrupted for the study and practice of telegraphy, during which, while stationed at Bord à Plouffe, a typical French Canadian village on the beautiful Rivière des Prairies, he first came in close contact with the habitant. Afterwards he attended the Montreal High

School, McGill University, and Bishop's Medical College, where, in later years, he was given the chair of Medical Jurisprudence. But it was in his rounds as a country doctor that the local colour and material for much of his verse were obtained.

'Dr. Drummond is just like a big Newfoundland dog: one 'feels so safe when he is near,' said one of his little patients. He was exceedingly fond of children, and the death of a beloved child deeply affected him, his health began to decline, and by the beginning of 1907 he had given up the active practice of his profession and spent a large part of his time in the supervision of the Drummond Mines, in the famous Cobalt district. It was a congenial task, for he loved his miners as he had loved his villagers, as, indeed, he loved every simple, practical phase of life. To keep his miners under control a novel method was put into practice. It was his theory that strikes could be avoided if workmen were amused and interested in their leisure moments, and the first inquiry to a man applying for work was, Could he play some musical instrument, or sing?—and so furnish entertainment. The idea seems quaint and quixotic, but no doubt Drummond remembered and tried to pattern after the happy life in that Arcadian society of the habitant village where the violinist is one of the most influential figures. Drummond was in Montreal when news was received that an epidemic of smallpox had broken out in the camp; he hastened to its relief, and, while fighting the disease, he himself was stricken with paralysis, from which he never rallied. His death occurred on April 6, at the age of fifty-three.

Drummond took a healthy, objective view of life. The modern psychological novel read to him, he said, like the annals of an insane asylum. He loved all animal life, and was actively interested in the propagation and preservation of game of every description. He enjoyed Canadian sports, and was an expert at snow-shoeing, hammer-throwing, and putting the shot, and he was an amateur champion for fast walking. Though a good shot, he seldom returned from his annual hunting expeditions in the Lake Superior wilds with trophies of his skill—he was too tender-hearted to like to destroy life.

But we must now turn from the personal to the literary aspects of Drummond's career. The kindly instincts and sound principles which actuated his life are present in each of the four volumes of his verse which appeared, beginning with 'The Habitant,' in 1897, and which was reprinted twenty-six times within ten years—an extraordinary success for a volume of modern verse. The next year 'Phil-o-Rum's Canoe' and

'Madeleine Verchères' were published; 'Johnny Courteau' in 1901, 'The Voyageur' in 1905, and a posthumous work, 'The Great Fight,' was lately issued from the press.

The foundations of Drummond's nature studies were laid in the rambles of his boyhood; it was in those early days that his mind took the bent which made a nature poet, and more—a poet of human nature. Here he excels in portraiture, for his poems are all concrete productions and are never without human interest, and his sentiment always rings true. The metre of his verse is at times irregular and faulty, but a false or inharmonious note in the thought or feeling may be sought for in vain. Drummond is essentially truthful, and yet to a certain extent he idealises his habitant—he makes heroes of them all! History does not narrate the state of society which does not contain the coarse and vulgar, but Drummond was able to depict vulgar types without vulgarity, and his humour contains nothing of the grotesque. Sensitive to the simple life of the poor—their toil, their cares, their joys and loves—he pictures that labour lightened by love, the labour with which he is first of all occupied.

He also draws vivid yet delicate and truthful sketches of inanimate nature. The impression on the mind left from the study of English foliage, massed thickly before the low brooding, softly vaporous clouds of the island landscape, is that of imposing dignity, and the fine silhouette of spruce and balsam sharply etched against the brilliantly coloured background of Canadian sky seems somehow, by contrast, thin, cold, undeveloped. But again, where the river course is overhung with the thickly growing graceful birch and a luxuriant elm and maple growth, festooned and linked together with the wild Virginia creeper and clematis, the Canadian scene is strangely tropical. At the end of a toilsome day in canoe and over portages—'An' only 't'ing decen' you do all day is carry me on partage,' complains Phil-o-Rum's old canoe—the silent half-breeds quickly pitch the tents and make up beds of fragrant boughs before a cone of blazing logs, and, listening to the lonesome call of the loon and the thousand mysterious voices which speak at night in the wilderness, we softly sink to sleep. Such are the recollections which Drummond's verse conjures up for the hunter, and, as is to be expected, his volumes form a part of every camp outfit throughout Canada and the United States.

Neither will anyone forget Drummond's descriptions who has observed the low, long, many-gabled, broad-porchéd habitations scattered along the banks of the St. Lawrence which are characteristic of the dwellings throughout the Province of

Quebec, housing families the old-fashioned numbers of which might well awaken the envy of their ancient fatherland. Could but France lay claim to-day to these large families!

‘W’at’s use de million acre, w’at’s use de belle rivière,  
 Ant’ing lak dat if we don’t have somebody leevin’ dere?  
 W’at’s make de worl’ look out for us, an’ kip de nation free,  
 Unless we’re raisin’ all de tam some fine large familiee?’\*

The character and suggestiveness of Drummond’s work places it on a high level, and the form of dialect which he has made his own is admirably calculated to express his thought, and is as fascinating as original. His characters tell their own story, and tell it in the language to which they would resort in talking to an Englishman ignorant of French. This particular use of dialect, the least artificial of any form of literary expression, is typical of the man, and in all his verse he shows himself a modern in his use of plain diction. In a word, simplicity of form and strength of feeling are the chief characteristics of his style, and in them are contained his charm and his power. The simply descriptive emotional narrative evokes images pleasant to dwell upon; it always tells a story—a story at once pathetic and humorous.

We may note another point in Drummond’s work—that his verse is adapted to recitation, for he was the most popular of after-dinner speakers, and often recited his poems. ‘Le vieux Temps,’ written for such an occasion, ‘The Wreck of the Julie Plante,’ the authorship of which was for a time boldly disputed, ‘De Papineau Gun,’ ‘Pelang,’ ‘De nice leetle Canadienne,’ ‘The Curé of Calumette,’ are all popular favourites and adapted to recitation.

Drummond’s idyls have been compared with those of Hans Breitmann, the German-American dialect poet, of James Whitcomb Riley, the ‘hoosier’ poet, of Eugene Field, another writer of the Middle West, and of others who write in dialect. Drummond has one feature in common with them—that he writes of the common people and in the common people’s speech, but it is the only point of resemblance. His use of the Franco-Canadian dialect is absolutely original, and he occupies a place apart in Canadian verse. As Monsieur Pierre Lorraine points out in the *Journal de Française*—a French Canadian magazine conducted by a clever and able woman—Drummond has done for the French Canadian peasant that which Burns did for the Lowland Scotch labourer, James Whitcomb Riley for the

\* Johnny Courteau, p. 78.

farmers of Indiana, Cable for the Louisiana creole—he was the discoverer of the ‘habitant.’

But we must more closely examine the poems themselves. In his non-dialect pieces Drummond wrote in plain, direct English, of which the spirited ‘Strathcona’s Horse’ is a good example. He wrote also in Irish dialect. But in Franco-Canadian dialect the pieces—which mark his originality—must be chiefly considered.

As has been said, patriotic and altruistic motives underlie all his work, and this we must examine in a little more detail. In ‘The Habitant’s Jubilee,’ England, in a quaint conceit, is likened to a kind stepmother, and the interminable quarrel between French and English, culminating in the death of Montcalm and Wolfe on the Plains of Abraham, is described in picturesque phraseology :

‘Dat’s finish it all, an’ de English King is axin’ us stayin’ dere  
W’ere we have sam’ right as de ’noder peep comin’ from Angletterre.  
Long tam’ for our moder so far away de poor Canayens is cry,  
But de new step-moder she’s good an’ kin’, an’ it’s all right bimeby.

‘ If de moder come dead w’en you’re small garçon, leavin’ you dere  
alone,  
Wit’ nobody watchin’ for fear you fall, an’ hurt youse’f on de stone,  
An’ noder good woman she tak’ your han’ de sam’ your own moder  
do,  
Is it right you don’t call her moder, is it right you don’t love her  
too ?

‘ Ba non, an’ dat was de way we feel, w’en de ole Régime’s no more,  
An’ de new wan come, but don’t change moche, w’y it’s jus’ lak’  
it be before,  
Spikin’ Français lak’ we alway do, an de English dey mak no fuss,  
An’ our law de san’, wall, I don’t know me, ’twas better mebbe for  
us.

‘ So de sam’ as two broder we settle down, leevin’ dere han’ in han’,  
Knowin’ each oder, we lak’ each oder, de French an’ de Englishman,  
For it’s curi’s t’ing on dis worl’, I’m sure you see it agen an’ agen’,  
Dat offen de mos’ worse ennemi, he’s comin’ de bes’, bes’ frien’.

Contentment, the foundation of the habitant’s unambitious philosophy, is well illustrated in the opening piece of ‘The Habitant,’ which well indicates the happy manner of the poet :

‘ De fader of me, he was habitant farmer,  
Ma gran’ fader too, an’ hees fader also,  
Dey don’t mak’ no monee, but dat isn’t fonnny  
For it’s not easy get ev’ryt’ing you mus’ know.

' All de sam' dere is somet'ing dey get ev'ryboddy,  
 Dat is, plaintee good healt', wat de monee can't geev,  
 So I'm workin' away dere, an' happy for stay dere  
 On farm by de reever, so long I was leev.'

The country inhabitants in ice-bound countries sympathise keenly with the joy of all living creatures at the relaxing of the grip of winter :

' O ! dat was de place w'en de spring tam she's comin',  
 W'en snow go away, an' de sky is all blue,  
 W'en ice lef' de water, an' sun is get hotter,  
 An' back on de medder is sing de gou-glou.

' W'en small sheep is firs' comin' out on de pasture,  
 Deir nice leetle tail stickin' up on deir back,  
 Dey ronne wit' deir moder, an' play wit' each oder  
 An' jomp all de tam jus' de sam' dey was crack—

“ Summer is comin',” and

' Dat's very nice tam for wake up on de mornin',  
 An' lissen de ressignol sing ev'ry place,  
 Feel sout' win' a-blowin', see clover a-growin'  
 An' all de worl' laughin' itself on de face.'

Neither has the decline of summer nor bleak winter power to alter the habitant's cheerful outlook on life :

' An' den wen' de fall an' de winter come roun' us  
 An' bird of de summer is all fly away,  
 W'en mebbe she's snowin' an' nort' win' is blowin',  
 An' night is mos' t'ree tam so long as de day.

' You t'ink it was bodder de habitant farmer ?  
 Not at all—he is happy and feel satisfy,  
 An' cole may las' good while, so long as de wood-pile  
 Is ready for burn on de stove by an' bye.

' W'en I got plaintee hay put away on de stable  
 So de sheep an' de cow, dey get no chance to freeze,  
 An' de hen all togedder—I don't min' de wedder—  
 De nort' win' may blow jus' so moche as she please.'

It is evening in winter ; the scene a farmhouse kitchen ; a picture of domestic comfort and peace :

' Philomene—dat's de eldes'—is sit on de winder  
 An' kip jus' so quiet lak wan leetle mouse,  
 She say de more finer moone never was shiner—  
 Very fonna, for moon isn't dat side de house.



' But purty soon den, we hear foot on de outside,  
 An' some wan is place it hees han' on de latch,  
 Dat's Isidore Goulay, las fall on de Brulé,  
 He's tak' it firs' prize on de grand ploughin' match.

' Ha, ha, Philomene ! dat was smart trick you play us,  
 Come help de young feller tak' snow from hees neck,  
 Dere's not'ing for hinder you come off de winder  
 W'en moon you was look for is come, I expect'.

' I s'pose dey be talkin' beeg lot on de kitchen  
 'Bout all de nice moon dey was see on de sky,  
 For Philomene's takin' long tam get awaken  
 Nex' day, she's so sleepy on bote of de eye.'

The piece concludes as it began, with a profession of the habitant's accustomed philosophy, that of supreme content with his vocation and his lot. 'The Habitant's Summer,' written in the same gay strain, is the farmer's view of the seasons, and of the part and place allotted him in the divine plan.

Patriotic, imperialistic, Drummond is, yet quite free from the bitter prejudice sometimes mistaken for patriotism, and he is far from the view-point of a certain Englishman who protests that, through patriotic motives, he travels only in countries which are under the British flag. In 'Two Hundred Years Ago' it is not the Canadian, but a man with universal sympathy for all brave endeavour and fruitful accomplishment who points out to the neighbouring nation that which they owe to the French flag :

' So, ma frien', de Yankee man, he mus' try an' understand  
 W'en he holler for dat flag de Star an' Stripe,  
 If he's leetle win' still lef', an' no danger hurt hisself,  
 Den he better geev' anoder cheer, ba cripe !  
 For de flag of la belle France, dat show de way across  
 From Louisburg to Florida and back ;  
 So raise it ev'ryw'ere, lak' de ole tam voyageurs,  
 W'en you hear of de la Salle an' Cadillac—Hooraw !  
 For de flag of de la Salle an' Cadillac.'

'The Voyageur' begins with a piece written in praise of the heroic *coureur de bois*, the pioneer of civilisation. The ingenuity of the author and the ingenuousness of the hero in 'Pro Patria' make it one of the most laughable among his pieces for recitation. In 'How Bateese Came Home Again,' another popular favourite, an ambitious youth travels across the border in the hope of bettering his condition, but, made wiser by experience, John B. Waterhole disappears for ever and Bateese

Trudeau returns to his former way of life, realising that higher pay does not necessarily signify more substantial gain. 'Ma 'Leetle Cabane' contains the same wholesome lesson.

An ancient Canadian legend is revived in 'La Chasse Gal'rie,' a gallant deed of early days in 'Madeleine Verchères,' wherein the dialect is discarded, and which, in its swinging cadence, recalls some of Longfellow's lines :

'Summer had come with its blossoms, and gaily the robin sang,  
And deep in the forest arches the axe of the woodman rang.  
Again in the waving meadows the sun-browned farmers met,  
And out on the green St. Lawrence, the fisherman spread his net.'

'Le Grand Seigneur' was written for Albani, and 'The 'Ressignal' was also set to music, while numbers of perfect little lyrics are interspersed in the narrative verse.

Innumerable lakes, large and small, lie hid in the Canadian hills ; no happier description of one of these could be found than in 'Little Lac Grenier' :

'Leetle Lac Grenier, she's all alone,  
Right on de mountain top,  
But cloud sweepin' by, will find tam to stop,  
No matter how quickly he want to go,  
So he'll kiss leetle Grenier down below.

'Leetle Lac Grenier, she's all alone,  
Up on de mountain high,  
But she never feels lonesome, 'cos for w'y ?  
So soon as de winter was gone away  
De bird come an' sing to her ev'ry day.

'Leetle Lac Grenier, she's all alone,  
Back on de mountain dere,  
But de pine tree an' spruce stan' ev'rywhere  
Along by the shore, an' make her warm,  
For dey kip off de wind an' de winter storm !

'Leetle Lac Grenier, she's all alone,  
No broder, no sister near,  
But de swallow will fly, an' de beeg moose deer,  
An' caribou too, will go long way  
To drink de sweet water of Lac Grenier.

'Leetle Lac Grenier, O ! let me go  
Don't spik no more,  
For your voice is strong lak de rapid's roar,  
An' you know youse'f I'm too far away,  
For visit you now—leetle Lac Grenier.'

Drummond sympathised with age. 'Phil-o-Rum's Canoe' requires no explanation :

- ' O, ma ole canoe ! W'at's matter wit' you, an' w'y was you be so slow ?  
 Don't I work hard enough on de paddle, an' still you don't seem to go ?  
 No win, at all on de fronte side, an' current she don't be strong,  
 Den w'y are you lak lazy feller, too sleepy for move along ?
- ' I 'member de tam w'en you jomp de sam' as deer wit' de wolf behin',  
 An' brochet on de top de water, you scare heem mos' off hees min' ;  
 But fish don't care for you now at all, only jus' mebbe wink de eye,  
 For he know it's easy git out de way w'en you was a passin' by.'

The exceeding love Drummond bore little children also finds expression in his verse, and 'The Last Portage' was written in commemoration of a young son from whose loss he never fully recovered :

' De night is dark and de portage dim,  
 Got plaintee o' log lyn' ev'ryw'ere,  
 Black bush aroun' on de right an' lef',  
 A step from de road an' you los' youse'f,  
 De moon and de star above is gone,  
 Yet somet'ing tell me I mus' go on.

' An' off in front of me as I go,  
 Light as a dreef of de fallin' snow—  
 Who is dat leetle boy dancin' dere,  
 Can see hees w'ite dress an' curly hair,  
 An' almos' touch heem, so near to me  
 In an' out dere among de tree ?'

Nor is it altogether surprising that with his Celtic nature the poet had a vein of superstition, and did not disbelieve in occult influences. When his boy was dying, though absent, he declared he distinctly heard his voice calling him.

In 'The Great Fight,' Drummond's posthumous work, 'The Calcite Vein,' 'The Boy from Calabogie,' and 'Marriage,' are the natural developement of his mining experiences, but, like the previous volumes, it is chiefly devoted to the habitant. The piece which gives the book its name has the strong religious sentiment of the habitant for its ruling purpose. A kiss given his pretty young wife is overlooked, but a derogatory word directed against his patron saint—and the 'Great Fight' ensues.

Drummond was a man of many friends, and in 'The Great Fight,' to which we have just referred, is an interesting page written in verse by one of his intimate circle, Dr. Weir Mitchell, the American novelist. Interesting, too, is the biographical sketch, with explanatory remarks on the later poems, by the poet's wife.

Drummond has made the habitant better known to thousands of his fellow-citizens; he has revealed him to many in England itself. His verse touches upon universal experience, and appeals to the universal heart; he possesses the power, not only to bring forth a smile or a sigh, but to make us wiser and better men. To understand is to sympathise, and so he helps us to a better comprehension of the simple, gay, laborious, and religious character of one of the most lovable types which the Empire contains.

When Louis Fréchettes died last year (June 1, 1908) Canada lost a figure long the most prominent in Canadian literature, and we will now more closely consider the main features of his life. On the heights opposite historic Quebec stands the city of Lévis, named after the old Duke, who held vast grants of the virgin land of Canada. The magnificent river, here at its grandest, rolls tempestuously between the two cities, and here at Lévis, in the heart of old French Canada, Fréchettes was born, November 16, 1839. He was educated for the law, and was called to the bar in 1864; but his inclination lay wholly in another direction, for from childhood he had promised himself that he would become a great poet. So, instead of practising the profession marked out for him, he took up that of letters. The vocation of poet not being profitable from the money-making point of view, he added to his income and gratified an increasing desire for political influence by becoming a journalist, founding the 'Journal de Lévis,' with which he conducted such a vigorous Liberal campaign that it resulted in an enforced retirement from priest-governed Quebec. The year 1865 found him in Chicago, where he gave vent to his indignation and resentment in a volume of satirical verse, 'La Voix d'un Exilé,' a bitter invective against the clerical party, and which was in striking contrast to the book of simple, objective verse, written in praise of nature, 'Mes Loisirs,' which he brought out in 1863. At first the disappointed young journalist occupied himself in Chicago by editing another newspaper, 'L'Amérique,' later accepting the position of corresponding secretary of the Illinois Central Railway, vacated by Thomas Dickens, the brother of the novelist. But at this time of his life Fréchettes never long kept out of trouble. We have before

given a practical illustration of the extreme tenacity with which he held to his French sympathies, for which also during his residence—'exile' he called it—in the United States he went so far as to fight a duel. It will be remembered that this was at the time of the Franco-Prussian war, and during the siege of Paris he was at New Orleans, where one night at the theatre, disliking the tone of the remarks of a German present, he challenged him and was wounded in the encounter which followed. In spite of the congenial French influences of New Orleans, in spite also of his admiration for the political institutions of the United States, where—though in exile—he said he breathed a 'purer air' than in Canada, and with whose literary side he was closely connected, Fréchet suffered from continual home sickness, and in 1871 he returned to his home and made the attempt to settle down to the practice of law—it is to be supposed to please his family. The interest he had shown in politics had not flagged, and in 1874 he stood and was elected member for Lévis; but he was defeated with his party in 1878, and again in 1882, when his political career came to an end. Henceforth Fréchet devoted himself almost entirely to literature, his appointment as Clerk to the Legislative Council, in 1889, allowing him considerable leisure. In the meantime '*Pêle-Mêle*' (1877) had appeared, and was included, in 1881, with '*Les Fleurs Boréales*' and '*Les Oiseaux de Neige*' in a single volume, which obtained for the author the satisfaction of being crowned by the French Academy. In 1887, when he was forty-eight, Fréchet's most important work, '*La Légende d'un Peuple*,' in the nature of an epic, was published, followed, in 1891, by '*Les Feuilles Volantes*,' the last volume of his verse to be printed in his lifetime.

The *édition de luxe* of Fréchet's verse which appeared last autumn—and against which his many admirers at home, who were impatient to have his final and complete work, are exclaiming because of its high price, but which speaks admirably for the skill and art of the Canadian printer and bookbinder—is a selected work, and, though there is some new matter, some productions have been omitted—for instance, the polemical '*Voix d'un Exilé*,' which would be interesting to foreign readers, and which, from the standpoint of development, both in his writing and in his personal career, would satisfy some curiosity. It is understood that the contents of this edition, however, were selected by the author himself, and they comprehend all that is necessary by which to judge his work.

First of all, when we open these large volumes and see the amount of careful work which Fréchet accomplished, we are

struck by the industry of the man. The mission of art, whether it be the art of painter, musician, or poet, is, we know, to arouse emotion, and the success of the artist in communicating his emotion is the test of his capacity. Poetry at its highest lifts us above practical considerations, beyond the levelling influences of insensible common sense, to a clear, bright height, where no lessons need be taught, where there is no morality, for all is moral.

Is this the standard of Fréchet? It is doubtful if he had such abstract aims. There is both delicacy and warmth in his verse, but it generally points a moral; and there is enthusiasm in his work as in his nature, but it is a tempered heat. His youth had its passionate period, when he had the courage to rise up against the extreme power wielded by the Roman Catholic clergy in the Province of Quebec; and 'La Voix d'un Exilé' testifies that he was capable of intemperate feeling; but this is foreign to his work in general, and he afterwards perfectly reconciled himself with the outraged clergy by writing 'Sous la Statue de Voltaire'—an attack directed against the ancient foe who has so often acted as scapegoat on like occasions. We are continually reminded that it is England's common sense which has made her the leader among nations—others waste themselves, in a greater degree, in dreams and visions—and perhaps Fréchet absorbed his practical quality from his English Canadian associates, for he seems to be almost more of the philanthropist than the artist by temperament. He had the passion of doing good, and 'La Légende d'un Peuple'—is it derived from Victor Hugo's 'Légende des Siècles'?—his most important book, the one on which he spent the most time and the best years of his life, was written with a patriotic motive. Canada owes much to Fréchet for this work. Writing in simple and direct language, he teaches the ordinary French Canadian more of his country's past than he would get from the perusal of some dozens of dull histories. In these tales of his countrymen's struggles for political independence there is a simplicity and charm which were a part of the man.

A Canadian writer, Senator L. O. David, in the Montreal 'La Presse,' compares Fréchet with Crémazie, the first of the Canadian lyrical poets. The life of Crémazie was a strange combination and contradiction of circumstances. A modest shop-keeper, to while away unoccupied hours he began to write verses. They became known, popular, and, finally, from their political bias, led to exile. He is probably the nearest approach to a rival whom Fréchet has. In the clever comparison which Senator David makes between the two poets, he remarks that Fréchet

had not perhaps 'le souffle, la puissance d'invention et de conception de Crémazie,' but that he had more 'd'abondance, de souplesse, de forme, il était plus complet, plus émotif, plus chaud.' Fréchette regarded himself as Crémazie's pupil:

'Et quoique faible encor, ma muse de vingt ans  
Peut te dire aujourd'hui de sa voix enfantine,  
Comme autrefois Reboul au divin Lamartine :  
Mes chants naquirent de tes chants.'

This was in his first volume of verse, published in 1863, when he was twenty-four. But Fréchette's verse has a wider scope and a greater variety than that of Crémazie, who confined himself entirely to patriotic subjects.

Illustrations of a poet's manner and style convey a better idea of his work than any comment can do, but some explanation of Fréchette's motive is perhaps necessary. In 'La Légende d'un Peuple,' his most ambitious work, Fréchette gives us the history of his race in Canada. He has taken advantage of its most striking and picturesque features, and by introducing their legends, which his wonderful memory retained to an astounding degree, makes us acquainted with character and personality as well as with fact. 'Ce livre est de ceux qui ajoutent une ligne, un chapitre à une histoire littéraire,' writes Jules Claretie in his Preface to this volume. The French in France have a strong sentimental regard for the French in Canada, so cruelly, so fatally, abandoned by their forefathers, which is apt to give to their criticisms on any work of their Canadian confrères a *couleur de rose*. Of this Fréchette was well aware, but by the production of this volume he did become the national poet, and justified their eulogies and his title of Poet Laureate.

'Mère, je ne suis pas de ceux qui ont eu le bonheur d'être bercés sur tes genoux.

Ce sont de bien lointaines échos qui m'ont familiarisé avec ton nom et ta gloire.

Ta belle langue, j'ai appris à la balbutier loin de toi.

J'ose cependant, aujourd'hui, apporter une nouvelle page héroïque à ton histoire déjà si belle et si chevaleresque.

Cette page est écrite plus avec le cœur qu'avec la plume.

Je ne te demande pas, en retour, un embrassement maternel pour ton enfant, hélas! oublié.

'Mais permets-lui au moins de baiser, avec attendrissement et fierté, le bas de cette robe glorieuse qu'il aurait tant aimé voir flotter auprès de son berceau.'\*

\* La Légende d'un Peuple, Dedication.

The emotional quality of this Dedication to 'La Légende d'un Peuple' is indicative of that long continued loyalty which seems so extraordinary when we remember that all this passionate personal feeling reverts back to events which took place a hundred and fifty years ago. The melancholy note occasioned by resentment at being abandoned by their country pervades all French Canadian literature, and though Fréchette, in one of his poems, protests: 'Nous l'avons pardonné ton abandon, 'ô France!'<sup>\*</sup> we feel that he is not telling the truth, as the following extracts out of many passages indicate:

'Et notre vieux drapeau, trempé de pleurs amers,  
Ferma son aile blanche et repassa les mers!' †

'Le sort avait parlé, notre astre s'éclipsait. . . .  
L'exil cruel, *sans fin*, d'un peuple commençait.' ‡

'Ce sont ces hommes-là qu'un monarque a vendus!' §

This is the underlying thought which gives a tinge of bitterness to many of the pages of 'La Légende d'un Peuple.' Devotion to a lost cause was never told with more feeling than in 'Jean Sauriol' and 'Les Excommuniés,' and throughout the volume is heard the tragic note: 'Nous serons Français malgré 'la France!'

One of the best pieces in the volume is the popular 'Drapeau 'Anglais,' where a father attempts to teach his boy his duty towards the British flag:

'Il brille sur tous les rivages;  
Il a semé tous les progrès  
Au bout des mers les plus sauvages  
Comme aux plus lointaines forêts.

'Laisant partout sa fière empreinte,  
Aux plus féroces nations  
Il a porté la flamme sainte  
De nos civilisations.

'Devant l'esprit humain en marche  
Mainte fois son pli rayonna,  
Comme la colombe de l'arche,  
Ou comme l'éclair du Sina.' ¶

And so he continues in a laudatory strain until, in the last verse, the child speaks and we perceive the real object of the lesson:

'Mais, père, pardonnez si j'ose . . . .  
N'en est-il pas un autre, à nous ?  
— Ah ! celui-là, c'est autre chose :  
Il faut le baiser à genoux !' ¶¶

\* La Légende d'un Peuple, p. 167. † Ibid. p. 33. ‡ Ibid. p. 179.  
§ Ibid. p. 123. ¶ Ibid. p. 320. ¶¶ Ibid. p. 322.



Fréchet also possessed a strong sense of humour, and in 'Spes Ultima,' as in Drummond's verse, pathos and humour are blended. The time is the present day; a working woman accosts a Parisian :

'Monsieur, vous jasez bien  
Sans doute, et cependant pas en vrai Canadien ;  
Pas en Anglais non plus, faut pas dire ça, dame !'

He explains that his speech is different because he is French :

'Français ? eh ben, pardî, c'est dans nos environs ;  
Pour être Canadiens on n'est pas des Hurons.  
On est tous des Français, nous aussi, que je pense !  
—Je vous comprends, mais moi je suis Français de France.  
—Français de France ? Et nous, de quel pays est-on ?'

At last she realises that he has come directly from the old country :

'Et, tandis que son œil commence à se troubler,  
S'avance, et d'une voix que l'émoi fait trembler :  
—Dites-moi donc, à moi, là . . . vont-ils revenir ?'

By such entirely delightful touches Fréchet lightens his long patriotic work.

No Christian country was ever colonised under so seemingly auspicious auguries as that of French Canada. Cartier and his band of hardy sailors sail on their adventurous cruise blessed by priests and people; land sighted, prayers and hymns of thanksgiving and praise arise from the little ships, and ever beside the flag is planted the cross. Earnest petitions for divine mediation attend the sowing of the seed; La Salle launches his boat to the chant of the *Te Deum*. All this is simply yet eloquently told, and the epic character of the work is well sustained. The two heroes, Montcalm and Wolfe, die gloriously in the same action on the same day. Captain Cook and La Perouse, rivals also in the work of exploration and civilisation, are combatants on the same battlefield.

Notwithstanding the strong racial sentiment evident in Fréchet's verse, he worked honestly for harmony between the French and British in Canada, and he often wrote with that purpose in view :

'Car la concorde enfin a complété son œuvre—  
Consultant l'horizon, veillant à la manœuvre,  
Se prêtent tour à tour un cordial appui  
Les ennemis d'hier, les frères d'aujourd'hui !'

---

\* *La Légende d'un Peuple*, p. 36.

And in the fine poem written for the inauguration of the monument to Laval, the first Bishop of Montreal, he predicts a happy and peaceful future for his country :

‘ De nos rivalités les brandons sont éteints ;  
 La Discorde a plié son aile ;  
 Joyeux avant-coureur de nouvelles saisons,  
 On voit, lueur sereine, au bord des horizons  
 Poindre une aurore fraternelle.’\*

and also

‘ Les rivaux d’autrefois ne se mesurent plus  
 Que dans des joutes pacifiques. . . .’†

The principle of democracy being the political ideal of Fréchet, he is among the number of those French Canadians to whom the present form of government in France was most acceptable. In the Ode to Laval he apostrophises in warm terms the Fourteenth of July, the Independence Day of the French :

‘ O Quatorze-Juillet ! ô sublime réveil !  
 Les peuples affranchis acclament ton soleil  
 Dont la chaleur partout pénètre . . .  
 Soleil qui dissipa tant de brouillards épais ;  
 Soleil de liberté, de justice, et de paix ;  
 Aurore des soleils à naître !’‡

And the never-ceasing growth of the idea in France is pointed out in the same piece : ‘ Elle vous vaincra par l’idée !’§

The many occasions on which Fréchet shows his sympathy with democracy does not prevent a just appreciation of British institutions, and in his Jubilee Ode he attempts to reconcile the two by claiming that they are identical :

‘ Ce règne glorieux, qui dura soixante ans,  
 Fut soixante ans de république !’||

He voices English sentiment at least when he declares, in the previous stanza, that

‘ . . . on n’est jamais grande reine ou grand roi  
 Qu’en régnant sur un pays libre.’

His tone throughout this well-written piece is impressive and striking :

\* *Epaves Poétiques*, p. 16.

† *Ibid.* p. 20.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 24.

§ *Ibid.* p. 17.

|| *Ibid.* p. 35.

‘ Jamais on n’avait vu, malgré tous les présages,  
Des rivages du Gange aux bords du Saint-Laurent,  
Sous un même drapeau flottant au vent des âges,  
Semblable impulsion vers le noble et le grand.

‘ Ce fut un cycle d’or, de calme et de lumières ;  
A l’appel du Génie aux multiples aspects,  
On vit, même au foyer des plus humbles chaumières  
Naître un ère d’espoir, de justice et de paix.’\*

Changing his metre, he develops, in the last three lines, the same idea, and in something of the same figure of speech, which Drummond worked out in his Jubilee Ode :

‘ Ce sceptre, il nous fut doux ; ton joug nous fut léger,  
O Reine ! . . . On voit souvent la masse s’insurger  
Contre le pouvoir qui l’opprime ;  
Mais qui pourrait frapper le bras qui le défend ?  
D’un mouvement ingrat, qui vit jamais l’enfant  
Mordre la main qui le caresse ?’ †

Amid so many fine lines one,

‘ Sus démocratiser le trône,’

gives just a little shock. And the central idea, the irrepensible tendency to lament bygone days, may be found even in this loyal production :

‘ . . . par le sang qui coule dans mes veines,  
Par la religion du passé, j’appartiens  
A de chers souvenirs qui ne sont pas les tiens.  
Ton drapeau, fier symbole à qui je rends hommage,  
Ce drapeau, dont l’éclat reflète aux yeux l’image  
Du soleil qui pour lui ne se couche jamais,  
Ce drapeau de ta race, et le mien désormais,  
Il me fut imposé dans un jour de défaite ;  
Et quand je le bénis, quand les miens lui font fête,  
Je ne sais quelle voix me crie au fond du cœur :  
“ Passe outre ! ce drapeau, c’est celui du vainqueur ! ” ‡

Fréchette closely followed the Romantic school, and has been accused of imitation. One of the pieces which have given occasion for this is addressed to the poet Pamphile le May. He introduces something of the same metaphor as Victor Hugo in his Ode to Lamartine, which runs :

‘ Naguère une même tourmente,  
Ami, battait nos deux esquifs ;  
Une même vague écumante  
Nous jetait aux mêmes récifs ;

\* Epaves Poétiques, p. 34.

† Ibid. p. 34.

‡ Ibid. p. 37.

Les memes haines débordées  
Soufflaient sous nos nefes inondées.\*

In Fréchette's verse, quite different in form, we find the same figure of speech of the two barks sailing in company on unknown seas—a well-worn metaphor before Hugo, though no doubt the one inspired the other.

‘Pourtant, naguère encor, suivant la même étoile,  
Nous n'avions qu'une nef, nous n'avions qu'une voile;  
Nos luths comme nos cœurs vibraient à l'unisson.’†

Turns and phrasology which call to mind Hugo and other of his favourite poets may be found no doubt, but whatever there may be to call forth criticism in Fréchette's smooth and even lines we find that he has accomplished a great task, and he could never have written so much had he not written with ease and facility.

‘Feuilles Volantes’ opens with a poem on J. B. de la Salle which is generally conceded to be his most perfect piece. The subject was sympathetic. It had to do with little children. In ‘Messe de Minuit’ and ‘La Poupée’ his tenderness for women and children is again brought out. In contrast to these is ‘Le Bonhomme Hiver,’ a bright and sparkling quatrain descriptive of a Montreal winter. ‘Le Pellerin’ possesses imagination and poetic beauty, showing again his aptitude to enter into the feelings of others. A warm admirer of the United States, Fréchette cherished the hope of an alliance between Great Britain, France, and the American Republic:

‘La Bannière étoilée et notre tricolore  
Mélés aux couleurs d'Albion!  
Quel gage d'avenir—quelle sublime aurore  
D'embrassement et d'union!’‡

The Entente Cordiale has partly realised his wish: we shall see if the poet's mission of prophecy shall be entirely fulfilled.

‘Les Oiseaux de Neige’—placed, in the new edition of his verse, in the volume with ‘Feuilles Volantes’—is composed of a hundred and one sonnets, and we, differing from Monsieur Rinfret,§ consider his mastery of this difficult form of verse one of his happiest achievements. Here again the poet becomes the historian, the recorder of the vagaries of the Canadian

\* Feuilles d'Automne, p. 233. Paris, Librairie Hachette. 1888.

† Feuilles Volantes, p. 9. ‡ Ibid. p. 156.

§ ‘Louis Fréchette.’ Par Fernand Rinfret, Saint-Jérôme, Libraire J.-E. Prévost, 1906.

climate and of the varied occupations and sports which this diversity makes possible.

A feature in the poet's love of nature is his fondness for birds, and birds of every season and every hue flit in and out of his verse.

The prologue to 'Oiseaux de Neige' contains charming lines which indicate the tenderness he had for his feathered friends :

' Chers petits voyageurs, sous le givre et la grêle,  
Vous voltigez gaîment, et l'on voit sur votre aile  
Luire un premier rayon du printemps attardé.

' Allez, tourbillonnez autour des avalanches ;  
Sans peur, aux flocons blancs mêlez vos plumes blanches :  
Le faible que Dieu garde est toujours bien gardé.'

The last line is one of those which haunt the memory.

Another charming verse, in 'Les Oiseaux Blancs,' is expressive of the same compassionate thought :

' Du froid, de la neige,  
Des vents et des eaux,  
Que Dieu vous protège,  
Petits oiseaux !'

Many of Fréchette's pages are devoted to friendship ; his love poems, on the contrary, are confined to a few slender, delicate productions. They possess no passion, no force or power, but there is a caressing charm in such a stanza as the following :

' Soupirs, brises, murmures,  
Vibrant sous les ramures,  
A la chute du jour !  
Rien ne vaut l'harmonie,  
La douceur infinie,  
D'un petit mot d'amour.'

Fréchette's kindly feeling towards other writers is well known, and sympathetic allusions to his immediate contemporaries are frequent in his work, which itself, in point of treatment and style, belongs to the nineteenth, rather than to the twentieth, century. In 1895 a group of young French Canadians attempted to found a new school of literature in Montreal, in contradistinction to the Quebec school, of which Fréchette accepted the post of honorary president. It was a proof as much of the confidence in which he was held by the younger men as of his own liberality and freedom from prejudice. One does not hear now of the *École Littéraire*, but no doubt it had

the result of encouraging a more careful technique. Intimate subjective verse begins to appear, and Hugo and Lamartine are laid aside for Herédia, for Baudelaire and Verlaine, the last of whom found a proper apostle in young Nelligan, the so-called Canadian Verlaine, and who, with another charming young writer, Lozeau, brings a distinctly new and brilliant note to Canadian poetry.

In our review of Fréchette's career we have considered his work as a poet only; his prose writing was considerable and excellent, but it is outside the scope of this criticism. He had the dramatic instinct strongly developed: it is seen in all his writings, but his pieces for the stage never attained popularity. Fréchette represents the older school, that which had for its foundation religion, local patriotism, and attachment to the old French *régime*. A good many of his productions were written for public occasions, and by their character permitted little of himself to come into view.

Fréchette's verse is unequal in perception; it has not the creative value of Drummond's, but he has a far greater mastery of his art. He does not always follow its rules, but his knowledge of the tools of his craft, of rhyme and rythm, of the æsthetic value of words, is that of an expert. He enlarged their horizon for his literary contemporaries, and wrote the uncircumscribed language of Paris; perhaps he studied the French poets too closely, and adapted his verse too much to theirs—he is certainly most interesting when most Canadian.

Fréchette's personal characteristics were all in his favour, and he was loved and admired by British and French Canadians alike, and though he has his disciples, none fill his place. Without means and without masters, he undertook the precarious career of Letters, and he had a great reward. For forty years he was given the title of Poet Laureate; he was called, also, the Lamartine of Canada, and he evoked something of the same spirit. He was the authority on French-Canadian folk-lore; it is this, probably, which first attracted him in Drummond's work: the love of the common people was in them both, and both embodied in their writings, speech, manners and customs, habits of living and ways of thought which probably will not long survive the rapid changes at work in Canada.

Early in the eighteenth century Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun said that 'if a man were permitted to make all the ballads he need not care who should make the laws of a nation.' The power which verse, minor or great, exerted in that age would seem to have declined. Certainly, considering the increase in the reading public and in the quantity of prose now produced

less verse is written, less read, than in the days of Fletcher. The change is marked even within our own times. Most of us can recall when we were taught by our elders to recite from Wordsworth or Longfellow, or whoever might be the favourite poet in the family circle; but the children of to-day are seldom so fortunate as to be taught to love the poets, their knowledge of them being acquired solely as a task in the school-room. All of us, to be sure, read Kipling, who, with his rugged verse and fierce impetuosity, excites unwonted sensations and stirs imperialistic patriotism; but a diminution in the supply and demand of poetry cannot be denied, and for this various and ingenious arguments have been advanced. But the subject has its brighter side. Great poets in any age are few. As for minor poetry, much that would have passed the critics unchallenged fifty years ago could not now find a publisher. The standard of writing of both verse and prose has risen, and this advance in public taste has affected the quantity, as well as quality, of production. And this in any case may be said, that whether it be the more cultivated taste, or that poetry calls for thought and that there is less time for thought in the life of the average man, whether the scientific spirit of the age requires more specific answers to its questions than poetry can give, or that a decay in the habit of reading aloud is responsible for a decline in the influence which poetry exerts—it is yet true to-day, as it has been since the dawn of speech, that the poet still exercises the greatest influence in the gift of man. It is the fife and drum which awake the martial spirit, and give the soldier courage to go into battle. An artist such as Millet, who draws attention to the labourer at his toil, generates benevolent impulses which give results the painter himself could never have foreseen. And poetry makes an even greater appeal to the emotions, and of its final effects no man can tell. The influence of Drummond and of Fréchette, accordingly, cannot yet be fully estimated, nor the extent to which in our own time each has contributed to the homogeneous and tranquil growth of the people of the Canadian Dominion. To the utmost of his ability each laboured untiringly for all that was highest and best in the development, moral, intellectual, and physical, of his countrymen.

## ART. X.—SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

1. *An Introduction to Social Psychology.* By WILLIAM McDUGALL. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1908.
2. *Social Psychology: an Outline and Source Book.* By EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1908.
3. *Human Nature in Politics.* By GRAHAM WALLAS. London: Archibald Constable & Co., Ltd. 1908.

FOR some time there has been observable a growing recognition of the fact that our treatment and consideration of social and political questions is haphazard and unscientific. Although great advances have been made in the study of psychology, heredity, and the evolution of mind, they have been more effective in undermining the previous theories of political science than successful in setting up new ones. The old school of philosophic Radicals, who did at least claim to draw their conclusions from a basis of psychological reasoning, has practically died out in the present generation, and social questions, no longer discussed in the light of a careful study of human nature, are more or less decided by the momentary feeling of the man in the street. Psychology has demonstrated the unreality of the view of human motive upon which utilitarianism was based, but has not yet succeeded in replacing it by any useful and practical, or, at all events, widely adopted, principle.

This result is perhaps natural enough. As long as psychology consisted merely of the study of consciousness, which could, by introspection and self-analysis, be observed and described, it offered a fairly simple problem. The deeper processes of the mind, the instinctive tendency and impulse were ignored. Emotions and desires were considered the result rather than the cause of intellectual processes. Man considered simply as a reasonable being, acting always upon a thought-out conclusion as to the most likely means to secure his own advantage, offered at all events an intelligible and straightforward problem; but man, a creature swayed by impulses and desires, that seem to have no definite cause, full of odd instinctive tendencies, that by no means always lead him to his own advantage, moved easily by emotion and open to suggestion, gives a view of human motive and conduct so baffling and elusive that the practical man is apt to turn away from it somewhat impatiently. The distinction between acquired and innate characteristics with the controversy that still surrounds them upon questions of inheritance again confuses the student of social questions who asks for help from science.



The appearance of these three books, independently but within a few months of each other, is an interesting indication that the time is arising for an attempt to put things on a more satisfactory footing. Their nearly simultaneous publication is a fortunate coincidence, as to a large extent they supplement and illustrate each other. They approach the question of the scientific study of social and political questions from three distinct points of view. Mr. McDougall, a psychologist with a special leaning to its physiological side, sets himself to trace out in detail the origin and development of the principal tendencies of the human mind. Mr. Ross, a professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin, U.S.A., describes the formation of public opinion and the effect upon human nature and mind of social influences. The third book, by Mr. Wallas, is the work of a practical politician and man of affairs dealing every day at first hand with the problems he is discussing; he is also a lecturer at the London School of Economics. A comparison of the conclusions in these three books is highly interesting.

When Bentham, having laughed out of court the theory of 'natural rights,' laid down as an incontrovertible truth that

'on the occasion of every act he exercises, every human being is led to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his views of the case, taken by him at the moment, will be in the highest degree contributing to his own greatest happiness,'

he thought that he had established a standard or basis by which political and social study could be made into an experimental science such as that of physics or chemistry. It would, he thought, be possible to collect statistics of all kinds—hours of work, income, pursuits, death-rate, and so on, and then by using the measure of pain and pleasure to arrive at practical certainty as to how men would act and how they could arrive at what was best for them. This was the basis of utilitarianism which, laying down the greatest happiness of the greatest number (happiness and pleasure being treated as synonymous terms) as the final end of all action, denied any 'rights' to an individual, whether of property, freedom, or anything else. Each man had only such rights as the general social advantage allowed him.

The sweeping generalisation of Bentham as a basis for a science of politics is no longer tenable. Only by straining the meaning of words past breaking-point can we get the force of instinctive impulse, tradition, habit, racial prejudice, personal idiosyncrasy, sentiment, and so on, simplified into the picture of the man intelligently seeking his own advantage.

Increasing knowledge of the physiology of the brain and the application of evolutionary principles to the study of mind have raised psychology in recent years into a science; it now claims with ever-increasing right to be the science of conduct and behaviour. It gives a dynamic, voluntaristic, functional view of mind. It shows conduct as the resultant of the social forces working upon the inherited tendencies and instincts of the race. It is beginning tentatively to offer an explanation of these tendencies, and to show how the simple life-preserving instincts evolved by the struggle for existence, becoming more and more differentiated, form the essential springs of all thought and action, individual or collective, as they are gradually developed under the guidance of the intellectual faculties and the changing environment.

‘We may say, then, that directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity; by the conative or impulsive force of some instinct (or of some habit derived from an instinct) every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained. The instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained; and all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but a means towards these ends, is but the instrument by which these impulses seek their satisfactions, while pleasure and pain do but serve to guide them in their choice of the means.’\*

Lack of space makes it impossible to follow Professor McDougall’s interesting and suggestive examination of the principal instincts and their modifications under the conditions of civilisation and social pressure, and, however much we may differ upon details as to the effect of particular instincts and the parts they now play, we can accept the concluding paragraph of the book as having been abundantly justified.

‘Our brief review of the social operations of the primary tendencies of the human mind is finished. Enough perhaps has been said to convince the reader that the life of societies is not merely the sum of the activities of individuals moved by enlightened self-interest, or by intelligent desire for pleasure and aversion from pain; and to show him that the springs of all the complex activities that make up the life of societies must be sought in the instincts and in the primary tendencies that are common to all men and are deeply rooted in the remote ancestry of the race.’

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\* ‘Social Psychology,’ Prof. McDougall, p. 44.

At the point where Professor McDougall leaves off, Mr. Wallas takes up the tale, and asks us to consider in what way our point of view upon political questions is affected by a better realisation of human motive. From this point of view he proceeds to survey his experience of political life, the methods of electioneering, and the action of the public.

He recognises the unreality of always attributing opinion to an intellectual process. He sees the popular mind at the mercy of the electioneering agent and the newspaper. He points out the fallacy underlying the assumption of those thinkers who assume not only that political action is the result of inferences as to means and ends, but that all inferences are of the same 'rational' type. Drawing attention to the way in which psychology has of recent years transformed the science of education and treatment of criminals, he asks for its application also to political science. We require more intellect, he says, more reason, a philosophy upon a sound psychological base for politics—we must give up simply muddling through and leaving all important posts and work to the cleverest and most unscrupulous manipulator of the popular mind. Mr. Wallas attacks and demolishes utterly the whole theoretical basis upon which democracy rests, but none the less manages to retain his belief in it, and by no means suggests a cynical acquiescence in its dangers and drawbacks as inevitable and unavoidable. The book is a protest against those who, following the idealists and political thinkers of the early part of the nineteenth century, treat politics and man, as far as he plays his part in them, upon a basis of simplicity that is, when compared with the complexity of human nature, almost ridiculously unreal. To this unreality is to be attributed the change of opinion which not infrequently follows when the student of economics and sociology is brought into touch with practical politics and actual men and women. Finding the reality bear so little resemblance to the convenient and well-ordered examples of his text-book, he is apt to throw overboard all his early knowledge and get along trusting to common-sense and growing experience.

After pointing out that as far as can be seen the main controversy as to the best form of government appears to have finally been settled in favour of popular representation, Mr. Wallas goes on :

'And yet, in the very nations which have most whole-heartedly accepted representative democracy, politicians and political students seem puzzled and disappointed by their experience of it. The United States of America have made in this respect by far the longest and most continuous experiment. Their Constitution has lasted for a

century and a quarter, and, in spite of controversy and even war arising from opposing interpretations of its details, its principles have been, and still are, practically unchallenged. But as far as an English visitor can judge, no American thinks with satisfaction of the electoral "machine," whose power alike in Federal, State, and municipal politics is still increasing.'

This puzzled distrust is greatly increased among the more observant by the fact that these unsatisfactory features are growing; they are not the disappearing remnants of an age worse educated than the present. The aggregation of men into cities, the spread of the power of reading and its consequence the rapid growth of the newspaper, so far from encouraging an intelligent formation of opinion, seem immensely to increase the power and influence of electioneering dodges. Mr. Ross, following somewhat the line of M. Le Bon's well-known study of *The Crowd*, traces the almost hypnotic influence that suggestion has, and the action and reaction of many people when collected together. In a crowd swayed by emotion it is the feelings that count, and men, vastly different intellectually, may be pretty nearly on a level when it comes to feeling. In a crowd it is the qualities common to the larger number that show; the intellectual aptitudes and differences are submerged. Thus in the decisions of crowds, we may usually find impulsive action or a strong display of emotion, but with little chance of intelligent or intellectual consideration. The crowd must agree, and they agree in virtue of the feelings that they have in common. The emotional excitement tends to inhibit the reason in favour of impulsive action, and as the critical sense weakens, the force of suggestion is greatly enhanced, until strong assertion appears more convincing than argument. The individual becomes merged in the crowd and at the mercy of the man with the biggest voice or the wildest language. The feeling of anonymity, and with it the loss of the sense of responsibility, also helps to relax much of the personal control usually exercised by an individual.

The unstable action of a crowd and the impossibility of predicting what line it will take, or what it will do next, have of course always been recognised and discounted, and as a matter of fact, under modern conditions and the great size of nations, does not really play an important part in political action; since it is but a very small proportion that can be actually got together at any one time. But what has not been so clearly seen, or at all events grappled with, is the fact that, owing to the resources of civilisation, the great majority of people live,

as far as their mental and intellectual life is concerned, very much under the conditions of a crowd. It is no longer necessary to be gathered together in one place for suggestion to have full scope. The telegraph and the newsagent do their work only too well. Hardly has the catastrophe happened or the speech been made before everyone is reading about it, so that people remote from each other are practically brought into each other's presence. Two men speaking of it both unconsciously express the same opinion which neither has formed for himself, but thereby immensely strengthening each other. No better instance of the effect of mass suggestion and the arousing of sympathetic excitement under modern conditions can be found than the extraordinary outburst of excitement that was recently shown during the South African war. The spread of education under the Compulsory School Attendance Act had produced an almost universal ability to read, and this had its result in the enormous increase of the newspapers, but the effect had remained unnoticed. On the outbreak of war there was an astonishing revelation of the way in which opinion over the whole country could be formed in a few hours.

But not only have we to reckon with these more or less simple emotional waves of feeling which are apt to run through the country, but with the more subtle, more pervasive, and on the whole far more important formation of opinion by non-rational inference. As Mr. Wallas does well to distinguish, the theory upon which so much of our political and economic thought is based contains really two assumptions: first, that men always act on a reasoned opinion as to the best means of attaining what they desire, and, secondly, that all inferences are of the same kind and are produced by a more or less uniform process of reasoning. Many of our opinions seem at first sight to be formed from inferences based upon some sort of logical process. It is, however, obvious to a very small degree of introspection that of the numerous conclusions which we make all day long, a large proportion are made by a kind of unconscious or immediate inference. Just as a dog couples the appearance of his master in a tweed coat and cap with a walk, and a black coat and top hat with being shut up indoors, so we continually get certain associations rising automatically together, giving us an inference, the conclusion being strengthened of course by repetition. Now in ordinary life this forms a fairly safe guide. The world does not go out of its way to take us in, and our final conclusions are the outcome of innumerable small inferences, the repetition of the truer and sounder gradually establishing themselves, those that fail being rapidly

eliminated. A thing that is repeated often enough begins to establish itself, and so our opinions grow up until we can hold them with extreme conviction and sincerity, though for many we should be hard put to it to find arguments in their favour if challenged, or to say how we had arrived at the belief we hold so firmly. While this is comparatively harmless in everyday life, it offers a fruitful field to the political propagandist. The very repetition that is usually a safeguard opens the door to the machinations of those who, unlike the material world, do find it worth their while to take a great deal of trouble to produce a false impression. So Mr. Wallas reasons and gives a good example :

‘ If the word “wastrel,” for instance, appears on the contents bill of the “Daily Mail” one morning as a name for the Progressives during a County Council election, a passenger riding on an omnibus from Putney to the Bank will see it half-consciously at least a hundred times, and will have formed a fairly stable mental association by the end of the journey. If he reflected, he would know that only one person has once decided to use the word, but he does not reflect, and the effect on him is the same as if a hundred persons had used it independently of each other. By the time that one or two other people have used the word to him he has a well-formed opinion as to the character of Progressive policy.’

How well this power of repeated assertion is understood by the Press is well illustrated by another morning paper, which contains a daily reminder that Tariff Reform means more wages, more work, or some other alluring prospect. A memory of this phrase comes conveniently to mind when some difficult question such as unemployment arises, and the speaker confidently puts forward this solution with a feeling that he has at some time satisfied himself that it is a sound remedy for want of work, or as he bangs his hand upon the table to emphasise his creed of ‘tax the foreigner,’ with its subtle appeal to race prejudice, that he has some time or other seen a satisfactory scheme by which the burden of our taxes will be thus conveniently shifted. Any election with its posters and its catch phrases will provide ample material for the study of this method of fabricating opinion.

All this, of course, if not clearly recognised is at all events fully exploited by those whose business it is to catch the ear of the public. The very spread of education—the hoped-for antidote—has in reality magnified the evil, for giving as it does little more than the power to read, it has thereby widely extended the power and scope of the clever manipulator of public opinion. There

has resulted a certain impatience and craving for novelty and excitement which provide a fertile soil for the agitator.

Is the picture exaggerated? It is hardly possible to look on at the political methods and life of the present day without being convinced that it is essentially true. Many even of those people who are sufficiently well educated and intelligent to form a good opinion, take part in political questions and dispose of their vote with an irresponsibility and carelessness which would speedily land them in the Bankruptcy Court if applied to their own affairs. It is not surprising, therefore, that the most ardent advocates of democracy and popular government are 'somehow 'puzzled and disappointed' when they see that the more the power of government passes into the possession of the people, the more it tends to be handed over, not to those most fitted to wield authority, but to the most unscrupulous manipulator of the electorate.

It is not a difficult task to demolish the arguments in favour of democracy by an appeal to facts as they are. Mr. Wells expresses the view of a good many people when he says in 'Anticipations':

'I know of no case for the elective democratic government of modern States that cannot be knocked to pieces in five minutes. It is manifest that upon countless important issues there is no collective will and nothing in the mind of the average man except blank indifference; that an electoral system simply places power in the hands of the most skilful electioneers.'

Are we then to consider the introduction of democracy a gigantic mistake, the impossibility of altering which is our only ground for acquiescence? Very few people would now advocate such a view; with all its faults and all its anomalies it is felt to be the only way through which progress can come. The exact moment in the life of a nation at which a representative government is possible, or the time when a further extension of the franchise is wise, is a matter for argument and opinion; that it is ultimately desirable few will deny. The fact that the reasons and arguments which induced the most ardent supporters of popular government to urge the extension of the franchise were based upon fallacious assumptions by no means proves that their conclusions were wrong. It was widely demanded, it was felt to be right, and as usual the reason was set to work to find a logical basis to support the feeling. The problem has now to be restated and reconsidered. The attitude that will be taken up towards it will depend very largely upon the way in which certain natural laws are interpreted in their application to social questions.

The theory of progress which has succeeded Benthamism is that which asserts that all progress is the result of, and can only be continued by the action of, the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence. We do not for a moment question the paramount importance of ensuring survival of the fittest, if social progress is to be maintained. But the view which a number of people profess to hold is merely a parody of this biological principle. Imagine, they say, nations and individuals left quite free to fight things out with no other influence at work except that of the need of getting the better of their competitors in the race for means of livelihood, what would be the result? Restriction of the birth-rate would be racially a weakness that would be quickly eliminated, and the struggle for mere subsistence would grow keener. National strength would become of the most vital importance, the individual would only be of value in reference to the nation. After a period, during which there would be immense empires founded and destroyed, equilibrium would probably be found in the appearance of smaller evenly balanced States, highly efficient for self-preservative purposes. These pseudo-biologists take the analogy of an ants' nest, a perfectly organised socialistic community, every member of which has by the process of ruthless selection lost all desires and feelings that do not contribute directly to the welfare of the community; every member has his allotted duties, the slightest deviation, or tendency to variation, would be instantly eliminated; military efficiency is kept up to the highest pitch; no one member is worse off than another; all are equal; there is no individual ownership; all do their allotted task not so much by compulsion as by having no other tendency. A State, they say, organised now on the lines of an ants' nest would be irresistible, no country could stand against it. No Socialist dreaming of Utopia has ever worked out an organisation so complete and so perfectly successful as that of an ants' nest, and it has been produced entirely by the struggle for existence. But those who argue thus imagine that what is good for ants must therefore be good for men. They ignore the fact that the struggle for existence leads to precisely opposite results in even closely allied groups. Among vertebrate animals, from the same origin it sometimes produces fins, sometimes wings, sometimes legs; and these fins, wings, or legs, after having reached a high state of development, may under the operation of the very same law dwindle and disappear again. Survival of the fittest, which leads in ants to an entire subordination of the individual to the group, appears among human beings to point to an ultimate state when the subordination of individual to the group is reduced



to a minimum. The ideal of the ants' nest is from one point of view admirable, from all others it is infinitely unattractive: it is life with all that makes life worth living omitted. Intellectual and emotional freedom are the essence of life and progress; thus a system by which life is ordered from without and so organised as to allow no freedom of initiative and variety is an effectual barrier to advance.

Competition, which is the form assumed by the struggle for existence among human beings, is a necessary and inspiring factor in progress. The qualities which may bring success in competition are often 'acquired characteristics,' due to education, favourable environment, the chance of being able to use material advantages provided by a previous generation, and thus they are not capable of being handed on by inheritance, but they do have their effect in raising the general level, being handed down by social transmission—tradition, example, teaching, and the improvement of the environment. At the same time natural characteristics that give an advantage, though tending to be inherited, cannot be expected to make a general effect upon the community, since there is no ground for supposing that in a civilised community the successful leave a larger number of children than the unsuccessful.

Up to a certain point we are upon tolerably safe ground in assuming selection by the struggle for existence to be the only, or at least the prepotent, factor in evolutionary development. At length, however, man began to formulate certain ideals for himself, and began to select certain attributes and qualities, and to develop them, which were in accordance with his ideals, introducing an additional selective factor sometimes concurring and sometimes running counter to the simple pressure of natural selection. These ideals may or may not be for the ultimate benefit of the race; it is enough for our present purpose that we think they are, and that they are at many points opposed to the lines upon which natural selection appears to work. We have, therefore, to consider what effect this would have, and in what way this conscious choice could have a permanent influence upon the direction of development.

In considering evolution by the survival of the fittest it is always necessary to remember, as Huxley often insisted, that 'fittest' does not mean 'best' in the usual meaning of the word as the superlative of good. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to ask whether some modification should not be made in respect of man's deliberate modification of and control of instinctive tendency. It should also be noted that the struggle becomes less intense with every rise in the scale of the animal kingdom.

So severe is the struggle among the lower organisms that of a million born there are but few survivors, the higher the animal the smaller the birth-rate, and the less severe the process of elimination. Man reached a stage at which competition with the animal kingdom, and to a large extent with the elements, ceased, a further rise into the first stages of civilisation, and there were periods of peace and for a certain number of people immunity from the struggle for existence. Leisure made progress possible, and those who could profit by it instructed the less fortunate—Nature's principle of killing off the sick and the weaker became abhorrent to the growing sense of humanity, until it is at the present day meaningless to talk of the survival of the fittest in the true sense of the term, by which is meant that the succeeding generations are chiefly born from the successful competitors in the last. Herbert Spencer, after emphasising the conflict between Individuation and Reproduction, deduced from *a priori* reasons that the more intellectual a man became, the less likely was he to have a large family, concluding the passage thus :

' But they [those who live a more intellectual life] will not have the maximum of posterity—will not have so many as they would have had if they had been careless or thoughtless men ; and so, upon an average, the issue of such intellectualised men will be less numerous than those of the unintellectual.'

That this is the fact is notorious ; so far from an elimination of the unfit being in progress under modern conditions, it is the less prudent, those most wanting in the qualities that seem to us best, that are producing the larger number of the coming generation. If, therefore, we are to believe that in the struggle for existence and the elimination of the less fit lies the only road to progress, the outlook is indeed a gloomy one, and the only possible forecast for civilised life is progressive deterioration, unless, indeed, we are prepared for such heroic measures as State interference with the propagation of those considered by some standard to be unfit. But even this could only be expected to secure a certain minimum of physical efficiency. If we apply the principle partially, and, upon the ground that hard and bad conditions produce a finer race by killing off the weakly, leave the lowest classes in the community in slums and unhealthy dwellings, we are more likely to breed a type ' fit ' for such an environment and more and more apt to find it congenial to live in a state of vice and squalor, when it is discontent with such a state that requires encouragement.

The problem that faces us then is a type invested with certain

physical and mental attributes of extreme persistence that vary about a mean within certain more or less ascertainable limits, and endowed with a stock of instinctive tendencies and desires developed and fixed in the process of evolution by the struggle for existence. From these tendencies we can trace the gradual rise and development of the moral and ethical characters, intellectual enjoyment gradually replacing the physical. At a certain stage certain qualities which we admire, such as altruism, unselfishness, kindness, patience, etc., spread beyond the family. Such qualities are so obviously misplaced in a keen struggle for existence that over and over again individuals and nations progressing too quickly in that direction have been annihilated. But as soon as the struggle becomes less severe they begin to emerge again. Those who show these qualities are admired, and therefore imitated by an increasing number of people, while success in the competition of civilised life is only considered admirable and satisfactory if achieved in accordance with the rules which common opinion, expressed in law and custom, has imposed to regulate it.

It is obviously true that the basis of many of the higher qualities are highly valuable for warlike operations; discipline, obedience, prudence, perseverance, postponement of immediate gratification to future advantage, honesty, and so on, are all characteristics that would bring a tribe or nation that possessed them to the front. In such cases and as would, of course, frequently happen, natural selection would coincide in the qualities it fostered with the aims of man and his ideas of moral advance. War, too, was, until comparatively recent times the only outlet for talent, and public opinion estimated qualities very much by this standard. The action of war, of course, is strongly in the direction of eliminating those who being selected as the most fit go out to fight; while in natural selection by want of food, or other adverse conditions, it is the weakest that come first into the fighting line. It is only in the most primitive times, when the whole tribe came into conflict and the weaker, men, women and children, were exterminated, that war has exercised a real test of the survival of the fittest. The more severe the struggle the more surely are the better qualities of kindness, forbearance, patience, forgiveness, justice, etc., eliminated, as, for example, among the tribes of Africa who have waged internecine war for countless generations.

To what influences then are we to attribute the rise in moral and intellectual standard that we have achieved, and what hope is there of continuous improvement if we are to put on one side the survival of the fittest as the only selective agency, and relegate it to the position of ensuring a certain minimum of physical

fitness, the actual degree of which is largely dependent upon medical science ?

Walter Bagehot \* put forward a suggestive idea when he stated that progress becomes possible to a nation as soon as it is enabled to combine variability with a sufficient degree of legality.

‘ The beginning of civilisation is marked by an intense legality ; that legality is the very condition of its existence, the bond which ties it together ; but that legality—that tendency to impose a settled customary yoke upon all men and all actions, if it goes on, kills out the variability implanted by Nature, and makes different men and different ages facsimiles of other men and other ages, as we see them so often. Progress is only possible in those happy cases where the force of legality has gone far enough to bind the nation together, but not far enough to kill out all varieties and destroy Nature’s perpetual tendency to vary.’

It seems possible that in the increased liberty of variation, we may find a clue to much that is puzzling in certain aspects of evolution at the present time. It is the tendency to variation, of course, which makes progress and development possible. Until man appeared, the selection of variations was left to pressure of circumstances and natural forces. Man, however, brought a new influence to bear, at first no doubt extremely slight, but, with the gradual emancipation from the stress of mere living, of increasing force. The effect of natural selection became more and more confined to eliminating those specially susceptible to certain diseases or climates and so on. At a later stage we have man definitely conceiving ends to be achieved and evolving ideals to which the ruder impulses became subordinated. In this way certain qualities would tend to arise from variations selected by other influences and for other purposes than suitability to environment, though of course the force of natural selection stood by ready to cut off any too rapid or premature advance ; but increasing knowledge and progress continually gave more and more power to the personal choice as it became more and more possible to adapt and alter the environment. The main tendency of the struggle for existence is a ruthless elimination of the unlike, a continued effort to produce uniformity and to keep to the type until the conditions alter.

In early times we may assume that men had no law at all and lived a mere chance collection, until after difficulties, hard to imagine now, they gained some sort of fixed law ; the tribe or nation who could do this at once destroyed those who could not. The next stage finds them suffering from the very law which had

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\* *Physics and Politics.*

given them strength, it has become fixed, and the discipline, sanctioned with superstition and terrible rites, kills out the tendency to variation and progress is stopped. The dislike to the new and the love of the old are too well known to need emphasis, the more backward the people the more true is it. Savages have been described as 'terribly conservative,' everything must be done as their fathers did it, originality meets with short shrift. There is no doubt that for the conditions of primitive and early life this 'first stage of civilisation' was the most effective, but until the second stage, where variability is possible and wanted, progress is slow or impossible beyond a certain point. Many tribes and nations, after having reached a certain pitch of advance, seem, at least as far as historical evidence goes, to have been shunted off the main track, and have remained for immense periods *in statu quo*.

The nation that is to survive must keep the rougher virtues needed in the first stage as it passes into the second. It will disappear if it lose a great many of the ruder virtues and gain only a small degree of progressive civilisation. History has numerous examples of nations that have, as Bagehot describes it, come out of the 'pre-economic stage' too soon. The nation that will survive is the nation that can stand wide variation without losing legality.

How, then, are these hardly-won improvements made comparatively permanent, and handed on to succeeding generations? We know that innate characteristics, instinctive tendencies, and so on, are not only of extreme persistency, but, as far as we can see, are only to be altered by selection of congenital variations. It is therefore highly improbable that the rapid social evolution of Western Europe during the last few hundred years can be attributed to biological changes. Social life has, however, been quickly changed by the effects of political liberty and newer ideals of social justice. The possibility of this rapid change is due to the high degree of adaptability or educability that the human race possesses. In spite of the strong effect of natural inclination and idiosyncrasy, education and environment can, by the formation of habits, produce an influence so strong as to be capable of meeting instinctive tendency; so powerful, indeed, that custom and public opinion are able to check the strongest instincts, even those of sex.

From birth each individual has acting upon him a number of influences which, by suggestion, public opinion, education, tradition, and the various conditions of environment, are capable of exerting a profound influence upon his character and actions. Habits impressed upon the growing individual while in a more

or less plastic condition often become indistinguishable from instinctive feelings. Not only would such acquired habits govern the actions of the individual during his life and induce him to impress them in turn upon his children, but unconsciously they tend to make him select to some extent a mate of similar tendencies. Thus we may believe that while acquired characteristics are not directly inherited, they are passed on indirectly by tradition, and lead to mutual selection of those with a natural aptitude for acquiring such habits.

Each advance that is made is registered in an improved environment, and this reacts in various subtle and not well-understood ways upon the organisms, especially during the stages of growth. Under the head of ecology, or the study of life under the natural conditions, botanists are now producing certain curious evidence of the direct effect of environment upon plants. Environment certainly has an effect upon fertility, and it is apparently a well-established fact that favourable conditions of life with a low death-rate are found to result in a reduced birth-rate. This fact largely accounts for the failure of Malthus' famous theory as to over-population, and it also throws an interesting light upon improvement of type by the struggle for existence. This subject is one that has an important bearing upon social questions, and requires careful investigation.

The formation of habit as a factor in progress is of most marked influence, and is only beginning to be really appreciated. The tyranny of bad habits has long been recognised ; we now recognise the value of the converse. Knowing that an action once done or a thought once made forms a path in the brain, and thus by providing a line of less resistance tends to be repeated, the advanced teacher of the present day, instead of waiting until the fault has been committed and then attempting by punishment to deter its repetition, tries as far as possible to avoid opportunities for its commission, contriving that the young child should do what is right by what seems his own choice, until a habit begins to be established. To the teacher of the old school this is looked upon as weakening and demoralising, and he turns with approval to the 'spare the rod and spoil the child' discipline of his younger days. The same principle runs through medical science : less and less the doctor relies on curing and more and more on providing healthy conditions, and so building up strength to resist the onset of disease. Like all principles, it is open to abuse, and the process can easily be carried on so long and so far as to weaken character ; but it by no means implies that life is to be made a bed

of roses, for this fails to form habits of self-reliance. The underlying fact is, however, unassailable—a habit once formed is a lasting influence for good or evil. Certain temptations once formidable hardly exist for the well-brought-up and well-educated classes; they shrink from things, as they would say, 'by instinct,' which is really only early inculcated habit. This is a point at which psychology and sociology come into close touch in an effort to decide how far the principle can be carried in safety. We now see that one of the most serious dangers in unemployment is the breaking of the habit of work and steadiness by months of enforced idleness.

Want of space makes it impossible to touch, even shortly, upon the other influences, such as the imitation of qualities generally admired; suggestibility, by which one strong and leading man may influence thousands; public opinion, and so on, with, we may imagine, innumerable influences too subtle to be isolated and described, all at work upon the natural variations. The direction in which they tend is that which the general consensus of opinion and feeling considers to be higher and better. What this means involves questions which it would be out of place to discuss here. The point now required is that we, as thinking beings, set up an ideal, and our conscious aim towards it acts directly and indirectly in slowly approximating human character to it; while from what we can discover we have no reason to suppose that a simple natural selection would do more than produce the most efficient machine for a particular environment.

Seeing that variation is the source of all progress, it is curious to note how strong is the innate dislike, both among human beings and animals, to change and to the new. The first sign of improved education is the ability to conceive that there may be a better way of doing things than the methods of our fathers. The strong dislike to originality, or to any suggestion that upsets our preconceived ideas and customs, which generally involves a short shrift for the innovator, is no doubt a legacy from long ages of the necessity for adaptation to environment, when the familiar, to which the organism had become suitable by selection, was safe, and the unknown and unfamiliar dangerous. It is, too, an invaluable safeguard by ensuring adequate consideration for any novelty. But the novelty must be considered on its merits, and not condemned, as is so often the case, because it is new, or accepted simply because it offers a change from conditions we dislike.

In early days, what law there was was supposed to have a semi-divine origin, and any alteration was inconceivable. The

smallest deviation from custom and rule was supposed to bring punishment from the offended deities, not merely upon the individual guilty of the infraction, but upon the whole tribe. It was thus a matter of public concern to see that no alterations were made. As long as a government is autocratic, or the fiction of infallibility upon the part of the ruler forms part of the system, no question as to the wisdom or rightness of any action can be allowed. But, as W. Bagehot \* points out, a government by discussion, if it can be borne, at once breaks down the yoke of fixed custom. The mere putting up of a subject implies that it is not settled by established rule, and that there is no one man whose decision has to be obeyed. Men are free to choose one way or the other. A nation that can combine order with freedom of choice will go far. In spite of the tyranny of majorities and the natural disinclination for new and upsetting notions, discussion does more than anything else to promote tolerance and remove bigotry.

Democracy is government by discussion, so that in democracy the conditions for freedom and wide variability are secured; but with these advantages come the dangers and difficulties which are so obvious, and of which we have so vivid a picture drawn by Mr. Wallas and Mr. Ross. The latter has a chapter headed 'Prophylactics against Mob Mind,' which seems to suggest some process by which we shall be inoculated with an antidote against the wavering and fickle tides of popular feeling. We are to be made 'crank proof,' and provided with 'truth filters' by means of higher education, a sound knowledge of hygiene, psychology, and sociology, the avoidance of the sensational newspaper, a country life, ownership of property, and a vital religion. Mr. Wallas faces the question of the future, and in spite of the evils and anomalies of democracy, which he sees clearly and describes with remarkable frankness, by no means gives way to despair. Starting from the assumption that the consent of the governed is a necessary factor for a stable condition in a State, he sees that democracy is the only possible form of government, and so looks forward with hope, if somewhat disillusioned and without the impatient optimism of the enthusiastic social reformer who hopes to see his ideals realised in his own lifetime. It must be confessed that Mr. Wallas is not quite so successful in removing apprehension for the future as he is in exposing the fallacies and inconsistencies of popular representation as it exists at present. He looks forward to improvement by education, guidance made effective

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\* *Physics and Politics*, p. 161.



by a clearer understanding of the impulses upon which men act. Already he notices a tendency to treat political questions on quantitative rather than the qualitative lines which lead to the wide generalisations which he distrusts. An election, he suggests, will be more and more an educational process, during which opinion will be formed, rather than a mechanical expedient for registering those already held. Democracy requires teaching; it must take to business methods and scientific enquiry instead of settling questions by emotional excitement. In the Civil Service there is, he points out, a great and well-organised force which will be of more and more use in obtaining and preparing useful information for public consumption and in guiding and controlling public action.

This last proposal is one that would require careful scrutiny. An increasing recognition of the unreasonableness and foolish action of the majority of people is very apt to lead to the multiplication of centralised control by expert advisers. This, if carried too far, becomes a heavy clog upon initiative and experiment; local bodies save themselves trouble by resting more and more freely upon the central body, and by becoming less responsible necessitate still more full and elaborate directions. The more clearly we recognise the need of variability and freedom for experiment and the educative value of responsibility, the more suspicious do we become of anything approaching the minute regulations of government by an expertocracy. In the free discussion of democracy lies one of the best safeguards for securing the delicate compromise between undue interference and a useful degree of guidance and advice.

Whether we are satisfied or not that progress will come as Mr. Wallas suggests, we must at least give him credit for facing facts as they are; and if at times we feel that he is skating on rather thin, perhaps even dangerous, ice in his efforts to find an issue both logical and satisfactory, we can still acknowledge the service he has done in demanding that the whole question of politics and popular government should be reconsidered in the light of the present aspects of psychology and evolution.

What is the result of such a reconsideration? Pure Benthamism has failed practically, and we now see that its theoretical basis was too limited and misleading for the wide deductions made from it. Shall we, with our advancing scientific knowledge and better understanding of the effects of heredity, environment and evolutionary process, be able to replace it by some other wide theory which will form a valid basis for political reasoning? Probably not for some time to come. Science is for the present somewhat shy of wide generalisations on social

affairs, and is much less ready to provide us with ideals of life. We are beginning to realise better the extreme complexity of the subject. A vast number of influences are at work, and great caution has to be observed lest, in the natural desire for simplification and a nicely rounded logical theory, one or another influence is picked out to the exclusion of others of perhaps equal importance. Forecasts of social results seem always doomed to failure, however strong they appear to be.

Increasing knowledge will, doubtless, save us from some mistakes, enable us to disentangle some of the influences at work, and so make it possible with ever-increasing certainty to throw our weight at points where there is a real likelihood of its being beneficial. It is in the management of the details that we are beginning to realise how helpful science can be, determining actual methods and subjects of education; how far and in what way conditions can be improved without injury to character. As more attention is paid to details it becomes more difficult to base our action upon general principles. For example, we may agree that undue State interference is an evil; but this will not enable us to decide exactly how far gambling should be stopped by law or opportunities for drinking limited, or to what degree women's and children's work in factories should be regulated; but a knowledge and study of psychology, heredity, and evolution will provide at least some grounds upon which to form an opinion. Probably everyone is in agreement that the main road to progress lies in improvement of character, but this does not prevent the widest possible divergence as to method. To one the giving of old age pensions is demoralising, tending to improvidence and, by reducing responsibilities, to a weakening of character; to another it appears as an inducement to thrift and a cementing of the family ties, and gives an opportunity for a slight rise in the standard of life. If the study of the social psychologist and sociologist can help to an authoritative decision upon these innumerable points of detail, they will be doing an incalculable service to politics.

We are beginning to see more clearly that the treatment of social questions is full of delicate compromise. Interference with existing conditions has to be done tentatively. At one time the whole question of charitable relief was judged simply from that of the merit acquired by the giver. As the nation became more kind-hearted, their generosity increased until the evils of indiscriminate alms-giving have become so notorious that there is rather a swing of the pendulum in the opposite direction. We do at least realise now that it is a question of extreme complication, and are casting about for the happy

mean between making things too easy and so of causing demoralisation, and yet of giving assistance that will bring his burden within the powers of the individual. How difficult and complicated this is, the enormous length of the Report of the Poor Law Commission is good evidence. In the place of the few sweeping generalisations of the previous report of 1834 we are given an extremely elaborate differentiation of the various kinds and causes of distress, not on the ground that the previous principles were wrong, but that our growing knowledge and study of social questions will enable us to adjust our treatment with more regard to the individual case. Here again at every point we require the help of the trained scientist, the medical man, the biologist, the statistician, and the accumulation of facts accurately observed; but as we realise more certainly the vast complexity of the problem we shall insist that every step be tested by its practical result; for no theory can be trusted to cover all the quickly changing factors of social life.

There is no doubt that to many people at the present day the outlook is a very gloomy one. The country is apparently heading straight for ruin. Parallels with the latter days of the Roman Empire are drawn freely. Nations, we are told, inevitably die, and the utmost we can hope is that a better race may rise upon the ashes of our civilisation. The nation has become foolishly sentimental, its moral fibre has deteriorated, physically it is degenerate. The people have become emotional and capricious, their pursuits are trivial, and they have lost their ideals; in fact, the rot has begun, and the inevitable, though perhaps slow, disintegration is in progress.

Before so pessimistic a view can be accepted it will be well to consider how far these things are temporary and superficial, and how far the real nature of the country is affected. That the nation has become humaner is obvious. Our forefathers acquiesced in such things as child-labour in mines, inhuman treatment of criminals and lunatics, public executions, and so on, which to the more enlightened opinion of to-day are almost incredible. No doubt many, having passed the limit of reasonable humanity, have reached the unwisely sentimental, and as they are emotional and feel strongly, they make much effect in comparison with their numbers. The almost daily record of heroic behaviour in mine accidents, shipwrecks, fires, etc., gives no support to the accusation of increasing want of courage, for these are not selected men, as soldiers are to some extent. The enormous spread of the daily Press, the ability to buy and the power of reading, now for the first time almost universal among those over twenty, have not produced the evil effects which are obvious

so much as brought them into the light. It is the first result of a little education. The numbers in England are large, and the newspaper shows each person with a fad how many others there are of the same way of thinking, and enables them to join and so make an effect. It is comparatively new, and the almost divine authority of the printed word has still a large influence, though there is some evidence that this particular form of credulity is less strong. It is hardly possible to discount with an approach to truth the disturbing effect to reason and common-sense of the spread of the Press; it came too quickly, and has had the suggestive influence, as pointed out at the beginning of this article, of a vast public meeting. Biology tells us that it takes very many generations to effect a change in innate characteristics; and we need not fear that this is more than a transient phenomenon, though foolish things may be done while it lasts.

Education is in its infancy; we are just beginning to find the rudiments of method and subject. It is difficult even to imagine what would be the effect of a period of real education, of careful character formation and not only mere teaching. We have only now realised the want of it. The results shown by the boys taken as young hooligans from the slums and kept for a few years upon one of the training ships are a revelation as to the effect of a change of environment, which has, too, a lasting influence upon their character.

There is no doubt that the country is passing through a critical time, and there is great risk in the very rapidity with which changes are in progress. The present is an age of freedom of discussion beyond anything hitherto known; nor is it, as has up to now been the case, confined to a comparatively small intellectual class. Religion, monarchy, social questions, politics, marriage, education—everything is open for free debate, so that it is hardly to be wondered at that people's heads are somewhat turned. The very excess of humanity which may produce some foolish legislation is in itself a promising sign, and if only our advancing knowledge of the processes at work in social development is able to keep pace with the desire to act promptly, and so enable the country to weather the rocks ahead, we may confidently look forward to continued progress.

Advanced philosophic thought is more and more tending to show us that the world we know is a world that we ourselves create, that the value and pleasure of it have to be judged by the feelings that we have as human beings, and thus to emphasise the point, the importance of which cannot be overrated, that the responsibility for the future and the direction it will take

depend upon us and our deliberate action in a sense and to a degree that have not hitherto been even contemplated.

We are beginning to realise that we cannot stand aside upon the assumption that the world is fore-ordained to proceed to some particular end, and that it will work out its own salvation in that direction uninfluenced by our efforts. It means that there is upon us the burden of an immense and critical responsibility, but at the same time it shows that the door is open to a more reasonable and practical hope than we have ever had before. Instead of the energy and effort-paralysing view of the world as ordered from without and pursuing relentlessly a course with which, whether we like it or not, we must acquiesce, accepting its evils patiently in view of a happier life to come, we are awakening to the fact that the world, as far as we thinking beings are concerned, is in our power to modify and guide.

If this unavoidable responsibility for the future were widely appreciated, we may well believe that it would have the same stimulating effect in urging us to consider and act for the general welfare, as the feeling that the course of his life and future depends upon his own exertions does to an individual. It would go a long way towards arousing that reasonable and calculating emotion for the State for which Mr. Wallas pleads and which is so obviously necessary to overcome the careless indifference that is the chief danger of democracy.

Can we look for the rise in moral standard in the chance and partial working of the natural elimination of the unfit? The fact that the moral level has risen more quickly in recent times, when the growth of medical and sanitary science and material prosperity has rendered this sort of selection less effective than at any previous period, shows that this is not the only factor. We come back, therefore, to the only means left—our own conscious efforts and the formation of public opinion. The chief means of effecting this lies in the education and formation of habit during the period of growth. The growing moral sense would more and more—as indeed there are signs now—recognise the undesirability of the marriage of the diseased and unfit, and, helped by education and knowledge, form a public opinion strong enough to act as an effective check. We need not fear that in a world where there is no hope of banishing death and but little of avoiding disease and disappointment, there will be too little opportunity of exercising the sterner virtues of patience, courage, and determination. We must expect development to be slow and liable to sudden fluctuations, and as we have the choice so there is the risk that we may never find the path to make the most and best of which human nature is capable.

## ART. XI.—THE POLITICAL SCENE.

THE political scene again invites criticism and remark, for it is now two years since we reviewed it,\* and the position of affairs is suitable for another survey. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman is dead, Mr. Asquith is Prime Minister, and the complexion of the Ministry has personally become more politically youthful. In a large measure the men not only of the present but of the immediate future are in power, and the existence of a new generation of electors is evidenced by the composition of the Cabinet. The Victorian Age has disappeared, and we have permanently entered on the epoch of Edward VII. And now also the Parliament of 1906 has reached its meridian; henceforth, until it constitutionally ceases to exist, it will be in a sense dying. The historian cannot, it is true, yet write the parliamentary history of the past three years, for the picture is still incomplete and parts of the canvas are yet unfilled: But there is ample material for retrospect, and an opportunity for anticipation—some general characteristics are plain, some personal points stand out clearly. Unquestionably in this latter respect the features of this Parliament are already fixed—the large body of Labour Members, for instance, who entered the House amidst the cheers of their followers and the fears of a large body of the public, have proved themselves about as useful as legislators as the bourgeois members whose legislative speed they were to accelerate. A Trades Union Bill and an Eight Hours Bill for coalminers have become law, but it is probable that these two measures would have been placed on the Statute Book if the Labour Members had been only one quarter of their number. Vague fears of Socialism are lessened, public apprehension has disappeared, and it is well that it has, for under our present social conditions the presence of a number of Labour Members at Westminster is alike inevitable and desirable. They represent a huge body of opinion whose ideas must find voice in the House of Commons, and its representatives will have the more weight the more they recognise that, though one of their functions is to safeguard the interests of a class, they are elected to represent first of all the interests of a locality, to take part as its representative in the general business of the House, whilst at the same time they advocate, when opportunity offers, the reasonable demands of the artisan.

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\* Political Parties and the Country, April 1907.

At the present time it is evident that the House of which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was in its beginning the leader will endure for about a normal period, and will come to an end in 1910 or 1911 under the leadership of Mr. Asquith. So much appears certain, because with the immense majority behind the Prime Minister he is secure from any of those political changes and chances which rendered the continuity of more than one Victorian Ministry precarious and unstable. That majority may sometimes be restless, but a majority of such dimensions could render harmless even caves of Adullam. Mere restlessness cannot affect the fate of the Cabinet. Therefore unless a positive bolt from the blue were suddenly to descend on the political world one factor of the present situation is obvious—that this Parliament will expire at the end of a purely normal period.

This fact is one of some constitutional importance and interest, and should make those who adversely criticise the English party system, with its obvious defects, pause in their comment. The bane of parliamentary institutions in France, and in every other country where there is any similarity with the parliamentary system of this country, is uncertainty in the life of administrations, the want of stability in parliamentary majorities, the too great influence of personal factors on party. But the Liberal majority will clearly remain—allowing for some slight movements and changes—the same strong force that it was in the first session of 1906. From the point of view of administration and of non-contentious legislation this stability is an immense national advantage. Efficient administration, however able may be the permanent officials, is difficult if parliamentary chiefs change rapidly, and if general lines of policy are subject to interruption and alteration. It is therefore clearly in the interest of the nation that Parliament should exist for its normal period, unless it is obviously out of touch with national feeling. Administratively and constitutionally, therefore, it was desirable that a premature dissolution should not take place. Whatever views, for example, may be held of Mr. Haldane's Army reforms, could anything have been more unfortunate for the country than that the man who watched over their conception should not have guided their fulfilment? Or that Mr. Burns, with his strong common-sense and sympathy with the workmen and artisans of Great Britain, should not have had ample time to carry out his administrative measures? Unquestionably, therefore, Mr. Asquith has done good service to the country by refraining from at once taking up the several challenges of the House of Lords to appeal to the country. In this particular phase of his policy the Prime

Minister has not only shown sagacity, he has also undoubtedly acted in a thoroughly constitutional manner. The fate of Ministers is in the hands of the House of Commons, representing, as that House does, the will of the people. Apart altogether from the administrative and political instability which would result if each House of Parliament were capable of causing an appeal to the country, it would be opposed to every constitutional principle which in arduous and trying years has been engrafted on the political constitution, if a Prime Minister with a strong majority at his back were to appeal to the people against a decision, not of the House by whose will his Ministry exists, but of a branch of the legislature which has not placed him in power. No statesman of modern times had more sagacity and a clearer knowledge of constitutional usages than Lord Melbourne, and he would never admit the right of the peers to force a Ministry to dissolve. When in 1839 Lord Roden carried a motion in the House of Lords for a select committee to enquire into the state of Ireland, Lord Melbourne replied by obtaining a vote of the Commons in his favour. At that time he wrote to the Queen: 'It is impossible to acquiesce in the vote of last night in the House of Lords. It would not be justifiable to resign in the face of the declaration that I made in the year 1836 in the House of Lords, that I would maintain my post as long as I possessed the confidence of the Crown and of the House of Commons, particularly as there is no reason to suppose that we have lost the confidence of the House' ('Letters of Queen Victoria'—Lord Melbourne to the Queen, 22 March, 1839). The refusal of the Prime Minister to appeal to the country against the action of the House of Lords in throwing out the Licensing Bill of last session, and the other measures whose fate has been sealed in that assembly, has made the constitutional position more fixed, for it could not be more clear. Time will show to what extent the peers are interpreters of the feelings and opinions of the nation at large, but at any rate we trust that the last has been heard of that strange anti-constitutional demand—remarkable as emanating from the party whose welfare is so bound up with the conservative instincts of the people—that a non-elective and hereditary chamber should usurp the functions of the Commons in regard to resignation or dissolution.

What will be the gain or loss from a purely party point of view of the determination of the Prime Minister to postpone a dissolution it is not our intention to consider at length. But it can scarcely be doubted that the failure of the Cabinet to put an end to the conflict in regard to religious education is not



one which will weaken them with their Nonconformist supporters. The embers of educational strife still smoulder: the entente between the Church and Nonconformity on this subject which arose for a time last year, and to some extent still continues, may cease at any moment. Now and again a flame springs up sufficient to show that very little would reproduce the lamentable and active strife which until last autumn has been so long in existence. The *odium theologicum* is at the bottom of it, and it is the despair of genuine educationalists and moderate-minded men. Meanwhile the extinction of the non-provided schools goes on slowly but none the less surely, so that every month in some respects weakens the power of the militant Church party. For it must be borne in mind that in every parish in which such a school is extinguished there is extinguished also a Church ally, because, so far as the particular district is concerned, there is no more to be gained by a continuation of the conflict. And indeed, as in the minds of many the *raison d'être* for the continuance of the old voluntary schools was the opportunity which they afforded of an escape from the payment of an education rate, the interest of a large number of electors in opposing provided schools has now ceased, since, provided or non-provided, they have to be paid for out of the county rates. But the grievance of the Nonconformists being in a great degree sentimental, it will remain strong until the two sets of schools are placed on the same footing. Thus from the point of view of a party struggle the continued existence of the religious question in regard to elementary schools is not one which, on the whole, can be considered to be favourable to the Opposition.

It is equally clear that, though the Licensing Bill of last session alarmed a not insignificant or unimportant body of middle-class electors—though they were probably neither as numerous or as influential as they seemed—who were holders of debentures and shares in brewery companies, and also a body of traders, yet that on the other hand the opposition of the brewers is regarded with dislike by a large number of disinterested persons who are fully aware of the injury done to the community by some of the traffic in alcoholic liquors. So that the gain to the Opposition by the antagonism of the brewery interest and its supporters to Mr. Asquith's Government will be counterbalanced by the strong temperance feeling which is so marked a feature of the social life of to-day. Yet the opinion of the country is at the present time more difficult to gauge than was the case during the late reign. The daily Press does not indicate the feeling of the mass of the electorate; though widely read, its influence is less. The tendency of the

Press to give as much attention as possible to news, to discuss events shortly and smartly, though it may be desirable from the point of view of business, tends to lessen the weight of the Press as a moulder of public opinion, just as it makes the enunciation of views on political subjects less valuable as an indication of popular feeling. And the increase in the weight of the provincial Press renders it also more difficult to formulate any view from a survey of the entire Press. More volatile and more emotional than of yore, the electorate is less stable, more influenced by an event of the moment, more capable of forgetfulness. An occurrence, sudden and unforeseen, may have an unexpected and powerful influence on a general election, whilst the increase also in the size of the electorate, the diffusion of education among the middle and working classes, are factors very disturbing to the political meteorologist.

Again, it is easy to exaggerate the effect of the legislative activity of a Liberal Ministry on the country as a whole, for it is inevitable that if such a Ministry is to satisfy the majority of its supporters it should initiate measures of change. This is the very *raison d'être* of its being. 'We have not been an idle Government,' said Mr. Gladstone of his famous administration of 1868, which disestablished the Irish Church, reformed the Army by abolishing purchase, and laid the foundation of a national system of education. The purpose, therefore, for which it is placed in power cannot be attained unless its policy is progressive; it must not be legislatively idle, and such a policy is sure to alarm a certain number of the electorate, and in due time its progressive force must necessarily be expended, which is the force on which it lives. But it is not those whom in the first instance it alarms who constitute a danger. True it is that this number is sure to make itself heard; each one of it becomes a person with a grievance, and we all know that a man with a grievance is generally audible. The Conservative elector who is alarmed for his pocket will often make a greater commotion than his grievances warrant. Mr. Gladstone was a positive *bête noire* to a large number of worthy Tories, it was difficult to find words bad enough for him, yet Mr. Gladstone was before 1886 more powerful in the country as a whole than any statesman before or since. It therefore by no means follows that the sequel to an active ministerial existence will be the return of Mr. Balfour to power in the near future, though it is well to bear in mind the shrewd remark of the first Lord Halifax: 'The feelings of those who suffer from the removal of abuses are always stronger than those of the general public who are benefited.'

After a long period of Conservative administration, such as preceded the general election of 1906, the actions of a Liberal Cabinet were sure to provoke opposition among a number of persons, to cause a stir new to a vast number of present-day electors, so long had the Tories been in power. It is easy, therefore, to overrate the importance and the weight of expressions of alarm and discontent. There is, in fact, no strong evidence that the country as a whole is hostile to Mr. Asquith's Government, or that it has any desire to place the Opposition in power. It would have been extraordinary if the popular wave of antagonism to Mr. Balfour's Ministry which was shown in 1906 had continued at the same high level. Tory candidates were certain to win some by-elections, which afford a fine opportunity to those who may be hostile to some 'plank' in the party programme to show their love of the party without violating their political conscience. Against Liberal losses may well be set such an election as that at Taunton in February, when in a quiet West Country town an avowed Socialist was able to poll a large number of votes. The seat was retained for the Unionist party, but the election, so far from showing any advance in Unionist feeling, indicated, if it indicated anything, that the feeling of the constituency was on the whole hostile to that party, because there must have been a number of voters, not Unionists, who would not have supported a Socialist candidate. One swallow does not make a summer, and we take this election, as well as the Scotch elections in March last, merely as one piece of evidence that on the whole the feeling of the country has not undergone any large or vital change since the beginning of 1906. And why should it? An ideal, a perfect administration has never yet existed, mistakes alike of policy, of legislation, and of administration are inevitable in every Cabinet. Many of the most long-lived Governments have made blunders, but in such instances the country has not had sufficient confidence in the Opposition to place it in power.

But as no administration is perfect, can it be said that the present one is now undeserving of the confidence of the country? Writing two years ago we said of the present Government: 'In their general conduct of affairs there has yet been 'little which the country is prepared to condemn,' and, again, 'on the whole, therefore, we see little reason for thinking that 'the actual conduct of affairs by the present Ministry has 'disappointed reasonable expectations.' Is there any reason to modify these statements in consequence of events during the intervening two years? We think not; for if we look over the legislative and administrative field we find, on the one side,

that a number of useful measures have become law—we may instance the Small Holdings Act of last session as a good example of progressive legislation—and on the other that unquestionable administrative capacity has been shown.

Foreign affairs were discussed in a recent number of this Review, and therefore it is sufficient to say that the foreign policy of the Cabinet—because, however much may be owing to Sir Edward Grey, the credit of his work must go to the general credit of the administration to which he belongs—has been justified out of the mouths of its opponents. Time was when violent party conflicts occurred over questions of foreign policy, when the fate of Cabinets was decided by the result of divisions on such a matter as was in issue in the memorable Don Pacifico debate of 1850. Whether those days have gone never to return may be doubted, but for the time being there is a tendency to treat questions of foreign policy as in some degree at least outside the party arena. Certainly there are now sufficient questions of parliamentary and public conflict without bringing in the foreign policy of an administration, but, whether this be so or not, this absence of partisan heat makes for stable government, and if things go well it places certain items, so to speak, on the credit side of the party ledger.

It is certainly to be regretted that questions of naval administration cannot be placed on the same footing for the purposes of parliamentary discussion as foreign affairs—criticism and the expression of opinion are necessary, but after them the responsibility must rest with the Government, if neither the one nor the other produce a change in formulated plans. A party debate in Parliament is forthwith removed to the platform, and if the subject of such a discussion is one of administration each side is hampered in the future by declarations on matters of administrative detail. No doubt as regards the administration of the Navy the speeches of the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty on the Naval Estimates last month stirred the feeling of the country in a remarkable manner, producing in fact what is popularly termed a 'scare,' at any rate in the Press, though we doubt whether the country was disturbed to the extent that the newspapers indicate. For after all the average Briton has a way of keeping his head which a Press, anxious for sensationalism, has not yet wholly destroyed. Mr. Asquith admitted that his naval advisers had been wrong in regard to the rapidity with which the German Government could construct battleships of the *Dreadnought* type, and that consequently this country would not presently hold such pre-eminence in this type of war-vessel as had been contemplated

when the Navy Estimates were discussed last year. If it is worth while to spend millions on a Navy, it goes without saying that it must be on a Navy which will—as far as ships can—give complete security to Great Britain in time of war; in other words, it must be sufficient for offensive and defensive purposes. But we deprecate the present tendency to estimate sea-power by the number of a particular, if very powerful, class of battleships. Such vessels are at present no doubt from a technical point of view of the first importance, and a Government which neglected to keep this country up to the mark in this respect would fail in its administrative duty. But sea-power does not rest only on particular types of battleships at particular moments, or on the numerical superiority of one fleet over another. 'Consequences momentous and stupendous were yet to flow from the decisive supremacy of Great Britain's sea-power, the establishment of which beyond all question or competition was Nelson's great achievement; but his part was done when Trafalgar was fought.' It is well to recall Admiral Mahan's pregnant words, because it would appear that both the House of Commons and the country are inclined to forget other factors—personal and geographical—which must come into play in a naval contest. The sea-power of Great Britain cannot fall from the standard on which it was placed by Nelson and his comrades merely because the number of one class of battleships is less at a given moment than some experts think desirable, and it is pitiful to find that public opinion appears to place reliance so much on one element only of sea-power. As soon as the naval advisers of the Government ascertained that the data on which their programme of ship-building was based were altered, the administration appears to have taken reasonable and business-like steps to meet the need which was apparent. To expend money as if the country were on the brink of war, and without regard to the satisfactory character of our foreign relations, would have been imprudent. Germany with her restless foreign policy has only herself to thank if other nations are unquiet and suspicious, but in regard to her war fleet it must always be borne in mind that her mercantile fleet has in the last few years immensely increased, and that an increase in a commercial navy postulates an increase in a war navy to guard it. It seems also to be overlooked that an increase in the naval power of Germany necessarily gives her more weight in relation to such maritime powers as France and Italy; in other words, it is not necessary to consider each addition to the German Fleet solely as a menace to English sea-power. At present, as Sir Edward Grey conclusively showed in the debate on the vote of censure on March 29, our

relations with Germany are entirely satisfactory, and Mr. Balfour also admitted that he could not descry a cloud in the sky. A fair-minded critic cannot consider that the Government has shown itself either supine or negligent in regard to the Navy; it has not hesitated—contrary to the feelings and wishes of a considerable body of its supporters—to ask the House of Commons for an increase in the Naval Vote; it has dealt frankly with the country, and it has been prudent without panic.

If our view is carried to that part of the scene whereon Colonial questions are visible, here again not only is there nothing open to criticism but, on the contrary, the South African question—the most troublesome for many a long year—appears to have entered upon a period of tranquillity and, it may be hoped, of renewed prosperity; and here again the policy of the Government has received the commendation of the Opposition. The administration of the Army raises a more debateable subject, but there is a general consensus of public opinion that Mr. Haldane's schemes should be allowed a fair trial. It cannot be said that they are viewed with hostility in any quarter, though there are many who are not convinced that they will be successful. If Mr. Burns at the Local Government Board has been regarded by some as not sufficiently sympathetic towards the demands of the unemployed, his common-sense and shrewdness have undoubtedly impressed the country at large. So that, if there were a general election to-morrow, over a large extent of the scene of administration it would be difficult to find ground for adverse criticism, whilst in some respects—as in regard to Lord Morley's Indian policy—the country is thoroughly cordial. A man of letters is primarily not as well fitted to be a political administrator as a man of affairs, for the habits of the student are not such as tend to capacity in the office. But there can be no doubt that Lord Morley has not only shown himself a great statesman, he has also, much to the benefit of his party, been able to impress his countrymen by his speeches on India inside and outside the Houses of Parliament. It is truly enough said by a recent American student of our institutions that English opinion is now more and more governed by the platform—and by the platform we should include important speeches in either House—that is to say, speeches which are read outside Westminster. Few educated persons can have failed to read those delivered by Lord Morley on India, and everything which he has said has impressed his countrymen. The author of the monographs on *Voltaire* and *Rousseau* is recognised as the ablest Indian Secretary of modern times.

To a considerable extent the exact opposite must be said of Mr. Birrell. It is true that last session he successfully piloted his University Bill through the House of Commons and inaugurated thereby a new university system in Ireland. He will doubtless receive due credit for this in the pages of the future historian. An English elector, however, knows little and cares less about the subject. But the administration of the law he thinks he understands, the tyranny of cattle-driving and of boycotting is alien to his own law-abiding nature, to his habit of public expression in a newspaper or on a platform of his grievances. In the debate in the House of Commons on February 23 Mr. Birrell read a long report from the police on the condition of several Irish counties. We take Roscommon as an example, not because it is better or worse than other counties, but because it seems to be a fair average example.

‘Roscommon.—No change in the general condition of the county, the leaders in the agitation being inactive at present; 1 person under constant protection and 7 by patrols; 2 outrages; combinations against the payment of rent exist on some 6 estates; cattle-driving in abeyance at present; no change of condition of boycotted person; some cases of intimidation.’

This report shows us a very disorganised state of society. There may be half a dozen murders or robberies committed in a town, but it does not necessarily imply a general disorganisation, a state of illegality. But in the above extract we find one person under constant protection and seven by patrols, and it is further significantly stated that the leaders in the agitation are inactive at present. This is a state of affairs which demands a strong yet a reasonable administrator. Mr. Birrell treated it from a different point of view. He admitted that the police had important duties to perform and great difficulties to contend with, but his tone was to a large extent apologetic. ‘There are causes of disturbance in the land question in Ireland, and as long as that is the case boycotting will be resorted to in some parts of the country.’ But is boycotting a necessary sequel of local dissatisfaction in regard to the land question, which it is clear is in process of gradual solution by the transfer of the ownership of farms from landlords to tenants?

It should be the aim of the Chief Secretary to prevent this sequel, not to regard it as a physician may some physical result of a disease which medical science cannot prevent. To criticise administrative acts or omissions which must largely depend on innumerable questions of detail is impossible. An omission here affords grounds for a party attack, something done there a basis

for a party defence. But the impression which a reasonable reader will gather from Mr. Birrell's speeches is that he has regarded the gravity of the state of Ireland too lightly, that more might have been done to prevent outrages by proceedings against the leaders. 'Never was I more in doubt in my life as to whether or not I should institute prosecutions against that 'honourable member' (Mr. Ginnell). However, Mr. Birrell did not prosecute him and the High Court of Justice did. But this hesitation to strike at leaders appears to show in Mr. Birrell a tendency to mingle administration and diplomacy, when the main object should be to obtain respect for the law. That the Irish Constabulary have performed their duties, as they always have done, with strenuousness we cannot doubt, but we do doubt if the head of the Irish administration has shown sufficient vigour, or sufficient appreciation of the importance of upholding respect for the law in Ireland.

In the article of two years ago to which we have already referred there occurred in regard to the subject of Ireland the following words: 'those who supported the present Ministry at the general election on the great fiscal issue are not prepared to acquiesce in the utilising of their assistance for the purpose of furthering the Home Rule projects of a party which it was authoritatively declared would not in the new Parliament forward the Home Rule policy.' It is clear that, so far as this Parliament is concerned, all danger of Home Rule is gone. The Government Bill to alter the administration of Ireland has been rejected. With this subject, however, we dealt in a previous number,\* and it is only touched on here because it appears to be clear that, though no doubt Home Rule will still continue to figure in some election addresses, it is no longer a serious political issue. The English people have made up their minds on the subject, and it is little likely that, as long as Mr. Asquith leads the Liberal party, anything more than purely constitutional measures to improve the condition and the administration of Ireland will be brought forward.

At the present moment, if this view be right, it is of the first importance that Unionists who are Free Traders should be prepared with the utmost energy to protect and to forward the Free Trade cause, for the fiscal question is much more the main issue of the time than is Home Rule. When any measure contrary to the principles and views which have been advocated steadfastly in this Review is laid before the country in definite terms and as a serious legislative project, then will be the time

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\* Ireland—a Nation, July 1907.



to show adherence to the Unionist principles which have had so vital an effect on the question of Home Rule. But in the meantime it would be at once unpatriotic and unpractical to weaken the cause of Free Trade by an academic adherence to principles which for the time are clearly not in danger.

We have already briefly referred to the action of the House of Lords with regard to the Education and the Licensing Bills. The question of the Reform of that House is not one which can be dealt with in a brief survey of the political situation at a given moment. Some years ago\* we expressed our views on the necessity of a reform of that chamber, and it has itself, by its recent report, shown the desirability of radical changes. But there is a vital difference between changes in the composition of what must always be to a considerable degree a conservative-minded assembly and a diminution of its legislative power. 'The social prestige of the aristocracy is immensely less than it was a hundred years or even fifty years since,' wrote Mr. Bagehot more than thirty years ago; it is now certainly still less, and Unionists as well as Liberals are agreed that changes in its *personnel* are inevitable. But is the country prepared to diminish the actual power of the peers? This question may be called in speeches on the platform the dominant issue of the time, but it will not become such until the peers are brought into acute conflict with the democracy, and therefore we see no likelihood of any such change until the issue has been decided by a general election in which this shall be the great, the true issue. Until the fiscal question is decided the House of Lords is safe, for the country cares at present far more about the means of livelihood and its methods of business than about the constitutional position of the Upper House in relation to the legislation of the Commons.

The intention of the Government to introduce during this session a Bill for the Disestablishment of the Church in Wales must obviously be regarded in connexion with the position of the House of Lords—for nothing can be more certain than that such a measure will not pass a second reading in that assembly. Such a Bill is without doubt eagerly demanded by the majority of the people of Wales, and, having regard to the tendency of public opinion to give more and more power to localities, to foster the spirit of local independence within the Empire, and at the same time to bring all its parts into closer harmony, that demand has greater weight than it has ever yet possessed. Those who preach the doctrine of what is called Imperialism do not

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\* The House of Lords, October 1893.

always see accurately whither it may carry them, for the closer the Colonies are brought into connexion constitutionally with the Mother Country so as to make them integral parts of one immense empire, the stronger become the claims of any part of that empire, even though they now are parts of the United Kingdom, for what may be termed separate treatment. The importance, therefore, of the second reading of the Welsh Church Bill will be in the evidence it will give that the demands of Wales have received the approval of a Parliament which for many years is the first to represent the Liberal opinion of the country. Obviously, should another Liberal Government follow on the next general election, a Welsh Church Bill must, if a second reading be carried in the Commons this year, form one of the first parts of its policy, and might very well be also the cause of a constitutional conflict between the two Houses of Parliament.

Shortly after the present number of this Review is in the hands of our readers they will also have had an opportunity of considering the Budget of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Upon this financial statement it is probable that the credit of Mr. Asquith's administration will largely depend, because the most important of his social measures—the Old Age Pension Act—is inextricably bound up with the finances of the country. Many things, both in public and private life, are desirable, but for their fulfilment money is required. In a great degree the justification for the above measure will depend on the manner in which the demands which it makes on the Treasury are justified. Emotional appeals, either to the House of Commons or to the country, will not justify it unless it can be worked without undue pressure on the country as a whole. That this change will in any way impair thrift we do not believe, and unquestionably it is an untold boon to a vast number of worthy and respectable people who have never been able to save sufficient for their old age. But sympathy for the aged and deserving poor will not be considered an excuse for rash finance.

But the moment that the question of national finance is brought up we are in contact with the remarkable phenomenon that the Unionist party has returned to the policy which was so thoroughly condemned by the country in the first half of last century. The Unionist party is now frankly Protectionist. There are, both among members of Parliament and non-parliamentary members of the party, a number of Free Traders, but the Unionist party as a whole is now Protectionist, and at the next election the country will have to decide whether it will give up the system of Free Trade under which it has for so many years prospered or return to Protection united to an

increasing power of Trusts. That the electorate is in a position to make up its mind there can be no doubt. Discussions on the subject have become a part of the nation's daily life; men who have almost gloried in stating that they are not politicians have argued, and will continue to argue, over a question which touches alike their homes and their business. Indeed, in our political history there has never been a subject which has so fixed the attention of the country. But in this discussion the position of the Liberal Ministry and its Free Trade supporters is clear and unambiguous—that of the Opposition is obscure and uncertain. Appeals to self-interest, to so-called Imperial feelings, to economic doctrines—appeals destructive sometimes of one another, generally antagonistic, characterise the speeches of the Opposition, portending, should Mr. Balfour return to power within the next two or three years, a remarkable clashing of opinions and interests. In former times the utterances of the Protectionist party were marked by the most complete sincerity, but it is a characteristic of the present Opposition that it is insincere. The Duke of Wellington and Lord George Bentinck desired to protect the agricultural interest by a duty on corn; there was a straightforward position—they were frankly Protectionist. But to-day the Opposition tries to run with the hare and to hunt with the hounds, to make out that the consumer will not be injured, and that the producer will also benefit, to hide an old policy under a new name. Whether the country will be deluded by these statements remains to be seen. The leader of the Unionists, too, is as obscure as the meaning of his speeches, and it is doubtful if the nation will consent to entrust its interests on such a subject to a statesman who continues to play so ambiguous a part. Lord John Russell's celebrated Edinburgh letter of 1845 was one of the frankest political party calls which were ever made, and if we examine history we shall find that to lead a party to victory a clear policy is necessary. This is one of the elements of strength of the Government, whilst its absence is one of the weaknesses of the Opposition. Nor should it be overlooked that the personal capacity of the Government as a whole is a long way above that of the Opposition. Men like Mr. Lloyd-George and Mr. Winston Churchill may not always satisfy a fastidious taste, but they have considerable influence over popular audiences and popular imagination. Can anyone be found on the side of the Opposition who has the same gift? Personal factors cannot be kept altogether out of consideration, and during the last three years in the House of Commons it cannot be said that there has been any marked ability

shown in the debates of that House by the Opposition, or, though some papers and periodicals may seem to suggest it, that there is any unseen parliamentary talent—even among that melodramatic body known as ‘the Confederates’—capable of forming a strong administration. Such talent as the Opposition possesses does not appear to blush unseen, or, when exhibiting itself, to be of any sterling quality.

The result, then, of a survey of the political scene seems to show that, though the Liberal Government may have made mistakes, it has carried out the mandate of the country as delivered to it in February 1906, it has administered the affairs of the nation with efficiency, it has placed some memorable laws—tending to the national welfare—on the Statute Book, and it has shown a large measure of personal ability. An administration may not be strong enough to continue in office if an Opposition is even more powerful; but an administration which, though it has committed faults, has vitality and strength, may be more than a match for an Opposition with an obscure and experimental policy and an ambiguous leader. Liberals and Peelites, ‘all Free Trade Conservatives,’ were able to prevent a return to Protection after 1846; is it likely then that in our time the Liberal party and the Unionist Free Traders, who number men as patriotic and as earnest as those who followed Sir Robert Peel, will not be able to safeguard the policy which is the enduring glory of that Conservative statesman?

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